[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
OVERSIGHT OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD BURMA
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
DECEMBER 4, 2013
__________
Serial No. 113-94
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
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http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DANA ROHRABACHER, California Samoa
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio BRAD SHERMAN, California
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
TED POE, Texas GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MATT SALMON, Arizona THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina KAREN BASS, California
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
MO BROOKS, Alabama DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
TOM COTTON, Arkansas ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
PAUL COOK, California JUAN VARGAS, California
GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III,
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania Massachusetts
STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas AMI BERA, California
RON DeSANTIS, Florida ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
TREY RADEL, Florida GRACE MENG, New York
DOUG COLLINS, Georgia LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
TED S. YOHO, Florida JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
LUKE MESSER, Indiana
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio, Chairman
DANA ROHRABACHER, California ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
MATT SALMON, Arizona Samoa
MO BROOKS, Alabama AMI BERA, California
GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania BRAD SHERMAN, California
DOUG COLLINS, Georgia GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
LUKE MESSER, Indiana WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
Ms. Judith Cefkin, Senior Advisor for Burma, Bureau of East Asia
and the Pacific, U.S. Department of State...................... 8
Mr. Vikram J. Singh, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
South and Southeast Asia, Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs, U.S. Department
of Defense..................................................... 22
Mr. Gregory Beck, Deputy Assistant Administrator, Bureau for
Asia, U.S. Agency for International Development................ 29
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
Ms. Judith Cefkin: Prepared statement............................ 11
Mr. Vikram J. Singh: Prepared statement.......................... 24
Mr. Gregory Beck: Prepared statement............................. 31
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 56
Hearing minutes.................................................. 57
Questions submitted for the record by the Honorable Steve Chabot,
a Representative in Congress from the State of Ohio, and
chairman, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, and responses
from:
Ms. Judith Cefkin.............................................. 58
Mr. Vikram J. Singh............................................ 64
Mr. Gregory Beck............................................... 66
Written responses from Mr. Vikram J. Singh to questions submitted
for the record by the Honorable Trent Franks, a Representative
in Congress from the State of Arizona.......................... 72
OVERSIGHT OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD BURMA
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WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 4, 2013
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 o'clock
p.m., in room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Steve
Chabot (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Chabot. Good afternoon. The subcommittee will come to
order.
I would like to welcome everyone. Our colleagues will be
here shortly. We are going to have votes here that is going to
interrupt this probably any minute. And then I am going to try
to get my statement in and probably the ranking member's as
soon as he gets here.
We would like to welcome the folks here, the witnesses, and
the members of the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific.
The ranking member, Mr. Faleomavaega, is not able to be
here today, so Mr. Bera will sit in his place this afternoon.
Mr. Bera and I will make opening statements and other members
will be recognized for 1 minute, assuming the timing goes right
for all of this.
In many ways, the Burma we see today is much different than
the one we knew only a few years ago, at least at first glance.
The sudden and unexpected democratic transition, which opened
Burma's frontier to the world, was welcomed by democracy
advocates everywhere. In fact, I traveled to Burma in August of
last year and saw a number of these changes.
To be sure, we are all pleased that Nobel Peace Prize
winner Aung San Suu Kyi is finally free and a duly elected
member of Parliament. The same can be said of the regime's
actions to release nearly 30,000 jailed citizens, of which
1,071 were political prisoners.
However, as we have seen, the political and social
situation in Burma is extremely fragile, and there is still
much work to be done. The escalation of human rights abuses
committed by the Burmese military and the civil unrest between
Burma's Buddhist majority and Muslim minority is threatening
the progression of future political reforms. Regrettably, the
rise of anti-Muslim violence has so far displaced over 250,000
individuals, destroyed over 10,000 homes, and killed nearly 300
people. Evidence shows the Burmese military perpetrated some of
these attacks directly. In other situations, the military and
police just stood by and watched the violence unfold.
What is not often mentioned is that over the last year or
so, nearly 1,000 Rohingya and 200 Kachin prisoners of
conscience of have been arrested and detained for their
religion or ethnicity, or for practicing their right to freedom
of assembly. This, I think, most would agree, is unacceptable.
A year ago, President Obama received 11 commitments from
President Thein Sein, which were reaffirmed in May when he made
an official visit to the White House. However, those
commitments remain largely ignored. These unfulfilled promises
include establishing a U.N. High Commissioner for human rights
office, allowing international humanitarian access to conflict
areas, taking decisive action in the Rakhine State to end
discrimination of the Rohingya Muslims, and ending illicit
weapons deals with North Korea, among others.
Despite substantial evidence that reforms are languishing
behind a corrupt governing system that is still being
manipulated by the veiled hands of the military, the Obama
administration has moved forward with offers of more rewards,
deals, and concessions. Over the last year, the administration
has lifted investment sanctions; lifted import bans; allowed
Burma's military to observe COBRA GOLD--the largest military
exercise in the world; lifted visa bans on top Burmese
politicians; hosted President Thein Sein at the White House;
signed a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement; began the
process of admitting Burma into the Generalized System of
Preferences program; and initiated military-to-military
engagement.
It is, as a result of these actions, that today's hearing
is being called to examine the administration's decision to
transition from an ``action-for-action'' engagement strategy to
one that I believe it labels as ``proactive.'' This contrasts
with America's longstanding Burma policy that enjoyed support
on both sides of the aisle. Years of bipartisan cooperation in
Congress, which resulted in the imposition of widespread
sanctions on Burma, is now, I am afraid, being overlooked.
As the administration has raced to turn Burma into its
success story, I believe its engagement strategy has lost sight
of the realities on the ground, and has become hasty and I am
afraid also misguided. I do not believe the administration has
provided enough time for nascent political reforms in Burma to
take route. As a result, it is premature to assess whether the
changes we have seen are genuine because Burma has not yet
demonstrated it is committed to a long-term path of democratic
governance. Constitutional revisions that implement reforms at
the central and local levels have not occurred. So until this
happens, all the optimism and hope is purely speculation.
Specifically, I want to focus on the administration's
unilateral decision to pursue engagement with Burma's military.
As we have seen elsewhere in the world, unconditioned military
assistance can lead to unanticipated outcomes. Absent any fixed
expectations or benchmarks to measure reforms, the U.S. is
throwing away what may be, since most sanctions have been
lifted, its last point of leverage that could help foster
further reforms in Burma.
In early June, then Secretary Leon Panetta stated that the
U.S. was interested in improving its military ties with Burma
if that country continued implementing democratic reforms and
improved its human rights record. Less than 6 months later,
reforms have stalled, and the country faces a situation U.S.
Ambassador Mitchell calls ``two steps forward, one step back,''
and human rights abuses continue. Nevertheless, the U.S. is
still moving forward on a policy fueled by hope.
The administration's decision to pursue a military-to-
military relationship with Burma ignores and disregards the
concerns of Burma's ethnic minorities who continue to express
their opposition. They believe pre-conditions must first be met
before these relations progress any further. With that in mind,
I hope today's witnesses will finally detail the
administration's short- and long-term plans to implement its
policy, including how military engagement will end the Burmese
military's perpetration of human rights violations, help Burma
achieve national reconciliation, reform Burma's Constitution,
or create an independent judiciary. I hope we can learn how it
plans to proceed in working with military leaders who have not
demonstrated a sincere interest in reforms, have not ended
violations of human rights laws, have not adhered to ceasefire
agreements, and have not held their own accountable for their
horrendous crimes. Without such a roadmap, it remains very
unclear whether future reforms in Burma will be consistent with
goals established under U.S. laws.
Lastly, the reopening of the USAID mission in Burma was an
important step in our engagement strategy because there is a
critical need for Americans on the ground to assess what is
actually happening there. At the same time, with all of these
lingering concerns about Burma's future, it is prudent that
U.S. assistance is targeting those areas and helping those
communities in most need. So I hope today's witnesses can also
provide us with more details about the growing foreign
assistance budget for Burma, and those areas where additional
funding has been requested.
I would also note that we will be welcoming the gentleman
from New York, Mr. Crowley, and the gentleman from Arizona, Mr.
Franks, this afternoon. They will be joining us. I ask
unanimous consent that they be permitted to speak and ask
questions after members of the subcommittee have done so.
Without objection, so ordered.
Mr. Bera is not here yet this afternoon. Mr. Brooks, would
you like to make an opening statement? Okay. We will go into
recess here while we go vote. We will be back in a little
while. We have two votes, so I am guessing it will be
approximately \1/2\ hour. I apologize for any inconvenience to
everybody. It is kind of these ``hurry up and wait'' things,
but votes have been called, so we have to go and do our
constitutional duty. We will be back shortly.
We are in recess. Thank you.
[Recess.]
Mr. Chabot. The subcommittee will come back to order.
I have already given my opening statement. I would now like
to recognize Ami Bera, who is filling in for Mr. Faleomavaega
this afternoon as the ranking member. We have already
recognized that Mr. Crowley of New York and Mr. Franks of
Arizona will be able to speak. If they would like to give an
opening statement for 1 minute, they have that opportunity as
well.
I now recognize Mr. Bera for 5 minutes.
Mr. Bera. Great. Thank you, Chairman Chabot, and thank you
for the witnesses on this incredibly important hearing.
Obviously, as we look to Burma as a country and future
democratic ally, it is a nation that is at a crossroads, you
know, emerging from, you know, what certainly has been a
difficult past and hopefully a future filled with promise. But
certainly that opportunity is not without challenge, and I
certainly look forward to hearing your testimony as witnesses
of how we, as a nation that fosters democracy, advance in that
challenge.
The last couple of years the Burmese Government has
certainly made progress in instituting a number of democratic
practices and a number of democratic reforms. Certainly, the
release of political prisoners, the inking of a ceasefire
agreement, and allowing the opposition to participate in
Parliament are noteworthy events that occurred in Burma.
That said, despite this progress, the challenges in
building a nation that celebrates its rich and ethnic and
religious diversity remain. You know, a few weeks ago, maybe a
few months ago, we had a prior hearing on some of the ethnic
issues and faith-based challenges that are occurring in the
northern part of Burma, and certainly those challenges remain
of great concern to most of us on this committee. We certainly
are concerned about the ongoing violence and human rights
abuses that we see occurring in Burma.
Also, as the world's greatest democracy, you know, we have
to have a role, and I do believe our Burmese engagement policy
should continue to be committed to seeing national
reconciliation, transparency, and ethnic equality. We have also
got to send a very clear message that we will not tolerate
these human rights abuses and oppression.
In addition, if military engagement continues with Burma,
this arrangement must be strategically tailored with firm and
clear human rights benchmarks aimed to drive the political
reform that we hope to see. The U.S. needs to remain a strong
supporter in South Asia and a leader in the global community in
order to advance the respect and rule of law and human rights.
I look forward to hearing your positions. I look forward to
reviewing our positions and policies on Burma, and, you know,
our role as the world's leading democracy and continuing a
peaceful transition for the military repression to a country of
democratic rule.
Thank you, and I will yield back.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much, Mr. Bera. I appreciate it.
The gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Franks, is recognized for 1
minute.
Mr. Franks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank you for
the opportunity to raise such a critical issue and one here
where the United States can have a truly serious impact.
One of the topics of this hearing will be how the
Department of State and the Department of Defense are reviewing
military-to-military engagement with the Burmese army or the
Burmese military. The Burmese military happens to be one of the
worst oppressors of human rights in recent history, and I urge
the administration work closely with Congress throughout this
process.
The U.S. needs a policy response that is more long-term
than just lifting military sanctions and setting broad
objectives for mil-to-mil engagement, especially if we intend
to be a leader in the region and help Burma become a more
rights respecting country.
We must have clear benchmarks for the Burmese military
before any sanctions on the military are lifted. We know that
the Burmese military wants the relationship with our military.
Our actions must incentivize the military to reform. Benchmarks
should focus on the implementation of constitutional reforms
that curb the military's control over the civilian government,
transparency and accountability by the military, and to end
abuses of ethnic and religious minorities.
I recently returned from a congressional delegation to the
Philippines. And among the many things I learned there during
that trip was how the U.S. can have extensive impact on these
countries in southeast Asia. The U.S. now has an opportunity to
make a positive impact in Burma, but we must proceed extremely
wisely and leverage the relationship we now have with Burma to
encourage the necessary reforms.
I thank you, Chairman Chabot, for the opportunity to speak
today, and for addressing this very vital topic in your
hearing. And I thank all of you for being here.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much.
The gentleman from New York, Mr. Crowley, is recognized for
1 minute to make an opening statement.
Mr. Crowley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also, if I could--
if you could pause the clock for a moment, I did note that you
referred to me as Mr. Moakley.
Mr. Chabot. I apologize.
Mr. Crowley. If I could be compared to any great Irish-
American, it could be Mr. Moakley. So thank you very much.
Mr. Chabot. That is what I had in mind.
Mr. Crowley. I thank you for holding this hearing today, as
well as my colleagues for being here, particularly Mr. Ami
Bera, Congressman Bera from California, for his interest, and
Mr. Faleomavaega from our side as well. Eni Faleomavaega has
been a great champion of the U.S.-Asia relations for many, many
years. I am sorry he can't be here today.
Many of you know that I am the lead sponsor of legislation
that imposed many of the sanctions on Burma, the Block Burmese
JADE Act in particular. I worked on this with our then-ranking
member Tom Lantos, and fully took the responsibility of the
legislation on after his passing. I also worked very closely
with Mr. Lantos on the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act.
He was someone who was a true champion for human rights
throughout the world, and Burma was no less a place of interest
for Mr. Lantos. We miss him.
As you know, the position of the Special Envoy to Burma,
the list of individuals targeted for sanctions called the
Specially Designated Nationals, or SDN list, and many other
sanctions were created by the JADE Act, which I authored.
All that being said, I have to be honest, I am increasingly
concerned about the approach our administration has recently
begun to take with respect to Burma, especially our apparent
plans for mil-to-mil relations and the furtherance of them. And
keep in mind, I am someone who initially supported the
administration's policy of action for action, but I think we
are going well beyond that now.
I am not opposed to talking to the Burmese regime, but I am
against unilaterally lifting all sanctions and pressures and
granting much sought after military training, if the situation
in Burma is stalled or further rolled back.
I have a more extensive opening statement, Mr. Chairman. I
won't read all. But, once again, focusing on I think a
premature stage of moving toward more open relations, mil-to-
mil relations, really from--going from DIILS to EIMET too soon,
in my opinion. There has not been enough action for action.
I look forward to hearing from the witnesses, and I welcome
them today. But I look forward also to the question and answer
period in which I will be a little bit more direct.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much. And without objection, the
gentleman's full statement will be entered into the record.
I would now like to turn to the gentleman from California,
Mr. Rohrabacher, who is the chairman of the Europe, Eurasia,
and Emerging Threats Subcommittee.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. If
there is a message the Government of Burma needs to hear from
the Congress, it is you are not ready to be accepted into the
family of free nations yet. You have made progress, but not
enough, and we expect certain things to be addressed if you are
indeed to be accepted as a legitimate democratic government, as
with the other democratic governments in the world.
The Burmese military is still conducting brutal and bloody
operations against the ethnic peoples on the Thai-Burma border.
The Burmese Government is permitting genocidal brutality
against the Muslim population living in the western part of
their country. And, again, I might add, Mr. Chairman, if indeed
the Muslims of the world who are trying to--the moderate
Muslims who are opposing radical Islam in this world are to
take the West seriously, we must make sure that we are loud and
clear when Muslims are being murdered genocidally in countries
like Burma.
So we need to step up, and we cannot start treating Burma
as, I say, a democratic country where their job is done until
we see some progress, especially in those areas. The Burmans--
one last point, sorry.
The Burmans were repressed by that horrible government that
I was proud to have stood with these people for 20 years. They
stood against this brutal dictatorship, but now what we have--
see emerging is a country in which the Burmans are free but the
Muslims are not, and the ethnic tribal people are not. That is
not acceptable to the people of the United States if Burma is
to be treated like any other democratic country.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much.
I would also like to recognize the presence this afternoon
of Congressman Perry from Pennsylvania and I understand that no
opening statement is necessary. Thank you very much.
Before I introduce the witnesses, I would also like to
recognize that we have a number of Burmese parliamentarians
with us here this afternoon. If they want to stand up and be
recognized, we would like to welcome you to the Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific. If you would like to
stand, we can recognize you. Thank you for being here. Thank
you very much. [Applause.]
I would now like to introduce our distinguished panel here
this afternoon. We first have Judith Cefkin, who is a career
member of the Senior Foreign Service. Prior to assuming her
duties as Senior Burma Advisor, she served as Deputy Chief of
Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok, Thailand, from 2010 to
2013. She previously served as the Ambassador's staff assistant
and as a political officer. Since entering the Foreign Service
in 1983, Ms. Cefkin has had overseas postings in Mexico City,
Paris, and in Manila. She has also served as Deputy Chief of
Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Sarajevo, Bosnia, and
Herzegovina; and as a desk officer for Rwanda, Burundi, and the
Central African Republic; Deputy Director of the Office of
Western European Affairs; and as Director of the Office of
Nordic and Baltic Affairs. She received a B.A. in government
from Smith College, and a master's in international relations
from the London School of Economics and Political Science. We
welcome you this afternoon.
I would also like to welcome Deputy Assistant Secretary
Vikram Singh. He is the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
South and Southeast Asia within the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs.
Mr. Singh serves as the principal advisor for all policy
matters pertaining to development and implementation of defense
strategies for the South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific.
Before his appointment in April 2012, Mr. Singh served as
Senior Advisor to the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy on
Asian and Pacific Security Affairs. He was the Deputy Special
Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan at the Department
of State. Mr. Singh lived and worked in Sri Lanka, where he ran
a Ford Foundation program on minority rights and conflict in
Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, and reported
on the Sri Lankan civil war. He holds degrees from the
University of California at Berkeley and Columbia University.
We welcome you here, Mr. Singh.
Finally, we have Deputy Assistant Administrator Gregory
Beck, who serves as Deputy Assistant Administrator for Asia.
His management and oversight responsibility includes all USAID
programs in East Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific. He has
over 15 years of senior-level leadership experience in
development and in conflict and post-conflict environments,
including in Asia, Africa, and the Balkans, and Caucasus'. He
was formerly Director of the Office of Humanitarian Assistance
with CHF International and he held a number of positions with
the International Rescue Committee, including as Senior
Regional Director of Asia and Country Director in Somalia,
Kenya, Rwanda, and Croatia. During Mr. Beck's career with the
IRC, he led emergency response teams in Somalia, Rwanda,
Pakistan, Indonesia, and Burma. Mr. Beck has a master's degree
in environmental engineering from the California State
University at Humboldt and a bachelor's degree in foreign
service and international politics from Pennsylvania State
University. He speaks Nepalese and has studied Thai, Kiswahili,
Croatian, and Kenya-Rwanda. That is a mouthful. We appreciate
your presence and we are looking forward to your testimony this
afternoon.
Ms. Cefkin, we will turn to you first. We do have the 5-
minute rule in effect here. The yellow light will come on
letting you know you have 1 minute to wrap up, and then the red
light will come on. We would appreciate it if you would
complete your testimony at that time, if at all possible.
Ms. Cefkin, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF MS. JUDITH CEFKIN, SENIOR ADVISOR FOR BURMA,
BUREAU OF EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Ms. Cefkin. Chairman Chabot, Ranking Member Bera,
distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify today about U.S. policy toward Burma and
the important transition that is underway in that country.
Members of Congress, and particularly those on this
committee, have been powerful proponents of human rights and
democracy in Burma over the past two decades. I know that we
share the goal of supporting reforms that complete Burma's
transition to become a democratic, peaceful, prosperous member
of the world community. We tackle this test cheered by the
advances that have been made, yet cognizant of the substantial
challenges that remain. Thank you for your past and future
partnership in supporting Burma's reform progress.
When then-Assistant Secretary Campbell testified before
this committee in April 2012, a historic--by election had just
brought Aung San Suu Kyi and 42 other members of the
opposition, National League for Democracy, into government, but
the NLD members had not yet taken their seats in Parliament.
Today, they are active leaders there.
Since 2011, the Government of Burma has released over 1,100
political prisoners. It has substantially eased media
censorship. Burma has signed the International Atomic Energy
Additional Protocol and taken steps toward fulfilling its
obligation to implement U.N. Security Council resolutions
concerning North Korea. And the government and ethnic armed
groups have intensified efforts to achieve peace and national
reconciliation.
Nearly 4 years after we started down the path of principled
engagement, the culture of reform in Burma is increasingly
self-driven, yet Burma's transition remains fragile. The
lifting of the authoritarian regime's heavy hand has exposed
long-standing challenges, including a struggle to define
national identity.
Communal conflict and anti-Muslim discrimination have been
unleashed in Rakhine State and across the country. Rule of law,
including efforts to promote justice and accountability,
continue to be inadequate, and the military remains closely
tied to politics and the economy. Power and the benefit of
Burma's vast natural resources remain concentrated in the hands
of a few.
These challenges will be neither quickly nor easily
remedied. Nevertheless, our surest road to helping Burma comes
through a strategy of engagement that seeks to assist the
country proactively in its transition to democracy and
development. This is a unique opportunity in modern Burmese
history. The people, the country, are calling for enhanced U.S.
engagement in virtually all sectors, and we must work
tirelessly to ensure that the reforms become irreversible.
I would like to briefly touch on four key pillars of U.S.
policy. The first is promoting national peace and
reconciliation. This is Burma's defining challenge, a challenge
that has eluded the country since its independence. Without
peace and national unity, other reforms will be at risk. To
support the peace process, our Ambassador, Derek Mitchell, and
his Embassy team meet regularly with the government and with
ethnic representatives of all ethnic groups to encourage an
inclusive, transparent peace process. We are supporting efforts
to rebuild trust, and we continue to urge all parties to
respect the human rights of civilian populations.
To counter the disturbing communal violence and anti-Muslim
discrimination that has racked Burma, particularly in Rahkine
State we are promoting messages of tolerance, and we continue
to urge the government to improve security for all vulnerable
populations and to ensure unimpeded humanitarian access to
conflict areas.
In addition, we are urging efforts to reintegrate
communities, and we are pressing the government to implement a
path to citizenship for the Rohingya.
Turning to a related area of focus, supporting democracy
and human rights remains a critical pillar of our policy. We
continue to press for the release of all political prisoners
and to advocate for the opening of a U.N. Office of Human
Rights. We are implementing programs to strengthen civil
society and build a democratic institution. We are also
encouraging the revision of laws necessary to protect
democratic rights.
The need for constitutional reform to allow citizens to
freely elect the leaders of their choice, to recognize the
rights of minorities, and to establish civilian control of the
military is part of this discussion. And this leads me to
mention the importance we attach to promoting security sector
reform.
A military under civilian control that protects the people,
promotes human rights, and respects international law is a
pillar of democracy and essential to the success of the
reforms. Our voice must be heard on this critical issue.
We believe that a carefully calibrated military engagement
to share lessons of how militaries operate in a democratic
framework will strengthen the hand of reformers and is one of
the best tools for shaping Burma's most powerful institutions
at this juncture.
My colleague, Vikram Singh, will elaborate on this,
including the benefit Title 22 authorities would offer to
provide Burmese military more consistent and structured
exposure to international human rights and military justice
standards.
Let me just briefly touch on two other policy areas. one is
supporting----
Mr. Chabot. If you could wrap up, because you are actually
over time now.
Ms. Cefkin. Okay. Supporting Burma's transition to a
transparent open market economy that promotes sustainable
growth, and the last is also to highlight--I would highlight
Burma. We want Burma to be a contributor to regional and global
security.
And just to say that our continued engagement to effect
positive change in Burma is grounded in our strategic interest
and a successful politically, economically progressive Asia
Pacific region, and in the fundamental values that go to the
core of who we are as a nation.
So to prevail and keep our focus on long-term goals, we
feel that we must have a strategic approach that is steady and
considered, but flexible in implementation, to keep pace with
conditions on the ground.
Mr. Chairman, I look forward to continued consultation and
cooperation with you on these important issues. And I want to
thank you again for inviting me to testify today, and I will
look forward to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Cefkin follows:]
----------
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much.
Mr. Singh, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF MR. VIKRAM J. SINGH, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST ASIA, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ASIAN AND PACIFIC SECURITY AFFAIRS,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. Singh. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the
subcommittee. I really want to thank you for inviting me to
speak with you today about our engagement with Burma. And I
will be summarizing my comments in an effort to stay under 5
minutes.
Congress has been instrumental in shaping U.S. policy with
Burma, and the Department of Defense views Congress as a
critical partner in developing and implementing a strategy for
careful, calibrated reengagement with the military in Burma.
The military in Burma remains critical to the ultimate success
of reform efforts and a full transition to democracy.
We believe the Burmese military is positioned to continue
supporting the government's reform program and is interested in
taking steps to modernize, professionalize, and reform itself.
At the same time, we are fully cognizant the military in Burma
retains a prominent role in political and economic life, faces
allegations of ongoing human rights abuses, and retains ties to
North Korea. It is very clear that a meaningful and sustainable
transition for this country and for its military will take many
years.
Given this complex reality of the military's role in Burma,
our policy supports two clear goals. First, encouraging the
military to continue its support for reforms; and, second,
enhancing the military's understanding of and ability to
respect human rights and civilian authority and control.
The Department of State has worked closely with--the
Department of Defense has worked closely with the Department of
State to develop a limited and calibrated set of engagements
with the Burmese military in support of these goals. The steps
we are taking are in line with the recommendations of a range
of Burmese stakeholders, including members of the opposition
and ethnic groups, who urge us to carefully engage the Armed
Forces to build their support for the reform agenda and to help
the military itself modernize and transform.
So far, DoD's only interactions in the last 2 years have
been limited diplomatic engagement, including, through the
U.S.-Burma human rights dialogue, and pull-asides with Burmese
counterparts at multilateral meetings. The resumption of
accounting operations for U.S. personnel missing from World War
II and unaccounted for in Burma.
Workshops and exchanges by the Asia-Pacific Center for
Security Studies on rule of law, civil-military relations, and
civilian control of the military. Supporting Thailand's request
to have Burmese observers at COBRA GOLD to observe just the
staff planning and humanitarian portions of that exercise.
Initial exchanges by the Defense Institute of International
Legal Studies to share views on human rights law and the law of
armed conflict.
These interactions have been largely symbolic. They have
not included any training or education. Under current
restrictions, we cannot undertake training or education
programs, such as DIILS courses on human rights and
international humanitarian law. But our limited engagements we
feel have begun to expose the military to international norms
and behavior and to foster some new trust and understanding.
Mr. Chairman, and members of the subcommittee, the
Department does not seek and is not recommending the full
normalization of bilateral defense ties with Burma at this
time. We are not suggesting the resumption of foreign military
financing or full international military education and
training, otherwise known as IMET.
Barring significant further progress, the engagement we
seek will be limited and calibrated. Over the next year, we
hope to continue the existing activities we have started and to
expand DIILS's engagement, to include some formal training in
human rights and other related areas for Burmese military
officials.
We see value in engagement that would support institutional
changes required to promote better civil military relations,
increased transparency, and greater civilian oversight. We also
recommend initiating steps to build Burma's capacity for
disaster relief, to deal with things like Cyclone Nargis in
2008.
The Department looks forward to working with Congress to
craft these engagements appropriately. All engagements we will
do will fully adhere to relevant sanctions, policy
restrictions, and vetting requirements. It is important to note
that under current sanctions we lack any dedicated mechanism
for this kind of reform-oriented engagement with the Burmese
military.
The main tool for this kind of process is expanded IMET,
which is a scaled and targeted subset of IMET that allows only
education and training related to civilian control of the
military, improving military justice in accordance with
internationally recognized human rights, proper management of
defense resources, and cooperation between the police and
military for counternarcotics.
We look forward to working with Congress on some version of
this kind of programming, so reform-focused engagement can be
more transparent and regularized.
I know I am coming to the end of my time, Mr. Chairman. You
mentioned examples of benchmarks we would want to see. Those
are many of the same things that the administration looks for,
humanitarian international--access for international
humanitarian organizations, accountability in the Burmese
military.
And given that I am coming to the end of my time, I also
just want to acknowledge that I recognize there is considerable
skepticism about what value this kind of military engagement
might provide. We believe that this kind of engagement is part
of our principled stance with regard to reform and supporting
democracy and reform in Burma, and we know there can be no
guarantee that our engagement will bring about the changes we
seek.
But we do believe we have an opportunity to engage for the
first time in decades with a military and government in Burma
open to implementing reforms and accepting U.S. advice to that
end. We believe we need to move forward with that opportunity
in a careful way, in close consultation with the Congress and
our friends and allies who share these objectives.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to taking questions
from you and the subcommittee.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Singh follows:]
----------
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much, Mr. Singh.
Mr. Beck, you are recognizing for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF MR. GREGORY BECK, DEPUTY ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR,
BUREAU FOR ASIA, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
Mr. Beck. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Bera, and
distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify today on USAID's work in Burma.
I would like to first acknowledge the role that this
committee and Congress have played in our engagement and our
advocacy of human rights, democracy, national reconciliation,
and economic reform. We believe the recent historic reforms can
be sustained with continued targeted efforts that support the
needs and aspirations of the people of Burma. However, we
remain conscious of the fragile state of reforms and
reconciliation taking place in the country.
Since the reopening of USAID's mission over a year ago, and
under the strong leadership of Ambassador Mitchell, USAID's
activities have been focused on supporting the U.S.
Government's priority policy objectives in Burma. Specifically,
they reinforce the four principles outlined in the U.S.-Burma
Partnership for Democracy, Peace, and Prosperity, the
principles of inclusivity, transparency, accountability, and
local empowerment.
In the spirit of these principles, we are targeting our
programming toward four key areas at this critical juncture in
Burma's transition--democratic reform, national peace and
reconciliation, economic reforms toward inclusive growth, and
building healthy and resilient communities.
In partnership with the people of Burma, we are helping to
build a foundation for a peaceful and sustained transition to
democracy. Our assistance supports strengthening Burma's
nascent democratic and political processes and institutions by
promoting free and fair elections, supporting political party
development, building the capacity of Parliament, and providing
broad assistance to civil society.
As an example, a USAID program brought civil society and
Parliament together for the first time to draft national
legislation. The result of this historic collaboration was a
new association law that is more in line with international
standards and gives a greater voice and strength to civil
society. This process was hailed by both civil society and
members of Parliament as a model for the future.
Through direct engagement with the people, USAID is
ensuring that Burma adopts legitimate and sustainable processes
that enable the pursuit of national reconciliation. For
instance, our Project for Local Empowerment is working in
conflict-prone regions of Burma to create linkages between
local border groups, communities, and government officials that
promote trust and cooperation.
We have partnered with over 100 local organizations from
human rights groups to humanitarian assistance providers to
help them carry out their vision for Burma.
Looking forward, the continued development of the Burmese
economy requires responsible foreign and domestic investments.
Reforms to the country's legal system are needed to encourage
investment that benefits the lives of the people of Burma,
protects their environment, and encourages a transparent land
tenure system.
Towards these goals, we have assumed leadership of the
donor coordination mechanism for agriculture, contributed
significant input into the recently approved Farmer Rights
Protection Act, and provided technical expertise on the
developing land use policies.
We have also forged milestone public-private partnerships
between American universities and companies, such as Cisco,
Microsoft, and Hewlett-Packard, and provide leadership
training, promote and encourage entrepreneurship, and assist
small- to medium-sized businesses.
But for all of our gains to take root, a healthy, resilient
population is necessary for sustained economic growth. Over the
past few years, USAID has become a leader in the health sector
in Burma, making significant contributions toward combatting
child and maternal mortality, HIV/AIDS, malaria, and drug-
resistant tuberculosis. By focusing in these areas, we are
reaching people who were previously unable to access basic
health care.
Beyond this, our multi-sector Shae Thot program works in
over 1,000 villages, bringing clean drinking water to over
300,000 people. Additionally, over 38,000 people have improved
access to health care, 12,000 farmers are using improved
agriculture technologies, and over 6,000 community-based
organizations and women's groups have received U.S. Government
assistance to strengthen their ability to support their
communities and to better engage with their governments.
Mr. Chairman, and members of the subcommittee, the USAID
mission in Burma is well on its way to establishing a model
mission that maximizes our investment by embracing partnerships
and alliances in all that we do. Whether it be with the private
sector, international organizations, academia, local groups, or
civil society, the relationships and partnerships we forge will
provide a catalytic platform for continued engagement to
improve the lives of the people that live in Burma, and ensure
a safer, more prosperous future for all.
I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today,
and I look forward to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Beck follows:]
----------
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much. We appreciate the
testimony of the panel this afternoon and I will recognize
myself for 5 minutes for the purpose of asking questions.
Last week, Aung San Suu Kyi gave a speech during her trip
to Australia where she said,
``Those of you who think that Burma has successfully
taken the path to reform would be mistaken. If you want
to know why you are mistaken, you only have to study
the Burmese Constitution. If you read it carefully, you
will understand why we can't have genuine democracy
under such a Constitution.''
Burma's Constitution has many severe flaws--no civilian
control of the military, no independence of the judiciary, no
protections and rights for minorities, 25 percent of the seats
in Parliament are reserved for the military, and it bars Aung
San Suu Kyi and others from becoming President. What is the
administration doing to support the universal call for Aung San
Suu Kyi and the people of Burma to advance constitutional
reform before the 2015 elections? Ms. Cefkin, if you would like
to take that.
Ms. Cefkin. Certainly. We very much agree with the priority
you attach to that issue. And, first of all, you may be aware
that there is a process underway in the country. The Parliament
has established a committee to review the current Constitution
and to make recommendations as to changes/amendments that
should be considered.
As you know, constitutional amendments can be a very
challenging process in a number of countries, and in Burma it
is no exception. It will require--first of all, changes will
require a vote of 75 percent of the members of Parliament, and
then many of the issues, probably most of the issues, will have
to go national referendum.
We are engaged in the discussion, and we have made very
clear our expectation that this has to be a priority, that
Burma will not realize its full democratic potential until the
Constitution is reformed. And the same issues you cited are
issues that we regularly cite, the fact that it is absolutely
critical, it will be critical that for the upcoming elections
to be seen as credible that the country--the people of Burma
are able to freely choose their leadership in free and fair
elections.
Of course, it is up to the people of Burma to choose their
leadership, but they should have the right to choose their
leadership, the candidates that they feel best represent them.
There are a number of other issues that are equally important,
and a key one is the rights of minorities. That will be part of
the discussion that we hope will be launched very soon as part
of the political dialogue for a durable peace.
So that--of course there will be many aspects to that that,
you know, will take time to determine what changes need to be
made, but that is also a priority. And, as you mentioned, the
civilian control of the military is another priority.
So we, you know, have made clear our position, our
expectations, our hopes for the country, and we are certainly
willing to provide them technical assistance, if it is helpful
to them as they undergo this very important challenge.
Mr. Chabot. Let me also ask, what are the implications of
statements from the administration saying whatever reforms
Burma achieves by the end of this year are the only reforms we
are likely to see in Burma until the 2015 elections, because
its government will be so focused on chairing ASEAN next year.
Is the administration really willing to accept such lack of
progress?
Ms. Cefkin. No, not at all. That is not anything that we
would subscribe to. We do recognize there will be challenges,
that the government is very focused increasingly on its ASEAN
responsibilities, but that does not mean we will in any way
flag in our--continuing our dialogue and our encouragement and
pressure to them to move forward on the reforms.
Mr. Chabot. All right. Thank you.
Mr. Singh, I have only about a minute, so let me get
quickly to a question. According to the U.S. State Department's
2011 report to Congress on military and intelligence aid to
Burma, Burma's primary foreign suppliers of weapons and
military-related technologies were state-controlled arms
companies from China, North Korea, Russia, and Belarus. There
is little doubt North Korean companies are still supporting
Burma's efforts to build and operate military-related
production facilities. Although Burma signed the IAEA
additional protocol on September 17, 2013, there is still no
clear evidence that Burma has halted its military relationship
with North Korea. A relationship between Burma and North Korea
has been, and continues to be, entirely unacceptable. Does
Burma intend to completely sever ties with North Korea or not?
Mr. Singh. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The Burmese Government
has decided to end the military relationship with North Korea.
We believe that is the direction they are going. We do not
believe that that is complete, and I would be very happy to
discuss in more detail what we think to be true about this in a
classified setting.
We see of primary importance to us and actually many of our
allies and partners the full severing of Burma's ties to the
DPRK as really critical to advancing beyond anything other than
this initial reengagement we have been talking about.
Mr. Chabot. I would certainly agree that is critical. My
time has expired.
The gentleman from California, Mr. Bera, is recognized for
5 minutes.
Mr. Bera. All right. Thank you, Chairman Chabot.
Let me direct my first question to Mr. Singh. Obviously,
Burma sits at a very critical juncture between China--between
an emerging relationship with India and offers some critical
access to trade routes, and so forth. But from a military
perspective, it certainly sits at a critical juncture.
It does look like India is increasing some of its military
sales to Burma, as well as, you know, offering assistance, and
so forth, at a similar time that China obviously is providing a
lot as well. How do you see this playing out in terms of vis-a-
vis some of the relationships between India and China as well?
Just from your perspective. And then the U.S.'s role.
Mr. Singh. Thank you, Congressman Bera. I think I should--I
need to just very briefly say hello to you from my mother-in-
law and father-in-law, who are your constituents----
Mr. Bera. Great. Thank you.
Mr. Singh [continuing]. In California, Dr. and Mrs. Baumer.
We really welcome the engagement of India with Burma. You
know, India and the United States have long had very similar
aspirations and goals for Burma, though we have often had very
different policy approaches to it. We believe that overall
India's reengagement with Burma on a whole host of issues will
be positive.
I would say that we will probably have disagreements about
specifics about what that looks like, so, for example, moves
into arms sales and other things will be things that we might
be concerned about. That said, I think it is incredibly
important for Burma to start interacting with militaries other
than those that have been their traditional partners and
suppliers, and with governments that have been other than their
traditional partners.
So we welcome that development. We believe China will try
to maintain a relationship with Burma, and Burma is finding
itself having for the first time in many years to actually
figure out where it wants to place its bets, where it wants to
put its cards, who it wants to deal with. We would like to
shape the kinds of choices that Burma makes through how we go
through this delicate process of reengagement with supporting
reform at the center of what we--of how we approach things.
Mr. Bera. Great.
Let me ask, Ms. Cefkin, with elections coming up--and the
chairman touched on what--you know, how we shape free and fair
elections--what would you define in 2015 as being a fair
election in Burma, if we were to look for some standards that
we would want to shoot for?
Ms. Cefkin. Yes. And let me also mention, and my colleague
Greg Beck may want to elaborate, but part of our assistance
actually is also working with the Election Commission in Burma
to help approve its efficiency and ability to monitor and to
help implement free and fair elections.
We would want to see the ability of all Burmese citizens,
obviously, to go to the polls, to register, to vote freely,
and, evidence that there is, no fraud or very limited fraud in
the conduct of elections, that the campaign was conducted in a
free and transparent manner, absent intimidation, that
candidates are able to access areas that they represent, and
that the citizens of the areas they represent are able to get
to the polls.
I think, you know, a lot will depend of course on what
changes they decide to advance as far as there has been
discussion in the country, do they want to keep the current
electoral system, or do they want to go to a proportional
system? You know, those kinds of issues are issues for the
people to decide. But in accordance with whatever system they
do choose, ultimately that everybody is freely allowed to
participate.
That is a very broad, general answer to your question.
Mr. Bera. Okay. Mr. Beck?
Mr. Beck. I might add that we do have as part of our rule
of law project, we are working with the Union Election
Commission, helping to enhance their systems and processes,
also to enhance to polling stations, working with civil society
to build out on voter education, and also to work as monitors
during the elections.
Mr. Bera. Right. In my last 30 seconds, one thing we have
talked about on this committee and in the full committee has
been one of the core pillars of democracy is within the rule of
law property right clause. Could you just briefly touch on, you
know, any one of you, what property rights in Burma look like
today?
Ms. Cefkin. That is actually a problem, and a problem that
needs to be addressed. We do know that there are senior
officials in the government that are grappling with it. My
understanding is currently there are not really clear property
rights in the country, and the problem of land seizures, land
grabs, is a big problem.
But we have heard, and certainly this will very much be
tied to our development work in agriculture, that there needs
to be clarity and there needs to be reform to provide for clear
land rights.
Mr. Bera. Great. Thank you.
Mr. Chabot. The gentleman's time has expired. I would just
note that the witnesses can definitely score points with the
panels if they can send greetings from their parents. That
definitely is a good move.
The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Perry, is recognized
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Perry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am particularly
concerned or interested in the U.S. policy toward Burma. Some
of the things I understand it seems like we are relaxing policy
a little bit as a way of I guess turning the page. And I see
where, at least as it describes in the document that I am
looking at, you know, democratically elected civilian
government, human rights, and those type of things, especially
to ethnic minorities, but it doesn't mention our policy
regarding nuclear ambitions.
And if you could, Ms.--I am sorry, Ms. Cefkin, if you can
elaborate on that, I would appreciate it.
Ms. Cefkin. Well, that is--very much remains a very key
policy priority area for us. As my colleague Vikram Singh said,
we have seen positive steps that have been taken by the
government to cut off the trade, the arms trade, with North
Korea. But we have not yet--we cannot yet say that that has
been completely implemented.
As far as nuclear goes, I think at this point we could
certainly, you know, arrange to come back in another setting to
discuss in more detail. But the nuclear bit is less the concern
than other systems I think at this point.
Mr. Perry. Okay. So do we have--is their relationship with
North Korea, is that a showstopper for the United States?
Ms. Cefkin. Well, first of all, it is part of their
international obligation to adhere to U.N. Security Council
resolutions. So----
Mr. Perry. But we have seen those kind of things erode in
the past in other negotiations with other nations where we say
``no further than this, unless you want to talk about it.''
So----
Ms. Cefkin. Right.
Mr. Perry [continuing]. What is our position?
Ms. Cefkin. Certainly, there are many things that we will
not be able to do to engage them on absent their full
compliance on that issue. And on the issue of military, that is
very much true, that we cannot foresee a full normalization
absent their having fully complied on that need.
Mr. Perry. Okay. So under human rights abuses, particularly
with the ethnic minorities, the Christians, the Muslims, et
cetera, and the military involvement in that, while I
understand the increased dialogue, so to speak, as opposed to--
you know, the stick as opposed to the carrot, so to speak--I
mean, do we trust these folks enough to do that under dialogue
as opposed to the boot? I hate to put it that way, but, you
know. And do we have quantitative benchmarks, including a
timeline, for their compliance with any of those things?
Ms. Cefkin. Let me start to answer, and I will turn to
Vikram perhaps to add a bit more. I guess one thing to keep in
mind is that they have been very, very isolated. They have not
had exposure to Western ways of thinking of operating. So we do
think that their exposure to our military, to see firsthand and
to be offered that alternative vision for how militaries
operate in a democratic framework will--has the potential to
help move them away from their current patterns of behavior.
We can't be absolutely sure that it will succeed. But if we
don't try, we can be quite sure that it won't succeed. So we do
have obviously a number of changes that we are looking for from
them before we would be able to move forward, and these
include, obviously, respect for human rights, setting up
systems such as ombudsman, inspector generals, mechanisms that
would allow to address human rights when they do take place.
We obviously need them to be in support of the reform
process, in support of the peace process, to stop use of child
soldiers, to--we have talked about North Korea, stop dealings
with North Korea, and to develop more transparent systems,
budgeting, personnel, and the big difficult issues, tackle the
big difficult issues of their role in politics and the economy.
There are a number of issues out there. We do feel that
certain issues may be easier to tackle than others, and we do
want to retain some flexibility going forward as how we sort of
leverage, you know, our requests and what we are able to
provide in exchange.
Mr. Perry. Okay. Thank you. I see my time is about to
expire. I am interested in pursuing a further discussion on the
previous questions under the appropriate setting.
Mr. Chairman, thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much. The gentleman's time has
expired.
The gentleman from New York, Mr. Crowley, is recognized for
5 minutes.
Mr. Crowley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also want to
express I feel--it is a homecoming for me. I served for 12
years on this committee, and I am getting my legs back. It is
great to be back here. Thanks again to all of you for
participating today.
As you can tell by my opening statement, I am a bit
skeptical about the advances that have been made, both on the
ground in Burma and our interaction with the junta, the Burmese
regime.
Mr. Singh, particularly, do you have plans to proceed to
full IMET? I ask this because originally the State Department
told us that our involvement would be limited to the DIILS
program before it proceeded to IMET. Now, however, I believe
you are seeking EIMET funding, which subsequently could change.
I can only assume you will be quickly changing to full IMET
request. Is that correct? And under what conditions would you
consider IMET training?
Mr. Singh. Thank you, Congressman. We are not seeking full
IMET, and we would not seek full IMET. I will----
Mr. Crowley. Are you seeking EIMET?
Mr. Singh. I will defer to my State Department colleagues--
this is a Title 22 authority, not a Title 10 authority, for
specific details. But EIMET exists simply as a subset of IMET,
but some form of IMET authorization is required to have EIMET
or anything--you know, anything like that.
What I would like--what I believe is necessary is the
ability to engage in some limited amounts of training and
education narrowly targeted that are things that are like what
we have in other settings used EIMET for. We are not
particularly determined to pursue one specific way of doing
that. What we would like to do is work with Congress on what
the most--you know, most appropriate way would be to ensure
that we have clear authority, and that there is transparency,
and that there is accountability.
And so that would be one way that that has been--that we
have done these sorts of activities, limited scope activities
in the past. I would like to assure you that we do not see any
danger. There is no one in this administration that is
interested in moving down some slippery slope toward fully
resuming IMET FMF and fully normalizing ties.
Constitutional reform is out there, elections are out
there. There are years between here and there, but we----
Mr. Crowley. Well, I appreciate that.
Mr. Singh [continuing]. Do need to have an ability to
engage and talk and help a path.
Mr. Crowley. Thank you. Appreciate it. The time is very
sensitive. Given the seriousness of the human rights situation
in Burma, have you developed genuine benchmarks beyond broad
ideas which we are talking about? We are talking about the
broad idea of the Constitution.
I know that this a workable Constitution for nascent
democracy. You are being very generous, Mr. Beck. I appreciate
that. It is very nascent. Can you tell me what--if there are
benchmarks, what they are? I ask this because the training of
the Burmese military, even if it is on a limited basis, is a
huge win public relations-wise for the Burmese military and for
the junta.
Mr. Singh. Thank you again, Congressman. I agree with you
that there is a--you know, this is--it is complicated to do
this kind of reengagement, and you don't want to inadvertently
send the wrong kind of signals.
We believe that the kind of progress we are looking for
would be through--to be more specific than these general terms,
you know, full, open, regular, humanitarian access for U.N. and
other non-governmental organizations to vulnerable populations
in conflicts area, transparency into military command
structures and operations and how they work, some kind of
independent internal review mechanism for accountability and
military justice, so, you know, like an ombudsman, like what--
we use inspectors general, those kinds of--something along
those lines.
Process to meet the commitment where they have made some
progress--they have made progress, but process--progress
meeting the commitment to end the use of child soldiers, an
enduring commitment to the peace process. What we don't have is
sort of we do specifically this and then we expect specifically
that. What we are doing is trying to have a very calibrated set
of initial engagements, be able to talk about these things, and
then be able to evaluate in a--you know, in a robust way what
process has been made and whether additional steps should be
taken.
Mr. Crowley. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the earnestness of
Mr. Singh and all giving testimony today. I have many, many
more questions. My time is running out. I personally don't
believe that the Burmese military needs to be trained to stop
killing and raping and stealing lands from people within their
own country.
I do hope that if anything comes from the intersection of
both our military and theirs is that they do stop those things,
because that is what is happening in that country today,
particularly in the Kachin region and, as was laid out earlier
by my colleagues, in the Muslim states as well. Some outrageous
and terrible and horrible things are taking place in our
country.
I have visited Burma, and I have a profound respect for the
people in the country, certainly for Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and
those who every day sacrifice so much to bring democracy to the
country. But I am concerned that our mil to mil is moving too
quickly, because they feed off of this prestige. And I want us
to not only visually but also in reality slow this down. I
think it is important to get the reforms that we want,
democratic reforms, constitutional reforms, to allow Daw Suu
Kyi and others to run for office, because the Constitution will
not be changed if left to the military device.
They control 25 percent of the Parliament. They are in
control of the constitutional changes, not the people of Burma.
So, Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired.
The gentleman from California, Mr. Rohrabacher, is
recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me
get straight where we are at, then, with Burma. Are we planning
to have a relationship with the Burmese military in which we
are providing them with certain weapons systems? No weapons?
Mr. Singh. No.
Mr. Rohrabacher. What are we going to be providing them? We
want to have transparency, we want to be--accountability and
everything. Are we going to give them anything in exchange for
this reform?
Mr. Singh. Congressman, all we are talking about at this
point would be continuing the initial engagements which have
been conversations about things like civilian control of the
military and the importance of that for a modern military, the
rule of law, accountability, how we approach these things and
how they approach these things----
Mr. Rohrabacher. So we are asking----
Mr. Singh [continuing]. We would be looking to move into--
--
Mr. Rohrabacher. We are asking them good conversation.
Mr. Singh. Well, that is all we can do right now, sir, is
have conversation. We are not able to even do training. What we
would like to be able to do is actually do some training where
our experts, like Captain Sanders here, who is the Director of
the Defense Institute for International Legal Studies and is
sitting behind me, where they could offer training, how does a
modern military deal with something like----
Mr. Rohrabacher. So is there anyone--any of you three that
are suggesting that the Burmese military is not now conducting
operations against the ethnic tribal people? Have they ceased?
Are you trying to tell us that they have ceased in these
operations?
Ms. Cefkin. Congressman, if I may, no, we would not--we
would not dispute what you are saying.
Mr. Rohrabacher. All right.
Ms. Cefkin. But just to underscore the point that we are
not talking about anything that in any way enhances their
tactical warfighting ability.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, that is good. I am glad to hear
that, because that is being more--that is being realistic. I
don't think good conversation accounts for anything,
especially--in fact, good conversation with people who are in
the process of conducting military operations that cause a
great number of innocent civilians to die among the tribal
populations, good conversation with those people might be seen
as a sign of weakness and not of strength.
Again, we should recognize that there has been progress. It
seems to me that we are talking about only progress among the
Burman population. And let us remember, Aung San Suu Kyi's
father was the President, was he not, and he was murdered by,
what, his guards--correct me if I am wrong--when he demanded--
when he led the effort to make sure that the Karens, and the
Karenees, and the Shan, and the rest of those tribal people
weren't going to be able to run their own schools in their own
language.
I mean, it seems to me--I hope that we can--and I would--I
am sorry that our friends from the Parliament had to leave--
there won't be--there will not be peace in Burma, for the
Burmans or anyone else, until compromises are reached with
living with those tribal people, and this is a 1,000-year-old
situation.
I am glad to see that our administration is dedicated to
playing a positive role. Even conversation with a great
emphasis is a positive role, as long as we don't ignore those
violations that are going on.
About Korea, however, I am not quite understanding--they
have not ceased their relationship with North Korea?
Mr. Singh. We believe they have taken steps, but we
believe--to end the military-to-military ties. They have a lot
of contracts and supplies from North Korea that have been--that
they have had over the years. We believe they have decided to
end that, but we do not believe they have completed severing
that entirely. So----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay. So----
Mr. Singh [continuing]. And we are watching closely, and we
are very happy to discuss this in a classified setting.
Mr. Rohrabacher. All right. They have given us some good
conversation on how they are changing their conversation with
Korea. Of course, maybe their relationship with North Korea
goes beyond conversation, which what we are really concerned
about.
Well, has there been any--would you--Burma used to be
infamous--I have got 30 seconds left--infamous for the drug
trade that was coming out of some of the tribal areas in fact,
as we know. Has there been any progress in that front?
Ms. Cefkin. That is still a very big problem. They are
still the world's second largest producer of opium poppy. I was
in Burma at the beginning of November. I went to Karen State. I
heard there some really very disturbing reports about the
incidence of drug use among use, methamphetamines coming from
the north. So it is a big problem.
We would like--we have done some limited counternarcotics
work with the Burmese. We are helping to finance an opium yield
survey, and we would like to expand that.
Mr. Rohrabacher. All right. Well, the second most heroin-
producing state is Burma, and I guess the most drug-producing
would be Afghanistan. And I guess we have very little influence
over there, don't we?
Thank you.
Mr. Chabot. The gentleman's time has expired.
The gentleman from the Commonwealth of Virginia, Mr.
Connolly, is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Connolly. I thank the chair, and welcome to our panel.
Forgive me, I am running back and forth, but we have two
subcommittee hearings at the same time. I belong to two
committees. I believe no human problem or endeavor cannot
substantially be improved with another hearing.
Can you talk just a little bit, Mr. Singh, and maybe Ms.
Cefkin, about the nature of what seems to be the spreading
violence between Buddhists and Muslims in Burma. What is the
source of it?
Ms. Cefkin. Yes, Congressman, it is a historical problem.
It has existed--there is based on deep-seated prejudices. There
have been waves of violence throughout history in the country,
and these latest outbreaks in the past year have been very
disturbing.
We very much see this as rooted in popular suspicion and
prejudices. And we think with the greater openings some of the
authoritarian structures that were in place before were bad,
but one thing they did do is tamp down some of these sorts of
incidents. And now I think there is--people are searching for
what their identity is, and unfortunately it has given rise to
bigotry, you know, among certain segments of the population.
But that I don't think represents Burma. I think that there
are voices for moderation there, but they have not been
sufficiently heard. One thing we are doing is working with
civil society to help them--give them more voice to speak up to
counter this very xenophobic rhetoric, and we are working very
closely with international humanitarian organizations to
address the immediate humanitarian needs.
We are working to try to build trust and confidence-
building measures between the communities. And with regard to
Rakhine State and the plight of the Rohingya specifically, we
are pressing the government to move forward expeditiously to
create a path to citizenship because we think that once that is
established it will take away some of the underlying root cause
that has given rise to the vulnerability of that group of
population.
Mr. Connolly. I am glad you brought up the Rohingya,
because Aung Sun Suu Kyi's spokesperson recently said that she
had little interest in supporting the Rohingya's claims for
rights and citizenship. That seems a surprising statement from
a Nobel Laureate who was, and is, remains a real symbol of--you
know, for democracy and freedom in Burma.
Can you elaborate on our read of that statement?
Ms. Cefkin. Congressman, I think it does go back to the
point I made about there being deep-seated society suspicions
and lack of fully embracing the diversity of the country and
the strength that that diversity can bring.
And I think, you know, obviously in our conversations with
all leaders, both in the government and the opposition, you
know, we do urge them to speak up in defense of those rights,
those human rights.
Mr. Connolly. The New York Times recently had a story about
a Buddhist monk, Ashin Wirathu, and the 969 Movement. And is it
our view that the rather inflammatory sermons this Buddhist
monk is recording and sharing are in fact incitement for more
violence against non-Buddhists?
Ms. Cefkin. There is that risk. And I think that we have
seen incidences where that kind of rhetoric has helped to
instigate violence. I do think that we have seen signs more
recently that the government is more seized with the importance
of tamping down this kind of rhetoric.
In my visit to Karen State, I had the opportunity to meet
with religious leaders, including a prominent monk, a prominent
imam, and they both told me that in the past months they had
formed an interfaith council, that they met regularly, that in
any instances of any perceived provocations the government was
very quick to call this council to meet.
And it seemed that, at least in that one instance, the
situation had improved, and I think that sort of effort has--is
taking place in many parts of the country, though it is still
not yet sufficient to address the problem.
Mr. Connolly. Do we sense--yes, Mr.----
Mr. Beck. Congressman, I just wanted to add also we are
working with youth to build their awareness of the core issue,
and using social media, which they are increasingly accessing.
So we are working through Facebook and other social media
outlets to develop early warning systems, educate to bring
people together, especially young people, young leaders, to
begin addressing this issue, and to be able--when it becomes
inflamed again, to address it and to initiate an early warning
system.
So the early warning system is working with faith-based
organizations or with other civil society organizations and
also working with the President's office. It is becoming
increasingly aware and building their capacity also to step in
at the early moment.
Mr. Connolly. Is there sufficient appreciation within the
government that this violence, left unchecked, could
significantly retard the ability of Burma, Myanmar, to reemerge
in the family of nations.
Ms. Cefkin. I do believe there is recognition. Our
Ambassador, Derek Mitchell, has been very prominent leading
diplomatic efforts in the country. He meets regularly with
other international partners to review the situation, discuss
what should be done. He recently led a mission to Rakhine
State, along with two key Burmese ministers, to get a better
handle on the situation, where the problems are, where there
are some signs of progress.
I should mention also the State Department has--our
Conflict Stabilization Office also has an officer based at the
Embassy in Rangoon who is dedicated to this issue.
Mr. Chabot. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Connolly. I thank the chair, and I thank the panel.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you.
The gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Franks, is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I appreciate
you, again, for holding this important hearing, and thank you
all for being here.
Among the many challenges that some of us are concerned
about, and probably one of the most significant concerns I
have, is the Burmese military's continued use of rape as a
weapon of war and the recruitment of child soldiers. Despite a
2002 through 2012 U.N. action plan to halt Burma's recruitment
of child soldiers, this has continued.
A little over a month ago, our office received yet another
report that Burma army soldiers attacked predominantly
Christian Kachin villages where they brutally gang raped two
young girls. And these are, of course, just a couple of very
well-documented patterns of sexual violence by the Burmese
army.
And Human Rights Watch has also closely documented how the
Burmese military's recruitment and use of child soldiers
continues. So I guess I have sort of a series of three main
questions, and I will direct them to you, Mr. Singh, if that is
all right.
First, how does DoD justify engagement with a military that
has a long recent record of committing these what should be
called crimes against humanity?
And, second, considering the Burmese military's history of
failing to meet its requirements, what reassurances were given
to the U.S. that the Burmese military will disband its child
soldiers and use of rape as a weapon of war?
And, finally, has the Obama administration implemented any
strategies to effectively measure policies intended to decrease
the number of child soldiers and the use of rape as a weapon of
war?
Mr. Singh. Thank you, Congressman. I greatly appreciate
your interest and your raising of what are among the most
fundamental issues that face us and that face all of us as we
think about what our policy toward Burma should be and how it
should proceed.
There is no doubt that the Burmese military has a long
history of substantial abuses, and that human rights abuses
continue, including the kinds that you have mentioned, the most
disturbing kinds. We absolutely do not believe that it is time
now for any kind of comprehensive reengagement beyond the areas
that we think will help this military move toward reform.
We do not believe that the military will stop being an
important factor in Burmese society. We do believe it needs to
find a way out of being in the political and economic life, and
it needs to find a way to transform itself into a responsible,
credible, accountable institution that will start protecting
its people instead of persecuting and threatening its people.
And it is our considered view that very limited,
calibrated, engagement is actually better than non-engagement,
with a clear sense that normalization would require a lot of
things to happen, some of which I mentioned in earlier question
and answer and in my earlier testimony.
I would like to turn to----
Mr. Franks. Before you shift, but would those engagements
consider implementing strategies to effectively measure
policies that were intended to decrease the number of child
soldiers and the use of rape as a weapon of war?
Mr. Singh. That would be--actually, I think I will turn to
Judith for precisely that piece, about how we and the State
Department together are looking at that exact issue.
Ms. Cefkin. Very much. That is very much, yeah, at the
forefront, one of the conditions that are looking at. I will
tell you possibly some glimmers of hope, that the government
has signed up to a U.N. Action Plan to cease the use of child
soldiers.
Under that plan, there has been some limited progress of
releases of child soldiers, and one of the sticking points has
been allowing international access to military facilities to be
able to verify whether or not there are child soldiers. That
has been somewhat stalled, but just recently there was some
limited progress of allowing international observers into some
facilities.
Possibly one thing worth mentioning, it is not only the
Burmese military, but also some of the armed ethnic groups that
have also been guilty on child soldiers, so that is another
problem that needs to be tackled.
Mr. Singh. The only thing I would add to that, and USAID
has programming that is also aimed at helping with this issue--
and Greg might want to speak to it--but I want to also add that
the government in Burma has taken a very strong stance, saying
that they are going to address this problem. And then we want
to help them live up to that commitment.
They are going to address the problem of violence. They are
going to address the problem of child soldiers.
Mr. Franks. Well, Mr. Chairman, I would just hope that
these things could be kept in mind because, you know, America's
perspective if it is not clearly elucidated in these areas,
then we really--you have got to wonder why we are doing any of
this.
Mr. Chabot. I thank the gentleman. His time has expired.
The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Collins, is recognized for
5 minutes.
Mr. Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to--we are
just going to continue down this line. I think it is a line
worth continuing. And you had--basically, the comment was just
made, and one of the things I want to go back and frame just a
little bit, I have listened in part of this, and I have been,
like Mr. Collins, bouncing with a couple of other
subcommittees.
But one of the things that I have heard since I have been
here, and also reading through testimony before, was--is we are
engaging them. We are doing these things. It might be just a
basic question, maybe it is just too basic, but what is their
willingness to actually be engaged? And I think that is maybe a
base question we need to ask here. Anybody want to try that
one?
Mr. Singh. If we are focusing on military to military, I
will certainly--I can certainly start with that.
Mr. Collins. Try that. And then we will go to this----
Mr. Singh. More broadly. So actually, you know, this is a
very interesting moment. I mean, honestly, with many countries
the kind of programming that I am talking about, starting some
initial engagements and some initial trainings on things like
the rule of law, human rights, and other things, those are
often not very welcomed.
And I would say, having joined the State Department for the
first human rights dialogue in Burma a year ago or so, I was
really surprised by the interest and almost enthusiasm about
understanding what it is the United States is wanting to talk
to them about in these areas.
There are certainly going to be Burmese military officers
who don't want to reform and will cease a lot to lose. But we
believe there will be those Burmese military officers and
leaders who want to reform and see a path toward being a
respected institution. And right now, there is an eagerness, a
welcoming of this kind of engagement, and we believe that is an
opportunity we should take advantage of.
Mr. Collins. And before we--is that an eagerness on a
lower--being in the military, is it--I mean, is this a lower
officer level, or a leadership level? Really, where was the
engagement there?
Mr. Singh. I would say it has been both. We probably
engaged more with some leadership, but the fact is this is an
institution we hardly know. We have had no engagement for so
long that we are in early days. And so leadership and sort of
that middle and upper tier, we are definitely seeing
indications that there is an interest in this kind of
engagement, and we should--we believe we should see where it
goes, but be--you know, one thing I would stress is be able to
calibrate. We can do a little more, but if things don't go
right we can do a little less.
Mr. Collins. Okay. Well, if we--or go ahead.
Ms. Cefkin. Certainly. No, I just--I was also going to make
the point that the human rights dialogue was actually quite
successful in terms of the candor of the discussion, including
with the military. And we do sense, as Vikram Singh said, that
there is certainly some quarters that are very receptive to the
messages we have.
I think it may be worth noting that those--many of those in
the government leading the reforms currently are former
military officers. So it seems to indicate that even before
there were some beginning to think about the need to do things
differently. And I think, you know, we shouldn't underestimate
their desire for international respect, which some realize
requires a completely different mode of operation and behavior.
Mr. Collins. Well, and I think the other thing here is we
are dealing with a country that has had to deal--or has worked,
you know, through many situations which are outside what I will
call international norms, international--you know, of standing
within the community. They may see it, but they see it from a
different perspective than we do, as far as, how do you live
among an international community, and what are those standards?
Because of the violence, because of the drug trades,
everything, and also just a part of the world that is very
difficult.
That is the concern that I have, and it is not to belabor
this point, and I think what you--the only concern that I have
in what I have heard is laying out--because undoubtedly if
there is some interest to talk about these things--and, again,
we can get into several that my friend from Arizona and others
talked about--is having more tangible, as it gets to that
point, benchmarks to say, ``If we come to here, then we can
offer this.''
And as we go forward--and I think that is because it did
say when they joined the U.N. plan on this--you know, child
soldiers is--I think your comment was is that, you know,
limited progress, but yet what you said was is they really
didn't get on to verify.
So my concern will be how we define ``limited progress.''
Does that mean we have got to go to the gate and look through
the gate? Or do they actually let somebody in unfiltered? So,
again, I appreciate your work there. This is not an easy part
of the world. I am not saying there is an easy solution.
And, really, that willingness to communicate sometimes is
more--at this stage, may be more than what we can hope for. But
I am sure we will do this, and, Mr. Chairman, I know you have
been diligent in this category and will continue to look at
this part of the world.
Thank you very much for being here.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much. The gentleman's time has
expired.
We are going to have votes here in just a minute, so I just
have a couple more questions and then we will wrap it up.
This summer, during a trip to Europe, President Thein Sein
promised to release all political prisoners by the end of the
year. Subsequently, some--but not all--political prisoners have
been conditionally released. At the same time, there has been a
significant rise in political prisoners in the months following
President Thein Sein's pledge. More than 200 activists are now
currently facing trial under old restrictive laws in the new
Peaceful Assembly Act. In addition, more than 1,000 Rohingya
have been unlawfully detained since mid-2012, and subjected to
cruel and degrading treatment, in many instances. Well over 500
farmers face trespassing charges for their ``plowing protests''
over government confiscation of their land.
Given that the release of political prisoners was a key
factor in the decision to suspend sanctions against Burma, and
increase our economic relationship with the Burmese Government,
what changes, if any, will the administration make to address
this troubling trend and double-talk by the Burmese Government?
Ms. Cefkin?
Ms. Cefkin. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Let me just make a few brief
comments, and I think my colleague, Greg Beck, may be able to
add more. But you really hit the nail on the head when you
talked about the arrests being made under old deficient laws.
Fortunately, there is a recognition that those laws are
deficient. There is an effort underway by Parliament to amend
these laws to change--revise these laws, and we have some
indications that there is progress being made on the assembly
law that is the cause or the basis for many of the arrests you
just cited.
Mr. Beck already mentioned success that our USAID mission
was very instrumental in facilitating, working toward a much
better assembly law. So those are a couple of points.
One other point I would make briefly is that one of the
things the government has done is established a mechanism, a
committee that is reviewing those currently incarcerated to
determine which are prisoners of conscience, and that committee
does include former political prisoners on the committee.
We think it is a good mechanism, we think it is making
progress, and we want to see it continue to operate and make
progress.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you.
Mr. Beck, did you want to add to that?
Mr. Beck. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I would just add that, as part
of the U.S. mission, USAID is pursuing a calculated policy
engagement that really test the political will of the
Government of Burma.
So targeting these key areas that will affect the people in
the most impactful way--agriculture, economic reform, media--we
have been working very closely with the Parliament to draft
laws of association, the Farmer Protection Act, land use
policies that really rise to international standards.
When they initially were drafted, they were horrible, but
we have seen a willingness from some of the key reformers to
listen and to engage with their citizens, and the end result
has been a fairly significant and positive advancement on those
particular laws that we think will be most effective in really
addressing the priority issues of the people of Burma.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you. The bells you hear are the votes
being called but I have two more questions.
The State Department June 2013 report on human trafficking
showed that in 2012 alone, Burma's Department of Social Welfare
received 195 repatriated victims. In addition, there are
reports that the unofficial count could be higher, with UNICEF
placing the estimated number of Burmese girls trafficked to the
Thailand brothels at 10,000 every year. In light of this
information, could you please outline the impact that existing
initiatives have had on human trafficking in Burma? What does
the State Department hope to see from the next anti-TIP
dialogue? Ms. Cefkin?
Ms. Cefkin. Yes. I would say that somewhat in line with the
human rights dialogue that we referenced a few moments ago, we
actually were quite gratified by the level of the discussion
that took place at the last TIP, Trafficking in Persons
dialogue. And I think actually the ball is a bit in our court
right now to follow through on some commitments that we made to
identify funding necessary to help support the action plan that
they derived to begin to seriously tackle this problem.
Mr. Chabot. All right. Thank you. Then one more question
and we will let you go. In 2011, the GAO reported that U.N. and
U.S. agencies assisted Burma after a devastating cyclone with
about $335 million in assistance, but that U.S. agencies needed
to strengthen their monitoring of assistance. The report
detailed that USAID took actions to help ensure U.S. funds were
used as intended and did not benefit sanctioned entities, but
that it had some monitoring weaknesses. In light of the ongoing
concerns with rampant corruption and efforts taken by the
military to benefit from Burma's new-found investment wealth,
what actions has USAID taken to monitor its assistance to
ensure it is reaching the intended recipients? Also, what
effect, if any, has having an in-country presence had on USAID
projects and programs aimed at addressing human rights issues?
What progress have you achieved so far?
Mr. Beck. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you.
Mr. Beck. As an aside, I did want to say that while I
didn't have an opportunity to present a welcome from my parents
to my Congressman, I did want to introduce my daughter Tona,
who is here with us today who has traveled----
Mr. Chabot. That is even better.
Mr. Beck. She has traveled to Burma, and she lived on the
Thai-Burma border for 4 years. So this is an important issue
for----
Mr. Chabot. Excellent.
Mr. Beck [continuing]. Our family.
Mr. Chabot. Well, we welcome her today as well.
Mr. Beck. Thank you. And thank you for raising this point.
It is very important. Dr. Shah has been relentless in focusing
on monitoring and evaluation of our programs for results as
regards to Burma.
We have actually increased our staffing from what we
previously, 2\1/2\ years ago, one personal service contractor.
We now have 24 staff on the ground, foreign service officers
and national staff. Allows us the ability to have much more
access, to have the ability to be out there to monitor our
programs, to build the capacity of both our international NGOs.
But as part of USAID forward, we are also building the
capacity of local organizations who have the contextual
understanding, who understand the dynamics of the community,
also are able to identify where those sort of rent-seeking
opportunities are, and to be able to address those, recognizing
what our regulations are.
And so we really do monitor very closely--it is built into
our grants, it is built into our contracts. So I think we have
made tremendous progress since that report came out.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much.
Just a little aside, for many years--I have been in
Congress quite a few years and other offices prior to that.
Sometimes I would speak at schools, and sometimes it was my
kids' schools, where I would recognize my daughter or son in
the audience. Whenever I did, it was always, ``Dad, why did you
embarrass me like that?'' So your daughter was blushing and
very embarrassed, I am sure. Anything you want to say about
your dad? [Laughter.]
We do appreciate the panel's testimony. It was very helpful
this afternoon. I know some of the members were fairly
aggressive, but that is the nature of the committee, as you
probably know. I think you all handled yourselves very well.
All members will have 5 days to supplement their statements
or to submit additional questions, should they wish to do so.
If there is no further business to come before the
committee, we are adjourned.
Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 4:09 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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