[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
ANNUAL REPORT
2013
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ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 10, 2013
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Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.cecc.gov
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CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
Senate
House
SHERROD BROWN, Ohio, Chairman CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey,
MAX BAUCUS, Montana Cochairman
CARL LEVIN, Michigan FRANK WOLF, Virginia
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon ROBERT PITTENGER, North Carolina
TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota
MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio
MICHAEL M. HONDA, California
EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
SETH D. HARRIS, Department of Labor
FRANCISCO J. SANCHEZ, Department of Commerce
NISHA DESAI BISWAL, U.S. Agency for International Development
Lawrence T. Liu, Staff Director
Paul B. Protic, Deputy Staff Director
(ii)
CO N T E N T S
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Page
I. Executive Summary............................................. 1
Introduction................................................. 1
Specific Findings and Recommendations........................ 14
Political Prisoner Database.................................. 54
II. Human Rights................................................. 57
Freedom of Expression........................................ 57
Worker Rights................................................ 67
Criminal Justice............................................. 77
Freedom of Religion.......................................... 86
Ethnic Minority Rights....................................... 96
Population Planning.......................................... 99
Freedom of Residence and Movement............................ 105
Status of Women.............................................. 109
Human Trafficking............................................ 113
North Korean Refugees in China............................... 118
Public Health................................................ 121
The Environment.............................................. 124
III. Development of the Rule of Law.............................. 131
Civil Society................................................ 131
Institutions of Democratic Governance........................ 137
Commercial Rule of Law....................................... 146
Access to Justice............................................ 157
IV. Xinjiang..................................................... 163
V. Tibet......................................................... 172
VI. Developments in Hong Kong and Macau.......................... 187
VII. Endnotes.................................................... 191
Political Prisoner Database................................ 191
Freedom of Expression...................................... 192
Worker Rights.............................................. 198
Criminal Justice........................................... 206
Freedom of Religion........................................ 213
Ethnic Minority Rights..................................... 221
Population Planning........................................ 224
Freedom of Residence and Movement.......................... 231
Status of Women............................................ 235
Human Trafficking.......................................... 239
North Korean Refugees in China............................. 244
Public Health.............................................. 247
The Environment............................................ 251
Civil Society.............................................. 260
Institutions of Democratic Governance...................... 265
Commercial Rule of Law..................................... 273
Access to Justice.......................................... 279
Xinjiang................................................... 285
Tibet...................................................... 295
Developments in Hong Kong and Macau........................ 313
I. Executive Summary
Introduction
The Commission notes China's lack of progress in
guaranteeing Chinese citizens' freedom of expression, assembly,
and religion; restraining the power of the Chinese Communist
Party; and establishing the rule of law under the new
leadership of President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang.
Official rhetoric at the start of their tenure suggested
openness to reforms and limits on the power of officials,
sparking public discussion across China. But the new leadership
soon cracked down on growing calls for human rights and the
rule of law and reiterated the Party's dominance over public
affairs. Despite widespread acknowledgement that loosening
restrictions on society to encourage public participation,
lessening state control over the economy, and enforcing the
rule of law are essential to China's economic development,
China continues to pursue economic modernization without
political reform or guarantees to fundamental human rights.
The Commission's reporting year, which covers the period
from fall 2012 to fall 2013, began with some potentially
hopeful signs. Statements starting in late 2012 by President
Xi, Premier Li, and other top leaders pledged to crack down on
corruption and rein in official abuses, promised major reforms
to the abusive systems of reeducation through labor and
household registration, and suggested an openness to giving
greater authority to China's Constitution. New and revised laws
that took effect, including the PRC Criminal Procedure Law and
the PRC Mental Health Law, contained significant flaws but also
had the potential to improve protection of citizens' rights.
China's relatively open response to an outbreak of avian flu in
early 2013 stood in marked contrast to its poor handling of the
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) crisis 10 years
earlier, a point highlighted at a Commission hearing held in
May 2013. Whether buoyed by statements from China's new leaders
or the possibilities accompanying a transition of power,
citizens from diverse sectors of society, from elements within
the Party to individuals affiliated with the grassroots New
Citizens' Movement, sought to engage in public discussion over
China's future. They urged their government to give greater
force to the Constitution as a check on official behavior, make
good on its promise to combat corruption by requiring officials
to disclose their assets, and ratify the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, which China signed in 1998.
By spring, however, it became clear that hopes China's new
leaders would engage with, or even tolerate, public discussion
on issues such as constitutionalism and anticorruption would
remain unfulfilled. In April, the Office of the Communist
Party's Central Committee reportedly issued Document No. 9,
which sought to marginalize and silence calls for
constitutional checks, anticorruption, universal human rights,
and press freedom as the products of ``Western anti-China
forces'' and dissidents, rather than treat them as the
legitimate concerns of China's own citizens and an obligation
under China's commitments to international standards such as
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. By September 2013,
authorities had detained, arrested, or ``disappeared'' nearly
60 individuals in an ensuing crackdown on free expression,
assembly, and association, including the prominent rights
advocates Xu Zhiyong and Guo Feixiong. Pro-reform editorials
and discussions on the Internet were censored. Citizens who
sought information about the government's human rights action
plan and the submission to the UN Human Rights Council's
Universal Periodic Review of China's human rights record
scheduled for October 2013 faced harassment, detention, and
arrest.
The Party's harsh response to calls for reform this past
year echoed a consistent theme across the 19 issue areas
covered in this report--that the Party's interest in
maintaining control and dominance over Chinese society still
trumps meaningful and lasting progress on transparency, human
rights, the rule of law, and easing state control over the
economy. To be sure, the Commission documented improvements at
the margins throughout this report, including the issuance of a
national anti-trafficking plan, the loosening of residency
restrictions in some localities, the introduction of labor law
amendments intended to curb abuse of subcontracted labor, and
the discontinuation of reeducation through labor sentences in
some provinces. But these took place against the backdrop of a
Chinese state that still views its citizens with suspicion and
still denies them basic freedoms.
This was evident in many of the headline issues that
captivated Chinese citizens this past year, from crippling
pollution and corrupt political figures to widespread concerns
over food safety and tensions in ethnic minority regions.
Citizens clamored for more information about the safety of
their environment and food, but authorities deemed soil
pollution data a ``state secret.'' Corruption was a top concern
for many in China, but authorities detained anticorruption
advocates and censored foreign news stories about the finances
of China's leaders and their families. Despite dozens more
self-immolations in Tibetan areas of China and some of the
worst unrest in Xinjiang since 2009, Chinese officials
continued to rely on heavier security and tighter control
instead of dialogue and reconciliation. Another year has passed
without resumption of formal dialogue with representatives of
the Dalai Lama, extending the longest break since talks resumed
in 2002. On the surface, the August trial of Bo Xilai, former
Party Central Political Bureau member and Chongqing Party
Secretary, appeared relatively more transparent, but it also
was a reminder that when the Party's interests are involved,
China remains very much a country ruled by the Party and not by
laws.
In addition, China made little progress toward achieving
the ``highly efficient modern government that operates under
the rule of law'' recommended in the groundbreaking ``China
2030'' report released by the World Bank and the Development
Research Center of China's State Council in 2012. The ``China
2030'' report, which the Commission raised in last year's
annual report, underscored the strong relationship between the
human rights and rule of law issues monitored by the Commission
and China's long-term economic development and stability. The
report urged China to take a number of steps to reach the next
stage of economic development, including allowing Chinese
people greater freedom of movement and public participation,
and strengthening the rule of law. The report also urged China
to reform its state-owned sector, a source of abuses that tests
China's commitment to the rule of law. On this count, this
report found that the state continues to play an outsized role
in China's economy, unfairly subsidizing state-owned
enterprises and coordinating an overseas investment strategy,
employing policies that favor domestic companies over foreign
firms, violating World Trade Organization obligations,
undervaluing its currency, and failing to curb the massive
theft of foreign intellectual property.
China's new leaders must undertake significant reforms to
meet China's human rights obligations under international
standards and to strengthen the rule of law. To that end, the
Commission provides the following main recommendations to
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
outlining ways to encourage such reforms.
Main Recommendations
International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR). China signed the ICCPR in 1998 but 15 years
later has still not ratified the covenant despite repeatedly
stating its intent to do so. China is the only permanent member
of the UN Security Council not to have acceded to or ratified
the ICCPR. China must take a number of concrete steps to come
into conformity with the specific provisions of the ICCPR,
including the following: Ending arbitrary arrest and detention
of political dissidents (Article 9); allowing citizens the
right to freely choose their place of residence (Article 12);
ending the policy of denying passports and restricting the
movement of activists and their families as political
punishment (Article 12); allowing citizens the freedom to not
only hold religious beliefs but also to practice them (Article
18); ending press and Internet censorship of peaceful political
content and allowing freedom of expression (Article 19);
allowing citizens the right to freely associate with others,
including through non-governmental organizations and trade
unions (Article 22); and allowing genuine elections by
universal and equal suffrage (Article 25).
RECOMMENDATION: Members of the U.S. Congress and
Administration officials should urge China to commit to a
specific date for ratifying the ICCPR, including providing a
concrete and transparent plan and timetable for ratification
developed through genuine, democratic, and open public
participation and comment from all sectors of civil society.
The Administration should raise this recommendation during
China's Universal Periodic Review before the UN Human Rights
Council on October 22, 2013, and at future bilateral dialogues
with China, including the Strategic and Economic Dialogue, the
Human Rights Dialogue, and the Legal Experts Dialogue. The
Administration should raise China's qualifications for
membership on the UN Human Rights Council prior to and during
the upcoming election for Council members at the UN General
Assembly on November 12, 2013.
U.S.-China Trade and Connection to Rule of Law and
Human Rights. One of the results of the United States'
extensive trade ties with China is that China's domestic human
rights and rule of law developments impact the public health
and economic well-being of Americans to a greater degree than
those of any other country. China is the world's second-largest
economy and has been a member of the World Trade Organization
(WTO) since 2001. China is the United States' second largest
trading partner, and exports a large and growing volume of
food, drugs, and products to the United States. The U.S. trade
deficit with China reached a record US$315 billion in 2012 and
topped US$30 billion in July 2013, the highest monthly deficit
ever. China continues to be the world's largest producer of
carbon dioxide emissions, while food continues to be grown in
areas of China contaminated by water and soil pollution. In
addition, pollutants originating in China, such as mercury and
ozone, are reaching the United States. The extent to which the
Chinese government is transparent, respects its international
trading obligations, and protects Chinese citizens' human
rights affects the safety and quality of goods imported from
China, and the ability of American workers and companies to
compete on a level playing field.
This connection between China's domestic commercial rule of
law and human rights developments and the health and economic
prosperity of Americans as a result of trade is evident in many
contexts. Without a free press and civil society, Chinese
consumers cannot effectively uncover and respond to food and
drug safety issues, environmental threats, and disease
outbreaks that could be exported abroad. Unfair trading
practices, such as industrial policies, currency manipulation,
quotas and subsidies, forced technology transfer, and
intellectual property theft--many of which contravene China's
obligations as a member of the WTO--directly harm American
businesses and workers. China's censorship of the Internet not
only denies China's nearly 600 million Internet users their
freedom of expression but also blocks companies such as
Facebook, Twitter, Bloomberg, the New York Times, Google, and
YouTube from accessing China's markets. The denial of the basic
right of Chinese workers to organize independent unions and the
lack of enforcement of minimum labor and environmental
standards places American workers and companies at a
competitive disadvantage. Over the last two years, the
Commission has held a number of hearings that have highlighted
how U.S. trade relations with China should not be viewed in
isolation from China's restrictions on expression, labor
rights, environmental and public health transparency, and civil
society, including ``China's Censorship of the Internet and
Social Media: The Human Toll and Trade Impact''; ``Ten Years in
the WTO: Has China Kept Its Promises?''; ``Working Conditions
and Worker Rights in China: Recent Developments''; ``Food and
Drug Safety, Public Health, and the Environment in China''; and
``Chinese Hacking: Impact on Human Rights and Commercial Rule
of Law.''
RECOMMENDATION: Members of the U.S. Congress and
Administration officials should seek to include human rights
and rule of law concerns as integral parts of their discussions
over trade and commercial issues with their Chinese
counterparts during the annual U.S.-China Strategic and
Economic Dialogue, negotiations over a bilateral investment
treaty, and other trade-related venues, pointing out the links
between, for example, China's censorship of the Internet and
market access, the rule of law and food safety, and China's
industrial policies and weak enforcement of law and theft of
American intellectual property. The Administration should also
continue to ensure that China adheres to its WTO obligations,
including by exercising the United States' rights under the WTO
dispute settlement process when necessary.
Rule of Law and Democratic Institutions. Early in
the Commission's reporting period, President Xi Jinping drew
attention with comments such as, ``[N]o organization or
individual should be put above the constitution and the law'';
and, ``[T]he Constitution should be the legal weapon for people
to defend their own rights'' and implemented in order to have
``life and authority.'' In practice, China's rule of law
development has stalled, as most laws and regulations are
developed behind closed doors largely in the absence of
democratic input; officials continue to arbitrarily apply laws
to punish individuals they deem politically sensitive; and
enforcement of laws, such as labor laws, remains uneven. China
lacks meaningful safeguards, such as an independent judiciary,
a free press, and an unrestricted civil society, to ensure that
the state's restrictions on freedom are narrowly tailored to
meet the requirements of international law.
RECOMMENDATION: Members of the U.S. Congress and
Administration officials should raise President Xi's statements
with Chinese officials and urge them to adopt the true
hallmarks of a society marked by the rule of law, including
laws and policies developed through democratic institutions and
public participation, and meaningful safeguards such as a free
press, independent judiciary, and vibrant civil society. U.S.
officials who wish to express support for the new Chinese
leadership's attempts to combat corruption should insist that,
in order for such efforts to be sustainable, they must be
accompanied by democratic participation, public oversight, and
the rule of law. U.S. officials should also cite the ``China
2030'' report's assertion that the creation of a ``highly
efficient modern government that operates under the rule of
law'' is key to China's economic future.
Ethnic Minorities. China's current policy toward
ethnic minorities, most notably with respect to Tibetans and
Uyghurs, has proven ineffective and counterproductive. Instead
of promoting the declared national goals of stability and a
harmonious society, these policies have led in the opposite
direction. Tibetans continue to engage in tragic acts of self-
immolation at an alarming rate, and the Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region (XUAR) has witnessed some of the most severe
unrest since 2009.
RECOMMENDATION: Members of the U.S. Congress and
Administration officials should note to Chinese officials that
instability in Tibetan areas of China and the XUAR is likely to
continue and could deteriorate further without a shift in the
state's policy away from a top-down approach that belies
China's constitutional commitment to ``ethnic autonomy,'' and
instead relies on heavy-handed security measures and
development policies that fail to provide for participation by
ethnic minorities in decisionmaking and fail to protect their
distinct cultural, linguistic, and religious identity. China
should be encouraged to move toward a more inclusive,
democratic approach that fully takes into account the views and
values of Tibetans and Uyghurs and respects their culture,
language, and religion. U.S. officials should take note of and
seek to learn more about what appeared to be more tolerant
policy suggestions on the Tibet issue that appeared within the
Party this year and should call on the Chinese leadership to
promote a more stable and inclusive society by allowing greater
public dialogue and debate among all groups, especially groups
such as Tibetans and Uyghurs that are among the most adversely
affected by current policies.
Reeducation Through Labor, Population Planning,
and Household Registration. Major policies such as the
reeducation through labor system, the population planning
policy, and the household registration system were the source
of great public discontent in China this past year. These
policies not only violate human rights but also contribute to
social instability and hold back China's economy. The
reeducation through labor system violates the rule of law by
incarcerating citizens without trialor access to legal counsel,
and high-profile cases of abuse have led to widespread calls
for abolishing the policy in China. The population planning
policy interferes with and controls the reproductive lives of
Chinese citizens, especially women, and involves serious abuses
such as forced sterilizations and forced abortions. The policy
also exacerbates the country's demographic challenges, which
include an aging population, diminishing workforce, and skewed
sex ratio. The household registration system denies Chinese
citizens the freedom to choose a permanent residence and leads
to unequal treatment and discrimination against migrants from
rural areas who move to cities, contributing to social tensions
and instability.
RECOMMENDATION: Members of the U.S. Congress and
Administration officials should inquire about indications this
past year of possible changes in these policies, including a
government restructuring plan that moves population planning
policy development to the National Development and Reform
Commission and the announcements of possible major reforms to
the reeducation through labor system and the household
registration system by the end of 2013. Members of the U.S.
Congress and Administration officials should request more
details about the changes and proposed reforms and urge Chinese
officials to undertake serious reform that would both remedy
rights violations and lead to greater social stability by
ending policies that are widely opposed in China.
Report Highlights
This report is divided into 19 issue areas. Highlights of
developments in each area are discussed briefly below.
The Commission observed China's implementation of practices
inconsistent with Article 19 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), as noted in this year's
Freedom of Expression section. As more and more Chinese
citizens accessed the Internet to share information and express
grievances, Chinese officials responded with overly broad and
non-transparent policies to curb ``online rumors'' and expand
the real-name registration requirement for online services.
Censorship of peaceful political content, a violation of
international standards, remained commonplace and targeted
everything from foreign news articles on the wealth of former
Premier Wen Jiabao's family to domestic online discussion of
the 18th Party Congress. New research indicated China was
expanding its censorship system and focusing on online activity
that could lead to collective movements. The Party continued to
exercise broad control over the press, and authorities punished
journalists such as Du Bin, who exposed abuses at the Masanjia
Women's Reeducation Through Labor Center, and Deng Yuwen, who
criticized China's North Korea policy. In a rare act,
journalists at the Southern Weekend staged a strike in January
2013 over the removal of an editorial advocating freedoms and
constitutional principles, news of which itself was censored.
China continued to violate internationally recognized
worker rights by not allowing workers the right to freely
associate and form independent trade unions. As noted in the
Worker Rights section, despite limited efforts to promote the
direct election of worker representatives to state-controlled
unions, union representatives remained generally ineffective in
representing workers' interests. Without adequate channels to
protect their rights and express workplace grievances, China's
large migrant worker population, which has provided the low-
cost labor to drive China's growth, continued to suffer
exploitation, with studies showing that less than 50 percent
had labor contracts, and even fewer had pensions and medical
insurance. At the same time, rising wages and a tightening
labor market led companies in the electronics industry and
elsewhere to hire, in some cases with local government
cooperation, underage workers and to exploit subcontracted
workers in violation of the law. In December 2012, the National
People's Congress amended the PRC Labor Contract Law to address
subcontracting abuses, but the effectiveness of implementation
remains to be seen.
In the Commercial Rule of Law section, the Commission noted
heavy state coordination of outbound investment, which has
grown significantly in recent years, as part of a ``go out''
strategy targeting ``strategic industries'' such as energy
resources, metals, advanced technology, and ``famous brands.''
An official urged Chinese companies investing abroad to keep a
low profile to avoid the appearance of state involvement, while
the Chinese government offered preferential financing that
created an uneven playing field in overseas markets. The yuan
remained significantly undervalued, according to the U.S.
Treasury Department. The WTO found that China had imposed
antidumping and countervailing duties on U.S. grain-
oriented electrical steel, U.S. chicken products, and European
x-ray inspection equipment in ways that were inconsistent with
China's WTO obligations. Chinese officials continued to use
technology transfer as a precondition for market access, in
violation of China's WTO obligations and commitments made
during the 2012 U.S.-China Joint Commission on Commerce and
Trade. Weak protection of intellectual property (IP) rights and
policies encouraging Chinese acquisition of technology have led
China to account for a reported 50 to 80 percent of
international IP theft. New information this year revealed a
massive cyber theft operation controlled by the People's
Liberation Army. Problems with the rule of law contributed to
ongoing food and product safety problems, including the cross-
border movement of hazardous and illegal products.
The Commission observed ongoing noncompliance with
standards for fair trial rights and the right to be free from
arbitrary detention and torture as set forth in the ICCPR and
the UDHR, as described in this year's Criminal Justice section.
The revised PRC Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) took effect on
January 1, 2013; while the new CPL is, for the most part, an
improvement over its predecessor, it fails to clearly stipulate
the rights to remain silent and to be presumed innocent, and
the right not to incriminate oneself. Article 73 of the new CPL
legalizes enforced disappearance (up to six months) in
contravention of international standards. Chinese authorities
continue to use the criminal justice system to suppress dissent
and punish activists and their family members--the criminal
detention of prominent rights activist Xu Zhiyong and the
jailing of Chen Kegui, the nephew of Chen Guangcheng, are just
two examples. The issue of confessions coerced through torture
and wrongful convictions was once again in the spotlight, but
it remains to be seen whether the CPL's new rule excluding the
use of illegally obtained evidence from criminal trials will
actually curb the use of torture in criminal investigations.
The Commission notes in the Freedom of Religion section
that the Chinese government's legal and policy framework for
religion violates international standards for freedom of
religion, including Article 18 of the UDHR. The PRC
Constitution limits citizens' ability to exercise their beliefs
by protecting only ``normal religious activities,'' and the
government continued to recognize only five religions--
Buddhism, Catholicism, Taoism, Islam, and Protestantism--for
limited state protections for religious activity. The
government and Party maintained strict ideological control and
oversight over religious groups, and a top official announced
all clergy would be registered with the government by the end
of 2013. Chinese citizens who sought to practice their faith
outside of state-approved parameters continued to face
harassment and detention. For example, Chinese officials
revoked the title of auxiliary bishop from bishop Thaddeus Ma
Daqin after he publicly withdrew from the state-run Catholic
Patriotic Association of China at his ordination ceremony. In
April 2013, a China-based magazine reported on claims of
torture and severe maltreatment of inmates at the Masanjia
Women's Reeducation Through Labor (RTL) Center in Liaoning
province, many of whom are believed to be Falun Gong
practitioners. Muslims were warned against going on Hajj
pilgrimages not organized by the government. The government
also continued to harass members of the Beijing Shouwang
Church, a Protestant house church in Beijing municipality, and
detained house church pastor Cao Nan and others for holding a
religious gathering in a public park in Shenzhen municipality.
The Commission observed that Chinese officials continued to
fail to respond to Tibetan grievances in a constructive manner,
instead dealing with the 65 Tibetan self-immolations that
occurred from September 2012 through July this year by
strengthening a security crackdown that has infringed on
Tibetans' freedom of expression, association, and movement, as
noted in the Tibet section. The self-immolations peaked in
November during the 18th Party Congress, prompting officials to
launch a troubling campaign to hold relatives, friends, and
associates of the self-immolators criminally liable. Some self-
immolators reportedly called for greater use of the Tibetan
language as they burned--an apparent indication of the
significant threat some Tibetans believe official policies pose
to Tibetan culture's vibrancy and viability. Officials
continued to emphasize economic development as the key to
achieving ``social stability,'' even though some initiatives
resulted in protests or alleged harm to local communities.
Talks between China and the Dalai Lama remained stalled, but
the publication of a Central Party School academic's remarks on
the potential benefits of improved relations with the Dalai
Lama suggested that some officials may be interested in greater
public discussion on the matter.
The Commission found that instances of unrest in the spring
and summer resulted in numerous deaths, with reported death
tolls ranging from dozens to 100 or possibly more, and raised
concerns about the failure of ethnic policy in the Xinjiang
Uyghur Autonomous Region to address the root causes of
instability. As discussed in the Xinjiang section, authorities
continued to rely on heavy-handed security measures, including
overly broad security sweeps targeting the general population
and top-down development that disproportionately excludes
Uyghurs, instead of pursuing inclusive, democratic policies
that respect religious, cultural, and linguistic rights.
Chinese officials violated Uyghurs' freedom of movement,
preventing Uyghur scholar Ilham Tohti from traveling abroad and
denying passports to some Uyghurs. News surfaced that
Mirhemitjan Muzepper had been sentenced to 11 years in prison
for serving as a translator for a Hong Kong media organization
reporting on the demolitions taking place in Kashgar's Old
City.
As discussed in the Ethnic Minority Rights section, some
Mongols continued to face harassment and imprisonment for
peaceful protest and assertions of cultural identity, and some
nomadic populations were forced to resettle away from
grasslands. Authorities continued to hold Mongol rights
advocate Hada in extralegal detention, denying him treatment
for serious mental health issues; and they ordered Batzangaa, a
former medical school principal who organized demonstrations to
protest the government's confiscation of campus property in the
Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, to begin serving a three-year
prison sentence.
China's policy of interfering with and controlling the
reproductive lives of Chinese citizens, including through
fines, withholding of benefits, and forced sterilizations and
abortions, continued to violate international human rights
standards, as noted in the Population Planning section. In
March 2013, China's new leaders merged the National Population
and Family Planning Commission with the Ministry of Health and
transferred the responsibility of developing population
planning policy to the National Development and Reform
Commission, a move some viewed as an opening for reform while
others saw it as strengthening the family planning system.
Calls for relaxing family planning policy continued, but local
authorities continued to aggressively push the policy, and news
and social media continued to publicize cases of forced
abortions and sterilizations across China.
Chinese authorities continued to enforce a household
registration (hukou) system that denies citizens their right to
freely determine their permanent place of residence, and
contributes to instability by discriminating against rural
migrants living in cities by denying them social services
because they lack urban hukous. As described in the Freedom of
Residence and Movement section, top officials announced that a
plan to reform the system would be unveiled by the end of 2013
as part of a larger push for urbanization to sustain China's
economic growth. Some officials experimented with policies to
expand educational and employment opportunities for rural
migrants in cities, but experts have said many local
governments lack the resources to fully implement such reforms.
China continued to deny its citizens the right to freely leave
the country by denying passports to a growing number of
politically sensitive individuals, including Tibetans, Uyghurs,
and political activists and their family members. Human rights
groups estimate that at least 14 million people may be
affected. Liu Xia, the wife of the imprisoned 2010 Nobel Peace
Prize laureate Liu Xiaobo, continued to be confined to her
home, one of many ``politically sensitive'' individuals denied
domestic freedom of movement.
The Commission observed that China continued to fall short
of commitments in the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination against Women to ensure female
representation in government. As noted in the Status of Women
section, female representation at all levels of government
continued to be low and did not markedly improve following the
leadership transition. Gender discrimination in education and
employment remains widespread. New national-level domestic
violence legislation promised in state-run media reports has
not materialized, and young female rape victims received
inadequate legal protection under the PRC Criminal Law.
China has taken some steps to comply with the UN Protocol
to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons,
Especially Women and Children, including the issuance of a new
national anti-trafficking action plan this year, as discussed
in the Trafficking section. After nine consecutive years on the
Tier 2 Watch List, China was in June automatically downgraded
to Tier 3, the lowest tier ranking, in the U.S. State
Department's 2013 Trafficking in Persons Report. Men, women,
and children continue to be trafficked to, from, and within
China for purposes including forced labor, forced marriage, and
sexual exploitation.
In the North Korean Refugees in China section, the
Commission noted that China continued to violate the 1951 UN
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967
Protocol by detaining and repatriating North Korean refugees to
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea despite the severe
punishments they face once returned. The Chinese government, in
concert with North Korean officials, appeared to strengthen
measures to stem the flow of North Korean refugees into China.
North Korean women in China continued to be trafficked into
forced marriage and commercial sexual exploitation. China
continued to violate the Convention on the Rights of the Child
by repatriating North Korean women and separating them from
their children born in China.
The Commission observed in the Environment section that
China faced severe pollution problems but still refused to
provide full transparency to its citizens or fully empower
citizens through law to enforce their rights. China's open
government information regulations require governments to
release information on the environment. Officials were more
forthcoming about the linkage between toxic chemicals and
``cancer villages'' and began to disclose abridged versions of
environmental impact statements, but they refused to release
information on soil pollution, claiming such information was a
``state secret'' in response to at least one citizen's request.
Citizens continued to be largely marginalized in the
policymaking process, as authorities detained environmental
advocates such as Liu Futang and Chen Yuqian, suppressed anti-
pollution demonstrations, and narrowed provisions in a new
draft of the Environmental Protection Law to allow only a
single government-
affiliated environmental organization to file public interest
suits under the law.
China continued to deny citizens the right to participate
in public affairs directly or through freely chosen
representatives and to vote in genuine elections by universal
and equal suffrage, a standard set forth in Article 21 of the
UDHR and Article 25 of the ICCPR. As discussed in the
Institutions of Democratic Governance section, China's new
leaders were chosen in an opaque, non-democratic process. At
all levels, from the judiciary and the National People's
Congress to the media and universities, the Chinese Communist
Party continued to dominate political affairs. Authorities
continued to detain or sentence democracy advocates, including
Cao Haibo and Liu Benqi, who joined a growing list of those
punished in recent years. The Chinese government continued to
show little tolerance for citizens considered to be politically
sensitive who sought to participate in public affairs. For
example, authorities arrested Peng Lanlan and harassed others
for seeking information regarding China's submission for its
Universal Periodic Review before the UN Human Rights Council in
October 2013. Authorities also arrested at least 25
anticorruption and social justice advocates who called for
officials to make public their personal assets or advocated on
other issues.
In the Civil Society section, the Commission found that the
Chinesegovernment'soverly broadrestrictionson non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) and informal citizen networks continued to
fail to comply with freedom of association standards, as
provided under Article 20 of the UDHR and Article 22 of the
ICCPR. The government and Party reaffirmed their control over
the development of NGOs in China, expressing preference to
groups perceived to support economic growth or provide social
welfare services, but harassing those engaged in issue advocacy
or matters the government deems politically sensitive. The
government pledged to issue long-awaited regulatory changes by
the end of 2013 to make it easier for certain types of groups
to register with the government, but excluded political, legal,
religious, and foreign NGOs.
The Access to Justice section highlighted the Chinese
government's lack of tolerance for citizens seeking effective
remedies to official violations of their rights, contrary to
Article 8 of the UDHR and Article 2 of the ICCPR. During the
18th Party Congress in November 2012, officials reportedly
ordered rights advocates, petitioners, and Falun Gong
practitioners to serve reeducation through labor (RTL) to
achieve ``zero petitioning'' and prevent protest in Beijing
during that period. Widespread media, scholarly, and government
attention has focused on the Chinese government's vague
statements about reform of the RTL system, possibly by the end
of this year. Harassment of rights defenders, political
activists, and their families continued, and prominent human
rights advocates Gao Zhisheng and Ni Yulan continued to serve
prison sentences. In spite of the increasing number of
individuals reportedly receiving legal aid, the arrest in
August 2013 of legal advocate Xu Zhiyong on trumped-up charges
of ``gathering a crowd to disrupt public order'' highlighted
the government's concerns over independent efforts to secure
justice. Xu had founded the non-governmental organization Open
Constitution Initiative in 2003, which authorities banned in
2009, and is a leading proponent of the New Citizens' Movement,
a broad network of individuals promoting legal and political
reforms, human rights, and social justice, among other causes.
The Commission noted in the Public Health section that
international health organizations commended China's effective
response to the H7N9 avian influenza outbreak in March 2013 and
China's progress in building an emergency response structure in
the decade since the 2003 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
(SARS) outbreak. The Chinese public, however, continued to
express concerns over the government's capacity to protect
public health and regulate food and drug safety. China's first
Mental Health Law was passed in October 2012 and took effect in
May 2013. Concerns remained regarding the lack of a guaranteed
right to appeal hospitalization and safeguards to prevent the
continued abuse of psychiatric commitment to punish
petitioners, political activists, and others. The government
also issued draft revisions of regulations on education for
persons with disabilities, for which civil society
organizations urged more precise definitions and amendments to
comply with the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities. Despite laws prohibiting it, health-based
discrimination in access to education, medical treatment, and
employment remained widespread.
In the Developments in Hong Kong and Macau section, the
Commission noted that Hong Kong officials dismissed calls for a
early public consultation on electoral reform for the election
of the Chief Executive (CE) by universal suffrage, which is set
to occur in 2017, despite concern from the UN Human Rights
Committee over the ``lack of a clear plan to institute
universal suffrage.'' Statements from mainland Chinese
officials ruled out a CE nominating process involving the
broader voting public and stated that CE candidates in an
election by universal suffrage would be required to be trusted
by the central government. The Hong Kong government postponed a
measure that would have made information about company
directors less transparent. Mainland experts and officials
continued to dissuade Macau from pursuing universal suffrage.
The Chinese government and Macau officials reportedly stepped
up efforts to regulate Macau's gambling industry as part of a
larger campaign against corruption.
To fulfill the Commission's mandate to compile and maintain
lists of persons believed to be imprisoned, detained, placed
under house arrest, tortured, or otherwise persecuted by the
Chinese government due to the pursuit of internationally
recognized human rights, the Commission maintains an extensive
database of political prisoners in China. According to the
Political Prisoner Database section, as of September 1, 2013,
the Commission staff had documented 1,304 cases of political
and religious prisoners currently known or believed to be
detained or imprisoned, and 6,005 cases of prisoners who are
known or believed to have been released or executed, who died
while imprisoned or soon after release, or who escaped. The
Commission notes that these numbers reflect the efforts by the
Commission's staff to document cases for which information is
publicly available and that the actual number of cases of
current political and religious imprisonment in China is likely
to be much higher.
The Commission's Executive Branch members have participated
in and supported the work of the Commission. The content of
this Annual Report, including its findings, views, and
recommendations, does not necessarily reflect the views of
individual Executive Branch members or the policies of the
Administration.
The Commission adopted this report by a vote of 14 to
0.
Specific Findings and Recommendations
A summary of specific findings follows below for each
section of this Annual Report, covering each area that the
Commission monitors. In each area, the Commission has
identified a set of issues that merit attention over the next
year, and, in accordance with the Commission's legislative
mandate, submits for each a set of recommendations to the
President and the Congress for legislative or executive action.
Freedom of Expression
Findings
During the Commission's 2013 reporting year,
Chinese officials continued to maintain a broad range
of restrictions on free expression that do not comply
with international human rights standards, including
Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and Articles 19 and 29 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. While such
standards permit states in limited circumstances to
restrict expression to protect interests such as
national security and public order, official Chinese
restrictions covered a much broader range of activity,
including peaceful dissent and expression critical of
the Communist Party.
According to the China Internet Network
Information Center (CNNIC), the national-level
administrative agency responsible for Internet affairs
in China, there were over 590 million Internet users in
China by the end of June 2013, bringing the Internet
penetration rate (i.e., the total number of Internet
users divided by the total population) to 44.1 percent.
The Chinese government has pledged to expand access to
mobile technologies and to increase government control
over the Internet.
During the 2013 reporting year, China's
Twitter-like microblogging sites continued to see
strong growth in the number of users. China's
microblogging sites--including China's most popular
microblog site, Sina Weibo--experienced dramatic growth
with 309 million registered accounts at the end of
2012.
The Chinese government reportedly increased
pressure on certain popular users of microblogging
services, including those who have posted blunt social
criticisms or political commentaries. The growing
popularity of services has allowed some microbloggers
to reach millions of users and to potentially shape
public opinion. With growing concern about ``online
rumors,'' Chinese Internet authorities responded with a
crackdown on high profile accounts and with a list of
``seven bottom lines'' for online activity. Some have
alleged the crackdown on prominent microblog users is
politically based.
While international and domestic observers
continued to note the vibrancy of Internet and cell
phone use in China, Chinese government and Communist
Party officials showed little sign of loosening
political control. Chinese officials remained non-
transparent in disclosing content that is blocked or
why it is blocked, and officials continued to block
content arbitrarily for purposes impermissible under
international standards. The online censorship and Web
site closures, in some cases, appeared politically
motivated and appeared to counter international
standards on freedom of opinion and expression.
Officials continued to restrict expression
arbitrarily by abusing vague criminal law provisions,
and imposing broad regulations and registration
requirements on journalists, publishers, news media,
and Internet users.
Government and Party officials continue to
exercise control over the press in violation of
international standards. A January 2013 strike at the
Southern Weekend, a progressive weekly newspaper in
Guangdong province, sparked public outrage and
highlighted the media's lack of editorial independence.
This past year the Commission continued to
monitor harassment of domestic and foreign journalists
in China. Chinese authorities, for instance, took
actions to punish or suspend journalists for
independent reporting. In other instances, foreign and
Hong Kong journalists were harassed, intimidated, or
assaulted.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Raise concerns over and draw enhanced international
attention to the Chinese government's continued
insistence that its restrictions on freedom of
expression are consistent with international standards.
Emphasize that the Chinese government's position
undermines international human rights standards for
free expression, particularly those contained in
Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and Articles 19 and 29 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
Emphasize to Chinese officials that Communist Party
and government censorship of the Internet and the press
can lead to instability by eroding public faith in the
media and government.
Engage in dialogue and exchanges with Chinese
officials on the issue of how governments can best
ensure that restrictions on freedom of expression are
not abused and do not exceed the scope necessary to
protect national security, minors, and public order.
Emphasize the importance of procedural protections such
as public participation in the formulation of
restrictions on free expression, transparency regarding
the implementation of such restrictions, and the
independent review of such restrictions.
Urge Chinese officials to implement their calls for
greater transparency and public participation in
lawmaking. Such discussions may be part of a broader
discussion on how the U.S. and Chinese Governments can
work together to ensure the protection of common
interests on the Internet, including protecting minors,
computer security, and privacy.
Acknowledge the Chinese government's efforts to
expand access to the Internet and cell phones,
especially in rural areas, while continuing to press
officials to comply with international standards.
Support the research and development of technologies
that enable Chinese citizens to access and share
political and religious content that they are entitled
to access and share under international human rights
standards. Support practices and Chinese-language tools
and training materials that enable Chinese citizens to
access and share content in a way that ensures their
security and privacy. Support the dissemination of
online Chinese-language information on the Internet,
especially through popular Chinese social media sites,
that discusses the rights and freedoms to which Chinese
citizens are entitled under international standards.
Elevate concern over the increased harassment of
foreign journalists, who this past year have been
beaten. Raise concerns over reports that authorities
repeatedly have delayed or denied the approval of
journalists' visa applications.
Worker Rights
Findings
During the Commission's 2013 reporting year,
the Chinese government continued to prevent workers
from exercising their constitutional right to freedom
of association. Workers in China are not guaranteed,
either by law or in practice, full worker rights in
accordance with international standards, including the
right to organize into independent unions. The All-
China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), the official
union under the direction of the Communist Party, is
the only legal trade union organization in China.
Authorities continued this past year to promote direct
elections of trade union representatives, although
questions remained over the ability of elections to
engender genuinely representative unions because of
continued management influence over candidate selection
and restrictions on worker participation in the
election process.
Genuine collective bargaining remains limited
by the inability of local-level trade unions to
effectively represent and advance the rights of workers
in negotiations with employers and a lack of
alternative union organizations to the ACFTU. Despite
the ACFTU's promotion of collective contracts and
collective wage bargaining in recent years, the
collective contract and consultation process remains
problematic in part because trade unions lack autonomy
and genuine worker representation.
The Commission continued to observe reports in
the past year of workers organizing strikes and
demonstrations in a variety of industries and regions
across China, often prompted by systemic labor-related
grievances, such as factory closings or relocations,
nonpayment of wages and benefits, and abusive
management practices. Official unions at the local
level frequently opposed worker-led actions and did not
play an organizing role in them, while media reports
indicated that government officials in some cases used
force against or detained demonstrating workers.
Changing demographic and economic shifts in
recent years have provided workers with greater
bargaining power in the workplace, increasing their
determination to redress grievances with employers and
press for better pay and working conditions. Moreover,
growing expectations of younger generation migrant
workers with regard to working conditions and labor
rights are seen as a driving factor behind the
increased assertiveness of recent protests.
Migrant workers remained largely marginalized
and vulnerable to exploitation in the workplace, facing
problems such as wage arrears, social discrimination,
and low levels of labor and social welfare protection.
Working predominately in low-end industries requiring
little technical skill, migrants face increased risk
for occupational injury and disease.
Despite China's laws and commitments under
international standards prohibiting child labor, the
use of underage workers remained evident in the
electronics manufacturing industry, with instances also
reported in other sectors. Systemic problems in
enforcement and a lack of sufficient resources
reportedly continue to constrain efforts to reduce
child labor.
Subcontracted workers hired through labor
employment agencies remain particularly vulnerable to
exploitation in the workplace, often receiving lower
wages and fewer benefits than workers hired through
direct labor contracts with employers. A series of
amendments to the PRC Labor Contract Law, passed in
December 2012, contain provisions that could help
reform labor subcontracting practices. Continued poor
enforcement and opposition by some state-owned
enterprises and national- and local-level government
offices, however, could weaken those reforms.
Average wage levels in China continued to
increase this past year, with reports suggesting that
structural changes in China's labor market, in
particular a decline in the working age population, in
combination with sporadic labor shortages and the
relocation of manufacturing operations further inland
or to Southeast Asia, signify the decline of ``cheap
labor'' in China.
Despite continued wage growth, income
inequality among different regions and industrial
sections has also increased, greatly expanding the
disparity between rich and poor. China's State Council
released a long-awaited income distribution plan in
February 2013 that seeks to reduce income inequality
and increase household income. However, observers
questioned whether it can be fully implemented.
Wage arrears and nonpayment of wages remained
serious problems this past year, particularly for
migrant workers. International media reports throughout
2013 indicated that wage arrears were a primary factor
behind worker-led protests, especially in the weeks
prior to the Chinese Lunar New Year holiday.
Chinese workers, especially those in the coal
mining sector, continued to face persistent
occupational safety and health risks. Fatalities have
been consistently reduced over the past few years, but
officially reported cases of disease have increased
during the same period. Despite legal measures aimed at
preventing workplace accidents and establishing a
regulatory system to inspect and handle safety
violations, systemic problems in implementation and
enforcement, as well as the lack of meaningful worker
participation in workplace decisions that impact safety
and health, continue to constrain efforts to reduce
industrial accidents.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Support projects promoting reform of Chinese labor
laws and regulations to reflect internationally
recognized labor principles. Prioritize projects that
not only focus on legislative drafting and regulatory
development but also develop knowledge, expertise, and
practical solutions to comply with internationally
recognized labor principles at the enterprise level.
Engage in dialogue with government officials,
workers, and trade union officials in locations that
have achieved successful cases of collective
bargaining; identify ways to increase awareness of
those experiences; and convey those experiences to
officials and trade unions in areas that have had less
success with collective bargaining. Where possible,
prioritize programs that demonstrate the ability to
conduct collective bargaining pilot projects in
enterprises with no functioning union present.
Convey support for the effective use of worker-
management committees, functioning collective
bargaining, and direct elections of trade union
representatives. Engage in dialogue with government and
trade union officials, as well as employers to identify
opportunities to increase awareness of successful
experiences with direct elections of trade union
representatives and to provide elected trade union
officials with ongoing training and support. Support
the U.S. Department of Labor's (USDOL) exchange with
the China National Coal Association regarding industry
regulatory compliance, worker representation at coal
mines, and safety and health improvements.
Encourage the expansion of exchanges between U.S.
collective bargaining practitioners and Chinese labor
rights advocates in non-governmental organizations, the
bar, academia, and the official trade union. Prioritize
exchanges that emphasize face-to-face meetings with
hands-on practitioners and trainers.
Support capacity-building programs to strengthen
Chinese labor and legal aid organizations involved in
defending the rights of workers. Encourage Chinese
officials at local levels to develop, maintain, and
deepen relationships with labor organizations inside
and outside of China, and to invite these groups to
increase the number of training programs in China.
Support programs that train workers in ways to identify
problems at the factory-floor level, conducting skills
and problem-solving training so they can communicate
their concern to employers effectively.
Where appropriate, share the United States' ongoing
experience and efforts in protecting worker rights--
through legal, regulatory, or non-governmental means--
with Chinese officials. Expand site visits and other
exchanges for Chinese officials to observe and share
ideas with U.S. labor rights groups, lawyers, the
USDOL, and other regulatory agencies at all levels of
the U.S. Government that work on labor issues.
Support USDOL's exchange with China's Ministry of
Human Resources and Social Security with regard to
setting and enforcing minimum wage standards;
strengthening social insurance; improving employment
statistics; and promoting dialogue and exchanges with
China's State Administration of Work Safety (SAWS)
regarding improving workplace safety and health.
Support the annual labor dialogue with China that USDOL
started in 2010 and the annual safety dialogue started
in 2012. Support USDOL's technical cooperation program
with SAWS on workplace safety and health and the
expansion of mining cooperation into broad occupational
safety and health areas. Support pilot projects that
establish public-private partnerships to address
workplace safety and health concerns, and the
introduction of meaningful worker participation in
management decisions important to workplace safety and
health.
Criminal Justice
Findings
The revised PRC Criminal Procedure Law (CPL)
took effect on January 1, 2013. While the law as
written has many positive aspects, it fails to
stipulate an explicit right to remain silent and right
not to incriminate oneself; nor does it provide a clear
right to the presumption of innocence as required by
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and
the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR).
If implemented effectively, the revised CPL
will enhance the ability of lawyers to better defend
their clients and further the rights of detained
criminal suspects and defendants, for example, by
facilitating meetings between lawyers and their
detained clients. Preliminary reports based on limited
data suggest that lawyers are finding it easier to meet
with their detained clients, but that some problems
remain.
Chinese authorities continue to use vaguely
defined crimes to suppress and punish dissent and
perceived challenges to Chinese Communist Party rule.
In addition to Article 105 of the PRC Criminal Law,
which criminalizes ``subversion'' and ``inciting
subversion,'' during this reporting year authorities
made ample use of vague crimes such as ``unlawful
assembly'' and ``gathering people to disturb public
order'' to suppress rights advocates and civil society
activists. Public security officers arrested prominent
rights activist Xu Zhiyong on August 22 on suspicion of
``gathering people to disturb public order.''
Chinese officials continue to harass and
arbitrarily detain rights advocates, civil society
activists, writers, lawyers, bloggers, and ordinary
citizens who advocate for their own rights or the
rights of others. They may be sentenced to prison for
the peaceful exercise of their internationally
recognized human rights, or subjected to various forms
of arbitrary or extralegal detention, including
confinement in ``black jails,'' administrative
detention facilities including reeducation through
labor (RTL) centers, unlawful confinement in their
homes, or enforced disappearance.
The issue of confessions coerced through
torture and wrongful convictions garnered a great deal
of attention during this reporting year as case after
case surfaced and senior judicial officials condemned
the practice. The revised CPL contains new provisions
for the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence from
criminal trials, which, if implemented effectively,
could lead to a reduction in the number of coerced
confessions and wrongful convictions.
Despite the Chinese government's continued
efforts to address the problem, torture and abuse in
places of detention in China remain widespread. In
April, a Chinese magazine published a detailed account
of torture, abuse, and forced labor at the Masanjia
Women's Reeducation Through Labor Center in Liaoning
province, which fuelled calls for reform of the RTL
system. Torture and the abuse of individuals detained
in connection with the campaign against organized crime
in Chongqing municipality carried out by Bo Xilai, the
former Communist Party Secretary of Chongqing, have
gradually come to light. While some initial steps have
been taken to provide redress to some of those
wrongfully accused and convicted during the campaign,
much more remains to be done.
Although the Chinese government continues to
treat data on the use of the death penalty as a state
secret, estimates suggest that the number is steadily
decreasing. Organs are still harvested from executed
prisoners. In March 2013, the Ministry of Health and
the Chinese Red Cross formally launched a national
voluntary organ donation system, and in August, a
senior health official reportedly announced that within
two years China would cease relying on organs of
executed criminals for organ transplants.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Urge the Chinese government to publicly commit to a
specific timetable for ratification of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), which the Chinese government signed in 1998
but has not yet ratified.
Encourage the Chinese government to move forward on
its stated goal to cease using the reeducation through
labor (RTL) system and urge the Chinese government to
also abolish other forms of extrajudicial
administrative detention, and ensure that the rights of
Chinese citizens to a fair trial and due process of law
under the UDHR and the ICCPR are guaranteed.
Call on the Chinese government to release all Chinese
citizens who have been detained or imprisoned for the
lawful exercise of their fundamental human rights of
freedom of expression, association, and peaceful
assembly, as well as the right to be free from
arbitrary detention, including rights advocates Xu
Zhiyong, Ni Yulan, Gao Zhisheng, and Wang Bingzhang.
Press the government to release relatives of activists
who have been unlawfully confined or imprisoned because
of the lawful exercise of human rights by their family
members, such as Liu Xia, the wife of Liu Xiaobo, and
Chen Kegui, nephew of Chen Guangcheng.
Press China to sign and ratify the International
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from
Enforced Disappearance and to extend an invitation to
the UN Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary
Disappearances to visit China, which issued a request
to visit in February 2013.
Support programs and international cooperation on
issues relating to the investigation of crimes,
including evidence collection, in order to reduce
Chinese law enforcement agencies' reliance on
confessions in criminal cases.
Freedom of Religion
Findings
The Chinese government's legal and policy
framework for religion violates international human
rights standards for freedom of religion, including
Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. Although the PRC Constitution states that all
citizens enjoy ``freedom of religious belief,'' it
limits citizens' ability to exercise their beliefs by
protecting only ``normal religious activities.'' The
government continued to recognize only five religions--
Buddhism, Catholicism, Taoism, Islam, and
Protestantism--for limited state protections for
religious activity, and the government has continued to
outlaw some belief systems, thereby denying members of
these communities the right to practice their faith
openly and without fear of government reprisal.
Strict ideological control and government
oversight over religious groups was maintained through
religious affairs bureaus, the Communist Party's United
Front Work Department, and the five ``patriotic''
religious associations, one for each of the recognized
religions. All clergy and religious organizations are
required to be registered with the government. A top
religious official announced that all clergy would be
registered by the end of 2013. This past year, central
government officials also announced a plan to loosen
some registration and administrative hurdles on social
organizations that explicitly excluded religious
organizations.
Officials continued to monitor, control,
restrict, and ``guide'' the religious activities of
Buddhists in non-Tibetan areas of China, with a top
official urging Buddhists to ``embrace the leadership
of the Party.'' At least three sects of Buddhism
continue to be banned as cults.
Observers contend Chinese policies have
divided Chinese Catholics into ``official'' and
``underground'' churches. Catholics in China continue
to be denied the freedom to accept the authority of the
Holy See to select bishops, and a new regulation on the
selection of bishops that took effect in April 2013
expands the state's role in the selection process and
explicitly requires bishop candidates to ``endorse the
Chinese Communist Party's leadership and the socialist
system.'' Officials at state-run Catholic organizations
announced in December a decision to revoke the title of
auxiliary bishop from bishop Thaddeus Ma Daqin after he
publicly withdrew from the state-run Catholic Patriotic
Association at his ordination ceremony in July 2012.
Clergy continue to be detained for their underground
activity or refusal to join the patriotic association,
including priest Song Wanjun.
The Commission continued to observe reports of
officials sentencing Falun Gong practitioners to long
prison terms, harassing lawyers who attempted to assist
Falun Gong practitioners, and pressuring practitioners
to renounce their beliefs. The Commission also observed
reports this past year regarding official anti-cult
efforts that placed an emphasis on the need to educate
the public to ``resist'' Falun Gong. In April 2013, an
article published in the China-based Lens Magazine
reported on claims of severe torture and maltreatment
of inmates at the Masanjia Women's Reeducation Through
Labor Center in Liaoning province, many of whom are
believed to be Falun Gong practitioners.
Chinese authorities continued to place curbs
on Muslims' ability to practice their religion and to
emphasize the role of Islamic clergy in promoting state
policies. Authorities also continued to regulate the
confirmation of Islamic religious leaders and to
monitor overseas pilgrimages in furtherance of state
policy. Islamic clergy at a certification ceremony in
February 2013 were told to ``resolve to become
politically reliable,'' and local authorities
throughout the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR)
warned religious believers against going on Hajj
pilgrimages not organized by the government.
Authorities in charge of religious affairs sought to
portray violent clashes that took place in the spring
and summer of 2013 throughout the XUAR as acts inspired
by ``religious extremism,'' and urged Muslim clergy to
work against ``religious extremist forces.''
The Chinese government continued to control
the doctrine and activities of its official Protestant
church and target members of unregistered house
churches for harassment, detention, and other forms of
abuse. The government continued its efforts to prohibit
worship gatherings of the Beijing Shouwang Church, a
house church of over 1,000 congregants in Beijing
municipality, denying the church's appeal against local
public security officials for preventing the church
from moving into property it had purchased. State-
sanctioned raids on house churches continued. In April
2013, local authorities raided a house church in Alxa
League, Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, firing tear
gas, detaining members of the congregation, and beating
others. Officials in Shenzhen municipality detained
house church pastor Cao Nan and others for holding a
religious gathering in a public park, and officials in
Shanxi province sentenced Li Wenxi and Ren Lancheng for
``illegal business operations'' in connection with the
printing and selling of religious publications.
The Chinese Taoist Association continued to
work with the Chinese government to ensure that Taoist
religious groups ``uphold the leadership of the
Communist Party and the socialist system.'' At a
November meeting, a top religious official reminded
Taoist leaders that ``studying and putting into
practice the spirit of the 18th Party Congress is the
chief political task for religious communities for the
coming period of time.''
Despite lacking formal central government
recognition, some religious communities have been able
to operate inside China and continue to appeal to the
Chinese government for greater recognition.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Call on the Chinese government to guarantee to all
citizens freedom of religion in accordance with Article
18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and to
remove the government's framework for recognizing only
select religious communities for limited state
protections. Stress to Chinese authorities that China's
ideological ``guidance'' of religious groups and the
general public violates its citizens' freedom of
religious belief, and that China's limited protections
for ``normal religious activities'' do not meet
international standards for freedom of religion. Stress
to the Chinese government that the right to freedom of
religion includes: The right of Buddhists to carry out
activities in temples independent of state controls
over religion, the right of Buddhist clergy to select
monastic teachers under Buddhist procedures and
standards, and the right of Tibetan Buddhists to
express openly their respect or devotion to Tibetan
Buddhist teachers, including the Dalai Lama; the right
of Catholics to recognize the authority of the Holy See
in matters relating to the practice of their faith,
including to make bishop appointments; the right of
Falun Gong practitioners to freely practice Falun Gong
inside China; the right of Muslims to engage in
religious outreach and preaching activities independent
of state-set parameters and not face curbs on their
internationally protected right to freedom of religion
in the name of ``upholding stability''; the right of
Protestants to worship free from state controls over
doctrine and to worship in unregistered house churches,
free from harassment, detention, and other abuses; the
right of Taoists to interpret their teachings free from
government guidance.
Call for the release of Chinese citizens confined,
detained, or imprisoned in retaliation for pursuing
their right to freedom of religion (including the right
to hold and exercise spiritual beliefs). Such prisoners
include: Sonam Lhatso (a Tibetan Buddhist nun sentenced
in 2009 to 10 years' imprisonment after she and other
nuns staged a protest calling for Tibetan independence
and the Dalai Lama's long life and return to Tibet);
Thaddeus Ma Daqin (the auxiliary bishop of the Shanghai
diocese who has been under confinement since July 2012
for renouncing his affiliation with the Catholic
Patriotic Association); Wang Zhiwen (a Falun Gong
practitioner serving a 16-year sentence for organizing
peaceful protests by Falun Gong practitioners in 1999);
Nurtay Memet (a Muslim man sentenced to five years'
imprisonment for ``superstition''-related activity
connected to his religion); Fan Yafeng (a legal
scholar, religious freedom advocate, and house church
leader kept under home confinement since November 2010
in connection with his advocacy for unregistered
Protestant communities and coinciding with a broader
crackdown on rights advocates); and other prisoners
mentioned in this report and in the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database.
Call on authorities to allow Chinese lawyers to
freely take cases involving religious freedom.
Call on officials to eliminate criminal and
administrative penalties that target religions and
spiritual movements and that have been used to punish
Chinese citizens for exercising their right to freedom
of religion. Specifically, call for officials to
abolish Article 300 of the PRC Criminal Law (which
criminalizes using a ``cult'' to undermine
implementation of state laws) and Article 27 of the PRC
Public Security Administration Punishment Law (which
stipulates detention or fines for organizing or
inciting others to engage in ``cult'' activities and
for using ``cults'' or the ``guise of religion'' to
disturb social order or to harm others' health).
Promote legal exchanges that bring Chinese experts to
the United States and American experts to China to
increase knowledge of international human rights
standards for the protection of freedom of religion.
Promote cultural exchanges that engage Chinese
intellectuals in discussions regarding freedom of
religion. Support non-governmental organizations that
collect information on conditions for religious freedom
in China and that inform Chinese citizens how to defend
their right to freedom of religion. Support
organizations that help religious practitioners appeal
prison sentences and orders to serve reeducation
through labor stemming from citizens' exercise of
freedom of religion; challenge government seizure of
property; and challenge job discrimination based on
religion.
Collaborate with the governments of countries that
have trade ties with China and that value freedom of
religion, to advocate for freedom of religion within
China.
Ethnic Minority Rights
Findings
During the 2013 reporting year, ethnic
minorities faced challenges to their rights as provided
in the PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law and
international law. Authorities placed the strictest
controls over groups perceived as potential threats to
``stability,'' including those living in the Tibet
Autonomous Region (TAR) and other Tibetan autonomous
areas, the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR),
and the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region (IMAR).
Authorities continued to detain, harass, and imprison
ethnic minority rights advocates who engaged in
peaceful protest and sought to assert their unique
cultural identity.
Government authorities continued to enforce
grasslands policies that require herders and nomads to
resettle in urban areas or in larger, compact rural
communities, portraying these developments as a move to
improve and ``modernize'' the lives of Mongols,
Tibetans, Kazakhs, and other minority groups and to
combat grasslands degradation.
In several instances in 2013, Mongol herders
protested the appropriation of their grazing lands for
military use and private development projects. Security
personnel detained and beat some of the herders, and
obstructed the protests.
Critics of official grasslands policies in the
IMAR have raised concerns over increased mining
activities and a corresponding loss of water and the
production of toxic wastewater.
During the 2013 reporting year, authorities in
the IMAR continued to hold Mongol rights advocate Hada
in extralegal detention and to deny him treatment for
serious mental health issues. Authorities in Hohhot
city, IMAR, tightened restrictions on the freedoms of
movement and communication of Hada's wife, Xinna, and
the couple's son, Uiles.
In April 2013, authorities arrested Batzangaa,
a former medical school principal who had been under
residential surveillance in Ordos municipality, IMAR,
since January 2011. Authorities alleged that Batzangaa
was attempting to flee the country with his wife and
two children. Following his April 2013 arrest,
authorities reportedly ordered Batzangaa, who organized
demonstrations in 2009 to protest against the
government's confiscation of campus property, to begin
serving a three-year prison sentence.
On July 4, 2013, authorities in Uzumchin Right
(Dongwuzhumuqin) Banner, Xilingol League, IMAR,
reportedly arrested Yunshaabiin Seevendoo, who had
advocated for the rights of Mongol herders, on fraud
charges. Family members reportedly said his health has
deteriorated during his detention.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Support non-governmental organizations that address
human rights conditions for ethnic minorities in China,
enabling them to continue their research and develop
programs to help ethnic minorities increase their
capacity to protect their rights. Encourage such
organizations to develop training programs on promoting
economic development that includes consultation with
and the participation of ethnic minority communities;
to develop programs to protect ethnic minority
languages, cultures, and livelihoods; and to develop
programs that document conditions and research rights
abuses in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region,
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, Tibet Autonomous
Region, and other autonomous ethnic minority areas.
Support rule of law programs and exchange programs
that raise awareness among Chinese leaders of different
models for governance that protect ethnic minorities'
rights and allow them to exercise meaningful autonomy
over their affairs, in line with both Chinese law and
international human rights standards.
Call on the Chinese government to examine the
efficacy of existing grasslands policies in
ameliorating environmental degradation and to take
steps to ensure that the rights of herders are also
protected.
Call on the Chinese government to investigate the
loss of groundwater and the production of toxic
wastewater due to mining activities in the IMAR, and to
ensure that mining companies operating in the region
adhere to state environmental regulations.
Call on the Chinese government to release people
detained, imprisoned, or otherwise held in custody for
advocating ethnic minority rights, including Mongol
rights advocate Hada, former medical school principal
Batzangaa, herders' rights advocate Yunshaabiin
Seevendoo, and other prisoners mentioned in this report
and in the Commission's Political Prisoner Database.
Population Planning
Findings
In March 2013, China's new leadership unveiled
a plan for restructuring agencies within the State
Council, and part of this plan involves merging the
National Population and Family Planning Commission
(NPFPC) and the Ministry of Health. The restructure
combines most of the responsibilities of the previous
two organizations into a new ``National Health and
Family Planning Commission,'' but transfers the
responsibility of creating population development
policies and strategies--previously held by the NPFPC--
to the National Development and Reform Commission. The
full impact of these changes on China's family planning
policies and their implementation remains to be seen.
Meanwhile, government leaders, experts, scholars, and
citizens continued calls this year for population
policy reform.
Chinese government officials continued to
implement population planning policies that interfere
with and control the reproductive lives of Chinese
citizens, especially women. Officials employed various
methods including fines, withholding of social benefits
and permits, forced sterilization, forced abortion, and
arbitrary detention to punish policy violators.
The PRC Population and Family Planning Law is
not consistent with the standards set forth in
international agreements, including the 1995 Beijing
Declaration and the 1994 Programme of Action of the
Cairo International Conference on Population and
Development. Controls imposed on Chinese women and
their families, and additional abuses engendered by the
system, from forced abortion to discriminatory policies
against ``out-of-plan'' children, also violate
standards in the Convention on the Rights of the Child
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights. China is a state party to these
treaties and has committed to upholding their terms.
Chinese law prohibits official infringement
upon the rights and interests of citizens while
implementing population planning policies but does not
define what constitutes a citizen's right or interest.
Chinese law does not stipulate punishment for officials
who demand or implement forced abortions. Provincial
population planning regulations in at least 22 of
China's 31 provinces explicitly endorse mandatory
abortions, often referred to as a ``remedial measure''
(bujiu cuoshi), as an official policy instrument.
The Chinese government's population planning
policies continue to exacerbate the country's
demographic challenges, which include an aging
population, diminishing workforce, and skewed sex
ratio.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Urge the Chinese government to seize the window of
opportunity provided by the government restructuring
and specifically the merger of the NPFPC and the
Ministry of Health to cease restrictive family planning
policies and population controls and begin to employ a
human rights-based approach to providing greater
reproductive freedom and privacy for all citizens,
especially women.
Urge Chinese officials to reevaluate the PRC
Population and Family Planning Law and bring it into
conformance with international standards set forth in
international agreements, including the 1995 Beijing
Declaration and the 1994 Programme of Action of the
Cairo International Conference on Population and
Development, as well as the Convention on the Rights of
the Child and the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights.
Urge China's central and local governments to enforce
vigorously provisions under Chinese law that provide
for punishments of officials and other individuals who
violate the rights of citizens when implementing
population planning policies and to clearly define what
these rights entail. Urge the Chinese government to
establish penalties, including specific criminal and
financial penalties, for officials and individuals
found to commit abuses such as coercive abortion and
coercive sterilization--practices that continue in
China. Urge the Chinese government to bar material,
career, and financial incentives and disincentives that
motivate officials to use coercive or unlawful
practices in implementing family planning policies.
Support the development of programs and international
cooperation on legal aid and training that help
citizens pursue compensation under the PRC State
Compensation Law and that help citizens pursue other
remedies against the government for injuries suffered
as a result of official abuse related to China's
population planning policies.
Freedom of Residence and Movement
Findings
The Chinese government continued to enforce
the household registration (hukou) system it first
established in the 1950s. This system limits the right
of Chinese citizens to freely determine their place of
residence. The hukou system classifies Chinese citizens
as either rural or urban and confers legal rights and
access to social services based on that classification.
The hukou system discriminates against rural hukou
holders who migrate to urban areas by denying them
equal access to public services and social security
benefits, as well as equal social, employment, and
educational opportunities. Such discrimination was
especially prevalent this past year with respect to
employment and access to urban higher educational
opportunities.
High- and local-level Chinese government
officials continued to emphasize the need for hukou
reform, including Premier Li Keqiang, who announced in
May 2013 an urbanization plan to be unveiled in late
2013 that would clarify the timing of proposed hukou
reforms. Reforms could include land management reform,
improvements to public services and social security
systems, the urbanization of rural residents, and
clarifying the application criteria for urban hukous.
Some local governments have proposed or
implemented policies that, for example, would abolish
hukou classifications and include people under a single
uniform hukou classification; expand access to school
entrance exams in urban areas for the children of rural
migrants; establish a points system to award rural
migrants more public services and opportunities; or
grant an urban hukou to graduates of local colleges.
However, scholars and journalists have expressed
reservations about hukou reform, citing local
government opposition to the financial burden an influx
of rural migrants would impose on public services and
infrastructure.
Chinese officials continued to deny citizens
who criticize the government their internationally
recognized right to leave the country. During the
Commission's 2013 reporting year, there were numerous
reports of political advocates and their family members
being denied exit from China or access to passports.
The number of Chinese subject to international
travel restrictions reportedly has jumped in recent
years, and human rights groups estimate that at least
14 million people may be affected. Restrictions
reportedly fall heaviest on Tibetans and Uyghurs, with
the U.S. State Department reporting that members of
these groups ``experienced great difficulty acquiring
passports.''
Chinese authorities continued to violate the
internationally recognized right which provides that
``Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State
shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty
of movement . . .'' by restricting the domestic
movement of activists and their families as a form of
harassment. Restrictions on the movement of activists
reportedly increased during politically sensitive
periods this past year.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Support programs, organizations, and exchanges with
Chinese policymakers and academic institutions engaged
in research and outreach to migrant workers in order to
advance legal assistance programs for migrant workers
and encourage policy debates on the hukou system.
Encourage U.S. academic and public policy
institutions to consult with the Commission on avenues
for outreach to Chinese academic and public policy
figures engaged in policy debates on reform of the
hukou system.
Stress to Chinese government officials that
noncompliance with international agreements regarding
freedom of movement negatively affects confidence
outside of China that the Chinese government is
committed to complying with international standards
more generally.
Raise specifically Chinese authorities' restrictions
on the liberty of movement of rights defenders,
advocates, critics, and their families, including,
among others: Tibetan writer Tsering Woeser; Uyghur
academic Ilham Tohti; Liu Xia, the wife of imprisoned
Nobel Peace Prize laureate Liu Xiaobo; and Chen
Mingxian, the wife of democracy advocate Liu Xianbin.
Status of Women
Findings
Chinese laws, including the amended PRC Law on
the Protection of Women's Rights and Interests and the
amended PRC Marriage Law, contain provisions which aim
to protect women's rights; however, ambiguity and lack
of clearly outlined responsibilities in China's
national-level legislation limit progress on concrete
protections of women's rights.
In its domestic laws and policy initiatives
and through its ratification of the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women (CEDAW), the Chinese government has committed to
ensuring female representation in government. After the
Chinese Communist Party and government leadership
transitions in November 2012 and March 2013,
respectively, some top Party bodies increased female
representation, while others decreased. Female
representation decreased in the newly appointed State
Council. Overall, female representation in the central
government still falls short of international standards
to which China has agreed. Female participation in
decisionmaking at the village level remains low,
underscoring long-held concerns about protection of
rural women's rights and interests.
China has committed under CEDAW to take ``all
appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination
against women in the field of employment.'' While
China's existing laws, such as the PRC Labor Law, the
amended PRC Law on the Protection of Women's Rights and
Interests, and the PRC Employment Promotion Law
prohibit gender discrimination in employment, women
continue to experience widespread discrimination in
areas including recruitment, promotion, wages, and
retirement.
Gender-based discrimination continues in
Chinese universities, despite provisions in China's
Constitution and the PRC Education Law that prohibit
it. Universities across China implement gender quotas
that require women to score higher than men on their
college entrance exams in order to be admitted into
certain majors.
Chinese national legal provisions on domestic
violence lack a clear definition of domestic violence
and do not specify the responsibilities of public and
private sector organizations in prevention, punishment,
and treatment. Domestic violence reportedly remains
pervasive, affecting men, women, and children. The
Supreme People's Court (SPC) announced plans to issue
standardized documents to guide adjudication in
domestic violence criminal cases, noting
insufficiencies in Chinese law. The SPC also
established several pilot programs to strengthen trial
procedures for domestic violence cases. Despite state
media reports that new domestic violence legislation
would be on the agenda in 2012, no drafts appear to
have been made publicly available.
Chinese law fails to adequately define,
prevent, and punish acts of sexual violence against
women, including rape, forced prostitution, and sexual
harassment. Chinese legislation does not provide a
clear definition of sexual harassment or specific
standards and procedures for prevention, reporting, and
punishment, presenting challenges for victims in
protecting their rights. Several widely reported cases
of sexual violence this reporting year exposed the need
for stronger legal protections and heightened awareness
among law enforcement.
Officials in localities across China continue
to employ coercion and violence against women--
including forced abortions, forced sterilizations, and
forced contraceptive use--in their enforcement of
national and local population planning policies.
Chinese law leaves women unprotected against such
abuses. Authorities also continue to use violence and
abuse against women in the enforcement of anti-
prostitution laws. Such treatment is in violation of
Chinese law.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Support programs in China that increase women's
political participation and leadership through U.S.-
China exchanges and international conferences. Support
exchanges, training, and legal programs that promote
women's land rights, especially in rural areas, and
urge higher levels of government to increase
supervision over village committees to ensure that
local rules and regulations are in accordance with
national-level laws and policies and to ensure adequate
protection of rural women's rights and interests.
Urge the Chinese government to take steps to
faithfully enforce provisions in the PRC Labor Law, the
amended PRC Law on the Protection of Women's Rights and
Interests, and the PRC Employment Promotion Law that
prohibit gender discrimination. Urge Chinese officials
in cities across China to supplement these laws with
local regulations that address and provide punishments
for all forms of gender discrimination in employment.
Support programs that teach women how to protect and
advocate for their rights and interests in the
workplace.
Urge Chinese officials to put an end to gender-based
quotas that allow preference for men over women in
certain fields of study in Chinese universities.
Urge the Chinese government to follow through on
stated plans to enact comprehensive national-level
legislation that clearly defines domestic violence in
criminal and civil law, allocates adequate resources,
assigns responsibilities to government and civil
society organizations in addressing domestic violence,
and details punishments for offenders. Urge officials
to release drafts of such legislation for public
comment.
Urge the Chinese government to further revise the PRC
Law on the Protection of Women's Rights and Interests
or enact new comprehensive national-level legislation
to provide a clear definition of sexual harassment and
specific standards and procedures for prevention and
punishment. Support technical assistance programs that
increase awareness among judicial and law enforcement
personnel of issues pertaining to violence against
women. One such area of U.S. technical assistance might
be in developing workplace protocols and reporting
mechanisms that ensure confidentiality and prevent
retaliation.
Urge the Chinese government to stop coercion and
violence against women during population planning
implementation and to clarify provisions under Chinese
law that would protect women against such rights
abuses. Urge the Chinese government to establish
penalties, including specific criminal and financial
penalties, for officials and individuals who engage in
coercive or violent population planning enforcement,
including forced abortion, forced sterilization, and
forced contraceptive use.
Human Trafficking
Findings
China remains a country of origin, transit,
and destination for the trafficking of men, women, and
children. The majority of human trafficking cases are
domestic and involve trafficking for sexual
exploitation, forced labor, and forced marriage. The
full extent of the forced labor problem in China is
unclear.
The Chinese government acceded to the UN
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in
Persons, Especially Women and Children (UN TIP
Protocol) in December 2009 and has since taken steps to
revise legislation and update policy efforts. In the
Commission's 2013 reporting year, the State Council
issued a new national anti-trafficking action plan,
which appears to contain some improvements in
terminology and objectives, and clearly lays out which
government agencies are responsible for implementation.
It remains to be seen whether authorities will provide
adequate resources and training to local authorities
for implementing the plan's objectives.
As Chinese law conflates human smuggling,
illegal adoption, and child abduction with human
trafficking, accurate official statistics on the number
of trafficking cases the government investigated and
prosecuted during this reporting year are not
available. In cooperation with international
organizations, Chinese authorities took steps to
improve protection, services, and care for victims of
trafficking, but continued to focus efforts only on
women and children. Chinese authorities did not release
detailed information on services provided or the number
of victims identified and assisted.
The Chinese government does not offer legal
alternatives to deportation for foreign victims of
trafficking and continues to deport North Korean
refugees under the classification of ``economic
migrants,'' regardless of whether or not they are
victims of trafficking.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Urge the Chinese government to abide by its
commitments under the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress
and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and
Children; and to bring anti-trafficking legislation
into alignment with international standards.
Specifically, urge the Chinese government to legally
distinguish the crimes of human smuggling, child
abduction, and illegal adoption from that of human
trafficking, and to expand the current legal definition
of trafficking to include all forms of trafficking,
including offenses against adult male victims, certain
forms of non-physical coercion, and the commercial sex
trade of minors.
Urge the Chinese government to implement goals in the
2013-2020 plan to combat trafficking that address root
cultural and societal factors contributing to China's
trafficking problem. These stated goals include
eliminating traditional notions of female inferiority,
improving women's education, and ensuring rural women's
property rights.
Call on the Chinese government to provide more
protective services for trafficking victims. Support
expanding training programs for law enforcement
personnel and shelter managers that help raise
awareness and improve processes for identifying,
protecting, and assisting trafficking victims. Support
legal assistance programs that advocate on behalf of
both foreign and Chinese trafficking victims.
Object to the continued deportation of North Korean
trafficking victims as ``economic migrants.'' Urge the
Chinese government to abide by its international
obligations under the 1951 Convention relating to the
Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol with regard to
North Korean trafficking victims and provide legal
alternatives to repatriation.
North Korean Refugees in China
Findings
During the Commission's 2013 reporting year,
the Chinese government persisted in detaining and
repatriating North Korean asylum seekers and refugees
to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK),
despite the severe punishments refugees face once
returned. The Chinese government is obligated under the
1951 UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees
(1951 Convention) and its 1967 Protocol to refrain from
repatriating North Koreans who left the DPRK for fear
of persecution or who fear persecution upon return to
the DPRK.
The Chinese government appeared to strengthen
measures to stem the flow of North Korean refugees into
China this past year, including reportedly increasing
security along the North Korean border and implementing
new campaigns to seek out and repatriate refugees.
Chinese authorities continue to collaborate
with North Korean security officials, allowing them to
operate within China to apprehend North Korean refugees
and disrupt organizations that attempt to assist them.
The number of refugees who reached South Korea in 2012
dropped by 50 percent to 1,508 compared with 2,706 in
2011. As of July 2013, the number of refugees entering
South Korea was slightly higher than for the same
period in 2012.
North Korean women in China continue to be
sold into forced marriage and commercial sexual
exploitation. The Chinese government's repatriation of
trafficked North Korean women contravenes the 1951
Convention and its 1967 Protocol, as well as Article 7
of the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish
Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children
(UN TIP Protocol).
Children born to North Korean women and
Chinese men are increasingly being raised in China in
households where either the mother or both parents are
absent. In some instances, Chinese authorities
repatriate North Korean mothers to the DPRK, while
others flee to South Korea or other parts of China.
Several experts and academic studies contend household
registration (hukou) policies have largely changed in
recent years to allow for a greater majority of
children born to North Korean women in China to gain
access to public education and social services, but
general poverty and the continued threat of
repatriation leaves these children and their families
at risk. The Chinese government's repatriation of North
Korean women who have given birth to a child in China
violates its international obligations under the
Convention of the Rights of the Child, which prohibits
separating children from their mothers.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Raise the issue of North Korean refugees in bilateral
discussions with Chinese officials, particularly the
U.S.-China Human Rights Dialogue.
Support the efforts of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to gain unfettered
access to North Korean refugees in China. Encourage the
Chinese government to work with the UNHCR in enacting
its full mandate and to operate in conformity with
China's obligations under the 1951 Convention and its
Protocol, as well as immediately cease detaining and
repatriating North Korean refugees in China.
Urge Chinese officials to grant residency status and
related social benefits to North Korean women married
to Chinese citizens. Urge the Chinese government to
allow greater numbers of North Korean refugees to have
safe haven and secure transit until they reach third
countries.
Urge Chinese officials to abide by their obligations
under the UN TIP Protocol (Article 9) and CEDAW
(Article 6) to prosecute human traffickers in
northeastern China and along the border with the DPRK.
Support the efforts of the United Nations Commission
of Inquiry on North Korea to document North Korean
human rights violations and determine the extent to
which they amount to crimes against humanity.
Public Health
Findings
The Chinese government's oversight of and
response to public health matters came into sharp focus
during the 2013 reporting year with an outbreak in
March of the H7N9 avian influenza. International health
organizations commended China's effective response to
the outbreak and China's progress in building an
emergency response structure in the decade since the
SARS outbreak in 2003. Two studies released in 2013
provided statistical evidence that link environmental
pollution in China to adverse health effects, including
cancer and shorter life spans. The Chinese public has
expressed concerns over the government's capacity to
protect public health and regulate food and drug
safety.
As part of the larger government restructuring
announced during the National People's Congress and
Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference in
March 2013, the Ministry of Health (MOH) and the
National Population and Family Planning Commission were
merged into a single entity, the National Health and
Family Planning Commission. Some medical professionals
expressed disapproval of the name change and the lack
of consultation prior to the announcement. Then-MOH
Vice-Minister Dr. Huang Jiefu commented that the merged
name might cause China ``difficulties in its
international exchanges,'' likely in light of
international controversy over China's population
planning policy.
China's first-ever Mental Health Law (MHL) was
passed in October 2012 and became effective on May 1,
2013, and aims to ``expand access to mental health
services.'' Another key goal is to prevent cases of
being ``misidentified as mentally ill'' (bei jingshen
bing), a practice which has been used by Chinese law
enforcement officials to involuntarily detain
petitioners and others in psychiatric facilities.
International and Chinese civil society organizations
and rights advocates have identified problematic
provisions in the new MHL that may continue human
rights violations.
The Chinese government issued draft revisions
to the Regulations on Education for Persons with
Disabilities (1994) for public comment in February
2013, as part of its ongoing legislative efforts to
strengthen the rights of persons with disabilities.
Civil society organizations identified language needing
more precise definition and amendments that need
further work in order to comply with human rights
standards in the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities, which China has signed and ratified.
China's existing legislative framework
prohibits health-based discrimination in access to
employment, medical treatment, and education, but there
continues to be widespread discrimination due to a lack
of compliance with the laws and inconsistencies between
national laws and local regulations. Rights advocates
and non-governmental organizations continue to request
revisions to physical eligibility standards that
disqualify persons with disabilities and carriers of
infectious diseases from employment as civil servants
and teachers. Disability rights advocates lauded
Guangdong province for removing discriminatory
provisions in its teacher physical eligibility
standards in May 2013.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Commend the Chinese government for its response to
the H7N9 avian influenza outbreak and urge its public
health and food and drug safety agencies to maintain a
high level of vigilance and transparency in dealing
with infectious disease outbreaks and other public
health emergencies. Strengthen support to the U.S.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention for
technical exchanges with China, not only on disease
surveillance and response but also on environment and
health monitoring and response mechanisms.
Encourage the development of non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) and media groups that advocate for
consumer rights in food and drug safety, public health,
and disability rights. Support efforts to raise the
technical and operational capacity of such NGOs, and
provide opportunities for these organizations to
participate in international forums on the rights to
health, food safety, and education.
Urge the Chinese government to supervise
implementation of the Mental Health Law to ensure that
petitioners and others are no longer ``misidentified as
mentally ill'' (bei jingshen bing) and involuntarily
committed to psychiatric facilities. Provide support to
Chinese civil society organizations and advocates and
legal and medical organizations in monitoring the
implementation of the Mental Health Law, such as
funding for training, research, and publication of
findings.
Call on the Chinese government to include people with
disabilities and their representatives, and disability
rights organizations not necessarily affiliated with
the Chinese Federation of Disabled Persons, in the
revisions to the Regulations on the Education of
Persons with Disabilities. Urge officials to ensure
that the revisions are in accord with the UN Convention
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities on
``reasonable accommodation,'' ``inclusive education,''
and other internationally recognized standards. Where
appropriate, share the United States' ongoing
experience and efforts in promoting the right to
education for persons with disabilities--through legal,
regulatory, and non-governmental means--with Chinese
officials. Expand site visits and other exchanges for
Chinese officials to observe and share ideas with U.S.
disability rights groups, lawyers, the U.S. Department
of Education, and other U.S. federal and state agencies
that work on ensuring educational opportunities for
persons with disabilities.
Urge Chinese officials to focus attention on
effective implementation of the laws and regulations
that prohibit health-based discrimination in access to
employment, medical care, education, and a barrier-free
environment. Ask Chinese officials about cases in which
disability rights advocates have been rebuffed in their
applications for open government information.
The Environment
Findings
Despite some progress during the Commission's
2013 reporting year, pollution problems remained
severe, and the associated financial costs continued to
grow. News and other reports highlighted major winter
air pollution incidents, groundwater contamination,
soil pollution challenges, the link between toxic
chemicals and ``cancer villages,'' and problems
associated with the migration of polluting industries
to western and poorer regions. Authorities were more
transparent about the problems of air and groundwater
pollution, and toxic chemicals, than they were about
soil contamination.
During the reporting period, authorities
continued to develop a regulatory framework to address
environmental problems, despite significant
limitations. Chinese leaders highlighted environmental
protection as one of China's ``four basic principles,''
and Party leaders added commitments to ``ecological
civilization'' to the Party constitution. Economic
development, however, remains the ``core concern.''
Authorities released two versions of the draft
revisions to the Environmental Protection Law to the
public for comments, which contained some incentives
for greater transparency and official accountability.
Environmental groups, experts, and the environmental
ministry pointed out other problems with the drafts
related to environmental interest lawsuits and numerous
other issues. Authorities appeared to restart stalled
efforts to revise the PRC Air Pollution Law, and to
draft a major national soil pollution law. In addition,
the State Council issued ten policies on air pollution
and an air pollution action plan.
Significant challenges for the development of
rule of law in the sector remain, including legal
violations, lax or arbitrary enforcement, evaluation
criteria prioritizing economic growth, corruption, lack
of supervision, a weak environmental protection
apparatus, and insufficient monitoring and
environmental penalties. Development of environmental
public interest law came to a standstill when the June
draft of the revisions to the Environmental Protection
Law stipulated that only the government-supported All-
China Environment Federation would be allowed to bring
public interest lawsuits. Legal remedies in
environmental cases continue to be unreliable for
several reasons, including the reluctance of courts to
accept cases, hesitation on the part of lawyers to
participate, mediation with a weak legal basis, and the
potential for forced mediation agreements. Citizens
continued to take to the streets in efforts to resolve
grievances.
During the reporting year, Chinese citizens
advocated for improvement of environmental quality, but
during the course of protecting their rights or
investigating claims of pollution, some people faced
detention (Liu Futang), extralegal home confinement
(Zhang Bing), harassment from officials (Chen Yuqian
and Mongolian herders), and beatings from unidentified
individuals (an environmental journalist). Officials
also questioned environmental advocates, took
extraordinary measures to prevent anti-pollution
demonstrations, and censored Internet postings,
including those critical of planned projects.
During the 2013 reporting year, citizens
called for greater environmental transparency, and
environmental authorities issued new internal rules to
improve proactive disclosure of abridged environmental
impact assessment reports and other information.
Authorities in select cities began to make public PM2.5
and air quality data using the revised air quality
index. Despite these new rules and measures,
authorities' proactive disclosure of information
remains irregular and censorship continues. According
to one study, while a greater percentage of
environmental authorities responded to information
requests, disclosure was less comprehensive in more
cases than in the previous year.
Grassland herder relocation programs,
reportedly conducted by authorities to address
grassland degradation as well as modernize the animal
husbandry industry, have also in some cases been
involuntary.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Call upon the Chinese government to cease punishing
citizens for their grassroots environmental advocacy,
for investigating pollution incidents, or for utilizing
official and institutionalized channels to voice their
environmental grievances or to protect their rights.
Support efforts by Chinese and U.S. groups working in
China to expand awareness of citizens' environmental
rights and to promote the protection of those rights.
Include environmental law issues in the bilateral human
rights and legal expert dialogues. In addition, include
discussion of human rights dimensions of climate change
in the new U.S.-China Climate Change Working Group.
Support multilateral exchanges regarding
environmental enforcement and compliance tools,
including environmental insurance, market mechanisms,
criminal prosecution of serious environmental
infringements, and public interest litigation
mechanisms. Encourage Chinese leaders to strengthen
environmental impact assessment processes and citizen
participation in those processes. Engage Chinese
officials and others who seek to devise a fair
compensation system for people harmed by pollution.
Support continued expansion of environmental
information disclosure in China. Share U.S. Government
experiences with the Toxics Release Inventory Program
and other U.S. programs that seek to provide more
environmental transparency. Support programs that
educate Chinese citizens about China's system of open
government information. In addition, continue U.S.
Government engagement with relevant individuals and
organizations in developing China's capacity to
reliably measure, report, publicize, and verify
emissions reduction strategies and techniques.
Encourage the development of environmental NGOs in
China, including by incorporating joint U.S.-China non-
governmental participation into bilateral projects.
Support efforts to raise the technical and operational
capacity of Chinese environmental NGOs.
Urge Chinese authorities to end nonvoluntary
relocation of nomadic herders and to conduct relocation
programs in a manner consistent with international
scientific and human rights norms. To this end, urge
authorities to consider the suggestions contained in
the 2012 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right
to Food; Addendum, Mission to China, to the United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.
Civil Society
Findings
Millions of civil society organizations
operate in China, making contributions to public
interest advocacy and the provision of social services,
organizing leisure activities, and promoting farming
and business development. Government-registered non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) make up a subset of
civil society organizations. Many NGOs are registered
as businesses or are unregistered due to a restrictive
regulatory environment. Individual advocates and
informal networks also engage on issues of public
interest in China.
During the 2013 reporting year, Chinese
government and Communist Party policy documents
reaffirmed government and Party leadership and control
over the development of ``social organizations,'' the
term commonly used to refer to NGOs. Chinese scholars
have observed differentiated treatment of NGOs; whereas
the government is willing to support groups that are
perceived to support economic growth or provide social
welfare services, the government continues to harass
groups and individuals involved in issue advocacy or
matters the government deems politically sensitive.
Human rights organizations have reported on a
crackdown beginning in spring 2013 on individual rights
advocates, some of whom have an affiliation with the
New Citizens' Movement, a loose network of individuals
who advocate for a range of issues, such as political
and legal reforms, human rights, and social justice. In
July, the Beijing municipality Bureau of Civil Affairs
shut down the Transition Institute, a think tank which
conducts research on public interest issues, reportedly
because the Institute is not registered as an NGO.
The government has pledged to issue long-
awaited regulatory changes to the legal framework for
social organization registration and management by the
end of 2013, including permitting direct registration
to allow organizations to register at civil affairs
bureaus without first securing a governmental or quasi-
governmental supervisory unit. Direct registration,
however, will be limited to business and industry
associations, technical and scientific associations,
charitable organizations, and community service groups.
Political, legal, and religious organizations, and
foreign NGOs with representative offices in China, will
continue to be required to find a supervisory unit and
operate under the existing ``dual management'' system.
Chinese government authorities at national and
local levels haveallocatedfunds toprocureservicesfrom
non-governmental organizations as part of the
development of a ``non-state services sector.''
Scholars and civil society experts have expressed
concerns that the fragmentary development of the
regulatory framework for government procurement from
NGOs has created problems in the selection of service
providers, contract implementation, and oversight of
projects.
China's government-run charitable
organizations, such as the Red Cross of China, continue
to face a confidence gap in the eyes of Chinese
citizens due to reports of misused donated funds and a
lack of transparency in financial reporting. Private
(non-governmental) charities have benefited from the
credibility gap, as illustrated by the large amount of
donations to such organizations in response to the
Sichuan earthquake in April 2013. The Chinese
government reportedly is working on a national Charity
Law, but has not yet issued a draft for public comment.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Urge the Chinese government to revise its regulatory
framework for social organizations in China to allow
all non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to benefit
from planned reforms in accordance with the rights to
freedom of association in Article 22 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Stress to Chinese authorities that freedom of
association includes public advocacy on a range of
issues. Call on the Chinese government to cease
harassment of NGOs and civil society advocates who work
on rights protection and public advocacy.
Encourage the Chinese government to establish a fair
and transparent framework for implementation and
regulation of government procurement of social services
from NGOs. Where appropriate, support technical
exchanges for central- and
provincial-level Chinese officials to visit the United
States to observe U.S. federal and state practice in
government procurement of services from NGOs.
Take measures to facilitate the participation of
Chinese citizens who work in the NGO sector in relevant
international conferences and forums. Increase support
for training opportunities in the United States to
build their leadership capacity in nonprofit
management, public policy, and public interest
advocacy. Expand support to U.S. organizations that
partner with Chinese NGOs on projects to build the
capacity of civil society organizations in China.
Institutions of Democratic Governance
Findings
At the 18th National Congress of the Chinese
Communist Party in November 2012, a major political
power succession took place within the Party, which
happens at 10-year intervals, and involved the
extensive turnover of power to a slightly younger
cohort of political leaders in a non-transparent
process. New Party General Secretary and President Xi
Jinping appeared to act quickly in the first few months
to move forward with his agenda and leadership style.
Some international and Chinese scholars, journalists,
and commentators believe that under the new echelon of
top leaders, the prospects for political reform in
China appear dim.
At the 18th Party Congress, the Party amended
the Party constitution to embrace ``scientific
development'' (former Party secretary Hu Jintao's
socio-economic theory), to declare that ``socialism
with Chinese characteristics'' is the reason behind all
of China's achievements, and to affirm that ``reform
and opening up are the path to a stronger China.''
Following the 18th Party Congress, top Party
leaders assumed leading posts in the Chinese government
in a transfer of government power that took place in
March 2013. The newly installed government leaders
issued a plan for a major reshuffling of State Council
institutions and a ``transformation of government
functions.'' The goals of the plan include improving
government efficiency, pushing forward reform toward
``super ministries,'' and resolving issues in the
relationships between the government and the market,
the government and society, and central and local
entities.
China's political institutions do not comply
with the standards defined in Article 25 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
which Chinese leaders have signed and declared an
intention to ratify. Nor do China's political
institutions comply with the standards outlined in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Communist
Party continues to dominate political affairs, allows
only limited independent political participation, and
exerts control over the courts, the National People's
Congress, the media, and state leadership appointments.
Officials took a variety of other actions to interfere
in local congress elections and to prevent independent
candidates from being nominated or elected as
delegates. Additionally, officials established
numerical requirements related to the composition of
National People's Congress delegates. During this
reporting year, the Party tried to exert greater
influence over university student groups and non-
governmental and quasi-governmental organizations. In
addition, developments suggest that the new Party
Central Committee is exerting more efforts to control
currents in the ideological realm.
Authorities continued to detain, arrest, and
sentence democracy advocates who exercised their right
to freedom of speech, of assembly, of association, and
of demonstration as guaranteed in China's Constitution
and under international human rights standards. This
reporting year, authorities detained or imposed prison
sentences on democracy advocates Cao Haibo and Liu
Benqi. Other democracy advocates given long prison
sentences in recent years remain imprisoned, including
Chen Wei, Chen Xi, Li Tie, Zhu Yufu, Xue Mingkai, Liu
Xiaobo, Liu Xianbin, Guo Quan, Zhou Yongjun, Xie
Changfa, and Huang Chengcheng.
While top Chinese leaders have voiced support
for greater transparency, citizens continue to face
challenges in accessing information. In one example,
authorities have suppressed citizen efforts to obtain
information regarding China's submission for the
October 2013 United Nations Human Rights Council
Universal Periodic Review process. Individuals seeking
information reportedly were harassed, prevented from
leaving their homes, detained, or formally arrested.
Authorities have passed or are drafting major
laws that have a bearing on when and how citizens may
hold their authorities accountable, including the PRC
Civil Procedure Law, the PRC Administrative Litigation
Law, and the PRC Administrative Reconsideration Law.
The State Council issued plans to continue to
strengthen administrative enforcement of laws and
policies, partially by promoting administrative
evaluation systems at the local level and strengthening
support for ``enforcement responsibility systems.''
Chinese leaders and citizens continued to
express concern about official corruption, and many
foreign and domestic business people reportedly think
China's legal environment has deteriorated. Top leaders
link the Party's legitimacy to its ability to manage
corruption. Authorities continued to issue regulatory
measures to curb corruption. In September 2013, a court
sentenced Bo Xilai, the former Party Central Political
Bureau member and Chongqing municipality Party
Secretary, to life imprisonment for corruption. Central
leaders have not, however, fully supported requirements
for top officials to disclose their assets, and
continued to have little tolerance for non-
governmental anticorruption efforts. Against the
backdrop of strong public demand for disclosure of
officials' finances, authorities criminally detained or
arrested dozens of advocates who made public appeals
for top officials to disclose their finances, including
anticorruption advocates such as Sun Hanhui, Ding
Jiaxi, Hou Xin, Yuan Dong, Zhang Baocheng, Ma Xinli,
Liu Ping, Zhao Changqing, and Wang Yonghong.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Take proactive steps to engage with the new cohort of
Chinese leaders and to understand their plans for the
future of governance in China. Conduct reciprocal,
high-level parliamentary exchanges to share information
and hold trainings regarding the congressional and
political systems in the U.S. and China. Support
efforts to research the implications of the Party and
government power transition and the restructuring of
State Council institutions, and to disseminate that
information widely. Support U.S. research programs that
shed light on the structure, functions, and development
of the Chinese Communist Party, including its roles
within government institutions, China's legislature,
the media, non-state-owned companies, and social
organizations (non-governmental groups, foundations,
and nonprofit organizations). Urge Chinese officials to
further increase the transparency of Party affairs.
Call on the Chinese government to release people
detained or imprisoned for exercising their right to
freedom of association and assembly, for engaging in
peaceful demonstrations, for calling for transparency
of officials' personal finances, or for calling for
political reforms within China. Some of these prisoners
have associated themselves with the New Citizens'
Movement and others are democracy advocates who are
serving long prison sentences.
Support projects of U.S. or Chinese organizations
that seek to work withlocalChinesegovernmentaland non-
governmental organizations to improve transparency and
accountability, especially efforts to expand and
improve China's government information disclosure
initiatives. Such projects might include joint efforts
to better publicize the Open Government Information
(OGI) Regulations at local levels and to train citizens
and groups about how to submit OGI requests. Encourage
Party and government officials to ensure regulations,
rules, and policies are made public. In addition,
support projects that involve an exchange of
information about bottom-up mechanisms to evaluate and
hold government and Party officials accountable and
emphasize the links between efficiency and
accountability.
Support programs that assist local governments,
academics, and the nonprofit sector in expanding
transparent public hearings and other channels for
citizens to participate in the policymaking process.
Such programs could include pilot projects in China in
which citizens' suggestions to authorities about draft
laws, regulations, or policies are made available to
the public.
Commercial Rule of Law
Findings
The Chinese government and Communist Party
continued to encourage state coordination of overseas
investment activity as part of a policy authorities
commonly referred to as the ``go out'' strategy.
Authorities continued to encourage Chinese businesses
to invest abroad in part as a way to increase
opportunities for Chinese enterprises to move up the
value chain. As part of the ``go out'' strategy,
authorities targeted ``strategic'' industries, such as
energy resources, metals, advanced technology, and
``famous brands.''
This past year, authorities took measures to
reform China's banking system, which continued to give
state-owned enterprises preferential access to loans.
The People's Bank of China removed a lower limit on
loan interest rates but maintained an upper limit on
interest rates payable to depositors, which news media
noted could allow state-owned enterprises to secure
cheaper loans, as well as reduce the profits of smaller
banks and constrain the ability of households to
accumulate savings.
The yuan appreciated this past year, but the
U.S. Treasury Department reported that it ``remains
significantly undervalued.'' Some Chinese officials
called for a more market-based approach to exchange
rate policy, but the Chinese government continued to
interfere with the exchange rate through the
accumulation of foreign exchange reserves.
During the 2013 reporting year--more than a
decade after China's accession to the World Trade
Organization (WTO)--China continued to face allegations
of violations of its WTO obligations, including
antidumping and countervailing duties and subsidies
inconsistent with its WTO obligations. Since its
accession to the WTO, China has been a respondent in 31
WTO Dispute Settlement cases; this past year, the WTO
found in favor of U.S. claims in three cases that the
United States brought against China, as well as
European Union claims in one case that the European
Union brought against China.
The Chinese government continued to take steps
to improve protection for intellectual property rights
(IPR) this past year, but weak protection and
enforcement of IPR continued to contribute to theft of
intellectual property. Theft of trade secrets, in some
cases reportedly authorized by the Chinese government,
continued this past year, including the reported theft
of large amounts of data by an organization operating
under the People's Liberation Army. In addition,
Chinese officials continued to use technology transfer
as a precondition for market access.
This past year, the Ministry of Commerce
published two new draft regulations for public comment:
the Provisions on Additional Restrictive Conditions for
the Concentration of Business Operators and the Interim
Provisions Regarding the Application of Standards for
Simple Cases of Concentration of Business Operators.
Both reportedly are designed to clarify and streamline
the merger review and approval process, but expert
commentators expressed doubts that the provisions will
have such an effect in practice.
During this past year, food safety scandals
continued to emerge in different parts of China, and
hazardous and illegal Chinese products continued to
cross borders. Over a three-month period, Chinese
authorities took into custody 904 people allegedly
involved in selling rat, mink, and fox meat disguised
as mutton. Over a six-week period, authorities in Hong
Kong took into custody 879 people allegedly involved in
smuggling milk formula from Hong Kong into mainland
China, as the quality of milk formula in mainland China
remained a concern.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Develop and support a project surveying the role of
China's industrial policies in the Chinese economy,
including how the development of these policies and the
role they play in directing China's economy influence
transparency, rule of law, and China's compliance with
its international commitments.
Include issues of commercial rule of law, investment
subsidies, and retaliation for excercising legal rights
in the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue and
other commercial dialogues, negotiations, and exchanges
with China. Expand dialogue with China through the U.S.
Department of the Treasury, U.S. financial regulators,
and the Small Business Administration on financial
sector reform issues, such as access to capital for
small business, corruption, subsidies, and taxpayer
accountability. In addition, when necessary, continue
to enforce U.S. rights through mechanisms of the WTO.
File a counter notification to the WTO regarding
China's subsidies, including its failure to report
subsidies.
Obtain details on the amount of Chinese investment
(other than in financial instruments) in the United
States--including information on the distribution of
that investment across different sectors of the
economy, the criteria Chinese authorities use in
approving such investments, and how such investment is
financed. Obtain these details through bilateral
dialogues between the U.S. Trade Representative and
U.S. Department of Commerce, and China's Ministry of
Commerce, National Development and Reform Commission,
and State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration
Commission.
Support capacity-building programs for Chinese
intellectual property regulators on U.S. best practices
in intellectual property rights protection. Obtain
information from Chinese officials on the overarching
goals and projected timeline of the Chinese
government's current efforts to reform intellectual
property laws and regulations and to curb intellectual
property theft, including cyber theft. Support a
project that seeks to quantify the scope of damages to
the U.S. economy from Chinese intellectual property
theft, and more aggressively investigate the links
between specific companies, organizations, and entities
within China and specific theft of U.S. intellectual
property. Conduct the project in a manner that protects
the privacy and confidentiality of companies, while
offering those companies incentives to participate.
Strengthen and expand capacity-building programs for
Chinese food safety regulators on U.S. best practices
in food safety programs. Pass legislation authorizing a
larger U.S. Food and Drug Administration presence in
China, with additional inspectors; support training
programs conducted by U.S. inspectors, producers, and
food safety experts; and ensure that regulated products
imported from China into the United States are
certified by the relevant entities in China.
Access to Justice
Findings
At a January 2013 meeting, the new Secretary
of the Communist Party's Political and Legal Affairs
Commission reportedly announced plans for reform of the
justice sector, reeducation through labor (RTL),
petitioning, and the hukou (household registration)
system. Public calls for reform of the RTL system have
been particularly strong during the 2013 reporting
year, but observers are concerned that any changes will
be in name only.
During the 2013 reporting year, the Commission
observed the Chinese government and Communist Party's
widespread use of ``stability maintenance'' measures in
advance of and during the 18th National Congress of the
Chinese Communist Party. Government and Party officials
reportedly ordered rights advocates, petitioners, and
Falun Gong practitioners, including Mao Hengfeng, Pei
Fugui, Cui Fufang, Tong Guojing, Shen Yongmei, Shen
Lianman, and Qin Wei, to serve RTL sentences to achieve
``zero petitioning'' and prevent protest in Beijing
during that period.
Harassment of weiquan (rights defense) lawyers
continued to follow the trend of past years with the
Chinese government using a variety of measures,
including license suspension, surveillance, and illegal
detention, to intimidate lawyers. Prominent human
rights advocates Gao Zhisheng and Ni Yulan continued to
serve harsh prison sentences; authorities arrested
rights advocate Xu Zhiyong in August 2013 following
several months of ``house arrest'' and criminal
detention.
Official sources reported that the number of
individuals who received legal aid in China exceeded 1
million in 2012, a 21 percent increase over 2011. The
Chinese government has steadily increased funding of
legal aid over the years, reportedly by almost 10
percent in 2012. The revised Criminal Procedure Law and
supporting regulations expand the scope and eligibility
of criminal suspects and defendants who may receive
legal aid, though scholars have raised concerns about
whether there are sufficient human, financial, and
institutional resources to support expected increases
in legal aid cases.
Official harassment of family members of
rights defenders and political activists continued to
take place during the 2013 reporting year. Chinese
authorities used a range of methods against family
members, restricting their rights to freedom of
movement, expression, and livelihood.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Object to the continued harassment of rights
defenders. Call for the release of lawyers, activists,
and others who have been ``disappeared,'' are
incarcerated, or are subject to unlawful home
confinement or other forms of extralegal detention, for
their activities to defend and promote the rights of
Chinese citizens, including Xu Zhiyong, Gao Zhisheng,
Ni Yulan, and others mentioned in this report and in
the Commission's Political Prisoner Database. Urge the
Chinese government to renew professional licenses to
the law firms and individual lawyers denied renewal in
2013 and in past years for their work on cases
officials deem to be sensitive.
Monitor the Chinese government's stated plans to
reform the reeducation through labor and petitioning
systems by asking Chinese officials about the substance
of the reforms, and the timeframe and benchmarks to
assess progress. Recommend the establishment of
independent evaluation mechanisms that include the
participation of civil society representatives, rights
defenders, and public interest lawyers.
Object to the ongoing harassment and abuse of the
family members of petitioners and rights defenders.
Call for the cessation of the denial of rights
(including the refusal to issue passports), physical
violence, and detention of family members, such as Liu
Xia, the wife of Nobel Peace Prize laureate Liu Xiaobo;
Chen Kegui, nephew of the prominent legal advocate Chen
Guangcheng; and Ablikim Abdureyim, one of the sons of
Uyghur rights advocate Rebiya Kadeer.
Increase support to the U.S. Department of State's
International Visitors Leadership Program and other
similar bilateral exchange programs that bring Chinese
human rights lawyers, advocates, and scholars to the
United States for study and dialogue. Expand support to
legal research and exchange programs in the non-
governmental and academic sector that partner with
China's human rights lawyers and public interest legal
organizations, and technical exchange and training
programs with China's official justice sector that
promote court independence.
Encourage the Chinese government (in particular, the
Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Education) to
allocate more funding to local bar associations and law
school clinical legal education programs to build a
stronger foundation for legal aid and public interest
law, and enhance legal training to provide legal aid
services to persons with disabilities, petitioners, and
those seeking legal protection from domestic violence
(including children), among other at-risk populations.
Xinjiang
Findings
Clashes that took place in the spring and
summer of 2013 throughout the region resulted in
numerous deaths, with reported death tolls ranging from
dozens to 100 or possibly more, and raised concerns
about the failure of ethnic policy in the Xinjiang
Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) to address the root
causes of regional instability. Overseas media and
rights groups reported instances involving security
forces shooting into crowds of Uyghurs, resulting in
deaths and injuries. In some cases, Uyghur residents of
the XUAR reportedly committed deadly attacks on members
of security forces, community workers, and others.
Authorities reportedly conducted pervasive
house searches throughout the region in order to
``maintain stability'' and target peaceful expressions
of religious belief among the Uyghur population. Human
rights advocates assert that widespread security checks
have exacerbated tensions in the region.
XUAR authorities continued intensive controls
over religion, especially Islam, posing a challenge for
Uyghurs seeking to practice their religious beliefs
outside of state control. Authorities continued to
enforce tight restrictions over peaceful religious
practices among the Uyghur population and carried out
targeted surveillance over individual religious
believers.
State-led development initiatives intensified
during the Commission's 2013 reporting year, drawing
large amounts of state and private investment and
increased migration into the XUAR. Development projects
in the region raised concerns that they have brought
disproportionately fewer economic, social, and cultural
opportunities for Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities
in the region, as well as concerns over the effects
such projects have had on the cultures and languages of
these groups.
Increased migration to the XUAR in recent
years has reportedly heightened ethnic tensions in some
areas and sparked concerns among Uyghur residents
regarding land rights and employment opportunities.
Regional development initiatives brought increased Han
Chinese migration to the XUAR during the past year, and
state-led programs provided assistance to migrants and
workers from other provinces, often in southern areas
of the XUAR traditionally inhabited by Uyghurs and
other ethnic minorities.
In the past year, the XUAR government
broadened the scope of Mandarin-focused ``bilingual
education'' in the region, a policy some Uyghur
students in the XUAR fear is aimed at assimilating
young Uyghurs into Chinese society at the expense of
their Uyghur identity. Under ``bilingual education,''
class instruction takes place primarily in Mandarin
Chinese, largely replacing instruction in languages
spoken by ethnic minority groups. In recent years, some
Uyghur students and teachers have expressed concern
over the compulsory nature of the region's
``bilingual'' curriculum and the corresponding loss of
young Uyghurs' ability to speak the Uyghur language.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Support legislation that expands U.S. Government
resources for raising awareness of human rights
conditions in the XUAR, for protecting Uyghur culture,
and for increasing avenues for Uyghurs to protect their
human rights.
Call on the Chinese government to reexamine the
effectiveness of official policies toward ethnic
minorities in the XUAR and end its reliance on
heightened security to respond to clashes in the
region. Call on Chinese authorities to report
transparently on conflict in the region.
Call on the Chinese government to end pervasive house
searches in Uyghur neighborhoods throughout the XUAR,
which human rights advocates assert have exacerbated
tensions in the region.
Call on the Chinese government to adhere to its
domestic laws and regulations guaranteeing freedom of
religious belief, as well as international regulations
guaranteeing religious practice free from state
restrictions.
Call on the Chinese government to support development
policies in the XUAR that promote democratic
decisionmaking processes among local communities
affected by development. Call on central and XUAR
authorities to ensure equitable development that not
only promotes economic growth but also respects the
broad civil and political rights of XUAR residents, and
engages these communities in democratic decisionmaking.
Call on the Chinese government to ensure the rights
of ethnic minorities to protect property and enjoy
equal access to employment opportunities in areas of
the XUAR affected by development efforts. Call on
central and XUAR authorities to enact programs to
actively preserve and maintain the culture and
livelihoods of Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities in
the face of increased migration.
Call on the Chinese government to consult with non-
Han parents, teachers, and students regarding what
language or languages of instruction should be used in
XUAR schools, from the preschool to the university
level. Call on Chinese officials to provide parents and
students a choice of instruction in the Uyghur language
and other non-Chinese languages prevalent in the XUAR,
as mandated in Article 4 of the Chinese Constitution
and Article 10 of the PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law
(REAL). Urge Chinese officials to support the
development of educational materials in the Uyghur
language and in other non-Chinese languages.
Tibet
Findings
Formal dialogue between the Dalai Lama's
representatives and Chinese Communist Party and
government officials has been stalled since the January
2010 ninth round, the longest interval since such
contacts resumed in 2002. The Commission observed no
indication during the 2013 reporting year of official
Chinese interest in resuming a dialogue that takes into
account Tibetan concerns regarding the Tibetan
autonomous areas of China.
The Party and government failed this past year
to respond to Tibetan grievances in a constructive
manner or accept any accountability for Tibetan
rejection of Chinese policies. The frequency of Tibetan
self-immolation reportedly focusing on political and
religious issues increased during the Commission's 2013
reporting year, peaking in October-November with 38
self-immolations preceding and during the 18th National
Congress of the Chinese Communist Party. During the
period September 2012 through July 2013, 66 Tibetan
self-immolations (60 fatal) took place. As self-
immolation frequency increased, authorities
strengthened a security crackdown infringing on
Tibetans' freedoms of expression, association, and
movement, and curtailed their ability to communicate or
share information. Self-immolations have shifted from
an initial pattern of less frequent self-immolations
mainly in Sichuan province with a majority of current
or former monastics, to a pattern of more frequent
self-immolations mostly outside of Sichuan with a
majority of laypersons.
Tibetan self-immolators this past year
continued to call for the Dalai Lama's return--a demand
that when voiced during a suicidal protest may signify
intense resentment toward Chinese government and
Communist Party intrusion into Tibetan Buddhist
affairs. The Party and government continued to create
new and unprecedented control over Tibetan Buddhism,
along with maintaining established repressive policies.
Effective December 2012, national measures required
Tibetan Buddhist monastic teachers to submit every five
years to a reassessment conducted by Party- and
government-controlled Buddhist associations. Criteria
include patriotism toward China, supporting Party
leadership, and accepting guidance from government- and
Party-run offices. Reappointed teachers must sign an
agreement acknowledging such obligations. Officials
characterize the result of such policies as the
``normal order'' of Tibetan Buddhism.
This past year, some Tibetan self-immolators
reportedly called for greater use of the Tibetan
language as they burned--an apparent indication of the
significant threat some Tibetans believe Party and
government policies pose to Tibetan culture's vibrancy
and viability. In Qinghai province, thousands of
Tibetan tertiary students protested against issues
including government language policy after authorities
required students to study an official booklet that
some regarded as ``derogatory'' toward Tibetan language
and that promoted using Mandarin. A court sentenced
eight of the students to imprisonment. Reports of
unofficial Tibetan initiatives to promote Tibetan
language emerged in Qinghai, Gansu, and Sichuan
provinces.
Officials continued to emphasize economic
development as the key to achieving ``social
stability,'' even though some initiatives resulted in
protests or alleged harm to local communities. A Tibet
Autonomous Region (TAR) official said the Lhasa-
Shigatse railway will begin operation by the end of
2014. Official media reported the TAR government had
settled (or resettled) ``nearly 2.1 million'' Tibetan
farmers and herders during 2006-2012, and that ``all
farmers and herders'' in the TAR would be settled by
the end of 2013. Media organizations reported on a
landslide disaster at a gold mine and on environmental
pollution that interfered with Tibetans' ability to
farm and maintain livestock. Government plans for
construction of hydroelectric projects along major
Tibetan rivers attracted the interest of news media and
analysts.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Urge the Chinese government to resume contacts with
the Dalai Lama or his representatives and engage in
dialogue without preconditions. Such a dialogue should
aim to protect the Tibetan culture, language, religion,
and heritage within the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR)
and the Tibetan autonomous prefectures and counties in
Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan, and Yunnan provinces. As
tensions continue to rise in Tibetan areas and Tibetans
express their respect for the Dalai Lama, a Chinese
government decision to engage in dialogue can result in
a durable and mutually beneficial outcome for the
Chinese government and Tibetans that will benefit local
and regional security in coming decades.
Urge the Chinese government to consider the role of
government regulatory measures and Party policies in
the wave of Tibetan self-immolations. Point out to
Chinese officials that, if the government and Party
address Tibetan grievances in a constructive manner,
the results could benefit state security and social
stability; point out to Chinese officials that
strengthening the measures and policies that Tibetans
resent is unlikely to promote ``social stability'' or a
``harmonious society.''
Convey to the Chinese government the urgent
importance of refraining from expanding the use of
intrusive management and legal measures to infringe
upon and repress Tibetan Buddhists' right to the
freedom of religion. Point out to Chinese officials
that government control over periodic review and
reappointment of Tibetan Buddhist teachers based on
criteria such as upholding Communist Party leadership
and accepting guidance from government- and Party-run
offices is inconsistent with state respect for
``freedom of religious belief,'' and that increased
pressure on Tibetan Buddhists created by aggressive use
of regulatory measures, ``patriotic'' and ``legal''
education, and anti-Dalai Lama campaigns is likely to
harm social stability, not protect it. Urge the
government to respect the right of Tibetan Buddhists to
identify and educate religious teachers in a manner
consistent with Tibetan Buddhist preferences and
traditions.
Request that the Chinese government follow up on a
2010 statement by the Chairman of the TAR government
that Gedun Choekyi Nyima, the Panchen Lama whom the
Dalai Lama recognized in 1995, is living in the TAR as
an ``ordinary citizen'' along with his family. Urge the
government to invite a representative of an
international organization to meet with Gedun Choekyi
Nyima so that Gedun Choekyi Nyima can express to the
representative his wishes with respect to privacy;
photograph the international representative and Gedun
Choekyi Nyima together; and publish Gedun Choekyi
Nyima's statement and the photograph.
Convey to the Chinese government the importance of
respecting and protecting the Tibetan culture and
language. Urge Chinese officials to promote a vibrant
Tibetan culture by honoring the Chinese Constitution's
reference to the freedoms of speech, association,
assembly, and religion, and refraining from using the
security establishment, courts, and law to infringe
upon and repress Tibetans' exercise of such rights.
Urge officials to respect Tibetan wishes to maintain
the role of both the Tibetan and Chinese languages in
teaching modern subjects and not to consign Tibetan
language to inferior status by discontinuing its use in
teaching modern subjects.
Encourage the Chinese government to take fully into
account the views and preferences of Tibetans when the
government plans infrastructure, natural resource
development, and settlement or resettlement projects in
the Tibetan areas of China. Encourage the Chinese
government to engage with appropriate experts in
assessing the impact of such projects and in advising
the government on the implementation and progress of
such projects.
Increase support for U.S. non-governmental
organizations to develop programs that can assist
Tibetans to increase their capacity to peacefully
protect and develop their culture, language, and
heritage; that can help to improve education, economic,
health, and environmental conservation conditions for
ethnic Tibetans living in Tibetan areas of China; and
that create sustainable benefits for Tibetans without
encouraging an influx of non-Tibetans into these areas.
Urge the Chinese government to refrain from using
security and judicial institutions to intimidate
Tibetan communities by prosecuting and imprisoning
Tibetans with alleged links to a self-immolator or for
sharing self-immolation information. Continue to convey
to the government the importance of distinguishing
between peaceful Tibetan protesters and rioters;
condemn the use of security campaigns to suppress human
rights; and request the Chinese government to provide
complete details about Tibetans detained, charged, or
sentenced for
protest-related and self-immolation-related ``crimes.''
Continue to raise in meetings and correspondence with
Chinese officials the cases of Tibetans who are
imprisoned as punishment for the peaceful exercise of
human rights. Representative examples include: Monk
Choeying Khedrub (sentenced to life imprisonment for
printing leaflets); Bangri Chogtrul (regarded by
Tibetan Buddhists as a reincarnated lama, serving a
sentence of 18 years commuted from life imprisonment
for ``inciting splittism''); and nomad Ronggye Adrag
(sentenced to 8 years' imprisonment for shouting
political slogans at a public festival).
Developments in Hong Kong and Macau
Findings
The Basic Laws of both Hong Kong and Macau
confirm the applicability of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) to both
territories. The Basic Law of Hong Kong provides
specifically for universal suffrage, while Macau's
Basic Law does not.
Public demand grew for a more specific plan
for election of Hong Kong's Chief Executive (CE)
through universal suffrage, which is set to occur in
2017. In July 2013, Hong Kong's current CE, CY Leung,
dismissed calls for early public consultation on
electoral reform. Mainland Chinese officials and
experts continue to dissuade Macau from pursuing
universal suffrage.
Concerns also grew over central government
interference in the nomination of CE candidates in
elections by universal suffrage, with statements from
mainland Chinese officials ruling out a nominating
process involving the broader voting public and stating
that candidates would be required to be trusted by the
central government.
Two incidents this year highlighted ongoing
challenges to Hong Kong's judicial and law enforcement
independence. Hong Kong authorities requested that Hong
Kong's highest court refer to the National People's
Congress Standing Committee in Beijing a key issue in a
case involving the right of foreign domestic helpers to
apply for Hong Kong permanent residence. In another
instance, former U.S. National Security Agency
contractor Edward Snowden was allowed to leave the
territory despite a U.S. request for his provisional
arrest. This incident raises concerns over whether this
was done at the request of the central government. If
so, it could be interpreted as the central government
interfering in what should have been a purely internal
Hong Kong law enforcement matter.
The Hong Kong government made uneven progress
toward maintaining transparency. The government
postponed implementation of a measure that would have
redacted from public corporate filings important
identifying information of company directors.
Self-censorship by journalists and strong
media ties to mainland China continued to threaten
press freedom in Hong Kong and Macau, although in
September 2012 Macau backed away from a controversial
plan to set up a ``press accountability board.''
The gambling industry in Macau is reportedly
tied to widespread corruption and the laundering of
large amounts of money out of mainland China. The
Chinese government and Macau officials reportedly
stepped up efforts to regulate Macau's gambling
industry as part of a larger campaign by the central
government against corruption.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Urge in meetings with Hong Kong and central
government officials for Hong Kong authorities to
prepare a clear plan with a specific timetable as soon
as practicable for instituting universal suffrage for
the election of the Chief Executive in 2017 that meets
the requirements of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR) and is developed with full
public participation. Include stops in Hong Kong and
Macau during trips to mainland China. U.S. Government
delegations' meetings in Hong Kong should include
meetings with members of the Hong Kong Legislative
Council, officials with the Hong Kong government
administration, members of the judiciary, and
representatives of reporters' organizations. In Macau,
delegations should meet with members of the Legislative
Assembly, especially directly elected members, with the
Macau government administration, and with leaders
outside the government.
Support and encourage agencies and organizations to
explore projects to monitor and strengthen democratic
practices, press freedom, and the rule of law in Macau.
Commend Hong Kong for its commitment to transparency
in light of recent measures toward a public archives
law and maintaining public access to corporate
directors' identifying information, and emphasize the
critical importance of transparency for maintaining
confidence in business and U.S.-Hong Kong relations.
Urge Macau to develop law enforcement mechanisms for
combating money laundering, such as a mechanism to
freeze suspicious assets, establishing cash declaration
requirements for visitors, lowering transaction
reporting thresholds for casinos, and enhancing legal
requirements for casino customer due diligence.
Political Prisoner Database
Recommendations
When composing correspondence advocating on behalf of a
political or religious prisoner, or preparing for official
travel to China, Members of Congress and Administration
officials are encouraged to:
Check the Political Prisoner Database (PPD)
(http://ppdcecc.gov) for reliable, up-to-date
information on a prisoner or groups of prisoners.
Consult a prisoner's database record for more detailed
information about the prisoner's case, including his or
her alleged crime, specific human rights that officials
have violated, stage in the legal process, and location
of detention or imprisonment, if known.
Advise official and private delegations
traveling to China to present Chinese officials with
lists of political and religious prisoners compiled
from database records.
Urge U.S. state and local officials and
private citizens involved in sister-state and sister-
city relationships with China to explore the database,
and to advocate for the release of political and
religious prisoners in China.
A POWERFUL RESOURCE FOR ADVOCACY
The Commission's 2013 Annual Report provides information
about Chinese political and religious prisoners\1\ in the
context of specific human rights and rule of law abuses. Many
of the abuses result from the Chinese Communist Party's and
government's application of policies and laws. The Commission
relies on the Political Prisoner Database (PPD), a publicly
available online database maintained by the Commission, for its
own advocacy and research work, including the preparation of
the Annual Report, and routinely uses the database to prepare
summaries of information about political and religious
prisoners for Members of Congress and Administration officials.
The Commission invites the public to read about issue-specific
Chinese political imprisonment in sections of this Annual
Report, and to access and make use of the upgraded PPD at
http://ppdcecc.gov. (Information about the PPD is available at
http://www.cecc.gov/resources/political-prisoner-database.)
The PPD received approximately 84,500 online requests for
prisoner information during the 12-month period ending August
31, 2013--an increase of approximately 36 percent over the
61,900 requests during the 12-month period ending August 31,
2012. During the 12-month period ending in August 2013, the
United States was the country of origin of the largest share of
requests for information, with approximately 31.9 percent of
such requests--a decrease from the 51 percent reported for the
United States in the Commission's 2012 Annual Report. China was
second with approximately 29.2 percent (an increase compared to
20 percent in the 2012 reporting period), followed by Japan
with 19.1 percent (compared to 1 percent in the 2012 reporting
period), Germany (4.1 percent), France (2.4 percent), the
United Kingdom (2.2 percent), the Russian Federation (1.0
percent), Hong Kong (0.8 percent), the Netherlands (0.8
percent), and India (0.7 percent).
Approximately 56.8 percent of the approximately 84,500
requests for PPD information were from numerical Internet
addresses that do not provide information about the name of the
registrant or the type of domain. That figure represents a
substantial increase over the 36 percent reported for such
addresses during the period ending in August 2012 and may
contribute to the proportional changes reported for the
following types of Internet domains.
Approximately 15.5 percent of the online requests for PPD
information during the 12-month period ending August 31, 2013,
originated from worldwide commercial (.com) Internet domains--a
decrease from the 19 percent reported in the 2012 Annual
Report. Worldwide network (.net) domains were second with
approximately 8.8 percent (compared to 16 percent in the 2012
reporting period), followed by U.S. Government (.gov) domains
with 6.7 percent (compared to 11 percent in the 2012 reporting
period), 2.8 percent from domains in Germany (.de), 1.5 percent
from worldwide nonprofit organization (.org) domains, 1.4
percent from domains in France (.fr), and 1.3 percent from U.S.
education (.edu) domains.
POLITICAL PRISONERS
The PPD seeks to provide users with prisoner information
that is reliable and up to date. Commission staff members work
to maintain and update political prisoner records based on the
staff member's area of expertise. The staff seek to provide
objective analysis of information about individual prisoners,
and about events and trends that drive political and religious
imprisonment in China.
As of September 1, 2013, the PPD contained information on
7,309 cases of political or religious imprisonment in China. Of
those, 1,304 are cases of political and religious prisoners
currently known or believed to be detained or imprisoned, and
6,005 are cases of prisoners who are known or believed to have
been released, or executed, who died while imprisoned or soon
after release, or who escaped. The Commission notes that there
are considerably more than 1,304 cases of current political and
religious imprisonment in China. The Commission staff works on
an ongoing basis to add cases of political and religious
imprisonment to the PPD.
The Dui Hua Foundation, based in San Francisco, and the
former Tibet Information Network, based in London, shared their
extensive experience and data on political and religious
prisoners in China with the Commission to help establish the
database. The Dui Hua Foundation continues to do so. The
Commission also relies on its own staff research for prisoner
information, as well as on information provided by non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), other groups that specialize
in promoting human rights and opposing political and religious
imprisonment, and other public sources of information.
MORE POWERFUL DATABASE TECHNOLOGY
The PPD has served since its launch in November 2004 as a
unique and powerful resource for the U.S. Congress and
Administration, other governments, NGOs, educational
institutions, and individuals who research political and
religious imprisonment in China, or who advocate on behalf of
such prisoners. The July 2010 PPD upgrade significantly
leveraged the capacity of the Commission's information and
technology resources to support such research, reporting, and
advocacy.
The PPD aims to provide a technology with sufficient power
to cope with the scope and complexity of political imprisonment
in China. The most important feature of the PPD is that it is
structured as a genuine database and uses a powerful query
engine. Each prisoner's record describes the type of human
rights violation by Chinese authorities that led to his or her
detention. These types include violations of the right to
peaceful assembly, freedom of religion, freedom of association,
and free expression, including the freedom to advocate peaceful
social or political change and to criticize government policy
or government officials.
The design of the PPD allows anyone with access to the
Internet to query the database and download prisoner data
without providing personal information to the Commission, and
without the PPD downloading any software or Web cookies to a
user's computer. Users have the option to create a user
account, which allows them to save, edit, and reuse queries,
but the PPD does not require a user to provide any personal
information to set up such an account. The PPD does not
download software or a Web cookie to a user's computer as the
result of setting up such an account. Saved queries are not
stored on a user's computer. A user-specified ID (which can be
a nickname) and password are the only information required to
set up a user account.
II. Human Rights
Freedom of Expression
International Standards on Free Expression
While international standards permit states to restrict
expression in limited circumstances, official Chinese
restrictions during the Commission's 2013 reporting year
covered a much broader range of activity--including peaceful
expression critical of the Chinese Communist Party and
independent news reporting.\1\ Many official Chinese
restrictions on free expression fail to comply with
international human rights standards. Article 19 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
and Articles 19 and 29 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights permit officials to restrict expression so long as it is
(1) for the purpose of respecting the rights or reputations of
others or protecting national security, public order, public
health or morals, or the general welfare; (2) set forth in law;
and (3) necessary and the least restrictive means to achieve
the purported aim.\2\ Regarding the first requirement, the UN
Human Rights Council (UNHRC) has said restrictions on
``discussion of government policies and political debate,''
``peaceful demonstrations or political activities, including
for peace or democracy,'' and ``expression of . . . dissent''
are inconsistent with Article 19 of the ICCPR, which the
Chinese government signed in 1998 but has not yet ratified.\3\
In June 2012, the UNHRC passed a resolution supporting freedom
of expression on the Internet, affirming that ``the same rights
that people have offline must also be protected online, in
particular freedom of expression, which is applicable
regardless of frontiers and through any media of one's
choice.''\4\
Growth and Control of the Internet
EXPANDING OVERALL ACCESS, INTRODUCING NEW RESTRICTIONS
China's Internet usage has experienced dramatic growth in
recent years, particularly in the number of Internet users
accessing the Web through mobile devices. According to the
China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC), the
national-level administrative agency responsible for Internet
affairs in China,\5\ there were over 590 million Internet users
in China by the end of June 2013, bringing the Internet
penetration rate (the total number of Internet users divided by
the total population) to 44.1 percent.\6\ By mid-2013, China
had more than 464 million people accessing the Internet from
mobile devices--amounting to 78.5 percent of the total Internet
population.\7\ According to information from three of China's
leading telecommunications operators, there were 1.15 billion
mobile phone subscribers by March 2013.\8\
The Chinese government has pledged to expand access to
mobile technologies and the Internet, according to news
reports.\9\ Chinese officials expect the number of Internet
users to grow to more than 800 million people by 2015,
including more than 200 million rural Internet users.\10\ In
the 2012-2015 National Human Rights Action Plan, the Chinese
government sets its target of increasing Internet penetration
to more than 45 percent by 2015.\11\ During the Commission's
2013 reporting year, the Chinese government continued steps to
expand the country's telecommunications infrastructure. In
February 2013, for instance, the Ministry of Industry and
Information Technology announced plans to increase access to
broadband services to cover 70 percent of Chinese Internet
users by year's end.\12\
Despite the stated goals of increasing online access,
official statements and state-run publications continue to
emphasize strengthening the legal limits and management of
Internet information rather than protecting Internet
freedoms.\13\ During the Commission's 2013 reporting year,
Chinese officials and state-run media outlets consistently used
the threat of ``online rumors'' (wangluo yaoyan) and
``unhealthy information'' (buliang xinxi) as a basis for
increased Internet controls and real-name registration
requirements.\14\ In December 2012, the People's Daily, the
official news media of the Chinese Communist Party, published a
front-page commentary on Internet users' legal obligations.\15\
The commentary stated, ``Demanding that people all use the
correct means to say the correct things is not practical, but
they must have a consciousness of the law and take
responsibility for their words--this is a must.''\16\ Officials
emphasized controlling Internet content over the course of this
past year.\17\ In May 2013, for instance, the State Internet
Information Office (SIIO) said that it was ``waging a war
against online rumors'' that ``have impaired the credibility of
online media, disrupted normal communication order, and aroused
great aversion among the public.''\18\
State-run media organizations and Chinese officials called
for stricter regulations in late 2012, promoting Internet
regulations as a necessary step in ``protecting'' Internet
users' privacy and online information.\19\ On December 28,
2012, the National People's Congress Standing Committee adopted
a 12-article decision, titled ``Decision on Strengthening
Online Information Protection,'' with new regulations
stipulating the collection of online personal information.\20\
According to multiple reports, new requirements mandating
Internet users to register accounts by using their real names
generated controversy.\21\ In early September, the Supreme
People's Court and the Supreme People's Procuratorate also
issued an official interpretation regarding re-posting
defamatory content online purportedly to protect users' rights
and reputations.\22\ The Interpretation states that Internet
users could face up to three years' imprisonment if defamatory
content is reposted 500 times or is viewed 5,000 times
online.\23\
Despite efforts to control Internet content and regulate
account registration, Chinese activists and foreign media have
noted the difficulties that officials face in completely
controlling this emerging and vibrant space for expression,
including criticism of government policies and discussion of
politically sensitive topics.\24\ An April 2013 Economist
article stated that the Internet in China, despite controls,
has allowed new shifts of public consciousness and new
pressures for authoritarian responses: ``. . . [E]ven casual
users can be drawn into political debates online, and the
internet is one place where people can speak their minds and
criticise the government relatively freely. . . . [B]eing able
to express diverging views collectively online is new. Millions
of users are low-grade subversives, chipping away at the
imposing edifice of the party-state with humour, outrage and
rueful cynicism.''\25\
CENSORSHIP OF ONLINE CONTENT
This past year, Chinese authorities appeared to maintain or
enhance policies to block and filter online content,
particularly sensitive information about rights activists,
official corruption, or collective organizing.\26\ According to
the Open Net Initiative, the Chinese government ``maintains one
of the most pervasive and sophisticated regimes of Internet
filtering and information control in the world.''\27\ Chinese
officials remained non-transparent in disclosing content that
is blocked or why it is blocked.\28\ The online censorship and
Web site closures, in some cases, appeared politically
motivated and appeared to counter international standards on
freedoms of opinion and expression.\29\ For example, in October
2012, Chinese censors blocked access to the New York Times'
English- and Chinese-language Web sites in response to articles
describing ``hidden'' wealth accumulated by former Premier Wen
Jiabao's family members.\30\ Also, international news media and
foreign Web sites reported that Chinese Internet censors
blocked or partially blocked a range of political names and
phrases related to the 18th National Congress of the Chinese
Communist Party and to the anniversary of the 1989 Tiananmen
protests.\31\
International reporting and research continued to
illustrate how Chinese officials, Internet companies, and
state-sponsored agents are able to control access to and
content on the Web.\32\ During the reporting year, the Chinese
government allegedly enhanced its national system of
surveillance and censorship (commonly known as the Great
Firewall or GFW), especially leading up to and throughout the
18th Party Congress.\33\ One U.S.-based study found that
Chinese censors ``actively manipulated'' search results related
to 18th Party Congress delegates.\34\ Another study argued that
Chinese authorities censored comments online ``to reduce the
probability of collective action by clipping social ties
whenever any collective movements are in evidence or
expected''--and ``not to suppress criticism of the state or the
Communist Party.''\35\ Another study addressed the speed and
efficiency of censors on China's popular microblog platforms,
finding that 30 percent of the deletions took place within 30
minutes and 90 percent within the first 24 hours.\36\ A
different study demonstrated how the China-only version of
Skype, the popular Internet-based communication software,
allowed officials to intercept thousands of politically
sensitive text messages, while monitoring users'
communications.\37\
Chinese regulatory and legal measures do not clearly define
prohibited online content. Internet regulations contain vague
and broad prohibitions on content that ``harms the honor or
interests of the nation,'' ``spreads rumors,'' or ``disrupts
national policies on religion.''\38\ Chinese law does not
define these concepts, nor does it contain specific criteria to
establish whether an action presents ``harm'' to the ``honor or
interests of the nation.''\39\ Since the concepts remain
undefined, Chinese authorities broadly apply these and other
vague legal provisions to punish those seeking to express
opinions or share information.\40\ At the same time, the
Chinese government places the burden on Internet service and
content providers to monitor and remove content based on these
vague standards and to maintain records of such activity and
report it to the government.\41\
CITIZEN AND GOVERNMENT USE OF MICROBLOGS
China's Twitter-like microblogging (weibo) sites continued
to see strong growth in the number of users during this
reporting year.\42\ By the end of 2012, according to the CNNIC,
China's microblogging sites--including China's two leading
microblog platforms Sina Weibo and Tencent (QQ) Weibo--had an
estimated 309 million registered accounts, an increase of 58.73
million users from the end of 2011.\43\ While most weibo users
access the microblogging sites for entertainment or social
purposes,\44\ many Chinese citizens continued to use the sites
for individual expression, to raise issues of public
accountability, and to publicize important political
developments.\45\ Despite China's sophisticated censorship
system, Chinese citizens have consistently used the
microblogging sites to bypass conventional media constraints
and circumvent censorship restrictions.\46\ In addition,
businesses, journalists, and microbloggers used virtual private
networks (VPNs), among other techniques, to access the U.S.-
based microblogging service provider Twitter (which has been
blocked in China since July 2009\47\), as well as other
foreign-based social networking sites blocked in China.\48\
In the absence of independent domestic media, microblogging
has emerged as an alternative outlet for a range of independent
opinions and news reporting. During this reporting year,
microblog users utilized the services to publicize various
incidents or news events--from air quality monitoring in
Beijing\49\ to the April 2013 earthquake in Ya'an municipality,
Sichuan province.\50\ In November 2012, microblog users
circulated information from a New York Times article on the
financial assets of former Premier Wen Jiabao's family members
while official censors blocked the newspaper's Web site and
search terms related to the story.\51\ In response to the
censorship, microblog users employed various related ``code
words'' and posted screenshots of the article to circumvent
restrictions.\52\
The circulation of independent news and information on
microblogs appears, in some instances, to have sparked outrage
over official abuses, particularly over local-level
corruption.\53\ Microbloggers and citizen journalists have
increasingly used microblogging platforms to uncover official
abuses or expose corruption, such as ill-gotten real estate
assets or luxury items.\54\ In one of the highest profile
cases, Chinese authorities investigated National Development
and Reform Commission Vice Chairman Liu Tienan after a
journalist publicly accused Liu of corruption and various
wrongdoings on Sina Weibo.\55\ China's new leadership and
state-run media appear to have acknowledged microblogging's
growing utility in exposing corruption and in promoting
transparency.\56\ In March 2013, for instance, Premier Li
Keqiang said, ``There are already hundreds of millions of weibo
users. If government information is not released in a timely
manner this generates animated discussion and speculation, and
this can easily cause resentment among the people and give rise
to negative influences, ultimately putting the government on
its back foot in doing its work.''\57\
In mid-2013, international media organizations reported
increased government pressure on certain popular users of
microblogging services (commonly referred to as ``Big V's''
because of their large followings and verified status),
including those who have posted blunt social criticisms or
political commentaries.\58\ The growing popularity of services
has allowed some microbloggers to reach millions of users and
to potentially shape public opinion.\59\ With growing concern
about ``online rumors,''\60\ Chinese Internet authorities
responded with a crackdown on high-profile accounts\61\ and
with a list of ``seven bottom-lines'' for online activity.\62\
The ``seven bottom-lines,'' according to state-run media,
include upholding or maintaining: Laws and regulations, the
system of socialism, the national interest, the people's
legitimate rights and interests, social order, morality, and
the accuracy of information.\63\ In an August 2013 Xinhua
editorial, the official state-run news agency argued that, ``as
recognizable figures in the online world, `Big V's' must have a
stronger sense of social responsibility than ordinary
users.''\64\ Some commentators, however, have alleged the
crackdown on prominent microblog users is politically
based.\65\ A September 2013 South China Morning Post article,
for instance, reported that ``[the] clampdown has been widely
interpreted as an attempt to silence prominent liberal
commentators.''\66\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Seven Topics Off Limits for University Teaching
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
In May 2013, Chinese microblog users circulated information about a
reported official university directive, which outlined seven topics
that university professors were prohibited from mentioning in their
classes.\67\ According to multiple reports, the seven topics were
universal values, press freedom, civil society, civil rights, the
Communist Party's historical mistakes, crony capitalism, and judicial
independence.\68\ One professor reportedly said the Chinese Communist
Party's General Office had issued the order and that ``only a select
group of teaching and administrative staff'' had been briefed on
it.\69\ A Shanghai-based law professor questioned whether the
prohibitions would undermine fundamental university responsibilities:
``Are we still a university if we are not allowed to talk about civil
rights and press freedom?''\70\ Some observers later linked this
directive to a Party memo referred to as ``Document No. 9,'' which
identified seven similar areas of concern.\71\ [For more information on
``Document No. 9,'' see Section III--Institutions of Democratic
Governance.]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
While China's social media and microblogging sphere has
provided space for citizens' voices, the Chinese government has
also made use of the tools for official purposes. According to
a report by the Chinese Academy of Governance, the Chinese
government had more than 176,000 microblog accounts at the end
of December 2012.\72\ The government microblogs were created
``to communicate with the public and provide services,''
according to a research report cited by Xinhua.\73\ Official
statements, in recent years, have emphasized enhancing
government presence on social media sites and ``promoting
social harmony and stability'' through microblogging
accounts.\74\
Punishment of Citizens' Free Expression
CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT
Chinese authorities continued to use the criminal justice
system to detain and punish citizens exercising their
constitutional rights to ``freedom of speech, of the press, of
assembly, of association, of procession and of
demonstration.''\75\ Some of those punished during the
reporting year had previous records of criticizing the Chinese
government and Communist Party and of advocating for democracy
and human rights.\76\ In addition, Chinese criminal defense
lawyers and suspects in free speech cases continued to face
substantial obstacles in ensuring that courts upheld procedural
safeguards and the right to a fair trial, as required by the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.\77\ [For
more information on rights abuses related to criminal suspects,
see Section II--Criminal Justice.]
Officials used vaguely worded criminal charges to detain
rights advocates,\78\ Internet writers,\79\ human rights
lawyers,\80\ and citizen journalists\81\ who engaged in
peaceful expression and assembly. The following cases represent
select detentions from the reporting year:
In November 2012, Beijing public security
authorities criminally detained blogger Zhai Xiaobing
on suspicion of ``spreading terrorist information''
after he allegedly posted a satirical tweet about the
18th Party Congress.\82\ Authorities released him weeks
later.\83\
On August 2, 2013, Beijing state security
officials detained journalist Chen Min, also known as
Xiao Shu, after he helped to organize a petition
advocating the release of Xu Zhiyong, a legal scholar
and rights advocate criminally detained in July
2013.\84\ According to an online statement released
after the detention, Chen claimed authorities held him
for 48 hours and that ``[a]t no point were any legal
procedures undertaken.''\85\
In May 2013, Beijing officials detained
independent journalist, author, and filmmaker Du Bin
after he released a book on the 1989 Tiananmen protests
and a documentary exposing abuses within the Masanjia
Women's Reeducation Through Labor Center, located in
Liaoning province.\86\ According to statements made by
Hu Jia, a prominent human rights activist, authorities
allegedly criminally detained Du for his recent work
exposing human rights abuses.\87\ Authorities released
Du on bail five weeks after his detention.\88\ As of
September 2013, he was awaiting trial on charges of
``creating disturbances,'' which can carry a criminal
sentence of up to 10 years' imprisonment.\89\
During this reporting year, Chinese authorities released
journalist and democracy advocate Shi Tao from prison in late
August, after he served less than nine years of an April 2005
10-year prison sentence for disclosing ``state secrets''
abroad.\90\
OFFICIAL HARASSMENT
This past reporting year, the Commission observed a range
of abuses related to the extralegal harassment of rights
advocates,\91\ Internet writers,\92\ and family members of
advocates,\93\ who sought to exercise their rights to freedom
of speech and assembly.\94\ The following examples illustrate
forms of official harassment:
In November 2012, Chinese authorities sent
journalist Li Yuanlong on forced ``vacation'' after he
published a story about children who died of carbon
monoxide poisoning in a Guizhou province dumpster.\95\
In June 2013, Beijing authorities placed
Tsering Woeser, a Tibetan writer, blogger, and rights
advocate, under ``soft detention,'' an extralegal form
of home confinement, reportedly in connection with her
efforts to highlight Chinese human rights abuses
against Tibetans. She was reportedly also held under
``soft detention'' in March 2013.\96\
In August 2013, East China University of
Political Science suspended outspoken Professor Zhang
Xuezhong from teaching at the university, in apparent
connection with his advocacy for constitutionalism.\97\
In suppressing free speech rights, Chinese authorities not
only targeted Chinese citizens who sought to express their
opinions peacefully but also targeted their family members and
acquaintances.\98\ In December 2012, Associated Press (AP)
journalists visited Nobel Peace Prize laureate Liu Xiaobo's
wife, Liu Xia, whom authorities continue to hold under an
extralegal form of home confinement.\99\ According to AP, ``Liu
Xia trembled uncontrollably and cried as she described how
absurd and emotionally draining her confinement under house
arrest has been . . . .''\100\
Press Freedom
Chinese government and Communist Party officials continue
to exercise control over the press in violation of
international standards. International experts have identified
media serving ``as government mouthpieces instead of as
independent bodies operating in the public interest'' as a
major challenge to free expression.\101\ In its 2013 World
Press Freedom Index, Reporters Without Borders ranked China
173rd out of 179 countries in terms of press freedoms, noting
that ``China shows no sign of improving. Its prisons still hold
many journalists and netizens, while increasingly unpopular
Internet censorship continues to be a major obstacle to access
to information.''\102\
In the reporting year, Chinese officials called for
enhancing controls over traditional media, specifically
domestic media organizations quoting or reproducing content
from foreign media.\103\ In an April 2013 edition of the Red
Flag Journal, a prominent Party publication, Ren Xianliang,
Vice Chairman of the All-China Journalists Association and
Deputy Director of the Shaanxi Provincial Chinese Communist
Party Propaganda Department, argued that traditional media and
new media tools form ``two distinct fields of public opinion''
and that the Party must ``have the courage to be hands on in
its control'' of the media.\104\ Top-level Chinese officials
reportedly took new steps to denounce press freedoms. For
example, in an April 2013 internal Party document (referred to
as ``Document No. 9''), central Party authorities reportedly
warned against ``subversive trends,'' including the Western
concept of press freedoms.\105\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
January 2013 Southern Weekend Protests
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
In January 2013, Chinese editors and staff at the Southern Weekend, a
progressive weekly newspaper based in Guangdong province, staged a rare
strike after provincial propaganda authorities ordered the publication
of a New Year editorial praising the Chinese Communist Party in place
of a previously prepared editorial calling for guarantees to
constitutional rights.\106\ The earlier editorial, titled ``China's
Dream, the Dream of Constitutionalism,'' called on leaders to uphold
constitutional principles and safeguard people's freedoms.\107\ After
staff submitted the article for review by official censors, editors
returned a pro-Party message that angered Southern Weekend staff and
former staff members.\108\ Southern Weekend journalists responded with
a strike to express outrage and to demand editorial independence.\109\
In the days that followed, hundreds of supporters reportedly gathered
outside the newspaper's Guangzhou municipality headquarters in
protest.\110\ Academics and celebrities posted online messages of
support, condemned the censorship, and called for Tuo Zhen, the
provincial propaganda chief, to step down.\111\
Chinese authorities took various steps to deescalate tensions related
to the strike and protests. The Central Propaganda Department ordered
that no media organization report, comment on, or forward any messages
related to the article or the strike at Southern Weekend.\112\ On
January 8, 2013, the Global Times published an editorial suggesting
that activists, operating outside of the domestic media, were
``inciting some media to engage in confrontation,'' while the editorial
cautioned the public to reject reforms that were ``out of step with
[China's] political development.''\113\
Following a reported compromise between Southern Weekend staff and
government officials, a former Southern Weekend opinion writer wrote a
January 2013 editorial for the New York Times on the incident, stating,
``The crisis has subsided, but there is little room for future
optimism, because the deep-seated question has not been resolved: Is
there, in fact, room for professional journalism to survive and develop
within the system?''\114\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
POLITICAL CONTROL OF MEDIA THROUGH REGULATION OF EDITORS AND
JOURNALISTS
China's media regulator, the State Administration of Press,
Publication, Radio, Film, and Television, continued to enforce
a system of strict controls and licensing requirements. (In
2013, the General Administration of Press and Publications
(GAPP) and the State Administration of Radio, Film, and
Television merged to create the State Administration of Press,
Publication, Radio, Film, and Television.\115\) All media
organizations in China are subject to an extensive licensing
system and government supervision.\116\ In order to report the
news legally, domestic newspapers, magazines, Web sites, and
journalists must obtain a license or accreditation from the
government.\117\ Radio and television broadcast journalists,
for instance, must pass a government-sponsored exam that tests
them on subjects including basic knowledge of Marxist views of
news and Communist Party principles.\118\
In recent years, China's media regulator has issued a range
of regulations to ``strengthen management'' and address
official concerns over ``false information'' in news reports.
In October 2011, the GAPP, the former government agency
responsible for monitoring and regulating print-based media,
released regulations on controlling use of ``unverified
information'' by prohibiting journalists from directly
referencing information obtained from the Internet or social
media in their reporting.\119\ Less than two years later, in
April 2013, the newly merged State General Administration of
Press, Publication, Radio, Film, and Television issued a
directive that officially bans journalists from using foreign
media reports without authorization and forbids news editors
from reporting information online that has not been verified
through official channels.\120\ According to a Hong Kong-based
media expert, officials may face challenges enforcing the
regulations, as information often moves quickly on microblogs:
``[Controlling press content] is very difficult to achieve when
foreign stories are breaking over on Sina Weibo before
[government agents] can put a stop to this whole
process.''\121\
PUNISHMENT OF DOMESTIC JOURNALISTS
While the 2012-2015 National Human Rights Action Plan
announced official intentions to safeguard ``the legitimate
rights and interests of news agencies, journalists, editors and
other persons concerned,''\122\ during this reporting year,
Chinese authorities took actions to punish, suspend, or remove
outspoken and independent journalists and newspaper staff.\123\
In March 2013, Deng Yuwen, an editor at a prominent Chinese
Communist Party journal, was ``suspended indefinitely'' after
publishing an editorial that criticized China's ``outdated''
alliance with North Korea in the U.K.-based Financial
Times.\124\ In August 2013, authorities in Chongqing
municipality detained Liu Hu, a journalist for a Guangdong
province-based newspaper,\125\ under suspicion of ``fabricating
and spreading rumors'' in apparent connection with his online
request that authorities investigate a former Chongqing
official for corruption.\126\ In other instances, Chinese
journalists faced threats or violence in attempting to
investigate news stories.\127\ In July 2013, for instance,
public security authorities in Hunan province threatened and
then assaulted two journalists attempting to report on protests
sparked by the death of a citizen assaulted by local chengguan,
or urban management officials.\128\ According to the Beijing
News, a popular newspaper, the public security officers
threatened the journalists by saying, ``Take no photos, or if
you take any, you will die here.''\129\
Chinese journalists working for foreign-based Web sites and
newspapers also faced the threat of official reprisals for
independent news reporting. In April 2013, Chinese authorities
detained journalist Sun Lin, a reporter with the foreign-based
Chinese news Web site Boxun, after he distributed online
footage of a protest over an elementary school's expulsion of a
rights advocate's daughter.\130\
HARASSMENT OF FOREIGN AND HONG KONG JOURNALISTS
This past year, the Commission continued to monitor
harassment of foreign journalists in China. In March 2013,
unidentified men in Beijing beat two Hong Kong journalists who
were filming a Hong Kong rights advocate's attempt to visit Liu
Xia, wife of imprisoned Nobel Peace Prize laureate Liu
Xiaobo.\131\ Reports claim that as many as a dozen unidentified
men beat the journalists as they attempted to access the
building where Liu Xia was being illegally detained.\132\ After
the attack, police authorities took away the Hong Kong rights
advocate.\133\ Also in March, Radio Free Asia reported that a
television crew working for Germany's public broadcaster ARD
was pursued, forced off the road, and attacked following
investigative reporting on urbanization in Hebei province.\134\
Following these actions, the International Federation of
Journalists issued a statement saying, ``The media should be
allowed to carry out its professional responsibilities in a
public place without fear of harassment, intimidation or
assault--particularly if the media is investigating suspicious
activity.''\135\ According to the Foreign Correspondent's Club
of China (FCCC), foreign journalists overall continued to face
challenging work conditions and various forms of
harassment.\136\ In an FCCC annual survey released in July
2013, 70 percent of journalists surveyed agreed that
``conditions have worsened or stayed the same as the year
before.''\137\
Worker Rights
Freedom of Association
The Chinese government continued to prevent workers from
exercising their constitutional right to freedom of
association\1\ this past year. Although the PRC Trade Union Law
provides workers with the right to participate in and form
trade unions, it also restricts workers' rights to freedom of
association by requiring that all union activity be approved by
and structured under the All-China Federation of Trade Unions
(ACFTU), an organization under the direction of the Chinese
Communist Party.\2\ Leading trade union officials hold
concurrent high-ranking positions in the Party and central and
local government, undermining union autonomy and giving the
Party and government undue influence over union policy and
decisionmaking.\3\ The ACFTU constitution and the PRC Trade
Union Law highlight the dual mandates of the ACFTU to protect
the legal rights and interests of workers while supporting the
leadership of the Party and broader goals and interests of the
government,\4\ a problematic arrangement that labor experts
claim constrains the ACFTU from protecting the interests of
workers.\5\ Generally speaking, unions at the enterprise level
remain weak and non-democratic, with the majority of union
officials appointed directly or indirectly by employers and
higher level trade unions.\6\ Increased labor activism in
recent years has reportedly put mounting pressure on the ACFTU
to institute union reform, yet continued structural weaknesses
of trade union branches make improvements to union autonomy and
worker advocacy difficult to achieve.\7\
Collective Bargaining
Genuine collective bargaining remains limited by the
inability of local-level trade unions to effectively represent
and advance the rights of workers in negotiations with
employers. The PRC Labor Law and related legislation provide a
legal framework for trade unions to negotiate collective
contracts and engage in collective consultations with employers
on a wide range of issues.\8\ In recent years, the ACFTU has
vigorously promoted collective contracts and collective wage
bargaining as essential means for upholding ``harmonious''
labor relations and addressing workers' grievances.\9\ Despite
these developments, collective contract and consultation
mechanisms remain problematic, in part because trade unions
lack autonomy and genuine worker representation.\10\ A 2013
research study conducted by a Yunnan provincial government
inspection group on the implementation of provincial measures
for collective wage consultations identified a number of
problems in the consultation process, despite an overall
increase in collective wage contracts signed since 2011,
including a lack of expertise in wage and contract negotiations
by union officials and a general misunderstanding and
shortsightedness by employers of the benefits of collective
negotiations.\11\ An official with the Yunnan provincial Bureau
of Human Resources and Social Security further asserted that
because workers in general continued to occupy a weaker
position in relation to employers in the collective
consultation process, many choose not to push for collective
negotiations, while in other instances employers and union
officials were found to put more emphasis on negotiating than
on signing collective contracts, leading to a process the
official argued was ``heavy on form, light on results.''\12\ In
one case in March 2013, workers at the Nanhai Honda automotive
plant in Guangdong province rejected what they considered to be
an unfair collective wage agreement negotiated by plant
managers and the trade union, initiating a strike to pressure
management to agree to higher wage increases.\13\ In other
instances, workers lacked knowledge of union functions
altogether, preventing them from accessing union
representation. For example, a 2013 study jointly conducted by
several Chinese universities found over 80 percent of workers
polled at three different factories did not know who their
union representatives were.\14\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Union Elections Expand as Problems Persist
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Authorities continued to promote direct election of trade union
officials in pilot programs at several enterprises, mainly located in
Guangdong province.\15\ In January 2013, Zhao Xiaosui, Chairman of the
Guangzhou Municipal Federation of Trade Unions, announced plans to hold
pilot trade union elections in 8 to 10 Guangzhou municipality-based
enterprises.\16\ In other cases, officials called for expanding already
established union election programs. In May 2013, Zhan Zhenbiao, Vice
Chairman of the Guangdong Provincial Federation of Trade Unions, called
on officials to strengthen existing union election programs at 162
enterprises in Foshan municipality and further expand direct union
elections to an additional 61 enterprises in the area.\17\ In addition,
Foxconn, a Taiwanese-owned multinational electronics manufacturer,
publicized plans in February 2013 to ``increas[e] the number of junior
employee'' union representatives in its factories through direct
elections.\18\
Despite these developments, recognition by Chinese and international
labor scholars of continued restrictions on worker participation in the
nomination and election process have led to questions over the ability
of direct elections to engender genuinely representative unions.\19\
Moreover, individuals involved in organizing union elections have
stated that significant challenges remain in educating workers on the
election process and the responsibilities of the elected union
committees.\20\ A number of observers have also indicated that recently
elected union representatives lack necessary skills and experience
needed to effectively run a union and represent and advance the rights
of workers.\21\ In one case in February 2013, workers at the Ohms
electronics factory in Shenzhen municipality demanded the recall and
reelection of their union chairman after only recently electing him
through direct elections in May 2012.\22\ According to a petition
letter written by workers, demands for the recall of the union chairman
stemmed from his inability to ``fulfill his duties'' and failure to
effectively intervene in several contract disputes.\23\ A non-
governmental labor organization based in Hong Kong suggested the
chairman lacked the necessary skills and support needed to play an
effective role, further stating that demands for his recall highlighted
``the importance of not just holding elections but of ensuring that the
elected officials can actually perform the tasks they were entrusted
with.''\24\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Worker Actions
During the past reporting year, the Commission continued to
observe reports of workers organizing strikes and
demonstrations in a variety of industries and regions across
China.\25\ Strikes were often prompted by systemic labor-
related grievances, such as factory closings or relocation,\26\
nonpayment of wages and benefits,\27\ and abusive management
practices.\28\ Official trade unions have played no role in
organizing strikes or demonstrations; instead, unions
frequently oppose worker-led actions and urge workers to
resolve their grievances through established legal
channels.\29\ In one case in March 2013, union officials at a
Honda manufacturing plantinFoshanmunicipality,
Guangdongprovince,criticized worker-organized protests as
illegal and unproductive.\30\ Media reports indicated officials
in some cases used force against or detained demonstrating
workers. For example in January 2013, public security officials
in Mayong city, Dongguan municipality, Guangdong, reportedly
detained 27 worker representatives after they sought assistance
from the local government in recovering wage arrears totaling
1.38 billion yuan (US$224 million) on behalf of 3,000 migrant
construction workers.\31\ The Commission has observed reports
in 2013 of officials using force to stop worker demonstrations
in locations including Shenzhen municipality;\32\ Guangzhou
municipality, Guangdong;\33\ and Fengcheng city, Jiangxi
province.\34\
Commentators in China and abroad have argued that
demographic and economic shifts in recent years have provided
workers with greater bargaining power in the workplace,
increasing their determination to redress grievances with
employers and press for better pay and working conditions.\35\
Moreover, experts contend the growing expectations of younger
generation migrant workers with regard to working conditions
and labor rights is a driving factor behind the increased
boldness of recent protests.\36\ Compared with earlier
generations, younger generation migrant workers have higher
levels of education, greater access to technology, and a deeper
understanding of their rights.\37\ A number of reports indicate
that these workers have been at the forefront of recent
strikes, including a demonstration in September 2012 at a
Foxconn factory in Taiyuan municipality, Shanxi province, in
which over 40 people were hospitalized after clashes with local
authorities.\38\
Migrant Workers
Migrant workers--rural residents who have left their
original place of residence to seek non-agricultural jobs in
cities--remain largely marginalized and vulnerable to
exploitation, facing problems such as wage arrears,\39\ social
discrimination,\40\ and low levels of labor and social welfare
protection.\41\ China's total migrant population grew 3.9
percent in 2012 from the previous year to more than 262
million.\42\ Working predominately in low-end industries
requiring little technical skill, such as construction, mining,
and manufacturing, migrants face increased risk for
occupational injury and disease.\43\ According to a report
published in May 2013 by the National Bureau of Statistics of
China, over 50 percent of migrant workers in 2012 did not sign
labor contracts with their employers,\44\ leaving them
vulnerable to abuse in the workplace and severely disadvantaged
should they seek to recover wages or injury compensation
through the court system.\45\ The report also indicated that
even with a slight overall increase from the previous year,
only a minority of migrants in 2012 had pensions (14.3
percent), medical insurance (16.9 percent), occupational injury
insurance (24 percent), and unemployment insurance (8.4
percent).\46\ Moreover, migrants often lack urban residency
status, preventing them from accessing public services in the
cities where they live and work.\47\ A study published in
February 2013 by Renmin University found migrants continued to
consider themselves outsiders despite having worked and lived
in a city for many years, presenting a challenge to government
efforts to improve migrant integration into urban society.\48\
Child Labor
Despite China's laws and commitments under international
conventions prohibiting child labor, employers continued to
hire underage workers this past year. As a member of the
International Labour Organization (ILO), China has ratified the
two core conventions on the elimination of child labor.\49\ The
PRC Labor Law and related legislation also prohibit the
employment of minors under 16 years old.\50\ Despite these
legal measures, systemic problems in enforcement and lack of
sufficient resources reportedly continue to constrain efforts
to reduce child labor.\51\ At a two-day high-level seminar on
child labor held in September 2012, officials from the Ministry
of Human Resources and Social Security acknowledged for the
first time within China the challenge child labor posed,
stating a need for improved legal enforcement and increased
awareness of protection of children's rights.\52\ While the
extent of child labor in China is unclear, in part because the
government does not release data on the issue,\53\ domestic and
international media reports from the past year indicate that
the use of child labor remained evident in the electronics
manufacturing industry, with instances also reported in other
sectors.\54\ Apple's January 2013 Supplier Responsibility
Report noted 74 cases of underage workers at one of its
supplier facilities in Guangdong province, stating that a
third-party labor agency had ``willfully and illegally
recruited young workers,'' reportedly conspiring with families
to forge age verification documents.\55\
The perpetuation of child labor through the misuse of
student workers in ``work-study'' programs and other related
activities also continues to be a concern. National provisions
prohibiting child labor provide that ``education practice
labor'' and vocational skills training labor organized by
schools and other educational and vocational institutions do
not constitute child labor when such activities do not
adversely affect the safety and health of students.\56\ The PRC
Education Law also supports schools that establish work-study
programs, provided they do not negatively affect normal
studies.\57\ The Commission, however, has continued to observe
reports\58\ of ``work-study'' programs that violate Chinese law
and appear inconsistent with ILO standards that permit
vocational training programs for young persons so long as they
relate to a course of education under a school's supervision or
facilitate choice of an occupation, among other
requirements.\59\ Throughout the reporting year, Chinese and
international media reported on vocational schools organizing
compulsory internship programs of questionable educational
benefit in which students worked long hours under physically
demanding conditions. In March 2013, Chinese media reported on
a compulsory internship program in Guangdong province where
technical school students were tasked with working long hours
at an electronics factory in violation of legal limits.\60\
According to reports, students who refused to participate in
the internship program would not graduate from the technical
school. The school's principal defended the program, stating
that it strengthened students' ability to ``endure hardships
and work hard.''\61\ In October 2012, a Foxconn subsidiary in
Yantai municipality, Shandong province, was found to have hired
56 underage interns.\62\ According to reports, students
complained of working excessive overtime on tasks unrelated to
their areas of study and receiving significantly lower wages
than adult workers despite performing the same tasks.\63\ A
vocational college, reportedly implicated in the Foxconn
internship program, stated that students had been working at
the factory since 2010 as part of a government initiative to
alleviate labor shortages.\64\ Some observers have noted that a
gradual tightening of the labor market in recent years has
prompted many companies to increasingly rely on student workers
to resolve labor shortages, often working with local
governments to put pressure on vocational schools to provide
student interns.\65\
Subcontracted Labor
Subcontracted workers hired through labor employment
agencies remain particularly vulnerable to exploitation in the
workplace, often receiving lower wages and fewer benefits than
workers hired through direct labor contracts with
employers.\66\ Following implementation of the PRC Labor
Contract Law in 2008, employers increasingly have used
subcontracted workers, also known as dispatch labor, to
circumvent the legal obligations and related financial costs
associated with direct labor contracts.\67\ While the PRC Labor
Contract Law stipulates that subcontracted workers generally
should be used only for ``temporary, auxiliary, or substitute
positions,'' they continue to be hired as long-term substitutes
for regular employment in violation of the law.\68\ According
to data released by the All-China Federation of Trade Unions
(ACFTU) in 2011 and 2012, China has between 27 and 37 million
subcontracted workers, working primarily in state-owned
enterprises, in some cases accounting for two-thirds of the
total workforce.\69\
In December 2012, the National People's Congress passed
amendments to the PRC Labor Contract Law, effective July 1,
2013, focusing on provisions related to labor
subcontracting.\70\ The amendments include clearer definitions
of the three types of positions that subcontracted workers can
be used for and requires employers to apply the same
compensation standards to both directly hired and subcontracted
laborers.\71\ Moreover, the amendments raise business standards
for employment agencies, requiring them to obtain operating
permits from local labor authorities.\72\ Despite these
changes, Chinese labor experts and union officials have
questioned whether upcoming regulations designed to implement
the amendments may weaken reforms as a result of lobbying by
state-owned enterprises.\73\ Poor regulation of the labor
subcontracting industry also continues to be a problem. Labor
employment agencies have been identified by observers in China
and abroad as a common outlet through which child workers end
up in factories.\74\ In May 2013, Chinese media reported on the
death of a 14-year-old boy at an electronics factory in
Dongguan city, Guangdong province, stating that the boy had
been hired through an employment agency which knowingly forged
his identification documents.\75\
Prison Labor
The use of forced labor in China's prison system remains
inconsistent with Chinese law and in violation of international
standards. The International Labour Organization's (ILO) core
conventions on forced and compulsory labor provide an exception
for prison labor on condition that the use of such labor is
consistent with ILO guidelines.\76\ While China has not
ratified either of the core conventions on forced and
compulsory labor, as a member of the ILO, it remains obligated
to respect a basic set of internationally recognized labor
rights, including those associated with forced and compulsory
labor.\77\ Despite these obligations, exploitation of prison
labor, particularly in reeducation through labor (RTL)
facilities, remains widespread, in part due to official
corruption and the economic incentives prison labor offers
local government.\78\ During the reporting year, Chinese and
international media have reported on abusive working conditions
at RTL facilities throughout China, stating that inmates are
routinely forced to work long hours under threat of physical
abuse with little or no compensation.\79\ RTL officers
reportedly solicit bribes from the families of inmates for
their early release or better treatment.\80\ In a report
published in May 2013 by Southern Weekend, a newspaper based in
Guangzhou municipality, Guangdong province, former RTL
officials acknowledged using ``high-pressure policies such as
beatings and [other] corporal punishment'' to enforce larger
production quotas on uncooperative prisoners, stating that the
amount they could earn depended on whether or not prisoners
could meet or surpass given production quotas.\81\
The export of prison products from China reportedly
continues despite China's 1991 Provisions Reiterating the
Prohibition on the Export of Products Made by Prisoners
Undergoing Reeducation Through Labor.\82\ While the extent of
prison labor in China remains unclear, U.S. government
assessments, as well as international media reports from the
past year, indicate prison labor has been used to manufacture,
among other products, toys, electronics, and clothing.\83\ The
1992 Memorandum of Understanding on Prison Labor and 1994
Statement of Cooperation between the United States and China
established mechanisms to safeguard against the export of
prison products to the United States.\84\ Despite these
agreements, Chinese cooperation has reportedly been slow and
irregular in responding to U.S. concerns.\85\
Wages
Average wage levels in China continued to increase this
past year, continuing a trend over the decade from 2000 to 2010
that saw real average wages more than triple.\86\ Reports
suggest structural changes in China's labor market, in
particular a decline in the growth of the working age
population, are partially responsible for the upward pressure
on wages.\87\ Sporadic labor shortages in 2013\88\ and the
relocation of manufacturing operations further inland or to
Southeast Asia to offset rising costs, among other factors,
also suggest tightening labor market conditions.\89\ According
to some Chinese and international observers this combination of
factors suggests the decline of ``cheap labor'' in China, as
wages will continue to increase for the foreseeable future.\90\
Despite continued wage growth, income inequality among
different regions and industrial sectors has also increased in
recent years, greatly expanding the disparity between rich and
poor people.\91\ Chinese and international economists indicate
that the annual rate of wage growth in China continues to fall
in proportion to gross domestic product,\92\ while wages for
migrant workers remain far behind the national average.\93\
China's State Council released a long-awaited income
distribution plan in February 2013 that seeks to reduce income
inequality and increase household income through a series of
measures, including doubling income levels by 2020 and
broadening social welfare programs;\94\ however, observers from
China and abroad have criticized the plan for its lack of
binding commitments and questioned whether it can be fully
implemented.\95\
MINIMUM WAGE RATES
Local governments continued to raise minimum-wage levels
this past year in keeping with growth targets outlined in the
12th Five-Year Plan on Employment Promotion issued in 2011,
which called for minimum-wage levels to increase annually by 13
percent and reach 40 percent of the average wage of local urban
workers by 2015.\96\ During the 2013 reporting year, the
Commission observed reports from Chinese media of increases in
the statutory minimum wage in 23 provincial-level jurisdictions
and the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone.\97\ Despite these
increases, minimum-wage levels in many locations continue to be
below the 40-percent target outlined in the 12th Five-Year
Plan.\98\ Moreover, reports indicate rising living costs
continue to erode wage gains as workers spend a greater portion
of their income on everyday necessities.\99\ In March 2013,
more than 250 workers from a wide range of professions in
Shenzhen municipality signed a petition protesting newly
implemented minimum-wage standards, arguing that the increase
was insufficient to cover rising living costs in Shenzhen.\100\
WAGE ARREARS AND NONPAYMENT OF WAGES
Wage arrears and nonpayment of wages remained serious
problems this past year, particularly for migrant workers.\101\
According to a report from the Ministry of Human Resources and
Social Security, wage arrears cases increased 7.5 percent in
2012 from the previous year, concentrated predominantly in the
construction and manufacturing industries.\102\ Widespread use
of subcontracting, among other factors, including tight credit
controls and declining export demand, remain the underlying
causes for wage arrears cases.\103\ As bank lending rates rise,
debt-burdened industries face increased difficulty paying
workers, delaying payments, and in some instances defaulting
and declaring bankruptcy, leaving workers with little recourse
to recover unpaid wages.\104\ Central- and provincial-level
government officials have taken steps in the past year to
reduce cases of wage arrears, including streamlining procedures
for investigating and resolving wage arrears claims,
establishing contingency funds,\105\ and pursuing criminal
charges against employers guilty of nonpayment of wages.\106\
Despite these measures, international media reports throughout
2013 indicated that wage arrears continued to be a primary
factor behind worker-led protests, especially in the weeks
prior to the Chinese Lunar New Year holiday.\107\
Occupational Safety
Workers in China continued to face occupational safety
risks this past year. The 2002 PRC Law on Production Safety and
related legislation contains a number of occupational health
and safety provisions aimed at preventing workplace accidents
and establishing a regulatory system to inspect and handle
safety violations.\108\ Despite these legal measures, systemic
problems in implementation and enforcement, as well as the lack
of meaningful worker participation in workplace decisions that
have an impact on safety and health, continue to constrain
efforts to reduce industrial accidents.\109\ Moreover,
unregistered and illegal manufacturing and mining operations
continue to be prevalent throughout the country.\110\ Chinese
officials have indicated that corruption and government
protectionism for local industries has also hindered effective
safety oversight, causing many industrial accidents.\111\
Research published in the Harvard Business Review in 2013 found
workers employed at enterprises in China with political
connections were five times as likely to die in an industrial
accident.\112\ At a forum held on production safety in May
2013, Director of the State Administration of Work Safety, Yang
Dongliang, emphasized that greater efforts were needed to
``resolve problems of lax enforcement and
implementation.''\113\
Workers in the construction, manufacturing, service, and
mining industries are most at risk for sustaining occupational
injury or disease.\114\ Although officially reported deaths
from industrial accidents declined by 4.7 percent to 71,983 in
2012,\115\ Chinese scholars and labor activists suggest the
actual number could be significantly higher due to
underreporting.\116\ Chinese media continued to report on cases
in which mine managers and local officials concealed
information about mine accidents.\117\ Despite a claimed 33
percent decline in reported mine deaths in 2012,\118\ the death
toll for workers in China's coal industry remains more than 10
times the rate in developed countries.\119\
Reports from non-governmental labor organizations and
Chinese and international media continue to highlight workplace
abuses and poor working conditions throughout China. Workers
often cited low wages, forced overtime, and harsh management
practices as some of the major problems that they face.\120\
Allegations of abusive working conditions, for example,
continued to surface at factories operated by Foxconn.\121\
While the Commission reported last year that Foxconn agreed to
improve working conditions at its factories, including reducing
overtime and ensuring overtime wages, a number of labor experts
in China and abroad indicate changes have been minimal.\122\
Reports also indicated that some workers are exposed to
chemicals known to be harmful.\123\ In June 2013, a fire at a
poultry factory in Jilin province killed 120 people and left 77
injured.\124\ According to an investigation by Chinese
officials, locked emergency exits prevented workers from
escaping, a problem that had been highlighted in previous
industrial accidents. Investigators also identified poor safety
supervision and insufficient safety equipment and fire
prevention training for workers as factors in the high number
of casualties.\125\
Occupational Health
Officially reported cases of occupational disease have
grown at increasing rates in recent years, particularly for the
lung disease pneumoconiosis.\126\ According to figures from the
Ministry of Health, out of a total of 749,970 reported cases of
occupation-
related disease at the end of 2010, 90 percent, or over
676,000, were cases of pneumoconiosis.\127\ According to
Chinese labor experts and lawyers, the total number could be
closer to six million.\128\ Inadequate government supervision
of industry compliance with occupational health standards,\129\
illegal actions by employers,\130\ and a lack of knowledge
among workers about health in the workplace reportedly have
contributed to high rates of occupational disease.\131\
Workers' Compensation
Obtaining compensation for work-related injury or
occupational disease in general remains a difficult and
protracted process. Chinese labor and occupational-disease
advocates contend that the legal framework regulating
compensation continues to be overly complicated and time-
consuming, taking anywhere between 2 to more than 10 years for
compensation claims to be processed, with no guarantee of
success.\132\ Moreover, illegal practices and intransigence by
employers and local governments, including refusing to hand
over documents required for processing compensation claims,
failing to sign labor contracts or provide workers with
statutory injury insurance, and refusing to accept liability
for hazardous working conditions, further delay and complicate
prospects for obtaining compensation.\133\ Occupational-disease
advocates insist processing delays can be particularly harmful
to workers suffering from pneumoconiosis--only 10 to 20 percent
of patients reportedly obtain an official diagnosis needed to
receive benefits--contributing to the high death rate among
sufferers.\134\ In some cases, workers with pneumoconiosis
settled for one-off compensation payments to pay for medical
care, even though the compensation fails to cover costs for
ongoing treatment.\135\ A health expert with the Chinese Center
for Disease Control and Prevention stated that only 10 percent
of employees in China receive regular occupational-health
services.\136\
Variations in local implementing regulations for national
legislation on compensation also indicate that actual benefits
can differ significantly from region to region. In October
2012, the family of Zhang Tingzhen, an employee at a Foxconn
factory in Shenzhen municipality who was severely disabled in a
work-related accident, brought a case before a labor
arbitration tribunal over the company's demands that Zhang
travel to Huizhou municipality for a disability assessment,
where compensation levels are substantially lower than in
Shenzhen.\137\ Zhang's father reported that he received text
messages from the company threatening to cut off funding for
his son's treatment if they did not travel to Huizhou, and that
he was beaten at one point by security officials when he tried
to retrieve his son's personal items from the factory.\138\
Labor activists insist that Zhang's case underlines a common
practice by companies in China, in which employers sign labor
contracts with employees in areas where compensation levels are
comparatively low, and then dispatch them to work in areas with
higher compensation rates.\139\
Amendments to the PRC Administrative Measures for the
Diagnosis and Evaluation of Occupational Disease, effective
April 10, 2013, contain provisions that could make it easier
for workers to raise occupational disease claims, while also
increasing the liability of employers.\140\ Most significantly,
it gives workers the right to select the official hospital they
will be diagnosed by, whereas previously local authorities
would usually only accept a diagnosis from a hospital in the
same jurisdiction as an employer, a prospect particularly
problematic for migrant workers who may have already left the
area after an illness developed.\141\
Criminal Justice
Introduction
During the Commission's 2013 reporting year, as in previous
years, developments in criminal justice were driven by the
Chinese government's and Communist Party's top priorities:
maintaining ``social stability'' and ensuring the Party's
continued monopoly on political power.\1\ The Commission
observed the politically motivated use of criminal law and
police power to suppress dissent and perceived challenges to
Party rule. The arrest of anticorruption campaigners and well-
known rights activist Xu Zhiyong, as well as the criminal
detention of prominent human rights advocate Guo Feixiong (aka
Yang Maodong), are just several examples from this reporting
year of the Party's use of criminal law to silence its
critics.\2\
In a major legal development this year, the new PRC
Criminal Procedure Law (CPL), which was adopted in March 2012
after being discussed for many years, took effect on January 1,
2013. While the revised law as written has numerous positive
aspects, it fails to incorporate several key rights for
suspects and defendants, such as a clear presumption of
innocence and an explicit right to remain silent and not to
incriminate oneself. Although it is too early to determine if
the new CPL is being effectively implemented, preliminary
reports suggest that new provisions aimed at enhancing the
ability of lawyers to meet with detained clients are being
implemented, albeit unevenly.\3\ The 2012 CPL also contains new
provisions for the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence. If
implemented, these measures could help address a major
challenge for the judicial system--confessions coerced through
torture and wrongful convictions--a problem that took center
stage this year as numerous cases surfaced of individuals
wrongfully convicted based on coerced confessions.
Abuse of Police Power
As the Commission noted in its 2012 annual report, China's
domestic security apparatus has grown significantly in stature
and influence since 2007.\4\ Zhou Yongkang, who retired in fall
2012 as the secretary of the Communist Party Central Committee
Political and Legal Affairs Commission (PLAC), had amassed
enormous power.\5\ The PLAC, which is responsible for
maintaining law and order, has direct control over the police,
prosecutors, and the courts.\6\ Meng Jianzhu, former Minister
of Public Security, is the new PLAC secretary--a position that
no longer has a seat on the downsized Standing Committee of the
Political Bureau of the Communist Party Central Committee, a
move likely designed to prevent any one leader from becoming
too powerful.\7\
Unchecked police power in Chongqing municipality under Bo
Xilai (who had close ties with Zhou Yongkang) was a defining
characteristic of his campaign against organized crime in
Chongqing from 2008 to 2011.\8\ Over 3,000 people were
convicted of various crimes during the campaign, and many were
tortured.\9\ Bo used the law not just to crack down on major
criminals in Chongqing but also to target his political rivals
and seize private assets.\10\ Some efforts are being made to
provide redress for those wronged by Bo and his former police
chief Wang Lijun; for example, the Chongqing Public Security
Bureau is reinstating or otherwise providing redress to
approximately 900 police officers who suffered unjust treatment
during the campaign.\11\ But, for those who have filed appeals
claiming they were wrongfully convicted, the matter has been
deemed ``sensitive,'' and there has been little progress in
redressing these wrongs.\12\
Chinese authorities continue to use vaguely defined crimes
to suppress and punish dissent and perceived challenges to
Party rule. In addition to Article 105 of the PRC Criminal Law,
which criminalizes ``subversion'' and ``inciting
subversion,''\13\ during this reporting year authorities made
ample use of such vague crimes as ``gathering people to disturb
public order'' and ``unlawful assembly'' to suppress rights
advocates and civil society activists.\14\ In mid-July, the
Beijing Public Security Bureau (PSB) detained Xu Zhiyong, a
leading proponent of the New Citizens' Movement--a loose
network of individuals promoting a broad range of ideas
including legal and political reforms, human rights, and social
justice--on suspicion of ``gathering people to disturb public
order.''\15\ On August 22, the Beijing PSB arrested him on the
same charge.\16\ Guangzhou-based activist Guo Feixiong was
detained on the same charge on August 8.\17\ As of late August,
dozens of anticorruption advocates and other citizens
reportedly affiliated with the New Citizens' Movement had been
detained or arrested for peaceful assembly on various charges,
including ``unlawful assembly'' and ``inciting
subversion.''\18\
Authorities also continued to abuse their power to
persecute relatives of activists.\19\ Chen Guangcheng's nephew,
Chen Kegui, was sentenced in November 2012 to three years and
three months in prison for the ``intentional wounding'' of
several township officials in what international and domestic
observers maintain was an act of self-defense, after a trial
that one legal expert described ``as a judicial farce.''\20\
Liu Xia, the wife of imprisoned Nobel Peace Prize laureate Liu
Xiaobo, remains unlawfully detained in her home.\21\ In June,
Liu Xia's brother, Liu Hui, was sentenced to 11 years in prison
for financial fraud; his appeal was denied in August.\22\
A symbol of unchecked police power is the urban management
law enforcement corps or ``para-police'' (chengguan), which has
become synonymous with lawlessness and brutality in China.\23\
Chengguan enforce administrative regulations in the cities,
often using violent methods.\24\ In 2009, the Commission
reported on the increasing number of violent incidents
perpetrated by chengguan against unlicensed street vendors and
others.\25\ In July 2013, the issue of the unregulated power of
chengguan was once again in the spotlight when chengguan in
Linwu county, Hunan province, beat an unlicensed watermelon
vendor to death, and, in a separate incident, when a man in a
wheelchair, reportedly paralyzed by a chengguan beating in
2005, detonated a bomb in the Beijing International Airport to
draw attention to his unsuccessful efforts to seek redress.\26\
As in 2009, such incidents of chengguan violence have prompted
calls for reform of the chengguan system.\27\
Arbitrary Detention
The UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention defines the
deprivation of personal liberty to be ``arbitrary'' if it meets
one of the following criteria: (1) There is clearly no basis in
law for such deprivation; (2) an individual is deprived of his
or her liberty for having exercised rights under the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); or (3) there is
grave noncompliance with fair trial standards set forth in the
UDHR and other international human rights instruments.\28\
In addition to the many democracy and human rights
advocates who continue to be arbitrarily detained in prison
under the second and/or third criteria of the Working Group's
definition above (e.g., Liu Xiaobo, Chen Wei, Chen Xi, Guo
Quan, Li Tie, Zhu Yufu, Liu Xianbin, Gao Zhisheng, Ni Yulan,
Wang Bingzhang), authorities also detain Chinese citizens
arbitrarily using other venues and methods.\29\ Forms of
arbitrary detention include, among others, ``soft detention''
(ruanjin), ``black jails'' (hei jianyu), shuanggui (a form of
Party discipline), enforced disappearance, and various forms of
administrative detention such as reeducation through labor,
``custody and education'' (for sex workers and their clients),
and compulsory drug treatment centers. Many forms of arbitrary
detention violate China's own laws.\30\
SOFT DETENTION
Soft detention (ruanjin) includes a range of extralegal
controls to which an individual may be subjected, such as home
confinement, surveillance, restricted movement, and limitations
on contact with others.\31\ During this reporting year,
authorities continued to use ruanjin against individuals deemed
``sensitive,'' such as dissidents, rights defense lawyers,
activists, civil society actors, and sometimes their family
members as well.\32\ Liu Xia's ongoing unlawful home
confinement (since October 2010) is an example of the use of
ruanjin against an activist's spouse.\33\ Before Xu Zhiyong was
taken into custody in mid-July, he was unlawfully confined to
his home for three months.\34\ Police aim to keep ``sensitive''
individuals under control and out of sight around major events
or anniversaries such as the 18th National Congress of the
Chinese Communist Party and the anniversary of the 1989
Tiananmen protests.\35\
SECRET DETENTION: ``BLACK JAILS,'' SHUANGGUI, ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCE
According to the UN Committee against Torture, detention of
individuals in secret detention facilities ``constitutes per se
disappearance.''\36\ ``Black jails'' are secret detention
facilities that operate completely outside of China's official
judicial and administrative detention systems.\37\ Chinese
authorities primarily use ``black jails'' to detain petitioners
who leave their hometown to seek redress at higher levels for
complaints they have relating to actions taken by local
government officials, such as forced evictions and land
seizures.\38\ Although Chinese officials have occasionally
taken legal action against individuals involved in operating
``black jails,'' the facilities continue to exist because, as
the Economist observed in March, ``[b]lack jails serve the
interests of every level of government.''\39\ The central
government is determined to keep petitioners off the streets of
Beijing in order to ``maintain stability,'' and local officials
want to ensure that their careers are not adversely affected by
disgruntled local residents causing ``trouble'' in Beijing.\40\
There were several hopeful signs with respect to ``black
jails'' during this reporting year.\41\ In a rare move, Chinese
authorities released hundreds of petitioners detained in
Jiujingzhuang, one of Beijing's largest ``black jails,'' in
connection with Rule of Law Promotion Day on December 4.\42\
And, in February 2013, Xinhua reported that a Beijing court
convicted 10 men from Henan province for illegally detaining 11
petitioners from Henan in Beijing.\43\ Seven of the defendants
received sentences ranging from six months to two years; the
other three were juveniles and given suspended sentences.
Global Times reported that the petitioners were not satisfied
with the sentences, and believed that local officials who were
responsible for their illegal detention should have been
charged.\44\ Despite these and other efforts by the central
government to rein in ``black jails,'' observers caution it is
unlikely that the Chinese government will dismantle the system
anytime soon.\45\
Shuanggui (``double regulation'' or ``double designation'')
is a form of extralegal detention used primarily for Chinese
Communist Party officials who are suspected of corruption or
other infractions, but also for ``cadres who have transgressed
politically.''\46\ Detainees are held incommunicado with no
access to a lawyer or family members.\47\ Secrecy and harsh
interrogation methods further the main objectives of shuanggui:
the extraction of confessions.\48\ Former Chongqing Party
Secretary Bo Xilai was held under shuanggui from March 2012 at
least until his case was turned over to prosecutors in late
September 2012.\49\ During Bo's trial in late August 2013, Bo
recanted confessions he had made while reportedly ``under
pressure'' in shuanggui detention.\50\ On September 22, the
Jinan Municipal People's Intermediate Court in Shandong
province, convicted Bo of bribery, embezzlement, and abuse of
power and sentenced him to life imprisonment; the court
rejected Bo's argument that his earlier confessions should be
excluded as unlawfully obtained.\51\ During this reporting
year, three Chinese officials died within a three-month period
while under shuanggui. Six Party investigators were put on
trial in September for the ``intentional infliction of harm
leading to death'' in connection with one of those cases.\52\
Police relied on enforced disappearance (usually in the
name of ``residential surveillance'') in the crackdown
following the calls for Tunisian-style ``Jasmine'' protests in
China in February 2011 to such an extent that the UN Working
Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances issued a
statement in April of that year expressing ``serious concern''
about the wave of disappearances in China.\53\ The practice of
enforced disappearance has not only continued since 2011, but
is now codified in one of the most controversial revisions to
the recently amended PRC Criminal Procedure Law (CPL), which
took effect on January 1, 2013.\54\ Article 73, or ``the
disappearance clause,'' provides that ``residential
surveillance'' of up to six months may be carried out in a
``designated residence'' (zhiding jusuo)--i.e., a place of the
public security bureau's choosing that is not an officially
recognized place of detention--when there is suspicion of the
crime of endangering ``national security, terrorism, or serious
bribery'' and residential surveillance at the suspect's
domicile may impede the investigation.\55\ Family members must
be notified within 24 hours only of the fact of ``residential
surveillance in a designated location'' and not of the person's
whereabouts or the basis of detention.\56\ Even this minimal
notification requirement may be waived if there is no way of
notifying the family (wufa tongzhi).\57\ The individual is thus
held incommunicado, increasing the likelihood that he or she
will suffer torture or abuse.\58\
ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION
There are several different forms of administrative
detention in China, including reeducation through labor (RTL);
``custody and education'' (shourong jiaoyu), which is applied
to sex workers and their clients; and ``custody and
rehabilitation'' (shourong jiaoyang), which targets juvenile
delinquents (under the age of 16).\59\ These and other forms of
extrajudicial administrative detention are arbitrary under
international human rights standards because they permit the
deprivation of personal liberty without trial or conformance
with other fair trial standards.\60\ In addition, they violate
China's own laws.\61\
The most prominent form of administrative detention in
China, RTL, has been the subject of intense public debate
during this past year,\62\ and the Chinese government has vowed
to reform RTL by the end of 2013.\63\ [See Section III--Access
to Justice for more information.] Under the RTL system--which
has become synonymous with rampant official abuses--Chinese
public security officers are authorized to detain individuals
without trial for a maximum term of three years, with the
possibility of up to a one-year extension.\64\ There have been
reports of RTL centers releasing detainees ahead of their
scheduled release dates and of centers being repurposed as
compulsory drug treatment centers.\65\ Compulsory drug
treatment centers, however, present the same legal problems and
human rights issues as RTL, and they violate both Chinese and
international law.\66\
Two other ``quasi-RTL'' measures are the relatively unknown
``custody and education'' (C&E) and ``custody and
rehabilitation'' (C&R). C&E is a form of administrative
detention that permits Chinese police to send sex workers and
their clients to detention facilities for up to two years
without trial or judicial oversight.\67\ As with RTL and
compulsory drug treatment, C&E inmates are subjected to forced
labor, and rights abuses are rampant.\68\ Under C&R, police may
send juvenile offenders under the age of 16 to detention
facilities for periods between one and three years without due
process of law. A recent editorial in the Southern Metropolitan
Daily argued that, because C&E and C&R suffer from the same
legal infirmities as RTL, they must be considered together in
any discussion of RTL reform.\69\
Access to Counsel
The 2012 PRC Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) contains several
positive developments with respect to access to counsel. For
example, it expands the circumstances under which legal aid
must be provided for suspects and defendants (for example, if
the suspect is facing a possible life sentence or death)--a
revision that may raise the generally low rate of
representation of defendants in criminal trials.\70\ The new
CPL incorporates provisions from the 2007 PRC Lawyers' Law that
seek to ameliorate the ``three difficulties'' defense attorneys
typically face--gaining access both to detained clients and to
prosecutor's case files, and collecting evidence.\71\ Because
the CPL clearly applies to the public security apparatus (the
police had argued previously that the Lawyers' Law only applied
to lawyers), the new CPL may ease the ``three
difficulties.''\72\ The new CPL stipulates that a lawyer need
only show ``three certificates'' (i.e., a lawyers' license, a
law firm certificate, and a client engagement letter), and the
detention center must arrange for a meeting with the detainee
within 48 hours of the request.\73\ Although it is too early to
draw conclusions, preliminary research conducted by Shangquan
Law Firm, a Beijing-based firm that specializes in criminal
defense, suggests that there has been substantial improvement
in the ability of defense lawyers to meet with their detained
clients.\74\
The Shangquan report notes, however, that some problems
still exist in certain locations. For example, several
detention centers in different jurisdictions require the
presence of two lawyers before a meeting will be arranged.\75\
Reminiscent of the ``state secrets'' exception under the prior
CPL, public security officials can rely on a vague exception in
the new CPL to require defense attorneys to first obtain
permission before they may meet with a detained suspect.\76\
Article 37 of the 2012 CPL requires prior permission in cases
involving the crimes of endangering state security, terrorism,
or serious bribery.\77\ The law firm's research found that
public security agencies are interpreting these ``three
categories of cases'' (sanlei anjian) broadly and are invoking
sanlei anjian as an excuse to restrict or prohibit meetings
between lawyers and their clients.\78\ The unevenness of
implementation of the CPL provisions that address the ``three
difficulties'' was highlighted in July by Cao Jianming, the
president of the Supreme People's Procuratorate, who referred
to ``local problems'' as the cause.\79\
In ``politically sensitive'' cases, defendants still have
difficulty not only gaining access to counsel but also
retaining counsel of their own choosing. Authorities twice
rejected requests by Xu Zhiyong's attorney, Liu Weiguo, to meet
with Xu, and on one occasion even held Liu for six hours.\80\
Eventually a different attorney, Zhang Qingfang, was permitted
to meet with Xu.\81\ In August, lawyers for Guo Feixiong were
denied access to their detained client.\82\ Bo Xilai was denied
access to counsel for many months while he was held in
shuanggui,\83\ and lawyers retained by Bo's family were denied
permission to represent him in court.\84\
Torture and Abuse in Custody
Despite the Chinese government's continued efforts to
address the problem, torture and abuse in police stations,
detention centers, prisons, administrative detention
facilities, and secret detention sites remain widespread in
China.\85\ In April 2013, a Chinese magazine published a
detailed account of torture, abuse, and forced labor at the
Masanjia Women's RTL Center in Liaoning province, sparking a
great deal of online commentary and fueling calls for the
reform or abolition of RTL.\86\ In May, Southern Weekend
published an expose on corruption and forced labor in RTL
centers based on interviews with former RTL guards, one of whom
is quoted as saying: ``The reality is that we force RTL
detainees to work and make money [for us]. That's what every
RTL center does.''\87\
Torture by police in the course of criminal investigations
remains a common problem.\88\ The government relies
overwhelmingly on confessions as evidence in criminal
cases.\89\ Sex workers interviewed by Human Rights Watch
describe how police beat them after taking them into custody to
try to force them to confess to prostitution.\90\ Many of the
targets of Bo Xilai's crackdown on organized crime in Chongqing
have alleged that police tortured them to confess.\91\ Gong
Gangmo was reportedly tortured by police in part to coerce him
to frame his lawyer, Li Zhuang, of the crime of suborning
perjury.\92\ Gong has filed an appeal seeking to have his
verdict overturned, as has Li. Gong, who has since apologized
to Li Zhuang for setting him up, will be assisted by Li in his
appeal.\93\
The Chinese government has attempted to address the
persistent problem of forced confessions since at least 1997,
without much success.\94\ During the 2013 reporting year, the
issue of coerced confessions and wrongful convictions garnered
a great deal of public attention after a number of wrongful
convictions came to light and high-level court officials made
statements condemning the phenomenon.\95\ The 2012 PRC Criminal
Procedure Law (CPL) contains new provisions that aim to prevent
confessions obtained through torture.\96\ The law incorporates
a June 2010 rule prohibiting the use of illegally obtained
evidence in criminal proceedings.\97\ Moreover, Article 50 of
the 2012 CPL contains a provision that prohibits police,
prosecutors, and judicial personnel from forcing a suspect to
incriminate himself.\98\ Article 50 is not framed as a right
held by the suspect, however, and its potential for curbing
abuse during interrogation is diminished by the retention of a
provision from the prior CPL requiring that suspects have an
obligation to answer the interrogator's questions
``truthfully.''\99\ The absence of an explicit right to remain
silent and a presumption of innocence may well undermine
efforts to prevent coerced confessions, and the absence of a
right to legal counsel during a detained suspect's first
interrogation also increases the likelihood of abuse.\100\
It remains to be seen how the provisions in the new CPL
regarding the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence will be
implemented in practice.\101\ Since the exclusionary rule was
first issued in June 2010, there have been few reports of
successfully excluded illegally obtained evidence.\102\ It was
only in September 2012 that the media reported on the first
case in Beijing in which a court excluded evidence that had
been illegally obtained.\103\ At his trial Bo Xilai argued,
without success, that his shuanggui confession had been
illegally obtained and thus should be excluded.\104\
Wrongful convictions, as the president of the Zhejiang
Province High People's Court stated in a media interview in
March, ``are basically all related to the coercion of
confessions through torture.''\105\ At the time of the
interview, his court was dealing with two high-profile wrongful
conviction cases, both of which involved confessions obtained
through torture. In March, the court reversed the convictions
of Zhang Gaoping and his nephew, who had spent 10 years in
prison for a rape and murder they did not commit.\106\ In July,
the court also overturned the convictions of five men who had
already served 18 years in prison for the robbery and murder of
two taxi drivers based on fingerprint evidence that was
uncovered in 2011.\107\ All five men said that their
confessions were the result of torture.\108\
In an article published in May, Shen Deyong, the Executive
Vice President of the Supreme People's Court, wrote that
wrongful convictions posed an ``unprecedented challenge'' to
the court system.\109\ In addition to the harm wrongly decided
decisions cause the parties involved, Shen wrote, they also
damage judicial authority and the public's faith in the law and
rule of law.\110\ In July, the head of the Guangdong Province
High People's Court criticized the fundamental structure of the
judicial system as outdated and reflecting a Soviet model in
which courts are treated like any other government agency and
thus are subject to various kinds of interference and
influence.\111\ In August, reportedly in response to the spate
of wrongful convictions that surfaced in 2013, the Communist
Party Central Committee Political and Legal Affairs Commission
issued, for the first time, guidelines on the prevention of
wrongful judgments that mandate lifelong responsibility for
police, prosecutors, and judges involved in judgments later
demonstrated to be wrong.\112\
Death Penalty
As in previous years, the Chinese government continues to
treat data on the use of the death penalty as a state
secret.\113\ Amnesty International concluded, based on
available information, that the Chinese government executed
more people in 2012 than the rest of the world combined.\114\
The number of executions in China is steadily decreasing,
however. The Dui Hua Foundation estimates that 3,000 prisoners
were executed in China in 2012, a decrease of 25 percent from
the 4,000 cases estimated for 2011.\115\ Tsinghua University
law professor Yi Yanyou puts the figure at over 2,000.\116\
Despite the lack of transparency regarding many aspects of
the death penalty, including the Supreme People's Court review
of death penalty sentences,\117\ the Chinese media and public
are paying increasing attention to fairness and procedural
justice in death penalty cases.\118\ In a case that received a
great deal of attention in the media and on the popular
microblog site Sina Weibo, Zeng Chengjie, a businessman and
property developer from Hunan province, was convicted of
fraudulent fundraising and executed on July 12.\119\ In
contravention of Chinese law, authorities failed to notify his
family until after the fact.\120\ Within a few days after his
daughter posted this news on Sina Weibo, it was forwarded more
than 70,000 times and had generated nearly 50,000
comments.\121\
Organs are still harvested from executed prisoners in
China,\122\ and the extent to which rules requiring prior
informed consent are followed is unclear.\123\ In March 2012,
then-Vice Minister of China's Ministry of Health, Huang Jiefu,
wrote that, of the organ transplant operations performed in
China using organs from deceased donors (the majority of such
operations), more than 90 percent of the donors were executed
prisoners.\124\ In March 2013, the Ministry of Health and the
Chinese Red Cross formally launched a national voluntary organ
donation system, but the number of organs donated during the
three-year pilot program before the launch was low--only 659
people donated a total of 1,804 major organs.\125\ According to
the newly created National Health and Family Planning
Commission (NHFPC), each year an estimated 300,000 people need
organ transplants, but only about 10,000 transplants are
performed annually.\126\ In August 2013, Huang Jiefu, now the
director of a human organ transplant committee at the NHFPC,
reportedly announced that China would cease relying on the
organs of executed prisoners within the next two years.\127\
Freedom of Religion
International Standards
The Chinese government's legal and policy framework for
religion violates the protections for freedom of religion set
forth in Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, and other international human rights
instruments.\1\ Although the PRC Constitution states that all
citizens enjoy ``freedom of religious belief,'' it limits
citizens' ability to exercise their beliefs by protecting only
``normal religious activities,''\2\ a vaguely defined term that
has been used to suppress forms of religious activity protected
under international human rights standards.\3\ The government
has created a regulatory framework that recognizes only five
religions--Buddhism, Catholicism, Taoism, Islam, and
Protestantism--for limited state protections for religious
activity,\4\ and the government has continued to outlaw some
belief systems,\5\ thereby denying members of these communities
the right to practice their faith openly and without fear of
government reprisal.
Regulatory and Policy Framework
During the Commission's 2013 reporting year, the Chinese
government continued to use law and policy as tools to restrain
rather than protect Chinese citizens' right to freedom of
religion. Although the 2005 Regulation on Religious Affairs
(RRA) and local government regulations protect some religious
activities, such protection is limited in scope and applies
only to the five state-sanctioned religious communities.\6\ The
RRA does not include criminal penalties for violation of its
provisions,\7\ but authorities use the PRC Criminal Law,\8\
anti-cult regulations,\9\ and various administrative
punishments, including reeducation through labor,\10\ to punish
or detain citizens for forms of religious practice deemed to
fall outside of approved parameters. Chinese government and
Communist Party control over religious affairs is exercised
through the State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA)
and lower level religious affairs bureaus (RABs) under the
State Council,\11\ the Party's United Front Work Department
(UFWD),\12\ and the five ``patriotic'' religious associations:
The Buddhist Association of China (BAC), the Catholic Patriotic
Association of China (CPA), the Islamic Association of China
(IAC), the Three-Self Patriotic Movement of Protestant Churches
in China (TSPM), and the Chinese Taoist Association (CTA).\13\
All religious clergy are required to be registered with the
government.\14\ In January 2013, a top religious official
announced that all clergy would be registered by the end of the
year.\15\
CONTINUING RESTRICTIONS ON RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATION REGISTRATION
Registration requirements for religious organizations\16\
in China continue to be highly restrictive, limiting the growth
of religious communities and the right to freedom of religion,
assembly, and association.\17\ During the 2013 reporting year,
the Chinese government announced an institutional reform plan
that will loosen registration and administrative strictures on
some social organizations, including charities and social
services organizations, but which explicitly excludes religious
organizations, among others.\18\ Religious organizations will
continue to be required to operate under a legal framework that
requires the approval and oversight of a supervisory unit and
registration with the relevant level of civil affairs
bureau.\19\ A February 2012 opinion issued by SARA, the UFWD,
and four other government departments called for ``equal
treatment'' of religious groups in establishing charitable
organizations and noted that ``some localities and departments
had not yet adequately recognized the positive significance of
religious communities' participation in charitable
activities.''\20\ It is unclear how the government will
facilitate religious communities' legal participation in
charitable and public interest activities given the exclusion
of religious groups from the current social organization reform
plan.\21\
China's Religious Communities
BUDDHISM (NON-TIBETAN)
During the Commission's 2013 reporting year, the Chinese
government and Communist Party, through the State
Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA), local religious
affairs bureaus, and the state-run Buddhist Association of
China (BAC), continued to monitor, control, restrict, and
``guide'' the religious activities of Buddhists in non-Tibetan
areas of China.\22\ [For information on Tibetan Buddhists, see
Section V--Tibet.] In a speech delivered at a ceremony
commemorating the 60th anniversary of the BAC in August 2013,
Vice Premier and member of the Political Bureau of the
Communist Party Central Committee (Politburo) Liu Yandong
stated her hope that Buddhists in China ``adhere to the
tradition of loving the country and loving religion, embrace
the leadership of the Party''; ``love deeply'' (re'ai) the
Party, the nation, socialism, and the masses; and ``adhere to
the road of socialism with Chinese characteristics.''\23\ In
October 2012, SARA and nine other central-level government
agencies issued a joint opinion on the handling of problems
involved in the management of Buddhist monasteries and Taoist
temples, calling for tighter control and regulation of
religious sites and personnel, and prohibiting unregistered
organizations and religious sites from conducting religious
activities or collecting religious donations.\24\
The Chinese government continues to ban at least three
sects of Buddhism it has labeled as ``cults'' (xiejiao):\25\
Guanyin Famen,\26\ the True Buddha School (lingxian zhen
fozong),\27\ and Yuandun Famen.\28\ A prominent Guangdong
province-based Buddhist leader, Wu Zeheng, also known as Zen
Master Xing Wu, has been monitored and harassed since his
release from prison for ``economic crimes'' in 2010.\29\ The
Chinese government has also refused to issue Wu a passport,
thereby preventing him from lecturing abroad: ``It's just
another way to punish people they don't like,'' Wu told the New
York Times in February.\30\
CATHOLICISM
Government control and interference. The Justice and Peace
Commission of the Hong Kong Catholic Diocese raised concerns
about the Chinese government's policies toward the Catholic
Church in China in an ``Opinion on Religious Freedom in China
for the UN Human Rights Council's October 2013 Universal
Periodic Review'' of the Chinese government's human rights
record. According to the opinion, the government's policy of an
``independent, autonomous, and self-administered'' Church
managed by two state-controlled entities--the Catholic
Patriotic Association of China (CPA) and the Bishops Conference
of the Catholic Church in China (BCCC)\31\--violates ``the
consciences of the faithful and basic Catholic doctrine.''\32\
The opinion asserts, moreover, that Chinese government policies
have divided Chinese Catholics into an ``official'' church and
an ``underground'' church.\33\ An unofficial estimate of the
total number of Catholics in China is approximately 12 million
people, split more or less evenly between the official and
underground churches.\34\
The Chinese government and Communist Party deny Catholics
in China the freedom to accept the authority of the Holy See to
select bishops. Although the Commission reported that the Holy
See has had a quiet role in jointly approving some bishops in
recent years,\35\ four bishops were ordained in China between
November 2010 and July 2012 without Holy See approval.\36\ In
late 2012, the BCCC adopted a new national regulation on the
selection and ordination of bishops that took effect in April
2013; the Holy See and international observers suggest the new
regulation strengthens a hardline approach.\37\ The regulation
explicitly requires bishop candidates to ``endorse the Chinese
Communist Party's leadership and the socialist system.''\38\
The new regulation also expands the authority of the BCCC and
the role of provincial-level religious affairs bureaus in the
selection and consecration process compared with an earlier
(1993) regulation.\39\ In a recent example of government
interference, the Union of Asian Catholic News reported that
provincial-level officials in Hubei province overruled Wuhan
city church leaders' November 2012 decisions on upcoming parish
assignments and transfers, dismissed two priests from the CPA,
and warned individual priests not to leave their parishes for
their new assignments.\40\
Detention of Catholic clergy. The detention of auxiliary
bishop Thaddeus Ma Daqin from the diocese of Shanghai
municipality, was a prominent focus of international media
coverage during the 2013 reporting year.\41\ Bishop Ma has been
confined to the Sheshan Seminary in Shanghai since his public
withdrawal from the Catholic Patriotic Association of China
(CPA) at his ordination on July 7, 2012.\42\ The CPA and the
BCCC subsequently announced in December their decision to
revoke Ma's title of auxiliary bishop and his membership as a
clergyman in the CPA,\43\ noting their ``hope that the Shanghai
diocese . . . learns a lesson from the incident.''\44\ The Holy
See denounced the state-run church's action, stating that ``no
episcopal conference, in any part of the world, has the power
to overrule the pontifical mandate . . .,'' and asserted that
the Holy See continues to recognize Ma as auxiliary bishop of
Shanghai.\45\ Bishop Ma, whose selection and ordination were
approved by both the Holy See and the CPA, was in line to
succeed bishop Aloysius Jin Luxian.\46\ Bishop Jin's death in
late April 2013 at the age of 96\47\ reportedly has left the
Shanghai diocese--one of the largest in China--without a
bishop.\48\
The Justice and Peace Commission of the Hong Kong Catholic
Diocese noted cases of underground clergy who have been
detained and ``disappeared'' for their pastoral activity and
refusal to join the CPA,\49\ such as priests Ma Wuyong, Liu
Honggeng, Lu Genjun, and elderly bishops Su Zhimin and Shi
Enxiang.\50\ In a recent example, the Cardinal Kung Foundation
reported that, on August 7, 2013, 10 public security officers
from Zhangjiakou city, Hebei province, took into custody Song
Wanjun, a priest with the underground church.\51\ As of August
2013, his whereabouts were unknown.\52\ Other priests
reportedly serving prison sentences are Li Huisheng and Wang
Zhong.\53\
China-Holy See relations. The Chinese government does not
maintain diplomatic relations with the Holy See, and there was
no apparent progress in the normalization of relations during
the 2013 reporting year.\54\ An October 2012 article by a
senior cleric at the Holy See, Cardinal Fernando Filoni,
however, raised his hope for ``sincere and respectful
dialogue'' by invoking a 2007 pastoral letter from Pope
Benedict XVI to Chinese Catholics that had launched a brief
period of improved relations between China and the Holy
See.\55\ During a press conference in March 2013, a Chinese
Foreign Ministry spokesperson stated that China's policy has
been ``consistent and clear'' that the Holy See must cut its
ties with Taiwan and ``should not interfere in China's internal
affairs under the name of religion.''\56\
FALUN GONG
The Commission continued to observe reports of arbitrary
treatment of Falun Gong practitioners by Chinese security and
judicial authorities, in some cases involving physical and
mental abuse. Courts continued to sentence Falun Gong
practitioners to long terms in prison.\57\ Authorities detained
and harassed persons who attempted to assist Falun Gong
practitioners, including lawyers Wang Quanzhang\58\ and Cheng
Hai.\59\ The Chinese Communist Party and government continued
to pressure Falun Gong practitioners to renounce their belief
and practice. The Party and government refer to this process as
``transformation through reeducation,'' or simply
``transformation.''\60\ From 2010 to 2012, the government
implemented a three-year, national campaign to increase efforts
to ``transform'' Falun Gong practitioners.\61\
The Commission also observed reports this past year
regarding official anti-cult efforts that placed an emphasis on
the need to educate the public to ``resist'' Falun Gong.\62\ An
All-China Women's Federation report stressed the need for the
expansion of anti-cult campaigns directed against Falun Gong
throughout Chongqing municipality, including through mobile
schools and mobile teams of anti-cult educators.\63\ At an
anti-cult symposium in Hangzhou city, Zhejiang province, held
in May, a provincial official emphasized the need to bring
anti-cult efforts ``deep into the grassroots and into the heart
of the masses,'' and to ``vigorously carry out'' education
against Falun Gong.\64\
In April 2013, an article published in the China-based Lens
Magazine reported on claims of torture and severe maltreatment
of inmates at the Masanjia Women's Reeducation Through Labor
(RTL) Center in Liaoning province.\65\ According to the New
York Times, former detainees reported that approximately half
of the people detained at the center are Falun Gong
practitioners or members of underground churches.\66\ Former
detainees at the center said authorities regularly tortured
them with electric batons, handcuffed them in painful positions
for long periods of time, and locked them in tiny ``punishment
cells,'' among other forms of mistreatment.\67\ Beginning in
June 2013, Beijing authorities detained journalist Du Bin for
five weeks, on allegations he said were partly a result of his
film about the abuses at the Masanjia Women's RTL Center.\68\
At a Commission hearing on December 18, 2012, Falun Gong
practitioner Hu Zhiming testified that, during the eight years
and two months he spent in detention in several different
locations in China for practicing Falun Gong, authorities
allowed prisoners to beat him and subjected him to sleep
deprivation, denial of medical care, and other types of
abuse.\69\ At the same hearing, Bruce Chung, a Falun Gong
practitioner from Taiwan, testified about how Chinese state
security officials detained him for 54 days during a visit to
Jiangxi province in the summer of 2012 and subjected him to
lengthy interrogation sessions without access to a lawyer in
connection with his earlier efforts to broadcast Falun Gong
materials into China.\70\
ISLAM
Chinese authorities continued to place curbs on Muslims'
ability to practice their religion and continued to emphasize
the role of Islamic clergy in promoting state policies. In
December 2012, at the conclusion of a training session for
``Muslim patriotic religious figures,'' Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region (XUAR) Party Committee member Shavket Imin
stressed that ``patriotic religious figures'' should
``relentlessly study the Party's general and specific
policies'' and ``actively guide the broad masses of religious
believers to continuously strengthen their national
consciousness.''\71\ In August 2013, Ningxia Hui Autonomous
Region (NHAR) Party Secretary Li Jianhua told local Muslims in
Yongning county, Yinchuan city, to ``unite to respond
positively to the call of the Party and the government,'' and
stressed the role of Muslims in the NHAR in promoting ethnic
unity, social harmony, and stability.\72\
During the 2013 reporting year, Chinese authorities
continued to regulate the confirmation of religious leaders and
to monitor overseas pilgrimages in furtherance of state policy.
Chinese authorities guided the training of imams at 10 state-
run Islamic institutes\73\ and conducted regular training
courses for Muslim clergy that stressed adherence to Party
religious and ethnic policies.\74\ Under the 2006 Measures for
Accrediting Islamic Clergy, the first requirement listed for
government recognition of imams is that they must ``love the
motherland, support the socialist system and the leadership of
the Communist Party of China, comply with national laws, [and]
safeguard national unity, ethnic unity, and social
stability.''\75\ At an Islamic Association of China (IAC)
certification ceremony for Muslim religious clergy in February,
Ma Jin, Deputy Director of the Islamic Department of the State
Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA), told the newly
accredited Islamic clergy he hoped they would ``resolve to
become politically reliable.''\76\ The IAC worked to strengthen
its system for organizing Hajj pilgrimages to Mecca,\77\ and
local authorities throughout the XUAR warned religious
believers against going on Hajj pilgrimages not organized by
the government.\78\
Authorities also continued to exert influence over the
teachings of Muslim clergy, such as through the interpretation
of Islamic scripture. SARA reported in February 2013 that
Chinese authorities had engaged in efforts to interpret Islamic
scripture for more than 10 years.\79\ SARA also reported that
authorities had recently distributed copies of compilations of
state-prescribed teachings of Islam to every mosque in the
XUAR.\80\
Authorities in charge of religious affairs sought to
portray violent clashes that took place in the spring and
summer of 2013 throughout the XUAR as acts inspired by
``religious extremism,'' and urged Muslim clergy to work
against ``religious extremist forces''\81\ and the ``three evil
forces''\82\ of terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism.
In an August 2013 article on ``religious extremism,'' XUAR
United Front Work Department Deputy Inspector Azat Omer wrote
that the ``struggle with religious extremist forces'' was a
``serious political struggle to defend the unification of the
motherland and safeguard ethnic unity.''\83\
[For more information on state controls over Islam in the
XUAR, see Section IV--Xinjiang.]
PROTESTANTISM
The Chinese government continued to control the doctrine
and activities of its official Protestant church and to target
members of unregistered Protestant groups for harassment,
detention, and other forms of abuse. The Three-Self Patriotic
Movement of Protestant Churches in China (TSPM) and the China
Christian Council (CCC) are the Protestant associations that
manage registered Protestants on behalf of the government and
Party.\84\ Protestants who choose not to affiliate with the
TSPM must worship with unregistered ``house churches,'' which
are often subject to interference, harassment, and abuses
during peaceful religious activities. According to the United
States Commission on International Religious Freedom's (USCIRF)
2013 Annual Report, ``[t]he government largely tolerates groups
that meet in homes or in small groups, but continues to view
with suspicion religious organizations with extensive foreign
ties, whose memberships grow too quickly, whose leadership
becomes too popular or organizes across provincial lines, or
whose religious activities allegedly disrupt ethnic or social
`harmony.'''\85\
Interference with places of worship. Authorities continued
to interfere with the religious activities of registered and
unregistered Protestant congregations by pressuring landlords
to terminate their leases, conducting raids during religious
gatherings, and threatening demolition of their buildings. The
government continued its efforts to prohibit worship gatherings
of the Beijing Shouwang Church, a house church of over 1,000
congregants in Beijing municipality that has endured ongoing
official harassment since at least 2006.\86\ In September 2012,
the church's pastor applied for administrative review of
actions the Beijing Public Security Bureau had taken against
the church, including preventing the church from moving into
property it had purchased.\87\ Two weeks later, the Beijing
Municipal Government rejected the application, citing lack of
evidence.\88\ In August 2013, the church reported that it was
still being forced to meet outdoors in public spaces.\89\ [For
additional information on the ongoing detention and harassment
of Shouwang leaders and congregants, see Harassment and
Detention below in this section.]
Reports continued to emerge this year regarding state-
sanctioned raids on house churches across China. In Shandong
province in April and May, for example, authorities raided two
house churches in Linshu county, Linyi city, and Yutai county,
Jining city, issued ban orders to both on grounds of ``illegal
assembly,'' confiscated donations, and imposed fines on
members.\90\ According to Radio Free Asia, these actions may
have been part of an informal crackdown against Protestant
house churches launched by Shandong authorities in March.\91\
Also during this reporting year, authorities conducted raids on
house church meetings--in some cases threatening or questioning
attendees, and in other cases fining, beating, or detaining
them--in other areas of China, including Beijing,\92\ Guizhou
province,\93\ Heilongjiang province,\94\ the Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region,\95\ and the Inner Mongolia Autonomous
Region.\96\
Authorities in locations including Hubei,\97\ Jilin,\98\
and Henan provinces also reportedly threatened churches with
demolition or eviction. In one case in Zhengzhou city, Henan
province, authorities repeatedly threatened a registered TSPM
church with eviction and demolition of their newly constructed,
government-approved building.\99\ In connection with these
threats, the church building has reportedly lost power and
water, and has been rendered inaccessible twice after
government-owned trucks blocked its doors with piles of dirt
and rocks.\100\
Harassment and detention. The Chinese government and
Communist Party continued to harass and detain Protestants who
worship outside of state-approved parameters. According to the
USCIRF 2013 Annual Report (USCIRF Report), authorities detained
close to 1,500 Protestants over the 2013 reporting period.\101\
Members of house church congregations in particular remained
subject to official harassment and maltreatment. Throughout the
reporting year, local- and national-level government offices
issued directives calling for the need to further monitor and
control house churches, in one case alluding to the alleged
``instability'' posed by their proliferation in recent
years.\102\ Reported cases of harassment throughout 2013
suggest authorities have heightened pressure on house churches
to register with local religious affairs bureaus and join
state-sanctioned churches, in some instances leading to
violence and the detention of house church members.\103\ In
April 2013, local authorities raided a house church in Alashan
(Alxa) League, Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, firing tear
gas, detaining members of the congregation, and beating others
in a move observers contend was part of a greater push at the
time by officials to pressure house churches into joining
state-sanctioned churches.\104\ Authorities also continued to
detain and harass members of Beijing's Shouwang Church.
According to the USCIRF Report, authorities detained 900
Shouwang Church members over the 2013 reporting period, while
others faced eviction from their homes, dismissal from
government jobs, and the confiscation of Beijing residency
permits by authorities.\105\
In other cases, authorities imposed criminal penalties or
imprisoned Protestants who worshipped or promoted religious
activities outside of state-approved parameters. The USCIRF
Report indicated authorities sentenced up to 18 Protestant
leaders to reeducation through labor or prison terms during the
2013 reporting year.\106\ In December 2012, authorities in
Shenzhen municipality, Guangdong province, detained house
church pastor Cao Nan and several other house church members on
two separate occasions for holding a religious gathering in a
public park.\107\ In the second instance of detention,
authorities ordered Cao to serve 12 days of administrative
detention for ``falsely using the name of religion to disturb
social order.''\108\ In June 2013, the Xiaodian District
People's Court in Taiyuan city, Shanxi province, sentenced Li
Wenxi to two years in prison and Ren Lacheng to a five-year
prison term on charges of ``illegal business operations''
connected to the printing and selling of religious publications
at the Taiyuan-based Enyu bookstore.\109\ According to media
reports, the Enyu bookstore sold Christian literature and had a
joint venture with a Beijing-based Christian bookstore, where
Li was a deputy manager.\110\ Ren was also reportedly a central
figure in unofficial university-based Christian associations in
Taiyuan and had used Enyu as a meeting place.\111\
Banned Protestant groups and designation of groups as
``cults.'' The Chinese government and Party continue to
prohibit categorically some Protestant groups from exercising
their right to religious belief by criminalizing their
communities as ``cult organizations'' (xiejiao zuzhi). The
government has designated at least 18 Protestant groups as
``cult organizations,'' banning their practice throughout the
country.\112\ Moreover, the PRC Criminal Law includes
provisions authorizing fines and imprisonment of up to seven
years for forming or associating with ``cult
organizations.''\113\ According to one Chinese freedom of
religion advocate, authorities have increasingly utilized
criminal law statutes, including those provisions related to
``cult organizations,'' to detain and imprison house church
leaders.\114\ In April 2013, authorities in Ye county,
Pingdingshan municipality, Henan province, sentenced house
church pastor Hu Linpo and congregation members Han Hai, Yang
Lianbing, Zhang Mian, Cao Xia, Wang En, and Li Dan to prison
sentences ranging from three years to more than seven years for
``using a cult organization to undermine implementation of the
law.''\115\ Authorities reportedly first detained all seven
individuals in April 2012 during a house church raid.\116\
According to the Ye County Procuratorate indictment notice,
authorities accused the defendants of belonging to the Local
Church, referred to by authorities as the ``Shouters.''\117\
In December 2012, authorities throughout the country
engaged in a wide-ranging crackdown on followers of the Church
of the Almighty God (CAG) in connection with their belief that
December 21 was prophesied to be the date of the
apocalypse.\118\ According to Chinese official media,
authorities in 16 provinces detained more than 1,300 CAG
followers in December 2012.\119\ In one case, authorities in
Shaoguan city, Guangdong province, sentenced CAG adherent Lai
Yiwa to seven years' imprisonment in April 2013 for reportedly
photocopying and distributing pamphlets in December 2012
related to the apocalypse prophesy.\120\
TAOISM
The Chinese government continued its control over Taoists
and Taoist activities. As in the past, the Chinese Taoist
Association (CTA) continued to work with the Chinese government
to ensure that Taoist religious groups ``uphold the leadership
of the Communist Party and the socialist system,'' ``actively
participate in socialist material, political, and spiritual
civilization,'' and ``make a contribution to the protection of
religious harmony, ethnic unity, social harmony, unity of the
motherland, and world peace.''\121\ Government agencies and the
CTA continued to hold training sessions for Taoist leaders,
including a November 2012 meeting of the CTA executive council
to ``study the spirit of the 18th National Congress of the
Communist Party of China''\122\ and a May 2013 study class led
by the State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA) and
attended by over 130 Taoist leaders from localities across
China.\123\ In the November meeting, SARA Director Wang Zuo'an
reminded Taoist leaders in attendance that ``studying and
putting into practice the spirit of the 18th Party Congress is
the chief political task for religious communities for the
coming period of time.''\124\ He further noted that he hoped
the Taoist community would gain a ``deeper understanding of the
greatness of the Chinese Communist Party,'' ``more
conscientiously accept the leadership of the Chinese Communist
Party,'' and ``take the path that conforms to socialist
society,'' among other goals.\125\
OTHER RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES
In the past year, the central government maintained its
framework for recognizing only select religious communities for
limited government protections, and it did not enlarge this
framework to accommodate additional groups. Despite lacking
formal central government recognition, however, some religious
communities have been able to operate inside China.\126\ The
Orthodox Church holds services in some areas,\127\ and at least
one provincial-level jurisdiction recognizes the Orthodox
Church.\128\ In May 2013, the leader of the Russian Orthodox
Church, Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and All Russia, made an
official visit to China and met with top officials, including
President Xi Jinping.\129\ During his visit, Kirill expressed
his hope that Orthodox parishes would be permitted to register,
and that a Chinese bishop would be appointed who could set
locations for worship and ordain priests.\130\ Under current
Chinese government regulations, foreign religious communities,
including communities not recognized as domestic religions by
the government, may hold services for expatriates, subject to
certain limitations and government control.\131\
Ethnic Minority Rights
During the 2013 reporting year, ethnic minorities faced
challenges to their rights as provided in the PRC Regional
Ethnic Autonomy Law and international law.\1\ Authorities
placed the strictest controls over groups perceived as
potential threats to ``stability,''\2\ including those living
in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and other Tibetan
autonomous areas, the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR),
and the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region (IMAR). Authorities
continued to detain, harass, and imprison ethnic minority
rights advocates who engaged in peaceful protest and sought to
assert their unique cultural identity. [See Section IV--
Xinjiang and Section V--Tibet for additional information on
these areas. See text below for information on broader
government policies toward ethnic minorities and on conditions
in the IMAR.]
State Policy on Ethnic Minorities
Government and private development projects in ethnic
minority regions, together with the absence of
institutionalized forums for ethnic minorities to discuss and
seek redress for their grievances, led to tensions between
local residents, railway workers, and government
authorities.\3\ The expansion of top-down development
initiatives\4\ in the IMAR, while bringing some economic
improvement to areas inhabited by Mongols,\5\ has weakened
Mongols' ability to preserve their unique culture, language,
and livelihoods.\6\
Grasslands Policy and Protests in Inner Mongolia
Central and regional government authorities continued to
enforce grasslands policies that require herders and nomads to
resettle in urban areas or in larger, compact rural
communities, portraying these developments as a move to improve
and ``modernize'' the lives of Mongols, Tibetans, Kazakhs, and
other minority groups, and combat grasslands degradation.\7\
Local governments throughout the IMAR carried out propaganda
campaigns in 2013 to promote national and regional regulations
regarding the protection of grasslands.\8\ The regulations
stipulate penalties for unauthorized use of grasslands\9\ but
lack protections for the rights of herders.\10\ Critics of
official grasslands policies in the IMAR have raised concerns
over increased mining activities and a corresponding loss of
water in the region,\11\ while the policies are officially
aimed at easing the degradation of grasslands.\12\ In a report
published in July 2013, Greenpeace criticized state-owned coal
mining company Shenhua Group for draining the water supply\13\
and causing the destruction of grasslands\14\ in areas
inhabited by Mongol farmers and herders in the IMAR. The report
states that Shenhua has extracted more than 50 million tons of
groundwater since 2007 in an area encompassing five villages in
Uushin (Wushen) Banner, Ordos (E'erduosi) municipality,
IMAR,\15\ and produces an estimated 4.79 million tons of toxic
industrial wastewater per year.\16\ This wastewater is
reportedly dumped into open sand pits in Ulan Moron
(Wulanmulun) township, Ejin Horo (Yijinhuoluo) Banner, Ordos
(E'erduosi) municipality, IMAR,\17\ contradicting Shenhua's
claims that its coal-to-liquid operations have ``low water
consumption'' and ``zero discharge.''\18\ [For more information
on rights abuses related to grasslands policies, see Section
II--The Environment.]
In several instances during the 2013 reporting year, Mongol
herders sought to protest the appropriation of their grazing
lands for military use and private development projects.\19\ On
August 19 in Uushin (Wushen) Banner, workers from China Railway
23rd Bureau reportedly beat to death Mongolian herder
Bayanbaatar, who was one of several herders protesting the
railway bureau's use of his and other herders' grazing
land.\20\ In March 2013, herders from Durbed (Siziwang) Banner,
Wulanchabu municipality, IMAR, reportedly gathered at the train
station in Hohhot city, seeking to travel to Beijing to protest
the appropriation of their land for the Beijing Military
Command's Zhurihe military training base.\21\ Police and
government officials from Durbed traveled to Hohhot to stop the
herders\22\ and reportedly physically assaulted several herders
who resisted their orders to return to Durbed.\23\ Local
authorities reportedly had sold the land to Chinese firms,
including two major mining companies.\24\ In July 2013, 38
Mongol herders reportedly gathered at the train station in
Tongliao city, IMAR, seeking to travel to Beijing to protest
their community's September 2008 forced resettlement from the
Khan Uul (Hanshan) Forest Area to Lubei township, Zaruud
Banner.\25\ Security personnel reportedly detained the 38
herders and beat those who resisted detention.\26\ In 2008,
Tongliao city officials resettled 963 people from Khan Uul, a
government-designated nature preserve, with the stated aim of
creating an area free of people and livestock.\27\ However,
resettled herders from Khan Uul reportedly complained in March
2013 that miners had begun operations in the area.\28\ Local
government officials have positively assessed the prospects for
mining exploration in the area.\29\
In July 2013, a herder in Ongniud (Wengniute) Banner,
Chifeng municipality, reportedly killed the head of a
``livestock grazing prohibition team'' and seriously injured
another official while ``defending his right to graze his
livestock on his grazing land,'' before committing suicide.\30\
Political Prisoners
The continued extralegal detention of Mongol rights
advocate Hada underscores the official repercussions Mongols
may face for promoting their rights. During the Commission's
2013 reporting year, authorities in Hohhot city, IMAR,
tightened restrictions on the movement and communications of
Hada's wife, Xinna, and the couple's son, Uiles.\31\ The
heightened restrictions began after Xinna gave interviews to
international media and rights groups about Chinese
authorities' treatment of Hada in extralegal detention and its
harmful impact on his mental health.\32\ Xinna stated in the
interviews that Hada is suffering from depression and that
authorities refused to allow him access to psychiatric care
that was recommended by a physician.\33\ As of September 23,
2013, the whereabouts of Xinna and Uiles are unclear.\34\ As of
the same date, Hada remained in official custody without
apparent legal basis\35\ despite his completion of a 15-year
prison sentence on December 10, 2010.\36\ Authorities
imprisoned Hada in 1995 after he organized peaceful protests
for Mongols' rights.\37\ Additional representative cases
follow:
On July 4, 2013, authorities in Uzumchin Right
(Dongwuzhumuqin) Banner, Xilingol League, IMAR,
reportedly arrested Yunshaabiin Seevendoo, who had
advocated for the rights of Mongol herders, on fraud
charges.\38\ Family members reportedly said his health
has deteriorated during his detention.\39\ Prior to his
detention, Seevendoo had organized Mongol herders to
protest against illegal government and corporate
expropriation of their grazing lands.\40\
On April 13, 2013, authorities in Guangzhou
municipality, Guangdong province, reportedly arrested
Batzangaa, a former medical school principal, after he
allegedly attempted to flee the country with his wife
and two children.\41\ Batzangaa had been under
residential surveillance in Dongsheng district, Ordos
(E'erduosi) municipality, IMAR, since January 2011.
According to Radio Free Asia, authorities ordered
Batzangaa to begin serving a three-year prison
sentence, starting on April 25, 2013, that had been
handed down as a suspended sentence in 2011.\42\
Batzangaa had attempted to seek refugee status in
Mongolia in October 2009 after organizing
demonstrations to protest against the government's
confiscation of campus property.\43\
In November 2012, the Tongliao Municipality
People's Court in Tongliao city, IMAR, reportedly
convicted author and rights advocate Govruud Huuchinhuu
on charges of ``providing state secrets to a foreign
organization,''\44\ a crime under Article 111 of the
PRC Criminal Law that ordinarily is punishable by no
less than five years in prison and by life imprisonment
in ``especially serious'' cases.\45\ Authorities
originally placed Huuchinhuu under home confinement in
November 2010 after she published calls on the Internet
for Mongols to show support for the release of
Hada.\46\
A number of other ethnic Mongols remain in prison or
detention or are presumed to remain in prison or detention for
political reasons, including Erden-uul (pen name Unaga), who
was detained in December 2010, and Sodmongol, who was detained
in April 2010.\47\
Population Planning
International Standards and China's Population Policies
Chinese officials continue to actively promote and
implement population planning policies which, in both their
nature and implementation, violate international standards. The
PRC Population and Family Planning Law and provincial
implementing guidelines limit couples' freedom of reproductive
choice by stipulating if, when, and how often they may bear
children.\1\ China's current population planning policies still
require married couples to obtain a birth permit to lawfully
bear a child.\2\ The population planning policies of all of
China's 31 provincial-level jurisdictions limit couples to
bearing one child.\3\ According to one team of demographic
experts, ``[The Chinese government's] policy of allowing all
couples to have only one child finds no equal in the world and
it may be one of the most draconian examples of government
social engineering ever seen.''\4\ Exceptions for couples who
meet certain criteria vary province-by-province,\5\ and include
some exceptions for ethnic minorities.\6\ Officials continue to
coerce compliance with population planning targets using
methods including heavy fines,\7\ forced abortions,\8\ and
forced sterilizations.\9\
Controls imposed on Chinese women and their families, and
additional abuses engendered by China's population and family
planning system, violate standards in the 1995 Beijing
Declaration and Platform for Action\10\ and the 1994 Programme
of Action of the Cairo International Conference on Population
and Development.\11\ China participated as a state party in the
negotiations and adoption of both.\12\ Acts of official
violence committed in the implementation of population planning
policies\13\ and the fact that these acts are not clearly
punishable under Chinese law\14\ contravene provisions under
the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment,\15\ which China has signed
and ratified.\16\ Further, discriminatory policies\17\ against
``out-of-plan'' children are in violation of the Convention on
the Rights of the Child\18\ and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.\19\ China is a state
party to these treaties and has committed to uphold their
terms.
Institutional Developments
Amid calls by Chinese government leaders,\20\ experts and
scholars,\21\ and citizens\22\ for the loosening or reform of
China's population policies, China's new leadership unveiled a
plan in March 2013 for restructuring agencies within the State
Council, including merging the National Population and Family
Planning Commission (NPFPC) and the Ministry of Health.\23\ The
restructure combines most of the responsibilities of the
previous two organizations into a new ``National Health and
Family Planning Commission'' (NHFPC),\24\ but transfers the
responsibility of creating population development policies and
strategies--previously held by the NPFPC--to the National
Development and Reform Commission.\25\ Some domestic and
overseas experts say that the restructuring and transfer of
certain population planning responsibilities suggests a
significant loss of power for the nation's family planning body
and a greater potential for population policy reform and
eventual cancellation,\26\ while at least one Chinese academic
expressed belief that the merger ``is in fact making the family
planning body more powerful.''\27\
The government restructuring plan itself has a stated aim
to ``better uphold the basic national family planning
policy,''\28\ and top-level officials have reinforced in
speeches that family planning will be ``beefed up, not
weakened.''\29\ The full impact of the dissolution of the NPFPC
on family planning policies and local implementation remains to
be seen. The NHFPC released an ``Action Plan'' in August which
ignited afresh citizens' hopes for policy relaxation,\30\ but
an NHFPC spokesman later clarified that the plan's call for
``improving the family-planning policy'' should not be viewed
``as a renewed sign of relaxing the policy to allow for a
second child''\31\--a hope held by many Chinese citizens.\32\
The spokesman also restated that China would adhere to its
basic family planning policies for the long term.\33\
Coercive Implementation
Chinese law prohibits officials from infringing upon the
rights and interests of citizens while implementing population
planning policies but does not define what constitutes a
citizen's right or interest.\34\ Chinese law reportedly does
not stipulate punishment for officials who demand or implement
forced abortion.\35\ Furthermore, provincial-level population
planning regulations in at least 22 of China's 31 provincial-
level jurisdictions explicitly endorse the practice, often
referred to as a ``remedial measure'' (bujiu cuoshi), as an
official policy instrument.\36\ Officials also reportedly
continue to use other coercive methods--including forced
abortion under arbitrary detention,\37\ forced implantation of
long-term birth control devices,\38\ and forced
sterilization\39\--to implement population planning policies.
OFFICIAL CAMPAIGNS
Language used in official speeches and government reports
from jurisdictions across China continued to reflect an
emphasis on strengthening enforcement measures with apparent
disregard for restraint. Between October 2012 and July 2013,
the Commission noted reports from at least eight provinces
(Hubei,\40\ Guangdong,\41\ Anhui,\42\ Shandong,\43\ Henan,\44\
Guizhou,\45\ Hunan,\46\ and Fujian\47\) using phrases such as
``spare no efforts'' (quanli yifu or fenli), ``use all means
necessary'' (qian fang bai ji), ``implement `man-on-man'
military tactics'' (shixing ``rendingren'' zhanshu), ``fight
the family planning battle'' (dahao jisheng gongjianzhan), and
``assault and storm the fortifications'' (tuji gongjian) to
urge officials to implement family planning measures. The
implementation measures promoted in these reports were harsh
and invasive, including ``remedial measures,'' the ``two
inspections'' (intrauterine device (IUD) and pregnancy
inspections),\48\ the ``four procedures'' (IUD implants, first-
trimester abortions, mid- to late-term abortions, and
sterilization),\49\ and the collection of ``social maintenance
fees.''\50\ For example, one report regarding population
planning work in Gangkou town, Chongyang county, Xianning
municipality, Hubei province, recounted a local Party cadre's
speech in which he urged officials to ``overcome the slackening
of efforts and war-weariness'' and ``continue to maintain a
situation of high temperatures and high pressure'' while
implementing family planning work, which included the ``four
procedures.''\51\ Following his speech, 13 ``team members''
went into local villages to ``find out the truth'' on
population planning compliance, implement ```man-on-man'
military tactics,'' retrieve those who had ``skipped town,''
and ``take backwards villages by storm,'' according to the
report.\52\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Representative Cases of Coercion (Arranged by Province)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Between July and September 2012, authorities in 23 of China's 31
provincial-level jurisdictions published statements banning late-
term\53\ abortions.\54\ Following the announcements, reports documented
that officials in these jurisdictions continued to use forced late-term
abortions to implement population planning policies:
Guizhou. In July 2013, local family planning officials
reportedly forced 18-weeks-pregnant Li Fengfei to the local family
planning office for a forced abortion. After beating her and breaking
one of her teeth, the officials reportedly forced her to fingerprint an
abortion consent form and subsequently injected her with several
medications to induce the abortion. The medications reportedly killed
the fetus, but did not successfully induce labor. Nine days following
the induction, reports indicated that Li remained in the hospital in
critical condition, as her body had still not gone into labor.\55\
According to a September ChinaAid report, authorities arrested Li on
charges of embezzlement after she spread information about her forced
abortion on the Internet.\56\
Hubei. In May 2013, local family planning officials reportedly
forced Zhang Yinping, who was six months pregnant with an ``out-of-
plan'' child, to accompany them to the family planning office for an
abortion. Following the surgery, Zhang reportedly suffered from severe
hemorrhaging, which caused her to die the next day. Zhang's family
reportedly protested at the family planning office following her death,
and the county government mobilized public security personnel to stop
the protest. Officials investigated the matter as a ``medical
accident'' and ordered the surgery unit to suspend its practice.\57\
Anhui. In March 2013, local family planning officials
reportedly detained a woman surnamed Lu, who was seven months pregnant
with an ``out-of-plan'' child, and took her to a local hospital for an
abortion. Medical personnel at the hospital injected her with a
substance that caused an abortion two days later.\58\ In an interview
cited in a March 25 ChinaAid report, Lu's husband said that the family
was seeking compensation from the government.\59\
Shandong. In October 2012, seven local family planning
officials reportedly detained a woman surnamed Song who was six months
pregnant with her third child. The officials took her to a hospital,
stripped her, tied her down, confiscated her belongings, forced her
fingerprint onto an abortion consent form, and injected her with a
substance that caused an abortion. Reports noted that the experience
caused her to suffer severe psychological trauma.\60\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Representative Cases of Coercion--Continued (Arranged by Province)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Officials have also continued to implement forced contraceptive
surgeries and sterilizations this reporting year:
Guizhou. In February 2013, seven or eight local family planning
officials took Nie Changmin to a local family planning office and
forced her to undergo a sterilization procedure. Due to a mistake made
during the procedure, Nie required several additional weeks of medical
treatment in a nearby hospital. Nie reportedly had two ``in-plan''
daughters and subsequently had an IUD inserted, all in compliance with
local regulations.\61\
Hubei. In March 2013, local family planning officials visited
the home of 42-year-old Shen Hongxia and her husband and threatened
court action if she did not undergo a surgical sterilization. Shen's
doctor had declared her medically unfit for sterilization, but she and
her husband consented to further examination at the local family
planning office. Instead of examining her, officials performed a
sterilization surgery on her, resulting in her death.\62\
Henan. In March 2013, local family planning officials ordered
Wan Liqiao to pay a 6,000 yuan (US$980) ``protection fee'' to avoid
having to undergo a tubal ligation after her third pregnancy. One day
later, and before she could come up with the fee, officials forced her
into a van and took her to the local family planning office, where they
performed a tubal ligation surgery on her without prior medical
examination (she has a rare blood type) and without obtaining her or
her family's written consent.\63\
Yunnan. In July 2013, local family planning officials took away
Guo Xingcong for a sterilization procedure. Later the same day, his
wife found him dead at the door of their home after apparently having
been severely beaten. Officials reportedly claimed that he had
committed suicide and buried the body quickly without the family's
approval. According to Guo's family, even though he had never violated
population planning policies, authorities had targeted him for years,
demanding that he be sterilized and that he pay a fine of 10,000 yuan
(US$1,633) for exceeding the birth quota.\64\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Punishments for Non-Compliance
Chinese authorities continued to use various methods of
punishment and reward to manage citizens' compliance with
population planning policies. In accordance with national
measures,\65\ local governments direct officials to punish non-
compliance with heavy fines, termed ``social maintenance fees''
(shehui fuyang fei), which force many couples to choose between
undergoing an unwanted abortion and incurring a fine much
greater than the average annual income of their locality.\66\
Furthermore, despite provisions in the PRC Population and
Family Planning Law that prohibit infringements on citizens'
personal, property, and other rights,\67\ officials in some
cases threatened or imposed job termination,\68\ expulsion from
the Communist Party,\69\ and violence\70\ for family planning
violations. In past years, reports have documented officials'
use of methods such as destruction of personal property and
arbitrary detention to punish couples who did not comply with
population planning policies.\71\
Authorities in some cases deny hukous--household
registration permits--to children based on their parents' lack
of compliance with local population planning policies. Children
who are born ``out-of-plan'' may go without hukous until their
parents pay the necessary ``social maintenance fees''
associated with their birth.\72\ These children are commonly
referred to as ``illegal residents'' (heihu)\73\ and face
considerable difficulty accessing social benefits typically
afforded to registered citizens, including health insurance,
public education, and pensions.\74\ A December 2012 South China
Morning Post report claimed that authorities in many Chinese
cities also refuse to give hukous to ``in-plan'' newborns if
their parents had not immediately implemented contraceptive
measures following the birth.\75\ [For additional discussion of
China's hukou system, see Section II--Freedom of Residence and
Movement.]
Demographic Consequences
The Chinese government's population planning policies
continue to exacerbate the country's demographic challenges,
which include an aging population, diminishing workforce, and
skewed sex ratio. Affected in recent decades by government
restrictions on the number of births per couple, China's total
fertility rate has dropped from 6.1 births per woman in
1949\76\ to an estimated 1.55 births per woman in 2013,\77\
resulting in a serious demographic imbalance with regard to
China's growing elderly population and shrinking working-age
population.\78\ Chinese authorities continue to implement a
ban\79\ on ``non-medically necessary sex determination and sex-
selective abortion,''\80\ which some people reportedly continue
to practice\81\ in response to government-imposed birth limits
and in keeping with a traditional cultural bias for sons.\82\
As a result of ongoing violations of the ban on sex-selective
abortion, China's male-female ratio at birth is severely
skewed.\83\ While Chinese media reports that China's sex ratio
at birth has decreased in the past few years,\84\ according to
the UN Population Division, it remains the highest in the
world.\85\ A 2010 study issued by the Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences reported that by 2020, the number of Chinese males of
marriageable age may exceed the number of Chinese females of
marriageable age by 30 to 40 million.\86\ Reports have also
suggested a link between China's large number of ``surplus
males'' and an increase in the trafficking of women and
children for forced marriage or commercial sexual
exploitation.\87\
Reports indicate that China's family planning policies and
policy implementers have contributed in part to what the state-
controlled Global Times has called China's ``massive and
lucrative baby market.''\88\ In one such case, state media
reported in December 2012 that a family planning official in
Anxi county, Quanzhou municipality, Fujian province, faced
charges for selling four infants as part of a child laundering
ring.\89\ Another local government official in Quanzhou was
implicated in the same ring for purchasing a baby boy with his
wife.\90\ A January 2013 Chinese investigative report uncovered
a separate case of hospital, civil affairs, health bureau, and
orphanage officials in Guixi city, Yingtan municipality,
Jiangxi province, working together to illegally acquire babies
from local hospitals or elsewhere and place them for either
domestic or international adoption at a profit.\91\ An
additional case emerged in August involving an obstetrician in
Shaanxi province who allegedly convinced a mother to relinquish
her newborn son, claiming he was seriously ill.\92\ The doctor
reportedly sold the healthy newborn for 21,600 yuan (US$3,528)
one day after his birth.\93\ Authorities detained the doctor
and five other suspects, retrieved the baby from nearby Henan
province, and launched an investigation into several similar
cases connected to the same hospital.\94\ For years, reports
have indicated that Chinese children are viewed as commodities
which yield considerable profit in adoption\95\ or forced labor
situations.\96\
Freedom of Residence and Movement
Freedom of Residence
The Chinese government continued to enforce the household
registration (hukou) system, established in the 1950s.\1\
Initially used to control migration of the rural population to
China's cities, the hukou system has developed into a
``mechanism determining one's eligibility for full citizenship,
social welfare, and opportunities for social mobility.''\2\ The
hukou system classifies Chinese citizens as either rural or
urban and accordingly confers legal rights and access to social
services.\3\ The implementation of these regulations
discriminates against rural hukou holders who migrate to urban
areas by denying them equal access to public services and
social security benefits, as well as equal social, employment,
and educational opportunities.\4\ China's hukou system
conflicts with international human rights standards that
guarantee freedom to choose one's residence and prohibit
discrimination on the basis of ``national or social origin[,] .
. . birth or other status.''\5\
Government officials and journalists estimate that there
are between 170 and 260 million rural migrants living in
cities;\6\ these people face challenges accessing social
services because they lack urban hukous. According to a 2013
survey commissioned by the National Development and Reform
Commission (NDRC), nearly 45 percent of migrant workers living
in cities reported not receiving social benefits, including
health care and unemployment benefits.\7\ In cities including
Beijing, Nanjing, Shanghai, Xi'an, Hangzhou, and Zhengzhou,
migrants (even those educated in the city) faced restrictions
when seeking employment,\8\ such as hiring policies favoring
local hukou holders\9\ or denial of employment due to lack of a
local hukou.\10\ Similarly, migrants working alongside local
urban hukou holders reportedly received lower salaries for
performing similar work.\11\ Moreover, children of migrants
continued to be denied equal access to urban public education
and higher educational opportunities.\12\ Government efforts
toward urbanization have fostered anger among rural
residents\13\ at the same time that competition for public
resources and systemic discrimination stemming from the hukou
system has exacerbated tensions between urban and rural
residents.\14\
As in recent years, high-level officials and state-run
media continued to emphasize the need for hukou reform as a
part of a larger urbanization policy, and China's new
leadership appeared to prioritize this urbanization policy with
an aim to spur economic growth.\15\ In May 2013, Premier Li
Keqiang announced that a reform plan will be unveiled in late
2013 that will clarify the timing of proposed reforms and push
``improvements to public services and the social security
system.''\16\ In December 2012, the NDRC indicated that hukou
reform, along with ``improving'' the land management system and
research on measures to push the ``urbanization'' of rural
migrants, would be accelerated in 2013.\17\ One expert
predicted that these reforms would provide ``specific
administrative measures'' to clarify application criteria for
urban hukous.\18\ According to a June 2013 report on
urbanization development delivered by the head of the NDRC, Xu
Shaoshi, the government should ``gradually tear down household
registration obstacles to facilitate the orderly migration of
people from rural to urban areas.''\19\ An August 2012 report
by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences stressed the
difficulty of incorporating an estimated 500 million rural
residents into urban society over the next 20 years in part
because of the increasing need for limited resources.\20\
Scholars and journalists have expressed reservations about the
central government's approach to hukou reform, citing local
government opposition to the financial burden an influx of
rural migrants would impose on public services and
infrastructure.\21\
The Commission noted in its 2012 Annual Report a February
2011 State Council General Office circular outlining a series
of reforms including relaxing hukou registration standards in
county- and prefectural-level cities, prohibiting coercive
requisition and conversion of rural residents' land in exchange
for urban hukous, and prohibiting any future policy attempting
to use hukou status as a prerequisite for access to social
services.\22\ During the 2013 reporting year, several
prefectural- and provincial-level jurisdictions released
implementation plans and opinions with respect to the
circular.\23\
The Commission has observed implementation and expressions
of intent to implement hukou reform in the 2013 reporting year
with varying degrees of reception and success. In November
2012, the Ministry of Education expressed its intention to
broaden education access to children of migrants and other non-
residents in urban areas.\24\ Some local governments continued
to relax hukou restrictions consistent with ongoing reform
efforts. Beijing, Guangzhou, and Shanghai municipalities issued
measures to expand and promote equal access to educational
opportunities for children of migrants.\25\ Despite efforts
like these, thousands of migrant children continued to be
prohibited from taking entrance exams in their locations of
residence and returned to their hometowns to take these
exams.\26\ In April 2013, authorities in Wuhan municipality,
Hubei province, issued an opinion that allows college graduates
who have been employed in Wuhan within two years following
graduation to apply for a local hukou.\27\ In May 2013,
Shanghai authorities issued measures that provided a points
system designed to allow non-Shanghai residents to apply for a
residence permit (juzhu zheng) if they meet certain criteria.
The measures went into effect in July.\28\ In May 2013,
Guangzhou municipal authorities issued measures to abolish
hukou classifications and incorporate all residents under a
single uniform hukou classification by 2014.\29\ At the
provincial level, the Guangdong provincial government continued
to promote a work plan calling for all residents of Guangdong
province to be included under a single uniform hukou
classification by 2014.\30\ The actual implementation and
results of these policies remain unclear.
International Travel
Chinese officials continued to deny citizens who criticize
the government their internationally recognized right to leave
the country. Article 12 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, which China has signed and committed to
ratify, provides that ``[e]veryone shall be free to leave any
country, including his own.''\31\ Under Article 12, countries
may restrict this right but only in narrow circumstances to
protect national security and certain other public
interests.\32\ Chinese law allows officials to bar those who
threaten state security from leaving the country,\33\ but in
practice officials target a much broader range of activity,
including the expression of views critical of the government,
or having a family association with individuals expressing such
views.\34\ A February 2013 article in the New York Times
compared the Chinese government's use of passport restrictions
on political opponents to the practices of the former Soviet
Union.\35\ The number of Chinese subject to these restrictions
reportedly has jumped in recent years, and human rights groups
estimate that at least 14 million people may be affected.\36\
Restrictions reportedly fall heaviest on Tibetans and Uyghurs,
with the U.S. State Department reporting that members of these
groups ``experienced great difficulty acquiring
passports.''\37\ Tsering Woeser, the noted Tibetan writer, told
the New York Times that authorities feared these ethnic
minorities, once abroad, would expose harsh ethnic policies or
interact with exile groups.\38\ In March 2013, authorities
blocked Woeser, who has been documenting Tibetan self-
immolations, from traveling to the United States to receive the
U.S. Department of State's International Women of Courage
Award.\39\ In February, public security officials prevented
Ilham Tohti, the Uyghur academic and advocate for the reform of
ethnic minority policies, from traveling to the United States
for a fellowship at Indiana University.\40\
During the 2013 reporting year, there continued to be
numerous reports of political advocates and their family
members being denied exit from China or access to passports. In
April 2013, police prevented prominent legal scholar and rights
advocate Xu Zhiyong from traveling to Hong Kong to attend a
legal symposium.\41\ According to a February 2013 report,
officials prevented the wife of imprisoned democracy advocate
Liu Xianbin from obtaining her passport without
explanation.\42\ Authorities also prevented the daughter of
democracy advocate Lu Gengsong from traveling to Hong Kong in
July 2013.\43\ The Chinese government granted passports to the
brother and mother of legal advocate Chen Guangcheng on the eve
of a meeting between President Barack Obama and President Xi
Jinping in June 2013, after repeatedly denying their earlier
passport requests.\44\
Domestic Movement
Article 12 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights provides that ``[e]veryone lawfully within the
territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the
right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his
residence.''\45\ Chinese authorities continue to violate this
right by restricting the domestic movement of rights
advocates\46\ and their families\47\ as a form of harassment,
frequently under the guise of ``stability maintenance.''\48\ A
combination of police and guards reportedly confined Liu Xia,
the wife of imprisoned Nobel Peace Prize laureate Liu Xiaobo,
to her home without a legal basis, a situation that has
persisted for more than two-and-a-half years since her husband
was awarded the prize in 2010.\49\ Roughly two dozen police
guarded the home of Feng Zhenghu, a Shanghai human rights
activist, and enforced his extralegal home confinement for 268
days from February to November 2012. During that time Feng was
allowed to leave his home only for police interrogations.\50\
Public security officials unlawfully confined prominent legal
scholar and rights advocate Xu Zhiyong to his home for three
months after police officers stopped him in the airport to
prevent him from traveling to Hong Kong in April 2013.\51\
Authorities increased restrictions on freedom of movement
during politically sensitive periods this past year, including
the 18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in
November,\52\ the March meetings of the National People's
Congress and the Chinese People's Political Consultative
Congress,\53\ and the anniversary of the 1989 Tiananmen
protests on June 4.\54\ For example, public security officials
held Hubei-based rights defender Liu Feiyue in a hotel and only
allowed him out for meals throughout the 18th Party
Congress,\55\ while shifts of three to four guards monitored
Anhui activist Wang Yixiang 24 hours a day around June 4.\56\
Status of Women
Women's Political Decisionmaking
Through its international commitments and domestic laws and
policies, the Chinese government has committed to ensure
gender-equal political participation; however, women remained
underrepresented in government and Communist Party positions
after leadership changes during this reporting year. In
accordance with its commitments under the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,\1\
the Chinese government has passed several laws\2\ and policy
initiatives\3\ to promote gender equality in government.
According to one UN expert, ``Gender balance in public
administration ensures that a wide enough range of perspectives
are consulted in policymaking to make tangible contributions to
sustainable development.''\4\ During the Commission's 2013
reporting year, female representation increased slightly at the
highest levels of the central government but decreased in the
Communist Party, and continued to fall far short of the 30
percent target that China has agreed to under international
standards.\5\ During the November 2012 meeting of the 18th
Party Congress, the Communist Party appointed a new set of
leaders for its top decisionmaking bodies, the Political Bureau
of the Communist Party Central Committee (Politburo) and the
Politburo Standing Committee. Men continued to hold all seven
positions\6\ in the Politburo Standing Committee, as has been
the case since the Party's establishment in 1949.\7\ Women held
2 out of 25 positions in the Politburo, up from 1 in the
previous 17th Party Congress in 2007.\8\ Female members in the
205-person Communist Party Central Committee decreased from 13
to 10,\9\ but the ratio of female to male delegates to the 18th
Party Congress increased to 23 percent, up from 20 percent in
the previous congress.\10\ Similarly, the percentage of female
delegates to National People's Congresses has shown little
growth since the early 1970s.\11\ In March 2013, the government
appointed a new set of ministers to the State Council, with
women holding 2 out of 35 ministerial-level positions, down
from 4 in the previous State Council.\12\ On the 10-person
State Council Standing Committee there is now 1 female vice
premier, Liu Yandong.\13\
Women's participation in decisionmaking at the village
level remains low, underscoring long-held concerns about
protection of rural women's rights and interests. Women
reportedly led only 2.7 percent of local village committees as
of November 2012.\14\ Women's rights advocates have continued
to raise concerns regarding violations of women's land use
rights in rural areas due in part to unlawful village rules and
agreements,\15\ rapid urbanization,\16\ and low female
representation in village committees.\17\
Gender-Based Discrimination
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
China has committed under international standards to taking
``all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against
women in the field of employment,''\18\ yet women in China's
workforce continue to face many forms of discrimination.
Several studies and reports released this year showed that
gender discrimination in recruitment remained widespread and
may have even increased,\19\ in some cases due to perceptions
about gender differences in physical and mental capacities\20\
and in other cases due to women's ``pregnancy potential.''\21\
Reports also highlighted the intrusive gynecological
examinations and related questioning that women face when
applying for civil service positions.\22\ An October 2012 study
documented continued and significant wage discrimination in
favor of men,\23\ and Chinese law continues to subject women to
mandatory retirement 5 to 10 years earlier than men.\24\
China's first local regulations on gender equality took effect
in Shenzhen municipality, Guangdong province, in January
2013,\25\ and, in February, China Daily reported that
authorities in Beijing municipality released similar draft
regulations for public comment.\26\ Such local provisions, if
implemented, could fill significant gaps in national-level
legislation as they stipulate punishments for employers who
engage in discriminatory hiring practices.\27\ In January 2013,
a company in Guangzhou municipality, Guangdong, paid the first
reported compensation in a gender discrimination case in China
after the local department of human resources and social
security investigated Wen Yuxuan's (alias) complaint that
recruiters denied her job application based on her gender. The
case was resolved in mediation, and the company reportedly paid
Wen 601 yuan (US$97) and issued an apology, but did not appear
to offer her a job.\28\
EDUCATION DISCRIMINATION
Gender-based discrimination remains a barrier for some
young women pursuing a university education in China, despite
provisions in the PRC Education Law that prohibit
discrimination on several grounds including gender.\29\ Reports
indicate that universities across China continue to implement
long-administered gender quotas that require women to score
higher than men on the college entrance exam (gaokao) for
acceptance into certain majors.\30\ Advocates for gender
equality in education reportedly filed an Open Government
Information request in July 2012, asking the Ministry of
Education to clarify which majors are permitted to have gender
quotas for enrollment.\31\ In response, the Ministry of
Education reported that gender quotas are permitted in military
and national defense, marine and mining, and some less-commonly
studied foreign language majors.\32\
Violence Against Women
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
Domestic violence is prohibited and punishable under
Chinese law,\33\ yet the problem of domestic violence in China
remains widespread.\34\ Current national-level legal provisions
regarding domestic violence leave many victims unprotected by
prohibiting domestic violence without defining the term or
clarifying the specific responsibilities of public and private
sector organizations in prevention, punishment, and
treatment.\35\ As of December 2012, 28 provincial-level
jurisdictions and more than 90 cities across China had
instituted local anti-domestic violence regulations or policies
that address gaps in national-level legislation.\36\ Amid
several high-profile domestic violence cases involving women
and children this year,\37\ Chinese advocates continued calls
for national-level legislation that specifically addresses
domestic violence.\38\ China's 2012-2015 National Human Rights
Action Plan, issued in June 2012, included the goal to
``formulate'' a domestic violence law.\39\ State media also
reported in 2012 that domestic violence would be on the
National People's Congress legislative agenda in 2012,\40\ but
no drafts appear to have been made publicly available.\41\ A
January 2013 Legal Daily article reported that the Supreme
People's Court (SPC) plans to issue standardized documents to
guide adjudication in domestic violence criminal cases. The
article did not provide a timeline for the release of these
documents, but reported that the SPC had set up pilot programs
and trainings in six courts around the country to strengthen
trial procedures in criminal cases involving domestic
violence.\42\ A January 2013 Caixin Media report also noted
that Chinese courts have issued 200 protection orders since
pilot programs on civil law protection orders began in
2008.\43\ Other Chinese state media and non-governmental
organization (NGO) articles indicate, however, that many courts
and law enforcement officials continue to treat reports of
domestic violence as a private family matter and do not take
legal action in response to those reports.\44\
SEXUAL VIOLENCE
Women and children subjected to sexual violence\45\ in
China face difficulties defending their rights. Reports
regarding officials' or their associates' involvement in sexual
violence against women and girls continued to emerge during the
Commission's reporting year, igniting public fury at the lack
of transparency and abuse of power displayed among China's
elite.\46\ The May 2013 case of an official and a primary
school principal sexually assaulting six primary school girls
overnight at a hotel in Hainan province,\47\ as well as several
similar cases reported shortly thereafter,\48\ exposed
loopholes in China's criminal law that protect perpetrators
from the more serious charges of rape if they claim the act was
consensual or if money was involved.\49\ Authorities beat and
detained women's rights activist Ye Haiyan after she carried
out a peaceful protest outside of the Hainan principal's
school.\50\ In response to these sexual abuse cases, a group of
women lawyers from across China reportedly joined together to
provide legal assistance to victims of sexual abuse.\51\
Sexual harassment, considered a form of violence against
women under international standards,\52\ is prohibited under
Chinese law;\53\ however, due in part to the lack of a clear
legal definition and standards for prevention, reporting, and
punishment,\54\ legal experts continued calls this year for
strengthened legislation on the issue.\55\ Chinese media
reporting on sexual harassment this year included a survey
showing a perceived increase of sexual harassment in urban
areas,\56\ a case of sexual harassment involving Foxconn
employees,\57\ and a case implicating a Guangdong province
official.\58\
STATE-AUTHORIZED VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
Officials in localities across China also continue to
employ other forms of coercion and violence against women--
including forced abortions, forced sterilizations, and forced
contraceptive use--in their enforcement of national and local
population planning policies, in contradiction with
international standards to which China has agreed.\59\ Chinese
law leaves women unprotected against such abuses; for even
though it prohibits officials from infringing upon citizens'
rights and interests during population planning implementation,
the law does not define what constitutes a citizen's right or
interest,\60\ nor does it stipulate punishments for
violations.\61\ Women engaging in sex work in China also report
suffering frequent violence at the hands of authorities,
including beatings and other forms of physical abuse, in order
to coerce confessions.\62\ Although sex work is illegal under
Chinese law,\63\ authorities are not permitted to use physical
violence or abuse against suspects when enforcing these
laws.\64\ According to a joint report issued by several
international non-governmental organizations regarding the
implementation of the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination against Women, in China ``[w]omen have
few avenues for pursuing rights claims when their rights and
interests conflict with those of the government or its
officials, or when discriminatory treatment they have suffered
is perpetrated by a government agency. . . . [T]he absence of
legal remedies and restrictions on freedom of association and
expression leave women with little opportunity for challenging
lack of government action or violations of their own
rights.''\65\ [For additional information on violence against
women in the implementation of population planning policies,
including specific case examples, see Section II--Population
Planning.]
Human Trafficking
Trends
China remains a country of origin, transit, and destination
for the trafficking of men, women, and children, as defined
under the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish
Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (UN TIP
Protocol).\1\ The majority of trafficking cases are
domestic;\2\ however, human traffickers continue to traffic
women and children from China to countries around the world.\3\
Women and girls also continue to be trafficked into China from
countries across Asia, as well as from the Americas, Europe,
and Africa, for the purpose of forced marriage, forced labor,
and sexual exploitation.\4\ Cases of men and children in China
working under forced or otherwise exploitative labor conditions
that constitute human trafficking under the UN TIP Protocol\5\
also emerged during the Commission's 2013 reporting year.\6\
The full extent of the forced labor problem in China remains
unclear, as the Chinese government has not traditionally
released statistics on forced labor or trafficking of male
victims.\7\ [See Section II--Worker Rights for more information
on cases of forced labor and child labor this year.]
Anti-Trafficking Efforts
Since its accession to the UN TIP Protocol in 2009,\8\ the
Chinese government has steadily taken steps, in concert with
other country governments\9\ and international non-governmental
organizations,\10\ to revise domestic legislation, policies,
and anti-trafficking efforts to come into compliance. For
example, in 2011, the National People's Congress Standing
Committee issued a revised PRC Criminal Law strengthening
provisions on forced labor.\11\ In January 2013, the State
Council took an additional step to bring government efforts
into compliance with international standards by issuing the
China Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Persons (2013-
2020),\12\ which is a revised version of its predecessor, the
China Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Women and Children
(2008-2012).\13\ The new Action Plan appears to contain some
improvements in terminology and objectives, and clearly lays
out which government agencies are responsible for
implementation.\14\ It remains to be seen whether the State
Council has provided adequate resources and training to local
authorities for implementing the plan's objectives.
Chinese authorities took limited steps this year to improve
prevention, protection, and services for victims of
trafficking, but did not release detailed information on the
services provided or the number of victims identified and
assisted.\15\ Chinese officials reportedly established two
shelters dedicated to assisting foreign trafficking victims in
Yunnan and Guangxi provinces, but did not provide data on the
number of victims assisted at these shelters or the types of
services provided there.\16\ While the government reportedly
maintained four nationwide anti-trafficking hotlines,\17\
continued training for law enforcement officials,\18\ and
stepped up efforts to cooperate with the governments of
bordering countries such as Laos\19\ and Burma,\20\ it is
difficult to assess China's progress in anti-trafficking
efforts, as the government does not release data on the overall
number of victims identified or assisted.\21\ After nine
consecutive years on the Tier 2 Watch List, China was in June
automatically downgraded to Tier 3, the lowest tier ranking, in
the U.S. State Department's annual Trafficking in Persons (TIP)
Report.\22\ The U.S. State Department's 2013 TIP report stated
that China has been ``deemed not to be making significant
efforts to comply with the minimum standards [for the
elimination of trafficking].''\23\ As a Tier 3 country, China
could be subject to certain U.S. government sanctions and
penalties.\24\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notable Changes in China's 2013-2020 Anti-Trafficking Plan of Action
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
General:
Broadens the Chinese term for trafficking from ``abduction and
sale of women and children'' (guaimai funu ertong) to ``abduction and
sale of persons'' (guaimai renkou).\25\
Presents ``protecting China's international image'' (weihu
woguoji xingxiang) as one of the plan's guiding principles.\26\
Calls for increased cooperation with UN organizations\27\ and
cites carrying out the UN TIP Protocol as one of the plan's
objectives.\28\
Urges all levels of government to factor implementation funds
into their budgets and to seek funding for anti-trafficking work from a
variety of channels, including donations from civil society
organizations, corporations, and individual donors, as well as
international aid.\29\
Calls for improvements to China's current laws, regulations,
and policies to support anti-trafficking work. Specifically, the plan
calls for revisions that will strengthen prosecution of buyers;\30\
practically protect victims' lawful rights and interests;\31\ and
improve regulations regarding temporary and permanent guardianship for
children.\32\
Prevention:
Calls for strengthening population planning services and
management, while reducing unplanned pregnancies and ``out-of-plan''
births as preventative measures in key regions of human
trafficking.\33\ (The Commission notes that the Chinese government's
usage of the term ``human trafficking'' here includes illegal
adoption.\34\)
Calls for the regulation of marriage registration and of
adoption channels.\35\
Calls upon specific government departments and the All-China
Women's Federation to ``comprehensively tackle'' China's sex ratio
imbalance;\36\ revise local regulations and launch trainings to protect
women's rights and interests and promote gender equality;\37\ eliminate
traditional notions of female inferiority and continuance of the family
line (through male heirs);\38\ improve girls' education;\39\ and
guarantee rural women's right to gender-equal land contracts, land
distribution, compensation for land expropriation, and collective
profit distribution.\40\
Calls for greater awareness, education, and training, including
adding anti-trafficking material to primary, middle, and secondary
school curricula\41\ and strengthening public education campaigns in
border areas.\42\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notable Changes in China's 2013-2020 Anti-Trafficking Plan of Action--
Continued
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Protection:\43\
Clarifies responsibilities and calls upon officials not to
abandon or cease investigations in child abduction cases;\44\ clarifies
procedures for rescued children; and calls for the use of China's Anti-
Trafficking DNA Database to help match parents with rescued children.
Calls for an ``assistance and protection mechanism for vagrant
minors,'' with reliance on experts in social work and other fields for
services, including psychological counseling, behavioral correction,
cultural education, skills training, and employment assistance.\45\
Expands available rehabilitation services--such as employment
skills training, guidance, and networking--to adult male trafficking
victims.\46\ The previous plan had limited these employment services to
women and minors over age 16.\47\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Anti-Trafficking Challenges
Additional revisions are needed to bring China's domestic
legislation into compliance with the UN TIP Protocol.\48\ For
example, while the PRC Criminal Law prohibits human
trafficking,\49\ its provisions do not appear to cover all
forms of trafficking, such as certain types of non-physical
coercion\50\ and the commercial sex trade of minors.\51\ Nor
does the definition of trafficking provided under Article 240
of the PRC Criminal Law clearly include offenses against male
victims,\52\ although other articles in the same law address
some aspects of these crimes.\53\ Each of these forms of
trafficking are covered under Article 3 of the UN TIP
Protocol.\54\ The PRC Criminal Law's trafficking definition is
also overly broad in some aspects compared with the UN TIP
Protocol, as it includes the purchase or abduction of children
for subsequent sale without specifying the end purpose of these
actions.\55\ Due to these key inconsistencies between the
Chinese legal definition and international standards on human
trafficking, Chinese official reports and statistics on
trafficking cases\56\ do not provide an accurate picture of the
number of trafficking cases being handled through the criminal
justice system in China.\57\
Several Chinese media reports in the past year highlighted
cases involving the purchase and sale of children--
misidentifying them as ``trafficking'' cases--and indicated
that a significant amount of ``anti-trafficking'' work in China
remains focused on these types of cases.\58\ Under the UN TIP
Protocol, the purchase or abduction of children for subsequent
sale constitutes trafficking only if the end purpose of the
sale is exploitation, such as sexual exploitation, labor, or
servitude.\59\
In addition, Chinese officials' anti-trafficking work
reflects a continued misalignment with international standards,
especially in officials' conflation of human trafficking with
human smuggling and their subsequent treatment of trafficking
victims as criminals.\60\ According to the UN Office on Drugs
and Crime, the main international body responsible for
implementing the UN TIP Protocol, ``human trafficking'' and
``migrant smuggling'' mainly differ with respect to consent,
exploitation, and transnationality.\61\ Commonly, human
trafficking involves the exploitation of an individual (either
domestically or after they have crossed borders) without the
individual's consent, or if the individual initially consented,
the consent was ``rendered meaningless by the coercive,
deceptive, or abusive actions of the traffickers,'' whereas
migrant smuggling involves the cross-border transport of an
individual with the individual's consent and ends when the
migrant arrives at his or her destination.\62\ In conflating
the two, Chinese officials may consider an individual's illegal
entry into China to be a crime of ``human smuggling'' and
punish the individual accordingly, while giving less
consideration to the role exploitation may have played in the
border crossing.\63\ The Chinese government continues to deport
all undocumented North Koreans as illegal ``economic migrants''
and does not provide legal alternatives to repatriation for
foreign victims of trafficking.\64\ [For more information, see
Section II--North Korean Refugees in China.]
Risk Factors
Chinese and international experts link China's ongoing
human trafficking problem to several political, demographic,
economic, and social factors. Reports indicate that China's sex
ratio\65\--which has become severely skewed against the
backdrop of China's population planning policies and Chinese
families' preference for sons\66\--has increased the demand for
trafficking of women for forced marriage and commercial sexual
exploitation.\67\ A 2010 study issued by the Chinese Academy of
Social Sciences reported that, by 2020, the number of Chinese
males of marriageable age may exceed the number of Chinese
females of marriageable age by 30 to 40 million.\68\ In recent
years, domestic and international observers have also linked
China's trafficking problem with a lack of awareness among
potential victims, lack of education on trafficking prevention
for vulnerable women and parents,\69\ challenging conditions in
bordering countries such as poverty and limited job
opportunities in Burma and the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea,\70\ and corruption among Chinese law enforcement
officials.\71\ [For additional information on China's skewed
sex ratio, see Section II--Population Planning.]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Representative Human Trafficking Cases From the 2012 Reporting Year
(Arranged by Province)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Guangdong. In October 2012, officials in Guangdong province
reportedly rescued four Colombian women who had been forced into sex
work during a raid on local entertainment venues.\72\ The women had
reportedly been trafficked into China by a criminal syndicate operating
out of Colombia. The case raised concerns that trafficking syndicates
are choosing new countries of origin as other countries' anti-
trafficking efforts have strengthened.\73\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Representative Human Trafficking Cases From the 2012 Reporting Year--
Continued (Arranged by Province)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Guangdong. In December 2012, an Internet user posted on Sina
Weibo that an employer from Dongguan city, Guangdong province, had
lured seven Chinese female students between the ages of 11 and 14 into
a van in Shaojue county, Sichuan province, to work in his toy factory.
The post spread quickly on the Internet, with citizens across China
pressuring the Shaojue government to take action. The Shaojue
government investigated the case and reported that the girls were
``living well, under safe conditions,'' but that authorities would
retrieve them and return them to school as soon as their whereabouts
were confirmed.\74\
Guangdong. In January 2013, a Vietnamese anti-trafficking
worker and a Vietnamese policeman posed as tourists and rescued two
Vietnamese girls, ages 17 and 19, from a brothel in Guangdong province.
The girls had reportedly been ``kidnapped, severely beaten, raped and
sold'' into sexual exploitation by members of an organized
syndicate.\75\
Yunnan. A December 2012 report released by international non-
governmental organization TrustLaw highlighted the cases of three
Burmese women whom traffickers lured into China with false promises of
employment and subsequently sold into marriage to Chinese men. One of
the women was trafficked as a minor and reported that she had lived in
a village in Yunnan for nearly five years and had given birth to two
children. She reported that there were many Burmese women in forced
marriages in nearby villages in the area.\76\
Jilin, Heilongjiang, etc. In September 2012, police in Jilin
province reportedly arrested four North Koreans and one Chinese man for
luring 12 North Korean women into China, forcing them to perform sexual
services for clients via the Internet, and then selling the women to
buyers in Heilongjiang province and other parts of China.\77\ Police
reportedly rescued and later repatriated all 12 victims to North Korea,
where, according to North Korean sources cited in a Chosun Ilbo report,
they will face torture or death.\78\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
North Korean Refugees in China
Unlawful Repatriation
During the Commission's 2013 reporting year, the Chinese
government continued to detain and repatriate North Korean
refugees to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK),
despite the severe punishments refugees reportedly face once
returned. The Chinese government maintains that North Korean
refugees in China are illegal economic migrants\1\ and
continues its repatriation policy based on a 1961 treaty with
the DPRK and a subsequent 1986 border protocol.\2\ China's
repatriation of North Korean refugees, including those who
leave the DPRK for fear of persecution, contravenes its
international obligations under the 1951 UN Convention relating
to the Status of Refugees (1951 Convention) and its 1967
Protocol, to which China has acceded.\3\ While there is no
reliable information available on the number of North Korean
refugees living in China--Chinese authorities do not release
information on refugees, nor do they permit the Office of the
UN High Commissioner for Refugees to operate along China's
northeastern border with the DPRK--international scholars and
media estimate the total number is currently between 11,000 and
50,000.\4\
During this reporting year, the Chinese government appeared
to strengthen measures to stem the flow of North Korean
refugees into China, including increasing security along the
North Korean border and continuing campaigns to seek out and
repatriate refugees.\5\ Sources cited by Chinese and South
Korean media reported that authorities in Yanbian Korean
Autonomous Prefecture, Jilin province, initiated a program in
March offering financial rewards of up to 2,000 yuan (US$326)
to Chinese citizens who provide information leading to the
arrest of refugees.\6\ According to official reports, the
program specifically aimed to ``stop the illegal trans-boundary
criminal situation at Yanbian . . . and strike at illegal
border crossers.''\7\ Chinese villagers living in Yanbian
attested to the success of such programs, stating that the
number of refugees in the area had decreased significantly in
comparison to previous years.\8\ While trans-border criminal
activity, including drug and human trafficking, remains a
serious concern,\9\ Chinese security officials do not
distinguish between criminals and refugees, leaving North
Koreans who enter China as asylum seekers and refugees at risk
of detention and repatriation.
International media reports also indicate Chinese
authorities continued to collaborate with North Korean security
officials, allowing them to operate within China to apprehend
North Korean refugees and disrupt organizations that attempt to
assist them.\10\ Sources cited by South Korean media noted the
presence of North Korean security agents at places commonly
frequented by North Koreans in China.\11\ One report further
stated that four North Koreans were detained and repatriated by
North Korean security agents near Shenyang municipality,
Liaoning province, in late 2012.\12\ According to human rights
and refugee advocates, coordinated efforts by China and North
Korea have made it increasingly difficult for refugee advocates
to operate on both sides of the border.\13\ In January 2013,
the South Korean Ministry of Unification announced the number
of refugees reaching South Korea dropped in 2012 by 50 percent
to 1,508 compared with 2,706 in 2011.\14\ Experts suggest
China's tougher border security and crackdowns were in part
responsible for the decline.\15\ As of July 2013, the number of
refugees entering South Korea was slightly higher than for the
same period in 2012.\16\
Punishment in the DPRK
North Koreans forcibly repatriated by the Chinese
government face the threat of imprisonment, torture, and
capital punishment in the DPRK.\17\ Under North Korean Criminal
Law, citizens who leave the country without official permission
can receive sentences of up to two years' imprisonment in a
``labor-training camp.''\18\ The North Korean Ministry of
Public Security adopted measures in 2010 making defection a
crime of ``treachery against the nation,'' carrying a sentence
of no less than five years' imprisonment.\19\ North Koreans
sentenced to prison terms reportedly face a combination of
forced labor, physical abuse, and induced malnutrition that
results in a high number of deaths in detention.\20\ According
to interviews with former refugees, the severity of
interrogation, torture, and other punishments repatriated North
Koreans face depends on North Korean authorities' assessments
of their conduct while outside the country.\21\ North Korean
authorities dispense harsher punishment, including long
sentences and possible execution, to repatriated North Koreans
deemed to have committed ``political'' crimes, which include
attempted defection; conversion to Christianity; exposure to
South Korean culture; and contact with religious groups, South
Koreans, or Americans.\22\ According to most recent estimates,
North Korea's prison population is believed to be between
80,000 and 120,000 people.\23\
The North Korean government's imprisonment and torture of
repatriated North Koreans renders North Koreans in China
refugees ``sur place,'' or those who fear persecution upon
return to their country of origin.\24\ Under the 1951
Convention and its 1967 Protocol, China is obligated to refrain
from repatriating refugees ``sur place.'' China is also
obligated under the UN Convention against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment to refrain
from repatriating refugees if there are ``grounds for believing
that they would be in danger of being subject to torture.''\25\
North Korean Women and Trafficking
Lacking legal status and under constant threat of forced
repatriation, North Korean women who stay in China and do not
travel directly to a third country remain vulnerable to abuse,
trafficking, and exploitation. Independent experts estimate a
majority of North Korean refugees in China are women, of which
some have been trafficked into forced marriages or commercial
sexual exploitation.\26\ Traffickers have used false promises
to lure North Korean women into China and in some cases have
resorted to kidnapping.\27\ In some regions of northeast China,
particularly in rural areas, a shortage of marriageable women
has created a market for trafficked North Korean brides.\28\
Some women reportedly have been sold and resold multiple times,
and trafficked North Korean women have testified to being
beaten and sexually abused.\29\
The Chinese government's repatriation of trafficked North
Korean women contravenes the 1951 Convention and its 1967
Protocol.\30\ China is obligated under Article 7 of the UN
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in
Persons, Especially Women and Children (UN TIP Protocol) to
``consider adopting legislative or other appropriate measures
that permit victims of trafficking to remain in its territory,
temporarily or permanently . . . giving appropriate
consideration to humanitarian and compassionate factors.''\31\
[See Section II--Human Trafficking for more information.]
Children of North Korean and Chinese Parents
Children born to North Korean women and Chinese men are
increasingly being raised in China in households where either
the mother or both parents are absent.\32\ In some instances,
Chinese authorities repatriate North Korean mothers to the
DPRK, while others flee to South Korea or other parts of
China.\33\ One demographic study published in 2013 estimated
the population in northeast China of children born to North
Korean women and Chinese men since the late 1990s was between
15,000 and 25,000.\34\ Several experts and academic studies
contend household registration (hukou) policies have changed in
recent years to allow for a greater majority of children born
to North Korean women in China to obtain official documentation
needed to attend public school and gain access to other social
services.\35\ Despite these changes, general poverty and the
continued threat of repatriation leaves these children and
their families at risk.\36\ China's repatriation policy is in
violation of its international obligations under the Convention
of the Rights of the Child, which prohibits separating children
from their mothers.\37\
Public Health
Public Health Challenges
The Chinese government's oversight of and response to
public health matters came into sharp focus during the
Commission's 2013 reporting year with an outbreak in March of
the H7N9 avian influenza.\1\ Despite initial questions about
possible delays in government reporting,\2\ international
experts favorably assessed the Chinese government's response to
the outbreak and its coordination with international health
agencies,\3\ and remarked on China's overall progress in
building an infrastructure for emergency response to epidemics
since the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak in
2003.\4\ Adverse health effects of environmental pollution
continue to be a public health challenge in China;\5\ research
studies published in 2013 confirmed links between water
pollution and higher cancer rates along the Huai River,\6\ and
between air pollution and shorter life spans in north China.\7\
In addition, citizens' increasing concerns over food safety\8\
and the quality of medical care\9\ have ``eroded trust in the
government's ability to regulate state and private enterprises
and protect public health.''\10\ Some government officials and
a state-run media outlet reportedly have attempted to censor
information\11\ or deny the severity of the public's
concerns.\12\
Institutional and Legislative Developments
During the annual meetings of the National People's
Congress and the Chinese People's Political Consultative
Conference (CPPCC) in March 2013, the State Council announced
the merger of the Ministry of Health (MOH) and the National
Population and Family Planning Commission into the National
Health and Family Planning Commission, as a part of its larger
governmental restructuring plan.\13\ At least 90 medical
professionals from the CPPCC reportedly disapproved of the
change and the lack of public consultation over the selected
name, arguing that the name ``Ministry of Health'' should be
kept as is, since population planning is only one part of the
larger public health system.\14\ Dr. Huang Jiefu, then-MOH Vice
Minister, reportedly commented that using the combined name
might cause China to ``encounter difficulties'' in its
international exchanges,\15\ because of international
controversy over China's population planning policy.\16\ [For
further information on the organizational merger, see Section
II--Population Planning.]
China's first-ever Mental Health Law (MHL) became effective
on May 1, 2013,\17\ and aims to ``expand access to mental
health services,'' though one international expert noted that
the MHL does not sufficiently address the ``stigma associated
with mental illness'' and the ``low rate of care-seeking.''\18\
A Chinese civil society report released in mid-May 2013
highlighted concerns with rights protections in the new MHL for
persons with mental illness, such as guardians' legal authority
in the commitment process and the lack of a guaranteed right to
appeal hospitalization.\19\ Discrepancies between the MHL and
national and local legislation, according to the U.S.-based Dui
Hua Foundation, create ``the potential for continued use of
abusive psychiatric commitment against petitioners, dissidents,
and others deemed to threaten China's social and political
order.''\20\ Local Chinese officials reportedly committed a
petitioner from Hunan province, Zhang Zhi, to a psychiatric
facility sometime around October 31, 2012,\21\ despite passage
of the MHL in October 2012.
Strengthening the rights of persons with disabilities
continued to be an ongoing legislative focus in China.\22\ In
February 2013, the State Council Legislative Affairs Office
released a draft revision of the 1994 Regulations on Education
for Disabled Persons for public comment.\23\ Chinese and
international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) submitted
recommendations and comments in response, many of which
incorporated input from Chinese disability rights advocates and
persons with disabilities.\24\ Human Rights Watch noted in its
submission that use of ``reasonable accommodation'' in the
draft, a term that promotes the right to equality for persons
with disabilities,\25\ lacks the clarity needed to comply with
the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
(CRPD) standard of ``necessary and appropriate modification and
adjustments not imposing a disproportionate or undue burden . .
. to ensure to persons with disabilities the enjoyment or
exercise on an equal basis with others of all human rights and
fundamental freedoms.''\26\ Chinese domestic organizations
raised a concern that the local-level advisory committees,
which are responsible for assessing students, do not require
the inclusion of legal experts, or disabled persons and their
representatives.\27\ In addition, these organizations
identified potential problems with mechanisms to remedy parent
grievances.\28\ The UN committee that reviewed China's
compliance with the CRPD in September 2012 recommended that the
Chinese government ``reallocate resources from the special
education system to promote . . . inclusive education in
mainstream schools, so as to ensure that more children with
disabilities can attend mainstream education.''\29\
Rights Protection and Health-Based Discrimination
China's existing legislative framework prohibits health-
based discrimination,\30\ yet discrimination in employment,\31\
access to medical treatment,\32\ and access to education\33\
continued during the 2013 reporting year, partially due to a
lack of compliance with the laws\34\ and inconsistencies
between national laws and local regulations.\35\ A 2012
National People's Congress report found that, between 2007 and
2011, government departments in 29 provinces had hired a total
of only 92 persons with disabilities for civil servant jobs,
far below the government's mandated provision that 1.5 percent
of government and private enterprise jobs go to persons with
disabilities.\36\ In spite of compulsory education regulations
and rights protections for disabled persons, official Chinese
statistics from 2010 estimate only 71 percent of children with
disabilities attend school.\37\
Employment: During the 2013 reporting year, NGOs and
disability rights advocates continued to focus attention on
physical eligibility standards that have been used to refuse
employment to persons with disabilities and those living with
infectious diseases.\38\ In a November 2012 letter to the State
Council Legislative Affairs Office, a group of lawyers wrote
that discriminatory provisions in the Civil Servant Recruitment
Physical Examination Standards contravene the Chinese
Constitution's protection of citizens' right to work.\39\ A
local court reportedly upheld a decision that cited state
secrets as the reason to refuse an application for open
government information on the number of civil servants with
disabilities.\40\ As a State Party to the UN Convention on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities, China has agreed to ``take
appropriate measures to employ teachers, including teachers
with disabilities'' and ``[p]rohibit discrimination on the
basis of disability with regard to all matters concerning all
forms of employment.''\41\ Although Guangdong province removed
discriminatory provisions against people with disabilities and
people living with HIV/AIDS in its physical standards for
teachers in May 2013,\42\ according to a 2011 study, at least
19 provinces reportedly maintain discriminatory provisions in
physical standards for teachers.\43\ Human Rights Watch pointed
out that an amended article in the national draft Regulations
for the Education of Persons with Disabilities may allow
government departments and schools to ``discriminate against
individuals on the basis of physical requirements.''\44\
Access to Medical Treatment: Discrimination in access to
medical treatment for people living with HIV/AIDS (PLWHA)
continues to be a challenge in China.\45\ In October 2012, a
Chinese NGO in Tianjin reported on a local man who had been
denied treatment for lung cancer at several hospitals due to
his HIV-
positive status.\46\ In November 2012, the Ministry of Health
(MOH)--reportedly at the behest of Premier Li Keqiang\47\--
issued a directive ordering hospitals to ``take steps to
guarantee the right to medical treatment'' for PLWHA.\48\
Beijing Aizhixing Institute, a public health advocacy
organization, however, raised a concern that the MOH directive
lacked enforcement provisions, such as punishments for
hospitals that refuse treatment to PLWHA.\49\
The Environment
Pollution Challenges and Government Disclosure
Despite some progress in protecting the environment,\1\
environmental problems remain a major challenge, and in recent
years, the associated costs reportedly have increased.\2\
During 2012, there were 542 environmental accidents, five of
which were serious.\3\ News reports emphasized the highly
visible ``foggy and hazy'' skies that affected 20 provinces in
early 2013,\4\ and which reportedly reached Japan.\5\ The
pollution events reportedly garnered extraordinary attention
from citizens, the media, the government,\6\ and deputies at
the March meeting of the National People's Congress,\7\ as well
as increased forward momentum on some relevant legislation.\8\
These were not isolated incidents; outdoor air pollution has
been an ongoing challenge, posing serious health risks.\9\
Authorities irregularly disclosed information on pollution
problems and their health impacts. Continuing a positive trend,
the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) acknowledged
that toxic chemicals have caused numerous acute air pollution
incidents,\10\ posed a danger to numerous drinking water
sources, and led to the emergence of ``cancer villages,'' among
other health problems.\11\ Groundwater pollution continued to
present difficulties,\12\ and officials publicly disclosed some
groundwater contamination data.\13\ Authorities reportedly
classified as bad nearly 60 percent of the groundwater tested
at monitoring sites in 198 cities during 2012.\14\ Soil
pollution reportedly is also widespread. It possibly affects as
much as one-fifth of China's arable land based on 2010 data\15\
and its possible impact on the food supply has been cause for
some concern,\16\ but authorities have so far been much less
forthcoming with soil contamination data.\17\
The problems created by the migration of polluting
industries to China's western and poorer areas continue,
including fast-paced scaling up of mining in Tibet.\18\
Migration practices leave behind contaminated sites,\19\ as
well as create new problems in areas where major pollutant
reduction targets may be lower, and environmental protection
capacity may lag behind more developed coastal areas.\20\
Reportedly, only 2.8 percent of China's 600,000 villages are
included in environmental comprehensive control efforts.\21\
Regulatory Developments and Challenges to Rule of Law and
Accountability
CONSTITUTIONAL AND OTHER LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS
During the reporting period, top Chinese Communist Party
and government leaders highlighted ``ecological civilization''
(shengtai wenming) (apparently a complex concept that includes
ecological and environmental protection, resource conservation,
and sustainable development), as being tied to the four basic
goals of a ``xiaokang'' society (an all-around well-off
society), and mandated the establishment of ``target systems,''
``assessment measures,'' and ``rewards and punishment
mechanisms'' related to the concept.\22\ Economic development,
however, remains the ``core concern.''\23\ At the 18th Party
Congress in November 2012, leaders revised the Chinese
Communist Party Constitution to include one new sentence and a
new paragraph that urge the promotion of ``ecological
civilization'' within the overall context of ``China's special
socialist enterprise.''\24\ In addition, former President Hu
Jintao\25\ and Premier Li Keqiang\26\ gave prominence to
``ecological civilization'' and environmental quality in
national speeches.
In June, court and procuratorate authorities issued a joint
interpretation clarifying the application of criminal
provisions to environmental violations; it outlines specific
standards for classifying the severity of the impacts of
environmental pollution, which then determines application of
the sentencing guidelines in the PRC Criminal Law.\27\ Other
authorities focused some regulatory measures on issues of
concern to Chinese citizens, including air pollution and soil
pollution. In December, MEP mandated that 117 cities will be
responsible for specified pollutant reduction targets not
already listed in the 12th Five-Year Plan, including PM2.5 and
PM10.\28\ These reduction targets will be included in
government responsibility assessments.\29\ After the winter air
pollution events, authorities reportedly restarted\30\ stalled
efforts to revise the PRC Air Pollution Prevention and Control
Law.\31\ In June, the State Council reportedly issued ten
policies intended to strengthen control over air pollution and
in September issued the Atmospheric Pollution Prevention and
Control Action Plan.\32\ During the reporting period, while
authorities were not forthcoming with soil contamination data,
legislators appeared to resuscitate efforts to draft a major
national soil pollution law by establishing a new drafting
group,\33\ and the State Council announced designs for a new
soil contamination survey and a partial monitoring network,\34\
and plans for soil cleanup efforts.\35\
In addition, leaders took regulatory steps to address
climate change, some outlined in the ``China 2012 Annual Report
on Policies and Actions To Address Climate Change''\36\ and in
the white paper, ``China's Energy Policy 2012.''\37\ Shenzhen
Special Economic Zone passed local legislation to restrict
greenhouse gas emissions, the first location in China to do
so.\38\ Authorities also began to ``research and establish'' a
national carbon emissions trading scheme and pilot trading
markets.\39\ China also issued its first greenhouse gas
bulletin.\40\ In April 2013, China and the United States signed
a joint statement on climate change announcing the formation of
a Climate Change Working Group,\41\ and in June, agreed to work
together to reduce hydrofluorocarbons.\42\
Authorities opened the Environmental Protection Law (EPL)
draft revision for public comment in September 2012\43\ and
collected 11,748 comments.\44\ The draft revisions reportedly
were widely criticized.\45\ Governmental and non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) submitted suggestions regarding the draft,
some urging for provisions providing for greater transparency
and strengthening enforcement of laws and regulations and
channels for public participation.\46\ One Chinese
environmental group commented that a June 2013 draft of the
revised EPL contained language in line with the group's
previous suggestions, including ones that related to the
pollution permit management system and daily penalties.\47\ The
group and environmental experts, however, found other areas in
need of improvement and suggested placing greater emphasis on
protecting citizens' environmental rights; modifying the
article related to public interest lawsuits to bring it more in
line with the Civil Procedure Law; strengthening public
participation in environmental impact assessments; and
disclosing enterprise pollution monitoring information.\48\
CHALLENGES TO RULE OF LAW AND ACCOUNTABILITY
Significant challenges hinder the development of rule of
law in the area of environmental protection. Official reports
highlighted the number of environmental legal violations
investigated and handled during 2012.\49\ Government
interference, local protectionism, and lax or arbitrary
enforcement are problematic.\50\ Related and additional
challenges include:
Official evaluation criteria and incentives
that overemphasize economic development;\51\
Inept or unethical behavior, disregard for
environmental regulations, and corruption;\52\
The lack of supervision over governments and
individual officials acting above the law;\53\
Investment in environmental protection is
lower as a percent of GDP than some Chinese scientists
believe it should be (it hovers around 1.3 to 1.5
percent of GDP) and environmental protection officials
lack authority in some cases;\54\ and
Insufficient monitoring as well as
environmental penalties that are too light to deter
polluting behavior.\55\
Development of Environmental Public Interest Law Comes to a Standstill
The PRC Civil Procedure Law issued in August 2012 contained
an article permitting public interest suits by ``agencies and
relevant organizations stipulated by law.''\56\ The general
legal foundation for these types of cases, however, remains
vague,\57\ the number of environmental cases remains
minimal,\58\ and the June 2013 draft of the Environmental
Protection Law stipulated that only one government-supported
environmental group, the All-China Environment Federation, will
be allowed to bring environmental public interest lawsuits.\59\
Other barriers to the development of public interest law
persist,\60\ including difficulties in obtaining evidence,\61\
the costs of pursuing such suits by organizations,\62\ and the
lack of authority and capacity of the courts that take these
cases.\63\
Despite these barriers, during the reporting period, the
Chinese media noted key environmental public interest cases. In
a first, in late September 2012, the Qingzhen Environmental
Tribunal of the People's Court in Qingzhen city, Guizhou
province, heard a case brought by an individual citizen,
``supported'' by the local procuratorate.\64\ A second case
involving illegal dumping of chromium sludge in Yunnan
province, brought in part by two NGOs not directly affiliated
with government agencies,\65\ is pending. The parties to this
case reached an initial pre-trial agreement in late 2012,\66\
but the defendant refused to sign the mediation decision at the
last moment.\67\ In a third case, officials reportedly
pressured lawyers representing an association to withdraw two
cross-provincial cases against a company linked to an aniline
chemical spill in Shanxi province; local news called the cases
``harmonized.''\68\
Role of Environmental Courts and Unreliable Legal Remedies
China's specialized environmental courts continue to
proliferate--reportedly reaching at least 95 by 2013. These
courts appear to be providing different functions from place to
place\69\ and some of them are not handling many cases.\70\
Legal remedies in environmental cases continue to be unreliable
as courts remain unwilling to accept some cases.\71\ Over 70
percent of grassroots environmental disputes reportedly are
handled through mediation, which has an ambiguous legal
foundation and which may be forced upon disputants.\72\
Sometimes citizens have taken to the streets in an effort to
resolve grievances. Pollution and degradation problems
reportedly are among the primary triggers of environmental mass
incidents,\73\ and such incidents increased 30 percent in
2012.\74\ Environmental protests continued to be the largest in
scale among incidents of unrest, and over 70 percent of the 47
environmental protests tracked by one organization involved
clashes with police.\75\ In some cases, authorities halted
plans for projects after public protests.\76\
Suppression of Environmental Advocates and Protests
Chinese citizens advocated for the improvement of
environmental quality, but during the course of protecting
their rights or investigating claims of pollution, some people
faced detention, harassment from officials, or beatings:
In December 2012, authorities gave former
forestry official and environmentalist Liu Futang a
three-year suspended sentence for allegedly engaging in
``illegal business activities'' linked to his self-
publication--with a Hong Kong publication number--of
environmental exposes that may have embarrassed local
government leaders.\77\
In January 2013, a journalist was reportedly
beaten when he went with staff from the All-China
Environmental Federation--a government-funded non-
governmental organization (NGO)\78\--to take pictures
of pollution linked to a paper company in Hunan
province.\79\ County leaders investigated the delayed
dispatch of police officers and inadequate
environmental oversight in the case,\80\ and police
later detained two suspects in the beating.\81\
In February, Chen Yuqian, an environmental
advocate in Zhejiang province, reported being attacked
in his home and beaten by more than 40 unidentified men
after he publicly challenged a local environmental
official to swim in a polluted local river.\82\ Chen
had campaigned for years to get officials to address
water pollution problems.\83\ He blamed officials for
the five beatings he has endured over the last 10
years.\84\
As of late July 2013, farmer and
environmentalist Zhang Bing's case remains in limbo.
Zhang claimed pollution killed nearly 2,000 kilos of
his fish in 2009, and when he was not compensated, he
petitioned higher level authorities and talked to the
press.\85\ Authorities sentenced Zhang to two years in
prison and three years' probation on the charge of
``extortion'' linked to his petitioning activities, but
a higher court overturned that sentence twice.\86\ The
procuratorate in Lujiang county, Anhui province, as of
July 2013, had not yet issued an official decision
declaring that it was not granting an indictment
against Zhang, even though the Lujiang court had issued
a decision granting the procuratorate permission to
withdraw the suit against Zhang.\87\
Officials also questioned environmental advocates, took
extraordinary measures to prevent anti-pollution and other
demonstrations, and censored Internet postings.
In November 2012, authorities questioned Chen
Zuoliang about giving foreign reporters pictures of the
protests over construction of a paraxylene (PX) plant
in Ningbo city, Zhejiang province, and forced rights
defender Wu Bin to return to his home, possibly because
he went to Ningbo to investigate the protests.\88\
In May, authorities in Chengdu municipality,
Sichuan province, reportedly took a variety of
measures\89\ and amassed a strong police presence to
prevent a ``walk'' to protest against a petrochemical
plant in nearby Pengzhou city,\90\ although they
claimed the police deployment was an exercise to
``support earthquake relief.''\91\ Officials reportedly
restricted the freedom of movement of a number of
rights advocates,\92\ deleted weibo postings opposing
the plant, and also warned a Chengdu blogger to delete
a petition voicing opposition to the plant, which she
had posted on the public comment page of the U.S. White
House Web site.\93\
During the reporting period, officials in various locations
in the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region reportedly suppressed,
sometimes using force, protests and appeal efforts by herders
who were unhappy about the loss of grasslands, land
confiscation, and mine pollution.\94\ Authorities reportedly
also deleted Internet postings regarding herders'
grievances.\95\
Environmental Transparency and Public Participation
During the 2013 reporting year, citizens called for greater
environmental transparency, and environmental authorities took
steps to improve proactive disclosure of information. In March,
23 environmental groups issued a plea for greater transparency
regarding pollution sources.\96\ The MEP issued an internal
rule that environmental protection agencies at all levels post
the abridged version of environmental impact assessment (EIA)
reports online as of September 1, 2012,\97\ and in October,
rescinded a 2008 decision to exclude construction project EIA
documents from the list of information subject to Open
Government Information (OGI) requests.\98\ In the same month,
MEP issued a circular,\99\ which if implemented, could
potentially improve proactive disclosure of certain types of
EIA documents, ``supervisory type'' monitoring data, and
information about specified types of environmental
accidents.\100\ The circular, however, has numerous
limitations.\101\ In steps forward, in 2012, select cities
began to make public PM2.5 and air quality data using the
revised air quality index\102\ and in 2013 officials released
some information from an environmental impact assessment report
for a refinery project in Kunming municipality.\103\
Despite these new rules and some progress, authorities'
proactive disclosure of information remains irregular.
According to one report, while there has been ``definite''
progress in disclosing air quality data, the number of cities
that performed poorly outnumbered the cities that performed
relatively well.\104\ In January 2013, the State Council
outlined plans to ``actively push forward with orderly
hydropower development,''\105\ including projects on the Nu
River.\106\ In relation to the plans, articles highlighted
concerns about transparency,\107\ as well as environmental
protection,\108\ social impacts, downstream and cross-border
impacts,\109\ and seismic risks.\110\
During the reporting period, instances of environmental
news censorship include the following:
In March, officials in Changzhi city, Shanxi
province, waited for five days to report an aniline
chemical spill at a fertilizer factory that affected
more than one million people downstream.\111\
In May, authorities reportedly censored news
of anti-pollution protests over construction of a
lithium-ion battery plant in Shanghai,\112\ and the
``walk'' in protest of a petrochemical plant poised to
open in Chengdu, Sichuan province.\113\
Authorities in Kunming, Yunnan province,
allowed a protest of hundreds of people against
construction of an oil refinery in May, but they
reportedly censored critical comments about the project
and told state-owned enterprise employees not to
participate or post comments online about the
protest.\114\ Kunming officials also blocked access to
a related EIA report on the grounds that it involved
``secret documents.''\115\
OPEN GOVERNMENT INFORMATION
Since the passage of the Open Government Information
Regulation (OGI) in 2007,\116\ citizens have become more
proactive in requesting environmental data, with some success,
but barriers to transparency remain. In April 2013, the
Ministry of Land and Resources responded to an OGI request
regarding groundwater quality by sending 400 pages of
data.\117\ In another positive development, a government-funded
environmental group won a court case against an environmental
protection bureau for not releasing information.\118\ One OGI
study found that a greater percentage of environmental
authorities responded to information requests than in the
previous year; however, the depth of transparency dropped in 35
percent of the locations surveyed.\119\ In some cases, city
government officials refused to provide lists of companies that
had been punished for polluting behaviors.\120\ Despite public
calls by Premier Li Keqiang to proactively disclose
environmental pollution information that affects citizens'
interests,\121\ central officials refused to provide
information about soil contamination in response to a request,
stating that the data was a ``state secret,''\122\ which
reportedly prompted criticism.\123\
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT PROCESSES
Central authorities expressed aspirations to expand public
participation in decisions about environmental assessments of
projects. In fall 2012, central authorities issued guiding
opinions\124\ or measures\125\ stipulating that specified
agencies should establish social risk assessment mechanisms
during the preparatory phase of domestic large-scale fixed
asset investment projects, reportedly at least in part to
reduce the number of environmental mass incidents.\126\ During
the reporting period, MEP announced plans in August 2012\127\
and in January 2013\128\ to clarify processes for public
participation and expanding transparency of EIA processes. The
2012-2017 MEP work plan for key projects, however, did not
appear to contain concrete mechanisms to achieve these goals,
although it included the aims of ``mobilizing'' and
``proactively guiding participation by all people.''\129\
Despite authorities' declarations of support for participation,
considerable barriers remain.\130\
III. Development of the Rule of Law
Civil Society
Introduction
Chinese non-governmental organizations (NGOs) number in the
millions,\1\ and illustrate wide breadth and increasingly
complex levels of organization on issue advocacy,\2\ social
service provision,\3\ and shared interests,\4\ as well as in
business promotion\5\ and farming.\6\ Government-registered
social organizations\7\ (shehui zuzhi) make up a subset of
Chinese NGOs: Official statistics reported 491,961 registered
social organizations in 2012, an increase of approximately 13.3
percent over 2011,\8\ that consist of 268,000 social
associations (shehui tuanti) such as membership groups and
trade associations, 221,000 non-governmental, nonprofit
organizations (minban feiqiye danwei) such as community
development and social services providers, and 2,961
foundations (jijinhui) such as public and private organizations
engaged in charitable and philanthropic work.\9\ Many Chinese
NGOs are registered as business entities or remain unregistered
due to obstacles in registering as social organizations,\10\
yet they play an active role in promoting the public interest
in environmental protection, protecting the rights of migrant
workers, and fighting health-based discrimination, among other
advocacy issues.\11\ Chinese scholars estimate between 3 to 10
million unregistered NGOs.\12\ Nor is civil society activity
found only within organizations: During the 2013 reporting
year, the Commission observed individuals and informal networks
engaging the government on issues of public interest.\13\
Government and Party Control
The Chinese government and Communist Party continue to
acknowledge the developing role of social organizations in
China, yet an April 2013 Party document leaked in August
portrays civil society and public participation as threats to
the government and Party for which stricter ideological control
is necessary.\14\ The senior leadership's public policy
statements during the 2013 reporting year repeat earlier policy
guidance in the government and Party's approach toward control
of social organization growth: The government should (1) ``lead
in the healthy and orderly development of social
organizations''\15\ and (2) accelerate the ``establishment of
Party leadership, government responsibility, societal support
and public participation.''\16\ A Central Party School
researcher, however, anticipates a potentially more dynamic
relationship between the government and non-governmental
organizations based on the 18th Party Congress report's
instruction that the government and Party ``accelerate the
formation of a system of modern social organizations in which
government functions are separated from those of social
organizations, rights and responsibilities are clearly
delineated, and social organizations exercise autonomy in
accordance with the law.''\17\
Chinese scholars and civil society advocates describe a
system of ``graduated control,'' or differentiated treatment by
the government, based upon where an organization falls along a
spectrum of political sensitivity, which can range from ``low-
level'' and ``infrequent'' monitoring to ``ruthlessly
crack[ing] down'' on operations, activities and
individuals.\18\ One aspect of this control can be illustrated
by efforts to build up the presence of the Communist Party
(``Party-building'') to guide and monitor social
organizations,\19\ and potentially exert influence that might
compromise organizations' decisionmaking and activities.\20\
For example, in May 2013, Foshan city, Guangdong province,
issued draft regulations on government procurement of services
that suggest authorities will give preference in awarding
contracts to social organizations which meet Party-building
requirements, such as having Party members among the
organizations' full-time staff or establishing an internal
Party branch.\21\ [See Section III--Institutions of Democratic
Governance for further examples.]
Civil society organizations that the government perceives
as politically sensitive face government interference under the
guise of ``stability maintenance,'' particularly during
anniversaries and large-scale political events.\22\ In advance
of the 18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in
November 2012\23\ and the annual meetings of the National
People's Congress and Chinese People's Political Consultative
Conference in March 2013, international media reported on
heightened surveillance, harassment, and extralegal detention
of civil society advocates.\24\ Chinese and international human
rights organizations have drawn attention to a government
crackdown on citizen rights' advocates beginning in spring
2013.\25\ Chinese authorities reportedly have detained or
arrested dozens of rights advocates, including Xu Zhiyong, a
leading proponent of the New Citizens' Movement, a loose
network of individuals who advocate for legal and political
reforms, human rights, and social justice.\26\ On July 18,
officials from the Beijing municipality Bureau of Civil Affairs
(BCA) shut down the Transition Institute, a think tank
established in 2007 that researches public interest issues such
as the taxation system, industry regulation, public
participation, and economic development.\27\ The BCA officials
reportedly shut down the think tank because it had not
registered with the BCA, although the think tank's founder
noted that it was registered as a business entity, similar to
many other think tanks in China.\28\
During the 2013 reporting year, several civil society
organizations sought legal or administrative redress in
response to government harassment. A public interest
organization that works on anti-discrimination advocacy won a
legal case in March 2013 against a hotel in Suzhou city for
breach of contract due to the cancellation of the group's hotel
reservation for a public interest lawyers' workshop in the
spring of 2012.\29\ Local police acknowledged that they had
demanded the cancellation because of a ``stability
maintenance'' order.\30\ In contrast, in December 2012, a court
in Shenzhen municipality dismissed a lawsuit brought by a
migrant workers' services organization in Shenzhen that had
been forcibly evicted from multiple locations during a
crackdown on labor NGOs in 2012.\31\ The Beijing Shouwang
Church, an unregistered Protestant house church in Beijing
municipality, took legal action against the Beijing police in
late September 2012 for preventing the congregation's worship
for more than one year, but the Beijing government's legal
affairs office reportedly rejected the church's application for
administrative review.\32\
Regulatory and Legislative Developments
The central government's institutional reform plan
(fang'an) issued in March\33\ has scheduled the release of
long-awaited revisions\34\ to the three key administrative
regulations on social organization management\35\ for the end
of 2013.\36\ An official from the Ministry of Civil Affairs
(MCA) stated in an interview that the revisions will address
registration,\37\ lay out a division of functions between the
government (e.g., inter-bureau coordination, policy and
guidance, oversight, and legal enforcement) and social
organizations (e.g., sector-based codes of conduct), and
encourage self-
regulation and mutual support.\38\ MCA officials reportedly are
encouraging local governments to formulate implementation
policies in advance of the forthcoming revisions.\39\ In July,
the Yunnan provincial government, for example, released drafts
of four regulatory documents that include provisions to forbid
current government officials to be the ``responsible person''
(i.e., a person with legal responsibilities) for non-
governmental organizations; bar the government from engaging in
public fundraising, except in case of natural disaster; and
increase the number of representatives from social
organizations in Yunnan's provincial leadership entities, e.g.,
the Party, the People's Congress, and the People's Consultative
Congress.\40\
At the March 2013 session of the National People's Congress
(NPC), Vice Premier Ma Kai announced that direct registration--
whereby social organizations would no longer require a
government or quasi-governmental sponsor for registration as
required under the current regulations (``dual
management'')\41\--will be permitted for business and industry
associations, technical and scientific organizations,
charities, and rural and urban community development groups
under the government's institutional reform plan.\42\ The plan,
moreover, may allow the registration of more than one social
organization per jurisdiction working on a particular
industry,\43\ which is a limitation on registration in the
current regulations.\44\ Yet Ma added that ``[p]olitical and
legal groups, religious groups, and foreign NGOs with [a]
domestic representative office . . . will continue to be
required to secure sponsor organizations'' for the existing
dual management process.\45\ The exclusion of political and
legal groups\46\ from the new policy appears to contradict
comments made in March 2012 by Minister of Civil Affairs Li
Liguo on equal treatment for human rights and political groups
in the registration and review process.\47\ The Chinese
government's limitations on NGO registration contravene the
right to freedom of association provided in China's
constitution and in Article 22 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, which provides that: ``No
restrictions may be placed on the exercise of [the freedom of
association] other than those which are prescribed by law and
which are necessary in a democratic society in the interest of
national security or public safety . . .''\48\
Local authorities began experiments in direct registration
of social organizations in Shenzhen municipality and Guangdong
province in 2009, and in 19 provinces\49\ in 2011,\50\ though
reports suggest that the implementation of direct registration
has been uneven. Guangdong reportedly experienced a 15.1
percent increase in the number of social organizations by the
end of 2012,\51\ but a university survey in 2012 of public
interest organizations that were newly registered as non-
governmental, nonprofit organizations in Guangdong found that
many faced increased taxes, expenses, and administrative work
following registration.\52\ While some of these post-
registration challenges may derive from ``growing pains''
related to NGO operational capacity,\53\ local civil affairs
bureaus reportedly face challenges due to insufficient staffing
and regulatory guidance on how to process applications for
registration.\54\ According to NGO advocates, some bureaus are
not registering public interest groups and service providers
because of a ``conservative''\55\ approach in authorizing
registration. For example, organizations working on rural
women's rights, service provision to persons with developmental
disabilities, and outreach to populations at greater risk of
HIV/AIDS infection, have reported being unable to directly
register as social organizations in Beijing despite Beijing
municipality's early participation as a direct registration
site.\56\
GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT OF PUBLIC SERVICES FROM NGOS
Over the past decade, several Chinese municipalities
launched experiments in government procurement of public
services (e.g., elder care, community corrections, and poverty
alleviation) from social organizations,\57\ reflecting the
Chinese government's efforts to transfer some government
functions to NGOs\58\ and develop a ``non-state social service
sector.''\59\ Local governments have begun formulating project
catalogues and budgets, selection and oversight processes, and
standards of transparency and accountability.\60\ The piecemeal
development of the regulatory framework, however, has
negatively affected the implementation and supervision of
procurement processes and service delivery, according to some
commentators.\61\ In a May 2013 speech, Premier Li Keqiang
urged officials to ``increase efforts to purchase basic public
services, and promptly formulate and introduce guiding opinions
for the government to purchase services from social
organizations.''\62\ The central government reportedly has
allocated about 200 million yuan (US$32.08 million) to procure
services and training from NGOs in 2013, approximately the same
amount of funding allocated in 2012.\63\
Some civil society advocates have raised concerns that
direct registration and the expansion of government procurement
of public services from NGOs will not necessarily benefit
grassroots (caogen) NGOs. NGOs unable to register as social
organizations are ineligible for government contracts, tax-
exempt status, and public fundraising, among other possible
benefits of formal registration.\64\ Some grassroots NGOs in
Foshan city, Guangdong province, for example, believe that
eligibility requirements for government procurement projects
are too difficult to meet, current policy is unclear, and
communication channels are lacking.\65\ In an analysis of 60
grassroots organizations in 2011 and 2012, scholars from the
Chinese University of Hong Kong speculated that grassroots NGOs
may be ``further marginalized by losing out in the new game of
competing for official funding and support.''\66\
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CHARITY SECTOR
Chinese legal scholars have identified ``conspicuous
problems'' in the regulatory framework for charities, despite
central and local government efforts in 2012 to improve
transparency and accountability.\67\ These problems, such as a
lack of a ``[legal] definition and identity'' for charitable
organizations or uniform legal rules in fundraising; haphazard
approaches to handling volunteers and their services; a high
threshold for charitable organizations' registration and
management; and a tax exemption policy without supporting
mechanisms for implementation,\68\ have hindered the
development of the charitable sector.\69\ Registration for
religious organizations, many of which have made charitable
contributions to disaster relief and poverty alleviation,
remains a ``forbidden zone,'' according to a scholar from Anhui
province.\70\ A national charity law has been on the State
Council and National People's Congress legislative agenda for
several years\71\ and China's state-run media agency Xinhua
reported in December 2012 that a draft is under way.\72\ The
Commission has not observed official announcements on a
timeframe for the Charity Law's completion. Wang Zhenyao,
director of the Philanthropy Research Institute at Beijing
Normal University, has recommended that the draft be made
public in order to benefit from public opinion.\73\
Reports of financial mismanagement at the Red Cross of
China\74\ and other state-run foundations\75\ since the 2008
earthquake in Sichuan province have diminished the credibility
of China's
government-run charitable organizations,\76\ and prompted calls
for stronger regulation of the charitable sector.\77\ Official
statistics from the Ministry of Civil Affairs China Charity
Donation Information Center showed an almost 20 percent overall
reduction in charitable donations in 2012 from 2011.\78\
Despite information disclosure regulations, 60 percent of
China's foundations reportedly ``failed to make public their
annual financial report, although they are legally obliged to
do so.''\79\ In the wake of the April 2013 earthquake in Ya'an
city, Sichuan province, public debates on the lack of
transparency and accountability in state-run charities
reportedly led to the Hong Kong Legislative Council's initial
refusal to donate HKD100 million (US$12,887,300)\80\ to relief
efforts and to Hong
Kongers'launchofa``NotOneCent''campaign.\81\ ``Non-
governmental'' charitable organizations have benefited from
government-run charities' credibility crisis;\82\ the Global
Times, an English-language arm of China's state-run media
agency Xinhua, reported that in the days after the Ya'an
earthquake, donations to a private foundation were more than 10
million yuan (US$1,592,230) compared to 30,000 yuan (US$4,783)
donated to the Red Cross of China.\83\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
HIV/AIDS Grassroots Organizations
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
China's grassroots (caogen) organizations working on HIV/AIDS issues
are of particular relevance during the 2013 reporting year in light of
the cessation of major international funding from The Global Fund to
Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (The Global Fund) at the close of
2013.\84\ Grassroots NGOs have played a significant role in China in
HIV/AIDS health prevention and control, and the protection of the legal
rights of people living with HIV/AIDS (PLWHA), yet UNAIDS reported in
2012 that ``to date, only a small fraction of HIV [NGOs] have legal
status.''\85\ Although The Global Fund spurred the Chinese government
to engage more deeply with domestic civil society organizations over
the past decade,\86\ resulting in some successful cooperation between
the government and grassroots organizations,\87\ grassroots HIV/AIDS
NGOs reportedly are ``heavily dependent'' on funding from international
organizations.\88\ The government gradually has acknowledged the
importance of HIV/AIDS non-governmental organizations,\89\ notably on
November 26, 2012, when then-Vice Premier Li Keqiang met with HIV/AIDS
NGO representatives\90\ and reportedly stated ``non-governmental
organizations, `grassroots organizations,' best understand the
conditions and needs of PLWHA'' and play an ``indispensable'' role in
the fight against HIV/AIDS.\91\ An October 2012 report from The Global
Fund, however, raised concerns that ``there is still no strong and
sustainable national funding mechanism or technical support for
ensuring service quality is in place to support CBOs [community-based
organizations].''\92\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Institutions Of Democratic Governance
18th Party Congress: Leadership Transition, Party Constitution
Amendment, and Reform
During the Commission's 2013 reporting year, a major
political power succession took place within the Chinese
Communist Party, which happens at 10-year intervals.\1\ This
top leadership transition, timed with the 18th National
Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in November 2012,
involved the extensive turnover of power to a slightly younger
cohort\2\ of political leaders in a non-transparent process.\3\
Propaganda officials dictated how news outlets were to cover
the 18th Party Congress and the transfer of power.\4\ Some
international scholars called the transition peaceful and
orderly, and a ``step forward in the institutionalization of
Chinese leadership politics.''\5\ The transition took place
amid factional struggles and a scandal resulting in the
downfall of Bo Xilai, a high-ranking official many believed was
in contention for a top leadership position, and his wife Gu
Kailai.\6\ [See Corruption and Anticorruption Measures in this
section.] One international scholar believes the transition
denoted an advance in the ``institutionalization of leadership
politics,'' and reinforced collective leadership at the top of
the Party, meaning Xi Jinping--Party General Secretary,
President, and Chairman of the Military Commission--is the
``first among equals.''\7\ The former Prime Minister of
Australia believed that Xi would be a strong leader and a key
political player.\8\ Xi appeared to act quickly in the first
few months to move forward with his agenda and leadership
style,\9\ although some sources point out that retired Chinese
leaders still may play a role in political affairs.\10\
At the 18th Party Congress, Party leaders also passed a
resolution\11\ to amend the Party constitution to include the
following revisions, among others:\12\
To uphold ``scientific development'' (former
Party General Secretary Hu Jintao's socio-economic
theory that ``puts people first and calls for
comprehensive, balanced and sustainable
development''\13\) as a guiding ideology;
To adhere to the idea that ``the fundamental
reason behind all of China's achievements and progress
since the reform and opening up policy was introduced
is, in the final analysis, that the Party has blazed a
path of socialism with Chinese characteristics . . .
.''
Some international and Chinese scholars, journalists, and
commentators believe that under the new echelon of top leaders,
the prospects for political reform in China appear dim,
although there is some variance of opinion,\14\ and some note
that it is too early to tell.\15\ In speeches, leaders have
defended the Party's hold on power,\16\ promised to combat
corruption,\17\ pledged to make the government more
efficient,\18\ and vowed to promote the ``China dream,'' which
includes ``national rejuvenation'' and a more pronounced role
for China in the international arena.\19\ While early in 2013,
Xi Jinping reportedly emphasized that ``no organization or
individual should be put above the constitution and the
law,''\20\ he also ``demanded a return to traditional Leninist
discipline'' in a talk in a private setting.\21\ Xi said the
Party should be able ``to put up with'' criticism and correct
mistakes,\22\ but he also urged officials not to ``allow any
subversive errors when it comes to the fundamental
issues.''\23\ An international scholar pointed out that
authorities appear not to have abandoned the Party's
fundamental Maoist approach to divide people into the vague and
undefined categories of friend or foe and to deal with
perceived enemies harshly,\24\ which may lead to the abuse of
authority.
New Government Leadership and Government Structural Reform
After the fall 2012 political power transition within the
Party, the new cohort of top Party leaders assumed the most
senior posts in the government in March 2013 during the
National People's Congress (NPC) and the Chinese People's
Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) meetings (Two
Sessions).\25\ During the Two Sessions, Chinese leaders also
passed a plan for a major reshuffling of State Council
institutions and a ``transformation of government functions,''
after the plan had been approved by the Party Central Committee
in November 2012.\26\ Authorities provided numerous reasons for
the restructuring, including:\27\
Improving government efficiency;
Reducing special transfer payments and fee
collections;
Eliminating overlapping government
responsibilities;
Pushing forward reform toward ``super
ministries''; and
Reducing micro-management.
At the heart of the reforms are plans to complete 72
changes to government functions and other tasks,\28\ which are
assigned to specific government organizations for completion
over the next three to five years.\29\ As part of the plan,
authorities made the following major changes:\30\
Reduced by 2 the number of ministries and
commissions that make up the State Council, bringing
the total to 25, and reduced by 2 the number of other
ministerial-level organs;
Separated the commercial and non-commercial
aspects of managing China's railways;
Merged the National Population and Family
Planning Commission and the Ministry of Health into a
new National Health and Family Planning Commission;
Established the State Food and Drug
Supervision and Management Administration; and
Reorganized the National Oceanic
Administration and the National Energy Administration.
Reach of the State Under One-Party Rule
China's political institutions continue to be out of
compliance with the standards defined in Article 25 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,\31\ which
China has signed and declared an intention to ratify;\32\ nor
have Chinese officials complied with the standards outlined in
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.\33\
The Communist Party continues to dominate political
affairs, allows only limited independent political
participation, and exerts control over the courts,\34\ the NPC,
the media,\35\ and state leadership appointments.\36\ For
example, this can be seen at the NPC meeting this year where
nearly 35 percent of the delegates concurrently held positions
as leading officials in the Party and government.\37\ In
another example, in September 2012, centralParty leaders issued
anopinion thatmay further strengthen the Party's control over
human resources affairs.\38\ Party-building and Party-loyalty
efforts focused on accounting firms,\39\ the People's Armed
Police,\40\ and Internet companies, such as the Sina
Corporation.\41\
The Party also exerts influence over non-governmental and
quasi-governmental organizations, including university student
groups,\42\ in part through its Party-building efforts within
these organizations, as well as by establishing its own Party-
organized social organizations.\43\ For example, various Party
organizations in different locations over the last few years
have established, are running, or are supporting ``social
affairs (or work) committees''\44\ and Party-sponsored
community service and nonprofit organizations, among
others.\45\ Through these organizations, the Party may engage
in the monitoring of groups and activities.\46\
In addition, developments suggest the Party is exerting
more effort to control the ideological realm. In April, the
Office of the Party Central Committee reportedly issued a
circular to select Party officials around China, titled
Document No. 9, which discusses seven ideological threats to
the Party's grip on power that ``require attention.''\47\ These
threats are preaching about Western constitutional democracy,
universal values, civil society, neo-liberalism, journalistic
freedom, historical nihilism--negating the history of the
Party, and questioning socialism with Chinese
characteristics.\48\ One account of the circular said officials
need to ``cut off at the source channels for disseminating
erroneous currents of thought.''\49\ In addition, state media
suggests that the Party believes China is in a ``struggle in
the ideological sphere''\50\ and the Party has initiated an
ideological ``rectification campaign.''\51\ For example, in May
and August 2013, a wave of articles, which one report
considered to have some powerful political backing, appeared on
the Internet attacking constitutionalism, after other articles
were posted that had more positive views of
constitutionalism.\52\ Also in May, Party and education leaders
jointly issued an additional opinion with 16 requirements to
``strengthen the ranks of young university teachers and improve
(their) ideological and political qualities . . . .''\53\
``Social Stability'' and ``Social Risk Assessments''
In August 2012, to prevent and resolve ``social
contradictions''\54\ and apparently to ``maintain social
stability,'' the National Development and Reform Commission
(NDRC) issued a provisional measure that stipulates central and
provincial authorities should establish and utilize ``social
stability risk assessment'' mechanisms to investigate and
analyze the ``social stability'' risks associated with large-
scale fixed asset investment projects that affect the interests
of citizens.\55\ If implemented, the NDRC will not examine and
approve projects assessed to be of medium or high social
risk.\56\ In Nanjing municipality, enterprises reportedly do
their own assessment reports for their own projects and send
them to the government for examination and approval.\57\
Nanjing officials reportedly conduct these assessments for 700
to 900 ``incidents'' or projects annually.\58\
Official Actions Against Democracy Advocates
During the reporting period, authorities detained or
arrested more than 60 citizens\59\ exercising their right to
freedom of speech, association, and assembly, some of whom
reportedly associated themselves with the New Citizens'
Movement. The New Citizens' Movement is a loose network of
individuals promoting a broad range of ideas including legal
and political reforms, human rights, and social justice.\60\
Some people who associated themselves with the Movement
assembled in groups for meals and engaged in advocacy or
peaceful demonstration activities.\61\ One international non-
governmental organization linked these detentions and arrests
with a notice issued by the Supreme People's Procuratorate
calling on prosecutors to combat activities construed as
``unlawful assembly and gathering a crowd to disrupt social
order,'' which are associated with the ``goal of subverting
state power.''\62\ Another news article linked these detentions
to the central Party Document No. 9 issued in April, which
reportedly says activists ``have stirred up trouble about
disclosing officials' assets, using the Internet to fight
corruption, media controls and other sensitive topics, to
provoke discontent with the party and government.''\63\ [See
Official Corruption and Anticorruption Measures in this
section.] Authorities also continued to harass, detain, and
impose prison sentences on democracy advocates and their
families who exercised their rights to freedoms of speech,
assembly, association, and demonstration. A list of
representative cases follows:
Democracy advocate Zhu Yufu, jailed in
February 2012 for ``inciting subversion of state
power,'' reportedly is seriously ill, but authorities
have denied him access to medicine and turned down
repeated requests for medical parole.\64\ Reports also
suggest Zhu may be being abused in prison.\65\
Officials reportedly have kept some members of Zhu's
family under surveillance, and harassed and warned them
to keep quiet about Zhu's case.\66\
In December 2012, villagers Song Jianzhong,
Luo Yonghong, Ma Zhizheng, Hao Sen, Zhao Daqing, Zhao
Zhenhai, and Ma Huimei lost their court case contesting
their sentences imposed in relation to 2010 protests
against alleged voting irregularities in a village
committee election in Raolefu, a village in suburban
Beijing. On appeal, however, the court reduced their
prison terms.\67\ Authorities also changed the charges
against them from ``gathering to assault state organs''
to the lesser crime of ``gathering to disturb social
order.''\68\
In October 2012, court officials sentenced Cao
Haibo, an Internet cafe owner in Kunming municipality,
Yunnan province, who founded an online discussion group
that discussed democracy and constitutionalism, to
eight years in prison on the charge of ``subversion of
state power.''\69\ The case involved questionable legal
procedures and officials warned Cao's wife not to talk
about her husband's situation.\70\
Authorities indicted democracy advocate Liu
Benqi in March 2013 on the charge of ``inciting
subversion of state power.''\71\ Reports asserted he
had been tortured and abused while in detention.\72\ In
addition, authorities ordered Liu Benqi's ex-wife, Liu
Ying, to serve one year of reeducation through labor,
possibly in connection to her conversations with
international media about her ex-husband's case.\73\
In addition, officials restricted the movements of,
harassed, or beat up several other democracy and human rights
advocates, including Guizhou province resident Liao
Shuangyuan.\74\ Yao Lifa, an independent elections advocate,
went missing on March 4 for more than 13 days and authorities
reportedly have restricted his movements since February
2013.\75\ Officials also intimidated or detained family members
of other advocates, including Zhang Anni, the daughter of
democracy activist Zhang Lin.\76\ In July, authorities
criminally detained Zhang Lin on charges of ``gathering a crowd
to disrupt social order'' and questioned him about who was
organizing and funding rights defender activities on behalf of
his daughter.\77\ In August, authorities formally arrested
Zhang on the same charge.\78\
Party and Government Accountability and Transparency
LIMITS OF TRANSPARENCY AND OPEN GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS
While top Chinese leaders have voiced support for greater
transparency, citizens continue to face challenges in accessing
government information. In a speech in March 2013, Premier Li
Keqiang reportedly raised six demands for anticorruption and
clean government work for 2013, including open government
affairs and making the exercise of authority transparent.\79\
Some ministries and local governments reportedly improved
communications with the public,\80\ but according to one
Chinese research institute's report, several problems persist,
including officials who do not proactively offer information,
do not provide information when rules say they should, or do
not provide full information.\81\ In October 2012, the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs (MFA) denied a request under the Open
Government Information (OGI) regulation regarding China's
report for its UN Human Rights Council Universal Periodic
Review (UPR) in October 2013, saying some of the information
was ``secret'' and not ``suited'' to be released.\82\ Beijing
resident Shi Hongping tried to sue the MFA, but the Beijing
Municipal No. 2 Intermediate People's Court refused to accept
the case on the grounds that submitting a report for the UPR is
a diplomatic action involving foreign affairs and legislation
dictates that courts ``cannot accept litigation brought by
citizens against state actors [in areas] such as national
defense and foreign affairs.''\83\ Authorities also reportedly
harassed, prevented from leaving their homes, or detained
individuals seeking information about the formulation of
China's second National Human Rights Action Plan (2012-2015)
(HRAP).\84\ Authorities eventually lifted the restrictions on
all of these individuals except for Peng Lanlan, whom they
formally arrested on charges of ``obstructing official
business'' and held in detention for a year before releasing
her.\85\ Peng surveyed petitioners for their opinions about
human rights conditions in China and collected signatures as
part of the OGI application for information about the HRAP.\86\
PEOPLE'S CONGRESSES
Towards the end of 2012, China completed the most recent
cycle of direct elections for local people's congress
delegates. During the election cycle the Internet provided a
new platform for ``independent candidates,'' but authorities
took a variety of steps to suppress their election efforts. At
the lowest administrative levels, including the county and
township levels, citizens, in theory, directly vote for
people's congress delegates.\87\ Above this level, people's
congresses elect delegates for congresses at the next highest
level.\88\ Ten or more citizens may nominate ``independent
candidates,'' otherwise known as ``voter-nominated''
candidates.\89\ One source reported that during the 2011-2012
election cycle there were thousands of independent candidates,
known partially because of their presence on the Internet.\90\
Reports surfaced, however, noting that authorities in some
locations did not accept the nomination of some of these
``voter-nominated'' candidates.\91\ In this election cycle, as
in previous cycles, large numbers of ``independent candidates''
were winnowed out, leaving few to compete in elections.\92\ One
source considers this cycle of elections the darkest (for
independent candidates) in the last 30 years.\93\
In 2012, Chinese authorities issued a draft decision with
numerical requirements related to characteristics of delegates
to be chosen for the 12th National People's Congress in March
2013. Four main goals reportedly guided the numerical
requirements for the composition of the Congresses' delegates:
equity among rural and urban areas, equity among regions,
equity among nationalities, and that they ``should be broadly
representative'' and ``include an appropriate number of
grassroots, worker, farmer, and intellectual delegates.''\94\
The resulting composition of the Congress's delegates roughly
mirror the requirements.\95\ For example, the numerical
requirement for delegates from minority populations was
``around 12 percent'' with at least one delegate from each of
China's official minority groups.\96\ After selection processes
were completed, nearly 13.7 percent of the delegates were from
minority populations and all 55 of the minority groups were
represented.\97\ The percentages of ``front line workers and
farmers, and professional and technical delegates'' were slated
to increase, which they did by over 5 and 1.2 percent
respectively.\98\
This year at the meetings of the National People's Congress
and Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (Two
Sessions), delegates voted on six work reports and overall,
there were 30 percent more negative votes for all of the
reports combined than there were last year.\99\ In one example,
out of 2,948 delegates, 120 delegates abstained from voting on
the work report of the Supreme People's Court and 605 delegates
voted to oppose the report, which received the highest number
of negative votes during the Two Sessions.\100\
GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY
Authorities are drafting or have passed national laws that
regulate when and how citizens may hold authorities
accountable. Work to discuss and revise the PRC Administrative
Litigation Law\101\ is ongoing and the State Council work plan
for the upcoming year reportedly includes the task of reviewing
the PRC Administrative Reconsideration Law.\102\
During the reporting period, the State Council issued plans
to improve top-down accountability systems and strengthen
administrative enforcement of laws and regulations. In April,
the State Council issued an opinion that included the goal of
``improving a system to constrain and supervise the operation
of authority.''\103\ The State Council also reported that it
took steps to strengthen evaluations of local governments and
officials, incorporated administrative work into the
comprehensive government work assessment systems, and
``guided'' local governments and ministries to introduce
administrative ``enforcement responsibility systems.''\104\
In line with these goals, central authorities continued to
take steps to promote the use of only legal and standardized
``red letter documents'' (``hongtou wenjian'')--rules issued by
local governments.\105\ During 2012, the State Council
reportedly registered 1,393 regulations and rules of local
congresses, governments, and departments, and took steps to
resolve conflicts between the local rules and major laws.\106\
One international academic report noted that citizens have the
right to request a review of legislative conflicts, but
relevant agencies have not formally responded to such
requests.\107\ In some cases, however, central authorities
reportedly have reacted by amending the regulations in
question, by making statements in the media about the requests,
or by inviting the citizens who made the request to participate
in consultations.\108\
OFFICIAL CORRUPTION AND ANTICORRUPTION MEASURES
Chinese leaders\109\ and citizens\110\ continued to express
concern about official corruption, and some foreign and local
business people reportedly believe China's legal environment
has deteriorated.\111\ Top leaders link the Party's legitimacy
to its ability to manage corruption. In a speech to the Central
Committee on November 19, 2012, President Xi Jinping said,
``facts have shown that if corruption becomes increasingly
severe, it will ultimately lead to the ruin of the Party and
the country!'' and ``[c]orruption was among the most important
of the reasons'' for ``social contradictions'' leading to
social unrest and the collapse of political power in some
countries.\112\ The corruption case against Bo Xilai, former
Party Central Political Bureau member and Chongqing Party
Secretary, who was charged with bribery, embezzlement, and
abuse of power, opened for trial on August 22, 2013.\113\ On
September 22, 2013, the Jinan Municipal People's Intermediate
Court, Shandong province, sentenced Bo to life imprisonment,
deprivation of political rights for life, mandatory return of
specified stolen monies, and confiscation of all personal
assets.\114\ Authorities reportedly denied Bo his choice of a
lawyer and he was held by Party disciplinary officials for
months under shuanggui,\115\ a form of arbitrary detention
utilized by the Party to investigate officials.\116\
Authorities continued to highlight anticorruption efforts
and to issue regulatory measures to curb corruption. Premier Li
Keqiang reportedly indicated that anticorruption work would be
included in local government, administrative departments, and
leading cadre performance evaluations.\117\ In addition, in
November 2012, procuratorate provisions included a new standard
for the crime of ``especially serious bribery,'' and stipulated
heavier sentences for this crime.\118\ In January 2013, two
judicial interpretations issued jointly by the Supreme People's
Court and the Supreme People's Procuratorate came into force;
one regarding the application of the law in handling criminal
bribery cases,\119\ and the other an interpretation on the
handling of dereliction of duty criminal cases, which
reportedly clarified the standards for categorizing specific
crimes.\120\
SUPPRESSION OF WHISTLEBLOWERS & DEMANDS FOR DISCLOSURE OF OFFICIALS'
ASSETS
During the reporting period, officials have detained a
number of online corruption whistleblowers\121\ and have had
little tolerance for citizens and non-governmental
organizations in various locations that have expressed demands
for disclosure of officials' assets. As of mid-September 2013,
officials in various locations reportedly had detained nearly
60 people who participated in petition drives or demonstrations
calling for more transparency of government officials'
finances, who called for the release of detained advocates, or
who engaged in other related political advocacy efforts, and
authorities formally arrested 29 of those people.\122\
Information on some of those cases follows:
In November 2012, a group of petitioners sent
a letter to former Premier Wen Jiabao asking him to
disclose his financial assets. At least one of the
petitioners reported being locked in a detention center
in Beijing municipality for 40 days for signing the
letter.\123\
In December 2012, more than 2,000 people took
to the streets of Shanghai municipality calling on
officials to disclose their personal assets, income,
and investments, as well as those of their spouses and
children.\124\
Officials detained anticorruption advocates
Sun Hanhui and Ding Jiaxi,\125\ who reportedly were
involved in collecting thousands of signatures for an
open letter to the National People's Congress, urging
members of the Party Central Committee to disclose to
the public their family assets to reassure citizens
that they are not corrupt.\126\ Authorities reportedly
censored the letter and deleted blog postings by the
organizers.\127\
In late March, Beijing officials criminally
detained anticorruption advocates Hou Xin, Yuan Dong,
Zhang Baocheng, and Ma Xinli on suspicion of ``unlawful
assembly'' for unfurling a banner with anticorruption
slogans in a busy shopping area along with a number of
other people.\128\ Authorities later released Hou Xin
on bail pending investigation.\129\
In April, officials detained other
anticorruption advocates, including Zhao Changqing and
Wang Yonghong, on suspicion of ``unlawful
assembly,''\130\ and Li Wei, another anticorruption
advocate.\131\ In response, individuals and a group
issued open letters demanding that authorities release
the anticorruption advocates.\132\ In addition, public
security personnel detained former independent people's
congress candidate Liu Ping and in July indicted Liu on
charges of ``unlawful assembly,'' ``gathering a crowd
to disrupt public order,'' and ``using a cult to damage
enforcement of the law.''\133\
Despite strong public demand for disclosure of officials'
finances,\134\ some of China's elite appear to be resistant to
moving forward with requirements for top officials to disclose
their assets.\135\ One member of the Central Commission for
Discipline Inspection reportedly pointed to the extensive
wealth of officials and noted that ``to publicize any of them
would lead to public anger.''\136\ A limited number of
locations have initiated pilot projects wherein officials
disclose their assets within the Party or to their own
organizations, but rarely to the public at large.\137\ Many
local governments and administrative institutions also have not
disclosed information on expenditures for overseas trips,
official receptions and entertainment, and vehicles, otherwise
known as the ``three publics,'' despite requirements to do
so.\138\
Commercial Rule of Law
During the Commission's 2013 reporting year, the Chinese
government and Communist Party continued to promote and develop
a state-led growth model, 12 years after China's accession to
the World Trade Organization (WTO) and 5 years after the onset
of the global financial crisis. Authorities encouraged national
coordination of overseas investment activity, including
targeted investment in industries they deemed strategic, and
China's state-owned enterprises continued to play a leading
role in that investment activity. Authorities implemented
banking reforms, although state-owned enterprises maintained
preferential access to loans. China's currency--the yuan--
appreciated during the past year, but it remained undervalued,
and the Chinese government continued to interfere with the
exchange rate. The United States and other countries continued
to pursue action against China through WTO mechanisms, and
China faced allegations of trade violations, including
antidumping and countervailing duties and subsidies
inconsistent with its WTO obligations. Intellectual property
rights violations, including state-authorized theft of trade
secrets, remained a significant issue of concern this past
year, and problems with the rule of law contributed to ongoing
food and product safety problems, including the cross-border
movement of hazardous and illegal products.
Outbound Investment
China's outbound investment continued to grow during the
Commission's 2013 reporting year, setting new records. Based on
data provided by the Heritage Foundation, China's outbound
investment grew by an average of 39.59 percent per year from
2005 to 2012,\1\ reaching a record annual high of US$79.7
billion in 2012.\2\ Some sources reportedly estimated different
outbound investment figures for 2012;\3\ for example, the
Economist Intelligence Unit estimated a figure of US$115
billion in 2012.\4\ According to the same Economist
Intelligence Unit report, from 2011 to 2012, China's outbound
investment (excluding tax havens) jumped from 16th place to 3rd
place worldwide, behind the United States and Japan.\5\
The Chinese government and Communist Party continued to
encourage state-led coordination of overseas investment
activity as part of a policy authorities commonly referred to
as the ``go out'' strategy (``zou chu qu'' zhanlue). As GDP
growth in China has largely slowed since 2007,\6\ authorities
have encouraged Chinese businesses to invest abroad in part as
a way to increase opportunities for Chinese enterprises to move
up the value chain.\7\ In a January 2013 Caixin article, Yi
Gang--Deputy Governor of the People's Bank of China\8\ and
Administrator of the State Administration of Foreign
Exchange\9\--said that the ``go out'' strategy ``was elevated
to the level of national strategy'' between 2000 and 2008, and
that, beginning in 2008, the ``go out'' strategy became a way
to guard against the vulnerability of China's export-led growth
model and take advantage of cheaper, post-financial crisis
assets in developed countries.\10\ Yi added that Chinese
enterprises should ``be low profile . . . and minimize the
appearance of government involvement to avoid policy resistance
and barriers to approval.''\11\ The 12th Five-Year Plan on
National Economic and Social Development (``12th Five-Year
Plan'')--a Party-initiated plan that outlines broadly, inter
alia, strategies for economic growth for the period from 2011
to 2015\12\--outlined the ``go out'' strategy at the national
level.\13\ State-owned enterprises continued to account for the
majority of China's overseas investment,\14\ although the role
of private enterprises reportedly increased last year.\15\
The government and Party also continued to emphasize the
importance of investment abroad in certain ``strategic''
industries this past year. The 12th Five-Year Plan noted the
importance of ``fostering the development of strategic emerging
industries,''\16\ such as new information technology and new
energy,\17\ as well as the importance of overseas investment
generally in energy resources, technology, and ``famous
brands.''\18\ According to state-run broadcaster China Central
Television, Chen Yuan, Vice Chairman of the Chinese People's
Political Consultative Conference,\19\ Chairman and Party
Secretary of the China Development Bank,\20\ and head of the
China Enterprises Investment Association (CEIA)\21\--an
organization that operates under the ``guidance and
supervision'' of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and the
Ministry of Civil Affairs\22\--emphasized at a December 2012
CEIA meeting that sectors such as energy, mining, electricity,
telecommunications, petrochemicals, and machinery manufacturing
were important.\23\ Chinese enterprises reportedly continued to
seek investment opportunities abroad in at least some of the
above sectors this past year.\24\ In 2012, China invested more
money overseas in the energy sector than in any other
sector,\25\ followed by the metals sector.\26\ In April 2013,
China signed a free-trade agreement with Iceland,\27\ a
development that some sources described as an attempt to gain
access to energy reserves, rare earths and other minerals, and
strategic shipping lanes.\28\
State-controlled organizations continued to offer
preferential terms for investment and export project financing
in locations around the world this past year. In July 2012
testimony before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Fred Hochberg, Chairman and President of the Export-Import Bank
of the United States, argued that the state-owned Export-Import
Bank of China\29\ (``China Exim Bank'') was able to create an
uneven ``playing field'' in Africa in part by offering
financing on ``terms and conditions better than commercial
banks''\30\ and by requiring ``preferential access to natural
resources'' in the host country in return for financing.\31\
This past year, construction continued on a reported US$5
billion project to build a city near Minsk, the capital of
Belarus, for which Chinese authorities agreed to provide low-
interest financing.\32\ Both China Exim Bank and the China
Development Bank--which operates under the State Council\33\--
reportedly agreed to provide financing for the project.\34\ One
former Belarusian official reportedly said that Chinese
authorities agreed to provide low-interest financing on the
condition that half the value of that financing was spent on
Chinese materials, technology, or labor.\35\ The same former
official said, ``The loan conditions are highly advantageous .
. . . It doesn't make sense for us to even consider financing
from other banks.''\36\
Financial Reforms
This past year, authorities took measures to reform China's
banking system, which continued to give state-owned enterprises
(SOEs) preferential access to loans. For example, in late July
2013, the People's Bank of China (PBOC) removed a lower limit
on loan interest rates,\37\ but it maintained an upper limit on
interest rates payable to depositors.\38\ Chinese and non-
Chinese media noted that this combination of policies could
allow SOEs--who reportedly already enjoyed preferential access
to loans compared to smaller borrowers\39\--to secure cheaper
loans, as well as reduce the profits of smaller banks and
constrain the ability of households to accumulate savings.\40\
Faced with difficulties securing financing, some smaller
businesses in recent years reportedly have relied on lending
outside the regulated banking system,\41\ some forms of which
are referred to as ``shadow banking.''\42\ A May 2013 report by
JPMorgan Chase Bank, Hong Kong, estimated ``shadow banking'' in
China at 69 percent of GDP and 27 percent of bank assets at the
end of 2012.\43\ In some cases, small businesses that turned to
loans outside the regulated banking system paid significantly
higher rates than those with access to formal bank loans.\44\
For example, one financial analyst estimated that small
businesses pay a premium of 20 to 30 percent over a base
lending rate, while state-owned borrowers typically borrow at a
discount from the base rate.\45\
In a July 28, 2013, announcement, the National Audit Office
said that it would ``organize auditing offices nationwide to
conduct auditing of government debt.''\46\ The announcement did
not elaborate further, but according to international media
sources, the audit may reflect official concerns over debt held
by SOEs and local governments,\47\ which some sources estimated
at US$2 trillion to US$3 trillion.\48\ From late 2008 to August
2013, authorities reportedly made ``[US$6.2] trillion of bank
loans available to state-owned companies and local
governments.''\49\ In one case, in early August 2013, the
state-owned Agricultural Bank of China reportedly agreed to
lend 250 billion yuan (US$40.8 billion)\50\ to Shanghai
municipality.\51\ According to unidentified sources reportedly
within the Shanghai city government, the loan was part of an
``unofficial economic stimulus'' that would support projects
including the establishment of a Disneyland theme park and a
``free-trade zone'' in Shanghai.\52\ Many local governments,
which retain 25 percent of value-added tax revenue--75 percent
goes to the central government--and whose officials depend on
economic growth for political success, reportedly continued to
borrow heavily to finance local development projects without
devising plans to avoid default.\53\
Foreign Exchange Control
The yuan remained undervalued this past year, despite an
increase in its value and calls by Chinese authorities to
liberalize exchange rate controls. In an April 2013 report, the
U.S. Treasury Department said that the yuan ``remains
significantly undervalued''\54\ and that the ``process of
exchange rate adjustment remains incomplete,''\55\ although the
yuan reportedly appreciated against the U.S. dollar this past
year.\56\ The Wall Street Journal reported that the yuan
appreciated 1 percent against the U.S. dollar in 2012 and 1.6
percent from January to May 2013.\57\ In a report to the
National People's Congress in March 2013, then-Premier Wen
Jiabao said that the government ``should steadily carry out
reforms to make interest rates and the RMB exchange rate more
market-based,''\58\ but exchange rate policy this past year did
not necessarily reflect a more market-based approach. For
example, the U.S. Treasury Department cited accumulations of
foreign exchange reserves--reportedly US$34.7 billion in the
fourth quarter of 2012\59\ and US$128 billion in the first
quarter of 2013\60\--as signs of increasing Chinese government
intervention in the exchange rate.\61\ In March 2013, Xia Bin,
then-adviser to the People's Bank of China (PBOC)--the central
bank of China, which operates under the State Council\62\--
reportedly called for ``more power [for the PBOC] in the areas
of some short-term and specific monetary policy adjustment and
operations,''\63\ although he did not call for a more market-
based approach in these areas.
This past year, the State Administration of Foreign
Exchange (SAFE) issued the Circular Regarding Improving and
Adjusting Policies on the Management of Direct Investment and
Foreign Exchange,\64\ which loosened several aspects of foreign
exchange control in an attempt to facilitate trade and overseas
investment.\65\ For example, the circular removed the
requirement that SAFE approve the establishment of several
kinds of foreign exchange accounts,\66\ as well as the
requirement that SAFE approve the reinvestment of yuan revenues
by foreign investors.\67\ The circular also allowed foreign-
invested enterprises to make loans to their foreign parent
companies under certain conditions.\68\
China in the World Trade Organization
During this reporting year--more than a decade after
China's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO)\69\--
China continued to face allegations from multiple countries of
violations of its WTO obligations. Since its accession to the
WTO, China has been a respondent in 31 WTO Dispute Settlement
cases;\70\ this past year, the WTO found in favor of U.S.
claims in three cases that the United States brought against
China, as well European Union claims in one case that the
European Union brought against China.\71\ WTO panels found that
the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) had imposed antidumping and
countervailing duties on U.S. grain-oriented electrical steel,
U.S. chicken products, and European x-ray inspection equipment
in ways that were inconsistent with China's WTO
obligations.\72\ China did not appeal the findings in the
chicken case or x-ray case this past year;\73\ in the steel
case, the WTO's Appellate Body upheld the panel report's
findings in October 2012 upon appeal.\74\ A July 2013 MOFCOM
statement announced MOFCOM had ``re-examined some procedures
and physical issues, on which the original antidumping measures
and the original countervailing measures were based.''\75\ The
statement announced a revised set of antidumping and
countervailing duties on U.S. grain-oriented electrical steel,
but it did not identify or discuss the ``issues'' in the
original examination.\76\ In July 2012, the United States
requested consultations with China regarding antidumping and
countervailing duties affecting U.S. automobiles,\77\ while a
case involving alleged subsidies to Chinese manufacturers of
automobiles and automobile parts remained in consultations.\78\
In February 2013, the WTO Secretary General composed a panel to
consider the claims of the United States.\79\ In another case,
a WTO panel found that China acted inconsistently with its WTO
obligations by maintaining China UnionPay--a Chinese company--
as a monopoly supplier for yuan-denominated transactions with
bank cards issued in China and used in Hong Kong and Macau.\80\
According to the WTO, China reported in July 2013 that it had
``fully implemented'' the findings in this case, but the United
States ``did not agree'' and ``would monitor and review China's
actions.''\81\
China did not fulfill its notification obligations under
the WTO's Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
(SCM Agreement) this past year. The SCM Agreement requires WTO
members to submit notifications of their subsidies by June 30
of each year,\82\ but a February 2013 joint report by the
Office of the United States Trade Representative and the U.S.
Department of Commerce found that China's most recent
notification was in 2011, covering the period 2005 to 2008, and
was incomplete.\83\ On September 17, 2012, the United States
requested consultations with China regarding alleged subsidies
in the automobile and auto parts industries,\84\ including
``grants, reduced corporate income tax rates and low-cost
lending from state-owned banks.''\85\
Non-Chinese companies continued to report an unequal
business environment in China when competing against Chinese
companies. For example, according to a US-China Business
Council (USCBC) report from 2012, some U.S. companies surveyed
by the USCBC reported their Chinese competitors ``may have
preferential access from licensing approvals to government
contracts to financing and other areas, giving them a
competitive edge.''\86\ According to the USCBC, ``nearly half''
of U.S. companies surveyed reported that they ``see
protectionism in the way the administrative licensing process
is managed,''\87\ some reported that they experienced unequal
enforcement of laws when compared to Chinese companies,\88\ and
some reported they continued to face market access barriers in
the investment and service sectors.\89\ Such practices appear
to violate the core WTO principle of national treatment.\90\
[See Antitrust Developments below for discussion of possible
unequal treatment in pricing and bribery investigations.]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fifth U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chinese officials reportedly announced plans to undertake several new
commercial reforms during the fifth U.S.-China Strategic and Economic
Dialogue (``the Dialogue''), held in July 2013. For example, Chinese
officials pledged to negotiate a bilateral investment treaty (BIT) with
the United States and address market access issues in the
negotiations.\91\ Chinese officials reportedly committed to negotiate
using a ``negative list'' approach, through which China would begin
with a ``presumption of openness'' and then create exceptions to open
market access on a case-by-case basis.\92\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fifth U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue--Continued
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, Chinese officials reportedly pledged to include
``substantial improvements'' in their next offer to join the Government
Procurement Agreement (GPA), which they said they planned to submit
later in 2013.\93\ The GPA is a WTO agreement designed to increase
transparency in government procurement, prevent protection of domestic
products or suppliers, and prevent discrimination against foreign
products or suppliers.\94\ The United States, the European Union, and
other parties to the GPA previously called for several improvements to
China's proposal to join the GPA, including coverage for state-owned
enterprises, expanded coverage for businesses below the central-
government level, and lower thresholds for the application of non-
discrimination provisions.\95\ During the Dialogue, Chinese officials
reportedly said ``they would be responsive to U.S. requests [. . .] to
increase the coverage of sub-central entities in [the] new offer, and
[. . .] might lower the thresholds above which the GPA's non-
discrimination disciplines apply.''\96\ According to a May 2013 Global
Times article, the total government procurement market in China was an
estimated US$1 trillion, growing at over 20 percent per year.\97\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Intellectual Property Rights
The Chinese government continued to take steps to improve
intellectual property rights (IPR) protections this past year,
but weak protection and enforcement of IPR continued to
contribute to IPR violations. This past year, the State
Intellectual Property Office outlined broad guidelines for
protecting intellectual property (IP) as part of its 2013
National Intellectual Property Strategy,\98\ and the number of
civil and criminal IPR cases, as well as county-level courts
that can hear IPR cases, reportedly increased this past
year.\99\ IPR violations remained widespread, however. In a May
2013 report, the Commission on the Theft of American
Intellectual Property noted that efforts to improve IPR
protections were too slow to prevent increasing theft\100\ and
that Chinese policies encouraging the acquisition of technology
created incentives for IPR violations.\101\ According to the
same report, China accounted for an estimated 50 to 80 percent
of international IP theft.\102\ This year, China remained on
the Priority Watch List of the Office of the United States
Trade Representative (USTR),\103\ where it has been every year
since 2006.\104\ Countries on the Priority Watch List are the
``focus of increased bilateral attention'' regarding problems
with ``IPR protection, enforcement, or market access for
persons relying on intellectual property.''\105\ USTR noted
this past year that ``sales of IPR-intensive goods and services
in China remain disproportionately low when compared to sales
in similar markets that provide a stronger environment for IPR
protection and market access.''\106\
Theft of trade secrets, in some cases reportedly authorized
by the Chinese government, continued this past year. USTR noted
in its 2013 Special 301 Report that the theft of trade secrets
is a growing area of concern\107\ and that such theft continued
to occur in China through circumstances involving ``departing
employees, failed joint ventures, cyber intrusion and hacking,
and misuse of information submitted to government entities for
purposes of complying with regulatory obligations.''\108\ U.S.
information security company Mandiant noted in a February 2013
report that, since 2006, an organization operating under the
People's Liberation Army that the Mandiant report referred to
as ``Unit 61398''\109\ stole ``hundreds of terabytes of data
from at least 141 organizations''\110\--of which 115 were
located in the United States\111\--from a ``wide range of
industries.''\112\ The 12th Five-Year Plan on National Economic
and Social Development designated several industries as
``strategic emerging industries,''\113\ and the Mandiant report
noted that, of the seven industries in which Mandiant observed
cyber-attacks from Unit 61398, four matched those ``strategic
emerging industries.''\114\ [See Outbound Investment above for
more information.]
Chinese officials continued to use technology transfer as a
precondition for market access this past year. According to a
2013 report by the American Chamber of Commerce, in the
People's Republic of China, 35 percent of companies surveyed
reported they were ``still concerned about de facto technology
transfer as a requirement for market access.''\115\ The
percentage of survey respondents that said de facto
requirements for technology transfer were increasing rose from
27 percent in 2012 to 37 percent in 2013.\116\ Using technology
transfer as a precondition for certain forms of market access
violates commitments in China's Protocol of Accession to the
WTO\117\ and commitments that China reportedly made during the
23rd U.S.-China Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade in late
December 2012.\118\
The Chinese government continued to revise a wide variety
of IP laws and regulations this past year as part of a process
that USTR referred to as a ``sweeping legal reform
effort.''\119\ In January 2013, the State Council amended the
PRC Copyright Law Implementing Regulations,\120\ the
Information Network Broadcasting Rights Protection
Regulations,\121\ and the Computer Software Protection
Regulations,\122\ increasing the administrative penalties
authorized under each.\123\ The State Intellectual Property
Office (SIPO), National People's Congress Standing Committee,
and National Copyright Administration reportedly continued to
deliberate on draft amendments to the PRC Patent Law,\124\ PRC
Trademark Law,\125\ and PRC Copyright Law,\126\ respectively,
this past year. The draft amendment to the Trademark Law
contains provisions that require trademark applicants to adhere
to the ``principle of good faith,''\127\ and it increases
maximum damages in cases where violations are deemed
``serious.''\128\ The draft amendment to the Patent Law expands
the role of administrative authorities responsible for managing
patents. For example, under the proposed amendment,
administrative agencies would have the authority to investigate
cases of patent violations that ``allegedly disrupt market
order,''\129\ as well as additional authority to fine
perpetrators in certain cases.\130\ According to SIPO, granting
additional authority to administrative authorities would, among
other things, help reduce ``litigation fatigue''\131\ and high
costs\132\ associated with bringing patent infringement cases
to court. Some commentators, however, expressed concern that
the amendment would shift authority away from the courts to
administrative authorities. For example, Liu Chuntian,
Professor at the Renmin University of China Law School,\133\
reportedly said the proposed amendments might ``hurt the
balance of power and the rule of law. . . . If the
administrative agencies are given more power, then there is
some concern that the courts might become more like an
administrative agency instead of acting as an independent
judiciary.''\134\ Other examples of legislative reform include
SIPO's November 2012 publication for public comment of a draft
of the Service Invention Regulations\135\--designed to clarify
and protect the rights of inventors and their employers\136\--
and the State Administration for Industry and Commerce's August
2012 release of the fifth draft of the Guide on Antimonopoly
Enforcement in the Field of Intellectual Property Rights (the
Guide).\137\ The Commission did not observe an official draft
of the Guide, but according to the Legal Daily, the fifth draft
of the guide, inter alia, prohibits price fixing of products
with intellectual property by competing companies.\138\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Amendment to the Civil Procedure Law
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
An amendment to the PRC Civil Procedure Law took effect on January 1,
2013,\139\ and some expert commentators noted it could bring greater
clarity, transparency, and efficiency to commercial litigation and
arbitration in China.\140\ For example, the amended law requires courts
to write out judgments and rulings and explain in writing the reasoning
behind them;\141\ the amended law also provides that the public may
look up judgments and rulings, but not those that concern state
secrets, trade secrets, or personal privacy.\142\ In addition, the
amended law provides that parties to a dispute may apply to a court for
measures designed to preserve assets and evidence prior to litigation
or arbitration.\143\ The amended law also allows parties to apply to a
court to freeze the assets of another party or order another party to
take or not take certain actions in the event that a judgment will be
difficult to enforce or that one party's interests may be harmed;\144\
and it allows the courts to take such measures on their own, if
necessary.\145\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Antitrust Developments
This past year, the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) published
for public comment two new draft regulations--the Provisions on
Additional Restrictive Conditions for the Concentration of
Business Operators (``Restrictive Conditions Provisions'')\146\
and the Interim Provisions Regarding the Application of
Standards for Simple Cases of Concentration of Business
Operators (``Simple Cases Provisions'')\147\--both reportedly
designed to clarify and streamline merger review and approval
processes.\148\ This past year, expert commentators continued
to criticize the merger review and approval processes for being
long and for advancing industrial policy,\149\ and noted that
the two new provisions had shortcomings. For example, law firm
Clifford Chance noted in an April 2013 analysis that it is
unclear whether or not the Restrictive Conditions Provisions
will shorten the merger review process, given that in at least
two recent cases reviews have exceeded statutory limits.\150\
The Simple Cases Provisions outline criteria by which MOFCOM
may or may not classify certain kinds of mergers as ``simple
cases,''\151\ but, as law firm Herbert Smith Freehills noted in
a May 2013 analysis, the Simple Cases Provisions do not provide
guidelines for the treatment of cases after they are classified
as ``simple cases.''\152\
This past year, the National Development and Reform
Commission (NDRC) imposed penalties on companies operating
outside of China, reportedly the first time it had done
so.\153\ On January 4, 2013, the NDRC reported that it had
fined six companies a total of 353 million yuan (US$56.5
million)\154\ for participating in a cartel (``LCD Cartel'') to
fix prices of liquid crystal display (LCD) screens sold into
the Chinese market.\155\ According to the NDRC report, during
the period from 2001 to 2006, representatives of the six
companies--LG and Samsung of South Korea and Chimei, AU
Optronics, Chunghwa Picture Tubes, and Hannstar of Taiwan--met
in Taiwan and South Korea a total of 53 times to exchange
information on the worldwide LCD market and to set prices for
LCD screens.\156\ The NDRC reported that it brought the action
against the LCD Cartel under the 1998 PRC Pricing Law\157\--
which covers collusion to manipulate market prices\158\--rather
than the 2008 PRC Antimonopoly Law,\159\ because the
Antimonopoly Law did not come into effect until 2008,\160\
after the activities in question allegedly took place.
The NDRC action raised certain issues concerning the NDRC's
adherence to the letter of the law. For example, Article 2 of
the Pricing Law provides that it shall apply to pricing acts
carried out inside China.\161\ The Pricing Law does not forbid
extraterritorial application, but it does not provide for such
extraterritoriality. In addition, under the PRC Administrative
Punishment Law, the applicable statute of limitations within
which authorities would have needed to take action is two
years,\162\ but the NDRC brought this action long after the
conduct occurred. Regarding when the limitation period begins
if the conduct has not been discovered, antitrust lawyer Marc
Waha reportedly said, ``At least in other legal systems, when
one speaks of a two year limitation period you are talking
about a four year maximum period. That is how it would work in
other jurisdictions, but the rules are not clear in
China.''\163\ Finally, the NDRC reportedly announced that the
members of the LCD Cartel ``proposed'' corrective actions
reportedly similar to those the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM)
has imposed in merger filing cases under the Antimonopoly
Law.\164\ As a January 7, 2013, commentary by O'Melveny & Myers
noted, however, the NDRC had not issued measures that
``[govern] the enforcement of remedial commitments in the
merger context.''\165\
China's pricing and bribery investigations in subsequent
cases involving dairy suppliers and drug manufacturers
reportedly have raised concerns over unequal treatment in favor
of Chinese businesses and, in particular, large state-owned
enterprises. In September the President of the European Union
Chamber of Commerce in China, David Cucino, said, ``In pricing
investigations, some of the chamber's member companies believe
there is disproportion in how foreign companies are covered on
this issue when compared with Chinese rivals.''\166\ Jeremie
Waterman of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, said that Chinese
authorities had initiated cases against Chinese companies, but
that ``nearly all large State-owned enterprises have been
exempt from enforcement actions to date.''\167\ [For more
information on unequal treatment of Chinese and non-Chinese
businesses, see China in the World Trade Organization in this
section.]
Consumer Product Safety
During this past year, food safety scandals continued to
emerge in different parts of China. For example, the Ministry
of Public Security reported that, over the course of a three-
month campaign that began on January 25, 2013, public security
authorities took into custody 904 people allegedly involved in
various ``meat product offenses,'' including the sale of fake
meat products.\168\ Later reports from Chinese and
international media revealed that those involved were suspected
of selling rat, fox, and mink meat disguised as mutton and
beef, among other offenses.\169\ In another case, authorities
in Guangzhou municipality, Guangdong province, reportedly found
that over 44 percent of rice and rice products they tested
contained unsafe levels of cadmium.\170\ Authorities at the
Guangzhou Municipal Food and Drug Supervision and Management
Bureau reportedly said that it was ``not convenient to reveal''
which brands carried the affected rice.\171\ In another case,
the Nanchang County People's Court, in Nanchang municipality,
Jiangxi province, reportedly sentenced six people to up to five
years in prison for disguising used cooking oil--which
reportedly can contain carcinogens--as new and selling it.\172\
Similarly, a court in Guangdong reportedly sentenced three
people for buying and reselling used oil.\173\
Hazardous and illegal Chinese products continued to cross
borders into other markets during this past reporting year. In
May 2013 testimony before the Commission, Steven Solomon,
Associate Director for Global Operations and Policy in the
Office of Global Regulatory Operations and Policy of the U.S.
Food and Drug Administration, reported that 3 percent of food,
8 percent of animal food, and 5 percent of drugs and biologics
imported into the United States came from China.\174\ In one
case, according to a report from U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE), authorities in New York reportedly charged
five individuals and five corporations after they allegedly
imported ``hazardous and counterfeit'' toys from China into the
United States.\175\ One ICE official reportedly said, ``The
people and companies involved in this illegal trade not only
allegedly infringed on intellectual property rights, they
placed the lives of innocent children in danger. . . . They
allegedly sold toys with high lead content and cheap knock offs
with substandard parts that break easily and pose a choking
hazard.''\176\ According to an October 2012 Der Spiegel
article, hazardous Chinese products--including glass chips
among pumpkin seeds, maggots in pasta, cadmium in dried
anchovies, contaminated strawberries, and antibiotics in
shrimp--reached a variety of European Union countries in late
2012.\177\
In addition, concerns over contaminated milk powder in
mainland China\178\ prompted mainland Chinese travelers to
bring illegal quantities of milk powder from Hong Kong back to
mainland China. Between March 1 and April 23, 2013, authorities
in Hong Kong reportedly took into custody 879 people allegedly
involved in smuggling milk powder from Hong Kong into mainland
China.\179\ According to an April 2013 Bloomberg article, on
March 1, Hong Kong authorities limited the amount of milk
powder that travelers may take out of Hong Kong after concerns
about the quality of milk powder in mainland China prompted
large numbers of Chinese travelers to buy milk powder in Hong
Kong and take it back to mainland China.\180\ According to
central government news agency Xinhua, the State Council
announced plans to increase safety measures in China's milk
industry.\181\ Under the plan, the government reportedly would
adopt new quality standards and would ``intensify the crackdown
on milk powder-related violations.''\182\
Access to Justice
Introduction
Chinese citizens face formidable obstacles in seeking
remedies to government actions that violate their legal rights
and constitutionally protected freedoms. International human
rights standards require effective remedies for official
violations of citizens' rights. Article 8 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights states that ``Everyone has the
right to an effective remedy by the competent national
tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him
by the constitution or by law.''\1\ Article 2 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
which China has signed but not yet ratified, requires that all
parties to the ICCPR ensure that persons whose rights or
freedoms are violated ``have an effective remedy,
notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by
persons acting in an official capacity.''\2\
Legal Reform
During the 2013 reporting year, the Commission observed key
leadership changes in the Chinese Communist Party and
government's legal sectors, and official statements on the
potential reform of controversial mechanisms within the legal
system. The new Supreme People's Court (SPC) President Zhou
Qiang has academic and professional training in legal affairs,
unlike his predecessor, Wang Shengjun, who had a security
background.\3\ The new Secretary of the Communist Party Central
Committee's Political and Legal Affairs Commission (PLAC), Meng
Jianzhu, does not have a concurrent government appointment as
head of public security or a seat among the seven-member
Standing Committee of the Central Committee's Political Bureau
as did his predecessor, Zhou Yongkang, which suggests a
downgrade of the PLAC after a decade of powerful growth.\4\ At
a January 2013 meeting of the PLAC, four areas of legal reform
for the coming year were announced: The justice sector,\5\ the
reeducation through labor (RTL) system,\6\ citizen petitioning,
and the household registration (hukou) system.\7\ [For
information on hukou system reform, see Section II--Freedom of
Residence and Movement.]
JUSTICE SECTOR REFORM
While China's Constitution provides for the exercise of
judicial independence in Article 126, the Constitution's
preamble establishes the leadership of the Communist Party over
all other institutions.\8\ An academic report on justice sector
reform during the latest round of judicial reforms (2008-2012)
concludes that ``fundamentally, there has been no progress in
judicial fairness, credibility, or authority'' and ``judicial
independence has deteriorated,'' even though there was some
progress on technical matters, such as court fee guarantees,
uniformity of adjudication, disclosure, and regulatory
constraints.\9\ Achieving judicial independence, it goes on to
say, will require ``clarifying'' (liqing) the relationship
between the judiciary and the Party.\10\ The State Council's
October 2012 white paper on judicial reform in China states
that the ``objectives of China's judicial reform'' include
``ensur[ing] that the people's courts and people's
procuratorates exercise adjudicative power and procuratorial
power fairly and independently'' and ``establish[ing] an
impartial, efficient and authoritative socialist judicial
system,''\11\ but makes no mention of the Communist Party or
the role of the Party's Political and Legal Affairs Commission
(PLAC) over the courts.\12\ References to judicial independence
in the departing Supreme People's Court (SPC) president Wang
Shengjun's work report in March,\13\ led at least one
commentator to suggest that judicial independence may be a key
agenda item for future judicial reform.\14\ The focus of the
next round of judicial reforms will likely be spelled out in
the SPC's next five-year plan covering 2014-2019\15\ as well as
in forthcoming PLAC announcement(s) on its institutional
priorities for legal reform.\16\
REEDUCATION THROUGH LABOR
The reeducation through labor (RTL) system operates
entirely outside of the judicial system and is influenced but
not constrained by the PRC Criminal Law. RTL is a system of
administrative punishment that enables law enforcement
officials to incarcerate Chinese citizens at RTL centers for a
maximum initial period of three years, with the possibility of
an extension of up to one year.\17\ Chinese and international
legal commentators state that RTL not only violates China's
international human rights obligations,\18\ but also violates
its own laws and constitutional protections.\19\ With a
reported 350 RTL detention centers nationwide and estimates of
more than 100,000 detainees,\20\ authorities use the RTL system
to detain petitioners seeking redress for official abuses,
practitioners of the Falun Gong spiritual movement,\21\ and
minor offenders--including drug users and sex workers--whose
alleged misconduct is not a criminal offense under Chinese
law.\22\
During the 2013 reporting year, high-profile individual
cases\23\ and an expose on harsh conditions at a women's RTL
center in Liaoning province\24\ focused national attention in
China on the use of RTL and strengthened calls for its reform
and even abolition.\25\ Although several provinces reportedly
began to ``transition'' RTL centers into compulsory drug
treatment facilities,\26\ to discontinue issuing RTL
sentences,\27\ and to operate rehabilitation and corrections
pilot sites,\28\ the government and Party's position on RTL
reform, nevertheless, remains ambiguous. PLAC Secretary Meng
Jianzhu's reported comment in January to ``halt'' RTL has
shifted to vague plans for reform,\29\ as when Premier Li
Keqiang told a March press conference in Beijing that plans to
reform China's RTL system ``might be unveiled'' by the end of
the year.\30\ Similarly, the government's submission to the UN
Human Rights Council for the October 2013 Universal Periodic
Review affirms an intention to reform RTL but provides no
timeframe for reform.\31\ The vagueness of official
pronouncements has raised concerns that extralegal detention
may continue, albeit under a different name.\32\
CITIZEN PETITIONING
The petitioning, or xinfang (letters and visits), system
exists to provide a channel, outside court challenges, for
citizens to appeal government, court, and Communist Party
decisions and to present their grievances.\33\ Citizens often
turn to petitioning as a means to seek redress for a wide range
of disputes--such as forced evictions and land
expropriation,\34\ wage arrears,\35\ unpaid pensions to
military veterans,\36\ and unpaid compensation required under
health-related regulations\37\--due to institutional weaknesses
in the judiciary and limits on citizens' ability to air
grievances. A prominent Chinese economist reportedly estimated
20 million petitioners in 2012, including repeated filings and
petitions at various levels of government.\38\ Chinese
authorities, however, announced an 11-percent decrease in the
total number of petitions during 2012 at a teleconference of
the heads of Letters and Visits Bureaus in January 2013, a
continuation of an eight-year decrease from 2005, when 12.6
million petitions were officially reported.\39\
Prior to and during the 18th Party Congress in November
2012, the Commission observed nationwide ``petitioning
stability maintenance work'' (xinfang weiwen gongzuo) to
achieve ``zero petitioning,'' particularly targeting potential
petitioners' travel to Beijing.\40\ While some localities
advised officials to mobilize into work teams\41\ and resolve
petitioner grievances with more service-oriented attitudes,\42\
some official guidance also suggested 24-hour surveillance of
long-time petitioners and other ``stability maintenance''
measures.\43\ A Chinese rights advocate described the control
of petitioners for the 18th Party Congress as ``comparatively
much bigger than in the past,''\44\ borne out by reports of
evictions from ``petitioner villages'' in Beijing,\45\
detention in ``black jails,''\46\ and RTL detention for several
Shanghai petitioners\47\ and rights advocates, including Mao
Hengfeng,\48\ Cui Fufang,\49\ Tong Guojing,\50\ Shen
Yongmei,\51\ and Shen Lianman.\52\ Caixin Media, a domestic
Chinese news organization known for its investigative work,
reported on the beating death of a petitioner from Henan
province as he was taken from Beijing by provincial ``black
security guards'' on the eve of the Party Congress.\53\
Even with increased repression of petitioners throughout
the fall of 2012\54\ and in early 2013 prior to the annual
meetings of the National People's Congress (NPC) and China
People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) (Two
Sessions) in March,\55\ government officials at the Two
Sessions nevertheless discussed possible reform of the
petitioning system. Former CPPCC head Jia Qinglin called for
establishing a mechanism to end ``abnormal petitioning,''\56\ a
broad term that denotes repeated petitioning, disruptive
conduct, multiple participants, or ``leap-frogging
administrative levels'' to complain to higher level
officials.\57\ One CPPCC official recommended hearings or
assessments for complex cases.\58\ Petitioning bureaus and
other agencies with petitioning offices appear to be
strengthening prohibitions against intercepting ``ordinary''
petitioners, characterizing interceptions as an ``incorrect
practice'' (cuowu zuofa).\59\ In May, Chinese state media
reported that, beginning in March 2013, the State Letters and
Visits Bureau had temporarily suspended issuance of the monthly
ranking of provinces based on the number of ``abnormal
petitioning'' incidents each month.\60\ A journalist from
Yunnan province, however, illustrated the lack of central-local
policy coordination by reporting on the Anhui Provincial
Communist Party Standing Committee's recommendation to start
``abnormal petitioning'' rankings for Anhui county- and
district-level governments on June 1, 2013.\61\
Harassment of Human Rights Lawyers and Defenders
The Commission observed instances of government
harassment,\62\ detention,\63\ and physical violence against
weiquan (rights defense)\64\ lawyers during the 2013 reporting
year, continuing a pattern of human rights violations against
rights defenders documented in prior years.\65\ During the
annual license renewal period in May 2013, the Beijing Justice
Bureau reportedly did not renew licenses of approximately 10
law firms and possibly dozens of weiquan lawyers,\66\ many of
whom have provided legal counsel in religious freedom, state
security, and reeducation through labor cases.\67\
International news media also reported that authorities have
shut down the blogs of lawyers involved in rights defense,\68\
and placed at least one lawyer on a government list of so-
called ``key persons'' (zhongdian renyuan, i.e., a person of
``key'' interest to security authorities).\69\ Local law
enforcement also reportedly detained and beat a group of
weiquan lawyers who went to Sichuan province in May 2013 to
investigate an allegedly illegal detention center.\70\
The Commission continues to monitor the cases of Chinese
lawyers and rights defenders detained and imprisoned for their
human rights advocacy, such as Xu Zhiyong,\71\ Gao
Zhisheng,\72\ and Ni Yulan.\73\ In July 2013, authorities
detained and subsequently arrested prominent rights advocate,
Xu Zhiyong, reportedly in connection with his advocacy of
citizen rights and official transparency.\74\ Gao Zhisheng,
well-known for his legal defense of marginalized citizens and
religious practitioners,\75\ is serving a prison term in Akesu
(Aksu) prefecture, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, on the
charge of ``inciting subversion of state power.''\76\ His
brother and father-in-law visited him in January 2013 at the
prison--the first time authorities permitted them to do so in
nine months\77\--but authorities prohibited any discussion of
Gao's prison conditions, legal case, or wife and children.\78\
In April 2012, authorities in Beijing sentenced Ni Yulan, a
housing rights advocate, and her husband Dong Jiqin, to two
years and eight months\79\ and two years in prison,
respectively, following a crackdown on rights defenders and
others in spring 2011.\80\ Authorities refused a medical parole
request for Ni submitted in October 2012:\81\ Ni is permanently
disabled as a result of police abuse,\82\ and reportedly
suffers from thyroid disorders.\83\
Efforts To Expand Legal Aid
The Chinese government continues to increase funding
available for legal aid in order to expand access to
institutions that assist citizens with legal claims and
disputes.\84\ According to official statistics, in 2012 there
was a 21-percent increase over 2011 in the provision of legal
aid in China, with more than 1,140,000 recipients of legal aid
and total national funding of 1.4 billion yuan (US$224
million), an increase of 9.9 percent.\85\ Although
approximately 60,000 persons with disabilities received legal
aid in 2012--an increase of 11.5 percent\86\--the UN Committee
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities raised concerns that
China has not allocated sufficient ``human and financial
resources'' to provide legal aid services to persons with
disabilities in its review of China's compliance with the
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in
September 2012.\87\ Scholars currently estimate that the rate
of legal representation for defendants in criminal cases is
less than 30 percent,\88\ yet the expansion of legal aid under
the revised Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) is likely to multiply
the number of criminal cases, thus resulting in a need for even
more funding and criminal defense lawyers.\89\ Under the
Regulations Regarding Criminal Procedure Law Legal Aid Work
issued in February 2013 (effective on March 1)\90\ that provide
guidance to legal practitioners on implementation of the
revised CPL,\91\ investigating agencies (e.g., the
Procuratorate or public security bureau) are required to inform
defendants of their right to counsel; and defendants--and their
family members--may apply for legal aid at all stages of a
case.\92\ The new regulations also stipulate that criminal
suspects or defendants will not have to show economic need to
apply for legal aid in cases where there is evidence of mental
disability; where other defendants in the same case have
employed defense counsel; where the ``procuratorate has
appealed''; or where the case may have ``significant social
impact.''\93\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Abuse of Family Members of Rights Defenders and Political Activists
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
During the 2013 reporting year, the Commission observed reports of
ongoing official harassment of family members of rights defenders and
political activists. Chinese authorities used a range of methods, such
as intimidation, extralegal detention, imprisonment, and physical
violence against these individuals.\94\
Chen Guangcheng.\95\ Multiple family members of the prominent
legal advocate Chen Guangcheng have suffered abuse in connection with
Chen's rights advocacy in China and his departure to the United States
in 2012.\96\ These include his nephew, Chen Kegui, who was sentenced in
2012 to three years and three months in prison for an alleged assault
on a group of plainclothes officials and hired personnel who broke into
his home in the middle of the night;\97\ his elder brother, Chen
Guangfu;\98\ his sister-in-law, Ren Zongju;\99\ and his mother, Wang
Jinxiang.\100\
Hada.\101\ Xinna, the wife of rights advocate Hada, and the
couple's son, Uiles, have spent years under surveillance, sometimes in
detention centers,\102\ in connection to Hada's efforts to preserve
Mongolian ethnic identity in Inner Mongolia.\103\ During this reporting
year, authorities limited their rights to freedom of movement and
communication.\104\
Liu Xiaobo.\105\ Liu Xia, wife of Nobel Peace Prize laureate
Liu Xiaobo, reportedly has been confined to her home under 24-hour
surveillance since October 2010, without cell phone or Internet
access.\106\ In June 2013, Chinese authorities sentenced Liu Xia's
brother, Liu Hui, to 11 years in prison for fraud, but Liu Xia and
others assert that Liu Hui's sentence is retribution against Liu Xiaobo
and Liu Xia.\107\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Abuse of Family Members of Rights Defenders and Political Activists--
Continued
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rebiya Kadeer.\108\ Family members of Uyghur human rights
activist Rebiya Kadeer have faced official persecution,\109\ including
home eviction,\110\ loss of livelihood,\111\ and extralegal
detention.\112\ One of her sons, Ablikim Abdureyim, is serving a nine-
year prison term on the charge of ``instigating and engaging in
secessionist activities.''\113\
Other family members of rights defenders and political activists who
have been harassed and are mentioned in this report include Zhang Anni,
the daughter of Zhang Lin;\114\ Liu Ying, the ex-wife of Liu
Benqi;\115\ and some relatives of Zhu Yufu.\116\ [For further
information, see Section III--Institutions of Democratic Governance.]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
IV. Xinjiang
Human rights conditions in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous
Region (XUAR) remained poor during the Commission's 2013
reporting year. Central and regional Chinese Communist Party
and government authorities carried out campaigns focused on
security and stability to enforce harsh security controls and
limit the freedoms of movement and expression throughout the
XUAR. Deadly clashes that took place in the spring and summer
raised concerns about the failure of ethnic policy in the XUAR
to address the root causes of regional instability. Overseas
media and rights groups reported instances during which
security forces shot into crowds of Uyghurs, resulting in
deaths and injuries. In some cases, Uyghur residents of the
XUAR reportedly committed deadly attacks on members of security
forces, community workers, and others. Pervasive house searches
throughout the region, as well as surveillance of individual
religious believers, reportedly targeted peaceful expressions
of religious belief among the Uyghur population, heightening
tensions in the region. Intensified regional development
projects raised concerns over disproportionate economic,
social, and cultural opportunities for Uyghurs and other ethnic
minorities in the region, as well as concerns over the effect
such projects have had on the cultures and languages of these
groups.
Security Measures and Conflict
XUAR officials strengthened security measures in a bid to
``maintain stability'' and ``fight terrorism'' in the region,
using methods some observers criticized as repressive and
counterproductive.\1\ In November 2012, on the sidelines of the
18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in
Beijing, XUAR government chairperson Nur Bekri warned of the
``three evil forces'' (terrorism, separatism, and religious
extremism) in the region, saying the fight against separatism
in the region would be ``long-term, complicated and
fierce.''\2\ According to official statistics released in
January 2013, regional authorities allocated 9.34 billion yuan
(US$1.5 billion) to the public security sector in 2012, a 23-
percent increase over 2011.\3\
Instances of violence throughout the spring and summer
reportedly resulted in numerous deaths, both Han Chinese and
Uyghur, with reported death tolls ranging from dozens to 100 or
possibly more. An April 23, 2013, clash between local
residents, community workers, and police in Siriqbuya
(Selibuya) township, Maralbeshi (Bachu) county, Kashgar
prefecture, reportedly resulted in the deaths of 21 people.\4\
Official media accounts of the incident described it as a
terrorist attack during which the attackers killed 15 community
workers and police.\5\ Some reports from overseas media and
human rights groups questioned authorities' portrayal of events
as terrorist in nature.\6\ A Uyghur rights advocate reportedly
asserted that a search of residents' homes had sparked the
violence.\7\ Similar searches are routinely conducted
throughout the XUAR to ``maintain stability.''\8\ On August 12,
2013, the Kashgar Prefecture Intermediate People's Court
sentenced two Uyghur men to death and three others to terms
ranging from nine years to life for taking part in the
violence.\9\
Xinhua reported that on June 26, 2013, in Lukchun (Lukeqin)
township, Pichan (Shanshan) county, Turpan prefecture, ``knife-
wielding rioters'' attacked police stations and other
government buildings before police fired on them.\10\ Official
media reported on June 28 that 35 people had died, including 24
killed by assailants and 11 shot and killed by police, and 21
people had been injured in the incident.\11\ Regional officials
reported that on August 15, attackers killed Turpan Islamic
Association Vice Chairman Abdurehim Damolla in front of his
home.\12\ According to Radio Free Asia (RFA), attackers
targeted Damolla for supporting a government crackdown in the
wake of the June 26 violence.\13\
Some overseas media reports and human rights advocates
questioned the official narrative regarding the incident on
June 26 in Turpan prefecture, including the death toll\14\ and
details of what took place,\15\ and raised concerns about the
role that repressive policies had played in contributing to
deadly clashes in the region.\16\ Media reports and human
rights advocates cited religious repression,\17\ house
searches,\18\ and housing redevelopment policies\19\ among the
factors exacerbating regional tension.
House searches were reportedly also related to two separate
deadly incidents in May and June. On May 9, a Uyghur farmer,
whom authorities believed had been involved in an earlier
deadly clash, reportedly stabbed two village officials to death
in Uchar (Wuqia) township, Yengisar (Yingjisha) county, Kashgar
prefecture, while they were conducting house searches, and
authorities subsequently beat the farmer to death.\20\ On June
30, authorities reportedly shot and killed a Uyghur man in
Artush (Atushi) city, Qizilsu Kyrgyz (Kezilesu Kirghiz)
Autonomous Prefecture, after he fatally stabbed a police
officer and injured two others during a house search.\21\
Additionally, on June 28, security forces reportedly shot and
killed a Uyghur man in Uchturpan (Wushi) county, Aksu
prefecture, after he stabbed and injured two people, including
at least one police officer, when they pressed him to shave off
his beard.\22\
On June 28, 2013, President Xi Jinping reportedly convened
a meeting of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of
the Communist Party Central Committee (Politburo) to discuss
the clashes in the XUAR, and two Politburo members, Meng
Jianzhu and Yu Zhengsheng, subsequently traveled to the
region.\23\ In June and July, in the lead-up to the anniversary
of demonstrations and riots that took place on July 5, 2009, in
Urumqi city,\24\ officials carried out displays of military and
paramilitary force in Urumqi and other areas of the XUAR, and
instituted 24-hour security patrols in some locations.\25\ Some
human rights advocates and international observers expressed
concern about the security buildup, together with what they
viewed as authorities' failure to address the root causes of
violence.\26\
In June and August, several incidents reportedly occurred
involving security forces' deadly use of force against crowds
of Uyghurs. According to official media, on June 28, security
forces detained people involved in a ``group disturbance'' in
Hanerik (Hanairike) township, Hotan county.\27\ Overseas media
and rights groups reported that security forces fired on a
crowd of Uyghurs in Hanerik, resulting in a number of deaths
and injuries, with reported death tolls ranging from up to 15
people to more than 100.\28\ RFA reported that on August 8, a
clash between police and local residents in Aykol township,
Aksu city, Aksu prefecture, over religious restrictions led to
the deaths of at least three Uyghurs when security forces fired
on a crowd of protestors.\29\ [See Freedom of Religion in this
section for more information on the clash in Aksu.] Overseas
media reported that on August 20 in Yilikqi township, Kargilik
(Yecheng) county, Kashgar prefecture, Chinese police shot and
killed 22 Uyghurs they suspected of terrorism, while the
Uyghurs were performing prayers.\30\ Official media confirmed
the raid, providing information about a Chinese police officer
killed in the incident, but did not confirm or deny the 22
Uyghur casualties.\31\
On August 23, in Kuybagh (Kuiyibage) township, Poskam
(Zepu) county, Kashgar prefecture, security forces reportedly
shot and killed 12 Uyghurs and injured 20 authorities said were
engaging in building and testing explosives at a ``terrorist''
facility.\32\
Official media reported in March that courts in Kashgar
prefecture and the Bayangol Mongol Autonomous Prefecture had
sentenced 20 Uyghurs to prison terms ranging from five years to
life for their involvement in ``terrorist'' and ``separatist''
activities.\33\ Chinese authorities stated that the 20 men had
used the Internet and cell phones to commit ``terrorist'' and
``separatist'' crimes, in addition to organizing religious
activities, buying weapons, and planning to attack police
officers.\34\ Some overseas media and human rights groups
criticized the sentences given to the 20 men, questioning
official accusations of terrorism and expressing doubts over
authorities' use of criminal charges to prosecute Internet and
cell phone use.\35\
Criminal Law and Access to Justice
Chinese government and official media reports in 2013
underscored the XUAR criminal justice system's frequent use of
charges of ``endangering state security'' (ESS).\36\ An article
published by the Dui Hua Foundation, a human rights advocacy
organization, in March 2013 stressed that, while ESS trials had
declined in the XUAR, the number of these trials in the XUAR
continued to represent a highly disproportionate ratio of the
total number of ESS trials throughout China.\37\ According to
Dui Hua estimates, based on official statistics, the XUAR
accounted for half of first-instance ESS trials throughout
China between 2008 and 2010, although less than 2 percent of
China's population lives in the XUAR.\38\ According to the
second annual work report of the XUAR High People's Court,
issued in January 2013, 314 criminal trials involving ESS
crimes were conducted in 2012, a 24 percent decline from 2011
figures.\39\
Authorities reportedly detained 12 students in early May
2013 at Tarim University, located in Ala'er city, Aksu
prefecture.\40\ On May 27, authorities reportedly released all
12 students.\41\ Ablimit, Dilshat, Alimjan, Ekber, and
Abdureshit were released on bail.\42\ The conditions of their
bail, which will remain in place until May 27, 2014, include
restrictions on their movement.\43\ Alimjan was reportedly
detained again by Ala'er public security officials for about a
day beginning on June 21,\44\ and was beaten during both
periods of detention.\45\
Development Policy
During the 2013 reporting year, XUAR officials accelerated
large-scale development plans throughout the region, including
in the areas of infrastructure,\46\ transportation,\47\ energy
exploitation,\48\ urban and rural construction,\49\
education,\50\ and employment.\51\ XUAR authorities oversaw
billions of yuan in investment in state-led development
projects and sought to attract private domestic and foreign
investment in the region, touting it as an economic hub for
central, western, and southern Asia.\52\ Regional officials
reiterated development goals first announced at the Xinjiang
Work Forum in 2010\53\ and reiterated strategies for economic
and political development that prioritize state economic and
political goals over respecting the rights of XUAR
residents,\54\ including those outlined in the PRC Regional
Ethnic Autonomy Law.\55\ International observers have expressed
concerns over the expropriation and destruction of ethnic
minority residents' property and a lack of protections for
cultural heritage related to urban development initiatives in
the region.\56\
In 2013, regional officials oversaw the growth of
``counterpart support'' programs that bring funding and
personnel assistance to the XUAR for development initiatives
from provinces and cities outside of the region,\57\ stressing
the patriotic nature of promoting regional economic
development.\58\ Counterpart provinces and cities reportedly
provided 149.3 billion yuan (US$24.3 billion) in aid to the
XUAR in 2012, a 37.3-percent increase over the previous
year.\59\
Increased migration to the XUAR in recent years has
reportedly heightened ethnic tensions in some areas and sparked
concerns among Uyghur residents regarding land rights and
employment opportunities.\60\ Regional development initiatives
brought increased Han Chinese migration to the XUAR during the
past year, often into southern areas of the XUAR traditionally
inhabited by Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities, and state-led
programs provided assistance to migrants and workers from other
provinces.\61\ This past year, reports cited Uyghurs' concerns
over government authorities' expropriation of their land,\62\
inadequate government compensation for expropriated land then
sold at a higher price to Chinese buyers,\63\ and government
subsidies given only to new Han Chinese migrants that allowed
them to save money to purchase more land.\64\ The growth of the
Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC)\65\ in
southern areas of the XUAR, billed by Chinese leaders as a
conduit for regional development in the aftermath of the July
2009 demonstrations and riots, has brought thousands of Han
Chinese migrants into areas near the majority-Uyghur city of
Hotan.\66\
During the reporting period, authorities intensified
housing construction and demolition projects in rural and urban
areas of the XUAR, in areas inhabited by Uyghurs and other
ethnic minorities.\67\ ``Counterpart support'' projects
provided hundreds of millions of yuan for construction and
resettlement efforts.\68\ In 2013, regional authorities
continued work to relocate and resettle farmers and herders
away from grasslands, as part of programs that XUAR authorities
publicize as improving farmers' and herders' living
conditions.\69\ These policies have impacted affected groups
with livelihoods based on traditional nomadic herding
practices.\70\ According to official statistics released in May
2013, authorities resettled 136,800 herders in the XUAR between
2010 and 2012, comprising 49.2 percent of the total population
of herders in the XUAR.\71\
Demolitions in Kashgar's Old City
Authorities continued to demolish and redevelop the Old
City section of Kashgar city,\72\ raising concerns over the
corresponding loss of unique cultural heritage\73\ and the
resettlement of 220,000 Uyghur residents.\74\ The Old City
demolitions, along with demolitions in other areas of the XUAR,
have been carried out in line with broader development
initiatives and a five-year demolition project launched in
2009.\75\ Since demolitions began in 2009, authorities have
reportedly disregarded Uyghur residents' concerns over
demolition efforts,\76\ in spite of official pledges to consult
residents for their opinions.\77\ Groups promoting the
protection of cultural heritage have outlined concerns over a
lack of transparency in the process of planning and
implementing the demolitions, and have expressed concern over
officials' failure to consider alternatives to the wholesale
demolition of Old City buildings.\78\
Labor
DISCRIMINATION
Some government and private employers in the XUAR continued
to discriminate against non-Han job candidates. As in past
years, some job announcements reserved positions exclusively
for Han Chinese in civil servant posts and private-sector jobs,
in contravention of provisions in Chinese law that forbid
ethnic discrimination.\79\ Private and public employers also
continued to reserve more positions for men, leaving non-Han
women to face both ethnic and gender discrimination in the
employment process.\80\ A study conducted by the University of
Melbourne, Australia, and published in November 2012, found
that Han Chinese residents of the XUAR are much more likely
than Uyghur residents to secure employment in high-paying,
high-status occupations, a trend that has exacerbated ethnic
tensions in the region.\81\
LABOR TRANSFERS AND FORCED LABOR
Regional officials continued to carry out programs that
send young non-Han men and women outside of the XUAR for
employment, under the slogan of ``transferring the excess rural
labor force.'' According to a January 2013 official news
report, more than 2.7 million people had been transferred to
jobs outside of their home area or outside of the XUAR in
2012,\82\ an increase from 2.58 million people in 2011.\83\ As
documented by the Commission in recent years, some participants
and their family members have reported coercion to participate
in the programs, the use of underage workers, and exploitative
working conditions.\84\ XUAR authorities also reportedly forced
some Uyghur farmers to perform road-building and agricultural
work without pay, although such ``free labor'' programs
officially had been abolished.\85\
Freedom of Expression
Local governments in the XUAR continued to implement
censorship campaigns focused on religious and political
publications during the reporting period. The campaigns have
targeted pirated and pornographic items in addition to
publications deemed ``illegal'' solely because of their
religious or political content.\86\ For instance, in March
2013, the XUAR Transportation Department published a statement
indicating that, in 2012, regional transportation officials had
uncovered 4,469 copies of ``illegal religious publications,''
as part of a campaign to ``sweep away pornography.''\87\
Uyghurs continued to serve prison sentences as a result of
exercising their right to free speech. In February 2013, Uyghur
Online, a Web site focused on Uyghur issues, reported that, in
April 2009, the Kashgar Municipality Intermediate People's
Court sentenced Uyghur translator Mirhemitjan Muzepper to 11
years in prison for ``inciting splittism of the state,''
information that authorities had not publicized.\88\ The court
had connected Muzepper's sentence to his work as a temporary
translator for a Hong Kong media organization reporting on the
demolitions taking place in Kashgar's Old City.\89\
Passport and Exit Restrictions
During the reporting year, Chinese officials implemented
restrictions on passports and international and domestic travel
for Uyghurs, highlighting official restrictions on Uyghurs'
freedom of movement.\90\ In February 2013, Chinese authorities
reportedly detained Beijing-based Uyghur scholar Ilham Tohti,
who founded the Web site Uyghur Online, at the Beijing Capital
International Airport, preventing him from boarding a flight to
the United States.\91\ Tohti reportedly held a valid passport
and had been issued a visa for educational exchange to the
United States, where he planned to take up a visiting scholar
position at Indiana University.\92\ Authorities also held and
interrogated Uyghur university student Atikem Rozi in February
2013, after she attempted to apply for a passport for the
second time in order to study abroad.\93\ The Toqsu (Xinhe)
County Foreign Affairs Office in Aksu prefecture reportedly
informed Rozi that the passport denial was due to the fact that
she was ``politically unqualified.''\94\ In July 2013, Rozi
reported her belief that police had detained her friend
Mutellip Imin--a Uyghur studying abroad in Turkey who had
performed volunteer work for Uyghur Online\95\--on July 15 at
the Beijing Capital International Airport as he prepared to fly
back to Turkey from Beijing.\96\ As of September 23, 2013, the
Commission had not observed any news regarding Mutellip's
release from detention. [See Section II--Freedom of Residence
and Movement for additional information on freedom of movement
in China.]
Forced Return of Uyghur Asylum Seekers and Migrants
The deportation and reports of the sentencing of Uyghur
asylum seekers this past year highlighted the dangers facing
Uyghur refugees and asylum seekers in neighboring countries
that are under the influence of Chinese economic and diplomatic
power. In December 2012, Malaysian authorities deported six
Uyghur asylum seekers to China, although the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees was still reviewing their asylum
claims.\97\ Malaysian authorities reportedly had detained the
six Uyghurs earlier in 2012 for allegedly attempting to leave
Malaysia on forged passports.\98\ Two international human
rights groups raised questions regarding the Chinese
government's role in the forced return, one of several
documented cases of forced deportation of Uyghurs to China in
recent years.\99\ In another case, Radio Free Asia (RFA)
reported in December 2012 that, according to a Malaysian
lawyer, 11 Uyghurs previously deported from Malaysia in August
2011 had been charged with terrorism and separatism; according
to relatives and friends, the men had been sentenced to prison
for terms of up to 15 years on charges of separatism.\100\
Freedom of Religion
XUAR authorities continued intensive controls over
religion, especially Islam, posing a challenge for Uyghurs
seeking to maintain their religious beliefs outside of state
control.\101\ Authorities continued to enforce tight
restrictions over peaceful religious practices among the Uyghur
population, and carried out targeted surveillance of individual
religious believers.\102\ A report issued by a Uyghur human
rights organization in April 2013 outlined concerns over
religious policies implemented by central and local
authorities, which the group said ``have progressively narrowed
the definition of lawful [religious] activity'' among
Uyghurs.\103\ The report also highlighted concerns over a lack
of transparency in religious regulations, official limitations
on religious pilgrimages, and other issues related to official
restrictions on Uyghurs' religious practices.\104\
On August 7, on the eve of the Eid holiday marking the end
of the Muslim holy month of Ramadan, police in Aykol township,
Aksu prefecture, reportedly sought to prevent residents from
another village from engaging in cross-village worship,\105\
and detained several Uyghur men for engaging in ``illegal
religious activities.''\106\ In the early morning hours of
August 8, after hundreds of people gathered in protest,
throwing stones and bricks, security forces reportedly fired on
the crowd, killing at least three Uyghurs and injuring at least
a dozen.\107\ Around 10 to 12 police officers reportedly also
sustained injuries in the clash.\108\ Police reportedly
arrested more than 90 people after the incident.\109\ Central
government propaganda authorities reportedly forbade Chinese
media from reporting on the confrontation, which officials
described as ``rioting and looting.''\110\
Together with widespread security checks, police raids, and
house searches among the Uyghur population aimed partially at
cracking down on ``illegal religious activities,''\111\
authorities in the XUAR reportedly subjected Uyghurs practicing
traditional Islamic customs to close scrutiny. Authorities in
Bulaqsu township, Shufu county, Kashgar prefecture, reportedly
kept registers related to ``stability maintenance'' efforts
that detailed the personal information of local religious
believers and their family members.\112\ The registers included
information such as whether or not female Muslims wore a veil
and when they started wearing it, as well as what time a
student of the Quran received Quranic instruction.\113\ A
Uyghur resident of Keriya (Yutian) county, Hotan prefecture,
told RFA in May 2013 that local officials in his township
maintained registration books documenting religious
believers,\114\ and a resident of Urumqi city reportedly told
RFA that officials maintained such documents throughout the
XUAR.\115\
Regional authorities carried out training sessions for
religious clergy throughout the XUAR, placing an emphasis on
reinforcing patriotism and opposing ``illegal religious
activities.''\116\ At a training session for ``patriotic
religious figures'' in Urumqi in March 2013, XUAR government
chairperson Nur Bekri expressed hopes that attendees would
become ``politically reliable'' ``patriotic religious figures''
who would ``guide religion to adapt to socialist
society.''\117\ Chinese government- and Communist Party-led
ideological campaigns encouraging students and youth in the
XUAR to refrain from engaging in ``illegal religious
activities'' were frequent and widespread throughout this
reporting period.\118\
Local governments in 2013 also continued to train women
religious specialists, known as buwi,\119\ using legal
restrictions that place them under strict state control.\120\
According to an official media report, in December 2012, the
Kashgar Women's Federation sent 19 buwi and other female
religious figures to trainings in six eastern Chinese cities,
stressing that the women should, upon their return, transmit
the Party's policies on ethnic minorities and religion, and
propagate ethnic unity.\121\
Authorities in Kashgar city reportedly detained 23-year-old
Uyghur Nurmemet Ismail without charge for 63 days beginning on
March 1, 2013, for selling the Quran and Quranic study
aids.\122\ Authorities' exact reasons for detaining Ismail are
unclear,\123\ but regional religious regulations stipulate that
government approval is required for the sale and distribution
of religious material, and these regulations may have been a
factor in Ismail's detention.\124\
Some Uyghur Muslims and Christians continued to serve
prison sentences as a result of exercising their faith.\125\
According to a January 2013 RFA report, authorities reduced
family visits to jailed Uyghur pastor Alimjan Yimit from once a
month to once every three months.\126\
As in 2012,\127\ local government officials throughout the
XUAR reportedly maintained restrictions over Uyghurs'
observance of Ramadan, prohibiting minors from entering
mosques,\128\ and forbidding government officials, students,
and teachers from fasting.\129\ According to Uyghur Online, in
July 2013, county officials fired Abduhelil Ablimit, a staff
member at a county government office in Shule county, Kashgar
prefecture, for fasting.\130\ Local officials also placed
restrictions on cross-village worship during the Ramadan
period.\131\ [See Section II--Freedom of Religion for
additional information on religion in China, including cases of
religious repression in the XUAR.]
Language Policy and ``Bilingual Education''
In the past year, the XUAR government broadened the scope
of Mandarin-focused ``bilingual education'' in the region, a
policy some Uyghur students in the XUAR fear is aimed at
assimilating young Uyghurs into Chinese society at the expense
of their Uyghur identity.\132\ The expansion of the policy was
carried out in line with targets set in 2010 to universalize
and develop ``bilingual education'' in preschool through
secondary school instruction throughout the region.\133\ Under
``bilingual education,'' class instruction takes place
primarily in Mandarin Chinese, largely replacing instruction in
languages spoken by ethnic minority groups.\134\ In recent
years, some Uyghur students and teachers have expressed concern
over the compulsory nature of the region's ``bilingual''
curriculum and the corresponding loss of young Uyghurs' ability
to speak the Uyghur language.\135\
The number of students enrolled in ``bilingual education''
has increased rapidly in the past several years. According to
the People's Daily, at the end of 2012, 1.41 million students
were enrolled in ``bilingual education'' from the preschool
through the secondary school level in the XUAR, making up 55
percent of the XUAR ethnic minority student population.\136\
This represents a 41.6-percent increase in the ``bilingual''
student population over 2009.\137\ According to China News
Service, from 2008 to 2012, central and regional authorities
invested 5 billion yuan (US$816 million) on preschool
``bilingual education'' initiatives, establishing 2,237
``bilingual'' nursery schools throughout the region.\138\
Population Planning Policies
Government authorities throughout the XUAR promoted family
planning campaigns targeting Muslim ethnic minorities, and
compelling Islamic religious figures to promote state family
planning policies. Authorities continued to issue monetary
rewards to ethnic minority households who have fewer children
than allowed under XUAR population and family planning
regulations.\139\ The rewards are issued according to a
``special rewards system'' for non-Han households that includes
a ``fewer births, faster wealth'' (shaosheng kuaifu)
program.\140\ The system is one of the reward mechanisms
present throughout China's population planning system, though
with special focus on ethnic minority households.\141\
In 2013, authorities in the XUAR and some other regions of
China with Muslim populations continued to report on the
implementation of a program entitled ``Muslim Reproductive
Health Project'' (musilin shengzhi jiankang xiangmu).\142\
Official reports have described the project's aims as providing
reproductive health information and health checks for Muslim
women of reproductive age while ``creating a harmonious happy
family.''\143\ Official media reports this past year emphasized
the need to improve the effectiveness of project efforts,
including through Islamic religious leaders' promotion of the
project among local Muslims.\144\
V. Tibet
Status of Negotiations Between the Chinese Government and the Dalai
Lama or His Representatives
Formal dialogue between the Dalai Lama's representatives
and Chinese Communist Party and government officials has been
stalled since the January 2010 ninth round,\1\ the longest
interval since such contacts resumed in 2002.\2\ The Commission
observed no indication during the 2013 reporting year of
official Chinese interest in resuming a dialogue that takes
into account Tibetan concerns in the Tibetan autonomous areas
of China.\3\ In December 2012, then-U.S. Department of State
Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues Maria Otero called on
the Chinese government to ``engage in dialogue with the Dalai
Lama or his representatives without preconditions.''\4\
In June 2013, Professor Jin Wei, with the Central Party
School, stated in an interview that, if the Party ``can use
creative ideas to break the impasse'' in dialogue, it would
``promote social stability and prevent the creation of long-
lasting nationality wounds.''\5\ Jin noted that the Party
``cannot simply treat [the Dalai Lama] as an enemy,''
recommended ``restarting the talks,'' and suggested discussing
that the Dalai Lama visit Hong Kong ``in his capacity as a
religious leader.''\6\
Tibetan Self-Immolation
The frequency of Tibetan self-immolation reportedly
focusing on political and religious issues increased during the
Commission's 2013 reporting year, peaking in October-November
2012 with 38 self-immolations\7\ preceding and during the
Communist Party Central Committee's 18th Congress.\8\ Reports
of self-immolators' calls for Tibetan freedom and the Dalai
Lama's return continued\9\ and remained concurrent with
government use of regulatory measures to control and repress
principal elements of Tibetan culture, including Tibetan
Buddhist monastic institutions,\10\ and with the apparent
collapse of the China-Dalai Lama dialogue.\11\ Tibetans have
self-immolated in 10 of 17 prefectural-level areas of Tibetan
autonomy and 1 ordinary prefecture.\12\
For a list of Commission summaries on Tibetan self-
immolations that contain maps such as this one, please visit
http://www.cecc.gov/tibetan-self-immolations-0.
The Party and government failed this past year to respond
to Tibetan grievances in a constructive manner or accept any
accountability for Tibetan rejection of Chinese policies.
Officials characterized the crisis as the result of an external
conspiracy to undermine China's internal security and social
stability.\13\ In response, officials maintained policies and
practices that exacerbate tension.\14\ In December 2012, then-
Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues Maria Otero cited
examples:\15\
``Severe government controls on Tibetan
Buddhist religious practice and monastic
institutions'';
``Education practices that undermine the
preservation of Tibetan language'';
``Intensive surveillance, arbitrary detentions
and disappearances of Tibetans, including youth and
Tibetan intellectual and cultural leaders'';
``Escalating restrictions on news, media and
communications''; and
``The use of force against Tibetans seeking
peacefully to exercise their universal human rights.''
A Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson in December 2012
denied that issues regarding Tibetan culture, language, and
religion had a role in what a reporter called ``the current
tense situation.''\16\ The spokesperson blamed ``the Dalai
clique''--the Dalai Lama and organizations and individuals the
Party associates with him--asserting that ``Tibet-related
issues are not issues of ethnicity, religion, or human rights''
but of ``China's sovereignty and territorial integrity.''\17\
Officials continued to use state-run media to discredit self-
immolators, depicting them in a pejorative manner (e.g., as a
weak, flawed, or distressed individual,\18\ ``copy-cat,''\19\
or terrorist\20\).
Tibetan Self-Immolations Reported or Believed To Focus on Political
and Religious Issues (September 2012-July 2013)
See CECC 2012 Annual Report for Self-Immolations 1-50 (February 2009-August 2012)\21\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Self-
Immolation
Date of Self- Name Sex / Occupation Location
No. Immolation Approx. Age Affiliation (Prov. / Status
Pref./
County)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2012 ........... .............. ............. ........
------------------------------------------------------------------------
51 September 29 Yungdrung Layperson Qinghai / Deceased
M/27 Yushu TAP / \22\
Zaduo county
------------------------------------------------------------------------
52 October 4 Gudrub Layperson TAR / Naqu Deceased
M/43 (writer) pref. / Naqu \23\
county
------------------------------------------------------------------------
53 October 6 Sanggye Layperson Gansu / Deceased
Gyatso Gannan TAP / \24\
M/27 Hezuo city
------------------------------------------------------------------------
54 October 13 Tamdrin Layperson Gansu / Deceased
Dorje Gannan / \25\
M/early 50s Hezuo
------------------------------------------------------------------------
55 October 20 Lhamo Kyab Husband and Gansu / Deceased
M/27 father Gannan / \26\
Xiahe county
------------------------------------------------------------------------
56 October 22 Dondrub Husband Gansu / Deceased
M/about 65 Gannan / \27\
Xiahe
------------------------------------------------------------------------
57 October 23 Dorje Husband and Gansu / Deceased
Rinchen father Gannan / \28\
M/58 Xiahe
------------------------------------------------------------------------
58 October 25 Tsepo, M/20 Laypersons TAR / Naqu / Deceased
59 Tenzin, M/ (cousins) Biru county Unknown\
25 29\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
60 October 26 Lhamo Layperson Gansu / Deceased
Tseten Gannan / \30\
M/24 Xiahe
------------------------------------------------------------------------
61 October 26 Thubwang Layperson Gansu / Deceased
Kyab Gannan / \31\
M/23 Xiahe
------------------------------------------------------------------------
62 November 4 Dorje Husband, Qinghai / Deceased
Lhundrub father, Huangnan TAP / \32\
M/25 artist Tongren
county
------------------------------------------------------------------------
63 November 7 Dorje, M/15 Monks Sichuan / Aba Deceased
64 Samdrub, M/ Ngoshul T&QAP / Aba Hospital
65 16 Monastery county ized
Dorje Kyab, Hospital
M/16 ized\33
\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
66 November 7 Tamdrin Tso Mother Qinghai / Deceased
F/23 Huangnan / \34\
Tongren
------------------------------------------------------------------------
67 November 7 Tsegyal Father TAR / Naqu / Deceased
M/27 Biru \35\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
68 November 8 Kalsang Former monk Qinghai / Deceased
Jinpa Rongbo Huangnan / \36\
M/18 Monastery Tongren
------------------------------------------------------------------------
69 November 10 Gonpo Layperson Gansu / Deceased
Tsering Gannan / \37\
M/19 Hezuo
------------------------------------------------------------------------
70 November 12 Nyingkar Husband Qinghai / Deceased
Tashi Huangnan / \38\
M/24 Tongren
------------------------------------------------------------------------
71 November 12 Nyingchag Layperson Qinghai / Deceased
Bum Huangnan / \39\
M/16 Tongren
------------------------------------------------------------------------
72 November 15 Tenzin Layperson Qinghai / Deceased
Drolma Huangnan / \40\
F/23 Tongren
------------------------------------------------------------------------
73 November 15 Khabum Gyal Layperson Qinghai / Deceased
M/18 Huangnan / \41\
Tongren
------------------------------------------------------------------------
74 November 17 Chagmo Kyi Mother Qinghai / Deceased
F/26 Huangnan / \42\
Tongren
------------------------------------------------------------------------
75 November 17 Sangdrag Husband and Qinghai / Deceased
Tsering father Huangnan / \43\
M/24 Tongren
------------------------------------------------------------------------
76 November 19 Wangchen Layperson Qinghai / Deceased
Norbu Haidong \44\
M/25 pref. /
Xunhua SAC
------------------------------------------------------------------------
77 November 20 Tsering Husband and Gansu / Deceased
Dondrub father Gannan / \45\
M/35 Xiahe
------------------------------------------------------------------------
78 November 22 Lubum Gyal Layperson Qinghai / Deceased
M/18 Huangnan / \46\
Tongren
------------------------------------------------------------------------
79 November 22 Tamdrin Former monk Gansu / Deceased
Kyab Shitsang Gannan / \47\
M/23 Monastery Luqu county
------------------------------------------------------------------------
80 November 23 Tamdrin Head of Qinghai / Deceased
Dorje household Huangnan / \48\
M/29 Zeku county
------------------------------------------------------------------------
81 November 25 Sanggye Nun Qinghai / Deceased
Drolma Mindrol Huangnan / \49\
F/17 Dargyling Zeku
Nunnery
------------------------------------------------------------------------
82 November 26 Wanggyal Student Sichuan / Unknown\
M/about 20 Ganzi TAP / 50\
Seda county
------------------------------------------------------------------------
83 November 26 Konchog Husband Gansu / Deceased
Tsering Gannan / \51\
M/18 Xiahe
------------------------------------------------------------------------
84 November 26 Gonpo Husband and Gansu / Deceased
Tsering father Gannan / \52\
M/24 Luqu
------------------------------------------------------------------------
85 November 27 Kalsang Nomad Sichuan / Aba Deceased
Kyab / Ruo'ergai \53\
M/24 county
------------------------------------------------------------------------
86 November 27 Sanggye Layperson Gansu / Deceased
Tashi Gannan / \54\
M/18 Xiahe
------------------------------------------------------------------------
87 November 28 Bande Khar Layperson Gansu / Deceased
(Wangden Gannan / \55\
Khar) Hezuo
M/21
------------------------------------------------------------------------
88 November 29 Tsering Husband and Gansu / Deceased
Namgyal father Gannan / \56\
(Tsering Luqu
Tashi)
M/31
------------------------------------------------------------------------
89 November 30 Konchog Father Sichuan / Aba Deceased
Kyab / Ruo'ergai \57\
M/29
------------------------------------------------------------------------
90 December 2 Sungdu Kyab Husband and Gansu / Hospital
M/17 father Gannan / ized\58
Xiahe \
------------------------------------------------------------------------
91 December 3 Lobsang Monk Qinghai / Deceased
Gedun Penag Guoluo TAP / \59\
(Lobsang Monastery Banma county
Geleg)
M/29
------------------------------------------------------------------------
92 December 8 Pema Dorje Farmer Gansu / Deceased
M/23 Gannan / \60\
Luqu
------------------------------------------------------------------------
93 December 8 Konchog Monk Sichuan / Aba Deceased
Phelgyal Sumdo / Ruo'ergai \61\
(Konchog Monastery
Phelgye)
M/24
------------------------------------------------------------------------
94 December 9 Wangchen Student Qinghai / Deceased
Kyi Huangnan / \62\
(Rinchen Zeku
Kyi)
F/17
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2013
------------------------------------------------------------------------
95 January 12 Tsering Husband Gansu / Deceased
Tashi Gannan / \63\
(Tsebe) Xiahe
M/22
------------------------------------------------------------------------
96 January 18 Tsering Husband and Sichuan / Aba Deceased
Phuntsog father / \64\
(Drubchog) Hongyuan
M/28 county
------------------------------------------------------------------------
97 January 22 Konchog Husband, Gansu / Deceased
Kyab father, Gannan / \65\
M/23 farmer Xiahe
------------------------------------------------------------------------
98 February 3 Lobsang Monk Sichuan / Aba Deceased
Namgyal Kirti / Ruo'ergai \66\
M/37 Monastery
------------------------------------------------------------------------
99 February 13 Drugpa Khar Husband and Gansu / Deceased
M/26 father Gannan / \67\
Xiahe
------------------------------------------------------------------------
100 February 17 Namlha Husband and Gansu / Deceased
Tsering father Gannan / \68\
M/49 Xiahe
------------------------------------------------------------------------
101 February 19 Rinchen, M/ Laypersons Sichuan / Aba Both
102 17 / Ruo'ergai deceased
Sonam \69\
Dargye, M/
18
------------------------------------------------------------------------
103 February 24 Phagmo Farmer Qinghai / Deceased
Dondrub Haidong / \70\
M/early 20s Hualong HAC
------------------------------------------------------------------------
104 February 25 Tsezung Farmer and Gansu / Deceased
Kyab nomad Gannan / \71\
M/27 Luqu
------------------------------------------------------------------------
105 February 25 Sangdrag Monk Sichuan / Aba Hospital
M/unknown Diphu / Aba ized\72
Monastery \
------------------------------------------------------------------------
106 March 13 Konchog Wife and Sichuan / Aba Deceased
Wangmo mother / Ruo'ergai \73\
F/28-31
------------------------------------------------------------------------
107 March 16 Lobsang Monk Sichuan / Aba Deceased
Thogme Kirti / Aba \74\
M/28 Monastery
------------------------------------------------------------------------
108 March 24 Kalkyi Wife and Sichuan / Aba Deceased
F/30 mother / Rangtang \75\
county
------------------------------------------------------------------------
109 March 25 Lhamo Kyab Forest ranger Gansu / Deceased
M/43 Gannan / \76\
Xiahe
------------------------------------------------------------------------
110 March 26 Konchog Monk Gansu / Deceased
Tenzin Mogri Gannan / \77\
M/28 Monastery Luqu
------------------------------------------------------------------------
111 April 16 Chugtso Wife and Sichuan / Aba Deceased
F/20 mother / Rangtang \78\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
112 April 24 Lobsang Monks Sichuan / Aba Both
113 Dawa, M/20 Tagtsang Lhamo / Ruo'ergai deceased
Konchog Monastery \79\
Oezer, M/
23
------------------------------------------------------------------------
114 May 27 Tenzin Layperson Qinghai / Deceased
Sherab Yushu / \80\
M/31 Qumalai
county
------------------------------------------------------------------------
115 June 11 Wangchen Nun Sichuan / Deceased
Drolma Dragkar Ganzi / \81\
F/31 Nunnery Daofu county
------------------------------------------------------------------------
116 July 20 Konchog Monk Sichuan / Aba Deceased
Sonam Sogtsang / Ruo'ergai \82\
M/17 Monastery
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
THE ``OPINION''
Information in this report and the Commission's 2012 Annual
Report\83\ demonstrates a shift from an initial pattern of less
frequent self-immolations mainly in Sichuan with a majority of
current or former monastics,\84\ to a pattern of more frequent
self-immolations mostly outside of Sichuan with a majority of
laypersons.\85\ The shift was pronounced during the October-
November surge: of 38 self-immolations reported, 32 were
outside Sichuan, and 29 of the 32 were laypersons.\86\
Coinciding with that shift, on or about December 3, 2012,
the Supreme People's Procuratorate, the Supreme People's Court,
and the Ministry of Public Security jointly issued the
``Opinion on Handling Self-Immolation Cases in Tibetan Areas in
Accordance With the Law'' (the Opinion).\87\ The Opinion called
for persons officials characterize as ``principal culprits''
linked to self-immolation to face prosecution for ``intentional
homicide,'' as well as for criminal prosecution for activities
including gathering at self-immolation sites to mourn, or
offering donations to self-immolators' relatives.\88\ The
relative sizes of the Tibetan monastic and secular communities
suggest one basis for official concern over the spread of self-
immolation from one community to the other. The lay Tibetan
population is about 44 times greater than the monastic
population--approximately 140,000 monks and nuns\89\ among a
total Tibetan population of approximately 6.28 million.\90\
By early February 2013, official media reported nearly 90
formal arrests linked to self-immolation cases since October-
November 2012 in Gansu and Qinghai provinces.\91\ Indicative
examples of Tibetans detained (some imprisoned) for alleged
links to a self-immolator or self-immolation, or for sharing
self-immolation information, with timelines at least in part
after the Opinion's issue, follow.
October 23, 2012. Officials detained six
Tibetans at the site of Dorje Rinchen's self-immolation
in Xiahe (Sangchu) county, Gannan Tibetan Autonomous
Prefecture (TAP).\92\ On January 31, 2013, the Gannan
Intermediate People's Court sentenced four of them to
up to 12 years' imprisonment for ``intentional
homicide'' and two to up to 4 years for ``picking
quarrels and provoking troubles.''\93\
After November 19. Following his detention, on
February 8, 2013, the Huangnan Intermediate People's
Court in Huangnan (Malho) TAP sentenced a monk to 13
years' imprisonment for ``inciting'' homicide and
separatism in a case where someone decided not to self-
immolate.\94\
Likely December. Officials detained at least
nine Tibetans in connection with Tsering Namgyal's
November 29 self-immolation in Luqu (Luchu) county,
Gannan.\95\ On February 28, 2013, the Gannan
Intermediate People's Court sentenced three of them to
up to 15 years' imprisonment for ``intentional
homicide.''\96\
Possibly December. Officials detained three
Tibetans in Haidong prefecture, Qinghai.\97\ On March
18, 2013, the Haidong Intermediate People's Court
sentenced them to up to six years' imprisonment for
using ``self-immolation incidents'' to disseminate pro-
independence information.\98\
December 3. After the December 2 self-
immolation of Sangdu Kyab in Xiahe on December 3,
security officials reportedly detained five Bora
Monastery monks for interrogation.\99\
After December 9. After the December 9 self-
immolation of Wangchen Kyi in Zeku (Tsekhog) county,
Huangnan, officials detained five Tibetans described as
friends or family of self-immolators.\100\
Around December 24. Following the November 29
self-
immolation of Tsering Namgyal in Luqu county, security
officials reportedly detained eight Tibetans for
sharing information on the self-immolation.\101\
Possibly early 2013. Following the detention
of four Tibetans in Huangnan, on April 13, 2013, the
Huangnan Intermediate People's Court sentenced the
Tibetans to up to six years' imprisonment for
``inciting separatism'' by sharing self-immolation
information with domestic and overseas groups.\102\
January. Officials detained seven Tibetans in
connection with Sanggye Gyatso's October 6, 2012, self-
immolation in Hezuo (Tsoe) city, Gannan.\103\ Police
characterized the case as ``organized and premeditated
homicide'' because three detainees allegedly discussed
self-immolation, contacted a Tibetan organization in
India, and sent self-immolation information out of
China.\104\
July. In a Sichuan province case, officials
reportedly detained six Tibetans, including five monks,
after monk Konchog Sonam self-immolated on July 20 in
Ruo'ergai (Dzoege) county, Aba (Ngaba) Tibetan and
Qiang Autonomous Prefecture.\105\
The examples above are among 112 cases\106\ in the
Commission's Political Prisoner Database as of September 1,
2013, of detention or imprisonment linked to self-immolation or
the issue of self-
immolation since August 2012.\107\
THE CRACKDOWN
As self-immolation frequency increased, authorities
strengthened a security crackdown based on the premise of
``stability maintenance''\108\ that infringed on Tibetans'
freedoms of expression, association, and movement, and
curtailed their ability to communicate or share
information.\109\ Examples follow.
Expression. The Opinion established a legal
pretext for punishing Tibetans who expressed views
sympathetic to self-immolators or self-immolation\110\
by providing a broad basis for characterizing such
expression as ``inciting'' self-immolation.\111\
Association, movement. Authorities interfered
with Tibetans' right to associate with other Tibetans
within local communities,\112\ within wider Tibetan
areas,\113\ and with persons living abroad.\114\ Human
Rights Watch reported establishment of neighborhood
security ``grids'' in the TAR,\115\ and a program to
classify Tibetan villagers individually based on
religious and political factors.\116\
Communication, information. Authorities
interfered with communication,\117\ preventing Tibetans
from sharing or receiving information on self-
immolations and other topics deemed harmful to ``social
stability,''\118\ as well as accessing international
news.\119\
Religious Freedom for Tibetan Buddhists
Tibetan self-immolators this past year continued to call
for the Dalai Lama's return\120\--a demand that when voiced
during a suicidal protest may signify intense resentment toward
Chinese government and Communist Party intrusion into Tibetan
Buddhist affairs. The trend of creating new and unprecedented
control\121\ over the religion continued,\122\ along with
maintaining established repressive policies.\123\ Officials
characterize the result of such policies as the ``normal
order'' of Tibetan Buddhism.\124\
Unofficial reports in June 2013, if accurate, indicated a
potentially positive development. Beginning in August 2013,
officials in Hainan (Tsolho) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture
(TAP), Qinghai province, said they would ``experiment'' with
allowing monks and nuns to ``revere, respect, and follow'' the
Dalai Lama in his capacity as a religious leader.\125\ The
reports emerged the same month as remarks by a Central Party
School professor calling for engagement with the Dalai Lama in
his capacity as ``a religious leader'' and ceasing to treat him
``as an enemy.''\126\
By July 2013 official reports discounted prospects for a
less hostile policy toward the Dalai Lama.\127\ A July 11
notice reportedly issued by the Guoluo (Golog) TAP United Front
Work Department warned Tibetans not to believe ``rumors'' of a
``new policy'' permitting ``freedom to venerate the Dalai
Lama's portraits, and so on.''\128\ The notice cited Yu
Zhengsheng, a member of the Standing Committee of the Political
Bureau of the Communist Party Central Committee\129\ and Head
of the Central Committee Coordinating Group for Tibet
Affairs,\130\ stating that the Dalai Lama is ``always engaged
in secessionist activities.''\131\ The notice instructed
Tibetan Buddhists to ``separate themselves politically'' from
the Dalai Lama,\132\ but did not address the Dalai Lama's
status as a religious figure.
On July 6, 2013, the Dalai Lama's birthday, People's Armed
Police (PAP) in Daofu (Tawu) county, Ganzi (Kardze) TAP,
Sichuan province, reportedly ``opened fire'' on ``hundreds'' of
Tibetans returning from a hillside location where they
conducted religious observances.\133\ PAP reportedly wounded
10-16 Tibetans with what may have been anti-riot projectiles
and beat or tortured other Tibetans.\134\
Developments consistent with established policies this past
year include the following examples.
Reassessment, reappointment of Tibetan
Buddhist teachers. Effective December 2012, national
measures required Tibetan Buddhist monastic
teachers\135\ to submit, every five years, to a
reassessment\136\ conducted by Party-\137\ and
government-controlled Buddhist associations.\138\
Criteria include patriotism toward China,\139\
supporting Party leadership,\140\ and accepting
guidance from government- and Party-run offices.\141\
Reappointed teachers must sign an agreement
acknowledging such obligations.\142\ Teachers who
``forfeit'' appointment credentials are deemed
unqualified to teach.\143\
More ``harmonious model monastery'' awards.
Following the May 2012 initial round of such
awards,\144\ officials recognized 100 TAR monasteries
and nunneries and over 7,500 ``patriotic, law-abiding,
and advanced monks and nuns'' in December.\145\ An
abbot speaking at the ceremony described patriotism
toward China as ``an unshirkable responsibility'' of
Tibetan Buddhists and likened ``safeguarding the
unification of the motherland'' to a duty of
``disciples of Buddha.''\146\
Aggressive ``legal education'' campaigns.
Officials continued to enforce ``education'' focusing
on government legal measures to pressure Tibetans into
complying with policies that obstruct their freedom of
religion.\147\ On January 14, 2013, authorities
reportedly ``detained'' or ``disappeared'' 14 senior
monastic officials from four of Lhasa's premier Tibetan
Buddhist institutions after summoning them to a local
meeting. Authorities removed them to a monastery in
Naqu (Nagchu) prefecture for ``political
education.''\148\
Status of Tibetan Culture
This past year, some Tibetan self-immolators reportedly
called for greater use of the Tibetan language as they
burned\149\--an apparent indication of the significant threat
some Tibetans believe Party and government policies pose to
Tibetan culture's vibrancy and viability. The Commission's 2012
Annual Report noted that a senior Party official\150\ advocated
in February 2012 for ethnic ``amalgamation,''\151\ ending
minority-language education programs to achieve
``desegregation,''\152\ and ``popularizing'' the use of
Mandarin Chinese ``without fail.''\153\ In December 2012, then-
Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues Maria Otero observed
that ``official rhetoric that denigrates the Tibetan language''
is a factor that ``has further exacerbated tensions.''\154\
Indicative developments this past year include the
following examples.
More language protests in Qinghai
Province.\155\ On November 26\156\ and 28,\157\ 2012,
thousands of Tibetan tertiary students protested
against issues including government language policy.
Authorities had required students to study an official
booklet that some regarded as ``derogatory'' toward
Tibetan language and that promoted using Mandarin.\158\
According to the booklet, bilingual education\159\
would help ``ethnic minorities to promote their culture
and reach its pinnacle.''\160\ A November 9 protest
involving thousands of Tibetan middle school students
at another Qinghai location also involved language
rights, among other things.\161\
Qinghai student protesters imprisoned. On
April 10, 2013, the Gonghe (Chabcha) County People's
Court sentenced eight Hainan Professional Training
School\162\ students to imprisonment\163\ for ``illegal
assembly''\164\ during the November 26 protest.\165\
One report described them as ``school prefects or class
monitors''\166\ and noted that students resented the
booklet's use in ``political education'' classes.\167\
An unidentified Qinghai court reportedly sentenced a
middle school student accused of ``organizing'' the
November 9 protests to four years' imprisonment.\168\
Citizens promote Tibetan language. Reports of
unofficial Tibetan initiatives to promote Tibetan
language emerged in Qinghai, where organizers of the
Mother Tongue Protection Association observed UN-
recognized International Mother Language Day;\169\ in
Gansu, where posters described the language as ``the
golden cup that holds the essence of Tibetan culture''
and urged Tibetans to ``give up impure mixed speech
forever'';\170\ and in Sichuan, where township
authorities banned informal classes on Tibetan language
and culture.\171\
Economic Development Policy and Implementation
Officials continued to emphasize economic development as
the key to achieving ``social stability''\172\ even though some
initiatives resulted in protests\173\ or alleged harm to local
communities\174\--including a reported self-immolator's call
for protection of Tibet's ``fragile environment.''\175\ The
Party and government maintained the development strategy
announced at the January 2010 Fifth Tibet Work Forum\176\--
adherence to a model based on ``Chinese characteristics'' and
retaining ``Tibetan traits.''\177\ Government ``investment'' in
China's western areas--a program launched in 2000 as ``Great
Western Development'' (xibu da kaifa)\178\--almost tripled in
2012 compared with 2011, state-run media reported.\179\
Indicative developments this past year include the
following examples.
Railroad construction. A Tibet Autonomous
Region (TAR) official said the Lhasa-Shigatse railway
will begin operation by the end of 2014.\180\ Previous
estimates ranged from 2010\181\ to 2015.\182\ TAR
officials expressed concern that a National People's
Congress decision to dismantle the Ministry of
Railroads\183\ could hinder railroad construction on
the Tibetan plateau by making unprofitable services
harder to finance.\184\
Forced settlement.\185\ Official media
reported that the TAR government would settle 460,000
farmers and herders in 2013, and that ``nearly 2.1
million'' had been settled (or resettled) during 2006-
2012.\186\ Party Secretary Chen Quanguo said in
September 2012 that ``all farmers and herders'' in the
TAR would be settled by the end of 2013.\187\ A 2011
government opinion called for nationwide settlement of
herders to be ``basically'' accomplished by 2015.\188\
Mining. International media organizations
reported on a March 2013 landslide disaster at a TAR
gold mine in Lhasa municipality,\189\ and on
environmental pollution that interfered with Tibetans'
ability to farm and maintain livestock.\190\ In a May
2013 protest, 3,500 Tibetans in Biru (Driru) county,
Naqu (Nagchu) prefecture, reportedly confronted
arriving workers they suspected to be miners and asked
them to ``leave our resources where they are.''\191\
Such reports are concurrent with TAR policy to increase
the mining share of TAR GDP from about 3 percent in
2010 to between 30 and 50 percent by 2020.\192\
Hydropower. Government plans for construction
of hydroelectric projects along major Tibetan rivers
attracted the interest of news media and analysts.\193\
A blog maintained by a Canada-based Tibetan published
detailed information in March 2013 on each project's
location, capacity, and status.\194\
Summary: Tibetan Political Detention and Imprisonment
As of September 1, 2013, the Commission's Political
Prisoner Database (PPD) contained 1,531 records--a figure
certain to be far from complete--of Tibetan political prisoners
detained on or after March 10, 2008, the beginning of a period
of mostly peaceful political protests that swept across the
Tibetan plateau.
Among the 1,531 PPD records of Tibetan political detentions
reported since March 2008 are 28 Tibetans ordered to serve
reeducation through labor (23 are believed released upon
completing their terms) and 328 Tibetans whom courts sentenced
to imprisonment ranging from six months to life (142 are
believed released upon sentence completion).\195\ Of the 328
Tibetan political prisoners sentenced to imprisonment since
March 2008, sentencing information is available for 315
prisoners, including 309 with fixed-term sentences averaging 4
years and 8 months, based on PPD data as of September 1, 2013.
CURRENT TIBETAN POLITICAL DETENTION AND IMPRISONMENT
As of September 1, 2013, the PPD contained records of 642
Tibetan political prisoners believed or presumed currently
detained or imprisoned. Of those, 622 are records of Tibetans
detained on or after March 10, 2008;\196\ 20 are records of
Tibetans detained prior to March 10, 2008. PPD information for
the period since March 10, 2008, is certain to be far from
complete.
Of the 622 Tibetan political prisoners who were detained on
or after March 10, 2008, and who were believed or presumed to
remain detained or imprisoned as of September 1, 2013, PPD data
indicated that:
314 (51 percent) are Tibetan Buddhist monks,
nuns, teachers, or trulkus.\197\
550 (88 percent) are male, 46 (7 percent) are
female, and 26 are of unknown gender.
288 (46 percent) are believed or presumed
detained or imprisoned in Sichuan province; the rest
are believed or presumed detained or imprisoned in the
Tibet Autonomous Region (143), Qinghai province (122),
Gansu province (68), and the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous
Region (1).
Sentencing information is available for 182
prisoners: 176 reportedly were sentenced to fixed terms
ranging from 1 year and 6 months to 20 years,\198\ and
6 were sentenced to life imprisonment or death with a
2-year reprieve.\199\ The average fixed-term sentence
is 6 years and 3 months. Seventy-nine (43 percent) of
the prisoners with known sentences are Tibetan Buddhist
monks, nuns, teachers, or trulkus.
Sentencing information is available for 16 of the 20
Tibetan political prisoners detained prior to March 10, 2008,
and believed imprisoned as of September 1, 2013. Their
sentences range from 8 years to life imprisonment; the average
fixed-term sentence is 13 years and 1 month.
VI. Developments in Hong Kong and Macau
Hong Kong
While in practice Hong Kong residents enjoy greater freedom
than citizens of mainland China, the Commission continued to
observe developments that raise concerns about the commitment
of the central and Hong Kong governments to Hong Kong's
autonomy and freedoms. Hong Kong's Basic Law guarantees the
freedoms of speech, religion, and assembly, promises Hong Kong
a ``high degree of autonomy,'' and confirms the applicability
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) to Hong Kong.\1\ The Basic Law also states that the
``ultimate aim'' is the election by universal suffrage of Hong
Kong's top official--the Chief Executive (CE)--and Hong Kong's
Legislative Council (LegCo).\2\ In March 2013, the UN Human
Rights Committee reviewed Hong Kong for compliance with the
ICCPR and expressed ``concern about the lack of a clear plan to
institute universal suffrage and to ensure the right of all
persons to vote and to stand for election without unreasonable
limitations.''\3\ The committee urged the Hong Kong government
to ``outline clear and detailed plans on how universal and
equal suffrage might be instituted.''\4\
UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE AND AUTONOMY
The Basic Law states that the CE is to be elected by
universal suffrage ``upon nomination by a broadly
representative nominating committee in accordance with
democratic procedures.''\5\ A 2007 National People's Congress
Standing Committee (NPCSC) decision further specified that the
CE ``may'' be elected through universal suffrage in 2017, after
which LegCo member elections may follow suit.\6\ In its
submission to the UN Human Rights Committee regarding Hong
Kong's compliance with the ICCPR, the Hong Kong government
confirmed the 2017 time frame for implementation of universal
suffrage for electing the CE and indicated that universal
suffrage for elections of all LegCo members would be
implemented in 2020.\7\ Currently 35 of the 70 LegCo members
are elected through Functional Constituencies, most with fewer
than 1,500 voters that can include companies with multiple
votes; a similarly disproportionate system is used to select
the 1,200 members of the election committee that chooses the
CE.\8\
Large numbers of Hong Kong residents continued advocating
for universal suffrage as local officials deferred discussion
of electoral reform. Public support grew\9\ for the Occupy
Central movement, which plans to mobilize 10,000 protesters to
occupy Hong Kong's financial district in July 2014 if the
government has not issued a universal suffrage plan meeting
international standards by that time.\10\ Other mass
demonstrations have recently compelled government action. In
October 2012, for example, the Hong Kong government formally
shelved a patriotic education curriculum\11\ that had been
criticized by tens of thousands of protestors as political
indoctrination.\12\ In July 2013, Chief Executive CY Leung
dismissed calls for early public consultation on electoral
reform while maintaining that he did not need the central
government's permission to launch such consultations.\13\ Pro-
democracy advocates fear that delays will leave insufficient
time for public consultation.\14\
Statements by central government officials this past year
raised concerns over central government interference in the
nomination of CE candidates to run in elections by universal
suffrage. During the most recent CE election in March 2012, the
central government reportedly wielded heavy influence in the
selection of its favored candidate CY Leung, after dropping
support for Henry Tang, who had become the subject of
controversies.\15\ In August 2013, the director of the central
government's liaison office in Hong Kong rejected a pro-
democracy party legislator's proposal to allow candidates who
receive a certain number of voters' nominations to run for CE,
instead saying that the election committee that currently
selects the CE should form the basis of the committee that
selects the CE candidates in an election by universal
suffrage.\16\ A pro-democracy legislator criticized the current
election committee as ``based on a very narrow electorate'' and
``not a broadly representative committee.''\17\ In March, the
chairman of the Law Committee under the National People's
Congress Standing Committee listed a set of requirements for CE
candidates to meet, one of which is that they must be trusted
by the central government.\18\ The chairman said such
candidates could criticize the central government, but they
could not, for example, consider the central government an
opponent, citing a pro-democracy legislator as an example.\19\
Two incidents this year highlighted ongoing challenges to
Hong Kong's judicial and law enforcement independence. In a
case involving the rights of domestic helpers to seek permanent
residency, the Hong Kong government took the unusual step of
requesting that Hong Kong's highest court refer a key issue for
interpretation to the National People's Congress Standing
Committee, which was expected to side with the Hong Kong
government's position.\20\ The court sided with the Hong Kong
government by ruling in March 2013 against permanent residency
for domestic helpers while saying it did not need to seek the
central government's interpretation in this particular
instance.\21\ In another case, local authorities delayed action
on a U.S. request for the provisional arrest of former U.S.
National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden, which
allowed him to leave Hong Kong.\22\ Unnamed sources cited in a
New York Times article claimed the Chinese government directed
local authorities to allow Snowden's departure.\23\ Local
officials maintained that their law enforcement process
remained independent.\24\
PRESS FREEDOM
Despite enjoying greater press freedom than mainland China,
Hong Kong journalists and media organizations continued to
report pressure and harassment. Assaults or instances of
harassment against Hong Kong journalists reportedly rose to 18
(7 occurring in mainland China), an increase over the 1 to 2
assaults reported on average in recent years.\25\ Among the
most heavily targeted media outlets was the Next Media group,
which reported four incidents in June 2013.\26\ The Hong Kong
Journalists Association claims that Hong Kong and central
government authorities have been largely unresponsive to
inquiries regarding the attacks.\27\ According to a 2012
survey, more than one-third of Hong Kong journalists reportedly
admitted to self-censorship,\28\ which they attribute in part
to editorial pressure from media owners with significant
political and economic interests in mainland China.\29\ Over
half the owners of Hong Kong's 30 major media outlets have been
appointed as representatives to either the central government's
top legislative or political advisory body.\30\ Several major
newspapers have reportedly set up special committees of largely
mainland Chinese membership to vet articles before publication,
which bears similarities to editorial practices in media
outlets in mainland China.\31\
TRANSPARENCY
During the last year, the Hong Kong government made uneven
progress toward maintaining transparency. Access to government
records was hampered by the loss or destruction of public
documents by government offices.\32\ Local activists say that
civil servants may dispose of files because there is no
existing legislation to regulate recordkeeping.\33\ In June
2013, a Hong Kong Law Reform Commission sub-committee began
work to review the current state of management of government
records, study relevant laws in other jurisdictions, and make
recommendations for possible regulatory reforms.\34\ In
addition, the Ombudsman of Hong Kong opened an investigation
into the ``access to information regime and Government's
records management system'' in January 2013.\35\
The government postponed implementation of a measure in
March 2013 that would have redacted from public corporate
filings important identifying information about company
directors--the type of information that was used by Bloomberg
and the New York Times to uncover the alleged vast wealth of
China's top political families.\36\ Proponents of the measure
cited the privacy rights of directors while opponents warned
that it would harm the reputation of Hong Kong's financial
markets for transparency and ``risk turning Hong Kong into an
opaque offshore tax shelter for China's plutocrats.''\37\
Macau
Macau's Basic Law differs from Hong Kong in several
aspects, including the absence of any language regarding
``universal suffrage,'' although it does include a provision
making the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) applicable to Macau.\38\ The Commission observed that
while Macau residents continued to enjoy greater freedom than
citizens of mainland China, the lack of democratic elections in
line with the ICCPR and threats to the freedoms of press and
assembly in Macau remain ongoing challenges. In its Concluding
Observations on Macau's compliance with the ICCPR issued
earlier this year, the UN Human Rights Committee urged Macau to
``outline a clear and comprehensive plan of action and set
timelines for the transition to an electoral system based on
universal and equal suffrage . . . .''\39\
POLITICAL AND PRESS FREEDOMS
Mainland experts and officials have dissuaded Macau from
pursuing universal suffrage.\40\ In March 2013, Political
Bureau Standing Committee member Yu Zhengsheng advised a
private audience of Hong Kong and Macau officials that their
governing administrations could not be opposed to the central
government.\41\ The chairperson of the UN Human Rights
Committee expressed concern in March 2013 that despite public
consultation, the government had made no further efforts toward
universal suffrage.\42\ Self-censorship and heavy local
government funding of Macau media persist, and journalists
report that articles with dissenting views are sometimes
altered or deleted.\43\ In September 2012, the Macau government
withdrew parts of a bill that would have established a ``press
accountability board.''\44\ Macau residents continued to
organize protests on a range of social and political issues,
but in some cases faced police retaliation, including
confiscation of news materials and detention.\45\
CORRUPTION
The gambling industry in Macau is reportedly tied to
widespread corruption and the laundering of large amounts of
money out of mainland China.\46\ This movement of money through
Macau is fueled by a ``junket'' system, which reportedly aids
mainland VIP patrons in bypassing China's limits on how much
money can be taken out of China.\47\ Casinos and junkets
account for a large portion of Macau's annual revenue,\48\ and
one Macau academic estimates that US$202 billion in ill-gotten
funds are channeled through Macau each year.\49\
During the reporting year, the Chinese government and Macau
officials reportedly stepped up efforts to regulate Macau's
gambling industry as part of a larger campaign by the central
government against corruption.\50\ In November 2012,
authorities issued updated guidelines to junket operators
intended to increase reporting on the transactions of gaming
clients and, in a high-profile incident, detained more than
half a dozen people in the junket business.\51\ In July 2013, a
U.S. official told the U.S.-China Security and Economic Review
Commission that Macau had taken some steps to address money
laundering deficiencies noted in a 2007 evaluation by a
regional anti-money laundering group, including performing
regular risk assessments of gaming operators and junkets and
enhancing the oversight of junkets operators.\52\ The official
noted, however, that Macau still needed to incorporate a
``freezing mechanism'' into its anti-money laundering
framework, lower its reporting threshold for large
transactions, and implement an ``effective cross-border cash
declaration system.''\53\ In June 2013, Macau's Financial
Intelligence Office announced that it was considering a
``cross-border cash declaration system.''\54\
VII. Endnotes
Voted to adopt: Senators Brown, Baucus, Levin, Feinstein,
and Merkley; Representatives Smith, Wolf, Meadows, Pittenger, Walz,
Kaptur, and Honda; Under Secretary Sanchez and Assistant Administrator
Biswal.
Did not vote: Deputy Secretary Harris.
Notes to Section I--Political Prisoner Database
\1\The Commission treats as a political prisoner an individual
detained or imprisoned for exercising his or her human rights under
international law, such as peaceful assembly, freedom of religion,
freedom of association, free expression, including the freedom to
advocate peaceful social or political change, and to criticize
government policy or government officials. (This list is illustrative,
not exhaustive.) In most cases, prisoners in the PPD were detained or
imprisoned for attempting to exercise rights guaranteed to them by
China's Constitution and law, or by international law, or both. Chinese
security, prosecution, and judicial officials sometimes seek to
distract attention from the political or religious nature of
imprisonment by convicting a de facto political or religious prisoner
under the pretext of having committed a generic crime. In such cases,
defendants typically deny guilt but officials may attempt to coerce
confessions using torture and other forms of abuse, and standards of
evidence are poor. If authorities permit a defendant to entrust someone
to provide him or her legal counsel and defense, as China's Criminal
Procedure Law guarantees in Article 32, officials may deny the counsel
adequate access to the defendant, restrict or deny the counsel's access
to evidence, and not provide the counsel adequate time to prepare a
defense.
Notes to Section II--Freedom of Expression
\1\Human Rights Watch, ``World Report 2013--Events of 2012,'' 31
January 13; Freedom House, ``Freedom of the Press 2013: China,'' May
2013.
\2\International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December
66, entry into force 23 March 76, art. 19(3). China has signed and
stated its intent to ratify the ICCPR. Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, adopted and proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolution 217A
(III) of 10 December 48, arts. 19, 29. The UN Special Rapporteur on the
Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and
Expression has also used this three-factor test to describe the
standard for determining when a restriction is permissible under
Article 19, paragraph 3 of the ICCPR. UN Human Rights Council, Report
of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right
to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Frank La Rue, 16 May 11, A/HRC/
17/27, para. 24.
\3\UN GAOR, Hum. Rts. Coun., 12th Sess., Promotion and Protection
of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, Including the Right to Development, adopted by Human Rights
Council resolution 12/16, A/HRC/RES/12/16, 12 October 09, para.
5(p)(i); State Council Information Office, ``Progress in China's Human
Rights in 2012,'' reprinted in Xinhua, 14 May 13.
\4\UN GAOR, Hum. Rts. Coun., 20th Sess., Promotion and Protection
of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, Including the Right to Development, Agenda Item 3, A/HRC/20/
L.13, 29 June 12; ``Human Rights Council Backs Internet Freedom,''
Agence France-Presse, reprinted in Google, 5 July 12.
\5\Lu Wei, ``Chinese Domain Set To Surf,'' China Daily, 7 July 10.
\6\China Internet Network Information Center, ``The 32nd
Statistical Report on Internet Development in China'' [Di 32 ci
zhongguo hulian wangluo fazhan zhuangkuang tongji baogao], July 2013,
5.
\7\Ibid.
\8\Christina Lo, ``China Mobile Subscribers Up 1.2 Pct to 1.15 Bln
in March,'' Reuters, 26 April 13.
\9\For more information, see ``Faster Internet To Reach More Parts
of China,'' Xinhua, 17 April 13; Shen Jingting, ``China Mobile To
Expand 4G Network,'' China Daily, 21 June 12.
\10\Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, ``Internet
Industry `12th Five-Year' Development Plan'' [Hulianwang hangye
``shi'er wu'' fazhan guihua], 4 May 12; ``Chinese Internet Users To Hit
800m by 2015,'' Xinhua, reprinted in China Daily, 5 May 12.
\11\State Council Information Office, ``National Human Rights
Action Plan of China (2012-2015),'' 11 June 12, sec. I(6).
\12\``4M Broadband To Cover 70% of Chinese Users,'' Xinhua,
reprinted in China Daily, 27 February 13.
\13\``Chinese Official Media Focuses on Internet Management;
Internet Users Worry About Limits to Anticorruption'' [Zhongguo guan
mei jujiao wangguan wangmin danxin fanfu shou xian], BBC, 23 December
12; ``Opinion: Strengthening of Internet Management Has Won Popular
Support'' [Sheping: jiaqiang hulianwang guanli shi de renxin de],
Global Times, 21 December 12; ``China Continues To Strengthen Internet
Management; Internet Spring Difficult Now'' [Zhongguo chixu jiaqiang
wangguan wangluo chuntian nan xian], BBC, 21 December 12.
\14\See, e.g., ``Expert: Three Characteristics of Online Rumors
Cause Great Harm; Should Heavily Punish Rumor Mongers'' [Zhuanjia: san
tedian zhi wangluo yaoyan weihai da ying jiazhong chengzhi zaoyao zhe],
People's Daily, 4 June 13; Liu Chang, ``Use Laws and Supervision To
Control Online Rumors'' [Yong falu he jianguan ezhi wangluo yaoyan],
Global Times, 27 May 13; Jing Ping, ``The Fundamental Policy of Curbing
Online Rumors'' [Ezhi wangluo yaoyan de zhiben zhi ce], Beijing Daily,
9 April 13.
\15\Mo Jinjin, ``The Internet Is Not Outside the Law'' [Wangluo
bushi fawai zhidi], People's Daily, 18 December 12.
\16\David Bandurski, ``People's Daily: Be Good Online,'' China
Media Project, 18 December 12.
\17\See, e.g., John Kennedy, ``New Propaganda Chief Reappears,
Calls for Greater Internet Control,'' South China Morning Post, 7
December 12; Jia Ruijin, ``Wang Junmin's Research on Internet
Propaganda and Management Work'' [Wang junmin diaoyan hulianwang
xuanchuan guanli gongzuo], Dazhong Net, 15 June 13; ``Wu Bangguo: All
Areas of Society Strongly Appeal for Strengthened Internet Management''
[Wu bangguo: shehui ge fangmian qianglie huyu jiaqiang wangguan], BBC,
8 March 13.
\18\``China Waging War Against Online Rumors,'' Xinhua, 2 May 13.
\19\``NPC Reviews Internet Info Protection Law,'' Xinhua, reprinted
in China Daily, 24 December 12; ``China's Top Legislature Mulls
Internet Regulatory Measures,'' Xinhua, 24 December 12.
\20\``China's Legislature Adopts Online Info Rules To Protect
Privacy,'' Xinhua, 28 December 12.
\21\See, e.g., Joe McDonald, ``China Real-Name Registration Is Now
Law in Country,'' Associated Press, reprinted in Huffington Post, 28
December 12; Keith Bradsher, ``China Toughens Its Restrictions on Use
of the Internet,'' New York Times, 28 December 12; Zhao Yinan and Zhang
Chunyan, ``Real Names Required,'' China Daily, 29 December 12.
\22\Supreme People's Court and Supreme People's Procuratorate,
Interpretation on Some Questions Regarding Applicable Law When Handling
Uses of Information Networks To Commit Defamation and Other Such
Criminal Cases [Guanyu banli liyong xinxi wangluo shishi feibang deng
xingshi anjian shiyong falu ruogan wenti de jieshi], passed 2 September
13 (SPP), 5 September 13 (SPC), effective 10 September 13; Chris
Buckley, ``China Cracks Down on Online Opinion Makers,'' New York
Times, 10 September 13.
\23\Supreme People's Court and Supreme People's Procuratorate,
Interpretation on Some Questions Regarding Applicable Law When Handling
Uses of Information Networks To Commit Defamation and Other Such
Criminal Cases [Guanyu banli liyong xinxi wangluo shishi feibang deng
xingshi anjian shiyong falu ruogan wenti de jieshi], passed 2 September
13 (SPP), 5 September 13 (SPC), effective 10 September 13, art. 2.
\24\Committee to Protect Journalists, ``China's New Leadership
Faces Censorship Challenge,'' 11 March 13; Ai Weiwei, ``China's
Censorship Can Never Defeat the Internet,'' Guardian, 15 April 12;
Sophie Beach, ``Challenged in China: Beyond Censors' Reach, Free
Expression Thrives, To a Point,'' Committee to Protect Journalists, 11
March 13; Gary King et al., ``How Censorship in China Allows Government
Criticism but Silences Collective Expression,'' American Political
Science Review, May 2013, 1-18; ``China's Internet: `A Giant Cage,'''
Economist, 6 April 13.
\25\``China's Internet: `A Giant Cage,''' Economist, 6 April 13.
\26\Vernon Silver, ``Cracking China's Skype Surveillance
Software,'' Bloomberg, 8 March 13; Andrew Phelps, Nieman Journalism
Lab, ``Reverse Engineering Chinese Censorship: When and Why Are
Controversial Tweets Deleted?'' 30 May 12; Gary King et al., ``How
Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but Silences Collective
Expression,'' American Political Science Review, May 2013, 1-18; David
Bamman et al., ``Censorship and Deletion Practices in Chinese Social
Media,'' First Monday, Vol. 17, No. 3, 5 March 12; Wang Xinyu, ```Naked
Official' Keywords Censored in China,'' New Tang Dynasty Television, 1
March 13.
\27\Open Net Initiative, ``Country Report: China,'' 9 August 12,
271.
\28\Oiwan Lam, ``China: Various Aspects of Censorship,'' Global
Voices Online, 17 March 10; Jedidiah R. Crandall et al., ``Chat Program
Censorship and Surveillance in China: Tracking TOM-Skype and Sina UC,''
First Monday, Vol. 18, No. 7 (1 July 13); Adam Taylor, ``Why China's
Enormous Twitter Rival Blocks Searches Related to `Hair Bacon,'''
Business Insider, 4 September 13. These sources provide information
about the types of ongoing censorship in China and the lack of
censorship transparency.
\29\UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on
the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and
Expression, Frank La Rue, 16 May 11, A/HRC/17/27, para. 24.
\30\Keith Bradsher, ``China Blocks Access to Times After Article,''
New York Times, 25 October 12.
\31\See, e.g., Michelle FlorCruz, ``China's Twitter Censors Party
Congress Chatter,'' International Business Times, 9 November 12;
Jonathan Kaiman, ``Tiananmen Square Online Searches Censored by Chinese
Authorities,'' Guardian, 4 June 13; ``Censors Ban Talk Online of
Tiananmen Massacre,'' Radio Free Asia, 28 May 13. For Commission
analysis, see ``Chinese Censors Limit Online Content for the 18th Party
Congress,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 21 December
12.
\32\For previous reporting on this issue, see CECC, 2012 Annual
Report, 10 October 12, 50-53.
\33\Jonathan Ansfield, ``Chinese Authorities Putting Pressure on
Businesses To Help Censor the Web,'' New York Times, 13 November 12;
Brian Spegele and Paul Mozur, ``China Hardens Grip Ahead of Party
Meeting,'' Wall Street Journal, 10 November 12; Zhang Zihan, ``Foreign-
Run VPNs Illegal in China: Govt,'' Global Times, 14 December 12.
\34\Jason Ng and Pierre Landry, ``The Political Hierarchy of
Censorship: An Analysis of Keyword Blocking of CCP Officials' Names on
Sina Weibo Before and After the 2012 National Congress (S)election,''
Eleventh Chinese Internet Research Conference, 15 June 13.
\35\Gary King et al., ``How Censorship in China Allows Government
Criticism but Silences Collective Expression,'' American Political
Science Review, May 2013, 1-18.
\36\Tao Zhu et al., ``The Velocity of Censorship: High-Fidelity
Detection of Microblog Post Deletions,'' Arvix.org, 4 March 13.
\37\Jeffrey Knockel, Jedidiah R. Crandall, and Jared Saia, ``Three
Researchers, Five Conjectures: An Empirical Analysis of TOM-Skype
Censorship and Surveillance,'' University of New Mexico, Department of
Computer Science; Jeffrey Knockel, ``What Keywords Trigger TOM-Skype
Censorship and Surveillance?'' Jeffrey Knockel's Personal Web site,
last visited 24 September 13; Vernon Silver, ``Cracking China's Skype
Surveillance Software,'' Businessweek, 8 March 13.
\38\State Council, Measures for the Administration of Internet
Information Services [Hulianwang xinxi fuwu guanli banfa], issued and
effective 25 September 00, art. 15.
\39\Ibid. For more information on non-transparent censorship
legislation, see Freedom House, ``Freedom on the Net 2012: China,'' 24
September 12, 17-18.
\40\Freedom House, ``Freedom on the Net 2012: China,'' 24 September
12, 18.
\41\State Council, Measures for the Administration of Internet
Information Services [Hulianwang xinxi fuwu guanli banfa], issued and
effective 25 September 00, arts. 15-16; Provisions on the
Administration of Internet News Information Services [Hulianwang xinwen
xinxi fuwu guanli guiding], issued and effective 25 September 05, arts.
19-21.
\42\China Internet Network Information Center, ``The 31st
Statistical Report on Internet Development in China'' [Di 31 ci
zhongguo hulian wangluo fazhan zhuangkuang tongji baogao], January
2013, 36; Yang Cheng, ``New Media Development Report: Are Most
Microblog Users From the `Three Lows?''' [Xin meiti fazhan baogao:
weibo yonghu duoshi ``sandi renqun?''] China Youth Daily, reprinted in
Xinhua, 5 July 13.
\43\China Internet Network Information Center, ``The 31st
Statistical Report on Internet Development in China'' [Di 31 ci
zhongguo hulian wangluo fazhan zhuangkuang tongji baogao], January
2013, 36.
\44\David Barboza, ``Despite Restrictions, Microblogs Catch on in
China,'' New York Times, 15 May 11.
\45\See, e.g., Brice Pedroletti, ``China's Citizen Journalists
Finding the Mouse Is Mightier Than the Pen,'' Guardian Weekly, 11 April
13; Human Rights Watch, ``China: Renewed Restrictions Send Online
Chill,'' 4 January 13; Jill Levine, ``Microblogs in China: Digital
Democracy,'' Tea Leaf Nation, 4 July 13.
\46\Keith B. Richburg, ``In China, Microblogging Sites Become Free-
Speech Platform,'' Washington Post, 27 March 11; Rachel Lu, ``What
Happens to Free Speech on Weibo After Real Name Registration,'' Tea
Leaf Nation, 28 February 12.
\47\Owen Fletcher and Dan Nystedt, ``Internet, Twitter Blocked in
China City After Ethnic Riot,'' CIO, 6 July 09.
\48\Mark McDonald, ``Adding More Bricks to the Great Firewall of
China,'' New York Times, 23 December 12.
\49\``Microblogs: Small Beginnings,'' Economist, 6 April 13; Edward
Wong, ``China Lets Media Report on Air Pollution Crisis,'' New York
Times, 14 January 13; Wayne Ma, ``Beijing Pollution Hits Highs,'' Wall
Street Journal, 14 January 13.
\50\Ning Hui, ``Social Media's Role in Earthquake Aftermath Is
Revealing,'' Tea Leaf Nation, 22 April 13.
\51\Anne Henochowicz, China Digital Times, ``Sensitive Words: Wen
Jiabao's Family Wealth,'' 26 October 12; Rachel Lu, ``Some Call NYT an
Inadvertent `Puppet' in Wake of Expose on Chinese PM,'' Tea Leaf
Nation, 26 October 12; Minami Funakoshi, ``Chinese Online Reaction to
New York Times Pulitzer Becomes Case Study in Censorship,'' Tea Leaf
Nation, 16 April 13.
\52\Rachel Lu, ``Some Call NYT an Inadvertent `Puppet' in Wake of
Expose on Chinese PM,'' Tea Leaf Nation, 26 October 12; Minami
Funakoshi, ``Chinese Online Reaction to New York Times Pulitzer Becomes
Case Study in Censorship,'' Tea Leaf Nation, 16 April 13.
\53\For more information, see ``Weibo: An Eye on Corruption,''
CNTV, 11 March 13; Gu Yongqiang, ``Bringing Down `Watch Brother':
China's Online Corruption-Busters Tread a Fine Line,'' Time, 10 October
12; Jonathan Kaiman, ``Chinese Official Sacked After `Citizen
Journalists' Expose Extravagant Banquet,'' Guardian, 25 April 13; Jonas
Parello-Plesner and Michael Anti, ``The Weibo Generation Can Reboot
China,'' Financial Times, 21 January 13.
\54\For more information, see Brice Pedroletti, ``China's Citizen
Journalists Finding the Mouse Is Mightier Than the Pen,'' Guardian
Weekly, 11 April 13; Andrew Jacobs, ``Chinese Officials Find
Misbehavior Now Carries Cost,'' New York Times, 25 December 12.
\55\``Xinhua Insight: Real-Name Whistleblowing Fuels China's Online
Anti-Corruption Efforts,'' Xinhua, 14 May 13.
\56\Guo Jinchao, ``Li Keqiang Talks Open Government, Must `Tell the
Truth, Be Completely Honest' With the Masses'' [Li keqiang tan zhengwu
gongkai: yao xiang qunzhong ``shuo zhenhua, jiao shidi''], China News
Service, 26 March 13; Charles Zhu, ``Social Media's Potential To
Transform Chinese Governance,'' Tea Leaf Nation, 9 May 12.
\57\Guo Jinchao, ``Li Keqiang Talks Open Government, Must `Tell the
Truth, Be Completely Honest' With the Masses'' [Li keqiang tan zhengwu
gongkai: yao xiang qunzhong ``shuo zhenhua, jiao shidi''], China News
Service, 26 March 13; David Bandurski, ``Li Keqiang Urges More
Information Openness,'' China Media Project, 27 March 13.
\58\Brian Spegele, ``Party Urges Popular Weibo Users To Think of
`National Interests,''' Wall Street Journal, China Real Time Report
(blog), 26 August 13; ``Big Vs and Bottom Lines,'' Economist, 31 August
13; ``China Steps Up Campaign Against Major Opinion-Leading Bloggers,
To Wrest Control of Internet,'' Associated Press, reprinted in
Washington Post, 19 August 13.
\59\``Big Vs and Bottom Lines,'' Economist, 31 August 13.
\60\Yiqin Fu, ``China's Crackdown on Social Media: Who Is in
Danger?'' Tea Leaf Nation, 2 September 13; Adam Taylor, ``China's War
on Online Gossip Is Starting To Get Scary,'' Business Insider, 31
August 13; ``China Voice: China Resolves To Root Out Online Rumors,''
Xinhua, 21 August 13.
\61\Malcolm Moore, ``China Launches New Crackdown on Internet
Celebrities,'' Telegraph, 13 May 13; ``Big Vs and Bottom Lines,''
Economist, 31 August 13.
\62\``Seven Bottom Lines That All Internet Users Should Observe''
[Qitiao dixian quanti wangmin yinggai gong shou], Xinhua, 14 August 13;
Human Rights Watch, ``China: Nationwide Arrests of Activists, Critics
Multiply,'' 30 August 13; Adam Minter, ``China's Top Tweeters Under
Fire,'' Bloomberg, 27 August 13; Dong Haibo, ``Web Celebrities Should
Follow Bottom Line,'' China Daily, 21 August 13.
\63\``Seven Bottom Lines That All Internet Users Should Observe''
[Qitiao dixian quanti wangmin yinggai gong shou], Xinhua, 14 August 13.
\64\Wu Dingping, ``Xinhua Commentary: Why Microblogging's `Big V's'
Must Discuss Social Responsibility'' [Xinhuawang ping: weibo ``da V''
wei he geng yao jiang shehui zeren], Xinhua, 11 August 13.
\65\``Outspoken Chinese American Investor Charles Xue Detained in
Beijing `Prostitution Bust,''' South China Morning Post, 26 August 13;
Patrick Boehler, ``Opponents Turn to Chinese Classics To Protest Anti-
Rumour Crackdown,'' South China Morning Post, 2 September 13.
\66\Patrick Boehler, ``Opponents Turn to Chinese Classics To
Protest Anti-Rumour Crackdown,'' South China Morning Post, 2 September
13.
\67\Sophie Beach, China Digital Times, ``Press Freedom, Other
Topics Off Limits for Academics,'' 10 May 13; ``Exposure of
Universities' `Seven Don't Mentions' Sparks Heated Debate'' [Zhongguo
gaoxiao ``qi bu jiang'' bei puguang yinfa re yi], Radio Free Asia, 10
May 13.
\68\Benjamin Carlson, ``7 Things You Can't Talk About in China,''
Global Post, 3 June 13; ``Exposure of Universities' `Seven Don't
Mentions' Sparks Heated Debate'' [Zhongguo gaoxiao ``qi bu jiang'' bei
puguang yinfa re yi], Radio Free Asia, 10 May 13.
\69\Raymond Li, ``Seven Subjects Off Limits for Teaching, Chinese
Universities Told,'' South China Morning Post, 11 May 13.
\70\Ibid.
\71\Willy Lam, ``Xi and China's Seven Taboos,'' Deutsche Welle, 10
June 13; ``Xi Jinping's New Policy: After the Seven Unmentionables,
There Are Another 16 Articles'' [Xi jinping xinzheng: qi bu jiang hou
you you shiliu tiao], BBC, 28 May 13.
\72\``China Has Over 170,000 Govt Microblogs,'' Xinhua, reprinted
in China Daily, 27 March 13.
\73\Ibid.
\74\See, e.g., ``Government Microblogging `Choir' Sings the
Positive Energies of a Harmonious Society'' [Zhengwu weibo ``hechang
tuan'' chang xiang hexie shehui zheng nengliang], Star Online, 20 June
13; Liu Fengping, Suichuan Political-Legal Committee, ``Suichuan County
Political-Legal Committee Opens Government Microblog To Maintain
Stability and Promote Social Harmony'' [Sui chuan xianwei zhengfa wei
kaitong zhengwu wei bo weiwen cu hexie], 28 April 13.
\75\PRC Constitution, issued 4 December 82, amended 12 April 88, 29
March 93, 15 March 99, 14 March 04, art. 35. See also CECC, 2012 Annual
Report, 10 October 11, 54.
\76\Human Rights in China, ``Criminally Detained: Zhao Changqing
and Six Other Advocates of Public Disclosure of Officials' Assets,'' 19
April 13; Human Rights in China, ``Activist Detained on Suspicion of
`Inciting Subversion of State Power' After Calling for Disclosure of
Officials' Assets,'' 9 May 13; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``China:
End Escalating Criminalizing Peaceful Assembly and Free Expression,''
17 July 13; ``China Detains Activist Xu Zhiyong,'' BBC, 17 July 13.
\77\International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December
66, entry into force 23 March 76, art. 14. China has signed and stated
its intent to ratify the ICCPR. Human Rights in China, ``Online
Activist Sentenced to 8 Years for Subversion; Lawyer Raises Procedural
Concerns,'' 5 November 12.
\78\Human Rights in China, ``Criminally Detained: Zhao Changqing
and Six Other Advocates of Public Disclosure of Officials' Assets,'' 19
April 13; Human Rights in China, ``Online Activist Sentenced to 8 Years
for Subversion; Lawyer Raises Procedural Concerns,'' 5 November 12;
Human Rights Watch, ``China: Nationwide Arrests of Activists, Critics
Multiply,'' 30 August 13.
\79\Human Rights in China, ``Jiangsu Citizen Gu Yimin Arrested for
`Inciting Subversion of State Power,''' 18 June 13; Gillian Wong,
``Zhai Xiaobing, Chinese Blogger, Arrested For Twitter Joke About
China's Government,'' Associated Press, reprinted in Huffington Post,
21 November 12.
\80\Human Rights Watch, ``China: Nationwide Arrests of Activists,
Critics Multiply,'' 30 August 13; Human Rights in China, ``Criminally
Detained: Zhao Changqing and Six Other Advocates of Public Disclosure
of Officials' Assets,'' 19 April 13; ``Veteran Chinese Rights Lawyer
Held on Public Order Charges,'' Radio Free Asia, 19 August 13.
\81\``China Detains Journalist and Photographer Du Bin,'' BBC, 13
June 13; Reporters Without Borders, ``Citizen Journalist on Trial Over
Self-Published Books About Environment,'' 11 October 12; ``Chinese
Journalist Held For Filming School Campaign,'' Radio Free Asia, 25
April 13.
\82\Gillian Wong, ``Zhai Xiaobing, Chinese Blogger, Arrested For
Twitter Joke About China's Government,'' Associated Press, reprinted in
Huffington Post, 21 November 12. See also ``Beijing Authorities Detain
Blogger for Satirical Tweet About 18th Party Congress,'' Congressional-
Executive Commission on China, 21 December 12.
\83\``Qin Yongmin, Zhai Xiaobing Released in Succession'' [Qin
yongmin, zhai xiaobing xianhou huoshi], Radio Free Asia, 12 December
12. See also ``Beijing Authorities Detain Blogger for Satirical Tweet
About 18th Party Congress,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on
China, 21 December 12.
\84\Jane Perlez, ``Chinese Journalist Detained in Beijing, One Day
After Human Rights Talk With U.S.,'' New York Times, 2 August 13;
Luisetta Mudie, ``Chinese Journalist Vows To Fight For Anti-Graft
Detainees,'' Radio Free Asia, 5 August 13.
\85\Luisetta Mudie, ``Chinese Journalist Vows To Fight For Anti-
Graft Detainees,'' Radio Free Asia, 5 August 13.
\86\Edward Wong, ``Journalist Held in Beijing, Friends Say,'' New
York Times, 12 June 13; ``China Detains Journalist and Photographer Du
Bin,'' BBC, 13 June 13.
\87\``China Detains Journalist and Photographer Du Bin,'' BBC, 13
June 13; ``Beijing Police For First Time Confirm Criminal Detention of
Independent Reporter Du Bin'' [Beijing jingfang shouci zhengshi duli
jizhe du bin bei xingju], BBC, 13 June 13.
\88\Patrick Boehler, ``Independent Filmmaker Du Bin Released on
Bail in Beijing,'' South China Morning Post, 9 July 13.
\89\Ibid.
\90\Neil Gough, ``Chinese Democracy Advocate Is Freed After 8 Years
in Prison,'' New York Times, 7 September 13; ``China Releases Prominent
Dissident Early--Group,'' Reuters, 8 September 13. For more information
on this case, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record
2004-05482.
\91\See, e.g., Mimi Lau, ``Sex-Worker Rights Activist Ye Haiyan and
Family Kicked Out of Guangdong,'' South China Morning Post, 8 July 13;
Wei De, ``Well-Known Human Rights Activist Hu Jia Beaten Until Bleeding
by Beijing Domestic Security Protection Officers'' [Zhuming weiquan
renshi hu jia bei beijing guobao ouda chuxie], China Free Press, 15
March 13; Andrew Jacobs, ``China Presses Crackdown on Campaign Against
Graft,'' New York Times, 21 April 13; ``Gansu Lawyer Wang Fengjun
Drugged and Beaten by Police Investigators for Handling Casework;
Another Internet User Calling for Disclosure of Public Property
Criminally Detained'' [Gansu lushi wang fengjun ban'an zao xingjing
duda beijing you yi wangyou xu caichan gongshi bei xingju], Radio Free
Asia, 8 July 13.
\92\``Tibetan Writer Woeser Again Placed Under House Arrest,''
Radio Free Asia, 20 June 13; Andrew Jacobs, ``Chinese Blogger Thrives
as Muckraker,'' New York Times, 5 February 13; Tom Phillips, ``Chinese
Blogger `Gagged' After Attacking Government for Treatment of Poor,''
Telegraph, 19 July 13.
\93\Isolda Morillo and Alexa Olesen, ``AP Exclusive: China Nobel
Wife Speaks on Detention,'' Associated Press, 6 December 12; ``Clashes
as Activist's Daughter Is Denied Schooling,'' Radio Free Asia, 8 April
13.
\94\PRC Constitution, issued 4 December 82, amended 12 April 88, 29
March 93, 15 March 99, 14 March 04, art. 35.
\95\Josh Chin, ``Forced `Vacation' for Man Who Broke Dumpster Death
Story,'' Wall Street Journal, China Real Time Report (blog), 23
November 12.
\96\``Tibetan Writer Woeser Again Placed Under House Arrest,''
Radio Free Asia, 20 June 13.
\97\``Chinese Professor Banned From Classrooms Over Speech,''
Associated Press, reprinted in Asahi Shimbun, 24 August 13; ``Law
Professor Suspended From Teaching for Pro-Constitutionalism
Expressions,'' China Change, 25 August 13; ``Shanghai Lawyer Suspended
Over Constitutional Campaigns,'' Radio Free Asia, 29 August 13.
\98\See, e.g., Andrew Jacobs, ``Chinese Blogger Thrives as
Muckraker,'' New York Times, 5 February 13.
\99\Isolda Morillo and Alexa Olesen, ``AP Exclusive: China Nobel
Wife Speaks on Detention,'' Associated Press, 6 December 12.
\100\Ibid.
\101\UN Human Rights Council, ``Tenth Anniversary Joint
Declaration: Ten Key Challenges to Freedom of Expression in the Next
Decade,'' Addendum to Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion
and Protection of the Rights to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, 25
March 10, A/HRC/14/23/Add. 2, art. 1(a).
\102\Reporters Without Borders, ``2013 World Press Freedom Index''
30 January 13; Olga Khazan, ``Map: Where Reporters Have the Least
Freedom,'' Washington Post, 30 January 13.
\103\Gao Yu, ``Beijing Observation: Regressing Further From `Five
Nos,''' Seeing Red in China (blog), 16 May 13; ``China's Control of the
Internet Activities of Media Professionals Causes Concern'' [Zhongguo
kongzhi meitiren wangluo huodong yin guanzhu] BBC, 17 April 13; Ren
Xianliang, ``Comprehensively Planning Two Public Opinion Fields,
Concentrating Positive Social Energy'' [Tongchou liang ge yulun chang
ningju shehui zheng nengliang], Red Flag Journal, reprinted in Seeking
Truth, 13 April 13.
\104\Ren Xianliang, ``Comprehensively Planning Two Public Opinion
Fields, Concentrating Positive Social Energy'' [Tongchou liang ge yulun
chang ningju shehui zheng nengliang], Red Flag Journal, reprinted in
Seeking Truth, 13 April 13. For an English translation of Ren
Xianliang's remarks, see David Bandurski, ``Party Must Grab the Agenda,
Says Official,'' China Media Project, 12 April 13; Gao Yu, ``Beijing
Observation: Regressing Further From `Five Nos,''' Seeing Red in China
(blog), 16 May 13.
\105\Chen Xi, ```Mingjing Magazine': Exclusive Entire Text of
Disseminated Chinese Communist Document No. 9'' [``Mingjing yuekan''
dujia quanwen kan fa zhonggong 9 hao wenjian], Mingjing Magazine, 19
August 13; Chris Buckley, ``China Takes Aim at Western Ideas,'' New
York Times, 19 August 13.
\106\``China Newspaper Journalists Stage Rare Strike,'' BBC, 7
January 13.
\107\```Southern Weekend' New Year's Message, Comparison of the Two
Versions'' [``Nanfang zhoumo'' yuandan xianci liang banben bijiao],
BBC, 4 January 13; ``Journalists Confront China Censors Over
Editorial,'' Associated Press, reprinted in USA Today, 4 January 13;
Keith B. Richburg, ``Chinese Journalists Mount Rare Protest Over an
Alleged Act of Government Censorship,'' Washington Post, 4 January 13;
International Federation of Journalists, ``Journalists Strike Against
Censorship in Mainland China,'' 7 January 13.
\108\Keith B. Richburg, ``Chinese Journalists Mount Rare Protest
Over an Alleged Act of Government Censorship,'' Washington Post, 4
January 13.
\109\Edward Wong, ``Protest Grows Over Censoring of China Paper,''
New York Times, 7 January 13; Jonathan Kaiman, ``China Anti-Censorship
Protest Attracts Support Across Country,'' Guardian, 7 January 13.
\110\Ibid.
\111\Edward Wong, ``Protest Grows Over Censoring of China Paper,''
New York Times, 7 January 13.
\112\International Federation of Journalists, ``Journalists Strike
Against Censorship in Mainland China,'' 7 January 13.
\113\``Southern Weekend Issue Prompts Soul-Searching Over Media's
Role,'' Global Times, 8 January 13.
\114\Xiao Shu, ``Dim Hopes for a Free Press in China,'' New York
Times, 14 January 13.
\115\``China To Merge Press, Broadcasting Regulators,'' Xinhua, 10
March 13; ``State General Administration of Press, Publication, Radio,
Film and Television Hangs a Sign; Cai Fuchao and Jiang Jianguo Joint
Photo'' [Guojia xinwen chuban guangdian zongju guapai cai fuchao jiang
jianguo heying], China News Service, 22 March 13.
\116\He Qinglian, The Fog of Censorship: Media Control in China
(New York: Human Rights in China, 2008), 25.
\117\State Council Information Office and Ministry of Information
Industry, Provisions on the Administration of Internet News Information
Services [Hulianwang xinwen xinxi fuwu guanli guiding], issued and
effective 25 September 05, arts. 7, 8, 11; General Administration of
Press and Publication, Regulations on the Administration of Publishing
[Chuban guanli tiaoli], issued 25 December 01, effective 1 February 02,
art. 15; General Administration of Press and Publication, Measures for
Administration of News Reporter Cards [Xinwen jizhe zheng guanli
banfa], issued 24 August 09, effective 15 October 09, arts. 11, 12, 16.
\118\Zhejiang Province Radio, Film and Television Bureau, ``2010
Nationwide Radio and Television Editors and Reporters, Broadcasters,
and Hosts Qualification Exam'' [2010 nian quanguo guangbo dianshi
bianji jizhe, boyin yuan zhuchi ren zige kaoshi dagang], 30 July 10,
chap. 2, art. 6.
\119\General Administration of Press and Publication, ``Several
Provisions To Prevent and Guard Against False Reporting'' [Guanyu
yanfang xujia xinwen baodao de ruogan guiding], 19 October 11, art.
1(4); Michael Wines, ``China Rolls Out Tighter Rules on Reporting,''
New York Times, 11 November 11.
\120\Pu Yasu, ``SARFT to Enhance Control Over Editors' Online
Activities'' [Xinwen chuban guangdian zongju jiang jiaqiang caibian
renyuan wangluo huodong guanli], China Press and Publishing Journal,
reprinted in Xinhua, 16 April 13.
\121\Tom Phillips, ``Chinese Journalists Banned from Quoting
Foreign Media,'' Telegraph, 17 April 13.
\122\State Council Information Office, ``National Human Rights
Action Plan of China (2012-2015),'' 11 June 12, sec. I (6).
\123\For more information, see Deng Yuwen, ``China Should Abandon
North Korea,'' Financial Times, 27 February 13; ``Chinese Editor Fired
Over Call To Abandon N.Korea,'' Chosun Ilbo, 1 April 13; Kentaro
Koyama, ``China Magazine Spikes Taiwan Issue, Fires Staff,'' Asahi
Shimbun, 23 March 13.
\124\Deng Yuwen, ``China Should Abandon North Korea,'' Financial
Times, 27 February 13; ``Chinese Editor Fired Over Call To Abandon
N.Korea,'' Chosun Ilbo, 1 April 13; Jane Perlez, ``Penalty for Chinese
Editor Critical of Korea Stance,'' New York Times, 1 April 13.
\125\Committee to Protect Journalists, ``Chinese Journalist Who
Raised Corruption Charges Jailed,'' 29 August 13.
\126\``Police Hold Chongqing Journalist Who Exposed Graft,'' Radio
Free Asia, 23 August 13; Committee to Protect Journalists, ``Chinese
Journalist Who Raised Corruption Charges Jailed,'' 29 August 13.
\127\Reporters Without Borders, ``Take No Photos or You Will Die
Here,'' 19 July 13.
\128\Ibid.; Liu Gang, ``In Hunan, Two Reporters Interviewing Melon
Vendors About Death Beaten by Police'' [Hunan 2 ming jizhe caifang gua
fan siwang shijian bei jingcha ouda], Oriental Daily, 18 July 13.
\129\Reporters Without Borders, ``Take No Photos or You Will Die
Here,'' 19 July 13; Liu Gang, ``In Hunan, Two Reporters Interviewing
Melon Vendors About Death Beaten by Police'' [Hunan 2 ming jizhe
caifang gua fan siwang shijian bei jingcha ouda], Oriental Daily, 18
July 13.
\130\Reporters Without Borders, ``RWB Calls for the Immediate and
Unconditional Release of Boxun Journalist Sun Lin,'' reprinted in
Boxun, 26 April 13.
\131\Verna Yu, ``Hong Kong Journalists, Activist Beaten Outside
Home of Wife of Dissident Liu Xiaobo,'' South China Morning Post, 9
March 13.
\132\Committee to Protect Journalists, ``Hong Kong Journalists
Beaten in Beijing,'' 11 March 13; Verna Yu, ``Hong Kong Journalists,
Activist Beaten Outside Home of Wife of Dissident Liu Xiaobo,'' South
China Morning Post, 9 March 13.
\133\Verna Yu, ``Hong Kong Journalists, Activist Beaten Outside
Home of Wife of Dissident Liu Xiaobo,'' South China Morning Post, 9
March 13.
\134\Committee to Protect Journalists, ``Top Chinese Reporter Fired
as Thugs Attack Film Crew,'' Radio Free Asia, 1 March 13; ``German TV
Crew Attacked While Filming in China,'' 4 March 13.
\135\International Federation of Journalists, ``Journalists
Attacked in Hong Kong and Mainland China,'' 23 April 13.
\136\Foreign Correspondents' Club of China, ``Annual Working
Conditions Survey,'' reprinted in Committee to Protect Journalists, 11
July 13.
\137\Ibid.
Notes to Section II--Worker Rights
\1\PRC Constitution, issued 4 December 82, amended 12 April 88, 29
March 93, 15 March 99, 14 March 04, art. 35.
\2\PRC Trade Union Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo gonghui fa],
issued and effective 3 April 92, amended 27 October 01, art. 3;
Constitution of the Chinese Trade Unions [Zhongguo gonghui zhangcheng],
adopted 26 September 03, amended 21 October 08, General Provisions.
\3\For example, during the past year, ACFTU Chairman Li Jianguo was
concurrently a member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party
Central Committee. See All-China Federation of Trade Unions, Yan Yan,
``Li Jianguo Elected Chairman of All-China Federation of Trade Unions''
[Li jianguo dangxuan zhonghua quanguo zong gonghui zhuxi], People's
Daily, 1 March 13. See also Lu Jianmin, ``The Trade Union System Within
Collective Bargaining in China'' [Lu jianmin: zhongguo jiti tanpan
zhong de tizhi gonghui], Leader, reprinted in Consensus Net, 7 May 13;
Li Honghuo, ``The System Really Has To Operate in Order To Contain
Conflict'' [Zhidu zhenshi yunzhuan caineng kongzhi chongtu], Dongguan
Daily, 20 May 13.
\4\PRC Trade Union Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo gonghui fa],
issued and effective 3 April 92, amended 27 October 01, art. 4;
Constitution of the Chinese Trade Unions [Zhongguo gonghui zhangcheng],
effective 26 September 03, amended 21 October 08, General Provisions.
\5\Elaine Sio-ieng Hui, ``How Direct Are the `Direct Elections' of
Trade Union Officials in China?'' Global Labour Column, Number 109,
October 2012; Working Conditions and Worker Rights in China: Recent
Developments, Hearing of the Congressional-Executive Commission on
China, 31 July 12, Written Statement Submitted by Mary E. Gallagher,
Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for
Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 10.
\6\Wu Jiajie, ``Trade Unions Must Return to Their Functional Role''
[Gonghui yao xiang zishen zhineng juese huigui], Dongguan Daily, 20 May
13; Lu Jianmin, ``The Trade Union System Within Collective Bargaining
in China'' [Lu jianmin: zhongguo jiti tanpan zhong de tizhi gonghui],
Leader, reprinted in Consensus Net, 7 May 13; Elaine Sio-ieng Hui,
``How Direct Are the `Direct Elections' of Trade Union Officials in
China?'' Global Labour Column, Number 109, October 2012.
\7\Elaine Sio-ieng Hui, ``How Direct Are the `Direct Elections' of
Trade Union Officials in China?'' Global Labour Column, Number 109,
October 2012.
\8\PRC Labor Law [Zhongguo renmin gongheguo laodong fa], issued 5
July 94, effective 1 January 95, arts. 8, 33. See also PRC Trade Union
Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo gonghui fa], issued and effective 3
April 92, amended 27 October 01, art. 18; PRC Labor Contract Law
[Zhongguo renmin gongheguo laodong hetong fa], issued 29 June 07,
effective 1 January 08, amended 28 December 12, arts. 6, 51-56.
\9\Suo Hanxue, ``70 Percent of Line Workers Not Satisfied With
Existing Wages, Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security Intends
To Push for Wage Negotiations'' [Qi cheng yixian gongren buman xianyou
gongzi renshibu ni tui gongzi xieshang], China Business, reprinted in
Sina, 9 March 13; Yang Mingqing, ``Vigorously Promote Collective Wage
Negotiations, Actively Advance Harmonious Labor Relations'' [Dali
tuixing gongzi jiti xieshang jiji cujin laodong guanxi hexie], Workers'
Daily, 23 January 13; Fan Xi and Chu Hang, ``Collective Wage
Negotiations Allow Workers To Enjoy `the Right To Speak' on Income''
[Gongzi jiti xieshang, rang laodongzhe xiangyou shouru ``huayu quan''],
Xinhua, 1 May 13.
\10\Lu Jianmin, ``The Trade Union System Within Collective
Bargaining in China'' [Lu jianmin: zhongguo jiti tanpan zhong de tizhi
gonghui], Leader, reprinted in Consensus Net, 7 May 13; Wu Jiajie,
``Trade Unions Must Return to Their Functional Role'' [Gonghui yao
xiang zishen zhineng juese huigui], Dongguan Daily, 20 May 13; Lei
Xiaotian, ``Reshaping the Government's Role in Collective
Consultations'' [Zhengfu zai jiti xieshang zhong zai juese chongsu],
Chinese Cadres Tribune, reprinted in Theory Net, 7 May 13.
\11\Chen Xiaobo and Zhang Xiaoyu, ``Awkward Situation of Collective
Wage Consultations'' [Gongzi jiti xieshang yu ganga], Yunnan Daily,
reprinted in Collective Bargaining Forum, 1 August 13.
\12\Ibid.
\13\China Labour Bulletin, ``Nanhai Honda Workers Obtain Higher
Salaries After One Day Strike'' [Nanhai bentian gongren zai wei qi
yitian de bagong hou huode geng gao gongzi], 25 March 13.
\14\Zhang Ke, ``Research Report Uncovers Foxconn `Real Trade
Unions' Merely for Decoration'' [Diaoyan baogao jiemi: fushikang
``zhenzheng gonghui'' zhishi baishe], First Financial, 1 May 13.
\15\Zheng Caixiong, ``Trial Begins To Elect Trade Union Chiefs,''
China Daily, 15 January 13; Wang Daobin, ``Trial Direct Elections of
Union Chairpersons Will Be Carried Out This Year'' [Jinnian jiang
shidian gonghui zhuxi zhixuan], Southern Metropolitan Daily, 15 January
13; Zhu Jun, ``Ningbo, Yingzhou District, Tangxi Town Attempts Direct
Elections of Enterprise Union Chairpersons'' [Ningbo yingzhou qu tangxi
zhen changshi qiye gonghui zhuxi zhixuan], Ningbo Net, reprinted in
Collective Bargaining Forum, 20 May 13; Yao Xuepei, ``61 Enterprises
Carry Out Direct Elections of Union Chairpersons'' [61 jia qiye tuixing
zhixuan gonghui zhuxi], Gaoming Today, 10 May 13. For previous
reporting on direct union elections, see, e.g., CECC, 2012 Annual
Report, 60.
\16\Zheng Caixiong, ``Trial Begins To Elect Trade Union Chiefs,''
China Daily, 15 January 13; Wang Daobin, ``Trial Direct Elections of
Union Chairpersons Will Be Carried Out This Year'' [Jinnian jiang
shidian gonghui zhuxi zhixuan], Southern Metropolitan Daily, 15 January
13.
\17\Yao Xuepei, ``61 Enterprises Carry Out Direct Elections of
Union Chairpersons'' [61 jia qiye tuixing zhixuan gonghui zhuxi],
Gaoming Today, 10 May 13.
\18\Clare Jim and Jonathan Standing, ``Foxconn Says To Boost China
Worker Participation in Union,'' Reuters, 4 February 13; Michelle Chan,
``Can We Trust Foxconn's New `Democratic' Chinese Factories?'' In These
Times, 11 February 13.
\19\``Foxconn Plans To Establish Genuinely Representative Trade
Unions in Chinese Factories'' [Fushikang zhongguo gongchang ni chengli
zhenzheng ju daibiaoxing gonghui], Voice of America, 5 February 13;
``Foxconn Prepares To Establish Trade Unions in China That Are
Genuinely Representative of Worker Rights and Interests'' [Fushikang
zhunbei zai zhongguo chengli zhenzheng daibiao gongren quanyi de
gonghui], Radio Free Asia, 4 February 13; Clare Jim and Jonathan
Standing, ``Foxconn Says To Boost China Worker Participation in
Union,'' Reuters, 4 February 13.
\20\Kathrin Hille and Rahul Jacob, ``China Wary Amid Push for
Workers' Union Poll,'' Financial Times, 3 February 13.
\21\Li Yulin, ``After the Direct Election of Unions'' [Zhixuan
gonghui zhihou], China Fortune, 3 September 12; China Labour Bulletin,
``Shenzhen Workers Demand Ouster of Trade Union Chairman After `Model
Election,''' 8 March 13; Sun Tianming, ``Enterprise Direct Union
Elections: A Rare Democratic Practice'' [Qiye gonghui zhixuan: nande de
minzhu caolian], Southern Metropolitan Daily, 27 June 13.
\22\Li Xiaoxu, ``First Directly Elected Union Chairman in Shenzhen
Suspected of Not Doing Enough To Defend Legal Rights Faces Joint
Declaration for His Dismissal'' [Shenzhen shouwei zhixuan gonghui zhuxi
yi yin weiquan bu li zao lianming bamian], Yangcheng Evening News, 1
March 13; ``Why We Want To Recall the Labour Union Chairman,'' China
Labour Net, 12 March 13.
\23\``Why We Want To Recall the Labour Union Chairman,'' China
Labour Net, 12 March 13.
\24\China Labour Bulletin, ``Shenzhen Workers Demand Ouster of
Trade Union Chairman After `Model Election,''' 8 March 13.
\25\``Worker Protests Continue To Emerge in Guangdong'' [Guangdong
lianxu chuxian gong chao], Radio Free Asia, 24 April 13; ``Multiple
Worker Protests Emerge in Guangdong'' [Guangdong gong chao duo chu
yongxian], Radio Free Asia, 8 March 13; Jennifer Cheung, China Labour
Bulletin, ``China Sees Upsurge in Worker Protests Prior to Lunar New
Year,'' 8 February 13; Jennifer Cheung, China Labour Bulletin,
``Strikes and Worker Protests in China's Service Sector on the
Increase,'' 7 May 13.
\26\``Over a Thousand Workers in Shenzhen Block Roads, Riot Police
Release Tear Gas To Drive Away Workers'' [Shenzhen yu qian gongren du
lu fangbaojing fang cuileidan qugan], Radio Free Asia, 23 May 13;
``Shenzhen Shoe Factory Goes Bankrupt, 500 Workers Demanding Back Wages
Assaulted by Riot Police'' [Shenzhen xie chang daobi wu bai gongren
taoxin zao tejing ouda], Radio Free Asia, 27 May 13; Jennifer Cheung,
China Labour Bulletin, ``Strike and Worker Protests in China's Service
Sector on the Increase,'' 7 May 13; ``A Thousand Workers in Foshan
Strike for Two Days, Factory Threatens To Fire Those Workers Who Don't
Return to Work'' [Foshan qian ming gongren lianxu liang ri bagong
gongchang weixie bu fugong jiu kaichu], Radio Free Asia, 7 June 13;
``Longgang District, Shenzhen Workers From Two Factories Stage
Collective Strikes'' [Shenzhen longgang qu liang chang yuangong jiti
bagong], Radio Free Asia, 21 June 13.
\27\``Several Hundred Dye Factory Workers Block Roads Seeking Back
Wages'' [Shubai ranchang gongren du lu zhui tao qianxin], Radio Free
Asia, 1 May 13; ``Labor Rights Damaged, Chongqing and Shenzhen Have
Labor Strikes'' [Laogong quanyi shousun chongqing, shenzhen xian gong
chao], Radio Free Asia, 30 April 13; Jennifer Cheung, China Labour
Bulletin, ``China Sees Upsurge in Worker Protests Prior to Lunar New
Year,'' 8 February 13.
\28\``Thousand Workers at Foxconn Jiangxi Factory Unsatisfied With
Wages and Treatment Demonstrate'' [Fushikang jiangxi gongchang qian ren
buman xinzi daiyu shangjie youxing], West Net, reprinted in First
Financial, 13 January 13; Fiona Tam, ``1,000 Workers Hold Managers
Hostage in Shanghai Labour Row,'' South China Morning Post, 21 January
13.
\29\Eli Friedman, ``China in Revolt,'' Jacobin, Issue 7-8, August
2012.
\30\Huang Xiaoqing et al., ``Workers at Nanhai Honda Stop Working
Seeking Raise in Salary'' [Nanhai bentian gongren tinggong qiu jiaxin],
Yangcheng Evening News, 20 March 13; China Labour Bulletin, ``China's
Workers Demand a Better Trade Union,'' 22 March 13.
\31\According to media reports, authorities released 19 of the 27
workers a day later. The Commission has not observed subsequent reports
on the eight workers not released. ``Guangdong Highway Owner Withholds
Hunan Migrant Workers' Billion Yuan in Wages Leading to Mass Incident''
[Guangdong gaosulu yezhu tuoqian hunan mingong shang yi yuan gongzi
yinfa qunti shijian], Radio Free Asia, 3 February 13; ``Migrant Worker
Salary Demands Frequent In All Parts of the Country, Government Blindly
Suppresses To Maintain Stability'' [Nongmingong taoxin gedi pin fa
zhengfu wei weiwen yiwei da ya], Radio Free Asia, 4 February 13.
\32\``Shenzhen Shoe Factory Goes Bankrupt, 500 Workers Demanding
Back Wages Assaulted by Riot Police'' [Shenzhen xie chang daobi wu bai
gongren taoxin zao tejing ouda], Radio Free Asia, 27 May 13; ``Over a
Thousand Workers in Shenzhen Block Roads, Riot Police Release Tear Gas
To Drive Away Workers'' [Shenzhen yu qian gongren du lu fangbaojing
fang cuileidan qugan], Radio Free Asia, 23 May 13; ``Taiwanese
Enterprise Closes Still Owing Wages, Over Hundred Petitioning Workers
Arrested'' [Tai qi jieye qianxin shangfang gongren bai duo ren beibu],
Radio Free Asia, 20 March 13.
\33\``Thousands Striking in Guangzhou in Bloody Clash With Police;
Hundreds of Workers at Guizhou Weapons Factory Go to the Streets
Seeking Pay'' [Guangzhou qian ren bagong yu jing liuxue chongtu guizhou
jun xie chang shubai yuangong shangjie zheng xinchou], Radio Free Asia,
30 January 13; ``Hundreds of Migrant Workers at Guangdong Provincial
Government Demanding Back Wages Dispersed, Over a Hundred Petitioners
in Shanxi Imprisoned for Petitioning at Two Sessions'' [Shubai
nongmingong yue fu taoxin zao qusan shanxi yu bai fangmin lianghui
qingyuan bei guanya], Radio Free Asia, 24 January 13.
\34\``Thousands of Workers at Foxconn Jiangxi Factory Unsatisfied
With Wages Demonstrate on the Streets'' [Fushikang jiangxi gongchang
qian ren buman xin zi daiyu shangjie youxing], West Net, reprinted in
First Financial, 13 January 13.
\35\Eli Friedman, ``China in Revolt,'' Jacobin, Issue 7-8, August
2012; Working Conditions and Worker Rights in China: Recent
Developments, Hearing of the Congressional-Executive Commission on
China, 31 July 12, Written Statement Submitted by Mary E. Gallagher,
Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for
Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 3-4; ``Worker Strikes Break
Out in Hangzhou and Other Places, Citizens Rights Defense Awareness
Gradually Increasing'' [Hangzhou deng di fasheng yuangong bagong
shijian gongmin weiquan yishi zhujian zengqiang], Radio Free Asia, 4
March 13.
\36\``Investigation States Not Paying Migrant Workers Overtime
Wages Is Still Comparatively Common Occurrence'' [Diaocha cheng bu
zhifu nongmingong jiaban gongzi xianxiang reng jiaowei changjian],
China Youth Daily, reprinted in Sina, 7 February 13; Han Dongfang,
``China's Workers Unite,'' New York Times, 8 November 12.
\37\Kevin Voigt, ``China's Workforce at a Crossroads,'' CNN, 21
March 13; William Wan, ``Foxconn Riots in China Seen as Likely To
Recur,'' Washington Post, 25 September 12; Yu Ran, ``Young Job Seekers
Expect More Than Just Wages,'' China Daily, 21 February 13; National
Bureau of Statistics of China, ``2012 Nationwide Migrant Worker
Monitoring Survey Report'' [2012 nian quanguo nongmingong jiance
diaocha baogao], 27 March 13.
\38\William Wan, ``Foxconn Riots in China Seen as Likely To
Recur,'' Washington Post, 25 September 12; Alexandra Ho and Tim Culpan,
``Foxconn Workers Labor Under Guard After Riot Shuts Plant,''
Bloomberg, 26 September 12; Lin Qiling, ``Taiyuan Foxconn Brawl
Persists for Four Hours; Alleged Beating by Security Guards Lead to
Brawl'' [Taiyuan fushikang qun ou chixu 4 xiaoshi jucheng yin baoan
daren yinfa], Beijing News, reprinted in Xinhua, 25 September 12.
\39\Li Li, ``Legal Expert: Evidence Is the Achilles Heel in Migrant
Workers' Difficulty Obtaining Back Wages'' [Falu zhuanjia: zhengju shi
nongmingong taoxin nan de sixue], China Youth Daily, 28 February 13;
``For Migrant Workers Seeking To Recover Wages in Hebei, 95 Percent of
Wage Arrears Occur in the Construction Sector'' [Hebei sheng wei
nongmingong zhui tao gongzi 95% qianxin fasheng zai jianzhu lingyu],
Great Wall Net, reprinted in China News Service, 16 January 13.
\40\China Labour Bulletin, ``Employment Discrimination in China,''
20 November 12; Jiang Chunyuan, ```Migrant Workers Prohibited From
Using Toilet': Discrimination and Arrogance Behind Signboard''
[``Nongmingong jinzhi ruce'': gaoshipai hou de aoman yu pianjian],
Xinhua, 26 March 13.
\41\China Labour Bulletin, ``Employment Discrimination in China,''
20 November 12; Zi Xiuchun, ``Lawyer Huang Leping's Letter: The Five
Main Problems in Migrant Workers' Lives I Hope Committee Delegates
Address'' [Huang leping lushi laixin: nongmingong shenghuo wu da nanti
xiwang dedao daibiao weiyuan guanzhu], Workers' Daily, reprinted in
Beijing Yilian Labor Law Aid and Research Center, 6 March 13.
\42\National Bureau of Statistics of China, ``2012 Nationwide
Migrant Worker Monitoring Survey Report'' [2012 nian quanguo
nongmingong jiance diaocha baogao], 27 March 13.
\43\Zi Xiuchun, ``Lawyer Huang Leping's Letter: The Five Main
Problems in Migrant Workers' Lives I Hope Committee Delegates Address''
[Huang leping lushi laixin: nongmingong shenghuo wu da nanti xiwang
dedao daibiao weiyuan guanzhu], Workers' Daily, reprinted in Beijing
Yilian Labor Law Aid and Research Center, 6 March 13.
\44\National Bureau of Statistics of China, ``2012 Nationwide
Migrant Worker Monitoring Survey Report'' [2012 nian quanguo
nongmingong jiance diaocha baogao], 27 March 13.
\45\Li Li, ``Legal Expert: Evidence Is the Achilles Heel in Migrant
Workers' Difficulty Obtaining Back Wages'' [Falu zhuanjia: zhengju shi
nongmingong taoxin nan de sixue], China Youth Daily, 28 February 13; Li
Keyong, Fu Yongtao et al., ``Labor Law, Those Clauses That Are Ignored
(Policy Focus)'' [Laodong fa, na xie bei moshi de tiaokuan (zhengce
jujiao)], People's Daily, 1 March 13.
\46\National Bureau of Statistics of China, ``2012 Nationwide
Migrant Worker Monitoring Survey Report'' [2012 nian quanguo
nongmingong jiance diaocha baogao], 27 March 13.
\47\Zi Xiuchun, ``Lawyer Huang Leping's Letter: The Five Main
Problems in Migrant Workers' Lives I Hope Committee Delegates Address''
[Huang leping lushi laixin: nongmingong shenghuo wu da nanti xiwang
dedao daibiao weiyuan guanzhu], Workers' Daily, reprinted in Beijing
Yilian Labor Law Aid and Research Center, 6 March 13; Sun Yangshuang,
``New Generation Migrant Workers `Merge Into the City,' a Long Road''
[Xinshengdai nongmingong ``rong cheng,'' lu you duo yuan], Jilin Daily,
reprinted in Worker's Daily, 25 March 13; ``China's Hukou System Puts
Migrant Workers at Severe Economic Disadvantage,'' Public Radio
International, 1 May 13.
\48\Zhuang Pinghui, ``Migrant Workers Feel Like Outsiders in
Mainland Cities, Says Survey,'' South China Morning Post, 3 March 13;
Huang Chen, ``Investigation of Migrant Worker Happiness: Although
Income Has Increased, Still Consider Themselves the Lowest Rung of
Society'' [Nongmingong xingfu gan diaocha: shouru sui zeng reng ziren
``diceng''], Caixin, 28 February 13.
\49\ILO Convention (No. 138) Concerning Minimum Age for Admission
to Employment, 26 June 73; ILO Convention (No. 182) Concerning the
Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms
of Child Labour, 17 June 99.
\50\PRC Labor Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo laodong fa], issued 5
July 94, effective 1 January 95, amended 10 October 01, art. 15. See
also PRC Law on the Protection of Minors [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo wei
chengnian ren baohu fa], issued 4 September 91, effective 1 January 92,
art. 28. See generally Provisions on Prohibiting the Use of Child Labor
[Jinzhi shiyong tonggong guiding], issued 1 October 02, effective 1
December 02.
\51\International Trade Union Confederation, ``Report for the WTO
General Council Review of the Trade Policies of the People's Republic
of China,'' June 2012, 16; International Labour Organization,
``Observation (CEACR)--adopted 2010, published 100th ILC session (2011)
C138--Minimum Age Convention, 1973 (No. 138)--China,'' adopted 2010,
published 100th ILC Session 2011.
\52\International Labour Organization, ``Address at the High-Level
Meeting on the Application of Child Labour Conventions Ratified by
China,'' 6 September 12; International Labour Organization,
``Information Document on Ratifications and Standards-Related
Activities,'' International Labour Conference, 102nd Session, 2013, 17.
\53\International Labour Organization, ``Observation (CEACR)--
C138--Minimum Age Convention, 1973 (No. 138)--China,'' adopted 2010,
published 100th ILC Session 2011.
\54\See, e.g., Apple Inc., ``Apple Supplier Responsibility 2013
Progress Report,'' January 2013, 18; ``Underage Foxconn Interns Return
to School,'' Xinhua, reprinted in China Daily, 17 October 12; Min-Jeong
Lee, ``Samsung Under Watch for China Labor Practices,'' Wall Street
Journal, 18 December 12; ``Unable To Recruit Workers, Child Laborers
Used as Substitutes, Clothing Factory in Jiaozhou Reformed'' [Zhao
budao gongren na tonggong dingshang jiaozhou yi fuzhuang chang bei
zhenggai], Online Textile City, 12 April 13; Rao Dehong, ``7 Female
Primary School Students From Liangshan Lured To Work in Dongguan Will
Be Returned to School'' [7 ming liangshan xiaoxue nu sheng bei you zhi
dongguan wugong jiang bei jiehui fanxiao shangxue], Southern
Metropolitan Daily, 6 December 12.
\55\John Paczkowski, ``Apple Busts Supplier for Underage Labor in
Latest Responsibility Report,'' All Things Digital, 24 January 13;
Apple Inc., ``Apple Supplier Responsibility 2013 Progress Report,''
January 2013, 18.
\56\State Council, Provisions on Prohibiting the Use of Child Labor
[Jinzhi shiyong tonggong guiding], issued 1 October 02, effective 1
December 02, art. 13.
\57\PRC Education Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jiaoyu fa], issued
18 March 95, effective 1 September 95, amended 27 August 09, art. 58.
\58\See, e.g., Raymond Li, ``Foxconn Flouts Labour Law With Under-
16 Interns in Shandong,'' South China Morning Post, 17 October 12; Lin
Yimin and He Daolan, ``Young Student Interns Become Assembly Line
Workers?'' [Xuesheng zi shixi bian liushui gong?], Guangzhou Daily, 14
March 13.
\59\See International Labour Organization (ILO), Convention
concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment (No. 138), adopted
by 58th Session ILC 26 June 73, entry into force 19 June 76, art. 6.
ILO guidelines on the subject of vocational training, apprenticeships
and related internships vis-a-vis child labor permits such work ``in
accordance with conditions prescribed by the competent authority'' and
in programs involving education, training, or ``guidance or orientation
[on] . . . the choice of an occupation or of a line of training.'' See
also ILO Recommendation 146 on the Minimum Age for Admission to
Employment, item 12.2. The General Conference of the ILO adopted
Recommendation 146 relating to the 1973 Minimum Age Convention, which
urged that measures ``be taken to safeguard and supervise the
conditions in which children and young persons undergo vocational
orientation and training within undertakings, training institutions and
schools for vocation or technical education and to formulate standards
for their protection and development.'' See also International Labour
Organization, Convention concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour (No.
29), adopted by 14th ILC Session 28 June 30, entry into force 1 May 32;
International Labour Office, General Survey Concerning the Forced
Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29), and the Abolition of Forced Labor
Convention, 1957 (No. 105), International Labour Conference, 96th
Session, 2007, 19-20. ILO's Committee of Experts noted that vocational
training does not necessarily constitute compulsory work or service
within the meaning of the Forced Labour Convention (No. 29), but states
that ``. . . vocational training usually entails a certain amount of
practical work, and for that reason, the distinction between training
and employment is sometimes difficult to draw. It is therefore only by
reference to the various elements involved in the general context of a
particular scheme of training that it becomes possible to determine
whether such scheme is unequivocally one of vocational training or on
the contrary involves the exaction of work or service within the
definition of `forced or compulsory labor.'''
\60\Lin Yimin and He Daolan, ``Young Student Interns Become
Assembly Line Workers?'' [Xuesheng zi shixi bian liushui gong?],
Guangzhou Daily, 14 March 13; Lin Yimin and He Daolan, ``Student
Factory Interns Act as Laborers, Working 11 Hour Days, Schools Do the
Negotiating'' [Xuesheng gongchang shixi bei dang laogong meitian gan 11
xiaoshi xiao fang yi jiaoshe], Guangzhou Daily, reprinted in China News
Service, 15 March 13.
\61\Lin Yimin and He Daolan, ``Young Student Interns Become
Assembly Line Workers?'' [Xuesheng zi shixi bian liushui gong?],
Guangzhou Daily, 14 March 13.
\62\``Underage Foxconn Interns Return to School,'' Xinhua,
reprinted in China Daily, 17 October 12.
\63\Ibid.; David Pierson, ``Chinese Factory Giant Employed Underage
Interns on Assembly Line,'' Los Angeles Times, 30 October 12.
\64\Raymond Li, ``Foxconn Flouts Labour Law With Under-16 Interns
in Shandong,'' South China Morning Post, 17 October 12.
\65\Lucy Hornby, ``Use of Student Interns Highlights China Labor
Shortage,'' Reuters, 6 January 13; Wang Xian and Li Nan, ``Foxconn
Stages Recruitment Frenzy, Numerous University Students `Forced Into
Internships''' [Fushikang shangyan zhao gong kuangchao duodi gaoxiao
xuesheng ``bei shixi''], China National Radio, 7 September 12.
\66\China Labour Bulletin, ``Debate on Revisions to Labour Contract
Law Delayed Because of Deluge of Submissions,'' 31 October 12; Pang Le,
``Dispatch Laborers Hope for Equal Pay for Equal Work'' [Laowu paiqian
panwang tonggongtongchou], Xi'an Daily, reprinted in NetEase, 11
September 12.
\67\China Labour Bulletin, ``Debate on Revisions to Labour Contract
Law Delayed Because of Deluge of Submissions,'' 31 October 12.
\68\Article 66 of the PRC Labor Contract Law states that ``labor
dispatch generally carries out temporary, supplementary, or
substitution work positions.'' PRC Labor Contract Law [Zhongguo renmin
gongheguo laodong hetong fa], issued 29 June 07, effective 1 January
08, amended 28 December 12, art. 66; ``China Aims To Ensure `Equal Pay
for Same Job,''' Xinhua, reprinted in People's Daily, 25 December 12;
Chu He, ``Workers' Daily Commentary: Who Should Be Alert to the
`Reverse of Labor Dispatch?''' [Gongbao shiping: ``nixiang laowu
paiqian'' shei gai jingxing?], Workers' Daily, 17 June 13.
\69\Sources citing data from the All-China Federation of Trade
Unions (ACFTU) in 2011 and 2012 report the total number of
subcontracted workers in China as between 27 and 37 million; however,
other reports state the total number is closer to 60 million. See Chen
Xin, ``Legislators Review Labor Law Revision on Regulating
Outsourcing,'' China Daily, 25 December 12; Kevin Slaten and Xue Chao,
``Wages Rising in Chinese Factories? Only for Some,'' In These Times,
18 March 13; Liu Xiaojie and Liu Chunxiu, ``Dispatch Labor Industry
Thresholds To Rise'' [Laowu paiqian hangye menkan jiang tigao], 21st
Century Business Herald, 22 November 12; Huang Yan, et al., ``Flood of
Labor Dispatch in Enterprises Common Phenomenon, Dispatch Workers Face
Unequal Pay for Equal Work'' [Qiye laowu paiqian fanlan xianxiang
pubian laowugong mianlin tonggong butong chou], Economic Information,
reprinted in People's Daily, 6 July 12; Zhang Zhilong, et al., ``Xinhua
Viewpoint: Labor Dispatch Personnel `Unequal Pay for Equal Work'
Problem Draws Concern'' [Xinhua shidian: laowu paiqian renyuan
``tonggong butong chou'' wenti yin guanzhu], Xinhua, 16 January 13.
\70\National People's Congress, Standing Committee of the National
People's Congress Decision Regarding Amendments to PRC Labor Contract
Law [Quanguo renmin daibiao dahui changwuweiyuanhui guanyu xiugai
``zhonghua renmin gongheguo laodong hetong fa'' de jueding], 29
December 12.
\71\Ibid., arts. 66, 63.
\72\Ibid., art. 57.
\73\Zou Mingqiang, ``On the Eve of the Implementation of Amendments
to PRC Labor Contract Law, the Public Looks Forward To Improving the
Unfair Circumstances of Dispatch Laborers'' [``Laodong hetong fa
(xiuzheng an)'' jijiang zhengshi shishi, gaishan laowu paiqiangong de
bu gongping jingyu cheng gongzhong qidai], Workers' Daily, 16 June 13;
Jiang Yunzhang, ``Second Examination of Amendments to Labor Contract
Law Postponed'' [Laodong hetong fa xiugai er shen tuiyan], Economic
Observer, 27 October 12.
\74\Kevin Slaten and Xue Chao, ``Wages Rising in Chinese Factories?
Only for Some,'' In These Times, 18 March 13; Li Shulong, ``Dongguan
Child Laborer Dies: 14-Year-Old Country Boy on the Assembly Line''
[Dongguan tonggong zhi si: zou shang liushui xian de 14 sui xiangxia
haizi], Southern Daily, 31 May 13.
\75\Li Shulong, ``Dongguan Child Laborer Dies: 14-Year-Old Country
Boy on the Assembly Line'' [Dongguan tonggong zhi si: zou shang liushui
xian de 14 sui xiangxia haizi], Southern Daily, 31 May 13.
\76\International Labour Organization, Convention concerning Forced
or Compulsory Labour (No. 29), adopted by 14th ILC Session, 28 June 30,
entry into force 1 May 32, art. 2.2(c); International Labour
Organization, Convention concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour (No.
105), adopted by 40th ILC Session, 25 June 57, entry into force 17
January 59, art. 1. Article 2.2(c) of the Convention concerning Forced
or Compulsory Labour allows for ``any work or service exacted from any
person as a consequence of a conviction in a court of law, provided
that the said work or service is carried out under the supervision and
control of a public authority and that the said person is not hired to
or placed at the disposal of private individuals, companies or
associations.''
\77\International Labour Organization, ``Ratifications of the
Fundamental Human Rights Conventions by Country,'' last visited on 6
September 13; International Labour Organization, ILO Declaration on
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, 18 June 98, art. 2. Other
rights member countries are obligated to respect include the effective
abolition of child labor; the elimination of discrimination in respect
of employment and occupation; and freedom of association and the
``effective recognition'' of the right to collective bargaining.
\78\Frank Langfitt, ``Ex-Inmates Speak Out About Labor Camps as
China Considers `Reforms,''' National Public Radio, 22 February 13;
Chai Huiqun, ``Confessions of Disgraced RTL Officers'' [Luoma laojiao
jingcha de jiantao], Southern Weekend, 2 May 13; Andrew Jacobs,
``Behind Cry for Help From China Labor Camp,'' New York Times, 11 June
13.
\79\Chai Huiqun, ``Confessions of Disgraced RTL Officers'' [Luoma
laojiao jingcha de jiantao], Southern Weekend, 2 May 13; Lisa Murray
and Angus Grigg, ``Qantas in China Prison Labour Row,'' Australian
Financial Review, 26 June 13; Andrew Jacobs, ``Behind Cry for Help From
China Labor Camp,'' New York Times, 11 June 13.
\80\Andrew Jacobs, ``Behind Cry for Help From China Labor Camp,''
New York Times, 11 June 13; Chai Huiqun, ``Confessions of Disgraced RTL
Officers'' [Luoma laojiao jingcha de jiantao], Southern Weekend, 2 May
13.
\81\Chai Huiqun, ``Confessions of Disgraced RTL Officers'' [Luoma
laojiao jingcha de jiantao], Southern Weekend, 2 May 13.
\82\State Council, Provisions Reiterating the Prohibition on the
Export of Products Made by Prisoners Undergoing Reeducation Through
Labor [Guanyu chongshen jinzhi laogai chanpin chukou de guiding],
issued and effective 5 October 91, art. 4.
\83\U.S. Department of Labor, List of Goods Produced by Child Labor
or Forced Labor, September 2012, 17; Lisa Murray and Angus Grigg,
``Qantas in China Prison Labour Row,'' Australian Financial Review, 26
June 13; Frank Langfitt, ``Ex-Inmates Speak Out About Labor Camps As
China Considers `Reforms,''' National Public Radio, 22 February 13.
\84\Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States of
America and the People's Republic of China on Prohibiting Import and
Export Trade In Prison Labor Products, effective 7 August 92; Statement
of Cooperation on the Implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding
Between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China
on Prohibiting Import and Export Trade in Prison Labor Products, 14
March 94.
\85\``Experts Say Products Made By Chinese Prison Labor Still Enter
US,'' Voice of America, 1 November 09.
\86\International Labour Organization, ``Global Wage Report 2012/
13: Wages and Equitable Growth,'' 2013, 20.
\87\The National Bureau of Statistics of China reported in January
2013 that China's working-age population shrank by 3.45 million in
2012. National Bureau of Statistics of China, ``China's Economy
Achieved a Stabilized and Accelerated Development in the Year of
2012,'' 18 January 13. According to Cai Fang, director of the Institute
of Population and Labor Economics under the Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences, the working-age population will fall by as much as 30 million
by 2020. Chen Xin, ``Labor Force `At Turning Point,''' China Daily, 6
November 12. See also Tom Orlik, ``China: The Jobs Report,'' Wall
Street Journal, 15 March 13; Kathrin Hille and Rahul Jacob, ``China:
Beyond the Conveyor Belt,'' Financial Times, 14 October 12; China
Labour Bulletin, ``Wages in China,'' 10 June 13.
\88\Xu Weiwei, ``China's Labor Shortage Worsens as Migrants Find
Work at Home,'' Morning Whistle, 19 February 13.
\89\Ding Qingfen and Qiu Quanlin, ``Higher Costs Forcing Firms To
Relocate,'' China Daily, 21 October 12; Keith Bradsher, ``Wary of
China, Companies Head to Cambodia,'' New York Times, 8 April 13; Tim
Culpan, ``Foxconn Inland Push Spurred by Labor, BI Says,'' Bloomberg, 3
March 13.
\90\These changes have also prompted observers to question whether
China has reached the Lewis Turning Point, the point when a country's
excess labor is exhausted, industrial wages rise, industrial profits
shrink, and investment declines. See International Monetary Fund,
Mitali Das and Papa N' Diaye, ``Chronicle of a Decline Foretold: Has
China Reached the Lewis Turning Point?'' IMF Working Paper, January
2013, 3, 17; International Labour Organization, ``Global Wage Report
2012/13: Wages and Equitable Growth,'' 2013, 20; ``All-China Federation
of Trade Unions: Labor Income as Proportion of GDP Continues 22-Year
Decline'' [Zhongguo zong gonghui: laodongzhe shouru zai GDP zhong zhan
bi lianxu 22 nian xiajiang], Gu Hantai Net, 14 March 13.
\91\Kevin Yao and Aileen Wang, ``China Lets Gini Out of the Bottle;
Wide Wealth Gap,'' Reuters, 18 January 13; China Labour Bulletin,
``Wages in China,'' 10 June 13.
\92\International Labour Organization, ``Global Wage Report 2012/
13: Wages and Equitable Growth,'' 2013, 42; ``All-China Federation of
Trade Unions: Labor Income as Proportion of GDP Continues 22-Year
Decline'' [Zhongguo zong gonghui: laodongzhe shouru zai GDP zhong zhan
bi lianxu 22 nian xiajiang], Gu Hantai Net, 14 March 13.
\93\China Labour Bulletin, ``Wages in China,'' 10 June 13.
\94\State Council, ``Several Opinions Regarding Deepening Reform of
the Income Distribution System'' [Guanyu shenhua shouru fenpei zhidu
gaige ruogan yijian], issued 3 February 13.
\95\``China Approves Income Plan as Wealth Divide Poses Risks,''
Bloomberg, 5 February 13; ``China's Inequality,'' Financial Times, 10
February 13.
\96\State Council, ``12th-Five Year Plan on Employment Promotion
(2011-2015)'' [Cujin jiuye guihua (2011-2015 nian)], 24 January 12.
\97\Li Jinlei, ``24 Provinces and Cities Raise Minimum Wage
Standards, Shanghai Leading With 1,620 Yuan (Chart Attached)'' [24
sheng shi shangtiao zuidi gongzi biaozhun shanghai 1620 yuan jushou
(fubiao)], China News Service, 1 September 13; Zhang Jun, ``Fujian
Raises Minimum Wage Levels, Monthly Minimum Wage in Quanzhou and Other
Areas is 1,050 Yuan'' [Fujian shangtiao zuidi gongzi biaozhun quanzhou
gedi zuidi meiyue 1050 yuan], Dongnan Net, reprinted in Sohu, 14 August
13. As of September 9, 2013, the Commission had not observed reports of
minimum wage increases in Qinghai and Hunan provinces, the Tibet
Autonomous Region, or Chongqing municipality.
\98\China Labour Bulletin, ``Wages in China,'' 10 June 13.
\99\Jennifer Cheung, China Labour Bulletin, ``China's Workers
Continue To Demand Higher Pay,'' 9 April 13; Jennifer Cheung, China
Labour Bulletin, ``Minimum Wage Increases in 2012 Fail To Provide
Workers With a Living Wage,'' 13 December 12; China Labour Bulletin,
``Wages in China,'' 10 June 13.
\100\Jennifer Cheung, China Labour Bulletin, ``China's Workers
Continue To Demand Higher Pay,'' 9 April 13.
\101\Li Li, ``Legal Expert: Evidence is the Achilles Heel in
Migrant Workers' Difficulty Obtaining Back Wages'' [Falu zhuanjia:
zhengju shi nongmingong taoxin nan de sixue], China Youth Daily, 28
February 13.
\102\He Yong and Pan Yue, ``All-China Federation of Trade Unions:
Problem of Wage Arrears Rebounds, Debt Settling Situation Increasingly
Grim'' [Quanguo zonggonghui: tuoqian gongzi wenti fantan qing qian
xingshi qu yanjun], People's Daily, reprinted in China News Service, 16
January 13.
\103\Fan Zhengwei, ``Wage Arrears Problem is Multiple Layers of
Subcontracting, Little Legal Precedence in Punishing Malicious Wage
Arrears Causes Inadequate Deterrence'' [Qianxin wenti cengceng zhuan
bao eyi qianxin zui pan li shao weishe li buzu], People's Daily,
reprinted in China News Service, 16 January 13; Yu Hu et al., ``Migrant
Workers' Rights Report'' [Nongmingong weiquan baogao], Chongqing Daily,
reprinted in People's Daily, 14 December 12; Zhao Lei, ``Workers
Assured of Wages Ahead of Festival,'' Changjiang Daily, reprinted in
People's Daily, 21 January 13.
\104\China Labour Bulletin, ``Wages in China,'' 10 June 13.
\105\Sichuan Provincial People's Government, ``General Office of
the Sichuan Provincial People's Government Notification Regarding
Establishing System of Accountability for Handling Wage Arrears In the
Construction Field'' [Sichuan sheng renmin zhengfu bangongting guanyu
jianli jianshe shigong lingyu qianxin chuli zerenzhi de tongzhi], 3
December 12; ``Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security
Discusses Migrant Workers' Wage Claims: Establish a `Green Channel' for
Speedy Recovery'' [Renshi bu tan nongmingong taoxin: jian ``luse
tongdao'' kuaisu jiejue], China News Service, 25 January 13; Yu Lixiao
and Chen Jian, ``Beijing Official: Must Maintain High Pressure Posture
on Wage Arrears Activity'' [Beijing guanyuan: yao dui qianxin xingwei
baochi gaoya taishi], China News Service, 26 January 13.
\106\Supreme People's Court, Supreme People's Court Interpretation
Regarding Several Questions in the Application of the Law in the Trial
of Criminal Cases for the Refusal to Pay Labor Remuneration [Zuigao
renmin fayuan guanyu shenli ju bu zhifu laodong baochou xingshi anjian
shiyong falu ruogan wenti de jieshi], issued 14 January 13, effective
23 January 13.
\107\Jennifer Cheung, China Labour Bulletin, ``China Sees Upsurge
in Worker Protests Prior to Lunar New Year,'' 8 February 13; ``Migrant
Worker Salary Demands Frequent in All Parts of the Country, Government
Blindly Suppresses to Maintain Stability'' [Nongmingong taoxin gedi pin
fa zhengfu wei weiwen yiwei daya], Radio Free Asia, 4 February 13.
\108\For more information, see PRC Production Safety Law [Zhonghua
renmin gongheguo anquan shengchan fa], passed 29 June 02, effective 1
November 02; PRC Mine Safety Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo kuangshan
anquan fa], passed 7 November 92, effective 1 May 93; State Council,
Regulations on Labor Protection in Workplace Where Toxic Substances are
Used [Shiyong youdu shipin zuoye changsuo laodong baohu tiaolie],
issued and effective 30 April 02.
\109\See, e.g., Fiona Tam, ``Grim Fate of Migrant Workers Maimed in
China's `Black Factories,''' South China Morning Post, 21 November 12;
Christina Larson, ``In China, Politically Connected Firms Have Higher
Worker Death Rates,'' Business Week, 28 January 13; Chen Xin, ``Sites
Still Hold Dangers for Construction Crews,'' China Daily, 17 September
12.
\110\Wang Huan, ``China Will Ban or Close 20,000 Non-Coal Mines
Over the Next Three Years'' [Woguo weilai san nian jiang qudi guancai
yue 2 wan zuo fei meikuang shan], Yicai Net, 19 September 12; Fiona
Tam, ``Grim Fate of Migrant Workers Maimed in China's `Black
Factories,''' South China Morning Post, 21 November 12.
\111\Wang Xiaodong, ``Risks of Accident are `Striking,''' China
Daily, 19 June 13; Christina Larson, ``In China, Politically Connected
Firms Have Higher Worker Death Rates,'' Bloomberg, 28 January 13.
\112\Raymond Fisman and Yongxiang Wang, ``The Unsafe Side of
Chinese Crony Capitalism,'' Harvard Business Review, January-February
2013.
\113\Office of Safety Administration, ``Yang Dongliang: Strict
Pledge to Constantly Open Up New Phase for Production Safety Work''
[Yang Dongliang: yan zi dang tou buduan kaichuang anquan shengchan
gongzuo xin jumian], reprinted on PRC Central People's Government Web
site, 10 May 13.
\114\Zi Xiuchun, ``Lawyer Huang Leping's Letter: The Five Main
Problems in Migrant Workers' Lives I Hope Committee Delegates Address''
[Huang Leping lushi laixin: nongmingong shenghuo wu da nanti xiwang
dedao daibiao weiyuan guanzhu], Workers' Daily, reprinted in Beijing
Yilian Labor Law Aid and Research Center, 6 March 13.
\115\National Bureau of Statistics of China, ``China Economic and
Social Development Statistics 2012 Report'' [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo
2012 nian guomin jingji he shehui fazhan tongji gongbao], 22 February
13.
\116\Fiona Tam, ``Grim Fate of Migrant Workers Maimed in China's
`Black Factories,''' South China Morning Post, 21 November 12; ``China
Cuts Coal Deaths,'' Radio Free Asia, 25 February 13.
\117\``China Cuts Coal Deaths,'' Radio Free Asia, 25 February 13;
Chao Xiangrong, ``Jilin Jiapigou Gold Mine Fire Incident Only Reported
9 Hours After Developed'' [Jilin jiapigou jinkuang huozai shi fa 9
xiaoshi cai shangbao], China Radio International, 16 January 13; Chen
Weiwei and Zhu Liyi, ``State Coal Supervision Bureau Reports on Three
Recent Coal Mine Accidents, Requires Reports Not Be Delayed or
Concealed'' [Guojia mei jian ju tongbao jinqi san qi meikuang shigu
yaoqiu bude chi bao manbao], Xinhua, 25 September 12.
\118\National Bureau of Statistics of China, ``China Economic and
Social Development Statistics 2012 Report'' [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo
2012 nian guomin jingji he shehui fazhan tongji gongbao], 22 February
13.
\119\``China Cuts Coal Deaths,'' Radio Free Asia, 25 February 13;
``2012 Coal Mine Mortality Rate Dropped to 0.374 Per Million Tons''
[2012 nian meikuang baiwandun siwanglu jiang zhi 0.374], International
Coal Net, 28 January 13; China Labour Bulletin, ``Report Claims Coal
Mine Deaths in China Fell By One-Third in 2012,'' 29 January 13.
\120\Students and Scholars Against Corporate Misbehavior,
``[Report] Apple Fails in Its Responsibility To Monitor Suppliers,'' 26
February 13; Students and Scholars Against Corporate Misbehavior,
``Widespread Labour Abuses at Disney and Mattel Factories ICTI Doesn't
Care About Labour Rights Standards,'' reprinted in Scribd, 7 January
13; China Labor Watch, ``Investigative Report of HTNS Shenzhen CO.,
Ltd. (Huizhou Branch),'' 14 December 12; Charles Kernaghan, Institute
for Global Labour and Human Rights, ``Toys From Hell: Walmart &
Disney,'' December 2012.
\121\``Thousands of Workers at Foxconn Jiangxi Factory Unsatisfied
With Wages and Treatment Demonstrate'' [Fushikang jiangxi gongchang
qian ren buman xinzi daiyu shangjie youxing], West Net, reprinted in
Caijing, 13 January 13; David Barboza, ``Group Says Deaths Show
Problems Remain at Foxconn,'' New York Times, 20 May 13.
\122\CECC, 2012 Annual Report, 10 October 12, 66-67; ``Have Foxconn
Working Conditions Improved?'' [Fushikang de gongzuo tiaojian gaishan
le ma?], Radio Free Asia, 17 May 13; ``Thousands of Workers at Foxconn
Jiangxi Factory Unsatisfied With Wages and Treatment Demonstrate''
[Fushikang jiangxi gongchang qian ren buman xinzi daiyu shangjie
youxing], West Net, reprinted in Caijing, 13 January 13; Isaac Shapiro
and Scott Nova, ``Still Polishing Apple: Second FLA Report Misleads on
Labor Rights Progress,'' Economic Policy Institute Blog, 7 June 13.
\123\Students and Scholars Against Corporate Misbehavior,
``[Report] Apple Fails in its Responsibility to Monitor Suppliers,'' 26
February 13; ``34 Workers Poisoned by Alkane Used to Clean Cellphone
Screens, Some Cases So Severe Workers Unable to Take Care of
Themselves'' [34 gongren caxi shouji pingmu wan zhongdu yanzhong zhe
shenghuo buneng zili], Legal Daily, reprinted in Phoenix Net, 26
September 12; Students and Scholars Against Corporate Misbehavior,
``Widespread Labour Abuses at Disney and Mattel Factories ICTI Doesn't
Care About Labour Rights Standards,'' 7 January 13.
\124\``Xinhua Insight: Fatal Fire Rings Alarm For Factory Safety,''
Xinhua, 5 June 13; ``China Gov't Blames Company, Inspectors for
`Extremely Chaotic' Safety at Poultry Plant in Fire,'' Associated
Press, reprinted in Washington Post, 6 June 13.
\125\Ibid.
\126\CECC, 2012 Annual Report, 10 October 12, 65; Zheng Li, ``Work-
Related Injury Insurance `Too High to Reach'; Migrant Workers with
Pneumoconiosis Urgently Need `Survival Money''' [Gongshang baoxian
``gao buke pan'' chenfei nongmingong jixu ``huoming qian''], Workers'
Daily, 28 February 13; Pan Qi, ``Migrant Workers With Pneumoconiosis
Exceed 6 Million in China, Lack of Labor Contracts Makes Defending
Rights Difficult'' [Woguo chenfeibing nongmingong chao 600 wan wu
laodong hetong zhi weiquan nan], Legal Daily, reprinted in Sina, 6
February 13.
\127\Pan Qi, ``Migrant Workers With Pneumoconiosis Exceed 6 Million
in China, Lack of Labor Contracts Makes Defending Rights Difficult''
[Woguo chenfeibing nongmingong chao 600 wan wu laodong hetong zhi
weiquan nan], Legal Daily, reprinted in Sina, 6 February 13.
\128\``Black Lung Patients Often Face A Long Wait For
Compensation,'' China Daily, 25 March 13; Lan Fang, ``Public Interest
Group Indicates Rate of Occupational Injury Perhaps Higher Than
Official Statistics'' [Gongyi tuanti zhi gongshang fashang lu huo gaoyu
guanfang tongji], Caixin, 28 April 13.
\129\See, e.g., He Huifeng, ``Toxic Gas Cloud at Honghu Factory
Leaves 20 in Hospital,'' South China Morning Post, 24 October 12; C.
Custer and L. Li, ``The Real Dangers in China's Mines,'' 2Non, 18
December 12.
\130\Li Keyong, Zhou Rui et al., ``Labor Law, Those Clauses That
Are Ignored (Policy Focus)'' [Laodong fa, na xie bei moshi de tiaokuan
(zhengce jujiao)], People's Daily, 1 May 13; ``Investigation States
That Defending the Rights of Pneumoconiosis Sufferers Stuck in
Difficult Situation, Majority Have Not Signed Labor Contracts''
[Diaocha cheng chenfeibing ren weiquan xian kunju duoshu mei qianding
laodong hetong], Guiyang Evening News, reprinted in China News Service,
22 January 13.
\131\Chen Xin, ``Sites Still Hold Dangers for Construction Crews,''
China Daily, 17 September 12; C. Custer and L. Li, ``The Real Dangers
in China's Mines,'' 2Non, 18 December 12.
\132\Zi Xiuchun, ``Lawyer Huang Leping's Letter: The Five Main
Problems in Migrant Workers' Lives I Hope Committee Delegates Address''
[Huang leping lushi laixin: nongmingong shenghuo wu da nanti xiwang
dedao daibiao weiyuan guanzhu], Workers' Daily, reprinted in Beijing
Yilian Labor Law Aid and Research Center, 6 March 13; Chen Xin and He
Dan, ``Black Lung Patients Often Face a Long Wait for Compensation,''
China Daily, 25 March 13.
\133\Echo Hui, ``In China, Losing Battle Against Lung Disease and
Workers' Rights,'' South China Morning Post, 3 July 13; Fiona Tam,
``Grim Fate of Migrant Workers Maimed in China's `Black Factories,'''
South China Morning Post, 21 November 12; ``Female Worker Becomes
Temporary Worker After Injury, Judge: Gate Card Proves Labor Relation''
[Nu gong shoushang hou cheng linshigong faguan: menka ke zhengming
laodong guanxi], Dahe Net, reprinted in China News Service, 4 July 13;
Jiang Jie, ``Black Lung Sufferers Receive Govt Damages,'' Global Times,
8 July 13.
\134\``Work Related Injury Insurance `Too High to Reach'; Migrant
Workers With Pneumoconiosis Urgently Need `Survival Money'''[Gongshang
baoxian ``gao buke pan'' chenfei nongmingong jixu ``huoming qian'']
Workers' Daily, 28 February 13; Pan Qi, ``Migrant Workers With
Pneumoconiosis Exceed 6 Million in China, Lack of Labor Contracts Makes
Defending Rights Difficult'' [Woguo chenfeibing nongmingong chao 600
wan wu laodong hetong zhi weiquan nan], Legal Daily, reprinted in Sina,
6 February 13. The PRC Regulations on Occupational Injury Insurance
stipulate that workers must obtain an official occupational disease or
injury diagnosis to be considered for compensation. See PRC Regulations
on Occupational Injury Insurance [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo gongshang
baoxian tiaoli], issued 27 April 03, amended 20 December 10, effective
1 January 11, art. 18.
\135\Jiang Jie, ``Black Lung Sufferers Receive Govt Damages,''
Global Times, 8 July 13.
\136\Chen Xin and He Dan, ``Black Lung Patients Often Face a Long
Wait for Compensation,'' China Daily, 25 March 13.
\137\Huang Yuli, ``Tribunal Hears Case of Injured Foxconn Worker,''
China Daily, 31 October 12; Tan Ee Lyn, ``Family of Brain-Damaged
Worker Takes Foxconn to Court in China,'' Reuters, 30 October 12.
\138\Tan Ee Lyn, ``Worker's Injury Casts Harsh New Light on Foxconn
and China,'' Reuters, 10 October 12; ``Foxconn Engineer's Workplace
Injury Leads to Compensation Dispute, Father Beaten by Security''
[Fushikang gongchengshi gongshang yin peichang jiufen fuqin ceng zao
baoan bao da], Shenzhen News, 28 September 12.
\139\Tan Ee Lyn, ``Family of Brain-Damaged Worker Takes Foxconn to
Court in China,'' Reuters, 30 October 12.
\140\Measures on the Administration of Diagnosis and Evaluation of
Occupational Diseases [Zhiyebing zhenduan yu jianding guanli banfa],
issued 28 March 02, amended 19 February 13, effective 10 April 13, art.
19, 22, 23-28, 44.
\141\Ibid., art. 19. See also China Labour Bulletin, ``Compensation
for Work-Related Injury and Occupational Disease in China,'' last
visited 16 August 13.
Notes to Section II--Criminal Justice
\1\``Bizarrely Consistent: A Crackdown on Legal Activists,''
Economist, 27 July 13.
\2\``China's Wrong Turn,'' Washington Post, 22 July 13; Jeffrey
Wasserstrom, ``A Reformist Chinese Leader? Stop Fooling Yourself,''
Time, 22 July 13; Donald Clarke et al., ``Xu Zhiyong Arrested: How
Serious Can Beijing Be About Political Reform?'' ChinaFile, 18 July 13;
Chris Buckley, ``Prominent Advocate Held in Southern China,'' New York
Times, 17 August 13; ``Chinese Police Arrest Rights Activist Xu
Zhiyong,'' Reuters, reprinted in Radio Australia, 23 August 13. See the
Commission's Political Prisoner Database, records 2005-00199 on Xu
Zhiyong and 2005-00143 on Guo Feixiong (Yang Maodong) for more
information on these cases.
\3\Jerome A. Cohen, Human Rights Watch, ``Criminal Justice in
China: From the Gang of Four to Bo Xilai,'' 25 July 13, 11; Shangquan
Law Firm, ``Investigative Report on the Implementation of the New
Criminal Procedure Law (2013, Q1)'' [Xin xingsufa shishi zhuangkuang
diaoyan baogao (2013 nian diyi jidu)], 4 June 13.
\4\CECC, 2012 Annual Report, 10 October 12, 69-70. The authority,
staff, and budgets of law enforcement agencies have grown substantially
since 2008.
\5\Ibid.; Jeremy Page, ``China Reins in New Security Boss's
Clout,'' Wall Street Journal, 20 November 12; Jerome A. Cohen, Human
Rights Watch, ``Criminal Justice in China: From the Gang of Four to Bo
Xilai,'' 25 July 13, 6.
\6\Willy Wo-Lap Lam, ``The Politics of Liu Xiaobo's Trial,'' in Liu
Xiaobo, Charter 08 and the Challenges of Political Reform in China,
eds. Jean-Philippe Beja et al. (Aberdeen, Hong Kong: Hong Kong
University Press, 2012), 261.
\7\``Meng Jianzhu Appointed Head of CPC Political and Legal Affairs
Commission,'' Xinhua, 19 November 12; CECC, 2012 Annual Report, 10
October 12, 70; Jeremy Page, ``China Reins in New Security Boss's
Clout,'' Wall Street Journal, 20 November 12; Jerome A. Cohen, Human
Rights Watch, ``Criminal Justice in China: From the Gang of Four to Bo
Xilai,'' 25 July 13, 6-7; Keith Zhai, ``Security Tsar Meng Jianzhu
Criticises Interference in Court Proceedings,'' South China Morning
Post, 9 January 13.
\8\``Zhou Yongkang, Former Security Tsar Linked to Bo Xilai, Faces
Corruption Probe,'' South China Morning Post, 30 August 13; Christopher
Bodeen, ``Zhou Yongkang, China Security Chief, Investigated as Bo Xilai
Scandal Expands,'' Associated Press, reprinted in Huffington Post, 19
April 12; Luo Jieqi and He Xin, ``In Bo Xilai's City, a Legacy of
Backstabbing,'' Caixin, 7 December 12; Keith B. Richburg, ``After Bo's
Fall, Chongqing Victims Seek Justice,'' Washington Post, 19 April 12.
\9\Luo Jieqi and He Xin, ``In Bo Xilai's City, a Legacy of
Backstabbing,'' Caixin, 7 December 12; Keith B. Richburg, ``After Bo's
Fall, Chongqing Victims Seek Justice,'' Washington Post, 19 April 12.
\10\Tania Branigan, ``China Indicts Bo Xilai for Corruption,''
Guardian, 25 July 13; Keith B. Richburg and Andrew Higgins, ``Bo
Xilai's Ouster Seen as Victory for Chinese Reformers,'' Washington
Post, 15 March 12; Gillian Wong, ``China Moves To Right Wrongs in City
Bo Once Ruled,'' Associated Press, reprinted in Yahoo! News, 3 December
12; Yu Xiaodong, ``Policing the Police,'' NewsChina Magazine, March
2013.
\11\Gillian Wong, ``China Moves To Right Wrongs in City Bo Once
Ruled,'' Associated Press, reprinted in Yahoo! News, 3 December 12.
\12\Keith B. Richburg, ``After Bo's Fall, Chongqing Victims Seek
Justice,'' Washington Post, 19 April 12; Louisa Lim, ``Targets of
Disgraced Bo Xilai Still Languish in Jail,'' National Public Radio, 27
May 13; Gillian Wong, ``China Moves To Right Wrongs in City Bo Once
Ruled,'' Associated Press, reprinted in Yahoo! News, 2 December 12.
\13\PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingfa], issued 1
July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25
December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February
05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, art. 105(1) and (2).
\14\Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``China: End Escalating
Crackdown Criminalizing Peaceful Assembly and Free Expression,'' 17
July 13; Human Rights Watch, ``China: Crackdown on Anticorruption
Activists Escalates,'' 9 June 13; ``Beijing Scholar Xu Zhiyong
Criminally Detained; Rights Defense Lawyer Says Types of Political
Cases Are Expanding'' [Beijing xuezhe xu zhiyong bei jingfang xingshi
juliu weiquan lushi cheng zhengzhi lei anjian you kuoda qushi], Voice
of America, 16 July 13; ``In Videotaped Message, Jailed Chinese
Activist Urges Citizens To Unite for Democracy,'' Associated Press,
reprinted in Washington Post, 8 August 13.
\15\Front Line Defenders, ``China: Formal Arrest of Human Rights
Defender Mr. Xu Zhiyong,'' 27 August 13; Chris Buckley, ``Formal Arrest
of Advocate Is Approved by China,'' New York Times, 23 August 13;
Patrick Boehler, ``Leading Citizen Movement Activist Xu Zhiyong
Arrested,'' South China Morning Post, 31 July 13; Chinese Human Rights
Defenders, ``Individuals Detained in Crackdown on Peaceful Assembly &
Association,'' 18 September 13; Xu Zhiyong, ``China's New Citizens'
Movement'' [Zhongguo xin gongmin yundong], Xu Zhiyong's Blog, 15
November 12.
\16\Ibid.
\17\Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Urgent: Well-Known Rights
Defender Guo Feixiong Is Criminally Detained'' [Jinji guanzhu: zhuming
weiquan renshi guo feixiong bei xing ju], 17 August 13. For more
information on Guo Feixiong, see the Commission's Political Prisoner
Database record 2005-00143.
\18\Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Individuals Detained in
Crackdown on Peaceful Assembly & Association,'' 28 August 13;
``Officials Detain Xu Zhiyong Amidst a Crackdown on Individuals Calling
for Greater Government Accountability,'' Congressional-Executive
Commission on China, 1 August 13; Calum MacLeod, ``China Silences Anti-
Corruption Activists,'' USA Today, 30 July 13; Chinese Human Rights
Defenders, ``China: End Escalating Crackdown Criminalizing Peaceful
Assembly and Free Expression,'' 17 July 13.
\19\Peter Ford, ``Briefing: 5 Things To Know About China's
Crackdown on Critics,'' Christian Science Monitor, 15 August 13.
\20\Jerome A. Cohen, ``Will 2013 See Progress in China's Rights
Protection?'' South China Morning Post, reprinted in Council on Foreign
Relations, 11 December 12; Peter Ford, ``Family of Blind Activist Chen
Guangcheng `Tormented' in China,'' Christian Science Monitor, 2 May 13.
\21\Edward Wong, ``China Sentences Brother-in-Law of Nobel Laureate
to 11 Years on Fraud Charges,'' New York Times, 9 June 13; Michael
Martina, ``Kin of Jailed Chinese Nobel Winner Liu Xiaobo Sentenced to
11 Years in Prison,'' Reuters, reprinted in NBC News, 9 June 13.
\22\Ibid.; ``Beijing Court Rejects Appeal by Nobel Laureate's Liu
Xiaobo's Brother-in-Law,'' Reuters and Associated Press, reprinted in
South China Morning Post, 17 August 13.
\23\Austin Ramzy, ``Above the Law? China's Bully Law-Enforcement
Officers,'' Time, 21 May 09; Joel Martinsen, ``A Practical Handbook for
Beating Street Vendors,'' Danwei, 22 April 09; Human Rights Watch,
```Beat Him, Take Everything Away': Abuses by China's Chengguan Para-
Police,'' 23 May 12.
\24\David Bandurski, ``Brutal Killing of (Citizen Journalist) Wei
Wenhua Underscores the Evils of China's `Urban Management' System,''
China Media Project, 10 January 08; ``Beijing Guide on How To Beat Law-
Breakers Sparks Outrage,'' Agence France-Presse, reprinted in Asia One,
23 April 09; Andrew Jacobs, ``Death of Watermelon Vendor Sets Off
Outcry in China,'' New York Times, 20 July 13; Peter Ford, ``China's
`Para-Police' Brutality Under Scrutiny,'' Christian Science Monitor, 22
July 13; Stanley Lubman, ``The Ticking Bomb of China's Urban Para-
Police,'' Wall Street Journal, China Real Time Report (blog), 8 August
13; Human Rights Watch, ```Beat Him, Take Everything Away': Abuses by
China's Chengguan Para-Police,'' 23 May 12.
\25\CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 93.
\26\Andrew Jacobs, ``Death of Watermelon Vendor Sets Off Outcry in
China,'' New York Times, 20 July 13; Michelle FlorCruz, ``Beijing
Airport Explosion Caused by Man Disgruntled About Accident That Left
Him Paralyzed,'' International Business Times, 22 July 13; Stanley
Lubman, ``The Ticking Bomb of China's Urban Para-Police,'' Wall Street
Journal, China Real Time Report (blog), 8 August 13; Kevin McGeary,
``Beijing Airport Bomber Is an Aggrieved Chengguan Victim From
Dongguan,'' Nanfang Insider, 22 July 13.
\27\Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``China Human Rights Briefing,
July 19-25,'' 25 July 13; Stanley Lubman, ``The Ticking Bomb of China's
Urban Para-Police,'' Wall Street Journal, China Real Time Report
(blog), 8 August 13; Human Rights Watch, ```Beat Him, Take Everything
Away': Abuses by China's Chengguan Para-Police,'' 23 May 12; CECC, 2012
Annual Report, 10 October 12, 131; Jeremy Chan, ``China To Revise
Policy Toward Peddlers,'' Wall Street Journal, 11 August 09; ``Legal
Status To Be Granted to Street Vendors'' [Liudong tanfan youwang hefa
shengcun], Caijing, 22 July 09.
\28\UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Working
Group on Arbitrary Detention Fact Sheet No. 26, May 2000, sec. IV(B);
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted
by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry
into force 23 March 76, arts. 12, 18, 19, 21, 22, 27; Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), adopted and proclaimed by UN
General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 48, arts. 7, 10,
13, 14, 18, 19, 21. The rights and freedoms protected under the second
category include those in Articles 7, 10, 13, 14, 18, 19, and 21 of the
UDHR and in Articles 12, 18, 19, 21, 22, and 27 of the ICCPR; CECC,
2012 Annual Report, 10 October 12, 70-71.
\29\See the Commission's Political Prisoner Database, records 2004-
03114 on Liu Xiaobo, 2011-00175 on Chen Wei, 2008-00379 on Chen Xi,
2008-00668 on Guo Quan, 2010-00616 on Li Tie, 2004-02253 on Zhu Yufu,
2004-04614 on Liu Xianbin, 2005-00291 on Gao Zhisheng, 2005-00285 on Ni
Yulan, and 2004-04650 on Wang Bingzhang, for more information on these
cases.
\30\See, e.g., CECC, 2012 Annual Report, 10 October 12, 71; PRC
Constitution, issued 4 December 82, amended 12 April 88, 29 March 93,
15 March 99, 14 March 04, arts. 35, 37, 41; PRC Criminal Procedure Law
[Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingshi susong fa], enacted 1 July 79,
amended 17 March 96, 14 March 12, effective 1 January 13, art. 3; PRC
Public Security Administration Punishment Law [Zhonghua renmin
gongheguo zhian guanli chufa fa], passed 28 August 05, effective 1
March 06, arts. 3, 9, 10, 16; PRC Legislation Law [Zhonghua renmin
gongheguo lifa fa], passed 15 March 00, effective 1 July 00, art. 8(v).
\31\CECC, 2012 Annual Report, 10 October 12, 71.
\32\See, e.g., Jerome A. Cohen, Human Rights Watch, ``Criminal
Justice in China: From the Gang of Four to Bo Xilai,'' 25 July 13;
Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``In the Name of `Stability': 2012
Annual Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in China,''
March 2013, 1; Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, U.S.
Department of State, ``Country Report on Human Rights Practices--2012,
China (Includes Tibet, Hong Kong and Macau),'' 19 April 13, 1.
\33\Michael Martina, ``Kin of Jailed Chinese Nobel Winner Liu
Xiaobo Sentenced to 11 Years in Prison,'' Reuters, 9 June 13. See the
Commission's Political Prisoner Database, record 2010-00629, for more
information on Liu Xia.
\34\David Bandurski, ``Citizens Issue Statement on Xu Zhiyong
Detention,'' China Media Project, 21 July 13.
\35\See, e.g., Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Weighty Times,
Aggressive Measures: China Must End Heightened Crackdown Ahead of Party
Congress,'' 1 November 12; ``China Cracks Down Ahead of Leadership
Meeting,'' Associated Press, reprinted in CBC News, 6 November 12;
Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ```Charter 08' Signatories Launch Anti-
Soft Detention Anti-Surveillance United Movement'' [Lingba xianzhang
qianshu ren faqi ``fan ruanjin fan jiankong lianhe da xingdong''], 20
June 09; CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 88, 95.
\36\UN Committee against Torture, Consideration of Reports
Submitted by State Parties Under Article 19 of the Convention:
Concluding Observations of the Committee against Torture: China, CAT/C/
CHN/CO/4, 12 December 08, para. 14. The 1992 United Nations Declaration
on the Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearance provides
that an ``enforced disappearance'' occurs when individuals are detained
or abducted ``or otherwise deprived of their liberty by officials of
different branches or levels of Government, or by organized groups or
private individuals acting on behalf of, or with the support, direct or
indirect, consent or acquiescence of the Government, followed by a
refusal to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the persons concerned or
a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of their liberty, which places
such persons outside the protection of the law.'' UN General Assembly,
Declaration on the Protection of all Persons from Enforced
Disappearance, A/RES/47/133, 18 December 92. In February 2009, during
its Universal Periodic Review by the Working Group on the Universal
Periodic Review at the UN Human Rights Council, the Chinese government
rejected the recommendation that it should consider ratifying the
International Convention for Protection of all Persons from Enforced
Disappearance, adopted by the UN General Assembly in December 2006. UN
GAOR, Hum. Rts. Coun., 11th Sess., Report of the Working Group on the
Universal Periodic Review--China, A/HRC/11/25, 3 March 09, paras. 38,
84, 117. The delegations from Mexico and Argentina offered this
recommendation.
\37\Human Rights Watch, ```An Alleyway in Hell': China's Abusive
`Black Jails,''' November 2009, 40-43.
\38\Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Silencing Complaints: Human
Rights Abuses Against Petitioners in China,'' 14 March 08, 5-7.
\39\``Urban Stability: Treating the Symptoms,'' Economist, 2 March
13.
\40\Ibid.; Ren Zhongyuan, ``The Death of a Petitioner,'' Caixin, 14
December 12; Josh Chin, ``Beijing Court Takes Rare Swipe at `Black
Jails,''' Wall Street Journal, China Real Time Report (blog), 5
February 13.
\41\Mandy Zuo and Shi Jiangtao, ``Many Freed From Beijing's Biggest
`Black Jail,''' South China Morning Post, 6 December 12; ``Urban
Stability: Treating the Symptoms,'' Economist, 2 March 13; Verna Yu,
``Rare Victory for Petitioners as 10 Hired Thugs Are Convicted Over
`Black Jail,''' South China Morning Post, 6 February 13.
\42\Mandy Zuo and Shi Jiangtao, ``Many Freed From Beijing's Biggest
`Black Jail,''' South China Morning Post, 6 December 12.
\43\``10 People Sentenced for Illegally Detaining Petitioners in
Beijing'' [Shi ming feifa jujin lai jing shangfang renyuan zhe bei
panxing], Xinhua, 5 February 13; Verna Yu, ``Rare Victory for
Petitioners as 10 Hired Thugs Are Convicted Over `Black Jail,''' South
China Morning Post, 6 February 13; Josh Chin, ``Beijing Court Takes
Rare Swipe at `Black Jails,''' Wall Street Journal, China Real Time
Report (blog), 5 February 13; ``Unhappy With Sentences,'' Global Times,
7 February 13.
\44\``Unhappy With Sentences,'' Global Times, 7 February 13; Verna
Yu, ``Rare Victory for Petitioners as 10 Hired Thugs Are Convicted Over
`Black Jail,''' South China Morning Post, 6 February 13.
\45\Mandy Zuo and Shi Jiangtao, ``Many Freed From Beijing's Biggest
`Black Jail,''' South China Morning Post, 6 December 12; ``Urban
Stability: Treating the Symptoms,'' Economist, 2 March 13; Verna Yu,
``Rare Victory for Petitioners as 10 Hired Thugs Are Convicted Over
`Black Jail,''' South China Morning Post, 6 February 13.
\46\``Official Discipline: Policing the Party,'' Economist, 1
September 12; CECC, 2008 Annual Report, 31 October 08, 35; Flora Sapio,
``Shuanggui and Extralegal Detention in China,'' China Information,
Vol. 22, No. 1 (2008), 7, 12.
\47\``Official Discipline: Policing the Party,'' Economist, 1
September 12; Andrew Jacobs, ``Accused Chinese Party Members Face Harsh
Discipline,'' New York Times, 15 June 12.
\48\Andrew Jacobs, ``Accused Chinese Party Members Face Harsh
Discipline,'' New York Times, 15 June 12; Steven Jiang, ``Investigators
Who Drowned Chinese Official Charged With Assault,'' CNN, 6 September
13.
\49\Donald Clarke, ``The Bo Xilai Trial and China's `Rule of Law':
Same Old, Same Old,'' Atlantic, 21 August 13.
\50\Keith Zhai, ``Defiant Bo Xilai Claims He Was Coerced Into Graft
Confession,'' South China Morning Post, 23 August 13; Steven Jiang,
``Investigators Who Drowned Chinese Official Charged With Assault,''
CNN, 6 September 13; Donald Clarke, ``The Bo Xilai Trial and China's
`Rule of Law': Same Old, Same Old,'' Atlantic, 21 August 13; Keith
Zhai, ``Bo Xilai Trial Transcripts Censored, Say Court Sources,'' South
China Morning Post, 26 August 13; Jerome A. Cohen, Human Rights Watch,
``Criminal Justice in China: From the Gang of Four to Bo Xilai,'' 25
July 13, 2.
\51\Bai Tiantian, ``Life in Jail for Bo Xilai,'' Global Times, 23
September 13; ``Judgment in First Instance Trial of Bo Xilai for
Bribery, Embezzlement, and Abuse of Power (Full Text)'' [Bo xilai
shouhui, tanwu, lanyong zhiquan an yishen panjueshu (quanwen)],
People's Daily, reprinted in China News Service, 22 September 13.
\52\Sui-Lee Wee, ``Six Chinese Officials Stand Trial for Torture in
Landmark Case,'' Reuters, 16 September 13.
\53\Joshua D. Rosenzweig et al., ``Comments on the 2012 Revision of
the Chinese Criminal Procedure Law,'' in Comparative Perspectives on
Criminal Justice in China, eds. Mike McConville and Eva Pils
(Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 2013), 461-62; Chinese
Human Rights Defenders, ``In the Name of `Stability': 2012 Annual
Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in China,'' March
2013, 5; UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ``China:
UN Expert Body Concerned About Recent Wave of Enforced
Disappearances,'' 8 April 11.
\54\Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``In the Name of `Stability':
2012 Annual Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in
China,'' March 2013, 5-7; Amnesty International, ``Briefing on China's
2013 Criminal Procedure Law: In Line With International Standards?''
July 2013, 16.
\55\PRC Criminal Procedure Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingshi
susong fa], enacted 1 July 79, amended 17 March 96, 14 March 12,
effective 1 January 13, art. 73.
\56\Ibid.
\57\Ibid.
\58\Amnesty International, ``Briefing on China's 2013 Criminal
Procedure Law: In Line With International Standards?'' July 2013, 16-
17; Joshua D. Rosenzweig et al., ``Comments on the 2012 Revision of the
Chinese Criminal Procedure Law,'' in Comparative Perspectives on
Criminal Justice in China, eds. Mike McConville and Eva Pils
(Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 2013), 461-462, 464;
Conor Foley, The Human Rights Centre, University of Essex, ``Combating
Torture: A Manual for Judges and Prosecutors,'' last visited 13 August
13, paras. 2.12, 2.13; UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No.
20: Replaces General Comment 7 Concerning Prohibition of Torture and
Cruel Treatment or Punishment (Art. 7) 03/10/1992, CCPR General Comment
No. 20 (General Comments) Article 7 (Forty-fourth session, 1992), para.
11.
\59\Dui Hua Foundation, ``RTL Reform Underway, but Undercover,''
Dui Hua Human Rights Journal, 19 June 13; Human Rights Watch, ```Swept
Away': Abuses Against Sex Workers in China,'' May 2013, 17.
\60\See, e.g., UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights,
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention Fact Sheet No. 26, May 2000, sec.
IV(B); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December
66, entry into force 23 March 76, arts. 9, 14; Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR), adopted and proclaimed by UN General Assembly
resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 48, arts. 8-11; CECC 2012 Annual
Report, 10 October 12, 70-71. China became a signatory to the ICCPR on
October 5, 1998, but has yet to ratify the treaty. As a signatory, the
Chinese government is obligated as a matter of international law to
refrain from taking actions that would undermine the purpose of the
treaty.
\61\See, e.g., The End of Reeducation Through Labor? Recent
Developments and Prospects for Reform, Staff Roundtable of the
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 9 May 13, Written
Statement Submitted by Ira Belkin, Executive Director, U.S.-Asia Law
Institute, New York University School of Law; ``Special Topic Paper:
Prospects for Reforming China's Reeducation Through Labor System,''
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 9 May 13; Chinese Human
Rights Defenders, ``Re-Education Through Labor Abuses Continue
Unabated: Overhaul Long Overdue,'' 4 February 09.
\62\``Special Topic Paper: Prospects for Reforming China's
Reeducation Through Labor System,'' Congressional-Executive Commission
on China, 9 May 13, 2.
\63\Ibid.
\64\State Council, ``Supplementary Decision of the State Council
Regarding Reeducation Through Labor'' [Guowuyuan guanyu laodong
jiaoyang wenti de buchong jueding], issued 29 November 79, art. 3; see
also ``Special Topic Paper: Prospects for Reforming China's Reeducation
Through Labor System,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 9
May 13, 2-3.
\65\Dui Hua Foundation, ``RTL Reform Underway, but Undercover,''
Dui Hua Human Rights Journal, 19 June 13; Human Rights Watch, ```Swept
Away': Abuses Against Sex Workers in China,'' May 2013, 17.
\66\See Human Rights Watch, ```Where Darkness Knows No Limits':
Incarceration, Ill-Treatment and Forced Labor as Drug Rehabilitation in
China,'' 7 January 10, 1-3, 19. The 2008 Anti-Drug Law authorizes
police to send suspected drug users to compulsory treatment centers for
a minimum of two years with a possible extension of an additional year
without trial or judicial supervision. PRC Anti-Drug Law [Zhonghua
renmin gongheguo jindufa], enacted 29 December 07, effective 1 June 09,
art. 47. In practice, deprivation of personal liberty in drug detention
centers can last up to six years. Andrew Jacobs, ``Court Ruling Deals
Public Blow to China's Labor-Camp System,'' 15 July 13. In March 2012,
12 UN agencies issued a joint statement calling for an end to
compulsory drug treatment and rehabilitation centers, finding not only
that they violate a wide range of human rights but also that they
threaten the health of those detained. See UNAIDS, ``Joint UN Statement
Calls for the Closure of Compulsory Drug Detention and Rehabilitation
Centers,'' 8 March 12.
\67\Human Rights Watch, ```Swept Away': Abuses Against Sex Workers
in China,'' May 2013, 15-16.
\68\Ibid., 16.
\69\Dui Hua Foundation, ``Limits of Public Outrage: RTL and Custody
and Education,'' Dui Hua Human Rights Journal, 9 July 13, translating
``In the Name of Rule of Law, Sort Out `Quasi-RTL Measures' as One
Package'' [(Shelun) yi fazhi mingyi yi lanzi qingli ``lei laojiao
cuoshi''], Southern Metropolitan Daily, 29 June 13.
\70\PRC Criminal Procedure Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingshi
susong fa], enacted 1 July 79, amended 17 March 96, 14 March 12,
effective 1 January 13, art. 34; Elizabeth M. Lynch, ``Who Will Be
Watched: Margaret K. Lewis on China's New CPL and Residential
Surveillance,'' China Law and Policy (blog), 25 September 12.
\71\PRC Criminal Procedure Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingshi
susong fa], enacted 1 July 79, amended 17 March 96, 14 March 12,
effective 1 January 13, arts. 37-41. See also Sun Jibin, ``How `Three
Difficulties' of Criminal Defense Became `10 Difficulties''' [Xingshi
bianhu ``san nan'' weihe bian ``shi nan''], Legal Weekly, 20 January
11; CECC, 2011 Annual Report, 10 October 11, 83.
\72\Joshua D. Rosenzweig et al., ``Comments on the 2012 Revision of
the Chinese Criminal Procedure Law,'' in Comparative Perspectives on
Criminal Justice in China, eds. Mike McConville and Eva Pils
(Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 2013), 491-93; Elizabeth
M. Lynch, ``Who Will Be Watched: Margaret K. Lewis on China's New CPL
and Residential Surveillance,'' China Law and Policy (blog), 25
September 12; Jerome A. Cohen, Human Rights Watch, ``Criminal Justice
in China: From the Gang of Four to Bo Xilai,'' 25 July 13, 11.
\73\PRC Criminal Procedure Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingshi
susong fa], enacted 1 July 79, amended 17 March 96, 14 March 12,
effective 1 January 13, art. 37.
\74\Shangquan Law Firm, ``Investigative Report on the
Implementation of the New Criminal Procedure Law (2013, Q1)'' [Xin
xingshi susongfa shishi qingkuang diaoyan baogao (2013 diyi jidu)], 23
April 13.
\75\Ibid.
\76\PRC Criminal Procedure Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingshi
susong fa], enacted 1 July 79, amended 17 March 96, 14 March 12,
effective 1 January 13, art. 37.
\77\Ibid.
\78\Shangquan Law Firm, ``Investigative Report on the
Implementation of the New Criminal Procedure Law (2013, Q1)'' [Xin
xingshi susongfa shishi qingkuang diaoyan baogao (2013 diyi jidu)], 23
April 13.
\79\``Supreme People's Procuratorate: Protect Lawyers' Right To
Review Case Files and Right To Know; Promote the Profession According
to Law'' [Zuigaojian: baozhang lushi yuejuan quan he zhiqing quan cujin
yifa zhiye], Xinhua, reprinted in China Law Info, 17 July 13.
\80\Human Rights in China, ``Xu Zhiyong's Lawyer Accuses Police and
Detention Center of Rights Violations,'' 22 July 13; Human Rights in
China, ``Xu Zhiyong's Lawyer Liu Weiguo in Custody, Rights Group Is
Shut Down,'' 18 July 13; ``Despite Detentions, Chinese Anti-Corruption
Activists Press On,'' Voice of America, 19 July 13.
\81\Human Rights in China, ``Lawyer Meets With Xu Zhiyong,'' 25
July 13 (lawyer not identified); ``In Videotaped Message, Jailed
Chinese Activist Urges Citizens To Unite for Democracy,'' Associated
Press, reprinted in Washington Post, 8 August 13. During attorney Zhang
Qingfang's meeting with Xu on August 1, Zhang shot a short video of Xu
calling on Chinese citizens to work together as citizens to promote
democracy and rule of law in China. Chris Buckley, ``Formal Arrest of
Advocate Is Approved by China,'' New York Times, 23 August 13.
\82\Human Rights in China, ``Support Group Says Police Unlawfully
Block Lawyers From Meeting With Guo Feixiong,'' 27 August 13.
\83\``Lawyer Gu Yushu Says Not Allowed To Represent Bo Xilai,''
Reuters, reprinted in South China Morning Post, 8 August 13; Jerome A.
Cohen, Human Rights Watch, ``Criminal Justice in China: From the Gang
of Four to Bo Xilai,'' 25 July 13, 5.
\84\``Lawyer Gu Yushu Says Not Allowed To Represent Bo Xilai,''
Reuters, reprinted in South China Morning Post, 8 August 13. According
to the South China Morning Post, two lawyers, Li Xiaolin and Shen
Zhigeng, whom the Bo family reportedly hired earlier, said in 2012 that
they were not permitted ``to either see Bo or represent him.'' In
August 2013, Gu Yushu, a lawyer whom Bo's sister had retained, said
that authorities had not granted him permission to represent Bo in
court. See also Sui-Lee Wee, ``Lawyer Says Not Allowed To Represent
China's Disgraced Bo Xilai,'' Reuters, reprinted in Guardian, 8 August
13; Barbara Demick, ``Bo Xilai's Wealth on Trial in China,'' Los
Angeles Times, 11 August 13; Chris Buckley, ``China Answers One
Question About Trial: A Date,'' New York Times, 18 August 13; Donald
Clarke, ``The Bo Xilai Trial and China's `Rule of Law': Same Old, Same
Old,'' Atlantic, 21 August 13.
\85\Wu Danhong, ``Dependence on Confessions Persists Despite Legal
Reforms,'' Global Times, 20 August 12; Chen Weijun, ``The Scourge of
Torture `Still Widespread' in Chinese Social System,'' Asia News, 24
July 13; Ira Belkin, ``China's Tortuous Path Toward Ending Torture in
Criminal Investigations,'' in Comparative Perspectives on Criminal
Justice in China, eds. Mike McConville and Eva Pils (Cheltenham, UK:
Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 2013), 93; Amnesty International,
``Briefing on China's 2013 Criminal Procedure Law: In Line With
International Standards?'' July 2013, 21; Dui Hua Foundation,
``(En)countering Torture in China [Part 1 of 2],'' Dui Hua Human Rights
Journal, 30 August 12. See also UN Committee against Torture, 41st
Session, Consideration of Reports Submitted by State Parties Under
Article 19 of the Convention: Concluding Observations of the Committee
against Torture--China, CAT/C/CHN/CO/4, 12 December 08, paras. 11-12.
\86\Dui Hua Foundation, ``Magazine Expose Reinvigorates Calls To
End RTL,'' Dui Hua Human Rights Journal, 11 April 13; Chris Luo,
``Women `Chained Up and Tortured' in Labour Camp,'' South China Morning
Post, 9 April 13.
\87\Dui Hua Foundation, ``RTL Detainees Pressed To Work, Paying To
Leave, Officers Say,'' Dui Hua Human Rights Journal, 5 August 13,
translating Chai Huiqun, ``Confessions of Disgraced RTL Officers; RTL
Centers: Labor First?'' [Luoma laojiao jingcha de jiantao; laojiaosuo:
laodong di yi?], Southern Weekend, 2 May 13. See also Tom Phillips,
``Chinese Official Speaks Out After Being Jailed for Criticising Bo
Xilai,'' Telegraph, 22 November 12.
\88\Wu Danhong, ``Dependence on Confessions Persists Despite Legal
Reforms,'' Global Times, 20 August 12; Chen Weijun, ``The Scourge of
Torture `Still Widespread' in Chinese Social System,'' Asia News, 24
July 13; Ira Belkin, ``China's Tortuous Path Toward Ending Torture in
Criminal Investigations,'' in Comparative Perspectives on Criminal
Justice in China, eds. Mike McConville and Eva Pils (Cheltenham, UK:
Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 2013), 93; Amnesty International,
``Briefing on China's 2013 Criminal Procedure Law: In Line With
International Standards?'' July 2013, 21; Dui Hua Foundation,
``(En)countering Torture in China [Part 1 of 2],'' Dui Hua Human Rights
Journal, 30 August 12.
\89\Wu Danhong, ``Dependence on Confessions Persists Despite Legal
Reforms,'' Global Times, 20 August 12; Elizabeth M. Lynch, ``Margaret
K. Lewis: What To Expect With China's New CPL,'' China Law and Policy
(blog), 23 September 12 (observing that ``[c]onfessions are still king
in China''); Dui Hua Foundation, ``(En)countering Torture in China
[Part 1 of 2],'' Dui Hua Human Rights Journal, 30 August 12. See also
Ira Belkin, ``China's Tortuous Path Toward Ending Torture in Criminal
Investigations,'' in Comparative Perspectives on Criminal Justice in
China, eds. Mike McConville and Eva Pils (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar
Publishing Ltd., 2013), 94, 116-17.
\90\Human Rights Watch, ```Swept Away': Abuses Against Sex Workers
in China,'' May 2013, 24-25.
\91\Keith B. Richburg, ``After Bo's Fall, Chongqing Victims Seek
Justice,'' Washington Post, 19 April 12.
\92\Luo Jieqi and He Xin, ``In Bo Xilai's City, a Legacy of
Backstabbing,'' Caixin, 7 December 12; Luo Jieqi, ``Days of Pain on
Chongqing's Torture Mountain,'' Caixin, 7 December 12; Wang Heyan,
``Defense Lawyer Seeks To Clear His Name--and Accuser's,'' Caixin, 6
November 12.
\93\Wang Heyan, ``Defense Lawyer Seeks To Clear His Name--and
Accuser's,'' Caixin, 6 November 12.
\94\Ira Belkin, ``China's Tortuous Path Toward Ending Torture in
Criminal Investigations,'' in Comparative Perspectives on Criminal
Justice in China, eds. Mike McConville and Eva Pils (Cheltenham, UK:
Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 2013), 94-95.
\95\Stanley Lubman, ``What China's Wrongful Convictions Mean for
Legal Reform,'' Wall Street Journal, China Real Time Report (blog), 17
July 13; ``Bizarrely Consistent: A Crackdown on Legal Activists,''
Economist, 27 July 13.
\96\PRC Criminal Procedure Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingshi
susong fa], enacted 1 July 79, amended 17 March 96, 14 March 12,
effective 1 January 13, arts. 54-58; Amnesty International, ``Briefing
on China's 2013 Criminal Procedure Law: In Line With International
Standards?'' July 2013, 18-19.
\97\Supreme People's Court, Supreme People's Procuratorate,
Ministry of Public Security, Provisions Concerning Questions About
Exclusion of Illegal Evidence in Handling Criminal Cases [Guanyu banli
xingshi anjian paichu feifa zhengju ruogan wenti de guiding], issued 24
June 10, effective 1 July 10.
\98\PRC Criminal Procedure Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingshi
susong fa], enacted 1 July 79, amended 17 March 96, 14 March 12,
effective 1 January 13, art. 50.
\99\Ibid., art. 118; Wu Danhong, ``Dependence on Confessions
Persists Despite Legal Reforms,'' Global Times, 20 August 12; Elizabeth
M. Lynch, ``Margaret K. Lewis: What To Expect With China's New CPL,''
China Law and Policy (blog), 23 September 12.
\100\Amnesty International, ``Briefing on China's 2013 Criminal
Procedure Law: In Line With International Standards?'' July 2013, 13,
15.
\101\Ibid., 18-19.
\102\Elizabeth M. Lynch, ``Margaret K. Lewis: What To Expect With
China's New CPL,'' China Law and Policy (blog), 23 September 12;
``First Case of a Beijing Court Activating Procedures To Exclude
Illegally Obtained Evidence'' [Beijing fayuan shouci qidong feifa
zhengju paichu chengxu pan'an], China National Radio, reprinted in
China Law Info, 16 September 12.
\103\``First Case of a Beijing Court Deciding To Exclude Illegally
Obtained Evidence'' [Beijing fayuan shouci qidong feifa zhengju paichu
chengxu pan'an], China National Radio, reprinted in China Law Info, 16
September 12. The court nevertheless convicted the defendant of drug
trafficking and sentenced him to life, based on other evidence.
\104\Yuan Yuan, ``All Eyes Focused,'' Beijing Review, No. 36, 5
September 13; Donald Clarke, ``Random Thoughts From Day 2 of the Bo
Xilai Trial,'' Chinese Law Prof Blog, 23 August 13.
\105\Dui Hua Foundation, ``Targeting Evidence To End Wrongful
Execution,'' Dui Hua Human Rights Journal, 14 March 13.
\106\Liu Dong, ``Efficient Injustice,'' Global Times, 31 March 13;
Jonathan Kaiman, ``China Suspects Presumed Guilty Until Proven
Innocent,'' Guardian, 20 May 13.
\107\Stanley Lubman, ``What China's Wrongful Convictions Mean for
Legal Reform,'' Wall Street Journal, China Real Time Report (blog), 17
July 13; ``18 Years Later, 5 Acquitted of Taxi Slayings,'' China Daily,
2 July 13.
\108\``18 Years Later, 5 Acquitted of Taxi Slayings,'' China Daily,
2 July 13.
\109\Shen Deyong, ``How We Should Guard Against Wrongful
Convictions'' [Women yingdang ruhe fangfan yuanjia cuoan], China Court
News, reprinted in People's Daily, 6 May 13 (English translation
available at the ChinaLawTranslate Web site, titled ``SPC Executive
Vice-President Shen Deyong on Wrongful Cases,'' 10 July 13); Dui Hua
Foundation, ``How Many More Sacrifices Until Rule of Law Reigns?'' Dui
Hua Human Rights Journal, 9 May 13; Stanley Lubman, ``What China's
Wrongful Convictions Mean for Legal Reform,'' Wall Street Journal,
China Real Time Report (blog), 17 July 13.
\110\Shen Deyong, ``How We Should Guard Against Wrongful
Convictions'' [Women yingdang ruhe fangfan yuanjia cuoan], China Court
News, reprinted in People's Daily, 6 May 13 (English translation
available at the ChinaLawTranslate Web site, titled ``SPC Executive
Vice-President Shen Deyong on Wrongful Cases,'' 10 July 13).
\111\Patrick Boehler, ``Guangdong Chief Justice Calls for Reform of
China's `Soviet' Court System,'' South China Morning Post, 3 July 13;
Stanley Lubman, ``What China's Wrongful Convictions Mean for Legal
Reform,'' Wall Street Journal, China Real Time Report (blog), 17 July
13; ``Bizarrely Consistent: A Crackdown on Legal Activists,''
Economist, 27 July 13.
\112\``New Guideline Can Safeguard Judicial Independence,'' Xinhua,
13 August 13; ``Central Committee Political and Legal Affairs
Commission Issues First Guiding Opinion on Preventing Wrongful
Judgments'' [Zhongyang zhengfawei chutai shou ge fang yuanjia cuoan
zhidao yijian], Xinhua, 13 August 13; ``Lifelong Responsibility,''
China Daily, 15 August 13; Wang Zhenghua, ``Court Strikes Down Murder
Conviction,'' China Daily, 15 August 13.
\113\Biao Teng, ``Chinese Death Penalty: Overview and Prospect,''
East Asian Law Journal, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2010), 87; Amnesty
International, ``Death Sentences and Executions 2012,'' April 2013, 2;
``The Death Penalty: Strike Less Hard,'' Economist, 3 August 13.
\114\Amnesty International, ``Death Sentences and Executions
2012,'' April 2013, 18-19.
\115\John Kamm, ``Trying Juveniles,'' New York Times, 29 November
12; Dui Hua Foundation, ``China Under the Microscope: The Second
Universal Periodic Review,'' 28 February 13; Dui Hua Foundation, ``Our
Work: Criminal Justice,'' last visited 8 August 13; ``The Death
Penalty: Strike Less Hard,'' Economist, 3 August 13.
\116\Xiaoqing Pi, ``Tough Questions After Chinese Court Mishandles
Execution,'' Wall Street Journal, China Real Time Report (blog), 16
July 13.
\117\Joshua Rosenzweig, ``China's National Verdict Database and the
Death Penalty,'' Siweiluozi's Blog, 3 July 13.
\118\See, e.g., Xiaoqing Pi, ``Tough Questions After Chinese Court
Mishandles Execution,'' Wall Street Journal, China Real Time Report
(blog), 16 July 13; World Coalition, China Against the Death Penalty,
Report 2012, last visited 27 September 13, 1, 4; Biao Teng, ``Chinese
Death Penalty: Overview and Prospect,'' East Asian Law Journal, Vol. 1,
No. 2 (2010), 90; Zi Heng Lim, ``Why China Executes So Many People,''
Atlantic, 9 May 13; Josh Chin, ``Video Reignites Death Penalty Debate
in China,'' Wall Street Journal, China Real Time Report (blog), 13
August 13.
\119\See, e.g., Xiaoqing Pi, ``Tough Questions After Chinese Court
Mishandles Execution,'' Wall Street Journal, China Real Time Report
(blog), 16 July 13; ``The Death Penalty: Strike Less Hard,'' Economist,
3 August 13; ``Court Blasted for Failure To Notify Family in Swift
Execution,'' Global Times, 15 July 13; Ren Zhongyuan, ``Executed
Businessman's Assets Sold for a Bargain, Lawyer Says,'' Caixin, 16 July
13; Ren Zhongyuan, ``Closer Look: When Hunan Didn't Bother To Tell a
Family It Was Killing One of Theirs,'' Caixin, 15 July 13; Voice of
America, ``Zeng Chengjie Secretly Executed; Internet Users Paying
Attention to Hidden Details Behind the Case'' [Zeng chengjie bei mimi
chujue wangyou guanzhu anzi beihou heimu], 15 July 13.
\120\Xiaoqing Pi, ``Tough Questions After Chinese Court Mishandles
Execution,'' Wall Street Journal, China Real Time Report (blog), 16
July 13; ``Court Blasted for Failure To Notify Family in Swift
Execution,'' Global Times, 15 July 13; ``China's Implementation of the
Death Penalty Explained: Prisoner Has Right To See Family Before
Execution'' [Zhongguo sixing zhixing chengxu jiedu: zuifan xing xing
qian you jian jiashu quanli], Chengdu Business Daily, reprinted in
China Law Info, 17 July 13.
\121\Xiaoqing Pi, ``Tough Questions After Chinese Court Mishandles
Execution,'' Wall Street Journal, China Real Time Report (blog), 16
July 13; Liang Chao, ``Zeng Chengjie's Daughter Apologizes to Changsha
Intermediate Court, Says She Only Wants To Get Her Father's Remains''
[Zeng chengjie nuer xiang changsha zhongyuan zhi qian cheng zhi xiang
nadao fuqin guhui], Jinghua Net, reprinted in Xinhua, 14 July 13.
Zeng's case is similar to that of Wu Ying, a woman entrepreneur from
Wenzhou who was initially sentenced to death for illegal fundraising in
2009. Following a protest on the Internet in which people questioned
the severity of Wu Ying's punishment, she was given a suspended death
sentence (i.e., death with a two-year reprieve) instead. Another
Wenzhou businesswoman, Lin Haiyan, was also sentenced to death earlier
this year for illegal fundraising (US$100 million). The Supreme
People's Court is currently reviewing her death sentence. See
``Underground Lender Gets Death Sentence in China,'' Associated Press,
reprinted in New York Times, 20 May 13.
\122\Christopher Bodeen, ``China Eliminating Reliance on Executed
Prisoners for Organs, but Cultural Attitudes a Barrier,'' Associated
Press, reprinted in Vancouver Sun, 17 May 13.
\123\Biao Teng, ``Chinese Death Penalty: Overview and Prospect,''
East Asian Law Journal, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2010), 87, 89; Ying Yang,
``Death Row Inmates Number One Organ Donors in China,'' Deutsche Welle,
9 March 12.
\124\Jiefu Huang et al., ``A Pilot Programme of Organ Donation
After Cardiac Death in China,'' Lancet, Vol. 379, No. 9818 (2012), 862-
63. As part of the institutional reforms approved by the National
People's Congress during its meeting in March 2013, the Ministry of
Health was merged with the National Population and Family Planning
Commission to create the new National Health and Family Planning
Commission. See ``National Health and Family Planning Commission,''
Global Times, last visited 14 August 13.
\125\Yaqiu Wang, ``In China Execution Done Behind Closed Doors
Raises Questions About Dubious Organ Transplant Practices,'' Tea Leaf
Nation, 18 July 13; ``China Will Formally Launch Organ Transplantation
[Donor System]; Organs Will Be Allocated According to 3 Main
Principles'' [Woguo jiang zhengshi qidong qiguan yizhi; qiguan fenpei
jiang zuncong 3 da yuanze], Beijing Evening News, reprinted in Xinhua,
26 February 13; ``Ministry of Health: China's Organ Donation Pilot Site
Only Received 659 Voluntary Donations in 3 Years'' [Weishengbu:
zhongguo qiguan juanxian shidian 3 nian jin 659 lie ziyuan juanxian],
People's Daily, reprinted in China Law Info, 19 April 13.
\126\Wen Ya, ``Organ Sourcing To See Overhaul,'' Global Times, 16
August 13; ``China To Phase Out Use of Executed Prisoners' Organs for
Transplants,'' Reuters, reprinted in South China Morning Post, 16
August 13.
\127\Ibid. See also ``Executed Prisoners Are Still Main Source for
Organ Transplants in China,'' Deutsche Welle, 21 December 12; CECC,
2012 Annual Report, 10 October 12, 113.
Notes to Section II--Freedom of Religion
\1\The term ``freedom of religion'' used in this section
encompasses the more broadly articulated freedom of ``thought,
conscience, and religion.'' Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR), adopted and proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolution 217A
(III) of 10 December 48, art. 18. For protections in international law,
see Article 18 in the UDHR; International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution
2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 23 March 76, art. 18;
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16
December 66, entry into force 3 January 76, art. 13(3) (requiring
States Parties to ``ensure the religious and moral education of . . .
children in conformity with [the parents'] own convictions'');
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), adopted and opened for
signature, ratification, and accession by UN General Assembly
resolution 44/25 of 20 November 89, entry into force 2 September 90,
art. 14; Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and
of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, adopted and proclaimed
by UN General Assembly resolution 36/55 of 25 November 81. See General
Comment No. 22 to Article 18 of the ICCPR for an official
interpretation of freedom of religion as articulated in the ICCPR. UN
Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 22: The Right to Freedom of
Thought, Conscience, and Religion (Art. 18), CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4, 30
July 93, para. 1. China is a party to the ICESCR and the CRC, and a
signatory to the ICCPR. The Chinese government has committed itself to
ratifying, and thus bringing its laws into conformity with, the ICCPR
and reaffirmed its commitment on April 13, 2006, in its application for
membership in the UN Human Rights Council. China's top leaders have
also stated on other occasions that they are preparing for ratification
of the ICCPR, including in March 18, 2008, press conference remarks by
then Premier Wen Jiabao; in a September 6, 2005, statement by Luo Gan,
State Councilor and member of the Political Bureau of the Communist
Party Central Committee, at the 22nd World Congress on Law; in
statements by Wen Jiabao during his May 2005 Europe tour; and in a
January 27, 2004, speech by former Chinese President Hu Jintao before
the French National Assembly. In 2009, China affirmed this commitment
during the Universal Periodic Review of China's human rights record
before the UN Human Rights Council. UN GAOR, Hum. Rts. Com., 11th
Sess., Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review--
China, A/HRC/11/25, 29 May 09, para. 114 (1). In addition, China's
first National Human Rights Action Plan (2009-2010) affirms the
principles in the ICCPR, and China's second National Human Rights
Action Plan (2012-2015) states that the government ``has continued to
carry out administrative and judicial reforms and prepare the ground
for approval'' of the ICCPR. See State Council Information Office,
``National Human Rights Action Plan of China (2009-2010),'' reprinted
in China Daily, 13 April 09; State Council Information Office,
``National Human Rights Action Plan of China (2012-2015),'' 11 June 12,
sec. V(1).
\2\PRC Constitution, issued 4 December 82, amended 12 April 88, 29
March 93, 15 March 99, 14 March 04, art. 36.
\3\For specific examples of the range of religious activities
protected under international law, see, e.g., General Comment No. 22 to
Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
General Comment No. 22: The Right to Freedom of Thought, Conscience,
and Religion (Art. 18), CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4, 30 July 93, paras. 1, 2,
4. The Chinese government denies protected activities such as the
``freedom to prepare and distribute religious texts or publications''
(General Comment No. 22, para. 4). For restrictions on the publication
of religious materials, see State Administration for Religious Affairs,
Regulation on Religious Affairs [Zongjiao shiwu tiaoli], issued 30
November 04, effective 1 March 05, art. 7. For an interpretation of the
provision protecting ``normal religious activities'' in the Regulation
on Religious Affairs, written by drafters of the regulation, see Shuai
Feng and Li Jian, Interpretation of the Regulation on Religious Affairs
[Zongjiao shiwu tiaoli shiyi], (Beijing: Beijing Religious Culture
Press, 2005), 19. See also page 6 of the preface of the book, noting
the authors' status as drafters of the RRA.
\4\The central government has referred to the five religions as
China's main religions, but in practice the state has created a
regulatory system that institutionalizes only these five religions for
recognition and legal protection. See, e.g., State Council Information
Office, White Paper on Freedom of Religious Belief in China [Zhongguo
de zongjiao xinyang ziyou zhuangkuang], reprinted in China Net, 1
October 97. This white paper states that there is a ``great diversity
of religious beliefs'' in China, with the ``main religions'' being
Buddhism, Taoism, Islam, Catholicism, and Protestantism. Wording from
this white paper is also posted as a statement of current policy on the
Web sites of the United Front Work Department, the agency that oversees
religious affairs within the Communist Party, and the State
Administration for Religious Affairs. Some local regulations on
religious affairs define ``religion'' to mean only these five
religions. See, e.g., Sichuan Province Regulation on Religious Affairs
[Sichuansheng zongjiao shiwu tiaoli], issued 9 May 00, amended 30
November 06, art. 2; Henan Province Regulation on Religious Affairs
[Henansheng zongjiao shiwu tiaoli], issued 30 July 05, effective 1
January 06, art. 2. There is limited formal tolerance outside this
framework for some ethnic minority and ``folk'' religious practices.
Kim-Kwong Chan and Eric R. Carlson, Religious Freedom in China: Policy,
Administration, and Regulation (Santa Barbara: Institute for the Study
of American Religion, 2005), 9-10, 15-16.
\5\See Falun Gong within this section for detailed information.
\6\Regulation on Religious Affairs (RRA) [Zongjiao shiwu tiaoli],
issued 30 November 04, effective 1 March 05. For an overview of the
general requirements within the RRA and an analysis of several
provincial-level regulations, see ``Zhejiang and Other Provincial
Governments Issue New Religious Regulations,'' CECC China Human Rights
and Rule of Law Update, June 2006, 9-10.
\7\The Regulation on Religious Affairs (RRA) provides
administrative penalties, such as fines, for violations of its
stipulations. Regulation on Religious Affairs [Zongjiao shiwu tiaoli],
issued 30 November 04, effective 1 March 05, arts. 40, 41. Such
administrative penalties also include the possibility of limited short-
term detention under the Public Security Administration Punishment Law.
Regulation on Religious Affairs [Zongjiao shiwu tiaoli], issued 30
November 04, effective 1 March 05, arts. 39, 40, 43; Public Security
Administration Punishment Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo zhi'an guanli
chufa fa], issued 28 August 05, effective 1 March 06, art. 27. The RRA
is not authorized to provide for criminal penalties. At the same time,
like other regulations, the RRA includes boilerplate language referring
to the necessity of pursuing a criminal investigation if a ``crime is
constituted.'' For example, where ``anyone uses religion to carry out
such illegal activities as harm state security or public security,
infringe upon citizens' right of the person and democratic rights,
impair the administration of public order, or infringe upon public or
private property,'' criminal charges are to be pursued where a ``crime
is constituted.'' Regulation on Religious Affairs [Zongjiao shiwu
tiaoli], issued 30 November 04, effective 1 March 05, art. 40.
\8\The government uses Article 300 of the Criminal Law to punish
activities deemed to be cult-related. Chinese authorities also punish
religious adherents by prosecuting them under other Criminal Law
provisions, such as by portraying the printing and distribution of
religious literature, a freedom protected under international human
rights law, as the crime of ``illegal operation of a business'' (art.
225). PRC Criminal Law, enacted 1 July 79, amended 14 March 97,
effective 1 October 97, amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29
December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February
09, 25 February 11, arts. 225, 300. See discussion of the cases of Li
Wenxi and Ren Lacheng in Protestantism within this section for examples
of authorities' use of Art. 225 to punish persons who distribute
religious literature.
\9\Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's
Congress on Banning Heretical Cult Organizations, Preventing and
Punishing Cult Organizations [Guanyu chudi xiejiao zuzhi, fangfan he
chengzhi xiejiao huodong de jueding], issued 30 October 99.
\10\Administrative punishments can range from a warning or fine to
detention in a reeducation through labor (RTL) center for up to three
years, with the possibility of a one-year extension. Forms of
administrative detention include, among others, short-term detention
under the Public Security Administration Punishment Law, RTL, forced
psychiatric commitment, forced drug detoxification, and work-study
schools.
\11\Fenggeng Yang, Religion in China: Survival and Revival Under
Communist Rule (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 78-84.
\12\The United Front Work Department (UFWD) is directly subordinate
to the Communist Party Central Committee and is the key organization
through which the Party implements control of religion. See Fenggeng
Yang, Religion in China: Survival and Revival Under Communist Rule (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 78-79. The senior officials of
the UFWD are listed in ``Chinese Communist Party 18th Central
Committee,'' Chinese Communist Party 18th Central Committee, reprinted
in Sina, 18 April 13.
\13\Fenggeng Yang, Religion in China: Survival and Revival Under
Communist Rule (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 81. According
to this book, ``In practice, the SARA and lower-level RABs usually rule
through the so-called patriotic religious associations. The
associations of the five official religions are nongovernmental
organizations in name, but they function as an extension and delegation
of the RAB.''
\14\``China To Register All Clergy,'' Xinhua, 8 January 13.
\15\The official claimed the requirement would protect the rights
of religious worshippers and ``help the public identify fake staff.''
``China To Register All Clergy,'' Xinhua, 8 January 13.
\16\The term ``religious organization'' (zongjiao tuanti) or
``religious-type of social organization'' (zongjiaolei shehui zuzhi or
shehui tuanti) refer here to registered religious groups, such as
Catholic dioceses, Muslim congregations, Protestant congregations, as
well as to charitable organizations established by registered religious
organizations, all of which are under the oversight of the five
Patriotic religious associations, the relevant level religious affairs
bureau, and the relevant civil affairs bureau.
\17\Zhang Qianfan and Zhu Yinping, ``Religious Freedom and Its
Legal Restrictions in China,'' Brigham Young University Law Review,
Vol. 2011, No. 3, 790-95 (recent online version of article dated 31
January 13); Fenggang Yang, Religion in China: Survival and Revival
Under Communist Rule (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 74-78.
For a discussion of how the restrictive regulatory framework has
limited the growth of religious venues, materials, and clergy, see
Yang, Religion in China, 149-154. For registration challenges to
religious organizations' establishing charitable organizations, see
Zhang Zhipeng, ``Let Legal Entity Status Help Advance the `Rapid
Development' of the Religious Charity Sector'' [Rang falu shiti diwei
zhutui zongjiao gongyi cishan shiye ``tengfei''], China Ethnicity News,
reprinted in China Ethnic Religions Net, 18 June 13.
\18\``Third Plenary Meeting of the First Session of the 12th
National People's Congress: Full Text Record'' [Shierjie quanguo renda
yici huiyi disan quanti huiyi wenzi shilu], Xinhua, 10 March 13.
\19\Ibid. See State Administration for Religious Affairs,
Regulation on Religious Affairs [Zongjiao shiwu tiaoli], issued 30
November 04, effective 1 March 05, chap. 2; State Council Religious
Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Civil Affairs, Implementing Measures on the
Management of the Registration of Religious Social Organizations
[Zongjiao shehui tuanti dengji guanli shishi banfa], issued 6 May 91,
arts. 2-7, 9-10; State Council, Regulations on the Registration and
Management of Social Organizations [Shehui tuanti dengji guanli
tiaoli], issued and effective 25 October 98, arts. 3, 7-19.
\20\State Administration for Religious Affairs, Chinese Communist
Party Central Committee United Front Work Department, National
Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Civil Affairs, Ministry
of Finance, and State Administration of Taxation, Opinion Encouraging
and Standardizing Involvement by Religious Organizations in Charitable
Activities [Guanyu guli he guifan zongjiaojie congshi gongyi
cishanhuodong de yijian],16February 12, paras.1, 2(2)-(3).
\21\See Zhang Zhipeng, ``Let Legal Entity Status Help Advance the
`Rapid Development' of the Religious Charity Sector'' [Rang falu shiti
diwei zhutui zongjiao gongyi cishan shiye ``tengfei''], China Ethnicity
News, reprinted in China Ethnic Religions Net, 18 June 13.
\22\This sub-section addresses what official sources refer to as
hanchuan fojiao, i.e., ``Han'' or Mahayana Buddhism, and nanchuan
fojiao, i.e., Pali (Theravada) Buddhism, which is practiced mainly by
the Dai ethnic group and other ethnic minorities in Yunnan province.
Tibetan Buddhism, the third major school of Buddhism in China, is
discussed in Section V--Tibet. Tibetan Buddhism is not practiced solely
by Tibetans; recently a growing number of Han Chinese have embarked on
the study of Tibetan Buddhism. Calum MacLeod, ``In China, Tensions
Rising Over Buddhism's Quiet Resurgence,'' USA Today, 2 November 11.
For information on the different schools of Buddhism recognized by the
Chinese government, see, e.g., State Council Information Office, White
Paper on Freedom of Religious Belief in China [Zhongguo de zongjiao
xinyang ziyou zhuangkuang], reprinted in China Net, 1 October 97, sec.
I; David A. Palmer, ``China's Religious Danwei: Institutionalising
Religion in the People's Republic,'' China Perspectives, No. 4 (2009),
26; ``Three Main Schools Discuss Buddhist Doctrine: Experience
Buddhism's Wisdom'' [San da yuxi tan fofa: ganshou fojiao de zhihui],
China Net, 26 April 12. For examples of continued state control over
religious activities and practices of Buddhists during this reporting
year, see, e.g., State Administration for Religious Affairs, ``State
Administration for Religious Affairs 2013 Main Work Points'' [Guojia
zongjiao shiwu ju 2013 nian gongzuo yaodian], 18 January 13; State
Administration for Religious Affairs, Opinion on Handling Problems
Involved With the Management of Buddhist Monasteries and Taoist Temples
[Guanyu chuli sheji fojiao simiao, daojiao gongguan guanli youguan
wenti de yijian], 8 October 12; State Administration for Religious
Affairs, ``Notice Regarding the Issuing of `Measures Regarding
Evaluation and Commendation of the Nationwide Establishment of Advanced
Units and Advanced Individuals in Harmonious Buddhist and Taoist
Temples and Churches''' [Quanguo chuangjianhexie siguan jiaotang
xianjin jiti he xianjingeren pingbi biaozhang banfa],6 July 13.
\23\``Vice Premier Liu Yandong: Speech at Meeting Commemorating the
60th Anniversary of the Buddhist Association of China'' [Liu yandong
fuzongli: zai zhongguo fojiao xiehui chengli 60 zhounian jinianhui
shang de jianghua], Buddhist Association of China, 26 August 13.
\24\State Administration for Religious Affairs, Opinion on Handling
Problems Involved With the Management of Buddhist Monasteries and
Daoist Temples [Guanyu chuli sheji fojiao simiao, daojiao gongguan
guanli youguan wenti de yijian], 8 October 12; ``China Bans
Profiteering From Religious Activity,'' Xinhua, reprinted in China
Daily, 22 October 12.
\25\Qi Zhijiang, ``A Discussion of the Connections and Differences
Between Religions and Cults,'' Kaifeng Network, reprinted in China
Anti-Cult Association, 11 November 11.
\26\Dui Hua Foundation, ``The Cult of Buddha,'' Dialogue, Issue 52,
29 August 13; ``Introduction to the China Anti-Cult Association,''
China Anti-Cult Association, 9 February 13; Tianjin Anti-Cult
Association, ``Which Organizations Has the Ministry of Public Security
Designated as Cults?'' 22 October 12; CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10
October 09, 115.
\27\Dui Hua Foundation, ``The Cult of Buddha,'' Dialogue, Issue 52,
29 August 13; ``Introduction to the China Anti-Cult Association,''
China Anti-Cult Association, 9 February 13; Tianjin Anti-Cult
Association, ``Which Organizations Has the Ministry of Public Security
Designated as Cults?'' 22 October 12.
\28\Dui Hua Foundation, ``The Cult of Buddha,'' Dialogue, Issue 52,
29 August 13; Tianjin Anti-Cult Association, ``Which Organizations Has
the Ministry of Public Security Designated as Cults?'' 22 October 12.
\29\Christian Solidarity Worldwide, ``Wu Zeheng, A Buddhist
Patriarch, Suffers Ongoing Harassment After Serving Eleven Years in
Prison,'' 22 March 12; Human Rights in China, ``Three Documents Related
to the Case of Buddhist Leader Wu Zeheng,'' 22 September 11.
\30\Andrew Jacobs, ``No Exit: China Uses Passports as Political
Cudgel,'' New York Times, 22 February 13.
\31\For background information on the history and function of the
state-led patriotic religious associations, see David A. Palmer,
``China's Religious Danwei,'' China Perspectives, Vol. 4 (2009), 19-21,
25.
\32\Hong Kong Catholic Diocese, ``Justice and Peace Commission of
the Hong Kong Catholic Diocese Opinion on Religious Freedom in China
for the UN Human Rights Council's Universal Periodic Review''
[Xianggang tianzhujiao zhengyi heping weiyuanhui jiu lianheguo renquan
lishihui pubian dingqi shenyi jizhi you guan zhonghua renmin gongheguo
zongjiao ziyou de yijianshu], 18 July 13.
\33\Ibid.
\34\Andrew Jacobs, ``China Reportedly Strips Shanghai Bishop of His
Title,'' New York Times, 12 December 12.
\35\Therese Postel, ``Can Pope Francis Go to China?'' Century
Foundation (blog), 13 March 13. See also CECC, 2012 Annual Report, 10
October 12, 80; CECC, 2011 Annual Report, 10 October 11, 96; CECC, 2010
Annual Report, 10 October 10, 101; CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October
09, 119; CECC, 2008 Annual Report, 31 October 08, 78.
\36\Hong Kong Catholic Diocese, ``Justice and Peace Commission of
the Hong Kong Catholic Diocese Opinion on Religious Freedom in China
for the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights' Universal Periodic
Review'' [Xianggang tianzhujiao zhengyi heping weiyuanhui jiu lianheguo
renquan lishihui pubian dingqi shenyi jizhi, you guan zhonghua renmin
gongheguo zongjiao ziyou de yijianshu], 18 July 13.
\37\Anthony E. Clark, ``China Renews Tension With the Vatican,''
Catholic World Report, 24 May 13; Michelle FlorCruz, ``China Quietly
Revises Church Regulations Requiring Government-Approved Catholic
Bishops,'' International Business Times, 24 May 13.
\38\Bishops Conference of the Catholic Church of China, Regulation
on the Election and Consecration of Bishops [Zhongguo tianzhujiao
zhujiaotuan guanyu xuansheng zhujiao de guiding], adopted 12 December
12, effective 8 April 13.
\39\Ibid.; Bishops Conference of the Catholic Church of China
Regulation on the Election and Consecration of Bishops [Zhongguo
tianzhujiao zhujiaotuan guanyu xuansheng zhujiao de guiding], passed 17
May 93. The new regulation requires local dioceses to apply in writing
to the provincial-level Bureaus of Religious Affairs for permission to
elect new bishops. Moreover, a bishop election work committee shall be
formed--under the guidance of the Bureau of Religious Affairs--
responsible for formulating election measures, recommending
representatives to the election committee and the total number of
representatives, selecting one to three candidates, and overseeing of
the election process.
\40\``Two Priests Dismissed in Wuhan,'' Union of Asian Catholic
News, 21 December 12.
\41\See, e.g., Sandro Magister, ``Shanghai, a Strong and Hard-
Pressed Diocese,'' Chiesa Espress Online (blog), 3 May 13; Andrew
Jacobs, ``China Reportedly Strips Shanghai Bishop of His Title,'' New
York Times, 12 December 12; ``Vatican Slams Chinese Official Church in
Bishop Row,'' Agence France-Presse, reprinted in South China Morning
Post, 14 December 12; N.J. Viehland, ``With No Bishop, Shanghai Priests
Concerned About Masses, Pilgrimages,'' Catholic News Service, 22 May
13; Tom Phillips, ``Shanghai's Catholic Church in Disarray,''
Telegraph, 12 July 13.
\42\Sandro Magister, ``Shanghai, a Strong and Hard-Pressed
Diocese,'' Chiesa Espress Online (blog), 3 May 13; ``Aloysius Jin
Luxian Dies at 96; Shanghai Bishop,'' Associated Press, 30 April 13. A
media source reported that Bishop Ma may have been transferred
temporarily to Beijing during funeral services for Bishop Jin. See Wang
Zhicheng, ``Msgr. Jin Luxian's Funeral Without Bishop Ma Daqin,'' Asia
News, 29 April 13.
\43\``Chinese Catholic Association and [Bishops] Conference
Spokesperson Comments'' [Zhongguo tianzhujiao yihui yituan fayanren
tanhua], Catholic Church in China, 14 December 12; Andrew Jacobs,
``China Reportedly Strips Shanghai Bishop of His Title,'' New York
Times, 12 December 12; Didi Kirsten Tatlow, ``Farewell to an Enigmatic
Chinese Bishop,'' New York Times, 29 April 13.
\44\``Chinese Catholic Association and [Bishops] Conference
Spokesperson Comments'' [Zhongguo tianzhujiao yihui yituan fayanren
tanhua], Catholic Church in China, 14 December 12.
\45\Sandro Magister, ``Shanghai, a Strong and Hard-Pressed
Diocese,'' Chiesa Espress Online (blog), 3 May 13; ``Vatican Slams
Chinese Official Church in Bishop Row,'' Agence France-Presse,
reprinted in South China Morning Post, 14 December 12.
\46\``Aloysius Jin Luxian Dies at 96; Shanghai Bishop,'' Associated
Press, reprinted in Los Angeles Times, 30 April 13.
\47\Although several international media sources have noted Bishop
Jin's age at death as 97, the Vatican Radio news item on his death
provides his date of birth--June 20, 1916--confirming that Bishop Jin
was 96 at his death. See ``China: Secretary of State Note on Death of
Bishop Jin Luxian,'' Vatican Radio, 30 April 13.
\48\N.J. Viehland, ``With No Bishop, Shanghai Priests Concerned
About Masses, Pilgrimages,'' Catholic News Service, 22 May 13; Tom
Phillips, ``Shanghai's Catholic Church in Disarray,'' Telegraph, 12
July 13.
\49\Hong Kong Catholic Diocese, ``Justice and Peace Commission of
the Hong Kong Catholic Diocese Opinion on Religious Freedom in China
for the UN Human Rights Council's Universal Periodic Review''
[Xianggang tianzhujiao zhengyi heping weiyuanhui jiu lianheguo renquan
lishihui pubian dingqi shenyi jizhi, you guan zhonghua renmin gongheguo
zongjiao ziyou de yijianshu], 18 July 13, paras. 19, 26.
\50\Ibid., paras. 18, 20. For further information on the case of
Bishop Su Zhimin, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database
record 2004-05380. For further information on the case of Bishop Shi
Enxiang, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2004-
05378.
\51\The Cardinal Kung Foundation, ``Arrest of an Underground
Catholic Priest in Hebei Province and an Appeal to the Chinese
Authorit[ies] To Release Religious Prisoners,'' 9 August 13; ``Hebei
Underground Catholic Priest Arrested,'' AsiaNews, 10 August 13.
\52\Ibid.
\53\``Hebei Underground Catholic Priest Arrested,'' AsiaNews, 10
August 13.
\54\Nailene Chou Wiest, ``Time for Sino-Vatican Rapprochement,''
Caixin, 18 March 13; Christopher Bodeen, ``China Maintains Hard Line on
Ties With Vatican,'' Associated Press, 14 March 13; Wang Zhaokun and
Mauro Lovecchio, ``Beijing-Vatican Breakthrough Not Expected,'' Global
Times, 15 March 13.
\55\Pope Benedict XVI, ``Letter of the Holy Father to the Bishops,
Priests, Consecrated Persons and Lay Faithful of the Catholic Church in
the People's Republic of China,'' 27 May 07; Cardinal Fernando Filoni,
``Five Years After the Publication of Benedict XVI's Letter to the
Church in China,'' Tripod, Winter 2012, Vol. 32, No. 167. Cardinal
Filoni lived in Hong Kong from 1992-2001. He currently is prefect of
the Rome-based Congregation for Evangelization of Peoples which is
responsible for international missionary work. See Profile of The
Congregation for the Evangelization of Peoples, The Vatican, last
visited 3 September 13. See also Therese Postel, ``Can Pope Francis Go
to China?'' Century Foundation (blog), 13 March 13.
\56\Wang Zhaokun and Mauro Lovecchio, ``Beijing-Vatican
Breakthrough Not Expected,'' Global Times, 15 March 13.
\57\See, e.g., ``Illegal Second Instance Trial at Ningxia's
Intermediate Court; Lawyers Defend Ma Xiongde's Innocence'' [Ningxia
wuzhong zhongyuan feifa ershen; lushi wei ma xiongde wuzui bianhu],
Clear Wisdom, 20 March 13; ``Mr. Yang Wenqing, Ms. Qu Zebi, and Ms.
Zhou Xulin Sentenced to Prison,'' Clear Wisdom, 21 February 13; ``Six
Practitioners Sentenced to Prison in Penglai City,'' Clear Wisdom, 6
February 13; ``Zhang Lin and Three Other Falun Gong Practitioners from
Xi'an Municipality Illegally Sentenced,'' Clear Wisdom, 5 February 13;
``Retired Teacher Ms. Pei Shanzhen From Shanghai Once Again Secretly
Sentenced to Prison,'' Clear Wisdom, 3 January 13.
\58\Human Rights in China, ``Rights Defense Lawyer Detained After
Court Appearance,'' 5 April 13; ``Lawyer Wang Quanzhang Is Released Two
Days Early from Detention'' [Lushi wang quanzhang bei ju liang ri
tiqian huoshi], Radio Free Asia, 8 April 13.
\59\Malcolm Moore, ``Chinese Lawyers Targeted As Xi Jinping
Tightens Control,'' Telegraph, 20 August 13; Maya Wang, ``Xi Jinping's
First 100 Days: Still Waiting for Human Rights Progress,'' Global Post,
9 July 13.
\60\See, e.g., Xiang Yang, China Anti-Cult Association, ``Basic
Thoughts on Preparing for the Transformation Through Reeducation
Assault and Consolidation Battle'' [Dahao jiaoyu zhuanhua gongjian yu
gonggu zhengti zhang de jiben sikao], 5 August 10; Gao Peiquan, ``Our
School Holds General Assembly To Commend the Conclusion of the Work in
the Transformation Through Reeducation Assault and Consolidation
Battle'' [Woxiao zhaokai jiaoyu zhuanhua gongjian yu gonggu zhengti
zhang gongzuo zongjie biaozhang dahui], Journal of Shihezi University,
30 November 12.
\61\CECC, 2011 Annual Report, 10 October 11, 99-101.
\62\All-China Women's Federation, ``The Vigorous Anti-Cult Work of
All Levels of Women's Federation Organizations in Chongqing Has
Achieved Outstanding Results'' [Chongqing shi geji fulian zuzhi dali
kaizhan fan xiejiao gongzuo chengxiao xianzhu], 1 August 13; Pucheng
County Public Security Bureau, ``In Order To Resist Cults, One Must
Adhere to the Four Combinations'' [Jujue xiejiao bixu jianchi sige
jiehe], 6 June 13.
\63\All-China Women's Federation, ``The Vigorous Anti-Cult Work of
All Levels of Women's Federation Organizations in Chongqing Has
Achieved Remarkable Results'' [Chongqing shi geji fulian zuzhi dali
kaizhan fan xiejiao gongzuo chengxiao xianzhu], 1 August 13.
\64\``First Meeting of Zhejiang Public Anti-Cult Work Meeting and
Anti-Cult Symposium Held in Hangzhou'' [Shoujie zhejiang sheng minjian
fan xiejiao gongzuo huiyi jifan xiejiao xueshu yantaohui zai hangzhou
zhaokai], Qianjiang Tide, 3 May 13.
\65\``Lens Magazine: Expose on Liaoning's Masanjia Women's RTL
Center'' [Shijue zazhi: jiemi liaoning masanjia nuzi laojiaosuo], Lens
Magazine, reprinted inChina DigitalTimes,7 April 13.
\66\Andrew Jacobs, ``BehindCry forHelpFromChinaLaborCamp,'' New
York Times,11June 13.
\67\Dui Hua Foundation, ``Dui Hua: Magazine Expose Reinvigorates
Calls to End RTL,'' 11 April 13; Didi Kirsten Tatlow, ``Story of
Women's Labor Camp Abuse Unnerves Even China,'' New York Times, 11
April 13; Chris Luo, ``Women `Chained Up and Tortured' in Labour
Camp,'' South China Morning Post, 9 April 13; ``Lens Magazine: Expose
on Liaoning's Masanjia Women's RTL Center'' [Shijue zazhi: jiemi
liaoning masanjia nuzi laojiaosuo], Lens Magazine, reprinted in China
Digital Times, 7 April 13.
\68\Andrew Jacobs, ``Chinese Journalist Is Released on Bail,'' New
York Times, 8 July 13; ``China Releases Journalist Du Bin From
Detention,'' BBC, 9 July 13. See the Commission's Political Prisoner
Database, record 2013-00206, for more information on Du Bin's case.
\69\Falun Gong in China: Review and Update, Hearing of the
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 18 December 12, Testimony
of Mr. Hu Zhiming, Twice-Imprisoned Falun Gong Practitioner.
\70\Falun Gong in China: Review and Update, Hearing of the
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 18 December 12, Testimony
of Mr. Bruce Chung, Falun Gong Practitioner Detained in China [in
2012].
\71\``Xinjiang's Third Round of Training for Islamic Patriotic
Religious Figures Trains 38,000 People'' [Xinjiang di san lun yisilan
jiao aiguo zongjiao renshi peixun 3.8 wan renci], Xinjiang Daily,
reprinted in PRC Central People's Government, 26 December 12.
\72\Zhang Xiaofang et al., ``Ningxia Muslims Celebrate Eid, Li
Jianhua, Liu Hui and Others Visit and Pay Respects to Muslim Public''
[Ningxia musilin huandu kai zhaijie li jianhua liu hui deng kanwang
weiwen musilin qunzhong], Ningxia Daily, reprinted in People's Daily,
10 August 13.
\73\State Administration for Religious Affairs, ``2013 National
Islamic Institute Work Situation Seminar Held in Beijing'' [2013 nian
quanguo yisilan jiao jingxueyuan gongzuo qingkuang jiaoliuhui zai jing
zhaokai], 31 January 13.
\74\``Xinjiang's Third Round of Training for Islamic Patriotic
Religious Figures Trains 38,000 People'' [Xinjiang di san lun yisilan
jiao aiguo zongjiao renshi peixun 3.8 wan renci], Xinjiang Daily,
reprinted in PRC Central People's Government, 26 December 12;
``Strengthen the Popularization of the Field of Religion and Thematic
Education, Promote Ethnic Unity and Religious Harmony'' [Jiaqiang
zongjiao lingyu pufa he zhuti jiaoyu cujin minzu tuanjie, zongjiao
hexie], China Ethnicity and Religion Net, 16 July 13.
\75\State Administration for Religious Affairs, ``Measures for
Accrediting Islamic Clergy'' [Yisilan jiao jiaozhi renyuan zige rending
banfa], 20 December 10.
\76\State Administration for Religious Affairs, ``Islamic
Association of China Convenes Association Certification Ceremony for
Muslim Clergy'' [Zhongguo yisilan jiao xiehui juban ben xiehui yisilan
jiao jiaozhi renyuan banzheng yishi], 25 February 13.
\77\Islamic Association of China, Circular Regarding the Launch of
the Islamic Association of China's Hajj Personnel Management System
[Guanyu zhongguo yixie chaojin renyuan guanli xitong kaitong shiyong de
tongzhi], 27 June 13; State Administration for Religious Affairs,
``2012 Work Situation Report of the State Administration for Religious
Affairs'' [Guojia zongjiao shiwu ju 2012 nian gongzuo qingkuang
baogao], 18 January 13.
\78\See, e.g., Liu Zhenxiang, Dorbiljin (Emin) County Government,
``Emin County Adopts a Number of Measures To Safeguard the Ramadan
Period'' [Emin xian caiqu duo xiang cuoshi quebao zhaiyue qijian], 5
July 13; ``Yining County Issues Leaflets Regarding the `10 Prohibited'
Illegal Religious Activities'' [Yining xian fabu zhizhi feifa zongjiao
huodong ``shi bu zhun'' xuanchuan dan], Uyghur Online, 15 July 13.
\79\State Administration for Religious Affairs, ``Strengthen the
Results and Application of Scriptural Interpretation and Promote the
Harmonious Development of Society'' [Qianghua jiejing chengguo yingyong
cujin shehui hexie fazhan], 4 February 13.
\80\Ibid.
\81\Gu Ruizhen, ``Yu Zhengsheng: Fully Implement Central Policies
and Arrangements, Strongly Complete Stability and Prosperity Work in
Xinjiang'' [Yu zhengsheng: quanmian guanche zhongyang juece bushu,
zhashi zuohao wen jiang xing jiang gongzuo], Xinhua, 28 May 13.
\82\Islamic Association of China, ``IAC Press Spokesperson Issues
Statement Regarding the Violent Terrorist Attacks in Xinjiang''
[Zhongguo yisilan jiao xiehui xinwen fayanren jiu xinjiang fasheng de
baoli kongbu xiji anjian fabiao tanhua], reprinted in State
Administration for Religious Affairs, 30 July 13.
\83\Azat Omer, ``Religious Extremist Ideology Is a `Cancer' Harming
Society'' [Zongjiao jiduan sixiang shi weihai shehui de ``duliu''],
Xinjiang Daily, reprinted in People's Daily, 16 August 13.
\84\According to the charters of the TSPM and CCC, among each
organization's duties are to: ``Under the leadership of the Chinese
Communist Party and the People's Government, unite all the country's
Protestants; fervently love socialism and the motherland; respect the
country's Constitution, laws, regulations, and policies; [and] actively
participate in the construction of a socialist society with Chinese
characteristics.'' Three-Self Patriotic Movement, Charter of the
National Committee of Three-Self Patriotic Movement of the Protestant
Churches in China [Zhongguo jidu jiao sanzi aiguo yundong weiyuanhui
zhangcheng], issued 12 January 08, art. 6(1); China Christian Council,
Charter of the China Christian Council [Zhongguo jidu jiao xiehui
zhangcheng], passed 12 January 08, art. 7(1).
\85\U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF),
``Tier 1 Countries of Particular Concern--China,'' Annual Report 2013,
30 April 13, 36-37.
\86\See e.g., ``Beijing's Shouwang Church Denounces Police
Repression,'' Asia News, 21 September 12; ``Police Stop Illegal House
Church Service,'' Global Times, reprinted in Beijing News, 22 August
12; Carsten T. Vala, ``Protestant Christianity and Civil Society in
Authoritarian China,'' China Perspectives, No. 3 (2012), 50; Liu Peng,
Pu Shi Institute for Social Sciences, ``How To Treat House Churches: A
Review of the Beijing Shouwang Church Incident,'' 16 February 12;
``Update: New Year Brings Renewed Efforts To Prevent Worship at
Shouwang Church,'' Voice of the Martyrs, 19 January 12; Beijing
Shouwang Church, ``An Explanation of the Issue of Worshiping Outside''
[Huwai jingbai wenti jieda], 4 April 11; Chris Buckley and Sui-Lee Wee,
``Beijing Church Faces Eviction in Tense Times,'' Reuters, 3 April 11;
Verna Yu, ``Fears of More Pressure on Underground Churches,'' South
China Morning Post, 1 April 11; Beijing Shouwang Church, ``Beijing
Shouwang Church March 2011 Open Letter to Congregation'' [Beijing
shouwang jiaohui 11 nian 3 yue gao huizhong shu], reprinted in
ChinaAid, 4 April 11. See also ``Beijing Authorities Harass and Detain
Shouwang Church Members,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China,
1 July 11.
\87\ChinaAid, ``Shouwang Church Applies for Administrative Review,
Using the Law To Defend Religious Rights,'' 20 September 12; Verna Yu,
``Shouwang Church Takes Legal Action Against Cops for Religious
Persecution,'' South China Morning Post, 21 September 12.
\88\Beijing Shouwang Church, ``Shouwang Church Announcement
Concerning the Application for Administrative Reconsideration,''
reprinted in ChinaAid, 6 October 12.
\89\Beijing Shouwang Church, ``Beijing Shouwang Church Announcement
on Outdoor Worship Service on August 11,'' reprinted in ChinaAid, 13
August 13. For other examples of authorities detaining Shouwang church
members or otherwise preventing them from attending services during
this reporting year, see Beijing Shouwang Church, ``Beijing Shouwang
Church Announcement on Outdoor Worship Service on July 21,'' reprinted
in ChinaAid, 24 July 13; Beijing Shouwang Church, ``Beijing Shouwang
Church Announcement on Outdoor Worship Service on March 17, 2013,''
reprinted in ChinaAid, 19 March 13; Beijing Shouwang Church, ``Beijing
Shouwang Church Announcement on Outdoor Worship Service on December 30,
2012,'' reprinted in ChinaAid, 4 January 13.
\90\``China's House Church Crackdown Gathers Pace,'' Radio Free
Asia, 11 June 13.
\91\Ibid.
\92\``Beijing Chaoyang Police Raid House Church Symposium, Force
Registration'' [Beijing chaoyang jingcha chuangru jiating jiaohui
yantaohui qiangxing dengji], Radio Free Asia, 27 February 13.
\93\``Guizhou, Tongren House Church Gathering Suffers Assault''
[Guizhou tongren jiating jiaohui juhui zao chongji], Radio Free Asia,
22 August 13.
\94\ChinaAid, ``Vicious Persecution of House Churches in
Heilongjiang and Shandong, Presbyterian Federation of Beijing Calls for
Prayers (photo),'' 21 February 13.
\95\ChinaAid, ``Two More House Churches Raided in Xinjiang,'' 22
July 13; ``China: House Church Accused of Being Religious Cult
Raided,'' Christian Today, 1 April 13; ChinaAid, ``Xinjiang Kucha House
Church Raided,'' 28 September 12.
\96\ChinaAid, ``House Church in Alxa Left Banner, Inner Mongolia,
Violently Banned in Late April'' [Neimenggu azuoqi yi jiating jiaohui
si yuedi bei baoli qudi], 23 May 13.
\97\ChinaAid, ``Christian Salvation Church in Wuhan City Faces
Illegal Forced Demolition,'' 25 September 12.
\98\ChinaAid, ``A TSPM Church in Yushu City, Jilin Province Is
Persecuted by Both the Government and the Developer Due to Demolition
and Removal,'' 27 September 12.
\99\``Officially-Recognized Church Threatened With Forced
Eviction'' [Guanfang renke jiaotang zao bi qian bei konghe], Radio Free
Asia, 7 August 13; ChinaAid, ``Zhengzhou: Sunzhuang Christian Church
Doorway Blocked by Transported Dirt Again'' [Zhengzhou: sunzhuang jidu
jiaotang zaici bei yuntu dumen], 6 August 13.
\100\Ibid.
\101\U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF),
``Tier 1 Countries of Particular Concern--China,'' Annual Report 2013,
30 April 13, 36.
\102\See, e.g., Lu Huaying, Xihu District People's Congress
Standing Committee Office, ``Reflections Regarding Strengthening and
Innovation of Management of Places of Worship'' [Guangyu jiaqiang he
chuangxin zongjiao changsuo guanli de sikao], reprinted in Hangzhou
People's Congress, 26 June 13; State Administration for Religious
Affairs, ``State Administration for Religious Affairs 2013 Main Work
Points'' [Guojia zongjiao shiwuju 2013 nian gongzuo yaodian], 18
January 13; ChinaAid, ``Local Government in Shandong Province Launches
City-Wide Investigation of `Privately Established Religious Meeting
Sites,''' 1 April 13.
\103\See, e.g., ``A Number of House Church Gatherings in Shandong,
Linzi Attacked'' [Shandong linzi duo jia jiating jiaohui juhui zaodao
chongji], Radio Free Asia, 16 August 13; ``China Probes House Churches
in Intelligence Sweep,'' Radio Free Asia, 20 March 13; ``Guizhou,
Tongren House Church Gathering Attacked'' [Guizhou tongren jiating
juhui zao chongji], Radio Free Asia, 22 August 13; ``Inner Mongolian
House Church Suppressed'' [Neimenggu jiating jiaohui shou daya], Radio
Free Asia, 20 June 13.
\104\``Inner Mongolian House Church Suppressed'' [Neimenggu jiating
jiaohui shou daya], Radio Free Asia, 20 June 13.
\105\U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF),
``Tier 1 Countries of Particular Concern--China,'' Annual Report 2013,
30 April 13, 37.
\106\Ibid., 36.
\107\Tom Phillips, ``Chinese Preacher Arrested for Hymn Session,''
Telegraph, 6 February 13; ChinaAid, ``Shenzhen House Church's Cao Nan
Brings Administrative Suit Against Futian Public Security Branch''
[Shenzhen jiating jiaohui de cao nan, yifa xingzheng qisu futian gongan
fenju], 4 February 13; ChinaAid, ``Well-Known Preacher Detained for
Second Time This Month for Preaching in Shenzhen Park,'' 21 December
12.
\108\Tom Phillips, ``Chinese Preacher Arrested for Hymn Session,''
Telegraph, 6 February 13; ChinaAid, ``Shenzhen House Church's Cao Nan
Brings Administrative Suit Against Futian Public Security Branch''
[Shenzhen jiating jiaohui de cao nan, yifa xingzheng qisu futian gongan
fenju], 4 February 13.
\109\``Christian Booksellers Li Wenxi Sentenced to 2 Years, Ren
Lacheng Sentenced to 5 Years'' [Jidutu shu shang li wen xi bei pan 2
nian ren la cheng bei pan 5 nian], Radio Free Asia, 19 June 13;
ChinaAid, ``Verdict Regarding Enyu Bookstore's Case Has Been
Determined: Lacheng Ren Sentenced to Five Years in Prison, Wenxi Li to
Two Years,'' 19 June 13; ChinaAid, ``Newsflash: Shanxi Enyu Bookstore
Case Announce Sentences Ren Lacheng 5 Years and Li Wenxi 2 Years''
[Kuaixun: shanxi en yu shufang jiao an xuanpan ren la cheng 5 nian li
wen xi 2 nian], 18 June 13; ChinaAid, ``Well-known Human Rights Lawyer
Zhu Jihu's Argument at Trial of Imprisoned Christian Bookstore Manager
Li Wenxi,'' 29 May 13; ``Two Christians in Taiyuan Sentenced for
`Illegally Operating a Bookstore''' [Taiyuan liang jidutu yin ``feifa
jingying shudian'' bei panxing], Radio Free Asia, 19 June 13. See the
Commission's Political Prisoner Database, records 2013-00217 on Ren
Lacheng and 2013-00216 on Li Wenxi, for more information on these
cases.
\110\Ibid. See the Commission's Political Prisoner Database,
records 2013-00217 on Ren Lacheng and 2013-00216 on Li Wenxi, for more
information on these cases.
\111\Ibid. See the Commission's Political Prisoner Database,
records 2013-00217 on Ren Lacheng and 2013-00216 on Li Wenxi, for more
information on these cases.
\112\Tianjin Anti-Cult Organization, ``What Are the Cult
Organizations the Ministry of Public Security Has Identified?''
[Gonganbu rending de xiejiao zuzhi you na xie?], 22 October 12. See
also Dui Hua Foundation, ``The `Cult' of Buddha,'' Dialogue, 29 August
13.
\113\PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingfa], enacted 1
July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25
December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February
05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, art. 300.
\114\``Guizhou, Tongren House Church Gathering Assaulted'' [Guizhou
tongren jiating juhui zao chongji], Radio Free Asia, 22 August 13.
\115\ChinaAid, ``7 House Church Leaders in Henan, Pingdingshan
Receive Heavy Sentences Year After Arrest and Criminal Detention,
Triggering International Mainstream Media Attention'' [Henan
pingdingshan 7 wei jiating jiaohui lingxiu xingjiu daibu yi nian hou
zaodao zhongpan, yinfa guoji zhuliu meiti guanzhu], 22 April 13;
ChinaAid, ``Update: Pingdingshan, Henan Province Prosecution Case
Escalates, 7 Christians Arrested for `Cult Crimes,''' 4 June 12;
ChinaAid, ``Seven Christians in Henan Province Convicted of Cult
Crimes, Sentenced to Prison Terms of Three to 7-1/2 Years,'' 27 April
13; ChinaAid, ``Seven House Church Christians in Henan Province Have
Been Charged with Engaging in Cult Activities,'' 25 November 12. See
the Commission's Political Prisoner Database, records 2013-00168 on Han
Hai, 2013-00172 on Hu Linpo, 2013-00173 on Yang Lianbing, 2013-00174 on
Zhang Mian, 2013-00175 on Cao Xia, 2013-00176 on Wang En, and 2013-
00177 on Li Dan, for more information on these cases. See also PRC
Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingfa], enacted 1 July 79,
amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25 December 99, 31
August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06,
28 February 09, 25 February 11, art. 300.
\116\ChinaAid, ``7 House Church Leaders in Henan, Pingdingshan
Receive Heavy Sentences Year After Arrest and Criminal Detention,
Triggering International Mainstream Media Attention'' [Henan
pingdingshan 7 wei jiating jiaohui lingxiu xingjiu daibu yi nian hou
zaodao zhongpan, yinfa guoji zhuliu meiti guanzhu], 22 April 13;
ChinaAid, ``Update: Pingdingshan, Henan Province Prosecution Case
Escalates, 7 Christians Arrested for `Cult Crimes,''' 4 June 12;
ChinaAid, ``Seven Christians in Henan Province Convicted of Cult
Crimes, Sentenced to Prison Terms of Three to 7-1/2 Years,'' 27 April
13; ChinaAid, ``Seven House Church Christians in Henan Province Have
Been Charged with Engaging in Cult Activities,'' 25 November 12. See
the Commission's Political Prisoner Database, records 2013-00168 on Han
Hai, 2013-00172 on Hu Linpo, 2013-00173 on Yang Lianbing, 2013-00174 on
Zhang Mian, 2013-00175 on Cao Xia, 2013-00176 on Wang En, and 2013-
00177 on Li Dan, for more information on these cases.
\117\Ibid. See the Commission's Political Prisoner Database,
records 2013-00168 on Han Hai, 2013-00172 on Hu Linpo, 2013-00173 on
Yang Lianbing, 2013-00174 on Zhang Mian, 2013-00175 on Cao Xia, 2013-
00176 on Wang En, and 2013-00177 on Li Dan, for more information on
these cases.
\118\``More Than 1300 People from `Almighty God' Cult Organization
Contained, Most From Qinghai and Guizhou'' [``Quanneng shen'' xiejiao
zuzhi 1300 duo ren bei kongzhi qinghai guizhou zui duo], China Network,
reprinted in Xinhua, 21 December 12; Dui Hua Foundation, ``China's
`Almighty God' Rises With Threat of Apocalypse,'' Dui Hua Human Rights
Journal, 17 December 12.
\119\``More Than 1300 People From `Almighty God' Cult Organization
Detained, Most From Qinghai and Guizhou'' [``Quanneng shen'' xiejiao
zuzhi 1300 duo ren bei kongzhi qinghai guizhou zui duo], China Network,
reprinted in Xinhua, 21 December 12.
\120\Li Ling and Wang Cian, ```Almighty God' Cult Believer From
Shaoguan, Guangdong Sentenced to 7 Years'' [Guangdong shaoguan yi
``quan neng shen'' xiejiao xintu huoxing qi nian], China News Service,
2 April 13; Dui Hua Foundation, ``Prisoner Update,'' 29 August 13. See
also the Commission's Political Prisoner Database, records 2013-00293
on Lai Yiwa, for more information on this case.
\121\Chinese Taoist Association, ``Introduction to the
Association'' [Xiehui jianjie], last visited 27 August 13.
\122\China Religion, ``China Taoist Association Convenes the Third
Meeting of the Eighth Executive Council To Study the Spirit of the 18th
National Congress'' [Zhongguo daojiao xiehui zhaokai bajie sanci
changwu lishihui xuexi dang de shibada jingshen], 26 November 12.
\123\PRC Central Government, ``SARA Hosts 2013 Study Class for
Taoist Representatives Nationwide'' [Guojia zongjiaoju juban 2013 nian
quanguo daojiao jie daibiao renshi dushu ban], 21 May 13. Seealso An
Baijie, ``TaoistLeadersFocus onPreserving Values,'' ChinaDaily, 5 June
13.
\124\China Religion, ``China Taoist Association Convenes the Third
Meeting of the Eighth Executive Council To Study the Spirit of the 18th
National Congress'' [Zhongguo daojiao xiehui zhaokai bajie sanci
changwu lishihui xuexi dang de shibada jingshen], 26 November 12.
\125\Ibid.
\126\For example, see the discussion in this section on the
Orthodox Church in China. In addition, the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints reported in March 2013 that worship services for
Chinese citizens are held separately from those for foreign passport
holders and that branches for Chinese citizens ``are directed by their
own local priesthood leaders.'' Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints Newsroom, ``New Church Website Will Help Chinese Nationals,
Church Leaders Around the World,'' 15 March 13.
\127\Xuyang Jingjing, ``Orthodox Christians in China Seeking
Official Recognition,'' Global Times, 15 May 13. According to the
Global Times, there are four Orthodox churches in China that are
approved for religious activities. These churches are located in Harbin
municipality, Heilongjiang province; Erguna city, Inner Mongolia
Autonomous Region; Urumqi city, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region
(XUAR); and Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, XUAR.
\128\Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Implementing Measures for the
Management of Venues for Religious Activity [Neimenggu zizhiqu zongjiao
huodong changsuo guanli shishi banfa], issued 23 January 96, effective
23 January 96, art. 2.
\129\Gianni Valente, ``PatriarchKirillPays Historical Visit
toChina,'' VaticanInsider,11May 13.
\130\Russian Orthodox Church, Department for External Church
Relations, ``Patriarch Kirill: The Dreams of theChinese
OrthodoxChurch's Bright Future Begins To Come True,'' 13 May 13.
\131\Provisions on the Management of the Religious Activities of
Foreigners Within the PRC [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jingnei waiguoren
zongjiao huodong guanli guiding], issued 31 January 94, effective 31
January 94, art. 4; Detailed Implementing Rules for the Provisions on
the Management of the Religious Activities of Foreigners Within the PRC
[Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jingnei waiguoren zongjiao huodong guanli
guiding shishi xize], issued 26 September 00, effective 26 September
00, arts. 7, 17(5).
Notes to Section II--Ethnic Minority Rights
\1\International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by
UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry
into force 23 March 76, art. 27. See generally PRC Regional Ethnic
Autonomy Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo minzu quyu zizhi fa], issued 31
May 84, effective 1 October 84, amended 28 February 01.
\2\``Political Commissar of the Xinjiang Production and
Construction Corps: Resolutely Crack Down on Harmful Separatist
Activities'' [Xinjiang shengchan jianshe bingtuan zhengwei: jianjue
daji fenlie pohuai huodong], China News Service, reprinted in Sohu, 6
May 13; ``China President Calls for Stability in Xinjiang,'' Agence
France-Presse, reprinted in West Australian, 26 April 13.
\3\See ``Grasslands Policy and Protests in Inner Mongolia'' below
for more information.
\4\See, e.g., ``Inner Mongolia's Two Sessions: Acceleration of
Development in Tertiary Industries Has Become a Bright Spot'' [Nei
menggu lianghui: jiakuai fazhan disan chanye cheng liangdian], New
Northern Net, reprinted in Imosi.com, 31 January 13; Zhao Yunping and
Han Shumei, ``Inner Mongolia: Accelerate the Development of County
Economic Coordination for Urban and Rural Development'' [Nei menggu:
jiakuai fazhan xianyu jingji tongchou chengxiang quyu fazhan], Inner
Mongolia Daily, reprinted in China County Economics, 18 January 13.
\5\See, e.g., ``Little Hu and the Mining of the Grasslands,''
Economist, 14 July 12; Lin Chao, ``Salary of Rural Herders in Inner
Mongolia Surpasses That of Urban Residents for Two Consecutive Years''
[Nei menggu nongmumin shouru zengsu lianxu liang nian chaoguo chengzhen
jumin], Xinhua, reprinted in Central Government of the People's
Republic of China, 20 February 13; Yang Zuokun et al., ``Striving To
Improve the Lives of the People--Inner Mongolian Representatives to the
18th Party Congress Discuss People's Livelihood'' [Nuli rang renmin
guoshang genghao shenghuo--nei menggu shibada daibiao tan minsheng],
Inner Mongolia Daily, reprinted in Xinhua, 10 November 12.
\6\See, e.g., ``Little Hu and the Mining of the Grasslands,''
Economist, 14 July 12; Human Rights in China, ``China: Minority
Exclusion, Marginalization and Rising Tensions,'' 2007, 14, 26-28;
Richard Fraser, ``Forced Relocation Amongst the Reindeer--Evenki of
Inner Mongolia,'' Inner Asia, Vol. 12, Issue 2 (2010), reprinted in
Academia.edu.
\7\Wang Hao et al., ``Farmers Turn Urban in Ordos,'' China Daily,
19 February 13; ``Herdsman on New Road to a Happy Life,'' China Daily,
reprinted in CRIenglish, 20 November 12; Li Baozhen and Liu Ning,
``Bayingol, Luntai County Herders Move Into Peaceful Resident,
Prosperous Citizen Houses, Enjoy `New Life''' [Bazhou luntai xian
nongmumin banjin anju fumin fang xiangshou ``xin shenghuo''], Xinhua, 5
November 12; Li Li, ``(A Winter View of Tibet- Linzhi) Herders on the
Bangjietang Grassland'' [(Dongji kan xizang-linzhi) bangjietang caoyuan
shang de mumin renjia], China Tibet Online, 26 January 13; Wang
Jianting, ``Xinjiang Wuqia Herders Put Down Their Whips and Use
Modernized Agriculture To Become Rich'' [Xinjiang wuqia mumin fangxia
mabian liyong xiandaihua nongye zhifu], China News Service, 27 May 13;
Wei Zhiyuan, ``Kazakh-Style Small `Villas' Make Xinjiang Burqin County
`Nomad Settlement' Full of Spring'' [Hasake shi xiao ``bieshu'' rang
xinjiang buerjin xian ``mumin dingju'' manmu chun], People's Daily, 11
May 13. For information on grasslands policy in earlier years, see,
e.g., CECC, 2012 Annual Report, 10 October 12, 88-89, 119, 149.
\8\Hulunbeir City Grassland Bureau of Supervision and Management,
``The Three Levels of Districts, Cities and Banners in Inner Mongolia
Jointly Held a Publicity Activity on the Grasslands Law'' [Nei menggu
qu shi qi sanji lianhe juban caoyuan pufa xuanchuan huodong], 16 April
13; ``The City Launches Activities for 2013 Grasslands Law Awareness
Month'' [Quanshi qidong 2013 nian caoyuan pufa xuanchuan yue huodong],
Agriculture and Animal Husbandry Bureau of Ulanqab City, reprinted in
Ulanqab Government, 8 April 13.
\9\See, e.g., ``The Newly Revised `Regulations on the Protection of
Inner Mongolian Grasslands' Take Effect Today'' [Xin xiuding de ``nei
menggu zizhiqu jiben caoyuan baohu tiaoli'' jinri qi zhengshi shixing],
Xinhua, 1 December 11; ``Chinese Pasture Region Charges Fees for
Grassland Exploitation,'' Xinhua, 28 February 12.
\10\China's Ethnic Regional Autonomy Law: Does It Protect Minority
Rights? Staff Roundtable of the Congressional-Executive Commission on
China, 11 April 05, Testimony of Christopher P. Atwood, Associate
Professor, Department of Central Eurasian Studies, Indiana University.
For Commission analysis, see ``State Council Opinion Bolsters Grazing
Ban, Herder Resettlement,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on
China, 18 October 11.
\11\Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ``Dr.
Chuluu Ujiyediin Speaks at `Promoting Human Rights, Democracy and
Freedom in East Turkistan, Tibet, Southern Mongolia and the People's
Republic of China,''' 31 March 13; Nick Holdstock, ``China Says It Is
Improving the Lives of Ethnic Minorities in Inner Mongolia. Don't Be
Fooled,'' Independent, 16 April 13; Unrepresented Nations and Peoples
Organization, ``Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO)
Individual Stakeholder Submission to the Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights regarding the Universal Periodic Review
of the People's Republic of China During the 17th Session, Oct-Nov
2013,'' February 2013; J. Carl Ganter, ``J. Carl Ganter: The Biggest
Story of Our Lifetime Is Water,'' Circle of Blue, 28 March 13.
\12\``The Newly Revised `Regulations on the Protection of Inner
Mongolian Grasslands' Take Effect Today'' [Xin xiuding de ``nei menggu
zizhiqu jiben caoyuan baohu tiaoli'' jinri qi zhengshi shixing],
Xinhua, 1 December 11.
\13\Greenpeace, ``Thirsty Coal 2,'' 23 July 13, 17-37.
\14\Ibid., 5, 12, 18-25, 28-32, 36-37, 53-54, 65.
\15\Ibid., 18-20, 34.
\16\Ibid., 39, 41-51.
\17\Ibid., 38-51.
\18\``Chinese Coal Company Releasing Toxic Wastewater, Greenpeace
Says,'' Reuters, reprinted in Guardian, 23 July 13; ``Greenpeace
Accuses Chinese Coal Company of Draining Water Resources,'' Voice of
America, 23 July 13; Greenpeace, ``Thirsty Coal 2,'' 23 July 13, Report
Summary, 39, 41.
\19\``Herders Blocked From Protest Marches to Beijing,'' Radio Free
Asia, 7 March 13; ``Herders Protest Loss of Land,'' Radio Free Asia, 9
October 12; Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center,
``Herders' Protests Put Down, Internet Posts Removed,'' 6 March 13;
Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ``Mongolian Herders
Protest China's Illegal Occupation of Their Land and Defamation of
Their Ancestors,'' 8 October 12; Southern Mongolian Human Rights
Information Center, ``Thirty Eight Displaced Herders from Zaruud Banner
Arrested and Detained in Protest,'' 19 July 13; Southern Mongolian
Human Rights Information Center, ``Mongolian Herders Beaten and Injured
in a Clash With the Chinese,'' 20 May 13; ``Police Probe Fresh Clashes
in Inner Mongolia,'' Radio Free Asia, 20 May 13.
\20\Rachel Vandenbrink, ``Inner Mongolian Herder Beaten to Death in
Land Clash,'' Radio Free Asia, 23 August 13; Southern Mongolian Human
Rights Information Center, ``Update to the Murder of Bayanbaatar:
Central Government Involved, Family Rejects Negotiation,'' 22 August
13; Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ``One More
Mongolian Herder Killed by the Chinese Defending His Grazing Land,'' 20
August 13. Bayanbaatar's daughter-in-law reportedly stated that
government authorities subsequently confined around 80 of his family
members to a funeral home and kept them under heavy police
surveillance. Bayanbaatar's death marks the first reported killing of a
Mongol herder who was protesting corporate use of grazing land since
two coal workers hit and killed herder Mergen on May 10, 2011, an
incident that contributed to protests involving thousands of people in
the following weeks. For Commission analysis, see ``Mongols Protest in
Inner Mongolia After Clashes Over Grasslands Use, Mining Operations,''
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 1 July 11. See also CECC,
2011 Annual Report, 10 October 11, 108.
\21\Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ``Herders'
Protests Put Down, Internet Posts Removed,'' 6 March 13; ``Herders
Blocked From Protest Marches to Beijing,'' Radio Free Asia, 7 March 13.
\22\Ibid.
\23\Ibid.
\24\Ibid.
\25\Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ``Thirty
Eight Displaced Herders from Zaruud Banner Arrested and Detained in
Protest,'' 19 July 13; ``Herders Blocked from Travel to Beijing,''
Radio Free Asia, 19 July 13.
\26\Ibid.
\27\State Forestry Administration Sanbei Forest Construction
Bureau, ``For the Inner Mongolia Hanshan Nature Preserve, the Effects
of Contraction and Transfer Are Positive'' [Nei menggu hanshan ziran
baohu qu shousuo zhuanyi xiaoguo hao], reprinted in China Forestry Net,
15 December 09.
\28\Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ``Thirty
Eight Displaced Herders from Zaruud Banner Arrested and Detained in
Protest,'' 19 July 13; ``Herders Blocked From Travel to Beijing,''
Radio Free Asia, 19 July 13.
\29\Wang Jinlong, ``Non-Ferrous Geological Exploration'' [Youse
dizhi kancha], Inner Mongolia Regional News Net, 11 November 12. See
also ``List of Achievements of the Inner Mongolia Bureau of Non-Ferrous
Geological Exploration Prospecting'' [Nei menggu youse dikanju zhao
kuang chengguo yi lan], China Non-Ferrous Metals Mineral Resources
Information Net, 20 March 13.
\30\Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ``One More
Mongolian Herder Killed by the Chinese Defending His Grazing Land,'' 20
August 13. The Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center
reported that the attack and suicide took place in Ongniud (Wengniute)
Banner, Ulanhot (Wulanhaote) municipality, but Ongniud Banner is
located in Chifeng municipality.
\31\Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ``Hada and
Family Members Still Missing,'' 24 February 13; Human Rights in China,
``Lawyer Asks for Immediate Release of Mongolian Dissident Hada; Family
Provides Further Details on Hada's Condition,'' 29 January 13.
\32\Human Rights in China, ``Mongolian Dissident Hada in 23rd Month
of Unlawful Detention After Long Prison Term; Family Appeals for
International Attention,'' 22 October 12; ``Wife of Mongolian Activist
Speaks Out Against Chinese Harassment,'' Associated Press, reprinted in
Guardian, 15 October 12.
\33\Ibid.
\34\Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ``Hada and
Family Members Still Missing,'' 24 February 13; ``Profiles in
Dissidence: Why China Is Crushing a Mongolian Intellectual,'' Global
Post, 5 March 13.
\35\Ibid.
\36\``Inner Mongolian Activist in Safe, Healthy State: Official,''
Xinhua, 6 March 13; Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center,
``Hada and Family Members Still Missing,'' 24 February 13.
\37\For Commission analysis on Hada, Xinna, and Uiles, see
``Authorities Heighten Persecution of Detained Mongol Rights Advocate's
Wife and Son,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 13
December 12. See the Commission's Political Prisoner Database, record
2004-02045 (Hada), record 2010-00704 (Xinna), and record 2010-00705
(Uiles) for more information on these cases.
\38\Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ``Mongolian
Herder's Rights Defender in Poor Health at Chinese Detention Center,''
2 September 13; Richard Finney, ``Advocate for Inner Mongolian Herdsmen
in `Failing Health' in Jail,'' Radio Free Asia, 3 September 13.
\39\Ibid.
\40\Ibid.
\41\Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ``Mongol-
Tibetan Medical School Principal Imprisoned for Alleged Escape
Attempt,'' 10 May 13.
\42\``Mongolian Medical College Founder Jailed for Three Years,''
Radio Free Asia, 10 May 13.
\43\Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ``Mongol-
Tibetan Medical School Principal Imprisoned for Alleged Escape
Attempt,'' 10 May 13; ``Founder of Mongolian Medicine College in Inner
Mongolia Detained'' [Nei menggu yi meng zang yiyao xuexiao chuangshi
ren beibu], Radio Free Asia, 20 October 09; Southern Mongolian Human
Rights Information Center, ``Deported United Nations Refugee Applicant
Batzangaa Tried in China,'' 17 January 11. See the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database, record 2009-00435, for more information on
the case.
\44\Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ``Southern
Mongolian Dissident Writer Wins Hellman/Hammett Grant,'' 20 December
12.
\45\Ibid.; PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingfa],
enacted 1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended
25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28
February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, art. 111.
\46\Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ``Dissident
Writer Huuchinhuu Beaten Repeatedly,'' 29 September 11; ``Dissident
Suffers Beatings in Detention,'' Radio Free Asia, 29 September 11. See
the Commission's Political Prisoner Database, record 2010-00597, for
more information on the case.
\47\For more information on these cases, see, e.g., ``Inner
Mongolia Writer Unaga Secretly Detained for Publishing New Book''
[Neimeng zuojia wunaga ni chuban xinshu zao mimi daibu], Radio Free
Asia, 19 January 11; ``Mongol Writer Unaga Secretly Arrested in Inner
Mongolia'' [Mongghul yazghuchisi unaga ichki mongghulda mexpiy
tutuldi], Radio Free Asia, 18 January 11; Southern Mongolian Human
Rights Information Center, ``Southern Mongolian Dissident Writer,
Author of `Forefront of Independence' Arrested and Detained,'' 23
January 11; UN Human Rights Council, Report by the Special Rapporteur
on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous
People, Cases Examined by the Special Rapporteur (June 2009-July 2010),
A/HRC/15/37/Add.1, reprinted in UN Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights, 15 September 10. Official Chinese information is not
available regarding the current legal status of Erden-uul and
Sodmongol. See also the Commission's Political Prisoner Database for
more information on the cases of Erden-uul (record 2011-00072) and
Sodmongol (record 2010-00146).
Notes to Section II--Population Planning
\1\PRC Population and Family Planning Law [Zhonghua renmin
gongheguo renkou yu jihua shengyu fa], adopted 29 December 01,
effective 1 September 02, art. 18. According to Article 18, ``The State
maintains its current policy for reproduction, encouraging late
marriage and childbearing and advocating one child per couple. Where
the requirements specified by laws and regulations are met, plans for a
second child, if requested, may be made.'' Chinese Human Rights
Defenders, ``I Don't Have Control Over My Own Body,'' 21 December 10,
6-7. Implementing regulations in different provinces vary on the ages
at which couples may give birth and the number of children they are
permitted to have.
\2\See, e.g., Beijing Municipal Commission on Population and Family
Planning, ``Beijing Municipal Birth Services Certificate Management
Measures'' [Beijing shi shengyu fuwu zheng guanli banfa], 7 April 12;
Guizhou Province Ninth People's Congress Standing Committee, ``Guizhou
Province Population and Family Planning Regulations'' [Guizhou sheng
renkou yu jihua shengyu tiaoli], 29 September 02; Population and Family
Planning Commission of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, ``Regional
Population and Family Planning Work Guide'' [Qunei renkou jihua shengyu
banshi zhinan], last visited 10 September 13.
\3\See Gu Baochang et al., ``China's Local and National Fertility
Policies at the End of the Twentieth Century,'' Population and
Development Review, Vol. 33, No. 1, Table 1 (2007).
\4\Feng Wang et al., ``Population, Policy, and Politics: How Will
History Judge China's One-Child Policy?'' Population and Development
Review, Vol. 38 (2012), 115-16.
\5\These criteria include such conditions as: the first child was
medically diagnosed as handicapped, both members of the couple are only
children, the couple are rural residents and their first child was a
girl, the couple are remarried, and so forth. Gu Baochang et al.,
``China's Local and National Fertility Policies at the End of the
Twentieth Century,'' Population and Development Review, Vol. 33, No. 1,
Table 1 (2007).
\6\Ethnic minority couples (couples in which at least one parent
belongs to an officially recognized ethnic minority group) are
permitted to bear a second child in all provincial-level jurisdictions
except Jiangsu, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Beijing. Ethnic minority couples
are permitted to bear a third child if they meet certain criteria in
the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region; the Tibet Autonomous Region; the
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region; and Heilongjiang, Fujian, Hainan,
Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Qinghai, and Ningxia provinces. Gu Baochang
et al., ``China's Local and National Fertility Policies at the End of
the Twentieth Century,'' Population and Development Review, Vol. 33,
No. 1, Table 1 (2007). In Hubei province, both members of the couple
must belong to an ethnic minority to be able to bear a second child.
Population and Family Planning Commission of Hubei Province, ``Hubei
Provincial Population and Family Planning Regulations'' [Hubei sheng
renkou yu jihua shengyu tiaoli], 2 February 09.
\7\See, e.g., Shaanxi Provincial Government, Shaanxi Provincial
Implementing Measures for Collection and Management of Social
Maintenance Fees [Shaanxi sheng shehui fuyang fei zhengshou guanli
shishi banfa], issued 8 June 04, effective 1 August 04, art. 5(1). In
Shaanxi province, individuals in violation of local population planning
regulations can each be fined three to six times the amount of the
average annual income of a resident in their locality, sometimes more,
based on statistics from the previous year. ``Fengdu County Population
and Family Planning Administrative Fines, Administrative Penalties
Program and Standards'' [Fengdu xian renkou he jihua shengyu xingzheng
zhengshou, xingzheng chufa xiangmu ji biaozhun], Fengdu County
Population and Family Planning Network, 27 November 11. As noted in
this document, residents of Fengdu county, Chongqing municipality, are
subject to fines amounting to two to nine times the local average
annual income from the previous year if they have an out-of-plan child
or illegally adopt (two to six times the local average annual income)
or have a child out of wedlock (six to nine times the local average
annual income). See also ``Cost of a Second Child: Pair Fined 1.3m
Yuan,'' Shanghai Daily, reprinted in China Internet Information Center,
31 May 12; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``I Don't Have Control Over
My Own Body,'' 21 December 10, 19-20.
\8\See, e.g., ChinaAid, ``Hubei Jiayu--Pregnant Woman Forced To
Abort on May 23 Dies'' [Hubei jiayu--yunfu 5 yue 23 ri bei qiangzhi
yinchan siwang], 25 May 13; ``Anhui Fengyang Seven-Month Fetus Forcibly
Aborted, Shocking Bloody Photo'' [Anhui fengyang 7 yue da taier bei
qiangzhi liuchan xielinlin tupian chumu jingxin], Sound of Hope, 25
March 13; Women's Rights in China, ``Women's Rights in China: Forced
Abortion Phenomenon in China's Rural Areas Still Serious'' [Zhongguo
fuquan: zhongguo nongcun qiangzhi liuchan xianxiang yiran yanzhong],
reprinted in Monitor China, 28 October 12.
\9\ChinaAid, ``In Tears, Victim Denounces the Violence Committed by
Family Planning Officials in Guizhou in Early 2013,'' 26 February 13;
Zhan Caiqiang, ``Hubei Tongshan Woman `Sterilized to Death,' Officials
Pay 1,000,000 To Buy Out [Victims'] `Right To Hold [Them]
Accountable''' [Hubei tongshan--funu ``jieza zhisi'' guanfang 100 wan
maiduan ``zhuize quanli''], Yunnan Info Daily, 9 April 13; ``Henan--
Nursing Mother Failed To Pay 6,000 Yuan Protection Fee, Forcibly
Sterilized'' [Henan--buru qi funu wei jiao 6 qian yuan baohu fei bei
qiangzhi jieza], China Net, reprinted in Southern Daily, 24 April 13.
\10\Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (1995), adopted at
the Fourth World Conference on Women on 15 September 95, and endorsed
by UN General Assembly resolution 50/203 on 22 December 95, paras. 9,
17. The Beijing Declaration states that governments which participated
in the Fourth World Conference on Women reaffirmed their commitment to
``Ensure the full implementation of the human rights of women and of
the girl child as an inalienable, integral and indivisible part of all
human rights and fundamental freedoms; . . .'' (para. 9) and ``are
convinced that . . . [t]he explicit recognition and reaffirmation of
the right of all women to control all aspects of their health, in
particular their own fertility, is basic to their empowerment; . . .''
(para. 17).
\11\Programme of Action of the Cairo International Conference on
Population and Development, 18 October 94, paras. 7.2, 8.25. Paragraph
7.2 of the Programme of Action of the Cairo International Conference on
Population and Development states that, ``Reproductive health therefore
implies that people . . . have the capability to reproduce and the
freedom to decide if, when and how often to do so. Implicit in this
last condition are the right of men and women to be informed and to
have access to safe, effective, affordable and acceptable methods of
family planning of their choice . . . .'' Paragraph 8.25 states, ``In
no case should abortion be promoted as a method of family planning.''
\12\United Nations, ``Report of the Fourth World Conference on
Women,'' 1996, Chap. II., para. 3; Chap. VI, para. 12. China was a
state party at the Fourth World Conference on Women, which adopted the
Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action. United Nations Population
Information Network, A/Conf.171/13: Report of the International
Conference on Population and Development, 18 October 94, Chap. II, sec.
C, Chap. VI, sec. 1. China was one of the participating States at the
International Conference on Population and Development, which reached
general agreement on the Programme of Action. The Programme of Action
is provided as an annex to the above ICPD report.
\13\For two recent examples of acts of official violence in the
implementation of population planning policies, see ChinaAid, ``Hubei
Jiayu--Pregnant Woman Forced To Abort on May 23 Dies'' [Hubei jiayu--
yunfu 5 yue 23 ri bei qiangzhi yinchan siwang], 25 May 13; ChinaAid,
``In Tears, Victim Denounces the Violence Committed by Family Planning
Officials in Guizhou in Early 2013,'' 26 February 13.
\14\Yan Shuang, ``Fury Over Forced Abortion,'' Global Times, 14
June 12. For one U.S. scholar's analysis of Chinese law with regard to
forced abortions, see Stanley Lubman, ``The Law on Forced Abortion in
China: Few Options for Victims,'' Wall Street Journal, China Real Time
Report (blog), 4 July 12. PRC Population and Family Planning Law
[Zhonghua renmin gongheguo renkou yu jihua shengyu fa], passed 29
December 01, effective 1 September 02, arts. 4, 39. Article 4 of the
PRC Population and Family Planning Law (PFPL) states that officials
``shall perform their administrative duties strictly in accordance with
the law, and enforce the law in a civil manner, and they may not
infringe upon the legitimate rights and interests of citizens.''
Article 39 states that an official is subject to criminal or
administrative punishment if he ``infringes on a citizen's personal
rights, property rights, or other legitimate rights and interests'' or
``abuses his power, neglects his duty, or engages in malpractices for
personal gain'' in the implementation of population planning policies.
\15\UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted by UN General Assembly
resolution 39/46 of 10 December 84, arts. 1, 4. In 2008, the Committee
against Torture noted with concern China's ``lack of investigation into
the alleged use of coercive and violent measures to implement the
population policy.'' UN Committee against Torture, 41st Session,
Consideration of Reports Submitted by State Parties Under Article 19 of
the Convention: Concluding Observations of the Committee against
Torture--China, CAT/C/CHN/CO/4, 12 December 08, para. 29.
\16\See United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights,
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, last visited 10 September 13. China signed the
convention on December 12, 1986, and ratified it on October 4, 1988.
\17\Children born ``out-of-plan'' in China may be denied household
registration (hukou) and thus face barriers to accessing social
benefits including health insurance and education. See Chinese Human
Rights Defenders, ``I Don't Have Control Over My Own Body,'' 21
December 10, 26.
\18\UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), adopted and
opened for signature, ratification, and accession by UN General
Assembly resolution 44/25 of 20 November 89, entry into force 2
September 90, China signed 29 August 90, ratified 2 March 92, arts. 2-
4, 6, 24, 26, 28. Article 2 of the CRC calls upon States Parties to
``respect and ensure the rights set forth . . . to each child within
their jurisdiction without discrimination of any kind, irrespective of
the child's or his or her parent's or legal guardian's . . . national,
ethnic or social origin . . . birth or other status.'' Article 24 sets
forth the right of the child to access healthcare, Article 26 sets
forth the right of the child to social security, and Article 28 sets
forth the right of the child to free primary education and accessible
secondary education and higher education.
\19\International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December
66, entry into force 3 January 76, China signed 27 October 97, ratified
27 March 01, art. 10(3). Article 10(3) calls upon States Parties to
recognize that ``Special measures of protection and assistance should
be taken on behalf of all children and young persons without any
discrimination for reasons of parentage or other conditions.''
\20\Sui-Lee Wee and Hui Li, ``Insight: The Backroom Battle Delaying
Reform of China's One-Child Policy,'' Reuters, 8 April 13; ``National
People's Congress Representative Suggests Relaxing to a Two-Child
Policy, Says No Reply to Previous Two Times She Proposed This'' [Renmin
daibiao jianyi kaifang ertai cheng qian liangci ti an wei huo huifu],
Sina, 5 April 13; Laurie Burkitt, ``Pressure Rises on China To Scrap
One-Child Policy,'' Wall Street Journal, 18 January 13.
\21\``Think Tank Calls for Loosening of One-Child Policy,'' Xinhua,
27 October 12; Laurie Burkitt, ``Pressure Rises on China To Scrap One-
Child Policy,'' Wall Street Journal, 18 January 13; Fang Xiao,
``China's One-Child Policy May Be Relaxed Province by Province,'' Epoch
Times, 5 March 13.
\22\David Wertime, ``Online Poll Shows Overwhelming Support for End
to China's One-Child Policy,'' Tea Leaf Nation, 2 November 12; Kim
Wall, ``What China's `One-Child Policy' Really Looks Like--A View From
the Grassroots,'' Tea Leaf Nation, 17 March 13.
\23\``State Council Institutional Reform and Functional
Transformation Plan'' [Guowuyuan jigou gaige he zhineng zhuanbian
fang'an], Xinhua, 10 March 13, item II; ``China To Merge Health
Ministry, Family Planning Commission,'' Xinhua, 10 March 13;
``Explanation of the State Council Institutional Reform and Functional
Change Plan'' [Guanyu guowuyuan jigou gaige he zhineng zhuanbian
fang'an de shuoming], Xinhua, 10 March 13.
\24\``State Council Institutional Reform and Functional
Transformation Plan'' [Guowuyuan jigou gaige he zhineng zhuanbian
fang'an], Xinhua, 10 March 13 (Open Source Center, 10 March 13), item
II. The plan states that the responsibilities of the new National
Health and Family Planning Commission will include ``unified planning
on resource allocation for medical care, public health, and family
planning services, organize and establish a national basic drug system,
formulate the family planning policy, oversee and regulate public
health and medical care services, and take charge of such work as
family planning administration and services.''
\25\Ibid. The plan states that, ``the State Population and Family
Planning Commission's duties of studying and drawing up the population
development strategy and program and the population policy will be
taken up by the National Development and Reform Commission.'' See also
Mou Xu, ``Xinhua Insight: Combining Population and Economic Policy To
Push Development,'' Xinhua, 13 March 13.
\26\Laurie Burkitt, ``One-Child Policy: Law Still in Effect, but
Police, Judges Fired,'' Wall Street Journal, 12 March 13. According to
population expert Wang Feng, cited in the Wall Street Journal, ``My
reading is that will mean that population control targets will be
weaker and weaker over time. And we will see that the one-child policy
era is over. The way to interpret this is that the laws are still in
effect, but the judges and the policemen have all been fired. Soon the
laws will also change.'' Laurie Burkitt, ``Agency Move Hints at Shift
in China's One-Child Policy,'' Wall Street Journal, 11 March 13.
According to Cheng Li, cited in the Wall Street Journal, ``This is a
signal to an end of a policy that in reality isn't in line with China's
other reforms.''
\27\Bai Tiantian, ``Govt Shake-Up for Efficiency,'' Global Times,
11 March 13. According to one professor of demography cited in the
Global Times, ``The merge with the health ministry is in fact making
the family planning body more powerful.''
\28\``State Council Institutional Reform and Functional
Transformation Plan'' [Guowuyuan jigou gaige he zhineng zhuanbian
fang'an], Xinhua, 10 March 13, item II.
\29\These officials included Wang Feng, deputy head of the State
Commission Office for Public Sector Reform, Ma Kai, secretary-general
of the State Council, and Vice Premier Liu Yandong. See, e.g., Mou Xu,
``Xinhua Insight: Combining Population and Economic Policy To Push
Development,'' Xinhua, 13 March 13; ``China To Merge Health Ministry,
Family Planning Commission,'' Xinhua, 10 March 13; ``Vice Premier Urges
Reform for Health, Family Planning Organs,'' Xinhua, 18 March 13.
\30\National Health and Family Planning Commission, ``National
Health and Family Planning Commission Implements `Serving the People's
Health Action [Plan]''' [Guojia weisheng jisheng wei shishi ``fuwu
baixing jiankang xingdong''], 6 August 13; He Huifeng, ``Hopes for One-
Child Policy Fix Tempered,'' South China Morning Post, 8 August 13.
\31\He Huifeng, ``Hopes for One-Child Policy Fix Tempered,'' South
China Morning Post, 8 August 13.
\32\Wan Mi et al., ``Over Fifty Percent of 1400 People [Surveyed]
Wish To Have Second Child'' [1400 ren chaoguo wucheng yuan sheng
ertai], Southern Metropolitan Daily, 4 August 13; Patrick Boehler,
``Most Chinese Want To Have Second Child, Says Survey,'' South China
Morning Post, 5 August 13.
\33\``Relaxation of One-Child Policy Still Being Mulled,'' Xinhua,
reprinted in China Daily, 3 August 13.
\34\PRC Population and Family Planning Law [Zhonghua renmin
gongheguo renkou yu jihua shengyu fa], passed 29 December 01, effective
1 September 02, arts. 4, 39. Article 4 of the PRC Population and Family
Planning Law (PFPL) states that officials ``shall perform their
administrative duties strictly in accordance with the law, and enforce
the law in a civil manner, and they may not infringe upon the
legitimate rights and interests of citizens.'' Article 39 states that
an official is subject to criminal or administrative punishment if he
``infringes on a citizen's personal rights, property rights, or other
legitimate rights and interests'' or ``abuses his power, neglects his
duty, or engages in malpractices for personal gain'' in the
implementation of population planning policies.
\35\Yan Shuang, ``Fury Over Forced Abortion,'' Global Times, 14
June 12. For one U.S. scholar's analysis of Chinese law with regard to
forced abortions, see Stanley Lubman, ``The Law on Forced Abortion in
China: Few Options for Victims,'' Wall Street Journal, 4 July 12.
\36\This number is based on Commission analysis of population
planning measures. These jurisdictions include Tianjin, Liaoning,
Jilin, Guangdong, Fujian, Hebei, Hubei, Chongqing, Shaanxi, Ningxia,
Shanxi, Xinjiang, Henan, Qinghai, Jiangxi, Sichuan, Anhui, Gansu,
Yunnan, and Guizhou. For two specific examples, see ``Revised
`Guangdong Province Population and Family Planning Regulations'
Published'' [Xiuding hou de ``guangdong sheng renkou yu jihua shengyu
tiaoli'' gongbu], Guangzhou Beiyun District Zhongloutian Public
Information Net, 29 June 09 and ``Jiangxi Province Population and
Family Planning Regulations'' [Jiangxi sheng renkou yu jihua shengyu
tiaoli], Jiangxi News Net, 11 April 09. The Beijing Municipal
Population and Family Planning Commission clearly draws the link
between the term ``remedial measures'' and abortion: ``Early term
abortion refers to the use of surgery or pharmaceutics to terminate a
pregnancy before the 12th week of gestation; it is a remedial measure
taken after the failure of contraception.'' Beijing Municipal
Population and Family Planning Commission, ``Early Term Abortion''
[Zaoqi rengong liuchan], 10 April 09.
\37\See, e.g., ChinaAid, ``Hubei Jiayu--Pregnant Woman Forced To
Abort on May 23 Dies'' [Hubei jiayu--yunfu 5 yue 23 ri bei qiangzhi
yinchan siwang], 25 May 13; ChinaAid, ``Another Bloody One-Child Case
in China: Seven-Months Pregnant Mother in Anhui Forcibly Aborted by
Lethal Injection (Warning: Graphic Photo),'' 25 March 13; Women's
Rights in China, ``Women's Rights in China: Forced Abortion Phenomenon
in China's Rural Areas Still Serious'' [Zhongguo fuquan: zhongguo
nongcun qiangzhi liuchan xianxiang yiran yanzhong], 28 October 12.
\38\Peony Lui, ``Outcry Over Blunders of China's One-Child
Policy,'' South China Morning Post, 19 December 12.
\39\ChinaAid, ``In Tears, Victim Denounces the Violence Committed
by Family Planning Officials in Guizhou in Early 2013,'' 26 February
13; Zhan Caiqiang, ``Hubei Tongshan Woman `Sterilized to Death,'
Officials Pay 1,000,000 To Buy Out [Victims'] `Right To Hold [Them]
Accountable''' [Hubei tongshan--funu ``jieza zhisi'' guanfang 100 wan
maiduan ``zhuize quanli''], Yunnan Info Daily, 9 April 13; ``Henan--
Nursing Mother Failed To Pay 6,000 Yuan Protection Fee, Forcibly
Sterilized'' [Henan--buru qi funu wei jiao 6 qian yuan baohu fei bei
qiangzhi jieza], China Net, reprinted in Southern Daily, 24 April 13.
\40\``Yuyue Town Spares No Efforts in Promoting Health and Family
Planning Work'' [Yuyue zhen quanli yifu tuijin chuang wei he jisheng
gongzuo], Jiayu Net, 15 April 13; Luo Hongwei, Population and Family
Planning Commission of Huanggang, ``Hongan County Prominent `Five Key
Points' Vigorous Promotion of the Present Population and Family
Planning Work'' [Hongan xian tuchu ``wuge zhongdian'' jiji tuijin
dangqian renkou jisheng gongzuo], 19 July 13; Chongyang County People's
Government, ``Gangkou Township Uses All Its Strength To Promote Family
Planning Work'' [Gangkou xiang quanli tuijin jihua shengyu gongzuo], 28
March 13.
\41\Lechang City Population and Family Planning Bureau, ``Lechang
City Pingshi Town Sound a Mobilization Order for the Spring Family
Planning Concentrated Services Activities'' [Lechang shi pingshi zhen
chuixiang chunji jisheng jizhong fuwu huodong dongyuan ling], last
visited 19 September 13; Zhuhai City Xiangzhou District Family Planning
Bureau, ``City, District Population and Family Planning Department
Leaders Go to Qianshan Neighborhood To Inspect Family Planning
Welcoming and Inspection Work'' [Shi, qu renkou jisheng ju lingdao dao
qianshan jiedao jiancha jisheng yingjian gongzuo], 1 February 13.
\42\Linquan County People's Government, ``Speech at the County
Government Fourth Plenary Conference on Honest and Clean Government
Work'' [Zai xian zhengfu disi ci quanti huiyi ji lianzheng gongzuo
huiyi shang de jianghua], 26 February 13.
\43\Zhang Xuan, ``Huayu Town Four Measures To Help Spring Family
Planning Services Work Reach the Desired Goal'' [Huayu zhen si cuoshi
zhuli chunji jisheng fuwu gongzuo daowei], Oriental Holy City Net, 19
April 13; Shanting District Family Planning Bureau, ``District Family
Planning Bureau's Four Measures for Making Great Efforts in
Implementing Present Work'' [Qu jishengju sixiang cuoshi zhuahao
dangqian gongzuo luoshi], 22 April 13.
\44\People's Government of Henan Province, ``Hebi City Population
and Family Planning Work Meeting Requirements'' [Hebi shi renkou he
jihua shengyu gongzuo huiyi yaoqiu], 1 April 13.
\45\Huang He and Chen Longbin, Guizhou Population Net, ``Youmai
Township Strictly Controls Early Marriages and Early Pregnancies, Urges
Family Planning Work To Ascend the Stairs'' [Youmai xiang yankong
zaohun zaoyu cu jisheng gongzuo shang taijie], 13 March 13; Zhang
Miaohui, Hongfenghu Town Party and Government Administration Office,
``Storm the Fortifications and Overcome Difficulties, Strongly Grasp
the Ten Links of Work, Spare No Efforts To Promote Achievement of the
`Three Years Three Strides' Goals in Family Planning Work'' [Gongjian
ke'nan zhashi zhuahao shi huanjie gongzuo fenli tuijin jisheng gongzuo
``sannian san kuayue'' mubiao shixian], 19 April 13.
\46\Wang Hongbin, Pingjiang County People's Government, ``Speech at
Central Pingjiang County Committee Work Meeting'' [Zai zhonggong
pingjiang xianwei gongzuo huiyi shang de jianghua], 25 February 13.
\47\Jianou City People's Government, ``Xiaoqiao Town Launches
Focused Publicity Activities on Implementation of `Four Procedures'''
[Xiaoqiao zhen kaizhan luoshi ``sishu'' jizhong xuanchuan huodong], 27
May 13; Jin'an District Population and Family Planning Bureau, ``Entire
District Population and Family Planning Work Regular Meeting Convenes''
[Quanqu renkou jisheng gongzuo lihui zhaokai], 7 December 12.
\48\For two such examples in which authorities reported on the
implementation of the ``two examinations and four procedures,'' see
Jianou City People's Government, ``Xiaoqiao Town Launches Focused
Publicity Activities on Implementation of `Four Procedures''' [Xiaoqiao
zhen kaizhan luoshi ``sishu'' jizhong xuanchuan huodong], 27 May 13;
Jin'an District Population and Family Planning Bureau, ``Entire
District Population and Family Planning Work Regular Meeting Convenes''
[Quanqu renkou jisheng gongzuo lihui zhaokai], 7 December 12. Chinese
Human Rights Defenders, ``I Don't Have Control Over My Own Body,'' 21
December 10, 2. According to Chinese Human Rights Defenders, some
government reports refer to ``three examinations,'' instead of two. The
third examination in these references is an examination for the
presence of a gynecological disease or illness.
\49\For an official government report enumerating the ``four
procedures,'' see Yancheng District People's Government, ``The Four
Surgeries in Family Planning'' [Jihua shengyu sixiang shoushu], last
visited 20 June 13.
\50\See, e.g., Zhang Miaohui, Hongfenghu Town Party and Government
Administration Office, ``Storm the Fortifications and Overcome
Difficulties, Strongly Grasp the Ten Links of Work, Spare No Efforts To
Promote Achievement of the `Three Years Three Strides' Goals in Family
Planning Work'' [Gongjian ke'nan zhashi zhuahao shi huanjie gongzuo
fenli tuijin jisheng gongzuo ``sannian san kuayue'' mubiao shixian], 19
April 13; Lechang City Population and Family Planning Bureau, ``Lechang
City Pingshi Town Sound a Mobilization Order for the Spring Family
Planning Concentrated Services Activities'' [Lechang shi pingshi zhen
chuixiang chunji jisheng jizhong fuwu huodong dongyuan ling], 22 March
13.
\51\Chongyang County People's Government, ``Gangkou Township Uses
All Its Strength To Promote Family Planning Work'' [Gangkou xiang
quanli tuijin jihua shengyu gongzuo], 28 March 13.
\52\Ibid.
\53\The term ``late-term abortion'' (dayuefen yinchan) is commonly
used to refer to abortions performed between gestational weeks 14 to
28. See, e.g., ``What are the Consequences of Late Term Abortion? Can
Women Who Have Aborted Still Get Pregnant?'' [Dayue yinchan de houguo
you naxie? yinchan hou nuren hai neng zai huaiyun ma?], Sina Lady,
reprinted in Xinhua, 19 June 12.
\54\All Girls Allowed published a report documenting the use of
varieties of the phrase ``prohibit'' (jinzhi or yanjin) or ``put an end
to'' (dujue) ``late-term abortions'' (dayuefen yinchan) in statements
dating between July 5 and September 12, 2012, from governments in 23 of
China's 31 provincial-level jurisdictions, including Anhui, Beijing,
Chongqing, Fujian, Gansu, Guangdong, Guizhou, Hebei, Henan, Hubei,
Hunan, Jilin, Jiangsu, Jiangxi, Liaoning, Inner Mongolia Autonomous
Region, Qinghai, Shandong, Shaanxi, Shanxi, Sichuan, Yunnan, and
Zhejiang. Provincial-level jurisdictions not included on this list are:
Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, Hainan, Heilongjiang, Ningxia Hui
Autonomous Region, Shanghai, Tianjin, Tibet Autonomous Region, and
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. See All Girls Allowed, ``Chinese
Provinces That Banned Late-Stage Abortion Following Feng Jianmei's
Forced Abortion,'' 25 September 12.
\55\ChinaAid, ``Guizhou Jinsha County Family Planning Committee
Forcibly Aborts, Mother Critically Ill'' [Guizhou jinsha xian jisheng
wei qiangzhi duotai yunfu shengming chuiwei], 18 July 13; ChinaAid,
``Family Planning Committee in Jinsha County, Guizhou Province, Forces
Woman To Undergo Abortion, Leaving Her in Critical Condition,'' 18 July
13.
\56\ChinaAid, ``Li Fengfei Arrested After Exposing Forced Abortion,
Guizhou Province Law Firm Provides Defense,'' 9 September 13.
\57\ChinaAid, ``Hubei Jiayu--Pregnant Woman Forced To Abort on May
23 Dies'' [Hubei jiayu--yunfu 5 yue 23 ri bei qiangzhi yinchan siwang],
25 May 13; Steven Ertelt, ``China: Mother Dies After Forced Abortion at
Six Months,'' LifeNews, 29 May 13.
\58\``Anhui Fengyang Seven-Month Fetus Forcibly Aborted, Shocking
Bloody Photo'' [Anhui fengyang 7 yue da taier bei qiangzhi liuchan
xielinlin tupian chumu jingxin], Sound of Hope, 25 March 13.
\59\ChinaAid, ``Another Bloody One-Child Case in China: Seven-
Months Pregnant Mother in Anhui Forcibly Aborted by Lethal Injection
(Warning: Graphic Photo),'' 25 March 13.
\60\Women's Rights in China, ``Women's Rights in China: Forced
Abortion Phenomenon in China's Rural Areas Still Serious'' [Zhongguo
fuquan: zhongguo nongcun qiangzhi liuchan xianxiang yiran yanzhong], 28
October 12; Kat Lewis, All Girls Allowed, ``Chinese Officials Force
Abortion on 6-Month Pregnant Woman,'' reprinted in LifeNews, 24 October
12.
\61\ChinaAid, ``In Tears, Victim Denounces the Violence Committed
by Family Planning Officials in Guizhou in Early 2013,'' 26 February
13.
\62\ChinaAid, ``Mother of Two in Hubei Province Dies From Forced
Sterilization Operation Ordered by Family Planning Officials Against
Doctor's Advice,'' 6 April 13; Zhan Caiqiang, ``Hubei Tongshan Woman
`Sterilized to Death,' Officials Pay 1,000,000 To Buy Out [Victims']
`Right To Hold [Them] Accountable''' [Hubei tongshan--funu ``jieza
zhisi'' guanfang 100 wan maiduan ``zhuize quanli''], Yunnan Info Daily,
9 April 13. According to these reports, local officials promised Shen's
family 1 million yuan (US$161,755) in compensation on the condition
that they ``voluntarily give up the pursuit of accountability.''
According to the Yunnan Info Daily report, family planning efforts in
Shen Hongxia's home county intensified after the county had received
the lowest score in the province on the previous year's population
planning work report.
\63\``Henan--Nursing Mother Failed To Pay 6,000 Yuan Protection
Fee, Forcibly Sterilized'' [Henan--buru qi funu wei jiao 6 qian yuan
baohu fei bei qiangzhi jieza], China Net, reprinted in Southern Daily,
24 April 13.
\64\``Chinese Man Dies After Attempted Forced Sterilization,''
Radio Free Asia, 13 August 13.
\65\PRC Measures for Administration of Collection of Social
Maintenance Fees [Shehui fuyang fei zhengshou guanli banfa], issued 2
August 02, effective 1 September 02, arts. 3, 7.
\66\All Girls Allowed, ``One-Child Policy Fines Relative to Income
Levels in China,'' 1 November 12. See, e.g., Shaanxi Provincial
Implementing Measures for Collection and Management of Social
Maintenance Fees [Shanxi sheng shehui fuyang fei zhengshou guanli
shishi banfa], issued 8 June 04, effective 1 August 04, art. 5(1). In
Shaanxi province, individuals in violation of local population planning
regulations can each be fined three to six times the amount of the
average income of a resident in their locality, sometimes more, based
on their income compared to the average income of rural residents the
previous year. ``Fengdu County Population and Family Planning
Administrative Fines, Administrative Penalties Program and Standards''
[Fengdu xian renkou he jihua shengyu xingzheng zhengshou, xingzheng
chufa xiangmu ji biaozhun], Fengdu County Population and Family
Planning Network, 27 November 11. As noted in this document, residents
of Fengdu county, Chongqing municipality, are subject to fines
amounting to two to nine times the local average annual income from the
previous year if they have an out-of-plan child or illegally adopt (two
to six times the local average annual income) or have a child out of
wedlock (six to nine times the local average annual income).
\67\PRC Population and Family Planning Law [Zhonghua renmin
gongheguo renkou yu jihua shengyu fa], adopted 29 December 01,
effective 1 September 02, art. 39. According to Article 39, officials
are to be punished either criminally or administratively for the
following acts: ``(1) infringing on a citizen's personal rights,
property rights or other legitimate rights and interests; (2) abusing
his power, neglecting his duty or engaging in malpractices for personal
gain; (3) demanding or accepting bribes; (4) withholding, reducing,
misappropriating or embezzling funds for family planning or social
maintenance fees; or (5) making false or deceptive statistical data on
population or family planning, or fabricating, tampering with, or
refusing to provide such data.''
\68\The threat of job termination specifically applied to civil
servants. See, e.g., ``Fujian Civil Servants Who Have Extra Births, or
Births Out of Wedlock Will Be Expelled From Their Positions'' [Fujian
gongwuyuan duo shengyu, hunwai shengyu jiang kaichu gongzhi], China
Daily, 15 December 12.
\69\See, e.g., ``Guangdong: Party Members, State Employees Who Go
Abroad and Have an Extra Child Will Be Expelled From the Party and
Fired'' [Guangdong: dangyuan, guojia gongzuo renyuan fu guo (jing) wai
chaosheng jiang bei kaichu dangji gongzhi], Xinhua, 17 January 13.
\70\Women's Rights in China, ``Women's Rights in China: Forced
Abortion Phenomenon in China's Rural Areas Still Serious'' [Zhongguo
fuquan: zhongguo nongcun qiangzhi liuchan xianxiang yiran yanzhong], 28
October 12; ChinaAid, ``Mother of Two in Hubei Province Dies From
Forced Sterilization Operation Ordered by Family Planning Officials
Against Doctor's Advice,'' 6 April 13; ``Chinese Man Dies After
Attempted Forced Sterilization,'' Radio Free Asia, 13 August 13.
\71\See, e.g., Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``I Don't Have
Control Over My Own Body,'' 21 December 10, 19-23. See also CECC, 2008
Annual Report, 31 October 08, 97.
\72\See, e.g., Huang Xiuli, ```Illegal Residents' Born in Excess
[of Family Planning Policies]: Living Like Shadows'' [Chaosheng
``heihu'' de rensheng: xiang yingzi yiyang huozhe], Southern Weekend,
reprinted in Phoenix Net, 4 June 13; Mu Guangzong, ``The Travails of
Having a Second Child,'' China Daily, 28 May 13. See also, Chinese
Human Rights Defenders, ``I Don't Have Control Over My Own Body,'' 21
December 10, 13, 26. According to the CHRD report, ``The management of
the hukou system is the domain of the Ministry of Public Security and
it refuses to issue hukous to children without birth permits, children
of unmarried parents, and children whose parents for some reasons have
not completed the required procedures. Without a hukou, a child cannot
apply for an ID card and thus does not have a legal identity, is not a
citizen and consequently is deprived of the rights accorded to other
Chinese citizens.''
\73\Huang Xiuli, ```Illegal Residents' Born in Excess [of Family
Planning Policies]: Living Like Shadows'' [Chaosheng ``heihu'' de
rensheng: xiang yingzi yiyang huozhe], Southern Weekend, reprinted in
Phoenix Net, 4 June 13.
\74\Ibid.; ``Separate and Unequal,'' China Economic Review, 5 April
12; Yan Hao and Li Yanan, ``Urban Hukou, or Rural Land? Migrant Workers
Face Dilemma,'' Xinhua, 10 March 10; Tao Ran, ``Where There's a Will,
There's a Way To Reform,'' China Daily, 22 March 10.
\75\Peony Lui, ``Outcry Over Blunders of China's One-Child
Policy,'' South China Morning Post, 19 December 12.
\76\``Total Population, CBR, CDR, NIR and TFR in China (1949-
2000),'' China Daily, 20 August 10.
\77\U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, ``The World Factbook,'' last
visited 12 September 13. While China's National Bureau of Statistics
estimated China's fertility rate at 1.8 in 2007, in May 2011, a group
of Chinese academics publicly disputed the number, stating that it had
been ``grossly overestimated.'' These academics estimated in 2011 that
China's total fertility rate more accurately stood anywhere from 1.63
to below 1.5. See ``China's Total Fertility Rate Grossly Overestimated:
Academic,'' Caijing, 17 May 11.
\78\``China's Working-Age Population Drops in 2012,'' Xinhua, 18
January 13; Deirdre Wang Morris, ``China's Aging Population Threatens
Its Manufacturing Might,'' CNBC, 24 October 12.
\79\State Council, PRC Outline for the Development of Children
(2011-2020) [Zhongguo ertong fazhan gangyao (2011-2020 nian)], issued
30 July 11, sec. 3(5)5. State Council Information Office, ``National
Human Rights Action Plan of China (2012-2015),'' 11 June 12, sec.
III(3). The National Human Rights Action Plan states, ``Discrimination
against girls will be eliminated. The state . . . bans identification
of the sex of a fetus for other than medical purposes and termination
of pregnancy in the case of a female fetus.'' See also ``Ban on Sex
Testing To Help Balance Girl-Boy Ratio,'' Global Times, reprinted in
People's Daily, 25 May 12.
\80\Liang Chen, ``Boys Preferred, Lucrative Trade Remains in
Illegal Fetus Gender Identification,'' Global Times, 21 March 13; Wang
Qingyun, ``Crackdown Begins on Illegal Reproductive Clinics,'' China
Daily, 26 March 13.
\81\For discussion of the continued practice and its impact, see
``Liang Chen, ``Boys Preferred, Lucrative Trade Remains in Illegal
Fetus Gender Identification,'' Global Times, 21 March 13. See also PRC
Population and Family Planning Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo renkou yu
jihua shengyu fa], adopted 29 December 01, effective 1 September 02,
art. 22. According to Article 22, ``Discrimination against,
maltreatment, and abandonment of baby girls are prohibited.'' For
regulations prohibiting the practices of non-medically necessary gender
determination tests and sex-selective abortion, see State Commission
for Population and Family Planning, Ministry of Health, State Food and
Drug Administration, ``Regulations Regarding the Prohibition of Non-
Medically Necessary Gender Determination Examinations and Sex-Selective
Termination of Pregnancy'' [Guanyu jinzhi fei yixue xuyao de taier
xingbie jianding he xuanze xingbie de rengong zhongzhi renshen de
guiding], issued 29 November 02, effective 1 January 03. For discussion
of these regulations, see ``China Bans Sex-Selection Abortion,''
Xinhua, reprinted in China Net, 22 March 03.
\82\Shan Juan, ``Gender Imbalance Set To Ease,'' China Daily, 30
March 12. According to Zhai Zhenwu, head of the social population
college at Renmin University, there is a deeply rooted tradition of son
preference, and this tradition remains in some areas, such as Guangdong
province. Zhai also noted that ``as fertility rates declined due to the
family planning policy, the figure for male births surged ahead.'' See
also ``Preference for Boys by Migrants,'' China Internet Information
Center, 15 December 11.
\83\``China's Sex Ratio at Birth Declines 4 Years in a Row,''
Xinhua, 5 March 13. According to Xinhua, China's sex ratio at birth in
2012 was 117.7 males for every 100 females.
\84\Ibid. According to Xinhua, China's sex ratio at birth in 2012
was 117.7 males for every 100 females, down from 117.78 in 2011, 117.94
in 2010, and 119.45 in 2009. See also ``China's Sex Ratio at Birth
Dropping,'' North Side Net, translated in Women of China, 12 July 12.
According to the North Side Net report, China's sex ratio at birth in
2008 was 120.56.
\85\Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social
Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, ``World Population
Prospects: The 2012 Revision,'' June 2013; According to United Nations
Population Division statistics, China's sex ratio at birth (SRB) from
2005-2010 was the highest in the world at 117 males per 100 females
born. Equally as high was Azerbaijan's sex ratio at 117, followed by
Armenia's at 115, and India's and Georgia's at 111. ``China's Sex Ratio
at Birth Dropping,'' North Side Net, translated in Women of China, 12
July 12. According to the North Side Net report, which cites a 2012
National Population and Family Planning Commission Bulletin, ``China's
sex ratio at birth in 2011 was 117.78, representing a drop of 0.16
compared to 2010. . . . The ratios of 2008, 2009 and 2010 were
respectively 120.56, 119.45 and 117.94.''
\86\Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, ``Difficulty Finding a Wife
in 10 Years: 1 Out of Every 5 Men To Be a Bare Branch'' [10 nian zhihou
quqi nan, 5 ge nanren zhong jiuyou 1 ge guanggun], 27 January 10.
\87\See, e.g., Office To Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons,
U.S. Department of State, ``Trafficking in Persons Report 2013--
China,'' 19 June 13, 129; World Health Organization, Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights, United Nations Population Fund, United
Nations Children's Fund, and United Nations Entity for Gender Equality
and the Empowerment of Women, ``Preventing Gender-Biased Sex
Selection,'' 14 June 11, 5; Susan W. Tiefenbrun and Christie J.
Edwards, ``Gendercide and the Cultural Context of Sex Trafficking in
China,'' 32 Fordham International Law Journal 731, 752 (2009); Therese
Hesketh et al., ``The Effect of China's One-Child Family Policy After
25 Years,'' New England Journal of Medicine, Volume 353, No. 11 (2005),
1173; Nicholas Eberstadt, ``A Global War Against Baby Girls: Sex-
Selective Abortion Becomes a Worldwide Practice,'' Handbook of Gender
Medicine, reprinted in All Girls Allowed, 1 May 11. According to the
Eberstadt article, ``Some economists have hypothesized that mass
feticide, in making women scarce, will only increase their `value'--but
in settings where the legal and personal rights of the individual are
not secure and inviolable, the `rising value of women' can have
perverse and unexpected consequences, including increased demand for
prostitution and an upsurge in the kidnapping and trafficking of women
(as is now reportedly being witnessed in some women-scarce areas in
Asia)[.]''
\88\For Global Times reference, see Zhu Shanshan, ``Shandong Baby
Trafficking Ring Taken Down,'' Global Times, 4 November 11. For recent
domestic reports, see, e.g., ``Xinhua Investigation: Resold Several
Thousand Miles Away, Changed Hands 7 Times--Tracing the Chain of Black
[Market] Baby Trafficking Driven by Huge Profit'' [Xinhua diaocha:
zhuanmai shu qianli, daoshou da 7 ci--zhuizong baoli qudong xia de
heise fanying lian], Xinhua, 24 December 12; Zhou Ping, ``Two Officials
Also Detained for Human Trafficking,'' Global Times, 26 December 12.
For international reports, see, e.g., Chen Weijun, ``One Child Policy
Leads to Baby Selling,'' Asia News, 4 January 13; ``What Is Fuelling
Child Abduction in China?'' Al Jazeera, 27 December 12.
\89\``Xinhua Investigation: Resold Several Thousand Miles Away,
Changed Hands 7 Times--Tracing the Chain of Black [Market] Baby
Trafficking Driven by Huge Profit'' [Xinhua diaocha: zhuanmai shu
qianli, daoshou da 7 ci--zhuizong baoli qudong xia de heise fanying
lian], Xinhua, 24 December 12; Zhou Ping, ``Two Officials Also Detained
for Human Trafficking,'' Global Times, 26 December 12. See also,
Malcolm Moore, ``Chinese Family Planning Official Caught Trafficking in
Children,'' Telegraph, 4 January 13.
\90\``Xinhua Investigation: Resold Several Thousand Miles Away,
Changed Hands 7 Times--Tracing the Chain of Black [Market] Baby
Trafficking Driven by Huge Profit'' [Xinhua diaocha: zhuanmai shu
qianli, daoshou da 7 ci--zhuizong baoli qudong xia de heise fanying
lian], Xinhua, 24 December 12; Zhou Ping, ``Two Officials Also Detained
for Human Trafficking,'' Global Times, 26 December 12.
\91\``Jiangxi Guixi Welfare Institution Exposed, Suspected of Being
Involved in `Reselling of Infants''' [Jiangxi guixi fuliyuan bei pu
shexian ``daomai yinger''], Shenzhen Consumer Online, 25 January 13.
For an English translation of this article, see C. Custer,
``Translation: Guixi Orphanage Implicated in Re-Selling of Babies,''
China Geeks, 13 February 13.
\92\Ma Lie and Lei Lei, ``Doctor Suspected of Child Trafficking,''
China Daily, 3 August 13.
\93\``China Vows To Seriously Punish Newborn Traffickers,'' Xinhua,
6 August 13.
\94\Ibid.
\95\See, e.g., ``Left Behind Children Become High Risk Group for
Trafficking, Expert Suggests `Criminal Punishment for Child Buying'''
[Liushou ertong cheng bei guai gaowei qunti zhuanjia jianyi ``maitong
ruxing''], Southern Daily, reprinted in People's Daily, 27 May 13; Liu
Baijun, ``Representative Chen Xiurong Suggests Punishing the Buyer
Market in the Trafficking of Women and Children'' [Chen xiurong daibiao
jianyi chengzhi guaimai funu ertong maifang shichang], Legal Daily, 12
March 12; Zhu Shanshan, ``Shandong Baby Trafficking Ring Taken Down,''
Global Times, 4 November 11; ``China Babies `Sold for Adoption,''' BBC,
2 July 09; Patricia J. Meier, ``Small Commodities: How Child
Traffickers Exploit Children and Families in Adoption and What the
United States Must Do To Fight Them,'' Journal of Gender, Race &
Justice, Vol. 12, No. 1, 16 September 08, 10-11; Beth Loyd, ``China's
Lost Children,'' ABC News, 12 May 08; Peter S. Goodman, ``Stealing
Babies for Adoption,'' Washington Post, 12 March 06.
\96\See, e.g., Rao Dehong, ``7 Female Primary School Students From
Liangshan Lured to Work in Dongguan Will Be Returned to School'' [7
ming liangshan xiaoxue nusheng bei you zhi dongguan wugong jiang bei
jiehui fanxiao shangxue], Southern Metropolitan Daily, 6 December 12;
``8 Sentenced for Abducting, Murdering Children in China as Govt Tries
To Combat Trafficking,'' Associated Press, reprinted in Washington
Post, 15 August 11.
Notes to Section II--Freedom of Residence and Movement
\1\PRC Regulations on Household Registration [Zhonghua renmin
gongheguo hukou dengji tiaoli], issued and effective 9 January 58.
\2\Kam Wing Chan, ``Crossing the 50 Percent Population Rubicon: Can
China Urbanize to Prosperity?'' Eurasian Geography and Economics, Vol.
53, No. 1 (2012), 67-68.
\3\Ibid., 66-67.
\4\Ibid., 67.
\5\International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December
66, entry into force 23 March 76, arts. 2(1), 12(1), 12(3), 26. China
has signed and expressed intent to ratify the ICCPR. Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by UN General
Assembly resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 48, arts. 2, 13(1).
\6\``Ma Jiantang: Resolutely Taking a Path of New Increase--
National Statistics Bureau Chief Is Guest in Xinhua Interview'' [Ma
jiantang: jianjue zou yi tiao xin zengzhang zhi lu--guojia tongjiju
juzhang zuoke xinhuawang fangtan], National Bureau of Statistics of
China, 16 July 13; Wang Su, ``Cracking the Hukou Code to Hasten
Urbanization,'' Caixin, 7 August 13.
\7\Xu Xiaodan et al., ``Survey on Rural Workers and Urbanization:
Close to Half of Migrant Workers in Cities Have No Social Security''
[Nongminhua yu chengzhenhua diaocha: jin ban jincheng nongmingong wu
shehui baozhang], Ban Yue Tan, reprinted in China News Service, 9 July
13. The survey, conducted by Ban Yue Tan Social Conditions and Public
Opinion Research Center at the behest of the National Development and
Reform Commission, revealed that 54.81 percent of migrant workers in
cities responded that they participated in social security programs.
\8\``Work Units Must Hire More Workers, Which Aspects Show
Employment Discrimination?'' [Danwei xuyao zhaoshou yuangong, jiuye
qishi biaoxian zai na xie fangmian?], Fabang Net, 16 January 13; Fan
Chunxu et al., ``This Year's Graduating Students Encounter Household
Registration and Age Restrictions While Seeking Employment'' [Yingjie
shengqiu zhi yu huji nianling xianzhi], Beijing News, 20 May 13; Wan
Jing, ``Enterprises and Work Unit Hiring Notices Become Household
Residence Discrimination Disaster Zones'' [Shiye danwei cheng zhaopin
huji qishi zhongzaiqu], Legal Daily, 29 May 13.
\9\China Labour Bulletin, ``Graduate Makes Formal Complaint Against
Local Government for Hukou Discrimination,'' 16 May 13; Cao Jingmei,
``Scholar: Hukou Discrimination is Regrettably China's Greatest
Unfairness'' [Xue zhe: huji qishi kong shi zhongguo jiuye zui da bu
gongping], Sound of Hope, 15 May 13; ``Employment Discrimination
Inventory: Educational Background is Checked Back Three Generations,
Requirements for Hukou and Appearance'' [Jiuye qishi pandian: xueli cha
sandai hukou xiangmao you yaoqiu], China Newsweek, reprinted in Sina,
22 May 13.
\10\``China's First Court Case of Hukou-Based Employment
Discrimination'' [Zhongguo huji jiuye qishi di yi an], Radio Free Asia,
15 May 13. The Nanjing Municipal Human Resources and Social Security
Bureau passed over a recent female college graduate from Anhui province
for a job opportunity due to her rural Anhui hukou. Dong Wanyu, ``Woman
From Anhui Blocked From Accepting Employment Position in Nanjing
Because of Household Registration'' [Anhui yi nu nanjing ying pin yin
huji shou fang], Yangtse Evening Post, 15 April 13.
\11\China Labour Bulletin, ``Employment Discrimination in China,''
20 November 12.
\12\Barbara Demick, ``Red Tape Bars Many Students from China's Top
Colleges,'' Los Angeles Times, 25 July 13; Wei Xue, ``Non-Beijing Hukou
Exam Students Who Returned Home to Take Test State Grades Changed From
Excellent to `Poor,' Their Spirits Have Dropped Significantly'' [Fei
jingji kaosheng huixiang gaokao: chengji youxiu bian ``diandi'' xinli
luocha da], China National Radio, 7 June 13; Liu Jinsong, ```Non-
Household Registration' Protester Zhan Haite'' [``Fei huji''
kangzhengzhe zhan haite], Economic Observer, reprinted in Phoenix Net,
30 November 12; Zhan Haite, ``Teen Girl Makes Case for Change,'' China
Daily, 7 December 12.
\13\Koh Gui Qing, ``Beatings, Evictions Reveal Ugly Side of China's
Local Debt Pile,'' Reuters, 2 September 13; ``Land Clashes Spring From
`Colonial' Spread of Cities,'' Radio Free Asia, 11 March 13; ``Chinese
Voice Anger and Nostalgia Over Urbanization,'' New York Times, 16 June
13.
\14\``China Urbanization to Hit Roadblocks Amid Local Opposition,''
Bloomberg, 12 August 13; Yin Yeping, ``Locals Oppose Changes to Gaokao
Policy,'' Global Times, 22 October 12; Wei Xue, ``Non-Beijing Hukou
Exam Students Who Returned Home to Take Test State Grades Changed From
Excellent to `Poor,' Their Spirits Have Dropped Significantly'' [Fei
jingji kaosheng huixiang gaokao: chengji youxiu bian ``diandi'' xinli
luocha da], China National Radio, 7 June 13.
\15\Jin Hui, ``Reform of Hukou, Land, and Financial Systems,
Elimination of the Two Layered Structure'' [Gaige huji tudi caizheng
zhidu pochu er yuan jiegou], Economic Information Daily, 30 August 13;
``New Urbanization Requires Participation from Corporations and
Entrepeneurs'' [Xinxing chengzhenhua xuyao qiye he qiyejia canyu],
Beijing News, 12 August 13; ``China Urbanization To Hit Roadblocks Amid
Local Opposition,'' Bloomberg, 12 August 13.
\16\``State Council: Residential Permit Administrative Measures To
Be Released and Reform of Household Registration System To Be Advanced
Within the Year'' [Guowuyuan: nian nei chutai juzhuzheng guanli banfa
tuijin huji gaige], Guandian Real Estate Net, 7 May 13; ``China's Hukou
System Puts Migrant Workers at Severe Economic Disadvantage,'' The
World, Public Radio International, 1 May 13; ``Xi Jinping, Li Keqiang
Ph.D Theses Both Mention Hukou Reform'' [Xi jinping li keqiang boshi
lunwen jun ti huji gaige], Chengdu Evening News, 20 May 13.
\17\Zhou Yu, ``National Development and Reform Commission: Next
Year Will Accelerate Reform of the Household Registration System''
[Fagaiwei: ming nian jiang jiakuai huji zhidu gaige], Beijing Times,
reprinted in The People's Daily, 19 December 12; ``Elimination of
Household Registration Barriers Suggested,'' Xinhua, 27 June 13.
\18\``Xi Jinping, Li Keqiang Ph.D Theses Both Mention Hukou
Reform'' [Xi jinping li keqiang boshi lunwen jun ti huji gaige],
Chengdu Evening News, 20 May 13.
\19\``Elimination of Household Registration Barriers Suggested,''
Xinhua, 27 June 13; Wu Nan, ``China Eases Household Registration
Rules,'' South China Morning Post, 28 June 13.
\20\Kan Feng, ``2012 Cities Bluebook: Development of China's Cities
Face Ten Major Challenges'' [2012 nian chengshi lanpishu: zhongguo
chengshi fazhan mianlin shi da tiaozhan], China News Service, 14 August
12; Liu Rong, ``City Bluebook: 500 Million Farmers Will Need To Be
`Urbanized' in the Next 20 Years'' [Chengshi lanpishu: weilai 20 nian
you jin 5 yi nongmin xuyao ``shiminhua''], People's Daily, 15 August
12. The original report does not appear to be publicly available. Yu
Qian, ``More Than Half of All Chinese Live in Cities, As Rural Exodus
Continues,'' Global Times, 15 August 12.
\21\Sun Xuemei, ``Experts Say Household Registration System Reform
Encounters Opposition from Local Governments Causing Difficulty in
Implementation'' [Zhuanjia cheng huji zhidu gaige zao difang zhengfu
fandui zhi qi nan luoshi], Beijing Times, 12 November 12; ``Xi Jinping,
Li Keqiang Ph.D Theses Both Mention Hukou Reform'' [Xi jinping li
keqiang boshi lunwen jun ti huji gaige], Chengdu Evening News, 20 May
13; ``China Urbanization to Hit Roadblocks Amid Local Opposition,''
Bloomberg, 12 August 13; ``Accounting for the Costs of Hukou Reform''
[Huji gaige de chengben zhang], Caixin New Century, No. 30, 5 August
13.
\22\State Council General Office, Circular Regarding the Active and
Sound Implementation of Household Registration Management System Reform
[Guowuyuan bangongting guanyu jiji wentuo tuijin huji guanli zhidu
gaige de tongzhi], issued 26 February 11; ``State Council General
Office Issues Circular Regarding the Active and Sound Implementation of
Household Registration Management System Reform'' [Guowuyuan
bangongting fabu guanyu jiji wentuo tuijin huji guanli zhidu gaige de
tongzhi], Xinhua, 24 February 12; Jiang Yunxin, ``China Puts Forward
Clear Urbanization Pathway for the First Time; Guarantees Reasonable
Housing Requirements'' [Woguo shouci mingque chu chengzhenhua lujing
baozhang heli zhufang xuqiu], Beijing News, 27 June 13.
\23\The Commission observed implementation opinions and plans of
the 2011 Circular and its related hukou reforms in several provinces,
municipalities, prefectures and provincial-level autonomous regions.
These include Ma'anshan Prefecture in Anhui province, the Xinjiang
Uyghur Autonomous Region and the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. See
General Office of the Ma'anshan Prefectural People's Government,
General Office of the Ma'anshan Prefectural People's Government
Implementing Opinion Regarding the Active and Sound Promotion of
Household Registration Management System Reform [Ma'anshanshi renmin
zhengfu bangongshi guanyu jiji wentuo tuijin huji guanli zhidu gaige de
shishi yijian], issued 7 March 13; Xinjiang Uyhgur Autonomous Region
Public Security Bureau, Xinjiang Uyhgur Autonomous Region Public
Security Bureau Implementation Details on Furthering Reform of the
Household Registration Management System (Trial) [Xinjiang weiwuer
zizhiqu gong'anting guanyu tuijin huji guanli zhidu gaige de shishi
xize (shixing)], effective 1 September 12; General Office of the Inner
Mongolia Autonomous Region People's Government, General Office of the
Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region People's Government Implementing
Opinion on Deepening Reform of the Household Registration Management
System [Neimenggu zizhiqu renmin zhengfu bangongting guanyu shenhua
huji guanli zhidu gaige de shishi yijian], issued 29 May 11.
\24\Chang Meng, ``MOE Wants to Broaden Gaokao Access,'' Global
Times, 27 November 12.
\25\Beijing Municipal People's Government, Beijing Municipal
Department of Education and Four Other Departments Circular Regarding
the Dissemination of the ``Work Plan for the Accompanying Children of
Migrant Workers to Take Entrance Examinations in Beijing After
Receiving Compulsory Education'' [Guanyu zhuanfa shijiaowei deng si
bumen zhiding de ``jincheng wugong renyuan suiqian zinu jieshou yiwu
jiaoyu hou zai jing canjia shengxue kaoshi gongzuo fang'an'' de
tongzhi], issued 29 December 12, reprinted in Beijing Education
Services Research; Shanghai Municipal People's Government General
Office, Shanghai Municipal Department of Education and Four Other
Departments Circular Regarding the Dissemination of the ``Work Plan for
the Accompanying Children of Migrant Workers to Take Entrance
Examinations in Shanghai After Receiving Compulsory Education'' [Guanyu
zhuanfa shijiaowei deng si bumen zhiding de ``jincheng wugong renyuan
suiqian zinu jieshou yiwu jiaoyu hou zai hu canjia shengxue kaoshi
gongzuo fang'an'' de tongzhi], issued 27 December 12, reprinted in
Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China;
Guangdong Provincial People's Government General Office, Guangdong
Province Department of Education and Other Departments Circular
Pertaining to ``How To Do a Good Job on Disseminating the Work Opinion
on the Children of Migrant Workers Taking Entrance Examinations in
Guangdong After Receiving Compulsory Education'' [Guangdongsheng renmin
zhengfu bangongting zhuanfa shengjiaoyuting deng bumen guanyu zuohao
jincheng wu gongrenyuan suiqian zinu jieshou yiwu jiaoyu hou zai wo
sheng canjia shengxue kaoshi gongzuo yijian de tongzhi], issued 29
December 12. See also ``Authorities Issue New Education Policies for
Children of Migrant Workers,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on
China, 2 April 13.
\26\Wei Xue, ``Non-Beijing Hukou Exam Students Who Returned Home To
Take Test State Grades Changed from Excellent to `Poor,' Their Spirits
Have Dropped Significantly'' [Fei jingji kaosheng huixiang gaokao:
chengji youxiu bian ``diandi'' xinli luocha da], China National Radio,
7 June 13; Yin Yeping, ``Locals Oppose Changes to Gaokao Policy,''
Global Times, 22 October 12; Barbara Demick, ``Red Tape Bars Many
Students from China's Top Colleges,'' Los Angeles Times, 25 July 13;
``Migrants Banned From Beijing Exam,'' Radio Free Asia, 23 November 12.
\27\Wuhan Municipal People's Government, Wuhan Municipal People's
Government's Opinion on Further Encouraging Graduates to Work and
Innovate in Wuhan [Wuhanshi renmin zhengfu guanyu jinyibu guli gaoxiao
biyesheng zai han chuangxin chuangye de yijian], issued 10 April 13;
``Restrictions on College Graduates Setting Up Residence in Wuhan,
Hubei Again Relaxed'' [Hubei wuhan biyesheng luohu zai fangkuan],
Xinhua, reprinted in People's Daily, 21 May 13; An Baijie, ``Wuhan
Lifts Hukou Restrictions on College Students,'' China Daily, 10 May 13.
\28\Shanghai Municipal People's Government, Shanghai Municipality
Residence Permit Administrative Measures [Shanghaishi juzhuzheng guanli
banfa], passed 20 May 13, effective 1 July 13, chap. 2, art. 9, 18. The
points system replaces Shanghai's original classification system. Those
non-Shanghai residents with steady employment who have participated in
their work unit's social security system for at least six months, or
those who rely on or live with family members with a Shanghai hukou, or
have attended school or undertaken advanced studies in Shanghai for six
months or more are eligible to participate in this system and apply for
a residence permit (juzhu zheng). See also Li Xin and Tian Xiaodong,
``Shanghai's Residential Permit Regulation Point System To Replace
Classification System in Determining Children's Access to Education''
[Hu juzhuzheng guanli banfa jifen zhi daiti fenlei, fenzhi jueding zinu
jiuxue], Xinming Net, 19 June 13.
\29\Guangzhou Municipal Public Security Bureau, Guangzhou Municipal
Public Security Bureau Department of Residence Explanation on Main
Questions Regarding the Handling of Changing Household Registration
[Guangzhou gong'an huzheng bumen jieda banli huanfa hukoubu yewu redian
wenti], 6 May 13; General Office of the Guangzhou Municipal People's
Government, Guangzhou Municipal Party Committee, ``Guiding Opinion
Regarding the Acceleration of the Unification of the New Structure for
Urban and Rural Economic and Social Development'' [Guanyu jiakuai
xingcheng chengxiang jingji shehui fazhan yitihua xin geju de shishi
yijian], 18 May 09; Zheng Caixiong, ``Guangzhou Moves to Abolish Rural
Hukou,'' China Daily, 10 May 13; ``Guangzhou Household Registration
Reform, A Single Urban/Rural Household Registration Classification To
Be Realized by 2014'' [Guangzhou huji gaige 2014 nian jiang shixian
chengxiang yige hukou], Guangzhou Local Treasure, 19 December 12.
\30\General Office of the Guangdong Provincial People's Government,
``Work Plan To Further Promote the Equalization and Comprehensive
Reform of Basic Public Services (2012-2014)'' [Shenru tuijin jiben
gongong fuwu jundenghua zonghe gaige gongzuo fang'an (2012-2014 nian)],
17 April 12, sec. 2, art. 2; Hong Yiyi, ``Household Registration System
Reform Allows Residents to Enjoy Equal Status'' [Huji zhidu gaige rang
jumin xiang tongdeng daiyu], Southern Daily, 8 January 13.
\31\International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted
by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry
into force 23 March 76, art. 12(2). A similar protection granting
``everyone . . . the right to leave any country, including his own, and
to return to his own country'' is provided for in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
adopted and proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of
10 December 48, art. 13(2).
\32\International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted
by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry
into force 23 March 76, art. 12(3).
\33\PRC Passport Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo huzhao fa], issued
29 April 06, effective 1 January 07, art. 13(7); PRC Exit and Entry
Control Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo chujing rujing guanli fa] issued
30 June 12, effective 1 July 13, art. 12(5).
\34\For examples of restrictions on international travel of rights
advocates, see Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Rights Lawyer Tang
Jitian Was Blocked from Going to Hong Kong'' [Weiquan lushi tang jitian
chu guan qianwang xianggang bei zu], 15 January 13; Chinese Human
Rights Defenders, ``Ding Hongfen Applies to Get a Passport, Wuxi City
Public Security Office Denies Approval'' [Ding hongfen shenqing qianfa
huzhao, wuxi shi gonganju buyu pizhun], 5 January 13; Gillian Wong,
``Denied Passport, Tibet Poet Can't Receive US Award,'' Associated
Press, 8 March 13. For examples of restrictions on international travel
of family members of rights advocates, see Chinese Human Rights
Defenders, ``The Wife of Famous Chinese Political Prisoner Liu Xianbin
Has Been Unable To Obtain Her Passport With No Hope for Visiting Her
Daughter During Chinese New Year'' [Dalu zhuming zhengzhifan liu
xianbin qizi chen mingxian huzhao wufa banli chunjie tanwang nuer
wuwang], 8 February 13; ``Shandong Police Deny Chen Family Passport
Bid,'' Radio Free Asia, 22 February 13; Chinese Human Rights Defenders,
``Daughter of Zhejiang Dissident Lu Gengsong Again Prevented from
Traveling to Hong Kong'' [Zhejiang yiyirenshi lu gengsong nuer qu
xianggang zaici bei zu], 9 July 13.
\35\Andrew Jacobs, ``No Exit: China Uses Passports as Political
Cudgel,'' New York Times, 22 February 13.
\36\Ibid.; Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S.
Department of State, Country Report on Human Rights Practices--2012,
China (Includes Tibet, Hong Kong and Macau), 19 April 13; ``Beijing
Refuses To Issue Passports To Strictly Control Entry and Exit, 14
Million on the Blacklist'' [Beijing ju fa zhengzhao yankong churujing
1400 wan ren shang heimingdan], Radio Free Asia, 25 February 13.
\37\Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department
of State, Country Report on Human Rights Practices--2012, China
(Includes Tibet, Hong Kong and Macau), 19 April 13; Andrew Jacobs, ``No
Exit: China Uses Passports as Political Cudgel,'' New York Times, 22
February 13; ``Beijing Refuses To Issue Passports To Strictly Control
Entry and Exit, 14 Million on the Blacklist,'' [Beijing ju fa zhengzhao
yan kong churujing 1400 wan ren shang heimingdan], Radio Free Asia, 25
February 13.
\38\Andrew Jacobs, ``No Exit: China Uses Passports as Political
Cudgel,'' New York Times, 22 February 13.
\39\Gillian Wong, ``Denied Passport, Tibet Poet Can't Receive US
Award,'' Associated Press, 8 March 13; Secretary of State John Kerry,
Remarks at the International Women of Courage Awards, Dean Acheson
Auditorium, 8 March 13.
\40\Andrews Jacobs, ``No Exit: China Uses Passports as Political
Cudgel,'' New York Times, 22 February 13.
\41\Xu Zhiyong, ``Cause and Effect--A Dialogue on the New Citizens'
Movement'' [Yinguo--yici guanyu xin gongmin yundong de duihua], Xu
Zhiyong Collected Works (blog), 24 April 13; Patrick Boehler, ``Leading
Citizen Movement Activist Xu Zhiyong Arrested,'' South China Morning
Post, 17 July 13. This international symposium to which Xu was invited
commemorated the anniversary of the beating death of Sun Zhigang, who
died after being taken into police custody for registration permit
questioning in 2003. After Sun's death, Xu worked with other activists
to abolish ``custody and repatriation'' centers. For more information,
see Zan Aizong, ``Rights Defense and `Non-Violent Non-Cooperation,'''
Human Rights in China, China Rights Forum, Issue 1, 2009; Keith J.
Hand, ``Using Law for a Righteous Purpose: The Sun Zhigang Incident and
Evolving Forms of Citizen Action in the People's Republic of China,''
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 45, 2006, 114-95. For more
information on the case of Xu Zhiyong, see ``Officials Detain Xu
Zhiyong Amidst a Crackdown on Individuals Calling for Greater
Government Accountability,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on
China, 1 August 13.
\42\Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``The Wife of Famous Chinese
Political Prisoner Liu Xianbin Has Been Unable to Obtain Her Passport
and Is Therefore Unable to Visit Her Daughter During Chinese New Year''
[Dalu zhuming zhengzhifan liu xianbin qizi chen mingxian huzhao wufa
banli chunjie tanwang nuer wuwang], 8 February 13.
\43\Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Daughter of Zhejiang
Dissident Lu Gengsong Again Prevented from Traveling to Hong Kong''
[Zhejiang yiyirenshi lu gengsong nuer qu xianggang zaici bei zu], 9
July 13.
\44\``Shandong Police Deny Chen Family Passport Bid,'' Radio Free
Asia, 22 February 13; Edward Wong, ``Family of China Rights Advocate
Given Passports,'' New York Times, 7 June 13.
\45\International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted
by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry
into force 23 March 76, art. 12(1). Similar protection granting
``everyone . . . the right to freedom of movement and residence within
the borders of each state'' is provided for in the See Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
adopted and proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of
10 December 48, art. 13(1).
\46\See, e.g., ``Zhang Lin and Daughter Successfully Flee Anhui to
Start New Life'' [Zhang lin funu chenggong taoli anhui guo xin
shenghuo], Radio Free Asia, 19 June 13; ``Ilham Tohti Again Placed
Under Home Confinement, Uyghur Students Who Posted Online Are
Detained'' [Yilihamu zaidu zao ruanjin weizu xuesheng wangluo fa wen
bei zhua], Radio Free Asia, 31 July 13.
\47\See, e.g., ``Chen Guangfu Forced to Return Home From Shanghai
Visit,'' Radio Free Asia, 20 August 13; Southern Mongolian Human Rights
Information Center, ``Hada and Family Members Still Missing,'' 24
February 13. For more information on the case of Hada and his family,
see ``Authorities Heighten Persecution of Detained Mongol Rights
Advocate's Wife and Son,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China,
13 December 12.
\48\Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``In the Name of `Stability,'
2012 Annual Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in
China,'' March 2013, 1, 4-6.
\49\Jared Genser, ``In China, Repression is a Family Affair,'' Wall
Street Journal, 25 April 13. See the Commission's Political Prisoner
Database record 2010-00629 for information on Liu Xia's case.
\50\Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``In the Name of `Stability,'
2012 Annual Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in
China,'' March 2013, 4-5; Human Rights Watch, ``China: End Unlawful
Practice of House Arrest,'' 24 October 12. See the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2008-00228 for information on Feng
Zhenghu's case.
\51\Chris Buckley, ``China Detains a Leading Human Rights
Advocate,'' New York Times, 17 July 13; Xu Zhiyong, ``Cause and
Effect--A Dialogue on the New Citizens' Movement'' [Yinguo--yici guanyu
xin gongmin yundong de duihua], Xu Zhiyong Collected Works (blog), 24
April 13. For more information on the case of Xu Zhiyong, see
``Officials Detain Xu Zhiyong Amidst a Crackdown on Individuals Calling
for Greater Government Accountability,'' Congressional-Executive
Commission on China, 1 August 13.
\52\``Activists Released After Congress,'' Radio Free Asia, 16
November 12.
\53\``As National CPPCC Opens Many Rights Activists Faced With
Different Degrees of Soft Detention'' [Quanguo zhengxie kaimu duoming
weiquan renshi zaodao butong chengdu de ruanjin], Radio Free Asia, 3
March 13.
\54\Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Anhui Dissident Wang Yixiang
Has Dealt with Restricted Movement as June 4th Approaches'' [Anhui
yiyirenshi wang yixiang yin liusi linjin bei xianzhi renshen ziyou], 2
June 13; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``As June 4th Approaches
Zhejiang Democracy Party Members Receive Stricter Controls'' [Liusi
linjin zhejiang minzhudang ren shou yan kong], 1 June 13.
\55\``Activists Released After Congress,'' Radio Free Asia, 16
November 12.
\56\Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Anhui Dissident Wang Yixiang
Has Dealt with Restricted Movement as June 4th Approaches'' [Anhui
yiyirenshi wang yixiang yin liusi linjin bei xianzhi renshen ziyou], 2
June 13.
Notes to Section II--Status of Women
\1\Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women, adopted and opened for signature, ratification, and
accession by UN General Assembly resolution 34/180 of 18 December 79,
entry into force 3 September 81. China signed the convention on July
17, 1980, and ratified it on November 4, 1980. See United Nations
Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, last visited
14 September 12. Under Article 7 of CEDAW, China is committed to
ensuring the right of women, on equal terms with men, ``to participate
in the formulation of government policy and the implementation thereof
and to hold public office and perform all public functions at all
levels of government.''
\2\The PRC Law on the Protection of Women's Rights and Interests
and the PRC Electoral Law of the National People's Congress and Local
People's Congresses stipulate that an ``appropriate number'' of female
deputies should serve at all levels of people's congresses. PRC Law on
the Protection of Women's Rights and Interests [Zhonghua renmin
gongheguo funu quanyi baozhang fa], passed 3 April 92, effective 1
October 92, amended 28 August 05, art. 11; PRC Electoral Law of the
National People's Congress and Local People's Congresses [Zhonghua
renmin gongheguo quanguo renmin daibiao dahui he difang geji renmin
daibiao dahui xuanju fa], passed 1 July 79, amended 10 December 82, 2
December 86, 28 February 95, 27 October 04, 14 March 10, art. 6.
\3\State Council Information Office, ``National Human Rights Action
Plan of China (2012-2015),'' 11 June 12, sec. III(2); State Council,
``PRC Outline for the Development of Women (2011-2020)'' [Zhongguo funu
fazhan gangyao (2011-2020)], issued 30 July 11, sec. 3(4).
\4\Christophe Bahuet, ``The Importance of Women's Leadership,''
China Daily, 6 November 12.
\5\The target of 30 percent female representation in leadership
positions by 1995 was set by the UN Commission on the Status of Women
at its 34th session in 1990. ``Target: 30 Percent of Leadership
Positions to Women by 1995--United Nations Commission on the Status of
Women,'' UN Chronicle, June 1990, reprinted in Popline.
\6\China's Politburo Standing Committee decreased from nine members
in the prior two Party Congresses to seven members in the 18th Party
Congress. See Edward Wong and Jonathan Ansfield, ``Changing of the
Guard: Grabs for Power Behind Plan to Shrink Elite Circle,'' New York
Times, 1 November 12.
\7\Jaime A. FlorCruz and Jethro Mullen, ``After Months of Mystery,
China Unveils New Top Leaders,'' CNN, 16 November 12. Prior to the
appointment of China's new leadership, some political observers had
speculated that Liu Yandong might have become the first woman promoted
to the Politburo Standing Committee. See Zhuang Pinghui, ``Breaking the
Glass Ceiling in the Politburo Standing Committee,'' South China
Morning Post, 19 September 12.
\8\State Councilor Sun Chunlan reportedly joined State Councilor
Liu Yandong as the second woman to hold a position on the Political
Bureau of the Communist Party Central Committee. See Benjamin Kang Lim
and Michael Martina, ``China's Politburo Has More Women, Is Younger--
But Barely,'' Reuters, 15 November 12.
\9\``Members of the 18th CPC Central Committee,'' Xinhua, 14
November 12; Kerry Brown, ``Chinese Politics--Still a Man's World,''
CNN, Global Public Square (blog), 27 August 12. According to the Global
Public Square blog report, the number of women on the previous (17th)
Communist Party Central Committee was 13 out of 204 members. See also
Didi Kirsten Tatlow, ``Chinese Women's Progress Stall on Many Fronts,''
New York Times, 6 March 12.
\10\He Dan and Zhu Zhe, ``Women Assume Bigger Role,'' China Daily,
8 November 12. According to the China Daily, 521 of 2,270 (22.95
percent) of the delegates to the 18th Party Congress were female, up
from 20 percent at the 17th Party Congress in 2007, and 18 percent at
the 16th Party Congress in 2002. See also National Bureau of Statistics
of China, ``Number of Deputies to All the Previous National People's
Congresses'' [Lijie quanguo renmin daibiao dahui daibiao renshu], China
Statistical Yearbook 2012, 2012, Table 23-1. According to the 2012
China Statistical Yearbook, female representation in China's parliament
has stayed around 21 percent since the late 1970s.
\11\National Bureau of Statistics of China, ``Number of Deputies to
All the Previous National People's Congresses'' [Lijie quanguo renmin
daibiao dahui daibiao renshu], China Statistical Yearbook 2012, 2012,
Table 23-1.
\12\Li Bin (Minister of the new National Health and Family Planning
Commission) and Wu Aiying (Minister of Justice) are reported to be the
only female members of China's newly appointed State Council. The
number used to be 4 out of 35. See ``China Unveils New Cabinet Amid
Function Reform,'' Xinhua, 17 March 13. See also Jen-Kai Liu, ``The
Main National Leadership of the PRC,'' China Data Supplement, Journal
of Current Chinese Affairs, Vol. 19, No. 3 (2011), 3; Michael Forsythe
and Yidi Zhao, ``Women Knowing China Men Rule Prove Mao's Half the Sky
Remains Unfulfilled,'' Bloomberg, 23 June 11.
\13\Only four women since 1949 have served in this high-ranking
position; of these, Wu Yi served most recently, and retired in 2008.
See All-China Women's Federation, ``China's Four Female Vice Premiers
Since 1949,'' 22 March 13. See also Jen-Kai Liu, ``The Main National
Leadership of the PRC,'' China Data Supplement, Journal of Current
Chinese Affairs, Vol. 19, No. 3 (2011), 3.
\14\Christophe Bahuet, ``The Importance of Women's Leadership,''
China Daily, 6 November 12; Julie Makinen, ``Where are China's Women
Leaders?'' Los Angeles Times, reprinted in Christian Science Monitor,
14 November 12.
\15\Rangita de Silva de Alwis, ``Women Leading in Lawmaking in
China--Introduction,'' Global Women's Leadership Initiative, Wilson
Center, February 2013, 7.
\16\Li Huiying, ``Women Leading in Lawmaking in China--The Pain of
Chinese Urbanization: Strengthening of Gender Layering,'' Global
Women's Leadership Initiative, Wilson Center, February 2013, 14-18.
\17\United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment
of Women, ``Asia-Pacific Calls for Urgent Increase to Low Participation
of Women in Politics,'' 4 February 13.
\18\Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women, adopted and opened for signature, ratification, and
accession by UN General Assembly resolution 34/180 of 18 December 79,
entry into force 2 September 81, art. 11. China signed the convention
on July 17, 1980, and ratified it on November 4, 1980. See United
Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, last visited
14 September 12.
\19\Liu Xiaonan, ``Women Leading in Lawmaking in China--Research
Report on Employment Discrimination in 2011 Civil Service
Recruitment,'' Global Women's Leadership Initiative, Wilson Center,
February 2013, 20, 22-23. For additional examples of gender
discrimination in hiring, see Chen Xin, ``Gender Bias Seen in Job Fair
Ads,'' China Daily, 25 February 13; Peter Kuhn and Kailing Shen,
``Gender Discrimination in Job Ads: Evidence From China,'' Department
of Economics, University of California Santa Barbara, 6 June 12; Zhou
Xiangyi, Zhang Jie, and Song Xuetao, ``Gender Discrimination in Hiring:
Evidence from 19,130 Resumes in China,'' Xi'an Jiaotong University,
Texas A&M University, North Carolina State University, 3 January 13.
\20\Rangita de Silva de Alwis, ``Women Leading in Lawmaking in
China--Introduction,'' Global Women's Leadership Initiative, Wilson
Center, February 2013, 2-3.
\21\Guo Huimin, ``Women Leading in Lawmaking in China--Pregnancy
Discrimination: Abrogation and Restoration of Rights,'' Global Women's
Leadership Initiative, Wilson Center, February 2013, 56.
\22\Amy Li, ``Job-seekers in Wuhan Protest Government-Imposed
Gynaecological Tests,'' South China Morning Post, 28 November 12.
\23\Raef Lawson, Institute of Management Accountants, ``Salary
Survey,'' October 2012, 41. According to the IMA report, Chinese
women's salary is on average about 58.6 percent that of men's, and
their total compensation is on average about 54 percent that of men's.
\24\Currently, retirement ages for male and female government and
Party officials are 60 and 55, respectively, while retirement ages for
male and female workers in general are 60 and 50, respectively. For
regulations on retirement ages for most workers, see State Council
Provisional Measures on Workers' Retirement and Withdrawal from Office
[Guowuyuan guanyu gongren tuixiu, tuizhi de zanxing banfa], 24 May 78,
art. 1. For regulations on extended retirement ages for cadres, see
State Council Provisional Measures on the Settlement of Elderly, Weak,
Sick, and Disabled Cadres [Guowuyuan guanyu anzhi lao ruo bing can
ganbu de zanxing banfa], 2 June 78, art. 4. See also, ``China's
Compulsory Retirement Age for Males and Females Challenged for
Violating Constitution'' [Woguo nannu tuixiu nianling guiding bei
tiqing weixian shencha], Legal Morning Post, reprinted in China Law
Education Net, 16 March 06. For information on the current debate about
raising the retirement age, see Chen Xin, ``Retirement Age Will Be
Pushed Back: Minister,'' China Daily, 22 March 11; Mark W. Frazier,
``No Country for Old Age,'' New York Times, 18 February 13.
\25\Shenzhen Municipal People's Congress Standing Committee,
Shenzhen Special Economic Zone Gender Equality Promotion Regulations
[Shenzhen jingji tequ xingbie pingdeng cujin tiaoli], passed 28 June
12, issued 10 July 12, effective 1 January 13. See also ``Shenzhen
Passes China's First Anti-Gender Discrimination Law,'' China Briefing,
23 August 12.
\26\Chen Xin, ``Gender Bias Seen in Job Fair Ads,'' China Daily, 25
February 13.
\27\Ibid. ``Huang Yizhi of Beijing Ruifeng Law Firm said labor laws
have made gender discrimination in employment illegal but they lack
language on fines for violations . . . Huang said labor authorities'
efforts to design codes to fine violators could serve as a deterrent to
employers and also help encourage victims to seek protection of their
rights.''
\28\Zhuang Qinghong and Zhang Yiting, ``First Successful
Compensation in Gender Discrimination Case'' [Xingbie qishi an shouci
chenggong huopei], China Youth Daily, reprinted in Xinhua, 31 January
13.
\29\PRC Education Law [Zhongguo renmin gongheguo jiaoyu fa], issued
18 March 95, effective 1 September 95, art. 9.
\30\China Labour Bulletin, ``Employment Discrimination in China,''
20 November 12; Didi Kirsten Tatlow, ``Women in China Face Rising
University Entry Barriers,'' New York Times, 7 October 12. According to
one woman cited in The New York Times, universities ``make it harder
for women to get in to study Arabic'' because university administrators
``believe that Arab nations don't want to deal with women.''
\31\Luo Wangshu, ``Ministry Defends Gender Ratios for Colleges,''
China Daily, 17 October 12. For additional information on the use of
gender-based quotas by Chinese universities, see China Labour Bulletin,
``Employment Discrimination in China,'' 20 November 12.
\32\Luo Wangshu, ``Ministry Defends Gender Ratios for Colleges,''
China Daily, 17 October 12.
\33\PRC Law on the Protection of Women's Rights and Interests
[Zhonghua renmin gongheguo funu quanyi baozhang fa], enacted 3 April
92, effective 1 October 92, amended 28 August 05, art. 46; PRC Marriage
Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo hunyin fa], passed 10 September 80,
effective 1 January 81, amended 28 April 01, art. 3; PRC Criminal Law
[Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingfa], passed 1 July 79, amended 14 March
97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29
December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February
09, 25 February 11, arts. 234, 236, 237, 260.
\34\Legal Daily reported in January 2013 that one in three families
have experienced domestic violence, and statistics released by the All-
China Women's Federation in the same month suggest one in four women
have experienced domestic violence. Zhou Bin, ``Plans To Issue
Standardized Document Guiding Domestic Violence Criminal Trials'' [Ni
chutai guifanxing wenjian zhidao jiabao xing'an shenpan], Legal Daily,
13 January 13; Zhao Wen, ``Domestic Violence Occurs in 1/4 Chinese
Homes,'' Shanghai Daily, 23 January 13. According to the All-China
Women's Federation statistics cited in Shanghai Daily, of the women
surveyed who reported experiencing domestic violence, around 5 percent
reported physical violence, and a large majority of these cases
affected rural women. See also Lin Zhiwen and Wang Biaochen, All-China
Women's Federation, ``Domestic Violence and Family Issues in Guangdong
Province,'' 11 April 13.
\35\PRC Law on the Protection of Women's Rights and Interests
[Zhonghua renmin gongheguo funu quanyi baozhang fa], passed 3 April 92,
effective 1 October 92, amended 28 August 05, art. 46; PRC Marriage Law
[Zhonghua renmin gongheguo hunyin fa], passed 10 September 80,
effective 1 January 81, amended 28 April 01, art. 3. For Chinese
experts' discussion of the shortcomings of current national-level
legislation, see Ng Tze Wei, ``A Clear Definition of Domestic Violence
Is Needed To Curb the Crime,'' South China Morning Post, 7 February 13;
Huang Yuli and He Dan, ``Call for Action on Domestic Violence,'' China
Daily, 26 November 12; ``China Scholars Call for Attention on `Anti-
Domestic Violence' Legislation'' [Zhongguo xuezhe huyu guanzhu ``fan
jiating baoli'' lifa], Radio Free Asia, 13 January 10; Li Fei, ``All-
China Women's Federation Strongly Promotes Anti-Domestic Violence
Legislation'' [Quanguo fulian litui fan jiating baoli lifa], People's
Representative News, 31 December 09. See also ``All-China Women's
Federation Proposes, Highlights Need for Draft Anti-Domestic Violence
Legislation,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2 February
10.
\36\You Chunliang, ``28 Provinces, Districts, and Cities in China
Have Issued Anti-Domestic Violence Local Regulations or Policies''
[Quanguo yi you 28 ge sheng qu shi chutai fan jiating baoli difangxing
fagui huo ce], Legal Daily, 6 December 12.
\37\Wu Jie, ``The Shadow of Domestic Violence: Another Incident of
Child Abuse in Shenzhen Ends Up as Homicide Case'' [Jiabao yinying:
shenzhen zaixian nue'er zhisi an], Southern Weekend, 31 December 12;
Lin Zhiwen and Wang Biaochen, All-China Women's Federation, ``Domestic
Violence and Family Issues in Guangdong Province,'' 11 April 13; ``Two
Cases Shine Spotlight on China Domestic Violence,'' BBC, 5 February 13;
Zhang Shan, ``Woman Can't Bear Domestic Violence, Uses Hammer To Beat
Husband to Death, Buries Corpse in Dry Well'' [Nuzi bukan jiabao chi
tiechui zasi zhangfu hou jiang shiti pao kujing], West Net, reprinted
in Phoenix Net, 22 March 13.
\38\Beijing Children's Legal Aid and Research Center, ``Don't Let
Children Grow Up With Domestic Violence'' [Bie rang haizi zai jiabao de
yinying xia chengzhang], 12 October 12; Huang Yuli and He Dan, ``Call
for Action on Domestic Violence,'' China Daily, 26 November 12; Ng Tze
Wei, ``A Clear Definition of Domestic Violence Is Needed To Curb the
Crime,'' South China Morning Post, 7 February 13; ``Push for Domestic
Violence Laws in China,'' CCTV, 8 March 13; Zhang Yiqian, ``Battered
But Not Beaten,'' Global Times, 18 February 13. For information on
calls for national-level legislation in previous years, see CECC, 2012
Annual Report, 10 October 12, 102; CECC, 2011 Annual Report, 10 October
11, 124; CECC, 2010 Annual Report, 10 October 10, 132.
\39\State Council Information Office, ``National Human Rights
Action Plan of China (2012-2015),'' 11 June 12, sec. III(2).
\40\He Dan, ``Domestic Violence Law Should Be Broad,'' China Daily,
12 March 12.
\41\Ng Tze Wei, ``A Clear Definition of Domestic Violence Is Needed
To Curb the Crime,'' South China Morning Post, 7 February 13. As of
this February 2013 South China Morning Post article, no drafts had been
tabled. In addition, the Commission has observed no reports of the
issue of a draft between February and August 2013.
\42\Zhou Bin, ``Plans To Issue Standardized Document Guiding
Domestic Violence Criminal Trials'' [Ni chutai guifanxing wenjian
zhidao jiabao xing'an shenpan], Legal Daily, 13 January 13.
\43\Lan Fang, ``China's Courts Experiment With Issuance of
Protection Orders Against Domestic Violence'' [Zhongguo fayuan shixing
qianfa renshen baohu ling fan jiating baoli], Caixin, 30 January 13.
\44\``Push for Domestic Violence Laws in China,'' CCTV, 8 March 13;
``Domestic Violence,'' China Daily, 5 February 13.
\45\The World Health Organization defines sexual violence as ``any
sexual act, attempt to obtain a sexual act, unwanted sexual comments or
advances, or acts to traffic, or otherwise directed, against a person's
sexuality using coercion, by any person regardless of their
relationship to the victim, in any setting, including but not limited
to home and work.'' World Health Organization, ``Violence Against
Women,'' Fact Sheet No. 239, November 2012. For information on trends
of sexual violence in China, see Women's Watch-China, ``E-Newsletter 86
of WW-China,'' February 2013, 8-10.
\46\Women's Watch-China, ``E-Newsletter 86 of WW-China,'' February
2013, 13; ``Official Gets 18-Year Sentence for Graft, Rape,'' Shanghai
Daily, reprinted in China Internet Information Center, 20 February 13;
``Li Guanfeng Charged With Rape,'' China Daily, 7 March 13; Scott
Murdoch, ``Chinese Party Cadre Sun Dejiang Sacked After Rape Claims,''
Australian, 5 December 12; Sophie Song, ``China's `Child Rape Isn't
Rape' Law Is Sparking Outrage,'' International Business Times, 13 May
13.
\47\Wu Xiaofeng and Xing Dongwei, ``Hainan, Wanning Primary School
Principal Takes 4 Young Girls to Hotel, Government Worker Takes 2 Young
Girls to Hotel'' [Hainan wanning yi xiao xiaozhang dai 4 younu kaifang
zhengfu zhiyuan dai 2 younu kaifang], Legal Daily, 13 May 13; Mimi Lau,
``Hainan Province Teacher, City Official Arrested Over Sex Assault of
Six Girls,'' South China Morning Post, 14 May 13.
\48\See Wang Aihua et al., ``Commentary: Keep Perverted Teachers
Far Away From Young Girls!'' [Shuping: rang selang jiaoshi yuanli
younu!], Xinhua, 29 May 13; ``China's Supreme Court Vows To Protect
Children,'' Associated Press, 29 May 13; Zhou Wenting, ``Schoolchildren
Taught To Avoid Sexual Assault,'' China Daily, 30 May 13.
\49\Sophie Song, ``China's `Child Rape Isn't Rape' Law Is Sparking
Outrage,'' International Business Times, 13 May 13. Chinese authorities
have also gone to the other extreme in prosecuting such cases, as seen
in the execution this past year of a teacher surnamed Bao for raping
and sexual assaulting several of his students. Sun Ying, ``Teacher Who
Raped or Behaved Lewdly With Female Students Is Executed, Supreme
People's Court: No Mercy in This Regard'' [Jiaoshi qiangjian weixie
nusheng bei chusi zui gaofa: duici jue bu shouruan], China Radio
International, 30 May 13.
\50\Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Women's Rights Worker Ye
Haiyan's Detention Gives Rise to Fierce Citizen Protest'' [Nuquan
gongzuozhe ye haiyan bei juliu yinfa minjian qianglie kangyi], 31 May
13.
\51\``Women Lawyers To Campaign for China's Sex Abuse Victims,''
Radio Free Asia, 3 June 13.
\52\Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (1995), adopted at
the Fourth World Conference on Women on 27 October 95, and endorsed by
UN General Assembly resolution 50/203 on 22 December 95, item 115.
According to the 1995 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action,
``Physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring within the
general community, including rape, sexual abuse, sexual harassment and
intimidation at work, in educational institutions and elsewhere,
trafficking in women and forced prostitution.''
\53\PRC Law on the Protection of Women's Rights and Interests
[Zhonghua renmin gongheguo funu quanyi baozhang fa], passed 3 April 92,
effective 1 October 92, amended 28 August 05, arts. 40, 58; State
Council, Special Provisions for the Work Protection of Female Employees
[Nu zhigong laodong baohu tebie guiding], issued and effective 28 April
12, art. 11. See also Women's Watch-China, ``Annual Report 2008,'' 23
October 09, 30.
\54\Ibid.
\55\Cao Yin, ``What Can Be Done To Prevent Sexual Harassment,''
Xinhua, 13 March 13.
\56\Canton Public Opinion Research Center, ``Urban Residents
Perceive an Increase in Sexual Harassment, Hope To Expand the Strength
of Punishments'' [Shimin renwei xing saorao zengduo, pan jiada chufa
lidu], 25 February 13.
\57\Ma Yujia, ``Foxconn Employees Suffer Sexual Harassment,'' China
Internet Information Center, 22 February 13.
\58\``Official Suspended After Sexual Harassment Scandal,'' Xinhua,
reprinted in CRIEnglish, 24 May 13.
\59\Lin Li and Han Mei, ``Seven-Month Fetus in Fengyang, Anhui
Forcibly Aborted, Shocking Bloody Photo'' [Anhui fengyang 7 yue da
taier bei qiangzhi liuchan xie linlin tupian chumu jingxin], Sound of
Hope, 25 March 13; ChinaAid, ``In Tears, Victim Denounces the Violence
Committed by Family Planning Officials in Guizhou in Early 2013,'' 26
February 13; Zhan Caiqiang, ``Hubei Tongshan Woman `Sterilized to
Death,' Officials Pay 1,000,000 To Buy Out [Victims'] `Right To Hold
[Them] Accountable''' [Hubei tongshan--funu ``jieza zhisi'' guanfang
100 wan maiduan ``zhuize quanli''], Yunnan Info Daily, 9 April 13;
``Henan--Nursing Mother Failed To Pay 6,000 Yuan Protection Fee,
Forcibly Sterilized'' [Henan--buru qi funu weijiao 6 qian yuan baohu
fei bei qiangzhi jieza], Southern Metropolitan Daily, 24 April 13.
According to the 1995 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action,
``Acts of violence against women also include forced sterilization and
forced abortion, coercive/forced use of contraceptives, female
infanticide and prenatal sex selection.'' Beijing Declaration and
Platform for Action (1995), adopted at the Fourth World Conference on
Women on 27 October 95, and endorsed by UN General Assembly resolution
50/203 on 22 December 95, item 115.
\60\PRC Population and Family Planning Law [Zhonghua renmin
gongheguo renkou yu jihua shengyu fa], passed 29 December 01, effective
1 September 02, arts. 4, 39. Article 4 of the PRC Population and Family
Planning Law (PFPL) states that officials ``shall perform their
administrative duties strictly in accordance with the law, and enforce
the law in a civil manner, and they may not infringe upon the
legitimate rights and interests of citizens.'' Article 39 states that
an official is subject to criminal or administrative punishment if he
or she ``infringes on a citizen's personal rights, property rights, or
other legitimate rights and interests'' or ``abuses his or her power,
neglects his or her duty, or engages in malpractices for personal
gain'' in the implementation of population planning policies.
\61\Yan Shuang, ``Fury Over Forced Abortion,'' Global Times, 14
June 12. For one U.S. scholar's analysis of Chinese law with regard to
forced abortions, see Stanley Lubman, ``The Law on Forced Abortion in
China: Few Options for Victims,'' Wall Street Journal, China Real Time
Report (blog), 4 July 12.
\62\Human Rights Watch, ```Swept Away': Abuses Against Sex Workers
in China,'' May 2013, 23-24.
\63\National People's Congress Standing Committee, Decision of the
National People's Congress Standing Committee on the Strict Prohibition
of Prostitution and Whoring [Quanguo renmin daibiao dahui changwu
weiyuanhui guanyu yanjin maiyin piaochang de jueding], issued and
effective 4 September 09; PRC Public Security Administration Punishment
Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo zhian guanli chufa fa], passed 28 August
05, effective 1 March 06, arts. 66, 67, 74. See also Human Rights
Watch, ```Swept Away': Abuses Against Sex Workers in China,'' 14 May
13, 14.
\64\Ministry of Supervision, Ministry of Human Resources and Social
Security, Ministry of Public Security, Regulations on the Discipline of
Policemen [Gongan jiguan renmin jingcha jilu tiaoling], issued 21 April
10, effective 1 June 10, art. 11. See also Human Rights Watch, ```Swept
Away': Abuses Against Sex Workers in China,'' 14 May 13, 23.
\65\Human Rights in China, Asia Monitor Resource Centre, China
Labour Bulletin, and Hong Kong Industrial Committee, ``Report on
Implementation of CEDAW in the People's Republic of China,'' December
1998, 6.
Notes to Section II--Human Trafficking
\1\UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in
Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted by
General Assembly resolution 55/25 of 15 November 00, entered into force
25 December 03. This protocol is also commonly referred to as the
Palermo Protocol because it was adopted in Palermo, Italy, in 2000.
\2\Office To Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S.
Department of State, ``Trafficking in Persons Report 2013--China,'' 19
June 13, 128-129.
\3\Ibid., 128. See also, for example, ``Wisconsin Restaurant Owner
Charged With Human Trafficking,'' Associated Press, reprinted in
Wisconsin Gazette, 18 April 13; ``Chinese Chef Slave Forced To Sleep in
Cage in Amsterdam,'' Agence France-Presse, reprinted in South China
Morning Post, 22 February 13; ``Trial Against Chinese Traffickers,''
Austrian Times, 15 January 13.
\4\Office To Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S.
Department of State, ``Trafficking in Persons Report 2013--China,'' 19
June 13, 128. See also, e.g., Phillip Martin, ``Human Trafficking:
Taken Into China,'' WGBH, 22 January 13; ``China Arrests Traffickers of
N. Korean Women,'' Chosun Ilbo, 17 January 13; ``Myanmar's Trafficked
Brides Fill China's Shortage of Women,'' TrustLaw, 4 December 12; Zhang
Yan, ``Efforts Boosted Against Human Trafficking,'' China Daily, 22
January 13.
\5\UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in
Persons (UN TIP Protocol), Especially Women and Children, Supplementing
the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime,
adopted by General Assembly resolution 55/25 of 15 November 00, entered
into force 25 December 03, art. 3. According to Article 3(a) of the UN
TIP Protocol, ```Trafficking in persons' shall mean the recruitment,
transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of
the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of
fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of
vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to
achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for
the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum,
the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual
exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar
to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.''
\6\See, e.g., China Labour Bulletin, ``Police Detain Five in
Tianjin for Use of Forced Labour,'' 4 December 12; Rao Dehong, ``7
Female Primary School Students From Liangshan Lured To Work in Dongguan
Will Be Returned to School'' [7 ming liangshan xiaoxue nusheng bei you
zhi dongguan wugong jiang bei jiehui fanxiao shangxue], Southern
Metropolitan Daily, 6 December 12.
\7\Office To Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S.
Department of State, ``Trafficking in Persons Report 2012--China,'' 19
June 12, 118. According to this report, ``The [Chinese] government did
not release any statistics relating to the trafficking of forced labor
victims or the trafficking of men.''
\8\``China's Top Legislature Ends Bimonthly Session, Adopts Tort
Law,'' Xinhua, 26 December 09.
\9\Zhang Yan, ``Efforts Boosted Against Human Trafficking,'' China
Daily, 22 January 13. According to this report, ``China has signed the
Mekong River Sub-regional Cooperation Anti-trafficking Memo with
Thailand, Myanmar, Vietnam and Cambodia, to establish annual high-level
exchanges. The ministry has also set up eight border offices with
neighboring countries.''
\10\Ibid. According to this report, ``In November, the ministry and
the International Organization for Migration, which is based in
Switzerland, held a seminar in the Chinese capital attended by 60
frontline police officers from 10 provinces and regions. . . . The team
also arranges regular training with the International Center for
Missing and Exploited Children, in the US, and the US central bureau of
Interpol.''
\11\The revised legislation broadens the scope of activity
considered punishable for forced labor and strengthens punishments for
``serious'' crimes of forced labor; however, the legislation still does
not clearly define what constitutes forced labor. PRC Criminal Law
[Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingfa], enacted 1 July 79, amended 14 March
97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29
December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February
09, 25 February 11, art. 244; ``Eighth Amendment to the Criminal Law of
the People's Republic of China'' [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingfa
xiuzheng'an (ba)], 25 February 11, item 38. See also CECC, 2011 Annual
Report, 10 October 11, 129.
\12\State Council General Office, ``China Action Plan To Combat
Trafficking in Persons (2013-2020)'' [Zhongguo fandui guaimai renkou
xingdong jihua (2013-2020 nian)], 2 March 13.
\13\State Council General Office, ``China's National Plan of Action
on Combating Trafficking in Women and Children (2008-2012)'' [Zhongguo
fandui guaimai funu ertong xingdong jihua (2008-2012 nian)], 13
December 07.
\14\See table titled ``Notable Changes in China's 2013-2020 Anti-
Trafficking Plan of Action'' for detailed information on these changes.
\15\Office To Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S.
Department of State, ``Trafficking in Persons Report 2013--China,'' 19
June 13, 130. According to this report, ``the Chinese government
claimed that out of the 1,400 shelters serving a wide variety of
people, including victims of crime and the homeless, five were
dedicated to care for victims of human trafficking; victims also had
access to basic services at China's general-purpose shelter network.
The government also reported that two additional shelters were
established in [Yunnan province and Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region]
to protect and assist foreign trafficking victims. However, the
government did not report the number of victims assisted or the
services provided to the victims.''
\16\Ibid. According to this report, ``The government also reported
that two additional shelters were established in [Yunnan province and
Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region] to protect and assist foreign
trafficking victims. However, the government did not report the number
of victims assisted or the services provided to the victims.''
\17\Ibid.
\18\Ibid. According to this report, ``The Supreme People's Court
holds both semi-annual and annual training courses on human trafficking
and anti-trafficking in provinces in China where there is a higher
prevalence of human trafficking. In July 2012, an anti-trafficking
training course was held in Yunnan province attended by over 300
judges.''
\19\``Laos, China Map Out Measures To Tackle Human Trafficking,''
Asia News Net, 10 May 13.
\20\``China, Myanmar Step Up Human Trafficking Crackdown,'' Xinhua,
reprinted in China Daily, 15 May 13.
\21\Office To Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S.
Department of State, ``Trafficking in Persons Report 2013--China,'' 19
June 13, 130. According to this report, ``The government's lack of
transparency prevents an accurate assessment of its efforts; it has
never provided any data on the number of victims it has identified or
assisted.''
\22\Ibid., 129.
\23\Ibid.
\24\Office To Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S.
Department of State, ``Trafficking in Persons Report 2011--Definitions
and Methodology,'' June 2011, 14. According to this report, ``Pursuant
to the TVPA, governments of countries on Tier 3 may be subject to
certain sanctions, whereby the U.S. government may withhold or withdraw
nonhumanitarian, non-trade-related foreign assistance. In addition,
countries on Tier 3 may not receive funding for government employees'
participation in educational and cultural exchange programs. Consistent
with the TVPA, governments subject to sanctions would also face U.S.
opposition to assistance (except for humanitarian, trade-related, and
certain development-related assistance) from international financial
institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the
World Bank.''
\25\State Council General Office, ``China Action Plan To Combat
Trafficking in Persons (2013-2020)'' [Zhongguo fandui guaimai renkou
xingdong jihua (2013-2020 nian)], 2 March 13.
\26\Ibid., Sec. 1(1). The 2008-2012 Plan of Action did not contain
this phrase. State Council General Office, ``China's National Plan of
Action on Combating Trafficking in Women and Children (2008-2012)''
[Zhongguo fandui guaimai funu ertong xingdong jihua (2008-2012 nian)],
13 December 07.
\27\This effort is to be headed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
the Ministry of Public Security, and the Ministry of Commerce, in
cooperation with the All-China Women's Federation. State Council
General Office, ``China Action Plan To Combat Trafficking in Persons
(2013-2020)'' [Zhongguo fandui guaimai renkou xingdong jihua (2013-2020
nian)], 2 March 13, sec. 2.6.2(2).
\28\This effort is to be headed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
in cooperation with the Supreme People's Court, the Supreme People's
Procuratorate, the Ministry of Public Security, and the Ministry of
Justice. State Council General Office, ``China Action Plan To Combat
Trafficking in Persons (2013-2020)'' [Zhongguo fandui guaimai renkou
xingdong jihua (2013-2020 nian)], 2 March 13, sec. 2.6.2(6).
\29\State Council General Office, ``China Action Plan To Combat
Trafficking in Persons (2013-2020)'' [Zhongguo fandui guaimai renkou
xingdong jihua (2013-2020 nian)], 2 March 13, sec. 3(2).
\30\This work is to be headed by the Ministry of Education and the
Ministry of Justice. State Council General Office, ``China Action Plan
To Combat Trafficking in Persons (2013-2020)'' [Zhongguo fandui guaimai
renkou xingdong jihua (2013-2020 nian)], 2 March 13, sec. 2.4.2(1).
\31\Ibid.
\32\Ibid.
\33\In the 2008-2012 Plan of Action, there had been no mention of
family planning. State Council General Office, ``China's National Plan
of Action on Combating Trafficking in Women and Children (2008-2012)''
[Zhongguo fandui guaimai funu ertong xingdong jihua (2008-2012 nian)],
13 December 07. In the 2013-2020 Action Plan, however, officials are
urged to ``strengthen family planning services and pregnancy management
in key areas of human trafficking criminal activity, reduce unexpected
pregnancies and out-of-plan births, and immediately report related
information.'' This work is to be headed by the National Population and
Family Planning Committee, in cooperation with the Ministry of Public
Security and the Ministry of Health. State Council General Office,
``China Action Plan To Combat Trafficking in Persons (2013-2020)''
[Zhongguo fandui guaimai renkou xingdong jihua (2013-2020 nian)], 2
March 13, sec. 2.1.2(2).
\34\The PRC Criminal Law defines trafficking as ``abducting,
kidnapping, buying, trafficking in, fetching, sending, or transferring
a woman or child, for the purpose of selling the victim.'' PRC Criminal
Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingfa], enacted 1 July 79, amended 14
March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01,
29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February
09, 25 February 11, art. 240.
\35\This work is to be headed by the Ministry of Civil Affairs.
State Council General Office, ``China Action Plan To Combat Trafficking
in Persons (2013-2020)'' [Zhongguo fandui guaimai renkou xingdong jihua
(2013-2020 nian)], 2 March 13, sec. 2.1.2(3).
\36\State Council General Office, ``China Action Plan To Combat
Trafficking in Persons (2013-2020)'' [Zhongguo fandui guaimai renkou
xingdong jihua (2013-2020 nian)], 2 March 13, sec. 2.1.2(3).
\37\Ibid.
\38\Ibid.
\39\Ibid.
\40\Ibid.
\41\This work is to be headed by the Ministry of Education and the
Ministry of Justice. State Council General Office, ``China Action Plan
To Combat Trafficking in Persons (2013-2020)'' [Zhongguo fandui guaimai
renkou xingdong jihua (2013-2020 nian)], 2 March 13, sec. 2.5.2(1).
\42\Ibid.
\43\Victim protection efforts under the ``3P'' paradigm include
rescue, rehabilitation, and reintegration. U.S. Department of State,
``The 3Ps: Prevention, Protection, Prosecution,'' 27 June 11.
\44\This work is to be headed by the Ministry of Education and the
Ministry of Justice. State Council General Office, ``China Action Plan
To Combat Trafficking in Persons (2013-2020)'' [Zhongguo fandui guaimai
renkou xingdong jihua (2013-2020 nian)], 2 March 13, sec. 2.2.2(1).
\45\This work is to be headed by the Ministry of Civil Affairs and
the Ministry of Public Security, in cooperation with the Ministry of
Finance, the Ministry of Housing and Urban Construction, the Ministry
of Health, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Human Resources
and Social Security, the Communist Youth League, and the All-China
Women's Federation. See State Council General Office, ``China Action
Plan To Combat Trafficking in Persons (2013-2020)'' [Zhongguo fandui
guaimai renkou xingdong jihua (2013-2020 nian)], 2 March 13, sec.
2.1.2(2).
\46\This work is to be headed by the Ministry of Education and the
Ministry of Justice. State Council General Office, ``China Action Plan
To Combat Trafficking in Persons (2013-2020)'' [Zhongguo fandui guaimai
renkou xingdong jihua (2013-2020 nian)], 2 March 13, sec. 2.3.2(4).
\47\State Council General Office, ``China's National Plan of Action
on Combating Trafficking in Women and Children (2008-2012)'' [Zhongguo
fandui guaimai funu ertong xingdong jihua (2008-2012 nian)], 13
December 07, sec. 4.4.2(2).
\48\Topics that need to be addressed in domestic legislation to
bring it into compliance with the UN TIP Protocol include protection
and rehabilitation of victims of trafficking (see UN TIP Protocol,
Article 6.3), addition of non-physical forms of coercion into the legal
definition of trafficking (see UN TIP Protocol, Article 3(a)),
commercial sexual exploitation of minors (see UN TIP Protocol, Article
3(c and d)), and trafficking of men (covered under the definition of
``trafficking in persons'' in Article 3(a) of the UN TIP Protocol). See
UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons,
Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted by General
Assembly resolution 55/25 of 15 November 00, entered into force 25
December 03. See also Office To Monitor and Combat Trafficking in
Persons, U.S. Department of State, ``Trafficking in Persons Report
2009--China,'' 16 June 09, 106. ``China's definition of trafficking
does not prohibit . . . offenses committed against male victims . . .
.''
\49\The PRC Criminal Law defines trafficking as ``abducting,
kidnapping, buying, trafficking in, fetching, sending, or transferring
a woman or child, for the purpose of selling the victim.'' PRC Criminal
Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingfa], enacted 1 July 79, effective 1
October 97, amended 14 March 97, 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29
December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February
09, 25 February 11, art. 240.
\50\Ibid., arts. 240, 244, 358. For additional information on this
topic, see Office To Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S.
Department of State, ``Trafficking in Persons Report 2013--China,'' 19
June 13, 130. According to this report, ``it remains unclear whether
[articles 240, 244, and 358] have prohibited the use of common non-
physical forms of coercion, such as threats of financial or
reputational harm, or whether acts such as recruiting, providing, or
obtaining persons for compelled prostitution are covered.''
\51\PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingfa], enacted 1
July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25
December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February
05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, arts. 240(4), 244,
358(3). See also Office To Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons,
U.S. Department of State, ``Trafficking in Persons Report 2013--
China,'' 19 June 13, 130. ``[I]t remains unclear whether, under Chinese
law, children under the age of 18 in prostitution are considered
victims of trafficking regardless of whether force is involved.''
\52\The PRC Criminal Law defines trafficking as ``abducting,
kidnapping, buying, trafficking in, fetching, sending, or transferring
a woman or child, for the purpose of selling the victim.'' PRC Criminal
Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingfa], enacted 1 July 79, amended 14
March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01,
29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February
09, 25 February 11, art. 240.
\53\Ibid., arts. 244, 358. See also Office To Monitor and Combat
Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Department of State, ``Trafficking in
Persons Report 2009--China,'' 16 June 09, 106. ``China's definition of
trafficking does not prohibit non-physical forms of coercion, fraud,
debt bondage, involuntary servitude, forced labor, or offenses
committed against male victims, although some aspects of these crimes
are addressed in other articles of China's criminal law.''
\54\UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in
Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UN TIP
Protocol), adopted by General Assembly resolution 55/25 of 15 November
00, entered into force 25 December 03, art. 3(a). Article 3(a) of the
UN TIP Protocol states: ```Trafficking in persons' shall mean the
recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of
persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of
coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power
or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of
payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control
over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation
shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of
others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or
services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the
removal of organs.''
\55\The PRC Criminal Law defines trafficking as ``abducting,
kidnapping, buying, trafficking in, fetching, sending, or transferring
a woman or child, for the purpose of selling the victim.'' PRC Criminal
Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingfa], enacted 1 July 79, amended 14
March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01,
29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February
09, 25 February 11, art. 240.
\56\``China Busts Trafficking Ring, 89 Children Rescued,'' Agence
France-Presse, reprinted in Yahoo!, 24 December 12; ``Trial Against
Chinese Traffickers,'' Austrian Times, 15 January 13; ``China Arrests
Traffickers of N. Korean Women,'' Chosun Ilbo, 17 January 13.
\57\Office To Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S.
Department of State, ``Trafficking in Persons Report 2013--China,'' 19
June 13, 130. According to this report, ``While trafficking crimes
could perhaps be prosecuted under general statutes related to fraud and
deprivation of liberty, authorities did not report using these specific
provisions to prosecute and punish trafficking offenders. The
government reported law enforcement statistics that included
incarceration of sex and labor trafficking offenders involving women
and children victims. The government reported that police cracked down
on 10,000 alleged human trafficking organized crime groups and placed
over 80,000 alleged suspects in criminal detention. However, due to the
government's continued conflation of human smuggling, child abduction,
and fraudulent adoptions with trafficking offenses and its lack of
judicial due process and transparency, it is difficult to ascertain how
many trafficking cases the government actually investigated and
prosecuted during the reporting period. It therefore was difficult to
accurately assess Chinese anti-trafficking law enforcement efforts,
including the government's statistics on trafficking related
investigations, prosecutions, and convictions.''
\58\``Left Behind Children Become High Risk Group for Trafficking,
Expert Suggests `Criminal Punishment for Child Buying''' [Liushou
ertong cheng bei guai gaowei qunti zhuanjia jianyi ``maitong ruxing''],
Southern Daily, reprinted in People's Daily, 27 May 13; ``63 Trafficked
Children Rescued in China,'' Xinhua, reprinted in China Internet
Information Center, 10 March 13; ``89 Children Rescued in Chinese
Trafficking Ring Bust,'' Xinhua, 24 December 12.
\59\The end result of exploitation is one of the required elements
of a trafficking case under Article 3 of the UN TIP Protocol. UN
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons,
Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted by General
Assembly resolution 55/25 of 15 November 00, entered into force 25
December 03, art. 3(c).
\60\CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 175. For more
information on distinctions between ``human smuggling'' and ``human
trafficking,'' see U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, ``Fact
Sheet: Human Smuggling and Trafficking,'' 16 January 13.
\61\United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, ``Trafficking in
Persons and Migrant Smuggling,'' last visited 2 July 13.
\62\Ibid.
\63\Office To Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S.
Department of State, ``Trafficking in Persons Report 2013--China,'' 19
June 13, 130.
\64\Ibid., 130-31. According to this report, ``Chinese authorities
continued to forcibly repatriate North Korean refugees. The government
continued to treat North Koreans found in China as illegal economic
migrants, despite credible independent reporting that many North Korean
female refugees in China are trafficking victims. The government
detained and deported such refugees to North Korea, where they may face
severe punishment, even death, including in North Korean forced labor
camps. The Chinese government did not provide North Korean trafficking
victims with legal alternatives to repatriation. Chinese authorities
sometimes prosecuted citizens who assisted North Korean refugees and
trafficking victims, as well as those who facilitated illegal border
crossings.''
\65\Xinhua reported in March 2013 that China's sex ratio at birth
in 2012 was 117.7 [as provided in source] males for every 100 females,
down from 117.78 in 2011, 117.94 in 2010, and 119.45 in 2009. See
``China's Sex Ratio at Birth Declines 4 Years in a Row,'' Xinhua, 5
March 13. According to a March 2012 China Daily article, ``it is
estimated that by 2020, China will have 24 million more men than women
of marriageable age.'' Shan Juan, ``Gender Imbalance Set To Ease,''
China Daily, 30 March 12. A previous study issued by the Chinese
Academy of Social Sciences reported that, by 2020, the number of
Chinese males of marriageable age may exceed the number of Chinese
females of marriageable age by 30 to 40 million. Chinese Academy of
Social Sciences, ``Difficulty Finding a Wife in 10 Years: 1 Out of
Every 5 Men To Be a Bare Branch'' [10 nian zhihou quqi nan, 5 ge nanren
zhong jiuyou 1 ge guanggun], 27 January 10.
\66\``China's Sex Ratio at Birth Declines 4 Years in a Row,''
Xinhua, 5 March 13. See also Mikhail Lipatov et al., ``Economics,
Cultural Transmission, and the Dynamics of the Sex Ratio at Birth in
China,'' Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United
States of America, Vol. 105, No. 49 (December 2008), 19171. According
to this study, ``The root of the [sex ratio] problem lies in a 2,500-
year-old culture of son preference.'' Wei Xing Zhu et al., ``China's
Excess Males, Sex Selective Abortion and One Child Policy: Analysis of
Data From 2005 National Intercensus Survey,'' British Medical Journal,
9 April 09, 4-5.
\67\See, e.g., Office To Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons,
U.S. Department of State, ``Trafficking in Persons Report 2013--
China,'' 19 June 13, 129. According to the report, ``The Chinese
government's birth limitation policy and a cultural preference for
sons, create a skewed sex ratio of 118 boys to 100 girls in China,
which served as a key source of demand for the trafficking of foreign
women as brides for Chinese men and for forced prostitution.'' See also
``The Burmese Brides Trafficked Into China To Marry Total Strangers,''
Metro UK, 11 February 13. According to this report, ```Because of the
one child policy, Chinese people prefer to have a male, rather than a
female. There's a big gap. That's why rural Chinese men are trying to
get a bride from other countries, like Burma, Vietnam or Cambodia.
Burma is one of the main ones.' Police Colonel Nyunt Hlaing, from
Burma's Transnational Crime Department's anti-trafficking unit, said:
`China's one-child policy is the main cause of the problem.'''
\68\Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, ``Difficulty Finding a Wife
in 10 Years: 1 Out of Every 5 Men To Be a Bare Branch'' [10 nian zhihou
quqi nan, 5 ge nanren zhong jiuyou 1 ge guanggun], 27 January 10.
\69\``Chinese Women Taught To Avoid People-Traffickers,'' Xinhua,
reprinted in China Daily, 8 March 10.
\70\``The Burmese Brides Trafficked Into China To Marry Total
Strangers,'' Metro UK, 11 February 13. According to one person cited in
this report, ``Women become brokers because they can approach the young
women and cultivate their trust . . . people are desperate to get out
of poverty.'' See also Kathleen E. McLaughlin, ``Borderland: Sex
Trafficking on the China-Myanmar Border,'' Global Post, 26 October 10;
``Women Tricked, Trafficked Into China,'' Radio Free Asia, 4 March 11;
Zhang Yan, ``More Women Kidnapped for Brides,'' China Daily, 3 December
11. According to the China Daily report, ``[the director of the
Ministry of Public Security's anti-trafficking office] said the lack of
natural barriers, such as rivers or mountains in the border areas
between China and Southeast Asian countries, in addition to poverty in
some regions in these countries, contribute to the rising trafficking
of foreign women.''
\71\Echo Hui, ``Websites Sell Burmese Brides to Chinese
Bachelors,'' Irrawaddy, 12 December 12.
\72\Zhang Yan, ``Efforts Boosted Against Human Trafficking,'' China
Daily, 22 January 13.
\73\Ibid.
\74\Rao Dehong, ``7 Female Primary School Students From Liangshan
Lured To Work in Dongguan Will Be Returned to School'' [7 ming
liangshan xiaoxue nusheng bei you zhi dongguan wugong jiang bei jiehui
fanxiao shangxue], Southern Metropolitan Daily, 6 December 12; Michelle
FlorCruz, ``Weibo: How China's Twitter Has the Power To Save Children,
and Why That Worries the Government,'' International Business Times, 6
December 12.
\75\Phillip Martin, ``Human Trafficking: Taken Into China,'' WGBH,
22 January 13.
\76\``Myanmar's Trafficked Brides Fill China's Shortage of Women,''
TrustLaw, 4 December 12. For additional stories of Burmese women
trafficked into China for forced marriage, see Tyler Chapman,
``Speaking Out To Combat Trafficking,'' Radio Free Asia, 30 November
12; Echo Hui, ``Websites Sell Burmese Brides to Chinese Bachelors,''
Irrawaddy, 12 December 12; ``The Burmese Brides Trafficked Into China
To Marry Total Strangers,'' Metro UK, 11 February 13.
\77\``Jilin Yanji Criminal Gang Trafficking 20 Foreign Women
Caught, Culprits Had Been Trafficked'' [Jilin yanji tuanhuo guaimai 20
ming waiji funu bei zhua zhufan ceng bei guai], NetEase, 16 January 13.
\78\``China Arrests Traffickers of N. Korean Women,'' Chosun Ilbo,
17 January 13.
Notes to Section II--North Korean Refugees in China
\1\Patrick Goodenough, ``China Spurns U.N. Criticism After Sending
N. Korean Refugees Back to Uncertain Fate,'' CNS News, 4 June 13;
``North Korean Workers in China Face Stepped-Up Restrictions,'' Radio
Free Asia, 15 March 13.
\2\Democratic People's Republic of Korea Ministry of State
Security, People's Republic of China Ministry of Public Security,
Mutual Cooperation Protocol for the Work of Maintaining National
Security and Social Order in the Border Area, signed 12 August 86, art.
4, reprinted in North Korea Freedom Coalition. The protocol commits
each side to treat as illegal those border crossers who do not have
proper visa certificates, except in cases of ``calamity or unavoidable
factors.'' According to a report commissioned by the UNHCR, the
validity of ``this document cannot be authenticated, but it does not
seem implausible.'' James Seymour, ``China: Background Paper on the
Situation of North Koreans in China,'' commissioned by UNHCR,
Protection Information Section, January 2005, 13.
\3\UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (1951
Convention), 28 July 51 by the UN Conference of Plenipotentiaries on
the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons convened under General
Assembly resolution 429(V) of 14 December 50, arts. 1, 33. Article 1 of
the 1951 Convention defines a refugee as someone who, ``owing to well-
founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or,
owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of
that country . . . .'' Article 33 of the 1951 Convention mandates that
``[n]o Contracting State shall expel or return (`refouler') a refugee
in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life
or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion.'' UN Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (1967
Protocol), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution A/RES/2198 of 16
December 66, entry into force 4 October 67. The Chinese government
acceded to the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol in September 1982,
but has not adopted legislation to implement the treaties.
\4\Andrei Lankov, ``Kim Cracks Open Refugee Issue,'' Asia Times, 5
January 13; Hazel Smith, Woodrow Wilson International Center for
Scholars, ``Explaining North Korean Migration to China,'' November
2012, 3; Roberta Cohen, ``North Koreans in China in Need of
International Protection,'' Forced Migration Review, reprinted in
Brookings Institution, December 2012; ``Park Geun-hye Will Discuss
North Korean Refugee Issue With Xi Jinping in Visit to China'' [Piao
jinhui fanghua jiang yu xi jinping tan tuobeizhe wenti], Duowei, 19
June 13.
\5\Kwanwoo Jun, ``North Korean Defector Arrivals Plunge in South in
2012,'' Wall Street Journal, 2 January 13; Zhao Jiayue, ``China North
Korean Border: Buying `North Korean Refugees' To Be Wives'' [Zhong chao
bianjing: mai ``tuobeizhe'' dang xifu], Southern People Weekly,
reprinted in Ta Kung Pao, 14 March 13; Matthew Pennington, ``US To
Press China Over Repatriation of NKoreans,'' Associated Press, 22 April
13; ``China Arrests Traffickers of N.Korean Women,'' Chosun Ilbo, 17
January 13. For reports on past campaigns to crack down on North Korean
refugees in China, see, e.g., CECC, 2012 Annual Report, 10 October 12,
108; CECC, 2011 Annual Report, 10 October 11, 131; CECC, 2010 Annual
Report, 10 October 10, 140-41.
\6\Life Fund For North Korean Refugees, ``China Promises Bounty on
All NK Refugees Turned In,'' 31 April 13; Zhao Jiayue, ``China North
Korean Border: Buying `North Korean Refugees' To Be Wives'' [Zhong chao
bianjing: mai ``tuobeizhe'' dang xifu], Southern People Weekly,
reprinted in Ta Kung Pao, 14 March 13.
\7\Life Fund For North Korean Refugees, ``China Promises Bounty on
All NK Refugees Turned In,'' 31 April 13.
\8\Zhao Jiayue, ``China North Korean Border: Buying `North Korean
Refugees' To Be Wives'' [Zhong chao bianjing: mai ``tuobeizhe'' dang
xifu], Southern People Weekly, reprinted in Ta Kung Pao, 14 March 13.
\9\```Ice' Use Spreads, Worsening North Korea's Drug Addiction
Problem,'' Radio Free Asia, 19 September 13; ``Crystal Meth and
Tesco,'' Economist, 16 February 13; ``NK's Massive Drug Trafficking
Angers China: Source,'' Dong-A Ilbo, 5 July 11; ``Revealed: How is
North Korea Circulating Methamphetamines into the Northeast? China is
Furious'' [Jiemi: chaoxian ruhe xiang dongbei toufang bingdu? Zhongguo
fanu le], Phoenix Weekly, reprinted in Wenxuecity, 15 October 11;
``Jilin Yanji Criminal Gang Trafficking 20 Foreign Women Caught,
Culprits Had Been Trafficked'' [Jilin yanji tuanhuo guaimai 20 ming
waiji funu bei zhua zhu fan ceng bei guai], New Culture News, reprinted
in NetEase, 16 January 13.
\10\Cho Jong Ik, ``Defection a Major Concern for the Kims,'' Daily
NK, 10 December 12; Lee Sang Yong, ``NSA Tracking China Permit
Violators,'' Daily NK, 6 November 12. For reports on previous
collaboration between Chinese and North Korean security officials, see,
e.g., CECC, 2012 Annual Report, 10 October 12, 108; CECC, 2011 Annual
Report, 10 October 11, 131.
\11\Cho Jong Ik, ``Defection a Major Concern for the Kims,'' Daily
NK, 10 December 12; Lee Sang Yong, ``NSA Tracking China Permit
Violators,'' Daily NK, 6 November 12.
\12\Lee Sang Yong, ``NSA Tracking China Permit Violators,'' Daily
NK, 6 November 12.
\13\Choe Sang-Hun, ``Fleeing North Korea Is Becoming Harder,'' New
York Times, 4 January 13.
\14\Kwanwoo Jun, ``North Korean Defector Arrivals Plunge in South
in 2012,'' Wall Street Journal, 2 January 13.
\15\Ibid.; Courtland Robinson, ``The Curious Case of North Korea,''
Forced Migration Review, Edition 43, May 2013, 53-54.
\16\``Defector Numbers Show Slight Rise,'' Daily NK, 22 July 13;
``N. Korean Defectors in S. Korea on the Rise,'' Yonhap News Agency, 21
July 13. According to the Ministry of Unification, a total of 717
refugees entered South Korea in the first half of 2013, a slight
increase from 710 in the first half of 2012. However, only 320 refugees
entered in the first quarter of 2013, marking a 10 percent decline from
2012. See ``Number of N. Korean Defectors Falls 10%,'' Yonhap News
Agency, reprinted in Korea Herald, 11 April 13.
\17\The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ``Report
of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Marzuki Darsuman,'' 1 February
13, Annex I, para. 21, 16.
\18\Ibid., Annex I, para. 39, 19; Stephen Haggard and Marcus
Noland, ``Repression and Punishment in North Korea: Survey Evidence of
Prison Camp Experiences,'' Politics, Governance, and Security Series,
No. 20, East-West Center, 5 October 09, 11-12.
\19\The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ``Report
of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Marzuki Darsuman,'' 1 February
13, Annex I, para. 39, 19; Human Rights Watch, ``North Korea: Denial of
Rights Forces Back Refugees,'' 30 May 13.
\20\Human Rights Watch, ``North Korea: Denial of Rights Forces Back
Refugees,'' 30 May 13; David Hawk, The Committee for Human Rights in
North Korea, ``The Hidden Gulag,'' 2012, 120-21; Esther Felden,
``Tortured, Beaten, Starved: Life in a Korean Gulag,'' Deutsche Welle,
18 June 13.
\21\Human Rights Watch, ``North Korea: Denial of Rights Forces Back
Refugees,'' 30 May 13; David Hawk, The Committee for Human Rights in
North Korea, ``The Hidden Gulag,'' 2012, 123-31.
\22\David Hawk, The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea,
``The Hidden Gulag,'' 2012, 119-21; ``Two North Korean Christians
Killed for Their Faith,'' Open Door USA, 18 January 13.
\23\David Hawk, ``North Korea's Hidden Gulag: Interpreting Reports
of Changes in the Prison Camps,'' The Committee for Human Rights in
North Korea, 27 August 13, 33; Chico Harlan, ``Population of North
Korea's Gulag Has Shrunk, Experts Say,'' Washington Post, 12 September
13. Some refugee activists estimate would-be refugees account for up to
5 percent of the total North Korean prison population, with one North
Korean human rights researcher pointing to a ``five-fold rise'' in the
number of detained refugees over the last 10 years. Chris Brummitt,
```Tightening the Noose': Crackdown on Defectors Fills North Korean
Prison Camps,'' Associated Press, reprinted in NBC News, 12 June 13.
\24\Under the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol, the Chinese
government is obligated to refrain from repatriating refugees ``sur
place.'' UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights,
``Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status
under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status
of Refugees,'' January 1992, Section B(4)(b), paras. 94-105.
\25\UN Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted by the UN General Assembly
10 December 84, entry into force 26 June 87, art. 3. Article 3 states
that ``No State Party shall expel, return (`refouler') or extradite a
person to another State where there are substantial grounds for
believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.''
The Chinese government ratified the Convention on 4 October 88.
\26\Courtland Robinson and Keumsoon Lee, ``Population Estimation of
North Korean Refugees and Migrants and Children Born to North Korean
Women in Northeast China: Results from a 2012 Study in Heilongjiang
Province,'' Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU), 12 March
13, 5, 21, 24. Robinson and Lee estimate between 80 and 90 percent of
the North Korean-born population in northeast China are women. Brian
Marten, ``Perilous Passage: Human Trafficking and the `Underground
Railroad,''' NK News, 11 February 13; Journalist and writer Melanie
Kirkpatrick estimates 75 percent of North Korean refugees in China are
women. Kim So Yeol, ``An Interview with Christian Activist Tim Peters,
Founder of Helping Hands,'' Network for North Korean Democracy and
Human Rights, 27 February 13. North Korean refugee activist Tim Peters
estimates between 70 and 80 percent of North Korean refugees in China
are women. For cases of trafficking and abuse of female refugees, see
Kim Kwang Jin, ``2 Murdered in Human Trafficking Incident,'' Daily NK,
3 January 13; Zhao Jiayue, ``China North Korean Border: Buying `North
Korean Refugees' To Be Wives'' [Zhong chao bianjing: mai ``tuobeizhe''
dang xifu], Southern People Weekly, reprinted in Ta Kung Pao, 14 March
13.
\27\Melanie Kirkpatrick, Escape From North Korea: The Untold Story
of Asia's Underground Railroad (New York: Encounter Books, 2012), 83;
``China Arrests Traffickers of N.Korean Women,'' Chosun Ilbo, 17
January 13.
\28\Melanie Kirkpatrick, Escape From North Korea: The Untold Story
of Asia's Underground Railroad (New York: Encounter Books, 2012), 83;
Brian Marten, ``Perilous Passage: Human Trafficking and the
`Underground Railroad,''' NK News, 11 February 13; Markus Bell,
``Empire and Trafficking in Northeast Asia,'' Foreign Policy in Focus,
reprinted in Asia Times, 5 June 13.
\29\Catherine Porter, ``A North Korean Refugee's Tale of Tragedy
and Bravery,'' Toronto Star, 23 May 13; ``China Arrests Traffickers of
N.Korean Women,'' Chosun Ilbo, 17 January 13; Brian Marten, ``Perilous
Passage: Human Trafficking and the `Underground Railroad,''' NK News,
11 February 13.
\30\UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (1951
Convention), 28 July 51 by the UN Conference of Plenipotentiaries on
the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons convened under General
Assembly resolution 429(V) of 14 December 50, arts. 1, 31-33; UN
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (1967 Protocol), adopted by
UN General Assembly resolution A/RES/2198 of 16 December 66, entry into
force 4 October 67.
\31\Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in
Persons, Especially Women and Children (UN TIP Protocol), supplementing
the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime,
adopted and opened for signature, ratification, and accession by
General Assembly resolution A/RES/55/25 of 15 November 2000, entry into
force 29 September 03, art. 7.
\32\Courtland Robinson and Keumsoon Lee, ``Population Estimation of
North Korean Refugees and Migrants and Children Born to North Korean
Women in Northeast China: Results From a 2012 Study in Heilongjiang
Province,'' Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU), 12 March
13, 6.
\33\Ibid.; Life Fund for North Korean Refugees, ``Stateless Foster
Children in China,'' 1 June 13.
\34\Courtland Robinson and Keumsoon Lee, ``Population Estimation of
North Korean Refugees and Migrants and Children Born to North Korean
Women in Northeast China: Results From a 2012 Study in Heilongjiang
Province,'' Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU), 12 March
13, 29-30.
\35\Ibid., 27; Christine Hong, ``The Fiction of the North Korean
Refugee Orphan,'' US-Korea Institute at SAIS, 38 North (blog), 19
September 12; Cho Jung-hyun et al., Korea Institute for National
Unification (KINU), ``White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea--
2013,'' July 2013, 468.
\36\Courtland Robinson and Keumsoon Lee, ``Population Estimation of
North Korean Refugees and Migrants and Children Born to North Korean
Women in Northeast China: Results From a 2012 Study in Heilongjiang
Province,'' Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU), 12 March
13, 6; Life Fund for North Korean Refugees, ``Stateless Foster Children
in China,'' 1 June 13.
\37\UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted by the UN
General Assembly resolution 44/25 of 20 November 89, entry into force 2
September 90, art. 9. Article 9 calls on state parties to ``ensure that
a child shall not be separated from his or her parents against their
will.'' The Chinese government ratified the Convention on the Rights of
the Child on March 2, 1992.
Notes to Section II--Public Health
\1\Keith Bradsher, ``China's Actions in Flu Cases Draw Critics,''
New York Times, 10 April 13; Yanzhong Huang, ``The Rise of a Deadly New
Strain of Bird Flu: Has China Handled This Properly So Far?'' Council
on Foreign Relations, Asia Unbound (blog), 1 April 13.
\2\Keith Bradsher, ``China's Actions in Flu Cases Draw Critics,''
New York Times, 10 April 13; Amy Li, ``Shanghai Stifled Flu `Rumours'
in Early Days, Says Report,'' South China Morning Post, 10 April 13.
\3\Lisa Schnirring, Center for Infectious Disease Research &
Policy, University of Minnesota, ``Global Health Groups Weigh in on
H7N9 Threat,'' 20 May 13. World Health Organization (WHO) Director-
General Margaret Chan reportedly ``praised China's quick response and
its transparency in sharing clinical investigation and virus
information with the global health community.'' Natasha Khan and Daryl
Loo, ``Deadly Lessons From SARS Spur Global Reaction to Bird Flu,''
Bloomberg, 9 April 13; Food and Drug Safety, Public Health and the
Environment, Hearing of the Congressional-Executive Commission on
China, 22 May 13, Testimony of Rear Admiral Anne Schuchat, M.D.,
Director, National Center for Immunization & Respiratory Diseases,
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services, 3-4, 6-7.
\4\Natasha Khan and Daryl Loo, ``Deadly Lessons From SARS Spur
Global Reaction to Bird Flu,'' Bloomberg, 9 April 13; Food and Drug
Safety, Public Health and the Environment, Hearing of the
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 22 May 13, Testimony of
Rear Admiral Anne Schuchat, M.D., Director, National Center for
Immunization & Respiratory Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 4, 6.
\5\Gonghuan Yang et al., ``Rapid Health Transition in China 1990-
2010: Findings from the Global Burden of Disease Study,'' Lancet, Vol.
381, Issue No. 9882 (2013), 1987-2015.
\6\Wei Mingyan, ```Economic Development Can't Come at the Cost of
the People's Health''' [``Jingji fazhan buneng yi minzhong jiankang wei
daijia''], Beijing News, 29 June 13. According to the Beijing News,
findings from an eight-year research study commissioned by the State
Council found higher than average cancer rates along the Huai River.
\7\Edward Wong, ``Pollution Leads to Drop in Life Span in Northern
China, Study Finds,'' New York Times, 8 July 13. Wong cites to a study,
``Evidence on the Impact of Sustained Exposure to Air Pollution on Life
Expectancy From China's Huai River Policy,'' published in the U.S.
Science journal, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, based
on data analysis of Chinese sources from 1981 through 2001. See Yuyu
Chen et al., ``Evidence on the Impact of Sustained Exposure to Air
Pollution on Life Expectancy From China's Huai River Policy,''
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, Vol. 110, No. 32 (8
July 13), 12936-12941.
\8\Zhao Yinan, ``Food, Medicine Safety Cases on Rise,'' China
Daily, 1 August 12; Pew Global Attitudes Project, Pew Research Center,
``Growing Concerns in China About Inequality, Corruption,'' 16 October
12. According to the 2012 Pew research report, ``[f]our years ago, just
12% rated food safety a very big problem; today, it's 41%. The
percentage expressing very serious concerns about the safety of
medicine has more than tripled, from 9% in 2008 to 28% today.''
\9\E Fan, ``Food Products Remain Greatest Source of Worry,
Improving Social Security Is Obvious'' [Shipin reng shi zuida bu'an
shehui zhi'an gaishan mingxian], Xiaokang Magazine, Vol. 6, 3 June 13.
Based on Xiaokang Magazine's research, food safety and medical care are
first and second place among the top five concerns among the Chinese
public. See, e.g., ``Survey: Only 10% of Chinese Patients Trust
Doctors'' [Diaocha: zhongguo jin 10% de huanzhe xinren yisheng], Radio
Free Asia, 18 March 13. According to a survey in Shandong raised by
members of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference,
credibility in the health system includes a low level of trust in
medical doctors and a high rate of disputes over medical treatment.
\10\``China's Shaken Trust,'' Wall Street Journal, 23 April 13;
Jonathan Kaiman, ``Inside China's `Cancer Villages,''' Guardian, 4 June
13; ``Towards Better Health for People in China,'' Lancet, Vol. 381,
No. 9882 (8 June 13), 1959.
\11\According to Guardian reporter Jonathan Kaiman, following the
Ministry of Environmental Protection's February 2013 mention of
``cancer villages'' in its most recent five-year plan, political
leaders ``renounced the report's wording'' and urged media censorship
at local levels. See Jonathan Kaiman, ``Inside China's `Cancer
Villages,''' Guardian, 4 June 13.
\12\Yanzhong Huang, ``Fatal Misperception: How Unsafe Is Chinese
Food?'' Council on Foreign Relations, Asia Unbound (blog), 10 July 13;
Li Jing, ``People's Daily Says Chemical Paraxylene Is No More Harmful
Than Coffee,'' South China Morning Post, 25 June 13.
\13\``China To Merge Health Ministry, Family Planning Commission,''
Xinhua, 10 March 13.
\14\Zan Xin, ``90 CPPCC Members Jointly Propose Retaining Ministry
of Health's Original Name'' [90 ming zhengxie weiyuan lianming tiqing
baoliu weishengbu yuanming], Caixin, 12 March 13.
\15\Lin Yunshi, ``The Name `National Health and Family Planning
Commission' Raises Debate'' [``Weisheng he jihua shengyu weiyuanhui''
mingcheng yin zhengyi], Caixin, 12 March 13.
\16\Chen Qiulin, ``Using Institutional Reform To Promote Reform of
Family Planning and Health Care'' [Yi jigou gaige tuidong jisheng,
yiliao gaige], Financial Times, 3 April 13.
\17\PRC Mental Health Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jingshen
weisheng fa], passed 26 October 12, effective 1 May 13; Zhang Youyi,
``Mental Health Law: A Step Forward,'' Caijing, 6 November 13. For
further information on the 27 years of preparation and debates on the
development of the Mental Health Law, see CECC, 2012 Annual Report, 10
October 12, 112-13; CECC, 2011 Annual Report, 10 October 11, 136-38.
\18\Michael R. Phillips, ``Can China's New Mental Health Law
Substantially Reduce the Burden of Illness Attributable to Mental
Disorders?'' Lancet, Vol. 381, No. 9882 (8 June 13), 1964-1966.
\19\Li Qiumeng, ``Civil Society Report Says Mental Health Law Is
Insufficient: Guardians' Authority Too Large'' [Minjian baogao cheng
jingshen weishengfa cun buzu: jianhuren quanli guoda], Jinghua Daily,
reprinted in Global Times, 13 May 13. See also Michael R. Phillips,
Hanhui Chen, et al., ``China's New Mental Health Law: Reframing
Involuntary Treatment,'' American Journal of Psychiatry, Vol. 170, No.
6, 1 June 13, 588-591. According to Phillips et al., ``With the
exception of forensic cases (which are regulated according to China's
revised Criminal Procedures Law), the process of involuntary admission
is not directly supervised by a court, but patients and family members
are empowered to take the case to court if they believe the required
procedures have been mismanaged. China's approach may be contrasted
with that of countries that provide direct judicial review of all
involuntary admissions and free legal representation.'' For a
comparative analysis on rights protections for the mentally ill in the
revised Criminal Procedure Law and the new Mental Health Law, see
Jeremy Daum, ``Still Crazy After All These Years,'' China Law
Translate, 20 May 13.
\20\Dui Hua Foundation, ``Involuntary Commitment: Ankang Regs vs
Mental Health Laws,'' Dui Hua Reference Materials, 29 November 12. See
also, Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ```The Darkest Corners': Abuses
of Involuntary Psychiatric Commitment in China,'' 6 August 12.
\21\Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``China Human Rights Briefing,
December 6-13, 2012,'' 14 December 12.
\22\State Council Information Office, ``National Human Rights
Action Plan of China (2012-2015),'' 11 June 12, section III, part 5. In
addition to the new Mental Health Law, passed on October 24, 2012, the
State Council passed on June 28, 2012, new Regulations on the
Construction of a Barrier-Free Environment. See PRC People's Republic
of China Mental Health Law (Full Text) [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo
jingshen weisheng fa (quanwen)], passed 26 October 12, effective 1 May
13, Xinhua, 26 October 12; State Council, Regulations on the
Construction of a Barrier-Free Environment [Wu zhang'ai huanjing
jianshe tiaoli], passed 13 June 12, effective 1 August 12.
\23\State Council Legislative Affairs Commission, Circular on the
``Regulations on the Education of Persons With Disabilities (Amended
Draft) (Manuscript) Public Solicitation of Opinions'' [Canjiren jiaoyu
tiaoli (xiuding cao'an) (song shen gao) gongkai zhengqiu yijian de
tongzhi], 27 February 13.
\24\Equity and Justice Initiative, ``Human Rights Watch Sends
Opinion to China State Council Legislative Affairs Commission Office
Regarding `Regulations on the Education of Persons with Disabilities'
Draft Revision'' [Renquan guancha zuzhi zhi zhongguo guowuyuan fazhi
bangongshi guanyu ``canjiren jiaoyu tiaoli'' xiuding cao'an de yijian],
31 March 13; Human Rights Watch, ``China: Submission by Human Rights
Watch to the Legislative Affairs Office of the State Council,'' 18 May
13 (the submission is dated 25 March 13); Sweet Road, ``The Sweet Road:
Recommendations for the Draft Revision of the `Regulations on Education
for Persons With Disabilities' to the State Council Legislative Affairs
Commission'' [Ganzhilu: wei ``canjiren jiaoyu tiaoli (xiugai cao'an)''
jianyan zhixin guowuyuan fazhiban], reprinted in Justice for All, 24
March 13; One Foundation, ``Public Participation in Legislation on
Regulations on Education for Persons With Disabilities, Airing the
Voices of Persons With Disabilities'' [Minjian canyu canji ren jiaoyu
tiaoli lifa, fachu canzhang renshi de shengyin], 20 March 13. According
to the One Foundation article, the One Foundation, One Plus One (Yi Jia
Yi), and the Beijing Children's Legal Aid and Research Center, together
with disability rights advocates, parents of disability rights
advocates, and public interest lawyers, jointly submitted
recommendations to the Legislative Affairs Commission on the draft
Regulations.
\25\Human Rights Watch, ``China: Submission by Human Rights Watch
to the Legislative Affairs Office of the State Council,'' 18 May 13
(the submission is dated 25 March 13).
\26\Ibid. For examples of the definition of reasonable
accommodation in several countries' disability legislation, see UN
General Assembly, Ad Hoc Committee on a Comprehensive and Integral
International Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights
and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, 7th Session, ``The Concept of
Reasonable Accommodation in Selected National Disability Legislation,''
Department of Economic and Social Affairs, A/AC.265/2006/CRP.1, 7
December 05.
\27\Sweet Road, ``The Sweet Road: Recommendations for the Draft
Revision of the `Regulations on Education for Persons With
Disabilities' to the State Council Legislative Affairs Commission''
[Ganzhilu: wei ``canjiren jiaoyu tiaoli (xiugai cao'an)'' jianyan
zhixin guowuyuan fazhiban], reprinted in Justice for All, 24 March 13;
One Foundation, ``Public Participation in Legislation on Regulations on
Education for Persons With Disabilities, Airing the Voices of Persons
With Disabilities'' [Minjian canyu canji ren jiaoyu tiaoli lifa, fachu
canzhang renshi de shengyin], 20 March 13.
\28\Sweet Road, ``The Sweet Road: Recommendations for the Draft
Revision of the `Regulations on Education for Persons with
Disabilities' to the State Council Legislative Affairs Commission''
[Ganzhilu: wei ``canjiren jiaoyu tiaoli (xiugai cao'an)'' jianyan
zhixin guowuyuan fazhiban], reprinted in Justice for All, 24 March 13;
Human Rights Watch, ``China: Submission by Human Rights Watch to the
Legislative Affairs Office of the State Council,'' 18 May 13 (the
submission is dated 25 March 13).
\29\UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,
Concluding Observations on the Initial Report of China, Adopted by the
Committee at Its Eighth Session, 15 October 12.
\30\See, e.g., PRC Law on the Protection of Persons with
Disabilities [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo canjiren baozhangfa], passed 28
December 90, amended 24 April 08, effective 1 July 08, arts. 3, 25, 30-
40; PRC Employment Promotion Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jiuye cujin
fa], passed 30 August 07, effective 1 January 08, arts. 3, 29, 30; PRC
Law on the Prevention and Control of Infectious Diseases [Zhonghua
renmin gongheguo chuanranbing fangzhi fa], issued 21 February 89,
amended 28 August 04, art. 16; State Council, Regulations on the
Treatment and Control of HIV/AIDS [Aizibing fangzhi tiaoli], passed 18
January 06, effective 1 March 06, art. 3. For the Commission's coverage
of health-based discrimination in recent years, see CECC, 2012 Annual
Report, 10 October 12, 112-13; CECC, 2011 Annual Report, 10 October 11,
136-37; CECC, 2010 Annual Report, 10 October 10, 148-49; and CECC, 2009
Annual Report, 10 October 09, 183-85.
\31\China Labour Bulletin, ``Employment Discrimination in China,''
20 November 12; ``More Than 40% of China's Rural Disabled Persons Live
Below the Poverty Line'' [Zhongguo you 40% yishang de nongcun canjiren
shenghuo zai pingkun xian yixia], Radio Free Asia, 28 August 12; Zhang
Xuhong, ``Individual With Outstanding Grades Refused Employment, First
Case of AIDS Employment Discrimination in Jiangxi Took Legal Action
Yesterday'' [Chengji youyi xiaohuo zao julu jiangxi aizibing jiuye
qishi diyi an zuo qisu], Jiangxi Daily, 27 November 12.
\32\Zhang Han, ``Where Can People Living With HIV Get Operations?''
[HIV ganranzhe shoushutai zai na?], Southern Metropolitan Daily, 20
December 12.
\33\For examples of health-based discrimination in access to
education, see Liang Chen, ``When B Is Worse Than F,'' Global Times, 5
September 12 (Hepatitis B); Huang Yuli, ``Principal Defends Rejecting
Autistic Boy,'' China Daily, 21 September 12 (autism); ``Feeling Their
Way,'' Economist, 13 July 13 (visual impairment); ``AIDS Guarantees
Have Not Been Implemented, Targeted Solutions Are Difficulty Piled Upon
Difficulty'' [Aizibing baozhang wei luoshi jiuzhi mubiao nan shang
nan], Radio Free Asia, 22 November 12 (HIV/AIDS).
\34\Can Xin, ``Closer Look: Efforts To Protect HIV/AIDS Patients'
Rights Fall Short,'' Caixin, 27 November 12.
\35\Zheng Xiaoqian and Shi Caiying, ``At Least 20 Provinces and
Municipalities Have Teacher Physical Standards That Might Discriminate
Against Persons With Disabilities'' [Zhishao 20 ge shengshi jiaoshi
zige tijian biaozhun shexian qishi canji ren], Dahe Net, reprinted in
Economic Daily, 10 September 11. See also, ``Many Provinces Stipulate
People Suffering From High Blood Pressure Should Not Become Teachers,
Probably Employment Discrimination'' [Duosheng guiding gaoxieya huanzhe
bude dang jiaoshi, she jiuye qishi], Modern Express, reprinted in China
Law Information, 8 January 13.
\36\He Dan, ``Disability Rights Advocates Call for Equal
Employment,'' China Daily, 4 December 12.
\37\One Plus One, ``Implementation in China of the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,'' submission to
the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Committee on
the Rights of Persons With Disabilities, 7th Session, March 2012, 20.
\38\For an account of long-term advocacy to stop employment
discrimination against carriers of Hepatitis B, see Fu Hualing,
``Embedded Socio-Legal Activism in China: The Case of Yirenping,'' Hong
Kong Law Journal, Vol. 42, Part 2 (2012). On recent efforts of NGOs and
disability rights advocates, see ``Jiangxi AIDS Discrimination Case:
First To Receive Compensation'' [Jiangxi aizi qishi di yi an huo
buchang], Radio Free Asia, 24 January 13; ``Guangdong's Plan To Prevent
People Infected With Sexually-Transmitted Diseases and HIV/AIDS From
Teaching Raises Debate'' [Guangdong ni jinzhi huan xingbing aizibingzhe
dang jiaoshi yin zhengyi], Xinhua, reprinted in China Law Information,
7 January 13; ``Guangdong Bureau of Education Prohibits AIDS Carriers
From Becoming Teachers, Public Interest Organization Suggests
Abolishing'' [Guangdong jiaoyuting jin aizibingzhe dang jiaoshi, gongyi
zuzhi jianyi quxiao], Legal Daily, 11 January 13. There also were open
government information requests from disability rights activists on the
number of disabled persons hired as civil servants during the 2013
reporting year. See ``Disabled Youth in Henan Requests the Chinese
[Government] Release Information About Civil Service Recruitment of the
Disabled'' [Henan canji qingnian yaoqiu zhongguo gongbu gongwuyuan luqu
canji ren qingkuang], Radio Free Asia, 3 December 12; Jiang Gewei,
``Why Is the Number of Civil Servants Who Are Disabled Persons a State
Secret?'' [Gongwuyuan zhong canzhang ren shuliang heyi cheng guojia
mimi], Hunan Broadcast Network Legal Weekly, 24 May 13.
\39\Wan Jing, ``Six Lawyers Demand an Investigation of the Legality
of the Civil Servant Physical Examination Standards'' [Liu lushi yaoqiu
shencha gongwuyuan tijian biaozhun hefaxing wenti], Legal Daily, 30
November 12. Several of the lawyers who sent the letter were involved
in the four known HIV/AIDS employment discrimination lawsuits. They
also noted that employment discrimination violates China's Employment
Promotion Law and the Regulations to Prevent and Control HIV/AIDS.
\40\Jiang Gewei, ``Why Is the Number of Civil Servants Who Are
Disabled Persons a State Secret?'' [Gongwuyuan zhong canzhang ren
shuliang heyi cheng guojia mimi], Hunan Broadcast Network Legal Weekly,
24 May 13.
\41\Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, adopted
by UN General Assembly resolution 61/106 of 13 December 06, entry into
force 3 May 08, art. 24(4), art 27(1). China signed the Convention on
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) on March 30, 2007, and
ratified it on August 1, 2008.
\42\Zhang Renwang, ``Persons With Disabilities From 19 Provinces
and Cities Thank Guangdong for Eliminating Discriminatory Provisions in
the Teacher Physical Examination Standards'' [19 shengshi canzhang
renshi ganxie yue shanchu jiaoshi tijian canzhang qishi tiaokuan],
Southern Daily, 20 May 13.
\43\Zheng Xiaoqian and Shi Caiying, ``At Least 20 Provinces and
Municipalities Have Teacher Physical Standards That Might Discriminate
Against Persons With Disabilities'' [Zhishao 20 ge shengshi jiaoshi
zige tijian biaozhun shexian qishi canji ren], Dahe Net, reprinted in
Economic Daily, 10 September 11. Presumably Guangdong province's
revisions to its teacher physical eligibility standards reduced by at
least one the total number of provisions with discriminatory
regulations. See also, ``Many Provinces Stipulate People Suffering From
High Blood Pressure Should Not Become Teachers, Probably Employment
Discrimination'' [Duosheng guiding gaoxieya huanzhe bude dang jiaoshi,
huo she jiuye qishi], Modern Express, reprinted in China Law
Information, 8 January 13.
\44\Human Rights Watch, ``China: Submission by Human Rights Watch
to the Legislative Affairs Office of the State Council,'' 18 May 13,
no. 6 (the submission is dated 25 March 13).
\45\Zhang Han, ``Where Can People Living With HIV Get Operations?''
[HIV ganranzhe shoushutai zai na?], Southern Metropolitan Daily, 20
December 12; ``AIDS Patients Face Discrimination at China Hospitals,''
Voice of America, 30 November 12.
\46\Zhang Han, ``Where Can People Living With HIV Get Operations?''
[HIV ganranzhe shouxutai zai na?], Southern Metropolitan Daily, 20
December 12.
\47\``China Orders Hospitals To Treat HIV/Aids Patients,'' Agence
France-Presse, reprinted in South China Morning Post, 24 November 12.
\48\Ministry of Health, Circular on Strengthening Medical Treatment
Services for People Living With AIDS and Carriers of HIV [Weishengbu
guanyu jiaqiang aizibing huanzhe he bingdu ganranzhe yiliao fuwu
gongzuo de tongzhi], 23 November 12.
\49\Wen Ya, ``MOH's Notice Not Enough To Help HIV/AIDS Patients:
NGOs,'' Global Times, 26 November 12.
Notes to Section II--The Environment
\1\National Development and Reform Commission, ``Report on the
Implementation of the 2012 Plan for National Economic and Social
Development and on the 2013 Draft Plan for National Economic and Social
Development,'' reprinted in Wall Street Journal, 5 March 13, 5. The
report stated that in 2012 the emissions of sulfur dioxide and nitrogen
oxide decreased by 4.52 percent and 2.77 percent, respectively; that
chemical oxygen demand and ammonia nitrogen in water decreased by 3.05
percent and 2.62 percent, respectively; and that carbon dioxide
emissions per unit of GDP decreased by 5.02 percent. The report also
indicated some advances in afforestation and grassland restoration, and
increases in daily capacity of wastewater and garbage treatment. For
additional information on environmental conditions in China, see the
Ministry of Environmental Protection, ``2012 Report on China's
Environmental Conditions'' [2012 Zhongguo huanjing zhuangkuang
gongbao], 28 May 13 (click on link to PDF); and for information on
``ecological progress,'' see the State Council Information Office,
``Progress in China's Human Rights in 2012,'' reprinted in Xinhua, 14
May 13, sec. 5.
\2\Edward Wong, ``Cost of Environmental Damage in China Growing
Rapidly Amid Industrialization,'' New York Times, 29 March 13.
Degradation reportedly cost China 3.5 percent of GDP in 2010, three
times as much as it did in 2004.
\3\Ministry of Environmental Protection, ``2012 Report on China's
Environmental Conditions'' [2012 Zhongguo huanjing zhuangkuang
gongbao], 28 May 13, 21 (click on link to PDF).
\4\Ministry of Civil Affairs, ``Ministry of Civil Affairs, Office
of the National Disaster Reduction Commission Issues 2013 First Quarter
National Disaster Situation'' [Minzheng bu, guojia jianzai weiyuanhui
bangongshi fabu 2013 nian yijidu quanguo zaiqing], 8 April 13. China
reportedly experienced 11 instances of very visible, large-scale
``foggy and hazy'' skies, the most since 1961, that affected 20
provinces during the winter months and lasted for a total of 20 to more
than 30 days depending on the area.
\5\Alexander Martin, ``Kumamoto Residents Stay Indoors Amid China
Pollution Fears,'' Wall Street Journal, 5 March 13. Japanese officials
suggested residents on one island stay in their homes because pollution
surpassed safety standards.
\6\Edward Wong, ``In China, Widening Discontent Among the Communist
Party Faithful,'' New York Times, 19 January 13; Edward Wong, ``China
Lets Media Report on Air Pollution Crisis,'' New York Times, 14 January
13; Barbara Finamore et al., ``Air Pollution Crisis Gives New Momentum
to Environmental Regulation in China,'' Natural Resources Defense
Council, Switchboard Blog (Barbara Finamore's blog), 22 February 13.
\7\Yang Wanli and Qiu Quanlin, ``A New Environment for Fight
Against Pollution,'' China Daily, 19 March 13. According to the China
Daily report, air pollution was a hot topic at the meetings of the
National People's Congress and the Chinese People's Political
Consultative Congress, with at least 20 deputies including the topic in
their speeches. Wang Tao, ``The Flavor of the `Atmosphere' During the
Political Season of the Two Sessions'' [Lianghui zhengzhi jili de
``kongqi'' weidao], Southern Weekend, 1 March 13; Sun Siya,
``Environmental Protection Becomes CPPCC Hot Proposal; Conference
Members Suggest Adding Environmental Rights to Constitution'' [Huanbao
cheng zhengxie ti'an redian weiyuan jianyi gongmin huanjing quan ru
xian], Beijing Times, reprinted in China Environmental News, 3 March
13.
\8\Barbara Finamore et al., ``Air Pollution Crisis Gives New
Momentum to Environmental Regulation in China,'' Natural Resources
Defense Council, Switchboard Blog (Barbara Finamore's blog), 22
February 13. According to this article, the episodes of serious air
pollution prompted the government to move forward with tougher fuel
standards and to advance revisions to the PRC Air Pollution Prevention
and Control Law. The Ministry of Environmental Protection also plans to
issue stricter emission control standards for certain heavily polluting
industries.
\9\Edward Wong, ``Air Pollution Linked to 1.2 Million Premature
Deaths in China,'' New York Times, 1 April 13. This NYT article
reported that in 2010 what was called ``ambient particulate matter
pollution'' was the fourth-leading risk factor linked to deaths, and
outdoor pollution was a factor in 1.2 million premature deaths the same
year. Verna Yu, ``Judge Officials on Health, Environment Too: Expert,''
South China Morning Post, 7 March 13. The SCMP reported that a doctor
in China said air pollution was a major contributor to respiratory
diseases. ``Law Amendment Urged To Combat Air Pollution,'' China
Internet Information Center, reprinted in Ministry of Environmental
Protection, 25 February 13. The article reported that the Beijing
Health Bureau showed air pollution was among the main causes for a 56
percent surge in lung cancer rates between 2001 and 2010. Greenpeace,
``Dangerous Breathing: PM2.5: Measuring the Human Health and Economic
Impacts on China's Largest Cities,'' 18 December 12. The Greenpeace
report stated that the PM2.5 levels (particulate matter with a diameter
smaller than 2.5 m) in certain regions in China during selected
periods were two to four times higher than the World Health
Organization's air quality guidelines.
\10\Ministry of Environmental Protection, ```12th Five-Year' Plan
on Prevention and Control of Environmental Risks From Chemicals''
[Huaxuepin huanjing fengxian fangkong ``shierwu'' guihua], issued 7
February 13. Fifty-one percent of the sudden environmental accidents
that occurred between 2008 and 2011 were linked to hazardous chemicals.
\11\Ibid. This follows a similar acknowledgement in 2010 linking
pollution along the Huai River with the high number of cancerous tumors
found in residents along the river as described in the Caijing article
below. Xu Chao, ``The Relationship Between Huai River Basin Pollution
and Cancer Basically Established'' [Huaihe liuyu wuran yu aizheng
guanxi jiben zhengshi], Caijing, 27 December 10.
\12\Feng Jie and Wang Tao, ``Groundwater Contamination Prevention
and Control's `Underground History''' [Dixiashui fangzhi de ``dixia
shi''], Southern Weekend, 28 February 13; Wang Qian and Li Jing,
``Groundwater Gets Worse, Land Agency Says,'' China Daily, 21 October
11. According to the China Daily article, in 2011, authorities
reportedly classified as bad more than 57 percent of the groundwater
monitored in 182 cities.
\13\Luna Lin, ``Beijing Campaigners Praise `Unexpected' Release of
Water Quality Data,'' Chinadialogue, 4 April 13.
\14\Li Tianyang, ``Li Tianyang: Must Find Out About the Real
Situation and Move Forward To Remediate Groundwater'' [Li tianyang:
dixiashui wuran zhengzhi yao yu modi bingjin], Beijing Times, reprinted
in Southern Net, 22 April 13.
\15\Xie Qingyu, ``Before the End of This Year Pearl River Delta
Will Introduce Comprehensive Soil Pollution Control'' [Zhusanjiao
jinnian di qian shishi turang wuran zonghe zhili], Southern Daily,
reprinted in Xinhua, 14 June 13.
\16\``China's Toxic Rice Bowl,'' Wall Street Journal, 22 May 13;
Josh Chin and Te-Ping Chen, ``Officials Try To Calm Rice Fears,'' Wall
Street Journal, 22 May 13; Brian Spegele, ``China To Survey Soil Amid
Fears Over Rice,'' Wall Street Journal, 12 June 13. The May 2013
revelation that in Guangzhou municipality more than 40 percent of a
small number of samples of rice sold on the market were contaminated
with cadmium raised anxieties about soil pollution.
\17\Tania Branigan, ``Chinese Pollution Study `Blocked on Grounds
of State Secrecy,''' Guardian, 26 February 13; Dong Zhengwei,
``Ministry of Environmental Protection Indicates Methodology of Soil
Pollution Survey Factor in Not Disclosing Data on Prevention and
Control Measures'' [Huanbaobu gaozhi turang wuran diaocha fangfa
chengyin fangzhi cuoshi shuju bu gongkai], Sina Blogs (Dong Zhengwei's
blog), 25 February 13. For more information on Dong Zhengwei's open
government information request and application for administrative
reconsideration, and the official response, see Dong Zhengwei,
``Administrative Reconsideration Requests Ministry of Environmental
Protection To Disclose Information on Soil Pollution Survey Data''
[Xingzheng fuyi qingqiu huanbaobu gongkai turang wuran diaocha shuju
xinxi], Sina Blogs (Dong Zhengwei's blog), 27 February 13; Dong
Zhengwei, ``Ministry of Environmental Protection Acknowledges
Nationwide Soil Contamination Survey Data Should Be Made Public''
[Huanbaobu queren quanguo turang wuran zhuangkuang diaocha shuju
yingdang xiang shehui gongkai], Sina Blogs (Dong Zhengwei's blog), 9
May 13. For Commission analysis, see ``Soil Contamination Data Remains
a State Secret Leaving Citizens Uninformed About Potential Pollution
Hazards,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 21 May 13.
\18\Richard Finney, ``Chinese Mines Pollute Tibet's Rivers,
Streams,'' Radio Free Asia, 6 May 13.
\19\Xie Dan, ``Purifying `Poisoned Land' Is Mysterious Business''
[``Dudi'' jinghua qianyi shenmi shengyi], Southern Weekend, 19 March
12.
\20\Xu Nan and Zhang Chun, ``The Chase for Growth in Western China
Could Cause `Huge Surge in Pollution,''' Chinadialogue, 23 January 13;
Nadya Ivanova, ``Toxic Water: Across Much of China, Huge Harvests
Irrigated With Industrial and Agricultural Runoff,'' Circle of Blue, 18
January 13. Circle of Blue quoted an expert as saying, ``Pollution is
getting worse and worse here. Many heavy metal companies and plants
have moved to Gansu from the east . . . .'' Thomas Stevenson, ``The
Dirty Secret Behind Shanghai's Bluer Skies,'' Tea Leaf Nation, 6
December 12. The Tea Leaf Nation article discusses the relocation of
industries to Yunnan province and the resulting pollution and health
problems. He Tao and Gao Shengke, ``Western-Bound Industrial Shift
Raises Environmental Concern,'' Caijing, 31 July 12. According to
Caijing, most lead-acid battery factories in one town in Jiangxi
province moved there from Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces because there
were weaker environmental policies in the Jiangxi town. Susan
Shifflett, ``Paradigm Shift in Chinese Environmental Sector Needed,
Says Activist Wang Canfa,'' Environmental Change and Security Program,
Woodrow Wilson Center (NewSecurityBeat Blog), 21 March 13.
\21\Liu Xiaoxing, ``Don't Let Rural Environment Become a Forgotten
Corner'' [Bie rang nongcun huanjing cheng bei yiwangjiaoluo], China
Environmental News, 11 March 13.
\22\``Hu Jintao Report at the 18th Party Congress of the Chinese
Communist Party'' [Hu jintao zai zhongguo gongchandang di shiba ci
quanguo daibiao dahui shang de baogao], Xinhua, 17 November 12, items 2
and 8; Meng Si, ``An Insight Into the Green Vocabulary of the Chinese
Communist Party,'' Chinadialogue, 15 November 12. The term ``ecological
civilization'' appeared in policy documents first in 2007, when former
Party General Secretary and President Hu Jintao included the concept as
being tied to the four basic goals of a ``xiaokang'' society (an all-
around well-off society).
\23\``Hu Jintao Report at the 18th Party Congress of the Chinese
Communist Party'' [Hu jintao zai zhongguo gongchandang di shiba ci
quanguo daibiao dahui shang de baogao], Xinhua, 17 November 12, Item
2.8.
\24\Chinese Communist Party Constitution, adopted 6 September 82,
amended 1 November 87, 18 October 92, 18 September 97, 14 November 02,
21 October 07, 14 November 12, General Program. The following is a
Commission translation of the paragraph: ``The Chinese Communist Party
leads the people in building a socialist ecological civilization. It
will establish an ecological civilization ethos that respects,
accommodates, and protects nature; uphold the basic national policies
of natural resource conservation and environmental protection; adhere
to the guiding principle of giving high priority to conservation [of
resources], protection [of the environment], and natural restoration
[of the ecosystem]; and adhere to the path of civilized development
with increased production, prosperous living, and a good ecological
environment. In order to create a good working and living environment
for the people and to realize the sustainable development of the
Chinese nation, the Party will do its utmost to construct a
conservationist and environmentally friendly society, which forms the
spatial framework [similar to spatial planning] for industrial
structures, production methods, and ways of living, that conserves
resources and protects the environment.'' For the official Xinhua
English translation of this paragraph, see ``Full Text of Constitution
of Communist Party of China,'' Xinhua, 18 November 12, General Program.
Li Jing, ``Pollution Targets Will Test New Leadership,'' South China
Morning Post, 15 November 12. One Chinese expert noted that ``promoting
ecological harmony'' was quite a vague concept that did not provide
much guidance about how to balance economic growth and the environment.
\25\``Hu Jintao's Report at the 18th Party Congress of the Chinese
Communist Party'' [Hu jintao zai zhongguo gongchandang di shiba ci
quanguo daibiao dahui shang de baogao], Xinhua, 17 November 12, item
8.4. Hu said, ``[R]esource consumption, environmental damage and
ecological efficiency shall be included in systems for evaluating
economic and social development, in order to establish a system of
targets, evaluation and rewards and punishments that reflects the
requirements of an ecological civilization.'' Leslie Hook, ``China:
Green Revolution Becomes a Plank of Beijing Political Agenda,''
Financial Times, 25 November 12.
\26\``Li Keqiang: Study the Spirit of the 18th Party Congress,
Advance Sustainable and Healthy Economic Development and Social
Progress'' [Li keqiang: xuexi dang de shibada jingshen cujin jingji
chixu jiankang fazhan he shehui jinbu], People's Daily, 21 November 12,
item 2(3). Li said that construction of an ``ecological civilization''
would be prominent and incorporated in economic, political, cultural,
and social development. ``Li Keqiang: Cannot Sacrifice the Environment
Which Would in Return Bring an Increase in Citizen Dissatisfaction''
[Li keqiang: buneng yi xisheng huanjing lai huanqu renmin bing bu manyi
de zengzhang], Xinhua, 17 March 13. At the March meeting of the
National People's Congress, Li Keqiang said that while advancing
China's economy and developing, it is necessary to ``let citizens
breathe clean air, drink safe water, and be reassured of edible food.''
Andrew Jacobs, ``In China, New Premier Says He Seeks a Just Society,''
New York Times, 17 March 13. According to this New York Times article,
Li Keqiang encouraged the media and the public to hold him accountable
if the government does not clean up water pollution and the food
supply.
\27\Supreme People's Court and Supreme People's Procuratorate,
``Supreme People's Court and Supreme People's Procuratorate
Interpretation of Certain Issues Related to Laws Applicable in Criminal
Cases of Environmental Pollution'' [Zuigao renmin fayuan, zuigao renmin
jianchayuan guanyu banli huanjing wuran xingshi anjian shiyong falu
ruogan wenti de jieshi], 17 June 13.
\28\``China Releases Air Pollution Reduction Plan, Vows PM2.5
Cut,'' Xinhua, 5 December 12; State Council, ``State Council Response
Letter Regarding the `12th Five-Year' Plan for Air Pollution Prevention
and Control in Key Regions'' [Guowuyuan guanyu zhongdian quyu daqi
wuran fangzhi ``shierwu'' guihua de pifu], 27 September 12; Ministry of
Environmental Protection, ```12th Five-Year' Plan for Air Pollution
Prevention and Control in Key Regions'' [Zhongdian quyu daqi wuran
fangzhi ``shierwu'' guihua], issued October 2012. See also ``China To
Cap Pollutant Emissions in Six Industries,'' Xinhua, reprinted in
Beijing Review, 7 March 13.
\29\State Council, ``State Council Response Letter Regarding the
`12th Five-Year' Plan for Air Pollution Prevention and Control in Key
Regions'' [Guowuyuan guanyu zhongdian quyu daqi wuran fangzhi
``shierwu'' guihua de pifu], 27 September 12; Ministry of Environmental
Protection, ```12th Five-Year' Plan for Air Pollution Prevention and
Control in Key Regions'' [Zhongdian quyu daqi wuran fangzhi ``shierwu''
guihua], issued October 2012.
\30\Barbara Finamore et al., ``Air Pollution Crisis Gives New
Momentum to Environmental Regulation in China,'' Natural Resources
Defense Council, Switchboard Blog (Barbara Finamore's blog), 22
February 13.
\31\``Law Amendment Urged To Combat Air Pollution,'' China Internet
Information Center, reprinted in Ministry of Environmental Protection,
25 February 13; Li Xin et al., ``A Period of Soliciting Opinions on
Draft Revisions to the `Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law' Is
Over'' [``Daqi wuran fangzhi fa'' xiudinggao zhengqiu yijian jieduan yi
jieshu], China National Radio, reprinted in Xinhua, 11 March 13.
Forward momentum had appeared stalled after the MEP submitted a draft
to the State Council in January 2010. The March China National Radio
report indicated the revisions have not yet been sent to the NPC and
noted that authorities had completed an internal comment period on the
draft revisions of the law.
\32\``Ten Regulatory Policies To Prevent and Control Air Pollution
Signed During Executive Meeting of State Council'' [Guowuyuan changwu
huiyi bushu daqi wuran fangzhi shi tiao cuoshi], The Central People's
Government of the People's Republic of China, reprinted in Legal Daily,
14 June 13; State Council, Atmospheric Pollution Prevention and Control
Action Plan [Daqi wuran fangzhi xingdong jihua], 10 September 13.
\33\Liu Xiaoxing, ``Li Ganjie Emphasizes Proceeding Quickly With
Soil Environmental Protection Legislative Work at First Meeting of the
Soil Environmental Protection Law and Regulation Drafting Work Leading
Small Group'' [Li ganjie zai turang huanjing baohu fagui qicao gongzuo
lingdao xiaozu diyici huiyishang qiangdiao jiakuai tuijin turang
huanjing baohu lifa gongzuo], China Environment News, reprinted in
Ministry of Environmental Protection, 16 November 12.
\34\State Council General Office, Circular Regarding Work
Arrangements for Near-Term Soil Environmental Protection and
Comprehensive Control and Management [Guowuyuan bangongting guanyu
yinfa jinqi turang huanjing baohu he zonghe zhili gongzuo anpai de
tongzhi], issued 23 January 13.
\35\Xie Qingyu, ``Before the End of This Year Pearl River Delta
Will Introduce Comprehensive Soil Pollution Control'' [Zhusanjiao
jinnian di qian shishi turang wuran zonghe zhili], Southern Daily,
reprinted in Xinhua, 14 June 13; State Council General Office, Circular
Regarding Work Arrangements for Near-Term Soil Environmental Protection
and Comprehensive Control and Management [Guowuyuan bangongting guanyu
yinfa jinqi turang huanjing baohu he zonghe zhili gongzuo anpai de
tongzhi], issued 23 January 13. The circular stipulated that not less
than 80 percent of the soil quality of arable land survey sites found
in a new national survey should meet standards by 2015. It also
stipulated that China should establish a national soil environmental
protection system by 2020.
\36\National Development and Reform Commission, ``China 2012 Annual
Report on Policies and Actions To Address Climate Change'' [Zhongguo
yingdui qihou bianhua de zhengce yu xingdong 2012 niandu baogao],
November 2012.
\37\Information Office of the State Council, ``China's Energy
Policy 2012,'' reprinted in Xinhua, 24 October 12.
\38\Globe International and Grantham Research Institute on Climate
Change and the Environment, ``The GLOBE Climate Legislation Study:
China,'' 14 January 13. The report is an extract from the third edition
of the study.
\39\National Development and Reform Commission, ``Report on the
Implementation of the 2012 Plan for National Economic and Social
Development and on the 2013 Draft Plan for National Economic and Social
Development,'' reprinted in Wall Street Journal, 5 March 13, 20.
\40\``China Issues First Greenhouse Gas Bulletin,'' Xinhua,
reprinted in Beijing Review, 16 January 13; China Meteorological
Administration, ``China Meteorological Administration Issues First
Period `China Greenhouse Gas Bulletin''' [Zhongguo qixiangju fabu
shouqi ``zhongguo wenshi qiti gongbao''], Greenhouse Gas and Related
Trace Components Research Professionals Team, 14 January 13.
\41\Office of the Spokesperson, U.S. Department of State, ``Joint
U.S.-China Statement on Climate Change,'' 13 April 13.
\42\Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, ``United States
and China Agree To Work Together on Phase Down of HFCs,'' 8 June 13.
HFCs are a greenhouse gas utilized in air conditioners and
refrigerators among other items.
\43\National People's Congress Standing Committee, ``Environmental
Protection Law Revisions (Draft) Articles'' [Huanjing baohufa xiuzheng
an (caoan) tiaowen], 31 August 12.
\44\National People's Congress, ``Legal Drafts for Public Comment''
[Falu caoan zhengqiu yijian], last visited on 17 June 13.
\45\Xie Qingyu, ```Environmental Protection Lawsuits' Still by the
Wayside in Environmental Protection Law Revisions'' [Huanbaofa zai
xiugai ``huanbao gongyi susong'' rengran pangluo], Southern Daily, 28
September 12; Yan Shuang, ``Experts Say Proposed Environmental
Protection Laws Fail To Protect,'' Global Times, 27 September 12; China
Democratic League, ``Proposal Regarding Improving the Environmental
Protection Law Revisions (Draft)'' [Guanyu wanshan ``huanjing baohufa
xiuzheng an (caoan)'' de ti'an], reprinted in People's Daily (Strong
Nation Forum, E Governance Square BBS), 5 March 13.
\46\Ministry of Environmental Protection, ``Regarding Letter Sent
With Comments and Suggestions About Environmental Protection Law
Revisions (Draft)'' [Guanyu baosong dui ``huanjing baohufa xiuzheng an
(caoan)'' yijian he jianyi de han], 29 October 12; China Democratic
League, ``Proposal Regarding Improving the Environmental Protection Law
Revisions (Draft)'' [Guanyu wanshan ``huanjing baohufa xiuzheng an
(caoan)'' de ti'an], reprinted in People's Daily (Strong Nation Forum,
E Governance Square BBS), 5 March 13; Friends of Nature,
```Environmental Protection Law' Revisions Still Lagging, Legislative
Breakthroughs Difficult'' [``Huanjing baohufa'' xiuding reng zhihou
lifa nan tupo], 21 September 12.
\47\Friends of Nature, ``Comments on the `Draft Revisions of the
Environmental Protection Law, Second Reading Draft''' [Guanyu
``huanjing baohufa xiuzheng an (caoan) erci shenyi gao'' de yijian], 13
August 13; Li Jing, ``Green Law Change Would Limit Lawsuits,'' South
China Morning Post, 27 June 13.
\48\Friends of Nature, ``Comments on the `Draft Revisions of the
Environmental Protection Law, Second Reading Draft''' [Guanyu
``huanjing baohufa xiuzheng an (caoan) erci shenyi gao'' de yijian], 13
August 13.
\49\Ministry of Supervision, ``Investigation and Management of
Discipline and Legal Violation Cases During 2012, Enforcement
Supervision and Rectification of Misconduct Work'' [2012 nian zhifa
jiancha, jiufeng gongzuo zhong chaban weiji weifa anjian qingkuang], 9
January 13. Between January and November 2012, in the environmental
protection sector, supervision authorities reportedly corrected 22,100
violations of laws and regulations and took Party and government
disciplinary actions against 305 people. Zhou Shengxian, ``Thoroughly
Carry Out the 18th Party Congress Spirit, Vigorously Promote Ecological
Civilization Construction Make Great Effort To Open a New Phase in
Environmental Protection Work--Minister Zhou Shengxian's Speech at the
2013 National Environmental Protection Work Meeting'' [Shenru guanche
dang de shibada jingshen dali tuijin shengtai wenming jianshe nuli
kaichuang huanbao gongzuo xin jumian--zhou shengxian buzhang zai 2013
nian quanguo huanjing baohu gongzuo huiyi shang de jianghua], Ministry
of Environmental Protection, 24 January 13, sec. 2, item 4, para. 4.
Minister Zhou noted that during inspections in 2012, environmental
officials investigated and handled 8,779 instances of behavior that
violated environmental laws and regulations nationwide; the Ministry of
Environmental Protection supervised the handling of 1,770 of those
cases. He also noted that during a ``100-day'' inspection campaign of
43,000 enterprises, authorities discovered 2,296 environmental risks.
\50\See, e.g., Chen Liping, ``Strengthen Environmental Legislation
and Improve Supervision and Management Mechanisms'' [Qianghua huanjing
fazhi wanshan jianguan jizhi], Legal Daily, 3 September 12; Luo Sha and
An Bei, ``Five Representatives From National People's Congress
Organizations Answer Journalists' Questions About NPC Work'' [Quanguo
renda jiguan wuwei fuzeren jiu renda gongzuo da jizhe wen], Xinhua,
reprinted in National People's Congress Net, 10 March 13; Ministry of
Environmental Protection, ``Ministry of Environmental Protection
Bulletin Regarding National Environmental Impact Assessment Mechanism
Enforcement Review'' [Huanjing baohubu tongbao quanguo huanjing
yingxiang pingjia jigou zhuanxiang zhifa jiancha qingkuang], 28 January
13; Chen Yuanyuan, ``Need To Raise Speed and Quality for Open
Information'' [Xinxi gongkai xuyao tisu tizhi], China Environment Net,
3 April 13; Li Jing, ``CCTV Expose Shows Frustration of Agencies at
Keeping Firms in Check,'' South China Morning Post, 28 September 12.
The SCMP article reported sources as saying it would be hard to rein in
the polluting behavior of state-owned firms because of their economic
and political power. Brian Spegele and Wayne Ma, ``China Clean-Air Bid
Faces Resistance,'' Wall Street Journal, 22 January 13. A director of
an environmental policy research group affiliated with the MEP
reportedly noted that there is poor enforcement of standards relating
to oil refineries. Niu Yongdou, ``How To Handle the Problem of
Grassroots Enforcement?'' [Ruhe chuli jiceng zhifa nanti?], China
Environmental News, 10 September 12.
\51\Li Jing, ``Ex-Minister Blames China's Pollution Mess on Lack of
Rule of Law,'' South China Morning Post, 21 January 13. Qu Geping, the
former Minister of Environmental Protection criticized the overemphasis
on economic growth when he told an international reporter that ``. . .
governments have done far from enough to rein in the wild pursuit of
economic growth. . . .'' He linked unchecked economic development to
the ``rule of men'' and not the ``rule of law.'' Niu Yongdou, ``How To
Handle the Problem of Grassroots Enforcement?'' [Ruhe chuli jiceng
zhifa nanti?], China Environmental News, 10 September 12.
\52\Chen Liping, ``Strengthen Environmental Legislation and Improve
Supervision and Management Mechanisms'' [Qianghua huanjing fazhi
wanshan jianguan jizhi], Legal Daily, 3 September 12; Wu Wenchong and
Jiang Xueqing, ``Who Guards the Green Guards?'' China Daily, 21
February 13. According to the China Daily, the MEP downgraded,
cancelled the qualifications of, or admonished 88 environmental impact
assessment organizations for a variety of reasons including poor
quality of personnel and assessment reports, and for inaccurate data or
falsifying data. Xi Jianrong, ``34 Steel Projects in Four Areas of
Hebei Did Not Undertake Any Environmental Procedures'' [Hebei sidi 34
ge gangtie xiangmu wu renhe huanbao shouxu], Legal Daily, reprinted in
China Transparency, 9 November 12. According to Legal Daily, a
longstanding problem has been that projects are begun without first
undertaking an environmental impact assessment. William Kazer and
Kersten Zhang, ``China's Environmental Protection Racket,'' Wall Street
Journal, China Real Time Report (blog), 1 February 13.
\53\Li Jing, ``Ex-Minister Blames China's Pollution Mess on Lack of
Rule of Law,'' South China Morning Post, 21 January 13. Qu Geping, the
former Minister of Environmental Protection, said that the strategy of
coordinating growth with conservation was not implemented ``because
there was no supervision of government. It is because the power is
still above the law.''
\54\Alex Wang et al., ``Airpocalypse Now: China's Tipping Point?''
ChinaFile, 6 February 13; ``Politics of Pollution: China's Oil Giants
Take a Choke-Hold on Power,'' Reuters, reprinted in CNBC, 3 February
13; Li Jing, ``CCTV Expose Shows Frustration of Agencies at Keeping
Firms in Check,'' South China Morning Post, 28 September 12.
\55\Chen Liping, ``Strengthen Environmental Legislation and Improve
Supervision and Management Mechanisms'' [Qianghua huanjing fazhi
wanshan jianguan jizhi], Legal Daily, 3 September 12; Li Jing, ``CCTV
Expose Shows Frustration of Agencies at Keeping Firms in Check,'' South
China Morning Post, 28 September 12; Alex Wang et al., ``Airpocalypse
Now: China's Tipping Point?'' ChinaFile, 6 February 13. Alex Wang noted
that ``China has faced the same problems with cheating anytime hard
targets are coupled with insufficient monitoring.''
\56\PRC Civil Procedure Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo minshi
susong fa], passed 9 April 91, amended 28 October 07, 31 August 12,
effective 1 January 13, art. 55.
\57\Li Na, ``Public Interest Litigation `Breaks the Ice,' Takes the
First Step To Enter the System'' [Gongyi susong rufa maichu zhidu
``pobing'' diyibu], Legal Daily, 5 September 12. Previously, only the
PRC Marine Environmental Protection Law had clarified the specific
entities that are allowed to bring such suits, i.e., oceanic
administrative departments. ``Ministry of Environmental Protection:
Four Major Problems With the Environmental Protection Law Amendment
Draft'' [Huanbaobu: huanbaofa xiuzheng'an caoan cunzai si da wenti],
Legal Daily, 1 November 12.
\58\ Xie Qingyu, ```Environmental Protection Lawsuits' Still by the
Wayside in Environmental Protection Law Revisions'' [Huanbaofa zai
xiugai ``huanbao gongyi susong'' rengran pangluo], Southern Daily, 28
September 12. Between 2009 and June of 2012, the All-China Environment
Federation (ACEF), which is supported by the government, brought in
part or in whole at least six of these public interest cases. The ACEF
won two of them, and three came to a mediated settlement. Ng Tze-wei,
``Lack of Environmental Public Interest Litigation in No One's Best
Interest,'' South China Morning Post, 9 November 12. Environmental
courts are estimated only to have heard a total of around 17 public
interest lawsuits.
\59\Li Jing, ``Green Law Change Would Limit Lawsuits,'' South China
Morning Post, 27 June 13; All-China Environment Federation,
``Introduction,'' 30 August 12. The introduction states that the ACEF
is supported by the government.
\60\Zhang Jing, ``Nongovernmental Groups Explore Environmental
Public Interest Litigation'' [Huanjing gongyi susong de minjian
tansuo], China Environment Net, reprinted in All-China Environment
Federation, 27 December 12; ``Chinese Fishermen File Lawsuit in US
Court Against Conoco Philips Over 2011 Oil Spills,'' Associated Press,
reprinted in Washington Post, 2 July 12. Just as with other types of
lawsuits, courts may be reluctant to accept cases (see Role of
Environmental Courts and Unreliable Legal Remedies in this section).
For example, lawyers attempted to file cases in their own names to
courts in three areas related to compensation claims from farmers
affected by the ConocoPhilips/China National Offshore Oil Corp. 2011
Bohai oil spill, but none of them have been accepted.
\61\Xie Qingyu, ```Environmental Protection Lawsuits' Still by the
Wayside in Environmental Protection Law Revisions'' [Huanbaofa zai
xiugai ``huanbao gongyi susong'' rengran pangluo], Southern Daily, 28
September 12. It can also be difficult to determine compensation, win
court cases, and enforce court judgments. Ng Tze-wei, ``Lack of
Environmental Public Interest Litigation in No One's Best Interest,''
South China Morning Post, 9 November 12. The SCMP article pointed out
that compensation rules are not clear in these suits.
\62\Wu Yunbo, ``Where Are the Difficulties With Environmental
Public Interest Lawsuits'' [Huanjing gongyi susong nan zai hechu],
Dazhong Daily, reprinted in China Development Brief, 10 October 12; Liu
Xiaoqing, ``Is the Road Smooth-Going for Non-Governmental Public
Interest Litigation?'' [Minjian gongyi susong tashang tantu?], China
Environment News, 6 November 12.
\63\Hu Zhonghua, ``The Limitations to China's Environmental Public
Interest Litigation System'' [Woguo huanjing gongyi susong zhidu de
xiandu], Journal of Wuhan University of Technology (Social Science
Edition), Vol. 24, No. 6, reprinted in China Environment and Resources
Law Network, 26 November 12.
\64\Zhou Yiming and Huang Yuanwu, ``Guizhou Qingzhen Procuratorate
Supports Individual Citizen as Plaintiff in Filing Environmental Public
Interest Suit'' [Guizhou qingzhen jianchayuan zhichi gongmin geren wei
yuangao tiqi huanjing gongyi susong], Justice Net, 27 September 12; Yan
Zhijiang and Wan Jing, ``First Case of Individual Citizen Bringing
Public Interest Litigation, Claims Damages of Over One Million (Yuan)''
[Gongmin geren tiqi huanjing gongyi susong shouan suopei sunshi guo
baiwan], Legal Daily, 27 September 12. The tribunal judge said the
plaintiff's standing was based on his being a volunteer for the
environmental protection group, Guiyang Public Environmental Education
Center, and the fact that he had signed an agreement with the group to
protect the watershed's environment. The defendant had already been
found guilty of environmental and other crimes, and sentenced to two
years and six months in prison and a fine.
\65\Qie Jianrong, ``Chromium Slag Pollution Case for 10 Million in
Damages Already Formally Accepted by Court'' [Yin gezha wuran suopei
qianwan an yi zhengshi li'an], Legal Daily, 20 October 11. The Court
accepted the case in October 2011. Yang Huajun, ``Difficulties With
Environmental Public Interest Suits: Hard To Obtain Evidence,
Assessment Costs High'' [Huanjing gongyi susong zhi kun: quzheng nan
pinggu feiyong gao], China Weekly, 11 April 12; Cao Yin and Guo Anfei,
``Talks Begin in Landmark NGO Environment Case,'' China Daily, 24 May
12. For more information, see Friends of Nature, ``Green Protests on
the Rise in China,'' 14 August 12. In May, the environmental tribunal
under the Qujing Intermediate People's Court presided over pretrial
negotiations and the court reportedly had two meetings about the case.
\66\Lin Ping, ``Mediation Fails in Yunnan Chromium Slag Public
Interest Case, Defendant Unilaterally Backs Out'' [Yunnan gezha gongyi
susong an tiaojie shibai yin beigao danfangmian fanhui], Justice Net,
19 April 13; ``China's 10 Major Influential Court Cases in 2012'' [2012
nian zhongguo shida yingxiangxing susong], Southern Weekend, 10 January
13. According to the above articles, the defendant had agreed to accept
full legal and financial liability, including stopping the
infringement, reducing the risk, and restoring the environment. The
defendant also agreed to third party supervision of the agreement's
implementation.
\67\Lin Ping, ``Mediation Fails in Yunnan Chromium Slag Public
Interest Case, Defendant Unilaterally Backs Out'' [Yunnan gezha gongyi
susong an tiaojie shibai yin beigao danfangmian fanhui], Justice Net,
19 April 13.
\68\Li Yang, ``Shanxi Aniline Pollution Incident: Cross-Provincial
Liability Case Withdrawn'' [Shanxi benan wuran shijian: kuasheng zhuize
susongzhuang bei chehui], Bandao Municipal News, reprinted in Sina, 15
January 13.
\69\Rachel E. Stern, ``Poor Rural Residents in China Seen As Easy
Target for Environmental Lawsuits,'' Chinadialogue, 24 April 13. This
article cites the findings of a research study showing that
environmental cases in Guiyang in 2010 involved minor violations, often
about damage to natural resources. In two other locations, Wuxi and
Chongqing, government authorities used the courts' authority to enforce
administrative decisions.
\70\Ibid.
\71\Chen Yuanyuan, ``Need To Raise Speed and Quality for Open
Information'' [Xinxi gongkai xuyao tisu tizhi], China Environment Net,
3 April 13; Hu Zhonghua, ``The Limitations to China's Environmental
Public Interest Litigation System'' [Woguo huanjing gongyi susong zhidu
de xiandu], Journal of the Wuhan University of Technology (Social
Science Edition), Vol. 24, No. 6, reprinted in China Environment and
Resources Law Network, 26 November 12.
\72\Chen Yu, ``Should Clearly Establish the Legal Status of
Administrative Mediation,'' [Ying mingque xingzheng tiaojie falu
diwei], China Environment Net, 24 January 13.
\73\``Chinese Anger Over Pollution Becomes Main Cause of Social
Unrest,'' Bloomberg, 6 March 13. For a discussion of mass incidents in
general, including environmental incidents, see Chen Rui et al., ``2012
Mass Incident Research Report'' [2012 nian chuntixing shijian yanjiu
baogao], Legal Net, 27 December 12. The information presented is a
summary of a longer report and the report's methodology and other
important information are not provided. Environmental incidents
reportedly comprised a relatively small percentage of the incidents
examined (8.9 percent).
\74\Wang Shu, ``Public Interest Litigation Not Included in
Environmental Protection Law Because of Differing Opinions Among
Departments'' [Gongyi susong yin bumen yijian bu tongyi weiru
huanbaofa], Beijing News, 31 August 12.
\75\``Reported PRC Civil Disturbances in 2012,'' Open Source
Center, 7 May 13, 12-13.
\76\``Jiangmen Citizens March To Make the Government Cancel Nuclear
Power Plant Plan'' [Jiangmen minzhong youxing poshi zhengfu quxiao he
gongchang jihua], Voice of America, 13 July 13; ``People Questioned
Again in Investigation of Ningbo Demonstrations'' [Zhuicha ningbo PX
shiwei zai you ren bei chuanhuan], Radio Free Asia, 12 November 12;
Wang Zhenghua, ``Shanghai Battery Factory Cancelled,'' China Daily, 16
May 13.
\77\``Officials Give Environmentalist Liu Futang a Suspended Three-
Year Sentence for Exposes,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on
China, 14 December 12; Liu Jianqiang, ``Environmentalist Liu Futang
Found Guilty of `Illegal Business Activities,''' Chinadialogue, 5
December 12; Liu Hongqiao, ```Crusader for Ecology' Liu Futang's 20-
Year Environmental Protection Journey'' [``Shengtai doushi'' liu futang
de 20 nian huanbao lu], Liu Hongqiao blog (Caixin), 11 October 12; Hai
Pengfei, ``Accused Chinese Environmentalist Liu Futang `Tired and
Unhappy,''' Southern People Weekly, reprinted in Chinadialogue, 31
October 12; ``Environmentalist Liu Futang Investigated for Suspicion of
Operating an Illegal Business 26 Environmental Groups Urge His
Release'' [Huanbao renshi liu futang shexian feifa jingying zui
shoushen 26 jia huanbao zuzhi huyu shifang], Southern Weekend, 16
October 12.
\78\All-China Environment Federation, ``Introduction,'' 30 August
12. The introduction states that the ACEF is supported by the
government.
\79\Huang Xinghua, ``Reporter from China Central TV Beaten While
Interviewing in Pingjiang County, Hunan, Officials Apologize Face to
Face'' [Yangshi jizhe zai hunan pingjiang xian caifang beida guanyuan
dangmian daoqian], Xinhua, reprinted in Southern Net, 10 January 13;
All China Environment Federation, ``Introduction,'' 30 August 12.
\80\Huang Xinghua, ``Reporter from China Central TV Beaten While
Interviewing in Pingjiang County, Hunan, Officials Apologize Face to
Face'' [Yangshi jizhe zai hunan pingjiang xian caifang beida guanyuan
dangmian daoqian], Xinhua, reprinted in Southern Net, 10 January 13.
\81\Ibid.
\82\``Zhejiang Environmentalist Beaten After River Dare,'' Radio
Free Asia, 26 February 13.
\83\Ibid.
\84\Sui-Lee Wee and Adam Jourdan, ``In China, Public Anger Over
Secrecy on Environment,'' Reuters, 10 March 13.
\85\Xia Haijun, ``Pollution Kills Nearly 2,000 Kilograms of an
Anhui Farmer's Fish, Demands for an Explanation Declared To Be
Extortion'' [Anhui yi nongmin yangyu shou wuran jin siqian jin yu
siguang tao shuofa bei dingzui qiaozha], Hefei Evening News, reprinted
in China Aquatic Breeders Net, 13 June 13; Chinese Human Rights
Defenders, ``After Anhui Zhang Bing's Environmental Rights Defense
Indictment Was Withdrawn, Ten Months Without Fair Result'' [Anhui zhang
bing huanjing weiquan bei chehui gongsu hou, shige yue wu gongzheng
jieguo], 10 May 13.
\86\Ibid.
\87\Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Anhui Lujiang Victim of
Environmental Pollution Zhang Bing's Complaint Illegally Evaded by
Anhui Lujiang Procuratorate'' [Anhui lujiang huanjing wuran shouhai ren
zhang bing jubao lujiang jianchayuan weifa bei tuiwei], 25 July 13; Xia
Haijun, ``Pollution Kills Nearly 2,000 Kilograms of an Anhui Farmer's
Fish, Demands for an Explanation Declared To Be Extortion'' [Anhui yi
nongmin yangyu shou wuran jin siqian jin yu siguang tao shuofa bei
dingzui qiaozha], Hefei Evening News, reprinted in China Aquatic
Breeders Net, 13 June 13; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``After Anhui
Zhang Bing's Environmental Rights Defense Indictment Was Withdrawn, Ten
Months Without Fair Result'' [Anhui zhang bing huanjing weiquan bei
chehui gongsu hou, shige yue wu gongzheng jieguo], 10 May 13.
\88\``People Questioned Again in Investigation of Ningbo PX
Demonstration'' [Zhuicha ningbo PX shiwei zai youren bei chuanhuan],
Radio Free Asia, 12 November 12.
\89\Amy Li, ``Unable To Walk the Walk, Chengdu Residents Talk the
Talk,'' South China Morning Post, 4 May 13. According to the SCMP
article, authorities posted flyers warning people not to spread rumors
about the Pengzhou project, offered printing shops rewards for
information about individuals printing flyers, and opened some schools
on a Saturday to keep students out of trouble. In addition, state-owned
enterprises told employees to stay off the streets. Louisa Lim, ``To
Silence Discontent, Chinese Officials Alter Workweek,'' National Public
Radio, 4 May 13. According to the NPR article, authorities kept
government employees busy with meetings on a Saturday and threatened
them with dismissal if they participated in a protest. The report
indicated that authorities also sent out letters to households asking
everyone not to believe rumors or participate ``in order to prevent
people with other motives from seizing this opportunity to create
turmoil.''
\90\Louisa Lim, ``To Silence Discontent, Chinese Officials Alter
Workweek,'' National Public Radio, 4 May 13. According to the NPR
article, authorities mobilized at least five types of security forces.
Amy Li, ``Unable To Walk the Walk, Chengdu Residents Talk the Talk,''
South China Morning Post, 4 May 13; ``Yesterday Chengdu Police Practice
Safeguarding Transportation and Guarding and Controlling Public
Security in a Live Drill To `Support Earthquake Disaster Relief and
Create a Safe and Sound Chengdu''' [Chengdu jingfang yanlian jiaotong
baozhang he zhi'an fangkong ``zhiyuan kangzhen jiuzai chuangjian
ping'an chengdu'' shizhan yanlian zuori juxing], Chengdu Daily, 5 May
13.
\91\Amy Li, ``Unable To Walk the Walk, Chengdu Residents Talk the
Talk,'' South China Morning Post, 4 May 13. According to the SCMP
article, some citizens criticized officials' claims that they were
holding a live exercise in support of earthquake rescue efforts. For
information on the notice, see ``Yesterday Chengdu Police Practice
Safeguarding Transportation and Guarding and Controlling Public Order
in a Live Drill To `Support Earthquake Disaster Relief and Create a
Safe and Sound Chengdu''' [Chengdu jingfang yanlian jiaotong baozhang
he zhi'an fangkong ``zhiyuan kangzhen jiuzai chuangjian pingan
chengdu'' shizhan yanlian zuori juxing], Chengdu Daily, 5 May 13.
\92\``Chengdu Exhausts Police Power To Block Urban Residents From
Massing a `PX' Protest Demonstration'' [Chengdu jinchu jingli zu shimin
fan ``PX'' da youxing], Radio Free Asia, 6 May 13; ``Chengdu Activists
Held Ahead of Chemical Plant Protest,'' Radio Free Asia, 3 May 13;
China Digital Times, ``Sensitive Words: Protests, Arrests, and More,''
29 April 13.
\93\Amy Li, ```I am Scared': Chinese Creator of White House
Petition Seeks Help After Police Visit,'' South China Morning Post, 14
May 13.
\94\Southern Mongolia Human Rights Information Center, ``Herders'
Protests Put Down, Internet Posts Removed,'' 6 March 13; ``Herders
Blocked from Protest Marches to Beijing,'' Radio Free Asia, 7 March 13;
``Herders Protest Loss of Land,'' Radio Free Asia, 9 October 12;
Southern Mongolia Human Rights Information Center, ``Mongolian Herders
Protest China's Illegal Occupation of Their Land and Defamation of
Their Ancestors,'' 8 October 12.
\95\Southern Mongolia Human Rights Information Center, ``Herders'
Protests Put Down, Internet Posts Removed,'' 6 March 13.
\96\Zhang Chun, ``Chinese NGOs Call on New Government To Be More
Open About Pollution,'' Chinadialogue, 28 March 13.
\97\Ministry of Environmental Protection, ``Requirements To Draw Up
Construction Project Environmental Impact Reports Abridged Version''
[Jianshe xiangmu huanjing yingxiang baogaoshu jianben bianzhi yaoqiu],
15 August 12.
\98\Ministry of Environmental Protection, Announcement Regarding
Rescinding Document No. 50 (2008) [Huanjing baohubu guanyu feizhi
huanhan (2008) 50 hao wenjian de gonggao], 9 October 12; State
Environmental Protection Administration, Response Letter Regarding
Relevant Issues With Public Requests for Construction Project
Environmental Assessment Documents [Guanyu gongzhong shenqing gongkai
jianshe xiangmu huanping wenjian youguan wenti de fuhan], 30 January
08.
\99\Ministry of Environmental Protection, Circular Regarding
Further Strengthening of Environmental Protection Open Government
Information Work [Guanyu jin yibu jiaqiang huanjing baohu xinxi gongkai
gongzuo de tongzhi], issued 30 October 12; ``Authorities Issue Circular
To Promote Environmental Information Disclosure,'' Congressional-
Executive Commission on China, 4 February 13.
\100\Ministry of Environmental Protection, Circular Regarding
Further Strengthening of Environmental Protection Open Government
Information Work [Guanyu jin yibu jiaqiang huanjing baohu xinxi gongkai
gongzuo de tongzhi], issued 30 October 12, Items 2.1.3, 2.2.2, 2.3;
``Authorities Issue Circular To Promote Environmental Information
Disclosure,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 4 February
13.
\101\``Authorities Issue Circular To Promote Environmental
Information Disclosure,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China,
4 February 13.
\102\Ministry of Environmental Protection, Circular Regarding
Implementation of ``Environmental Air Quality Standards (GB3095-2012)''
[Guanyu shishi ``huanjing kongqi zhiliang biaozhun'' (GB3095-2012) de
tongzhi], 29 February 12. The notice above outlines when certain cities
will begin to include PM2.5 in environmental monitoring and air quality
reports. According to the sources below, in February 2012, authorities
added fine air particulates (PM2.5), ozone, and carbon monoxide to the
revised air quality index (AQI). Ministry of Environmental Protection,
Technical Regulation on Ambient Air Quality Index (Provisional)
[Huanjing kongqi zhiliang zhi shu (AQI) jishu guiding (shixing)],
issued 29 February 12, effective 1 January 16; ``Pollution Measures for
Public Feedback,'' China Daily, reprinted in Xinhua, 17 November 11;
Te-Ping Chen, ``Following Beijing, Hong Kong Releases PM2.5 Pollution
Data,'' Wall Street Journal, China Real Time Report (blog), 9 March 12.
Beijing began to release PM2.5 data in late January, and Guangdong and
Hong Kong began releasing data in March. Cai Wenjun, ``Release of All
PM2.5 Readings Starts Today,'' Shanghai Daily, reprinted in People's
Daily, 27 June 12. Shanghai began releasing daily PM2.5 data to the
public in June 2012.
\103\Luna Lin, ``Kunming Oil Refinery Environmental Report
`Invalid' Say NGOs,'' Chinadialogue, 5 July 13.
\104\Institute of Public and Environmental Affairs, ``Small
Particles, Big Breakthrough: 2012 Urban Air Quality Information
Transparency Index,'' October 2012, 23.
\105\State Council, ``Energy Development `12th Five-Year' Plan''
[Nengyuan fazhan ``shier wu'' guihua de tongzhi], 1 January 13, chap.
3, sec. 1.4. For English sources with partial information on some of
the plans, see Beth Walker, ``China Gives Green-Light to New Era of
Mega-Dams,'' Chinadialogue, 1 February 13. For information on a number
of potential hydroelectric dam construction projects planned for
Tibetan areas, see ``2013 Update: Dams on the Drichu (Yangtze), Zachu
(Mekong) and Gyalmo Ngulchu (Salween) Rivers on the Tibetan Plateau,''
Tibetan Plateau Blog, 26 March 13.
\106\Andrew Jacobs, ``Plans To Harness Chinese River's Power
Threaten a Region,'' New York Times, 4 May 13.
\107\Deng Quanlun, ``Campaigners Re-Ignite Nu River Dam Debate,''
Chinadialogue, 11 February 13; Beth Walker, ``China Gives Green-Light
to New Era of Mega-Dams,'' Chinadialogue, 1 February 13; Brahma
Chellaney, ``China's Hydro-Hegemony,'' New York Times, 7 February 13;
Simon Denyer, ``Chinese Dams in Tibet Raise Hackles in India,''
Washington Post, 7 February 13.
\108\Deng Quanlun, ``Campaigners Re-Ignite Nu River Dam Debate,''
Chinadialogue, 11 February 13.
\109\Brahma Chellaney, ``China's Hydro-Hegemony,'' New York Times,
7 February 13; Simon Denyer, ``Chinese Dams in Tibet Raise Hackles in
India,'' Washington Post, 7 February 13; David Stanway, ``As Wen Jiabao
Departs, China's Dam Plans To Accelerate,'' Reuters, 18 November 12.
According to the Reuters article, the environmental protection minister
said ``social impact'' issues will need to be resolved before
construction continues.
\110\John Jackson, ``Earthquake Hazards and Large Dams in Western
China,'' Probe International, April 2012; Beth Walker, ``China Gives
Green-Light to New Era of Mega-Dams,'' Chinadialogue, 1 February 13;
International Rivers Network, ``China Moves To Dam the Nu, Ignoring
Seismic, Ecological, and Social Risks,'' 25 January 13; Andrew Jacobs,
``Plans To Harness Chinese River's Power Threaten a Region,'' New York
Times, 4 May 13.
\111\Edward Wong, ``Spill in China Underlines Environmental
Concerns,'' New York Times, 2 March 13.
\112\China Digital Times, ``Sensitive Words: Poison, Environmental
Protests,'' 3 May 13; China Digital Times, ``Ministry of Truth:
Shanghai Factory Pollution,'' 29 April 13.
\113\China Digital Times, ``Sensitive Words: Protests, Arrests, and
More,'' 29 April 13.
\114\``Residents in Southern China Shout `Protest! Protest!'
Against Plans for Refinery in Kunming,'' Associated Press, reprinted in
Washington Post, 16 May 13.
\115\Chen Hongyan, ``Yunnan Development and Reform Commission:
Sinopec Kunming Project EIA Report Involves Secrets Not for
Disclosure'' [Yunnan fagaiwei: zhongshiyou kunming xiangmu huanping
baogao shemi bu gongshi], China Broadcasting Net, 14 May 13.
\116\State Council, Regulations of the People's Republic of China
on Open Government Information [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo zhengfu xinxi
gongkai tiaoli], issued 5 April 07, effective 1 May 08. For more
information, see ``China Commits to `Open Government Information'
Effective May 1, 2008,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law
Update, May 2008, 2. The State Environmental Protection Administration
passed its version of the OGI regulations in April 2007. State
Environmental Protection Administration, Measures on Open Environmental
Information (Trial) [Huanjing xinxi gongkai banfa (shixing)], issued 11
April 07, effective 1 May 08. For more information, see ``SEPA Issues
Measures on Open Environmental Information,'' CECC China Human Rights
and Rule of Law Update, January 2008, 5.
\117\Luna Lin, ``Beijing Campaigners Praise `Unexpected' Release of
Water Quality Data,'' Chinadialogue, 4 April 13.
\118\Li Yang, ``Shanxi Aniline Pollution Incident: Cross-Provincial
Liability Case Withdrawn'' [Shanxi benan wuran shijian: kuasheng zhuize
susongzhuang bei chehui], Bandao Municipal News, reprinted in Sina, 15
January 13. The information was about the pollution permits it issued
to a milk company and about the number and location of the enterprise's
water pollution effluent pipes.
\119\Institute of Public and Environmental Affairs and Natural
Resources Defense Council, ``Open Environmental Information: From
Bottleneck to Breakthrough'' [Huanjing xinxi gongkai: pingtou, tupo], 1
April 13.
\120\``Chinese Appeal for Improved Environmental Transparency,''
Global Times, 5 March 13.
\121\``Premier Li Keqiang Presides Over and Gives a Speech at the
First State Council Clean Government Meeting'' [Li keqiang zhuchi
zhaokai guowuyuan diyici lianzheng gongzuo huiyi bing jianghua],
Xinhua, reprinted in the National Bureau of Corruption Prevention of
China, 27 March 13.
\122\Li Yanjie and Xu Hao, ``Lawyer Applies for Information on
China's National Survey of Soil Pollution'' [Lushi shenqing gongkai
quanguo turang wuran qingkuang kaocha xinxi], China Business Review,
reprinted in China Transparency, 3 February 13; Tania Branigan,
``Chinese Pollution Study `Blocked on Grounds of State Secrecy,'''
Guardian, 26 February 13. The Ministry of Environmental Protection and
other departments completed a national contamination survey in 2010,
reportedly with some resistance from local governments, but have not
yet made the results of the survey available to the public. ``Ministry
of Environmental Protection Indicates Methodology of Soil Pollution
Survey Factor in Not Disclosing Data on Prevention and Control
Measures'' [Huanbaobu gaozhi turang wuran diaocha fangfa cheng yin
fangzhi cuoshi shuju bu gongkai], Sina Blog (Dong Zhengwei's blog), 25
February 13; ``Information Disclosure Request to Ministry of
Environmental Protection for National Survey Data of Soil Pollution
Conditions and Prevention and Control Methods'' [Shenqing huanbaobu
xinxi gongkai quanguo turang wuran zhuangkuang diaocha shuju he fangzhi
fangfa], Sina Blog (Dong Zhengwei's blog), 2 February 13;
``Administrative Reconsideration Requests Ministry of Environmental
Protection To Disclose Information on Soil Pollution Survey Data''
[Xingzheng fuyi qingqiu huanbaobu gongkai turang wuran diaocha shuju
xinxi], Sina Blog (Dong Zhengwei's blog), 27 February 13.
\123\Brian Spegele, ``China Environment Ministry Not Breathing
Easy,'' Wall Street Journal, China Real Time Report (blog), 15 March
13.
\124\``Minister Zhou Shengxian's Speech at the National
Environmental Protection System Open Government Information Work
Meeting'' [Zhou shengxian buzhang zai quanguo huanbao xitong zhengfu
xinxi gongkai gongzuo huiyi shang de jianghua], China Environment News,
reprinted in the Ministry of Environmental Protection, 29 August 12.
\125\National Development and Reform Commission, Major Fixed Asset
Investment Project Social Stability Risk Assessment Provisional
Measures [Zhongda guding zichan touze xiangmu shehui wending fengxian
pinggu zanxing banfa], issued 16 August 12.
\126\Keith Bradsher, ```Social Risk' Test Ordered by China for Big
Projects,'' New York Times, 12 November 12.
\127\``Minister Zhou Shengxian's Speech at the National
Environmental Protection System Open Government Information Work
Meeting'' [Zhou shengxian buzhang zai quanguo huanbao xitong zhengfu
xinxi gongkai gongzuo huiyi shang de jianghua], China Environment News,
reprinted in the Ministry of Environmental Protection, 29 August 12.
\128\Ministry of Environmental Protection, ``Thoroughly Carry Out
the 18th Party Congress Spirit, Vigorously Promote Ecological
Civilization Construction, and Make Great Effort to Open a New Phase in
Environmental Protection Work--Minister Zhou Shengxian's Speech at the
2013 National Environmental Protection Work Meeting'' [Shenru guanche
dang de shiba da jingshen dali tuijin shengtai wenming jianshe nuli
kaichuang huanbao gongzuo xin jumian--zhou shengxian buzhang zai 2013
nian quanguo huanjing baohu gongzuo huiyi shang de jianghua], 24
January 13, section 2, item 3.3.
\129\Ministry of Environmental Protection, ``National Environmental
Protection `12th Five-Year' Plan Key Work Intra-Ministry Work
Distribution Plan'' [Guojia huanjing baohu ``shierwu'' guihua zhongdian
gongzuo bunei fengong fang'an], issued 29 November 12, item 10. It also
mentioned implementing environmental education plans, promoting green
lifestyles, and advocating for green production.
\130\``Villagers to Battle Waste Plant,'' Radio Free Asia, 21
August 12. In Guangdong province, authorities neglected to poll
citizens' opinions regarding plans to build a Human Waste Disposal
Plant incinerator near two villages and a reservoir. Residents
reportedly wrote more than 10,000 complaint letters and in August 2012,
more than 1,000 residents attended a town meeting to protest the plans.
Feng Yongfeng, ``Many Falsehoods in Environmental Assessment Reports,
Experts Suggest Revision of the Environmental Impact Assessment Law As
Soon As Possible'' [Huanping baogao maoni duo zhuanjia jianyi jinzao
xiugai huanjing yingxiang pingjiafa], Guangming Daily, reprinted in
China Transparency, 13 January 13; Sui-Lee Wee and Adam Jourdan, ``In
China, Public Anger Over Secrecy on Environment,'' Reuters, 10 March
13.
Notes to Section III--Civil Society
\1\Wang Ming, ``Moving Toward Civil Society'' [Zouxiang gongmin
shehui], Jilin University Journal of Social Sciences, Vol. 4, reprinted
in China On-line Official Gateway, 2009; Chao Guo et al., ``Civil
Society, Chinese Style: The Rise of the Nonprofit Sector in Post-Mao
China,'' Nonprofit Quarterly, 25 October 12.
\2\Fu Tao, Guo Ting, and Liu Haiying, ``An Analysis of the Diverse
Forms of Public Advocacy in China,'' China Development Brief, March
2013.
\3\Shawn Shieh and Amanda Brown-Inz, ``Mapping China's Public
Interest NGOs,'' China Development Brief, January 2013, 13.
\4\Chao Guo et al., ``Civil Society, Chinese Style: The Rise of the
Nonprofit Sector in Post-Mao China,'' Nonprofit Quarterly, 25 October
12. Guo et al. note that millions of unregistered local groups ``engage
in singing, dancing, exercising, martial arts, and other similar
leisure activities.''
\5\Wang Ming, ``Moving Toward Civil Society'' [Zouxiang gongmin
shehui], Jilin University Journal of Social Sciences, Vol. 4, reprinted
in China On-line Official Gateway, 2009.
\6\Wang Su, ``Rural Cooperatives Exceed 600,000: Scholars Point to
Non-Standardized Development'' [Nongmin hezuo she chao 60 wan jia
xuezhe zhi duoshu fazhan bu guifan], Caixin, 16 January 13. Caixin
reported in June 2013 that organic farming groups have begun to form.
See Wang Su, ``New Model of Organic Farming Sprouts Up in Suburbs of
Big Cities,'' Caixin, 20 June 13.
\7\The term ``social organization'' is a ``broad category'' in
Chinese official parlance, according to Chinese University of Hong Kong
scholars Fengshi Wu and Kin-Man Chan, in that it is broadly inclusive
of organizations that function as quasi- or semi-state-run
organizations. See Fengshi Wu and Kin-Man Chan, ``Graduated Control and
Beyond: The Evolving Government-NGO Relations,'' in China Perspectives,
No. 3, 2012. China's ``mass organizations'' (qunzhong tuanti) such as
the All-China Women's Federation, the All-China Federation of Trade
Unions, and the Communist Youth League, are also commonly referred to
as ``social organizations,'' and sometimes describe themselves as non-
governmental even though they function as quasi-governmental entities
under government and Party leadership. See Yu Keping, ``China's Civil
Society: Concepts, Classifications, and Institutional Environment''
[Zhongguo gongmin shehui: gainian, fenlei yu zhidu huanjing], Social
Sciences in China, Issue No. 1, 2006.
\8\According to statistics cited in the Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences Blue Book on Developments in Philanthropy, government-
registered social organizations increased by 6.5-percent in 2012 from
2011. In 2012, there were 268,000 registered social associations, a 5-
percent increase over 2011; 221,000 registered non-governmental,
nonprofit organizations, an 8.3-percent increase over 2011; and 2,961
registered foundations, a 13.3-percent increase over 2011. See Chang
Hong, ``China Has a Total of 490,000 Social Organizations, Internet-
Based Public Interest Turning Into Micro-Blogging Public Interest
Movement'' [Zhongguo gong you 49 wan shehui zuzhi wangluo gongyi xiang
wei gongyi shehui yundong zhuanhua], People's Net, 31 May 13.
\9\Chang Hong, ``China Has A Total of 490,000 Social Organizations,
Internet-Based Public Interest Turning Into Micro-Blogging Public
Interest Movement'' [Zhongguo gong you 49 wan shehui zuzhi wangluo
gongyi xiang wei gongyi shehui yundong zhuanhua], People's Net, 31 May
13; The International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, ``NGO Law Monitor:
China,'' last visited 2 July 13; Fengshi Wu and Kin-man Chan,
``Graduated Control and Beyond: The Evolving Government-NGO
Relations,'' China Perspectives, No. 3, 2012, 10.
\10\Wang Yiyin and Gong Liang, ``After Social Organizations Have
Been `Loosened,' Then What?'' [Shehui zuzhi ``songbang'' hou zenme
ban], Guangming Daily, 5 September 2012; He Dan, ``New Rules for NGOs
To Improve Operations,'' China Daily, 17 April 13. According to the
China Daily article, the director of the MCA Bureau of Administration
of NGOs stated, ``at least 1 million NGOs either operate without legal
identities or have to register as companies under the current
registration policy.''
\11\Fu Tao, Guo Ting, and Liu Haiying, ``An Analysis of the Diverse
Forms of Public Advocacy in China,'' China Development Brief, March
2013.
\12\Wang Hairong, ``Springtime for NGOs,'' Beijing Review, 8 April
13. A scholar from a government think tank, Yu Keping, estimates
approximately three million ``unrecognized'' groups. Another group of
scholars estimates ten million based on a presentation given by Wang
Zhenyao, Dean of the China Philanthropy Institute at Beijing Normal
University. See Chao Guo et al., ``Civil Society, Chinese Style: The
Rise of the Nonprofit Sector in Post-Mao China,'' Nonprofit Quarterly,
25 October 12.
\13\Wan Jing, ``Six Lawyers Demand an Examination of the Legality
of Civil Servant Physical Examination Standards'' [Liu lushi yaoqiu
shencha gongwuyuan tijian biaozhun hefaxing wenti], Legal Daily, 30
November 12; Liu Jin, ``Sending OGI Requests to 31 Provincial Education
Bureaus About Information on Education for Disabled Children'' [Zhixin
31 sheng jiaoyuting yaoqiu gongkai canji ertong jiaoyu xinxi], Southern
Daily, 1 February 13.
\14\Chris Buckley, ``China Takes Aim at Western Ideas,'' New York
Times, 19 August 13; ``Mingjing News Magazine: Exclusive Entire Text of
Disseminated Chinese Communist Document No. 9'' [Mingjing yuekan: dujia
quanwen kanfa zhonggong 9 hao wenjian], Mingjing News, 19 August 13;
``Ming Jing: Notification Regarding `Circular on Current State of
Ideology' Printed and Distributed by General Office of CPC Central
Committee,'' 1 September 13 (translated in Open Source Center, 23
August 13).
\15\``Full Text of Hu Jintao's Report at the 18th Party Congress''
[Hu jintao zai zhongguo gongchandang di shiba ci quanguo daibiao dahui
shang de baogao], Xinhua, 17 November 12, section 7. The Outline of the
Twelfth Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development,
issued in 2011, also contains the phrase ``lead in the healthy and
orderly development of social organizations.'' See PRC Outline of the
12th Five-Year Plan on National Economic and Social Development
[Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guomin jingji he shehui fazhan di shierge
wunian guihua gangyao], passed 14 March 11, issued 16 March 11, chapter
39.
\16\``Full Text of Hu Jintao's Report at the 18th Party Congress''
[Hu jintao zai zhongguo gongchandang di shiba ci quanguo daibiao dahui
shang de baogao], Xinhua, 17 November 12, Section 7; Fengshi Wu and
Kin-man Chan, ``Graduated Control and Beyond: The Evolving Government-
NGO Relations,'' China Perspectives, No. 3, 2012, 15. Wu and Chan note
that the phrase ``Party leadership, government responsibility,
society's cooperation, and public participation'' were used in Hu
Jintao's central policy speech on ``social management innovation'' in
February 2011. See also CECC, 2012 Annual Report, 10 October 12, 126.
\17\Kang Xiaoqiang, ``Core Direction for the System of Modern
Social Organizations'' [Xiandai shehui zuzhi tizhi de hexin quxiang],
Study Times, 15 April 13; ``Full Text of Hu Jintao's Report at the 18th
Party Congress'' [Hu jintao zai zhongguo gongchandang di shiba ci
quanguo daibiao dahui shang de baogao], Xinhua, 17 November 12.
\18\Fengshi Wu and Kin-man Chan, ``Graduated Control and Beyond:
The Evolving Government-NGO Relations,'' China Perspectives, No. 3,
2012, 11-13.
\19\Patricia Thornton, ``The Advance of the Party: Transformation
or Takeover of Urban Grassroots Society?'' China Quarterly, No. 213,
March 2013, 15; Qiao Li, ``Party Building for Comprehensive Coverage of
Social Organizations'' [Shehui zuzhi dangjian quan fugai], Liberation
Daily, reprinted in Renmin Net, 25 October 12.
\20\Patricia Thornton, ``The Advance of the Party: Transformation
or Takeover of Urban Grassroots Society?'' China Quarterly, No. 213,
March 2013, 3. See also China Development Brief description of the
``Social Affairs Committee'' as a creation of the Communist Party and
functioning to build Party representation, capacity, and stability in
``social organizations,'' in ``Meet Your Local Social Affairs
Committee,'' ChinaDevelopmentBrief, Policy Brief No.9, 23October 12.
\21\Liu Jialin, ``Social Organization Appraisal Rating, Will Look
at Record of Party-Building Work'' [Shehui zuzhi kaohe pingji yaokan
dangjian gongzuo chengji], SouthernDaily, 13 May 13.
\22\Zheng Dao, ``Chinese Public Interest Organization Wins
`Stability Maintenance' Legal Suit'' [Zhongguo gongyi jigou yingde
``weiwen'' guansi], Caixin, 25 March 13.
\23\``Will China Loosen Up Social Management? Different NGOs Have
Contrasting Views'' [Zhongguo shehui guanli hui fangsong? butong
NGOkanfa buyi], RadioFree Asia,13 November 12.
\24\``China Hauls Away Petitioners in Congress Crackdown,''
Associated Press, 6 November 12; ``Xu Zhiyong: On the New Citizens'
Movement,'' reprinted in China Digital Times, 13 May 13.
\25\Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Individuals Detained in
Crackdown on Peaceful Assembly & Association,'' 17 August 13; Human
Rights Watch, ``China: Nationwide Arrests of Activists, Critics
Multiply,'' 30 August 13; Dui Hua Foundation, ``Government Notice Fuels
Crackdown on Assembly as Subversion,'' Dui Hua Human Rights Journal, 19
August 13.
\26\Li Xiaorong, ``What's Behind the New Chinese Crackdown,'' New
York Review of Books (blog), 29 July 13; Patrick Boehler, ``Leading
Citizen Movement Activist Xu Zhiyong Arrested,'' South China Morning
Post, 17 July 13. Beijing Public Security officials reportedly kept Xu
under illegal home confinement beginning in April, criminally detained
him on July 16, and formally arrested him on August 22. See Human
Rights in China, ``Xu Zhiyong, Advocate of Disclosure of Officials
Assets, Criminally Detained,'' 16 July 13; Chinese Human Rights
Defenders, ``Individuals Detained in Crackdown on Peaceful Assembly &
Association,'' 17 August 13; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``New
Citizens' Movement Advocate Xu Zhiyong Is Arrested'' [Gongmin yundong
changdaozhe xu zhiyong bei daibu], 24 August 13; ``Officials Detain Xu
Zhiyong Amidst a Crackdown on Individuals Calling for Greater
Government Accountability,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on
China, 1 August 13.
\27\``MCA Shuts Down Well-Known NGO `Transition Institute' During a
Surprise Raid'' [Zhuming NGO ``chuanzhixing yanjiusuo'' bei minzheng
bumen tuxi chachao qudi], Radio France Internationale, 18 July 13; ``Is
Beijing Increasing Suppression of Citizen Movement? The NGO Transition
Institute Is Shut Down'' [Beijing jiajin daya gongmin yundong? minjian
zuzhi chuanzhixing yanjiusuo zao chafeng], Voice of America, 18 July
13.
\28\``MCA Shuts Down Well-Known NGO `Transition Institute' During a
Surprise Raid'' [Zhuming NGO ``chuanzhixing yanjiusuo'' bei minzheng
bumen tuxi chachao qudi], Radio France Internationale, 18 July 13;
``Beijing Social Think-Tank Shut Down Amid Crackdown,'' Radio Free
Asia, 19 July 13; ``Is Beijing Increasing Suppression of Citizen
Movement? The NGO Transition Institute Is Shut Down'' [Beijing jiajin
daya gongmin yundong? minjian zuzhi chuanzhixing yanjiusuo zao
chafeng], Voice of America, 18 July 13.
\29\Zheng Dao, ``Chinese Public Interest Organization Wins
`Stability Maintenance' Legal Suit'' [Zhongguo gongyi jigou yingde
``weiwen'' guansi], Caixin, 25 March 13. See also ``Anti-Discrimination
NGO Wins Lawsuit Against Hotel in `Stability Maintenance' Case,''
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 3 May 13.
\30\Ibid.
\31\``Repeatedly Harassed Volunteer Organization Sues Authorities
for Unreasonable Eviction'' [Lushou daya zhiyuan jigou kong dangju wuli
biqian], Radio Free Asia, 4 December 12; Fiona Tam, ``Workers' Voice of
Shenzhen Takes a Beating in Crackdown,'' South China Morning Post, 6
January 13.
\32\Verna Yu, ``Shouwang Church Takes Legal Action Against Cops for
Religious Persecution,'' South China Morning Post, 21 September 12.
\33\State Council General Office, Circular Regarding the Division
of Labor in Implementation of the ``State Council Institutional Reform
and Functional Transformation Plan'' [Guowuyuan bangongting guanyu
shishi ``guowuyuan jigou gaige he zhineng zhuanbian fang'an'' renwu
fengong de tongzhi], 28 March 13.
\34\Fengshi Wu and Kin-Man Chan, ``Graduated Control and Beyond:
The Evolving Government-NGO Relations,'' China Perspectives, No. 3,
2012, 10. According to Wu and Chan, ever since the Regulation on the
Registration and Management of Social Organizations was amended in
1998, ``[t]here have been high expectations of a new round of revisions
. . . but none has appeared to date.''
\35\Regulations on the Registration and Management of Social
Associations [Shehui tuanti dengji guanli tiaoli], issued and effective
25 October 98; Temporary Regulations on the Registration and Management
of Non-Governmental, Nonprofit Organizations [Minban fei qiye danwei
dengji guanli zanxing tiaoli], issued and effective 25 October 98;
Regulations on the Management of Foundations [Jijinhui guanli tiaoli],
issued 8 March 04, effective 1 June 04.
\36\Lan Fang, ``New Regulations for Management of Social
Organizations Will Be Released Within the Year'' [Shetuan guanli xingui
jiang zai niannei chutai], Caixin, 29 March 13.
\37\Chen Qiao, ``MCA Official: Social Organizations' Direct
Registration Will Become Law at the End of the Year'' [Minzhengbu
guanyuan: shehui zuzhi zhijie dengji niandi youfa keyi], Jinghua Times,
3 June 13. Chen quotes MCA official Wang Jianjun who noted ``hub''-like
social organizations and other ``intermediary'' organizations might
become responsible for registration of some organizations.
\38\Ibid.
\39\Wang Yong, ``Yunnan Promotes the Development of Social
Organizations by Seeking Comments on 4 Documents'' [Yunnan tuijin
shehui zuzhi fazhan 4 wenjian zhengqiu yijian], China Philanthropy
Times, 23 July 13.
\40\Ibid. Yunnan province is not alone in prohibiting officials
from jointly holding responsible positions in the non-state sector.
See, e.g., Cheng Zhanpeng, ``Anhui: Government Officials Cannot Jointly
Hold Positions at Associations, Social Groups, Etc.'' [Anhui: zhengfu
gongwu renyuan bude zai xiehui deng shehui tuanti jianzhi], China News
Service, 18 May 13.
\41\Chao Guo et al., ``Civil Society, Chinese Style: The Rise of
the Nonprofit Sector in Post-Mao China,'' Nonprofit Quarterly, 25
October 12.
\42\``Third Plenary Meeting of the First Session of the 12th
National People's Congress: Full Text Record'' [Shierjie quanguo renda
yici huiyi disan quanti huiyi wenzi shilu], Xinhua, 10 March 13.
\43\Ibid.
\44\Regulations on the Registration and Management of Social
Associations [Shehui tuanti dengji guanli tiaoli], issued and effective
25 October 98, art. 13(2).
\45\``Third Plenary Meeting of the First Session of the 12th
National People's Congress: Full Text Record'' [Shierjie quanguo renda
yici huiyi disan quanti huiyi wenzi shilu], Xinhua, 10 March 13.
\46\Raymond Li, ``Rights Groups Miss Out on Easing of Registration
Rules for NGOs,'' South China Morning Post, 12 March 13.
\47\Zheng Jinran and Xu Jingxi, ``Govt Plans To Give All NGOs Equal
Treatment,'' China Daily, 8 May 12.
\48\International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December
66, entry into force 23 March 76, art. 22. China has signed, and stated
its intent to ratify the ICCPR.
\49\``19 Provinces in China Already Implementing Direct
Registration of Social Organizations'' [Woguo 19 ge shengfen yi kaizhan
huo shixing shehui zuzhi zhijie dengji], Beijing Times, reprinted in
Ministry of Civil Affairs NPO Management Bureau, 16 February 13.
\50\Tang Yue and He Dan, ```Spring' in the Air for NGOs?'' China
Daily, 17 April 13.
\51\Li Qiang, ``Social Organizations in the Province Increased by
15% Last Year'' [Quansheng shehui zuzhi qunian zengzhang 15%], Southern
Daily, 29 May 13.
\52\Zhao Xinxing, ``Survey Shows: Newly Registered Public Interest
Organizations Face Taxes, Increased Expenses, and Other Problems''
[Diaocha xianshi: xin zhuce gongyi zuzhi mianlin shuifei kaizhi da deng
wenti], Southern Daily, 9 October 12. To gather the information,
Zhongshan University's (Sun Yatsen University) Center on Philanthropy
conducted the survey of approximately 10 public interest organizations.
See Li Yulin, ``Tax Pressures on Grassroots NGOs as High as the
Mountains: Tax Exemption Application Eligibility Is Difficult'' [Caogen
NGO shuifu yali shanda: mianshui zige shenqing nan], Southern
Metropolitan Daily, reprinted in China Development Brief, 28 January
13. According to Southern Metropolitan Daily, one of the administrative
hurdles for non-governmental, nonprofit organizations is obtaining tax-
exempt status.
\53\Zhao Xinxing, ``Survey Shows: Newly Registered Public Interest
Organizations Face Taxes, Increased Expenses, and Other Problems''
[Diaocha xianshi: xin zhuce gongyi zuzhi mianlin shuifei kaizhi da deng
wenti], Southern Daily, 9 October 12; Li Yulin, ``Tax Pressures on
Grassroots NGOs as High as the Mountains: Tax Exemption Application
Eligibility Is Difficult'' [Caogen NGO shuifu yali shanda: mianshui
zige shenqing nan], Southern Metropolitan Daily, reprinted in China
Development Brief, 28 January 13.
\54\Wang Huixian, ``Some Cities in Zhejiang Experiment With
Allowing Social Organizations To Register Directly'' [Zhejiang bufen
chengshi shixing shehui zuzhi zhijie dengji], Public Interest Times, 6
November 12; Li Jia, ``Social Organization Direct Registration Not Yet
Accomplished'' [Shehui zuzhi zhijie dengji jun wei bancheng], Beijing
Youth Net, 2 April 13.
\55\Lan Zhixin and Liu Jiaqi, ``NGOs `Transfer to Full
Registration' in Progress'' [NGO ``zhuanzheng'' jinxing shi], First
Financial Daily, 26 March 13.
\56\Wei Mingyan, ``Four Kinds of Social Organizations in Beijing
Will Start Direct Registration Next Month, Government-Organized
Professional Associations Will Hasten Separation'' [Beijing silei
shehui zuzhi xiayueqi zhijie dengji guanban hangye xiehui jiasu
tuogou], Beijing News, 29 March 13.
\57\Wang Ming, ``Suggestions on the Establishment of a
Comprehensive System for Government Procurement of Public Services from
Social Organizations'' [Guanyu jianli jianquan zhengfu xiang shehui
zuzhi goumai gonggong fuwu tizhi de jianyi], Social Welfare and
Charitable Matters Promotion, reprinted in Ministry of Civil Affairs,
26 March 13; Andreas Fulda, ``Government Procurement of CSO Services in
the PR China: Doing the Party's Work?'' China Policy Institute Policy
Paper, No. 4, 2013, 2.
\58\``Li Keqiang's Speech at the Teleconference To Mobilize the
Transformation of the State Council's Organizational Functions'' [Li
keqiang: zai guowuyuan jigou zhineng zhuanbian dongyuan dianshi dianhua
huiyi shang de jianghua], Xinhua, 15 May 13.
\59\Shawn Shieh and Amanda Brown-Inz, ``Mapping China's Public
Interest NGOs,'' China Development Brief, 14 January 13, 20.
\60\See, e.g., Huang Farong, ``Policy Suggestions To Further
Improve Mechanisms by Which the Shanghai Government Procures Public
Services From Social Organizations'' [Guanyu jinyibu wanshan benshi
zhengfu xiang shehui zuzhi goumai gonggong fuwu jizhi de jianyi],
Shanghai Municipal People's Political Consultative Conference, 13 May
13; Fang Xiangwen and Xie Yanmei, ``An Enlightening Record of
Guangdong's Social Organization Reform'' [Guangdong shehui zuzhi gaige
qishi lu], China Social Organizations, Vol. 1, 2013, reprinted in
Ministry of Civil Affairs China NPO Management Bureau, 30 March 13.
\61\Wang Ming, ``Suggestions on the Establishment of a
Comprehensive System for Government Procurement of Public Services From
Social Organizations'' [Guanyu jianli jianquan zhengfu xiang shehui
zuzhi goumai gonggong fuwu tizhi de jianyi], Social Welfare and
Charitable Matters Promotion, reprinted in Ministry of Civil Affairs,
26 March 13; ``People's Daily Suggestion: Standardize Government
Procurement of Public Services'' [Renmin ribao jianyan: guifan zhengfu
goumai gonggong fuwu], People's Daily, 20 March 13.
\62\``Li Keqiang's Speech at the Teleconference To Mobilize the
Transformation of the State Council's Organizational Functions'' [Li
keqiang: zai guowuyuan jigou zhineng zhuanbian dongyuan dianshi dianhua
huiyi shang de jianghua], Xinhua, 15 May 13.
\63\``Chinese Government's NGO Funding Peaks in 2012,'' Xinhua,
reprinted in China Daily, 13 February 13; Zhang Xuetao, ``Next Year,
The Government Will Continue To Contract NGO Services'' [Zhengfu
mingnian jixu goumai shehui zuzhi fuwu], Philanthropy Times, 18
December 12.
\64\Zhang Tianjiao et al., ``Zhang Shuqin: Public Interest Needs
Greater Understanding'' [Zhang shuqin: minjian gongyi xuyao gengduo
lijie], Xinhua, 19 February 13.
\65\Mai Fengzhuang and Li Feng, ``Government Procurement of
Services: This Close, That Far'' [Zhengfu goumai fuwu: zheme jin, name
yuan], Foshan Daily, 17 September 12.
\66\Fengshi Wu and Kin-Man Chan, ``Graduated Control and Beyond:
The Evolving Government-NGO Relations,'' China Perspectives, No. 3,
2012, 17.
\67\Zhao Yanhong, ``CASS Law Blue Book: China's Charity System Has
Legal Gaps'' [Shekeyuan fazhi lanpishu: woguo cishan zhidu tixi cunzai
henduo falu kongbai], People's Daily, reprinted in China Daily, 25
February 2013.
\68\China Academy of Social Sciences Institute of Law, The Annual
Report on China's Rule of Law No. 11 (2013), [Zhongguo fazhi fazhan
baogao No. 11 (2013)], (Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press, 2013),
26.
\69\Zheng Mingda, ``Charity Legislation: Release the Strength of
Philanthropy'' [Cishan lifa: shifang gengduo de cishan nengliang], Ban
Yue Tan, 20 February 13, Vol. 3.
\70\Zhang Zhipeng, ``Let Legal Entity Status Help Advance the
`Rapid Development' of the Religious Charity Sector'' [Rang falu shiti
diwei zhu zhun zongjiao gongyi zishan shiye ``tengfei''], China
Ethnicity News, 18 June 13.
\71\``MCA: Promoting a Charity Law, Will Establish China Charity
Alliance'' [Minzhengbu: tuidong cishan lifa ni chengli zhongguo cishan
lianhehui], China News Service, reprinted in Beijing News, 13 March 13.
\72\Zou Wei and Hu Hao, ``Charity Law Already Entered Drafting
Phase'' [Cishan shiyefa yi jinru qicao jieduan], Xinhua, 28 December
12.
\73\Wang Wei et al., ``Five Questions About Charity (Question 3):
Who Watches Over Our Donations?'' [Cishan wuwen zhi sanwen: shui lai
jiandu women de juankuan?], Xinhua, 31 July 13.
\74\Edward Wong, ``After Quake, Donors Shun Aid Groups Run by
China,'' New York Times, 22 April 13.
\75\Amanda Brown-Inz, ``View From the Media: The Mysterious Decimal
Point,'' China Development Brief, 17 April 13. The article features a
story on alleged financial malfeasance at China Children's Charity.
\76\Ma Xueling and Ding Dong, ``CASS: Reconstruction of Red Cross's
Public Credibility Is More Difficult Than Expected'' [Shekeyuan baogao:
honghui shehui gongxinli zhongjian zhi jiannan yuanchao yuqi], China
News Service, 31 May 13; ``Survey: 60 Percent of Interviewees Believe
in Non-Governmental Charitable Organizations'' [Diaocha: liucheng
shoufangzhe xinren minjian cishan jigou], China Youth International, 5
May 13.
\77\Zheng Mingda, ``Establishing a Charity Law: Releasing the
Strength of Charity'' [Cishan lifa: shifang gengduo de cishan
nengliang], Fortnightly Review, 20 February 13.
\78\``Report Says That Donations to Red Cross Shrank by Almost 30
Percent This Year, Public Really Wants Transparency'' [Baogao cheng
honghui juanzengliang jiangjin sancheng, gongzhong zuipan gongkai
touming], Mirror, 31 May 13.
\79\Karla Simon, ``Trends in Chinese Transparency and
Philanthropy,'' Alliance, 6 February 13.
\80\Colleen Lee and Ng Kang-chung, ``Legco Approves HK$100m Sichuan
Quake Donation,'' South China Morning Post, 4 May 13.
\81\``The Ya'an Earthquake: Mainland, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau
`Refuse To Donate''' [Ya'an dizhen, liang'an sandi qi ``kangjuan''],
Radio Free Asia, 2 May 13.
\82\``Survey: 60 Percent of Interviewees Believe in Non-
Governmental Charitable Organizations'' [Diaocha: liucheng shoufangzhe
xinren minjian cishan jigou], China National Radio, reprinted in China
Youth International, 5 May 13.
\83\Chang Meng, ``A Red Cross To Bear,'' Global Times, 26 April 13.
Although the Global Times notes that donations to the Red Cross
eventually did outstrip those to private foundations, the Wall Street
Journal China Real Time Report reported that ``In the first day after a
magnitude 7.0 earthquake hit the county of Lushan in Sichuan, the Red
Cross received roughly 140,000 yuan ($22,700) in donations, compared to
10 million taken in by martial arts star Jet Li's One Foundation.'' See
William Kazer, ``China's Red Cross Tries To Rebuild After Self-
Inflicted Disaster,'' Wall Street Journal, China Real Time Report
(blog), 30 April 13.
\84\Yang Jingjie, ``Global Fund Phases Out China Projects Due To
Finance Shortfalls,'' Global Times, 1 February 12; China Global Fund
Watch Newsletter, Issue No. 18, January 2012. According to The Global
Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria China portfolio
information, The Global Fund has disbursed US$763,385,847 to China. See
The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, ``Investing
in: China,'' last visited 26 June 13.
\85\Zhang Tao, ``A New Paradigm of AIDS Governance,'' China Xiehe
Medical University Publishing House, May 2012, 71-74; UNAIDS China
Office, David Shallcross and Nana Taona Kuo, ``Summary of `The
Expectations and Realities of NGO Registration: A Study of HIV/AIDS
Groups in Sichuan and Yunnan,''' China Development Brief, 12 December
12.
\86\Nicole A. Szlezak, The Making of Global Health Governance:
China and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria (New
York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2012), 124-127, 133-143.
\87\Hui Hongtao, ``We Are the Bridge!--A Successful Advocacy Case
of Promoting Communication Between the HIV-Affected Community and the
Center for Disease Control (CDC) in Heilongjiang Province,'' Asia
Catalyst, 10 May 13.
\88\Food and Drug Safety, Public Health, and the Environment in
China, Hearing of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 22
May 13, Testimony of Yanzhong Huang, Senior Fellow for Global Health,
Council on Foreign Relations and Associate Professor and Director of
the Center for Global Health Studies, Seton Hall University.
\89\Lan Fang, ``Gov'ts, NGOs Increasingly Cooperating To Solve
Social Problems,'' Caixin, 7 November 12; Du Yongtao et al., ``Li
Keqiang Meets With People Living With AIDS, Says He Wants To Hear
Opinions From Grassroots Organizations'' [Li keqiang huijian aizibing
huanzhe cheng yao ting caogen zuzhi yijian], China News Service,
reprinted in Sina, 28 November 12.
\90\Li Yang, ``Fighting a Dreaded Disease,'' China Daily, 1
December 12; Du Yongtao et al., ``Li Keqiang Meets With People Living
With AIDS, Says He Wants To Hear Opinions From Grassroots
Organizations'' [Li keqiang huijian aizibing huanzhe cheng yao ting
caogen zuzhi yijian], China News Service, reprinted in Sina, 28
November 12.
\91\Du Yongtao et al., ``Li Keqiang Meets with People Living with
AIDS, Says He Wants To Hear Opinions From Grassroots Organizations''
[Li keqiang huijian aizibing huanzhe cheng yao ting caogen zuzhi
yijian], China News Service, reprinted in Sina, 28 November 12.
\92\Office of the Inspector General, ``Diagnostic Review of Global
Fund Grants to the People's Republic of China,'' The Global Fund to
Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, 23 October 12, 19, para. 68.
Notes to Section III--Institutions of Democratic Governance
\1\John Dotson, ``The China Rising Leaders Project, Part 2:
Outcomes of the Chinese Communist Party's 18th National Congress,''
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 21 December 12, 4.
\2\Alice Miller, ``The New Party Politburo Leadership,'' China
Leadership Monitor, Hoover Institute, Stanford University, No. 40
(Winter 2013), 14 January 13, 2-5. This article contains additional
information about the collective characteristics of the new Party
Central Committee. Besides Xi, other people selected for the top
leadership positions in the powerful seven-member Party Central
Committee Political Bureau Standing Committee include Li Keqiang, Zhang
Dejiang, Yu Zhengsheng, Liu Yunshan, Wang Qishan, and Zhang Gaoli. For
information on these leaders' possible views toward economic reform,
see Barry Naughton, ``Signaling Change: New Leaders Begin the Search
for Economic Reform,'' China Leadership Monitor, Hoover Institute,
Stanford University, No. 40 (Winter 2013), 14 January 13.
\3\John Dotson, ``The China Rising Leaders Project, Part 2:
Outcomes of the Chinese Communist Party's 18th National Congress,''
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 21 December 12, 5;
Benjamin Kang Lim, ``Exclusive: China's Backroom Powerbrokers Block
Reform Candidates--Sources,'' Reuters, 20 November 12. For more
information on the new cohort of leaders, see Alice Miller, ``The New
Party Politburo Leadership,'' China Leadership Monitor, Hoover
Institute, Stanford University, No. 40 (Winter 2013), 14 January 13, 1.
\4\John Dotson, ``The China Rising Leaders Project, Part 2:
Outcomes of the Chinese Communist Party's 18th National Congress,''
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 21 December 12, 12.
\5\Ibid., 5; Alice Miller, ``The New Party Politburo Leadership''
China Leadership Monitor, Hoover Institute, Stanford University, No. 40
(Winter 2013), 14 January 13, 11-12. For information about the downfall
of Bo Xilai and his wife, Gu Kailai, see CECC, 2012 Annual Report, 10
October 12, 131.
\6\John Dotson, ``The China Rising Leaders Project, Part 2:
Outcomes of the Chinese Communist Party's 18th National Congress,''
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 21 December 12, 5.
For information about the downfall of Bo Xilai and his wife, Gu Kailai,
see CECC, 2012 Annual Report, 10 October 12, 131.
\7\Alice Miller, ``The New Party Politburo Leadership,'' China
Leadership Monitor, Hoover Institute, Stanford University, No. 40
(Winter 2013), 14 January 13, 1-2, 10.
\8\``A New Strategic Roadmap for Sino-American Relations,''
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2 April 13.
\9\Chris Buckley, ``China's New President Nods to Public Concerns,
But Defends Power at Top,'' New York Times, 14 March 13; Russell Leigh
Moses, ``Xi Set To Slow Down on Reform? Signs Point Other Way,'' Wall
Street Journal, China Real Time Report (blog), 18 March 13; ``A New
Strategic Roadmap for Sino-American Relations,'' Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, 2 April 13.
\10\Joseph Fewsmith, ``The 18th Party Congress: Testing the Limits
of Institutionalization,'' China Leadership Monitor, Hoover Institute,
Stanford University, No. 40 (Winter 2013), 14 January 13, 1-3; John
Dotson, ``The China Rising Leaders Project, Part 2: Outcomes of the
Chinese Communist Party's 18th National Congress,'' U.S.-China Economic
and Security Review Commission, 21 December 12, 18-19.
\11\``Full Text of Resolution on Amendment to CPC Constitution,''
Xinhua, 14 November 12. The new language quoted in the text is infused
throughout the Articles of the Constitution. In addition, revisions
enshrined the system of ``socialism with Chinese characteristics'' as
China's path and included the promotion of ``ecological civilization''
as a long-term task that is to be incorporated into all aspects and
processes of advancing economic, political, cultural, and social
progress. For more information, see Section II--the Environment.
\12\Chinese Communist Party Constitution, adopted 6 September 82,
amended 1 November 87, 18 October 92, 18 September 97, 14 November 02,
21 October 07, 14 November 12.
\13\For detailed information about the origins and meaning of this
phrase, see Joseph Fewsmith, ``Promoting the Scientific Development
Concept,'' China Leadership Monitor, Hoover Institute, Stanford
University, No. 11 (Summer 2004), 30 July 04.
\14\David Shambaugh, ``Don't Expect Reform From China's New
Leaders,'' Washington Post, 15 November 12; Elizabeth Economy,
``China's New Leaders: No Reform Dream Team,'' Council on Foreign
Relations, Asia Unbound (blog), 15 November 12; China's New Leadership
and Implications for the United States, Hearing of the U.S.-China
Economic and Security Review Commission, 7 February 13, Written
Testimony of Cheng Li, Director of Research and Senior Fellow, John L.
Thornton China Center, Brookings Institution; Chris Buckley, ``China's
New President Nods to Public Concerns, But Defends Power at Top,'' New
York Times, 14 March 13. The New York Times article quotes views from
people inside China. Bruce Gilley, Jamestown Foundation, ``China's New
Leaders To Strengthen the Party-State,'' China Brief, Vol. 12, No. 23,
30 November 12. Prof. Gilley asserts that ``liberalizing political
reforms are off the table.'' Scott Kennedy, ``China's New Leadership:
Econ Reform Yes, Political Reform No,'' The China Track (blog), 15
November 12; Willy Lam, Jamestown Foundation, ``National People's
Congress Marks Sharp Turn Toward Conservatism,'' China Brief, Vol. 13,
No. 6, 15 March 13.
\15\Stephen Roach, ``China's Dream Team,'' Project Syndicate, 28
November 12; Ian Johnson, ``A Promise To Tackle China's Problems, But
Few Hints of a Shift in Path,'' New York Times, 15 November 12. A
Chinese human rights lawyer remarked that ``[t]his is quite a mediocre
lineup, and we'll have to wait and see what they do.''
\16\Chris Buckley, ``Vows of Change in China Belie Private
Warning,'' New York Times, 14 February 13.
\17\Ibid.; Andrew Jacobs, ``In China, New Premier Says He Seeks a
Just Society,'' New York Times, 17 March 13.
\18\Russell Leigh Moses, ``Bold Break: What Is Xi Up To?'' Wall
Street Journal, China Real Time Report (blog), 5 December 12.
\19\Russell Leigh Moses, ``Xi Set To Slow Down on Reform? Signs
Point Other Way,'' Wall Street Journal, China Real Time Report (blog),
18 March 13. For more information on the ``China Dream,'' see ``Xi
Jinping: Speech at the First Meeting of the 12th National People's
Congress'' [Xi jinping: zai di shier jie quanguo renmin daibiao dahui
diyici huiyishang de jianghua], Xinhua, 17 March 13; ``Wang Yiwei:
China's Dream Should Also Be the World's Dream'' [Wang yiwei: zhongguo
meng ye ying shi shijie meng], Global Times, reprinted in Xinhua, 6
March 13. For one analysis of the ``China Dream,'' see ``China--Xi
Jinping's `Chinese Dream' Suggests Counter to Perceived Appeal of US,''
Open Source Center, 22 March 13.
\20\Choi Chi-yuk, ``Xi Jinping Vows To Uphold Constitution and Rule
of Law,'' South China Morning Post, 25 February 13.
\21\Chris Buckley, ``Vows of Change in China Belie Private
Warning,'' New York Times, 14 February 13. This article reported that
Xi Jinping's statement appeared in a summary of a speech that was
circulated among Party members during Xi's visit to Guangdong province
but that was not publicized.
\22\``Xi Jinping Urges CPC To Accept Criticism,'' Xinhua, reprinted
in Global Times, 7 February 13. According to the Xinhua article, Xi
Jinping said ``[t]he CPC should be able to put up with sharp criticism,
correct mistakes if it has committed them and avoid them if it has
not.'' Criticism from non-Party members, he reportedly said, could help
the Party find, analyze, and resolve problems. Ira Belkin, ``Maoist
Attitude to Dissent Is Blocking China's Road to the Rule of Law,''
South China Morning Post, 8 April 13.
\23\Ira Belkin, ``Maoist Attitude to Dissent Is Blocking China's
Road to the Rule of Law,'' South China Morning Post, 8 April 13.
\24\Ibid. This article reports that the Party-state seems to ignore
the constitution and laws in some cases involving perceived enemies.
``Spirit of the Central Propaganda Work Meeting: Prohibits the Media
From Opposing the Party, Opposing Maoism, and Opposing Marxism-
Leninism'' [Zhongyang xuanchuan gongzuo huiyi jingshen: jinzhi meiti
fan dang fan mao fan malie], Aboluo Net, 31 March 13.
\25\Susan Lawrence and Michael Martin, ``Understanding China's
Political System,'' Congressional Research Service, 20 March 13, 2, 5-
6.
\26\``State Council Institutional Reform and Functional
Transformation Plan'' [Guowuyuan jigou gaige he zhineng zhuanbian
fang'an], Xinhua, 10 March 13; ``Communique of the Second Session of
the 18th CPC Central Committee'' [Zhongguo gongchandang di shiba jie
zhongyang weiyuanhui di erci quanti huiyi gongbao], Xinhua, 28 February
13 (Open Source Center, 13 March 13). For a graphic depiction of these
changes, see ``Infographic: China's New Streamlined Government,'' South
China Morning Post, 18 March 13; Zhao Chao and Cui Qingxin, ``New Round
of State Council Institutional Reform To Commence, State Council
Ministry Groups Reduced to 25'' [Xin yilun guowuyuan jigou gaige jiang
qidong guowuyuan zucheng bumen jianzhi 25 ge], Xinhua, 10 March 13.
\27\``State Council Institutional Reform and Functional
Transformation Plan'' [Guowuyuan jigou gaige he zhineng zhuanbian
fang'an], Xinhua, 10 March 13; ``Communique of the Second Session of
the 18th CPC Central Committee'' [Zhongguo gongchandang di shiba jie
zhongyang weiyuanhui di erci quanti huiyi gongbao], Xinhua, 28 February
13 (Open Source Center, 13 March 13).
\28\``State Council Institutional Reform and Functional
Transformation Plan'' [Guowuyuan jigou gaige he zhineng zhuanbian
fang'an], Xinhua, 10 March 13; State Council General Office, Circular
Regarding Division of Labor in Implementing the ``State Council
Institutional Reform and Functional Transformation Plan'' [Guanyu
shishi ``guowuyuan jigou gaige he zhineng zhuanbian fang'an'' renwu
fengong de tongzhi], 28 March 13. Authorities appear to have already
started on the top five tasks on that list (the Xinhua article provides
more details regarding the first three of the tasks listed below). (1)
Separate the commercial side of the administration of railways from the
regulatory functions by establishing the China Railway Corporation and
establishing the State Railway Administration under the Ministry of
Transportation. (2) Establish the General Administration of Food and
Drug Management and Supervision and combine the responsibilities of
several different offices within this administration. (3) Combine some
functions of the Population and Family Planning Commission and the
Ministry of Health into a new institution, the National Health and
Family Planning Commission, and eliminate the two old institutions. (4)
Integrate the registration responsibilities for housing, forests,
grasslands, and land. (5) Strictly control new items that require
administrative examination and approval. From now on, in general,
agencies will not have the liberty to require new licenses. If there is
a definite need for a new license for special needs, then it must
strictly adhere to administrative license provisions. Strengthen the
demonstration of the legality, necessity, and rationality of
examination process.
\29\State Council General Office, Circular Regarding Division of
Labor in Implementing the ``State Council Institutional Reform and
Functional Transformation Plan'' [Guanyu shishi ``guowuyuan jigou gaige
he zhineng zhuanbian fang'an'' renwu fengong de tongzhi], 28 March 13.
\30\Ma Kai, ``Explanation of State Council Institutional Reform and
Functional Transformation'' [Guanyu guowuyuan jigou gaige he zhineng
zhuanbian fang'an de shuoming], Xinhua, 10 March 13 (Open Source
Center, 10 March 13).
\31\International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December
66, entry into force 23 March 76, art. 25; UN Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights, General Comment No. 25: The Right To
Participate in Public Affairs, Voting Rights and the Right of Equal
Access to Public Service, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.7, 7 December 96. Under
General Comment 25 to the ICCPR, the language requires that: ``Where
citizens participate in the conduct of public affairs through freely
chosen representatives, it is implicit in article 25 that those
representatives do in fact exercise governmental power and that they
are accountable through the electoral process for their exercise of
that power'' (Item 7); ``The right to vote at elections and referenda
must be established by law and may be subject only to reasonable
restrictions . . . [p]arty membership should not be a condition of
eligibility to vote, nor a ground of disqualification'' (Item 10);
``Freedom of expression, assembly and association are essential
conditions for the effective exercise of the right to vote and must be
fully protected . . . .'' (Item 12); ``The right of persons to stand
for election should not be limited unreasonably by requiring candidates
to be members of parties or of specific parties . . .'' (Item 17); and
an ``independent electoral authority should be established to supervise
the electoral process and to ensure that it is conducted fairly,
impartially and in accordance with established laws which are
compatible with the Covenant . . . .'' (Item 20).
\32\International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December
66, entry into force 23 March 76. China has signed, but has not yet
ratified, the ICCPR. In the 2009-2010 National Human Rights Action Plan
issued by the Chinese government in April 2009, officials stated that
the ``essentials'' of the ICCPR were some of the ``fundamental
principles'' on which the plan was framed, and that the government
``will continue legislative, judicial and administrative reforms to
make domestic laws better link with this Covenant, and prepare the
ground for approval of the ICCPR.'' State Council Information Office,
``National Human Rights Action Plan of China (2009-2010),'' reprinted
in Xinhua, 13 April 09, Introduction, sec. V(1).
\33\Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed
by UN General Assembly resolution 217A(III) of 10 December 48, art. 21.
``Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country,
directly or through freely chosen representatives . . . . The will of
the people shall be the basis of the authority of government, this
shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by
universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by
equivalent free voting procedures.''
\34\``Supreme People's Court Work Report (Full Text)'' [Zuigao
renmin fayuan gongzuo baogao (quanwen)], Legal Daily, reprinted in
China Law Info, 22 March 13. Wang Shengjun, then Chief Justice, noted
that in the last five years, the Supreme People's Court has been under
the ``firm leadership of the Party . . . .'' Keith Zhai, ``Security
Tsar Meng Jianzhu Criticizes Interference in Court Proceedings,'' South
China Morning Post, 9 January 13.
\35\David Bandurski, ``Control, On the Shores of China's Dream,''
China Media Project, 22 May 13; ``Full Text: Work Report of NPC
Standing Committee,'' Xinhua, 20 March 13.
\36\``Full Text: Work Report of NPC Standing Committee,'' Xinhua,
20 March 13. In the NPC Standing Committee report to the NPC, Wu
Bangguo emphasized this relationship: the NPC ``consciously upheld the
Party's leadership over the NPC's Work; . . . carried out major
decisions and arrangements of the Party Central Committee; turned the
views of the Party into the will of the state through statutory
procedures; and placed people recommended by the Party organization in
leadership positions in bodies of state power through statutory
procedures.''
\37\``The Percentage of Leading Cadres Among the 2,987 Delegates
Decreases, The Number of Frontline Workers and Rural Residents
Increases'' [2987 ming daibiao zhong lingdao ganbu bili jiang yixian
gongren nongmin daibiao zeng], China Net, 27 February 13.
\38\``County-Level and Above Party Committees in Our Nation Will
Establish Human Resources Leading Work Groups'' [Woguo xianji yishang
difang dangwei jiang jianli rencai gongzuo lingdao xiaozu], Xinhua,
reprinted in Chinese Communist Party Information Net, 26 September 12.
The opinion regarding strengthening ``Party management over human
resources'' stipulates all Party committees at the county level and
above must establish a ``human resources leading small group,'' and all
related major documents and activity arrangements must be examined and
approved through the small group. Major items are examined and approved
by the Party committee at the same level.
\39\Fang Li, ``Party Organizations in Accounting Firms Reach
3,264'' [Quanguo kuaijishi shiwusuo dang zuzhi da 3264 ge], Guangming
Daily, reprinted in United Front Work Department, 18 September 12.
\40\Li Xuanliang and Zhang Dongbo, ``Xi Jinping: Build a
Victorious, First Rate, Modernized People's Armed Police That Obeys the
Party's Commands'' [Xi jinping: jianshe tingdang zhihui neng da
shengzhang zuofeng youliang de xiandaihua wuzhuang jingcha budui],
Xinhua, 29 January 13.
\41\``Well-Known Chinese Web Sites Establish Party Organizations
One After Another'' [Zhongguo ge zhiming wangzhan fenfen chengli dang
zuzhi], BBC, 11 January 13.
\42\Jonathan Kaiman, ``China Keeps a Close Eye on University
Student Groups,'' Los Angeles Times, 9 December 12.
\43\Qiao Li, ``The Party Seeks To Establish a Presence in All
Social Organizations'' [Shehui zuzhi dangjian quan fugai], Liberation
Daily, reprinted in People's Daily, 25 October 12; Patricia Thornton,
``The Advance of the Party: Transformation or Takeover of Urban
Grassroots Society?'' China Quarterly, Vol. 213 (March 2013), 9-11.
\44\``Policy Brief No. 9 (October 2012): Meet Your Local Social
Affairs Committee,'' China Development Brief, 23 October 12. According
to this article, the Committees also provided funding for
administrators and assistants for the Party groups. Qiao Li, ``The
Party Seeks To Establish a Presence in All Social Organizations''
[Shehui zuzhi dangjian quan fugai], Liberation Daily, reprinted in
People's Daily, 25 October 12.
\45\Patricia Thornton, ``The Advance of the Party: Transformation
or Takeover of Urban Grassroots Society?'' China Quarterly, Vol. 213
(March 2013), 9-11.
\46\Ibid.
\47\Chris Buckley, ``China Takes Aim at Western Ideas,'' New York
Times, 19 August 13; Chen Xi, ``Mingjing Monthly: Exclusive Entire Text
of Disseminated Chinese Communist Document No. 9'' [Mingjing yuekan:
dujia quanwen kanfa zhonggong 9 hao wenjian], Mingjing Monthly, 19
August 13; ``Ming Jing: Notification Regarding `Circular on Current
State of Ideology' Printed and Distributed by General Office of CPC
Central Committee,'' Open Source Center, 21 August 13.
\48\Ibid.
\49\Chris Buckley, ``China Warns Officials Against `Dangerous'
Western Values,'' New York Times, 13 May 13.
\50\David Bandurski, ``Censors, Show Your Swords!'' China Media
Project, 4 September 13.
\51\``China's Struggle Sessions,'' Wall Street Journal, 4 September
13.
\52\Qian Gang, ``The Uncertain Death of `Constitutionalism,'''
China Media Project, 2 September 13; David Bandurski, ``China's
Constitutional Debate,'' China Media Project, 14 August 13.
\53\``Chinese Communist Party 16 Item Opinion To Strengthen Higher
Education Young Teachers' Political Thought Work'' [Zhonggong 16 tiao
yijian jiaqiang gaoxiao qingnian jiaoshi sixiang zhengzhi gongzuo],
Ministry of Education, reprinted in People's Daily, 28 May 13.
\54\National Development and Reform Commission, Major Fixed Asset
Investment Project Social Stability Risk Assessment Provisional
Measures [Guojia fazhan gaigewei zhongda guding zichan touzi xiangmu
shehui wending fengxian pinggu zanxing banfa], issued 16 August 12,
art. 1.
\55\National Development and Reform Commission, Major Fixed Asset
Investment Project Social Stability Risk Assessment Provisional
Measures [Guojia fazhan gaigewei zhongda guding zichan touzi xiangmu
shehui wending fengxian pinggu zanxing banfa], issued 16 August 12.
\56\Ibid., art. 8.
\57\Liu Chunxiang, ``Nanjing Trash Generator Project Draws Civic
Evaluation: `Social Risk Grade' To Determine Project's Life or Death''
[Nanjing laji fadian xiangmu yinru minjian pinggu ``shehui fengxian
pingfen'' ding shengsi], 21st Century Business Herald, 12 September 12.
\58\Ibid.
\59\Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Individuals Detained in
Crackdown on Peaceful Assembly & Association,'' 18 September 13.
\60\Ibid.; Xu Zhiyong, ``China's New Citizens' Movement'' [Zhongguo
xin gongmin yundong], Blogspot (Xu Zhiyong's blog), 15 November 12.
\61\Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Individuals Detained in
Crackdown on Peaceful Assembly & Association,'' 27 August 13; ``Leader
of Citizens Movement That Held Dinner Party Debates Is Formally
Arrested in Beijing,'' Associated Press, reprinted in Washington Post,
23 August 13; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``China Human Rights
Briefing, August 15-21, 2013,'' 22 August 13.
\62\Dui Hua Foundation, ``Government Notice Fuels Crackdown on
Assembly as Subversion,'' Dui Hua Human Rights Journal, 19 August 13.
\63\Chris Buckley, ``China Takes Aim at Western Ideas,'' New York
Times, 19 August 13; Chen Xi, ``Mingjing Monthly: Exclusive Entire Text
of Disseminated Chinese Communist Document No. 9'' [Mingjing yuekan:
dujia quanwen kanfa zhonggong 9 hao wenjian], Mingjing Monthly, 19
August 13; ``Ming Jing: Notification Regarding `Circular on Current
State of Ideology' Printed and Distributed by General Office of CPC
Central Committee,'' Open Source Center, 21 August 13.
\64\``Authorities Deny Medical Treatment to Zhu Yufu; Condition
Serious,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 16 April 13;
Chen Guangcheng and Gao Zhisheng: Human Rights in China, Hearing of the
Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health,
Global Human Rights, and International Organizations, U.S. House of
Representatives, 9 April 13, Testimony of Bob Fu, Founder and
President, ChinaAid. See the Commission's Political Prisoner Database
record 2004-02253 for more information on Zhu Yufu's case.
\65\``Authorities Deny Medical Treatment to Zhu Yufu; Condition
Serious,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 16 April 13;
Chen Guangcheng and Gao Zhisheng: Human Rights in China, Hearing of the
Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health,
Global Human Rights, and International Organizations, U.S. House of
Representatives, 9 April 13, Testimony of Bob Fu, Founder and President
of ChinaAid.
\66\Ibid.
\67\Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Lighter Sentences in Retrial
of Beijing Fangshan Raolefu Village Election Cases'' [Beijing
fangshanqu raolefucun xuanjuan an chongshen jianqing panjue], 25
December 12. For more information on the cases, see David Bandurski,
``Important Story Lost in the Shuffle,'' China Media Project, 23 August
10. See the Commission's Political Prisoner Database (PPD) for more
information on these cases: records 2013-00104 on Song Jianzhong, 2013-
00106 on Luo Yonghong, 2010-00314 on Ma Zhizheng, 2010-00317 on Hao
Sen, 2010-00316 on Zhao Daqing, 2010-00315 on Zhao Zhenhai, and 2013-
00105 on Ma Huimei.
\68\Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Lighter Sentences in Retrial
of Beijing Fangshan Raolefu Village Election Cases'' [Beijing
fangshanqu raolefucun xuanjuan an chongshen jianqing panjue], 25
December 12.
\69\``Democracy Advocate Cao Haibo Sentenced to Eight Years for
Subversion,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 4 December
12. Authorities reportedly did not inform the family of the trial, and
did not provide a sentencing notice to the family. Chinese Human Rights
Defenders, ``Submission to UN on Cao Haibo-April 1, 2013,'' 3 April 13;
Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Creator of Society To Strengthen
China Cao Haibo Secretly Sentenced to Eight Years for `Subversion'''
[Zhenhuahui chuangshiren cao haibo bei yi ``dianfuzui'' mimi panxing 8
nian], 1 November 12; Human Rights in China, ``Zhang Qi Released After
Four Years; Cao Haibo Tried in Closed-Door Hearing,'' 23 May 12; Human
Rights in China, ``Online Activist Sentenced to 8 Years for Subversion;
Lawyer Raises Procedural Concerns,'' 5 November 12; Andrew Jacobs,
``Chinese Cafe Owner Given 8-Year Sentence Over Online Messages,'' New
York Times, 1 November 12; Sui-Lee Wee, ``China Dissident Gets Eight
Years for Subversion Ahead of Congress,'' Reuters, 1 November 12;
Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Cao Haibo Secretly Sentenced,
Netizens Visit His Wife and Child, Zhang Nian Reveals Script in Letters
Home Inconsistent'' [Cao haibo bei mipan wangyou qianwang shenwang qi
qi er, zhang nian pu jilai de jiashu ziti bu yizhi], reprinted in
Boxun, 6 November 12. See the Commission's Political Prisoner Database
record 2011-00737 for more information on Cao Haibo's case.
\70\Ibid.
\71\``Letter by Qin Yongmin and Others Urgently Pressing Golmud
Authorities To Release Liu Benqi'' [Qin yongmin deng jiji duncu geermu
dangju shifang liu benqi de lianming xin], Boxun, 22 April 13.
Authorities detained Liu after he posted a remark online saying the
right to demonstrate is protected by the constitution and suggesting
people demonstrate in Beijing during the 18th Party Congress. See the
Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2013-00028 for more
information on Liu's case.
\72\Liu Lang, ``Qinghai Dissident Liu Benqi Brutally Persecuted in
Detention Center'' [Qinghai yiyi renshi liu benqi kanshousuo zao canku
pohai], Canyu, reprinted in Boxun, 28 January 13; ``Letter by Qin
Yongmin and Others Urgently Pressing Golmud Authorities To Release Liu
Benqi'' [Qin yongmin deng jiji duncu geermu dangju shifang liu benqi de
lianming xin], Boxun, 22 April 13.
\73\Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Liu Benqi Criminally Detained
On Suspicion of `Inciting Subversion,' His Wife Liu Ying Sentenced to
RTL, Five-Year-Old Son Goes Missing'' [Liu benqi bei yi shexian
``shandian'' xingju, qizi liu ying bei laojiao, wusui haizi shizong], 1
November 12. See the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record
2013-00044 for more information on Liu Ying's case.
\74\``Guizhou Dissident Liao Shuangyuan Beaten Up, Zhejiang
Democratic Party Member Forbidden To Leave Home'' [Guizhou yiyi renshi
liao shuangyuan zao ouda zhejiang minzhudang ren bei jin chumen], Radio
Free Asia, 14 January 13.
\75\Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Elections Expert Yao Lifa
Missing for Over 13 Days'' [Xuanju zhuanjia yao lifa shizong yu 13
tian], 17 March 13. See the Commission's Political Prisoner Database
record 2011-00532 for more information about Yao Lifa's case.
\76\``Lawyers Get Involved in Case of 10-Year-Old Zhang Anni's
Kidnapping'' [Lushi jieru shisui zhang anni bei bangjia an], Voice of
America, 6 March 13; Human Rights in China, ``Activist and Ten-Year-Old
Daughter Illegally Detained Before Forcible Removal From Hefei,'' 1
March 13. For information on instances in which authorities harassed
the family members of rights defenders, see Chinese Human Rights
Defenders, ``In the Name of `Stability': 2012 Annual Report on the
Situation of Human Rights Defenders in China,'' March 2013.
\77\Human Rights in China, ``Family Says Rights Defender Zhang Lin
Is Criminally Detained,'' 19 July 13; Chinese Human Rights Defenders,
``Attorneys Liu Xiaoyuan, Li Fangping Go to Detention Center To Visit
Zhang Lin'' [Liu xiaoyuan, li fangping lushi dao kanshousuo huijian bei
jiya de zhang lin], 22 July 13.
\78\Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``China Human Rights Briefing,
August 22-28, 2013,'' 28 August 13.
\79\Rao Aimin, ``Premier Li Keqiang Presides Over and Gives a
Speech at the First State Council Clean Government Work Meeting'' [Li
keqiang zhuchi zhaokai guowuyuan diyici lianzheng gongzuo huiyi bing
jianghua], Xinhua, reprinted in the National Bureau of Corruption
Prevention of China, 27 March 13; David Bandurski, ``Li Keqiang Urges
More Information Openness,'' China Media Project, 27 March 13. Premier
Li Keqiang reportedly also said that there should be more transparency
so that citizens could supervise the government.
\80\``Govts Go More Transparent on Web,'' Xinhua, reprinted in
China Daily, 6 December 12.
\81\China Academy of Social Sciences Institute of Law, Annual
Report on China's Rule of Law No. 11 (2013) [Zhongguo fazhi fazhan
baogao No. 11 (2013)], (Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press, 2013),
171-173.
\82\Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China,
``Reply Concerning an Application for Public Disclosure of Government
Information'' [Guanyu shenqing zhengfu xinxi gongkai de fuhan],
translated by Chinese Human Rights Defenders, 15 November 12; Chinese
Human Rights Defenders, ``China Cites `State Secrets' in Rejecting
Civil Society Participation in Universal Periodic Review,'' 2 April 13.
\83\Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ```Chinese Citizens vs. The
Government' Over Participation in Universal Periodic Review,'' China
Human Rights Briefing, August 29-September 5, 2013, 6 September 13;
Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Beijing Municipality Second
Intermediate People's Court Administrative Ruling'' [Beijing shi di er
zhongji renmin fayuan xingzheng caidingshu], 23 August 12 (includes
translation).
\84\Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``China Human Rights Briefing
August 10-16, 2012,'' reprinted in Amnesty International, 16 August 12.
\85\Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Hunan Rights Defender Peng
Lanlan Released After a Year in Detention'' [Hunan weiquan renshi peng
lanlan bei jiya yi nian hou huoshi], 15 August 13; Chinese Human Rights
Defenders, ``Case of Hunan Rights Defender Peng Lanlan Is Sent to
Procuratorate'' [Hunan weiquan renshi peng lanlan yian bei yisong
jianchayuan], 23 January 13.
\86\Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Case of Hunan Rights Defender
Peng Lanlan Is Sent to Procuratorate'' [Hunan weiquan renshi peng
lanlan yian bei yisong jianchayuan], 23 January 13. Chinese Human
Rights Defenders, ``China Human Rights Briefing August 10-16, 2012,''
reprinted in Amnesty International, 16 August 12. While Peng Lanlan was
in custody, officials reportedly tortured her. See the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2011-00262 for more information
about Peng Lanlan's case.
\87\National People's Congress, Election Law of the National
People's Congress and the Various Levels of Local People's Congresses
of the People's Republic of China [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo quanguo
renmin daibiao dahui he difang geji renmin daibiao dahui xuanjufa],
passed 1 July 79, amended 10 December 82, 2 December 86, 28 February
95, 27 October 04, 14 March 10, art. 2.
\88\Ibid.
\89\Ibid., art. 29. Candidates also may be nominated by either a
political party, local people's congress delegates, or a ``mass
organization.''
\90\Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``China Independent Candidate
Watch Report (Part I)'' [Zhongguo duli canxuan guancha baogao (shang)],
10 December 12.
\91\Wei Huanhuan, ``Beijing Election Observation'' [Beijing xuanju
guancha], New Citizen Law Net, reprinted in China Elections and
Governance, 29 November 11. For example, the New Citizen Law Net
article noted that, in one voting district in Beijing municipality,
only candidates nominated by ``small groups'' would be allowed on the
candidate list. See also Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Independent
Candidates Face `Filter' of `Consultation Brewing''' [Duli canxuanren
zaoyu ``xieshang yunniang'' de ``guoluwang''], 27 October 11.
\92\``President Hu Gains Votes, No Independent Candidates Are
Elected'' [Hu zong you de piao duli canxuanren wu de xuan], Mingpao,
reprinted in Sina, 9 November 11; Chinese Human Rights Defenders,
``China Human Rights Briefing, November 2-7, 2011,'' 15 November 11;
What ``Democracy'' Means in China After Thirty Years of Reform, Staff
Roundtable of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 22 May
09, Testimony of Melanie Manion, Professor of Public Affairs and
Political Science, University of Wisconsin-Madison. See also
``Officials Discourage and Prevent `Independent Candidates' From
Getting on Official Ballots in Local People's Congress Elections,''
CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 1, 24 January 12,
3.
\93\Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``China Independent Candidate
Watch Report (Part I)'' [Zhongguo duli canxuan guancha baogao (shang)],
10 December 12. See also Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``China
Independent Candidate Watch Report (Part II)'' [Zhongguo duli canxuan
guancha baogao (xia)], 10 December 12. This complete report in two
parts contains very detailed information regarding the characteristics
of some independent candidates, describes the steps authorities took to
suppress their election efforts, and highlights a few specific cases of
elections that included independent candidates.
\94\``Record of Draft Decision Regarding the Number of People
Allowed and Election Questions for the Representatives of the 12th
National People's Congress (Full Text)'' [Guanyu shier jie quanguo
renda daibiao minge he xuanju wenti jueding caoan shilu (quanwen)],
China Net, 8 March 12.
\95\For a full description of the characteristics of the resulting
National People's Congress delegates, see ``Undertaking the Great Trust
of the People--Analysis of the Unique Composition of Representatives of
the 12th National People's Congress'' [Jianfuqi renmin de zhongtuo--
shier jie quanguo renda daibiao goucheng tese fenxi], Xinhua, 27
February 12.
\96\``Record of Draft Decision Regarding the Number of People
Allowed and Election Questions for the Representatives of the 12th
National People's Congress (Full Text)'' [Guanyu shier jie quanguo
renda daibiao minge he xuanju wenti jueding caoan shilu (quanwen)],
China Net, 8 March 12.
\97\``Undertaking the Great Trust of the People--Analysis of the
Unique Composition of Representatives of the 12th National People's
Congress'' [Jianfuqi renmin de zhongtuo--shier jie quanguo renda
daibiao goucheng tese fenxi], Xinhua, 27 February 12.
\98\``Record of Draft Decision Regarding the Number of People
Allowed and Election Questions for the Representatives of the 12th
National People's Congress (Full Text)'' [Guanyu shier jie quanguo
renda daibiao minge he xuanju wenti jueding caoan shilu (quanwen)],
China Net, 8 March 12; ``Undertaking the Great Trust of the People--
Analysis of the Unique Composition of Representatives of the 12th
National People's Congress'' [Jianfuqi renmin de zhongtuo--shier jie
quanguo renda daibiao goucheng tese fenxi], Xinhua, 27 February 12.
\99\``Deputies Give Lowest Marks in Six Years to Budget and
Court,'' South China Morning Post, 18 March 13.
\100\``Closing Ceremony of the First Meeting of the 12th National
People's Congress'' [Di shier jie quanguo renmin daibiao dahui diyici
huiyi bimuhui], Xinhua, 17 March 13. Voting results for other reports
are as follows: Draft Government Work Report, 101 negative votes and 44
abstentions; the Draft Report on the Implementation of the 2012
National Economic and Social Development Plan and on the 2013 National
Economic and Social Development Plan, 221 negative votes and 60
abstentions; Draft Report on the Implementation of the 2012 Central and
Local Budgets and on the 2013 Central and Local Budgets, 509 negative
votes and 127 abstentions; Draft Work Report of the Standing Committee
of the National People's Congress, 150 negative votes and 61
abstentions; Supreme People's Procuratorate Draft Work Report, 485
negative votes and 121 abstentions.
\101\``Administrative Litigation Law Revisions and Improving the
Procuratorial System'' [Xingzheng susongfa xiugai yu jiancha zhidu de
wanshan], Procuratorial Daily, 8 February 13; ``Supreme People's Court
Convenes Seminar About Administrative Litigation Law Revisions''
[Zuigao fayuan zhaokai xingzheng susongfa xiugai yantaohui], People's
Court Daily, reprinted in China News Service, 14 October 11.
\102\Zhou Fenmian, ``Administrative Reconsideration Law Revision
Included in Plans, Two Revised Drafts Submitted to Legislative Affairs
Office [of the State Council]'' [Xingzheng fuyi fa xiuding lieru jihua
liangban xiuding gao tijiao fazhiban], Legal Daily, 10 October 12.
\103\State Council General Office, Opinion Regarding Implementing
``Government Work Report'' and the Spirit of the State Council First
Plenum Key Working Departments Division of Labor [Guanyu luoshi
``zhengfu gongzuo baogao'' he guowuyuan diyi ci quantihui jingshen
zhongdian gongzuo bumen fengong de yijian], issued 28 March 13.
\104\Zhang Yong, ``Unceasingly Accelerate the Pace of Constructing
a Rule by Law Government--State Council 2012 Legislative Work Summary''
[Buduan jiakuai fazhi zhengfu jianshe bufa--guowuyuan er ling yi er
nian fazhi gongzuo zongshu], People's Daily, reprinted in the
Legislative Affairs Office of the State Council, last visited 7 January
13.
\105\``Advance Administrative Examination and Approval System
Reform, Promote Legal, Standardized, and Scientific `Red Letterhead
Documents''' [Tuijin xingzheng shenpi zhidu gaige cu ``hongtou
wenjian'' hefa guifan kexue], Xinhua, 3 November 12. According to
Xinhua, Shandong province issued a provision stipulating that all such
documents would need to be uniformly registered, numbered, and
announced. Documents that had not received a publication number would
not go ``into effect.'' Dang Shu, ``Research on Problems Related to
Normative Document Formulation Procedures'' [Guifanxing wenjian zhiding
chengxu de wenti yanjiu], China Law Information and Research Net, last
visited 10 January 13; Wen Jiabao, ``Make Authority Operate in the
Light'' [Rang quanli zai yangguang xia yunxing], Seeking Truth, 16
April 12, para. 3. Wen Jiabao noted that, to improve governance, local
officials should not use ``red letterhead documents'' (local official
documents) to impose additional responsibilities or duties on citizens,
enterprises, or other social groups not included in national laws.
\106\Zhang Yong, ``Unceasingly Accelerate the Pace of Constructing
a Rule by Law Government--State Council 2012 Legislative Work Summary''
[Buduan jiakuai fazhi zhengfu jianshe bufa--guowuyuan er ling yi er
nian fazhi gongzuo zongshu], People's Daily, reprinted in the
Legislative Affairs Office of the State Council, last visited 7 January
13. For more information regarding the filing and review systems of the
State Council and the National People's Congress (and its standing
committee), see Keith Hand, ``Understanding China's System for
Addressing Legislative Conflicts: Capacity Challenges and the Search
for Legislative Harmony,'' Social Science Research Network, revised 3
July 13, 37 (also forthcoming in Columbia Journal of Asian Law).
\107\Keith Hand, ``Understanding China's System for Addressing
Legislative Conflicts: Capacity Challenges and the Search for
Legislative Harmony,'' Social Science Research Network, revised 3 July
13, 51 (also forthcoming in Columbia Journal of Asian Law).
\108\Ibid.
\109\``OSC Analysis: China: NPC Work Report Signals Policy
Continuity,'' Open Source Center, 8 March 13. This report noted that
the 2013 NPC Work Report for the first time listed corruption among the
list of China's problems.
\110\Tom Lasseter, ``Pew Report Finds Growing Worry Among Chinese
About Corruption and Income Gap,'' McClatchy Newspapers, 16 October 12.
\111\John Garnaut, ``Row Between China's Elite Spills Into Open,''
Age, 30 March 13.
\112\``Exclusive Release: Xi Jinping's Speech at the First
Collective Study Session of the 18th Chinese Communist Party Central
Committee Political Bureau'' [Shouquan fabu: xi jinping zai shiba jie
zhonggong zhongyang zhengzhiju diyi jiti xuexi shi de jianghua],
Xinhua, 18 November 12.
\113\``Transcript Summary of Bo Xilai's Trial for Bribery,
Embezzlement, and Abuse of Power,'' People's Daily, 26 August 13;
``Trial of Bo Xilai: Evidence, Charges and Defense,'' China Daily, 28
August 13.
\114\``Judgment in First Instance Trial of Bo Xilai for Bribery,
Embezzlement, and Abuse of Power (Full Text)'' [Bo xilai shouhui,
tanwu, lanyong zhiquan an yishen panjueshu (quanwen)], People's Daily,
reprinted in China News Service, 22 September 13.
\115\Donald Clarke, ``The Bo Xilai Trial and China's `Rule of Law':
Same Old, Same Old,'' Atlantic, 21 August 13.
\116\For information on shuanggui, see CECC, 2012 Annual Report, 10
October 12, 71.
\117\``Li Keqiang: `From This Year on Achieve Transparency of
Government Reception Expenses at the County Level and Above''' [Li
keqiang: jinnian qi shixian xianji yishang zhengfu jiedai jingfei
gongkai], Beijing News, reprinted in Procuratorial Daily, 27 March 13.
\118\Zhang Hailin, ```Especially Serious Crime of Bribery' Standard
Makes Appearance'' [``Tebie zhongda huiluzui'' biaozhun chutai],
Oriental Outlook, 3 January 13. The standard in the Provisional Supreme
People's Procuratorate Criminal Litigation Provisions recategorized
some crimes as serious. These crimes carry a heavier sentence, and
include cases that seriously influence society, involve the national
interest, or involve particularly heinous bribery (500,000 yuan
[US$81,500] or more).
\119\Supreme People's Court and Supreme People's Procuratorate,
Interpretation of Several Issues Concerning the Specific Application of
Law in Handling Criminal Bribery Cases [Guanyu banli xinghui xingshi
anjian juti yingyong falu ruogan wenti de jieshi], issued 21 August 12,
effective 1 January 13.
\120\Supreme People's Court and Supreme People's Procuratorate,
Interpretation of Several Issues Concerning the Application of the Law
in Handling Criminal Malfeasance Cases (1) [Guanyu banli duzhi xingshi
anjian shiyong falu ruogan wenti de jieshi (1)], issued 12 September
12, effective 9 January 13; Chen Fei, ``Supreme People's Court Explains
in Detail Judicial Interpretation on the Handling of Dereliction of
Duty Criminal Cases'' [Zuigaofa xiangjie banli duzhi xingshi anjian
sifa jieshi], Caixin, 9 January 13.
\121\Brice Pedroletti, ``After a Whiff of Online Glasnost, China
Cracks Down on Whistleblower Bloggers,'' Le Monde, reprinted in
Worldcrunch, 1 September 13; Committee To Protect Journalists,
``Chinese Journalist Who Raised Corruption Charges Jailed,'' 29 August
13.
\122\Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Individuals Detained in
Crackdown on Peaceful Assembly & Association,'' updated 18 September
13; ``Leader of Citizens Movement That Held Dinner Party Debates Is
Formally Arrested in Beijing,'' Associated Press, reprinted in
Washington Post, 23 August 13; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``China
Human Rights Briefing, August 15-21, 2013,'' 22 August 13; Dui Hua
Foundation, ``Government Notice Fuels Crackdown on Assembly as
Subversion,'' Dui Hua Human Rights Journal, 19 August 13; Chinese Human
Rights Defenders, ``Individuals Detained in Crackdown on Peaceful
Assembly & Association,'' 28 August 13. For information on one
petition, see ``The Xu Zhiyong Incident Civil Society's Appeal'' [Xu
zhiyong shijian zhi gongmin shehui huyushu], reprinted in NeoEase (Xu
Zhiyong's blog), 20 August 13.
\123\``Woman Held Over Letter to Wen,'' Radio Free Asia, 2 January
13.
\124\``Activists Held Over Transparency Protest,'' Radio Free Asia,
2 April 13.
\125\Human Rights in China, ``Criminally Detained: Zhao Changqing
and Six Other Advocates of Public Disclosure of Officials' Assets,'' 19
April 13.
\126\Raymond Li, ``China's New Central Committee Members Urged To
Disclose Assets,'' South China Morning Post, 14 December 12.
\127\Human Rights Watch, ``China: Free Anti-Corruption Activists,''
3 April 13; Andrew Jacobs, ``Chinese Leader's War on Graft Appears To
Have Limits,'' New York Times, 4 April 13.
\128\Andrew Jacobs, ``Chinese Leader's War on Graft Appears To Have
Limits,'' New York Times, 4 April 13.
\129\Human Rights in China, ``Criminally Detained: Zhao Changqing
and Six Other Advocates of Public Disclosure of Officials' Assets,'' 19
April 13.
\130\Ibid.
\131\Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Chinese Authorities Must
Release Activists, End Escalating Crackdown on Free Expression,'' 19
April 13; ``Beijing Rights Defender Li Wei Has Been Missing for Four
Days'' [Beijing weiquan renshi li wei shizong disi ri], Boxun, 14 April
13.
\132\Human Rights in China, ``Criminally Detained: Zhao Changqing
and Six Other Advocates of Public Disclosure of Officials' Assets,'' 19
April 13.
\133\Human Rights in China, ``Two New Charges for Asset
Transparency Advocate Liu Ping,'' 29 August 13; Chinese Human Rights
Defenders, ``Special Notice: Rights Activist Liu Ping Trial for
`Illegal Assembly' Set for July 18th'' [Tebie guanzhu: weiquan renshi
liu ping ``feifa jihui zui'' yian jiang yu ben yue 18 ri kaiting], 5
July 13; Patrick Boehler, ``Chinese Activist Detained `For Inciting
Subversion of State Power,''' South China Morning Post, 8 May 13;
Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ```Chinese Human Rights Defenders'
Strongly Protests Detention of Citizens `Demanding Disclosure of
Officials' Assets' by Beijing and Jiangxi Authorities''
[``Weiquanwang'' yanzheng kangyi beijing he jiangxi dangju jubu
``yaoqiu guanyuan gongbu caichan'' de gongmin], 8 May 13. Authorities
reportedly denied Liu access to a lawyer.
\134\Liu Yingtuan, ``People's Daily: Where the Difficulties Are
With Disclosing Officials' Assets'' [Renmin ribao: guanyuan caichan
gongkai nan zai na], People's Daily, reprinted in China News Service,
23 November 12. According to this article, a Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences survey showed that over 80 percent of respondents thought
officials should disclose their assets.
\135\Andrew Jacobs, ``Elite in China Face Austerity Under Xi's
Rule,'' New York Times, 27 March 13.
\136\Robert Keatley, ``Xi's Reforms Face Big Obstacle,'' National
Interest, 2 May 13.
\137\``Three Locations in Guangdong Start Pilot Project Disclosing
Officials' Finances, Will Expand in Future'' [Guangdong sandi guanyuan
kaishi gongkai caichan shidian fanwei jiang kuoda], People's Daily,
reprinted in China Transparency, 6 February 13. In Guangdong pilot
projects, officials in two locations have already posted their assets
in public areas, and officials in another location plan to post
information on assets on an internal network, likely not visible to the
public. ``People's Daily: Where the Difficulties Are With Disclosing
Officials' Assets'' [Renmin ribao: guanyuan caichan gongkai nan zai
na], People's Daily, reprinted in China News Service, 23 November 12;
Dai Zhiyong, ``If the People Can Learn To Compromise, Please Learn To
Govern Honestly'' [Ruguo minzhong neng tuoxie, qing ni xuezhe zuo
qingguan], Southern Weekend, 24 September 09. In September 2009, the
Party Central Discipline Inspection Commission reportedly announced
that officials must disclose their personal records related to housing,
investments, and the employment status of their spouses and children.
He Huifeng, ``Guangdong Officials To Disclose Assets--But Not to the
Public,'' South China Morning Post, 15 October 09. Several provinces
and cities have initiated similar asset-reporting requirements for
select categories of officials including a city in the Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region, cities in Hunan and Guangdong provinces, and the
municipality of Shanghai, although in many cases reported information
remained within the Communist Party and unavailable to the public.
\138\Zhu Na, ``Reluctant Transparency,'' Economic Observer, 26 July
11; Mei Kunlun, ``Refusal To Disclose `Three Publics' Requires
Accountability and Transparency'' [Jujue gongkai ``sangong'' xuyao
wenze doudi], Southern Metropolitan Daily, 30 September 12. Thirty-four
of the 42 government institutions contacted by Chinese researchers in
one study refused to provide information about average per capita
office expenses during 2011 and have not provided information on the
``Three Publics.''
Notes to Section III--Commercial Rule of Law
\1\Derek Scissors, Heritage Foundation, ``China's Global Investment
Rises: The U.S. Should Focus on Competition,'' 8 January 13, 2. Other
sources have estimated similar figures. For example, the Economist
Intelligence Unit estimated that the average annual growth in China's
outbound investment from 2005 to 2012 was 35 percent. Economist
Intelligence Unit, ``China Going Global Investment Index,'' 2013, 4.
\2\Derek Scissors, Heritage Foundation, ``China's Global Investment
Rises: The U.S. Should Focus on Competition,'' 8 January 13, 2.
\3\See, e.g., Derek Scissors, Heritage Foundation, ``China's Global
Investment Rises: The U.S. Should Focus on Competition,'' 8 January 13,
2; Economist Intelligence Unit, ``China Going Global Investment
Index,'' 2013, 4.
\4\Economist Intelligence Unit, ``China Going Global Investment
Index,'' 2013, 4.
\5\Ibid.
\6\See, e.g., World Bank, ``GDP Growth (Annual %),'' last visited
14 August 13.
\7\See, e.g., Yi Gang, ``How To Implement the `Going Out'
Strategy,'' Caixin, 18 January 13; Zhao Yanrong, ``Outbound Investment
Continues,'' China Daily, 24 May 13; Nerys Avery, ``Chinese Companies
Seen Seeking Brands in Overseas Investment,'' Bloomberg, 16 April 13.
\8\People's Bank of China, ``Biographical Statement,'' last visited
14 August 13.
\9\State Administration of Foreign Exchange, ``Management Team,''
last visited 14 August 13.
\10\Yi Gang, ``How To Implement the `Going Out' Strategy,'' Caixin,
18 January 13.
\11\Ibid.
\12\National People's Congress, PRC Outline of the 12th Five-Year
Plan on National Economic and Social Development [Zhonghua renmin
gongheguo guomin jingji he shehui fazhan di shier ge wunian guihua
gangyao], passed 14 March 11, issued 16 March 11, para. 1.
\13\Ibid., chap. 52, sec. 2.
\14\Derek Scissors, Heritage Foundation, ``China's Global
Investment Rises: The U.S. Should Focus on Competition,'' 8 January 13,
5. See also Li Qiuyuan, ``State-Owned Enterprises Urged To Expand
Overseas,'' CCTV, 2 December 12.
\15\Derek Scissors, Heritage Foundation, ``China's Global
Investment Rises: The U.S. Should Focus on Competition,'' 8 January 13,
5.
\16\National People's Congress, PRC Outline of the 12th Five-Year
Plan on National Economic and Social Development [Zhonghua renmin
gongheguo guomin jingji he shehui fazhan di shier ge wunian guihua
gangyao], passed 14 March 11, issued 16 March 11, chap. 10, para. 1.
\17\Ibid., chap. 10, sec. 1.
\18\Ibid., chap. 52, sec. 2.
\19\Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, ``Chen
Yuan, Vice Chairman of the Twelfth National Committee of the Chinese
People's Political Consultative Conference'' [Zhongguo renmin zhengzhi
xieshang huiyi di shier jie quanguo weiyuan hui fu zhuxi chen yuan],
last visited 14 August 13.
\20\Ibid.
\21\Wang Yiwei, ``Chen Yuan Becomes Head of China Enterprises
Investment Association'' [Chen yuan churen zhongguo qiye touzi xiehui
huizhang], Sina, 3 December 12.
\22\China Enterprises Investment Association, ``Charter of the
China Enterprises Investment Association'' [Zhongguo qiye touzi xiehui
zhangcheng], issued 21 January 06, effective 21 March 06, art. 4.
\23\Li Qiuyuan, ``State-Owned Enterprises Urged To Expand
Overseas,'' CCTV, 2 December 12.
\24\Nerys Avery, ``Chinese Companies Seen Seeking Brands in
Overseas Investment,'' Bloomberg, 16 April 13; Derek Scissors, Heritage
Foundation, ``China's Global Investment Rises: The U.S. Should Focus on
Competition,'' 8 January 13, 4; Doug Young, ``China Mobile Eyes
Pakistan Expansion,'' South China Morning Post, 26 June 13; Tarek Amara
and Fatma Mattoussi, ``Etisalat, Turkcell, Others Eye Dubai's Tunisie
Telecom Stake,'' Reuters, 26 June 13.
\25\Heritage Foundation, ``China Global Investment Tracker''
Dataset, last visited 14 August 13, dataset 1.
\26\Ibid.
\27\Christopher Bodeen, ``China and Iceland Sign Free Trade
Agreement,'' Associated Press, 15 April 13.
\28\Ibid.; Peter Ford, ``China Cozies Up to Iceland in Race for
Arctic Resources,'' Christian Science Monitor, 15 April 13.
\29\Export-Import Bank of China, ``Brief Introduction,'' last
visited 14 August 13.
\30\Economic Statecraft: Increasing American Jobs Through Greater
U.S.-Africa Trade and Investment, Hearing of the Committee on Foreign
Relations, U.S. Senate, 25 July 12, Testimony of Fred P. Hochberg,
Chairman and President, Export-Import Bank of the United States, 7.
\31\Ibid.
\32\Aliaksandr Kudrytski, ``China Builds EU Beachhead With $5
Billion City in Belarus,'' Bloomberg, 26 May 13. See also Li Xiaokun,
``China Signs Cooperation Agreements With Belarus,'' China Daily, 17
July 13.
\33\China Development Bank, last visited 14 August 13.
\34\Aliaksandr Kudrytski, ``China Builds EU Beachhead With $5
Billion City in Belarus,'' Bloomberg, 26 May 13.
\35\Ibid.
\36\Ibid.
\37\People's Bank of China, ``Notice on Furthering Market-Based
Interest Rate Reform,'' 22 July 13.
\38\``A Small Step Forward,'' Economist, 27 July 13; Zhou Feng,
``Beginning of a New Era in Lending,'' China Daily, 26 July 13; Li
Junheng, ``China's Interest Rate Liberalization, Banking Reform and
Implied Risks to Equity Investors,'' Forbes, 21 July 13; Michael J.
Casey, ``China Scraps Lending Rate Floor, but Don't Call It
Liberalization,'' Wall Street Journal, 19 July 13.
\39\See, e.g., Zhou Feng, ``Beginning of a New Era in Lending,''
China Daily, 26 July 13; ``Teamaker's Woe Signals China Fund Deficit
for Entrepreneurs,'' Bloomberg, 12 August 13.
\40\``A Small Step Forward,'' Economist, 27 July 13; Zhou Feng,
``Beginning of a New Era in Lending,'' China Daily, 26 July 13; Michael
J. Casey, ``China Scraps Lending Rate Floor, but Don't Call It
Liberalization,'' Wall Street Journal, 19 July 13.
\41\``Teamaker's Woe Signals China Fund Deficit for
Entrepreneurs,'' Bloomberg, 12 August 13.
\42\Ibid. See also Financial Stability Board, ``Global Shadow
Banking Monitoring Report 2012,'' 18 November 12; JPMorgan Chase Bank,
Hong Kong, ``Economic Research Note: Shadow Banking in China,'' 3 May
13.
\43\See, e.g., JPMorgan Chase Bank, Hong Kong, ``Economic Research
Note: Shadow Banking in China,'' 3 May 13.
\44\See, e.g., ``Teamaker's Woe Signals China Fund Deficit for
Entrepreneurs,'' Bloomberg, 12 August 13.
\45\``Teamaker's Woe Signals China Fund Deficit for
Entrepreneurs,'' Bloomberg, 12 August 13.
\46\PRC National Audit Office, ``Audit of Government Debt To Launch
Comprehensively'' [Zhengfuxing zhaiwu shenji jiang quanmian kaizhan],
28 July 13.
\47\Phillip Inman, ``China To Audit Local Authorities and State
Enterprises Over Debt Fears,'' Guardian, 29 July 13; Keith Bradsher and
Chris Buckley, ``China Plans Audit of Debt Government Has Incurred,''
New York Times, 28 July 13; ``China Bank Loans to Local Governments up
6 Pct at End June,'' Reuters, 31 July 13.
\48\Phillip Inman, ``China To Audit Local Authorities and State
Enterprises Over Debt Fears,'' Guardian, 29 July 13; Keith Bradsher and
Chris Buckley, ``China Plans Audit of Debt Government Has Incurred,''
New York Times, 28 July 13.
\49\``Teamaker's Woe Signals China Fund Deficit for
Entrepreneurs,'' Bloomberg, 12 August 13.
\50\Based on an August 12, 2013, Chinese yuan (CNY)-U.S. dollar
(USD) exchange rate of 0.16, from XE. XE, ``Current and Historical Rate
Tables,'' last visited 14 August 13.
\51\George Chen, ``Key Chinese Cities and Provinces Set To Receive
Stimulus--on the Quiet,'' South China Morning Post, 12 August 13;
George Chen and Jane Cai, ``Shanghai's Disney Park Major Beneficiary of
HK$314b Agbank Loan,'' South China Morning Post, 12 August 13.
\52\Ibid.
\53\Chen Tian, ``Reining in Culture of Debt,'' Global Times, 12
August 13.
\54\U.S. Department of the Treasury, ``Report to Congress on
International Economic and Exchange Rate Policies,'' 12 April 13, 18.
\55\Ibid.
\56\See, e.g., Eleni Himaras, ``Summers Says Yuan Isn't as
Undervalued as It Was Five Years Ago,'' Bloomberg, 14 January 13; U.S.
Department of the Treasury, ``Report to Congress on International
Economic and Exchange Rate Policies,'' 12 April 13, 16; Wynne Wang,
``China Yuan Hits New High on PBOC Guidance,'' Wall Street Journal, 9
May 13.
\57\Wynne Wang, ``China Yuan Hits New High on PBOC Guidance,'' Wall
Street Journal, 9 May 13.
\58\``Full Text: Report on the Work of the Government,'' Xinhua, 18
March 13.
\59\U.S. Department of the Treasury, ``Report to Congress on
International Economic and Exchange Rate Policies,'' 12 April 13, 17.
\60\``China's Big Dilemma--Currency Reform,'' Reuters, reprinted in
CNBC, 27 April 13.
\61\U.S. Department of the Treasury, ``Report to Congress on
International Economic and Exchange Rate Policies,'' 12 April 13, 17.
\62\People's Bank of China, ``About PBC,'' last visited 14 August
13.
\63\Li Yanping et al., ``Exiting PBOC Adviser Urges More Power for
Central Bank: Economy,'' Bloomberg, 21 March 13.
\64\State Administration for Foreign Exchange, Circular Regarding
Improving and Adjusting Policies on the Management of Direct Investment
and Foreign Exchange [Guojia waihui guanli ju guanyu jin yi bu gaijin
he tiaozheng zhijie touzi waihui guanli zhengce de tongzhi], issued 19
November 12, effective 17 December 12.
\65\Ibid., para. 2. For additional discussion of the circular, see
Cooley LLP, ``SAFE Simplifies Foreign Exchange Controls on Foreign
Direct Investment,'' 20 December 12.
\66\State Administration for Foreign Exchange, Circular Regarding
Improving and Adjusting Policies on the Management of Direct Investment
and Foreign Exchange [Guojia waihui guanli ju guanyu jin yi bu gaijin
he tiaozheng zhijie touzi waihui guanli zhengce de tongzhi], issued 19
November 12, effective 17 December 12, art. 1.
\67\Ibid., art. 2.
\68\Ibid., art. 8(2).
\69\China joined the WTO on December 11, 2001. See, e.g., World
Trade Organization, ``China and the WTO,'' last visited 14 August 13.
\70\World Trade Organization, ``Disputes by Country/Territory,''
last visited 14 August 13.
\71\World Trade Organization, DS413, China--Certain Measures
Affecting Electronic Payment Services, last visited 14 August 13; World
Trade Organization, DS414, China--Countervailing and Anti-Dumping
Duties on Grain Oriented Flat-Rolled Electrical Steel From the United
States, last visited 14 August 13; World Trade Organization, DS425,
China--Definitive Anti-Dumping Duties on X-Ray Security Inspection
Equipment From the European Union, last visited 14 August 13; World
Trade Organization, DS427, China--Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duty
Measures on Broiler Products From the United States, last visited 14
August 13.
\72\World Trade Organization, DS414, China--Countervailing and
Anti-Dumping Duties on Grain Oriented Flat-Rolled Electrical Steel From
the United States, Summary of the Dispute to Date, last visited 14
August 13; World Trade Organization, DS425, China--Definitive Anti-
Dumping Duties on X-Ray Security Inspection Equipment From the European
Union, last visited 14 August 13; World Trade Organization, DS427,
China--Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duty Measures on Broiler
Products From the United States, Summary of the Dispute to Date, last
visited 14 August 13.
\73\World Trade Organization, DS427, China--Anti-Dumping and
Countervailing Duty Measures on Broiler Products From the United
States, Summary of the Dispute to Date, last visited 14 August 13. See
also Office of the United States Trade Representative, ``United States
Wins Trade Enforcement Case for American Farmers, Proves Export-
Blocking Chinese Duties Unjustified Under WTO Rules,'' 2 August 13.
\74\World Trade Organization, DS414, China--Countervailing and
Anti-Dumping Duties on Grain Oriented Flat-Rolled Electrical Steel From
the United States, Summary of the Dispute to Date, last visited 14
August 13.
\75\Ministry of Commerce, ``MOFCOM Announcement No. 51 of 2013 on
Executing WTO's Ruling Against Grain Oriented Flat-Rolled Electrical
Steel,'' 31 July 13.
\76\Ibid. For more information, see AK Steel, ``AK Steel Comments
Regarding the Government of China's Failure To Implement WTO Rulings on
Grain Oriented Electrical Steel,'' Wall Street Journal, 31 July 13.
\77\World Trade Organization, DS440, China--Anti-Dumping and
Countervailing Duties on Certain Automobiles From the United States,
last visited 14 August 13.
\78\World Trade Organization, DS450, China--Certain Measures
Affecting the Automobile and Automobile-Parts Industries, last visited
14 August 13.
\79\World Trade Organization, DS440, China--Anti-Dumping and
Countervailing Duties on Certain Automobiles From the United States,
Summary of the Dispute to Date, last visited 14 August 13.
\80\World Trade Organization, DS413, China--Certain Measures
Affecting Electronic Payment Services, Summary of the Dispute to Date,
last visited 14 August 13.
\81\Ibid.
\82\World Trade Organization, Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures, date of signature 15 April 94, entry into
force 1 January 95, arts. 25.1, 25.2.
\83\Office of the United States Trade Representative and U.S.
Department of Commerce, ``Subsidies Enforcement: Annual Report to the
Congress,'' February 2013, 14.
\84\World Trade Organization, DS450, China--Certain Measures
Affecting the Automobile and Automobile-Parts Industries, last visited
14 August 13.
\85\Office of the United States Trade Representative and U.S.
Department of Commerce, ``Subsidies Enforcement: Annual Report to the
Congress,'' February 2013, 15.
\86\US-China Business Council, ``USCBC 2012 China Business
Environment Survey Results,'' 2012, 9.
\87\Ibid., 8.
\88\Ibid., 13.
\89\Ibid.
\90\World Trade Organization, ``Understanding the WTO: Principles
of the Trading System,'' last visited 4 September 13. See also World
Trade Organization, ``Glossary,'' last visited 4 September 13, which
defines ``national treatment'' as follows: ``The principle of giving
others the same treatment as one's own nationals. GATT Article 3
requires that imports be treated no less favorably than the same or
similar domestically-produced goods once they have passed customs. GATS
Article 17 and TRIPS Article 3 also deal with national treatment for
services and intellectual property protection.''
\91\Office of the United States Trade Representative, ``USTR
Michael Froman Welcomes Progress at U.S.-China Strategic and Economic
Dialogue,'' 12 July 13; ``Treasury Official Touts New Chinese
Investment Commitments at S&ED,'' China Trade Extra, 12 July 13; Teshu
Singh, ``China and the US: Fifth Strategic and Economic Dialogue--
Analysis,'' Eurasia Review, 25 July 13.
\92\``Treasury Official Touts New Chinese Investment Commitments at
S&ED,'' China Trade Extra, 12 July 13.
\93\Ibid.
\94\World Trade Organization, ``Government Procurement: Opening Up
for Competition,'' last visited 14 August 13.
\95\``China Indicates It Is Unlikely To Table New GPA Offer Before
End of 2013,'' China Trade Extra, 30 May 13.
\96\``Treasury Official Touts New Chinese Investment Commitments at
S&ED,'' China Trade Extra, 12 July 13.
\97\``US Law Ruins Fair Chance of Competition,'' Global Times, 16
May 13.
\98\PRC State Intellectual Property Office, ``Promotion Plan for
the Implementation of the National Intellectual Property Strategy in
2013,'' 26 March 13, sec. IV.
\99\Commission on the Theft of American Intellectual Property,
``The IP Commission Report,'' May 2013, 59.
\100\Ibid., 3.
\101\Ibid. For a description of national policy guidelines for the
acquisition of technology, see, e.g., National People's Congress, PRC
Outline of the 12th Five-Year Plan on National Economic and Social
Development [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guomin jingji he shehui fazhan
di shier ge wunian guihua gangyao], passed 14 March 11, issued 16 March
11, chap. 27.
\102\Commission on the Theft of American Intellectual Property,
``The IP Commission Report,'' May 2013, 3.
\103\Office of the United States Trade Representative, ``2013
Special 301 Report,'' May 2013, 31.
\104\Office of the United States Trade Representative, ``2012
Special 301 Report,'' April 2012, 26; Office of the United States Trade
Representative, ``2011 Special 301 Report,'' April 2011, 19; Office of
the United States Trade Representative, ``2010 Special 301 Report,'' 30
April 10, 19; Office of the United States Trade Representative, ``2009
Special 301 Report,'' 30 April 09, 13; Office of the United States
Trade Representative, ``2008 Special 301 Report,'' last visited 14
August 13, 19; Office of the United States Trade Representative, ``2007
Special 301 Report,'' last visited 14 August 13, 18; Office of the
United States Trade Representative, ``2006 Special 301 Report,'' last
visited 14 August 13, 16.
\105\Office of the United States Trade Representative, ``Background
on Special 301,'' last visited 14 August 13.
\106\Office of the United States Trade Representative, ``2013
Special 301 Report,'' May 2013, 32.
\107\Ibid., 33.
\108\Ibid., 13.
\109\Mandiant, ``APT 1: Exposing One of China's Cyber Espionage
Units,'' 18 February 13, 9.
\110\Ibid., 3.
\111\Ibid., 22.
\112\Ibid.
\113\National People's Congress, PRC Outline of the 12th Five-Year
Plan on National Economic and Social Development [Zhonghua renmin
gongheguo guomin jingji he shehui fazhan di shier ge wunian guihua
gangyao], passed 14 March 11, issued 16 March 11, chap. 10.
\114\Mandiant, ``APT 1: Exposing One of China's Cyber Espionage
Units,'' 18 February 13, 24.
\115\American Chamber of Commerce in the People's Republic of
China, ``China Business Climate Survey Report 2013,'' 2013, 10.
\116\Ibid.
\117\World Trade Organization, Protocol on the Accession of the
People's Republic of China, WT/L/432 (01-5996), 23 November 01, part I,
art. 7(3).
\118\Office of the United States Trade Representative, ``Fact
Sheet: 23rd U.S.-China Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade,'' 19
December 12.
\119\Office of the United States Trade Representative, ``2013
Special 301 Report,'' May 2013, 33.
\120\PRC Copyright Law Implementing Regulations [Zhonghua renmin
gongheguo zhuzuo quan fa shishi tiaoli], issued 2 August 02, amended 16
January 13, effective 1 March 13.
\121\Information Network Broadcasting Rights Protection Regulations
[Xinxi wangluo chuanbo quan baohu tiaoli], issued 18 May 06, amended 16
January 13, effective 1 March 13.
\122\Computer Software Protection Regulations [Jisuanji ruanjian
baohu tiaoli], issued 20 December 01, amended 16 January 13, effective
1 March 13.
\123\PRC Copyright Law Implementing Regulations [Zhonghua renmin
gongheguo zhuzuo quan fa shishi tiaoli], issued 2 August 02, amended 16
January 13, effective 1 March 13, art. 36; Information Network
Broadcasting Rights Protection Regulations [Xinxi wangluo chuanbo quan
baohu tiaoli], issued 18 May 06, amended 16 January 13, effective 1
March 13, arts. 18, 19; Information Network Broadcasting Rights
Protection Regulations [Xinxi wangluo chuanbo quan baohu tiaoli],
issued 18 May 06, effective 1 July 06, arts. 18, 19; Computer Software
Protection Regulations [Jisuanji ruanjian baohu tiaoli], issued 20
December 01, amended 16 January 13, effective 1 March 13, art. 24;
Computer Software Protection Regulations [Jisuanji ruanjian baohu
tiaoli], issued 20 December 01, effective 1 January 02, art. 24, para.
2; State Intellectual Property Office, ``China Increases Administrative
Penalties Under the Copyright Law Implementing Regulations'' [Woguo
zhuzuo quan fa shishi tiaoli shangtiao xingzheng chufa e], 26 February
13.
\124\Chen Liping, ``State Intellectual Property Office Sets Out To
Research Amendments to the Patent Law'' [Guojia zhishi chan quan ju
zhuoshou yanjiu xiugai zhuanli fa], China Court, 6 February 13; State
Intellectual Property Office, ``State Intellectual Property Office
Convenes Conference on the Issue of Amendments to the Patent Law''
[Guojia zhishi chan quan ju zhaokai zhuanli fa xiugai zhuanti yantao
hui], 25 May 13.
\125\Zhang Wei, ``Amendments to Trademark Law Expand Elements for
Registration'' [Shangbiao fa xiuding kuoda zhuce yuansu], Legal Daily,
15 April 13.
\126\Yuan Ruting and Qu Jing, ``China Amends `Copyright Law' Again,
Strengthens Law Enforcement To Protect Intellectual Property Rights''
[Zhongguo zai xiu ``zhuzuoquan fa'' qianghua zhifa baohu zhishichan
quan], Xinhua, 17 November 12.
\127\National People's Congress, ``Trademark Law Amendment (Draft)
Articles'' [Shangbiao fa xiuzheng an (cao an) tiaowen], 28 December 12,
paras. 3, 9, 39.
\128\Ibid., para. 37; PRC Trademark Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo
shangbiao fa], passed 23 August 82, amended 22 February 93, 27 October
01, art. 56.
\129\State Intellectual Property Office, ``Patent Law Draft
Amendment (Draft for Comment) Comparison of Articles'' [Zhuanli fa
xiugai cao an (zhengqiu yijian gao) tiaowen duizhao], last visited 14
August 13, row 3.
\130\Ibid., paras. 3, 5, 6.
\131\State Intellectual Property Office, ``Explanation Regarding
the Patent Law Draft Amendment (Draft for Comment)'' [Guanyu zhuanli fa
xiugai cao an (zhengqiu yijian gao) de shuoming], last visited 14
August 13, para. 3(2).
\132\Ibid., para. 3(5).
\133\Renmin University of China Law School, ``Faculty Directory:
Liu Chuntian,'' last visited 14 August 13.
\134\Emma Barraclough, ``Concerns Raised Over Chinese Patent Law
Amendment,'' Managing Intellectual Property, 19 April 13.
\135\State Intellectual Property Office, State Intellectual
Property Office Circular Concerning the Solicitation of Opinions
Regarding the ``Draft Service Invention Regulations (for Comment)''
[Guojia zhishi chanquan ju guanyu zhengqiu dui ``zhiwu faming tiaoli
cao an (zhengqiu yijian gao)'' yijian de tongzhi], 12 November 12.
\136\See, e.g., State Intellectual Property Office, ``Draft Service
Invention Regulations (for Comment)'' [Zhiwu faming tiaoli cao an
(zhengqiu yijian gao)], 12 November 12, art. 1; Duan Xiaoling,
International Law Office, ``Draft Regulations on Service Inventions
Released,'' 14 January 13.
\137\Zhang Wei, ``Enforcement Guide To Come Out in the Field of
Intellectual Property Antimonopoly'' [Zhishi chanquan lingyu
fanlongduan jiang chu zhifa zhinan], Legal Daily, 16 August 12.
\138\Ibid.
\139\PRC Civil Procedure Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo minshi
susong fa], passed 9 April 91, amended 28 October 07, 31 August 12,
effective 1 January 13.
\140\See, e.g., Gary A. Seib et al., Baker & McKenzie, ``Client
Alert: Recent Amendments to China's Civil Procedure Law Bring Important
Changes and Greater Remedies,'' September 2012; Paula Hodges et al.,
Herbert Smith Freehills LLP, ``Amended Civil Procedure Law Is Good News
for Arbitrations in Mainland China,'' reprinted in Lexology, 3 October
12; Hui Huang, Wan Hui Da Intellectual Property Agency, ``Amendments of
China Civil Procedure Law Will Come Into Effect on Jan 1st 2013,''
reprinted in Lexology, 29 November 12; Terence Tung et al., Mayer Brown
JSM, ``New Amendments to PRC Civil Procedure Law Aimed at Increasing
Efficiency, Transparency and Parties' Autonomy,'' 17 January 13.
\141\PRC Central Government, ``Decision of the National People's
Congress Standing Committee Regarding Amending the `PRC Civil Procedure
Law''' [Quanguo renmin daibiao dahui changwu weiyuanhui guanyu xiu gai
``zhonghua renmin gongheguo minshi susong fa'' de jueding], 31 August
12, paras. 32-33; PRC Civil Procedure Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo
minshi susong fa], passed 9 April 91, amended 28 October 07, 31 August
12, effective 1 January 13, arts. 152, 154(3). See also Paula Hodges et
al., Herbert Smith Freehills LLP, ``Amended Civil Procedure Law Is Good
News for Arbitrations in Mainland China,'' reprinted in Lexology, 3
October 12; Hui Huang, Wan Hui Da Intellectual Property Agency,
``Amendments of China Civil Procedure Law Will Come Into Effect on Jan
1st 2013,'' reprinted in Lexology, 29 November 12; Terence Tung et al.,
Mayer Brown JSM, ``New Amendments to PRC Civil Procedure Law Aimed at
Increasing Efficiency, Transparency and Parties' Autonomy,'' 17 January
13, 3.
\142\PRC Central Government, ``Decision of the National People's
Congress Standing Committee Regarding Amending the `PRC Civil Procedure
Law''' [Quanguo renmin daibiao dahui changwu weiyuanhui guanyu xiu gai
``zhonghua renmin gongheguo minshi susong fa'' de jueding], 31 August
12, para. 34; PRC Civil Procedure Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo minshi
susong fa], passed 9 April 91, amended 28 October 07, 31 August 12,
effective 1 January 13, art. 156. See also Hui Huang, Wan Hui Da
Intellectual Property Agency, ``Amendments of China Civil Procedure Law
Will Come Into Effect on Jan 1st 2013,'' reprinted in Lexology, 29
November 12; Terence Tung et al., Mayer Brown JSM, ``New Amendments to
PRC Civil Procedure Law Aimed at Increasing Efficiency, Transparency
and Parties' Autonomy,'' 17 January 13, 3.
\143\PRC Central Government, ``Decision of the National People's
Congress Standing Committee Regarding Amending the `PRC Civil Procedure
Law''' [Quanguo renmin daibiao dahui changwu weiyuanhui guanyu xiu gai
``zhonghua renmin gongheguo minshi susong fa'' de jueding], 31 August
12, paras. 17, 22; PRC Civil Procedure Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo
minshi susong fa], passed 9 April 91, amended 28 October 07, 31 August
12, effective 1 January 13, arts. 81, 101. See also Paula Hodges et
al., Herbert Smith Freehills LLP, ``Amended Civil Procedure Law Is Good
News for Arbitrations in Mainland China,'' reprinted in Lexology, 3
October 12; Terence Tung et al., Mayer Brown JSM, ``New Amendments to
PRC Civil Procedure Law Aimed at Increasing Efficiency, Transparency
and Parties' Autonomy,'' 17 January 13.
\144\PRC Central Government, ``Decision of the National People's
Congress Standing Committee Regarding Amending the `PRC Civil Procedure
Law''' [Quanguo renmin daibiao dahui changwu weiyuanhui guanyu xiu gai
``zhonghua renmin gongheguo minshi susong fa'' de jueding], 31 August
12, para. 21; PRC Civil Procedure Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo minshi
susong fa], passed 9 April 91, amended 28 October 07, 31 August 12,
effective 1 January 13, art. 100. See also Gary A. Seib et al., Baker &
McKenzie, ``Client Alert: Recent Amendments to China's Civil Procedure
Law Bring Important Changes and Greater Remedies,'' September 2012, 2;
Hui Huang, Wan Hui Da Intellectual Property Agency, ``Amendments of
China Civil Procedure Law Will Come Into Effect on Jan 1st 2013,''
reprinted in Lexology, 29 November 12; Terence Tung et al., Mayer Brown
JSM, ``New Amendments to PRC Civil Procedure Law Aimed at Increasing
Efficiency, Transparency and Parties' Autonomy,'' 17 January 13, 2.
\145\Ibid.
\146\Ministry of Commerce, ``Provisions on Additional Restrictive
Conditions for the Concentration of Business Operators (Draft for
Comment)'' [Jingyingzhe jizhong fujia xianzhixing tiaojian de guiding
(zhengqiu yijian gao)], 27 March 13.
\147\Ministry of Commerce, ``Interim Provisions Regarding the
Application of Standards for Simple Cases of Concentration of Business
Operators (Draft for Comment)'' [Guanyu jingyingzhe jizhong jianyi
anjian shiyong biaozhun de zanxing guiding (zhengqiu yijian gao)], 3
April 13.
\148\See, e.g., Ninette Dodoo et al., ``MOFCOM Seeks To Streamline
and Clarify the Chinese Merger Control Process--Draft Regulations
Published,'' Clifford Chance, 24 April 13; Herbert Smith Freehills LLP,
``Recent Developments in Chinese Merger Control: MOFCOM Consults on
Draft Regulations and Imposes Remedies in Glencore/Xstrata and
Marubeni/Gavilon Mergers,'' 7 May 13.
\149\See, e.g., Michael Martina, ``Insight--Flexing Antitrust
Muscle, China Is a New Merger Hurdle,'' Reuters, 2 May 13; Herbert
Smith Freehills LLP, ``Recent Developments in Chinese Merger Control:
MOFCOM Consults on Draft Regulations and Imposes Remedies in Glencore/
Xstrata and Marubeni/Gavilon Mergers,'' 7 May 13.
\150\Ninette Dodoo et al., ``MOFCOM Seeks To Streamline and Clarify
the Chinese Merger Control Process--Draft Regulations Published,''
Clifford Chance, 24 April 13, 3.
\151\Ministry of Commerce, ``Interim Provisions Regarding the
Application of Standards for Simple Cases of Concentration of Business
Operators (Draft for Comment)'' [Guanyu jingyingzhe jizhong jianyi
anjian shiyong biaozhun de zanxing guiding (zhengqiu yijian gao)], 3
April 13, arts. 2-4.
\152\Herbert Smith Freehills LLP, ``Recent Developments in Chinese
Merger Control: MOFCOM Consults on Draft Regulations and Imposes
Remedies in Glencore/Xstrata and Marubeni/Gavilon Mergers,'' 7 May 13.
\153\Nickie Yeung, ``NDRC Cracks Down on Anti-Competitive
Behaviour,'' China Law & Practice, January/February 2013. See also
``Chinese Authorities Fine LCD Cartel in First Case Concerning Conduct
Outside China,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 12
February 13.
\154\Based on a January 4, 2013, Chinese yuan (CNY)-U.S. dollar
(USD) exchange rate of 0.16, from XE. XE, ``Current and Historical Rate
Tables,'' last visited 14 August 13.
\155\National Development and Reform Commission, ``Six Foreign
Enterprises Carry Out LCD Screen Price Fixing, Investigated According
to the Law'' [Liu jia jingwai qiye shishi yejing mianban jiage longduan
bei yifa chachu], 4 January 13. See also ``Chinese Authorities Fine LCD
Cartel in First Case Concerning Conduct Outside China,'' Congressional-
Executive Commission on China, 12 February 13.
\156\National Development and Reform Commission, ``Six Foreign
Enterprises Carry Out LCD Screen Price Fixing, Investigated According
to the Law'' [Liu jia jingwai qiye shishi yejing mianban jiage longduan
bei yifa chachu], 4 January 13.
\157\PRC Pricing Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jiage fa], passed
29 December 97, issued 29 December 97, effective 1 May 98.
\158\Ibid., art. 14(1).
\159\PRC Antimonopoly Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo fan longduan
fa], passed 30 August 07, effective 1 August 08.
\160\Ibid.
\161\PRC Pricing Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jiage fa], passed
29 December 97, issued 29 December 97, effective 1 May 98, art. 2.
\162\PRC Administrative Punishment Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo
xingzheng chufa fa], passed 17 March 96, issued 17 March 96, effective
1 October 96, art. 29.
\163\Nickie Yeung, ``NDRC Cracks Down on Anti-Competitive
Behaviour,'' China Law & Practice, January/February 2013.
\164\Nathan Bush et al., O'Melveny & Myers LLP, ``China's NDRC
Penalizes Global LCD Panel Price Cartel,'' 7 January 13.
\165\Ibid.
\166\Meng Jing, ``Watchdog Bites With No Favor,'' China Daily, 16
September 13.
\167\Ibid.
\168\Ministry of Public Security, ``Public Security Organs
Concentrate on Combatting Meat Product Offenses, Protecting Safety at
the Table'' [Gongan jiguan jizhong daji rouzhipin fanzui baowei canzhuo
anquan], 2 May 13.
\169\See, e.g., Jonathan Kaiman, ``China Arrests 900 in Fake Meat
Scandal,'' Guardian, 3 May 13; Laurie Burkitt, ``Rats! China Chews on
New Food Safety Scandal,'' Wall Street Journal, China Real Time Report
(blog), 3 May 13; ``Over 900 Arrested in China for Meat-Related
Crimes,'' Xinhua, 2 May 13.
\170\Didi Kirsten Tatlow, ```Cadmium Rice' Is China's Latest Food
Scandal,'' New York Times, IHT Rendezvous (blog), 20 May 13; Shen
Jingwen, ``Over 40 Percent of Rice Sampled in Guangzhou Contains
Cadmium Levels That Are Too High, Poisonous Brands Still a Mystery''
[Guangzhou dami bei choujian chao 4 cheng ge chaobiao, youdu pinpai
reng cheng mi], China National Radio, 17 May 13.
\171\Ibid.
\172\``China Jails 6 for Selling Dirty Cooking Oil as New,''
Associated Press, 8 April 13.
\173\Ibid.
\174\Food and Drug Safety, Public Health, and the Environment in
China, Hearing of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 22
May 13, Testimony of Steven M. Solomon, Associate Director for Global
Operations and Policy, Office of Global Regulatory Operations and
Policy, Food and Drug Administration, U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services.
\175\U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, ``Corporations
Charged for Allegedly Importing Hazardous and Counterfeit Toys From
China for Sale in the US,'' 6 February 13.
\176\Ibid.
\177\Charlotte Haunhorst, ``Food From Nowhere: Producers Reject
Calls for Stricter Labels,'' Der Spiegel, 17 October 12.
\178\See, e.g., CECC, 2008 Annual Report, 31 October 08, 157-58.
\179\``Milk Smugglers Top Heroin Courier Arrests in Hong Kong,''
Bloomberg, 26 April 13.
\180\Ibid.
\181\``Chinese Premier Vows To Boost Dairy Industry,'' Xinhua, 31
May 13.
\182\Ibid.
Notes to Section III--Access to Justice
\1\Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by
UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 48, art. 8.
\2\International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December
66, entry into force 23 March 76, art. 2. China has signed, and stated
its intent to ratify the ICCPR.
\3\Ng Tze-wei, ``Pedigree of Top Judge Zhou Qiang Offers Hope for
Legal Reform,'' South China Morning Post, 4 April 13.
\4\Keith Zhai, ``Security Tsar Meng Jianzhu Criticises Interference
in Court Proceeding,'' South China Morning Post, 9 January 13.
University of Hong Kong Law School Professor Fu Hualing wrote of former
Minister of Public Security and Politburo Standing Committee member
Zhou Yongkang that his ``legacy will be his willingness and ability to
turn the legal system against law and create a culture of contempt of
law within the political legal system.'' See Fu Hualing, ``Autonomy,
Courts and the Political-Legal Order in Contemporary China'' in The
Routledge Handbook of Chinese Criminology, eds. Liqun Cao, Ivan Y. Sun,
and Bill Hebenton (Abingdon, Oxon: 2013--Forthcoming), Chap. 7, and
University of Hong Kong Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 2013/013, via
Social Sciences Research Net, last visited 26 June 13.
\5\Quan Yi, ``Reform of Operational Mechanisms of Judicial Powers
`The Direction Is Judicial Independence and Integrity''' [Sifa quanli
yunxing jizhi gaige ``fangxiang zaiyu sifa duli qie lianjie''],
Oriental Morning Post, 8 January 13.
\6\Chen Baocheng, ``Police To Stop Using Camps This Year, Politburo
Members Says,'' Caixin, 7 January 13.
\7\Cui Qingxin and Liu Yizhan, ``China Will Promote RTL, Residence
Permit, and Other System Reforms'' [Zhongguo jiang tuijin laojiao, huji
deng zhidu gaige], Xinhua, 7 January 13.
\8\PRC Constitution, issued 4 December 82, amended 12 April 88, 29
March 93, 15 March 99, 14 March 04, preamble, art. 126.
\9\Xu Xin et al., Beijing Institute of Technology Center for
Judicial Reform, ``Annual Report on China's Judicial Reform (2012)''
[Zhongguo sifa gaige niandu baogao (2012)], China University of
Politics and Law Forum, Issue 2, 2013.
\10\Ibid.
\11\State Council Information Office, ``Full Text: Judicial Reform
in China,'' reprinted in Xinhua, 9 October 12.
\12\Fu Hualing, ``Autonomy, Courts and the Political-Legal Order in
Contemporary China'' in The Routledge Handbook of Chinese Criminology,
eds. Liqun Cao, Ivan Y. Sun, and Bill Hebenton (Abingdon, Oxon: 2013--
Forthcoming), Chap. 7, and University of Hong Kong Faculty of Law
Research Paper No. 2013/013, via Social Sciences Research Network, last
visited 26 June 13.
\13\``Two Sessions' Authorized Release: Supreme People's Court Work
Report'' [Lianghui shouquan fabu: zuigao renmin fayuan gongzuo baogao],
Xinhua, 21 March 13.
\14\Dui Hua Foundation, ``Judicial Independence Debuts in
Contentious SPC Work Report,'' Dui Hua Human Rights Journal, 19 March
13.
\15\For the two most recent five-year plans, see ``Outline of the
Third Five-Year Plan for Reform of People's Courts (2009-2013)''
[Renmin fayuan di sange wunian gaige gangyao (2009-2013)], 27 March 09;
``Outline of the Second Five-Year Plan of People's Courts (2004-2008)''
[Renmin fayuan di erge wunian gaige gangyao (2004-2008)], 26 May 05.
The fourth five-year plan presumably will encompass the years 2014-
2019. The judiciary's five-year plans designate the focal areas for
which the court system as a whole should improve, strengthen, or
reform. Past plans have included such issues as court personnel,
operational and procedural mechanisms, adjudication, and
standardization, among others.
\16\Cui Qingxin and Liu Yizhan, ``China Will Promote RTL, Residence
Permit, and Other System Reforms'' [Zhongguo jiang tuijin laojiao, huji
deng zhidu gaige], Xinhua, 7 January 13; Chen Baocheng, ``Report: New
Voice of the Supreme People's Court'' [Baodao: zui gao fayuan de xin
shengyin], New Century Magazine, 14 July 13.
\17\Fu Hualing, ``Re-Education Through Labour in Historical
Perspective,'' China Quarterly, Vol. 184, December 2005, 811; John
Givens, ``Small Details Make for Big Injustices: Re-education Through
Labour and Administrative Litigation,'' Politics in Spires, Oxon China
(blog), 11 June 13; CECC, ``Special Topic Paper: Prospects for
Reforming China's Reeducation Through Labor System,'' 9 May 13; CECC,
2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 99.
\18\Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Rule of Law Is Key to Ending
All Forms of Extralegal Detention, Including Forced Labor,'' reprinted
in Amnesty International, 6 February 13.
\19\Zhao Lei and Zheng Li, ``Wang Hanbin Witnessed Significant
Legislative Debates'' [Wang hanbin qinli de zhongda lifa lunzheng],
Southern Weekend, 18 April 13; Li Yonggang, ``Pu Zhiqiang: Why We Are
Calling for the Complete End to Reeducation Through Labor'' [Pu
zhiqiang: women wei shenme huyu chedi feichu laojiao], Chinese Business
Gazette, 23 November 12. Commentator Zhang Ruoyu wrote in Chinese
Business View that, ``At the very least, the RTL system violates the
Constitution, the Legislation Law, the Administrative Penalty Law, and
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which the
Chinese government has signed.'' See Zhang Ruoyu, ``Deposing RTL Lacks
Only the Puncture of a Paper Window'' [Feichu laojiao zhidu jiu cha
tongpo yiceng chuanghu zhi], Chinese Business View, 8 January 13,
translated and reprinted in Dui Hua Foundation, ``RTL Abolition: `Only
A Matter of Time?''' 9 January 13.
\20\Andrew Jacobs, ``China Says It Will Overhaul Sprawling System
of Re-Education Through Labor,'' New York Times, 7 January 13.
\21\Human Rights Watch, ``Dangerous Meditation: China's Campaign
Against Falungong,'' January 2002.
\22\Fu Hualing, ``Re-Education Through Labour in Historical
Perspective,'' China Quarterly, Vol. 184, December 2005, 811, 823-27.
\23\Tania Branigan, ``Outcry in China Over Mother Sent to Labour
Camp After Daughter's Rape,'' Guardian, 16 August 12; Yu Jincui,
``Punishing Criticism Outdated in Today's China,'' Global Times, 12
October 12; ``Chongqing Village Official's `Give Me Liberty or Give Me
Death' T-Shirt Used as RTL Material Evidence'' [Chongqing cunguan ``bu
ziyou wuning si'' T xiu bei zuo laojiao wuzheng], DaHe Net, reprinted
in People's Daily Online, 11 October 12.
\24\``Lens: Expose on Liaoning's Masanjia Women's RTL Center''
[Jiemi liaoning masanjia nuzi laojiaosuo], Lens Magazine, reprinted in
China Digital Times, 7 April 13; Dui Hua Foundation, ``Magazine Expose
Reinvigorates Calls To End RTL,'' 11 April 13.
\25\The End of Reeducation Through Labor? Recent Developments and
Prospects for Reform, Staff Roundtable of the Congressional-Executive
Commission on China, 9 May 13, Testimony of Li Xiaorong, Independent
Scholar; CECC, ``Special Topic Paper: Prospects for Reforming China's
Reeducation Through Labor System,'' 9 May 13.
\26\``RTL Centers in Jiangsu, Beijing and Elsewhere To Become
Compulsory Drug Treatment Centers'' [Jiangsu beijing dengduo di
laojiaosuo zhuanxing wei qiangzhi jiedusuo], Shun Net, 18 June 13.
\27\Zhou Qingshu et al., ``Many Places Throughout the Country Have
Stopped Approving RTL'' [Quanguo duodi tingzhi laojiao shenpi], Beijing
News, 16 July 13; Liu Guannan, ``Guangzhou Intermediate Court Vice-
President: Guangzhou Has Already Stopped Approving RTL'' [Guangzhou
zhongyuan fuyuanzhang: guangzhou yi tingzhi shenpi laojiao], Southern
Daily, reprinted in Guangdong News Net, 5 September 13.
\28\Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Rule of Law Is Key To Ending
All Forms of Extralegal Detention, Including Forced Labor,'' reprinted
in Amnesty International, 6 February 13.
\29\Keith Zhai, ``Calls To Abolish Labour Camps Are Unlikely To Be
Heard By NPC,'' South China Morning Post, 27 February 13; Wang Hairong,
``Re-Education Scrutinized,'' Beijing Review, 4 April 13; ``Yunnan's
Response to RTL Reform: The First To `Suspend' Is Reading Too Much Into
It'' [Yunnan huiying laojiao gaige: luxian ``jiaoting'' shu guodu
jiedu], Beijing Morning Post, reprinted in Xinhua, 8 February 13.
\30\``Li Keqiang: China's Reeducation Through Labor System Reform
Program Expected Within the Year'' [Li keqiang: zhongguo laojiao zhidu
gaige fang'an youwang niannei chutai], Xinhua, 17 March 13.
\31\UN GAOR, Hum. Rts. Coun., 17th Sess., National Report Submitted
in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of the Annex to Human Rights Council
Resolution 16/21, A/HRC/WG.6/17/CHN/1, 5 August 13, para. 48; ``Calls
for Transparency in China Labor Camp Reform,'' Radio Free Asia, 20 June
13.
\32\``Lawyers Concerned Reeducation Through Labor System Reform in
Name Only'' [Lushi you laojiao zhidu gaige qiaozhi huantang bu
huanyao], Beijing Times, reprinted in NetEase, 9 January 13.
\33\See Carl F. Minzner, ``Xinfang: An Alternative to Formal
Chinese Legal Institutions,'' Stanford Journal of International Law,
Vol. 42, No. 103 (2006); Flora Sapio, ``Legal Erosion and the Policing
of Petitions,'' in Comparative Perspectives on Criminal Justice in
China, eds. Mike McConville and Eva Pils (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar
Publishing, Inc., 2013), 348-69.
\34\Amnesty International, ``Standing Their Ground: Thousands Face
Violent Eviction in China,'' 11 October 12, 31-32.
\35\Liang Weiguo, ``Zhu Jiamu: Wage Arrears Problems for Migrant
Workers Demand Quick Resolution'' [Zhu jiamu: nongmingong zixin wenti
yao jinkuai dedao jin yi bu jiejue], China Social Sciences Net,
reprinted in Chinese Communist Party News Net, 13 March 13.
\36\``Veterans Detained Over Protest,'' Radio Free Asia, 20 August
12.
\37\``AIDS Orphans Still Not Paid,'' Radio Free Asia, 3 January 13.
\38\``Security Steps Up For Petitioners as China Parliament
Meets,'' Agence France-Presse, reprinted in South China Morning Post,
11 March 13.
\39\``Letters and Visits Bureau Heads' Conference: Rectify Practice
of Intercepting Ordinary Petitioning'' [Xinfang juzhang huiyi: jiuheng
lanka dujie zhengchang shangfang zuofa], People's Daily Online,
reprinted in Southern Metropolitan Daily, 10 January 13; ``The Rising
Momentum of Petitioning Cases Has Begun To Turn, Petitioning Tending To
Be More Rational'' [Woguo xinfang zongliang zhixu pansheng shitou huo
e'zhi shangfang geng quxiang lixing], Central People's Broadcasting
Net, 29 April 06.
\40\The Commission found official announcements on ``petitioning
stability maintenance work'' during the 18th Party Congress on
government Web sites for at least 14 provinces and province-level
regions, including Zhejiang, Hebei, Henan, Shaanxi, Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region, Shanxi, Guangdong, Yunnan, Guizhou, Liaoning,
Jiangxi, Shandong, Sichuan and Gansu. Representative examples of ``zero
petitioning'' announcements are: Zhejiang province, People's Government
of Jiangshan, Zhejiang, ``Notice on Earnestly Doing Petitioning
Stability Maintenance Work During the 18th Party Congress'' [Guanyu
renzhen zuohao dang de shibada qijian xinfang weiwen gongzuo de
tongzhi], 14 August 12; and Hebei province, Hebei Province Letters and
Visits Bureau, ``Tangshan City Letters and Visits Bureau Promotes
`Three Family' Content To Create and Deepen Positive Activities''
[Tangshan shi xinfangju tuidong yi ``sanjia'' wei zhuyao neirong de
chuangxian zhengyou huodong shenru kaizhan], partial date, 2012, last
visited 15 July 13.
\41\See, e.g., Shandong Province, Qingyun County People's
Procuratorate, ``Strengthen Five Measures To Guarantee Social Stability
During Major Events'' [Qianghua wuxiang cuoshi quebao zhongda jiehui
qijian shehui wending], 1 June 12.
\42\See, e.g., Hebei Province Bureau of Letters and Visits,
``Tangshan City Bureau of Letters and Visits Promotes `Three Family'
Content To Create and Deepen Positive Activities'' [Tangshan shi
xinfangju tuidong yi ``sanjia'' wei zhuyao neirong de chuangxian
zhengyou huodong shenru kaizhan], partial date, 2012, last visited 15
July 13.
\43\See, e.g., People's Government of Jiangshan, Zhejiang, ``Notice
on Earnestly Doing Petitioning Stability Maintenance Work During the
18th Party Congress'' [Guanyu renzhen zuohao dang de shibada qijian
xinfang weiwen gongzuo de tongzhi], 14 August 12.
\44\``Many Petitioners Are Seized Without a Trace and Disappear,
Open Letter Calls To Do Away With Black Jails'' [Zhong fangmin bei
zhuashi zongying gongkai xin huyu fei heilao], Radio Free Asia, 5
November 12. Oriental Daily, a Hong Kong-based media outlet, reported
that 1.4 million volunteers were mobilized in Beijing to ``maintain
stability'' for the 18th Party Congress. See ``Mobilization of 1.4
Million Volunteers To Maintain Stability During the 18th Party
Congress'' [Shibada weiwen dongyuan 140 wan zhiyuanzhe], Oriental
Daily, 1 November 12.
\45\``Petitioners Evicted Ahead of Congress,'' Radio Free Asia, 1
August 12.
\46\``Before the CCP 18th Party Congress, Authorities To Increase
Stability Maintenance Efforts'' [Zhonggong shibada qian dangju jiada
weiwen lidu], Radio Free Asia, 5 October 12.
\47\Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Close To 500 Citizens Send
Letter to Xi Jinping, Demanding Release of Shanghai Rights Defenders''
[Jin 500 ming gongmin zhixin xi jinping, yaoqiu shifang shanghai
weiquan renshi], 17 February 13. Prior to the 18th Communist Party
Congress in fall 2012, ``stability maintenance work'' also resulted in
RTL decisions for Qin Wei, a former middle school art teacher and Falun
Gong practitioner from Beijing municipality (two years and six months),
and Pei Fugui, the founder of the Petitioners' House in Beijing (one
year and three months). For more information on Qin Wei's case, see the
Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2013-00020. For more
information on Pei Fugui's case, see the Commission's Political
Prisoner Database record 2013-00084.
\48\Human Rights in China, ``Shanghai Petitioner Mao Hengfeng
Released To Finish Reeducation Order at Home,'' 8 February 13. For
additional information on Mao Hengfeng's case, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2004-05122.
\49\Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Shanghai Rights Defenders
Sent to RTL, Tong Guojing and Cui Fufang, Raise Administrative Appeal''
[Bei laojiao de shanghai weiquan renshi tong guojing, cui fufang tiqi
xingzheng susong], 8 January 13. For additional information on Cui
Fufang's case, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record
2013-00137.
\50\``Tong Guojing Gets RTL Twice Within Two Years, Jiangxi and
Hubei Petitioners Abused in Psychiatric Hospital (Photo)'' [Tong
guojing liangnian nei liangdu bei laojiao gan e fangmin jingshenbing
yuan shou nuedai (tu)], Radio Free Asia, 31 October 12. For additional
information on Tong Guojing's case, see the Commission's Political
Prisoner Database record 2013-00191.
\51\``Shen Yongmei's Trial Starts at Shanghai Qingpu Women's RTL
Center'' [Shen yongmei zai shanghai qingpu nuzi laojiaosuo kaiting],
New Tang Dynasty TV, 30 January 13. For additional information on Shen
Yongmei's case, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record
2013-00138.
\52\Wang Liang, ``Shanghai Shen Lianman RTL Case Goes To Trial,
Close To 500 Citizens Go To Court in Support'' [Shanghai shen lianman
laojiao an kaiting jin 500 gongmin fu fayuan shengyuan], Epoch Times,
19 April 13. For additional information on Shen Lianman's case, see the
Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2013-00228.
\53\Ren Zhongyuan, ``The Death of a Petitioner,'' Caixin, 14
December 12.
\54\``Beijing Police Encounter the 18th Party Congress with `Zero
Petitioning''' [Beijing jingfang yi ``ling shangfang'' yingjie 18 da],
Radio France Internationale, 25 October 12; ``Security Steps Up For
Petitioners As China Parliament Meets,'' Agence France-Presse,
reprinted in South China Morning Post, 11 March 13; ``Thousands at
Complaints Bureau,'' Radio Free Asia, 3 September 12.
\55\``Security Steps Up For Petitioners As China Parliament
Meets,'' Agence France-Presse, reprinted in South China Morning Post,
11 March 13; ``Beijing Commences Stability Maintenance for the Two
Meetings, Petitioners Are Beaten and Detained'' [Beijing qidong
lianghui weiwen fangmin beida huo beiju], Radio Free Asia, 20 February
13.
\56\Li Qiumeng et al., ``Jia Qinglin: CPPCC Raises Suggestion of
Establishing System To End Abnormal Petitioning'' [Jia qinglin: zhenxie
ti yijian feizhengchang shangfang zhongjiezhi]. Beijing Times,
reprinted in China News, 4 March 13. Among the measures suggested to
resolve intractable petitioning cases were justice sector dispute-
resolution in the courts or procuratorate, hearings, and a specialized
department within the letters and visits offices. See also ``Shenzhen
Expands Measures Against `Abnormal Petitioning,''' Congressional-
Executive Commission on China, 11 May 10.
\57\Yuan Zhoubin, ``Discussing Abnormal Petitioning Dilemmas and
Paths to Resolution'' [Lun fei zhengchang shangfang wenti de kunjing yu
jiejue lujing], People's Tribune, 22 April 13. See also Flora Sapio,
``Legal Erosion and the Policing of Petitions,'' in Comparative
Perspectives on Criminal Justice in China, eds. Mike McConville and Eva
Pils (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing Inc., 2013), 345-69.
\58\Xin Shengzhi, ``CPPCC Recommends Establishing Comprehensive
Mechanism To End Abnormal Petitioning'' [Quanguo zhengxie tichu jianli
jianquan fei zhengchang shangfang zhongjie jizhi], Southern
Metropolitan Daily, 4 March 13.
\59\``Letters and Visits Bureau Heads' Conference: Rectify Practice
of Intercepting Ordinary Petitioning'' [Xinfang juzhang huiyi: jiuzheng
lanka dujie zhengchang shangfang zuofa], People's Daily Online,
reprinted in Southern Metropolitan Daily, 10 January 13; Liang Changjie
and Yao Yi, ``Central Commission for Discipline Inspection Petition
Office: Advocates Normal Channels and Real-Name Reporting'' [Zhongyang
jiwei xinfang shi: tichang zhengchang qudao shiming jubao], People's
Daily, reprinted in PRC Ministry of Supervision, 8 May 13; ``Central
Commission for Discipline Inspection: Strictly Prohibit Interception of
Ordinary Petitioners in Public Places'' [Zhongjiwei guanyuan: yanjindao
gonggong changsuo lanjie zhengchang shangfang qunzhong], China News
Service, reprinted in Xinhua, 7 May 13; ``Beijing News: Abolish
Petitioning Rankings, Let Petitioning Go Towards Rule of Law''
[Xinjingbao: quxiao xinfang paiming rang xinfang zou fazhi], Beijing
News, 9 May 13.
\60\Zhou Di, ``Beijing Youth News: Suspension of Petitioning
Rankings Is A Positive Signal'' [Beiqingbao: tingfa xinfang paimingbiao
shi yige jiji xinhao], Beijing Youth News, reprinted in People's Net
Online, 9 May 13. A National People's Congress deputy from Changsha
city, Hunan province recommended abolishing the ``ranking'' system
because local officials have prioritized lowering the number of
petitions rather than trying to solve petitioner grievances. See Xin
Shengzhi, ``CPPCC Recommends Establishing Comprehensive Mechanism To
End Abnormal Petitioning'' [Quanguo zhengxie tichu jianli jianquan fei
zhengchang shangfang zhongjie jizhi], Southern Metropolitan Daily, 4
March 13.
\61\Yao Wenhui, ``Eradicating Local Officials' Infatuation With
Petitioning Rankings,'' Kunming Evening News, 23 May 13, translated and
reprinted in Dui Hua Foundation as ``Hefei Petitioning Rankings
Continue Despite Central Stoppage,'' 11 June 13.
\62\``[We] Strongly Call on Relevant Authorities To Carry Out Their
Responsibilities, Punish Illegal Actions Against Lawyers' Professional
Rights'' [Qianglie huyu youguan dangju luxing zhize chengzhi qinhai
lushi zhiyequan de weifa xingwei], reprinted in China Human Rights
Lawyers Concern Group, 22 July 13; ``Riot Police Raid Chinese
Dissident's Legal Team,'' Radio Free Asia, 25 June 13; Karla Simon,
``Good News and Bad From the Public Interest Law Front in China,''
Alliance, 23 May 13.
\63\``Lawyer Wang Quanzhang Is Released Two Days Early From
Detention'' [Lushi wang quanzhang beiju liangri tiqian huoshi], Radio
Free Asia, 8 April 13; ``Wang Cheng of Hangzhou Was Detained,
Authorities Intensify Suppression of Citizen Action'' [Hangzhou wang
cheng bei zhua dangju huo jiajin daya gongmin xingdong], Voice of
America, 26 April 13; Human Rights in China, ``Criminally Detained:
Zhao Changqing and Six Other Advocates of Public Disclosure of
Officials' Assets,'' 19 April 13.
\64\Zhuang Chen, ``China Lawyers Held and Beaten Over `Black Jail'
in Sichuan,'' BBC, 14 May 13; Human Rights in China, ``Lawyers Beaten
During Attempt To Visit Black Jail,'' 13 May 13.
\65\CECC, 2012 Annual Report, 10 October 12, 146-47; CECC, 2011
Annual Report, 10 October 11, 188-89; Chinese Human Rights Defenders,
```We Can Dig a Pit and Bury You Alive' Annual Report on the Situation
of Human Rights Defenders in China, 2011,'' 9 March 12; UN Office of
the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ``China: UN Expert Body
Concerned About Recent Wave of Enforced Disappearances,'' 8 April 11.
\66\Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``China Human Rights Briefing
May 31-June 6, 2013,'' 6 June 13.
\67\``Beijing Justice Bureau Doesn't Give License To Practice to
Rights Defense Lawyers and Law Firms'' [Beijing sifaju bufa gei weiquan
lushi he lushisuo congye zhizhao], Radio Free Asia, 3 June 13.
\68\``Outspoken Lawyer Si Weijiang Faces Complete Ban, Material in
`Zhongnanhai Letter' Touches Authorities' Sensitivity'' [Ganyan lushi
si weijiang zao quanmian fengsha liao ``zhongnanhai laixin'' chutong
dangju], Radio Free Asia, 22 March 13; Chinese Human Rights Defenders,
``Attorney Pu Zhiqiang's Blog Shut Down After Denouncing Zhou
Yongkang'' [Pu zhiqiang lushi shiming jubao zhou yongkang weibo
zhanghao bei shanchu], 12 February 13.
\69\Zhou Xi, ``Lawyer Pu Zhiqiang Is Refused Entry Into Hotel
Because an ID Check Revealed He is a Key Person'' [Lushi pu zhiqiang
yin shenfenzheng xianshi xi zhongdian renyuan zao bingguan jujue
jiedai], Radio France Internationale, 22 May 13.
\70\Zhuang Chen, ``China Lawyers Held and Beaten Over `Black Jail'
in Sichuan,'' BBC, 14 May 13; Human Rights in China, ``Lawyers Beaten
During Attempt To Visit Black Jail,'' 13 May 13.
\71\See the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2005-
00199 for more information on Xu Zhiyong's case.
\72\See the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2005-
00291 for more information on Gao Zhisheng's case.
\73\See the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2005-
00285 for more information on Ni Yulan's case.
\74\Chris Buckley, ``A Leading Chinese Human Rights Advocate Is
Detained in Beijing,'' New York Times, 17 July 13. See also ``Officials
Detain Xu Zhiyong Amidst a Crackdown on Individuals Calling for Greater
Government Accountability,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on
China, 1 August 13.
\75\Edward Wong, ``Family's Visit Confirms Chinese Dissident Is
Alive,'' New York Times, 23 January 13.
\76\Jerome A. Cohen, ``Beijing Must Reveal Fate of Human Rights
Lawyer Gao Zhisheng,'' South China Morning Post, 19 March 09; PRC
Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingfa], enacted 1 July 79,
effective 1 October 97, amended 14 March 97, 25 December 99, 31 August
01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, 28
February 09, 25 February 11, art. 105(2). See the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2005-00291 for more information on
Gao Zhisheng's case.
\77\Keane Shum, ``Hope Against Hope for Gao Zhisheng's Freedom,''
South China Morning Post, 8 February 13.
\78\Edward Wong, ``Family's Visit Confirms Chinese Dissident Is
Alive,'' New York Times, 23 January 13.
\79\In July 2012, the Beijing Municipal No. 1 Intermediate People's
Court reduced Ni's prison sentence by two months, to two years and six
months. See Human Rights in China, ``Court Overturns `Fraud Conviction'
in Ni Yulan Appeal, Cuts Jail Sentence By Two Months,'' 27 July 12.
\80\Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Human Rights Activist Ni
Yulan Sentenced to Two Years and Eight Months in Prison, Husband Gets
Two Years,'' 10 April 12. Ni and her husband were detained in April
2011, indicted in December 2011, and sentenced in April 2012. See the
Commission's Political Prisoner Database records 2005-00285 for more
information on Ni Yulan's case and 2011-00353 for Dong Jiqing's case.
\81\``Jailed Rights Lawyer's Parole Request Refused,'' Radio Free
Asia, 4 July 13.
\82\```I Felt They Could Shatter My Body,''' Radio Free Asia, 13
April 12.
\83\``Jailed Rights Lawyer's Parole Request Refused,'' Radio Free
Asia, 4 July 13.
\84\Zhou Bin, ``Last Year's Legal Aid Cases Throughout the Nation
Exceeded One Million for the First Time Ever'' [Qunian quanguo falu
yuanzhu an shou po baiwan], Legal Daily, reprinted in China Legal Aid,
20 February 13.
\85\Ibid.
\86\Ibid.
\87\UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,
Concluding Observations on the Initial Report of China, Adopted by the
Committee at Its Eighth Session, 15 October 12.
\88\Chen Jie, ``Current Effectiveness of Legal Aid in China Is
Worrisome, New Legal Provision Lowers the Bar for Applying for Legal
Aid'' [Zhongguo falu yuanzhu shixiao kanyou xingui jiangdi yuanzhu
shenqing menkan], Caixin, 20 February 13; Xie Youping and Wu Yu,
``Constructing the System of Criminal Legal Aid and Public Defenders''
[Xingshi falu yuanzhu yu gongshe bianhu zhidu de jiangou], Tsinghua Law
Journal, Vol. 6, No. 3 (2012), 31.
\89\Zhang Yuan, ``Next Year Criminal Legal Aid Cases Will Likely
Increase to 550,000 Cases'' [Mingnian xingshi falu yuanzhu anjian huo
zeng zhi 55 wan jian], Legal Daily, 19 December 12.
\90\Ministry of Justice, Supreme People's Court, Supreme People's
Procuratorate, and Ministry of Public Security, Regulations Regarding
Criminal Procedure Law Legal Aid Work [Guanyu xingshi susong falu
yuanzhu gongzuo de guiding], issued 18 February 13, effective 1 March
13; Zhou Bin, ``Deputy Justice Minister Zhao Dacheng Responds to
Reporter's Questions About the `Regulations Regarding Criminal
Procedure Law Legal Aid Work''' [Sifabu fubuzhang zhao dacheng jiu
``guanyu xingshi susong falu yuanzhu gongzuo de guiding'' da jizhe
wen], Legal Daily, 17 February 13.
\91\Chen Jie, ``Current Effectiveness of Legal Aid in China Is
Worrisome, New Legal Provision Lowers the Bar for Applying for Legal
Aid'' [Zhongguo falu yuanzhu shixiao kanyou xingui jiangdi yuanzhu
shenqing menkan], Caixin, 20 February 13.
\92\Song Ninghua, ``Expert Analysis: `Regulations Regarding
Criminal Procedure Law Legal Aid Work''' [Zhuanjia jiedu ``guanyu
xingshi susong falu yuanzhu gongzuo de guiding''], Xinmin Evening News,
reprinted in Eastday, 28 February 13.
\93\Ibid.
\94\Geng He and Chen Guangcheng, ``China's Rule of Law: Go After
the Lawyers,'' Washington Post, 9 April 13.
\95\See the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2005-
00126 for information on Chen Guangcheng's case.
\96\Chris Buckley, ``Chinese Officials Order Questioning of Exiled
Activist's Relatives,'' New York Times, 24 April 13.
\97\Keith B. Richburg, ``Chen Guangcheng's Nephew Found Guilty of
Assault in China; Sentenced to 39 Months,'' Washington Post, 30
November 12. See also ``Authorities Use Threats, Abuse, and Harassment
To Maintain Control Over Chen Kegui and Family,'' Congressional-
Executive Commission on China, 28 March 13; ``Chen Kegui Serving
Criminal Sentence, Legal Experts Refute Conviction,'' Congressional-
Executive Commission on China, 28 March 13; ``Authorities Sentence Chen
Kegui in Trial Marred by Procedural Violations,'' Congressional-
Executive Commission on China, 7 December 12.
\98\Verna Yu, ``Chen Guangcheng's Brother Beaten in Latest Apparent
Revenge on Family,'' South China Morning Post, 10 May 13.
\99\Amnesty International, ``China: Legal Activist's Sister-In-Law
Detained As Harassment Intensifies,'' 24 April 13.
\100\Annie Wu, ``Chen Guangcheng's Mother Comes Under Pressure,''
Epoch Times, 2 June 13.
\101\See the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2004-
02045 for information on Hada's case.
\102\``Wife of Mongolian Activist Says She Was Detained,''
Associated Press, reprinted in South China Morning Post, 15 October 12.
\103\``In Hohhot, Inner Mongolia, Wife of Mongolian Scholar Hada
Discusses the 15th Year of Her Husband's Imprisonment'' [Neimeng hushi
mengzu xuezhe hada qizi tan zhangfu ruyu di 15 nian], Radio Free Asia,
6 July 10.
\104\Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ``Wife and
Son of Hada Disappear Again,'' 7 November 12. See also ``Authorities
Heighten Persecution of Detained Mongol Rights Advocate's Wife and
Son,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 13 December 12.
\105\See the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2004-
03114 for information on Liu Xiaobo's case.
\106\Isolda Morillo and Alexa Olesen, ``AP Exclusive: China Nobel
Wife Speaks on Detention,'' Associated Press, 6 December 12; Reporters
Without Borders, ``Nobel Laureate's Wife at a Window, The Only Freedom
She Is Allowed,'' 12 October 12. See the Commission's Political
Prisoner Database record 2010-00629 for further information on Liu
Xia's case.
\107\Tania Branigan, ``Liu Xiaobo Brother-in-Law Jailed,''
Guardian, 8 June 13; ``China's Jailed Nobel's Wife Writes Open Letter
to Chinese Leader To Protest Brother's Sentence,'' Associated Press,
reprinted in Washington Post, 14 June 13.
\108\See the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2004-
02142 for information on Rebiya Kadeer's case.
\109\Human Rights Watch, ``China: Uighur Activist's Family
Threatened,'' 15 May 05.
\110\``Uyghur Leader's Family Evicted,'' Radio Free Asia, 20 August
09.
\111\Uyghur American Association, ``Chinese Officials Increase
Pressure on the Imprisoned Sons of Rebiya Kadeer,'' 29 May 12.
\112\Ibid.
\113\See the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2006-
00084 for information on Rebiya Kadeer's son, Ablikim Abdureyim.
\114\Human Rights in China, ``Activist and Ten-Year-Old Daughter
Illegally Detained Before Forcible Removal From Hefei,'' 1 March 13;
``Clashes as Activist's Daughter Is Denied Schooling,'' Radio Free
Asia, 8 April 13.
\115\Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Liu Ying Ordered To Serve
RTL Because of Her Concern Over Husband, To Date Friends and Family
Have Not Yet Seen RTL Decision'' [Liu ying yin guanzhu zhangfu bei
laojiao, qinyou zhijin weijian laojiao juedingshu], 24 January 13. See
the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2013-00044 for
additional information on Liu Ying's case.
\116\``Zhu Yufu's Abusive Treatment in Prison Intensifies, Family
Members' Visit Forcibly Stopped By Prison Guards'' [Zhu yufu yuzhong
shoupo qingkuang jiaju jiaren tanjian bei yujing qiangzhi zhongduan],
Radio Free Asia, 12 March 13. See also ``Authorities Deny Medical
Treatment to Zhu Yufu; Condition Serious,'' Congressional-Executive
Commission on China, 16 April 13. See the Commission's Political
Prisoner Database record 2004-02253 for additional information on Zhu
Yufu's case.
Notes to Section IV--Xinjiang
\1\``China Jails 20 in Restive Xinjiang Region,'' Agence France-
Presse, 27 March 13; Edward Wong, ``Killings Stir Fears of Ethnic
Tensions in Chinese Region,'' New York Times, 8 March 13; Human Rights
Watch, ``World Report 2013: China,'' 1 February 13, 1, 3; ``A Muslim
Divide in China,'' Radio Free Asia, 30 November 12.
\2\``Xinjiang Governor Sees `Long-Term, Complicated, Fierce' Battle
Against Separatism,'' Xinhua, reprinted in Global Times, 11 November
12; Wu Haochen, ``Nur Bekri: People of All Ethnic Groups in Xinjiang
Condemn Terrorist Attacks'' [Nuer baikeli: xinjiang gezu minzhong
qianze kongxi], Ta Kung Pao, 10 November 12.
\3\Cui Jia, ``Xinjiang Improves Social Stability After Attacks,''
China Daily, 27 January 13; Ministry of Finance, ``Report on Xinjiang
2012 Budget Implementation Situation and 2013 Draft Budget'' [Xinjiang
2012 nian yuxuan zhixing qingkuang he 2013 nian yusuan caoan de
baogao], reprinted in China Central Government Net, 19 February 13.
\4\Cui Jia, ``Recalling Pain From Day of Horror,'' China Daily, 2
May 13; Stephen McDonell, ``21 People Killed in Unrest in China's
Xinjiang,'' Australian Broadcasting Corporation, including material
from Agence France-Presse, 24 April 13.
\5\Cui Jia, ``City Unites To Say Farewell,'' China Daily, 30 April
13; ``Full Justice for the 25 Terrorists Planning To `Do Something Big'
in Kashgar This Summer'' [Yumou jinxia zai kashi ``gan dashi'' 25 ge
kongbu fenzi quan gui an], Chengdu Evening News, reprinted in Guangming
Daily, 30 April 13.
\6\Damian Grammaticas, ``Doubts Over China Government Claims on
Xinjiang Attack,'' BBC, 26 April 13; Peter Ford, ``Mystery Clouds
Deadly Clash in Western China With `Suspected Terrorists,''' Christian
Science Monitor, 24 April 13; Uyghur American Association, ``Unlawful
House Search and Arbitrary Use of Lethal Force Results in Nearly Two
Dozen Deaths in Kashgar,'' 24 April 13; World Uyghur Congress, ``Call
Issued for Independent Investigation on Maralbeshi Incident by World
Uyghur Congress and International Community Urged to Follow Up on
Recent Arrests,'' 1 May 13.
\7\Uyghur American Association, ``Unlawful House Search and
Arbitrary Use of Lethal Force Results in Nearly Two Dozen Deaths in
Kashgar,'' 24 April 13.
\8\See, e.g., ``Inspection in Awat County Leads to Two Dead--
Authorities Conceal Details of Case'' [Xinjiang awati xian qingcha zhi
er ren siwang dangju yinman anqing], Uyghur Online, 23 May 13; Meng
Hongqi, Qiongkule Township Government, ``Qiongkule Township Focuses on
Carrying Out the `Two Sessions' Security Inspection Operation''
[Qiongkule xiang jizhong kaizhan ``lianghui'' anbao da qingcha
xingdong], 6 March 13; Xiang Xuan, ``Halayugong Township Carries Out
Major Stability Maintenance Inspection'' [Halayugong xiang kaizhan
weiwen da qingcha], Xinjiang Peace Net, 13 June 13.
\9\``5 Jailed, Sentenced to Death for Xinjiang Terrorist Attack,''
Xinhua, 12 August 13; Tian Shan, ``First Instance Verdict Announced
Today in Xinjiang Bachu Violent Terrorist Case: 5 Accused and 2 Receive
Death Penalty'' [Xinjiang bachu baokong an jin yi shen xuanpan: 5 ming
beigao 2 ren huo sixing], Tianshan Net, reprinted in Beijing Daily, 12
August 13; Chris Buckley, ``5 Uyghurs Sentenced in China for Attack,''
New York Times, 12 August 13. The five men were sentenced on charges
including intentional homicide and organizing and leading a terrorist
group.
\10\``Last Fugitive of Xinjiang Attack Captured,'' Xinhua,
reprinted in CRIEnglish, 30 June 13.
\11\Lin Meilian and Yang Jingjie, ``Riot Toll Rises to 35 in
Xinjiang,'' Global Times, 28 June 13.
\12\Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Public Security Bureau,
``Reward Notice'' [Xuanshang tonggao], reprinted in Tianshan Net, 16
August 13; ```8-15' Religious Personnel Murder Case Cracked'' [8-15
zongjiao renshi bei hai an gaopo], Turpan Net, 19 August 13; ``Imam
Stabbed to Death After Supporting Crackdown Against Uyghurs,'' Radio
Free Asia, 16 August 13.
\13\``Imam Stabbed to Death After Supporting Crackdown Against
Uyghurs,'' Radio Free Asia, 16 August 13; ``Vice Chair of Turpan
Islamic Association Hacked to Death'' [Tulufan yisilan xiehui fu zhuxi
zao kan si], Radio Free Asia, 16 August 13.
\14\``Xinjiang Violence More Serious Than Reported,'' Radio Free
Asia, 27 June 13; ``Chinese Authorities Confirm Police Fired at Uyghur
Protesters,'' Radio Free Asia, 30 June 13; World Uyghur Congress, ``WUC
Issues Report on the Recent Incidents in East Turkestan,'' 5 July 13.
\15\``Xinjiang Violence More Serious Than Reported,'' Radio Free
Asia, 27 June 13; ``Two Uyghurs Believed Killed in Hotan Violence,''
Radio Free Asia, 28 June 13; Uyghur American Association, ``The Uyghur
American Association Expresses Concern at Massive Build Up of Chinese
Security Forces in East Turkestan,'' 1 July 13; Uyghur American
Association, ``The Uyghur American Association Calls on the Chinese
Government To Substantiate Terror Claims With an Open and Independent
Investigation,'' 28 June 13; Uyghur American Association, ``Uyghur
American Association Urges Caution on Details of June 26, 2013 Turpan
Incident,'' 26 June 13; World Uyghur Congress, ``WUC Issues Report on
the Recent Incidents in East Turkestan,'' 5 July 13.
\16\Uyghur American Association, ``The Uyghur American Association
Calls on the Chinese Government To Substantiate Terror Claims With an
Open and Independent Investigation,'' 28 June 13; Gillian Wong,
``Scholar Slams China Repression of Ethnic Minority,'' Associated
Press, 5 July 13; Chris Buckley, ``27 Die in Rioting in Ethnically
Divided Western China,'' New York Times, 26 June 13. In addition, U.S.
State Department spokesman Patrick Ventrell stated at a press briefing
on April 24, 2013, that `` . . . we urge the Chinese authorities to
conduct a thorough and transparent investigation of this incident, and
to provide all Chinese citizens, including Uighurs, the due process
protections to which they are entitled not only under China's
constitutional laws but under their international human rights
commitments as well.'' See U.S. Department of State, Daily Press
Briefing, 24 April 13.
\17\``Unveiled Threats,'' Economist, 6 July 13; Kelly Olsen,
``Identity Crisis Behind China's Xinjiang Unrest: Experts,'' Agence
France-Presse, reprinted in Fox News, 3 July 13.
\18\``Forced Searches in Kashgar, Yengisar County Last Week Lead to
Conflict'' [Kashi yingshaji xian shangzhou qiangzhi qingcha yinfa
chongtu], Radio Free Asia, 14 May 13; Uyghur American Association,
``Unlawful House Search and Arbitrary Use of Lethal Force Results [in]
Nearly Two Dozen Deaths in Kashgar,'' 24 April 13.
\19\``Restive Xinjiang,'' Wall Street Journal, 2 July 13; Chris
Buckley, ``27 Die in Rioting in Ethnically Divided Western China,'' New
York Times, 26 June 13.
\20\``Xinjiang Clash Leaves Two Village Officials Dead,'' Radio
Free Asia, 24 May 13.
\21\``Two Dead in Xinjiang Attack Following House Search,'' Radio
Free Asia, 5 July 13; ``Uyghur Shot in Attack,'' Global Times, 11 July
13.
\22\``Uyghur Man Shot Dead in Violence Sparked by His Beard,''
Radio Free Asia, 5 August 13; ``Xinjiang Man Pressed To Shave Off His
Beard Is Killed by Police After Stabbing Two Police'' [Bei qiangxing
yaoqiu tixu xinjiang nanzi zhashang liang jing hou bei jingcha jibi],
Radio Free Asia, 4 August 13.
\23\``Unveiled Threats,'' Economist, 6 July 13; Stephen Chen, ``Top
Officials in Emergency Visit to Xinjiang After Outbreaks of Unrest,''
South China Morning Post, 30 June 13.
\24\For Commission analysis on the July 2009 demonstrations and
riots in Urumqi, see ``Xinjiang Authorities Forcefully Suppress
Demonstration, Restrict Free Flow of Information,'' CECC China Human
Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 4, 2009, 2.
\25\Julie Makinen, ``China Sends Armored Vehicles to Volatile
Xinjiang Region,'' Los Angeles Times, 29 June 13; ``Bloody Clashes
Bring Army Onto Streets in Xinjiang,'' South China Morning Post, 1 July
13; ``China Tightens Security in Xinjiang Ahead of Anniversary,'' Voice
of America, 2 July 13; ``Unveiled Threats,'' Economist, 6 July 13;
``Official Urges 24-Hour Patrol in Xinjiang After Terror Attacks,''
Xinhua, reprinted in CRIEnglish, 30 June 13.
\26\Gillian Wong, ``Scholar Slams China Repression of Ethnic
Minority,'' Associated Press, 5 July 13; Uyghur American Association,
``The Uyghur American Association Expresses Concern at Massive Build Up
of Chinese Security Forces in East Turkestan,'' 1 July 13; ``EU Says
China Needs To Release More Information About Xinjiang Violence,
Address Causes,'' Associated Press, reprinted in Washington Post, 1
July 13.
\27\``Xinjiang Properly Handles Group Disturbance Incident, There
Are No Casualties'' [Xinjiang tuoshan chuzhi yi qi qunti juji naoshi
shijian wu qunzhong shangwang], Tianshan Net, 28 June 13. There is at
least one conflicting official media report regarding the June 28
incident or incidents in Hoten prefecture. The Global Times reported
that ``over 100 terrorists'' armed with knives attacked a police
station in Qaraqash (Moyu) county, Hoten prefecture. See Qiu Yongzheng,
``New Round of Riots Brings Fresh Violence to Xinjiang,'' Global Times,
29 June 13.
\28\``At Least 15 Uyghurs Killed in Police Shootout in Xinjiang,''
Radio Free Asia, 25 August 13; Andrew Jacobs, ``Over News of Clash, a
Shroud of Silence in Xinjiang,'' New York Times, 26 August 13. Radio
Free Asia, citing local officials, reported that ``up to 15 people may
have been killed and 50 others injured'' in the incident. According to
the New York Times, ``numerous sources say that dozens were shot dead
on the highway that connects Hanerik to Hotan,'' and ``[e]xile groups
[said] the death toll may exceed 100.''
\29\``In Another Bloody Conflict in Xinjiang, 3 Are Dead and More
Than 20 Are Injured'' [Xinjiang zai you liuxue chongtu 3 si 20 duo
shang], Radio Free Asia, 12 August 13; ``Three Uyghurs Shot Dead, 20
Injured in Eid Eve Clashes,'' Radio Free Asia, 10 August 13.
\30\``Death Toll in Xinjiang Police Shootout Climbs As Exile Group
Blasts Raid,'' Radio Free Asia, 27 August 13; ``China Confirms Raid on
Alleged Terror Cell in Restive Northwest, But Details Remain Sketchy,''
Associated Press, reprinted in Washington Post, 28 August 13.
\31\``In the Violent Terrorist Incident in Xinjiang, Kashgar on
August 20, a Member of the Special Police Sacrificed Himself''
[Xinjiang kashi 8 yue 20 ri fasheng baoli kongbu an yi ming tejing
xisheng], Kashgar Daily, reprinted in People's Daily, 28 August 13.
\32\``Up to 12 Uyghurs Shot Dead in Raid on Xinjiang `Munitions
Center,''' Radio Free Asia, 17 September 13; ``Xinjiang Terrorist
Training Camp Destroyed, 12 Uyghurs Killed'' [Xinjiang daopo kongxi
xunlian ying jiao 12 weizu ren], Radio Free Asia, 18 September 13;
Andrew Jacobs, ``12 Are Killed in Raid by Security Forces in Western
China,'' New York Times, 18 September 13.
\33\Zhang Yiwei, ``Terrorists Sentenced By Xinjiang Courts,''
Global Times, 28 March 13; Cui Jia and Cao Yin, ``20 Sent to Jail in
Xinjiang for Terror Activities,'' China Daily, 28 March 13.
\34\Cui Jia and Cao Yin, ``20 Sent to Jail in Xinjiang for Terror
Activities,'' China Daily, 28 March 13; Zhang Yiwei, ``Terrorists
Sentenced By Xinjiang Courts,'' Global Times, 28 March 13; Sui Yunyan,
``Five Cases of the Use of the Internet, Mobile Phones, and Electronic
Storage Media To Commit Crimes Tried in Xinjiang'' [5 qi liyong
hulianwang, shouji ji dianzi cunchu jiazhi jinxing fanzui anjian zai
jiang shenpan], Tianshan Net, 26 March 13.
\35\Chris Buckley, ``China Sentences 20 in Restive Region,'' New
York Times, 27 March 13. The New York Times quotes Human Rights Watch
researcher Nicholas Bequelin, who states, ``It's not clear what is
being alleged against these people beyond being members of a
clandestine organization.'' He continues, ``China has for a long time
conflated religious activities taking place outside of state control
with extremism. There's [sic] been so many unsupported accusations by
the Chinese government about extremist Islamic activities and terrorist
activities in Xinjiang that it makes its [sic] difficult to have faith
in these kinds of announcements.'' Uyghur American Association,
``Uyghur American Association Condemns Sentences Handed Down to 20
Uyghurs,'' 27 March 13; ``Uyghur Jailings Highlight Chinese Media
Controls,'' Radio Free Asia, 29 March 13; ``Again, 20 Uyghurs Are
Sentenced on Charges of Using the Internet and Cell Phones to Split the
State'' [You you 20 ming weiwuer ren beikong liyong hulianwang, shouji
deng fenlie guojia bei panxing], Uyghur Online, 27 March 13.
\36\``Annual Work Report of Xinjiang's Courts'' [Xinjiang fayuan
gongzuo niandu baogao], Xinjiang Court Net, 21 January 13;
``Commentary: Severely Crack Down on Criminal Activities Using the
Internet, Cell Phones, and Electronic Storage Media'' [Pinglun: yanli
daji yong wangluo shouji ji dianzi chubei jiazhi fanzui de huodong],
Xinjiang Daily, reprinted in Tianshan Net, 27 March 13; Wang Yunxia,
Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps Bureau of Justice,
```Secrets Act' Study Session Organized and Launched by the 45th Corps'
Legal Outreach Office Finishes Up'' [Sishiwu tuan pufa ban zuzhi
kaizhan de ``baomifa'' xuexi jieshu], 4 June 13. ``Endangering state
security'' (ESS) is a category of criminal offenses that authorities in
China have used to punish peaceful activism, free expression of ethnic
identity, and independent religious activity. CECC, 2009 Annual Report,
10 October 09, 244, 253-54. For the Chinese legal definition of ESS,
see PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa], enacted 1
July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25
December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February
05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, arts. 102-113.
\37\Dui Hua Foundation, ``Transparency in Xinjiang: Reporting on
State Security Trials,'' Dui Hua Foundation Reference Materials, 7
March 13.
\38\Ibid.
\39\``Annual Work Report of Xinjiang's Courts'' [Xinjiang fayuan
gongzuo niandu baogao], Xinjiang Court Net, 21 January 13; Dui Hua
Foundation, ``Transparency in Xinjiang: Reporting on State Security
Trials,'' Dui Hua Foundation Reference Materials, 7 March 13;
``Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region High People's Court for First Time
Publicly Issues Annual Work Report'' [Xinjiang weiwuer zizhiqu gaofa
shouci duiwai fabu niandu baogao], Xinjiang Metropolis Daily, 19
January 12. The Xinjiang Metropolis Daily article indicates 2012 was
the first time authorities publicly issued the work report on
Xinjiang's courts. In 2011, courts in the XUAR tried and completed 414
cases, an increase of 38 cases over the previous year. In contrast,
authorities completed 268 ESS cases in the region in 2008 and 437 cases
in 2009. For more information on ESS cases in the XUAR, see, e.g.,
CECC, 2012 Annual Report, 10 October 12, 150-51.
\40\``Tarim University Students' Case Set for First Court Hearing
on May 25th'' [Talimu daxue xuesheng an dingyu benyue 25 ri kaiting
shenli], Uyghur Online, 15 May 13; ``Detained Tarim University Students
Released On Bail'' [Talimu daxue zao juliu xuesheng huo baoshi], Uyghur
Online, 29 May 13; ``Detained Xinjiang Students To Be Secretly Tried,
WUC Condemns Authorities for Detaining People'' [Xinjiang beibu
xuesheng jiang mimi kaiting, shiwei hui qianze dangju zhuaren], Radio
Free Asia, 21 May 13.
\41\``Tarim University Students Released, Uyghur Students Continue
to be Harassed by PSB'' [Talimu daxue huoshi weiwuer xuesheng chixu zao
guobao saorao], Uyghur Online, 19 June 13; ``Detained Tarim University
Students Released On Bail'' [Talimu daxue zao juliu xuesheng huo
baoshi], Uyghur Online, 29 May 13.
\42\``Expelled Tarim University Student Is Again Illegally
Detained'' [Talimu daxue bei kaichu xuesheng zai zao feifa juliu],
Uyghur Online, 24 June 13. See the Commission's Political Prisoner
Database, record 2013-00232 (Ablimit), record 2013-00233 (Dilshat),
record 2013-00234 (Alimjan), record 2013-00235 (Ekber), and record
2013-00236 (Abdureshit) for more information on these cases.
\43\Ibid.; ``Tarim University Students Released, Uyghur Students
Continue to be Harassed by PSB'' [Talimu daxue huoshi weiwuer xuesheng
chixu zao guobao saorao], Uyghur Online, 19 June 13. Article 56 of the
PRC Criminal Procedure Law mandates restrictions on the movement of
individuals released on bail. PRC Criminal Procedure Law [Zhonghua
renmin gongheguo xingshi susong fa], enacted 1 July 79, amended 17
March 96, 14 March 12, effective 1 January 13, art. 56.
\44\``Expelled Tarim University Student Is Again Illegally
Detained'' [Talimu daxue bei kaichu xuesheng zai zao feifa juliu],
Uyghur Online, 24 June 13.
\45\Ibid.; ``Tarim University Students Continue to be Detained
Without Formal Procedures, and Are Suffering Humiliation and Beatings''
[Talimu daxue xuesheng jixu bei wu shouxu guanya bing zao ru da],
Uyghur Online, 27 May 13; ``Three Uyghur University Students Suspected
of Overseas Links Released On Bail Pending Trial'' [Sanming weizu
daxuesheng yi shewai baoshi houshen], Radio Free Asia, 6 June 13.
\46\Wang Xia, ``Forty Billion To Be Invested This Year in Highway
Construction in Xinjiang, the Construction of Highways and Major
Thoroughfares To Be Accelerated'' [Xinjiang gonglu jianshe jinnian
jihua touzi 400 yi gonglu da tongdao jiasu xingcheng], Yaxin Net,
reprinted in Xinhua, 21 February 13.
\47\He Yan, ``Passengers at Xinjiang's Kashgar Airport Exceed One
Million Mark for the First Time'' [Xinjiang kashi jichang luke tuntu
liang shouci tupo 100 wan renci daguan], Yaxin Net, reprinted in Sina,
29 November 12.
\48\Christina Larson, ``On China's Electricity Grid, East Needs
West--for Coal,'' Bloomberg Businessweek, 21 March 13.
\49\Mao Weihua and Yang Wang, ``Construction Corps Leads War On
Poverty,'' China Daily, 9 November 12; ``In 2013, the XPCC Will Invest
4.746 Billion To Promote 157 Agricultural Construction Projects''
[Xinjiang bingtuan 2013 nian tou 47.46 yi tuijin 157 ge shenong xiangmu
jianshe], Tianshan Net, 1 April 13.
\50\``Shandong Province Starts An `Educational Aid To Xinjiang'
Project, Strengthens Bilingual Teaching'' [Shandong sheng qidong
``jiaoyu yuanjiang'' gongcheng, jiaqiang shuangyu jiaoxue], Xinhua,
reprinted in Dazhong Net, 15 March 13; ``Counterpart Assistance
Provinces and Cities Invest 24 Billion Yuan in Xinjiang To Implement
More Than 2,300 Projects'' [Yuanjiang shengshi touru xinjiang 240 yi
yuan shishi 2300 duoge xiangmu], Chinese News Net, reprinted in Xinmin
Net, 15 November 12.
\51\``Counterpart Assistance Provinces and Cities Invest 24 Billion
Yuan In Xinjiang To Implement More Than 2,300 Projects'' [Yuanjiang
shengshi touru xinjiang 240 yi yuan shishi 2300 duoge xiangmu], Chinese
News Net, reprinted in Xinmin Net, 15 November 12; Su Jianchao,
``Xinjiang `Spring Wind Action' Provides 100,000 Employment Positions
for Rural Workers'' [Xinjiang ``chunfeng xingdong'' wei nongmin gong
tigong 10 wan jiuye gangwei], Tianshan Net, reprinted in Xinhua, 26
February 13.
\52\Ma Yining, ``An Investment of Over 250 Billion Yuan in Xinjiang
in 2012 Has Become a Foregone Conclusion'' [2012 nian xinjiang
zhaoshang yinzi chao 2500 yi yuan yi cheng dingju], Tianshan Net,
reprinted in China Economic Net, 14 December 12; ``Foreign Capital
Flows Into Xinjiang,'' Xinhua, reprinted in CRIEnglish, 21 December 12;
Dong Shaohua and Wang Yongfei, ``In the First Three Quarters, 136.7
Billion Was Invested, Xinjiang People's Livelihood Construction
Achieves Breakthrough Progress'' [Qian san ji touru zijin 1367 yi,
xinjiang minsheng jianshe qude tupoxing jinzhan], Tianshan Net,
reprinted in Xinjiang Daily, 4 November 12; Zhang Xiaocheng, ``XPCC
Invests More Than 20 Billion Yuan To Speed Up Poverty Alleviation in
Poor Areas of Southern Xinjiang'' [Xinjiang bingtuan touru 200 duo yi
yuan jiakuai nanjiang tekun diqu tuopin], China Information Broadcast
Network, reprinted in People's Daily, 3 April 13; Zhu Jingchao,
``Representative Says Kashgar, Xinjiang Will Become Economic Hub for
Central, Western, and Southern Asia'' [Daibiao cheng xinjiang kashi
jiang cheng zhong xi nanya jingji quan zhongxin], China News Service,
reprinted in Eastday, 7 March 13.
\53\See, e.g., ``Accelerate the Course of Xinjiang's Leapfrog
Development and Long-Term Stability'' [Jiakuai tuijin xinjiang kuayue
shi fazhan he changzhi jiuan jincheng], Xinjiang Daily, 16 May 13; Wang
Dan, ``Xinjiang Project To Resettle Herders Promotes Continuous
Improvement in the Living Standards of Rural Herders'' [Xinjiang dingju
xingmu gongcheng cujin nongmumin shenghuo tiaojian chixu gaishan],
Tianshan Net, reprinted in China Religion and Ethnicity Net, 10 May 13;
Feng Jin et al., ``Government Work Report of the Deliberations of the
Xinjiang Delegation Attending the NPC Meeting'' [Chuxi quanguo renda
yici huiyi xinjiang daibiao tuan shenyi zhengfu gongzuo baogao],
Xinhua, reprinted in Xinjiang Daily, 6 March 13. The Xinjiang Work
Forum was convened in Beijing in May 2010 by top central government and
Party leaders. The inaugural forum set government and Party objectives
for the XUAR's economic and political development, intensifying a trend
of top-down initiatives. Work Forum initiatives included the expansion
of ``counterpart support'' programs, herder resettlement programs, and
housing construction and demolition projects in areas inhabited by
Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities. For more on the Work Forum, see
CECC, 2012 Annual Report, 10 October 12, 149; CECC, 2011 Annual Report,
10 October 11, 196-97.
\54\See, e.g., PRC Constitution, issued 4 December 82, amended 12
April 88, 29 March 93, 15 March 99, 14 March 04, arts. 4, 36. China's
Constitution entitles minorities, like all citizens of China, to the
freedom of religious belief and freedom from discrimination.
\55\PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo
minzu quyu zizhifa], issued 31 May 84, effective 1 October 84, amended
28 February 01, art. 9. The Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law (REAL)
outlines ethnic minorities' rights in the PRC, including: self-
government within designated autonomous areas; proportional
representation in the government; freedom to develop their own
languages, religions, and cultures; and power to adjust central
directives to local conditions. REAL also guarantees minorities greater
control over local economic development than allowed in non-autonomous
areas; the right to manage and protect local natural resources; and the
right to organize local public security forces to safeguard public
order.
\56\``The Effects of Kashgar's Special Zone, Residents of
Demolished Housing Cry Foul'' [Kashi tequ xiaoying, fangwu beichai
jumin shangfang hanyuan], Uyghur Online, 29 October 12; Kilic Bugra
Kanat, ``The Kashgar Incident and China's Uyghur Question,'' World
Bulletin, 8 May 13; ``Uyghur Businessman Attacked After Demolition
Complaint,'' Radio Free Asia, 19 April 13.
\57\Li Yiren, ``Xinjiang Spirit: Leading All of Xinjiang in Making
a Big Leap'' [Xinjiang jingshen: yinling quanjiang da kuayue], Tianshan
Net, reprinted in Tencent, 12 November 12; Dai Lan and Hu Renba,
``Strive To Promote Leapfrog Development and Long-Term Stability--
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Party Secretary Zhang Chunxian''
[Fenli tuijin kuayueshi fazhan he changzhi jiuan--xinjiang weiwuer
zizhiqu dangwei shuji zhang chunxian], People's Daily, 11 September 12;
Xie Sijia, ``Efforts To Promote Higher Standards in Aiding Xinjiang
Work'' [Yi geng gao biaozhun quanli tuijin yuanjiang gongzuo], Southern
Daily, reprinted in Nandu Net, 22 March 13; ``Audit of Xinjiang
Counterpart Assistance Projects Strives for Full Coverage of Three
Southern Xinjiang Regions as the Focus for 2013'' [Xinjiang yuanjiang
xiangmu shenji lizheng 2013 nian quan fugai nanjiang san dizhou wei
zhongdian], Xinjiang Daily, reprinted in Xinhua, 29 March 13.
\58\Li Yiren, ``Xinjiang Spirit: Leading All of Xinjiang in Making
a Big Leap'' [Xinjiang jingshen: yinling quanjiang da kuayue], Tianshan
Net, 12 November 12; Dai Lan and Hu Renba, ``Strive To Promote Leapfrog
Development and Long-Term Stability--Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region
Party Secretary Zhang Chunxian'' [Fenli tuijin kuayueshi fazhan he
changzhi jiuan--xinjiang weiwuer zizhiqu dangwei shuji zhang chunxian],
People's Daily, 11 September 12; ``Audit of Xinjiang Counterpart
Assistance Projects Strives for Full Coverage of Three Southern
Xinjiang Regions as the Focus for 2013'' [Xinjiang yuanjiang xiangmu
shenji lizheng 2013 nian quan fugai nanjiang san dizhou wei zhongdian],
Xinjiang Daily, reprinted in Xinhua, 29 March 13.
\59\``A New Round of Aid to Xinjiang, 2,378 Aid Projects Have Been
Implemented in Total'' [Xin yilun yuanzhu xinjiang leiji shishi yuanzhu
xiangmu 2378 ge], Gucheng Net, 21 February 13.
\60\``Circling the Wagons,'' Economist, 25 May 13; ``Han Migrant
Influx Threatens Uyghur Farms,'' Radio Free Asia, 11 March 13; ``The
Killing of a Uyghur Boy Triggers Uyghur-Han Conflict'' [Yi weizu
nantong bei sha yinfa wei han chongtu], Radio Free Asia, 10 April 13.
\61\Gao Lirong et al., ``Southern Xinjiang Passenger Train Begins
Operating, the First Group of Rural Workers Enters Xinjiang for the
Southern `Gold Rush''' [Nanjiang linke kaixing shoupi jin xinjiang
nongmin gong nanxia ``taojin''], Xinjiang Metropolis Daily, reprinted
in Xinhua, 26 February 13; Xue Genzhu, ``Qianjiang: A Thousand Rural
Residents Travel Far to Xinjiang to `Pan for Gold''' [Qianjiang:
qianming nongmin gong yuan fu xinjiang ``taojin''], Xinhua, 8 April 13;
He Zhanjun and Zhang Yongheng, ``Xinjiang Railway Line Opens To Deal
With Surge of Workers Coming Into Xinjiang'' [Xinjiang tielu kaixing
linke yingdui jinjiang wugong keliu], Xinhua, 20 February 13; Pang
Shuwei, ``Qinghai: 60,000 Rural Residents Go to Xinjiang To Pick
Cotton'' [Qinghai: 6 wan nongmin fu xinjiang cai mian], Xinhua, 12
October 12. For more information on the demographics of southern areas
of the XUAR, see ``Full Text: Development and Progress in Xinjiang,''
Xinhua, 21 September 09; Stanley Toops, ``Demographics and Development
in Xinjiang After 1949,'' East-West Center, 1 May 04.
\62\``Han Migrant Influx Threatens Uyghur Farms,'' Radio Free Asia,
11 March 13.
\63\``Uyghur Family Home Bulldozed,'' Radio Free Asia, 11 October
12.
\64\``Han Migrant Influx Threatens Uyghur Farms,'' Radio Free Asia,
11 March 13.
\65\The PRC government established the XPCC in 1954 as a means of
settling demobilized soldiers and Han migrants to perform border
defense functions and to support economic development. The government's
White Paper on the History and Development of Xinjiang says that the
ranks of the XPCC are now ``a mosaic of people from 37 ethnic groups,
including the Han, Uygur, Kazak, Hui, and Mongolian.'' It describes the
XPCC as ``a special social organization, which handles its own
administrative and judicial affairs'' but ``in accordance with the laws
and regulations of the state and the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous
Region.'' State Council Information Office, ``History and Development
of Xinjiang,'' May 2003, Part 9.
\66\``Circling the Wagons,'' Economist, 25 May 13.
\67\``Xinjiang Peaceful Resident, Prosperous Citizen Projects Have
Doubled Completion Rate'' [Xinjiang anju fumin gongcheng kaigong
jungong shuang chao'e], Tianshan Net, reprinted in Xinhua, 17 December
12; ``Xinjiang XPCC Annual Rural Peaceful Resident Housing Work Rate
Exceeds 90 Percent'' [Xinjiang bingtuan niandu nongcun anju zhufang
kaigong lu chao jiucheng], Chinese News Net, reprinted in Fujian China
Gold Online Net, 23 October 12; ``Xinjiang Peaceful Resident,
Prosperous Citizen Projects Increase by 320,000 Households'' [Xinjiang
anju fumin gongcheng xin zeng 32 wan hu], Xinjiang Daily, reprinted in
Xinhua, 13 December 12.
\68\``Shanghai Aids in the Construction of Kashgar's `Peaceful
Resident, Prosperous Citizen' Projects, With Special Funds Reaching 820
Million'' [Shanghai yuanjian kashi ``anju fumin'' gongcheng zhuanxiang
zijin da 8.2 yi], China Net, 10 May 13; Hong Liu, ``Shanghai City Aids
in the Construction of Peaceful Resident, Prosperous Citizen Projects,
Benefitting 110,000 Households of Rural Herders'' [Shanghai shi
yuanjian anju fumin gongcheng huiji 11 wan hu nongmumin], Kashgar
Government Information Net, 11 April 13; ``Xinjiang Peaceful Resident,
Prosperous Citizen Projects Increase by 320,000 Households'' [Xinjiang
anju fumin gongcheng xin zeng 32 wan hu], Xinjiang Daily, reprinted in
Xinhua, 13 December 12.
\69\``Herdsman on New Road to a Happy Life,'' China Daily,
reprinted in CRIEnglish, 20 November 12; ``Xinjiang Herdsmen Move
House,'' China Daily, 17 October 12; Claire O'Neill, ``What Big
Highways Mean For China's Small Villages,'' National Public Radio, 18
October 12.
\70\See generally Human Rights Watch, ```No One Has the Liberty To
Refuse': Tibetan Herders Forcibly Relocated in Gansu, Qinghai, Sichuan,
and the Tibet Autonomous Region,'' June 2007; Human Rights in China,
``China: Minority Exclusion, Marginalization and Rising Tensions,''
2007, 14; China's Ethnic Regional Autonomy Law: Does It Protect
Minority Rights? Staff Roundtable of the Congressional-Executive
Commission on China, 11 April 05, Testimony of Christopher P. Atwood,
Associate Professor, Department of Central Eurasian Studies, Indiana
University. For Commission analysis, see ``State Council Opinion
Bolsters Grazing Ban, Herder Resettlement,'' Congressional-Executive
Commission on China, 18 October 11.
\71\Kang Yan, ``In Three Years, Xinjiang Has Completed the
Resettlement of 136,800 Herders'' [Xinjiang 3 nian lai wancheng
youmumin dingju 13.68 wan hu], Yaxin Net, reprinted in China Xinjiang,
6 May 13; Wang Dan, ``Xinjiang Project To Resettle Herders Promotes
Continuous Improvement in the Living Standards of Rural Herders''
[Xinjiang dingju xingmu gongcheng cujin nongmumin shenghuo tiaojian
chixu gaishan], Tianshan Net, reprinted in China Religion and Ethnicity
Net, 10 May 13.
\72\``[Xinjiang Forum] Kashgar Old City's Old Appearance Gets a New
Look'' [[Xinjiang tai] kashi laocheng de jiumao yu xinyan], China Radio
International, 11 December 12.
\73\A 2008 book by architect and historian George Michell described
Kashgar before the Old City demolition as ``the best-preserved example
of a traditional Islamic city to be found anywhere in Central Asia.''
Michael Wines, ``To Protect an Ancient City, China Moves To Raze It,''
New York Times, 27 May 09.
\74\``The Effects of Kashgar's Special Zone, Residents of
Demolished Housing Cry Foul'' [Kashi tequ xiaoying, fangwu bei chai
jumin shangfang hanyuan], Uyghur Online, 29 October 11. For the
population figure of 220,000, see ``Ancient Xinjiang City's Residences
Safer After Gov't Rebuilding Program,'' Global Times, reprinted in
Xinhua, 26 May 10.
\75\For general background on the project, see ``Demolition of
Kashgar's Old City Draws Concerns Over Cultural Heritage Protection,
Population Resettlement,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law
Update, No. 3, 2009, 2. For more information on concerns regarding the
resettlement of Old City residents and the project's impact on Uyghur
cultural heritage, see Uyghur Human Rights Project, ``Living On the
Margins: The Chinese State's Demolition of Uyghur Communities,'' 2
April 12.
\76\See, e.g., Michael Wines, ``To Protect an Ancient City, China
Moves To Raze It,'' New York Times, 27 May 09; ``China Remodels Silk
Road City but Scars Run Deep,'' Agence France-Presse, 7 August 11 (Open
Source Center, 7 August 11); Uyghur Human Rights Project, ``Living On
the Margins: The Chinese State's Demolition of Uyghur Communities,'' 2
April 12, 16-17, 55, 71-77; Joshua Hammer, ``Demolishing Kashgar's
History,'' Smithsonian Magazine, March 2010.
\77\Michael Wines, ``To Protect an Ancient City, China Moves To
Raze It,'' New York Times, 27 May 09; Hu Xiaorong, ``Kashgar, Xinjiang
Spends Three Billion Yuan To Transform the Old City District, Plans To
Backfill 35.9 Kilometers of Tunnels'' [Xinjiang kashi 30 yi yuan gaizao
laochengqu jiang huitian 35.9 gongli didao], Yaxin Net, 23 March 09.
\78\Beijing Cultural Heritage Protection Center, ``Please Help To
Protect Kashgar Old Town,'' 16 April 09; International Council on
Monuments and Sites, ``ICOMOS World Report 2008-2010 on Monuments and
Sites in Danger,'' 2010, 48-51. Details of the Old City demolition
project suggest that authorities have bypassed ways to protect Old City
residents' safety while preserving existing buildings. Standards set by
professionals in the field of cultural heritage preservation indicate
compatibility between historic preservation and measures to guard
against natural disaster. Articles 10 and 14 of the Charter for the
Conservation of Historic Towns and Urban Areas, adopted by the non-
governmental International Council on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS) and
available on its Web site, recognize the importance of introducing
``contemporary elements'' and preventative measures against natural
disasters while ensuring they are ``adapted to the specific character
of the properties concerned.'' Charter for the Conservation of Historic
Towns and Urban Areas, adopted by ICOMOS General Assembly, October
1987, arts. 10, 14.
\79\See, e.g., PRC Constitution, issued 4 December 82, amended 12
April 88, 29 March 93, 15 March 99, 14 March 04, art. 4; PRC Regional
Ethnic Autonomy Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo minzu quyu zizhifa],
issued 31 May 84, effective 1 October 84, amended 28 February 01, art.
9; PRC Labor Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo laodong fa], issued 5 July
94, effective 1 January 95, amended 10 October 01, art. 12; PRC
Employment Promotion Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jiuye cujinfa],
issued 30 August 07, effective 1 January 08, art. 28. See also legal
analysis in ``Governments in Xinjiang Continue To Sponsor, Sanction Job
Recruitment That Discriminates Against Ethnic Minorities,'' CECC China
Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 2, 2009; ``Xinjiang Kashgar
Prefecture Career Units (Agency Worker and Service Positions) Position
Table of 2013 Recruitment of Workers'' [Xinjiang kashi diqu shiye
danwei (jiguan gongqin gangwei) 2013 zhaopin gongzuo renyuan gangwei
biao], Civil Service Examination Information Network, 28 March 13;
``Xinjiang Changji People's Hospital 2012 Public Recruitment for
Workers'' [Xinjiang changjizhou renmin yiyuan 2012 nian shiye danwei
gongkai zhaopin gongzuo renyuan], China Talent Net, last visited 2 July
13; ``[Xinjiang] Xinjiang, Kashgar Prefecture, Shache County Education
System 2013 Recruitment'' [[Xinjiang] Xinjiang kashi diqu shache xian
jiaoyu xitong 2013 zhaopin], Chongqing Normal University, reprinted in
Graduate Job Net, 19 May 13. For more information regarding job
discrimination against ethnic minorities in Xinjiang, see ``Job
Discrimination Against Ethnic Minorities Continues in Xinjiang,''
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 31 March 11.
\80\See, e.g., Luntai Industrial Park, ``Bazhou Dongchen Group Ltd.
Co. Recruiting Notice'' [Bazhou dongchen jituan youxian gongsi zhaopin
jianzhang], 9 June 13; Hainan University, ``Xinjiang Water Resources
and Hydropower Research Institute 2013 Personnel Recruitment''
[Xinjiang shuili shuidian kexue yanjiuyuan 2013 nian rencai zhaopin], 7
June 13; Zhang Xinyu, ``Xinjiang Convenes Summer Recruitment Meeting
for Vocational School Graduates'' [Xinjiang juban xiaji dazhongzhuan
biyesheng zhaopin hui], Xinjiang Daily, reprinted in Tianshan Net, 19
May 13; Hutubi Human Resources and Social Security Bureau, ``Hutubi
County 2013 `Private Enterprise Recruitment Week' Recruitment
Information'' [Hutubi xian 2013 nian ``minying qiye zhaopin zhou''
zhaopin xinxi], reprinted in Hutubi County Government, 6 June 13. See
also ``Uyghur Women Face Double Discrimination When Applying for Civil
Service Positions'' [Weiwuer nuxing bao kao gongwuyuan mianlin
shuangzhong qishi], Uyghur Online, 17 May 13.
\81\David Scott, ``Lack of Better Jobs for China's Ethnic
Minorities a Worsening Problem,'' Melbourne Newsroom, 22 November 12;
Sunanda Creagh, ``Inequality Fuels Tension Between China's Minority
Uyghurs and Hans,'' Conversation, 26 November 12.
\82\``Xinjiang People's Congress Representatives Discuss How To
Make the Road Smoother for Those Going Inland To Do Business and Work''
[Xinjiang renda daibiao taolun ruhe rang fu neidi jingshang wugong zhi
lu geng tongchang], Tianshan Net, 29 January 13.
\83\``In 2011, Xinjiang Achieved the Transfer and Employment of
2.58 Million Rural Surplus Laborers'' [2011 nian xinjiang shixian
nongcun fuyu laodongli zhuanyi jiuye 258 wan renci], Xinjiang Daily,
reprinted in Central People's Government, 22 March 12.
\84\CECC, 2008 Annual Report, 31 October 08, 179; CECC, 2009 Annual
Report, 10 October 09, 264-66; CECC, 2010 Annual Report, 10 October 10,
211-12.
\85\``Farmers Pressed Into Road Work,'' Radio Free Asia, 19
December 12; ``Uyghurs Pressed Into Field Work,'' Radio Free Asia, 8
February 13.
\86\For background information on how authorities in the XUAR have
targeted religious and political publications in censorship campaigns,
see ``Xinjiang Authorities Target Religious and Political Publications
in Censorship Campaigns,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China,
31 March 11.
\87\``Transportation Department Increases Supervision of `Sweeping
Away Pornography' in Road Transportation Links'' [Jiaotong yunshuting
jiada daolu yunshu huanjie ``saohuang dafei'' jianguan lidu], XUAR
Transportation Department, 7 March 13. For information on a similar
campaign, see ``Tekes County Public Security Bureau Launches Activity
Focused on Destroying Illegal Religious Publications'' [Tekesi xian
gonganju kaizhan jizhong xiaohui feifa zongjiao chubanwu huodong],
Tekes County Television Station, reprinted in Tekes County Government,
2 November 12.
\88\``Sentencing Document: Phoenix News Is Innocent, Uyghur Who
Helped Them Is Guilty'' [Panjueshu: fenghuang xinwen wuzui, bang qi
weiwuer ren youzui], Uyghur Online, 15 February 13; ``Exclusive: A
Uyghur Who Served as Translator for Chinese Media Was Sentenced to 11
Years, the Media Did Not Dare To Report This For Several Years'' [Dujia
baodao: yi weiwuer ren wei zhongguo meiti dang fanyi beipan 11 nian,
meiti changda jinian bu gan baodao], Uyghur Online, 13 February 13; Mai
Yanting, ``Uyghur Who Translated for Phoenix Satellite TV Sentenced to
11 Years, Media Silence Is Criticized'' [Weizu ren ti fenghuang weishi
fanyi bei panxing 11 nian, meiti jinsheng zao piping], Radio France
Internationale, 16 February 13. See the Commission's Political Prisoner
Database, record 2013-00089, for more information on the case.
\89\Mai Yanting, ``Uyghur Who Translated for Phoenix Satellite TV
Sentenced to 11 Years, Media Silence Is Criticized'' [Weizu ren ti
fenghuang weishi fanyi bei panxing 11 nian, meiti jinsheng zao piping],
Radio France Internationale, 16 February 13; ``Uyghur Youth Who Acted
as a Translator for Phoenix Satellite TV Sentenced to 11 Years'' [Wei
fenghuang weishi zuo fanyi, weiwuer qingnian beipan shiyi nian], Radio
Free Asia, 13 February 13.
\90\Article 13(7) of the PRC Passport Law and Article 8(5) of the
PRC Exit and Entry Control Law give officials the discretion to prevent
Chinese citizens from traveling abroad when they believe that a
citizen's leaving China might harm ``state security'' or harm or cause
``major loss'' to national interests. The meaning and scope of harm or
loss to state security or national interests are undefined, however,
which has led to official abuse and arbitrary enforcement. PRC Passport
Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo huzhao fa], issued 29 April 06,
effective 1 January 07; PRC Exit and Entry Control Law [Zhonghua renmin
gongheguo chujing rujing guanli fa], issued 30 June 12, effective 1
July 13.
\91\``Uyghur Scholar, Daughter Held,'' Radio Free Asia, 1 February
13.
\92\``Scholar Put on 24-Hour Watch,'' Radio Free Asia, 7 February
13; Andrew Jacobs, ``No Exit: China Uses Passports as Political
Cudgel,'' New York Times, 25 February 13.
\93\``Minzu University Student Atikem Continues To Be Harassed by
Xinjiang State Security'' [Zhongyang minzu daxue xuesheng atikemu chixu
bei xinjiang guobao saorao], Uyghur Online, 7 February 13. For
Commission analysis on the cases of Ilham Tohti and Atikem Rozi, see
``Authorities Block Uyghur Scholar From Leaving China, Refuse To Grant
Passport to Uyghur Student,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on
China, 7 March 13. See also Uyghur Human Rights Project, ``Briefing:
Refusals of Passports to Uyghurs and Confiscations of Passports Held by
Uyghurs Indicator of Second-Class Status in China,'' 7 February 13.
\94\Andrew Jacobs, ``No Exit: China Uses Passports as Political
Cudgel,'' New York Times, 22 February 13; Atikem Rozi,
``Correspondence: [My] Passport Is Not Processed, Xinjiang Police Say
I'm Politically Unqualified'' [Laixin: huzhao bu gei ban, xinjiang
jingfang shuo wo zhengzhi bu hege], Uyghur Online, 16 December 12.
\95\``Xinjiang Uyghur Student Detained by Police at the Beijing
Airport [Has Been Gone] for More Than a Week'' [Xinjiang weizu xuesheng
zai beijing jichang bei jing daizou yu yi zhou], Radio Free Asia, 23
July 13.
\96\Atikem Rozi (Web name Uyghuray), ``Mutellip, Where Are You?''
[Mutalipu, ni zai nali?], Uyghur Online, 22 July 13; ``A Uyghur Student
Studying Abroad Is Detained Prior to Boarding Time at Beijing Airport,
World Uyghur Congress Condemns Authorities for Persecuting Those Who
Return to the Country'' [Yi weizu liuxuesheng beijing dengji qian yi
bei kou shiweihui qianze dangju yan cha guiguozhe], Radio Free Asia, 23
July 13; Atikem Rozi (Web name Uyghuray), ``Urgent Appeal: Release
Mutellip, Resolutely Oppose Forced Disappearances'' [Jinji huyu:
shifang mutalipu, jianjue fandui qiangpo shizong], Uyghur Online, 7
August 13.
\97\Human Rights Watch, ``Malaysia: Stop Forced Returns to China,''
3 February 13; Hemananthani Sivanandam and Dorothy Cheng, ``Six Uighurs
Deported for Violating Immigration Laws,'' Sun Daily, 18 February 13.
\98\Human Rights Watch, ``Malaysia: Stop Forced Returns to China,''
3 February 13.
\99\Ibid.; World Uyghur Congress, ``WUC Condemns Illegal
Deportation of Uyghurs From Malaysia,'' 4 February 13.
\100\``Deported Uyghurs Jailed,'' Radio Free Asia, 20 December 12.
The mother of one of the sentenced men reportedly told RFA that
authorities did not allow her to attend the trial of her son, but she
believed authorities accused him of separatism based on his translation
assistance to other Uyghurs in Malaysia. It is unclear whether or not
the 11 Uyghurs were charged with or sentenced on charges of terrorism
in China.
\101\For information on various legal restrictions on Islamic
practices in the XUAR, see CECC, 2012 Annual Report, 10 October 12,
151-52.
\102\``Exclusive News: Xinjiang Religious Control of `Special
Groups'--Documentation of Registration'' [Dujia baoliao: xinjiang
zongjiao guanzhi ``teshu renqun''--dengji zai an], Uyghur Online, 1 May
13. For more information on restrictions on Uyghurs' religious
practices, see Uyghur Human Rights Project, ``Sacred Right Defiled:
China's Iron-Fisted Repression of Uyghur Religious Freedom,'' 30 April
13.
\103\Uyghur Human Rights Project, ``Sacred Right Defiled: China's
Iron-Fisted Repression of Uyghur Religious Freedom,'' 30 April 13, 2.
\104\Ibid., 17, 30, 36-43, 66, 83.
\105\``Eid Eve Clashes Stoked by Gunshots Fired at Uyghur Girl,''
Radio Free Asia, 12 August 13; Uyghur American Association, ``UAA
Condemns Shootings by Police During Religious Celebration,'' 14 August
13.
\106\``Confrontation With Police Occurs in Aksu, At Least 3 People
Are Shot and Killed by Police'' [Akesu fasheng jingmin duizhi, zhishao
3 ren bei jingcha kaiqiang dasi], Radio Free Asia, 9 August 13; ``In
Another Bloody Conflict in Xinjiang, 3 Are Dead and More Than 20 Are
Injured'' [Xinjiang zai you liuxue chongtu 3 si 20 duo shang], Radio
Free Asia, 12 August 13.
\107\``In Another Bloody Conflict in Xinjiang, 3 Are Dead and More
Than 20 Are Injured'' [Xinjiang zai you liuxue chongtu 3 si 20 duo
shang], Radio Free Asia, 12 August 13; ``Three Uyghurs Shot Dead, 20
Injured in Eid Eve Clashes,'' Radio Free Asia, 10 August 13; ``Hundreds
of Uyghurs Held After Violence Over Prayer Restrictions,'' Radio Free
Asia, 15 August 13.
\108\``In Another Bloody Conflict in Xinjiang, 3 Are Dead and More
Than 20 Are Injured'' [Xinjiang zai you liuxue chongtu 3 si 20 duo
shang], Radio Free Asia, 12 August 13; ``Confrontation With Police
Occurs in Aksu, At Least 3 People Are Shot and Killed by Police''
[Akesu fasheng jingmin duizhi, zhishao 3 ren bei jingcha kaiqiang
dasi], Radio Free Asia, 9 August 13.
\109\``In Another Bloody Conflict in Xinjiang, 3 Are Dead and More
Than 20 Are Injured'' [Xinjiang zai you liuxue chongtu 3 si 20 duo
shang], Radio Free Asia, 12 August 13; ``Three Uyghurs Shot Dead, 20
Injured in Eid Eve Clashes,'' Radio Free Asia, 10 August 13.
\110\Anne Henochowicz, China Digital Times, ``Ministry of Truth:
Violence in Xinjiang on Eid,'' 11 August 13.
\111\``Xinjiang Raids Point to Religious Controls,'' Radio Free
Asia, 7 March 13; Hai Lan, ``In Xinjiang, Another Instance of Searches
Leads to a Clash Between Uyghurs and Police, With Two Dead'' [Xinjiang
you yin qingcha zhi weiren yu jing chongtu 2 si], 22 May 13. For
specific examples of security checks, police raids, and house searches,
see Fu Yongkai, ``Wolituogelake Township Thoroughly Carries Out `Three
Inspections' Unified Action'' [Wolituogelake xiang shenru kaizhan
``sancha'' tongyi xingdong], Xinjiang Peace Net, 6 May 13; ``Kashgar's
Strict Inspections, 7 Uyghurs Detained'' [Kashi yancha 7 weiren bei
jing daizou], Radio Free Asia, 7 May 13; ``Inspection in Awat County
Leads to Two Dead--Authorities Conceal Details of Case'' [Xinjiang
awati xian qingcha zhi er ren siwang dangju yinman anqing], Uyghur
Online, 23 May 13; Meng Hongqi, ``Qiongkule Township Focuses on
Carrying Out `Two Sessions' Security Inspection Operation'' [Qiongkule
xiang jizhong kaizhan ``lianghui'' anbao da qingcha xingdong],
Qiongkule Township Government, reprinted in Qiemo County Government, 6
March 13; Xiang Xuan, ``Halayugong Township Carries Out Major Stability
Maintenance Inspections'' [Halayugong xiang kaizhan weiwen da qingcha],
Xinjiang Peace Net, 13 June 13; Damian Grammaticas, ``Doubts Over China
Government Claims on Xinjiang Attack,'' BBC, 26 April 13; Edward Wong,
``21 Dead in Clash With `Gangsters' in Western China,'' New York Times,
24 April 13; Uyghur American Association, ``Unlawful House Search and
Arbitrary Use of Lethal Force Results [in] Nearly Two Dozen Deaths in
Kashgar,'' 24 April 13; Peter Ford, ``Mystery Clouds Deadly Clash in
Western China With `Suspected Terrorists,''' Christian Science Monitor,
24 April 13.
\112\``Exclusive News: Xinjiang Religious Control of `Special
Groups'--Documentation of Registration'' [Dujia baoliao: xinjiang
zongjiao guanzhi ``teshu renqun''--dengji zai an], Uyghur Online, 1 May
13; ``China Registering the Religious in Xinjiang,'' Radio Free Asia, 2
May 13.
\113\``Exclusive News: Xinjiang Religious Control of `Special
Groups'--Documentation of Registration'' [Dujia baoliao: xinjiang
zongjiao guanzhi ``teshu renqun''--dengji zai an], Uyghur Online, 1 May
13.
\114\``China Registering the Religious in Xinjiang,'' Radio Free
Asia, 2 May 13.
\115\``Xinjiang Will Enter the Religious Belief Status of Ethnic
Minority Families Into Stability Maintenance Roster'' [Xinjiang jiang
shaoshu minzu jiating zongjiao xinyang qingkuang lieru weiwen mingce],
Radio Free Asia, 2 May 13.
\116\``Fourth Round of Training Launched for Our Region's Patriotic
Religious Figures'' [Woqu aiguo zongjiao renshi disi lun peixun
qidong], Xinjiang Daily, 28 March 13; ``Fourth Round of XPCC Religious
Figures' Political and Legal System Education Training Begins Second
Term of Classes'' [Bingtuan disi lun bingtuan zongjiao renshi zhengzhi
fazhi jiaoyu peixun dier qi kai ban], XPCC United Front Work
Department, 9 April 13; ``Qiba'erxiang 2013 Annual Patriotic Religious
Figure Training Class'' [Qiba'erxiang 2013 niandu aiguo zongjiao renshi
peixun ban], Kaba County Government, 24 April 13; ``Sa Township, Kaba
County, Holds Patriotic Figure Training Class'' [Kabahe xian sa xiang
juban aiguo renshi peixun ban], Altay Women's Federation, 25 April 13.
\117\Li Xing, ``Fourth Round of Training Launched for Our Region's
Patriotic Religious Figures'' [Woqu aiguo zongjiao renshi disi lun
peixun qidong], Xinjiang Daily, 28 March 13.
\118\For statements illustrating the ``frequent and widespread''
nature of the campaigns, see Li Donghui, ``Intensively Study and
Implement the Spirit of the 18th Party Congress, Strive To Create New
Conditions Care for the Next Generation Work Committee'' [Shenru xuexi
guanche dang de shibada jingshen, nuli kaichuang guangongwei gongzuo
xin jumian], Xinjiang Care for the Next Generation Work Committee, 19
February 13; Circular Regarding the Launch of the 2013 Regional
Vocational Student Summer Social Practicum [Guanyu kaizhan 2013 nian
zizhiqu dazhongzhuan xuesheng shuqi shehui shijian de tongzhi], China
Communist Youth League Xinjiang Committee, 27 June 13; China Communist
Youth League Xinjiang Committee, ``Resolutely Resist Illegal Religion,
Firmly Establish an Ideological Foundation for Young People'' [Jianjue
dizhi feifa zongjiao, dianding he laogu qingshaonian de sixiang jichu],
18 January 13. For representative anecdotal examples of campaigns, see
Xinjiang Association for Science and Technology, ``Tekes County
Launches School Activities To Resist Extremist Religious Thought and
Preaching'' [Tekesi xian kaizhan dizhi zongjiao jiduan sixiang
xuanjiang jin xuexiao huodong], 27 March 13; Xinjiang Care for the Next
Generation Work Committee, ``Yanqi County Launches County-Wide
Religious Propaganda Educational Activities in County, City, and
Township Schools To Stop Illegal Religious Activities'' [Yanqi xian zai
quan xian cheng xiang xuexiao kaizhan zhizhi feifa zongjiao xuanchuan
jiaoyu huodong], 5 April 13; Aksu Prefecture Education Bureau,
``Prefectural Education System Takes Numerous Measures and Carries Out
Solid Propaganda Educational Work To Curb Illegal Religious
Activities'' [Diqu jiaoyu xitong duocuo bing ju zhashi kaizhan zhizhi
feifa zongjiao huodong xuanchuan jiaoyu gongzuo], 12 September 12; Kong
Xiaofeng, Bole City Retired Cadre Bureau, ``In 2012, Propaganda
Lectures Carried Out by the Bole City Care for the Next Generation Work
Committee To Curb Illegal Religious Activities Achieved Remarkable
Results'' [Bole shi guangongwei 2012 nian kaizhan zhizhi feifa zongjiao
huodong xuanjiang chengxiao xianzhu], reprinted in Bole City Party
Construction, 25 December 12.
\119\Zhu Kaili, ``Kashgar Prefecture Female Buwi Successfully
Complete Patriotic Thankfulness Education'' [Kashi diqu nu buwei
yuanman wancheng aiguo gan'en jiaoyu], Tianshan Net, 24 December 12; Ma
Dengchao, ``Xinjiang, Kargilik County, Yitimukong Township Convenes
Township-Wide Buwi Training'' [Xinjiang yecheng xian yitimukong xiang
zuzhi quan xiang buwei jinxing peixun], China Ethnicity and Religion
Net, 28 February 13.
\120\For information on earlier steps to increase regulation of
buwi and place them under state control, see ``Xinjiang Authorities
Tighten Controls Over Muslim Women,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule
of Law Update, No. 5, 4 June 10, 2; ``Xinjiang Authorities Train, Seek
To Regulate Muslim Women Religious Figures,'' CECC China Human Rights
and Rule of Law Update, No. 4, 2009, 2.
\121\Zhu Kaili, ``Kashgar Prefecture Female Buwi Successfully
Complete Patriotic Thankfulness Education'' [Kashi diqu nu buwei
yuanman wancheng aiguo gan'en jiaoyu], Tianshan Net, 24 December 12.
\122\``Uyghur Youth Detained for Selling Touch Reading Pen for the
Quran Has Been Released'' [Chushou ``gulanjing'' diandubi er zao ju
weiwuer qingnian huoshi], Uyghur Online, 15 May 13; ``Young Uyghur
Detained for Selling Quran Touch Reading Pens'' [Weiwuer zu qingnian
yin shou ``gulanjing'' diandubi bei juliu], Uyghur Online, 23 April 13;
``Official Says 21 Dead and 2 Injured in Kashgar Terrorist Attack''
[Guanfang cheng kashi kongbu xiji 21 si 2 shang], Radio Free Asia, 24
April 13.
\123\Ibid.
\124\The 2001 Amendments to the 1994 XUAR Regulation on the
Management of Religious Affairs mandate prior government approval for
the sale and distribution of religious material. The Amendments are
unpublished but documented by Human Rights Watch and Human Rights in
China in their report ``Devastating Blows: Religious Repression of
Uighurs in Xinjiang,'' 1 April 05. For the 1994 Regulation, see
``Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Regulation on the Management of
Religious Affairs'' [Xinjiang weiwuer zizhiqu zongjiao shiwu guanli
tiaoli], passed 16 July 94, effective 1 October 94.
\125\For representative examples, see the Commission's Political
Prisoner Database record 2009-00328 (Kurbanjan Semet), record 2009-
00314 (Merdan Seyitakhun), and record 2008-00014 (Alimjan Yimit).
\126\``Jailed Uyghur Pastor Denied Visit,'' Radio Free Asia, 23
January 13.
\127\See CECC, 2012 Annual Report, 10 October 12, 152.
\128\Zhang Guijun, Bole City Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau,
``Bole City Adopts a Number of Measures To Prohibit Minors From
Entering Places of Worship'' [Bole shi caiqu duo xiang cuoshi zhizhi
weichengnian ren jinru zongjiao huodong changsuo], reprinted in Bole
City Government, 25 July 13; Liu Zhenxiang, Dorbiljin (Emin) County
Government, ``Emin County Adopts a Number of Measures To Safeguard the
Ramadan Period'' [Emin xian caiqu duo xiang cuoshi quebao zhaiyue
qijian], 5 July 13; CPC Hoboksar Mongol Autonomous County Committee and
Organization Department, ``Hoboksar County Tiebukanwusan Township's
Three Measures To Strictly Prohibit Minors From Entering Places of
Worship'' [Hebukesaier xian tiebukenwusan xiang san xiang cuoshi yanli
zhizhi weichengnian ren jinru zongjiao huodong changsuo], 29 July 13.
\129\``Uyghur Muslims Face New Religious Clampdown,'' Radio Free
Asia, 11 July 13; Bill Smith, ``China's Controls Curb Uighurs'
Ramadaan,'' South African Press Association, reprinted in IOL News, 12
July 13; Liu Haijun, Korgas (Huocheng) County Committee Office,
``Huocheng County Committee Office Cadres Take the Lead in Not
Believing in Religion and Not Fasting'' [Huocheng xian weibian ban
ganbu daitou bu xinjiao bu fengzhai], reprinted in Korgas Government,
12 July 13; Wen Fucheng, ``Health Road Community Organizes Activity for
All Party Members To Sign Pledge To Deal With Illegal Religious
Activities According to the Law and Curb Extremist Thinking'' [Jiankang
lu shequ zuzhi quanti dangyuan ganbu qianding yifa zhili feifa zongjiao
huodong, ezhi zongjiao jiduan sixiang chengnuo shu], Akqi (Aheqi)
County Government, 16 July 13.
\130\``A Uyghur With a Strong Religious Consciousness Was Expelled
From His Public Post'' [Yi zongjiao yishi nonghou de weiwuer ren bei
kaichu gongzhi], Uyghur Online, 3 August 13; ``Uyghur Fired for
Fasting'' [Yi weiwuer ren yin fengzhai er bei tingzhi gongzuo], Uyghur
Online, 29 July 13.
\131\``Uyghur Muslims Face New Religious Clampdown,'' Radio Free
Asia, 11 July 13; Uyghur American Association, ``UAA Condemns Shootings
by Police During Religious Celebration,'' 14 August 13; ``Eid Eve
Clashes Stoked by Gunshots Fired at Uyghur Girl,'' Radio Free Asia, 12
August 13; ``One Dead and Two Injured in a Uyghur-Han Conflict in
Xinjiang, Authorities on Alert for Eid Holiday'' [Xinjiang wei han
chongtu yi si liang shang rouzijie dangju tisheng jiebei], Radio Free
Asia, 5 August 13.
\132\Graham Adams, ``The Xinjiang Perspective: Part III,''
Diplomat, 8 November 12.
\133\For Commission analysis, see ``Xinjiang Authorities Accelerate
Promotion of Mandarin-Focused Bilingual Education,'' Congressional-
Executive Commission on China, 10 May 11.
\134\Ibid.
\135\``Uyghur Youths Forced Into Exile in Order To Protect Their
Ethnic Identity'' [Weiwuer nianqing ren wei baohu minzu shenfen er bei
po liuwang haiwai], Radio Free Asia, translated and reprinted in Uyghur
Online, 1 June 13; ``Uyghurs Support Language Protest,'' Radio Free
Asia, 27 October 10.
\136\Zhang Xuehong, ``Xinjiang Has Nearly 1.41 Million Students in
Bilingual Education Classes, Teaching Personnel Are the Bottleneck''
[Xinjiang shuangyu ban xuesheng yi you jin 141 wan ren, shizi shi
pingjing], Yaxin Net, reprinted in People's Daily, 24 December 12. At
the end of 2012, there were reportedly 1.68 million students in the
XUAR enrolled either in ``bilingual education'' or as minkaohan
students (minkaohan students are enrolled in longstanding programs,
which are separate from ``bilingual education,'' that place ethnic
minority students directly into Mandarin Chinese schooling). This
figure reportedly represents a 19.2 percent increase over 2011, and
comprised 66.6 percent of the ethnic minority student population
enrolled at the preschool to the secondary school level. See Cheng
Yong, ``Xinjiang: A Belief That `Bilingual Education' Will Change One's
Fate, Parents Are Willing To Select Bilingual Kindergartens''
[Xinjiang: xiangxin ``shuangyu'' gai mingyun, fumu yuan xuan shuangyu
youeryuan], China News Service, reprinted in Sohu, 6 March 13.
\137\Zhang Xuehong, ``Xinjiang Has Nearly 1.41 Million Students in
Bilingual Education Classes, Teaching Personnel Are the Bottleneck''
[Xinjiang shuangyu ban xuesheng yi you jin 141 wan ren, shizi shi
pingjing], Yaxin Net, reprinted in People's Daily, 24 December 12.
\138\See Cheng Yong, ``Xinjiang: A Belief that `Bilingual
Education' Will Change One's Fate, Parents Are Willing To Select
Bilingual Kindergartens'' [Xinjiang: xiangxin ``shuangyu'' gai mingyun,
fumu yuan xuan shuangyu youeryuan], China News Service, reprinted in
Sohu, 6 March 13.
\139\Ren Xixian, ``Xinjiang's Yili Ethnic Minority Family Planning
Households Happily Receive `Fewer Births, Faster Wealth' Monetary
Rewards'' [Xinjiang yili shaoshu minzu jisheng hu xi ling ``shaosheng
kuaifu'' jiangli jin], Xinhua, reprinted in People's Daily, 20
September 12; Liu Chunyang, ``Sixty-Five Minority Households in Tuokayi
Township Happily Receive 400,000 Yuan in Fewer Births, Faster Wealth
Rewards'' [Tuokayi xiang 65 hu shaoshu minzu xiling shaosheng kuaifu
jiangli jin 40 wan yuan], China News Service, 15 March 13. Under
Article 15 of the XUAR's Regulation on Population and Family Planning,
rural ethnic minority families are permitted to give birth to a maximum
of three children, and urban ethnic minority couples are permitted to
give birth to two children. When one member of the couple is an urban
resident, urban birth limits apply. For information on reward programs
in earlier years, see CECC, 2012 Annual Report, 10 October 12, 153.
\140\Ren Xixian, ``Xinjiang's Yili Ethnic Minority Family Planning
Households Happily Receive `Fewer Births, Faster Wealth' Monetary
Rewards'' [Xinjiang yili shaoshu minzu jisheng hu xi ling ``shaosheng
kuaifu'' jiangli jin], Xinhua, reprinted in People's Daily, 20
September 12; Liu Chunyang, ``Sixty-Five Minority Households in Tuokayi
Township Happily Receive 400,000 Yuan in Fewer Births, Faster Wealth
Rewards'' [Tuokayi xiang 65 hu shaoshu minzu xiling shaosheng kuaifu
jiangli jin 40 wan yuan], China News Service, 15 March 13.
\141\For more information on these types of reward mechanisms, see
CECC, 2012 Annual Report, 10 October 12, 153.
\142\``Training Course for Northern Xinjiang Rural Resident
Reproductive Health Religious Figures and Managers'' [Beijiang
nongmumin shengzhi jiankang zongjiao renshi he guanli renyuan peixun
ban], XUAR Population and Family Planning Commission, reprinted in
Tianshan Net, 14 December 12; ``Deputy Mayor Ma Zhongyong Visits Mosque
That Is the Site of a Muslim Reproductive Health Preaching Education
Project'' [Ma zhongyong fu shizhang weiwen musilin shengzhi jiankang
xuanchuan jiaoyu xiangmu dian qingzhensi], Wuzhong City Population and
Family Planning Bureau, 31 August 12. The project is also referred to
as the ``Herder Reproductive Health Project'' (nongmumin shengzhi
jiankang xiangmu). See ``Key Work of the Prefectural Family Planning
Commission for 2013'' [2013 nian diqu jihua shengyu xiehui gongzuo
yaodian], Altai Prefecture Population and Family Planning Commission,
22 March 13; ``Autonomous Region Convenes Northern Xinjiang Herder
Reproductive Health Project Religious Figures and Managers' Training
Course'' [Zizhiqu juban beijiang pian nongmumin shengzhi jiankang
xiangmu zongjiao renshi he guanli renyuan peixun ban], XUAR Population
and Family Planning Commission, reprinted in XUAR Leading Group on the
Rule of Law, 17 December 12.
\143\Jiang Yan, ``Muslim Reproductive Health Project Extends
Benefits to Nearly 300,000 Muslim Masses in Yining County'' [Musilin
shengzhi jiankang xiangmu huiji yining xian jin 30 wan musilin
qunzhong], Tianshan Net, 29 September 11; XUAR Population and Family
Planning Commission, ``Association Information--August 22'' [Xiehui
xinxi], 22 August 11.
\144\``Autonomous Region Convenes Northern Xinjiang Herder
Reproductive Health Project Religious Figures and Managers' Training
Course'' [Zizhiqu juban beijiang pian nongmumin shengzhi jiankang
xiangmu zongjiao renshi he guanli renyuan peixun ban], XUAR Population
and Family Planning Commission, reprinted in XUAR Leading Group on the
Rule of Law, 17 December 12; ``Key Work of the Chinese Family Planning
Association for 2013'' [Zhongguo jihua shengyu xiehui 2013 nian gongzuo
yaodian], Guangyuan City Family Planning Association, 14 December 12;
``Deputy Mayor Ma Zhongyong Visits Mosque That Is the Site of a Muslim
Reproductive Health Preaching Education Project'' [Ma zhongyong fu
shizhang weiwen musilin shengzhi jiankang xuanchuan jiaoyu xiangmu dian
qingzhensi], Wuzhong City Population and Family Planning Bureau, 31
August 12.
Notes to Section V--Tibet
\1\Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, ``Press Statement,'' 25
January 10. According to the January 25 press statement, the Dalai
Lama's envoys would arrive in China ``tomorrow'' (i.e., January 26,
2010).
\2\``Press Conference on Central Govt's Contacts With Dalai Lama
(Text),'' China Daily, 11 February 10. After the ninth round of
dialogue, Zhu Weiqun referred to the gap between the eighth and ninth
rounds as ``the longest interval after we resumed contact and talks in
2002.''
\3\For more information on the Tibetan autonomous areas of China,
see CECC, ``Special Topic Paper: Tibet 2008-2009,'' 22 October 09, 22-
24. In China there are 1 provincial-level area of Tibetan autonomy, 10
prefectural-level areas of Tibetan autonomy, and 2 county-level areas
of Tibetan autonomy. The area of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR)
(approximately 1.2 million square kilometers), the 10 Tibetan
Autonomous Prefectures (TAPs) (approximately 1.02 million square
kilometers), and the 2 Tibetan autonomous counties (TACs)
(approximately 0.019 million square kilometers) totals approximately
2.24 million square kilometers. The 10 TAPs make up approximately 46
percent of the TAR/TAP/TAC total area. Steven Marshall and Susette
Cooke, Tibet Outside the TAR: Control, Exploitation and Assimilation:
Development With Chinese Characteristics (Washington, DC: Self-
published CD-ROM, 1997), Table 7, citing multiple Chinese sources.
Table 7 provides the following information. Tibet Autonomous Region
(1.2 million square kilometers, or 463,320 square miles). Qinghai
province: Haibei (Tsojang) TAP (52,000 square kilometers, or 20,077
square miles), Hainan (Tsolho) TAP (41,634 square kilometers, or 16,075
square miles), Haixi (Tsonub) Mongol and Tibetan AP (325,787 square
kilometers, or 125,786 square miles), Huangnan (Malho) TAP (17,901
square kilometers, or 6,912 square miles), Guoluo (Golog) TAP (78,444
square kilometers, or 30,287 square miles), and Yushu (Yushul) TAP
(197,791 square kilometers, or 76,367 square miles). Gansu province:
Gannan (Kanlho) TAP (45,000 square kilometers, or 17,374 square miles)
and Tianzhu (Pari) TAC (7,150 square kilometers, or 2,761 square
miles). Sichuan province: Ganzi (Kardze) TAP (153,870 square
kilometers, or 59,409 square miles), Aba (Ngaba) Tibetan and Qiang AP
(86,639 square kilometers, or 33,451 square miles), and Muli (Mili) TAC
(11,413 square kilometers, or 4,407 square miles). Yunnan province:
Diqing (Dechen) TAP (23,870 square kilometers, or 9,216 square miles).
The table provides areas in square kilometers; conversion to square
miles uses the formula provided on the Web site of the U.S. Geological
Survey: 1 square kilometer = 0.3861 square mile. For population data,
see Tabulation on Nationalities of 2000 Population Census of China,
Department of Population, Social, Science and Technology Statistics,
National Bureau of Statistics, and Department of Economic Development,
State Ethnic Affairs Commission (Beijing: Ethnic Publishing House,
September 2003), Tables 10-1, 10-4. According to China's 2000 census
data, the Tibetan population of the TAR (approximately 2.43 million
persons), the 10 TAPs (approximately 2.47 million persons), and the 2
TACs (approximately 0.11 million persons) totaled approximately 5.01
million Tibetans. The Tibetan population of the 10 TAPs made up
approximately 49 percent of the TAR/TAP/TAC total Tibetan population as
of 2000. See also Tabulation on the 2010 Population Census of the
People's Republic of China, National Bureau of Statistics, Department
of Population and Employment Statistics, Population Census Office Under
the State Council, 23 April 13, Table 2-1. The table titled
``Population by Age, Sex, and Nationality'' listed the national Tibetan
population as 6,282,187. As of August 2013, the Commission had not
observed detailed data based on the2010census forethnic populationin
provincial-, prefectural-, and county-level administrative areas.
\4\Office of the Spokesperson, U.S. Department of State,
``Statement by Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues Maria Otero,'' 5
December 12. As of the statement date, Maria Otero also served as Under
Secretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights.
\5\International Campaign for Tibet, ``New Challenges to Tibet
Policy From Inside China,'' 27 June 13. ICT provided a translation of
the Asia Weekly article and provided citation information: Shuo Jiming,
``Beijing Expert: Resume Negotiations To Resolve the Tibet Issue,''
Asia Weekly, Vol. 27, No. 22 (June 2013).
\6\Ibid.
\7\The table included in this report--Tibetan Self-Immolation
Believed To Focus on Political or Religious Issues (September 2012-July
2013)--shows self-immolation numbers 52 to 89, a total of 38 self-
immolations, during October and November 2012.
\8\``CPC Congress Concludes, New Central Committee Elected,''
Xinhua, 14 November 12. According to the report, the Chinese Communist
Party Central Committee's 18th Congress opened on November 8, 2012, and
concluded on November 14.
\9\For reports providing specific detail on self-immolators'
protests during the period beginning on September 29, 2012 (in
chronological order), see, e.g., International Campaign for Tibet,
``Second Tibetan Dies in Less Than a Week as Self-Immolations Continue
in Tibet,'' 5 October 12 (Yungdrung ``shouted slogans calling for
freedom in Tibet and for the return of the Dalai Lama and the
Karmapa''); ``Tibetan Man Self-Immolates in Nagchu,'' Voice of America,
4 October 12 (Gudrub ``shouted slogans calling for freedom for Tibet
and return of the Tibetan spiritual leader''); ``Third Tibet Self-
Immolation in One Week,'' Voice of America, 6 October 12 (Sanggye
Gyatso ``shouted for the swift return of the Dalai Lama to Tibet and
called for religious and language rights''); ``Breaking: Tibet
Continues To Burn With Another Self-Immolation,'' Phayul, 13 October 12
(Tamdrin Dorje ``raised slogans for the return of His Holiness the
Dalai Lama and freedom in Tibet''); Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and
Democracy, ```These Chinese Are Not Letting Us Live in Peace. It's
Better To Die, Better To Die,''' 29 October 12 (Lhamo Kyab ``shouted
slogans calling for `independence for Tibet,' `release of the 11th
Panchen Lama,' and the `return of His Holiness the Dalai Lama''');
``Retired Farmer Dies After Burning Himself in Labrang,'' Voice of
America, 22 October 12 (Dondrub ``burned himself at a Stupa on the main
road near the monastery''); ``Man Burns Near Police Station,'' Radio
Free Asia, 23 October 12 (Dorje Rinchen ``set himself on fire and died
Tuesday in front of a police station''); International Campaign for
Tibet, ``Two Self-Immolations in Nagchu,'' 31 October 12 (Tsepo and
Tenzin ``set fire to themselves in a double self-immolation near a
government building''); Free Tibet, ``Fourth Tibetan This Week Sets
Himself on Fire,'' 26 October 12 (Lhamo Tseten ``[set] himself on fire
close to a military camp and a local court building''); ``Mass Protest
After Fatal Burning,'' Radio Free Asia, 4 November 12 (Dorje Lhundrub
``shouted slogans against Chinese rule and called for the return of . .
. the Dalai Lama''); ``Five Tibetans Self-Immolate,'' Radio Free Asia,
7 November 12 (Dorje, Samdrub, and Dorje Kyab ``set themselves ablaze
in front of a police station in Ngaba town, calling for a free Tibet
and the return of . . . the Dalai Lama''); ``Five Tibetans Self-
Immolate,'' Radio Free Asia, 7 November 12 (Tamdrin Tso ``died shouting
slogans calling for the return of the Dalai Lama''); ``6 Tibetans Self-
Immolate in Two Days,'' Voice of America, 8 November 12 (Kalsang Jinpa
``was reported to have raised a white banner with slogans that called
for Dalai Lama's return and rights of all Tibetan people''); ``Tibetan
Burnings Rise to 70,'' Radio Free Asia, 10 November 12 (Gonpo Tsering
called for ``freedom for Tibetans, the return of the Dalai Lama to
Tibet and freedom of languages''); ``Two Tibetan Self-Immolaters Left
Letters Behind,'' Voice of America, 20 November 12 (Nyingkar Tashi left
a letter that ``urged unification of all Tibetans and urged Tibetans to
learn and speak Tibetan, and called for freedom for Tibet''); ``More
Tibetan Burning Protests,'' Radio Free Asia, 12 November 12 (Nyingchag
Bum self-immolated ``in front of a Chinese government office
building''); ``Two More Burn in Rebgong,'' Radio Free Asia, 15 November
12 (Tenzin Drolma self-immolated ``in the courtyard of a community
temple''); ``Self-Immolations Continue in Rebkong, Two Die in
Protest,'' Voice of America, 15 November 12 (Tenzin Drolma ``shouted
slogans calling for return of the Dalai Lama''); ``Two Tibetan Self-
Immolaters Left Letters Behind,'' Voice of America, 20 November 12
(Chagmo Kyi's letters ``expressed her wish for equality of all
nationalities and called on the new Chinese leader Xi Jinping to meet
with the Dalai Lama''); International Campaign for Tibet, ``Young
Tibetan Father Self-Immolates in Tsekhog; Officials Warn Tibetans Not
To Gather at Cremations,'' 19 November 12 (Sangdrag Tsering
``frequently spoke about the Dalai Lama not being allowed to be in
Tibet, that Tibetans have no rights, and that the Panchen Lama is still
in prison''); ``Tibetan Self-Immolations Continue, 25-Year-Old Dies in
Protest,'' Voice of America, 19 November 12 (Wangchen Norbu ``shouted
slogans calling for the return of the Dalai Lama to Tibet, release of
the Panchen Lama and freedom for Tibet''); Tibetan Centre for Human
Rights and Democracy, ``Tibetan Man Dies of Burning Protest at a Gold
Mining Site,'' 21 November 12 (Tsering Dondrub ``set himself on fire .
. . at a mining site. . . . wanted to highlight the hardship and
suffering of the local Tibetans harmed by mining activities'');
International Campaign for Tibet, ``Three Self-Immolations in Two Days
as Total in Tibet Reaches 81,'' 24 November 12 (Tamdrin Kyab reportedly
had said previously there was ``no reason to live without the Dalai
Lama's return to Tibet''); ``Tibetan Burns, Hails Dalai Lama,'' Radio
Free Asia, 24 November 12 (Tamdrin Dorje ``could be seen putting his
hands together in prayer, shouting long life to the Dalai Lama'');
``17-Year-Old Self-Immolator's Last Note Calls for the Dalai Lama's
Return and Tibet's Independence,'' Phayul, 28 November 12 (Sanggye
Drolma left ``a will, written in the form of a poem'' expressing ``her
belief in the swift return of . . . the Dalai Lama and Tibet's
independence''); ``Three Self-Immolations in Two Days, Total Reaches
84,'' Voice of America, 26 November 12 (Sanggye Drolma self-immolated
``in front of the [local] Chinese government office''); ``Breaking: 18-
Year-Old Sets Self on Fire, Third Self-Immolation in Two Days,''
Phayul, 26 November 12 (Konchog Tsering self-immolated near the same
mining site where Tsering Dondrub self-immolated on November 20);
``Father of Three Dies After Self-Immolation,'' Voice of America, 26
November 12 (Gonpo Tsering ``shouted slogans calling for freedom for
Tibet, human rights in Tibet and return of the Dalai Lama to Tibet'');
```May the Sun of Happiness Shine on Tibet,' a Self-Immolator's Last
Words,'' Phayul, 29 November 12 (Kalsang Kyab's letter to Tibetans in
India: ``I am setting myself on fire for the sake of Tibet.'');
``Tibetan Teenager Burns Himself to Death,'' Voice of America, 28
November 12 (Sanggye Tashi ``shouted slogans calling for return of the
Dalai Lama and release of the Panchen Lama and all Tibetan political
prisoners''); ``Two Tibetans Self-Immolate, Total Reaches 89,'' Voice
of America, 29 November 12 (Bande Khar called for ``the return of the
Dalai Lama to Tibet, the release of all Tibetan political prisoners,
freedom of religion and language and protection of Tibet's fragile
environment''); ``Two Tibetans Self-Immolate, Total Reaches 89,'' Voice
of America, 29 November 12 (Tsering Namgyal ``[set] himself on fire
near the local government office''); ``Tibetan Self-Immolates in
Golok,'' Voice of America, 3 December 12 (Lobsang Gedun ``raised
slogans with his hands clasped in prayers while engulfed in flames'');
International Campaign for Tibet, ``Three Tibetans Self-Immolate in Two
Days During Important Buddhist Anniversary: Images of Troops in Lhasa
as Tibetans Pray,'' 10 December 12 (Pema Dorje shouted that the Dalai
Lama should be allowed to return to Tibet, and called for the unity of
the Tibetan people); Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy,
``Tibetan Religious Festival Marked by Two Self-Immolation Death,'' 9
December 12 (Konchog Phelgye folded his hands in prayer position and
``shouted slogans for the long life of . . . the Dalai Lama and return
. . . to Tibet''); ``Tibetan Girl Self-Immolates,'' Radio Free Asia, 10
December 12 (Wangchen Kyi, or Rinchen Kyi, called ``for the long life
of . . . the Dalai Lama''); International Campaign for Tibet,
``Authorities Bar Customary Religious Rituals To Enforce Quick
Cremation of Tibetan Who Self-Immolated in Amchok,'' 15 January 13
(video of Tsering Tashi ``depicts him lying on the street in flames,
lifting his hands into a prayer position and saying the name of the
Dalai Lama''); ``Breaking: Monk in Ngaba Becomes 100th to Self-Immolate
Under China's Rule,'' Phayul, 13 February 13 (Lobsang Namgyal, while
burning, ``shouted slogans for the long life of . . . the Dalai Lama as
he ran towards the local police building''); Free Tibet, ``Cross-Legged
in Flames: Another Protest in Tibet,'' 17 February 13 (Namlha Tsering
self-immolated in the main road ``opposite the . . . county cinema
hall''); ``A Tibetan Man Self-Immolates in Palung, Amdo Tsoshar
(Qinghai),'' Voice of America, 24 February 13 (Phagmo Dondrub ``set
fire to himself near or within the grounds of [Jakhyung Monastery]'');
International Campaign for Tibet, ``Two Tibetans Self-Immolate at
Monasteries During Prayer Ceremonies in Amdo,'' 25 February 13 (Tsezung
Kyab self-immolated ``in front of the main temple of Shitsang Gonsar
monastery''); ``Tibetan Self-Immolates in Ngaba County,'' Radio Free
Asia, 26 February 13 (Sangdrag self-immolated ``in a public area of the
Ngaba county center''); ``Tibetan Monk Dies in Self-Immolation on
Sensitive Date for Amdo Ngaba,'' Voice of America, 16 March 13
(``poured gasoline over himself near his residence . . . and after
igniting himself . . . walked towards the western gate of the
monastery''); ``Tibetan Mother of Four Dies in Self-Immolation
Protest,'' Voice of America, 24 March 13 (``set herself on fire . . .
near Zamthang Jonang Monastery''); Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and
Democracy, ``Burning Protests Continue Against Chinese Repression in
Tibet,'' 30 March 13 (Konchog Tenzin ``set himself on fire . . . near
his monastery''); ``Thousands Gather After Young Tibetan Mother Self-
Immolates,'' Radio Free Asia, 16 April 13 (Chugtso ``self-immolated
near . . . Jonang monastery''); Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and
Democracy, ``Two Tibetan Monks Die of Self-Immolation Protest,'' 25
April 13 (Lobsang Dawa and Konchog Oezer ``died yesterday after setting
themselves on fire on the eve of the 24th birthday of Gedhun Choekyi
Nyima, Tibet's XIth Panchen Lama''); ``Tibetan Man Self-Immolates in
Protest Against China,'' Voice of America, 29 May 13 (Tenzin Sherab
``criticized Chinese policies on Tibetans and expressed concern about
Tibetan religion and culture'' prior to his self-immolation); Tibetan
Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, ``Teenage Monk Dies of Burning
Protest; Fate of Body Unknown,'' 22 July 13 (monks saw Kunchog Sonam
``on fire with both his hands clasped in a praying gesture''); ``Five
Tibetans Detained in Connection With Self-Immolation,'' Radio Free
Asia, 26 July 13 (Konchog Sonam was ``crying out for Tibetan freedom''
as he burned).
\10\For Commission analysis of Chinese government regulatory
intrusion upon Tibetan Buddhist affairs, see, e.g., ``Special Report:
Tibetan Monastic Self-Immolations Appear To Correlate With Increasing
Repression of Freedom of Religion,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule
of Law Update, No. 1, 24 January 12; ``Tibetan Buddhist Affairs
Regulations Taking Effect in Tibetan Autonomous Prefectures,''
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 10 March 11; ``New Legal
Measures Assert Unprecedented Control Over Tibetan Buddhist
Reincarnation,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 22 August
07. For measures issued by China's central government, see, e.g., State
Administration for Religious Affairs, Measures for Evaluating the
Credentials of and Appointing Monastic Teachers in Tibetan Buddhism
[Zangchuan fojiao simiao jing shi zige pingding he pinren banfa],
passed 25 November 12, effective 3 December 12; State Administration
for Religious Affairs, Management Measures for Tibetan Buddhist
Monasteries [Zangchuan fojiao simiao guanli banfa], passed 29 September
10, effective 1 November 10; State Administration for Religious
Affairs, Measures on the Management of the Reincarnation of Living
Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism [Zangchuan fojiao huofo zhuanshi guanli
banfa], passed 13 July 07, issued 18 July 07, effective 1 September 07.
\11\During the 2013 reporting year, the Commission did not observe
indications that dialogue between the Chinese government and the Dalai
Lama's representatives might soon resume.
\12\For summary information on Tibetan self-immolation, periodic
updates are available on the Commission's Web site (www.cecc.gov). As
of July 20, 2013, the following numbers of Tibetan self-immolations
reported or believed to focus on political and religious issues took
place in the following 10 prefectural-level areas of Tibetan autonomy
(arranged in descending order by number of self-immolations): Aba
(Ngaba) Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture, Sichuan province, 51
self-immolations; Gannan (Kanlho) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (TAP),
Gansu province, 26 self-immolations; Huangnan (Malho) TAP, Qinghai
province, 16 self-immolations; Ganzi (Kardze) TAP, Sichuan, 5 self-
immolations; Yushu (Yulshul) TAP, Qinghai, 5 self-immolations; Naqu
(Nagchu) prefecture, Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), 4 self-immolations;
Lhasa municipality, TAR, 3 self-immolations; Guoluo (Golog) TAP,
Qinghai, 2 self-immolations; Changdu (Chamdo) prefecture, TAR, 1 self-
immolation; Haixi (Tsonub) Mongol and Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture,
Qinghai, 1 self-immolation. In addition, 2 Tibetans self-immolated in
Haidong prefecture, Qinghai, which is not an area of Tibetan autonomy.
(The preceding information does not include Yushu TAP self-immolation
property protests by females Dekyi Choezom and Pasang Lhamo on June 27
and September 13, 2012, respectively, and an unidentified woman in
March 2013; and the April 6, 2012, deaths of a Tibetan Buddhist abbot,
Athub, and a nun, Atse, in a Ganzi TAP house fire initially reported as
accidental and later as self-immolation. The Commission continues to
monitor reports on their deaths.)
\13\``Commentary: Let Not the Burning Desire of `Tibet
Independence' Consume the Good and Kind People'' [Pinglun: wu rang
zangdu de yuhuo fenshao liangshan de renmin], China News Service, 10
December 12 (translated in Open Source Center, 11 December 12). The
editorial refers to ``the Dalai and the new leader of the government-
in-exile'' and states that self-immolation is a ``political
conspiracy'' to split China.
\14\The following three sources provide examples of official
positions that continue to exacerbate tensions with Tibetans in the
context of significant current issues. Chen Feiyu, ```Five Continued
Focuses,' Realize Greater Development (Under Guidance of Scientific
Development Concept)--Interview With Tibet CPC Secretary Chen Quanguo''
[``Wu ge jixu zhuoli'' shixian geng da fazhan (zai kexue fazhan guan
zhiyin xia)--fang xizang zizhiqu dangwei shuji chen quanguo], People's
Daily, 4 September 12 (translated in Open Source Center, 21 September
12). According to the article, TAR Party Secretary Chen Quanguo listed
accomplishments including: [regarding religion] ``improved and upgraded
the work to ensure that all monasteries and temples have a management
organization, a party organization, a leading group, a contingent,
duties and functions, and a mechanism''; [regarding security]
``established 698 police stations for providing service to the people,
with a coverage area of 300-500 meters for each station. In this way,
we can ensure that police officers will arrive at the scene in three to
five minutes when an unexpected incident occurs''; [regarding
compulsory settlement and resettlement] ``carried out in a down-to-
earth way the comfortable housing project for farmers and herdsmen. We
will ensure that all farmers and herdsmen can live in safe and
comfortable houses by the end of 2013.'' Wu Bin, ``Qiang Wei Conducts
Fact-Finding on Safeguarding Stability in Hualong County, Emphasizes
Need To Consolidate Achievements in Ad Hoc Struggle Against Self-
Immolation, Create a Good Social Environment for Promoting Construction
and Development'' [Qiang wei zai hualong xian diaoyan weihu wending
gongzuo shi qiangdiao gonggu fan zifen zhuanxiang douzheng chengguo--
wei zhua jianshe cu fazhan yingzao lianghao de shehui huanjing],
Qinghai Daily, 2 March 13 (translated in Open Source Center, 7 March
13). According to the article, Qinghai Party Secretary Qiang Wei issued
guidance regarding: [the political environment] ``thoroughly conduct
the education on patriotism, legal system, and gratitude, and develop a
dense social atmosphere of ardently loving the party and the state, the
nationality, and the homeland''; and [handling the self-immolation
crisis] ``give prominence to `strictness,' dealing harsh blows at the
people who support, incite, and abet self-immolation.'' ``Aba
Prefecture Governor: The Chief Cause of Self-Immolations Is the 14th
Dalai Lama'' [Aba zhou zhouzhang: zifen zong genyuan zai shisi shi
dalai lama], Xinhua, 8 March 13, reprinted in People's Daily. According
to the article, Wu Zegang, Governor of the Aba Tibetan and Qiang
Autonomous Prefecture, stated explicitly that the 14th Dalai Lama
(shisi dalai lama) is the root (genyuan) of problems in Tibet.
\15\Office of the Spokesperson, U.S. Department of State,
``Statement by Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues Maria Otero,'' 5
December 12. As of the statement date, Maria Otero also served as Under
Secretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights.
\16\``Foreign Ministry Spokesman: China Expresses Strong
Dissatisfaction, Resolute Opposition Over Statement Issued by the
United States on Tibet-Related Issues'' [Waijiaobu fayanren: dui
meifang jiu she zang wenti fabiao de shengming biaoshi qianglie buman,
jianjue fandui], Xinhua, 7 December 12 (translated in Open Source
Center, 7 December 12).
\17\Ibid.
\18\``Gansu Police Crack Homicide Case of Self-Immolation Organized
and Masterminded by Members of the `Tibetan Youth Congress' of the
Dalai Clique'' [Gansu jingfang zhenpo dalai jituan ``zangqing hui''
chengyuan zuzhi cehua zifen sharen'an], Xinhua, 15 January 13
(translated in Open Source Center, 15 January 13; available in Chinese
on China News Service). The article describes October 6, 2012, self-
immolator Sanggye Gyatso as having committed ``repeated acts of
theft,'' having been ``without a job for a long time,'' and having had
``improper relations with several women.'' Li Huizi et al., ``Families
Suffer Amid Tibetan Flames of Deceit,'' China Daily, 5 February 13. The
article refers to the November 29, 2012, self-immolator Tsering Namgyal
(or Tsering Tashi) as ``Tsekho'' and notes that he ``did not get along
well with his wife,'' attempted to borrow money from his father to
start a business but was instead denied the loan and ``scolded'' by his
father, who ``was worried his alcoholic son would squander the money on
excessive gambling and drinking.'' Li Huizi and Jiang Weichao, ``(China
Focus) Lies and Facts Behind the Flames: An Investigation of Self-
Immolation Incidents in the Tibetan Area of Southern Gansu'' [(Zhongguo
jujiao) huoyan beihou de huangyan yu zhenxiang: gannan zang qu zifen
diaocha], Xinhua, 31 January 13 (translated in Open Source Center, 12
February 13). The report refers to the August 7, 2012, self-immolator
Drolkar Tso as ``Zhang Kecao'' and notes that her ``left leg was
handicapped,'' she was ``at odds with her husband and her husband's
family,'' and ``often blamed and bullied by her mother-in-law.'' ``70
Arrested in Qinghai Over Self-Immolations,'' Xinhua, 8 February 13. The
article refers to November 8, 2012, self-immolator Kalsang Jinpa, a
former Rongbo Monastery monk, and notes that he ``resumed secular life
after falling in love with a woman, but later discovered she was a
prostitute and parted with her.'' ``Prefecture, County Public Security
Authorities Successfully Solve Case of Intentional Homicide, Burning
Body,'' Aba Daily, 19 March 13 (translated in Open Source Center, 21
March 13). The article refers to March 13 (or March 12) self-immolator
Konchog Wangmo as ``Guangqiu Ema'' and notes that her husband,
``criminal suspect'' Drolma Kyab, ``got into an intense fight with his
wife''; ``strangled the neck of [his wife] with his hands''; ``brought
the body of [his wife] to the west wall of [a nearby building]''; and
``used gasoline to burn the body.''
\19\Li Huizi et al., ``Families Suffer Amid Tibetan Flames of
Deceit,'' China Daily, 5 February 13. The article refers to December 2,
2012, self-immolator Sungdu Kyab as ``Sangdegye'' and observes,
``Copycat self-immolations spread in the border area of Qinghai,
Sichuan and Gansu provinces last year, . . . .'' The article described
Sungdu Kyab as ``introverted,'' someone who watched ``Voice of America
Tibetan-language programs,'' and ``believed in the Dalai Lama clique.''
\20\Ibid. The China Daily report contains four subheadings:
``Families suffer amid Tibetan flames of deceit,'' ``Copycat
suicides,'' ``Loss of life,'' and ``Terrorism.'' The first three
subheadings contain specific details about specific self-immolations
that the article represents as substantiating the points it seeks to
make. The subsection on ``Terrorism'' contains no specific information
regarding terrorism for any of the self-immolations, nor any
information on terrorism except to provide an apparent representation
of language in the 1994 UN Declaration on Measures to Eliminate
International Terrorism on what constitutes terrorism: ``criminal acts
intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the public, a
group of persons or particular communities for political purposes are
not justifiable under any circumstances, no matter the considerations
of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious
or any other nature that may be invoked to justify them.'' Li Huizi and
Jiang Weichao, ``(China Focus) Lies and Facts Behind the Flames: An
Investigation of Self-Immolation Incidents in the Tibetan Area of
Southern Gansu'' [(Zhongguo jujiao) huoyan beihou de huangyan yu
zhenxiang: gannan zang qu zifen diaocha], Xinhua, 31 January 13
(translated in Open Source Center, 12 February 13). The report does not
provide any information about any of the self-immolators supporting the
depiction of them as ``terrorists,'' but it provides a representation
of language in the 1994 UN Declaration on Measures to Eliminate
International Terrorism that is briefer than that in the preceding
citation: ``criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of
terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons
for political purposes are in any circumstance unjustifiable.'' Tibetan
Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, ``China Alienates, Angers
Tibetan Students With Political Education,'' 29 November 12. According
to the TCHRD report, in addition to remarks on language policy, the
official booklet characterized Tibetan self-immolators as
``terrorists'' and the Dalai Lama as ``a political itinerant.''
\21\CECC, 2012 Annual Report, 10 October 12, 157-160.
\22\See, e.g., International Campaign for Tibet, ``Second Tibetan
Dies in Less Than a Week as Self-Immolations Continue in Tibet,'' 5
October 12 (provides the name ``Yangdang''); ``One More Immolation in
Tibet, Number Escalates to 52,'' Tibet Express, 29 September 12
(provides the name ``Yongdrung''); ``Plea To Stop Burnings Ignored,''
Radio Free Asia, 29 September 12.
\23\See, e.g., ``Tibetan Man Self-Immolates in Nagchu,'' Voice of
America, 4 October 12; ``India-Educated Tibetan Dies in Self-Immolation
Protest,'' Tibet Express, 4 October 12; International Campaign for
Tibet, ``Second Tibetan Dies in Less Than a Week as Self-Immolations
Continue in Tibet,'' 5 October 12.
\24\See, e.g., ``Third Tibet Self-Immolation in One Week,'' Voice
of America, 6 October 12 (provides the name ``Sangay Gyatso''); ``Third
Burning Protest in a Week,'' Radio Free Asia, 6 October 12; ``Breaking:
Tibet Continues To Burn, Second Self-Immolation in Three Days,''
Phayul, 6 October 12.
\25\See, e.g., International Campaign for Tibet, ``Grandfather of
Tibetan Reincarnate Lama Dies After Self-Immolation Today,'' 13 October
12; ``Breaking: Tibet Continues To Burn With Another Self-Immolation,''
Phayul, 13 October 12; ``Tibetan Man Dies After Self-Immolation in
Protest Against China,'' Tibet Post International, 13 October 12.
\26\See, e.g., ``Burning Tibetan Charges at Police,'' Radio Free
Asia, 20 October 12; Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy,
```These Chinese Are Not Letting Us Live in Peace. It's Better To Die,
Better To Die,''' 29 October 12.
\27\See, e.g., International Campaign for Tibet, ``Self-Immolation
at Tibet's Labrang Monastery,'' 22 October 12; ``Retired Farmer Dies
After Burning Himself in Labrang,'' Voice of America, 22 October 12;
Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, ``Elderly Tibetan Nomad
Burns Himself Alive in Protest,'' 23 October 12.
\28\See, e.g., ``Tibetan Villager Self-Immolates in NW China,''
Xinhua, 23 October 12 (reprinted in China Daily); International
Campaign for Tibet, ``Tibetan Farmer Self-Immolates in Labrang,'' 23
October 12; ``Man Burns Near Police Station,'' Radio Free Asia, 23
October 12.
\29\See, e.g., International Campaign for Tibet, ``Two Self-
Immolations in Nagchu,'' 31 October 12; ``Cousins in Burning Protest,''
Radio Free Asia, 27 October 12.
\30\See, e.g., Free Tibet, ``Fourth Tibetan This Week Sets Himself
on Fire,'' 26 October 12; ``Fourth Burning in a Week,'' Radio Free
Asia, 26 October 12.
\31\See, e.g., ``Thousands Attend Tibetan Self-Immolator's
Funeral,'' Phayul, 1 November 12 (provides the name ``Thubwang Kyab'');
International Campaign for Tibet, ``Second Tibetan Self-Immolates Today
in Sangchu,'' 26 October 12 (provides the name ``Tsewang Kyab''); ``2nd
Self-Immolation From Sangchu Country Today,'' Voice of America, 26
October 12 (provides the name ``Tsepak Kyab'').
\32\See, e.g., ``Tibetan Artist Sets Himself on Fire in Tibet,''
Voice of America, 4 November 12; ``Mass Protest After Fatal Burning,''
Radio Free Asia, 4 November 12; International Campaign for Tibet,
``Tibetan Farmer Self-Immolates in Rebkong,'' 4 November 12.
\33\See, e.g., Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy,
``Three Teenage Monks Burn Themselves Alive in Ngaba,'' 8 November 12;
``Five Tibetans Self-Immolate,'' Radio Free Asia, 7 November 12;
``Breaking: Three Teenagers in Triple Self-Immolation Protest in
Tibet,'' Phayul, 7 November 12.
\34\See, e.g., International Campaign for Tibet, ``Tibetan Self-
Immolations Escalate in Number on Eve of China's Party Congress;
Tibetans Gather En Masse in Rebkong,'' 8 November 12; ``Five Tibetans
Self-Immolate,'' Radio Free Asia, 7 November 12; ``Breaking: Tibet
Burns on Eve of Crucial China Meet,'' Phayul, 7 November 12.
\35\See, e.g., ``Five Tibetans Self-Immolate,'' Radio Free Asia, 7
November 12 (does not provide a name for the self-immolator); Tibetan
Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, ``Tibetan Dies of Untreated
Burns in Police Custody in Nagchu,'' 28 November 12; ``Kunchok Kyab
Passes Away, Self-Immolation Death Toll Reaches 76,'' Phayul, 3
December 12.
\36\See, e.g., ``6 Tibetans Self-Immolate in Two Days,'' Voice of
America, 8 November 12; ``Troop Buildup After New Burning,'' Radio Free
Asia, 8 November 12; ``Breaking: Another Self-Immolation Today, Six
Tibetans Burn in Two Days,'' Phayul, 8 November 12.
\37\See, e.g., ``Tibetan Villager Dies in Self-Immolation in NW
China,'' Xinhua, 10 November 12, reprinted in China Internet
Information Center, 11 November 12; ``Tibetan Burnings Rise to 70,''
Radio Free Asia, 10 November 12; International Campaign for Tibet,
``Death of Popular, Educated Young Tibetan After Self-Immolation
Confirmed by Chinese Media,'' 13 November 12.
\38\See, e.g., ``Two Tibetan Self-Immolaters Left Letters Behind,''
Voice of America, 20 November 12 (provides the name ``Nyingkar
Tashi''); ``More Tibetan Burning Protests,'' Radio Free Asia, 12
November 12 (provides the name ``Nyingkar Tashi''); International
Campaign for Tibet, ``Thousands of Tibetans Mobilize in Reaction to
Self-Immolations Despite Security Build Up,'' 14 November 12 (provides
the name ``Nyangkar Tashi'').
\39\See, e.g., ``More Tibetan Burning Protests,'' Radio Free Asia,
12 November 12; ``Two Tibetans Die After Self-Immolation in Rebkong,''
Voice of America, 12 November 12; International Campaign for Tibet,
``Thousands of Tibetans Mobilize in Reaction to Self-Immolations
Despite Security Build Up,'' 14 November 12 (provides the name
``Nyangchag Bum'').
\40\See, e.g., ``Self-Immolations Continue in Rebkong, Two Die in
Protest,'' Voice of America, 15 November 12 (provides the name
``Dangzin Dolma''); ``Two More Burn in Rebgong,'' Radio Free Asia, 15
November 12; ``Breaking: Tibetan Woman Self-Immolates, Two Fiery Deaths
in a Day,'' Phayul, 15 November 12 (provides the name ``Tangzin
Dolma'').
\41\See, e.g., ``Self-Immolations Continue in Rebkong, Two Die in
Protest,'' Voice of America, 15 November 12 (provides the name ``Kabum
Gyal''); ``Breaking: Young Tibetan Burns Self to Death,'' Phayul, 15
November 12; ``Two More Burn in Rebgong,'' Radio Free Asia, 15 November
12.
\42\See, e.g., ``Two Tibetan Self-Immolaters Left Letters Behind,''
Voice of America, 20 November 12 (describes letter left behind);
Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, ``Tibetan Woman Dies of
Burning Protest in Rebkong,'' 17 November 12; International Campaign
for Tibet, ``Tibetan Self-Immolation in Rebkong,'' 17 November 12.
\43\See, e.g., ``Another Tibetan Self-Immolates in Rebkong,'' Voice
of America, 17 November 12; International Campaign for Tibet, ``Young
Tibetan Father Self-Immolates in Tsekhog; Officials Warn Tibetans Not
To Gather at Cremations,'' 19 November 12; ``Breaking: Tibet Continues
To Burn, Man Sets Self on Fire,'' Phayul, 18 November 12.
\44\See, e.g., ``Tibetan Self-Immolations Continue, 25-Year-Old
Dies in Protest,'' Voice of America, 19 November 12; ``Third Burning in
Three Days,'' Radio Free Asia, 19 November 12; ``Breaking: Tibet
Continues To Burn, 15th Self-Immolation in November,'' Phayul, 20
November 12.
\45\See, e.g., Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy,
``Tibetan Man Dies of Burning Protest at a Gold Mining Site,'' 21
November 12; ``Tibetan Man Self-Immolates in Amchok, Amdo,'' Voice of
America, 20 November 12; ``Breaking: Another Tibetan Burns Self to
Death, Toll Reaches 78,'' Phayul, 20 November 12.
\46\See, e.g., ``A 18-Year-Old Tibetan Self-Immolates in Rebkong,
Amdo,'' Voice of America, 22 November 12; International Campaign for
Tibet, ``Three Self-Immolations in Two Days as Total in Tibet Reaches
81,'' 24 November 12; Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy,
``Tibetan Burnings Continue as China Enforces Ban on Self-Immolation,''
27 November 12 (provides the name ``Lubum Tsering'' and age as 19).
\47\See, e.g., International Campaign for Tibet, ``Three Self-
Immolations in Two Days as Total in Tibet Reaches 81,'' 24 November 12
(self-immolated at night); ``Another Tibetan Self-Immolates on Same
Day,'' Voice of America, 22 November 12; ``Self-Immolation Toll Hits
80,'' Radio Free Asia, 23 November 12.
\48\See, e.g., International Campaign for Tibet, ``Three Self-
Immolations in Two Days as Total in Tibet Reaches 81,'' 24 November 12;
``Breaking: Another Tibetan Self-Immolates, Seven Deaths in Seven
Days,'' Phayul, 24 November 12; ``Tibetan Burns, Hails Dalai Lama,''
Radio Free Asia, 24 November 12.
\49\See, e.g., ``17-Year-Old Self-Immolator's Last Note Calls for
the Dalai Lama's Return and Tibet's Independence,'' Phayul, 28 November
12 (provides the name ``Sangay Dolma''); ``Three Self-Immolations in
Two Days, Total Reaches 84,'' Voice of America, 26 November 12;
``Breaking: Tibetan Nun Passes Away in Fiery Protest, Toll Jumps to
83,'' Phayul, 26 November 12.
\50\See, e.g., ``Three Self-Immolations in Two Days, Total Reaches
84,'' Voice of America, 26 November 12; ``Breaking: Tibetan Student
Sets Self on Fire, Calls for Dalai Lama's Return,'' Phayul, 26 November
12; International Campaign for Tibet, ``Self-Immolations by Tibetans,''
last visited 1 May 13.
\51\See, e.g., ``Three Self-Immolations in Two Days, Total Reaches
84,'' Voice of America, 26 November 12; ``Breaking: 18-Year-Old Sets
Self on Fire, Third Self-Immolation in Two Days,'' Phayul, 26 November
12; ``Four Tibetans Self-Immolate,'' Radio Free Asia, 26 November 12.
\52\See, e.g., ``Father of Three Dies After Self-Immolation,''
Voice of America, 26 November 12; ``Breaking: Father of Three Burns
Self to Death, Third Self-Immolation in a Day Takes Toll to 85,''
Phayul, 26 November 12; ``Four Tibetans Self-Immolate,'' Radio Free
Asia, 26 November 12.
\53\See, e.g., ```May the Sun of Happiness Shine on Tibet,' a Self-
Immolator's Last Words,'' Phayul, 29 November 12 (letter reportedly
sent to India); ``Breaking: Tibet Continues To Burn, Tibetan Man Set
Self on Fire,'' Phayul, 27 November 12; ``Tibetan Student Protesters
Held,'' Radio Free Asia, 27 November 12.
\54\See, e.g., ``Tibetan Teenager Burns Himself to Death,'' Voice
of America, 28 November 12 (provides the name ``Sangay Tashi'');
``Breaking: Teenaged Tibetan Sets Self on Fire, Sixth Self-Immolation
in Last Three Days,'' Phayul, 28 November 12; ``Tibetan Student
Protests Spread,'' Radio Free Asia, 28 November 12.
\55\See, e.g., ``Two Tibetans Self-Immolate, Total Reaches 89,''
Voice of America, 29 November 12 (provides the name ``Bendey Khar'');
``Breaking: Young Tibetan Burns Self to Death, Mass Prayer Service for
Self-Immolators in Eastern Tibet,'' Phayul, 29 November 12; ``Two More
Self-Immolations,'' Radio Free Asia, 29 November 12.
\56\See, e.g., ``Breaking: Tibetan Man Burns Self to Death, Toll
Climbs to 89,'' Phayul, 29 November 12; ``Two Tibetans Self-Immolate,
Total Reaches 89,'' Voice of America, 29 November 12; ``Two More Self-
Immolations,'' Radio Free Asia, 29 November 12 (provides the name
``Tsering Tashi'').
\57\See, e.g., ``Kunchok Kyab Passes Away, Self-Immolation Death
Toll Reaches 76,'' Phayul, 3 December 12; ``Breaking: Tibet Self-
Immolation Toll Reaches 90, Fears Over Major Protests in Barkham,''
Phayul, 30 November 12; ``Self-Immolations Hit 90 Mark,'' Radio Free
Asia, 30 November 12.
\58\See, e.g., ``Tibetan Self-Immolator May Lose Both Legs, Battles
for Life,'' Phayul, 27 December 12; ``17-Year-Old Tibetan Self-
Immolates in Bora,'' Voice of America, 2 December 12 (provides the name
``Songdhi Kyab''); Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy,
``Tibetan Man Hospitalised After Latest Protest Self-Immolation,'' 3
December 12.
\59\See, e.g., ``Tibetan Self-Immolates in Golok,'' Voice of
America, 3 December 12; ``Self-Immolator Leaves Message of `Unity and
Solidarity' Among Tibetans,'' Phayul, 5 December 12; International
Campaign for Tibet, ``Self-Immolations by Tibetans,'' last visited 1
May 13 (provides name ``Lobsang Geleg'').
\60\See, e.g., ``Breaking: Burning Tibetan Calls for Independence,
Two Self-Immolations in a Day,'' Phayul, 8 December 12; International
Campaign for Tibet, ``Three Tibetans Self-Immolate in Two Days During
Important Buddhist Anniversary: Images of Troops in Lhasa as Tibetans
Pray,'' 10 December 12; ``Two Young Tibetans Burn,'' Radio Free Asia, 8
December 12.
\61\See, e.g., ``Two Young Tibetans Burn,'' Radio Free Asia, 8
December 12; Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, ``Tibetan
Religious Festival Marked by Two Self-Immolation Death,'' 9 December 12
(Konchog Phelgye); International Campaign for Tibet, ``Three Tibetans
Self-Immolate in Two Days During Important Buddhist Anniversary: Images
of Troops in Lhasa as Tibetans Pray,'' 10 December 12.
\62\See, e.g., ``Tibetan Girl Self-Immolates,'' Radio Free Asia, 10
December 12 (Rinchen Kyi); ``A 17-Year-Old Tibetan Girl Dies After
Self-Immolation in Amdo Tsekock,'' Voice of America, 9 December 12;
``Breaking: Tibetan Schoolgirl Burns Self to Death, Says, `Don't Want
Chinese Authorities To Take Away My Dead Body,''' Phayul, 9 December 12
(``Bhenchen Kyi'').
\63\See, e.g., International Campaign for Tibet, ``Authorities Bar
Customary Religious Rituals To Enforce Quick Cremation of Tibetan Who
Self-Immolated in Amchok,'' 15 January 13; ``Chinese Security Official
Force Hasty Cremation of Tibetan Self-Immolator,'' Voice of America, 13
January 13; ``Breaking: Tibetan Youth Sets Self on Fire, Toll Rises to
96 in Tibet,'' Phayul, 12 January 13.
\64\See, e.g., International Campaign for Tibet, ``Chinese State
Media Blame `Dalai Clique' and Announce Detentions in Aggressive
Security Drive Against Tibetan Self-Immolations,'' 18 January 13;
Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, ``Chinese Police
Confiscate Body of Second Tibetan Self-Immolator,'' 21 January 13;
``Father of Two Self Immolates in Ngaba,'' Voice of America, 18 January
13.
\65\See, e.g., Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy,
``China Intensifies Ban on Religious Gatherings After Third Self-
Immolation,'' 25 January 13; ``Tibetan Man Self-Immolates in Bora,''
Voice of America, 22 January 13; ``Breaking: Tibet Continues To Burn,
98th Self-Immolation in Tibet,'' Phayul, 22 January 13.
\66\International Campaign for Tibet, ``Tibetan Sets Fire to
Himself in Kathmandu; in Tibet, 100th Self-Immolation,'' 13 February
13; Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, ``Kirti Monastery
Monk Dies of Self-Immolation Protest in Ngaba,'' 14 February 13;
``Breaking: Monk in Ngaba Becomes 100th To Self-Immolate Under China's
Rule,'' Phayul, 13 February 13.
\67\See, e.g., International Campaign for Tibet, ``Further Self-
Immolation in Tibet Despite Harsh Legal Measures To Deter Protests;
Tibetan Who Set Fire to Himself in Nepal Dies,'' 14 February 13;
``Burnings Rage On Despite Controls,'' Radio Free Asia, 14 February 13.
\68\See, e.g., International Campaign for Tibet, ``Tibetan Farmer
From Nomadic Area Sets Fire to Himself in Labrang,'' 17 February 13;
Free Tibet, ``Cross-Legged in Flames: Another Protest in Tibet,'' 17
February 12; ``New Burning Protest in Tibet,'' Phayul, 18 February 13.
\69\See, e.g., International Campaign for Tibet, ``Two Tibetan
Teenagers Set Themselves on Fire in Ngaba,'' 20 February 13; Tibetan
Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, ``Two Teenage Tibetans Die of
Self-Immolation Protest,'' 20 February 13.
\70\See, e.g., ```Without Independence Tibet Will Be Annihilated,'
a Self-Immolator's Last Words,'' Phayul, 9 May 13; ``Tibetan Self-
Immolator Phagmo Dhondup Dies,'' Phayul, 18 April 13; ``A Tibetan Man
Self-Immolates in Palung, Amdo Tsoshar (Qinghai),'' Voice of America,
24 February 13; International Campaign for Tibet, ``Two Tibetans Self-
Immolate at Monasteries During Prayer Ceremonies in Amdo,'' 25 February
13.
\71\See, e.g., International Campaign for Tibet, ``Two Tibetans
Self-Immolate at Monasteries During Prayer Ceremonies in Amdo,'' 25
February 13; ``Tibetan Man Self-Immolates in Luchu, in Gansu
Province,'' Voice of America, 25 February 13; ``Breaking: Two Fiery
Protests in as Many Days, Tibetan Self-Immolator Passes Away,'' Phayul,
25 February 13.
\72\See, e.g., ``Tibetan Self-Immolates in Ngaba County,'' Radio
Free Asia, 26 February 13; ``Tibetan Monk Sets Himself on Fire, 107th
Self-Immolation,'' Voice of America, 26 February 13; International
Campaign for Tibet, ``Self-Immolations by Tibetans,'' last visited 1
May 13.
\73\See, e.g., Yeshe Choesang, ``Two Self-Immolation Protests in
Tibet, Pushed the Toll to 109,'' Tibet Post International, 17 March 13
(``burned herself . . . around 11.00 pm in the night''; ``staged the
self-immolation protest at [a] Chinese official building'');
International Campaign for Tibet, ``Two Self-Immolations in Tibet:
Kirti Monk on Crackdown Anniversary and Woman in Dzoge,'' 18 March 13
(age 31; ``set fire to herself at her home and ran into the street'');
``Chinese Police Deny Self-Immolation of Tibetan Woman,'' Voice of
America, 19 March 13 (police say ``she was murdered by her husband who
later set the body on fire''); ``Police Dismiss Reports of Tibetan
Woman's Self-Immolation,'' Global Times, 19 March 13 (age 28;
``strangled to death by her husband, who later burned her body'');
``Prefecture, County Public Security Authorities Successfully Solve
Case of Intentional Homicide, Burning Body,'' Aba Daily, 19 March 13
(translated in Open Source Center, 21 March 13) (``criminal suspect . .
. got into an intense fight with his wife''; ``strangled the neck of
[his wife] with his hands''; ``brought the body of [his wife] to the
west wall of [a nearby building]''; ``used gasoline to burn the
body'').
\74\See, e.g., ``Tibetan Monk Dies In Self-Immolation on Sensitive
Date for Amdo Ngaba,'' Voice of America, 16 March 13; ``Breaking: Kirti
Monk Marks March 16 With Self-Immolation, Toll Rises to 108,'' Phayul,
16 March 13; Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, ``Monk Dies
of Self-Immolation on Protest Anniversary,'' 18 March 13; International
Campaign for Tibet, ``Two Self-Immolations in Tibet: Kirti Monk on
Crackdown Anniversary and Woman in Dzoge,'' 18 March 13.
\75\See, e.g., ``Tibetan Mother of Four Dies in Self-Immolation
Protest,'' Voice of America, 24 March 13; ``Breaking: 110th Tibetan
Self-Immolation,'' Phayul, 24 March 13; International Campaign for
Tibet, ``Self-Immolations of a Tibetan Forest Guard and Mother of Four
in Eastern Tibet,'' 26 March 13.
\76\See, e.g., ``Tibetan Man Self-Immolates in Labrang Area
Village,'' Voice of America, 25 March 13; ``Breaking: Second Self-
Immolation in 24 Hours, Toll Rises to 111 (Updated),'' Phayul, 25 March
13; International Campaign for Tibet, ``Self-Immolations of a Tibetan
Forest Guard and Mother of Four in Eastern Tibet,'' 26 March 13.
\77\See, e.g., ``Breaking: A Monk Sets Self Ablaze in Tibet,''
Phayul, 29 March 13; ``A Buddhist Monk Dies in Latest Self-Immolation
Protest in Tibet,'' Tibet Post International, 29 March 13; Tibetan
Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, ``Burning Protests Continue
Against Chinese Repression in Tibet,'' 30 March 13.
\78\See, e.g., ``Tibetan Mother Self-Immolates in Zamthang,'' Voice
of America, 16 April 13; ``Thousands Gather After Young Tibetan Mother
Self-Immolates,'' Radio Free Asia, 16 April 13; Tibetan Centre for
Human Rights and Democracy, ``Tibetan Mother Dies of Self-Immolation,
Denied Proper Cremation by Chinese Authorities,'' 17 April 13.
\79\See, e.g., ``Two Tibetan Monks Set Themselves on Fire,'' Voice
of America, 24 April 13; ``Three Tibetans Die in Burning Protests,''
Radio Free Asia, 24 April 13; Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and
Democracy, ``Two Tibetan Monks Die of Self-Immolation Protest,'' 25
April 13.
\80\See, e.g., ``New Tibetan Self-Immolation After One-Month
Hiatus,'' Radio Free Asia, 29 May 13; ``Tibetan Man Self-Immolates in
Protest Against China,'' Voice of America, 29 May 13; International
Campaign for Tibet, ``Tibetan Nomad Self-Immolates and Dies in Yushu,''
29 May 13.
\81\See, e.g., ``Latest Tibetan Nun Self-Immolator's Identity
Confirmed,'' Tibet Express, 14 June 13; ``New Information on June 11
Self-Immolation in Kham Tawo,'' Voice of America, 14 June 13;
``Clampdown Imposed as Nun Secretly Cremated After Burning Protest,''
Radio Free Asia, 17 June 13.
\82\See, e.g., ``Monk, 17, Sets Himself on Fire in Sichuan,''
Global Times, 30 July 13; International Campaign for Tibet, ``Teenage
Tibetan Monk Dies After Self-Immolation in Dzoege,'' 22 July 13;
Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, ``Teenage Monk Dies of
Burning Protest; Fate of Body Unknown,'' 22 July 13.
\83\CECC, 2012 Annual Report, 10 October 12, 157-60.
\84\For information on the shifting profile of Tibetan self-
immolations, see CECC, ``Special Report: Tibetan Self-Immolation--
Rising Frequency, Wider Spread, Greater Diversity,'' 22 August 12.
\85\The Commission has posted on its Web site (www.cecc.gov) a
series of summaries of information on Tibetan self-immolations. The
summaries include a breakdown by gender, location, and occupation type.
\86\See the table in this section titled ``Tibetan Self-Immolation
Believed To Focus On Political or Religious Issues (September 2012-July
2013).'' The 38 self-immolations numbered 52-89 took place in October-
November 2012.
\87\``Those Who Incite Self-Immolations Must Be Severely Punished
Under the Law'' [Shandong zifen zhe bijiang shoudao falu yancheng],
Gansu Daily, 3 December 12 (translated in Dui Hua Human Rights Journal,
5 December 12); Dui Hua Foundation, ``China Outlines Criminal
Punishments for Tibetan Self-Immolations,'' Dui Hua Human Rights
Journal, 5 December 12; ``Official Opinion Urges Criminal Prosecution
of Persons Linked to Self-Immolations,'' Congressional-Executive
Commission on China, 18 January 13.
\88\``Those Who Incite Self-Immolations Must Be Severely Punished
Under the Law'' [Shandong zifen zhe bijiang shoudao falu yancheng],
Gansu Daily, 3 December 12 (translated in Dui Hua Human Rights Journal,
5 December 12); Dui Hua Foundation, ``China Outlines Criminal
Punishments for Tibetan Self-Immolations,'' Dui Hua Human Rights
Journal, 5 December 12; ``Official Opinion Urges Criminal Prosecution
of Persons Linked to Self-Immolations,'' Congressional-Executive
Commission on China, 18 January 13. According to the Dui Hua
translation, the specific language in the Opinion warns that, ``Anyone
who summons a group to mourn or collect funds for a self-immolator
shall be prevented from doing so in accordance with the law.'' Based on
Commission monitoring, since self-immolators generally are deceased,
the collected donations are for self-immolators' survivors. For an
example of such a case, see the Commission's Political Prisoner
Database record 2013-00076 on Gyadehor. For more information on the
case, see Cao Kai and Wang Daqian, ``Sentence Announced at First Trial
of Gyadehor of Huangnan in Qinghai Over Inciting Secession'' [Qinghai
huangnan jiadehe shandong fenlie guojia an--shen xuanpan], Qinghai
Daily, 8 February 13 (translated in Open Source Center, 11 February
13).
\89\``Zhu Weiqun Talks About Dalai and Other Issues With EU
Officials, Scholars, and Reporters'' [Zhu weiqun yu oumeng guanyuan,
xuezhe, jizhe tan dalai deng wenti], China Tibet Online, 29 December 11
(translated in Open Source Center, 12 January 12). According to the
report, then United Front Work Department Executive Deputy Head Zhu
Weiqun told a gathering in Brussels that included European Union
officials, ``The self-immolation incidents occurred at four
monasteries; Tibet and other Tibetan-inhabited areas have a total of
3,542 temples and monasteries, with 140,000 clergy; therefore the Dalai
clique's claim that the entire Tibetan-inhabited areas `were on fire'
was entirely groundless . . . .''
\90\National Bureau of Statistics, Department of Population and
Employment Statistics, Population Census Office Under the State
Council, Tabulation on the 2010 Population Census of the People's
Republic of China, 23 April 13, Table 2-1, ``Population by Age, Sex,
and Nationality.'' The table listed the total Tibetan population as
6,282,187.
\91\``Gansu's Gannan Official: 18 Self-Immolation Cases Cracked''
[Gansu gannan guanyuan: pohuo 18 qi zifen anjian], China News Service,
23 January 13 (translated in Open Source Center, 26 January 13) (``Of .
. . 21 cases, 18 have been cracked, five cases . . . transferred to the
court . . ., 16 people . . . arrested.''); ``70 Arrested in Qinghai
Over Self-Immolations,'' Xinhua, 8 February 13, reprinted in China
Daily (``Seventy suspects . . . arrested in Huangnan . . . in
connection with . . . self-immolations . . . since November).
\92\``Tibetan Villager Self-Immolates in NW China,'' Xinhua,
reprinted in China Daily, 23 October 12; ``China Sentences Another 6
Tibetans Over Self-Immolation,'' Xinhua, 31 January 13. For more
information, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database records
2013-00068 on Pema Dondrub, 2013-00069 on Kalsang Gyatso, 2013-00070 on
Pema Tso, 2013-00071 on Lhamo Dondrub, 2013-00072 on Digkar Gyal, and
2013-00073 on Yangmo Kyi. See also ``Official Opinion Urges Criminal
Prosecution of Persons Linked to Self-Immolations,'' Congressional-
Executive Commission on China, 18 January 13.
\93\``China Sentences Another 6 Tibetans Over Self-Immolation,''
Xinhua, 31 January 13; International Campaign for Tibet, ``Six Tibetans
in Gansu Sentenced After Protecting Body of Self-Immolator in
Aggressive Drive To Criminalize Self-Immolations,'' 4 February 13. For
more information, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database
records 2013-00068 on Pema Dondrub, 2013-00069 on Kalsang Gyatso, 2013-
00070 on Pema Tso, 2013-00071 on Lhamo Dondrub, 2013-00072 on Digkar
Gyal, and 2013-00073 on Yangmo Kyi. See also ``Official Opinion Urges
Criminal Prosecution of Persons Linked to Self-Immolations,''
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 18 January 13.
\94\The case is unusual because the person convicted of intentional
homicide, Phagpa, allegedly discussed the subject of self-immolation
twice (June and July 2012) with a person who, on November 19, 2012,
decided not to self-immolate. ``First Instance Verdict in Qinghai
Combined Case of Intentional Homicide and Incitement to Separatism''
[Qinghai yiqi guyi sharen, shandong fenlie guojia an yishen xuanpan],
Xinhua, 8 February 13; Wang Huazhong, ``Man Gets 13 Years Over Inciting
Self-Immolation,'' China Daily, 8 February 13; Cao Kai and Wang Daqian,
``Xinhua Insight: Tibetan Self-Immolation Instigator Contrite,''
Xinhua, 8 February 13; ``China Focus: Police Reveal Fraud Behind Self-
Immolations in NW China,'' Xinhua, 7 February 13; ``China Begins Self-
Immolation Trial, Makes More Arrests,'' Phayul, 29 January 13; ``China
Arrests Tibetan in New Tactic Against Self-Immolation,'' Reuters, 24
January 13, reprinted in Voice of America. For more information, see
the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2013-00064 on
Phagpa. See also ``Official Opinion Urges Criminal Prosecution of
Persons Linked to Self-Immolations,'' Congressional-Executive
Commission on China, 18 January 13.
\95\``Nine Tibetans Go on Trial Over Burning Protests,'' Radio Free
Asia, 28 February 13.
\96\``China Sentences Three Tibetans for Inciting Self-
Immolations,'' Tibet Express, 1 March 13; ``Three Tibetans Sentenced to
Long Jail Terms Over Self-Immolation,'' Tibet Post International, 2
March 13; ``China Sentences Three Tibetans Up to 15 Years for Self-
Immolation `Crimes,''' Phayul, 2 March 13. For more information, see
the Commission's Political Prisoner Database records 2013-00098 on
Lhamo Dorje, 2013-00099 on Kalsang Sonam, and 2013-00100 on Tsezung
Kyab. See also ``Official Opinion Urges Criminal Prosecution of Persons
Linked to Self-Immolations,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on
China, 18 January 13.
\97\Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, ``Three Tibetans
Sentenced to Prison for `Inciting Separatism,''' 20 March 13.
\98\``Haidong Prefecture Intermediate People's Court Issues
Sentences in First-Instance Trial for Inciting Splittism'' [Haidong
diqu zhongji renmin fayuan yishen xuanpan yiqi shandong fenlie guojia
an], People's Daily, 18 March 13; Dui Hua Foundation, ``Tibetans
Imprisoned for Text, Images as Immolations Continue,'' Dui Hua Human
Rights Journal, 21 March 13; Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and
Democracy, ``Three Tibetans Sentenced to Prison for `Inciting
Separatism,''' 20 March 13. For more information, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database records 2013-00119 on Jigme Thabkhe, 2013-
00121 on Kalsang Dondrub, and 2013-00122 on Lobsang. See also
``Official Opinion Urges Criminal Prosecution of Persons Linked to
Self-Immolations,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 18
January 13.
\99\Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, ``Five monks
From Bora Monastery `Missing' After Detention,'' 18 December 12;
``Monks' Whereabouts Unknown,'' Radio Free Asia, 18 December 12. For
more information, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database
records 2013-00012 on Gedun Gyatso, 2013-00013 on Lobsang Phagpa, 2013-
00015 on Jamyang Zoepa, 2013-00016 on Jamyang Lodroe, and 2013-00017 on
Jamyang Gyatso. See also ``Official Opinion Urges Criminal Prosecution
of Persons Linked to Self-Immolations,'' Congressional-Executive
Commission on China, 18 January 13.
\100\``More Tibetans Detained,'' Radio Free Asia, 12 December 12;
``China Arrests Relatives, Friends of Tibetan Self-Immolators,''
Phayul, 14 December 12. For more information, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database records 2013-00030 on Tsondru, 2013-00031
on Chagthab, 2013-00032 on Shawo, 2013-00033 on Choedron, and 2013-
00034 on Rigshe. See also ``Official Opinion Urges Criminal Prosecution
of Persons Linked to Self-Immolations,'' Congressional-Executive
Commission on China, 18 January 13.
\101\``Chinese Authorities Arrest Eight Tibetans for Sharing
Information of Self-Immolation Protest,'' Phayul, 14 January 13. For
more information, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database
records 2013-00056 on Nyima, 2013-00057 on Lhamo Dondrub, 2013-00058 on
Dorje Dondrub, 2013-00059 on Kalsang Kyab, 2013-00060 on Kalsang Sonam,
2013-00061 on Kalsang Namdren, and 2013-00062 on Sonam Kyi. See also
``Official Opinion Urges Criminal Prosecution of Persons Linked to
Self-Immolations,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 18
January 13.
\102\``Huangnan Prefecture Intermediate People's Court Pronounced
Sentences in Series of Inciting Secession Cases'' [Huangnan zhou
zhongji renmin fayuan xuanpan xilie shandong fenlie guojia an], Qinghai
Daily, 12 April 13; Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy,
``China Confirms Sentencing Four Tibetans for `Inciting Separatism,'''
15 April 13. For more information, see the Commission's Political
Prisoner Database records 2013-00139 on Choepa Gyal, 2013-00141 on
Namkha Jam, 2013-00142 on Chagthar, and 2013-00143 on Gonpo. See also
``Official Opinion Urges Criminal Prosecution of Persons Linked to
Self-Immolations,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 18
January 13.
\103\``Gansu Police Crack Homicide Case of Self-Immolation
Organized and Masterminded by Members of the `Tibetan Youth Congress'
of the Dalai Clique'' [Gansu jingfang zhenpo dalai jituan ``zangqing
hui'' chengyuan zuzhi cehua zifen sharen'an], Xinhua, 15 January 13
(translated in Open Source Center, 15 January 13; reprinted in Chinese
on China News Service); ``1st LD Writethru--China Exclusive: Police
Apprehend 7 Suspected of Inciting Self-Immolation,'' Xinhua, 15 January
13, reprinted in China Internet Information Center; ``Seven Held After
Man Set Himself Ablaze,'' Xinhua, 16 January 13, reprinted in China
Daily. For more information, see the Commission's Political Prisoner
Database records 2012-00301 on Kalsang Gyatso, 2012-00303 on Tashi
Gyatso, and 2013-00075 on Gonpo Gyal. See also ``Official Opinion Urges
Criminal Prosecution of Persons Linked to Self-Immolations,''
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 18 January 13.
\104\Ibid.
\105\In addition to the six named Tibetans who officials retained
in detention, the reports mentioned that three of Konchog Sonam's
relatives were detained briefly then released, and two unidentified
persons had been detained. ``Monk, 17, Sets Himself on Fire in
Sichuan,'' Global Times, 30 July 13 (reports two unnamed monks detained
and under police investigation); ``Five Tibetans Detained in Connection
With Self-Immolation,'' Radio Free Asia, 26 July 13 (names five persons
detained after the self-immolation; three were monks); ``Three Tibetan
Monks Sentenced to Two and Half Years' Prison in Chamdo, One Arrested
in Zoege,'' Phayul, 2 August 13 (names one additional monk detained);
``8 Tibetans Disappeared in Connection With Latest Tibetan Self-
Immolation,'' Tibet Express, 29 July 13 (names eight detained persons
but does not state that three of them were detained prior to the self-
immolation). For more information on the detention of three monks that
reportedly may have ``triggered'' monk Konchog Sonam's self-immolation,
see ``Arbitrary Detention of Tibetans Triggered Latest Tibetan Self-
Immolation,'' Tibet Express, 23 July 13.
\106\As of September 1, 2013, the Commission's Political Prisoner
Database (PPD) contained the following 112 records of detention or
imprisonment linked to self-immolation or the issue of self-immolation
since August 2012 (arranged in descending chronological order: records
2013-00142 on Chagthar, 2013-00139 on Choepa Gyal, 2013-00143 on Gonpo,
2013-00141 on Namkha Jam, 2013-00268 on Palden Yignyen, 2013-00264 on
Sherab, 2013-00267 on Yonten Gyatso, 2013-00266 on Sanggye Palden,
2013-00265 on Palden Gyatso, 2013-00263 on Tenzin Gyatso, 2013-00129 on
Drolma Kyab, 2013-00126 on Tritsan, 2013-00180 on Yijia, 2013-00181 on
Ruoba, 2013-00077 on Yarphel, 2013-00163 on Samten, 2013-00164 on Tashi
Gyatso, 2013-00165 on Tenphel Gyalpo, 2013-00166 on Tensang, 2013-00162
on Tsering Tagchen, 2013-00178 on Jigme, 2013-00119 on Jigme Thabkhe,
2013-00121 on Kalsang Dondrub, 2013-00171 on Kalsang Dorje, 2013-00099
on Kalsang Sonam, 2013-00098 on Lhamo Dorje, 2013-00122 on Lobsang,
2013-00100 on Tsezung Kyab, 2013-00230 on Urgyen Dorje, 2013-00058 on
Dorje Dondrub, 2013-00059 on Kalsang Kyab, 2013-00061 on Kalsang
Namdren, 2013-00060 on Kalsang Sonam, 2013-00057 on Lhamo Dondrub,
2013-00056 on Nyima, 2013-00062 on Sonam Kyi, 2013-00055 on Kalsang
Samdrub, 2013-00031 on Chagthab, 2013-00033 on Choedron, 2013-00034 on
Rigshe, 2013-00032 on Shawo, 2013-00030 on Tsondru, 2013-00023 on Tashi
Sonam, 2012-00344 on Choekyab, 2013-00012 on Gedun Gyatso, 2013-00017
on Jamyang Gyatso, 2013-00016 on Jamyang Lodroe, 2013-00015 on Jamyang
Zoepa, 2013-00013 on Lobsang Phagpa, 2008-00580 on Washul Dortrug,
2013-00101 on Donnu, 2013-00170 on Gobe, 2013-00076 on Gyadehor, 2013-
00064 on Phagpa, 2013-00291 on Shawo Tashi, 2013-00292 on Sobum, 2013-
00004 on Choekyong Kyab, 2013-00006 on Dola Tsering, 2013-00003 on
Jampa Tsering, 2013-00008 on Kunsang Bum, 2013-00001 on Lhaten, 2013-
00005 on Sanggye Bum, 2013-00007 on Tsering Tashi, 2013-00002 on
Wanggyal Tsering, 2013-00145 on Gedun Tsultrim, 2013-00144 on Tsondru,
2012-00346 on Konchog Sonam, 2013-00285 on Tsondru Choeden, 2013-00075
on Gonpo Gyal, 2013-00097 on Ngawang Tobden, 2012-00303 on Tashi
Gyatso, 2012-00343 on Phurbu, 2012-00341 on Thubten Nyandrag, 2012-
00342 on Tsewang, 2013-00072 on Digkar Gyal, 2013-00069 on Kalsang
Gyatso, 2013-00071 on Lhamo Dondrub, 2013-00068 on Pema Dondrub, 2013-
00070 on Pema Tso, 2013-00073 on Yangmo Kyi, 2013-00211 on Pema
Tsewang, 2012-00300 on Jigme Gyatso, 2012-00301 on Kalsang Gyatso,
2012-00302 on Konchog Gyatso, 2012-00333 on Losal, 2012-00332 on
Tobden, 2012-00331 on Tsondru, 2013-00288 on Dorje, 2013-00290 on
Sonam, 2013-00289 on Tashi Choewang, 2013-00081 on Lobsang Sanggye,
2012-00275 on Lobsang Jinpa, 2012-00277 on Ngawang Monlam, 2012-00279
on Sonam Sherab, 2012-00278 on Sonam Yignyen, 2012-00276 on Tsultrim
Kalsang, 2012-00330 on Lobsang Choephel, 2012-00349 on Lobsang Tsering,
2012-00282 on Jamyang Khyenko, 2012-00281 on Lobsang Sanggye, 2012-
00280 on Lobsang Palden, 2012-00284 on Lobsang Rabten, 2012-00266 on
Lobsang Konchog, 2012-00246 on Asong, 2012-00245 on Thubwang Tenzin,
2012-00261 on Bonkho Kyi, 2012-00262 on Chechog, 2012-00242 on Lobsang
Sengge, 2012-00244 on Namse, 2012-00243 on Yarphel, 2012-00231 on
Choephel, and 2012-00232 on Sherab.
\107\The Political Prisoner Database cases include a range of
circumstances involving official suspicion or prosecution related to
activities including: engaging in discussions that officials regard as
sympathetic toward or supportive of the act of self-immolation;
association with persons who committed self-immolation or contemplated
self-immolation; gathering at a self-immolation site; attempting to
maintain control over a self-immolator's body so that Tibetan Buddhist
monastics can conduct customary religious rites; participating in a
memorial gathering or offering condolences to a self-immolator's
survivors; seeking to intercede with authorities on behalf of someone
officials regard as associated with a self-immolator or self-
immolation; refusing to support an official account describing a self-
immolator or self-immolation; gathering information on self-
immolations; possessing information on self-immolations; providing
information on self-immolations to individuals or groups, especially
those outside of China; and composing or circulating articles, essays,
poetry, lyrics, etc., that officials regard as supportive or
sympathetic toward self-immolators or self-immolation.
\108\See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, ``China: `Benefit the Masses'
Campaign Surveilling Tibetans,'' 19 June 13. The report cites a
February 28, 2013, Tibetan-language report in China Tibet News that
quotes Hao Peng instructing People's Armed Police to ``thoroughly
ensure no shadows, no gaps, no cracks, not giving hostile forces even
the slightest opportunity'' [to endanger social stability]. ``Hao Peng
Attends Meeting Calling on the TAR People's Armed Police To Carry Out
Their Social Stability Maintenance Duties During the Two National
Meetings'' [Drag-chas nyen-rtog bod-ljongs dpung-sde rgyal-yongs skyi
tshogs-`du gnyis ring gi brtan-lhing srung-skyong las-`gan-sgrub rgyu'i
skul-slong tshogs-chen `tshogs-pa], China Tibet News, 28 February 13.
\109\For official statements on handling issues and individuals
linked to self-immolation in two Tibetan autonomous prefectures where
numerous self-immolations took place, and on rewards offered to
citizens who provided information to authorities, see, e.g., Human
Rights Watch, ``Tibetan Immolations, Security Measures Escalate,'' 29
November 12 (on Huangnan (Malho) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (TAP),
Qinghai province); International Campaign for Tibet, ``Chinese
Authorities Offer Large Rewards for Information on `Black Hand' Behind
Tibetan Self-Immolations,'' 24 October 12 (on Gannan (Kanlho) TAP,
Gansu province).
\110\See, e.g., Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy,
``Monastery Under Siege as Monks Face Expulsion While Another Detained
for Writing Book on Immolations,'' 19 March 13 (Monk Tritsun went
``missing'' after the distribution of his book on self-immolations);
``Tibetan Writer Gartse Jigme Arrested,'' Tibet Express, 10 January 13
(``in the second volume of his book [The King's Valor] he has written
on the self immolations, . . .'').
\111\``Those Who Incite Self-Immolations Must Be Severely Punished
Under the Law'' [Shandong zifen zhe bijiang shoudao falu yancheng],
Gannan Daily, 3 December 12, reprinted in Gansu Daily (translated in
Dui Hua Human Rights Journal, 5 December 12). E.g., the following
statement in the Gannan Daily article is vague, broad, and threatens
``severe punishment'': ``In particular, those black hands behind the
scenes who plan, direct, and incite others to commit self-immolation,
[have committed] serious, illegal crimes that are extremely inhuman and
they have violated human society's most basic standards of conscience
and morality. They must be subject to the law's severe punishment and
moral condemnation.'' See also Dui Hua Foundation, ``China Outlines
Criminal Punishments for Tibetan Self-Immolations,'' Dui Hua Human
Rights Journal, 5 December 12; Human Rights Watch, ``Tibetan
Immolations, Security Measures Escalate,'' 29 November 12; ``Official
Opinion Urges Criminal Prosecution of Persons Linked to Self-
Immolations,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 18 January
13.
\112\Human Rights Watch, ``China: Alarming New Surveillance,
Security in Tibet--Restrictions Tightened on Tibetans Despite Lack of
Threat,'' 20 March 13. ``676 new police-posts established throughout
Tibet in 2012 as part of the stability maintenance drive . . .
facilitate coordination of information and operations between the
security services and the semi-official grid units.'' ``[By] July 2012,
[the] 676 permanent, street-side `convenience police-posts' (Ch.: bian
minjing wu zhan) had been set up in towns across the region. These are
equipped with computers and video technology for computerized checks of
people passing through on a `case-by-case' basis. Police officers who
staff the posts are required to be on duty around-the-clock.''
\113\Ibid. ``Stability maintenance teams and the new street-side
police-posts are maintaining records of all vehicles entering the city
or area. In some areas, official media reports said, the new police-
posts are required to keep records of `those going outside the
locality' and to register each of them individually, . . .''
\114\Gillian Wong, ``Denied Passport, Tibet Poet Can't Receive US
Award,'' Associated Press, 8 March 13 (officials prevented Tibetan
writer Tsering Oezer (Woeser) from traveling to the United States to
receive an award); International Campaign for Tibet, ``ICT's Bhuchung
Tsering Highlights Chinese Misguided Policies on Tibet at Capitol Hill
Event,'' 1 February 13. ICT's then-Vice President of Special Programs
and subsequent Interim President Bhuchung Tsering said in a prepared
statement: ``Tibetans are virtually being denied new passports
currently. Tibetan applicants for passports are subjected to a new
procedure that is not implemented for Chinese. Worse still, the
authorities in the Tibet Autonomous Region have in fact been
confiscating the passports of the few fortunate Tibetans who have them,
thus denying them their right to travel abroad.''
\115\Human Rights Watch, ``China: Alarming New Surveillance,
Security in Tibet--Restrictions Tightened on Tibetans Despite Lack of
Threat,'' 20 March 13. According to the HRW report: ``The new grid
system grows out of the nationwide `social stability maintenance' (Ch.:
weiwen) policy drive, and establishes a new sub-local layer to the
administrative system in urban and rural areas across China. According
to one Chinese scholar, the grid system is designed to ensure that
``information is proactively gathered about people, events, and things
so as to build up a database of urban components and events . . .
through which relevant departments and work units can proactively
uncover problems in a timely manner.''
\116\Human Rights Watch, ``China: `Benefit the Masses' Campaign
Surveilling Tibetans,'' 19 June 13. According to the report, teams of
officials were ``categorizing Tibetans according to their religious and
political thinking, and establishing institutions to monitor their
behavior and opinions.''
\117\See, e.g., Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy,
``China Launches Crackdown on Personal Cellphones in Lhasa,'' 11 March
13. According to the TCHRD report, ``Chinese authorities in the Tibetan
capital, Lhasa, have now begun implementing a campaign to search
personal cellphones owned by Tibetans, particularly those in monastic
institutions.'' See also International Campaign for Tibet, ``Young
Tibetan Father Self-Immolates in Tsekhog; Officials Warn Tibetans Not
To Gather at Cremations,'' 19 November 12 (referring to an autonomous
Tibetan area in Qinghai province: ``a military build-up and
communications cut-off has been put in place''); Tibetan Centre for
Human Rights and Democracy, ``China Impose Near-Total Information
Blockade After Series of Burning Protests,'' 5 November 12 (``near-
total information blockade has been imposed in Kanlho . . . where seven
Tibetans burned themselves in protest in the past month'').
\118\Human Rights Watch, ``China: Tibetan Immolations, Security
Measures Escalate,'' 29 November 12; Human Rights Watch, ``China:
Alarming New Surveillance, Security in Tibet--Restrictions Tightened on
Tibetans Despite Lack of Threat,'' 20 March 13. According to the HRW
report: ``In 2012 Tibetan authorities set up a `TAR Social Stability
Maintenance Command' in Lhasa, and established `Stability Maintenance
Work Groups' at every level of the administration, responsible for
exercising control over online and phone communications.''
\119\See, e.g., ``Chinese Authorities Destroy Television Viewing
Equipments in Malho,'' Voice of America, 10 January 13; ``China
Authorities Seize Satellite Dishes in Labrang, Eastern Tibet,'' Voice
of America, 25 March 13; Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy,
``Crackdown on Satellite Dishes, Broadcast Equipment Deepens in
Tibet,'' 29 January 13. According to the TCHRD report, ``Chinese
authorities have now heightened the campaign to eradicate all avenues
of receiving Tibet-related radio and TV news available on foreign
channels by issuing a public notice, which announced monetary fines and
actions for those who fail to surrender banned satellite dishes and
other broadcast equipment by 27 January 2013.''
\120\For reports on self-immolations during the Commission's 2013
year that included a self-immolator's reference to the Dalai Lama
during the act of self-immolation (in chronological order), see, e.g.,
International Campaign for Tibet, ``Second Tibetan Dies in Less Than a
Week as Self-Immolations Continue in Tibet,'' 5 October 12 (Yungdrung
``shouted slogans calling for . . . the return of the Dalai Lama and
the Karmapa''); ``Tibetan Man Self-Immolates in Nagchu,'' Voice of
America, 4 October 12 (Gudrub ``shouted slogans calling for . . .
return of the Tibetan spiritual leader''); ``Third Tibet Self-
Immolation In One Week,'' Voice of America, 6 October 12 (Sanggye
Gyatso ``shouted for the swift return of the Dalai Lama to Tibet'');
``Breaking: Tibet Continues To Burn With Another Self-Immolation,''
Phayul, 13 October 12 (Tamdrin Dorje ``raised slogans for the return of
His Holiness the Dalai Lama''); Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and
Democracy, ```These Chinese Are Not Letting Us Live in Peace. It's
Better To Die, Better To Die,''' 29 October 12 (Lhamo Kyab ``shouted
slogans calling for . . . the `return of His Holiness the Dalai
Lama'''); ``Mass Protest After Fatal Burning,'' Radio Free Asia, 4
November 12 (Dorje Lhundrub ``called for the return of . . . the Dalai
Lama''); ``Five Tibetans Self-Immolate,'' Radio Free Asia, 7 November
12 (Dorje, Samdrub, and Dorje Kyab ``set themselves ablaze in front of
a police station in Ngaba town, calling for a free Tibet and the return
of . . . the Dalai Lama''); ``Five Tibetans Self-Immolate,'' Radio Free
Asia, 7 November 12 (Tamdrin Tso ``died shouting slogans calling for
the return of the Dalai Lama''); ``6 Tibetans Self-Immolate in Two
Days,'' Voice of America, 8 November 12 (Kalsang Jinpa ``was reported
to have raised a white banner with slogans that called for Dalai Lama's
return''); ``Tibetan Burnings Rise to 70,'' Radio Free Asia, 10
November 12 (Gonpo Tsering called for ``the return of the Dalai Lama to
Tibet''); ``Self-Immolations Continue in Rebkong, Two Die in Protest,''
Voice of America, 15 November 12 (Tenzin Drolma ``shouted slogans
calling for return of the Dalai Lama''); ``Two Tibetan Self-Immolaters
Left Letters Behind,'' Voice of America, 20 November 12 (Chagmo Kyi's
letter ``called on the new Chinese leader Xi Jinping to meet with the
Dalai Lama''); International Campaign for Tibet, ``Young Tibetan Father
Self-Immolates in Tsekhog; Officials Warn Tibetans Not To Gather at
Cremations,'' 19 November 12 (Sangdrag Tsering ``frequently spoke about
the Dalai Lama not being allowed to be in Tibet, . . . and that the
Panchen Lama is still in prison''); ``Tibetan Self-Immolations
Continue, 25-Year-Old Dies in Protest,'' Voice of America, 19 November
12 (Wangchen Norbu ``shouted slogans calling for the return of the
Dalai Lama to Tibet, [and] release of the Panchen Lama'');
International Campaign for Tibet, ``Three Self-Immolations in Two Days
as Total in Tibet Reaches 81,'' 24 November 12 (Tamdrin Kyab reportedly
had said previously there was ``no reason to live without the Dalai
Lama's return to Tibet''); ``Tibetan Burns, Hails Dalai Lama,'' Radio
Free Asia, 24 November 12 (Tamdrin Dorje ``could be seen putting his
hands together in prayer, shouting long life to the Dalai Lama'');
``17-Year-Old Self-Immolator's Last Note Calls for the Dalai Lama's
Return and Tibet's Independence,'' Phayul, 28 November 12 (Sanggye
Drolma left ``a will, written in the form of a poem'' expressing ``her
belief in the swift return of . . . the Dalai Lama''); ``Father of
Three Dies After Self-Immolation,'' Voice of America, 26 November 12
(Gonpo Tsering ``shouted slogans calling for . . . return of the Dalai
Lama to Tibet''); ``Tibetan Teenager Burns Himself to Death,'' Voice of
America, 28 November 12 (Sanggye Tashi ``shouted slogans calling for
return of the Dalai Lama and release of the Panchen Lama''); ``Two
Tibetans Self-Immolate, Total Reaches 89,'' Voice of America, 29
November 12 (Bande Khar called for ``the return of the Dalai Lama to
Tibet''); International Campaign for Tibet, ``Three Tibetans Self-
Immolate in Two Days During Important Buddhist Anniversary: Images of
Troops in Lhasa as Tibetans Pray,'' 10 December 12 (Pema Dorje shouted
that the Dalai Lama should be allowed to return to Tibet); Tibetan
Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, ``Tibetan Religious Festival
Marked by Two Self-Immolation Death,'' 9 December 12 (Konchog Phelgye
folded his hands in prayer position and ``shouted slogans for the long
life of . . . the Dalai Lama and return . . . to Tibet''); ``Tibetan
Girl Self-Immolates,'' Radio Free Asia, 10 December 12 (Wangchen Kyi,
or Rinchen Kyi, called ``for the long life of . . . the Dalai Lama'');
International Campaign for Tibet, ``Authorities Bar Customary Religious
Rituals To Enforce Quick Cremation of Tibetan Who Self-Immolated in
Amchok,'' 15 January 13 (video of Tsering Tashi ``depicts him lying on
the street in flames, lifting his hands into a prayer position and
saying the name of the Dalai Lama''); ``Breaking: Monk in Ngaba Becomes
100th To Self-Immolate Under China's Rule,'' Phayul, 13 February 13
(Lobsang Namgyal, while burning, ``shouted slogans for the long life of
. . . the Dalai Lama as he ran towards the local police building'').
\121\For information on two unprecedented developments during the
Commission's 2012 reporting year, the opening of a new Tibetan Buddhism
Theological Institute intended to establish an updated ``normal order''
for the religion, and on teams of Chinese Communist Party cadres
dispatched to every monastery and nunnery in the Tibet Autonomous
Region to take over monastic management, see, e.g., CECC, 2012 Annual
Report, 10 October 12, 161-62; Chang Chuan, ``Tibet Buddhist
Theological Institute Is Completed and Open--Pagbalha Geleg Namgyai,
Qin Yizhi Attend Ceremony, Zhu Weiqun, Hao Peng Speak, Luosang Jiangcun
Unveils Signboard, Qizhala Presides Over Ceremony, 11th Panchen Erdini
Qoigyi Gyibo Sends Congratulatory Message'' [Xizang foxue yuan luocheng
kai yuan pabala gelie langjie qin yizhi chuxi dianli zhu weiqun hao
peng jianghua luosang jiangcun jiepai--qizhala zhuchi shiyi shi banchan
e'erdeni--queji jiebu zhi hexin], Tibet Daily, 21 October 11, reprinted
in China Tibet Information Center (translated in Open Source Center, 26
October 11) (on the opening of the new Tibetan Buddhism Theological
Institute intended to establish an updated ``normal order'' for the
religion); Zou Le, ``Committees To Ensure Stability in Tibet's
Monasteries,'' Global Times, 15 February 12 (``A [Monastery Management
Committee] has been established in every monastery in the Tibet
Autonomous Region''); Li Chengye, ``Regionwide Video-Teleconference on
Stability Maintenance and Comprehensive Public Order Management by
Public Security, Procuratorial, and Judicial Departments Emphasizes
Need To Create New Situation in Regional Harmony and Stability and To
Usher in Triumphant Opening of 18th CPC National Congress With
Outstanding Achievements; Chen Quanguo, Hao Peng Deliver Speeches;
Baima Chilin, Wu Yingjie, Gongbao Zhaxi, Qizhala, Deng Xiaogang Attend
Meeting; Luosang Jiangcun Presides Over Meeting; Luobu Dunzhu Attends
Meeting at Chamdo Branch Conference Hall'' [Quan qu zhengfa wei wen
zong zhi gongzuo dianshi dianhua huiyi qiangdiao--nuli kaichuang quan
qu hexie wending de xin jumian--yi youyi chengji yingjie dang de 18
dasheng shengli zhaokai--chen quanguo hao peng jianghua baima chilin wu
yingjie gongbao zhaxi qizhala deng xiaogang chuxi luosang jiangcun
zhuchi luobu dunzhu chuxi changdu fenhuichang huiyi], Tibet Daily, 5
January 12, reprinted in China Tibet Information Center (translated in
Open Source Center, 16 January 12) (Chen Quanguo instructed government
officials and Party cadres to ``strengthen and innovate management of
temples and monasteries by making it a key feature to routinely station
cadres in temples and monasteries''); Li Chengye, ``Chen Quanguo Gives
Important Instructions on Further Improving the Work of Cadre Presence
in Monasteries: Let Monks and Nuns Who Love Their Country and Their
Religion Experience the Solicitude and Loving Care of Party and
Government and Consciously Make Greater Contributions to the Building
of Harmonious Tibet and Peaceful Tibet,'' Tibet Daily, 2 February 12,
reprinted in China Tibet Online (translated in Open Source Center, 10
February 12) (Chen said, ``The numerous comrades of the task forces for
cadre presence in monasteries and the monastery management committees
should build on their achievements and keep up their good work; . .
.''). For background on self-immolations and measures repressing
Tibetans' freedom of religion, see CECC, ``Special Report: Tibetan
Monastic Self-Immolations Appear To Correlate With Increasing
Repression of Freedom of Religion,'' 24 January 12.
\122\See, e.g., State Administration for Religious Affairs,
Measures for Evaluating the Credentials of and Appointing Monastic
Teachers in Tibetan Buddhism [Zangchuan fojiao simiao jing shi zige
pingding he pinren banfa], passed 25 November 12, effective 3 December
12.
\123\For recent CECC reporting and analysis on established
repressive policies toward the Tibetan Buddhist religion and
institution, see, e.g., CECC, 2012 Annual Report, 10 October 12, 161-
63; CECC, 2011 Annual Report, 10 October 11, 208-12; CECC, 2010 Annual
Report, 10 October 10, 220-22; CECC, ``Special Report: Tibetan Monastic
Self-Immolations Appear To Correlate With Increasing Repression of
Freedom of Religion,'' 24 January 12; ``Tibetan Buddhist Affairs
Regulations Taking Effect in Tibetan Autonomous Prefectures,''
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 10 March 11.
\124\See, e.g., State Administration for Religious Affairs,
Measures for Evaluating the Credentials of and Appointing Monastic
Teachers in Tibetan Buddhism [Zangchuan fojiao simiao jing shi zige
pingding he pinren banfa], passed 25 November 12, effective 3 December
12, art. 11(3) (``educate and guide monks and nuns on . . . upholding
the monastery's normal order''); Chen Feiyu, ```Five Continued
Focuses,' Realize Greater Development (Under Guidance of Scientific
Development Concept)--Interview With Tibet CPC Secretary Chen Quanguo''
[``Wu ge jixu zhuoli'' shixian geng da fazhan (zai kexue fazhan guan
zhiyin xia)--fang xizang zizhiqu dangwei shuji chen quanguo], People's
Daily, 4 September 12 (translated in Open Source Center, 21 September
12) (``[W]ith safeguarding the normal order of Tibetan Buddhism as the
basic goal, we have administered religious affairs in accordance with
laws and regulations.'').
\125\International Campaign for Tibet, ``New Challenges to Tibet
Policy From Inside China,'' 27 June 13. According to the report,
unofficial sources described meetings that reportedly took place in
June at three locations, at least of one of which was a monastery, in
Hainan (Tsolho) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture and in Xining city, the
Qinghai province capital, as advising: ``In terms of religion, the 14th
Dalai Lama can be revered, respected and followed. However, in terms of
politics, he cannot be followed; religion and politics need to be
separated.''
\126\Ibid. ICT provided a translation of the Asia Weekly article
and provided citation information: Shuo Jiming, ``Beijing Expert:
Resume Negotiations To Resolve the Tibet Issue,'' Asia Weekly, Vol. 27,
No. 22 (June 2013).
\127\``Chinese Official Says No Softening in Communist Party
Struggle Against Dalai Lama Supporters,'' Associated Press, 9 July 13,
reprinted in Star Tribune; ``New Crackdown by China on Dalai Lama
Photos,'' Radio Free Asia, 22 July 13; International Campaign for
Tibet, ``Discussions on Anti-Dalai Lama Policy Shut Down in Qinghai;
Kalachakra in Tsolho Cancelled,'' 24 July 13 (includes a translation of
an official notice titled, ``Notice Regarding Not Listening to
Rumors''); ``China Denies Lifting Ban on Dalai Lama Worship,'' BBC, 28
June 13. See also ``Top Political Advisor Stresses Stability in Tibetan
Region,'' Xinhua, 9 July 13.
\128\International Campaign for Tibet, ``Discussions on Anti-Dalai
Lama Policy Shut Down in Qinghai; Kalachakra in Tsolho Cancelled,'' 24
July 13.
\129\``List of Members of Standing Committee of Political Bureau of
18th CPC Central Committee,'' Xinhua, 15 November 12.
\130\Zhong Yongyong, ``Chinese Communist Party 18th Central
Committee,'' Chinese Communist Party 18th Central Committee, reprinted
in Sina (blog), 18 April 13. In addition to the posts of member of the
Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Chinese Communist
Party and Head of the Central Committee Coordinating Group for Tibet
Affairs, Yu Zhengsheng is a Deputy Head of the Central Committee
Coordinating Group for Taiwan Affairs. ``Yu Zhengsheng--Chairman of
National Committee of Chinese People's Political Consultative
Conference,'' Xinhua, 11 March 13. Yu also holds the post of Chairman
of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Committee.
\131\International Campaign for Tibet, ``Discussions on Anti-Dalai
Lama Policy Shut Down in Qinghai; Kalachakra in Tsolho Cancelled,'' 24
July 13; ``Top Political Advisor Stresses Stability in Tibetan
Region,'' Xinhua, 9 July 13. According to the Xinhua article, Yu
Zhengsheng visited Gannan (Kanlho) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Gansu
province, on or shortly before July 9, 2013; apparently on the same
trip, Yu stated, ``Only when the Dalai Lama publicly announces that
Tibet is an inalienable part of China since ancient time, gives up the
stance of `Tibet independence' and stops his secessionist activities,
can his relations with the CPC Central Committee possibly be
improved.''
\132\International Campaign for Tibet, ``Discussions on Anti-Dalai
Lama Policy Shut Down in Qinghai; Kalachakra in Tsolho Cancelled,'' 24
July 13.
\133\The following reports include images: International Campaign
for Tibet, ``Shooting in Tawu on Dalai Lama's Birthday: Update,'' 26
July 13; Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, ``More Injured
by Gunshots Than Earlier Reported in Tawu,'' 17 July 13.
\134\International Campaign for Tibet, ``Shooting in Tawu on Dalai
Lama's Birthday: Update,'' 26 July 13 (``opened fire . . . injuring at
least ten people''; ``wounds apparently caused by shooting or using
some form of riot control devices''; ``[a]t least 16 Tibetans were
tortured and beaten''); Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy,
``More Injured by Gunshots Than Earlier Reported in Tawu,'' 17 July 13
(``14 have sustained gunshot wounds'').
\135\Teachers over the age of 50 are exempt from periodic
reassessment and reappointment if authorities deem them to satisfy
requirements under Article 4 on, among other things, patriotism toward
China, upholding Party leadership and the socialist system, obeying
monastic management groups, and accepting supervision by Buddhist
associations and government departments. State Administration for
Religious Affairs, Measures for Evaluating the Credentials of and
Appointing Monastic Teachers in Tibetan Buddhism [Zangchuan fojiao
simiao jing shi zige pingding he pinren banfa], passed 25 November 12,
effective 3 December 12, arts. 4, 5(3), 10.
\136\State Administration for Religious Affairs, Measures for
Evaluating the Credentials of and Appointing Monastic Teachers in
Tibetan Buddhism [Zangchuan fojiao simiao jing shi zige pingding he
pinren banfa], passed 25 November 12, effective 3 December 12, art. 10.
\137\Older legal measures acknowledge the role of the Party in
Buddhist associations. See, e.g., Tibet Autonomous Region People's
Government, Tibet Autonomous Region Temporary Measures on the
Management of Religious Affairs [Xizang zizhiqu zongjiao shiwu guanli
zanxing banfa], passed 9 December 91, effective 20 December 91, art.
15. The measures state, ``The Buddhist Association is a . . . bridge
for the Party and government to unite and educate personages from
religious circles and the believing masses. Its effectiveness shall be
vigorously brought into play under the administrative leadership of the
government's religious affairs department.''
\138\State Administration for Religious Affairs, Measures for
Evaluating the Credentials of and Appointing Monastic Teachers in
Tibetan Buddhism [Zangchuan fojiao simiao jing shi zige pingding he
pinren banfa], passed 25 November 12, effective 3 December 12, art.
5(3).
\139\Ibid., art. 4(2) (``love the nation and love religion'').
\140\Ibid., art. 4(2) (``Uphold the leadership of the Chinese
Communist Party and the socialist system, . . .'').
\141\Ibid., art. 4(3) (``accept the guidance and supervision of the
religious affairs departments and Buddhist Associations under the
People's Government in the monastery's locale'').
\142\Ibid., art. 10.
\143\Ibid., art. 14.
\144\``List of Autonomous Region's Harmonious Model Monasteries and
Patriotic Law-Abiding Advanced Monks and Nuns,'' Tibet Daily, 3 May 12,
reprinted in China Tibet News; Liu Xiangrui and Daqiong, ``Tibetan
Monasteries Cited for Contributions to Harmony,'' China Daily, 20 April
12.
\145\Li Hualing, ``Tibetan Monks and Nuns Say That Patriotism Is
the Precondition for the Development of Tibetan Buddhism'' [Xizang
sengni: aiguo shi zangchuan fojiao fazhan de xianjue tiaojian], Xinhua,
28 December 12 (translated in Open Source Center, 5 January 13).
\146\Ibid.
\147\See, e.g., Wu Bin, ``Qiang Wei Conducts Fact-Finding on
Safeguarding Stability in Hualong County, Emphasizes Need To
Consolidate Achievements in Ad Hoc Struggle Against Self-Immolation--
Create a Good Social Environment for Promoting Construction and
Development'' [Qiang wei zai hualong xian diaoyan weihu wending gongzuo
shi qiangdiao gonggu fan zifen zhuanxiang douzheng chengguo--wei zhua
jianshe cu fazhan yingzao lianghao de shehui huanjing], Qinghai Daily,
2 March 13 (translated in Open Source Center, 7 March 13). According to
the report, while on an inspection visit to Hualong county, Haidong
prefecture, Qinghai province, Party Secretary Qiang Wei expressed
``hope'' to Jakhyung Monastery monks that they would ``strengthen
monastery management and legal system education for the monks, actively
cooperate with the Party and the government in all work, and safeguard
social harmony and stability.''
\148\As of September 1, 2013, the Commission had not observed any
followup report on when or whether the senior monastic officials were
able to return to their Lhasa monastic institutions. Media and advocacy
groups sometimes use the term ``political education'' or ``patriotic
education'' to describe compulsory classes that Chinese state-run media
and officials refer to using the more recent term, ``legal education.''
See ``Fears of New Crackdown on Monks,'' Radio Free Asia, 30 January 13
(reports total of 14; names 14); ``Senior Monks of Sera, Drepung,
Ganden Disappeared,'' Phayul, 30 January 13 (reports total of 16; names
14). For more information, see the Commission's Political Prisoner
Database records 2013-00147 on Jampal Lhagsam, 2013-00148 on Ngawang,
2013-00149 on Ngawang Donden, 2013-00150 on Ngawang Palsang, 2013-00151
on Ngawang Samten, 2013-00152 on Migmar, 2013-00153 on Samten, 2013-
00154 on Ngawang Lodroe, 2013-00155 on Tashi Gyaltsen, 2013-00156 on
Kalden, 2013-00157 on Lobsang Ngodrub, 2013-00158 on Tseten Dorje,
2013-00159 on Lhundrub Yarphel, and 2013-00160 on Ngawang Lophel.
\149\For reports providing specific detail on self-immolators'
reference to Tibetan language or culture (in chronological order), see,
e.g., ``Third Tibet Self-Immolation in One Week,'' Voice of America, 6
October 12 (Sanggye Gyatso ``shouted for the swift return of the Dalai
Lama to Tibet and called for religious and language rights'');
``Tibetan Burnings Rise to 70,'' Radio Free Asia, 10 November 12 (Gonpo
Tsering called for ``freedom for Tibetans, the return of the Dalai Lama
to Tibet and freedom of languages''); ``Two Tibetan Self-Immolaters
Left Letters Behind,'' Voice of America, 20 November 12 (Nyingkar Tashi
left a letter that ``urged unification of all Tibetans and urged
Tibetans to learn and speak Tibetan, and called for freedom for
Tibet''); ``Two Tibetans Self-Immolate, Total Reaches 89,'' Voice of
America, 29 November 12 (Bande Khar called for ``the return of the
Dalai Lama to Tibet, the release of all Tibetan political prisoners,
freedom of religion and language and protection of Tibet's fragile
environment''); ```Without Independence Tibet Will Be Annihilated,' a
Self-Immolator's Last Words,'' Phayul, 9 May 13 (Phagmo Dondrub
allegedly told friends shortly before he self-immolated that
``authorities have restricted studying Tibetan language . . . and all
teachers have been expelled . . . I am really sad now'').
\150\China Directory 2011, ed. Radiopress (Kawasaki: RP Printing
Co., 2010), 17, 27. Zhu Weiqun, who retired from the Communist Party
Central Committee at the October 2012 18th National Congress of the
Chinese Communist Party, held positions as Executive Deputy Head of the
Party's United Front Work Department and Director of the Party's
General Office of the Central Coordinating Group for Tibet Affairs.
``Official: Dalai Lama `Stubborn in Talks, Not True to His Word,'''
Xinhua, 26 March 09, reprinted in People's Daily. According to the
article, ``Zhu has been dealing with Tibet-related issues since 1998
and has been personally involved in all the contacts and talks with the
Dalai Lama side since 2003.''
\151\Zhu Weiqun, ``Some Thoughts on Existing Problems in the Field
of Nationalities'' [Dui dangqian minzu lingyu wenti de jidian sikao],
Study Times, 13 February 12 (translated in Open Source Center, 20
February 12). Zhu stated: ``If assimilation is the natural amalgamation
of all nationalities to move toward prosperity, that would be
progressive. . . . In China's history, some nationalities have been
constantly amalgamated and some new nationalities have constantly
emerged; this is a universal and regular phenomenon.''
\152\Ibid., (``promoting desegregated education for students of
different nationalities''). Zhu states in the article: ``Now some of
our educational and administrative measures have, by accident or
design, weakened the education on the sense of nationhood and
identification with the Chinese Nation.''
\153\Ibid. Zhu stated: ``Whether from the perspective of benefiting
the development and progress of minority nationalities, or from the
perspective of benefiting the Chinese Nation's unanimity, it is
imperative to popularize the state's common spoken and written
languages without fail.''
\154\Office of the Spokesperson, U.S. Department of State,
``Statement by Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues Maria Otero,'' 5
December 12. As of the statement date, Maria Otero also served as Under
Secretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights.
\155\For information on previous large-scale Tibetan student
protests in Qinghai in March 2012 and October 2010 against policy
changes that students reportedly believed would reduce the status and
use of Tibetan language, see CECC, 2012 Annual Report, 10 October 12,
164; CECC, 2011 Annual Report, 10 October 11, 214-16.
\156\The following reports refer to a November 26, 2012, tertiary
student protest in Gonghe (Chabcha) county, the capital of Hainan
(Tsolho) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Qinghai province. ``More Than
1000 Chabcha Students Protest Chinese Authorities,'' Voice of America,
26 November 12. According to VOA, ``[m]ore than 1000 Chabcha Tibetan
Medical School students'' chanted ``slogans for equality of
nationalities, freedom of language, respect for truth and establishment
of new governance.'' ``Tibetan Student Protesters Held,'' Radio Free
Asia, 27 November 12. According to RFA, citing local residents, the
students protested ``over the release of an official Chinese booklet
which ridiculed the Tibetan language as irrelevant and condemned the
series of self-immolation protests against Beijing's rule as acts of
`stupidity.'''
\157\The following report refers to a November 28, 2012, tertiary
student protest in Gonghe county, Hainan TAP. ``Tibetan Student
Protests Spread,'' Radio Free Asia, 28 November 12. According to the
report, citing a source, ``Students from the Tsolho Technical School in
Chabcha (in Chinese, Gonghe) . . . stormed out of their campus and
shouted for `freedom' and `Tibetan language rights' in front of the
prefecture government center.''
\158\``More Than 1000 Chabcha Students Protest Chinese
Authorities,'' Voice of America, 26 November 12. Referring to the
November 26 protest, VOA stated, ``The protest appears to be a direct
response to a 10-point leaflet distributed to students by the local
authorities. The leaflet was perceived to be derogatory towards the
individuals who have carried out self-immolation protests and against
use of Tibetan language.'' Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and
Democracy, ``China Alienates, Angers Tibetan Students With Political
Education,'' 29 November 12. According to TCHRD, the booklet, on page
48, apparently set aside the notion that ``bilingual education caused
the decline of minority language,'' and stated that promoting and
implementing bilingual education policy in ethnic minority areas is of
``long-term significance for the Chinese Communist Party and the
Chinese nation.''
\159\For information on China's ``bilingual education'' policy for
ethnic minority groups such as Tibetans and Uyghurs, see, e.g., CECC,
2012 Annual Report, 10 October 12, 152-53, 164; CECC, 2011 Annual
Report, 10 October 11, 48, 201-2, 214-15; CECC, 2010 Annual Report, 10
October 10, 208-9; CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 244, 258-
61. See also International Campaign for Tibet, ``Thousands of Tibetan
Pilgrims Face Troops at Religious Ceremonies in Eastern Tibet,'' 8
March 13; Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, ``China Calls
for Bilingual Policy, Crackdown on Immolations,'' 15 March 13.
\160\Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, ``China
Alienates, Angers Tibetan Students With Political Education,'' 29
November 12. TCHRD attributes the remark to Chapter Four on bilingual
education.
\161\International Campaign for Tibet, ``Young Tibetans Sentenced
to Five-Year Prison Terms After Chabcha Student Protests,'' 12 December
12; ``Mass Tibetan Student Protest,'' Radio Free Asia, 9 November 12.
According to the ICT report, middle and high school students in Tongren
(Rebgong), Huangnan (Malho) TAP, reportedly called for, among other
things, ``equality of nationalities and freedom of languages.''
\162\Reports referred to the school by different names; it was not
clear whether students from more than one institution participated in
the protest. ``Gonghe County People's Court Pronounces Sentences for
`11.26' Illegal Assembly Case'' [Gonghe xian renmin fayuan xuanpan
``11-26'' feifa youxing shiwei an], Xining Evening News, 17 April 13,
reprinted in Qinghai News Agency (Hainan Vocational and Technical
School); Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, ``Chabcha
Student Protesters Sentenced Up to Four Years,'' 17 April 13 (Hainan
[Tsolho] Vocational School); International Campaign for Tibet,
``Tibetan Student Detentions After Protests in Chabcha, Rebkong,'' 19
December 12 (Hainan [Tsolho] Professional Training School); ``More Than
1000 Chabcha Students Protest Chinese Authorities,'' Voice of America,
26 November 12 (Gonghe [Chabcha] Medical School); ``More Tibetans
Detained,'' Radio Free Asia, 12 December 12 (Hainan [Tsolho] Medical
Institute).
\163\For more information on the eight students and their
sentences, see the following in the Commission's Political Prisoner
Database: Records 2013-00001 on Lhaten (3 years and 6 months); 2013-
00002 on Wanggyal Tsering (3 years and 3 months); 2013-00003 on Jampa
Tsering (3 years and 6 months); 2013-00004 on Choekyong Kyab (3 years
and 3 months); 2013-00005 on Sanggye Bum (4 years); 2013-00006 on Dola
Tsering (3 years); 2013-00007 on Tsering Tashi (3 years); and 2013-
00008 on Kunsang Bum (3 years and 6 months).
\164\PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingfa], issued 1
July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25
December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February
05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, art. 296 (``an
assembly, a procession or a demonstration is held with no application
made in accordance with the provisions of law . . . .'').
\165\Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, ``Chabcha
Student Protesters Sentenced Up to Four Years,'' 17 April 13 (students
reportedly also resented the booklet's ``propaganda attacks against
self-immolation protests''); ``Gonghe County People's Court Holds Trial
for `11.26' Illegal Assembly'' [Gung-ho rdzong mi-dmang khrims-gang gos
``11-26'' krims-'gal-gyi khrom-skor-byed pa'i gyod-don `dri-gcod byas-
pa], China Tibet Network, 17 April 13; ``Gonghe County People's Court
Pronounces Sentences for `11.26' Illegal Assembly Case'' [Gonghe xian
renmin fayuan xuanpan ``11-26'' feifa youxing shiwei an], Xining
Evening News, 17 April 13, reprinted in Qinghai News Agency.
\166\``More Tibetans Detained,'' Radio Free Asia, 12 December 12.
\167\International Campaign for Tibet, ``Tibetan Student Detentions
After Protests in Chabcha, Rebkong,'' 19 December 12 (``the pamphlet
includes an incoherent diatribe on the Tibetan self-immolation
protests, which are equated to `terrorist acts'''); Tibetan Centre for
Human Rights and Democracy, ``China Alienates, Angers Tibetan Students
With Political Education,'' 29 November 12 (the booklet stated that
self-immolations ``are [the] same as other violent and terrorist
acts'').
\168\``Tibetan Student Leader Jailed, Nuns Released,'' Radio Free
Asia, 12 June 13. For more information, see the Commission's Political
Prisoner Database record 2013-00207 on Wangchug Dorje.
\169\``Push To Preserve the Tibetan Language in China,'' Radio Free
Asia, 25 February 13. According to the RFA report, Tibetans in Guoluo
(Golog) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Qinghai province, gathered on
February 21 in front of a portrait of the Dalai Lama and read poems on
the importance of protecting the Tibetan language. See United Nations,
``International Mother Language Day: 21 February,'' last visited 9 May
13. According to the UN Web site, the United Nations Educational,
Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) established
International Mother Language Day in November 1999 in order ``to
promote the preservation and protection of all languages used by
peoples of the world.'' International Mother Language Day has been
observed on February 21 since 2000.
\170\``Push To Preserve the Tibetan Language in China,'' Radio Free
Asia, 25 February 13. According to the report, the posters appeared in
Luqu (Luchu) county, Gannan (Kanlho) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture,
Gansu province.
\171\``Tibetan Language Classes Closed,'' Radio Free Asia, 10
January 13. According to the report, authorities in a township in
Songpan (Zungchu) county, Aba (Ngaba) Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous
Prefecture, Sichuan province, banned the classes, which were underway
during the winter school break.
\172\``No Local Residents, Monks, Nuns Self-Immolate in Tibet:
Official,'' Xinhua, 3 March 13 (Pema Choling, Chairman of the Standing
Committee of the Tibet Autonomous Region People's Congress, said,
``Developing economy, improving people's well-being, and building a
sound education is key to overall development of Tibet.''); Chen
Quanguo, ``Firmly and Unswervingly Take the Road of Development With
Chinese and Tibetan Characteristics, and Struggle in Unity To Achieve
Development by Leaps and Bounds and Long-Term Stability and Security''
[Jianding buyi zou you zhongguo tese xizang tedian fazhan luzi--wei
shixian kuayueshi fazhan he changzhijiuan er tuanjie dou], Tibet Daily,
18 November 11, reprinted in China Tibet Information Center (translated
in Open Source Center, 4 December 11) (TAR Party Secretary Chen Quanguo
described development as ``the foundation on which to resolve all of
Tibet's problems.'').
\173\See, e.g., ``Tibetans Detained for Protesting Destruction of
Their Homes,'' Radio Free Asia, 11 April 13. For more information on
earthquake-related property protests in Kyegudo (``Jiegu''), see CECC,
2011 Annual Report, 10 October 11, 218-19. For information on self-
immolations carried out as property protests in Kyegudo (``Jiegu''),
see, e.g., ``Tibetan Evictee Self-Immolates,'' Radio Free Asia, 4 April
13 (on the non-fatal, late-March 2013 self-immolation of an
unidentified female); ``A Tibetan Woman's Self Immolation Known,''
Tibet Express, 4 January 13 (on the September 13, 2012, non-fatal
property protest by Pasang Lhamo); ``Land Seizure Protests in Keygudo
Prompts Self-Immolation,'' Phayul, 4 July 12 (on the June 27, 2012,
non-fatal property protest of female Dekyi Choezom).
\174\See, e.g., ``Threat To Destroy Chinese Abattoir,'' Radio Free
Asia, 1 February 13 (Tibetans in Mangkang (Markham) county, Changdu
(Chamdo) prefecture, TAR, ``threatened to destroy a Chinese-operated
slaughterhouse polluting local sources of drinking water after
authorities ignored their petitions to shut it down''); ``Mine Ruins
River, Destroys Farms,'' Radio Free Asia, 18 January 13 (``Chinese
mining operations'' in Linzhou (Lhundrub) county, Lhasa municipality,
TAR, were ``destroying farmers' fields and forcing herders to move away
from traditional grazing areas'').
\175\``Two Tibetans Self-Immolate, Total Reaches 89,'' Voice of
America, 29 November 12 (Bande Khar called for ``the return of the
Dalai Lama to Tibet, the release of all Tibetan political prisoners,
freedom of religion and language and protection of Tibet's fragile
environment'').
\176\``Political Bureau Done Mapping Out New General Strategy for
Governing Tibet'' [Zhengzhiju mouding zhizang xin fanglue], China News
Service, 10 January 10 (translated in Open Source Center, 10 January
10); ``The CPC Central Committee and the State Council Hold the Fifth
Tibet Work Forum; Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao Deliver Important
Speeches,'' Xinhua, 22 January 10 (translated in Open Source Center, 24
January 10). See also CECC, 2010 Annual Report, 10 October 10, 215-19;
``Communist Party Leadership Outlines 2010-2020 `Tibet Work' Priorities
at `Fifth Forum,''' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No.
3, 16 March 10, 2.
\177\``Political Bureau Done Mapping Out New General Strategy for
Governing Tibet'' [Zhengzhiju mouding zhizang xin fanglue], China News
Service, 10 January 10 (translated in Open Source Center, 10 January
10) (``adherence to a development path with Chinese characteristics
[tese] and Tibetan traits [tedian]'').
\178\See, e.g., Liu Sha, ``Investment in Western China Tripled in
2012,'' Global Times, 21 December 12 (``western development strategy, a
policy adopted in 2000 by the State Council''); Li Dezhu, ``Large-Scale
Development of Western China and China's Nationality Problem,'' Seeking
Truth, 1 June 00 (Open Source Center, 15 June 00) (Li Dezhu [Li Dek Su]
addresses the social and ethnic implications of the program that Jiang
Zemin launched in 1999); ``Premier Wen Says China Will Continue
Developing Western Region,'' Xinhua, 16 October 09 (Premier Wen Jiabao
stated China ``would unswervingly stick to the West Development
Strategy adopted in 2000''); ``Chinese Leaders Call for More Efforts To
Develop West,'' Xinhua, 6 July 10; ``China's Western Region Development
Plan a Dual Strategy,'' Xinhua, 8 July 10 (Deputy Director Du Ying of
the National Development and Reform Commission said the initiative
would continue ``in the western region during the next ten years'').
\179\Liu Sha, ``Investment in Western China Tripled in 2012,''
Global Times, 21 December 12.
\180\Zhu Zhe, ``Lhasa-Xigaze Railway To Open by the End of 2014,''
China Daily, 8 November 12. According to the China Daily report, Jampa
Phuntsog, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the TAR People's
Congress, provided the date that operation would start. Budget for the
railway reportedly is 13.3 billion yuan.
\181\``Tibet Starts Building 5th Civil Airport,'' Xinhua, 30 April
09. According to the report, ``Construction on the 11-billion-yuan
[US$1.61 billion] Qinghai-Tibet railway's extension line started in
2008 and was expected to be completed in 2010.'' The article provided
the estimated cost as 11 billion yuan.
\182\``Full Speed Ahead for Tibet Railway Extension,'' Xinhua, 17
January 12. According to the report, ``The extension of a landmark
railway from Tibet's capital, Lhasa, to its second-largest city,
Xigaze, is in full swing and will be completed by 2015, officials said
Tuesday.''
\183\Fu Shuangqi et al., ``China Unveils Plan To Streamline
Gov't,'' Xinhua, 10 March 13; Cheng Yunjie and Chen Siwu, ``Xinhua
Insight: Parliament Endorses Cabinet Reshuffle, Unleashing China's
Reform Vitality,'' Xinhua, 14 March 13.
\184\Cui Jia and Wang Huazhong, ``Doubts Surface Over Reorganizing
Railways,'' China Daily, 13 March 13. According to the report, Jampa
Phuntsog (Xiangba Pingcuo) said ``there would be uncertainty if the
Ministry of Railways ceased to exist because under the current system
it's easier for the ministry to approve construction plans in the
region.'' Chairman of the TAR People's Government Lobsang Gyaltsen
(Luosang Jianzan) reportedly said, ``The cost of building railways in
high plateau areas is extremely high and it is not something a company
would like to do if it doesn't make money.'' China Directory 2012, ed.
Radiopress (Tokyo: JPM Corporation, Ltd., 2011), 432-33. Under the name
``Qiangba Puncog,'' China Directory provides the positions of Executive
Deputy Secretary of the TAR Party Committee and Chairman of the
Standing Committee of the TAR People's Congress; under the name
``Lobsang Gyaincain,'' it provides the position of member of the
Standing Committee of the TAR Party Committee.
\185\For information on the compulsory nature and extent of the
program, see Human Rights Watch, ```They Say We Should Be Grateful'--
Mass Rehousing and Relocation Programs in Tibetan Areas of China,'' 27
June 13. Also see Human Rights Watch, ```No One Has the Liberty To
Refuse'--Tibetan Herders Forcibly Relocated in Gansu, Qinghai, Sichuan,
and the Tibet Autonomous Region,'' 11 June 07; CECC, ``Special Topic
Paper: Tibet 2008-2009,'' 22 October 09, 53-54.
\186\``Tibet To Accelerate Housing Project in Rural Area,'' China
Tibet Online, 11 January 13, reprinted in China Tibet News.
\187\Chen Feiyu, ```Five Continued Focuses,' Realize Greater
Development (Under Guidance of Scientific Development Concept)--
Interview With Tibet CPC Secretary Chen Quanguo'' [``Wu ge ji xu
zhuoli'' shixian geng da fazhan (zai kexue fazhan guan zhiyin xia)--
fang xizang zizhiqu dangwei shuji chen quanguo], People's Daily, 4
September 12 (translated in Open Source Center, 21 September 12) (``We
will ensure that all farmers and herdsmen can live in safe and
comfortable houses by the end of 2013.'').
\188\State Council Opinion on Promoting and Speeding Up Sound
Development in Grazing Areas [Guowuyuan fabu guanyu cujin muqu you hao
you kuai fazhan de ruogan yijian], PRC People's Central Government, 9
August 11.
\189\For information on the March 29, 2013, landslide at a gold
mine that killed at least 83 workers in Mozhugongka (Maldro Gongkar)
county, Lhasa municipality, TAR, see, e.g., ``Memorial Service Held for
Tibet Landslide Victims,'' Xinhua, 4 April 13; International Campaign
for Tibet, ``Disaster in Gyama Draws Attention to Impact of Mining in
Tibet,'' 5 April 13; ``More Than 80 Trapped in Tibet Gold Mine
Landslide,'' Radio Free Asia, 29 March 13. For a 2011 commentary and
images of mining in the area where the landslide occurred, see ``Using
Google Earth To Monitor Mining in Tibet 3: Example of Gyama,'' Tibetan
Plateau (blog), 9 January 11.
\190\``Mine Ruins River, Destroys Farms,'' Radio Free Asia, 18
January 13 (``mining operations are damaging the environment in a
county outside Tibet's regional capital Lhasa, destroying farmers'
fields and forcing herders to move away from traditional grazing
areas''); ``Chinese Mine Killing Livestock, Destroying Farm in Tibet,''
Phayul, 21 January 13 (``mining project in [Linzhou (Lhundrub) county,
Lhasa municipality] has forced the eviction of hundreds of Tibetans . .
. and caused severe damage to the environment, leading to livestock
deaths and decline in farm yield''); ``Threat To Destroy Chinese
Abattoir,'' Radio Free Asia, 1 February 13 (residents in Mangkang
[Markham] county, Changdu [Chamdo] prefecture, TAR, ``threatened to
destroy a Chinese-operated slaughterhouse polluting local sources of
drinking water after authorities ignored their petitions to shut it
down''). For an overview of mining operations and pollution, see
Richard Finney, ``Chinese Mines Pollute Tibet's Rivers, Streams,''
Radio Free Asia, 6 May 13.
\191\``Thousands of Tibetans Protest Against Mine,'' Radio Free
Asia, 28 May 13.
\192\``Tibet To Step Up Exploitation of Mineral Resources, Vowing
To Be `Rational,''' Xinhua, 12 March 10. According to the report, an
official described the TAR mining industry as ``fledgling'' and
``contributing about 3 percent to the local economy.'' ``By 2020, the
mineral industry would contribute to 30 to 50 percent of Tibet's GDP,''
he said.
\193\Richard Finney, ``Concerns Arise Over China's Dam Building
Drive in Tibet,'' Radio Free Asia, 17 April 13; Simon Denyer, ``Chinese
Dams in Tibet Raise Hackles in India,'' Washington Post, 7 February 13;
``China Announces a Slew of Dams on Brahmaputra and Salween,'' Phayul,
31 January 13.
\194\For details on hydropower projects that are currently
operational, under construction, or proposed, including maps, name
information in English, Chinese, and Tibetan, and details on capacity
and height, see ``2013 Update: Dams on the Drichu (Yangtze), Zachu
(Mekong) and Gyalmo Ngulchu (Salween) Rivers on the Tibetan Plateau,''
Tibetan Plateau (blog), 26 March 13.
\195\In addition to the 328 Tibetans detained on or after March 10,
2008, whom courts sentenced to imprisonment, are 8 Tibetans believed
charged with a crime (and who may face trial); 7 Tibetans believed
charged and tried (and who may have been sentenced); 1 Tibetan who was
charged, tried, and released; and 1 Tibetan who was charged, tried, and
then died.
\196\In addition to the 622 Tibetan political prisoners believed or
presumed to be currently detained or imprisoned and who were detained
on or after March 10, 2008, the Commission's Political Prisoner
Database recorded, as of September 1, 2013, 909 Tibetan political
prisoners detained or imprisoned on or after March 10, 2008, who are
believed or presumed to have been released, or who reportedly escaped
or died.
\197\Tibetan Buddhists believe that a trulku is a teacher who is a
part of a lineage of teachers that are reincarnations.
\198\Of the 176 fixed terms of imprisonment, 171 were judicial
sentences ranging from 1 year and 6 months to 20 years, and 5 were
periods of reeducation through labor of 2 years.
\199\PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingfa], issued 1
July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25
December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February
05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, art. 50. A sentence of
death with a two-year reprieve may be commuted to life imprisonment
upon expiration of the two-year suspension if a prisoner ``commits no
intentional crime'' during the suspension. If a prisoner ``has truly
performed major meritorious service,'' then the sentence may be
commuted to a fixed-term sentence of not less than 15 years and not
more than 20 years. If the prisoner ``has committed an intentional
crime'' during the period of suspension, the death penalty ``shall be
executed upon verification and approval of the Supreme People's
Court.''
Notes to Section VI--Developments in Hong Kong and Macau
\1\Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the
People's Republic of China, passed 4 April 90, effective 1 July 97,
art. 2 (``high degree of autonomy''), art. 27 (freedoms of speech and
assembly), art. 32 (freedom of religion), art. 39 (applicability of
ICCPR).
\2\Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the
People's Republic of China, passed 4 April 90, effective 1 July 97,art.
45 (selection of Chief Executive by universal suffrage), art. 68
(selection of Legislative Council by universal suffrage).
\3\UN Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on the Third
Periodic Report of Hong Kong, China, Adopted by the Committee at its
107th session (11-28 March 2013), CCPR/C/CHN-HKG/CO/3, 29 April 13,
para. 6.
\4\Ibid.
\5\Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the
People's Republic of China, passed 4 April 90, effective 1 July 97,
art. 45.
\6\Decision of the National People's Congress Standing Committee on
Issues Relating to the Methods for Selecting the Chief Executive of the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and for Forming the Legislative
Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in the Year 2012
and on Issues Relating to Universal Suffrage [Quanguo ren da
changweihui guanyu xianggang tebie xingzheng qu 2012 nian xingzheng
zhangguan he lifahui chansheng banfa ji youguan puxuan wenti de
jueding], passed 29 December 07.
\7\UN Human Rights Committee, Consideration of Reports Submitted by
States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant, Third Periodic Report
of States Parties, Hong Kong, China, CCPR/C/CHN-HKG/3, 19 July 11. The
document is a report by the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
government to the UN Human Rights Council.
\8\Legislative Counsel of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region of the People's Republic of China, ``LegCo Today,'' last visited
2 October 13; Bill K. P. Chou, ``Elections in Hong Kong: International
Perspectives and Implications for China,'' in China and East Asia:
After the Wall Street Crisis, eds. Peng Er Lam et al. (Singapore: World
Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., 2013), 82 (Chief Executive
election), 88-89 (Legislative Council's corporate electors, electors
with multiple votes), 89 (electorate size for functional
constituencies).
\9\``Occupy Central Movement Gaining Support Among Young,'' South
China Morning Post, 2 July 13; Joshua But and Emily Tsang, ``Occupy
Central Poised To Top July 1 Donation Chart,'' South China Morning
Post, 3 July 13.
\10\Joshua But and Gary Cheung, ``Occupy Central Pioneer Outlines
Its Four-Stage Plan To Achieve Democracy,'' South China Morning Post,
28 March 13.
\11\Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Information Services
Department, ``Curriculum Guide of Moral and National Education Subject
Formally Shelved (Press Release),'' 8 October 12.
\12\Keith Bradsher, ``Hong Kong Retreats on `National Education'
Plan,'' New York Times, 8 September 13.
\13\Stuart Lau and Joshua But, ``CY Leung Won't Be Drawn on PLA
Help for Occupy Central,'' South China Morning Post, 12 July 13;
Chester Yung and Te-Ping Chen, ``Thousands in Hong Kong Mark Handover
With Rally for Democracy,'' Wall Street Journal, 1 July 13; Tony
Cheung, ``Leung Chun-Ying Says Beijing's Consent To Start Reform Talks
Not Needed,'' South China Morning Post, 4 May 13.
\14\Phila Siu et al., ``Call To Put Off Suffrage Debate Is Panned
as `Stalling Tactic,''' South China Morning Post, 24 June 13.
\15\CECC, 2012 Annual Report, 10 October 12, 169.
\16\Zhang Xiaoming, ``Director Zhang Xiaoming Replies to Civic
Party Leader Alan Leong's Letter'' [Zhang xiaoming zhuren huifu
gongmindang dangkui liang jiajie de xin], Liaison Office of the Central
People's Government in the Hong Kong S.A.R., 30 August 13; Tanna Chong,
``Civil Nomination Proposal Violates Basic Law, Says Zhang Xiaoming,''
South China Morning Post, 13 September 13.
\17\Te-Ping Chen, ``Communist Party Douses Hong Kong Hopes for Full
Democracy,'' Wall Street Journal, 13 September 13.
\18\Liaison Office of the Central People's Government in the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region, ``Qiao Xiaoyang's Remarks at a Hong
Kong Conference With Select Legislative Council Members'' [Qiao
xiaoyang zai xianggang lifahui bufen yiyuan zuotanhui shang de
jianghua], 27 March 13.
\19\Ibid.
\20\Keith Bradsher, ``Hong Kong Court Denies Residency to
Domestics,'' New York Times, 25 March 13.
\21\Ibid.
\22\``US Got NSA Leaker Edward Snowden's Middle Name Wrong, Says
Hong Kong,'' Associated Press, reprinted in Guardian, 26 June 13.
\23\Jane Perlez and Keith Bradsher, ``China Said To Have Made Call
To Let Leaker Depart,'' New York Times, 23 June 13.
\24\Ibid.
\25\Hong Kong Journalists Association, ``Dark Clouds on the
Horizon--Hong Kong's Freedom of Expression Faces New Threats, 2013
Annual Report,'' July 2013, 8-9.
\26\Ng Kang-chung, ``Next Media Dangles HK$1M Carrot To Hunt Down
Attackers,'' South China Morning Post, 1 July 13.
\27\Hong Kong Journalists Association, ``Dark Clouds on the
Horizon--Hong Kong's Freedom of Expression Faces New Threats, 2013
Annual Report,'' July 2013, 8-9; Johnny Tam, ``Leung Chun-Ying
`Failing' on Press Freedom, Says Journalist Group,'' South China
Morning Post, 8 July 13.
\28\Hong Kong Journalists Association, ``Survey on Press Freedom
Under the Tsang Administration (2005-12),'' 24 June 12.
\29\Freedom House, ``Freedom of the Press 2013, Hong Kong,'' 2013.
\30\Hong Kong Journalists Association, ``Dark Clouds on the
Horizon--Hong Kong's Freedom of Expression Faces New Threats, 2013
Annual Report,'' July 2013, 15.
\31\Ibid.
\32\Nicholas Frisch, ``Hong Kong's Blind Spot,'' Wall Street
Journal, 25 November 11; ``Memory Hole,'' Economist, 12 April 13; Te-
Ping Chen, ``Hong Kong's Skyscraper-Sized `Memory Hole,''' Wall Street
Journal, 25 January 13.
\33\Te-Ping Chen, ``Hong Kong's Skyscraper-Sized `Memory Hole,'''
25 January 13.
\34\The Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong, ``Archives Law,'' last
visited 11 September 13.
\35\Office of the Ombudsman, ``Press Release--Ombudsman Probes
Access to Information and Records Management in Hong Kong,'' 20 January
13.
\36\Financial Services and the Treasury Bureau, ``New Arrangement
for the Inspection of Personal Information on the Companies Register
Under the New Companies Ordinance,'' Legislative Council Panel on
Financial Affairs, CB(1)788/12-13(01), 28 March 13; Nick Frisch, ``Hong
Kong's Tainted Transparency,'' Wall Street Journal, 19 February 13;
``Hong Kong Company Director Privacy Plan Raises Transparency
Concerns,'' Associated Press, reprinted in Guardian, 10 January 13;
``Of Privacy and Opacity,'' Economist, 2 March 13.
\37\Nick Frisch, ``Hong Kong's Tainted Transparency,'' Wall Street
Journal, 19 February 13. See also ``Hong Kong Company Director Privacy
Plan Raises Transparency Concerns,'' Associated Press, reprinted in
Guardian, 10 January 13; ``Of Privacy and Opacity,'' Economist, 2 March
13.
\38\Basic Law of the Macao Special Administrative Region of the
People's Republic of China, passed 31 March 93, effective 20 December
99, art. 40 (``The provisions of International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights . . . as applied to Macao shall remain in force and
shall be implemented through the laws of the Macao Special
Administrative Region'').
\39\UN Human Rights Committee, International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, Concluding Observations on the Initial Report of
Macao, China, Adopted by the Committee at its 107th session (11-28
March 2013), CCPR/C/CHN-MAC/CO/1, 29 April 13, para. 7.
\40\Fox Yi Hu, ``Macau Told Not To Tag Along With Hong Kong on
Universal Suffrage,'' South China Morning Post, 14 August 12.
\41\``Yu Zhengsheng: Ensuring the Strength of Loving the Nation and
Loving Hong Kong in the Long-Term Government of Hong Kong and Macau [Yu
zhengsheng: aiguo aigang liliang zai gangao changqi zhizheng], Wen Wei
Po, 7 March 13.
\42\UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ``Human
Rights Committee Considers Report of Macao Special Administrative
Region of China,'' 19 March 13.
\43\International Federation of Journalists, ``Media at Risk: Press
Freedom in China 2012-13,'' January 2013, 49-50; Neil Gough, ``A Loss
for Words in `Boring' Macau,'' South China Morning Post, 8 August 12.
\44\Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department
of State, ``Country Reports on Human Rights Practices--2012, China
(Includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau),'' 24 May 12, 146.
\45\Sum Choi, ``AL Plenary Session: Lawmakers and PJ Head Debate on
Journalists Values,'' Macau Daily Times, 17 April 13; Sum Choi, ``Jason
Chao Turns the Tables on the Gov't,'' Macau Daily Times, 26 February
13.
\46\``Macau's Gambling Industry,'' Economist, 10 December 11; ``The
House Is Still Winning,'' Week in China, 10 May 13.
\47\``The House Is Still Winning,'' Week in China, 10 May 13; Matt
Isaacs, ``Special Report: The Macau Connection,'' Reuters, 11 March 11.
For more information on Macau's junket system, see Farah Master,
``Factbox: How Macau's Casino Junket System Works,'' Reuters, 21
October 11.
\48\Farah Master, ``Gamblers Not So Anonymous: Beijing Keeps Closer
Eye on Macau,'' Reuters, 29 April 13. According to this article, casino
and junket operators ``helped bring in over two-thirds of Macau's $38
billion in revenues last year.'' See also ``The House Is Still
Winning,'' Week in China, 10 May 13; CECC, 2011 Annual Report, 10
October 11, 224.
\49\``The House Is Still Winning,'' Week in China, 10 May 13.
\50\Farah Master, ``Gamblers Not So Anonymous: Beijing Keeps a
Closer Eye on Macau,'' Reuters, 29 April 13; Farah Master, ``China
Takes Anti-Corruption Drive to Macau's Casino Halls,'' Reuters, 4
December 12.
\51\Farah Master, ``Gamblers Not So Anonymous: Beijing Keeps a
Closer Eye on Macau,'' Reuters, 29 April 13.
\52\Macau and Hong Kong, Hearing of the U.S.-China Economic and
Security Review Commission, 27 July 13, Testimony of Daniel L. Glaser,
Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing, U.S. Department of the
Treasury, 3-4.
\53\Ibid.
\54\``Cross-Border Cash Flow Controls Mooted: Report,'' Macau
Business, 5 July 13.