[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
COAST GUARD MISSION EXECUTION: HOW IS THE COAST GUARD MEETING ITS
MISSION GOALS?
=======================================================================
(113-44)
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
DECEMBER 11, 2013
__________
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COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania, Chairman
DON YOUNG, Alaska NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia
THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon
HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee, Columbia
Vice Chair JERROLD NADLER, New York
JOHN L. MICA, Florida CORRINE BROWN, Florida
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
GARY G. MILLER, California ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
SAM GRAVES, Missouri RICK LARSEN, Washington
SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts
CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York
DUNCAN HUNTER, California MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine
ERIC A. ``RICK'' CRAWFORD, Arkansas GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California
LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois
BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota
LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana STEVE COHEN, Tennessee
BOB GIBBS, Ohio ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland
RICHARD L. HANNA, New York JOHN GARAMENDI, California
DANIEL WEBSTER, Florida ANDRE CARSON, Indiana
STEVE SOUTHERLAND, II, Florida JANICE HAHN, California
JEFF DENHAM, California RICHARD M. NOLAN, Minnesota
REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin ANN KIRKPATRICK, Arizona
THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky DINA TITUS, Nevada
STEVE DAINES, Montana SEAN PATRICK MALONEY, New York
TOM RICE, South Carolina ELIZABETH H. ESTY, Connecticut
MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Oklahoma LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
ROGER WILLIAMS, Texas CHERI BUSTOS, Illinois
TREY RADEL, Florida
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
RODNEY DAVIS, Illinois
MARK SANFORD, South Carolina
------
Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation
DUNCAN HUNTER, California, Chairman
DON YOUNG, Alaska JOHN GARAMENDI, California
HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey RICK LARSEN, Washington
PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York
STEVE SOUTHERLAND, II, Florida, LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
Vice Chair CORRINE BROWN, Florida
TOM RICE, South Carolina JANICE HAHN, California
TREY RADEL, Florida NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia
MARK SANFORD, South Carolina (Ex Officio)
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania (Ex
Officio)
CONTENTS
Page
Summary of Subject Matter........................................ iv
TESTIMONY
Vice Admiral John P. Currier, Vice Commandant, United States
Coast Guard.................................................... 3
PREPARED STATEMENT AND ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED BY
WITNESS
Vice Admiral John P. Currier:
Prepared statement........................................... 26
Answers to questions from the following Representatives:
Hon. Duncan Hunter, of California........................ 30
Hon. John Garamendi, of California....................... 32
SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD
Vice Admiral John P. Currier, Vice Commandant, United States
Coast Guard, responses to requests for information from the
following Representatives:
Hon. John Garamendi, of California, requested details on how
the Coast Guard's internal acquisition enterprise operates
in a way consistent with the Coast Guard's planning and
budgeting efforts.......................................... 9
Hon. Rick Larsen, of Washington, requested justification for
the Coast Guard's program of record reduction for the
Response Boat-Medium (RB-M) from the original program of
record of 180 RB-Ms to the Coast Guard's new Acquisition
Program Baseline of 170 RB-Ms.............................. 14
Hon. Duncan Hunter, of California, requested a comparison of
the capabilities of the National Security Cutter (NSC) and
the Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC) that indicates why the NSC
costs so much more than the OPC............................ 21
Hon. Tom Rice, of South Carolina, asked if U.S. shipping
safety standards are more stringent than international
shipping standards, and, if more stringent, is this the
reason why the size of the U.S.-flagged vessel fleet has
decreased.................................................. 23
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COAST GUARD MISSION EXECUTION: HOW IS THE COAST GUARD MEETING ITS
MISSION GOALS?
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WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 11, 2013
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime
Transportation,
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:10 a.m., in
Room 2167, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Duncan Hunter
(Chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Hunter. The subcommittee will come to order.
The subcommittee is meeting this morning to examine why the
Coast Guard cannot meets its mission performance targets and
whether those targets are truly achievable, as well as to
review mission requirements and the capabilities the Service
plans to acquire.
As the Coast Guard's own data shows, the Service is not
meeting its mission performance targets. In fiscal year 2012,
the Coast Guard met less than half of its mission performance
measures. Over the last 5 fiscal years, the Service never
scored better than 61 percent.
Other metrics of mission performance paint an equally bleak
picture. For instance, the Coast Guard has reported that since
fiscal year 2005 the total number of flight hours for aircraft
and underway hours for cutters has declined by more than 14
percent. The reduction in these and other metrics that judge
mission performance are largely attributable to the fact that
the Coast Guard's fleet of aircraft and vessels are not longer
reliable. Most Coast Guard assets have surpassed their service
lives and become increasingly prone to failures. Simply put,
the Service cannot perform its missions when its aircraft and
cutters are not working.
For years, this subcommittee has advocated for more funding
for the Coast Guard's recapitalization program in an effort to
acquire new and more capable assets. The thinking was, if we
could complete the recapitalization program of record in a
timely manner, we could restore the capability and ensure
mission success.
The truth of the matter is, in this budget environment,
there is simply not enough money to complete the program of
record. Both the Commandant and the GAO noted that at least $2
billion annually would be needed to build the program of record
on schedule, but the President's fiscal year 2014 budget only
requests $909 million for the Coast Guard acquisitions, a 41-
percent cut over fiscal year 2013. Let me repeat that: a 41-
percent cut by this administration over fiscal year 2013.
Projected future funding for the Coast Guard acquisitions
also falls significantly short of what is required. The Service
reports that it does not plan to spend more than $1.1 billion
on acquisitions in any of the next 5 fiscal years.
The Coast Guard has taken some steps to reduce costs. For
instance, it has reduced plan capability for the Offshore
Patrol Cutter and worked with Congress on the potential
transfer of aircraft from the Air Force. This morning I am
pleased to announce that, thanks to the hard work and
leadership of Chairman McKeon and, I would say, Bob Simmons,
the staff director for the Armed Services Committee, the Air
Force will soon transfer 14 new C-27J aircraft to the Service
and avoid over $600 million in planned acquisition costs.
However, even if sufficient funding was in place, the
program of record does not provide the capability necessary to
meet mission performance targets. As the charts on the screen
indicate, building the program of record still leaves the Coast
Guard tens of thousands of hours short of what is needed to
meet its post-September 11th mission requirements.
The time has obviously come for the Coast Guard to conduct
a thorough review of its program of record and for the Service,
the administration, and Congress to make some hard decisions
about how to rebalance capabilities and mission requirements.
I thank Vice Admiral Currier for being here today, for his
service and leadership. I look forward to your insight,
Admiral, on how to resolve this situation.
With that, I yield to Ranking Member Garamendi.
Mr. Garamendi. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I want to
thank you for scheduling this meeting to discuss the internal
and external factors affecting the ability of the United States
Coast Guard to execute and fulfill its important missions and
responsibilities.
Admiral Currier, welcome. I am looking forward to your
testimony.
Oversight by this subcommittee to stay on top of the
activities of the Coast Guard is a necessity. Why? For the
simple reason the Coast Guard is responsible for the safety and
security of the maritime transportation system, a diverse
intermodal network which moves waterborne cargo valued at more
than $649 billion annually and sustains more than 13 million
U.S. maritime-related jobs.
It is no exaggeration to say that the Coast Guard is
indispensable to commerce, security, and the environmental
protection of the United States. And, regrettably, it is also
no exaggeration to say that our Coast Guard is overlooked,
overworked, and underresourced.
But that is nothing new. We have been down this road
before, most recently at the subcommittee's hearing in February
regarding the Coast Guard's mission balance. So I am compelled
to ask: Exactly what new information do we expect to receive
today?
Should any member of this subcommittee really be surprised
or shocked to hear the Coast Guard is failing to meet roughly
half of its performance goals? If so, tell me why we would be
shocked. After all, it is the Coast Guard itself who told us in
February that the budget cuts imposed by the bludgeon of
sequestration would force the Service to reduce by over 20
percent its operating hours across all missions except search,
rescue, and emergency response.
So what has it meant? Well, off the California coast, the
Coast Guard has had to curtail air operations by approximately
15 percent and maritime operations by approximately 22 percent.
Consequently, security patrol supports and critical
infrastructure, security escorts of cruise ships and ships
carrying hazardous cargoes, drug and migrant interdiction and
other law enforcement operations have been reduced.
Considering all the challenges facing the Coast Guard,
especially those challenges related to its $29 billion
recapitalization program, sequestration only ensures that
underperformance will be the preordained outcome. The fact of
the matter is that the Congress, by failing repeatedly to pass
budgets and provide the Coast Guard with sufficient annual
appropriation, is complicit and, in my view, the reason why the
Coast Guard underperforms.
Nonetheless, we often hear critics claim that the Coast
Guard must get real, that it must adjust its performance
targets and its operations to meet the new budget realties. And
while there is more than a small grain of truth to that, I
contend it is more the Congress that is living in a fantasy
world. Considering the impacts caused by sequestration and the
recent announcement of the chairs of the House and Senate
Intelligence Committees stating that the threat of terrorism
against the United States is growing, an inadequately funded
Coast Guard presents an ill-advised gamble.
Instead of proposing additional cuts to funding levels, we
should be working with the administration and our colleagues on
the Appropriations and the Budget Committee to provide the
Coast Guard with the resources it needs. It is doubtful that
the budget proposal that is now being discussed in the halls of
the Congress and across this Nation will meet that challenge.
It will not provide the resources necessary.
The hard reality remains, you get what you pay for. And if
the Congress continues to think it can underfund the Coast
Guard yet expect our guardians of the sea will magically
fulfill all of its mission responsibilities, we will simply be
perpetuating a delusion--one that is harmful to the Coast
Guard, to the U.S. maritime economy, and the safety and
security of the United States and the safety and security of
those who are on the water.
I yield back.
Mr. Hunter. I thank the ranking member.
On our witness panel today we have Vice Admiral John
Currier, Vice Commandant of the United States Coast Guard.
Admiral Currier, you are recognized for your opening
statement.
TESTIMONY OF VICE ADMIRAL JOHN P. CURRIER, VICE COMMANDANT,
UNITED STATES COAST GUARD
Admiral Currier. Thank you, Chairman Hunter, Ranking Member
Garamendi, and members of the subcommittee. Good morning, and
thank you for the opportunity to speak about the Coast Guard's
mission performance and our continued efforts to best serve the
American people.
On behalf of the Commandant and the men and women of the
Coast Guard, thank you for your oversight and continued support
of our service.
The United States faces an increasingly broad set of
maritime risks to people, cargo, conveyances, and the
environment. These risks drive the need for effective maritime
governance and an increased demand for Coast Guard's unique
authorities and operational capabilities.
As we balance the demand for our services with available
resources in this challenging fiscal environment, tough choices
have to be made. Unfortunately, despite our continuing efforts
to meet all mission demands, we are not able to sustain
effective presence, meet every demand, or conduct operations in
all areas that are needed. However, we are making responsible
and informed decisions through our performance planning process
to mitigate our highest risks and to respond to the highest
maritime threats.
An integral component of this performance planning process
is continually evaluating our mission effectiveness. This
requires careful consideration, robust metrics, as well as a
number of internal and external factors. These factors are not
only influenced by the dynamic nature of the threats we face,
but also by the fiscal realties that inform our performance
targets and our budget priorities.
The Coast Guard has missed several of our mission
performance targets in fiscal year 2012, and we expect similar
shortfalls in fiscal year 2013. Specifically, what concerns me
is the Coast Guard fell short in key performance areas such as
drug interdiction, migrant interdiction, and ports, waterways,
and coastal security.
In executing its drug interdiction mission, the Coast Guard
and its partners removed 88 metric tons of cocaine from the
Transit Zone last year. That is 19 fewer tons than 2012. Just
to frame this, that is an uncut value on the street of over a
half-billion dollars. Maritime interdiction of narcotics
remains the most effective interdiction method. Moreover, at-
sea interdictions deprive transnational criminal organizations
of profits and facilitate prosecutions that destabilize these
criminal networks.
As we continue to enhance security in our land borders,
illicit maritime activity and threats to our maritime borders
will increase. There are implications on this interdiction in
the Transit Zone on political security in the Central American
countries.
Intelligence indicates in 2013 the flow of undocumented
migrants attempting to enter the U.S. via maritime routes
increased. Last year, we interdicted approximately 860 fewer
individuals attempting to illegally enter the U.S., and that is
a 28-percent decrease over prior years. The tragic loss of life
aboard a Haitian sail freighter migrant vessel last month,
where 30 people perished at sea, is a stark reminder of the
need for effective presence to deter illegal immigration and to
prevent loss of life at sea.
Protection of the maritime transportation system is vital
to promote the safe and efficient flow of legitimate maritime
commerce in executing our ports, waterways, and coastal
security mission.
In fiscal year 2013, we conducted fewer security boardings
and escorts of high-interest vessels, high-capacity passenger
vessels such as ferries and cruise ships, and vessels carrying
what is termed ``certain dangerous cargo.'' The effect of this
reduction is difficult to quantify, but persistent levels of
reduced activities could impact our ability to deter and
disrupt terrorist activity. It is the same concept as the value
of the policeman on the beat.
While no single year's data can indicate a real trend, I
have to express my growing concern with the erosive impacts of
sequestration. As this subcommittee is aware, the funding
impact of sequestration totaled approximately $340 million and
required the Coast Guard to reduce operations by an average of
25 percent, which impacts this ability to meet mission goals.
In addition, critical maintenance on our aging cutters/
aircraft has been deferred, further degrading availability
rates and long-term viability of these systems. Our cutter,
boat, and aircraft crews are trained to minimum levels of
proficiency.
You know, sir, the Coast Guard's unique value is our
ability to perform these many missions across the 11 statutory
missions set, yet still, when called upon, react to a national
level of contingency. This surge capability is not always
apparent until it is needed. And it is eroding at a rate that
should be of great concern to Congress and the American people.
I am also concerned with the long-term effects of decreased
funding levels of acquisition, construction, and improvement
accounts. Speaking candidly, continued funding at current
levels will prevent us from adequately recapitalizing critical
assets and will ultimately increase risk in the offshore
environment and will dramatically change the face of the Coast
Guard.
Our legacy major cutters, many of which were commissioned
during the Johnson administration, continue to age. They are
proving to be increasingly unreliable and cost-prohibitive to
operate. This past year, we conducted emergency dry-dock
availabilities for three of our almost 50-year-old 210-foot
cutters due to structural deterioration. In no uncertain terms,
these cutters are increasingly unable to carry out mission
requirements, and ultimate concerns for the safety and welfare
of our crews will force us to remove them from service.
With reductions to the U.S. Navy presence in the drug
Transit Zone, emerging operations in the Arctic, and increased
focus on the Pacific, demands for Coast Guard services are
increasing. Yet our ability to meet these demands is in
decline. This reality reinforces the need to continue to invest
and recapitalize in the offshore cutter fleet, the Offshore
Patrol Cutter in particular.
I would like to thank the support of Congress, the
administration. We have gained significant recapitalization
success through acquisitions of the National Security Cutter,
Fast Response Cutter, the Response Boat-Medium, and other major
projects. We are currently embarked on our largest and most
important acquisition, the Offshore Patrol Cutter.
There are three things necessary for major systems
acquisition success: stable requirements, an efficient
acquisition organization, and predictable funding. With these
three things, we can acquire and deliver our much-needed assets
and capabilities on time, according to specifications, and
within budget targets.
Clearly, we face difficult times on the way forward. We
have made tough choices within significantly reduced budget
authority, effectively conducting operations to counter the
greatest maritime risks faced by the Nation while continuing to
recapitalize our most vital assets.
We are America's first responders in the maritime. And the
current fiscal path foreshadows a less capable Coast Guard,
perhaps not fully able to respond natural disasters such as
Katrina, Sandy, the Haitian earthquake, or manmade disasters
akin to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. My greatest fear is
that when our Nation calls the Coast Guard to respond in the
future, we will be less ready, less proficient, and less
capable of providing the standards of service that have been
our hallmark for 223 years. Semper Paratus, our motto, our
ethic, may not ring true.
Thank you again for the opportunity to testify today and,
in particular, for your support and hard work on the NDAA and
the C-27 transfer. We appreciate your steadfast support for our
Coast Guard. And I look forward to answering any questions.
Thank you, sir.
Mr. Hunter. Thank you, Admiral Currier, for your testimony.
I will now start recognizing Members, starting with myself.
I guess my first question is--could we put that graph back
on the screen?
So if my friend from California were sitting here, he might
have sequester included in this. This does not include
sequester. If sequester was included in this graph, those
vertical bars would all be lower than they are. Sequester is
not included.
Do you have this graph in front of you, Admiral?
Admiral Currier. No, sir, I don't, but I am----
Mr. Hunter. Can someone get him one of these so we can go
through it?
The red line is the 1998 baseline of what the Coast Guard
had to do to fulfill its requirements. The blue line is the
post-9/11 hours required and acquisitions required to meet
those goals. You have big cutters, small cutters, rotary-wing,
and fixed-wing.
So the question is, regardless of sequester--because I like
to sit in on my Armed Services Committee and listen to
everybody say how Congress ruined sequester while they do
billions and billions of dollars' worth of bad programs in
DOD--regardless of sequester, the blue line is unattainable.
I just came back from Huntington Ingalls, where I got to go
on the NSC and walk around on it. That is a beautiful ship, but
it is also an almost $700 million ship that you could paint
gray and put a Navy crew on. OK? So what you got is you got the
best gizmo possible, the best ship you could possibly ever get,
and in exchange for that now you are not going to have enough
of anything else. You almost meet your requirement on the large
cutters because of the NSC, almost, but you don't reach it
anywhere else. And one reason for that is you probably
overspent by $250 million, $300 million what you really needed
for your NSC. Now, you have the best frigate in the world now
that any Navy and any military would be happy to have, but now
you are going to be short everywhere else, with no sequester.
So the question is now--it is up to you to go back and say,
the blue line is too high. We can maybe meet our 1998 line,
that baseline, but there is no way you are going to hit the
blue line. And I think until we, kind of, face that and realize
that that is true, there is no fixing this. You will just fall
short year after year after year after year and never be able
to drill down on what you really need to get.
So that is my question. If you look at that blue line, you
look at the red line, regardless of sequester, are your post-9/
11 mission requirements achievable?
Admiral Currier. Sir, thanks for that question.
Clearly, when we look at the blue line, it was envisioned
as the Deepwater goals that assumed, when they set that line,
that all the systems were in place, fully funded, crewed, and
operating to optimal capacity. That has not been achieved to
date. While I believe that we will make progress toward the
blue line, I tend to agree with you that we probably will not
achieve that.
It requires us to relook at that, revalidate that
particular part of it, but I think I want to underscore that,
despite numerous studies that have been done, we believe that
the program of record is still valid.
And I would say to you, sir, that, yes, the National
Security Cutter is certainly expensive, it is highly capable,
the three that we have in the water are performing outstanding,
but there are areas that we operate where that size ship is not
an overreach. The Bering Sea, the Gulf of Alaska, even the
Eastern Pacific and the Western Caribbean for drug interdiction
often have sea states where a ship of that size is really
required to do the job.
So while I agree with you, sir, that we certainly need to
revalidate where we are with the unconstrained mission, our
line, the blue line, that made the assumptions of fully
functional and acquired and funded systems, the actual POR, the
program of record, from the National Security Cutter down to
the Fast Response Cutter and the aircraft pieces of it are
still valid and have been revalidated multiple times.
Mr. Hunter. All right. So let me get this straight. So just
looking at this graph----
Admiral Currier. Yes, sir.
Mr. Hunter [continuing]. You are still saying that the
program of record which this represents, this is your program
of record----
Admiral Currier. Right.
Mr. Hunter [continuing]. That falls massively short of the
blue line, you are saying that that is still a valid program of
record?
Admiral Currier. Yes, sir. And I think we will be up around
that blue line when we get these systems fully acquired, fully
in place, fully crewed, and fully funded. And to date, that has
not happened.
We are in a transit period. We have legacy assets, and we
are driving toward the program of record. Were that bought on
time, were that fully funded, fully crewed, fully capable, I
don't think the blue line is an unattainable goal. But,
certainly, in the budget environment we are in, I am not going
to tell you in the near term we are going to make material
progress toward that.
Mr. Hunter. Well, I just want to get this straight. This is
the program of record fully funded and fully capable, correct?
Admiral Currier. Correct.
Mr. Hunter. OK. I want to understand. This is the program
of record that you are looking at that is fully funded. This is
a fully funded program of record. Those are those vertical
bars. That is if you got every single thing that you wanted,
that is what those blue bars represent.
Admiral Currier. Not exactly, sir. When they established
that blue line was back--it was in a time when none of this had
taken place. The force lay-down that you see reflected in these
blue vertical bars is the reality of today.
So when they established that theoretical blue line, that
was making the assumption that we would have bought all these
assets on time, they would be fully funded, implemented largely
by now, and fully functioning. And that has not proven to be
the case for a myriad of reasons. But I want to make sure we
are in agreement on what we are looking at here.
Mr. Hunter. I will yield to the ranking member while we
look at that. Thank you.
Mr. Garamendi. It seems to me that there is a preceding
question that needs to be asked in this issue of whether you
are able to perform to the desired level, and that is: What is
the desired level? What is necessary to achieve the mission of
the Coast Guard?
And that is, presumably, the program of record. And so it
is several years old now; it needs to be updated. But let's go
to the history here that is the program of record that is on
the books today that is, as I understand it, a statement of
what the Coast Guard should be doing. Is that correct?
Admiral Currier. Yes, sir, that generally is correct. I
think what we established when we baselined the program of
record were the goals that we established, Congress approved,
where we would be capabilities-wise operationally when the
program of record was bought out.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you. I appreciate that. But it is a
statement--bottom line, it is a statement of what must or
should be done to achieve the mission of the Coast Guard. Given
the resources, given the allocation and so forth, you would
want to achieve that mission. Is that correct?
Admiral Currier. Yes, sir.
Mr. Garamendi. OK.
Now, then the question arises, why are you not able to
achieve that goal? I would assume that there are several
reasons. I think you just said there are several reasons.
One, the acquisition program didn't work out as planned. It
is more expensive. It takes longer. That is one reason. The
second reason is we are not giving you the money to carry it
out--that is, the financial resources necessary to carry it
out.
Are those the two principal reasons here?
Admiral Currier. Yes, sir. I think that is true. If I could
expand on it just for a second?
Mr. Garamendi. Take both of those, and you can come back to
us on the second piece, but take the first piece.
Admiral Currier. The acquisition enterprise, I will tell
you that, given the time in the 1980s when we kicked this off,
the thinking on acquisition--and we had gone through a
Government downsizing at the time--was that you could outsource
systems integration. We found out that just not a viable way
forward. The thinking changed. We reintegrated the acquisition
enterprise inside our fence line, and I think we have got it
right going on. But I can't say that there weren't errors made,
delays incurred previously.
And then when we look at that blue line, the assumption
made when that line was put on paper was that we would acquire
on time, they would be fully funded, fully crewed, fully
operational, and by certain time gates that, clearly, we have
not met, sir.
Mr. Garamendi. I want to really drill on this and get down
into this in some detail.
There are two pieces to that blue line, which is the
performance level that the Coast Guard wants to have. It is the
availability of equipment being delivered, ships and planes and
so forth being delivered on time, on budget. That didn't
happen. There has been a long history here and numerous
hearings about that.
And I think your testimony a moment ago was that seems to
be straightened away. Is that correct? Are you now operating on
the acquisition side of this and in a way that is consistent
with your planning and budgeting?
Admiral Currier. Yes, sir, we certainly are.
Mr. Garamendi. OK. I would like to see some details on
that, the new ships, planes, and so forth.
[The Coast Guard submitted the following information for
the record:]
The Coast Guard is mindful of the current fiscal
climate and our acquisition enterprise has worked hard
to ensure the assets we are acquiring or planning to
acquire are affordable.
For example, the OPC acquisition strategy has been
designed to maximize affordability and flexibility. We
have incorporated lessons learned from the NSC project,
and many others, into the OPC acquisition to ensure
that it remains affordable moving forward.
Additionally, the Coast Guard, in close collaboration
with the Department, completed over a 2-year effort to
ensure the ship specifications represented minimum
requirements; making significant cost trade-off
decisions to balance capability and affordability
through extensive deliberations on speed, range, boat
launching requirements, and aviation capability.
With an efficient acquisition enterprise, a stable
funding profile and stable requirements, I am confident
we can acquire and deliver assets on-time, according to
specification, and within an affordable budget.
Mr. Garamendi. And also, in that regard, you are picking up
14 C-27Js. That relieves, I think the chairman said, some $600
million of acquisition that is planned but will not now be
necessary. What will you do with that line item in the budget?
Admiral Currier. Well, it gets back to the level of funding
in the capital accounts. We were looking forward. Our
operational gaps are in the offshore. That is where our most
pressing need is, so that is where our capitalization focus has
been, that being the NSC and the OPC.
We have bought out--on the program of record, we had 36 HC-
144 aircraft envisioned. But we had gotten to this fiscal
year--or last fiscal year, when I testified, I mentioned we had
struck a strategic pause in that aircraft acquisition. So that
was about halfway through the procurement of the program of
record. We will have 18 of those 36 on contract.
Now, what the C-27 does for us is, by acquiring those 14,
with their capacity, is to close out that MRS aircraft mission
requirement in the program of record. So we will basically have
14 C-27s and 18 HC-144s and have that class of aircraft bought
out. That $500 million to $600 million that we are estimating
is not there, because we had taken a strategic pause. Actually,
that money has not been appropriated at this point because it
was in the out-years that we were looking for that requirement.
So it is not like there is $500 million inside the CIP level
that we could reapply. The money was not there.
Mr. Garamendi. Oh, darn.
Admiral Currier. Yes, sir.
Mr. Garamendi. Well, so much for that idea.
It seems as though we need to, as a committee and the Coast
Guard, we need to look at and readjust, if necessary, the
program of record--that is, what is it that the Coast Guard
must do, needs to do, wants to do, and the money necessary to
achieve that, both in terms of capital equipment as well as in
personnel and the like.
It has been some time. When was the last record?
Admiral Currier. Well, sir, if I could take just a second
on that. I want to be crystal-clear on this blue line, and I
don't think I am articulating it very well to either you or the
chairman.
That was established as the justification for the program
of record and the level of operations that we would achieve
with a fully funded, on time. We have done four separate
studies, one of which has not been completed, validating the
program of record. Because each year this comes up; how can we
look back at 2004 and take that requirement and carry it forth
to 2013 or 2014 without having revalidated?
And there has been two DHS-sponsored cutter studies, an
additional one and one in progress that involves the
administration and the Department, all of which have validated
and pointed to--and I don't say this in a smug way, but each
one of these reports has not only said the program of record is
justified, but there is need for additional capacity, given the
increased mission demands on the Coast Guard.
And I say that as a matter of fact, not to be smug or to
try to gain advantage. It is just a fact.
Mr. Garamendi. I want to stay with this for a while because
it is, in my mind, fundamental to our work that we have a clear
understanding of the mission and the resources necessary to
carry out that mission.
I am pleased to hear that you have looked at that program
of record, which dates back a decade. You have updated it four
times. You have come to the conclusion, through those updates,
that the requirements remain the same or similar. Is that
correct?
Admiral Currier. Yes, sir. And to be clear, these have not
been Coast Guard studies. These have been sponsored by the
Department, with outside, third-party looks, as well.
Mr. Garamendi. All right. And I think you also said that
the program of record and the four updates indicate that you
are not able to meet some new requirements that have come about
as a result of, for example, terrorist threats. Is that
correct?
Admiral Currier. Well, the 2004 program of record took into
account post-9/11 requirements, which generally addressed
terrorist threats and the other security concerns. We have not,
over the years, met our performance goals every year in areas
like that. And, I mean, there are 23 performance measures, and
each year we grade ourselves on them, but we have not
consistently achieved our goals across the board. You are
correct.
Mr. Garamendi. As I look at this and try to sort out our
responsibilities, it seems to me that we really need, I really
need, to have a clear understanding of the mission, its various
elements--drug interdiction, rescue, safety, all of the things
you do, including the terrorism requirements--and then, against
that mission, the resources you need to carry it out at the
optimal level.
Recognizing the realities of the budget and appropriations,
we are tasked with two decisions. One is your analysis of
optimal performance to meet all those missions. We need to
correct, the overstating/understating, we have to make that
judgment. And then we have the obligation of providing the
resources based upon that judgment. Failing to do both of those
things is something that creates this burden that we must not
have.
That is where I am coming from, Mr. Chairman. You have
given me 5 extra minutes. You are most generous. Thank you very
much.
Mr. Hunter. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Coble from South Carolina is now recognized.
Mr. Coble. North Carolina.
Mr. Hunter. Excuse me, North Carolina. They are all the
same to us Californians. I am sorry.
Mr. Coble. That is a very delicate boundary you are walking
there, Mr. Chairman.
Good to have you with us, Admiral.
Chairman, you and the ranking member may have already
touched this with the Admiral. And, as you know, Mr. Chairman,
when it comes to the Coast Guard, I am not objective; I am very
subjectively involved. So I will try to insert some objectivity
into the question.
Admiral, I will ask you--and, as I said, you may have
already plowed this ground earlier today. What were the primary
reasons for the failure of the Coast Guard to better achieve
its own mission performance measures, A? And, B, what steps is
the Coast Guard taking to improve its performance? And I
realize assets, or lack thereof, may be part of the problem.
Admiral Currier. Thanks for that question, Congressman. It
is great to see you, sir.
It is a little bit--as always, I can't give a simple answer
to this because we have to talk just a little bit about what
these mission performance goals really are. They are self-
generated. They are made up of multiple factors, not the least
of which is the Government Performance and Results Act, GPRA.
So we established these internal requirements and goals. We
passed them through strategic screening. The flaw, in my
opinion, on these performance goals is, part of it, when you
establish them, you look at historical levels of funding, and
when you are in a declining level of funding, then that biases
your ability to achieve the performance goals because they made
the assumption you were funded at a higher level. So that is
kind of a trick that happens that we do to ourselves.
We run it through a strategic planning process. We come out
with goals that are given to the operational commanders with a
caveat that they have some flexibility, based on whether they
are in California or North Carolina or where they are, to
adjust according to the local requirements.
When we aggregate these goals at the end of the year,
oftentimes we exceed them, sometimes we don't. We could walk
through each of the 23 and provide a detailed explanation on
why.
But to categorize it in real generalities on us not having
the equipment or the funding, the only thing I could say about
this is, as I have explained these performance measures, it is
virtually impossible for us to meet many of them, some of which
are aspirational, in a declining budget environment when their
levels were informed by previous funding levels.
I am not sure I am making that clear. I hope I am, sir,
but----
Mr. Coble. I think so.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Hunter. I thank the gentleman from North Carolina.
The gentleman from Washington, Mr. Larsen, is now
recognized.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, last month, the Coast Guard released a business-
case analysis for reactivating and extending the service life
of the Polar Sea and the icebreaker. That report found that the
Polar Sea would cost $99 million to reactivate and then provide
7 to 10 years of service to the Coast Guard. How does that
compare with the cost of building a new icebreaker?
Admiral Currier. Sir, the comparison of cost, our estimate
for a new icebreaker from a cold start is about a billion
dollars. And, as you said, the estimate in the business-case
analysis for Polar Sea would be in the $99 million to $100
million range to buy 5 to 7 years of service life. So that is
also the difference is, what you are actually buying for that
$100 million.
Mr. Larsen. Right. Right.
On page 4 of the findings, the BCA notes that current
requirements do not justify the need for heavy icebreaking
capability in the Arctic. Is that statement not in conflict
with the Coast Guard's own assessment of needs in the Arctic
Strategy document issued earlier this year?
Admiral Currier. No, sir, I don't think it is. I mean, if
you are asking how do we go forward with the acquisition of a
new icebreaker and how do we establish the requirements for
that ship, that would be a whole-of-government solution. What I
don't want people to think is that the Coast Guard is
advocating or looking to procure a new-start icebreaker for a
billion dollars that is strictly to address Coast Guard
requirements.
Two caveats on the new start of the icebreaker. One is it
needs to be a whole-of-government solution where the National
Science Foundation, the Department of Defense, and everyone
else that has a stake in the Arctic contributes to the
requirements build and, ideally, contributes to the financial
solution, the funding of the ship. Because a billion dollars is
clearly not something we can absorb in our out-year acquisition
accounts.
Mr. Larsen. So what will the Coast Guard do now with the
Polar Sea? Will you go forward with reactivating the Sea now
that the BCA has made clear it is a cost-affordable option?
What is the plan now?
Admiral Currier. Well, Polar Star got underway for the
South Pole, which is a success after----
Mr. Larsen. Yeah.
Admiral Currier [continuing]. A $62 million overhaul.
We currently have the option, to be honest, Congressman, on
the Polar Sea. It is cold iron tied up in Seattle, at this
point. We have not been appropriated funds to reactivate that
ship. We have been appropriated seed money to start the
requirements generation on a new polar icebreaker, but we have
no plans at this point to reactivate Polar Star.
Mr. Larsen. Polar Sea.
Admiral Currier. I am sorry. Yes, sir. Polar Sea. Thanks.
Mr. Larsen. Sure.
I will switch gears a little bit here to the RB-Ms,
Response Boat-Medium. In section 220 of the Coast Guard Act in
2012, it required the Commandant to maintain an approved
program of record of acquisition of 180 RB-Ms. My understanding
is that last month you all signed a smaller acquisition request
for 170 boats.
We submitted a--or, actually, I submitted a question on the
record on this issue from our last hearing asking for
justification for the smaller request. We haven't received that
answer, so I will ask again.
Admiral Currier. Thank you, Congressman.
There are two documents in circulation. One is an
acquisition program baseline that authorizes or cites our
program of record at 170 boats. And that is with the Department
for review and will be en route to Congress, visible by your
office shortly.
And then there was an operational validation of the number
of boats actually needed, which came out to be 167 boats. And
that is a report to Congress that is under review at this time
by the administration and will become visible very shortly.
Mr. Larsen. Is that revised program of record going to just
have a different number, or is there going to be some
justification written into that?
Admiral Currier. Yes, sir, both will justify the numbers.
It is 167 required operationally, and we are going for 170 on
the program of record. And I believe that the extra boats will
be spares to enhance our operational readiness.
To be clear, on the RB-M, which is built at Kvichak Marine
in Kent and also in Wisconsin, it is an unbelievable success
for us from an acquisition perspective. The boat is performing
above our expectations, which caused us to reevaluate the
number we actually needed. It is a fantastic boat, and we are
having great luck with it. A lot of it is due to the quality of
workmanship that comes from the Kent facility.
Mr. Larsen. All right. We look forward to getting that and
getting back with you about our thoughts about it.
[The Coast Guard submitted the following information for
the record:]
The Coast Guard reanalyzed its requirements for the RB-
M acquisition and determined that 166 boats are
sufficient to meet operational needs as reflected in
the Fiscal Year 2013 President's Budget request. The
RB-M has proven to be more capable than originally
envisioned, and, in addition to its substantially
increased speed and range compared to the 41-foot
Utility Boat it replaces, can safely conduct missions
in up to 12-foot seas and 50-knot winds. Also, crew
habitability on the RB-M is significantly improved over
the previous fleet of boats, which contributes greatly
to mission effectiveness.
In the 2013 Coast Guard Acquisitions, Construction and
Improvement appropriation, funds were appropriated
above the President's request for acquisition of four
additional RB-Ms. As a result, the Coast Guard has
adapted boat siting plans for 170 RB-Ms and revised the
RB-M Acquisition Program Baseline. The new 170-boat
Acquisition Program Baseline was approved by the Coast
Guard Acquisition Executive, Vice Admiral John P.
Currier, on November 25, 2013.
Mr. Larsen. Thanks a lot.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hunter. Thank you.
The gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Rice, is now
recognized.
Mr. Rice. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Looking at the Coast Guard missions listed here, 11
statutory missions, to fully implement these--and looking,
also, at this table that shows how many of these missions were
met and how many weren't met, it looks like we are about 50/50
here.
What would you suggest--I mean, perhaps--I guess, how much
money would it take, first, for you to be able to meet all of
your missions as listed, these 11 missions here? How much money
do you think is the shortfall that prevents you from--or is it
money? Is it some other failure other than money?
Admiral Currier. Well, sir, as you see from that table,
that is a complex equation.
Mr. Rice. Right.
Admiral Currier. I would say it is not only money. It is
the refining of our ability to set these performance goals that
we hold ourselves and you all hold us responsible for.
Mr. Rice. Yes, sir.
Admiral Currier. The process is somewhat flawed, in that
one of the assumptions it uses as a foundation are previous
levels of funding. And that biases it to a negative side when
you look at the next year. You assumed you were going to get
more than you got. So how did you perform at that projected
level?
Mr. Rice. Right.
Admiral Currier. And so part of it is that. And part of it
is funding. If we achieve the level of funding that we need in
the capital accounts, as we bring these new assets on line,
they are going to contribute to the successes that we need in
our own performance goals.
Mr. Rice. How much more annual funding would the Coast
Guard need to fully fund everything it would want and carry out
all its missions?
Admiral Currier. Sir, that is a difficult question. I can
address the capital accounts. The Commandant has been on record
saying a $2 billion annual capital account, AC&I account for
the Coast Guard.
Mr. Rice. $2 billion?
Admiral Currier. Yes, sir.
Mr. Rice. More or $2 billion total?
Admiral Currier. No, $2 billion total.
Mr. Rice. OK. How much are they getting now?
Admiral Currier. Well, over the last few fiscal years, we
have averaged between $1.2 billion and $1.4 billion.
Mr. Rice. OK. All right. So about a 50-percent increase.
Admiral Currier. And then the budget that is--the 2014
budget is significantly less than that.
Mr. Rice. All right. Well, you know, everybody knows that
we are spending far more money than we take in, almost 40 cents
on the dollar, and that additional 50-percent increase is
probably not a realistic thing. So we have to look for
alternatives, and, you know, I don't know what those would be.
Particularly, I am interested in your recommendations,
should we scale back on these missions? Should we eliminate
some of them? Should we just go into it knowing we are going to
fail in some and accept that? Or should we try to shift some of
these missions to other entities? What should we do?
Admiral Currier. Sir, for 223 years, we have been trying to
meet the expectations of the American public in the maritime.
These 11 statutory missions, we can adjust capacity around, but
we feel giving up the capability on any of these missions would
violate the intent of Congress and certainly the law.
Mr. Rice. You know, I am sitting here looking at this list,
and, I mean, obviously, I know that the Coast Guard's missions
are incredibly important to the security and sovereignty of
this country. And when you look at search and rescue, I mean, I
have spent a lot of time offshore fishing, and believe me, the
fact that the Coast Guard is there, thank God I have never had
to call on them, but knowing that they are there means a lot.
And then the aids to navigation, obviously, coastal security,
drug interdiction, migrant interdiction, I agree.
But, you know, we know that we are not going to meet these
funding goals that you would like to see to fully meet all your
missions. So we know that. So how are we going to fix it? How
are we going to bring the two lines together? What can we
eliminate? What can we move to make sure that we succeed in the
priorities that we have?
Admiral Currier. Sir, you know, I will be honest. It is
very difficult for me to give an answer that is not looking
through the lens of my service. But I will tell you, as we have
wrestled with this problem with our own department, we have
taken hard looks at the mission set. And the latest one is in
the portfolio review that we have enjoined between the
Department and the national security staff. And every time we
have a meeting and we come in and we look at areas that could
be reduced or cut off that 11 mission list, people will come to
the conclusion that there is really--no one wants to take the
responsibility for reducing performance in those mission areas.
As a matter of fact, generally what we find is people will come
to the meetings and say, well, wait a minute, how about this,
how about that, and add to the portfolio.
So it really is almost impossible for me to offer you what
we shouldn't do to protect the maritime public. Because I can
tell you, in that list of performance indicators or in the list
of the 11 mission sets, there is nothing that doesn't
materially add to the security and safety of the people that
use our waterways; there is nothing. Is it less aids to
navigation? Is it less search and rescue? Is it less ability to
search through a Katrina? I just can't tell you.
Mr. Rice. Well, you know, I mean, there are excesses in
every department, in every entity. I have been, I mean, I am
not talking about once, I am talking about numerous times, on
the waterways around my area and seen a Coast Guard boat
checking people right next to a sheriff's deputy boat and a DNR
boat. So, I mean, there is obviously redundancy that perhaps
doesn't need to be there.
And while I agree that it is important that, you know, the
Coast Guard should be out there on Saturday afternoon checking
people's life jackets, some of these other things are more
important. And I think maybe if we know that we are not going
to have the money to fully fund everything, that maybe we
should prioritize those things and use our resources in the
most efficient and wise way.
Admiral Currier. Yes, sir. And I offer this counter to your
question, your answer to your question, not in a flip way but
in an honest way. So those people that are--and we have
interagency partnerships all over the place, and it really adds
to it, and it reduces our requirement to be out there, to be
perfectly honest.
But that boat that is checking life jackets on Saturday
afternoon is the same boat that is going to have to go 40 miles
offshore to get somebody in 8-foot seas. But by checking those
life jackets, hopefully--and we empirically can demonstrate
this--it reduces the chances that they will have to go 40 miles
offshore and rescue somebody.
So search and rescue has been a shrinking enterprise, to a
certain extent, mainly because of the enhancements that have
occurred in hardware, in radios, in GPS, in boating safety
standards. All of those things are affected globally by the
Coast Guard, but they are all interrelated.
So, you know, I don't mean to be argumentative, but it is a
system that works to great effect.
Mr. Rice. And I understand and don't argue that. The only
point that I am trying to make is, we know we are not going to
have these 100-percent funding levels. We know that. And so,
shouldn't we prioritize among these various missions to most
efficiently utilize the funds that we have?
Admiral Currier. Yes, sir, I think that is where we are
going to have to be. I agree with you.
Mr. Rice. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Hunter. I thank the gentleman.
A couple things, Admiral. Playing off of what Mr. Rice just
talked about, it seems that there is a period of time with
organizations, whether it is the Coast Guard, the military, or
other entities, where if you can come to Congress and say, ``We
are only making half of what we are supposed to be doing with
what you are giving us,'' over and over and over, at some point
Congress goes, ``We need to give them all of that money so they
can get 100 percent.''
I think the Coast Guard is trapped in that phase right now,
where if they came in 60 percent, 60 percent, 60 percent, we
are never going to reach the blue line, the reality is the blue
line needs to move down. Because if you have checked and
rechecked and validated four times the acquisition requirements
to that blue line, to those missions sets that you have, then
that is fine, but that means that the mission sets need to be
validated.
And I know that when you go in these meetings and everybody
wants something else, that that is how you get a $700 million
NSC, that that is how you get Deepwater, is you have
requirements added on, added on, added on while they are still
designing. Then you start building and doing requirements at
the same time and doing design change, and then you add
hundreds of millions of dollars onto your shipbuilding cost.
And that is how you get to the whole scuttled program that you
had big problems with, right?
So the missions need to change and the missions need to be
prioritized so you can at least say, ``We are meeting 90
percent of our mission requirements, and here is how we have
changed those.'' And when people come in and want more and more
from the Coast Guard, the Coast Guard needs to be able to say
no. And I don't see that happening with that blue line staying
where it is. It needs to come down. Because the bottom line
isn't moving up. It is not going to happen.
Number two, there are things, when it comes to vessel
certification, that ABS can do, the American Bureau of Shipping
can do, that the Coast Guard doesn't need to concern itself
with, where you can have them do that and carry out the Coast
Guard's mission when it comes to certification. It would be
more efficient, more effective, and more cost-saving not just
for the Coast Guard but for the entities that you are
certifying, whether that is tuna vessels or whether that is
offshore resupply for oil rigs in the gulf.
There are things that other organizations can do that the
Coast Guard doesn't necessarily have to, especially if you want
to focus on your core competencies. Because the reality is,
Admiral, that you can't make everything your core competency.
Every businessman knows that and every military knows that. The
Army is not going to build a bunch of amphibs. The Marine Corps
is not going to try to do a land war. The Navy is not going to
go build runways to fly an F-35 off of. Everybody has their
core competency.
And I think the Coast Guard is in place where you are
saying everything from search and rescue to vessel
certification to Marine safety to drug interdiction to
military--you cannot be all things to all people when you are
getting less of a piece of that pie than anybody else is. So
that is what is going to have to change, because you cannot
make everything your core competency.
Have at me.
Admiral Currier. OK, sir. Well, first of all, I would say
that your comments on Deepwater, I would not dispute that. But
I want to make it crystal-clear that it is in the past, and
where we are today in acquiring these systems, the mechanism of
acquisition, the stability of the requirements are there. The
third leg in that stool----
Mr. Hunter. They are. I agree.
Admiral Currier. The third leg in that stool, sir, is the
predictable funding.
OK, set that aside. I had to say that because I was part of
the redesign of the acquisition enterprise.
You know, Congressman, to be perfectly honest with you, we
have 11 statutory missions. You know, when the Commandant is
not there, I sit on the Joint Chiefs, and I have friends at
that level; the vice service chiefs are all very close. They
have a different mission set. You know that, having been a
former Marine. Go in, take the beach, establish dominance;
those things they do.
Ours is much more diverse, but it is grounded in law, it is
grounded in statute. So it is not discretionary on our part,
necessarily, to say we are not going to do certain things.
Mr. Hunter. I understand. But here is what we are asking
you, I think. And I think this goes for everybody. Here is what
we are trying to get from you. If you can't make mission based
on the missions that you have now, your statutory missions, we
would love to hear from you what needs to change there, as
opposed to foisting upon you mission changes and saying, here
is what your new missions are.
And we are trying to get from you, here is what I would
look at if I were you. Because if you have to change it
statutorily, we can do that. That is why we are here. But we
would love to have input from you and from the Coast Guard on
how to do that as opposed to us doing it blind.
I mean, John and Jeff can do a great job at that, but we
would much rather have you tell us now, hey, here are some
places where I think and the Coast Guard thinks that we should
scale back in order to improve our search and rescue or
interdiction capability; here are the places where we would
farm that out a little bit or we would lease that out or we
would give that to ABS or those types of things.
Otherwise, you force us to come up with those things for
you, and we are not as smart as you are on the things that you
do.
Admiral Currier. Well, Congressman, I think that dialogue
can take place. Of course, we have equities with the Department
of Homeland Security and the administration on that. But----
Mr. Hunter. But you say these are statutory missions,
right? So how do you get a statutory mission?
Admiral Currier. But our relative weighting of what we
suggest that could be scaled down or scaled or eliminated, you
know, we would not unilaterally come to you with that. We are,
as you know, part of the Department of Homeland Security, and
they have codependency with us in our mission sets. So it
wouldn't just be the Coast Guard saying that.
But if your staff and our staff want to enjoin that
conversation, then we are not going to object to it. But it is
going to be a complex undertaking.
Mr. Hunter. But right now you wouldn't say that there is
any part of your statutory mission set that you would scale
back on or prioritize higher?
Admiral Currier. I would say, sir, that based on what I
know of the Coast Guard, the interdependency of our mission set
and what we deliver as a system to the American public, it is
very difficult, and I would not be prepared today to offer you
candidates for a reduction one over another. I just couldn't do
it.
Mr. Hunter. OK. Thank you, Admiral.
Mr. Garamendi is recognized.
Mr. Garamendi. I want to carry on from where the Chair was
going with this question.
Eleven statutory missions. You are working in an
environment, physical environment, and leaving that aside, are
also subject to the political environment here in Washington,
the prioritization and the amount of money available year-to-
year to carry out those 11 statutory missions that is not made
by the Coast Guard alone. You only need to look at the
President's budget to determine that, I don't know, some $400
million was reduced from previous levels by the administration.
So you are operating in an environment administered by the
Office of Management and Budget and within the Department of
Transportation where priorities are made, resulting in a
budget, in this case the President's budget, which is your
budget. Like it or not, that is your budget.
From this point of view--and I was in your seat not a
decade ago, a little longer than that, and dealing with all of
that internal administrative give and take. I am in a different
seat now, looking at it from a different point of view. And
what I need to know and I think this committee needs to know
is, what does the Coast Guard need to carry out the 11
statutory missions that you have?
Not after being reviewed by the Department of Homeland
Security first and then by the Office of Management and Budget
and then given to us, which is a different document than what
the Coast Guard might--no, excuse me, the Coast Guard would put
out on its own.
I don't know that you are going to be able to go there
unless we force you to go there by asking very specific
questions that require you to respond to us directly,
understanding that--in other words, going past your chain of
command.
I think we need to do that, Mr. Chairman. It is a complex--
it is something that we need to do, taking into account each of
those 11 statutory missions and then asking the Coast Guard
specifically what it needs to do, recognizing that they are in
a big bind, having to go up through the Secretary and then to
OMB and then back to us. But I think we can get a better fix on
what is actually necessary, those 11 missions, to be carried
out.
So I am going to try to formulate that and, working with
you and others, try to ask the Coast Guard very specific
questions about the 11 missions so that we can then get a
baseline of what is necessary to achieve an appropriate level.
And then we are going to have to make a decision on our side,
and that is to prioritize--the word you used in a conversation
with me just a few moments ago.
Right now we are kind of in the dark. We are dealing with
ancient history, in many ways. We are obviously dealing with
the internal administrative priorities of the administration,
understandably. But we have to, I think, get a different view
of this.
So I am going to make it my task and David's task over the
next several weeks to try to lay out a series of questions that
go to the heart of that and then come back hopefully by the
time we do an authorization bill here.
Leaving that aside, I have a series of other questions that
deal with tiny things. You know, I don't want to take a lot of
time in this committee. I am going to ask them in writing. I am
just going to quickly go through the subject areas, not asking
you to respond to them right now. There is a series of things
that have come to my attention by various interested parties.
We have talked about the level of funding. I will let that
go for now.
Maritime education and training institutions are concerned
about a lack of interaction between the Coast Guard and those
institutions on what the educational requirements are. You
really ought to be consulting with them before you march off
requiring educational programs that may or may not be able to
be put in place. So I will put a specific question to you.
There is a question about maritime licensing examinations,
whether the Coast Guard is really up to the challenge of that.
And I will get that question to you.
Another question about the Standards of Training,
Certification, and Watchkeeping for Seafarers, the standards:
How you are putting those out? Are they consistent? Are they
going beyond what ought to be required? Again, a series of
questions.
Almost every one of these go to interaction and
communication with the interested parties. And, as I look at
it, you are doing it on your own. You really need to bring
these interested parties in to help you understand the full
implications of what you are proposing.
I will let it go at that. You will have specific questions,
and, of course, I am sure you will respond in an appropriate
and timely way.
I yield back.
Mr. Rice. Mr. Chairman, I just have one more comment with
respect to your comment----
Mr. Hunter. The gentleman is recognized.
Mr. Rice. I just wanted to point out that, as the country
music song says, it is heads, Carolina--this goes to the
chairman and the ranking member--heads, Carolina; tails,
California.
Mr. Hunter. I thank the gentleman.
I just have one last thing to bring up, too, and that is,
as you are looking at the cost, the acquisition cost,
especially the OPC and the NSCs and the requirements that those
boats have, I think right now--because looking at the OPCs, a
couple of the submissions that were accepted in the--I think it
was the top five you have narrowed it down to now, the top five
submissions for the OPC, and what the NSC is and how cheap it
will be as you get to ship number eight or nine and what the
different mix of those is that you really need if they almost
do the same thing. And from what I could see, they almost do
the same thing. There is stern launcher and recovery, which was
not required on the OPC; same sea states; same--there is a
different propulsion system between the OPC and the NSC. And
there is not much more difference than that in their abilities.
And at the same time, you have a $700 million price tag
compared to a $250 million projected price tag. So you have a
big discrepancy there with just a few things that would account
for the $500 million in difference. And those numbers just
didn't add up to me.
So I would say a question for the record from me is, if you
could give me a breakdown of those things. And I have seen
breakdowns done by outside parties where you have the NSC, OPC,
and FRC and the different mixes. But I would just like to hear
the justification for the discrepancy in the cost for that
delta based on what things, right, whether it is propulsion or
stern launch and recovery and that kind of thing.
[The Coast Guard submitted the following information for
the record:]
The table below shows a comparison of top-level
requirements between the Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC)
and National Security Cutter (NSC).
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Capability OPC (Threshold) NSC
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Seakeeping Sea State 5-- Sea State 5+ --
Boats and Boats and
Helicopter Helicopter
Operations Operations
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Range & Endurance 8500NM & 45 Days 12000NM & 60
Days
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Boats & Aviation (Hangar) 2 boats & H-60/ 3 boats with
Vertical stern launch &
Unmanned Aerial H-60/VUAV (2 H-
Vehicle (VUAV) 65s)
(1 H-65)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Speed 22 knots 28 knots
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Accommodations 120 146
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Command and Control Limited NATO
integration & interoperable,
interoperability Integrated,
Link
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Surface Combat Capability Medium Caliber Medium Caliber
Deck Gun, Small Deck Gun, Close
Caliber Anti- In Weapons
Terrorism and System (CIWS),
Force Protection Small Caliber
(ATFP) Weapons ATFP Weapons
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ASCM Defense Capability Soft Kill Hard & Soft Kill
Provides a Provides both
passive defense passive and
capability to active defense
divert missile to detect,
threats track, and
eliminate the
threat through
weapons systems
------------------------------------------------------------------------
CBRN Capability Countermeasure Collective
Washdown Protection
To support the System &
evacuation from Countermeasure
a contaminated Washdown
environment Provides a
system to
support the
continued
operation in a
CBRN
contaminated
environment
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Intelligence Gathering Limited (Space, Full SCIF
Weight, and
Power reserved)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Coast Guard, in close collaboration with the
Department, completed over a 2-year effort to ensure
the OPC specifications represented minimum
requirements; making significant cost trade-off
decisions on the OPC to balance capability and
affordability through extensive deliberations on speed,
range, boat launching requirements, and aviation
capability.
OPC requirements are at ``threshold'' levels--the
lowest levels that can still meet mission demands.
Further de-scoping of OPC requirements will prevent the
Coast Guard from meeting operational need and achieving
effective maritime governance in all of our operating
areas, including those with more demanding
environmental conditions (Eastern/Western Pacific, Gulf
of Alaska, Bering Sea, and the Arctic).
Additionally, the OPC acquisition strategy has
incorporated lessons learned from other acquisitions,
including the NSC, and has been deliberately formulated
to maximize affordability. For example, the NSC was a
sole source procurement using a cost plus fixed fee
contract type while the OPC is planned to use a fixed
price incentive firm target contract type specifically
tailored to maximize competition and incentivize
affordability while minimizing government risk.
Mr. Hunter. If there are no further questions, I thank the
witness--Admiral, thank you for your testimony--and the Members
for their participation.
I yield to Mr. Rice.
Mr. Rice. Admiral, one thing that I have learned a lot
about, being on this committee, and it is really not the
subject so much today, but, from what I understand, there is a
set of--with respect to international shipping, there is a set
of international standards that comply worldwide. I can't
remember the name of that set of standards. And then the United
States has their own set of standards.
And I have been inquiring of shipping companies as to why
international carriers don't flag here, you know, why we have
essentially lost our entire international shipping fleet over
the last 50 years. And one of the reasons that always comes up
is that our safety standards are so much higher than the
international standards.
Can you comment on that at all?
Admiral Currier. Sir, I can provide a detailed answer for
the record, but in general there is a U.N. organization called
IMO, International Maritime Organization, centered in Europe.
Most nations are participants in that, and they set a safety
standard regime that we follow.
As a matter of fact, ships, foreign-flag ships that come
into our ports are routinely inspected for safety--safety of
life at sea, basically, tenets of the IMO standards.
So I think our safety standards are pretty well-aligned
with international safety standards. But we can provide you a
more detailed briefing or answer for the record.
[The Coast Guard submitted the following information for
the record:]
The Coast Guard submitted a report to Congress in
September 2013, entitled ``Impediments to the United
States Flag Registry.'' As explained in that report,
the Coast Guard has researched available information on
the operating costs related to the design, construction
and operations relating to inspections for U.S.-flagged
merchant vessels. An analysis by the Maritime
Administration (MarAd) of the operating costs comparing
the costs of U.S.-flag vessels with foreign-flag
vessels has shown that ``U.S. flag carriers face a
significantly higher cost regime than do foreign flag
carriers'' (See MarAd, Comparison of U.S. and Foreign-
Flag Operating Costs, September 2011, page 1). The
MarAd report identified operating costs, including
crew, stores and lubes, maintenance and repair,
insurance costs, and overhead costs, as potential cost
impediments to operating vessels under the U.S. flag.
The cost of design, construction and operations
relating to inspections was not separately identified
in the MarAd report.
The Coast Guard has taken steps to make its regulations
less burdensome and more flexible, and to implement
improvements that could be made to the enforcement
process, while still ensuring a high level of safety
and environmental protection. As part of the Coast
Guard's regulatory reform initiative, the Coast Guard
published in the Federal Register (62 FR 51188) on
September 30, 1997, a final rule entitled
``Harmonization with International Safety Standards.''
This rulemaking amended U.S. regulations for both
inspected and uninspected vessels by removing obsolete,
unnecessary or excessive provisions, and harmonizing
regulations with international safety standards.
In addition, the Coast Guard also developed the
Alternate Compliance Program (ACP) with the intent of
providing more autonomy to U.S-flagged shipowners to
utilize the services of classification societies to
perform plan review and inspection functions which have
historically been retained by the Coast Guard. Under
ACP, the Coast Guard retains authority to issue a
Certificate of Inspection (COI) to a U.S-flagged
vessel, while relying on the expertise of a
classification society to perform the inspection
functions that must be carried out to ensure U.S.-flag
vessels comply with both domestic and international
standards. This is similar to how many other nations
conduct safety oversight inspections for vessels under
their administrations.
The Coast Guard strives to ensure our national
standards are consistent with new and revised
international standards. The Coast Guard's goal is to
quickly adopt the most recent design and engineering
requirements of the international conventions, and
delegate authority to recognized classification
societies in order to ensure that the U.S.-flag fleet
keeps pace with the rest of the international shipping
industry.
For further details on these efforts, please refer to
the report to Congress dated September 03, 2013,
entitled ``Impediments to the United States Flag
Registry.''
Mr. Rice. I would like to know if ours are--I just keep
hearing that ours are very much more strict, and that is one of
the reasons why our shipping fleet has dropped from 1,000
American-flag ships in international commerce to 80.
Admiral Currier. Sir, I couldn't comment yea or nay on
that. But I will tell you that, in general, our safety
standards are aligned with international IMO standards and that
if there are individual company policies that are more
stringent than that, I am not aware.
But, in general, the safety regime is pretty well-evolved
around the world, and we are not only in compliance but we are
enforcing those regulations.
Mr. Rice. Thank you, sir.
Again, going back to the role of Congress in this, if there
is some area in which you are bound by statute to safety
regulations that are far more onerous, I sure want to hear
about it and see if we can fix that.
Admiral Currier. Yes, sir. We can provide you background
information on that.
Mr. Rice. Thank you, sir.
Thank you, Chairman.
Mr. Hunter. The gentleman yields.
I recognize the ranking member.
Mr. Garamendi. Yeah, I will try to do this quick.
We were discussing earlier the C-27s, the $600 million that
is not going to need to be spent on additional aircraft. And I
have been trying to think this thing through. But in your
future budget years, you are projecting that expenditure over a
period of time--maybe it is $100 million a year, $50 million a
year--going into the future. Is that correct?
Admiral Currier. Well, currently, in the SIP that exists,
capital projected accounts, we have not made accommodation for
that class of aircraft past the 18 that are on contract.
Mr. Garamendi. I am sorry, past the----
Admiral Currier. The 18 aircraft that are currently on
contract.
Mr. Garamendi. So future budgets never anticipated the full
purchase of the 40 force?
Admiral Currier. Not at this point, sir. Not in the current
4-year budget projection.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you.
Mr. Hunter. There are no further questions.
Thank you, Admiral, for your testimony.
And this subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:17 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]