[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
AFTER THE WITHDRAWAL: THE WAY FORWARD IN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN (PART
II)
=======================================================================
JOINT HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
AND THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 29, 2013
__________
Serial No. 113-82
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DANA ROHRABACHER, California Samoa
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio BRAD SHERMAN, California
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
TED POE, Texas GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MATT SALMON, Arizona THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina KAREN BASS, California
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
MO BROOKS, Alabama DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
TOM COTTON, Arkansas ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
PAUL COOK, California JUAN VARGAS, California
GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III,
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania Massachusetts
STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas AMI BERA, California
RON DeSANTIS, Florida ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
TREY RADEL, Florida GRACE MENG, New York
DOUG COLLINS, Georgia LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
TED S. YOHO, Florida JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
LUKE MESSER, Indiana
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
TOM COTTON, Arkansas DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
RON DeSANTIS, Florida JUAN VARGAS, California
TREY RADEL, Florida BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois
DOUG COLLINS, Georgia JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III,
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina Massachusetts
TED S. YOHO, Florida GRACE MENG, New York
LUKE MESSER, Indiana LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
------
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio, Chairman
DANA ROHRABACHER, California ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
MATT SALMON, Arizona Samoa
MO BROOKS, Alabama AMI BERA, California
GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania BRAD SHERMAN, California
DOUG COLLINS, Georgia GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
LUKE MESSER, Indiana WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
Frederick W. Kagan, Ph.D., Christopher DeMuth chair and director,
Critical Threats Project, American Enterprise Institute for
Public Policy Research......................................... 7
General Jack Keane, USA, retired, chairman of the board,
Institute for the Study of War................................. 15
Ms. Lisa Curtis, senior research fellow, Asian Studies Center,
The Heritage Foundation........................................ 27
Stephen Biddle, Ph.D., adjunct senior fellow for defense policy,
Council on Foreign Relations................................... 39
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
Frederick W. Kagan, Ph.D.: Prepared statement.................... 9
General Jack Keane: Prepared statement........................... 17
Ms. Lisa Curtis: Prepared statement.............................. 29
Stephen Biddle, Ph.D.: Prepared statement........................ 41
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 82
Hearing minutes.................................................. 83
The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress
from the Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement.......... 85
The Honorable Tulsi Gabbard, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Hawaii: Questions for the record submitted to
General Jack Keane............................................. 87
AFTER THE WITHDRAWAL: THE WAY
FORWARD IN AFGHANISTAN AND
PAKISTAN (PART II)
----------
TUESDAY, OCTOBER 29, 2013
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa and
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The committees met, pursuant to notice, at 2:15 p.m., in
room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-
Lehtinen (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. The joint subcommittee hearing will come
to order. After recognizing myself, Chairman Chabot, Ranking
Member Ted Deutch, and Ranking Member Faleomavaega, for 5
minutes each for opening statements, we will then hear from our
witnesses and without objection, the witnesses' prepared
statements will be made a part of the record and members may
have 5 days in which to insert statements and questions for the
record, subject to the length limitation in the rules.
The Chair now recognizes herself for 5 minutes. In May, I
led a bipartisan congressional delegation to Afghanistan and
was honored to spend some time with our brave heroes in the
armed forces who continue to sacrifice their own safety to
protect our freedoms.
As the administration's deadline to finalize the Bilateral
Security Agreement, also known as the
BSA, with the Afghan Government approaches, it is becoming
clear that there are still obstacles to overcome. It is vitally
important that the BSA adequately addresses the safety and well
being of our brave men and women who will remain in Afghanistan
after 2014.
However, if a BSA is finalized that addresses all of our
concerns, we must ensure that an adequate number of U.S. forces
will stay in Afghanistan to help fight extremist elements and
train and advise the Afghan National Security Forces.
Listening to the counsel and advice of our generals on the
ground regarding troop numbers is crucial to maintaining the
gains we have made over the last decade. We cannot let politics
get in the way of our national security and stability in this
volatile region. We may not be leaving in place enough of a
support team to fight the extremist elements who will quickly
move to take power away from the Afghan people.
I remain highly skeptical of the Afghan security forces'
ability, political will, and commitment to fight jihadists on
their own. Last week an Afghan Special Forces Commander
defected to an insurgent group allied with the Taliban, taking
with him most of his unit's guns, ammo, high tech equipment,
packed in a Humvee.
We cannot risk allowing the Taliban to retake control of
Afghanistan, reversing the significant progress made by our
heroes in uniform. This will also lead to al-Qaeda regrouping
and stepping up terrorist activities using the safe havens in
Pakistan as a staging ground, posing a real danger to our
national security interests and those of our allies in the
region.
A major test of the stability of a post-2014 Afghanistan
will be the upcoming elections in April 2014. In Afghanistan, I
urged President Karzai to commit to the electoral process and
ensure that a free, fair, and transparent election will result
in a peaceful transition of power through a democratic process.
The 2009 election was marred in controversy, as corruption and
fraud were widespread and rampant. Another fraud-plagued
election this spring could severely jeopardize Afghan security,
and put our own forces at risk. With a new government, I hope
we will be able to tackle the endemic corruption that has
plagued the Afghan Government and hampered substantial
progress.
One reason for the massive corruption problems in
Afghanistan stems from narcotics. Our codel pressed the Afghan
Government to do more to counter narcotics operations and
eradication efforts. During the last poppy season, it is
disappointing that the Afghan Government wasn't willing to
provide security for the eradication teams. Combating the nexus
between terrorism financing and narcotics trafficking is vital
to stabilizing the security situation in Afghanistan so that
terrorist organizations cannot finance their illicit
operations.
And let us look at Pakistan's role on the security
situation in Afghanistan. For Afghanistan to achieve security
and stability, Pakistan is going to have to play a stronger and
more positive role. Extremist groups like the Taliban, al-Qaeda
and the Haqqani Network have used areas in the Pakistan border
as insurgent sanctuaries to conduct militant operations inside
Afghanistan without much resistance from the Pakistani
intelligence and military forces, if not outright
collaboration.
Because Pakistan is vital in establishing stability in the
region, we must work with the government. But we mustn't
continue to give billions of dollars in aid to Pakistan and
hope, and pray, and wish that the Prime Minister will work with
us. We must ensure that Pakistan is meeting certain benchmarks
in its fight against these insurgent sanctuaries within its
borders, or else Pakistan should not receive further U.S.
funding.
And with that, I will conclude my remarks and turn to the
ranking member, Mr. Deutch, and then Mr. Chabot and Mr.
Faleomavaega.
Thank you, Ted.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Madam Chairman. And thanks to our
witnesses for testifying today on the future of Afghanistan as
the U.S. continues its responsible drawdown of troops.
Like many of my colleagues, I recognize that ending 12
years of war in Afghanistan raises many difficult challenges
that have no easy solutions. But I am deeply committed to
bringing our troops home as quickly and as responsibly as
possible. Our country is tired of war. More than 2\1/2\ million
American men and women have served our country in Afghanistan
and in Iraq. Tragically, in Afghanistan alone, there have been
more than 2,200 American casualties. We will never forget these
tragic deaths, as well as the crippling injuries that so many
of our bravest have suffered.
This war must end for financial reasons as well. Given that
the United States Government now spends about $2.1 million per
year per soldier deployed in Afghanistan, an unending presence
in Afghanistan is not in our best interest. However, we must
act to protect our national security. Allowing Afghanistan to
devolve back into a safe haven for al-Qaeda threatens U.S.
national security.
Furthermore, we have a moral obligation to ensure that
progress that has been made with regard to human rights,
health, and personal freedoms in Afghanistan continues, even
without a sizable American military presence. For example, a
recent report found that a USAID health program has saved the
lives of 100,000 Afghan children per year. When considering the
staggering statistics, it is essential we remember the impact
that even one life can have on the world.
Although I wish it was under different circumstances,
everyone in the world is now familiar with Malala Yousafzai and
her courageous stance against the Taliban to advance the
universal rights of equality in education. She is an
inspiration and a reminder that we need to give every child,
including those from Afghanistan, the education necessary for a
brighter future.
So how do we responsibly ensure that Afghan security and
our national security without committing to an unending
American presence? How do we ensure our moral commitment to the
Afghan people without risking more American lives? There are
those who believe that the only way to achieve a stable
Afghanistan is through an unending American military presence
on the ground. However, as former U.S. Ambassador to
Afghanistan, General Eikenberry has pointed out, no amount of
troops can make our political and military strategies succeed
if we do not have the full support of Afghani leadership.
Others have advocated for the immediate withdrawal of every
last American troop and all resources. However, this, too, is
not a realistic option. Leaving an on-going war totally on an
Afghan Government that cannot afford its own security service
threatens our national security as it could very well lead to
the re-emergence of terrorist safe havens inside Afghanistan
and severely jeopardize the humanitarian gains that have been
accomplished.
Some have advocated for a negotiated political solution
with the Taliban. And while this should be explored, it cannot
come at the expense of human rights and equality. At this
juncture, it remains unclear whether the Taliban is even
serious about negotiations or wants to be an on-going force for
division in Afghanistan's future.
Therefore, in a world where we have only bad choices, I
believe that the best option is for Congress to continue to
support the Afghan National Security Forces and the
administration's drawdown strategy while remaining cautiously
hopeful that reconciliation efforts between the Afghan
Government and the Taliban are able to resume.
In June, the Security Forces officially took the lead role
in securing the country and is now exclusively patrolling
Afghan villages. While it is not able to operate independently,
it is improving. It has shown it is capable and is undoubtedly
the future of Afghanistan's security.
At the same time, we need to finalize the Bilateral
Security Agreement with the Government of Afghanistan that
provides U.S. personnel with necessary protections so that
American and NATO forces are able to continue to train, to
assist, and to advise Afghan Security Forces.
Ultimately, for any of this to succeed, the Afghan
Government must become more accountable for its future. If
Afghanistan is going to progress as a sustainable democracy, a
good point of measure will be the country's April 2014
elections. These elections cannot be marred with the widespread
fraud of 2009 and the next Afghan President must protect the
human rights conventions in the constitution and provide
Afghans with a leader that they ultimately will believe in.
A stable Afghanistan will require continued patience and
some level of resources from Congress. Achieving strategic
objections in Afghanistan is never going to be quick or easy,
but we owe it to the Americans and Afghans who have sacrificed
so much to try to get this right.
I appreciate the witnesses being here today and I look
forward to our discussion. I yield back.
Ms. Chabot. Thank you very much, Mr. Deutch. And I also
want to thank Chairman Ros-Lehtinen for calling this important
joint hearing this morning or excuse me, this afternoon, with
the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific. I am pleased to join
her efforts to discuss the current situation in Afghanistan and
Pakistan in that region and how the United States' 2014
withdrawal from Afghanistan might impact the broader region.
Earlier this year, the picture of the U.S. withdrawal from
Afghanistan remained largely unclear, but it was clear that
expediting the withdrawal plan was strategically risky to the
stability and security interest of South Asia more broadly. The
departure of 34,000 U.S. troops by February 2014 still raises
the prospect that the security situation may take a wrong turn,
especially due to Afghanistan's weak and corrupt governance.
This is an issue that should be of particular concern
considering that Afghanistan prepares for national elections in
April 2014 which is not that far away. Even 6 months out, there
is consensus that the election process will be filled with
political pressures from Karzai, vote rigging, and practices
not representative of a democratic system.
There are few signs Karzai's government learned the lessons
from Afghanistan's past elections. He took control of the
independent election commission and appointed new commissioners
who will no doubt show preference toward his alliances and
acolytes. There is little disagreement that the structure of
Afghanistan's Government is itself a major problem, but how we
help move it toward a more democratic, fair, and incorrupt
system at this point is a difficult matter.
In the coming months, Afghanistan's mounting internal
political uncertainties cannot be brushed off. The political
power struggle that will no doubt consume the Presidential
campaign season in Afghanistan may also threaten to unravel
negotiations to finalize the Bilateral Security Agreement with
the U.S. And to no one's surprise, the likelihood that the U.S.
and Afghanistan will finalize the BSA before the end of the
year faces some major obstacles.
It is important that the final agreement adequately
safeguards our troops which, as of earlier this month, is the
primary issue still on the table. Failure to reach an agreement
would threaten U.S. gains in Afghanistan and impair our
commitments to the broader region. But let us not forget that
the outcome of the BSA is not the only issue influencing U.S.
withdrawal plans. Long-term stability in Afghanistan, political
reconciliation, and a successful U.S. military drawdown is
contingent upon Pakistani cooperation. Since the election of
Prime Minister Sharif earlier this year, U.S.-Pakistan
relations are showing some signs of improving as illustrated by
Sharif's visit to Washington just last week and the Obama
administration's decision to release more than $1.6 billion in
military and economic aid to Pakistan.
Suspicions between the U.S. and Pakistan still linger
despite marginal recent advances. Newly elected Sharif is
linked to sectarian extremist groups in Punjab and his past
support of the Afghan Taliban may well influence his policies
in the upcoming months to the detriment of Pakistan's neighbors
and U.S. security informed policy interests. Islamabad's desire
in maintaining an indispensable position in Afghan peace talks
while obstructing its neighbor India is paramount. I find it
increasingly difficult to justify the administration's decision
to release the $1.6 billion in military and economic aid and
having spoken to my colleagues on the Hill, many of them share
those same concerns. My concern regarding this level of
assistance is amplified by Pakistan's widespread persecution of
religious minorities, particularly the Christian communities.
Pakistan is ranked among the most religiously intolerant
countries in the world and this level of intolerance,
unfortunately, seems to be increasing. A Pakistani adhering to
anything but Suni Islam finds himself the target of
discrimination, overt persecution, and potential terrorist
attacks. For example, in September 22nd, a suicide bombing of
the All Saints Church in Peshwar, left over 130 Christians
killed and over 150 injured. And earlier this month, extremists
beat two Christians in Islamabad after they refused to convert
from Christianity to Islam.
While this is a problem we see happening throughout the
region, the level of oppression existing in Pakistan is
particularly aggressive. It is my hope that Prime Minister
Sharif addresses this problem and reforms Pakistan's blasphemy
laws, laws that terrorists use as an excuse to attack Christian
churches, burn their settlements, and commit murder in
Christian communities.
I urge Prime Minister Sharif to include the protection of
religious minorities as part of his new security strategy and I
urge the Obama administration to make Pakistan's progress on
this particular issue, among others, a qualification for
receiving U.S. assistance.
I again want to thank Chairwoman Ros-Lehtinen for calling
this hearing and we look forward to hearing testimony from our
distinguished panel of witnesses and it is truly a
distinguished panel this afternoon. I will turn it back over to
Chairwoman Ros-Lehtinen.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Steve. Thank you.
And now we are pleased to welcome our distinguished
panelists. First, we welcome Dr. Frederick Kagan, who holds the
Christopher DeMuth chair and is the Director of the Critical
Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute. Dr. Kagan
has served in Afghanistan as part of General Stanley
McChrystal's Strategic Assessment Team and also conducted
research there for Generals David Petraeus and John Allen. For
his work in Afghanistan, he received the distinguished Public
Service Award, the highest honor given to a civilian who does
not work for the Department of Defense and he gets the Great
Witness Award from our subcommittee for always being available.
Thank you.
Next we welcome General Jack Keane, who is chairman of the
Institute for the Study of War. In 2005, General Keane retired
from the U.S. Army as Vice Chief of Staff after 37 years in
public service and during this time he provided strategy and
oversight for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. He is a career
paratrooper and like my hubby, he is a decorated combat veteran
of Vietnam, who has served in operational command roles
throughout the world including in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and
Kosovo. The General is also a member of the Secretary of
Defense's Policy Board and an advisor to two foundations that
assist veterans. Thank you, sir.
Third, we welcome Ms. Lisa Curtis, who is a senior research
fellow for South Asia at The Heritage Foundation. Prior to
this, she served as a staff member at the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, handling the South Asia Portfolio for then
Chairman Richard Lugar and from 2001 to '03, she served as an
advisor on India-Pakistan relations to the Assistant Secretary
of State. Ms. Curtis also served as a South Asia policy analyst
at the CIA and before this was stationed in U.S. Embassies in
Islamabad and New Delhi as a foreign service officer. We
welcome you, Ms. Curtis. Thank you.
And finally, we welcome Dr. Stephen Biddle. Thank you, sir,
who is an adjunct senior fellow for defense policy at the
Council on Foreign Relations and professor of political science
and international affairs at George Washington University.
Prior to joining George Washington, Dr. Biddle taught at the
U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute and served at
the Defense Policy Board and also advised Generals Petraeus and
McChrystal in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Indeed a distinguished set of panelists and we will begin
with you, Dr. Kagan.
STATEMENT OF FREDERICK W. KAGAN, PH.D., CHRISTOPHER DEMUTH
CHAIR AND DIRECTOR, CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT, AMERICAN
ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH
Mr. Kagan. Thank you, Madam Chair, Ranking Member, it is an
honor to be in front of this committee, talking about this
important topic and I thank you very much for convening
hearings at this time when so much else is going on to focus on
an issue that I think hasn't received as much attention as it
should, given what the stakes are in so many ways.
Reasonable people can disagree about the desirability of
committing to a long-term relationship with Afghanistan,
keeping American troops there, giving large amounts of
financial aid to Pakistan and many other specific policy
decisions in South Asia. We can argue about the relative
importance of U.S. interests in that area compared with the
cost of taking this with that action and also compared with the
cost of inaction or withdrawal. And we can certainly argue and
I and many in this room have been part of arguments, about what
strategies might work or might not work.
But all of these discussions and arguments should be based
on a common set of facts that are not really arguable. American
national security requires defeating al-Qaeda and all other
affiliated groups that seek to kill Americans, working with
local partners to prevent those groups from maintaining or
reestablishing safe havens from which to do so and retaining
the ability to take direct action against those groups, if and
when required. It is also a fact that the war in Afghanistan is
not yet either won or lost and it can still go either way. A
more inconvenient fact is that the Afghan National Security
Forces will not be ready to secure their government or their
territory without significant U.S. and international support,
including military forces and denablers after 2014.
A still more unpleasant fact is that Pakistan continues to
harbor, shelter, and support some of the most virulent
insurgents and terrorist groups closely associated with al-
Qaeda including serving as haven for some that have already
tried to attack the U.S. homeland.
Yet, it is also a fact that Pakistan is a country of some
190 million people with perhaps 100 nuclear weapons and the
deepest hatred for the U.S. of any nation on earth. Pakistan is
also, moreover, perennially on the verge of complete economic
collapse that would lead to political collapse and consequently
very likely a massive increase in the number of terrorist
groups operating there. In the very worst case, one or more of
those terrorist groups might get control of a Pakistani nuclear
weapon and use it or at least try to use it against India, the
U.S., or another of our allies.
The most distressing fact of all is that there is no single
clear policy or strategy that could reliably handle all of
these other facts. And that offering simplistic solutions or
focusing on one of these problems to the exclusion of the
others will simply lead rapidly to failure.
International Afghan forces have made tremendous gains
against the Taliban in the past 4 years, largely sweeping them
out of Kandahar of which they have nearly gained control in
2009, driving them to the fringes of Helmand, securing the
Konar River Valley to Asadabad and most strategically vital,
Nangahar Province, and preventing the enemy from sustaining
significant bases in other parts of the country.
Isolated spectacular attacks in Herat and Kabul and
elsewhere have not disrupted Afghan politics nor significantly
affected the daily lives of most Afghans. Tragic instances of
Afghan forces or Taliban masquerading as Afghan forces
attacking NATO and U.S. troops have not destroyed the
cooperation or cohesion of the coalition. Many seasons of tough
fighting have not seen the erosion of the ANSF, but rather have
seen it improve in strength size, skill, and determination.
But President Obama ordered reductions in U.S. forces
prematurely, preventing them from completing critical clearing
operations in southeastern Afghanistan where the Haqqani
network operates from sanctuaries in Pakistan. Haqqani forces
and their allies retain important safe havens in Ghazni, Logar,
Wardak, Paktia, Paktika, and Khost Provinces and neither the
U.S. nor the ANSF have the resources needed to clear them out
at this point.
On the contrary, we can expect to see an increase in
Haqqani network activity over the coming months and years,
including both spectacular attacks in Kabul and a regular
drumbeat of attacks against U.S. and ANSF positions in the
Haqqani areas. The ANSF will not be able to defend itself
against this threat on its own after 2014. It lacks the
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets that the
U.S. and NATO provide which give it a decisive advantage over
its enemies. It does not have enough artillery or skill in
using it to overmarch the enemy, nor will it have enough of its
own combat air power to do so. A full U.S. withdrawal would
very likely be followed by the collapse of ANSF forces facing
the Haqqanis that would be very bad for the U.S.
The obvious rejoinder to these comments is that, of course,
I am talking about bases in Pakistan and that the problem
really is in Pakistan and not in Afghanistan at this point. And
the bottom line take away that I would offer to the
subcommittees is that you should not imagine that we can solve
this problem on one side of the Durand Line only. Losing in
Afghanistan, yielding the gains that we have made so far,
failing to complete efforts to defeat the enemy, to deprive
them of safe havens in Afghanistan will make it impossible to
succeed on the other side of the Durand Line just as succeeding
in Pakistan is not in and of itself sufficient to achieve
success in Afghanistan.
And so despite all of the displeasure, all of the obvious
distastefulness of providing support on such a large scale to a
regime in Islamabad that is so clearly harboring our enemies
and so clearly failing even to provide adequately for its
people, nevertheless, there are important strategic reasons to
continue to do so having to do with the complexity,
unfortunately, of any sound strategy that might conceivably
work to achieve American security in this region. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kagan follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
----------
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Dr. Kagan.
General?
STATEMENT OF GENERAL JACK KEANE, USA, RETIRED, CHAIRMAN OF THE
BOARD, INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF WAR
General Keane. Madam Chairman and Ranking Minority and
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for inviting
me. I haven't been back to foreign affairs until September
2007, just prior to Dave Petraeus doing it. Some of you may
have been there. You had a joint committee meeting in a room
much larger than this and I think there was somewhere in the
neighborhood of 70 of you there. And myself and Bill Perry went
through 5 hours of questioning. I really appreciate the
seriousness of what you are about here. I know this is the
second hearing that you have had, the first one dealing with
the Bilateral Security Agreement.
This is my third hearing on Afghanistan. Your colleagues in
the House Armed Services Committee have been about this task as
well. So I truly appreciate what the House is trying to do in
educating and informing itself so it can influence some policy
direction.
Let me correct the record. I am a Vietnam veteran, but I
was not in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Haiti. My troops were and I
had left the Defense Policy Board after 9 years. I thought
providing advice to three Secretaries was sufficient and
probably about wearing my welcome out in terms of advice, so I
walked away.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. You are always welcome here.
General Keane. I walked away from the fourth opportunity.
Obviously, the decisions we are going to make in the next 6
to 12 months are going to have profound impact on Afghanistan
and the region as a whole. And certainly a stable and secure
Afghanistan, free of radical Islamist sanctuaries, free of
radical Islamists is in the U.S. national interest to be sure
and something we are trying to achieve.
What is key to achieving that is, in fact, U.S. commitment
and resolve and U.S. leadership. It is not about cutting our
losses. It is about not squandering the gains and the results
that we have achieved. The United States and Afghanistan have
got a written strategic agreement right now which is a long-
term strategic relationship between both nations for mutual
benefit. I am reminded, we had a similar agreement in Iraq. It
was called the Strategic Framework Agreement. In my judgment,
it was not honored. We pulled away from Iraq. Iran gained
influence and al-Qaeda reasserted itself as we can see today.
At issue at the time was a place we are in now. We are
arguing over the status of forces agreement. It is a
misrepresentation of what took place to say that the reason
there are no forces in Iraq is because we could not get an
agreement over immunity. Maliki only offered that as a face-
saving device because the forces we put on the table, personal
envoy to the President of the United States was 10,000,
virtually 60 percent less than what the military commander had
recommended. Maliki, a nefarious character to be sure, knew
that wasn't a serious proposal and tried to find a way out of
it. We cannot make that mistake again here.
We need military presence post-2014. We also need a
determined, aggressive, diplomatic and political engagement for
years to come. And we have to help a fledgling democracy
mature. We have huge experience in this area and we can help
them. They certainly have huge problems as we all know and has
been born out of the last 12 years. We have got to assist
Afghanistan to move from a donor economy to a self-sustaining
economy focused around mining, agriculture, and a
transportation hub and some of that is clearly now on the
horizon. We know how to do this. We have done this in Germany,
Italy, Japan, post-World War II, South Korea, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Kosovo, just to name a few and the list is long.
We have had some problems as well with other countries.
The central issue facing Afghanistan post 2014 is managing
the security risk. Three key decisions to mitigate that risk:
Funding the ANSF right now through 2015 at 352,000. We have got
to keep that funding through 2020. If we draw down the ANSF on
the heels of the NATO-U.S. drawdown it absolutely makes no
sense operationally and tactically and we might as well
underscore failure if we permit that to happen. And we are
actually arguing over what? Two or three billion dollars a year
for 5 years? Given what we spent in this government, that is
what we are arguing over between 352,000 versus 200,000 and
something? That makes no sense to me whatsoever and it borders
on irresponsibility if we go down that road.
The second thing is the residual force and you spent a lot
of time on it. I won't. The force is essential. It is the glue
that will bind the United States, Afghanistan, and
international community relationship during the critical
transition years; largely noncombat except for counterterrorism
missions. If it is too small and cannot perform the required
mission, the risk will go up exponentially. Must be
counterterrorism. Must be training assistance. And must be
enablers.
The third thing is sanctuaries. My dear friend, Fred Kagan,
mentioned it. This is a huge problem for us. The south is
relatively stable. The east, some parts of it are, as you go
toward the Pak border, it is not. The Haqqani network
dominates. We were never able to put in place the surge forces
in the east that we were able to do in the south. Why? We
prematurely withdrew those forces over the objections of
General Petraeus. So we never had the force application. As a
result of that, they still dominate there.
My recommendation to mitigate that risk is to permit
targeting of the Haqqani network in those sanctuaries in
Pakistan. And then you bring down Haqqani's operational network
and certainly raise the morale of the ANSF forces to the point
where they think they have a chance.
Some relationship to Pakistan because you included it in
this and just let me very quickly say this is a regime that is
dominated by its military who puts its military self above the
state. We have got a weak civilian government, fundamentally
corrupt. The economy is in the tank. We have got a raging
insurgency. We have got an escalating nuclear power. They
support terror operations in India with terrorist
organizations. They support the Haqqani network and the Taliban
in conducting operations against the United States and NATO and
Afghanistan. They have got blood all over their hands with the
casualties, Ranking Minority Member, that you mentioned.
[The prepared statement of General Keane follows:]
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Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, General. Thank you so much for
your testimony.
General Keane. Sorry I ran longer than you wanted.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
Ms. Curtis. Thank you very much, you are next.
STATEMENT OF MS. LISA CURTIS, SENIOR RESEARCH FELLOW, ASIAN
STUDIES CENTER, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION
Ms. Curtis. Madam Chairwoman, Chairman Chabot, and Ranking
Member Deutch, thank you very much for inviting me here today
to share my views on Pakistan and its role in Afghanistan.
The election of Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif does
provide an opportunity for the U.S. to forge a more effective
partnership with Pakistan albeit on a limited set of issues
including social and economic development. Washington and
Islamabad are seeking to revive these ties following a series
of shocks to the relationship, particularly in 2011 including
the U.S. raid on Osama bin Laden's compound in Abbottabad and
an accidental NATO strike on the border with Afghanistan and
Pakistan that killed 24 Pakistani soldiers later that year.
Now Pakistan's reopening of the ground lines of
communication in the summer of 2012 and the U.S. reinstatement
of coalition support funding for Pakistan in December of that
year did mark the beginning of a rapprochement between our two
countries and this culminated in last week's visit of Nawaz
Sharif to Washington during which the administration resumed
$1.6 billion in economic and military assistance. Now the
mutual good will that was generated by the Obama-Sharif meeting
was welcome, but it should not mask the fact that each side
remains deeply distrustful of the other.
Pakistan is home to a variety of terrorist groups that keep
the region unstable and contribute to the spread of global
terrorism. The Pakistani military's policies toward the Afghan
Taliban and terrorist groups like the Haqqani network and the
Lashkar-e Tayyiba have remained largely unchanged over the last
12 years, despite U.S. pressure and $27 billion in aid.
Pakistan's military maintains a short-term tactical
approach of fighting some terrorist groups deemed to be a
threat to the state, while supporting others that are aligned
with Pakistan's goal of curbing Indian regional influence. The
recent release of Taliban leader Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar
from a Pakistani jail is a potentially positive step for Afghan
reconciliation efforts. Afghan leaders have praised the release
of this pro-talks leader but say Baradar remains under the
supervision of Pakistan's intelligence agencies. But it is
unclear to what degree other Taliban leaders believe the group
should engage in talks while U.S. and NATO forces are
departing. There is skepticism among experts, including myself,
about the Taliban's sincerity in the negotiating process. The
insurgents have stepped up their attacks and they appear
confident that time is on their side.
While Pakistan has been helpful in facilitating travel of
Afghan Taliban leaders to meetings in third countries, there
are no signs that Pakistan has pressured the Taliban leadership
or Haqqani network to compromise for peace. For reconciliation
talks to succeed, the Taliban and Haqqani network would have to
come under more pressure in Pakistan. Pakistan's inconsistent
policies toward terrorism certainly pose a threat to U.S.
national security interests. But cutting off relationships with
Pakistan altogether would be a risky option. The U.S. instead
should pursue policies that build up the economy and support
Pakistani civil society while conditioning military assistance
on Pakistan's cooperation with U.S. counterterrorism goals.
There is recognition among some Pakistan civilian leaders
that a Taliban-dominated Afghanistan would likely have a
destabilizing effect on Pakistan and unless Islamabad uses its
resources now to convince the Taliban to compromise in
Afghanistan, Pakistan will suffer from an emboldened Taliban
leadership that will project its power back across the border
into Pakistan. But despite the frustration with Pakistan's
approach, the U.S. should persist in using the tools that it
has to try to shape Pakistani decision making in a more helpful
direction.
Number one, the U.S. should strictly condition military aid
to Pakistan. In the last year, the Obama administration has
exercised its waiver authority on two occasions to provide
military aid to Pakistan. If the administration continues to
rely on its waiver authority, it will undermine its ability to
influence Pakistani terrorism policies.
Number two, as my colleagues have also testified, we should
maintain a robust, residual force presence in Afghanistan post-
2014 and commit to funding the ANSF for several more years.
Third, we should foster U.S.-Pakistan civil society
dialogue. There are many Pakistani citizens working to reverse
extremist trends in the society. There is a need for the U.S.
to bolster these forces through civil society engagement and
here I would point to an initiative that I believe the U.S.
should get behind which is the U.S.-Pakistan Leadership Forum
which is a forum that brings together American and Pakistani
civil society and private sector leaders to cooperate in areas
like media, the arts, education, business, and agriculture.
Lastly, it is important for the U.S. to encourage Indo-
Pakistani dialogue. The two countries made significant progress
in their peace talks from the period of 2004 to 2007 and the
U.S. should encourage both countries to get back to those terms
of talks. The U.S. should not seek to restrict India's
diplomatic and economic involvement in Afghanistan to appease
Pakistan. India has an important role to play in encouraging
democratic institution building and economic development in
Afghanistan and it shares our objective of preventing
terrorists from reestablishing bases in the country. Thank you
very much.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Curtis follows:]
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Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Ms. Curtis.
Dr. Biddle.
STATEMENT OF STEPHEN BIDDLE, PH.D., ADJUNCT SENIOR FELLOW FOR
DEFENSE POLICY, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
Mr. Biddle. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, and thanks to the
committee for the opportunity to speak with you on these
important national issues.
The Afghanistan debate often focuses on the immediate and
that is understandable. Certainly, there are lots of important
short-term challenges to overcome from the need to negotiate a
Bilateral Security Agreement to the need to hold acceptable
Afghan elections in the spring, to the need for a successful
transition to Afghan security responsibility by the end of
2014. But as important as these issues are, they tend to
overlook a question of larger, ultimate importance which is not
how we get to a successful transition, but how we get from a
successful transition to an actual end to the war that can
realize the interests for which we now wage that war. We need
to avoid losing focus on what David Petraeus famously asked in
his question, ``Tell me how this ends?''
And if current trends continue, when U.S. counterinsurgent
combat troops withdraw, they are likely to leave behind a
stalemated war in 2014. The Taliban is unlikely to be able to
defeat the Afghan National Security Forces or the ANSF as they
are sometimes called, or take major urban centers such as Kabul
or Kandahar, but I think the ANSF is also unlikely to be able
to drive the Taliban from their remaining strongholds,
especially in the countries east, and the Taliban are unlikely
to surrender or stop fighting, simply because they can't break
rivals' hold on major urban areas or because foreign combat
troops have left.
In fact, the Taliban are likely to remain militarily viable
for the foreseeable future. If so, the result would then be
deadlock in which neither side can prevail, not the Taliban,
but also not the ANSF. The ANSF can probably sustain the
stalemate indefinitely, but only as long as the U.S. Congress
pays the annual bills needed to keep the ANSF in the field and
fighting. The war will then become a contest in stamina between
the U.S. Congress and the Taliban. For the ANSF to win this
contest outright would require either that the Congress be more
patient than the Taliban or that the Taliban prove less
resilient in the next decade than they have been in the last.
But if the ANSF isn't going to win the war outright, that
leaves only two plausible long-term outcomes to the conflict.
One is a negotiated settlement with the Taliban, at some point,
whether near or distant. The other is defeat for the Afghan
Government. Of course, this body will determine to an important
degree via its decisions on funding Afghan National Security
Forces whether the ANSF can, in fact, outlast the Taliban.
What I would like to do with the balance of my time this
afternoon is to sketch briefly one of the two plausible
alternatives to that end game, a negotiated settlement, be it
near term or be it more distant, what that might look like and
what it would require of us.
My written testimony goes into these questions in some
detail. For now, I will just make two points. The first is the
plausible terms of an eventual settlement, if it is possible at
all and it may not be, would presumably involve the Taliban
agreeing to break with al-Qaeda, forego violence, disarm and
accept something like the current Afghan constitution. In
exchange, they would get legal status as a political actor
within Afghanistan, some set of offices or parliamentary seats
or ministries, and the withdrawal of any remaining foreign
forces. This would obviously be no panacea. The Taliban are an
abhorrent group with the blood of thousands of innocent Afghans
and American soldiers on their hands and they represent an
ideology contrary to deeply held American values. Settlement
with them represents at best a least bad option. But a deal
along these lines would nevertheless be preferenced to outright
defeat and properly structured could preserve the two core
interests at the heart of the U.S. war effort, that Afghanistan
not become a base by which militants could strike the United
States or our allies in the west and that Afghanistan not
become a base for destabilizing its neighbors, including
Pakistan.
The second point I want to make is that if a negotiated
settlement is going to be ultimately the way this war ends, and
if we are serious about ensuring that its terms secure the
interests for which we are now waging the war, then there are
things we need to do starting now to lay the ground work. This
includes, of course, funding the ANSF long enough to enable the
talks to reach fruition which will be a long process of years
at best, but it also includes real governance reform of a kind
that we have not been willing to pursue seriously heretofore.
Any plausible deal that ends this war will legalize the
Taliban as a political actor and provide them some sort of a
foothold in Afghan politics. The only way to keep the terms of
any such deal sustainable and to limit the subsequent influence
of the Taliban is via domestic political competition within
Afghanistan from a viable non-Taliban alternative. The existing
political establishment in Kabul is unable to provide this and
is unlikely to change simply because we asked them to.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
Mr. Biddle. Real change of a kind that could make an
eventual settlement sustainable will require credible
conditionality and the longer we wait to do this the harder it
will get.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Biddle follows:]
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----------
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thanks so much to Dr. Biddle.
Thank you to all of our panelists. I will begin the
questions.
There is no short-term solution, no policy decision that
Congress or the administration can make to win the war and see
stability and democracy flourish in Afghanistan in the
foreseeable future and certainly not before 2015. But there are
decisions that we can make or not make that would jeopardize
our efforts in Afghanistan and risk eliminating the gains we
have made during the past 12 years.
The first obstacle is ensuring that the Bilateral Security
Agreement is finalized and that it includes immunity for U.S.
personnel from persecution under Afghan law. The administration
has indicated that without this it would pull out of
Afghanistan completely, leaving the zero option on the table.
Putting aside the immunity issue, what are the key features the
BSA will need to include in order for us to ensure that we are
able to maintain the gains made while protecting U.S. troops
and personnel? That is number one.
Another major obstacle is the size of the residual force in
post-2014 Afghanistan.
General, you testified that based on the scope, size, and
difficulty of the post-2014 mission, the residual U.S. force
should be about 20,000.
And Dr. Kagan, you didn't put a number on it, but you
testified that the Afghan National Security Forces would not be
ready to secure their territory without significant U.S. and
international support which includes military forces.
Ms. Curtis, you stated that the U.S. must maintain a robust
residual force.
We have heard that the administration could set its numbers
at less than 10,000 and it was reported that NATO is planning
on a smaller residual force than we first thought. What are the
dangers of leaving behind a smaller force that has been
recommended? Insurgents generate over $100 million a year in
illegal drug trade and that is with troop levels at a much
higher number than is currently been floated. How will the
reduced numbers impact other operations that are critical to
our mission in Afghanistan like counternarcotics?
And finally, at times our President has laid out the
narrative that al-Qaeda has been decimated and nearly defeated.
With so much of a threat still remaining in Afghanistan,
Pakistan region, should we underestimate al-Qaeda's strength
and is that believed to be setting the U.S. for failure in a
post-2014 Afghanistan?
Dr. Kagan, we will start with you, quickly.
Mr. Kagan. Yes, I think al-Qaeda is not decimated and
actually if you look at maps as our team has provided of al-
Qaeda area of operations around the world, it controls more
territory, has more fighters and poses a greater threat to the
United States today than it ever has. Giving it back its
sanctuary in Afghanistan would be a crowning glory for al-Qaeda
and would be extremely dangerous for the U.S.
Please hear me very carefully because I don't want to have
numbers taken out of context. My personal assessment of the
forces required after 2014 to do the missions that are being
described is upwards of 30,000. That has not been on the table
for a long time. I agree with General Keane that with 20,000 at
very high risk and with a great deal of difficulty, it is
feasible. When you get down below 10,000, a lot of missions
fall off. We will not be doing counternarcotics. We will not be
doing counterinsurgency and our ability to train, advise, and
assist will be extremely limited.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Dr. Kagan.
General? Punch your button for the mic.
General Keane. I agree with Dr. Kagan about al-Qaeda. It is
on the rise and there is a lot of misunderstanding about them.
They are not morphing into something else. Their plan was
always to decentralize, establish a caliphate in a region by
gaining operational and territorial control in the various
countries that they want to control and that is absolutely
happening before our eyes. So let us be clear about it.
In terms of size of residual force, it is about the
missions which must be performed that drives the size of the
force. And those are counterterrorism, training assistance, and
also the enablers that the force requires.
The optimal size, I totally agree with Fred is 30,000, a
minimum of that is 20,000. We can establish arbitrary numbers
here and then what you have eventually if you get down into the
numbers people are talking about, 10,000 and below, you have a
residual force in name only that is not capable of performing
assigned missions.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, and I am sorry for the other
two, I know Ms. Curtis and Dr. Biddle were ready, but I am out
of time and we have got a lot of folks. So we will get you
later.
Mr. Deutch.
Mr. Deutch. Thanks. General, let me just continue with
that. You say we can establish arbitrary numbers. Help me
understand, this is the issue that we all struggle with. I am
not a general, so when you talk about the need, both of you
talk about the need for 30,000 is optimal, maybe 20,000, the
administration has been talking making 10,000, maybe 6,000, all
sorts of numbers have been thrown around. How do you
determine--how is it that the administration can come up with a
number that they think works with lots of generals giving their
input into that decision for you to consider it so far off?
General Keane. I can't speak for that analysis. Frankly,
just when you look at the mission and you start to lay it down
what it is, let us just take one as an example,
counterterrorism. If you try to perform that mission from one
location, you cannot operationally accomplish the mission. So
in other words to go all the way to the east to take down
Afghan, excuse me, Taliban leaders, to go all the way to the
south to do the same as we are currently doing, you have to be
at multiple bases. That drives up numbers. It is not just about
special operators who kick doors down. The fact of the matter
is they have to have drones, the crews to support them. They
have to have helicopters which is an assault force. They need
maintenance to support those helicopters. They need
intelligence analysts. And they also need people to secure them
and some logistical support as well.
So when you lay those numbers down, you get way beyond
10,000. Just in dealing with this one alone, I think the
minimum force requirement on the mission I am just talking to
you about is about 7,000.
Mr. Deutch. And that mission is what exactly? How do you
define the mission?
General Keane. Excuse me?
Mr. Deutch. How do you define the mission that we need
30,000 troops ongoing in Afghanistan?
General Keane. How do I define the mission for the residual
force?
Mr. Deutch. Yes.
General Keane. Is to assist in the stability and security
of Afghanistan, recognizing that we are in a transition phase
from where we have been in the lead and the Afghan security
forces are now on their own. They do not have the kind of
terrorism capability that we have. They have a facsimile of it.
The other thing, they need enablers. Just think of this.
All the NATO forces that are in Afghanistan to this day by and
large all receive some kind of enablers from the United States
to be able to function effectively. How could we possibly walk
away and not provide the Afghan National Security Forces with
some enablers to enable them to function when they are an
infantry-based force?
Mr. Deutch. General, I don't think anyone is saying that
there should be no assistance, no enablers. I would make one
point though. When you said earlier, almost in an off-handed
way that the discussion about troop numbers, whether it is--we
are discussing cost and you said $2 billion, $3 billion a year
over the course of however many years until 2020 that it is
almost irresponsible for us to be discussing that.
I would just make the point that here in Washington these
days, we have debates in every one of our committees about
where we spend money and how we spend money and what our
priorities are. And I don't think it is irresponsible for us to
struggle through, with all due respect, I don't think it is
irresponsible for us to try to struggle through whether $2
billion or $3 billion a year more in Afghanistan is something
that we should be spending when tomorrow, the conferees are
going to meet on the Farm Bill to talk about whether to cut
SNAP funding by $40 billion. And on Friday, there is going to
be a $5 billion cut in SNAP funding when the Recovery Act
expires.
So I don't--my problem here is we are trying to get to the
right point here where we can, as I laid out in my opening
statement, where we can get to an Afghanistan that can take
care of itself, that doesn't become a breeding ground for
terrorists again. But we can't have that debate in the absence
of a broader debate about what our priorities are as a nation.
So when we listen to the administration make suggestions,
to readily dismiss a force for being too small because it
doesn't do all that we think it should, I think is to lose
track. And I don't blame you for this. You are looking at a
very specific point. But for us here, as we debate these
broader issues, at some point we have to start to balance
whether spending that extra $3 billion a year in Afghanistan is
more important than spending the extra $3 billion a year on
critical needs here in this country. That is just part of the
debate that too often is missing and I think it needs to be
brought back in and I yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Deutch. Thank you.
Mr. Chabot is recognized for his time.
Ms. Chabot. Thank you, Madam Chair. General Keane, let me
get back to you for just a second. If you get down to say
10,000 or fewer U.S. troops, I have heard this and if you can
tell me how accurate this is, you get to a point where
basically those personnel are for the most part protecting
itself kind of, its own force protection and things like that
and that you can't really perform any functions outside that
are going to be particularly helpful to U.S. interests in
Afghanistan. Is that correct?
General Keane. Well, certainly, I do agree with that.
Numbers have a certain quality all of their own. And when you
rationalize what those numbers should be it has to be on the
tasks and the missions that are required to be accomplished by
a residual force. If you permit the sizing of the force to be
essentially numbers driven and not mission and task driven,
then you are just pulling the guts out of what you are trying
to accomplish.
And I think if you will put arbitrary numbers on the table
without looking at the tasks--the military can definitely
provide task purpose and numbers assigned to that task and
purpose. And if you are going to bring down the numbers, you
have to understand what we are losing as a result of those
reduction in numbers. And we should be honest with ourselves
about that. I think it is a serious degradation and mission
capability when you drive those numbers down like that. We
should know what is the loss of that and not just tell those
10,000 make do and do the best you can.
Ms. Chabot. Thank you. Thank you, General.
Dr. Kagan, let me turn to you, if I can. I remember the
last time I was in Iraq it was maybe 6 months before the
agreement with Iraq fell apart. And I remember being in various
military briefings and talking with Iraqis and government
leaders over there. Everybody at that point assumed that there
would be a residual, pretty significant residual U.S. force
there on the ground and I and many other people were ultimately
shocked when it was just announced pretty much: We can't reach
an agreement, everybody is coming out.
Now when that happened, there were obviously consequences
as a result of that. Could you touch on some of the
consequences we have seen in Iraq? And what should that teach
us about what we are actually talking about here with respect
to Afghanistan which isn't too late?
Mr. Kagan. Thank you, Congressman. The consequences in Iraq
have been absolutely devastating. We have seen the
reconstitution of al-Qaeda in Iraq in most of the safe havens
from which it had been operating before the surge and
subsequent operations cleared it out. It is now conducting car
bomb operations at the same level as it had been in mid-2007.
We have seen Shia sectarian militias remobilized and now some
of them are being brought into the Iraqi security forces. We
are seeing increased sectarian killing and of course, all of
this is in the context of the Syrian war as well.
If we pull out of Afghanistan, the consequences may or may
not ensue as rapidly as they did in Iraq, but I believe that
they will ensue very much along those lines because like the
Iraqi security forces, the Afghan National Security Forces were
not created, have not been established in such a way that they
can continue to operate independently without any support.
Ms. Chabot. Thank you. With about a little over a minute
that I have got left, let me turn to Ms. Curtis and Dr. Biddle.
We really haven't touched too much on India which is right
in the region there and a key player. Could you discuss briefly
India's role in all of this relative to the future of
Afghanistan and Pakistan to some degree? What role have they
played? What role would you expect them to play? And I have got
about a minute so Ms. Curtis, maybe I will give you 30 seconds
and Dr. Biddle, about 30.
It is only the second most populist country on earth and
let us talk about that for 30 seconds.
Ms. Curtis. Can I quickly just add that when we are talking
about troop numbers in Afghanistan, obviously that decision
will have an impact on Pakistan, a nuclear arms state. So we
are not just talking about the Afghanistan state, but we are
talking about the entire region and the impact on the entire
region.
As far as India goes, India has played a helpful role in
Afghanistan. They have provided assistance. They have built
roads, power stations. They have helped support the nascent
democratic process there. So India's goals in Afghanistan match
those of the U.S. and not wanting the Taliban to retake the
country. The problem is that Pakistan is paranoid about any
role that India has in Afghanistan, even if the Indian role is
helping with the economy, Pakistan sees any increase in
influence that India has in Afghanistan as detrimental to
Pakistan's interests.
But as I said, I don't think we can play into Pakistan's
hands and ask India to pull back from Afghanistan just to
appease Pakistan. I think the only way to reduce the Pakistani
paranoia is to encourage better Indo-Pakistani relations.
Ms. Chabot. Thank you. Madam Chair, I would ask unanimous
consent for 30 seconds for Dr. Biddle to complete the thought.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Without objection.
Mr. Biddle. I agree with most of what my colleague said. I
am very skeptical about the prospects for Indo-Pakistani
rapprochement any time soon. And I think in the absence of
that, the way I would prefer we look at India's role in
Afghanistan is as a part of a strategy for bringing about a
settlement to the war that will necessarily require Pakistani
agreement.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. I am so sorry, Mr. Chabot, but
we have so many----
Ms. Chabot. He has got 6 seconds.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Okay, go ahead.
Mr. Biddle. Don't let marginal Indian help in Afghanistan
overturn relations with Pakistan.
Ms. Chabot. Thank you very much.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. Mr. Higgins is recognized.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Madam Chair. First of all, on the
issue of Afghanistan, we have been there 12 years. We have lost
2,092 American troops. We have spent $1 trillion. There is an
agricultural economy, but it is not one the government controls
or at least from what we know it is the poppy fields. It is the
heroin trade. And Gretchen Peters in her book, Seeds of Terror,
puts the estimate of $\1/2\ billion which goes to fund Taliban
activities in Afghanistan. Very little has been done about that
issue. And the Taliban doesn't even own the poppy fields. They
preside over it. They charge protection, but it funds their
activities.
The United States has spent $89 billion, rebuilding the
roads and bridges of Afghanistan and then the Taliban sets and
provides explosive devices on the very roads and bridges that
we built to kill our people. The best way to defeat an IED is
not to be there. About 63 percent of American casualties are
attributed to IEDs.
There has been a lot of talk about Pakistan being a partner
in defeating terrorist activity over the past 12 years. Well,
guess what? Pakistan is not helping to defeat terrorism. In
fact, they are facilitating it.
Abbottabad is about 70 miles north of the capital city of
Islamabad. Abbottabad is described as a pleasant weather city
with lots of educational institutions and military
establishments. Also the place, prior to the knowledge of bin
Laden living there, of hundreds of thousands of tourists every
day. We are up in the mountains of Afghanistan looking for bin
Laden and he is in one of the most prosperous cities of
Pakistan. The Pakistani Government, the military, or the
intelligence services didn't know he was there? He has been
there for 6 years. How about people just walking by and saying
I wonder who lives there? He doesn't pay property taxes. He
added to the compound going against zoning regulations in that
city.
Back to Afghanistan, we, the United States have to bribe
the brother of the President to help his brother, the
President, build a functioning state. And after 12 years and $1
trillion and over 2,000 soldiers lost, Afghanistan is nothing
more than a major criminal enterprise. Afghanistan is as
violent today as it has ever been. So this talk about staying
in or leaving or kind of staying in or kind of leaving, it
seems as though we are getting played. There is always two
conversations going on in that part of the world, the one that
the Americans are participating and the ones where they are
being plotted against. And that is just the reality.
So I think, you know, we need to develop a new strategic
policy to try to constrain in some way the bad activity that is
taking place in both of those countries. And believe me, I am
not naive about this stuff. I understand. Our Afghan problem is
really our Pakistan problem. Pakistan is a big country, about
190 million people, a lot of Islamist extremists and they have
nuclear weapons, last count 131 of them. A major goal of al-
Qaeda is to gain access to an area with nuclear weapons. But
the amount of time that we have been there, the lives that have
been lost because of our excursion there, our distraction away
from the real problem which was Afghanistan in the early 2000s
to spend time in Iraq chasing weapons of mass destruction that
weren't there, this just isn't working.
So whether we have 30,000 troops at the end of next year or
50,000, the fact of the matter is things aren't changing. We
are told that we are not nation building Afghanistan. You know
what? I was in Kandahar city. I was in Kandahar, the spiritual
home of the Taliban because that is where all the poppy fields
are. And the literacy rate for women, 1 percent. One percent.
What are we told constantly that we are doing there? We are
building up an Afghan army and security force. Oh, really? With
a population that is largely illiterate? How do you change
that? You build schools and power lines and roads to get people
to those schools. That by definition is nation building. We
have been played in that part of the world. We continue to be
played in that part of the world and the American people are
sick and tired of it. I yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Higgins.
Mr. Kinzinger.
Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you, Madam Chair. I think it is
important to remind everybody at the outset of my discussion
that there was this really tragic event on September 11, 2001
in which thousands of Americans were killed by folks that found
safe haven in Afghanistan and we were able to root them out of
Afghanistan. I also take issue with the idea that there has
been no improvement and that the place is just as violent as it
has ever been. I think that flies into the face of every
statistic I have seen, including the statistic that a huge
percent of the Afghan population is under the age of 30,
actually under the age of 20, that there actually is this
revolution among the youth of this idea that we can discuss our
differences without resorting to the gun. We can do it by
having verbal discussions. I think you have seen revolutionary
changes in a positive way in the population of Afghanistan.
I would also like to remind that the $3 billion we are
talking about and sure, at any moment we talk about spending
taxpayer dollars it is something we should take seriously. But
that is \1/100\ of what we spend in interest on our debt every
year which has exploded in the last 5 years.
I also want to thank you, General, for exposing the farce
of this idea that golly, we really wanted to stay in Iraq, but
we just had no choice because they didn't want us. When you
offer a plan of just a handful of troops, compared to what was
needed, you really incur upon the Iraqi Government and this was
the decision they made a much higher political cost than your
number of troops had the ability to actually counter on the
other end. And that is my concern with what we are looking at
in Afghanistan. There is a cost. We have to know it. We have to
understand it. There is a cost to having American troops when
it comes to a domestic government having American troops on
their soil. They know that they become a target of terrorist
activities. They become the focus of that. But if you end up
with 7,000, 8,000, 9,000 troops, half of whose job is to clean
latrines and cook food and secure the gates so that the other
half may be able to actually exit the gate at some point, you
almost incur upon the native population a much higher political
cost than you do any benefit of U.S. troops being there.
So I think the number of 20,000, 30,000 is not a number
that has been pulled out of the air. It is a number that says
if we are going to have an effective counterterrorism strategy
or if we know a network exists or we know bad actors exist, we
can send something over that kills that person or captures that
person to take them out of the mix of being a threat to the
domestic government of Afghanistan, then that is what we need.
I would hate for history in 20 years to judge that America lost
the war in Afghanistan over the difference of 10,000 troops and
that is what I fear right now.
In Afghanistan, the Taliban have a saying that says,
``America has the watches, but we have the time.'' And that, to
me, is so evident of the fact that this administration made the
decision to ``surge'' into Afghanistan, but in the same breath
tried to reassure the American people that we are going to be
out very quickly. Basically, at the moment the last surge troop
is going in, the last one is going to exit, so don't worry,
everybody. The Taliban just simply said okay, so now we have a
timetable on how long we have to outlast the Americans.
In Iraq, the reason the surge I believe was so successful
was not just the addition of thousands of American troops, it
was the fact that in a time when I even heard a leader from the
other body in this wonderful body we have here, from the other
side of the Capitol, stood up and said and I was actually
getting ready to fly a mission into Afghanistan, and I saw the
news and I saw this leader say that the war in Iraq is lost.
And I could only have imagined the cheers that went through the
opposition at that point. But in the midst of all that bad
press, the President of the United States, President Bush said
not only are we not retreating, not only is the war not lost,
we are doubling down and we are going to win. And we saw the
opposition forces in Iraq say we can't defeat the United States
on the battlefield. We have no choice but to join them. That is
what could and should happen in Afghanistan. The longer we
debate a post-2014 plan, the longer the administration goes
without saying what the answer is in Afghanistan, the more
damage I fear we are doing in the long term.
Now let me just say one, I guess I have 30 seconds, so Mr.
Kagan, I will ask you to answer this. Let us say we leave
Afghanistan as we did Iraq. What is that going to do to the
morale of the Taliban and to al-Qaeda and to the enemies of the
United States around the globe?
Mr. Kagan. It will be an enormous boon to the morale of the
Taliban and it will be an incredible boon for al-Qaeda which
will explain they wrongly claim credit for defeating the Soviet
Union. They are poised to claim credit for defeating the second
super power and for reclaiming the land on which their movement
was founded. It would be a devastating blow for us from the
standpoint of al-Qaeda morale.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Kinzinger.
Mr. Schneider is recognized.
Mr. Schneider. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Thank you to the
panel for joining us here today.
I want to turn to Dr. Biddle and Ms. Curtis to the idea of
as we look at our strategies, as we look going forward,
whatever we want to accomplish, we cannot accomplish without
partners. And partners in Afghanistan, ANSF, partners in
Pakistan.
Dr. Biddle, I will turn to you first in Afghanistan. What
is it we need to do immediately, short term, medium term to
make sure that we have the partnership to get to the choices
you laid out earlier?
Mr. Biddle. On the military side of the partnership, I
think we need to provide funding for the ANSF and the kind of
enablers people have talked about. On the governance side of
the partnership, I think the theme, we can talk about the
particular mechanics if you like, but the theme has to be
conditionality. The governance problem in Afghanistan which
also affects the Afghan National Security Forces, it is not
just a problem of civil government, it exists because malign
actors in Afghanistan profit from it, prefer it, and want it to
continue. If that is going to change, the only way it is going
to change is if the United States uses leverage to change the
interest calculus of actors who are profiting from the kind of
misgovernance that we see in the country now.
The scale of leverage at our disposal is much smaller now
than it was some years ago, but in principle, anything we do in
the country is a potential source of leverage. If, in fact, we
are prepared to use conditionality and shape what we do as a
tool for changing not the structure of Afghan governance,
certainly not eliminating corruption in Afghanistan, but to
bring about a relatively small number of carefully triaged
governance objectives that we think are critical to making the
difference between there being a viable non-Taliban alternative
and not after 2014.
Mr. Schneider. Are there things we should be doing in the
immediate term before the next election or are there things we
should be looking to see after the election to do immediately
following?
Mr. Biddle. I think before the election, it is time to do
the homework. After the election, it is time to execute. We
don't know what after the election government in Afghanistan is
going to be yet, but there is a great deal of preparation we
need to do before we act in any event. There is intelligence
work that we need to do. There is policy coordination work that
we need to do. We actually enjoy the advantage of having an
interregnum in which it doesn't make sense to act initially and
we ought to use that time to our advantage.
Mr. Schneider. Thank you. Ms. Curtis, with respect to
Pakistan and as you touched on, what do we need to do to
develop a workable partnership with Pakistan vis-a-vis
Afghanistan?
Ms. Curtis. Well, I think what we need to do is we need to
have a dual strategy where we are supporting the civilian
leadership, the Pakistan civil society through our aid, through
our diplomatic engagement. But we are also conditioning our
military assistance to the Pakistan military on its efforts to
help us in Afghanistan to crack down on the Haqqani network,
the Taliban leadership.
We need to be willing to pull the plug on the military aid
that we provide Pakistan because it is the Pakistani military
and intelligence services that are making those decisions on
how they are supporting the Haqqani network and the other
militant groups. There is a lot of debate about whether this is
an issue of capability or political will. It is my belief after
following this region for 20 years that it is more an issue of
political will. And that while capabilities are an issue,
particularly when you are looking at the TTP and trying to get
them under control, that when you are looking at groups like
the Haqqani network, the Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, the senior Taliban
leadership, it is more a question of will. And the Pakistanis
could be doing more to crack down on these groups using their
leverage to get these groups to compromise for a political
solution in Afghanistan. I believe that is possible, but we
need to be willing to put more pressure on Pakistan.
Mr. Schneider. I think one of the challenges we face though
and it was highlighted in today's New York Times in a story of
the question of Pakistan working in collaboration with Afghani
Taliban and then we see Afghanistan potentially working with
the Pakistani Taliban. How do we deal with two partners on both
sides who are oftentimes playing against each other and
oftentimes playing against us?
Ms. Curtis. Well, I think that is true. I think it is very
disconcerting to see that the Afghan Government may have been
supporting parts of the TTP, a group that has been conducting
suicide bombings in Pakistan, killed thousands of Pakistanis.
This is extremely problematic and again, unfortunately,
Pakistan has relied on violent groups to achieve its foreign
policy objectives and it just has backfired on Pakistan and I
would see that story that we saw today as part of that
backfiring effort and that we need to be able to convince
Pakistan that that is not in its interests either to support
these groups.
Mr. Schneider. Thank you.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Ms. Curtis. Thank you, Mr.
Schneider.
Mr. Rohrabacher.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman.
General, how much does it cost to have 1,000 troops in
Afghanistan? You are advocating 30,000 residual troops. How
much would it cost?
General Keane. I don't know what that----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thirty billion dollars. Does that sound
out of line?
General Keane. Absolutely.
Mr. Rohrabacher. No, that is the estimate of what was given
to us about a few years ago on the number of cost per troop in
Afghanistan, $30 billion. This isn't a couple billion. This is
we were borrowing that money at a time we are cutting back
services to our own people. And we are borrowing money from
China in order to maintain a force in Afghanistan.
Could the fact that we haven't won yet indicate that there
is something wrong more fundamentally in other than just we
don't have enough troops there? Do you believe the
constitution--let me be more clear. Do you believe the
constitution of Afghanistan which we forced upon the Afghan
people after the Taliban were kicked out by the Northern
Alliance, I might add, not by U.S. troops, is that constitution
consistent with Afghan tradition? Do you know anything about
the constitution there? It is the most centralized constitution
of any country in the world that we have foisted upon these
people which is the most decentralized country in the whole
world with a tribal culture. They don't even elect their
provincial leaders, do they? Do you think we would have
corruption in the United States if we had a government in which
the President of the United States appointed all the governors
and then the governors appointed all the chiefs of police and
all the people responsible for education? Do you think we would
have a corruption problem here?
We have forced on these people a system totally
inconsistent with their tradition and then we are arguing about
how many troops we are going to keep there because the
situation is so unstable.
General, you were in Vietnam. You know, do you think we
just needed to keep a couple extra troops there and the
situation would have cleared itself up? There are some
fundamental decisions that were wrong in Vietnam. And let me
say that after 9/11, let us remember this, how many people who
flew the planes into those buildings were Afghans? None. They
were Saudis. And that operation was probably planned in Saudi
Arabia and elsewhere and we all know it. Yeah, they were giving
aid and comfort to Osama bin Laden and we should never forgive
them for that and I am very happy that we support the Northern
Alliance to help them free their country from the Taliban which
was allied with al-Qaeda. But those days are over.
General, it would not have helped our country to stay in
Vietnam any longer. We were divided then and going through that
experience eventually helped us get ourselves together to put a
better perspective on things.
We need a better perspective of the role of the United
States in the world and it is no longer acceptable to the
people of the United States to be the policemen of the world
and they have 2,000 guys lost here, 5,000 guys lost here, and
then they leave the area because the world hates us now because
we are playing the policeman role. This is--what I am getting
today is frankly wrong-think. And I am sorry, but I disagree
with what almost everybody has testified today.
Let me put it this way. Thirty billion dollars for 30,000
extra troops in Afghanistan. The whole gross national product
of that country is $15 billion. And I can assure you the
experience that I have had in Afghanistan, which is extensive,
that for $3 billion we can buy off every tribal leader and
every political leader in that country and we can have them
wave good-bye to us and for an extra billion dollars, there can
be smiles on their faces and they can wave American flags. And
that is more important right now, just get our troops out of
there, let them run their affair. And this idea that everywhere
that there is a radical Muslim who pops his head up that we are
going to send troops over to that country, we should be yes,
helping the Northern Alliance, helping those people who are
struggling against the radicals in their own country as they
are in Egypt right now with Morsi. Morsi was kicked out by al-
Sisi and we should be helping the al-Sisis of the world over
there and let them do the work. But the last thing we need to
do is send our troops everywhere in the world any more. The
American people are tired of it. They are sick and tired of
being the policemen of the world. It is too expensive and we
end up having thousands of American lives lost for who knows
what. Thank you very much.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, sir.
Dr. Bera is recognized.
Mr. Bera. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I had the privilege
of visiting Afghanistan with our chairwoman over Memorial Day.
And let me just say we met some of the most professional
troops, men and women that answered the call of duty and have
performed extremely admirably. But talking to them, talking to
our leaders on the ground, talking to our intelligence folks on
the ground, talking to our diplomatic community, and then
having the opportunity to meet with President Karzai, I don't
think 30,000 troops solves it. I don't think 10,000. I think
this is a very difficult part of the world and I think my
colleague from California, Mr. Rohrabacher, just touched on how
difficult this part of the world is.
I also think we haven't touched on what I think the most
critical factor in Afghanistan's stability is. As we start to
draw down and I think the American people have spoken pretty
loud and clear that they are ready to start drawing down,
whether it is $30 billion or $3 billion, the presence of our
troops there over this last decade has essentially been the
driving force of Afghanistan's economy.
As we draw down and maybe this is for Ms. Curtis or Dr.
Biddle, I think my biggest fear of Afghanistan falling apart is
their economy falls apart when we are not there and we are no
longer pumping those billions of dollars into their economy. I
would be interested in your thoughts.
Ms. Curtis. Thank you. There are a couple of issues here.
There is one, the issue of the troop numbers and I would just
point out we still have 30,000 troops in Korea, 60 years after
the war ended. So if we can afford to have a number of troops
there, I don't see what the issue is with keeping a substantial
residual force in Afghanistan, about 20,000 troops in the place
where the 9/11 attacks originated.
In terms of moving forward and supporting the Afghans, you
know, it has also been pointed out that we need to continue
funding the Afghan security forces and if we allow the Afghan
security forces to kind of flail about on their own without any
U.S. support, then I think we are going to see the Taliban
gradually begin to retake parts of the country, allow al-Qaeda
to reestablish its safe haven there and we do have to think
about what we have invested there. It is not impossible. We
don't need to go from 100 to zero. I think there is something
to be said for a responsible drawdown where we do have gains
that have been made. I think those were pointed out by a few
people and it is not as if the people of Afghanistan are not
better off today than they were under Taliban rule.
Mr. Bera. Certainly, I don't disagree that our troops have
not made gains and certainly inside Kabul, when we were there,
you see stability and you see a somewhat normal way of life.
Obviously, in the rural parts of the country, it is probably
much less stable. Since I have only got about a minute and a
half left, I was also recently in India and the issue of post-
2014 Afghanistan certainly is very present on Indian minds.
They have invested about $3 billion. I think they stand ready
to continue to invest in infrastructure, and both their
industry and their government, want to see a stable
Afghanistan, obviously. They want to see stability in South
Asia.
Maybe Dr. Biddle, India's concern is they won't invest
those dollars if it is an unstable security situation. So I may
be contradicting myself, but I understand that we have to have
some presence and we have to try to have a stable ANSF. But
what would you like to see India's role being in Afghanistan?
Mr. Biddle. I would like to see India's role in Afghanistan
be as part of a larger strategy for dealing with Pakistan. I
could imagine India being cooperative in a way that would help
us build leverage with Pakistan. If it is uncoordinated,
however, mostly what it stands to do is play into Pakistani
paranoia in a way that isn't constructive and doesn't move our
agenda forward.
If I could, I would like to spend just a brief moment
speaking to the question you raised initially on the economic
consequences in Afghanistan of the western drawdown. Because
when I was last there in March, we spent some time with the
World Bank team and with the Economic Branch and the Embassy
talking about exactly that question. And to my surprise, their
assessment was they believed that the economic consequences,
while negative, would be modest. In fact, their projection is a
reduction in the growth rate of the Afghan economy, but they
don't actually project a recession.
There are a variety of reasons for that that I doubt I will
be able to detail in 4 seconds, but suffice to say that my
sense is that the best economic analysis of the country at the
moment holds that they will not see an economic catastrophe as
a result of this. I yield back.
Mr. Weber [presiding]. All right, the gentleman from
Florida is recognized.
Mr. Yoho. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, gentlemen, and ma'am, I
appreciate you all being here.
I am going to ask my last question first and that is I want
you to think about this when I come back to you. I want you to
spend about 30 seconds. What is the role of the U.S. Government
in the world?
And then starting with that, General Keane and Dr. Kagan,
you both said that al-Qaeda is more dispersed around the world,
throughout the Middle East, and greater in number, and this is
after $2 trillion in Afghanistan and Iraq, several thousand
lost lives, tens of thousands of injured soldiers, and this is
after an 11- to 12-year effort of going over there fighting the
war terror.
How much has our intervention over the last 60-plus years
in the Middle East, how much has that led to the radical
Islamist terrorists that mean to do us harm like in Beirut, the
Cole in Yemen, 9/11, and Benghazi that we see today? If one or
two of you want to answer that real quickly, then we will move
on to the next question.
General?
General Keane. Well, I don't see a direct correlation of
U.S. involvement in the Middle East and radical Islam. Radical
Islam is an ideology that has a historical, theological, and
philosophical foundation for it.
Mr. Yoho. Right.
General Keane. And you know how ambitious that ideology is.
One of the near term strategic objectives to be able to achieve
their ambitious political goals which is what they are is to
drive the United States out of the region so they can dominate
it. The United States is in the region because of genuine
national interest and we have been there rather significantly
since post-World War II.
I don't think you can draw a correlation that that is the
spark that drives radical Islam. They certainly use it
politically to their advantage.
Mr. Yoho. I would love for you to come by our office at
some point where we could have a more in-depth discussion.
Dr. Kagan?
Mr. Kagan. Well, sir, I agree with General Keane on that
point. I think that this is a movement that has evolved from a
number of different sources, some of which were related to the
American presence, some of which weren't. Most of them pre-
dated this significant American presence in the region quite a
lot and I think we have the problem that al-Qaeda does not
identify the United States as an enemy because we are in the
region. They identify the United States as an enemy because of
what we stand for and who we support.
Mr. Yoho. You know, I have heard that, but I personally
don't believe that. I believe it is because we try to put
western ideologies in their government that they don't want to
accept: Freedom of religion, freedom of expression, women's
rights, and all these things that we believe on the western
side. And we go over there with foreign aid and we say we will
give you this foreign aid if you do these things. I think we
are going to disagree on that.
Let me go to Ms. Curtis and Dr. Biddle. If we develop
energy security in the U.S., would it change our foreign policy
in the Middle East, if we had energy independence here in this
country?
Mr. Biddle. At the margin, but probably not radically
because our major trading partners will continue to be
dependent on the Middle East for energy. To the extent that we
care about whether Europe, for example, as an economy that can
trade with us and maintain our economic growth, we therefore
need to worry not just about where we get our energy, but also
where our trading partners get it.
I think at the margin it can mean that we can become less
militarily engaged, but I don't think it can get to the point
where we can become independent of events in the Middle East.
Mr. Yoho. Okay, let me ask what would be a way to negotiate
a change in foreign policy from military conflicts and to
capitalize on the investment we have had with human life, the
trillions we have spent and build one around trade whether it
is agriculture, construction. Is it feasible with a corrupt
government in both those countries? And you know, you both said
you know, that both of those governments are corrupt. And I
don't understand how we can throw billions and billions of
dollars over and over again to a corrupt government and expect
it is going to turn out good. I see it in Egypt and I see it in
all these countries in the Middle East that we have done over
and over again.
And Ms. Curtis, if you could answer that real quickly. And
I want to get your response to that first question I asked you.
Ms. Curtis. I think you have made a very good point about
in the interest of building trade linkages and how that might
be a more stable relationship than just providing foreign aid
and this is something that the new Pakistan Government is
extremely interested in and hopefully we can expand the
dialogue and try to improve our trade relationship. Even though
I believe the aid is still important, perhaps focusing more on
trade rather than just focusing on the aid would be a prudent
way to approach the relationship with Pakistan.
And also, promoting regional integration and regional trade
is extremely important. That means Afghanistan-Pakistan trade,
Indo-Pak trade, anything we can do to encourage more regional
economic linkages. That is going to help stabilize that region
and that will be in our interest as well.
Mr. Yoho. All right, thank you. Mr. Chairman, I am out of
time. If you guys would submit that question I asked you, the
role of the United States Government in the world, I look
forward to your answers. Thank you.
Mr. Weber. Thank you. The gentleman from Virginia is
recognized.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome to our
panel.
General Keane, you had a lot to do with helping President
Bush understand the failed policy in Iraq, militarily, and to
repivot with the counterinsurgency strategy propounded by
General Petraeus. Is that correct?
General Keane. Yes. Others participated, not the least of
which is the man sitting next to me.
Mr. Connolly. That is right. I remember your name as well,
Mr. Kagan. That is right.
We have been in Afghanistan now for 12 years. By one simple
measurement, that is the longest war we have ever been involved
in, is that not correct?
General Keane. Yes, it is.
Mr. Connolly. The President who ran against Mr. Gore, Vice
President Gore, inter alia, saying he didn't believe in nation
building, has spent a lot of money nation building in
Afghanistan. And included in that nation building was the
reconstitution or the constitution of a security force of
350,000 members at a cost estimated of about $40 billion. What
is your assessment, General, of the ability of that security
force after those 12 years to deter insurgent threats and to
create some semblance of peace and stability domestically in
Afghanistan?
General Keane. Yes. Just let me briefly say that 12 years
is driven by choices that we made. We set up a government
initially of our choosing. And we did not provide initially to
grow and develop a security force early on. We changed our
priorities from Afghanistan to Iraq very early. The decision
was made actually in December 2001 and priorities began to
shift. Afghanistan from 2002 to late 2008 was on a diet. And we
never really got after it again in a way that was consequential
until after President Obama made his decision to escalate.
Just to put the facts on the table, a lot of our own policy
decisions drove this long war. I believe the Afghan National
Security Forces, after all the stumbling that we have done in
fashioning a coherent strategy for the growth and development
and the resources to support it, we have finally arrived at a
point where we have an acceptable force. It has proven its
mettle in the south. It is now leading operations there and
according itself. Their casualties have certainly gone up from
what they used to be when we were in the lead, but those
preliminary signs are favorable that that investment has been
worth it.
As Dr. Kagan and I have both said, we have a problem in the
east that I don't think they can handle by themselves. And we
have to assist them as we transition and pull all of our combat
forces out which we will do. That is already a decision. We
have to assist with that transition.
I also believe the training and assistance force is
important intellectually to stay engaged with them. We need
officers there to help shape their operations. Those numbers
are low by comparison to what our commitment is now. Those
numbers will be in the thousands, but relatively low. What we
get out of that is exponentially greater than the numbers that
are there to help shape it. There is a lot we can do to assist
them.
The most important thing is they have the courage to fight,
no doubt about that and we have given them the skill to fight
and they have now shown that they can handle that. It is
uncertain what it would be like when we are totally gone and
that is a question mark. We think the signs are favorable,
except for what we are dealing with in the east.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you. Mr. Biddle, Dr. Biddle, there were
reports in today's New York Times complicating what General
Keane I think would like to see accomplished and I don't
disagree, that the Afghan Government has been secretly
negotiating with elements of the Pakistan Taliban. We captured
Mr. Mehsud, one of the key leaders in that effort and it raises
real questions about trust and about the intention of the
Afghani Government and given what General Keane just said, it
might be construed as also undermining the work of their own
security forces. Would you comment?
Mr. Biddle. Clearly, it has been a major source of friction
between ourselves and the Afghans and may have had something to
do with the difficulties and the talks over the Bilateral
Security Agreement over recent months. That said, I think it is
only natural that the Afghans are trying to develop leverage
against what they view as a Pakistani Government that has been
unhelpful in talks to settle the war.
The appropriate use of leverage in dealing with Pakistanis
would ideally be something that we would coordinate across the
various interested parties on our side of the conflict. This
was evidently remarkably uncoordinated, but leverage is
necessary in any negotiation and it is certainly going to be
necessary in this one and we are not particularly leverage
rich.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you. I wish I had more time. This is a
fascinating panel. Thank you all for being here. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Weber. The gentlelady from Florida is recognized.
Ms. Frankel. Well, thank you, Mr. Weber. It is a pleasure
to be here with you. I have enjoyed the discussion and thank
you all very much. I am sure it is very frustrating for you to
hear our frustration because really, I think Congress should
stand in front of a mirror and yell at itself, but with that
said, you are the ones that get to sit here.
My son who I am very proud of, a United States Marine, who
served in Afghanistan and returned in USAID and I also did
visit Afghanistan with Mr. Wilson, who led a very wonderful
codel.
One thing that I found and I would echo Mr. Bera's comments
that we met with many, many military personnel and I thought
they were articulate. They were committed. I have nothing but
very high marks. The other observation I had was that they also
had what I would see as a narrow view of their own world
because obviously, you are in the military in Afghanistan, that
is probably what you are thinking about. You are not thinking
about educating a kid in West Palm Beach, Florida.
Anyway, I have often wondered--I studied psychology in
college and I learned about this principle called cognitive
dissonance which is basically, it is like there was an Aesop's
fable, the fox, when he can't reach the grapes he decides well,
he really didn't want grapes in the first place. I often
wonder, are we in a situation where we have cognitive
dissonance which is really defined as a distressing mental
state that people feel when they find themselves doing things
that don't fit what they know. And sometimes otherwise they
take puzzling and irrational and destructive behavior.
The point being is this, are we supporting continuing
efforts in Afghanistan because we want to try to feel good
about what we did even though we know, I think many of us have
doubts about that. Or is it about national security? And so the
question I have and I am not sure whether you can answer it,
but I want you to take a shot at it if you want to because some
of you would seem to me are coming from the point of view of
continued military action or involvement in Afghanistan.
What do you fear is worse to happen to us in this country
than us not properly educating our children, not modernizing
our infrastructure, not finding cures for diseases, not feeding
poor children and elderly? Because those are the choices we
have to make in Congress, where to put our money.
General Keane. I will be happy to take a shot at that,
Congresswoman. It is obviously a very important question and it
needs to be answered for anybody who is going to advocate
putting U.S. resources against military operations.
I am not making a sunk cost argument in Afghanistan. My
eyes are fixed as clearly as they can be on the people who wake
up every morning and ask themselves what they can do to kill
Americans that day. And my answer to your question, ma'am, is
having more Americans killed on American soil, that I think is
worse than the various other things that you identified because
it is the first responsibility of government to protect its
citizens from death and injury by foreign attack. That is what
I am preoccupied with and that is what I believe the stakes
are, otherwise I wouldn't be advocating for military force.
Ms. Frankel. I will let somebody else answer that, too.
There are many who believe that it is our economic superiority
that it will lead to our security.
I see, Ms. Curtis, you want to answer that?
Ms. Curtis. I lived in Pakistan in the mid-'90s. I saw the
rise of the Taliban. I saw what the extremist groups in
Pakistan, what that meant. And then, of course, 9/11. We just
cannot afford to go back to 1989. That is when we turned our
backs on the region after the Soviets left. And I believe that
over time the result was the 9/11 attacks and I simply believe
we cannot afford to go back to that situation where we just
simply throw up our hands, say this is too difficult, and we
can't make any progress.
Again, I will reiterate. It is not an either/or option
here. Certainly, all of the things that you listed are
extremely important, but I think what I fear is losing our
sense of freedom and safety here in the U.S. which we certainly
lost in spades on September 11, 2001. And so I think what is
driving me to counsel you to continue to support the efforts in
Afghanistan is that fear that us completely pulling up stakes
and leaving will embolden the Taliban, will embolden al-Qaeda,
will provide them a safe haven again, we will be back to where
we were on September 10, 2001.
General Keane. You know, the tension that you are
describing is something your predecessors and national leaders
have felt for the past 60 years, going all the way back to the
decisions should we do something about the problem in Europe in
World War II, etcetera. And those are understandable tensions
between what are our concerns at home with education and
poverty and crime and other major issues that this country has
dealt with for 60 years, and then also our responsibility to
protect those very people that we are so concerned about, our
American citizens.
The fact is the United States is involved in the world.
From a national security perspective, we have global interests
in the world. We want open and free markets. We want a stable
world out there. Radical Islam is a major, major ideology and
political movement that is threatening the security of the
United States. And the issue that we are talking about here is
directly related to that and everybody knows that.
We are at the cusp of a long involvement with it and we are
frustrated because it has taken us so long and the fact of the
matter is some of the key decisions we make now will drive how
this does turn out. And I think war is fundamentally a test of
wills and the ultimate objective of it is to break your
opponent's will. It is our resolve and it is about our
commitment and it is about our leadership. And I believe that
is what is needed now. Your leadership, as well to understand
the issues that we are trying to speak to here, and also our
national leadership to commit to see this through.
Ms. Frankel. It is up to the chair. Does anybody else want
to try?
Mr. Biddle. Briefly, then. I think probably relative to the
other members of the panel, I am more skeptical about the
merits of counterterrorist uses of violence around the world,
but I make an exception in Afghanistan and South Asia. And
among the reasons why I make an exception there is the unique
status of Pakistan as a radically unstable nuclear weapons
power in which there is a resident of militant groups that have
expressed threats toward the United States and our allies in
the West.
If Pakistan does collapse, if the state loses the
counterinsurgency war that it is fighting within its own
borders in Pakistan, that nuclear arsenal could breach
containment and that is one of the very few ways in which I can
imagine a terrorist threat to the American homeland reaching
the scale of weapons of mass destruction in severity. And that
strikes me as a very unusual problem relative to what the
United States faces around the world and merits an unusual
degree of attention and sacrifice in order to address.
Mr. Connolly. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Just an observation
I want to share with the panel. Listening to this conversation
has to be fascinating, especially to those of you who come from
conservative think tanks. What you heard at this dais today is
from the right of center and the left of center, real
skepticism about the continued role of the United States in
conflicts such as this even when from your point of view and
mine, U.S. self interests are clearly indicated, given the
history of Afghanistan. This is part of the consequence, I say
to you, as conservatives of the obsession with the debt. It has
led to a false choice. We can either afford to fund a food
stamp program or we can fund our foreign policy interests. We
cannot do both. And I would submit that a great power must
never be forced into such a false choice, otherwise it will not
remain a great power. But that is where we are. That is what
you just heard.
And you heard it echoed in the debate about Syria.
We could argue the merits of whether a reaction was
justified, but much of the debate wasn't about that. It was
about how we are sick of it. We are tired of it and we don't
want to be dragged into any more conflict irrespective of the
merits. And to me, I don't know about you, but that is a very
dangerous place for the United States to be. Debate is healthy,
but looking at where we have been led because of the obsession,
frankly, with the debt.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me to share my
thoughts.
Mr. Weber. Now it is my turn. Dr. Kagan, you said in your
comments, I am paraphrasing, Pakistan hates us like no other
nation.
Ms. Curtis, you said you spent some time--was it in
Pakistan, and you watched the rise of the Taliban in the 1990s.
General Keane, you said in your comments just a short while
ago that we are on the cusp of having to deal with radical
Islam and decision we make are going to be pretty major was
what you insinuated.
Now I want you all to square that for me and I will start
with Dr. Kagan first. You are saying the Taliban has been
around a long time. Now let me say this. I liked what our
colleague from New York, Mr. Higgins, said earlier when he said
that we educate and we train and we build roads and we build
infrastructure and yet we have a radical Taliban group who
blows up those very roads that we build in the country. They
stand for anti-education. Is that true enough? So even though I
like the idea that we would educate so that those people would
have a political will, that they would develop the political
will of their own, they would get educated, they would
understand they can have freedom if they are ready and willing
to work and sacrifice and pay one terrific price for it.
We cannot go in there and absolutely inject with a needle,
if you will, that political will or that willingness for them
to sacrifice and pay all kinds of prices, some of them the
ultimate price, to take their country back.
So Dr. Kagan, with that in mind, explain to me why it is
that Pakistan hates us like no other nation?
Mr. Kagan. Well, Congressman, I don't know why Pakistan
hates us like no other nation. We poll very poorly in Pakistan.
Part of that, I think has been because the number of Pakistani
leaders have seen it as in their interest while receiving a lot
of money from the United States to run against the United
States. That is a reality of the world and I don't think there
is an obvious conclusion that follows from that, frankly, about
what it is exactly that we should do.
Mr. Weber. General Keane, how do you explain? I mean, you
said we are on the cusp of dealing with radical Islam, yet this
has been going on for a long time, witness Ms. Curtis' comments
that she watched the rise of the Taliban in the '90s.
General Keane. The question about the cusp was the
decisions we are about to make and how they dramatically will
affect the future stability of Afghanistan and obviously it is
in relationship to Pakistan because if Afghanistan is
destabilized as a result of the policy decisions that we make
where we contribute to it, it obviously will have an adverse
impact on Pakistan. That is what my comments were. It was not
to the general issue of radical Islam. I have strong feelings
about that as well.
Mr. Weber. I see. I appreciate that. To any of y'all's
recollection has there been any country that is so devolved in
this kind of violence and terrorism and we are going to come
back to your comments, Dr. Biddle, but you were skeptical about
using counterterrorist violence around the world is what you
just said a few minutes ago, and we will come back to that. But
is there any of you who can remember a country that has so
devolved into the world where an outside nation, i.e., the
United States came in and we were able to prop them up and get
their people to understand what was at stake and they were able
to help them pull themselves up from the bootstraps and they
are now a successful, thriving, democracy today? Anybody
remember a country like that?
Mr. Kagan. I think you can make an argument for Colombia
along those lines. Large swaths of the country were controlled
by vicious drug gangs and there was incredible violence in the
capital. The government was unable to function. We worked
closely with a very small footprint with Colombians who were
interested in taking that back and Colombia is now very much
headed in the right direction and much more democratic, much
more peaceful and the drug trade is much more under control. So
yes, I think there are premises. Was it as bad as Afghanistan?
No, not necessarily.
Mr. Weber. Forgive me for interrupting, but what kind of
outlay of manpower, casualties, suffering on our behalf and
money did the United States----
Mr. Kagan. It was obviously much more limited than what we
have put into Afghanistan, but the circumstances were also very
different and the requirements were very different.
Mr. Weber. Would you say there was a difference in the
people, the willingness of the people to actually get involved
and take their country back?
Mr. Kagan. Sir, I would not. I have got to tell you that
for the many months that I have spent in Afghanistan and the
many Afghans that I have known, and the many people standing up
in suras fighting against the Taliban after their successors
were killed and the successors before them were killed, that
the Afghans are very determined to take the fight and are
willing to take casualties and have been willing to take
casualties at a much higher rate than the United States.
Mr. Weber. Time will tell, won't it?
And Dr. Biddle, we are going to go to you now. Your comment
about you were skeptical about the use of antiterrorist,
counterterrorist violence around the world, what did you mean
by that?
Mr. Biddle. Two things. One is I think with respect to any
tool when it is perceived as free, it tends to be overused. I
think many of the military instruments we have been using for
counterterrorist activity have been perceived by some in the
United States Government as being largely free of cost, but
especially largely free of risk to the United States and I
think that necessarily tends to create over use. But I would
distinguish between terrorist threats to the United States and
I would not treat them all the same.
I believe that a terrorist threat of the use of weapons on
the scale of 9/11 or on the scale of nuclear or biological is a
serious existential threat to the American way of life and
warrants the waging of war to prevent.
Mr. Weber. I.e., the falling of nuclear weapons and
Pakistan becoming----
Mr. Kagan. And I believe that is the primary means by which
that threat could be realized.
Mr. Weber. Does that also translate over to Iran in your
estimation?
Mr. Kagan. My view of Iran tends to be that they have
powerful disincentives to transfer weapons of that kind to
terrorist groups. I would prefer that they not get nuclear
weapons. I see no particular benefit to the United States or
the region in that happening, but I tend to believe that if
they get it, the odds that they will transfer the materials are
relatively modest.
What worries me about Pakistan is that the state could
collapse and if that happens, then you don't have to assume
that a state that could be retaliated against will transfer
weapons to a terrorist. The weapons simply become loose and
that strikes me as a very----
Mr. Weber. Are you also concerned about that in Syria?
Mr. Kagan. Well, Syria doesn't have----
Mr. Weber. Well, I get it on nuclear, but we are talking
about weapons of mass destruction, WMDs.
Mr. Kagan. And you will note that I mentioned biological
and nuclear and I did not mention chemical. I believe the scale
of the threat associated with chemical weapons is significantly
lower than the other two and warrants different treatment.
Mr. Weber. Your comment intrigued me. I thank you. And we
have our distinguished colleague, Mr. Sherman, and I yield 5
minutes to him.
Mr. Sherman. Thank you. We are obsessed, of course, as we
should be with our own national security. The Pakistani
military is either obsessed with its national security or it at
least needs to appear to be so if it is going to retain its
position in that society.
And one existential threat would be if Afghanistan were to
be in some alliance with India because India is the traditional
existential threat to Pakistan. We installed Karzai. It is not
like he had this huge national following in Afghanistan. And we
seem to have done so without Pakistan either voicing approval
or disapproval in any loud way. And then today, the Taliban
exists pretty much because the ISI wants it to exist.
What can we do to assuage the Pakistani military that
Afghanistan will not be a second front in a confrontation with
India? Why has Karzai allowed the Indian Embassy in Kabul to be
so robust? And why is he the only Muslim ruler that seems to
not take the Pakistani side on the Kashmir issue?
I will look to see if I have got any volunteers? Yes, the
witness whose name has collapsed in front of you, Mr. Kagan.
Mr. Kagan. Hopefully, it is just my name that has
collapsed.
Look, the Pakistanis are hated in Afghanistan by all sides
to a remarkable degree and the reason for that is that for the
past 30 years Pakistani policy in Afghanistan has been to
supply guys with guns, foster chaos, create death, and do
absolutely nothing positive for that country.
Mr. Sherman. If I can interrupt, you are going back 30
years. Pakistan played a critical role in overthrowing the
communists, the Russian-supported regime?
Mr. Kagan. Yes, that is right.
Mr. Sherman. The Taliban had enough popular support to
obtain power in Afghanistan, although they were supported by
the Pakistanis.
Mr. Kagan. The Taliban was created by the Pakistanis and
would not have been able to defeat its enemies militarily or
take control of the country, such control as it had without
Pakistani support.
Mr. Sherman. But they also wouldn't have been able to take
control without Afghan support.
Mr. Kagan. Yes, of course, that is true. What I can tell
you is the conversations, again, it is remarkable. As you go
down to Kandahar, you talk to the tribal chiefs there who are
fighting against the Taliban. You ask them who these guys are
and they say they are Pakistanis. You ask them who their enemy
is, they are Pakistanis. And that is not just because they
don't want to admit that there is Afghan Taliban.
My point is that the Pakistanis have been treating problems
in Afghanistan like a nail, and the hammer that they have is
supplied guns to bad dudes. They need to figure out that that
is not going to work and that they need a new policy. And what
we can best do for them, I think, is to help them figure that
out.
Mr. Sherman. General.
General Keane. I believe if you look at Pakistan, there are
very few countries in the world that have a history as profound
as theirs is in making poor strategic choices and
miscalculations. It is quite extraordinary. And this one with
the Taliban is another example of it.
I mean I have felt for some time in dealing with them that
we should have taken the gloves off a long time ago, maintain a
relationship with them, but certainly deal much more directly
with them and I agree with my panel colleague about their aid.
I think it should have been much more conditioned based and
this last aid should have that----
Mr. Sherman. General, if I can interrupt because my time is
close to expiring. Why did we install a regime in Kabul
unacceptable to the Pakistani military?
General Keane. I think why was Karzai installed was the
issue. We had a relationship with Karzai and the Central
Intelligence Agency had a relationship with them. These are all
the things that were done very quickly to put somebody in
charge. Was it a good decision? Probably not.
Mr. Sherman. Ms. Curtis?
Ms. Curtis. I think at the time, Karzai was a good leader
for the country. He is a Pashtiun. He was a consensus builder.
Certainly things have fallen off in the last few years and we
see more corruption. But you know, it really gets at what, is
Afghanistan a sovereign country? That is like asking why we
would allow a certain Pakistani leader----
Mr. Sherman. We didn't allow Karzai to be swept into Kabul
by a wave of popular support. You are saying Afghanistan is a
sovereign country and therefore had a chance to select its
anti-Pakistani leader, it didn't select Karzai. We selected
Karzai.
Ms. Curtis. I would refer to Karzai as an anti-Pakistan
leader.
Mr. Sherman. But the Pakistani behavior seems to indicate
that they regard him as an anti-Pakistani leader.
Ms. Curtis. But I think he has tried to build better
relations and he has been able to, to a certain degree with
Pakistan civilian leadership. If you look at the equation
with----
Mr. Sherman. How large is the Indian Embassy in Kabul?
Ms. Curtis. How much aid is India supplying to Afghanistan?
He is a rational leader.
Mr. Sherman. I get to ask the questions. I couldn't do your
job. That is why they gave me mine. Let me go on to another
question. I thank the chairman for a little additional time.
And that is Pakistan is a very diverse nation at its upper
levels there has been an effort to homogenize Pakistan and back
when there was an East and West Pakistan and even an attempt to
impose the Urdu language on East Pakistan.
Now you have a government there that seems to indicate a
preference for the Urdu language. Should we be reaching out to
Pakistanis in the various languages they speak or should we
accede to the wishes of the most Urdu homogenous in Islamabad?
General?
General Keane. Well, I cannot comment about the language
issue, but certainly I do believe we should be working closely
with Pakistan. What I wasn't able to say before is that I agree
with my colleague here that the aid in general, it has been a
mistake to continually provide aid to the military regime that
is dominating the country. And we should have a condition base
so that the country moves toward responsible civilian
government where they can control the military. That is down
the road. It is generational to be sure. But the path we are
currently on is not the right one.
Mr. Sherman. Okay, thank you. I thank the chairman for his
indulgence.
Mr. Weber. Ms. Frankel?
Ms. Frankel. Thank you, Mr. Weber. I do have one followup
to something to--Dr. Biddle, I am sorry, my glasses are not on.
Okay, because I am very interested in the point you made about
what a failed Pakistan would look like and the potential of
nuclear weapons getting a very bad--worse actor's hand. And I
would just like to ask if the rest of the panel agrees with
that and whether you think that is a serious possibility or
consequence.
Mr. Kagan. Yes, absolutely. I mean if you are looking at a
failed Pakistani state, then once you have a state collapse
scenario, you cannot be confident about how the military forces
will break down. You certainly have a very large concentration
of well armed and well trained insurgent fighters who are eager
to get their hands on those weapons and I do think that it is a
significant risk that we should be concerned with.
Ms. Frankel. Where do you put that in the--one to ten, you
are advocating continued military involvement. Where do you put
that risk compared to some of the others that you talked about
today?
Mr. Kagan. It is a very low probability, extraordinarily
high risk scenario. Obviously, a lot of things have to go wrong
to get there. What I am concerned about is that we, from this
perspective, and I think there are a lot of other reasons why I
would put ahead of this as higher probability, things that we
need to be concerned about.
What I am concerned about is creating conditions in
Afghanistan or allowing conditions to be created in Afghanistan
that will conduce to this kind of state collapse and make what
is now, I think, a very low probability scenario a much higher
probability. And if I could beg your indulgence for one more
comment, you know, I have come across as very anti-Pakistani in
this.
I want to make the point that Nawaz Sharif has come to
office trying to focus like a laser beam on getting the
Pakistani economy turned around. Now I am a little skeptical
about his ability to do that. But it is a laudable goal. And he
is doing it with much more energy and creativity than his
predecessor did and it is very much in our interest for him to
succeed in that.
And I think as we talk about how we are going to approach
the problem of Pakistan at this minute as opposed to in general
terms, I don't think this is actually a terribly good idea to
be pulling aid or talking about taking aid out. I think it is
worthwhile giving Sharif a chance to try to turn the Pakistani
economy around.
Ms. Frankel. Ms. Curtis, did you want to answer that?
Ms. Curtis. Yes, I just wanted to say I would characterize
the risk of Pakistan's nuclear weapons falling into the hands
of extremists as a high risk, low probability scenario. I think
the Pakistani military is a competent force and the senior
leaders understand the importance of keeping the nuclear
weapons safe and the U.S. has assisted in this effort which is
important for maintaining our engagement with Pakistan. I have
made that point.
But I think the links to the extremist elements in Pakistan
are worrisome and that if you do have a scenario where
Afghanistan falls back on the Taliban sway, there will be
blowback into Pakistan. And as Dr. Kagan pointed out, this,
what I would call high risk, low probability scenario then
becomes a high risk, high probability scenario.
General Keane. Let me just follow up. You have the Central
Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense spend a lot
of effort on this issue of nuclear weapons in Pakistan. And we
have had the opportunity to check on the security of those
weapons and were somewhat comforted that the military
establishment has that as a top priority to protect those
weapon systems.
There are some issues surrounding that though because
Pakistan has made a decision to go to tactical nuclear weapons
as opposed to the strategic nuclear weapons they have now which
means that you can fire a nuclear weapon out of an artillery or
rocket capability that we used to have by the tens of thousands
and have destroyed them since the conventions with the Soviet
Union. That escalation gives people pause for concern because
of the numbers of those and the multiple locations they will be
at. If they would ever be of any use you have to decentralize
those weapons to many more locations. So that is an issue.
The second issue is our Department of Defense has very high
on its list of scenarios for this issue in dealing with an
implosion of a government and what do we do about those nuclear
weapons. And it has been practiced and practiced and practiced
in dealing with the reality of that issue.
Ms. Frankel. So I am not trying to put words in anyone's
mouth. So is your top fear 9/11-type scenarios? Is that like
number one most probable risk?
Mr. Kagan. I don't think it would look like 9/11 again. My
concern is that you have a global organization that is trying
to bring the war to our shores and that enabling them and
giving them a victory of this variety and giving them a staging
area of this variety will make it more likely that they will
bring the war to our shores. That is my higher probability,
perhaps lower risk, but still intolerable.
Ms. Frankel. In some of type of terrorist attack, maybe
not----
Mr. Kagan. I am more concerned about the possibility of a
terrorist campaign because among other things, we have watched
these terrorist organizations evolve away from the one off
spectacular attack to the multiple attacks, smaller and so
forth that in some respects could do even more damage to the
American psyche.
Ms. Frankel. You are in agreement with that?
Ms. Curtis. Yes. I also am concerned about emboldening the
Taliban and al-Qaeda and other extremist groups in the region
and outside of the region if the terrorists can then
propagandize and show that they were able to defeat not only
the U.S., but the 40-odd NATO countries as well.
Ms. Frankel. And one last, would this be--is the concern
some type of a physical conflict or incident or cyber security
breach or both?
Mr. Kagan. When you are talking about al-Qaeda, the
principal threat is physical attack. They haven't to my
knowledge developed a very sophisticated cyber attack wing
although they are getting more sophisticated at that.
Ms. Frankel. Thank you, Mr. Weber, and I yield back my
time.
Mr. Weber. General Keane, you said something that got my
attention that they now have tactical nuclear weapons. I think
in all my reading, if I remember correctly, Pakistan has 100
nuclear weapons. Does that sound right?
General Keane. I think that is a generally-accepted number
in public sources.
Mr. Weber. Okay. So you are saying I think what the
gentlelady from Florida was driving at if there is another
attack along those lines, it will be far worse than 9/11,
especially if they were able to use one of those weapons,
whether they were to use them against our ally Israel and draw
us over there. So with that in mind, what would the four of
you, each of you offer? How do you fix that for Pakistan? What
is your recommendation? Okay, so they have got these nuclear
weapons. They hate us like no other nation on earth was part of
your testimony. What do we do about that? What is the best case
scenario?
General Keane, you look the most anxious.
General Keane. To me, it is not a military answer. It has
to do more with Pakistan's internal situation, you know, a
stronger government, less corrupt, that is responsive to the
needs of its people that is capable of controlling a military
is something that is desperately needed as opposed to the
reverse, a military that dominates the country and dominates
the civilian government and puts itself and its needs first.
Those are the kind of things that I think are needed and I
think in a sense we know how to do that. And a much more----
Mr. Weber. We do know how to do that, but as was already
previously stated, it might have been Mr. Connolly who said
they don't like it when we come over there to try to help them
do that. So how do you get around that? How do you placate that
hatred for Americans when we come over there to try to help
them do that?
And Dr. Biddle, you looked awful anxious to mash your
button.
General Keane. Let the doctor mash his button.
Mr. Weber. All right. My wife tells me you don't mash a
button, you press a button. I said look, in Texas, we mash
buttons. Go ahead.
Mr. Kagan. Preempting a military officer is a dangerous
thing, but I will offer some brief commentary which is that
there are very few bilateral policy options we enjoy toward
Pakistan that I think have very much traction for us at all.
There is a serious problem there that poses serious risks to
us. There is very little that we can do, I think, positively to
make the situation better. Given that, I think in many ways the
appropriate policy stance for the United States is to invoke
the Hippocratic Oath, and at least----
Mr. Weber. Do no harm.
Mr. Kagan. Don't make a bad situation that it is very hard
for us to improve any worse than it needs to be. And the reason
why I care about Afghanistan is because it seems to me that
failure of the project there is actually a serious opportunity
for us to make things considerably worse in Pakistan than they
might be otherwise. And in an environment where it is very hard
for us to improve things, avoiding making them worse than they
need to be strikes me as an unusual policy priority. And I
think the key issue in policy priority toward Pakistan is the
collapse of the state is the primary threat to the United
States. I don't worry nearly as much about Pakistani nuclear
weapons leaking out or somehow being stolen by terrorists, as
long as the Pakistani Government is intact and as long as their
control of their nuclear arsenal is no worse than it is today.
It is if they lose their war that I think we have got a
problem that poses literally unique national security issues
for the United States. And our primary leverage over that, I
suspect at the end of the day, limited as it is, is our
influence over what happens in Afghanistan.
Mr. Weber. You are not real encouraging.
Mr. Kagan. Sorry.
Ms. Curtis. If I may make a quick clarification? So
Pakistan's development of tactical nuclear weapons is mainly to
counter what it perceives as the Indian threat. So to the
extent that we can encourage Indo-Pakistani talks, strategic
stability talks to try to reduce their nuclear arsenals or at
least put in mechanisms that provide more stability in the
region, I think that is where we can help on that issue.
When it comes to, you talk about Pakistani hatred toward
the U.S., I think it is important to remember that we have seen
that the Pakistani intelligence services often feed negative
stories to the Pakistani media about the U.S. They try to fuel
this anti-U.S. sentiment.
Mr. Weber. You mean like we are spying on the Germans?
Ms. Curtis. I think what I was going to say it was
important for us to engage directly with civil society, the
civilian leadership to ensure that we are not just focusing all
of our attention on engaging with the military leadership.
Mr. Weber. Well, they have called votes. It looks like we
have picked you all's brains as long as we can. So I thank the
witnesses and this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:42 p.m., the joint subcommittees were
adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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