[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
HOW SECURE IS VETERANS' PRIVACY INFORMATION?
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS
of the
COMMITTEE ON VETERANS' AFFAIRS
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
TUESDAY, JUNE 4, 2013
__________
Serial No. 113-21
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Veterans' Affairs
______
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COMMITTEE ON VETERANS' AFFAIRS
JEFF MILLER, Florida, Chairman
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine, Ranking
GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida Minority Member
DAVID P. ROE, Tennessee CORRINE BROWN, Florida
BILL FLORES, Texas MARK TAKANO, California
JEFF DENHAM, California JULIA BROWNLEY, California
JON RUNYAN, New Jersey DINA TITUS, Nevada
DAN BENISHEK, Michigan ANN KIRKPATRICK, Arizona
TIM HUELSKAMP, Kansas RAUL RUIZ, California
MARK E. AMODEI, Nevada GLORIA NEGRETE MCLEOD, California
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado ANN M. KUSTER, New Hampshire
BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio BETO O'ROURKE, Texas
PAUL COOK, California TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota
JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana
Helen W. Tolar, Staff Director and Chief Counsel
______
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado, Chairman
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado ANN KIRKPATRICK, Arizona, Ranking
DAVID P. ROE, Tennessee Minority Member
TIM HUELSKAMP, Kansas MARK TAKANO, California
DAN BENISHEK, Michigan ANN M. KUSTER, New Hampshire
JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana BETO O'ROURKE, Texas
TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota
Pursuant to clause 2(e)(4) of Rule XI of the Rules of the House, public
hearing records of the Committee on Veterans' Affairs are also
published in electronic form. The printed hearing record remains the
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of converting between various electronic formats may introduce
unintentional errors or omissions. Such occurrences are inherent in the
current publication process and should diminish as the process is
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C O N T E N T S
__________
June 4, 2013
Page
How Secure Is Veterans' Privacy Information?..................... 1
OPENING STATEMENTS
Hon. Mike Coffman, Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigations................................................. 1
Prepared Statement of Hon. Coffman........................... 54
Hon. Ann Kirkpatrick, Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on
Oversight and Investigations................................... 2
Prepared Statement of Hon. Kirkpatrick....................... 55
Hon. Jackie Walorski, Member, Committee on Veterans' Affairs,
U.S. House of Representatives, Prepared Statement only......... 55
WITNESSES
Linda A. Halliday, Assistant Inspector General for Audits and
Evaluations, Office of Inspector General, U.S. Department of
Veterans Affairs............................................... 3
Prepared Statement of Ms. Halliday........................... 55
Accompanied by:
Ms. Sondra McCauley, Deputy Assistant Inspector General for
Audits and Evaluations, Office of Inspector General,
U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs
Mr. Michael Bowman, Director, Information Technology and
Security Audits Division, Office of Inspector General,
U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs
Stephen W. Warren, Acting Assistant Secretary for Information and
Technology, U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs................ 17
Prepared Statement of Mr. Warren............................. 61
Accompanied by:
Mr. Stan Lowe, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Information
Security, Office of Information and Technology, U.S.
Department of Veterans Affairs
Jerry L. Davis, Former Deputy Assistant Secretary for Information
Security, Office of Information and Technology, U.S. Department
of Veterans Affairs............................................ 41
Prepared Statement of Mr. Davis.............................. 62
Executive Summary of Mr. Davis............................... 65
QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD
Letter From: Hon. Coffman, Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight &
Investigations, To: U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs........ 65
Questions From: Hon. Coffman, To: U.S. Department of Veterans
Affairs........................................................ 66
Questions From: Hon. Huelskamp, To: U.S. Department of Veterans
Affairs........................................................ 67
Questions and Responses From: U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs 67
HOW SECURE IS VETERANS' PRIVACY INFORMATION?
Tuesday, June 4, 2013
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Veterans' Affairs,
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations,
Washington, D.C.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:50 p.m., in
Room 334, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Mike Coffman
[Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Coffman, Lamborn, Roe, Huelskamp,
Walorski, Kirkpatrick, O'Rourke, and Walz.
OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN COFFMAN
Mr. Coffman. Good afternoon. I would like to welcome
everyone to today's hearing titled ``How Secure is Veterans'
Private Information?'' Reports from VA's Office of Inspector
General, private inspector consultants brought on by VA, and
this Subcommittee's own investigation have revealed tremendous
problems within VA's Office of Information and Technology. Some
of these issues have been made public in the Inspector General
reports which outline mismanagement of human measures and the
lack of much-needed technical expertise.
Other issues have been less publicized, such as those
captured in the Deloitte, quote/unquote, ``DeepDive'' that
identified gaps in OI&T's organizational structure and a poorly
executed business model. The latter report recognized the
growth of VA by 33 percent since 2006, growth that is mirrored
by the expansion of VA's computer network. Unfortunately, there
has not been a comparable growth in the technical personnel
needed to manage security of VA's sprawling network.
These failures have created problems for both the
Department and for veterans. The Inspector General
substantiated that VA was transmitting sensitive data,
including personally identifiable information and internal
network routing information, over an unencrypted
telecommunications carrier network, both violations of Federal
regulation and basic IT security. The IG also noted that VA has
not implemented technical configuration controls to ensure
encryption of sensitive data, despite VA and Federal
information security requirements.
Similarly, it is evident that software patches are not up-
to-date across the network, too many users have administrative
access, security software is not up-to-date on older computers,
and computer ports are not properly secured. There is little to
no security of file transfer protocol and Web pages are
vulnerable, allowing unauthorized access to veterans'
unprotected personal information within the system.
While these issues alone give cause for grave concern, this
Subcommittee's investigation has identified even greater
problems. The entire veteran database in VA, containing
personally identifiable information on roughly 20 million
veterans, is not encrypted, and evidence suggests that it has
repeatedly been compromised since 2010 by foreign actors,
including China and possibly by Russia.
Recently, the Subcommittee discussed VA's authorization to
operate, a formal declaration that authorizes operation of a
product on VA's network which explicitly accepts the risk to
agency operators and was told that, quote, ``VA's secrecy
posture was never at risk,'' unquote. In fact, VA's security
posture has been an unacceptable risk for at least 3 years as
sophisticated actors use weaknesses in VA's security posture to
exploit the system and remove veterans' information and system
passwords. While VA knew foreign intruders had been in the
network, the Department was never sure what exactly these
foreign actors took because the outgoing data was encrypted by
the trespassers.
These actors have had constant access to VA systems and
data, information which included unencrypted databases
containing hundreds of thousands to millions of instances of
veterans' information, such as veterans' and dependents' names,
Social Security numbers, dates of birth, and protected health
information. Notwithstanding these problems, VA has waived or
arbitrarily extended accreditation of its security system on
its network. It is evident that VA's waivers or extensions of
accreditation only appear to resolve material weaknesses
without actually resolving those weaknesses.
VA's IT management knowingly accepted the security risk by
waiving the security requirements even though such waivers are
not appropriate. This lapse in computer security and the
subsequent attempts by VA officials to conceal this problem are
intolerable, and I look forward to a candid discussion about
these issues.
I now yield to Ranking Member Kirkpatrick for her opening
statement.
[The prepared statement of Chairman Coffman appears in the
Appendix]
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ANN KIRKPATRICK
Mrs. Kirkpatrick. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As the Department of Veterans Affairs works hard to serve
the needs of today's veterans, they must work equally hard to
protect their personal information. Today's hearing is an
attempt to determine whether a veteran's private information is
secure.
Mr. Chairman, veterans need to know that when they ask the
VA for services and benefits that they have earned, the
information they submit in order to get those benefits will not
be compromised under any circumstances. I hope that the VA came
prepared today to provide assurances to Congress and veterans
that their information technology systems are secure. We expect
VA to also answer our questions directly and honestly. As we
get questions from veterans in our district, we want to provide
complete and honest answers to them.
Congress received a letter from Mr. Jerry L. Davis, now a
former employee at the VA, who states that, quote, ``There is a
clear and present danger and risk of exposure and compromise of
sensitive data,'' end quote.
Mrs. Kirkpatrick. I share the Chairman's concern on whether
VA is following the required government practices and policies
regarding the monitoring and remediation of system risk.
Two OIG reports, from 2012 and 2013, raised additional
concerns. The 2012 report questions whether the agency has the
proper strategic human capital management program to meet
mission-critical system capabilities as the VA moves into the
21st century. The second, 2013, OIG report faults VA for
failing to secure private information by not encrypting health
data transmitted to outpatient clinics and external business
partners. The VA must address the concerns raised and assure
veterans who come to the VA for assistance that their personal
information is secure.
I want to thank everyone for being here today. I would also
like to thank the witnesses for their testimony and for
answering questions about the security of veterans' private
information at the Department of Veterans Affairs.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Kirkpatrick appears in the
Appendix]
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Ranking Member Kirkpatrick.
I would now like to welcome our first panel to the witness
table. On this panel we will hear from Ms. Linda Halliday,
Assistant Inspector General for Audits and Evaluations from the
VA's Office of Inspector General. Accompanying Ms. Halliday is
Ms. Sondra McCauley, Deputy Assistant Inspector General for
Audits and Evaluations, and Mr. Michael Bowman, Director of the
Information Technology and Security Audits Division.
Before I recognize the panel, I ask that you please rise
and raise your right hand.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Coffman. Ms. Halliday, you are now recognized for 5
minutes.
TESTIMONY OF LINDA A. HALLIDAY, ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR
AUDITS AND EVALUATIONS, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, ACCOMPANIED BY SONDRA MCCAULEY,
DEPUTY ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AUDITS AND EVALUATIONS,
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS
AFFAIRS, AND MICHAEL BOWMAN, DIRECTOR, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
AND SECURITY AUDITS DIVISION, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS
Ms. Halliday. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee,
thank you for the opportunity to testify on VA's security of
veterans private information. With me today are Ms. Sondra
McCauley, my deputy, and Mr. Michael Bowman, the Director of
the OIG's Information Technology Security Division.
Secure systems and networks are essential to VA's programs
and operations for delivering benefits and services to our
Nation's veterans, yet OIG reports continue to disclose a
pattern of ineffective information security which places VA at
unnecessary risk. For more than 10 consecutive years, our
consolidated financial statement audit reports have identified
IT security as a material weakness.
We also perform annual reviews of VA's compliance with the
requirements of the Federal Information Security Management
Act, known as FISMA. This act serves as a catalyst for
developing the framework to protect agency IT systems and
sensitive information.
As last year's FISMA audit progressed, we did note VA
focused more efforts to standardize information security
controls. Mid-year in 2012, VA initiated CRISP, the Continuous
Readiness and Information Security Program, to ensure year-
round monitoring and to establish a team responsible for
resolving the IT material weakness. However, CRISP was not in
place long enough to adequately improve the material weakness
for last year's FISMA report. The report will be issued this
month and will include 32 recommendations for improving VA's
information security program.
We found repeat weaknesses and vulnerabilities in four key
areas. In the area of system access, we found password
standards that were not consistently implemented and user
accounts that were not enforcing minimal access privileges.
In the area of configuration management, we found critical
systems lacked appropriate baseline controls and up-to-date
vulnerability patches. Also, the policies and procedures for
authorizing, testing, and approval of system changes were not
consistently implemented.
In the area of security management, VA still had to address
about 4,000 outstanding security vulnerabilities. We found its
risk assessments and security plans were outdated and in some
instances were not consistently put in place to reflect VA's
current IT environment or Federal standards.
In the fourth area, contingency planning, we found some
plans were not fully tested or updated, and in addition, backup
tapes were not always encrypted prior to being sent to offsite
storage. More importantly, we continue to identify significant
technical weaknesses in databases, servers, network devices
supporting sensitive data exchanges among VA facilities. Many
of these weaknesses are due to inconsistent program enforcement
and ineffective communication between VA management and field
offices.
In addition to FISMA, OIG projects over the past 2 years
have identified information security deficiencies, placing
sensitive veterans data at risk of unauthorized access, loss,
or disclosure. Specifically, we reported on a broad range of
security concerns, including VA's transmission of sensitive
data and internal network routing information over an
unencrypted carrier network, and VA's external data-sharing
agreements and system interconnections which resulted in
unsecured electronic and hard copy data at VA medical centers
and co-located research facilities. We reported that 48 percent
of VA's 400,000 encryption software licenses, valued at about
$5.1 million, remained unused, leaving VA computers vulnerable.
And we reported on a backlog of personnel background checks
which were inappropriately prohibiting some 3,000 contractors
from working on awarded contracts.
In summary, our audit reports and findings and
recommendations provide a roadmap for VA to improve its
information security program, and VA needs to focus on
addressing previously reported security issues related to the
IT material weakness, they need to remediate high-risk system
issues in their Plans of Actions and Milestones, and they need
to establish effective processes for continuous monitoring and
to perform vulnerability assessments.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement, and we would be
happy to answer any questions you or the Subcommittee may have.
[The prepared statement of Linda A. Halliday appears in the
Appendix]
Mr. Coffman. Thank, Ms. Halliday.
How effective are VA facilities with protecting sensitive
veteran data?
Ms. Halliday. Well, based on our oversight, we're
continuing to find information security vulnerabilities at
almost every VA medical center we visit. We visit 20 to 30
VAMCs a year as part of our FISMA work and we consistently find
problems. The types of vulnerabilities include weak passwords,
missing software patches, lack of software updates, excessive
permissions, and unnecessary user accounts left on the system.
Mr. Coffman. What are the foremost reasons why, after all
this time, information security is still a major concern at the
VA?
Ms. Halliday. I would say that ineffective access controls,
ineffective configuration management controls, I think
ineffective management of systems interconnection and
inadequate contractor oversight would be a fourth major reason.
Mr. Coffman. Ms. Halliday, based on your ongoing oversight
work, is VA likely to get rid of its IT security material
weaknesses this year?
Ms. Halliday. At this point it is too early to conclude. We
do expect that the CRISP initiative, which is starting to
provide continuous monitoring, will be in place for the entire
12 months of this fiscal year 2013 FISMA review. Our concern,
while we're seeing weaknesses occur with less frequency, they
are still occurring and they are repeat occurrences and
vulnerabilities that we have reported on in fiscal year 2012
and earlier years.
Mr. Coffman. What are VA's most significant risks related
to adequately protecting its systems and sensitive data?
Ms. Halliday. The first would probably be ineffective
access controls. That's where critical systems had accounts
with default passwords that were considered weak passwords,
i.e. easy to guess. User accounts with access rights that were
not appropriate. In other words, you want to make sure that all
users have a need for that information and that they have a
security level appropriate to that need. We also identify
unsecured electronic and hard copy research data at VA medical
centers and co-located research facilities.
So that covers access controls. Then we have inconsistent
configuration management controls. Systems include key
databases supporting critical applications, but they are not
patched timely or secured and configured to mitigate previously
known information vulnerabilities. We have ineffective
management of system interconnections. That's VA sensitive data
such as health records and internal Internet protocol,
addresses. They are transmitted between VA medical centers and
the community-based outpatient clinics using unencrypted
protocols. And then access control and configuration
management. These are all very significant risks that VA faces.
As far as inadequate contractor oversight, contractors
without the appropriate security clearances are gaining access
to some VA mission critical systems, and we did a report on not
having security clearances in place before gaining access to
the systems with contractors.
Mr. Coffman. Moving forward, what steps can VA take to
prevent the loss of sensitive data?
Ms. Halliday. I think VA really needs to improve its
continuous monitoring process to ensure all the controls are
operating as intended, and it needs to address the external
organizations that it works with to make sure that they are
adequately protecting sensitive veteran data in accordance with
the VA policy and FISMA requirements. VA needs to ensure all
service provider contracts include provisions to implement
information security protections in accordance with their
policies and procedures.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you.
Ranking Member Kirkpatrick.
Mrs. Kirkpatrick. You testified that there's a 10-year
period of weakness and vulnerability. So there was a report
given to the VA year after year after year. In that 10-year
span, did you see an increase in vulnerability and weakness? A
decrease? Can you quantify that for me over that 10-year
period?
Ms. Halliday. We do an audit of VA's consolidated financial
statements annually and our contractors look at all of the
controls associated with information security. They have felt
that it has been a material weakness in VA for 10 full years.
Mrs. Kirkpatrick. Has it been the same level of weakness
and vulnerability? What I mean is, has it been getting worse
for a while or has it gotten better?
Ms. Halliday. I don't think you ever get the exact same
level of vulnerability. I think our concern, we report out on
these various problems based on the testing. A couple years
ago, VA's Plan of Actions and Milestones addressing security
vulnerabilities was almost at 15,000 items that were
outstanding and unaddressed. This past year VA has gotten it
down to about 4,000, but that's still 4,000 security weaknesses
and vulnerabilities that haven't been addressed. It is too
many.
Mrs. Kirkpatrick. Do you think that the CRISP program is
helping them address those vulnerabilities more quickly?
Ms. Halliday. Based on the preliminary and early testing,
yes. We are still seeing and identifying security weaknesses
and vulnerabilities, but to a lesser extent that we've seen
that in the past. I would also have to say that VA is actively
working with us to try and make sure that they understand what
we are finding as part of our FISMA testing, understand the
full scope so that they can put the right fixes in place.
Mrs. Kirkpatrick. That was going to be one of my questions.
When you issue a report, do you actually have a conversation
with leadership at the VA about what needs to be implemented?
Ms. Halliday. Absolutely.
Mrs. Kirkpatrick. And is that on an ongoing basis?
Ms. Halliday. Yes, it is. With this information security
material weakness rising to the last material weakness in the
Department's financial statements, the Secretary on down
through his chain of command has had it on their radar. They
are working very hard. And we have made sure that we have been
communicating with the Department. For example, that if we
employ certain tools in our oversight to scan their systems,
they are also acquiring those same state-of-the-art tools. So I
think that there is an effort there, and at least this year and
part of last year the communications have been better between
what OIG is doing in the field, finding, and getting it
remediated.
Mrs. Kirkpatrick. I have one last question. I have a
concern in your audit report. You say that you are concerned
with a lack of human resources, and your statement says OIT
experienced vacancies and excessive turnover in key leadership
positions responsible for OIT's strategic human capital
management program. Could you tell the Committee a little bit
more about that? What do you mean by excessive turnover?
Ms. Halliday. I'm going to ask Sondra McCauley to take
that.
Mrs. Kirkpatrick. If you could just quantify that and give
some reasons why you think that's happening.
Ms. McCauley. Excessive turnover in terms of the leadership
within OIT in terms of managing the program. Turnover in terms
of the program managers and project managers needed to manage
each specific project, if you will, as well as a reliance on
contractors to do a lot of the jobs that we really need
government personnel to do.
Mrs. Kirkpatrick. And why do you think that there is that
excessive turnover?
Ms. McCauley. Some of it was attributed to a lack of
planning, that is the need for a human capital plan to really
focus in on the succession planning at the leadership level.
But also to better identify the skills that were needed to help
manage these IT programs, and what would be a better
contractor-to-FTE ratio to manage the programs.
Mrs. Kirkpatrick. Okay. Thank you. I yield back, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Ranking Member Kirkpatrick.
Mr. Lamborn, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And before I ask my
questions, I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for having this
hearing. This is such an important topic. And there is so much
going on here that I was frankly not really aware of and should
have been, and we need to be aware what's going on. So thank
you for your leadership. This is so critical.
Ms. Halliday, I am stunned about what's going on here. And
you said in your written testimony, ``Lacking proper
safeguards, IT systems are vulnerable to intrusions by groups
seeking to obtain sensitive information, commit fraud, disrupt
operations, or launch attacks against other systems. VA has at
times been the victim of such malicious intent.''
Can you tell us what you know about these malicious attacks
on the VA's sensitive information? Who committed these?
Ms. Halliday. I will let Mr. Bowman speak to this one. It
is in his area.
Mr. Bowman. Thank you.
We were informed of an intrusion by foreign countries
through the Network Security Operations Center. The specifics
of that, the foreign countries have actually compromised the
domain controller and gained access to email accounts and were
taking email information of the senior leadership at VA. The
difficult part was, is VA was unsure how the foreign countries
gained access to the networks and what was actually being
transmitted out of the VA networks back to the original source.
That's the one that's most current that I'm aware of. We also
reference 2006 with the stolen laptop and the loss of the 26
million records. But those are the two main things that come to
mind.
As far as our ongoing FISMA work, we do continue to
identify weaknesses with the critical databases that does host
sensitive data, and the Web applications that are facing the
Internet do have well-known vulnerabilities that could be
exploited from the Internet. And these are ongoing from year-
to-year. So there are significant risks out there that are
related to this.
Mr. Lamborn. And why don't we know how much was taken?
Mr. Bowman. A lot of it is having the right tools in place,
such as intrusion-detection systems, and audit logs turned on.
In some cases, VA doesn't have audit logs enabled, so it is
unaware of how these systems have been infiltrated and what
data has been captured and what has been transmitted. Good
Intrusion Detection Systems on all the network segments are
important to identify the attack signatures.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. What is the kind of sensitive
information concerning a veteran like in my district back in
Colorado Springs that could have been compromised?
Mr. Bowman. It is more personal identifiable information
that could be used to commit fraud. Let's say a malicious
intruder gains access to a database and has the Social Security
number, name, and the date of birth, they could use that to
commit credit card fraud. And that's the main risk to veterans.
Mr. Lamborn. And with the 20 or so million veterans who are
on the system, the VA doesn't know how few or how many of their
sensitive information like Social Security numbers have been
compromised?
Mr. Bowman. That's a potential risk.
Mr. Lamborn. It could be all of them?
Mr. Bowman. Yes, without having audit logging enabled, you
don't know what has been compromised or how often those systems
have been accessed in an unauthorized manner.
Mr. Lamborn. Would either of you ladies like to add to what
I've been asking?
Ms. Halliday. No, I think Mike answered it perfectly.
Mr. Lamborn. I'm just amazed at this. I mean, this is
serious. And the VA has known about this for up to 10 years
now?
Mr. Bowman. We've reported significant vulnerabilities for
well over 10 years, as indicated by the IT material weakness.
In the last 5 years, we have increased our assessment of the
security controls through our user vulnerability assessment
tools, database tools, Web app tools, so we think our
evaluation is more comprehensive. In the last 5 years, we've
shown consistent vulnerabilities from year to year that put the
VA systems at risk.
Mr. Lamborn. And you mentioned potential state actors with
malicious intent. Was that fairly recent that those attempts or
those actions were detected?
Mr. Bowman. I heard about that within the last year and a
half.
Mr. Lamborn. So there's a pattern of knowing about this for
10 years leading up to a malicious capture of who knows how
many Social Security numbers or other sensitive pieces of
information of up to 20 million veterans within the last year
and a half. Is that a proper understanding?
Mr. Bowman. It is possible. We don't know.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Lamborn.
Mr. O'Rourke for 5 minutes.
Mr. O'Rourke. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
For Ms. Halliday, I actually wanted to follow up on some
questions Mr. Lamborn was asking. For a veteran back home in
the districts we represent, specifically, have we seen any
consequences that we've been able to document in terms of their
information being stolen and used by someone who has broken
into this system? And not necessarily in my district, but can
you point to some examples of how this has affected people that
we represent?
Ms. Halliday. VA has an NSOC program where you report
security incidents to them. They will prioritize it and start
to work on the severity of those incidents. There is normally a
good record then given of the facts of what happened and they
will look at the controls and try to put the remediation in
place. There are hundreds of incidents reported on an annual
basis.
Mr. O'Rourke. And can you take us through one to illustrate
the consequences? For example, Social Security information was
taken. They used that to impersonate that veteran to try to
take benefits or to obtain credit cards or--
Ms. Halliday. I do not have an example.
Mr. O'Rourke. Okay. Let me just ask you or Mr. Bowman, do
you know of examples that have been documented, specific
consequences? I mean, I agree with what everyone has said so
far, the overall problem and the threat represented by these
security vulnerabilities is unacceptable and needs to be
addressed and needs to be fixed, but I also want to understand
the human dimension of this, what problems it has already
caused for veterans, if any, if you've been able to document
them. I am assuming there have been. So anyhow, that's
something we would like to follow up on.
Then I guess for Mr. Bowman, what's the expectation in
terms of being able to address these? When should this
Committee expect to hear back from Ms. Halliday at a future
hearing that these findings and problems that have been
uncovered have been addressed to our satisfaction and that we
feel that we have a reasonable level of security, these threats
have been closed, and we are now happy with that system? What's
a date that you could point us towards?
Mr. Bowman. VA plans to implement a fully developed
continuous monitoring program within the next 6 to 8 months.
Using that, they should have a better visibility of the
security posture of their IT systems. We have 32 outstanding
recommendations from our FISMA work that need to be addressed
to improve the security posture. It will probably take VA well
over a year, year and a half to get a good handle on that and
address those issues.
So if we could possibly convene maybe a year from now, VA
may be able to communicate some significant progress in their
IT security program; we will be able to communicate that as
well.
Mr. O'Rourke. And just to make sure that I understand what
you just said, within 12 to 18 months those 32 recommendations
would be implemented?
Mr. Bowman. I don't know for sure, but I think that's a
reasonable timeline if VA takes an aggressive approach for
improving its security program.
Mr. O'Rourke. Okay.
Ms. Halliday. Sir, we just received the official comments
from Mr. Warren on the 32 recommendations and the
implementation plans that they will deploy regarding those 32
recommendations. There are various timeframes associated with
that. But our first conclusion will come at the end of this
year's audit of the consolidated financial statements as to
whether they would drop that material weakness or not, and all
of the testing will be happening over the summer. So that
report is issued on November 15th, and it will assess whether
the material weakness remains or it drops to a significant
deficiency. At this point, since VA has not fully implemented
its continuous monitoring, Mike is exactly correct that it is
probably going to take longer than a few months to take care of
this.
Mr. O'Rourke. Okay. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. O'Rourke.
Dr. Roe for 5 minutes.
Mr. Roe. I thank the Chairman.
Ms. Halliday, thank you and your team for the excellent
work you've done and certainly informing our Committee of the
problems. I guess my concern is, is that this mirrors and
patterns many of the other hearings I've been to where we can't
seem to get the electronic health record fixed year after year,
and it looks like that security is a problem year after year.
We just passed a bill in the House, CISPA.
Most of us in this room have been to classified briefings
on the security risks that this country has from outside bad
actors. And I've got to go home this weekend, as every member
up here does, and when this information gets out, veterans are
going to come to me, there are many veterans sitting right up
here at this dais, and they are going to say, are my records
secure? And I'm going to have to look them in the eye and say,
no, they are not, from what I've heard. And that's not a very
acceptable answer, especially after 10 years, and especially
after we know the risks in the government.
You haven't looked at every other phase, but do other
departments in the U.S. Government share these same problems?
In other words, is this a systemic-wide problem across
government or is this just VA specific? And you may not be able
to answer that question.
Ms. Halliday. I can't give you a definitive answer, but it
is a problem for those agencies that are dealing with privacy-
type information.
Mr. Roe. You know, we've been asked as a Congress, we've
been instructed in private that it is a severe problem for
business. We've been asked to look at some privacy issues about
how you--and we have a department of government that's not even
doing what we're asking business to do right now.
I think there are a couple of things that I would like to
ask just briefly, and government-wide we don't know. How will
we know that when we do go home, when can we say that this
information will be secure? And we certainly know how when you
steal private information, whether it is through somebody
getting your debit card number or whatever, what it is used
for, it is basically just to steal from you. So is that it,
just mainly you think, or is it access to other government
agencies through the VA? Is this the back door to some other
agencies?
Ms. Halliday. When we can say that the security of veterans
information has been taken care of, I think will be at the
point when VA addresses all the recommendations in the reports
that we have made with regards to FISMA. We've given them a
roadmap to fix things. It is such a decentralized organization
that they have to bring a culture of accountability, personal
accountability for every action, and they need to make sure
they have a consistent implementation of the policies and
procedures. We don't quite see that yet with the FISMA testing
or the testing done as part of the consolidated financial
statements.
Mr. Roe. Let's say you go to a VA medical center somewhere,
and you mentioned that some of the software wasn't up to date,
passwords, you can figure it out, 111, whatever, four 1s in a
row, whatever. Who is responsible for that and what penalty is
it if you don't do anything?
Ms. Halliday. The responsibility lies with the CIO in the
Department of Veterans Affairs and it tiers down through that
organization.
Mr. Roe. Okay. When a breach occurs, what does VA do then?
When you know you've been hacked or there is an attempt. Let's
see you haven't been breached, but you know that your firewall
has been pinged, what do you do?
Ms. Halliday. You assess the severity of it based on the
facts you can determine. You get a team together to look at how
to fix whatever controls are needed to be fixed related to what
happened. And VA has been trying to do that, but they have a
significant number of security incidents.
Mr. Roe. And I'm thinking, I am a veteran, I'm sitting here
thinking okay, we've lost a laptop computer with 20 million
bits of information on it and the system is not secure now.
That doesn't give me a lot of confidence if I go to the VA to
hand over my Social Security number and all that.
Ms. Halliday. Right. VA did mandate cybersecurity and
privacy awareness training nationwide to bring down a level of
personal accountability to every individual that's doing work
and touching veteran-sensitive information to make sure it
brought accountability to this process and requires individuals
to sign a statement that they will protect the veteran's
information. So that is a step in the right direction.
Mr. Roe. Ms. Halliday, thank you. And I think we have our
marching orders, and we will hear from the other two panels.
But I think in 12 months we should be able to sit here, or
less, and be able to look our veterans in the eye and say to
them that your information is as secure as we can do it. I
understand there is nothing that's 100 percent, I got that. But
it is relatively secure. Am I correct in that?
Ms. Halliday. Absolutely. Both the prior VA Secretary and
the current have asked for the gold standard in protecting VA's
veterans information, and I think the expectation should be
nothing less.
Mr. Roe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Coffman. Mr. Walz for 5 minutes.
Mr. Walz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Halliday and your team, thank you once again for
coming.
Again, we have been through these hearings and we listen to
them. I guess the part I'm getting at is, and many of us,
myself included, I've been advocating for more sharing of data,
especially between DoD and VA, been advocating for being able
to get some of that information to some of our partners, like
the county veteran service officers, to help with claim
processing, been advocating for bringing private medical data
into the system to help speed the claims process.
With that being said, with the VA and its research
partners, how do they do the formal agreements between them?
And I guess the point I'm getting at here is, is this issue
we're addressing--and I would assume you have lots of contact
with your private sector counterparts and best practices--this
very same thing happens in the private sector, correct, but
there's no requirement for them to report when there is a
breach. Is that correct?
Ms. Halliday. Pretty much, yes.
Mr. Walz. How are these agreements done and if there's a
breach at a research institution on the private sector side,
how do we know they are reporting that breach back and who is
ultimately responsible in those agreements?
Ms. Halliday. Basically, you need a formal agreement that
outlines the roles and responsibilities of both the external
partner and VA. In that particular instance, we see some real
inconsistencies and some of these agreements are not being put
in place.
The second you would like to do is make sure that, whatever
arrangement VA is entering into, that organization has
commensurate controls with VA so that they can adhere to VA's
policies and procedures.
Mr. Walz. But they are not required to adhere to FISMA, is
that correct, private entity?
Ms. Halliday. Right. But you can establish those terms in
these agreements.
Mr. Walz. Okay.
Ms. Halliday. And that's where you should do that. Because
if you have one side, securing veterans' information very
tightly and another handling it very loosely, you have a
problem.
Mr. Walz. Is it safe to say we then do not know the scope
of the problem yet if those are lacking, because there are
many, many of these agreements.
Ms. Halliday. Absolutely.
Mr. Walz. Okay. So we have no idea on the scope of that.
Ms. Halliday. Right.
Mr. Walz. When you look at this, where is the model? Is
there an entity, an institution that's out there that is the
gold standard of best practices, how should this be done? I
mean, there are standards and protocols that should be
implemented. Who is doing it on the scale of VA? Is Citibank
doing it? Is Credit Suisse doing it? Who is doing it that it
looks correct? Because the targets here aren't necessarily
targets because they are veterans. They are targets because
they are easy, is that correct, or they are trying to make it
easy in many cases. Can you give me an example of who is the
gold standard?
Ms. Halliday. We can't give you an example.
Mr. Walz. Is that for lack of your knowledge on what others
are doing or is that because there might not be one?
Ms. Halliday. I would say more lack of our having direct
knowledge of who is actually performing specific practices.
Some people might attest that they do have a gold standard, but
when you look behind it and you see breaches and problems with
that. We haven't looked at that so I can't really answer.
Mr. Walz. If we had some of them here to talk to us about
the problems they are having, that might help us get an
understanding of this and let the VA bring some of those things
in.
Ms. Halliday. I think there's always an opportunity to
bring in best practices from the outside and from other Federal
agencies.
Mr. Walz. Okay. So if we implement all the protocols that
you've put out there, and I think you gave me the number of
4,000 potential weaknesses or vulnerabilities, if we
implemented all of those and were able to do it, what's the
cost associated with that? I understand what the cost of not
doing it is great. It is a breach of trust and security of our
veterans. What's the implication? Is that not something you
factor in when you do your assessment?
Ms. Halliday. Sir, I would not have that answer, but you
should ask VA.
Mr. Walz. Okay. Very good.
All right. Well, again, I thank you for your service. It is
invaluable. As I always say, the more that we can do to support
the IG, the better government we get out of it. So thank you.
Ms. Halliday. Thank you.
Mr. Coffman. Mr. Huelskamp for 5 minutes.
Mr. Huelskamp. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you
providing the opportunity for this hearing. And I must say I
have a lot of words to describe my feelings, and embarrassed by
the actions or lack thereof by the VA might be one of those.
Shocked. Surprised. I guess I will probably be even more
surprised by later testimony.
But if I understand correctly, one of the things that you
did mention, that there was a violation or personal emails of
the Secretary and high-level staff were compromised. And can
you describe that a little bit further?
Mr. Bowman. My understanding is that when the domain
controllers got compromised, they got access to the senior
leadership email accounts, and there is information that
indicates that those emails were exported outside the VA
network.
The value of them is unknown. What they did with those
emails is unknown. But whenever you compromise a domain
controller, essentially you own the enterprise. That's the
seriousness of it.
Mr. Huelskamp. I appreciate that. You own access to 20
million records, plus that of their dependents. What was the VA
response when you brought that to their attention?
Mr. Bowman. It wasn't formally communicated to me. I heard
it in a meeting that was discussed between the NSOC. And they
probably were unaware I was listening in, but that is just what
I heard, just by observing some of these meetings and VA
describing these events.
Mr. Huelskamp. And this is very shocking, Mr. Chairman. I
know we have a letter in front of us from a very high-ranking
official at the VA that says, quote, ``VA's security posture
was never at risk.'' Was never at risk. And that's a quote from
a high-ranking official. And I would guess that perhaps they
used email to put this together. Can you imagine the thought
that the folks that were hacking the system were actually
reading this email as they were exporting 20 million private
records. And you indicated we do have evidence potentially of
external state-sponsored espionage that might be occurring to
the VA. One of you had indicated that was a possibility?
Mr. Bowman. That's my understanding.
Mr. Huelskamp. Okay. And did you bring this to the VA's
attention and what was their response?
Mr. Bowman. We haven't. With the FISMA work, we haven't
specifically addressed that issue. We do get into incident
handling and monitoring. And we identify every year there are
network connections that aren't being monitored by VA. So the
risk is that you could have systems compromised, data being
transmitted externally, and VA could be unaware of it.
Mr. Huelskamp. They could be unaware that the information
is actually leaving. And if asked, they could potentially, even
under oath say we know of no such transmission, which if I
understand correctly might absolutely be true and would suggest
obviously when you've given up control of the system like you
indicated you would have actually no idea of the threat then?
Mr. Bowman. That's correct.
Ms. Halliday. Sir, one of the things that we do as part of
our oversight is gain an understanding of what is happening in
the VA environment, and then we send information to our
contractor who is doing the actual FISMA assessment to put the
right work steps in place to do full evaluations, to understand
and properly assess the risks. That's all happening as part of
the FISMA process.
Mr. Huelskamp. And I appreciate your work. You have a very
difficult task of identifying the problems and hopefully
providing some solutions, but it is up to the VA, maybe after
10 years, to finally implement some of those.
The latest thing I see in your report is an incident from
March 2013 in which sensitive, private, perhaps medical and
personal data was transmitted over an unencrypted
telecommunications carrier network. Can you tell me what
happened when that personal data was transmitted unencrypted?
Apparently VA did not know they were doing that. What's their
response? You indicate that the management acknowledged this
practice and formally accepted the security risk. Did they
identify who was at risk, how they were at risk, and did they
close this security gap?
Mr. Bowman. Yes, we received a hotline complaint discussing
the transmission of unencrypted data between the medical
centers and the community-based outpatient clinics using
unencrypted protocols over a telecommunication carrier network.
We went and discussed with the network engineers and various
levels with VA, and they admitted that this is a common
practice.
Mr. Huelskamp. They admitted this is a common practice.
Mr. Bowman. It is a common practice. But a mitigating
factor is, is they logically segment that traffic from other
customer traffic. The downside of that is it still needs to be
encrypted, and there are technological solutions that can
encrypt that traffic when it is outside of VA's span of
control. Now, VA responded to that report by saying they plan
to implement encryption controls, so that will improve that
risk of losing that data as it leaves VA's span of control.
Mr. Huelskamp. I'm sorry, Mr. Chairman, one last question.
So they planned. Do you know if they actually have
implemented the encryption to protect sensitive data?
Mr. Bowman. My understanding is that edge router encryption
controls have not been implemented yet.
Mr. Huelskamp. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Coffman. Ms. Walorski for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Walorski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I appreciate the report, I appreciate the information. I
will tell you, when I was in the Indiana House, we did hold
companies responsible for these massive breaches of identify
theft, especially when a Social Security number was in the
breach. And so we did have legislation and we still do, and I
think 17 or 18 other States now have it as well, holding
private companies responsible, and if there's a breach that the
buck does stop with them for immediate information sharing, in
some cases freezing credit reports.
So my first question is on this information as it is leaked
to a veteran in my district, say their Social Security number
was accessed, are any of those Social Security numbers redacted
or is this just free-flowing raw data that's going out the
door?
Mr. Bowman. Well, we don't have knowledge of any specific
cases of data loss, other than the 2006 example, and in those
cases VA is responsible for providing credit reporting services
to the veterans who may have been harmed by this. But what we
try to indicate, is that using unencrypted protocols, the risks
remain, that the potential is there, and that VA needs to
implement these proactive controls so these type of events do
not occur going forward.
Mrs. Walorski. But in light of the answers to the various
questions up here, there obviously has been more than just one
incident in 2006 when that information has been available. And
so, you know, I think about this in my district. I have 52,000
veterans in my district and then their extended families, and
I'm thinking, you know, if this happened in the private sector,
automatically this would have triggered--just the suspicion and
the not knowing would have triggered an automatic credit freeze
to the people that would be living in my district.
So I'm looking at this from the standpoint of saying, you
know, sending out an APB when I get out of here that says to
the 52,000 vets in my district, better check your credit report
because we have no idea that your information has not been
breached, and to continually check that. And as we continue to
tell people to go access their VSOs and go access their
facilities because there's a long wait and the things we deal
with on the veteran side, is how at risk they are with sharing
that information in today's day with these violations.
In the private sector, this type of an entity would never
survive. The lawsuits that would come would shut them down
because of private information being at risk and being taken
and nobody responsible. So it is absolutely baffling to me that
in addition to some of the other things that we have heard in
this report, that the buck stops with the CIO, and we have had
nothing but turnover, as you've reported, in this entity of
this area of the VA to begin with. Has anybody ever been
disciplined based upon the findings of your reports?
Ms. Halliday. We can only make a recommendation. It is up
to the Department to take the administrative action. That's the
extent of our authority.
Mrs. Walorski. Have any of your recommendations involved
issues of employees or incompetence or training or things
actually for the people who are actually working there taking
this information?
Ms. Halliday. Yes, I would say several, especially with our
administrative investigations. It's looking at very specific
personal accountability for actions.
Mrs. Walorski. And are you asking specifically that
supervisors and managers and CIOs and these kind of people that
have been in charge, where the buck stops with this
information, that they be disciplined, if not terminated?
Ms. Halliday. We make a recommendation for appropriate
administrative action and then generally give a discussion with
that--
Mrs. Walorski. And is the appropriate action usually
termination? I'm not familiar with the protocol. What is the
appropriate action on something like this large of a risk to
this many people?
Ms. Halliday. You would have to look at the severity of the
incident, determine the exposure, determine what the
accountability was. Was there intent? Was this a mistake that
they may not have been able to prevent? And then when you do
that, you apply the Douglas factors for discipline actions in
the Federal Government?
Mrs. Walorski. But my understanding would be, in the last
10 years, based upon the previous questioning, that the 40 or
so outstanding compliance issues that you have advocated that
they follow, had those been followed in the last couple of
years, we would have remedied this situation. So there has to
be some kind of accountability still, and disciplinary actions,
and the buck stops someplace with this staff, correct?
Ms. Halliday. We absolutely think the Department should
have implemented many of the FISMA recommendations and
tightened controls early, and they would have less security
incidents.
Mrs. Walorski. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, panel. I appreciate your testimony.
You are now excused.
I now invite the second panel to the witness table.
On this panel, we will hear from Mr. Stephen Warren, Acting
Assistant Secretary for Information and Technology at the
Department of Veterans Affairs. Accompanying Mr. Warren is Mr.
Stan Lowe, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Information Security
from the Office of Information and Technology at the Department
of Veterans Affairs.
Before I recognize the panel, I ask that you please rise
and raise your right hand.
[Witness sworn.]
Mr. Coffman. You may be seated.
Mr. Warren, you are now recognized for 5 minutes.
TESTIMONY OF STEPHEN W. WARREN, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
INFORMATION AND TECHNOLOGY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS
AFFAIRS, ACCOMPANIED BY STAN LOWE, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY
FOR INFORMATION SECURITY, OFFICE OF INFORMATION AND TECHNOLOGY,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS
Mr. Warren. Chairman Coffman, Ranking Member Kirkpatrick,
Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to
testify regarding the Department of Veterans Affairs
Information Technology Security Program. Accompanying me today
is Mr. Stanley Lowe, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Information
Security.
There is no higher priority than protecting the data that
VA holds on our Nation's veterans. I, as well as the many IT
employees at VA--over 56 percent are veterans themselves--take
this responsibility very seriously.
As the Committee knows, the Department received a wake-up
call from the stolen laptop incident in 2006. As a result, the
VA consolidated its disparate IT functions into a single,
unified IT organization. VA's consolidated IT organization is
responsible for providing the tools, services, and systems that
are necessary to protect veterans' information at 153
hospitals, 853 community-based outpatient clinics, 57 benefit
processing offices, and over 160 cemeteries or memorial cites.
Our network supports over 400,000 users and over 750,000
individual devices. We are committed to protecting the
information we hold on millions of veterans, their
beneficiaries, and more than 300,000 VA employees.
As we all know, IT security threats continue to evolve. To
that end, we have implemented our continuous monitoring
program, which continuously checks all IT systems and monitors
every device attached to the VA network. VA launched the
Continuous Readiness in Information Security Program, or CRISP,
in 2012 to proactively address process and policy deficiencies,
as well as architecture and configuration issues.
As part of the CRISP effort, the VA conducts rigorous
vulnerability scanning, continuous monitoring of patching and
software inventory, implementing port security, anti-virus
services, and encryption of nonmedical IT desktops and laptops.
Through Web Application Security Assessments, VA is able to
identify critical vulnerabilities and potential exploits in VA
systems. We protect the network infrastructure by identifying
all network assets, critical database stores, all external
connections, and provide the Trusted Internet Connection
Gateways services.
In the past year, VA has measurably improved its security.
The Department has ensured that over 98 percent of VA staff
have received the mandatory security training they need to
protect the information of veterans and their families. Only
staff turnover prevents us from reaching 100 percent.
After the 2006 incident, VA worked to ensure its laptop
computers were encrypted to provide another layer of
protection. Currently, over 98 percent of VA's nonmedical IT
laptops are encrypted. The Department aims to complete the
encryption of the final 2 percent by June 30.
VA has a robust data breach notification process using a
Data Breach Core Team. When the team determines that a
potential breach may have occurred, they notify affected
individuals and offer credit monitoring. VA also posts a
monthly report of data breach notification on its Web site, and
this report is provided to Congress, in addition to the
required quarterly data breach report.
VA has become one of the very best large organizations of
providing notification if a potential breach occurred. This law
requires notification within 60 days. A review of VA's incident
tracking system over the current fiscal year indicates that VA
takes, on average, 25 days to provide notice. VA's standards
and practices exceed even the strictest Federal, State laws and
policies.
I would like to update you on our progress to extend VA's
authority to operate, or ATOs. Before giving you this update, I
would like to assure the Committee in the strongest terms that
at no time was veterans' data placed at risk by this process.
The signing of an ATO represents the final step in what is
otherwise a continual process of security and management
reviews.
As the Committee is aware, VA has been working to extend
nearly 600 ATOs over the last several months. We have worked to
assure that requirements for each ATO are properly conducted
and documented. VA trusts the ATO validation process and the
work of the information security officers, facility CIOs, and
system owners to ensure system security. This paper-based
process validates that critical steps are being taken to
protect our veterans' data.
Mr. Chairman, VA places the highest priority on
safeguarding veterans' and employees' personnel information. We
are committed to information security. And although work
remains, VA has made significant improvements in the last few
years and strives to meet those highest standards in protecting
our Nation's veterans' sensitive information.
Thank you for your continued support of veterans, their
families, and our efforts to protect veterans and their
information. I am prepared to answer any questions by the
Ranking Member, the Chairman, or the Members.
[The prepared statement of Stephen W. Warren appears in the
Appendix]
Mr. Coffman. Mr. Warren, given your knowledge of visitors
in the network since 2010, and understanding that there were
significant security weaknesses, why would you insist on
conveying the message that veteran data is not at risk?
Mr. Warren. Thank you, Chairman. I think that that actually
is a great question to ask within the construct of information
protection.
I think it's very important to note that my partners in the
Inspector General's Office used words such as could, might,
potential, possible, is possible. When an audit takes place,
when a review takes place, the focus is on what could happen.
But remember, the existence of a risk is not the same as the
removal of information out of the network.
Several things need to exist. What needs to exist is the
potential, and we try to drive those down as quick as we can.
There needs to be an actor who has access and the ability to
get to where that risk is. They need to be able to do that in
such a way that they are not seen, and then they need to be
able to move the information out of the network through all the
sensors and past the gateway, as well as past our partners in
DHS who are watching outside our gateway, and then remove it.
So the piece we need to be very careful of is, we're talking
about potentials, we're not talking about actuals. And so the--
Mr. Coffman. I'm sorry. How do you define the difference
between an actual and a potential? And I'm looking at an
internal report on August 15, 2012, and it talks about an
actual--at least it talks about that the network was
penetrated. So how do you define actual versus potential?
Mr. Warren. Sir, I don't have that report in front of me.
Mr. Coffman. Well, I'll make it available to you.
Mr. Warren. And I will gladly respond to the record, sir,
in terms of that specific incident.
Mr. Coffman. Sure. Okay.
Mr. Coffman. Please define the difference between actual
and potential.
Mr. Warren. Potential is--and we'll do as an example your
home computer. So if you do not update your--
Mr. Coffman. How about we just stick with the VA system.
Let's talk about that.
Mr. Warren. Sure. We can talk about a desktop computer.
Once a month Microsoft puts out a set of patches on Tuesdays.
So every Tuesday, once a month, the first Tuesday Microsoft
sends out a full set of patches. If we do not incorporate those
patches into the system, the potential for somebody going to a
Web site and the potential being exploited goes up. But the VA
has a very aggressive program to make sure those desktop
patches happen once a month as Microsoft puts it out. So if you
don't do them and you don't do it over multiple months, the
potential for the desktop to be compromised and the system
itself to be compromised goes up.
Mr. Coffman. It's my understanding you have not instituted
all the patches in the VA system. Is that correct?
Mr. Warren. I'm sorry, I missed the first part.
Mr. Coffman. That you have not instituted all of the
patches prescribed for the VA system.
Mr. Warren. I would tell you, Mr. Chairman, that we have a
very aggressive program to make sure the desktop computers are
patched.
Mr. Coffman. You're not answering my question.
Mr. Warren. The intent is not--
Mr. Coffman. To the VA system. Is it true that not all the
patches have been applied as prescribed in the VA system? In
the information network.
Mr. Warren. Sir, there are about 750,000 devices in the
network. So if you're asking does every single one of those
devices have every single one of the patches that their
manufacturers put out, the answer would be no because there are
multiple times when that patch will actually break the
application that you need to use, and therefore there is a
waiver in place that says you don't patch that system because
not working is actually worse than a potential risk within an
environment which is--
Mr. Coffman. Mr. Warren, why did you not previously
disclose to the Committee that VA has had serious and
continuous compromises of systems and data by nation-state
sponsored actors?
Mr. Warren. With all due respect, I do not believe it is a
true statement, as you laid it out, that the VA has been
continually compromised by foreign nation states. We have a
strong partnership with Homeland Security, which watches the
boundary for the Department.
Mr. Coffman. Mr. Warren, has a foreign entity targeted and
penetrated our network?
Mr. Warren. I am aware of a single incident that our
network operation center identified.
Mr. Coffman. And when was that?
Mr. Warren. It was last year. I will need to get back for
the record in terms of the specific date.
Mr. Coffman. Very well. And I will make this internal
document available to you. And I think you can be informed that
there actually have been quite a few breaches.
Ranking Member Kirkpatrick.
Mrs. Kirkpatrick. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'd like to
follow that line of questioning.
Mr. Warren, if a system is compromised, would you know? Or
is it possible for it to be compromised and you to not know?
Mr. Warren. I would tell you, with the controls that we
emplace, with continuous monitoring, as well as the work that
we do at our boundaries with Homeland Security and our NSOC,
the probability of somebody being in the network and
compromising a system without us knowing it is very, very low.
But I can't argue the absolute.
Mrs. Kirkpatrick. Can you provide for the Committee how
many times the system has been hacked since the beginning of
this year?
Mr. Warren. I will gladly provide that for the record.
Mrs. Kirkpatrick. Thank you. Was it your testimony that it
takes you 25 days to notify the veteran that their personal
information may have been compromised?
Mr. Warren. Yes, ma'am. If I could expand on that.
Mrs. Kirkpatrick. Would you expand on that, because that
really concerns me. In 25 days everything could be wiped out
for that person.
Mr. Warren. Certainly, ma'am. What happens is as soon as--
and VA has a 1-hour reporting requirement--as soon as an
employee believes the potential of something happening, they're
supposed to notify our NSOC, and it is part of the reporting we
do. At that point, we pull the team together and we ask the
question: What and why? Is it real? And if it turns out we have
an issue, the Data Breach Team--which meets once a week, which
is made up of career staff who are outside the chain of
command--they do the analysis of that potential breach and they
determine if the potential was high enough that data had left.
And normally, if there is just a little potential, the
Department goes ahead and reaches out to all of those veterans
with credit monitoring for a year. And the 25-day period is the
time for the notification to the NSOC, the establishment of the
team, the analysis of the data to make sure what was reported
was actual. And in many cases--in fact, in most cases--it's the
potential that is reported, and we reach out to veterans anyway
and we offer that credit reporting.
Mrs. Kirkpatrick. How many times have you had to notify
veterans within the last year?
Mr. Warren. Ma'am, I will get you that for the record in
terms of the number of times that we notified veterans and
offered credit reporting as a result of a potential data
breach.
Mrs. Kirkpatrick. Thank you. And was it also your testimony
that by June 30 of this year your system will be encrypted?
Mr. Warren. Actually, my testimony, ma'am, was that for all
nonmedical IT laptops. So the ones that are under my
responsibility, we will have the last of those encrypted.
Mrs. Kirkpatrick. But the medical laptops will not be
encrypted?
Mr. Warren. No, ma'am. And, Ranking Member, the difficulty
we have with medical devices is they're constrained by their
certification from the FDA. And the concern is by putting
encryption on that laptop, a medical device that has a laptop
in it, you will actually impede the ability of that medical
device to do its job.
And so we've had lots of conversations with the FDA to
figure out how you can do that. But when a device is certified
that has a medical device in it, the condition of the device at
the time of certification constrains what you can do
afterwards. And so to handle that, we actually have a separate
area, an isolated area in the VA network where we put those
medical devices that are based on IT equipment. And we also go
further by working with our partners in VHA where we start
testing those devices to see if there is an impact to its job
in terms of delivering care, or if we impact their
certification boundary. And in cases where it isn't--and there
is a tool called bar-code medication, which is what the nurses
move through the wards--we are able to show that there was no
impact, those medical device laptops are now encrypted. And so
we work our way through that with our partners in the health
administration and the biomed folks.
Mrs. Kirkpatrick. I have one last question. Are you
familiar with or have you heard the Inspector General talk
about the fact there has been excessive turnover in key
leadership positions and there's a lack of human resources in
the IT departments? Do you agree with that statement?
Mr. Warren. I would tell you that an organization going
through transformation is a difficult place to work because
everything is moving around you. And so we have had transition
of staff. We've had transition of staff going out and coming
in. This year, I believe I am 100 folks below my ceiling of
about 8,500 individuals.
Mrs. Kirkpatrick. Do you have a strategy to address that so
you have adequate human resources?
Mr. Warren. We do active recruiting. We work with the HR
organization to figure out how do I do pools so I can make sure
I've got project managers lined up, to make sure I have
individuals lined up to bring them in.
We also have a very strong focus on veterans. As an
example, last year, 75 percent of my new hires were veterans,
because that's very important to me, as a veteran, to make sure
we're bringing our clients, if you will, into the organization
to help us do a better job.
Mrs. Kirkpatrick. Thank you, Mr. Warren. I yield back.
Mr. Coffman. Mr. Warren, please be reminded that during the
course of this oversight hearing and Committee investigation,
it is a Federal crime, pursuant to 18 United States Code
section 1001, in pertinent part, knowingly and willfully to
falsify, conceal, or cover up a material fact, or to make any
materially false, fictitious or fraudulent statement.
Mr. Lamborn, you have 5 minutes.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Warren, members of the previous panel testified under
oath that foreign state actors have accessed sensitive
information of veterans within the last 2 years and that the VA
does not know how much information was stolen. Would you agree
with that statement?
Mr. Warren. I would say, Congressman Lamborn, there is that
potential. I would tell you that, working with our partners at
Homeland Security in terms of where they watch our gateway--so
it's not just the VA connected to the world and everything
happens, we have Homeland Security, if you will, at the gate.
So I have our team on our side and Homeland Security on the
other side. And between the two of us, we watch all the traffic
going back and forth.
So the ability of material to move, yes, there is always a
potential. We referred to a particular incident that the
Inspector General talked about. I was aware of that incident.
So I would tell you that one, we know happened. With the other
ones, it's still the potential and the probable, in terms of--
Mr. Lamborn. And of the one that you will admit has
happened, we don't know how much information was taken because
it was encrypted before being exported. Isn't that correct? So
we don't know how little or how much the data was that was
stolen?
Mr. Warren. Sir, my recollection of that report--and what
I'd like to do is go back and review that report to give you
the answer in terms of what came out and what the report was
able to tell us given the conditions that existed.
Mr. Lamborn. What kind of dependent information is put into
some veterans' files?
Mr. Warren. I would tell you, Congressman Lamborn, the
veteran files are held in many locations in the VA, in many
systems, whether in the electronic health record or whether in
the new--used as part of the new VBMS system, as well as all
the other systems. So the information necessary to provide
benefits or services is what we--
Mr. Lamborn. So it can include the names and Social
Security numbers of dependents.
Mr. Warren. If that's required as part of the claim or
service process, sir.
Mr. Lamborn. Another problem I have is--and this happened
to me recently. I got a credit card in the mail. It turns out
that my credit card issuer had been compromised, so everyone
had to get a new credit card. And we had to go back and change
the numbers on all our accounts. It was a big hassle.
Fortunately, nothing was stolen that I know of. But what
happens when a Social Security number is stolen? You can't
replace that. I mean, we're talking about something really
serious here. Are you aware of how serious this is?
Mr. Warren. Congressman Lamborn, we take any potential
incident and any incident very seriously. I take it personally.
It's one of the reasons why the VA offers credit monitoring. So
even when there is a potential, we reach out to the veteran and
we offer them that credit monitoring for a year. We also have a
1-800 number that we've made available to veterans if they have
any questions so that they can reach out to us if by chance
something does happen, so we can help them, walk them through
that process.
Mr. Lamborn. You said earlier that we place the highest
priority on protecting this information, and yet members of the
OIG indicated that for more than 10 consecutive years,
independent public accounting firms under contract with OIG
have identified information technology security controls in the
VA as a material weakness. How can that condition have
persisted for 10 years if that's your highest priority?
Mr. Warren. Congressman Lamborn, thank you for that
question. I would tell you that material weakness is actually a
financial term. It's the same type of term used as part of
Sarbanes-Oxley in terms of laying those financial controls on
the organization. So the material weakness says there is a
question about whether the financial data in the system is
secure or not.
So material weakness, yes. I will tell you that, as an
organization, the Department wasn't going, we've got a material
weakness, move on. Every year we took the inputs--and I've only
been with the VA for 7 of those 10 years--every year I've been
there we took those inputs and we laid out what we needed to
do. We laid the resources on it. We put focus on training. And
I will tell you it wasn't enough. And so 2 years ago, this
major effort of doing CRISP, of taking the whole organization--
not just the IT organization, but taking the whole
organization, because information protection is not just an IT
thing.
Mr. Lamborn. Well, I'll agree with one thing you've just
said when you said it wasn't enough. I certainly agree with
that.
And how do we know that there isn't going to be some kind
of document dump by a foreign actor, you know, WikiLeaks or
something like that? I mean, there are so many things--health
care records. There is such sensitive information in health
care records. So we're not just talking about Social Security
numbers, there's health care records. We shouldn't be here
today, and I am sad that we are at this juncture right now.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Lamborn.
Mr. O'Rourke.
Mr. O'Rourke. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
For Mr. Warren, I'm not as conversant in the details of
these issues and the different systems and protocols involved
as I would like to be, but I think it's fair to say that the
picture you paint of the VA's IT system and the vulnerabilities
is very different than the one that we just heard from, from
Ms. Halliday. And I think you heard many of us say that what we
heard presented was unacceptable in terms of the
vulnerabilities, unacceptable in terms of the amount of time
that the VA has known about those vulnerabilities without
successfully addressing them, some concerns about when
information was reported to this Committee and others in terms
of breaches to the system and retrieval of information by
foreign actors.
Can you just, so in general terms that I can understand,
address that discrepancy from what we just heard to what you're
presenting? You seem to be saying that things are generally
under control.
Mr. Warren. I would tell you the state of security and the
work we need to do is something that I wrestle with all the
time. Am I satisfied with where we are? No, I'm not. Can we do
better in terms of fixing the things that our partners in the
IG and the audit community have identified? Yes. And we are
dedicated to doing that.
But the difference that you are hearing from myself versus
the audit community is, they have to deal with potential: Is
there a chance? Is there any opportunity for something like
that to happen? And the answer will always be yes. It will
always be yes, that there is a potential. So if you ever ask
me, or even if you ask me today, can I guarantee that
everything is perfect and wonderful? I could not give you that
guarantee because it's constantly changing, the technology
constantly changes.
So my focus is more of a very pragmatic operational person
whose job is to try and make sure we continue to deliver those
benefits and services in a way that has the least risk, the one
that does not put our veterans' information at risk while we do
that. And again, is it where I want it to be? No. Do we
continue to drive on getting it to where we need to be? Yes.
Mr. O'Rourke. In terms of the 32 recommended steps that
need to be implemented--and I asked the IG's Office about what
the timeframe would be to implement those--do you agree that
it's a 12-to-18-month implementation timeframe?
Mr. Warren. Yes, sir. And in fact, when the report gets
published, you will find there is a departmental response. And
it actually lays out what it is that we have in place and what
we are going to do. And I believe the latest date I have when I
signed out that document with all the different organizations
was September 2014 for some of the longer items. And I believe
that fits within that 12-to-18-month period.
But there are many things that are happening now. We have
some significant things coming online at the end of August.
There are things taking place between now and August. But the
longer, harder ones take that extra time to get there.
Mr. O'Rourke. And so there are no fundamental differences
between your office and the IG's report in terms of what they
just described to us in their findings, their vulnerabilities,
and the seriousness of those vulnerabilities and threats?
Mr. Warren. I will tell you, there were many reports
referred to in the prior panel. You will find that if you look
at the report and you look in the appendix, the place where the
Department did not agree with the findings, you will find a
statement in there that says--again, we always thank our
partners to come in. We see them as part of the team. They give
us that outside view. But where we disagreed with what their
observations were, we normally state that in the document.
So, given the Chairman's reminder, I need to make sure that
where the Department did not agree, we stated in the report.
And we also state what it is we're doing as a result of what
they find and what our plan of actions are. And then we give a
quarterly update to all of the things that we said we are going
to do. And as the Acting Assistant Secretary, I sign off on
every one of those quarterly reports in terms of what we said
we were going to do, what did we do to ensure that we are
responsive not only to what the Inspector General identified,
but ensuring that we're doing everything we need to do to
protect our veterans data.
Mr. O'Rourke. Let me ask one more question. You've used the
terms ``possible,'' ``probable'' and ``actual'' several times
in response to our questions. A question I asked of the
previous panel, can you tell us of an actual incident where,
because of a security vulnerability, private information from a
veteran was retrieved by someone to negatively impact that
veteran, whether they stole their Social Security number or
other personal data that was then used to harm that veteran?
Mr. Warren. I am aware of several incidents, and I will
describe one for you. It's an individual who accessed--he was a
system administrator--again, not foreign, but domestic--
accessed the database and used the information to do identity
theft. When identified, we refer those to the IG and they bring
in criminal investigations. So, in that regard, there was an
individual who breached the system. It is always referred to
law enforcement. It is always referred to law enforcement. And
then we provide credit monitoring, and we also work with the
law enforcement folks to make sure that they have full access
to do what they need to do.
So I will tell you, large organization, lots of people,
there are going to be folks who do bad things. As we find them,
we refer them to law enforcement for them to take action. And
then we just keep, as a result of what we saw--what then do we
do, right; how did that person get in there. So you will see
there is a very strong personal accountability program the
Department is bringing onboard to go ask the question, are we
hiring the right people? Do they have the right credentials?
Are there flags here on their personnel records such that we
really shouldn't be putting them into a position of trust--not
an IT thing, but the broader aspect of how you hire folks and
how you make sure you're bringing in the right folks.
Mr. O'Rourke. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Coffman. Just real quick. When the OIG, in their
report, said that your system got hacked by foreign actors, do
you refute that as part of your response?
Mr. Warren. So, again, I believe you're referring to that
August report. Let me just make sure what you're referring to,
Mr. Chairman, if I can. I don't have enough information to
answer your question, sir.
Mr. Coffman. So you're not aware--in the OIG report, in
their testimony, when they were up here, they referenced that
your system got hacked by foreign actors. First of all, do you
acknowledge that?
Mr. Warren. I believe I already have in my testimony, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Coffman. Yes or no?
Mr. Warren. Yes.
Mr. Coffman. Very well.
Dr. Poe for 5 minutes.
Mr. Roe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And a couple of questions that Congressman Lamborn talked
about.
One of the reasons that, the way I understand this from
listening this afternoon, that you might not know what
information is going out is that the information that people
were after was not encrypted. But on the way out the door it
was encrypted, so you couldn't read what was gone. So you could
truthfully sit there and say we don't know what's been stolen
because you really don't know. And it should just have been the
other way around; we should have had the data encrypted so that
nobody could have gotten a hold of it or done anything with it.
Am I right or wrong with that? Did I misunderstand?
Mr. Warren. No, Congressman Roe, you are actually laying it
out appropriately. And again, with the report that we're
referring to, glad to do a private briefing to the Committee
with the details because of some of the issues around it.
I will tell you that the area where the individuals were,
were in the email area, in terms of pulling emails out. The one
compensating controller, the thing we do as well, is many of
our emails are encrypted. So the reference to unencrypted is
information in databases. This particular information--which I
believe has been referred to--deals with folks who went after
email packages. In many cases, those are encrypted such that it
would be difficult to read them. But again, because, as you
rightfully pointed out, the data left the network encrypted,
it's hard to say yes or no what it was.
Mr. Roe. I understand that now. And let me ask, would any
of this other information, since you-- do you cover the part of
the VA involved in contracting? Is that data--not just personal
information, but is contract data? In other words, if I'm
bidding on a project out here, would a foreign competitor know
what that contract was? Because we certainly have seen that in
other areas. Is that possible?
Mr. Warren. Sir, I can't refute the possible of any
scenario in terms, again, there are no absolutes in information
security. We strive to make sure there aren't any--
Mr. Roe. Let me stop you. I've heard that before. This
August 15th, there is an Office of Information Security, and
you stated you heard--at least were known of one time that--I
think that I understood this--that you had been hacked or
pinged. March 10th and onward the DeepDive Analysis has been
tracking activities of well-funded cyber-espionage teams that
regularly target VA. Over the past 31 months, the DDA--that's
the Direct Dive Analysis--has identified eight of these teams
as part of our threat program. Each team is assigned a name--I
won't go through that. Assigning a common nomenclature has
allowed them to contribute each of their campaigns and see
which one of them is the most effective. And it goes through
how they were doing it. I'm sure you're aware of that.
Mr. Warren. Yes, sir. The key reporting and the fusion
technology team--so the individual whose report you're reading
from--is an initiative that I started in terms of asking folks
to go out and start pulling data and understand what was going
on. What I think what you will see--
Mr. Roe. Help clear me up because you said you only heard
of one--you only knew of one incident, and yet you started
this, which there are eight different teams that are looking.
And it appears from this information we have--which it makes
sense that they most like to hack us during holiday times,
which makes sense, your defenses are down, Thanksgiving,
Christmas, those times when we would be less--our defenses are
up less.
Mr. Warren. I think what you'll find, sir, if you read into
that report, it's targeting. So the report, again, it's a very
aggressive defensive policy in terms of through our network
security folks is trying to identify where the threats are.
Now, again, the August report we talked about, the specific
instance where we saw the material leaving and some of the
things that we did as a result of that, you will find there are
reports like that that are published probably a couple times a
month from the fusion team saying this is what we're tracking,
this is what we're monitoring, this is what we're doing about
it.
Mr. Roe. But you wouldn't be tracking those if they weren't
active.
Mr. Warren. Sir, there are things known as honey pots,
black holes, where the individual may try to come in. And what
you do is you set up your perimeter so it looks like they're
actually getting into data, but they're not. You're actually
tracking and capturing them.
The other piece, if I could, is there are actors you see
inside, but you also set it up on the outside, where if they
are trying to send data out, you basically put a trash can
where the data goes versus leaving the Department.
Mr. Roe. I have some more questions on that to see how many
times that has happened. There is a note here I have that says
over 400,000 systems in VA's network do not even have a basic
security baseline installed. Is that correct or incorrect?
Mr. Warren. Sir, I would need to basically validate where
that report is coming from, and I will take that for the
record.
Mr. Roe. And lastly, just one quick question: Who are the
state-sponsored actors that we're dealing with? You haven't
called any names, but who are they?
Mr. Warren. I would tell you, sir, that my preference is to
do that in a closed session; otherwise I would put my clearance
at risk, as well as the fines and penalties.
Mr. Roe. That's fine. That's fine. I yield back.
Mr. Coffman. Mr. Walz for 5 minutes, please.
Mr. Walz. Thank you, Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Warren.
Your data is on those computers too, correct, as a veteran?
Mr. Warren. Yes, it is, sir.
Mr. Walz. Okay. And you were over at FTC and DOE?
Mr. Warren. Yes, sir. I was at the Federal Trade
Commission, where I did the national Do Not Call Registry,
something I'm very proud of, as well as annual credit
monitoring that you can get, and then at the Department of
Energy with the Weapons Clean Up Program.
Mr. Walz. How does your knowledge over there--does the
current job you're in correspond with you having a knowledge of
those organizations and their ability to provide security over
data? Because I'm assuming both of those have very sensitive
data, especially DOE, in terms of state secrets and things like
that. So is there a comparison there? Can you tell us how they
function or how VA's system is in terms of robustness compared
to those?
Mr. Warren. I would tell you, sir, we are all facing the
same threats. And we all put the protections in place and we
work with each other. In fact, we have a very aggressive
outreach program with the folks in the other organization. And
there is also a larger effort through the Federal CIO Council
to learn from each other and use our best practices because we
are all facing that threat today.
Mr. Walz. I agree. And this is what I'm trying to get at.
And I think the gentlewoman from Indiana brought up a good
point. States are trying to tackle this as they go. And I'm
looking through, there's a Privacy Rights Organization
Clearinghouse that, as we speak, in realtime is listing this:
Health Information Trust of Frisco, Texas, 111 record
compromised. A dentist in Rochester, New York, on June 3, theft
of a laptop, 13,806 records.
One, though, that comes in here--and I think it brings to
the point of what we're trying to get at--is Hampton Roads
Health System, Newport News, Virginia, talked about employees
accessing information incorrectly. And it even notes in this
that they were fired for that. And then of course there's
malicious content and all that.
The point I'm trying to figure out here is, when you do
this, is data security an all-or-nothing, zero-sum proposition?
Is it an impenetrable firewall, or it's open access, or are
decisions made in the business community as well as you that
risk assessment and what is acceptable risk is in that?
I'm assuming in the private sector now--and listening to
Ms. Walorski brought up a very good point--is there is a huge
market in identity theft insurance, data breach insurance on
that. Those insurance underwriters must be drawing some
guidelines on what is acceptable risk and what is not. Does
that pertain to what you're doing? Is the VA doing that very
same risk analysis based on best practices of those
underwriters?
Mr. Warren. Yes, sir. We apply those same rules. It is
baked into the standards that we follow. The National Institute
of Standards and Trust applies those to us.
And to your question about, is there an all or nothing? I
think our partners at DoD found out with WikiLeaks, in a secure
system, you still could not guarantee the material would not--
Mr. Walz. Well, what I guess I'm asking for is, is it
worth--and I'm going to come to this question is: What's the
cost, have you figured, to implement OIG's recommendations? Is
there a cost factor that takes into this? Say, for example,
depending on where I'm at, versus a high crime versus a low
crime neighborhood, I might not invest in the most robust
security system, taking and thinking into--there hasn't been a
crime in my neighborhood in 75 years. Those are things that we
work in. Now, if I always want to be absolutely sure, I could
go to the top of the line every time and implement that
security. How do you view that at VA when you make those
decisions?
Mr. Warren. Sir, great question. Thank you for that
question. We look at what the risk is. Is it something at the
perimeter or is it something inside? Is the data inside
something that has the highest level of need or something that
is just transactional data? And the amount of resources we
apply and the controls we put in place are actually tailored to
the information that's in the system and the potential risk.
Mr. Walz. Does OIG take that into consideration when they
put out their recommendations, that you are doing--what you're
telling me is, you are doing a risk analysis, a cost-benefit
analysis. Is OIG asking or saying this is the ultimate perfect
world, what it looks like in security? Are they factoring that
in?
Mr. Warren. I believe my partners in the Inspector General
Office are taking that into consideration. But I will tell you
they've done a fair appraisal, in terms of the FISMA audit, of
areas where we need to continue our attention and focus. And I
will tell you the one thing that tells me that we're on the
right path is we did this massive program last year called
CRISP, which was more than just IT, it was the leadership of
the organization--the VHAs, the VBAs, the NCAs. So they got
engaged from the senior levels of what do we need to secure the
enterprise. And we are seeing the critical things dealing with
personal attitude by non-IT folks as well as IT folks is
changing to where it needs to be.
Mr. Walz. Well, if I heard that right, OIG did say they
didn't give an assessment based on it hasn't run its whole
course yet. So what your assessment is, is at the end of this,
when you go back and look at what CRISP did, we're going to see
a change across the spectrum, culturally and robustness of
security.
Mr. Warren. Yes, sir. We are seeing that change. And I will
tell you the change will need to continue from here on out
because we know that threat evolves with our change.
Mr. Walz. I'm going to use my last 25 seconds here. You're
not going to get the opportunity to do this, but following you,
Mr. Davis is going to speak and there's going to be some
questions of how things came out or why they came out. Is there
anything you'd like to address? I'm out of time here. You know
the situation, the memorandum and how things are going to play
out, and I think it's only fair that you be able to respond.
Mr. Warren. I would tell you, sir, I was perplexed by what
happened and how it went down. I was troubled by the fact that
there are two memos in circulation, a memo dated 29 January
that I and leadership received, and the one that we received
from the Committee that was signed on the 28th of January that
we were not aware of the existence of it until Friday, when the
Committee staff gave it to us. And the memos are almost
identical except for one paragraph, and that paragraph says:
``Clear and present danger.''
I will tell you, if anyone tells me there's a clear and
present danger, I pick them up and I walk them over to the IG
and say, tell them what it is that I am missing here. I
actually did that on the 29th with the memo received. That memo
I took to the IG.
On Friday, when I learned of the existence of a second memo
different than the one the Department received, I took both of
those memos and I reached to the IG and said, I need you to
help me figure this out because I cannot figure out why the
Department would get one memo with four paragraphs and the
Committee would get a different memo with five paragraphs and
the difference is ``clear and present danger.'' That was not
communicated in the memo we received. And I'll tell you, I am
still perplexed on why that would exist.
Mr. Walz. Mr. Chairman, I thank you for indulging the extra
time.
Mr. Coffman. Ms. Walorski for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Walorski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Warren, can you guarantee that the veterans in my
district, in Indiana's Second District, have not suffered a
security breach?
Mr. Warren. Ma'am, I'd be lying to you if I made that
guarantee. Again, it is all about what the risks are. And we
try our darnedest--in fact, we do more than try our darnedest.
Mrs. Walorski. But you can't guarantee that.
Mr. Warren. I can't--and in fact, nobody--if someone sat
here and guaranteed, you should haul them out of here--
Mrs. Walorski. All right. Do you personally, sir, do you
personally feel responsible for the fact that we have a Nation
of veterans that are vulnerable?
Mr. Warren. I care deeply that we are not further--
Mrs. Walorski. Do you feel personally responsible, when you
leave and check out at night and go home, do you feel
responsible for the fact that there are various security
breaches and our whole Nation's veterans are at risk?
Mr. Warren. Ma'am, I go home tired every night for all the
things that I do.
Mrs. Walorski. Do you feel responsible for all the things
that we talked about here today?
Mr. Warren. Ma'am, I'm personally responsible for the
organization as the Acting CIO.
Mrs. Walorski. Thank you.
I yield back my time to Dr. Roe.
Mr. Roe. Just a couple of questions, and maybe I got to
this before. But are the state actors, is that classified
information? Because I've seen published reports. I mean, we've
just had the Chinese in every headline in the world here
saying, oh, it's not a big deal, it's not a big. We know it's a
big deal. So who are the state actors?
Mr. Warren. Sir, as a young lieutenant, one of the first
briefings I got when I came onboard was that just because
something is published in the press, if you receive a briefing
that says it's classified, until the classifying authority says
it's clear, it's classified no matter what you read.
Mr. Roe. The briefings you've had, I mean, what you've got
done right here, when you determine with what you're doing that
somebody is trying to breach your firewalls and get into data
that's in the VA system, that's classified information, you
can't come here to this Committee and say, this is what
happened?
Mr. Warren. Sir, actually, you had asked me a different
question, which was the naming of the actors. We work with
Homeland Security on our boundary, so they are in constant
communication with us. They are telling us when they see stuff.
We are telling them when we see stuff.
Mr. Roe. We want you to tell us when you see stuff. What's
the problem with that? I thought that we all work for the
American people.
Mr. Warren. As do I, sir.
Mr. Roe. Well, I include you. I said we all. You, me,
everybody in this room who's here who's a public servant works
for the American people. They have a right to know who's trying
to get into their personal information. I would like to know
who's trying to get into the veterans that I serve, the 70-
something thousand of them that live in northeast Tennessee.
Mr. Warren. Congressman Roe, we would be glad to come up
and give you that private briefing with all of the material you
would like.
Mr. Roe. I guess my question is--second question is--why is
that classified? Why wouldn't that be public? When people are
trying to steal from you, we ought to let the people in our
country know who's trying to steal our own veterans'
information, I think. I think that's very important to be
public. Why are we hiding that? And that's above where you are,
I understand that. But that's a philosophical question.
The next question is, is that, when we come back a year
from now--I've been here now 4-1/2 years, and I see problems
that linger on and on and on. Are we going to come back 1 year
from now and have the same conversation? And I totally agree
with you, Mr. Warren, when you were saying you couldn't
absolutely guarantee. I've had people come to me when I'm
taking them to the operating room and say, will you guarantee
that I'm going to live through the surgery? Well, I can't
guarantee that. I got that. I understand that. But with as good
a system, can we say a year from now that the IG, in fact, who
gave a very good report, you will have met those metrics that
you agree with, and then you all work out if you don't agree
with them?
Mr. Warren. Sir, I would like to take the 12 to 18 months
the IG identified. But the intent is to clear as many of those
as we can in the 12 months with the schedule we've given them,
and to keep moving through those until we've cleared them all.
Mr. Roe. I yield back.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Huelskamp.
Mr. Huelskamp. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Warren, the IG's testimony outlined some pretty serious
deficiencies in the Office of Information and Technology. And
according to the evidence, VA's network has been accessed by
foreign state actors since March 2010. And in that fiscal year,
and since then, you've received a grand total of more than
$87,000 in bonuses. Can you explain how you merit such a large
amount in bonuses?
Mr. Warren. Sir, as you're aware, the way the compensation
system works in the Federal Government is a performance plan is
laid on an employee, as in myself. A supervisor sits down and
lays out what I expect from you in the year. And based upon how
you do, there is an appraisal given.
Mr. Huelskamp. So how you did was worthy of $87,000 in
bonuses? Is that your understanding?
Mr. Warren. I believe, as a result of me exceeding the
performance expectations that my leadership have laid on me, I
was recognized with performance awards of that amount.
Ms. Halliday. Okay. I'd like to ask a question as well,
that you did state there were no absolutes in your mind in
security. But we do have a letter here, a very absolute
statement from your boss, the Secretary, that says, quote, ``To
be clear, VA's security posture was never at risk.''
Is that a true or false statement?
Mr. Warren. I would tell you, sir, as the person who ghost
wrote that memo, in terms of doing the staff work for the
Secretary, I was not clear in my language and I take ownership
of that.
Mr. Huelskamp. Is it true or false?
Mr. Warren. It is true with respect to the ATO process,
which this memo was trying to answer. With respect to the
broader question, as we've already talked about today, there
always is some risk. And so again--
Mr. Huelskamp. Is this a false statement then?
Mr. Warren. I would not say it was a false statement, sir.
Mr. Huelskamp. It's an inadequate statement? A mistake?
Mr. Lowe, let me ask you a question: Have you ever brought
to Mr. Warren's attention that there are significant security
issues that need to be addressed?
Mr. Lowe. Congressman, thank you.
Have I ever brought attention to Mr. Warren that there are
significant security issues that need to be addressed? No, sir,
I have not.
Mr. Huelskamp. You have not?
Mr. Lowe. I have not.
Mr. Huelskamp. Usually, I try to anticipate an answer. And
to anticipate an answer that in your job you have never
identified a single security risk really strains credibility.
Your own testimony.
So you've never sent an email, never made a statement to
Mr. Warren or his superiors that there are any security risks
in the IT system at the VA?
Mr. Lowe. I brief Mr. Warren and the Secretary frequently
on security risks for the organization.
Mr. Huelskamp. Do you know how many foreign state actors
have been identified as perhaps intruding upon the system?
Mr. Lowe. I know that there are foreign state actors that
are--
Mr. Huelskamp. Do you know how many have you identified? Is
there one or more?
Mr. Lowe. Individual state actors?
Mr. Huelskamp. The Individual states. It's a pretty clear
question.
Mr. Lowe. Yes, sir.
Mr. Huelskamp. Have you identified more than one?
Mr. Lowe. Yes, sir.
Mr. Huelskamp. How many more? Mr. Warren said there was
only one, in his earlier testimony. How many more were
identified?
Mr. Lowe. How many more state actors that are actively
trying to penetrate the network or actors that have
penetrated--
Mr. Huelskamp. I'm guessing there will be a second round of
questions, so it probably doesn't help to try to stall. Would
you answer the question? How many more?
Mr. Lowe. Sir, I have been in this position for
approximately 90 days. I'm still trying to ascertain the state
of the organization.
Mr. Huelskamp. Have you seen any memos that would identify
more than one?
Mr. Lowe. More than one--
Mr. Huelskamp. State actor. You believe there's more than
one. Mr. Warren stated there was only one. You believe there's
more than one. I am asking how many more?
Mr. Lowe. I don't know the answer off the top of my head,
sir. If I could get back to you on the record, I would
appreciate it.
Mr. Huelskamp. Well, I will note for the Committee I've had
a grand total of, I believe 23 questions. I've been waiting for
264 days for your agency to respond. As Dr. Roe mentioned,
we're supposed to be working for the American people. And when
your agency, your bosses refuse to answer questions, it looks
like you're covering things up. When you say there's one state
actor, he says there's more, he's only been here for 90 days,
we've got a report from the people that work for you, Mr.
Warren--you know this report. You know there's eight actors
identified on here. And you claimed there's only one in your
earlier testimony. I think that's embarrassing. It's not only
embarrassing, you're sworn under oath. So I'm going to ask you
one more time, how many state actors have you identified or
believe are out there that have accessed the system for 20
million veterans and their dependents?
Mr. Warren. Congressman Huelskamp, I believe that question
is directed to myself?
Mr. Huelskamp. Is your name Mr. Warren? Answer the
question, please. Let's get on with it. We're doing the
business of answering questions. Please answer them. I come
from Kansas. We don't go through all this trying to act like we
don't know what the question is. I asked your name. Answer the
question.
Mr. Warren. I would tell you that the Department, through
the NSOC, is aware of multiple state actors who are trying to
take action against the Department.
And I will tell you it is more than just state actors. It
is very known in the community that it is more than countries.
There are syndicates who have this as a money-making activity.
And I believe that's also in the open press in terms of it's
not just countries, it's individuals, it's groups of
individuals. And it is not just veteran data they're going
after, they go after your home, your home computer, Web sites
you go to. And there is a very aggressive effort, and I know
that Congress is engaged in terms of what's notification, what
you should notify, how we share, and how do we do all those
things.
Mr. Huelskamp. But you're comfortable with the current
security risk?
Mr. Warren. I am not comfortable with the current security
risk, sir. And again, I will tell you the safest computer is
the one you don't hook up to the Internet.
Mr. Coffman. Mr. Huelskamp, we'll do a second round.
Mr. Huelskamp. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Coffman. Mr. Warren, so we know that we've been hacked
by a foreign actor, we know that, the VA system. We know that
they encrypted their way out, exiting. So we don't know what
they took. We know that the system contains the personal
identification information for about 20 million veterans. So
isn't it possible that they could have taken all of that--that
there is an entity, having hacked our system, that has all the
personal identifying information for all our 20 million
veterans? Isn't that correct?
Mr. Warren. Sir, I am very concerned about stringing all
those facts together and stating a causality. In other words,
this, this, this, this means.
Mr. Coffman. Well, okay, let's walk through it then.
Number one, our system has been hacked, correct?
Mr. Warren. We are aware of incidents--
Mr. Coffman. That's right. Number two, that they
encrypted--that they penetrated the system, and they encrypted
on their way out, so we don't know what files they took. Is
that correct?
Mr. Warren. In the incident referred to, there was data
removed that was encrypted, yes, sir.
Mr. Coffman. So we don't know what files they took,
correct?
Mr. Warren. We do not know what files they took out of the
VA.
Mr. Coffman. Had access to information pertaining to our 20
million veterans, did they not?
Mr. Warren. I would tell you, sir, that is the point where
I diverge, because it's not clear where they had access, right.
So you're assuming the VA is a small place with one computer.
Mr. Coffman. You're right, we don't know. That's the
problem. We don't know. That's right. And so the fact is that
they had access to the 20 million veterans. Aren't you
concerned about that?
Mr. Warren. Sir, I am concerned any time veterans' data is
put at risk.
Mr. Coffman. Don't you feel that the veterans of this
country--I being one of them, and there are some other veterans
on this Committee--ought to be warned of that fact?
Mr. Warren. I believe you are accomplishing that through
this hearing, sir.
Mr. Coffman. Should you have accomplished that?
Mr. Warren. To what end, sir? To drive veterans away from
the health care they need, the mental health care they need?
Mr. Coffman. To inform them that they need to watch out,
the fact their--that the system had been compromised, just as
any private entity that had been compromised would notify the
consumers that they serve. You, in fact, had an obligation to
notify the consumers that you serve. That's the men and women
that served this Nation in uniform.
Mr. Warren. Yes, sir, as I did. And any time there is the
potential where we believe there is the potential of a breach,
we offer credit monitoring--
Mr. Coffman. There was a breach.
Mr. Warren. We offer credit monitoring for a year. We have
a hotline to provide those services to individuals. In the
past, we have received emails from Homeland Security--
Mr. Coffman. Ranking Member Kirkpatrick.
Mrs. Kirkpatrick. I yield back.
Mr. Coffman. Mr. Lamborn.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and once again, thank
you for your leadership on this issue.
Mr. Warren, it was testified under oath by the previous
panel that when you own the domain controls you own the network
and that that is what happened at the VA. Would you agree with
that statement?
Mr. Warren. I would tell you, sir, that when you have the
domain controllers you can go where you would like. That is not
necessarily the same as owning the network. Owning the network
means you control what anybody does or anybody can do and where
all the traffic goes. That is not the case.
Mr. Lamborn. But if you are looking for information and you
can go wherever you want to go, that is a pretty bad situation.
Mr. Warren. As I believe I have--yes, sir.
Mr. Lamborn. Can you tell me about the APO process, the
certification process? I hope I am using the right terminology.
Mr. Warren. Yes, sir. The authority to operate process is
something that was established I think approximately in 2002 by
the E-Gov Act. It was a paper process that was used, very
routine eyes, very checklist focused, very document oriented,
to if you are bringing a system online, are you putting it in a
box and controlling all of the boundaries on the box in such a
way that it was worth the risk to the organization for the
system to run.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay, thank you. So if you go to a vendor or
if you go to someone in the VA and say I want you to certify
that everything is working properly and is secure, how long
would it normally take them to do that?
Mr. Warren. So that the ATO process is actually an ongoing
process. Multiple documents are on different schedules on when
they are generated and when they are updated. As an example,
COOP/COG, which deals with what do you do if a system breaks,
that gets checked and exercised on an annual basis, and in fact
every year the IG comes in and looks at have you done that?
That is a part of that. There is a system security plan which
is the description of it. There is the security controls in
terms of what you are doing. There are the management controls
in terms of what you put in place because technology can't do
it. And there is a whole list of documents that you run
through. Each of those are on a different schedule. So when you
talk certifying, there are multiple steps in the process.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. What would be a normal range of high-end
and low end of how long that certification would take?
Mr. Warren. Sir, if you are referring to the last two
steps, which I take it you are, which is the individual looking
at all of the material that exists and asking is it relevant
and correct and then recommending authorization, I believe you
can do that in 2 weeks to 30 days if you have a well-run
organization.
Mr. Lamborn. Two weeks to 30 days.
Mr. Warren. For the last two steps of the process. As I
said, all of the other ones are ongoing. Those last two steps
are validating that the individuals below, the information
security officer, the system owner, the facility, have actually
done all the things and certified, attested that all of the
information is correct, that it is current. So that
certification process is not a go do a lot of work. It is make
sure all the folks below you, all the processes you are
responsible for, have happened.
Mr. Lamborn. So if you accepted certifications like that in
that 2 weeks to 30 days or 2 months process, then you would
also be trusting that everything before those last two steps
had been accomplished on an ongoing and regular basis?
Mr. Warren. Yes, sir. You count on the signature of the
individual and the attestation they have done their job. And I
will tell you, when we did that first cycle, of the 268
documents that were signed, I rejected over 40 percent because
when I looked at the underlying documentation, which is how I
do things, it did not meet the standard and I sent them back to
be redone. So the certifier said yep, it is ready, but when I
did that first set, 44 percent did not meet it.
Mr. Lamborn. So you would not accept an ATO without all of
the previous steps having been done on an ongoing basis up to
the last two steps and then reviewing it once again for those
last two steps?
Mr. Warren. Yes, sir.
Mr. Lamborn. And you would not rush something through just
to look good or something like that?
Mr. Warren. Sir, my signature means a heck of a lot to me,
so when I sign something saying that I am accepting the risk, I
am accepting that risk. So I believe I laid out a responsible
time period for something to be done and I had an expectation
that the individual would have done all the things necessary
such that when it got to me that it needed to be done. And in
fact the action was given in November in a meeting where the
individual accepted the responsibility to do the job by
February. It had been talked about prior to that in multiple
meetings about the need to fix that process. I was expecting at
the end of the process that all of the things they were
responsible for had happened. And even though they were, I
still checked and rejected the ones that did not meet the
standard.
Mr. Lamborn. All right. Thank you.
Mr. Coffman. Mr. Warren, a quick question. Did you mislead
the Secretary of Veterans Affairs when you had inserted the
language in the letter that was sent to me on May 14th, ``To be
clear, VA security posture was never at risk.'' Did you mislead
the Secretary?
Mr. Warren. Mr. Chairman, I did not intend to mislead the
Secretary.
Mr. Coffman. But you did?
Mr. Warren. I don't believe I did.
Mr. Coffman. You did?
Mr. Warren. I believe my answer was within the context of
the question which was dealing with the ATO process.
Mr. Coffman. Dr. Roe.
Mr. Roe. Just very briefly. Mr. Warren, one of the things
that is most important I think at the VA or with anyone in
health care is trust. You have to trust not only the person
that is seeing you, providing the care, but you have to trust
that that information will be protected. Because many times it
could be very embarrassing if something had occurred to you
years ago that maybe current family members, other people don't
know about, right now the relationships you have had, issues
that come along, mental health care issues. That is why it is
so--not just money, but that is why that is important.
And I guess a question that I have, and the VA has not done
an exemplary job, in 2006 with the laptop it took forever to
notify people. Secondly, when the issue came along with the
colonoscopies, that wasn't handled very well by the VA. And I
don't think that veterans right now understand, as a matter of
fact I guarantee you they won't until they see this hearing
today and the word gets out among the veteran community that
all of their personal information potentially is at risk.
I guess the question I have for you is, are you concerned
at all about your data in the VA, if you go to the VA, about
your own personal information, you?
Mr. Warren. Sir, I have no reservation about using VA
benefits or services, placing the data, my data in the
veterans' hands, into my staff's hands, into the rest of the
VA. I believe we would be doing a disservice to our veterans by
telling them, hey, there is a disproportionate risk and
therefore you should not be coming to the VA for those services
or benefits.
We know health care, and as you have already talked about
in other settings about mental health care and making sure our
veterans get that, I would hate that this, the potential to
drive folks away from the services and the benefits not only
that they have earned but they need.
Mr. Roe. But equally just as bad is to have that
information once she have shared it with somebody, shared with
the world, I think Mr. Lamborn said in a WikiLeak drop. I think
the most compelling thing you said, and I have to agree with
you the more I hear in these hearings I go to, is don't hook up
a computer to the Internet if you don't want somebody to know
about it. Apparently if you can't protect it, I mean that is
what you said just a minute ago, whether you said that just out
of exasperation or fact, but I think when you hook it up, you
may be now, you may be an open book.
Mr. Warren. I would tell you, sir, and it is a great area
where we focus and it is the training of our workforce, our
greatest asset and our greatest risk is our employee base,
because if you do something without thinking, if you do not
think about where you go--in other words, if you go out to the
Internet and you say ``free car,'' and you go to that Web site
to get that free car, you are actually downloading probably
malicious software.
Within the VA, we protect against that. But when you are at
home, if you go to the wrong place or your child goes to the
wrong place or a visiting sibling or niece, you are putting
that computer at risk, right? And one of the programs that we
have at the VA is, we don't allow you to hook your personal
commuter up to the VA. We actually allow you to come into the
VA through a virtual environment so you don't bring any of the
things you have on your home computer.
In fact, at the Federal Trade Commission before the virtual
technology had really matured, we paid for anti-virus
protection for individuals' personal computer because we knew
if they had to use it to get into the VA through remote or into
the Federal Trade Commission.
At the VA we don't have to do that because we protect by
doing virtual. But the behaviors that we build at the VA we
want them to take home, because if you are at home dealing with
identity theft because you did a bad thing unintentionally, you
really can't do your job at the VA as a result of it.
Active aggressive education. Posters. Some of the things
that we have been exploring with, and we did it at the Federal
Trade Commission, is you do spooks, right? You send individuals
email at work intentionally, bad stuff, right, and you want
them to basically do it. And you pop up and say don't do this
for real, because this, if this had been a real one, you would
have just compromised your system.
Mr. Coffman. Mr. Walz.
Mr. Walz. I yield back my time, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Coffman. Mr. Huelskamp.
Mr. Huelskamp. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize for my
emotion earlier. I have a 95-year-old veteran uncle, a Purple
Heart recipient who is facing some medical problems and the
thought that his records might be at risk is particularly
worrisome to me. But I have a few more follow-up questions for
Mr. Warren and his assistant on some budget issues.
If I understand correctly, the VA intends to transfer
almost $69 million to various IT efforts. Is any of that money
destined for IT security?
Mr. Warren. Sir, so I can make sure I am answering the
question appropriately, is that referring to a reprogramming
action that was sent up to the Hill, or is this something else?
Mr. Huelskamp. That would be a reprogramming.
Mr. Warren. This would be the reprogramming. I need to go
back and confirm which accounts were being moved. I do not
believe--in fact, I am pretty sure that that transfer would not
be degrading any of the efforts we are doing in information
security; that the work that we need to do to continue CRISP
and to support the work on the material weakness that the IG
has identified--
Mr. Huelskamp. Is it enhancing your IT security efforts?
Mr. Warren. I would tell you every day we are working on
enhancing our--
Mr. Huelskamp. With this transfer, are you moving money to
enhance the IT security?
Mr. Warren. The primary purpose of those dollars, sir, that
transfer, is to move accounts, move dollars out of different
accounts--
Mr. Huelskamp. Are you using it for enhancing IT security?
Yes or no.
Mr. Warren. I will need to go back and confirm if we are
moving funds into the information security accounts. I can't
tell you that directly here, but I will get back to you, sir.
Mr. Huelskamp. The second budget question would be, it is
my understanding under your direction, the VA spent $14 million
for a conference room, approximately $14 million for a
conference room in Martinsburg, Virginia. Is that accurate?
Mr. Warren. Sir, I would need to take that one for the
record. The number I believe is high, but I need to go back and
pull the records up to confirm.
Mr. Huelskamp. When you say high, is that in the ballpark?
Roughly? I appreciate getting the actual figures, but your best
guess is how much was spent on this conference room?
Mr. Warren. Sir, the reason I would like to take the
question for the record is Martinsburg is a facility that has
multiple conference facilities in it. It is a place where we
have the NSOC in terms of our security group. So I don't know
if it is facilities we built for them. There is a location for
the Secretary and the leadership team. I don't know if it
refers to that. We also have a command post for the IT
organization in case we deploy there. So I don't know which one
you are speaking to, so that is why I would like to take it for
the record.
Mr. Huelskamp. There is one here. It would be the one room
that has a plaque on the wall with your name on it. And I don't
know if we have a copy of that. That would be the plaque that
is on the wall. So if you are going to look for the room--is it
customary in the VA to put your name on a plaque on a wall?
Mr. Warren. Sir, that is actually the plaque to the
building, and I was the responsible official that worked with
the Congress to get the funding for that location. And I
believe if you look in any new building that has been built,
the names of the individuals responsible normally appear on the
plaque.
Mr. Huelskamp. I would say actually say put about 300
million taxpayers on there as the ones responsible for the
building.
The last thing I want to ask you about, you mentioned
credit monitoring services.
Mr. Warren. Yes, sir.
Mr. Huelskamp. Who do you provide those to?
Mr. Warren. We provide those in any case where we believe
there is the potential for the release of veterans data.
Mr. Huelskamp. So you do that on an individual--
Mr. Warren. On an individual basis. A letter is sent out to
each of the veterans where--
Mr. Huelskamp. Do you know how many you have provided this
for?
Mr. Warren. I will take that for the record and get it back
to you, sir.
Mr. Huelskamp. Okay. So you actually have identified
individuals you believe their data is at risk and provided them
credit monitoring services if they so choose?
Mr. Warren. Any time we believe there is the potential of
the information being released, we offer the credit monitoring
protection to those veterans.
Mr. Huelskamp. Okay. And I understand you don't believe
anything is actual, you don't have actually any loss of data.
It is all potential.
Mr. Warren. I will tell you, sir, we go the extra distance
by offering that. We actually have a lower threshold for
offering than anybody else because we want to be sure--
Mr. Huelskamp. You know that how?
Mr. Warren. Based upon our communication with the industry
and conversations with folks who offer credit monitoring. I am
not sure you will find other government agencies who offer
credit monitoring if there is the potential of a risk. I think
the VA is unique in that regard.
Mr. Huelskamp. I look forward to that information, the
exact numbers of folks you have identified potentially at risk.
Mr. Warren. Yes, sir.
Mr. Huelskamp. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Coffman. Potentially, I think that number is about 20
million. Mr. Warren, thank you so much for your testimony
today. Mr. Lowe, you are excused, both of you. Thank you. Stay
around. I think if we have time we will do that classified
setting after Mr. Davis gives testimony.
On the last panel today is Mr. Jerry Davis, former Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Information Security for the Office of
Information and Technology at the Department of Veterans
Affairs.
Before I recognize you, Mr. Davis, I ask that you please
rise and raise your right hand.
[Witness sworn.]
Mr. Coffman. Please take your seat and you will be
recognized for 5 minutes, Mr. Davis.
STATEMENT OF JERRY L. DAVIS, FORMER DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY
FOR INFORMATION SECURITY, OFFICE OF INFORMATION AND TECHNOLOGY,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS
Mr. Davis. Chairman Coffman, Ranking Member Kirkpatrick,
and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity
to convey my concerns to you regarding the protection of
information systems and information, which includes sensitive
veteran data at the Department of Veterans Affairs.
From August 2010 until February 2013 I have served as the
Deputy Assistant Secretary Information Security and Chief
Information Security Officer at the VA. As the DAS IS, I served
as the most senior civil servant staff member within VA with
responsibility for oversight and accountability and the
protection of VA information, VA privacy, records management,
and the Freedom of Information, FOIA, Act process.
At that time, the time of my departure from VA in early
February 2013, I was one, if not the longest serving chief
information security officer in the Federal Government, with
nearly a decade of service in that role spread across multiple
Federal agencies. I am also a Marine veteran, having served in
combat with distinction during the first Gulf War, so the
appointment to the position as the VA CISO had special meaning.
It was a position that I did not take lightly and I was and I
still am extremely proud to have had an opportunity to serve
our country, and equally proud to have had an opportunity to
serve the veteran community.
My time at VA was largely filled with a great sense of
pride because of the purpose and mission of VA and because of
my role, which had a direct and positive impact on the veteran
community. However, there came a time at the end of my tenure
where my pride turned to serious consternation, and that
consternation remains to this day.
In nearly 20 years of building and managing security
programs across government and private industry, I have never
seen an organization with as many unintended security
vulnerabilities. Upon my arrival in late August 2010, I
inherited results of more than 15 continuous years of an
unintended and documented material weakness in IT security
controls. This material weakness included more than 13,000
uncompleted IT security corrective actions. These 13,000
corrective actions will require more than 100,000 sub-actions
to fully remediate and manage IT security vulnerabilities and
improve the VA security posture. In early September 2010, I was
also advised that nearly 600 VA systems' Authority to Operate
had expired and there was no plan in place to bring these
systems into compliance.
Despite the voluminous number of uncompleted corrective
actions and expired ATOs, the most concerning issue was a
conversation I had with the VA Principle Deputy Assistant
Secretary Steph Warren, who told me shortly after my arrival
that we have uninvited visitors in the network. Further
discussion with the VA network security operations team
indicated that VA became aware of a serious network compromise
in March 2010 and these uninvited visitors were nation-state
sponsored attackers.
Over the course of time while working with the VA NSOC and
external agencies I learned that these attackers were a nation-
state sponsored cyber espionage unit and that no less than
eight different nation-state sponsored organizations had
successfully compromised VA networks and data or were actively
attacking VA networks, attacks that continue at VA to this very
day.
These group of attackers were taking advantage of weak
technical controls within the VA network. Lack of controls such
as encryption on VA data bases holding millions of sensitive
records, web applications containing common exploitable
vulnerabilities, and weak authentication to sensitive systems
contributed to successful unchallenged and unfettered access
and exploitation of VA systems and information by this specific
group of attackers.
During my tenure, I consistently ensured that each instance
of attack or compromise by these group of attackers was
documented and communicated to the VA OIT leadership through
specialized reporting called Key Investigative Reporting
performed by the NSOC Deep Dive analysis team and biweekly
security meetings with the VA Principle Deputy Assistant
Secretary, Mr. Steph Warren.
From late August 2010 until my departure in early February
2013, I planned for and executed with support from various sub
offices within OIT a series of initiatives and activities
needed to improve network and system security with the
particular focus on defending the network against sophisticated
and targeted attacks levied by nation-state sponsored
organizations. Some of these initiatives included a web
application security program, the VA software assurance
program, continuous monitoring and diagnostics of VA
information systems, mandating encryption of all VA databases,
and supported the reduction of the total number of VA databases
hosting sensitive veteran information.
During my tenure as CISO, with the support of VA as a
whole, we were able to close more than 10,000 of the 13,000
security corrective actions. In all, VA personnel executed more
than 100,000 sub actions. While these actions did improve
security from a compliance perspective, there still existed a
problem of fully implementing adequate technical security
controls needed to defend network systems and system
information from nation-state sponsored attackers.
The heart of selecting the proper technical controls meant
fully understanding the threat actors, their tactics,
techniques and procedures, and along with systems and network
vulnerabilities in implementing a program that could
continuously report on and remediate identified vulnerabilities
in a near realtime fashion.
Over time, the Office of Information Security worked to
enhance a comprehensive program called Continuous Monitoring
and Diagnostics that would provide adequate security of VA
systems and networks by continually evaluating certain
technical controls in a near realtime fashion. There is proof
that a good CMD program monitoring the correct controls can
significantly improve information security and is consistent
with the direction that the Federal Government is taking in
securing Federal systems. It is also significantly superior to
even a good paper-based ATO process.
It is my testimony that at the time of my departure from VA
that the process required for the DAS IS to make an attestation
that VA systems were adequately secure was completely faulty
and improper and implementation of the process veteran systems
and VA information to further risk of compromise. It was
confirmed to me by the VA information security staff charged
with executing the process that it was flawed, provided no
value, and that providing a positive attestation to the
adequacy of security controls would seriously compromise the
integrity of the VA security program. I subsequently conveyed
this message to the Assistant Secretary and the PDAS by formal
memorandum and in conversation to the PDAS between January 15,
2013, and January 23, 2013.
VA Handbook 6500.3 states that the DAS is responsible for
reviewing all C&A packages and making a decision recommendation
to the authorizing official to issue an IATO, ATO or Denial of
Authorization to operate; and providing an IATO extension in
the event local management can demonstrate continuous
monitoring and security due diligence are being provided.
In accordance with VA information security policy and
following VA information security procedures as a DAS IS, I
elected to recommend a denial of Authority to Operate and also
elected to recommend movement of VA systems over the course of
eight months into an enhanced continuous monitoring program
where systems technical controls can be centrally managed and
evaluated in a near realtime fashion. I based my decision on
the guidance provided by the information security team on the
fact that the paper-based process would not keep highly
sophisticated nation-state sponsored attackers from further
compromising VA data.
Furthermore, as each VA system was transitioned into the
continuous monitoring program, additional specific critical
controls would be evaluated for adequacy before being fully
granted a full ATO. These additional critical controls are
proven to slow and repeal sophisticated nation-state sponsored
attackers from compromising information systems and data. This
was an agreed upon process with the VA information security
team and a process that had been briefed by me to the Director
of IT Audits and Security within the VA Office of the Inspector
General several weeks before the process implementation.
Despite the authority granted to the DAS IS, to make the
recommendation to deny authorization, the VA OIT PDAS made a
concerted effort to circumvent my authority and influence my
decision to make a recommendation to the accrediting official
that 545 VA systems be given an interim authority to operate.
Furthermore, VA handbook and policy 6500.3 and VA policy 6500
provides no role or authority for the PDAS, OIT with regard to
the program or processes governing authority to operate.
To this end, I would recommend to this Subcommittee some
recommendations. Review all key investigation reports and Deep
Dive analysis reports and Web Application Security Program
reports to assess the damage and depth of exposure, extent of
compromise to VA systems and compromise to Veteran information,
and regularly report to the House Committee on Veterans Affairs
on progress made with respect to mitigating access to VA
systems and veteran information by nation-state sponsored
organizations.
Assess previously identified web application exposures and
assess for potential compromise of veteran data, both PII and
PHI.
Include web application exposures as part of the Data
Breach Core Team evaluation process.
Assess the potential compromise to non-VA networks sharing
an interconnection with VA's networks.
Designate the VA network as a compromised environment and
establish controls that are effective and support the
reclamation of control back to VA from nation-state sponsored
organizations.
Move the VA systems into a full continuous monitoring and
diagnostics program with near realtime situation awareness of a
security posture with a focus on the 20 critical controls.
Increase VA funding for VA security programs and number of
information security officers supporting VA field offices and
facilities.
Move reporting lines for the DAS Information Security
directly to the Assistant Secretary OIT or to the Office of the
Secretary, VA.
Assess the past and present practices of the OIT leadership
with regard to decisions made in the protection of VA systems
and information.
I would like to thank the Members of the Subcommittee for
your time today and I look forward to any questions you may
have.
[The prepared statement of Jerry L. Davis appears in the
Appendix]
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Davis. Mr. Davis, in your
experience, what would be the intended use for their access
once these actors gained access into the network?
Mr. Davis. The actors, once they get inside a network,
depending on what their goals and objectives are, could be a
number of things. So initially, once they get inside a network
they establish a foothold and that foothold is actually meant
and designed to allow them access into the network at another
given time. So basically what they do is, they install
backdoors into the network. Once they are inside the network
and they have established those backdoors, they then attempt to
move laterally throughout the network by compromising
passwords, user names and things of that nature, and elevating
their privileges so they can further move throughout the
network and start looking at systems to potentially compromise.
Their long-term objective is to maintain a presence inside
the network for whatever they need to do. So by maintaining the
presence means that they will attack multiple systems, they
will continue to steal passwords, user names, things of that
nature, so they can maintain their presence, and then
essentially take whatever data that they deem may be important
for them.
Mr. Coffman. Mr. Davis, can you elaborate on these nation-
state attackers?
Mr. Davis. So within VA I saw--we dealt with approximately
eight different types of attackers or groups or organizations.
In looking at reporting that was put out by industry experts,
particularly a report in February of 2013, Mandiant, they
identified attackers coming from the People's Republic of
China, the People's Liberation Army, and in information that I
had at the time and looking back when we did the analysis on
those individuals, we identified that it was also the same
groups. One the groups we called were the Comment Crew, and
they are known to be sponsored by the People's Liberation Army.
Mr. Coffman. Mr. Davis, how does an organization defend
against these sophisticated attackers once they are in the
network?
Mr. Davis. Once they are in the network, once you
understand that they are in the network, you have to do
something which I call is, you are in a compromised
environment. So there is a number of things that you need to do
to understand how do you reclaim that environment.
The first thing you need to do is identify which systems
were compromised, do a forensics evaluation if you can on what
was actually taken, remove users from resources around the
network and then do things such as look at what we call
indications of compromise.
So this is basically digital fingerprints that we would
have of different groups who have compromised other
environments and we now have their fingerprints. You will look
for these indications of compromise and then basically go back
and remediate all of those areas where you believe the
compromise took place or where you know the compromise took
place.
So if you know that the compromise was a missing patch, you
have to start patching past the systems. The problem is, is
that once you realize that the individuals are in the network,
on average, they have already compromised the environment for
generally up to a year by the time you figured out they have
been in the network. So you may go back and patch a particular
system, but they have already established backdoors elsewhere
in the network. So it becomes sometimes chasing your tail
around and around in circles in trying to identify where they
are. So you may patch, but they will pop up again somewhere
else. So it takes over time a number of years, months to years,
to go through the organization systematically and plug these
holes.
DoD puts out a very good document, it is not classified, it
is sensitive but it is the not classified, that is called
Operating in a Compromised Environment, and it teaches
organizations, it is instructions on how you actually operate
in a compromised environment and reclaim that environment.
Mr. Coffman. Mr. Walz.
Mr. Walz. Thank you, Chairman. Mr. Davis, thank you. Thank
you for your service both in uniform and after.
I am going to try and go back at this issue because I think
the issue of security and veterans security is paramount. The
accusations that have been laid out, I am going to get at this
and try and figure it out. Can you tell me, was this issue over
you pointing out that there were problems, did that lead to
your departure from VA?
Mr. Davis. The problems at VA didn't lead to my departure.
Like I said earlier, we had worked through a tremendous number
of corrective actions. You know, as I said earlier, I worked
through about--of the 13,000, we had gotten through about
10,000 of them. At that time I felt that the work that I was
doing at VA, some other opportunities came up. I had an
opportunity to move back to the West Coast where I am from
originally and be closer to my family out there, was part of
the reason why I elected to move back.
Mr. Walz. Because you signed off, if I am right here, in
August 31 of 2011 you did the extensions on the ATOs.
Mr. Davis. That is correct.
Mr. Walz. And then again you met with Mr. Warren on
November 29th about the expiring ATOs, and then on December
21st you informed him of your resignation. It is just personal
timing on all this, is why this hit like this?
Mr. Davis. Yes, it was the timing. I had actually notified
the previous Assistant Secretary Mr. Baker before November that
I would be departing. I had just had a one-on-one with him and
said that I have an opportunity to go back to the West Coast. I
don't have anything in writing but there has been a formal
offer. When I get a formal offer--
Mr. Walz. This was all prior to December 31st on the
expiring ATOs.
Mr. Davis. That is correct.
Mr. Walz. Why would they have asked you when they knew you
were leaving, you had already signed on to these, do you think
it was appropriate at that time? Now, you say, the thing that I
am going at is under duress. What did they do or ask you to do
that violated your conscience on this to sign these things?
Mr. Davis. The process to do the Authority to Operate, it
is a sign-off that says--that gives my attestation that the
systems are adequately secure. The process is pretty involved
and very extensive. So the problem that I had was that the
process was asked to be short-circuited. In other words, an
email had come out from the OIT front office indicating that
Mr. Warren wanted all the authorities who operate to be signed
by the time I left, and that was 2 weeks. This is January 11th.
So my team forwarded that to me--
Mr. Walz. Why didn't you just say no and walk away? Because
what you are asking here is signing off on a system that is
going to possibly lead to the breach of this. You knew it
wasn't working. You knew that there were violations made. But
by putting your name on it, it gave the authorization to move
it forward. You were already leaving your job and had notified
them, and then a month later a memo is sent, and I am going to
get to that in a minute, two different ones, and I find out
about it here for this hearing. I am still trying to get at
this.
Mr. Davis. Yes, sir. At that point, I did say no in
writing, in memorandum form to Mr. Baker, and that would have
been on or about January 15th, immediately after I became aware
that I was needed to sign these before I had departed. In the
memorandum that I sent to Mr. Baker, I said that this is
improper because all of the activities that are needed to make
a decision on authorities to operate can't be done in 2 weeks.
I said there is going to be errors and omissions and that it
was improper, we would jeopardize the integrity of security.
Mr. Walz. Did someone threaten you?
Mr. Davis. I wouldn't say--no one threatened me, but
basically I was told that I would not be getting--be given a
transfer date, a transfer date would not be given to the agency
that picked me up until I signed off on the documentation.
Mr. Walz. Who told you that about the transfer?
Mr. Davis. Mr. Warren.
Mr. Walz. Mr. Warren said you would not be given a transfer
date if you wouldn't sign on a document that your conscience
told you was wrong?
Mr. Davis. That is correct. And that was--I contacted the
senior executive HR because the new organization was contacting
me and asking me when was I going to be coming on board,
because I had told them back in December that I would give VA
30 days to work through whatever I had left to do and I would
be coming on board. At this point they are contacting VA. They
are asking when am I going to get a release date. I contacted
HRHCS and I was told that Mr. Warren said that you would not be
given a release date because you still had a project to finish.
Mr. Walz. Did he miss this last paragraph in the memo you
gave him? The one I have here says I attest that there is a
clear and present danger and risk of exposure and compromise of
the sensitive data.
He testified under oath that he never got that, that this
was added to the letter that was sent to Congress on January
28th, and on January 29th he got the letter without that there.
Mr. Davis. He did indeed, sir, get a different copy.
Mr. Walz. Why a different copy?
Mr. Davis. Let me explain what happened. I originally--that
was the original letter that I had written, and that letter was
on an internal--a letter that was going to VA internally and it
had concurrently copied all the Members of Congress. My
business office came back to me, because we were putting it
through the official VA system, my business office came back to
me and said we don't concurrent copy Members of Congress on
letters of this type. They get an individual memorandum. So I
said okay.
So they went ahead and drafted the individual memorandum in
the background. Meanwhile, what I did was, I had someone look
at the letter and they said they didn't like the language. They
said I don't like the language. They said you probably should
change this language at the bottom. It sounds a little bit
dramatic and that sort of thing.
Mr. Walz. Well, when I read this letter, the most important
paragraph is the last one.
Mr. Davis. Yes. It was--someone told me that I asked to--
the person I asked to look at it thought it was overly
dramatic. I said, you know, this is a dramatic thing, but maybe
it is. So I did change the letter. But what had happened was I
sent that inside, but then later on before I left, I had gotten
copies of the original letters that came up here to the Members
of Congress and those had went out.
Mr. Walz. Okay, I will yield back. We will wait if there is
a second round of questions.
Mr. Coffman. Mr. Lamborn.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Continuing on these ATOs, Mr. Warren testified that in a
well run organization you can finish up the last two steps
prior to signing off on an ATO in as little as 2 weeks. Now,
you did not feel that that was appropriate though, and why not?
Mr. Davis. Because the team that was putting together,
which was the security team that worked under me that runs the
what we call assessment and authorization process, they looked
at the process--they put together the process, looked at it,
brought it to me and said, sir, do not sign these, the process
is not good. But I already knew that just by looking at what
was coming up to me for me to sign that it wasn't a good
process.
Mr. Lamborn. So in an ideal situation, if it was a well run
organization you could do that. So you are saying it wasn't a
well run organization?
Mr. Davis. The ATO process that was taking place at the
very end was not the general ATO process that we had done in
the 2-1/2 years that I had been there. It was cut short, very
abbreviated, to make this 2-week timeframe. And I said there is
no way you can certify and accredit 600 systems in a 2-week
timeframe by going through all the controls.
The bigger problem that I had was there is a checklist, and
some individuals have already testified to this. That on that
checklist we were asking people out in the field to validate
that the controls had not changed. My team that came back to me
in reaching out to the field, one of the reasons they told me
not to sign the document is because the individuals who were
supposed to sign off on the checklist delegated the authority
down, down, down into the organization to hurry up and meet the
timeframe.
So you had individuals that had no concept about the
security posture of the system checking off on this checklist
and then sending them up to me for signature, and I just
refused to sign them.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you. That is very illuminating, and I am
sorry that we are even in this posture today. I am sorry that
we have to have this hearing.
You mentioned encryption and others have talked about that.
Was it a negligent practice or a deficient practice not to have
veterans' personal information encrypted so that one of these,
up to eight state actors or state sponsored or outside actors,
had they accessed it, it would have been not usable to them?
Mr. Davis. That is correct. Encryption of any sensitive
data is a general policy. When I got to VA and we started
looking, the VA policy, which is Directive 6500, encryption on
databases was basically optional. So in 2012, I said absolutely
not. I am mandating that all databases be encrypted because of
the issues of individuals being in the network who could
quite--pretty simply, once you got into the database you had
everything that you needed.
Mr. Lamborn. Now, those of us, some of us anyway on this
panel have been concerned about what would have been able to be
accessed. Am I correct in assuming that this would include, of
the 20 million veterans on the system, Social Security numbers
and names, ages and possibly Social Security numbers of
dependents and sometimes personal health information?
Mr. Davis. Sure. Some of the systems that were compromised,
if they had that information in them obviously they would take
that. In some of the studies that my organization did when we
were looking at web applications, and web applications that
have a database connected to the back end it has veterans'
information, my team will run security software tools and it
will tell them if that application is vulnerable to attack and
how easily it is vulnerable and exploitable.
My team at that time found a number of applications that
had veteran information, 30 million instances of veteran
information that was exploitable, and they exploited the system
to show that it was exploitable inside those systems; Social
Security numbers, date of birth, so on and so forth.
Mr. Lamborn. And what about, and I don't know if there is
going to be a second round or not, I may have to pursue this
later, but what about access to other networks? Like, I know
DoD and VA interact a lot, at least in the health care issue.
What possible access could this allow if someone was
controlling VA or at least had domain control to get into other
networks?
Mr. Davis. As we talked about earlier, the team did these
key investigative reports, so specifically looking at the
nation-state sponsored attackers. And one of the compromises
that they picked up on, this report was right as I was leaving,
this came out on January 9th, 2013, there was an incident that
took place where the team, and I will just kind of read it, it
says the teams in turn simply gains initial access to an
enterprise via spear pfishing by moving laterally previously
through compromised trusted networks.
I will jump forward in this report, and what they have said
is that--has targeted and compromised one or more systems
within the Silver Spring office site code, many of which are
virtual private network users. Based on information collected
from open source intelligence and interviews of targeted users,
the Deep Dive analysis team considers the Bidirectional Health
Information Exchange Program to be a high value target for this
team. The BHIE program is a joint information technology data
exchange initiative between the Department of Defense, DoD, and
VA. The team may be interested in the data residing in the
system and the network interconnections between the VA and DoD
allowing this program to function or both.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
Mr. Coffman. Dr. Roe.
Mr. Roe. Thank you. A couple of things I want to just go
over very quickly and then yield my time. In March 2010, these
uninvited visitors were nation-state sponsored attackers. Over
the course of time, while working with the VA, the NSOC team
and external agents learned that these attackers were a nation-
state sponsored cyber espionage unit and that no less than
eight different nation-state sponsored organizations had
successfully compromised VA networks or data or were actively
attacking, not necessarily compromised but attacking VA
networks, and attacks continue to VA to this day. Is that a
correct statement?
Mr. Davis. That is correct.
Mr. Roe. So to this date, to date perhaps these attacks are
taking place. The other question I have is, that I think you
just stated, and you said the PLA without any hesitation. I
guess I would have to ask Mr. Warren, why couldn't he say the
PLA? He didn't mention that. It is not any big secret to
anybody.
Mr. Davis. It is in the public domain.
Mr. Roe. Yes, it is.
Mr. Davis. And that is what I am going off. I am going off
the report that came out in the public domain that listed these
groups of individuals, organizations, and based on that
information that is in this public domain report, we could
accurately say that those are the same individuals. Even the
nomenclature is the same.
Mr. Roe. And I am not a technical person so stop me if I am
off base, but you mentioned that once that system has been
compromised, that piece of malware is in the system, there are
ways you can operate around it.
Mr. Davis. Yes.
Mr. Roe. But would encryption work once you have been
compromised? Once that malware--do you follow me?
Mr. Davis. Right. So it depends on what exactly the malware
is that they put on the system. Your encryption would be of
little value to you if--once the malware is on the system, the
malware can then go out and call down other tools into the
environment. And some of the tools that they do remotely is
they pulled down keystroke logging. So if they have those types
of tools, a keystroke logger on that system, when you go to log
in to decrypt, they have the decryption password for that
system.
Mr. Roe. So they get your password that way.
Mr. Davis. That is correct.
Mr. Roe. And do you know that that has happened? When you
have got the system up now, let's say you are back there, would
you know that has happened to you, that they swiped the
password?
Mr. Davis. We know that the way these individuals work that
it is a typical tactic for them to, if they compromise
something such as a domain controller as was said earlier, or
particularly the domain controllers, the domain controller has
a file on it called the SAM file and that file is the
securities accounts manager. In that file are all the password
accounts for the users in the network. So if they have got the
domain controller, they will grab the SAM file. When they
encrypt the information, generally, if it is going out and it
is encrypted, I know they hit a domain controller. I guarantee
they probably took the SAM file. They are going to go back,
crack it later and are going to take every password that was on
that system.
Mr. Roe. So you better change your password pretty often?
Mr. Davis. Yes, you would have to change all the--but the
problem is, if you have compromised the domain controller, you
have to change the password to the domain controller as well
because they are on a controller. If you are just changing
passwords without changing the domain controller, they are just
grabbing that as it goes along.
Mr. Roe. Well, I want to thank all of the people here
today, Ms. Halliday, certainly your team and every one of you.
I have learned a lot today, and I think we will continue.
Mr. Chairman, thanks for holding this hearing.
Mr. Coffman. Mr. Huelskamp.
Mr. Huelskamp. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just want to
follow up on a statement that Dr. Roe mentioned in which he
stated that you learned about these attackers were a nation-
state sponsored cyber espionage unit with no less than eight
different nation-state sponsored organizations. Who told you
this, how did you determine that, and was that common knowledge
in the IT network?
Mr. Davis. It was put together through information that the
VA Information Security Team, they are called the Enterprise
Network Defense Team, they put that information together
because they track, as Mr. Warren stated earlier, they track
all these issues across the network. They produce these
reports. They would send them to me and Mr. Warren and a couple
other folks and I would read through them and work out a plan
of action or strategy to work through this.
Mr. Huelskamp. So the report you mentioned, which I believe
we have a copy of, both reports, did Mr. Warren receive these
reports as well?
Mr. Davis. Yes, he was on that email distribution list. I
think it was only Mr. Warren, myself and maybe one other
person. There is like three people.
Mr. Huelskamp. Did you discuss this issue of nation-state
sponsored organizations with Mr. Warren?
Mr. Davis. We did from time to time initially when I first
came on board at VA. He told me that we have uninvited visitors
in the network. I pretty much knew what that meant. I had dealt
with it before. And then going on in subsequent talks, from
time to time I had a biweekly security meeting with Mr. Warren.
It would come up about these attackers in the network. If we
had an incident it might be the topic of the day that we had an
incident and we are trying to work through it. So, yes, we
definitely talked about it.
Mr. Huelskamp. And above Mr. Warren, did you discuss with
any of his superiors about that or did you just leave it in his
hands?
Mr. Davis. I generally--my reporting line was to Mr.
Warren, so generally, I didn't have a great opportunity to talk
to folks above Mr. Warren.
Mr. Huelskamp. Did you ever email them with the information
or include them on an email distribution about this issue?
Mr. Davis. No. I just worked directly with Mr. Warren on
those things.
Mr. Huelskamp. Okay. I think you were here earlier, but a
statement from Mr. Shinseki indicates that, again to be clear,
VA security posture was never at risk. Your opinion on that,
Mr. Davis. Is that an accurate statement?
Mr. Davis. I would say that is not an accurate statement.
Mr. Huelskamp. Okay. Did Mr. Warren ever tell you that was
an inaccurate statement? Did you ever discuss something along
those lines?
Mr. Davis. At the time when we were doing the ATOs in the
memorandum and at the time when he visited my office, I believe
it was January 22nd, I said that, you know, that the process
was just bad and basically, as I wrote in the memo, I repeated
the words that it jeopardized the integrity of the security
program.
Mr. Huelskamp. Lastly, I didn't get a chance to ask
questions on this issue, but recently it has come up that
numerous other Secretary and high level individuals in
Washington have at times used private apparently non-secure
email systems to communicate and to conduct business. Do you
know if that was occurring at the VA?
Mr. Davis. I couldn't say definitely. I would suspect that
people do do that, but I have no direct knowledge that anybody
was doing it. I was not asked to investigate or anything like
that.
Mr. Huelskamp. Okay. Were there any VA policies about doing
that?
Mr. Davis. I believe there is a VA policy. I believe it
would be more on the--possibly on the HR side of the house, but
it may also be in the security policy, that official business
you have to conduct using VA provided email systems and things
of that nature. But I don't know the exact policy that that
would be. But I am pretty sure that it is in policy.
Mr. Huelskamp. And then lastly and I will yield back, Mr.
Chairman, I wasn't trying to figure out what you were doing on
personal time, but the testimony you have given sometimes has
not matched up with earlier testimony as I understood that. Do
you have any printed out emails or anything in your possession
that would help establish the veracity of some of the
discussions today, or is that all retained entirely by the
Department?
Mr. Davis. Anything that I have with me, it is free to go
to the Committee. It is a lot--some of this is off the public
Internet and some of them are internal VA documentation and
email systems information, things like that, that--some of them
I would be concerned that where there are system compromise--or
system issues, exposures of data, that it identifies the
particular vulnerability in the system. So I would ask that the
system piece of it be stripped out.
Mr. Huelskamp. I understand. Last, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Davis,
as I understand it, you have 20 years of experience in the
private and public sector dealing with system security and it
still is your recommendation that the VA network should be
designated as a compromised environment. Is that still your--
Mr. Davis. That is correct.
Mr. Huelskamp. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Huelskamp. Does anybody have
any questions they would like to ask?
Very well. Our thanks. Mr. Davis, thank you very much for
your testimony today. You are now excused.
It is obvious from what we have heard here today that VA
needs to take action to improve its IT security. The
Subcommittee looks forward to working with VA to address these
serious deficiencies and ensure that all steps are being taken
to safeguard the information of our veterans. In that vein, I
ask that in 30 days VA provide this Subcommittee a specific
plan to address all of its IT vulnerabilities.
I ask unanimous consent that all Members have 5 legislative
days to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous
material. Without objection, so ordered.
Mr. Weaver, the Committee will be in touch with you to
establish a date and time for a separate meeting for a
classified brief--
Mr. Warren. Warren.
Mr. Coffman. Mr. Warren, I am sorry. I was looking at you.
Mr. Warren, okay.
I would like to once again thank all of our witnesses and
audience members for joining us today in conversation. This
hearing is now adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:40 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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Prepared Statement of Hon. Mike Coffman, Chairman
Good afternoon. I would like to welcome everyone to today's hearing
titled ``How Secure is Veterans' Private Information?''
Reports from VA's Office of Inspector General, private sector
consultants brought on by VA, and this Subcommittee's own investigation
have revealed tremendous problems within VA's Office of Information and
Technology.
Some of these issues have been made public in Inspector General
reports which outlined mismanagement of human resources and the lack of
much needed technical expertise. Other issues have been less
publicized, such as those captured in the Deloitte (``deep dive'' that
identified gaps in OI&T's organizational structure and a poorly
executed business model.
The latter report recognized the growth of VA by thirty-three
percent since 2006; growth that is mirrored by the expansion of VA's
computer network. Unfortunately, there has not been a comparable growth
in the technical personnel needed to manage security of VA's sprawling
network.
These failures have created problems for both the Department and
for veterans.
The Inspector General substantiated that VA was transmitting
sensitive data, including personally identifiable information and
internal network routing information, over an unencrypted
telecommunications carrier network--both violations of Federal
regulation and basic IT security. The IG also noted that VA has not
implemented technical configuration controls to ensure encryption of
sensitive data despite VA and Federal information security
requirements.
Similarly, it is evident that software patches are not up to date
across the network, too many users have Administrator access, security
software is not up to date on older computers, and computer ports are
not properly secured. There is little to no security of file transfer
protocol, and web pages are vulnerable allowing unauthorized access to
veterans' unprotected personal information within the system.
While these issues alone give cause for grave concern, this
Subcommittee's investigation has identified even greater problems. The
entire veteran database in VA, containing personally identifiable
information on roughly 20 million veterans, is not encrypted, and
evidence suggests that it has repeatedly been compromised since 2010 by
foreign actors, including in China and possibly in Russia.
Recently, the Subcommittee discussed VA's Authorization to Operate,
a formal declaration that authorizes operation of a product on VA's
network which explicitly accepts the risk to agency operations, and was
told that ``VA's security posture was never at risk.''
In fact, VA's security posture has been an unacceptable risk for at
least three years as sophisticated actors use weaknesses in VA's
security posture to exploit the system and remove veterans' information
and system passwords. While VA knew foreign intruders had been in the
network, the Department was never sure what exactly these foreign
actors took, because the outgoing data was encrypted by the
trespassers.
These actors have had constant access to VA systems and data,
information which included unencrypted databases containing hundreds of
thousands to millions of instances of Veteran information such as
veterans' and dependents' names, social security numbers, dates of
birth, and protected health information.
Notwithstanding these problems, VA has waived or arbitrarily
extended accreditation of its security systems on its network. It is
evident that VA's waivers or extensions of accreditation only
``appear'' to resolve material weaknesses without actually resolving
those weaknesses.
VA's IT management knowingly accepted the security risks by waiving
the security requirements even though such waivers are not appropriate.
This lapse in computer security and the subsequent attempts by VA
officials to conceal this problem are intolerable and I look forward to
a candid discussion about these issues.
I now yield to Ranking Member Kirkpatrick for her opening
statement.
Prepared Statement of Hon. Ann Kirkpatrick
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As the Department of Veterans Affairs works hard to serve the needs
of today's veterans they must work equally hard to protect their
personal information.
Today's hearing is an attempt to determine whether a veterans'
private information is secure. Mr. Chairman, veterans need to know that
when they ask VA for the services and benefits they have earned, the
information they submit in order to get those benefits will not be
compromised under any circumstances.
I hope that the VA came prepared today to provide assurances to
Congress and veterans that that all their information technology
systems are secure. We expect VA to also answer our questions directly
and honestly. As we get questions from veterans in our districts we
want to provide complete and honest answers to them.
Congress received a letter from Mr. Jerry L. Davis, now a former
employee at VA, who states that ``there is a clear and present danger
and risk of exposure and compromise of the sensitive data.'' I share
the Chairman's concern on whether VA is following the required
government practices and policies regarding the monitoring and
remediation of system risk.
In addition, two OIG reports from 2012 and 2013 raise additional
concerns. The 2012 report questions whether the agency has the proper
Strategic Human Capital Management program to meet mission-critical
system capabilities as VA moves in the 21st century. The second 2013
OIG report faults VA for failing to ensure private information by not
encrypting health data transmitted to outpatient clinics and external
business partners. The VA must address the concerns raised and assure
veterans who come to VA for assistance that their personal information
is secure.
I want to thank everyone for being here today. I would also like to
thank the witnesses for their testimony and for answering our questions
about the security of veterans' private information at the Department
of Veterans' Affairs.
Thank you Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Prepared Statement of Hon. Jackie Walorski
Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member, it's an honor to serve on this
Committee.
I thank you for holding this hearing on such an important issue
affecting our veterans and their sensitive personal information.
There are over 22 million veterans who have proudly served this
country and who we are indebted to for their selfless call to protect
the freedoms which we cherish. \1\ The fact that the personal
information of many of these veterans may have been compromised is
completely unacceptable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Veteran population estimates, as of September 30, 2012, are
produced by the VA Office of the Actuary (VetPop 2011). http://
www.va.gov/vetdata/Veteran--Population.asp.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The VA's Office of Information and Technology has proven inept at
securing the Department's information systems and has consequentially
exposed veteran information.
Our veterans are comprised of an exceptional group of men and
women, including their families, who should not live in fear of their
private information getting into the wrong hands.
I look forward to working my colleagues and our panelists to
establish an immediate plan of action that will address this serious
problem.
Thank you.
Prepared Statement of Linda A. Halliday
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to discuss the Office of Inspector General's (OIG) work
regarding the securing of veterans' private information by VA. I am
accompanied by Ms. Sondra McCauley, Deputy Assistant Inspector General
for Audits and Evaluations, and Mr. Michael Bowman, Director, OIG's
Information Technology and Security Audits Division.
BACKGROUND
Secure systems and networks are integral to supporting the range of
VA mission-critical programs and operations. Information technology
(IT) safeguards are essential due to the wide availability of hacking
tools on the internet and the advances in the effectiveness of attack
technology. Lacking proper safeguards, IT systems are vulnerable to
intrusions by groups seeking to obtain sensitive information, commit
fraud, disrupt operations, or launch attacks against other systems. VA
has at times been the victim of such malicious intent. In the past, VA
has reported security incidents in which sensitive information has been
lost or stolen, including personally identifiable information (PII),
potentially exposing millions of Americans to the loss of privacy,
identity theft, and other financial crimes. The need for an improved
approach to information security is apparent, and one that senior VA
leaders well recognize.
In response to the need to improve security controls, VA has made
progress defining policies and procedures supporting its Department-
wide information security program. However, VA continues to face
significant challenges implementing effective access controls,
configuration management controls, and contingency planning to protect
mission-critical systems from unauthorized access, alteration, or
destruction. VA has taken positive steps to safeguard personal and
proprietary information used by VA employees and contractors. Key
actions have included:
Mandating cyber security and privacy awareness training
to ensure that VA and contract employees are familiar with applicable
laws, regulations, and policies.
Reviewing the accuracy of position sensitivity level
designations for VA and contract employees.
Strengthening its policies and procedures for identifying
and reporting incidents involving information management and security
violations to ensure that the incidents are promptly and thoroughly
investigated.
Establishing a clear chain of command and accountability
structure for information security.
These were good first steps toward improving information security;
however, more needs to be done. Over recent years, the OIG has
conducted a series of reviews to help VA overcome its information
security challenges by identifying the underlying causes for VA's
security vulnerabilities and deficiencies. These include our statutory
work, reviews of complaints to the OIG Hotline, and proactive reviews
of internal controls. Our report findings have disclosed a pattern of
ineffective information security controls that expose VA's mission-
critical systems and sensitive data to unnecessary risk. We believe our
corresponding audit recommendations provide a roadmap for VA to improve
the effectiveness of its information security program and safeguard the
sensitive data needed to support delivery of benefits and services to
our Nation's veterans.
STATUTORILY-REQUIRED REVIEWS
For more than 10 consecutive years, independent public accounting
firms under contracts with the OIG identified information technology
security controls as a material weakness as a result of their annual
audits of VA's Consolidated Financial Statements. Work on these audits
supports our annual Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA)
assessments. FISMA requires agencies to develop, document, and
implement agency-wide information security risk management programs and
prepare annual reports. FISMA also requires that each year, the OIG
assess the extent to which VA complies with FISMA's information
security requirements, information security standards developed by the
National Institute of Standards and Technology, and the annual
reporting requirements from the Office of Management and Budget.
In the middle of FY 2012, while our annual FISMA assessment was
ongoing, VA instituted the Continuous Readiness in Information Security
Program (CRISP) to ensure continuous monitoring year-round and
establish a team responsible for resolving the IT material weakness. As
our FISMA work progressed, we noted more focused VA efforts to
implement standardized information security controls across the
enterprise. We also saw improvements in role-based and security
awareness training, contingency plan testing, reducing the number of
outstanding Plans of Action and Milestones (POA&Ms), developing initial
baseline configurations, reducing the number of IT individuals with
outdated background investigations, and improving data center web
application security. However, the CRISP initiative was not launched
until March 2012 and the improved processes had not been implemented
for an entire fiscal year with the opportunity to demonstrate sustained
improvements in information security.
For FY 2012, we provided a draft report to VA for review and
comments and we expect to issue our report in June 2013. The report
will discuss control deficiencies in four key areas:
Configuration Management Controls are designed to ensure critical
systems have appropriate security baseline controls and up-to-date
vulnerability patches implemented. However, we found:
Systems including key databases supporting various
applications were not timely patched or securely configured to mitigate
known and unknown information security vulnerabilities.
Baseline configurations, including implementation of the
Federal Desktop Core Configuration, were not consistently implemented
to mitigate significant system security risks and vulnerabilities
across the facilities.
Change control policy and procedures for authorizing,
testing, and approval of system changes were not consistently
implemented for the networks and mission critical system hardware and
software changes.
Access Controls are designed to ensure that password standards are
consistently implemented across the enterprise and that user accounts
are monitored to enforce minimal access privileges necessary for
legitimate purposes and to eliminate conflicting roles. Our FISMA
assessment revealed that:
Password standards were not consistently implemented and
enforced across multiple VA systems, including the network domain,
databases, and mission critical applications. In addition, multi-factor
authentication for remote access had not been implemented across the
agency.
Inconsistent reviews of networks and application user
access resulted in numerous generic, system, and inactive user accounts
that were not removed and/or deactivated from the system, and users
with access rights that were not appropriate.
Proper completion of user access requests was not
consistently performed to eliminate conflicting roles and enforce
principles of least system privilege.
Lack of monitoring of access in the production
environment for individuals with elevated application privileges for a
major application.
Security Management is designed to ensure that system security
controls are effectively monitored on an ongoing basis and system
security risks are effectively remediated through corrective action
plans or compensating controls. We will report that:
Security management documentation, including the risk
assessments and System Security Plans, were outdated and did not
accurately reflect the current system environment or Federal standards.
Background reinvestigations were not performed timely or
tracked effectively. In addition, personnel were not receiving the
proper level of investigation for the sensitivity levels of their
positions.
Scheduled completion dates for POA&Ms were updated
without written justification and supporting documentation was not
adequate to justify POA&M closures.
Contingency Planning Controls ensure that mission-critical systems
and business processes can be restored in the event of a disaster or
emergency. However, we determined that:
Contingency plan documentation had not been updated to
reflect lessons learned from the contingency and disaster recovery
tests, and detailed recovery procedures for all system priority
components had not been documented and/or did not reflect current
operating conditions.
Backup tapes were not encrypted prior to being sent to
offsite storage at selected facilities and data centers.
More importantly, we continue to identify significant technical
weaknesses in databases, servers, and network devices that support
transmitting sensitive information among VA's Medical Centers, Data
Centers, and VA Central Office. Many of these weaknesses are due to
inconsistent enforcement of an agency-wide information security program
across the enterprise and ineffective communication between VA
management and the individual field offices. Therefore, VA needs to
improve its monitoring process to ensure controls are operating as
intended at all facilities and communicate security deficiencies to the
appropriate personnel to implement corrective actions.
We have identified and reported deficiencies where control
activities were not appropriately designed or operating effectively.
The dispersed locations, the continued reorganization of VA business
units, and the diversity in applications adversely affected facilities
and management's ability to consistently remediate IT security
deficiencies agency-wide. For example, VA's complex and dispersed
financial system architecture had resulted in a lack of common system
security controls and inconsistent maintenance of IT mission-critical
systems. Consequently, VA continues to be challenged by a lack of
consistent and proactive enforcement of established policies and
procedures throughout its geographically dispersed portfolio of legacy
applications and newly implemented systems. In addition, VA lacks an
effective and consistent corrective action process for identifying,
coordinating, correcting, and monitoring known internal security
vulnerabilities on databases, web applications, and networks
infrastructures.
Our FY 2012 FISMA report will include 27 current recommendations to
the Acting Assistant Secretary for Information and Technology for
improving VA's information security program. The report also highlights
five unresolved recommendations from prior years' assessments for a
total of 32 outstanding recommendations. Overall, we are recommending
that VA focus its efforts in the following areas:
Addressing security-related issues that contributed to
the IT material weakness reported in the FY 2012 audit of the
Department's consolidated financial statements.
Remediating high-risk system security issues in its Plans
of Action and Milestones.
Establishing effective processes for evaluating
information security controls via continuous monitoring and
vulnerability assessments.
We continue to evaluate VA's progress during our ongoing FY 2013
FISMA audit and acknowledge increased VA efforts to improve information
security, but we are still identifying repeat deficiencies, albeit to a
lesser extent. This fall, upon completion of our FY 2013 FISMA testing
and related work, we will make a determination as to whether VA's
improvement efforts are successful in overcoming the IT material
weakness.
OTHER REPORTS RELATED TO INFORMATION SECURITY
Over the past 2 years, we have issued a series of audits and
reviews that have identified VA's information security controls
deficiencies. Our reports disclosed a number of issues, including
ineffective management of systems interconnections and sensitive data
exchanges, delayed contractor background investigations, and inadequate
access controls that placed sensitive veterans' data at unnecessary
risk.
Review of Alleged Transmission of Sensitive VA Data Over Internet
Connections
In March 2013, we substantiated an allegation made through the OIG
Hotline that VA was transmitting sensitive data, including PII and
internal network routing information, over an unencrypted
telecommunications carrier network. VA Office of Information Technology
(OIT) personnel disclosed that VA typically transferred unencrypted
sensitive data, such as electronic health records and internal internet
protocol addresses, among certain VA Medical Centers and Community
Based Outpatient Clinics using an unencrypted telecommunications
carrier network. OIT management acknowledged this practice and formally
accepted the security risk of potentially losing or misusing the
sensitive information exchanged.
VA has not implemented technical configuration controls to ensure
encryption of sensitive data despite VA and Federal information
security requirements. Without controls to encrypt the sensitive VA
data transmitted, veterans' information may be vulnerable to
interception and misuse by malicious users as it traverses unencrypted
telecommunications carrier networks. Further, malicious users could
obtain VA router information to identify and disrupt mission-critical
systems essential to providing health care services to veterans.
VA acknowledged transmitting PII over privately segmented networks
to support service to veterans. VA concurred with our recommendations
to improve the protection of sensitive data transmitted over the
unencrypted carrier networks and implement configuration controls to
ensure encryption of such data. VA clarified that it employs an
industry telecommunications carrier network to provide a segmented
network for transmitting PII, but noted that these network links are
not currently employing encryption controls to protect sensitive data.
VA did not agree with the assertion that PII and internal network
routing information were being transmitted over unsecured internet
connections. However, based on interviews with OIT personnel at VA
Medical Centers as well as information provided by the OIG Hotline
complainant, we maintain that PII and router information were being
transmitted unencrypted through a telecommunications carrier that also
provided internet services to customers outside of VA. Nonetheless, we
commend OIT for performing a review of the locations associated with
the Hotline complaint and inspecting communication networks to ensure
proper segmentation of VA networks from internet connections. We
recognize that industry telecommunications carriers can segment data
traffic from unsecured Web connections. However, we believe the risk
remains that sensitive VA data and router information can be
compromised when it is transmitted across unencrypted
telecommunications carrier networks outside of VA's span of technical
control. More specifically, the network alone does not provide
encryption, integrity, or authentication protections for the
transmission of sensitive data and such services may be vulnerable to
denial of service or sniffing attacks by malicious users. The Assistant
Secretary for Information and Technology acknowledged these information
security risks by stating OIT will review technical network
communications practices across the enterprise and take corrective
actions without hesitation.
Audit of VA System Interconnections With Research and University
Affiliates
In October 2012, we reported on the effectiveness of VA's
management of network interconnections and sensitive data exchanges
with its research and university affiliates. Our audit disclosed that
VA has not consistently managed its systems interconnections and data
exchanges with its external research and university affiliates. Despite
Federal requirements, VA could not readily account for the various
systems linkages and sharing arrangements. VA also could not provide an
accurate inventory of the research data exchanged, where data was
hosted, or the sensitivity levels. In numerous instances, we identified
unsecured electronic and hardcopy research data at VA Medical Centers
and co-located research facilities.
We determined that VA's data governance approach has been
ineffective to ensure that research data exchanged is adequately
controlled and protected throughout the data life cycle. VA and its
research partners have not consistently instituted formal agreements
requiring that hosting facilities implement controls commensurate with
VA standards for protecting the sensitive data. The responsible
Veterans Health Administration program office's decentralized approach
to research data collection and oversight at a local level has not been
effective to safeguard sensitive VA information. Because of these
issues, VA data exchanged with its research partners was considered to
be at risk of unauthorized access, loss, or disclosure.
VA has the opportunity to further serve veterans by supplying the
patient and medical data needed to achieve advancements in medical
research and health care services. However, providing such sensitive
data through electronic or hard copy means without effective
information security controls and oversight has left the data
susceptible to unauthorized access, loss, or disclosure. Leaving
hosting facilities responsible for data governance at the local level
without coordinated involvement of all stakeholders has proven
ineffective and improvements are needed.
Establishing formal information security agreements is one method
of documenting data sharing agreements and ensuring that hosting
facilities institute information security controls commensurate with VA
standards. Further, a centralized data governance and storage approach
would ensure researchers effectively control and securely manage
sensitive VA research information over the data life cycle. Such
measures are key to protect veterans' PII and personal health
information and promote continued advancements in medical research now
and for the future. VA generally concurred with our report
recommendations. VA is taking corrective actions, however, all
recommendations remain open as full implementation has not occurred.
Review of Alleged Incomplete Installation of Encryption Software
Licenses
In October 2012, we substantiated a Hotline allegation that OIT had
not installed and activated an additional 100,000 licenses purchased in
2011. As of July 2012, OIT officials stated they had installed and
activated only a small portion, about 65,000 (16 percent), of the total
400,000 licenses procured. OIT did not install and activate all of the
licenses due to inadequate planning and management of the project.
Specifically, OIT did not allow time to test the software to ensure
compatibility with VA computers, ensure sufficient human resources were
available to install the encryption software on VA computers, and
adequately monitor the project to ensure encryption of all VA laptop
and desktop computers.
As such, 335,000 (84 percent) of the total 400,000 licenses
procured, totaling about $5.1 million in questioned costs, remained
unused as of 2012. Given changes in VA technology since 2006, VA lacked
assurance the remaining software licenses were compatible to meet
encryption needs in the current computer environment. Further, because
OIT did not install all 400,000 encryption software licenses on VA
laptop and desktop computers, veterans' PII remained at risk of
inadvertent or fraudulent access or use.
We recommended the Assistant Secretary for Information and
Technology complete an assessment of the encryption software project to
determine whether the software was compatible with VA's operating
systems and still met VA needs. Based on the assessment, we recommended
that VA terminate the project or develop a plan, including adequate
human resources and project monitoring, to ensure installation and
activation of the remaining encryption software licenses. The Assistant
Secretary for Information and Technology concurred with our finding and
recommendations and is taking steps to move forward with the software
implementation.
Review of Alleged Delays in VA Contractor Background Investigations
In September 2012, we reported on the merits of a complaint
regarding ineffective VA management of its contractor background
investigations. We substantiated that VA could improve management of
its contractor background investigations. Specifically, VA had a
backlog of 3,000 contractor background investigations as of April 2012,
despite process improvements and a reduction in pending cases in recent
months. VA also inappropriately prohibited contractors from working on
awarded contracts although VA policy only requires initiating, not
fully completing, investigations before contractors could start work.
According to VA officials, delays occurred due to ineffective
management within VA's program office which is responsible for
initiating and adjudicating background investigations; staff
misunderstanding VA's personnel security requirements and investigative
processes; and no effective centralized system to monitor progress in
addressing the backlog. In the absence of a system linking contractors
needing background investigations with underlying contracts, we could
not determine whether VA unnecessarily paid for contractors not yet
authorized to work on awarded contracts. Nonetheless, VA officials said
the backlog adversely affected their ability to fully staff major IT
initiatives.
Our report provided several recommendations for improving
procedures to reduce the backlog of contractor background
investigations and implementing a central case management system to
monitor contractor status and associated costs during the background
investigation process. VA generally concurred with our findings and
recommendations and has reported corrective actions to address them.
Review of Alleged Mismanagement of the Systems To Drive Performance
Project
In February 2012, we reported that VA's Office of Management did
not effectively manage the Systems to Drive Performance (STDP) project.
We substantiated that VA did not adequately protect sensitive VA
information from unauthorized access and disclosure. Specifically, we
determined that more than 20 system users had inappropriate access to
sensitive STDP information. On a specific note, VA's National Data
Systems Group did not consistently approve requests for user access.
Furthermore, project managers did not report unauthorized access as a
security event, as required by VA policy. Security deficiencies
occurred because STDP project managers were not fully aware of VA's
security requirements for system development and had not formalized
user account management procedures. Inadequate Information Security
Officer oversight also contributed to weaknesses in user account
management and the failure to report the granting of excessive user
rights as security violations. As a result, VA lacked assurance of
adequate control and protection of sensitive STDP data.
VA concurred with our findings and recommendation to ensure that
employees assigned to the STDP project receive the role-based security
training needed to address the issues highlighted in the report.
Additionally, VA agreed to assign an Information Security Officer to
the project to ensure VA's information security requirements are met.
Corrective actions have been taken and these recommendations are now
closed.
Review of Alleged Unauthorized Access to VA Systems
In July 2011, we reported on the merits of an OIG Hotline
allegation that certain contractors without proper security clearances
gained unauthorized access to VA networks and Veterans Health
Information System and Technology Architecture (VistA) systems at
multiple VA medical facilities. Our review substantiated the allegation
and found that contractors improperly used other employees' Virtual
Private Network user accounts to gain unauthorized access to VA systems
and networks. The review also substantiated that contractor personnel
did not obtain appropriate background security clearances before
gaining access to VA systems and networks. Contractors admitted to
sharing two of their employees' user accounts to access VA networks on
a number of occasions for maintenance and monitoring of contractor
systems. Further, contractors could not provide evidence that it
readily initiated actions to terminate user accounts after the
employee's separation date.
VA policy specifically prohibits the sharing of user accounts and
requires the closing of user accounts as part of proper user account
management. Further, VA policy requires VA personnel to regularly
review user account access for inappropriate or unusual activity and
take necessary actions. Contractors stated they did not fully
understand VA's information security requirements regarding user
account access and did not believe additional user accounts were
needed. Additionally, VA did not actively monitor user account activity
or readily communicate with contractors the need periodically to
identify and terminate unnecessary user accounts. Without effective
controls to prevent unauthorized access by contractors, VA information
systems and sensitive veterans' data are vulnerable to increased risks
of compromised availability, integrity, and confidentiality. The lack
of individual accountability over user accounts provides ample
opportunities to conceal malicious activity such as theft or misuse of
veterans' data. VA concurred with our findings and recommendations.
However, the report remains open because a key recommendation regarding
contractor security controls and practices has not been implemented
almost 2 years after we issued the report.
CONCLUSION
Well-publicized information security incidents at VA demonstrate
that weaknesses in information security policies and practices expose
mission-critical systems and data to unauthorized access and
disclosure. Through its CRISP initiative, VA has strengthened its
efforts to define policies and procedures supporting its agency-wide
information security program. However, its highly decentralized and
complex system infrastructure poses significant challenges to
implementing effective access controls, system interconnection
controls, configuration management controls, and contingency planning
practices that adequately protect mission-critical systems from
unauthorized access, alteration, or destruction. Until VA fully
implements key elements of its information security program and
addresses our outstanding audit recommendations, VA's mission-critical
systems and sensitive veterans' data remain at increased and
unnecessary risk of attack or compromise.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. We would be happy to
answer any questions you or other Members of the Subcommittee may have.
Prepared Statement of Stephen W. Warren
Introduction
Chairman Coffman, Ranking Member Kirkpatrick, Members of the
Subcommittee: thank you for inviting me to testify regarding the
Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) Information Technology (IT)
security strategy. I appreciate the opportunity to discuss VA's plans,
actions, and accomplishments in IT security.
Protecting the data that VA holds on Veterans is as important as
the Veterans themselves. As the committee knows, the Department
received a wakeup call from the incident in 2006 involving a stolen
laptop which contained unencrypted information on over 19 million
Veterans. As a result of this incident, VA consolidated its disparate
IT functions into a single, unified IT organization. This consolidation
has benefited VA in many ways, especially in terms of strengthening its
information security posture. VA's consolidated IT organization is
responsible for protecting Veteran information at 153 hospitals, 853
community-based outpatient clinics, 57 benefits processing offices, and
131 cemeteries and 33 soldier's lots and monument sites. Our network
supports over 400,000 users, and over 750,000 devices.
We remain committed to protecting the information we hold on
millions of Veterans and their beneficiaries and more than 300,000 VA
employees by providing round-the-clock security of VA's enterprise and
infrastructure. The Department fully supports the White House's
information security initiatives such as two-factor authentication
using HSPD-12 compliant PIV cards, which the VA is in the process of
implementing. The Department continues to improve the security posture
of the VA network through our Visibility into Everything initiative,
which allows VA to see and manage all of its devices and network
components in real time. The continuous monitoring program is
responsible for checking IT systems and monitoring every desktop and
laptop computer attached to the VA network.
To reinforce our commitment to information security, we are
fostering a culture change to ensure that all users on our system
follow all necessary and required IT and privacy protection rules. VA
launched the Continuous Readiness in Information Security Program
(CRISP) in 2012 to proactively address process and policy deficiencies
and architecture and configuration issues. As part of the CRISP effort,
VA conducts rigorous vulnerability scanning, continuous monitoring of
patching and software inventory, implementing port security, anti-virus
services, and encryption of non-medical IT laptops.
Through Web Application Security Assessments, VA is able to
identify critical vulnerabilities and potential exploits in VA
applications that store millions of records of sensitive data. The
network infrastructure is protected through identification of all
network assets and critical database stores, identification of all
connections, and providing the Trusted Internet Connection Gateways
services for mail, content filtering, name resolution and firewall
protection.
In the past year, VA improved its security posture. The Department
has ensured that over 98 percent of VA staff have received the
mandatory information security training they need to protect the
information of Veterans and their families. We have also completed a
number of business impact assessments for contingency planning.
After the 2006 laptop incident, VA worked to ensure its laptop
computers were encrypted to provide another layer of protection.
Currently, over 98 percent of VA's non-medical IT laptops are
encrypted. VA has around 2,500 unencrypted laptops remaining and, with
the exception of laptops with specific waivers (specific medical uses,
research laptops using software where encryption would disable the
device, service/maintenance laptops that do not connect to VA's network
or store sensitive information, and laptops purchased by VA and given
to Veterans as part of a A rehabilitation program) the Department
expects to complete encryption of all laptops by June 30, 2013.
Data Breaches
The Department has worked hard to regain the trust of Veterans
after the stolen laptop incident in 2006. VA now has a robust data
breach notification process, using a Data Breach Core Team (DBCT),
which provides advance planning, guidance, analysis, and direction
regarding the potential loss of Protected Health Information (PHI),
Personally Identifiable Information (PII), or both. The DBCT serves as
the decision making body between the functional area(s) affected, VA
organizations, and external stakeholders.
The DBCT is made up of representatives from across nearly every
part of the VA enterprise. When the DBCT determines that a breach is
reportable, notification is made to the affected individuals and credit
monitoring is extended. VA also posts a monthly report of data breach
notifications on its Web site and holds a press call with reporters to
discuss the contents of the report. The report is also provided to
Congress, in addition to a quarterly data breach report.
VA has become one of the very best large organizations at providing
notification when a breach occurs. For example, while the HITECH Breach
Notification Rule requires covered entities to provide notification
within 60 calendar days after discovery of the breach, and the
strictest state laws require notice within 45 days after discovery of a
breach, VA policy requires notification within 30 days. A review of
VA's incident tracking system over the current fiscal year indicates
that VA takes, on average, 25 days to provide notice. VA's standards
and practices exceed even the strictest Federal and state laws and
policies.
Conclusion
Mr. Chairman, VA places the highest priority in safeguarding
Veterans' and employees' personal information. We are committed to
information security, and although work remains, VA has made
significant improvements made in the last few years and strives to meet
the highest standards in protecting sensitive information. Thank you
for your continued support of Veterans, their families, and of our
efforts to protect Veterans and their private information. I am
prepared to answer any questions you and other Members of the
Subcommittee may have.
Prepared Statement of Jerry L. Davis
INTRODUCTION
Chairman Coffman, Ranking Member Kirkpatrick and members of the
Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to convey my concerns to
you regarding the protection of information systems and information,
which includes sensitive Veteran data at the Department of Veterans
Affairs (VA).
From August 2010 until February 2013, I served as the Deputy
Assistant Secretary, Information Security (DAS IS) and Chief
Information Security Officer (CISO) at the VA. As the DAS IS, I served
as the most senior civil service staff member within VA with
responsibility for oversight and accountability in the protection of VA
information, VA privacy, records management and the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) process. At the time of my departure from VA in
early February 2013, I was one, if not the longest serving Chief
Information Security Officer (CISO) in the federal government with
nearly a decade of service in that role spread across multiple federal
agencies. I am also a Marine Veteran having served in combat with
distinction during the First Gulf War, so the appointment to the
position as the VA CISO had special meaning. It was a position that I
did not take lightly and I was and I still am extremely proud to have
had an opportunity to serve our country and equally proud to have had a
great opportunity to serve the Veteran community.
My time at VA was largely filled with a great sense pride because
of the purpose and mission of VA and because of my role, which had a
direct and positive impact on the Veteran community. However there came
a time at the end of my tenure where my pride turned to serious
consternation and that consternation remains this very day.
SECURITY POSTURE IN 2010: VA's COPROMISED ENVIRONMENT
In nearly 20 years of building and managing security programs
across government and private industry, I had never seen an
organization with as many unattended IT security vulnerabilities. Upon
my arrival in late August 2010 I inherited the results of more than 15
continuous years of an unattended and documented material weakness in
IT security controls. This material weakness included more than 13,000
uncompleted IT security corrective actions. These 13,000 security
corrective actions would require more than 100,000 sub actions to fully
remediate and manage IT security vulnerabilities and improve the VA
security posture. In early September 2010, I also was advised that
nearly 600 VA systems' Authority to Operate (ATO) had expired and there
was no plan in place to bring these systems into compliance.
Despite the voluminous number of uncompleted corrective actions and
expired ATOs, the most concerning issue was the conversation I had with
the VA Principle Deputy Assistant Secretary (PDAS), Stephen Warren, who
told me shortly after my arrival that ``We have uninvited visitors in
the network''. Further discussion with the VA Network Security
Operations (NSOC) team indicated that VA became aware of a serious
network compromise in March 2010 and these ``uninvited visitors'' were
nation-state sponsored attackers. Over the course of time while working
with the VA NSOC team and external agencies, I learned that these
attackers were a nation-state sponsored cyber espionage unit and that
no less than eight (8) different nation-state sponsored organizations
had successfully compromised VA networks and data or were actively
attacking VA networks; attacks that continue at VA to this very day.
These groups of attackers were taking advantage of weak technical
controls within the VA network. Lack of controls such as encryption on
VA databases holding millions of sensitive records, web applications
containing common exploitable vulnerabilities and weak authentication
to sensitive systems contributed to the successful unchallenged and
unfettered access and exploitation of VA systems and information by
this specific group of attackers.
During my tenure, I consistently insured that each instance of
attack or compromise by these group of attackers was documented and
communicated to the VA OIT leadership through specialized reporting
called Key Investigative Reporting (KIR) performed by the NSOC Deep
Dive Analysis (DDA) team and biweekly security meetings with the VA
Principle Deputy Assistant Secretary (PDAS), Mr. Stephan Warren.
MITIGATION ACTIVITIES 2010-2013
From late August 2010 until my departure in early February 2013, I
planned for and executed with support from various sub offices within
OIT a series of initiatives and activities needed to improve network
and systems security with a particular focus on defending the network
against sophisticated and targeted attacks levied by nation-state
sponsor organizations. Some of these initiatives included the Web
Applications Security Program (WASP), the VA Software Assurance
Program, Continuous Monitoring and Diagnostics (CMD) of VA information
systems, and mandating encryption of VA databases, and supported the
reduction of the total number of VA databases hosting sensitive Veteran
information.
During my tenure as CISO, with the support of VA as a whole, we
were able to close more than 10,000 of the 13,000 security corrective
actions. In all, VA personnel executed more than 100,000 sub actions.
While these actions did improve security from a compliance perspective,
there still existed a problem of fully implementing adequate technical
security controls needed to defend networks, systems and sensitive
information from nation-state sponsored attackers. The heart of
selecting the proper technical controls meant fully understanding the
threat actors, their tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) and
along with system and network vulnerabilities and implementing a
program that could continuously report on and remediate identified
vulnerabilities in a near real time fashion.
Over time, the Office of Information Security (OIS) worked to
enhance a comprehensive program called Continuous Monitoring and
Diagnostics (CMD) that would provide adequate security of VA systems
and networks by continually evaluating certain technical controls in a
near real time fashion. There is proof that a good CMD program
monitoring the correct controls can significantly improve information
security and is consistent with the direction that the federal
government has taken in securing federal systems. It is also
significantly superior to even a good paper based ATO process.
OIT LEADERSHIP DEVIATES FROM ATO PROCESS
It is my testimony that at the time of my departure from VA that
the processes required for the DAS, IS to make an attestation that VA
systems were adequately secure was completely faulty and improper and
the implementation of the process exposed Veteran systems and VA
information to further risk of compromise. It was confirmed to me by
the VA information security staff charged with executing the process
that it was flawed, provided no value and that a providing a positive
attestation to the adequately of security controls would seriously
compromised the integrity of the VA security program. I subsequently
conveyed this message to the Assistant Secretary and the PDAS by formal
memorandum and in conversation to the PDAS between January 15, 2013 and
January 23, 2013.
VA Handbook 6500.3 states that the DAS, IPRM (now called DAS,IS) is
responsible for:
(3) Reviewing all C&A packages and making a decision recommendation
to the AO to issue an IATO, ATO or Denial of Authorization [emphasis
added] to operate; and
(4) Providing an IATO extension in the event local management can
demonstrate continuous monitoring and security due diligence are being
provided . . . .
In accordance with VA information security policy and following VA
information security procedures, As the DAS, IS, I elected to recommend
a denial of an authority to operate and also elected to recommend
movement of VA systems over the course of eight (8) months into an
enhanced continuous monitoring program, where systems technical
controls could be centrally managed and evaluated in a near real time
fashion. I based my decision on the guidance provided by the
information security team and on the fact that the paper based process
would not keep highly sophisticated nation-state sponsored attackers
from further compromising VA data. Furthermore, as each VA system was
transitioned into the continuous monitoring program, additional
specific critical controls would be evaluated for adequacy before being
granted a full ATO. These additional critical controls are proven to
slow and repel sophisticated, nation-state sponsored attackers from
compromising information systems and data. This was an agreed upon
process with the VA information security team and a process that had
been briefed by me to the Director of IT Audits and Security within the
VA Office of the Inspector General (OIG) several weeks before the
process implementation.
Despite the authority granted to the DAS, IS to make a
recommendation to deny authorization, the VA OIT PDAS made a concerted
effort to circumvent my authority and influence my decision to make a
recommendation to the Accrediting Official (AO) that 545 VA systems be
given an IATO. Furthermore, VA handbook 6500.3 and VA policy 6500,
provides for no role or authority for the PDAS, OIT with regard the
program or processes governing Authority to Operate.
RECOMMENDATIONS
To this end, I would recommend that this subcommittee:
1. Review all VA Key Investigative Reports (KIRs) and Deep Dive
Analysis (DDA) reports and Web Application Security Program reports
(WASP) to assess the damage and depth of exposure, extent of compromise
to VA systems and compromise of Veteran information; and
2. Regularly report to the House Committee on Veteran Affairs on
progress made with respect to mitigating access to VA systems and
Veteran information by nation-state sponsored organizations;
3. Assess previously identified web application exposures and
assess for potential compromise of Veteran data, both PII and PHI;
4. Include web application exposures as part of the Data Breach
Core Team (DBCT) evaluation process;
5. Assess the potential compromise to non VA networks sharing an
interconnection with VA's network;
6. Designate the VA network as a ``compromised environment'' and
establish controls that are effective and support the reclamation of
control back to VA from nation-state sponsored organizations;
7. Move the VA systems into a full continuous monitoring and
diagnostics program with near real time situational awareness of its
security posture with a focus on the 20 critical controls;
8. Increase VA funding for information security programs; and
number of Information Security Officers (ISOs) supporting VA field
offices and facilities
9. Move reporting lines for the DAS, IS directly to the AS, OIT or
to the Office of the Secretary, VA
10. Assess the past and present practices of the OIT leadership
with regard to decisions made in the protection of VA systems and
information.
I would like to thank the members of the subcommittee for your time
today and I look forward to any questions you may have.
Executive Summary
At the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), the Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Information Security (DAS, IS) is responsible for
information security and privacy strategy, management, policy,
procedures, oversight and reporting. VA handbook 6500.3, Certification
and Accreditation (C&A) of VA Information Systems, Holds the DAS, IS
responsible for;
Reviewing all final C&A packages and making a decision
recommendation to the AO to issue an IATO [Interim Authority to
Operate], ATO [Authority to Operate], or Denial of Authorization to
operate . . . `` and ``Providing an IATO extension in the event local
management can demonstrate continuous monitoring and security due
diligence are being provided . . . ''
Beginning in early 2010 and continuing through late 2012, VA
systems had been under repeated attacks and data compromised by no less
than eight (8) groups of well organized and sophisticated nation-state
sponsored actors who appear to have had unfettered and at times,
unchallenged access to VA networks, systems and information. Internal
reporting by the Office of Information Security (OIS) to the Principle
Deputy Assistant Secretary (PDAS), Office of Information and Technology
(OIT) kept the PDAS informed of the condition regarding exposures of
Veteran dated in information systems. This reporting further confirmed
to the PDAS by his own admission in late 2010 that ``uninvited visitors
were in the [VA] network'' and thus continued to be a persistent threat
and risk to VA systems and sensitive information and other
interconnected non-VA networks.
Security enhancements and programs put into place by the DAS, IS
beginning in late 2010 through early 2013, revealed over time that
significant amounts of Veteran data was exposed to potential compromise
by any attacker from both the Internet and from within the VA network
infrastructure.
Because of unfettered access to VA systems and information by
sophisticated attackers and lack of adequate controls to ensure
protection of Veteran information, in January 2013, the DAS, IS
operating under the authority of VA policy and FISMA, determined that
the newly derived C&A process was not proper and inadequate for
securing VA systems holding sensitive information. Despite the
recommendation from the DAS, IS to the Assistant Secretary, OIT to
reconsider an IATO using the inadequate process, the PDAS used his
official position to influence the DAS, IS to sign an attestation that
systems were adequately secure for more than 250 ATOs, and essentially
exposing VA systems and sensitive data to further risk of compromise
and exposure.
Questions For The Record
Letter From: Hon. Mike Coffman, Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight &
Investigations, To: VA
October 22, 2013
The Honorable Eric K. Shinseki
Secretary
U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs
810 Vermont Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20420
Dear Mr. Secretary:
Please provide written responses to the attached questions for
record for the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee hearing
entitled ``How Secure is Veterans' Private Information'' that took
place on June 4, 2013.
In responding to these questions for the record, please answer each
question in order using single space formatting. Please also restate
each question in its entirety before each answer. Your submission is
expected by the close of business on July 25, 2013, and should be sent
to Ms. Bernadine Dotson at [email protected].
If you have any questions, please call Mr. Eric Hannel, Majority
Staff Director of the Oversight & Investigations Subcommittee, at 202-
225-3527.
Sincerely,
Mike Coffman
Chairman
Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigations
MC/hr
Questions for the Record from Subcommittee Chairman Mike Coffman
1. The OIG indicates that IT security has been a material weakness
at VA for more than 10 years. Why did VA OI&T wait until 2012 to
institute a proactive initiative like the Continuous Readiness in
Information Security Program (CRISP) to try to address this issue?
2. The OIG's more recent Semiannual Report states that OI&T has 11
reports open containing 60 recommendations with 14 open for more than
year. Can you explain why you concur with OIG recommendations but can't
seem to complete the actions necessary to close the recommendations?
For example, one report will be open for 2 years come
July and yet the most significant recommendation remains open - which
deals with reviewing contractor security controls and practices to
ensure compliance with VA's information security requirements.
3. What steps is VA taking to eliminate the IT Material weakness in
FY 13?
4. Why does VA have so many repeat findings and recommendations
from the OIG's FISMA work? Why has VA not made any significant progress
towards eliminating these long standing recommendations?
5. What actions is VA taking to eliminate the use of clear text
protocols used to transmit medical information between the VAMCs and
the CBOCs over external service provider networks?
6. Based on the information provided in the Deloitte's deep dive
report detailing inefficiencies in OI&T operations, what steps will the
CIO take to improve delivery of IT services?
7. How will the issuance of the PIV badge affect the ability of the
Department to respond to Congressional requests, litigation demands,
and other similar requests to search, decrypt, and release bulk volumes
of VA emails? Does the planned roll-out of the PIV badge tied to
automatic encryption hinder timely responses to such requests in any
way?
8. Why is it that the PMAS processes only focuses on meeting
milestones and schedule but there are no metrics around quality,
functionality and customer satisfaction?
9. The VA regulations on Information Security Matters at 38 CFR
Part 75 appear to authorize an accelerated response with notice to the
subjects of a data breach and/or an offer of credit protection
services. How many times has credit protection service been offered to
veterans for FY 2008-2012 and for each such instance, to how many
veterans were such services offered? Please provide the annual cost for
credit services for each year between FY 2008-2012.
10. Under the regulations at 38 CFR Part 75, if the Secretary
determines that individual notice is not warranted for a data breach,
then an independent risk analysis is required to be performed. How many
risk analyses have been performed in accordance with these provisions
for FY 2008 to present? Please describe each occurrence of such
analysis including the findings and conclusions. Please also indicate
each date and instance in which a data breach was reported to OMB and/
or to Congress within FY 2008 to present.
11. By letter to the committee dated May 14, 2013, you stated: ``To
be clear, VA's security posture was never at risk.'' Please explain how
this statement is true given the admissions uncovered in the hearing
that systems and networks had been breached by foreign state actors and
the testimony of OIG that, at one point, there were 4000 open
vulnerabilities. If the statement was untrue when made (as it certainly
appears), please describe what disciplinary action is being taken for
the subordinates responsible.
12. Reports indicate that VA became aware in January, 2013, of an
incident where attackers used a spearphishing attack to gain access to
a joint VA-DoD network dealing with health data. How many instances
have hackers tried to use VA networks to gain access to Defense
Department computer systems? Please describe each instance and what
corrective actions were taken in response.
Questions for the Record from Congressman Tim Huelskamp
1. I reiterated in my questioning during your testimony, if you
could please communicate with the appropriate individual my request for
answers to the letters I sent to the Department of Veteran Affairs on
September 23, 2012 and October 3, 2012? If you need a copy of those
questions, my office would be happy to provide those to you.
2. Your explanation for receiving $87,000 in bonuses was that you
met the performance expectations laid out for you by your leadership--
could you please provide further explanation of those expectations to
my office?
3. Can you please provide information on how data security at the
Department of Veteran Affairs compares with industry standards outside
the federal government? Specifically, please describe the current data
encryption process used by the Department of Veteran Affairs.
4. It was stated during the hearing that outside foreign agents
have had access to information in the Veterans Affairs database. Could
you please provide to me detailed information on who has accessed the
data, the date(s) it was accessed, and what the Department of Veteran
Affairs has done to prevent future compromises to the system?
Questions and Responses From: U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs
Questions for the Record from Subcommittee Chairman Mike Coffman
1. The OIG indicates that IT security has been a material weakness
at VA for more than 10 years. Why did VA OI&T wait until 2012 to
institute a proactive initiative like the Continuous Readiness in
Information Security Program (CRISP) to try to address this issue?
VA Response: VA has been taking proactive steps to strengthen IT
security for many years. Prior to 2006, information technology (IT) at
the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) was decentralized. Among other
implications, this decentralization made securing the vast VA
enterprise information systems, and thus ending the material weakness,
virtually impossible. The lack of an ability to address the material
weakness in IT was one of the primary reasons the Department, with the
help of Congress, began to consolidate IT functions into the Office of
Information and Technology (OIT) in 2006. As a result of IT
consolidation, all governance, funding, and implementation of IT
programs and security controls are managed out of VA Central Office
(VACO). VA's consolidation of OIT was not completed until 2009.
After consolidation, VA managed its information security posture as
an IT concern. Prior to 2012, information security was seen by some as
only an IT issue. Today, VA recognizes information security is a
Department-wide concern and responsibility of every single VA employee.
In order to bring leadership and field-level focus on the goal of
ending the material weakness, the Continuous Readiness in Information
Security Program (CRISP) was formed in 2012 under a new innovative
management methodology. The CRISP effort consolidates all of the
disparate material-weakness related initiatives under the leadership of
one focused team across VA. Moreover, CRISP is more than just a
program, but rather is a culture change to be embedded throughout the
agency. CRISP is steered by VA executive leadership and executed by two
OIT co-managers. This collaborative approach with senior leader
oversight allowed for more consistent communication, implementation,
and consolidation of tasks downstream, more accurate reporting and
oversight upstream, and meant a more agile governance of the program.
2. The OIG's more recent Semiannual Report states that OI&T has 11
reports open containing 60 recommendations but can't seem to complete
the actions necessary to close the recommendations?
For example, one report will be open for 2 years come
July and yet the most significant recommendation remains open - which
deals with reviewing contractor security controls and practices to
ensure compliance with VA's information security requirements.
VA Response: VA appreciates the work conducted by the Office of
Inspector General (OIG) to ensure that the Department is following the
correct path in working to serve Veterans. VA takes OIG's
recommendations seriously, and where we concur with the
recommendations, we work to implement the recommendations to OIG's
satisfaction as quickly as possible.
VA's OIT acknowledges that it has several outstanding
recommendations over a year old. Many of these recommendations have
either been submitted to OIG for closure, or are in the process of
being implemented. VA will continue to work with its OIG partners to
implement and close all outstanding recommendations.
VA has furnished OIG with what it believes to be responses
sufficient to close the open recommendation for its oldest reports.
3. What steps is VA taking to eliminate the IT Material weakness in
FY 13?
VA Response: VA's OIT has made strides to improve its information
security program. While many of the changes in fiscal year (FY)2012
were recognized by OIG during the FY 2012 audits, those changes were
not in place long enough to assure auditors a permanent process had
been firmly established. In FY 2013, VA focused on the four major areas
of repeat material weakness findings which are: Configuration
Management, Access Controls, Security Documentation, and Contingency
Planning. The CRISP team and VA leadership are optimistic that the
progress made from FY 2012 have been sustained, and when coupled with
the early audit results this year, will show positive improvements
during the remainder of FY 2013 audit results. FY 2013 also includes
the introduction of a new office which focuses on patch management and
baseline configuration management. While this program is new to FY
2013, it is demonstrating promise in its effectiveness.
FY 2014 continues to bring other significant changes in working
towards security improvement. Some examples of major initiatives
include the Department-wide implementation of a Governance, Risk, and
Compliance (GRC) tool (begun in
FY 2013) which will aid in the assessments of the overall security
posture within VA as well as the funding approval for a Security
Information and Event Management (SIEM) tool to provide an audit log
and event management oversight capability.
All of these efforts are in conjunction with VA's 18-month plan in
response to OIG's Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA)
Audit. The plan, provided to OIG and part of their FISMA report,
addresses each and every OIG recommendation with a plan to remediate
the recommendation at various intervals, but no later than 18 months.
This plan includes work to complete implementation of a risk governance
structure, completion of a process for better documenting Plans of
Actions and Milestones, update system security plans, finish
implementing strong password requirements on all computers, continue
reviewing user accounts for correct level of user access, implement a
mechanism for ensuring antivirus definitions are installed and up to
date, and others.
4. Why does VA have so many repeat findings and recommendations
from the OIG's FISMA work? Why has VA not made any significant progress
towards eliminating these long standing recommendations?
VA Response: As stated above, VA takes OIG's recommendations
seriously and is working to implement the recommendations with which VA
concurs as quickly as possible, including several targeted efforts as
outlined in the 18-month plan to address recommendations in OIG's FISMA
report. Many of the recommendations are technical in nature and require
extensive research, and detailed implementation plans spanning more
than a year in order to request closure of the recommendation by OIG.
All findings have remediation plans either currently in development or
execution which will position VA to address OIG's FISMA
recommendations.
5. What actions is VA taking to eliminate the use of clear text
protocols used to transmit medical information between the VAMCs and
the CBOCs over external service provider networks?
VA Response: OIT does not agree with the conclusion reached by OIG
in its recent report regarding data transmission. In its final report,
OIG acknowledges that VA does not send unencrypted sensitive
information over the public Internet. However, VA does not agree with
OIG's assertion in its final report that the manner with which VA
transmits data over its network necessarily exposes sensitive data to
non-VA personnel.
Although OIT does not agree with OIG's findings in the OIG final
report, we concurred with the recommendation to immediately conduct a
comprehensive review. The information contained in the OIG report is
incorrect for the specific network links cited in Veterans Integrated
Service Network 23, and is inaccurate of the network as a whole.
VA takes a defense-in-depth approach to the protection of data in
flight. Encryption is being deployed at the network layer as well as
means to encrypt data in flight at the application layer. The
Department is already approximately two thirds done with deployment of
a Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) Layer 3 bulk
encryption solution for wide area network (WAN) links to its major
facilities including medical centers, regional offices, and data
centers. This would eliminate the passing of ``clear text'' across
those VA WAN links regardless of the use of private external service
provider networks as an underlying transport. Encryption for the links
to major facilities is scheduled to be completed by the end of the
calendar year and the same solution is being extended to the
Department's Community-Based Outpatient Clinics.
In addition to the bulk WAN encryption, there is encryption at the
application layer in some instances related to the transmission of
medical and other sensitive data. For terminal emulation sessions to
its hospital information systems (VistA), for instance, VA uses secure
shell which encrypts all traffic transmitted between the end user
client and the VistA system. For the bulk transmission of VistA data,
the VistA systems end user clients and other VA servers have the
capability to use secure file transmission protocol which encrypts the
data in flight. For other types of sensitive transmissions, VA staff
and systems have standard public key infrastructure (PKI) capabilities
to digitally sign and encrypt any transmissions and, for document
encryption and user-based controls, VA has Rights Management Services
(RMS). RMS encrypts documents regardless of where and how they are
transmitted and controls how the recipient is permitted to handle the
document (e.g., whether they are permitted to forward it, print it,
store it, etc.). VA also uses secure socket layer and transport layer
security, which encrypts sensitive http transmissions. All of these
methods are in place and encrypt data transmissions independent of
whether or not the underlying network is, itself, encrypted.
6. Based on the information provided in the Deloitte's deep dive
report detailing inefficiencies in OI&T operations, what steps will the
CIO take to improve delivery of IT services?
VA Response: VA is working hard to position its IT organization as
a product and service delivery organization focused on providing
quality customer service. VA asked for the Deloitte survey to be
conducted specifically to help address any existing issues in order to
meet the goal of improving customer service. As part of our culture of
constant measurement and evaluation against goals and objectives,
leadership asked for a tough and thorough analysis to evaluate the
effectiveness of the Service Delivery organization.
Since the delivery of the Deloitte deep dive report, we have worked
on expediting initiatives already in place designed to improve service
delivery and have begun two related efforts to address customer service
and communications issues. We are currently exploring ways of
accelerating the implementation of the National Service Desk, which we
believe will streamline and improve our efficiency in capturing issues
facing our customers so they can be addressed and resolved more quickly
and analyzed more comprehensively so as to enable proactive efforts to
do IT preventive maintenance interventions, where necessary.
In terms of new efforts, we established a Customer Advisory Tiger
Team in April 2013, comprised of members of field-based employees from
the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) and OIT as recommended by the
Assistant Deputy Undersecretary for Health and the Acting Assistant
Secretary for Information and Technology. This tiger team is tasked to
explore the impact of OIT organizational initiatives, such as the
establishment of regional service lines. Recommendations resulting from
the work of this committee were presented to the Acting Assistant
Secretary for OIT in August 2013. In addition, we have begun an effort
toward enhancing field communications and dialogue between VACO and the
field through direct meetings, mostly via teleconferencing, with field
leadership in the Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA) regional
offices, VA medical centers, and National Cemetery Administration
offices, working to identify and solve issues identified through focus
group dialogues and intervention by our customer service improvement
council. Using the October 2013 VA-wide customer satisfaction survey as
a launching point, this program of structured interviews will identify
six issues to address nationwide on a quarterly basis. The first of
several quarterly reports is due at the end of this month, and the six
initial issues we seek to address were identified in August 2013. The
investigation process will continue with additional interviews in the
next two quarters.
OIT leadership is actively working with field staff to keep
communication lines open as changes to the organization are developed
and implemented. The Acting Assistant Secretary for OIT conducts weekly
calls with IT field leadership to keep them informed and involved in
this significant initiative to transform service delivery at VA. VA
will keep the committee informed after recommendations are selected for
adoption and the initial set of six customer concern issues are
selected for resolution.
7. How will the issuance of the PIV badge affect the ability of the
Department to respond to Congressional requests, litigation demands,
and other similar requests to search, decrypt and release bulk volumes
of VA emails? Does the planned roll-out of the PIV badge tied to
automatic encryption hinder timely responses to such requests in any
way?
VA Response: The issuance and use of Personal Identity Verification
(PIV) cards will improve the security posture of VA by ensuring only
authorized employees have access to general information systems by
requiring a higher level of assurance through using multi-factor
authentication. Multi-factor authentication and hard PKI certificates
associated with the PIV card will improve network access and help
secure VA and Veteran's information. The use of PIV cards with hard PKI
certificates to encrypt/decrypt email complicates the response to e-
Discovery request. We have several efforts underway to improve our
response times when dealing with emails encrypted with a hard PKI
certificate, as VA understands the importance of complying with such
requests.
8. Why is it that the PMAS processes only focuses on meeting
milestones and schedule but there are no metrics around quality,
functionality and customer satisfaction?
VA Response: The Project Management Accountability System (PMAS) is
an evolving IT project development methodology and management oversight
system. From the very inception of PMAS, VA leadership planned to
systematically expand the scope and function of PMAS over time. PMAS
was initially implemented to ensure on-time delivery of IT
capabilities. PMAS' initial focus on schedule was the most impactful to
reviving the IT delivery rate at VA. However, PMAS continues to evolve
and now also includes quality, functionality and customer satisfaction
elements.
PMAS Guide 4.0, dated November 7, 2012, establishes current PMAS
policy. PMAS mandates that IT customers be engaged in the process of
identifying the functionalities and capabilities that new IT projects
are to deliver. Before development of a new IT project begins, as well
as during the development process, the customer is intricately involved
and their satisfaction is a critical element in the ability of that
project to continue development. In addition, PMAS requires direct and
continual participation by the customer across the entire life cycle of
project development via the Integrated Project Team. Specifically, PMAS
policy mandates that the Project Manager and the customer agree not
only on the IT capability to be delivered, but also on the schedule by
which the new IT capability is to be developed.
At the conclusion of each development period, called increments,
the customer must approve of the capabilities which were delivered.
Without this measure of customer satisfaction being achieved, the
project cannot continue development. To deliver on time, the capability
must be delivered to a production environment by the scheduled
increment delivery date, and the customer must agree that the
capability meets desired functionality and schedule goals.
Recently, measuring functionality (scope) has also been added to
PMAS by capturing function points delivered in an IT project's
increment. Function points measure an amount of business functionality
delivered by the IT system to its users. By capturing these metrics,
analysis can be conducted to also measure the effectiveness and
efficiency of functionality delivered to the VA enterprise.
In addition to measuring functionality, PMAS is now able to capture
costs per increment by integrating data from the Budget Tracking Tool
and PMAS data to achieve a cost per increment.
The PMAS program will continue to mature; the near-future will
focus on: ???(1) increasing customer satisfaction by assisting the
customer in determining and measuring the business value the increment
delivers; (2) recognizing and verifying the progress toward achieving
the customers' strategic goals and objectives; and (3) determining the
quality of the code delivered to production.
9. The VA regulations on Information Security Matters at 38 CFR
Part 75 appear to authorize an accelerated response with notice to the
subjects of a data breach and/or an offer of credit protection
services. How many times has credit protection service been offered to
veterans for FY 2008-2012 and for each such instance, to how many
veterans were such services offered? Please provide the annual cost for
credit services for each year between FY 2008-2012.
VA Response: The following table demonstrates the number of credit
monitoring offers extended by VA, and the cost to the agency.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY Issued Cost
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2009........................................... 20,287 97,519
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2010........................................... 28,369 148,367
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2011........................................... 26,980 74,908
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2012........................................... 16,160 39,498
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2013*.......................................... 11,485 25,156
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
*so far through July
VA has reached out to Veterans Service Organizations to help
encourage Veterans who are offered credit monitoring to accept the
service.
10. Under the regulations at 38 CFR Part 75, if the Secretary
determines that individual notice is not warranted for a data breach,
then an independent risk analysis is required to be performed. How many
risk analyses have been performed in accordance with these provisions
for FY 2008 to present? Please describe each occurrence of such
analysis including the findings and conclusions. Please also indicate
each date and instance in which a data breach was reported to OMB and/
or to Congress within FY 2008 to present.
VA Response: The results of several contracted Independent Risks
Analysis' (IRA) VA has conducted are below. The costs for each IRA are
at least $29,000 and as much as $67,000. In 2012 alone, there were
4,724 incidents. Conducting an IRA for each incident would have cost
the Government over $136 million. The costs are not justified by the
results from the IRAs. Of note, VA's OIG has declined to conduct IRA's
as authorized by 38 U.S.C. Sec. 5724(a).
In order to protect our Nation's Veterans, VA uses a very low
threshold for offering credit protection services when a Veteran's
sensitive personal information is the subject of a data breach. All
reported incidents are triaged by VA's Incident Response Team and
forwarded to the Department-wide Data Breach Core Team (DBCT) to
determine when credit monitoring or notification letters are required.
The DBCT team performs the same function as the IRA at a much lower
cost.
Additionally, the Department routinely performs other monitoring
activities to ensure information is protected and has not been
compromised, including conducting quarterly generalized data breach
analysis on the 20 million Veterans names in the Beneficiary
Identification Record Locator Subsystem to determine if any anomalies
indicating identity theft warrant intervention on behalf of the
Veteran. If such anomalies are detected, individual Veterans are
notified by mail. This proactive data breach analysis identifies both
potential identity theft that may be the result of undetected VA data
breaches and identity theft unrelated to VA experienced by the Veteran
population.
1. April 2008 - An Independent Risk Analysis (IRA) was completed on
an incident that involved unaccounted for IT Equipment Inventory losses
across VA. A reasonable risk of harm was not found. Approximately
$53,000.
2. June 2008 - An IRA was completed on an incident that involved
lost CD's at VBA regional offices. A reasonable risk of harm was not
found. Approximately $29,000.
3. October 2009 - An IRA was completed on an incident that involved
contracted transcription services done for various facilities within
VHA. A reasonable risk of harm was not found. Approximately $67,000.
4. April 2011 - An IRA was contracted regarding an OIT employee in
Fayetteville, North Carolina, who was stealing identities. The contract
was cancelled in September 2011, after the employee was convicted and
the OIG determined the investigation was complete. Credit protection
services were provided due to reasonable risk of harm.
11. By letter to the committee dated May 14, 2013, you stated: ``To
be clear, VA's security posture was never at risk.'' Please explain how
this statement is true given the admissions uncovered in the hearing
that systems and networks had been breached by foreign state actors and
the testimony of OIG that, at one point, there were 4000 open
vulnerabilities. If the statement was untrue when made (as it certainly
appears), please describe what disciplinary actions is being taken for
the subordinates responsible.
VA Response: As has been previously explained to the committee on
July 12, 2013, this statement came in the context of a response to an
inquiry on a particular topic. On April 25, 2013, VA received a letter
from Congressman Coffman asking how VA will renew its ``Authorizations
to Operate'' (ATO) various IT systems ``without compromising system
security.'' The Secretary responded to this question in a letter on May
14, 2013, outlining the ATO process and stating that through this
process, ``VA's security posture was never at risk.'' As the Acting
Assistant Secretary for OIT, Mr. Stephen Warren indicated in the
testimony at the June 4, 2013, Subcommittee hearing, that specific
phrase in the letter was and is clearly referring to the context of the
letter: The process to approve ``Authorizations to Operate'' did not
``compromise system security.'' The line did not - and was not meant
to--imply that normal operation of VA systems were never at risk based
on other factors. Further, as you know, Mr. Warren indicated in the
hearing that his office drafted that letter for the Secretary's
signature and that in retrospect Mr. Warren believes he could have been
more clear. Regardless, the sentence is within the context of the ATO
situation and responds to Congressman Coffman's request for assurance
that the process of renewing ATOs would not put VA systems at risk.
12. Reports indicate that VA became aware in January, 2013, of an
incident where attackers used a spearphishing attack to gain access to
a joint VA-DoD network dealing with health data. How many instances
have hackers tried to use VA networks to gain access to Defense
Department computer systems? Please describe each instance and what
corrective actions were taken in response.
VA Response: A response to this question was provided in a briefing
to Committee staff on July 12, 2013. VA is bound by agreements with
outside agencies to not reveal information they report to the
department in public documents or settings. This has been explained to
committee staff several times.
Questions for the Record from Congressman Tim Huelskamp
1. I reiterated in my questioning during your testimony, if you
could please communicate with the appropriate individual my request for
answers to the letters I sent to the Department of Veteran Affairs on
September 23, 2012 and October 3, 2012? If you need a copy of those
questions, my office would be happy to provide those to you.
VA Response: VA provided a response to Congressman Huelskamp's
October 3, 2012, letter on January 24, 2013. A response to Congressman
Huelskamp's September 23, 2012, letter will be provided as soon as it
is available.
2. Your explanation for receiving $87,000 in bonuses was that you
met the performance expectations laid out for you by you leadership--
could you please provide further explanation of those expectations to
my office?
VA Response: Mr. Warren met and exceeded the performance
expectations set by his supervisors. As a Senior Executive, Mr. Warren
was responsible for meeting the executive core requirements of leading
change, leading people, being results-driven, exercising business
acumen, and building coalitions. Mr. Warren has excelled in these areas
as reflected in the performance appraisals.
3. Can you please provide information on how data security at the
Department of Veteran Affairs compares with industry standards outside
the federal government? Specifically, please describe the current data
encryption process used by the Department of Veteran Affairs.
VA Response: Effectively comparing data security at VA to industry
standards largely depends on what sector of industry is being used for
comparison. VA is on par with health care providers in terms of data
security based on publicly available data regarding Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act reports to the Department of Health
and Human Services. VA has made great strides in encrypting laptops and
desktops, having completed approximately 99.6 percent encryption of
laptops and 70 percent encryption of desktops, with the remainder of
desktop encryption to be completed by the end of the calendar year.
4. It was stated during the hearing that outside foreign agents
have had access to information in the Veterans Affairs database. Could
you please provide to me detailed information on who has accessed the
data, the date(s) it was accessed, and what the Department of Veteran
Affairs has done to prevent future compromises to the system?
VA Response: A response to this question was provided in a briefing
to Committee staff on July 12, 2013. VA is bound by agreements with
outside agencies to not reveal information they report to the
department in public documents or settings. This has been explained to
committee staff several times.