[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE ARABIAN PENINSULA: YEMEN AND BAHRAIN
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
NOVEMBER 19, 2013
__________
Serial No. 113-84
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DANA ROHRABACHER, California Samoa
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio BRAD SHERMAN, California
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
TED POE, Texas GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MATT SALMON, Arizona THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina KAREN BASS, California
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
MO BROOKS, Alabama DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
TOM COTTON, Arkansas ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
PAUL COOK, California JUAN VARGAS, California
GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III,
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania Massachusetts
STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas AMI BERA, California
RON DeSANTIS, Florida ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
TREY RADEL, Florida GRACE MENG, New York
DOUG COLLINS, Georgia LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
TED S. YOHO, Florida JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
LUKE MESSER, Indiana
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
TOM COTTON, Arkansas DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
RON DeSANTIS, Florida JUAN VARGAS, California
TREY RADEL, Florida BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois
DOUG COLLINS, Georgia JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III,
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina Massachusetts
TED S. YOHO, Florida GRACE MENG, New York
LUKE MESSER, Indiana LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESS
Ms. Barbara Leaf, Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Arabian
Peninsula, U.S. Department of State............................ 4
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
Ms. Barbara Leaf: Prepared statement............................. 7
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 28
Hearing minutes.................................................. 29
U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE ARABIAN PENINSULA: YEMEN AND BAHRAIN
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TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 19, 2013
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., in
room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-
Lehtinen (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. The subcommittee will come to order.
After recognizing myself and Congressman Ted Deutch, the
ranking member is on his way, for 5 minutes each for our
opening statements, I will then recognize other members seeking
recognition for 1 minute each. We will then hear from our
witness, and without objection, the prepared statements will be
made a part of the record, and members may have 5 days to
insert statements and questions for the record, subject to the
length limitation in the rules.
The chair now recognizes herself for 5 minutes. With so
much focus being given to the conflict in Syria, the ever-
changing political landscape in Egypt and, of course, Iran's
march toward full nuclear breakout capability, it is vitally
important that we not lose sight of the big picture and remain
engaged throughout the region. The U.S. must look ahead and try
to anticipate problems before they arise, by being proactive
rather than reactive as all too often we are.
Today, we take a look at two of those countries, Yemen and
Bahrain, that may not get much media attention, but whose
recent developments are a cause for concern for U.S. national
security interests and may have regional implications as well.
After more than 33 years in power in Yemen, the President
of Yemen was forced to resign from office in early 2012 as a
result of a rising tide of pro-democracy movements in Yemen.
Since that time, Yemen has been in a period of political
transition as the Yemeni people attempted to draft a new
Constitution, implement new electoral laws, and move toward a
more inclusive governing body by implementing a national
dialogue process.
The U.S. and the international community must support the
national dialogue in its effort to get a consensus on how to
move the country forward toward a path for democracy. But in
order for the political process to stand a chance, the economy
and the security situation must all improve in Yemen. There has
been a serious and a worrisome rise in extremism, and civil
unrest has not simmered down.
Contrary to what some in the administration believe, al-
Qaeda has not been decimated. It is not on the run. It is
resurgent throughout the region, and Yemen is no different. The
fragile socioeconomic and political situations in Yemen has
fostered an environment that allows al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula, to gain a safe haven from which to operate, posing a
serious threat to Yemen's stability and to our U.S. national
security.
But just as Yemen has seen its fair share of uprisings as a
result of the Arab Spring, so has Bahrain. Bahrain has served
as the long-term headquarters of the United States Navy Fifth
Fleet, so it is in the vital interest of our national security
to see a stable, unified, and democratic Bahrain. In 2002, it
appeared that the Government of Bahrain had set itself out on a
path toward democracy. A national action charter was adopted by
the people that led the way to Bahrain's first parliamentary
elections in nearly three decades and the first municipal
election in almost 50 years. Suffrage was extended to women.
Political parties were finally legalized, and I introduced a
resolution praising these efforts in July 2004. That resolution
reaffirmed the friendship between the United States and Bahrain
and offered to assist them in the future should any challenge
arise on its road to democracy, and that offer still stands.
Fast forward to 2011, it became clear that Bahrain did not
reach the end of the path toward democracy. The political
dialogue that began in 2011 had failed to bring about any of
the reforms required with several prominent members of the
moderate reform party as being targeted by the regime for
arrest and prosecution. The administration has largely remained
silent throughout most of the process, but it needs to be more
vocal and supportive of the nonviolent moderate reformists in
Bahrain and it must stress to the government the importance of
a political solution that can only be achieved by the people of
Bahrain themselves.
It must also call attention to the growing number of
reports on human rights abuses in the country and the
increasing numbers of political prisoners. All sides must come
together in Bahrain to find a political solution and the
administration must work with the government and the opposition
to come together to solve their disputes, address human rights
abuses and fully implement the recommendations of the Bahrain
Commission of Inquiry.
As we convene this hearing today, I look forward to hearing
the administration's strategic goals and objectives in both
Yemen and Bahrain and what concrete steps we are taking to
ensure regional stability as well as furthering U.S. national
security interests.
Thank you. And with that, I am pleased to turn to our
ranking member, Mr. Deutch of Florida.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, ma'am.
Thank you, Madam Chairman, and I am pleased today that we
will have the opportunity to focus on a region of vital
importance to the interest of the United States.
And I thank you, Deputy Assistant Secretary Leaf for
joining us. I know you recently returned from the region. We
look forward to hearing how things are progressing both in
Yemen, and in Bahrain.
You know, 3 years ago, inspired by events in Tunisia, the
people of Yemen courageously took to the streets to add their
voices to the growing discontent with stagnant economic
conditions, repression of freedoms and government corruption
that seemed to be sweeping the Middle East and North Africa.
Within months, the Gulf Cooperation Council presented President
Saleh with a plan to cede his 30-year grip of power to then
Vice President Hadi. It has now been 21 months since Hadi took
over as interim President. The GCC-backed agreement called for
national dialogue that would eventually give way to a new
Constitution, followed by local and national elections.
By comparison of many of its neighbors, Yemen's political
transition seemed to be progressing positively. The national
dialogue included 565 representatives from across the political
spectrum with a mandate that one-third of the participants be
women, while youth accounted for one-fifth of the participants.
A secular woman was even appointed chair of one of the
committees. However, meetings have stalled since September, and
I am concerned that there will be a lack of progress now that
difficult questions about Yemen's future are pending.
We must continue to urge national dialogue to move forward
with real solutions and mechanisms for implementing its
recommendations. We have got to continue to feed momentum
toward the drafting of an a new Constitution and eventually new
elections. The United States can play an extremely important
role in providing technical support for free and fair
elections, working with civil society to support an inclusive
democratic process and instituting needed economic reforms. But
I am increasingly concerned that our efforts to assist the
political transition and aid in economic development are often
overshadowed by an overwhelming focus on our security
relationship with Yemen. Al-Qaeda and the Arabian Peninsula
activities in Yemen has proven to be a breeding ground for some
of the organization's most influential leaders. As Yemeni
security forces struggle to root out terrorists, it raises
questions about what kind of training and support the United
States is providing on the ground. How has our reliance on
drone strikes to reach these high-level targets hindered our
relations with the Yemeni people, and what exactly is our long-
term strategy for Yemen?
Yemen is widely believed to be on the front line in our
fight against terror, but I am concerned that whether our level
of security assistance reflects the need. U.S. assistance to
Yemen totaled $256 million for Fiscal Year 2013, but these
funds come from 17 different accounts, all with very different
objectives.
Deputy Assistant Secretary Leaf, I hope that you will
address any ongoing discussions to reevaluate our assistance
and provide a long-term strategy for ensuring a stable and
inclusive Yemen.
Turning to Bahrain, the United States, and Bahrain have
enjoyed, long enjoyed a close partnership by Bahrain housing
the U.S. Navy's Fifth Fleet, having hosted it now for over 60
years. This relationship plays an integral part of security in
the Persian Gulf. The King has remained a steadfast partner of
the GCC and our regional efforts to address mutual security
concerns. Since the 2011 demonstrations, the government has
undertaken a process to institute various reforms for a more
inclusive government. The commencement of a national dialogue
led by the Crown Prince was promising, but the continuing
violence and recent boycotts by the opposition threatened to
unravel progress. The U.S. response to the uprisings in Bahrain
has been somewhat puzzling.
And I hope that today, Secretary Leaf, you will be able to
provide some clarity as to how the United States plans to
balance our security and interests in our close partnership
with Bahrain with our expectations for human rights. How do we
balance those two?
Our Gulf allies are playing an increasingly critical role
in regional geopolitics. How are Yemen and Bahrain affected by
U.S. relationships with other regional powers, with Saudi
Arabia, with Qatar? And as we work together to counter the
Iranian influence in Syria and across the Gulf and prevent a
nuclear armed Iran, communication and cooperation is essential.
How do we work on parallel tracks to support democratic
values, strengthen economic factors, and stabilize the security
of our regional partners? So Secretary Leaf, I recognize that
there is no one-size-fits-all policy toward our friends in the
Arabian Peninsula, but I appreciate you being here today to
shed light on our long-term strategy, and I yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Deutch.
I am pleased to yield for a 1-minute opening statement to
Mr. Weber of Texas.
Mr. Weber. I am ready to go.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
Mr. Schneider of Illinois.
Mr. Schneider. I am ready.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Ready to go.
Mr. Kennedy of Massachusetts.
Mr. Kennedy. I am not going to break the trend. Thank you,
Madam Chair.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much and now our
committee, the subcommittee, is very pleased to welcome Ms.
Barbara Leaf, who is Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Arabian
Peninsula at the State Department. Prior to this position, Ms.
Leaf was the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Iraq and previously
served as the first director of the State Department's Office
of Iranian Affairs. She is also a member of the Senior Foreign
Service.
Welcome, Ms. Leaf, and we look forward to your testimony.
Thank you, ma'am.
STATEMENT OF MS. BARBARA LEAF, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
THE ARABIAN PENINSULA, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Ms. Leaf. Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member Deutch,
members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me here
today to discuss two quite important countries for the U.S. in
the Middle East, Yemen and Bahrain.
I have just returned from a trip to this region, and I
welcome the chance to discuss them with you and ask that my
full testimony be submitted for the record.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Without objection.
Ms. Leaf. On Yemen, the U.S. enjoys a strong and
comprehensive relationship with the government of President Abd
Rabbuh Mansour Hadi and the Yemeni people. I visited Sana'a
last week for 5 days to underscore our support for Yemen's
historic transition and continued bilateral security
cooperation. Yemen continues to make significant strides
forward in its political transition, even while it faces
unprecedented challenges. Since the new November 2011 signing
of the GCC brokered transition initiative, Yemen has taken
several big steps forward, including the launch of a national
dialogue conference this march, a gathering of 565 delegates
from across the political spectrum, indeed across the country,
brought together for the most inclusive discussion of its kind
in Yemen's history. The dialogue has accomplished what many
thought impossible as Yemen stood on the brink of civil war a
little more than 2 years ago. Political elites, travel elders,
women, youth, civil society activists, and representatives of
minority communities have gathered to share ideas and develop
meaningful recommendations and proposals for Yemen's future.
Despite these positive achievements, disagreement over the
future state structure has delayed the dialogue well beyond its
scheduled September 18 conclusion. We are actively engaging
with President Hadi and other Yemeni political leaders to
encourage a consensus agreement on principles of the state
structure to allow the dialogue to conclude and subsequent
transition steps, including constitutional reform,
constitutional referendum and national elections, to proceed.
However, there also remains spoilers' intent on disrupting
or derailing the transition process, from members of the former
Saleh regime to political opportunists bent on bolstering their
own support at any cost. While we do not believe these
detractors will succeed in their attempts, we continue to make
clear that we will not tolerate any attempts to subvert the
process. We are in close coordination with the international
community in Sana'a as well as the U.N. and other international
partners to encourage transition progress. The GCC in
particular has played and will continue to play a critical role
supporting Yemen throughout its transition. Economic reform and
development will also be a key underpinning of the transition
success.
Yemen's economy is showing some signs of recovery since the
events of 2011. In tandem with international partners, we have
made clear to Yemen that undertaking specific achievable
economic reforms today, is essential to building the foundation
necessary to address the needs of all Yemenis. As Yemen tackles
these issues of reform, it continues to cope with serious
economic and social challenges affecting the everyday lives of
Yemenis. Investment in the economic and social wellbeing of the
Yemeni people as well as immediate relief for urgent
humanitarian needs is necessary to help realize the
transition's full potential.
Finally, the Yemeni Government has made some gains in
extending the security in the country, both through military
operations against al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and
through a challenging reorganization of security institutions.
However, as President Obama said in his May speech at the
National Defense University, AQAP is the most active
organization plotting against our homeland. We have encouraged
the Yemeni Government to continue progress on restructuring of
the military and security services, which will strengthen
Yemeni capacity to secure the country against internal and
external threats. We view continued use of U.S. support for the
Yemeni security sector as critical as the country continues to
battle an AQAP presence within its borders.
Turning to Bahrain. Bahrain is a major non-NATO ally and a
steadfast partner in regional security, host to the Fifth Fleet
and U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, Bahrain is home to our
main naval operating base in the Middle East. Our relationship
with Bahrain allows us to address threats to national security
interests, ensure open sea lanes for international commerce,
and counter piracy. The U.S. is committed to this relationship.
During my visit to Bahrain this past September, I met with
a wide range of Bahraini interlocutors, from government
officials to political society leaders, civil society members.
I saw firsthand the importance of this relationship to
Bahrainis in general. The complex challenges Bahrain is facing
and the ways in which the U.S. can support Bahrain's transition
beyond this challenging period in its history, a more stable
secure and prosperous Bahrain will enable us to continue to
build our strong security partnership, meet our national
security goals across the region, and promote reform, human
rights, and dialogue.
November 23rd marks the 2-year anniversary of the landmark
Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry report. King Hamad
demonstrated strong leadership in convening the body and taking
on board the recommendations in the report and committing to
implement them in full. Two years later, the government has
made some progress, but much remains to be done, particularly
in the areas of accountability for police abuse, freedom of
expression, and media incitement.
The First Deputy Prime Minister's Office has laid out an
additional set of measures aimed at addressing both BICI report
recommendations, as well as other initiatives that go beyond
the scope of the report. These include projects to rebuild
mosques and religious structures demolished during the 2011
unrest and construction of new housing tracts. They are
positive steps that can help rebuild trust.
As you noted, the Bahraini Government announced a national
dialogue in early 2013. Regrettably those talks have broken
down, and the opposition societies maintain a boycott of the
dialogue that they initiated in September as a result of a
deteriorating political environment. An end to the dialogue
would leave both Bahrain's political societies and its
government with no formal mechanism to negotiate a path
forward. We have consistently urged the opposition to return to
the table and demonstrate political courage in denouncing
unequivocally all violent acts. At the same time, we have
consistently pressed the Bahraini Government to take concrete
steps that would improve the environment for dialogue. We are
deeply committed to working with all parties in Bahrain to move
beyond this period of crisis, which, by the way, is a term that
every, literally, every Bahraini used with me, whether inside
government or outside.
In the end, however, we do agree that Bahrainis themselves
must find the solution. It must be a Bahraini-driven solution.
But strong leadership is needed from all sides in order to move
Bahrain beyond its current situation of impasse. Thank you for
the opportunity to testify, and I look forward to answering any
questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Leaf follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
----------
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much. Thank you for that
testimony, and thank you for the written testimony as well.
Ms. Leaf, in May 2012, President Obama issued Executive
Order 13611, blocking property of persons threatening the
peace, security, or stability of Yemen. This gave the Treasury
Department authority to freeze U.S.-based assets of anyone
deemed to be obstructing the political transition in Yemen or
who is engaged in activity that threatens Yemen security or
political stability, yet I believe that no individual or entity
has yet been sanctioned under Executive Order 13611. And will
sanctions now be considered as we see some obstruction taking
place once again in Yemen?
How effective has this tool been if we have not yet used
it, and do you believe that it could be effective in helping to
create a stable environment for the political transition to
proceed? And I will continue, and then I will let you answer if
you could.
It is clear that the economic situation in Yemen is rapidly
deteriorating. Yemen relies heavily on foreign assistance from
neighboring countries in the Gulf, most notably, its neighbor
to the north, Saudi Arabia, but also the United States.
However, late last month, Saudi Arabia said that it would halt
its aid to Yemen, and to make matters worse, it has been
deporting Yemeni workers from Saudi Arabia by the tens of
thousands.
You testified that we will continue to work with our
international partners to provide the incentives and support
Yemen in carrying out what we hope will be its reform agenda.
What incentives are we providing? Have we been using our
leverage with the GCC to get them to provide much more of the
needed development assistance for Yemen? And in Fiscal Years
2011 and 2012, Yemen received about $27 million in economic
support funds. In Fiscal Year 2013, State requested $38
million, and now, in Fiscal Year 2014, you have requested $45
million. What is the justification for this increase in ESF
funds, and what kinds of programs do we want to implement or
augment with that additional money? What kind of return on
investment are we seeing with all of our assistance to Yemen?
Thank you very much, Madam.
Ms. Leaf. Thank you for that set of questions. First, to
the issue of sanctions, whether they be bilateral sanctions or
U.N.-based sanctions. I would say that at this point, we are
closely evaluating the situation and whether there is a need to
go forward with anything specific at this time. We are in very
close and constant touch with the government, with President
Hadi himself. I met with him a week ago during my visit, and we
went over the proximate set of obstacles to concluding this
phase of the transition, which means wrapping up the dialogue.
I think we are going to evaluate carefully before we move.
We have a number of tools, obviously, available, and we have
been in discussion with what we call the Group of 10
Ambassadors, missions in Sana'a, as well as partner countries.
I stopped in Riyadh on the way home from Sana'a to discuss
these issues. We want to allow President Hadi and those who are
directing, who are running the national dialogue to take the
steps that they want to do, not get out in front of them, but
be ready to act as needed. So we are in the process of
evaluating exactly this right now. I would say it is--while
there is a degree of obstructionism by former regime elements,
there are also genuine political issues at play right now that
are--that have to be resolved. They mostly relate to the north-
south divide and the issues as to how a future state set of
structures will be elaborated.
So there are legitimate political issues that need to be
finessed. And then there is also elements of what I would call
possible obstructionism. Now, whether they are enough to block
the conclusion of this phase is yet to be determined. But we
will be ready to assist President Hadi all along the way in
this because it is a critical first step, and you--and this
step will then take us to the next, or take Yemen to the next.
On the issue of economic assistance, of course, Saudi
Arabia is by far the largest donor of the group of donor
countries. The GCC as a block have pledged something on the
order of $4.4 billion, and of that, Saudi funds are $3.25
billion. There have been ongoing discussions among donors and
with Yemeni Government, both on a bilateral basis and in other
groups, such as the Friends of Yemen, about how the Yemeni
Government can best leverage those funds. To put it politely,
there is endemic corruption and a certain large
dysfunctionality in Yemeni Governments that goes back three
decades. Donors naturally want a fair degree of accountability
so that their funding goes against the areas of need. We have,
as donors set up and the World Bank helped to craft this
approach, what we call a mutual accountability framework, an
executive board that is going to be the liaison between Yemeni
Government and donors to ensure that the funding can flow and
the funding can flow directly to the needs defined. So that was
one of the issues that I discussed both with the government as
well as with the donor community in Sana'a.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Let me just interrupt you a second
because I had another question. With the Bahrain Independent
Commission of Inquiry they had made 26 recommendations. Has the
government implemented those? And that is dealing with the
investigation and reporting of a pro-democracy protest that
took place between February and March 2011. What can you tell
us about that?
Ms. Leaf. We issued a report, a sort of a report card, if
you will, in August on this sort of the state of play on BICI
recommendations, and I would say it is a mixed bag. The main
shortcomings are in accountability. Accountability for abuses,
excesses committed by security forces during the unrest.
Obviously, there are some structural reforms that need to be
tackled, and I think it is fair to say the government is
beginning those--is putting those steps in place. But
accountability, they have certainly fallen short and that is
something that we have raised regularly with the government. I
met with the new ombudsman this summer. He has started work
pretty energetically, he and his team. This is a piece of
structural reform that I think will essentially help in the
accountability piece.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, I appreciate it.
Mr. Deutch is recognized.
Mr. Deutch. Thanks.
Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Deputy Assistant Secretary Leaf, I am concerned that there
has been so much focus on completing the national dialogue in
Yemen, that other really important, critically important
factors have been overlooked. It is my understanding that none
of the committees in the national dialogue have focused on any
large-scale economic issues, which was a key driver of the 2011
unrest. What are we doing? What is the United States doing to
assist with the economic development issues or the kinds of
economic reforms that ultimately will be necessary to secure
any sort of IMF loan?
Ms. Leaf. You know, the thing that struck me when I was in
Sana'a is that basically all eyes are focused now on this end
game of the first phase of the transition timeline. All eyes
are focused on that, even in places like the Ministry of
Defense, there is sort of a waiting to see how this finishes
out. The working groups, there are nine of them, as you may
know, have tackled a range of issues that will go into drafting
a new Constitution. But the issues that have really seized the
dialogue and that have sort of gripped them at this point
relate to the north-south cleavage, which is a critical piece
of future stability to get past.
We are putting--we and other donors, the donor community,
are putting money against efforts to improve in the immediate
term, because the government of President Hadi of course, is a
transition--transitional government, and hereto, frankly, I
would say even the government ministers who were in charge of
these areas, the foreign minister himself, have regretted that
there is not enough energy and push by the government to tackle
these structural reforms. I would say, frankly, that there is a
sense of reluctance to do things that are politically risky
right now. The more so because of this stalemate right now that
has developed over this end game piece of the national
dialogue.
But we are putting money toward a variety of sectors, and
they would help the government improve social services
delivery, which is a critical issue, and was a--has been long
been a flash point of instability, especially in the south,
which has felt substantially shortchanged, and to promote
sustainable policy reforms. But I would say that we have--what
we are trying to do is help the Yemenis, the dialogue,
participants, and President Hadi, get over this political hump
even as we are beginning to bear in on some of the structural
economic issues, and the Yemenis are in a prolonged
conversation with the IMF about a loan program. But they are,
shall we say, reluctant to tackle some of the reforms right now
that they need to do.
Mr. Deutch. But what are we doing to help with that? I
understand the focus on helping to deliver what services and
the rest, but on the requirements that the IMF would demand,
any sort of reforms that would help address those fundamental
issues, what are we doing?
Ms. Leaf. They are--we are pushing them. We are pushing
them. All of the donor community is pushing, you know, with the
force of a large community to get them to do things on
essentially ghost workers, cleaning out the rolls of the
government, pension rolls, and tackling fuel subsidies. We are
looking at some incentivations to help them over this hump.
Mr. Deutch. And the Friends of Yemen Group, which was
initially organized, the United States, Britain, and 24 other
countries, has pledged nearly $8 billion. Only $2.2 billion, it
is my understanding, only $2.2 billion has been delivered. You
spoke about corruption. You spoke about efforts that are
underway to try to address that to make sure the dollars get
where--the money gets where it is supposed to. Is that enough
to convince our friends to fulfill their pledges? What do they
need to see for their commitments to be upheld?
Ms. Leaf. I think so. They have just appointed the
executive board. I met with the interim director of the board.
I do think it will be enough to start moving things forward. So
yes.
Mr. Deutch. And if I may, Madam Chairman, just for one
last----
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Absolutely.
Mr. Deutch [continuing]. Thing on Bahrain. The Crown Prince
has taken a lead in Bahrain in negotiations with the
opposition, instituting reforms. How much leeway does the Crown
Prince really have? How much space does he really have to
accomplish the reforms?
Ms. Leaf. You know, Congressman, as the King appointed him
as First Deputy Prime Minister last spring. I, you know, it is
early days to see how far he is going to get in some of the
things that he has laid out, but what we have seen is he has
got a pretty ambitious plan that combines, as I said, elements
of BICI implementation, which the King himself has committed
fully to implement. So that is already--that is sort of already
part of the record or the government's public commitment.
He has a slate of other activities and programs that he
would like to take forward. We don't really, I would say, peg
everything on the Crown Prince or the First Deputy Prime
Minister. We are looking at this as a whole of government
requirement, and we work with all of the ministers, the King,
the Prime Minister. The government owns this whole set of
problems, not just the First Deputy Prime Minister. So we don't
personalize it to say that all of our efforts hang on him. He
is an important figure in the government, but there are line
ministries which have responsibility in both accountability as
well as the larger reform effort.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
Mr. Deutch, thank you.
Mr. Weber of Texas is recognized.
Mr. Weber. Madam Chair, why don't you pass me up right now
and get back to me.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Sure. All right. Mr. Kinzinger.
Mr. Kinzinger. I don't have any questions.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Dr. Yoho?
Mr. Yoho. Thank you, Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, for holding
this very important hearing.
Ms. Leaf, thank you for lending your considerable expertise
into the hearing on the very important issues of the United
States policy toward Yemen and Bahrain. The escalating
political uncertainty in both countries should give us all
pause, so as we can evaluate our strategy in the region and
make sure it is the most effective it can be at securing our
national interests while promoting peaceful democratic reforms.
I look forward--unfortunately, I missed your opening lines, but
I look forward to this hearing to find out how we can better
utilize the aid we give, not just in money and food but the
military, how we can utilize that better to get a more
favorable outcome. Because what I see is a repeat of so many of
the policies we have done in the Middle East. In your
experience, you know, we promote democracy, but yet we do that
in a country that doesn't believe the same way we do. How can
we better approach that to get the results that we both want,
you know? I know there is something on their side that they
want, and there is something on our side that we want. What
would you recommend to do different than we have maybe done in
the past?
Ms. Leaf. You know, the interesting thing about Yemen, is
that even while we, the country, the government is grappling
with this huge, really seismic political transition, our own
mission is working in pretty difficult circumstances in terms
of the security environment, and yet we get out and we engage
across the board in all of the critical sectors where action by
the Yemeni Government and by us and other donors is really key
to them being successful in this.
So that is in military restructuring where our advice to
the military and security services is quite critical and is
highly valued. It is in counterterrorism assistance and
essentially trying to help stimulate and grow their capacity to
tackle the internal fight to secure their borders, maritime and
to take the fight to al-Qaeda. But on the political and
economic, our small and hardy but very talented and committed
staff, both USAID and State, works up and down the spectrum of
political activists and civil society members and is really
engaging through both with the national dialogue but also the
elements of society that have become newly active in a way that
really Yemen has never seen before.
Mr. Yoho. All right, let me ask you something else. Do they
have a workable Constitution?
Ms. Leaf. Constitution drafting is the next step.
Mr. Yoho. All right, is there--I mean, the thing that made
our country so great, it was from the ground up, and what we
have learned is, you know, life, liberty, pursuit of happiness
for all, and you can't have personal freedom without economic
freedom.
Ms. Leaf. Okay.
Mr. Yoho. Are they going to have things in there like
property rights and human rights and things like that that they
would agree on, that, again, is more of a Western value that we
don't see so much, like the freedom of religion, the freedom of
free speech, the freedom to organize. Do you see that on the
horizon as something that will happen over there, and is that
something--I guess the big thing that helped us here in the
early years in the 1700s and the 1800s was the knowledge that
the base, the population had and the understanding of those
rights. Is that feasible in that country or in Bahrain?
Ms. Leaf. Sir, they are very, very different cases, but to
take Yemen, which on any given day, you know, has pretty
daunting challenges, I mean, across the board. I mean, you
know, you have a population of 24 million; 40 percent
unemployment; you know, 1 million cases of what is termed acute
malnutrition; and almost 50 percent of the population has what
we call food insecurity; and a significant portion of the
population struggles to get access to clean water and
sanitization services. So, on the one hand, you have got this
daunting economic picture; on the other hand, you have got a
pretty daunting security picture.
Mr. Yoho. So, at this point right now, they are more
concerned about survival than a Constitution and property
rights, and all that.
Ms. Leaf. Well, not so, not so entirely. Yes, there are
people who are just struggling to survive every day, but the
thing about this dialogue, which is so extraordinary, is it is
tapped into people across the country that have really never
had a voice. And I tell you, I spent----
Mr. Yoho. I am going to have to cut you off because my time
has expired.
Ms. Leaf. Okay.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. We will let her finish.
Mr. Yoho. Okay, thank you, Miss Chairman.
Ms. Leaf. I spent a whole afternoon with about three or
four dozen extraordinarily outspoken and feisty Yemeni women,
many of whom were participants in the national dialogue, others
who were simply active in various civil society domains. And
having wrestled through this process, as sort of a minimal
floor of participation, they are determined to hang on to it,
come what may. And they are determined to hang on to it through
the next steps of the constitutional drafting. But all of these
people who are new voices in the national dialogue are going
back to their communities and taking back that experience. So
it is really, I have to say, it is quite extraordinary. We
won't see a Constitution that looks like ours.
Mr. Yoho. Right.
Ms. Leaf. It will be a Yemeni-style Constitution, but I
think it will respond to some things.
Mr. Yoho. Thank you, ma'am.
Thank you, Ms. Leaf.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Dr. Yoho.
Mr. Schneider.
Mr. Schneider. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Thank you for
calling this hearing.
Deputy Assistant Secretary Leaf, thank you for being here,
as you said, addressing the issues in two very important
countries.
Starting first with Yemen, and just to put it in maybe a
frame, in your words, this is a historic seismic transition in
the context of unprecedented challenges, including spoilers
inside the country, as well as urgent humanitarian needs. You
kind of touched, Yemen is the poorest of the Arab countries. It
has food insecurity widespread. It has a lack of water, a
shrinking supply of water. And yet, at the same time, for all
of those challenges, we are dealing with the presence of al-
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, an external threat, but a
threat that is not just to Yemen but to the entire region. Both
the historic transition and the challenge to al-Qaeda requires,
again, a word you used a few times, capacity building. What are
the most critical issues from our standpoint as we are looking
at American policy, vis-a-vis Yemen that we need to focus on to
make sure that there is capacity to address the humanitarian
needs internally, but also to ensure that AQAP is a threat we
can work to eliminate rather than see expand?
Ms. Leaf. Thank you, Congressman.
You know, we are, and I saw this myself in meeting with the
Group of 10 Missions, who meet on a weekly basis in Sana'a and
basically compare notes, compare approaches, and coordinate
tightly as the international community, and that includes the
U.N.'s Special Representative for Yemen's Transition and
economic assistance agencies.
We coordinate tightly, but we are doing--essentially what
you said is the Yemenis bitten off a lot. Have they bitten off
too much? I think they have no choice--they view themselves as
having no choice but to do it all. They are tackling
assiduously the political challenges. They are coming forward
slowly to tackle the economic challenges, but I think it is
there that the donor community has to continue to provide
technical expertise to make up for the lack of capacity that is
evident in many of the ministries. And on the security front,
we are evaluating on just a constant basis how best we can
calibrate our security assistance and training to help the
security forces, the military, continue to stand up in terms of
their capacity to secure their borders but also to take the
fight to al-Qaeda. It is a lot to do. They view themselves as
having no choice but to do all at the same time, and we are
helping on all of those fronts, in addition to helping with aid
that we push through the U.N. principally to help them get
their most urgent humanitarian needs met.
Mr. Schneider. And unfortunately, I have limited time, but
let me shift gears a little bit. These are two very different
countries with very different challenges, but a common thread
for both of them is the fingerprints, if you will, of Iran and
Iran trying to influence what is happening. Can you touch a bit
on how Iran is trying to affect events in Yemen, and in
particular, more so in Bahrain, and efforts of Bahrain to
counter that influence?
Ms. Leaf. As you are probably aware, there was--the Yemenis
seized the dhow of Iranian origin with arms last January that
was clearly en route to support elements of the Houthis
community. I don't want to tar the whole Houthis population in
Yemen to suggest that they are sort of a backdoor in any sense
for Iran. The Houthis have representation in the national
dialogue. There are elements, however, who were fighting the
central government, and indeed, there were five or six such
wars with Saleh's regime over the past years. There is evidence
of Iranian meddling. I think it would, as in--and I will speak
to it in a minute in Bahrain, but I think it would be best to
do this in a restricted session if you want more granularity on
it.
On Bahrain, let me say two things. The events of 2011 were
Bahraini driven, are Bahraini originated. And at the same time,
there has been evidence or concern, certainly expressed by the
Bahrainis, and we have seen some evidence that Iran is
fostering some of the sectarian sort of conflict, especially by
media incitement. Again, I think I would rather do this in a
restricted session, if you want to do more.
Mr. Schneider. I would welcome that.
Ms. Leaf. Okay.
Mr. Schneider. I mean, there is obviously concern about
Iranian intentions, and they continue to put pressure on Iran
and their influence in the region, so I would welcome that
opportunity. And with that, I have extended my time.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much.
Mr. Kinzinger.
Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you, Madam Chair.
And I thank you for being here, by the way, today. We
appreciate your willingness to be here. I just want to touch on
a couple of brief issues. I have seen recent reports that the
administration is considering or maybe trying to reengage in
the idea of closing Guantanamo and transferring the prisoners
to Yemen. I want to ask you first off if you are aware of any
effort to do that? Is that in fact true, or is that not true,
or----
Ms. Leaf. Thank you, Congressman. Well, the President moved
earlier this year to release, essentially, the embargo on
returning Yemeni nationals from Guantanamo. But there is a--but
there is a case-by-case review of all such cases that has to be
done. And it will necessarily hinge on a number of issues,
including security issues and the capacity of the Yemeni
Government to take back and secure anyone who was transferred.
So there is not an immediate----
Mr. Kinzinger. But there is discussion, then?
Ms. Leaf. Yes.
Mr. Kinzinger. And does that discussion include a
rehabilitation program like was implemented in Saudi Arabia?
Ms. Leaf. So, there is a U.N. body uniquely which has the
resident expertise on these issues, and it has established as
steering group. We are part of it, and a number of other
countries are part of that effort to look at providing
technical assistance to the Yemeni Government, about how to
stand up such a program in its early stages. But Cliff Sloan,
whom I think you may know is our envoy on Guantanamo closure.
He is engaged in those discussions.
Mr. Kinzinger. Okay, I just think it is important to point
out, in 2009, the GAO report the chairwoman actually
commissioned, showed that there was a 20 percent recidivism
rate among those, and when you look at a place as unstable as
Yemen and you look at, frankly, the challenges they have, I
think that is definitely of concern and I think something that
ought to be put on the record.
You touched on it briefly, but let's say something like
this actually moves forward, and what can we do, how can we
ensure that the Yemeni Government has--by the way, I was in
Yemen last year and just for a brief period. It was like a 24
hours, but how can we help ensure that they, you know, run the
program correctly, they have the resources, and that these guys
aren't either taken out of prison or released prematurely?
Ms. Leaf. Congressman, those are all issues that we are
looking at in detail. We are--we would be quite concerned to
see that any such program is sustainable and is sound. And that
is why we, the Yemenis will rely principally on UNICRI to lead
this effort. There will undoubtedly be funding needs, but it
will be, to say the least, it would be a very methodical effort
and one that we will carefully evaluate before moving ahead.
Mr. Kinzinger. Okay, and then just briefly to touch on
Bahrain, what are the benefits, and I am supportive of it. I
just want to hear it from your end. What are the benefits of
having the Fifth Fleet headquartered in Bahrain?
Ms. Leaf. Well, the Fifth Fleet has been there for decades,
as you know, and the Bahrainis have provided a level of support
and access to necessary facilities that is really unparalleled.
They have also been ready and able participants in both
exercises for our fleet as well as partners in security
operations going back to Desert Storm, and most recently in
Afghanistan, where they provided security forces to guard our
forces in the Helmand Province. It is a longstanding
relationship. It is, as I say, they have been unstinting in
their support for our needs there, that spanned, you know, the
spectrum of the CENTCOM AOR.
Mr. Kinzinger. Okay, great.
I yield back, thank you.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much.
Now I am pleased to yield to Mr. Chabot, the chairman of
the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
Just a couple of questions. I was also in Yemen about a
year ago, I guess, and we actually went to another country
prior to that and in the air we learned that over 100 troops
had been killed on parade grounds and an explosion, and I don't
know if we were still going to come. We did. But the concern I
guess a lot of us have at this point, is how is the vetting now
amongst those types of things compared to back then? I mean,
these were actually, to my recollection they were a number of
people that were either troops, or dressed up as troops. I
think they were troops that had actually been responsible for
the explosion. And my recollection is it was like 100-plus
killed and 200-plus wounded. I don't remember if it was a
graduation ceremony, but it was something, you know, somewhat
festive occasion, so it hit the country extremely hard, and so
anything you would like to comment on that, or anything
following that, I would be interested.
Ms. Leaf. It indeed was a shocking incidence of AQAP's
ability to reach in and strike, and indeed, over these past
months, what we have seen is after a period last year when the
government essentially pushed AQAP out of pieces of the south
that it was essentially holding territory, what you have got
now is a more dispersed AQAP that focuses on sort of guerilla
tactics and asymmetrical attacks against Yemeni forces.
You know, I wish there were a silver-bullet approach to
this. There isn't. We know it. The Yemenis know it. It requires
a very methodical kind of capacity building across both
conventional forces as well as more elite units, and that is
something that we are engaged in as well as the range of
traditional professional military education tools and so forth.
But it is something we really have bitten into and that we are
very committed to.
Mr. Chabot. Okay, thank you, and my second question
relative to Yemen is, you just touched on it, and that is that
at the time, there were pretty significant portions of the
southern part of the country that were under AQAP's control,
and they have had some success there, but success also
sometimes breeds other difficulties, and that is the dispersal
in other areas. Could you discuss the greater challenges that
faces and what we are doing to assist the Yemenis in battling
AQAP in its current form rather than when it was in a certain
area?
Ms. Leaf. I think if you would allow me, I would like to
default to a restricted setting on that.
Mr. Chabot. All right, that is fine. That is fine. Thank
you. Let me shift over to Bahrain just for a moment then. And
they are obviously in relatively close proximity to Iran, as
the other Gulf states are, and they are very wary of Iran, and
in the recent things which almost occurred in Geneva, I am just
wondering what the administration is hearing from some of those
countries that are very close relative to possible loosening of
the sanctions on nuclear weapons with respect to Iran in return
for at least concessions on paper on moving in the other
direction on the nuclear program?
Are we hearing concerns from those countries, especially
Bahrain? I would assume that we are.
Ms. Leaf. Thank you, Congressman.
We are engaged in sort of a constant rolling conversation
with the Gulf countries, including Bahrain, on these issues.
And in September, on the margins of the U.N., we had the third
session of the US-GCC strategic cooperation forum, and that was
a forum in which we talked in detail about their anxiety
levels, which are longstanding. This is not new. Bahrain, as
you say, has some more acute concerns, especially given sort of
the historically irredentist tendencies of Iran vis-a-vis
Bahrain and the tendency to direct problematic broadcasting in
Bahrain.
But we have used not only that form but very high level
conversations on a very ongoing basis, including Secretary
Kerry's most recent trip through the Gulf, to reaffirm the
depth of our commitment to their security, one and all,
including Bahrain.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you.
I yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much.
Mr. Weber of Texas.
Mr. Weber. Gosh, I am thinking all my answers are going to
be in a classified setting.
Do you believe, Ms. Leaf, that al-Qaeda in that area has
been decimated?
Ms. Leaf. I can only refer--I can only repeat exactly what
the President said in May. It is the most active affiliate
targeting and plotting against the homeland.
Mr. Weber. Would you hazard--well, let me put it this way.
You are getting help--we are getting help from the FBI and the
CIA actively engaged I am assuming.
Ms. Leaf. Uh-huh.
Mr. Weber. Okay, would you hazard a guess as to how many
al-Qaeda fighters there are in both of those countries?
Ms. Leaf. I wouldn't in this setting, you are absolutely
right. But I would be happy to look for that and get it to you
in a----
Mr. Weber. Okay, a lot of workers, Yemeni workers kicked
out. Of course, the Saudis announced they were halting aid and
kicking out workers. There is a strain between us and the
Saudis over what is going on in the peace process.
Do you think, is that a good, is that a fair and accurate
assessment? Do you think that is why it is happening?
Ms. Leaf. Actually, I would like to correct a
misapprehension here. The Saudis are not halting aid. In fact,
I discussed a range of assistance issues with them when I was
there this past week, and they are actually acceding to some
additional bilateral requests that the Yemeni Government made
recently.
The worker issue is a separate one, and it is part of a
larger push to essentially legalize all workers in the country.
Obviously, and the Yemenis raised this with me, the Yemeni
Government raised their concerns about the economic effect of
these workers coming back.
What I heard back from the Saudis was they were in no way
targeting the Yemenis. They do want everybody to regularize,
and they said it obviously behooves them and the Yemeni
Government to have a more structured discussion of that. So I
think that would be--that is something we will encourage.
Mr. Weber. So, in your discussion, you are not hearing any
mention of the peace process going on between John Kerry about
the sanctions with Iran?
Ms. Leaf. Oh, you mean with the Saudis?
Mr. Weber. Uh-huh.
Ms. Leaf. No. No. No that was, I mean the----
Mr. Weber. I am talking about you personally.
Ms. Leaf. Of course. I mean, I didn't discuss the peace
process. I discussed the range of regional issues with the
Saudis when I was there last week.
Mr. Weber. And they tied it to the peace process, which you
didn't discuss?
Ms. Leaf. No. No. They did not.
Mr. Weber. They did not tie it to the peace process?
Ms. Leaf. No.
Mr. Weber. So they didn't raise that concern about our
apparent path to easing the sanctions on Iran? They have not
raised that with you.
Ms. Leaf. No. They had a full, full discussion of that
between the king and Secretary Kerry as well as other cabinet
ministers, yes.
Mr. Weber. And US aid to Yemen has spread across a number
of different program areas. Two questions. Is all of our aid
getting marked? When we send aid into a country, USA, there has
been some discussion about taking off our stamp so that some of
the insurgents won't go right at it or the people receiving it.
Are we experiencing that in those countries?
Ms. Leaf. Let me get back to you. I don't believe so, but
let me get back to you on that, sir.
Mr. Weber. Well, then a follow-up question is, you may or
may not know the answer is, of those programs, which one is
yielding us the best bang for the buck?
Ms. Leaf. In Yemen, I would say without question the
support that we have provided to the national dialogue;
technical expertise, mentoring of delegates, you know, legal
and other expertise provided to help them shape their
discussions.
Mr. Weber. And you may have answered this question earlier,
and that is we are seeing, I am hoping or I am guessing we are
seeing heightened awareness of security concerns in that area?
In other words, we don't want to repeat a Benghazi, obviously.
So what is being done to prevent that?
Ms. Leaf. In terms of our mission in Sana'a, yes. No, we
have an extraordinarily robust set of security arrangements
there for our mission and for the facility where our people are
housed. And I would obviously not want to go into those in
detail here. We are doing enhancements that build on others of
the last couple of years, but security is front and center for
us there.
Mr. Weber. Madam Chair, I yield to the classified setting.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. And we do look forward to
maybe having a session with you in a classified setting in
order to answer Mr. Weber's----
Ms. Leaf. Absolutely.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Concerns and others.
I just have one last question, and I will have Mr. Deutsch
ask one last question as well.
As we speak, Senator Kelly Ayotte is presenting an
amendment to the NDAA bill prohibiting the U.S. from any
transfers of GTMO detainees to Yemen or to the United States.
Do you care to comment on that amendment?
Ms. Leaf. Well, I can only affirm--reaffirm the President's
policy on this which is to see a closure, an eventual closure
of the facility. As to the issue of returning Yemeni nationals,
detainees to Yemen, obviously, that is part of the closure of
the facility. We have, as I indicated, a very thorough
understanding of the challenges that relate to doing so, and we
would only do so in a very careful, methodical fashion that
would be in our national security interests.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you ma'am, Mr. Deutch.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Thank you.
The remaining questions I have I would also like to ask in
a classified setting.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. So we look forward to doing that.
And with that, the subcommittee is adjourned. Thank you.
Thank you to our Capitol Police officers.
[Whereupon, at 3:33 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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