[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE IRAN NUCLEAR DEAL: DOES IT FURTHER U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY?
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
DECEMBER 10, 2013
__________
Serial No. 113-108
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DANA ROHRABACHER, California Samoa
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio BRAD SHERMAN, California
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
TED POE, Texas GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MATT SALMON, Arizona THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina KAREN BASS, California
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
MO BROOKS, Alabama DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
TOM COTTON, Arkansas ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
PAUL COOK, California JUAN VARGAS, California
GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III,
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania Massachusetts
STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas AMI BERA, California
RON DeSANTIS, Florida ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
TREY RADEL, Florida GRACE MENG, New York
DOUG COLLINS, Georgia LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
TED S. YOHO, Florida JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
LUKE MESSER, Indiana
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESS
The Honorable John F. Kerry, Secretary of State, U.S. Department
of State....................................................... 5
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 48
Hearing minutes.................................................. 49
The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress
from the Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement.......... 51
Questions submitted for the record to the Honorable John F. Kerry
by:
The Honorable William Keating, a Representative in Congress
from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts....................... 52
The Honorable Joe Wilson, a Representative in Congress from the
State of South Carolina...................................... 54
The Honorable Paul Cook, a Representative in Congress from the
State of California.......................................... 56
The Honorable Scott Perry, a Representative in Congress from
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania............................. 57
THE IRAN NUCLEAR DEAL: DOES IT FURTHER U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY?
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TUESDAY, DECEMBER 10, 2013
House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:05 p.m., in
room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ed Royce
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Chairman Royce. This hearing will come to order.
Today the committee will discuss the interim nuclear
agreement which the United States and five other Nations have
reached with Iran last month.
And we welcome our Secretary of State, the Honorable John
Kerry, to address the questions of the committee members here
regarding the administration's plan.
And Mr. Secretary, we very much appreciate you coming
before the committee today. And while we will debate how best
to derail Iran's nuclear weapons program, I know that you and
all of us appreciate that it poses a threat to our national
security here in the United States.
Congress has played a key role in U.S. policy toward Iran,
mainly by driving sanctions against the regime. And I will
remind the members of this committee that the legislation which
we passed here passed out unanimously, legislation that--the
Royce-Engel bill, which passed the House of Representatives
last summer, passed by a vote of 400 to 20. So we look forward
to a constructive discussion today. These are high-stake
issues. But I am confident that the spirit of bipartisanship
will prevail, as it typically does on this committee. And we
welcome our Secretary of State here today.
The key issue is whether a final agreement would allow Iran
to manufacture nuclear fuel. Unfortunately, the interim
agreement raises some questions about this. My concern is that
we have bargained--we may have bargained away our fundamental
position, which is enshrined in six U.N. Security Council
resolutions. And that fundamental agreement is that Iran should
not be enriching and reprocessing. And we may bargain that away
for a false confidence that we can effectively block Iran's
misuse of these key nuclear bomb making technologies.
Just within the last few days, Iran has announced plans to
press on and improve its centrifuge technology in order to
enrich uranium. Meanwhile, on Wednesday, we had the comment
from the Foreign Minister of Iran stating that Iran was going
to continue construction at the plutonium reactor at Arak,
which will be capable of producing weapons-grade plutonium once
it is operational. And we had another comment from those in the
regime that they may produce, that they will set up more of
these plutonium reactors. That tells us something about Iran's
intentions. And that is why we are concerned about how this
agreement will be enforced. Yes, we agree, you know, on the
concept of verification, that we have to have good
verification. One of the things we remember, as we deal with
this government in Iran, is that it is one that aggressively
supports terrorism, supports the most radical groups. In 2006,
I was in Haifa when it was being shelled, and it was being
shelled specifically with Iranian missiles and missiles
provided, rockets provided by Syria. This is a regime which, as
we were reminded not too long ago, Mr. Ted Deutch reminded me,
that when we heard the rally and the slogan ``Death to
America,'' it was not just the Basiji that were marching; it
was members of the government as well that were shouting
``Death to America.'' It is a regime which brutally, brutally
represses its own people. And oftentimes the way a country
treats its own citizens tells you how it might treat others.
And it threatens our ally with extinction, saying that Israel
is a country which could be destroyed with just one bomb. It is
that kind of commentary out of the regime that gives us pause.
And this is the important point to many of us. It has a
history of deceiving the international community about its
nuclear program. The director of the IAEA raised that concern
with me. It has that history, and it is pursuing a ballistic
missile program in violation of U.N. Security Council
resolutions as well. So Iran is not just another country. It
simply can't be trusted with enrichment technology because
verification efforts can never be foolproof with respect to
their ability to get undetectable nuclear breakout. That is one
of the concerns we have. An agreement in which Iran purchases
and returns spent nuclear fuel for energy generation is one
thing. That is something that we were willing to get an
agreement on. But allowing enrichment, I feel, is too high,
going beyond the lines of realistic international control.
There has been a lot of talk about whether Iran has the
right to enrich technology. This committee has held several
hearings on the Nonproliferation Treaty over the years. It is
clear that Iran has no such right under that treaty. And while
I have heard the administration say that Iran has no right, it
is a moot point in an agreement permits enrichment, giving Iran
a de facto right.
The proposed sanctions relief is another concern. The
sanctions pressure that drove Iran to the negotiating table
took years to build. While the interim agreement relief is
limited, governments throughout the world will not be easily
convinced to reverse course and ratchet up sanctions pressure
if Iran is only buying time with this agreement. Moreover,
companies have stayed away from Iran as much due to the
atmosphere of international isolation as to the letter of U.S.
sanctions law. I am concerned that that may now be lost because
foreign-based oil companies have jumped to start discussions
with Iran.
This is the headline from the Wall Street Journal, ``Iran
Deal Opens Door for Businesses.'' We have got to counter that
impression.
Lastly, a point I want to make is that sanctions have
worked elsewhere. International sanctions pressure brought down
the immoral apartheid regime in South Africa. That led to South
Africa not only releasing Nelson Mandela from prison, but also
abandoning its nuclear arsenal, giving up its atomic bomb. A
bipartisan coalition, from Newt Gingrich to John Kerry,
supported those tough sanctions, even overriding a Presidential
veto. Negotiations, quiet diplomacy was tried first. But at the
end of the day, there was the intent that if we did not achieve
the result that the overbearing, the overwhelming sanctions
would be imposed. And indeed they were, and indeed they worked.
We are facing an immoral and very dangerous regime in Iran,
one nearing a nuclear weapon. I am hard pressed to understand
why we would be letting up sanctions pressure at the very time
its economy is on the ropes without getting an agreement which
stops its centrifuges from spinning. I think all of us expected
that the sanctions would be used to get an agreement that
stopped the centrifuge program, to stop those from spinning.
And that is my basic concern here.
I now turn to Ranking Member Engel for his opening
statement.
Mr. Engel. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Kerry, thank you for appearing before the
committee today, and for your tireless efforts to enhance the
security and prosperity of the United States.
Thank you, Chairman Royce, for calling this hearing on an
issue that obviously is of paramount importance to American
national security.
Upon taking office nearly 5 years ago, President Obama
inherited an almost nonexistent strategy to deal with the
looming threat of Iran obtaining a nuclear weapons capability.
The President initially focused on the diplomatic track. But
the limitations of that one-dimensional approach soon became
apparent when Iran walked away from the P5+1 negotiations in
October 2009. After that, the administration shifted to a two-
track strategy, which coupled engagement with increasing
economic pressure through sanctions, while making it clear that
all options remain on the table. This is the policy I favored.
And the President, together with Secretary Clinton, succeeded
beyond expectations in uniting the international community
against Iran's nuclear ambitions.
The U.N. Security Council and the European Union, acting in
parallel with our efforts, imposed tough new sanctions on Iran.
This committee took the lead on a bipartisan basis to pass
biting sanctions legislation, the Royce-Engel bill, designed to
cripple the Iranian economy, giving the administration the
tools it needed to change the calculus of the Iranian regime.
That was a bill that passed unanimously out of this committee.
I was very, very proud of it, to work on such a bipartisan
basis with Chairman Royce. And then passed the floor, as the
chairman has pointed out, by a vote of 400 to 20. It was, I
think, one of the finer days of the United States House of
Representatives. Over the last 3 years, President Obama has
signed four major Iran sanctions bills into law. Taken together
with international sanctions, this has made it exceedingly
difficult for Iran to sell its oil on the global markets, cut
off Tehran from the international financial system, and
severely limited Iran's access to hard currency. Several weeks
ago, thanks to sustained efforts by Congress and the
administration, the Iranians finally admitted that the
sanctions are hurting them badly. And for the first time, they
started talking about the specifics of a negotiated settlement
to curtail their nuclear program. As all of us know, the P5+1
reached an interim agreement with Iran at the end of November.
And Secretary Kerry, I want to commend you for your
incredible personal efforts to secure this deal. It makes me
tired just watching all of your travel back and forth across
the Atlantic and around the world. But having said that, I want
to make it clear that I have some serious reservations about
the agreement.
First and foremost, it seems to me at a minimum, it should
have required Iran to suspend uranium enrichment, as demanded
by six separate U.N. Security Council resolutions. I don't
think it is asking too much of Iran to say that at least while
we are talking, you stop enriching. For the 6-month period
while we are talking Iran, in my estimation, should not be
enriching. And if they refuse to do that, again going counter
to six separate U.N. Security Council resolutions, it makes me
wonder how serious they are and how sincere they are in terms
of really wanting to negotiate in good faith.
Mr. Secretary, you and other administration officials have
sought to make the case that the interim agreement will place
significant restraints on the Iranian nuclear program, and not
allow it to advance while we negotiate a long-term settlement
to eliminate the threat of an Iranian nuclear weapons
capability once and for all. You have also said that the
sanctions relief we are providing is very limited and
reversible. I hope you are right. And I am sure you will agree
with me that the interim agreement must be fully implemented
and completely verified. I can assure you that Congress will
act immediately to ratchet up the pressure with the first sign
of cheating or backtracking by Iran.
Mr. Secretary, I hope you can confirm for the committee
today that the administration will continue to enforce all
sanctions that remain in place during the implementation of the
interim agreement and that you will not hesitate to designate
additional entities for sanctions over the next 6 months as
circumstances warrant.
In addition, I hope you will send a clear message to
businesses all over the world that now is not the time to make
plans to reenter Iran. And again, the chairman showed that
headline in the Wall Street Journal.
In order for me to support a comprehensive agreement,
restraints must be put in place to assure us that Iran cannot
continue down the path of a nuclear weapon.
In that context, Secretary Kerry, I hope you will address
the following questions in our discussion today. First, if Iran
retains any enrichment capacity, how can we be sure that they
will not forever remain on the brink of a breakout capacity?
Second, why do many of our closest regional allies feel the
interim deal caught them by surprise? And what are you going to
make certain--what are you doing to make certain that they are
included as negotiations continue on a final deal? Three,
allies of the United States that look at Iran as an existential
threat to them--Saudi Arabia, Israel, United Arab Emirates--all
oppose the deal. They are the ones closest to it. Why is that
the case? Why does the administration strongly oppose
congressional action on Iran sanctions legislation which makes
clear new sanctions will not be imposed unless Iran violated
the terms of the interim deal? So now that we have an interim
deal we must focus with laser-like intensity on ensuring that
any long-term agreement dismantles all Iranian nuclear
infrastructure that could lead to a breakout capacity. Any deal
which does not achieve that goal will be a devastating failure.
Mr. Secretary, it is critical that you and the President
consult very closely with Congress as you implement the interim
agreement and negotiate a final deal. Waivers in existing
sanctions legislation will only get you so far, and it is
likely that Congress would have to pass legislation to
implement any comprehensive deal. But it will be impossible to
take that step unless this committee and the full House are
fully informed and absolutely convinced that Iran has agreed to
verifiably abandon its efforts to develop a nuclear weapons
capability.
And finally, Mr. Secretary, as you continue to engage with
the Iranians, and I know you know this, but I really need to
mention it, I would urge you to remain cognizant of the fact
that Iran remains the top state sponsor of terrorism in the
world, continues to support Hezbollah, and the brutal Assad
regime in Syria, continues to engage in systematic violations
of human rights, continues its efforts to destabilize a number
of Persian Gulf states, and continues to imprison innocent
Americans, all of this under the so-called moderate Rouhani
government. So, again, Mr. Secretary, thank you for appearing
today, and I look forward to hearing your testimony.
Chairman Royce. Members of the House, this afternoon, we
are pleased to be joined by John Kerry, our country's 68th
Secretary of State.
Prior to his appointment, Secretary Kerry served as a
United States Senator from Massachusetts for 28 years, chairing
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee during the last 4 years
of his tenure. The Secretary was in the Middle East just last
week. He will be returning there tomorrow before heading to
Southeast Asia to, among other things, assess relief efforts in
the Philippines. It is a demanding schedule.
Without objection, Mr. Secretary, your prepared statement
will be made part of the record. The committee members here
will have 5 days to submit statements and questions for the
record.
And Mr. Secretary, we would like to again welcome you
before this committee today. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOHN F. KERRY, SECRETARY OF STATE,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Secretary Kerry. Well, Mr. Chairman, thank you very, very
much.
Ranking Member Engel, members of the committee, thanks very
much for welcoming me back. And I am happy to be back here.
There is no more important issue in American foreign policy
than the question of the one we are focused on here today. And
obviously, from the chairman's introduction, you know that I
come here with an enormous amount of respect for your
prerogatives on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, as we did
in the Senate. And it is entirely appropriate that we are here
to satisfy your questions, hopefully allay your concerns and
fears, because I believe the agreement that we have ought to do
that. And I think the path that we are on should do that. And
as I describe it to you, I hope you will leave here today with
a sense of confidence that we know what we are doing, our eyes
are open, we have no illusions. It is a tough road. I don't
come here with any guarantees whatsoever. And I think none of
what we have done in this agreement begs that notion. In other
words, everything is either verifiable or clear, and there are
a set of requirements ahead of us which will even grow more so
in the course of that comprehensive agreement. And we can talk
about that; I am sure we will in the course of the day.
Let me just begin by saying that President Obama and I have
both been very clear, as every member of this committee has
been, that Iran must not acquire a nuclear weapon. And it is
the President's centerpiece of his foreign policy Iran will not
acquire a nuclear weapon. This imperative is at the top of our
national security agenda. And I know it is at the top of yours
as well.
So I really do welcome the opportunity to have a
discussion, not only about what the first step agreement does
but also to clarify, I hope significantly, what it doesn't do.
Because there is a certain, as there is in any of these kinds
of things, a certain mythology that sometimes grows up around
them. The title of today's hearing is, ``The Iran Nuclear Deal:
Does It Further U.S. National Security?'' And I would state to
you unequivocally, the answer is yes. The national security of
the United States is stronger under this first step agreement
than it was before. Israel's national security is stronger than
it was the day before we entered into this agreement. And the
Gulf and Middle East interests are more secure than they were
the day before we entered this agreement.
Now, here is how. Put simply, once implemented, and it will
be in the next weeks, this agreement halts the progress of
Iran's nuclear program, halts the progress, and rolls it back
in certain places for the first time in nearly 10 years. It
provides unprecedented monitoring and inspections while we
negotiate to see if we can conclude a comprehensive agreement.
If we can conclude. And I came away from our preliminary
negotiations with serious questions about whether or not they
are ready and willing to make some of the choices that have to
be made. But that is what we put to test over the next months.
While we negotiate to see if we can conclude a comprehensive
agreement that addresses all of our concerns, there is an
important fact: Iran's nuclear program will not move forward.
Under this agreement, Iran will have to neutralize, end its
entire stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium, which you all
know is a short step away from weapons-grade uranium. So if you
remember when Prime Minister Netanyahu held up that cartoon at
the U.N. with the bomb in it in 2012, he showed the world a
chart that highlighted the type of uranium that he was most
concerned about. And he was talking about that 20 percent
stockpile. Under this agreement, Iran will forfeit all, not
part, all of that 20 percent, that 200 kilogram stockpile.
Gone. Under this agreement, Iran will also halt the enrichment
above 5 percent. And it will not be permitted to grow its
stockpile of 3.5 percent enriched uranium. Iran cannot increase
the number of centrifuges in operation. And it will not install
or use any next-generation centrifuges to enrich uranium.
Under this agreement, we will have increased transparency
of Iran's nuclear program, giving us a window into their
activities that we don't have today. We will have access to
Fordow, a secret facility in a mountaintop, that we have never
been in. We will now get into it, not once or twice, every
single day. We will get into Natanz and have the ability to
know, not once or twice, but every single day what is happening
in Natanz. And we will have access each month to the Arak
facility, where we will have an extraordinary ability to be
able to know, through inspections, whether or not they are
complying with their requirements.
Now, this monitoring is going to increase our visibility
into Iran's nuclear program, as well as our ability to react
should Iran renege on this agreement. And taken together, these
first steps will help prevent Iran from using the cover of
negotiations to continue advancing its nuclear program in
secret, a concern that everybody on this dais shares. Now, in
addition, and this is very important, one of our greatest
concerns has been the Arak, A-r-a-k, nuclear reactor facility.
And this is a heavy water plutonium-capable reactor. That is
unacceptable to us. In the first step, we have now succeeded in
preventing them from doing any additional fuel testing, from
transferring any fuel rods into the reactor and from installing
any of the un-installed components which are critical to their
ability to be able to advance that particular reactor. So it is
frozen stone cold where it is in terms of its nuclear threat
and capacity. Iran will not be able to commission the Arak
reactor during the course of this interim first step agreement.
Now, that is very important.
Now, we have strong feelings about what will happen in a
final comprehensive agreement. From our point of view, Arak is
unacceptable. You can't have a heavy water reactor. But we have
taken the first step in the context of a first step. And they
will have to halt production of fuel for this reactor and not
transfer any fuel or heavy water to the reactor site. It cannot
conduct any additional fuel testing for this. And Iran is
required to give us design information for the site. We are
actually going to have the plans for the site delivered to us.
We have long sought this information. And it will provide
critical insight into the reactor that has not been previously
available to us through intel or any other sources. Now, those
are the highlights of what we get in this agreement. Now, I
know many of you have asked, well, what does Iran get in
return? And I have seen outlandish numbers out there in some
articles talking about $30 billion, $40 billion, $50 billion
and so forth, or a disintegration of the sanctions.
My friends, that is just not true. It is absolutely not
true. We have red teamed and vetted and cross-examined and run
through all the possible numbers through the intel community,
through the Treasury Department, through the people in charge
of sanctions. And our estimates are that at the end of the 6
months, if they fully comply, if this holds, they would have
somewhere in the vicinity of $7 billion total. And this is
something that I think you ought to take great pride in. I was
here as chairman when we put this in place. I voted for the
sanctions, like we all did in the United States Senate. I think
we were 100 to nothing, as a matter of fact. And we put them in
place for a purpose. The purpose was to get to this
negotiation. The purpose was to see whether or not diplomacy
and avoidance of war could actually deliver the same thing or
better than you might be able to get through confrontation.
Now, sanctions relief is limited to the very few targeted
areas that are specified in this agreement, for a total of
about the $7 billion that I have described. And we will
continue to vigorously, Ranking Member Engel, we will
absolutely--not only will we--I mean, this is going to actually
result in a greater intensity of focus on the sanctions because
I have sent a message to every single facility of the United
States, anywhere in the world, that every agency is to be on
alert to see any least movement by anybody toward an effort to
try to circumvent or undo the sanctions. We don't believe that
will happen. And one of the reasons it won't happen is we have
a united P5+1. Russia, China, the United States, France,
Germany, and Great Britain are all united in this assurance
that we will not undo the sanctions and that we will stay
focused on their enforcement.
Now, all the sanctions on Iran, further, on its abysmal
human rights record, over its support for terrorism, which you
mentioned, and over its destabilizing activities in places like
Syria, those sanctions will all remain in effect. They have
nothing to do with the nuclear. They are there for the reasons
they are there. And we are not taking them off. This agreement
does provide Iran with a very limited temporary and reversible
relief. And it is reversible at any time in the process that
there is noncompliance. If Iran fails to meet its commitments,
we can and will revoke this relief. And we will be the first
ones to come to you, if this fails, to ask you for additional
sanctions. The total amount of relief is somewhere between the
$6 billion and $7 billion that I described. That is less than 1
percent of Iran's $1 trillion economy. And it is a small
fraction of the $100 billion plus of oil revenue alone that we
have deprived Iran of since 2012. I want you to keep in mind
this really pales in comparison to the amount of pressure that
we are leaving in place. Iran will lose $30 billion over the
course of this continued sanctions regime over the next 6
months. So compare that: They may get $7 billion of relief, but
they are going to lose $30 billion. It is going to go into the
frozen accounts. It will be added to the already $45 billion or
so that is in those accounts now that they can't access.
And during the 6-month negotiating period, Iran's crude oil
sales cannot increase. Oil sanctions continue as they are
today. There is no diminishment of the oil and banking
sanctions that you put in place. We have not lifted them. We
haven't eased them. That means that as we negotiate, oil
sanctions will continue to cost Iran about the $30 billion I
just described and Iran will actually lose more money each
month that we negotiate than it will gain in relief as a result
of this agreement. And while we provide $4.2 billion in relief
over the 6 months, which is direct money we will release from
the frozen account, we are structuring this relief in a way
that it is tied to concrete IAEA-verified steps that they have
agreed to take on the nuclear program. That means that the
funds will be transferred, not all at once, but in installments
in order to ensure that Iran fulfills its commitments. And it
means that Iran will not get the full measure of relief until
the end of the negotiating period, when and if we verify,
certify that they have complied.
So now we have committed, along were our P5+1 partners, to
not impose any new nuclear-related sanctions for the period of
the 6 months. Now, I am sure there are questions about this. I
know I have seen--and there are some in Congress who have
suggested they ought do it. I am happy to answer them. I will
tell you that in my 29 years, just about shy of the full 29, I
have served in the Senate, I was always the leading proponent
of the sanctions against Iran. I am proud of what we did here.
But it was undeniable that the pressure we put on Iran through
these sanctions is exactly what has brought Iran to the table
today. And I think Congress deserves an enormous amount of
credit for that. But I don't think that any of us thought we
were just imposing these sanctions for the sake of imposing
them. We did it because we knew that it would hopefully help
Iran dismantle its nuclear program. That was the whole point of
the regime.
Now, has Iran changed its nuclear calculus? I honestly
don't think we can say for sure yet. And we certainly don't
just take words at face value. Believe me, this is not about
trust.
And given the history--and Mr. Chairman, you mentioned the
question of deception--given the history, we are all rightly
skeptical about whether or not people are ready to make the
hard choices necessary to live up to this. But we now have the
best chance we have ever had to rigorously test this
proposition, without losing anything. At least twice in this
agreement it is mentioned that nothing is agreed until
everything is agreed. And that is specific as to the final
agreement. In addition, where it does talk about the potential
of enrichment in the future, it says ``mutually agreed upon''
at least four times--three or four times--in that paragraph.
Has to be agreed. We don't agree, it doesn't happen. Every one
of us remembers Ronald Reagan's maxim when he was negotiating
with the Soviet Union, ``Trust but verify.'' But we have a new
one, ``Test but verify.'' Test but verify. And that is exactly
what we intend do in the course of this process.
Now, we have all been through tough decisions, those of you
on the top dais have been around here a long time, and you have
seen, we all know the kinds of tough, you know, decisions we
have to make. But we are asking you to give our negotiators and
our experts the time and the space to do their jobs. And that
includes asking you, while we negotiate, that you hold off
imposing new sanctions. Now, I am not saying never. I just told
you a few minutes ago, if this doesn't work, we are coming back
and asking you for more. I am just saying not right now.
Let me be very clear. This is a very delicate diplomatic
moment. And we have a chance to address peacefully one of the
most pressing national security concerns that the world faces
today, with gigantic implications of the potential of conflict.
We are at a crossroads. We are at one of those really hinge
points in history. One path could lead to an enduring
resolution in international community's concerns about Iran's
nuclear program. The other path could lead to continued
hostility, and potentially to conflict. And I don't have to
tell you that these are high stakes. We have an obligation to
give these negotiations an opportunity to succeed.
And we can't ask the rest of the P5+1 and our partners
around the world to hold up their ends of the bargain if the
United States isn't going to uphold its end of the bargain. If
we appear to be going off on our own tangent and do whatever we
want, we will potentially lose their support for the sanctions
themselves, because we don't just enforce them by ourselves; we
need their help. And I don't want to threaten the unity that we
currently have with respect to this approach, particularly when
it doesn't cost us a thing to go through this process, knowing
that we could put sanctions in place, additionally, in a week,
and we would be there with you seeking to do it.
I don't want to give the Iranians a public excuse to flout
the agreement. It could lead our international partners to
think that we are not an honest broker and that we didn't mean
it when we said that sanctions were not an end in and of
themselves but a tool to pressure the Iranians into a
diplomatic solution. Well, we are in that. And 6 months will
fly by so fast, my friends, that before you know it, we are
either going to know which end of this we are at or not. It is
possible also that it could even end up decreasing the pressure
on Iran by leading to the fraying of the sanctions regime. I
will tell you that there were several P5+1 partners at the
table ready to accept an agreement significantly less than what
we fought for and got in the end.
Mr. Chairman, you want me to wrap?
Chairman Royce. If you could, Mr. Secretary.
Secretary Kerry. Okay. Let me just say to you that the
Iranians know that this threat is on the table. I do want to
say one quick world about Israel and Prime Minister Netanyahu.
I speak to the Prime Minister usually a couple times a week or
several times. Talked to him yesterday morning, and I am
leaving tomorrow, and I will be seeing him Thursday night. We
are totally agreed that we need to focus on this final
comprehensive agreement. And Yossi Cohen, the national security
adviser to the Prime Minister, is here in Washington this week
working with our experts. And we will work hand in hand
closely, not just with Israel but with our friends in the Gulf
and others around the world to understand everybody's
assessment of what constitutes the best comprehensive agreement
that absolutely guarantees that the program, whatever it is to
be, is peaceful and that we have expanded by an enormous amount
the breakout time.
This first step agreement, Mr. Chairman, actually does
expand the breakout time. Because of the destruction of the 20
percent, because of the lack of capacity to move forward on all
those other facilities, we are expanding the amount of time
that it would take them to break out. And clearly, in a final
agreement, we intend to make this failsafe that we can
guarantee that they will not have access to nuclear weapons. So
I just simply put the rest of my testimony in the record, Mr.
Chairman.
I look forward to your questions.
Chairman Royce. Well, thank you, Mr. Secretary.
[Secretary Kerry did not submit a prepared statement.]
Chairman Royce. And I think we all agree with you; the
purpose of the sanctions imposed on Iran was to get Iran to the
negotiating table.
But I think it is also important to remember the
perspective that we had about what we would get in those
agreements at the negotiating table. If you recall, the early
suggestion was that Iran could basically keep the right to
import nuclear fuel, but that would then allow the dismantling
of their nuclear weapons capability.
And here is the problem, Mr. Secretary, as I said in my
statement: We have heard the administration say that Iran has
no right to enrich. But the Iranians this week say they do. And
the Joint Action Plan indicates that the U.S. would accept an
Iranian enrichment program.
Iran, from our standpoint, does not need this technology to
generate electricity. Clearly, we are prepared to allow them to
import nuclear fuel. But if they have this technology, it is
exactly what they do need to make a nuclear weapon.
So am I reading this right? Is the administration's
position that while it may not recognize Iran's right to
enrich, Iran will in practice retain an enrichment program as
part of the final agreement? That is the question.
Secretary Kerry. It depends, Mr. Chairman, on the final
agreement. It is not locked in, no. If you go to the agreement,
I will read to you from the agreement, the last paragraph says
that it would involve a mutually defined enrichment program,
with mutually agreement parameters, consistent with practical
needs. That is a very important concept. It has to relate to
whatever it is practically that they might have a reason for
arguing they need it for, like medical research or whatever it
is. But that would be very limited. It then says with agreed
limits on scope and level of enrichment activities and capacity
and where it is carried out and stocks of enriched uranium for
a period to be agreed upon. So I have got one, two, three, four
mutually agreed or agreed-upons. Now, those are going to have
to be agreed upon. And if they can't be, no, they won't have
one.
If it is so limited and so verifiable and so transparent
and so accountable, and you have all of the attributes of
cradle-to-grave documentation--one of the things I didn't
mention to you we got in the first step is access to their
mining facilities so we can trace how much they are mining. We
have access to their milling so we can trace the transition. We
have access to the centrifuge workshops. We have access to the
centrifuge storage facilities. So we are building the capacity
here to know exactly what is happening in an unprecedented
fashion. And I will say, as I said to Foreign Minister Zarif in
our negotiations, there is no right to enrich in the NPT. But
neither is it denied. The NPT is silent on the issue.
Chairman Royce. Well, it is, of course, the most important
concession that they wanted. And from our standpoint, as you
know, the goal was, since, as I explained, you are right, if
they can enrich to 20 percent, they are 80 percent there in
terms of a bomb. But if they can enrich to 5 percent, because
of the way technology works, once you master it, if you can
enrich to 5 percent, you are still 70 percent of the way there
toward getting a bomb. So the question going forward that we
have is focused on precisely how we dismantle their nuclear
weapons program. And that is why we really appreciate this
dialogue with you today.
There was an additional discussion that I wanted to have on
this ``managed access.'' I talked to the director of the IAEA.
And the inspectors on the International Atomic Energy Agency
will have certain abilities, managed access as we say, with
respect to the locations in which the centrifuges, as you said,
are assembled or where they are produced. But does this include
access to the military base in Parchin, the military base where
the IAEA alleged to me that testing for weapons designs takes
place? And I would just ask you also about another point which
they have made, which is that Iran is out of compliance with
respect to their ICBM program, their three-stage ICBMs that
they are developing. And so what type of access at the end of
the day are the IAEA really going to possess here?
Secretary Kerry. Well, Mr. Chairman, let me answer a couple
of things there, if I can, because it is very important to this
process. In any negotiation, and you all know this because you
negotiate around here every day, you can have a wish list, and
you approach it from a U.N. Security Council resolution point
of view and say, well, this is where we would like to be. But
then there is the question of where you can really be. Now,
without what we have achieved here, Iran would be progressing
toward its nuclear weapon now. The window would be narrowing in
terms of its breakout time. Israel would be more at risk if we
weren't where we are today. That is where we were heading.
And from Iran's point of view, as they look at it, they say
to themselves, Well, wait a minute now, there are about 17
countries in the world that have nuclear weapons that are
peaceful, and about four or five of them enrich. And why can't
we? Well, obviously, the answer from all of us is because you
are out of synch with the IAEA standards, with the NPT, and et
cetera. But if they came into compliance, what is it that says
that they then couldn't be able to do it? That is their
question to us. Now they say to us, Okay, you guys say we ought
to completely end enrichment, and yet you are not willing to
give us sanctions relief. To them, the balance in the
negotiation is if we give up the very thing we are fighting to
be able to do, then you ought to give up the thing that you are
using to get us to do it. So their equivalency was we stop
enrichment, you stop sanctions altogether.
Now, there isn't anybody here who would have stopped
sanctions altogether at that point, because we have to build a
process. So what we did was we got, I thought, a remarkable
amount. We stopped their program, and we have eliminated the 20
percent and rolled back their breakout time, enlarged it, while
we move toward the final negotiation. Now, the final
negotiation is going to be in conjunction with all of our
partners. And whatever we do, it has got to make Israel safer.
It has got to make the world safer. It can't threaten the
Emirates. It can't threaten Saudi Arabia. It can't threaten the
region. We all understand this. It has to be a peaceful
program. We have to know this to a certainty. And it isn't hard
to prove a program is peaceful if it really is. So we are now
in the main game. And what we are saying to you is,
respectfully, that you should give us an opportunity, working
with you, we will brief you, we will be keeping everybody
informed, working with our friends to make sure we are all on
the same page as we go through this process of proof.
Now, Mr. Chairman, you are absolutely correct, there are
dimensions of the ballistic missiles that are of great concern.
And we are well aware of that. And there is the Parchin
military development facility that is of great concern. The
fact is that we believe this agreement also opens the door for
our ability to deal with some of that. And the language
specifically is the plan says that Iran will work with the IAEA
to facilitate resolution of past and present issues of concern.
Past and present issues of concern is formula language for the
IAEA and Iran in addressing possible military dimensions,
including Parchin. It also says that in the final step, they
have to have a resolution of our concerns, which is understood
to include the military dimensions of the program, which are on
the table. In addition, the plan says there will be some
interim steps, additional steps in between the initial measure
and the final step, including addressing the U.N. Security
Council resolutions, with a view toward bringing to
satisfactory conclusion the U.N. Security Council's
consideration in this matter. The U.N. Security Council, you
will remember, Mr. Chairman, sought suspension, not
prohibition. And in effect, we now believe that in this plan
that we have laid out, Iran is required to address the U.N.
Security Council resolutions regarding its nuclear program
before a comprehensive agreement can be reached. And the U.N.
Security Council Resolution 1929, which is contained in that,
specifically addresses ballistic missiles. So the answer is, it
is on the table; it is part of the discussion.
Chairman Royce. Well, my time has expired. I want to thank
you. As you know, I am very concerned about this Iranian regime
being allowed enrichment capability at the end of the day. I
don't think--since neighboring countries don't have it, I think
it is a problem that might set off something of an arms race
among its neighbors.
But I want to go now to Mr. Eliot Engel of New York for his
questions.
Mr. Engel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
I want to just follow up on the enriching. And I said this
in my opening remarks, Mr. Secretary. I understand that you
said that if we force them to stop enriching, they would want
us to remove the sanctions right away. I want to talk about
both of those. First, the enriching. I just think if there are
six Security Council resolutions calling on Iran to stop
enriching, the least they could do is stop enriching while we
are negotiating with them. And I don't really think that that
is too much to ask. And that is one of the things that bothers
me greatly.
Secondly, you mentioned Israel. We have all heard from the
governments of Israel, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, they
all regard Iran as an existential threat to them, all three
governments. And they don't like the deal. So why are the
countries that seem to be most affected by it, that are closest
in geography to Iran, that feel an existential threat, why
don't they like the deal?
Secretary Kerry. Well, actually, the Emirates put out a
statement of support for it. I have been to the Emirates
recently, and they believe that, cautiously, they are
concerned, but I think they are completely understanding where
we are heading with this and supportive of it. I stood up with
the Foreign Minister of the Emirates in Abu Dhabi, and he said,
I support the agreement and what they are trying to do. I was
in Saudi Arabia shortly thereafter. I met with Foreign Minister
Saud al-Faisal, I met with the King and explained to them where
we are. And they have issued a statement supportive of the
direction we are going in.
Now, Prime Minister Netanyahu in Israel obviously had a
difference tactically. The Prime Minister thought we should
ratchet up the sanctions and keep the pressure on, and somehow
they would collapse. We didn't read it the same way. We also
felt that by just trying to go into the negotiation for the
final status comprehensive agreement, you would be allowing
them to continue to grow their program while you were
negotiating. And that is more like the North Korean model. You
know, you sort of get into this long, prolonged negotiation,
but they are progressing while you are doing it. We wanted to
make sure we could try to stop the program where it is and have
an assurance then while we negotiate that it can't progress. We
also thought it was important to show the world whether or not,
in a first step, they were willing to show good faith in moving
forward. They have done so. They are stopping. They are doing
it. Now, they haven't done it yet. We have to implement. Our
negotiators are right now in Vienna and The Hague, working on
this. And we hope in the next days that will happen. And we
have plans to resume the negotiations in short order
thereafter.
Mr. Engel. Thank you.
Let's talk about sanctions. You agree with us that it was
sanctions that brought Iran to the negotiating table. I believe
that we need to keep the sanctions pressure on Iran and that
the pressure track will actually strengthen your hand.
We have been told by the administration and also in your
testimony here today that if Congress passes sanctions now,
even if those sanctions don't go into effect for 6 months or
would only go into effect if there was a strong breach by Iran,
that we would cause irreversible damage to our diplomatic
process with Iran. If that is true then, how can the United
States send a message to Iran that there will be dire
consequences if the interim deal does not come to fruition? And
secondly, why hasn't the administration issued any sanctions
designations which involve sanctions that are already in place
since the election of Rouhani?
Secretary Kerry. Well, Mr. Chairman, I can assure you the
Iranians are listening to this hearing today. And I can assure
you they have listened to us in every conversation that we have
had and in every conversation that our friends have had with
them. They know we are serious. They know the President is
serious. They know we are serious about diplomacy, because we
prefer to resolve this through diplomacy and to reach a
reasonable accord and to test whether or not President Rouhani
and Foreign Minister Zarif and the supreme leader want to try
to move in a different direction. If they do, you should
welcome that. We would welcome that.
But we are not naive. We are not sitting here believing
that because somebody says it to you it is true. You have got
to work through this process. You have to build trust. You
know, when Nixon opened China and Kissinger went over and sat
with Mao Tse-Tung, it wasn't based on trust. They set up a
process, and they began to build a different relationship. Same
thing with Gorbachev and Reagan and the Soviet Union. It wasn't
based on trust; it was based on a process that was put in
place. So we are approaching this I think realistically, with
an understanding that these sanctions make a difference. Now,
they know, they know that if this fails, sanctions will be
increased. We have said it a hundred times, and you all have
said it a hundred times. And they know you are yearning to go
do it. But you don't need to do it. It is actually gratuitous
in the context of this situation, because you can do it in a
week if you need to, when we say this ain't working, we need
your help. And believe me, we will be prepared to do that.
And you will be partners in this as we go along, because we
will be sharing, you know, a sense of where we are and what is
going on.
So I would simply say to you we also have partners in this,
Congressman. You know that. I mean, if our partners in Europe
and China and Russia see us go off and we are hammering in a
way that, you know, runs contra to the agreements we have made,
it really is very difficult for us to hold the thing whole. And
I think--I just think it is not the wisest approach.
Mr. Engel. Well, I think it could potentially strengthen
your hand with a good cop/bad cop scenario.
Secretary Kerry. Well, I appreciate you thinking that. I am
respectfully suggesting to you that we think our hand is very,
very strong, and nothing is undone in the sanctions regime.
They are going to lose $30 billion over the course of the
next--they normally have--they normally sell 2.5 million
barrels per day of oil. They are down to a million. Their
economy is careening. And they know what they need to do. And
their people's hopes and aspirations have been raised. You saw
what happened. They came back, and people were excited and
anticipating the possibility they might have different lives.
Those aspirations can't suddenly be put back in a can. So I
think there is a lot that is moving in the right direction
here. And I think we just ought to try to respect the process.
If you couldn't put them in place in a week, if it was
impossible to design them--we will work with you, you can
design them. We can sit here and be ready to go. We are just
saying to you, please, give us the opportunity to negotiate
along the contours of what we have agreed upon.
Mr. Engel. What about the sanctions designations that are
already in place?
Secretary Kerry. They stay in place.
Mr. Engel. But there haven't been any sanctions
designations issued since Rouhani's election.
Secretary Kerry. With respect to what?
Mr. Engel. With respect to the sanctions that are in place
if there have been any violations.
Secretary Kerry. Well, I am not sure there have been. I am
not aware of one that begged us to put an additional sanction
in place.
Mr. Engel. And I know my time is up, Mr. Chairman, but let
me just ask one final question. You mentioned, Mr. Secretary,
that $6 billion to $7 billion or $7 billion to $8 billion in
sanctions relief is being provided to Iran as a result; that it
is minimal. The rial, we are told, is up about 30 percent since
the signing of this interim agreement. Has that been taken into
account when we look at the amount of pressure that we are
taking, we are moving from Iran?
Secretary Kerry. Yes, it has been. And we also take into
account, obviously, the variations in the price of oil,
sometimes the production. In some times they have had 800,000
barrels in a month, sometimes they have more, it is about the
million. There are variations. We have taken the entire curve
of variations into effect. By the way, the day after this
agreement was made, the stock market in Israel was the highest
it has been.
Chairman Royce. We are going to go now to Ileana Ros-
Lehtinen of Florida.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
Mr. Secretary, you stated on ``60 Minutes'' that, on a
nuclear deal with Iran, a bad deal is worse than no deal. Well,
this deal is a bad deal. I believe that the concessions offered
to Iran will be the death knell on the sanctions program as we
know it. This threatens our allies. It threatens our closest
ally, the democratic Jewish state of Israel.
Isn't it true that the fissile material is just one aspect,
but there is also the weaponization to consider and also
ballistic missiles? This Iran deal does not address these, and
Iran has announced a significant advancement on its ballistic
missile program. Why was it decided to leave these aspects of
Iran's nuclear weapons program unaddressed in the agreement?
I oppose the administration's acceptance of Iran's
illegitimate claim to a right to enrich uranium. Iran says that
this deal does give it that right. I expect the Iranian regime
to welcome in the entire international community to show that
it has not violated the terms of the deal, and both the
administration and the media will be effusive in their praise
of Iran's fulfillment of the deal. Well, we set the bar so low
that Iran will probably comply. And we must not be fooled by
that approach, as Iran can start up the centrifuges. It will be
too late to stop them. How long would it take for Iran to
enrich uranium from 3.5 to 90 percent with its current nuclear
infrastructure with advanced centrifuges?
I have worked, as you know, over the years to help create
the Iran sanctions program that we have in place now. I was the
author of several Iran sanctions bills that have become law,
including the toughest set of sanctions currently on the books.
And it is discouraging that many countries are now eager to do
business with Iran, to get Iranian gas. And we will not be able
to stop this cash infusion and get sanctions back to their
current levels.
Now, Jay Carney suggested that if pursuing a diplomatic
resolution in Iran is disallowed or ruled out, then we would be
faced with no other option than war to prevent Iran from
acquiring a nuclear weapon. This is a false binary choice. It
is not one or the other. We have been increasing sanctions on
the Iranian regime for a decade.
Do you agree with this characterization, and do you believe
that those of us in Congress who oppose this deal and seek an
increase in sanctions to force Iran to give up its enrichment
program, it is not to force Iran to negotiate, it is to force
Iran to give up its enrichment program, that we are warmongers?
And lastly, two issues. Regarding Camp Ashraf, are the
Ashraf 7 being held in Iran or are they in Iraq? And, Mr.
Secretary, sometimes a handshake is just a handshake, but when
the leader of the free world shakes the bloody hand of a
ruthless dictator like Raul Castro it becomes a propaganda coup
for the tyrant. Raul Castro uses that hand to sign the orders
to repress and jail democracy advocates. In fact, right now, as
we speak, Cuban opposition leaders are being detained and they
are being beaten while trying to commemorate today, which is
International Human Rights Day. They will feel disheartened
when they see these photos.
Could you please tell the Cuban people living under that
repressive regime that, a handshake notwithstanding, the U.S.
policy toward the cruel and sadistic Cuban dictatorship has not
weakened? Thank you.
Secretary Kerry. Well, thank you very much, Madam
Chairwoman. Let me begin, first of all, by making clear, my
staff slipped me a piece of piper that informs me that on
September 6, the Treasury Department--I see Congressman Engel
is not here--but the Treasury Department identified a network
of six individuals and four businesses subject to the Iran
Sanctions Act, and they did sanction them. So Treasury has done
at least one instance of sanctioning since then.
With respect to your opening comment, Madam Chairwoman,
regarding the death knell of the sanctions, we just have to
respectfully disagree. And in 6 months the world will know
whether you are right or I am right or whether you are wrong or
I am wrong, and we are going to know. I don't agree with you. I
do not believe it is the death knell of the sanctions, because
all of our partners are united.
And we have enormous tools at our disposal. We are the ones
who control access to the financial system in the United
States, which is, you know, sine qua non for almost any
financial transaction in the world. We have huge ability to
leverage and to have an impact on people. And as I said to you
earlier, we are going to be all over this. So I have great
confidence in our ability to go forward.
Moreover, most companies know that the sanctions are still
in place and that we are going to be doing this. The visibility
that has been given creates great uncertainty for them. Very
few companies are going to go out and try and actually cut a
contract with Iran if they think in 5 months or 4 months that
contract is going to be null and void because the sanctions are
going to be ratcheted up or you might be at war. It is just not
going to happen. Common sense tells you that. They want more
certainty before they sign any long-term contracts, and those
are long-term contract, oil contracts and such.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. If you could answer the Ashraf and the
Cuba question.
Secretary Kerry. Beg your pardon?
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. If you could answer the Ashraf and the
Cuba question.
Secretary Kerry. Sure. The question on Ashraf was, where
are they?
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Iran or Iraq?
Secretary Kerry. Well, they are in Iraq.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. They are in Iraq?
Secretary Kerry. The people.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. The seven hostages----
Secretary Kerry. Oh.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen [continuing]. Taken from Camp Ashraf. We
have not known where they are.
Secretary Kerry. I can talk to you about that in classified
session.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. And on the issue of Cuba and the U.S.
policy?
Secretary Kerry. On the issue of Cuba, ladies and
gentlemen, today is about honoring Nelson Mandela, and the
President is at an international funeral with leaders from all
over the world. He didn't choose who is there. They are there
to honor Mandela. And we appreciate that people from all over
the world and from all different beliefs and walks of life who
appreciated Nelson Mandela and/or were friends of his came to
honor him.
And I think as the President said, I urge you to go read
his speech, or if you didn't see it or haven't read it, because
the President said in his speech today honoring Nelson Mandela,
he said, we urge leaders to honor Mandela's struggle for
freedom by upholding the basic human rights of their people.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. And would you say Raul Castro is
upholding the basic human rights.
Secretary Kerry. No. Absolutely not.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, sir.
Secretary Kerry. And you know my position on that.
Chairman Royce. We go now to Mr. Brad Sherman of
California.
Mr. Sherman. Secretary, I would like to thank you and
others in the administration for your hard work and for
actually enforcing the sanctions laws that we in Congress pass.
We have got a number of Iran sanctions statutes on the
book; some have waivers, some don't. With regard to those that
don't have waivers, can you pledge now that this administration
will enforce the laws on the books to the best of your ability?
Secretary Kerry. Absolutely. I think we do.
Mr. Sherman. I am concerned, because as the ranking----
Secretary Kerry. Are you talking about the waiver on the
oil?
Mr. Sherman. I was just talking about all of the sanction
laws. Some have waivers, some don't.
I am concerned, as the ranking member points out, the first
6 months of this year we had dozens and dozens of individual
companies sanctioned because we discovered the information that
indicated that they had violated U.S. sanctions laws. Since
Rouhani was elected in the middle of this year, one, and you
have identified it. So we have gone from dozens and dozens to
one. I am hoping that we are not slow walking things because we
are so happy with Rouhani.
I want to thank the administration for recognizing the
importance of the sanctions bills that Congress has passed. The
sanctions that the administration lauds now, you opposed, or
the administration opposed, you weren't there at the time,
every single one of them then, most significantly the banking
sanctions----
Secretary Kerry. That is the virtue of my having voted for
them.
Mr. Sherman. Yes. But it is the administration, not just
any one Cabinet officer that makes policy. And Secretary
Geithner speaking for the administration at the time said that
he strongly opposed those banking sanctions and that they might
actually benefit the regime. And, in fact, all the
administrations have opposed all these sanctions. They are the
reason we didn't pass any sanctions 2001 to 2008. The
administration is the reason we didn't pass any in 2009 or
2013. And now you are here saying don't do anything now,
because we will be with you in urging sanctions if this deal
doesn't go forward.
My fear is we won't be able to act in a week, because the
only way we can act in a week is if the administration is with
us, and every administration has been opposed to every sanction
since before I got here.
Now, as to the importance of the sanctions relief that we
have granted, when international companies know no sanctions in
2013, no sanctions in 2014, that is enough of a window for them
to exploit the loopholes in the existing laws. Since the Geneva
deal, instead of the Iranian economy careening, it is
rebounding, a 30 percent increase in the value of the rial,
Chinese oil companies, Turkish Government, Japanese banks all
saying now is the time to do business with Iran, and the YPO
group, which has members in all of our districts, announces an
international business conference in Tehran.
I was briefed by the administration on this deal, and I was
impressed a little bit less after I read it, because, Mr.
Secretary, you say it halts and rolls back the program. The
fact is they have got 9,000 centrifuges turning now, and they
will turn throughout, they will spin throughout the term of
this agreement. So the centrifuges are literally rolling
forward.
You have told us that they can't increase their stockpile
of enriched uranium. Yes, they can. They just have to convert
it to uranium oxide. Well, that doesn't neutralize, it creates
a new stockpile of enriched uranium oxide, which can be turned
into uranium hexaflourine in just a couple of weeks. And the
Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control calculates that they
will, during the term of this agreement, which is really 7
months, create enough enriched uranium for 1 nuclear bomb.
Now, the one issue before Congress is whether we should
adopt sanctions that go into effect in this summer, or instead
that it is safe to wait. As you point out, we can pass
sanctions in a week if you are lobbying for them, but if you
are, as every administration has, trying to prevent them, you
are asking us to be asleep and do nothing while 9,000
centrifuges turn and a new uranium stockpile is created.
And as a practical matter this agreement, it doesn't start,
the 6 months doesn't start for many weeks. Six months after
that is late July. And anyone who has looked at the
congressional calendar knows we will not be able to pass a
controversial bill opposed by the administration unless we take
action well before July. Are we in session in August,
September, or October? Yeah, a couple of weeks.
It appears my time is about to expire.
Secretary Kerry. I hope you enjoyed my answer.
Mr. Sherman. The one thing I would like you to focus on is
why are you convinced that the 1,600 kilos of uranium oxide
that Iran will create during this agreement is not a threat?
And do you disagree that it can be converted to gas very
easily?
Secretary Kerry. It can be if you have a conversion
capacity, and Iran doesn't have a conversion capacity and they
are not allowed to build one.
Mr. Sherman. So it takes a couple more weeks.
Secretary Kerry. Well, no. No, no, no. Congressman, you are
really setting up a straw man, and it is really not a hard one
to knock down because there is just no reality to the scenario
you are drawing.
First of all, I was chair of the hearings on the Iran
sanctions and I was working with the administration. The
administration did not oppose them, they opposed the timing of
it. They had a timing issue, because they thought they had the
prerogative to be able to negotiate, as I am now arguing we
should have. But the Senate, in its infinite wisdom, decided no
and went ahead and passed them, and the timing was decided for
the administration.
Now, I don't know any administration that doesn't like to
conduct its foreign policy on its terms, and I don't know any
Congress that doesn't like to, you know, weigh in.
Now, here is the deal. There is a way for us to get the
best of both worlds. I have come here representing the
President telling you that the President is committed, if this
fails, he is going to want to ratchet up, because we are going
to have to do what we have to do to make sure they don't get a
nuclear capacity.
This is important, though, Mr. Chairman. You have got to
have a chance to answer some of the questions here. I think it
is important.
Chairman Royce. Well, we have given you that chance, Mr.
Secretary.
Secretary Kerry. Well, I want to just make this point,
because it is important to how we could proceed. We are
committed to asking you for additional sanctions if we fail. We
will need them. And I am asking you, work with us. We will work
with you now in support of those. Let's frame what they might
be, how they might be, and we could certainly be ready. I am
asking you not to do it now because of the, you know,
relationship with our P5+1 and the message that it sends. But
you are wrong when you say that the administration is not going
to come and ask for them. You are just dead wrong. We are
telling you we will.
Moreover, with respect to the facilities that exist or
anything else, if they started to spin more centrifuges, it is
clear to us they are not serious. That would be such a flagrant
violation of this, it would not only invite more sanctions, it
might invite----
Mr. Sherman. Well, they are spinning 9,000 now.
Chairman Royce. Okay.
Secretary Kerry [continuing]. If they started to spin. But
they are not allowed to hook up the ones that are in Fordo.
They have been restricted in that. They are not allowed to put
additional centrifuges in place. They have 19,000. They could
be hooking them all up. They are not going to do that.
But let's say they did. Let's say that they say to hell
with you, and our inspectors see what they are doing. We have
the absolute capacity deployed now to deal with that, if we
have to, from a military point of view, which they know we have
and will not invite. And we could not only terminate those
facilities, but we could obviously set back that program for
some time. Now, it comes with a whole different set of costs
and different calculations, but that has not been taken off the
table.
Chairman Royce. We are going to go to Mr. Smith of New
Jersey. And I am going to suggest, members, we are going to
hold to 5 minutes, so ask your question, we will get the
response and we will move along. Thank you.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And welcome, Mr. Secretary.
Mr. Secretary, last spring Congressman Frank Wolf chaired a
hearing on an American, Pastor Saeed Abedini, who is unjustly
jailed in Iran. His wife, Naghmeh, testified that the State
Department had told her that there was nothing that could be
done. She was shocked and dismayed, but we were all grateful
that in response to her testimony and her appeal, you issued a
much welcomed statement on behalf of her imprisoned husband.
On Thursday Naghmeh will testify before my subcommittee and
the subcommittee of Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, joint subcommittees,
and from her advanced testimony she will say,
``He has been beaten until the pain has been so great
he can't stand. I fear for the worst. Even worse, I
fear that our children, Rebekka, who is 7, and Jacob
Cyrus, who is 5, may never see their daddy again.''
Then she goes on to say,
``My husband is suffering because he is a Christian, he
is suffering because he is an American, yet his own
Government, at least the executive and diplomatic
representatives, has abandoned him. Don't we owe it to
him as a Nation to stand up for his human rights and
for his freedom?''
She goes on to say,
``While I am grateful for President Obama's willingness
to express concern about my husband and the other
imprisoned Americans, including Amir Hekmati and Robert
Levinson, I was devastated to learn that the
administration didn't even ask for my husband's release
when directly seated across the table from the leaders
of the government that holds him captive.''
So my first question would be, is that true? Did we raise
Abedini's case directly with the Iranians in the negotiations
on the nuclear issue?
Secretary Kerry. The answer is that is not true. I
personally raised the issue with Foreign Minister Zarif when I
first met him, the very first time. And we have not linked it
directly to the nuclear issue, because we believe that
prejudices them, and it also prejudices the negotiation. We
don't want them to become the hostages or pawns of a process
that then gets played against something they want with respect
to the nuclear program; nor do you, I think. We want them
returned because they are American citizens, because they have
to be accountable to us for them, and because they deserve to
be returned.
Mr. Smith. With all due respect, Mr. Secretary, wasn't
that----
Secretary Kerry. It is a fundamental humanitarian basis.
Believe me, I am not at liberty to go into what is happening on
it, and that is the difficulty in some of these situations many
times, because there are back channels and other kinds of
efforts that are engaged in. But we have never stopped trying
to secure their release or raising that issue with our
representative nations that represent us in Tehran, with the
Swiss, with the Swedish, with others. It is a constant process
and we are engaged in that effort.
Mr. Smith. And I do appreciate that, but it seems to me
that there was a window of opportunity when they wanted
something and wanted it desperately to raise the issue at that
negotiating table. Let me ask you this before you answer.
Secretary Kerry. Well, Congressman, Congressman Smith, let
me just say something. This opportunity is huge and still
exists, but we are not going to link them to the nuclear,
because it prejudices them.
Mr. Smith. But he is at risk right now of death. He has
been transferred to an even more ominous prison. He is in a
cell with known murderers. He woke up with a knife next to his
face just recently.
Secretary Kerry. I am happy to sit with you in a classified
venue, providing it is cleared appropriately, and I can tell
you what we are doing. But it is an ongoing and constant
effort.
Mr. Smith. Do you have expectations that he and the others
will be free?
Secretary Kerry. I have hope. I can't speak for what they
will do or not do. But I am constantly----
Mr. Smith. Well, the chairman talked about how, if there is
respect for human rights of their own people, it raises our
sense of trust, even though you say trust and test. But it
seems to me that here we have an American----
Secretary Kerry. I didn't say trust. I said test and
verify. Nothing is not based on trust yet, certainly.
Mr. Smith. But again, it raises even more serious questions
about their credibility when an American is being tortured and
we are conducting a negotiation and he is not even--I know he
is part of it on the side, but not----
Secretary Kerry. I understand.
Mr. Smith. It ought to be central.
Secretary Kerry. Obviously, we have to make some very tough
decisions about what affects what.
Mr. Smith. I understand.
Secretary Kerry. We believe it would disadvantage them.
Mr. Smith. Who?
Secretary Kerry. They would become pawns to the process.
And it could prolong it, could make it more risky or dangerous.
Mr. Smith. I am almost out of time and I have one other
question.
Secretary Kerry. Okay.
Mr. Smith. I apologize. It disadvantages them according to
whom? I mean, they are the ones, they are in charge, they don't
care about public opinion. But there was a Times of Israel
report that four Iranians were released, including Gholikhan,
Tajik, Seirafi, and Atarodi. Was that in any way linked in
terms of the nuclear negotiations----
Secretary Kerry. No.
Mr. Smith [continuing]. Either before or after?
Secretary Kerry. No.
Mr. Smith. No direct----
Secretary Kerry. None whatsoever.
Mr. Smith. None whatsoever.
Secretary Kerry. No.
Mr. Smith. Thank you.
Secretary Kerry. And one last thing just say to you on
this. Look, we have a lot of problems with Iran. I mean, you
know, they are supporting Hezbollah, Hezbollah is in Syria,
they are supporting Syria, Assad. They are purveyors of
terrorism, as people have described here. The Iranians, you
know, there was a plot taking place to blow up an Ambassador
here in a restaurant in Washington. There are a number of
different serious issues that exist, and they are not tied
either to this, because the nuclear file is the most critical,
most pressing, most urgent with respect to Israel, the region,
and us and the world in terms of proliferation, and it is
critical to be disciplined and focused and targeted on that
program and get that under control. And meanwhile, we are
continuing to put to test their bona fides on all of these
other issues.
Chairman Royce. We go now to Mr. Albio Sires from New
Jersey.
Mr. Sires. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
hearing today.
And welcome, Mr. Secretary.
You know, Mr. Secretary, in your statement you stated that
there were no guarantees and that you have serious questions
regarding these negotiations. And obviously we are all
skeptical for the very reasons you just stated to Mr. Smith.
My concern, we have this window of negotiations. Who
determines whether negotiations are going well? Are we going to
have a scenario where you are going to come back to us and say,
well, look, we are moving forward, I need another 6 months or I
need another 3 months? Who determines whether we are making
progress or not or we are going to cut off the negotiations and
we are going to come back to the Congress and say, listen, we
tried, you are committed to the sanctions, let's do this in a
week?
Secretary Kerry. Congressman, we will, obviously, the
President of the United States, my team. We will make the
initial judgment. But we are accountable to you and to the
American people through you. So we will obviously have to
confer, we will come up here. I am sure you will want to hear
from us somewhere in the middle of this or somewhere in the
process. And we will, needless to say, brief you in the
appropriate places and in the appropriate manner. And you will
join us, I hope, in making that judgment. But, you know, this
is in all of our interests to get this right.
Mr. Sires. Do you see a scenario where you are going to
come back to us and say, look, we need more time?
Secretary Kerry. You know, I am not going to say that it
won't happen, but it is not our preference. And my hope is that
this can be resolved sooner rather than later. My hope is we
could even move faster than the 6 months. I think there is a
chance, an outside chance, that that might be able to be
possible. So I can't tell you today.
We left a provision that you could extend the 6 months, but
it has to be by mutual concept. So if we think they are not
doing it and they want to extend, we obviously will be
reluctant to. If, on the other hand, we are really making
progress and we think we are on track, we may come to you and
describe that to you, and you may concur in the judgment that
it is worth a few more months or something. My hope is and my
expectation is that will not have to happen----
Mr. Sires. Well, Mr. Secretary, I think that will send----
Secretary Kerry [continuing]. But it could.
Mr. Sires [continuing]. That will send a terrible message
if we keep extending these negotiations.
Secretary Kerry. I said my expectation is it will not
happen. It could, but I don't expect it. And my hope is that we
get it done sooner rather than later.
Mr. Sires. Okay. You know, I keep reading about the resolve
of the Iranians to get this nuclear program done. And, quite
frankly, I just don't know if this diplomatic effort on their
behalf is really serious. Do you sense there is sincerity in
this, any sincerity in this?
Secretary Kerry. Whose sincerity?
Mr. Sires. The Iranians.
Secretary Kerry. Well, it is not my job to measure
sincerity. It is my job to lay down a process by which we can
measure it, and thus far they have indicated they are ready to
do things that make a difference. But they haven't done them
yet. So we have to get the implementation moving and we have to
start moving down those 6 months. I just said to you we are not
going to go by virtue of words. This is based on actions, so it
is test and verify. And we need to verify it and put it to the
test. That is what we are saying to you.
Mr. Sires. Because I really don't think that they care what
their people think in Iran. I think this is a regime that the
leader makes the decisions, and whether the Iranian people are
happy that we are negotiating doesn't mean anything to them.
Secretary Kerry. Well, you know, I think your comment sort
of speaks for itself. The supreme leader is the supreme leader.
Mr. Sires. Right. All right. Thank you.
Chairman Royce. Thank you.
We will go now to Mr. Rohrabacher of California.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for being with us. And I know it
is a grueling situation to face, but we appreciate you being
here with us. Rarely do we get a chance to ask you some
questions, so I have got a few housekeeping questions to ask
before I go into the issue of the day.
I am introducing a bill today that will allow 3,000
refugees from Camp Ashraf and Camp Liberty, now Camp Liberty,
status, refugee status, and thus will permit them to be enabled
to come to the United States. Hundreds of these people have
been slaughtered. They live under constant threat of being
murdered. We know that. And will this administration be
supporting my legislation to prevent these people from being
slaughtered by this pro-mullah regime that we have in Iraq now?
Secretary Kerry. Well, Congressman, I have gone to the
lengths of appointing a special representative to work
exclusively to get the----
Mr. Rohrabacher. I am just asking about--we have
legislation.
Secretary Kerry. Well, I need to see the legislation, but
in principle, we are trying to find a place for them to go,
including here.
Mr. Rohrabacher. But in principle you would agree with
letting these refugees have status, refugee status, so they can
come here?
Secretary Kerry. We are trying to find a place for them to
go now.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay. So in principle do you agree that--
--
Secretary Kerry. In principle, I would like to see the
legislation, but I can't speak for the President on this one
unseen.
Mr. Rohrabacher. All right. Thank you. All right. I am
trying to get the answer, but I understand.
Mr. Secretary, it has been reported that there was live
drone footage 2 hours into the attack on our consulate in
Benghazi. Further, it was reported that there were closed
circuit cameras on the outer walls of the consulate. And one
State Department official has been quoted as saying that ``the
main gate camera revealed large numbers of men, armed men,
flowing into the compound'' at 9:40 that night.
We have not seen those videos. First of all, do the videos
exist? If they do exist, will you make them available to this
committee?
Secretary Kerry. I haven't seen any drone video footage,
but I have seen video footage of the facility itself and I have
seen those people pouring in.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Right.
Secretary Kerry. And we all saw them. We saw them in the
Senate. I think they were made available to the House, too.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay. So are you aware of any videos that
have not been made available?
Secretary Kerry. I am not. No, I am not.
Mr. Rohrabacher. All right. Thank you.
Mr. Secretary, again, when we are talking about the issue
at hand today, we all should recognize that you are trying to
deal with a challenge, a threat that you did not make and that
was around while the Republicans were in charge of government
and they did not succeed. So that being considered, I am going
to ask you some tough questions, but I do understand that you
didn't make the problem and you are here trying to do what you
can, what you believe will solve the issue.
You know, when you talk about we are not going to trust but
verify, we are going to test but verify, and then you refer to
the leader of the government there as the supreme leader, quite
frankly, that is groveling, but test but verify. The fact is,
he is not a supreme leader, he is not some democratically
elected governor of that. He is a vicious man with a bloody
background, and we are treating him like the supreme leader.
Isn't that groveling before a group of people who do not
deserve. Of course they are not going to at that point. Of
course they are going to think that they have got leverage and
they can do things if we treat them with that type of respect,
the same way we would a democratic government.
Secretary Kerry. There is no equivalency, Congressman. That
is just his title. It is his name. That is what they treat him
as.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, that is what they call him. And are
we necessarily going to treat Adolf Hitler as the fuhrer? This
is not a supreme leader. This is a man who holds power through
brute force. And as I say, instead of trust but verify, instead
of test but verify, it looks like it is grovel but verify, to
me.
Secretary Kerry. Congressman, I just don't agree with you
about the question of test but verify being groveling. The
point I am making is there is no issue of trust involved.
Mr. Rohrabacher. All right.
Secretary Kerry. We are going to protect our interests by
testing what they are doing.
Mr. Rohrabacher. I understand the point you are making,
sir.
Secretary Kerry. And I don't consider anything that we have
done here with respect to this to be anything except acting in
the interests of our Nation and of our friends in the region.
And I think we are better off today than we were the day before
we made this agreement, when they were progressing to do
whatever they wanted in this program. Now they are not. Now
they are, because of the sanctions, negotiating with us with
respect to a final agreement.
Mr. Rohrabacher. We will, look at your proposal very
closely. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Secretary Kerry. Thank you.
Chairman Royce. Thank you.
We go to Mr. Ted Deutch of Florida.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, thank you for being here. And first I would
like to thank you for your efforts on behalf of my constituent,
Robert Levinson, on behalf of his family, who really
appreciates your personal efforts and those of the State
Department and so many in government. We hope you will continue
to press for his release so he can come home safely to south
Florida.
I wanted to talk about sanctions a little bit and take some
issue with your premise that we put sanctions in place to get
to negotiation. I don't think that is why we put sanctions in
place. We put sanctions in place to get to negotiation on our
way to getting the Iranians to give up their nuclear weapons
capability. That is where we were going.
And the concern that a lot of us have, I think, is that if
we don't set some marker--you asked us to work with you, we ask
the same back--if we don't set some marker that says if there
is not a deal, and which we thought might come in 6 months, but
the interim agreement now says the goal is to have it in 12
months, but if there is not a deal, then these additional
sanctions that we passed during the summer, when many told us
not to because Rouhani wouldn't even negotiate if we did, but
we should put those in place so it is clear what will happen if
there is not a deal.
And I do think that we can work with you on this, but no
one is suggesting that the legislation impose those additional
sanctions this afternoon. But if it is not 6 months, because
you need space, then let's figure out what it is. Is it 7
months? Is it 8 months? At some point why wouldn't it be in our
interest and the interests of our allies to make clear what
will happen if the Iranians continue to push and extend and
extend and there is no deal? Why can't we work together in the
interest of a negotiating position to help with diplomacy, to
strengthen diplomacy in order to do that?
Secretary Kerry. Congressman, we have made it clear to them
what the implications are of not being successful. They know
what the stakes are. And we have told them there will not be
new sanctions of any kind imposed while we are negotiating. So
if Congress votes for new sanctions, Congress is going off on
its own, and it raises a question. Most importantly, I am not
as worried about, you know, how they interpret it as I am
worried about how our allies, our friends, our partners
interpret it. They are part of this. And if the United States
sort of just lumbers off on its own and does its own thing when
we are working with those partners, they have a right to say,
you know, we are in partnership.
Mr. Deutch. They do. They do, Mr. Secretary.
Secretary Kerry. Well, let me just finish one thing,
though. You know, our whole policy is that Iran will not get a
nuclear weapon. So we are not in this for the sake of
negotiations for negotiations' sake; we are here because those
negotiations are to prevent them from getting the program,
obviously. I finished the sentence. But, you know, if we don't
negotiate, I think, in a way--I don't want to give them an
excuse or any other rationale for upping the ante, changing
the----
Mr. Deutch. Mr. Secretary, I am sorry, we are limited in
time.
Secretary Kerry. Let me ask you something. Let me ask you
something.
Mr. Deutch. I agree.
Secretary Kerry. They are listening to us now. They know
there are going to be more sanctions. We have told them 100
times. What is wrong with our working together to tee up what
we think might be appropriate if there is failure and then do
it?
Mr. Deutch. Completely agree. I completely agree. We should
tee it up and we should tee it up with a date certain.
Secretary Kerry. But teeing it up doesn't mean passing it
here now.
Mr. Deutch. We should tee it up with a date certain. And if
we all agree that at some date----
Secretary Kerry. But you can't have a date certain until
you know how your negotiations are working. You don't want to
make a presumption.
Mr. Deutch. My concern is we have heard the argument before
that sanctions undermine international unity. When the Senate
voted unanimously on the Iranian Central Bank sanctions, it was
the same day that the Department of Treasury sent a letter to
every Senator telling them not to vote for it. Not only did it
pass unanimously, but it was vital in changing Iran's nuclear
calculus and the world's approach to Iran, because of the
decision that they had to make about whether to do business
with Iran or whether to do business with the United States. So
I would like to work together to try to tee something up, as
you said.
I just have one other quick question. You said that oil
sanctions continue as they are in place with no diminishment of
oil sanctions, and yet the sanctions relief provides that a
million barrels per day is now a fixed amount during the 6
months that the Iranian can export. And yet under our existing
sanctions, there needs to be a significant reduction in the
amount that they can export. So it seems to me there is a
contradiction.
Secretary Kerry. Well, what we did, Congressman, is we put
in place a pause for the few nations, China, India, South
Korea, Japan, there are a number of nations who are working
with us very closely in sanctions enforcement who have been
reducing their consumption of oil now over this period of time.
And they have reached a point where it is very, very difficult
for them to further reduce without serious impact on global
economy and their economy. So in effect we worked a way that we
were able to release some of the money against giving them a
pause for these 6 months because of that difficulty.
Now, that is not a change in the sanctions regime, it is
simply a pause in its application, but it still applies, and it
will apply after the 6 months are over if we don't have an
agreement.
Chairman Royce. We are going to need to go to Mr. Joe
Wilson of South Carolina.
Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, Ranking Member Eliot Engel, for your
leadership, too.
Mr. Secretary, thank you for being here. But you can see,
this is a bipartisan concern. I think there are excellent
questions on both sides, because many of us believe that the
policies of this administration are putting the American people
at risk, our allies at risk, Israel, the Persian Gulf states,
Saudi Arabia. In fact, with the missile capability that Iran
has, our NATO allies, Turkey, Bulgaria, Greece. And so there
are just great concerns that we have.
And I truly agree with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu
that this agreement is a mistake. Additionally, I agree with
Ambassador John Bolton. In the Weekly Standard he wrote,
``This interim agreement is badly skewed from
America's perspective. Iran retains full capacity to
enrich uranium, thus abandoning a decade of Western
insistence and Security Council resolutions that Iran
stop all uranium enrichment activities. Allowing Iran
to continue enriching, and despite modest (indeed
utterly inadequate) measures to prevent it from
increasing its enriched-uranium stockpiles and its
overall nuclear infrastructure, lays the predicate for
Iran itself to fully enjoy its `right' to enrichment of
any `final' agreement. Indeed, the interim agreement
itself acknowledges that a `comprehensive solution'
will `involve a mutually defined enrichment program.'
``In exchange for superficial concessions, Iran
achieved three critical breakthroughs. First, it bought
time to continue all aspects of its nuclear weapons
program the agreement does not cover (centrifuge
manufacturing and testing; weaponization research and
fabrication; and the entire ballistic missile program).
Indeed, given that the interim agreement contemplates
periodic renewals, Iran may have gained all the time it
needs to achieve weaponization, not for simply a
handful of nuclear weapons, but dozens more.''
I also agree with Democratic Senator Robert Menendez of New
Jersey. In The Hill last week it was pointed out that,
``He argued that it was harsh sanctions that have
brought Iran to the negotiating table in the first
place. He added that he found many additional flaws
within the agreement besides its approach on
sanctions.''
Mr. Secretary, again, we see how bipartisan this is, and I
am just really pleased. This is nothing personal. The American
people are concerned, our allies are concerned. Clearly
sanctions make a difference.
What are the baselines or red lines or markers of success
that you will be looking for in 6 months?
Secretary Kerry. Very simple. Iran's inability to have
ever, without our knowing it with sufficient amount of time, a
huge amount of time that we could do something about it to stop
it, any kind of weaponization or nuclear weapons program,
bottom line.
Look, you just said decades of resolutions that they
abandon enrichment. What did they get you? What did those
decades of resolutions get you?
Mr. Wilson. They have gotten the people of Iran hopefully
to the point--this is the great culture of Persia--hopefully
for the people of Iran an opportunity for them, the Green
Revolution, to finally succeed.
Secretary Kerry. Congressman, that is a wishful thought,
but meanwhile their program continues to grow; meanwhile,
Israel is more at risk. In 2003, my friend, they had 164
centrifuges. Now they have 19,000. You know what Zarif said to
me? You know what your sanctions have gotten you? Nineteen
thousand centrifuges.
Mr. Wilson. But also that is clearly indicating that they
are not dealing in good faith, that they cannot be trusted, and
even with test but verify.
Secretary Kerry. Congressman, nobody has said to you, I
never sat here and said, I have never said the word good faith
in terms of what they are doing. Everybody knows that you don't
build a secret hole in a mountain to have centrifuges and
enrich if you are operating in good faith. Everybody knows you
don't refuse to sign the additional protocols. Everybody knows
you don't deny the IAEA access. Everybody knows you don't go up
to 19,000 centrifuges. We all understand that.
The issue here is, what are we going to do about it so that
we don't have a sudden breakout that threatens Israel and all
the countries in the region and ourselves? Now, the truth is,
you went further, you said something like they bought time to
continue all aspects of weaponization.
Mr. Wilson. Yes.
Secretary Kerry. No, they haven't, because in order to
weaponize you have to have highly enriched uranium, and under
our plan they are going the opposite direction. They are
destroying their highly enriched uranium.
Mr. Wilson. And it appears to me to be benign observation.
Secretary Kerry. We would know, Congressman, we would know
immediately----
Chairman Royce. We are going to go now to Mr. Ami Bera from
California.
Mr. Bera. Thank you, Chairman Royce.
And thank you, Secretary Kerry, for joining us today.
You know, we don't agree on a lot in this town, but I would
say certainly on this committee, throughout Congress, and, I
believe, the administration, and to quote your words, we all
agree on one issue, which is Iran must not and will not acquire
a nuclear weapon. I think there is general consensus on that.
On Saturday the President, when being asked at the Sabin
Institute what he envisioned the final agreement might look
like, he talked about an agreement that would let Iran enrich
enough nuclear material for energy, but enough in the way of
restrictions to assure the United States and Israel that it
could not produce a nuclear weapon. I think I am quoting that
correctly. When asked the chances of success of getting to that
agreement, to quote the President, I wouldn't say it is more
than 50/50, but we have to try.
I think we agree that we should try, because the outcome of
failure is probably one that we don't want to see. But given
Iran's history, you know, many of us in this body, on this
committee, and myself personally, remain very skeptical. And
certainly, as you approach the negotiations, I think you have
expressed a healthy set of skepticism as well. But again, we
have to try. Any agreement that we enter into has to--and,
again, I think to quote you--it has to halt their progress and
roll it back, and it has to lengthen the time to nuclear
breakout.
So with this model of test and verify, how can we guarantee
that, you know, they aren't continuing to enrich, they aren't
continuing to enrich above the 3 percent threshold or above a 5
percent threshold?
Secretary Kerry. It is certainly a good question.
Mr. Bera. And within the context, do they understand how
skeptical members of this body are and how, you know, if there
is any backsliding, you know, we have already in a unanimous
way supported increased sanctions? Over in the Senate, you
know, they are probably very close to, you know, if there is
progress, how close they are.
Secretary Kerry. How close they are?
Mr. Bera. How skeptical we are within this body about their
intentions.
Secretary Kerry. Well, look, the answer is that the purpose
of our first step is to know with certainty what they are
doing. And they have said to us, I mean, that is part of their
proffer to us, if they say it is going to be a peaceful
program, they say we will allow you unlimited access, we will
allow restraints, we will make these things happen. And that is
sort of what we have to put to the test now.
Now, we will now have access to this secret underground
facility. We haven't had that. That is a big deal. We will now
have access to Natanz and we will know what they are doing
there. We will have sufficient access to the heavy water
reactor.
Now, as we go down the road here, there are going to have
to be built in very significant intrusive verification
mechanisms so that we know to a certainty. When I say to a
certainty, you know, Prime Minister Netanyahu is going to sit
there and say to us, and others, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia,
the Emirates, you know, Mohammed bin Zayed, they are going to
look to us and say, are we really protected? And we have a
responsibility as an administration to negotiate an agreement
where we can come to all of you and withstand appropriate
scrutiny of what the framework of this agreement is. Does it
answer the question that you know what they are doing? Does it
give you adequate insight ongoing? Is it possible for them to
somehow be cheating on you and you don't know it? Is there a
way that you can, you know, failsafe guarantee that there is no
hidden enrichment taking place? Is there a guarantee that you
are able to say this program is, to a certainty, a peaceful
program?
Now, as I said, there are other countries that engage in
peaceful programs, and we have inspectors and inspection and a
level of intrusion. It will take Iran a period of time,
obviously, where that is going to have to be greater for them.
Why? Because of the record here, because of the history that
has raised these sanctions to the level they are, that has
brought the global community together in this effort. And it is
up to Iran really to decide how fast they want to prove this
and how far they are willing to go to make it clear that it is
certain. If it isn't certain, we have a problem.
Chairman Royce. Mike McCaul of Texas.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, thank you for being here today.
As President Kennedy once said, let us never fear to
negotiate, but let us not negotiate out of fear. As an
American, I want to wish you my heartfelt, sincere wish that
your negotiations are successful. I think every American wants
that. I think that the stakes you are dealing with, the
national security stakes have never been higher than they are
with Iran, and from a national security, homeland security
standpoint as well.
I have some concerns about this deal. We have worked on
these sanctions for a decade. We have gotten to the point where
we can possibly negotiate. I sent a letter to Senator Reid
signed by 70 Members of Congress to continue and vote on the
sanctions bill that we passed by 400 votes in the House so that
we could strengthen your hand, strengthen your leverage in
these negotiations.
My concern is that this deal violates six U.N. Security
Council resolutions to give Iran the right to enrich; that it
sends a message to our partners in the Middle East that it is
okay for a state sponsor of terrorism to enrich, but not for
them. I am concerned that it could spark a nuclear arms race in
the Middle East if not done correctly. I am concerned that it
deals nothing with the technology aspects, as we know they have
the capability to hit Israel and Europe with its missiles
currently, and the Pentagon projects that they have ICBM
capability of hitting the United States by 2015. And I think
most disturbingly, Mr. Secretary, that President Rouhani just
said this week that Iran's centrifuges, in his words, ``will
never stop spinning.''
Now, I have talked to officials in the Bush administration
who claim that one of the biggest mistakes made was North
Korea. I think Iran is playing the North Korean playbook, if
you will, and also trying to play the United States.
As Homeland Security chairman, I am concerned about $7
billion of relief without any assurance that that money will
not be used for further terrorism and will not be used to
further a nuclear weapons program. I think that we should
negotiate, but I believe that lifting sanctions should not be
done until they have dismantled their nuclear program. In other
words, Mr. Secretary, are you willing at the end of the 6
months, in the final deal, to say, look, we are willing to lift
the sanctions when you stop enriching uranium?
Secretary Kerry. Well, let me speak for a minute to the
question of the never stop spinning the centrifuges. If they
are, you know, less than 1,000 or 500 or whatever they are,
they may never stop spinning them, but they are very limited in
what they are going to be able to do.
The outlines of this have to take shape now, and we are
very clear. This agreement, as I read earlier to you,
envisions, and they have accepted this, envisions severe
restraints, a mutually defined program with mutually agreed
parameters consistent with practical needs. What are the
practical needs? To have some medical research, maybe; to feed
enough fuel into a legitimate power program, which may be done
in consortium with other people with intrusive knowledge of
what is going on as a result? I mean, there are a lot of things
here yet to be filled out in this.
So the answer is, at the end of this, I can't tell you they
might not have some enrichment, but I can tell you to a
certainty it will not be possible for them to be able to turn
it into a weapons program without our knowing it so far in
advance that all the options that are available to us today to
stop it. Let's say we weren't here talking about this and they
are proceeding down the road and we came to you and said, hey,
we have got to stop it the only way we know how. That is still
going to be available to us, only it is going to be available
to us with much greater foresight, much greater knowledge of
what is happening, and much more restraint on whatever their
program is between now and then. That does make Israel and
Saudi Arabia and the Emirates and Egypt and all the other
countries concerned much more secure. It makes us more secure.
Mr. McCaul. I think you would have more confidence from
Israel, I think, and Members of Congress if you came back in 6
months and said, you know, they can have a peaceful program,
but not enriching uranium inside Iran, and that can be done by
providing that enriched uranium to them outside of Iran. I
would urge you to pursue that.
Secretary Kerry. That deal was on the table a number of
years ago, but that deal, I am afraid, has probably been lost.
Chairman Royce. The gentleman's time has expired. We go to
Gerry Connolly of Virginia.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And welcome, Mr. Secretary.
Mr. Secretary, when is the last time we had a negotiated
agreement of any kind with Iran?
Secretary Kerry. I think 10 years ago there was some
restraint on some level of their program.
Mr. Connolly. Kind of an infrequent phenomenon.
Secretary Kerry. That was the first time. Well, we haven't
really talked to them face to face in 35, 40 years, whatever it
is, since 1979.
Mr. Connolly. Some of the critics of this agreement,
interim agreement, frame it as----
Secretary Kerry. Let me reframe that. There have been a
couple of meetings where people have talked, but there has been
no negotiation of this kind.
Mr. Connolly. No agreement.
Some of the critics would have one believe that an
alternative to what you and your team, working with our allies,
have hammered out here really could be improved upon and
actually made into a comprehensive agreement. Why have an
interim confidence-building agreement when really the only
agreement that counts is the complete dismantlement of existing
stockpiles, sites, processing facilities, and the like? And
that has come from some friends, or so-called friends, who have
criticized the interim agreement. I wonder if you could comment
on that. Why didn't you get a comprehensive agreement that
meets all of our concerns?
Secretary Kerry. Well, it is not an interim agreement. Let
me frame this very carefully for everybody. It is not an
interim agreement. It is a first step toward a comprehensive
agreement. And why did we do that? For the simple reason we
wanted to make our friends and ourselves safer. And if you
simply sat there and negotiated toward the comprehensive
agreement, then you are getting sucked into the North Korea
syndrome where you are having six parties who are negotiating
while they develop their program, and then they go explode
something and it is too late. We definitively did not want to
fall into that trap. So we insisted on trying to get a step
where we could hold things where they are while we put to test
their sincerity and willingness to do the whole thing.
Now, if they are willing to do the whole thing then we have
lost nothing, and if they are not willing to do the whole thing
we have not allowed them to progress to a point where we put
people at greater risk. That is what I think makes this a
smarter approach.
Mr. Connolly. Mr. Secretary, you talked about inspections.
What is our current capability in terms of inspections? Can we
go in every day?
Secretary Kerry. No.
Mr. Connolly. Or any day into Iran and inspect what they
are doing?
Secretary Kerry. No, we can't. We can't at all. The IAEA is
allowed to get into some facilities on an, I think, once a
week--they can get in to the two facilities we are now going
into daily, and they have been able to go into Arak, I think,
on a sporadic basis. I think it is about once a month.
Mr. Connolly. And the agreement that you all have, have
negotiated, allows daily inspections?
Secretary Kerry. Daily.
Mr. Connolly. On all of the sites we are concerned about?
Secretary Kerry. No. Daily on Fordow, daily on Natanz and
monthly on Arak, may even wind up being a little more monthly,
but it is definitely monthly.
Mr. Connolly. So significant change in our capacity to look
at and view what is going on.
Secretary Kerry. Well very much so. And in addition to
that, we have access to their centrifuge storage facilities,
their centrifuge workshops, production facilities, and we have
the plans that will be given us with respect to Arak. So we
have much greater manifestation of a kind of willingness to
open up and put this to the test.
Mr. Connolly. You know, it is an adage in negotiations, Mr.
Secretary, that you want to try to let it be a win-win, not an
``I win, you lose'' kind of situation. And often that requires
face-saving measures to allow some of us to step back from the
brink. What is in it for Iran? What most motivates Iran to want
to, A) reach this agreement, and B) reach the ultimate part of
this agreement?
Secretary Kerry. Well, I think Iran mostly wants to get out
from under the sanctions ultimately because their economy is in
shambles. Their people are hurting, and there is enormous
pressure on President Rouhani to deliver. You recall that
Rouhani was not the choice of the supreme leader, that Rouhani
was really a reflection of votes that were cast, and it was a
surprise. And then he promised the people of Iran in his
election campaign that he was going to deliver change. He was
going to try and reach out to the West, change the
relationships and improve the economy. And I think that is
really what has been driving them.
Chairman Royce. Mr. Ted Poe of Texas.
Mr. Poe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I want to make it clear that I do
not question the motives or the interest that you have and the
administration has in doing what is best for the United States.
I really believe that that is what you want to do is make the
world safer for us and everyone else.
On this, particular agreement, and the proposal, I
disagree. It seems to me that we are giving away the farm and
the mineral right, as well. It seems to me also that rather
than make them dismantle their nuclear weapons program, we are
just freezing the program, which could be thawed out at any
time down the road.
And these are my concerns about Iran and this situation,
and then I am going to have two questions if I don't talk too
long.
The first concern, of course, is their continuing
development of intercontinental ballistic missiles. When I met
with Prime Minister Netanyahu in Israel a couple weeks ago, he
said that they are not developing those ICBMs for us, Israel,
they can reach us with what they already have; they are
developing them for you, United States.
And so I am concerned about that. They continue to develop
intercontinental ballistic missiles. It seems that they would
want something on the tips of those intercontinental ballistics
down the road, like weapons.
The second concern are the terror groups that they sponsor
all over the world, in most places that most Americans have
never even hard of: Hezbollah, of course, their activities not
only in the Middle East but in other parts of the world; the
Quds Force, IRGC. They are causing mischief, as you know,
everywhere including in Syria, trying to support a rogue
government there as a puppet state maybe for Iran.
Mr. Rouhani is a smooth talker, in my opinion. He is
different from Ahmadinejad, who was a flamethrower, a bomb
thrower, with his rhetoric, but he seems to continue to hang
his own people and smile in the process of that. And, of
course, there is always the situation that we continue to talk
about because it hasn't been resolved of the MEK, the dissident
group, now five attacks on them. No one has been brought to
justice in the Iraqi Government and criminals haven't been
brought to justice.
The latest one--excuse my partner here--when they were
attacked on September 1st, the murders occurred in Iraq; 50
people were murdered. Many of them murdered while they were
wounded in the different locations, tracked down and murdered.
I believe that Iran was behind this attack. And, of course, no
one has been held accountable, not Iran, not the Iraqis, and
not the criminals themselves. And there are some other
examples.
My question is this: Big picture, has the supreme leader
changed his position that Iran wants to eliminate Israel and
Iran wants to eliminate the United States?
Secretary Kerry. Congressman, let me begin by saying to you
that I agree with you on each of the concerns that you have
expressed.
There is no question but that the ICBM missile program of
Iran is of serious concern, and we have, we believe, inserted
language in the agreement and an understanding in the agreement
that that is very much one of our concerns going forward is the
weaponization.
Likewise, the terror, support for terror, I raised it
earlier, and I will let the record just speak to that.
With respect to the stated positions, public positions of
Iran and its rhetoric, no, it hasn't changed, and it is very
inflammatory and very threatening.
Mr. Poe. Excuse me, Mr. Secretary, because I just have 1
minute left. Do you believe it is still the goal of the supreme
leader to destroy Israel and destroy the United States?
Secretary Kerry. Well, you know, when you say, do I
believe, believe, that that is----
Mr. Poe. Well, do you think, do you believe, what do you
think about that position? He states that.
Secretary Kerry. I think their rhetoric is dangerous and
threatening and, you know, incredibly counterproductive and
damaging to any potential rational relationship but----
Mr. Poe. Reclaiming my time. I want to reclaim my time, Mr.
Secretary. I asked the question.
Secretary Kerry. But, my but is----
Mr. Poe. I am reclaiming my time. My other question is
this, Mr. Secretary. If Iran gets nuclear weapons, will then
Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Egypt also then rush to get nuclear
weapons as well?
Secretary Kerry. If Iran got a nuclear weapon, there would
be an arms race in the region for certain, which is one of the
reasons why they are not going to get a nuclear weapon.
Mr. Poe. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Secretary Kerry. I want to finish----
Mr. Royce. Absolutely, Mr. Secretary. Go ahead.
Secretary Kerry. I just want to finish that there are lots
of people in the world who use outrageous and outlandish
rhetoric, and they play to their street, and they play to their
constituency, and they have no means of actually implementing
what they are saying. But we take seriously the threat of Iran
and the potential of a nuclear weapon. And that is why the
centerpiece of the President's foreign policy is they will got
not get a nuclear weapon while this President is President of
the United States.
Chairman Royce. Juan Vargas of California.
Mr. Vargas. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, very much, Mr. Secretary, for being here.
I want to premise my remarks by saying I have nothing but
the highest respect and regard for you personally and
professionally. In fact, one of my biggest disappointments
politically is that you did not become President. We worked
very hard in California for you, and I think you would been a
magnificent President, so I am not a so-called friend; I am a
believer.
However, when it comes to this deal, I am completely
against it. I do think it is naive, and I don't think it makes
us safer, unfortunately, and I don't think it makes our allies
safer, especially Israel. Instead, I agree with those that say
that sanctions were working but that we didn't ratchet them up
enough, that we should have tightened them down even more.
So the choice becomes whether the Iranians decide that they
want a functioning economy or they want a nuclear weapons
capability, a weapons program. I think we need a corollary to
your axiom that nothing is agreed until everything is agreed,
and instead, we should say that we won't agree to anything
until everything is agreed. We need that comprehensive deal
first.
And you said, has Iran changed its nuclear calculus? We
don't know; we should be skeptical. I am not skeptical. I am
not skeptical at all. I don't think it changed its calculus. I
think it continues to want a nuclear weapons program.
I do want to give you plenty of time to answer those
questions so I won't go all the way until there are 2 seconds
left and then say, Mr. Secretary, would you like to answer
those 50 questions? But I do want to know, it seems to me to be
naive, to be frank, on its face.
Secretary Kerry. Well, first of all, Congressman, I am
really pleased that you think I would have made a good
President, and I appreciate your support in that effort, and I
hate to disappoint you that I have come up with something in
conjunction with the administration and our efforts that you
think is naive.
I think it is anything but naive, anything but. And I think
that for many reasons. I have been thinking about and working
on the Iran file, so to speak, for a lot of years. And there
are a lot of people who have a different calculation about what
Iran might or might not want to do. It is all well and good to
sit here and theoretically say, ratchet up the sanctions, and
you will drive them in to a place where they will crush. But do
you know what? The Russians and the Chinese won't be with you
doing that. And ultimately, the Europeans might not be either,
because as you ratchet them up and they think it is
unreasonable based on their willingness to explore the
diplomacy, you lose them, too. And then guess what you have
done? You have actually undone the sanctions, not reinforced
them.
Let me go a step further. There are a lot of people in the
intel community who will sit and tell you--and I urge you to
get briefed on it--who will tell you that their whole school of
thought in Iran, the hardliners, who welcome the idea that the
United States might whack them because they think they will be
heroes in the street, and they think they will be true to the
revolution, and they think that, as a result, they will
actually be stronger as a regime. And there are many people who
believe that if the regime got into real extremis on the
economy, what would happen is the supreme leader will say,
Well, I am not surrendering. We are not ever going to surrender
to the Great Satan. Now we are going to go for the weapon
because it is the only thing we can do, and we will dig deeper,
and we will go more secret, and we will take whatever it takes,
but we are going to get it because that is all the United
States of America understands.
Now that is an alternative theory to this notion that you
can just go out there and raise your sanctions ad infinitum and
you are going to win. We are in a good place now to negotiate.
We are at a level of reasonableness and capacity to perhaps get
an agreement. Now maybe we won't get the agreement, and we will
have to do the other thing anyway.
But you know, one of the things I learned a long time ago
is if you are going to take a nation to war, you better have
exhausted all the possibilities of trying to get a peaceful
resolution before you do it. And we are doing that now. We are
going through the testing and testing to see whether or not
they are serious, and if not, we have all the options available
to us.
But there is nothing naive about what we are doing. It is
calculated, it may be wrong, you may find that it is a
miscalculation, but it is not miscalculation based on naivete.
We understand the dangers. We understand the risks. We
understand how critical this is and how high the stakes are.
And I believe, absolutely, no question in my mind, if we were
just negotiating and pressing further, we would be inviting a
prolonged process, which would drive them to want to get the
weapon even more, and then you would be in a place where you
might get to a negotiation but they are even closer to having
the weapon than they are today. Much more dangerous.
Mr. Vargas. In my last 8 seconds, I pray you are right. And
again, I encourage you. I think you are a man of great courage,
and I hope the best for you. Thank you.
Secretary Kerry. Thank you.
Chairman Royce. Matt Salmon of Arizona.
Mr. Salmon. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
I have three questions, and they all deal with the issue of
accountability, and I am going to ask the three questions, and
then I will turn the time over to you.
It is an alarming fact that this agreement that you struck
with the Iranians gives them access to $7 billion in cash. Can
you assure the American people that not one single dollar of
that new money coming into Iran is going to be used to kill one
American soldier?
The second question is that I don't feel like the Obama
administration has a stellar track record on the issue of
accountability. From Benghazi, NSA, AP, IRS to Fast and
Furious, these are all dismal examples of where we still don't
have answers to why they happened or who is ultimately
accountable. So where does the buck stop with this new deal if
Iran doesn't work like it is promised? Are you going to held
ultimately accountable or the President or who in the
administration?
And finally, continuing on that theme of accountability,
the administration claimed to not be in negotiations with Iran
when they in fact were. The State Department has admitted that
Victoria Nuland misled reporters when, in February, she flatly
denied the existence of direct secret bilateral talks with
Iran. It turns out your department intentionally misled the
American people about these negotiations taking place behind
closed doors.
So how can we have the confidence that the information you
are giving us now is on the level, particularly since the
Iranians clearly have a different interpretation of the
agreement than you do?
Those are my questions, and I am very interested in your
answers.
Secretary Kerry. I honestly I would have to go back and
check. I became Secretary of State I think February 1st. I am
not--I am not sure what was said then or not said exactly or
what the state of play was, but let me find out.
With respect to accountability, I am hanging out there. I
will be accountable. I have absolute confidence that you will
hold me accountable. As I said to the chairwoman a moment ago,
I said I don't think the sanctions regime will come apart; she
says it is the death knell of it. We are going to know in a few
months. So I will be accountable.
Mr. Salmon. As to my very first question, with the new
money that they are getting--and I will take at face value the
amount that you have speculated $7 billion--with that new money
coming into the Iran, can you assure the American people that
not a dollar of that money is going to be used to kill an
American soldier?
Secretary Kerry. Congressman, I wish I could give you that
kind of an assurance, but I have no ability to tell you exactly
what fundibility there is in money in Iran or where the budget
goes or what happens. My prayer is that no soldier will be
killed as a consequence of anything that Iran chooses to do.
And our hope is that, as a consequence of this process, maybe
we can get at some of those other issues that are very
significant between our two countries.
Mr. Salmon. Finally, I think this has boiled down to a
disagreement of whether or not ultimately we want them to be
able to continue any kind of a nuclear program within Iran
versus being able to go forward and not have any kind of a
nuclear program.
Secretary Kerry. When you say ``nuclear,'' do you mean
power program or power plant?
Mr. Salmon. Yes, any kind of a nuclear program, any kind of
enrichment whatsoever. They can get all the nuclear material
that they need for power by purchasing that from other
countries. They don't need to be able to enrich that
themselves.
And the way I look at this deal, and I understand there are
a lot of components, but you mentioned earlier in your initial
remarks that one of the big successes of this interim deal or
6-month deal is that they have to waylay their 20 percent
enriched uranium. But that is very insubstantial. It is a small
quantity. They have a far larger quantity of 3 to 5 percent
enriched materials, and it doesn't take a lot to get to that
next level. I think we all understand that.
And so it seems like a large--it seems to me like a great
deal to get a small quantity of 20 percent enriched uranium for
$7 billion bucks.
Secretary Kerry. Well, Congressman, if they don't have the
ability to enrich it, and they can't during this--they are not
allowed to put in any enrichment facilities, any additional
facilities. They are not allowed to change that stock. So it is
relative. If you think it is not worth for 6 months trying to
negotiate a comprehensive deal while you hold their program
where it is, then you make your judgment. We believe it is.
And, you know, we have proven in the last years, as we went
from those 164 centrifuges to 19,000, what you get for not
talking. You get closer to a bomb. So we believe it is
important to try to sit down and see if we can resolve this.
Chairman Royce. We go now to Mr. David Cicilline, if we
could, of Rhode Island.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for being here, and thank you to
the administration for its briefings and for the important
information you have shared with us today and thank you for the
good work that you are doing.
I was very pleased to hear you say and each time the
President has spoken about it reaffirmed our commitment to
ensure that Iran not be permitted to develop a nuclear weapon.
And I think when people ask the question whether this deal make
us safer and makes our allies safer, the question is whether or
not this is likely to make it more likely or less likely that
we prevent Iran from having a nuclear weapon. And the
skepticism that everyone has expressed is healthy. But I think
the question is, what is, you know, does this make it more
likely that we achieve this objective.
And I think there seem to be very competing timelines. One
is, you know, one timeline is doing nothing and the development
of a nuclear Iran. The other timeline is additional sanctions
so severe that either Iran abandons its nuclear ambition or the
regime is brought down. And then another timeline is this
negotiation. And I think we, we ask questions as if nothing
will happen if we don't take some action or pursue some
diplomatic alternative.
And so like everyone on this panel, I hope you are
successful in leading this effort because I think the greatest
safety will be achieved if we prevent a nuclear Iran and we do
it as expeditiously as we can.
But I want to follow up with really two questions. One is
to follow up on Congressman Deutch's question, if it is true
that the Iranians are certain that if they violate this
agreement that additional sanctions will be imposed, if they
are certain of that, then speak to what would be the
consequence of enacting sanctions, additional sanctions, that
would not be triggered until a default of some kind in the
agreement or even an effective date a year from now or some
other mechanism if, in fact, they already expect that? You
know, what would be the impact on the negotiations? What would
be the impact on our allies? Why wouldn't we do that as a
mechanism to be--sort of make clear what they, what you are
already indicating they already know?
Secretary Kerry. Because we told them we wouldn't do it
while we were negotiating and because our partners----
Mr. Cicilline. Additional sanctions or passing----
Secretary Kerry. Because our partners don't expect us to
pass new sanctions while we are negotiating and because our
partners, if we pass them now, you know, could get squirrely on
the whole idea of the sanctions. I mean, they will figure we
are kind of doing our own thing and that we are not part of the
team.
Mr. Cicilline. Do you think that is the same view, even if
the sanctions are not imposed but enacted----
Secretary Kerry. Even if the sanctions are not imposed, it
implies a lack of faith in the process and an unwillingness to
play by the rules that our partners are playing by.
Mr. Cicilline. And the second question, Mr. Secretary, is I
know that, and I think this is an important point the interim
agreement says, and I quote, ``Iran reaffirms that under no
circumstances will Iran ever seek or develop any nuclear
weapons.''
And as you well know, there are many steps in research and
development and testing that a state may undertake that are
important steps to build nuclear capacity. In the past,
according to IAEA, Iran has taken some of these steps and
argued dual use because of civilian use.
Is that an issue that you intend and can assure us that you
will address in a final agreement?
Secretary Kerry. It has to be. Absolutely. And that is part
of what we were talking about, about resolving all of our
concerns and dealing with the larger U.N. Security Council and
ballistic missile and weaponization program issues.
Mr. Cicilline. Then, Mr. Secretary, it seems to me that the
outlines of the first step are creating a window of
opportunity, and the alternative of not proceeding aggressively
in this negotiation would allow the Iranians to proceed
unchecked really over the next 6 months or longer. And it is my
hope that you will be successful, and it will provide greater
security to this country and to our allies in the region.
And I thank you, and I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Kerry. Thank you, Mr. Congressman.
Chairman Royce. Thank you.
And we go to Mr. Jeff Duncan of South Carolina.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
You know, it is quite a feat to have the Secretary State in
front of our committee twice in 1 year, and I just wanted to
remind the committee that it has been 15 months since the
Benghazi terrorist attacks that have killed four brave
Americans, including Tyrone Woods. The administration has
brought none of the perpetrators to justice, nor has anyone
been dismissed at the Department of State that may have
culpability in the deaths of these brave Americans.
In negotiating with Iran, the administration chose to
ignore the plight of Pastor Abedini during the negotiations and
decided instead to release an Iranian nuclear scientist to
please the Iranians. That just baffles me.
Mr. Secretary, in negotiating with Iran, you seem to give
them the benefit of the doubt that they will comply with the
agreement. But I agree with the Canadian Foreign Affairs
Minister John Baird, who says, ``We think past actions best
predict future actions, and Iran has defied the United Nations
Security Council and the IAEA.'' Simply put, ``Iran has not
earned the right to have the benefit of the doubt.'' Iran is a
bad actor. We all know that.
Numerous hearings in this committee have pointed out
Iranian activity in the Western Hemisphere. Even the Defense
Minister of Israel acknowledges this in a December 9th article
in the Times of Israel. He states that Iran has built an
infrastructure of terror in Central and South America in order
to, among other goals, have a base from which to attack the
U.S. These are the guys we are negotiating with.
Iran has been clearly implicated in the Buenos Aires AMIA
bombings in the 1990s and Latin America's administration has
chosen to abandon 190 years of U.S. foreign policy by declaring
the era of the Monroe Doctrine is over. Now what kind of
message does that send? It sends the wrong message to countries
like Iran and also to China, Russia and North Korea about our
reliability in the region.
So having made all those statements, I have to ask, why
trust Iran? There has been no accountability for past actions
and past links to terrorism.
So I have got a series of yes-or-no questions for you.
Iran is still listed by the U.S. State Department as a
State sponsor of terrorism, correct?
Secretary Kerry. Yes, it is.
Mr. Duncan. Is Iran still supporting Hezbollah and Hamas?
Secretary Kerry. Yes.
Mr. Duncan. Hezbollah is still active in South America. We
have established that in this committee, and the State
Department has seemed to agree with that in complying with the
Iranian threat in the Western Hemisphere Act of the last
Congress. So what impact do you estimate sanctions relief will
have on Iranian financial and material assistance to Hezbollah
and other regional proxies? If we lift these sanctions and they
have $7 billion of U.S. dollars, what impact do you think that
will have on their state sponsor of terrorism?
Secretary Kerry. I think very little, if any, because they
are a $1 trillion economy, and this is a tiny percentage of
that. So they don't--they are not banking on this money in
order to be able to engage in the nefarious activities they
take place in, which we disagree with, all of them. I cited a
moment ago our concern about the many other issues, from
ballistic missiles to supports for terror to support for
Hezbollah. I mentioned Hezbollah earlier. So, obviously, all of
these things concern us a lot, Congressman.
But nowhere, nowhere, not once today, nothing that I said
intimated in any way whatsoever a benefit of any doubt. I sat
here and said we are skeptical. I sat here and said they have
got to prove it. I sat here and said we are going to test them.
I said we are not going to even mention the word trust. This is
based on testing and verification.
So I don't know where you get this idea about giving them
any benefit of the doubt. There is no benefit of any doubt
here. This is a very skeptical and tested and focused process
of verifying a program that we have to account to the world
for.
Mr. Duncan. Let me ask you another question then.
Does North Korea have nuclear weapons?
Secretary Kerry. North Korea does not have a program yet
that is capable, but they have had some explosions of devices.
Mr. Duncan. In February and April 2007, North Korea agreed
to abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs
and returning at an early date to a treaty on nonproliferation
of nuclear weapons and the IAEA safeguards. Supposedly, this
significant achievement commits six parties at that time to an
agreement to a denuclearized Korean Peninsula. That was in
February and April 2007.
Guess what? September 2008, they were back. And we gave
them 700--I think it was 950,000 tons of fuel if they would
stop their nuclear weapons program.
I go back to one of the gentlemen to my left said, freeze
and then it would unfreeze. That is exactly what happened in
North Korea. They froze it, and then they got what they wanted
out of the deal, and then they restarted it. I am afraid we are
going to do this similar thing happen; different actors, the
same script.
And I yield back.
Chairman Royce. We are going to go to Lois Frankel of
Florida.
Ms. Frankel. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
And we all agree, and thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your
service, your perseverance and your fortitude. And we all agree
that Iran should not acquire a nuclear weapon.
I have a few questions. There seems to be, listening to my
colleagues, a lot of skepticism in the room, and implicit is,
it sounds to me, is the belief that pushing more sanctions
will--would eventually bring Iran to full capitulation.
So my question to you really has to do with the timing. Why
do you think the timing is right now for these talks and
whether you disagree with the premise that more sanctions until
you reach full capitulation is possible? One question.
Number two, are we getting pressure from our partners, not
just about sticking with this agreement but with actually
bringing an agreement? Do you feel like they are tiring about
enforcing sanctions?
And then, as to the $7 billion, you seem to imply that it
is really more or less a drop in the bucket. I know $7 billion
isn't a drop in the bucket, but you say compared to what stays
in place.
So what is--what is Iran getting from this that will lead
us to progress in these talks?
And last, in talking about the final deal, are you going to
be looking at having--putting back sanctions automatically if
certain benchmarks are not met?
Secretary Kerry. Say the last one again? I am sorry.
Ms. Frankel. In the final deal, are you looking at
sanctions automatically being put back if certain benchmarks
are not met?
Secretary Kerry. Well, let me go through each of your
questions, Congresswoman. Thank you very much. Is the timing
right? Is capitulation possible? And what is the timing here?
Well, the timing, we believe, is right for a number of
different reasons. Because we have the unity of the P5+1,
because we believe that Iran, because of the change of the
administration in Iran, wants to try to reach out and see if
they can indeed achieve a different relationship.
Now, for all the mistrust here, I have to tell you, there
is an equal amount, if not more, mistrust in Iran. They
mistrust us. They have a complete lack of a sense of confidence
that we are willing to make a deal or that we will keep the
deal. And so these things work two ways. And they have a
perception that we are out for regime change and that what we
want to do is just hammer them and bring more sanctions. So
there is a lot of doubt about whether we are going to negotiate
in good faith, which is one of the reasons why there is a
question here about what we wind up doing after we enter into a
negotiation.
Now is capitulation possible? I don't believe that it is. I
mean, it depends what you, I suppose, engage in. Does United
States have the power ultimately, militarily, yeah, but is that
where we are headed? Is that where Americans want to go? Is
that what the situation calls for? That is a whole different
set of questions, and I doubt the answers are very affirmative.
But I think that basically sanctions are not going to
produce capitulation, and I think that is part of the
calculation here.
And I think when you have a country ready to negotiate, and
they step up and say, ``We are prepared to do this,'' and we
have partners in the deal, if those partners perceive that we
are not prepared to do it, then they will go off and do what
they need to do and you lose this unanimity, this cohesion that
we have today and cooperation we have, which is part of what
makes the application of these sanctions so powerful. We don't
want to lose that.
In addition, you asked, you know, what is Iran getting?
Well, what Iran is getting is a road map to the way they can
get rid of the sanctions, that they ultimately hopefully can
even strike a new relationship.
Now what does that that require? It obviously requires
things beyond just the nuclear program. It will require dealing
with missiles, ballistic missiles, with terrorism, their
support for it, with other kinds of activities. But you have
got to begin somewhere. And the most immediate threat to us and
to our friends in the region is the nuclear program, and that
is where we have begun.
Chairman Royce. Mr. Mo Brooks of Alabama.
Mr. Brooks. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for sharing your time
with us on a very important and very high risk issue.
In 2005, the President of Iran stated, ``Israel must be
wiped off the page of time.'' In 2006, the President of Iran
said, ``Whether you like it or not, the Zionist regime,''
referring to Israel, ``is on the road to being eliminated.''
Also, in 2006, the Iranian President added that ``the Zionist
regime is a rotten dry tree that will be eliminated by one
storm.''
I emphasize that a nuclear attack on Israel certainly
qualifies as being ``eliminated by one storm.''
The Jewish community, the United States and, for that
matter, almost all the rest of the world disregarded Adolph
Hitler's threats and were deceived by Hitler's promises in the
1930s, resulting in the Holocaust and murder of millions of
innocent Jews. Inasmuch as Israel appears to be Iran's number
one target, I give great weight to Israel's opinion about the
Iran nuke deal that you advocate.
So far, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has not
been favorably impressed, having said,
``What was achieved in Geneva is not a historic
agreement. It is a historic mistake. To a large degree,
this agreement rescues Iran from the pressure it has
been under and also gives it international legitimacy
to continue its nuclear program. This is a bad
agreement.''
It seems to me, Mr. Secretary, that the key to any
agreement is whether the United States can and will enforce it.
In that vein, Mr. Secretary, on April 12, 2013, the chairman of
the House Armed Services Committee, Buck McKeon, and the
chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, Mike Rogers, sent President Obama and you a
letter that states in part,
``Since October, we have written to you twice with our
concerns about a massive Russian violation and
circumvention of an arms control obligation to the
United States of great significance to this Nation and
to its NATO allies.''
Given the Obama administration's failure to enforce arms
control agreement with Russia, what can you say to Israel and
the rest of our allies in the Middle East to convince them that
America is still a reliable ally, that America will enforce
agreements with Iran, or else, and that America's not ignoring
history and repeating the 1930s Neville Chamberlain like
pattern of appeasement and retreat that helped trigger World
War II and the deaths of tens of millions of people around the
world?
Secretary Kerry. Well, let me begin, Congressman, by first
of all condemning in the strongest language possible those
expressions of hate and of sheer and utter insanity almost,
asking for a country to be wiped off the face of the map and of
time and for people to be so. That language is the most
abhorrent kind of language you can find in any discourse in
public life. It has no place in a reasonable world. It is
unacceptable, and we should never hear that kind of language
again.
Secondly, with respect to Prime Minister Netanyahu and
``his attitude'' about this, I have had many conversations with
the Prime Minister. He is a friend of mine, we talk frequently,
and I respect his leadership. And I think he and I are working
very, very effectively together on a lot of things. He knows,
and I think Israel knows, that nothing will come between our
relationship, our security relationship. Our commitment to
Israel is ironclad, and we just may occasionally have a
difference of tactics, but we have no difference strategically
in what our goal is. Our goal is to make Israel safer, make the
world and region safer, and we are committed to not allowing
Iran to have a nuclear weapon.
And this President, I will tell you unequivocally, without
any question, demonstrably, measurably has done more to provide
for the security of Israel than any other administration in
history. He has provided an Iron Dome----
Mr. Brooks. Mr. Secretary, my time is running out, let me
just conclude with one sentence.
Secretary Kerry. I am going to exercise the privilege of
answering your question, Congressman. I am not just going to
sit here and have you lecture me----
Mr. Brooks. Mr. Chairman, may I have 5 to 10 seconds?
Chairman Royce. Excuse me, I think there is time for, Mr.
Brooks, both for you to ask a question and certainly for our
Secretary of State to answer that question.
Secretary Kerry. The President has made certain that Israel
has Iron Dome, Israel has the B-22 Osprey. No other nation in
the world has it. Israel has weaponry no other nation has. We
have an aid program. A day-to-day collaboration, day to day.
Even this week, the national security adviser is here
collaborating, talking with us about how we approach this
question of dealing with Iran.
So I will tell you that we take no back seat to any
administration ever in our support and our friendship and
commitment to the state of Israel.
Now, that said, I think that the United States is engaged
in many efforts in the region now that make clear our
determination to be a friend and supportive. We are removing
weapons of mass destruction from Syria. We are engaged in major
discussions with the Saudis, Emirates, and others about Syria,
about other issues, and I think those countries understand that
when the President says Iran will not get a nuclear weapon and
he actually develops the military capacity to guarantee that,
which no other President did, they can trust that the President
means what he says.
Mr. Brooks. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
In April 2009, President Obama said in Prague, ``Rules must
be binding. Violations must be punished. Words must mean
something.''
If there is anything I can do to assist you in that regard
with respect to these agreements, please, let me know.
Secretary Kerry. Absolutely. And I will tell you that we
are focused on those, and we take them seriously.
Chairman Royce. Well, I thank you, again, Mr. Secretary. I
understand you have to go.
And I am sorry we didn't get to all of the members, but I
think the department is going to be available to answer all the
members' written questions, and the Secretary of State will
certainly be involved in that process in the days and weeks
ahead. We, again, thank all of the members for attending this
hearing today.
And Mr. Secretary, we thank you.
Secretary Kerry. With your permission, Mr. Chairman, we
didn't have time to do this earlier, but I would like to just
put something on the record, because I keep hearing this and I
don't think it adequately reflects the record.
The FBI is currently conducting investigation and working
through the law to try to apprehend identifiable people with
respect to what happened in Benghazi. But it is absolutely
inaccurate to suggest that nobody paid a price in the State
Department for what happened.
A report was delivered to me. I have acted on that report,
as I said I would. Two people were demoted and retired, two
retired. Two careers were ended over it. And they left the
department. And two other careers have seen demotions as a
consequence of what happened there.
So I think it is simply inaccurate, and I hope we will stop
repeating something as a mythology that has no basis in fact.
There was accountability. There is accountability, and we need
to go forward from that, frankly.
Chairman Royce. Well, thank you, Mr. Secretary.
As you know, we have made requests for a lot of data,
which--some of which we got and a lot we did not. And so we
look forward to continuing to work with you to have the
questions that were asked by Members of Congress answered by
the department of State and receiving the information that we
have requested. We thank you again for your testimony here
today.
We thank the members.
Secretary Kerry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Royce. We stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:45 p.m., the committee was
adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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