[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
VISA SECURITY AND OVERSTAYS:
HOW SECURE IS AMERICA?
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER
AND MARITIME SECURITY
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MAY 21, 2013
__________
Serial No. 113-18
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
__________
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Candice S. Miller, Michigan, Vice Brian Higgins, New York
Chair Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Ron Barber, Arizona
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania Dondald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Jason Chaffetz, Utah Beto O'Rourke, Texas
Steven M. Palazzo, Mississippi Tulsi Gabbard, Hawaii
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Filemon Vela, Texas
Chris Stewart, Utah Steven A. Horsford, Nevada
Richard Hudson, North Carolina Eric Swalwell, California
Steve Daines, Montana
Susan W. Brooks, Indiana
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania
Vacancy
Greg Hill, Chief of Staff
Michael Geffroy, Deputy Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER AND MARITIME SECURITY
Candice S. Miller, Michigan, Chairwoman
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania Loretta Sanchez, California
Steven M. Palazzo, Mississippi Beto O'Rourke, Texas
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Tulsi Gabbard, Hawaii
Chris Stewart, Utah Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Michael T. McCaul, Texas (Ex (Ex Officio)
Officio)
Paul L. Anstine, II, Subcommittee Staff Director
Deborah Jordan, Subcommittee Clerk
Alison Northrop, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Statements
The Honorable Candice S. Miller, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Michigan, and Chairwoman, Subcommittee on
Border and Maritime Security................................... 1
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Border and Maritime Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 3
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
Witnesses
Mr. John Wagner, Acting Deputy Assistant Commissioner, Office of
Field Operations, Customs and Border Protection, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 7
Joint Prepared Statement....................................... 9
Mr. James Dinkins, Executive Associate Director, Homeland
Security Investigations, Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 15
Joint Prepared Statement....................................... 9
Mr. Shonnie Lyon, Acting Director, Office of Biometric Identity
Management, National Protection and Programs Directorate, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 17
Joint Prepared Statement....................................... 9
Ms. Rebecca Gambler, Director, Homeland Security and Justice,
Government Accountability Office:
Oral Statement................................................. 18
Prepared Statement............................................. 20
VISA SECURITY AND OVERSTAYS:
HOW SECURE IS AMERICA?
----------
Tuesday, May 21, 2013
U.S. House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Candice S. Miller
[Chairwoman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Miller, Duncan, Palazzo, Barletta,
Stewart, Jackson Lee, O'Rourke, and Gabbard.
Also present: Representative Bilirakis.
Mrs. Miller. The Committee on Homeland Security the
Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security will come to
order. The subcommittee is meeting today to examine our
Nation's visa security efforts.
Our witnesses today are John Wagner, who is acting deputy
assistant commissioner from Customs and Border Protection;
James Dinkins, who is the executive associate director of
Homeland Security Investigations; Shonnie Lyon, who is the
acting director of the National Protection and Programs
Directorate Office of Biometric Identity Management; and
Rebecca Gambler, director of Homeland Security and Justice
Section for the Government Accountability Office. I will make a
more formal introduction after the opening statements.
Our Nation is in the midst of a debate on how to best
reform our broken immigration system. As we explore potential
changes to our immigration processes, we must also strengthen
our border security efforts. A key part of both of those
efforts must be serious reforms to our visa process. According
to a widely-circulated 2006 Pew Hispanic Center study, as much
as 40 percent of all illegal aliens who come into our country
do not cross the desert. They actually come in through the
front door.
They come in through our land, our sea, and air ports of
entry, with permission, and then they overstay their visas. If
we are serious about border security, the Congress needs to
look beyond just the traditional borders--the Northern, the
Southern maritime borders--and must reduce the ability of
people to overstay their visas. Visa security is by no means a
new challenge. We have known for some time that our visa
process is vulnerable to exploitation by terrorists and others
who seek to do us harm.
We all recall that at least four of the 9/11 hijackers were
here on visa overstays or were out of status. Among the most
important weaknesses the attackers exploited was the porous
outer ring of border security. The hijackers passed through
U.S. border security a combined total of 68 times without being
detected. The man who attempted to conduct a suicide attack on
the Capitol just last year had been in the country since 1999;
was here on a tourist visa overstay.
Another individual arrested in the aftermath of the Boston
Marathon bombings, who may have helped destroy evidence, was
able to return to the United States despite being out of status
on his student visa. These events highlight the fact that
vulnerabilities in our visa processing system can have
catastrophic consequences. The American people need to know how
many more visa overstayers are out there who pose a serious
threat to the security of our homeland.
Clearly, more must be done to ensure the integrity of the
visa system, including enhancements to Immigration and Customs
Enforcement's ability to identify and to promptly remove those
who overstay their visa. Pushing out the border and conducting
more vigorous, more rigorous vetting of VISIT applicants
overseas thru the Visa Security Program, which stations ICE
agents overseas, as well as the inclusion of fingerprints into
the visa application process, have made the visa process more
secure than it was, certainly, before 9/11.
But as well, we are also very concerned with our ability to
track and to promptly remove overstays who remain in our
country. ICE does not have a way to identify and track down
overstays who entered the country prior to 2003, before US-
VISIT was created, and we are concerned that we do not even
have a good handle on the total number of overstayers in the
country right now. I understand that the Department has plans
to release some of the overstay data by the end of the year.
However, we are debating these issues right now, and I
would like to see the data while we are discussing immigration
reform, not after. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses
today on progress made since the creation of US-VISIT, now
called the Office of Biometric Identity Management, identifying
overstays, especially those that pose National security and
public safety threats. I think that Members will be most
interested in how the Department of Homeland Security plans to
implement a comprehensive exit system that will prevent
terrorists from successfully exploiting the visa system; a
requirement, I might add, that was first mandated in 1996.
If we are serious about controlling who comes into the
Nation and preventing another attack we need to get serious
about an exit program, a robust exit program. Biometric might
not be the right solution until the technology is mature enough
to not interfere with passenger flow. But we certainly want to
be interested--we will be interested in hearing from the
witnesses on how we can move forward with a workable plan in
the interim.
I certainly don't want to discount the progress that has
been made especially over the last 2 years in connecting many
of the DHS's databases to the arrival and departure information
system, which has helped to narrow down the number of people we
are concerned about. But we cannot have vulnerabilities that we
have known about for some time remedied only after a high-
profile incident like that that happened, that tragedy in
Boston. Last Congress, this subcommittee held several hearings
on the backlog of unvetted records that numbered more than 1.6
million.
Those have been screened for terrorism and public safety
concerns, but a persistent backlog of unmatched records
remains. According to the preliminary findings of the GAO
report, there are more than 1 million of these records; a
million people that we cannot confirm whether or not they have
left the country. ICE's prioritization scheme virtually ensures
that a large backlog will continue to exist well into the
future. Visa security is a critical component of our border
security efforts, and we really cannot reform our immigration
system without taking a hard look at the Department's efforts
to develop a robust exit system.
The American people need to be confident that all of the
holes in the border are as secure as possible. So we will be
very interested in hearing from the witnesses on that point.
With that, I would like to yield to the Ranking Member, the
gentlelady from Texas, for her opening statement.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, and thank you
for having--holding this hearing. I am glad to join you in
holding this hearing today to examine the issue of visa
overstays--those who enter this country through the proverbial
front door, but fail to depart in a timely way--and their
effect on our Nation's security. I know it goes without saying,
and it has been said over and over again, and it is a reminder
that I think--however, that is very important.
That those who were engaged in the 9/11 horrific and
heinous terrorist act were, in fact, some of them, visa
overstays. We have had that scar for, now, 12 years going on 13
years. It should be a very important reminder. However, we know
that people who are visa overstays are, by and large,
individuals who seek an opportunity in this country, are
students, family members. But even beyond that, knowing that
most of these are innocent and desirous of good things, this is
an important process.
So I want to thank the gentlelady from California and the
gentleman from Pennsylvania in their discussion of the mark-up,
who mentioned the idea of a concept to deal with visa
overstays, which I asked to join them. I look forward to my
staff working with them so that we can present an idea that
will be constructive. I think this hearing, overall, will be
enormously constructive as we move the Homeland Security border
bill, border security bill, to the floor.
We had a very active bipartisan discussion about visa
overstays, as I have just said, in our recent subcommittee
mark-up H.R. 1417, the Border Security Results Act of 2013.
Last week, I was pleased to support an amendment at the full
committee mark-up of the bill to require the Department of
Homeland Security to develop an implementation plan for a
biometric exit capability at ports of entry, which is an
essential part of our effort to address overstays.
I am committed to working with my colleagues on this very
important issue. So far, this Congress' subcommittee has
focused much of its oversight in legislative efforts on what
DHS must do better--to better secure our land borders, and the
Southern Border in particular. While this is a critically
important matter, it represents only one part of broader border
security and immigration enforcement issue. Addressing visa
overstays is certainly equally important.
Indeed, finding a way to deal with the overstay issue will
likely be essential to any immigration reform and border
security package considered in Congress. It is my hope that as
the great work of this subcommittee, Madam Chairwoman,
continues, and the moving of the border security bill, that we
will be in front of any question to be able to answer such so
that no obstacles stop us from doing what really will make this
country safer. That is, comprehensive immigration reform.
I want all the questions answered, and I want us to have
solutions. Yes, I think it would be very important to put in
new processes for this effort of visa overstays. Finding a way
to deal with the overstay issue will be very important. Just
this week, an amendment to address this issue was accepted at
the mark-up of the Senate immigration bill. We have examined
this issue regularly in Judiciary Committee, where I am also a
member.
It is important to note that overstays are one of the
reasons for many questions on the immigration control system. A
small handful of those who overstay their visas may also pose a
threat, as I mentioned earlier, as it relates to the 9/11
hijackers. There are many important questions to be answered
regarding visa overstays, and I hope we can have a productive
dialogue about some of those questions here today.
For example, what security issues do individuals who
overstay their visas pose to the United States? Frankly, I
believe that an inventory of these overstays is important, even
as we try to craft our legislative fix. Is there an ability for
DHS to know, by having a list and date of entry and date of
departure? Is that inventory, is that digitized, is it on a
computer, can it be pulled up by birth date? So what is DHS
doing to identify and locate individuals who are visa
overstays, but also may pose a threat?
What are the indicia that are used to be able to track
individuals, even now, without a better construct? What can be
done to prioritize enforcement resources and enhance efforts to
address overstays? I will say that I am encouraged by the
recent shift of overstay analysis and exit operation
responsibilities from US-VISIT to ICE and CBP. I am hopeful
that this new configuration of responsibilities will help ICE
and its DHS partners address potential overstays in a more
efficient way.
I want to qualify and say that I am mindful that these
individuals are mostly harmless and that they are here because
our immigration system does not provide them a pathway. That is
why we must match these two processes together. I know that we
have a very active business community on the Southern Border,
active business community on the Northern Border. I know that
business is done. I know that people come over with visas.
Who knows what part of businesses, what part of families,
what part of tourists, what part of students? We know that DHS
currently has over a million unmatched records representing
potential overstays. While these individuals have been, and
continue to be, vetted against National security and criminal
database, we hope, we have no record of them exiting the
country. DHS has reduced the number of unmatched records
significantly from just a couple of years ago, but the problem
persists.
I do want to take note of the work that DHS has done. I
want to hear from ICE and GAO today about what more can be done
to reduce the number of unmatched records allowing DHS to focus
on locating individuals who we have confidence are still in the
country. I am curiously optimistic--cautiously optimistic that,
given CBP responsibility for developing and deploying, a
biometric exit system will help DHS make progress on this long
overdue mandate.
I know as CBP and ICE come before these committees,
sometimes they ask the question: What are we expected to do? I
want to qualify, for the last time, as I close my remarks, to
indicate that we know that there are provisions such as
prosecutorial discretion that ICE uses. I want to make sure
that my comments do not in any way undermine my enthusiasm
about that process when it is needed, when it is necessary, and
when it is warranted.
I also want to make note that we are running into, Madam
Chairwoman, some difficulties in a badging issue in my very
large airport, in Houston, Texas. I am thinking that that is an
issue of sequestration and the lack of dollars. I hope that we
will have that matter resolved. So when CBP comes and ICE
comes, I hope they know that we respect what they do. We want
to hear about the concerns that they have. We want to make sure
that the laws that they have to be merciful are not countered
because we want them to be efficient and right.
Congress first mandated an entry-exit system for visitors
to the United States in 1996. While DHS has made significant
progress by implementing biometric entry system, a solution for
biometric exit has been far more difficult. Let me just close
by indicating that there has been a troubled history with the
system of kiosks. We need to find a clear path forward on the
biometric exit system. I want to hear more today. I want to
know what we can--how do we work with the biometric system.
I am pleased to see the improvements, but I believe it is
very important for this discussion today to ensure that we have
a very secure border and that we work hand-in-hand with the
idea of comprehensive immigration reform. I thank the
gentlelady for her yielding, and I yield back my time.
[The statement of Ranking Member Jackson Lee follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Sheila Jackson Lee
May 21, 2013
I thank Chairman Miller for holding this hearing today to examine
the issue of visa overstays--those who enter this country through the
proverbial front door but fail to depart in a timely way--and their
effect on our Nation's security.
We had a very active, bi-partisan discussion about this issue
during our recent subcommittee mark-up of H.R. 1417, the Border
Security Results Act of 2013.
Last week, I was pleased to support an amendment at the full
committee mark-up of the bill to require the Department of Homeland
Security to develop an implementation plan for a biometric exit
capability at ports of entry, which is an essential part of our effort
to address overstays.
I am committed to working with my colleagues on this very important
issue.
So far this Congress, the subcommittee has focused much of its
oversight and legislative efforts on what DHS must do to better secure
our land borders, and the Southern Border in particular.
While this is a critically important matter, it represents only one
part of the broader border security and immigration enforcement issue.
Addressing visa overstays is certainly equally important.
Indeed, finding a way to deal with the overstay issue will likely
be essential to any immigration reform and border security package
considered in Congress.
Just this week, an amendment to address this issue was accepted at
the mark-up of the Senate immigration bill.
We have examined this issue regularly in the Judiciary Committee,
where I am also a Member.
It is important to note that overstays are more than an immigration
control concern.
A small handful of those who overstay their visas may also pose a
threat to our homeland security, like several of the 9/11 hijackers.
There are many important questions to be answered regarding visa
overstays, and I hope we can have a productive dialogue about some of
those questions here today.
For example, what security issues do individuals who overstay their
visas pose to the United States? What is DHS doing to identify and
locate individuals who may pose such a threat?
What can be done to prioritize enforcement resources and enhance
efforts to address overstays?
I will say that I am encouraged by the recent shift of overstay
analysis and exit operations responsibilities from US-VISIT to ICE and
CBP.
I am hopeful that this new configuration of responsibilities will
help ICE and its DHS partners address potential overstays in a more
efficient way.
We know that DHS currently has over a million ``unmatched records''
representing potential overstays.
While these individuals have been and continue to be vetted against
National security and criminal databases, we have no record of them
exiting the country. DHS has reduced the number of unmatched records
significantly from just a couple of years ago, but the problem
persists.
I want to hear from ICE and GAO today about what more can be done
to reduce the number of unmatched records, allowing DHS to focus on
locating individuals who we have confidence are still in the country.
I am cautiously optimistic that giving CBP responsibility for
developing and deploying a biometric exit system will help DHS make
progress on this long-overdue mandate.
Congress first mandated an entry-exit system for visitors to the
United States in 1996.
While DHS has made significant progress by implementing a biometric
entry system, a solution for biometric exit has been far more difficult
to come by.
We have seen the troubled history of this effort, from a system of
kiosks located in inconvenient and inconsistent locations in airports,
to two pilots involving CBP and TSA, each of which had advantages and
disadvantages.
What is needed now is a clear path forward on biometric exit, and I
hope to hear more from our witnesses today on what that path will be.
While not a substitute for biometric exit, I am pleased to see
recent efforts to enhance biographic exit, particularly for individuals
crossing the Northern Border.
However, addressing biographic exit at the Southern Border is more
problematic and will take more resources and ingenuity to develop a
workable solution.
America's borders will only be secure when we address not only
those who walk through the desert to come here, but also those who
arrived in this country through our front door.
Mrs. Miller. I thank the gentlelady for her comments. Other
Members of the committee are reminded that opening statements
might be submitted for the record. I would just say, before I
introduce the witnesses, that immigration reform is of
interest, as our country debates this, by other countries as
they are watching what we are doing in relation to border
security. It is interesting to note that that is particularly
so with visa securities, as evidenced by the presence of a
media outlet here today from Russia, who is covering these
proceedings.
I just point that out for the Members. We have four
distinguished witnesses before us today for this important
topic. First of all, Dr.--or, excuse me, Mr. John Wagner--you
could be a doctor--is the acting deputy assistant commissioner
from the U.S. Customs and Border Protection. Mr. Wagner
formerly served as the executive director of admissions and
passenger programs, with responsibility for all traveler-
related policies and programs, including the Trusted Traveler
Program, the electronic system for travel authorization, and
the Immigration Advisory Program. And the Fraudulent Document
Analysis unit.
Mr. James Dinkins, who has been here on other occasions--we
welcome you back, sir, as well--is the executive associate
director of Homeland Security Investigations. Prior to assuming
his current position, Mr. Dinkins held a number of key
leadership positions within ICE, including acting director for
the Office of Professional Responsibility, chief of ICE's
Financial Investigation Programs, and assistant special agent
in charge for HSI Michigan.
Mr. Shonnie Lyon is the acting director of the National
Protection and Programs Directorate Office of Biometric
Identity Management, OBIM, formerly known as the US-VISIT
program. It is the lead entity in the Department of Homeland
Security for Biometric Identity Management Services across the
Government. Mr. Lyon is also responsible for overseeing the
day-to-day operations of that program.
Ms. Rebecca Gambler, again, has been before our committee
on a number of occasions in this Congress and the last
Congress, is the acting director in the U.S. Government
Accountability Office's Homeland Security and Justice Team. Ms.
Gambler leads the GAO's work on border security and immigration
issues.
The witnesses' full written statements will appear in the
record. The Chairwoman now recognizes Mr. Wagner for his
opening comments for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF JOHN WAGNER, ACTING DEPUTY ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER,
OFFICE OF FIELD OPERATIONS, CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Wagner. Good morning, Chairwoman Miller, Ranking Member
Jackson Lee, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you on behalf of
the dedicated men and women of U.S. Customs and Border
Protection to discuss our role in addressing visa overstays.
CBP is responsible for securing our Nation's borders while
facilitating the flow of legitimate international trade and
travel that is so vital to our Nation's economy and prosperity.
Within this broad responsibility, our priority mission remains
to prevent terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the
United States. We recognize that those who pose a National
security or public safety threat may seek to commit immigration
fraud by way of overstaying a visa in order to remain in the
United States.
CBP operates at more than 320 ports of entry and processes
nearly 1 million travelers each day as they enter the United
States. About 30 percent of those, about 100 million people a
year, and travelers who arrive via commercial aviation. DHS and
CBP have developed and strategically deployed resources to
detect, assess, and, when necessary, mitigate risks, including
potential overstays at the earliest possible point and
throughout the travel continuum.
Prior to a foreign national traveling to the United States,
they must either obtain a visa from the Department of State or
an Electronic System for Travel Authorization, also known as an
ESTA, if they are traveling under the visa waiver program by
air or sea. When applying for a visa, travelers must submit an
application and provide fingerprints for enforcement screening.
These fingerprints are submitted to IDENT, maintained by the
Office of Biometric Identity Management, OBIM, to determine if
there is any adverse action, and adverse information,
available.
VWP travelers apply for an ESTA on-line prior to travel,
and the biographical application data is correlated against and
maintained in CBP's text database. CBP utilizes the visa and
the ESTA information, as well as passenger name record data and
Advance Passenger Information Manifests, also known as APIS, to
assess the risks of all passengers, regardless of citizenship,
on all inbound and outbound international flights before they
depart. CBP's National Targeting Center, or the NTC, analyzes
traveler data through the advantaged targeting system and uses
advanced software to apply intelligent-driven targeting rules
to conduct a risk assessment.
For air travelers, some persons of interest are referred
for further questioning prior to boarding the plane. CBP has
officers located in 11 airports in 9 foreign locations as part
of the Immigration Advisory Program to identify and address
passengers of concern long before they reach the physical
border of the United States. These CBP officers work in
partnership with foreign law enforcement officials to evaluate
potential risks, including potential possible overstays, and
then work in coordination with commercial airlines to issue no-
board recommendations to the airline to keep the suspected
high-risk or inadmissible passengers from traveling to the
United States.
In locations where we do not have immigration advisory
officers stationed, we also work through our National Targeting
Center and our regional carrier liaison groups to contact
airlines directly in order to advise of no-board
recommendations. The NTC vetting process for international
passengers continues while the flight is en route to the United
States in order to identify any travelers who, although not
necessarily National security risks, may need a more thorough
inspection on the first port of entry upon arrival in the
United States.
At the land border ports, advanced information is generally
not available unless the passengers are enrolled in a Trusted
Traveler Program, like NEXUS or SENTRI, or if they are arriving
by rail or chartered bus and that company is voluntarily
submitting APIS data to CBP. On the land border, we are well-
positioned to address admissibility and overstay risk. The
Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative reduced the number of
acceptable documents from more than 8,000 to a core set of six,
allowing CBP--through the application of RFID technology--to
increase the percentage of documents verified and queried from
CBP from 5 percent in 2005 to over 97 percent today.
The ability for CBP officers to access real-time and
reliable information about non-immigrants seeking
administration to the United States is critical to our anti-
terrorism and anti-fraud efforts. Upon arrival in the United
States, all persons are inspected by CBP officers. This
inspection begins with the officers scanning the traveler's
entry document and performing a query of several databases.
Most foreign nationals arriving at U.S. airports, CBP officers
will capture their fingerprints and photographs, which is used
to verify identity against the information provided by the
Department of State at the time of visa application.
In addition, each traveler is interviewed by a CBP officer
to determine the purpose and their intent to travel, and
whether any further inspection is necessary. Outbound
inspection, namely the collection of exit data for persons
departing the United States, is crucial in order to match entry
records and, therefore, determine who is lawfully abiding by
the terms of their administration and to sanction those who are
not. The exit system in the air environment is similar to
inbound targeting, in that CBP obtains advanced outbound
manifest information through the APIS system from air and sea
carriers prior to departure.
As soon as APIS indoor becomes available, CBP immediately
begins the screening and vetting process of the outbound flight
for possible matches to the terrorist screening database as
well as other law enforcement records. At the land border, the
standard mechanism for gathering departure information is the
collection of the form I-94 or I-94W on the traveler's exit.
CBP is working with the Canadian government under the Beyond
the Border Plan also to facilitate the exchange of entry
information so that the entry into one country is considered an
exit from the other in the land border environment.
A pilot of this exchange was completed in January of this
year, and phase two will commence at the end of next month,
where both countries will exchange data on third-country
nationals. All arrival and departure information collected by
CBP is submitted to the Arrival and Departure Information
System, also known as ADIS, which is available to ICE and
Department of State and other agencies to assist with the
determination and enforcement of overstays.
DHS has made significant progress in preventing terrorists
from exploiting the visa process, and further technological
investments will enhance DHS and CBP's ability to address
threats in a more effective and efficient manner than before.
We will continue to work closely with our partners to combat
visa fraud and identify potential travelers to the United
States who may pose a threat.
Thank you for allowing me the opportunity to testify today,
and I look forward to answering any of your questions.
[The joint statement of Mr. Wagner, Mr. Dinkins, and Mr.
Lyon follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement of James A. Dinkins, John Wagner, and Shonnie
Lyon
May 21, 2013
introduction
Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and distinguished
Members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss
the efforts of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to
prevent the exploitation of our non-immigrant visa system by terrorists
and criminals. Every day, Federal, State, local, and Tribal government
officials verify the identities of individuals for a variety of
purposes to determine whether they pose a risk to the United States and
whether they meet the requirements for a specific Government benefit or
credential. Aliens who violate their immigration status and overstay
their authorized periods of admission implicate critical areas of DHS's
mission to protect National security and promoting the integrity of our
immigration system.
dhs overseas presence and coordination with the u.s. department of
state (dos)
Stopping threats before they reach our shores is one of DHS's most
important priorities. The U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) Office of International Affairs has personnel in 75 offices in 48
countries who collaborate with international counterparts and Federal
partner agencies in joint efforts to disrupt and dismantle
transnational criminal organizations engaged in money laundering,
contraband smuggling, weapons proliferation, forced child labor, human
rights violations, intellectual property rights violations, child
exploitation, human smuggling and trafficking, and many other
violations. Additionally, ICE facilitates the repatriation of
individuals with final orders of removal, returning violators and those
unlawfully present to their home countries.
Effective border security requires broad information sharing and
cooperation among U.S. agencies. In October 2006, ICE entered into to a
memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the DOS Bureau of Consular
Affairs in order to exchange visa and immigration data. The agreement
has allowed ICE and DOS to exchange information contained in each
other's electronic databases pertaining to foreign persons seeking
entry into the United States. This exchange of information allows DOS
Consular Affairs personnel to query and access ICE and U.S. Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) immigration violator records contained in ICE's
Enforcement Integrated Database. DOS Consular Affairs personnel can
then take into consideration prior immigration violations when
adjudicating visa applications for foreign persons who have applied to
enter the United States. The exchange of information between DOS and
ICE also allows ICE enforcement personnel to query the DOS Consular
Consolidated Database and access visa application information for
foreign persons who are being investigated by ICE.
In January 2011, ICE signed an MOU outlining roles,
responsibilities, and collaboration between ICE and the DOS Bureaus of
Consular Affairs and Diplomatic Security. The MOU governs the day-to-
day operations of ICE agents conducting visa security operations at
U.S. embassies and consulates abroad. To facilitate information sharing
and reduce duplication of efforts, ICE and DOS conduct collaborative
training and orientation prior to overseas deployments. Once they are
deployed to overseas posts, ICE and DOS personnel work closely together
in working groups, meetings, training, and briefings, and engage in
regular and timely information sharing. ICE continues to evaluate the
need to screen and investigate additional visa applicants at high-risk
visa-issuing posts beyond the 19 such posts at which the agency
currently operates. ICE will continue to conduct joint site visits with
DOS to identify locations for deployment based on emerging threats. We
look forward to continuing to report back to you with updates on this
process.
In addition, CBP uses advance information and a select overseas
footprint to address concerns long before they reach the physical
border of the United States. Using its Automated Targeting System, CBP
leverages all available advance passenger data, including the Passenger
Name Record (PNR) and Advance Passenger Information System data, United
States-bound travel reservations, Electronic System for Travel
Authorization applications, visa applications, passenger manifests,
previous crossing information, intelligence, and law enforcement
information, as well as open-source information in its anti-fraud and
anti-terrorism efforts at the National Targeting Center (NTC).
Immigration Advisory Program officers work in partnership with foreign
law enforcement officials to evaluate potential risks, including
possible overstays, and then work in coordination with commercial air
carriers to issue no-board recommendations to the airline to keep
suspected high-risk or inadmissible passengers from traveling to the
United States. In fiscal year 2012, CBP made more than 9,500 no-board
recommendations to carriers.
The NTC vetting process for international passengers continues
while the flight is en route to the United States in order to identify
any travelers who, although not necessarily National security risks,
may need a more thorough inspection at the first port of entry upon
arrival in the United States.
dhs visa security program
The Homeland Security Act directs DHS to assist in the
identification of visa applicants who seek to enter the United States
for illegitimate purposes, including criminal offenses and terrorism-
related activities. The visa adjudication process often presents the
first opportunity to assess whether a potential non-immigrant visitor
or immigrant poses a threat to the United States. The Visa Security
Program (VSP) represents ICE's front line in protecting the United
States against terrorists and criminal organizations by preventing
foreign nationals who pose as a threat to National security from
entering the United States.
ICE deploys trained special agents overseas to high-risk visa
adjudicating posts in order to identify potential terrorist and
criminal threats before they reach the United States by conducting
targeted, in-depth reviews of individual visa applications and
applicants prior to visa issuance, and making recommendations to
consular officers to refuse or revoke visas when warranted. DHS actions
complement the consular officers' screening, applicant interviews, and
reviews of applications and supporting documentation.
In March 2010, the NTC implemented a program to conduct continuous
vetting of valid U.S. nonimmigrant visas. Recurrent vetting ensures
that changes in a traveler's visa status are identified in near real-
time, allowing CBP to timely determine whether to provide a ``no-board
recommendation'' to a carrier, to recommend that DOS revoke the visa,
or to notify the appropriate domestic ICE office regarding individuals
determined to be within the United States. Since the program's
inception, DOS has revoked more than 4,852 visas based on requests from
CBP on information uncovered after a visa was issued.
In support of the VSP, ICE, and CBP, in collaboration with DOS,
have initiated an automated pilot program to enhance on-going visa
security efforts. The Pre-Adjudicated Threat Recognition Intelligence
Operations Team (PATRIOT) initiative is the automated screening of visa
application information against DHS holdings prior to interview. The
process includes in-depth vetting of applicants identified as having
potential derogatory information, who may be of investigative interest,
or ineligible to receive U.S. visas. The PATRIOT initiative takes a
risk-based approach and uses interagency resources from ICE, CBP, DOS,
and the intelligence community to identify National security, public
safety and other visa concerns. In 2012, Visa Security Program special
agents screened more than 1.3 million visa applicants in collaboration
with the DOS. In 2014, VSP will enhance visa vetting by increasing
automated data exchange with DOS and CBP's NTC so that the flow of on-
line visa information to DHS systems will be automated and information
will be sent back to DOS also using an automated interface. ICE will
leverage modernization efforts to increase investigations of visa
applicants who pose the greatest threats to National security such as
terrorism, counter-proliferation and export violations, and human
rights and war crime violations.
student and exchange visitor program
The Student and Exchange Visitor Program (SEVP) is funded by fees
collected from non-immigrant students, exchange visitors, and
participating schools. It manages information on non-immigrants whose
primary reason for coming to the United States is to study at U.S.
institutions certified for inclusion in the Student and Exchange
Visitor Information System (SEVIS) database. SEVIS tracks non-immigrant
students, exchange visitors, and their dependents during their
authorized stays in the United States.
Over the past several months, DHS has taken steps to upgrade SEVIS.
Earlier this month, DHS implemented a technological solution that
ensures that CBP inspectors at our ports of entry have the most current
information regarding a student visa holder's status at the time of
their entry and exit from the United States. On a daily basis CBP's
TECS database will be updated with a record of individual status
changes to an individual's I-20. Thus, if that individual presents
themself for inspection before a CBP Officer, the officer would see
that there was a status indication change and the I-20 should be
checked/validated via SEVIS to assist in a proper admissibility
decision. These improvements will be supplemented later this month
through a system upgrade that improves SEVIS's interface with the
Arrival Departure Information System (ADIS), which displays critical
travel data such as those found on the form I-94 (admission number,
passport expiration date, and visa expiration date). This upgrade will
automate the lookout for SEVIS violators and improve communication
between the two systems in order to better identify overstays using
internal reporting capabilities and security control remediation for
authorized users including CBP Officers. An additional upgrade allows
DOS to also access and record information in SEVIS records, which
further enhances our situational awareness of foreign students.
SEVIS contains the records of more than 1.1 million active non-
immigrant students, exchange visitors, and their dependents, as well as
information on approximately 10,000 SEVP-certified institutions. SEVP
regulates schools' eligibility to enroll non-immigrant students for
academic and vocational training purposes, and manages participating
schools as well as students in the F (academic) and M (vocational) visa
classifications and their dependents. DOS manages the Exchange Visitor
Program for non-immigrants in the J visa classification, which enables
foreign nationals to come to the United States to teach, study, conduct
research, demonstrate special skills, or receive on-the-job training
for periods ranging from a few weeks to several years.
SEVP is responsible both for certifying schools and for withdrawing
certification from non-compliant schools. The certification process
supports the law enforcement functions of furthering National security
and protecting the integrity of our Nation's borders by providing
consistent, comprehensive oversight while preserving the Nation's
tradition of welcoming non-immigrant students and exchange visitors.
SEVP collects, maintains, and provides information to interagency
partners so that only legitimate non-immigrant students and exchange
visitors gain entry to, and remain in, the United States. The SEVP
program provides timely information to support the Department's mission
and facilitates the sharing of data with our Federal partners.
Additionally, the data maintained by SEVP in SEVIS supports the DOS's
Bureau of Consular Affairs visa process by providing advanced
electronic data on non-immigrant visa applicants prior to visa
issuance.
The non-immigrant student and exchange visitor programs that bring
F, J, and M visa holders to the United States are of immense value to
all countries involved, as they serve to strengthen relations between
our Nation and others while fostering intercultural understanding.
These programs produce economic benefits as well with the U.S.
Department of Commerce estimating that non-immigrant students, exchange
visitors, and their dependents contributed more than $21 billion to the
U.S. economy through their expenditures on tuition and living expenses
during the 2011-2012 academic year.
SEVP has been working diligently to address the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) recommendations contained in a report
issued last fall entitled ``Student and Exchange Visitor Program: DHS
Needs to Assess Risks and Strengthen Oversight Functions.'' As part of
this effort, SEVP has partnered with the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) to ensure proper certification for flights
schools. As a result of this collaboration, SEVP has issued new
guidance clarifying that all flight schools must have final FAA Part
141 certification and has completed identifying and notifying all
flight schools that do not meet this standard that they will be
withdrawn. Additionally, even prior to the GAO recommendation to focus
more on risk, SEVP has also taken on several risk-management
initiatives to identify and analyze programmatic risk over the past 2
years. This includes the development of a school risk scorecard, a
risk-informed compliance methodology, and an analysis of
characteristics associated with high-risk schools.
the counterterrorism and criminal exploitation unit
The Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation Unit (CTCEU) is the
first National program dedicated to the enforcement of non-immigrant
visa violations. Each year, the CTCEU analyzes records of hundreds of
thousands of potential status violators after preliminary analysis of
data from SEVIS and the Overstay Analysis Unit (OAU) along with other
information. After this analysis, CTCEU determines potential violations
that warrant field investigations and/or establishes compliance or
departure dates from the United States. Between 15,000 and 20,000 of
these records are analyzed each month and, since the creation of the
CTCEU in 2003, over 2 million such records have been analyzed using
automated and manual review techniques.
Today, through the CTCEU, we proactively develop cases for
investigation in cooperation with SEVP and OAU. These programs enable
special agents to access information about the millions of students,
tourists, and temporary workers present in the United States at any
given time, and to identify those who have overstayed or otherwise
violated the terms and conditions of their admission. ICE special
agents and analysts monitor the latest threat reports and proactively
address emergent issues. This practice, which is designed to detect and
identify individuals exhibiting specific risk factors based on
intelligence reporting, including travel patterns, and in-depth
criminal research and analysis, has contributed to DHS's
counterterrorism mission by initiating or supporting high-priority
National security initiatives based on specific intelligence.
In order to ensure that the potential violators who pose the
greatest threats to National security are given priority, ICE uses
intelligence-based criteria, developed in close consultation with the
intelligence and law enforcement communities. ICE assembles the
Compliance Enforcement Advisory Panel (CEAP), which is comprised of
subject matter experts from other law enforcement agencies and members
of the intelligence community, who assist the CTCEU in keeping
targeting methods in line with the most current threat information. The
CEAP is convened on a tri-annual basis to discuss recent intelligence
developments and update the CTCEU's targeting framework, in order to
ensure that the non-immigrant overstays and status violators who pose
the greatest threats to National security are targeted.
To further strengthen the Nation's enforcement efforts concerning
overstays and other status violations, DHS is currently assessing
various approaches to sharpen the focus of programs that address
vulnerabilities exploited by visa violators.
overstay analysis unit
DHS is focused on enhancing its vetting initiatives across the full
mission space of homeland security by providing real-time biometric
functions to its front line operational components while continuing to
set Government-leading biometric policies and standards. To this end,
the OAU analyzes biographical entry and exit records stored in the
National Protection and Programs Directorate's (NPPD) Office of
Biometric Identity Management (OBIM) Arrival and Departure Information
System (ADIS) to further support DHS's ability to identify
international travelers who have remained in the United States beyond
their authorized periods of admission. DHS's Automated Biometric
Identification System (IDENT) and ADIS provide person-centric
information by searching biometric and biographic data against
Government databases to establish and confirm the identities of
individuals that DHS has already encountered. OBIM supports DHS
components by providing matching services against its databases and
returning any linked information when a match is made as they vet those
identities of individuals already encountered by DHS to identify known
or suspected terrorists, National security threats, criminals, and
those who have previously violated U.S. immigration laws.
The OAU analyzes and validates two types of non-immigrant overstay
records: Out-of-country overstays (OCO) and in-country overstays (ICO).
OCO records pertain to visitors who stayed beyond their authorized
admission period and subsequently departed the country. The OAU
validates these violations based on their reported departure dates and
creates biometric and biographic lookouts for these subjects. The
lookouts are posted in two separate databases: The OBIM Automated
Biometric Identification System (IDENT) Secondary Inspection Tool and
CBP's TECS, respectively, to alert and notify DOS consular officers and
CBP Officers of a subject's violation before he or she is granted a
visa or re-entry to the United States. ICO records pertain to visitors
with no evidence of departure or adjustment of status upon expiration
of the terms of their admission. The OAU reviews and validates these
ADIS system identified violations based upon ICE identified categories
of interest.
The OAU makes overstay and status violation referrals from three
unique sources, which apply respectively to typical overstay violators,
admitted watch list subjects, and Visa Waiver Program (VWP) violators.
The first source, non-immigrant overstay leads, is used to generate
field investigations by identifying foreign visitors who violate the
terms of their admission by remaining in the United States past the
date of their required departure. The second source, admitted watch
list leads, monitors records for individuals who, at the time of
admission to the United States, were the subject of a watch list record
containing derogatory information that did not render the individual
inadmissible to the United States, but did warrant monitoring their
visit.
The third source is CTCEU's Visa Waiver Enforcement Program (VWEP).
Visa-free travel to the United States builds upon our close bilateral
relationships and fosters commercial and personal ties among tourist
and business travelers in the United States and abroad. The VWP, the
primary source of non-immigrant visitors from countries other than
Canada and Mexico, currently allows eligible nationals of 37 countries
\1\ to travel to the United States without a visa and, if admitted, to
remain in the country for a maximum of 90 days for tourist or business
purposes. Prior to the implementation of the VWEP in 2008, there was no
National program dedicated to addressing overstays within this
population. Today, ICE regularly scrutinizes a refined list of
individuals who have been identified as potential overstays who entered
the United States under the VWP. One of the primary goals of this
program is to identify those subjects who attempt to circumvent the
U.S. immigration system by obtaining travel documents from VWP
countries.
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\1\ The list of designated VWP countries can be found at 8 C.F.R.
217.2, with the most recent designation being that of Taiwan in October
2012. The Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, Public Law 96-8, Section
4(b)(1), provides that ``[w]henever the laws of the United States refer
or relate to foreign countries, nations, states, governments, or
similar entities, such terms shall include and such laws shall apply
with respect to Taiwan.'' 22 U.S.C. 3303(b)(1). Accordingly, all
references to ``country'' or ``countries'' in the Visa Waiver Program
authorizing legislation, Section 217 of the Immigration and Nationality
Act, 8 U.S.C. 1187, are read to include Taiwan. This is consistent with
the United States' one-China policy, under which the United States has
maintained unofficial relations with Taiwan since 1979.
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creation of the office of biometric identity management
The Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013
(Public Law 113-6) enacted on March 26, 2013, transferred the core of
United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-
VISIT) Program staff to stand up OBIM under NPPD. Biometric identity
management plays a critical role in supporting the DHS mission to
secure the Nation, and this office will leverage its experience and
expertise to provide biometric and associated biographic identity
verification and analysis services to current and existing customers
within DHS, and with our Federal, State, local, the intelligence
community, and foreign partners.
The act also aligns operational capabilities and realizes
efficiencies by transferring US-VISIT's overstay analysis functions to
ICE and moves entry/exit policy and operations to CBP. As the lead
entity within DHS responsible for biometric identity management
services, OBIM is focused on improving biometric and associated
biographic data sharing through system interoperability with the U.S.
Departments of Defense, Justice, and State towards a ``whole-of-
Government'' approach to identity services, and with trusted
international partners to increase National and global security. By
storing, matching, and analyzing biometric data linked to biographic
information, OBIM provides homeland security decision makers with
person-centric, actionable information on immigration violators,
criminals, and known or suspected terrorists to enhance the Nation's
safety and resiliency.
Biometric information sharing between the Federal Bureau of
Investigation's Criminal Justice Information Services and OBIM is the
foundation of the use of IDENT/Integrated Automated Fingerprint
Identification System (IAFIS) interoperability under ICE's Secure
Communities. Through the use of IDENT/IAFIS interoperability under
Secure Communities, aliens--including those who have overstayed or
otherwise violated their immigration status--who are encountered by law
enforcement after arrest for the commission of a crime may be
identified as immigration violators when fingerprints are submitted to
IAFIS. Once individuals are identified, ICE officials determine what
enforcement action is appropriate and consistent with ICE's enforcement
priorities. Currently, the use of this technology is deployed to 3,181
jurisdictions in 50 States, five Territories, and the District of
Columbia.
conclusion
DHS has made significant progress in preventing terrorists from
exploiting the visa process. Technological advances have created an
opportunity for law enforcement to identify and mitigate National
security and public safety threats on an efficient basis that otherwise
would have required hundreds of employees. These new technologies
enable us to address these threats in a more cost-effective and
expeditious manner than ever before. We will continue to work closely
with our international, Federal, State, local, and Tribal partners to
combat visa fraud and protect the integrity of our visa security
system.
Thank you again for the opportunity to testify today and for your
continued support of DHS and its law enforcement mission. We would be
pleased to answer any questions.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mrs. Miller. I thank the gentleman for his comments.
The Chairwoman now recognizes Mr. Dinkins for his 5
minutes.
STATEMENT OF JAMES DINKINS, EXECUTIVE ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR,
HOMELAND SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS, IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Dinkins. Good morning, Chairman Miller and Ranking
Member Jackson Lee and distinguished Members of the
subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our
collective efforts to prevent the exploitation of non-immigrant
visas by terrorists and other criminal organizations.
We have had great collaboration with our partners at CBP
and throughout DHS, as well as the State Department, to
effectively combat visa fraud and mitigate National security
and public safety threats. ICE and security investigations
plays a critical role in the U.S. Government's layered approach
to visa security. The process begins overseas with the
submission of a non-immigrant visa application, extends
throughout multiple layers of vetting and review during the
application process, as well as after the visa is actually
issued.
Today, I would like to highlight three programs: The HSI
Visa Security Program, our Student Exchange Visitors program,
and the HSI Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation Unit.
The HSI Visa Security Program represents DHS's front line in
protecting the homeland by preventing foreign nationals who
could pose a threat from actually obtaining a visa in the first
place. To accomplish this, we rely upon highly-trained HSI
special agents deployed to 19 high-risk visa-issuing posts
overseas, combined with sophisticated technology developed in
partnership with CBP at the National Targeting Center.
As a result of today's increasingly sophisticated
technology, we have the ability to vet more visa applicants
against more data sets--has grown faster than ever before.
Since fiscal year 2011 alone, HSI special agents screened over
3 million visa applications through a manual review that
identified over 10,000 individuals who could pose a potential
threat to the United States. As a result, we recommended that
they not be issued a visa. These are 10,000 individuals who
could have posed a threat to our Nation, but were never
afforded the opportunity to do so.
With the State Department's transition from a paper visa
application system to an on-line entrance process, we began
collaborating with CBP to take advantage of this technological
milestone. This year, we started piloting an automated vetting
program. This program, known as Patriot, is revolutionizing the
screening of electronically-submitted visa applications.
Patriot automates an in-depth vetting of non-immigrant visa
applications, a process that previously was done manually and
took weeks to do. But with Patriot, the initial screening can
be done electronically in a matter of seconds.
With the help of Patriot, in the near future we will not
only be able to screen visa applications filed at the 19 high-
risk posts, but virtually every HSI special non-immigrant visa
application submitted from around the world within seconds of
the person hitting the ``submit'' button and well in advance of
them ever being considered by the State Department for a visa.
The security and investigative benefits of this new program are
immense, and will have a direct impact on our National
security.
I would also like to take the opportunity to discuss
international students. While the vast majority of these
students came to the United States in search of a quality
education, there are those who choose a different path and seek
to exploit the system for their nefarious purposes. As you
know, HSI manages the Student Exchange Visitor Program as well
as the Student Exchange Visitor Information System, known as
SEVIS, which is a database that tracks HSI special non-
immigrant students, exchange visitors, and their dependents.
Today, SEVIS contains the records related to more than 1
million active students as well as information of approximately
10,000 certified institutions for education. While overseeing
this program, the men and women assigned to the Student
Exchange Visitor program monitor both the institutions and the
students for compliance as well as potential criminal activity,
immigration fraud, and status violations. When such activity is
detected, the information is referred to the HSI
Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation Unit.
This unit is a National program dedicated to investigating
non-immigrant visa violations, and is responsible for
identifying and targeting those HSI special non-immigrant visa
holders who could pose a National security or public safety
threat to our Nation. Each year, the unit analyzes hundreds of
thousands of potential visa status violators. These
intelligence-based screening criteria, developed in close
consultation with our law enforcement partners as well as the
intelligence community, ensure that the latest information is
incorporated into our targeting process.
When potential threats are identified, they refer the cases
for investigation to HSI field special agents located
throughout the United States. In all, the unit has the support
of over 450 men and women dedicated to this important mission.
Again, we have collectively made great strides in preventing
terrorist and National security threats from exploiting the
visa process. Technological advances have created an
unprecedented opportunity for law enforcement to identify and
mitigate National security and public safety threats in a more
efficient and expeditious way.
I appreciate the opportunity to be here today, and I look
forward to answering any questions you may have.
Mrs. Miller. I thank the gentleman.
The Chairwoman now recognizes Mr. Lyon for his 5 minutes of
testimony.
STATEMENT OF SHONNIE LYON, ACTING DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF BIOMETRIC
IDENTITY MANAGEMENT, NATIONAL PROTECTION AND PROGRAMS
DIRECTORATE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Lyon. Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and
distinguished Members of the subcommittee, I am pleased to
appear before you today with my colleagues to discuss the
progress we continue to make to secure the Nation and address
the challenge of visa overstays.
Shortly after the Department was created, DHS established
the United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator
Technology Program, know as US-VISIT, a critical component of
the Department's strategy to prevent terrorist attacks on the
United States and facilitate the movement of legitimate travel
and trade.
US-VISIT represented a major achievement in creating an
integrated border screening system that enhanced our Nation's
security.
Through US-VISIT, DHS increased its ability to manage
information collected about foreign nationals during the pre-
entry, entry, status management, and departure processes,
allowing us to conduct better analysis of that information and
thereby strengthen the integrity of our immigration system. In
2007, DHS created NPPD and a realigned US-VISIT under that
directorate. Expanding rapidly beyond its original mandate, US-
VISIT evolved in its mission space, providing advanced
biometric and biographic identification services to front-line
decision-makers so that they can accurately identify people and
assess whether they pose a risk to the United States.
The Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act
of 2013 transferred the US-VISIT overstay mission to ICE, the
US-VISIT entry-exit policy and operations mission to CBP, and
the biometric identity functions of US-VISIT to the newly-
established Office of Biometric Identity Management. The
aforementioned legislation designates the Office of Biometric
Identity Management as the lead entity within DHS responsible
for biometric identity services and retains responsibility for
US-VISIT's identity systems, the Biographic Space Repository,
known as ADIS, and the Biometric Space System, known as IDENT.
Although most people are familiar with the Office of
Biometric Identity Management's role in identifying visa
applicants and travelers arriving at ports of entry, the
behind-the-scenes work to identify visa overstays is less well-
known but equally important to the integrity of our immigration
system. ADIS is used to biographically match entry information,
changes in status and exit data, on foreign nationals to help
determine possible overstays. ADIS processes arrival and
departure information from CBP, changes in immigration status
from USCIS, and changes in student status from ICE.
Additionally, IDENT provides biometric identifiers for
identity verification, along with biometric encounters related
to apprehensions, visa applicants, and status updates that
assist in resolving overstays. The IDENT and ADIS systems
provide permit-centric information by searching biometric and
biographic data to establish and confirm the identities of
individuals that Homeland Security decision-makers encounter
and to identity known or suspected terrorists, National
security threats, criminals, and those who have previously
violated U.S. immigration laws.
The Office of Biometric Identity Management is focused on
improving biometric and associated biographic data sharing
through system interoperability with the Departments of
Defense, Justice, and State towards a whole-of-Government
approach to identity services. With trusted international
partners to increase National and global security. By storing,
matching, and analyzing biometric data linked to biographic
information the Office of Biometric Identity Management
provides Homeland Security decision-makers with person-centric
actionable information on immigration violators, criminals, and
known or suspected terrorists to enhance the Nation's security
and resiliency.
Thank you again for this opportunity to testify. I look
forward to working with this committee as we continue to
improve the biometric and biographic identification services
our front-line decision-makers rely on to identify and deter
human threats. I am pleased to address the committee's
questions.
Mrs. Miller. I thank the gentleman for his testimony.
The Chairwoman now recognizes Ms. Gambler for her 5 minutes
of testimony.
STATEMENT OF REBECCA GAMBLER, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND
JUSTICE, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Ms. Gambler. Good morning, Chairwoman Miller, Ranking
Member Jackson Lee, and Members of the subcommittee. I
appreciate the opportunity to testify at today's hearing to
discuss GAO's work on overstay enforcement issues. My statement
is based on GAO's April 2011 report and our on-going work for
this subcommittee and others on DHS's programs and efforts to
address overstays.
Overstays are generally defined as foreign nationals who
were legally admitted to the United States on a temporary
basis, but then overstayed their authorized periods of
admission. Most overstays are likely motivated by economic
reasons to stay in the country. However, overstays can pose
homeland security concerns. Today, I would like to focus my
remarks on three key areas. First, I will discuss DHS's efforts
to address a prior backlog of potential overstay records and
our preliminary observations on the file of unmatched arrival
records that DHS continues to maintain.
Second, I will discuss DHS's steps to strengthen its data
on potential overstays and report overstay estimates. Finally,
I will discuss DHS's planning efforts for a biometric exit
capability. First, as of January 2011, DHS had a backlog of
potential overstay records that totaled 1.6 million. Since that
time, DHS completed a review of those records against various
National security and law enforcement databases. Based on that
review, DHS closed those records for which information
indicated that individuals had departed or changed status.
DHS also identified any National security or public safety
threats for possible investigation. DHS has continued to review
all potential overstay records against National security and
law enforcement databases. However, DHS continues to have more
than 1 million unmatched arrival records. Some of these
individuals are likely overstays, while others have departed or
changed status without a record of them doing so.
Our preliminary analysis of these 1 million records
indicates that about 44 percent are for non-immigrants who
traveled to the United States on a tourist visa, while about 43
percent are for tourists who were admitted under the visa
waiver program. In addition, our preliminary analysis indicates
that the average amount of time elapsed since travelers with
unmatched arrival records were expected to depart was about 2.7
years. We are continuing to analyze these records for
additional categories or trends.
With regard to my second point, DHS has taken steps to
enhance the connections among component databases to reduce the
need for manual exchanges of data used to help identify
overstays. While these changes have resulted in efficiencies,
they have not addressed some of the underlying data quality
issues we previously identified, such as incomplete data on
land-based departures. DHS is implementing the Beyond the
Border Initiative with Canada to exchange entry data on
travelers crossing the Northern Border at land ports of entry.
This initiative should help address the issue of missing
departure data by providing a new source of information on
travelers departing at land ports. This new data could also
help DHS in determining and reporting overstay estimates, which
DHS has announced plans to do by the end of this year. DHS has
not reported overstay estimates since 1994 due to concerns
about the reliability of its data. DHS initiatives for
improving data on potential overstays are in the early stages
of implementation. Thus, it is too soon to assess their full
effect on helping to strengthen the reliability of DHS's
overstay data for reporting purposes.
Finally, DHS has not yet implemented a biometric exit
capability, but has plans underway to assess options for such
an exit capability at air and seaports. DHS has faced long-
standing challenges in determining how to implement an exit
capability, such as identifying efficient mechanisms for
collecting biometric data that do not disrupt passenger flow.
DHS has plans to finalize goals and objectives for biometric
air exit, and test various scenarios for collecting biometric
data in the airport environment going forward.
In closing, since we last reported on overstay issues in
April 2011, DHS has made progress in its overstay enforcement
effort. However, a number of DHS's changes have been recently
implemented or are in the process of being implemented.
Further, other efforts are planned for the future. Thus, it is
not yet clear what all of DHS's--what impact all of DHS's
efforts will have on improving its processes and data for
identifying potential overstays.
We are continuing to assess DHS's efforts, and plan to
report our final results later this summer. This concludes my
oral statement. I am pleased to answer any questions Members
may have.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Gambler follows:]
Prepared Statement of Rebecca Gambler
May 21, 2013
immigration enforcement.--preliminary observations on dhs's overstay
enforcement efforts
gao-13-602t
Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and Members of the
subcommittee: I am pleased to be here today to provide our preliminary
observations on the actions that the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) has taken since April 2011 to address overstays.\1\ Each year,
millions of visitors come to the United States legally on a temporary
basis either with a visa or, in some cases, as visitors who were
allowed to enter without a visa.\2\ Overstays are individuals who were
admitted into the country legally on a temporary basis but then
overstayed their authorized periods of admission.\3\ We have reported
that most overstays are likely motivated by economic opportunities to
stay in the United States beyond their authorized periods of
admission.\4\ However, overstays could pose homeland security
concerns--for example, 5 of the 19 September 11, 2001, hijackers were
overstays.
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\1\ GAO, Overstay Enforcement: Additional Mechanisms for
Collecting, Assessing, and Sharing Data Could Strengthen DHS's Efforts
but Would Have Costs, GAO-11-411 (Washington, DC: Apr. 15, 2011).
\2\ Visitors who are allowed to seek admission without a visa
include citizens of Canada and the British Overseas Territory of
Bermuda (and certain residents of other adjacent islands, such as the
Bahamas) under certain circumstances, as well as Visa Waiver Program
participants. This program allows nationals from certain countries to
apply for admission to the United States as temporary visitors for
business or pleasure without first obtaining a visa from a U.S.
consulate abroad. Currently, there are 37 participants in the program.
\3\ In this statement, we include out-of-status students--student
visa holders who fail to meet certain requirements, such as enrolling
in a qualified education program--in our definition of overstays. In
general, foreign students remain in status and therefore eligible to
stay in the United States under their student visas as long as they are
enrolled in and attending a qualified education program.
\4\ GAO, Visa Waiver Program: Limitations with Department of
Homeland Security's Plan to Verify Departure of Foreign Nationals, GAO-
08-458T (Washington, DC: Feb. 28, 2008).
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DHS has primary responsibility for identifying and taking
enforcement action to address overstays. Within DHS, U.S. Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) is tasked with, among other duties, inspecting
all people applying for entry to the United States to determine their
admissibility to the country and screening Visa Waiver Program
applicants to determine their eligibility to travel to the United
States under the program. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) is the lead agency for enforcing immigration law in the interior
of the United States and is primarily responsible for overstay
enforcement. Within ICE, the Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation
Unit (CTCEU) and the Overstay Analysis Unit are primarily responsible
for overstay investigations. The Office of Biometric Identity
Management (OBIM), within DHS's National Protection and Programs
Directorate, supports the identification of overstays by managing the
Arrival and Departure Information System (ADIS), which tracks and
matches arrival and departure records for the purpose of identifying
potential overstays, and the Automated Biometric Identification System
(IDENT), which maintains biometric information, such as fingerprints,
collected from non-immigrants upon their entry into the United
States.\5\
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\5\ The Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT) also
contains fingerprints collected by the Department of State to establish
and verify the identities of visa applicants. Both the Overstay
Analysis Unit and OBIM were formerly part of the U.S. Visitor and
Immigrant Status Indicator Technology Program (US-VISIT) within DHS's
National Protection and Programs Directorate. DHS initiated US-VISIT in
2002 to develop a comprehensive entry and exit system to collect
biometric data from aliens traveling through U.S. ports of entry. In
2004, US-VISIT initiated the first step of this program by collecting
biometric data on aliens entering the United States. Pursuant to the
fiscal year 2013 DHS appropriations act and its accompanying
explanatory statement, DHS realigned US-VISIT's overstay analysis
function into ICE and created OBIM effective March 27, 2013.
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In April 2011, we reported on DHS's actions to identify and take
actions to address overstays and made recommendations to the Department
to strengthen these efforts.\6\ DHS concurred with our recommendations
and has taken or is taking steps to address them. Further, since April
2011, DHS has reported taking additional actions to strengthen its
processes for identifying and taking enforcement action against
overstays.
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\6\ GAO-11-411.
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This testimony discusses our preliminary observations on DHS's
efforts since April 2011 to: (1) Review potential overstay records for
National security and public safety concerns, (2) improve data on
potential overstays and report overstay rates, and (3) plan for a
biometric exit system. My statement is based on preliminary analyses
from our on-going review of overstay enforcement for this subcommittee
and other Congressional requesters. We expect to issue a final report
on this work in July 2013. To conduct this work, we analyzed DHS
documents and data related to overstays and interviewed relevant DHS
officials. Specifically, we analyzed DHS planning documents and reports
on processes to review potential overstay records and collect
additional data to improve overstay identification. We analyzed DHS's
unmatched arrival records as of November 2012, the most recent date for
which DHS had compiled the records at the time we began our review. We
also reviewed statutory requirements and a May 2012 DHS report on the
status of efforts to implement biometric exit capabilities at airports.
To analyze the reliability of data on previously unreviewed potential
overstay records and DHS's current set of unmatched arrival records, we
reviewed documentation regarding the databases used to collect these
data and interviewed DHS officials familiar with the data. We
determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes.
We conducted this work in accordance with generally accepted Government
auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform
the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We provided a draft of this statement to DHS for review and
incorporated its comments where appropriate.
dhs continually reviews potential overstay records, but unmatched
arrival records remain
DHS Reviewed a Backlog of 1.6 Million Potential Overstay Records
DHS has taken action to address a backlog of potential overstay
records we previously identified in April 2011. Specifically, in April
2011, we reported that, as of January 2011, ADIS contained a backlog of
1.6 million potential overstay records, which included prior non-
priority overstay leads that had not been reviewed, non-priority leads
that continued to accrue on a daily basis, and leads generated in error
as a result of CBP system changes.\7\ DHS uses ADIS to match departure
records to arrival records and subsequently close records for
individuals with matching arrival and departure records because either:
(1) The individual departed prior to the end of his or her authorized
period of admission and is therefore not an overstay or (2) the
individual departed after the end of his or her authorized period of
admission and is therefore an out-of-country overstay. Unmatched
arrival records--those records in ADIS that do not have corresponding
departure records--remain open and indicate that those individuals are
potential in-country overstays.\8\
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\7\ ICE prioritizes potential overstay leads for possible
investigation. The specific criteria ICE uses to rank the priority
level of overstay leads are determined triannually based on current
threat information by the Compliance Enforcement Advisory Panel, an
interagency panel of intelligence experts assembled by ICE for the
purpose of determining these criteria. CBP system changes had resulted
in multiple arrival and departure records being inadvertently created
for a single individual.
\8\ Enforcement actions for in-country and out-of-country overstays
differ in that the focus of enforcement against in-country overstays is
to remove them from the country if they pose a threat, whereas
enforcement against out-of-country overstays is to prevent possible
readmission to the United States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the summer of 2011, DHS completed a review of the 1.6 million
records against various National security and law enforcement databases
to determine if the subjects of these records had already left the
United States and to help identify if the subjects posed any potential
National security or public safety threats.\9\ As a result, DHS closed
approximately 863,000 records for individuals who had departed, were in
status, or had adjusted status, and removed them from the backlog.
Second, DHS reviewed the remaining 757,000 records against National
security and law enforcement databases to identify potential National
security or public safety threats. As part of this National security
and public safety review, DHS also reviewed approximately 82,000
additional records identified by CTCEU that were unresolved or had not
yet undergone full review because they did not meet ICE's enforcement
priorities (a total of approximately 839,000 combined records). As a
result of these reviews, DHS reprioritized 1,901 of the 839,000 records
because the subjects of the records could pose National security or
public safety concerns and provided them to CTCEU for further review
and consideration for enforcement action. Table 1 describes how CTCEU
resolved these leads.
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\9\ To determine whether an unmatched arrival record is likely to
be an in-country overstay, DHS agencies review multiple databases to
determine if any information is available to document a departure or a
change in immigration status. For example, the review process includes
both automated searches, such as searching for immigration benefit
application information through a U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services database, and manual searches, such as determining whether the
individual applied for refugee or asylum status.
TABLE 1.--PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF RESULTS OF DHS'S 2011 REVIEW OF
BACKLOG OF POTENTIAL OVERSTAY RECORDS
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Number of Records (Percentage
Outcome of Total)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Individual had departed the United 711 records (37.4 percent).
States.
Records forwarded to ICE's Enforcement 481 records (25.3 percent).
and Removal Operations (ERO) as
potential public safety threats*.
Individual was in status (e.g., the 302 records (15.9 percent).
subject filed a timely application to
change his or her status or extend his
or her authorized period of admission
in the United States).
Individual could not be located**....... 266 records (14.0 percent).
Individual was arrested................. 9 records (0.5 percent).
Other***................................ 132 records (6.9 percent).
-------------------------------
Total............................. 1,901 records (100 percent).
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: ICE CTCEU.
* CTCEU refers information on non-priority potential overstays to ICE's
ERO, which is responsible for identifying and apprehending aliens who
are subject to removal from the country, detaining these individuals
when necessary, and removing aliens subject to removal from the United
States. ERO personnel may encounter overstays in the course of their
work but they do not directly focus on overstay enforcement.
** An ICE contractor's system automatically queries these records
against various databases on a weekly basis for new information
relating to the location of the suspected overstay. If such
information is identified, CTCEU will reopen the investigation.
*** Other includes the following outcomes: (1) ICE determined that
information indicating a possible National security or public safety
threat was false (73 leads, 3.8 percent); (2) the subject of the lead
was in removal proceedings, previously arrested, or the subject of an
investigation (43 leads, 2.3 percent); (3) the lead is open for
continuous review (13 leads, 0.7 percent); and (4) the subject of the
lead is the subject of an on-going investigation at an ICE Homeland
Security Investigations field office (3 leads, 0.2 percent).
Since completing this review of the backlog of potential overstay
records in the summer of 2011, DHS has continued to review all
potential overstay records through National security and law
enforcement databases to identify potential threats, regardless of
whether the subjects of the records meet ICE's priorities for
enforcement action. This occurs on an on-going basis such that DHS may
identify threats among individuals who were not previously identified
as such when new information becomes available in various National
security and law enforcement databases.
DHS Has More Than 1 Million Unmatched Arrival Records
As of April 2013, DHS continues to maintain more than 1 million
unmatched arrival records in ADIS (that is, arrival records for which
ADIS does not have a record of departure or status change). Some of
these individuals are overstays, while others have either departed or
changed immigration status without an ADIS record of their departure or
status change. For example, the individual may have departed via a land
port of entry without providing a record of departure or the individual
may have applied for immigration benefits using a different name. In
addition, these records include those from the previous backlog of
unmatched arrival records that were not prioritized for enforcement in
the summer of 2011 and have not subsequently been matched against a
departure or change of status record. As part of our on-going work, we
are analyzing these data to identify various trends among these
unmatched arrival records. For example, our preliminary analysis shows
that 44 percent of the unmatched arrival records are non-immigrants
traveling to the United States on a tourist visa, while 43 percent are
also tourists but were admitted under the Visa Waiver Program. Figure 1
presents our preliminary analysis of the breakdown of unmatched arrival
records by admission class.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
We also analyzed the records to assess the amount of time that has
elapsed since travelers were expected to depart the country, based on
travelers' ``admit until'' date. CBP assigns certain nonimmigrants an
``admit until'' date, by which they must leave the country to avoid
overstaying.\10\ Figure 2 presents our preliminary analysis of the
breakdown of the amount of time elapsed, as of November 2012, since the
``admit until'' date. The average amount of time elapsed for all
unmatched arrival records was 2.7 years.
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\10\ In general, foreign students remain in status and therefore
eligible to remain in the United States as long as they are enrolled in
and attending a qualified education program. Individuals traveling on
student visas are generally not issued a specific date until which they
are authorized to remain in the United States, but instead are admitted
for what is referred to as duration of status. This means that they may
remain in the country until they complete their approved program of
study, provided they otherwise maintain their student status.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
As of April 2013, DHS has not analyzed its unmatched arrival
records to identify whether there are any trends in these data that
could inform the Department's overstay enforcement efforts. We will
continue to evaluate these data as part of our on-going work.
dhs has actions completed and under way to improve data, but the effect
of these changes is not yet known
DHS Has Begun Collecting Additional Data and Improved Sharing of Data
Among Its Databases to Help Identify Potential Overstays
Since April 2011, DHS has taken various actions to improve its data
on potential overstays. In April 2011, we reported that DHS's efforts
to identify and report on overstays were hindered by unreliable data,
and we identified various challenges to DHS's efforts to identify
potential overstays, including the incomplete collection of departure
data from non-immigrants at ports of entry, particularly land ports of
entry, and the lack of mechanisms for assessing the quality of leads
sent to ICE field offices for investigations.\11\ Since that time, DHS
has taken action to strengthen its processes for reviewing records to
identify potential overstays, including: (1) Streamlining connections
among DHS databases used to identify potential overstays, and (2)
collecting information from the Canadian government about those exiting
the United States and entering Canada through northern land ports of
entry.
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\11\ GAO-11-411.
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First, DHS has taken steps to enhance connections among its
component agencies' databases used to identify potential overstays and
reduce the need for manual exchanges of data. For example:
In August 2012, DHS enhanced data sharing between ADIS and
IDENT. This improved connection provides additional data to
ADIS to improve the matching process based on fingerprint
identification. For example, when an individual provides
fingerprints as part of an application for immigration benefits
from U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services or a visa from
the State Department, or when apprehended by law enforcement,
IDENT now sends identity information, including a fingerprint
identification number, for that individual to ADIS. This
additional source of data is intended to help allow ADIS to
more effectively match the individual's entry record with a
change of status, thereby closing out more unmatched arrival
records.
Beginning in April 2013, ICE's Student and Exchange Visitor
Information System (SEVIS) began automatically sending data to
ADIS on a daily basis, allowing ADIS to review SEVIS records
against departure records and determine whether student visa
holders who have ended their course of study departed in
accordance with the terms of their stay.\12\ Prior to this
date, DHS manually transferred data from SEVIS to ADIS on a
weekly basis. According to DHS officials, these exchanges were
unreliable because they did not consistently include all SEVIS
data--particularly data on ``no show'' students who failed to
begin their approved course of study within 30 days of being
admitted into the United States.
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\12\ SEVIS contains biographical and immigration status information
for nonimmigrant foreign students and exchange visitors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Also in April 2013, DHS automated the exchange of potential
overstay records between ADIS and CBP's Automated Targeting
System (ATS), which is intended to allow DHS to more
efficiently: (1) Transfer data between the systems for the
purpose of identifying National security and public safety
concerns, and (2) use matching algorithms in ATS that differ
from those in ADIS to close additional records for individuals
who departed.
These changes have resulted in efficiencies in reviewing records
for determining possible overstay leads; however, they do not address
some of the underlying data quality issues we previously identified,
such as incomplete data on departures through land ports of entry.
Furthermore, because many of these changes were implemented in April
2013, it is too early to assess their effect on the quality of DHS's
overstay data.
Second, DHS is implementing the Beyond the Border initiative to
collect additional data to strengthen the identification of potential
overstays. In October 2012, DHS and the Canada Border Services Agency
began exchanging entry data on travelers crossing the border at
selected land ports of entry. Because an entry into Canada constitutes
a departure from the United States, DHS will be able to use Canadian
entry data as proxies for U.S. departure records. We have previously
reported that DHS faces challenges in its ability to identify overstays
because of unreliable collection of departure data at land ports of
entry.\13\ This effort would help address that challenge by providing a
new source of data on travelers departing the United States at land
ports on the Northern Border. In the pilot phase, DHS exchanged data
with the Canada Border Services Agency on third-country nationals at
four of the five largest ports of entry on the Northern Border.\14\
These data covered entries from September 30, 2012, through January 15,
2013. DHS plans to expand this effort to collect data from additional
ports of entry and to share data on additional types of travelers.
According to DHS officials, after June 30, 2013, DHS plans to exchange
data for third-country nationals at all automated ports of entry along
the Northern Border.\15\ At that time, DHS also plans to begin using
these data for operational purposes (e.g., taking enforcement action
against overstays, such as revoking visas or imposing bars on
readmission to the country based on the length of time they remained in
the country unlawfully).\16\ After June 30, 2014, DHS plans to exchange
data on all travelers, including U.S. and Canadian citizens, at all
automated ports of entry along the Northern Border.
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\13\ GAO-11-411.
\14\ These ports were Pacific Highway (Blaine, Washington), Peace
Arch (Blaine, Washington), Lewiston-Queenston Bridge (Lewiston, New
York), and Rainbow Bridge (Niagara Falls, New York). For the purposes
of this pilot, third-country nationals are individuals who are not
citizens of Canada or citizens or nationals of the United States. The
pilot phase included the exchange of biographic data on permanent
residents of Canada and lawful permanent residents of the United
States.
\15\ For the purposes of the Beyond the Border initiative, an
automated port of entry refers to a port of entry on the shared Canada-
U.S. land border with a primary processing capacity to capture traveler
(land, ferry, and pedestrian) passage as an electronic record. This
does not include large cruise vessels deemed to be sea crossings under
the laws of Canada and the United States.
\16\ Since these data include only individuals who have departed
the United States, all of the overstays identified would be out-of-
country overstays. In general, non-immigrants, such as those traveling
under temporary visas for business or pleasure, who were unlawfully
present in the United States for a period of more than 180 days but
less than 1 year and voluntarily departed the United States prior to
the commencement of legal proceedings to remove them from the country,
are inadmissible for 3 years. In addition, aliens who were unlawfully
present in the United States for 1 year or more, and who again seek
admission within 10 years of the date of their departure or removal
from the United States, are inadmissible. For non-immigrants whose
overstay violations fall below 180 days, their visas are void and the
State Department has the discretion to determine whether to issue them
new visas, and CBP has the discretion whether to readmit them into the
country.
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DHS Continues to Face Challenges in Reporting Reliable Overstay Rates,
and Recent Changes Have Not Yet Been Fully Implemented
DHS has not reported overstay rates because of concerns about the
reliability of its data on overstays. According to Federal law, DHS is
to submit an annual report to Congress providing numerical estimates of
the number of aliens from each country in each non-immigrant
classification who overstayed an authorized period of admission that
expired during the fiscal year prior to the year for which the report
is made.\17\ Since 1994, DHS or its predecessors have not reported
annual overstay rates regularly because of its concerns about the
reliability of the Department's overstay data. In September 2008, we
reported on limitations in overstay data, such as missing data for land
departures, that affect the reliability of overstay rates.\18\ In April
2011, we reported that DHS officials stated that the Department had not
reported overstay rates because it had not had sufficient confidence in
the quality of its overstay data. DHS officials stated at the time
that, as a result, the Department could not reliably report overstay
estimates in accordance with the statute.\19\ Although the new
departure data DHS is collecting as part of the Beyond the Border
initiative may allow DHS to close out more potential overstay records
in the future, these data are limited to land departure at Northern
Border ports of entry, and as the initiative has not yet been fully
implemented, it is too early to assess its effect on helping strengthen
the reliability of DHS's overstay data for reporting purposes. In
February 2013, the Secretary of Homeland Security testified that DHS
plans to report overstay rates by December 2013.\20\ As of April 2013,
DHS was working to determine how it plans to calculate and report these
overstay rates. As part of our on-going review, we are assessing how
the changes DHS has made to its processes for matching records to
identify potential overstays may affect the reliability of overstay
data and DHS's ability to report reliable overstay rates.
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\17\ 8 U.S.C. 1376(b).
\18\ GAO, Visa Waiver Program: Actions Are Needed to Improve
Management of the Expansion Process, and to Assess and Mitigate Program
Risks, GAO-08-967 (Washington, DC: Sept. 15, 2008).
\19\ GAO-11-411.
\20\ See statement of Janet Napolitano, Secretary, Department of
Homeland Security, before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States
Senate, Washington, DC: February 13, 2013.
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dhs faces challenges planning for a biometric exit system at air and
sea ports of entry
Developing a biometric exit capability has been a long-standing
challenge for DHS. Beginning in 1996, Federal law has required the
implementation of an integrated entry and exit data system for foreign
nationals.\21\ The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004 required the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop a plan to
accelerate full implementation of an automated biometric entry and exit
data system that matches available information provided by foreign
nationals upon their arrival in and departure from the United
States.\22\ Since 2004, we have issued a number of reports on DHS's
efforts to implement a biometric entry and exit system. For example, in
November 2009, we reported that DHS had not adopted an integrated
approach to scheduling, executing, and tracking the work that needed to
be accomplished to deliver a comprehensive exit solution. We concluded
that without a master schedule that was integrated and derived in
accordance with relevant guidance, DHS could not reliably commit to
when and how it would deliver a comprehensive exit solution or
adequately monitor and manage its progress toward this end.\23\ We have
made recommendations to address these issues, including that DHS ensure
that an integrated master schedule be developed and maintained.\24\ DHS
has generally concurred with our recommendations and has reported
taking action to address them. For example, in March 2012, DHS reported
that the US-VISIT office was adopting procedures to comply with the
nine scheduling practices we recommended in our November 2009 report
and has conducted training on our scheduling methodology.
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\21\ Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, 110, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-
558 to 59.
\22\ 8 U.S.C. 1365b.
\23\ GAO, Homeland Security: Key US-VISIT Components at Varying
Stages of Completion, but Integrated and Reliable Schedule Needed, GAO-
10-13 (Washington, DC: Nov. 19, 2009).
\24\ GAO-10-13; GAO, Homeland Security: U.S. Visitor and Immigrant
Status Program's Long-standing Lack of Strategic Direction and
Management Controls Needs to Be Addressed, GAO-07-1065 (Washington, DC:
Aug. 31, 2007); and Homeland Security: First Phase of Visitor and
Immigration Status Program Operating, but Improvements Needed, GAO-04-
586 (Washington, DC: May 11, 2004).
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DHS has not yet implemented a biometric exit capability, but has
planning efforts under way to assess options for such a capability at
airports and seaports. In 2009, DHS conducted pilots for biometric exit
capabilities in airport scenarios, as called for in the Consolidated
Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act,
2009.\25\ In August 2010, we reported on the results of our review of
DHS's evaluation of these pilot programs. Specifically, we reported
that there were limitations with the pilot programs--for example, the
pilot programs did not operationally test about 30 percent of the air
exit requirements identified in the evaluation plan for the pilot
programs--which hindered DHS's ability to inform decision making for a
long-term air exit solution and pointed to the need for additional
sources of information on air exit's operational impacts.\26\ According
to DHS officials, the Department's approach to planning for biometric
air exit has been partly in response to our recommendation that DHS
identify additional sources for the operational impacts of air exit not
addressed in the pilot programs' evaluation and to incorporate these
sources into its air exit decision making and planning. As of April
2013, the Department's planning efforts are focused on developing a
biometric exit system for airports, with the potential for a similar
solution to be rolled out at seaports, according to DHS officials.
However, in October 2010, DHS identified three primary reasons why it
has been unable to determine how and when to implement a biometric air
exit solution: (1) The methods of collecting biometric data could
disrupt the flow of travelers through air terminals; (2) air carriers
and airport authorities had not allowed DHS to examine mechanisms
through which DHS could incorporate biometric data collection into
passenger processing at the departure gate; and (3) challenges existed
in capturing biometric data at the point of departure, including
determining what personnel should be responsible for the capture of
biometric information at airports.
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\25\ Pub. L. No. 110-329, 122 Stat. 3574, 3668-70 (2008).
\26\ GAO, Homeland Security: US-VISIT Pilot Evaluations Offer
Limited Understanding of Air Exit Options, GAO-10-860 (Washington, DC:
Aug. 10, 2010).
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According to DHS officials, these challenges have affected the
Department's planning efforts. In 2011, DHS directed its Science and
Technology Directorate (S&T), in coordination with other DHS component
agencies, to research ``long-term options'' for biometric exit.\27\ In
May 2012, DHS reported internally on the results of S&T's analysis of
previous air exit pilot programs and assessment of available
technologies, and the report made recommendations to support the
planning and development of a biometric air exit capability.\28\ In
that report, DHS concluded that the building blocks to implement an
effective biometric air exit system were available. However, DHS
reported that significant questions remained regarding: (1) The
effectiveness of current biographic air exit processes and the error
rates in collecting or matching data, (2) methods of cost-effectively
integrating biometrics into the air departure processes (e.g., matching
arrival and departure records based on biometric information like
fingerprints rather than based on biographic information, such as names
and dates of birth), (3) the additional value biometric air exit would
provide compared with the current biographic air exit process, and (4)
the overall value and cost of a biometric air exit capability. The
report included nine recommendations to help inform DHS's planning for
biometric air exit, such as directing DHS to develop explicit goals and
objectives for biometric air exit and an evaluation framework that
would, among other things, assess the value of collecting biometric
data in addition to biographic data and determine whether biometric air
exit is economically justified.\29\
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\27\ In our previous reviews of DHS's efforts to pursue biometric
exit capabilities, DHS's plans have approached development of a
biometric exit system through a phased approach that involved
conducting pilots to inform eventual planning for long-term solutions.
Different pilots were created to inform solutions at air/seaports and
land ports. See GAO-10-13.
\28\ DHS, DHS Biometric Air Exit: Analysis, Recommendations, and
Next Steps, draft final report (Washington, DC: May 2012).
\29\ The report recommended that DHS take the following actions:
(1) Develop explicit goals and objectives for biometric air exit, (2)
leverage improvements in passenger facilitation and biometric
technology to support a concept of operations, (3) use developmental
scenario testing instead of pilot programs to validate a concept of
operations, (4) establish collaborative relationships with airports and
airlines, (5) use operational tests to validate performance and cost
estimates, (6) develop an evaluation framework for biometric air exit,
(7) employ a holistic approach to assess the costs and benefits of
comprehensive biometric entry and exit processes, (8) determine whether
biometric air exit is economically justified, and (9) incrementally
deploy biometric air exit to airports where it is cost-effective to do
so.
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DHS reported that, by May 2014, it planned to take steps to address
the recommendations in its report; however, according to DHS Office of
Policy and S&T officials, the Department has not yet completed actions
in response to these recommendations, although DHS officials reported
that DHS has plans to do so to help support development of a biometric
air exit concept of operations. For example, DHS's report recommended
that DHS develop explicit goals and objectives for biometric air exit
and use scenario-based testing rather than operational pilot programs
to inform the concept of operations for biometric air exit. As of April
2013, DHS officials stated that they expect to finalize goals and
objectives in the near future and are making plans for future scenario-
based testing. In addition, DHS's report stated that new traveler
facilitation tools and technologies--for example, on-line check-in,
self-service, and paperless technology--could support more cost-
effective ways to screen travelers, and that these improvements should
be leveraged when developing plans for biometric air exit. However, DHS
officials stated that there may be challenges to leveraging new
technologies to the extent that U.S. airports and airlines rely on
older, proprietary systems that may be difficult to update to
incorporate new technologies. Furthermore, DHS officials stated they
face challenges in coordinating with airlines and airports, which have
expressed significant reluctance about biometric exit because of
concerns over its effect on operations and potential costs. To address
these concerns, DHS is conducting outreach and soliciting information
from airlines and airports regarding their operations.
DHS officials stated that the goal of its current efforts is to
develop information about options for biometric exit and to report to
Congress in time for the fiscal year 2016 budget cycle regarding: (1)
The additional benefits that biometric exit provides beyond enhanced
biographic exit, and (2) costs associated with biometric exit. As part
of our on-going work, we are assessing DHS's progress in meeting its
goals for addressing the recommendations in its biometric exit report
by May 2014. We plan to report on the results of our analysis in July
2013.
Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and Members of the
subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be pleased
to respond to any questions that you may have at this time.
Mrs. Miller. Thank you very much, Ms. Gambler. Thanks to
all the witnesses. Excellent testimony by all of you.
I will now recognize myself for my 5 minutes of
questioning. I think I will start with Mr. Wagner, who talked
about how DHS is collecting all this information--the number of
visa overstays from each country--but couldn't share the
information until the end of this year. I am just wondering
whether or not DHS--why we can't have that information before
the end of the year, understanding that you are going through
your processes now.
But as we have talked on this committee, we think we have
sort of a moment in time, politically perhaps, where the
Congress is willing to have a--and is having, currently engaged
in a very intensive debate about comprehensive immigration
reform. In fact, this subcommittee passed our border security
bill out of our subcommittee just last week, then passed a
border security bill out of full committee. We will see if it
goes to the floor, hopefully.
But a big concern that was raised by many Members here was
this whole visa overstay and what we are gonna do with the visa
issue? You know, that--in the 40 percentile of everybody who
was here illegally is here on some sort of visa overstay. I am
just wondering: How can the DHS help us better go through our
debate by giving us all of the pertinent information as the
debate is occurring? By the end of the year, we may not need
that information quite as badly.
Mr. Wagner. Thank you for the question. So CBP collects the
arrival and the departure data. You know, we are validating the
inbound data with our inspection process at the port of entry.
We are working with the carriers to--a similar process we call
document validation. Where, when they send us the advanced
information pre-departure, we are looking into our system to
make sure it is actually correct and complete data and sending
them a confirmation message back.
We're in the initial phases of starting to roll that out.
Then on the departure, you know, for commercial air and sea we
do get the APIS data. You know, we are relying on to airlines
to transmit accurate and complete data to us. Of course, they
are subject to fines if that is not the case. We take that
information and then we provide it into the ADIS system, the
Arrival and Departure Information System, so the other agencies
can take and then start to match up the arrival and the
departure records and look for exactly what those gaps are.
There are a lot of reasons as to why it is just not so easy
to match the departure with the arrival. People can enter and
depart using different documents for very valid reasons. If
they, you know--maintain they come in as a permanent resident,
using the permanent resident card, and then they depart using a
foreign passport because they are still a citizen of that
country. It is a little challenging sometimes to match up those
records.
People come in on commercial air and will drive across the
land border when they depart so it is tough for us to--not
having the departure data from the land to match up those
biographical records, as well. Or people come in, and then get
into our immigrations benefits system and either extend their
stay or apply for benefits or adjust their status. It is a
matter of having our systems go through and pull all those
different records, and then linking them up so we can close out
those arrival records and not report as an overstay or someone
that hasn't left.
So we are making progress at the land border, at least on
the Northern Border. We ran a successful pilot with the
Canadian government, exchanging data on third-country
nationals, meaning non-U.S. or non-Canadian citizens, whereas
the entry into one country would serve as the exit and close
out that arrival record from that other country. We exchanged,
during a pilot phase, about 400,000 records. We were able to
close out about 97.5 percent of those.
Mrs. Miller. If I could, where was that pilot program?
Mr. Wagner. That was along the U.S.-Canada land border.
Mrs. Miller. Where?
Mr. Wagner. I will have to look up the exact sites, but it
was a handful of locations where we did that exchange.
Mrs. Miller. So based on that pilot program, do you
expect--what is your anticipated--I mean, are you looking to
roll that out, then, along the entire border at all the POEs,
or----
Mr. Wagner. Yes. At the end of June we will expand that
across just almost the entire Northern Border, where we will
exchange data with--on third-country nationals between the
United States and Canada. Then about a year later, so thinking
June 2014, we will also look to start to include U.S. and
Canadian citizen records, as well, into that. So the sort of
strategic plan is it will be on the border if it is good.
So it is a matter of us collecting and validating the
accurate data, putting it into ADIS, and then allowing the
systems to link it up to provide those types of overstay
numbers that we all have confidence in. Trying to do that in a
timely basis, but understanding that the challenge is before
you, too.
Mrs. Miller. Okay, thank you.
Mr. Dinkins, I know you had previously testified that you
were using about 3 percent of your resources to look at some of
these visa overstays. I don't know if that statistic is still
current, or what. I understand you have a lot of other things
going on. But, you know, we--again, it is obviously a critical
component, we think about 40 percent, of some of the situation
that we have here. Then only 3 percent of your resources.
I understand the financial constraints that we find
ourselves in. I guess I would just ask you: Do you think that
that is an adequate amount of your resources? Sort of in a
perfect world, by your standards where you would have adequate
resources, what would you really be--I mean, the Congress, we
are really relying on all of you to tell us what you really
need. Then we will have to decide within the confines of our
existing fiscal constraints of where we want to prioritize our
appropriations process.
But it is a big part of what these hearings are about, as
we try to get our arms around how we prioritize, as I say,
within the existing revenues, of what we think we can do. But,
obviously, this whole immigration reform is a huge debate right
now. We want to make sure we try to get it right here. What is
your thought about the amount of resources, if it is only 3
percent? If that is correct?
Mr. Dinkins. Yes, ma'am. That is about correct. This is the
challenge. So right now, as you had mentioned, is we do
prioritize our leads. So we get tens of thousands of potential
overstays and--each week, and we vet them out. We look for
anybody that is gonna pose that National security or public
safety threat. Those are the ones that we specifically send out
and target.
The ones that do not pose any threat that we do not
actually actively go out and pursue those individuals. If we
did, and this is the thing--so it is not just like ICE
resources. It is actually the entire immigration system
resources. So the system is equipped to remove so many people
from the country as it is. If we were to go out and get more
than the system can put in, it just--you know, it wouldn't be
an effective use of resources at all.
Because there is only so many immigration courts, only so
many judges and so forth. So I think--you know, going back to
your question is, that would depend on what the immigration
reform actually does. Because then, it would--you know, you
would not necessarily end up with the same number of visa
overstays, as you both had mentioned in your opening remarks.
Because there would be other paths for people to come here and
want to stay in the country.
So I would presume that those numbers would drop down. So
you would have to look at the bill to see. But right now, if we
go out and we were to target every single one of those--and we
do, do--we look for the public safety. They are continuously
being monitored through secured communities. So if the visa
overstay were to get arrested they would be prioritized, and
then sought after.
But for using more resources right now, it would end up
just clogging the system up of--that would not be able to
handle it. Then criminals would be the ones left behind not
being dealt with.
Mrs. Miller. The Chairwoman now recognizes the gentlelady
from Texas for her questions.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much. Let me thank the
witnesses very much. I have a number of questions, so you can
help me by giving brief, or yes-or-no, answers. Before I even
start, I wanted to just publicly acknowledge the horrific
tragedy that occurred yesterday in Oklahoma and to offer our
collective sympathy and concern for those who have lost their
lives and those who are facing devastation now.
Mrs. Miller. We all join with that, and certainly for the
unbelievable devastation.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Unbelievable.
Mrs. Miller. It is difficult to even understand it as you
are watching it, but a time when all Americans come together
for our fellow Americans.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you, Chairwoman. As we have homeland
security before it, I know that--hopefully that we will be
having some briefing for the entire committee to make sure that
we can be as helpful as we possibly can. So I thank the
Chairwoman for allowing me to say that, and to the Members, as
well.
Let me start off by just a quick question as to whether
reduced resources--I think DHS's facing sequestration and
reduced resources are impacting your work. Mr. Wagner.
Mr. Wagner. Yes, the reduced resources impact us. But we
are also--have a very concerted effort to look at our
operations and ensuring they are as critical as they can be.
Changing things and procedures in places where we are getting
the most efficient and secure----
Ms. Jackson Lee. But you are responding to the lack of
resources. Is that what you are saying? You are being creative
and efficient, but you are responding to the lack of resources.
Mr. Wagner. Yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. You are doing things differently.
Mr. Dinkins.
Mr. Dinkins. Absolutely, ma'am, it has definitely had a
major impact on our operations.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me go directly to the matter in
Boston, the Boston Marathon. As you well know, the younger
bomber had three of his friends arrested. One of the students,
one of his friends, was a student from Kazakhstan and had had
an expired I-20 certificate of eligibility. And came back into
the country, and had a student visa but did not have the
current I-20. However, the CBP Officer was unaware his I-20 was
terminated and admitted him into the country in error.
I guess we have established that he admitted him in error.
I understand that there is a lack of interoperability between
the tech and SEVIS, and that we have known about this
vulnerability since 2007. First, I would like--I am just gonna
go to Mr. Wagner and Mr. Dinkins. Be as brief as you can. Why
do you think this happened? I mean, I articulated that the I-20
was not in place, but my understanding that they carry that
around and he did not have it, or it was expired.
What are our CBP trained to do? Then if this was a known
vulnerability since 2007, why hasn't it been fixed? Mr. Wagner
and Mr. Dinkins.
Mr. Dinkins. Yes, ma'am. In fact, we have known about this
vulnerability. This is kind of what--I will give you in a
nutshell real quick on how that happens. So he had actually
left the country. So you get--your visa is good for up to 5
years, but it requires you to have an I-20 to actually attend
school. It is a two-piece type of verification process.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Correct.
Mr. Dinkins. So he had--was out of status, left school. But
he actually left the country. So when we got the records
indicating that he was out of status and left the country we
did not send out a lead or put out any type of alert for him
because he had left the country. The vulnerability there, as
you had mentioned, is that it is a paper form. The I-20 is a
paper form. So it is never canceled as a hard form.
So actually, starting in April of this year we had actually
made the progress to start piloting a fix for that. We ran it
through April, to where even if those records were closed out
we were using a batch input of anybody that had that----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Do you have any other database
inoperabilities that you are trying to deal with, and have you
dealt with them?
Mr. Dinkins. We are dealing with them--either
electronically solutions or through an export and import, you
know, mass.
Ms. Jackson Lee. What--from 2007, really from 2001, what
took so long? We are now 2013.
Mr. Dinkins. It is--the technology, ma'am, is so old--is
very old, and----
Ms. Jackson Lee. So are we going away from the paper I-20,
or we are still--and when will we hit the non-paper I-20?
Mr. Dinkins. That is a good question. I am not for sure
exactly when. But we have worked around that to make sure
that--right now is, if you were to come back in and you had
been out of status on an I-20, and now you will have to go to--
Customs and Border Protection will validate that when you come
in that you have a good I-20, and----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Okay, this is as of today, May 21, 2013?
This is since the Boston tragedy.
Mr. Dinkins. Yes, we had started doing that in April.
Started running a pilot program, where we were doing the checks
and balances of those, yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me just--the GAO just stated that you
have gone down from 1.6 to 1 million overstays, 44 percent are
non-tourists. The others are under visa waiver. What are you
doing to get down past the 1 million, and how fast can we get
down past the 1 million?
Mr. Dinkins. We had originally been referred to--and there
are two things here. There is the original, the IG report,
which indicated there was about 1.6 million. Which we whittled
down to about 800,000.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Okay, your number is 800,000?
Mr. Dinkins. Yes. But there is--but that is in this one
particular instance. So there is a--I guess, as Ms. Gambler had
mentioned, about a million in the system that are unmatched.
Those are coming through different ways. As we go under the
Canadian system and doing that checks and balances, those could
whittle out some of those, as well. But it is an incremental
process, so each type of advance that we get can actually
whittle those down.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me just put something on the record,
Madam Chairwoman, and I will yield back to Mr.--thank you--to
Mr. Wagner of a problem of badging at the IAH Airport. I think
I mentioned that in my testimony. So do you have a quick answer
of your fixing it, or----
Mr. Wagner. Yes, we would be happy to discuss afterwards
some of the details. We did review it.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I will put my complaint on the record,
which is that my legitimate workers are being prevented from
getting to their job because of the badging problem.
With that, Madam Chairwoman, I will yield back. I thank you
for your courtesy.
Mrs. Miller. I thank the gentlelady. I would ask unanimous
consent, as well, if the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Bilirakis
would--a former Member of the committee--be allowed to sit in
our hearing and participate. Without objection, so ordered.
The Chairwoman now recognizes the gentleman from South
Carolina, Mr. Duncan.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, and thanks for
having this hearing. I think it is timely, with the immigration
debate that is raging on the Hill and with the Senate taking up
the immigration reform legislation. We do have an illegal
immigration problem in this country.
I will note for the record that 40 to--roughly 40 to 50
percent, almost half, of all the illegal aliens in this country
came here legally. They came through an airport or a port
through a visa system. They were students, they were tourists,
and they were here on a work visa. Decided they loved America
as much as I do, and decided to stay. We know who these people
are.
They have had an interview at a consulate, they filled out
an application. We probably have a last known address, we
probably know where they were going to school, where they were
working or the hotel they were staying at. So that is low-
hanging fruit as far as I am concerned with regard to
immigration enforcement. Because these aren't chasing
footprints in the desert. These are people that we know about.
It is a little different when you talk about an illegal
alien that just walked across our Southern Border or across our
Northern Border, or got off a merchant ship and decided to
enter this country illegally. These are folks that willfully
came to this country, and we gave them permission. By issuing
that visa, America is saying come on in to our country,
experience what we have in--here in America. Work for an
employer, go to school, or enjoy our country as a tourist.
I was doing some research about student visas. I understand
that they have got to go through an application process and
they have to have an interview at the consulate. In fact,
everyone that comes for a visa has to have an interview unless
you are of certain ages. If you are 13 or younger you generally
don't require an interview. If you are 80 and older an
interview is generally not required. But if you are 14 to 79
you went to a consulate or you went to an embassy in your home
country, and you sat down in front of a customs enforcement
officer or a CBP Officer or somebody from the Department of
State and y'all had an interview.
It says here, on student visas, we gave a thumbprint. You
are gonna give--an ink or non-ink digital fingerprint scan will
be taken as part of your application process. I think that is
vital, as we talk about an exit system, that we do have that
information. But as we look back at what happened in Boston,
with the bombing there, according to reports one of the
individuals arrested in connection with the aftermath of the
Boston Marathon bombing was able to return to the United States
despite the fact that he lacked proper documentation associated
with his student visa.
So I have got to ask myself, when he came into this country
and he walked in front of that customs enforcement officer at
that airport--which I have done at Dulles and Atlanta and other
places--that little interview, when they ask you that question
that, as Americans coming into our own country, I am
intimidated, I am nervous. This guy was coming into our country
without the proper documentation. Yet we stamped his documents
and let him come into the country.
That alarms me as a United States citizen. According to the
reports, the lapse occurred in part because the Customs or
Border Protection Officers at primary inspection currently do
not have access to ICE's Student Exchange Visitor Information
System, SEVIS, database to verify whether a student has an
active I-20 and is eligible to be admitted to the United
States. So we are granting the visa over, but we are not
telling the proper authorities that are doing that interview in
that line at Dulles International Airport or at Boston airport
or in Atlanta, Georgia.
They are not having access to the information they need to
determine the eligibility of that guy's status coming into this
country. Wow. We have had numerous hearings in this committee
in the last Congress, and already one in this Congress, where
we have talked about this failure to communicate between
systems, across agency lines. We had the 9/11 Commission
report, talked about security information being stovepiped.
But we are talking about folks that we allow to come in
this country, visas that we issue, and we are not allowing the
guys that are the front line defense of our country that are
standing in that booth or sitting in that booth, interviewing
those folks coming into this country, they don't have access to
the information that they need to determine the status of that
individual coming in. It is no wonder we don't have more people
like the gentleman that came in from Boston, that went to
Russia and came back.
It is no wonder we don't have more of that if y'all aren't
allowing those computer systems to talk to one another, if the
information isn't being shared with the vital front line
components in this Nation. So I am alarmed about that. America
is alarmed about that, and they are looking to us as Members of
Congress to ask the hard questions about why. Why aren't those
computer systems talking? Why doesn't his personnel that are
standing in those booths have the information that they need to
determine whether that person can or cannot come into this
country?
Those are the questions that we need to ask. Those are the
questions America is asking. When we look that we have spent
hundreds of billions of dollars, established DHS and 225,000
employees. We have spent a lot of money in this country to try
to make this country safe, and these seem like simple
components that have been either overlooked or neglected. I
think about the first suspect or person of interest, the Saudi
national that was in the hospital.
He was supposed to be going to college in Ohio. A text file
was created on that individual because they couldn't determine
that he was ever enrolled in college in Ohio. But yet he had
sent his paperwork in to go to a college in Massachusetts and
so he was original suspect because there was a failure of
communication there. Guys, we have got to get it right. We have
got to address this, and we have got to address it fairly
rapidly to get it right to secure this country.
That is what this committee is charged with, that is what
you guys are charged with. Madam Chairwoman, I hope we have
another round of questions. Because on my rant I didn't get to
my question. So I yield back.
Mrs. Miller. We are gonna try to have another round of
questions, depending on our time. I thank the gentleman.
The Chairwoman now recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr.
O'Rourke.
Mr. O'Rourke. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. Thank you for
holding this hearing and assembling this panel. I want to
actually follow up on the comments made by the gentleman from
South Carolina about the need to share information, and the
interoperability of systems between CBP and ICE. To illustrate
the problem a different way, in El Paso, the community I
represent, the University of Texas at El Paso treats its
students from Ciudad Juarez as though they are in-State tuition
students.
So it is as though they are in El Paso living in our
community because, in many ways, we are one community.
Thousands of those University of Texas at El Paso students
start their day, every day, in Juarez and cross our ports of
entry to come into El Paso to attend classes. Following the
Boston bombing, these students were sent into a primary and
secondary inspection process that, at times, lasted up to 8
hours for these students to cross.
I want to say that both CBP and ICE were very responsive to
our office when we brought this issue to their attention. But
our understanding was, there was a lack of communication
between the computer systems at ICE and CBP. So with that being
the case, and the facts that Mr. Duncan just laid out, before
we invest in new systems, new biometric systems, how do we get
the systems we already have working the way they should be?
I will address that to Mr. Wagner and Mr. Dinkins.
Mr. Dinkins. Yes. The situation you mentioned was--while we
were piloting the program to validate this process in the
interim we started doing--you know, CBP started doing a hard
inspection, basically, of the I-20s going back into secondary,
and then querying the system to make sure that it was valid,
and SEVIS and directly into the system. Since that time,
though, however the only people that would have to go back to
secondary are people who had been--an I-20 canceled.
So they are attending school and had it canceled for some
reason. They were still on their original visa. Then now they
are coming back in, when they actually should have already left
and not returning. So those are the only ones that are gonna be
returning. Now, they could be coming back in because they have
a new I-20. But our systems are actually now communicating. So
that is what we had started in April.
So now we have--you know, we are doing batch runs for
exporting that data and importing it in. A record will only be
created for the people that we actually want to talk to, rather
than having to look at the whole pool and narrowing it down,
actually, on the front lines.
Mr. O'Rourke. It seems like there was some fundamental
breakdown in the week following Boston. I can't tell you how
many phone calls our office received. And a breakdown that your
Department has fixed subsequently. So it does seem like there
are still some problems within the system.
Related to that, I want to ask Mr. Lyon, my understanding
is that we began in earnest on this biometric entry-exit system
in 1996. Since then, how much have we spent on this system?
Mr. Lyon. We actually really started in--even though the
first law was passed for an integrated entry-exit system in
1996. It wasn't until 2003 that we actually built the biometric
entry system. Then we--that was at the air and seaports. Then
we rolled it out to the land border ports on the Northern
Border and the Southern Border in 2004-2005.
Since that date, when you talk about the--to maintain and
operate both the IDENT biometric system and ADIS, Arrival and
Departure Information System, I believe since 2003 the number
through fiscal year 2012 is about $3 billion. But I can get you
that exact number. But you have to remember, IDENT supports
more than just entry.
It supports ICE Investigation, it supports the Department
of State overseas. It supports CIS, when someone applies for
legal permanent residence or to become a U.S. citizen we house
those prints in our system. The IDENT system houses about 154
million unique individuals in that system of foreign nationals.
Mr. O'Rourke. Mr. Lyon, how much more do we need to spend
to fully complete this system?
Mr. Lyon. There was an estimate. DHS did a proposed rule
back in 2008 to implement a biometric exit system. The cost
ranged, over a 10-year period, anywhere from $3 billion to $9
billion depending on what you wanted to do. But right now, what
the Department is doing, CBP--I don't want to speak for them,
but they are working very closely with S&T looking at a
biometric exit solution.
They are putting a lab together, and actually are going to
be looking to build a cost-effective biometric system. I think
the challenge that we have is--and having worked in this field
for over 12 years now, looking at entry and exit, exit is a
huge challenge because of the infrastructure problem. For
arriving in the United States, obviously we have done--over the
years, we have, you know, great facilities to actually be able
to inspect everyone.
But we have an open society, as we all know. So the issue
is, we have never built any exit infrastructure, whether that
is at an airport, whether that is at a seaport or a land
border. So that is why that cost is so expensive.
Mr. O'Rourke. My time is up. If there is a second round of
questions I would like to know, from Ms. Gambler, if there is a
way to do a cost-benefit assessment on programs like these.
So I yield back. Thank you.
Mrs. Miller. I thank the gentleman.
The Chairwoman now recognizes the gentleman from
Pennsylvania, Mr. Barletta.
Mr. Barletta. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, and I want to
personally thank you for this hearing today. These overstays--
has been my main focus since I got on this committee. I believe
it is very important. Because there is so much focus on the
Southern Border, when we talk about border security. I believe
that these overstays are a much, much more serious National
threat.
Furthermore, I don't even believe we should be talking
about any type of immigration reform for a claim--or make a
claim that our borders are secure, 90 percent secure or 100
percent secure unless we fix this visa overstay problem. Until
we understand that this is just as serious as someone crossing
one of our borders and include that in whether or not our
borders are secure, then we are creating an illusion to the
American people that we can now move forward with immigration
reform until that is done.
As I said many times, any State that has an international
airport, being that 40 percent of the people enter the country
legally, with a visa, any State that has an international
airport is a border State. One of the 9/11 hijackers, as you on
the panel know, entered the country on a student visa. Two
other of the 9/11 hijackers had their student visas approved
years after they were dead. Student visas are one of the most
preferred methods for terrorists to gain entry into our
country.
Now, within the United States ICE's Student and Exchange
visa--Visitor Program, SEVP, certifies universities that wish
to admit foreign students; once a university has been enrolled
in SEVP they can offer a student admission. Now, Congress has
required that SEVP schools be recertified every 2 years. But as
of last year, ICE has recertified only 19 percent of more than
10,000 schools that participate in this program.
Mr. Dinkins, can you describe the process for recertifying
universities in an SEVP program? Given the power that these
universities have to bring foreign students to our country, why
has ICE been so lax in recertifying universities? Also, why
does ICE not conduct background checks on school officials who
participate in this program?
Mr. Dinkins. Sir, great question. Historically, we did not
have the resources, or a unit set up, to go and validate each
university every 2 years. Now we do do that. We have built a
unit. I don't have the exact month, but I believe it is by the
end of the year, we will have completed the first go-round of
reviews of the--each university or institution that has foreign
students.
Mr. Barletta. If I could just jump in there a second.
Mr. Dinkins. Yes, sir.
Mr. Barletta. Being the fact that is the most preferred way
for terrorists to enter the country, wouldn't it make sense to
reallocate funds within the Department?
Mr. Dinkins. Yes, and now it is not a funds issue anymore,
sir. We have built this program, and we have that capability to
do it. We are on-going through it. Now, what we are finding,
too, is that before, you might have 10,000 universities that
would be willing to do it because it was a paper exercise. But
now that they know that they have to go through this process
and be reviewed, some of those are dropping out.
So we have had a few hundred actually, I believe, that is
dropped out of the process. But it is now a rigorous process,
that they go in. We need to make sure that they are allowing--
that they are capable of handling the number of students that
they are actually allowing and enrolling. Because you can have
fraud, institutional fraud, as well as just the threat of the
individual students themselves.
Mr. Barletta. According to your testimony, DHS responded to
a recent GAO report by partnering with the FAA to ensure proper
certification for flight schools. Why is this happening 11
years after 9/11, when we know several of the hijackers
exploited the flight school loophole?
Mr. Dinkins. Historically, sir, I can't answer--have not
been here, knowing that for sure. I am sorry, I can't answer
that. However, now we do--we built that in there, and we are
using our system to actually compliment FAA, who didn't--rather
than them try to build an entire SEVIS type of structure, as
well, for the flight schools.
Mr. Barletta. I also understand that beginning last month,
DHS began updating its arrival-departure database with SEVIS on
a daily basis. Why did it take the Boston tragedy to make this
happen?
Mr. Dinkins. Sir, we actually had known, and been working
for, that technological solution for quite some time. It was
prior to the Boston situation that we actually had done that.
The individual that Boston highlighted actually was in January.
We rolled this out in April. But we had been working on that
technological solution for some time.
Mr. Barletta. Thank you, Mr. Dinkins. Hopefully, we will
have a second round.
Mrs. Miller. I thank the gentleman.
The Chairwoman now recognizes the gentlelady from Hawaii,
Ms. Gabbard.
Ms. Gabbard. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I have some
questions for Mr. Dinkins with regard to the estimated 40
percent of people who are here unlawfully who came on valid
visas, that many of my colleagues have already touched on. You
spoke briefly about prioritizing resources based on security
threat. Would like you to speak to how you--basic--what is the
criteria, and what is your process for identifying these
security threats?
Mr. Dinkins. So there is two-fold. So overall, in general,
we have the prioritization for all immigration violations. But
specifically related to the students program and the visa
overstays, we work with the intelligence community and law
enforcement. We come up with a criteria, and I don't want to
talk about the criteria in open forum. Because then next thing
you know, somebody is adopting the new criteria and trying to
work around our system.
But we vet that information against virtually every type of
intelligence community or law enforcement database; from
criminal, to intelligence, to National survey, public safety,
or border security threats. Based on that, we screen out the
number of hits. Then we actively go after those. As well as--so
that leaves the population that would actually not be known to
us, pose any threat to the country, specific threat to the
country. However, it is a continuous process.
So that gets re-done all the time. I think it is daily that
those--anybody with a visa gets re-ran through the system each
day. So if that were to change, and now we have new
intelligence or new information, they would be captured in that
and prioritized out.
Ms. Gabbard. How effective is the interoperability in
sharing that information, the analysis, between not only
Federal agencies, but also the State and local law enforcement?
Mr. Dinkins. Very good. Because if you become out of
status, and you are a priority, we put you on a list of--
basically a hot list, right? It is getting ran every day. So we
may not know where you are at today, and maybe not be able to
find you, but if you do any type of--register a new car or get
a phone account in your name, we are gonna get an alert and we
are gonna to be able to now know where you are at.
Also, it gets put into the databases for NCIC for--State
and locals would actually know that this person is subject out
of status.
Ms. Gabbard. What about with regards to no-fly lists? You
talk about prioritizing those who have overstayed. You know, we
have heard reports of how many--the large number of people who
are on no-fly lists and how many of those people actually
present a security threat, or those who should be on the list
who have a security threat and are not, and how many--whether
they are U.S. citizens or otherwise, people who are on the list
who don't pose a security threat, and basically taking up
valuable--limited resources that should be addressed to those
who actually pose a threat.
Mr. Dinkins. Yes. I mean, you are bringing up a good point.
Many times, we will have intelligence on a name-specific--you
know, Jim Dinkins could be attending a camp, for example, in
Afghanistan for a terrorism camp, but that is all we have. So
when that person comes in--now I am traveling and my name is a
match--you know, it can be distracting. Now, we go through and
try to add that information in, and we--and the nominating
agency is asked, whoever nominates, that they be on a no-fly
list specifically in your situation that your brought up--would
be asked to come back with more information on that.
Also, Jim Dinkins--you know, the head of HSI, would
eventually--may be stopped once or twice, but eventually be
able to work out of that system once they were able to come up
and validate that information. But it is a continuous process.
So as we validate, for example, on our side, the F-1 students
or the visas that come in from the State Department for visa
applications, if we come up with data on that, or CBP or ICE or
whoever has that data, we can--that we think somebody should be
on the no-fly list, then we can actually nominate that person
for the no-fly list.
Ms. Gabbard. Thank you. Just one follow-up for Mr. Lyon
with regards to the biometric exit program. Ms. Gambler
mentioned in her testimony the necessity for a master schedule.
It is mind-boggling that we have put so much money towards this
effort already, and still don't appear to be making very much
progress, and still a long road ahead of us. What is the status
of creating a master schedule and a time line for actually
implementing a biometric exit program that will allow us to
track how many people actually are overstaying their visas?
Mr. Lyon. Thank you for that question. The Department, last
May, submitted a report to Congress about the status of
biometric exit. In that report, it lays out the schedule that
we have. A lot of the steps that we have taken over the last 18
months are in that plan. So the idea of making the--some of our
systems more interoperable as we enhance the biographic exit
system we have, those are steps that we are actively working
right now.
I believe we are on--there were three phases set up for the
enhanced biographic exit. We have finished phase two and we are
actually working on phase three. On the biometric exit piece,
one of the things that is in the report, it talks about,
really, a cost-benefit analysis and the idea of having a system
that would be cost-effective. That is one thing that our
science and technology director, working with CBP, is actually
looking at. I believe, right now, if I remember the schedule
correctly, that they are planning to actually do some lab
tests.
This year, they are setting up the lab, and then they are
going to be starting some further tests in the future. But I
believe fiscal year 2016 was in the schedule for actually doing
operational tests. I will refer to Mr. Wagner, if he has any
more information on that one.
Mr. Wagner. Thank you. So we have been working closely with
the science and technology branch in DHS. So we are out
currently, right now actually, doing some of the baseline
logistics and measurements of the outbound process at the major
airports to look at, you know, what is the process, what are
the logistics, what is the infrastructure, how does the
passenger flow work, and getting a lot of those baseline
measurements.
Now, we are also looking at setting up a test lab with the
science and technology branch. I believe we are scheduled for
early next calendar year to have that operational, to start to
test the current biometric capabilities against what some of
those sort-of real-life situations are and what those real
logistics are. Looking at the impacts to introducing, you know,
the current biometric capability into the existing logistics of
how travelers exit the United States either at--land or air.
Because, again, like Mr. Lyon had mentioned earlier, you
know, a lot of our transportation infrastructure was not set up
to handle any outbound or exit-type processing. You know, it is
like at airports--you know, airlines you don't come to one area
just to depart the United States like they do on the inbound.
They leave from any type of multiple gates or terminals.
Ms. Gabbard. Thank you.
Mr. Wagner. So it just adds to the complexity of it.
Ms. Gabbard. Thank you. Thank you very much.
Mrs. Miller. The Chairwoman now recognizes the gentleman
from Utah, Mr. Stewart, for his questions.
Mr. Stewart. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. Like all of us,
we thank the panel for your service, for your expertise, for
being with us today. The other Members of the committee, Madam
Chairwoman, we all believe that this is an important issue. It
has some urgency to many of us.
As has been said here over and over today, 40 percent is
not an insignificant figure. We are not talking about a small
problem. We are really talking about a significant problem. The
importance in this committee and being able to help to address
that, I appreciate. I think I share some of the frustrations
that have been expressed today with the pace of our progress in
that. Again, to the witnesses, thank you for your expertise.
But I think we all agree that we can do better, and that we
probably have to do better, on this. I would like to address
quickly, if I could, some of the lim-facs, some of the limiting
factors, that you are encountering. One of is, I suppose, with
airlines. Airlines would like passengers to show up, very
quickly move through security, get their tickets, be on board
the aircraft without a lot of delay. It seems that that is
where you are getting some pushback is the airlines helping to
implement your being a partner with you.
Is that true? If that is true, can you shed some light on
maybe how we could incentivize them or prod them along, or how
we could help with that process? Mr. Wagner, would you mind?
Mr. Wagner. Sure, thank you. Thank you for the question.
Yes, the airlines have been pretty vocal in what they see,
really, as a Government responsibility being placed on them and
their business to collect biometrics for exiting travelers.
They do, however, provide the biographic information a number
of years now on all inbounds and all outbound passengers. It is
looking at the logistics and the impact to how airports are
designed and how the airline business practices operate, and
not being a big roadblock in travelers' navigating through the
different components of leaving the United States.
As the airlines, you know, look to move away from checking
in at an airline counter or checking in at a kiosk, and
removing some of the stops of that currently take place at an
airport to board a flight, they look to automate that. I think
they are very concerned about us injecting a new process into
that.
Mr. Stewart. Are we making progress towards that, though?
Are are we breaking down some of their concerns and actually
moving forward in implementing some of the--you know, these
things that you would like to do, from your end?
Mr. Wagner. Well, we continue to work with them. We are
enhancing the biographical collection of the data. We are
starting to validate when they transmit the manifest data to us
in advance. We are validating that that document is on record
and that it is accurate. They have been very good partners in
working with us on that. But also, it is where do we put the
technology collection in that process to ensure the person
really left, and got on a plane and boarded and left?
You know, if we put it at a place in the airport where
someone can go check out, and then turn around and walk right
out of the airport, it kind of defeated the purpose of what we
set out to do. So it is do you put it on the jetway, do you put
it on the plane? At what point in the process are we gonna
capture people that actually are leaving in a place where we
are not really gonna shut down air travel for people leaving.
Mr. Stewart. Yes. It would seem to me that putting it on
the jetways, is probably your only viable option, wouldn't you
agree?
Mr. Wagner. It is looking like that. That is why we are
working with our science and technology branch about building a
jetway and looking at the capacities and the infrastructure.
What would the best biometric be to support that in, I will
say, the less-intrusive manner to not slow down or shut down
air travel.
Mr. Stewart. Okay. Let me address, if I could, one more
concern that I have as far as the limiting factor. That was
perhaps some of the training or the vetting with the school
officials who are responsible for updating these student visas,
or the SEVPs. Is that a concern of only mine, or do some of you
share that concern, as well? Because clearly, there have been
some breakdowns in that area.
Mr. Dinkins. It definitely, sir, has been an on-going
process. But now, we have actually increased the number of
designated school officials, as well. I believe that they are
carrying that responsibility, the legitimate ones. Because
there are some institutions that are created just literally--
legitimately for fraud purposes. You know--but those reputable
ones that we are not criminally investigating actually, I
think, do take that responsibility very seriously. We have a
very continuous dialogue with them, on-going, each day.
Mr. Stewart. So you are comfortable that if someone were
here on a student visa, and they were expelled from school or
withdrew from school for some reason, that that information
would be passed on and that would be noticed now? Is that your
testimony? That we have made progress in that?
Mr. Dinkins. Absolutely, sir.
Mr. Stewart. Okay. All right, thank you again. Madam
Chairwoman, I yield back.
Mrs. Miller. I thank the gentleman.
The Chairwoman now recognizes the gentleman from Florida,
Mr. Bilirakis.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. Thank you for
allowing me to participate again today. I have been focusing on
this student visa issue, closing these loopholes, since I have
been in Congress. I have some questions for the panel, if I
may.
What can we do to ensure that foreign students abide by the
terms of their student visas? That if foreign students leave
school for any particular reason, they are not followed? Again,
not--there is no oversight. We want to make sure that they do
not remain in the country. Because I understand there are over
7,300, at least, overstays per year. I also want to focus on
the interview process.
My good friend talked about that. How many--what percentage
of these applicants are interviewed as far as the screening
process over there? I would like to know that. How
comprehensive are the interviews?
Mr. Dinkins. So I will work backwards in your question. So
the interviews--so right now, and this is--I mean, this is
great progress, and I am very excited about it. Is the fact
that as when the State Department went to electronic visa, and
with Patriot what we will be able to do with the new automated
system, so they apply. They are sitting on their couch or in a
cave in Afghanistan or wherever they may be. They hit
``submit'' on a visa application, that is gonna be transmitted
through the system over CBP's National targeting center, where
ICE and CBP sits.
That information is gonna be churned way before--months, in
some cases--before the State Department even sets up that
interview. So we will have that lead time well in advance so if
there--you know, if there is a red light because they are a
known suspect, and there is no sense of doing an interview
unless maybe for law enforcement purposes to gather some
intelligence. But if it is a green light, they still have to
sit down--every single one of those students sit down--
someplace, except for, as was mentioned, if they are young--you
know, children or very senior individuals.
They are gonna sit with an interviewer, and it is a pretty
in-depth process. So that is the process as far as validating
that they are coming here for legitimate purposes. Now, I do
want to point out, as the economy and, you know, it is probably
one of the factors. But I also do believe that some aggressive
enforcement has played a role in this. Is that what we are
seeing is that the number of out-of-country--so those people
who may have not left exactly on time, but they have still
departed when we start screening it--that number of folks has
started increasing, that percentage is increasing.
So we definitely have deincentivized, short of using, you
know, the stick and going out and putting cuffs on them, them
remaining in the country. So the numbers of people that we are
getting that may stay over when they are supposed to, but
ultimately do leave, is a growing number of population.
Mr. Bilirakis. Could I ask you for maybe the contents--you
are at liberty to give us the contents--of maybe an example
interview? Tell me how long are those interviews, time-wise, in
the average, would you say?
Mr. Dinkins. I couldn't say how long exactly, on the
average. But they are several minutes, at least, and longer.
Because they sit down, they have to go through and validate the
stuff on there that they have the economical--and it is with a
consulate officer that they do the interviews with. So they
have to validate that they have the economic means to actually
sustain their--themselves at school and in the United States
and so forth.
So it is--I don't want to say it is a full-fledged
background investigation, but it is definitely an in-depth
interview that they go through with a consular office, who is
trained to identify potential fraud.
Mr. Bilirakis. Okay. You say that all applicants are
interviewed, with the exception of the younger children. Is
that correct?
Mr. Dinkins. Yes, sir.
Mr. Bilirakis. Okay. Let me ask you, with regard to the
visa security units, I understand that there are nine. However,
the State Department and Homeland Security have identified 50
high-risk areas in the world. I believe we have, currently, 19
in 15 countries. But I understand 11 of the top 20 posts are
not covered. What is--why are they not covered? Why haven't we
made more progress with regard to visa security units? How many
have we put in place in the last couple of years?
Mr. Dinkins. That is another good questions, is some of the
highest-ranking threat locations that are identified between
ICE and on the State Department for visa-issuing posts are in
parts of the world where they are very geographically-
challenged because of space, because of the security
conditions. They are not building new embassies, and so forth.
So in many of those cases, there is simply no space for us to
actually get into to do it.
With that said--as we are continuously going and chipping
away at those top priorities as we have gotten new money. I
believe that we opened up three this year, and we have plans to
open up another one. So we will have 20 soon. But with Patriot,
we are gonna be able to do with what we are doing with those
pre-deployed people and actually expand that out. So I have,
right now, 75 international offices, I believe it is, in 48
different countries.
With Patriot, no matter where you are applying it--right
now, our visa security, our special agents, are running those
names manually. We are still doing the background and running
it in the back, through the automated Patriot system for
validation. But they are sitting down and bringing those
people's names in. Soon, no matter in the entire world where
you are at and you submit that application, we basically have
the first line of visa security defense.
Then the reason we will need people overseas will be to
coordinate doing those interviews. Because now that we know
that Jim Dinkins, a suspected terrorist, has applied to come
into the United States for a visa the question shouldn't end
there. The question should be, well, what is the plans for Jim
Dinkins coming to the country. We need boots on the ground to
be able to help turn that. Because if we just say no to Jim, no
to Mr. Wagner--and they will eventually find somebody that we
don't know about if we don't actively look at the reason why
they are actually trying to get to the country in the first
place.
What type of plot, what type of criminal scheme they are
doing. So we are covering the blanket much broader with a
computer solution which will be able to give a red light, green
light right off the bat. Then the yellow lights are the ones
that we are gonna actually have to have boots on the ground to
deal with.
Mr. Bilirakis. Madam Chairwoman, thank you very much. I
want to yield back. Can somebody, maybe someone else on the
panel, address these issues? Or maybe we can wait until the
second round of questions.
Mrs. Miller [continuing]. So got to go.
Mr. Bilirakis. All right, and----
Mrs. Miller. Yes, we are gonna go to a second round here.
Mr. Bilirakis. Okay. Thank you so much. I yield back.
Mrs. Miller. Thank you. Thank you.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thanks for allowing----
Mrs. Miller. We are gonna obviously go to a second round of
questions here. We appreciate the witnesses being here.
Obviously, there is a huge amount of interest in this.
I have to ask a--perhaps a naive question. But I am
listening to all of this, and just trying to understand. When
people actually get a visa--and somebody talked about the
electronic visas, what is going on with that. So your visa is
expiring. How do we notify, or do we even notifiy, people that
their visa is expiring? Or we just leave it up to them to
notify us? I mean, and if that is so, it would seem to me that
everybody that gets a visa we would require them to have an e-
mail address, for instance.
Or we would just e-mail them, and say, look, your visa is
about to expire. Tell us, you know, how--when do you expect to
be leaving here? Are you gonna be leaving on time? Or if not,
recognize we are watching you. I know it sounds ridiculously
simple, but how do we tell people, if we do at all?
Mr. Dinkins. Ma'am, I am not aware if the State Department
has any type of communication with them on that, on the issuing
date. Other than when they get it issued and they know that
they have X amount of time in the country. Then when they get
admitted, then they know that is reinforced at the port of
entry upon admittance. But I am not for sure if the State
Department has any type of communication with them as far as
that it is a--I don't know of any.
Mrs. Miller. I am not aware of any either. So it just
would--I mean, it seems, like I say, ridiculously simple. But
wouldn't it seem that we would at least e-mail then and say:
Hey, time is up, and apparently you are gonna be leaving. Or if
not, you better let us know, or, we are watching you. Anybody
else have a comment on that?
Mr. Wagner. So as part of the administration process at the
port of entry, I mean, the visa has a date on it. We will grant
them administration for a prescribed period of time, depending
on the type of visa. A visa waiver traveler is gonna get 90
days. A person with a visa, depending on the type of visa and
the purpose and their intent, or their visit here, we are gonna
stamp the passport and write down the admit-until-date.
Some of those admit-until-dates are the duration of status,
like in the case of, you know, certain visa types: While they
are in school, they are in status, and it gets a little more
complex. But, you know, we are generally going to look at, and
make our decision based, at the port of entry. Do we feel this
traveler is going to comply with the terms of their admission
and what they are saying they are doing, and what that visa is.
But we are gonna grant their administration date until the
date that we think they are gonna take care of what their
purpose of their intent here. But there is a date on that visa.
Mrs. Miller. Okay. I guess I am just throwing this out
here. There seems to be such an easy, at least first step of
trying to fix some of this. There has got to be communication
on both sides. Just requiring anybody to get the visa, to have
an e-mail address so that we can keep in constant contact with
them without chasing them down if they move post offices, what
have you.
I would like to ask a question of Ms. Gambler, who has been
sitting there. We think about a million visa overstays that are
here currently, with the backlog, approximately, the number, 1
million unmatched records, as we call it. From the Government
Accountability Office, what is your observation on the
accountability of that kind of a number?
Ms. Gambler. As we reported in our statement, DHS has not
yet assessed that set of unmatched arrival records to look for
trends in those records. We are continuing to analyze that set
of records to identify additional trends, or categories. But it
certainly might make sense for DHS to have a look at the
different categories of populations that make up those records.
Because that kind of information could help them better target
their efforts to identify overstays and take enforcement
action.
Mrs. Miller. Thank you.
In the interest of time, I will now recognize the
gentlelady from Texas.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Madam Chairwoman, I thank you. As
indicated to the witnesses, I appreciate you. I may be stepping
away. I am right in the middle of a mark-up in the Judiciary
Committee, and being called for my amendments. But both of us,
the Chairwoman and myself, agree that this is an enormously
vital hearing and will generate, I think, a positive response
for what our tasks are before us.
I want to be very clear on the record that I do not see, or
foresee, this being an obstacle to comprehensive immigration
reform. But I do see the urgency of picking this up and quickly
moving to give comfort to the American people, to give a
framework, and to give an answer to this committee about how we
tackle this now and on-going. I want to ask Mr. Dinkins, we say
about 40 percent of the persons that are unlawfully present
have overstayed their visa.
About--and that these are millions of individuals. What
would you estimate are the numbers that would likely pose a
security threat?
Mr. Dinkins. Very small, ma'am. We get those numbers--those
in. So, for example, we vetted so far this year about 480,000
names of potential new visa overstays. Of that 480,000 names,
about 3,000 of them actually hit a potential National security
or public safety threat. So----
Ms. Jackson Lee. You have the--of those 3,000, do they get
in a separate area? Do they get sent out to local law
enforcement, fusion centers, joint terrorism task force, et
cetera?
Mr. Dinkins. Yes, those actually get criminal cases opened
up on each and every one of those in our field offices to go
track them down and arrest them.
Ms. Jackson Lee. All right. Let me--thank you very much. On
CBP, you--will CBP be working with DHS and S&T to evaluate
technology as efficiently as possible in order to expedite the
eventual deployment of a biometric exit? This is for you, Mr.
Wagner. Are you all in the midst of really getting to the nuts
and bolts to get the kind of technology that is necessary?
Mr. Wagner. Yes, we are out there currently baselining the
existing operations and looking at the existing exit, or
outbound, processes at the airports with S&T and looking at
what are those logistics and what are those operational
capacities and constraints on how we would do it. Then we will
set up a demo lab to look at the current states of biometric
technology and how we can fit that into the existing logistics
or right existing constraints to find out: What is the best
biometric to deploy out there to capture the exiting
biometrics?
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Evans--I am sorry, Mr. Lyons, how fast
can this pace go?
Mr. Lyon. Ma'am, it is--I think it is going at the pace
that was in our plan that was released last year. Then----
Ms. Jackson Lee. What is your plan--when do we think we are
gonna be there?
Mr. Lyon. As in the plan, I believe that we are looking at
fiscal year 2016. Like Mr. Wagner said, they are setting up the
lab to allow them to do lab tests. Then from there, they can
actually then start doing some operational pilots.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Is there a resource question impacting
your time frame? Money question impacting how fast you can
move?
Mr. Lyon. I would have to defer that to----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Wagner?
Mr. Lyon [continuing]. To Mr. Wagner.
Mr. Wagner. Yes, because it will be expensive to deploy----
Ms. Jackson Lee. All right, so let me--I am going to do, in
the interest of time, too. Let me conclude. Gentlemen, I got
your answers. I am not cutting you off. I just thank you very
much for your answers. What I see here is that you have laid
out the problem and the answer, or the answer and the problem.
You have laid out that you are working--and I would say this,
Madam Chairwoman. First of all, I think we should have some on-
going briefings, continued hearings. Probably briefings may be
faster.
I would like to get an updated time line on what you think
can be expedited that would move you further in from 2016;
further going this way. Meaning 2014, 2014-\1/2\, et cetera.
The other thing that I think is very important, I am gonna put
on the record. Our airlines have to be part of this effort.
This is a business, I understand it, they make profits. But the
United States Government is providing them with their
infrastructure of security.
I do believe, with all of our Constitutional protections,
we should look at a framework that would fit the United States,
Madam Chairwoman that would be an exit infrastructure that
would not infringe upon our Constitutional values and
principles. I believe a briefing with the airlines would be
very helpful, try and understand what their issue is. I would
also ask for any of you to provide me with any work that you
have done with Israel in looking at Israel's system of exit
visas.
I would like an answer in writing on that, Madam
Chairwoman. I yield back.
Mrs. Miller. I thank the gentlelady.
The Chairwoman recognizes the gentleman from South
Carolina, Mr. Duncan.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. Thank you guys for
your service. But I must say I am alarmed by something I just
heard when the Chairwoman was asking you a question. We are
relying on the honesty of visa holders to look at that date and
say, ``Oh, no. I got to get out of here by March 31.'' We are
not notifying them? We don't--you know, after, say, June 31 go,
``We gave him a little bit of a grace period. Let's go knock on
their door.''
We are relying on them to understand--I mean, my license
expires on my birthday, and I still let it go beyond the
expiration date before I go get it renewed. Wow. Did I
understand you right, that we are relying on them to look at
that date?
Mr. Wagner. It is an assessment of the traveler to make a
determination are they going to comply with what their exit
date is intended. It may be a question of looking at their
airline ticket and their return ticket for when they intend to
leave. It may be a case of, you know, visa waiver travelers
restricted to 90 days here. We ask them where they are going,
why they are going, what they are gonna be doing. We make that
assessment and we make that call.
If we feel they are not going to comply with the terms of
that administration or that visa we are not going to admit them
to the United States. We are going to restrict them in how long
they can be here. But by and large, yes, you are correct. It is
up to that traveler, once they are released from that port of
entry and admitted, if their plans change there are mechanisms
where they can go and engage with citizenship and immigration
services to extend the terms of their administration or they
can change status.
But by and large, we are not following each one of these
people around to ensure that they do actually comply with it.
We--a lot of it is left up to them. We do stamp their passport
and tell them which date they are admitted until. But you are
correct, in that by and large it is up to them.
Mr. Duncan. Let me ask you this, then. How do we know when
they leave the country?
Mr. Wagner. So if they fly out by commercial air----
Mr. Duncan. You are looking at manifests----
Mr. Wagner. We will get the manifest.
Mr. Duncan [continuing]. For either travel by boat, or
manifest. In Canada, we have got some data-sharing. I read
about that, but----
Mr. Wagner. Correct. So that information will feed into the
arrival-departure information system. If it is then matched up,
and we find that the person did overstay and the person is out
of the country, an alert will be placed in our database. So
either the Department of State, when the person applies for a
visa again----
Mr. Duncan. What if the name is put in differently?
Mr. Wagner. If it--well, if it----
Mr. Duncan. What if they leave out a middle initial or the
name is spelled differently?
Mr. Wagner. It depends on the variations and how wide our
algorithms are casting a search to find up those names. When
they apply for ESTA, when we get the APIS manifest from the
airline that this person's intending to travel, if we see they
are a prior overstay they are going to be inadmissible to the
United States. We are going to call that airline and recommend
they don't board that person because they are gonna have to fly
him right back.
If we have our immigration advisory on-site at those 11
locations overseas, working at the gate with the airline
personnel as people board, they are going to wait for that
person to check in, and interview them, and march them over to
the airline desk and tell them we do not recommend this person
flies because they are more than likely inadmissible to the
United States because they overstayed previously, or we don't
feel this person is going to comply with the terms of the
admission. But it is a matter of collecting that exit
information, piecing it back together, placing an alert in our
system so our various stages we can catch these people and
prevent them from coming back.
Mr. Duncan. I appreciate what you are trying to do there.
The Department of State is involved in this. So the gentleman
said a minute ago--Mr. Lyon said about the Department of State
not communicating with you guys as well with--and notification
of visa overstay. So I think we got some issues here. I want to
shift gears.
Ms. Gambler, do you agree with the assessment of the Pew
Institute? I think in 2006 they said there were about 4\1/2\
million overstays here. Do you think that number is accurate?
Ms. Gambler. Congressman, we have not specifically assessed
the reliability of that estimate. I think what will be telling
is when DHS reports overstay estimates at the end of this year,
which they have announced plans to do so. I think then we will
need to look at the methodology that DHS is using to report
those overstay estimates and what, if any, limitations they
identify with that methodology.
Mr. Duncan. What do you project the number to be, today,
2013?
Ms. Gambler. Congressman, GAO is not in a position to make
an estimate because DHS does not have--or DHS itself has not
reported estimates of overstay rates. We previously identified
challenges the reliability of the data that they used to
identify potential overstays. That data would feed into their
estimating of overstay rates.
Mr. Duncan. Right. Mr. Wagner, you are--DHS currently
collects the information regarding the number of visa overstays
from each country. However, to date it has refused to share
such information with Congress. They say they are gonna share
this by the end of the year. Why hadn't they released the
information? What are we waiting on here?
Mr. Wagner. I believe the offices that are working on that
information are still validating the accuracy of it and piecing
together people that might not have just arrived and departed
via commercial air. But some of the more complexities I
discussed earlier about why someone might not have a readily
apparent departure from the United States, and going through
those different systems and finding if there is a departure
record. Or if there is a legal way that they adjusted their
status and they are still here legally.
Or, in the case if they are not here, you know, if they are
here but they are in overstay, in fact. So it is a matter of
verifying the accuracy of that information and making sure it
is complete and accurate before it is released.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you. Madam Chairwoman, when you fly to
Mexico they give you a little card that you have to keep with
your passport. When you leave the country, you turn that back
in and they keep that. It seems like a fairly simple system to
me.
I yield back.
Mrs. Miller. I thank the gentleman.
For the last questions, for Mr. Barletta, from
Pennsylvania.
Mr. Barletta. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. According to the
Department of Justice, 10 percent of individuals who have been
convicted of terrorism, terrorism-related charges, have entered
the United States legally and overstayed their visas. Unless
this is addressed, I see this as a major stumbling block to
immigration reform. We are talking about giving amnesty to 11
million people in the country illegally, and 40 percent of them
overstayed their visas and are a possible threat to our
National security.
Now, ICE devotes approximately 3 percent of its resources
to investigating visa overstays. Federal law requires that DHS
report overstay estimates, but DHS has not done this since
1994. Mr. Dinkins, being the fact that 40 percent of illegal
immigrants are visa overstays, and the Morton memorandum only
prioritizes criminal aliens for deportation, so how can this
administration claim that they are serious about securing our
borders?
Mr. Dinkins. So we have--there are multiple areas that we
prioritize our work. As you mentioned, criminal aliens is
definitely our priority to remove. But we are dealing with the
confines of funding. But not just for ICE and not for special
agents and deportation officers and so forth. We are dealing
with a system. The system can only handle about 400,000 that we
put into a year.
We are trying to make sure that those 400,000 make up the
greatest threat for public safety and National security and
border security that we can, to make sure that we are not
collapsing the system to make it even, you know, less efficient
than what it is designed to do.
Mr. Barletta. You know, without enforcement, our laws mean
nothing. I am very concerned that what we are doing is really
just creating a paper tiger. I will give the definition of a
paper tiger. It is something that gives the appearance of
strength, but is actually weak and ineffective. Thank you.
I yield back.
Mrs. Miller. I thank the gentleman. Again, I want to thank
the witnesses. It has been an excellent hearing, I think. We
have got a lot of good information and have a lot of ideas from
a Congressional standpoint of things that we may want to be
legislating to improve our visa system. I appreciate all of
your service to the country as we work toward our common goal
of securing the homeland.
Pursuant to committee rule 7(e), the hearing record will be
held open for 10 days. Without objection, the committee stands
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:53 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]