[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE TERRORIST THREAT IN NORTH AFRICA: BEFORE AND AFTER BENGHAZI
=======================================================================
JOINT HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE
AND THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JULY 10, 2013
__________
Serial No. 113-33
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DANA ROHRABACHER, California Samoa
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio BRAD SHERMAN, California
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
TED POE, Texas GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MATT SALMON, Arizona THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina KAREN BASS, California
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
MO BROOKS, Alabama DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
TOM COTTON, Arkansas ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
PAUL COOK, California JUAN VARGAS, California
GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III,
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania Massachusetts
STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas AMI BERA, California
RON DeSANTIS, Florida ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
TREY RADEL, Florida GRACE MENG, New York
DOUG COLLINS, Georgia LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
TED S. YOHO, Florida JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
LUKE MESSER, Indiana
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade
TED POE, Texas, Chairman
JOE WILSON, South Carolina BRAD SHERMAN, California
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
MO BROOKS, Alabama JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
TOM COTTON, Arkansas JUAN VARGAS, California
PAUL COOK, California BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III,
TED S. YOHO, Florida Massachusetts
------
Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
TOM COTTON, Arkansas DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
RON DeSANTIS, Florida JUAN VARGAS, California
TREY RADEL, Florida BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois
DOUG COLLINS, Georgia JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III,
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina Massachusetts
TED S. YOHO, Florida GRACE MENG, New York
LUKE MESSER, Indiana LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
Mr. Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, director, Center for the Study of
Terrorist Radicalization, Foundation for Defense of Democracies 9
Mr. Aaron Zelin, Richard Borow fellow, The Washington Institute
for Near East Policy........................................... 21
Daniel L. Byman, Ph.D., professor, Security Studies Program,
Georgetown University.......................................... 30
Mr. Mike Lovelady, brother of Algerian gas plant terrorist attack
victim, Victor Lovelady........................................ 42
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
Mr. Daveed Gartenstein-Ross: Prepared statement.................. 12
Mr. Aaron Zelin: Prepared statement.............................. 23
Daniel L. Byman, Ph.D.: Prepared statement....................... 32
Mr. Mike Lovelady: Prepared statement............................ 44
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 66
Hearing minutes.................................................. 67
The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress
from the Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement.......... 68
Question submitted for the record by the Honorable Scott Perry, a
Representative in Congress from the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, and response from Daniel L. Byman, Ph.D.......... 70
Question submitted for the record by the Honorable Dana
Rohrabacher, a Representative in Congress from the State of
California, and responses from:
Mr. Daveed Gartenstein-Ross.................................... 71
Mr. Aaron Zelin................................................ 76
Daniel L. Byman, Ph.D.......................................... 77
THE TERRORIST THREAT IN NORTH AFRICA: BEFORE AND AFTER BENGHAZI
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WEDNESDAY, JULY 10, 2013
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade
and Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 10 o'clock
a.m., in room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ted Poe
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Poe. Subcommittees will come to order. Without
objection, all members may have 5 days to submit statements,
questions, and extraneous materials for the record subject to
the length of the limitation rules of the subcommittee. I will
proceed with my opening statement and then we will have the
ranking member and the other committee members make comments as
well.
There are a lot of things we don't know about the Benghazi
attack that killed Americans including our Ambassador Chris
Stevens. During her testimony before Congress earlier this
year, Secretary Clinton responded to a question over the cause
of the attack of Benghazi by saying, ``What difference at this
point does it make?''
It does make a difference. It makes a difference to the
victims' families who want justice, and it also makes a
difference to the United States. Understanding why the attack
happened does matter. We must respond to any type of violent
attack that occurs against Americans no matter where it is when
it is a terrorist attack.
The morning after the Benghazi attack, I said it on the
House floor that this was a terrorist attack. Everyone
including the administration now knows and recognizes that this
was a terrorist attack. I do look forward to hearing from the
witnesses today about what the security environment in Libya
was like, what it was like before the attack, and what
terrorist groups in Libya were there at the time. Was there any
indication that a terrorist attack was probable against
Americans? What was the response of other governments with
Embassies in Libya to the threat of the terrorist group? And
what is the American response and has it been any different
since the days of the attack?
The security environment in Libya after the attack is also
important to understand. An FBI team was on the ground in Libya
investigating, but supposedly it wasn't even safe for them to
spend much time in Benghazi to determine what happened. I don't
know how they plan to capture those responsible if they can't
go to the area where the perpetrators acted.
At this late date, with all the intelligence that the
United States has at its disposal, do we know the persons that
committed these murders? If we do know who they are, why aren't
they in custody? I have heard from journalists who have
traveled to Benghazi that the identities of at least some of
the attackers are known as are their whereabouts. One of them
openly drank coffee every morning in the same cafe after the
attack, so why has no one been brought to justice not even at
this date?
The idea that four Americans can die on sovereign U.S. soil
and almost a year later no one has been held accountable is
contrary to what we stand for in this nation. The United States
is the most powerful nation in the world. Are we afraid to
arrest those who commit terrorist acts against the United
States? There must be consequences for killing Americans. If
there aren't consequences that just encourages terrorists to
act even more. Terrorists will grow more daring in their
attacks and put more Americans in danger if no consequences
from the United States occur. They should know, all terrorists
should know that they cannot kill Americans and get away with
it. As a former judge, I believe that at the courthouse there
should be justice, and justice should continue, and the long
arm of American justice should reach to areas where Americans
are murdered by terrorists.
We know what happened in Libya did not stay in Libya. In
May, this subcommittee held a joint hearing on the growing
crisis in the African region. Arms which the administration
apparently allowed to be smuggled to extremists' hands during
the Libyan revolution found their way into terrorists' hands
throughout the region in North Africa. It wasn't long before
Mali was overrun with terrorists and the French had to come in
and prevent the whole country from collapsing. It soon spread
to Algeria, when on January 16, 2013, an al-Qaeda linked
Islamic militant group called ``Those Who Signed in Blood''
took nearly 800 people hostage at the gas plant in Algeria.
After a tense, 4-day hostage standoff, Algerian special forces
raided the facility in an effort to free the hostages, and more
than 80 people including three Americans were killed. These
Americans were killed for who they were, because they were
Americans.
There are many unanswered questions that remain. Why did
the United States not take direct action to protect American
interests and American citizens? Three Americans died. I have
been told that American forces were within a few miles of the
facility ready to assist in the rescue but were told to stand
down. Is this true? And if so, why? Why did we allow the safety
of our citizens to depend on the acts of another country, and
why haven't we responded or held anyone accountable for these
murders that took place in January?
Today we have with us the brother of one of those victims.
Mike Lovelady is here with his family, including his wife Wanda
and Victor's wife Maureen, and their family as well. I want to
thank the Lovelady family for being here today, and we are all
sorry for the loss of a loved one, and let you know that Victor
and the other victims from the Algerian attack will not be
forgotten, and it is our hope that we find out who committed
these murders and hold them accountable. But I do want to thank
the Lovelady family for coming in from Texas to be here today.
The mastermind behind the deadly attack was allegedly an
Algerian militant named Mokhtar Belmokhtar. He claimed the
attack was in retaliation for Algeria's support of the French
military offensive against Islamist insurgents in neighboring
Mali. So from Libya to Mali to Algeria it is obvious that
terrorism is running loose in North Africa. We need to learn
from our lessons about these terrorist attacks. We should not
push these attacks behind closed doors and pretend just to move
on down the road. The families of the four American victims in
Benghazi have not moved on. The Loveladys have not moved on.
The FBI investigation has not moved on at all. And the United
States Congress should not move on until we have answers about
what happened in Benghazi and what happened in Algeria, not
until we have justice.
I will now turn it over to the ranking member Mr. Sherman
for his opening statements.
Mr. Sherman. Thank you Mr. Chairman. If I can digress one
country to the east and talk about Egypt for just a second, If
we had a functioning democracy and government here in the
United States, the administration would be conferring with
Congress as to what would be the best policy and how quickly we
could modify our statutes in order to have those statutes call
for the best policy, particularly with regard to our aid under
these circumstances. Instead we have got White House lawyers
trying to figure out how to say what happened in Egypt isn't a
coup. And the entire country will accept that because the
entire country has reached the conclusion that Congress is so
dysfunctional that the idea of conferring with Congress and
having Congress change the statute seems silly when a statute
can simply be ignored or twisted out of all shape.
As we work for democracy in the Middle East I look forward
to focusing on our institutions here. That is why with regard
to Libya I was so concerned about the enforcement of the War
Powers Act, which, in an effort to bring democracy to Libya was
not actually adhered to, which is always a good idea with
regard to statutes. Focusing again on the past in Libya, we had
a chance then to demand that the rebels purge from their midst
the worst elements amongst them. We did not. We were all too
anxious to see a collection of the best and worst forces of
Libya overthrow Ghadafi, and now those worst forces exercise
substantial power particularly in eastern Libya.
It is thought to be a proof of one's dull-headedness if you
worry about a few billion dollars here or there when there is
the great issues of war and peace whereas you can always get a
few more billion dollars from the American taxpayer. But the
fact is, we should have insisted that the Libyans pay for the
overthrow of Ghadafi, the costs that we incurred. We could have
asked for that pledge early. I met with some of the top people
during the rebellion, and they said, the message we have is
don't worry about reimbursing the U.S. taxpayer, just make sure
you give good deals to U.S. oil companies. At the time I
thought this gentleman from the Middle East misunderstood my
government and its objectives. It appears to me now that he
understood my government better than I do. I look forward to a
government that focuses on billions of dollars for American
taxpayers.
This also focuses our attention on the cost of aid to the
Iraqi Government, a government which is using billions of
dollars to pay its debts to Kuwait because Kuwait lent money to
Saddam Hussein to wage his war against Iran. So we have to give
money to the Iraqis so they can give money to the Kuwaitis, a
country that still exists just because we defended them from
Saddam Hussein, also at our own cost.
There is substantial argument here in this city about why
there would seem to be a misstatement of what motivated those
who attacked our Embassy in Benghazi. I want to put to rest, if
it can--I don't think it can be put to rest, but at least
expose the silliness of the idea that this was some sort of
grand political plan. Because if one says that terrorists hit
our Embassy in Benghazi, it proves that our foreign policy in
the Middle East failed to totally defang the terrorists. That
was always known to be true anyway whether organized terrorism
was behind Benghazi or not.
And if there was a spontaneous demonstration touched off by
a silly YouTube, and offensive YouTube posting, then our public
diplomacy in the Middle East has failed to the point where a
YouTube posting can lead to the deaths of Americans, even
respected Americans. So I would say in either case the Benghazi
attack demonstrates that our policies in the Middle East have
not been entirely successful, which does not mean that any
other policies could have been more successful. It is simply a
difficult area, and both our public diplomacy efforts and our
efforts to destroy al-Qaeda are still works in process.
I look forward to focusing not only on Libya, but on Mali
and the Tuareg independence movement there, as misguided as it
is for such a small group, population-wise, to seek
independence, and the terrorists' exploitation of that. And as
the chairman pointed out, we need to focus on the Algerian
attacks. We should look at the security situation in Libya and
whether the perpetrators of the Benghazi attack will ever be
brought to justice by either the Libyan Government or American
drones. And I yield back.
Mr. Poe. The Chair will now recognize the chairwoman of the
Middle East and North Africa Subcommittee, Ms. Ileana Ros-
Lehtinen from Florida, for 5 minutes.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much. Thank you, Judge Poe.
I am pleased that both of our subcommittees are convening this
important hearing. And I would also like to express my deepest
condolences to Michael Lovelady for the loss of his brother
Victor Lovelady who was killed during the horrendous attack by
al-Qaeda-linked terrorists in Algeria earlier this year. Our
thoughts and prayers are with you and with your family, as they
are with Victor's wife Maureen and their two children Erin and
Grant.
With growing instability in North Africa, it is necessary
to examine the security threats posed by rising extremism and
deteriorating stability in the Middle East and North Africa
region, how we got there and where we are going. Sadly, this
threat is not new. For nearly 20 years I have been trying to
raise awareness of this very real and growing threat to the
United States. In April 1995, I was at the time chairman of the
Africa subcommittee, and I convened a hearing entitled, ``The
Threat of Islamic Extremism in Africa'' and stated that Islamic
extremism was on the rise and that militant groups posed a
growing threat to regional stability, to the fragile
democracies in the region, and to U.S. national security
interests. April 1995.
Almost two decades later not much has changed. The wave of
radical Islam continues to spread, and the threat posed by al-
Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and other foreign terrorist
organizations is due to the establishment of a base of
operations in North Africa by taking advantage of the lack of
security, political will, and the capability of the governments
in the region.
To illustrate the expansion of narcoterrorism activities in
the region, this year we learned that the DEA-led investigation
leading to the arrest of individuals connected to Guinea-Bissau
and the FARC were indicted for narcotrafficking and terrorism
offenses. It is alarming that these individuals indicted were
charged with conspiring to sell weapons including surface-to-
air missiles which could be used against U.S. military
personnel in the region. This is why I believe that the DEA
should have a larger footprint in North Africa to help
dismantle linkages between drug traffickers and terrorist
organizations that promote and finance these nefarious
activities. However, we cannot concentrate only on the security
front. We must also commit resources and attention to help
build civil society and strengthen institutions in North
Africa.
The Arab Spring began in Tunisia with the self-immolation
of a disparaged street vendor and Tunisia was believed to be
the most likely to undergo democratic change. Unfortunately,
the assassination of one of Tunisia's opposition leader was a
detrimental blow to the moderate and secular forces in that
country. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood-led government under
Morsi failed to demonstrate a commitment to democratic
principles and hopes for a truly democratic society that
respected human rights remains in jeopardy. In Libya, the Obama
administration has yet to hold anyone accountable for the
terrorist attacks on September 11th. The individuals at the
State Department who were responsible for the security failures
in Benghazi continue to operate in different capacities without
any real consequences, and the terrorist perpetrators who were
behind the Benghazi attack are still at large. What is being
done to capture them?
Prior to the September 11, 2012 attacks in Benghazi which
left four brave Americans dead, it was already clear that the
security situation in Libya had been far from secure. The
administration should have been more aware of these threats and
taken the proper steps to increase security measures to ensure
the safety of our Embassy personnel. They did not.
Unfortunately, it is clear that these steps were not taken. We
also know that Libya was used as a staging ground for the
January 16, 2013 hostage standoff in the gas plant attack in
Algeria which resulted in the deaths of more than 80 people.
As Secretary Clinton said when she testified in Congress in
January, there is no doubt that the Algerian terrorists had
weapons from Libya. There is no doubt that the remnants of AQIM
in Mali had weapons from Libya. Yet, we seem to not learn from
our mistakes as the administration seeks to inject even more
arms into the region by arming the Syrian rebels. Our strategy
in the region needs to be aimed at disrupting extremist
networks and denying safe havens to these groups. However, in
order to do that we must first get a real understanding of the
nature of the problem and increase our attention to these
threats because so far we have been woefully lacking in our
understanding of these threats, and I think that it is evident
in our lack of a coherent foreign policy to these issues.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for this timely hearing.
Mr. Poe. The Chair will now recognize the ranking member of
the Middle East and North Africa Subcommittee, Mr. Deutch from
Florida, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you Chairman Poe and Chairman Ros-
Lehtinen for holding today's hearing. The purpose of today's
hearing is to examine the threats to U.S. interests and
security in North Africa from extremist groups because that is
how we are going to prevent tragedies like Benghazi from
occurring again.
I hope that we will uphold the purpose of this hearing
rather than furthering baseless political witch hunts. I hope
as well that we can use today as an important opportunity to
look at ways to better ensure our security and stability in the
region. And I hope that today doesn't devolve into another
opportunity to try to score political points by suggesting that
there was some kind of massive government cover-up or that the
administration chose to ignore threats leading up to Benghazi,
when as we now know that is simply untrue.
And it doesn't change the fact that four courageous
Americans died in the attack on Benghazi. The attack on
Benghazi was a tragedy, a tragedy perpetuated by terrorists
that are fundamentally at odds with everything the United
States and our allies stand for. So instead of continuing to
lay false blame, I am hopeful that today we will be able to use
this hearing to ensure that we are doing everything we can to
protect our interests from extremist threats.
The spread of extremism in North Africa is of increasing
concern as groups like al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb take
advantage of political and economic instability and the free
flow of weapons and cash. In post-revolutionary Libya, the
democratically elected Libyan National Congress remains under
constant threat of armed terrorist groups. For the young men in
Libya who fought for freedom from Ghadafi's rule, watching a
paralyzed government achieve very little really doesn't equate
to tangible change in their daily lives. Ghadafi's vast weapons
cache is making its way across the region, trickling down to
terrorists in Mali and into the hands of extremist fighters in
Syria.
I am increasingly concerned that in Egypt's current tenuous
political situation, extremists may look for a window of
opportunity to broaden support and turn to violence there. AQIM
has become quite adept at making a fortune off of kidnappings
across North Africa. While AQIM has long been viewed as
possessing little threat to the U.S. homeland, it has been
emboldened by its increasing numbers and power in the lawless
vacuum of post-rebellion states. We have far too many strategic
interests in the region as we saw with the brazen attack on
U.S. and other workers in an Algerian gas field earlier this
year that left 23 dead. And my sincerest condolences to you and
your family, Mr. Lovelady, on the loss of your brother. Thank
you for being with us today and to share his story and your
family's story.
So how do we combat the growing presence of these extremist
elements? We have got to continue to strengthen the state
institutions of our allies in North Africa. The Libyan and
Tunisian Governments are struggling to rebuild. Libya remains
without a legitimate and functioning police force to stem the
rogue militias operating throughout the country. Libya's oil
production is starting to rebound but there is serious concern
over the management of this oil revenue. Tunisia, an economy
long dependent on tourism, is slowly beginning to attract
foreign investment. A strong economy, and increasing education
and job opportunities for youth makes the allure of fighting
for AQIM less desirable.
But the French intervention in Mali has sparked increasing
violence toward Western targets. An al-Qaeda-affiliated group
launched a suicide attack on a French uranium mine in Niger in
May. And we have got to refocus efforts on border control.
Libya's poorly patrolled southern border is a gateway for
Islamic extremists into Mali and Niger and Chad. And without a
strong national army or a security force, Libya is relying on
various militias to patrol the border. Weapons flow freely from
Sudan into Egypt and into the hands of Hamas and al-Qaeda
affiliates in the Arabian Peninsula.
I am heartened by the announcement in May that Libya, Sudan
and Egypt agreed to work together to develop the border
triangle and to establish free trade zones that would help
improve the economic lives of those living in that area. A lack
of basic infrastructure has stunted economic development in
many areas of the Sahara. U.S. investment in roads and
electrical grids will help shore up these underdeveloped areas.
And with much of our attention focused on Syria, Egypt, and
the threat of Hezbollah and Iran, we cannot allow North Africa
to become a terrorist Wild West. Strong support from the U.S.
and our allies for counterterrorism cooperation through
programs like the Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Partnership,
is an interagency partnership that focuses on improving
individual country and regional capabilities in the Sahel and
Maghreb to defeat terrorist organizations. Focusing on that is
a must. Active cooperation on border control and intelligence
sharing can restrict the movement and diminish the presence of
these terrorist groups.
I appreciate the witnesses being here today and I look
forward to continuing this discussion with all of you. Thank
you Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Poe. Thank the gentleman from Florida. We will now
recognize other members for 1 minute, who have an opening
statement. Mr. Chabot from Ohio, you are recognized for 1
minute.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you Mr. Chairman. I think Libya is an
example of what you get when the United States leads from
behind. And there is a saying that ``nature abhors a vacuum,''
and that is what we had in Libya after this conflict took place
and the United States was leading from behind in the conflict
itself, but then especially after the war was over we now see
jihadists exercising considerable power there. We have seen
four brave Americans killed, and it is just a tragedy and we
all express our sympathy to the Lovelady family. It is a
horrible thing.
Unfortunately, I think we saw the same thing in Iraq where
we saw--you talk about seizing defeat from the jaws of victory,
we basically had the country stabilized, a potential ally.
There was always a plan to leave troops there. We have pulled
troops out. The country is now coming apart at the seams and we
are going to see that repeated in Afghanistan, I am afraid. I
yield back.
Mr. Poe. Thank the gentleman. The Chair will now recognize
Mr. Schneider from Illinois for 1 minute.
Mr. Schneider. Thank you Mr. Chair, and I want to thank the
witnesses for joining us today, and to the Lovelady family,
please accept my sincerest condolences as well.
Following the end of the Ghadafi regime in Libya we have
observed a weak central government which has been relatively
unable to police vast swaths of territory within the country.
This has resulted in a proliferation of militant groups carving
out areas of influence and protection, a situation which does
not generally contribute positively to the goals of the central
government. Personally, I am extremely concerned with the rise
of groups such as Ansar al-Sharia and their growing influence
across the Islamic Maghreb. I am also concerned that portions
of Libya may be used as training grounds for foreign fighters
and a conduit for transporting weapons and equipment for
terrorist organizations not only in North Africa but also
throughout the Middle East.
Mr. Zelin, you mentioned in your prepared remarks that one
of the worst kept secrets locally, but only reported on within
the past month, is the large amount of weapons that Libyans
have sent to Syria via Benghazi and Misrata through Lebanon and
Turkey. I look forward to hearing your thoughts and the
thoughts of the panel on how we can address these potential
regional destabilizing efforts by groups affiliated with al-
Qaeda. Thank you, and I yield back my time.
Mr. Poe. Thank the gentleman. The Chair will now recognize
Mr. Yoho from Florida for 1 minute.
Mr. Yoho. I thank the chairs and ranking members for
holding this hearing today. The fact that we still have not
brought to justice those who attacked us is a travesty.
Terrorists have spilled American blood and we must do
everything we can to bring the perpetrators to justice. As
famously said, ``Justice delayed is justice denied.'' And I
give my regards to Mr. Lovelady and your family on the loss of
your brother and son, and all others who have lost loved ones
in a cowardly attack against the United States and its
citizens. And I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses
today, and I thank you for being here. I yield back.
Mr. Poe. Does any other member wish to make an opening
statement? I will now proceed with the introduction of our four
witnesses and then they will testify. A brief introduction of
each.
Mr. Gartenstein-Ross is a senior fellow at the Foundation
for Defense of Democracies. He studies challenges posed by
violent, non-state actors. He is the author or volume editor of
12 books including ``Bin Laden's Legacy'' and is published
widely in the popular and academic press.
Mr. Aaron Zelin is the Richard Borow fellow at the
Washington Institute for Near East Policy. His research focuses
on how jihadist groups are adjusting to the new political
environment of the Arab uprisings and politics in countries
transitioning into democracy. Mr. Zelin also maintains a Web
site, jihadology.net, which is an archive for jihadi primary
source materials.
Dr. Daniel Byman is a professor in the Security Studies
Program at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service
and a research director at the Saban Center for Middle East
Policy at the Brookings Institution. Dr. Byman has served as a
professional staff member with both the 9/11 Commission and the
joint 9/11 inquiry staff of the House and Senate Intelligence
Committees. He has worked as a research director of the Center
for Middle East Public Policy in the RAND Corporation as an
analyst of the Middle East for the United States intelligence
community.
Mike Lovelady, born in Port Arthur, Texas, that is
southeast Texas, was a firefighter for the City of Nederland
for over 30 years. He has been married for 35 years to his wife
Wanda and has three children, Kevin, Jason and Ashley. His
brother Victor Lovelady--and Victor's widow and wife, Maureen,
is here today--Victor Lovelady was killed by terrorists who
attacked the gas plant where he was working in Algeria in
January of this year.
I want to thank all four of the witnesses for being here.
The Chair would recognize each of you for 5 minutes. Keep your
testimony to 5 minutes or you may get gaveled. And you will
find out what that means if you don't figure it out. So after
each witness testifies then the people on both subcommittees
will ask questions. First, we will hear from Mr. Gartenstein-
Ross for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF MR. DAVEED GARTENSTEIN-ROSS, DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR
THE STUDY OF TERRORIST RADICALIZATION, FOUNDATION FOR DEFENSE
OF DEMOCRACIES
Mr. Gartenstein-Ross. Chairman Poe and Ros-Lehtinen,
Ranking Members Sherman and Deutch, distinguished members of
the subcommittees, it is an honor to appear before you today to
discuss the threat of jihadist terrorism in North Africa.
In my view, the most important facet of understanding the
regional threat is how the Arab uprisings have fundamentally
changed the shape of jihadism. Al-Qaeda and other like-minded
militants possess a defined regional strategy that began to
take shape even as Hosni Mubarak's regime was drawing its very
last breaths. The rough consensus that jihadist strategists
reached about developments produced some simple principles for
action on their part.
These strategists agreed that the political upheaval helped
their movement in several ways. One of the most significant was
that they foresaw unprecedented opportunities to undertake
dawa, or missionary work, to propagate their particularized
version of the Islamic faith. The new and democratically
elected regimes would be less likely to suppress jihadist
groups' dawa efforts so long as they didn't explicitly engage
in violence against the state. And indeed, in this new
environment groups like Ansar al Sharia Tunisia have been quite
effective at expanding both their numbers and influence.
That being said, the jihadist movement, as we all know, has
never been satisfied with constraining itself to nonviolent
advocacy. Some of their post-uprisings' militant activity in
countries like Tunisia and Egypt has taken the form of
vigilante violence aimed at such perceived foes of the movement
as artists, civil society activists, educators, and also
religious minorities. But another aspect of their work has
involved jihad, which these groups understand as warfare
against other competitors for power.
There is currently a mutually reinforcing interaction
between countries in the region in which jihadists are
primarily engaged in dawa, countries like Tunisia and Egypt,
and those where a weak or disintegrating state makes violence
more feasible, in places like Libya or Mali. The fact that
jihadist groups currently engaged in dawa efforts have not
given up on using violence to eventually seize power, makes a
regional approach important to them. Having steep variations in
how these groups relate to violence allows groups like Ansar
al-Sharia Tunisia or Egypt's Salafi jihadist groups to
propagate their ideology, but at the same time to refrain from
the kind of large scale involvement in either violence or
preparations for violence that could trigger a state crackdown.
At the same time, these groups can also take advantage of
regional developments to quietly arm themselves and also
undertake militant training.
So I would like to note how Libya in particular fits into
the broader regional picture, and the fact that Libya's central
government is incredibly weak and the country increasingly
chaotic at this point cannot be denied by any reasonable
observer. Militant groups have taken advantage of this
environment. One way is training, with camps operating in
southern Libya. The impact of these camps can be seen, for
example, in the tragic January attack at the In Amenas gas
complex in Algeria. Some of the attackers reportedly trained in
Libya before undertaking that attack. In addition, they also
used Libyan soil as a staging ground before undertaking that
attack. Al-Qaeda and Emir Ayman Al-Zawahiri has also
established connections to militant camps in Libya, which, for
example, include training for suicide missions.
A second issue is the flow of arms to neighboring
countries, as Chairman Ros-Lehtinen pointed to. Libyan arms
have played a role in the Malian conflict, they played a role
in the In Amenas attack in Algeria, and they have also been
moved across Algeria into Tunisia where they have helped
strengthen Ansar al-Sharia Tunisia. Right now we are also
focused on Egypt, and Libyan arms have poured into Egypt's
North Sinai which has seen over the past few days an escalation
in attacks on security forces following the ouster of Mohamed
Morsi.
A third issue is how Libya can serve as a safe haven.
Following the French intervention in Mali, fighters from Ansar
al-Din and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb made their way into
southwest Libya where they blended with local militant groups.
This is also an important part of the jihadist regional
strategy. Rather than standing and fighting, the militants who
are occupying North Mali melted away. Such a tactic helps to
keep the movement's capabilities alive and prevent significant
attrition.
Overall, the relationship between countries where dawa is
the predominant strategy and countries where violence is
dominant is vital to understanding the threat on a regional
scale. The region should be understood as a whole, and
countries where violence is more feasible can also make
violence more likely in places where dawa is predominant. A
very dangerous game is currently being played in Egypt, and if
that situation escalates look for Libya to be an increasingly
important part of that dynamic.
The jihadist regional strategy overall is coherent. The
U.S. doesn't have to be at the forefront of a response. Over
the past few years we have seen partner nations take the lead
against militant groups and it is sensible for the U.S. to
minimize its expenditure when feasible and wise. But we should
understand that jihadist strategy is designed for the long
term, rather than tricking ourselves into thinking that these
groups will inevitably moderate. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gartenstein-Ross follows:]
----------
Mr. Poe. Thank the gentleman.
Five minutes from Mr. Zelin. Thank you, sir.
STATEMENT OF MR. AARON ZELIN, RICHARD BOROW FELLOW, THE
WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY
Mr. Zelin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Mrs. Chairman, and
members of the two subcommittees for giving me the opportunity
to testify today on the threat emanating from Libya. I will be
summarizing my written testimony.
Currently one can identify three interrelated but unique
threats within Libya. One that is local with Ansar al-Sharia in
Libya, one that is regional with Libyans going to fight in
Syria, and the third is transnational related to al-Qaeda in
the Islamic Maghreb. I will be focusing on the first two since
my colleague Daveed just spoke about AQIM. Before discussing
this it is important to note that Libya has all types of
violence and most is actually not related to jihadi
organizations or those sympathetic to them. A large portion of
it is militia based, a legacy of the revolution against the
Ghadafi regime and related to local economic or political
grievances. This should be kept in mind when contextualizing
jihadi violence within the broader picture of Libya.
Ansar al-Sharia in Libya is an organization that was
established in February 2012, and has steadily grown over time
over the last 1\1/2\ years. We have been able to see this based
off of the two annual conferences they held. At the first one
in June 2012, there were less than 1,000 individuals that were
present, but at the one that occurred 2 weeks ago there were
more than 2,000 individuals.
So what explains this? Dawa, as Daveed mentioned,
missionary work, has been at the forefront of their activities
within Benghazi--cleaning streets, holding lectures, opening up
medical clinics. But their most successful actions have been
their anti-drug campaign within Benghazi, and it has actually
gotten local buy-in from the psych ward in Benghazi, the local
soccer club, the telecommunications company, as well as other
actors there, and it has also allowed them to expand their
operations outside of Benghazi for the first time with one
event and lecture in Tripoli and the capital.
This also highlights a false narrative that was heard in
the media following the attack last year that they were
essentially kicked out of the city. This is not true. They were
just kicked out of the base that they were in, but the members
of the organization stayed within Benghazi, and within a few
days after the attack you actually heard from doctors and
nurses at the hospital that they had been guarding that they
wanted them back there to help out. In addition, we also see a
growth in terms of their connections with some tribesmen in the
southern city of Ubari, as well as the fact that they opened up
a second branch of the organization just 1 week ago in the city
of Sirte.
On a regional level we see Libyans going over in droves to
Syria right now to fight against the Assad regime, and Libyan
nationals are actually the largest number of foreign nationals
fighting in Syria against the regime as well as the largest
number of foreign nationals who have died. And the worry is,
what happens when they go home? Is it going to be a repeat of
what we saw in the 1980s in the anti-Soviet jihad in
Afghanistan when you saw Libyans going home and then going to
fight against the government there?
The difference now though is, unlike in the 1990s, the
central government is very weak. We could see this with the
different militia groups being able to blackmail the central
government in terms of legislation, in terms of individuals in
different ministries. Additionally, even though there have been
attempts to integrate militias into the police force and
military, because of the way Ghadafi ruled, we saw there are
potential issues because of regionalism and localism there. So
let us say you have somebody from Zintan trying to do police
work in Dharna. There might be potential issues there because
of this sort of localized xenophobia in some respects.
So what can the United States and its allies do? I think
one of the things is we can't just be holed up in Embassies and
staying in the capital. We need to have individuals go out to
the cities, get in touch with the local businessmen, the local
civil society actors, as well as even the local militiamen to
better understand the mosaic in these local communities.
Another area where the United States can help out is promoting
entrepreneurship. This is what America does best and it is also
a way to combat against the community organizing that groups
like Ansar al-Sharia in Libya do, since we should be using
globalization to our advantage just as they do.
A third aspect is that we should continue our robust
intelligence gathering with our local and regional allies as
well as our allies in Western Europe who are a lot closer to
this. And finally, I think one of the things that should be on
the table as long as it is okay with the Libyan Government is
that we should think about potentially using drones in southern
Libya on the training camps of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.
This of course could be controversial just because of the
debate on drones, but I think it is important. But I would
advise against using it in the northeast and west of the
country where there are larger population centers. But using it
in the south could be legitimate since it is sparsely
populated, so collateral damage could potentially be low, and
the fact that that is where AQIM is hosting its training camps.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Zelin follows:]
----------
Mr. Poe. Dr. Byman, I recognize you for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF DANIEL L. BYMAN, PH.D., PROFESSOR, SECURITY
STUDIES PROGRAM, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY
Mr. Byman. Chairman Poe, Chairman Ros-Lehtinen and Ranking
Members Sherman and Deutch, distinguished members of the
subcommittees, thank you for this opportunity to testify today.
I am humbled to be here on the panel with Michael Lovelady.
Please know that my thoughts go out to him, his family, and the
other relatives of those Americans who have died in Algeria and
from other terrorist attacks.
There is a bit of good news, which is that the al-Qaeda
core is weaker, in part, due to the American drone campaign.
But the bad news is that affiliate groups like al-Qaeda in the
Islamic Maghreb or groups or individuals that have no formal
relationship with al-Qaeda but share many of its goals are
filling the void. They are taking advantage of greater state
weakness in the Middle East which is likely to increase in the
years to come.
We have seen terrorism spread to new areas since the Arab
Spring, and several African countries have also become more
dangerous. In recent weeks, Egypt has become markedly less
stable so similar plots in chaotic areas are likely to be in
our future. The only strong regime in the North Africa region
is Algeria, and the United States has at best a lukewarm
relationship with the Algerian Government.
Algerians are at the core of AQIM, and the Algerian
Government runs the most extensive spying network in the
region. So we must look to Algeria to get at both the problem
and the solution. However, the Algerian Government has a
history of manipulating opposition groups including violent
terrorist groups, making it difficult to trust the information
it provides. I believe that the U.S. reaction to the Benghazi
attack may leave us less prepared for terrorism in the future.
During my time as a staff member of the 9/11 Commission and
for the House and Senate joint committee investigating 9/11, we
consistently pushed for a CIA and a State Department that were
more expeditionary and willing to take risks. In short, we
wanted more people with the courage, experience, skill and
mindset of Ambassador Stevens. His loss was a great tragedy for
our country. Unfortunately, the political and bureaucratic
lesson of Benghazi is clear. Avoid taking risks at all costs.
American diplomats will be more confined to well-guarded
parts of capital cities and more removed from local
populations. This will keep them safer, but U.S. intelligence
is likely to decline and U.S. statecraft to diminish. Better
intelligence and good relations are important for keeping
Americans safe in different parts of the world and in the U.S.
homeland. It is impossible to quantify the benefits derived,
but better intelligence allows numerous plots to be disrupted
and better relations reduce hostility to the United States and
improve cooperation when trying to disrupt attacks or manage
their consequences. Trying to improve intelligence and
relations, however, will put those Americans charged with
gathering intelligence and those State Department officials
charged with improving relations at more risk.
The United States should bolster not draw down its presence
in North Africa. America has important interests in the region,
and in any case the threats will not disappear simply because
the United States chooses to ignore them. Jihadists may point
to any U.S. retreat after Benghazi as proof of U.S. cowardice.
The region is now a growing arena for jihadists and the size of
their area is growing. In addition, jihadists from the region
as well as weapons from Libya are showing up in places like
Syria and Sinai, and here I commend a recent report authored by
my colleague here, Mr. Zelin.
In short, the region's problems are no longer regional. We
should seek to understand and engage regional governments to
counter the threats that emanate from North Africa. To this end
we need a robust intelligence and diplomatic presence even in
dangerous countries or ones that suffer from governments that
reject democratic practices. Because the operating environment
is risky, the United States should augment and systematize its
rapid response capabilities and post-attack procedures. The
United States must also work more with allies like France to
prepare for contingencies. In addition, U.S. bureaucracies
should adopt a more regional response to the terrorism threat.
Unfortunately, U.S. bureaucracies still face difficulty working
in a regional way.
Finally, it is particularly important to hedge as we expand
ties to undemocratic regimes. This involves expanding the range
of American contacts across government and society and trying
to find alternative solutions to dependence on troubling
countries like Algeria. Such hedging allows the United States
to protect its interests yet make clear to regime figures that
the United States is not completely dependent on them. This
both makes U.S. pressure more credible and leaves the United
States in a better position to deal with the aftermath of
revolution. Thank you again for this opportunity to present my
views.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Byman follows:]
----------
Mr. Poe. Mr. Lovelady for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF MR. MIKE LOVELADY, BROTHER OF ALGERIAN GAS PLANT
TERRORIST ATTACK VICTIM, VICTOR LOVELADY
Mr. Lovelady. Good morning.
Thank you, Mr. Poe, for the opportunity, and the rest of
the committee members, to come testify on behalf of my brother.
I have just got a story I put together on how this went down,
and I think it would be very, very helpful for you to
understand the hurt that my family feels.
On the morning of January 16, 2013, at approximately 3:30
a.m., my home phone rang. As usual, a call at this time in the
morning does not bring good news. When my wife answered the
phone, a strange voice asked, who is speaking? When my wife
refused to give her name she heard Victor state, ``Wanda, I am
in trouble. I need Mike.''
When I answered the phone Victor stated, ``I am in trouble.
I have been captured by al-Qaeda and we are tied up.'' Then
Victor asked me to tell his wife Maureen about his situation in
person, because he did not want her to be alone when she got
the news about him. Victor then said, ``You will know what to
do.'' I told him that I would notify his wife, contact the FBI
and the U.S. State Department. I attempted to ask questions
about his situation, but he stated that the captors were next
to him and he could not answer any questions. Then we told each
other bye. That was the last I have ever heard from my brother.
Victor was only 57 years old and my only sibling.
Victor and I grew up in Nederland, Texas, with wonderful
parents that raised us with traditional and solid values that
would help us throughout our lives. We were the type of family
that did everything together such as going to the beach or the
lake. As we grew up and went in different career paths we did
not get to see each other as much as I would have liked.
However, we still talked on the phone a lot. I always
considered Victor the genius of the family. I admired his
ingenuity and I was in awe of his knowledge about electricity
and electronics.
Victor had two degrees from Lamar University in Beaumont,
Texas. His Bachelor of Science was in Industrial Engineering
and his Associates Degree was in Electricity and Electronics.
Victor was a great brother, husband and father. Victor, married
to his wife Maureen for 33 years, he had two children he loved
so much. Erin, 28, and Grant, 21 years old.
At this time I would like to introduce Victor's wife
Maureen, his son Grant, and my family. Wanda is my wife, and my
children, Kevin, Jason and Ashley. His daughter Erin would have
liked to have been here today. She had to have emergency back
surgery over this past Saturday.
Victor had a heart of gold and would do anything for
anyone, especially the elderly. He was a kind and gentle man.
Victor was an industrial engineer by trade and designed system
buildings to control industry operations. He was also a master
electrician and could almost do anything. Most of Victor's life
was spent in Nederland, only recently moving to Houston after
his children graduated from Nederland High School.
When work in our area slowed down, Victor traveled back and
forth to Houston, 170-mile round trip, for about 3 years so his
children could graduate from Nederland High School. His son
Grant was a star football player and his daughter Erin was
assistant softball coach at Nederland High School. Victor never
had a pension plan and always had to pay his family's insurance
with no input from the company he worked for. He never had more
than 2 weeks off in a year. However, he longed to be able to
retire and spend more time with his wife and children while he
was still a relatively young man.
When the opportunity came up for Victor to go to work
overseas, Victor weighed the pros and the cons. He was told
that he could only work overseas until he was 60 years old. He
knew that if he could do this job for 3 years he would be able
to make enough money to retire and be with his family. He was
assured that it was a safe place to work. He told his family
and me that he would be safe. He said the plant was in the
middle of the desert and no one would go there.
After speaking with my brother, I called the State
Department's Washington number to see if they could provide me
with more information about his situation. After explaining it
to them that I just received a call from Victor, they said they
would look into the matter and call me back. The State
Department called me back later that morning to confirm that
there was an attack on the plant. I continued to receive
regular calls from both the State Department and the FBI after
that. They kept us well informed of Victor's situation on a
daily basis and were very respectful. In addition to that we
were visited by agents from New York, Beaumont, and the New
York City offices.
On January the 19th, the FBI came to a family member's
house where we had gathered and told us that Victor had died on
January 17th. On January 21st at 3 o'clock a.m., the State
Department and the FBI called again asking if there was any
identifying marks that could be used to identify Victor. I told
them that Victor had a tattoo of a lightning bolt on his upper
left arm. A half hour later they called me back and confirmed
that they had positively identified his body.
About 2 months later, in March, we got more details of
Victor's death. The FBI's Special Agent Jessica Ulmer informed
us that Victor was killed as the hostages were being moved from
one side of the compound to the other and the Algerian forces
had launched a raid. I don't know if the Algerian forces took
out the cars or the terrorists blew up the vehicles, but
Victor's cause of death was listed as blast injuries. Agent
Ulmer has kept in contact with me over the last few months
regarding Victor's personal effects that we hope to recover.
Jessica is a compassionate agent that works hard to complete a
task such as this investigation, and truly understands the
feeling of our family regarding our loss.
I personally want to thank Congressman Ted Poe and his
staff for their care and diligence on having Victor's personal
effects returned from Algeria. Congressman Poe never forgot our
family and continues to seek justice for the people that lost
their lives on that fateful day. Congressman Poe is a true
patriot and he makes me proud to be from Texas. I also want to
thank Congressman Randy Weber for making sure our every need
was met throughout this entire ordeal.
Finally, on behalf of the Lovelady, Buttaccio and Rowan
families, I want to thank Congressman Poe, Congressman Weber,
and all the House Committee on Foreign Affairs members for
continuing to fight terrorism and keeping Americans safe and at
home. Thank you for your time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Lovelady follows:]
----------
Mr. Poe. Thank you Mr. Lovelady.
And once again on behalf of both of the committees that are
here, I want to extend our sympathy to you, Maureen, and the
families of Victor.
I will now recognize myself for 5 minutes for questions and
then we will proceed through each committee member. I am going
to ask, start with the basics regarding both Benghazi and the
attack in Algeria. Did we know before the attack in Benghazi,
did we know before the attack in Algeria that it was going to
occur? After the attacks are over with, do we know who
committed the attack in Benghazi and Algeria? If we do know,
where are those people that committed those attacks?
So those are three questions, and I will throw that out to
all of the committee members. Mr. Byman, do you want to start
first?
Mr. Byman. Thank you Mr. Chairman. I should stress that my
knowledge of this comes from unclassified sources and I am sure
that much of value is in the classified realm. My
understanding, certainly, of the Benghazi attack was that it
was widely known that it was a very dangerous threat
environment before the attack. In terms of the specifics of the
plot, to my knowledge, that was not anticipated by the U.S.
Government from almost everything I have seen including the
reported actions of Ambassador Stevens.
In Algeria, I believe it slightly differently. Algeria,
including the energy sector, had historically been a relatively
safe area. Now we need some real caveats when we say that
because Algeria itself has had huge terrorism problems
especially in the 1990s. Another thing to remark on is
Algeria's role, albeit limited, in supporting the French effort
in Mali.
Mr. Poe. Excuse me, Dr. Byman. Can you cut to the chase?
Did we know about the attack in Algeria before it occurred? I
am talking about the United States. And the second question is,
do we know who committed it, and if so, have those people been
apprehended? That is the three questions regarding both places,
since the time is limited.
Mr. Byman. I would say, in Algeria, sir, that we knew there
was a dangerous threat environment but again did not anticipate
the attack. Afterwards we know some of the individuals
involved, to my knowledge, but I don't believe we know all of
them. There is still some uncertainty. And to my knowledge they
have not been apprehended.
Mr. Poe. Mr. Zelin, do you want to weigh in on those three
questions?
Mr. Zelin. Sure. In both cases I am unsure that the U.S.
Government was aware that they were going to occur at that
specific time. In terms of who did what in Benghazi, there was
a statement put out by Ansar al-Sharia in Libya within about 12
hours of the attack saying that they themselves did not order
anything, but the way it was worded suggested that members of
the group were involved. So it could have been some type of
freelancing.
And then in terms of the In Amenas attack, Mokhtar
Belmokhtar's group claimed responsibility for it and it is
believed that some of the members in his group with him were a
part of it. And currently it is believed that Mokhtar
Belmokhtar is either in northern Niger or in southern Libya,
but this is unsure, and then the members of Ansar al-Sharia are
still in Benghazi.
Mr. Poe. So has anybody in either attack been apprehended,
to your knowledge?
Mr. Zelin. I am not aware of that. And in the case of
Mokhtar Belmokhtar we have seen that he has conducted other
operations in northern Niger a couple of months ago, or maybe a
month ago.
Mr. Poe. Mr. Gartenstein?
Mr. Gartenstein-Ross. So as to preserve your time, Mr.
Chairman, I don't have anything to add to my colleagues. I
agree with them.
Mr. Poe. You made a comment, Dr. Byman, that kind of
irritated me in that you said that the terrorists in North
Africa look at the United States' policies since both of these
actions, Algeria, and then first, Benghazi, as a retreat from
the area, and that the United States, if I got your comments
correctly, has cowardice regarding this issue. So that
irritates me. Do you want to explain that word ``cowardice''
and what you mean by that?
Mr. Byman. Mr. Chairman, I apologize for irritating you.
Mr. Poe. Oh, it is okay. It is not the first time.
Mr. Byman. It is the first time I have done it, I hope.
Sir, in the past, Bin Laden would point specifically to the
bombing of the Marine barracks in Lebanon and also to Somalia
as proof that if you hit the United States hard it will leave a
country. In Benghazi in particular, my fear is that if what
happened in Benghazi leads to a drawdown of the broader U.S.
diplomatic and intelligence presence in North Africa, that 5
years from now, 10 years from now we will be hearing Benghazi
added to this list. And it is a way of encouraging his
followers, sir, that he says that. Hit the United States and
they run. I hope that is not so, sir.
Mr. Poe. My last question to all of you, do any of you know
whether it is true or not that regarding Algeria, the United
States had forces in the general area before the attack and
right after the attack?
Mr. Gartenstein-Ross. I have no knowledge of that sir.
Mr. Poe. Mr. Zelin?
Mr. Zelin. Neither do I.
Mr. Poe. Dr. Byman?
Mr. Byman. Nor I, sir.
Mr. Poe. And lastly, Mr. Lovelady, do you have any other
thing that your brother told you that you haven't already told
us, before he was killed in the plant in Algeria?
Mr. Lovelady. No, sir, I don't. I just, pretty much I spoke
with him very little, and the information I have got was from
the FBI on how he died and what was happening when he died.
Mr. Poe. And he told you he was already captured by what
group or what----
Mr. Lovelady. He told me he was captured by al-Qaeda.
Mr. Poe. All right. Thank you very much. Five minutes for
the ranking member. Mr. Sherman?
Mr. Sherman. Mr. Lovelady, thank you for your testimony,
and I would like to thank your entire family for being here to
put a human face on what we are talking about. There are those
who blame America any time anything bad happens anywhere in the
world. That we are the world hegemon and that therefore
anything bad that happens is a sign of American weakness or
American error.
The fact of the matter is, with some crises we need to
watch and not get involved, with some we need to influence and
put only some of our prestige, money, and in some cases,
troops, on the line. And only in a very few cases do we need to
actually be sure to control the outcome and assume ownership of
the crisis and make a full commitment. We should not retreat
from all involvement in the world, nor should we try to take
responsibility for the outcome of any crisis. The phrase ``lead
from behind'' has been disparaged and as a turn of phrase it
deserves to be disparaged, but as a concept, that is to say, be
involved but not necessarily take the leadership role, it has
to play a role in American foreign policy.
In Niger we helped France but France took the lead. Would
we have had it any other way? Is there anyone in this room that
wants American troops in Niger? And in Libya it was a
combination of the United States, NATO and the rebels on the
ground that overthrew Ghadafi. We did not put our troops on the
ground or try to control the outcome. We got an outcome that
was far from perfect. Would we have preferred to see American
troops dominate Libya? There is also the Pottery Barn rule put
forward by Colin Powell that says if we do get involved we have
to take ownership and we are responsible for rebuilding. I will
point out that history proves that wrong.
In World War I we played a critical role in breaking the
German, Austro-Hungarian, and Ottoman empires. No one in
America dreamed that we had the responsibility to rebuild or
that we owned that which had been broken. And while some of our
more imperialist friends who were with us in World War I took
advantage of opportunities, no one asserted that they had the
obligation to rebuild every society that was destroyed. We have
a right to defend ourselves without assuming the obligation to
make sure that every country that harbors terrorists ends up as
prosperous and as democratic as our World War II adversaries.
And we have to be humble enough to realize that sometimes we
will influence but not control.
Now I would like to turn our attention to Morocco, which is
one area we haven't focused on yet. I am concerned that the
AQIM, the al-Qaeda and Islamic Maghreb, has reportedly
established ties with the Polisario militants in Algeria.
Algeria provides material support and land for the Polisario,
and some of the members seem to have been involved in the
terrorist operations in northern Mali. I don't know which of
our experts to ask, but what are the links between AQIM and the
Polisario? What are we doing to disrupt those links, and what
should we be doing to help allies like Morocco deal with AQIM-
aided organizations?
Mr. Zelin. Based off of what I know in the open source
reporting, it appears that there is a lot of rumors related to
potential connections but there is no hard evidence as of now,
at least based off the open source reporting. And in terms of
any connections at all, I would assume that our allies in
Morocco would help out in arresting individuals as the
Moroccans have in other cases where there have been different
terrorist cells within Morocco that we have seen over the past
10 years.
Mr. Sherman. Well, the Polisario is being sheltered by
Algeria. What should we do there?
Mr. Zelin. I don't really focus on Algeria that much in
terms of my research, so I don't know the nature of what the
United States' relation is there, but I assume that the United
States can speak with Algeria. But we also have to understand
in this context that there is a rivalry between Morocco and
Algeria and we can't necessarily influence it that much.
Mr. Sherman. I am going to try to sneak in one more
question. Is Libya--we turned over tens of billions of dollars
of Ghadafi's reserves to the Libyan Government. Is that money
being used to establish security on the ground, is it being
hoarded, or is it being stolen? Anybody have a one-word answer?
Mr. Byman. I would say primarily hoarded and stolen, but a
portion of it is being used to try to develop some governance,
but not enough, sir.
Mr. Sherman. I yield back.
Mr. Poe. Thank the gentleman. Chair recognizes the chairman
of the Middle East and North Africa Subcommittee, Ms. Ros-
Lehtinen from Florida. Five minutes.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you Judge Poe. The threat of
radical Islamists as we all know is not a new phenomenon, and
we know that the problem is not just localized in one country.
It is spread across an entire region. Radical Islamic militants
are opportunists. They seek out areas of weak governance to
establish bases of operation, and from there they go out and
wage war against anyone who doesn't comport to their
interpretation of Islam.
And since the Arab Spring we have seen this opportunistic
wave of Islamic militants move across the region from Libya to
Tunisia to Algeria to Mali and beyond. And now we are seeing
thousands of radical Islamists and al-Qaeda-linked terrorists
flocking to Syria to join the fight there. If and when Assad
falls and the Islamists manage to control Syria, what further
implications would that have for the rest of the region, and
what can the U.S. do to prevent an even further spread of this
Islamist wave?
And when looking at the administration's policy when it
comes to this region, it is difficult to define any clear or
decisive agenda. In order to tackle this problem it is
imperative that we support our African partners' efforts to
disrupt the operations of terrorist networks, deny safe havens
to extremist groups, prevent an escalation of emerging threats
through greater mutual cooperation and constant vigilance.
So Dr. Byman, I would like to ask you, in your testimony
you state that North Africa and the Sahel tend to be separate
bureaucratically even though many of their problems are linked.
How effective can programs like the Trans-Saharan
Counterterrorism Partnership be in bolstering our partners in
the region and fighting these threats, if funded and run
properly, and what governments, whether it is local or
national, can the United States work with in this region? Where
have we seen any host nation buy in on these issues?
And Mr. Zelin, yesterday the British Defense Ministry
announced that it would train up to 2,000 Libyan troops which
is part of a broader package of defense and security assistance
developed with the U.S., with France, and Italy. In your
testimony you state that the U.S. should work with regional and
Western European allies. Will this help stabilize the
deteriorating situation in Libya? Should the U.S. do more to
help the Libyan Government?
Dr. Byman?
Mr. Byman. The regional versus state-focused issue is a
very difficult one for any bureaucracy. Almost any approach you
take is going to have problems one way or another. But when you
do something cross-regional, having state-focused bureaucracies
makes it far more difficult. Each Ambassador is going to have
his or her own little fiefdom that is operated in a different
way. You are going to have analysts not talk to one another.
You are going to have programs that are implemented in
different ways. And unfortunately, at times, the bad guys are
more regional than we are.
Mr. Zelin. I think that the steps that the U.K. is taking
with training Libyan troops is a great idea. I think it should
be done in addition to whatever else the United States is doing
and our allies in Western Europe. But as I mentioned, I think
we have to be careful also about the regionalism that we do see
in Libya and the potential strife that could happen if you have
individuals from different parts of the country trying to
secure other parts. So that is something to think about as
well.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
Mr. Gartenstein-Ross?
Mr. Gartenstein-Ross. I will speak to the initial point
that you made about Syria. I think that at the end of the day
jihadists will not control Syria, but they will control enough
territory and have enough influence that it is going to create
a lot of problems within the region. I would specifically look
at the interplay between Syria and the developing situation in
both Egypt and also Iraq. In terms of what we can do, I think
there are three things that we can do right now. One is I do
support engagement with Syrian factions in order to both map
the factions and also to gain influence with whomever ends up
being the eventual winner.
But I think it is extremely important, and you already
pointed to the dangers of arming Syrian factions, there has
been some talk of sending them anti-tank weapons or anti-
aircraft weaponry. I think especially given that groups like
Jabhat al-Nusra, which are linked to al-Qaeda, have not been
shunned by other Syrian factions and also that we can't control
the flow of this weaponry, we absolutely should not undertake
it in that it will be used against the United States or else
our allies.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much. Thank you Mr. Poe.
And our deepest condolences to the entire Lovelady family.
Thank you.
Mr. Poe. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida,
the ranking member of the Middle East and Africa Subcommittee,
Mr. Deutch.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you Mr. Chairman. I have some questions
for the panel, but first, Mr. Lovelady, there are a lot of
discussions that take place here that are, suffice it to say,
dry, sometimes uninteresting to people who happen to pay
attention to what we do. There are not enough opportunities for
the members of this committee, and I would suggest not enough
opportunities, I think, unfortunately too often for the
American people to be reminded of why what we do here really
matters so much. And your being here today with your wife Wanda
and your kids, and Maureen, your being here with Grant really
does remind us of that.
When your brother was killed in the middle, as you put it,
in the middle of the desert in Algeria, this matters to us and
this matters to this country. And the battle that we have
against terror and our fight against terrorists in what for
many is seen as some remote part of the world, is all the more
important when we are reminded of the impact that this has on
peoples' lives here in this country. So we do offer our
condolences, but I also want to offer our profound thanks.
It is not, I am quite certain, it is not something that you
ever thought that you would do to come to testify at the United
States House of Representatives. It means a lot to us. I
appreciate you being here. And to your family and Maureen and
Grant, thank you very much for being here. I know that we have
taken something significant from your presence here, and if you
would pass our condolences to Erin, I hope her surgery went
well also.
Now Dr. Byman, if you could speak to your assessment of al-
Qaeda in the Maghreb and specifically chain of command issues,
cooperation, how structured is it, or are we just talking about
hundreds of offshoot extremist groups that are loosely
affiliated with these principles?
Mr. Byman. It is an organization that is less structured
than the other al-Qaeda affiliates. There are a few main
branchings but a lot of divisions within, and then divisions
within the divisions.
Mr. Deutch. And you focused on Nigeria in your testimony,
Dr. Byman. How do we encourage Morocco and Algeria as North
Africa's two most stable countries, to not only work together
on greater intelligence, but how do we encourage them to take
the lead on these issues?
Mr. Byman. The good news is Morocco is already a very close
American partner on counterterrorism issues. Algeria is
extremely tricky. There is a history of suspicion and it is
really an intelligence-led regime in a very nasty way. This
requires, to me, a much greater awareness on the U.S. part of
the different players in Algeria. U.S. efforts to cultivate
different parts of the regime especially as a transition is
possible there. Regular pressure, and also high level pressure.
But all that said, much of that will only get us so far and we
may have to live with what is going to be a very uneasy
relationship.
Mr. Deutch. And Mr. Zelin, should the United States be
providing greater training on counterterrorism border control?
The French had offered to send 100 military trainers to help
the Libyans. Should the U.S. be more involved in that as well?
Mr. Zelin. Yes, I think so. I think the U.S., France, the
U.K. and some of our other allies who have been dealing with
some of these issues over the past decade or so, have a lot of
experience in how to deal with some of these problems in
different countries. And the fact that especially the French,
they have historic connections with North Africa and the Sahel
region, so they have a good cultural understanding in a lot of
the different players in the region too so they can maybe help
take a lead in this, but we can also augment it based off of
our own expertise in these types of trainings.
Mr. Deutch. I appreciate it. And Mr. Chairman, before I
yield back, Michael, I think I inadvertently confused your and
Victor's names. Let me clarify that again we are moved by your
presence here, and to you and the family thank you very much.
And I yield back.
Mr. Poe. Thank the gentleman from Florida. The Chair will
recognize the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Weber, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Weber. Thank you Mr. Chairman, I appreciate that.
Loveladys, thank you all for being here. We appreciate you
guys. Dr. Byman, I think it was you who said maybe Algeria had
the best spy network. Was that you?
Mr. Byman. Yes, it was, sir.
Mr. Weber. Could you elaborate on that?
Mr. Byman. The Algerian State has been an intelligence and
military state for several decades now. And because they faced
a massive civil war and Islamist uprising in the 1990s, they
had to develop very good sources and networks simply to
survive. And so since many of the groups they were fighting, or
individuals, were regional, their networks became regional. And
also I will say, in a very nasty way they were trained by the
Soviets, and the Soviet approach in order to defeat the
opposition you become the opposition. So they brought a lot of
groups under the government's banner, directly or indirectly,
and as a result were able to manipulate and control them, and
gave them extensive intelligence and influence over the
opposition but also implicated the government in several of the
jihadists' worst attacks as well.
Mr. Weber. So would you say that extends to al-Qaeda and
the jihadists and forces outside of Algeria that they would
have extensive knowledge about those groups?
Mr. Byman. Yes, I would.
Mr. Weber. Is it safe to say then, in your opinion that
perhaps they might have had information about this attack
before it occurred on the BP plant in Algeria?
Mr. Byman. I believe the answer is no. The attack on the
Algerian plant was quite bad for the Algerian Government in the
sense of its most important resource and its reputation. So I
think they would have tried to stop that had they known about
it.
Mr. Weber. So you have obviously been involved and you have
been studying this group for a while, this country, so it is
your opinion that had they known then they would have taken the
necessary steps to stop it, or would they have notified us?
Mr. Byman. I believe they would have taken the necessary
steps to stop it, and there is a good chance they would not
have notified us because they prefer to keep many of these
things secret.
Mr. Weber. You don't think they would have enlisted our aid
or notified BP? They would have just intervened militarily to
stop the attack itself?
Mr. Byman. I think that they believe they could handle it
themselves. They believe they have handled worst in the past
and that they don't need superpower support.
Mr. Weber. So they would have been willing to spill blood
to protect American, well, foreign workers on their soil?
Mr. Byman. I think they would phrase it as, we are willing
to spill blood to kill terrorists who are going after Algeria's
natural resources. The presence of foreigners I don't think
mattered terribly to them.
Mr. Weber. Okay. Don't turn your mic off. I am not done
with you. I think you also named the gentleman that may have
instrumental in this, Ayman al-Zawahiri?
Mr. Byman. The al-Qaeda leader. Yes, sir.
Mr. Weber. Okay. And we know where he is. We have seen him
at different places, put it that way.
Mr. Byman. Sir, Ayman al-Zawahiri is the al-Qaeda leader in
Pakistan who----
Mr. Weber. Okay.
Mr. Byman. I don't think we know where he is.
Mr. Weber. Okay. Is it your professional opinion, since you
study this stuff and keep up with it, maybe we ought to assign
one drone to him?
Mr. Byman. I think right now, sir, there are many drones
with his name on it. I just don't think we can find him.
Mr. Weber. Okay. Were you the one in earlier testimony that
mentioned the use of drones, or was that----
Mr. Byman. That was me, sir.
Mr. Weber. Okay. Do you think if the--so you are saying
that you don't believe that the Algerian Government saw this
coming. So in essence, does that sort of vindicate our own
State Department in not only Algeria but in Benghazi that maybe
they couldn't have seen it coming, or do you think the State
Department should have seen the attack in Benghazi coming?
Mr. Byman. I would say that they should have known it was a
much higher risk environment than what they prepared for. I
think anticipating any specific attack is going to be
exceptionally difficult, but I think that the risk environment
was treated as lower than they should have treated it.
Mr. Weber. Would you compare that to other areas that we
have Embassies in, for example, Syria, or any of the other
Middle Eastern states, where would you have put Benghazi on
that list?
Mr. Byman. I would say, well, near the top in terms of
danger, sir.
Mr. Weber. So when there was a request for more security
then that should have been heeded very seriously.
Mr. Byman. Absolutely.
Mr. Weber. Okay. Is there a way, to your knowledge--and I
agree with my colleague Mr. Poe when he says what has been
done. Is there a way for us to track the movement of these
terrorists short of just a satellite assigned to them?
Mr. Byman. Part of it depends on cultivating local sources.
Part of it is identifying their communications methods. That is
often the best way. And so what you want is a mix of methods.
Often the local governments have the best information, and that
may be the Government of Algeria, or in some cases it may be
sub-state groups and you want to work with them as well.
Mr. Weber. Okay, I am out of time. Thank you Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Poe. Thank the gentleman. Just a point of clarification
there, Dr. Byman. Is it Algeria's policy when it comes to
terrorists just to go in with guns blazing? I mean is that
really their policy?
Mr. Byman. They do a variety of things. They will try to
arrest and disrupt in advance. They will try at times to co-opt
people they can co-opt. They at times bribe them to go in
different directions. And at times they have killed them in
large numbers. So it is a mixer.
Mr. Poe. Thank you. The Chair will recognize my good friend
and chief irritant from Virginia, Mr. Connolly, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you. Just a paid advertisement before
my time gets started, Mr. Chairman. Ted Poe and I both believe
it is time for transparency in the Supreme Court. We want
cameras in the Supreme Court. So I thank the judge for his
passion on that subject.
And Mr. Lovelady, let me add my voice of sympathy to you
and your family for your loss. It is a terrible thing.
Dr. Byman, in listening to your answers to questions put to
you, I assume one could conclude that this whole region of
North Africa is maybe inherently unstable or certainly less
secure than some other parts of the world one might want to
visit.
Mr. Byman. I think that is a safe assumption, sir.
Mr. Connolly. There are active insurgencies throughout the
region?
Mr. Byman. Yes, sir.
Mr. Connolly. There are armed militias throughout the
region?
Mr. Byman. Yes, sir.
Mr. Connolly. There are jihadists throughout the region?
Mr. Byman. Yes, sir.
Mr. Connolly. There are al-Qaeda elements throughout the
region?
Mr. Byman. I would say there are al-Qaeda sympathizers and
like-minded groups throughout the region.
Mr. Connolly. Right. And then there are just, what the
heck, why not put on a bandolier and enjoy terrorism or
insurgency or there could be local grievances that fuel local
indigenous militias and insurgencies as well?
Mr. Byman. Yes, sir.
Mr. Connolly. And then there are independence fighters like
Polisario who have been fighting for a long time for what was
formally Spanish Morocco, is that correct?
Mr. Byman. It is a long list, sir, yes. Yes, sir.
Mr. Connolly. So given all of that and given limitations of
our intelligence and intelligence sharing, you cited Algeria as
an example, should the United States withdraw or retreat?
Should we close Embassies and consulates throughout the region?
Mr. Byman. My view is a strong no.
Mr. Connolly. Why?
Mr. Byman. The United States has interests in North Africa,
and also as my colleagues have testified what is happening in
North Africa is not staying in North Africa. So we have to deal
with it one way or another. It is not something we can simply
turn our back on.
Mr. Connolly. So we knowingly want to stay engaged and we
want to minimize risks and try to understand it but we can't
eliminate it. Is that what you are saying?
Mr. Byman. Yes, sir.
Mr. Connolly. And therefore sometimes we understand that
diplomacy can be dangerous when you go into areas of
instability or insecurity.
Mr. Byman. Many diplomats I know, sir, very much believe
that part of their job is to take on such risks.
Mr. Connolly. Mr. Gartenstein-Ross, I was intrigued by your
fairly definitive answer about arming rebels in Syria, and I
wanted to spend a little bit of time with you on that. Because
the concern I have is, I don't know, do the good guys wear
white hats and the bad guys wear black hats? We just go right
in and say, you we will arm and you we won't? Is that how it
works?
Mr. Gartenstein-Ross. Well, I think that as you said, it is
not as though the bad guys are wearing black. It is difficult
to distinguish between the factions. There is a lot of mobility
between them. That is why providing arms that would be a great
danger to the U.S. or our allies is such a very dangerous game.
Mr. Connolly. Do you believe that the United States
therefore should not be arming any of the insurgents, any of
the rebels, in Syria?
Mr. Gartenstein-Ross. I am very skeptical of arming them in
any way. But the administration has said that that is their
intention. Thus I think that preventing arms that could be of
most danger such as anti-tank weapons, anti-aircraft weapons is
the thing that I would focus on. But yes, I am skeptical of the
entire endeavor.
Mr. Connolly. You made another point about that which is in
an odd way arms are fungible. The fact that you give arms to
somebody you have certified as a good guy does not mean he
doesn't turn around and sell it, or the arms are stolen or just
meander over time into the hands we would rather they not be.
Is that correct?
Mr. Gartenstein-Ross. Absolutely. And also in many ways the
good guys and bad guys there, to use kind of a colloquial way
to refer to them, are in many ways brothers-in-arms. Look at
when the U.S. designated Jabhat al-Nusra for its linkages to
al-Qaeda. All of the factions in Syria were outraged that we
did so. There was no faction that came in and said, oh, it is a
great thing that they were designated. Instead the designation
was extremely controversial across the board.
Mr. Connolly. One of the concerns I have--and I would ask
you and Mr. Byman to address this in what little time I have
remaining. But that is, what worries me always about our plans,
I mean what is Plan B? What happens next? So Ghadafi goes,
Mubarak goes. Now what? And it is my view that we have actually
limited leverage in shaping outcomes. And by the way I will
just throw it in here. I was in Libya and Egypt last year,
post-revolution both countries. I actually was more hopeful for
Libya than I was for Egypt and I remain so. Your comment on
that in the little time we have got left.
Mr. Gartenstein-Ross. Sir, I very much agree with where you
are coming from, and would say in addition to that we should
also be thinking about what our strategic interests are. For me
particularly when we went into Libya, it wasn't clear what
strategic interest was being served. It served to hasten events
in the region which we already did not have a good handle on in
terms of the effect on Islamic militancy. And I think as a
result, if you look at the intervention in Libya it actually
made that particular problem set deeper. I don't think we put a
lot of thought into that, and likewise in Syria given how
confusing the situation is, I think there is a great deal of
danger and a lot of great potential for second order
consequences that we will regret.
Mr. Byman. I tend to have a slightly different view on
this. I am pessimistic we can shape what is going to happen in
Syria now through a program of arming the rebels, but I do
believe that a long-term program that does involve arms, but
especially training, will at least give us some local capacity
should Assad fall or should Syria fall apart. And that is not
much, sir. I don't want to say that is something we can take to
the bank, but it is better than nothing. Syria, the instability
there is going to emanate throughout the region and we are
going to have to play a role and having some presence there
will be helpful.
Mr. Connolly. Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your
indulgence, and what I take away from that is we have to stay
engaged. There are some options but they are limited options,
and we need to get used to the idea--well, sometimes our
rhetoric up here you would think otherwise--we are neither
omnipotent nor omniscient. Thank you.
Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman. Mr. Yoho from Florida for 5
minutes.
Mr. Yoho. Thank you Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, I appreciate
your testimony. Mr. Lovelady, thank you and your family for
being here and sharing that compelling and moving story, and we
sympathize with your loss, all of you. And also as Mr. Weber
brought out, how it brings home the importance of what we do
here, and I think you have heard that across the board here.
My questions go back to what we did in Libya, what have we
learned on Libya? We did the flyovers. We got in, we got out.
Weapons were left there by other forces, whether it was the
U.N. or NATO, and we know those weapons wound up leaving Libya,
going to Algeria, and now we have got the situation where we
have got to face in Syria, I mean this is coming up, decisions
are going to have to be made and we don't want to repeat
mistakes of the past.
And I am hearing from Mr. Gartenstein-Ross, you were
talking about we need to arm the people over there, but we have
done that again and again, and the way I understand it there
are over 1,000 different groups in Syria. Which one do you arm?
And if we do that when do you pull out? When is there a line
that you say, all right, we have done enough, we need to back
out? I would just like to hear from all three of you what you
think we should do in that situation so that we don't repeat
the mistakes. And again going back to Libya, what have we
learned there that we don't want to repeat?
Mr. Gartenstein-Ross. To be very clear, sir, I am not
advocating arming the Syrian rebels. I am actually advocating
the opposite.
Mr. Yoho. Okay. I misunderstood you then in your testimony.
Mr. Gartenstein-Ross. I think that doing so would be
extremely dangerous.
Mr. Yoho. I am glad to hear that.
Mr. Gartenstein-Ross. And the point that I would make, the
overarching point I would make is simply that the most
dangerous thing would be giving them arms like anti-aircraft
weapons and anti-tank weapons. Those are the kind of weapons
that I think we would most regret sending to the rebel
factions.
Mr. Yoho. Okay, I misunderstood you then. Because I thought
you said that we should do that and I am thinking I don't want
to do that again.
Mr. Zelin?
Mr. Zelin. I think one of the important things that the
United States needs to do is show a lot of leadership on Syria
at this point. We are essentially ceding the ground to some of
our allies in the Gulf, but the problem is, is our allies in
the Gulf do not have the same interests as us in Syria. We have
seen many private citizens in these Gulf nations who have been
providing weapons and a lot of money to a bunch of different
Salafist organizations within Syria as well as the jihadi
groups.
And even when there was sort of this trial run in December
when there were Croatian weapons that went into Syria via
Jordan, even though they were supposedly going to the good guys
they actually ended up in the hands of Jabhat al-Nusra within a
month. So I am skeptical about providing arms, but I do think
there are other options in terms of leadership with
centralizing the opposition in Syria as well as also
potentially using some type of no-fly zone activity as well.
And then from there, because you have this centralized military
capability in Syria that we have relations with, then
potentially we could work with them after the Assad regime
falls, if it does, to then deal with some of the other elements
like----
Mr. Yoho. Let me interrupt you there. You are talking about
a no-fly zone. I mean what gives us the authority to do that? I
mean do we do that unilaterally? Do we go through the U.N.,
NATO? I mean constitutionally we are attacking a nation that
has not attacked us.
Mr. Zelin. Sure. I think we would try the U.N. but I think
that Russia and China would block this. One other area could be
through the Arab League since this is sort of their
jurisdiction. And if they want that we could----
Mr. Yoho. How much effort has the Arab League come out in
support of this or how much involvement do they have to help
calm that strife over there?
Mr. Zelin. Well, we have seen Arab states calling for help
the past 2 years, even though they themselves probably don't
want to themselves be involved in the no-fly zone they can
potentially help fund it since they do have the money, in a
similar way that happened in the Kuwait war.
Mr. Yoho. Let me ask you guys this. Does China have
interest in that area where the attacks were, where Mr.
Lovelady died, as far as petroleum?
Mr. Zelin. China has, I would say, two interests, sir. One
is it is becoming a major importer of petroleum, and of course
the Middle East is a key area. The second is, it has tried to
secure contracts in areas where it has----
Mr. Yoho. All right, so they have a presence there?
Mr. Zelin. I don't know about that particular part of
Algeria.
Mr. Yoho. Are they being attacked, have terrorist attacks
against their interests?
Mr. Zelin. They have had kidnappings and attacks in parts
of Africa, but not what we would call terrorist attacks from
al-Qaeda.
Mr. Yoho. Okay, why do you think that is?
Mr. Zelin. The United States, sir, is opposed by al-Qaeda
for a whole variety of reasons. Some of it includes our
policies in the Middle East. Some of it is our values. Some of
it is simply because we are the face of modernity. It is a mix.
Mr. Yoho. Do you think it has something to do that China
just stands--I mean we heard you say something about the
cowardice. When we show up we don't follow through and so they
look at us as being weak, maybe, and China not. Do you think
that has something to do with that?
Mr. Zelin. I think it is more that China stands on the
sidelines, sir, and----
Mr. Yoho. Okay.
Mr. Zelin [continuing]. And that is main.
Mr. Yoho. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Mr. Poe. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida,
Mr. DeSantis, 5 minutes.
Mr. DeSantis. Thank you Mr. Chairman. Mr. Lovelady, thank
you for coming. Sorry for your loss. I definitely believe that
when Americans are killed people need to be brought to justice.
This could be for anyone who wants to weigh in. With
respect to the Benghazi terrorist attack, why has there been in
your judgment so much trouble bringing the perpetrators of that
to justice?
Mr. Zelin. I think part of it has to do with the weakness
of the central government. They have had a hard time having a
writ over a lot of the periphery, and actually the periphery
has been able to blackmail the central government into doing a
variety of things related to this isolation law that happened
in their Parliament as well as sacking different ministers.
Mr. DeSantis. And what about U.S. actions?
Mr. Zelin. Sure.
Mr. DeSantis. Why have our actions not borne any fruit thus
far, given that four Americans were killed? It is not as if
these were just Americans who just kind of happened to be
traveling. I mean this was an Ambassador. This was U.S.
territory in some ways, and yet here we are. I mean we are
coming up, it is almost a year later and nothing.
Mr. Zelin. I think part of it just has to do with the
weakness of the central government and their inability to be
able to really control what is going on in some parts of the
country. And therefore, even if the United States would go in
and go from Tripoli to Benghazi as has been noted by the FBI
and we have seen in the media, that there is a potential that
you might have elements then try and attack them. So I think
you have that issue----
Mr. DeSantis. No, I understand that. And it is interesting
when we have the State Department folks in front of Oversight.
The Libyan leadership said it was terrorism, initially, and
they got really upset when we said it was because of a YouTube
video. So I think our administration hurt the cause in that
respect. The fact that we haven't brought anybody to justice,
is that something that is going to likely deter future
terrorist attacks? It seems to me that they figure that they
have gotten away with it. It is likely to embolden more people
to want to attack U.S. interests abroad. Does anyone disagree
with that?
Mr. Zelin. No, I fully agree.
Mr. DeSantis. With respect to the Algerian attack, how did
the overthrow of Ghadafi, the revolution in Libya, did it play
any role in that? I know that there a lot of jihadists that
were able to get weapons and operate more freely. So was there
a linkage, in your judgment, to those Islamic fighters and the
attack that happened?
Mr. Gartenstein-Ross. Absolutely. One linkage is through
arms. The other linkage is that Libya was used as a staging
ground for the Algeria attack.
Mr. DeSantis. Do all the witnesses concur with that?
Mr. Zelin. I also think part of it had to do with the
French intervention of northern Mali as well, since a lot of
the individuals melted away, as Dr. Byman mentioned, and went
into northern Niger as well as southern Libya, so then they
were able to use that as another different type of base for
this attack. And one could argue that the attack on the In
Amenas base was in retaliation to the French intervention in
northern Mali.
Mr. DeSantis. With Afghanistan there was this concern, I
mean it is still there, but al-Qaeda used that as a training,
training fighters as a base of operations. And if you look
across northern Africa, I mean it just seems to me that you
could easily have parts of northern Africa end up with al-Qaeda
type fighters, Islamic fighters using that. Is that something
that we should be concerned about?
Mr. Byman. In my view, absolutely. It is harder than the
past because of the drone program because of greater U.S.
attention, but when you have these ungoverned areas, these
become extremely dangerous if they are exploited by al-Qaeda.
Mr. Gartenstein-Ross. And I would add that another area of
concern is not just training but also places where people can
actually engage in live action fighting. Syria is one example.
Mali has been one example. And let us watch the situation in
Egypt. That could end up a very chaotic situation. I don't
think that jihadists will be at the forefront of any sort of
confrontation, but they certainly could end up one of the major
beneficiaries.
Mr. DeSantis. And with Syria, this has been going on for a
long time. As this has dragged on longer and longer that is
actually, you have seen more and more of the foreign fighters
go. So to the extent to which this turmoil in Egypt lasts
longer and you have fighting, it seems to me that that would be
a magnet for a lot of these fighters in northern Africa. So it
is a very, very dicey situation.
Mr. Gartenstein-Ross. I agree that it is. Like I said, I
don't think that jihadists will be at the forefront in Egypt.
They simply don't have the incentive to do so. If you have
clashes between Brotherhood supporters and supporters of the
military, that is a great chaotic situation where they can
quietly build up their capabilities without being at the
forefront of violence on the streets.
Mr. DeSantis. Well, I thank the witnesses. Thank you, Mr.
Lovelady, for your appearance, and I yield back to the
chairman.
Mr. Poe. Thank the gentleman. The Chair will recognize the
gentleman from California, Mr. Rohrabacher, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit for the record a blog
article by Walid Shoebat who claims to be a former member of
the Muslim Brotherhood and has some intelligence information
that I think would be very valuable to this hearing.
Mr. Poe. Without objection, be made part of this hearing's
record.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much.
I would like to ask the witnesses, do you know, is there
any evidence of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood's involvement
in the attack that resulted in the death of our Ambassador in
Benghazi?
Mr. Gartenstein-Ross. No, sir. I know of absolutely no
information suggesting that.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay. Anybody?
Mr. Zelin. No.
Mr. Byman. Not that I have seen, sir.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay, so do you folks, or are you aware of
a terrorist organization called Ansar al-Sharia?
Mr. Gartenstein-Ross. Yes, sir. There are multiple branches
in multiple countries.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay. And so this is a known terrorist
organization. Is it Sharia? I am sorry, al-Sharia, is that how
you pronounce it? So this is a known terrorist organization?
Mr. Gartenstein-Ross. Sir, it is a known jihadist
organization in a number of countries. They are not actually
engaged in terrorism on the ground, but they make clear that
they are aligned with Salafist jihad ideals such as the ideals
of al-Qaeda. This is something that is very clear from the
social media that the group puts out in countries like Tunisia
and Libya.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay. Were any of the members of that cell
to your knowledge arrested for the attack that took our
Ambassador's life in Benghazi?
Mr. Zelin. I believe there have been one or two individuals
who have been detained in Tunisia as well as in Libya, but both
have then been released based off of lack of information.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Mr. Shoebat reports that six members of
Ansar al-Sharia were arrested in Libya, and presents a document
that indicates that they were involved and that they are
Egyptians of course and not Libyans. Have any of you heard
anything about that at all?
Mr. Byman. I have seen some press reports about Egyptians
involved in the attack, sir, but as far as their affiliation I
do not know.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay. So Mr. Shoebat who claims to have
been a member of the Muslim Brotherhood and may well have been
a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, I just haven't verified it
yet, suggests that this terrorist organization has direct ties
to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Is that something you know
about?
Mr. Gartenstein-Ross. Sir, I wouldn't infer that just from
the national origin of individuals involved. We know for a fact
that there is a large stream of Egyptian extremists who have
gone into Libya. There are camps, for example, one set of camps
is known as the Jamal Network. And the individual who runs them
is himself Egyptian. That also is a camp that has been
connected directly to al-Qaeda.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, in terms of this position, this is
that it was not al-Qaeda but this Ansar al-Sharia terrorist
cell that was involved in the attack, and that they were
Egyptian and that they are--in fact, part of his report which I
read and looked at the other night is a news clip that is taken
from a camera that one of the terrorists, or people who were
involved in the terrorist attack, or at least that is what they
say. You could see armed people going back and forth, shooting
going on, and some of the terrorists suggesting that they had
been sent by Morsi, meaning the President of Egypt. Is the
President of Egypt, he has a long close ties with the Muslim
Brotherhood, does he not?
Mr. Zelin. Yes, Mohamed Morsi was the President of Egypt
before he was dispatched the other week, though I find these
claims not that credible. There is no evidence to suggest based
off of anything I have seen that the Muslim Brotherhood is
linked to Ansar al-Sharia in Libya or that any members of the
Muslim Brotherhood were involved or that Mohamed Morsi told
members of the Brotherhood to go to Libya to conduct an----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay, so you don't know of any evidence
that suggests that.
Mr. Zelin. No, sir.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay. And I would appreciate it if you
guys would read this report and give me your personal analysis
of it. Did President Morsi ever, during recent years, talk
about the return of the Blind Sheikh--is that how you pronounce
it?--the Blind Sheikh that we have here in custody in the
United States?
Mr. Gartenstein-Ross. Yes, sir. That was one of the demands
that he made to the U.S.
Mr. Rohrabacher. But he was, President Morsi himself has
made statements that this is important to him, I would say, and
that it is a priority.
Mr. Gartenstein-Ross. Yes, sir. It is something that he
asked the U.S. to do. In Egypt this is a rather big political
issue which he was clearly tapping into.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Or leading. Or leading. Sometimes it is
hard to tell whether a political leader is tapping into
something in the population or if someone is creating it.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you very much for this hearing, and I
think that the information that we were just discussing may
well deserve a lot closer attention. And I would like the
opinion of your witnesses today on this report. And if indeed
Mr. Shoebat has the documentation which he seems to be
presenting here, unless this is--by the way what I made part of
the hearing is a document that suggests it is from Libya, about
the six prisoners who are Egyptian admitting that they were
part of this terrorist unit and that it was connected with the
Muslim Brotherhood, unless that is a forged document. I think
we should pay close attention and get to the bottom of this.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing
today and perhaps opening up an area or directing our attention
to something that could help explain what the hell happened in
Benghazi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Poe. Ask the witnesses to respond in writing to the
request by Mr. Rohrabacher from California.
And one last question, Mr. Gartenstein-Ross. You alluded to
the fact the United States may have a policy regarding the
people who committed the Benghazi attack. What is the policy of
the U.S. for the future? To take those people out or to capture
those people and bring them back? What is the policy, if you
know what it is?
Mr. Gartenstein-Ross. Sir, I don't know what our policy is
with respect to the perpetrators.
Mr. Poe. All right. And the Chair, without objection, will
enter into the record an article out today in Vanity Fair
regarding the timeline on the 40 minutes in Benghazi.
All members have 5 days to submit statements with questions
and extraneous materials for the record subject to the length
limitation of the rules. I thank all the witnesses for being
here, the Lovelady family especially for being here today. This
subcommittee meeting is over. Thank you very much.
[Whereupon, at 11:52 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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