[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
TERRORIST GROUPS IN LATIN AMERICA:
THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 4, 2014
__________
Serial No. 113-121
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DANA ROHRABACHER, California Samoa
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio BRAD SHERMAN, California
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
TED POE, Texas GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MATT SALMON, Arizona THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina KAREN BASS, California
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
MO BROOKS, Alabama DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
TOM COTTON, Arkansas ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
PAUL COOK, California JUAN VARGAS, California
GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania AMI BERA, California
STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
RON DeSANTIS, Florida GRACE MENG, New York
DOUG COLLINS, Georgia LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
TED S. YOHO, Florida JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
LUKE MESSER, Indiana
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
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Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade
TED POE, Texas, Chairman
JOE WILSON, South Carolina BRAD SHERMAN, California
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
MO BROOKS, Alabama JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
TOM COTTON, Arkansas JUAN VARGAS, California
PAUL COOK, California BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III,
TED S. YOHO, Florida Massachusetts
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
Gino Costa, Ph.D., president, Ciudad Nuestra (appearing via
teleconference)................................................ 5
Ms. Celina B. Realuyo, William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric
Defense Studies, professor of practice of National Security
Affairs, National Defense University........................... 13
Mr. Douglas Farah, senior associate, Americas Program, Center for
Strategic and International Studies............................ 27
Mr. Michael Shifter, president, Inter-American Dialogue.......... 59
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
Gino Costa, Ph.D.: Prepared statement............................ 7
Ms. Celina B. Realuyo: Prepared statement........................ 16
Mr. Douglas Farah: Prepared statement............................ 30
Mr. Michael Shifter: Prepared statement.......................... 61
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 76
Hearing minutes.................................................. 77
TERRORIST GROUPS IN LATIN AMERICA:
THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE
----------
TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 4, 2014
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 o'clock
p.m., in room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ted Poe
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Poe. The committee will come to order.
Without objection, all members may have 5 days to submit
statements, questions, extraneous materials for the record,
subject to the length limitation of the rules.
Transnational criminal and terrorist groups in Latin
America are a threat to the United States national security.
Some of the main players on this battlefield are FARC in
Colombia, and Shining Path in Peru, and even Hezbollah. The DEA
has solid evidence showing stronger ties between FARC and
Hezbollah.
Hezbollah operative Ayman Joumaa smuggled over 90,000 tons
of cocaine into America and laundered over $250 million for the
cartels. Jamal Yousef, also a Hezbollah agent, agreed to
provide military grade weapons to FARC in exchange for hundreds
of kilograms of cocaine.
Hezbollah and FARC maintain an operational alliance, much
of which occurs under the protection of the Venezuelan regime.
Other illicit Hezbollah activity occurs in the dangerous tri-
border area. The activities of these groups include drug
trafficking, money laundering, human trafficking, and weapons
shipments.
In Peru, Shining Path is the main terrorist organization.
Shining Path recruits children to participate in the drug
activity, also forcing them to fight on the front lines. We
have seen progress, however, in the fight against Shining Path.
U.S. assistance was critical to kicking them out of an area
called San Martin. Our assistance helped eradicate cocaine
crops, give farmers alternative crops to plant, and take out
leaders of Shining Path.
This past August, two of the group's top leaders were
killed. I had the opportunity to go to San Martin last fall. I
saw Peruvians working in the heat of the day pulling up one by
one the cocaine crops. They were trying to make their country a
safer place.
I also visited a farm that stopping growing cocaine. The
matriarch was a strong-willed woman whose husband was killed by
drug violence. When this happened, she decided she had seen
enough, and now she grows some of the best quality chocolate in
the world. Ten years ago, even the Peruvian Government could
not set foot in the region. Today Shining Path is nowhere to be
found, and it is known as the San Martin Miracle.
The war is not won. Up to 500 members of the Shining Path
are holding on in a hard region known as VRAEM. More than 50
percent of all cocaine produced in Peru comes from this region.
There are few roads that go in and out of the rugged terrain,
but drug traffickers fly about six flights a day out of VRAEM
into neighboring countries.
President Humala has doubled down on the taking out of
Shining Path. For the first time in its history, the Government
of Peru is now spending its own money on drug eradication, and
now President Humala is preparing to go into VRAEM and smoke
these bandits out.
Now is not the time, when we have the Shining Path on the
run, for the United States to stop its help. We need to help
Peru finish this job. In Colombia, the FARC is the main enemy.
Thanks in part to over $100 million of U.S. assistance and
training the FARC has never been weaker. FARC went from 20,000
members in 2004 to 7,000 today, but FARC is still a serious
threat.
No longer able to execute large and high profile attacks,
they are going back to their guerrilla warfare. They have
increased small scale attacks on the military and government
workers in the last 2 years. They are getting more involved in
the drug trade. Some say they are even morphing into their own
criminal organization.
The Colombian Government is negotiating with FARC as we
speak. So far, the two sides have tentatively agreed on what
political participation would look like in some of the rural
development and land reform.
Now the ball is in FARC's court to see if the talks are
going to progress. FARC has to decide if it is willing to give
up its weapons and change their criminal behavior. It is not
clear if these negotiations are going to work. Any deal is not
necessarily a good deal. FARC senior leaders might enjoy a
deal, but the foot soldiers won't benefit much. If that
happens, there is a chance that the lower ranks will fracture
and form their own separate criminal or terrorist
organizations, and the problem may only grow.
We have seen progress in both Colombia and Peru, and I want
to know from our witnesses what lessons we can learn from this
progress and how we can help fight other terrorist
organizations. It remains to be seen if this progress can be
sustained. We have not yet achieved victory against these two
groups, and I look forward to hearing what our witnesses think
U.S. policy should be going forward to make sure we can finish
the job.
I will now turn over for his opening statement the ranking
member, Mr. Sherman from California.
Mr. Sherman. Thank you, Judge, for holding these hearings.
We will focus particularly on Colombia and Peru, which have
struggled with insurgencies for decades. These conflicts have a
long and complicated history. Additionally, the neighboring
states and various non-state actors have used the region as a
battleground and as a base to advance their interests.
I want our witnesses to particularly focus on three
things--the involvement of Hezbollah, the exportation of drugs,
and human trafficking.
The insurgent activity in Peru has been reduced in strength
and territory from its peak in the 1980s and the 1990s. Current
assessments of the insurgency known as Shining Path consist of
only a few hundred armed members. At one point, this insurgency
had at least 5,000 armed fighters.
Shining Path operations have been mostly limited to the
most remote rural areas, and Shining Path is a militant
movement founded by a former university professor who is now in
prison. Its goal was to destroy the Peruvian Government and
replace it with a revolutionary peasant authority using Mao-
style guerilla warfare.
Engaging in massacres and assassinations, Shining Path
posed a threat to the Peruvian Government and institutions at
the height of its activity. The conflict led to 70,000 deaths,
most of whom were civilians. Alberto Fujimori, then President,
led a counterinsurgency campaign that improved national
security, but according to many human rights groups came at the
cost of many human rights violations.
Shining Path began a minor resurgence in 2001. It currently
has two competing factions constituting a low level threat in
certain mountainous and hard-to-reach Andean regions. There was
a split over whether or not to pursue a peace process, with one
faction expressing interest in those negotiations.
According to the State Department's most recent country
report on terrorism, Shining Path committed 87 acts of
terrorism in 2012 killing 1 civilian and 13 members of the
military, 5 police officers, for a total of 19 people.
Turning to Colombia, the State Department's annual report--
annual Country Reports on Terrorism in 2012, which was issued
in May of last year, indicates that the majority of terrorist
acts in Latin America were perpetrated by the FARC--one
organization, the majority of terrorist acts on the entire
continent, in fact the entire region.
FARC is a group of mostly rural insurgents who, since the
organization's founding in 1964, have sought to overthrow the
Colombian Government. FARC grew steadily over the decades and
drew resources from drug trafficking, extortion, other illicit
activities. The FARC portrays itself as a struggle against the
Colombia systematic inequality. The FARC was declared to be a
foreign terrorist organization by the United States in 1997,
and in that same year so was the Shining Path of Peru. Both are
still listed.
It is believed that at its high point in the early 2000s
FARC had approximately 16,000, even 20,000 troops. It is now
down to about half that strength. Reports indicate that some
220,000 people have died in the course of Colombia's conflict,
and of course the vast majority of those were civilians.
The war with FARC entered a very different phase over the
course of the implementation of Plan Colombia. The United
States appropriated over $9 billion this century to carry out
that plan. I know our witnesses will assess for us the impact
of that aid.
Under Plan Colombia and its subsequent strategies, the
country has made considerable progress in combatting drug
trafficking and insurgent activities. However, here again we
hear human rights groups citing elements with the Colombian
military, working with right wing paramilitary forces, and
abusing human rights.
There have of course been tensions with Colombia's
neighbors, most especially Venezuela, but there also has been
FARC operations in Ecuador, Panama, and Peru. And I look
forward to learning more from our witnesses, and I yield back.
Mr. Poe. I thank the ranking member. Without objection, all
of the witnesses' prepared statements will be made part of the
record, and I will ask that each witness keep their
presentation to 5 minutes.
I will introduce all four witnesses, and then we will hear
from our first witness. Dr. Gino Costa is the head of the
Ciudad Nuestra, an NGO specializing in citizen security and
police reform. Prior to that he worked in the U.N. Center for
Human Rights in Geneva and the U.N. Mission to Nicaragua,
Honduras, and El Salvador. He served as executive secretary of
the Ad Hoc Pardons Commission set up by the Peruvian Government
in 1996 to review terrorism conviction and was Deputy Ombudsman
for Human Rights from '97 to 2000.
Ms. Celina Realuyo--is that right? Close enough? Is
professor of practice at the William J. Perry Center for
Hemispheric Defense Studies at the National Defense University
where she focuses on U.S. national security, illicit networks,
transnational organized crime, counterterrorism, and threat
finance issues in the Americas. She is a former U.S. diplomat,
international banker with Goldman Sachs, and a U.S. foreign
policy advisor under the Clinton and Bush administrations.
Mr. Douglas Farah is the senior non-resident associate of
the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies. Since January 2005, he has also been the
president of the IBI Consultants. His focus is on the
transnational criminal organizations, terrorism, and their
effects on states and corruption with a focus on the Western
Hemisphere. And he serves as consultant to several U.S.
Government departments, agencies, combatant commands, and
leading academic centers in the United States and overseas.
Mr. Michael Shifter is the president of the Inter-American
Dialogue. Since '93, he has been adjunct professor of Latin
American Politics at Georgetown University School of Foreign
Service. Before joining the Dialogue, he directed the Latin
American and Caribbean Program at the National Endowment for
Democracy and the Ford Foundation Governance and Human Rights
Program in the Andean region in Southern Cone.
Dr. Costa will give his opening statement, and we will
proceed directly to members' questions from him. We will then
end the video conference with him and hear from our remaining
witnesses.
Dr. Costa, thank you for joining us from Peru. Thank you
also for waiting some time. And you may now give us your
statement, and then we will go directly to questions from the
panel, and then hear testimony from our other three witnesses.
STATEMENT OF GINO COSTA, PH.D., PRESIDENT, CIUDAD NUESTRA
(APPEARING VIA TELECONFERENCE)
Mr. Costa. Chairman Poe, Ranking Member Sherman, and
members of the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and
Trade, I very much appreciate the opportunity to appear before
you today.
In 1992, 12 years after the beginning of the armed
conflict, the most important leaders of the Shining Path and
the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement were captured by the
police, and their military forces were almost completely
dismantled. Since then, the leaders of both groups have been in
prison and military actions have almost disappeared.
This victory was the result of excellent police
intelligence in urban areas and an alliance between the armed
forces and rural peasants in the countryside. Holdovers from
the Shining Path retreated to mountainous, inhospitable, and
inaccessible areas located in the coca-growing regions of the
VRAEM and the Upper Huallaga valleys, where they engaged in
sporadic actions to obstruct efforts by the security forces to
eradicate illicit crops and fight drug trafficking.
In February 2012, 20 years later, Comrade Artemio, the
Shining Path leader in the Huallaga Valley, was detained by the
police. Thus, one of the two armed holdovers of the Shining
Path was effectively dismantled. Artemio's downfall was the
result of a prolonged and successful intelligence effort, which
involved the counternarcotics and counterterrorism police.
Previously, police actions had led to the arrest or killing
of Artemio's most important supporters. Progress in security
went hand in hand with the eradication of illicit coca,
alternative development efforts, and a growing state presence.
Although illicit crops remain, they are shrinking in number,
and the Valley has turned into a peaceful region, a condition
which has been described as the ``San Martin miracle.''
Unlike the Huallaga Valley, the strategy against the
Shining Path in the VRAEM was led by the military, and the role
of the police was negligible until fairly recently. The
strategy, implemented a decade ago, was basically defensive and
consisted of the establishment of military bases for the
purpose of containing the Shining Path's expansion.
Between 2008 and 2009, the armed forces went on the
offensive in order to take control of the Shining Path
headquarters in the Vizcatan region. After initially
retreating, the Shining Path counterattacked by ambushing and
killing dozens of soldiers and police agents, and even
disrupting its air support, forcing the military to withdraw in
defeat with not one Shining Path soldier detained or killed.
Artemio's capture made evident that the unsuccessful
military strategy in the VRAEM had to be replaced by the
successful police strategy carried out in the Huallaga Valley.
It was not easy for the military to acknowledge that the police
had to play the lead role in the counterterrorist effort.
The decision was finally made by President Humala, who
decided to integrate the intelligence activities of the
counternarcotics police, the counterterrorist police and the
Peruvian Navy, which together formed a special intelligence
brigade under police leadership. This brigade, with the support
of all the branches of the armed forces, made it possible to
strike on an ad hoc basis.
It was this new strategy that led to the killing of Comrade
William in September 2012, and Comrades Alipio and Gabriel in
August 2013, the three most important Shining Path military
leaders and the number 5, 2, and 4 of its command structure,
respectively.
The Shining Path has been dealt a very hard blow, but it is
still a long way from being defeated. Estimates of its strength
in the VRAEM vary between 140 armed men and somewhere between
400 and 500. It is essential to take advantage of its current
weakness to capture and kill what is left of its leadership--
Comrades Jose, Raul, and Olga--and dismantling its military
apparatus. U.S. assistance, through DEA, has been instrumental
in the progress thus far achieved and should be sustained to
ensure the defeat of what is left of the Shining Path.
The achievements of the last 2 years demonstrate the
effectiveness of the new strategy, which could be helpful to
confront terrorist groups elsewhere. This strategy consists of
prioritizing police intelligence work, which should combine
human intelligence with electronics, telephone and radio
listeners. Good intelligence facilitates more precise police
operations in the field to capture or hit the main leaders of
the terrorist organizations.
Military involvement in these command operations can be
very helpful. It is crucial to ensure the legality of
intelligence and operational actions, so that these cases may
be prosecuted by the judicial system. An effort of this nature
requires only a small number of participants, but highly
professional ones, that generally come from various units and
institutions. Thus, it is essential that their actions be
properly coordinated and conducted at the highest possible
level.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Costa follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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Mr. Poe. Thank you, Dr. Costa. It is good to see you again.
I will start with the questions. There are reports that the
United States Government is looking at cutting some of the aid
to Peru. What impact will this have on the fight against
Shining Path? And, second, what impact will it have on drug
eradication?
Mr. Costa. The U.S. Government has already been cutting
down its cooperation to Peru. So the information that it might
cut it further is not good news for the fights against what is
left of Sendero and the fight against drug trafficking in Peru.
So we do hope that an effort can be made to sustain the support
provided by the U.S. Government to the Peruvian Government,
especially to make sure that we can finish what is left of the
Shining Path.
I do think that the U.S. support is crucial. It has been
crucial, and we need to continue with that support.
Regarding the fight against drug trafficking and illicit
crops, the Peruvian Government has been increasing its budget
to finance what periods ago was exclusively an effort funded by
U.S. resources. And we hope that in the coming years that
national effort will increase to make sure that we can deal on
our own with, you know, the need to confront drug trafficking
in Peru.
Still, we also need in this regard sustained support by the
U.S. Government. But I want to stress the type of thing that,
you know, the most important threat now is to deal with the
violent expression of drug trafficking in Peru, and there is a
need to get the job finished before retreating from Peru.
Mr. Poe. If you would be a little more specific on U.S.-
Peruvian counterterrorism efforts and give us some detail as to
what has been effective, what has been the most successful
strategy between Peru and the United States on
counterterrorism.
Mr. Costa. Chairman Poe, as I said in my statement, it has
been crucial for the progress achieved regarding the Shining
Path to ensure that quality of the intelligence work that has
been carried out. And in this regard, the support of the U.S.
has been very important in terms of training, in terms of
providing equipment for electronic intelligence, and in terms
of following and accompanying the efforts of the security
forces in Peru.
There have also been resources provided by the U.S.
Government to recompense us to compensate for those that
provide information that could lead to the detention of Shining
Path leaders. So I think that that would be the most important
aspects of U.S. cooperation with Peruvian security forces.
Regarding the fight against the Shining Path, of course the
drugs program in Peru, which is also very important, it has
been instrumental for the success of the San Martin experience
regarding the eradication of illicit crops and alternative
development strategies. But as I said before, the Peruvian
Government in the last 2 years has been investing of its own
resources to be able to compensate for the reduction in the
U.S. support in this regard.
Mr. Poe. Do you know of any evidence that Shining Path is
working with FARC or other Mexican drug cartels?
Mr. Costa. No. We don't have any--I don't have any
information regarding relations between what is left of the
Shining Path and Hezbollah or the FARC, or even the Mexican or
Colombia cartels themselves. There is no doubt that the Shining
Path is related to the drug traffic.
The most important source for the funding of its activities
comes from drug trafficking and mainly from the support and
protection that it provides drug trafficking in the VRAEM. But
I don't have information as to direct relations between the
Shining Path and the Mexican and the Colombian cartels.
Mr. Poe. Thank you, Dr. Costa.
Now the ranking member, Mr. Sherman, for his questions.
Mr. Sherman. Thank you, Chairman.
The Shining Path is split into two organizations, one with
the initials SL.FRAEM, the other SL.UHV. Would you think either
one of these will reach a peace accommodation with the Peruvian
Government?
Mr. Costa. Actually, the two--I mentioned that after the
defeat of the Shining Path, the strategic defeat of the Shining
Path in the early '90s, there were two armed holdovers, one in
the Huallaga Valley and one in the VRAEM. The holdover in the
Huallaga Valley, headed by Artemio, wanted a peace accord with
the government, and Artemio followed the line, the political
direction, of Abimael Guzman imprisoned for life in the
Peruvian naval base.
But Artemio was detained, as I said in my statement, 2
years ago. And after his detention the whole military apparatus
led by Artemio collapsed and was dismantled. So actually today
we only have one Shining Path group, which is one left in the
VRAEM. They have no relation with the leadership of Abimael
Guzman and Artemio. They believe that Guzman has betrayed the
Peruvian Revolution, and they follow a different line.
So in military terms, all we have left today is one Shining
Path group concentrated in the VRAEM that has no relation with
historical leadership of the Shining Path.
Mr. Sherman. Thank you for that update. President Fujimori
was convicted not only of corruption but also of stated crimes
against humanity and human rights abuses. How does the human
rights behavior of the current Peruvian Government compare to
those who practice under President Fujimori?
Mr. Costa. I do believe that we have learned the lesson.
Currently, there are no serious allegations of human rights
abuses against the security forces in the context of the fight
against the Shining Path in the VRAEM, or previously the
Shining Path in the Huallaga Valley, nor any serious
allegations regarding the conduction of our anti-drug policy in
those two valleys and a number of other valleys where the coca
leaf is produced.
Mr. Sherman. Obviously, the Shining Path is a much less
dangerous organization than it was in its heyday. Peru is a
mid-income country. Why can't the Peruvian Government deal with
this and other issues of national security and drug
interdiction without help from the United States taxpayer?
Mr. Costa. We are certainly dealing with the problem, but
we certainly benefit a lot from U.S. assistance. We are well
aware of, you know, the budgetary and fiscal problems you are
facing in the United States. And as I said before, we have been
making a very important effort to compensate for the reduction
in U.S. cooperation regarding the fight against drugs and the
fight against Shining Path.
As I said before, I think it would be very important to
ensure that U.S. cooperation can be sustained at least until we
finish what is left of the Shining Path, and that is what I
would hope. I think it is also, as Chairman Poe said at the
beginning of his presentation, that this is also in the
interest of--the international interest of the U.S. Government.
Mr. Sherman. Thank you.
Mr. Poe. We will now hear questions from the gentleman from
Illinois, Mr. Kinzinger.
Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, sir, thank you for being here. I am actually--I fly an
RC26, which is an intelligence surveillance reconnaissance
airplane, and I believe Peru actually has the same asset. You
talked a lot about the use of intelligence in terms of
finishing off these groups or in terms of taking the fight to
them anywhere else that this replicates.
Where does Peru stand right now in terms of having enough
of those assets without U.S. help? And, you know, where do they
need to be in order to be able to effectively take--to finish
this fight and take it to the bad guys?
Mr. Costa. We do have the wherewithal to deal with the
problem, but part of that wherewithal is being provided by the
U.S. Government. So, as I said before, that is one of the
reasons why I do believe that it would be helpful to continue
receiving U.S. assistance, especially regarding intelligence,
electronic intelligence.
Mr. Kinzinger. Okay. Also, so now to kind of tie this to
the issue we deal with in the Middle East and in other places,
what is the risk right now? What do you see the risk of--if we
let up on this fight in Peru, what do you see the future as?
Are they going to stay, you know, 500 people? Do you see the
risk of this expanding yet again?
And on top of that, I want you to talk about the difference
between what drives this group, Shining Path, and what drives,
for instance, al-Qaeda? Al-Qaeda, which is a jihadist group
driven by religion versus kind of a political ideology. Could
you talk about the difference in the risk associated with that
issue?
Mr. Costa. Yes. If we would be having this conversation 2
years ago, we would certainly be much more concerned, because
that strategy to deal with Sendero was failing until we managed
to strike Artemio in the Huallaga, and then implement the new
strategy to deal with the Shining Path in the VRAEM. And now we
expect to be able to conclude the job if we insist in applying
this new strategy.
But 2 years ago the feeling was that we were losing this
battle, that the Shining Path--especially in the VRAEM was
growing, its area of influence was increasing, and its military
presence was threatening the transportation of natural gas from
the Camisea region in Cusco to the coast and mainly to the
capital in Lima. That natural gas accounts for around 40
percent of the energy we consume in the country.
That threat is still there. We know that part of the
funding of Sendero comes from extortion to the gas companies
that are responsible for the transportation of the natural gas
from Cusco to Lima. So that is the kind of threat, and what
concerns us the most with Sendero, the possibility of Sendero
recovering the lost territory it had in the early '90s,
threatening the supply of natural gas, 40 percent of the energy
we consume in the country.
But we are aware that it is more a local than an
international threat in this moment. As I said before, we don't
have information that it has contacts with international
terrorist groups. This discussion within Peru where Sendero is
today, the military expression of drug trafficking in Peru, or
if it is still a political group, I do believe that it is still
a political group, although its interests with drug trafficking
and illegal logging and extortion to gas companies have--makes
this group also an organization involved in common crime.
But I think there are great differences between the Shining
Path and al-Qaeda and these sort of movements in the Middle
East.
Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you. And I will just conclude by
saying I think it is important when you have a group like this
on their heels, this is where we tend to sometimes make the
decision to let up, because we are not eager to have a fight
over--and I think this is when it is important to double down
pressure and extinguish existing terrorist groups.
Mr. Chairman, I will yield back.
Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman. Five minutes for the
gentleman from Arkansas, Mr. Cotton.
[No response.]
All right. He yields back his time.
Mr. Costa, I want to--Dr. Costa, I want to thank you for
joining us today by video conference. We appreciate your
testimony and your answers to all of the questions. And I also
want to thank the U.S. Embassy for helping to set this up. So
thank you very much.
Mr. Costa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Poe. We will now turn to the witnesses at the--present
in the hearing room. Thank you for waiting. Ms. Realuyo, you
have 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF MS. CELINA B. REALUYO, WILLIAM J. PERRY CENTER FOR
HEMISPHERIC DEFENSE STUDIES, PROFESSOR OF PRACTICE OF NATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS, NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY
Ms. Realuyo. Thank you, Chairman Poe, Ranking Member
Sherman, and members of the subcommittee for the opportunity to
appear today before you to testify on the convergence of
illicit networks in Latin America.
I am a professor of practice at the William J. Perry Center
for Hemispheric Defense Studies, but the views expressed today
are my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
Perry Center, the National Defense University, or the Defense
Department.
Globalization has transformed our lives positively with the
free flow of goods, services, information, and technology.
However, at the same time, globalization has empowered illicit
networks, including terrorists, criminals, and proliferators
that undermine our prosperity and security.
Terrorists have political objectives while criminals seek
to maximize profits. What we are witnessing today is a
disturbing convergence of terrorism and crime from the
mountains of Afghanistan to the jungles of Latin America that
threatens the rule of law, governments, the economy, and
society.
In contrast to indigenous terrorist groups like the FARC in
Colombia and the Shining Path, Hezbollah, the Shia Muslim
political group in Lebanon, designated by the United States as
a foreign terrorist organization, operates inside and outside
of Lebanon. It relies on significant support from Iran and the
Lebanese Shiite diaspora community around the world.
As you know, before the tragic attacks of September 11
perpetrated by al-Qaeda, Hezbollah was the terrorist group
responsible for the most U.S. casualties from terrorist attacks
since its founding in 1982. More recently, Hezbollah has been
in the headlines for actively supporting and fighting alongside
President Bashar Al-Assad's regime in Syria.
Hezbollah and its global facilitators represent an emerging
terror-crime nexus through its networks in the Middle East,
Africa, and the Western Hemisphere. Since the 1990s, Hezbollah
has enjoyed ideological and financial support from the Lebanese
community in the tri-border area of Argentina, Brazil, and
Paraguay, a region known for arms, drugs, counterfeit, and
human trafficking.
Three more recent cases illustrates Hezbollah's increasing
reliance on facilitators engaged in criminal activities beyond
the tri-border of South America. In 2008, Operation Titan, a 2-
year joint U.S.-Colombian investigation, dismantled an
international cocaine smuggling and money laundering ring that
allegedly directed part of its profits to Hezbollah.
Among the 138 suspects arrested was Lebanese kingpin Chekry
Harb, accused of being a world-class money launderer. According
to Colombian officials, he laundered millions of dollars each
year from Panama to Hong Kong and paid some 12 percent of his
profits to Hezbollah.
In a separate case, Ayman Joumaa, a Lebanese-Colombian
national and critical facilitator for Hezbollah, was indicted
in absentia in November 2011 for distributing 85,000 kilograms
of cocaine from Colombia through Central America to the Los
Zetas cartel in Mexico. He is also accused of laundering $850
million of drug money from Mexico, Europe, and West Africa, to
Colombia and Venezuela.
Joumaa allegedly charged between 8 to 14 percent for
laundering the funds and directed some of his profits to
Hezbollah. This partnership between a prominent Hezbollah
facilitator and Los Zetas, Mexico's most violent cartel, is a
disturbing development illustrating the convergence of
terrorism and crime.
The most recent case of Hezbollah's global facilitators
involved the now-defunct Lebanese Canadian Bank, Lebanon's
eighth largest bank with assets worth over $5 billion.
According to the DEA, this bank and some Lebanese exchange
houses wired at least $329 million from 2007 to 2011 to the
United States to finance a sophisticated illicit trade and
money laundering scheme.
This network moved drugs from South America to Europe and
the Middle East, and purchased used cars in the U.S. to be
shipped and sold in West Africa. Cash from the car sales, as
well as from the drug trafficking, were funneled to Lebanon
through Hezbollah-controlled money laundering channels.
On June 23, 2013, Lebanese Canadian Bank agreed to pay here
in the United States a settlement of $102 million. It is just a
fraction of the amount of money allegedly laundered by this
institution.
In the age of globalization, the convergence of terror
crime networks is capitalizing on global resources, supply
chains, markets, and facilitators. The Operation Titan, Ayman
Joumaa, Lebanese Canadian Bank cases illustrate how Hezbollah
relies on criminal activities and support from overseas among
the Lebanese diaspora in Latin America.
Drug trafficking, money laundering, and illicit trade in
Latin America that fund Hezbollah are impacting U.S. consumers,
financial institutions, and markets. While according to the
State Department, Hezbollah may not be currently plotting
terrorist acts in the United States or Latin America, we must
remain vigilant and prepare for potential threats.
The 2011 White House Strategies to Combat Terrorism and
Transnational Organized Crime seek to channel the appropriate
USG resources to address these threats. To confront the
convergence of illicit networks, we need to promote more
effective interagency and international cooperation to better
understand, analyze, and counter these illicit networks.
Thank you for your time and attention. I look forward to
your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Realuyo follows:]
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Mr. Poe. The chair recognizes Mr.--is it Farrah or Farah?
Mr. Farah. Five minutes. Thank you, sir.
STATEMENT OF MR. DOUGLAS FARAH, SENIOR ASSOCIATE, AMERICAS
PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Mr. Farah. Thank you, sir. Chairman Poe, Ranking Member
Sherman, and members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity here to talk about the FARC and lessons learned for
the United States. I should clarify that I am speaking on
behalf of myself and not any institution.
I believe the U.S. Government--the U.S.-Colombia
partnership is one of the most successful in recent times. I
have had the privilege of working in Colombia since 1989 and
have seen the nation teeter on the edge of the abyss in the
1990s to emerge as a regional model of democracy and economic
development.
The FARC, despite the ongoing peace talks with the
government of President Juan Manuel Santos in Cuba, remain
engaged in criminal enterprises and terrorist activities that
stretch from Colombia to Argentina and northward to Central
America and Mexico. Recent cases by the DEA show the direct and
growing criminal and drug ties between the FARC and Hezbollah.
As I detail in my testimony, the FARC, since at least 1999,
has established a relationship with the Government of Iran
designated by the United States Government as a state sponsor
of terrorism. The FARC was designated in 1997 following the
kidnapping and executions of seven American missionaries. The
European Union followed suit in 2005.
Under the protection of the Governments of Venezuela,
Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Bolivia, as well as powerful friends
elsewhere, the FARC maintains a robust international
infrastructure that produces thousands of kilos of cocaine and
launders hundreds of millions of dollars. It has emerged as a
prototype hybrid criminal/terrorist insurgency.
It is not for me as a non-Colombian to judge the wisdom of
holding peace talks, but what I can say is that the FARC is a
central part of the revolutionary project of bringing together
armed groups and terrorist organizations under the umbrella of
the Bolivian Revolution with the aid and support of Iran.
The glue that binds these groups is a shared vision of
creating a new world order in which the United States, Europe,
and Israel are enemies to be destroyed. Their common doctrine
of asymmetrical warfare explicitly endorses the use of weapons
of mass destruction against their perceived enemies.
Over the past 15 years, Colombia has undergone a profound
transformation. This is testament to Colombia's own innovative
and courageous policies and the sustained bipartisan U.S.
support that span three administrations and has led to a
partnership that is unique in Latin America.
During the 3-year peace negotiations that ended in February
2002 in Colombia, the FARC significantly expanded its outreach
to other terrorist groups to increase its technical
capabilities and establish relationships that endure to this
day.
Among the visitors to the FARC territory during the talks
were the Iranian Government officials, ostensibly to build a
refrigerated meat storage facility. The plant was never built,
but it provided the FARC leadership with direct contact with
Iranian officials, a relationship that endures today through
the Venezuelan Government.
ETA terrorists and other groups trained the FARC, and by
2003 the FARC was using techniques from these organizations in
attacks that took hundreds of civilian lives. In my written
testimony, I detail the support based on documents captured by
Colombian security forces when they killed Raul Reyes in 2008.
Of these groups, as well as Hugo Chavez, Rafael Correa, Daniel
Ortega, and Salvador Sanchez Ceren, the leading candidate for
President of El Salvador, and his fellow FMLN leader, Jose Luis
Merino.
The FARC's Central American Network is among the most
important in the current discussion because it is still active.
Nicaraguan President Ortega offers refuge and financial aid to
the FARC, and the Reyes documents show that when Reyes was
killed Merino and El Salvador was brokering a deal that
included the sale of grenade launchers, 50-caliber machine
guns, sophisticated explosives, and possibly surface-to-air
missiles.
Former U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador, William Walker, a
friend of Merino, recently wrote an op-ed in The New York Times
defending the FMLN and dismissing its ties to the FARC, which
he called a leftist movement rather than a terrorist
organization. The right of the FMLN to participate in the
electoral process is not in discussion as Ambassador Walker
mistakenly argues. But defending its leaders who supply weapons
to a terrorist organization is shocking for a former U.S.
Envoy.
There is significant evidence showing the FARC's
operational alliance with Hezbollah and Hezbollah's allies
based in Venezuela under the protection of the Maduro
government. The evidence is compelling that both the FARC and
Hezbollah are now engaged in a series of business relationships
that involve the cocaine and weapons trades.
Despite the support, the FARC did not win. The Colombian
people ultimately wanted to save their country. It was this
will, welded to the political will of successive U.S.
administrations, to support them that is perhaps our greatest
lesson to be drawn. The U.S.-Colombia Strategic Partnership
must continue for the foreseeable future, even if peace talks
are successful.
With or without a peace agreement, the Colombian Government
will require not only ongoing military and police support but
support in other areas of their vast undertaking of
reestablishing a positive state presence in huge areas of the
country where the government has been absent for generations.
Failure to adequately address the continuing challenges could
put at risk many of the hard-won gains achieved by the
Colombians.
There are several key lessons one can draw from Colombia
that are applicable in other theaters. First is that there has
to be a significant level of trust in a successful partnership
or there will be conflicts, as we see in Afghanistan today. In
Colombia, the trust led the United States to support some of
the Colombian Government's riskiest operations, including a
hostage rescue, that it would be almost impossible to image
with any other ally.
Second is that hybrid groups like the FARC, the Taliban in
Afghanistan, and many others thrive in the seams of the world's
illicit trade pipelines. The money from cocaine that the FARC
has garnered has ensured that it has endured far longer than it
would have as a simple insurgent group.
All of these new groups are dangerous and far more
difficult to attack than terrorist groups of the past, given
their enormous access to financial resources. None of these
groups operate in a vacuum. Governments like those of
Venezuela, Nicaragua, Bolivia, and Ecuador create a permissive
operational environment in which the FARC, Hezbollah, Iranian
officials, ETA, and others can safety meet, exchange lessons
learned, and work to build alliances.
This is not to say there is one giant alliance of all these
groups aimed at the United States. Rather, it is a deliberately
created environment where these groups can trade expertise and
make temporary alliances of mutual convenience, none of which
will be of benefit to the United States. This is the danger of
the FARC, and that danger is unlikely to diminish even with a
successful peace process in El Salvador--in Colombia, I am
sorry.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Farah follows:]
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Mr. Poe. Mr. Shifter, you have 5 minutes. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF MR. MICHAEL SHIFTER, PRESIDENT, INTER-AMERICAN
DIALOGUE
Mr. Shifter. Thank you very much, Chairman Poe, Ranking
Member Sherman, and members of the subcommittee, I appreciate
this opportunity today.
Latin America's landscape is indeed changing. On balance,
the changes have been positive. The region has had sustained
growth, lowered its levels of poverty and inequality, and is
moving toward more democratic, pragmatic politics.
On the negative side of the ledger, there is spreading
criminality in many countries, often fueled by the drug trade
and other illicit activities. The result is institutional
weakness, corruption, and challenges to the rule of law.
Colombia and Peru are among Washington's closest South
American allies. The U.S. has trade agreements with both
countries and cooperates with them in a variety of key areas.
Both countries have ample experience in battling insurgencies
designated as terrorist groups by the State Department that
have sought to topple democratically elected governments.
Fortunately, both the Shining Path in Peru and the FARC in
Colombia have been substantially weakened militarily. They are
still capable of inflicting some damage, but they no longer
pose an existential threat to either the Peruvian or Colombian
states.
The Shining Path, the Maoist movement that started in 1980,
is perhaps one of the most ruthless insurgencies in Latin
America. It stopped being a significant strategic threat when
its leader, Abimael Guzman, was captured in September 1992. The
success was the result of old-fashioned, painstaking police
work and sound intelligence-gathering. This was a top-down
group, and when the leader went, the rest crumbled.
Today, the Shining Path, as we just heard, is operating
mainly in VRAEM region in Peru. It is sustained by drug-related
income. The Peruvians have applied intelligence techniques and
other approaches that have been used successfully in Colombia
with United States support to engage successful policy against
the Shining Path in the VRAEM region.
The U.S. provides currently about $55 million in
counternarcotics aid to Colombia--I am sorry, to Peru. 2014 is
a big year. There are ambitious targets to destroy crops and
illegal airstrips in Peru.
There is one risk, which is that eradicating--focusing on
eradication of coca crops in Peru could possibly deprive
peasant growers of their most viable source of income and
heighten resentment against the Colombian military and the
Colombia Government--Peruvian military and the Peruvian
Government.
In the case of Colombia, the U.S. has provided far more
substantial support, some $9 billion since Plan Colombia was
approved by the U.S. Congress in July 2000. This has been
complemented by support in intelligence-gathering and
coordination. This is a positive story of international
cooperation.
At a time when the FARC and the Self Defense Forces of
Colombia posed a threat in the late 1990s or early 2000s and
everybody was talking about a failed state, there was a
response by the United States and by the Colombian Government
and by its society.
The figures of success are dramatic--a reduction in
homicides, a reduction in kidnappings, an expansion of the
defense budget, and police presence now in all of the country's
municipalities. The sustained U.S. bipartisan support over a
dozen years to Colombia, with the initial focus on security and
increasingly on institutional support and alternative
development, contributed to the turnaround.
As the GAO report of 2008 indicated, there has been more
progress on the security than on the drug issue, which remains
a significant challenge for Colombia. The key to success was
the commitment and will on the part of the Colombian Government
and major sectors of its society to mobilize and turn around a
deteriorating situation.
Today, faced with a militarily and politically weakened
FARC, the Colombian Government is pursuing a peace process.
Colombians clearly support that process. It has moved a bit
more slowly than many expected. Two of the five issues on the
agenda have been covered, and President Santos now says he
plans to conclude it this year.
Thanks to the efforts of the Colombian Government,
including 8 years under the presidency of Alvaro Uribe, the
process has a better chance of succeeding than it did in the
past. It will not be easy. There is no guarantee. The most
difficult, vexing question, in my opinion, is how to deal with
the FARC, who are guilty of serious human rights crimes. This
is an issue that remains to be addressed. Most Colombians want
the FARC to pay for their crimes.
The U.S. should sustain its support to a key strategic ally
in South America. If a peace accord is reached, assistance will
be helpful in post-conflict scenarios. And if an agreement is
not reached, then Colombia would continue to benefit from aid
for its social and justice reform agenda.
The U.S. is rightly supporting President Santos' peace
effort. There will be issues that will need to be addressed
regarding U.S. counterdrug policy, but the goal should be to
try to reach an agreement. That would be a big boost for
Colombia, for the region, and for U.S. interests.
At the same time, peace will not immediately come to pass.
The FARC is likely to fragment and fracture. Other groups will
look and take over the illicit activities that are now
controlled and dominated by the FARC.
If we look at the broader situation on Hezbollah, clearly
there are a few cases when they sought to advance their cause
in the region in Argentina in the early 1990s aimed against
Jewish targets.
There is information, reliable information, about
ideological and financial support for these groups in the
region, but no evidence that we know of of operational cells.
There is a lot of speculation and a lot of allegations, but a
high standard of credible proof is critical.
Organized crime is a major concern in many countries of the
region. Colombia, fortunately, is now using U.S. support to
help train Central American police and others to deal with
their problem.
Mr. Poe. If I could ask you to sum up your testimony,
please.
Mr. Shifter. Thank you very much. The main emphasis of the
U.S. should be to try to encourage development of democratic
institutions, justice systems, and police forces.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Shifter follows:]
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----------
Mr. Poe. Thank you. I will start with questions. Mr. Farah
and Ms. Realuyo, I don't know if any State Department officials
are present for your testimony, but the State Department takes
the position, insists that there is no real Hezbollah threat in
Latin America, even though the Defense Department and the DEA
have said otherwise.
Do you know of why the State Department would take the
position there is no Hezbollah? And both of you just talked
about it. Ladies first.
Ms. Realuyo. And having been a U.S. State Department
official in the Counterterrorism Office, if you recall, after
September 11 we actually added, as well as al-Qaeda and
affiliates, we added Hezbollah to Hamas, as well as the FARC
and Tamil Tigers to that.
And, more importantly, I am sad that we don't have a State
Department colleague here with us to explain, but the bigger
question is, perhaps we need to take a look at the mistakes we
have committed in the past. We considered in the 1990s Osama
Bin Laden as just merely a money man for al-Qaeda.
What we have described I think between Doug's and my
testimony, and we actually work collaboratively together, is a
lot of the fund-raising you can't separate out when you look at
terrorist organizations, because we consider the money as the
oxygen for any activity, legal or illegal, and, more
importantly, for these lethal operations.
So I think that is actually why the different agencies look
and define Hezbollah and its activities in the Western
Hemisphere differently than perhaps a diplomatic stance. So as
the State Department----
Mr. Poe. Well, diplomatically, we are in denial. And the
ones that do the hard work, the DEA and the Department of
Defense, say, ``Yeah, those folks are really down in Latin
America.'' You don't know why they--I mean, you have been
pretty diplomatic in your statement. You used to work for the
State Department.
Mr. Farah, are you going to weigh in on this issue?
Mr. Farah. I have had many discussions with senior State
Department officials about this. Their view is that the
intelligence community does not have compelling evidence of
Hezbollah's operational activities in the region. I think part
of the issue is resources, and part of the issue is that there
are overwhelming issues, both in Latin America and other parts
of the world, that make it difficult to isolate this out and
focus on it as I think they should, perhaps a little more
aggressively.
And I think that one of the things that is lost in this is
that starting in 2008, the DEA particularly, but other
agencies, built a series of what are now public cases in a
judicial record that clearly shows this involvement in
transnational organized activities and the--not the merging,
the alliances between the FARC Hezbollah, Hezbollah and many
other trafficking organizations in the region.
And it has not been put together into a timeline that can
show, unless you really study it, to put the pieces together
and say, ``Holy cow, it is really there.'' We keep hearing it
is not there, we don't see the evidence, but it is there, it is
just in many little pieces.
And I think that that is one of the frustrations of people
who deal with the issue on the ground and see it is that it is
hard to get through the policy perception that it is not there.
And why that is I honestly don't know.
Mr. Poe. Ms. Realuyo, let me be--I want you to be specific.
You said that Hezbollah works with the brutal drug cartel, the
Zetas, operates out of Mexico. Be a little more specific about
how they are partners in outlawry, if you will.
Ms. Realuyo. So actually what is quite interesting is if
you think about the Lebanese-Colombian community, those who
support Hezbollah--and this is actually very important in terms
of qualifying that it is a subset of the Lebanese diaspora
community that supports Hezbollah and, more importantly,
actively moves money and product for them, what they are doing
is actually offering a service to cartels such as the Mexican
Los Zetas cartel.
What they were doing in the case of Ayman Joumaa, in the
indictment that has been unsealed, is actually describe how
they were helping to move cocaine toward the Mexican cartels
and then also launder the money in the backflow. So there is a
big question, when we take a look at these types of groups of
illicit actors, which includes terrorists, proliferators, and,
more importantly, criminals, a lot of them are actually
offering and brokering services.
They may not espouse the same kind of ideological fervor
that other groups have, but what we are really disturbed by is
the fact that they are finding a lot of these very specialized
services to which Doug has actually written about these terror
pipelines where you see this very unholy alliance between
terrorist groups and criminal groups who in the end, have a
win-win because they actually meet their long-term objectives
in terms of that. And that is the one case that we have seen
specifically documented through legal--kind of an actual
indictment of Ayman Joumaa's interaction with Los Zetas.
Mr. Poe. And then Hezbollah uses the money maybe for other
Hezbollah activities somewhere else.
Ms. Realuyo. And that is the part that is actually worrying
us. As they step up operations in the Middle East, they need to
finance and support their militants.
Mr. Poe. And, Mr. Farah, briefly explain in a little more
detail the connection between Hezbollah and the FARC in
Colombia.
Mr. Farah. I think if you look at Operation Titan, which
then grew into--going forward into the Ayman Joumaa cases, they
are all interconnected. You saw for the first time in 2008
Hezbollah operatives directly buying product from the FARC.
That hadn't been seen before. There were rumors of it. There
were suspicions of it.
But in large quantities, and where a significant amount of
the profits--the FARC benefitted on the front end directly from
selling the cocaine, and then the sale profits, large parts of
them filtered back directly into Hezbollah. And that was well
documented, again, an open source judicial case that the
Colombians worked with the Americans on for 2 years.
An Ayman Joumaa case grew out of that. Again, you had
direct purchase from FARC, 48th Front on the Ecuadorian border,
and others, where the money then moved--so the FARC benefits
clearly on the front end. Hezbollah benefits from skimming off
the percentages as was mentioned of the money that--it doesn't
all go to Hezbollah, but a significant amount of that revenue
does.
And then you have to look I think at the state sponsorship
or the protection of the states like Venezuela that allow these
groups to operate with impunity, which really cuts down on
their operating costs. If you are not worried about getting
caught, you can do a lot more things than you otherwise would
do. And I think that is one of the primary issues. And where
you see the FARC being very active with a heavy Iranian
presence is in Bolivia, and I think you have to look at how
state support mitigates the cost and the threat to these
groups.
Mr. Poe. Thank you.
Ranking member Mr. Sherman.
Mr. Sherman. Thank you. We are focused here on Colombia and
Peru. If we were going to focus on a third or fourth country,
what would it be? Where should we be concerned?
Ms. Realuyo. Probably a region. It is actually Central
America, because of the fact that, actually, if we think about
the balloon effect, which we have talked about a lot in terms
of this topic, as Colombia and Peru become much more effective
in terms of countering and have real assets, and are actually
growing economies, Central America, unfortunately, has become
now the new ungoverned territory, if you want to call it that,
for these cartels to move, not just drugs by the way; there are
tons of other illicit products and activities. And, sadly,
human trafficking has become now in the headlines, which I know
it is a topic of interest to you.
Mr. Sherman. Thank you.
Mr. Farah.
Mr. Farah. I would add Argentina. I think if you look at
the funnel of--the way the drug trafficking patterns have
developed as the movement of cocaine downstream, you have
Bolivia now producing HCL and large quantities. Peru--Brazil
has cut off its borders, Chile has protected its borders, and
you have one giant funnel going down to the one country, that,
one, has a very high consumption rate; and, two, uncontrolled
border traffic to West Africa and Europe, which is Argentina.
Mr. Sherman. So from a drug perspective, Argentina. What
about from the perspective of ideologically driven terrorist
organizations?
Mr. Farah. I think you see both--I think you see the REA
program between Argentina and Iran, which I think is one of the
really troubling areas. I think in terms of where they are
active and where they are raising money, Panama is where
Hezbollah is probably----
Mr. Sherman. There are people in Panama who take money out
of their own pocket and----
Mr. Farah. No. This is where they take money from other
people's pockets and buy dual-use equipment and all kinds of
weapons in a completely uncontrolled--and then the free trade
zones particularly, I would say that where the money flows
through, not where they are generating the revenue----
Mr. Sherman. So Panama is a place for Hezbollah to go on a
shopping spree, not a place where they are going to----
Mr. Farah. As well as Iran, yes, absolutely.
Mr. Sherman. Yes. Mr. Shifter?
Mr. Shifter. I would say Central America, especially the
northern triangle of Central America, Honduras and Guatemala,
in terms of the drug trafficking. And in terms of ideological
affinity, you know, I think you could find--I mean, Venezuela
is still--is a problem that deserves a lot of attention as
well.
Mr. Sherman. Now, Plan Colombia has cost us $9 billion. The
request for the administration is $323 million, including
almost half of that for economic support. Colombia is
considerably better off economically than many countries that
get little or no economic support from the United States.
Colombia has been substantially successful. Why do we need
to honor the President's request for $323 million, particularly
his request for $140 million of economic support? Mr. Shifter.
Mr. Shifter. Well, I mean, I think Colombia, first of all,
is assuming a larger responsibility than they had in the past,
and I think that number requested has gone down from what it
was a number years ago. I also think that, you know, the United
States has made a huge investment in Colombia over a dozen
years. This is a success story, and I think it is in our
interest to do what we can to make sure----
Mr. Sherman. I see in foreign policy, everywhere we do
something, that is where we have got to put more. Where we put
our blood, we have to put more of our blood; where our money,
more of our money. Iraq is the most important country in the
Arab Middle East because Americans have died there. And
everywhere we have made an effort we have a stake in continuing
that effort.
It is frustrating. I would like to see somebody come before
us and say, ``We have been so successful we don't need any more
money.'' How large--I mean, the natural affinity for Hezbollah
will come among some portion of the Lebanese Shiite community.
How large a Lebanese Shiite community is there in several of
the countries we have talked about? And what portion of that
community has an ideological adherence to Hezbollah?
Mr. Farah. I think--if I might, I think that is not
necessarily a correct--excuse me? It is on. My light is on.
Mr. Poe. They are all off. Mine is working.
Mr. Farah. Okay. I will talk loud. I think that there is a
misconception that the primary issue is the Lebanese diaspora
community or I think they are very important. I think more
important to understand is this--is anybody else's mic working?
No?
Okay. I think one needs to look at the broader issue of
the--as I said before, the state protection that allows--it is
not so much that you have people who are profoundly--who have a
profound affinity for radical Islam or Hezbollah activities.
It is that you have states in the region that are willing
to allow those groups to operate with impunity in their
national territory, issue them, as Venezuela has done, has
Ecuador has done, as Panama has done, hundreds, if not
thousands, of valid passports, so they are no longer tracked as
Iranians, where they can move their money with impunity.
One of the great black holes in the Iranian sanctions is
the Venezuelan economy, the Panamanian economy, the Ecuadorian
banking sector. And so I think that if you look at what they
are doing in Latin America, it is not so much the recruitment
and this massive conversion effort, it is having a safe haven
in which they can operate, get to know each other, cross-
pollinate, and raise a lot of money with groups like the FARC
and others, which is not to say that you should dismiss the
Lebanese diaspora community, which provides some of the fixer
opportunities, but in those states where they are protected
many other types of things can happen that wouldn't happen
without that state protection.
Mr. Poe. And they get that protection because the
governments want money or they just want to stick it to us?
Mr. Farah. I think if you read their literature and what
they talk about and what they want, it is heavily anti-
American, is part of the glue that goes to--that binds these
groups together, as part of--they have developed a whole
theology that equates liberation theology with Shia Islam. They
have entire books now about the new theology that is possible.
It is strange, but if you read----
Mr. Sherman. You are saying that books that equate
liberation theology with Shiite Islam then motivate the
Panamanian or Ecuadorian Governments to take action which
otherwise wouldn't be in their national interest?
Mr. Farah. I don't think it motivates them. I think it is a
justification for creating--as I say, I think that there is a
common--the commonality is the desire to inflict hurt on the
United States, pain on the United States.
Mr. Sherman. Thank you.
Mr. Poe. The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Yoho.
Mr. Yoho. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Appreciate it.
You just touched on what I wanted to talk about.
[Loud noise.]
Are we all right?
What I wanted to touch on here was the coming together of
all of these organizations--FARC, Hezbollah, the Shining Path--
it seems like they are on the run--coming together for that
commonality, and that is against the United States, European
powers, and to me that is the danger.
And what we saw was FARC had been--there was good control
put on them and their numbers went down, but yet what we are
seeing seems like an increase in the techniques, the military
capabilities of them, bombing and roadside bombs on the
military and the police in Colombia. They seem to become more
violent and more dangerous.
And with this coming together with us as the targets, my
questions are, is there any idea how much illicit traffic and
trade, and what type of that, is coming through our southern
borders? Not just our southern but our eastern and western
shores, and maybe even our northern borders. So this
organization of the TOCs.
Mr. Farah. I think that--in my research, I think that that
is the--I don't think we know how much, but I think that if you
look at what crosses our border in terms of illicit products,
they probably have a better delivery rate than FedEx or UPS.
You know, if you put something in an illicit pipeline from
Venezuela and want it to get across our border, it will get
there.
Mr. Yoho. Where do you see most of that coming through, the
southern border or the coast?
Mr. Farah. The southern border. I think that they now have
the capability to use submersibles now that can get all the way
to California. I think one of the concerns in the security
community is that they know that the submersibles exist. They
can carry 10 tons of anything, and they can reach our coast
without refueling now, and we can't find them very easily. And
I think that that is one of the great unknowns out there.
Mr. Yoho. Okay. So not just our southern border but our
shorelines, east and west, is a national security interest that
we should monitor these and secure them. Would you say that--we
are in agreement there from a national security standpoint?
Mr. Farah. Sure.
Mr. Yoho. Okay.
Mr. Farah. I think securing borders is----
Mr. Yoho. How about the other two members? Are you guys in
agreement with that?
Ms. Realuyo. Yes.
Mr. Yoho. It is a national security threat that we should
address?
Ms. Realuyo. Yes. Because if you think about the types of
people and products that are actually penetrating the borders,
that are marketed and pushed by these illicit networks, they
are actually directly affecting American consumers.
So we have this tragic case of this very famous actor who
was found, we allegedly think, from a heroin overdose. And many
people who work in this field are suspecting that the heroin
probably originated from or was trafficked by Mexican cartels,
because there have been reports now that consumption in the
United States of cocaine is actually at its lowest levels ever,
but that is not to say--prescription drugs, methamphetamine,
and heroin is actually on the rise.
So since there is a market still here in the United States
for these types of illicit drugs, we are creating a market, and
obviously because of the financial incentive and to empower
themselves these groups look for the governance gaps on our
borders, maritime or land, in order to actually get the product
and people here into their market.
Mr. Yoho. And what we are seeing is the rise of heroin. I
read a report the other day that said children under the age of
18 to 25, in the last 5 or 10 years 20 percent of them have
tried heroin. And it is a rise because drugs like oxycontin
have gotten so high that heroin is so cheap, and I think it is
a very dangerous thing that we need to bring under control.
The other thing is I know several people in the Coast
Guard. The people are out there and they are running into these
people, if not yet, they are going to, and these people are
going to be well armed with military assets, and it is going to
put our military and our Coast Guard at a high risk, and this
is something that we need to bring under control.
What other ways do you see that we can fight this war on
the narco-terrorist organizations, other than a perpetual war
on drugs or a war on terror, through maybe policy change or a
paradigm shift in the United States of America?
Ms. Realuyo. Well, here in the United States we have to
start to raise awareness of the average citizen. I am from New
York City. There was tons of campaigns and ads about human
trafficking, which we had never seen, at a large major
metropolis sporting event.
Mr. Yoho. We are running those in our district, too.
Ms. Realuyo. And you saw that as well.
Mr. Yoho. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Realuyo. There was a huge takedown of the syndicates
that were actually trafficking not just people but also
counterfeit goods that could actually harm consumers. So there
is a big push for awareness on the demand side.
And then on the actual supply side and interdiction, we
have actually seen--I think the cases of Peru and Colombia
illustrate how good intelligence and good cooperation and
coordination, tactically but also strategically, in terms of
political will, can actually bear some kind of influence to
constrain the operating environments of the----
Mr. Yoho. Thank you. I am out of time. I have to cut you
off. Thank you, ma'am.
Mr. Poe. I want to thank all the witnesses for their
testimony. It has been very informative, and thank you for the
information that you have given us.
This subcommittee hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:30 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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