[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
HOMELAND SECURITY GRANTS: MEASURING OUR INVESTMENTS
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HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY
PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE,
AND COMMUNICATIONS
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 19, 2013
__________
Serial No. 113-6
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
__________
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Candice S. Miller, Michigan, Vice Brian Higgins, New York
Chair Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Ron Barber, Arizona
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania Dondald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Jason Chaffetz, Utah Beto O'Rourke, Texas
Steven M. Palazzo, Mississippi Tulsi Gabbard, Hawaii
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Filemon Vela, Texas
Chris Stewart, Utah Steven A. Horsford, Nevada
Keith J. Rothfus, Pennsylvania Eric Swalwell, California
Richard Hudson, North Carolina
Steve Daines, Montana
Susan W. Brooks, Indiana
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania
Greg Hill, Chief of Staff
Michael Geffroy, Deputy Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE, AND COMMUNICATIONS
Susan W. Brooks, Indiana, Chairwoman
Peter T. King, New York Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Steven M. Palazzo, Mississippi Brian Higgins, New York
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Michael T. McCaul, Texas (ex (ex officio)
officio)
Eric B. Heighberger, Subcommittee Staff Director
Deborah Jordan, Subcommittee Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Statements
The Honorable Susan W. Brooks, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Indiana, and Chairwoman, Subcommittee on Emergency
Preparedness, Response, and Communications..................... 1
The Honorable Donald M. Payne, Jr., a Representative in Congress
From the State of New Jersey, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee
on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications........ 2
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security.............................................. 4
Witnesses
Mr. Tim Manning, Deputy Administrator, Protection and National
Preparedness, Federal Emergency Management Agency:
Oral Statement................................................. 6
Prepared Statement............................................. 8
Ms. Anne L. Richards, Assistant Inspector General for Audits,
Office of Inspector General, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 12
Prepared Statement............................................. 14
Mr. David C. Maurer, Director, Homeland Security and Justice
Issues, Government Accountability Office:
Oral Statement................................................. 20
Prepared Statement............................................. 21
Appendix
Questions From Chairman Susan W. Brooks for Tim Manning.......... 47
Question from Chairman Susan W. Brooks for Anne L. Richards...... 48
Questions From Chairman Susan W. Brooks for David C. Maurer...... 48
HOMELAND SECURITY GRANTS: MEASURING OUR INVESTMENTS
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Tuesday, March 19, 2013
U.S. House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response,
and Communications,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:04 a.m., in
Room 311, Cannon Office Building, Hon. Susan W. Brooks
[Chairwoman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Brooks, Marino, Palazzo, Perry,
Payne, Thompson, and Clarke.
Mrs. Brooks. The Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and
Communications will come to order. The subcommittee is meeting
today to examine the administration of grants at the Department
of Homeland Security.
I will now recognize myself for an opening statement.
After holding a number of site visits and briefings over
this past month, the subcommittee is convening to hold its
first hearing of the 113th Congress on a subject that has had a
great impact on the prevention, preparedness, and response
capabilities of our State and local partners. That is homeland
security grants.
The September 11 terrorist attacks exposed significant gaps
in prevention, preparedness, and response capabilities at all
levels of government. As a result, a suite of grant programs
was created to address these issues and enhance our
preparedness as a Nation.
To date, nearly $40 billion has been distributed to States
and localities through these grants. According to the National
Preparedness Report, which was released last year by FEMA,
progress in building and sustaining capabilities has been made
as a result of these grants.
According to this report, Federal preparedness assistance
programs have helped build and enhance State, local, Tribal,
and territorial capabilities through multi-year investments
across mission areas. The report goes on to say that Federal
preparedness assistance has clearly contributed to the
capability gains achieved since 9/11.
However, as has been noted by the Government Accountability
Office and the DHS Inspector General, FEMA has still been
unable to develop comprehensive measures and metrics to
quantify the impact of these grant investments on grantee
capabilities. Although a difficult task, we must always ensure
that we are good stewards of taxpayer dollars and we are able
to justify and account for these significant investments.
The 9/11 Act, which became law in 2007, states that in
order to ensure that the States and high-risk urban areas are
appropriately using grants administered by the Department, the
FEMA administrator shall use performance metrics, and ensure
that any such State or high-risk area regularly tests its
progress against these metrics.
Still, nearly 6 years later, we are still waiting for
comprehensive measures with respective to the metrics.
Anecdotally, we know that these grants have made a
difference, most definitely. The National Network of Fusion
Centers has enhanced intelligence and information sharing.
Emergency plans have been better developed, updated, and
exercised. Emergency response providers have received important
training. Investments in vital communications capabilities have
been made.
However, we also know that challenges and capability gaps
still remain. But without appropriate measures and metrics, we
can't ensure that these grants are going to address critical
capabilities in the area with the greatest risk.
We are all aware of the grave fiscal challenges facing all
levels of government. We must ensure we are getting a return on
our investment and that each and every grant dollar is used
appropriately. When it comes to our--however, when it comes to
our security, we can't afford to waste a single dollar.
Last Congress, this subcommittee held a number of hearings
on homeland security grants--and in fact, I learned almost 1
year ago yesterday--or a year ago tomorrow, as I understand
it--and the capabilities that have been attained since 9/11.
We continue this important oversight today. We have many
questions about the impacts of these grants and about how these
dollars are utilized, how their impact is being measured and
how the Department and FEMA are ensuring that the grants are
being used in an appropriate manner, according to their intent.
I hope today's hearing will answer several key questions.
What progress has been made in FEMA's efforts to measure the
impact of the homeland security grants? What steps are being
taken to ensure that grant funds are being used in accordance
with the grant guidance?
What progress has FEMA made since this subcommittee held a
hearing on grants almost exactly a year ago? How will the
THIRAs help inform the investment justification and project
approval process?
Then based, finally, on the findings of the National
Preparedness Report, what are the capabilities most yet in need
of investment?
So I am pleased to welcome our distinguished panel of
witnesses. I look forward to hearing your perspectives on these
important topics.
Now the Chairwoman would recognize the gentleman from New
Jersey, Mr. Payne, for any opening statement you might have.
Mr. Payne. Good morning. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman
Brooks, for convening today's hearing.
I also want to thank our panel of witnesses, and thank them
for testifying today.
Madam Chairwoman, before I move forward with my opening
statement, I would like to commend FEMA's response, recovery,
and relief efforts related to Hurricane Sandy. As a native of
New Jersey, I can attest to the severe damage caused to our
public and private properties, critical infrastructure, and
transportation systems.
The coordinated efforts to foster regional collaboration
with our local first responders and neighborhoods and
neighboring States is a testament of the whole-community
approach.
Thank you.
Today, we will discuss FEMA's efforts to measure the return
on investment from homeland security grants provided to States
and locals, as well as identify and close preparedness gaps
with homeland security resources. Also, we are eager to learn
about FEMA's fiscal year 2012 impractical proposal to
consolidate 16 homeland security grants under their National
Preparedness Grant Program.
FEMA's homeland security grants have enhanced State,
territory, local, and Tribal government capabilities to plan,
coordinate, and train to prepare and to respond to any natural,
terroristic attack or catastrophic situations.
Since 2002, Congress has appropriated $39 billion for
homeland security grants. Congress and FEMA would like to use
this hearing to further investigate and understand the returns
on investment taxpayers are receiving from the grant program.
We have to determine how homeland security grants have
specifically helped our communities become further equipped to
handle threats and natural disasters, and how we can sustain
our preparedness.
It is for this reason that Congress has directed FEMA to
establish performance metrics that would allow States and urban
areas to report the capabilities they have built with Federal
funding.
Over the years, FEMA has presented plans to gauge the
effectiveness of its homeland security grants. However, it is a
history of mostly unsuccessful attempts.
The OIG, GAO, and the National Academy for Public
Administration released respective findings that FEMA must do
the following: Improve its guidance in establishing performance
metrics and measurements, establish qualitative and
quantitative frameworks to measure grants' performance, and
develop and implement a system for assessing natural
preparedness capabilities.
In addition to the findings of the OIG, GAO, and the NAPA,
staff have learned that critical information about the success
of grant programs such as UASI, MMRS, and others have not been
properly conveyed to Congress.
It would be unfortunate for wholesale changes and cuts to
be made to our grant programs that result in the elimination of
capabilities necessary to meet complex challenges of
emergencies because FEMA has not clearly presented the efforts
of the State and locals.
Mr. Manning, I admire FEMA's attempts to promote and
streamline the grant process. But I am confounded to hear from
our homeland security stakeholders about the Department's
audacity to move forward with the implementation of NPGP
despite Congressional opposition.
Last year, the Senate and House rejected this proposal
because it lacked the necessary details and stakeholder
outreach. Last week, the Senate Appropriations released
Consolidated and Further Appropriations Act of 2013, which
rejected the NPGP proposal, due to the lack of justification,
and includes bill language prohibiting obligations of funds for
such programs, or any successive program, unless authorized by
Congress.
Congress created discrete programs to direct grant
investments to address specific gaps in National and local
preparedness capabilities. Measuring preparedness is a
difficult task. But I hope this hearing will help us better
understand how FEMA can successfully move forward in achieving
its goals of ensuring that local communities have the necessary
tools, resources, and processes to keep their people safe.
I look forward to hearing FEMA's response to our concerns
and its efforts to implement performance measures.
Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I yield back.
Mrs. Brooks. Thank you.
The Chairwoman now recognizes the Ranking Member of the
full committee, gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Thompson. Any
statement you might have?
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman. I
would like to thank you for holding this hearing, as well as
our Ranking Member, Mr. Payne, also. I think this is the maiden
voyage for both of you. Congratulations.
From the Urban Area Security Initiative and the State
Homeland Security Program to the Port Security Grant Program
and the Transit Security Grant Program, the preparedness grant
programs administered by the Federal Emergency Management
Agency help build critical disaster response capability in
every Congressional district.
Over the past 10 years, we have invested around $39 billion
in these and other homeland security grant programs. When we go
back to our districts, we hear anecdotal stories about how
homeland security grant program funding has supported a
tabletop exercise to test a local emergency operation plan or
to purchase technology that will help first responders to do
their job quicker, better, and safer.
Communities across the country are proud of the
preparedness capabilities that they have worked to develop over
the past 10 years, a feat made possible by support from
Homeland Security Grant Program.
But now these capabilities may be mothballed. Federal,
State, and local budgets are stretched more and more every
year. Large grant awards that helped State and local
governments prepare for manmade and natural disasters are
becoming less common, but the threats, disasters posed are not.
With less Federal support available, State and local
governments are struggling to maintain the capabilities
achieved over the past decade. Our oversight responsibilities
include making sure FEMA uses its limited preparedness funding
wisely.
For at least 5 years, this committee has been asking FEMA
to develop capability objectives and metrics to help State and
local governments prioritize grant investments. I am also
concerned that FEMA has not yet implemented the grant
management and oversight practices necessary to ensure that the
limited grant money available is spent effectively and
efficiently.
I am disappointed to read in one after another GAO and I.G.
report identifying management failures that have led to
duplicative purchases or increased administrative costs. Now
more than ever, FEMA must develop and implement the tools
necessary to efficiently manage the limited grant funds awarded
each year.
We cannot afford for Homeland Security Grant Program
dollars to be spent on unnecessary equipment because metrics
are not available to determine whether a State or local
government has sufficient resources to meet its preparedness
needs.
We cannot afford for Homeland Security Grant Program
dollars to be spent on duplicate purchase because FEMA has not
taken the necessary action to ensure grantees use appropriate
inventory practices.
Although I understand that FEMA has made progress in
implementing the recommendations of GAO and the DHS I.G. to
improve grant management, I was encouraged by the release of
the National Preparedness Report last year.
I am interested to learn from Deputy Administrator Manning
how FEMA will continue its efforts to manage and measure the
effectiveness of grants.
Finally, I would like to make a brief comment on the
National Preparedness Grant Program. As you may recall, Deputy
Administrator Manning, Members of this committee, as
authorized, were surprised to read for the first time a
proposal to consolidate 16 targeted grant programs in the
fiscal year 2013 budget request last year.
Members of this committee rejected that proposal,
expressing concern about the Department's failure to work with
authorizers and other stakeholders during the development of
the NPGP. Appropriators were similarly apprehensive and have
not provided funding in any other fiscal year 2013 spending
bills.
I understand that the administration plans to submit the
NPGP proposal again in the fiscal year 2014 budget request.
Before doing so, I would urge you to provide Members of this
committee a detailed briefing explaining how the grant
proposals were developed, how the feedback of stakeholders was
solicited and incorporated, specific details about the funding
structure and how you expect the new grant program will address
the flaws in the Homeland Security Grant Program identified by
DHS I.G. and GAO.
The Ranking Member has also referenced some Senate activity
around this, where they just basically said, don't do it. I
think it is important that, as authorizers, you do come and
say, here is what we plan to do. So I look forward to hearing
from you on that.
I would like to also thank the other witnesses for being
here today. I look forward for their testimony.
I yield back, Madam Chairwoman.
Mrs. Brooks. Thank you.
Other Members of the committee are reminded that opening
statements may be submitted for the record. We are pleased to
have a very distinguished panel before us today on this
important topic.
Mr. Tim Manning is the deputy administrator for protection
and national preparedness at the Federal Emergency Management
Agency. In this capacity, he oversees the National Preparedness
Directorate, the Grants Program Directorate, the National
Continuity Programs Directorate and the National Capital Region
Coordination Directorate. That is a mouthful.
Mr. Manning brings to FEMA nearly 2 decades of emergency
management experience, including service as a firefighter,
emergency medical technician, and a rescue mountaineer.
Mr. David Maurer is a director in the U.S. Government
Accountability Office's Homeland Security and Justice Team,
where he leads GAO's work reviewing DHS and DOJ management
issues. His recent work in these areas includes DHS management
integration, the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, Secret
Service financial management, DOJ grant management, the Federal
prison system, and an assessment of technologies for detecting
explosives in the passenger rail environment.
Last, but certainly not least, and who was here last year,
as I understand, Ms. Anne Richards is the assistant inspector
general for the Office of Audits within the Department of
Homeland Security's Office of Inspector General. Prior to
joining OIG in 2007, Ms. Richards served in the Department of
the Interior, including as the assistant inspector general for
audits.
Ms. Richards has also held a number of positions with the
U.S. Army Audit Agency.
The witnesses' full written statements will appear in the
record. The Chairwoman now recognizes Mr. Manning for 5 minutes
for an opening statement.
STATEMENT OF TIM MANNING, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR, PROTECTION AND
NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS, FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY
Mr. Manning. Madam Chairwoman, good morning. Thank you very
much.
Ranking Member Payne, Members of the subcommittee, good
morning.
I am Tim Manning, FEMA's deputy administrator for
protection and national preparedness. On behalf of Secretary
Napolitano and Administrator Fugate, thank you for the
opportunity to appear this morning.
As you know, FEMA's preparedness grant programs have
contributed significantly to the overall security preparedness
of the Nation. We are more secure and better prepared to
prevent, protect, and mitigate the impacts of all threats than
we have been at any other time in our history.
We plan better. We train better. We work together better.
We respond and recover better. With each passing year, our
planning, preparations, and capabilities continue to mature.
Much of this progress has come from leadership at the State
and local levels, fueled by FEMA's grant programs. Over the
past 10 years, Congress, through DHS, has provided State,
territorial, local, and Tribal governments with more than $39
billion.
We have built and enhanced capabilities by acquiring needed
equipment, training, developing plans, exercising and building
relationships across city, county, and State lines. Although
Federal funds represent just a fraction of what has been spent
on homeland security across the Nation overall, these funds and
the development of capabilities that they have made possible,
have fundamentally changed the level of preparedness in the
United States.
The first National Preparedness Report, released last year,
provided specific accomplishments in the context of the core
capabilities identified in the National Preparedness Goal.
Among the report's findings, the Nation has made significant
progress and has achieved a high degree of maturity in several
core capabilities, particularly in the cross-cutting, common
capabilities and those that support disaster response.
Planning, operational coordination, interoperable
communications, intelligence and information sharing,
environmental response, health and safety, search and rescue,
and public health and medical services stood out as areas where
we are particularly strong. This is due, in large part, to the
significant investments we have made in those areas.
The development and maturation of the State and major area
fusion centers represents one other example of the impact our
grant programs have had in States and communities across the
Nation. Fusion centers function as a focal points, information
hubs within State and local jurisdictions to provide for the
gathering and sharing of critical information and intelligence
among Federal, State, and local agencies.
There are currently 78 designated State and major urban
area fusion centers across the country.
FEMA preparedness grant programs have also built
operational coordination capabilities, specifically helping to
establish the National Incident Management System, or NIMS, as
the common incident management doctrine for the Nation.
Prior to the introduction of NIMS in 2004, the Nation had
no single, official incident management system. By 2011, nearly
10 million homeland security and emergency management
professionals, volunteers, and students from across the Nation
had successfully completed the FEMA-sponsored independent study
courses on NIMS. It is used widely.
One of our most visible success stories involves the
search-and-rescue capabilities we have built across the Nation
with our homeland security grant dollars. Currently, there are
300 State and local urban area search and rescue teams. Only 55
percent of those teams existed prior to 2001.
At the time of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks,
many major population centers across the United States lacked
advanced search-and-rescue coverage. But today, there are urban
search-and-rescue teams--organized urban search-and-rescue
teams within a 4-hour drive of 97 percent of the Nation's
population.
This National expansion of State and local urban search-
and-rescue capabilities is a direct response--or direct result
of the Federal funding and training from this program.
In March 2011, President Obama signed Presidential Policy
Directive, PPD-8 on National preparedness, directing the
development of a National preparedness goal.
Plainly stated, the goal, developed through a collaborative
process, including all levels of government, the private
sector, the general public, envisions a secure and resilient
Nation with the capabilities required across the whole
community to prevent, protect, mitigate, respond, and recover
from threats and hazards that pose the greatest risk.
This year, FEMA released the methodology for determining
risks through the Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk
Assessment, or THIRA. The approach allows a jurisdiction to
establish its own capability targets based on the threats and
hazards that exist with that jurisdiction, and expands on
existing State, local, territorial, and Tribal hazard
identification and risk assessments by incorporating whole-
community approaches from the beginning to the end of the
process, and accounting for important community-specific
factors.
In conclusion, we have demonstrated the efficacy of our
programs through a reasoned analysis of the threats and hazards
that exist across the country, and the attendant core
capabilities that can be applied to those hazards.
The National Preparedness Goal provides us with a clearly
defined target to work towards. We have greatly improved the
ability to assess our needs and track spending towards meeting
those needs. Consolidating many of our programs will eliminate
duplication and bring focus to the overall effort.
Thank you for the opportunity again to discuss these
important issues this morning. I look forward to the
conversation and addressing any questions the committee may
have.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Manning follows:]
Prepared Statement of Timothy Manning
March 19, 2013
Chairwoman Brooks, Ranking Member Payne, and Members of the
subcommittee: Good morning. I am Timothy Manning, FEMA's deputy
administrator for protection and national preparedness. On behalf of
Secretary Napolitano and Administrator Fugate, it is my pleasure to
appear before you today to discuss the Department of Homeland
Security's (DHS) preparedness grant programs.
As this committee is aware, FEMA's preparedness grant programs have
contributed significantly to the overall security and preparedness of
the Nation. By providing funds, encouraging State and local
collaboration, and encouraging planning, these programs have enhanced
the security and preparedness of States, territories, Tribal nations,
regions, cities, borders, ports, and transit systems. As a Nation, we
are more secure and better prepared to prevent, protect, and mitigate
the impact of all threats than we have been at any time in our history.
We plan better, we train better, we work together better, and we
respond and recover better. And with each passing year, our planning,
preparations, and capabilities continue to mature.
Much of this progress has come from leadership at the State and
local levels, fueled by the preparedness grant programs. Over the past
10 years, Congress, through the Department of Homeland Security, has
provided State, territorial, local, and Tribal governments with more
than $35 billion in funding to enhance the Nation's ability to plan
for, protect against, prevent, mitigate, respond to, and recover from
natural disasters, terrorist attacks, and other events. We have built
and enhanced capabilities by acquiring needed equipment, offering
training to personnel, developing plans, exercising and building
relationships across city, county, and State lines. Although Federal
funds represent just a fraction of what has been spent on homeland
security across the Nation overall, these funds and the development of
capabilities they have made possible, have changed the culture of
preparedness in the United States.
The first National Preparedness Report, released last year,
provided specific accomplishments in the context of the core
capabilities identified in the National Preparedness Goal. Among the
Report's findings, the Nation has made significant progress and has
achieved a high degree of maturity in several core capabilities,
particularly in cross-cutting, common capabilities and those that
support disaster response. Planning, operational coordination,
interoperable communications, intelligence and information sharing,
environmental response, health and safety, search and rescue, and
public health and medical services stood out as areas where we are
particularly strong. This is due in large part to the significant
investments we have made in those areas. Since 2006, our State, local,
Tribal, and other partners have applied for more than $7.3 billion in
preparedness assistance from DHS to support the core capabilities
identified in the National Preparedness Goal.
The development and maturation of State and major urban area fusion
centers represent just one example of the impact our grant programs
have in States and communities across the Nation. Fusion centers
function as focal points--information hubs--within State and local
jurisdictions to provide for the gathering, receipt, analysis, and
sharing of critical information and intelligence among Federal, State,
and local agencies. Funding to support fusion centers has been
leveraged from several of the Homeland Security Grant Programs,
specifically the State Homeland Security Program (SHSP) and the Urban
Areas Security Initiative (UASI) Grant Program. As of March 2013, 78
designated State and major urban area fusion centers exist nationally,
greatly enhancing the Nation's ability to share critical information
among all levels of government and the private sector.
Additional areas of success include improved planning capabilities
and operational coordination among response agencies. For example, the
Nation has significantly improved the adequacy, feasibility, and
completeness of plans for catastrophic events, due in part to
significant State and local investments in planning activities through
FEMA grant programs. The 2010 Nation-wide Plan Review showed
significant increases from 2006 in the number of jurisdictions
confident in their plans for catastrophic events. By 2010, more than 75
percent of States and more than 80 percent of urban areas were
confident that their overall basic emergency operations plans were
well-suited to meet the challenges of a large-scale catastrophic event.
Additionally, both States and urban areas show high degrees of
confidence in their functional plans appendices and in their hazard-
specific plans. Not surprisingly, they were particularly confident in
plans for events with which they have some experience, such as flooding
or tornadoes. FEMA has included planning as an allowable use of grants
since 2003 and has emphasized planning as a priority for preparedness
funding since 2006.
FEMA preparedness grant programs also have built operational
coordination capabilities, specifically helping to establish the
National Incident Management System (NIMS) as the common incident
management doctrine for the Nation. Prior to the introduction of NIMS
in 2004, the Nation had no single, official incident management system.
By 2011, nearly 10 million homeland security and emergency management
professionals, volunteers, and students from across the Nation had
successfully completed the FEMA-sponsored independent study courses on
the National Incident Management System.
One of our most visible success stories involves the search-and-
rescue capabilities we have built across the Nation with our homeland
security grant dollars. Currently, there are approximately 300 State
and/or local urban search-and-rescue (US&R) teams; only 55 percent of
these teams existed prior to 2001. At the time of the September 11,
2001 terrorist attacks, many major population centers in the United
States lacked search-and-rescue coverage. Today, there are US&R teams
within a 4-hour drive of 97 percent of the Nation's population. This
National expansion of State and local US&R capabilities is a direct
result of Federal funding and training: From fiscal year 2006 through
fiscal year 2010, recipients of State and local homeland security grant
funds allocated approximately $158 million in preparedness assistance
to build and maintain US&R capabilities. As a result, in the aftermath
of the deadly April 2011 outbreak of tornadoes in the United States,
Alabama mobilized State and local US&R teams to support response
operations in Marion, Jefferson, Franklin, and Tuscaloosa counties.
This enhanced local and regional capacity resulted in a faster and more
effective response than would previously have been possible. The entire
search-and-rescue operation was conducted by State and local assets.
Federal resources were never requested, and that is the ultimate marker
of success.
monitoring our progress
As our preparedness has improved so, too, has our ability to
measure preparedness and to understand the role played by the grant
programs in these improvements. In the past several years, FEMA has
made significant improvements to its internal operations and in its
management and oversight of the Homeland Security Grant Program. We
also have enhanced our ability to measure the effectiveness of grant
dollars on the Nation's overall preparedness.
I would first like to discuss FEMA's grant monitoring programs,
which involves both financial and programmatic oversight to ensure
accountability and proper management of preparedness grants. Our
monitoring regime ensures that:
Funds are used in accordance with Federal law, regulations,
and administrative procedures.
Funds are utilized to meet the objectives of the grant
program as determined by law or grant guidance.
Waste, fraud, and abuse of grant funding is identified where
it may exist and is eliminated.
Grantees are practicing sound grant management practices and
making progress toward program goals.
In fiscal year 2013, FEMA implemented an integrated monitoring plan
designed to realize efficiencies and improve information sharing
between the financial and programmatic monitoring staff. While
financial and programmatic monitoring works hand-in-hand, they entail
separate methodologies and processes. Financial monitoring focuses on
compliance with statutory, regulatory, and FEMA grant administration
requirements. Programmatic monitoring is designed to identify
administrative or performance issues that threaten the success of grant
objectives, and to target assistance to resolve those issues as early
as possible in the grant cycle--before they become crises. Over time,
the integrated analysis of financial and programmatic monitoring data
will increase our ability to identify common issues and challenges and
to proactively target assistance to grantees.
The foundation of the integrated monitoring program is an
assessment-based approach to portfolio management that allows FEMA to
direct scarce monitoring resources to grantees and programs that may
require additional attention or assistance. Under the assessment-based
approach, every open grant is reviewed annually using a programmatic
baseline assessment as well as a periodic analysis of cash
transactions. The programmatic baseline assessment looks at key
indicators of risk including: The dollar value of the grant, prior
indications of problems, whether the grantee is new or has had a recent
change in staff, the grantee's audit history, its record of
responsiveness and collaboration, the complexity of the grant and the
amount of time since the last assessment site visit.
The cash analysis is completed quarterly or semi-annually,
depending on the grant program, and compares grant draw-down
information to grant implementation progress reports to track financial
progress. These reviews help FEMA determine which grants should receive
further attention, either through closer examination of records
submitted by the grantee, or through site visits, to review
documentation with the grantee.
This approach lays the foundation for future financial assessment-
based monitoring that will support FEMA's and DHS's risk management
philosophy. As a result of these efforts, over the past 2\1/2\ years
FEMA has made significant improvements to its grant monitoring
activities. In the future, FEMA will require all grant applications to
include project-level information. This will provide FEMA with an
unprecedented level of information about how grantees are using their
grant funds. This will improve FEMA's ability to ensure that grant
spending is efficient, targeted, and coordinated and will better enable
FEMA to document how grantees are making progress towards filling
capability gaps.
measuring preparedness: the national preparedness system
In March 2011, President Obama signed Presidential Policy Directive
(PPD) 8 on National Preparedness. In it, the President directed the
development of a National Preparedness Goal that identifies the core
capabilities necessary for preparedness and a National Preparedness
System to guide activities that will enable the Nation to achieve the
goal. Plainly stated, the National Preparedness Goal, developed through
a collaborative process including all levels of Government, the private
sector, and the general public, envisions a secure and resilient Nation
with the capabilities required across the whole community to prevent,
protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from the threats and
hazards that pose the greatest risk.
As a Nation, we cannot understand our progress in achieving the
National Preparedness Goal (NPG) without an understanding of our
collective preparedness efforts. The National Preparedness System is
the instrument the Nation will employ to build, sustain, and deliver
those core capabilities in order to achieve the goal of a secure and
resilient Nation. The components of the National Preparedness System
include: Identifying and assessing risk, estimating the level of
capabilities needed to address those risks, building or sustaining the
required levels of capability, developing and implementing plans to
deliver those capabilities, validating and monitoring progress, and
reviewing and updating efforts to promote continuous improvement.
Developing and maintaining an understanding of the variety of risks
faced by communities and the Nation, and how this information can be
used to build and sustain preparedness, are essential components of the
National Preparedness System. Risk varies across the Nation--for
example, a municipal risk assessment will reflect a subset of the
threats, hazards, and related consequences contained in a State or
Federal risk assessment. A risk assessment collects information
regarding the threats and hazards, including the projected consequences
or impacts.
This year, FEMA released the methodology for determining risks in
Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 201: Threat and Hazard Identification
and Risk Assessment (THIRA) Guide (CPG-201). The THIRA process is an
all-hazards assessment tool developed by FEMA for use by jurisdictions
of all sizes. Diverging from past efforts to establish measures and
metrics for a capability that would be applied uniformly, this approach
allows a jurisdiction to establish its own capability targets based on
the risks it faces. It expands on existing local, State, territorial,
and Tribal hazard identification and risk assessments and other risk
methodologies by broadening the factors considered in the process,
incorporating the whole community from the beginning to the end of the
process, and by accounting for important community-specific factors.
This knowledge allows a jurisdiction to establish informed and
defensible capability targets and commit appropriate resources to
sustain existing capabilities and to close the gap between current
capabilities and the required levels identified during the capability
estimation process.
When existing capabilities need to be supplemented to reach a
required level, communities might develop strategies that address
shortfalls through local, regional, or National mutual aid agreements
or they could choose to obtain the necessary resources through the
private sector. They also may determine that they need to build a
capability themselves, and they may choose to use Federal preparedness
grants to do so. Cities, counties, States, territories, and Tribes may
require the resources of other levels of government to achieve a
capability target, especially for catastrophic incidents. Accordingly,
FEMA requires States to participate in the Emergency Management
Assistance Compact (EMAC) as a condition for grant funding. EMAC offers
assistance during a Governor's declared State of Emergency through a
responsive, straight-forward system that allows States to send
personnel, equipment, and commodities to help disaster relief efforts
in other States.
The results of the THIRA and other National Preparedness System
components, such as the capability estimation process, are designed to
allow jurisdictions at all levels of government to make informed
decisions about how to allocate their resources to build and sustain
capabilities. Existing reporting mechanisms, such as the State
Preparedness Report (SPR), can then be used to communicate progress
toward achieving capability targets and to inform assessments such as
the National Preparedness Report. Taken together, the THIRA results and
the SPR will identify capability needs. These products will allow the
Nation to look holistically across all capabilities and whole community
partners to gauge areas of strength and areas for improvement. FEMA
reports the results of the capability assessments annually in the
National Preparedness Report.
evolving the grant program: the national preparedness grant program
Federal investments in State, local, and Tribal preparedness
capabilities have contributed to the development of a significant
National-level capacity to prevent, protect against, respond to, and
recover from disasters of all kinds. As we look ahead, to address
evolving threats and make the most of limited resources, in the fiscal
year 2013 budget administration proposes to reform the grant programs
and establish a National Preparedness Grant Program (NPGP) to focus on
building and sustaining core capabilities associated with the five
mission areas within the NPG that are readily deployable and cross-
jurisdictional, helping to elevate Nation-wide preparedness.
The proposed NPGP would consolidate current State and local
preparedness grant programs into one overarching program (excluding
Emergency Management Performance Grants and fire grants) to enable
grantees to build and sustain core capabilities outlined in the NPG
collaboratively. As a single, comprehensive grant program, the NPGP
would eliminate the redundancies and requirements placed on both the
Federal Government and the grantees resulting from the current system
of multiple individual, and often disconnected, grant programs. By
removing stovepipes, encouraging collaboration among disciplines and
across levels of government, State and local governments would be able
to collectively prioritize their needs and allocate increasingly scarce
grant dollars where they would have the greatest impact.
The NPGP would prioritize the development and sustainment of core
capabilities as outlined in the National Preparedness Goal. Particular
emphasis would be placed on building and sustaining capabilities that
address high-consequence events that pose the greatest risk to the
security and resilience of the United States and could be utilized to
address multiple threats and hazards. The NPGP would use a
comprehensive process for assessing regional and National capability
gaps through the THIRA process to prioritize and invest in key
deployable capabilities.
The NPGP would draw upon and strengthen existing grants processes,
procedures, and structures, emphasizing the need for greater
collaboration and unity among Federal, State, local, and Tribal
partners. This is particularly important as they work together to make
smarter investment decisions, develop deployable capabilities, and
share resources through Emergency Management Assistance Compacts (EMAC)
or other mutual aid/assistance agreements. In many ways, the NPGP
structure mirrors the collaboration and decision-making process that
occurs during disasters, when various stakeholders and jurisdictions
come together to plan, build, and execute capabilities together.
Under the proposed NPGP, grantees would be required to match their
proposed investments to core capabilities, incorporate effectiveness
measures, and regularly report progress on the acquisition and
development of identified capabilities. These measures would enable all
levels of government to collectively demonstrate how the proposed
investment would build and sustain core capabilities necessary to
strengthen the Nation's preparedness.
Thank you for the opportunity to discuss these important issues
before the subcommittee. I am happy to respond to any questions you may
have.
Mrs. Brooks. Thank you, Mr. Manning.
The Chairwoman now recognizes Ms. Richards for 5 minutes
for an opening statement.
STATEMENT OF ANNE L. RICHARDS, ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR
AUDITS, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY
Ms. Richards. Good morning, Chairman Brooks, Ranking Member
Payne, Ranking Member Thompson, and Members of the
subcommittee. Thank you for inviting me to testify today on the
Homeland Security Grant Program.
Homeland security grants are awarded to States,
territories, local, and Tribal governments to enhance their
ability to prepare for, prevent, respond to, and recover from
terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. The
program, administered by FEMA, includes several grant programs,
such as the State Homeland Security Program and the Urban Areas
Security Initiative, that funds a range of preparedness
activities.
As of today, we have completed audits on 34 States and
their urban areas and one territory, to examine how they manage
these grants' funds. I am happy to report that States generally
comply with applicable laws and regulations in distributing and
spending their awards.
However, the States face some challenges related to their
homeland security strategies: Obligation of grant funds,
reimbursement to sub-grantees for expenditures and monitoring
of sub-grantees' performance. Our audits show that the goals
and objectives in many State homeland security strategies were
too general to effectively measure performance and progress
toward improving their capabilities.
In addition, many strategies were outdated and, thus, did
not reflect current priorities, risks, needs, and capabilities.
Our audits have also shown that States did not always obligate
homeland security grants to sub-grantees promptly, which could
have led to increases in sub-grantees' administrative costs,
hampering completion of projects and delivery of equipment and
training, thus putting preparedness and response capabilities
at risk.
Some States also did not reimburse sub-grantees for their
grant expenditures in a timely manner. Many homeland security
grantees did not adequately oversee sub-grantees' performance
or measure their progress toward achieving objectives and
goals. Without sufficient oversight, States cannot ensure
effective and efficient use of funds to enhance capabilities.
We also noted that FEMA did not require States to report
progress in achieving milestones as part of the annual
application process. This is troubling, as many projects
require several years to complete. It is difficult to make wise
investment decisions without accurate information about the
current status and progress of long-term projects.
FEMA has agreed to add this requirement to the fiscal year
2013 application process.
In some of our audits, we identified sub-grantees that did
not fully comply with Federal procurement regulations. For
example, in fiscal year 2012, we identified sub-grantees that
did not obtain an adequate number of bids or properly justify
sole-source procurements. Some States did not conduct required
cost analyses.
As a result, States cannot always be assured that sub-
grantees are making fully informed decisions on contract awards
or selecting the best possible vendors.
In January 2012, we issued a report on the U.S. Virgin
Islands' management of homeland security grants from fiscal
year 2007 through 2009. Based on our audit work, we questioned
nearly $1.3 million in claimed costs, and were concerned about
the territory's ability to support the entire $3.4 million
expended.
For these reasons, we recommended that FEMA consider
classifying the territory as a high-risk grantee. FEMA
concurred with all 22 of our recommendations.
In February 2013, we issued an audit report providing
recommendations on ways FEMA could improve its risk-based
monitoring of grantees. Although FEMA's fiscal year 2013 plan
included improvements over its fiscal year 2012 practices, its
plan did not ensure that all grantees with increased risk would
be properly selected for financial monitoring.
In closing, I would like to note FEMA's efforts over the
past several years to improve homeland security grants
management, and its plans to continue these efforts by updating
program guidance and better monitoring grantees.
Since 2007, FEMA has concurred with, taken steps to
implement, or implemented almost all of our recommendations to
improve the management of homeland security grants. For our
part, we are currently conducting 15 audits of homeland
security grants. By August 2014, we will have completed audits
of all States and territories receiving these grants.
Our overall objective in these audits remain essentially
unchanged, to continue recommending actions that will make
grant management more effective and efficient, while
strengthening the Nation's ability to prepare for, respond to,
and recover from natural and man-made disasters.
Ms. Chairman, this concludes my prepared remarks. I welcome
any questions that you or the subcommittee Members may have.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Richards follows:]
Prepared Statement of Anne L. Richards
Good morning Chairman Brooks, Ranking Member Payne, and Members of
the subcommittee: I am Anne Richards, assistant inspector general for
audits at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector
General (OIG). Thank you for inviting me to testify today on the
Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP).
HSGP provides funds to State, territory, local, and Tribal
governments to enhance their ability to prepare for, prevent, protect,
respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and
other emergencies. Within DHS, the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) administers HSGP, which is an important part of the
administration's larger, coordinated effort to strengthen homeland
security preparedness. The program includes several interrelated
Federal grant programs that fund a range of preparedness activities,
including planning, organization, equipment purchase, training, and
exercises, as well as management and administration. Under HSGP, the
State Homeland Security Program (SHSP) provides financial assistance to
States and U.S. territories for these activities, and the Urban Areas
Security Initiative (UASI) provides funding to high-risk urban areas
for the same types of activities.
Since 2007, DHS OIG has audited States and urban areas to determine
whether they have implemented their HSGP grants efficiently and
effectively, achieved program goals, and spent funds according to grant
requirements. In fiscal year 2012, we completed audits of 13 States, 1
territory, and 2 urban areas: Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida,
Georgia, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Mexico,
Ohio, Oklahoma, U.S. Virgin Islands, Utah (urban area only), and
Washington (urban area only). In total, as of March 2013, we have
completed audits on HSGP grant management in 34 States and 1 territory
(U.S. Virgin Islands), some of which included urban areas; we have 15
on-going audits.
Through our audits, we determined that the States complied with
applicable laws and regulations in distributing and spending their
awards. However, we noted several challenges related to the States'
homeland security strategies, obligation of grants, reimbursement to
subgrantees for expenditures, monitoring of subgrantees' performance
and financial management, procurement, and property management.
homeland security strategies
Many States' homeland security strategies did not include specific
goals and objectives and were outdated. According to DHS guidance,
States that receive HSGP grants are to create and use strategies aimed
at improving preparedness and response to natural and manmade
disasters. The goals and objectives in these strategies should be
specific, measurable, achievable, results-oriented, and time-limited.
However, the goals and objectives in many strategies were too general
for States to use to effectively measure their performance and progress
toward improving preparedness and response capabilities. In addition,
because some States did not update their strategies, they did not
reflect the most current priorities, risks, needs, and capabilities.
Using outdated strategies can also hamper decision-making on future
expenditures.
In our audits completed in fiscal year 2012, we noted that the
homeland security strategies for Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kansas,
Louisiana, Minnesota, Montana, New Mexico, U.S. Virgin Islands, and
Washington did not include some or all of the elements necessary for a
successful strategy, such as specific, measurable, achievable, results-
oriented, and time-limited goals and objectives.
Minnesota and New Mexico also had outdated strategies. For example,
Minnesota's homeland security strategy was last updated January 18,
2008, but referred to a comprehensive risk, capabilities, and needs
assessment completed in October 2003. According to the strategy, a
needs assessment was to have been updated in 2006, but it had not been.
New Mexico developed a 3-Year Domestic Preparedness Strategy in January
2003 that did not contain current and specific goals, objectives, and
performance measurements and was never updated. FEMA requested an
update in fiscal year 2005, and New Mexico developed a draft, but it
was never approved.
obligation of grant funds
Our audits also showed that States did not always obligate HSGP
grants to subgrantees in a timely manner. In many cases, it took months
for State grantees to obligate grant funds. By not obligating funds
promptly, grantees may have increased subgrantees' administrative
costs. They may have also hindered the subgrantees' ability to complete
projects and deliver needed equipment and training, which could
ultimately put preparedness and response capabilities at risk. In
addition, some State grantees did not promptly reimburse subgrantees
for their grant expenditures.
In 2012, we found that Arkansas, Florida, and Georgia did not
obligate funds to their subgrantees in a timely manner. In Arkansas,
there was a lapse of 137 to 1,031 days between required obligation and
availability of funds during fiscal years 2008 to 2010. Florida had
some instances during fiscal years 2007 and 2008 in which funds were
obligated more than 400 days after the award date, and in fiscal year
2009, the State obligated funds from 44 to 101 days late. Georgia did
not make funds available for expenditure to subgrantees until as many
as 261 days after the required date. Additionally, in fiscal year 2009,
Florida did not adequately calculate and award SHSP funds designated
for local jurisdictions. Rather than following FEMA program guidance to
separately obligate at least 80 percent of SHSP and UASI funds within
45 days of receipt, Florida combined the funds, and from the total,
allocated 80 percent to local jurisdictions. This method resulted in
less than 80 percent of the SHSP award being obligated to local
recipients. The difference equated to approximately $2.9 million that
local jurisdictions could have used to complete critical projects.
During fiscal years 2008 through 2009, New Mexico withheld $2.5
million in SHSP grant funds from local units of government to provide
training and exercises. By withholding a portion of the grant funds,
the State obligated less than the required amount to local units.
In fiscal year 2007, 24 subgrantees and 4 State agencies we visited
in Ohio did not receive grant awards until an average of 8 months after
the State obligated the grant funds. For fiscal year 2008, delays
increased to an average of 10 months (between 6 and 30 months); for
fiscal year 2009, they increased to an average of 11 months. Four
subgrantees did not receive fiscal year 2009 grant awards by May 15,
2011--19 months after Ohio reported to FEMA that these funds were
obligated. Eighteen of the 28 grant recipients requested an extension
to the grant performance period because they needed more time to
complete planned procurements and obtain reimbursements.
Ohio did not always make payments to subgrantees for grant
expenditures in a timely manner. A sample of 55 payment requests showed
payments were made anywhere from 13 to 89 days after the requests were
submitted to the State. As a result, local funds were often not
reimbursed in a timely manner and vendors were not always paid timely
for goods and services.
monitoring of subgrantees' performance and financial and management
Many HSGP grantees did not adequately oversee subgrantees'
performance or measure their progress toward achieving objectives and
goals, nor did they always adequately monitor subgrantees' financial
management of grants. Inadequate assessment of subgrantees' performance
and progress may have limited the States' ability to assess
capabilities and gaps and take corrective actions to improve them.
Without performance monitoring, States cannot be certain that they have
met program goals and used funds to enhance capabilities, rather than
wasting them by not addressing deficiencies. The States also could not
ensure that subgrantees' funding requests were aligned with real
threats and vulnerabilities. By not adequately overseeing subgrantees'
financial management practices, States may not have been fully
knowledgeable about the subgrantees' financial status. Further, the
States could not ensure that subgrantees were using funds efficiently
and effectively and complying with Federal and State regulations in
administering grants.
In our fiscal year 2012 audits, we determined that nine States
needed to improve their monitoring of grant performance and
subgrantees' adherence to Federal and State regulations because they
did not have procedures to ensure that subgrantees consistently tracked
what they accomplished with grant funds, did not always ensure
compliance with Federal laws and regulations, or had limited oversight.
Fiscal year 2012 audits also showed that States needed to improve their
financial management practices, performance and financial reporting,
transfer of grant funds, management and administrative costs, or grant
expenditure reviews.
Arizona and New Mexico did not have procedures to track grant
performance. Arizona did not ensure that subgrantees prepared After-
Action Reports and Improvement Plans, which are critical to documenting
weaknesses identified by exercises and to track corrective actions. New
Mexico did not have a system, process, or qualified personnel to track
accomplishments resulting from grant funds. Personnel were not trained
on measuring improvement in preparedness, and the State had not hired
additional personnel to address this function.
Washington had not implemented an assessment process to measure
improvements in preparedness. Each year, the State reassessed its
priorities without considering improvement in performance and
attainment of objectives in prior years. It had not fully used FEMA's
Target Capabilities List to measure improvements and identify gaps.
Arkansas monitored subgrantees through desk reviews of budgets,
payments, an inventory database, and After-Action Reports, which did
not always ensure subgrantee compliance with Federal laws and
requirements. No subgrantee reviews were conducted during fiscal years
2008 through 2010. Consequently, some grant funds were being used for
other than the intended purposes.
Colorado's guidance to subgrantees did not provide sufficient grant
administration information or program support to ensure compliance with
Federal requirements. With the exception of activities such as grant
reimbursement requests and modification procedures, Colorado's written
guidance did not adequately describe its expectations, methodologies,
or functional administration requirements. Also, its guidance did not
address requirements to ensure segregation of duties, nor did it
suggest methods to accomplish such segregation.
Louisiana did not have adequate oversight to ensure that
subgrantees complied with all Federal requirements. Louisiana's
monitoring processes were not sufficient to identify subgrantees' non-
compliance with Federal financial and equipment-related requirements.
Of the 17 subgrantee financial records reviewed, five did not include
required information such as records of expenditures, obligations,
unobligated balances, and liabilities. In addition, the New Orleans
urban area did not have a regional multi-year training and exercise
plan, but instead relied on a University of New Orleans consortium to
develop a plan. However, the consortium was abolished in 2009 because
of budget shortfalls. In December 2010, Texas A&M University selected
New Orleans as a pilot site for its Training Needs Assistance Project,
which should result in a fully developed multi-year training plan.
Minnesota did not adequately monitor subgrantee activities for
fiscal years 2007 through 2009. Its monitoring was limited, and the
State did not have subgrantee program performance monitoring policies
and procedures until December 31, 2009.
Montana had minimal oversight through periodic contact with
subgrantee staff, review of subgrantee grant applications, and
processing of reimbursement requests. According to State officials,
subgrantee site visits were not made during the grant years reviewed.
There were other weaknesses in the State-required subgrantee progress
reports that described the activities, difficulties, and use of funding
during the period. For example, Montana's fiscal year 2007
interoperability investment justification requested $3.7 million to
meet five milestones; however, the progress reports for this grant did
not indicate how well the funds were being spent, nor did the reports
discuss the progress toward meeting particular milestones. Therefore,
Montana funded activities without knowing the extent that prior funds
had on the subgrantee's ability to meet specific program goals.
Oklahoma did not adequately document and analyze performance data
related to accomplishing its homeland security strategy goals and
objectives. The State did not always collect information on the
progress of on-going projects and did not always document progress in a
manner that facilitated on-going analysis and review.
In fiscal year 2012, our audits also showed that the States needed
to improve their financial management practices, performance and
financial reporting, transfer of grant funds, monitoring of management
and administrative costs, and grant expenditure reviews.
Montana did not comply with Federal grant financial management
requirements. The State had incomplete subgrantee file information for
award letters and supporting documentation for reimbursement requests.
In addition, the State Administrative Agency did not adequately
cooperate with the supporting administrative office responsible for
paying subgrantee invoices. Montana had missing grant award letters
totaling $477,000 out of $3.4 million in awards selected for testing,
had difficulty reconciling subgrantee award amounts with expenditures,
and did not have supporting documentation for subgrantee reimbursement
requests totaling $938,601. Because the State Administrative Agency did
not manage all its grants to subgrantees, it could not determine the
actual status of SHSP grant funding.
In New Mexico, one subgrantee paid funds to a vendor for a data
management system upgrade and related equipment before it received the
services and equipment. The subgrantee advanced a total of $99,250, or
63 percent of the total contract price of $157,620. New Mexico
reimbursed the subgrantee for the amount advanced to this vendor;
however, as of the date of our audit testing, the upgrades and
equipment had not been received. We questioned the $99,250 that the
subgrantee advanced.
Minnesota subgrantees did not submit timely State-required
quarterly financial status reports and did not always submit State-
required quarterly progress reports. Minnesota relied on subgrantee
financial and progress information to generate the State-wide financial
status documents and determine the progress being made in using grant
funds. Yet, five financial status reports exceeded the quarterly
reporting requirement, with one report covering 28 months. In addition,
5 of the 22 subgrantees we visited did not submit progress reports from
October 1, 2007, through June 30, 2010. For example, one subgrantee
received $1.69 million of grant funds in fiscal year 2007 and had spent
$1.687 million by June 30, 2010, but in that time it had not submitted
any progress reports.
New Mexico did not submit timely and accurate Biannual Strategy
Implementation Reports and Financial Status Reports to FEMA. Of the 12
Biannual Strategy Implementation Reports submitted, 11 were submitted
24 to 1,003 days late, and the amounts included in these reports were
not accurate. Additionally, 8 of 27 Financial Status Reports were
submitted late.
In fiscal years 2009 and 2010, Utah changed the scope of several
projects by transferring approximately $2.3 million in UASI grant funds
between projects without prior approval from FEMA. Although the grant
guidelines allowed these types of expenditures, FEMA should have
ensured that the State Administrative Agency submitted budget change
requests for all funding transfers between projects. This would help to
ensure that items purchased did not exceed approved amounts and were
allowable under the grant guidelines.
Kansas and New Mexico did not identify and validate management and
administrative costs in accordance with Federal and State requirements.
A Kansas fiscal agent representing six of the seven homeland security
regions could not provide supporting documentation for any of the
$197,532 in management and administrative costs submitted to and
reimbursed by the State from fiscal year 2008 through October 2011.
Kansas decided to reimburse the fiscal agent for the maximum allowable
amount of management and administrative costs without requiring support
for these costs.
New Mexico allocated $195,735 as management and administrative
costs in fiscal year 2009, which was the 3 percent maximum allowed to
the State. However, the State did not provide detailed costs for the
$195,735 and spread the amount among various budget line items without
sufficient supporting documentation.
Minnesota did not have written policies and procedures to guide its
financial review and did not always have documentation to support
reimbursement approvals. As a result, the State could not ensure that
grant expenditures were allowable, allocable, authorized, and in
accordance with grant requirements. In two instances, approved
reimbursement requests did not include invoices: (1) $392,000 for hand-
held digital portable radios, and (2) $64,000 for a wireless X-ray
system. Even though invoices were subsequently obtained from the
subgrantees, the State Administrative Agency should not have approved
the reimbursements without the appropriate documentation.
compliance with procurement regulations
In some audits that we conducted since 2007, we identified
subgrantees that did not fully comply with Federal and State
procurement regulations. For example, in our fiscal year 2012 audits,
we identified subgrantees that did not comply with Federal regulations
because they did not obtain an adequate number of bids, did not
properly justify sole-source procurements, or did not conduct a cost
analysis as required for a non-competitive procurement. As a result,
the States could not always be assured that subgrantees made fully
informed decisions on contract awards, and that they had selected the
best offerors.
In Arkansas, 14 of 18 subgrantees did not: (1) Obtain an adequate
number of qualified quotes or formal bids, (2) conduct a cost analysis,
or (3) justify sole-source procurements. Of the 114 reviewed
transactions, we questioned more than $1.2 million in 63 transactions
for issues related to rate quotes, cost analysis, sole-source
justifications, and formal bidding.
Georgia and some of its subgrantees did not follow Federal
regulations for equipment and services procured using grant funds. For
example, a subgrantee awarded a noncompetitive contract for $2.2
million to purchase communications equipment without a sole-source
justification. In another example, a contractor awarded a subcontract
for $450,000 to a local university to update an inventory of food
systems within the State, also without a sole-source justification for
awarding a noncompetitive subcontract. Although both the contractor and
subcontractor were State entities and therefore exempt from Federal
competitive bidding requirements, Georgia law requires competitive
bidding for this particular procurement.
Ohio did not ensure that subgrantees followed Federal regulations
for equipment and services procured with HSGP funds. Although other
sources were available, Ohio made 76 noncompetitive procurements of the
85 procurements reviewed. Subgrantees did not prepare cost or price
analyses for any of the procurements. Five of the 76 noncompetitive
procurements from Ohio were specifically identified as sole-source by
the purchasing agent, and local procedures were followed to obtain
approval.
Also in Ohio, 55 purchases from suppliers on its State Term
Schedules may have met Ohio competition requirements; however, these
purchases did not meet Federal procurement standards for fair and open
competition for purchases in excess of $100,000. State Term Schedules
are lists prepared and maintained by the Ohio Department of
Administrative Services of approved manufacturers with products offered
at ``best prices'' and specific State-required terms. Competition is
not part of the process for suppliers to be placed on the State Term
Schedules. Federal regulations require that all prequalified lists of
persons, firms, or products that are used in acquiring goods and
services be current and include enough qualified sources to ensure
maximum open and free competition. The items on the State Term website
are not necessarily the best value, but rather are a list of suppliers
that have qualified their products for the State Term Schedules.
property management
During our audits, when conducting our on-site visits, we
identified weaknesses in property management. Not all subgrantees were
regularly inventorying grant-funded equipment. In addition, subgrantees
did not always maintain accurate, complete, and up-to-date property
records; did not always include required details in inventory
documentation; and did not always properly mark grant-funded equipment
as required by DHS. Without adequate property management, States and
subgrantees may not be able to make certain that they have the
necessary equipment, make well-informed decisions on future equipment
needs, and prevent duplicative purchases. Proper inventory practices
also help safeguard against loss, damage, and theft. Of the 16 States
we audited in fiscal year 2012, six had property management weaknesses,
including physical inventories that had not been completed and
inaccurate, incomplete, and missing property records. One State did not
enforce the requirement for subgrantees to establish and maintain
effective control and accountability systems.
One subgrantee in Colorado did not properly mark equipment
purchased with grant funds, did not enter some items on the inventory
control sheet, and did not follow-up with subrecipients to ensure that
they had received equipment. Another subgrantee had difficulty
providing an equipment list that correlated to our fiscal years 2007-
2009 grant review period. At another location, listed property was
assigned to individuals who did not have custody of the property. One
subgrantee did not maintain an equipment list.
In Louisiana, 7 of 16 subgrantees' equipment property records did
not include pertinent information such as acquisition dates, serial
numbers, cost, or location.
Montana subgrantees did not always maintain property management
records in accordance with Federal requirements. Property record
requirements were not being followed at 14 of 22 subgrantees.
Oklahoma and Utah did not ensure that equipment purchased with
grant funds was properly identified as such to help deter theft or
unauthorized use. In Oklahoma, 9 of 28 locations had various items such
as interoperable equipment, emergency response vehicles, and
surveillance cameras not labeled as purchased with grant funds. In
Utah, none of the items reviewed was marked.
Minnesota did not enforce the requirement that subgrantees
establish and maintain effective control and accountability systems to:
(1) Safeguard property procured with HSGP grant funds, or (2) provide
assurances that the property was used solely for authorized purposes.
u.s. virgin islands as a high-risk grantee
In January 2012, we issued The U.S. Virgin Islands Management of
State Homeland Security Program Grants Awarded During Fiscal Years 2007
Through 2009. This audit, conducted by Foxx & Company, included a
review of approximately $4.6 million in SHSP grants awarded to the U.S.
Virgin Islands during fiscal years 2007 through 2009. We determined
that the U.S. Virgin Islands did not efficiently and effectively
administer its grant program according to guidance and regulations. We
identified eight areas for improvement: Strategic goals and objectives,
sole-source procurement and management of contract deliverables,
financial management documentation, property management controls and
accountability, use of purchased equipment, procurement of training,
personnel time charges, and filing of financial reports. As a result of
these issues, we questioned nearly $1.3 million in claimed costs for
specific items. Furthermore, we considered the entire $3.4 million in
funding granted to the U.S. Virgin Islands in fiscal years 2007 through
2009 as potential questioned costs until the territory could provide
adequate support for the funds. Because of the numerous problems we
noted in our audit, we determined that FEMA should consider classifying
the U.S. Virgin Islands as a high-risk grantee. FEMA concurred with our
22 recommendations for improvements which, if implemented, would help
strengthen program management, performance, and oversight.
fema monitoring of hsgp grantees
As a result of our audits, we have recommended that FEMA work with
the States to improve HGSP management. FEMA concurred with almost all
of our recommendations and has either coordinated with the State
Administrative Agencies to implement them or taken steps to implement
them. Although we audited the States' management of HSGP awards rather
than FEMA's program management, we noted that FEMA could strengthen
HSGP by issuing better guidance to the States on strategic planning,
which would in turn improve the States' performance measurement and
progress toward achieving their goals and objectives. For example, in
our February 2013 report, Kentucky's Management of State Homeland
Security Program and Urban Areas Security Initiative Grants Awarded
Fiscal Years 2008-2010, we recommended that FEMA issue guidance to HSGP
grantees to periodically update strategic plans and include goals that
align with current National Preparedness Guidelines. According to
officials in FEMA's Grant Programs Directorate, the National
Preparedness Directorate was expected to issue updated guidance in the
summer of 2013.
In the past, FEMA has had challenges monitoring its grant programs.
Specifically, the component's financial and programmatic monitoring
plans did not ensure that it could properly monitor all grantees with
increased risk. However, FEMA has taken steps to improve its grant
monitoring process by issuing a comprehensive and integrated risk-based
monitoring plan.\1\ As we noted in our February 2013 report, FEMA's Use
of Risk-based Monitoring for Grantee Oversight, FEMA's plans from the
prior fiscal year did not specify using risk indicators to select
grantees to monitor. Instead, the component relied on legislative
mandates, random sampling, and subjective judgment to select grantees.
Although the fiscal year 2013 financial and programmatic monitoring
plan covers all of FEMA's grants, the component still plans to select
random samples of grants for financial monitoring. For HSGP, FEMA plans
to pilot joint financial and programmatic monitoring of the maximum
number of awards, given resource constraints and monitoring needs. At
the end of fiscal year 2013, FEMA will assess the outcome of this
effort and consider expansion of joint monitoring of HSGP awards.
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\1\ Fiscal Year 2013 FEMA Monitoring Plan, October 2012.
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In our February 2013 report on monitoring, we made recommendations
related to risk-based selection of grantees for financial monitoring
and coordination of monitoring plans. FEMA needs to ensure that all
grantees with increased risk are properly selected for financial
monitoring and will be appropriately monitored. In addition, FEMA
should communicate regularly with DHS to ensure consistency in
monitoring plans. Without coordination, the component might issue new
plans that are inconsistent with the DHS risk model and thus, need to
be revised.
auditing plans
We are currently conducting 15 HSGP audits, and we plan to complete
audits of all States and territories receiving HSGP grants by August
2014. Our overall objective in these audits remains essentially
unchanged--to continue recommending actions that will make grants
management more efficient and effective, while strengthening the
Nation's ability to prepare for and respond to natural and man-made
disasters.
Ms. Chairman, this concludes my prepared remarks. I welcome any
questions that you or the Members of the subcommittee may have.
Mrs. Brooks. Thank you, Ms. Richards.
The Chairwoman now recognizes Mr. Maurer for 5 minutes for
an opening statement.
STATEMENT OF DAVID C. MAURER, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND
JUSTICE ISSUES, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Mr. Maurer. Good morning, Chairman Brooks, Ranking Member
Payne, Ranking Member Thompson, and other Members and staff. I
am pleased to be here today to discuss FEMA's on-going efforts
to improve how it manages grant programs and assesses our
preparedness for natural and man-made disasters.
Over the past decade, Congress has appropriated $39 billion
for a variety of grant programs designed to help the Nation be
better prepared for terrorist attacks and disasters. GAO has
been there providing objective, nonpartisan oversight.
What we have found has often been not encouraging. DHS, and
more specifically FEMA, has struggled to effectively manage and
measure grant programs. It is difficult to say what we have
really gotten for our $39 billion investment because FEMA has
been unable to measure how grant funding has enhanced our
National ability to be prepared.
Our work has found that FEMA lacks measures to assess how
well its individual grant programs are working, and whether
collectively these programs have helped enhance National
preparedness.
It comes down to knowing how prepared we are and how
prepared we should be. Since FEMA has been unable to assess how
prepared we are and how prepared we should be, it also lacks a
clear goal--a clear view, rather--of where we have preparedness
gaps. That makes it very difficult to direct grant money to
address those gaps.
Now I need to be clear. It is difficult to measure
preparedness. FEMA has been working on this for years. It is
important to give them credit for what they have been able to
accomplish over the course of the last 18 months.
FEMA now has the basic elements in place for assessing
National preparedness capabilities. It has articulated a
National goal, developed a plan for achieving that goal, issued
its first National report on progress, and has enhanced the
consideration of risk in funding decisions.
These steps are vital. They make progress toward addressing
GAO recommendations. However, FEMA continues to face important
challenges. Most significantly, FEMA still lacks clear,
objective, and quantifiable measures of how prepared the Nation
is, and how prepared we should be.
That means FEMA is not yet in a position to target grant
funding toward the most critical capability gaps. FEMA also
continues to lack measures to gauge the performance of the
programs it has funded. That means the Nation has little way of
knowing the extent to which the billions spent on these
programs have been successful.
I would like to briefly mention another significant problem
in FEMA's management, the risk of duplication. Last February,
we issued a report looking at four of the largest FEMA
programs. We found significant overlap among grant recipients,
goals, and locations.
A single jurisdiction can apply for funds for the same
project from all four programs. FEMA may not know, because it
makes award decisions with different levels of information.
For some grant programs, FEMA literally does not know
exactly what the grant money will fund. In addition, FEMA lacks
internal coordination across its programs to compare notes on
what grant recipients are requesting and what FEMA's various
internal units have decided to fund.
Since our report, FEMA has taken actions to address our
findings. Most significantly, in the fiscal year 2013 budget,
FEMA proposed consolidating most of its grant programs into a
single program. However, it was not clear from the proposal
whether this would, in fact, address our recommendations.
As a practical matter, Congress has not accepted this idea
with open arms.
FEMA is also in the process of updating its data systems
and enhancing its internal administration of grant programs to
reduce the risk of duplication.
In conclusion, there is no doubt FEMA is trying to do
things that are very difficult. But they need to do them. The
law requires it. The President requires it. Stacks of GAO
reports have recommended it.
Billions of taxpayer dollars are being invested in making
the Nation better prepared for a terrorist attack and natural
disaster. After years of effort, FEMA still does not have a
clear and objective, quantifiable way to know what has been
accomplished with the money spent to date, what still needs to
be done, and the resulting gaps.
This is vital for ensuring that, in the future,
increasingly scarce grant funding is focused on closing those
gaps.
Chairman Brooks, thank you for the opportunity to testify
this morning. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Maurer follows:]
Prepared Statement of David C. Maurer
March 19, 2013
gao highlights
Highlights of GAO-13-456T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications, Committee on
Homeland Security, House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study
From fiscal years 2002 through 2012, the Congress appropriated
about $39 billion to a variety of DHS preparedness grant programs to
enhance the capabilities of State and local governments to prevent,
protect against, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks and
other disasters. DHS allocated more than $21.3 billion through four of
the largest preparedness programs--the Port Security Grant Program, the
State Homeland Security Program, the Transit Security Grant Program,
and the Urban Areas Security Initiative.
In February 2012, GAO identified factors that contribute to the
risk of FEMA potentially funding unnecessarily duplicative projects
across the four grant programs. In March 2011, GAO reported that FEMA
has faced challenges in developing and implementing a National
preparedness assessment, which inhibits its abilities to effectively
prioritize preparedness grant funding. This testimony updates GAO's
prior work and describes DHS's and FEMA's progress over the past year
in: (1) Managing preparedness grants, and (2) measuring National
preparedness by assessing capabilities. This statement is based on
prior products GAO issued from March 2011 to February 2012 and selected
updates in March 2013. To conduct the updates, GAO analyzed agency
documents and interviewed FEMA officials.
What GAO Recommends
GAO has made recommendations to DHS and FEMA in prior reports. DHS
and FEMA concurred with these recommendations and have actions underway
to address them.
national preparedness.--fema has made progress in improving grant
management and assessing capabilities, but challenges remain
What GAO Found
Officials in the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)--a
component of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)--have identified
actions they believe will enhance management of the four preparedness
programs GAO analyzed; however, FEMA still faces challenges. In
February 2012, GAO found that FEMA lacked a process to coordinate
application reviews and made award decisions with differing levels of
information. To better identify potential unnecessary duplication, GAO
recommended that FEMA collect project-level information and enhance
internal coordination and administration of the programs. DHS
concurred. The fiscal year 2013 President's budget, proposed the
establishment of the National Preparedness Grant Program (NPGP), a
consolidation of 16 FEMA grant programs into a single program. However,
Members of Congress raised concerns about the NPGP and have not
approved the proposal. As a result, FEMA officials reported that the
agency was drafting new guidance for the execution of the NPGP based on
pending Congressional direction on fiscal year 2013 appropriations. If
approved, and depending on its final form and execution, the NPGP could
help mitigate the potential for unnecessary duplication and address
GAO's recommendation to improve internal coordination. In March 2013,
FEMA officials reported that FEMA intends to start collecting and
analyzing project-level data from grantees in fiscal year 2014; but has
not yet finalized data requirements or fully implemented the data
system to collect the information. Collecting appropriate data and
implementing project-level enhancements as planned would address GAO's
recommendation and better position FEMA to identify potentially
unnecessary duplication.
FEMA has made progress addressing GAO's March 2011 recommendation
that it develop a National preparedness assessment with clear,
objective, and quantifiable capability requirements and performance
measures; but continues to face challenges developing a National
preparedness system that could assist FEMA in prioritizing preparedness
grant funding. For example, in March 2012, FEMA issued the first
National Preparedness Report, which describes progress made to build,
sustain, and deliver capabilities. FEMA also has efforts underway to
assess regional, State, and local preparedness capabilities. In April
2012, FEMA issued guidance on developing Threat and Hazard
Identification and Risk Assessments (THIRA) to self-assess regional,
State, and local capabilities and required States and local areas
receiving homeland security funds to complete a THIRA by December 2012.
However, FEMA faces challenges that may reduce the usefulness of these
efforts. For example, the National Preparedness Report notes that while
many programs exist to build and sustain preparedness capabilities,
challenges remain in measuring progress over time. According to the
report, in many cases, measures do not yet exist to gauge performance,
either quantitatively or qualitatively. Further, while FEMA officials
stated that the THIRA process is intended to develop a set of National
capability performance requirements and measures, such requirements and
measures have not yet been developed. Until FEMA develops clear,
objective, and quantifiable capability requirements and performance
measures, it is unclear what capability gaps currently exist and what
level of Federal resources will be needed to close such gaps. GAO will
continue to monitor FEMA's efforts to develop capability requirements
and performance measures.
Chairman Brooks, Ranking Member Payne, and Members of the
subcommittee: I appreciate the opportunity to participate in today's
hearing to provide an update on the efforts of the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA)--a component of the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS)--to manage preparedness grants and measure and assess
National capabilities to respond to a major disaster. From fiscal years
2002 through 2012, the Federal Government appropriated about $39
billion to a variety of DHS homeland security preparedness grant
programs to enhance the capabilities of State, territory, local, and
Tribal governments to prevent, protect against, mitigate the effects
of, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks and other
disasters.\1\ DHS allocated more than half of this total--$21.3
billion--to grant recipients through four of the largest preparedness
programs--the Port Security Grant Program, the State Homeland Security
Program, the Transit Security Grant Program, and the Urban Areas
Security Initiative.
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\1\ This total is based on Congressional Research Service data and
our analysis, and includes firefighter assistance grants and emergency
management performance grants. See Congressional Research Service,
Department of Homeland Security Assistance to States and Localities: A
Summary of Issues for the 111th Congress, R40246 (Washington, DC: Apr.
30, 2010). For the purposes of this testimony, we define capabilities
for prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery as
preparedness capabilities.
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Congress enacted the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act
of 2006 (Post-Katrina Act) in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina.\2\ In
response to the act, among other things, DHS centralized most of its
preparedness programs under FEMA's Grant Programs Directorate (GPD) to
better integrate and coordinate grant management. The act also requires
that FEMA develop a National preparedness system and assess
preparedness capabilities to determine the Nation's preparedness
capability levels and the resources needed to achieve desired levels of
capability.\3\
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\2\ The Post-Katrina Act was enacted as Title VI of the Department
of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-295, 120
Stat. 1355 (2006). The provisions of the Post-Katrina Act became
effective upon enactment, October 4, 2006, with the exception of
certain organizational changes related to FEMA, most of which took
effect on March 31, 2007.
\3\ According to the act, the assessment system must assess, among
other things, current capability levels as compared with target
capability levels (which, for the purposes of this testimony, we refer
to as capability requirements), and resource needs to meet capability
requirements. 6 U.S.C. 744, 749.
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In March 2012, we testified before this committee and summarized
our work from April 2002 through February 2012 on DHS's and FEMA's
efforts to manage preparedness grants; develop and assess National
preparedness capabilities at the Federal, State, and local levels;
identify capability gaps; and prioritize future National preparedness
investments to fill the most critical gaps.\4\ As requested, my
testimony today provides an update on that work, including the extent
to which DHS and FEMA have made progress over the past year in: (1)
Managing preparedness grants and (2) measuring National preparedness by
assessing capabilities and addressing related challenges.
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\4\ GAO, Managing Preparedness Grants and Assessing National
Capabilities: Continuing Challenges Impede FEMA's Progress, GAO-12-526T
(Washington, DC: Mar. 20, 2012).
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My statement is based on our March 2012 testimony, as well as
reports on DHS and FEMA grant management and preparedness that we
issued from March 2011 through February 2012. More information about
the scope and methodology of our prior work can be found in those
reports. To update our work, we analyzed documentation such as DHS's
National Preparedness Report, issued in March 2012; interviewed
relevant FEMA officials to obtain updates on recent progress in
managing preparedness grants and measuring National preparedness; and
reviewed our prior reports. We conducted our work in accordance with
generally accepted Government auditing standards. Those standards
require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,
appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe the evidence
obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions
based on our audit objectives.
background
Over the past decade, the Federal Government has expanded financial
assistance to a wide array of public and private stakeholders for
preparedness activities through various grant programs administered by
DHS through its component agency, FEMA. Through these grant programs,
DHS has sought to enhance the capacity of States, localities, and other
entities, such as ports or transit agencies, to prevent, respond to,
and recover from a natural or man-made disaster, including terrorist
incidents. Four of the largest preparedness grant programs are the Port
Security Grant Program, the State Homeland Security Program, the
Transit Security Grant Program, and the Urban Areas Security
Initiative.
The Port Security Grant Program provides Federal assistance
to strengthen the security of the Nation's ports against risks
associated with potential terrorist attacks by supporting
increased port-wide risk management, enhanced domain awareness,
training and exercises, and expanded port recovery
capabilities.
The State Homeland Security Program provides funding to
support States' implementation of homeland security strategies
to address the identified planning, organization, equipment,
training, and exercise needs at the State and local levels to
prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from acts of
terrorism and other catastrophic events.
The Transit Security Grant Program provides funds to owners
and operators of transit systems (which include intracity bus,
commuter bus, ferries, and all forms of passenger rail) to
protect critical surface transportation infrastructure and the
traveling public from acts of terrorism and to increase the
resilience of transit infrastructure.
The Urban Areas Security Initiative provides Federal
assistance to address the unique needs of high-threat, high-
density urban areas, and assists the areas in building an
enhanced and sustainable capacity to prevent, protect, respond
to, and recover from acts of terrorism.
Since its creation in April 2007, FEMA's GPD has been responsible
for managing DHS's preparedness grants.\5\ GPD consolidated the grant
business operations, systems, training, policy, and oversight of all
FEMA grants and the program management of preparedness grants into a
single entity.
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\5\ The Post-Katrina Act transferred most of the Preparedness
Directorate to FEMA, effective on March 31, 2007. Pub. L. No. 109-295,
120 Stat. 1355, 1394 (2006).
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fema has taken or proposed actions to address potential duplication
issues identified by gao, but challenges remain
FEMA Needs Better Coordination and Improved Data Collection to Reduce
Risk of Unnecessary Duplication in Four Grant Programs
In February 2012, we identified multiple factors that contributed
to the risk of FEMA potentially funding unnecessarily duplicative
projects across four of the largest grant programs \6\--the Port
Security Grant Program, the State Homeland Security Program, the
Transit Security Grant Program, and the Urban Areas Security
Initiative. These factors include overlap among grant recipients,
goals, and geographic locations, combined with differing levels of
information that FEMA had available regarding grant projects and
recipients. Specifically, we found that FEMA made award decisions with
differing levels of information and lacked a process to coordinate
application reviews.\7\ To better identify potential unnecessary
duplication, we recommended that FEMA: (1) Take steps to ensure that it
collects project information at the level of detail needed to better
position the agency to identify any potential unnecessary duplication
within and across the four grant programs, and (2) explore
opportunities to enhance FEMA's internal coordination and
administration of the programs. DHS agreed with the recommendations and
identified planned actions to improve visibility and coordination
across programs and projects. We also suggested that Congress consider
requiring DHS to report on the results of its efforts to identify and
prevent duplication within and across the four grant programs, and
consider these results when making future funding decisions for these
programs.
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\6\ GAO, Homeland Security: DHS Needs Better Project Information
and Coordination Among Four Overlapping Grant Programs, GAO-12-303
(Washington, DC: Feb. 28, 2012).
\7\ GAO, More Efficient and Effective Government: Opportunities to
Reduce Duplication, Overlap and Fragmentation, Achieve Savings, and
Enhance Revenue, GAO-12-449T (Washington, DC: Feb 28, 2012).
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FEMA Has Taken Actions to Enhance Preparedness Grant Management, But
Challenges Remain
Since we issued our February 2012 report, FEMA officials have
identified actions they believe will enhance management of the four
grant programs we analyzed; however, FEMA still faces challenges to
enhancing preparedness grant management. First, the fiscal year 2013
President's budget outlined a plan to consolidate most of FEMA's
preparedness grants programs, and FEMA officials expect this action
would reduce or eliminate the potential for unnecessary duplication.
The fiscal year 2013 President's budget proposed the establishment of
the National Preparedness Grant Program (NPGP), a consolidation of 16
grant programs (including the 4 grants we analyzed in our February 2012
report) into a comprehensive single program. According to FEMA
officials, the NPGP would eliminate redundancies and requirements
placed on both the Federal Government and grantees resulting from the
existing system of multiple individual, and often disconnected, grant
programs. For example, FEMA officials said that the number of
applications a State would need to submit and the Federal Government's
resources required to administer the applications would both decrease
under the consolidated program. However, Members of Congress have
expressed concern about the consolidation of the 16 grant programs and
Congress has not yet approved the proposal. In October 2012, FEMA
officials told us that Members of Congress had asked FEMA to refine the
NPGP proposal to address concerns raised by stakeholders, such as how
local officials will be involved in a State-administered grant program.
As of March 2013, FEMA officials reported that the agency was drafting
guidance for the execution of the NPGP based on stakeholder feedback
and direction from Congress pending the fiscal year 2013 appropriations
bill. If the NPGP is not authorized in fiscal year 2013, FEMA officials
stated that the agency plans to resubmit the request for the fiscal
year 2014 budgetary cycle. If approved, and depending on its final form
and execution, the consolidated NPGP could help reduce redundancies and
mitigate the potential for unnecessary duplication, and may address the
recommendation in our February 2012 report to enhance FEMA's internal
coordination and administration of the programs.
Second, in March 2013, FEMA officials reported that the agency
intends to start collecting and analyzing project-level data from
grantees in fiscal year 2014; however, FEMA has not yet finalized
specific data requirements and has not fully established the vehicle to
collect these data--a new data system called the Non-Disaster Grants
Management System (ND Grants). As of March 2013, FEMA officials expect
to develop system enhancements for ND Grants to collect and use
project-level data by the end of fiscal year 2013. FEMA officials
stated that FEMA has formed a working group to develop the functional
requirements for collecting and using project-level data and plans to
obtain input from stakeholders and consider the cost effectiveness of
potential data requirements. In alignment with data requirement
recommendations from a May 2011 FEMA report, the agency anticipates
utilizing the new project-level data in the grant application process
starting in fiscal year 2014.\8\ Collecting appropriate data and
implementing ND Grants with project-level enhancements as planned, and
as recommended in our February 2012 report, would better position FEMA
to identify potentially unnecessary duplication within and across grant
programs.
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\8\ FEMA, Redundancy Elimination and Enhanced Performance for
Preparedness Grants Act: Fiscal Year 2011 Report to Congress
(Washington, DC: May 23, 2011).
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Third, in December 2012, FEMA officials stated that there are
additional efforts underway to improve internal administration of
different grant programs. For example, officials stated that a FEMA
task force has been evaluating grants management processes and
developing a series of recommendations to improve efficiencies, address
gaps, and increase collaboration across regional and headquarters
counterparts and financial and programmatic counterparts. These
activities represent positive steps to improve overall grants
management, but they do not include any mechanisms to identify
potentially duplicative projects across grant programs administered by
different FEMA entities.
fema has made progress in establishing national preparedness
capabilities, but challenges remain in establishing performance
measures that could assist in prioritizing grant funding
FEMA Has Faced Challenges Developing a National Assessment of
Preparedness
According to DHS and FEMA strategic documents, National
preparedness is the shared responsibility of the ``whole community,''
which requires the contribution of a broad range of stakeholders,
including Federal, State, and local governments, to develop
preparedness capabilities to effectively prevent, protect against,
mitigate the effects of, respond to, and recover from a major
disaster.\9\ Figure 1 provides an illustration of how Federal, State,
and local resources provide preparedness capabilities for different
levels of government and at various levels of incident effect (i.e.,
the extent of damage caused by a natural or manmade disaster). The
greater the level of incident effect, the more likely State and local
resources are to be overwhelmed.
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\9\ FEMA, FEMA Strategic Plan: Fiscal Years 2011-2014 (Washington,
DC: February 2011), and DHS, National Preparedness Goal (Washington,
DC: September 2011).
We have previously reported on and made recommendations related to
DHS's and FEMA's efforts to develop a National assessment of
preparedness, which would assist DHS and FEMA in effectively
prioritizing investments to develop preparedness capabilities at all
levels of government, including through its preparedness grant
programs.\10\ Such an assessment would:
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\10\ GAO, Homeland Security: DHS's Efforts to Enhance First
Responders' All-Hazards Capabilities Continue to Evolve, GAO-05-652
(Washington, DC: July 11, 2005); and National Preparedness: FEMA Has
Made Progress, but Needs to Complete and Integrate Planning Exercise
and Assessment Efforts, GAO-09-369 (Washington, DC: Apr. 30, 2009).
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identify the critical elements at all levels of government
necessary to effectively prevent, protect against, mitigate the
effects of, respond to, and recover from a major disaster
(i.e., preparedness capabilities), such as the ability to
provide lifesaving medical treatment via emergency medical
services following a major disaster;
develop a way to measure those elements (i.e., capability
performance measures); and
assess the difference between the amount of preparedness
needed at all levels of government (i.e., capability
requirements) and the current level of preparedness (i.e.
capability level) to identify gaps (i.e., capability gaps).
The identification of capability gaps is necessary to effectively
prioritize preparedness grant funding.
However, we have previously found that DHS and FEMA have faced
challenges in developing and implementing such an assessment. Most
recently, in March 2011, we reported that FEMA's efforts to develop and
implement a comprehensive, measurable, National preparedness assessment
were not yet complete. Accordingly, we recommended that FEMA complete a
National preparedness assessment and that such an assessment should
assess capability gaps at each level of Government based on capability
requirements to enable prioritization of grant funding.\11\ We also
suggested that Congress consider limiting preparedness grant funding
until FEMA completes a National preparedness assessment. In April 2011,
Congress passed the fiscal year 2011 appropriations act for DHS, which
reduced funding for FEMA preparedness grants by $875 million from the
amount requested in the President's fiscal year 2011 budget.\12\ The
consolidated appropriations act for fiscal year 2012 appropriated $1.7
billion for FEMA Preparedness grants, $1.28 billion less than
requested.\13\ The House committee report accompanying the DHS
appropriations bill for fiscal year 2012 stated that FEMA could not
demonstrate how the use of the grants had enhanced disaster
preparedness.\14\
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\11\ GAO, Opportunities to Reduce Potential Duplication in
Government Programs Save Tax Dollars and Enhance Revenue, GAO-11-318SP
(Washington, DC: Mar. 1, 2011).
\12\ Pub. L. No. 112-10 1632, 125 Stat. 38, 143 (2011).
\13\ Pub. L. No. 112-74, 125 Stat. 786, 960 (2011). This total
includes all grant programs in the State and local programs account and
the Emergency Management Performance Grant program but does not include
funding appropriated for firefighter assistance grant programs.
\14\ H.R. Rep. No. 112-91, at 106-08 (2011).
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FEMA Has Made Progress in Establishing Preparedness Capabilities
In March 2011, the White House issued Presidential Policy Directive
8 on National Preparedness (PPD-8), which called for the development of
a National preparedness system that includes a comprehensive approach
to assess National preparedness. According to PPD-8, the approach
should use a consistent methodology to assess National preparedness
capabilities--with clear, objective, and quantifiable performance
measures.\15\ PPD-8 also called for the development of a National
preparedness goal, as well as annual preparedness reports (both of
which were previously required under the Post-Katrina Act).\16\ To
address PPD-8 provisions, FEMA issued the National Preparedness Goal in
September 2011, which established a list of preparedness capabilities
for each of five mission areas (prevention, protection, mitigation,
response, and recovery) that are to serve as the basis for preparedness
activities within FEMA, throughout the Federal Government, and at the
State and local levels.\17\ In November 2011, FEMA issued the National
Preparedness System, which described an approach and cycle to build,
sustain, and deliver the preparedness capabilities described in the
National Preparedness Goal. The system contains six components to
support decision making, resource allocation, and progress measurement,
including identifying and assessing risk and estimating capability
requirements.\18\ According to the system, measuring progress toward
achieving the National Preparedness Goal is intended to provide the
means to decide how and where to allocate scarce resources and
prioritize preparedness. Finally, in March 2012, FEMA issued the first
National Preparedness Report, designed to identify progress made toward
building, sustaining, and delivering the preparedness capabilities
described in the National Preparedness Goal. According to FEMA
officials, the National Preparedness Report also identifies what they
consider to be National-level capability gaps.
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\15\ The Post-Katrina Act required FEMA, in developing guidelines
to define preparedness capabilities, to ensure that the guidelines are
specific, flexible, and measurable. 6 U.S.C. 746.
\16\ 6 U.S.C. 743, 752. The Post-Katrina Act required FEMA to
prepare a Federal preparedness report and a State preparedness report.
\17\ The National Preparedness Goal refers to these capabilities as
``core capabilities,'' which replace what had been previously called
target capabilities. The target capabilities were initially developed
by DHS in 2005. For example, one of the preparedness capabilities for
the response mission area relates to mass search-and-rescue operations,
specifically to deliver traditional and atypical search-and-rescue
capabilities, including personnel, services, animals, and assets to
survivors in need, with the goal of saving the greatest number of
endangered lives in the shortest time possible.
\18\ The six components are: (1) Identifying and assessing risk,
(2) estimating capability requirements, (3) building and sustaining
capabilities, (4) planning to deliver capabilities, (5) validating
capabilities, and (6) reviewing and updating.
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Challenges Remain in Establishing Capability Requirements and
Performance Measures That Could Assist in Prioritizing
Preparedness Grant Funding
While FEMA issued the first National Preparedness Report, the
agency has not yet established clear, objective, and quantifiable
capability requirements and performance measures that are needed to
identify capability gaps in a National preparedness assessment, as
recommended in our March 2011 report. As previously noted, such
requirements and measures would help FEMA identify capability gaps at
all levels of government, which would assist FEMA in targeting
preparedness grant program funding to address the highest-priority
capability gaps. According to the National Preparedness Report, FEMA
collaborated with Federal interagency partners to identify existing
quantitative and qualitative performance and assessment data for each
of the preparedness capabilities. In addition, FEMA integrated data
from the 2011 State Preparedness Reports, which are State-wide survey-
based self-assessments of capability levels and requirements submitted
by all 56 U.S. States and territories. Finally, FEMA conducted research
to identify independent evaluations, surveys, and other supporting data
related to preparedness capabilities.
However, limitations associated with some of the data used in the
National Preparedness Report may reduce the report's usefulness in
assessing National preparedness. First, in October 2010, we reported
that data in the State Preparedness Reports--one of the key data
sources for the National Preparedness Report--could be limited because
FEMA relies on States to self-report such data, which makes it
difficult to ensure data are consistent and accurate.\19\ Second, at
the time the National Preparedness Report was issued, in March 2012,
States were still in the process of updating their efforts to collect,
analyze, and report preparedness progress according to the new
preparedness capabilities issued along with the National Preparedness
Goal in September 2011. As a result, the report states that assessment
processes, methodologies, and data will need to evolve for future
iterations of the report. Third, the report's final finding notes that
while many programs exist to build and sustain preparedness
capabilities across all mission areas, challenges remain in measuring
progress over time. According to the report, in many cases, measures do
not yet exist to gauge performance, either quantitatively or
qualitatively. Therefore, while programs may exist that are designed to
address a given capability gap, the Nation has little way of knowing
whether and to what extent those programs have been successful.
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\19\ GAO, FEMA Has Made Limited Progress in Efforts to Develop and
Implement a System to Assess National Preparedness Capabilities, GAO-
11-51R (Washington, DC: Oct. 29, 2010).
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Thus, as of March 2013, FEMA has not yet completed a National
preparedness assessment, as we recommended in our March 2011 report,
which could assist FEMA in prioritizing grant funding. However, FEMA
officials stated that they have efforts under way to assess regional,
State, and local capabilities to provide a framework for completing a
National preparedness assessment.\20\ For example, in April 2012, FEMA
issued guidance on developing Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk
Assessments (THIRA), which were initially required to be completed by
State and local governments receiving homeland security funding by
December 31, 2012.\21\ Guidance issued for development of the THIRAs
describes a process for assessing the various threats and hazards
facing a community, the vulnerability of the community, as well as the
consequences associated with those threats and hazards. For example,
using the THIRA process, a jurisdiction may identify tornadoes as a
hazard and asses its vulnerabilities to and the consequences of a
tornado striking the jurisdiction, as well as the capabilities
necessary for an effective response. Using the THIRA results, a
jurisdiction may then develop a strategy to allocate resources
effectively to achieve self-determined capability requirements by
closing capability gaps.
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\20\ GAO-11-318SP.
\21\ According to FEMA officials, as of March 2013, some State and
local urban areas had not yet completed their THIRAs. FEMA granted 6-
month extensions to the December 31, 2012 deadline for five States and
three local urban areas affected by Hurricane Sandy in late October
2012.
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According to FEMA officials in March 2013, the THIRAs are to be
used by State, regional, and Federal entities for future planning
efforts. At the State level, FEMA guidance notes that State officials
are to use the capability requirements they identified in their
respective 2012 THIRAs in their future State Preparedness Reports. FEMA
officials stated that they planned to use both the THIRAs and the State
Preparedness Reports to identify States' (self-reported) capability
gaps based on capability requirements established by the State. At the
regional level, each of the 10 FEMA regions is to analyze the local and
State THIRAs to develop regional THIRAs.\22\ At the National level, the
local, State, and regional THIRAs are collectively intended to provide
FEMA with data that it can analyze to assist in the identification of
National funding priorities for closing capability gaps. The outcome of
the THIRA process is intended to be a set of National capability
performance requirements and measures, which FEMA officials stated they
intend to incorporate into future National Preparedness Reports. As of
March 2013, FEMA officials are working to coordinate their review and
analysis of the various THIRAs through a THIRA Analysis and Review
Team. The team plans to conduct on-going meetings to discuss common
themes and findings from the THIRAs and intends to develop an initial
proposed list of National preparedness grant funding priorities by
summer 2013.
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\22\ FEMA officials stated that they required the FEMA regions to
complete their inaugural THIRAs by September 30, 2012, 3 months before
the local and State THIRAs were due. As a result, the first regional
THIRAs did not incorporate information from the local and State THIRAs.
The officials explained that FEMA directed the regional THIRAs to be
completed in 2012 before the local and State THIRAs in order to aid
development of preparedness grant guidance for fiscal year 2013, but
that future iterations of the regional THIRAs are intended to
incorporate information from completed local and State THIRAs.
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Depending on how the THIRA process is implemented and incorporated
into future National Preparedness Reports, such an approach could be a
positive step toward addressing our March 2011 recommendation to FEMA
to develop a National preparedness assessment of existing capabilities
levels against capability requirements. Such a National preparedness
assessment may help FEMA to: (1) Identify the potential costs for
developing and maintaining required capabilities at each level of
government, and (2) determine what capabilities Federal agencies should
be prepared to provide. While the recently completed THIRAs and 2012
National Preparedness Report are positive steps in the initial efforts
to assess preparedness capabilities across the Nation, capability
requirements and performance measures for each level of government that
are clear, objective, and quantifiable have not yet been developed. As
a result, it is unclear what capability gaps currently exist, including
at the Federal level, and what level of resources will be needed to
close such gaps through prioritized preparedness grant funding. We will
continue to monitor FEMA's efforts to develop capability requirements
and performance measures.
Chairman Brooks, Ranking Member Payne, and Members of the
subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be pleased
to respond to any questions that you may have at this time.
Mrs. Brooks. Thank you, Mr Maurer.
I will now recognize myself for 5 minutes for questions.
This is primarily to Administrator Manning.
In 2010, as you just heard, Congress did pass and the
President signed into law the Redundancy Elimination and
Enhanced Performance Preparedness Grants Act. That bill was
considered and passed by this subcommittee. Among other things,
it required the FEMA administrator to enter into a contract
with the National Academy of Public Administration, to study,
develop, and implement the quantifiable performance measures we
have been talking about, and metrics to assess the
effectiveness of the grant.
The report was released in October 2011, and it offered 16
different recommendations of performance measures for FEMA's
consideration. NAPA also recommended that FEMA conduct an
assessment of collaborative approaches, in coordination with
local jurisdictions, States, regions, and urban areas, and use
the results to develop a scoring system for future quantitative
or qualitative performance measures on collaboration, and to
assist program participants specifically to strengthen their
performance on these critical issues.
Can you provide this subcommittee with an update on the
implementation of those recommendations from NAPA, please?
Mr. Manning. Madam Chairwoman, thank you. I would be very
happy to. We, of course, implemented fully all the
recommendations in the REEPPG Act. We entered into a contract
with NAPA. We had a very productive review period, working with
NAPA, received their report with great anticipation, and
reviewed their recommendations that recommended metrics and
performance measures against all of the things that we have
been tracking.
In most cases, were able to cross walk their
recommendations against data that we had been collecting over
the years in various forms, and were able to then consolidate
that in a report back to the committee that updated where we
are on those.
I have a number of them with me. For example, one of the
recommendations from NAPA on the kind of foundational
activities of the whole program was to review and monitor the
number of FEMA State and UASI risk assessments against their
grants. We found that 100 percent of the States were current in
that recommendation.
We have subsequently updated that guidance, as you
mentioned in your opening remarks, Madam Chairwoman, into the
Threat and Hazard Identification Risk Assessment, the THIRA
guidance, that will help track, implement specific measurable
metrics for the grant program, things, identifying the gaps,
the capabilities required in a given jurisdiction, the
particular activities that need to be performed to achieve
those capabilities, and the percent completion against those,
against multiple grant years.
The intention there is to achieve the goal, as has been
described, in a measurable and meaningful way, as we continue
to implement the programs.
I would be happy to provide the committee with additional
copies of those data, the measures that we achieved that we
have tracked against the NAPA report, and address any further
questions you may have on that.
Mrs. Brooks. Were there any recommendations that you
disagreed with specifically?
Mr. Manning. I don't recall any that we explicitly
disagreed with. There were some measures that we felt that we
were collecting data in a way that achieved the intent of the
recommendation, but in possibly a different way than was
recommended in the report.
That is summarized as well in the report. I would be happy
to provide that to you.
Mrs. Brooks. We would be interested in receiving that
report.
It is my understanding that the 2013 National Preparedness
Report is due to the President this month. Is FEMA on track to
deliver and provide that report to the President by its
deadline?
Mr. Manning. Madam Chairwoman, we are. We are very happy at
the success of the 2012 National Preparedness Report. We think
it is a very good summation of what we have achieved as a
Nation since the advent of homeland security with the
application of, at the time, I think just about $36 billion
worth of preparedness assistance.
The 2013 report, as you mentioned, is due to the President
at the end of the month. It is on schedule. It is on track. We
expect it delivered to the President on time.
I think it will show measurable increases over last year's
report.
Mrs. Brooks. I would also ask, on behalf of the committee,
that we receive the report as well.
On a different note, there has been a backlog in the past
in spending of grant funds. That has been referenced. It has
been an issue for years.
As of last month, FEMA reported $5.2 billion in grant funds
from fiscal years 2008 through 2011 still yet to be drawn down.
I know that some of these are still within the period of
performance.
But can you share with us whether or not the limitation on
extensions that have been given--what impact they have had on
the grantee's ability to spend those funds within the amount of
time? Obviously, Congress is always looking at these funds. To
see that we have over $5 billion still, you know, unspent, can
you just speak to that, please?
Mr. Manning. Yes, ma'am. As you may be aware, we have taken
many steps to alleviate the backlog in draw-downs. There are a
great many number of reasons as to why that condition grew over
the years.
In the last year, we have modified program guidance. We
have issued information bulletins. We have worked with grantees
in the way we provide extensions, addressing those extensions
to really the only most critical areas that require extensions,
and in places where there are business plans in place to show
an appropriate burn rate and get that draw-down.
All of the efforts we have taken together, I am very happy
to tell you that over the last year, we have gone from just
about $9 billion in undrawn balances--we are down to right
about $4 billion now.
We have made significant progress in just 1 year, cut that
in almost half in the amount of money that has gone undrawn. We
are continuing to work with all of our grantees. We expect that
burn rate--we hope that burn rate to continue. We are working
very closely with each and every individual grantee to ensure
that continues.
Mrs. Brooks. Thank you. Congratulations on that. We look
forward to hearing more.
The Chairwoman now recognizes Ranking Minority Member of
the subcommittee, gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Payne, for any
questions.
Mr. Payne. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Deputy Administrator Manning, sequestration has gone into
effect now. Congress is debating the budget of this year.
Sequestration has already led to cuts in areas like TSA, CBP,
air traffic controllers and the like, which, in my opinion,
reduces our ability to prepare for and protect against a
terrorist threat.
How will sequestration and proposed cuts in the House
budget affect, if at all, FEMA's grant programs you have spoken
about? In particular, UASI grants that benefits my district a
great deal in New Jersey, Jersey City, Bayonne, and Newark, and
that high-risk area about the port and Port Newark?
Mr. Manning. Thank you. Those are very interesting and
difficult questions that we have been wrestling with a great
deal over the past few months. The grantees that we work with,
all of the State and local governments across the country have
made tremendous strides in their level of capabilities over the
years.
We continue to work with them.
The sequestration impacts to the grants has resulted in a
decrease to each of the grantees across the previous year. I am
aware that there are a number of proposals under consideration
in both the House and the Senate for the balance of the fiscal
year funding and in out-years. As we address those varying
funding levels, we would be happy to provide the committee with
the particular impacts by grantee, as we were able to--as we
are able to forecast that.
I have no doubt, though, that FEMA will continue to work
with all of our State and local partners to continue to develop
the capabilities to address the most critical needs within each
of those jurisdictions.
We have been working over the years to increase flexibility
in the way that grantees can use their funds to address those
most specific problems unique to each individual. What we
proposed last fiscal year in the National Preparedness Grant
Program was an effort towards providing that coordination and
flexibility with decreased funds, an ability to identify
potential duplication, as you have heard from other witnesses
this morning, and potentially alleviate that duplication and
maximize the use of diminished resources available to the
grantees.
We will continue to work with people to identify those
opportunities, leverage partnership possibilities between
grantees. I have directed the staff within the Grants Program
Directorate to compare the, for example, court and transit
grant applications to the UASI grant applications and see if
there are opportunities to get geographically similar grantees
to be able to work together and leverage some of those
resources as well.
Mr. Payne. Well, I am a bit concerned that if, you know,
the proposal to consolidate and go to a block--you talk about
flexibility, I don't see how that allows for flexibility if it
is turned into a bulk block grant. But we will see how that
works out.
You know, we have done a great deal of good work around the
UASI grant in Newark. As the former president of council, I was
very involved in that, in the hardening of, you know, certain
targets and what have you. It would be unfortunate to have the
work that we have done there diminished.
But as we have been saying here, there is no real way to
gauge. You know, it looked good to me, but, you know, from your
perspective in understanding how well they have done with those
dollars would be good to know. Thank you.
Ms. Richards, you mentioned in your testimony that FEMA
could strengthen its grant program by issuing further guidance
to States. Yet the NPGP consolidates 16 grant programs into a
block grant and gives even more discretion and less direction
to the States.
How do you expect that the funds under a block grant would
be accounted for better, since it seems FEMA will have less
presence?
Ms. Richards. Sir, I would have to say that we have not
audited a program that hasn't been implemented yet. So I am not
able to fully answer your question.
We have looked at some of FEMA's programs and identified
areas where local entities were having to apply multiple times
for funds for the same project, but trying to get it from
different programs. We had recommended to FEMA that they look
at consolidating some of those application processes to ease
the burden on the States and the sub-grantees.
As to how FEMA could oversee a block grant, I don't have
any information on that today.
Mr. Payne. I would just, as I am closing, say that, you
know, I think that under consolidating this into a block grant
and not dealing with the sub-recipients could fall under
partisan and political concerns on the State level. If a State
administration doesn't necessarily like the administration in a
locale, that there could be effects to the grantee at the end.
So I think that FEMA being involved in making sure without
those issues at hand, in mind, can see that the sub-recipient
is doing what they need to do, as opposed to someone making a
decision because of their feeling this way or that way about an
official.
So thank you. I yield back.
Mrs. Brooks. The Chairwoman now recognizes the Ranking
Minority Member of the full committee, gentleman from
Mississippi, Mr. Thompson, for any questions.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman.
Mr. Maurer, your review of the grant program listed some
very I think salient issues. You said that at the time of your
review, FEMA lacked the ways to measure how money was spent.
That goes to the Chairwoman's question about how you have
money left, if you don't know how you are measuring the way you
have spent.
So can you provide, after your review, what FEMA told you
they did to correct that problem?
Mr. Maurer. Yes, absolutely. After we completed our report
last February, we followed up with FEMA to talk about their
actions to address our recommendations. A lot of FEMA's efforts
were wrapped up in their broader attempts to develop a clear
National capabilities framework.
As part of building up that framework, they are trying to
enhance their ability to assess both the impacts of individual
programs, as well as more broadly what has been accomplished to
date and what still needs to be done in the future.
Let me be the first to recognize, like I said in my opening
statement, that this is difficult to do. FEMA definitely has a
difficult challenge.
But, you know, some of our work looking at other Federal
programs, other Federal grant programs show that there are
opportunities to achieve success or relative success in this
area. There is no such thing as perfect performance measures.
Nor is there such a thing as a perfect grant program.
But other programs have made good efforts. So, for example,
at the Department of Justice, we issued work looking at the
Justice Assistance Grant Program, which is roughly analogous to
the State Homeland Security Grant Program at FEMA. When we did
our review, DOJ was in the process of developing measures.
We recommended they take a couple of actions to enhance
those measures. They did that. They worked more closely with
the local stakeholders, for example, to get input on those
measures. DOJ also took efforts to validate the information
that was coming in from the recipients. In other words, trust
what they are reporting but also verify it.
Another large program that has some reasonably effective
measures is the President's Emergency Program for AIDS Relief.
This is a $44 billion multi-agency effort to combat AIDS.
Mr. Thompson. Just so you are satisfied that they are
moving in the right direction?
Mr. Maurer. I think they are definitely on the right track.
We are going to keep a careful eye on what they are doing. But
they still have a long way to go, however.
Mr. Thompson. Well, as part of the review, Mr. Manning, can
you explain to me the oversight responsibility for the regional
offices in the grants program?
Mr. Manning. Yes, sir. Our 10 FEMA regional offices work
very closely with the State and local jurisdictions within
their geographic area. We have over the years modified the way
we oversee and manage the grants programs. We have divested a
great deal of programmatic oversight in certain portfolios of
the preparedness grants to our regional grants administrators.
The National applications for the Homeland Security Grant
Program still come to the National level, still come to
Washington. They are reviewed through our 2013 integrated
monitoring plan for fiscal and programmatic monitoring, happens
within the headquarters area here, but specific implementation
steps on many of the procurement actions, the Emergency
Management Performance Grant, which is a very successful grant
program that builds capability for disaster response, really
the backbone of emergency management across the country, is
entirely managed within our regional structure at this time.
We have reorganized each of our 10 regions to have a
dedicated grant management division that reports directly to
the regional administrator and coordinates with the Grants
Program Directorate here in Washington.
Mr. Thompson. Well, can you provide the committee with a
little more--in other words, a State or locality applies to the
National office, but you outsource the responsibility for
monitoring to a regional office. Am I correct?
Mr. Manning. That is correct. Each individual State or
local jurisdiction, working through their State, applies to the
National level, so we can compare the applications across at
the National level. But we are one FEMA.
Mr. Thompson. Are they compared Nationally or are they
compared regionally?
Mr. Manning. The activities that a particular grantee
proposes to accomplish, that has opportunities to leverage on
each other's States, for mutual aid opportunities, for example,
are coordinated by the regions, most definitely.
But where there are competitive applications, the
Assistance of Firefighters Grants, for example, the SAFER
Grants, where they are a competitive grant program, they are
reviewed against the entire Nation by a peer review panel that
is assembled here in Washington, made of grantee peers from
across the country.
Mr. Thompson. A little confusing as to how you describe it,
because I am trying to see whether or not a State like
Mississippi is competing against people in Mississippi, people
in the region or people Nationally.
Mr. Manning. I understand. The State of Mississippi, in the
Homeland Security Grant Program, HSGP and UASI grant program,
is not competing against other States. They are competing
against--their application is not in competition against other
States regionally or Nationally.
The homeland security risk, as outlined in the Post-Katrina
Act, that is used to determine the allocation amount by State,
is a National list. So the risk to Mississippi from a terrorist
attack is compared against the other 49 States. That is
correct.
But in the competition--there is no competition in those
grants. The Port Grants are competed within the area by the
captain of the port. We work closely with the Coast Guard. I
would be happy to coordinate the Coast Guard to come give you a
much deeper brief, if you would like it, on how that process
works.
Mr. Thompson. Well, thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
I guess one of the policy questions is, is FEMA best-suited
to run a grants program, period? Or should they just be in the
disaster response and recovery business, rather the grants? I
don't know. I just see you trying to build capability with an
agency whose mission is in another direction.
I yield back. Thank you.
Mrs. Brooks. Thank you.
The Chairwoman will now recognize other Members of the
subcommittee for questions they may wish to ask the witnesses.
In accordance with the committee rules and practice, I plan to
recognize Members who were present at the start of the hearing,
by seniority on the subcommittee. Those coming in later will be
recognized in order of arrival.
So at this point, the Chairwoman now recognizes the
gentleman from Pennsylvania, Congressman Perry, for any
questions.
Mr. Perry. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Thank you for coming in to testify. All of you really
offered some very compelling information for me in particular.
I am sure for everybody else as well. I am not sure exactly who
to address the question to. I have been in and out a little
bit. So I am trying not to be redundant. If I am, please let me
know, because I will have more.
But for Pennsylvania, we saw about $20 million in
Assistance to Firefighters Grants, money being used for
equipment and vehicles. From my standpoint, the turnout in gear
and vehicles and equipment is really where these folks want to
spend that money. We have a huge amount of volunteer and
professional firefighters and emergency responders in
Pennsylvania.
The particular grant has been highlighted, though, as a
source of waste within the Department. I am just wondering if
there is some way to ensure the--first of all, is that what we
should be procuring? Because in the testimony, one of the
things I kind of get is a flavor of we don't really know
exactly, in this regard, what the grant program--and correct me
if I am wrong--what exactly our mission is. What are we trying
to achieve?
If that is the case, you know, is there some way to make
sure these funds are directly correlated with increased
firefighter safety, security, productivity?
Please, anyone chime in if you feel compelled.
Mr. Manning. Thank you. Absolutely. It is important, I
think first, to note there are a great many number of grant
programs, each of which has a different objective and a
different goal and a different administration process. So while
the Homeland Security Grant Program has a certain suite of
things that are eligible for acquisition or training
opportunities that are eligible to be paid for, the Emergency
Management Performance Grant has a different set.
The Assistance to Firefighters Grant was created expressly
for building the material and training capacity in fire
departments across the country, most predominantly bunker gear,
air packs, fire apparatus, those sorts of things.
There has been a measurable amount of resources put against
firefighter wellness as well, to increase the capability of
firefighters themselves.
We know with great detail exactly what has been purchased
against all of these grants. We know what equipment has been
procured. We know who has been trained in what. Those are the
data that we have used to develop the National Preparedness
Report last year and are doing this year.
I think the Assistance to Firefighters Grant, it is
monitored closely, as we were describing, through our
integrated monitoring plan. It is one of those suite of grants
that is monitored at least biannually. We have a process that
we use to evaluate each grantee to determine if they are high-
risk or not, to get more close scrutiny.
Our monitoring process is one to identify problems before
they happen. It is not an audit, per se. Where we identify
potential problems either through fraud, waste, or abuse, we
are happy to refer those to our colleagues at the inspector
general.
I think what has been procured, what we are trying to
achieve in the Assistance to Firefighter Grants is critical for
the Nation, for the Nation's capability, has very specific
activities and pieces of equipment that aren't eligible for
procurement under any other grant program.
That particular one is not duplicated by anything else. At
the same time, we do coordinate what is happening, what the
applications are with the States, so they know that a
particular jurisdiction has received an award for, say, a piece
of new fire apparatus, a new engine, a new ladder truck. So the
State will know, and they know that they don't have to worry
about duplicating assistance there.
Mr. Perry. Okay. Then just since you mentioned it--and let
me say this because I don't want to run out of time just by--I
want to get this point in, especially for our volunteer
firefighters and emergency responders. Those are the folks--the
volunteers are filling out the grant applications.
These are folks that have jobs, whether under the fire,
police, or whatever, that are leaving their employment to go
fight the fire or, you know, tend duties as fire, police, or
whatever. So the less onerous and the more direct that those
grant applications can be, the better for them.
With that, I am just wondering, is there a metric? You
know, I am picturing the firefighters that I know. Is there
some metric to describe wellness and fitness programs, so we
make sure? Most of the folks I know want the gear. You know,
wellness is all probably some descriptive term that is hard to
pin down.
I am just looking for some kind of metric that you guys use
to determine what that is. I will yield when the answer is in.
Mr. Manning. Certainly. I would be happy to have the grant
staff--and we will come over and provide you a very detailed
briefing on that particular element of the grant program.
The vast majority of that grant does, in fact, go to
equipment, to bunker gear, to apparatus. We do our level best
to make that grant application as simple and non-onerous as
possible.
I was one of those volunteer firefighters. I used every
hour of my vacation day for 10 years to go to calls and go to
training. There is nothing I hate more than an overly
complicated process where we are trying to help people that are
trying to do this on their nights and weekends.
We do everything we can to make it as simple as possible.
Mr. Perry. Thank you.
Mr. Maurer. Representative Perry, if I can, just real
quickly? One thing to always keep in mind for any grant
program--I mean, if you are talking specifically about
firefighters, more equipment and more training is always sort
of generically better. But the challenge is how much more do we
need and how much more should the Federal Government provide
its resources towards providing that support at the State and
local level?
Not having that framework in place makes it very difficult
to make that kind of assessment.
Mrs. Brooks. The Chairwoman now recognizes the gentlelady
from New York, Ms. Clarke, for any questions.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman, Ranking
Member.
Thank you to our witnesses. This is a very interesting
conversation we are having today, because I come from a very
complex user or grantee environment, grantee-rich environment.
When I think about this grant consolidation, particularly for a
city like New York, it becomes a bit more imperative that we
really look at what the implications here are.
We have a transit. We have the ports. So for them to be
basically competing for the same pot of money in such a very
complex environment is a bit concerning.
Ms. Richards stated--this question is to just Deputy
Administrator Manning. Ms. Richards stated that the OIG audits
unveiled States did not always obligate the HSGP grants to sub-
grantees in a timely manner, which would potentially cause an
increase in sub-grantee's administrative costs, and hinder the
sub-grantee's ability to complete projects and deliver needed
equipment and training.
State grantees did not properly reimburse sub-grantees for
their grant expenditures. Again, I am looking at the context of
a place like New York City, within the context of a State like
New York. How would the NPGP promote efficiencies with sub-
grantee draw-downs?
Since it is unclear how the funding in the NPGP will be
distributed to local areas, how do we assure that it is used to
meet local threats and preparedness gaps? How do we ensure that
the political considerations do not become the criteria for the
distribution of these funds?
So that is like a bundle of stuff there. I hope you can
address it.
Mr. Manning. Yes, ma'am. Thank you. I particularly like
your description of a grantee-rich environment. I think that is
very appropriate.
I think an important thing to consider in our proposal of
the National Preparedness Grant Program last year, and our
discussion of that, is that it works in combination with the
shift in philosophy in implementation that has come from
Presidential Decision Directive 8, the National Preparedness
System.
In the past, the Homeland Security Grant Program and the
UASI grant programs have functioned under State-specific
strategies, in which a great deal of latitude was provided and
very little specificity on how to conceive of what needs to be
achieved in a particular jurisdiction.
You have heard from both witnesses this morning the
attendant problems we have had with that approach, that it was
difficult to understand or conceive of a National level of
preparedness, how prepared are we, and how much more prepared
do we need to be.
The idea around the National Preparedness Grant Program was
one of consolidation of the multiple buckets of grants in a way
that we can, in combination with an approach that looks at the
most likely severe threats and hazards to a jurisdiction,
through the lens of this National preparedness goal, our
multiple core capabilities.
For example, if we look in New York City, of the various
threats and hazards that exist to the city of New York and the
entire New York urban area, you may consider the effects of a
large hurricane. Certainly with Sandy we now have an all-too-
real tangible evidence of what happens.
But just a few years ago, that was a planning scenario.
That wasn't one that we had experienced in quite some time. You
may look at a large terrorist attack. You could look at a
series of tornadoes, even an earthquake.
A couple of years ago, no one would have considered the
northeast at risk of much earthquake. You see the scaffolding
going up around town to repair the damage here in Washington.
When you consider the threats and hazards against the very
specific geographic area, against these core capabilities, you
have an idea of your targets. So, for example, the New York
area has been building advanced search-and-rescue capability
for some time, but not using a coordinated method, where you
can understand what needs to be built in a way that we can
compare across the entire New York Metro Area, across the
entire State of New York, all of FEMA Region II, the eastern
seaboard, the entire eastern United States or across the whole
country.
So as we were talking earlier of the THIRA and the system,
the idea is simply one of what could possibly happen where I
live? Using this language of our NIMS, the National Incident
Management System that we have rolled out over the last 10
years, using that for resource typing, given what might happen,
what do I need?
Then focusing the grants on the gaps. So if I determine
that I need four urban search-and-rescue teams, and I know that
I have three in New York, I know that is a priority. I am going
to work between FDNY and the police department and the Port
Authority to try to build those capabilities in response,
prevention, protection, mitigation, and recovery.
Certainly, there are critical infrastructure protection
challenges with the port and transit facilities that don't lend
itself to that evaluation. We have been working very closely,
in fact using the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey as
our example and our closest collaborator, on determining a way
that that would most effectively work.
Mrs. Brooks. Thank you.
The Chairwoman now recognizes the gentleman from
Pennsylvania, Mr. Marino, for questions.
Mr. Marino. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Thank you for being here, folks. I am going to get right
into the questioning.
I am from northeast Pennsylvania, 10th Congressional
District. We have been hit just like everyone else, floods and
you name it. We have had our share.
There is a fire department in my district, volunteer, who
put together rather a very well-written grant. They were told
it was a very well-written grant to help them purchase a new
fire truck. They received notice several weeks ago that they
had been turned down.
The call was made as to why they were turned down. Here is
the response they got: ``Well, you have written on here that it
is a 1986 fire truck and it is not old enough.'' They said,
``We don't have an 1986. We have a 1968.'' The numbers were
transposed.
So whoever typed up at the fire department the last hard
copy changed from a 1968 to a 1986. They were told that FEMA
that--``too bad. You have to reapply again, because you have
the wrong date of fire truck down.''
``Well, can we have it back and we will switch it or we
will tell you or we will send a supplement?''
``No, you are out of the grant process.''
Now, can any of you respond to that? Because, quite
obviously, on its face, after sending in a 25-page grant, it is
just ridiculous.
So Mr. Manning and then Ms. Richards and Mr. Maurer.
Mr. Manning. Sir, I am sorry to say, I do hear examples
like that all too often. I will happily go back and look very
closely into your specific example.
I can say, though, in having looked into these in the past,
the problem is simply one of the competitiveness of this
program. I know this isn't going to be a satisfactory answer.
There are thousands and thousands and thousands of applications
against this grant program, each of which has a compelling need
for that particular department.
The staff is forced to make extremely difficult decisions,
often on what seem in retrospect to be occasionally arbitrary
decisions like that. The decisions on which applications are
successful or not are made by a peer-reviewed panel of like
fire departments, representatives from across the country.
I----
Mr. Marino. If I may, would the grants have been decided
upon before the notification was sent out saying, it is too-new
of a truck, we cannot? I can understand that.
Mr. Manning. Yes, sir. The awards are decided upon before
the notifications are made.
Mr. Marino. Okay, that answers that question. But perhaps I
can give you specifics and perhaps we can look at it.
Mr. Manning. Yes. We would be happy to help them, you
know----
Mr. Marino. I have looked over your background. You are
very well-educated. You are very well-qualified. I would not be
so bold as to tell you how to do what you are doing, whatever
that is, how complex it is.
But this is a general question pertaining to some stats. We
have spent approximately, for preparedness grants since 2001,
$40 billion dollars. Now in your opinions, are we getting the
bang for our buck? How do we know we are getting the bang for
our buck, question No. 2?
No. 3, have any of you experienced a situation, like we all
have--we are human; it is complicated--where this is absolutely
ridiculous, on what we spent this money on, and it just didn't
serve the purpose and it wasn't effective and efficient?
So if you would, please? Mr. Maurer, do you want to start
on that and work to your right?
Mr. Maurer. Yes, absolutely. Certainly with that $40
billion, we now have more equipment. We certainly have more
training. We have more generic capability. How much more? We
don't really know.
How much closer we are to what we need, we don't really
know that either. That is the central challenge facing this
whole program, kind of writ large, is knowing when do we need
another $100 billion? Do we need another $10 billion?
Where does that money need to go, in what areas? That still
remains unclear.
Mr. Marino. Let us move on to the next part of this, as far
as--and if you want to tap on, add a little bit, that is fine.
But how about, are we looking for programs and saying, this
just didn't work? It is not working, scrap it and start over?
Ms. Richards.
Ms. Richards. When we do our audits, we do look at what
equipment has been bought. At the inception of the program, we
did make several reports where we had found that equipment that
was bought was not appropriate for the situation. It was not in
accordance with FEMA's rules. Or it was being used for non-
approved purposes.
Over the life of this grant program, that has diminished
considerably. At this point, we are finding that only very
rarely----
Mr. Marino. Good.
Ms. Richards [continuing]. That they are buying
inappropriate equipment.
Mr. Marino. I see my time has expired. I yield back.
Mrs. Brooks. Thank you.
I will now recognize myself.
To Mr. Maurer, GAO has repeatedly expressed concerns
regarding FEMA's inability to assess National preparedness. You
just mentioned it yet again. Given the work that has been done
to date--and there has been considerable work done to date--
what, in your opinion, remains to be done?
What does FEMA need to be doing to address GAO's concerns?
Mr. Maurer. Well, they need to finish the work on
implementing the requirements of the Presidential directive.
They certainly had that framework in place. We are looking
forward to seeing the next National Preparedness Report.
The THIRA process is underway. They don't have all the
THIRAs in from all the various States. A number of them
received extensions for very valid reasons, because of
Hurricane Sandy.
But we are looking forward for that being completed.
Mrs. Brooks. I am sorry. Could you please explain for the
panel the THIRA again?
Mr. Maurer. Yes. In generic terms, it is ability to assess
the risks that the State and locals are facing from a variety
of threats. It is a way of doing that in a comprehensive way.
It gives them a common way of expressing that to FEMA. The idea
is that FEMA would be able to direct money towards those areas
with the greatest risks, where there are still capabilities
gaps.
Another issue that we think it is important for FEMA to
address is looking more closely at the self-reported nature of
the information that underlies this kind of reporting.
So, for example, the way the system is set up now, the
States are reporting on what they think their capabilities are
and what they think their capabilities need to be. It is
certainly appropriate to get that level of input from the
recipients. But we also think it is important to have some look
into that at the Federal level, to make sure that there is
oversight of that as well.
That has been one of the sort of overarching issues we have
identified in all of our grants work across the Federal
Government, this idea that there needs to be oversight of self-
reported data.
A third issue that we think is important to address is
developing specific measures on individual programs, which will
help build up the broader capability of assessing capabilities
and capability gaps.
Mrs. Brooks. To Administrator Manning, to his point with
respect to the oversight of the State self-reporting, what is
your response as to what FEMA is doing, you know, to give that
analysis and oversight as to what the States' requests are?
Mr. Manning. Yes, the balance of third-party or independent
research into the level of preparedness of a particular grantee
or State and local jurisdiction, and the self-reported nature
of most of the data, that is one we are always struggling with
and constantly trying to refine.
A number of years ago, it was entirely self-reported. We
have gone into a more objective, more quantitative methodology
with the adoption of the THIRA and that process through the
National Preparedness System, one where self-reporting is going
to be less subjective, less qualitative, and something that is
more concrete and more easily auditable on the back end.
We are also using additional Federally-driven or third-
party reviews of activity, not simply requiring--relying,
excuse me--on self-reporting data. It is one that I don't
believe we will ever completely resolve. As anyone who does
fundamentally qualitative research will tell you, it is
something you are constantly having to modify your research
methodologies to achieve the relevant data.
Mrs. Brooks. When you indicate third-party reviews, what
third party are you referring to?
Mr. Manning. In many cases, we are talking about relevant
National associations, for example fusion centers. There are a
baseline assessment for fusion centers. In the past, it used to
be: Do you have one, do you not have one, do you feel good
about it? Those were the measures.
Now we are using these assessments, these baseline
capability assessments that were done collaboratively by the
fusion centers, through their National association, in
collaboration with the Intelligence and Analysis Division of
the Department of Homeland Security.
So we have this kind of third-party review of the data sets
and the collective data, to help us determine whether it is
relevant or not.
Mrs. Brooks. Thank you. Just finally, talking about fusion
centers, I was able to visit my State's fusion center. As a
former United States attorney, was involved in standing up the
fusion center in Indiana. So I have been very familiar with
fusion centers and the importance of them.
Is FEMA now able to more accurately report how much grant
dollars have gone toward fusion centers across the country?
Mr. Manning. Yes, we are. That is a very important point.
In the beginning of the fusion centers, I too was involved,
prior to my Federal service, in standing up one of the fusion
centers and helping build that network across the country. In
the early days, it was something that was--it was a grassroots
initiative. It wasn't a Federally-driven program.
Because of that, there weren't the tools built into the
grant process to track that specifically. So retrospectively,
when we try to figure out--when we were trying to figure out
how much money has gone into fusion centers, we had to do
essentially keyword searches on things like ``information
sharing, data analysis systems, fusion centers,'' that sort of
thing.
We got what we believed to be inflated numbers, because in
many cases a grantee may have been procuring mobile data
terminals for their law enforcement, for their patrol vehicles.
It may support the fusion center, but not specifically for the
fusion center.
Now, as we shift into program-level reporting in the grant
applications--but certainly even now, as we require the
grantees, if it is an explicit funding line for a fusion
center, there is a box that says, ``this is for a fusion
center.''
So it is a very clear, binary analysis of whether it is
fusion-center funding or not.
Mrs. Brooks. Okay. Thanks.
I now recognize the Ranking Member of the committee,
gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Payne. Any further questions?
Mr. Payne. Yes, thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
You know, back to the NPGP grant consolidation and my
concerns really about that taking place; I understand FEMA
plans to include the NPGP program in its 2014 budget request,
with modifications to address the concerns raised by
stakeholders after the program was initially proposed last
year.
What modifications should we expect to see in the National
Preparedness Grant Program proposal?
Mr. Manning. Thank you, Ranking Member Payne. Since we
originally proposed that in the fiscal 2013 budget request, the
administration has taken the advice, has very clearly heard the
advice of both the House and the Senate and all of our
constituents and partners across the country.
We have been working non-stop with all of our urban area
partners, our State partners, port, transit, the relevant
constituent groups, law enforcement, fire service, public
works, on listening to their concerns and considering how what
we had proposed or what we are considering could be best
addressed, best modified, best constructed to achieve those.
Going forward, I think it is important for me to note that
we will, of course, comply with whatever Congress directs us to
do in the budget we have in 2013. Whatever is--we will
function--we will design the grant programs and implement as
authorized and as directed in the appropriation.
As for what we may propose for the 2014 submission, I am
happy once the administration does make its proposal to go into
more detail. But at this time, I can't, unfortunately, comment
on a budget proposal that has yet to be released.
Mr. Payne. Okay. Second, you know, homeland security
stakeholders at the State and local level have had to deal with
multiple iterations, you know, of FEMA's attempt to measure
performance and meet Congressional mandates.
What support and training would be provided to States and
locals to support these new monitoring efforts?
Mr. Manning. You are absolutely correct in that assessment.
As a former grantee myself, I am very well-versed in what FEMA
and the Department, prior to the Post-Katrina Act and grants
moving to FEMA, how that works. We have a great deal of
opportunities through our technical assistance function, our
technical assistance branch, as we change reporting
requirements, grant application requirements, to work with our
grantees.
We schedule as we can, as funds are available and as travel
is available, to go to areas where grantees are to help them,
or try to bring them into central locations, not always just
Washington, but across the country, to work with them.
As we are shifting the philosophy of the National
Preparedness System and the things that the grants are trying
to achieve and how they work together, we have had workshops
all across the country, multiple in every region to work
through how the THIRA is supposed to work, with capability
estimation is supposed to work, and how all of that functions
and supports the grant applications, to make their lives as
easy as possible.
We do everything we can to do that. We will continue. You
have my assurance that we will do as much outreach and as much
technical assistance is possible, as any of these requirements
shift, to make the grantees successful in doing their work.
Mr. Payne. So, you know, any additional changes to the FEMA
grant monitoring process in the next year--you know, I am
concerned that when will you notify the State and local
stakeholders?
Mr. Manning. The grant monitoring process, we do it with
our integrated monitoring. The grantees know at the time of
their award whether they have been flagged as a grantee that we
are going to be working with.
It is criteria that are published and well-understood,
things like a new grantee or a great number of audit findings,
those sorts of things. We work very closely with those
grantees. At no time should that be a surprise to anyone in the
monitoring system.
Mr. Payne. Well, you know, Mr. Manning, let me--sorry,
Deputy Manning, let me just thank you for your testimony today.
But I am still concerned that, you know, the Department's
NPGP proposal does not provide substantial details on how the
grant program may work, how the funds will be distributed or
what safeguards will be in place to ensure local threats and
preparedness gaps are actually closed.
So I am still not sold on this being the best direction,
and a way for the funds to be allocated out of a block, as
opposed to the way they are managed now. Because, as I said, in
Newark, we have had substantial success in being involved
directly with the Federal Government.
But to put it in that block, in my State, gives me pause.
So I just want to put that on the record.
I yield back.
Mrs. Brooks. Thank you.
Mr. Manning, last week, or sometime in the month of March,
we received this capability estimation report. It is a draft,
as I understand it, a comprehensive preparedness guide, which
is supposed to help States and localities identify the
resources it needs.
When can we expect the final version? What I liked about
it, it is very specific. It gives ideas as to whether or not
there are shortfalls on certain areas. So when will they get
the final guide for this?
Then also, how will this capability estimation report
impact grants awards?
Mr. Manning. Thank you. Thank you for the comments on it as
well.
I think that goes to the example I was using with
Congressman Perry that we try to make it as simple and
implementable, usable for the grantees as possible.
We are in our, I hope to be, final stages of collaborative
development with our partners. We try not to do anything and
just drop it on grantees. So we are working, working with
partners to pilot it, to work through it. We just finished a
pilot with the city of Baltimore to see how effective it would
be in a complex urban area.
We are working with others as well.
We don't have a specific hard release date at this time,
but I expect it to be very, very soon. As soon as we have
analyzed the results of our pilot with Baltimore and other
jurisdictions, we will be able to finalize that.
We will be happy--we will, of course, let you know as soon
as we finalize that date. But as you said, it is widely
available for everybody's use now. But it is important to us
that it work effectively for all the grantees before we
finalize anything.
The intent is that it be used in the future to drive the
prioritization of acquisition from the grants, but not be award
itself. It is not envisioned to make a determination, at this
time, on which grantees are more needy than another grantee, to
make allocations decisions.
We do and will continue to operate under the authorizations
in the Post-Katrina Act and the 9/11 Act that determine those
award amounts.
The idea here is that, as I described earlier, the current
regime is simply one of a jurisdiction having determined their
own strategy a number of years ago, without coordination with
other jurisdictions around the country, and in a way that we,
the Federal Government, on your behalf, and on America's people
behalf, can't understand what a jurisdiction may be done or
what is most important, given some others.
To go back to a question that Congressman Marino had about
the bang for the buck, this is a tool. That is how we got here.
We absolutely have seen a tremendous bang for the buck, beyond
performance measures, in real examples, things like the fact
that in Joplin, after the tornadoes tore through Joplin, this
kind of tragic event, in the past it would have been about 24
to 48 hours before advanced search-and-rescue was on the
ground.
They were done with search-and-rescue by dawn the next
morning, because of capabilities built under this program.
Capabilities in that example that have been quantified under
the National Incident Management System for a number of years,
one of the examples we used in developing that.
The capability estimation tool drives against all the core
capabilities, provides the tool for a jurisdiction to take the
threats and hazards it is facing, contextualize it to their own
community, take the NIMS resource typing--that is what this
tool does--and lets them say, I need this much sheltering
capacity; I need this much mass casualty response; I need this
many SWAT teams, bomb teams, that sort of thing, in a way that
we have never been able to do Nationally before.
Beyond the grants, what is most important to the public, it
provides a planning tool for mutual, to say--for example, say I
am a mid-sized Midwestern city, and I know I have a gap that I
identified through the Capability Estimation Tool. I know I
don't have the resources to fill that gap through acquisitions.
So I know I need to enter into a mutual aid plan with a
neighboring State or a city 4, 5, 6, 8 hours away.
That is not a tool--nobody has been able to do that in a
coordinated way before. We are very excited about the
opportunity.
Mrs. Brooks. Thank you very much. We look forward to seeing
what the final version looks like.
I would like to thank the witnesses.
Or I am sorry. Do you have any further questions?
Mr. Payne. No, ma'am.
Mrs. Brooks. Okay, thank you.
I would like to thank the witnesses for your valuable
testimony. As you said, we are, I believe, since having been
involved in this since 9/11 or shortly after 9/11, when I
became the U.S. attorney--I do believe that over this period of
time, we are quicker. We are better. We are safer for the work
that FEMA has done, and work particularly of the State and
locals, and FEMA's support of the State and locals.
Obviously a lot of progress has been made, and we're
continuing to make the progress. But with tightening Federal
Government resources, that is why it is so important for us to
continue this oversight and continue to ask these questions, to
make sure that the grants that are provided to our State and
local governments are utilized to the best of their
capabilities.
But I think when you mention what happened in Joplin, in
particular, the fact--and you had mentioned earlier, and I am
very pleased to hear that now we have search-and-rescue teams
that can be anywhere within 4 hours, almost anywhere in the
country.
I think that speaks a lot to our enhanced capabilities. But
I think we always are never certain what that next threat will
be coming, and the fact that this country could be attacked
once again, as we were on 9/11. So we have to continue to stay
on top of this, and make sure we are using our resources to the
best of our ability.
So I would like to remind the Members of the committee who
might have additional questions for you, we are going to ask
them to--you may be asked to respond in writing to those who
couldn't be here. Pursuant to Committee Rule 7-E, the hearing
record will be open for the next 10 days.
Without objection, the committee stands adjourned and I
thank you very much.
[Whereupon, at 11:34 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Questions From Chairman Susan W. Brooks for Tim Manning
guidance to states
Question 1. As I am sure you are aware, The Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 requires the
Department's Office of Inspector General (OIG) to audit individual
States' management of State Homeland Security and UASI grants. I have
had the chance to read the latest results of the Indiana and
Massachusetts audits. Both of these reports echoed the findings of
previous audits. Specifically, the OIG maintains that most States have
not developed performance measures to document enhancements to
preparedness resulting from the grant awards. In her written testimony
submitted for today, Ms. Richards stated, ``Without performance
monitoring, States cannot be certain they have met program goals and
used funds to enhance capabilities, rather than wasting them by not
addressing deficiencies.'' Can you please describe some of the things
FEMA is doing to help States update their Homeland Security and Urban
Area Security Initiative Strategies to include more meaningful
performance measures?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
thira
Question 2. Since our hearing almost exactly 1 year ago, FEMA has
released its much-anticipated THIRA guidance. Some early feedback we've
received is that the role of local government officials, local
emergency managers, and first responders is not clear--such as how the
threats and capability gaps identified at the local level will be
included in the State THIRAs submitted to FEMA. In addition, Mr. Gruber
said in his testimony last year before this subcommittee that FEMA's
approach to measuring the effectiveness of grants will be tied to
assessing the achievement of National priorities. My question is, as
you look to evaluate the effectiveness of homeland security grants, how
will you ensure that you are accounting for the benefits, or
deficiencies, realized at the local level, where most of the incidents
occur?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
grants task force
Question 3a. I have learned that FEMA has convened a task force to
evaluate grants management processes and develop a series of
recommendations to improve efficiencies, address gaps, and increase
collaboration across regional and headquarters counterparts and
financial and programmatic counterparts. Mr. Maurer referred to this
task force in his written testimony. Can you please discuss the work of
this task force as well as any recommendations that have come out of
the task force?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3b. If recommendations are not yet available, can you
please provide a time frame for when they might be ready?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
draw-down of grant funds
Question 4. The backlog in the spending of grant funds has been an
issue for years. As of last month, FEMA reported that $5.2 billion in
grant funds from fiscal years 2008 through 2011 has yet to be drawn
down. Obviously, some of these grants are still within their period of
performance, but some of them are well outside that time frame. What
impact has FEMA's limitation on the issuance of extensions had on
grantee's ability to spend grant funds within the prescribed time
limit?
We continue to hear that some reviews, such as the Environmental
and Historic Preservation reviews, are causing delays in grantees'
ability to draw down their funds, despite FEMA's efforts to expedite
these processes. What is FEMA doing to further streamline and expedite
review processes such as these to ensure that projects are in
compliance, but are not delayed? What percentage of grant funds has
been returned to the Treasury due to failure to expend all funds within
the 5-year budgetary requirement?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
collection of project-level information
Question 5a. IG and GAO reviews have noted that FEMA frequently
lacks sufficient information on projects once grant funds leave the
State level. I understand that FEMA is beginning to collect more
project-level information. In their written testimony today, GAO re-
stated that visibility into project-level data was important, ``but
that FEMA had not yet finalized data requirements or fully implemented
the data system to collect the information.'' How will this new
approach provide you with more visibility at the project level so you
can be sure that funds are being used appropriately?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 5b. Is FEMA ready to begin collecting additional project-
level information?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
fema organization
Question 6. Within your organization (Protection and National
Preparedness) are the Grant Programs Directorate and the National
Preparedness Assessment Division. The National Preparedness Assessment
Division has the responsibility for developing measures and metrics for
these grants. However, grants measurement seems to be handled by FEMA's
policy shop. Why is grants measurement completed by a different
division than that which develops grant policy and makes grant awards?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question from Chairman Susan W. Brooks for Anne L. Richards
examples of measures and metrics
Question. Has either of you (GAO and/or IG) seen examples of other
agencies within the Federal Government--or maybe oven at a State and
local level--that is able to effectively measure grants? Can you please
describe those to us?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Chairman Susan W. Brooks for David C. Maurer
examples of measures and metrics
Question 1. Has either of you (GAO and/or IG) seen examples of
other agencies within the Federal Government--or maybe oven at a State
and local level--that is able to effectively measure grants? Can you
please describe those to us?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
capability assessment
Question 2a. GAO has repeatedly expressed concerns regarding FEMA's
inability to assess National preparedness capabilities. In September
and November 2011, FEMA issued the National Preparedness Goal and
System, respectively, and in May 2012, FEMA issued its National
Preparedness Report. To what extent do you think FEMA defines the
capability requirements necessary for National preparedness?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2b. To what extent do you think FEMA's 2012 National
Preparedness Report addresses GAO's historical concerns regarding the
assessment of National capability gaps against National capability
requirements?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2c. Given the work that has been completed to date, what
remains to be done, in your view, to address GAO's historical concerns?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.