[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
DYSFUNCTION IN MANAGEMENT OF WEATHER
AND CLIMATE SATELLITES
=======================================================================
JOINT HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT &
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 19, 2013
__________
Serial No. 113-49
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology
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Available via the World Wide Web: http://science.house.gov
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COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY
HON. LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas, Chair
DANA ROHRABACHER, California EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
RALPH M. HALL, Texas ZOE LOFGREN, California
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois
Wisconsin DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland
FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma FREDERICA S. WILSON, Florida
RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas SUZANNE BONAMICI, Oregon
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas ERIC SWALWELL, California
PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia DAN MAFFEI, New York
STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
MO BROOKS, Alabama JOSEPH KENNEDY III, Massachusetts
RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois SCOTT PETERS, California
LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana DEREK KILMER, Washington
STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas AMI BERA, California
BILL POSEY, Florida ELIZABETH ESTY, Connecticut
CYNTHIA LUMMIS, Wyoming MARC VEASEY, Texas
DAVID SCHWEIKERT, Arizona JULIA BROWNLEY, California
THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky MARK TAKANO, California
KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota ROBIN KELLY, Illinois
JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma
RANDY WEBER, Texas
CHRIS STEWART, Utah
VACANCY
------
Subcommittee on Oversight
HON. PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia, Chair
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., DAN MAFFEI, New York
Wisconsin ERIC SWALWELL, California
BILL POSEY, Florida SCOTT PETERS, California
DAVID SCHWEIKERT, Arizona EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota
LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas
------
Subcommittee on Environment
HON. CHRIS STEWART, Utah, Chair
JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma SUZANNE BONAMICI, Oregon
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., JULIA BROWNLEY, California
Wisconsin DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland
DANA ROHRABACHER, California MARK TAKANO, California
RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
RANDY WEBER, Texas
LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas
C O N T E N T S
September 19, 2013
Page
Witness List..................................................... 2
Hearing Charter.................................................. 3
Opening Statements
Statement by Representative Paul C. Broun, Chairman, Subcommittee
on Oversight, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S.
House of Representatives....................................... 14
Written Statement............................................ 15
Statement by Representative Dan Maffei, Ranking Minority Member,
Subcommittee on Oversight, Committee on Science, Space, and
Technology, U.S. House of Representatives...................... 16
Written Statement............................................ 17
Statement by Representative Chris Stewart, Chairman, Subcommittee
on Environment, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology,
U.S. House of Representatives.................................. 18
Written Statement............................................ 19
Statement by Representative Suzanne Bonamici, Ranking Minority
Member, Subcommittee on Environment, Committee on Science,
Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives........... 20
Written Statement............................................ 21
Witnesses:
Mr. David Powner, Director, Information Technology Management
Issues, U.S. Government Accountability Office
Oral Statement............................................... 23
Written Statement............................................ 26
Ms. Mary Kicza, Assistant Administrator, Satellite and
Information Services, National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration
Oral Statement............................................... 48
Written Statement............................................ 50
Mr. Marcus Watkins, Director, Joint Agency Satellite Division,
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Oral Statement............................................... 61
Written Statement............................................ 63
Discussion....................................................... 67
Appendix I: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Mr. David Powner, Director, Information Technology Management
Issues, U.S. Government Accountability Office.................. 86
Ms. Mary Kicza, Assistant Administrator, Satellite and
Information Services, National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration................................................. 90
Mr. Marcus Watkins, Director, Joint Agency Satellite Division,
National Aeronautics and Space Administration.................. 102
Appendix II: Additional Material for the Record
GAO report to the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology,
House of Representatives, ``Geostationary Weather Satellites:
Progress Made, but Weakness in Scheduling, Contingency
Planning, and Communicating with Users Need to Be Addressed''.. 110
GAO report to the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology,
House of Representatives, ``Polar Weather Satellites: NOAA
Identified Ways to Mitigate Data Gaps, but Contingency Plans
and Schedules Require Further Attention........................ 172
DYSFUNCTION IN MANAGEMENT OF WEATHER AND CLIMATE SATELLITES
----------
TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 19, 2013
House of Representatives,
Joint Hearing with the Subcommittee on
Oversight and Environment
Committee on Science, Space, and Technology,
Washington, D.C.
The Subcommittees met, pursuant to call, at 10:03 a.m., in
Room 2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Paul Broun
[Chairman of the Subcommittee on Oversight] presiding.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Broun. This joint hearing of the Subcommittee on
Oversight and the Subcommittee on Environment will come to
order.
Good morning and welcome to today's joint hearing. In front
of you are packets containing the written testimony,
biographies, and truth-in-testimony disclosures for today's
witnesses. Before we get started, since this is a joint hearing
involving two Subcommittees, I want to explain how we will
operate procedurally so all Members understand how the
question-and-answer period will be handled. We will recognize
those Members present at the gavel in order of seniority on the
full Committee and those coming in after the gavel will be
recognized in their order of arrival.
I now recognize myself for five minutes for an opening
statement.
Today's hearing is titled ``Dysfunction in Management of
Weather and Climate Satellites. Let me begin by extending a
warm welcome to our witnesses and thank you all for appearing
here today.''
The Committee on Science, Space, and Technology has held
about a dozen hearings on weather satellites, under both
Republican as well as Democratic leadership, all since 2003.
Continued oversight is important because these programs are
important. Data from these satellites not only help one decide
whether or not to leave the house with an umbrella, they allow
meteorologists to more accurately predict extreme weather,
military planners to more intelligently deploy troops around
the world, and emergency managers to better respond to
wildfires and other natural disasters.
Unfortunately, the programs have been plagued with
problems. The Department of Commerce Office of Inspector
General, the U.S. Government Accountability Office, and other
independent reviewers have repeatedly assessed that the
programs are at risk of exceeding cost and missing deadlines
due to a myriad of issues. Citing ongoing concerns about
potential data gaps for NOAA's polar-orbiting and geostationary
satellite programs, including a potential polar-orbiting gap of
17 to 53 months, GAO added NOAA's satellite programs to its
High Risk List in a report issued earlier this year.
On that note, I want to take a moment to thank the GAO
staff for their diligent work on this issue over the years. You
have been a valuable resource to this Committee's oversight
efforts, and I want our witness Mr. Powner to know that I
personally, and we as a Committee, appreciate your work and
your presence here today. Thank you, sir.
As I have said before, it is frustrating to watch these
important programs struggle. But it is even more frustrating to
be told by NOAA and NASA that ``all is well'' when we all know
that that is not the case. An IG report, GAO reports, and a
2012 independent report sponsored by NOAA all say otherwise,
with the independent report going so far as to use the word
``dysfunctional'' in its analysis of the weather satellite
programs. Another independent NOAA-commissioned report released
this year described the possibility of the United States'
reliance on China for satellite data as a ``silver bullet.'' I
have grave concerns about incorporating data into U.S. systems
from a country well known for its persistent and malicious
cyber attacks against our Nation.
The latest lifecycle cost estimate for JPSS is $11.3
billion, but it took some crafty accounting to arrive at that
number. Along the way, the program went from six satellites
operating in three separate orbits and carrying 11 unique
sensors under NPOESS, the precursor to JPSS, to now two
satellites, operating in one orbit, carrying only five sensors.
Even with those downgrades, the first JPSS satellite isn't
scheduled to launch until March 2017.
The GOES-R program is further along than JPSS, but it, too,
is facing a potential data coverage gap. It is my understanding
that NOAA expects to retire one of its operational satellites,
GOES-13, and move the backup, GOES-14, into operation in April
2015. That means for at least six months, there will be no
backup satellite, assuming GOES-R is launched in October of
2015. Recently, however, program officials acknowledged that
the launch date will likely slip by one quarter, which could
result in a delay of as much as six months. And the cause for
the delay? A $54 million sequester cut, according to NOAA
staff.
If money is so tight and our weather satellite programs are
so vulnerable, then perhaps the Administration needs to
evaluate its priorities and determine which is more important:
near-term weather monitoring, which can save lives and property
today, or beefing up NOAA's climate portfolio in an effort to
guess what the weather might be decades from now.
I look forward to hearing our witnesses' testimonies and
receiving some candid answers to our questions. Let me also
make this general observation to you all: it is a lot easier
for Congress to work collaboratively with the Administration on
solving our satellite problems if there is transparency about
potential concerns. As such, I will ask you to please answer
our questions later in a concise, straightforward, expeditious,
and accurate manner. It will defeat the purpose of this hearing
if our questions are sidestepped through the use of
bureaucratic doublespeak, as that will only try our patience
and will waste our limited and valuable time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Broun follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Paul C. Broun, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Oversight
I want to extend a warm welcome to our witnesses and thank them for
appearing today.
The Committee on Science, Space, and Technology has held about a
dozen hearings on weather satellites, under both Republican and
Democratic leadership, since 2003. Continued oversight is important
because these programs are important. Data from these satellites not
only help one decide whether or not to leave the house with an
umbrella, they allow meteorologists to more accurately predict extreme
weather, military planners to more intelligently deploy troops around
the world, and emergency managers to better respond to wildfires and
other natural disasters.
Unfortunately, the programs have been plagued with problems. The
Department of Commerce Office of Inspector General, the U.S. Government
Accountability Office and other independent reviewers have repeatedly
assessed that the programs are at risk of exceeding cost and missing
deadlines due to a myriad of issues. Citing ongoing concerns about
potential data gaps for NOAA's polar-orbiting and geostationary
satellite programs, including a potential polar-orbiting gap of 17 to
53 months, GAO added NOAA's satellite programs to its High Risk List in
a report issued earlier this year.
On that note, I want to take a moment to thank the GAO staff for
their diligent work on this issue over the years. You have been a
valuable resource to this Committee's oversight efforts, and I want our
witness Mr. Powner to know that we appreciate your work and your
presence here today.
As I have said before, it is frustrating to watch these important
programs struggle. But it is even more frustrating to be told by NOAA
and NASA that ``all is well'' when we all know that is not the case. An
IG report, GAO reports, and a 2012 independent report sponsored by NOAA
all say otherwise, with the independent report going so far as to use
the word ``dysfunctional'' in its analysis of the weather satellite
programs. Another independent NOAA-commissioned report released this
year described the possibility of the United States' reliance on China
for satellite data as a ``silver bullet.'' I have grave concerns about
incorporating data into U.S. systems from a country well-known for its
persistent and malicious cyber attacks against our nation.
The latest lifecycle cost estimate for JPSS is $11.3 billion, but
it took some crafty accounting to arrive at that number. Along the way,
the program went from six satellites, operating in three separate
orbits and carrying 11 unique sensors under NPOESS, the precursor to
JPSS, to now two satellites, operating in one orbit, carrying only five
sensors. Even with those downgrades, the first JPSS satellite isn't
scheduled to launch until March 2017.
The GOES-R program is further along than JPSS, but it too is facing
a potential data coverage gap. It is my understanding that NOAA expects
to retire one of its operational satellites, GOES-13, and move the
back-up, GOES-14, into operation in April 2015. That means for at least
six months, there will be no backup satellite, assuming GOES-R is
launched in October 2015. Recently, however, program officials
acknowledged that the launch date will likely slip by one quarter,
which could result in a delay of as much as six months. And the cause
for the delay? A $54 million sequester cut, according to NOAA staff.
If money is so tight and our weather satellite programs so
vulnerable, then perhaps the Administration needs to evaluate its
priorities and determine which is more important--near-term weather
monitoring, which can save lives and property today, or beefing up
NASA's climate portfolio in an effort to guess what the weather might
be decades from now.
I look forward to hearing our witnesses' testimonies and receiving
some candid answers to our questions. Let me also make this general
observation to you all: it is a lot easier for Congress to work
collaboratively with the Administration on solving our satellite
problems if there is transparency about potential concerns. As such, I
will ask you to please answer our questions later in a concise,
straightforward, and accurate manner. It will defeat the purpose of
this hearing if our questions are sidestepped through the use of
bureaucratic doublespeak, as that will only try our patience and waste
our limited time.
Chairman Broun. I now recognize the Ranking Member, the
gentleman from New York, my friend Mr. Maffei, for an opening
statement.
Mr. Maffei. I want to thank my friend, the Chairman, and I
want to apologize for being just a couple minutes late today.
We are going to be talking about how it is difficult to protect
the weather. Apparently, it is difficult to predict the traffic
in Washington as well.
But, Mr. Chairman, the weather satellites we have flying
over the poles and in geostationary orbits over the East and
West Coast provide essential data for weather forecasting. And
both the Joint Polar Satellite System and the Geostationary
Operational Environmental Satellite are essential acquisition
programs intended to put replacements on orbit for the current
generation of operating satellites. Unfortunately, both of
these acquisitions have been troubled, and that is why I am
grateful to you for holding this hearing today, as well as
Chairman Stewart.
Of the two, JPSS is far and away in the most trouble. It
will produce a definite gap in coverage due to the technical
and cost challenges which have plagued the program. The
Geostationary program is also worrisome with an ongoing
possibility of a data gap emerging due to schedule slips.
Obviously, none of us are happy about this. However, it has
been suggested in some locations that this might be something
tied to the cost of doing climate science, and I don't believe
this is the case.
When the Obama Administration took office, they inherited a
crippled program already. It lacked planning and management
guidance to move forward. It had experienced cost growth from
6.5 billion to at least 12.5 billion. For almost 100 percent of
the growth, we were getting two satellites instead of six, and
we had jettisoned many sensors. This is what the Administration
inherited and they had to make hard decisions about how to move
the program forward, and that took almost two years to get the
Defense Department out of the program and NOAA and NASA on a
fresh path.
Any observer, I think, would have to conclude that the
restructured JPSS program is better managed and better
structured now than it was in 2008, and that we should be proud
of, but there are still gaps in the management tools needed in
JPSS. Again, compared to where we were between 2005 and 2008,
the bleeding has stopped and the slips seem relatively small.
With that said, we are still facing an inevitable gap in
coverage and what to do about that gap is going to be and
should be explored today.
The Geostationary Satellite program has always been a
little healthier than JPSS. It has suffered from more technical
issues and less relative cost growth and enjoyed more stable
management than the polar program. That said, there is still a
chance of a gap in coverage that would be tragic. NOAA has to
keep the track--keep on track to get our satellites in orbit
and working before the current geostationary satellites go
dark. We need satellites ready for launch to avoid limit or gap
in coverage. We need clear plans for alternative sources of
data to protect accurate forecasting. And we need to make sure
that we are not forced to depend on other countries such as the
People's Republic of China that the Chairman rightfully pointed
out would have unacceptable downsides to that kind of
relationship. We need to be confident that both of these
programs are going to succeed even by the diminished
expectations we now hold for them.
And with that, I yield back to you, Mr. Chairman, and I
thank you again for holding the hearing.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Maffei follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Dan Maffei, Ranking Minority
Member, Subcommittee on Oversight
Mr. Chairman, the weather satellites we fly over the poles and in
geostationary orbits over the East and West coasts provide essential
data for weather forecasting.
Both the Joint Polar Satellite System (JPSS) and the Geostationary
Operational Environmental Satellite (GOES-R) are essential acquisition
programs intended to put replacements on-orbit for the current
generation of operating satellites. Unfortunately, both these
acquisitions have been troubled.
Of the two, JPSS is far and away in the most trouble, and will
produce a definite gap in coverage due to the technical and cost
challenges which have plagued the program. GOES-R is also worrisome,
with an ongoing possibility of a data gap emerging due to schedule
slips.
None of us are happy about this. However, it has been suggested
that somehow the problems in these programs are tied to the costs of
climate science. This is just not the case.
When the Obama Administration took office, they inherited a
crippled program that lacked all the planning and management guidance
necessary to move forward. It had experienced cost growth from $6.5
billion to at least $12.5 billion. For almost 100 percent cost growth
we were getting two satellites instead of six and we had jettisoned
many sensors. The Administration inherited hard decisions about how to
move the program forward and it took almost two years to get DOD out of
the program and NOAA and NASA on a fresh path.
Any objective observer would have to conclude that the restructured
JPSS program is better managed and better structured now than it was in
2008. There are still gaps in the management tools need in JPSS, but
compared to where we were in 2005 through 2008, the bleeding has
stopped and the slips seem relatively small.
That said, we are facing an inevitable gap in coverage. While that
cannot be laid at the feet of this Administration, we can ask of the
Administration whether they have put necessary resources into settling
on a valid gap-filler strategy. Have they identified other sources of
data? Do they have all agreements in place to insure they have unbroken
access to that data? What steps have been taken to validate the effects
of that data on our modeling to insure that we minimize impacts on
forecast accuracy? These are crucial questions that I would like to see
answered today.
As to GOES-R, that program has always been a little healthier than
JPSS. It has suffered from fewer technical issues and less relative
cost growth, and enjoyed more stable management than the polar program.
That said, there is still a chance that a gap in coverage could emerge
and that would be tragic. NOAA has to keep on track to get us
satellites on orbit and working before the current GOES satellites go
dark. The recent slip narrows the margin for error and is a cause for
concern among all of us.
We need satellites ready for launch to avoid or limit coverage
gaps. We need clear plans for alternative sources of data to protect
forecasting accuracy. We need confidence that both these programs are
going to succeed, even by the diminished expectations we now hold for
them.
Chairman Broun. Thank you, Mr. Maffei.
I now recognize the Chairman of the Subcommittee on
Environment, the gentleman from Utah, Mr. Stewart, for his
opening statement.
Mr. Stewart. Thank you, Dr. Broun, for holding this
important hearing. I would like to thank the witnesses for
being with us today. We look forward to hearing from you and
for your expertise and for your service to our country.
I think all of us agree this is an important issue. I think
we all sense the clock is ticking and there is a sense of
urgency of trying to move forward in a way that is, I think,
beneficial.
The Science Committee has a long history of overseeing the
management of NOAA and NASA weather and climate satellite
systems. Unfortunately, these programs have been rife with
delays and other issues for more than a decade now, as has
already been expressed by the two previous opening statements.
Topics at issue today are also very timely in that they relate
to legislation being considered by this Committee, the Weather
Forecasting Improvement Act of 2013, which attempts to focus
critical resources on developing a top-notch weather
forecasting system based on streamlined research-to-operations
and a more reasonable balance of resources toward weather
research.
All of our witnesses acknowledge the strong possibility of
a data gap for one or both of our major weather satellite
systems in a few short years. These satellites provide the
majority of data for numerical weather predictions in this
country, and a gap could be catastrophic for forecasting by the
National Weather Service and our innovative weather enterprise.
A potential gap in the polar-orbiting or geostationary
satellite data, combined with continuing issues with how NOAA
develops, analyzes, procures and integrates other satellite
information, risks the permanent loss of U.S. leadership in
weather forecasting. I believe the writing is on the wall, and
our current trajectory is simply unacceptable.
As the Government Accountability Office will testify, our
geostationary and polar-orbiting programs, known as GOES and
JPSS, have been--again, indicated in previous testimony or
opening statements, they have been plagued with cost overruns,
with technical issues, and other delays. And we need to
consider the right mix of satellite technology to make timely,
accurate, and effective forecasts to protect American lives and
property.
For our polar-orbiting satellites, not only is there a
potential gap in the 2016 to 2018 time frame, but there may
also be issues between the first and second JPSS satellites in
the early 2020s.
While the GOES-R program has made progress in completing
testing for several components, the program has still missed
several key milestones for both flight and ground segments.
This has caused the launch date for the GOES-R to slip from
October 2015 to perhaps March of 2016. There are also other
technical problems on the horizon, including the Geostationary
Lightning Mapper, an instrument that appears to duplicate some
already-existing commercial capabilities.
Robust contingency planning and implementation of these
plans, as suggested by GAO, is essential. We have seen that it
has taken several years for NOAA to validate key products on
the SUOMI-NPP satellite. Just after the Oklahoma tornadoes this
year, a micrometeoroid appears to have hit an existing GOES
satellite, turning off all of its instruments. Murphy's Law
seems to be on full display when it comes to our weather
satellites, and continued blue sky evaluations by NOAA could
prevent us from dealing with these problems before they arise.
It has taken the Administration several years and the
prodding of this Committee as well as GAO to fully acknowledge
the very real risk of a data gap, and we need to look at all
options to mitigate potential breakdowns in our forecasting
ability. While NOAA has paid for reports to examine gap
mitigation options, I have fear that not enough has been done
to pursue implementation of these backup plans.
We need to look at American, as well as potentially
commercial, sources for these critical data. It should be
alarming that we may be in a position to have to rely on
international partners for weather data and to protect lives
and property, an outcome that could raise much greater quality
and access concerns than some of our other potential commercial
partners that have so far been rebuffed by NOAA.
And with that, Mr. Chairman, I now yield back.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Stewart follows:]
Prepared Statement of Subcommittee on Environment Chairman Chris
Stewart
Thank you, Dr. Broun, for holding this important hearing. The
Science Committee has a long history overseeing the management of NOAA
and NASA weather and climate satellite systems. Unfortunately, these
programs have been rife with issues for more than a decade. Topics at
issue today are also very timely as they relate to legislation being
considered by this Committee, ``The Weather Forecasting Improvement Act
of 2013,'' which attempts to focus critical resources on developing a
top notch weather forecasting system based on streamlined research-to-
operations and a more reasonable balance of resources toward weather
research.
All of our witnesses acknowledge the strong possibility of a data
gap for one or both of our major weather satellite systems in a few
short years. These satellites provide the majority of data for
numerical weather prediction in this country, and a gap could be
catastrophic for forecasting by the National Weather Service and our
innovative weather enterprise. A potential gap in polar-orbiting or
geostationary satellite data, combined with continuing issues with how
NOAA develops, analyzes, procures and integrates other satellite and
observational information, risks the permanent loss of U.S. leadership
in weather forecasting. The writing is on the wall, and our current
trajectory is unacceptable.
As the Government Accountability Office will testify, our
geostationary and polar-orbiting programs, known as GOES and JPSS, have
been plagued with cost overruns, technical issues, and delays. We need
to consider the right mix of satellite technology to make timely,
accurate, and effective forecasts to protect American lives and
property.
For our polar orbiting satellites, not only is there a potential
gap in the 2016 to 2018 timeframe, but there may also be issues between
the first and second JPSS satellites in the early 2020s.
While the GOES-R program has made progress in completing testing
for several components, the program has still missed several key
milestones for both flight and ground segments. This has caused the
launch date for GOES-R to slip from October 2015 to March 2016. There
are also other technical problems on the horizon, including with the
Geostationary Lightning Mapper, an instrument that also appears to
duplicate some already-existing commercial capabilities.
Robust contingency planning and implementation of those plans as
suggested by GAO is essential. We have seen that it has taken several
years for NOAA to validate key products on the SUOMI-NPP satellite.
Just after the Oklahoma tornadoes this year, a micrometeoroid appears
to have hit an existing GOES satellite, turning all of its instruments
off. Murphy's Law seems to be on full display when it comes to our
weather satellites, and continued blue sky self-evaluations by NOAA
could prevent us from dealing with these problems before they arise.
It has taken the Administration several years and the prodding of
this Committee and GAO to fully acknowledge the very real risk of a
data gap, and we need to look at all options to mitigate potential
breakdowns in our forecasting ability. While NOAA has paid for reports
to examine gap mitigation options I have fear that not enough has been
done to pursue implementation of these backup plans. We need to look at
American, and potentially commercial, sources for these critical data.
It should be alarming that we may be in a position of having to rely on
international partners for weather data to protect lives and property,
an outcome that could raise much greater quality and access concerns
than some of the potential commercial partners that have so far been
rebuffed by NOAA.
Chairman Broun. Thank you, Mr. Stewart.
The Chairman now recognizes Ms. Bonamici, the Ranking
Member of the Environment Subcommittee, for her statement.
Ms. Bonamici. Thank you very much, Chairman Broun and
Chairman Stewart, for holding this hearing today and thank you
to all of our witnesses who are here today. We look forward to
your testimony and answers.
Our constituents may spend little time thinking about
weather satellites managed by NOAA, but we have all at some
point been transfixed by the images of hurricanes captured by
NOAA's Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites, and
we all benefit from the forecasts, especially of severe storms
that result from data collected in polar and geostationary
satellite systems.
As Mr. Stewart mentioned on the Environment Subcommittee,
we have been working on how to improve weather forecasting and
protect the American public and economy from severe weather.
Losing coverage from either of the polar satellite or the
geostationary satellites would seriously affect accurate
weather forecasting. Because of a litany of troubles in the
polar program, it now appears virtually certain that we will
have a gap in satellite coverage perhaps for as long as three
years, and there remains a chance, not a probability but a
possibility, that we may face a gap in the geostationary
satellites as well. There was a time when we would all say that
a gap in coverage is unacceptable, and now what would be
unacceptable would be not having a viable plan to address such
a gap.
And with that in mind, the questions for our witnesses
today have to be how do we minimize the scope and length of the
expected gap in the polar program? How can we avoid a gap in
the geostationary program? And are the plans to fill the gaps
in coverage appropriately developed?
On the Joint Polar Satellite System program, we have had
eight years to determine how to handle a gap, and as early as
2005, we were getting warnings of slips in schedule and
instrument issues and cost growth. Today, I am interested in
hearing about NOAA's definitive plan for how to deal with the
gap they know they will face for polar satellite data.
And on the GOES satellites, a potential for a gap has been
slower in developing and still appears to be avoidable.
However, even here I would expect and hope that NOAA has
started to think about a contingency plan should the satellites
suffer early failure and the replacement satellite suffer
further delay. Of course we all hope everything performs
optimally, but I would also hope that prudent managers would
develop a plan for failure.
I want to join Mr. Maffei in expressing my regret and
frankly surprised that the majority charter for the hearing
suggests that the problems in NOAA's satellite program are
somehow tied to climate science research. That simply is not
accurate, and anyone who spends time looking at the history of
these programs would be hard-pressed to identify climate
research as even a factor in the technical problems, the
schedule slips, or cost growth in the last eight years.
Further, the majority charter seems to perpetuate what has
become a common misconception in this Committee, that climate
research is the same thing as climate change research.
Colleagues, the issue before us today has been ongoing for
years. My hope is that we can set aside partisanship and find
solutions to what really is a slow-moving national tragedy. We
should emerge from this hearing with a bipartisan commitment to
work together and to help ensure that NOAA is doing all it can
and should to manage these programs and plan for and cover any
gaps. I also hope we can work together to support NOAA in
getting any resources it needs to continue to protect the
American public. I look forward to hearing from the witnesses
from GAO, NOAA, and NASA, and to discuss the relevant agencies'
plan of action to address the looming satellite coverage gaps
and to keep these programs on track.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and with that, I yield
back.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Bonamici follows:]
Prepared Statement of Subcommittee on Environment Ranking Member
Suzanne Bonamici
Thank you, Chairman Stewart and Chairman Broun, for holding the
hearing today. Our constituents may spend little time thinking about
weather satellites managed by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, but we have all at some point been transfixed by the
images of hurricanes captured by NOAA's Geostationary Operational
Environmental Satellites. And we all benefit from the forecasts-
especially of severe storms--that result from data collected in the
polar and geostationary satellite systems.
On this Committee, we have been working on how to improve
forecasting and protect the American public and economy from severe
weather. Losing coverage from either the polar satellites or the
geostationary satellites would seriously affect accurate weather
forecasting.
Because of trouble and mismanagement in the polar program, it now
appears virtually certain that we will have a gap in satellite
coverage, perhaps for as long as three years. And there remains a
chance, not a probability but a possibility, that we may face a gap in
the geostationary satellites as well.
There was a time when we would all say that a gap in coverage was
unacceptable. Now what is unacceptable is not having a viable plan to
address such a gap.
With that in mind, the questions for our witnesses have to be:
How can we minimize the scope and length of the expected
gap in the polar program,
How can we avoid a gap in the geostationary program, and
Are plans to fill gaps in coverage appropriately mature?
On the Joint Polar Satellite System program we have had eight years
to determine how to handle a gap. As early as 2005, we were getting
warnings of slips in schedule and instrument issues and cost growth.
Today I am interested in hearing about NOAA's definitive plan for
how to deal with a gap they know they will face for polar satellite
data. On the GOES satellites, the potential for a gap has been slower
in developing and still appears to be avoidable. However, even here, I
would expect that NOAA has started to think about a contingency plan
should the current satellites suffer early failure and the replacement
satellite suffer further delay. Of course we all hope everything
performs optimally, but also I would hope that prudent managers will
develop a plan for failure.
I want to join Mr. Maffei in expressing my regret, and frankly
surprise, that the Majority charter for this hearing suggests the
problems in NOAA's satellite program are somehow tied to climate
science. That simply is not true and anyone who wants to spend some
time looking at the history of these programs would be hard pressed to
identify climate as even a factor in the technical problems, schedule
slips, or cost growth of the last eight years. Further, the majority
charter seems to perpetuate what has become a common misconception on
this committee: that climate research is the same thing as climate
change research.
Colleagues, this is an issue that has been ongoing for years. My
hope today is that we can set aside partisanship and find solutions to
what really is a slow-moving, national tragedy. We should emerge from
this hearing with a bipartisan commitment to work together and help
ensure that NOAA is doing all that it can and should to manage these
programs and plan for gaps. I also hope we can work together to support
NOAA in getting the resources they need to continue to protect the
American public I look forward to hearing the witnesses from GAO, NOAA,
and NASA discuss how the relevant agencies plan of action to address
the looming satellite coverage gap and to keep these programs on track.
Chairman Broun. Thank you, Ms. Bonamici.
If there are Members who wish to submit additional opening
statements, your statements will be added to the record at this
point.
At this time, I would like to introduce our panel of
witnesses. Our first witness is Mr. David Powner, Director of
Information Technology Management Issues at the U.S. Government
Accountability Office. Mr. Powner, welcome.
Our second witness is Ms. Mary Kicza, Assistant
Administrator for Satellite and Information Services at the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. Welcome.
And our third witness is Mr. Marcus Watkins, Director of
the Joint Agency Satellite Division at the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration. Welcome, sir.
As our witnesses should know, spoken testimony is limited
to five minutes each, after which the Members of the Committee
will have five minutes each to ask you all questions.
It is the practice of this Subcommittee to receive
testimony under oath. Now, if you would please stand and raise
your right hand.
Do you solemnly swear or affirm to tell the whole truth and
nothing but the truth, so help you God?
Thank you. You may be seated.
Let the record reflect that all the witnesses participating
have taken the oath.
Now, before I recognize the first witness, let me just make
a couple of points. I am very eager to hear your testimonies,
but I would have appreciated the opportunity to read the NOAA
and NASA testimonies 48 hours ago when they were due. I
understand and I hope neither of you are directly responsible
for the tardiness of submitting your testimony to this
Committee, but I would like for you to pass the message along
to the appropriate person or individuals that it is
inconsiderate to provide testimony less than 48 hours before a
hearing less than 24 hours before a hearing when the deadline
is 48 hours. You were both given ample notice about this
hearing, in fact, on August 14th, which was over a month ago,
and yet you were unable to provide the testimonies as
requested.
I am further frustrated by NASA when I consider that the
agency declined to send another witness requested by the
Committee and it still submitted testimony late.
When testimony is delivered this late, it does not provide
Members of the Committee sufficient time to review and prepare
to engage in an informative discussion with you about these
programs. Your tardiness is intolerable and it reflects poorly
on your respective agencies and the Administration by default
as well.
Further, will you please confirm that you will personally
ensure that the Committee receives responses to our questions
for the record following the hearing in a timely manner that is
closer to two weeks than two months?
Ms. Kicza nodded her head and you assure us that, Mr.
Watkins?
He nodded his head yes, too, so I am counting that as a
commitment on both of your part.
And I am looking specifically at you, Ms. Kicza, because as
you well know, NOAA has yet to reply to questions from the
Committee relative to a hearing on the National Weather Service
held over a year ago. You are aware. That hearing in which your
colleague, Dr. Sullivan, testified before us here, do you have
an update on the status of those responses? Could you please
give us an update from the agency as soon as possible? We are
eagerly awaiting those responses and I think it is
inappropriate and inconsiderate. Thank you.
I thank you and I appreciate everyone's indulgence.
Now, I recognize Mr. Powner for five minutes.
TESTIMONY OF MR. DAVID POWNER, DIRECTOR,
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY MANAGEMENT ISSUES,
U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Mr. Powner. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Members, and Members of
the Subcommittee, earlier this year GAO added the potential
gaps in weather satellite coverage in consultation with this
Committee as a high-risk area demanding immediate attention
from NOAA management. Gaps in weather satellite coverage are
likely and could have severe effects on lives and our economy.
Therefore, our country needs the very best backup plans that
budgets can afford.
This morning, we are releasing two reports completed at
your request, one on the GOES-R acquisition and the other on
JPSS, which address the gap situation and contingency efforts.
I would like to highlight our recommendations and findings on
each, starting with GOES.
There has been significant progress on the flight and
ground components. The flight components are at various stages
leading up to key systems integration and the spacecraft
construction started earlier this year. Integration of ground
components is slated to occur in early 2014, and the program is
currently operating within its $10.5 billion lifecycle cost
estimate.
Turning to the launch date of October 2015, last year, we
reported to this Committee that there was a 40 percent chance
the GOES-R would meet its October launch date, and our report
today highlights technical issues, delayed interim milestones,
and scheduling weaknesses that call into question that launch
date.
Right after we received NOAA's comments on our report, they
did in fact slip the launch date to early 2016. Although this
slip might not appear significant, it is since it extends the
period of time where there will be no operational backup
satellite for about a year-and-a-half from April 2015 until
GOES-R launches and completes the 6-month check-out. Having
this backup satellite in orbit at all times is an essential
NOAA policy, as it has proved useful on multiple occasions over
the past several years when one of the two operational GOES
satellites has experienced issues and the backup had to be
moved into position to provide weather observations.
NOAA has fairly solid contingency plans to address the
scenario, many consistent with best practices, but our report
points out some areas where improvements are needed, primarily
in areas focusing on preventing launch delays. We are also
making recommendations on improving the spacecraft and ground
schedules so that additional delays do not occur.
Moving to JPSS, again, there is very solid progress to
report. NPP transitioned from interim to routine operations in
February of this year and key upgrades to the ground system
have been made.
Regarding JPSS-1, flight project is on track and
instruments are between and 80 and 100 percent complete and the
critical design review has been completed on the spacecraft.
However, although the JPSS ground project has made progress, a
major software release has been delayed.
Also, major revisions to the programs scope are occurring
to keep it within the $11.3 billion lifecycle cost estimate.
Last year, when we testified, the program was going from $14.6
billion to $12.9 billion; now, it is at $11.3 billion. That is
a $3.3 billion reduction in not a very long time. NOAA is
reporting the bulk of the savings as coming from moving certain
climate sensors outside of the JPSS program and also moving
other sensors to NASA. There are many uncertainties associated
with these moves, namely, what satellites these sensors will
fly on and whether these savings will truly allow the program
to operate within the $11.3 billion cost estimate.
We looked in depth at the schedules of VIIRS, the ground
component in the spacecraft. We found issues with certain
components' schedules and the program overall did not have an
integrated master schedule. All this is necessary to stay on
track for the March 2017 launch date.
In addition, NOAA and NASA are reporting they have a 70
percent confidence in the JPSS-1 March 2017 launch date. Our
confidence is much lower because the 70 percent assessment did
not factor in the scheduling weaknesses we raised in our
report. Hitting this March 2017 launch date is extremely
important because any delays will extend the likely 17-month
gap in the afternoon orbit. The gap will likely occur from late
2016 to early 2018.
NOAA had an initial contingency plan to address the gap and
recently contracted for technical assessment that identified
additional alternatives. Options included using other
government foreign and commercial satellite, using non-
satellite sources such as aircraft observations and improving
weather models. This list is quite extensive, but let's be
clear. None of the options can replace JPSS polar satellite
observations. These options can minimize the gaps but do not
eliminate the damage to forecasts from the gap. Because of
this, the very best contingency options need to be selected.
Therefore, we recommended that decisions need to be made on
exactly what strategies to be pursued and the procedures need
to be established to implement and adequately test them. We are
also making recommendations on improving the spacecraft and
ground schedules so that the March 2017 launch date does not
slip.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. Thank you for
your leadership and oversight of these critical acquisitions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Powner follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Broun. Thank you, Mr. Powner.
Now, Ms. Kicza, you are recognized for five minutes.
TESTIMONY OF MS. MARY KICZA,
ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR,
SATELLITE AND INFORMATION SERVICES,
NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION
Ms. Kicza. Good morning, Chairman Stewart and Broun,
Ranking Members Bonamici and Maffei, and Members of the
Subcommittees. I am pleased to join Mr. Watkins and Mr. Powner
to provide an update on the JPSS and GOES-R series programs.
I am proud to report that JPSS and GOES-R series continue
to meet their key milestones. For the SUOMI-NPP mission, NOAA
assumed operational control of the satellite in February 2013.
Suomi has achieved over 99 percent data availability and its
high resolution sounder data has been incorporated into weather
service operational models. JPSS-1 remains on track for launch
in second quarter Fiscal Year 2017. The instruments are built
and now undergoing testing. The spacecraft is being built. Data
products are being calibrated and validated and the ground
systems are being upgraded. With a decision to focus JPSS on
NOAA's critical weather mission, we have reduced the JPSS
lifecycle cost to $11.3 billion and accelerated the JPSS-2 to
launch the first quarter of Fiscal Year 2022. JPSS-2
instruments and spacecraft acquisitions are now underway.
For GOES-R, four of six instruments have completed
environmental testing and the spacecraft bus has completed its
critical design review. Significant progress has been made on
the ground system with installation now complete for four of
six antennas at Wallops Island, VA and West Virginia. GOES-R is
on track for its second quarter Fiscal Year 2016 launch.
While the title of this hearing would lead one to believe
otherwise, management and oversight of these critical programs
is functional. In response to recent review recommendations,
the Department of Commerce, NOAA, and NASA have streamlined
oversight and management decision-making processes, documented
roles and responsibilities, and instituted a reporting process
which has been well received.
Within JPSS, the NOAA and NASA systems engineering
personnel have been integrated into a single team, which is
recognized as a cohesive high-performing unit. Within NOAA/
NESDIS, we have added an enterprise-level systems engineering
function and begun implementation of common ground services.
Both efforts are already producing results which serve to
reduce future costs.
The NOAA/NASA partnership remains robust. The significant
progress on JPSS and GOES-R reinforces the 2010 Administration
decision to return to the partnership that has built and
operated our Nation's operational weather satellites for more
than 40 years. This partnership capitalizes on the strengths of
both organizations to develop and operate our weather
satellites enabling delivery of products and services critical
to our weather forecasts.
Our NOAA/NASA team relies heavily on our industry partners.
Contractors at locations across the Nation are working to bring
JPSS and GOES-R to fruition. I congratulate them for their
successes to date, particularly with SUOMI-NPP and thank them
for their dedication to building next-generation systems on
time and within budget.
We remain closely connected to our user community and
appreciate the GAO's recommendation to strengthen these
connections. Concerns about a possible observational gap has
been a common theme among our users. I assure you, maintaining
observational continuity remains our singular focus, and to
that end, we remain intent on keeping our on-orbit assets
operating safely, delivering next-generation capabilities on or
ahead of schedule, and implementing approaches to mitigate the
impact of the gap should one occur.
Louie Uccellini, my counterpart at the National Weather
Service, understands the importance of satellite data for the
national weather forecasting enterprise. We both recognize,
however, this enterprise includes contributions from academia,
where much of the research and development occurs; the private
weather forecasting sector, which provides avenues for
dissemination of weather products; and federal, state, and
local emergency managers who serve as first responders when
severe weather strikes.
NOAA also relies on our relationships with our
international partners to meet our requirements. In this
regard, we recently signed a long-term agreement with EUMETSAT,
our European counterpart, to ensure continuity of our
partnership to share space-based observational data.
Finally, I turn my attention to Congress. The ability of
our teams to achieve sustained observations is only possible
with your continued support. In addition to providing
oversight, we depend on you to provide the budgets required to
implement next-generation systems and to do so in a manner in
which we can plan effectively. We are grateful for your
support.
We understand the difficult fiscal challenges our Nation
faces and we have worked hard to minimize the impacts to our
launch schedules in light of sequester reductions. We
appreciate the recommendations offered by the GAO and by other
external review bodies and we will respond to them. We
recognize that collectively we all share the same objective,
and that is mission success.
Thank you and I am happy to answer your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Kicza follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Broun. Thank you, Ms. Kicza.
Now, Mr. Watkins, you are recognized for five minutes.
TESTIMONY OF MR. MARCUS WATKINS,
DIRECTOR, JOINT AGENCY SATELLITE DIVISION,
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Watkins. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee,
thank you for the opportunity to appear today to provide you
information regarding the NASA role in, and commitment to,
NOAA's Joint Polar Satellite System, also referred to as JPSS,
and the Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite-R
Series, or GOES-R, programs. The JPSS and GOES-R programs are
critical to the Nation's weather forecasting system,
environmental monitoring, and research activities.
NASA and NOAA have been partners for more than 40 years in
developing the Nation's polar and geosynchronous weather
satellites. With the President's direction in 2010, NASA and
NOAA returned to this successful partnership for JPSS. The NASA
program office for JPSS has been established and is fully
staffed. NOAA and NASA have established joint agency-level
program management councils to oversee JPSS, and have
integrated their decision-making processes to efficiently and
effectively manage this cooperative activity. The NASA and NOAA
teams have strengthened their working relationship over the
last three years. One example of the JPSS organization success
is the upcoming launch of the Total Solar Irradiance
Calibration Transfer Experiment, TCTE, later this year on a
United States Air Force mission to be launched November 4.
The Suomi National Polar-orbiting Partnership, or SUOMI-
NPP, was successfully launched almost two years ago and NOAA
has operational control of this satellite. Meteorologists
continue to use data products from instruments from SUOMI-NPP
in their weather forecasts, and all of the data products have
been publicly released.
In addition to this success of SUOMI-NPP, the transition
from the NPOESS program to the new JPSS program is now
finished. The JPSS program successfully completed two critical
milestones in 2013, keeping the program on schedule and within
budget. Now, both the JPSS-1 satellite mission and overall
program have moved from the planning and formulation phase to
implementation and execution.
NASA, as NOAA's acquisition agent, manages all of the JPSS
instrument, spacecraft, and the majority of the ground system
contracts. The first JPSS satellite, JPSS-1, will be a near
clone of SUOMI-NPP with upgrades to meet the JPSS-1 level
requirements. The instrument vendors continue to make progress
in the manufacture of the flight units for the JPSS-1 and the
spacecraft is currently being fabricated. Additionally, the
Delta II rocket has been selected as the launch vehicle for the
JPSS-1 mission.
The GOES-R Series program of four geosynchronous satellites
continues to make progress toward launching GOES-R, the first
satellite of the series, in the second quarter of Fiscal Year
2016. Last fall, the GOES-R Series program successfully
completed a Mission Critical Design Review. Since then, the
GOES-R and GOES-S spacecraft have made good progress in
component manufacturing, and GOES-R is proceeding with
spacecraft integration. Four of the six GOES-R instruments have
completed environmental testing.
The next major milestone for the GOES-R Series program is
the Systems Integration Review, which is currently planned for
the spring of 2014. Those performing the System Integration
Review will evaluate the readiness of the program to start
assembly, test, and launch operations.
NASA and NOAA are committed to the JPSS and GOES-R program,
and ensuring the success of these programs is essential to both
the agencies and the Nation. The NASA and NOAA teams have
established strong working relationships and are striving to
ensure the weather and environmental requirements are met on
the most efficient and predictable schedule without reducing
system capabilities or further increasing risk.
Once again, thank you for the opportunity to testify today.
I appreciate the support of this Committee and the Congress for
these critical programs and would be pleased to answer any
questions that you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Watkins follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Broun. Thank you, Mr. Watkins.
I want to thank all of you for your testimony.
Now, reminding Members that Committee rules limit
questioning to five minutes, the Chair at this time will open
the first round of questions by recognizing myself for five
minutes.
Ms. Kicza, there seems to be a big disconnect between what
you say and your testimony and what we hear from other folks,
and hopefully, we can sort all that out. One thing we have just
heard from you is that lifecycle cost of JPSS is now at $11.3
billion, but the responsibility for three climate sensors were
transferred to NASA. NOAA has entered a new budget line item
for a polar-free flyer program that had previously been
included in the JPSS program an estimate. Please explain how
these actions are not just budgeting tricks to make it appear
that costs have gone down, when in reality they have been
transferred to somewhere else and taxpayers are still on the
hook for them.
Ms. Kicza. Yes, sir. In response to both Congressional
feedback and the President's Fiscal Year 2013 budget, as well
as an independent review, NOAA in concert with the
Administration took the actions to focus the JPSS program on
the critical weather mission. In doing so, there were several
activities that took place. One was transferring capabilities
outside of the scope of the JPSS program. While the JPSS
program was reduced, those costs still remain should be
Administration and the Congress choose to continue to fund
those.
Chairman Broun. Well they are still there. Those costs are
still there.
Ms. Kicza. Yes. That is correct.
Chairman Broun. You can transfer the cost so it is not
actually a reduction in the cost to the program, is that
correct?
Ms. Kicza. It is a reduction in the cost of the JPSS
program, not a reduction of the total cost of the program. In
addition to that, as part of the JPSS activities, we also
reduced costs there as well. And if you would like a question
for the record, we can enumerate those particular costs. Some
of them were due to reducing reserves given the positive
progress that the program has made, as well as the positive
results of the SUOMI-NPP mission. Other areas include reducing
areas of overlap between the NOAA and NASA activities
particularly associated with the science.
Chairman Broun. Well, let me ask you this, Ms. Kicza. GAO
reports that identify the lifecycle costs, that is the sum of
all recurring and one-time costs from cradle to grave of the
program at $11.34 billion JPSS and $10.9 billion for GOES-R.
Can you break those numbers down for us further?
Ms. Kicza. Yes, sir.
Chairman Broun. Let me ask, for example, how much is being
spent on research and development for the ground components?
How much is being spent on flight systems and sensors? How much
will it cost to launch these satellites into orbit, and what
are the estimated annual operating and maintenance costs? Can
you give us those figures?
Ms. Kicza. Sir, I would be happy to take a question for the
record that enumerates all of those figures from both of those
satellite systems.
Chairman Broun. Okay. Well, I would appreciate it. We are
going to give you some questions----
Ms. Kicza. Absolutely.
Chairman Broun. to answer for the record, and if you would,
please breakdown the cost associated with each program in
response to the Committee's questions for the record.
Ms. Kicza. Yes, sir. Those are available.
Chairman Broun. Okay. Mr. Powner, JPSS is reporting a 70
percent confidence in its planned launch date for JPSS-1. What
concerns do you have that the JPSS-1 schedule will stay on
track and what percentage would you give the program of meeting
its March '17 launch date?
Mr. Powner. So, Mr. Chairman, what we did is we looked in
detail at various schedules with JPSS program. One of the key
sensors, VIIRS spacecraft in the ground system, because those
scheduling practices give you confidence that ultimately you
can hit a launch date. What we found were weaknesses in some of
that scheduling. We actually found VIIRS to be stronger than
the spacecraft in the ground component, which was encouraging.
When you look at the 70 percent confidence analysis that was
done, it did not factor in all the components of the program,
so our confidence would be less than 70 percent.
Chairman Broun. Can you give us a number?
Mr. Powner. I don't have an exact number. It is definitely
less than 70 percent.
Chairman Broun. Is it less than 50?
Mr. Powner. That would be difficult to say. You know, we
would have to look at those numbers with the models that they
ran with that assessment, and that was our one recommendation
is to rerun that with a more realistic confidence level
factoring in all of these issues, ground and all the things we
found with the flight segment also.
The key, Mr. Chairman, is this: I think these scheduling
practices, we are really focused on doing everything we can to
tighten up those scheduling practices so that launch dates
don't slip anymore. We can't have launch date slips because any
further launch date slips like what happened on GOES, it
appears insignificant, it is actually significant because it
affects the backup situation.
Chairman Broun. Right.
Mr. Powner. That is really the focus that needs to occur.
Chairman Broun. Absolutely. And particularly when you get
into a backup situation, you are talking about 17-month gap in
there and this is intolerable just for good weather
forecasting.
My time is expired. Now, I recognize Mr. Maffei for five
minutes.
Mr. Maffei. I thank the Chairman.
Mr. Powner, just following on that, were you surprised by
the delay in the launch in the first GOES satellite? And what
issues are in play that may lead to further delays with GOES?
Mr. Powner. The delay in the launch did not surprise us
because last year we testified in front of this Committee that
there was a 48 percent confidence in the October 2015 launch
date and we highlighted some scheduling weaknesses. In our
report this year, we talk about some interim milestones that
were missed, some technical issues, the Geostationary Lightning
Mapper is one good example, and then also further scheduling
issues. So the delay did not surprise us.
Mr. Maffei. It is difficult to overestimate the importance
of weather prediction in my central New York State district. We
get very bad weather, as people know. They are quite manageable
because we can predict the weather, we can get our plows on the
roads, et cetera. It doesn't slow us down in contrast to this
city which can't seem to handle--the thought of a flake of
snow, everybody closes.
Chairman Broun. One snowflake will close Atlanta.
Mr. Maffei. Yeah--well, yeah.
Chairman Broun. Almost.
Mr. Maffei. Yeah, exactly. Yes. But we will get that--we
will enter that into the record.
But in any event, it is extremely important, and it is
obviously extremely important to the Nation's economy. And as
we do see more and more storms and things like that--Hurricane
Sandy was devastating and it was just the latest one--it is
just absolutely vital that we get this going.
So pardon me for leaving the technical stuff behind but,
you know, John F. Kennedy announced we were going to the moon
in 1962 and seven years later we were there. We have got 3-1/2
years to wait just for the JPSS to launch, and that might slip.
GOES has already slipped. I mean I--and so I go to--I talk to
the staff and I say, well, it must be money, right? There is
not enough money here? But my understanding is money is really
not the issue. If it is, you can correct me, but--so I will
start with Mr. Powner, can you educate me? What--why does it
take so darn long to put these things up when we are 2013? We
have been doing these satellites--are we making the perfect the
enemy of the good? Is that the problem? We want to have
absolutely the latest technology on everything and so we, you
know--I yield.
Mr. Powner. Well, I think we did. I mean these things were
much more complex in the past and they are being whittled down
to becoming simpler and simpler with less sensors, and that is
probably a good thing.
But the reality is there were a lot of problems over the
years, probably more significant than what we currently have. I
mean I used to testify in front of this Committee where we
would talk about one and two year slips and billion-dollar
overruns like clockwork. It was like clockwork year-to-year.
And that put us in the situation we are in.
So I know the GOES. It slipped one quarter. Historically,
if you look at that, that looks actually pretty good but it is
not. It is not because it is significant. But the problem is is
we have built up to this point in time where all these sins of
the past with NPOESS and the whole bit, it is catching up to
everyone and that is why we have a gap. That is why we added it
to our high-risk list so it gets the right attention with the
appropriate contingency plans.
Mr. Maffei. Ms. Kicza and then Mr. Watkins, is there
anything you can enlighten me with? Why does it take so long to
get a weather satellite up in the greatest country in history
in 2013?
Ms. Kicza. I would offer that it is a combination of issues
that cause it to be difficult to build these more rapidly than
we currently are. First of all, these are complex systems for
both GOES-R and for the JPSS system. With SUOMI-NPP, there were
new instruments, which oftentimes is more difficult when we
start.
However, I could contend that given the partnership that we
have with NASA, our track record particularly on GOES-R has
been very good. This is the first slip other than a protest we
had with a contract early on that we have announced since 2007.
And in fact the team itself continues to work to the earlier
date.
What we suggested is, given our reserve posture, we are
committing to a date that is in the second quarter of Fiscal
Year 2016. The team itself continues to work to the earlier
date. We have had several reviews of the schedule of
confidence, including the one that Mr. Powner refers to. In
going through the analysis of the GOES-R system, we all agree
that the best thing to do is to continue to work to the
earliest date possible, which is what this team is doing.
Mr. Maffei. Thank you, Ms. Kicza. I want--it has improved
that I do want to give Mr. Watkins a chance to explain. And are
we making the perfect the enemy of the good?
Mr. Watkins. I don't believe that we are making perfect the
enemy of the good. Again, when you are looking at these weather
satellites and the instrumentation that we are carrying, the
instruments are advanced. With respect to the JPSS, again,
initially SUOMI-NPP was to be a research and development
satellite, a satellite that we would learn about the
instruments. We now find ourselves in a position of utilizing
that satellite operationally. Now, it is performing extremely
well and the data products are already making their way into
weather forecasting.
The biggest challenge that we see is one of stability. What
the programs, GOES as well as JPSS, need are stable funding so
that we can plan accordingly, implement the programs. If you
look at the track record associated with JPSS since the demise
of NPOESS, we have been on schedule even with the challenges
associated with in some cases delayed funding, in some cases--
well, even with those challenges, we have been able to maintain
the JPSS-1 launch date.
Mr. Maffei. Mr. Watkins, thank you very much. Your point is
good. I am already a minute over but I am sure we will continue
to explore it.
Mr. Watkins. Okay. Thank you.
Chairman Broun. Thank you, Mr. Maffei. By the way, for the
record, I was being very facetious. Atlanta does a great job of
taking care of snow when we get it down there. We don't get as
much as you all do in upstate New York, but I applaud what the
Atlanta public works folks do in taking care of the snow. And--
--
Mr. Maffei. I am sure Representative Lewis will appreciate
the correction. I will let him know.
Chairman Broun. It just reflects, though, how important it
is for not only upstate New York but for Atlanta and for
California and for the whole country for us to get these
satellites flying and get them on board. So thank you, sir.
Now, Mr. Stewart, you are recognized for five minutes.
Mr. Stewart. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I have a
facetious comment about Atlanta as well that I will forbear in
order to be gracious.
I appreciate the testimony from the witnesses. I appreciate
some of the questioning that has taken place. And it is
interesting to me and honestly a little bit troubling to me
some of the differences in opinions or perceptions based on
some of the testimony and some of the answers to the questions.
You don't know so let me share with you. I was an Air Force
pilot for 14 years. I flew one of the most sophisticated
weapons systems ever built. And I honestly--maybe because of
that culture, I can't imagine going into a mission without a
backup. It just didn't happen. And it would have been
completely unacceptable if we presented a proposal or a
campaign where we didn't have multiple backups. And yet that is
exactly the situation we find ourselves in now. And I think we
all agree that it is a mess.
And now, I am convinced that this is a result of
sequestration. Very clearly this goes back previous to the last
year when sequestration actually was implemented. But I don't
think it is entirely the fault of this Administration. I think
this has been perhaps in the making for a little bit longer
than that.
But rather than look back, I would like to look forward to
concentrate on what we can do to mitigate some of these
concerns that we have. And some of the options that we have
that will maybe relieve some of the pressure, as I understand
it, we are basically looking at generally two options. One of
them is to rely on foreign sources of data, foreign government,
particularly the Chinese, which is, I think, troubling for all
of us. The second would be tapping into available commercial
sources of some satellite or data capability. I would
appreciate any of you have input to that, would commercial data
purchases help NOAA avoid having to rely on foreign governments
for much of this very critical data? Ms. Kicza, would you mind
addressing that?
Ms. Kicza. Yes, that is part of the contributions that we
would take advantage of. In fact, if we are in a situation
where we do have a gap, and I will say that our gap situation
has improved since we last were before this Committee given the
positive progress on SUOMI-NPP and the fact that we have
remained on schedule for JPSS-1 and have accelerated JPSS-2.
But in the event we do have a gap, NASA and NOAA are looking at
several options and we are thankful for the funding in the
Sandy Supplemental that is allowing us to move forward on that.
That includes making better use of existing data, including
microwave sensor data from the Defense Meteorological Satellite
Program. Using our Cloud Impact Radiance data and using that
more fully than we have been able to use it in the past,
extending our current operational systems further into the
future--NPOESS and the MetOp series--and making sure that we
are sustaining that for as long as we are able to, and taking
advantage of the new data sources that are planned for the
future, including the potential of commercial data sources.
Radio occultation in particular is one of interest.
Mr. Stewart. Okay. Let me pursue this a little bit if I
could. I think most of us would be much more comfortable
relying on U.S. sources, commercial sources than relying on
foreign governments. Tell me the steps you are taking to
prepare for that eventuality. Is the Administration moving
forward to say, okay, when we reach that point because many of
us suspect that we will, this is what we are doing to prepare,
and for example, are you working with any of these commercial
providers right now to prepare so that we can move forward very
quickly should we need to?
Ms. Kicza. In response to the Sandy Supplemental funding
that was provided in Fiscal Year 2013, NOAA is moving out on
several fronts simultaneously to do the items that I just
referred to. In addition to that, we are improving our
computational capability and doing operational simulations that
will allow us to determine which is the best source of data to
procure, whether that be through commercial or through
international partnerships.
Mr. Stewart. So, as I understand it right now, you are
still just evaluating?
Ms. Kicza. No, we are in fact moving out on those
activities. Those are underway.
Mr. Stewart. Okay. And a contracting process, is that
underway?
Ms. Kicza. That is beginning in some of the activities.
Mr. Stewart. Okay.
Ms. Kicza. Yes, and if you would like a question for the
record, I could--
Mr. Stewart. Okay.
Ms. Kicza. --enumerate that more for you.
Mr. Stewart. Would either of the other witnesses have any
perspective you could add to that?
Mr. Powner. I have a comment on the gap situation
improving. I am not aware of the gap situation improving. NPP,
if it lasts five years and maybe we are expecting it to last
longer than five years, and hopefully it will so there is less
of a gap, but that puts us in late 2016. We launch in March
2017. We have a year check-out. That gives us the 17-month gap
we talk about. So our concern is we take the gap very serious
so that we have the right plans in place and not downplay the
likelihood of a gap. I think that is very important going
forward so that we have the most robust plan in place.
Mr. Stewart. Well, I appreciate that, Mr. Powner, I do, and
I share exactly your sentiment. And I don't think it is helpful
for us to, you know, as I said in my opening statement, blue
sky the scenarios here.
And, Ms. Kicza, I appreciate and I would encourage you and
the Administration to continue to lean forward to looking at
other options, particularly the commercial options. That may be
something that could be very beneficial to us and we are far
better to be doing it now that we are to be doing in 2016.
And with that, Mr. Chairman, I apologize for taking a
little extra time and I yield back.
Chairman Broun. Well, thank you, Mr. Stewart, and I think
we all agree with that statement. We all on both sides are very
eager to get these things flying and operational. It is
absolutely critical for weather warnings for all of us, even
upstate New York.
Now, Ms. Bonamici, you are recognized for five minutes.
Ms. Bonamici. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
appreciate the discussion and want to follow up a bit and
really get more focus on the expected gap. And I understand,
Ms. Kicza, that the current gap--and now we are talking about a
range here--could be as low as we just heard, 17 months. I have
heard it could be up to three years. So could you talk about
what NOAA is--what steps NOAA is taking to make sure that the
gap stays at the short end of that range?
Ms. Kicza. First of all, refocusing the JPSS to a weather-
focused mission improves our confidence in meeting both the
JPSS-1 and JPSS-2 launch dates. As I said, JPSS-1 is on track;
JPSS-2 has been accelerated. Close management of the Suomi
operations will allow us to preserve that mission for as long
as possible. And as I have mentioned, we now have two years of
successful operations of Suomi on orbit. The issues that we
would have expected to see that are referred to as ``infant
mortality issues,'' early issues that will manifest themselves
and present themselves as problems have not been seen on SUOMI-
NPP.
Both of these areas increase development schedule content--
confidence. Keeping JPSS-1 on track and Suomi on orbit
operation success gives us confidence that if SUOMI-NPP
continues to perform as expected, that we can significantly
reduce our projected risk of a gap in orbit.
Lastly, I will note that the projections that we had had in
the past also assumed the time associated with calibrating and
validating the instruments on JPSS-1, our experience in SUOMI-
NPP is also indicating that we may be able to reduce the time
associated with the on-orbit check-out and calibration
measurements on the JPSS-1. All of these contribute to reduced
risk.
Ms. Bonamici. Thank you. And I want to follow up on the
SUOMI-NPP. Mr. Powner, in your testimony you say that the
program estimates that there will be a gap of about a year-and-
a-half from the time when the current SUOMI-NPP satellite
reaches the end of its expected lifespan and when the JPSS-1
launch satellite will be in orbit and operational. So how do
you calculate the expected lifespan, and obviously, it is an
expected lifespan so it will be shorter or longer, and what are
you doing to plan for the entire span?
Mr. Powner. So on NPP that was a demonstration satellite
that was not built with the rigor that we will have on JPSS-1.
Ms. Bonamici. Right.
Mr. Powner. So the expected lifespan was three to five
years. So the five-year mark, we use that as a--okay, that is--
hopefully we get the full five years out of it and it could go
longer, okay. We acknowledge that. But I think it is good to
plan for five years. Five years puts you in late 2016. If you
launch March 2017 and have a one-year check-out, which is
typically how it goes--now, Mary, I am glad to hear that
hopefully you can reduce that 12-month check-out. Those are the
things that we want to see, but that is how we calculate the
17-month likely gap, and that is on the--that is best case
scenario on our point because what happens is if NPP doesn't
last the full five years, it is longer. If JPSS-1 slips, it is
longer. So all of those, that is how we get this range of
likelihood of the gap. We think planning at least for a 17-gap
is prudent.
Ms. Bonamici. Thank you. And, Mr. Powner, I want to ask you
another question, too. In your current report or past report--I
know you have been working on this quite a long time--did you
ever identify the NASA Earth sciences budget allocation as a
cause for delay in satellite procurement at NASA?
Mr. Powner. We have not.
Ms. Bonamici. And has trouble with climate sensors or a
focus on the technology led to a delay in the satellite program
or contributed at all to the data gaps?
Mr. Powner. Trouble with the climate sensors? Not
particularly. The major issue was with the VIIRS. The major
issue was with VIIRS if you go back historically and----
Ms. Bonamici. Thank you. And did--have you identified steps
that might be taken to prevent a data gap from developing in
the GOES program? I know in your testimony you do note that you
made multiple recommendations to NOAA and NOAA has taken steps
to address the recommendations. Have you identified steps or
made recommendations to prevent the data gap--a data gap from
developing in the GOES program?
Mr. Powner. So on the GOES situation, it is a little
different. It is a gap--it is not having an operational backup
capability. That is very important because prior to Super Storm
Sandy, we have repositioned the backup into operations. We did
it again this year and 2012. So it is very important to have
this operational backup.
The issue there is with--when the current GOES launches,
there is likely going to be about a year where we don't have
the operational backup, so this little slip of a quarter, which
could be as long as six months, pushes that to about a year-
and-a-half. So there are fairly good contingency plans
associated with the GOES program because they actually use them
when they actually move satellites into operations. Really what
you need to do is minimize any further slips in the launch of
GOES so that we don't have a further issue with the backup.
Ms. Bonamici. Thank you very much. I see my time is
expired.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Broun. Thank you, Ms. Bonamici.
Now, the Chairman recognizes Mr. Rohrabacher for five
minutes.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
appreciate the opportunity to get to know more about this
program and appreciate that some people who are out there
putting an awful lot of work into making sure that the American
people have the information they need and a weather satellite
system that will serve its very needs and protect us against
the maladies of weather that have plagued humankind. A reading
of history is a reading of people whose lives were destroyed by
maladies in the weather.
And today, we have come a long way in that. And I would
like to ask Ms. Kicza how many total satellites do you have in
orbit that you are looking after or looking after us?
Ms. Kicza. In the polar orbit right now we have NOAA-15 and
NOAA-16 are older satellites that are secondary. We had NOAA-18
as a secondary.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Excuse me. So you have 15 satellites and
then another 16?
Ms. Kicza. No, I am sorry. In the polar orbit----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Yes.
Ms. Kicza. --we have our primary operational satellite,
which is NOAA-19. We have older satellites that remain in their
orbits that are still producing data although at degraded
levels. So we have NOAA 15, NOAA-16, NOAA-18, NOAA-19, and
SUOMI-NPP. In the geostationary orbit we have GOES 13, GOES 14,
and GOES 15. So we have got one, two, three, four, five, six,
seven, eight satellites that we are operating right now that
are NOAA's satellites. In addition to that, we also support the
Defense Meteorological Satellite Program and their series of
satellites.
Mr. Rohrabacher. So you have eight satellites and right
now, we are in discussion about replacing how many of them?
Ms. Kicza. The JPSS will replace the SUOMI-NPP. SUOMI-NPP
is currently operating, as is NOAA-19. JPSS-1will replace
SUOMI-NPP in 2017. GOES-R will replace the on-orbit spare that
by that time we likely will have positioned into a primary
position. So it would replace GOES-14.
Let me take this opportunity to let the Committee know that
all of our older satellites we continue to operate for as long
as possible. The geostationary satellites, for example, GOES
13, 14, 15, they are designed for ten-year lives. We typically
operate them until we have no fuel left. So the depletion of
fuel for GOES-13, for example, is in the 2021 time frame. For
GOES-14 and GOES-15, it is in the 2024 time frame.
Mr. Rohrabacher. So we are here to discuss replacing two
today?
Ms. Kicza. We are replacing--the plans are to replace the
primary spacecraft----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Right.
Ms. Kicza. --when their primary missions are complete----
Mr. Rohrabacher. There are two?
Ms. Kicza. --and most likely when they are degraded.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Two satellites?
Ms. Kicza. Yes.
Mr. Rohrabacher. And you were just telling us now that
there may be a need quickly when this fuel runs out to either
replace or refuel these.
Ms. Kicza. No, what I am suggesting is that we use our
older satellites for as long as we can.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Right.
Ms. Kicza. They are not our primary satellites. They become
secondary. And that our current constellation that is in orbit,
we will continue to fly those as long as we have fuel and the
instruments are operating.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Right. But you expect that fuel to run out
within a number of five, six years?
Ms. Kicza. For the geostationary satellites, if the
instruments to perform and the satellite continues to perform--
--
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay.
Ms. Kicza. --the fuel will last long past when GOES-R would
be launched.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay. I have got to, I guess, get moving.
Thank you for----
Ms. Kicza. Sure.
Mr. Rohrabacher. --clarifying this for me. This is a very
expensive program but a program that provides a very important
and valuable service.
I would think that there have been other valuable services
that government has provided in the past that has evolved into
private sector services. And we want to especially, of course,
encourage that at a time when the government has such a huge
deficit that would help having the private sector put
investment in where government was the sole provider before. We
had a nice discussion in my office the other day, and it just
seems to me in listening today and reading about this, that
there is a hesitancy about purchasing commercial data and thus
evolving into a situation where the commercial companies could
actually play a much greater role.
At the same time, it is important to note that a
commissioned study by NOAA suggested that maybe this gap, for
example, could be handled--you call it the ``silver bullet''
solution--is to rely on data from Chinese government
satellites. It seems to me that it is a pretty misplaced set of
values here when we are more interested in Chinese satellite
data and we are hesitant to use commercial data from our own
American companies.
And thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Broun. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher.
Now, Mr. Posey, your recognized for five minutes.
Mr. Posey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Kicza, I understand that the GOES-R ground system
continues to make some very good progress toward the ground
ratings, and I wondered if you could give me some examples of
the progress, you know, how the installation of antennas in
Wallops and Fairmont going?
Ms. Kicza. Yes, sir. I am happy to do that. The GOES-R
ground system has made excellent progress. The release of the
mission management core ground element has been delivered to
the NOAA Satellite Operations Facility in Suitland, Maryland.
Four of the six new antenna structures have been completed.
These are at the Wallops Flight Facility in Wallops Island,
Virginia, and at our remote backup site and Fairmont, West
Virginia. And the GOES-R ground system did complete its
critical design review last July.
Mr. Posey. Thank you. Also, what about the initial mission
management software? Has that been installed at NOAA Satellite
Operations Facility and has it passed acceptance test yet?
Ms. Kicza. Yes, sir, it has been installed at the NOAA
Satellite Operations Facility and it is undergoing tests now.
Mr. Posey. Okay. Mr. Watkins, I read recently that we
missed on our orbit by two weeks gamma, ray bursts from the sun
that would have knocked out quite a few of our satellites and
perhaps taken down our grid. I am just wondering what your
assessment of that is. If we had been on a two-week-later path,
what damage do you think we would have sustained?
Mr. Watkins. Sir, I am going to have to take that question
for the record. I really don't have the expertise in that area
to speak on that.
Mr. Posey. Do you realize there was any danger? I mean have
you been advised? I mean you are the Joint Agency Satellite
Division National Aeronautics Director.
Mr. Watkins. That is correct, and my primary role is
implementation of NOAA's portfolio of weather satellites. I am
an engineer by training. I work to get them built. To talk
about the science associated with a gamma ray burst, clearly
they offer risk to our planet and there are steps that we take
and monitor these. But I am--in no way would I care to really
speak in depth on the impact of a gamma ray burst.
Mr. Posey. Would you be kind enough to provide my office
with that information?
Mr. Watkins. Absolutely, sir.
Mr. Posey. Okay. Thank you.
Back to Ms. Kicza, given that the GOES-R will provide about
40 times more data to the weather expert community, it is
important that the users are going to be ready to actually
utilize the information, hopefully. And I assume that stations
are going to need to be upgraded. I am just curious about what
you are doing to prepare the weather prediction community for
this extraordinary increase in information that they are going
to have available.
Ms. Kicza. Yes, sir. In fact, the GOES-R program has for
some time now implemented what we call GOES-R proving grounds.
And in doing so, we work hand-in-hand with our operational
weather forecasters to prepare them for what they are likely to
see in the GOES-R era so that they know what to expect and how
to utilize it.
Similarly, to be ready to accommodate this data on the
ground is an effort in and of itself. I mentioned the progress
on the GOES-R ground system. We have about 150 racks of
equipment coming in to the NOAA Satellite Operations Facility
and the backup facility in Fairmont, West Virginia, in just a
few months. So there is a tremendous amount of work going on.
And being ready to receive that equipment requires facility
upgrades that are underway and on track. It requires that we
have our ability to distribute that data in place. That, too,
is on track. And in the long-term that we have the ability to
archive that data, and we are working through our CLASS archive
capability to prepare for that as well.
Mr. Posey. Thank you. And I guess I have about a half-a-
minute left. I just wondered if you could briefly comment on
the instruments in GOES-R that I understand are weather-focused
instruments that can observe weather not just here on Earth but
we can also get a better view of the space weather.
Ms. Kicza. That is correct. There are six instruments on
the GOES-R series system. The Advanced Baseline Imager is the
primary weather imager, a critical instrument that has
significant capability over our current GOES assets in orbit.
There is the Geostationary Lightning Mapper, which is a new
capability that will allow us to see much more closely the
cloud-to-cloud lightning, which is a major indicator of pre-
thunderstorm activity. And in addition to that, we have a suite
of in-situ sensors that sense the space weather that are
incoming to our planet. And all of those instruments are
progressing very well.
Mr. Posey. Thank you. That is good stuff.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Chairman Broun. Thank you, Mr. Posey.
And we will begin our second round of questions now.
Hopefully, we will have at least five minutes for each Member.
Ms. Kicza and Mr. Watkins, following up on questions from
Mr. Stewart as well as Mr. Rohrabacher about this so-called
``silver bullet'' that Riverside Technology and Integrity
Applications stated utilizing Chinese data, as they say, is the
``silver bullet.'' This implies that this provides an immediate
and a definitive solution to a complex problem. Are you looking
for this so-called Chinese ``silver bullet?'' Mr. Stewart was
asking about commercial utilization and so was Mr. Rohrabacher.
Do you both agree with this characterization? Are you looking
to the Chinese ``silver bullet,'' and what if any concerns that
you would have about such collaboration? Ms. Kicza?
Ms. Kicza. As you mentioned in your opening statement,
security concerns exist with the use of Chinese data in the
event of a gap. We are obviously very sensitive to that. NOAA
believes that this would be a ``whole-of-government'' decision
involving national security staff.
Chairman Broun. Are you counting upon that, Ms. Kicza, as
far as Chinese data?
Ms. Kicza. No, sir. As we have indicated already, we have a
host of activities underway beyond use of other international
assets that we are actively exploring.
Chairman Broun. Well, I certainly hope so. I hope that is
not even a consideration.
Mr. Watkins?
Mr. Watkins. I have nothing to add.
Chairman Broun. Mr. Powner, do you have anything to add to
that?
Mr. Powner. Well, we would agree that the security
concerns, also of availability concern I think are big issue
going that route, too. There are security concerns, but the
availability issue when it is in fact available if you went
that route needs to be strongly considered.
Chairman Broun. I certainly hope so. We have seen a lot of
cyber attacks from China and it is a very strong concern of
mine personally as a Member of not only this Committee but
Homeland Security Committee about what is going on with China
and they are attacking us. And utilizing them as a ``silver
bullet'' is absolutely not appropriate, and I hope that you all
will look to other sources and put in policy that is going to
look to the commercial sources, as well as backfilling all
these gaps and problems that we see.
And, Mr. Powner, have NOAA or NASA satisfied GAO's
inquiries concerning the new structure, budgets, and timeline
for the JPSS and the GOES-R programs?
Mr. Powner. Yes, I think we are in alignment on what needs
to be done--what the current budget is and the schedules and
that type of thing. Our big push, Mr. Chairman, is that
tightening up the management of those schedules, the integrated
master schedule with JPSS and the components schedules. We are
in the weeds with them on this, but it is important to be in
the weeds so that they stay on that March 2017 launch date.
Chairman Broun. Well, this is a weedy problem and it is
something that we need to fill because I am very concerned and
I think all of us are concerned about these gaps.
Mr. Watkins, does NASA have any concern about NOAA's
proposal to shift climate sensors to you?
Mr. Watkins. Again, sir, my area of expertise is in
managing weather satellites, reimbursable programs on behalf of
NOAA.
Chairman Broun. Well, if you could answer that question for
us in the questions for the record.
Mr. Watkins. Yes.
Chairman Broun. Can you answer this? Why would NOAA's
ownership of these instruments be better than under the current
arrangement under NASA, which is building the instruments for
NOAA?
Mr. Watkins. Again, that is a question that I will have to
take for the record.
Chairman Broun. Okay.
Mr. Watkins. We have a science division that handles those
areas.
Chairman Broun. And certainly if you would help us with
that.
Mr. Watkins. I will.
Chairman Broun. Mr. Maffei, you are recognized for five
minutes.
Mr. Maffei. I thank the Chairman, and I echo his remarks
about depending too much on China. There is no bipartisan
divide whatsoever on this. We are very concerned about it.
Hopefully, they would--we would never have to rely on them. And
on the Armed Services Committee, we, too, are very, very
concerned about the cyber security issues and it would put us
in a very awkward position to have to depend on that particular
country for this stuff.
I do want to get back to Mr. Rohrabacher's comments on
having the private sector more involved. Mr. Powner, my--I
actually would be open to that. I am a big advocate of private
sector involvement and public-private partnerships in the space
program. But my understanding is is that there are already
private contractors that do most of the actual work that are
hired to build the satellites and even launch the satellites
into orbit. Is that true?
Mr. Powner. Yeah, that is true.
Mr. Maffei. Can you----
Mr. Powner. Private contractors, private companies,
correct.
Mr. Maffei. So there is not--so most of this is already
private--well, public-private partnerships that really do it.
Mr. Powner. Yeah, I think the key question is with the
Riverside analysis there was a suggestion that commercial
providers could actually be used to help fill the gap. I think
that is where the suggestion was. Both government for and
commercial, all that was on the table with Riverside study.
Mr. Maffei. Mr. Chairman, I might suggest that a study
might be in order to have GAO take a closer look at whether
there are any additional opportunities for public-private
partnerships in the space program. I think it would be a
bipartisan thing to----
Chairman Broun. Well, certainly. I think all of us would be
very eager to make sure that that happens.
Mr. Maffei. Okay. Thank you.
Ms. Kicza, I think you are the right person to ask this to,
but according to the GAO, key satellite data users were not
fully informed about the changes to GOES-R capabilities or
alternative efforts to receive the data needed in the event of
a system failure. Have there been any outreach efforts in place
to ensure that GOES data will continue to enable users that are
outside of NOAA to complete their mission and--I mean are there
any outreach efforts just to make sure that all of the various
scientific users and private sector users are kept informed of
these sort of issues when they arise?
Ms. Kicza. Yes, there are avenues, and I think that what
Mr. Powner encouraged is that we strengthen those. And so we do
have regular conferences that we present at, where the users
are largely present where we highlight the changes that are
made. We have operational working groups that reach out to the
users that inform them and help us make decisions on any trades
that we have to make.
In addition to that, in a response to the recommendations
of the GAO, we are working with the Office of the Federal
Coordinator of Meteorology to reinstitute a committee that had
been in place prior to NPOESS as an additional method of
reaching out to other agencies and their users to ensure that
they are kept abreast of how our programs are progressing.
Mr. Maffei. Mr. Watkins, how has the sequester affected
your agency's ability to implement these weather-related
programs?
Mr. Watkins. So all of our funding is received via our
partners, NOAA. And so clearly sequestration has had an impact
on our ability associated with stable funding, which is what we
need in order to adequately be able to build operational
weather satellites.
Mr. Maffei. Ms. Kicza, same question to you. And do you
have enough flexibility in order to at least keep everything on
track? How is that affecting you?
Ms. Kicza. As I mentioned in my oral testimony, we have
worked hard in the face of sequester reductions received in
FY2013 to try to maintain the launch schedules. We were able to
do that with the JPSS, keep JPSS-1 on track. To be honest with
you, the way that we did that is we impacted the Polar Free
Flyer, the part that was outside of the JPSS.
With the GOES-R, as I had also indicated, the team is
working to maintain the earlier launch date. However, given the
low budget reserve posture we have in light of the reductions,
the commitment we are making is to the second quarter of Fiscal
Year 2016 for that launch.
Mr. Maffei. All right. Mr. Powner, I appreciate it if you
would follow up on it just in terms of your analysis, the
impact of the sequester on these programs.
Mr. Powner. So sequestration $54 billion, it was clear that
GOES-R on our--based on our analysis a year ago and currently
was going to slip without sequestration. So now they are saying
part of the slip was due to sequestration. Sequestration, we
don't know the details on what actually affect that the slip. I
will say this: There were two prime contractors, one with the
spacecraft, one with the ground. They continued to do work. So
we did not have a situation where work was stopped.
Mr. Maffei. Okay. So work continued.
Mr. Powner. I know there was arrangements cut with
contractors which was appropriate to keep the work going. So
those details on how 54 equated to a one quarter slip, we don't
have that, but I do want to say that I think it was likely
going to slip without sequestration.
Mr. Maffei. I thank the Chairman. I have gone three seconds
over.
Chairman Broun. Thank you, Mr. Maffei.
Mr. Stewart, you are recognized for five minutes.
Mr. Stewart. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And again, I won't
take that long. I have just a very quick question.
And this is helpful to me; I think it is helpful for the
record. But I was going to ask you as witnesses to give your
best perception or opinion on a scale of one to ten, ten being
severe, one being we are in great shape, what is your
perception of the potential the gapping and satellite coverage
of being a problem to the United States? How big of a problem
is it to you, Mr. Powner? Could you give me a perception on
your feeling on that?
Mr. Powner. I think for me it is a ten.
Mr. Stewart. Okay.
Mr. Powner. I think that we are predicting a 17-month gap.
I think you are going to have a gap.
Mr. Stewart. Yeah.
Mr. Powner. Having no gap at all I think is highly
unlikely, so I would put it at ten.
Mr. Stewart. Okay. Thank you.
Ms. Kicza?
Ms. Kicza. The impact of a gap is severe. I would rate that
as a 10. The probability of a gap I think is improving.
Mr. Stewart. Okay. Would you give me a rating on that, what
you think the probability is?
Ms. Kicza. I would say given the progress we have made and
the operations on SUOMI-NPP I would rate it as a five.
Mr. Stewart. Five? And, Mr. Powner, your rating was both on
the severity and also the likelihood, is that true?
Mr. Powner. Correct.
Mr. Stewart. Okay. Mr. Watkins?
Mr. Watkins. I think for the JPSS program, given that
SUOMI-NPP has been operating on orbit without any infant
mortality issues, given the fact that I have confidence in the
schedule associated with JPSS-1, I would probably give it a
four or five.
Mr. Stewart. Okay. And that is on the likelihood?
Mr. Watkins. Yes.
Mr. Stewart. Not on the severity should we encounter a gap?
Mr. Watkins. No. No.
Mr. Stewart. Yeah.
Mr. Watkins. And that is on the likelihood. The severity--
--
Mr. Stewart. Yeah.
Mr. Watkins. --is huge.
Mr. Stewart. Yeah. I hope that you who are more optimistic
are right. I am afraid that you are not. I think it is in my
opinion much more than a five. I think it is almost inevitable.
Let me ask you one other question using the same kind of
format. What do you think are the best options? Do you think
that the commercially available data is the best option? That
should be the direction we are leaning? Or should we be leaning
towards foreign sources? Mr. Powner?
Mr. Powner. Well, I think it is clearly a combination not
only of using additional satellites, whether it is some
foreign, some commercial, some other government. I think you
need to look at all those, but also, it is important to look at
other weather observations, observations from aircraft and also
improving the weather modeling.
Mr. Stewart. Okay.
Mr. Powner. Weather modeling improvements could help, too.
Mr. Stewart. Can help, too?
Mr. Powner. It is a combination of everything.
Mr. Stewart. So you would rate them all as equally
important, one not being much more than another?
Mr. Powner. Yes, I don't know if I am in a position to say
that it is better or not. I think that our recommendation is
that we need to make the decisions on what the best options are
given the current budget situation.
Mr. Stewart. Which was part of my previous question. Let's
lean forward on that.
Ms. Kicza, is one considered a strong preference in your
opinion?
Ms. Kicza. My strongest preference is to keep these
programs funded, keep them stable so that these teams can
execute.
Mr. Stewart. Okay.
Ms. Kicza. I think that is our strongest weapon against
running a gap.
Mr. Stewart. Okay. But if you had to choose right now, you
know, as a relief as something that you could count on as
backing up, would that be commercially available or foreign?
Ms. Kicza. I would use a combination of the assets that are
available to us.
Mr. Stewart. Both of them being equal?
Ms. Kicza. Yes.
Mr. Stewart. Okay.
Ms. Kicza. Yes.
Mr. Stewart. Mr. Watkins?
Mr. Watkins. Again, I believe that we need to remain as
focused as possible on trying to meet our overall schedules and
deadlines associated----
Mr. Stewart. Understanding----
Mr. Watkins. --and----
Mr. Stewart. --that, but if that weren't to be the event,
what would be your preference for the primary backup?
Mr. Watkins. I think we would be looking at everything and
I would defer to the expertise of NOAA to meet those needs.
Mr. Stewart. All right. Thank you. And I yield back.
Chairman Broun. Thank you, Mr. Stewart.
Ms. Bonamici, you are recognized for five minutes.
Ms. Bonamici. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I don't think I will take that long but I wanted to follow
up on the question that Mr. Maffei asked about GOES-R. Ms.
Kicza, the cost estimates on JPSS have gone up and down of
course in recent years. At the high point, it was projected to
be about $14.6 billion; now, it is down to $11.3 billion. Could
you talk a little bit about how you have folded the key users
and stakeholders in the process to ensure that the essential
functionality was not sacrificed in the search for savings?
Ms. Kicza. Yes, ma'am. As we establish our requirements for
the JPSS program, we worked very closely with all of the major
line organizations within NOAA, the Weather Service being
obviously the primary line organization, and assured that the
requirements and trades that we are addressing are keeping
their highest priority requirements intact. Those are referred
to as the Key Performance Parameters. So we worked very closely
with our NOAA counterparts who are taking this data and
providing the products and services that the broader country
takes advantage of.
In addition to that, as we go through these trades, there
are multiple opportunities to have dialogue with the broader
community and we regularly engage in those forums.
Ms. Bonamici. Thank you. And I want to follow up on what
Mr. Stewart said earlier about looking forward. And obviously,
there have been troubles in the past, and looking forward, I
know that the Independent Review Team completed a report on the
JPSS program last year. So what steps have you taken to follow
the advice of the Independent Review Team? I think we all need
some reassurance that things are getting better.
Ms. Kicza. The Independent Review Team, which was led by
Tom Young and host of other very senior acquisition experts,
provided a report in July of last year, July of 2012. They had
23 recommendations. This past August we brought that entire
team back and we reviewed with them our response to all of
those recommendations. I think it is fair to say that they were
pleased, quite pleased with the progress that has been made.
They have identified a couple of areas that they want
additional detail in, and we are scheduled to provide that
information to them and they are projecting to have a report
available in the November time frame.
Ms. Bonamici. Thank you very much.
And I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Broun. Thank you, Ms. Bonamici.
I thank the witnesses for your valuable testimony today,
and I thank the Members for their questions. Members of the
Committee may have additional questions for you, and I ask that
you respond to those questions in writing, and please do it as
expeditiously as possible.
Let me remind you that everyone's responses to our
questions are expected in a very timely manner. I am not
unreasonable and I can permit a delay of a week or two, but
delays that extend for over one year are totally inexcusable
and intolerable.
The record will remain open for two weeks for additional
comments and written questions from Members.
Thank you all so much. The witnesses are excused and this
hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:34 a.m., the Subcommittees were
adjourned.]
Appendix I
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Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Appendix II
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Additional Material for the Record
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