[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 113-59]
THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT'S POSTURE FOR SEPTEMBER 11, 2013: WHAT ARE
THE LESSONS OF BENGHAZI?
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
SEPTEMBER 19, 2013
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS
MARTHA ROBY, Alabama, Chairman
K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts
MO BROOKS, Alabama ROBERT E. ANDREWS, New Jersey
WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina JACKIE SPEIER, California
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma
Christopher Bright, Professional Staff Member
Paul Lewis, Counsel
Arthur Milikh, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2013
Page
Hearing:
Thursday, September 19, 2013, The Defense Department's Posture
for September 11, 2013: What Are the Lessons of Benghazi?...... 1
Appendix:
Thursday, September 19, 2013..................................... 21
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THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 19, 2013
THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT'S POSTURE FOR SEPTEMBER 11, 2013: WHAT ARE THE
LESSONS OF BENGHAZI?
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Roby, Hon. Martha, a Representative from Alabama, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations................... 1
Tsongas, Hon. Niki, a Representative from Massachusetts, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations........... 3
WITNESSES
Reid, Garry, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense,
Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, Department of
Defense........................................................ 4
Roberson, Maj Gen Darryl, USAF, Vice Director, Operations (J-3),
Department of Defense, Joint Staff............................. 7
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Reid, Garry.................................................. 29
Roby, Hon. Martha............................................ 25
Tsongas, Hon. Niki........................................... 28
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Ms. Speier................................................... 37
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.]
THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT'S POSTURE FOR SEPTEMBER 11, 2013: WHAT ARE THE
LESSONS OF BENGHAZI?
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations,
Washington, DC, Thursday, September 19, 2013.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 4:00 p.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Martha Roby
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARTHA ROBY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS
Mrs. Roby. Good afternoon. The subcommittee will come to
order. Last week we marked a solemn milestone. Last week we
took solemn note of the 12th anniversary of the September 11,
2001, terrorist attacks on the United States. This September 11
also was the first anniversary of the terror strike in
Benghazi, Libya. That murderous rampage killed four brave
Americans serving this Nation abroad. In the first months after
the events in Benghazi, the committee held three classified
Member briefings, three classified staff briefings, and one
hearing.
Chairman McKeon also requested additional written
information from the Department of Defense. This spring, in an
effort to direct additional dedicated resources to the
committee's effort, Chairman McKeon directed the Oversight and
Investigations Subcommittee to undertake further work on the
subject.
In a letter to the Department of Defense, Chairman McKeon
made it clear that he intended for the Committee on Armed
Services to address thoroughly, authoritatively, and
conclusively the Benghazi-related matters within its purview.
In a May briefing, the subcommittee received classified
information from today's witnesses about the Department of
Defense's actions in connection with the Benghazi attack. We
also learned about constraints on deploying other forces,
including drones and fighter aircraft. In two subsequent
briefings, we heard from flag and general officers and field
grade subordinates who were in Libya at the time or were in
contact with those who were. We learned about how these
officers understood the events as they unfolded and the
operational limitations they faced.
In order to understand fully the Department of Defense's
response, it has been necessary for the subcommittee's
briefings to be held at top secret or higher level. I am
certain that Members understand this requirement. I also expect
that they recognize that the committee has worked to allow
interested Members to hear these briefings firsthand and to
have access to the classified transcripts.
As Chairman McKeon has directed, the subcommittee's
Benghazi oversight is continuing. But based upon the
information we have collected to date, I don't believe that any
amount of heroism during the attacks could overcome the tragic
lack of preparedness leading up to it.
It does not appear that U.S. military forces, units,
aircrafts, drones, or specific personnel that could have been
readily deployed in the course of the attack in Benghazi were
unduly held back, or told to stand down, or refused permission
to enter the fight. Rather, we were so badly postured, they
could not have made a difference or we were desperately needed
elsewhere.
I hope to learn in today's hearing that we were far better
prepared to face a similar attack this September 11, and today,
than we were a year ago. The subcommittee wants to ensure our
requirement as members of this subcommittee and as members of
this committee is to ensure that the Department of Defense has
learned from Benghazi and is taking steps to minimize the
chance that a strike like that can be successful again.
This committee's work on this issue has not been, and will
not be a political exercise. Majority and minority members
alike have asked important questions about our preparedness in
2012, and I expect they will do the same this afternoon.
Before turning to Representative Tsongas, Ranking Member
Tsongas, for her opening remarks and my introduction of those,
again, at the witness table today, let me review how we will
proceed today. Our witnesses are going to make unclassified
remarks about DOD's [Department of Defense] posture last week.
To the extent that they can do so in this environment, they
will describe generally how our forces continue to be deployed.
They will also discuss what changes have come about as a result
of the lessons learned in 2012.
Immediately after we adjourn, and my understanding is that
now votes will not be called until later, so I think we have
roughly an hour, hour and 45 to maybe even 2 hours before votes
are called, so at some point, when we have exhausted this open,
unclassified briefing, then we will move up to room 2337. And
at that time, our witnesses will brief us on classified
specifics that cannot be discussed now. And I caution Members,
please, to raise only unclassified general topics in this room,
and to hold off to the classified questions for our later
session. And obviously, you, our witnesses, will direct us in
the event that it is a question that needs to wait until the
later briefing. We are also today joined by committee members
who do not sit on the subcommittee but sit on the full Armed
Services Committee. And therefore, I ask unanimous consent that
nonsubcommittee members be allowed to participate in today's
hearing after all subcommittee members have had an opportunity
to ask questions.
Is there objection?
Without objection, nonsubcommittee members will be
recognized at the appropriate time for 5 minutes.
Before I go to you, Ranking Member Tsongas, our chairman,
Mr. McKeon, is here, and so we will ask him if he has any
opening comments.
The Chairman. No.
Mrs. Roby. Okay. Now I will invite my distinguished ranking
member to make her opening remarks.
[The prepared statement of Mrs. Roby can be found in the
Appendix on page 25.]
STATEMENT OF HON. NIKI TSONGAS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
MASSACHUSETTS, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND
INVESTIGATIONS
Ms. Tsongas. Thank you, Madam Chair.
And thank you all for being here today. We have heard from
you before, and in a classified setting, and we look forward to
hearing you again today. And I thank you for all that we have
been able to learn from you.
The tragedy that took place in Benghazi on September 11,
2012, shocked and saddened the Nation. And that is what has
prompted this deep investigation of the circumstances. And we
are reminded, with the tragic shooting at DC's Navy Yard, just
how vulnerable those who serve our Nation might be, and yet
again how vigilant we must be. Since the tragedy in Benghazi,
the State Department, DOD, and Congress have worked to figure
out what went wrong in an effort to make sure that such a
tragedy never happens again.
The State Department's Accountability Review Board released
an unclassified version of their findings. Many issues were
addressed, and new measures have been put in place. And that
was a primary focus on the State Department. Today, we will
hear what the DOD has done to make sure that they are postured
to immediately respond to threats and/or attacks involving our
diplomatic facilities around the world. I look forward to your
testimony. Thank you. And I yield back.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Tsongas can be found in the
Appendix on page 28.]
Mrs. Roby. Thank you, Representative Tsongas.
Today we are joined again by Mr. Garry Reid, who is the
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special
Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, and the principal
adviser to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special
Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict. He joined the Office of the
Secretary of Defense after 28 years of military service in
Special Operations.
Major General Darryl Roberson is the vice director for
operations on the Joint Staff. Among his other military
accomplishments, General Roberson is an Air Force Command
fighter pilot with more than 865 combat hours.
Mr. Reid will give this afternoon's statement. He and
General Roberson will both respond to Members' questions.
Mr. Reid, please proceed.
STATEMENT OF GARRY REID, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE, SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT,
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. Reid. Chairman Roby, Ranking Member Tsongas, and
members of the committee, thank you for your continued interest
in our overseas posture and matters related to the tragic
events of last year. And thank you for the opportunity for
allowing us to come over today and talk about where we are on
these topics. As the chairman mentioned, a year ago, our
government facilities in North Africa and the Middle East came
under attack. These attacks took place in a region that was
being swept up by revolutions and widespread social upheaval.
In Cairo and Tunis, protesters breached the grounds of our
embassies. In Sana'a and Khartoum, the protests escalated into
attacks, which led to damage to our missions. And finally, as
you know, a terrorist attack on our facilities in Benghazi,
Libya, resulted in the tragic deaths of four brave Americans.
These events are dramatic examples of the threats and
challenges our personnel overseas currently face. The pressure
exerted by the United States and its partners has isolated the
core of Al Qaeda. As the President has said, the remaining
operatives in the Al Qaeda core spend more time thinking about
their own safety than plotting against us.
But we now confront a threat from diversified groups, some
affiliated with Al Qaeda and others not. The most well known of
the affiliated groups is Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula,
which continues to plot against the United States. But
increasingly, new groups of loosely affiliated extremists have
emerged. The upheaval in North Africa and the Middle East has
contributed to a permissive environment for such extremist
networks.
Unlike Al Qaeda core in Afghanistan and Pakistan or Al
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, these groups are mostly focused
on the countries and regions where they are based. They work
together through existing familial and tribal networks, and
focus on acting locally, as we saw in Benghazi, and at the
British Petroleum oil facility in Algeria. And as we strive to
work with our partners in the region, we see that political
changes ushered in by the Arab Spring present challenges as
well. Although many of the governments in the region are
friendly to our interests, they struggle to exert a monopoly of
force within their own borders.
So although host nations are bound by international law to
protect our diplomatic personnel, we must recognize their
capability shortfalls and work to offset them. In this
environment, the Department of Defense is working hard with our
interagency partners to ensure our military resources are best
positioned to help protect U.S. personnel and facilities
abroad.
The year since the attacks against our facility in Benghazi
has been characterized by unprecedented cooperation between the
Departments of State and Defense. From Secretaries Hagel and
Kerry, down to the staffs on both sides of the river, we are in
regular, open communication. The National Security Staff
convenes weekly reviews of threat streams and security measures
to identify hot spots, anticipate crises, and synchronize our
proactive, preventative, and contingency response planning
efforts. Our colleagues in the Intelligence Community provide
daily reporting of threat indicators and warnings. And our
combatant commanders and chiefs of mission are in regular
contact to assess threats and discuss contingency plans.
This improved interagency planning allows us to reinforce
the efforts of host governments, which under the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations, have the lead for overall
protection of our diplomats. This leads to a broader point. We
believe a proactive approach is the best way to protect our
staffs and our facilities overseas. Because once we are in a
rescue situation, the chances of a positive outcome for both
our diplomats and our military forces attempting to rescue them
are already reduced.
To this end, much of our work over the last year has been
to place an emphasis on acting before the crisis. One of the
most visible measures of security at U.S. diplomatic posts is
the Marine Security Guard detachment. We appreciate Congress'
expansion of the Marine Security Guard program in the National
Defense Authorization Act for 2013, which allowed us to add up
to 1,000 Marines into this valuable program.
This increase in personnel underpins a broader expansion of
Marine Security Guards. We are raising the minimum size of
existing Marine Security Guard detachments at high-threat,
high-risk posts from 7 to 13. These increases have already
begun, and will be complete next month.
We are fielding 35 new Marine Security Guard detachments to
posts that do not currently have them. Three of those
detachments have already deployed; seven more will be in the
field by the end of this year; and we aim to have the remainder
of them fielded by the end of 2014.
The United States Marine Corps has established the Marine
Security Augmentation Unit in Quantico, Virginia, which will be
able to provide Marine Security Guards on short notice at the
requests of chiefs of mission. These Marines are drawn from
combat units and have extra training in close quarters battle,
trauma, weapons, and tactics. Six squads will be available by
the end of this year, and we have already seen the benefit of
this approach. At the request of the Department of State,
Marines from these units were sent to eight posts in advance of
the September 11 anniversary last week.
As we have grown the Marine Security Guard program, we have
also enhanced their ability to protect U.S. facilities and
citizens. For instance, in July of this year, the Department of
State and the U.S. Marine Corps amended the mission of the
Marine Security Guards to elevate the protection of people and
facilities to be a co-equal priority with the protection of
classified information. Just a few weeks ago, the Department of
State also approved the use of additional crowd control weapons
for Marine Security Guards.
Both of these changes, when combined with the expansion of
the program, reduce risks to our citizens and facilities where
Marine Security Guards are deployed. At some posts, we need a
higher level of security. At many high-risk posts, the
Department of State is hardening the facilities or is
increasing the numbers of security personnel at the post. The
Department of State is using lessons learned to improve
physical security and assess the best methods of providing that
security for the Department to conduct U.S. foreign policy
objectives. Facility security is focused on delaying mobs and
small group attacks, with a tiered defense of physical barriers
and protection against bomb-laden vehicles with perimeter anti-
ram barriers, crowd access controls, and setback distance.
In places where the threat is high and the host nation's
capacity is low or our facility is vulnerable, the Department
of Defense can be a bridging solution by either providing
temporary forces at post or by enhancing the posture of nearby
response forces and assets until those risks are brought to a
more manageable level by permanent solutions. Security
augmentation forces, DOD security augmentation forces, provide
the ambassador with a robust security capability. And we know
the presence of a larger force can be a deterrent to those
considering an attack against the facility.
In some cases, when a decision is made to reduce embassy
staff due to heightened threats, DOD can also assist with
airlift and other transportation in support of a noncombatant
evacuation. We will discuss the details of how we have done
this more recently in the closed session. In those countries
where we have willing but less capable host nation security
forces, the administration is investing in building the
capacity of host nation forces, who are required under
international law to be our first line of defense. Although we
understand that we cannot be solely dependent on our partners
for security, we must encourage and, where appropriate, help
them live up to their responsibilities. Through the use of
available Department of Defense authorities, such as section
1206 Global Train and Equip and the Global Security Contingency
Fund, we will continue to build the capacity of partner forces
in the Middle East and North Africa. These and other efforts
that allow direct military-to-military engagement provide an
opportunity to improve their overall ability to respond to
threats against our shared interests, as well as build
relationships with their security forces that can be invaluable
in a crisis.
Lastly, as Major General Roberson will explain in greater
detail during the closed session, I want to underscore that we
are more ready than ever to respond to a crisis or attack if
one occurs without warning. In addition to realigning our
forces around the globe, we have made joint planning between
combatant commanders and chiefs of mission at high-threat,
high-risk posts a priority task. As a consequence of these
efforts, the combatant commands now have a better understanding
of the threats and expectations at diplomatic posts. In turn,
the chiefs of mission at these posts now have our best estimate
of response times to inform their decisions about adjustments
to staff presence in times of increased security threats. The
President has made clear that we must mitigate risk to our
personnel and facilities with preventive, proactive security
steps and contingency response plans.
Although we cannot eliminate the risks completely in all
cases, I believe we have made significant progress over the
last year toward getting the right balance between our needs to
deploy personnel into these dangerous areas around the world to
advance our security interests, and the risks to U.S. personnel
and facilities inherent with those deployments. We are taking
prudent steps to reduce the vulnerability of people and
facilities abroad, while not turning our embassies into
fortresses and degrading our diplomats' ability to do the
critical work that benefits us all.
Madam Chairman, I thank you again for the invitation to be
before you and discuss these important subjects. I am happy to
respond to any questions you or members of the subcommittee may
have. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Reid can be found in the
Appendix on page 29.]
Mrs. Roby. Thank you.
General Roberson.
STATEMENT OF MAJ GEN DARRYL ROBERSON, USAF, VICE DIRECTOR,
OPERATIONS (J-3), DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, JOINT STAFF
General Roberson. Madam Chairman Roby, Ranking Member
Tsongas, and members of the committee, it is my honor to be
here today.
I don't need to repeat what Mr. Reid has already said, so I
would just like to highlight three main points and then open it
up for questions.
First of all, our force posture today is better suited to
what we call the new normal. We have added several entities to
the list of alert forces, and the Marines have really moved out
on this, bringing additional capabilities and strengthening
their longstanding relationship with the State Department. We
have deployed key response forces abroad and aligned lift to
those forces. This has allowed DOD to adjust the location of
these response forces, as required or needed, and to reduce
their response times. And I will be happy to elaborate on these
forces during our classified session following this hearing.
The second point I would like to make is that the
cooperation and the progress with the State Department and the
whole interagency has truly been significant over the past
year. Weekly meetings and sometimes daily phone calls have
allowed us to synchronize our efforts. And the latest response
to the Yemen threat just recently in the last few weeks is a
great example that I would once again like to elaborate on
during our classified session.
Finally, we have shifted our focus from simply reacting to
crises to proactively addressing potential crises. Through
better intelligence sharing, engaging our partners, helping to
develop host nation capacity, and augmenting our diplomatic
facilities with DOD security professionals ahead of a crisis,
we have placed greater emphasis on getting in front of the
attack.
Madam Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to discuss
our progress, and we look forward to your questions.
Mrs. Roby. Thank you, sir.
And let me just begin, as I don't want to miss the
opportunity to tell you both thank you again for your service
to our country. And on behalf of my family, thank you to your
families who support you and are also serving our country.
And I want to start with, assuming that the changes that
you outlined today had been in place on September 1 or even
September 10 of 2012, would the U.S. preparation for and the
response to the Benghazi attack differed?
Mr. Reid. Let me make sure I understood. You said, were
these current situations in place a year ago, would the
response have been different? Is that the question?
Mrs. Roby. Right. So all the changes that you have made in
preparedness, lessons learned, if those had been in place
today, would the response have been different in 2012?
Mr. Reid. Yes. The capabilities in place now and in place
on the alert status that we had them last week, modulated to
the very highest level, would significantly have increased and
improved our response capability. Yes.
Mrs. Roby. In building on that, would a different or more
robust mix of forces been available to the Department of
Defense once the attack commenced?
Mr. Reid. Again, yes. And we can talk the details and lay
out for you precisely which types of forces and which positions
we have arrayed to address that question.
Mrs. Roby. And could the forces have responded faster?
Mr. Reid. And again, yes. And I would just point out that
in this session, we can say that we have modulated--we modulate
this with the indicators and warnings and the threats. And you
can look back over the past several months, and multiple
instances where we take this force to a higher response
posture, quicker response posture. Keep in mind, when you talk
about an alert response force and you say, you, force
commander, detachment commander, your force must be able to get
on this airplane and be in the air in 1 hour, or 2 hours, I
would say anything up to 4 hours, that is all you can do if you
are that person, if you are that element. You cannot go very
far from that position. You are basically sitting on an
airfield, and the air crew, same thing, accentuated even more
because they have to keep the aircraft ready.
So when you take a force and you say I want to be in the
air in 4 hours, that is a rapid response. And I think it is
hard for folks to imagine, because we are used to 911, and
police and fire. But that is not the same thing. So getting
that force on that posture, when we put them say at 1 hour
alert time, we have to do that in a way that we can manage the
time that that takes. Because if you want that over a long
period of time, then you have to have multiple sets of that
force that can cycle through. And, you know, on a week by week
or month by month basis. Then you have to start thinking about
training and readiness. Because, again, you can go no further
than you can be back and be on that aircraft in that time
frame. In many cases, now you have to say, well, what if I want
this force to go out and do rehearsals? What if I want them to
go to the rifle range?
Mrs. Roby. Right.
Mr. Reid. So it is a compounded effort.
Mrs. Roby. Of the changes that you discussed here today, is
there one or two that is of most significance that you would
like to highlight again? I mean, I know you pointed out a long
list of changes, but can we drill down and talk about one or
two that are of most significance?
Mr. Reid. The two I would highlight would be putting
tailored response forces in closer proximity to the area of
most anticipated need, and dedicating airlift to those assets
is, one, highly significant. I would point out, though, just to
keep the balance here between sort of proactive and reactive,
because I always want to bring this back to what we can do
ahead of things, the growth of the Marines and expanding the
size of these detachments and refocusing them, because this is
really the more on-the-scene asset for areas--again, we are
talking about Africa, the distance from southern Europe to
Mali----
Mrs. Roby. And in 2012, is it a fair assessment that we
were only postured to be reactive, and now these changes allow
for us to be proactive? Is that a fair statement?
Mr. Reid. But keep in mind, we had Marines at embassies for
decades. So we weren't totally reactive.
Mrs. Roby. But as it related to this attack in Benghazi, it
was reactive, rather than proactive, and the changes and the
lessons learned are we are now postured to be proactive.
Mr. Reid. Yes, Madam Chair. And again, also remember two
things. Augmenting ahead of a crisis in some areas where the
threat is not perceived to be imminent or the facility is more
hardened, adding a smaller force there is substantial. In other
places, and we can talk the details, that are very dangerous
areas, putting additional forces in there now proactively
beyond the capability of Marine Security Guards, I am talking
about security augmentation forces of significant numbers,
again, that is something we had in some places before the
attacks of last year.
Mrs. Roby. Right.
Mr. Reid. But we have added more of those in the area of
this interest as well.
Mrs. Roby. Okay. My time has way expired. So thank you.
Ranking Member Tsongas.
Ms. Tsongas. Thank you. You have described a sort of DOD to
State Department regularized process by which you sort of
assess what the threats are out there. Can you describe sort of
the structure of it? Where does it reside? How is it
implemented? Just to have a sense of sort of how embedded it is
in both institutions. I am sorry we don't have the State
Department here. It is not our purview. But because it is so
co-dependent, really, I would like to hear how this has been
structured so that it takes place as it should.
Mr. Reid. The linkage, the interagency linkage is provided
in this example by the National Security Staff. And within that
structure, we have groups that are focused full time on
counterterrorism, we have groups that are focused on regional
issues, and we have another group that is focused on strategic
issues. What we have done in this past year is bring those for
the purpose of this threat into a common forum, chaired at a
very senior level, with participation at a senior level within
our Department at the deputies level. And as the general
mentioned, in that context once a week. The other lower level
is a daily interaction. But that is where it comes together.
Separately, though, we have direct relations with our
colleagues in Diplomatic Security, Assistant Secretary Starr, I
believe, who has had a hearing today, Greg Starr is one of our
constant colleagues. Deputy Assistant Secretary Bill Miller,
which is a position created after the Benghazi attack, is the
deputy assistant secretary for security at high-threat posts.
We are in very regular contact. And some of the folks that are
here with us today at the action officer level also established
these counterpart relationships that are much more robust. The
access was always there, but the focus, the intensity, the
repetition and the levels at which we do it has been increased
significantly over the past year.
Ms. Tsongas. Would you say the State Department could
report a similar sort of structure change so that they have the
same feeling that this information is flowing back and forth as
you are describing from the DOD's point of view?
Mr. Reid. I know this. And at, at least, our weekly
meetings, but I do know it happens more often, but at our
weekly meetings, all threats are reviewed. Again, these types--
there are broad threats everywhere, but this diplomatic
security threat in particular, all threats are briefed, all
agencies, not just us and the Department of State, all agencies
are asked, are there any threats that you know about that
weren't mentioned, or are there any threats you just heard
about for the first time? And do we need to elaborate? That is
one. And the second part of that is, is everybody getting the
support and cooperation from the other agencies? The question
posed back to us, have we responded to all requests for
security? And it is posed back to Secretary Starr and Under
Secretary Kennedy in this context.
You know, are all your requests of DOD being met? And that
is done at the deputies level every week. But again, we do it
every day at a lower level. So I do firmly believe that we
would all have the same answer to this question, because we are
in the same room frequently.
Ms. Tsongas. And if there is a disagreement between the two
Departments, what is the dispute resolution mechanism, knowing
that timing is very important?
Mr. Reid. Well, we work problems at the lowest level. We
are already operating at a very senior level. So I can't off
the top of my head think of a dispute we could not have
resolved. But as I mentioned, Secretary Kerry and Secretary
Hagel have met separately; they have met on this topic. And
they have met with the President on this topic. So, you know,
there is no pending disputes. But again, our focus----
Ms. Tsongas. There are cultures, though, there are cultures
within the two Departments that may merit sort of different
approaches to things.
General Roberson. Ma'am, I would just say that over the
past year, you know, we have gotten this down better than we
have ever in the past. And I would say that right now, it is as
good as it can be. And we continue to expect that that will be
the case for the future. So every day, we have people very
dedicated to the high-threat, high-risk areas, as well as
around the world. And we routinely coordinate. I mean, I pick
up the phone weekly, if not daily, with folks over at the State
Department.
Ms. Tsongas. Thank you.
I yield back.
Mrs. Roby. Mr. Scott.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I have just got a couple of questions before we move to the
next area. But do you believe, Mr. Reid, I just ask you this,
do you believe that the ambassador was the target or do you
believe the special mission was the target?
Mr. Reid. I believe the United States was the target, the
facilities representing the interests of the United States for
this attack. I am assuming you are talking about the attack on
Benghazi. I believe the United States presence was the target,
but my own personal view.
Mr. Scott. General, do you believe that the ambassador was
the target, or do you believe the mission was the target?
General Roberson. Sir, I believe that there were many
people in Libya that truly loved the ambassador.
Mr. Scott. The ambassador had not been to that facility in
approximately a year, if I am reading the reports right. Is
that correct? When was the last time----
Mr. Reid. I am not aware of the details of his travel.
General Roberson. Yes, sir. Same here. I mean, the State
Department could answer that.
Mr. Scott. Okay. Madam Chair, I guess with one last
question. What about the human intelligence on the ground in
these other countries? Have we been able to--I know, obviously,
we have got a lot of technology, and we can pick up on a lot of
things through technology. What about our human intelligence
capabilities? Can you speak to that?
Mr. Reid. I can speak in general here and in more detail
later. I would say that when we talk about building capacity in
these countries oriented on these threats, expanding
intelligence capacity of our own and of our partners is an
element of that.
Mr. Scott. I will tell you, I think the ambassador was the
target. I think it was an outright assassination. I don't think
these guys just got that lucky and got--and hit the special
mission when the ambassador happened to be there.
Madam Chair, I will yield the remainder of my time and look
forward to the next.
Mrs. Roby. Thank you.
Ms. Duckworth.
Ms. Duckworth. Thank you, Madam Chair.
And I would like to take a moment to thank you for your
leadership in this hearing and focusing it on lessons learned
and what we can do better for our brave Americans who serve all
around the world, both in the State Department and in the
Department of Defense.
Gentlemen, I had another Benghazi hearing just today
actually, earlier today, and one of the things that came to
light was the fact that the State Department does not have as
much experience in doing risk assessments to the level that
those in the military does. You know, even the frontline
leader, the buck sergeant, knows how to do a risk assessment
and a risk mitigation.
Similarly, General, with aviators, this is in your blood.
You do this before every single mission, throughout the
mission. One of the things that I am hearing is that the State
Department did not do a good risk assessment in deciding to
continue to be in Benghazi. I wonder, with the greater
coordination between the Department of Defense and the State
Department, if you could talk a little bit more about the
interagency coordination process between DOD and the Department
of State, and perhaps to some of the lessons learned such as
the risk assessment. Have you been able to sort of share some
of that knowledge, some of that experience with the folks in
the Department of State?
Mr. Reid. Absolutely. My own military background,
experience, I worked quite a bit with Diplomatic Security in
the context of embassy security. And I would first say that I
take your point about the general military planning and
assessment process. I think we have got that way over-optimized
as a cultural item. But on the other hand, assessing risk in
terms of physical risk and mitigation measures for a forward-
operating base or a fire base is different than doing it for a
diplomatic facility. And I think there is an art and science
that Diplomatic Security colleagues are much more skilled and
capable of applying in that context than we would be. But in
the middle of that, and folks that we do provide them to help
with these assessments, we have interagency assessment teams.
Right after the attacks of last year, we sent DOD special
operators out with Diplomatic Security assessment teams to 19
diplomatic locations in the areas of the greatest risk to do an
immediate interagency security assessment. That is something we
have always done within the combatant commands.
The combatant commands provide survey teams to diplomatic
posts in their area. Every Department of State emergency action
plan includes a military annex, where we contribute our own
assessments into that process. So we have always been joined in
that effort. And I think the collaboration where we have gone
in the last year is now at an even higher level. We have tasked
all the combatant commands to go to every embassy and every
chief of mission and dissect that scenario, look at the
facility.
You have heard, I am sure, from our State colleagues of the
variances in the facilities and the level of construction. And
we have gone to detail in every one of those and matched that
with our military capability and our military footprint in
these areas of operation. This is all the commands, not just
AFRICOM [Africa Command]. And where we have to factor in
distance and factor in lack of basing, and balance that against
the threat, and really do a cooperative assessment so we have a
common understanding. And within all of that these assessments
and this sharing of how we look at the problem, it happens at
every level up the chain to close whatever gap there may be
that you are referring to in mind-set or in approach to
assessing risk.
Ms. Duckworth. Thank you. General.
General Roberson. Ma'am, I would just add one point and
reemphasize another. The first point is many of the State
Department's personnel that are in this business of risk
assessment are prior military. So they have that background in
many ways as well. And then I would just reconfirm what Mr.
Reid has said, in that the State Department has expertise, and
they are good at this, too. And we help, whenever they ask, to
make these assessments.
Ms. Duckworth. Thank you, gentlemen.
I yield back my time.
Mrs. Roby. Mr. Bridenstine.
Mr. Bridenstine. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Just had a couple of questions for the major general. I
guess my question is, are you aware of any requirement to have
a carrier presence in the Mediterranean and what that
requirement might be?
General Roberson. Sir, I am very aware of that.
Unfortunately, I can't talk about it in this forum, but I would
be happy to share that with you in the classified session
following this.
Mr. Bridenstine. Okay. Regarding the host nation in this
case, it seemed like the host nation was wholly inadequate at
providing security for our diplomats. Would you agree with that
assessment?
General Roberson. Sir, in this case, in the Libya case for
Benghazi, yes.
Mr. Bridenstine. In these cases, and certainly there are
other cases around the world, is it your assessment that we are
currently postured with American forces to provide that
security when the host nation can't provide it?
General Roberson. Sir, what I would say is this is part of
the new normal that I was referring to in the opening
statement. And what has happened is even though countries, some
countries that are a part of this Arab Spring are willing and
want to do this protection of embassy personnel for all of the
countries there, they are physically incapable or the capacity
doesn't exist. So especially where those circumstances exist,
we are working very hard to try to increase the capacity of the
host nations.
Mr. Bridenstine. So, apart from just increasing the
capacity, which is going to take time, and of course between
now and then there is a gap, are we currently postured for the
protection of those embassies?
General Roberson. And the way that I would answer that,
sir, is the protection of the embassy as a whole is a layered
defense posture. So we work on multiple layers. And again, the
State Department has primary responsibility for putting that
layered defense together. DOD plays a very specific role in
capabilities. We add to that as State Department asks for us.
But where we have an identified gap, we are working with the
State Department, and DOD is helping to shore those gaps up.
Mr. Bridenstine. So that there are currently gaps. And I
guess my next question is where those gaps exist, is there a
response that would withdraw our diplomatic folks in those
areas where those gaps exist?
General Roberson. Absolutely, sir. And we have seen recent
cases of this. We withdrew personnel out of Beirut just
recently due to the circumstances. And in the classified brief,
I would like to speak to what we did in Sana'a in Yemen
regarding this kind of situation as well. So very definitely,
based on the circumstances and the situation, the indications
and warning, the threats that we are facing, we all collaborate
together to make a determination on the best way to proceed.
And one of the pre-bang activities that we look for is
evacuating the embassy.
Mr. Bridenstine. So, in an unclassified setting, obviously,
we can't talk about what the carrier requirement might be in
the Mediterranean; can you say if we were adhering to whatever
requirement there might be?
General Roberson. Definitely, sir.
Mr. Bridenstine. We were adhering to that? Is that correct?
General Roberson. Are we now?
Mr. Bridenstine. No, were we at that time adhering to the
requirement for the carrier presence in the Mediterranean,
whatever that requirement might be?
General Roberson. Sir, I am not exactly sure why you are
referencing the carrier presence. And again, I would be happy
to discuss this in the classified environment for, you know,
Benghazi of last year. I will just say that we were postured as
we thought was appropriate, and we were meeting all
requirements at the time that Benghazi happened.
Mr. Bridenstine. Roger that. Thank you.
Mrs. Roby. Ms. Speier.
Ms. Speier. Thank you, Madam Chair.
And thank you both for participating today. There was
another committee hearing on Benghazi today. We were in
Oversight and Government Reform for 6 hours. And there was an
interesting point that was raised that--and forgive me if it
has already been addressed here--but of the 240 embassies we
have around the world, about a third of them are in a similar
vulnerable setting as was Benghazi, where they are interim
missions. They are not full-out embassies, and that we could
potentially have similar issues in about a third of these
sites. Can you comment on that?
Mr. Reid. I would comment on how--where we fit in on the
Defense side and how this contributes to the greater effort,
and acknowledging your point, Madam, that all facilities are
not created equally as a matter of construction standards and a
matter of infrastructure and a matter of host nation and the
physical environment. We absolutely agree with that. What we
have done in our cooperative assessments with chiefs of mission
and with State colleagues back here in Washington is look at
each one of these and participate in a dialogue about what
could be done, what ought to be done, what should be done.
Ms. Speier. So you are alerted to the fact that about a
third of these facilities are inadequate in terms of security.
Mr. Reid. We have a post-by-post listing of what type--
there is three general construction standards. And we have that
breakdown and we know which posts are of which construction. We
share that with State colleagues. Absolutely.
Ms. Speier. All right. So Admiral Mullen said to General
Ham that he was inclined to extend the Security Support Team
mission, and Ambassador Stevens wanted that mission extended
for both security and training purposes, but the State
Department official said, quote, ``Didn't want to be
embarrassed by having DOD continue to provide security,''
unquote. Now, have we gotten to the point where we have
addressed someone in State Department's purview that is
reluctant to rely on DOD support because it doesn't feel right
or--I was just very troubled by that comment.
Mr. Reid. I am not a firsthand witness to the conversation,
but I have read some of the documents pertinent to the security
team in Tripoli. And my understanding is that the ambassador
was transitioning from a DOD security element to an element
comprised of Diplomatic Security agents.
Ms. Speier. No, I understand that. But State was kind of
driving the train here and basically wanted to shift from DOD
to State Department security, I guess. And I am wondering if
DOD can trump State if they believe that the security risk is
great.
Mr. Reid. I would--a bit hypothetical, but I am very
confident that right now, if we had a conversation in these
interagency and these security meetings that I referred to
earlier, and as I said, the dialogue is, is everyone aware of
the threats? Is everyone comfortable with the solutions? That
conversation would definitely take place today. I can't speak
for exactly what conversations took place at the Department of
State a year ago. But I would also, again, though, underscore
that our team in Tripoli was a temporary solution that was sent
there to help get that facility back up and running, and to
allow the State Department to transition to Diplomatic
Security. That is exactly what the plan was. And as I
understand it, that is the plan the ambassador was executing.
It wasn't a refusal, or as you mentioned--and I can't speak to
the quote you are offering from someone else about was it
stubbornness or whatever. From our view, it was always part of
the plan.
Ms. Speier. One military official was quoted in the press
saying that DOD has shifted from being reactive to anticipating
and being more proactive against the crisis. Based on what you
are saying, you would concur with that.
Mr. Reid. If you are referring to events over the past 12
months of how we are approaching this problem, ma'am, yes,
absolutely. A proactive approach is our best preferred
recommended approach because, again, we are trying to temper
expectations that we, I think as then-Secretary Panetta
mentioned in his testimony, we are not the fire station down on
the corner.
Ms. Speier. One last question. Part of the response to
Benghazi is to improve intelligence collection. How much
progress has the Department made in hiring Arabic speakers and
others that would improve our human intelligence capabilities?
Mr. Reid. Ma'am, I don't--I am not aware of the details of
that, but I would be happy to take that for the record and get
you an answer from the Department.
Ms. Speier. Thank you.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 37.]
Mrs. Roby. The gentlelady's time has expired.
Mr. Thornberry.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you, Madam Chair.
General, this may be somewhat repetitive, but I just want
to try to understand. So a Benghazi-like incident starts to
occur in country X today, who makes the decision to put
response forces on a heightened alert?
General Roberson. Sir, the way that that process works
right now is if we have indications and warning of any type
beforehand, then we will adapt our forces based on that
information. So we will start doing the proactive front side
before the bang kind of measures. So we use that indications
and warning. We will start to either augment the facility with
extra forces. We will draw down the embassy, and this is all in
coordination with the interagency. So the answer to your
question of who makes it is the situation is discussed in this
environment that we talked about collaboratively, and we make
the decision together.
Mr. Thornberry. I am really talking about the response
forces. Is it the combatant command or the Joint Staff that
says, okay, there may be a problem here, we need to put these
particular forces on a heightened alert?
General Roberson. Yes, sir. The response forces are under
the command of the combatant commander.
Mr. Thornberry. Okay. And so something starts to happen.
Then who decides whether to send those forces into a particular
situation? Can the combatant commander--particularly, if there
is an embassy under attack, is it the combatant commander on
his own? Can he only send those forces in response to a request
from the State Department or some other government agency? How
does that work exactly?
General Roberson. Sir, I would say that it depends on the
circumstances and the situation. The commander will, you know,
depending on the situation, again, when we get indications that
we need to move forces, if we are going to go into another
country, then we have to elevate that level of decision all the
way up to the President.
Mr. Thornberry. So the President would have to--Benghazi
happens again. Just like it, you know, essentially, except it
happens today, and the President would have to decide to send
some military forces into Libya, into Benghazi to assist or to
evacuate Americans?
Mr. Reid. The approval authority for the military operation
rests with the President. That is correct. We can provide ahead
of time a framework for--accelerate that in real time. And as
you are aware, the President can make a decision and then
delegate the timing of that to the Secretary or the combatant
commander. All of this in this example would be initiated by
the chief of mission in the first instance. And this process we
put in place leans as far forward into that as we can. And as
you are aware, there are other factors dealing with host nation
and these other dynamics because, again, the first effort on
the ground, if anything is starting to happen, is to get the
host nation on the scene as well. So there is parallel
dialogue.
But to the root of your question, launching a military
operation into a sovereign country is a decision the President
makes.
Mr. Thornberry. Okay. Thank you.
I yield back.
Mrs. Roby. Mr. Nugent.
Mr. Nugent. Thank you, Madam Chair.
And I appreciate our panel today. I think the question
keeps coming back, though, is: does DOD have the ability to
supersede State Department when there is a specific threat to
an embassy or, like, in Benghazi, to that outpost? Do we have
the ability, does DOD have the ability to supersede and say, it
is just not safe to have our people here?
Mr. Reid. Our people being all Americans? You are not
referring just to the DOD people?
Mr. Nugent. Because typically we will have a small presence
of DOD personnel there. So those personnel are at risk just
like Department of State personnel. But DOD's responsibility,
obviously, should primarily be to its personnel. And if they
are put in a position because of a decision by the ambassador,
does DOD have the ability to overrule that?
Mr. Reid. If I could take that in two parts. Clearly, the
Secretary has the authority to move DOD people out of a
situation. That would be an extreme example, but he certainly
has that ability. To the question of should we do something
different in a country, I mean, the chief of mission is the
President's representative in that country. The engine of this
dialogue and decision originates with the chief of mission. In
our collaborative forum that we have, if at any level a Defense
representative sees a risk or an unaddressed problem, we have
the ability to raise that successively up through the chain as
high as it would need to go. But I wouldn't put that in the
context of an overriding the chief of mission. I mean, the
chief of mission is the President's representative.
Mr. Nugent. It just seems that when you task DOD with a
security detail, that, at some point in time, DOD, while I
respect the ambassador's position and chief of mission and all
that, they don't necessarily have the same experience as
whoever you have in charge at a local mission, or at least the
DOD representative that may have a little more experience in
regards to, hey, listen, we can't defend this compound because
of just the physical layout with the number of personnel that
we have.
Mr. Reid. Again, I fully believe we have a dialogue
process. And that has been unfolded in hearings on this with
the site security team leaders and the SOC [Special Operations
Command] Africa representatives that came here. And I think
what you heard is they had a dialogue with the charge or the
chief of mission, they worked collaboratively, but they were
also connected to their military headquarters. So it isn't one
or the other. We are there are in support of the chief of
mission. There is a military chain of command that exists
through Title 10. The chief of mission isn't necessarily an
element of that chain of command. But we put forces out there
in support of that chief of mission, and we have agreements,
and we have a resolution process to bring up anything that may
rise to the level of a disagreement.
Mr. Nugent. And I guess this is where the American public
is somewhat confused in regards to the role of DOD,
particularly at security of missions. And I am glad to hear
that there is an expanded role for the Marines as they relate,
because we were told, you know, last time they are basically
there to protect documents and destroy documents, not in
protecting people. And I think that was kind of reversed from
where it should be. And I am glad to see that that has been
reversed. Am I correct on that?
Mr. Reid. You are correct. It is an equal priority. And
just to add to the previous narrative and perhaps make it even
more confusing, but the Marine Security Guards, again, we have
an agreement, a memorandum of agreement between the
Departments, they are under the direction of the Regional
Security Officer. There is a different example of a day-to-day
guidance and direction to that element. There is a very
complicated dialogue about if there is an act of war that comes
on top of that and how we manage that. But that example, they
are under the direction of the ambassador through his Regional
Security Officer by agreement between the two Departments for
day-to-day embassy operations, which can rise to the point of
riots and crises and other things. We have that system in place
as well. The augmentation piece we are talking about people
coming in is a bit of a different formulation. But they both
exist.
Mr. Nugent. I appreciated your response.
I yield back.
Mrs. Roby. Dr. Wenstrup.
Dr. Wenstrup. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Thank you, gentlemen. I appreciate taking lessons learned
and putting some things into action. You know, there was
requests from Benghazi for increased security earlier than the
attack, like as soon as August, maybe even sooner, and you
talked about risk assessments being done. So this request was
made--there were requests made to the State Department. Was
there a risk assessment done by the State Department before the
attack when these requests were made for increased security, or
an evaluation of the increased threats?
Mr. Reid. Yeah, I apologize, but I don't know the details
of exactly who or what or when was requested, and I have heard
in these hearings other people comment, but I don't feel
comfortable saying what they did. I believe and I have heard in
hearings about additions and security enhancements, for
instance, at the temporary mission facility, so I would assume
there was assessments and requisitions and things happening,
but I don't know the details.
Dr. Wenstrup. That may be something we should ask the State
Department to see if they did that. Thank you for that.
Is there a protocol more in place today of handling
requests for increased security that go through the State
Department that will incorporate DOD's input to it?
Mr. Reid. Yes, and it is the same process that exists
broadly for any interagency request for support. We have
received at least two, I could give you the details separately,
formal requests for augmentation at diplomatic posts, and so
there is a formal request process that goes from Department to
Department and there is at that level, and then, obviously, the
informal coordination that sorts out all of the details.
Typically, receive a request, comes through, we already know it
is coming because we work with these folks every day. We would
assign that in terms of DOD to a combatant commander or an
element of the force. They would link up with the customer, do
an assessment, do a survey, figure out exactly what the details
are, and then the Secretaries will agree, and off we go.
Dr. Wenstrup. So, at this point, if there is a risk, both
Departments would be involved, both State and DOD, and maybe
that wasn't the case before?
Mr. Reid. I would say it was the case before. What is
different now is we address these more regularly at higher
levels within our branches in our Departments, up to the, as I
mentioned before, up to national security staff level.
Dr. Wenstrup. And of course, in the process of coming up
with lessons learned and taking actions, you review the
incidents that took place and how you can make things better in
the future. And that usually comes from an after-action review.
Is there an after-action review that we may be able to see at
some point in a better setting?
Mr. Reid. The primary after-action review that--for us was
the ARB [Accountability Review Board], and at the time,
Secretary Panetta ensured that we were linked up with the
Accountability Review Board. That is the more formal after-
action report that we participated in.
Dr. Wenstrup. Was there after-action review done by the
people involved with the incident, say, within 24 hours, or a
week?
Mr. Reid. At the military unit level, I think it is a
matter of just military operations, and some of you know this,
they have an after-action review process internally. And then
there is a broader effort across, again, all of the Department
in terms of lessons learned and, you know, we have lessons
learned databases, and Web sites, and classified lessons
learned. USSOCOM [United States Special Operations Command] has
an entire effort to do joint lessons learned, and they are all
promulgated and proliferated out to everybody.
Dr. Wenstrup. I guess what I am asking is in the proper
setting, would we have access to some of those reviews,
especially the most early reviews?
Mr. Reid. Sure. I mean, we can talk to specifics if there
is something in particular you are asking for. If it is just
more general, we could definitely follow up and talk about
whatever has been asked. You know, we responded to many of the
requests for documents, and we have people that do that that we
could link up and figure out if there is any gaps.
Dr. Wenstrup. Okay, thank you very much.
General Roberson. If I could just add, you know, routinely,
as a part of the chairman's program, we are still culling
lessons learned from Iraq. We are still culling lessons learned
from Afghanistan. This is a continual process that we go
through, and so this, Benghazi results and all of that will be
a part of a process that we will continue to review and learn
from.
Dr. Wenstrup. Thank you, gentlemen.
I yield back.
Mrs. Roby. Ms. Tsongas.
Ms. Tsongas. Just as a follow-up, it is my understanding
that Admiral Mullen said as part of the ARB process that he did
look at all, whatever there might have been, that constituted
an after-action review. So that--just to put that into the
record.
Thank you.
Mrs. Roby. Okay, this part is adjourned, and if we would,
votes are imminent. If we could please move to 2337, Members
only, and we will begin the next part of this up there
immediately.
[Whereupon, at 5:04 p.m., the subcommittee proceeded to
closed session.]
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A P P E N D I X
September 19, 2013
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
September 19, 2013
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[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
September 19, 2013
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RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. SPEIER
Mr. Reid. Based on information provided by the Under Secretary of
Defense for Intelligence, overall, the Defense Intelligence Community
continues to face challenges in acquiring linguists at the professional
proficiency level. To better understand the challenge faced by the
Department in managing linguists, it is important to discern the
difference between speakers with tested capabilities and the language
tasks to be performed.
Language capabilities are not ``one size fit all''--for example, we
cannot take Cryptologic Language Analysts skilled in passive language
skills like listening and expect them to perform as HUMINT collectors,
a mission that demands active language skills like speaking fluency.
The Department is continuously balancing these language requirements in
order to ensure that we not only increase the overall number of trained
linguists, but we also best match language tested capabilities to
mission needs. [See page 15.]