[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
NASA INFRASTRUCTURE:
ENABLING DISCOVERY AND
ENSURING CAPABILITY
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 20, 2013
__________
Serial No. 113-50
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology
Available via the World Wide Web: http://science.house.gov
______
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COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY
HON. LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas, Chair
DANA ROHRABACHER, California EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
RALPH M. HALL, Texas ZOE LOFGREN, California
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois
Wisconsin DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland
FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma FREDERICA S. WILSON, Florida
RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas SUZANNE BONAMICI, Oregon
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas ERIC SWALWELL, California
PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia DAN MAFFEI, New York
STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
MO BROOKS, Alabama JOSEPH KENNEDY III, Massachusetts
RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois SCOTT PETERS, California
LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana DEREK KILMER, Washington
STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas AMI BERA, California
BILL POSEY, Florida ELIZABETH ESTY, Connecticut
CYNTHIA LUMMIS, Wyoming MARC VEASEY, Texas
DAVID SCHWEIKERT, Arizona JULIA BROWNLEY, California
THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky MARK TAKANO, California
KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota ROBIN KELLY, Illinois
JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma
RANDY WEBER, Texas
CHRIS STEWART, Utah
VACANCY
------
Subcommittee on Space
HON. STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi, Chair
RALPH M. HALL, Texas DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland
DANA ROHRABACHER, California SUZANNE BONAMICI, Oregon
FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma DAN MAFFEI, New York
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas JOSEPH KENNEDY III, Massachusetts
MO BROOKS, Alabama DEREK KILMER, Washington
LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana AMI BERA, California
STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas MARC VEASEY, Texas
BILL POSEY, Florida JULIA BROWNLEY, California
DAVID SCHWEIKERT, Arizona FREDERICA S. WILSON, Florida
JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
CHRIS STEWART, Utah
LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas
C O N T E N T S
September 20, 2013
Page
Witness List..................................................... 2
Hearing Charter.................................................. 3
Opening Statements
Statement by Representative Steven Palazzo, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Space, Committee on Science, Space, and
Technology, U.S. House of Representatives...................... 26
Written Statement............................................ 27
Statement by Representative Julie Brownley, Acting Ranking
Minority Member, Subcommittee on Space, Committee on Science,
Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives........... 28
Written Statement............................................ 29
Witnesses:
The Honorable Paul K. Martin, Inspector General, National
Aeronautics and Space Administration
Oral Statement............................................... 30
Written Statement............................................ 32
Mr. Richard Keegan, Associate Deputy Administrator, National
Aeronautics and Space Administration
Oral Statement............................................... 40
Written Statement............................................ 42
Discussion....................................................... 49
Appendix I: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
The Honorable Paul K. Martin, Inspector General, National
Aeronautics and Space Administration........................... 68
Mr. Richard Keegan, Associate Deputy Administrator, National
Aeronautics and Space Administration........................... 84
Appendix II: Additional Material for the Record
Submitted statement of Representative Donna F. Edwards, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Space, Committee on Science, Space, and
Technology..................................................... 114
Submitted statement of Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson,
Ranking Member, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology.... 116
Agency/MPCV Risk: Inability to Certify TPS Performance
presentation, submitted by Representative Steve Stockman,
Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of
Representatives................................................ 117
Safety and Mission Assurance concerns related to the closure of
the JSC Arc Jet Facility letter, submitted by Representative
Steve Stockman, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology,
U.S. House of Representatives.................................. 158
Update on Closure of the JSC Arc Jet Facility and National
Security Concerns letter, submitted by Representative Steve
Stockman, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S.
House of Representatives....................................... 161
NASA, Ames Research Center's Justification for Other than Full
and Open Competition document, submitted by Representative
Steve Stockman, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology,
U.S. House of Representatives.................................. 165
Letter submitted by Representative Bill Posey, Committee on
Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives.. 170
Letter submitted by Representative Bill Posey, Committee on
Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives.. 173
NASA INFRASTRUCTURE:
ENABLING DISCOVERY AND
ENSURING CAPABILITY
----------
FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 20, 2013
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Science
Committee on Science, Space, and Technology,
Washington, D.C.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:35 a.m., in
Room 2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Steven
Palazzo [Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.
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Chairman Palazzo. The Subcommittee on Space will come to
order. Good morning. Welcome to today's hearing titled ``NASA
Infrastructure: Enabling Discovery and Ensuring Capability.''
In front of you are packets containing the written testimony,
biographies, and required Truth-in-Testimony disclosures for
today's witnesses.
I recognize myself for five minutes for an opening
statement.
The purpose of today's hearing is to address NASA's complex
infrastructure issues. This is a tall order for an agency that
is the ninth largest Federal Government real property holder.
That includes an inventory of more than 124,000 acres, and more
than 44 million square feet within approximately 4,900
buildings and other structures. However, nearly 80 percent of
the agency's facilities date back to the Apollo era and are 40
or more years old. A 2012 study by NASA estimated that NASA may
have as many as 865 unneeded facilities, with maintenance costs
of over $24 million a year. Also, NASA has a backlog of over
$2.19 billion in deferred maintenance.
In order to better manage its infrastructure and
facilities, NASA has established an Agency Master Plan to align
its infrastructure with its mission and set up a Technical
Capabilities Assessment Study to identify and evaluate Center
capabilities against Agency needs. Also, various Centers are
implementing innovative ways to address these infrastructure
challenges such as the Langley 20-Year Revitalization Plan to
right-size the Center's facilities and bring about greater
efficiencies. Despite these efforts, NASA will continue to face
challenges with right-sizing its infrastructure as long as it
does not have a coherent and consistent roadmap for
exploration.
Since 2005, Congress has provided consistent guidance on
how NASA should develop such a roadmap as well as the necessary
funding on a go-as-you-can-pay basis. Despite our efforts, OMB
and the recent Administration have chosen to divert resources
from exploration to other efforts.
The President's 2009 cut of $1 billion from the exploration
budget, and the roughly 45 percent increase in the Earth
Science budget since 2007 are just a few examples.
Until the Administration allows NASA to develop a coherent
exploration strategy, rather than pushing NASA toward costly,
complex and controversial distractions such as the
Administration's asteroid proposals, NASA will never know what
infrastructure and facilities it actually needs.
Setting aside this issue, I believe there are things that
the Administration and Congress can do to allow NASA to better
manage its facilities. NASA already has authorities to enter
into Enhanced Use Lease agreements to maintain underutilized
infrastructure, Space Act Agreements, traditional leases, and
various other incentives.
I hope the witnesses will be able to discuss how NASA is
using these existing authorities. Are they being fully
utilized, and does NASA have robust policies to determine which
authority should be used for each facility, and whether Agency
oversight is sufficient to ensure fairness and protect taxpayer
equities.
In addition to existing authorities, NASA and stakeholders
have recommended various additional authorities such as
conveyance authority, expanded Enhanced Use Lease, the
establishment of a capital fund, and enhanced authority to
cooperate with the commercial launch sector. While these
proposals are promising, I believe that they must be
accompanied by strong oversight provisions to ensure that
taxpayer investments are protected.
While the NASA Authorization Act of 2013 funds key NASA
missions, maintains infrastructure and even increases funding
for Center Management and Operations, it does not attempt to
solve all of the agency's complex infrastructure issues.
Instead, we have allowed time for opportunities such as this
hearing to gain better understanding of NASA's challenges and
options. I hope that the insights we gain today will be useful
as we move forward with the NASA Authorization Act.
I would be remiss if I did not mention the intense amount
of interest that Members and stakeholders have in NASA's
infrastructure. This is exhibited by the recent debates
surrounding the Kennedy Space Center's Launch Complex 39A, the
Shuttle landing facility, and the Shiloh site, as well as the
Johnson Space Center's arc jet, cleanup of the Santa Susanna
Site, test stand use at Stennis Space Center, as well as Hangar
One and Moffett field at Ames Research Center, to mention just
a few. I know many Members have opinions on these topics that
directly impact their districts. I look forward to working with
my colleagues, as well as NASA and the Administration to tackle
these challenges.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Palazzo follows:]
Prepared Statement of Subcommittee on Space Chairman Steven Palazzo
The purpose of today's hearing is to address NASA's complex
infrastructure issues. This is a tall order for an agency that is the
ninth largest Federal Government real property holder. That includes an
inventory of more than 124,000 acres, and more than 44 million square
feet within approximately 4,900 buildings and other structures.
However, nearly 80 percent of the agency's facilities date back to the
Apollo era and are 40 or more years old. A 2012 study by NASA estimated
that NASA may have as many as 865 unneeded facilities, with maintenance
costs of over $24 million a year. Also, NASA has a backlog of over
$2.19 billion in deferred maintenance.
In order to better manage its infrastructure and facilities, NASA
has established an Agency Master Plan to align its infrastructure with
its mission and set up a Technical Capabilities Assessment Study to
identify and evaluate Center capabilities against Agency needs. Also,
various Centers are implementing innovative ways to address these
infrastructure challenges such as the Langley 20 Year Revitalization
Plan to right-size the Center's facilities and bring about greater
efficiencies. Despite these efforts, NASA will continue to face
challenges with right-sizing its infrastructure as long as it does not
have a coherent and consistent roadmap for exploration.
Since 2005, Congress has provided consistent guidance on how NASA
should develop such a roadmap as well as the necessary funding on a go-
as-you-can-pay basis. Despite our efforts, OMB and the recent
Administration have chosen to divert resources from exploration to
other efforts.The President's 2009 cut of $1 billion from the
exploration budget, and the roughly 45 percent increase in the Earth
Science budget since 2007 are just a few examples.
Until the Administration allows NASA to develop a coherent
exploration strategy, rather than pushing NASA toward costly, complex
and controversial distractions such as the Administration's asteroid
proposals, NASA will never know what infrastructure and facilities it
actually needs.
Setting aside this issue, I believe there are things that the
Administration and Congress can do to allow NASA to better manage its
facilities. NASA already has authorities to enter into Enhanced Use
Lease agreements to maintain underutilized infrastructure, Space Act
Agreements, traditional leases, and various other incentives.
I hope the witnesses will be able to discuss how NASA is using
these existing authorities--are they being fully utilized, does NASA
have robust policies to determine which authority should be used for
each facility, and whether Agency oversight is sufficient to ensure
fairness and protect taxpayer equities.In addition to existing
authorities, NASA and stakeholders have recommended various additional
authorities such as conveyance authority, expanded Enhanced Use Lease,
the establishment of a capital fund, and enhanced authority to
cooperate with the commercial launch sector. While these proposals are
promising, I believe that they must be accompanied by strong oversight
provisions to ensure that taxpayer investments are protected.
While the NASA Authorization Act of 2013 funds key NASA missions,
maintains infrastructure and even increases funding for Center
Management and Operations, it does not attempt to solve all of the
agency's complex infrastructure issues. Instead, we have allowed time
for opportunities such as this hearing to gain better understanding of
NASA's challenges and options. I hope the insights we gain today will
be useful as we move forward with the NASA Authorization Act.
I would be remiss if I did not mention the intense amount of
interest that Members and stakeholders have in NASA's infrastructure.
This is exhibited by the recent debates surrounding the Kennedy Space
Center's Launch Complex 39A, the Shuttle landing facility, and the
Shiloh site, as well as the Johnson Space Center's arc jet, cleanup of
the Santa Susanna Site, test stand use at Stennis Space Center, as well
as Hanger One and Moffett field at Ames Research Center, to mention
just a few. I know many Members have opinions on these topics that
directly impact their districts. I look forward to working with my
colleagues, as well as NASA and the Administration to tackle these
challenges.
Chairman Palazzo. With that, I yield to the Ranking Member,
the gentlewoman Ms. Brownley.
Ms. Brownley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding today's
hearing to review NASA's infrastructure and facilities, and
welcome to our witnesses. Ranking Member Edwards had another
commitment this morning, and has asked me to sit in her chair,
and I request that her prepared statement be entered into the
record.
Ranking Member Edwards and I share the same passion for
ensuring that NASA has a productive and inspiring future.
However, a strong and vibrant space program requires that we
provide NASA with adequate resources, including the R&D tools
and facilities it needs to accomplish its challenging missions
and cutting edge research.
I am concerned about the state of the agency's facilities
and infrastructure. The fact that NASA's facilities are aging
should come as no surprise. Many were built during and before
the Apollo era. Today, challenged by both declining funding and
an uncertain budgetary environment, NASA is trying to make due
with what it is given. In that regard, I am especially
concerned about adequately funding NASA's Environmental
Compliance and Restoration Program, which is responsible for
cleaning up hazardous materials and waste that have been
released to the surface or groundwater at NASA installations,
NASA-owned industrial plants supporting NASA activities,
current or former sites where NASA operations have contributed
to environmental problems, and other sites where the Agency is
legally obligated to address hazardous pollutants.
According to NASA's Fiscal Year 2014 budget requests, one
of the projects planned includes investigation and clean up of
contaminated groundwater, soils, and demolition at Santa Susana
Field Laboratory in accordance with a consent order with the
State of California. This and other planned environmental
compliance restoration activities have been the result of
painstaking negotiations between NASA and several States.
That is why I hope to learn more about the status of NASA's
actions at Santa Susanna, and about what is needed to address
NASA's other longstanding facilities and infrastructure
challenges.
NASA's successes are a shining light of inspiration and
accomplishment for our youth and our Nation, and I want to
ensure that we enable NASA to continue to fill that role in the
coming years.
Thank you, Mr. Chair, and I yield back.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Brownley follows:]
Prepared Statement of Subcommittee on Space Acting Ranking Minority
Member Julie Brownley
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding today's hearing to review
NASA's infrastructure and facilities, and welcome to our witnesses.
Ranking Member Edwards has another commitment and has asked me to
sit in the chair. I request that her prepared statement be entered into
the record.
Ranking Member Edwards and I share the same passion for ensuring
that NASA has a productive and inspiring future. However, a strong and
vibrant space program requires that we provide NASA with adequate
resources, including the R&D tools and facilities it needs to
accomplish its challenging missions and cutting-edge research.
I am concerned about the state of the agency's facilities and
infrastructure. The fact that NASA's facilities are aging should come
as no surprise. Many were built during and before the Apollo era.
Today, challenged by both declining funding and an uncertain budgetary
environment, NASA is trying to make do with what it is given.
In that regard, I am especially concerned about adequately funding
NASA's Environmental Compliance and Restoration program, which is
responsible for cleaning up hazardous materials and waste that have
been released to the surface or groundwater at NASA installations,
NASA-owned industrial plants supporting NASA activities, current or
former sites where NASA operations have contributed to environmental
problems, and other sites where the Agency is legally obligated to
address hazardous pollutants.
According to NASA's FY 2014 budget request, one of the projects
planned includes investigation and cleanup of contaminated groundwater,
soils, and demolition at Santa Susana Field Laboratory in accordance
with the consent order with the State of California.
This and other planned environmental compliance and restoration
activities have been the result of painstaking negotiations between
NASA and several states.
That is why I hope to learn more about the status of NASA's actions
at Santa Susana and about what is needed to address NASA's other long-
standing facilities and infrastructure challenges.
NASA's successes are a shining light of inspiration and
accomplishment for our youth and our nation, and I want to ensure that
we enable NASA to continue to fill that role in the coming years.
Chairman Palazzo. Thank you. Thank you, Ms. Brownley. If
there are Members who wish to submit additional opening
statements, your statements will be added to the record at this
point.
Chairman Palazzo. If there are Members who wish to submit
additional--actually, at this time I would like to introduce
our panel of witnesses. Our first witness is the Honorable Paul
Martin, the Inspector General of the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration. Our second witness is Mr. Richard Keegan,
NASA's Associate Deputy Administrator. As our witnesses should
know, spoken testimony is limited to five minutes each, after
which Members of the Committee have five minutes each to ask
questions. Your written testimony will be included in the
record of the hearing.
I now recognize our first witness, Mr. Martin, for five
minutes.
TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE PAUL K. MARTIN,
INSPECTOR GENERAL,
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS
AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Martin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Palazzo,
Congresswoman Brownley, and Members of the Subcommittee, the
Office of Inspector General welcomes this opportunity to
discuss the challenges facing NASA with respect to its aging
infrastructure and antiquated facilities.
Over the past three years, we have issued 10 audits
examining many of NASA's most pressing infrastructure-related
issues. In my remarks this morning, I will focus primarily on
our February audit that assessed NASA's efforts to reduce its
unneeded infrastructure.
As mentioned, NASA is the ninth largest Federal Government
property holder, controlling approximately 4,900 buildings and
structures, more than 80 percent of which are over 40 years old
and beyond their design life. However, NASA has not been able
to properly fund required maintenance for its facilities, and
estimates its deferred maintenance costs at $2.3 billion.
In our February audit, we identified 33 facilities, wind
tunnels, test stands, thermal vacuum chambers, air fields, and
launch infrastructure, that NASA was not fully utilizing or for
which managers could not identify a future mission use. These
facilities cost more than $43 million to maintain in 2011
alone. The need for these facilities has declined as a result
of their poor condition, changes in NASA's mission, and the
advent of alternative testing methods. We found that NASA's
attempts over the years to address its infrastructure problems
have met with limited success. Our audit identified four
reasons why.
First, Fluctuating and Uncertain Requirements. Changes to
national space policy initiated by the President and Congress
have increased the difficulty of determining which facilities
NASA needs. For example, NASA's human exploration mission has
transitioned from the Space Shuttle Program to the
Constellation Program to the Space Launch System in just six
years. Because decisions about whether to retain specific
facilities depends heavily upon the missions that NASA
undertakes, frequent changes to these missions complicate the
Agency's efforts to manage its infrastructure.
A recent example is the A-3 test stand at Stennis, which
was constructed to accommodate special testing requirements for
the J2-X engine. When Constellation was cancelled in 2010, the
test stand was approximately 65 percent complete. Because
neither the Space Launch System nor any other existing or
planned NASA program requires the A-3's capabilities, NASA
plans to mothball the $350 million test stand later this month
once it is completed. Even so, maintenance costs for the
mothballed stand may reach $1.5 million annually.
Second, Agency Culture and Business Practices.
Historically, NASA has practiced a decentralized approach to
managing its infrastructure, leading Centers to compete for
work from the Agency's major programs. A ``keep it in case you
might need it'' culture has led Centers to either build or
preserve facilities that duplicate capabilities elsewhere in
the Agency. For example, NASA currently has 36 wind tunnels at
5 Centers, 35 rocket test stands at 6 sites, and 40 large
thermal vacuum chambers at seven locations.
Third, Political Pressure. The political context in which
NASA operates often impedes its efforts to reduce
infrastructure. During our review, we noted several examples
where political leaders intervened in NASA's plans to close or
consolidate Agency facilities. For example, Members of Congress
opposed NASA's decision to consolidate arc jet operations at
Ames, and in another matter, argued against NASA's efforts to
relinquish control of Hangar One at Moffett Field. While input
from federal, state, and local officials is not unique to NASA,
such pressure creates additional difficulties as the Agency
seeks to manage its aging infrastructure.
Finally, Inadequate Funding. Disposing of facilities that
NASA no longer needs is not without cost, and in many
instances, requires environmental remediation. For example,
under the terms of its current agreement with California, NASA
estimates that the environmental cleanup at the Santa Susana
Field Laboratory will cost more than $200 million.
Consequently, NASA's ability to reduce its infrastructure
depends on funding for cleanup and other costs associated with
demolition and disposal.
NASA officials readily acknowledge that the Agency has more
infrastructure than it needs to carry out current and planned
missions, and to its credit NASA has a series of initiatives
underway that we believe are positive steps toward right sizing
its real property footprint. However, many of these efforts are
in the early stages and their ultimate success remains unclear.
In the end, NASA's best efforts to reduce its excess
facilities may be insufficient to overcome the cultural and
political obstacles that have impeded past efforts.
Accordingly, an outside process similar to the DoD's Base
Realignment and Closure Commission may be needed to help make
the difficult but necessary--infrastructure decisions.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Martin follows:]
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Chairman Palazzo. Thank you, Mr. Martin.
I now recognize our next witness, Mr. Keegan, for five
minutes.
TESTIMONY OF MR. RICHARD KEEGAN,
ASSOCIATE DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR,
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS
AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Keegan. Chairman Palazzo and Members of the
Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before
you today to discuss NASA's continuing efforts to balance and
align the Agency's infrastructure goals with today's evolving
mission requirements.
Every day, NASA scientists and engineers achieve tremendous
advances in the areas of human space flight, Earth Science,
space science, aeronautics research, and space technology,
inspiring people worldwide. These achievements would not be
possible without access to reliable and cost effective physical
infrastructure capabilities located across the country at
NASA's 10 Centers and their associated facilities. NASA takes
seriously its responsibility to be an effective steward of
these capabilities, ensuring they are effective and available
as needed for our current and future missions.
Like other Federal agencies, NASA is challenged with
managing the significant needs of an aging physical
infrastructure portfolio within a budget environment that can
be difficult to predict. NASA's infrastructure was largely
constructed during or before the Apollo era. While our
facilities are generally well-designed and constructed, age and
changing mission requirements have affected the resilience and
usefulness of many of our facilities. Yet in spite of these
challenges, NASA continues to make significant progress on
achieving our overarching facility strategy. For example, each
NASA Center has one or more major facility replacement projects
underway at the planning, design, or construction stage.
NASA is pursuing public and private sector utilization
opportunities for assets that are excess to its needs. An
example is the recent agreement between NASA and Space Florida
for the use of Orbital Processing Facility 3 at Kennedy Space
Center. Another such opportunity is the ongoing competition
regarding Kennedy's Launch Complex 39A. Given that this is an
ongoing competition, it would be inappropriate for me to
comment further on this particular matter today.
Agency-deferred maintenance, an estimate of the essential
but unfunded maintenance work necessary to bring all facilities
up to standards, has decreased by 5.7 percent since 2011. The
utility system replacement projects at our NASA Centers are
underway, reducing the risk of major utility failures that
could impact Agency operations, and the number of real property
assets owned and maintained by NASA continues to decrease,
thereby freeing up infrastructure dollars for other projects.
NASA estimates that it will reduce administrative space by
another 256,000 square feet by the year 2015 via demolition,
transfer, or lease termination.
Today, NASA's infrastructure decisions are guided by an
Agency facility strategy defined in 2009, along with a 20-year
Agency master plan that informs implementation of this
strategy. NASA has also established an Agency level mission
support council to integrate senior management review of
decisions within the mission support portfolio, ensuring that
mission requirements and facility investment are better
aligned. Additionally, we have established a collaborative
partnering arrangement between center and headquarters
officials in order to ensure facility strategic goals are
realistic, based on budget availability.
In July, 2012, NASA stood up a Technical Capability
Assessment Team, or TCAT, under the leadership of the Associate
Administrator that was charged with developing a process for
identifying and assessing each Center's technical capabilities
against the current and future needs of the Agency. The team
was also asked to identify areas for potential capability
divestment or investment, due to changing mission needs and/or
duplication of capabilities. Once complete, the team's analysis
will be used from a facilities perspective to inform future
Agency master planning activities, and to support future
strategic facility investment decisions.
In summary, NASA believes that our strategic infrastructure
approach, aligned with mission requirements and guided by a
well-integrated risk management practice provides the best
framework for achieving the Agency's infrastructure goals in
the most cost effective manner over time. We therefore
appreciate this Subcommittee's continued support for NASA
programs and priorities, and for the funding NASA needs to
maintain, protect, and improve our Nation's valuable Space and
Aeronautics Program infrastructure. I will be pleased to answer
any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Keegan follows:]
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Chairman Palazzo. Thank you, Mr. Keegan. I thank the
witnesses for being available for questioning today. Reminding
Members that Committee rules limit questioning to five minutes,
the Chair will at this point open the round of questions. The
Chair recognizes himself for five minutes.
My question is going to be for Mr. Martin or Mr. Keegan.
Both of you can answer. How does NASA's Enhance Use Leasing
authority differ from the authorities granted to other Federal
agencies? Mr. Keegan, you would like to start?
Mr. Keegan. I am not certain the authorities other agencies
have in the Enhanced Use Leasing area. I know that we use our
Enhanced Use Leasing authority at five Centers currently, and I
think there is more that NASA can do to take advantage of that
authority. But I am not aware of a comparison with other
agencies and the particular authorities they have under
Enhanced Use Leasing. I know we are restricted, for example,
from the nature of in-kind contributions we can accept and
things like that.
Chairman Palazzo. That is a good question. Mr. Martin, do
you--I will come back with the in-kind limitations.
Mr. Martin, do you have--would you like to add anything?
Because I know there have been reports and studies, you know,
talking about NASA's Enhanced Use Leasing authority compared to
other agencies. I am assuming you all read these and can kind
of glean best practices.
Mr. Martin. Yes, I was going to comment on the same thing
Rick mentioned that is the limitation on Enhanced Use Leasing.
The in kind contributions need to be tied to some type of----
Mr. Keegan. Energy.
Mr. Martin. --energy-dependent type thing, and I think as
we talk about what are possible changes that Congress may
consider, it may be removing that limitation.
Chairman Palazzo. Would you like to expand on that to maybe
address possibly commercial space endeavors and others, because
it is limited to just energy--environmental projects at this
time.
Mr. Keegan. I know that NASA requested authority this year
to accept commercial revenue under tightly controlled
circumstances where we share, for example, a launch complex. I
know the Air Force has--or DoD has that authority where they
can accept a commercial vendor's funding to fund a support
contract at that launch facility to provide services to all the
launch vehicles, government and commercial, and giving NASA
that authority would give us--it might provide some leveraging
of resources, but also from a private industry point of view,
create common business practices, whether it is a NASA launch
site or DoD launch site.
Chairman Palazzo. If we expand these authorities, would you
all like to--I mean, how would we go about A) making sure it is
uniform and fair across all the Centers, and B) how are we
going to protect the taxpayer investment and making sure that
we are getting the right return on these agreements and
authorities? Mr. Keegan?
Mr. Keegan. I think, first of all, any degree of oversight,
you know, the Committee would want to exercise would be
important, but NASA would develop internal procedures for the
use of those authorities that would make sure that we make
decisions that are optimum from an agency level that are
equitable across the Centers, and that do protect the taxpayer
interest to get the, you know, the most and maximum benefit out
of the assets that they have funded, you know, at NASA.
Mr. Martin. Mr. Chairman, if I could just add to that?
Chairman Palazzo. Yes, Mr. Martin.
Mr. Martin. The broader issue on leasing is that leasing is
a valuable mechanism that NASA can use to help pick up some of
its operations and maintenance costs. We did a review looking
at NASA's leasing practices, and our bottom line conclusion
there--quite frankly, there were several. One is that NASA--
before you can enter into an Enhanced Use Lease or a
traditional lease, NASA needs to make a decision that it needs
to retain that facility or property for a future mission use.
We found that NASA wasn't making that decision as a threshold
matter. You are not supposed to use leasing of in kind as a
substitute for disposal, demolition, or giving over it to GSA.
So that is a threshold issue. The threshold decision is does
NASA have a future mission use for this facility or property?
And if so, our audit found that NASA was not aggressively
promoting these leasing opportunities at its Centers.
Chairman Palazzo. I mean, that comes back to we really need
a roadmap for where NASA is going to explore next so we can
actually determine what facilities and infrastructure that we
truly need. Would you agree with that, Mr. Keegan?
Mr. Keegan. Yes, I think a definitive roadmap obviously
would allow us to focus our facility investments, sort of have
more certainty about where we are going and the kind of
investments we need to make.
Chairman Palazzo. Mr. Martin?
Mr. Martin. I would agree as well. We pointed out in our
written and oral remarks that changing the focus of these sort
of big ticket, long-term missions, and focused primarily on
human exploration, is costing the taxpayers a significant
amount of money.
Chairman Palazzo. I have a tendency to agree, and I think
that is one of the reasons why the NASA 2013 Authorization Act
does direct NASA to come up with a roadmap so that we can know
where we are going, and then we can all focus on getting there.
So I appreciate your questions. My time is expired. I now
recognize Ms. Brownley for five minutes.
Ms. Brownley. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and my question is
directed to Mr. Martin.
Your office's February 2013 report on NASA's environmental
remediation efforts at the Santa Susana Field Laboratory
appears to question NASA's 2010 agreement with the State of
California to clean up NASA's portion of the site to background
levels. It says, and I quote, ``NASA has agreed to clean its
portion of the Santa Susanna site to a level that exceeds the
generally accepted standard necessary to protect human health
in light of the expected future use of the site.'' In your
report, are you suggesting that NASA not comply with the
agreement, and if so, could you clarify its findings and
recommendations?
Mr. Martin. Sure. Our recommendation is just as you spelled
it out. The Santa Susana Field Laboratory, we believe that NASA
needs to investigate any and all alternatives for reaching a
more, we think, appropriate resolution of the environmental
remediation based on the future use of the site. The agreement
that NASA has entered into, as you indicated, would be to clean
the Santa Susana Field Laboratory, NASA's portion, to a
background level, which will cost taxpayers over $200 million.
Given that the expected future use is for recreational
purposes, cleaning up to that level will cost the taxpayers $25
million. And so we were laying the facts out there that NASA
should do everything in its power to clean--to follow, I think,
what is the normal practice and clean this site for its
expected future use.
Ms. Brownley. Okay. Well, I think the future use I think is
still--I don't think it is defined necessarily to strictly
recreational areas, but I know that there is some interest in
moving in that direction. But the agreement certainly was very
carefully negotiated, certainly by the State of California and
DTSC, and there was a reason I think the State felt and I
certainly concurred that cleaning up to background levels was
the appropriate clean up for it to be safe for potentially
recreational use or other uses. But I appreciate your comment
on that.
I guess I would follow up with Mr. Keegan with regards,
again, to the Santa Susana Field Lab and its clean up. So I
understand, certainly my interpretation and I think the State
of California's interpretation on the AOC is that the agreement
is it will get cleaned up to these background levels. I know
that there was recently a completed EIS report, and the purpose
of that EIS report was to determine the best ways in which this
clean up could occur. I think we are in the process of a public
comment period as we speak, which ends, I think, on October the
1st.
So I was just wondering with the EIS report and that
process that is going on if you could just comment from your
vantage point what is the status of NASA's actions with respect
to the clean up of your portion of that site?
Mr. Keegan. Yes, Congresswoman. All the information you
just related is my understanding as well of where we are. The
draft EIS is open for comment until October 1, and we expect a
final EIS in November, and NASA is committed to fulfilling our
obligations under the AOC. There is sufficient funding in our
FY14 request to accomplish all the activities that are planned
for FY14, leading to fulfilling our commitments under the AOC.
Ms. Brownley. So regardless then of what the IG may be
recommending, your commitment is still to the agreement with
the AOC?
Mr. Keegan. We are committed to the agreement under the
AOC.
Ms. Brownley. Okay, thank you.
Thank you very much, and I will yield back my time.
Chairman Palazzo. Thank you. I know recognize Mr. Brooks
for five minutes.
Mr. Brooks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Which one of you two would be best to share information
about launch pad 39A? Do you both have insight on it?
Mr. Martin. The Inspector General's office has not done any
audits or reviews of the current--certainly the current RFP
that is on the street for leasing. We have looked more broadly
at launch infrastructure, but we have not looked specifically
at pad 39A or 39B.
Mr. Brooks. Mr. Keegan?
Mr. Keegan. I can talk in general terms about pad 39A as an
asset, but not about the ongoing competition, because it is a
matter that is under competition and we want to preserve the
integrity of that competition.
Mr. Brooks. Are you familiar with the accumulated taxpayer
costs for the construction and maintenance of launch pad 39A?
Mr. Keegan. The current replacement value if we were to
build a new one just like that is over half a billion dollars.
It is $535 million.
Mr. Brooks. Five hundred thirty-five million dollars. Are
you familiar with the annual maintenance costs for launch pad
39A?
Mr. Keegan. When it was in operations, it was about $12
million a year. Now in the mothball status when we are doing
only a minimal amount of maintenance, it is $1.2 million.
Mr. Brooks. Well, I do want to address as best as possible
the announcement for proposals or request for proposals
concerning 39A. It has come to my attention that it is possible
that under the current proposal situation that 39A could be
taken over by one private company. Is that an accurate
perception that I have?
Mr. Keegan. The AFP, which is a public document, is open to
proposals for either single user use or multi-user use of pad
39A. We don't express a preference for the operational concept.
Mr. Brooks. Are you familiar with SpaceX's proposal?
Mr. Keegan. I probably should not comment on that.
Mr. Brooks. Are you familiar with it? That is my first
question, not whether you should comment on it.
Mr. Keegan. Yes.
Mr. Brooks. And is it public?
Mr. Keegan. No.
Mr. Brooks. The information I have from the Committee staff
and also from letters by my colleagues in the House and then
also individuals in the Senate to NASA, they express concern
that the way things are going, NASA may turn over launch pad
39A to a single user, SpaceX, which would be to thee exclusion
of other commercial space providers and also potentially to the
exclusion of launch pad 39A being a backup for the Space Launch
System. Is there any merit to those concerns expressed by my
colleagues in the House and their letters to NASA, and then
also by Members of the United States Senate?
Mr. Keegan. I would--as I said earlier, the AFP that NASA
issued indicated that we were open to either a single user
concept or a multi-user concept. With respect to SLS, I think
our analysis indicated that pad 39B is more than sufficient
under any reasonable scenario to fully subscribe--to fully meet
the requirements of SLS. As a matter of fact, it won't fully
subscribe 39B. 39B has the potential to do a lot more, and so
to achieve that maximum potential, we are looking to make 39B a
multi-user launch pad.
Mr. Brooks. Well, I have serious concerns and reservations
with NASA's potential plans to lease Kennedy Space Flight
Center's launch complex 39A exclusively to one company. If you
would, please explain to me and the panel what benefit it is to
taxpayers for one commercial provider to have sole use of pad
39A, regardless of which commercial provider that may be.
Mr. Keegan. I am not sure how much I should say about this.
I would just say that the AFP provides the criteria under which
NASA will make a selection in best interest of the public to
get the maximum benefit for the public out of that asset that
taxpayers have invested in.
Mr. Brooks. Well that being the case, as much as I can, I
would encourage NASA to make launch pad 39A a multi-user
facility. I have reservations about the potential adverse
impact on our space program of one of our primary launch pads
being taken over by one user, which in my judgment, would tend
to both stifle competition, which I think is a good thing, on
the one hand, and on the other hand, reduce the ability of 39A
to be used as a backup, should it be necessary for either other
private users or by NASA itself.
I see my time has expired, but I hope that you will take my
concerns and the concerns of other Members of Congress and of
the United States Senate into account as NASA wrestles with
this matter. Thank you.
Chairman Palazzo. I now recognize Mr. Kilmer.
Mr. Kilmer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to follow up on
the previous gentleman's line of questioning.
A handful of questions. If launch complex 39A is run as a
multi-use facility, I understand the commercial companies
involved want to make it multi-user. Has NASA completed fully
converting launch complex 39B into a multi-user facility, and
if not, what is the remaining cost of doing so? And if so, can
we assume that no more taxpayer funds are needed to modify 39B
for multiple users?
Mr. Keegan. The work to convert pad 39B is not fully
complete, but I don't have the cost figures. We are in that
scheduled process. If you like, I could provide that for the
record.
Mr. Kilmer. Thank you. In addition, can you talk about how
those costs compare to the $1.2 million of maintenance costs
that you just spoke about related to pad 39A?
Mr. Keegan. The cost for conversion of 39B or ultimately
for the cost of maintenance?
Mr. Kilmer. Both.
Mr. Keegan. I don't have the specifics on that, but again,
I can provide that for the record. I am certain that an active
launch pad would cost more to operate and maintain than the
$1.2 million to maintain a mothball launch pad.
Mr. Kilmer. Okay. Thank you. The rest of my questions were
covered. Thank you.
Chairman Palazzo. The gentleman yields back. I now
recognize Mr. Stockman for five minutes.
Mr. Stockman. Thank you. I remember when the Columbia had
its unfortunate accident, and the one thing that they mentioned
in the after report was the inability for NASA to focus on
safety, and the culture--as you recall, the culture of safety
was not there. And yet, I have this report in front of me, an
internal review, which talks about safety. Some of the concerns
I have are in regards to arc jet. Mr. Martin, are you familiar
with the closing of arc jet?
Mr. Martin. I am familiar with the consolidation of the arc
jet.
Mr. Stockman. Are you familiar also with the report that I
hold in my hand? It is called ``The Inability to Certify TPS
Performance.'' It was issued March 8, 2012.
Mr. Martin. I have not personally read it.
Mr. Stockman. Okay. Mr. Chairman, I ask that this report be
submitted for the record, and that one of the things----
Chairman Palazzo. Without objection.
[The information appears in Appendix II]
Mr. Stockman. One of the things it states, actually, your
report is that this closing of arc jet could raise--and this is
all quote from your own report--from NASA's own report. ``We
believe the loss will impact our ability to certify TPS or in
tests next year.'' And I am wondering if you could take an
opportunity to look at this. I mean, you and I or both of you
could look at this and understand, I think, the mistake that is
going forward on consolidating the arc jets, because quite
frankly, it is going to impact safety. That is not me, that
is--also, we have two letters from other individuals which I
would like to also submit for the record----
Chairman Palazzo. Without objection.
[The information appears in Appendix II]
Mr. Stockman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am wondering, if
you haven't heard of this, why not and would you consider
looking at this if we turned it over to you?
Mr. Martin. If I could, as a point of clarification, I am
with the Inspector General's office. That is not our report.
That is probably Mr. Keegan's report or big NASA's report or an
advisory group. So I am not familiar with it because the Office
of Inspector General has not issued that report. I would be
happy to read any piece of paper that anyone puts in front of
me----
Mr. Stockman. Okay.
Mr. Martin. --to inform our independent review of NASA.
Mr. Stockman. But I am just saying is the person that is--
and we all remember the tragedy, and I just think that wisdom
dictates that we take a look at what they are recommending and
what is going on. And what is going on now is that we are
transferring arc jet, and in the meantime, diminishing NASA's
ability to create a culture of safety. I would think that you
would be interested as Inspector General--that this would be
something that would be critical to your office.
Mr. Martin. The culture of safety is critical to my office.
Absolutely. Consolidating NASA's infrastructure is also
critical.
Mr. Stockman. But you wouldn't want to do it at the expense
of safety, would you?
Mr. Martin. Not if there is a tradeoff. Safety would come
first.
Mr. Stockman. Okay. Well, I want to point to you that this
is what is happening. In order to cut literally $5 million out
of a very large budget, it is questioning the rationale behind
that and I am just really concerned that we are going to repeat
our mistakes.
I guess, Mr. Keegan, you have something to say or do you
want to comment on it? Are you more familiar with it?
Mr. Keegan. I am not familiar with any official NASA report
that comes to that conclusion. I know our chief engineer and a
whole team of engineers across the Agency looked at this
closely and determined that we could safely make this
transition. So----
Mr. Stockman. Well, that is not what your own report says,
or the experts. I am just letting you know. I will give it to
you. I will give you the letters, I will give you your own
report which I highly recommend you read. I think that if this
comes out down the road that we have problems then it is going
to be looked back that we didn't do our jobs, that we on the
Committee turned a blind eye to NASA documents and said we are
going to go forward with a policy that is going to be
detrimental to safety. And I just have to tell you, for me,
that raises real concerns and I am glad you are open to reading
this. I will forward you the documents and I hope you take into
consideration.
My time is also run out, but if you guys could come by my
office sometime and you want to speak with me, I would be happy
to do so, but this is a fear that we are going to repeat the
same mistakes we did before by making safety secondary to $5
million. It just doesn't make sense.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time. Thank
you.
Chairman Palazzo. The gentleman yields back. I now
recognize Mr. Bera.
Mr. Bera. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will just register
support for the comments that Mr. Brooks and Mr. Kilmer made
with regard to some concern about the launch complex 39A
decision-making process, and I would register that I actually
think it would be in our interest to have that as a multi-user
facility.
My line of questioning is actually going to be a little bit
different. Based off of Mr. Martin's opening testimony and
based off of my vast congressional experience of 9 months on
this committee, it seems as though we have gone through several
missions just in that nine months. You know, when I first got
here, it seemed like the mission was we were going to look for
manned space travel to Mars, and we talked about asteroid
retrieval. Then there was a shift to a mission to the Moon. I
think you were very clear in your testimony that the first step
we have to do is actually come up with a strategic plan, that
we actually have to have a mission and a roadmap, and I think
this committee has made that recommendation. Because if you
don't have that long-term plan, if you don't have that roadmap,
how are we going to make the decisions on what facilities to
keep, what facilities not to keep, what to decommission, what
the best process is? I would love to hear your thoughts on
that, either one of you. But again, I think that is the
critical issue here, how you get NASA, the Administration, and
Congress on the same page to come up with a single mission in a
single timeframe, and then we can make decisions. You know, if
we want to go to Mars, is the best step to go to the Moon? Is
the best step to do asteroid retrieval? So we need that clarity
of mission, would you guys agree?
Mr. Keegan. Yes, Congressman, I would certainly agree that
the more definitive your technical roadmap for your mission
requirements, the more you can tailor and optimize the limited
resources you have to invest, especially in these large cost
items that Mr. Martin mentioned. So that would help.
I would say also that NASA agrees that we can also do
better just in the situation we are in as pointed out in the
Inspector General's report to do a better job within our
existing authorities and our existing situation to dispose of
our excess infrastructure as well.
Mr. Bera. Mr. Martin, would you agree with that?
Mr. Martin. Well, as the Office of Inspector General, we
are not permitted to have any original thoughts or opinions. We
are not management, we just come behind management after they
have made a decision and criticize that decision.
Mr. Bera. So let me change the question. Would you agree
lack of mission clarity makes it much harder to make some of
these decisions on what assets to keep and what assets not to
keep?
Mr. Martin. Absolutely.
Mr. Bera. Okay.
Mr. Martin. Absolutely, and then if I could, beyond the
human exploration, you know, the scientific mission, which is
obviously a massive component of what NASA does, the thermal
vacuum chambers and a lot of the big ticket--the wind tunnels,
the very expensive infrastructure that NASA has, you need to
have a map.
Mr. Bera. Right. So my challenge to this body, my challenge
to the Administration, my challenge to NASA's leadership is
that we need to lock ourselves in a room, we need to agree on a
mission, and we need to agree on a timeframe by which we hope
to accomplish that mission, similar to President Kennedy giving
us a challenge in the 1960s, to get this clarity, because how
can you make decisions, how can you look at assets without
knowing where we want to head? So that is not a question, that
is just a rhetorical comment.
The other thing, Mr. Martin, in your testimony was the
decision-making process. NASA as a large organization has to
make central decisions. Each facility can't make their own
decision--because they are based on the interest of that
particular facility. Again, we are in times of tight budgets
and we have to have a better decision-making process. So again,
that is not a question, it is just a comment. The decision-
making process is going to get more complicated as well
because, you know, we are seeing this shift from a largely
public government agency to one that is becoming a public-
private partnership, and that adds just another dimension of
complexity. So again, not a question but just an observation.
I will make one final comment. Again, I hope this body,
this committee, the Administration, and NASA's leadership can
come to an agreement on what our mission is, what our timeframe
is, and then just agree and let's start moving forward and
let's go forth and accomplish that mission.
Mr. Chairman, I will yield back.
Chairman Palazzo. The gentleman yields back. I now
recognize Mr. Hall for five minutes.
Mr. Hall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased to be here,
and I am pleased at a guy named Olin ``Tiger'' Teague, whose
portrait is right over here, he is watching and I hope he is
listening to all of this, because I am a very pro-NASA guy,
always have been since I have been here. I asked, through him,
to get on the NASA Committee and Energy and Commerce, and
received both of them back in 1981. I have been with this
Committee ever since. I have seen some things I have disagreed
with, but I think they always try to be fair, and I guess that
is what we are asking for here.
I presume that NASA has a statutory mission obligating it
to ``seek and encourage to the maximum extent possible the
fullest commercial use of space.'' That is a very good
statement. You can comment on that, can't you, sir?
Mr. Keegan. Yes, that is a very good statement.
Mr. Hall. You subscribe to that, don't you, when you
comment----
Mr. Keegan. I subscribe to that.
Mr. Hall. And with that mission in mind, I have some
questions about the process NASA is using to determine the
disposition of launch complex 39A and 39B at Kennedy Space
Center. These are national assets that cost millions of dollars
as has been testified to here to construct that are historic
sites of numerous space launches. And I don't have a Texas
angle here. Johnson Space Center and Mr. Tiger are not involved
here directly, but these launch pads certainly have an interest
to all Americans in how they are going to be utilized to the
greatest extent possible in the future, and how they will be
maintained in the Florida environment. So it is my
understanding that NASA is considering launch pad 39B for its
own use in the future and is considering awarding the use of
pad 39A for commercial industry use. Do you understand that and
agree to that? You both agree to it? You think that is a good
way to do it?
Mr. Keegan. I would put it somewhat differently. With the
end of the Shuttle Program, NASA and Kennedy in particular
identified assets that we would no longer require to implement
our program, and in January, 2011 put out an announcement of
availability to provide broad information about those assets.
Pad 39A was one of those assets, the Shuttle launch facility
was another one, Orbiter Processing Facility 3 was yet another,
so----
Mr. Hall. Okay, I thank you for that, and I will get to
that.
In regards to launch pad 39A, is NASA doing all it can to,
as I have quoted up here, ``encourage to the maximum extent
possible the fullest commercial use of space.''
Mr. Keegan. Yes, that is a criteria in the AFP and we will
evaluate the proposals according to criteria in the AFP.
Mr. Hall. Some have argued that NASA should operate 39A as
a multi-user facility, given the significant investment by the
taxpayers, roughly $500 million. Please explain the rationale
if 39A were not to be operated as a multi-user facility.
Mr. Keegan. The rationale would be that the proposed use in
that scenario would best meet the criteria that we laid out in
the RPF and provide the best benefit for the Nation of the
investment in that facility.
Mr. Hall. What steps can NASA take to ensure that out-
leases are awarded through an open, competitive, and fair
process? Mr. Martin, will you respond to that?
Mr. Martin. Well, I think they have. They have the RFP, the
request for proposals right now, and you have a decision-making
process at NASA Headquarters which NASA currently is involved
in. Again, as an Office of Inspector General, if there are any
complaints or allegations that the process was somehow
circumvented----
Mr. Hall. I understand your----
Mr. Martin. --we will jump in.
Mr. Hall. --thrust there. Who will make the decision for
39A, personnel at Kennedy Space Center or NASA Headquarters?
Mr. Keegan. That decision will be made at NASA Headquarters
and I will be the source selection.
Mr. Hall. One more question about the closure of Johnson
Space Center, and it is not--we don't--Johnson is not in this
battle. But the NASA authorization of 2010, Sections 1102 and
1103 required NASA to conduct an institutional requirement
study which has driven NASA's action to consolidate, retire,
outsource, and revitalize various facilities. However, the
language in Section 1105 states ``Prior to receipt by the
Congress of the study, recommendations, and implementations
strategy developed pursuant to Section 1103, none of the funds
authorized under this Act may be used to transfer the
functions, missions, or activities and associates civil service
and contractor positions from any NASA facility without
authorization by the Congress to implement the proposed
strategy.'' To your knowledge, has NASA complied with the law,
Mr. Inspector General?
Mr. Martin. I am actually unfamiliar with that particular
portion. I have not heard that they haven't complied with the
law.
Mr. Hall. Congressional Members have asked multiple times
through letters, and I understand that the delegation from
Florida has stated their position and I respect that. I would
do the same thing if I was on their--operated out of Florida
instead of Texas. I just think that fairness is fairness, and
ask this last question. Is Ames arc jet facility able to
fulfill all of NASA's needs, Mr. NASA?
Mr. Keegan. It will be when we complete the transition.
Mr. Hall. Mr. Chairman, I thank the witnesses and I thank
you. I yield back.
Chairman Palazzo. I now--the Chair now recognizes Ms.
Bonamici for five minutes.
Ms. Bonamici. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you
to the witnesses.
One of the things that we have talked about a lot in this
subcommittee is the importance of and need to maintain United
States leadership in space and aeronautics going forward, so I
wanted to talk a little bit about the National Academy's
assessment of the NASA laboratories.
In that assessment, the panel, after assessing the NASA
laboratories use for basic research, recommended that NASA
increase resources to its aeronautics laboratories and
facilities to attract and retain the best and brightest
researchers, and to at least remain on par with international
aeronautical research organizations in Europe and Asia. So it
is worth noting, too, that the panel found that the equipment
and facilities at NASA's basic laboratories are inferior to
those at comparable Department of Energy laboratories, top tier
U.S. universities, and corporate research laboratories. You
know, it goes without saying that without the modern and
capable facilities, it is hard to remain competitive with the
rest of the world.
So Mr. Keegan, in your prepared statement, the following
reference to the National Research Council about the NASA
laboratories, you state that ``NASA is evaluating the
replacement of several laboratories that will support the
Agency's future research needs.'' So can you please talk a
little bit about that effort and how you are weighing the
importance of remaining competitive in the research field? How
are you bringing in stakeholders on that task and how are you
making research a priority?
Mr. Keegan. I would say that NASA is very concerned about
the issue of having state-of-the-art research facilities and
being able to attract the best and the brightest to work at
NASA. In the NRC report, they cited the Exploration Sciences
Building at Goddard as an example of a renewal facility or
repair by replacement facility that included state-of-the-art
laboratory facilities, and we have several similar facilities
in planning or in design right now where we would replace old,
antiquated facilities with a new, energy efficient, smaller
footprint building but at the same time, including state-of-
the-art laboratory facilities.
Ms. Bonamici. And what is the basis of the definition? I
understand it is future research needs. Where is that decision
coming from, and who has input into that?
Mr. Keegan. The broader research community has input to it
through the various standing mechanisms, but the--basically it
is a decision that is made at the strategic level at NASA
Headquarters in terms of where to put our priorities in terms
of the research we should emphasize.
Ms. Bonamici. Well, I want to align myself with Mr. Bera's
comments, too, about the need to have a clear mission, and
again, that is critical to the work that you are doing but all
of NASA as well.
Can you talk a little bit about the--what is apparently a
$2 billion deferred maintenance backlog. Is that getting worse,
better, or staying about the same and what do you need to
significantly reduce that deferred maintenance backlog?
Mr. Keegan. The deferred maintenance backlog is a measure
of all the maintenance that it would take to bring all of our
facilities up to current standards. It has accumulated and
grown over the years, historically because NASA has not been
able to carve out sufficient funding to maintain facilities up
to standard from limited resources. Since 2011, it has come
down and the way we were able to make progress against that was
through the use of demolition--if you demolish a facility with
a lot of accumulated deferred maintenance that comes off the
books--and by our repair by replacement approach, where we
replace old, antiquated facilities with newer, more efficient,
flexible facilities, and again, we get rid of that accumulated
backlog of deferred maintenance. So we have had a little
success in the last couple years through using those
strategies.
Ms. Bonamici. Thank you, and can you follow up a little bit
on the similar capabilities, smaller footprint strategy, and
talk about why NASA settled on this strategy versus other
options, and how is it going? And I want to ask Mr. Martin,
too, based on your work, to what extent is NASA positioned to
make progress on carrying out the similar capabilities, smaller
footprints, and what might be the barriers?
Mr. Keegan. We chose that because we thought we didn't want
to reduce the capability that NASA had, but we thought it had
to exist in a smaller footprint because the resources weren't
available to maintain sort of the capability suite that we
have.
Mr. Martin. I think the jury is still out about how
successful. We are seeing some of the dynamics during this
hearing here, some of the cultural and historic influences
within NASA about shedding itself from a Center and program-
specific area. We are seeing some of the, as GAO calls it,
stakeholder influences, the political influences that
individual Members of Congress don't want to diminish the
capabilities of NASA Centers within their jurisdictions. It is
very complex and dynamic. I think it is too early to tell
specifically though how this is going to play out.
Ms. Bonamici. Thank you, and my time is expired. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Palazzo. Mr.--the Chair now recognizes Mr. Posey
for five minutes.
Mr. Posey. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am sure we
have all been witness to the fact it often seems that everyone
in the rooms knows how to make a baby stop crying, except the
person who is holding it. In the interest or balance, I would
like to enter into the record and briefly quote a couple of the
letters referred to a few minutes ago by the gentleman from
Texas, Mr. Hall.
Chairman Palazzo. Mr. Posey, I am going to reserve the
right to object to the inclusion of this material into the
record until my staff and I have the time and opportunity to
review it.
Mr. Posey. Mr. Chairman, with all due respect I will yield
to that. I haven't ever heard of that rule before.
Chairman Palazzo. Neither have I, until the last minute so
why don't we do this? Since I have already done it twice, we
will do it a third time. Without objection.
[The information appears in Appendix II]
Mr. Posey. Thank you. I would just like to read a couple of
lines of it. We won't enter it into the record until you have
had a chance to prove it.
But it says ``We write to voice our continued support of
NASA's ongoing effort to quickly and efficiently lease their
costly, excessive space launch infrastructure and other assets
for commercial use consistent with--'' and it gives all the
Federal regulations. ``Two decades ago, the United States was a
world leader in commercial launches. Today, that has virtually
disappeared. However, there are American launch companies that
are committed to changing that.'' And we basically talk in this
letter, then, about the rest of the world, China, Russia, et
al, are launching commercial satellites left and right while
our best launch pads sit there and rot. We commend NASA for
moving forward, essentially, and I think you will be pleased to
include the letter when you have the opportunity to read it, or
your staff does.
You know, Kennedy Space Center and NASA is asking for
proposals for both single and multi-user pad use. People here
are trying to weigh in, actually, before that process is
completed. Our position is we need to complete the process. We
are not taking sides on the formal configuration of the launch
pad, whether single or multi-use, although they are looking at
both. We just want our space program to move forward. We want
to alleviate the Monday morning quarterbacking and second
guessing. We have Inspector Generals that do that for us. You
know, we have used charts and we have seen charts in this
Committee that are a matter of record that show over two dozen
of our space programs--we call them missions to nowhere--over
the last two decades, and billions and billions and billions of
dollars wasted because we have the parochial interest of
different members trying to micromanage what NASA does. It is
like a city councilman trying to tell police chief who to
arrest and who not to arrest. I think that is a big problem and
that is the essence for this letter.
A question I have for the Inspectors--and I have several. I
hope we have time for a second round today. Earlier this
summer, the Kennedy Space Center selected Space Florida to
operate their former Shuttle landing facility. It is well-known
that the Federal Government can prove difficult for private
industry to partner with, obviously, because the government has
many bureaucratic policies and procedures. Can you tell me what
steps NASA is taking to ensure Space Florida's success in
attracting commercial business to the KSC former Shuttle
landing facility?
Mr. Keegan. My knowledge of that process is that we are
anticipating negotiations with Space Florida beginning soon and
anticipate a lease award in December. I am unaware of any
issues in that regard.
Mr. Posey. Okay, thank you.
NASA has determined that much of its former Shuttle
infrastructure at Kennedy Space Center, including 39A, is no
longer needed by the space agency. If NASA is unable to attract
private companies to utilize these facilities, what will happen
to them, just for the record?
Mr. Keegan. They will be excessed and demolished or
abandoned.
Mr. Posey. At a loss of a significant investment.
Mr. Keegan. That capability will no longer be there.
Mr. Posey. Thank you. Do you believe that NASA has the
legal authority it needs to expeditiously deal with their
excess or underutilized property?
Mr. Keegan. I think yes, we have the authority to
effectively deal with that, yes.
Mr. Posey. Okay, my time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I
yield back.
Chairman Palazzo. Mr. Posey, are you done? Okay. I just
want to remind you also that your letter has been entered into
the record without objection. I do just want to remind all the
Members it is normal practice to allow staff to review your
letters for the record or reports for the record, so if we
could, we will try to do that in the future.
Mr. Posey. One question, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Palazzo. Yes.
Mr. Posey. There were two letters. There was a bipartisan
letter signed by every Democrat and every Republican member of
the delegation in the House, and there was one signed
bipartisan, both our Democratic and our Republican Senator
signed a similar letter. Are both of those bipartisan unanimous
letters admitted for the record?
Chairman Palazzo. They will be without objection.
Mr. Posey. Thank you, and I apologize if you had not had
the chance to see these letters before. I thought we had
supplied you copies of them. Mr. Hall had copies of them and
some of the other Members did, and I do apologize if you did
not get them.
Chairman Palazzo. Thank you. The Chair now recognizes Mr.
Veasey. Okay, he is good. The gentleman yields back. The Chair
now recognizes Mr. Rohrabacher.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much. I wasn't expecting
that.
Just one note, I have been here 25 years and people ask me,
what is the thing that you are the proudest of that you have
accomplished in Congress? Now with Ralph, he has been here a
lot longer and had a lot more accomplishments than I have, so
it doesn't take me a long time to figure out what it is that I
am the most proud of. And one of the things I am most proud is
that I am the author of this Commercial Space Act of 2004. I
think that bill, that piece of legislation has done more to
change America for the better than anything that I have done in
25 years. Now my Democratic colleagues wouldn't be surprised
that that is the only thing that I am lauding right now, but
the fact is is that we all worked together and this is the
great thing about this Committee is that we do work together as
Democrats and Republicans and try to get things done because we
believe in space, but we also believe in science and technology
as an energy source for our country to improve its condition
and the condition of our people.
If America is to remain the leading Nation or at least a
leading Nation in space, we must ensure that the energy and the
creativity of the American commercial space industry is brought
into the play in a big way. To the degree that we have not laid
the foundation so that the creative genius and investment by
people in the private sector can take place, well, we will be
limiting America's role and America's leadership in space. So
that is one of the things that we are talking about,
facilities. It is really important that we use our facilities
in a way that is maximized, that are going to maximize bringing
in private sector involvement and investment, especially if we
are talking about assets that are now not being used and are
not likely to be used by NASA. We have some--let me just note,
I know that there is a controversy about this space pad 39A,
and I will just say this. We need--right now, we need to make
sure that whatever decision is made, it is going to make sure
that that asset is put to use for--as soon as possible for as
long as possible in producing a service or producing an
activity that will benefit our people. We have got people in
the private sector who want to use that. If it is determined
that one decision will mean that that pad is not being used,
well, we shouldn't make that decision. There is a decision that
says well, it is going to be used right away and it is going to
be put to use as soon as possible, well that is a decision that
we should be doing. We shouldn't be--and that is just my
advice. That was the spirit behind that bill, the Commercial
Space Act. Let's get as many people involved and invested in
space and space activities as we can and as soon as we can. So
that is my bit of advice on how to solve that problem. I am not
being specific because I don't have the wisdom to go through
all of the, you know, paperwork to make that determination. But
I would say it should be based on that concept and also it
should be based not on the philosophy, but on what practically
will have that impact.
I think I am going to leave it at that. I would yield my
friend, Mr. Stockman, 60 seconds.
Mr. Stockman. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, as a follow up to my
questions to Mr. Richard Keegan on the safety concerns of the
internal NASA report, I cited I would ask that part of my
questions for the record for the NASA Chief of Safety and
Missions Assurance address the concerns and response to the
Committee. I understand that safety is not necessarily Mr.
Keegan's job, but is in NASA's witness before us today, so I
ask that that follow up occur, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Keegan. And I would say that our Administrator has told
us safety is every one of our jobs, so----
Mr. Stockman. So you can go on the record that you will
show this to the head of the safety?
Mr. Keegan. Yes.
Mr. Stockman. Okay, thank you.
Mr. Rohrabacher. And my time is up. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Palazzo. Well thank you. At this time, we will--we
do have a little time before votes are going to be called. They
estimate it is going to be at 10:50. There are--I believe some
members have said they would like to ask a few more questions,
so if you don't mind, we will go into a second round.
At this time, we will go into a second round of questions.
Just real quick, Mr. Keegan. How does NASA decide if a facility
is underutilized? In some of the follow up aspects of your
answer, include the standard criteria that would be used. What
is the process for making such a determination, and of course,
what type of oversight provisions exist to ensure that this
process is not manipulated or taken advantage of?
Mr. Keegan. It is, first of all, an open agency discussion
with all of the relevant stakeholders taking place. But
utilization is measured based on a facility's capacity versus
the actual activity that takes place in that facility during a
period of time. So if a test stand is available but is only
used, you know, 50 percent of the time that it is available for
testing, you would just say that is underutilized. That doesn't
necessarily mean that it is excess. If that facility has a
unique capability that is critical to NASA, we need to keep it
and we would strive to increase the level of utilization to
spread to fix costs, but it doesn't mean we can somehow excess
it. So I think in general, that is responsive to your question.
Chairman Palazzo. Mr. Martin, do you have anything to add?
Mr. Martin. Not too much to add, no, not to that. The
criteria that the Agency uses to identify what is excess--I
mean, there are test stands, as Mr. Keegan indicated, that may
be used once a year, just given the current human exploration
or rocket development program, and that is underutilized, but
if you only need to use it once a year, you have to have that
capacity when you need it.
Chairman Palazzo. Good response. How about from an
oversight controls standpoint?
Mr. Martin. Well I mean, what we have is--and we discussed
it in our testimony--is you have redundancies, I think
unnecessary redundancies among many of the Centers, because
historically they have competed for work. I mean, there used to
be a philosophy just a handful of years ago about sustaining
ten healthy Centers, that is, partitioning the work at that
time in the Constellation Program among all the Centers to keep
them busy. Well, Constellation is no more and clearly from an
infrastructure perspective NASA does not have, unfortunately,
ten healthy Centers. I am not sure from an infrastructure
standpoint NASA has a single healthy Center.
Chairman Palazzo. Well, I appreciate that comment but I
think it comes back to the stark reality is that we need a
roadmap to exploration so these Centers can actually judge
their infrastructure, judge their facilities and so going
forward, they can actually know are they going to be utilizing
those assets in the future, because you know, it was mentioned
that people like to hold on to their facilities and hold on to
their assets, because they don't know what is going to be there
tomorrow because of the massive amount of uncertainty. And I
think this Committee will agree with that because it has been
mentioned several times.
So at this time, I will recognize Ms. Brownley.
Ms. Brownley. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I wanted to--Mr. Keegan, wanted to follow up with Ms.
Bonamici's line of questioning around the deferred maintenance
backlog and clearly, that is a backlog that this significant is
going to impede construction and maintenance and operations
budgets. So I wanted to follow up with the question that if
budgets remain at the current level, how much progress do you
think in the next five to ten years could NASA expect to make
on its goal that was stated in the Agency Master Plan of having
62 percent of NASA's assets be under 40 years old by 2055?
Mr. Keegan. Clearly our ability to make progress against
that strategic goal is limited by the resources that are
available to accomplish it, so we would still be shooting at
the same goal but it would take us that much longer to get
there.
Ms. Brownley. So I mean, if you had to kind of reconcile
things based on the current level of budgeting, you couldn't
predict what it might look like five to ten years out?
Mr. Keegan. Not certainly in the moment, and it would be
very difficult anyway because we would have to, I think, go
back and revisit the assumptions then about the amount of
infrastructure we would have and can we do anything to affect
that, and so forth.
Ms. Brownley. Okay. And then following up on that, if
current trends continue, I fear that NASA will reach a point of
mediocrity and due to the condition, age, and capabilities of
the facilities. In your opinion, how far away from that point
do you think we are?
Mr. Keegan. In my opinion, I believe and I hope that we are
a long way away and we have a dedicated group of employees and
leaders trying to figure out innovative ways to address sort of
these difficult issues and complex issues that would allow us
to make better progress even in a resource-constrained
environment.
Ms. Brownley. Well, thank you. I mean, I think I certainly
believe and I know the Ranking Member also believes the
importance of investing in NASA and enabling the Agency to
carry out a 21st century space program. And on the other hand,
I think that given where the budget is and so forth, it may be
worthwhile for us to be looking or at least to know what a plan
B might look like with budgets as they are and what it might
look like so that we can, I think, better evaluate a future
direction.
Mr. Keegan. Thank you.
Chairman Palazzo. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Posey.
Mr. Posey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
In your written testimony, you said that the Agency will
continue to conduct and operate only those assets required to
conduct its program, maintain core capabilities, and meet
national responsibilities. And yet, NASA's own IG report
earlier this year noted that the Agency has historically
maintained unused facilities for a decade or more, and that it
is an institutional problem. How do you see this culture being
changed and NASA said their 10 research Centers will manage
their infrastructure in a coordinated fashion?
Mr. Keegan. As the Inspector General also pointed out, it
is a complex problem to address, and sometimes there are
differences of opinion about whether a capability may be needed
at some time in the future or not. As an example, some of the
facilities mentioned in the Inspector General's report, some
have been demolished, some have been abandoned or mothballed,
but others are currently active again because requirements have
emerged to use the capabilities in those facilities. And so
there is some difficulty, and a lot of this is based on
judgment and prediction of what might be required. I would say
that with the--we created the Mission Support Council at the
Agency level in order to provide some kind of Agency-wide
strategy and optimization of these types of decisions. It is
not just managed at the local level. And we have active
teamwork with all the Center directors and relevant Agency
managers to make sure we make decisions in the best interest of
the Agency. But it is a problem that we have to wrestle with
and make better progress against.
Mr. Posey. Thank you. Buried deep in the appendices of the
IG's report was a reference to a recent change we made which
allowed DoD to work with contractors on property that they
don't have a use for and which would be to the mutual benefit
of the taxpayer. I was delighted to see that there and I would
just like to encourage you to share with our staff the benefits
of allowing NASA to do that. I think it would be much more
effective and I think our taxpayers would be much better
served, and it would probably make a whole lot of people a lot
more comfortable, reduce a lot of bureaucracy, and every
American would benefit.
What is--same question for each of you--the single best
action that you believe that Congress could take to improve our
space program?
Mr. Keegan. I think I would defer that to my Administrator.
Mr. Martin. I think my answer would be to come together on
the broad overall mission for NASA, not just human exploration,
but science, aeronautics, if it is even possible to come
together, and then to fully fund that mission. Because for far
too long, NASA has been asked to do too many things with not
enough funds, and then we have hearings--important hearings
like this, but discussions like this. So identify the missions,
plural, fully fund those missions over the long term, and I
think that is the best thing that could happen.
Mr. Posey. Well, I think that is the heartfelt wish of
everybody on this Committee on both sides of the aisle. The
only time it ever gets a little bit difficult, I think, is when
we try and all agree on what exactly those missions are and we
try and convince the other 430 Members that aren't in here of
the necessity of fully funding it. The residual benefits that
every American receives from our space program--but I
appreciate your comments and if you get more developed through
the flow chart, and I would appreciate you sharing those with
us as well.
Thank you very much. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Palazzo. The gentleman yields back.
I want to thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony
and the Members for their questions. The Members of the
Committee may have additional questions for you, and we will
ask you to respond to those in writing. The record will remain
open for two weeks for additional comments and written
questions from Members. The witnesses are excused, and this
hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 10:55 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
Appendix I
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Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by The Honorable Paul K. Martin
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Appendix II
----------
Additional Material for the Record
Submitted statement of Donna F. Edwards, Ranking Member, Subcommittee
on Space, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding today's hearing to review
NASA's infrastructure and facilities, and I would like to welcome our
witnesses.
Before I start, allow me to congratulate NASA, the Ames Research
Center, the Wallops Launch Facility, agency employees, contractors, the
Mid-Atlantic Regional Spaceport, and Orbital Sciences in particular,
for two outstanding space launches in the past two weeks. I am hopeful
that LADEE will give us further insight into the Moon's environment and
that Orbital's docking of its Cygnus spacecraft to the International
Space Station signals the start of routine cargo resupply to that
orbital laboratory.
NASA, like other government agencies, built a range of facilities
during its early years to meet national objectives. In NASA's case,
those objectives included sending probes to investigate the Earth-space
environment and study near and distant planets, advancing aeronautics,
and sending humans to the surface of the Moon and returning them home
safely. The Space Shuttle, during its thirty years of operations,
required its own considerable infrastructure.
These facilities, and many others at NASA, have enabled the United
States to achieve the remarkable discoveries and advances over the last
50 years that have inspired generations of Americans.
The problem, as we know, is that the assets that enabled the past,
are now, to an extent, a burden on the future. Nearly 80 percent of
NASA's facilities are more than 40 years old. In addition, NASA is
carrying a deferred maintenance backlog assessed at more than $2
billion.
It is hard to expect NASA to perform as a 21st century space agency
with 20th century facilities. In fact, a 2010 National Academies
report, Capabilities for the Future: An Assessment of NASA Laboratories
for Basic Research, found that:
``Over the past five years or more there has been a steady and
significant decrease in NASA's laboratory capabilities, including
equipment, maintenance, and facility upgrades..The fundamental research
community at NASA has been severely impacted by the budget reductions
that are responsible for this decrease in laboratory capabilities, and
as a result NASA's ability to support even NASA's future goals is in
serious jeopardy.''
And yet, research laboratories are just one facet of the problem.
There are test stands, wind tunnels, arc jets, thermal vacuum chambers,
launch complexes, and Shuttle processing facilities that are
underutilized or that may no longer have a defined NASA need.
NASA Authorization Acts of 2005, 2008, and 2010 have provided
direction to NASA to address its infrastructure challenges, and
multiple reports of the NASA Inspector General, among other advisory
bodies, have highlighted NASA's infrastructure challenges.
To its credit, NASA has, and is, taking positive steps to
facilitate prudent, strategic decisions on maintenance, consolidation,
demolition, and renewal of facilities, including the development of an
Agency Facilities Strategy and an integrated agency-wide Real Property
Master Plan.
But let's face it, NASA's facility and infrastructure challenges
are a bit of a Catch-22. NASA needs clear direction on its future,
especially in human spaceflight and exploration, to help the agency
leverage and optimize its infrastructure decisions and investments.
And the underutilization of assets, along with the poor state of
NASA's research labs, is in part a result of not giving NASA the
resources it needs to implement the missions the nation is asking it to
carry out.
So, we have a choice: ignore the problem and let NASA's facilities
run themselves into the ground to the point at which NASA is limping
into mediocrity.
Or invest in NASA and enable its future as a 21st century space
agency that will continue its remarkable successes while fostering our
national innovation agenda, the passions and dreams of our people, and
new discoveries and advances in science, aeronautics, human spaceflight
and exploration.
I submit that this is not the time to back away from NASA. Rather,
this is the time to provide NASA with the tools it needs to become a
productive 21st century space agency.
That's why I included in my alternative NASA Authorization Act of
2013 bill, H.R. 2616, provisions to both focus NASA on an exploration
goal and to help address NASA's aging facilities.
I know there are a lot of issues to discuss and I look forward to
hearing from our witnesses on today's topic, for which I believe the
hearing title couldn't be more apt--``NASA INFRASTRUCTURE: ENABLING
DISCOVERY AND ENSURING CAPABILITY.''
Thank you, and I yield back.
Submitted statement of Eddie Bernice Johnson, Ranking Member, Committee
on Science, Space, and Technology
Good morning. I would like to join my colleagues in welcoming our
witnesses to today's hearing.
When we think of NASA, we think of astronauts at work on the
International Space Station, the Apollo program and today's Orion and
Space Launch System exploration vehicles. We think of cutting edge
aeronautics research; robotic spacecraft landing on Mars, heading to
the far reaches of the solar system and beyond, and imaging distant
galaxies; as well as of spacecraft circling the Earth to provide us
with unforgettably imagery and critical data needed to better
understand our home planet and its climate. When we think of NASA, we
don't often think of wind tunnels, environmental test chambers,
research labs, and office buildings. However, NASA's impressive
accomplishments would not be possible without NASA's infrastructure and
NASA's dedicated workforce.
That is why today's hearing is so important. We must ensure that
NASA has the facilities and equipment that it needs to remain
preeminent in space exploration, science, and aeronautics in the coming
decades, and this hearing will help provide Members with the
information we will need as we make decisions on NASA's funding and
priorities. In that regard, I hope that today's hearing will be
followed in the future by a hearing to look at what can be done to
ensure that NASA's employees will remain productive and at the
forefront of their fields too, especially at a time when the federal
workforce is facing severe challenges on a number of fronts.
Mr. Chairman, as we debate the fiscal challenges we face as a
nation, it is important that we not let our examination of NASA's
infrastructure turn into simply an accounting exercise, one focused on
cost savings and budgets cuts. By that I don't mean to minimize the
importance of seeking efficiencies and appropriate cost savings in
NASA's infrastructure investments whenever possible. Rather, what I am
saying is that we need to focus first on what we are trying to
accomplish with the nation's investments in NASA-what are the outcomes
we are seeking. Only then, can we intelligently assess what NASA will
need in the way of infrastructure now and in the future. I believe that
the NASA Authorization bill that Rep. Edwards and I introduced earlier
this year provides clear direction and compelling goals for the agency,
and I want to continue to work with colleagues on both sides of the
aisle to come to a bipartisan consensus on NASA this year. However, I
think it should be clear to all of us that NASA will be unable to
achieve those goals if we fail to invest in safe, efficient, and
productive infrastructure for the agency.
Presentation submitted by Stephen Stockman
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Letter submitted by Representative Stephen Stockman
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Letter submitted by Representative Stephen Stockman
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Document submitted by Representative Stephen Stockman
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Letter submitted by Representative Bill Posey
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Letter submitted by Representative Bill Posey
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