[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
TRANSITION AT A CROSSROADS: TUNISIA THREE YEARS AFTER THE REVOLUTION
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
DECEMBER 4, 2013
__________
Serial No. 113-92
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DANA ROHRABACHER, California Samoa
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio BRAD SHERMAN, California
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
TED POE, Texas GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MATT SALMON, Arizona THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina KAREN BASS, California
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
MO BROOKS, Alabama DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
TOM COTTON, Arkansas ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
PAUL COOK, California JUAN VARGAS, California
GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III,
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania Massachusetts
STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas AMI BERA, California
RON DeSANTIS, Florida ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
TREY RADEL, Florida GRACE MENG, New York
DOUG COLLINS, Georgia LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
TED S. YOHO, Florida JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
LUKE MESSER, Indiana
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
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Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
TOM COTTON, Arkansas DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
RON DeSANTIS, Florida JUAN VARGAS, California
TREY RADEL, Florida BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois
DOUG COLLINS, Georgia JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III,
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina Massachusetts
TED S. YOHO, Florida GRACE MENG, New York
LUKE MESSER, Indiana LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
Mr. Scott Mastic, regional director, Middle East and North
Africa, International Republican Institute..................... 5
Mr. Leslie Campbell, senior associate and regional director,
Middle East and North Africa, National Democratic Institute.... 12
Mr. Bill Sweeney, president and chief executive officer,
International Foundation for Electoral Systems................. 21
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
Mr. Scott Mastic: Prepared statement............................. 7
Mr. Leslie Campbell: Prepared statement.......................... 14
Mr. Bill Sweeney: Prepared statement............................. 23
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 40
Hearing minutes.................................................. 41
TRANSITION AT A CROSSROADS: TUNISIA THREE YEARS AFTER THE REVOLUTION
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WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 4, 2013
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 o'clock p.m.,
in room 2167 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-
Lehtinen (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. The subcommittee will come to order.
After recognizing myself, my good friend, the ranking member
Ted Deutch of Florida for 5 minutes each for our opening
statements, we will then break for votes and when we come back,
I will recognize members of our subcommittee for 1-minute
opening statements each. And then, we will hear from our
panelists. And without objection, the witnesses' prepared
statements will be made a part of the record and members may
have 5 legislative days to insert statements and questions for
the record, subject to the length limitation of the rules. The
chair now recognizes herself for 5 minutes.
Three years ago this month, the self-immolation of a
Tunisian street vendor would set in motion a series of events
that would fundamentally change the political landscape of the
entire Middle East and North Africa region--a period we now
call the Arab Spring. Finally fed up with autocratic rule, with
corruption, with a lack of basic freedoms, thousands of
Tunisians took to the streets calling for democratic and social
reforms and an end to the maligned 23-year rule of their
leader.
But though there has been some significant progress made
since his ouster, there is still so much that needs to be done
to meet the goals and the aspirations of the Tunisian people
who began this process, as I said, 3 years ago. By most
accounts, the Tunisians had a successful National Constituent
Assembly election in October 2011, which brought a party into
power together with the Tunisian two leading secularist
parties.
However, the newly formed government quickly ran into
obstacles that it could not overcome and Tunisia's transition
came to a grinding halt this summer when a prominent secular
party member was assassinated. The assassination eventually led
to the formation of a National Dialogue process to jump start
the reconciliation process, to select a caretaker government,
and get Tunisia back on track for a new round of elections. But
the National Dialogue has been met with its own set of
obstacles and the negotiations over who will be the caretaker
Prime Minister have caused an impasse.
Now, as the political process has paused and the future of
the Constitution and elections are in question, Tunisia finds
itself at a crossroads as frustrations begin to set in and the
rift between the secular and the Islamist ideologues continues
to grow as both sides battle for legitimacy. Compounding these
political problems are the economic and security challenges
facing Tunisia as all three are undeniably linked and all three
face an uphill battle.
However, one of the most pressing issues from a U.S.
perspective is the threat of Islamic extremism in Tunisia.
Foreign fighters and home grown extremists have challenged the
stability of Tunisia, and while the Tunisian security forces
have thus far been able to combat al-Qaeda, AQIM, and its
affiliates, these terrorist networks continue to pose a threat
to Tunisia and to the region.
Tunisia's border with Algeria is known to be a training
area for the terrorist groups, and the insecure border with
Libya is a major area for concern as it is vulnerable to
smugglers and others who wish to cross into Tunisia undetected.
Terrorist attacks like the one on the U.S. Embassy in September
2012 as well as the assassination of two prominent secular
politicians threaten to derail the political process.
With Tunisia being the birthplace of the Arab Spring, we
must continue to support the democratic aspirations in the hope
that it can come through this transition successfully. For
better or worse, the fate of Tunisia is tied to the reform
movements throughout the rest of the region as it is viewed as
the test-case for the democratic transitions in the Arab world.
It is in the vital national security interests of the
United States to see a secure, a stable and a democratic
Tunisia, and I hope the administration does not overlook the
importance of this strategic country. We must remain engaged
throughout the National Dialogue process and beyond to ensure a
successful transition to democracy in Tunisia and we must not
allow the terrorist groups to derail the political transition
nor gain any more influence in an already susceptible region.
And we must work to find effective ways to assist Tunisia as it
struggles to fight this rising threat of terrorism.
This is a critical juncture for Tunisia, for the region and
for United States strategic interests. We must support the
people of Tunisia as they struggle to achieve real reforms and
we must also support groups like IRI, NDI, IFES who are on the
ground day after day promoting democracy in this vitally
important region and working to find a consensus among all
parties on a new Constitution and new electoral process.
With that, I yield to my ranking member, my friend, Ted
Deutch.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and thanks to our
witnesses for testifying today on the state of Tunisia's
transition. Thanks as well for your patience as we prepare to
head off to vote.
It has been 3 years since a Tunisian street vendor changed
the course of Tunisia in the Middle East. As we all remember,
Mohamed Bouazizi, an unlicensed vendor was being harassed by
police and accused by local authorities of evading an arbitrary
fine. The police confiscated six crates of his fruits and his
electronic scale and denied him any appeal. In debt, tired of
being harassed, without recourse and without economic
opportunities, Bouazizi set himself on fire. His act became a
catalyst for the Jasmine Revolution and the wider Arab Spring
and it incited demonstrations and riots throughout Tunisia and
the region in protest of social, political, and economic
issues.
In the months that followed, the world had great hopes
about what Tunisia might become. In early 2011, Tunisia ended
the authoritarian regime of then President Ben Ali and in
October 2011, Tunisia held elections that were praised as free
and fair. Political and civil liberties were expanded and it
appeared that Tunisia would become a model for the rest of the
Middle East. Unfortunately, Tunisia has fallen short of the
lofty and perhaps unrealistic expectations that were set in
2011. Political squabbling is limited to structural reforms
needed to guarantee democratic institutions and the summer's
assassination of a prominent secular leader has left many
Tunisians not only disillusioned with their country's growing
political polarization, but also increasingly worried about
their own safety.
Under former President Ben Ali, the Tunisian people were
used to the stability of a police state. However, violent
extremist groups have exploited the region's poorest borders
with terrorist attacks on the U.S. Embassy and a popular
tourist resort. Tunisians are increasingly frightened and
seeking stability. Furthermore, many of the same economic
challenges that contributed to the Jasmine Revolution still
exist today. Youth unemployment among college graduates is over
30 percent. Tunisia's international credit rating is poor and
the increasingly unstable security situation has been
particularly damaging for a country that employs 400,000 people
in the tourism industry.
Furthermore, according to press reports, not a single
project from the 2012 budget has been fully implemented yet. In
short, it's not clear that the everyday life of Tunisians has
improved since the ouster of Ben Ali. A young Tunisian
protester was recently quoted as saying, ``We live in desperate
conditions because of unemployment, poverty, and misery. We are
only asking to live in dignity.''
My worry is that continued the political stalemate and
instability that are plaguing Tunisia may make the country
increasingly vulnerable to political actors who could set the
country on a path back toward an authoritarian state. We all
know that establishing a democracy is not easy, that political
squabbling is by no means limited to Tunisia. This political
conflict while damaging is not being fought with bullets. The
Tunisian political parties have seen the devastating conflict
in Syria. They have seen the errors or Morsi in Egypt. The
parties have all publicly agreed that widespread violence and
exclusionary governance that has plagued the region is not what
they want for Tunisia's future. The ruling Ennahda Party has
shown that it can compromise on key issues and reign in those
hard liners demanding conservative amendments to the
Constitution.
The party eventually agreed to step down to make way for a
caretaker administration which is why the constituent assembly
which is drafting the Constitution will remain in place and
will hopefully produce a Constitution that establishes the
structures and institutions that are necessary for a democratic
Tunisia.
The United States has made a pledge to the people of
Tunisia in support of their transition to a democracy and
although success has not been immediate, in many ways, Tunisia
still has the best chance of turning into a consolidated
democracy. And that is why despite the challenges, the success
of Tunisia is key to our interests and our ideals.
I want to thank NDI, IRI, and the International Foundation
for Electoral Systems for your contributions in Tunisia, not
only doing key work in strengthening political parties, civil
society, and providing election support, but in many ways it is
your organizations that are representing the American ideals of
equal opportunity and dignity for all and we are grateful for
that. Although the attention that Congress and the American
people are paying to Tunisia is probably insufficient, I hope
that today will provide an opportunity to remember how great
the consequences are of Tunisia's quest for democracy.
As we saw in 2011, the future of Tunisia will be decided by
the Tunisian people, but if democracy fails, there are no good
alternatives. Therefore, I believe that the United States has a
vital role to play in helping to assist the democratic, free,
and stable Tunisia and I look to our witnesses to provide your
perspectives on what is happening inside the country, your
reactions to U.S. response so far and your recommendations for
Congress and the United States Government. I thank you, Madam
Chairman, and I yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Deutch. Thank you for your
excellent statement. I now would like to grant 1-minute opening
statements to Mr. Schneider, followed by Ms. Meng, and then Mr.
Vargas. Mr. Schneider is recognized.
Mr. Schneider. In the interest of time as votes have been
called, I will yield my time back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. But we have got plenty of
time. Don't worry. Ms. Meng?
Ms. Meng. I yield my time, too.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. Mr. Vargas.
Mr. Vargas. I also yield my time back, but I do thank the
people that we have here today and look forward to their
testimony.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much and with that, I am
going to introduce the panelists and then we will come back and
hear from you.
First, we welcome Mr. Scott Mastic, the Regional Director
for Middle East and North Africa at the International
Republican Institute. In this capacity, he has helped grow this
division into the Institute's largest regional division. Mr.
Mastic has led various democracy assistance efforts in the
region and served as an election observer in many countries,
including Tunisia, Egypt, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.
Next, we welcome Mr. Leslie Campbell, Senior Associate and
Regional Director for the Middle East and North Africa at the
National Democratic Institute where he has directed programs in
this region since '96. Mr. Campbell has 25 years of experience
in international development and parliamentary governance.
Thank you, sir.
And third, we welcome Mr. William Sweeney, who is the
President of the International Foundation for Electoral
Systems. Prior to this position, Mr. Sweeney served on the
Board of Directors and is chairman of IFIS. Mr. Sweeney has
observed elections in the Philippines, Russia, Nicaragua and
Jamaica. We thank all of you for being here and when we come
back, if there are any members who would like to make an
opening statement, I will recognize them first and then we will
hear from you, gentlemen. And with that the subcommittee is
temporarily on vacation.
[Off the record.]
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. The subcommittee has reconvened. Thank
you so much. Mr. Mastic, we will begin with you for your
remarks and as I said, all of your written statements will be
made a part of the record. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF MR. SCOTT MASTIC, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, MIDDLE EAST
AND NORTH AFRICA, INTERNATIONAL REPUBLICAN INSTITUTE
Mr. Mastic. Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member Deutch,
members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to
testify today on the important topic of Tunisia, a country that
I remain guardedly optimistic about despite a number of
challenges that continue to confront its transition.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. If you could put the microphone a little
bit closer.
Mr. Mastic. How is that? There. I offer this sense of
optimism based on what we have seen during the past 3 years and
especially as a result of the interactions among Tunisia's many
political stakeholders. Unlike Egypt with a troubling
authoritarian behavior of the country's Muslim Brotherhood,
irrevocably polarized relations between the political forces,
or like Libya where we see an absence of security making a
successful transition incredibly fragile or like the horrific
effects we see from Syria's civil war, what we see today in
Tunisia is a continued effort from political stakeholders to
reach agreement through negotiation.
This is not to say we can take for granted Tunisia will be
successful and to the contrary, the country has reached its
most pivotal make or break point yet and currently stands in an
impasse.
Today, I would like to briefly elaborate on what I see as
three key factors to the transition either moving forward
successfully or going in a different, less optimal, direction.
First is the political track of national dialogue agreed to by
the current government and opposition parties and moderated by
the so-called quartet of civil society entities. Key actions
related to the ultimate passage of a Constitution and electoral
law and appointment of an electoral commission extend from the
dialogue's success, but ultimately these important benchmarks
will not be achieved unless the political parties agree on a
caretaker prime minister and government that can shepherd the
country to elections.
Recent public comments from UGTT, Tunisian trade union
leaders which are mediating the dialogue, suggest the primary
political parties remain committed to the process and that it
may resume even this week or next. In the current state of
negotiation, the key factor appears to be neither side
believing it can leverage too much advantage or dig in for a
better deal. The willingness of the main parties to reach
agreement at the negotiating table is of paramount importance.
Second is security, specifically the threat posed by
Islamic extremists. We have seen the poisoning effect that acts
of terrorism have had on Tunisia during the past 3 years. This
has contributed to polarization between Islamists and
secularists with the latter believing the Ennahda-led
government has been too slow to recognize the threats posed by
jihadists. Future acts of terror and especially at this
critical moment could derail the national dialogue before a
successful interim government is put into place. This would
leave Tunisia in a free fall. Therefore, time is of the essence
in avoiding a potential terrorist-induced crisis.
Third, and perhaps most important, is the continued
patience Tunisian citizens are willing to show toward their
political leaders. My sense is that the patience of ordinary
Tunisians directly relates to the state of the country's
economy and the belief that the transition offers at least the
promise of economic betterment in the future. How long
Tunisians will accept the current conditions is unclear, but
Tunisia's politicians should not assume limitless good will.
And the indicators at present are not that good. A public
opinion poll conducted by the International Republican
Institute in October found that 79 percent of Tunisians say the
country is going in the wrong direction, the highest yet
recorded number. The economy and specifically jobs continues to
count as the most important problem as Tunisians see it.
Disturbingly in the October survey, an increasing number of
respondents, 29 percent, say they are having a hard time
feeding themselves and their family, while 48 percent say they
are making just enough to get by.
Future Tunisian Governments must prioritize economic
issues. Addressing these issues, though, is not possible with
the current political impasse. As with the other factors, it
seems the longer this impasse continues between the major
political forces, the more frustrated Tunisian citizens may
become based on their desire for better life opportunity.
With respect to our programming and democracy assistance,
IRI was registered by the Tunisian Government in November 2011
and has been able to pursue active programming with all
political stakeholders throughout the country. My continued
optimism about Tunisia is linked to what we are experiencing
through those interactions. Programs from the international
community are widely welcomed which is always encouraging, but
from our vantage point what distinguishes Tunisia is the
seriousness shown by the political parties and civil society in
developing their organizations.
Tunisia's civil society is playing an important role in
advancing human rights, women's rights, and transitional
justice. And we see key civil society groups in a central
mediation roles attempting to advance the transition. I cannot
stress how important this point of wanting a democratic system
to emerge is. The Arab world continues to lack a successful
working model of elective democracy and when one looks across
the region, we are hard pressed to see something with more
promise emerging sooner elsewhere.
Even as the current dynamic is uncertain, I believe Tunisia
remains the best hope for a democratic political transition in
this region. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Mastic follows:]
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Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much. Mr. Campbell.
STATEMENT OF MR. LESLIE CAMPBELL, SENIOR ASSOCIATE AND REGIONAL
DIRECTOR, MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA, NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC
INSTITUTE
Mr. Campbell. Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Deutch,
members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to
appear today to testify in the state of Tunisia's political
transition. Since the toppling of Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali,
Tunisia has made significant progress toward establishing
democratic institutions. While Tunisia's transition is today
more vulnerable than at any point thus far, there's reason to
hope that the country's experience can and will continue to
serve as an inspiration to those beyond Tunisia's border.
Serving as part of the leadership of NDI's international
observation mission in October 2011, I witnessed firsthand the
hopes that many Tunisians placed in the national constituent
assembly elections that they would represent a solid step
toward a more democratic future. Ennahda's moderate Islamist
leadership sought to form a broad coalition to share the
responsibility of governing. The ruling ``troika'' coalition
formed by Ennahda and two center left parties, took power in
December 2011. In these 2 years, the coalition has struggled
but remained intact, despite the often strained communication
among its members and increasing pressure from opposition
political parties.
If there is an early lesson in the post-Arab Spring
aftermath it is that coalitions and consensus building are far
preferable to winner take all politics. Egypt went the route of
winner take all and paid the price. Tunisia has chosen thus far
to be more inclusive. Unfortunately, the ``troika'' government
has struggled to address the growing economic and security
challenges as the Tunisian economy has generally declined or
stagnated. Last week, the Tunisian currency hit an all-time
low. New figures show the unemployment rate hovering just
around 16 percent with university graduate unemployment closer
to 34 percent. Thus, the young Tunisians who are widely
credited with bringing about the revolution are those being
left behind. Some Tunisians have accused Ennahda of failing to
crack down on violent extremism, a perception that was fueled
by the assassination of two leftist politicians, but as the
assassinations caused the political standoff between Ennahda
and secular opposition, there were efforts to broker a
settlement which led to the signing of a national dialogue
process to address four fundamental issues. First, the
composition of a new apolitical technocratic government; two,
reaching agreement on the final sticking points in the
Constitution; three, appointing the leadership of an
independent election administration; and four, agreeing on the
sequence and timeline for Presidential and parliamentary
elections.
Tunisian views about the dialogue are clear. To begin the
process of restoring public confidence, all responsible
political parties much return to the negotiation table
immediately. They must work to complete the constitutional
phase, making it possible to hold elections. There has finally
been movement on the constitutional process and the naming of
an interim prime minister. Yesterday, opposition members of the
assembly returned to hash out remaining disagreements. There
are also rumors that there is finally a compromised candidate
for prime minister.
Despite Tunisia's numerous challenges, reasons for optimism
remain. The transition has moved forward in fits and starts,
but it does remain on track. The Tunisian value of consensus
over expediency remains a strength. There is a growing
perception though in Tunisia that the world has lost interest
in this important democratic experiment. The international
community should enhance its support of the Tunisian transition
emphasizing that an immediate return to national dialogue
negotiations is essential to demonstrate commitment to
democratic principles and fundamental freedoms. The mediation
team, in my opinion, should announce a definitive date for the
dialogue to recommence and stress that any party that fails to
participate will forfeit its right to contribute to decisions.
Tunisian politicians must conclude their agreement to
nominate a caretaker prime minister and that may happen soon.
They must finalize the Constitution, appoint the election body
and outline the steps, the next steps in the transitions. These
steps are absolutely required to address pressing citizen
priorities including salvaging the economy and ensuring safe
and secure communities. While there is an urgent need for more
international economic support and assistance and I hope this
is addressed more in this hearing, the United States should
also strongly and consistently support popular demands for
transparency, accountability and freedom. This means a
continued commitment to pluralism and civil society and
speaking out very clearly with respect to the on-going threats
to freedom of expression.
Thank you, Madam Chairman, members of the committee.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Campbell follows:]
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Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Campbell.
Mr. Sweeney. If you could push that button on the mike and
hold it close to your mouth. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF MR. BILL SWEENEY, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE
OFFICER, INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATION FOR ELECTORAL SYSTEMS
Mr. Sweeney. I thank you for the opportunity to testify in
this hearing on Tunisia's transition and democratic
development. The International Foundation for Electoral
Systems, IFES, has received grants from the U.S. Government and
other international donors to conduct an on-the-ground
assessment of the electoral environment and provide technical
expertise to the Court of Accounts, civil society, various
ministries and the country's first independent election
management body, the Independent High Commission for Elections,
known as the ISIE.
On October 23, 2011, Tunisians held their first democratic
elections and elected a national constituent assembly called
the NCA. The elections were administered by the ISIE. They were
seen as inclusive and competitive. Public confidence was high
in the electoral process. The ISIE received high praise for its
independence, commitment, honesty, and successful delivery of
elections in a short time frame and under difficult
circumstances. Since those elections, frustration and
disappointment have dominated. Progress in adopting a new
Constitution for Tunisia and the institutional legal framework
for elections has been slow. Parliamentarians elected in 2011
have received most of the criticism. Opposition parties are now
contesting the legitimacy of any legislation and calling for
dissolution of the NCA. Two political assassinations of
prominent leaders have adversely affected the potential for any
political consensus.
As a result, Tunisia has yet to adopt a new Constitution
and develop a new legal framework for the upcoming elections.
ISIE's 2011 mandate ended in May 2012. This means no
electoral preparations, no election law, no election
commission, no budget, no plan. There remain enormous
challenges and risks and the country is losing valuable time in
the current political stalemate. While minor difficulties with
the 2011 elections were largely accepted in stride by the
population, the same tolerance may not be forthcoming for the
next elections. Simply put, if the administration of the next
election does not meet public expectations, a lack of trust in
the results is possible. Internal stability and the nation's
transition will be threatened.
For the 2011 elections, IFES provided technical expertise
and guidance to the ISIE, trained election management staff,
established the ISIE media center to announce results and
election-related communications before, during, and after
election day, assisted the ISIE in design and distribution of
10,000 posters and 2 million fliers for voter education efforts
throughout the country, partnered with the Ministry of Social
Affairs to communicate with illiterate voters on the election
and how to vote, and trained members of I Watch, a youth-led
civil society organization to be the first independent
organization to monitor campaign finance expenditures during
the election.
After the 2011 elections, IFES focused on ISIE's
performance and lessons learned. With funding from U.S. AID,
IFES carried out a technical evaluation of the NCA elections
and in-depth analyses of the legal framework for elections and
campaign finance regulations.
Thanks to support from the U.S. Government, IFES has
remained in country and continues to play a role in helping
Tunisians in their democratic transition. IFES meets regularly
with legislators to advise them on electoral legal reforms;
trains judges in charge of monitoring campaign finance
expenditures; and works closely with local civil society
organizations to help them all be advocates for inclusive
democracy in expectation of the next round of elections in
Tunisia under a new ISIE. With support from the European Union
and the United Nations Development Programme, IFES sustains the
dialogue and debate among Tunisian political stakeholders on
voter registration, electoral system design, election
management bodies, and campaign finance, a process which has
been underway all year.
Madam Chairman, the Arab Spring started in Tunisia. Tunisia
is the furthest along in its transition, has the most engaged,
robust, national conversation on democracy and has the greatest
institutional capacity to succeed. Tunisia's success will be a
model for other transitioning countries in the region and in
the world. Despite setbacks, Tunisians are highly engaged in
the political dialogue, not violence.
I was in Tunisia this past February. IFES conducted the
largest attended forum in the region on voter registration and
the value of a trusted voter registrar. The next few months are
critical as Tunisia appoints a new government, selects new
election commissioners, finalizes its Constitution and develops
a new electoral law.
Madam Chair, thank you for putting a spotlight on Tunisia
today. This is a critical time in the history of the country.
It is critical that there be a focus on the opportunity for
democracy in this region as well as the threats. Thank you,
Madam Chair.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Sweeney follows:]
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Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, all three of you for excellent
testimony and I will begin with a round of questions and I have
many of them, so if you could jot them down and address
whichever one you would like. As we have discussed, the
national dialogue process has stalled, but the dialogue between
opposing parties continues. No party has walked away completely
from the process and they remain engaged in an attempt to
reconcile their differences. One major achievement would be if
the parties would come together and agree on a caretaker prime
minister and cabinet. This could stabilize the country, and
guide it through its next round of elections.
How far apart are the parties on deciding on a prime
minister? And what are the main obstacles that have prevented
them from coming to an agreement?
Mr. Mastic, I had the opportunity to review IRI's latest
polling data from Tunisia from October and it states that 79
percent of Tunisians believe things are headed in the wrong
direction. Only 16 believe in the right direction. And when
asked how much longer the national constituent assembly should
take to complete its mandate, nearly two thirds of the
respondents said less than 6 months and over three fourths said
less than a year. And although we can agree that placing
artificial timelines on such a delicate process is not the best
practice, but giving the overarching trend of dissatisfaction
how much longer do you think that this political stalemate can
last before the political transition in Tunisia is permanently
derailed? Time is clearly an issue for the Tunisian transition.
And in this case we have economic, security, and political
clocks all working against each other, all moving at different
speeds.
Do you gentlemen believe that the leadership can adequately
address all three tracks at the same time? Or does it need more
help from outside sources and if so, what does Tunisia need the
most in order to ensure a successful transition? What programs
do your institutions have in place to promote new elections to
build local capacity? And finally, women's rights. Tunisia has
been touted as a leader when it comes to women's rights in the
Middle East and North Africa. Ever since Tunisia gained its
independence as we discussed in '56, women have had an even
more prominent role in society compared to the counterparts in
neighboring countries and this was illustrated by the elections
in 2011 of the National Constituent Assembly, with 27 percent
of the seats won by women. But there are many reports of gender
inequality, and violence against women. What would you say is
the current status of women's rights in the country? Are
women's concerns being evenly represented in the national
dialogue and in the drafting of the Constitution?
We will begin with Mr. Mastic.
Mr. Mastic. Thank you. With respect to the process and how
far apart the parties are, I think at this point really it has
come down to who the prime minister will be. And the
polarization that has grown in Tunisia over the last year
between the major parties and specifically Ennahda, the
Islamist party, has made the selection of that individual very
difficult because one does not want to be in a position of
having given advantage to the other.
Based on the various iterations of governments, Tunisia has
been through since the 2011 revolution, there are definitely
personalities I think that both can agree to. Neither have
walked away. The public statements of the mediating body right
now suggests they are very close to identifying that
individual. So I don't think they are far apart and I think
that you could see progress on this very soon.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much. Mr. Campbell?
Mr. Campbell. Well, I would agree that rumors speaking to
NDI's office director in Tunisia today, there are very strong
rumors on the street that a name has been put forward. I won't
mention the name now because who knows if it will happen, but a
name is put forward. It has not been rejected. So there is
clearly talking.
I should also mention just as we were speaking, Sheikh
Mourou, who is the vice president of the Ennahda Party, walked
into this meeting room and I think it is significant in the
sense that I met with him. He has been in Washington I think on
a mission to say look, we are reasonable. We want this to work.
We want this to be a model. And there is a recognition, I
think, among most Tunisians that they do not want this to fail,
that they want Tunisia to be seen as a democratic model. It
would be the only one other than Israel and it is very
important to Tunisia. So there is good will.
I think the message though of Tunisians, certainly that
come to Washington, the message that I would like to leave
today is that without economic help and you addressed these
different tracks, without people's lives improving, all the
election commissions and political parties and so on in the
world won't succeed. Of course, as organizations work heavily
on the political process which important governance is vitally
important, but I think we would be remiss if we didn't say that
politics will fail and again talking to leaders in Tunisia,
they have said very clearly, the cupboard is bare. They don't
have the money in the budget to cover their expenses. They
don't have the prospects. The currency is at a low. The credit
rating has dropped. Their borrowing costs have gone up. So I
think if there is a track that is not being adequately
addressed, it is the economic track. The political track, I
think, will take care of itself.
The question of women, my answer would be that on the
surface, Tunisia continues to lead: 27 percent of the members
of the constituent assembly are women. At the top level, at the
elite level you will find many, many women in leadership, women
leadership positions. But I think if you scratch below the
surface and especially if you get away from the capital, in the
interior you see a very, very different reality, much more
typical, traditional Arab world type of situation. And I think
redoubling the efforts on human rights, on women's rights is
absolutely important. I think we can't be--we shouldn't be too
fooled by sort of the flash that you see in the capital.
The one thing I would add at the end is that some of the
statistics that were put forward under the rule of Ben Ali were
blatantly false. There was a sense, maybe, that women had made
greater achievements than they actually had in reality. They
sort of inflated the statistics, for example, of literacy.
Literacy among women is much, much higher than Ben Ali's
government had ever let on. So investing in that area I think
is vitally important.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much. Mr. Sweeney?
Mr. Sweeney. Madam Chairman, the problem of being the third
speaker on this panel to those questions is I am in violent
agreement with everything my two colleagues have said.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Nobody has said it quite as eloquently as
you are about to say it.
Mr. Sweeney. Thank you very much, I am going to give it my
best shot. What I would say are two things. Number one is that
if you look very closely at what happened in 2011, the decision
makers seemed very, very far apart and because of the very
robust engagement, when they came to agreement, they came to
agreement, very, very quickly. And so they were able to conduct
their election in October 2011. They were able to make
decisions very quickly because much of the spade word, much of
the discussions had already taken place and there was a
consensus and you didn't have to revisit every decision. So I
do have great hope that when they come to consensus, they can
come to consensus very quickly.
Number two, the point I would make on women is in complete
accord with my colleague. However, you should know that you
have a colleague who is the chair of the election management
process in the Parliament. And she is one of the most engaged
legislators I have met over the course of the last year. She is
very conservative. She is very traditional, but she also is
very aware. I had a long dinner with her one night about the
importance of more than 50 percent of the population having a
political voice and more than 50 percent of the population in
Tunisia having their rights fully exercised.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much. Excellent answers.
Thank you. I am pleased to yield to my friend, Mr. Deutch of
Florida.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Madam Chairman. For the last couple
of years, the administration has proposed to implement a Middle
East and North Africa incentive fund. And in addition to
allotting money for contingencies, the fund was going to build
on a model of centers for good governance. That would result in
additional foreign assistance similar to the Millennium
Challenge Corporation model. Presumably, that would be a big
benefit to Tunisia. I support the idea. I like the idea of
allocating significant and flexible resources to the region,
but like others I have some questions about the details of the
fund. I am curious to know from the three of you what your
opinions, since you are really implementers here, what your
opinions are of this fund. Is it something that you would
support? How would it be used and ultimately how could it be
beneficial to Tunisia?
We will start with Mr. Sweeney, so he doesn't have to go
last this time.
Mr. Sweeney. Congressman, I am not particularly familiar
with the details of the implementation of the fund. However,
what I know is that if there is a reward for good governance
that results in the type of institution building that the
Tunisians are famous for, that the Tunisians ought to be able
to meet the metrics and expectations and certainly it is a
society which desperately needs continued investment and
engagement and has shown over time that they can perform
economic miracles within their own country. So I would be
positive of both the metrics and very confident of the ability
of the Tunisians to meet those metrics and use whatever foreign
assistance from the United States or the European Union or any
other donor to maximum advantage to solve what Les referred to
as the more serious crisis, the crisis of unemployment and
investment in the society.
Mr. Campbell. Thank you. Well, I would strongly support the
idea of an incentive fund, but just to go backwards for a
second, I should say first of all that the administration,
congressional resources, congressional interest in Tunisia up
until recently has been very, very strong. I think it is still
strong from the funding side, certainly for what we do. None of
us went into great detail of what we do, but the support has
been strong for the process, for training political parties,
working with the election commission, working with women, human
rights organizations, domestic civil society organizations.
That has ben quite strong.
What is missing and I think this is germane to the
incentive fund question is something in addition to that. So I
think the idea that if the country, and I think there is
tremendous willingness in the country, if the country is going
to behave democratically, seek consensus as they have, govern
itself well, as you said, Millennium Challenge style, a way of
incentivizing that performance would be great.
I know in our conversations, we are often dealing with very
high level political leaders in Tunisia. Their comment back is
we really appreciate what you do. Over the long term this is
fantastic. But if we can't provide evidence that people's lives
are improving, this is all going to go backwards. So I think
the incentive fund is necessary. I think U.S. diplomats often
feel a little hamstrung right now. They have a lot of talk.
They don't have a lot of scratch, basically, to use a
colloquial term.
Mr. Deutch. And Mr. Mastic, before you answer, Mr. Sweeney
talked about donors and Mr. Campbell talked about scratch. We
often have these discussions without acknowledging that there
are other countries that would like to be involved, that would
like to exert influence in a country in transition like
Tunisia. Am I right? Is that the case here? And who are they
and what role are they playing and trying to play?
Mr. Mastic. Definitely others are involved. So of course
the IMF has given an important loan stabilization program to
Tunisia, so that is a key actor right now. The European Union
also is very much involved, invested in Tunisia. According to
the EU's neighborhood policy, they see Tunisia as a very
important country in transition in the region.
I will say though that I think from the Tunisians that we
interact with, there is a perceived interest and value in an
ongoing and robust U.S. engagement in their country. And as I
think it holds the best promise among the transitions
occurring, I think we benefit a lot from that engagement.
Quickly, just with respect to the incentive fund, I don't
know that many details about the fund. I think one of the
challenges with the idea of the fund is that the details about
what, in fact, it would do have been a little bit murky. So
that's something to obviously take into consideration. But the
idea of incentivizing good governance in Tunisia, of course, is
something to be supported. I also would say that with whatever
types of programming that will be supported through the fund,
we have to have it be reflective of a transition process and
support for democratic development as well. I will just put
that in a very specific set of data.
You know, in the initial revolution, we did a poll
immediately after. And 79 percent of the people at that time
said the country was going in the right direction. Okay, that
number was never going to stay that high. And it slowly went
down in the months that followed. At two points, the downward
trend reversed itself. One was shortly before the NCA election
when people were essentially 50-50 on whether the country was
going in the right direction. And then immediately after that
election, the number shot back up in a positive response rate.
And the only time it shot back up in a positive response rate.
So the political process is very much tied to the other
challenges Tunisia faces and needs to be part of any type of
fund or incentivation of good governance and behavior in the
country.
Mr. Sweeney. Mr. Deutch, if I could add one or two specific
points. Swiss foreign assistance and British foreign assistance
have been part of our program in Tunisia. We have worked very
closely with a variety of elements within the European Union
neighborhood program and some of their democracy assistance. We
have also had a terrific partnership with the United States
Development Fund on all of the aspects of voter registration,
election management. That was one of the meetings that I
referred to in my testimony. But the U.S. Government should be
commended at this point because the U.S. Government has had
staying power in terms of the programs that it has been
supporting in Tunisia where some of these others have been very
limited projects. But there are other organizations, other
governments, other interests involved.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Deutch. Thank you,
gentlemen.
Mr. Cotton of Arkansas.
Mr. Cotton. Thank you and thank you all for appearing today
on this matter. So I believe that one reason that America has
been so great and so prosperous for so long is that we are not
merely a democracy, but a constitutional democracy. Too many
other countries around the world sometimes with too much
support from the West reduce good government to elections which
are certainly very important and they are the principal way to
hold the government accountable. But they underplay the
significance of constitutional forums, both the structures of
government that we have in place here like the separation of
powers, unitary executive, an independent judiciary and
prosecutor, as well as individual rights, rights of freedom of
speech and religious and assembly and immunity from arbitrary
and indefinite arrests and so forth.
Mr. Sweeney, I will let you start off and then Mr. Campbell
and Mr. Mastic, I will let you maybe respond.
You had said in your testimony that Tunisia still does not
have a Constitution. The assembly needs to adopt one. I would
just like to get your perspective on the prospects for a
Constitution that has both those kind of structurals and those
individual rights, guarantees.
Mr. Sweeney. I am very positive that the Tunisians are
going to adopt a Constitution. They have a long history of
institutions and regard for those institutions. When I was in
Tunisia, I met with representatives of the course that were
engaged in reviewing campaign finance reform issues. I met with
different ministries. I met with a great number of
parliamentarians. In just about every meeting, there was great
regard for individual rights and the need for the Constitution
and the behavior of the institutions to reflect and open
democratic society. So generally, sir, I am very, very positive
that they are moving in the right direction. And more
importantly, from a perspective of our history, many of these
institutions are in place and have a robust history and have
very committed public servants who are leading them right now.
So the debate is fully engaged. We are not dealing with an
artificial process. We are dealing with a country which has a
great, robust, strong history and great institutions.
Mr. Cotton. Would you care to venture a guess on a
prospective timeline?
Mr. Sweeney. I would concur with my colleague, Mr.
Campbell, that it is possible we are going to see the first
step which will be the caretaker government put in place. There
has been more than enough debate and dialogue within the
society and reflecting back on 2011, they move very, very
quickly once they come to consensus.
Mr. Cotton. Thank you. Mr. Campbell?
Mr. Campbell. Sure. Maybe I can, since you made a
philosophical point, maybe I will respond with a bit of a
philosophical point which is this idea of a concentration of
elections. I think there is some truth to that, that in many
organizations people have been guilty of that. And there are a
few lessons I think of the Arab Spring thus far and one is that
rushing into competitive, contested elections is a mistake. Why
is that? Because as you say, in part, you don't have the
structures, you don't have the bedrock to work from. But
secondly, you have this big tumult in the country, an uprising.
And then the first thing that happens in the case of Egypt
within say a month or 2 months is that we throw political
contestants with very little experience into what appears to be
a winner take all process and you raise the stakes so high that
the tension goes through the roof and I think that has been a
big mistake.
One thing that Tunisia has done well, among others, but has
done very well is it has kind of let this process play out over
time and I know that we sometimes become impatient with that,
delays and so on. But I actually think the delays are okay. As
long as the delays are not there to the benefit of one group,
one partisan group or another.
One thing that is----
Mr. Cotton. Can I take back my time for a moment?
Mr. Campbell. Please.
Mr. Cotton. Just to ask you to elaborate on that point,
that is a happy side effect of the delays is that you have time
for mediating institutions like political parties or a free
press to come about. I was a soldier in Iraq. I saw that happen
there as well over the years as they were preparing for round
after round of election. Have you seen those kind of mediating
institutions maturing in Tunisia in a way they didn't have a
chance to in Egypt?
Mr. Campbell. Much more so. So you have a very strong
opposition and one of the interesting side effects of the time
is that the opposition which was very weak during the election
is now very strong which has actually caused the standoff.
Ennahda is unable to impose its will. That is worrying for the
economy because you have got this stalemate. But in the long
run it may be okay. Tunisians are serious about the
Constitution maybe because of the French influence. They see a
document like that as very important.
I will just throw in a little comment about Egypt. Egypt
has for the second time drafted a Constitution in 2 months and
they are going to have a referendum 25 days later. That is not
how it is done. I think Tunisia, as much as it is unsettling,
probably are doing it in a much better manner, but it would be
terrible if the economy in the meantime falters and fails.
Mr. Cotton. Thank you all.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Cotton.
Mr. Schneider of Illinois.
Mr. Schneider. Thank you. I want to thank the witnesses for
your insights as you have highlighted as an important issue for
not just the region, but for the United States.
Mr. Mastic, you enclosed in your submitted comments with a
line and I will quote, ``Tunisia remains the best hope for a
democratic political transition in the Arab world.'' You
touched on this sense within Tunisia of declining confidence of
direction, but plateauing. This may not be a fair question, but
does the hope remain for the Tunisian people and what are their
aspirations? What would the outcome that they want to see that
would change that curve in an upward direction?
Mr. Mastic. Sure. Certainly, some of the economic
aspirations that I think people have, expectations that they
have are not achievable, not in short order. There is no
question about that. However, with movement on the political
track, we consistently see renewed confidence in the democratic
process. And even as satisfaction with where the country is
headed right now is at an all-time low. You still see a slight
majority supporting a turbulent democratic system that is some
other model. And so I do think that it is very much rooted in
sort of a general sense of hope, but that could quickly turn
when you see progress on the political track.
Mr. Schneider. The idea of hope springs eternal, but
without hope, all things are lost is important. The future, and
I am going to turn to Mr. Sweeney. The future depends so much
on those institutions and you have mentioned a couple of times
the strength of Tunisian institutions. What are some of the
ones that you have the most confidence in? What are some of the
institutions that we should be watching a little more closely
and working to reinforce?
Mr. Sweeney. Most confidence is sort of hard to measure
right now because the country is really at a stalemate in terms
of making progress on a whole series of political decisions. So
it is relatively difficult to give you an answer and say A is
better than B.
In our particular area of expertise, IFES, we are going to
be starting all over again. Now the good news and one of the
reasons why I say they will move relatively quickly is the
Parliament already has all of its 36 candidates. Nine of them
will be appointed to constitute the next election commission.
That is part of the dialogue that is going on. However at the
same time, all the investment that was made in 2011 in terms of
the election commission has basically gone away. The staff that
we trained has moved on to other jobs because the election
commission's mandate, budget, everything expired in May 2012.
So we are going to be starting over again. And I think that is
part of the frustration that is expressed at the political
level that is also showing up at the economic level. Great
progress was made. Aspirations, dreams, hopes got to 70 percent
and then all of a sudden, the process got gridlocked. And that
is where we are right now. I have great hope that once they get
to consensus, they will again demonstrate the ability to move
very, very quickly.
Mr. Schneider. Mr. Campbell?
Mr. Campbell. Well, the quick part of the answer is that we
know which institutions Tunisians don't trust and that don't
work and that is basically the security institutions and the
police. It is partly not their fault in the sense that it has
been difficult to restore order, but partly the trust is not
there because there were decades of experience of the security
services, interior security being used for repression.
On the other hand, the military is still by far the most
trusted institution. Unlike in Egypt, it has shown no
inclination to get into politics. It really is genuinely above
the fray. And so those are the sort of polar opposites in terms
of institutions. But Tunisians do have trust in government. The
ministries have traditionally operated reasonably well. There
is a history actually of technocratic ministers. It is
interesting that the ministers, immediately post transition,
many of them were drawn from previous governments. They were
seen as able figures. So I think the actual ministries are well
regarded. The military is well regarded. But the security
services are not, I think is the basic answer to the question.
Mr. Schneider. I will close with this. I am almost out of
time, but the need to reinforce those institutions to work with
the military to try to establish a credible security
infrastructure, what policy recommendations, and you can submit
these later, what policy recommendations for us does that lead
to? And what are the timelines that would be realistic? Because
it is the time and space to build those institutions that I
think are going to become critical going forward.
I will close with Mr. Mastic's remark to ensure that
Tunisia is not just a hope for democracy, but an accomplishment
of a democracy. Thank you very much.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Schneider.
Mr. Collins is recognized.
Mr. Collins. Thank you, Madam Chair. I appreciate it. It is
a normal Wednesday around here with markups and everything else
going on, so I appreciate getting in here.
I think the story in this arena is 3 years and it is
amazing what has happened in these 3 years, not just in this
location, but across the world.
My question is fairly brief, but you can answer how you
want to. It really deals with the economic issues. What is the
likely course of Tunisia's economy and what is the appropriate
role of its international partners in helping Tunisia to
promote economic growth and job creation and to address
regional inequalities which I think is one of the issues. And
then really what steps, if any, can or should the United States
take to promote bilateral trade and investment.
It started sort of as an economic in some way, and I think
the future will be based on economic and how we go forward, so
I would just love to hear what you think.
Mr. Mastic. Sure, I will respond briefly to that. IMF
assistance is important for macroeconomic stability in Tunisia.
That is happening. I think efforts to promote regional
integration, regional economic integration are an important
part of the solution to both the jobs and economic growth
problems in Tunisia and elsewhere in the Maghreb.
And then lastly, with respect to the United States, efforts
encouraging U.S. investment by U.S. companies and to lower the
barriers for U.S. companies in Tunisia are important.
Mr. Collins. I want to follow up, but I want to get to you
as well. You mentioned the regional aspect there, especially
with the instability that is inherent right there, what can be
done to overcome that? What can be done to encourage it even
with Europe, what can we do there? Because you mentioned that
and it is an interesting concept.
Mr. Mastic. Sure. The obvious factor here is with Libya you
have a potential economic giant that can really help with
respect to growth in the region, jobs creation. But the
security challenges are a serious obstacle to that. So it is
sort of like you can't address something simply at the economic
level. There has to be a redoubled effort on the security level
as well.
Mr. Collins. Mr. Sweeney or Mr. Campbell?
Mr. Campbell. I was going to say that is a great answer
because I was privileged to go shortly after the transition to
Tunisia with Raj Shah from USAID and looking at economics, not
normally my field. And one of the things that sort of struck me
is just imagine Tunisia's human resources and youth, educated
youth, highly educated youth, 34 percent unemployment rate
among college graduates. Marry that to Libya's wealth, enormous
wealth and Egypt's population and sort of consumer possibility.
It is not going to happen soon, but you can imagine a North
Africa union and there are some talks about this, a North
African union being a really strong economic force with Algeria
and Libya's wealth, Tunisia's people, and Egypt's population.
In the immediate term, it is tourism and agriculture.
Tourism was a driver of the economy, a main driver. In touring
Tunisia with Raj Shah, we saw a lot of high-tech agriculture
and science, but Tunisia is very, very fertile, can feed its
own people, already or did export agricultural products. So I
think short term is tourism and agriculture. Long term is
opening the borders between the countries in North Africa.
Mr. Sweeney. Again, sir, I am going to concur with my
colleagues. I will point out that tourism is a good 10 percent
of all of the county's economies and sources of foreign
exchange that you referenced. Tourism directly goes to whether
or not the local population feels that they have a government
that works and provides them with a modicum of security as well
as a message to tourists as to whether or not they can travel
there in safety which means that you have to double down on
security and you have to double down on protection of
infrastructure if you're going to try and develop a regional
economic framework in terms of either oil, natural gas, or any
other major commodity.
Mr. Collins. I think what is interesting there and you just
said something and my background has a lot of counseling
involved. And the very thing I tell the people who have a
problem is the very thing you need to fix is the very thing
that is broken. And in a relationship, whether it be husband
and wife or anybody else, is trust. And if that trust is
broken, it is the very thing that you need to rebuild the
relationship, but it is broken and it is like trying to run a
marathon on a broken leg. You are just going to have that
issue.
Great answers. I think maybe a time for another hearing is
if there was a joining together there, that is an interesting
power shift that could occur from a lot of different areas,
especially from Israel on over from that side, so that's
another topic for another day, but I do appreciate you being
here and those are answers that I think we need to continue the
panel. And Madam Chair, thank you as always.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much. Mr. Vargas of
California is recognized.
Mr. Vargas. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. I just wanted
to briefly say to Mr. Sweeney, you are very correct about being
the most engaged and charismatic chair we have and certainly
rival the election committee chair in Tunisia, I assure you.
She does a fantastic job here.
I wanted to continue to ask the questions on the issues of
the economy. You mentioned Libya. Libya is about half the size
and population as Tunisia, I believe, and it is smaller in GDP
than Tunisia. So I was curious when you said that Libya is a
powerhouse for Tunisia, could you further comment on that? It
caught me off guard there.
Mr. Campbell. I don't know the exact figures, but just as
an example, Libya has a budget surplus, a big budget surplus
even without oil being refined and pumped at its previous
levels. If Libya got its current capacity, and when I say
current capacity, I don't mean building new capacity, I just
mean the capacity that is up to speed, it would have, and
again, unfortunately I don't know the exact figures, but it has
a budget surplus of many billions of U.S. dollars. Whereas
Tunisia, Tunisia has a big budget deficit. I believe it is
something like $1/2 billion. I just heard this the other day so
you're looking at something with billions in surplus versus $1/
2 billion in debt. And it is just oil wealth. It is that
simple, small population oil wealth. But Libya had
traditionally imported its labor. And they had bad relations
with Tunisia. So you had the educated young people of Tunisia,
highly technical. You have Libya that has always had labor
shortages because of being a resource-based economy. And you
have Libya with surplus cash. So there is a real potential
combination there. And they are not enemies at all. But they
don't have any--right now, there is no structure of inter-
country partnership.
Mr. Vargas. Again, the curiosity for me because again,
Libya's GDP is smaller than Tunisia's GDP, so it is maybe the
case that the government is doing better. But I guess the
reason I would say that is because it seems like the Jasmine
Resolution began because of issues of unemployment, the youth,
and obviously self-immolation was a trigger, but all these
problems, and the problems still seem to be there. And with
growing unemployment, well, I don't know if it is growing
unemployment, but I saw that the growth rate did slow down this
year compared to last year, so you do have the economy that is
slowing down. I mean these problems are problematic. You have
this tumultuous democratic system you are trying to fix, but
underneath that, it is the economy. It is the old, it is the
economy, stupid. So could you comment on that because I think
that is the issue.
Recently, we had the opportunity, a few of us, to go to the
tribal areas in Pakistan. We saw that the roads were being
built, dams were being built, and people seemed to have some
hope for the future because things were getting done. And here
it seems like, if I was a person there, it seems like, yes, we
are going the wrong way, you know? I thought this was supposed
to better. Could you comment?
Mr. Sweeney. I will take the opening opportunity. In
Tunisia, you have a real country. It is not a country that has
been cobbled together in different ways over time and now that
a dictator is gone in the case of Libya, different identities
are coming out. You do have a country with Tunisia.
The other important thing to remember about Tunisia is that
it is extraordinarily rich in agriculture. As Les said, it can
feed itself. I has a population, it has an educated population,
but that population has not been given opportunity in the last
few years. So there is enormous opportunity there if there is
investment, if there is confidence, if there is trust, if there
is some stability. That is not as easy to say about Libya. That
is not as easy to say about some other countries that are in
transition right now. So you are hitting the central point and
the central strength and the reason for optimism about Tunisia
and why it needs and deserves the attention is because it
really is a country. It is not just a collection of peoples
that were put together in a colonial map. And it does have a
Constitution. It does have strong institutions. It does have a
very robust political process.
Mr. Campbell. I will maybe just add that there are so many
challenges in these countries, including Tunisia, but there is
a real political debate about the type of economy Tunisia will
have. You have got very strong leftist parties that would
prefer to continue the system of subsidies and sort of a state-
run or managed economy. The ruling party, Ennahda, is actually
a little more free market oriented. And then you have the
smaller liberal parties that are sort of radically free market.
And there is a very, very strong debate. I don't think there is
any consensus on which direction they are going to go with
their economy so that is another issue to think about.
Mr. Vargas. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Vargas. Mr. Connolly of
Virginia is recognized.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. Welcome to our
panel.
Mr. Campbell, would it be fair to describe Tunisia under
the former President Ben Ali as a police state?
Mr. Campbell. Yes, absolutely. I mean----
Mr. Connolly. You would concur, Mr. Mastic?
Mr. Mastic. Yes.
Mr. Connolly. Mr. Sweeney, in light of that, I assume you
don't dispute that. How vulnerably politically is Tunisia to a
backlash in terms of opening up that an authoritarian figure
comes along and says yes, but the price we are paying is a lack
of order, chaotic politics, and we need to restore that order.
What kind of appeal might such a figure have in Tunisia in your
view?
Mr. Sweeney. I think over the course of the hearing today,
each of us has highlighted the fact that there are threats to
Tunisia and those threats are somewhat based on the economic
situation, somewhat based on the security situation, somewhat
based on the current political stalemate. While at the same
time each of us, I believe, has pointed out there is great hope
and optimism and there is the opportunity for the entire system
to work. But would you, if you were doing a risk analysis,
would you completely discount the potential of an authoritarian
figure coming back into play? No. No. You couldn't discount
that. But I don't believe that any of us or at least to my
knowledge have that as a potential outcome. In the short term,
we are all very optimistic that the current, very robust
political dialogue that is under way will result in the
opportunity for a new Constitution, a new election process, and
the voice of the people being heard and acted upon and
hopefully within the next year.
Mr. Connolly. And obviously, part of the answer to what
you're saying is building enduring democratic institutions.
Mr. Sweeney. Absolutely, absolutely. And Tunisia has a
history of institutions which gives us great hope.
Mr. Connolly. What are the implications in terms of the
Tunisian evolution for the Arab Spring, the other Arab Spring
countries?
Mr. Sweeney. I think all of us have great hope that Tunisia
will become the working model of a democratic system and a
working model for other countries, other judiciaries, other
parliaments, other election commissions, other news media,
other civil society groups to use as their model going forward.
Mr. Connolly. Mr. Campbell, Mr. Mastic?
Mr. Campbell. Just one point on the previous question, a
great part about Tunisia is that during the last election 27
parties won at least one seat. The ruling party, Ennahda, or
the plurality party I should say, won around 50 percent, but
there are many, many other parties. So they didn't have the
pendulum swing of Egypt where you had this kind of Mubarak to
Muslim Brotherhood back to the former regime. So I am
optimistic that they won't go back to a dictatorship.
I think the best hopes in the Arab world right now in terms
of models are Tunisia and Yemen. And even though they are very
different countries what brings them together is the idea of
consensus and coalition building. And so both have coalition
governments. Both have a dialogue process, a form of dialogue
process and both are seeking consensus. I think we have to be
careful not to rush them into further elections. Let them play
this sort of political negotiation out a little bit, don't
rush, number one. But number two, both Yemen and Tunisia need
this economic help and we, of course, were discussing that a
lot here. It is not sort of in the cards, it seems in Yemen and
Tunisia to get the economic help, but if we don't rush them. If
we allow them to play out this kind of coalition building
negotiation and we support them economically, we can have two
models. But Tunisia will be the more modern--it will be the one
that we recognize in terms of its inclusivity, proximity to
Europe, and so on. So it is probably more important.
Mr. Connolly. Mr. Mastic?
Mr. Mastic. Yes, I would concur with that for the reasons
Les points out with respect to Tunisia, Tunisia's institutions
and the proximity and the sort of cultural affinity that it
would have with the West, more so than you would find in Yemen.
At this point, I hesitate or I would caution against the
positive effects or spillover effects of a successful
transition in Tunisia and other transition countries.
Definitely, Tunisia was the critical country to start the Arab
Spring. However, we are not where we were in 2011 anymore and
unfortunately, very different processes have played out in
Egypt and Libya.
Having said that and as I said in my statement, Tunisia is
important because the region, the Arab world lacks a successful
working model of democracy. And so for that reason I think it
is incredibly important that there be strong engagement,
continued engagement in Tunisia.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you both and I do think this can work
in Tunisia. It at least creates another model, especially for
places like Egypt.
Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Connolly. And thank you to
our panelists, to our members, to the audience. I feel greatly
encouraged after hearing from our three specialists. And with
that, the subcommittee is adjourned. Thank you very much.
[Whereupon, at 3:39 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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