[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE IRAN NUCLEAR DEAL
=======================================================================
JOINT HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
AND THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JANUARY 28, 2014
__________
Serial No. 113-115
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DANA ROHRABACHER, California Samoa
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio BRAD SHERMAN, California
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
TED POE, Texas GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MATT SALMON, Arizona THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina KAREN BASS, California
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
MO BROOKS, Alabama DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
TOM COTTON, Arkansas ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
PAUL COOK, California JUAN VARGAS, California
GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania AMI BERA, California
STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
RON DeSANTIS, Florida GRACE MENG, New York
DOUG COLLINS, Georgia LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
TED S. YOHO, Florida JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
LUKE MESSER, Indiana
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
TOM COTTON, Arkansas DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
RON DeSANTIS, Florida JUAN VARGAS, California
DOUG COLLINS, Georgia BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts
TED S. YOHO, Florida GRACE MENG, New York
LUKE MESSER, Indiana LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
------
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade
TED POE, Texas, Chairman
JOE WILSON, South Carolina BRAD SHERMAN, California
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
MO BROOKS, Alabama JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
TOM COTTON, Arkansas JUAN VARGAS, California
PAUL COOK, California BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts
TED S. YOHO, Florida
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
The Honorable Mark D. Wallace, chief executive officer, United
Against Nuclear Iran (former United States Ambassador to the
United Nations)................................................ 9
Mr. Gregory S. Jones, senior researcher, Nonproliferation Policy
Education Center............................................... 24
Mr. Olli Heinonen, senior fellow, Belfer Center for Science and
International Affairs, Harvard University (former Deputy
Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency).... 32
Mr. David Albright, founder and president, Institute for Science
and International Security..................................... 40
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable Mark D. Wallace: Prepared statement................ 12
Mr. Gregory S. Jones: Prepared statement......................... 26
Mr. Olli Heinonen: Prepared statement............................ 34
Mr. David Albright: Prepared statement........................... 42
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 80
Hearing minutes.................................................. 81
Questions submitted for the record by the Honorable Luke Messer,
a Representative in Congress from the State of Indiana, and
responses from:
The Honorable Mark D. Wallace.................................. 83
Mr. Gregory S. Jones........................................... 84
Questions submitted for the record by the Honorable David
Cicilline, a Representative in Congress from the State of Rhode
Island, and responses from:
Mr. Olli Heinonen.............................................. 85
Mr. Gregory S. Jones........................................... 88
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE IRAN NUCLEAR DEAL
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TUESDAY, JANUARY 28, 2014
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa and
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 2 p.m., in
room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-
Lehtinen (chairman of the Subcommittee on Middle East and North
Africa) presiding.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much. So the joint
subcommittee will come to order. After recognizing myself,
Ranking Member Deutch, and, of course, we will hear from our
Foreign Affairs full committee chairman Mr. Royce, we will hear
from Chairman Poe and Ranking Member Sherman, for 5 minutes
each for our opening statements, and then due to time
limitations, we will go directly to our witnesses' testimony.
And without objection, the witnesses' prepared statements will
be made a part of the record. And members may have 5 days to
insert statements and questions for the record subject to the
length limitation in the rules.
The Chair now recognizes herself for 5 minutes.
On November 24, 2013, Secretary Kerry announced that an
interim negotiated settlement had been reached between the P5+1
and Iran on its nuclear program. The announcement contained the
broad strokes, but was short on the details.
The picture that was painted was that Iran would agree to
modest limits on its enrichment capabilities, increased
International Atomic Energy Agency monitoring, the cessation of
manufacturing centrifuges, and it would not fuel the Arak
heavy-water reactor. In exchange, Iran would receive an easing
of sanctions on its oil sales and the suspension of certain
sanctions on the import of precious metals and exports from
Iran's auto and petrochemical sectors.
No doubt President Obama will count this deal as the
ultimate achievement for diplomacy and peace while excoriating
those of us who had the temerity to say, hey, wait a minute, I
don't trust the Iranian regime. Let's have a backup plan to
increase sanctions on Iran if it is found to be acting
unfaithfully, which, as history has shown, is not out of the
realm of possibility.
But though the announcement was made in November, it wasn't
until 1 week ago, on January 20th, that the technical details
were agreed upon and finally implemented. The most glaring
deficiency with this interim deal is its lopsidedness. Iran got
a sweetheart deal, and the rest of the world is not any safer
from the Iranian bomb than before.
Our closest ally and friend in the region, the democratic
Jewish State of Israel, has been very concerned with what this
deal means for its security from the get-go. And other
countries in the Gulf region feel slighted by our approach to
this issue.
But let's set aside the dangerous precedent that this sets
for the rest of the world and the bridges that we have burned
with allies to reach this agreement. Remember, this agreement
doesn't even live up to the obligations set forth by the U.N.
Security Council's resolution on Iran and is far from our
policy of disarmament from only 10 years ago, and focus on what
Iran is allowed to do.
Iran is allowed to keep its nuclear weapons program
infrastructure intact and will still be allowed to enrich.
Sure, there are caps to the enrichment, and it will have to
convert some of its uranium to oxide, but Iran will maintain
the ability, know-how and proficiency that if it decides to
break the agreement, it can continue toward breakout capability
with only a minor setback in any timetable.
It is a shame that we have seemingly acquiesced to Iran's
demand that it has some sort of right to enrich. Iran had long
ago abandoned all claims to a right of enrichment when it
decided to conduct a covert nuclear program and was in
violation of its international obligations under the NPT and
other treaties. It therefore must not be allowed to enrich, and
I fear that by starting out where the P5+1 did here, Iran will
never be pushed off this stance in a final comprehensive
agreement.
The interim deal focuses on the nuclear aspect and falls
short on Iran's weaponization efforts and its ballistic missile
program, which it now has more time to advance. And there is
nothing in the interim agreement that allows the International
Atomic Energy Agency to access Iran's military sites. And, for
me, what is really at the crux of the issue here: Time. From
announcement to implementation, 2 months' time has passed. This
gave the regime plenty of time to continue to make advancements
while the parties hashed out all of the technical details. I
don't believe this was done by mistake on their part, as
Rouhani is an expert in delay tactics and doubletalk.
In the 2 months after Secretary Kerry's press conference in
Geneva, Tehran has announced that it has made advances in its
ICBM technology, it has designed a new generation of uranium
centrifuges and is ready to manufacture them, and that it would
continue construction at its heavy-water reactor in Arak. I
envision a scenario in which Iran may comply with this
agreement for 6 months, but even if Iran does violate the terms
of the agreement, the joint commission that it established in
the final document has murky authority at best to conduct
oversight, enforce compliance, or impose strict consequences.
There is no mechanism that allows for adjudication of
violations in this deal, and that is very troublesome.
Bottom line: As long as the infrastructure is in place for
Iran to continue its nuclear program, the threat that it can
create a nuclear weapon will always be all too real, and that
is where the P5+1 monumentally failed in this interim
agreement. And with Rouhani and Zarif stating just last week
that Iran would not dismantle any part of it nuclear program
under any circumstance, it has me fearing what the
administration will accept in a final comprehensive agreement.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses, their
testimonies, and the views of my colleagues. And now I turn to
my good friend, the ranking member, Ted Deutch of Florida.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Madam Chairman, Chairman Poe, for
holding today's hearing to examine the implementation of the
first phase of the Iran nuclear deal. And thank you to our
panel of very distinguished experts for appearing here today.
We welcome your expertise and your insight as we determine the
efficacy of Iran's actions under the JPOA, and the next steps
in reaching a final agreement to achieve our ultimate goal of
preventing a nuclear-armed Iran.
Let me be clear from the outset: There is no doubt that
resolving the Iranian nuclear crisis through diplomacy has
always been the preferred track of the administration and of
the Congress. I think we all recognize the significant
achievement of the U.S. efforts to bring Iran to the table. But
there are many members of both sides of the aisle who feel that
it is absolutely appropriate for Congress, the body that built
the sanctions architecture that brought Iran to the table, to
remind the Iranians that full sanctions relief will come only
when a deal acceptable to the P5+1 and our regional allies is
reached.
This relief can only come if Congress acts, so I would also
suggest that it is appropriate to send Iran a reminder, as well
as to remind the companies lining up to visit Tehran a message
of what is at stake if Iran violates the terms of the Joint
Plan of Action.
A deal is in place, and if we are going to move forward
with the final deal, we have to focus on ensuring that Iran
fulfills its obligations, while beginning to define the
acceptable parameters of a comprehensive solution. We are 8
days into the implementation of the Joint Plan of Action, a 6-
month deal to freeze Iran's nuclear activities, resulting in a
complete cessation of Iran's 20 percent enrichment and the
conversion of its current stockpile, as well as to open up
Iran's nuclear program to intrusive inspections. And while
these caps on Iran's current program are substantial, we know
that they cannot be the terms of a long-term deal. We must
ultimately see serious, permanent rollbacks of the program, not
just easily reversible freezes.
We know that the Joint Plan of Action sets the course for
Iran to maintain a mutually defined enrichment program
consistent with practical needs. Iran continues to claim a
right to enrich for nuclear power, but we must understand that
none of Iran's current enrichment activities are useful for a
civilian nuclear program.
Consider: Iran already has a nuclear energy reactor at
Bushehr that is running on imported Russian fuel. In fact, the
Russian deal requires the use of Russian imported fuel, just as
other offers from Western nations to fill Iran's nuclear power
needs are contingent on the use of imported fuel from those
nations. It would take Iran years to build the technology
necessary to turn its low-enriched uranium into fuel for a
power reactor. We must remember that none of Iran's current
stockpile of domestically enriched uranium can be used in its
nuclear reactor. To that end, the majority of nations with
nuclear power don't domestically enrich uranium, and instead
import the fuel from other countries.
So what does this all mean? Iranian stockpiles are
essentially useless for their domestic energy program. However,
19,000 centrifuges and 7 tons of enriched uranium are highly
useful when a nation is trying to build a nuclear weapon.
We can all agree that nuclear science is complicated, but
it seems that someone with only a cursory knowledge of nuclear
technology understands the dangers posed by Iran's nuclear
enrichment activities.
Despite the access granted under the JPOA to the IAEA to
inspect centrifuge-manufacturing facilities, can we be sure
that we are going to be able to see the manufacturing of all
the various parts that make up--again, can we be sure that Iran
is not continuing to manufacture more centrifuges at other
locations? Moreover, can we verify that Iran has not already
commenced a third unknown enrichment site? It should not be
lost on us that both Fordow and Natanz were also constructed in
secret until being exposed by the international community in
2002 and 2009 respectively. And Iran has long said that it
intends to have up to 10 enrichment facilities.
Under the JPOA, Iran may continue its research and
development, allowing them to continue work of centrifuge
development. Mr. Albright, you note in your testimony that
centrifuge R&D could also lead to breakthroughs in materials or
methods that would further strengthen a secret breakout effort.
How concerned should we be that continued R&D will simply allow
Iran to install highly advanced centrifuges in 6 months, or in
a year, or in 5 years? These are the kinds of difficult
questions that have to be answered if the P5+1 are to reach an
acceptable final deal.
But perhaps most critically, before any long-term deal is
reached, Iran must come clean about all aspects of its program.
This includes finally addressing all outstanding IAEA concerns
of the possible military dimensions, the development of nuclear
explosive devices, procurement of nuclear-related materials by
the IRGC, and military-run activities at the Parchin site.
The Institute for Science and International Security
described the Parchin site as a huge site dedicated to the
research, development, and production of ammunition, rockets
and high explosives. Iran must know at the outset that they
will not be able to sweep these allegations under the rug.
I look forward to discussing with our witnesses the path
forward to halting what is the greatest threat to international
security, a nuclear-armed Iran. And I yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Deutch.
And now we turn to our full committee chairman Mr. Royce
for his opening statement.
Mr. Royce. Well, thank you very much, Chairman Ros-
Lehtinen, and I thank you, and I thank Chairman Ted Poe, and
also Mr. Deutch, for that very well-reasoned argument that he
just laid out. And, Ileana, I think you laid out a compelling
case as well.
I think all of us are a little stunned. I think we are
stunned that not only does Iran continue to enrich uranium, but
they are very, very vocal about the fact that they are going to
continue the research and development on faster and faster
spinning of centrifuges. And for them to be making this
pronouncement in the middle of this interim agreement on how
they are reaching this capability to develop and spin these
centrifuges at supersonic speeds, setting new records, implies
a certain intent on undetectable nuclear breakout capability.
I think this is what Members worry about. We worry that,
you know, as you try to work out an agreement here, and we talk
about the plutonium reactor, the heavy-water reactor facility
at Arak, they make the point that they are going to continue
performing work at that site.
I think the large quantities of existing stockpiles when
they make the comment that, no, they are not going to draw down
on those stockpiles, all of this sends a message in terms of
what their intent is, and, quite simply, these elements of a
nuclear program which we are talking about right now will
continue to operate as the talks go on. So I think for the
Members of the House here on the Foreign Affairs Committee, we
are a little concerned that unless Iran is pressed to fully
reveal Iran's extensive activities to develop and test a
nuclear device, unless we get that out on the table--and, as we
hear today, there is a great deal of evidence that Iran has
devoted much effort to this over the years. Unless we have the
details on that, I think we are left wondering about Iran's
clear intentions here.
And I don't think we want them to cover up that extensive
evidence either. And part of it is because we watch Iran's
actions. Over 400 executions last year of political and of
religious opposition in the country. Stoning is still going on
in Iran as a penalty. It is a capital offense for things such
as adultery. As has been mentioned a number of times, a regime
that is stoning women with one hand shouldn't be allowed with
the other hand to get its grip on a nuclear weapon.
I mean, this is just logical that we be concerned about
this. And if a comprehensive agreement is reached, the threat
of a nuclear-armed Iran is not going to be over for a couple of
other reasons.
One of today's witnesses has estimated that even if we were
to force Iran to dismantle 80 percent of its 19,000 installed
centrifuges, and, of course, they say, you know, they won't
dismantle one of them, even if we were to force it to close its
entire enrichment facility at Fordow, even if we were to
dismantle or convert its planned heavy-water reactor to a
light-water reactor, agree to a multidecade intrusive
inspections regime, the fact is that Iran would still be 6
months away from nuclear breakout. So if we are in a situation
right now where they won't give ground on any of these points
that I have just raised, I think we have something of a problem
on our hands.
So even if the administration were to achieve this
agreement, which increasingly, many say, might be a 50/50
proposition, I think that was the administration's assumption,
especially now that we have let up on sanctions pressure, Iran
will likely still possess the capability of very quickly
producing a nuclear weapon. Why do I say that? Because when you
let up on sanctions pressure, you let up on the one thing you
had that made it hard for them to get hard currency, that might
make the ayatollah make the tough choice between compromising
on the nuclear program or economic implosion. So that is gone
now. The message is out, you know, Iran is open for business.
You see the headlines, you know, the next day in the Wall
Street Journal: Businesses rush to Iran to cut business deals.
You see their stock market go back up, their currency go back
up in value. So we could end up, if we are not careful, ending
up on a track to have us face a permanent nuclear threat from
Iran because we rehabilitate their capabilities.
And so that is why I thank the chairwoman, I thank Mr. Poe
and Mr. Deutch for their observations on this. But I especially
thank the panel of witnesses, because our four witnesses today
are true experts in this field. We look forward to the
testimony.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Well put. Thank you so much, Mr.
Chairman.
We now turn to the ranking member of the TNT Subcommittee,
Mr. Sherman.
Mr. Sherman. A November agreement was supposed to last 6
months, but not until 2 months after it was signed, 8 months.
It can be extended for another 6 months. We are looking at 14
months. What happens during the 14 months? Their 20 percent
stockpile, half gets oxidized, but it is still 20 percent.
Another half gets diluted and oxidized. More low-enriched
uranium is created and stockpiled, albeit in oxidized form.
Work on centrifuge technology continues, though certain
centrifuges will not be used. This delays only for a short time
when Iran would have a nuclear weapon, because the 20 percent
oxidized uranium can be converted back to a gas quite quickly.
Iran uses that same technology to convert yellowcake into
gaseous uranium. And at the end of this agreement, Iran may be
a little bit further than they were in November from their
first bomb, but will be closer to a cache of 5 to 10 bombs
because they will have all of the additional low-enriched
uranium that they create during the pendency of the deal.
The sanctions relief has been very substantial because it
has changed the business climate. It is not just the content of
the relief. There are loopholes in our existing sanctions laws.
Companies have been reluctant to exploit those because they
figure the next sanctions law was around the corner. Well, now
it is not, and so we see a rush to do business with Iran.
The disagreement here in Washington is actually rather
modest. There seems to be agreement that we are not adopting
new statutory sanctions until July, or at least not letting
them become effective until July. The administration
significantly has agreed to enforce existing sanctions, and
would do that even if the Iranians threatened to walk out of
the agreement.
Secretary Kerry was in this room where your witnesses are
sitting now. He agreed that he would continue enforcing the
existing law. Within a day they designated roughly a dozen
entities, the Iranians walked out. They came back. So we agreed
to enforce existing laws. We agree no new laws will become
effective until July. So the question is under what
circumstances will new sanctions becoming effective in July go
into effect, and who will make that decision, the President
alone or the President with Congress?
Who will decide that Iran is just engaged in a delay
program, or that we have reached sufficient progress? I don't
think Congress should surrender this role, because Congress has
been right, and three administrations have been wrong. From
1996 to 2010, Congress didn't enact major sanctions
legislation. Why? Because three administrations sought so
effectively, usually in the Senate, to prevent the adoption of
that legislation. Congress is right. The House was more right
than the Senate, and Congress was more right than three
different administrations.
Now we are being asked, oh, just don't do anything. Trust
the President. He will do the right thing. The fact is that we
are told by the administration we can adopt new sanctions in a
nanosecond, should we decide that that is important. What he
really means is, what the administration means is, we can adopt
new sanctions in a nanosecond if the administration agrees with
them; but if they don't, their capacity for delay and
obfuscation, for dilution and defeat of sanctions has been
proven. It was proven effective in 2009. It was proven
effective for the 8 years of the prior administration.
What are our choices? We can act now and adopt sanctions
that will go into effect in July, but also schedule a vote in
July where Congress could decide by joint resolution to suspend
or prevent the sanctions from becoming effective, and we would
do so if adequate progress is made. We can have a compromise
approach, right, and conference on the sanctions, and schedule
a vote, affirmative vote, of both Houses of Congress without
delay, without filibuster, without obfuscation, without further
division between the committees and the Houses as to what the
content would be, and pass new legislation, if warranted, in
July, and soon enough to prevent any pocket veto since we go
out in August.
The final approach is what I call the narcolepsy approach:
Go to sleep until the administration decides to wake us up.
Then they say, then we will get around to thinking about
something in July because we will notice that the 6 months
which is 8 months has passed. At that point you can be sure
that this administration, like the prior two administrations,
will be for delay, dilution and defeat, and we will be in
session only a few weeks between the end of July and the end of
the year. So Iran will get a full year of relief from
sanctions, and actually 14 months.
I think the one thing for this hearing to establish is that
we are not going to adopt the narcolepsy approach; that we are
going to have sanctions that Iran will know will go into effect
in July if adequate progress, determined by Congress, is not
reached, and with that, I think our negotiators will be far
more effective than if Congress is regarded as on vacation.
I yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Sherman.
And now we go to the chairman of the TNT Subcommittee,
Judge Poe from Texas.
Mr. Poe. Thank you, Madam Chair.
The world powers surrendered to the Iranian nation's will.
Those are the words of Iranian President Rouhani. It should not
surprise any of us that the Iranians view this agreement as a
win for them, a loss for us, and a loss for a safer world.
Iran's Foreign Minister boasted, we did not agree to dismantle
anything, referring to their enrichment activities. He is
right. Iran not only gets to keep its infrastructure intact, it
gets to keep enriching, or it gets to keep its yellow cake and
eat it, too.
The U.N. has voted on five occasions, saying Iran has
cheated in its nuclear capability, and they should not be able
to enrich at all. In one deal Iran just wiped away all of those
U.N. resolutions.
When the United States negotiates a deal that makes the
U.N. look tough, we got a problem. Just as bad, none of its
changes agreed to are permanent, and verification is difficult.
Hours after Iran signed the agreement, their top nuclear
negotiator bragged on Iranian TV that they could ``return to
the previous situation in 1 day.''
In reality, estimates suggest the Iranians could still
achieve nuclear breakout capability in 6 months. This agreement
doesn't force Iran to stop its nuclear program. Rouhani is a
snake oil salesman. He sold poison medicine to us, and the
State Department gave away the farm and the mineral rights in
exchange. This agreement bars Iran from installing nuclear
equipment at its heavy-water reactor, Arak, but allows them to
continue to construct its nuclear reactor. The problem is that
Arak's reactor size and design is too big for a peaceful
reactor. Experts say it more closely resembles a nuclear
weapons facility. Well, no kidding.
When asked if he thought that Arak could be used for
peaceful purposes, former State Department nonproliferation
official Robert Einhorn said, ``Yes, it could. A 12-inch
hunting knife could also be used to spread jam on your toast in
the morning.''
In this deal Iran will get $6 billion in cash payments over
6 months. Iran also gets billions more as companies who were
sitting on the sidelines out of fear of the sanctions now say
it is okay to do business as usual with Iran. This could inject
about $20 billion into Iran's economy according to sanctions
expert Mark Dubowitz.
The Iranians know there is no enforcement mechanism once a
final agreement is reached because all sanctions will be
lifted. Despite what the White House says, it will be nearly
impossible to restart punishing sanctions if Iran cheats or
lies. You can't turn on sanctions, can't turn them on and off
like a light switch.
I talked to Prime Minister Netanyahu right after this deal
was signed. He is correct. This is a bad deal for Israel and a
bad deal for the United States. The only leverage we had on
Iranian hardliners was tough sanctions that brought their
economy to its knees. By easing sanctions we have blunted our
sharpest tool to get a peaceful solution. We have made peace
less likely. This is a flawed appeasement deal that gave away
too much to Iran. It is similar to Chamberlain's appeasement to
the Nazis in the 1930s, where the allies boasted of peace in
our time and got World War II. I think we will see this interim
deal extended for another 6 months while Iran continues to
enrich and march closer to a nuclear weapon.
Iran has agreed to freeze its nuclear enrichment. They must
dismantle their nuclear weapon program, not just freeze it. The
Iranian Supreme Leader hasn't changed his goal. He has said he
wants to destroy Israel. He wants to destroy the United States.
I think we should believe him when he says he wants to get rid
of us. So Congress cannot wait. We should pass tougher
sanctions, not let up on sanctions at this time. And that is
just the way it is, Madam Speaker.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Judge Poe.
And the bells have rung, but I am going to introduce our
witnesses, and I think that we will have time to listen to our
first witness, Ambassador Wallace, before we break.
First we will welcome Ambassador Mark Wallace, Chief
Executive Officer of United Against Nuclear Iran, which he
founded in 2008. His organization has been a leader in
pressuring businesses to end their dealings with Iran, and has
promoted sanctions legislation to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran.
Prior to this position, Ambassador Wallace was U.S. Ambassador
to the United Nations on U.N. management and reform issues. We
welcome you, sir.
Next we will welcome Mr. Gregory Jones, thank you, Senior
Researcher at the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center. Mr.
Jones has been a defense policy analyst for the past 40 years
and brings great expertise in the areas of nonproliferation and
counterproliferation, especially regarding terrorist
organizations and regimes attempting to acquire nuclear
technology. Welcome, sir.
Third, we welcome Mr. Olli Heinonen--I am sorry if I don't
say that right--close enough--Senior Fellow at the Harvard
Kennedy School of Government. Prior to this position, he served
for 27 years at the International Atomic Energy Agency,
including as Deputy Director General. He led the Agency's
efforts to identify and dismantle nuclear proliferation
networks, including overseeing its efforts to monitor and
contain Iran's nuclear program. He has led nuclear programs
investigations around the world, including to South Africa,
Iraq, North Korea, and Syria. Welcome, Olli.
Last but not least we welcome Mr. David Albright, a
physicist and founder and president of the Nonprofit Institute
for Science and International Security. Mr. Albright has
written numerous assessments on secret nuclear weapons programs
throughout the world and has coauthored several books on the
subject.
Your statements in full will be made a part of the record,
and please feel free to summarize them. We will start with you,
Mr. Ambassador.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MARK D. WALLACE, CHIEF EXECUTIVE
OFFICER, UNITED AGAINST NUCLEAR IRAN (FORMER UNITED STATES
AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED NATIONS)
Ambassador Wallace. Thank you, Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, and
Chairman Poe, Ranking Member Deutch----
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. I think you need to--I don't know if the
mike is on.
Ambassador Wallace. There we go. Thank you, Chairman, and
Chairman Poe, Ranking Members Sherman and Deutch, and members
of the joint subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to
testify before you once again. I am honored to sit here on the
panel with a group of very distinguished and committed
colleagues. It is a true honor.
We at UANI sincerely hope that a comprehensive and
verifiable agreement that rolls back Iran's nuclear program is
reached in 6 months, but the prospects appear small, and we
must confront the difficulties with candor and bipartisan
debate.
The Joint Plan has provided disproportionate sanctions
relief to Iran, and allowed Iran to retain and continue to
develop and advance a dangerous nuclear program. Under the
agreement, Tehran will not dismantle a single centrifuge or its
heavy-water reactor at Arak, IR-40. Today Iran retains the
ability to produce enough weapons-grade uranium for a bomb in
as little as 2 months, and Iran has not indicated that it would
end its development of the IR-40. At the same time the
sanction's architecture, developed over decades, has been
significantly rolled back, and enforcement has fallen to a
trickle. What is the acceptable scope and size of Iran's
enrichment program, and will we permit Iran to operate the IR-
40?
If Iran truly only sought a peaceful nuclear energy
program, there would be no need for any enrichment or a heavy-
water reactor. The international community seems to have
forgotten there are multiple U.N. Security Council resolutions
calling for Iran to suspend all enrichment. Regrettably, the
Geneva Joint Plan declares that in any final accord, Iran will
be permitted to enrich and is, at best, vague regarding the
future of the IR-40.
Today you will hear a range of opinions on what an
acceptable Iranian enrichment program would look like and the
dangers of Iran's operation of the IR-40. We should all agree
that extending Iran's breakout time from its current 30 to 60
days to well beyond is the imperative. But does any serious
person believe that Iran is prepared to dismantle between
15,000 and 19,000 centrifuges and forego the installation of
far more efficient and advanced centrifuges? Clearly not.
Sanctions have become so important to this matter.
Unfortunately, the White House has described the sanctions
relief provided in the agreement as economically insignificant.
We disagree. Iran's economy is blossoming.
Some hard data. The rial has increased in value by more
than 25 percent. The Tehran stock exchange has increased by
nearly 100 percent. Dozens of multinational corporations are
returning to Iran. Iran's oil exports have increased by nearly
60 percent.
Iran's oil exports have risen to 1.2 million barrels per
day from a low of 761,000 barrels per day. Under the Joint
Plan, Iran's oil exports will increase further, and if oil
sanctions continue unaltered, Iran's oil sales would have
continued to drop to as little as 500,000 barrels per day by
the end of 2014.
Importantly, the administration has curtailed its
enforcement efforts. In 2013, the United States Treasury
Department designated 183 entities for Iran's sanctions
violations. Since President Rouhani's election, the United
States has blacklisted only 29 entities. The Obama
administration must hold to its pledge to enforce sanctions.
The White House estimates that Iran stands to receive $6
billion, to $7 billion in sanctions relief. The true value of
sanctions relief is well more than $20 billion. Just calculate
the increase in oil sales, lest there be any doubt. Now we
believe there will be far less pressure for Iran to actually
make material concessions on its nuclear program.
The Congress must actively take part in this process and
make its position known. We all must agree that Iran will not
be permitted to retain an industrial-scale nuclear program.
This would entail capping the number of IR-1 centrifuges to a
small fraction of the nearly 20,000 Iran currently possesses
or, more appropriately, none at all. Iran must be kept well
over a year away from breakout, given its long history of
duplicity and hostility. Rouhani strongly supports efforts to
impose sanctions on Iran in 6 months' time until a final accord
is reached.
The Congress should pass and the President should sign into
law the Nuclear Weapons Free Iran Act, which has the support of
a bipartisan majority. It is wrong that the White House is
characterizing those who support new sanctions or question the
Joint Plan as dishonest warmongers.
History offers a disturbing precedent. In the 1990s, we
entered into a similar interim nuclear agreement with North
Korea. The Agreed Framework became the proverbial can that was
kicked down the road. No final agreement was ever struck, and
the DPRK surprised the world with a nuclear test. This time
Congress must make clear that if there is no final agreement
after the Joint Plan's initial 6-month term, that Congress will
adopt more robust sanctions. We must learn the lessons of
history and not repeat its mistakes.
Thank you, Madam Chairman, for the opportunity.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Wallace follows:]
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Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. And the subcommittees will recess while
we vote, and we will come right back to hear the rest of our
panelists and to have members question them. The subcommittee
is in recess.
[Recess.]
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. The subcommittee will come to order.
Thank you for your patience as we voted. We will have
another set of votes at 4 o'clock, so we hope that we can
almost wrap it up.
Mr. Jones, you are welcome to make your statement, and your
prepared remarks, as we said, will be made a part of the
record. Thank you, sir.
STATEMENT OF MR. GREGORY S. JONES, SENIOR RESEARCHER,
NONPROLIFERATION POLICY EDUCATION CENTER
Mr. Jones. Thank you.
In early November, Secretary of State Kerry said of the
ongoing negotiations with Iran, ``We need to get the right
deal. No deal is better than a bad deal.'' Unfortunately, the
November 24th Joint Plan of Action is a bad deal. This fact has
been obscured by both a mischaracterization of the deal's
benefits and the denial of the deal's great flaw.
President Obama has said that the deal has ``cut off Iran's
most likely paths to a bomb.'' This is not true. Before the
current nuclear deal, Iran could produce the highly enriched
uranium, HEU, for a nuclear weapon in just 6 weeks. Over the
next 6 months, the Joint Plan of Action will increase this
interval only slightly, to 8 weeks. Iran will remain perilously
close to a nuclear weapon.
The Joint Plan of Action allows Iran to continue to produce
3.5 percent enriched uranium, which is the key starting
material for any uranium effort to produce HEU for weapons.
Iran's stockpile of this material will continue to grow during
the course of this nuclear deal, though several White House
statements as well as Secretary Kerry have incorrectly claimed
otherwise. As this stockpile of enriched uranium grows, the
number of nuclear weapons that Iran could produce from it will
grow as well.
Iran's stockpile of 3.5 percent enriched uranium in the
form of uranium hexafluoride is not supposed to grow. Iran is
supposed to convert the excess into an oxide form, but Iran can
easily convert this material back into hexafluoride once it
begins to produce nuclear weapons. This fact is well known to
U.S. technical experts, but their input was apparently either
not sought or heeded.
The Joint Plan of Action does have some benefits, and there
are those who have argued that even limited benefits are better
than no deal, but this view ignores the great flaw in the deal.
It permits Iran to retain centrifuge enrichment. Centrifuge
technology puts any country within an arm's reach of the HEU
for nuclear weapons.
The Joint Plan of Action has already stated that when the
follow-on so-called comprehensive solution has expired, Iran
``will be treated in the same manner as that of any nonnuclear
weapons state party to the NPT.'' This means that in, say, 5 or
10 years, Iran's nuclear program will be under no special
restrictions, and if the P5+1 members have allowed Iran to keep
its centrifuge enrichment program, then not only could it build
as many centrifuges as it wants, it could also import
centrifuges as part of normal nuclear trade. Iran could then
have a larger, more robust centrifuge enrichment program and be
much closer to acquiring nuclear weapons than it currently is.
What is worse, the Joint Plan of Action will be setting a
precedent for all other nonnuclear-weapon countries. After all,
if Iran is to be treated in the same manner as that of any
nonnuclear-weapons state party to the NPT, then the reverse
would be true as well. If Iran, that has violated its IAEA
safeguards by conducting clandestine centrifuge enrichment and
has defied multiple U.N. Security Council resolutions demanding
that it halt its centrifuge enrichment, is allowed to retain
this capability, on what basis can any country that has abided
by its IAEA safeguard obligations be denied centrifuge
enrichment? The Joint Plan of Action is setting the stage for
many countries to acquire centrifuge enrichment, making it very
easy for them to produce the HEU for nuclear weapons whenever
they desire them.
Unfortunately, there are no good options to head off a
nuclear-armed Iran. Any negotiated settlement would require
major reductions in Iran's centrifuge enrichment program,
reductions that Iran has already said it will not agree to.
Further sanctions are unlikely to be effective since countries
such as Russia and China will probably undercut them. Military
strikes could easily lead to an ill-advised major war with
Iran.
The U.S. instead needs to try to strengthen the overall
nonproliferation system, which appears to be unraveling. Key to
this effort will be to stop countries from using nominally
peaceful nuclear activities to acquire the HEU or plutonium
needed for nuclear weapons. The U.S. needs to urge the IAEA to
clarify which materials and facilities it can effectively
safeguard and which it cannot. A negotiated agreement with Iran
that legitimizes its centrifuge enrichment program would be a
step in the wrong direction.
Thank you.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Jones.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Jones follows:]
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Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Mr.--help me out.
Mr. Heinonen. Thank you very much.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Heinonen.
Mr. Heinonen. Heinonen.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Got it.
STATEMENT OF MR. OLLI HEINONEN, SENIOR FELLOW, BELFER CENTER
FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, HARVARD UNIVERSITY
(FORMER DEPUTY DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC
ENERGY AGENCY)
Mr. Heinonen. Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member Deutch,
distinguished members of the committee, thank you very much for
inviting me to address this hearing.
I will concentrate my remarks on the verification aspects
of this deal which was concluded on the 20th of November,
highlight some of the implications from a verification angle,
and make some minor proposals for the way forward.
The interim agreement is a small but important step
forward, which got, after a long delay, finally a good start on
the 20th of January. Under this deal Iran continues to produce
low enriched uranium, keeps both 5 and 20 percent enriched
uranium stocks on its soil, maintains centrifuge production
capabilities, including the skills of the workforce, and
continues with centrifuge R&D and testing.
Iran will produce additional centrifuge rotors only to
replace broken ones, but is not restricted in its production of
other key centrifuge components or raw materials. No new
centrifuges will be installed or new enrichment locations will
be built during this period. Some of the 5 percent enriched
uranium and all the 20 percent enriched uranium gets converted
to oxides.
In terms of capacity, that is, when Iran is able to produce
enough weapons-grade UF6 material for a single nuclear
explosive, the sliding bar will move from 2, 3 weeks to 3
months as a result of this deal. In other words, Iran maintains
its semi-industrial enrichment capabilities.
Construction work in nonnuclear parts is permitted at the
Arak IR-4 reactor, and reactor component manufacturing proceeds
elsewhere. The production of heavy water continues. The halting
of the fuel production at Isfahan and prohibiting of the
installation of nuclear components delays the commissioning of
Arak reactor until 2016.
In November 2003, EU-3, France, Germany, and the U.K., and
Iran agreed to suspend uranium enrichment and reprocessing
programs in Iran, implementing provisionally the additional
protocol, and providing the IAEA with a complete picture on its
past nuclear program. The verification of details worked out in
2003 agreement by the IAEA and Iran generally have provided
IAEA a much wider access than this agreement.
The 2003 undertaking included, inter alia, access to the
nuclear R&D not involving nuclear material. An example of such
access was the IAEA visits to centrifuge mechanical testing,
but this is in Tehran, Natanz, and Isfahan, and to centrifuge
component manufacturing facilities, and to key raw materials
such as high-strength aluminum or maraging steel.
One of the current challenges the IAEA is facing is to
establish the actual inventory of centrifuge rotors
manufactured by Iran. Iran commits itself not to construct new
enrichment locations, reconvert uranium back to hexafluoride,
and that it will not construct any facility capable for
reprocessing. With the access provided currently by Iran and
the JPA, the IAEA remains limited in its capabilities to
confirm the statements made to this end by Iran regardless
whether it is to do with the centrifuges, past centrifuge
enrichment, laser enrichment, or reprocessing.
The preamble of this JPA refers to additional steps between
initial measures and the final step, which include addressing
the U.N. Security Council resolutions. Those include
outstanding issues such as related to the possible military
dimension of the Iranian nuclear program. In other words, Iran
needs, according to those resolutions, to explain--resolve the
questions related to all its studies, missile reentry vehicle,
green salt, and certain high-explosive studies.
It has to explain why it acquired that uranium metal
document, which was to do with the manufacturing of a nuclear
warhead. It has to clarify the procurement and R&D activities
of military-related institutes and companies, and has to
explain the production of nuclear equipment and components by
companies related to the military establishment.
Without addressing these questions, the IAEA Secretariat
will not be able to come to any conclusion that all nuclear
material in Iran is in peaceful use, which is essential in
building confidence of the international community over Iran's
nuclear program. To this end, I give in my written statement
some proposals how to proceed on this way, gradually to set up
and build this confidence about the peaceful nature of the
program.
Then at the end I would like to say that this agreement
serves an interim stage. It should not be either an end by
itself or be sustained indefinitely beyond the allotted time
period up to 1 year without end game in sight. Further
extensions may also run the risk of proliferation consequences
in the region when the states see Iran not only maintaining its
current nuclear breakout capabilities, but slowly advancing
them, in particular areas which remain unaccessible to the IAEA
inspectors.
Thank you.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much for your expertise.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Heinonen follows:]
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Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Mr. Albright.
STATEMENT OF MR. DAVID ALBRIGHT, FOUNDER AND PRESIDENT,
INSTITUTE FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
Mr. Albright. Thank you very much for inviting me today. It
is a great pleasure to be here. And I appreciate all your work
that you are doing to try to sort through the proper oversight
role of Congress, which I personally believe is extremely
important in this situation.
I think we have discussed the interim deal of the Joint
Plan of Action quite a bit, and I think its strengths and
weaknesses have been identified. I think the real test of the
Joint Plan of Action is going to lie in negotiating the long-
term arrangements, and that is a process that many are not
giving a high probability of success. But nonetheless, this
long-term, comprehensive solution is going to have to create
meaningful limits on Iran's nuclear program, combined with
adequate verification sufficient to ensure that any attempt by
Iran to build nuclear weapons would be detected in a timely
manner and provide adequate time for an international response.
Now, the interim deal is, from my point of view, an
important confidence-building measure, but it certainly has its
weaknesses, many of which have been talked about. And we
yesterday published an article on some problems and loopholes
involving centrifuge R&D, which we think rather than
criticizing the interim deal, I would argue that that has to be
fixed in any comprehensive solution; that Iran's ability to
make advanced centrifuges has to be severely curtailed, and the
process that they are involved in with centrifuge R&D has to be
much more transparent, and particularly to deal with some of
the problems Olli has confronted.
Also, I want to agree with what Olli said, that the interim
deal should not continue past its planned lifetime. By itself
it is by no means sufficient. And if you can't get a
comprehensive deal, the interim deal is not a substitute in any
manner.
Also, I want to say that a real test of Iran's intentions
in the short to medium term is how it is going to treat the
IAEA on these issues involving the allegations of Iran's past
work on nuclear weapons and other military programs. Iran has
delayed the meeting with the IAEA that was supposed to happen
in January until February 8. Is it going to delay it again? Is
it going to--and if it has a meeting, is it going to allow the
IAEA to go to Parchin and other facilities and meet with people
so the IAEA can get to the bottom of it?
Now, on the comprehensive solution, my testimony and our
studies at ISIS have outlined what we see as a model, and
certain things have been talked about. Certainly we want to see
much greater breakout times. To meet our national security
interests, we think the breakout times should be measured in 6
to 12 months to allow detection time and response time, and
that is going to require Iran to remove over 14,000 centrifuges
at Natanz and Fordow.
Also, some of my colleagues have mentioned the problem with
oxide. I mean, the stocks of LEU need to be reduced,
particularly the 20 percent stocks. Putting them into oxide may
work in an interim deal, but it doesn't work in a comprehensive
deal. We all agree that the Iraq reactor, Iran's plutonium
route to nuclear weapons, has to be blocked.
Also, we haven't talked a lot about it, but there needs to
be much greater verification that is put in play. Often Iran
says, we will accept the additional protocol. We would argue it
has to be the additional protocol plus. There has to be another
set of verification conditions in this deal that are going to
provide much greater transparency of the program.
The other thing that is also important is to remember how
long these conditions would last. The administration is talking
about 20 years. Iran is talking about 3 to 5. I think it is
very important that 20 years be the minimum, and that the
administration be held to that minimum. I think if that is
done, and in a sense Iran would be on probation for 20 years,
that could provide the confidence that Iran has turned a
corner.
One thing that this Joint Plan of Action doesn't deal with
is how do they in a sense come out of probation; that it is
right now implied that the conditions would end from one day to
the next. And whatever the length is, probably some work needs
to be done to make sure that the conditions are removed only if
Iran has satisfied certain criteria.
I think I have talked enough about the verification, but I
do want to reemphasize that Iran has been very tough on this.
It has resisted all kinds of verification. It is resisting it
today. And I think that another test is going to be whether
Iran is fully cooperative with the IAEA and with the IAEA's
effort to get to the bottom of all its outstanding issues,
which are going to require much more intrusive verification,
and that would be played out over the next several months if
the comprehensive solution is going to be negotiated by the end
of this 6-month period.
Let me just end there. I am sorry. I realize I am over
time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Albright follows:]
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Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much to the excellent
panelists.
We will begin with our set of questions.
My first question is why is this deal in secret? Why is it
that Members of Congress have to go to a supersecret secure
location, cone of silence, Get Smart kind of place to look at
the deal? And, Mr. Acevedo, our subcommittee staff director,
and I did that, and we went into the room, and it is a very
easy-to-read document. One doesn't have to be as an expert as
one of our panelists is to understand what is there. It is
quite eye-opening. I encourage all of the Members to go there
and read the document. You can't take notes. You can't take it
out.
But if this is such a great deal, if this is so good for
peace and diplomacy in our time, why is it held in secret? And
do you worry about the details in this plan? Do you worry about
what may be or may not be in it? I just ask that as a general
question, because having read it, if the administration is
proud of it, I think that they should highlight it.
I will ask the panelists, what is the greatest worry you
have about this deal? And, Ambassador Wallace, last week there
were reports that Iran could use the money from sanctions
relief to fund terrorism against us. What kind of oversight or
mechanisms are in place, do you know, to ensure that the proper
and adequate use of sanctions relief funds, and can we follow
the money once it is released?
So the secretive nature of the deal; why doesn't the public
have it; why can't we just have it in an open setting; your
greatest worry; and can we follow the money? Whoever wants to
get at that.
Ambassador?
Ambassador Wallace. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
My biggest worry about the deal is that we have
significantly rolled back the sanctions architecture which all
of you, both sides of the aisle, have carefully constructed,
and defied a variety of Presidents over a long time, and
created the sanctions architecture.
Mr. Sherman said it quite well in his intervention where he
said, you have to have ever-increasing sanctions for them to be
effective. The moment you start dialing them back, they start
falling away. So we have really undercut dramatically the
sanctions effort, and the Iranian economy, as I said, is
blossoming.
At the same time, we haven't rolled back their nuclear
program in any material way. No one on this panel, and there
are true experts on this panel on the complexities of the
nuclear physics, can show that a single centrifuge has been
dismantled. Whatever the range of opinions here, if you believe
in no enrichment or some limited enrichment, it means that Iran
can only have something like zero to maybe 4,000 IR-1, the most
primitive centrifuge. That is the range of opinion probably at
this table. I don't want to speak for my colleagues. What are
the chances that Iran is going to dismantle 15,000 to 19,000 of
its centrifuges? I say none.
So my worry is that the interim agreement becomes the
permanent agreement.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
Any other panelists?
Mr. Jones.
Mr. Jones. Can I just say with regard to the terms being
somewhat secret, this does bother me, and not necessarily for
the reason you think. It appears to me that the administration
has negotiated an agreement it doesn't fully understand, and I
don't understand how that can happen, because obviously there
are technical experts in the national labs who know as much as
I, if not more. But it is clear there are various places, and
one is the 3.5 percent enriched uranium stockpile won't grow,
which is obviously not correct. Another is that disconnecting
the tandem cascades would prevent Iran from producing 20
percent, where we know that they originally produced it with
single cascades, which was what they would be left with.
So I am left with the impression that the administration
doesn't really understand what it has negotiated, and that I
find most worrisome.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Heinonen?
Mr. Heinonen. Yes.
About the document and the secret agreement, actually it is
not very unusual in this. I think there are similar
understandings where at the time of the Agreed Framework with
North Korea. So we have seen those before.
When I look at the technical explanations, where this
really--especially the White House, I didn't see any reason
technically to keep those provisions secret. But there might be
some other parts which I just don't know because I have not
seen the document and how big it is. But I think it would
clarify a lot of areas if it is made public.
Then the second thing, my worries. I think that I mentioned
my worries in my opening statement, and particularly really
this becomes a kind of final agreement, or agreement which has
a long life expectancy, because we really don't get any insight
to the content of the Iranian nuclear program with this deal.
It is better than what was a year or 2 ago the situation, but
it is not the final solution.
And I still want to remind from the verification point of
view that every day when the IAEA doesn't have access to this
so-called military dimension, it would be more and more
difficult for it to verify what actually took place.
Thank you.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much.
And, Mr. Albright, we will have to wait for your statement
maybe in another set of questions from my colleagues.
And I would like to encourage our members to please go and
read the document. I encourage you to do so.
And before I recognize Ranking Member Deutch, I hear that
his older brother is in the front row; is that right?
Mr. Deutch. That is correct.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. You told me he was your younger brother.
Thank you so much. Mr. Deutch.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Madam Chairman. That is one I don't
believe that I will live down for a while.
That is right, Ranking Member Sherman points out he does
have more hair than his younger brother.
Mr. Sherman. Not that I would notice.
Mr. Deutch. I wanted to just follow up with Mr. Albright.
If I understand correctly, the quote that I referred to in my
opening statement about Parchin being a huge site dedicated to
the research, development, production of ammunition, rockets,
and high explosives, which is owned by Iran's military industry
and has hundreds of buildings and test sites, is one that came
from your organization; is that correct?
Mr. Albright. Yes. We have looked at that quite a bit.
Mr. Deutch. So if you could just speak to what is, I think,
the crux of all this entire debate. This is not about just the
centrifuges that are spinning, this is about how to prevent
Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. And that statement and
Parchin seems to be right at the heart of this, and yet we
don't yet have the details behind.
Mr. Heinonen, you just alluded to this as well. What do we
have to see there? How likely is it for the Iranians to have
completely swept clean Parchin? And when we talk about Iran
coming clean on the possible military dimensions, what is it
that they have to provide; and are there examples of other
regimes in similar circumstances who have faced this question,
and what have we expected from them?
Mr. Albright. I think Parchin, there is a site there that
is alleged to have been engaged in high-explosive work related
to nuclear weapons development. The IAEA has evidence of it. It
asked to go for over 18 months and has been denied. And in that
time Iran has significantly modified the site to the point
where it may not be possible for them to take environmental
sampling and find something.
But I think the key thing is, one, Iran has to allow the
visit, and then they have to allow the follow-up. It is not
just a visit. I mean, the IAEA will come, they will do things
that Iran will have to allow them to do, and then they are
going to have to give them access to the people involved, based
on IAEA information at least, and answer the basic question,
did they do this work.
Mr. Deutch. When were the previous inspections?
Mr. Albright. They have never been to this building, or to
this particular complex. They have been to Parchin, Olli can
talk about that, but it was a long time ago, and the
information available was much less complete than it is now.
And so I think the focus now is on this particular site of high
explosives.
Now, you asked there is other sites, too. There are sites
involved, workshops that are alleged to have made reentry
vehicles prior to 2004. The IAEA has asked to go there in the
past and has not been allowed.
So I think in cases where it has worked, Libya, South
Africa, the country cooperates, and in that cooperation you can
see that it can work out, and that IAEA can do its job. Iran
has not shown that level of cooperation.
And so one of the first things to look for, if Iran is
going to settle this, is it cooperating, and so that the IAEA
is able to get the people, gets the information it needs, and
then is able to ask follow-up questions to get to the very
bottom of this?
Mr. Deutch. But we are not operating in the dark here. We
have a list, presumably, and, Mr. Heinonen, I would ask you
this as well. We know who we would like--the IAEA knows the
people that need to be spoken to, correct?
Mr. Albright. Well, they know some, but they won't know the
complete list. I mean, it is not possible. I know in the case
of South Africa, there were people that you wouldn't have
expected who provided important information.
Mr. Deutch. But you don't get those other names until you
start with the ones that we have.
Mr. Albright. That is right. You need to start.
Mr. Deutch. So tell us about the discussions that have
taken place thus far. Have we identified those individuals that
we wish to speak with? And what is the response from----
Mr. Albright. Yes, but Olli should really answer the ones
they have spoken to.
Mr. Deutch. Please.
Mr. Heinonen. Actually, those discussions are reflected in
the IAEA reports, in 2008 March report and then again for the
June report of 2008. And at that point in time, when we come to
these so-called or possible military dimensions, we have an
opportunity to discuss with the first director of that so-
called physics research center which Iran had programmed for
more than 10 years, but unfortunately he was not able to answer
all the questions. And then we wanted to see his successor,
which never materialized.
So the IAEA has a good understanding of those; also, about
the people who had procured certain equipment which had been
used in those experiments; some scientific publications which
have been published by these people. So there is quite a good
starting point. And then you start to talk, and look at the
facts, and go from there and see whom else you might need to be
seeing.
Mr. Deutch. But is there--if I may, Madam Chair, have we
prepared this list and presented it to the Iranians in all of
the talks thus far? And is there an acknowledgment that, yes,
those are appropriate questions, and we will make sure that
these individuals will respond?
Mr. Heinonen. Well, when you go through an investigative
process, you don't give the whole list. You start with the key
persons, and then you work your way from there. So I don't
think that the IAEA has prepared a very long list at this
stage; only the starting point and then go from there. But such
kind of list exists.
Mr. Deutch. And were those names included in the last
report?
Mr. Heinonen. No, only one name, I think, has been in the
reports, because that is another reason the IAEA doesn't want
it disclosed for a number of reasons, the names.
Mr. Deutch. But that name has been disclosed----
Mr. Heinonen. Yeah, one name has been disclosed.
Mr. Deutch. Since that would certainly be a good place to
start, and he has already been identified in the report, has he
agreed to engage in these discussions?
Mr. Heinonen. Yes. We met him, I think, twice. But then at
one point in time, then the process got stopped, and we never
got to his successor.
Mr. Deutch. Madam Chairman, just before I yield back, I
hope later in Mr. Heinonen's responses he might be able to
elaborate on the comment that he made in his opening statement
that in 2003 in the agreement there was much greater access
provided than there is today.
Mr. Albright. Can I add one thing, though, to add to Olli's
answer?
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Go right ahead.
Mr. Albright. One is Mohsen Fakhrizadeh has been
identified. Olli was talking about Shahmoradi, who ran the
physics research center. So there are lists of names that have
been made public. And no, I don't think any of them have ever
talked about anything to do with the military dimensions.
Shahmoradi, correct me if I am wrong, Olli, talked about work
he did as a professor at Sharif University, but he didn't talk
about the physics research center work.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much. Thank you, Mr. Deutch.
And we appreciate the younger brother being here to get you
here on time after the votes. Now we know the weapon when Mrs.
Deutch is not available.
Judge Poe. That's just the way it is.
Mr. Poe. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
I want to say amen to your comments about the deal being
public not only for Members of Congress, but for American
people as well, since it affects us. I am perplexed why it is
not. And I still don't know why it is not.
Iran is the mischief maker in the Middle East. They have
the military. Their military is involved in Syria. They support
terrorism throughout the world. They are sending rockets to
Hezbollah in Lebanon so they can be fired into Israel. They are
responsible for the attacks on the Iranian dissidents, the MEK
in Iraq, over the last several years.
The Supreme Leader of Iran said that he wants to destroy
Israel. He wants to destroy the United States. They are
building intercontinental ballistic missiles. They are
expanding their conventional war capabilities.
What in the world are we thinking that they want to deal
with us and cut back on their nuclear weapon development? What
incentive? I mean, they might just not be telling us the truth
that they will cut back. I don't think we should believe
anything they say.
Contracts, deals are made when both sides agree, and there
are inspections, or people act in good faith. The Iranians
aren't acting in good faith. I don't see any evidence over the
last few years they have ever acted in good faith. Sanctions
have worked, and we are now backing off the sanctions. They
have to be forced not to be able to build nuclear weapons.
Now, I agree peace is the best answer, negotiations is the
best answer. Long term we got to do that. We don't want to be
involved in some type of military action, and we have to
prevent that from happening. But long term, Mr. Albright, you
talked about the long-term situation, we look down the road
months, years, it doesn't look too good for the free world as
far as nuclear weapons go. I mean these ICBMs, they are being
built not to go Israel, but to go west, Europe, go to the
United States.
So, Ambassador, and I will let all of you comment on this,
long term how are we going to resolve the problem that Iran is
determined to have nuclear weapons; what is the answer to that
question?
Ambassador Wallace. I guess I will take a first crack at
that big question.
President Obama recently said that somehow if we could have
a nuclear deal with Iran, that it would resolve the sectarian
tensions that are plaguing the region. I disagree with that
strongly, particularly since the nature of this deal seems to
not understand their nuclear weapon program.
The U.N. Security Council passed several resolutions saying
that Iran must suspend its enrichment and clarified the
military aspects that Olli and Mr. Albright were talking about.
That hasn't happened. So I think that we are a long way away
from getting to a point where we can use this nuclear file in a
vacuum to deal with the problems in the region and the like.
And I remain greatly concerned that we seemingly forgot
those Security Council resolutions which required suspension of
enrichment, required a clarification on military dimension. And
in the agreement it says that Iran will have a mutually defined
enrichment program in the final deal. I thought that was an
unfortunate step.
I don't think that goes a long way to answering your big
question, but I want to allow my colleagues time.
Mr. Poe. Well, Ambassador, let me ask you this: Is it
correct that Iran is developing ICBMs? Is that correct?
Ambassador Wallace. We have seen a variety of evidence that
they are looking at the other aspects of obtaining a nuclear
weapon, which is the delivery capacity, the ignition capacity,
and the like.
So we have seen a lot of evidence of this. I think there is
a really important part of the agreement that hasn't been
focused on, which is clarifying these other military aspects of
the program. We haven't heard from Iran about this. They
haven't clarified that. Those reports are very disturbing.
Mr. Poe. Mr. Jones, you want to weigh in on this? Give us
the long-range answer.
Mr. Jones. Well, unfortunately I am always the party pooper
at these things. I believe the ship has sailed, that it is too
late to stop Iran.
Mr. Poe. So you think Iran is going to get nuclear weapons.
Mr. Jones. That is correct. And that depresses everyone who
hears me talk, but that is what I believe, because, as I said
in my statement, I can't see how there is going to be any
agreement. I don't see how the sanctions with the Russians,
Chinese, the Indians undercutting them are going do any good.
As you correctly pointed out, I am not in favor of getting into
yet another war in the Middle East.
Mr. Poe. We have got the Saudis and the Israelis working
together. Who would have ever thought of this? I mean, the
Saudis are worried about the nuclear weapon capability of Iran,
of course Israel is, and they are working together and
denouncing this deal.
Mr. Jones. It certainly shows the level of the threat and
the concern in the region.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Judge.
Thank you.
Mr. Sherman is recognized.
Mr. Sherman. Thank you.
First, if Iran has nuclear weapons, Americans shouldn't
feel that they are safe even if missile defense worked, because
you can smuggle a nuclear weapon inside a bale of marijuana.
Second, the best argument for this agreement remaining
secret is it must contain wonderful pro-American provisions
that hardliners in Iran are unaware of. Unfortunately, and I
know the hardliners look to me for advice and information, but
we have seen it. It doesn't. So it is peculiar that this
agreement is not disclosed.
Nobody wants just one bomb. You are a nuclear power when
you have got several and you are confident enough to test one.
In July, Iran will have a certain stockpile of enriched
uranium. It will have about half its 20 percent enriched, with
that being in oxide form. It will have its low-enriched uranium
hexafluoride that it has today, and then it will have an
additional supply of low-enriched uranium oxide.
Assuming they don't do anything with the yellowcake, they
are just looking at the enriched uranium that they will have in
July, how many bombs is that enough uranium for once they
enrich it to weapons grade?
Mr. Jones?
Mr. Jones. I would estimate around four weapons.
Mr. Sherman. Four. Okay. And how long would it take them,
knowing that they can spend the next 6 months doing experiments
and engineering on their advanced centrifuges, but are not
making any more centrifuges, as I understand the agreement, but
they have got what they have got, they are learning how to use
it better--how long will it take for them to use this stockpile
of enriched uranium and make four weapons, assuming breakout?
Mr. Jones. With just what they have got, they get the first
weapon in about 2 months; the four weapons, I don't know,
probably 4 or 5 months.
Mr. Sherman. 4 to 5 months. I will go down the panel.
Everybody agree with Mr. Jones?
Ambassador Wallace. I would.
Mr. Sherman. You do agree.
Mr. Heinonen?
Mr. Heinonen. I would like to add to the picture another
part, which is the unknowns. It is easy to talk about this what
we see.
Mr. Sherman. Right.
Mr. Heinonen. But the most important thing is to register
the amount of unknowns. Are there additional centrifuges? If
there are, are there additional stocks? And I think this is
where the whole focus----
Mr. Sherman. Based on what we do know, and one of the only
advantages of this agreement is we are inspecting a few things
we hadn't been inspecting before, but answering the question
Mr. Jones did, do you agree with him basically four weapons in
4 months?
Mr. Heinonen. I think it will take longer than 4 months,
but the first weapon will be there in 2, 3 months.
Mr. Sherman. Okay. And Mr. Albright?
Mr. Albright. In terms of the first one, in 2 months,
around that, but I think to get to four or five, I would
probably just multiply that number by four or five. So you are
talking about 8, 10 months.
Mr. Sherman. Okay. So you tend to agree first weapon in 2,
fourth weapon in 4 to 8.
I would point out that if we lose this game, it is not
because of who was calling the plays in the final quarter. We
didn't field a team for the first three quarters.
From 1996 to 2010, although this committee did everything
possible to pass new sanctions, they were stopped by three
successive administrations. Our effective sanctions against
Iran began in 2010; their program began 10 years sooner.
We are now committed to this goal-line stand just a few
yards from the goal line, and it is not clear which play we
could possibly call, but we have got three. We have got the
voluntary sanctions, which is what we have now. That is to say
we have the sanctions we can get other countries to agree to.
Then there are secondary sanctions where you basically threaten
a cutoff of world trade if they don't radically change their
laws. The Iran Sanctions Act calls for that, but we don't do
it. And then finally there is the prospect of military action.
If we took military action, would we be able to turn into
rubble the centrifuges at Natanz and Fordow; do I have an
answer? Mr. Jones?
Mr. Jones. I discuss that in my written testimony.
Mr. Sherman. Uh-huh.
Mr. Jones. Unfortunately, the centrifuges are quite
resistant to bombardment because you have at Fordow 96 parallel
cascades----
Mr. Sherman. Uh-huh.
Mr. Jones [continuing]. That can run. So you certainly you
take out some. A bombing raid, and we saw this in World War II,
you knock out the utilities, the plant goes down. But how
quickly can it get back? And it turns out fairly fast.
Mr. Sherman. Let me put up one other thing. And then the
final possibility is that we threaten to hit every oil field
and industrial and strategic target in Iran if they don't allow
Mr. Wallace to go in with 400 experts, along with the entire
panel, and just clean out everything.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Sherman.
Mr. Sherman. And I don't think I have time to ask for your
comment on that, so you can respond in writing.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
Hold that thought, Olli. Thank you.
Mr. Kinzinger.
Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you, Madam Chair.
And thank you, Mr. Sherman. I thought those were great
questions.
And to the panel, thank you for being here. I am having a
hard time actually figuring out what the United States got out
of this. I mean, you know, the Iranians got a lot. They
basically got an implicit right to enrich uraniun, and we have
allies that are begging us in 3-2-1 agreements to be able to
enrich uranium.
We say no to allies, but then to enemies we basically give
them the right to enrich uranium as a reward for doing it the
wrong way. I mean, I guess I am really having a hard time
figuring out anything that the United States gained besides
being able, I guess, for the next year to go in front of the
American people and say that we won something, but then that
will only be proven wrong by history.
This, to me, is like the equivalent of a police officer
pulling somebody over for DUI, and the person in the car is
saying, well, Mr. Officer, I will be happy to pull over, but
you have to let me have the keys in the car with the engine
running, and I am not going to get out. And then the officer
saying, you know what, that sounds like a fair deal. That is a
good deal for me. So I am having a hard time with that.
I also, you know, think back to what happened in North
Korea. And I remember the agreement that was hailed as, you
know, the peace in our time of the Korean nuclear agreement in
North Korea, that they were going to not have a nuclear weapon.
And, in fact, I remember reading some of the editorial papers
that basically said this was a huge victory against the
warhawks and the people that said diplomacy could never work.
And then a year later, North Korea has nuclear weapons, and
that is something we are dealing with today. And that, I think,
is a regime that, as threatening as they are, are probably less
threatening than what would happen if the Iranians got nuclear
weapons.
And I think of how the sanctions went down even in--and I
know Iraq is a touchy subject, so not talking about the war in
2003, but the inspection regime in the 1990s, and this cat-and-
mouse game that occurred and everything like that. So I am
trying to figure out what the enforcement mechanism on our end
and the motivation to prevent Iran from playing the cat-and-
mouse game. And the second they do, is this a matter of, okay,
well, the deal is off, and we are back to the full sanctions?
But I get no indication that that is the case either.
I want to ask the members of the panel both about the North
Korean parallel here and something we ought to be concerned
with, and your words of wisdom on that. But also, if you think
back to when we have used sanctions in the past, times that
they have been successful and times that they have not been
successful, pulling the trigger on relieving sanctions too
early, I think, leads to unsuccess. And so I want to know if
any of you all have an example of that, or maybe even a counter
example to what I am saying. Maybe pulling the trigger early
has helped. And then also discuss the North Korean parallel.
Ambassador, I will start with you.
Ambassador Wallace. Sure. I will try to get at the
sanctions question and leave it to my colleagues on some other
previous examples.
Look, I think we did pull the trigger well too early on
sanctions here. I am not a sanctions apologist. I run a group
that engages in economic pressure and engages in sanctions
promotion, but they don't always work. Actually, this committee
and this Congress showed that they were working in the context
of Iran. Iran's economy was veering toward the red zone, and I
think that we blinked, unfortunately, 4 to 6 months too early.
There are many more examples of sanctions not working
historically than they have worked. I would argue that our
sanctions on Iran were maybe the most effective, but we
unraveled them too quickly. There is no secret here. There are
only four tools in the tool shed: Sanctions, diplomacy, a
military option, and covert action. A serious foreign policy
would engage in all of them. Unfortunately, we just dialed back
the sanctions when they were just about to have the great
fundamental impact.
Mr. Kinzinger. It is like, in essence, if you look at those
old 1980s shows when, you know, the investigator always should
punch the bad guy one last time, and you know it, and he walks
away and the bad guy gets up.
Mr. Jones.
Ambassador Wallace. A Roadrunner episode is coming to mind.
Mr. Jones. I want to first say that much of what you said
sounds like you were reading off my sheet here.
Mr. Kinzinger. Maybe I was.
Mr. Jones. Thank you.
But on North Korea, I want to point out how these failures
are damaging U.S. credibility worldwide. I was discussing Iran
with some Canadian intelligence analysts a while ago, and I
gave my pessimistic views on Iran, and one of the Canadians
said, but the U.S. administration said they are not going to
allow Iran to get nuclear weapons. And before I could say
anything, one of the other Canadians said, that is what they
said about North Korea, too. And these are our friends.
Mr. Kinzinger. Well, and I also think the administration
would probably have never said that Fallujah would be taken
over by al-Qaeda again when they left, but that is another
issue.
I guess maybe briefly the last two. My time has expired,
but if you would just real quick.
Mr. Heinonen. It brings to my mind my discussion in 2003
with my North Korean counterpart when we were kicked once more
out from North Korea and I asked, what next? Is it a nuclear
weapon? He told me that, Olli, don't worry, we will not build a
nuclear weapon. Plutonium is our weapon. Well, we know now what
happened, and I think this is exactly the situation with Iran--
--
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. We will have you hold that thought just
because, sir, I have to be fair to everybody----
Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you, Madam Chair. I will yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen [continuing]. And be equally rude to
everyone and cut you off. Thank you.
Mr. Higgins is recognized.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I just want to go back to the elections that brought
Rouhani into office. You know, there were six candidates
running. Rouhani ran against the policies that created
international isolation, he ran against the policies that
created sanctions, and then he won the election.
Now, Iranian elections aren't like United States elections.
Rouhani could not have won without the Supreme Leader,
Khamenei, willing it. In fact, in Iran if you don't get 50
percent of the vote, there is a runoff. Rouhani got 50.6
percent of the vote. It tells us that either the Supreme Leader
is trying to bamboozle the United States into believing that
Iran is committed to reform, or that the Supreme Leader is
allowing Rouhani an opportunity to negotiate a deal. But the
big question is we don't know if it is a deal that we can live
with, and we don't know if it is a deal that the international
community can live with.
Now, there is three generations of nuclear proliferation in
Iran. The first one was basically a glorified national science
project. Iran 10 years ago had 164 centrifuges, which is
basically the machinery that spins uranium at supersonic speeds
to produce weapons-grade fuel. Today Iran has 19,000
centrifuges. It has a multibillion-dollar atomic infrastructure
that has given Iran breakout capability, which means that Iran
can produce now weapons-grade material before we can detect it
and act against it, which is in fundamental conflict with the
objectives of the United States, and that is Iran will not get
nuclear weapons, not the containment of a nuclear weapon once
they get it.
So the objective of prevention may be lost. And in addition
to 19,000 centrifuges, Iran also constructed its first heavy-
water reactor for plutonium enrichment, another bomb fuel.
There wouldn't be this discussion, and Iran wouldn't be at
the table unless we imposed sanctions, because that is the only
thing that they respond to. I think if we take sanctions off
the table, you take away the leverage, assuming that Rouhani is
sincere about this--he ran the nuclear program for 10 years
prior to his election as President--and the only leverage we
have.
Remember the Iran-Iraq war. They were at war for 8 years.
It was basically a stand-off. Nobody won. Khamenei said that
upon basically calling a truce, it was like drinking poison
from a chalice. Then the United States went in Iraq and did in
3 weeks what Iran couldn't do in 8 years, and guess what Iran
stopped doing? Enriching uranium.
So, you know, we have been through this, and I think the
United States gets played by leaders in Iraq. They push us away
when they are doing well; they pull us in when they are being
challenged. Same in Afghanistan and the same in Iran.
I think we need to be very careful as a Nation before we
begin to provide relief from sanctions because the Iranian
economy is a mess. It dropped 6 percentage points last year.
They don't even have the capacity to refine the oil that they
produce for so many other countries. Europe stopped buying oil
from Iran. China, who continues to buy oil from Iran, said, we
will continue to buy it from you so long as it is deeply
discounted, which further hurts Iran.
Now, there are 90 million people in that country, the vast
majority of whom are under the age of 30. They are sick and
tired of these repressive regimes, and because of social media,
Twitter, the Internet, YouTube, they see how the rest of the
world is living. And the tools of social media are not only
used for aspirational purposes and seeing how everybody else is
living, but it is used highly effectively for organizational
purposes.
Iran was always good at suppression. Tehran is not like New
York City, it is like Los Angeles. It is spread out. But the
regime was always good at keeping people down. So I just think
that we need to be very, very careful.
I know that I went on a little bit longer here. So I just
ask a brief comment.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. Maybe we will have them
comment in someone else's answers.
Mr. Higgins. Okay.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Higgins.
Mr. Perry is recognized.
Mr. Perry. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Gentlemen, just a couple quotes because I think they bear
repeating over and over again. And this is a key quote out of
Iran earlier in the decade:
``The dilemma was if we offered a complete picture, the
picture itself could lead us to the U.N. Security
Council, and not providing a complete picture would
also be a violation of the resolution, and we could
have been referred to the Security Council for not
implementing the resolution.''
And then the next one just from last week when President
Rouhani said, as Judge Poe already indicated, ``The Geneva deal
means the surrender of big powers before the great Nation of
Iran.'' And in that context it seems to me that all the of the
American people, liberals, conservatives, Republicans,
Democrats, people that don't care, can see exactly what is
happening here, and the only folks that genuinely support this
somehow come out of academia with some hope for a better
solution that is not based in reality.
My first questions, I guess, would go to Mr. Albright. It
seems like you are kind of in favor of the deal, but I just
want to get your context. Do you understand it is a deal about
nonproliferation? Is that what we are trying to get to? And is
it your opinion that it gets us a little closer to
nonproliferation? As quickly as you can.
Mr. Albright. The goal of the deal is to ensure that Iran
does not get nuclear weapons. But again, it is the
comprehensive solution that would get this, not the interim
deal.
Mr. Perry. Right. Right. But we don't trust these folks,
and they have no reason to have our trust. They haven't done
anything to earn it over a period of time.
Mr. Albright. That is right.
Mr. Perry. Now, there is this 3-year study recently
published by the Pentagon that intelligence agencies are not
yet organized or fully equipped to detect the development of
nuclear weapons or the ramping up of existing arsenals in
foreign countries. Are you familiar?
Mr. Albright. Yes.
Mr. Perry. So with that in mind--have you ever been to
Iran?
Mr. Albright. No, I have not.
Mr. Perry. I mean, you have seen it on a map. It is a big
country, right? I mean, it is----
Mr. Albright. I have studied it a lot.
Mr. Perry. Yeah. Hard to find big things and little things
in----
Mr. Albright. But one thing, that study, you have to
remember in Iran the Intelligence Community has done pretty
well. It has exposed many secret sites.
Mr. Perry. Many, which is great. But there is not a lot of
margin for error. So do you think the elements of the Joint
Action Plan and the implementation agreement can be adequately
verified under the current context?
Mr. Albright. I think, well, the interim deal is limited
steps. Yeah, I think that can be adequately verified. I think
many things that are important are not included in that, and in
order to verify those, there is going to have to be a great
deal of stepped-up verification.
In terms of the Intelligence Community, certainly any
efforts to improve their abilities is good, but I would say
that on----
Mr. Perry. But by your own testimony, didn't you already
say that earlier this month Iran has already been somewhat
intractable and nonresponsive or not interested----
Mr. Albright. Well, and that is right. But you asked me if
it can be done. I think it can be. And one of the verification
conditions is are they cooperating.
Mr. Perry. Yes. In the context that everything in the world
is possible, anything can be done.
Mr. Albright. No, no, it is not possible. If Iran is not
cooperative, they are not abiding by----
Mr. Perry. Right.
Mr. Albright [continuing]. The verification conditions,
then that is an early test of whether they intend----
Mr. Perry. But again, we are working within the context of
there is no--in my mind anyhow, especially if you live in
Israel--no margin for error.
Mr. Albright. I have lived in Israel. So I think there is
plenty of room to design a verification regime.
Mr. Perry. But you are not in Israel now.
Mr. Albright. Well, obviously not. But there is plenty of--
--
Mr. Perry. Okay. Okay. So, Ambassador Wallace, have we
already moved from prevention to containment?
Ambassador Wallace. I certainly hope not, but it is
certainly looking that way.
Mr. Perry. How is that measured? Do we know how that is
measured?
Ambassador Wallace. I would just say, particularly with the
expertise on this panel, absent countries that fully and 100
percent cooperate, there is no such thing as verification that
works.
So we are deluding ourselves in the context of Iran that
additional protocol plus--I don't want to speak for my
colleagues--is all great to ask for, but absent 100 percent
cooperation, verification equals bomb.
Mr. Perry. Right.
So back to my other question regarding containment or
prevention, because we have been told by this administration we
are going to prevent, we are going to prevent, we are going to
prevent.
Ambassador Wallace. I have worried about this.
Mr. Perry. Have we moved to containment?
Ambassador Wallace. If we had made this deal 10, 15 years
ago and locked in at a very early stage of Iranian nuclear
program, I would say we aren't containing. Now it sure looks
like we are containing.
Mr. Perry. Mr. Jones.
Mr. Jones. As I said, I think the ship has sailed. We are
to containment.
Mr. Perry. So when did we get to containment, in your
opinion?
Mr. Jones. In, I don't know, maybe 2008, 2009. I mean, you
know, it was a gradual process as they add more and more.
Mr. Perry. Could we, if we kept the sanctions present,
could we have gotten--if we got to containment in 2008 and 2009
and didn't admit it, if the sanctions would have continued,
would we have been able to get back to prevention, in your
opinion?
Mr. Jones. Well, if we had the sort of sanctions we are
talking about now back then or maybe 2006, I think so. Now I
think it is too late.
Mr. Perry. Thank you. Thank you, gentlemen.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much.
Mr. Schneider.
Mr. Schneider. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I want to thank the witnesses for being here today, for
sharing your insights. I want to thank you for what you all do
every day. I don't think a day goes by where I am not reading
something from UANI, from ISIS, from Belfer, many days from all
three. So thank you.
I have said before, you highlighted here, the Joint Plan of
Action is an agreement fraught with dangers, some--Olli, as you
said, some known, some unknown. But I thought the point was
well taken that the real test of these negotiations is not the
Joint Plan of Action, but the final comprehensive agreement, in
my words, ending Iran's nuclear ambitions and rolling back and
dismantling their nuclear programs, and that is what we have to
work towards.
I consider the Joint Plan of Action, it is necessary that
it not be allowed, as you have all said, to extend beyond its
parameters, ideally 6 months, at the longest 12 months. We just
block and then close any and all pathways for Iran to get a
nuclear weapon; not just plutonium pathway at the Arak reactor,
I believe, the uranium enrichment, both in centrifuges and in
laser. And as Mr. Heinonen said, we must address the military
aspects. What you said in your testimony, a comprehensive deal
can only be reached if uncertainties over Iran's military
nuclear capability are addressed. I think that is crucial.
Mr. Albright, you wrapped up your written testimony, and I
think it is worth restating. An adequate comprehensive solution
will depend on the United States and its allies now making
clear to Iran what is required of it, and that this is indeed a
pivotal moment.
I guess this is where I come in with my question to you all
is as we talk about passing a resolution in the House,
extending what we passed last summer on the Nuclear Iran
Prevention Act, I am worried that if at 6 months, 12 months we
are not quite there, the question will be, the argument will
be, don't do more sanctions now because we are close. I am
worried that 12 months from now, if we are almost there, but
not quite, the argument is going to be we must wait now. I am
further worried that as we sit here today, if we can clearly
and transparently indicate to the Iranians not just what is
expected, but that the sanctions that will follow a failure of
these negotiations will be orders of magnitude greater than
what they faced when it brought them to the table back in
November, that that makes it easier to stay on this path to
peacefully ending the nuclear ambitions.
I guess my question to the panel--and, Mr. Albright, I will
start with you--is if the administration--or if the Congress
passes a resolution in the House that says this is what we
intend to do if we can't go down this path, but we want to stay
on the path that will peacefully end in a comprehensive
solution, why is that not a good strategy?
Mr. Albright. I personally think it is. I think it is
important to lay out the criteria that the agreement should
reach or should ascribe to; that, in a sense, minimum
conditions need to be laid out. I think it would be very
useful. I think it would certainly clarify things to Iran. It
would also make sure that the administration understands what
the minimum conditions are, because, again, in the heat of the
moment, there are tendencies to make compromises. So I think
Congress has a very important role and hope that it can work to
lay down basic conditions the agreement should reach.
And I think the Senate started that in the recent
legislation introduced, and that can be extended. And I hope it
is done, because Iran is certainly doing it. I mean, it is
doing it privately inside of Iran, I am sure, and it is doing
it publicly.
Mr. Schneider. Ambassador Wallace.
Ambassador Wallace. Remember what we are talking about
here. We are saying we are not going to do business with you.
We are going to close our pocketbook. We are not invading them.
We are just simply saying, we don't like your policy. We are
going to close our pocketbook. Somehow that is being turned
into warmongering. Somehow that is in debate.
I don't know about you all, but if somebody does something
that I don't like, I don't want to do business with them. We
shouldn't do business with Iran. That is what we are debating
here. Is that so controversial? We cannot allow partisanship to
enter this debate and say that we are somehow warmongering
because we don't want to open our pocketbook.
Mr. Schneider. Mr. Heinonen.
Mr. Heinonen. Actually I agree with what both of these
gentlemen say, but in a somewhat a different way, if I may say
so. First of all, I think it is important to put the red lines
there and say what the United States of America wants from
Iran. That needs to be a clear-cut message, because Iran says
at the same time, no one centrifuge will be dismantled; we
won't quit building our reactor. So it is important for the
discussion. But having said that----
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Having said that, I am going to interrupt
you yet again. I am rather disciplined with the time, because
we are going to be voting, and then members won't have the
time. Thank you, sir.
Mr. DeSantis, my Florida colleague.
Mr. DeSantis. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, and thanks to
the witnesses.
Ambassador Wallace, I appreciate that last comment. I mean,
when I am hearing these things and people say that trying to
move forward with sanctions is tantamount to saying that we
need to invade Iran to me is just not acceptable.
The President said not too long ago that he thought the
chance of a deal actually succeeding was about 50/50, and, to
me, I was really alarmed by that. I mean, here is the guy who
is supposed to believe in what they are doing, and he still
thinks it is essentially a coin toss.
It just seems to me that understanding the nature of this
regime, we may never be able to actually have an agreement that
works, just given who they are, but why would you go easy on
sanctions? Seems to me the way would be to apply more pressure
on them, show them that we are serious about this, and maybe
they would be able to reevaluate whether it is actually in
their interests.
And it has been mentioned earlier, but some of these
military sites likes Parchin, you know, Ambassador Wallace, it
doesn't seem to me that we would be able to really monitor what
goes on there.
Ambassador Wallace. You are right. Absent cooperation, we
wouldn't be able to.
I want to give some of my time to Olli because he was cut
off a couple of times. But I was talking about sanctions
previously and how wonderful in a bipartisan way this committee
and other Members of Congress have said what sanctions should
be. Now I respectfully implore you all to say what are your red
lines on enrichment, on the heavy-water reactor and the like.
Olli was about to refer to that, I think, in his testimony, but
I have had the privilege of testifying before you all many
times. I have never asked something of you like this, but
please, each one of you should go on the record with the
President, the future President, as to what your red lines are.
That is important that Congress speak with a unified voice. I
beg you to do that.
I defer to Olli. Olli, you need to get in there.
Mr. Heinonen. Thank you.
What I wanted to say that it is not totally about the
United States of America. It is also about the unity of the
international community, and more needs to be invested to P5+1
and get the Russians and Chinese fully behind it, because
without them the sanctions won't be a success.
Mr. DeSantis. So in terms of--and I think that is true in
terms of what our red lines are. It seemed to me that the
United Nations had always said that Iran wasn't going to be the
able to enrich, and now it is like, well, you know, you know,
well, you can enrich.
So I think the red line for Congress should be no
enrichment. I think that is the only way that we can have a
somewhat degree of certainty that this is something that we can
prevent from happening in terms of them having a nuclear
weapon.
One thing that is odd about this whole agreement and these
negotiations is nobody is talking about, within the context of
this, terrorism and Iran's role in international terrorism, and
I worry. They are a leading state sponsor of terrorism. They
have committed terrorist acts against the United States going
back from the Embassy takeover to Beirut, which they were
involved in. They were attacking our service members in Iraq
with EFPs. So how can it be that we are just kind of just
acting like the terrorism aspect doesn't exist? This seems to
me to be a very serious shortcoming for this agreement. Does
anyone want to weigh in on that?
Mr. Albright. Let me just say, I think--I have worked on
many agreements. I mean, typically the nuclear is roped off. I
mean, that has been the tradition, but it doesn't mean that the
terrorism issue can be let lie unsettled. And I think Congress
is going to have to face--in reviewing the lifting of
sanctions, it will have to review that condition. My
understanding is that is part of the law. So I think the
administration eventually is going to have to answer how it is
going to deal with that.
But traditionally these nuclear deals are done in--I don't
want to say in isolation, but done as cutouts in a sense. And
it would be up to, in a sense, oversight to decide whether that
is enough to remove sanctions.
Mr. DeSantis. I just wonder whether that model is
applicable to a regime like this that would have been to maybe
some of these other nuclear powers, and, of course, we have had
negotiations with countries like North Korea that have ended up
backfiring on us. So I appreciate that, but I still have a lot
of concerns.
So Mr. Jones, I mean, what would you recommend? You say,
hey, the cat is out of the bag. So what should we be doing in
Congress if we are somebody who is concerned about this regime
possessing nuclear weapons? You seem to think that we are not
going to be able to prevent that at this point, so what should
our response in Congress be?
Mr. Jones. I am not sure other than to look at the problem
more broadly. I mean, look down the road to prevent further
Irans. We have had a string of failures: Pakistan, North Korea,
Iran. We are looking at possibly now Saudi Arabia, even Turkey,
suddenly showing interest.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Jones.
Thank you, Mr. DeSantis.
And Mr. Vargas.
Mr. Vargas. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman. Again,
thank you for holding this hearing. I appreciate it. And thank
you to the witnesses.
I am usually a rather optimistic person, but I am not
optimistic at all, and I continue to think that this interim
deal was a mistake. In fact, I think it was a terrible mistake.
And I hope that I am wrong, but I continue to think it was a
mistake.
I think we are naive in these negotiations. I think that
this notion that these are just a tiny easing of the sanctions
I think is wrong-headed; in fact, just the opposite, I think,
that this easing of the sanctions is, in fact, going to allow
their economy to blossom and to take off. I think it is a
terrible mistake, and it is going to be very hard, I think,
afterwards to try to put the genie back in the bottle and get
these sanctions going once again.
And another thing that I am very fearful of, I think the 6
months is going to turn into a year, and then they are going to
ask for more time, and aren't we close, and it is going to
continue to slide and to be more and more problematic.
And, in fact, I think all we have to do is really listen to
the Iranians themselves on what they are saying. I mean, Iran's
leaders recently made it very clear that they have no intention
of coming into compliance with the international obligations in
the nuclear arena. I don't think they have any intention.
In fact, I would like to read a transcript very quickly
here from Fareed Zakaria, who is the host of CNN, and Rouhani:
``Iran will absolutely retain its enrichment?'' That is what
Fareed asked. And this is Rouhani responding: ``It is our
national pride, and nuclear technology has become indigenous.
And recently we have managed to secure very considerable
prowess with regards to the fabrication of centrifuges. We will
not accept any limitations.''
So Zakaria asked him again, ``So there will be no
destruction of centrifuges or existing centrifuges?''
Rouhani: ``No, not at all.''
I think they have made it very clear where they want to go
with this. He goes on. They asked him later if it is for a
nuclear weapon and he says, ``No, no, of course not.''
He says, ``And to know that when, from a religious point of
view, religious leaders, to be more specific, the great and
eminent leader of the revolution, announces and states that the
fabrication and the stockpiling of nuclear weapons is haram,
religiously forbidden, this should tell you that we don't want
to build a bomb.''
And yet, everything they have done is to build a bomb.
Everything they have done. Does anyone disagree with that? Does
anyone believe that what they have been doing so far has been,
in fact, for peaceful purposes? Does anyone there? Nobody?
Yes, sir.
Mr. Jones. Can I add just one thing because that interview
was very important. And one thing that didn't get quite
explicated is Rouhani also said that he wants 20,000 megawatts
of nuclear power and for Iran to provide the fuel for this.
Well, I did some quick math. That is like 1 million or 2
million centrifuges, not 19,000. So that gives you an idea of
what the Iranian view of this is. Thank you.
Mr. Vargas. No, thank you. And I appreciate that. And I do
think that--unfortunately, that we eased up on sanctions right
when they were starting to work. Because I do think that we
should have put the real question to them, do you want an
economy, or do you want a nuclear weapons program? And I think
tightening down the sanctions was the right way to go, and I
think that it was finally working, and easing up now is going
to be just the opposite. It is going to be so much harder now
to get things back on track.
I would like to ask you, Ambassador, about that. What do
you think? And I know that you do this every day, but I would
like to hear you again on this.
Ambassador Wallace. Sure. I thank you.
I prepared a quick chart for this. Congressman Deutch and I
talked about this. But this shows sort of the oil production
that is happening now on a daily basis in Iran, around $1.2
billion a day, and presumably going up. This green line shows
where it would go down to, which would be about 334,000 barrels
a day, assuming a trending out over the course of the year.
The next time the administration says that it is truly only
$6 billion or $7 billion of sanctions relief, ask them this
question: $27 billion alone just on oil sales, not even getting
to the Iranian auto industry and the other sectors. I think
this is a very powerful indication of what the sanctions relief
is all about.
Mr. Vargas. Anyone else like to comment on that? Because I
guess my point would be it is not so much just the $6 billion;
I think it is more than that. An economy looks at confidence;
you know, is there confidence in the economy to take off. And I
think that is the problem here; that all of a sudden the world
has confidence that these sanctions are going to be lifted.
That is why their economy is taking off. It is going to be very
hard to impose sanctions once again.
Yes, sir.
Mr. Albright. Yeah, I think that--maybe I am by nature an
optimist, but the thing to me that seems imminent or urgent to
do is to send a signal that the sanctions are going to be fully
enforced, and they are going to be strengthened if time clock--
--
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, and I am going to be
a disciplinarian. We are going to cut it down to 4 minutes so
that we can all get our questions in. And I apologize.
Mr. Weber is next.
Mr. Weber. Can you cut it down on the next person? Can you
cut it down on the next person, Madam Chair?
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Yes, of course I can. Thank you. Go
ahead.
Mr. Weber. All right. To any of you all on the panel, does
November 4, 1979, ring a bell? That is the day that they took
hostages, Iran did, at our U.S. Embassy. Do you know how long
they held them for? Four hundred and forty-four days.
Now, so November the 4th will be the 35th anniversary of
that hostage taking. They have been exporting terrorism for
almost 35 years. I am going to follow up on what Adam Kinzinger
said when he said, what is the U.S. getting for this? They have
been exporting terrorism forever, and what are we getting out
of this? We are getting told that, as Mr. Wallace said, that we
are somehow warmongers because we want to strengthen those
sanctions, because we want to make them come to the table and
negotiate, and they are about to do that.
So you all work with me here. Any of you all think that 35
years is a long time? Simply a yes-or-no question?
Ambassador Wallace. That is the easiest one I have had in a
long time. That is a long time.
Mr. Weber. You all will agree that--is 444 days a long
time?
Mr. Jones. If you are a hostage, yeah.
Mr. Weber. It is a long time, isn't it?
Now, do you agree with Brad Sherman's comments that ``the
first three-quarters of this game, we have been missing in
action, that we are down to the goal line stance''? Do you all
agree with that? I am getting a no from Albright, I am getting
two over here, and the guy in the green is just kind of
contemplating that. He is not admitting to anything.
But here is the point. If we continue to hold them under
sanctions for 444 days, we haven't taken their hostages. We
haven't had an act of violence take them by violence. So if we
make them toe that line, then we can't be accused of being
violent or being oppressive.
By their own words, they want to wipe America and Israel
off the face of the map. Now, have we threatened to wipe Iran
off the face of the map, anybody? Have we threatened to wipe
Israel?
Mr. Albright, you lived in Israel. Do you have any family
living there now?
Mr. Albright. No.
Mr. Weber. Okay. Mr. Wallace, you said that 100 percent
cooperation was needed, and we would know that pretty quick if
we are not going to get that in verification. Should we give
them 444 days?
Ambassador Wallace. I am very skeptical. They haven't shown
any indication they want to cooperate, and there is no
verification without cooperation.
Mr. Weber. Excuse me. Mr. Albright, you said we ought to
lay out minimum conditions earlier in the negotiations. And the
man in the green, and I can't pronounce your name, you said we
ought to have a red line. We don't have a real good track
record on red lines right now. Would you be in favor of
military action if those red lines are passed? Would it be one
of the conditions, Mr. Albright?
Mr. Albright. For the red lines on the comprehensive
solution, no, no, of course not. The red line that has been
articulated by President Obama is that they be prevented from
getting a nuclear weapon.
Mr. Weber. Yeah, well, since they saw us bomb Syria, with
President Obama's red line, they know how serious we are.
Mr. Albright. Well, the threat of military strikes has to
be credible, and the U.S. is going to have to reestablish that
credibility if it wants to deal with Iran.
Mr. Weber. Yeah, well, we don't have a lot of credibility
with the threat of red lines. I am just----
Mr. Albright. Well, Syria is not Iran.
Mr. Weber. Well, I understand that.
Mr. Albright. I mean, we didn't have a lot of vested
interest in the----
Mr. Weber. Mr. Schneider, I am going to follow up on what
he said. In 12 months we don't want them coming back and
saying, look, we are almost there. No more sanctions.
Do any of you all think that Iran is going to be serious
and that we have 12 months, or are we going to have two bombs,
four bombs in 12 months?
Would you want to go over and live in Israel, Mr. Albright,
right now?
Mr. Albright. I would, and I don't think that----
Mr. Weber. Okay. Well, we are going to miss you.
Mr. Albright. Yeah.
Mr. Weber. The guy in the green. Would you live over there?
Anybody else?
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Well, we are done. Thank you so much. You
had the full 5 minutes.
Mr. Weber. Thank you.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. And Ms. Frankel is recognized. Thank you.
Ms. Frankel. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you so much
for bringing this diverse panel. And really, this is very
complicated, at least it is to me. Some of these other folks
see it more simple, but I think we all agree that Iran should
not be allowed to obtain a nuclear weapon, although, Mr. Jones,
you think they already have one.
Mr. Jones. Yes.
Ms. Frankel. Okay. So you agree they shouldn't have been
allowed, but that is too late. The three of you, the rest of
you, think they don't have a nuclear weapon, or you are not
sure.
Mr. Albright. They do not.
Ms. Frankel. You think they do not?
Ambassador Wallace. They do not, but they have the
capability within 2 or 3 months of breaking out with that
ability to have a nuclear weapon.
Ms. Frankel. Okay. And I think everybody here pretty much
agrees that the interim agreement should not be the long-term
agreement, right?
Ambassador Wallace. Absolutely.
Ms. Frankel. Right? But logic does tell me that, you know,
in a give-and-take situation, Iran would eventually want all of
the sanctions relieved; is that right?
Ambassador Wallace. I think they already have that. I
think----
Ms. Frankel. You think they have all the--okay.
Ambassador Wallace. I think that their sanctions relief is
far greater than what meets the eye. Their economy is booming
right now, coming back very strongly. Certainly we could lift
other sanctions, but we have to send a message that more
sanctions are coming to stop that growth in the Iranian
economy. That is a key thing that this committee can
participate in.
Ms. Frankel. Okay. So we would expect them to go further,
give up something further than what is in the interim agreement
in order to get further relief.
Mr. Jones. Well, remember, the current agreement says that
when we finally get done, there is not going to be any
restrictions on Iran at all. They are going to be treated like
any other non-nuclear-weapon party to the NPT. That means they
are scot-free at that point.
Mr. Albright. Well, not exactly. I mean, I would expect
embargoes on military goods. I mean, there would be
counterproliferation sanctions. And again, we are talking--if
this works as the administration has outlined, we are talking
about a deal that is extremely restrictive of its nuclear
program, and the conditions last 20 years. They have dealt with
the IAEA concerns. Their weaponization or past weaponization
infrastructure is under verification. They have shown
cooperation. So I think it is--when the sanctions would come
off, Iran would have had to have met many, many conditions. And
so it is not at all like the interim deal.
Ms. Frankel. And, Mr. Jones, do you rule out or do you
advocate any kind of military action?
Mr. Jones. No. I think it would take a full-scale war with
Iran, and I don't see that the U.S. is in any position to
embark on such a war at this point, which is why I think there
is nothing we can do. I mean, if we could take military action,
then Iran wouldn't have nuclear weapons, or wouldn't have them
for long.
Ms. Frankel. Okay. So it is very easy to be the Monday-
morning quarterback. So let me just--it is what it is right
now. Could you each--my last question is what do you recommend
we do next, given the situation?
Ambassador Wallace. Six months from the adoption of the
interim agreement, this Congress should make clear that Iran
will face the most robust sanctions in history, and its oil
sales will go down to nearly zero, its auto industry will not
be able to function, and their economy will cease to exist.
That is the message the committee must send in order for Iran
to dial back its nuclear program, which is a requirement, in my
opinion, for a final deal.
Mr. Jones. Well, I don't believe the sanctions are going to
be nearly that effective. The Russians have already said they
are going to negotiate a barter arrangement to launder Iranian
oil. I think the Iranians have options. The Indians have helped
them as well; so have the Chinese. I am not optimistic.
Mr. Albright. You know, I think it is important to
articulate what a comprehensive solution would look like, if
you want zero enrichment articulated, if you want----
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so very much. I appreciate it.
Mr. Cook.
Mr. Cook. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ambassador Wallace, I really appreciate what you say about
sanctions. I actually believe in them, too. There are always
variables that are associated with them. You know, my
background, I was in the military for quite a while, 26 years,
and we always said the NATO scenario--this is back in the Cold
War time, and, you know, the threat was always the Soviet Union
for nuclear war. And after the wall came down, we have never
had those similar scenarios, and now it has kind of changed
completely with what is going on with North Korea and,
obviously, Iran.
In your opinion, how close, in your opinion, anyone, do you
think that Iran would--I think we all agree that they are going
to get the bomb, and many of them. Would they use it, or is
that just a threat?
Ambassador Wallace. I think one of the greatest dangers of
Iran going nuclear are the incredible sectarian tensions that
are plaguing that region right now and the fact that we will
have a nuclear arms race in the region. We will take the most
volatile region in the world and we will make it more volatile
and nuclear volatile. And if it were me as a leader, if I were
a leader of one of those countries, the ayatollah and others
have said that they could conceivably use these types of
weapons before, I think you have to take them at their word. I
think you have to take it quite seriously.
Mr. Cook. Before you answer any more, the reaction of other
countries. Let's just go with the scenario that they have the
nuclear bomb. We are talking about Saudi Arabia, some of the
other Arab States; Arab, you know, Persian, Iranian, the
animosity between them. Do you foresee many other countries
that would be very eager to do exactly what Iran did just
because of what happened? Any suggestions on what countries
would acquire the bomb in that region?
Ambassador Wallace. I think it is very clear that other
countries in the region, again, playing along the sectarian
lines, would seek to go nuclear. It might take them a little
bit of time.
Mr. Cook. Which ones?
Ambassador Wallace. Saudi Arabia.
Mr. Cook. Anyone else?
Ambassador Wallace. I think the Emirates. I think Turkey,
Egypt, a variety of countries in the region.
Mr. Cook. So as many as perhaps six?
Ambassador Wallace. All of them.
Mr. Cook. Okay. Does the panel share that opinion?
Mr. Jones. I am not sure I think quite so high, but I would
also point outside the region. I mean, with North Korea, and if
the general regime starts to collapse, I think we could be
talking about South Korea, Japan. I mean, I think this problem
is broader than the Middle East.
Mr. Cook. And then the possibility for use of a nuclear
attack from a mathematical standpoint, if you do the math,
which is very, very scary, there would be some kind of event,
as opposed to when I was in the Cold War, it was limited to
just a few powers.
Mr. Jones. Well, certainly, I am already, frankly, quite
concerned about Pakistan. I mean, it looks like at various
points Pakistan might just dissolve and break into some sort of
Islamist sectarian fight, and who knows who would wind up with
the weapon. Same thing with North Korea.
Mr. Cook. I just wanted to----
Mr. Albright. I think it shows why it is so important to
prevent Iran from getting nuclear weapons.
Mr. Cook. And I agree with you, and I just--you know, trust
and verify, and going down this road, it shows just how naive
we are, and the consequences are enormous. And I hope this body
here, which seems to be one of the few that is addressing this,
will continue to fight for that action.
Thank you, Madam Chair, I yield.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much. And although votes
have started, we have two more members who are going to ask
questions, so we are fine with the time. I didn't cut anyone
off.
Mr. Connolly is recognized.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Madam Chairman. And welcome to the
panel.
My colleague just referred to naivete. I am not sure what
he was referring to. To support an interim agreement that is
supported by a number of the players, main players, trying to
get Iran to desist might be wisdom rather than naivete. We
don't know yet.
Mr. Heinonen, were you involved at IAEA in any of the
negotiations with Iran, or discussions with Iran, or
verification experiences with Iran?
Mr. Heinonen. Yes, I was, indeed. I visited a number of
times there, maybe 20, 30 times.
Mr. Connolly. Is it your impression, based on that
experience, that Iran is hellbent on getting nuclear weapons,
and that an interim agreement such as the one successfully
negotiated is merely a stalling tactic until they reach their
ultimate goal?
Mr. Heinonen. I think there is one more scenario here, and
this is that Iran pushed its enrichment capability to such a
level that it is not in--breaking its safeguards obligation,
but may not be in the spirit of the NPT. And this will be the
most difficult situation for the international community to
handle.
Mr. Connolly. Were you surprised, based on your knowledge
and experience in Iran, that they agreed to this interim
agreement?
Mr. Heinonen. No, I was not surprised, because I have seen
them following this partial, small deal, small step at a time,
agree on something, and then back off and agree again. So this
is in the pattern. But now we need to break this pattern, and
this is for the red lines that the resolutions and in my mind
comes to the picture.
Mr. Connolly. Ambassador Wallace, you talked about the
complete shut-down of their economy. One wonders whether that
is possible, but certainly their economy has hurt. Based on
fairly--about--I mean, I am old enough to remember sanctions
going way back on all kinds of countries, and with a spotty
record. I mean, sometimes sanctions work pretty well, sometimes
they don't. And it is not clear to me that they are always an
efficacious tool of foreign policy, but they certainly are a
tool available to us, and in this case it looks like it has had
a desired effect.
I assume that your concern is that, with the best of
intentions with an interim agreement, that we take our foot off
that pedal a little bit and ease back on sanctions, if not the
United States, others, and that that obviously would be a
counterproductive development until we see their performance in
this agreement and their willingness to now finalize an
agreement 6 months hence.
Ambassador Wallace. I think that is right, Congressman. My
concern is not just the foot off the gas, though, but I think
we really dialed back the sanctions regime, and their economy
is flourishing. We measure their currency, we measure their
inflation, we measure their stock market, and it is booming.
And I am concerned that the very little concessions that we
got, no real rollback was met with a dramatic rollback of the
economic pressure so that they had an economic boom to their
economy. And I think my concern is, and I am certainly being
effusive, you can't shut down their economy. We can certainly
get their oil sales down to a few hundred thousand barrels, and
we should try.
Mr. Connolly. But until very recently, all of the reports I
saw were that they were having trouble moving their oil in
international markets.
Ambassador Wallace. The low point was about 761,000 barrels
a day. Right now it has already gone up to 1.2 million barrels
a day and even higher.
Mr. Connolly. Excuse me for interrupting, but is that
because of some of the carve-outs in the agreement for India,
for example, and some others?
Ambassador Wallace. It has been--actually if the carve-outs
were kept in place, the reduction of oil sales would go down to
about 334,000 barrels. Right now we are on a trajectory of
between 1.2-plus over the course of this year. That was in
anticipation of the agreement and the agreement itself. So you
have seen a huge economic windfall for the Iranians.
Mr. Connolly. My time is up. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Thank you.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. And you are an ex-Senate staffer. You
forgot.
Mr. Connolly. It is not something I bring attention to,
but----
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Inside joke here.
And to wrap up, Mr. Collins, I am expecting big things from
you.
Mr. Collins. Well, we thank you for being here, and we will
get to it. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Look, I think the interesting comments right there in just
that last conversation was Iran would take a little, and then
they would back up, take a little and back up. And then Mr.
Wallace just pointed out they are now--and now their economy is
doing well. It is even more incentive just to back up and say,
well, we can't get there right now. Can we get a little more
time? And I think that is the concern that most of us have here
is the sense of, as has been said earlier--and I am not going
to rehash it, because I have got a more specific question--when
you look at it, we, frankly, did not get anything from this.
They got what they were looking for, and I think the only
reason we got to the place to start with was the sanctions were
having an effect. So we have to look at it from a different
perspective.
I want to get a little more technical, and anyone can
answer this question. Three basic steps needed to produce a
nuclear weapon. You know, a primary fissile material,
sufficient quantity and quality for the nuclear device. You
have to have a weapon that will survive a nuclear warhead and
produce an effective means for delivering the weapon. So I have
a question. What is known of Iran's development of the delivery
method for a nuclear warhead, and what type of delivery
mechanism would be needed to develop to target Israel or the
U.S.?
Mr. Albright. Their ballistic missile capability is pretty
robust. What is not known, do they have the ability to put a
warhead on that ballistic missile, and there are divisions
whether they can actually do that.
Mr. Collins. Okay.
Mr. Albright. Eventually, they would be able to if they
went down that route.
Mr. Collins. Right.
Mr. Albright. Can I say, though, I don't think we got
nothing for this deal. I mean, I don't want to get into a
debate. I am sure you did last week with the administration,
but we did get something, and so I think that has to be----
Mr. Collins. Messed over I think would be a good----
Mr. Albright. No, I think progress was stopped. Freeze is
worth something. And so I think there were benefits to this
deal, and we can argue the value in terms of sanctions, and I
think we are all worried about the sanctions slipping more than
the administration intended.
Mr. Collins. No, actually I am not worried as much about a
sanction. I am worried about a nuclear Iran.
Mr. Albright. Well, I think we all are.
Mr. Collins. I think we are in disagreement in
understanding what that--and I will happily, you know, concede
your point and my point--but I think one of the things that is
of concern here is if we are looking toward this, let's look at
the overall of the pattern of what is developed. You have an
opinion that it worked; I have an opinion that it doesn't. And
I think the concern is that a nuclear Iran that has this
capability here which I am concerned about from an actual
projection and actual use of a nuclear material to actually
provide a warhead that actually can be used against Israel and
actually be used against the United States. That is my
question.
Mr. Albright. Yeah.
Mr. Collins. And my next question, if targeted with a
nuclear warhead, what deterrent, if any, does Israel have?
Mr. Albright. Israel is in a bad situation. I mean, it is a
nation that one or two nuclear weapons, if they had sufficient
yield, can almost end its existence. I mean, for Israel, it
truly is an existential threat, and I think we would argue that
we have to work harder together to keep Iran from getting
nuclear weapons.
Mr. Collins. You also have to agree, and from your end it
is not just a threat to Israel, it is a threat to us. We have
assets in that region that we can't overlook. We think about
Israel, and other members of this committee have worked very
hard on our partnership with Israel and helping Israel, but we
also can't just neglect ourselves from this. We have assets. I
served in Iraq. We still have got military people there. This
is something we can't do--take apart.
Ambassador Wallace. Congressman, you are right, and since,
as you know, you served in Iraq, most of the various site
casualties that occurred in Iraq were as a result of Iranian
meddling. Right now nothing--one big absence in this hearing
was Iran's role in Syria. Many, many, if not a vast majority of
the casualties that are occurring are occurring as the result
of Iranian largesse of arms and money. So we haven't even
touched on that part of the Iranian--I don't think we mentioned
Syria one time in terms of Iran's support of Syria in this
hearing.
Mr. Collins. Well, and how much they got out of this deal--
you are talking about who lost--I think that is an issue that
does need to be discussed and the amount of money they have now
that they could funnel into Syria.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Collins.
But now the Florida contingent is really the best. Dr.
Yoho, you are recognized.
Mr. Collins. Go, dog.
Dr. Yoho. Thank you, Madam Chair. I appreciate it. I
appreciate you guys' patience.
Mr. Jones, you said, I feel Iran will get nuclear weapons,
and that is something I have talked about before in these
panels. In fact, we had Ambassador Bolton here, and he said
that we can't allow that to happen, but yet our sanctions have
been going on since pretty much 1979 at different levels. You
know, they started off, you know, more mild, you know, we froze
some bank accounts, and now we have gone all the way to where
we prevented oil from being sold out of that country. And we
have put these sanctions in place since 1979. Yet, from what I
am hearing from the four of you is within a year, I think, if I
understood this right, they are going to have five to six
nuclear weapons despite our sanctions.
So my question is the sanctions, you know, I know they were
well intended, but they don't seem to have worked, so what else
can we do? And, Mr. Albright, you brought up that we need to
work together, and I assume with our allies, to prevent Iran
from getting a nuclear weapon.
Number one, Mr. Jones, I ask you, do you feel like they are
going to have these weapons regardless?
Mr. Jones. I feel like regardless, but not necessarily in
the near term. We should think of like Pakistan that developed
these weapons in the late 1980s, but it wasn't until 1998 that
they actually tested. I mean, most of these countries take a
long view. I think Washington tends to be sort of too myopic on
some of this material.
Also, just on the sanctions, I would like to point out, as
Ambassador Wallace has said, sanctions have certainly hurt
Iran. But Iran hasn't stopped, and, to me, that flips around
the other way. It shows how interested and how determined the
Iranians are to move forward and not give up.
Dr. Yoho. Well, and then if you go back and watch over the
last 25, 30 years, there has been a cat-and-mouse game where
they are building them; no they are not; yes, they are; you
know, and we all proved that, yes, they are enriching. And, I
mean, if you look over the last 10 years, they have gone from a
few centrifuges to over 19,000.
Mr. Albright, what you were talking about, how do we
prevent this? I mean, what is your idea of preventing them from
getting a nuclear weapon?
Mr. Albright. Not possessing one at all.
Dr. Yoho. But how do you do that?
Mr. Albright. I think that what the priority is now is to
make sure that Iran is tested on whether it is going to accept
very serious limitations on its nuclear program and accept
verification requirements that allow an adequate job to be done
so that early detection is guaranteed, and there is time for a
response. So I think that is what needs to be done now, and
there is a clock ticking that this can't be extended.
Dr. Yoho. Yeah, I see that clock ticking since 1979. We
have been working to prevent that, but, you know, I just heard
you guys say there was four to five bombs they will have the
capacity to build within a year. And so we can watch them for
another 6 months, another 6 years. My feeling, like Mr. Jones
said, is they are going to get one, and what I would like to
focus on, what do we do looking forward, and how are we going
to deal with it?
Mr. Albright. Well, one is I think we don't have to worry
as much now about them getting four to five bombs in the next
year because of this Joint Plan of Action; that it did buy
time; that it removes some of the pressure.
Dr. Yoho. But earlier on today you just said, you know, it
was going to be about a year, and they would have four to five
bombs is what I understood.
Mr. Albright. That is if they want to do it. I mean, it was
a theoretical question if they want to do it. I think the Joint
Plan of Action has bought us time where I don't think they are
going to try to do it in the next 6 months or a year if it is
extended. So I think that is an advantage of this deal.
Dr. Yoho. What can we do? If we look back retrospectively
on sanctions, how can we handle this differently in the future
going forward, other than sanctions? I mean, I think the
diplomacy is the big thing we need to do, and I also think we
need to prepare. Like you said, Pakistan went ahead and
developed bombs. India has them. North Korea has them. I think
we need to have a different policy in place for when they do
get one. How are we going to handle that, Mr. Heinonen?
Mr. Heinonen. I think the focus needs to be moved somewhere
else, particularly for this so-called military dominance. If we
all the time put all of the efforts on the enrichment program
only, it is like a chain where you try to improve the strength
of a chain by improving one ring. But the rest of the rings you
leave, so never the chain will then be strong. So there is a
need for refocus, and for really to that part find what is
there, what is going on, and then dismantle single-use and
multiuse capabilities.
Mr. Albright. No, and I agree with that. I mean, it is
really--the ultimate tests, are they going to come clean about
nuclear weapons? And if they didn't work on nuclear weapons,
are they going to provide the information to convince people
that that is the case? And that can be tested quickly.
Dr. Yoho. Madam Chair----
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
Dr. Yoho. Thank you. Thank you, guys. I appreciate your
time.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Mr. Heinonen, I finally let you finish an
answer. Not bad, 1 out of 25.
Thank you so much, panelists, for excellent testimony,
thank you to all of the members for wonderful questions, and
thank you for the audience and the press for covering this. And
with that, our subcommittees have adjourned, and zero seconds
to get to the floor. No problem.
[Whereupon, at 4:55 p.m., the subcommittees were
adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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