[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
BORDER SECURITY OVERSIGHT: IDENTIFYING AND RESPONDING TO CURRENT
THREATS
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
of the
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT
AND GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JUNE 27, 2013
__________
Serial No. 113-53
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
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Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov
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COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM
DARRELL E. ISSA, California, Chairman
JOHN L. MICA, Florida ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland,
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio Ranking Minority Member
JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
PATRICK T. McHENRY, North Carolina ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
JIM JORDAN, Ohio Columbia
JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
TIM WALBERG, Michigan WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
JUSTIN AMASH, Michigan JIM COOPER, Tennessee
PAUL A. GOSAR, Arizona GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania JACKIE SPEIER, California
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee MATTHEW A. CARTWRIGHT,
TREY GOWDY, South Carolina Pennsylvania
BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas MARK POCAN, Wisconsin
DOC HASTINGS, Washington TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
CYNTHIA M. LUMMIS, Wyoming ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
ROB WOODALL, Georgia DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky TONY CARDENAS, California
DOUG COLLINS, Georgia STEVEN A. HORSFORD, Nevada
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina MICHELLE LUJAN GRISHAM, New Mexico
KERRY L. BENTIVOLIO, Michigan
RON DeSANTIS, Florida
Lawrence J. Brady, Staff Director
John D. Cuaderes, Deputy Staff Director
Stephen Castor, General Counsel
Linda A. Good, Chief Clerk
David Rapallo, Minority Staff Director
Subcommittee on National Security, Homeland Defense and Foreign
Operations
JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah, Chairman
JOHN L. MICA, Florida JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts,
JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee Ranking Minority Member
JUSTIN AMASH, Michigan CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
PAUL A. GOSAR, Arizona STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
TREY GOWDY, South Carolina JACKIE SPEIER, California
CYNTHIA M. LUMMIS, Wyoming PETER WELCH, Vermont
ROB WOODALL, Georgia MICHELLE LUJAN GRISHAM, New Mexico
KERRY L. BENTIVOLIO, Michigan
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on June 27, 2013.................................... 1
WITNESSES
Mr. Michael Fisher, Chief, U.S. Border Patrol, Customs and Border
Protection
Oral Statement............................................... 5
Written Statement............................................ 7
Mr. David J. Murphy, Assisting Acting Commissioner, Customs and
Border Protection, Office of Field Operations
Oral Statement............................................... 16
Mr. Thomas Homan, Executive Associate Director, Enforcement and
Removal Operations, USICE
Oral Statement............................................... 17
Written Statement............................................ 20
Ms. Rebecca Gambler, Director, Homeland Security and Justice,
U.S. Government Accountablity Office
Oral Statement............................................... 28
Written Statement............................................ 30
APPENDIX
The Hon. Jason Chaffetz, a Member of Congress from the State of
Utah, Opening Statement........................................ 90
Hearing Question from Member Duncan.............................. 93
BORDER SECURITY OVERSIGHT: IDENTIFYING AND RESPONDING TO CURRENT
THREATS
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Thursday, June 27, 2013
House of Representatives
Subcommittee on National Security, Homeland
Defense, and Foreign Operations
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
Washington, D.C.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:05 a.m. in
room 2247, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Jason
Chaffetz [chairman of the subcommittee], presiding.
Present: Representatives Chaffetz, Mica, Duncan, Gosar,
Gowdy, Lummis, Woodall, Bentivolio, Tierney, Maloney, Kelly and
Grisham.
Staff Present: Ali Ahmad, Communications Advisor; Daniel
Bucheli, Majority Assistant Clerk; Sharon Casey, Majority
Senior Assistant Clerk; Mitchell S. Kominsky, Majority Counsel;
Mark D. Marin, Majority Director of Oversight; Devon Hill,
Minority Research Assistant; Peter Kenny, Minority Counsel; and
Chris Knauer, Minority Investigator.
Mr. Chaffetz. The committee will come to order.
I would like to begin this hearing by stating the Oversight
Committee Mission Statement.
We exist to secure two fundamental principles. First,
Americans have the right to know that the money Washington
takes from them is well spent. Second, Americans deserve an
efficient and effective government that works for them.
Our duty on the Oversight and Government Reform Committee
is to protect these rights. Our solemn responsibility is to
hold government accountable to taxpayers because taxpayers have
a right to know what they are getting from the government.
We will work tirelessly in partnership with citizen
watchdogs to deliver the facts to the American people and bring
genuine reform to the Federal bureaucracy.
Good morning and I thank everyone for coming to attend this
hearing which is entitled Border Security Oversight:
Identifying and Responding to Current Threats.
I would also like to thank my colleagues who are here and
the people in the audience for joining us today.
Much of the current immigration reform debate has centered
on the importance of border security but the conversation has
not focused enough on how to secure the border in the most
effective manner.
As a result, today's hearing will examine a variety of
threats to the U.S. border security from illegal entrance to
drug trafficking organizations to potential national security
breaches. This hearing will also examine how to measure each of
these risks and the most effective responses to the threats we
confront.
The Department of Homeland Security is responsible for
controlling and guarding the borders of the United States. The
Department's operational responsibilities include ``preventing
and investigating illegal movement across our borders,
including the smuggling of people, drugs, cash and weapons.''
The Secure Fence Act of 2006, which intended ``to establish
operational control over the international land and maritime
borders of the United States,'' authorizes the Secretary of the
Department of Homeland Security to take necessary and
appropriate actions to secure the U.S. borders.
From 2006 to 2012 the security measures implemented to help
achieve operational control of U.S. borders have cost U.S.
taxpayers approximately $75 billion. Despite spending tens of
billions of taxpayer dollars to secure the borders, the
Government Accountability Office reported in 2011 that there
were only 129 miles of the 1,954 mile long southwest border,
roughly six percent of the border, where border patrols can
actually ``deter or detect and apprehend illegal entry'' at the
border itself--six percent operational control.
The lack of operational control documented by GAO directly
contradicts statements made by the Administration that the
border is the most secure that it has ever been. After GAO
reported low levels of operational control, DHS changed its
policy to make the number of ``apprehensions'' the measure of
effectiveness.
However, the number of apprehensions which DHS uses as its
metric now does not indicate whether Federal Government efforts
to secure the border are actually achieving operational control
or not.
One of the fundamental questions I have is if the rise in
apprehensions is increasing, does that mean the border is more
secure or does that mean the border is less secure? If the
number of apprehensions is declining, does that mean the border
is less secure or does that mean the border is more secure?
I asked the Attorney General this question. Attorney
General Holder said, you cannot draw a conclusion based solely
on apprehensions. I asked the Secretary of Homeland Security,
who didn't really give a thorough answer to that question. It
is something we need to explore, not to play gotcha but to try
to come up with a metric that we can all live with. When those
metrics change, you cannot compare them to past performance.
That is something we need to explore.
Since the creation of the Department of Homeland Security,
the committee's oversight efforts have examined the effective
use of taxpayer dollars at the border. While the Department is
working hard to secure the border, there are examples of
wasteful spending. For instance, SBInet, which was intended to
improve video surveillance of the border, has cost taxpayers
roughly $1.2 billion, but SBInet has been deemed a failure.
From April 2 to 4 of this year, members and staff of the
House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, including
myself, traveled to Yuma, Paco and Nogales, Arizona, to assess
the Federal Government's most recent efforts to secure the
border. I appreciate the men and women who we interacted with
there. We had a very productive trip.
The committee also visited the Eloy Detention Facility in
Arizona and was briefed by prison and ICE officials. The
committee learned that individuals classified as OTMs and how
the Department classifies people. OTM stands for Other Than
Mexican and accounted for roughly 900 inmates from 60 different
countries out of approximately 1,500 in the Eloy Detention
Facility. In other words more than half of the people in the
detention facility were not Mexicans, but were from 60
different countries.
For those that assume that the border problem is simply a
problem with Mexico, that is just not true. There is nothing
statistical that would support that and certainly, if you look
at the detentions, it is a much bigger and broader problem than
just people coming north from Mexico. It is a bigger and
broader problem.
Based on our conversations with CBP officers in Yuma, and
Nogales and other cities, there appears to be an increasing
trend of OTMs moving across the southwest border. A significant
portion of OTMs are coming from Latin America, including
Guatemala and Honduras, in addition to India and China, other
parts in Europe, Asia and other countries.
Border patrol officers on the ground also told the
committee about potential problems to our immigration system.
For instance, it appears the judicial process or asylum
requests and the government's issuance and administration of B1
and B2 visas may contain some very serious flaws.
During our trip to the border, we also found that the
government continues to identify new and emerging threats to
secure the border, including the drug cartels' use of semi-
submersible vessels, ultra light aircraft and the construction
of underground tunnels. Even right in the heart of Nogales,
they still recently found another tunnel going right into the
heart of the city.
Today, we hope not only to discuss these threats but also
responses to some of these risks, including the use of
effective drones, strategic placement of troops and other
technology which can be successfully implemented along the
border. Whether through technology or border patrol agents, we
must allocate the necessary resources to secure the border but
in a way that is smart, strategic and ensures that we do not
waste taxpayer dollars.
I want to emphasize and I commend the work and support of
our law enforcement officers from the various different
agencies who do amazing work in exceptionally difficult
conditions. We cannot thank them enough for their good, hard
and diligent work. It is tough, tough work.
Today's discussion should focus on understanding the
threats to our borders and how we should respond to each of the
challenges. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses for a
productive conversation about securing the borders of the
United States.
However, I am disappointed that Joseph Langlois, the
Associate Director for Refugee, Asylum and International
Operations with the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services,
has refused to testify before this subcommittee today. The
committee requested his attendance and participation in the
hearing 13 days ago on June 14, 2013.
Despite providing essentially a two-week notice to testify
before the subcommittee, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services has declined to appear asserting ``Due to the lack of
sufficient notice to prepare and clear testimony as well as to
prepare a suitable witness, USCIS will be unable to appear at
the upcoming June 27th hearing on border security.''
I want to thank the four other people from the other
agencies who were able to prepare, who did come and were
briefed, and who are joining us today. I find it totally
unacceptable that with 13 days notice, that is not sufficient
time to prepare to testify in Congress about what you do every
day and the job and responsibility that you have for your own
department and agency.
I thank those who are here. We duly note the person who is
not here and find that unacceptable. The American taxpayers
deserve answers to the important questions before the
subcommittee today. We have left the seat open hoping that the
witness would appear today but it appears as if he will not.
Again, thank you to the agencies that are here today. I
also want to thank and commend my colleague, Trey Gowdy, for
his work. He is the chairman of the subcommittee that is
dealing with immigration.
As we move forward in dealing with the problem that is
immigration, from a legislative standpoint, it is critical that
we get the border security portion right. Every bit of
legislation, whether in the Senate or the House, has always
focused on how are we going to secure the border, how do we
assure the American people that the border is secure?
There has been legislation that was passed in 2006 that
supposedly dealt with securing the border and the fence, yet we
have only 6 percent operational control. Earlier, we passed
legislation that would ensure a viable entry/exit system. We
have none. That is a problem and we need to discuss that today.
I look forward to Congress tackling immigration reform. It
is much needed. We need to understand what is happening at the
border and we appreciate those who are here today.
Mr. Chaffetz. Does anyone have an opening statement they
would like to make? Members may have seven days to submit
opening statements for the record.
We will now recognize our first panel: Mr. Michael Fisher,
Chief, U.S. Border Patrol; Mr. David J. Murphy, Assisting
Acting Commissioner, Customs and Border Protection, Office of
Field Operations; Mr. Thomas Homan, Executive Associate
Director, Enforcement and Removal Operations, ICE; and Ms.
Rebecca Gambler, Director, Homeland Security and Justice, U.S.
Government Accountability Office. Again, we thank you all for
being here today.
Pursuant to committee rules, all witnesses will be sworn
before they testify. Please rise and raise your right hand.
Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you are
about to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing
but the truth?
[Witnesses respond in the affirmative.]
Mr. Chaffetz. Thank you. You may be seated.
In order to allow time for discussion, please limit your
testimony, if you would, to five minutes. Your entire written
statement will be a part of the record. We will give you some
latitude, but again, I want to thank you for being here and
will recognize Mr. Fisher.
WITNESS STATEMENTS
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL FISHER
Mr. Fisher. Chairman Chaffetz, Ranking Member Tierney and
other distinguished members of the subcommittee, it is indeed
an honor and a privilege to be before you today to discuss the
identification and response to current threats.
As CBP prepares for our 2014 operations, the U.S. Border
Patrol continues to be guided by the three pillars of our
strategy: information, integration and rapid response. Current
intelligence estimates suggest that transnational criminal
organizations and the networks that support them continue to
exploit the border in Arizona and south Texas.
For the first time in over a decade, illegal cross-border
activity is more prevalent in south Texas than any other
corridor along the southwest border. Today, activity in south
Texas accounts for approximately 34 percent of all arrests
along the southwest border.
It is also noteworthy to recognize, as the Chairman pointed
out, that 60 percent of these arrests are of nationals from
some other country than Mexico. In particular, the top three
sending countries are Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador.
However, the current activity in south Texas needs to be put in
proper context. Even with elevated activity in Rio Grande
Valley, the daily apprehension rate is approximately 40 percent
less than it was in 1997.
We continue to mature our integrated operations in each
corridor with our federal, State, local and tribal partners.
Protecting the citizens against those who would do us harm does
not begin or end at the border. We cannot achieve border
security alone.
As the incremental transition of activity shifted to south
Texas, we took the following actions. We directed most Border
Patrol Academy classes and those agents to south Texas,
increasing the overall agent boots on the ground in high risk
areas such as Rio Grande Valley. We redeployed approximately
100 pieces of technology to south Texas from other southwest
border sectors. These were equipment such as unattended ground
sensors, global surveillance systems and thermal imaging
systems.
As you may recall, we entered into a Memorandum of
Understanding with the Department of Defense to allow the
transfer of detection and monitoring equipment from the
military to CBP. With the draw-down of forces in theater, we
sought to capitalize on the opportunity to reuse equipment the
taxpayers already paid for to assist front line agents.
Accordingly, we recently delivered the first installment of
this equipment to the field with 224 detection and monitoring
systems that have been inventoried and sent to the southwest
border, 75 percent of which went to south Texas.
In March 2013, we initiated vulnerability assessment
flights along the southwest border utilizing CBP's Predator
Beast equipped with synthetic aperture radar for broader
situational awareness. To date, we have developed more than 80
target folders covering approximately 320 non-contiguous miles.
In support of this effort, we continue to leverage geospatial
intelligence collection to augment our own organic
capabilities.
In conclusion, my team has designed and implemented a
formidable strategy and we continue to learn and adjust our
tactics, techniques and procedures as conditions on the ground
dictate. I stand by my convictions that given the operational
flexibility to match capability to threat, we will reduce the
likelihood of attack against the Nation and continue to provide
the requisite safety and security to the citizens who deserve
no less.
Mr. Chairman, again, thank you for the opportunity to
testify today. I look forward to answering your questions.
[Prepared statement of Mr. Fisher follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Chaffetz. Thank you, Mr. Fisher.
I will now recognize Mr. Murphy for five minutes.
STATEMENT OF DAVID J. MURPHY
Mr. Murphy. Good morning, Chairman Chaffetz, Vice Chairman
Lummis and distinguished members of the subcommittee.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I
appreciate the committee's leadership and commitment to
ensuring the security of the American people and look forward
to discussing the progress we have made in securing the border.
We define a secure border at our Nation's ports of entry as a
well managed border when mission risks are effectively
identified and addressed and legitimate trade and travel are
expedited.
Every day we carry out our mission to protect the people
and the economy of the United States by preventing dangerous
people and goods from entering the Country while expediting
legitimate trade and travel that is the life blood of our
economy at 329 ports of entry.
Traffic at our ports of entry differs by environment type,
which encompasses air, land and sea, traveler or cargo and mode
of transportation, commercial or general aviation, personally-
owned vehicles, pedestrians, trucks, containerized, packaged or
bulk. Each of these environments and activity presents a
different set of challenges with respect to threats, volume and
timing of processing.
Last year, CBP welcomed more than 350 million passengers
and processed $2.3 trillion in total trade value. We are seeing
volume increases in all environments and anticipate volume to
continue as the economy recovers. One of the most substantial
growths is in the air environment where we have seen a volume
increase of 12 percent since 2009.
It is important to note that the vast majority of this
traffic complies with all rules and regulations enforced by
CBP. Our goal is to identify and interdict those few travelers
and shipments that may present a risk while facilitating the
vast majority of legitimate traffic. We are working to find and
stop the proverbial needles in the haystack while the haystack
is moving.
We continue to improve our ability to do this and to focus
our finite resources on those people and goods that present the
highest potential risk. In addition to refining our risk base
and layered approach to security, we have worked to extend our
borders outward and to interdict threats before they reach the
United States.
DHS, in cooperation with our interagency and Port partners,
now screens people and goods earlier in the process, before
boarding passengers or loading cargo onto planes or vessels
destined for the United States. Since 2009, CBP has expanded
its pre-departure screening efforts and now checks all air
travelers against government databases on all flights arriving
to and departing from the United States prior to boarding.
CBP has also extended our Nation's borders outward in the
cargo environment. All inbound cargo manifests are screened
before they are laden on the vessels with almost 85 percent of
high risk shipments examined or addressed before arrival at
U.S. seaports.
In addition to improving our ability to identify and
mitigate potentially high risk travel and trade, CBP remains
focused on identifying waste to facilitate the growing volume
of people and goods entering the United States. We have seen
marked facilitation improvements in the development of a series
of transformation initiatives that increase the speed of our
processing, including the expansion of the Trusted Traveler and
Trusted Trader programs, the elimination of paper forms and the
increased use of technology.
We will continue to aggressively pursue these strategies
which both increase security and streamline the border process
for people and goods.
These types of programs and enhanced management tools have
not only increased our ability to facilitate lawful travelers,
but have also provided significant security benefits. For
example, we have limited the number of accepted travel
documents and increased our ability to identify at our land
ports resulting in a decreased use of fraudulent documents and
attempts by inadmissible persons to enter through our ports.
As we refine our targeting and interdiction efforts along
the southwest border, transnational criminal organizations have
begun to use unique and non-traditional deep concealment
smuggling methods using smaller loads to avoid detection. Ever
improving interdiction efforts by CBP continue to force these
organizations to attempt a myriad of more costly and often less
successful smuggling techniques.
In 2009 and 2010, we focused our agricultural protection
efforts on increasing interception of our highest agricultural
risk pests, Asian Gypsy Moths and Caper Beetles. These pests,
if left undetected, could result in millions of dollars in
economic damage. In the year following this nationwide
training, we saw record levels of interceptions and continue to
maintain those levels of interceptions today.
The state of border security continues to improve at our
ports of entry. We have made tremendous progress and are well
postured against terrorist threats having pushed our security
measures beyond our immediate borders. We are pushing a robust
strategy to optimize our current business practices. In short,
we have maintained and increased our mission effectiveness
while facing increasing demands for growing passenger and trade
volume and continue to seek ways to improve.
Chairman Chaffetz, Ranking Member Tierney, Vice Chairman
Lummis and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify. I look forward to your questions.
Mr. Chaffetz. Thank you, Mr. Murphy.
I will now recognize Mr. Homan for five minutes.
STATEMENT OF THOMAS HOMAN
Mr. Homan. Good morning, Chairman Chaffetz, Ranking Member
Tierney and distinguished members of the subcommittee.
On behalf of Secretary Napolitano and Director Morton,
thank you for the opportunity to appear today to discuss the
significant progress ICE and DHS have made to secure our
border.
As you may know, ICE is the principal investigative agency
within DHS and the second largest in the Federal Government.
The men and women of ICE play a critical role in securing the
border and carrying out smart and effective immigration
enforcement policies.
ICE consists of three operational programs: Enforcement and
Removal Operations, ERO; Homeland Security Investigations, HSI;
and the Office of the Principal Legal Advisor, OPLA. HSI
investigates a wide range of crimes that arise from illegal
movement of people and goods into, within and out of the United
States.
I am head of ERO. In this role, I lead a program that
identifies, apprehends, detains and removes alien subjects for
removal from the United States pursuant to ICE's prioritized
enforcement principles. I have been a federal law enforcement
officer for 29 years, 27 of which have been spent in
immigration enforcement.
Over the years, I have seen and worked the entire life
cycle of immigration enforcement. I have served on the front
lines as a border patrol agent; I tackled smuggling
organizations as a special agent with the former INS, and now
focus on smart enforcement at the back end of the process that
being removal of aliens from the United States.
Over the past four years, ICE has focused its resources on
removal of individuals who fit within our enforcement
priorities. Those priorities include people who are threats to
national security and public safety such as convicted
criminals, recent illegal border crossers and those who
obstruct immigration controls.
This focus has led to unprecedented successes. Last year,
ICE removed almost 410,000 aliens, some 55 percent of them had
criminal convictions. This is almost double the number of
criminal alien removals in 2008 and 96 percent of those aliens
fit within the priority categories I mentioned above. Simply
put, our reforms and priorities have made our communities
safer.
ICE carefully manages its detention population in our field
offices on the border and nationwide. Operational needs on the
southwest border can change quickly. ICE has a policy and
infrastructure in place to meet those needs.
The successes I mention today could not have been achieved
without implementation of the smart, effective and efficient
policies issued by Secretary Napolitano and Director Morton. Of
course we must work closely with our DHS partners in order to
meet our goals. For instance, 44 percent of ICE's detainees in
ICE custody came from the CBP.
Our joint efforts are critical to the Nation's border
enforcement efforts and I am proud of the working relationship
I have with my colleagues with whom I am testifying today.
Another part of our commitment to smart and effective
immigration enforcement are the major reforms we have made to
the detention system. All of our reforms help ensure that
individuals in ICE's detained population are held appropriately
and are classified according to their risk. We have put in
place strong safeguards against abuse to ensure our detainees
have access to health care and legal resources.
The success I have outlined today is the result of
reasonable immigration policies and priorities. Even in this
time of budget uncertainty, we are using our resources in a
smart, effective and responsible manner. We are making the
public safer by targeting our resources where they are needed
most.
Thank you again for inviting me to testify. I am pleased to
answer any questions you may have.
[Prepared statement of Mr. Homan follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Chaffetz. Thank you, Mr. Homan.
We now look forward to hearing from Ms. Gambler for five
minutes.
STATEMENT OF REBECCA GAMBLER
Ms. Gambler. Good morning, Chairman Chaffetz and members of
the subcommittee.
I appreciate the opportunity to testify at today's hearing
to discuss GAO's work on DHS programs and efforts to secure the
border.
Since 2004, DHS has increased resources allocated to
securing borders. For example, in fiscal year 2004, the Border
Patrol had over 10,000 agents; in fiscal year 2011, there were
over 21,000 agents. Similarly, the number of Customs and Border
Protection Officers stationed at ports of entry has increased
from over 17,000 in fiscal year 2004 to more than 20,000 in
fiscal year 2011. DHS has deployed technology and
infrastructure to border areas.
Today, I will focus my remarks on three key areas in which
GAO has assessed DHS' efforts to secure our Nation's borders.
First, I will highlight our work reviewing GAO's efforts to
assess its border security activities. Second, I will discuss
GAO's work reviewing interagency coordination efforts. Third, I
will highlight GAO's work on DHS management of technology
assets for securing the border.
With regard to my first point, Border Patrol data show that
from fiscal year 2006 to 2011, apprehensions within each
southwest border sector declined. Border Patrol attributed this
decrease to various factors such as changes in the U.S. economy
and increases in resources. Fiscal year 2012 data reported by
the Border Patrol indicate that apprehensions across the
southwest border increased from fiscal year 2011 but it is too
early to assess whether this increase indicates a change in
trend. Further, from fiscal year 2006 through 2011, estimated
known illegal entries in each southwest border sector also
declined.
In addition to data on apprehensions, other data collected
by the Border Patrol are used by sector management to inform
assessments of its efforts. These data include, among other
things, the percentage of estimated known illegal entrants who
were apprehended more than once, which is referred to as the
recidivism rate, and contraband seizures.
With regard to the recidivism rate, our analysis of Border
Patrol data showed that the rate decreased across southwest
border sectors between fiscal years 2008 and 2011. With regard
to drug and other contraband seizures, the number of seizures
increased by 83 percent from fiscal year 2006 to 2011.
Since fiscal year 2011, DHS has used a number of
apprehensions on the southwest border between ports of entry as
an interim performance goal and measure for border security.
This measure provides some useful information but does not
position the department to be able to report on how effective
its efforts are at securing the border resulting in reduced
oversight and DHS accountability.
The Border Patrol is in the process of developing goals and
measures. However, it has not set target time frames for
completing its efforts. We recommended that the Border Patrol
establish such time frames to help ensure that development of
goals and measures are completed in a timely manner. The
Department agreed with our recommendations and stated that it
plans to establish such time frames by November 2013.
With regard to my second point, DHS and other agencies have
reported improvements in interagency coordination of border
enforcement operations. For example, several partners
responsible for securing federal lands along the borders have
cited increased information sharing and communication.
However, our work has also identified opportunities for
improvements in more consistent implementation of existing
interagency agreements and stronger oversight of interagency
forums for border security.
Finally, DHS has deployed technology infrastructure and
other assets to U.S. borders. However, DHS has faced a number
of challenges in effectively planning for and managing its
technology programs and other assets. For example, our work has
shown that DHS could better document the analysis it has used
to determine the types, quantities and locations of
technologies it plans to deploy to the southwest border under
its new technology plan.
Further, CBP has not yet defined performance metrics for
assessing implementation of its new technology plans, hindering
CBP's efforts to assess the effectiveness of the plan going
forward.
In closing, our work has identified opportunities for DHS
to strengthen its border security programs and efforts. We have
made a number of recommendations to the Department to address
various challenges and to enhance management of border security
related programs. DHS has generally concurred with our
recommendations and is taking action to address them. We will
continue to monitor DHS' efforts in these efforts.
This concludes my prepared statement and I would be pleased
to answer any questions members may have.
[Prepared statement of Ms. Gambler follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Chaffetz. Thank you.
I will now recognize myself for five minutes.
Ms. Gambler, is it fair to say there are no metrics to
determine how secure or insecure the border is currently?
Ms. Gambler. Currently, the Department is using the number
of apprehensions on the southwest border between ports of entry
as its goal and measure for border security.
Mr. Chaffetz. That is an incomplete metric, would you
agree?
Ms. Gambler. That measure does not position the Border
Patrol and DHS to be able to assess the effectiveness of its
efforts because it doesn't compare apprehensions to estimated
entrants.
Mr. Chaffetz. Thank you.
Mr. Murphy, my understanding is we have no entry/exit
system, particularly at the land-based ports, to gauge who is
coming and who is going out, correct?
Mr. Murphy. No, sir, I wouldn't say that is completely
correct. I think we have made some significant improvements in
sophistication and entrants. Obviously that has been the focus.
As far as the exits, we are working on that. That is a
significant issue. We are well aware of it.
Mr. Chaffetz. Do you have any statistics to show how many
people actually leave the Country?
Mr. Murphy. No, sir.
Mr. Chaffetz. My understanding is the majority of visas
this Country offers are called B1 and B2 entry/exits. I sat and
watched this. Thousands of people in Nogales and Yuma streamed
into the Country. In fiscal year 2011, my understanding is we
approved, through the State Department, 4.3 million of these
cards where people are supposed to be in the Country
temporarily, right?
Mr. Murphy. Yes, sir.
Mr. Chaffetz. How many people came into the Country using a
B1, B2 entry/exit card?
Mr. Murphy. I don't have that number but I can get that.
Mr. Chaffetz. Is this something the agency has?
Mr. Murphy. Oh, yes, we track what comes in. It is what is
going out that right now we need to get a better handle on.
Mr. Chaffetz. When you say better handle, do you track any
of them going out?
Mr. Murphy. Right now, our outbound operations are
basically geared towards intelligence and pulse and surge
operations.
Mr. Chaffetz. That is not what I asked you.
Mr. Murphy. I know, sir. No, we don't.
Mr. Chaffetz. We are letting millions of people, almost a
million a day, into the Country. We have no idea how many are
going out, is that fair to say?
Mr. Murphy. Yes, sir.
Mr. Chaffetz. This is current law, right, that we are
supposed to have an entry/exit program. Why don't we have an
exit program?
Mr. Murphy. We are working on it, sir.
Mr. Chaffetz. You have been there for a while. How long
have you worked in the agency?
Mr. Murphy. Twenty-nine years, sir.
Mr. Chaffetz. Why don't we have an exit program? It is not
good enough to just smile at me.
Mr. Murphy. No, sir. I don't have a good answer for you. We
know it is an issue.
Mr. Chaffetz. Is it a funding issue? Is it a lack of
commitment? Is there not available software? If you are telling
me we are gauging when they come into the Country, why aren't
we gauging when they go out of the Country?
Mr. Murphy. I think it is a huge issue and unfortunately,
it is a costly issue too. We would have to replicate what we
have coming into the Country at ports of entry almost at port
of entry going out of the Country in order to probably get our
arms around that exact issue.
Mr. Chaffetz. We are told that 40 percent of the people
here illegally came here legally. When we don't have a viable
exit system and there are no metrics, there is no information,
there is not even an attempt to try to gather some names, I am
really concerned about the entry/exit program. I am really
concerned about the B1, B2 visas. I think it is the untold
story of the immigration problem and mess that we have.
When the majority of the visas given out to this Country
are given via the B1, B2 entry/exit, 4.3 million we gave out in
fiscal year 2011, what is the rule? You are only supposed to go
into the Country a certain 10 miles or something with an entry/
exit card, correct?
Mr. Murphy. I think it was 25. We just increased that
recently.
Mr. Chaffetz. Why? Why did we increase it? Increased it to
what?
Mr. Murphy. I believe in New Mexico it is 55 miles.
Mr. Chaffetz. In certain parts of the Country, you are only
supposed to go 10 miles, in some it is 25 and now you are
saying in parts of New Mexico you can go 55 miles. Do we do any
monitoring of that?
Mr. Murphy. No, sir.
Mr. Chaffetz. There is no monitoring, we just do it on your
word. We have millions of these out there. Do you know how
many? We issued 4.3 million entry/exit cards in 2011. How many
cards are out there? When you get a card, how long is that good
for? Is it valid for just a year or is it valid forever? Do you
know?
Mr. Murphy. I don't know offhand. I do know they put a date
on how long it is valid, yes, sir.
Mr. Chaffetz. So there are millions of these cards out
there. It is just the honor system right now, right? You are
just supposed to come back but you are not gauging even a
single person as to whether or not they are returning?
Mr. Murphy. We are not capturing that right now.
Mr. Chaffetz. My time has expired. I now recognize the
gentlewoman from Wyoming, Ms. Lummis, for five minutes.
Mrs. Lummis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to also thank the gentlemen and the lady for being
here today.
My questions are going to concentrate on the fence as a
mechanism to stop trans land crossings. Has the fence between
California and Mexico improved the crossing of undocumented
workers and illegals? Mr. Fisher, you are nodding your head?
Mr. Fisher. Yes, Congresswoman. The fence, and in
particular, you mentioned San Diego, has had an impact in
reducing the flow of people into the United States in those
areas where we do have that.
Mrs. Lummis. How much of the fence is completed on the
Arizona-Mexico border?
Mr. Fisher. In total, there is about 652 miles across the
southwest border that has been completed. Some of that is
pedestrian fence and some of that is vehicle barriers. I am not
really sure specifically in Arizona how much. Arizona has about
260 miles of border. Within those urban areas in Douglas, Naco
and Nogales out to both the east and west flanks of the ports
of entry, that has been extended a significant number of miles.
Mrs. Lummis. Do you believe that completing a fence on the
border between Mexico and Arizona would be beneficial to
preventing the flow of people and narcotics across the border?
Mr. Fisher. I do, in some locations.
Mrs. Lummis. What locations would those be, specifically
along the Arizona-Mexico borders?
Mr. Fisher. It would be in those areas where the networks
and criminal organizations like to exploit the legitimate
infrastructure that exists.
Mrs. Lummis. Such as? What is legitimate infrastructure?
Mr. Fisher. If you think of a smuggling organization much
like a business, they are trying to move a commodity, whether
that is people or narcotics, through the borders and out the
border areas. The infrastructure that requires them to do that
is road systems, airports, bus stations and all that legitimate
infrastructure supports the communities within those border
areas.
Mrs. Lummis. What about wilderness areas where we don't
have fencing, where you have been restricted by other U.S.
agencies from using motorized vehicles in wilderness areas and
the offending parties are using vehicles making it difficult
for you to apprehend them? Is that problematic?
Mr. Fisher. In some areas, I wouldn't qualify it as
problematic. There are areas, as you mentioned, public lands in
Arizona, which prohibit in most situations on a steady state
deployment, motorized vehicles. We do have, and have entered an
agreement with the Department of Interior and Fish and Wildlife
to be able to go into those areas based on intelligence if we
know there is activity. We are allowed onto those areas to
basically track individuals that come across.
Mrs. Lummis. So you have to get agreements with another
federal agency to gain access to federal land on our side of
the border?
Mr. Fisher. The agreement has already been set. In other
words, the Memorandum of Understanding allows us to go onto
those lands. Remember, some of that public land is protected
under the environmental laws. It doesn't preclude us from going
on there, just we have the agreement that we are allowed to go
in when we are actually working the border.
Mrs. Lummis. You can pursue someone?
Mr. Fisher. Yes, we can.
Mrs. Lummis. But can you protect the border? Can you patrol
the border?
Mr. Fisher. In some areas, in most areas, we can.
Mrs. Lummis. With vehicles?
Mr. Fisher. Yes, we do it with vehicles, we do it with
horseback and a lot of the detection is made from the air also.
Mrs. Lummis. The Tucson border has been an area where we
have seen significant crossings?
Mr. Fisher. That is correct.
Mrs. Lummis. Is that now the second most prevalent area to
cross?
Mr. Fisher. In terms of apprehensions right now, it is
second only to Rio Grande Valley in the south Texas area.
Mrs. Lummis. It continues to be a major source of
crossings?
Mr. Fisher. Yes.
Mrs. Lummis. What would be your recommended best deterrent
to illegal crossings in that area, in Mexico and Arizona?
Mr. Fisher. There are a couple things. I wouldn't invest on
one thing in particular. One investment would be additional
technology, detecting and monitoring.
Mrs. Lummis. We have seen some technology reports that some
of the technology has failed and was expensive and its failure
has not necessarily been corrected. How is that going? The
SBInet, what is the Department's plan to improve that
technology, the border radar system?
Mr. Fisher. About three years ago when SBI was being
assessed, Secretary Napolitano asked CBP, in particular the
Border Patrol, to make an assessment on whether we should
continue exploring that type of technology and integrated
technology that SBI had planned.
Mrs. Lummis. $1.2 billion, as I understand, has been spent
on that?
Mr. Fisher. That sounds about right, yes.
Mrs. Lummis. You are assessing now whether that is going
forward in a productive way?
Mr. Fisher. We made that assessment and our recommendation
to the Secretary, which she agreed to, was to invest more in
the mobile technology and not to invest in things like SBInet
which were more static.
Mrs. Lummis. My time has expired. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chaffetz. Mr. Fisher, will you please provide to the
committee the Interagency Working Agreement on your ability to
patrol and pursue potentially people who are here illegally on
public lands that are designated wilderness or similar, the
wilderness study areas, those types of things. Organ Pipe, for
instance, would be an area. Is that something you can provide
to the committee?
Mr. Fisher. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chaffetz. How long would it take to get that to us?
Mr. Fisher. I will take that back as an action item right
after the hearing.
Mr. Chaffetz. When is a reasonable time that I should get
upset that you haven't provided that to me?
Mr. Fisher. Far be it for me, sir.
Mr. Chaffetz. You are in charge here, so you make a
decision. What is the date? All right, July 3 of this year, is
that fair?
Mr. Fisher. You read my mind.
Mr. Chaffetz. Thank you.
We will now recognize the gentleman from Tennessee, Mr.
Duncan, for five minutes.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Fisher, just out of curiosity, can you give me a rough
number of how many Border Patrol agents there were when you
started with the agency 26 years ago?
Mr. Fisher. Less than 3,000.
Mr. Duncan. Less than 3,000?
Mr. Fisher. Yes, sir.
Mr. Duncan. The reason I asked that, I remember we gave
billion increases in funding for border control in the 1990s
and how we have heard Ms. Gambler say that since 2004, we have
gone from 10,000 to 21,000 agents. Now the Senate has passed an
amendment saying we are supposed to double that again.
Frankly, I know you can never satisfy any government
agency's appetite for money or land, but I am really skeptical
as to whether we can efficiently and effectively spend all the
money that we are throwing at this effort and increase the
number of agents that much that quickly. What do you say about
that Commissioner Murphy? How big was Customs when you started
29 years ago?
Mr. Murphy. To be honest with you, I don't know what that
number is. As you indicate, there is significant work to be
done but as to the determination of the right number, I think
that is obviously something that has to be decided.
Mr. Duncan. Isn't the number coming across in large part
determined by the economy, the economy in Mexico and here,
because I read during our down turn the numbers coming across
greatly decreased and a lot of people who had come here
illegally were going back to Mexico or other countries? Is that
true?
Mr. Murphy. As you may be aware, one thing that we have
done to try to transform the way we look at the border and the
numbers we need, we created the Workload Staffing Model. This
takes 100 different data element and over a million
calculations that takes into account the current volume of
activity, apprehensions, seizures, hours of operation and how
many folks are onboard now.
It is a very dynamic process. It will tell you based upon
that workload and the time it takes to do those different
functions in the workload, how many bodies that you need. The
nice thing about this one is it is not a static process. It is
a very dynamic process. In the case where you see an uptick in
activity at a port of entry or an area for a year or two, that
Workload Staffing Model will dictate what that number should be
based on that volume, activity and workload.
Mr. Duncan. Let me stop you. A lot of what you said is very
bureaucratic and I have just a little bit of time left.
Mr. Homan, what do you say about the statement by Ms.
Gambler that because of the transition from using operational
control and so forth, she says, therefore, until new goals and
measures are developed, DHS and Congress could experience
reduced oversight and DHS accountability? What do you say about
that? That is a pretty serious charge.
Mr. Homan. Yes. I can say we are shoulder to shoulder with
Border Patrol. Our level of collaboration has never been
higher. My staff meets with the Border Patrol staff at least
once a week talking about enforcement strategies on the border.
As a matter of business, we detain all recent border entrants,
so I think we are doing the right thing.
I think with the resources we have, I think we are
executing the mission at an all time high. My removals are at a
record high, my arrests are at a record high, my detentions are
at a record high. I think the mission, us and the Border Patrol
working hand in hand, along with CBP, makes sense.
Mr. Duncan. The Chairman mentioned 4.3 million coming
across just on one program. Can anybody on the panel tell me
how many people are entering this Country legally each year?
Ms. Gambler, do you know anything about that? Somebody should
know that.
Ms. Gambler. We could provide that number for the record. I
don't know it off the top of my head.
Mr. Duncan. What are the latest estimates as to how many
are coming across illegally? Surely this panel should know
something like that. Your latest guesses or estimates?
Mr. Fisher. Our estimates right now, we are averaging
approximately, this fiscal year 2013, 1,100 apprehensions. If
you take a look at what we are trying to design as it relates
to the effectiveness rate, in getting what the Chairman
mentioned as the denominator, trying to get that known flow, we
don't have those estimates right now but we are working towards
getting that as well.
Mr. Duncan. I think that is something you should provide to
us as soon as you get it.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Chaffetz. Following up on that, Mr. Fisher, how many
turn back south per day?
Mr. Fisher. I don't know specifically what that number is
but we do track that and I can get that.
Mr. Chaffetz. How many got-aways?
Mr. Fisher. I can do that as well. I don't have that number
off the top of my head. The effectiveness rate alone on the
southwest border right now is approximately 75 percent.
Mr. Chaffetz. Again, I really challenge that number as I
think the GAO does. Those are just the known got-aways, does
not include turn back souths or TBSs?
Mr. Fisher. It includes all those variables, includes all
the apprehensions, the got-aways and the turnbacks. That is the
effectiveness formula. When you take a look at the
apprehensions, you add those to your turnbacks and divide that
by the total entries, that is the effectiveness rate.
Mr. Chaffetz. What about the ones we are not aware of?
Mr. Fisher. There are two different methodologies we use. I
mentioned earlier in my testimony the geospatial intelligence
piece and the use of the Predator Beast is to do just that, to
shrink the border, increase our situational awareness so that
we have a better sense of what that number is to cover a lot
more of that border.
Mr. Chaffetz. I will now recognize the gentleman from South
Carolina, the always dapper Mr. Gowdy.
Mr. Gowdy. Thank you, Chairman Chaffetz.
I want to welcome all of our witnesses.
Chairman Chaffetz shared a bit of philosophy with me a
couple of nights ago at dinner and I wrote it down to make sure
I got it right. He said if you don't know where you are going,
you probably won't know when you get there.
Ms. Gambler, I am asked constantly about border security.
Tell me what is an ambitious but reasonable goal with respect
to border security to the extent that it is a condition
precedent to any other part of immigration reform? What are we
looking for?
Ms. Gambler. Congressman, setting a goal for border
security would be the responsibility of DHS or would be a
policy call on the part of Congress.
Mr. Gowdy. I know, but I am asking you if you were empress
for the day, what would you do? What is a realistic but
ambitious goal?
Ms. Gambler. Again, that is a responsibility for the
Department to set that goal and that is a policy call for
Congress. As would be the case for any bill, GAO's role would
be to review the implementation of any provisions or programs
that the Executive Branch might implement resulting from a bill
if we were asked to do so.
Mr. Gowdy. How long have you worked for GAO?
Ms. Gambler. I have been with GAO since 2002.
Mr. Gowdy. That is 11 years?
Ms. Gambler. Yes.
Mr. Gowdy. Surely you have an opinion on what is likely to
work because you probably are following the debate just like
the rest of us are. Before you get to any other aspect of
immigration reform, they want to make sure the border is
secure. That is an easy phrase to use but it is a hard phrase
to implement. What is a realistic definition of a secure
border?
Ms. Gambler. What we recommended is that the Department of
Homeland Security set a goal for its border security efforts
and then set metrics for assessing progress made against that
goal. DHS is in the process of developing those goals and
measures. We have suggested that they set time frames for
completing those goals and metrics so that there are mechanisms
in place for assessing what the goal is for border security and
how that can be measured.
Mr. Gowdy. Why is there not currently a goal or am I just
naive?
Ms. Gambler. Up until fiscal year 2011, DHS was using
operational control as its performance goal and measure for
border security. They discontinued using that measure in fiscal
year 2011.
Mr. Gowdy. Why?
Ms. Gambler. They told us they wanted to move toward more
quantifiable metrics for border security and using the number
of apprehensions on the southwest border was designed to be an
interim measure. DHS has said they were going to put those
metrics in place by fiscal year 2012 but have been using the
number of apprehensions as the interim measure. We recommended
again that they set time frames and milestones for completing
development of those goals and measures.
Mr. Gowdy. Let me ask it another way. If you had to go back
to your hometown and stand in front of people asking you
whether or not the border was secure, what metrics would you
use in answering their question?
Ms. Gambler. If I was asked that question, I would say the
Department has not yet set goals and measures for assessing how
secure the border is, so that makes it difficult to assess
against criteria or a yardstick on the level of security.
Mr. Gowdy. Difficult may be an understatement. It makes it
kind of hard for those of us interested in getting on to the
next steps of immigration reform if you don't get over the
condition precedent and prove to your constituents that you
have a reasonable but ambitious border security goal. It makes
the rest of it pretty tough.
Visa overstays, do you know how they are currently
investigated?
Ms. Gambler. We issued a report on overstays in April 2011
and have ongoing work looking at overstay enforcement efforts
as well. That ongoing work will issue in July, next month.
Mr. Gowdy. I promise I am going to read the report, but you
already know something about the issue. Currently, if Mr.
Chaffetz were here on a visa and he overstayed, how would we
know, how would we investigate, how would we decide what we
were going to do about it? What is currently being done?
Ms. Gambler. If a foreign national enters the U.S. and
there is no corresponding departure record for that person,
that record would be checked against numerous DHS databases and
would be prioritized against ICE's law enforcement and public
safety priorities. If the person met those priorities, their
information, their record would be sent forward for
investigation to ICE field offices.
Mr. Gowdy. You wouldn't have to wait for that person to
commit some other offense or have some other interaction with
government, would you?
Ms. Gambler. The overstays that ICE is prioritizing for
investigation are those who meet their public safety and
national security priorities. If the person would not meet
those priorities and they were likely an overstay, they would
not be investigated by ICE.
Mr. Gowdy. Mr. Chairman, I was going to thank them for
their service and I was going to ask them about what role, if
any, State and local law enforcement should play in assisting
them but I am out of time. I yield back.
Mr. Chaffetz. I thank the gentleman.
I think the gentleman from South Carolina would be most
interested to know that based on the formula that Ms. Gambler
just shared, the majority of visas that we give out in this
Country are B1, B2 entry/exits. Mr. Murphy testified that they
don't track any of the exits, none of them, so we have
absolutely zero information about who may be overstaying, who
may have gone beyond the bounds because they are variable. They
are only supposed to go into certain parts of the Country.
It is probably the biggest, gaping hole we have on our
border. There is no tracking, there is no information, there
are no statistics and no field reports. There is nothing unless
that person commits a crime.
I would hope that the agency would be able to provide,
through maybe the Department of Justice and others, a report of
how many people committed crimes that came here on a B1, B2
entry/exit visa. Somehow or some way we are going to unearth
that number.
Now I will recognize the gentleman from Michigan, Mr.
Bentivolio, for five minutes.
Mr. Bentivolio. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you very much for appearing here today. We really
appreciate it. Maybe you can help me clear up some questions I
have.
I keep hearing in the media we have 11 million people here
who should not be here. How did we arrive at that number? If
you have no way of knowing who you didn't catch, how do you
come up with a figure of 11 million?
Mr. Fisher. Congressman, I don't know where that number
comes from.
Mr. Bentivolio. I keep hearing it in the media.
Mr. Fisher. I have heard it as well but I don't know where
that came from.
Mr. Bentivolio. So it is really not 11 million and could be
more, right?
Mr. Fisher. I don't know that either.
Mr. Bentivolio. We really do not know it, do we because it
is the old saying, if the crime is committed and nobody was
there, how do you know the crime was committed except by
evidence, but we don't have any evidence.
What percentage of the border does technology cover?
Mr. Fisher. I don't know the percentage. That is a good
question. I could find out and get back to you. Specifically,
we have approximately 15,000 pieces of equipment covering about
17,000 miles. It doesn't cover all 17,000 and that is based on
the military specs in terms of what the equipment can do. You
then have to take into consideration the geography and the
topography in which it is located. I don't know the percentage
but we can factor that as well.
Mr. Bentivolio. I also heard you have cameras that do
thermal imaging and other cameras. When you detect somebody
crossing illegally, what is the response time?
Mr. Fisher. It really depends on where the entry is
detected, depending on where we have patrol agents, depending
on whether we do it within the first 100 meters or whether we
do it within the first mile. Terrain is going to dictate that.
The tactics and techniques of the agents on the ground will
determine where is the best way to make the approach in a safe
and secure manner.
Mr. Bentivolio. A Border Patrolman told me there was an
alert, he had to go out there and there were 26 people and they
just scattered. My question is, how do you send one or two
Border Patrol agents to pick up 26 people, especially in the
terrain that I was in when I toured the border? Is there
another way? He said well, they caught three but 23 got away.
Is that how we determine the number of 11 million?
Mr. Fisher. I don't believe so but to your earlier point,
whether there is one Border Patrol agent that responds or
whether there are two or three Border Patrol agents, really
determines on how they are applying the strategy on the ground.
In some cases, the Border Patrol agent may not know how many
people, there may be just a sensor indication, so we may not
have specific quantities of individuals that may have made the
incursion.
Many times, Border Patrol agents are assisted with air to
ground support. Our Office of Air/Marine Operations provides
over watch for us in that regard. Our strategy is built on
being able to deploy and redeploy resources for those Border
Patrol agents if in fact they come across a group of 23 and
they run.
Generally, what would happen is we would continue tracking
operations and more resources would be brought to bear to be
able to continue to track to the extent possible and make sure
that we apprehend everybody that comes across in between the
ports of entry.
Mr. Bentivolio. I also heard stories of hang gliders flying
out of Mexico when I was there, personal gliders, dropping off
drugs to the United States and then flying back. Are you doing
anything to stop that?
Mr. Fisher. Yes, sir. As a matter of fact, I believe you
are referring to the ultra lights over the last few years. One
of the things I alluded to in my testimony was when you look at
the transnational criminal organizations and those networks
that own and operate within the border areas, they are always
going to adapt their operations to be able to increase their
profit margin. One of the things we have seen is the ultra
lights.
We are working with the Marine Operations Center in
Riverside, California which gets radar feeds from throughout
the United States to be able to adjust those radar to be able
to detect low flying aircraft like the ultra lights. It is not
perfect yet. We also have Border Patrol agents that use mobile
surveillance systems on the ground and be able to look up and
be able to identify those ultra lights as well.
Mr. Bentivolio. Maybe you could explain to me what the term
catch and release means?
Mr. Fisher. Catch and release was a phrase a few years ago
and I believe it was coined, maybe not the first time, but used
quite a bit by Secretary Chertkof when he was Secretary of
Homeland Security.
It was meant when we were seeing increases in activity in
locations that part of the policy at the time was people we
were going to apprehend in between the ports of entry, we were
not going to just release on what we would call their own
recognizance. Today certainly in high risk areas, we want to
maintain the policy of catching individuals that have come
illegally between the ports of entry and make sure they are
detained.
Mr. Bentivolio. So a person who came here illegally, you
catch them and then you release them on their own recognizance?
Mr. Fisher. No, sir. The current policy really was to end
catch and release. In some locations over the years, depending
upon fluctuations and funding availability for the enforcement
and removal operations, individuals that would request a
hearing from an immigration judge, if they did not pose any
risk to the public and there was no detention space allowed,
there was a provision within the administrative piece to
release them on their own recognizance pending their
administrative hearing with the judge.
That policy was adjusted depending upon what resources are
available and it fluctuates to be able to minimize risk.
Mr. Bentivolio. Mr. Chairman, I have one more question.
Mr. Chaffetz. Go ahead.
Mr. Bentivolio. Thank you.
They would go in front of a judge and the judge would
release them, correct?
Mr. Fisher. Generally, because I am not the expert, the
real Border Patrol agents do the work in the field, but
generally, what would happen is once we made the determination,
we issued a warrant of arrest and a notice to appear. That
notice to appear was for an immigration hearing.
Mr. Bentivolio. How many would come back and actually
reappear before the judge? Do you have a percentage that come
back, do they all come back or just 50 percent, 75 percent?
Mr. Fisher. I don't have that number right off the top of
my head, but it would depend on which year you are talking
about or recently.
Mr. Bentivolio. It is probably closer to about 10 percent,
would that be right?
Mr. Fisher. I would not want to guess at that.
Mr. Bentivolio. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back my time. Thank you.
Mr. Chaffetz. I now recognize the Ranking Member, the
gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Tierney, for five minutes.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I thank the witnesses for their testimony here today. It
sounds like you have a relatively easy job, gentlemen,
challenging to say the least.
Over the last decade, the U.S. taxpayer has funded tens of
billions of dollars in additional personnel, technology and
infrastructure along that southwest border. I think we have
installed radiation detection portals, non-intrusive imaging
equipment, license plate readers, camera systems, fencing, and
the list goes on.
Despite the staggering sums of that money, we know that
cartels are still able to bring illicit drugs into the Country;
persons looking for work still cross over; and organized crime
networks still manage to smuggle various forms of contraband
through these ports of entry.
Nobody disputes the fact that this guns, guards and gates
spending has been effective to a degree, but not all spending
is equal, I guess. As we move forward, we will take a look and
see which areas of investment are more effective and produce
better results.
Let me begin with you, Chief Fisher, on the gates. As I
understand it, building the border fence or improving the
existing fence makes sense in some locations but may not make
sense in others. For instance, just west of San Ysidro,
California, people say it helped control illegal crossing
problems there. Others say that it provided significant
benefits in other locations, particularly in urbanized crossing
corridors. Does that sound accurate to you?
Mr. Fisher. It does.
Mr. Tierney. Ms. Gambler, I also understand that GAO has
questioned the effectiveness of the fence and often looks at
the high cost of building the fence. That question has been
raised for a number of years. Is that also true?
Ms. Gambler. In our work, Congressman, we did find that DHS
had not taken steps to assess or quantify the contributions
that fencing is making to border security. We recommended that
they conduct a cost effective analysis to do that.
Mr. Tierney. If Congress were to decide to double the size
of the existing fence or at least add hundreds of additional
miles to it, how would the department determine where to build
that extra fence?
Ms. Gambler. I don't know how they would determine where to
build the fence, but they do have analysis under way in
response to our recommendation to determine what contribution
fencing is making to border security efforts. That would be an
important question going forward.
Mr. Tierney. I am guessing that it makes sense to add
fencing in some areas and may be a total waste in others. Is
that generally true?
Ms. Gambler. That would be for the Department of Homeland
Security to determine.
Mr. Tierney. Mr. Fisher or Mr. Murphy, does that sound true
to you, that in some areas it would be a good investment and in
others, it may not be a good investment at all?
Mr. Fisher. That is accurate, sir, yes.
Mr. Tierney. Are you comfortable that the Department is
putting criteria in place to help identify which areas are
which?
Mr. Fisher. I am, sir, yes.
Mr. Tierney. Ms. Gambler, there are also proposals to add
new sensors, technology, camera systems, all along the border
to detect illegal crossings. I know that GAO previously
reviewed some major technology problems with the SBInet and
found hundreds of millions of dollars have been squandered in
that effort and there were challenges that had to be overcome.
Before we invest billions of dollars in that type of
technology, can you tell us what lessons were learned from that
whole SBInet situation?
Ms. Gambler. Our body of work looking at DHS' management of
border security, border surveillance technologies has
identified challenges in the management of that technology,
including the technology being delivered on schedule and within
cost parameters that were set for the technology.
Back in 2012, we issued a report on DHS' new plan for
deploying border surveillance technologies to Arizona. One of
the key findings from that report was that DHS had not fully
documented the underlying analysis and justification used to
support the types, quantities and locations of technologies it
plans to deploy under that new plan.
Mr. Tierney. You are comfortable that the department is
responding to your report and your recommendations?
Ms. Gambler. The department did agree with those
recommendations and is taking steps to address them. We do have
ongoing work reviewing that new plan and are monitoring DHS'
actions to respond to our recommendations.
Mr. Tierney. Now we are talking about possibly increasing
the number of agents exponentially on that basis. What steps
should the Border Patrol take to make sure the increase in
personnel is effectively utilized, that they are placed in the
right places in the right numbers?
Ms. Gambler. The Border Patrol issued its new strategic
plan last year in May 2012. As part of implementation of that
plan, we understand the Border Patrol is developing a process
for assessing what resources are needed and how to deploy them.
We understand that process is moving forward and they are
looking to implement it in fiscal years 2013 and 2014.
Mr. Tierney. Mr. Fisher, can you tell us a bit more about
that?
Mr. Fisher. Certainly within the framework of the strategy,
we really focused our efforts on being risk-based as opposed to
just asking for more and more resources and deploying them in a
lateral fashion across the southwest border. That was a
significant strategic shift in our thinking and certainly
within our deployments over the last couple of years.
As we moved forward, we also recognized that technology has
come a long way. I can remember as a young agent getting the
first pair of AMPBS-7 Bravos which were the old night vision
goggles from the military after the first Gulf War. I thought
at that point we were really going to make a difference in
border security because now for the very first time as an
agent, at night I was able to see five feet in front of me. I
thought that was going to change the operation by which the
Border Patrol started back in 1924.
We continue to learn and adjust with the technology. I will
tell you as good as technology is getting, the more technology
we get, it is still no replacement for a well trained Border
Patrol agent because at the end of the day, it doesn't matter
what you have flying in the air, it doesn't matter how many
unattended ground sensors you have buried on the ground, the
Border Patrol agent still while at times alone, as we have
heard today, has to close that 50 meters by himself or herself.
The thinking and the training of those Border Patrol
agents, who as we speak right now, are out there on patrol,
there is no substitute for that. I am very proud of the work
they do. It is a combination of taking a look at the best
technology that is available, taking a look at the
infrastructure and continuing to train and support the Border
Patrol agents is the best way. That is the way we are
approaching the implementation against this new strategy.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you. Thank you again for your work and
for your testimony here today.
Mr. Bentivolio. [Presiding] The Chair will now recognize
the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Gosar.
Mr. Gosar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chief Fisher and Mr. Murphy, in your shared testimony, you
said the following, ``We do not use this term 'operation
control' as a measure of border security because of the complex
nature of the magnitude of different border conditions cannot
be described by a single objective measure. Although an
indicator of success, we cannot measure border security solely
based on crime rates because even the safest communities in
America have some crime.''
If you are claiming that one objective measure is not
enough to measure border security, then why is only one
measure, apprehension rates, used or cited when top DHS
officials try to pass off our southern border as secure?
Mr. Fisher. Apprehension still is the metric that we
capture and report to the Department. However, we have learned
quite a bit over the last couple of years and I think Ms.
Gambler talked on some of that. The apprehension number really
doesn't tell you much because if you compare and contrast it
from previous fiscal years, as the Chairman mentioned, if it
goes up I can say that is success and if it goes down I can say
that is success.
We recognized a few years ago that in and of itself was not
a good metric, but you need the apprehension to then peel back
the layers to understand how many people within that total
population of arrests were there because recidivism doesn't
matter. It is important to me and important to the organization
to distinguish those individuals who are only apprehended two
times from those individuals that were apprehended perhaps six
or eight times.
Mr. Gosar. Would you agree, Mr. Murphy?
Mr. Murphy. From our standpoint as I indicated in my
testimony earlier, we look at it as a well managed border. I
don't think there is one single metric. There are a variety of
things that we do look at, but I think what we have tried to do
is to look at transforming the way we do business, our
processes, bringing in new technology, trying to basically do a
better job much more efficiently.
In that way we feel we will have much more success, not
only from the standpoint of apprehensions or seizures, but also
from the standpoint of facilitating the legitimate flow of
traffic and trade.
Mr. Gosar. Are you aware of an experiment in which a drone
actually looked at a corridor over time and looked at
apprehension rates and made a comparison of actually who
crossed that border versus apprehension rates? Are you aware of
that study?
Mr. Murphy. No, sir.
Mr. Gosar. Actually, it is very staggering because it
showed there were 422 apprehensions, but in actuality, there
were over 7,000 people that crossed the border. Are you aware
of that, Ms. Gambler?
Ms. Gambler. We have not seen that study.
Mr. Gosar. Really, and we are going to trust our border
security with Homeland Security and we still don't understand
that? How familiar are you with the numbers you are citing to
the American public and Congress in regard to the number of
illegal immigrants in this Country?
Ms. Gambler. In terms of the data we reported in our
December 2011 report, we reported the data that Border Patrol
had available.
Mr. Gosar. Based on apprehensions. This is showing you in
this technology aspect that we are showing less than six
percent actually being apprehended versus what is actually a
known factor, is that true?
Ms. Gambler. Again, we looked at the data that the Border
Patrol was collecting at the time that we did the work. We
looked at number of apprehensions, as well as estimated known
illegal entries and presented that data. We did also identify
some limitations with that data.
Mr. Gosar. It is very antiquated. I am just pointing out
that when you are citing these studies, they are antiquated
measures. We need to have more opportunities, a diverse
opportunity and not just from Federal Government, State and
locals to look at the metrics in regard to border security,
would you agree?
Ms. Gambler. We recommended and the Department is in the
process of setting goals and metrics for border security. We
recommended they come up with time frames for completing that
effort so that the measures can be completed in a timely
manner.
Mr. Gosar. Does that include State and local officials so
that we have a uniform policy enforcement all the way through
this Country, not just on border?
Ms. Gambler. It would be for the department to set what
those goals and metrics are.
Mr. Gosar. I will be honest with you. I am not real
comfortable. I am from Arizona and we have some problems there.
Border security should be a uniform policy that is all the way
through.
I can tell you coming from a number of people within my
conference, it is not going to be left up to Homeland Security,
it will be a joint venture in regards to having border security
so that we see the metrics from Border Patrol all the way and
encompassing all avenues of law enforcement.
I think that is what the American public wants. We have
limited resources. Homeland Security has not really restored a
lot of trust. Trust is a series of promises kept and we don't
find much of that with Homeland Security.
Let me ask you an other question. How do you feel about
border security around Yuma, Arizona?
Ms. Gambler. Around Yuma, Arizona, in our work when DHS was
using operational control as its performance measure for border
security, Yuma reported that its miles were under operational
control. That was up to fiscal year 2010.
Mr. Gosar. I have to take a little leniency here because it
actually is one of the shining stars in regard to border
security. That is the proper answer. In fact, in that segment,
there has not been an illegal border crossing in that 40 or 50
miles in the Yuma sector for over six years, isn't that true?
Ms. Gambler. I am not aware of that specifically.
Mr. Gosar. When you come here to represent what DHS has
proposed, we need to have success models and Yuma is a success
model. It has border fence, it has a unified application of the
law from border security to law enforcement, and what is even
more important is actually prosecution. Is that not true?
Is that not true that those folks from the Tucson sector do
not want to be pushed to the Yuma sector because they are going
to get prosecuted?
Ms. Gambler. We haven't specifically looked at that issue.
Mr. Gosar. I am having problems once again. I am having
somebody from Homeland Security I see on a Senate bill that we
are going to entertain that you are going to have border
security all the way through and you have no metrics, you don't
know what works, you don't site that working and you are still
coming up that we are going to entrust you with border
security.
Once again, Ms. Gambler, I want to say trust is a series of
promises kept. Tell me why I should have to trust in the DHS?
I will yield back for the second round of questions.
Mr. Tierney. Mr. Chairman, might I interject for a question
here? Ms. Gambler, you are with the Government Accountability
Office, not Homeland Security, right?
Ms. Gambler. I am with the Government Accountability
Office.
Mr. Tierney. I hope that would absolve you from some of the
information being sought from you or the position sought from
you. I think you are doing an excellent job. I just wanted to
clarify that she is not Homeland Security.
The other thing I was going to ask was if the gentleman
would produce the study you mentioned at the beginning of your
questions, who the author was, and make that available for the
committee?
Mr. Gosar. You bet.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you.
Mr. Bentivolio. The Chair now recognizes the gentlewoman
from New York, Mrs. Maloney.
Mrs. Maloney. Thank you for your hard work and for
testimony today before the committee.
I am concerned about commerce. Not only do we need to keep
out bad products and homeland security and all that focus, but
Mexico is a very important trading partner with America. It is
our third largest trading partner. Our relationship has grown
tremendously since NAFTA and significantly in the past years.
Mexico has grown to be roughly $500 billion in bilateral
trade. That is important to the economy of America and it is
also sustained through the trade by some estimates of 6 million
jobs in the United States. It has economic value that is
important to our people. They say U.S. sales to Mexico are
larger than all U.S. exports to the BRIC countries which are
Brazil, Russia, India and China. In short, trade with Mexico is
important for our jobs.
I guess I should ask, Mr. Murphy, isn't it true that part
of your profession is not only to protect the border but also
to help facilitate trade between our two countries and at our
ports of entry both land and sea. Is that true is that part of
your goal, not only security, which is the number one priority,
but also to allow legitimate fair trade?
Mr. Murphy. You are absolutely right. We believe that
border security and economic prosperity go hand in hand.
Recently there was study done by USC, the Create Study, that
showed by adding additional CBP personnel to ports of entry to
help facilitate not only the border security aspect, but the
trade facilitation aspect, it adds to the GDP, it reduces lost
opportunity costs.
We have partnered both with Canada and Mexico. We have our
21st Century border and beyond the border initiatives. In
Mexico, we are working on Otay Mesa and Laredo on pre-
inspection pilots, so we are partnering very closely with
Mexico. We recognize the importance of trade. It is the life
blood of our economy. I think that CBP and OFO have
particularly matured in recent years in recognizing that
dynamic and the importance of that trade.
Mrs. Maloney. You mentioned the Laredo site and port and
that is a very important site. I understand that 700 of the
Fortune 1000 companies do international business through that
port. Can you give an example on the ground of how you protect
against terrorists, illegal guns and really bad things coming
into our Country and also allowing the trade that is necessary?
How do you make that happen in a way that allows the trade but
also has the significant strength to stop terrorists, illegal
guns or other activities?
Mr. Murphy. There are a number of ways. We brought
technology, number one. We have our RPMs there obviously for
the detection of nuclear-radiological elements. We also have
our license plate readers. On the southwest border right now we
have our RFID technology. Right now, 60 percent of the
documents being used on the border are RFID compliant. We are
trying to again enable both trusted trader programs and our
trusted traveler programs.
From the standpoint of the trade, we are trying to focus
our resources there. We are working on the trusted trade
program with our CTPAD. We have a number of programs and a
number partners with the industry. Laredo is a huge industry of
trade for the United States. We recognize that fact and have
directed our resources.
I mentioned earlier the Workload Staffing Model which is a
way that we can direct and allocate resources where they are
truly needed, both from a trade standpoint and also from an
enforcement standpoint.
Mrs. Maloney. I read a synopsis of a report that I believe
came from Princeton University, one of the think tanks. I am
going to find that report and get it to the Chairman. It said
that a side effect of the increased border security was that
more immigrants were staying in the Country, that usually a lot
of Mexican workers would come in, do seasonal work and then
leave and go back to Mexico. However, now because the border is
becoming much tougher to get in and out off, they are just
staying in America.
I would ask if anyone would like to comment? Have you seen
that? Is there any substance to the idea put forward by this
report?
Mr. Murphy. I have not seen that.
Mrs. Maloney. You have not seen that. Anyone else want to
comment?
Ms. Gambler. We have not seen that study. We have not
reviewed that.
Mrs. Maloney. Or the idea, have you seen that is happening?
Ms. Gambler. We have not evaluated that issue.
Mrs. Maloney. Thank you. My time has expired.
Mr. Bentivolio. I would now like to recognize myself for
five minutes.
In February, I told my staff, after several long weeks of
working hard, if I could find two days where I could go
someplace warm with some sand and they sent me to Arizona to
tour the border fence. It was a big eye opener.
Earlier, Mr. Fisher, we discussed the ultra lights. If I am
not mistaken, Border Patrol received $100 million for the ultra
light problem. That is an awful lot of money and yet we really
have not seen any significant change. Can you tell me what
seems to be the problem? You could probably post quite a few
Border Patrol agents just to sit there and look up in the sky
with $100 million. Nothing seems to be getting done because I
keep hearing it is a problem from the boots on the ground.
Mr. Fisher. It has been defined as an emerging threat over
the last couple of years and continues to be so today. One of
the things to take into consideration is ultralights can really
take off and land pretty much anywhere. The whole area of
operation for the smuggling organizations opens up that
aperture than other areas that we have seen across the
southwest border.
We have and continue to experiment with ground-based radar,
to be able to tweak the radar to make sure that we are able to
identify low flying ultra lights and others that may be flying
in that particular area. The truth of the matter is we still
look to find out and adjust our policies.
First and foremost, as a law enforcement organization, we
enforce laws in the United States and we do so with a matter of
consistency and compassion within the Constitution. One of the
challenges we face right now is even if we detect an
ultralight, identify it and are able to track it with a U-860
or a Black Hawk helicopter, the end game, if you will, has not
been established in terms of what we can do to that particular
ultralight because in many cases the ultra light when it makes
entry to the United States, does not land.
It will simply kick out its cargo, which to this point has
been narcotics, predominantly marijuana, and there is a ground
crew that later picks up the marijuana and moves on. It does
not land in the United States but turns around and goes back
into Mexico.
We are working with the Department and with science and
technology, to increase the effectiveness by which we detect
the entry in the first instance by the ultra lights and then
continuing to work within the law enforcement framework on how
we can mitigate this evolving threat.
Mr. Bentivolio. According to Border Patrol agents, the $100
million detection program has not worked and has been a waste
of taxpayer money. Border Patrol says ``Ultralight aircraft are
impossible to stop. We don't have the technology.'' This was
also reaffirmed on my official tour of Nogales with the Border
Patrol. Another Border Patrol agent states, ``difficult
mission, define drop locations, intercept narcotics and arrest
smugglers, success rates are low.'' Those are comments from the
boots on the ground, those guys in the trenches.
We have this very expensive fence. It is 18 feet tall. I am
asking questions and I just want answers. You cannot put razor
wire on top because people are hopping over the fence, people
are driving up and actually with a torch, cutting through the
steel and sending people in that way. Then they are welding it
back so the Border Patrol does not see it. There are also a
number of tunnels and no real detection.
I asked about dogs. Is there some problem with employing
more dogs with our Border Patrol agents?
Mr. Fisher. Not that I am aware of.
Mr. Bentivolio. Instead of this $100 million on a system
that does not work, we know dogs can detect things from the sky
as well as on the ground. It is very low tech, maybe not as
sexy, but what is your comment on that? Should we employ more
dogs versus $100 million worth of high tech?
Mr. Fisher. I would not suggest substituting canine and
their handlers for technology or infrastructure. We employ
approximately 300 canines and handlers throughout the border.
They, along with horses and other types of technology we have,
is a complement.
The other thing to take into consideration, perhaps I would
foot stomp this as well, is each section of the border is
different. What may work in a place like Yuma, Arizona may not
work in a place like Nogales. Some of the ultralight technology
may not work in sections of El Paso, Texas but works really
well in a place like El Centro, California.
It is identifying the geography, the tactics, techniques
and procedures of the criminal organizations, understanding how
they operate, understanding the extent to which they are
vulnerable so that we can then exploit that. There is no cookie
cutter approach to be able to do that in my opinion.
Mr. Bentivolio. Thank you.
The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from Illinois, Ms.
Kelly.
Ms. Kelly. Thank you.
I would like to talk about the data issue. One thing that
seems clear from today's hearing and from the Government
Accountability Office's comprehensive review of the
department's border security statistics is that the number of
immigrants apprehended by the department or apprehensions has
declined markedly along the southwest border between 2006 and
2011.
This amounted to about a 68 percent drop in apprehensions
which seems to suggest the border enforcement is currently
working. Ms. Gambler, do you infer this from the data, that the
number of illegal border crossings has fallen and if so, isn't
this a good thing?
Ms. Gambler. The data we reported and that you cited was on
apprehensions, so that is the number of illegal entrants the
Border Patrol arrested. The data shows that apprehensions
declined from fiscal year 2006 to 2011. The 2012 data reported
by the Border Patrol indicate that apprehensions increased from
fiscal year 2011 levels.
In that report, we also provide data on estimated known
illegal entrants by sector. Those numbers, as estimated by
Border Patrol, did decrease in the southwest border sectors
over that time.
Ms. Kelly. The meaning of apprehensions data by itself
seems to be the subject of some debate, it remains clear that
the department continues to use this figure on an interim basis
until it is able to develop an alternate approach and that
poses some concerns. Ms. Gambler, how long has Border Patrol
used the number of apprehensions as its interim performance
goal?
Ms. Gambler. They have been using that since fiscal year
2011.
Ms. Kelly. Chief Fisher, when will Border Patrol begin
using a more comprehensive data point for measuring flows
across the border?
Mr. Fisher. We started developing those this year and will
baseline this year and start with the new metrics in fiscal
year 2014 which starts October 1.
Ms. Kelly. Can you explain how the Border Patrol currently
uses apprehensions data such as where to allocate resources?
Mr. Fisher. The apprehension data, in and of itself, does
not dictate where we deploy or redeploy resources. That
decision is based on risk and it is done both in terms of my
staff at headquarters looking at the strategic laydown of all
forces within the northern, southern and coastal environments.
It is really left in the hands of the field commanders in the
field to be able to deploy and redeploy those resources within
the areas that they have operational control.
Ms. Kelly. If you were to get additional Border Patrol
agents, where would you place them? Where do you see the
biggest need?
Mr. Fisher. We would look into areas for instance where we
are unable perhaps to put fence or unable to put certain pieces
of technology because it is a combination. It is not just
putting in more Border Patrol agents. We have to do that in
consultation with the field commanders and the Border Patrol
agents to tell us what works or does not work. We would make
sure we put the resources in the areas of highest risk along
our borders and work out way back from there.
Ms. Kelly. When you say they tell you what works and what
does not work, how often do you check, every three months or
every month? What is the evaluation process?
Mr. Murphy. Quite frankly, with 21,370 Border Patrol
agents, they are not shy to call me and let me know through
email what works and what does not work. I appreciate their
willingness to tell us in headquarters what is the best
approach.
Ms. Kelly. Ms. Gambler, do you have any current concerns
about the apprehension data and how it is used?
Ms. Gambler. In terms of the apprehensions data, that is
data on the number of illegal entrants that the Border Patrol
apprehends. In our December 2011 report, we did identify some
limitations with the data that Border Patrol collects and
estimates for what are called turnbacks and got-aways. The
limitations with that data preclude Border Patrol from using
that data to make comparisons in performance across sectors.
Border Patrol issued updated guidance to the field in
September 2012 to provide for a more common approach to
estimating turnbacks and got-aways across the southwest border
sectors and we understand that the Border Patrol sectors are
implementing that guidance.
Ms. Kelly. Chief, do you feel this will give a more
complete data picture, including got-aways and turnbacks?
Mr. Murphy. We are getting better at that but let me be
clear, we have to be, I say we broadly, very careful of
applying a very specific scientific method, in inaccuracy and
certitude to a function and operation that does not allow that.
We are going to do the best we can to determine how many people
came in and of that number, how many people did we apprehend.
No technology or system that I am aware of is going to,
with 100 percent accuracy, make that determination going
forward. It doesn't exist in other law enforcement
organizations that I am aware of.
Ms. Kelly. My time is up. Thank you.
Mr. Bentivolio. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from
Arizona, Dr. Gosar.
Mr. Gosar. Thank you again, Mr. Chairman.
Before I start my second line of questioning, I want to
make a point that we make sure that Mr. Langlois has had an
opportunity to come before this committee. Either he comes here
or we go there because I think we need to have this discussion
in front of the American people.
Ms. Gambler, one of the things that I am critical about, to
be honest with you I am a big fan of GAO, but you cited a
number of studies in regard to the gentlewoman from Illinois. I
need to see that same type of application from where we are
coming from in Arizona. I want to see some equal latitude.
Mr. Fisher, you just made a comment that works in Yuma does
not work anywhere else but the principles are the same, are
they not, deterrent, enforcement, apprehension and also going
before justice. Isn't that true?
Mr. Fisher. The principles and the strategy apply but the
application in different geographic areas do not.
Mr. Gosar. I am happy with that.
Let me ask you, Mr. Fisher and Mr. Murphy, in your
testimony you said ``A secure border means living free from
fear in their towns and cities.'' Do you feel the folks in
southern Arizona can actually say that today?
Mr. Fisher. In some locations, that would be accurate and
in others, probably not.
Mr. Gosar. Some. How about you?
Mr. Murphy. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gosar. I would say if we really want to start making
this deterrent or dictation, probably about the 50 miles coming
from the California border is secure; beyond going into the
Tucson sector from that 50 miles, not secure. We have some type
of problem with the Tucson sector and going further east, we
have bigger problems, do we not?
Mr. Fisher. In somewhat of a west to east quick look at the
border. As you mentioned, that is always going to fluctuate
with the criminal organizations adjusting their operations.
Mr. Gosar. I know. From what I understand, we have a
problem in the Tucson sector. It has shifted more to the Texas
side. You are right but there are still some generalities that
we can hold true, can we not?
Mr. Fisher. Certainly.
Mr. Gosar. Can we put the slide on the screen? These signs
were found posted not at the border, not within 20 miles of the
border, but were posted 80 miles from the border. Local law
enforcement officers in addition to Customs and Border Patrol
officers told us that our policies are failing, that the
enforcement measures are so shoddy that it is equivalent to
ceding parts of our great Country to cartels.
I am saddened by the terrible amount of illegal activity on
our southern border but I am down right angry that the Federal
Government isn't doing its part to protect its own citizens. I
do think that thousands of agents and officers that put their
lives on the line day in and day but it seems there is such a
disconnect between those on the front lines and the bureaucrats
that have marched up here on the Hill to tell us what they
think and what we want to hear.
Thankfully, from time to time, we bypass the so-called
proper channels and go directly to the source, which is what I
do, I am a science guy, to get the raw intelligence before it
is scrubbed and framed here in Washington.
I have talked to numerous CBP agents during my time in
Congress. The story they paint is far different than the one
painted by DHS representatives here today and in the news media
at large. One agent told me that the methods for counting
border crossings are completely inadequate as the officers are
told to count tracks going north.
The problem is that the drug runners cover their tracks
very carefully going north because they don't want to be
tracked. The number found going north is often actually less
than those found going south because the cartel members don't
care if they are being apprehended going south. They have
already dropped off their drugs and since they are already
going south, they might as well get a free ride home.
Another agent told me that when he first started, one of
his supervisors started a meeting one day by saying
``Apprehensions are down. We are not catching as many people.''
This particular officer lowered his head feeling that he and
his colleagues were about to be scolded for not doing their
job. He couldn't imagine when to his surprise he was
congratulated and told ``good job'' by that same supervisor.
One agent, a man who puts his life on the line each day,
referred to the apprehension metrics by measuring border
control as asinine. Whereas Napolitano, our Secretary, claims
the border is safe and secure, better than at any time before,
the people who actually do this for a living estimate they
might apprehend 20 percent of border crossings on a good day.
One of possibly the most discouraging and shameful things
that I have been told by a CBP agent on the ground is they feel
they signed up for one job when they actually have two jobs.
They say their job is to fight the drug cartels and the so-
called coyotes, but all they say their job is a constant fight
with the Federal Government. In their words, they have to fight
their own employer to do the job they were hired for. This is a
situation that could only be created by this town.
Mr. Chairman, I would ask that you consider having another
hearing at a later date in which we can invite CBP officers and
other State and local officers from the front lines who are
actually able to offer some real perspectives, highlight the
real problems and help guide us toward a real solution.
When we start looking at the border, it is a fascinating
issue. We have Forest Service, we have primitive areas and we
have to have a common sense policy in which to have
apprehensions to make this Country secure. I would like to hear
from the Border Patrol agents directly.
Thank you.
Mr. Bentivolio. Thank you.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Florida, Mr.
Mica.
Mr. Mica. First of all, I want to echo Dr. Gosar's
comments. I have absolutely had it with the officials who
refuse to appear before our committee. This is the chief
investigative panel of the House of Representatives. What's
this guys name Langlois? You are Acting Chair right now but I
want a meeting staff with Mr. Chaffetz and Mr. Issa. I want
these people held responsible.
We will subpoena Mr. Langlois' butt in here or they will
appear before us one way or the other. This is the last time
this is going to happen that I will be involved in any of the
subcommittees or the full committee and have particularly a DHS
staffer, this is an important position, not just any staffer,
not appear before this committee. It is important that he
appear with these other witnesses.
I am absolutely frosted and this is the last time I
guarantee you. They will regret not appearing before our
committee. I don't care who it is.
Again, I know you are Acting Chair right now. Staff, I want
a meeting within the next 24 hours with Chairman Chaffetz and
also Mr. Issa and if we have to bring the other side of the
aisle in, whatever it is going to take. Again, I am not very
pleased that we would have again the Associate Director for
Refugee, Asylum and International Operations, thumb his nose at
a legitimate request timely given to appear before this
subcommittee of Congress.
I have some questions. Who oversees procurement of some of
the equipment? Who would have the most knowledge? Do both of
you have equal knowledge?
I was not here earlier but you are looking at mobile rather
than the fixed surveillance system, is that correct?
Mr. Fisher. That is correct.
Mr. Mica. Mr. Murphy, correct?
Mr. Murphy. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mica. I have information from a whistleblower that
there are several types of surveillance equipment available.
One is available at $54 million and the second is available at
over $100 million. Are you aware of the two principal types of
mobile surveillance equipment that you are using?
Mr. Fisher. I am not aware of that.
Mr. Murphy. No, sir.
Mr. Mica. I want you to be aware of it. This is information
I have that you are dividing the contract. I am not interested
in the 50 percent premium that the taxpayers pay on this mobile
equipment. I want a report back from one or both of you on what
is going on, what kind of equipment is being purchased, why you
are paying twice as much for some equipment that has the same
capability, I am told, as the other equipment, okay? Do you get
it?
Mr. Fisher. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mica. Back to the committee through myself or the
Chair, I want a report on why you are paying twice as much for
some equipment that has the same capability as others. We have
very limited amount of money, isn't that correct, gentlemen?
Mr. Fisher. Yes.
Mr. Murphy. Yes.
Mr. Mica. We are constrained. This is something that has
been brought to my attention by a whistleblower. I want it
verified and documented exactly what you are doing.
Now let us go to border crossings and protection. There are
three different types of entry documents, four actually, the
passport, global entry, you can get in with a global entry
card, do you have to have a passport too? Murphy, Fisher?
Mr. Murphy. Yes, sir. Based on the Western Hemisphere
Travel Initiative, we took about 8,000 different documents out
there and there's just a few but with the passport.
Mr. Mica. You get in with a global entry by itself, yes or
no?
Mr. Murphy. I will have to get back to you.
Mr. Mica. What is your position?
Mr. Murphy. I am the Acting Assistant Commissioner for
Field Operations.
Mr. Mica. You can't tell me whether I can get in or out
with a global entry card?
Mr. Murphy. In order to get the global entry card, you have
to have that document and your face will appear on the screen
when you are coming through.
Mr. Mica. Can someone entering the United States from
Canada or Mexico or somewhere come in with just a global entry
card?
Mr. Murphy. I will have to get back to you, sir.
Mr. Mica. Dear God, please don't tell me--you are acting.
That is pretty scary.
There are two other documents. One is what, NEXUS and FAST.
NEXUS is Canadian for Canada. FAST is?
Mr. Murphy. Cargo, through trucks.
Mr. Mica. What is the one for Mexico? Is there a card for
Mexico?
Mr. Murphy. There is Century, FAST, NEXUS and global entry.
Mr. Mica. We have all these cards. I had a hearing a couple
weeks ago on ID cards which again that so and so from DHS isn't
here so we cannot go after him because they are responsible for
overseeing some of the standards. We have all these cards. None
of them have a dual biometric capability, is that right?
Mr. Murphy. Dual metric in terms of?
Mr. Mica. Fingerprints and iris would be biometric.
Mr. Murphy. Yes, it is fingerprint.
Mr. Mica. But they do not have dual?
Mr. Murphy. Right.
Mr. Mica. We had someone testify from the hearing last
week, get the transcript, from the FBI that fingerprints can be
altered; they are not secure. The only secure means of
identification that is guaranteed would be dual biometric. That
is iris and fingerprint. We do not have anything with iris,
NEXUS, FAST, global entry, passport, Century, right?
Mr. Murphy. I believe we are looking at the iris but I
don't believe we have it.
Mr. Mica. For 11 or 12 years, I asked that be done in law
after 2001. I think in 2002, repeated it in law several times.
Here, again we do not have a DHS person to testify.
We have a document being used that can be undependable and
you don't know if global entry can be used to get in. What
about the others? Can they get in from Canada with the NEXUS
card?
Mr. Murphy. I apologize, sir. I know you have to have that
card.
Mr. Mica. Dear God, where do they send these people from?
Mr. Bentivolio. Mr. Mica, we are going to have to wrap it
up.
Mr. Mica. Wait a second. Did you have two rounds?
Mr. Bentivolio. Yes.
Mr. Mica. That is my first round, so I will go into my
second round. Did you have a waiting Democrat who wants to go
first?
Mr. Bentivolio. Yes.
Mr. Mica. We will let her go and then I will come back. I
will try to recover in the meantime.
Mr. Bentivolio. The gentlelady from New Mexico, Ms. Lujan
Grisham.
Ms. Lujan Grisham. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and
thank you to the panel.
I am in an interesting position from New Mexico in that we
have a small, unique border from New Mexico to Mexico but are
affected primarily by the border at El Paso, but we don't get
the same border health investments, don't get the same federal
investments for border protection issues that are beyond the
border itself but invest in the State.
We are affected by trade issues which I know have been a
topic this morning in terms of some of the questions. We are
affected by the efficacy of what you do on the border. We have
public safety issues and we also have one of the highest drug
trafficking and substance abuse problems per capita in the
Country.
As a proponent of comprehensive immigration reform, which I
think helps us with border activity because now we have a legal
pathway for folks to go back and forth, I am absolutely
concerned about security issues. I think, given the topics of
the questions today, is really for Ms. Gambler.
Of all the investments, we have had significant investments
and watching what is occurring in the Senate, there is momentum
for even more investments at the border, tell me which of those
investments, personnel, equipment, fencing, high tech
investments, are the most effective? I need to know that both
in terms of whether it is a cost effective aspect or whether it
is giving you those protections that we are interested in
having occur at the border?
Ms. Gambler. Your question gets at a key takeaway from a
number of GAO reports we have issued looking at CBP's efforts
to deploy technology, infrastructure and personnel along the
border. That takeaway is that the department has been
challenged to be able to identify the contributions that its
investments have been making to border security.
For example, we recommended that the department conduct a
cost effective assessment to be able to assess the
contributions that tactical infrastructure and fencing have
made to border security. With regard to technology and our
review of DHS' new technology plan for placing surveillance
technologies along the southwest border, we recommended that
DHS identify the benefits and metrics for assessing
implementation of the plan and the technologies going forward.
Your question gets at a key takeaway from a number of
reports we have issued on border security efforts.
Ms. Lujan Grisham. I am hearing from my colleagues on both
sides that while we know we have to do that, we have to perform
those evaluations. We don't have that concrete information. In
your opinion, given unprecedented investments, I am concerned
about whether they are making the difference we need, should
our next set of funds, assuming they move forward, be
contingent upon those assessments and you can only draw down if
you can demonstrate that in fact it is going to be a cost
effective investment that also brings about real results at the
border?
Ms. Gambler. That would certainly be a policy call for
Congress but our recommendations have gone to the need for DHS
to be able to assess the benefits from its investments and the
contributions those investment are making to its border
security efforts.
Ms. Lujan Grisham. If we don't do that, the reality is, and
I hope, you have immigration reform, continue to make sure we
do have secure borders, invest in technology that we will be
using in other places and efforts and if we don't do it in a
contingent, effective manner, then we will not, regardless of
the policy decisions we make here, have an effective
environment for protecting and securing the border while making
sure that the trade takes place and legal travel back and forth
across the border is not minimized but is accepted in a
productive and safe manner.
Based on the testimony today, I am very concerned that we
don't have that information readily available to us. That
minimizes any of the efforts that we make here in Congress. Is
that a fair statement? Anybody can answer. 23 whole seconds. No
takers? Come on. Mr. Murphy?
Mr. Murphy. I think we are working very hard to identify
our risks. And again, not to beat a dead horse I think our Work
Group Staffing Model is helping us identify areas that need
additional resources and basically trying to take more of a
business transformational type of look at our processes and how
we do business.
Ms. Lujan Grisham. It sounds like we may not be as ready as
we should be.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bentivolio. The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady
from Wyoming, Mrs. Lummis.
Mrs. Lummis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
To the previous comment by the gentlelady from New Mexico,
therein lies the problem, trying to get us to do comprehensive
immigration reform at a time when we cannot assure our
constituents, the people we work for, that the border is
secure, is a non-starter. When I go home, all I hear about is
secure the border first, then we will talk about comprehensive
immigration reform. I hear that from all aspects, from all of
my constituents.
I cannot tell them that we have accomplished step one,
secure the border, which is their green light to move forward
on comprehensive immigration reform. This is not a new
condition that the American people, especially those from non-
border States, have put on us. They have been telling us for
years secure the border first, then we will talk about
comprehensive immigration reform.
There is a bill that probably passed the Senate today that
will comprehensively reform immigration. It is not going to
pass the House because we have not addressed the one condition
the American people have put on us before they will allow us to
have a robust conversation about comprehensive immigration
reform. We haven't secured the border.
My constituents have asked me this repeatedly. Is a fence
the least expensive, most effective way to secure the border in
land to land border crossings? Mr. Fisher, is that true?
Mr. Fisher. In some locations, that would be true, yes.
Mrs. Lummis. Do we have a fence in every location where
that is true?
Mr. Fisher. That I don't know but I should add it is not
just the fence because anywhere you would have a fence, which
predominantly you would put in places because you have
identified it as high risk which is attributed by a lot of
illegal crossings in between the ports of entry, just having
the fence in and of itself does not necessarily guarantee
border security.
Mrs. Lummis. The Corker Amendment that is being discussed
in the Senate, I don't know whether it passed or failed, would
add 700 miles of fence and 20,000 troops on our border to
defend our border. If you were me and you go home every weekend
and your constituents are telling you secure the border, secure
the border, would you vote for the Corker Amendment?
Mr. Fisher. Representative, I am not in the position to put
myself in your position although there are similar
circumstances. When I do go home, my wife and son ask me the
same question and we have a very interesting discussion about
that, so I can understand the challenges that you and certainly
other members of the committee are looking at right now as it
relates to the current legislation.
Mrs. Lummis. What are you telling your wife and child?
Mr. Fisher. I try to change the subject.
Mrs. Lummis. I will bet you do. Mr. Murphy?
Mr. Murphy. It is a very important issue.
Mrs. Lummis. Let me ask, the Corker Amendment, 20,000
troops, 700 miles of fence on our southern border, would you
vote for that amendment?
Mr. Murphy. I don't think I could put myself in your
position to answer that.
Mrs. Lummis. Do you have the same conversation with your
family that Mr. Fisher does?
Mr. Murphy. Yes, I do.
Mrs. Lummis. What do you tell them?
Mr. Murphy. I tell them that we have men and women out
there doing the best we can with what we have.
Mrs. Lummis. Mr. Homan, would you vote for the Corker
Amendment if you were me and your constituents, every weekend
when you went home, said, secure the border first, then we will
let you talk about comprehensive immigration reform? Would you
vote for the Corker Amendment?
Mr. Homan. I don't think I am in a position to give my
opinion on that.
Mrs. Lummis. Do you have a family that you discuss these
things with?
Mr. Homan. No. My wife wants me to retire.
About border security, I think we are doing more with our
partners in the Border Patrol than we have ever done before.
There are a couple operations we are currently doing with the
Border Patrol. For instance, we talk about the Alien Transfer
Exit Program, ATEP, where if a Mexican national crosses the
border illegally in Texas, rather than returning them back to
Texas and they make multiple reentries, we take custody of
them, detain them, transport them to another State for removal.
That separates them from the alien smuggling operations so
you hurt the criminal smuggling organization and cuts down the
recidivism. Now that alien is out of his area, he doesn't know
the area, so chances are he is not going to cross again.
Mrs. Lummis. I am glad to hear we are making progress but
let me ask you, is our border secure? Is our southern border
secure?
Mr. Homan. I do not have resources on the border, we do not
control the border.
Mrs. Lummis. Mr. Murphy, is our southern border secure?
Mr. Murphy. I think we are working toward that end.
Mrs. Lummis. Is it now? If I go home this weekend, can I
tell my constituents, and they are going to ask, is our border
secure? What should I say? What would you say if you were me?
Mr. Murphy. We are doing our best.
Mrs. Lummis. Mr. Fisher, what would you say?
Mr. Fisher. I would say in certain sections along the
border, that is, in fact true, the border is secure.
Mrs. Lummis. Can you give us the sections where it is not
secure? Can you show us a map and show us where it is not
secure?
Mr. Fisher. In some locations.
Mrs. Lummis. Can you advise us, in those locations, those
some locations where you can tell us, can you tell us how to
make it secure?
Mr. Fisher. We are in the process of building that right
now.
Mrs. Lummis. When will that process be completed?
Mr. Fisher. Probably in the next few months.
Mrs. Lummis. When you get it, are you going to share it
with us?
Mr. Fisher. It would be my intention to do so but that
would not be my call.
Mrs. Lummis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Bentivolio. The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady
from Illinois, Ms. Kelly.
Ms. Kelly. I just have another question about the data.
Clearly the Border Patrol also collects data other than
apprehensions and the Government Accountability Office has also
reviewed this data. For instance, GAO analyzed the percentage
of repeat border crossers and found that figure had declined
also between 2006 and 2011.
Ms. Gambler, do these indicators paint roughly the same
picture as apprehensions that the number of illegal border
crossings may have declined over the last six years and what
else you think they tell us?
Ms. Gambler. The recidivism rate data we looked at covered
the period from fiscal year 2008 to 2011. It found that the
recidivism rate across the southwest border decreased by six
percent during that time. The recidivism rate looks at
estimated known illegal entrants who were apprehended more than
once, so it is not exactly the same as looking at data on just
apprehensions. It is looking at the number who have been
apprehended more than once.
Ms. Kelly. I also wanted to make a comment that I totally
understand on both sides of the aisle in this committee that
when we call someone, we expect the person to be here and
expect the person to answer our questions. It is also my
understanding that the gentleman has offered to sit down with
staff. I just want to make sure we give him a little credit for
that but I too agree that when we call people, they should come
to session but from my understanding, he has offered to sit
down with staff.
Thank you.
Mr. Bentivolio. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from
Florida, Mr. Mica.
Mr. Mica. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let us go back to the identifications used for entry at the
border. Either Mr. Fisher or Mr. Murphy, are you familiar with
any of the technical boards that approve the credentials used
for crossing the border? Mr. Fisher?
Mr. Fisher. I am not, no.
Mr. Mica. Mr. Murphy?
Mr. Murphy. No, sir.
Mr. Mica. This is why it is difficult to conduct this
hearing without someone responsible from DHS who can answer
these questions.
We have at least five documents I cited and none of them
have dual biometric capability. Do you know, Mr. Fisher, if
again those documents can be used by themselves, either global
entry, NEXUS, FAST or Century?
Mr. Fisher. I don't know that, sir. That is not my area of
expertise.
Mr. Mica. Again, I think as Chief of U.S. Border Customs
and Protection, you should know which documents can be used. I
am not able to question, again whether or not there is any
coordination in the development of those documents and what
they contain, the capability that they contain.
How many individuals were apprehended last year, Mr. Homan,
maybe you have already told the subcommittee, crossing the
borders illegally?
Mr. Homan. I don't have the number of illegal aliens
crossing the border but I can tell you we arrested, processed
and removed 410,000.
Mr. Mica. You removed 410,000 back to their original point
of entry or whatever country they came from?
Mr. Homan. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mica. How many were incarcerated in the United States
last year at any time? Would that be all of them? Is there a
population of illegals in our prisons?
Mr. Homan. Yes, of the 410,000 removed last year, 225,000
of those were convicted criminals.
Mr. Mica. How many were convicted?
Mr. Homan. Two hundred twenty-five thousand, 55 percent of
the 410,000 were convicted criminals.
Mr. Mica. Did you detain those convicted criminals?
Mr. Homan. Yes. Our strategic approach has four priorities:
those that are a threat to national security and community
safety which are convicted criminals; recent border entrants
and those that are fugitives.
Mr. Mica. Taxpayers foot the cost while they are in prison.
Do we also pay their legal costs? Are they read any rights?
Mr. Homan. No, we are an administrative process. If they
get convicted of crimes, they do their time in whatever State
or federal facility. We get them after the fact and we do try
to process them for removal while they are still in custody of
the law enforcement agencies so we don't incur unnecessary
costs.
Mr. Mica. Are they entitled to any kind of legal counsel
that we provide or they can get their own counsel?
Mr. Homan. They can get their own counsel. Under
administrative remove procedures, they are not entitled to a
paid attorney.
Mr. Mica. They are not. Any idea as to the cost of
incarcerating these individuals?
Mr. Homan. In our custody or in the custody of law
enforcement?
Mr. Mica. What is your cost and is there an estimate on the
cost of incarceration?
Mr. Homan. ERO is funded at 34,000 beds a year and those
beds turn over quickly. Our funding for detention operations is
about $1.7 billion.
Mr. Mica. I saw a number of Customs and Border Patrol
people were killed historically, maybe in the last decade. Have
most of the culprits been apprehended, Mr. Murphy or Mr.
Fisher, do you know?
Mr. Fisher. Over the last few years, there have been
arrests of individuals where there was enough evidence to
warrant their arrest that were attributed to violence against
Border Patrol agents and in some cases, killing of Border
Patrol agents and CBP officers.
Mr. Mica. I remember working with the Reagan Administration
when they killed Kiki Camarena. I think the way Reagan handled
it was he closed the borders for a while but we still have
people who haven't been apprehended who have killed our agents,
isn't that correct?
Mr. Fisher. That is correct.
Mr. Mica. That is kind of a sad commentary. I think we need
to do everything possible to target those individuals. It might
be a good use of drones to take them out when you kill an
enforcement officer or Border Patrol personnel of the United
States.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Bentivolio. Did you have more questions?
Mr. Mica. No. I would like the staff to send a letter and I
have asked for a response on this paying twice as much. I guess
they divided the contract between a couple vendors. One of the
pieces of equipment I understand costs twice as much as the
other. It is nice to divide the contract, but I don't really
care about that. I am looking at the taxpayer cost. It has the
same capabilities but I want to find out about that mobile
surveillance equipment, the acquisition and cost of the
equipment, difference in any capability and what would justify
paying twice as much for the same thing.
We will have the meeting with the Chair of the subcommittee
and the full committee Chair on calling in the DHS witness.
Other than that, I appreciate the courtesy.
Mr. Bentivolio. Thank you.
I have a few more questions. Mr. Fisher, you testified
earlier that part of the border is secure and other parts are
not. What parts of the border are unsecured?
Mr. Fisher. These would be areas where generally we don't
have access to the immediate border, we don't have full-time
deployments of Border Patrol agents and we have very little or
in many cases, nonexistent technology. It is only in those
areas where intelligence leads us to believe that criminal
organizations may be exploiting those areas.
We adjust our resources accordingly. That is what I meant
by in some cases, the border is more secure than in others.
Mr. Bentivolio. What percentage is unsecured?
Mr. Fisher. I don't have a percentage. It is very difficult
to identify a percentage.
Mr. Bentivolio. Miles?
Mr. Fisher. It is even harder to distinguish miles because
it fluctuates.
Mr. Bentivolio. What particular areas, Texas, New Mexico,
Arizona?
Mr. Fisher. All across the southwest border are sections
that are considered secure and other sections that are less
secure. As a good example, there is a five mile stretch in San
Diego. My recent post was as Chief in San Diego. That five
miles is between San Ysidro port of entry and the Otay Mesa
port of entry. You may have visited it on one of your recent
border tours.
That section of the border has been pointed out to me over
the last couple of years as exactly what we need the whole
southwest border to look like because within that five mile
stretch, CBP has over the years put in a single fence, had all
weather roads, there is a secondary fence between 15 and 18
feet high and on top of that secondary fence we have razor wire
triple stranded, by the way, across that. There are hundreds of
unattended ground sensors in and around that secondary fence
area. We have integrated fixed towers that provide 7-24
surveillance and Border Patrol agents routinely deploy that.
Very few people cross that section of the border.
If you also look over the last ten years of the
predominance in tunneling activity along the southwest border,
that area is the most exploited.
Mr. Bentivolio. Thank you but I am looking for what part of
the border is unsecured? You mentioned that part of the border
is secure and the other part is unsecured. Now you are back
pedaling saying it is not as secure. It is either secure or not
secure.
Mr. Fisher. That is a really interesting point because when
you look at security, it is not an either/or proposition. It is
the state of the border at any particular time. Any section of
the border that we say is secure is potentially continuing to
be exploited.
Mr. Bentivolio. You said part of the border is less secure.
Mr. Fisher. That is correct.
Mr. Bentivolio. You are saying at certain times, all of the
border is unsecured and sometimes it is secured? I am confused.
I would like to help you fix the border and make sure it is
secure, 100 percent of the time, 24/7, but you are telling me
part of the border is not secured. What geographical area is
unsecured?
Mr. Fisher. There are certain segments. We talked about
Arizona earlier in the west desert, in and around the Tohono
O'odham Nation. That is one particular area where I would
qualify right now because we have less security in that
particular area than we do in other parts of Arizona.
Mr. Bentivolio. Do you have a map?
Mr. Fisher. I can get a map. I don't have one with me.
Mr. Bentivolio. I would like to see a map. I am an old
soldier and my perimeter is going to be secure. When I go to
sleep at night, I want to know I have people out there to
protect my perimeter.
Mr. Fisher. Understood, sir.
Mr. Bentivolio. You know how it works, right?
Mr. Fisher. I do.
Mr. Bentivolio. Americans want to go to sleep at night
knowing their perimeter is secure. I want to know, like a
soldier, what part is the weakest, what is the strongest and
what can we do to fix it?
Mr. Fisher. Certainly. That is understandable.
Mr. Bentivolio. I have just a few more questions. I was
reading a blog from Debbie Sushgall, a blogger. What does she
mean by the term reverse escort? Can any of you answer that
question? Mr. Homan?
Mr. Homan. I can answer that question. The activity in Rio
Grande Valley spiked a couple months ago and since has gone
down but we have seen an increase in other new Mexican arrests,
citizens from El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, the three
major populations.
We have a congressionally mandated cap on overtime. My
office is going to make so much in overtime and a lot of the
arrests the Border Patrol is unaccompanied juveniles. These are
nationals under the age of 18. We are only allowed to detain
them up to 72 hours before we turn them over to Health and
Human Services, Office of Refugee Resettlement.
With the surge in the unaccompanied alien juvenile arrests
that we have in custody, we are by law and the statute supposed
to turn them over to HHS. They have facilities all across the
Country. We contact them, saying we have a juvenile in custody,
where do we take them. We have to deliver that unaccompanied
juvenile to them so they can place them in a facility
comparable for a juvenile.
My officers were doing so many escorts of these juveniles,
they were bumping against the overtime cap, so the cost is the
same for an officer to go from San Antonio to Detroit to drop
off a juvenile to Health and Human Services and fly back to San
Antonio, it is a fixed cost. Since we were bouncing against the
cap, what we are asking the officers to do rather than have
this guy exceed the cap, we are having the Detroit officer fly
to San Antonio, pick up the juvenile and take him back to
Detroit, same cost across the board.
It is a way to deal with our budget, a way to deal with the
mandate of the limit of overtime we can pay our officers.
Mr. Bentivolio. According to the blog, they are saying
immigration agents are dropping them off in sanctuaries,
awaiting amnesty.
Mr. Homan. That is not accurate. My officers turn them over
to Health and Human Services, Office of Refugee Resettlement.
They have contracts with certain people that detain the
juvenile, makes sure he gets his medical and food until he gets
a hearing from the immigration judge and gets ordered removed.
You would have to talk to Health and Human Services about
how they bill out that contract and who they contract with to
house the juveniles but that is totally taken out of context.
Mr. Bentivolio. The other question is why would you fly a
juvenile or anybody from Texas, Arizona or New Mexico to
Detroit to await trial or some kind of disposition?
Mr. Homan. Health and Human Services ran out of beds in
Texas. They have contracts all over the Country. Juvenile
aliens are arrested all over the 50 States. Because of the
shortage in the Rio Grande Valley, Health and Human Services
ran out of contract beds in Texas, so now HHS tells us here is
where there is availability to take care of this child, here is
where you bring them. Again, that is Health and Human Services'
call on where there contracts are for bedding.
Mr. Bentivolio. Thank you clarifying that.
This catch and release thing, I toured Eloy, a holding
facility or prison? What do you call it?
Mr. Homan. It is a detention facility.
Mr. Bentivolio. A detention facility, thank you. I
understand you only have so much bed space.
Mr. Homan. We are funded for 34,000 beds.
Mr. Bentivolio. At Eloy?
Mr. Homan. No.
Mr. Bentivolio. One thousand five hundred sixty, about
1,500, right?
Mr. Homan. Approximately.
Mr. Bentivolio. If all those beds are filled and you have
30 that you just caught, where do they go?
Mr. Homan. At the beginning of the year, we actually had
over 37,000, actually overburdening the budget because our
enforcement strategy that makes sense. If we are completely
full and are beyond budget, as aliens come into custody, we
need to make a determination. Is there somebody sitting in a
bed that is a non-criminal, a non-mandatory case, maybe has
U.S. citizen kids, maybe a child serving in the Armed Forces,
can we put him in an alternative form of detention, maybe an
ankle bracelet and monitor him, release him and make that bed
available for the priority case.
We save our beds for priority cases which are criminal
aliens, those who threaten national security and recent border
crossers. Actually increased the beds in Texas to make sure we
can detain recent border crossers because I think that is
important border control strategy.
Mr. Bentivolio. The Border Patrol agents tell me that they
get a message saying beds are filled and they don't respond or
they don't make a big effort capturing all the 26, maybe only
capture three or four. Is that accurate?
Mr. Homan. No. What I can tell you is, as a matter of
practice, we detain all recent border entrants. We have brought
on a couple thousand more beds in Texas to deal with the
influx. There are situations where somebody is released from
our custody, we release people every day, like every jail does,
maybe we can't get a travel document. Maybe he is from Somalia
and maybe we cannot get a travel document to Somalia.
We have a Supreme Court decision in Zabeda that says we can
only detain someone up to six months. If there is no
significant likelihood of removal, we must release them as long
as they are not a danger to the community.
As Border Patrol gives us the aliens, we make it a priority
to detain those aliens. If they are unaccompanied juveniles, we
will turn them over to HHS so they are released from our
custody. If they claim fear and are interviewed by CIS and CIS
finds a claim of fear positive, that alien becomes eligible for
bond.
We release aliens all the time on bond, if they meet bonds
set by the judge. If there is a humanitarian concern, maybe an
alien comes to our attention, we find out is a sole caregiver
for a child and that person is not a danger to the community,
he might be better served in an alternative form of detention.
Mr. Bentivolio. We have heard reports of significant
increases in other than Mexicans, OTMs, crossing our southwest
border. In fact, Chairman Chaffetz tweeted about nine Romanians
apprehended crossing the southwest border during his recent
trip and some Arizona news outlets are reporting an increase in
Indian nationals, more than 1,000 since January this year
crossing in that State. What other countries are they coming
from?
Mr. Homan. The big majority right now in order is
Guatemala, the biggest, Honduras and El Salvador. Let me
explain what we did with that. We were bringing so many OTMs
into custody, we have way over 37,000. I instructed my staff to
meet with the governments of Guatemala, Honduras and El
Salvador and start a pilot program.
Usually, these nationals are in detention for 10 to 20 days
before a government official from Guatemala would interview
them. They have to interview them and make sure they are
nationals of their country and issue a travel document. It took
20 days so the beds were backing up.
I issued instructions to start a pilot program with
agreement from the governments. We made equipment available for
Guatemala and Honduras and they are doing the interviews now
through a pilot program within 24 hours. They are issuing a
travel document within 24 hours. I reassigned some flight hours
to Central America, so we surged Central American flights. In
the last two weeks we removed over 5,000 OTMs to their country
through this pilot program, so that got my bed level down.
As far as the East Indians in Arizona, CBP can speak to
that but it is my understanding because we are getting them in
custody that they are actually surrendering themselves at a
port of entry and claiming fear. At that point, the processes
will contact CIS, CIS arranges an interview and tries to make
the determination is that fear credible. If that determination
is yes, he has a substantiated credible fear of returning to
his homeland, then that alien becomes eligible for release
either under bond or other supervisory release.
Mr. Bentivolio. They are claiming fear, these nine
Romanians. It was my understanding they went to trial or went
before a judge, were released on bond of some sort and never
showed back up.
Mr. Homan. I am unfamiliar with the Romanians. I know about
the East Indian issue because it is well over 1,000 we have in
retention that we are dealing with CIS. I am unfamiliar with
the Romanian case. Last year, we removed aliens from over 150
countries, so we see aliens from every country on the planet.
Mr. Bentivolio. Walk me through this. Somebody comes to
Eloy, they go before a judge.
Mr. Homan. On Mexican nationals, we can turn them around
pretty quickly. On OTMs, before we can remove them to their
homeland, they have to be interviewed by officials of their
country to ascertain that they are in fact a citizen of
Guatemala. After that interview, the Guatemalan government will
issue a travel document. That identifies the person as a
national of that country and that allows us to repatriate them
to that country.
We arrest somebody and they are an OTM and we set them up
for an immigration hearing. They will see an immigration judge
if they request a hearing.
Mr. Bentivolio. How many show up after you release them?
Mr. Homan. It depends. If they are released under some sort
of ordered supervision, maybe an anklet bracelet, ATD shows
about 80 percent show rate at the hearing. Those released on
OR, the appearance rate is lower.
Those arrested crossing the border, the Border Patrol will
process them as an expedited removal. An expedited removal is a
removal order in itself, so they don't have to see a judge.
When the Border Patrol processes them as expedited removal,
they come to my custody. We get a quick interview from the host
government, they issue a travel document and remove them.
The only time a hearing comes into effect is if they are
claiming fear and they get to go through NCIS and later an
immigration judge. If they are not an expedited removal case,
if we arrest them in the interior, we cannot process them
expedited removal, we have to give them a notice to appear in
front of an immigration judge.
Mr. Bentivolio. What percentage of OTMs, do you have an
average number in detention facilities?
Mr. Homan. At the time we started the pilot, we had
approximately 34,000 in custody and approximately 7,000 to
8,000 OTMs.
Mr. Bentivolio. The rest are?
Mr. Homan. Citizens of Mexico.
Mr. Bentivolio. Eighty percent show up.
Mr. Homan. The ADT metric, when we release someone on ADT
or ankle bracelet, the appearance rate on that and other forms
of reporting, telephonic reporting, could be an officer doing a
bed check at their residence, we have an 80 percent appearance
rate for those released to alternative detention.
Mr. Bentivolio. So, at least 20 percent did not appear?
Mr. Homan. Yes, sir.
Mr. Bentivolio. How many people is that approximately,
10,000? You are talking 400,000 people you processed.
Mr. Homan. Actually we had intake of 475,000 last year, we
removed 410,000. Some are still fighting their cases. We have
some cases that go to immigration court, they will get a final
order of removal and they will appeal that to the Board of
Immigration Appeals. They can go further and appeal once more
to the circuit court. We have a lot of aliens with final orders
sitting in our beds that we cannot remove because they have
appeals pending.
Mr. Bentivolio. You have 400,000 plus; 20 percent of that
is 80,000 people that never show back up.
Mr. Homan. Our current fugitive operation backlog, people
ordered removed and have fled, they have not been removed, is
462,000, latest count.
Mr. Bentivolio. Four hundred sixty-two thousand, and the
news reports or media reports 11 million illegal in this
Country. Somebody told me it is closer to 20 million; somebody
else told me 30 million.
Mr. Homan. I have heard the 11 million figure. That is why
I think what ICE is doing is smart and effective enforcement.
Knowing that we can are remove 400,000 aliens, that is what we
are staffed and budgeted for, I think a smart way to do that is
it going to be the first 400,000 we encounter, the first
400,000 in the door?
I think our policy focusing on the criminal aliens, those
that threaten national security, I like to think we can decide
who those 400,000 are going to be. The more criminals there
are, the safer our communities are. We make a bigger impact, so
our policy is clear. Let us decide who that 400,000 is going to
be if that is all we can do. Let us make as many of them
community safety factors as possible. That makes our
communities safer.
I mentioned earlier we removed 225,000 criminal aliens last
year. That is a significant impact on community safety, not to
mention the recidivism rate of around 50 percent. How many
crimes did we prevent by removing that many criminal aliens?
Mr. Bentivolio. Two hundred twenty-five thousand, is half
of the 400,000.
Mr. Homan. That is 55 percent. If you look at the 410,000,
96 percent fell into our priorities, either 55 percent were
criminal aliens and the rest, 96 percent, were either
fugitives, those who were ordered removed and reentered which
makes them reentry or the recent border entrants. The recent
border entrants remain a priority for us because we need to
secure the border.
Mr. Bentivolio. A second illegal entry is a felony?
Mr. Homan. If they have been ordered removed formally by an
immigration judge, they reenter and we catch them, they can be
prosecuted for 8 U.S.C. 1326 which is a felony, reentry after
deportation.
Mr. Bentivolio. Do you agree with other law enforcement
professionals who are concerned that the rise in OTMs
correlates to the rise in smuggling operations coming out of
Mexico?
Mr. Homan. I think the rise in OTM apprehensions, a vast
majority are being smuggled by smuggling organizations
operating out of Mexico.
Mr. Bentivolio. I have one last question. When I was at
Eloy, they gave me a daily report. It was a sheet of paper with
all the countries in the world and there was a little space
next to it. Every day, somebody would fill out that report and
write the number being held at that facility in that little
space on the sheet of paper. Is that like a daily report?
Mr. Homan. I am unfamiliar with that. That might be
something that facility does but we track every alien in
custody, where they are from, who they are, how long they have
been in custody through electronic databases.
Mr. Bentivolio. I saw all the countries that were
represented in that facility. Knowing from what I have seen
that we don't capture 100 percent, we don't, the one thing that
bothered me the most was there was the number one next to the
country of Afghanistan. I don't know why but that really played
on me.
If we don't capture everybody, how many that we didn't
capture from that particular country, because that is of
concern to me and I am sure a lot of others, I guess that is
why I stay awake at night sometimes when I think about this
border and the problems we have there.
Operational control is often described as a strategy used
by DHS and CBP to describe their operations in securing U.S.
borders. What do you view as the biggest threat to the security
of our borders, Mr. Fisher, and we will go right down the line?
Mr. Fisher. Certainly the biggest threat as I would
describe it would be those individuals that seek and wake up
each and every day thinking about nothing else but doing harm
to this Country. That is our number one threat and that is what
our strategy looks to target.
Mr. Bentivolio. What does that mean?
Mr. Fisher. Your question had to do with how we evaluate
threat along the border and what that threat is?
Mr. Bentivolio. What do you think the biggest risk is and
how are we responding to that risk? To give you an example,
there was one person there from Afghanistan. Right now we are
fighting a war in Afghanistan. Why is somebody from Afghanistan
sneaking into our Country or trying to? They are being held in
Eloy Prison at the time.
Then I hear we have 11 million illegals and we are not 100
percent secure. You said the border is not secure. Somebody who
wants to do us harm is going to exploit our weaknesses and the
weak points in our border. My job, as the Congressman, is to
protect this Country, number one priority in the Constitution.
You are telling me our border is not secure and I would
like to know what you think the biggest threat to the security
of our borders is? Can you give me a percentage?
Mr. Fisher. I do share the same responsibility as you as
the Chief of United States Border Patrol. I along with the
other agents took the same oath to support and defend the
Constitution against all enemies foreign and domestic. Within
that framework, and the strategy which we have implemented over
the last couple of years, specifically the threat that keeps me
up as well is those individuals, potential terrorists, seeking
entry to this Country and they do so between the ports of
entry.
We build a strategy and try to identify what the
requirements are to minimize the likelihood that those
individuals if they are inclined to get into this Country in
that manner, we are able to detect them and apprehend them when
they do so.
If you are looking at threats or vulnerabilities as
established geographically, I cannot give you certain segments
of miles and I cannot give you percentages. I can give another
example outside of the West Desert in Arizona, in a place like
south Texas where the border is separated by the Rio Grande
Valley and areas where we generally do not have a lot of
detection capability, we do not have impediments like we have
in other places like 12 to 15 foot fences.
The areas right now where we see the vast majority of
individuals seeking entry are within those areas in the Rio
Grande Valley. From a regional standpoint, vulnerability is in
the Rio Grande Valley.
Mr. Bentivolio. Mr. Murphy?
Mr. Murphy. I believe it is terrorists and implements of
terror. One of the things we have done is we have pushed our
borders back from air traffic, the passengers. We know who is
coming, we know well in advance of them boarding planes, and we
know what is coming from a cargo and get that information in
advance. At our land ports of entry and at our seaports, we
have our RPMs or radiation detection devices. I believe that is
where we have really done the most work as far as identifying
that threat ahead of time.
We denied boarding to 4,200 people in 2012. These were
potentially high risk individuals that could have come to this
Country to do harm.
Mr. Bentivolio. We want 100 percent border security and you
do not have it and one from Afghanistan comes in. That is all
it takes is one.
Mr. Homan?
Mr. Homan. I have carried a badge for 29 years. I care
about the security of this Country and I think it is my job to
protect the security of this Country and the security of our
communities. I think the biggest threat is those who want to
come to this Country and do harm in two different fashions.
The other side of the house, HSI Division, is a priority
project they are working on, investigations of a national
security nature. Also important is the safety of the
communities for those who come here and want to commit crime
who not only enter the Country illegally but then commit a
crime against a citizen of this Country.
I have been doing this for a long time. There was a time
when I was a street agent and we would just go out and arrest
aliens because they are here in violation of the law. I am
enforcing immigration law. At the end of the day, what impact
did I make? At the same time I am arresting this person who is
here illegally but maybe hasn't committed another crime, there
is a child predator walking out of State prison because we
didn't have a presence in all the jails across the Country.
This Administration, I truly believe this, has done a lot
for community safety by deploying secure communities across the
Country. We have a virtual presence in every jail. When an
alien is arrested and finger printed, we are going to find out
about that alien and we can take action and remove him from the
Country.
The strategy ICE has built on prioritizing what we do on
national security threats, aliens that are a threat to public
safety, makes sense to me. It is the right thing to do. If we
are built to remove 400,000 people, let us make that 400,000
count. I think what we are doing now makes sense. I have been
doing this 29 years. I think we are in a better spot now than
we have been in years.
Mr. Bentivolio. Thank you very much.
Ms. Gambler?
Ms. Gambler. The Border Patrol has identified threats to
border security from terrorism, from drug smuggling and from
illegal migration. The Border Patrol is working on developing
some risk assessment tools to help assess what those risks are
and help inform its identification of resources. That is in
process right now.
Mr. Bentivolio. Thank you very much.
I would like to thank all our witnesses for taking time
from their busy schedules to appear before us today. The
committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:40 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
APPENDIX
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Material Submitted for the Hearing Record
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