[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE RESURGENCE OF AL-QAEDA IN IRAQ
=======================================================================
JOINT HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE
AND THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
DECEMBER 12, 2013
__________
Serial No. 113-96
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DANA ROHRABACHER, California Samoa
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio BRAD SHERMAN, California
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
TED POE, Texas GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MATT SALMON, Arizona THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina KAREN BASS, California
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
MO BROOKS, Alabama DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
TOM COTTON, Arkansas ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
PAUL COOK, California JUAN VARGAS, California
GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III,
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania Massachusetts
STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas AMI BERA, California
RON DeSANTIS, Florida ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
TREY RADEL, Florida GRACE MENG, New York
DOUG COLLINS, Georgia LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
TED S. YOHO, Florida JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
LUKE MESSER, Indiana
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade
TED POE, Texas, Chairman
JOE WILSON, South Carolina BRAD SHERMAN, California
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
MO BROOKS, Alabama JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
TOM COTTON, Arkansas JUAN VARGAS, California
PAUL COOK, California BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III,
TED S. YOHO, Florida Massachusetts
------
Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
TOM COTTON, Arkansas DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
RON DeSANTIS, Florida JUAN VARGAS, California
TREY RADEL, Florida BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois
DOUG COLLINS, Georgia JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III,
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina Massachusetts
TED S. YOHO, Florida GRACE MENG, New York
LUKE MESSER, Indiana LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
Kenneth M. Pollack, Ph.D., senior fellow, Saban Center for Middle
East Policy, The Brookings Institution......................... 6
Ms. Jessica D. Lewis, research director, Institute for the Study
of War......................................................... 23
Michael Knights, Ph.D., Lafer Fellow, The Washington Institute
for Near East Policy........................................... 102
Daniel L. Byman, Ph.D., professor, Security Studies Program,
Georgetown University.......................................... 116
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
Kenneth M. Pollack, Ph.D.: Prepared statement.................... 8
Ms. Jessica D. Lewis: Prepared statement......................... 25
Michael Knights, Ph.D.: Prepared statement....................... 104
Daniel L. Byman, Ph.D.: Prepared statement....................... 118
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 144
Hearing minutes.................................................. 145
THE RESURGENCE OF AL-QAEDA IN IRAQ
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THURSDAY, DECEMBER 12, 2013
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade
and Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 1 o'clock
p.m., in room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ted Poe
(chairman of the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific)
presiding.
Mr. Poe. Committee will come to order. The witnesses will
be seated, please. Just so you know, as a former judge, I like
starting on time, and I start on time.
Without objection, all members may have 5 days to submit
statements, questions, and extraneous materials for the record,
subject to the length limitation in the rules.
Al-Qaeda is back in Iraq.
Would somebody shut the back doors?
From the Summer of 2012 to the Summer of 2013, al-Qaeda in
Iraq was responsible for 24 major suicide bombings and 8 prison
breaks. The prison breaks allowed al-Qaeda to free their fellow
killers who were captured. Many of these operatives have turned
up on the battlefield in Iraq and Syria with intent to cause
chaos and anarchy and to kill people. Jail breaks, massive
suicide attacks, and assassinations are the norm.
Not since 2008 has it been this bad. I would direct your
attention to the screen. There should be a chart up on the
screen that shows the--I am going to hold it up. So maybe you
can see this one better. It shows the massive spike in killings
from 2008 and then how now in 2013, it has even gotten worse,
gotten worser.
One of the most frustrating parts about this is that the
al-Qaeda in Iraq is the same bunch of killers that the United
States special forces took apart from 2007 through 2011.
Prime Minister Maliki, a close friend of the Iranian
regime, didn't want our help anymore. He is suffering the
consequences. And now he wants help once again. He talks out of
both sides of his mouth while trying to cozy up to the United
States. He cozies up to the Iranians at the same time.
Prime Minister Maliki came here dragging the sack in
November, wanting more American taxpayer money. He wanted
attack helicopters and all sorts of advanced equipment. But is
that what he needs to go after al-Qaeda? Does he have other
reasons for wanting this type of equipment?
Maliki has centralized power, alienated the Sunnis, brought
back the Shia hit squads. This, in part, has allowed al-Qaeda
to return to be back in Iraq.
What Maliki needs is a new strategy to fight al-Qaeda. This
includes doing a better job of reaching out to the Sunni
population so they feel like he represents all Iraqis, not just
1 group.
The chaos next door in Syria is not helping at all. Al-
Qaeda in Iraq gave birth to al-Qaeda in Syria. And the groups
essentially act as the same. Their goal, it seems, is to
establish an extremist area that spans the entire region of the
world in that area.
This problem is not going away. Over the past 2 years, we
have heard from the administration al-Qaeda is on its last legs
or it is defeated. It doesn't seem that is the case. Over the
world, al-Qaeda affiliates are gaining size and strength. Many
continue to follow commands from core al-Qaeda in Pakistan, as
I call them, the Benedict Arnold ally of the United States.
That would be Pakistan.
Al-Qaeda in Iraq is creating a troubling trend. The United
States doesn't have the luxury of turning our back on the
situation. Sectarian war in Iraq would be a disaster for the
entire region and American national security.
Containing Iranian influence in the region is a top
priority. Al-Qaeda reestablishing a safe haven to plan and
launch attacks outside the region is unacceptable. And it is a
threat to American security. Maintaining the free flow of oil
to the global market out of Iraq is essential; in fact, some
way that al-Qaeda in Iraq could hit the Iraqi oil
infrastructure to weaken Baghdad.
Al-Qaeda in Iraq has little to lose and everything to gain.
They are alive, and they are well.
We are here today to learn from our experts about al-Qaeda
in Iraq, its resources, its strategy, its tactics, and what we
are going to do about it, if anything. I look forward to the
testimony.
And I now yield time to the ranking member, Mr. Sherman,
from California.
Mr. Sherman. Judge, thanks for your convening these
hearings. And thanks for starting on time.
Al-Qaeda in Iraq reached the height of its destructive
capacity in late 2006 and early 2007 before it was largely
decimated by a counterterrorism campaign, by coalition troops
and Iraqi security forces, which basically means our troops.
The organization was weakened to a fraction of its members and
its capacities.
In the past 2 years, al-Qaeda in Iraq has regrouped,
regained capacities, and expanded in the areas from which it
was expelled during the latter stages of the Iraq war in 2008.
The result has been perhaps 8,000 deaths this year in a
revitalization of al-Qaeda in Iraq.
One of our witnesses, Dr. Pollack, says in his testimony
that in 2013, Iraq is on track to experience a 100 percent
increase in violent deaths when compared to 2012. And 2012 was
no walk in the park.
There is a cycle of violence in Iraq where AQI targets Shia
communities and the Iraqi Government responds with massive
security sweeps against Sunni regions that eliminate some
extremists but also lay the groundwork for AQI recruiting in
the future. AQI was largely decimated when we left in 2011. Now
its ranks have regrown to at least a couple of thousand
fighters, according to most reports.
In July 2013, al-Qaeda in Iraq successfully attacked the
prison Abu Ghraib, leading to the escape of 500 prisoners, most
of which were people we put in that prison for terrorism. That
builds a case for perhaps helping Prime Minister Maliki. And he
wants American weapons. And his biggest argument is that we
should give him American weapons because his enemies hate us.
The problem is his friends hate us, too. And his friends in
Teheran are more dangerous to us than his enemies in Fallujah.
Now, Maliki's argument goes something like this. He holds
office today solely as a result of various actions taken by the
United States, some of which were mistakes. And since,
therefore, he is our product, therefore, we have to protect him
and do whatever he wants. And, therefore, he is ``one of the
good guys,'' no matter who he allies himself with today. The
fact is allegiance to Teheran is only a bit less than Assad's
allegiance to Teheran. But Maliki's argument goes something
like this. Since he has been the beneficiary of a series of
American mistakes in the past, we have a legal duty to continue
to make mistakes for his benefit in the future.
If we are going to provide him with weapons, there ought to
be at least 4 conditions. The first is that he start trying to
reach a compromise with at least some elements of the Sunni
community. He has taken provocative actions against Sunnis,
such as postponing elections in Sunni regions and forcing
prominent Sunni politicians out of the government. He shouldn't
be seeking the best deal he can for the Shiite community. He
should be seeking a peace that would benefit not only him but
the United States. And he needs to allow proper Sunni
representation in his government.
Second, if he wants our weapons, he ought to pay for them.
People involved in foreign policy seem to be so focused on
foreign policy that whether we get paid for the weapons or not
is, at most, a footnote. The fact is Iraq has plenty of oil
now. We will have even more oil in the future. They have got
enough cash to pay for the weapons now. And they can certainly
borrow in the international markets. And, at a very minimum,
they can agree to pay us later in cash or in oil.
Third, he has got to stop Iranian flights over his airspace
into Syria. Now, he will say, ``Well, then give me an air
force.'' We don't have to. All he has to do is authorize the
Saudi, the Turkish, or the American Air Force to ensure that
his airspace is not used wrongfully by Iranian thugs
transitioning to Damascus so they can deploy and kill many
innocent people and some non-innocent people in Syria.
And, finally, he has got to focus on the hostages from Camp
Ashraf and the human rights of those in Camp Hurriya, also
known as Camp Liberty. These are international responsibilities
that he has.
So if there is no penetrating analysis, the argument will
be we created him; therefore, he is a good guy, he is in
trouble; therefore, we give him weapons for free. That is the
default position of our foreign policy. My hope is that through
this hearing and other forms, we are able to penetrate a little
bit more deeply.
I yield back.
Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman. The Chair will recognize
the gentleman--the gentle lady?
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. Yes.
Mr. Poe. The gentle lady from Florida.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. It is all about timing.
Mr. Poe. Perfect timing.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.
Well, as we know, so much as been going on with the
resurgence of al-Qaeda in Iraq. Just last month, our
Subcommittee on the Middle East on North Africa held a hearing
on U.S. policy toward Iraq as we tried to establish what the
administration's strategic goals and objectives are in Iraq.
And the most common theme and cause for concern that came up
throughout our hearing was the threat posed by the resurgence
of al-Qaeda in Iraq.
Unfortunately, as we have seen in many of our other
hearings this year, al-Qaeda is resurgent throughout the Middle
East and North Africa, not just in Iraq. The grim reality is
that al-Qaeda is on the rise. It continues to be a grave threat
to U.S. national security, despite the administration's
assessment that it is on the run.
It has now been 2 years since we withdrew all U.S. forces
from Iraq, leaving behind a fragile Iraq that perhaps was not
ready to become stable. Since our departure, we have seen a
drastic increase in sectarian violence at levels not seen since
2008, with over 7,000 civilian deaths so far this year. Leaving
Iraq with so much uncertainty caused irreparable repercussions
to our regional and national security interests, not to mention
all of the sacrifices made by our brave men and women in
uniform.
The administration's failure to find a mutually agreeable
resolution to extend our presence in Iraq has severely weakened
our influence in the country and left a vacuum that is
currently being filled by forces who seek to harm us and our
allies.
On one side, we see a growing Iranian influence in Iraq as
the regime in Tehran strengthens its ties with the Maliki
government. Nowhere is this more evident than with the
unwillingness of the Iraqi Government to halt the Iranians from
using Iraqi airspace to ship Assad and his regime weapons,
supplies, and even Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps, IRGC,
members to fight along Hezbollah and Assad's forces.
On the other hand, we have seen a dangerous rise in
extremism as we witness a clear resurgence of al-Qaeda in Iraq,
AQI, also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, ISIS,
and other groups, due to the fact that the Iraqi security
forces are struggling to combat these extremists and their
government is not willing to be tough on the Iranian regime.
AQI took advantage of the uncertain security situation
created there by U.S. disengagement in Iraq, and reemerged
stronger and more popular than before the surge. Viewed as a
theater of jihad, Iraq, along with Syria, has been among one of
the top destinations for foreign fighters who seek to engage in
jihad. These foreign fighters pose a serious threat to our
national security, that of our regional allies and beyond, and
may soon be able to create a large safe haven that spans from
Syria to Iraq due to the instability and lack of security in
both countries.
Not only do these fighters threaten our European partners,
where many of these foreign fighters come to train, to wage
jihad, and then take what they learn back to their home
countries, they also threaten our friends and allies in the
region like Israel, Jordan, the UAE, who all fear that the
extremists will soon turn their attention toward them.
It is important for the administration to not lose sight of
what is going on in Iraq and the region. Instead, it must
strategically implement clear, constructive, goal-oriented
policies that are geared toward advancing U.S. national
security interests in the long run.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the time.
Mr. Poe. I thank the gentle lady.
The Chair will now recognize other members for 1 minute.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. Vargas.
Mr. Vargas. Thank you, Your Honor. Thank you for the
opportunity to speak here today.
Two years after the U.S. forces departed Iraq, al-Qaeda's
influence and capabilities have grown significantly,
particularly in the Sunni communities. The number of civilian
casualties continue to rise. And al-Qaeda in Iraq remains a
destabilizing force in the region through its support of
terrorist networks. Iraq is in danger of becoming a failed
state. And our national security interests are undermined by
the growing insecurity of the Maliki government.
I look forward to hearing from our panel of experts on the
recommendations on how U.S. can play a strategic role in
defeating al-Qaeda in Iraq. Thank you. And I yield back, sir.
Mr. Poe. The Chair will now recognize the gentleman from
Illinois, Mr. Kinzinger.
Mr. Kinzinger. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
It is no secret I have been very critical of this
administration. And Iraq, as a veteran of Iraq, somebody who
was there a number of times, I saw, frankly, the bravest
political move I think in 50 years, the surge in Iraq, doing it
in opposition to what many on Capitol Hill demanded of the
President. The President decided to surge, send a message to
the bad guys that not only is America not leaving. We will
never be defeated on the battlefield. And we are doubling down
our commitment to Iraq. Unfortunately, this administration
completely threw away that gain when we completely withdrew
from Iraq. I think it is one of the most embarrassing and
shameful foreign policy decisions that this administration has
made. And I will continue to remain critical of it.
When America retreats from the world, chaos follows. And
when American retreats from Iraq, chaos follows. And what we
are seeing was an American retreat followed by chaos. So I am
interested in finding out how we can stay engaged, despite the
difficulties we see there.
And I yield back.
Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman.
Without objection, all of the witnesses' prepared
statements will be made part of the record. I ask that each
witness remember that I like to start on time and quit on time.
You have 5 minutes. I will introduce each of the witnesses and
then give them time for their opening statements. And, once
again, the members do have copies of your prepared remarks.
Dr. Kenneth Pollack is a senior fellow at the Saban Center
for Middle East Policy. Dr. Pollack began his career as a
Persian Gulf military analyst at the CIA and has served twice
on the staff of the National Security Counsel. He has also been
a senior research professor at the National Defense University
and director of the National Security Studies at the Council on
Foreign Relations.
Jessica Lewis is the research director at the Institute for
the Study of War. Prior to joining the Institute for the Study
of War, she served 8 years on the active duty as an
intelligence officer for the United States Army. Her military
career includes 3 deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan, where
she served as tactical, operational, and theater-level
commands. She has twice been awarded the Bronze Star medal for
her impact on operations. Ms. Lewis, as a side note, thank you
for your service in the military.
Dr. Michael Knights is the Lafer Fellow at the Washington
Institute for Near East Policy specializing on Iraq and the
Kurdistan Regional Government. He has worked almost exclusively
on Iraq for the last 15 years, working in every Iraqi province
and most of the country's 100 districts as an adviser to
government, military, reconstruction agencies, and the oil
sector.
Dr. Daniel Byman is a professor in the Security Studies
Program at Georgetown University School of Foreign Service and
the research director for the Saban Center for Middle East
Policy at the Brookings Institution. Dr. Byman previously
served as a professional staff member with both the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States--that is
the 9/11 Commission--and the joint 9/11 inquiry staff of the
House and Senate Intelligence Committees.
We have an excellent group of panelists today. And we will
start with Dr. Pollack. You have 5 minutes.
Mr. Pollack. Thank you, sir.
STATEMENT OF KENNETH M. POLLACK, PH.D., SENIOR FELLOW, SABAN
CENTER FOR MIDDLE EAST POLICY, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION
Mr. Pollack. Mr. Chairman, Madam Chairman, Congressman
Sherman, distinguished members, thank you very much for
affording me this great honor in addressing you today on this
extremely important topic.
I would like to focus my remarks on the strategic context
that has produced the resurrection of al-Qaeda in Iraq in the
expectation that my very able colleagues will be better able to
handle the tactical aspects and the technical aspects of that
resurgence.
I would simply like to make 4 remarks about what we are
seeing in Iraq. First, the rise of al-Qaeda in Iraq is not the
malady itself. It is a symptom of the malady. The real problems
in Iraq are the problems of Iraqi politics. It has been the
problem ever since 2003. From 2003 until 2006, as a result of
our catastrophically mishandled early reconstruction of Iraq,
Iraqi politics were a mess. They enabled the infiltration of
al-Qaeda into Iraqi society, pushed the Sunni tribes into the
arms of al-Qaeda and other Salafist groups and built the
foundation for the heavy terrorist campaign insurgency that we
faced in Iraq during that period of time.
It is not a coincidence that from 2007 until at least 2010,
during the period of the surge, Iraqi politics turned in a very
different direction. They moved in a very positive direction,
toward greater inclusiveness, toward greater democratization.
It is no coincidence that, as a result, al-Qaeda in Iraq was
enormously marginalized. The Sunni awakening was a critical
element of that, but it was only 1 element of that larger
process.
And it is also no coincidence that beginning in about 2011,
as Iraqi politics faced a very significant downturn following
the removal of American troops from Iraq that, once again, we
have seen a resurgence of al-Qaeda's activities, its ability to
recruit, its ability to insinuate itself, and its acceptance
within the Sunni community of Iraq.
There has been a tendency to ascribe al-Qaeda in Iraq's
resurgence to Syria. And there is no question that the Syrian
civil war has contributed to this state of affairs.
From 2009 to 2010, however, while Iraqi politics were doing
quite well, there was no shortage of jihadists coming from
Syria, but there was simply no acceptance in Iraq. And so we
cannot attribute the problems entirely to Syria. It is true
that the Syrian civil war has helped re-radicalize the Iraqi
population. It has empowered Iraqi extremists. But it is only
part of what is going on.
Second, the obvious follow-on from my first point that the
rise of al-Qaeda is primarily a function of the problems in
Iraqi politics should lead us to a focus on Iraqi politics as
the real solution to that problem. Certainly greater
counterterrorism assistance, more proficiency with
counterterrorism will help, but it will help primarily to treat
the symptom. Unless we are willing, unless the Iraqis are able
to deal with their political problems, the symptoms will recur.
And they could recur in a far more virulent form. And,
therefore, it is incumbent upon us to help the Iraqis deal with
their political problems if we are to eradicate al-Qaeda in
Iraq once again. And this focuses on bringing the Sunnis back
into the government and rebuilding the power-sharing
arrangement that the United States brokered as part of the
surge in 2007-2008.
Third, the upcoming elections in Iraq could turn Iraq in a
more positive or a potentially much more negative direction. In
particular, if Sunnis and other Iraqis who feel marginalized
believe that they have political recourse to address their
grievances, they will be far less likely to support both
actively and passively groups like Iraq. But, unfortunately,
the opposite is also true. And if the elections produce an
outcome that Sunnis and others believe has further alienated
them, made it more difficult for them to address their
grievances through the political process, it is likely that
they will more closely embrace al-Qaeda and other radical
groups and the violence will worsen.
And, finally, it is important to remember that while
American influence in Iraq has waned and has waned quite
considerably, it is not nonexistent. We still do have levers of
influence with the Iraqis. And, what is more, we could rebuild
our influence further, in particular, by conditioning our aid
in exactly the manner that Congressman Sherman described in his
opening remarks. There is a great deal that the Iraqis still
want from us. And all of that that Iraq wants from us is a
source of leverage, a source of leverage that we could be
employing without a dramatic increase in our actual funding of
Iraq but that could, nevertheless, make a very important impact
on Iraqi politics and, therefore, on al-Qaeda in Iraq.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Pollack follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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Mr. Poe. Ms. Lewis?
STATEMENT OF MS. JESSICA D. LEWIS, RESEARCH DIRECTOR, INSTITUTE
FOR THE STUDY OF WAR
Ms. Lewis. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Mrs. Chairman, Mr.
Ranking Member, and distinguished members. It is an honor to
speak to you today. And I thank you as well for your service.
Al-Qaeda in Iraq is resurgent. As you have mentioned levels
of violence in Iraq this year compared to 2008 according to
multiple sources, the pattern of car bomb attacks attributed to
al-Qaeda in Iraq compared to early 2007, these attacks are not
haphazard; instead, demonstrating clear patterns and
operational intent as well as a sophisticated military
bureaucracy that can design, resource, and execute phased
military campaigns. It is necessary to observe their
capabilities and organization as well as their expressed goals
in order to estimate what threats al-Qaeda may pose to
governments in the region and ultimately to U.S. interests.
The two al-Qaeda campaigns I will discuss are the Breaking
the Walls campaign from July 2012 to July 2013 and the ongoing
Soldiers' Harvest campaign. The testimony I provided reports
extensively on the former to support the conclusions I will
address here.
The first, the Breaking the Walls campaign, was executed
primarily through al-Qaeda in Iraq's signature weapons system,
the vehicle-born improvised explosive device, or VBIED, which
is a highly specialized and signature car bomb. The campaign
involved 2 main objectives: To reconstitute the veteran al-
Qaeda network in prison in Iraq, as mentioned; and to target
Shia civilians in order to stoke a sectarian war. Al-Qaeda in
Iraq was successful at both. Two prison attacks resulted in
mass prisoner release, including the most recent Abu Ghraib
attack. The wave of car bomb attacks against Shia civilian
attacks escalated dramatically in February of this year. And by
May, there were indications of Shia militia remobilization in
Baghdad. The waves of car bombs showcased al-Qaeda in Iraq's
robust supply chain and specialized weapons skills.
The second campaign, the Soldiers' Harvest, involved 2 new
objectives to target the Iraqi security forces directly and to
establish control of terrain in Iraq as well as Syria. The
Iraqi security forces are now targeted in their homes as an
intimidation tactic. They are also being targeted through
combined arms attacks upon security compounds, particularly in
Kirkuk and Anbar provinces. The attacks upon hardened
facilities are complex, involving car bombs, indirect fire,
small arms fire. And they represent al-Qaeda's contests for
control of terrain in Iraq.
As of November 2013, there are indications of al-Qaeda's
moving to establish control in southern Anbar province, in
Diyala province, and northern Babil province, along with
multiple locations in Syria, including northern border towns in
areas around Aleppo City.
The control of terrain serves more than a military purpose.
Al-Qaeda in Iraq's goals include governance, which also extends
to Syria. In April 2013, the organization's leader, Abu Bakr
Al-Baghdadi, announced the establishment of the Islamic State
of Iraq and al-Sham, referring to Iraq and Syria. This
indicates not only that Al-Baghdadi's goal is the establishment
of an Islamic emirate but also that he envisions his emirate as
transnational, spanning territory in Iraq as well as Syria.
It is likely that al-Qaeda's military resurgence in Iraq
was made possible because of the war in Syria as well as
political conditions in Iraq, but given the attention that al-
Qaeda continues to direct to attacks in Iraq, it is also likely
that al-Qaeda's military achievements in Iraq have allowed it
to assert greater control over territory and organizations in
Syria.
As the moderate opposition in Syria falters, al-Qaeda in
Iraq stands to gain without rivals to limit its advances on
that front. In Iraq, the Iraqi security forces are mobilized to
fight al-Qaeda, but their operations are not succeeding. And
al-Qaeda's operations are driving security force response.
Al-Qaeda in Iraq's resurgence poses a direct threat in the
region in 2 ways that I see. First, al-Qaeda establishes
control of terrain. It does so at the expense of state
legitimacy, which extends conditions of lawlessness from Syria
to Iraq and further threatens Turkey, Jordan, and other states
in the region.
Second, al-Qaeda's campaign against Shia civilians and holy
sites in Iraq escalates regional sectarianism and necessarily
invokes Iranian concern. In this way, al-Qaeda in Iraq
accelerates other regional threats.
Aside from associated threats to U.S. interests that are
physically located in the region, the greatest threat that al-
Qaeda in Iraq poses to U.S. security today is the military
professionalism of the foreign fighter network, as mentioned,
which connects al-Qaeda's affiliates globally. Foreign fighters
in Iraq and Syria today are learning al-Qaeda in Iraq's style
of warfare and potentially forming strong bonds. As these
fighters return to Africa, to Chechnya, to Europe with
experiences and relationships in hand, they will pose new
threats. They may precipitate attacks in the West.
At this time, al-Qaeda in Iraq has not voiced the intent to
target the U.S., which has been interpreted to mean that it
should be a lower-priority terrorist threat. While it is likely
that the broader al-Qaeda network benefits from al-Qaeda in
Iraq's success, which should concern us, it is also important
to recognize that al-Qaeda in Iraq is not solely operating as a
terrorist organization. It is operating like a military
vanguard. And it is necessary to evaluate the threat to the
region and to the U.S. that an al-Qaeda-led emirate in Iraq and
Syria may pose. Conditions point to their increased strength
over the coming year, making this goal a greater concern.
I yield back to you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Lewis follows:]
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Mr. Poe. Dr. Knights, you have 5 minutes.
Mr. Knights. Thank you very much.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL KNIGHTS, PH.D., LAFER FELLOW, THE
WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY
Mr. Knights. It is an honor to appear before you this
afternoon. I clearly remember the first moment that I felt that
al-Qaeda was making its comeback in Iraq. In July 2011,
security forces found in the desert district of Rutba the
corpses of 3 prominent sheikhs, 3 brothers, who had been
beheaded by al-Qaeda and their bodies booby-trapped to prevent
a prompt burial, a sign of disrespect. I camped in that desert
area just a year beforehand, spending a memorable 4th of July
there.
It is my firm belief that al-Qaeda's resurgence was both
predictable and preventable, but, just as firmly, I believe the
counterterrorism situation in Iraq is recoverable.
This is a rare problem in that we know exactly how to fix
it. We defeated al-Qaeda in Iraq just 5 years ago,
comprehensively dismantling their network's propaganda
campaigns. In the coming years, the United States can help Iraq
to do it again.
Put simply, Iraq needs to do 2 things. The Iraqi Government
needs to make the right political choices during the next
parliamentary term. And the Iraqi military needs to turn back
toward population-focused counterinsurgency. It wasn't easy
last time. It is going to be even harder this time with Iraqi
brigades, rather than U.S. brigades.
The good news is that today's al-Qaeda in Iraq is
vulnerable. It is expanding rapidly. It is conventionalizing. I
knew a New York Times report from I think a couple of days ago
talking about al-Qaeda convoys of 40 vehicles moving around in
the desert. Well, that is very scary for Iraqis, but I will bet
to an AC-130 targeteer, that is quite a tempting target.
As they conventionalize, they expose themselves to attack.
And try as they might, al-Qaeda in Iraq cannot resist the urge
to control territory, to tax populations, to impose Islamic
scripture on the locals, to kill and insult local power
brokers, and to fight with other insurgents. It is already
over-reaching. It is already alienating Iraqis.
And also al-Qaeda in Iraq has only succeeded because the
Government of Iraq has made egregious errors in the last couple
of years. Al-Qaeda in Iraq still has no positive manifesto for
how it would run Sunni parts of Iraq or Syria or anywhere else.
It is wholly reliant on the Iraqi Government, continuing to
make grievous political mistakes in its treatment of the Sunni
Arabs and in its counterinsurgency operations.
My experience in Iraq, whether it is the Mahdi Army militia
or whether it is al-Qaeda, is that these groups only expanded
because others let them. They only expanded because they
exploited others' mistakes, not because they were so great
themselves. They are certainly not 10 feet tall. We beat them
before, and we can do it again.
So the stage is set for a major new counterterrorism
campaign undertaken by Iraq if the Iraqi Government could
embrace this opportunity. What should be our role, the U.S.
role, in helping them to defeat al-Qaeda again?
Well, Iraq cannot kill its way out of this crisis.
Unfortunate evidence of this was shown in 2010. We killed al-
Qaeda's 2 senior leaders. They had been making a lot of
mistakes. Their successors have made very few.
Al-Qaeda has a strong believable narrative at the moment.
And this is what we have got to break down. This narrative is
that an Iranian-backed, Shiite-dominated government in Baghdad
is determined to collectively punish the Sunni Arabs and that
the only force capable of resisting the government and avenging
the Sunnis is al-Qaeda. This narrative has to contain fewer
seeds of truth than it does today if al-Qaeda in Iraq's growth
is to be checked.
What can the U.S. do? Well, the first thing we can do,
which doesn't require a lot of money, weapons, or troops, is to
help the Iraqi Government to stop making mistakes by using our
voice persistently and at moments of leverage, like the
government formation process that is going to come in 2014. We
need to encourage them to hold punctual, free, and fair
elections, to undertake judicial reforms to de-Baathification,
counterterrorism laws, a modernized prison system, and also
some kind of landmark rehabilitation of the major persecuted
Sunni Arab leader, such as Rafi al-Issawi, that the U.S.
Government has defended in the past from legal threats and
charges against him and should do so again.
Most importantly, the U.S. should stay engaged. By staying
engaged in Iraq, by paying attention to the details of Iraq's
politics, the U.S. can reduce the Sunni Arab perception, in
Iraq and elsewhere, that Iraq is being ceded to Iran in some
diabolical great game. That is not the case. The U.S. still has
a lot of influence in Iraq and should continue to use its voice
as well as to provide behind-the-scenes counterterrorism
support.
I yield back to the chair.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Knights follows:]
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Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman.
Dr. Byman?
STATEMENT OF DANIEL L. BYMAN, PH.D., PROFESSOR, SECURITY
STUDIES PROGRAM, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY
Mr. Byman. Chairman Poe, Chairman Ros-Lehtinen,
distinguished members of the subcommittees, thank you very much
for allowing me to testify today.
My colleagues on this panel have handled the domestic
situation in Iraq well. So, rather than repeat their points,
let me focus on several of the regional aspects because al-
Qaeda in Iraq both is and aspires to be a regional movement.
The conflict raging next door in Syria has proven a huge
boost to this organization. Al-Qaeda in Iraq was able to
relocate part of its leadership and part of its cadre to Syria,
both to support jihad there and also to enjoy the sanctuary
that such chaos offers to arm and train and organize. Although
Syria is often referred to as the new Iraq or the new
Afghanistan regarding its role in aspiring jihadists, in
reality, the situation is much worse. The data are scarce, but
it appears that more foreigners from the West have come to
Syria in a far shorter period of time than the numbers who
travel to previous fields of jihad. These fighters in Syria are
remarkably well networked with each other and with other
jihadist causes, especially al-Qaeda in Iraq. Many others are
developing relationships while they are in Syria.
Unfortunately, a number of Arab states and movements,
including a number of governments that are allied to the United
States, share al-Qaeda in Iraq's view that its fight against
the Maliki government is similar to the Syrian Sunni
community's struggle against the Assad regime. Both rebels in
the eyes of many Sunni Muslims are fighting an Iran-backed
apostate regime that is brutalizing the Sunni community.
These states and movements supporting Syrian rebels often
use al-Qaeda in Iraq and western Iraqi tribes to transfer
resources to Syria. Naturally, al-Qaeda in Iraq has kept some
arms and money for itself. Even more important, it was able to
convince many volunteers who intended to fight in Syria to stay
in Iraq and fight on its behalf.
A number of Sunni states, notably Saudi Arabia, see Iraq as
part of a strategic competition with Iran. Riyadh fears that
Teheran is bent on regional hegemony and sees Teheran's gain of
an ally in Iraq after 2003 as a huge shift in the regional
balance. Undermining Iran's ally in Iraq and ideally reversing
Iran's gains are motivating these states to support anti-regime
forces there.
As al-Qaeda in Iraq grows, the violence could spill over
into the region outside Syria. Other states, especially Jordan,
are targets for al-Qaeda in Iraq. Also, as the organization
becomes stronger, its ability to strike Western targets outside
the region, including in Europe but also in the United States,
also grows. Unfortunately, since U.S. forces have departed
Iraq, the United States has done its best to ignore the
country. Hearings like this are rare moments when Iraq is given
the attention it deserves.
Although there are regular diplomatic contacts and I
commend many administration officials for trying to push Iraq
in the right direction, unfortunately, a deeper level of
engagement is required if the United States is going to have
any chance of dissuading the Maliki government from continuing
its self-defeating policies, the ones that fuel the growth of
al-Qaeda in Iraq.
But many of the keys to defeating al-Qaeda in Iraq lay
outside Iraq. The United States needs to push allies, like
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, to stop using Iraq as a transfer point
for financing and arming fighters in Syria. In addition,
Washington should strongly discourage their perception that
Iraq could be another front in rolling back Iran. Washington
should also consider backing secular Syrian opposition forces
more forcefully in order to ensure that jihadist organizations
do not completely dominate the opposition in Syria as this
cross-border relationship has tremendous benefits for al-Qaeda
in Iraq.
Finally, and given the many problems that are to be
expected with the Maliki regime, the United States should
prepare for the problem to get worse. It should take steps to
prepare for potential spillover from Iraq to Jordan, Saudi
Arabia, and other neighbors as well as ensure its own
counterterrorism capabilities. And authorities are robust. So
the United States can act unilaterally if necessary.
Thank you very much for this time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Byman follows:]
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Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman. The Chair will yield 5
minutes to the chairman of the Middle East Subcommittee, Ms.
Ros-Lehtinen, from Florida.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. You are a Texas gentleman. Thank you. But
then I repeat myself. Thank you. I have caught my breath. So
thank you so much.
Well, as the hearing is entitled, as you know, there is a
resurgence of al-Qaeda in Iraq. And that has not been the
narrative from the administration. And, in fact, we hear little
about how the administration plans on fighting al-Qaeda in Iraq
and throughout the region. Do you believe that the
administration has underestimated the growth, the capacity, the
reach of al-Qaeda and its affiliates? And why has it been
reluctant, if you agree or not agree, to admit that the scope
of the danger is far larger than we thought, that we're facing
an al-Qaeda that is stronger?
On Syria, we know that the Syrian conflict has played a
role in the increase of violence in Iraq, but it is clearly not
the driving force behind the deterioration of the security
situation in Iraq. However, with the Iraqi Government's
inability to secure the areas around the Syrian border and the
instability in Syria seemingly unending, we may see al-Qaeda
able to establish a safe haven across both countries. What
steps should we take to combat the AQI threat to ensure that
they don't establish a safe haven in the Iraq-Syria border? And
to what extent has Maliki's inability to govern in an inclusive
way without catering to a sectarian agenda helped to create
this environment in Iraq that has allowed al-Qaeda to make
these gains?
Now we have got upcoming elections in Iraq next year. And
many of us are concerned with the current instability, the
distrust between the different political groups and religious
groups. There is a lack of political will to overcome these
differences, that these elections may bring Iraq to an all-out
civil war.
Are these elections going to be a calming influence, a
bringing together, or is it going to be a problem? What can we
do to support Iraq in this troublesome period? What measures
can we take to help ensure that these elections will be free
and fair and transparent and will result in a peaceful and
constructive effort that can create an inclusive government,
which is what we want, willing and capable of maintaining
stability and the rule of law in Iraq?
And we know that Iran's influence has grown with Maliki. We
have done so much to try to make that divorce happen, but we
haven't seen from the administration any tangible results.
What leverage do we have left with Maliki when it comes to
Iran? That is a whole lot of stuff.
Ms. Lewis. Madam Chairwoman, I would like to tackle what I
took away as 3 questions. The first, did we underestimate al-
Qaeda's resurgence? While we are talking about this topic,
there is still a narrative that perhaps al-Qaeda has been
defeated.
And I think for me, the principal question is, what is the
relationship between al-Qaeda in Iraq and al-Qaeda core? And
what does that tell us about what will happen to the broader
al-Qaeda network if al-Qaeda in Iraq becomes stronger in Iraq
as well as in Syria? And I think that over the course of this
discussion, we have framed very well that 1 of the principal
concerns that connects all of these things is the draw of
foreign fighters globally to the fight, which al-Qaeda in Iraq
is leading in Syria as well as Iraq. So yes, I think that it
does make the----
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. And the foreign fighters has been--okay.
So 1 minute. Have at it, Dr. Byman.
Mr. Byman. I think the reasons why the administration has
downplayed this to me are relatively clear. I would emphasize
2. One is the answers are very, very difficult in terms of
actual solutions. U.S. influence is present but limited. And
many of the things we may try may not work. But, more
important, I think there is very little domestic support for a
strong re-engagement with Iraq. And the administration is
sensitive, even though that is what is necessary if we are
going to fix things. It requires taking action in Iraq. It
requires taking action in Syria. And I think the administration
is sensitive to the lack of American public support for that.
Mr. Knights. I will tackle 2 points. Back in late 2010,
early 2011, it was extremely difficult to get anyone to take
the beginning of the resurgence of al-Qaeda in Iraq seriously.
And that is the opportunity that we missed here with the
administration. At that point, nobody wanted to accept that
Iraq was not in a fit state to handle----
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
Mr. Knights. Thank you.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. And I am out of time. I apologize.
Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Poe. Ranking Member? The Chair will yield 5 minutes to
the ranking member, Mr. Sherman.
Mr. Sherman. Thank you.
One of the things I learned from this hearing and a host of
other hearings in this room is that we have to resist the
Pentagon's desire to pivot toward Asia. Given all of the
complexities and difficulties of dealing with the Middle East,
I can understand why our generals weaned on the World War II
movies that we all enjoy. Living through the great success we
had in the Cold War and military confrontation with the Soviet
Union long for a conventional, uniformed foe and would it be
the case that we had this whole Middle East thing all handled
and it was time to worry about whether Japan got to control a
couple of uninhabited rocks in the East China Sea.
The gentleman from Illinois I agree with in part when he
says it is a bad thing when America retreats, but I would say
when America gets hoodwinked into fighting and dying for Iran's
allies, that is not necessarily a good thing.
In both Afghanistan and Iraq, we foolishly and prematurely
turned the government over to native governments that were
certainly not pro-American. We contrast this to how we not only
won the war but won the peace in World War II. We did not
transfer power in Tokyo. We did not transfer power to Bonn
until certainly the countries were completely pacified. And,
second, the government taking over was undoubtedly pro-America.
I slightly disagree with Dr. Pollack when he says we have
got to have fairness for the Sunnis or we are going to have
continued unrest. I have chanted in the past, ``No justice, no
peace,'' but the fact is that Saddam demonstrated that 1
community can effectively dominate in Iraq and not necessarily
a good thing.
My first question for whoever on the panel can answer it
is, how much of our money does Maliki get now? How much is he
asking for? And when I say, ``our money,'' I mean free food,
free weapons, military aid, civilian aid. Does anybody happen
to have those numbers?
[No response.]
Mr. Sherman. No one does, but I know our staff will get
those and supplement the record. I would point out that--and I
don't know if anyone has the answer to this question. And that
is, is Iraq producing all the oil it can or just all the oil it
is allowed to under the OPEC cartel agreement? Dr. Knights?
Mr. Knights. Iraq is producing as much oil as it can at the
moment. The main restraint on it is the export infrastructure
and water injection and so on, technical details basically. But
they should iron a number of those out in the first quarter of
next year. And then they could be very significantly increasing
the amount of oil that they produce.
Mr. Sherman. Will they bump up against the OPEC quota? And
do they plan to produce more than that quota when it is
technically capable?
Mr. Knights. For the moment, they want to produce more than
that quota until they feel that they have rebuilt the country
from its decades of disaster. And they will also bump up
against the Iranian wish to also come back on the market
hopefully from their perspective. So we could see a little bit
of Iran-Iraq friction.
Mr. Sherman. Ms. Lewis or anyone else who has any question.
You have got Maliki saying, ``Hey, I don't want thugs and
weapons flying over my country to kill innocent people in
Syria, but I can't control my airspace.'' Is that true? Does he
have not a single operational aircraft?
Ms. Lewis. Mr. Ranking Member, shortly I would have to go
back and research who does have rotary wing aircraft. I would
defer to other subject matter experts on the panel if I am
missing----
Mr. Sherman. Because these Iranian planes, they are like
707s from the '80s, the '70s.
Mr. Pollack. They have no fixed-wing air defenses, fixed-
wing aircraft.
Mr. Sherman. They have no fixed-wing----
Mr. Pollack. They could take them down, correct. They do
not. They are trying to get them as fast as they can.
Mr. Sherman. But there is not a single operational----
Mr. Pollack. Right.
Mr. Sherman [continuing]. Rotary propeller, nothing?
Mr. Pollack. Rotary they have, but they do not have
fighters that could actually shoot down jets.
Mr. Sherman. Even the kind of plane that my parents were
flying to Europe on in the '50s.
Mr. Pollack. a helicopter would have a hard time getting--
--
Mr. Sherman. When you say, ``rotary,'' you mean yes, okay.
You don't mean propeller. You mean helicopter.
Mr. Pollack. I mean helicopter.
Mr. Sherman. Yes. Helicopter probably doesn't shoot down a
jet. I will just point out that they could, of course, invite
the United States to patrol their airspace.
And I don't know if Dr. Knights has a comment.
Mr. Knights. Just a very quick one, which is that the
Iraqis had no problem whatsoever closing their airspace to the
Turkish Energy Minister just over a week ago. So it is really
about political will, not whether they can shoot something
down.
Mr. Sherman. Where was the Turkish Energy Minister going?
Mr. Knights. He was flying into the Kurdish north of Iraq
to attend the oil conference.
Mr. Sherman. Yes.
Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman from California.
I want to follow up on some of your comments earlier. When
I was in Iraq a couple of years, year and a half ago, prime
minister--I asked him the question about the oil and how about
paying for some of this nation building, military, all the
things America is doing. And he literally was very vocal about
Iraq would not pay the United States a dime for helping them
liberate their country and rebuild their country. So I think
that might still be his position.
I would like to look at this a little bit bigger. No
question about al-Qaeda is back in Iraq. Maliki, the
government, are they playing both sides? Are they wanting the
United States to help them to defeat al-Qaeda, which is on the
rise, no question about it, so that we can do their work for
them so they can pivot toward Iran and Iran come in and Iraq be
a new coalition, so to speak, and the United States is still
the bad guy in the neighborhood?
I would like your opinion on that. I fear this possibility.
So I would like to know what you experts think about that.
Mr. Pollack. Mr. Chairman, if I could offer some thoughts
on that matter? It is certainly the case that the Iraqi
Government would like our help dealing with al-Qaeda. I think
that if we offered to take care of al-Qaeda for them, they
would be more than glad for that.
It is also the case that Iran wields a great deal of
influence in Iraq, largely because we have abdicated our
influence in the country and Iran has lots of different ways to
do so.
That said, I think it important that in my own experience,
both watching Iraq and also my own interactions with Prime
Minister Maliki, I do not believe that this is a man who is an
eager ally of Iran. In fact, my experience with him is he
really dislikes the Iranians. He is very afraid of the
Iranians. He is very much an Iraqi nationalist. He would like
to separate himself from the Iranians if he could, but since
there is nobody really pushing on the other side, he doesn't
feel like he has got a whole lot of help.
And I also want to be clear he makes a lot of mistakes
himself. He overreacts. He goes after his internal rivals in an
undemocratic fashion that has alienated both his internal
rivals and their external supporters. And it has left him with
little choice but to turn to Iran.
Mr. Poe. Anybody else want to weigh in on that with--just
briefly, Ms. Lewis?
Ms. Lewis. Mr. Chairman, I would agree. I think we should
consider the possibility that Maliki's fear of al-Qaeda is
driving him closer to Iran as we craft what we might do about
it.
Mr. Poe. So do you see the scenario that I mentioned as
something that we should be concerned about that he is pivoting
to Iran, wants us to get rid of al-Qaeda with him and then he
is buddy buddy with Iran? Is that something that we should be
concerned about, the United States----
Mr. Byman. Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Poe [continuing]. Or not?
Mr. Byman. Excuse me.
Mr. Poe. Go ahead, Dr. Byman.
Mr. Byman. Mr. Chairman, we should absolutely be concerned
about it, but the recognition is what he wants is a high degree
of independence and autonomy to do what he wants. And right now
Iran is the dominant power in Iraq. And he can't do that. We
need to have our own presence there. And that is an economic
presence. That is a political presence and a security presence.
And then he will try to play us off.
He is a cynical politician. He is ruthless. He is
conniving. But right now he has to work with the Iranians
because he has no choice. We need to give him some other
options in order for this to even be a possibility.
Mr. Poe. All right. The United States is at a point here
where--we all know where we are as far as U.S. involvement. To
defeat al-Qaeda in Iraq and be an influence in Iraq, are we
just there to stay? I mean, are we there--is Iraq going to
become the 51st state? Are we just going to be there forever?
People I think are concerned, like a lot of Americans,
about all the money that has gone to Iraq, all those things. So
al-Qaeda is the problem. We are saying we are going to help
them. How long is this going to take? Dr. Byman, look into your
crystal ball. Help us out with this.
Mr. Byman. Sir, I don't think there is any chance that we
are going to go in big to Iraq. So the question to me is, are
we able to restore some influence? Part of that is through arms
sales. Part of that is through renegotiating diplomatic
agreements. Part of it is through covert action, intelligence
cooperation. We can get something, sir.
Mr. Poe. Does Iraq have the money to buy our equipment or
do we need to continue just to give it to them?
Mr. Byman. Iraq increasingly has the money, but we want
them to have our equipment. That is a good thing for us as well
as for them.
Mr. Poe. All right. Dr. Knights, last comment on this
question.
Mr. Knights. Yes. Iraq is economically not a Bahrain or a
Yemen or a Jordan, requiring the same kind of military
assistance to buy our stuff, but they are not a Saudi or a UAE
yet either. The country is totally wrecked.
Mr. Poe. All right. Thank you very much.
The Chair will yield 5 minutes to Mr. Connolly.
Mr. Connolly. I thank the chair. I welcome the panel.
The chair has circulated a bar chart showing the upsurge in
violence in Iraq. Dr. Byman, to what would you attribute this
really quite stunning increase in the number of civilian deaths
in Iraq?
Mr. Byman. Sir, I would say in the big picture, 2 things.
One is a set of rather disastrous mistakes by the Maliki
government ranging from very bad counterinsurgency to
politically excluding the Sunni community and making them look
to al-Qaeda in Iraq as a defender. And externally I would say
the Syrian conflict has fueled radicalism throughout the region
and put resources into this area in a very dangerous way.
Mr. Connolly. And, Dr. Knights, I saw you and Dr. Pollack
shaking your heads and you, Ms. Lewis. Anything you want to add
to that?
Mr. Knights. From my perspective, I think all those points
are right: The Iraqi Government policy poor counterinsurgency
tactics, the Syrian crisis back to back with this one, and the
4th thing, that they alienated the United States at the precise
moment of withdrawal, preventing a really close intimate
intelligence relationships but forming. Now we have another
chance to start that again after Maliki's visit.
Mr. Connolly. Mr.--I am sorry if you wanted to comment?
Ms. Lewis. Well, Congressman, just very quickly to provide
the tactical observation that most of those deaths occurred
because of al-Qaeda's car bomb campaign, which is actually a
very small component of the al-Qaeda broader military
organization and can actually be targeted effectively by Iraqi
security forces if they could figure out how to do it.
Mr. Connolly. Right.
Mr. Pollack. Congressman, just to build on the points by my
colleagues earlier, in 2007, the United States helped forge a
power-sharing arrangement, a new power-sharing arrangement,
among the different communities of Iraq. Unfortunately, since
our departure, Prime Minister Maliki but also with some help
from his opposition has torn that agreement apart. And that has
led to once again a resurgence of fear across Iraq, which has
pushed the Sunni community back into the arms of al-Qaeda, in
many cases very unwillingly because they remember what it was
like in 2006-2007. And so they have gone grudgingly. And that
at least opens up the possibility that we could help the Iraqis
once again put that power-sharing agreement back together,
which I think would go a very long way to dealing with the
problems.
Mr. Connolly. That is very interesting because there is the
political aspect of this that has real consequences.
Mr. Pollack. Correct.
Mr. Connolly. But there is also--and I think, Ms. Lewis,
you were alluding to it. And I would be interested in comments.
What is the--I mean, we have helped create a security force of
800,000 in Iraq. What are we getting for that relationship,
that investment? Are they capable of deterring long-term the
threat that is posed by al-Qaeda? Dr. Byman?
Mr. Byman. Currently sir, I would say no. I would say that,
despite their numbers, despite their fire power, they are
pursuing a doctrine of, I will say, suppression, rather than
counterinsurgency. They are going into villages. And they are
often systematically arresting or abusing young males. They are
not trying to use intelligence to find out who the bad guys
are.
And, to go a little bit further, sir, I would say that this
is a problem pushing resources to them right now, which is that
they will use them in the wrong way. And we need to have a
training program that goes along with any arming program.
Mr. Connolly. Which we need to keep in mind given pending
requests by Mr. Maliki on his visit.
Mr. Byman. Yes, sir.
Mr. Connolly. One final--I am probably going to get in only
1 more final question. We were talking about Iran, but I think
it is really important for an American audience not to conflate
Iran with al-Qaeda.
Iran has no love and the Iranian leadership has no love for
al-Qaeda. As a matter of fact, they do view them as a terrorist
threat. Do they not, Dr. Pollack?
Mr. Pollack. Absolutely. The Iranians see al-Qaeda and
other Salafist groups as very important adversaries. At times,
they have made tacit arrangements with them. But, by and large,
they fight them very hard all across the region. And I think
that they are quite concerned about the rise of al-Qaeda in
Iraq.
But what has been interesting is that the Iranians have
been among those who have been urging restraint on various
Iraqi groups because they are afraid that this resurgence in
violence will push Iraq into civil war, something that they
don't want to see either. It is one of these strange areas
where our interests and Iran's are at least in confluence.
Mr. Connolly. If the chair would allow the rest of the
panel just to comment on that, I would appreciate it.
Mr. Poe. You may.
Mr. Connolly. I thank the chair.
Mr. Knights. I think there has been quite a lot of tactical
cooperation between the Iranians over the years but ultimately
agree with Dr. Pollack that they are not aligned strategically.
Mr. Byman. Sir, there is a tremendous anger, both among
Bohra Shia populations, Bohra Sunni populations, toward each
other. And the sectarianism of the civil war, the horrific
images that are circulated on social media have made it hard
for open and closed cooperation and, in fact, have pushed both
sides farther apart.
We saw last month the bombing of the Iranian Embassy in
Lebanon. And it is still a bit murky who was behind it, but the
leading suspects seem to be Sunni jihadists of the sort linked
to al-Qaeda. This is a very bad relationship, even though there
is tactical cooperation.
Mr. Poe. Ms. Lewis?
Ms. Lewis. Congressman, I would just add that I do agree
that al-Qaeda does represent a huge threat to Iran; in fact, a
more direct and immediately proximate one than perhaps we may
interpret, and that that should be an opportunity that we
consider among our levers and relationships with all the
countries in the region.
Mr. Connolly. I thank the panel. And I thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Poe. The question was asked earlier about assistance to
Iraq. Staff has provided these figures for the panel and
members: 2011, $1.2 billion; 2012, $300 million; 2013, $142
million.
The Chair recognizes Mr. Kinzinger from Illinois,----
Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you, Mr.----
Mr. Poe [continuing]. Iraqi veteran.
Mr. Kinzinger. Yes. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, again, to the panel, thank you for being here. This
is--I forget who mentioned it earlier, but it is tragic in my
mind that Iraq is not discussed more here. I am not going to
blame anybody for that because I don't think it is anybody's
fault. I think it is just a matter of--you know, it is not in
people's consciousness. I think, frankly, Afghanistan is not
discussed enough. I think there are too many people that think
that we still have 100,000 troops in Afghanistan that are
taking the fight to the Taliban and unaware of the fact that
the Afghan Government has actually begun to really stand up.
I want to say--I mentioned this in my opening statement how
sad it is. I remember I was in Iraq in 2008, after the surge
had begun. And, you know, you still saw. I flew ISR. So I still
saw that people were stuck in their homes. They weren't out
walking around.
And then when I went in 2009, a striking thing happened. We
saw kids out playing soccer. We saw people visiting stores. And
there was really a feeling that we had turned the corner in
Iraq. And it was a good feeling.
And, again, my concern has been that we took that potential
victory and we turned it into a complete failure because we
decided that it wasn't worth the political points and the
political cost. I believe a promise was made in an election to
get out of Iraq. And that meant we are going to get out and not
push hard for a status of forces agreement.
I agree with the chairman in his concern about nation
building. I do want to point out, however, though, thousands of
Americans gave their lives on behalf of the Iraqi people. Lots
of money was given on behalf of the Iraqi people. And at the
end of the day, I would love to see a successful conclusion in
Iraq so in 10 years, we can look back and say, ``Maybe we went
through a difficult period here, but good things happened in
the very end.''
Ms. Lewis, you have produced some outstanding reports
regarding this topic. You have been very helpful and insightful
in regards to the current status of al-Qaeda in Iraq and how
the violence has reached levels that we haven't seen since
2008. In light of that fact that AQI has established and named
specific campaigns, carried out a high amount of targeted VBIED
attacks, do you believe that al-Qaeda, AQI, is more organized,
better trained, and equipped than ever before?
Ms. Lewis. Congressman, I think they are tremendously well-
organized, as we have mentioned, largely because of prison
breaks that have been successful. There are al-Qaeda veterans
in the field now. And I do think, particularly since September
of last year, there is a tremendous amount of military
wherewithal that is applied to their operations. I think they
are leveraging old weapons systems that they used before and
that they are maximizing the effects of these car bombs
specifically and that if that capability were to go away, they
would be overall much weaker.
Mr. Kinzinger. Yes. And we don't have the threat of
American troops. And so it gives them kind of a freedom to
breathe and operate and plan and coordinate.
Let me ask the panel. Then I will yield back when I am done
asking the panel. We will start with you, Dr. Pollack. Can you
explain to the American people, explain to us how the threat of
al-Qaeda in Iraq actually is a threat to the American homeland?
Mr. Pollack. Sure. I will start by saying that there is
obviously a direct threat in that al-Qaeda has attacked the
American homeland. It is one of the very few groups or nations
that has been able to do so successfully. What we have learned
from Afghanistan is that if we allow them to recruit and build
up a base, they will bring the war to us if and where they can.
Beyond that, though, we should also keep in mind another
point that you were getting at, Congressman, which is they were
trying very hard to create a civil war in Iraq. That is their
goal. They want a civil war in Iraq. If they create a civil war
in Iraq, it is likely to affect Iraq's oil exports. Iraq is now
the second largest producer in OPEC. Much of the expectation of
future production in the world is going to come from Iraq. That
will hurt oil prices globally. And that will affect the
American economy.
Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you.
I will just ask Dr. Knights and Dr. Byman if you don't mind
answering that briefly: The threat to the homeland.
Mr. Knights. So just a brief one. We saw with al-Qaeda in
the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen that once an al-Qaeda franchise
gets to a certain level of ambition and size, sometimes it
turns toward homeland attacks against the U.S. There is a lot
of rivalry between al-Qaeda and Iraq and rival groups in Syria
like Jabhat al-Nusra. If you want to raise your profile and be
the clear leader, one way to do that is to attack the U.S.
homeland.
Mr. Kinzinger. Dr. Byman?
Mr. Byman. I would agree with that and simply add this is
an organization that poses not only a threat to the homeland
but to U.S. interests more broadly. And that includes interests
in Iraq but includes interests in the region. A number of the
states are close U.S. allies. And it is an enemy of all of
them.
Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you.
And, just in my brief 10 seconds left, I just want to say
to folks that are watching this hearing, that is the importance
of what we are talking about. This isn't just about wanting to
say we won in Iraq. This is about protecting the homeland,
protecting America, and looking back in 10 or 20 years without
regrets and not looking back and saying that we had an
opportunity and we completely failed.
So thank you for being here. Mr. Chairman, I will yield
back.
Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman for his excellent questions.
The Chair will recognize the gentleman, Mr. Schneider, from
Illinois for 5 minutes.
Mr. Schneider. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And, again, thank you
to the witnesses for being here.
Dr. Pollack, you talked about the goal of al-Qaeda in Iraq,
AQI, being a civil war in Iraq. We have seen this great
increase in the numbers of civilian deaths. And I have spoken
with some of the representatives from Iraq. That has not yet
turned to sectarian violence. With all of the attacks, you
haven't seen neighbors attacking neighbors.
What do you see--and I will open it to the whole panel.
What do you see as the reasons why the sectarian violence this
time around hasn't gone up commensurate with the terrorism? And
what are the things we should be watching for to be prepared if
it does start to turn?
Mr. Pollack. Congressman, I think this is an absolutely
critical question because you are right. These levels of
violence could easily have pushed the country into civil war
already.
I would identify 3 critical forces of restraint in Iraq,
all of which have been important but none of which may be
permanent, the first of which I have already mentioned is the
Iranians. For their own reasons, they don't want a civil war in
Iraq. They have got a civil war in Syria that is consuming them
enough. They don't want a second one, especially one closer to
home.
A second one is the Kurds. At different points in time, the
Kurds have played a more constructive or less constructive
role. For now and for the past year or so, what we have seen is
a Kurdish decision that creating problems in Iraq is
problematic for them. And they have actually taken a number of
important steps to help mollify the violence and to reach out
to the government, which has been very important.
And then the last one is that both sides, Sunni and Shia,
are concerned that if there is a future civil war, they may not
win. And that is another calculation, I think a critical
calculation, which is true at this moment, but it may not last.
The Sunnis believe that they have the help from the wider Sunni
world, but they don't know what that means.
And for the Shia, they know they have got the numbers in
Iraq, but the Iraqi security forces have performed fairly badly
in recent months. I think there is great concern on the part of
the government about what would happen and how well they would
perform if there were a larger war.
Mr. Poe. Ms. Lewis, do you want to?
Ms. Lewis. Congressman, 2 things I would add quickly are
that among the car bombs I tracked this past year, 19 of them
targeted Shia mosques and that this can have a very incendiary
effect.
As well, the majority of those car bombs targeted Shia
neighborhoods in Baghdad repeatedly and aggressively. And at
some point, I am concerned that someone is going to step up to
defend those neighborhoods. And this is the space that we are
talking about that to me is actually very small between
potential energy for sectarian violence and that possibly
becoming virulent.
Mr. Schneider. Dr. Knights?
Mr. Knights. We do see the beginnings of sectarian
retaliation at very low levels, corpses with letters attached
to them explaining exactly why they were killed in retaliation,
but we are still down around 1,400 incidents a month, instead
of the 6,000 we saw during the height of the civil war. That is
because most people have not got involved again back into the
fighting.
I put it down to 2 more local reasons: Conflict fatigue.
People know what a civil war looks like, and they are not sure
they would win it. Everyone knows they lose from it. And,
secondly, the Shia now know that the Iraqi security forces
retaliate on their behalf. So there is a large Shiite militia
out there attacking Sunnis, and it is called the security
forces.
Mr. Byman. Sir, very briefly, I believe we are in a
situation akin to Syria in early 2012, where we are seeing
violence and we are seeing it growing and we are seeing a
sectarian hue again. And my concern is that if you were to have
hearings a year from now, a year and a half from now, we would
be talking about the second sectarian civil war raging in the
Middle East.
I think all the trend lines are negative. And the points
that my colleagues have raised about what is holding us in
check I think are well-taken, but I am concerned that the
direction is very much the wrong way.
Mr. Schneider. The fact that this has been growing for so
long and that it hasn't gone to sectarian violence, however, I
think gives us some space to work in. Dr. Pollack, how do we
use that space to work to make sure that it doesn't degrade
into another conflict, like what we are seeing in Syria?
Mr. Pollack. Yes. Another great question. And here I would
focus, Congressman, on these impending elections, which are
going to be very important for Iraq, which could either push
Iraq conceivably into civil war or help pull it back. And there
I think the U.S. has an important role. First, focus on the
process. One of the great mistakes that we made in 2010 was
that even though we were the guarantors and the builders of
Iraqi democracy, we didn't enforce the rules of the road. And
things came off the tracks. And Iraq went in a bad direction.
A second one, conditionality, which we have been talking
about, we need to make clear to our--to the Iraqis that our aid
is ultimately predicated on their good behavior following the
rules and then, finally, a willingness to name and shame. The
United States carries a great weight in Iraq and in the region.
And simply standing up and saying that so and so is behaving in
a way that subverts Iraqi democracy is a very powerful tool.
Mr. Schneider. Okay. And, with that, I am going to have to
give you the last word as votes have been called and we have to
go. Thank you. And I yield back.
Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman.
As the gentleman mentioned, we are in the middle of some
votes. That is one of the things that we are supposed to do as
Members of Congress, to let our voice be known. And so we would
be in recess until 2:45. I thank you, all 4 of you, for your
patience. We will start back at 2:45.
[Recess.]
Mr. Poe. The committee will come back to order. There are
some more members come their way. I am going to take the
opportunity to ask some more questions. And I appreciate your
diligence in being here and coming back.
How many al Qaeda fighters are there in Iraq? Anybody that
knows. Ms. Lewis?
Ms. Lewis. Mr. Chairman, I don't from my own research. I
have heard estimates of 3,000 to 4,000 fighters that I believe
is oriented on Iraq that I don't have any reason to refute. The
attacks that I have seen could be achieved by a force of that
size.
Mr. Poe. Anybody disagree with that? Dr. Knights?
Mr. Knights. No disagreement, but membership of al Qaeda in
Iraq is kind of like an onion, so many layers. Of that 3,000 to
4,000, that probably includes everyone including the guys who
steal the cars, the guys who weld them together, and all the
rest of that. I think the core of card carriers could be
substantially smaller than that. It could be in the high
hundreds.
Mr. Poe. Where do they get their money?
Mr. Knights. Okay. So starting----
Mr. Poe. Dr. Knights?
Mr. Knights. A lot of it is organized crime. When we ripped
this organization to pieces back in the 2005 to 2009 timeframe,
it started the process of disintegrating into organized crime
networks, and it became self-funding. As Iraq became a sordid
place to have a jihad, not very inspiring.
It ceased to get foreign funding, and they started to turn
to their own means of raising money and that has allowed them
to--and they have remained running those networks. We are
talking about real estate, extorting mobile phone companies,
running trucking companies, exporting oil.
Mr. Poe. Ms. Lewis.
Ms. Lewis. Mr. Chairman, I agree entirely. I would add that
there are a few characteristics of their funding that describe
this further, specifically that it is stable. They have a very
stable supply chain. They are able to control the rate of their
attacks. They aren't chasing money. They have a good system for
this.
What I would also add over in Syria is that it appears that
they are fighting for control of the border checkpoints on
Syria's northern border with Turkey, and I think they are also
trying to seize opportunities for resources that are coming
into the country.
Mr. Poe. Dr. Byman.
Mr. Byman. I think this is absolutely true. What I would
add is I think their funding sources are changing. We are
seeing hundreds of millions of dollars--or billions depending
on your estimate--pouring into Syria, and they are able to
extract a percentage of that because some of it goes through
Iraq. And some of that is money, but a lot of it is weapons or
in-kind transfers, and they are able to siphon that off.
Mr. Poe. The bombings of mosques, for example, are they--do
they discriminate against Shia and Sunni? And how does the--I
think, Ms. Lewis, you may have mentioned this. How does the
public view the security force's reaction to whether it is a
Sunni or a Shia mosque, for example, that is bombed?
Ms. Lewis. Mr. Chairman, they are primarily targeting Shia
mosques. I think I have seen a couple of occasions where we had
explosive attacks against joint Sunni/Shia prayer sessions in
Diyala in order to deter that conciliatory behavior. They are
specifically trying to make the Shia feel like they have to
defend themselves and that the state is not succeeding in this.
I would actually defer to the expertise that has already
been had at the panel about the primary fact that that has not
actually manifested as much as perhaps it might have in former
years. But ultimately it does make the Iraqi security forces
look like they can't do it.
Mr. Poe. Dr. Pollack.
Mr. Pollack. Mr. Chairman, I would simply add that in terms
of public reaction, among the Shia, by and large, there is a
great deal of pressure on Prime Minister Maliki to crack down
even harder. And, you know, we have seen large-scale operations
into Anbar, into Salahadin, into Diyala, to try to go after
these guys. We look at them and see them as rather
indiscriminate, but there are a lot of Shia Iraqis who would
like to see an even greater use of force.
Mr. Poe. Let us focus back on what we need to be doing.
What is our position? What are we looking for in the future?
Where do we need to push? Where does Congress need to push, the
United States need to push? What is in our national security
interest going forward?
Now, we know the problem. We know it is increasing, al
Qaeda is increasing in Iraq. How about some advice here? I want
to go down the row. You are the experts, so we want to hear
what you have to say. Dr. Pollack.
Mr. Pollack. Mr. Chairman, certainly the United States has
influenced, and part of what we need to do is actually employ
that influence. We have been reticent to do so. The
administration has not been as engaged either with Iraq or with
the Middle East, as I would argue that they ought to be, as in
the U.S. interest.
But I will go beyond that and say something that is
probably quite controversial in these halls, which is that the
United States needs to manufacture more influence in Iraq, and
that may actually require some commitment of additional
resources. I would actually argue that we can do a lot more in
terms of technical assistance, in terms of simply advising the
Iraqis.
I think that there is a certain amount that we can do that
the Iraqis can pay for themselves. In fact, quite a bit that
the Iraqis can pay for themselves. And I am reminded of the
relationship that we had with the Saudis in the 1970s and '80s
where together, using Saudi money and American expertise, we
built the oil ports of Yanbu and Jubail. We built their
telecommunications network. We built their road network.
But at the moment, that is a little bit off into the
future. And, again, I think even setting that up, using the
strategic framework agreement between the United States and
Iraq, to begin to set that up, would be very helpful, because
Iraqis will know it is coming and they are looking for it.
But right now they have got some needs. And as Dr. Knights
was pointing out earlier, the Iraqis are mostly exhausting the
resources that they have available very quickly. Obviously, if
there is corruption in their system, you might be able to
extract more.
But this actually is a moment when some additional
assistance from the United States, additional resources from
the United States, I think could go a very long way in terms of
saying to the Iraq people, ``We have not abandoned you. We are
still interested in Iraq. We have our interests there. We are
willing to commit resources, but they are going to be committed
to what we need to see happen.''
Mr. Poe. Ms. Lewis. We will go right down the row.
Ms. Lewis. Mr. Chairman, I do think that resources are a
valid expectation for what would need to be part of----
Mr. Poe. Just get a little closer to the microphone, if you
would.
Ms. Lewis. Yes, of course, Mr. Chairman. The primary
deficiency that I see is how they are applying the resources
that they have. I do not see that their military campaign to
counter al Qaeda is a very good one. I think one of our
greatest potential levers is expertise in fighting al Qaeda,
and I think that we should make this very much about what an
effective campaign to counter al Qaeda in Iraq looks like, and
fashion that into our options.
Mr. Poe. Dr. Knights.
Mr. Knights. That is absolutely right. No one is better at
fighting al Qaeda in Iraq than the U.S. military. Even now the
institutional memory is still there and it is still fresh. One
of the dirty little secrets of operating in Iraq is that they
are not very good at doing counterinsurgency in their own
country.
We always thought back in 2003 we made all of these
mistakes because we are new to the country and that the Iraqis
knew it much better. In fact, they are worse than we are and
they have no excuse. And they are worse than we are willfully.
They understand the country. They just don't want to do
population-focused counterinsurgency.
If they are willing to take our advice, we are able to
bring a much more thoughtful approach to counterinsurgency/
counterterrorism in Iraq than they would. So I think all of the
professional military education support we can provide to Iraq,
IMET funding, OSCI, the security corporation command in Iraq,
Section 1206 funding.
Any of these things would be pretty well spent. They are
quite small amounts of money often, and I think they can
maintain a thoughtful--they can build a thoughtful approach in
the Iraqi security forces toward counterinsurgency. They need
to--we need to be back in there proffering our advice again.
Mr. Poe. Dr. Byman.
Mr. Byman. Mr. Chairman, rather than repeat what my
colleagues have said, let me just add two points. My view is
that part of Congress' role is to highlight these issues, to
force the administration to engage at a higher level. I often
agree with specific things the administration is doing, but it
is being done at the ambassadorial level, it is being done at
the deputy assistant level, it is being done by individuals who
are very well meaning but in Iraqi terms don't have the clout
of, say, the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense.
And as a result, they believe I think correctly that they
don't have to pay attention because the United States doesn't
really care.
And as my colleagues have said, a lot of the problem is not
resources; it is how they use the resources. We have elections
coming up, and there will be a question of, are these fair
elections? There is a question of, are the security services
defending Iraqis, or are they the arm of the Shia community?
And the administration needs to push harder on all of these
issues, and I think Congress' role is to highlight them so the
administration really has to address them one way or another.
Mr. Poe. And the last question has to do, once again, with
Iran. I know you all are experts on al Qaeda. But should we be
concerned of a situation in Iraq that is similar to the one in
Syria, or you result in civil war, you have got two sides
fighting each other, and you have the Sunnis and the Shias
fighting, and then you have outside countries coming in and
taking sides, and we know Syria is--it is bad on the citizens.
They are the ones who lose, the people who live there.
Is that a scenario that could play out, or is that not?
Just kind of looking into the future if civil war erupts
because of al Qaeda's presence and the things that you all have
talked about. Dr. Pollack. We will go down the row, and it will
be the last question.
Mr. Pollack. Mr. Chairman, I think that is a very important
concern. It is one of the great issues of civil wars. Dr. Byman
and I did a study of civil wars back in 2006 when we were
looking at Iraq and civil war, and that was one of the great
conclusions of our work was that this was a very real risk,
that an all-out civil war would almost certainly suck in all of
the neighbors into the fighting itself.
Iran, because of its position, was relatively able to
dominate over much of Iraq. And if Iraq falls back into civil
war, which is a very real possibility at this point in time,
looking at some point into the future, I think that that
scenario is one that we absolutely have to be concerned about.
I will simply add, Mr. Chairman, that we have to be equally
concerned about our allies getting sucked into an Iraqi civil
war. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan, even Turkey--these are not
countries whose economies and militaries are ready to withstand
the stresses of a civil war. These are not countries whose
political systems can withstand that either.
Mr. Poe. Thank you. Ms. Lewis.
Ms. Lewis. Mr. Chairman, I agree. I think the primary thing
I would highlight is that that is exactly what al Qaeda is
trying to do and why they are stoking sectarian violence--that
would set them most up for success in trying to establish an
Islamic Emirate and that they will try to precipitate that end
by every way that they can think of.
Mr. Poe. Dr. Knights.
Mr. Knights. Back in 2006/2007 when we had civil war-like
conditions in Iraq, I would argue that--and actually they did
not really suck in the neighbors. But this time, if we went
back into civil war in Iraq, it would because things have
changed since then. The regional context is different. We have
the Sunni/Shia conflict, much more heightened now. We have a
number of Sunni states, like the Saudis, the Emiratis, the
Qataris, who have been actively involving themselves in
regional conflicts--Libya, Syria, Yemen, et cetera--and the
U.S. is out. So this time it has got much more potential to
drag in third parties than it did back in '06/'07.
Mr. Poe. Last word, Dr. Byman.
Mr. Byman. I am not sure I am worthy of that, Mr. Chairman.
But all I would say is that Iran feels that it has lost ground
because of the Syria conflict, that it had a very strong stable
ally in Syria, and now the situation is fraught and its ally
might fall.
From Iran's point of view, losing Iraq as well would be a
disaster, and I think they are prepared to go very hard and
very strong, should the situation become quite negative in Iraq
itself.
Mr. Poe. Well, I want to thank all 4 of you. The testimony
has been excellent, including your prepared statements.
And so the subcommittee is adjourned, and thank you once
again for your help.
[Whereupon, at 3:05 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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