[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 113-51]
ACQUISITION AND DEVELOPMENT
CHALLENGES ASSOCIATED WITH
THE LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND
PROJECTION FORCES
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
JULY 25, 2013
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia, Chairman
K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
DUNCAN HUNTER, California JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi RICK LARSEN, Washington
ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr.,
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado Georgia
JON RUNYAN, New Jersey COLLEEN W. HANABUSA, Hawaii
KRISTI L. NOEM, South Dakota DEREK KILMER, Washington
PAUL COOK, California SCOTT H. PETERS, California
David Sienicki, Professional Staff Member
Vickie Plunkett, Professional Staff Member
Nicholas Rodman, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2013
Page
Hearing:
Thursday, July 25, 2013, Acquisition and Development Challenges
Associated with the Littoral Combat Ship....................... 1
Appendix:
Thursday, July 25, 2013.......................................... 41
----------
THURSDAY, JULY 25, 2013
ACQUISITION AND DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES ASSOCIATED WITH THE LITTORAL
COMBAT SHIP
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Courtney, Hon. Joe, a Representative from Connecticut,
Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces................. 3
Forbes, Hon. J. Randy, a Representative from Virginia, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces................. 1
WITNESSES
Francis, Paul L., Managing Director, Acquisition and Sourcing
Management, U.S. Government Accountability Office.............. 9
Hunt, VADM Richard W., USN, Director, Navy Staff, Department of
Defense........................................................ 4
Stackley, Hon. Sean J., Assistant Secretary of the Navy
(Research, Development and Acquisition), Department of Defense. 6
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Forbes, Hon. J. Randy........................................ 45
Francis, Paul L.............................................. 62
Stackley, Hon. Sean J., joint with VADM Richard W. Hunt...... 47
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Forbes................................................... 77
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Forbes................................................... 81
Mr. Langevin................................................. 83
Mr. McKeon................................................... 81
Ms. Speier................................................... 89
Mr. Wittman.................................................. 84
ACQUISITION AND DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES ASSOCIATED WITH THE LITTORAL
COMBAT SHIP
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces,
Washington, DC, Thursday, July 25, 2013.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:30 a.m., in
room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. J. Randy Forbes
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. J. RANDY FORBES, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND
PROJECTION FORCES
Mr. Forbes. I want to welcome all our Members and our
distinguished panel of experts to today's hearing that will
focus on the acquisition and development challenges associated
with the Littoral Combat Ship [LCS].
Concurrent with our hearing this morning, the Government
Accountability Office [GAO] released a report entitled
``Significant Investments in the Littoral Combat Ship Continue
Amid Substantial Unknowns about Capabilities, Use and Cost.''
In this report GAO expresses concern about the design stability
of the platform and concern about the program goals of the
mission modules. Until these issues are clarified, GAO has
recommended Congress consider restricting future funding to the
program for the construction of additional seaframes until
certain conditions are met.
This is not the first time that we have received reports
critical of the LCS program. The Perez report was a report
commissioned by the Vice Chief of Naval Operations to assess
and review the Navy readiness to receive, employ, and deploy
the Littoral Combat Ship. This report, conducted in early 2012,
was also critical of the LCS program both in terms of concepts
and implementation. Specific concerns included in this report
include the concept of operations, manning, maintenance,
modularity, mission package capability, training, and
commonality were identified.
The Director, Operational Testing and Evaluation [DOT&E]
has also expressed concerns about the survivability of the
Littoral Combat Ship and indicated that LCS 1 is not expected
to be survivable in combat, and unable to maintain mission
capability after taking a significant hit in a hostile combat
environment. The testing program associated with this first
class is also lagging.
I would be remiss if I did not mention the engineering
casualties that LCS 1 is encountering during the deployment to
Singapore. While expected in the first class, the sheer number
of casualties associated with LCS 1 is troubling and needs to
be quickly addressed. At a time of reducing resources, the Navy
is planning to even more heavily rely on this lower cost
alternative. I believe it is incumbent on this subcommittee to
ensure that we have the most capable lower cost alternative
that is relevant to the combatant commanders in time of
conflict.
I also believe that criticism of the LCS program is
warranted. From this most recent GAO report to the Perez
report, and even DOT&E assessment, they all provide an
alternative view as to how to best manage the acquisition and
development of this effort. But let me emphasize that none of
these reports disputes the necessity to rapidly field the
capabilities proposed by the Littoral Combat Ship, and I look
forward to doing my part to make sure that we methodically and
expeditiously field the right LCS capability to the fleet in
the years ahead.
Today we are honored to have as our witnesses the Assistant
Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and
Acquisition, the Honorable Sean Stackley--Mr. Stackley, thank
you for being here and for your dedication to our country; the
Director of the Navy Staff and Chairman of the Littoral Combat
Ship Council, Vice Admiral Richard Hunt, and, Admiral Hunt, we
thank you for your service to this country and for taking time
to be with us today; and the Managing Director of Acquisition
and Sourcing Management, Government Accountability Office, Mr.
Paul Francis. And, Mr. Francis, thank you and your entire team
for the good work that they do in bringing these issues
forward.
And we thank you all for being here. I couldn't think of a
better panel to assist our subcommittee in reviewing this
issue, and I hope that at the end of this hearing, that we will
be best able to provide a firm direction as to the path forward
with the LCS program.
And before I recognize Mr. Courtney, I want to just make
one other comment, and it is this: I hear from time to time
people saying, well, isn't this really problematic, because we
have a difference within the Navy even about the LCS; that we
have people that are raising different issues, and they are not
on the same sheet of music? And I want to just tell you all I
take a totally different view of that. I want to applaud you
all for being able to come to the table, having divergent
points of view, being willing to really ask the tough questions
and put them on the table, and I think that is what makes our
Navy so strong and capable is our ability to do that. So I just
want to thank you all for your willingness to not come in here
in an adversarial role where each person has to put forward
their own side, but that we can really ask these tough
questions and get answers, because in the end we want the best
vessels for our Navy and for the American people, and I want to
applaud you all for trying to do that.
And after saying that, it is my privilege now to recognize
the acting ranking member, I guess we would say today, or the
vice ranking member Mr. Courtney, someone who is very committed
to the Navy, and for any remarks that he might have. Mr.
Courtney.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Forbes can be found in the
Appendix on page 45.]
STATEMENT OF HON. JOE COURTNEY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
CONNECTICUT, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
organizing this hearing. And I couldn't agree with you more. We
have an outstanding panel here today, who have been here in the
past to talk about this issue over the last number of years,
and, again, we look forward to an update, particularly in light
of the GAO report.
Today the subcommittee meets in open session to hear
testimony on the acquisition and development challenges
associated with the Littoral Combat Ship. The LCS is a critical
element of the Navy's long-term shipbuilding plan and our
national security strategy. However, 9 years into the program,
many of us on this subcommittee and many of our colleagues in
the House have serious questions regarding the LCS concept of
operations; its manning, maintenance, and sustainment concepts;
and its survivability in a combat environment. Given how
critical this platform is to the Navy's ability to meet
critical-mission areas in the decades ahead, it is important
that we get this right.
Based on the Navy's assurances that its revised acquisition
strategy would provide an affordable transformational ship for
the future, Congress agreed to funding additional LCS seaframes
at the same time that the Navy continued its planned period of
experimentation, testing, and evaluation. Now, however, we find
a program facing cost growth, schedule delays, and problems
with delivering intended capabilities, as GAO noted in their
report released today. These issues and others lead us to
examine where the program stands now, where it is heading, and
what steps all of us here today can do to ensure its success.
The GAO's report that we will discuss today raises several
important questions that the Navy and this panel will need to
sort out. For instance, is proceeding with procurement of so
many seaframes so far ahead of availability of the
antisubmarine, mine countermeasure, and surface warfare mission
modules the best and most cost-effective approach?
Second, with regards to the GAO's recommendation that
Congress halt progress on future ships pending further study
and oversight, what impact would such an approach have on
existing contracts and ongoing efforts to reduce costs?
Third, is it good fiscal judgment and sea-building practice
to continue with the planned purchase of seaframes over the
next 2 to 3 fiscal years when design changes that could result
from further developmental and operational testing and
evaluation could drive up costs?
With regards to recent news from the LCS deployment in
Singapore, how should Congress respond to the reliability
issues with the Freedom's variant diesel engines, which have
experienced multiple instances of loss of power during
deployments?
Finally, given the expertise and experience of our
witnesses today, I hope you can help us put the challenges of
this LCS in proper historical context relative to those
experienced in other shipbuilding programs in the earlier
years. Ultimately this panel will have to make some tough
choices in the coming years regarding the right balance between
getting the fleet, the platforms, and capability it so urgently
needs, while ensuring that we do all we can as good stewards of
our increasingly limited fiscal resources. I look forward to
hearing from our witnesses and to a robust discussion of this
important program.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. Courtney.
Just a couple of procedural matters. I ask unanimous
consent that nonsubcommittee members, if any, be allowed to
participate in today's hearing after all subcommittee members
have had an opportunity to ask questions. Is there any
objection?
Without objection, nonsubcommittee members will be
recognized at the appropriate time for 5 minutes.
I also ask unanimous consent that other committee and
noncommittee members be allowed to participate in today's
hearing after all subcommittee members have had an opportunity
to ask questions. Is there any objection to that?
Without objection, nonsubcommittee members will be
recognized at the appropriate times for 5 minutes.
With that, Secretary, we are glad to have you here, and we
are going to give you the floor.
Secretary Stackley. Mr. Chairman Forbes, Representative
Courtney, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you
for the opportunity to appear before you today alongside Vice
Admiral Hunt to address the Littoral Combat Ship program. With
the permission of the subcommittee, I propose to provide a
brief statement and submit a separate formal statement for the
record.
Mr. Forbes. And your written statements of all the
witnesses will be made part of the record.
Secretary Stackley. Thank you, sir.
In view of the witnesses today, myself and Vice Admiral
Hunt, I am going to ask that Vice Admiral Hunt provide his
statement first to address the need for LCS in terms of
requirements, and I will follow to talk about where we are
programmatically and our proposal for the way ahead.
Mr. Forbes. And we are happy to do that. Admiral, as we
mentioned at the beginning, we appreciate your service. Thank
you for being here, and we would like to turn the floor over to
you then right now.
STATEMENT OF VADM RICHARD W. HUNT, USN, DIRECTOR, NAVY STAFF,
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Admiral Hunt. Thank you, Chairman Forbes.
Mr. Forbes. Admiral, if you could pull that mike just a
little bit closer. I know they are kind of tricky sometimes.
Make sure it is turned on.
Admiral Hunt. How about this?
Mr. Forbes. That is great.
Admiral Hunt. Chairman Forbes, distinguished members of the
subcommittee and other distinguished Members, first of all, I
want to thank you for holding this hearing on the Littoral
Combat Ship, and I appreciate the opening statements. It is
exactly where we want to go is take this to the next level and
make sure we have got the right program for the fleet, and I am
personally confident that we do.
In my years in the Navy, I have had the honor of serving as
a numbered fleet commander. I was the 3rd Fleet commander that
took delivery of USS Freedom several years ago. I have been the
Surface Force Type commander, which is responsible for man
training and equipment of all of our surface Navy ships. I have
had command of a frigate; I have had command of a cruiser; a
strike group command. But perhaps most insightful for the
hearing that we are having today is I was a precommissioning
engineer on USS Underwood, FFG-36, and lived the life of
introducing a new ship class to the fleet with the challenges
that that brings.
I think really the grouping of those past experiences give
me a kind of a unique perspective to address the topic that we
are looking at today.
The Littoral Combat Ship provides our Navy with vitally
important capabilities and is key to the future of all naval
operations. LCS, with its speed, shallow draft, and
persistence, coupled with the modular architecture, offers the
ability to operate in the inshore environment and the near-land
battlespace. It will take us to improve our Navy's global reach
further than we have today. Its affordable and its
reconfigurable mission--focused-mission warship design is core
to handling the swarming surface threat, the countermine
challenges that we have, and submarines in the contested
littorals. LCS meets that threat today and has the flexibility
to continue to improve and face upcoming threats in the future.
We certainly intend to take LCS into harm's way. LCS is a
warship that has credible combat systems. If damaged in combat,
she is built to survive and then withdraw. In terms of aviation
and unmanned system, this ship has more aviation and off-board
vehicle capability than any surface combatant of comparable
size in the world.
I want to be clear on this fact: LCS will deploy with
effective mission modules. Each of LCS's three mission
modules--the antisurface warfare, the mine countermeasures, and
antisubmarine warfare--offers credible combat power greater
than what we have today.
With that in mind, I would like to give just a quick
thumbnail sketch of these capabilities. I would offer I have
had the opportunity to talk to all of our forward fleet
commanders, the 7th Fleet commander in the western Pacific, the
5th Fleet commander in the Gulf, and the 6th Fleet commander in
the Mediterranean, and what I am about to say they all agree
with and recognize the importance.
For the antisurface warfare capability, we provide an armed
SH-60 Romeo helicopter. We will eventually provide Fire Scout
VTUAV [Vertical Take-Off and Landing Tactical Unmanned Aerial
Vehicle]. It comes with two highly effective 30-millimeter
cannons, and that supplements the core 57-millimeter main gun.
This gives LCS a capability that is equal to or exceeds any of
our small combatants that we have today.
The package additionally includes two 11-meter RHIBs, which
are rigid hull inflatable boats, and comes with a dedicated
boarding team when configured in this manner. The 11-meter
RHIBs are a great enhancement over the 7-meter RHIBs that we
have predominantly in the fleet and allow us to conduct
maritime interdiction operations in antipiracy actions, a point
made very specifically to me the other day by our 5th Fleet
commander.
For mine countermeasures [MCM], the initial increment will
be about twice as effective as what we have on our MCM-1 class
Avenger mine sweeps, and it comes with more precise sonar
capability for rapid hunting and, therefore, avoiding of mines,
which is clearly where we are going in the 5th Fleet AOR [area
of responsibility]. As we go through the enhancements, the
capability will expand to about three times the capability of
what we currently have in inventory, and we do that without
putting the ship and, therefore, our sailors into the
minefield, enhancing their safety.
And finally, our antisubmarine warfare capabilities are
equally impressive. It comes both with passive and active towed
arrays and variable-depth sonars to provide a tremendous
capability not only where we could escort our battle groups at
sea, but specifically designed to be effective in the littoral.
So we have really developed and produced a terrific
capability. It is the right thing to do, and I stand forward
looking forward to your questions here as we go throughout the
hearing.
Thank you.
[The joint prepared statement of Admiral Hunt and Secretary
Stackley can be found in the Appendix on page 47.]
Mr. Forbes. Admiral, thank you. I am sure the Members are
going to look forward to asking you a number of questions in
just a few moments.
And, Mr. Secretary, tell us the status of the program now.
We know the admiral has told us why we need it, and let us hear
where we are going.
STATEMENT OF HON. SEAN J. STACKLEY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE
NAVY (RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND ACQUISITION), DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir. Yes, sir, thank you.
And I am going to start by putting this in the context of
the overall shipbuilding requirements. So I will start with the
fact that today's Navy is a battle force of 286 ships, about
half of which are underway on any given day, providing maritime
security, missile defense, intelligence, surveillance,
reconnaissance as needed, where needed. They are conducting
antipiracy patrols, global partnership stations, humanitarian
assistance, and all the while they are training and repairing
for the next deployment, the next operation.
And whether measured by the breadth and pace of today's
operations or by the defense strategy's call for increased
naval presence from the Middle East to the Pacific, the broad
range of missions your Navy is called upon to perform relies
upon a fleet that--as outlined by the CNO [Chief of Naval
Operations] in his report to Congress earlier this year--a
fleet that is globally present, operating forward, a fleet made
of a balanced mix of ships, a fleet that is 306 ships in
number.
The Navy's objective to reach the 300-ship level by the end
of this decade is more an imperative than a goal if your fleet
is to meet the missions called for by the Nation, while
sustaining the operational tempo that we have all grown to
expect of our ships and sailors. This requires that we build
that balanced mix of ships per the CNO's requirements at a rate
of about 10 ships per year, and that we not merely control
costs, but that we drive down costs in each of our new
construction programs.
The Littoral Combat Ship, or LCS, is central to this
strategy. The LCS's high speed and low draft design make the
ship uniquely qualified for operations ranging from open ocean
to coastal or littoral waters. The investment in automated
systems and low-maintenance design make the ship capable of
operations at manning levels of less than half that of the
ships she will replace. The seaframe designed to naval vessel
rules with an installed combat system capable of meeting the
ship's self-defense requirements provides a level of
survivability matched to the threat in which she will operate.
And, most importantly, the modular mission package design, call
it flexibility, call it agility, the LCS's ability to put to
sea with a warfare system and crew tailored to meet its
assigned mission is a classic force multiplier.
Today three distinct mission packages are in development
and testing: surface warfare mission package designed to meet
the emerging threat proposed by fast inshore attack craft; mine
countermeasures mission package designed to close a critical,
absolutely critical, warfighting gap in mine warfare; and an
antisubmarine warfare mission package designed to provide
greater capacity to combat the growing threat posed by the
proliferation of increasingly quiet attack submarines.
Each of these mission packages has made significant strides
this past year towards respective operational test milestones.
In fact, today the USS Freedom, LCS 1, deployed to the western
Pacific with the first increment of the surface warfare mission
package on board, is meeting the combatant commander's demands
in that theater of operations. Meanwhile, the USS Independence,
LCS 2, operating in her home port of San Diego, is serving as
the operational test ship for the first increment of the mine
countermeasures mission package and soon will be joined by the
USS Fort Worth, LCS 3, operating with the developmental model
of the next increment of the surface warfare mission package.
The Navy's strategy for delivering of these mission modules
is a textbook case of best practices. First, the mission
modules are designed with an open architecture, which provides
the ability to upgrade rapidly as new technologies emerge, and
which provides the ability to compete future upgrades
throughout the ship's life.
Second, mission modules are integrated into the ship via
standard interfaces, which means that upgrades to the mission
modules are accomplished without impacting the ship. This
breakthrough design approach provides the LCS with the unique
ability to upgrade its mission systems without lengthy, costly,
disruptive depot modernization periods required by other ship
classes.
Third, mission modules can be rapidly swapped out if called
for by a change to the ship's anticipated mission.
And fourth, employing these design characteristics, the
Navy is able to field mission packages utilizing an incremental
fielding plan that manages risks, while providing urgently
needed capability and capacity.
Specifically, by leveraging mature technologies and off-
the-shelf systems, the first increments of LCS mission packages
provide much-needed capacity, exceeding that available in the
fleet today. Meanwhile we continue to develop new technologies
and systems needed to fill gaps in today's warfighting
capabilities for incorporation in later increments.
Today the mission packages are on track to deliver the
capability needed by the Navy, and they are doing so within the
cost targets established for the program. In fact, the greatest
risk to our mission package program is not technical. Today the
greatest risk is that posed by the disruption and delay caused
by stop and start, and slowdown caused by continuing
resolutions, sequestration, and other budget reductions.
With specific regard to LCS ship or seaframe production,
lessons learned from the lead ships have been thoroughly
incorporated into the production plan. Lead ship design
deficiencies have been corrected, and the design is very
stable, very stable, with design changes reduced by 80 to 90
percent in follow ships.
The significant facility improvements and investment in
workforce training made by each shipyard has resulted in
greatly improved efficiency in each ship's construction. The
vendor base is leveraging the stability provided by the long-
term LCS contract to drive down costs. By every measure quality
is high, meeting and exceeding standards set by the Naval Sea
Systems Command and the Navy's Board of Inspection and Survey,
and overall the dual-block buy, contracts for 10 ships over 5
years at each of the shipbuilders, is delivering on the $2.9
billion savings announced at award.
In summary, LCS provides the capacity the Navy needs today
to fill critical gaps in our warfighting ability, and as we
continue to field future increments of LCS mission packages, we
will be able to provide much-needed capabilities that do not
exist in the fleet today.
The LCS program was initiated with critical flaws, we are
all aware of that; however, current execution of the LCS
program is following best practices in acquisition. Holding
requirements stable, holding the design stable, leveraging
competition to the fullest, our costs are under control and
greatly improved, and contained within fixed-price contracts.
Risk is well managed by leveraging mature technologies and
employing an incremental approach to upgrading the program's
modular mission systems. Now is not the time to slow the
program and add costs.
We have decisions to make before we proceed in fiscal year
2016 beyond the current block buy. We will take a fully
informed business and warfighting-based approach to these
decisions, and we are committed to working with Congress to
provide transparency as we formulate these decisions.
This is our most affordable warship program. It is on a
critical path to meeting the Navy's force structure
requirements as outlined by the Chief of Naval Operations.
There are challenges yet ahead, and there is need for further
improvement, as there is in each of our shipbuilding and
aviation programs, but we believe we have properly assessed
these challenges, and we are going about the business of
meeting these challenges with a degree of rigor and discipline
and, too, urgency matched to the critical need for these ships
in the fleet.
We thank you for your past support, we urge your continued
support, we welcome your oversight, and we look forward to
answering your questions.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
[The joint prepared statement of Secretary Stackley and
Admiral Hunt can be found in the Appendix on page 47.]
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Francis.
STATEMENT OF PAUL L. FRANCIS, MANAGING DIRECTOR, ACQUISITION
AND SOURCING MANAGEMENT, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Mr. Francis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Courtney, members of the subcommittee and
other Members, good morning. And I am happy to be here to
participate in the discussion of the Littoral Combat Ship. I
think we are all well aware of the unique capabilities and
features that the ship offers, and I think we would all like to
see the ship reach its full potential. I will give you a quick
snapshot of where we see the program today in terms of
seaframes, mission modules, and the concept of operations.
I think of the three, the seaframes are the furthest along,
and I would agree with what Mr. Stackley said about the
production of the ships being under control, costs being under
control; I think design in pretty good shape. There is
significant testing yet to be done, shock trials and
survivability trials, and then testing out the combat system,
and the Navy is looking at some design changes for the future,
doing some studies on that. So we will need to see the effects
of those.
On the mission modules, they have had a much tougher go of
it. They have not done that well in testing. There is quite a
bit to go yet on the mission modules, and I wouldn't say that
the configuration of the modules, particularly regarding the
mine countermeasures, is stable at this point.
I think the long pole in the tent right now is the concept
of operations, which involves the manning, the swapping out of
the mission modules in theater, and the maintenance support
concept, which is basically off the ship and on shore. The ship
itself is not going to have much onboard maintenance
capability. And while I see the seaframes and the modules as
giving the ship its technical ability, it is really the CONOPS
[concept of operations] that give it its capability. So those
abilities won't be able to be brought to bear unless the
support of the ship works. So at this point I think one can be
hopeful, but not yet confident that the ship is going to
deliver on its full capability.
Let me switch now briefly to oversight. In my view, the
primary oversight mechanisms that we applied to major weapons
systems have not been applied on the LCS program, and let me
give you some examples. When a program starts, you would do
typically an analysis of alternatives and then pick the best
alternative. In the case of LCS, the ship was picked first, and
then the analysis of alternatives done afterwards.
In shipbuilding you have a sequence where you do design,
and then you do construction. When we started LCS, we did
design and construction concurrently.
In shipbuilding you have a Milestone B decision that
authorizes the detailed design and construction of the lead
ship. When we had Milestone B on the LCS, we had already 24
ships under contract. On the mission modules, those are weapons
systems, Milestone B on a weapons system authorizes the
beginning of engineering development. Now, we haven't had a
Milestone B on mission modules yet, but two of them are already
in production.
And then finally, law and policy says before you go into
full-rate production, a program has to go through operational
testing. I would say that the LCS today is in full-rate
production. We authorized four ships a year in 2012, which is
the full rate anticipated, yet operational testing is not going
to occur until 2019.
So, in my view, the strategy up to this point on LCS has
been buy before fly, and at this point we are producing at full
rate, yet we are still experimenting with the ship. I think the
Department of Defense has instituted a number of mechanisms to
try to do reviews, cost studies, Defense Acquisition Board
reviews every year, but I believe, in my view, that these are
workarounds for the oversight mechanisms that were not used.
So what do we do now? I think we have to look at the
program the way it is. It is a ship in full-rate production,
but its operational effectiveness will not be demonstrated for
years to come. That is where we are. We have to look at the
ship today as being substantially bought already, so you are
going to have to provide the support it requires, whether it is
crew changes, whether it is mission module updates, whether it
is additional spares. We already know we need additional
manning on shore to do the offshore maintenance. So you will
have to provide that for the ships already done.
In my mind, the report we have issued today makes rather
modest recommendations on the program. We say, put strings on
the fiscal year 2014 money, and have the Navy come back and
tell you what design changes are we anticipating on the ship.
We also ask the Navy to come back and say--to tell you what are
the relative advantages and disadvantages of each ship as they
perform each mission. Now, the Navy is already doing studies on
these. It should be pretty easy to do, and you ought to know
it, so I don't see that as halting the program. These are
things I think the Navy could do as a condition for getting the
money.
We have also made other recommendations that would be
relevant to the 2016 block buy. This is the next block of
ships. It is a very big decision coming up. What we have
recommended is keep the production of the ships to a minimum
rate during that block buy at least until we get through
operational testing, and in line with that, we say, hey, keep
the mission modules' production rate minimum so--just enough to
support testing.
Now, the Department does not agree with us on that and
says, hey, we are in full rate, we are making four a year, we
have great prices. If we slow it down, prices are going to go
up, and we have to produce the mission modules to keep pace
with the ships. I would just ask you to be wary of that dynamic
because it creates, in my mind, irreversible momentum to go
forward and can tie your hands. So just be wary of that.
So what can you do? I think about you having a very good
window for oversight over the next 2 years. In spring of 2015,
you will have to consider the Navy's proposal for the 2016
block buy, so your dates actually come a little bit faster than
you might otherwise think. At that point I think you can employ
some of the mechanisms that we have recommended on the 2014 and
2015 buy to get the Navy to provide you information that you
need to make the decisions on those two ships, and I would pay
particular attention to what the Navy proposes for the block
2016 buy. For example, if that proposal came in for a large
number of ships or a number of ships that, say, went beyond
operational testing, then I think your hands really could be
tied in oversight because we will have locked in the bulk of
the program.
So in closing I would say you have some leverage between
now and the spring of 2015. Use it. And I wouldn't be too
overcome by concerns that this is going to be devastating to
the program. I don't think it is.
So, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Courtney, that concludes my remarks.
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Francis, thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Francis can be found in the
Appendix on page 62.]
Mr. Forbes. And to all of our panelists, we want to just
tell you how much again we appreciate you being here. We also
understand you represent large teams behind you. As we thank
you, we are also thanking the professionalism that they bring
today.
I want to just tell you, today is not a deposition, so we
don't want to have a situation we are asking questions, and you
feel like you have to get out without answering anything in a
short period of time. We want you to have that discussion.
I am going to defer all of my questions because this is one
of the most bipartisan subcommittees probably we have in
Congress. We have enormous respect for each other. A lot of
expertise represented in this room today. I want to make sure
all of our Members can ask their questions.
With that, I would like to ask unanimous consent that we
can reduce our time from 5 minutes to 4 minutes, because I
think we have votes sit at 11 o'clock coming up, and I want to
make sure we can get as many Members in as possible. I think
Mr. Courtney has agreed to that. Is there any objection to
that? If not, we will reduce our time to 4 minutes.
I will ask maybe some questions in between just to link up
with the previous questions. If any of you want to comment,
just let me know, give me a signal. We want to make sure you
get whatever you need on the record.
With that, I would like to go first to my good friend Mr.
Courtney for his questions.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and, again, I know
we have a lot of attendance here today, so I am going to try to
keep my questions very brief and succinct.
Again just, Mr. Stackley, I was wondering if you could just
kind of help us sort of understand the study suggestion that
came out of GAO where they, again, suggested to Congress that
we restrict funding until studies have been complete. Are these
studies actually under way? Are they close to being finished, I
mean? And what do you see as the impact; is it neutral or is it
significant if such a restriction was put into place, again
just on the studies?
Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir. So first on the studies.
Every shipbuilding program that we have got we have got ongoing
studies in terms of looking at what further capabilities do we
need to bring to the ship, what is the cost associated with
bringing that capability, what is the impact to the program,
and then what is the best way for incorporating those upgrades
if it is determined that the cost is well worth the added
capability?
So specifically for the LCS program, I would characterize
we have three not so much studies, but we are doing three looks
at the program. First is the continuation of correction of
deficiencies. You know, we have the first ship out on
deployment, and one of the things that we are gaining from that
deployment is lessons learned in terms of extended persistent
operations in theater, what do we need to do different going
forward to improve its performance.
Chairman Forbes, in your statement you made reference to
the SSDGs [ship service diesel generators]. That is probably
the most significant design deficiency that we are dealing with
today. We do have reliability issues that we have identified,
we have fixes in place on the follow ships, and as LCS 1
continues its deployment, we will be incorporating those fixes
on LCS 1 to address that issue. So there are correction of
deficiencies that are ongoing.
The second is I will call it commonality. We want to
achieve greater commonality with fleet standard systems and
across the class, so we are looking at two areas in which
commonality have big bang for the buck. One is what we call
C4I, or our command, control, communications information
systems; and the second is in the combat system itself.
So we have done studies in terms of what alternatives we
would look at. The open architecture design of the LCS gives us
great ability to bring forward those type of upgrades without
significant disruption to the platform, and now we are going at
looking at the specific details in terms of what changes would
be required to the platform, what timeframe makes sense to do
that, and what is the associated cost.
So, for example, we look at the fiscal year 2016
procurement as that would be a likely time to incorporate
upgrades in that regard. We do this very thoughtfully, we do it
through a configuration steering board, we go through the rigor
of the design and the cost estimating, and we work with the
shipbuilders to ensure it does not set us backwards.
The third area would be in the mission modules themselves.
As I described in my opening statement, what we are doing today
is we are leveraging off-the-shelf technologies for the early
increments, and we are also continuing with development of new
technologies. In that development of new technologies arena, we
have had a couple of setbacks. We have relied on systems that
were either being procured by one of the other services that we
were going to leverage, specifically the non-line-of-sight
missile that the Army was producing or developing to produce.
They have cancelled that program, so we are moving on with the
development of an alternative surface-to-surface mission module
capability for a future LCS increment.
So those are the three types of studies that are ongoing,
and we are doing this in broad daylight. We are not doing this
behind closed doors. We are doing it in broad daylight. We
welcome the oversight, we welcome the insight that we can
provide to you all, because we are going to be coming back to
you at least annually with a budget to discuss and propose
future investments in those regards.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you.
And just one other sort of housekeeping question. Again,
the GAO recommendation was to buy sort of a minimum quantity of
ships to preserve the industrial base until full production--
full-rate production design decision is made. In the Navy's
response you state that the Navy plans to buy LCS seaframes in
accordance with the most recent long-range shipbuilding plan.
So I guess the question is, again, in your testimony you
said we are building four a year right now, but the
shipbuilding plan, when we checked that, it was two a year for
2016 and 2018. Again, is that the number for those years, two?
Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir. Yes, sir. So both the
shipbuilding plan and the President's budget that was submitted
for 2014 FYDP [Future Years Defense Program], we continue with
the block buy through 2015, which is four per year, and the
budget and the long-range plan lays up a reduction to two per
year.
So let me go to the specific, the second half of your
question, which is, well, what would the impact be of slowing
down the program, taking a pause, or delaying in 2014 while we
continue to do further studies? Well, the impact would be many-
fold. First, there is going to be an impact to the fleet
because the fleet needs the capability, and this is delaying
getting the capability out there.
Second, there is an impact associated with the cost to the
program. Any delay in any shipbuilding program is going to have
a cost impact, and so we have to decide, is it worth that
impact. As I described, we believe that the seaframe production
is very stable. We are going forward with off-the-shelf
technologies on the mission packages, which we are developing.
So to delay the fiscal year 2014 ships, which would be
delivering in the 2017, 2018 timeframe, to await completion of
later increments developmental testing, I think that is going
in the absolute wrong direction. We will be incurring
unnecessary added cost on the program associated with that
disruption. What we would rather be doing is sitting down with
Congress as we submit future budgets and walking through in
great detail exactly where we are, why we believe this is the
exact right thing to do for the Navy and the Nation, and look
for your support in that regard.
Third impact beyond just the loss of the capability and the
added cost is the industrial base. Both of these shipbuilders
have done an outstanding job of responding to the issues and
the failures on the lead ship to train up a skilled crew, to
make investments in their facilities, to hit the targets that
we set with the block buy, and right now they are getting up on
the governor for steady-state production. Again, to insert a
pause, a break in that production in the shipbuilding program
is going to have impact not just to the cost, but to that
workforce, that skilled workforce, that we have got in place. I
do not recommend that.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you.
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Francis, you wanted to respond to that?
Mr. Francis. Yes, sir. Thank you.
I think the things Mr. Stackley just talked about, the
studies they are doing, I think that is basically the essence
of our recommendation, to come back and tell you what they have
in mind and when, and recall that the seaframe is doing well
now because it is coming down its learning curve. So of real
importance would be are we considering any design changes for
the 2016 block that could interrupt that learning curve and
maybe change prices?
So that is the essence of our recommendation. The Navy has
until March before it actually gets that next block under way.
I think there is plenty of time. So I don't envision a scenario
where the 2014 buy actually gets held up pending these studies.
I think the Navy could in pretty good time give you the
information you need.
And then on the shipbuilding plan, the numbers are going
on, as Mr. Stackley said, from 2016 on, are less than four
ships a year, so I don't know if there is a down select
envisioned out there. If there isn't, then that rate would
comport with our other recommendations, which is keep the rate
at--the minimum sustained rate would be between two and three
ships a year until operational testing. So we might be in
violent agreement.
Mr. Forbes. Okay, thank you.
Gentlemen----
Secretary Stackley. I would like to have that----
Mr. Forbes. Oh, sure, yeah.
Secretary Stackley. I would like to have that on the
record: GAO said they are in agreement with the Navy.
Mr. Forbes. Notice he said ``violent agreement.''
Mr. Runyan is recognized for 4 minutes.
Mr. Runyan. Thank you, Chairman.
Mr. Stackley kind of answered my first question about
increased costs, but the next one kind of deals with it also,
too. Admiral Hunt, talking about the Freedom getting back
underway less than a day after a generator issue, is that
problem more systemic, and does it increase the costs of future
ships to fix it?
Admiral Hunt. I think the most recent casualties that we
have had to Freedom are things that you get in normal
operations, quite frankly. So we have a first of, you know,
ship out there going through the paces. It is one of the
reasons why we wanted to get Freedom on deployment out there in
a real-world operating situation as quickly as we did.
I am very encouraged in the fact that the maintenance team
in place is able to take these casualties, repair them in
stride, and get the ship back under way. I would be more
concerned if we had casualties that we found were surprising
us, we didn't have the right ILS [integrated logistics
support], the logistic support, in place, and we had big
delays. We have not seen that.
So this is, first of all, I think, expected. You know, one
of the things that we have asked is we have gone back and, to
put some historical context in this, taken a look at the FFG-7
program, the Arleigh Burke program, Ticonderoga. I may have the
exact timeframe wrong, but Arleigh Burke when she first
deployed, I think, ended up in a shipyard overseas in the
Mediterranean for almost 2 months. We are not seeing that kind
of stuff at all.
So I think we do have a good program in place, and we are
adapting. We are learning, and we are putting the things that
we learn straight into follow-on ships in a very useful way.
Secretary Stackley. Sir, can I add to that?
Mr. Runyan. Sure.
Secretary Stackley. Specifically with regard to the ship
service diesel generators, first the requirement. Those
generators are required to perform at 800 hours of operation
between failures. Today what our experience is is 450 hours
between failures. So that is the symptom of the problem. We
have three known issues, one associated with the governor on
the generator, one associated with the cooler that goes with
the generator, and one associated with the size of the piping
that is associated with coolant flow. There are fixes for all
three. They are not all incorporated in LCS 1 today, but they
are all being incorporated on the follow ships of that variant.
So today we are working through these interruptions in terms of
the ship's operations, if you will, to incorporate these
failures. We have got to fix that.
The good news is that the ship is designed with four diesel
generators. It requires two under operations plus one in stand-
by, so there is redundancy in the system to overcome some of
the shortfall in the operational availability, and there are
fixes in place, and those fixes are largely contained to that
package unit that shows up from the vendor, and they are being
incorporated by the vendor. So the impact on the ship side will
be minimized.
Mr. Runyan. Thank you.
And I don't know if Mr. Francis can answer this question,
but I think it is kind of--I won't use the phrase
``problematic,'' but it is something I think we are walking
down when you talk about our acquisition process. I think
another member of the Armed Services Committee, Ms. Duckworth,
raises a question about concurrency in, you know, development.
Are we kind of walking down the same path with the LCS as the
F-35 in that realm and kind of don't know what the future
holds?
Mr. Francis. Mr. Runyan, I think there are some
similarities there. I mean, it has been concurrent. I think
problems with the generator that we just talked about, I don't
think you minimize those, but I think these are things that the
Navy is going to solve, you know. I don't think those are show
stoppers.
But I think the discussion we are having today with 24
ships under contract and a number delivered and under
construction, I think, sets a little different context. If we
were talking about what don't we know about the configuration
of the modules, and what they will be able to do, does the
operational concept work, are we going to be able to swap the
mission modules out in theater, if we were having this
discussion 5 years ago on the first ship, I would say, hey, we
are learning as we are going, and it is a pretty good strategy.
At this point we are so far down the pike, we are quite
concurrent, and as I mentioned in my opening statement, our
oversight tools are rather limited.
So this is, I think, emblematic of the acquisition process.
This is how things go. So there is, I think, bigger things to
do in the future about the acquisition process, and part of it
is you have to put money on the table to get a program going,
and generally money goes on the table about 2 years before the
program starts. So it goes on the table on the basis of
promises, promises about we think we are going to be five times
better than anything we have, and we don't think it is going to
cost much. As those promises get reduced over time, then we are
way down the pike, and that is where we are.
So I think it is systemic. I think we put people in
difficult positions in the Department because you have to be
able to justify your program that way, and it is optimism, and
it gets embedded. So, yes, we are playing out, I think, what is
typical in the acquisition culture.
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Francis, the time is up. And let me just
point out to our Members, we are told our floor votes are going
to be ratcheted up a little quicker. In consultation with Mr.
Courtney, we would like to ask unanimous consent we can reduce
our time to 3 minutes each. I just want to get as many Members
in as possible. Any objection?
We will reduce it to 3 minutes. And if you can, try to
focus on one question. And we don't want to cut you guys off,
but if you can make your answers as succinct as possible
because we have a lot of Members that want to get their
questions in.
And with that, we recognize Mr. Johnson from Georgia for 3
minutes. Mr. Johnson.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Stackley, you indicated that design costs are under
control and--or design and costs are under control, but there
are some design changes that are being considered.
And then, Mr. Francis, you indicated that for 2014 fiscal
year, we should hold the money and ask for any design changes,
and you also recommended that we keep the block 2016 buy, keep
it at a minimum amount.
What I would like to ask Secretary Stackley is can you tell
us what would be the impact on the Navy in terms of meeting its
future requirements if this committee were to follow the
recommendations of Mr. Francis?
Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir, and we did some clarification
in terms of his recommendation and my earlier response.
Mr. Johnson. And then I would like to get Mr. Francis'
rebuttal, if you will.
Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir. Our plan to continue with
procurement of the block buy, which would mean four ships in
2014 and another four ships in 2015, is central to, one,
getting the capability that is in the CNO's requirements letter
to Congress, and is filling a shortfall that we have today in
terms of overall force structure, getting up to the 300 ships.
Those four ships in 2014 and four ships in 2015 with the
capability they bring, we need those for operational
considerations, and then, as earlier discussed, disrupting that
flow in the shipyard and the vendor base will drive costs into
the program, which is exactly what we are trying to avoid. So
that is a short description of what the impact would be.
Understanding what Mr. Francis described earlier in terms
of providing more information, more insight to Congress in
terms of where the Navy is going before we put those ships
under award, under contract, we welcome that, and, in fact, we
have monthly reports to Congress we are providing, we have
quarterly reports to Congress we are providing, we have annual
reports to Congress we are providing, we have briefings. We
will provide you full insight, full daylight in terms of where
we are going and the considerations that we are considering,
the issues that are under consideration.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you.
Mr. Francis.
Mr. Francis. Yes, sir. I think we are squared away on what
our recommendation means. I would be surprised and disappointed
if it actually did result in holding off the 2014 buy, because
the studies are in place, and I think the answers could be
given.
We pegged that to the 2014 money just as a forcing
mechanism so that the Navy could come by or come back to you in
good time. Really, the things that we are talking about will
affect most directly the 2016 buy, but you should have some
time to consider that. So I think if the Navy comes forward
with that information, I don't see why the contract couldn't be
awarded, and you will have the information.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Johnson's questions are excellent
questions. We may ask you guys to expand a little bit on those
in written form, if you would, after this hearing.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
beginning on page 77.]
Mr. Forbes. And now we recognize the gentleman from
Colorado Mr. Coffman for 3 minutes.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Hunt, we have two separate shipbuilders building
Littoral Combat Ship, and I have read some analysis that this
is really going to take, require separate crew training. Is
that criticism valid? I mean, are these ships by these two
different builders really that different that require separate
crew training?
Admiral Hunt. There will clearly be some differences in the
training, but fundamentally the training that we have
established and set up in the schoolhouse in San Diego is very
similar; same instructors walking through folks. The
differences is primarily going to be operating the consoles
that they have. That is something that is achievable. It is
programmed in right now, and I think we will manage that very
satisfactorily.
Mr. Coffman. So as we proceed, then, that a sailor on one
variant of this class of ship, would they be expected, then, to
proceed with their career in that same variant, or can they
cross over easily?
Admiral Hunt. You know, again, it is going to depend on
exactly what kind of sailor that we are talking about. So
diesels are different, gas turbines are different. There will
be a different training in that. But within the Navy we do that
quite often. When you go between cruisers and destroyers and
frigates, there are changes. Is that a major impact? I don't
believe it is. I think it is something that we are going to
work through. It is clearly within the realm of the training
system that we have set up right now.
Mr. Coffman. When you talk about the open architecture of
the Littoral Combat Ship, I mean, really how significant is
that in reducing costs in the long run, because we do service
life extension programs all the time on other ships. Secretary
Stackley, would you want to----
Admiral Hunt. If I could, I would love to take that.
I think that is the essence of the program. I think it is
vitally important. I have lived my entire Navy career where we
have made changes, and we routinely do, especially in combat
systems, to Navy ships, and when we do them on the older legacy
ships, we rip out everything to bare metal. We pull cables, we
take it out, we rebuild it. I have seen it, I have lived it as
the type commander on cruisers. You walk into a space, and it
is completely bare metal.
That is a very expensive way to upgrade and is really one
of the biggest challenges that we have in the Navy in
modernization. The modularity and open systems architecture
that this ship provides is the entryway to the way the Navy
must do ship construction in the future.
I am very encouraged by what we have got. I think you are
going to see more and more of this, and it is going to be a
huge force multiplier not only from the cost perspective--and I
will yield to Mr. Stackley on that--but equally important from
a combat systems enhancement, the reliability and safety that
we get from it.
Secretary Stackley. I just want to provide a couple
crystal-clear examples. First the combat system. Now, this is
the core of the ship's weapon system; two different versions,
both of them are described as open. One is Lockheed Martin
variant, and the other variant is a Northrop Grumman variant on
the LCS 2.
So what we did to challenge this was we took the LCS 2
combat system, we dropped the software that came with it, and
we brought the Navy's Ship Self-Defense System [SSDS] software
to the system, loaded it up, and demonstrated that we could
drive that combat system with the Navy's SSDS system, and then
likewise porting over to the Lockheed Martin version. So now we
have choices. When you talk about commonality, we have choices
in terms of loading up the combat system for LCS 1, LCS 2 to
drive commonality and figure out what gives us best capability
and cost.
That is software.
On the hardware side, describe the non-line-of-sight [NLOS]
missile cancellation. We were able to quickly move over and
look at other missile systems to fit the exact same form, fit
and function that was provided by NLOS, and without disrupting
the ship, we are developing and testing different missiles to
go in its place without missing stride in terms of the IOC
[initial operating capability] date for that capability.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Forbes. The gentleman from Washington, Mr. Larsen, is
recognized for 3 minutes.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think this subcommittee and the committee as a whole has
a like/hate relationship. We like it, and we hate hearing about
it all the time. And I have been here in my 13th year along
with Mr. Forbes, and it hasn't been that long since I have been
hearing about it, but it has been about half that time. And it
is usually never 100 percent positive or 100 percent negative,
but we just keep hearing about it. And this today is just the
next chapter in a long book, a book I want to finish, and I
want you all to finish. I want to stop reading this book.
But I am concerned that this is turning into a 52-ship Beta
program. I keep hearing about we are deploying, but we are
testing while we are deploying, in the hopes and eventuality we
will have fully operational platforms with the modules in
place, using them. But we don't have the modules in place, and
we are still out deploying and testing the platforms we have.
So the first question I have for Mr. Stackley is--maybe I
am wrong, and I have been wrong on a lot of things--how similar
is this deploy and test model to other classes of ships? We do
it on other platforms or other programs that sometimes works
and sometimes don't, but we are talking about a multimillion-
dollar platform here, so how similar is this?
Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir. Let me describe that I have
been involved with every lead ship since the late 1970s that
the U.S. Navy has fielded either as a sailor, as a designer, as
a production manager, as a program manager, as an oversight
member in the Senate Armed Services Committee and in this job.
This is the way we bring ships to the fleet. We do not have a
prototype. We do not have a prototype. LCS 1 is the prototype
for this class. That is the way ships are built and fielded.
The development that is going on in parallel with deploying
the ship--this is for future upgrades and increments that have
been laid out in the mission modules; not to the ship itself,
to the mission modules that bring that weapon system
capability--but if you look at the early increments, those
capabilities are in the fleet today. It is the 60 helicopter;
it is the AQS-20 Alpha sensor that protects the mine. Remote
mine-hunting system, she has demonstrated her ability to hit
her IOC date.
You go right on down the list of early capabilities, the
30-millimeter gun, they are in the fleet today. We are not
talking about developing concurrent with building; we are
talking about integrating these capabilities into the mission
package, completing the test program, and getting it out into
the fleet. The risk in these early increments is very low, very
well managed.
There are some developments for later increments that we
are breaking new ground, and that is why they are coming in
later increments, and we are not trying to do ``Big Bang''
approach in the early instantiation.
So this is the way we field ships. We did get out of the
blocks wrong on this program, absolutely, and that is why you
are reading that book over and over again, but we have
corrected those issues. We have to make sure we don't
backslide, and we, again, welcome your oversight as we continue
to march down this path.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you.
Mr. Forbes. The chairman of the Readiness Subcommittee, Mr.
Wittman, is recognized for 3 minutes.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you so much for joining us today.
Secretary Stackley, I want to get right to an issue of
survivability, I want to give you some examples. If you go to
1987, USS Stark was hit by two Exocet missiles, killing 37
sailors. The ship didn't sink; made temporary repairs, made its
way home under its own power. In 1988, USS Samuel B. Roberts
hit a naval mine in Persian Gulf. The ship didn't sink. It made
it out of the minefield under its own power. In 2000, we all
know the story of the USS Cole was attacked by terrorists in
Aden, Yemen, killing 17 sailors. The ship didn't sink. We all
know the story of how it was put on a drydock ship, repaired,
back into service today. In 2006, the INS Hanit, an Israeli
Navy Sa'ar 5 corvette built in the United States, was hit by a
Charlie-802 antiship missile killing four sailors. The ship
didn't sink.
Let me ask you this: The Navy plans to do survivability
trials in 2014 and 2015 on LCS. The Navy's Director, though, of
Operational Tests and Evaluation has reported the LCS is not
expected to maintain mission capability after taking a
significant hit in hostile combat environment.
My question is this: By the time the Navy completes these
LCS capability and survivability trials, the Navy will have
either procured or have under contract more than half of the
ships in this class. The question is this: Will LCS 1 or LCS 2
survive a hit from an Exocet missile, a mine, a Charlie-802
antiship missile, or a small boat packed with high-energy
explosives?
Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir. Let me first describe that we
don't wait for the final test to determine how we are faring.
So every aspect of the design and the testing of each
component, each element of a ship leads to that final exam
associated with the total ship's survivability trials and the
ship shock trial, just as in every other shipbuilding program.
And every piece of analysis, every aspect of the design data
says that we are going to meet the survivability requirements
established for the LCS.
Now, first, each of the examples that you described, they
took a hit, and they came home safely. They did not carry on
their mission. They did not carry on their mission. When we
talk about the level of survivability for the LCS, it has to be
able to, one, defend itself. And there is a threshold
requirement of what it needs to be able to defend itself
against, whether it is an Exocet, whether it is a fast attack
craft that is approaching the ship. So it designed to meet that
threat. Then if it takes a hit, it is designed to survive
through watertight subdivision design, through advanced
firefighting systems, to automated systems that respond
immediately to the impact and contain the impact. It is
designed to survive that and then be brought home safely.
Mr. Francis. Mr. Wittman, may I just comment? One of the
things on the LCS regarding survivability, and you are right,
the final tests are in 2014 and beyond, but the expectations of
the ship have been lowered over time. So I think originally
when chapter 1 of the book, if you will, we are talking about
the ship being able to go into areas where there was access
denial and so forth and hostile environment, that has been
backed off to benign low-threat environment. So that is a hedge
against survivability. And also I think the thought was it was
going to be a self-sufficient surface combatant. It wasn't
necessarily going to need a destroyer or cruiser to help it
with certain threats. I think we backed off on that as well. It
will need it.
So two things are going on. There is the survivability of
the seaframe itself, and then adjustments to what situations we
are going to put the seaframe in.
Mr. Wittman. Very good.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Forbes. I thank the gentleman.
Admiral Hunt. Mr. Chairman, could I comment on that?
Mr. Forbes. Absolutely.
Admiral Hunt. The two things for survivability. First of
all, as naval officers we fight our group. It is not individual
ships; we put it together. The cruisers protect the aircraft
carrier; the aircraft themselves protect the larger group. So
we work in a layered system, if you will.
It is incumbent upon that leader, whether he is a strike
group commander or a fleet commander, to make sure that he does
that in as safe an operational situation that he can make, and
he will do so.
This ship is designed exactly to be the right survivability
in the right operations that we are going to put it in. It
truly is. It was designed with lower RCS, radar cross-section.
It has got speed. It can maneuver rapidly. All that contributes
directly to self-defense from a ship driver perspective. So I
feel very comfortable with that.
The kind of missions that we get it if it goes into a
higher-threat environment, it will come with that protection,
and that is coalition protection. The course that I am teaching
right now up in Newport, Rhode Island, at the war college for
our next-generation fleet commanders, it talks about how we do
that and how we think about it. So I am comfortable there.
From the ship perspective itself, when we modified the
initial design to follow enabled vessel rules, we enhanced and
increased the survivability of the ship itself. The
firefighting system is solid. The configuration of the ship,
the way she is built, is solid. It is good enough to protect
our sailors and extract yourself from that dangerous situation,
and that is really it.
Mr. Forbes. And we need to go to Mr. Hunter from
California. He is recognized for 3 minutes.
Mr. Hunter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First question is concerning the NLOS system that you no
longer do, and have you heard the Brimstone missile? You all
just did a test with the Brimstone and hit four small boats,
swarm in the LCS, and what have you thought about that for a
replacement.
Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir, we have taken a good look at
the Brimstone. It has got some desirable qualities. But I can't
tell you----
Mr. Hunter. It is relatively inexpensive.
Secretary Stackley. It is relatively inexpensive, but I
cannot tell you that we are running to that missile. We have
other alternatives that are in the mix, yes, sir.
Mr. Hunter. Number two, what type of ships would you put in
if you had to go up against China, if you had to go up against
a China or a North Korea? Would you use the LCS, or would you
use more destroyers and subs? What type of ships would you use?
Admiral Hunt. For part of that operation, I would
absolutely use LCS. So it is interesting right now, again, we
are doing a war game that is part of the scenario that we are
looking at, LCS is part of the mix. You know, for the initial
phase to be in the theater and sense the environment before
hostilities may occur, we would use all the assets available.
So she is a sensor, she has got speed, she can, you know,
link that information back to the larger group, and she
provides those unique capabilities in each one of the mission
modules that the fleet commander would then tailor, depending
on how the operational concept developed that could be used. So
from the surface to the ASW to the mine, I would expect all
those capabilities will be added to the mix.
Mr. Hunter. If you don't know what the modules do yet
because they don't exist as modular, for them to be able to be
plugged in, how do you know what the conduct of operations
would be if you don't have the module?
Admiral Hunt. I think we have a good idea what the initial
increments of those modules will provide. We certainly have the
surface module right now on Freedom in Singapore.
Mr. Hunter. But you would have to replace the NLOS on
surface module, right? So you don't really have it; you kind of
have it. You don't really have anything. You kind of have----
Admiral Hunt. That is an additional capability. What she
provides right now is equal to what you have on an FFG.
Mr. Hunter. Well, then, why get a new ship if what you have
is just equal, right?
Admiral Hunt. Because the FFGs are timing out from a
costing perspective, modernization, and being able to adapt it.
Mr. Hunter. My question is, though, if you had to go up
against a China or a North Korea, the LCS is not the best ship
for that scenario. It is not the best type of ship. Now, you
could use anything. You could use a RHIB, you could use an
unmanned underwater vehicle, you could use a whole lot of
stuff. But I have talked to a number of admirals and Navy
experts that say the LCS is not what you want there. It is
great for the Strait of Hormuz, it is great for other areas,
but with the Asia pivot it is not what you want. You want more
cruisers. You want more subs that have survivability against
the long-range threat that China provides.
Admiral Hunt. Two things, Congressman. The first is we set
the stage before the conflict begins. LCS is absolutely key to
that. And I just had a 2-hour discussion with our 7th Fleet
commander, who absolutely is ecstatic about what else he has us
doing in theater right now and the contribution that it
provides.
And the second piece is----
Mr. Hunter. I don't understand, though. What the LCS has
done in theater so far is dock at a harbor that other ships
couldn't dock at because it has a very shallow draft, right? So
it has done that. It has gone to some other docks.
Admiral Hunt. And she is out operating in the CARAT
[Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training] exercises
throughout the region.
Mr. Hunter. Doing doughnuts, right? Going really fast in
circles? That is what the ship driver said a couple days ago,
right?
Admiral Hunt. She is out performing the missions as desired
by our 7th Fleet commander.
Mr. Hunter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Forbes. To the witnesses, I hate to impose on you, but
we have a vote on the floor that is going to probably run about
40 minutes. What are your schedules like? Can you take a recess
and let us come back? I know it is tough on your schedules, but
we have got a few Members that really would like to ask just a
couple more questions. How are your schedules?
Secretary Stackley. Sir, we are at your service.
Mr. Forbes. We apologize for that. They don't call us and
ask us if the votes are convenient now. But we will recess
until the votes are completed, and then we will reconvene for
whatever questions that remain.
Thank you.
[Recess.]
Mr. Forbes. Let me thank our witnesses for their patience
in allowing us to get through that cycle of votes. And at this
particular point in time, we would like to recognize the
gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Rogers, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Hunt, a key criticism of the GAO report was the
Littoral Combat Ship program is that the Navy did not have yet
a decision on how it is to be used. As the leader of LCS
Council for over a year now and a veteran surface warfare
officer, is there any question in your mind as to how this ship
will be employed?
Admiral Hunt. Thank you for that question.
No, there isn't. I think we know very accurately how we are
going to employ the ship with each of the modules.
Mr. Rogers. Would you describe those, please?
Admiral Hunt. Certainly. The surface mission capability
will be in the littoral, meaning in close to land. It will
provide with its gun capability initially, and then, when you
add on top of that the missile capability, the ability to go
out and interdict small boats and small vessels that would be
potentially opposing us as we moved amphibious ships or an
aircraft carrier through choke points.
The second piece that that capability provides is it has
excellent capability exceeding what we have now in our maritime
interdiction operations, meaning taking a boarding party and
going over doing antipiracy or anti-weapons-of-mass-destruction
movement, the kinds of things that we are doing routinely in
the Gulf of Aden, the Horn of Africa and around the waters of
the Persian Gulf right now.
Mr. Rogers. I understand that a key component of LCS
concept is the mission package; however, does the Navy have a
plan for utilizing seaframe without the mission packages as
well?
Admiral Hunt. No, it does not. In every instant of seeing
how we would operate the platforms today, it would always be
inherently with one of the three mission packages.
Mr. Rogers. Mr. Stackley, the GAO has criticized the Navy's
LCS program business case, stating that questions remain on
cost, the time needed to develop and field the system, and its
anticipated capabilities. Will you address each of those three
items?
Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir. In terms of cost, the
program's cost performance today is very well understood and
well behaved both in terms of the seaframes of the ship
production and in terms of the mission packages.
I think one of the questions or concerns from the GAO has
to deal with we will call it the program baseline that we are
measuring against. We owe that to Congress, and we will bring
that forward. In fact, Mr. Francis described that we get to go
to a Milestone B long before this hearing was scheduled. In
fact, we had the mission module Milestone B scheduled for this
week where we did go through all those details to lock them
into a formal document that will come forward to the Hill.
In the interim we do report annually inside of what is
referred to as a selective acquisition record to Congress, and
we are performing well within those costs that we are
projecting. Good learning, good cost performance.
The second aspect I think you raised was schedule, with
regards to schedule, again, ship production and mission
modules. On the ship production side, we have adjusted
schedules at the both of the shipyards on the order of 4 to 6
months for the early ships in the block buy, the smart thing to
do. What we did not want to do was to incur costs or cost risk
because of overly aggressive schedules within the shipyards.
The start-up of production on the block buys was somewhat
disrupted by a gap that had occurred between the first couple
of LCS ships and the decision to go forward with the block buy,
and because of that disruption and the transition from earlier
lead ships to that stable design that we are insisting upon to
support production of the subsequent ships, there was, in fact,
lag time that led to some schedule delay. We believe we have
got that well captured, and today both Marinette up in
Wisconsin and also in Alabama are performing in accordance with
those schedules. Got to keep a watchful eye on it because we
are continuing to ramp up in production, but we think we have
schedule stability in place, and it is supporting our cost
projections.
Mr. Rogers. Great.
I want to ask you, you described earlier before we had to
break for votes your history in the shipbuilding business, and
that what you are doing with this system is consistent with
what you have always done. Were you surprised at the GAO's
observation that this was somehow outside the norm?
Secretary Stackley. I think GAO did a lengthy review of the
LCS program that I think extended over 12 to 16 months. When I
read the report, read their findings, my first reaction is we
need to spend more time with the GAO to outline exactly what we
are doing and why we are doing it. And we owe that to GAO, we
owe that to Congress.
Shipbuilding is different from other acquisition. It is.
LCS is different from other shipbuilding programs. And so by
virtue of that fact, we have to explain why those differences
make sense, and why we are on that path.
The second aspect of it is GAO asks a lot of questions in
their report, critical questions. They are fair, and rather
than providing a short and concise response, I think we need to
engage with Congress and further with the GAO and provide the
detailed responses that they warrant, because they are
important for you all to understand where we are going, and
that is necessary for us to earn and expect your support.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you. My time has expired.
Mr. Forbes. Ms. Speier is recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. Speier. Mr. Chairman, thank you, and thank you for your
service to our country, all of you, and for the important work
that we are addressing here today.
Mr. Francis, I am truly struck by your earlier testimony,
and it reminds me a little bit of our lives in that Admiral
Hunt in 2010 told Congress that the dual-acquisition strategy
would save money. Now we hear the Navy is considering changes
to increase the commonality between the two variants, as I
recall it, these were two great alternatives that were being
suggested, and so we really wanted both of them. It would be
like any one of us saying, gosh, the Lamborghini is beautiful,
and the Ferrari is beautiful; let us buy both of them, except
for the fact that it costs a lot of money.
And I am troubled by the fact that we are purchasing first
and testing second, and I think the taxpayers of this country
expect us to be frugal in the way we move forward with this
effort.
Now, the GAO had originally suggested that we go slow. I
actually took that GAO recommendation and turned it into an
amendment, which was held not to be in order by the Rules
Committee when the NDA was taken up on the floor. So having had
that happen, but having the good and sound recommendations that
you have offered, how do we make sure that this 2-year
oversight opportunity that we have is actually exercised in a
way that we just don't say at the end of 2 years, well, too
bad, we missed the window, we are going to build all these
ships, they are not going to meet the standards, they are going
to cost--the cost overruns are going to be extraordinary, and
that is just the way it is?
I mean, we as Congress, we as this committee, I believe,
have a responsibility to make sure that what we are building
makes sense, makes sense for the long term. And I feel that
there is this rush to construction, and we will worry about the
details later.
So could you comment on that, please?
Mr. Francis. Definitely.
We made a recommendation in August of 2010 that because
operational testing was slipping, there were some problems with
the mission modules at that point, and the ships and the
modules were kind of getting out of sync. We recommended to the
Department, resequence these and get them back in line so that
you know what the combined capability of the seaframes and
mission modules are before you get into operational testing.
Now, the Department agreed with that, but since then the
seaframes, if anything, have gone faster, the modules slower.
Ms. Speier. So they agree, but they then don't follow
through with what they say?
Mr. Francis. No. The strategy that they embarked on was a
different strategy than what we had recommended.
Ms. Speier. So how do we trust anything?
Mr. Francis. Well, I think you have to hold the Department
accountable. I mean, we can talk about, for example, mission
modules, but it takes four increments for those mission modules
to meet minimum capability. So the things we are talking about
what we know now does not meet minimum capability for the Navy.
It will be 2017 and 2019 respectively before those increments
are operationally tested.
So I think that is where I say you have to exercise
prudence in how many ships and modules you approve before they
have gone through that.
Ms. Speier. We are full speed ahead right now. That is what
the NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] recommends. That
is not what you recommend. The Navy certainly recommends that.
And I guess I want you to give us a road map on what we should
do if we are going to do a diligent job on oversight over the
next 2 years. What would you provide us as a road map?
Mr. Francis. A couple of things. We mentioned the studies
that we think the Navy should report back to you on on
potential design changes. You should know that in the next--in
this 2-year window; an approved program baseline for each of
the increments of the mission modules. I don't think we can
afford to--you know, as we have learned with the modules, if
something doesn't work we have a different game plan; if this
doesn't work, we have a different game plan.
I think you should be able to hold the Department
accountable. You said you were going to do this this year and
this this year, and hold them accountable for that. And I would
take a real hard look at the 2016 block buy. If that is too
many ships or takes you past operational testing, I think you
have yielded a lot of your oversight authority. So that would
be the outlines of what I would say.
Ms. Speier. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Ribble is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Ribble. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to
especially thank you and ranking vice member, Vice Chair
Courtney, for allowing me to come in.
I also want to thank the witnesses for being here today,
especially the GAO. You know, oversight is an important part of
what Congress does, and it is part of our responsibility to do
this, but I would say as well that a lot of what I have read in
the report is eerily similar to other reports on other
shipbuilding programs. And so shipbuilding is a process, not
just something that today we are going to do it, and tomorrow
it is there and it is perfect. There is a process that goes on.
And the report that you gave on LCS is similar to those
reports that GAO did in the 1970s, and other programs that
became very successful in the 1990s, and another ship that
became very successful. And so in one degree where I might take
and have some disagreement with some of the findings in the
report, I think the report is important, because it sharpens
all of us. It helps us move forward and make improvements to
the Navy response, Congress' response, and things go forward.
So thank you for submitting the report and your testimony this
morning.
Mr. Stackley, I appreciate you being here, and I would like
to talk just a little bit about the cost of the ship and what a
delay in production might do for that cost. It can either
improve cost or delay it. LCS 1 cost the Federal taxpayers $637
million, way, way above budget. However, the LCS 5 had dropped
down to $437 million, LCS 11 is at $358 million, and LCS 15 at
$348 million, all trends going in the right direction; in fact,
nearly a 50 percent reduction in cost over the course of the
project.
What would a delay do to that?
Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir. The most critical aspect for
any major weapon system program when it comes to cost is
stability, stability requirements, stability of design and
stability of funding. Any disruption to the production of the
LCS, or any other major weapons system program for that matter,
but more so in shipbuilding, you are going to suffer--first you
are going to lose the capability that you are going after. You
are going to suffer cost growth that starts in the vendor base,
because the vendor base, which is a national vendor base, is
going to be stopping production particularly on any unique
components that are associated with that ship program, and then
it is going to hit the shipyard itself where the workforce, the
skilled workforce, that you are building up, in this particular
case the LCS program, they are going to have to stop and start
again, and you have to deal with hiring and firing cycles,
green labor and things of that nature.
It is extraordinarily disruptive, and the unique case of
shipbuilding where you are in a 4- or 5- and, in certain cases,
carriers where get up into the 9-year range of when you start
and complete construction, you have got to ensure stability of
that production workforce going from ship to ship to ship, or
you are just going to continue to suffer sawtooth in cost
growth.
So that is one of the things we guard against, and the way
we guard against it is to drive stability into the program. The
LCS 1 and LCS 2, the front end of this program, absolutely not
stable. The design was not complete, the requirements were
moving, the production workforce was not ready, the government
was not ready, and that is why you saw a $637 million number at
the start of the program.
We have worked to nail down all those aspects that bring
stability, and then lock it in the long-term agreement
associated with the block buy so that the vendor base, the
shipbuilder and the government can all pull in the same
direction to drive costs down to where we are now taking a ship
that started off in the $600-$700 million range, and we are
locked into a fixed-price contract at prices that are half of
that years later.
Mr. Ribble. It is clearly going the right direction.
Admiral Hunt, the U.S. Navy has been at the forefront of
national defense, well, since the beginning of the Navy. Thank
you for your service and the work that you have been doing.
What impact would a delay have on the Navy's ability to
meet its future requirements?
Admiral Hunt. The LCS will immediately provide capability
forward. Initially it is one of getting out there and
developing contact. It is the presence piece, which is
essential from all the forward numbered fleet commanders'
perspective. So we are out there developing relationships with
allies, with countries that are deciding which camp to play in,
and we are sending signals to those who could be adversaries.
So presence is first and foremost on what we do day in and
day out. When you combine that with the capability that each of
the mission modules bring, credible combat capability, a huge
force multiplier that will immediately go into the calculus
that those numbered fleet commanders will use in operating
within their area of responsibility.
And I would make the point that each one of the first
increments meets or exceeds current capability that we have in
the United States Navy. So while it is true that some of them
have up to four increments, and we are providing capability
that we may not demonstrate fully until towards the end of this
decade, that first increment that will be developed in the next
year or so for all of those meets or exceeds everything we
have, and that is an important piece that can't be overlooked.
Mr. Ribble. Thank you for your testimony.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Francis. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Forbes. Yes, Mr. Francis.
Mr. Francis. I think the things that Mr. Stackley said are
true in terms of bringing the cost of the ship down, but,
again, I think we have to remember it is a first-in-class ship
of a new class of ships. So we have some questions on the
mission modules, but, you know, even if you said the seaframes
worked just the way they are supposed to and the modules worked
the way that they are supposed to, we still have the
operational concept. Is that going to work? Are we going to be
able to do the maintenance concept the way we think of it?
The real question if I look in terms of cost risk, I think
seaframes the least risk, modules are a higher risk, O&S
[operations and support] costs are probably the biggest risk.
So it is not just a first-in-class ship, it is a first in class
of a new class and a new concept of operations. And we are in
rate production, so the caution I would offer is the business
imperatives for keeping things the way they are should not
outweigh the programmatic and testing imperatives that will
prove, can the ship work.
Mr. Forbes. We have been joined by ranking member Mr.
McIntyre. He has graciously deferred his questions so Mr.
Bonner can ask his at this time. So we recognize Mr. Bonner for
5 minutes.
Mr. Bonner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And as others have
said, thank you for holding this hearing. And to our witnesses,
thank you. I think it has been very enlightening, the questions
have been thoughtful, and the responses have certainly been
appropriate, I think, to help answer some of the questions
about this very important program.
There have been several comments made by some of our
colleagues, Mr. Chairman, and so I am going to try to ask one
question of the admiral, and then I am going to let him answer
it. But I am going to offer a quick observation before he does.
One of the comments was that it appears that LCS might be
of little value to the Asia pivot strategy. So my question
would be, what else does the Navy do in the South Pacific
beside planning on fighting big wars? I mean, are there not any
other missions the Navy does? And you can think about that as I
am opining about some other facts.
I mean, I am in the last few days of my tenure in Congress.
I have worked up here for 18 years, I have served for 10 years,
it has been the greatest honor of my life. One thing that I
have been struck by is the fact that we really never know when
we wake up what the day holds. And I certainly can't look into
my crystal ball, I don't know if the GAO can. My father worked
with the GAO when he was going to law school a long, long time
ago, so I hold you in great respect. But I don't know that any
of us are really that qualified to predict what the world's
challenges are, but here are some facts.
There are 217,000 miles of inshore coastline, the
littorals, around the world. Our Navy can't be every place,
obviously, but only our Navy, only our military can provide the
stability that the world needs. And it is hard for me to see,
and I know the chairman has talked about the concern he has and
many of us have about the decreasing number in the fleet. We
have got, what, 285 ships today? I was with the former Navy
Secretary a few weeks ago, who worked for President Reagan when
we were shooting for a 600-fleet Navy.
My friend and colleague from California talked about
comparison between the Ferrari and Lamborghini. I would say
that the LCS isn't either, not compared to the cruisers, to the
destroyers and other ships that we have which are also a vital
part, but I would say it is probably more like a Malibu or a
Taurus. It provides a function, especially in those inshore
waters that perhaps we don't need the more expensive
Lamborghini or Ferrari to provide that mission.
So I would be happy to now ask the question, and if the
Admiral or any of the panelists to provide an answer.
Admiral Hunt. Congressman, thank you for that question. It
is a very insightful one, and it speaks exactly to the way I
think that the Navy over the next decade or two is going to
contribute directly to our national defense.
The Navy does more than fight these wars. Ideally we will
shape and understand an area that we are operating in to
prevent the conflict. We do that by contact. We do that by
contact with other nations. To have contact we must have
presence.
Your comments on being out and about, I think, are exactly
right. The influence that we have by having proportional
capability with nations around the world is absolutely
essential. That is how you develop the relationships, develop
trust and confidence between the nations.
There is some question in the Western Pacific right now on
the resolve of the United States. The presence of Freedom in
Singapore is being used by Admiral Haney, our fleet commander
in Pearl Harbor, and by Admiral Swift, the 7th Fleet commander
out there, and they see great value.
The ship operates by exercises and by conducting operations
with those national partners out there. And what we are getting
in feedback is that it resonates with those potential partner
nations, and they see that as commitment of the United States
to be in the region, and that contributes directly to increased
stability.
So one of the key advantages that we get from LCS is the
unit cost is low, the number of people manning them and still
providing credible combat power is low, which is good for
lifecycle costs, and the ability to operate at sea in the
manning construct that we use of having two ships, three crews
and rotating them gives us about 50 percent optempo
[operational tempo], which is much higher than the standard
one-third that we get. So for about 52 LCS, I get the
equivalent presence of about 100 destroyer or cruiser ships.
And I would offer that the smaller ship of the lower draft
allows us to reach many of the places that we can't get in and
develop that contact and relationship with others right now.
Vitally important, you can only do that if the nations you
operate respect that credible combat power. That is what you
get right now on that first increment of LCS surface warfare
module. That is exactly what you will get with the MCM mission
module, which is going to be hugely important and send a signal
in the 5th Fleet area of responsibility, and I am confident we
will see the same thing with the antisubmarine module.
Thank you, Congressman.
Mr. Bonner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Forbes. And this committee would like to thank Mr.
Bonner for his service. We know you will be leaving us soon and
get to sleep in your bed more instead of traveling back and
forth. But you have done a great job for your constituents and
for your country, and we appreciate that service.
And we appreciate all the questions. I just have a few, and
then Mr. McIntyre may have a few that he would like to wrap up
with. And I come in a unique position, because I am not
predisposed one way or the other. I want to try to make sure we
are answering the questions.
I think my friend sitting to my right, Mr. Hunter, would
probably suggest that--not that the LCS is not a good ship, but
sometimes we get the impression it is like we walked into a
department store, and we saw this wonderful thing, and we
bought it, and we get home and say, now what do we do with it?
You know, it can do so many different things.
And I think we heard today, we talk about presence, and
that is a very valuable thing that we need to address. In fact,
we had Admiral Roughead, who testified just yesterday, who
talked about the importance of process as we make this shift.
We have also heard Admiral Roughead talk about the enormous
delays we have in being able to get anything deployed. From the
concept to when we do it, sometimes that can be as much as 22
years. And this is not an infant. I mean, we have been dealing
with LCS for over a decade, fair assessment, I think, Mr.
Secretary.
Mr. Hunter raised a good question to just put on the table,
Admiral. If we get into a major conflict--and that is what we
have to constantly be recognizing; just as Mr. Bonner said, we
don't always know what we end up with on any given day--
presence may not be enough. I mean, we may need to look at
capability there. And then again I think Mr. Francis at least
raises a good question: What happens if the operational testing
comes in wrong, and we have already locked into making all of
these purchases?
So I guess while what I would throw out to each of you to
weigh in on is a couple of things. Number one, how do we strike
that balance? Do we have the right balance?
And number two, has the Department done the analysis, not
just to say what we can do with the LCS, I know it feels pretty
comfortable with that, but what we really are going to need 10
years down the road, 15 years down the road. Because as you
guys know, when we see these shipbuilding plans, they are
fantasies because we are a billion dollars short of where we
can build them, so we are not going to be able to build all
those things.
And then particularly I would like you to laser in on the
development schedule for the modules versus the seaframes, are
we on track there? Do we need to kind of modify that? What
sometimes we worry about is our schedules, they are going to
create a situation where we deliver an immature mission module,
because, you know, we have had some people raise the fact that
by the time we get our mission modules, we might have used 25
percent of the whole life of some of these seaframes.
So could any of the three of you address those as you deem
appropriate?
Secretary Stackley. Mr. Chairman, let me go ahead and get
started and then allow Admiral Hunt and Mr. Francis to join.
First operational test risk. The entire strategy for LCS
development seaframe plus mission modules is a risk-management
approach where, by breaking down the mission modules into these
increments, we are bringing to the fleet a capability that is
today off the shelf, it is off the shelf. So the risk is not a
technical, there is not discovery involved. What we are doing
is we are integrating off-the-shelf capabilities onto a
platform that was not designed as a truck, it was a truck--
space, weight, power, cooling--to handle these mission modules.
And it becomes an engineering issue associated with the
details, those interfaces, and operating on and off the ship as
opposed to an operational test risk where we are going to take
a high-risk new system out and determine whether or not it
works.
We know these systems are going to work. We know they are
going to work. The 60 [SH-60] works today. It is the workhorse
for the fleet. The remote mine-hunting system, we have
demonstrated 800 hours of operational testing of that system,
and so it is well beyond its mean time between failures that we
were targeting for.
The AQS-20 Alpha sonar associated with the mine
countermeasure mission package, that is a 20-year-old sonar. We
know exactly how it works, and what we are doing is a preplan
product improvement so that we can get it to the next level of
capability.
The 30-millimeter gun works. It is on the LPD-17 class.
You write down the list of those systems that we are
bringing in that first increment, the systems work. The risk is
extremely well managed. We are working the engineering details
of integrating those capabilities into that platform with the
trained crew, and demonstrating its operational performance
against those key performance parameters.
Mr. Francis is exactly right. We don't meet the final level
of capability that we are targeting for the program until the
fourth increment of mine countermeasures, third of the surface
warfare, and really off the bat with ASW [antisubmarine
warfare]. But those are planned, those are scheduled, and we
are executing in accordance with those schedules except for the
impact of sequestration, continuing resolution and budget
reductions, which is putting our test program at risk, because
when we pull that much money out of our test program, that
slows us down, and we are having to try to recover gracefully
from that.
Mr. Forbes. Let me let you take just a breath there. Just a
minute. I want to come back to you, Admiral.
But, Mr. Francis, you have heard the Secretary's very
logical, rational reasoning there. What was your response to
that?
Mr. Francis. I see things differently, Mr. Chairman. If we
go through what we are learning on the mission modules, and let
us just take mine countermeasures I was going through here, the
sonar is an off-the-shelf system, but the shelf is a little
dusty. The sonar has not been able to detect mines as we have
expected. It has had some false positives. It needs preplanned
product improvement. We have some operational work-arounds. The
same is true for each of the four systems in that first
increment. They haven't worked the way we thought. We also
thought that the OASIS [Organic Airborne and Surface Influence
Sweep] system was going to be able to be towed by the MH-60,
and that has been scrapped.
I am not offering this up as, gee, this means the program
is terrible, but it means we are learning as we go, and things
may not work out the way that we thought.
On surface warfare, Mr. Hunter brought up the issue about
the missile that gives that ship the stand-off range for the
littorals. So that is the part we don't know yet. That is going
to be a TBD [to be determined].
I don't think we can be confident that mission modules are
going to do what they say they are going to do. And this is
also developmental testing. This is very structured, benign
environment testing, experts and maintainers from the
contractors present. That is not what the operational concept
is going to be.
So there is a reason that the law was created for
operational testing. There is a reason there is a Director of
Operational Testing Evaluation who reports to the Congress and
the Secretary of Defense. So what is going on now is not a
substitute for operational testing.
Mr. Forbes. Admiral, I know you love this program, and I
say that in a good way, because you should. What is your
response to Mr. Francis?
Admiral Hunt. Again, I thank you for the opportunity to
respond here. Let me just walk through the different modules
and give you my perception.
Again, with the surface warfare module as it exists right
now, we do have the guns on there that are equal to the
equivalent replacement platform if you look at it for a
specific capability, which would be the FFG-7, Oliver Hazard
Perry class. She additionally comes with an SH-60 Romeo armed
helicopter. That provides us the reach and stand-off
capability. And eventually we will be augmented by the missile
system when we replace NLOS. But providing the helicopter and
providing the guns right now is greater capability than what we
currently have, so I am very comfortable with that, and I think
that will be used in a very good way, and it will continue to
get better as we evolve.
The MCM [mine countermeasures] capability, we have had some
reliability problems with the sonar. We are working our way
through there. We plan on taking that IOC [initial operational
capability] testing here in fiscal year 2015. And I think we
will demonstrate that that gives us about twice the capability
for hunting than we currently have on Avenger class.
That is very important as we kind of take a look at the
CONOPS on how 5th Fleet and 7th Fleet would use this. It is
hunting and avoiding in round 1; neutralizing probably in round
2, and only when you must. And the fact that we do this without
putting the ship in the minefield greatly provides security to
our sailors. So, again, I think we know how we are going to use
that, and it provides value added.
For ASW, not only does it provide an excellent, excellent
littoral in the shallower waters capability, the fact that we
have this variable depth sonar so we can go below this layer
and get better visibility into submarines, that will develop
into a capability where the ship fights alongside the carrier
strike group in different phases.
To Congressman Hunter's, you know, comments about how you
would use this in a Western Pacific scenario, I would very much
appreciate the opportunity, sir, to come back and at a
classified level walk through that and give you some of the
ideas that we are looking at. We are developing those; we
continue to do that. Again, as I said, we are doing that war
game right now today in Newport, Rhode Island. We will wrap
that up on Friday. We continue to evolve that using the
capabilities in different ways.
When you ask, is LCS going to work in the Western Pacific?
Yes, I think the surface module works very, very well with what
we have got in the initial evolution of a potential spark to
warfare. The ASW platform will be good for being out and about
should things go hot, and a very important thing in protecting
the carrier and the amphibious ships. And the MCM capability
that she provides may be at the wrap-up at the end. The fact
that she can do all of those, understanding you have to time-
sequence it, war is not an immediate overnight thing, it takes
time, and that is part of the logistics aspect of tying it
together in an effective way, and we are looking at doing that.
Mr. Forbes. Admiral, I don't want to speak for Mr. Hunter
or for my good friend the ranking member, but I think at least
all three of us would love to have not just that briefing, but
I think the committee would love to have a briefing.
Mr. Secretary, I know that you are the guy that builds the
ships once they tell you what we need to build, you know, but
at some point in time we would love for the Department to come
over and give us a laydown of this is what we think the risks
are, this is why we need these capabilities, this is the
projection, so we are looking at that in a holistic picture.
What we want to make sure we are not doing is creating a
strategy by acquisition. You know, we want to make sure we have
the strategy, and then we are getting what we need to to get.
And, Mr. Secretary, one criticism that has come forward is
that we do have two designs. Those designs are moving in a
similar path. I had the privilege of going out and seeing both
of them back to back, near Mr. Hunter's home turf, and they are
incredibly different. And when you ask both crews which one is
best, needless to say, it is the one they are on. But then they
said something unique: We may have to have a hybrid of the two.
But I think what Mr. Francis would say, without putting words
in his mouth, is that you are committing to buying all of this.
At what point in time do we sit back and say, well, do we need
some design changes on these vessels, and by the time we get to
know what we need, have we already locked in to what we are
going to buy?
So how are we protecting against that, Mr. Secretary, and
do you see any proposed design changes that might be
forthcoming?
Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir. We are capturing lessons
learned, and we are looking at opportunities. Mr. Francis
described studies that we are doing. In fact, as previously
discussed, we are specifically looking at C4, command, control,
communications, computer, and information systems, as well as
the combat system, looking at individual elements, plus the
command and decision system that rides on the network. Those
are the principal areas.
In the specific case of LCS 1, we discuss the ship service
diesel generators. We are looking real hard at the design that
we have in place and making the upgrades to that design that
are necessary to support the platform better.
So those evaluations are taking place. I described loading
the combat management system onboard the LCS 2 variant with two
other versions that are more common to the Navy. We are on that
path. We are looking at the individual components associated
with the combat system and just evaluating is this meeting our
needs most effectively; are there other alternatives that we
should consider; and if so, what is the cost, what is the
benefit; and what would be the strategy for incorporating those
without driving costs into the program?
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Secretary, would not Mr. Francis come back
and say that was his point, that we are looking at these
modification designs, but are we going to be locked in too far
on our buy?
Mr. Francis, let me not put words in your mouth. What would
your response to that be?
Mr. Francis. I think that is a fair characterization, Mr.
Chairman. So to these, I think these are changes to the
existing designs that could be considered. Will they affect the
learning curves that we have enjoyed on the current ships?
There is, I think, the question, then, going forward in block
16, which could be flight 1 of the ship, if we are looking at
the shipbuilding plan, the 30-year plan, it has lower
quantities. Is that going to a single design, whether it be a
hybrid design or one of the other two? That would be much more
significant.
Mr. Forbes. Mr. McIntyre, do you have any questions that
you would like to pose?
Mr. McIntyre. Thank you. I know our time is running short,
and I will just ask quickly, and thank you for conducting this
hearing.
Thank you, gentlemen, for your commitment to helping our
U.S. Navy continue to be the best that it is; in fact, in the
entire world.
Having been upon LCS 1, the USS Freedom, it is an
impressive ship, very interesting, and obviously, with the
capabilities that it has, something that we want to make sure
that we continue to support.
I have a couple of quick questions. The Joint High Speed
Vessel [JHSV] has been added to the LCS Council's purview. How
are these programs related, and does this mean the Navy is
considering adding the Joint High Speed Vessel to meet some of
the LCS missions?
Admiral Hunt. The CNO made a decision to add the JHSV
program to the LCS Council because he was impressed with, I
think, the degree that we were digging into the program,
finding new ways to improve it. He liked the process aspect of
it. So he asked us to take a look at JHSV, one, because there
is some commonality with LCS 2, where there may be some
efficiencies; and then, two, take a look at what we could do
with what I will call roll-on and tie-down capabilities to
potentially enhance the capability of that platform to do other
missions.
So you have got this group of folks that has been gathered
and working LCS for almost a year now. With a lot of thought
and different ideas, it is a quick adjustment to roll in
another similar size, shape of a different mission ship and
take a good hard look at that and see what are the
opportunities, again, for efficiencies and, two, to utilize as
comparable ways to interact with LCS, and there certainly are
many. We could include that in maintenance packages or training
packages afloat when we start operating the LCS in small groups
forward.
So we are exploring things, a little programmatic change, a
lot of research and idea, then to come back, be considered, and
take it through the normal process that we have for any
shipbuilding program.
Mr. McIntyre. How long is that evaluation going to take, do
you think?
Admiral Hunt. It is open-ended. Right now we are kind of
targeting having this thing wrapped in about a 6-month period,
but I haven't been given a completion date by CNO.
Mr. McIntyre. Secondly, there have been a number of press
reports referring to internal Navy studies questioning the
combat capability of the LCS. I don't know if we quite hit that
head-on today. And as we are wrapping up, maybe we ought to go
in and hit it head-on so those questions don't linger.
What design and requirement changes to the LCS Council--is
the LCS Council considering to address these concerns? I know
you were touching some on that in answering Mr. Forbes'
questions, but I just want to make sure there is nothing else
out there. And what impact would these changes have on the
seaframes themselves?
Secretary Stackley. Let me go ahead and take that one.
First off, both versions, installed combat systems, meet
the requirements. And what we are doing is we are looking at
alternatives to improve upon that, either improve upon that
capability, or drive some further commonality with the broader
fleet. So in that regard, we are specifically, as I described,
looking at the communication suite. The LCS specification, we
did not specify what communication suite to install onboard.
Com [communication] suites are volatile in terms of
technology. The rate of change of technology out there for a
communication suite insists that we are going to be continually
upgrading these systems in the ship's life. And so we are
taking a look at, okay, if we are going to be refreshing and
upgrading the communication suite, then is there a point of
incorporation where we take a more standard common suite in the
Navy and then, when we upgrade, replace it with that standard
suite? And, in fact, we are on that path.
And now when you talk about what is the impact, we are
talking about cabinets in the--basically cabinets landing on
foundations and potentially some antennas. We are going through
what that means in terms of drawings, in terms of production,
in terms of equipment procurement, so we will have both a cost
and schedule assessment in that regard.
On the combat systems side, we are looking at a couple of
areas. One is one of the principal batteries on the ship, which
is in the self-defense system. Today LCS 1 and LCS 2, we have
different systems that we are going to move to a common system,
referred to as SeaRAM. It is basically a RAM [Rolling Airframe
Missile] missile launcher mounted with a close-in weapons
system radar system, gun mount, and that provides tremendous
capability with minimal impact to the ship, but some price
delta in terms of the cost of the equipment. Well worth the
investment, and so we are committed to heading down that path.
Otherwise we are taking a look at the different three-
dimensional air search radars on board and assessing and
comparing those to determine does it make sense to go to a
common design in that arena.
Mr. McIntyre. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Francis. Mr. Chairman, can I offer one comment on that?
Mr. Forbes. Absolutely.
Mr. Francis. One of the things we haven't talked about in
design, and it is more, I would say, mundane than combat
systems and so forth, is we have added 20 berths, I believe, to
this ship. To be determined, then, is how to do the
habitability requirements that go with it, you know, the water,
the food, the storage and so forth, if you are going to house
that many more sailors. That could have design implications
because of the space limitations on the ship. So not as
glamorous, but something that would have to be looked at.
Secretary Stackley. And I would just counter, this isn't
point/counterpoint, but we added the bunks with a clear view on
what the capacity was of the installed capacity for
habitability on the ship, because to go beyond that, in fact we
would be looking at extra chill boxes, extra stowage for the
crew gear and things of this nature. So we believe right now we
have it about balanced, and if we go beyond that, in fact, we
are going to have to take a look at the installed habitability.
Mr. Forbes. And it is not point/counterpoint, but it is
question and answer, and we appreciate you guys doing that.
I want to come back to what I started with and to say that
I have absolutely no problem that we don't all agree on this. I
think that is the strength of our Navy and the strength of our
way of government, that we can ask these questions and get
answers. I want to compliment all three of you for your
professionalism, the teams that work with you, and for your
ability to come in here and give us information. You know, we
don't always get that. You all have been wonderful throughout
this in answering the tough questions.
The other thing I want to say is I have incredible
admiration for my friend Mr. Larsen, but I disagree a little
bit with the fact that I don't want to read any more about this
book. I want to read about this book for years to come, I want
to read about the stories of how the LCS saved lives and
defended this country, and that is why we are doing this,
because sometimes the first few chapters are the heavy reading
you have got to get through, and that is what we are all
working through now, to make sure that we have a happy ending
to this saga as it goes forward.
And the other thing is while we believe in this program, we
don't want to wake up and have half our Navy LCSs. You know, I
think none of us want that. We want to make sure we get the
right mix, the right balance as we do it.
So I want to thank all of you. I told you at the beginning,
also, I want to give you the final wrap-up of anything you
think we didn't cover that we should have, any comments that
you think were misconstrued. This is your chance. And, Admiral,
if we can start with you, because that is where we started our
hearing, love to give you the last word, and then we will go
right on down the line.
Admiral Hunt. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate
the opportunity.
Again, I think we have covered most of the points that I
wanted to get in there, but I would tell you, this is the
capability that we need forward. We need numbers, and we need
presence out there. The capability that we have in the existing
mission modules and those that are quickly to follow, to
include the MCM, is one that is vitally necessary, and it will
be used. And our forward fleet commanders are planning on using
this capability in a very important way.
I feel confident that the hulls themselves are going to be
a great platform in which different payloads, the mission
modules, will hopefully continue to evolve for the life of the
ship. As Mr. Stackley has pointed out, most of the components
that go into mission modules are from other existing programs
and have proven capability. It is a matter of tying them
together now and making sure that we can operate them in a
proper way. To really demonstrate that, I want to get them
forward in the waters that they are going to operate. That is
hugely important to those of us that sail ships, and we are
ready to do that.
We are going to deliver a good product. I am very confident
in the program, the leadership that we have, and I really
appreciate the opportunity to be here, Congressman. Thank you,
sir.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Admiral.
Mr. Secretary.
Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir, just a few comments.
Clearly the program had missteps at the front end of the
program, clearly. But the objective was well placed, and we
have spent time and effort, the Department plus the Congress,
to get the program back on the right track, and we believe that
that is where we are. We believe that the performance continues
to improve on the program, and while we have different
assessments of risk that remains, we believe, in fact, we have
got a good risk-mitigation plan in place.
The GAO has raised some critical questions, as I described
earlier. Rather than answer those in short statements, what we
owe you and we commit to you is to come back and go through in
detail what our plan is, why we believe it makes sense, and
look for your continued support.
And finally, I will end where I started, which is today we
are at 286 ships. The requirement is 306 ships. We don't get
there without completing this program. It is the most
affordable ship in the Navy. It does deliver capability; not
simply capability that we need near term, far term, but filling
critical gaps that today place vulnerabilities in terms of our
ability to perform our mission around the world. And so we hold
this as a priority inside of our shipbuilding program, and we
are committed to executing and retiring those risks that we
have discussed today.
Mr. Forbes. Good, and thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Mr. Francis, I think you would probably say ditto to
everything they said, and then you would say but, and we are
going to let you do the wrap-up.
Mr. Francis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It has been a
pleasure to be involved in the discussion, and I think, as you
know, while we have differences, I really respect what Mr.
Stackley and Admiral Hunt are doing. And I think we are all
interested in the ship reaching its full potential, so we are
all part of the same government.
I would say, you know, to pick up on Mr. Stackley's
metaphor, if the program is on track, that is good, but we
don't want it to be on rails that we can't make adjustments
that we may have to make in the future.
And I just end on the note, let us not forget about the
maintenance concept. You know, in other programs, other ships,
aircraft, if the components aren't as reliable, they need more
maintenance, need more spares, you can overpower that situation
with more assets. But LCS will have an austere crew. It is not
going to have a lot of space for spares on the ship. It has to
be reliant on offshore support for the ship to stay
operational. So there is no real plan B there, and let us just
keep that in mind as we go forward. I think working out that
maintenance concept and making sure that crew can handle that
ship and keep it operational that far away from its log
[logistical] support, very important.
Mr. Forbes. We thank you for your questions you raise,
valid good questions; Admiral, for your passion for this
program. Mr. Secretary, thank you for your commitment to say
you are going to come back and give us those responses so that
we make sure the program is going in the direction that we need
to go.
And with that, Mr. McIntyre, if you don't have any other
comments----
Mr. McIntyre. No.
Mr. Forbes [continuing]. Then we are adjourned. Thank you
all very much.
[Whereupon, at 12:35 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
July 25, 2013
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
July 25, 2013
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[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
July 25, 2013
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RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES
Secretary Stackley and Admiral Hunt. The Navy is in the process of
developing the acquisition strategy for the post block buy ships
(Fiscal Year (FY) 2016 and out). Additional information will be
provided once the strategy has been developed, estimated to be in late
FY 2014. [See page 17.]
Mr. Francis. We believe our recommendations are reasonable and
important for ensuring well informed acquisition decisions that meet
the Navy's needs. In regards to the fiscal year 2014 budget under
consideration, we suggested that Congress consider restricting funding
for construction of additional seaframes until the Navy:
completes the ongoing LCS technical and design studies,
determines the impacts of making any changes resulting from these
studies on the cost and designs of future LCS seaframes, and
reports to Congress on cost-benefit analyses of changes to the
seaframes to change requirements and/or capabilities and to improve
commonality of systems, and the Navy's plan moving forward to improve
commonality.
Waiting until the Navy has presented this information better
ensures that there is adequate knowledge to support seaframe
construction because the results of these studies may indicate the
potential for additional design changes that may have cost
implications. As shown in the table below, the Navy planned to have all
of the studies completed by the start of fiscal year 2014. Therefore,
we would expect the Navy to be able to report the results to Congress
before any fiscal year 2014 funding restrictions would take effect.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Studies Referred to in GAO Report Navy's Estimated Completion Date
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Command, control, communications, computers, and Completed
intelligence (C4I) commonality feasibility study
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Common Combat Management System Study Completed
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Flight 1 technical trade study (including habitability) Completed
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Flight 1 capabilities study Completed
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Since these studies should be complete the Navy should be able to
meet this proposed reporting requirement prior to March 31, 2014--the
last day that the Navy can contractually award funding to the shipyards
in fiscal year 2014 without compromising its obligations to the
shipyards.
With regards to plans beyond 2016, we recommended that the Navy buy
only seaframes at the minimum sustaining rate--which the Navy defines
as 1 to 2 ships per yard per year--until it successfully completes a
full-rate production decision review in order to ensure that decision
makers are adequately informed prior to committing to future seaframe
buying decisions. DOD disagreed with this recommendation, stating that
delaying or slowing future procurements to a minimum sustaining rate is
unnecessary and will cause an increase in prices. However, DOD also
stated that it plans to procure future seaframes in accordance with the
Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels that supported
the fiscal year 2014 budget submission which indicates that the Navy
plans to procure 2 to 3 ships per year from 2016 to 2027. If the Navy
adheres to its current long range shipbuilding plan and continues to
buy seaframes from both shipyards as it has been doing, then our
recommendation is consistent with the Navy's future procurement plan.
But if the Navy makes significant changes to its future procurement
plan, such as opting to downselect to one shipyard (which could
increase the rate above the minimum sustaining rate for one shipyard)
or planning a large block buy, we would recommend that the Navy first
gain key knowledge from operational testing results. We would again
caution that while slowing production might result in an increase in
seaframe unit prices, the cost to the government of buying ships before
validating performance and ensuring that the seaframes still meet the
Navy's needs might be much greater. Since the Navy is not currently
under contract for any LCS seaframes beyond 2015, it currently has no
longer term contractual obligations to these shipyards that could be
impacted. [See page 17.]
?
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
July 25, 2013
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MCKEON
Mr. McKeon. Please comment on the capabilities of the ALaMO system,
the threats it addresses, it's development timeline and funding
profile.
Secretary Stackley and Admiral Hunt. The Advanced Low Cost
Munitions Ordnance (ALaMO) system is currently in science and
technology demonstration by industry but after successful development
it is projected to provide all-weather operation and improved lethality
over existing 57mm ammunition. Once developed, ALaMO would provide an
extended engagement range and guidance, making it an improved counter-
small boat capability. The system uses a combination of two channel,
multi-band sensor for target acquisition and Guided Integration Fuzing
(GIF) in order to maximize warhead lethality.
ALaMO is not an acquisition Program of Record and therefore not
currently funded. The estimated development cost to conduct Engineering
Manufacturing and Development over a five year period is estimated to
be $225M. The notional development timeline would lead to Initial
Operational Test & Evaluation (IOT&E) of ALaMO in the early part of the
fifth year, with an Initial Operational Capability (IOC) later in that
same year.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES
Mr. Forbes. DOD disagreed with GAO's recommendation to only buy the
minimum quantity of ships to preserve the industrial base until a full-
rate production review is held in 2019. The Navy's most recent long-
range shipbuilding plan states that the Navy intends on purchasing two
ships per year in fiscal years 2016-2018, followed by three ships per
year in 2019. This is the minimum rate if there are two shipyards
building LCS. Does the Navy's disagreement with the GAO recommendation
mean that it has chosen to downselect to one shipyard as part of its
acquisition strategy going forward?
Secretary Stackley and Admiral Hunt. The Navy's decision to
continue procuring two ships per Fiscal Year in FYs 2016-2018, followed
by three ships per year in FY 2019, reflects the need to remain on the
critical path to meeting the Navy's Force Structure requirements as
outlined by the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). The LCS shipbuilding
profile is in alignment with the CNO's 2012 Navy Force Structure
Requirement and does not reflect the outcome of an acquisition
strategy. While the Navy is mindful of the need to preserve the
industrial base, the Navy disagreed with GAO's recommendation due to
the need to maintain the flexibility to consider the appropriate
procurement strategy in the context of the industrial base as well as
Department of Defense Strategic Guidance and the CNO's Force Structure
Requirement.
Mr. Forbes. The former Under Secretary of the Navy and others have
noted that each variant may be better suited for certain regions and
missions; has the Navy begun to assess the relative advantages of each
seaframe design and how will this affect the next contract award?
Secretary Stackley and Admiral Hunt. The Navy is evaluating its
follow-on acquisition strategy, which includes assessing the advantages
of each seaframe design. As part of this acquisition strategy, the Navy
will consider a number of factors in making its decision including
maintaining competition, overall cost and affordability, each variant's
operational performance, as well as the industrial base. All of these
factors will be assessed in the context of how to best meet the CNO's
Force Structure Requirement.
To date, both LCS variants provide the operational capability
required by the Navy and the Navy's decision to continue production of
both variants of ships was founded on the additional savings achieved
in procurement as well as the benefit to the industrial base. As the
two designs become more prevalent in the Fleet and gain additional
operational time, the Navy may find that some capabilities are enhanced
on one variant over the other and will evolve the ships as has been
done with past shipbuilding programs.
Mr. Forbes. Developmental testing to date of the mission modules--
especially the mine counter measures mission module--has shown
continued performance problems, with the technologies generally not
operating as intended. If the mission modules do not perform as
expected in operational testing, how will this affect the Navy's
planned purchase of seaframes and/or mission packages?
Secretary Stackley and Admiral Hunt. Navy is committed to achieving
Initial Operational Capability (IOC) for the three Littoral Combat Ship
Mission Packages, and following IOC each mission package will continue
to provide improved warfighting capabilities to the Fleet.
Through time-phased fielding of capability, Navy will be able to
rapidly field systems as they mature rather than waiting for the final
capability delivery. Further, the flexibility of this concept is that
if a technology does not meet a specified requirement, a determination
can be made to use the technology because of the operational value it
provides, or a different technology can be inserted into the mission
package without having to start a new system program. Currently the
capabilities of the initial increment of each Mission Module exceeds
capabilities existing in today's fleet. The result is a savings in both
reduced fielding time and overall cost.
As Navy prepares for the next procurement of LCS ships,
developmental and operational testing of the capabilities of each LCS
Class and associated Mission Package is being conducted and the results
will be used to inform future program decisions.
Mr. Forbes. In your 2010 testimony before the Congress, you note
that the block buy strategy for seaframe procurement did not require
the Navy to buy any ships after the first year and did not have
termination costs, thereby enabling the Congress and the Navy to have
continual oversight. Given the issues highlighted in GAO's recent
report, shouldn't we exercise this oversight and allow the Navy to
pause and figure out the design and capabilities that it wants in these
ships?
Secretary Stackley and Admiral Hunt. Navy does not believe a pause
is warranted in construction of the Littoral Combat Ships or the
Mission Packages. The required capability of the ships and Mission
Packages is well defined within its Capabilities Development Document
(CDD) and it is this capability that has been delivered to Navy with
the commissioning of USS FREEDOM (LCS 1), USS INDEPENDENCE (LCS 2), USS
FORT WORTH (LCS 3) and soon, USS CORONADO (LCS 4).
Since the 2010 testimony, significant strides have been made in
addressing key risks to ship production. For example, lessons learned
from the lead ships have been captured and thoroughly incorporated into
the production planning and processes. Lead ship design deficiencies
have been corrected and the design is very stable, with design changes
reduced by 80 to 90 percent in the follow ships. Both shipyards have
also made substantial investments in facility improvements and
workforce training which have greatly improved the accuracy and
efficiency in each ship's construction. The larger vendor base is also
leveraging the stability provided by the long-term LCS contract to
drive down cost. As a result of these improvements, the ship costs are
under control and are contained within the fixed-price contracts which
limit the Government's liability.
The LCS procurement strategy has not changed since the Block Buy
awards in December 2010. Navy will not be required to pay termination
or cancellation costs if the FY 2014 and FY 2015 ship contracts are not
funded. However, there are additional costs Navy would be required to
pay if the FY 2014 and FY 2015 Block Buy ships are not funded. Cost for
all ships under contract will be increased due to impact of lost
shipyard workload, inefficiencies, and production breaks in the vendor
base. The Navy's liability in this case extends to the contract ceiling
for LCS 5-LCS 16. Additionally, in the event of lost workload at Austal
USA, the Joint High Speed Vessel program cost would increase. Further,
insofar as these ships were procured within the framework of the highly
competitive fixed price contracts, Navy risks significant cost
increases to procure these ships in future years (which would be
necessary to meet Navy's requirement). Most importantly, a pause in
seaframe procurement would cause a significant impact on meeting Navy's
Force Structure for small surface combatants. LCS is central to meeting
the Force Structure requirement and pausing production would exacerbate
Navy's challenge in building to the right mix of ships as detailed in
the 30 year shipbuilding plan.
Mr. Forbes. Why was the Navy delegated acquisition authority for
the mission modules program from OSD? What steps do you intend on
taking to manage that program, given its continued performance
problems, delays in achieving milestones and aggressive acquisition
approach?
Secretary Stackley and Admiral Hunt. On October 3, 2012, USD(AT&L)
signed an Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM) designating the
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Mission Module Program as an ACAT IC program
and delegating the Milestone Decision Authority to the Navy. USD(AT&L)
retained approval authority for the initial Acquisition Program
Baseline (APB) for the LCS Mission Module Program.
The Navy will execute the normal, rigorous process to ensure that
the Mission Module procurement meets the specified requirements, and
that the costs are well understood. The Navy continues to perform
annual Navy Gate Review and Defense Acquisition Board Integrated
Program Reviews with USD(AT&L). Additionally, the Navy will continue to
rely on the LCS Council, with 3-star flag officer membership from
requirements, acquisition and fleet stakeholders, to drive actions and
coordinate all administrative control responsibilities.
The LCS Mission Modules are currently on track to deliver the
capability needed by the Navy, and they are doing so within the cost
targets established for the program. The greatest risk to the program
is not technical, it is the risk posed by disruption and delay caused
by continuing resolutions, sequestration and other budget reductions.
Mr. Forbes. The GAO report clearly lays out the delays in the
development and integration of the surface-to-surface missile for the
Surface Warfare Mission Package. According to the report, the Navy
plans to procure just one Griffin unit with eight Griffin IIB missiles
by 2015, but now even this plan has been delayed and may be
reconsidered. What is the way forward on the surface-to-surface
missile? Is the Navy planning to conduct an Analysis of Alternatives to
determine the best long-term material solution for this critical
component of the Surface Warfare package?
Admiral Hunt. The Navy suspended Surface-to-Surface Missile Module
(SSMM) Increment 1 (Griffin) activities during Fiscal Year 2013 in
order to assess alternative solutions which could provide increased
range and capability. The Navy is also planning on conducting a SSMM
Resources and Requirements Review board (R3B) in October 2013.
These events will help determine the SSMM path forward and revised
timeline.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN
Mr. Langevin. My understanding of the LCS program is that the ship
is critical to the Navy's network-centric warfare and intended to
replace three other classes of aging ships. Understanding the costs,
schedule, and performance items associated with the sustainment of this
program is important for us in Congress to make informed decisions
about the future of the programs. Focusing on the interesting
developments in USV and UUV technologies being integrated with the
mission packages, I am concerned by the recent July 2013 GAO report
that states, ``they do not believe the Navy has adequate knowledge
about how integrated mission module systems onboard an LCS will perform
in an operational environment.'' Additionally, the GAO report asserts
that the Navy will not be able to meet threshold capabilities defined
in its requirements documentation with mission modules integrated with
the seaframes until 2019. I'd be interested in your assessment of how
these critical technologies are being implemented within the LCS
program given the setbacks within the Mine Countermeasure Modules
(MCM).
Secretary Stackley. The Mine Countermeasures (MCM) and Surface
Warfare (SUW) Mission Packages are being delivered incrementally for
purposes of controlling cost and risk while fielding initial capability
in the most rapid manner practicable.
The initial increments for both of these Mission Packages meet or
exceed current capabilities in the Fleet today. Each of these Mission
Packages brings credible combat capability to the Fleet now for SUW and
for MCM in FY 2015.
Increment I of the MCM Mission Package uses a semi-submersible
vehicle called the Remote Multi-Mission Vehicle (RMMV), which tows the
AQS-20A minehunting sonar set. This system is called Remote Minehunting
System (RMS) and can operate under remote control, or execute a
programmed search in an autonomous mode to find mines either in the
water volume or on the bottom. This system has accumulated over 850
hours of successful testing to date and is scheduled for Initial
Operational Capability (IOC) in FY 2015. Increment II will incorporate
an unmanned surface vehicle to conduct sustained influence minesweeping
capability, and is scheduled for IOC in FY 2017. The last planned
increment will use the Knifefish Unmanned Undersea Vehicle (UUV) for
buried mind detection, and is scheduled for IOC in FY 2019.
Mr. Langevin. We recently held a hearing on the Asia-Pacific
Rebalance; I'd be interested in hearing your thoughts on how the LCS
would be utilized within an A2/AD environment.
Secretary Stackley and Admiral Hunt. LCS, with a surface, anti-
submarine, or mine countermeasures Mission Package embarked, is
designed to conduct littoral operations within an Anti-Access/Area
Denial (A2/AD) environment. LCS will be a vital component of any A2/AD
operations, whether clearing mines, identifying enemy submarines or
protecting high value units from hostile, swarming surface craft.
Littoral Combat Ships are able to respond to threats quickly with speed
(40 plus knots), maneuverability, a shallow draft and the unique
capacity to respond with a variety of networked off-board systems.
LCS is designed to operate independently or in surface action
groups in low-to-medium threat environments. As a small surface
combatant, LCS was not envisioned to operate independently in a high
air threat environment. Rather, LCS will be networked as part of a
battle force including multi-mission, deep water surface combatants and
air assets to defend against elevated A2/AD threats such as high-volume
Anti-Ship Cruise Missile (ASCM) raids, Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles
(ASBMs), and tactical air threats. While LCS has a very capable self-
defense capability, in situations where the threat of complex and high
volume anti-ship missile attack is high, LCS will operate with Strike
Group assets or area air defense capable ships.
In addition to Mission Package weapons and systems, LCS will use
its speed, organic weapons (including 57mm gun, decoys, chaff, and the
RAM and SeaRAM missile system) and sensors to counter surface and air
threats in the littorals. Further, LCS has equal or greater self-
defense capability compared to today's small surface combatants
including Frigates, Mine Countermeasure Ships and Coastal Patrol Craft.
Mr. Langevin. We recently held a hearing on the Asia-Pacific
Rebalance; I'd be interested in hearing your thoughts on how the LCS
would be utilized within an A2/AD environment.
Mr. Francis. Since GAO has not completed work on this topic, we
would suggest that you please direct this question to the Navy for a
response.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WITTMAN
Mr. Wittman. Much of the savings and efficiencies of the LCS, the
forward deployment plan, the mission modules, personnel reductions,
logistics supply chains are all ``works in progress''. When do you
expect to have this complete ``LCS system'' up and running--that means
enough mission modules that have been tested and proven deployed to the
appropriate location with the correct personnel to support them and the
supply chain necessary for this bold concept of operations? When this
entire system is up and running and the expected efficiencies are
finally realized--the LCS hulls will be 10/15 years, over one third of
their hull life will be expired before the efficiencies of the LCS are
fully realized?
Secretary Stackley. By Fiscal Year 2016, all three mission packages
will have achieved Initial Operating Capacity (IOC). By Fiscal Year
2018, the support facilities for Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) and the
mission modules will be operational on both East and West Coasts and in
two forward operating stations.
In the 3:2:1 rotational crewing concept, three crews rotate between
two LCS, with one ship for every two LCS operating forward, providing
persistent presence in the Pacific Command (PACOM) and Central Command
(CENTCOM) areas of responsibility. Under this concept, with 52 LCS,
Navy will be able to continually forward-operate 26 LCS. In the current
Navy deployment model for single-crewed cruisers, destroyers and
frigates, the Navy would require more than one hundred ships to
maintain the equivalent level of presence of 52 LCS. The LCS program
remains an economical method to address warfighting capability gaps
while providing sizable global forward presence.
In Fiscal Year 2018, the Navy's fleet will include 20 LCS. USS
FREEDOM (LCS 1) and USS INDEPENDENCE (LCS 2), which delivered in 2008
and 2010, respectively, will be the only two LCS that will be near the
10 year point of their service life.
By contrast, LCS 5--LCS 20, will be less than four years old at the
point when the LCS system is ``up and running'' with tested and fully
supported ships and Mission Packages.
Mr. Wittman. How has the Navy ensured compliance with Title 10
maintenance requirements for U.S. homeported ships while supporting LCS
1 forward deployed? And, what will be the ultimate plan for supporting
multiple hulls in both Singapore and Bahrain?
Secretary Stackley. Title 10 Section 7310 states ``A naval vessel
the homeport of which is in the United States or Guam may not be
overhauled, repaired, or maintained in a shipyard outside the United
States or Guam, other than in the case of voyage repairs.'' USS
FREEDOM's homeport during the current deployment to the Western Pacific
remains San Diego, and therefore the Navy is providing required labor
and technical expertise for regularly scheduled Preventive Maintenance
Availability Periods (PMAV's) and Restricted Availability Periods
(RAV's) via fly away teams consisting of United States based labor
sources.
Navy has ensured compliance with Title 10 maintenance requirements
by using U.S.-based ``flyaway teams'' of U.S. contractors (prime/
subprime) for ship and mission module maintenance. Lockheed Martin (LM)
also maintains a team in Singapore in order to coordinate logistics,
scheduling, planning, quality assurance, liaison with local contractors
and Navy, and supervise facilities maintenance. Emergent maintenance,
or voyage repairs, can be performed by either flyaway teams or local
contractors in accordance with Title 10.
The Navy's ultimate plan for supporting multiple hulls in Singapore
and Bahrain is to have permanent facilities in place at those
locations, which will provide storage, staging and laydown of required
tools, parts and equipment, as well as providing workshops for U.S.
Navy personnel and contractor teams. The ultimate composition of
maintenance teams remains to be determined, but the Navy will continue
to follow all current and future Title 10 regulations.
Mr. Wittman. VADM Hunt, how critical is the ASW mission module to
the LCS mission? In 2008 the Navy cancelled the ASW project on LCS
after the module showed that it did not contribute significantly to ASW
capabilities. The Navy changed the requirements for the module to
include a capability that would function in deep-water escort missions
of high-value ships and submarines? VADM Hunt, the LCS has been pitched
to us as a littoral combat ship that would operate at high speed and
independently deploy. With the ASW module, is the idea now to integrate
LCS into a Strike Group type scenario for escort duty? I can buy the
MCM and SUW modules and filling the MCM and PC gaps in the fleet, but
the frigate replacement seems like a stretch to me. Is the ASW module a
bridge to far? You have 22 Cruisers and 62 (and counting) DDGs that
have advanced ASW combat systems suites. Is this a needed capability in
the LCS?
Admiral Hunt. The LCS's ASW Mission Package (MP) is critical to the
LCS mission and to the Fleet's overall ASW capability. LCS is capable
of prosecuting a threat submarine from detection to engagement, on its
own or in concert with other ships. The change from a static, barrier
ASW capability to a mobile, ``in-stride'' ASW capability allows an ASW
MP-equipped LCS to operate as part of a Strike Group if required. In
that case, the LCS's ASW capabilities would complement those of the
other ships and aviation assets to better defend aircraft carriers and
other high-value ships. LCS significantly enhances the ASW Commander's
capability to maintain undersea battlespace awareness, counter quiet
threat submarines, and protect critical Fleet assets.
LCS with an ASW MP provides this enhanced capability not only in
deep water with a Strike Group, but also in littoral regions where FFG
7/CG 47/DDG 51 Class ships may have limited access.
The LCS, equipped with an ASW Mission Package, provides greater ASW
capability than the current FFG 7, CG 47, and DDG 51 classes,
particularly in a littoral environment. Those ships carry hull-mounted
SONAR whose effectiveness is limited against a submarine hiding below
an acoustic layer defined by temperature and pressure. The ASW MP
provides a variable-depth SONAR that can be placed below this layer to
detect these threats. This SONAR also provides a continuously-active
acoustic source to provide an uninterrupted flow of data to the LCS.
Current SONAR systems employed on other Navy ships must transmit pulsed
signals through the water, listen, and then transmit again. This
provides a less detailed SONAR ``picture'' to the ship. Together with
the variable-depth SONAR, the continuously-active acoustic source
allows an LCS to both detect submarines at longer ranges and better
detect submarines that are able to hide from currently-fielded SONAR
systems. The ASW MP also provides a towed torpedo decoy system, the
Light Weight Tow persistent torpedo decoy system, that has the
equivalent functionality of the AN/SLQ-25 NIXIE employed by the FFG 7,
CG 47, and DDG 51 classes, but which has an operating envelope that
supports lower speed and shallower water operation. Finally, the LCS
also is able to operate its sensors at a higher speed than those
classes.
Mr. Wittman. Admiral Hunt, in light of the Admiral Wray report from
last year which highlighted various long-term sustainment challenges,
can you please provide specific examples of how the LCS Council has
addressed some of these shortfalls and affected change for long-term
sustainment of the platform?
Admiral Hunt. The LCS Council has been an integral leadership body
in addressing the shortfalls identified in Admiral Wray's report.
Issues addressed by the LCS Council include a variety of solutions
designed to improve reliability and sustainment of the ship and its
equipment. Some examples are improving hydraulic systems reliability,
for the INDEPENDENCE class ships, installing redesigned water jet
controls for increased robustness to FREEEDOM (LCS 1) and adding
electrical feedback loops to replace mechanical cables on INDEPENDENCE
class ships (LCS 2 & 4 scheduled for post-delivery installation).
In order to ensure the long-term material sustainment of LCS, Class
Maintenance Plans (CMPs) for both FREEDOM and INDEPENDENCE classes were
created by the shipbuilders. Surface Maintenance Engineering Planning
Program (SURFMEPP) engineers conduct a continuous technical review of
the plans to ensure accuracy. A Maintenance Efficiency Review (MER) was
completed in March 2013, resulting in the realignment of FREEEDOM (LCS
1) Planned Maintenance between the core crew and ashore maintenance
teams. This ensures required upkeep is fully accomplished with proper
accountability and quality assurance measures with plans to realign
planned maintenance on INDEPENDENCE (LCS 2) in the future.
Per LCS Council decision, the Navy added ten additional crew
members to the core-crew to increase organic capacity for preventative
and corrective maintenance in order to further enhance organic
maintenance accomplishment rates. FREEDOM's current deployment is a
test-bed for several improved maintenance efforts yielding positive
results. Specifically, installed Reliability Engineering/Condition
Based Maintenance (RE/CBM) sensors identified material deficiencies in
the ship's air compressors prior to catastrophic failure, allowing for
a preemptive repair (vice an unplanned industrial availability) and
increasing the time the equipment was available for use.
Mr. Wittman. VADM Hunt, as of last month you have contracted 24
seaframes and procured 8 mission modules. You are on track to have a
total of 52 seaframes and maintaining a balance of 16 ASW, 24 MCM, and
24 SUW modules. What is the target for optimal and efficient manning
for the hulls and the modules?
Admiral Hunt. As Navy gains operational experience with LCS, the
Navy will continue to refine the optimal number of billets and rates of
Sailors in the LCS core crew and Mission Package detachments. The OPNAV
Readiness Review that was conducted by RADM Perez, as well as multiple
war games and studies, have demonstrated the need for additional core
crew. The additional sailors will increase operational flexibility,
enhance embarked maintenance capability, and support robust shipboard
Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) missions when in stationed in
austere forward locations.
As a result of these reviews and studies, USS FREEDOM (LCS 1)
deployed to the Western Pacific in early 2013 with ten additional core
crew members. Navy leadership will use the lessons learned from this
deployment to inform any permanent manning changes. Navy also recently
decided to add five Sailors to the Mine Countermeasures (MCM) Mission
Package detachment, increasing the total number of personnel from 15 to
20. This decision was made to ensure the detachment is able to fully
meet the maintenance and handling requirements of the unmanned vehicles
that are the center of the MCM Mission Package. The change was made
based upon lessons learned during operational tests and evaluations.
The number of Sailors for each Anti-Submarine Warfare Mission Package
detachment remains at 15 Sailors, while the Surface Warfare Mission
Package manning requirement remains at 19 Sailors.
The potential increases in the core crew and the Mission Package
are not significant departures from the minimal manning construct. The
core crew is still within the threshold requirement of 50 personnel,
and total crew manning remains below the threshold of 100 total
Sailors.
Mr. Wittman. VADM Hunt, what is the estimated procurement cost and
life cycle maintenance cost of one mine warfare mission module? One
hull costs $460-$480M a piece, while module cost seems to be in the
range of $45-$59M a piece. We want this ship to replace the PCs, the
MCMs, and the FFGs . . . Can this ship really replace the FFG mission?
Would it be as or more affordable/cost effective to build a new FFG?
Admiral Hunt. Based on the Navy's official Service Cost Position of
6 February 2013, the Mine Countermeasures Mission Package has an
initial procurement cost of $97.7M per unit, with an estimated ``life
cycle maintenance'' cost of $340.1M over 30 years that includes costs
for operation and sustainment, replacement/attrition/technology
refresh, and disposal.
The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) will be more capable than the Oliver
Hazard Perry Class Frigate (FFG), Patrol Craft (PC), and Mine
Countermeasure (MCM) ships. The Navy's strategy calls for a ship to be
capable of operating in a wide range of environments ranging from the
open ocean to coastal or littoral waters. The LCS's high speed and low
draft design make the ship uniquely qualified to operate in this wide
range of environments. While both of these design features are key
capabilities, the ship's true capability is its flexibility to be
configured to perform any of the capabilities resident in an FFG, PC or
MCM, and the LCS will be able to do so with capability that exceeds
that of any of these current platforms.
The Surface Warfare (SUW) capability of the LCS is far superior to
that of an FFG or PC. The embarked armed helicopter, 30mm and 57mm
guns, as well as LCS's much greater speed give LCS a superior counter-
swarm capability. The Surface to Surface Missile Module (SSMM) will
further improve over time as an extended range missile capability is
phased into the ship's arsenal. A SUW Mission Package (MP) is also
configured so that LCS can conduct Visit Board Search and Seizure
(VBSS), Maritime Interception Operations (MIO), and Intelligence,
Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) as proficiently as an FFG, and in
certain mission areas, with increased capabilities.
When comparing a legacy MCM ship to an LCS, the MCM MP will almost
double Navy's legacy capability when the first increment meets its
Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in FY 2015. For example, the
Remote Minehunting System (RMS) will provide autonomous clearance of a
minefield, taking the ship and the crew out of harm's way while doing
so at an increased clearance rate over the MCM's. Future increments
will further improve the Navy's ability to find and clear minefields
throughout the water column as well as in the beach landing zone.
The Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) MP-configured LCS will also
provide far greater ASW capability than the FFG 7 Class. The LCS ASW MP
complements and expands the detection ranges of today's Strike Group
through unique systems such as a variable depth, continuously active
sonar system. With improved detection ranges and its ability to operate
sensors at increased speeds, LCS significantly enhances the ASW
Commander's capability to maintain undersea battlespace awareness,
counter quiet submarines, and protect critical Fleet assets. LCS with
ASW MP provides this enhanced capability not only in deep water with a
Strike Group, but also in littoral regions. The ASW MP's Light Weight
Towed Torpedo Decoy will provide superior torpedo defense capability
than the AN/SLQ-25 Nixie system carried by the FFG.
A new FFG Class would be neither affordable nor able to be fielded
in a timely manner compared to the current LCS Class. The Navy would be
forced to incur the high cost and lengthy process of starting a new
ship acquisition. Additionally, the legacy ships would have to undergo
a costly Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) during the restart of a
new program until the replacement FFGs are in-service. The Navy would
also be left without a key future component to its global forward
presence. The LCS program includes the 3:2:1 rotational crewing concept
that provides for three crews to rotate between two LCS, with one ship
for every two LCS operating forward. This concept provides persistent
presence in the Pacific Command (PACOM) and Central Command (CENTCOM)
areas of responsibility. Under the rotational crewing concept, with 52
LCS, Navy will be able to continually forward-operate 26 LCS. In the
current Navy deployment model for single-crewed cruisers, destroyers
and frigates, the Navy would require more than one hundred ships to
maintain the equivalent level of presence of 52 LCS. The LCS program
remains an economical method to address warfighting capability gaps
while providing sizable global forward presence. The LCS program is the
Navy's most affordable warship program, and the ship is on the critical
path to meeting the Navy's force structure requirements as outlined by
the Chief of Naval Operations.
Mr. Wittman. In April the Chief of Navy Reserve testified before
the Senate Appropriations Committee Defense Subcommittee
``The Navy Reserve provides daily operational support and is a
potent force multiplier that is leveraged on a daily basis to support
Navy missions. Examples of the Navy Reserve's support to Navy and Joint
Warfighting efforts include:
Reserve Sailors are currently augmenting the first LCS deployment
aboard USS Freedom (LCS-1).''
VADM Hunt, how do you see the Navy Reserve force augmenting the
Active duty force in the future and as more hulls and modules enter the
fleet? With all options on the table to find efficiencies and cost
savings, do reserve units and Sailors offer a long-term force
multiplier to the LCS community and do you see this capability growing
in the future?
Admiral Hunt. The Navy Reserve provides essential operational
support to the Fleet. The LCS Council has been studying further use of
the Navy Reserve with the Littoral Combat Ship program as more ships
and mission modules enter the Fleet. Navy leadership has determined
Reserve Component Sailors will serve in conjunction with the Mission
Packages and Aviation Detachments, including the unmanned Fire Scout
system.
Reserve Component Sailors provide CONUS/OCONUS maintenance of
Mission Packages and Littoral Combat Ships. With respect to LCS
Aviation Detachments, the Reserve Component cannot assume the entire
mission, but they can provide limited Aviation Detachment support as
well as Fire Scout training at shore bases.
In Fiscal Year 2013, Reserve Component manning entailed 387 billets
in 13 detachments throughout the country, providing administrative,
logistics, training, maintenance and watch standing support. Future
plans anticipate growth to approximately 1000 billets in 20 detachments
providing a minimum of 20,000 man days of support per year.
Mr. Wittman. Admiral, in response to a question posed at a HASC
hearing in February 2012 about LCS crew swap, you mentioned that the
most significant savings associated with flying ship crews overseas is
the cost avoidance of the fuel required for the ship transiting and the
cost of the associated support ships. Transporting a ship's crew--even
a relatively small LCS crew--between the United States and a foreign
port seems to present a significant logistical challenge. Commercial
aviation is expensive, lacks flexibility, and is not a viable option in
an environment of heightened tensions or conflict.
You stated that the Navy was examining the viability of using Navy
Unique Fleet Essential Airlift (NUFEA) to transport crews, cargo and
support personnel in both peacetime and wartime for OCONUS LCS crew
swaps. According to your statement, the Navy could leverage its own air
logistics capability to enhance operational readiness at a significant
cost savings.
a. You have recently completed a crew swap of USS FREEDOM (LCS-1).
Did the Navy use its NUFEA capability to accomplish this swap?
b. If so, did you find that the utilization of air logistics assets
controlled and operated by Navy was a force enhancer and effectively
supported the operational capabilities of LCS 1?
c. Your initial analysis concluded that using Navy air logistics
assets would also be more cost effective than commercial means.
Considering the crew swap model is in place to save steaming dollars
and you have found that Navy airlift can execute the mission at a low
relatively low cost, does the Navy plan to pursue the crew swap model
with any other class of ships?
Admiral Hunt. On July 31, 2013, Navy executed the very first
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) crew swap evolution. A single Navy C-40A
Clipper, a Navy Unique Fleet Essential Airlift (NUFEA) asset, was used
to execute the crew swap. The USS FREEDOM (LCS 1) Blue Crew--consisting
of 76 personnel from ship's company, mission module detachment, and
aviation detachment personnel--was safely delivered to Paya Lebar Air
Base in Singapore. Following a successful turnover of the ship, the LCS
1 Gold Crew was returned to Continental United States (CONUS) on August
07, 2013, utilizing the Navy C-40A aircraft.
The Navy determined that NUFEA provided the most operationally
effective and fiscally efficient method to execute the LCS crew swap
mission. The flexibility and responsiveness of Navy's organic airlift
assets were critical success factors for this mission. The operational
schedule of a forward deployed surface combatant, especially in the
Pacific Area of Responsibility, is extremely dynamic and subject to the
demands of ever-changing world events. This requires air logistics
support that is flexible and able to respond quickly as the ship's
operational schedule changes. Since Navy operates and schedules NUFEA
assets to support Navy's mission, they are uniquely suited to fulfill
this requirement.
Cost analysis was an important consideration when determining how
to source the LCS crew swap mission. Examination of the options
revealed that Navy saved a significant amount of money using its own
airlift vice relying on other airlift options (e.g. commercial,
contract or other services' flights). The LCS crew swap model was
developed to save ship steaming and maintenance dollars, and NUFEA is
an important part of this model.
In addition to being the most cost effective mechanism to execute
this air logistics requirement, utilizing the Navy's NUFEA assets
enabled FREEDOM's crews to maintain crew integrity throughout the
evolution. This permitted an entire crew-to-crew turnover, instead of
having to conduct the turnover in multiple iterations if the crew were
unable to travel as a unit. Keeping the crew intact during the airlift
mission was also essential to ensure force protection--and therefore
safety--of FREEDOM's crews.
Due to the success of the first crew swap, Navy plans to use NUFEA
assets to execute future LCS crew swap missions. There are no plans to
conduct crew swap with other classes of ship, but if that option were
pursued by Navy leadership, NUFEA would be a logical choice.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SPEIER
Ms. Speier. My office has been told that the LCS 1 deployment to
Singapore relied more heavily upon a ship rider than is typical for the
Navy, and that some are concerned this may be undermining the ability
of the sailors to operate the ship in the future. Are contractors
performing functions that should be performed by sailors so they can
operate their own ship? How do you know if the training pipeline is
working if contractors are supplementing the crew?
Admiral Hunt. During the deployment of USS FREEDOM (LCS 1) to the
Western Pacific there have been Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) on board
providing technical assistance to the crew as required. SMEs aboard USS
FREEDOM are not performing any functions assigned to the officers or
enlisted Sailors of FREEDOM's crew.
The first overseas deployment of USS FREEDOM will provide lessons
learned which will be examined and applied as needed to the shore based
training curriculums in preparation for follow on LCS crew operations
and deployments.
Ms. Speier. What oversight plan would you recommend for Congress
between now and the next block buy decision? Please includes dates of
key decision points, information Congress should know before those
decision points, and possible indicators of increased cost, schedule,
and general program risk.
Mr. Francis. Congress has several options for providing oversight
between now and the next block buy decision in 2016. We highlighted a
number of these options in our recent report (GAO-13-530) and they are
also reflected in the table below.
As shown in the table below, in each fiscal year from now (fiscal
year 2013) through fiscal year 2015, Congress is faced with a number of
decisions regarding the future of the LCS program, including
authorizing and appropriating seaframes and mission modules, and
ultimately authorizing the next block buy contract. At the same time,
the Navy plans to complete a series of events over the next couple of
years, including tests and trials, as well as submissions of Milestone
documentation and analytical studies--each of which represent
opportunities to gain further insight into the program's performance
and enable Congress to make well informed funding decisions (see ``Navy
Events/Oversight Opportunities''). Milestone documentation may provide
an indication of increased cost, schedule, and program risk. For
example, consistent with our recommendation, Congress may choose to
request that the Navy submit an approved acquisition program baseline
for the mission modules that accounts for the threshold and objective
cost, schedule, and performance targets for each mission module
increment before authorizing future mission module procurements.
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Fiscal Year
Congressional Decision Navy Events/Oversight Opportunities GAO Recommendations
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2013 Authorize and LCS 1 Singapore deployment Restrict FY14 ship funding until
appropriate FY14 LCS 4 Acceptance Trials Navy:
funding: 4 ships, 4 Aluminum structure testing Completes ongoing technical and
mission packages (survivability) design studies
Mission Module Milestone B Determines impacts of design
(including approval of cost, changes
schedule, performance baseline and Reports on plans to improve
test plans) commonality
Capability Production Documents Reports on cost-benefit analysis of
(requirements) for Mission Package seaframe changes; commonality
Increments improvements
Studies evaluating changes to Buy minimum number of modules needed
increase commonality and add for operational testing.
capability and requirements
Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) In-
process Review (annual OSD-AT&L
review of program)
Submission of Long Range
Shipbuilding Plan
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2014 Authorize and SUW Inc I and Inc II Operational If the Navy is approved by USD AT&L
appropriate FY15 Testing (Freedom variant) to award additional seaframe block
funding: 4 ships, 4 DOT&E operational assessments buy contracts for LCS 25 and
mission packages Total Ship Survivability Trials beyond, ensure that it only
(Freedom variant) procures the minimum sustaining
Capability requirements for next rate (1 ship per year for each
Block Buy contract finalized shipyard) until successful
Contract award for long-term completion of full-rate production
maintenance review (scheduled for FY19)
DAB In-process Review (annual AT&L
review of program) Require Navy to report on relative
Submission of Long Range advantages of each seaframe before
Shipbuilding Plan awarding the next Block Buy
contract.
Buy minimum number of modules
needed for operational testing.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2015 Authorize and Acquisition strategy for next If the Navy is approved by USD AT&L
appropriate FY16 Block Buy contract finalized to award additional seaframe block
funding: 2 ships, 6 Solicit proposals and source buy contracts for LCS 25 and
mission packages selection for next Block Buy beyond, ensure that it only
contract procures the minimum sustaining
Authorize next SUW Inc I and Inc II Operational rate (1 ship per year for each
seaframe contract(s) Testing (Independence variant) shipyard) until successful
(Second Block Buy MCM Inc I Operational Testing completion of full-rate production
contract) (Independence variant) review (scheduled for FY19)
DOT&E operational assessments
Total Ship Survivability Trials Require Navy to report on relative
(Independence variant) advantages of each seaframe before
DAB In-process Review (annual awarding the next Block Buy
AT&L review of program) contract.
Submission of Long Range
Shipbuilding Plan Buy minimum number of modules
needed for operational testing.
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