[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE NASA AUTHORIZATION
ACT OF 2013
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JUNE 19, 2013
__________
Serial No. 113-37
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://science.house.gov
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COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY
HON. LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas, Chair
DANA ROHRABACHER, California EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
RALPH M. HALL, Texas ZOE LOFGREN, California
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois
Wisconsin DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland
FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma FREDERICA S. WILSON, Florida
RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas SUZANNE BONAMICI, Oregon
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas ERIC SWALWELL, California
PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia DAN MAFFEI, New York
STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
MO BROOKS, Alabama JOSEPH KENNEDY III, Massachusetts
RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois SCOTT PETERS, California
LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana DEREK KILMER, Washington
STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas AMI BERA, California
BILL POSEY, Florida ELIZABETH ESTY, Connecticut
CYNTHIA LUMMIS, Wyoming MARC VEASEY, Texas
DAVID SCHWEIKERT, Arizona JULIA BROWNLEY, California
THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky MARK TAKANO, California
KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota ROBIN KELLY, Illinois
JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma
RANDY WEBER, Texas
CHRIS STEWART, Utah
VACANCY
------
Subcommittee on Space
HON. STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi, Chair
RALPH M. HALL, Texas DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland
DANA ROHRABACHER, California SUZANNE BONAMICI, Oregon
FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma DAN MAFFEI, New York
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas JOSEPH KENNEDY III, Massachusetts
MO BROOKS, Alabama DEREK KILMER, Washington
LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana AMI BERA, California
STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas MARC VEASEY, Texas
BILL POSEY, Florida JULIA BROWNLEY, California
DAVID SCHWEIKERT, Arizona FREDERICA S. WILSON, Florida
JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
CHRIS STEWART, Utah
LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas
C O N T E N T S
Date of Hearing
Page
Witness List..................................................... 2
Hearing Charter.................................................. 3
Opening Statements
Statement by Representative Steven M. Palazzo, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Space, Committee on Science, Space, and
Technology, U.S. House of Representatives...................... 95
Written Statement............................................ 96
Statement by Representative Donna F. Edwards, Ranking Minority
Member, Subcommittee on Space, Committee on Science, Space, and
Technology, U.S. House of Representatives...................... 98
Written Statement............................................ 99
Statement by Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson, Ranking
Member, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House
of Representatives............................................. 101
Written Statement............................................ 102
Witnesses:
Dr. Steven W. Squyres, Goldwin Smith Professor of Astronomy,
Cornell University
Oral Statement............................................... 103
Written Statement............................................ 106
Mr. A. Thomas Young, Former Executive Vice President, Lockheed
Martin Corporation
Oral Statement............................................... 114
Written Statement............................................ 117
Discussion....................................................... 125
Appendix I: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Dr. Steven W. Squyres, Goldwin Smith Professor of Astronomy,
Cornell University............................................. 142
Appendix II: Additional Material for the Record
Submitted statement by Representative Dana Rohrabacher, Committee
on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of
Representatives................................................ 158
Submitted letter by Representative Dana Rohrabacher, Committee on
Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives.. 160
Submitted letter by Representative Steve Stockman, Committee on
Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives.. 161
Submitted report, Investment in Space Technology is Critical for
NASA and our Nation's Future, by Robert D. Braun, David and
Andrew Lewis Professor of Space Technology, Georgia Institute
of Technology.................................................. 162
THE NASA AUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2013
----------
WEDNESDAY, JUNE 19, 2013
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Space
Committee on Science, Space, and Technology,
Washington, D.C.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:04 a.m., in
Room 2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Steven
Palazzo [Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Palazzo. The Subcommittee on Space will come to
order.
Good morning. Welcome to today's hearing titled ``The NASA
Authorization Act of 2013.'' In front of you are packets
containing the written testimonies, biographies and required
Truth in Testimony disclosures for today's witnesses. I
recognize myself for five minutes for an opening statement.
The discussion draft of the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration Act of 2013 before us today is the result of
input from a wide variety of interests throughout the science
and space communities. The outreach efforts of this Committee
have been unprecedented, and I am proud of the draft we have
put together. My goal for this hearing is to ensure that all of
our Members have an opportunity to ask questions, raise
concerns and debate important topics. I expect the tenor of
today's hearing to be respectful. We are all here because we
care about NASA and want it to succeed.
The draft bill includes a top line budget of over $16.8
billion and authorizes the agency for two years. This budget is
consistent with the requirements of the Budget Control Act.
In regards to sequestration, I want to take a moment to
point out that I and several of my colleagues sitting here in
this room worked extremely hard to avoid getting to this point.
We have offered solid solutions and replacements for these
damaging cuts, and we stand ready to work with the Senate and
the Administration to replace the sequester with responsible,
strategic cuts. This authorization bill reflects a sincere
effort to maximize return to the taxpayer while working to
protect America's role as the world leader in space
exploration.
It is realistic and reflective of the hard choices we must
make as a Nation and provides support for agreed-upon
priorities. The stark reality is that if we fail to reform
mandatory spending, discretionary funding for space, science
and research will continue to shrink.
The Administration must focus on core programs such as the
Space Launch System and Orion crew capsule, the International
Space Station, the James Webb Space Telescope and the
Commercial Crew program. The Space Launch System is authorized
at over $1.7 billion and the Orion crew capsule at $1.2
billion. The SLS and Orion will take our astronauts deeper into
space than ever before. I am committed to the success of these
assets and ensuring their continued on-time development and
appropriate prioritization moving forward.
The Commercial Crew program is authorized at $700 million,
but let me be clear: this is not a blank check for the
Administration. The bill includes several accountability
measures and a flight readiness deadline of December 31, 2017.
This deadline is not negotiable. NASA must do whatever is
necessary in its acquisition model to meet this deadline, even
if that means radically altering their current plans.
The International Space Station is authorized at over $2.9
billion, and the bill includes a framework for NASA to use for
determining the future life of the Station. This Committee
intends to ensure the ISS is utilized to the greatest extent
possible and that every dollar is efficiently allocated with a
priority placed on microgravity research. The $4.62 billion
authorized for the Science Mission Directorate ensures critical
programs will continue on schedule including the James Webb
Space Telescope and Planetary Science missions. Over the last
five years, the Earth Science program has grown by more than 40
percent at the expense of other critical missions within the
Science Mission Directorate and elsewhere in NASA.
There are 13 agencies throughout the Federal Government
that currently fund over $2.5 billion in climate science
research, but only one agency does space exploration and space
science. This bill ensures a balanced portfolio of science
mission programs by simply moderating the increases that Earth
Science has received over the last five years.
The Aeronautics Mission Directorate promotes technology
sharing among government agencies and infuses critical research
and data into the commercial market. It is authorized at $565
million with requirements for interagency roadmaps for various
technology areas.
This bill authorizes $500 million for the Space Technology
program. This investment in game-changing technology
development is crucial for future exploration mission, both
robotic and human. We also recognize the role this program can
play in finding innovative solutions to tough problems.
The President's budget request this year included a major
structural change to STEM programs at NASA. The full Science
Committee held a hearing that revealed significant bipartisan
concerns about this plan. While the Committee generally
supports consolidation of government programs to ensure
efficiencies, this change was poorly conceived and is not ready
for implementation. For this reason, the bill prohibits NASA
from implementing those changes.
Another request in the President's budget was an Asteroid
Retrieval Mission, or ARM. While the Committee supports the
Administration's efforts to study near-Earth objects, this
proposal lacks in details, a justification or support from the
NASA's own advisory bodies. Because the mission appears to be a
costly and complex distraction, this bill prohibits NASA from
doing any work on the project, and we will work with
appropriators to ensure the agency complies with this
directive.
In addition to authorizing funding and giving direction to
the agency for critical missions, the Committee has included
several measures to ensure good government practices and
transparency within NASA including reform for the use of Space
Act Agreements, changes to termination liability requirements
and stricter cost growth controls.
As people in our districts and across the Nation continue
to struggle to find jobs and put food on the table, we must
ensure that every single dollar appropriated to NASA is spent
effectively and efficiently. This bill provides commonsense
guidance and prioritizes those most critical NASA missions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Palazzo follows:]
Prepared Statement of Subcommittee on Space Chairman Steven Palazzo
The discussion draft of the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration Act of 2013 before us today is the result of input from
a wide variety of interests throughout the science and space
communities. The outreach efforts of this Committee have been
unprecedented and I am proud of the draft we have put together. My goal
for this hearing is to ensure that all of our Members have an
opportunity to ask questions, raise concerns and debate important
topics. I expect the tenor of today's hearing to be respectful. We are
all here because we care about NASA and want it to succeed.
The draft bill includes a topline budget of over $16.8 billion
dollars and authorizes the agency for two years. This budget is
consistent with the requirements of the Budget Control Act.
I will take a moment to point out that I and several of my
colleagues sitting here in this room worked extremely hard to avoid
getting to this point. We've offered solid solutions and replacements
for these damaging cuts, and we stand ready to work with the Senate and
the Administration to replace the sequester with responsible, strategic
cuts. This authorization bill reflects a sincere effort to maximize
return to the taxpayer while working to protect America's role as the
world leader in space exploration. It is realistic and reflective of
the hard choices we must make as a nation and provides support for
agreed-upon priorities. The stark reality is that if we fail to reform
mandatory spending, discretionary funding for space, science, and
research will continue to shrink.
The Administration must focus on core programs such as the Space
Launch System and Orion crew capsule, the International Space Station,
the James Webb Space Telescope and the Commercial Crew Program. The
Space Launch System is authorized at over $1.77 billion and the Orion
crew capsule at $1.2 billion. The SLS and Orion will take our
astronauts deeper into space than ever before. I am committed to the
success of these assets and ensuring their continued on-time
development and appropriate prioritization moving forward. The
Commercial Crew program is authorized at $700 million, but let me be
clear; this is not a blank check for the Administration. The bill
includes several accountability measures and a flight readiness
deadline of December 31, 2017. This deadline is not negotiable. NASA
must do whatever is necessary in its acquisition model to meet this
deadline, even if that means radically altering their current plans.
The International Space Station is authorized at over $2.9 billion
and the bill includes a framework for NASA to use for determining the
future life of the Station. This Committee intends to ensure the ISS is
utilized to the greatest extent possible and that every dollar is
efficiently allocated with a priority placed on microgravity research.
The $4.62 billion authorized for the Science Mission Directorate
ensures critical programs will continue on schedule including the James
Webb Space Telescope and Planetary Science missions. Over the last five
years the Earth Science program has grown by more than 40% at the
expense of other critical missions within the Science Mission
Directorate and elsewhere in NASA. There are 13 agencies throughout the
federal government that currently fund over $2.5 billion in climate
science research, but only one agency does space exploration and space
science. This bill ensures a balanced portfolio of science mission
programs by simply moderating the increases that Earth Science has
received over the last five years.
The Aeronautics Mission Directorate promotes technology sharing
among government agencies and infuses critical research and data into
the commercial market. It is authorized at $565 million with
requirements for interagency roadmaps for various technology areas.
This bill authorizes $500 million for the Space Technology program.
This investment in game-changing technology development is crucial for
future exploration missions--both robotic and human. We also recognize
the role this program can play in finding innovative solutions to tough
problems.
The President's budget request this year included a major
structural change to STEM programs at NASA. The Full Science Committee
held a hearing that revealed significant bipartisan concerns about this
plan. While the Committee generally supports consolidation of
government programs to ensure efficiencies, this change was poorly
conceived and is not ready for implementation. For this reason, the
bill prohibits NASA from implementing those changes.
Another request in the President's budget was an Asteroid Retrieval
Mission or ARM. While the Committee supports the Administration's
efforts to study Near Earth Objects, this proposal lacks in details,
justification or support from NASA's own advisory bodies. Because the
mission appears to be a costly and complex distraction, this bill
prohibits NASA from doing any work on the project and we will work with
appropriators to ensure the agency complies with this directive.
In addition to authorizing funding and giving direction to the
Agency for critical missions, the Committee has included several
measures to ensure good government practices and transparency within
NASA including; reform for the use of Space Act Agreements, changes to
termination liability requirements and stricter cost growth controls.
As people in our districts and across the nation continue to
struggle to find jobs and put food on the table, we must ensure that
every single dollar appropriated to NASA is spent effectively and
efficiently. This bill provides common sense guidance and prioritizes
those most critical NASA missions.
Chairman Palazzo. I now recognize the Ranking Member, the
gentlelady from Maryland, Ms. Edwards, for an opening
statement.
Ms. Edwards. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
calling this hearing to discuss a draft of the proposed NASA
authorization bill.
NASA has been and should continue to be the Nation's crown
jewel for spurring innovation, highly skilled and good-paying
jobs, and inspiring the next generation of scientists. It is
vital that any new NASA Authorization match that same standard.
I think we both agree that a strong NASA is critical to the
Nation and that this authorization is vitally important, and it
is an important opportunity to set the policy direction and
authorized funding needed to ensure America's global leadership
in space. It is my hope that we can work together to ensure
that NASA's mission is clear, establish expectations that will
inspire the public and the workforce, and then provide the
level of resources needed to enable the agency to be
successful. Doing otherwise would not only be a disservice to
the men and women at NASA, its contractor workforce and the
American people, but would effectively set the agency on a path
to failure. I know that Members of this Committee want to see
NASA thrive, and we must have an authorization bill that
ensures that.
Mr. Chairman, we are not, nor should we be, the scientists
and engineers who devise the programs and projects to meet the
high-level goals set for the agency. That should be left to the
capable experts at NASA.
I was pleased to see that the draft bill contains a number
of reporting requirements and other provisions taken from the
2010 House version of the NASA Authorization Act of 2010, since
those were not included in the enacted law because Members only
voted on the Senate bill in 2010.
Developing a plan or a roadmap for human exploration to
Mars and seeking criteria for evaluating the potential
extension of ISS operations beyond 2020 are just a few of the
key areas where I see the potential to build consensus.
I am concerned however, with several aspects of this draft
bill, and I question whether, in the end, this draft will serve
to ensure our Nation's hard-earned leadership in space and all
the inspiration, discovery, international standing and economic
benefits that such leadership brings.
First, the draft bill would appear to shift the emphasis of
NASA's core mission to human exploration. This is counter to
the policy of NASA's organic Act, the National Aeronautics and
Space Act of 1958, as well as to the policy statements of
multiple NASA authorizations that have seen NASA as a multi-
mission agency with significant activities in science,
aeronautics and human spaceflight and exploration, and
technology development
Another key concern is the level of funding that is
authorized. The proposed bill would slash NASA's budget by
almost a billion dollars relative to both the President's
proposal for Fiscal Year 2014 and the pre-sequester funding
approved by Congress in Fiscal Year 2012, and it would maintain
that cut over each of the years of the Majority's authorization
bill.
The severe cuts to NASA's top line are manifested
throughout the draft bill. For example, Earth Science would be
cut by almost $650 million relative to the Fiscal Year 2014
request, meaning the Earth Science account is cut by one-third.
Cuts to Earth Science would not only result in gaps in the data
needed to understand changes in our Earth system, it would also
impact on the data needed for water monitoring, forest and
timber productivity forecasting, improving gas and electric
utilities load forecasting, and assessing the impact of sea-
level rise in coastal communities. These uses and societal
benefits are exactly what we hope for when we make Federal
investments in research and technology. To stop them would be
irresponsible.
And the bill appears to shift all Space Technology
activities to support only exploration-related technology
development. More importantly, the proposed reduction in
funding for Space Technology will not keep NASA on a path
aligned with 21st century innovation and job creation. Plans to
pursue new technologies such as in-space propulsion and
cryogenic fuel storage may suffer. The impact of making these
reductions was not discussed in preceding hearings, as they
should have been.
Compounding these things, the bill establishes aggressive
milestones and activities that run contrary to proposed
downsized levels without any real regard for safety and
schedule. These are exactly the pressures of the lessons that
we learned from both Challenger and Columbia, and we can't
afford to repeat those tragedies. We cannot expect NASA to
develop a sustainable and inspiring space program under these
circumstances, and Mr. Chairman, the Subcommittee has
historically done best for NASA when we move legislation in a
bipartisan manner.
As a minimum, now that the draft bill is open for
discussion and before we begin considering markup, we should
first take the time to hold hearings with valued experts and
stakeholders impacted by the bill's provisions, especially in
areas such as Earth Science, Space Technology, and Commercial
Crew safety.
As we will hear from one of the witnesses today, one way of
counteracting the high cost of human space exploration may be
in the form of expanded international partnerships. This is an
idea that needs to be considered as the journey to Mars will be
long, yet rewarding for the future of humankind.
Thank you, and I look forward to hearing from our witnesses
today.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Edwards follows:]
Prepared Statement of Subcommittee Ranking Minority Member Donna
Edwards
Mr. Chairman, thank you for calling this hearing to discuss a draft
of the proposed NASA authorization bill.
NASA has been and should continue to be the Nation's crown jewel
for spurring innovation, highly-skilled and good paying jobs, and
inspiring the next generation of scientists. It is vital that any new
NASA Authorization match that standard.
I think we both agree that a strong NASA is critical to the nation
and that this Authorization is a vitally important opportunity to set
the policy direction and authorize funding needed to ensure America's
global leadership in space.
It is my hope that we can work together to ensure that NASA's
mission is clear, establish expectations that will inspire the public
and workforce, and then provide the level of resources needed to enable
the agency to be successful.
Doing otherwise would not only be a disservice to the men and women
at NASA, its contractor workforce, and the American people, but would
effectively set the Agency on a path to failure. I know that Members of
this Committee want to see NASA thrive; we must have an Authorization
bill that ensures that.
Mr. Chairman, we are not, nor should we be, the scientists and
engineers who devise the programs and projects to meet the high-level
goals of the Agency. That should be left to the capable experts at
NASA.
I was pleased to see that the draft bill contains a number of
reporting requirements and other provisions taken from the 2010 House
version of the NASA Authorization Act of 2010, since those were not
included in the enacted law because Members only voted on the Senate
bill in 2010.
Developing a plan or roadmap for human exploration to Mars and
seeking criteria for evaluating the potential extension of ISS
operations beyond 2020 are just a few of the key areas where I see the
potential to build consensus.
I am concerned however, with several aspects of this draft bill,
and I question whether, in the end, this draft will serve to ensure our
nation's hard-earned leadership in space and all the inspiration,
discovery, international standing, and economic benefits that such
leadership brings.
First, the draft bill would appear to shift the emphasis of NASA's
core mission to human exploration. This is counter to the policy of
NASA's organic Act, the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, as
well as to the policy statements of multiple NASA Authorizations that
have seen NASA as a multi-mission agency with significant activities in
science, aeronautics, and human spaceflight and exploration, and
technology development.
Another key concern is the level of funding that is authorized. The
proposed bill would slash NASA's budget by almost a billion dollars
relative to both the President's proposal for FY 14 and the pre-
sequester funding approved by Congress in FY 12, and it would maintain
that cut over each of the years of the Majority's Authorization bill.
The severe cuts to NASA's top line are manifested throughout the draft
bill.
For example, Earth Science would be cut by almost $650 million
relative to the FY 14 request, meaning the Earth Science account is cut
by 1/3.
Cuts to Earth Science would not only result in gaps in the data
needed to understand changes in our Earth system, it would also impact
on the data needed for water monitoring, forest and timber productivity
forecasting, improving gas and electric utilities load forecasting, and
assessing the impact of sea level rise in coastal communities.
These uses and societal benefits are exactly what we hope for when
we make federal investments in research and technology. To stop them
would not be responsible. And the bill appears to shift all Space
Technology activities to support only exploration-related technology
development.
More importantly, the proposed reduction in funding for Space
Technology will not keep NASA on a path aligned with 21st century
innovation and job creation. Plans to pursue new technologies such as
in-space propulsion and cryogenic fuel storage may suffer.
The impact of making these reductions was not discussed in
preceding hearings, as they should have been. Compounding things, the
bill establishes aggressive milestones and activities that run contrary
to proposed downsized levels.
We cannot expect NASA to develop a sustainable and inspiring space
program under these circumstances. Mr. Chairman, this Subcommittee has
historically done best for NASA when we have moved legislation in a
bipartisan manner.
As a minimum, now that the draft bill is open for discussion and
before we consider moving to markup, we should first take the time to
hold other hearings with valued experts and stakeholders impacted by
the draft bill's provisions, especially in areas such as Earth science,
space technology, and commercial crew safety.
As we will hear from one of the witnesses today, one way of
counteracting the high cost of human space exploration may be in the
form of expanded international partnerships. This is an idea that needs
to be considered as the journey to Mars will be long, yet rewarding for
the future of humankind.
Chairman Palazzo. Thank you, Ms. Edwards.
If there are Members who wish to submit additional opening
statements, your statements will be added to the record at this
point. Oh, I apologize, Ms. Johnson. Our Ranking Member is
present. I now recognize the Ranking Member of the full
Committee for her remarks.
Ms. Johnson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and good
morning, and I would like to join you in welcoming our
witnesses to this morning's hearing. You both have offered
valuable counsel to our Committee in the past, and I am certain
that you will do that again today.
As the Chairman has indicated, we are here today to begin
our review of the Majority's discussion draft of the NASA
Authorization Act of 2013. Those who know me know that I
consider NASA to be a critical part of the Nation's innovation
infrastructure, a driver of technological and scientific
progress, a positive symbol of the United States throughout the
world, and most importantly, a source of inspiration for
successive generations of our young people. I strongly believe
that any NASA authorization bill that comes out of this
Committee should reflect these realities.
Unfortunately, the draft bill that we are starting to
examine today doesn't do that. It doesn't contain funding
commensurate with the tasks NASA has been asked to undertake.
In fact, it gives NASA additional unfunded mandates while
maintaining deep sequestration cuts over the life of the bill.
It contains policy direction that I fear will do long-term
damage to the agency. And, I regret to say that if enacted, it
would not help NASA meet the challenges facing the agency. In
short, it is a missed opportunity to position NASA for
excellence, and it is a bill that if enacted would lead to the
erosion of the capabilities that have made NASA such a positive
force for progress.
Why do I say that? Well, I have already mentioned the deep
and sustained cuts this bill makes to NASA's overall budget at
a time when we should be investing more in NASA, not putting it
on a path to mediocrity. It also cuts NASA's Earth Science
budget by one-third, which I find very baffling. Certainly the
Committee has held no hearings on NASA's Earth Science program
in this Congress nor the 112th Congress, so it is hard to see
any justification for those cuts. It makes equally damaging
cuts and changes to NASA's Space Technology program, again
without explanation. And despite on the one hand putting NASA's
budget on a path of declining purchasing power for the
foreseeable future, it on the other hand directs NASA to
establish major new programs, not just goals, for sustained
human presence on both the Moon and Mars.
Moreover, in addition to imposing other unfunded and
underfunded mandates on numerous NASA programs, it also sets an
arbitrary deadline by when NASA will have had to carry out a
successful commercial crew flight to the International Space
Station, a deadline that I fear will lead to the kind of
schedule pressure the Columbia Accident Investigation Board
warned against a decade ago after the tragic loss of the Space
Shuttle Columbia.
Mr. Chairman, there are other areas of this draft
legislation that I fundamentally disagree with, but I think you
have a sense of my overall view. This is not a bill ready for
markup. This is a flawed draft, starting from its funding
assumptions, and I cannot support it in the present form. I can
also predict that if passed by our Committee, this bill would
be DOA in the Senate, DOA meaning dead on arrival.
Rather than moving directly to an unproductive markup, I
hope that the Majority will take a step back and at a minimum
hold additional legislative hearings so we can hear from the
affected parties what the impacts of the proposed cuts and
changes to Earth Science and Space Technology will be. We also
need to hear from the congressionally established Aerospace
Safety Advisory Panel on its views of this legislation, because
I know that no member of this Committee will want to do
anything that would jeopardize safety.
In closing, NASA is an investment in our future. The women
and men who work at NASA are some of our best and brightest. We
owe it to them and to our children and grandchildren to take
the time to produce a NASA Authorization Act worthy of this
Committee.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back the balance of my
time.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Johnson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Committee Ranking Member Eddie Bernice Johnson
Good morning. I'd like to join the Chairman in welcoming our
witnesses to this morning's hearing. You both have provided valuable
counsel to our Committee in the past, and I am certain that you will do
so again today.
As the Chairman has indicated, we are here today to begin our
review of the Majority's Discussion Draft of the NASA Authorization Act
of 2013. Those who know me know that I consider NASA to be a critical
part of the nation's innovation infrastructure, a driver of
technological and scientific progress, a positive symbol of the United
States throughout the world, and most importantly, a source of
inspiration for successive generations of our young people. I strongly
believe that any NASA Authorization bill that comes out of this
Committee should reflect those realities.
Unfortunately, the draft bill that we are starting to examine today
doesn't do that. It doesn't contain funding commensurate with the tasks
NASA has been asked to undertake--in fact, it gives NASA additional
unfunded mandates while maintaining deep sequestration cuts over the
life of the bill. It contains policy direction that I fear will do long
term damage to the agency. And, I regret to say that if enacted, it
would not help NASA meet the challenges facing the agency. In short, it
is a missed opportunity to position NASA for excellence, and it's a
bill that if enacted would lead to the erosion of the capabilities that
have made NASA such a positive force for progress.
Why do I say that? Well, I have already mentioned the deep and
sustained cuts this bill makes to NASA's overall budget--at a time when
we should be investing more in NASA, not putting it on a path to
mediocrity. It also cuts NASA's Earth Science budget by one-third,
which I find baffling. Certainly the Committee has held no hearings on
NASA's Earth Science program in this or the 112th Congress, so it's
hard to see any justification for those cuts. It makes equally damaging
cuts and changes to NASA's Space Technology program--again without
explanation.
And despite on the one hand putting NASA's budget on a path of
declining purchasing power for the foreseeable future, it on the other
hand directs NASA to establish major new programs--not just goals--for
sustained human presences on both the Moon and Mars.
Moreover, in addition to imposing other unfunded and underfunded
mandates on numerous NASA programs, it also sets an arbitrary deadline
by when NASA will have had to carry out a successful commercial crew
flight to the International Space Station--a deadline that I fear will
lead to the kind of schedule pressure the Columbia Accident
Investigation Board warned against a decade ago after the tragic loss
of the Space Shuttle Columbia.
Mr. Chairman, there are other areas of the draft legislation that I
fundamentally disagree with, but I think you have a sense of my overall
view. This is not a bill ready for markup. This is a flawed draft,
starting from its funding assumptions, and I cannot support it in its
present form. I can also predict that if passed by our Committee, this
bill would be DOA in the Senate.
Rather than moving directly to an unproductive markup, I hope that
the Majority will take a step back and at a minimum hold additional
legislative hearings so we can hear from the affected parties what the
impacts of the proposed cuts and changes to Earth Science and Space
Technology will be. We also need to hear from the congressionally
established Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel on its views of this
legislation, because I know that no Member on this Committee will want
to do anything that would jeopardize safety.
In closing, NASA is an investment in our future. The women and men
who work at NASA are some of our best and brightest. We owe it to them
and to our children and grandchildren to take the time to produce a
NASA Authorization Act worthy of this Committee.
Chairman Palazzo. Thank you, Ms. Johnson. Again, the
purpose of this Committee to hear our Members' concerns, issues
and questions and also have some debate on those issues.
If there are Members who wish to submit additional opening
statements, your statements will be added to the record at this
point.
At this time I would like to introduce our panel of
witnesses. Our first witness is Dr. Steven Squyres, the Goldwin
Smith Professor of Astronomy at Cornell University, and Chair
of the NASA Advisory Council. Our second witness is Mr. Thomas
Young, former Executive Vice President of Lockheed Martin
Corporation.
As our witnesses should know, spoken testimony is limited
to five minutes each, after which Members of the Committee have
five minutes each to ask questions. Your written testimony will
be included in the record of the hearing.
I now recognize our first witness, Dr. Squyres, for five
minutes.
TESTIMONY OF STEVEN SQUYRES
GOLDWIN SMITH PROFESSOR OF ASTRONOMY,
CORNELL UNIVERSITY
Dr. Squyres. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee,
thank you for the opportunity to appear today.
Three themes run through my testimony. First, NASA needs a
clear and compelling long-term goal. In my opinion, that goal
should be to send human explorers to Mars. Second, NASA is
being asked to do too much with too little. Unless program
content can be matched to budget, the result will be wasted
effort and delay. Third, our Nation's civil space program will
be best served by having high-level policies set by the
Administration and Congress, and implementation details
recommended by NASA engineers, scientists and managers.
I recently testified at a hearing before this Committee
entitled ``Next Steps in Human Exploration to Mars and
Beyond.'' An underlying assumption of that hearing was that a
crucial future goal for NASA should be to send human explorers
to the surface of Mars. I argued then and I reiterate now that
sending human explorers to Mars to learn whether or not life
ever emerged there is a goal worthy of a great national space
agency. It should be NASA's number one long-range priority.
To make progress towards the goal, the draft Authorization
Act wisely calls for NASA to develop a Mars human exploration
roadmap, but then, with little technical justification, the
draft legislation also dictates what some of the key elements
of that roadmap should or should not be. Specifically, it
directs NASA to establish a program to develop a sustained
human presence on the moon and forbids NASA to fund the
development of an Asteroid Retrieval Mission. I believe that it
would be unwise for Congress to either prescribe or proscribe
any key milestone in NASA's Mars exploration roadmap at this
time. Personally, I agree with the draft Authorization Act's
position on the Asteroid Retrieval Mission, and I disagree with
its position on a sustained lunar presence, but my personal
views are not the point.
In the 1960s, the government set the high-level goal of
sending humans to the Moon and then left it to the engineers
and the scientists and managers of NASA to find the right
program architecture to achieve this goal. I believe that a
similar approach should be taken to achieving the goal of
getting humans to Mars. I urge that milestones not be dictated
either by the Administration or the Congress without allowing
NASA to develop a technically sound roadmap first. The
objective of this roadmap should be to achieve the goal of
human exploration of Mars as quickly and efficiently as
possible, and then once a viable roadmap has been generated,
the additional technologies, vehicles and milestones that are
needed to make it a reality will become clear.
Moving on to Space Science, this program has been one of
NASA's major success stories for many years. Priorities across
the full sweep of Space Science have been recommended by the
National Research Council's Decadal Surveys. I am pleased that
the draft Authorization Act places particular emphasis on
assuring that NASA's Space Science program follows decadal
priorities.
Unfortunately, tight budgets and mission cost overruns have
put NASA's Space Science program under pressure. Recent
Administration budget requests have funded most Space Science
disciplines adequately but have included cuts to Planetary
Exploration that were so deep as to appear punitive. The draft
Authorization Act, in contrast, restores funding for Planetary
Exploration but introduces alarmingly deep cuts to Earth
Science. I feel it is important that cuts be driven by science
priorities as outlined in the Decadal Surveys and that they be
distributed sensibly across disciplines. So I urge this
Committee to strive for balance in the Space Science portfolio
rather than singling out Earth Science or any other discipline
for disproportionate cuts.
The draft Authorization Act would reorganize the Space
Technology program by moving much of the responsibility for
technology development to the Human Exploration and Operations
Mission Directorate. Unfortunately, when budgets are tight, it
is tempting for mission directorates to use technology funds to
solve today's problems rather than enabling tomorrow's
missions. So I favor a more distributed approach in which only
technology funding for specific near- and medium-term needs of
a mission directorate resides within that directorate. I feel
that longer-term and more broadly applicable exploration
technology funding is better maintained in a separate
technology organization helping protect it from being used to
solve immediate mission problems.
Returning to my opening themes, I believe that the mismatch
between the agency's aspirations and its budget is the most
serious problem facing NASA. Unless a solution is found, some
very hard choices may have to be made soon. Specifically, a
choice is looming, I believe, regarding whether the focus of
human spaceflight should be ISS utilization or moving beyond
low-Earth orbit. At projected budget levels, I fear that NASA
will not be able to do both of these safely and well.
Part of the solution may be international partnerships. If
no major funding increase for NASA is forthcoming, then I
believe that the agency should aggressively seek out
international partners for human exploration beyond low-Earth
orbit. If capable partners who are willing to shoulder a
substantial fraction of the cost of deep space exploration can
be found, then it may be possible for NASA to maintain
something like its current portfolio of activities. Otherwise I
fear that a painful reduction in program content may lie ahead.
Despite the challenges that it faces, NASA is one of our
Nation's greatest assets and a source of pride for all
Americans. An Authorization Act that enunciates a clear and
compelling long-term goal for the agency, that matches program
content to budget and that lets NASA formulate the
implementation details of national civil space policy will
allow it to remain so.
Again, thank you for the opportunity to appear today.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Squyres follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Palazzo. Thank you, Dr. Squyres.
I now recognize our next witness, Mr. Young.
TESTIMONY OF A. THOMAS YOUNG,
FORMER EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT,
LOCKHEED MARTIN CORPORATION
Mr. Young. Chairman Palazzo, Ms. Edwards and Committee
Members, I am pleased to have the opportunity to present my
views on issues I believe to be important as you prepare the
NASA Authorization Act of 2013.
The United States civil space program has been the source
of enormous pride, prestige, knowledge and awe-inspiring
technology. This has been the product of the exceptional men
and women in NASA, other government agencies, industry and the
scientific community working with highly competent leadership.
This integrated effort is the foundation of the U.S. civil
space program. As we move forward there are storm clouds over
this great human endeavor that require attention.
Nothing is more important than maintaining NASA as the
premier civil space organization including maintaining the
special capabilities of other government agencies, industry and
the scientific community. This can only be achieved by having
challenging, inspiring and worthy things to do. Studies,
technology pursuits and overseeing others are important but
will not maintain the civil space program as world class. We
must endeavor to populate the Authorization Act with worthwhile
opportunities that maintain these critical capabilities.
To maximize the return from the investment in the civil
space program requires that program content be in balance with
the budget. This is a much discussed but seldom achieved goal.
We continually operate with a budget that is inadequate to
implement the established program. Our inability to delete
worthy but lower-priority endeavors results in this imbalance.
Too much program for the available budget results in
inefficiencies, excessive risk and program cancellations. The
result is that less is accomplished for more. Pay-as-you-go is
a much-discussed concept that I believe has merit. Go-as-you-
pay is a useful concept when deciding the point at which the
budget will support starting a project. Go-as-you-pay is a most
wasteful concept for the implementation of a project.
The dominant strategic issue facing the civil space program
today is human spaceflight. Today, there is a human spaceflight
program but no credible human space exploration strategy. There
is much discussion about going to the Moon, an asteroid,
Phobos, Deimos and Mars, however, there is no credible plan or
budget. There are human exploration elements such as SLS and
Orion.
The NASA budget contains about $8 billion for human
spaceflight, not including infrastructure costs. This funds the
International Space Station, SLS, Orion, some technology,
Commercial Cargo and Commercial Crew. If the budget remains
approximately the same, my judgment is that there are two basic
choices: a space station-focused human spaceflight program or
an exploration-focused program. I do not believe the budget is
adequate to accomplish both, and a choice needs to be made to
have a credible path forward. I believe as a part of making
this choice, an independent assessment of the value of the ISS
return for the significant portion of the NASA budget that is
dedicated to ISS is necessary. A senior review is a concept
that is appropriate for conducting this assessment. If this
human spaceflight strategy issue is not resolved, the graveyard
of cancelled, abandoned and unachievable endeavors will
continue to be populated. The responsibility for leading the
resolution of this strategic issue should reside with NASA.
Another strategic issue that is important resides in the
science area of the NASA program. There are a small number of
profound questions for which the United States is in a
leadership position and is on the cusp of greatly increasing
our knowledge. These include: Are we alone? What is dark energy
and dark matter? What is the future of our climate? Is the
United States going to be a leader in these profound areas or
are we going to voluntarily move to the sidelines? Decadal
Surveys have identified the top-priority programs in pursuing
these special opportunities. Sample return from Mars, a wide-
field IR telescope and missions identified in the Earth Science
Decadal deserve priority consideration in the new Authorization
Act.
Technology is important ``seed corn'' for the civil space
program. A debate in any organization involving high-technology
pursuits is: Should the technology be managed in a mission
organization to maximize the relevance of the technology, or
should the technology be managed in an independent organization
to maximize the probability that the technology program will be
implemented?
The risk of the former is that the demands of implementing
challenging projects will consume all the resources, thus
sacrificing technology endeavors. The risk of the independent
organization is the technology will be less relevant to NASA's
missions and become an end in itself with scope beyond what is
affordable. I believe the independent organization concept with
a strong oversight process to assure maintaining relevance and
responsibly containing scope of the endeavor is the best
balance of merit and risk.
The final topic I want to discuss in my prepared comments
is leadership. I place my toe in these troubled waters with
great reservation. However, I believe leadership of the civil
space program is a topic that must be openly discussed. I
strongly believe the leadership of the U.S. civil space program
must be vested in NASA. This includes both formulation and
implementation. Politics and ideology are a part of the fabric
of a democracy, however, they should be relegated to lower-
level issues in the civil space program. I recognize that there
are times when national issues are important factors, as was
the case for Apollo, however, NASA has been and will be
sensitive to such issues.
NASA is about engineering, science, exploration and
discovery. NASA really is rocket science in its broadest
definition. Leadership of the civil space program must have the
capabilities and experience consistent with this demanding
charter. Today, leadership of the civil space program is
diffuse and authority is invested in organizations, while
important, that do not have the expertise to be in a
controlling role. This is a prescription for mediocrity whether
it be an organization of great national importance, an
industrial corporation or a local community organization. I
have great worry about what I believe to be a declining
trajectory for NASA and the civil space program. I believe the
most significant factor in this negative outlook is the adverse
leadership concept I observe.
As an example of what results from diffuse leadership with
too much authority in the wrong places is the proposed Asteroid
Retrieval Mission. This is a mission that is not worthy of a
world-class space program that is focused upon maximizing the
return that can be realized from a constrained budget. NASA
must be returned to the leadership role of the civil space
program. If this occurs, many of the issues confronting the
program will be very positively addressed. If not, the outlook
is discouraging.
The Authorization Act of 2013 will be important in
achieving a positive trajectory correction for NASA and the
civil space program. It is hard to overstate the need for a
program that is focused upon the highest-priority
opportunities, a program that is consistent with available
funding, and a program with leadership vested in NASA.
Great nations do great things. The United States is a great
Nation, and I continue to believe the civil space program is a
great thing.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Young follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Palazzo. Thank you, Mr. Young. I thank the
witnesses for being available for questioning today, reminding
members that Committee rules limit questioning to five minutes.
The Chair will at this point open the round of questions. The
Chair recognizes himself for five minutes.
One of the first questions I asked Administrator Bolden at
our NASA budget hearing earlier this spring was whether the
President's budget request would cause a slip in the schedule
for the Space Launch System. Administrator Bolden replied that
it would not. After looking at the budget request, however, it
became apparent that if this was indeed true, the funding
levels were barely enough. That is why the discussion draft
before us calls for an increase of $70 million above the
Administration's request.
Mr. Young, what funding levels are necessary to maintain
the current SLS schedule?
Mr. Young. I really can't answer that question, but I do
have some comments on the question. One of the things that is
in the authorization bill and I pointed out is that go-as-you-
pay is a useful concept when you are deciding when to start a
project, but when you are implementing a project, it is a most
wasteful concept, and I think if SLS falls into the mode of a
go-as-you-pay program, then it is going to be highly
inefficiently implemented, and what really happens in a go-as-
you-pay concept when you are implementing a program is, good
people accomplish all the work in a given Fiscal Year that they
can for the money that is available. What they can't
accomplish, they move to the right, and this accumulates into
schedule delays but it is even more significant that you don't
accomplish the program in the most efficient manner and you
probably end up with a lot of programs doing one program for
the price of two. So I applaud your focus on this issue of
assuring that the SLS funding is appropriate to implement a
program in the most efficient manner. I am just not in a
position to make judgment of exactly what those dollars are.
Chairman Palazzo. Dr. Squyres, do you have anything to add?
Dr. Squyres. Yeah, I think the thing I would add to this,
and I have mentioned this to this Committee in the past, is
that the real issue to me is not when the first flight of SLS
takes place, it is the flight rate thereafter. And if you look
at the projected budget and what it implies in terms of the
projected flight rate for SLS, you wind up with a flight rate
that is almost an order of magnitude lower than what was done
for, say, the Saturn V system back in the 1960s and early
1970s. We have no experience with a human-rated flight system
that only flies every two or three or four years, and I believe
that is cause for serious concern. It is not just simply a
matter of maintaining program momentum. It is not even purely a
matter of efficiency. It is also largely a matter of just
keeping the flight team sharp and safe and mission-ready. So I
am deeply concerned about the flight rate of that system.
Chairman Palazzo. Can NASA afford to develop the 130-
metric-ton variant right now or will it have to focus on the
70-ton version? Does anybody want to--no comments on that? We
will work that one out later. It keeps popping in my mind. Now,
this is something I think you all can elaborate on. Now, the
discussion draft includes the requirement that NASA build a
Mars human exploration roadmap. Are there any additional
requirements for the roadmap that you think should be added?
Dr. Squyres?
Dr. Squyres. Actually, I think the roadmap requirements in
the bill are overconstrained. What I mean by that, I think the
idea of establishing a roadmap for human exploration to Mars is
great. It is one of my favorite provisions in this bill. But I
think it would be best to allow NASA to do that, to work out
that roadmap and its technical details and find the best way to
achieve that and then come back with a set of recommendations
of what the intermediate milestones should be. As written, the
bill prescribes certain milestones, for example, sustained
presence on the surface of the Moon, which as the Ranking
Minority Member of the full Committee noted is an unfunded
mandate. It also says that we should not do certain things
along the way. I think, and I agree with Tom on this, that
allowing NASA to take the first steps towards establishing what
the roadmap should be using the technical expertise that
resides within the agency would be an appropriate way to go
forward.
Mr. Young. I too applaud the roadmap. I mean, I think we
are badly in need of a human exploration strategy. I think that
the concept of doing the roadmap, NASA leading it, is good,
giving NASA as much flexibility as can be and putting together
is also good. You will always have an opportunity to critique
the products as they come out. The only thing I would add to
what Steve has said is that it is also got to be a roadmap that
gives appropriate recognition to budget, and what is realistic
and what is not realistic, and I don't mean to overconstrain
you by that because if I had the job, I would look at options
and various levels to understand what we can do, you know, at
various levels. But a strategy without the resources to execute
the strategy or a roadmap without the resources to execute it
is simply a hope as opposed to something that is realistic. So
we have got to put it in the context of what is realistic to be
implemented. But personally, it is the objective--I was sitting
thinking as Steve was doing his testimony, I don't know how
long I have been associated with Mars but I almost have three
children: Carter, Blair and Mars.
Chairman Palazzo. Thank you for your comments. I now
recognize Ms. Edwards for five minutes.
Ms. Edwards. Thank you, Dr. Squyres and Mr. Young. It is
always good to have you here, and I just really appreciate the
value that you provide for the Committee. As I read your
testimony and listened to you today, what I heard is that I
think we actually can agree on some of the broad concepts of
the bill including identifying a roadmap to Mars as we just
discussed, maintaining a balanced and steady agenda for NASA's
programs as a multi-mission agency, and taking a look at how we
can assure the effectiveness of the agency's leadership in
maintaining a long-term vision. But there are some aspects of
the draft bill that I think are really problematic, and I
wonder if you could discuss with some level of detail--and Dr.
Squyres, you did, but Mr. Young, I wonder if we could have a
comment from you about this idea of a sustained presence on the
Moon and Mars. Because there is where I do think that there is,
you know, some significant division in the details, and I
wonder if you might comment as well about some of the things
that we could ask for in a roadmap and a timetable that would
allow us a Committee to look at what NASA is doing and ask
those questions in detail without prescribing the scientific
detail for the agency.
Mr. Young. The comment I would make on the Moon question
that you have is the following. I do not believe that landing
on the Moon or operations on the Moon is a prerequisite to
going to Mars. So if Mars--you know, given Mars as the focus,
then it is not necessary? And it is probably a significant
resource consumer that will take away from the time and the
effort to go to Mars.
I also don't want to imply that the Moon is a useless
location, and so that is not, from my standpoint, meant to be
implied at all. I mean, I think there is enormous, you know,
research, understanding and benefit that can be derived from a
mission to the lunar surface. I just think that if our focus is
on Mars, it is not a necessary prerequisite and it is an
enormous consumer of resources including time, and it really
takes away from the basic thrust of a Mars roadmap.
Ms. Edwards. Dr. Squyres?
Dr. Squyres. Well, I certainly agree with Tom that the
reason to go to the surface of the Moon is not to help us get
to Mars; it is to go to the Moon. With respect to what you
could ask for in a roadmap, certainly asking what are the
appropriate technologies is the right thing to do, certainly
asking what vehicles, what specific pieces of hardware are
appropriate to get the job done, and then I think there are a
range of different milestones that could be looked at. Clearly,
lunar orbit is a sensible first milestone. Whether there is a
rock there that has been directed from, you know, an asteroid
that has been brought in or not, it is the right place to go.
The other milestones you could look at include the lunar
surface. They include a near-Earth object of significant size.
They include the moons of Mars, Phobos and Deimos. They include
operations in Mars orbit, which is clearly going to be
necessary.
So I think you could lay out the range of possible
milestones and ask the agency, okay, with these possibilities,
what are the right ones that will get us most efficiently to
the long-term goal, and then what are the specific
technologies, what are the specific pieces of hardware that are
necessary, and one other thing that I would add is that I think
it would be valuable to ask the agency and more broadly ask the
question, once we have identified the vehicles, once we have
identified the technologies, are there ones in there that could
be sensibly provided by an international partner to help spread
the costs.
Ms. Edwards. Thank you very much, because I think that
would help us actually develop an authorization that would be
useful to the agency without us, as lawmakers without the
requisite experience, pointing out the details of what it is
that the agency should do. So I appreciate that.
I want to ask you very quickly, both of you, the draft bill
proposes to make drastic cuts in NASA's Earth Science program
at a time when natural disasters here at home in the United
States and abroad are wreaking havoc on individuals,
businesses, municipalities, the entire economic system, and so
I wonder if you could share with me what you think the proposed
cuts in the legislation mean to our ability to understand,
predict, monitor and respond to natural disasters and to
climate change.
Dr. Squyres. I am deeply concerned about the magnitude of
the proposed cuts to Earth Science, just as I was deeply
concerned about the magnitude of the proposed cuts to Planetary
Science in the Administration budget. There needs to be a
balance found. There needs to be a compromise found in which
the cuts if they have to be directed to Space Science are
spread more sensibly across the different disciplines.
With respect to Earth Science, the National Research
Council's Decadal Survey for Earth Science has very nicely
spelled out a sequence of missions, a series of activities that
could be conducted by NASA studying the Earth from space and
those have broad benefits both in the specific areas that
benefit humans that you outlined but also just across the broad
sweep of understanding the Earth as a complex system. The
climate system, the geology of the Earth, the oceans, the sea
ice, all of this are interconnected in a very complex way, and
these missions are necessary to understand that system, and
there are unexpected discoveries awaiting. There are unexpected
consequences of flying these missions, and----
Ms. Edwards. Thank you. I appreciate that. I think I am
actually out of time, so we will let somebody else continue.
Dr. Squyres. I could go on on that one for a long time.
Ms. Edwards. I know that you could. I apologize. I have to
slip out for a bit but I will be back.
Chairman Palazzo. And we could listen for a long time. I
would like to say this bill does not require NASA to establish
a Moon base or lunar outpost. In fact, the 2005 and 2008 NASA
Reauthorization Acts required NASA to establish a sustained
human presence on the Moon and authorized NASA to establish a
lunar base. This bill authorizes NASA to continue those
pursuits already in existing law and to plan for eventual
missions to Mars. So if there was any confusion, I want to
clear that up.
I now recognize Mr. Brooks.
Mr. Brooks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
By way of background, I represent Alabama's 5th
congressional district, the home of the Marshall Space Flight
Center, and quite frankly, the birthplace of America's human
spaceflight program. The Marshall Space Flight community plays
a pivotal role in the development of America's Space Launch
System, the next-generation rocket system that empowers America
to return to exceptionalism in space and stop the current
rather humiliating situation wherein America is reduced to
having our astronauts thumb rides with the Russians.
The people in my district who either have a keen interest
in SLS or who are responsible for building the next-generation
SLS rocket system have had scant time to review the draft NASA
Authorization Act of 2013. The early response, however, to
these reviews have been, to put it mildly, most disconcerting,
so disconcerting, in fact, that unless I receive differing
expertise that satisfies me that our words and support of human
spaceflight match our actions and deeds, I will have no choice
but to vote against and otherwise oppose this Authorization
Act.
In that vein, I seek today's witnesses' expertise and
insight in hopes that it will help satisfy these concerns. Page
5 of the draft discussion bill states, ``$1.454 billion shall
be for the Space Launch System.'' Have either of you had
communications with any private-sector contractor who is
responsible for building the next-generation SLS rocket to
determine whether they can meet their 2017 launch deadline if
they are authorized only $1.4 billion in FY 2014? And if so,
who have you spoken with, what have they said? Mr. Young, have
you?
Mr. Young. I have not.
Mr. Brooks. Dr. Squyres, have you?
Dr. Squyres. No, I have not.
Mr. Brooks. In that vein, let me share with you some of the
concerns that I have had shared with me from folks in my
district. The first one is a gentleman that I am sure you are
very familiar with. I have a letter from former NASA
Administrator Mike Griffin dated today, June 19, 2013, at 6:11
a.m. He is doing this while he is at the Paris air show in
Europe. Dr. Griffin states in part, and I quote, ``I wish to
express my concern over the proposal to authorize 2014 funding
for the Space Launch System at a level of $1.45 billion. It is
not adequate to develop the launch system that was approved by
the Congress in the NASA Authorization Act of 2010. Development
of the SLS that was mandated by the Congress requires a 2014
authorization and appropriation of $1.8 billion.'' I repeat
that: $1.8 billion. ``Specific requirements which cannot be met
at this level,'' cannot be met at this level of $1.45 billion,
``include, one, concurrent development of the upper stage
required to meet the 130-metric-ton floor for human exploration
capability that was mandated by the 2010 Authorization Act;
two, schedule protection for completion of core vehicle
development by 2017, again, a requirement of the 2010 Act;
three, completion of the interim cryogenic propulsion stage by
2017 necessary to reach the initially planned SLS capability of
70-metric-tons; four, continuation of advanced booster
development.''
I also have a much more candid, and I have excised parts of
it for family consumption, communication from a former well-
respected NASA employee. This person states, ``I have reviewed
the draft authorization bill. I really seized up over the
amount for SLS. It is too low. I have been talking for months
now with the principals on the program on just this point, and
the money they need to have a healthy program is $1.8 billion
to the project manager for the rocket, not money to JSC,
Johnson Space Center, for Orion, not money to Kennedy Space
Center for ground facilities. These latter things are good to
do, no question, but without the launch vehicle itself, they
are irrelevant. As important as building the rocket is building
the right rocket, the 130-metric-ton version, not the half-
capable 70-metric-ton first step that Lori Garver and the
Obamas want to settle for. That version is quintessential white
elephant. It is twice as big as what you need to get to low
orbit to service the International Space Station, and thus very
inefficient for that application, and half what you need for
human space exploration and thus inefficient for that
application as well.''
Mr. Chairman, I urge this Subcommittee conduct as many
hearings as are necessary to determine whether $1.4 billion is
adequate to construct the Space Launch System rocket and
restore America's exploration in space as scheduled or is
merely a painkiller given to a terminal patient to ease the
cause of death. That having been said, with respect to these
two communications, do you all have any reaction?
Mr. Young. I do. Mike Griffin, that was probably in his
afternoon work even though you had it at 6 a.m. Yeah, my
comment is the following. We actually know how to estimate the
cost of these programs, not with great precision but within,
you know, the realm of what is necessary for budgeting, and so
this is really an example of some of the things I was talking
about and have testified before previously. We have the ability
based on experience to do a reasonably credible cost estimate
for projects like SLS. We can do it in a statistical manner,
and we know that for a standalone project, the most probable
result is the 80/20 statistical number, a lot of history on
that. I mean, I have looked at NRO data, I looked at NASA data,
Air Force data, as others have, and that is the point at which
you determine the most probable cost of a program. The next
more important item is that the 80/20 not just be a total but
it be 80/20 every year, because if I put all of my reserve and
contingency into the program, I may feel good about the total
but I have done nothing, which is probably what these letters
are implying.
So my recommendation or comment to you would be, get a
credible organization who knows how to do independent cost
estimating and get them to do an independent cost estimate for
the SLS given the launch date that you want to specify and they
can assess the realism of that and they do it at an 80/20 level
and then you can really assess where the budget is relative to
the reality as to what the program would cost. But I want to
emphasize, we know how to do this. This is something that we
really have developed a real capability for in the recent
times.
Chairman Palazzo. Thank you, Mr. Young. Dr. Squyres, out of
consideration for the other members that are here, I would like
to ask the members again to try to keep their questions and
comments to five minutes.
I now recognize Mr. Kennedy for five minutes.
Mr. Kennedy. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you once again
to our witnesses for testifying yet again before the Committee.
A couple of questions to broaden the base a little bit here.
For both of you, just to start, you mentioned in the
Administration's--you each mentioned this, the Administration's
STEM education reorganization proposal as an issue moving
forward. In my district back home in Massachusetts, we have a
number of programs that have been highly successful in reaching
students of all ages and getting them interested in STEM
fields. I share some of your concerns about potentially
reorganizing these programs and losing the expertise of issue
area specialists. I visited at some vocational schools that
have amazing partnerships with NASA in getting kids really
excited about fields of engineering and exploration, and I
think we can all agree that increasing the effectiveness and
efficiency for Federal STEM efforts is something worth
pursuing. Do you have any recommendations or any suggestions on
how NASA can improve its education and outreach priorities
going forward?
Dr. Squyres. I believe that the Administration's proposed
reorganization of STEM education at NASA is deeply misguided.
NASA is a unique organization within the government. It flies
missions into space, and the technical audacity of those
missions and their capability to inspire are virtually
unmatched in terms of what this government does and its ability
to get young people turned on by science, by technology. And to
take that responsibility, the responsibility for sharing that
capability with the public away from NASA and give it to, I
don't care, any organization that doesn't do spaceflight I
think is a bad idea. The thing that makes NASA's education
outreach programs as effective as they are is that they are
conducted by people who have not only a deep knowledge about
what they are doing but a passion for sharing it. And you
listen to some of NASA's scientists and engineers talk with
young people about how excited they are about what we get to do
for a living. You know, this is compelling stuff, and to take
that away from the agency and hand it off to an organization
that has no experience flying stuff in space I think is just a
bad mistake.
Mr. Kennedy. Fair enough. Anything you want to add sir? No?
Great.
Then moving on, I would like to hear a little bit more
about your thoughts on the Space Technology provisions of the
bill. As I understand it, authorization levels included in the
draft are obviously much lower, and the program would need to
be adjusted to support exploration-related technology
development by moving much of the funding to support the Human
Exploration and Operations of Mission Directorate. How do you
think this would impact the future development of space
technology?
Mr. Young. The thing I commented on is not so much the
level of the program, because that is important, but it is very
difficult for someone in our position to have gone through all
the activities. But having been involved both in NASA and in
the private sector for a long time, both operational missions
and technology, the thing that has always struck me is that
there is a constant debate, and that is, there is a motivation
to try to align the technology with the management of the
missions or the projects because that really makes it most
relevant. I mean, no question, they are the users. The problem
is when the crunch comes, and it always comes, the resources
that are there for the technology gets used to solve problems
on the missions that you are trying to execute, and I don't
offer that as being wrong. I mean, that is the priorities that
people have to take.
The other side of it is, if you put technology in a
technology organization, there are some dangers there too
because then the technology kind of creeps away from being as
relevant as you want it to be. It falls more in the paradigm of
building the technology budget as opposed to the overall
balance of the activities, and it can kind of become an end in
itself, as I commented.
So you have really got those two situations. There is not
an optimum solution. Having watched it, lived it, seen the
merits and the problems with it over time, I favor putting it
in an independent organization, however, with a strong
oversight capability----
Mr. Kennedy. Sir, if I could----
Mr. Young. --to assure relevance and to assure that it
doesn't get out of control. The NRC or the Academies is a great
oversight kind of an organization.
Mr. Kennedy. I have got three seconds, but briefly, you
both commented on the Asteroid Retrieval Mission. I seem to
sense some skepticism from both of you on that mission. Are
there other technological advances, are there gains that can be
made if our overall goal, NASA's goal, is getting to Mars, that
benefit from the Asteroid Retrieval Mission? And if you can,
answer it in less than 10 seconds.
Dr. Squyres. I personally don't see a strong connection
between the proposed Asteroid Retrieval Mission and sending
humans to Mars, but I believe NASA should at least be given the
opportunity to try to make that case. I haven't heard it yet.
Mr. Young. My belief is that any technology that comes out
of it, there are better ways to do it, and I am passionate as
you go forward with the Authorization Act to utilize whatever
resources are available on the highest-priority endeavors, and
my judgment is, this is not a highest-priority endeavor.
Mr. Kennedy. Thank you both, and thank you, Mr. Chair, for
the flexibility.
Chairman Palazzo. Thank you, Mr. Kennedy. I now recognize
Mr. Rohrabacher.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. We just
heard from my colleague from Alabama that the SLS project needs
to be funded, and Mr. Young, the people he was quoting are the
people who know how to do these numbers, Mr. Griffin and the
rest of them. They build the rockets down in his district and
they say for this project to be sustainable and to meet the
deadlines that we are doing, and that costs a lot more in the
long run, as you pointed out, that we are going to need to
spend $1.8 billion rather than what is being authorized, which
is 1.4. It seems to me that that should be a warning sign for
all of us that this project is going to cost a lot more money
and that money has got to come from somewhere. The tooth fairy
isn't going to leave it under our pillow, and all of this talk,
we were talking about these other things that NASA does like
whether it is inspire young people or whatever it is that NASA
wants to do, that is going to suffer and it is going to go into
this rocket, or the SLS Titanic, as I like to describe it, but
this huge, massive rocket that our other witness, Mr. Young,
has already stated he has studied and it has only got one or
two uses that we are going to have out of that rocket.
Doesn't this mean that--frankly, I differ from my colleague
from Alabama. I think all of this adds up to, we are on the
wrong course and we should just get away, cancel this project.
It is not sustainable and will drain money from every other
thing that we want to do in space eventually, and worst of all,
it may end up being canceled, as you pointed out so many times,
Mr. Young. In the past, we have seen so many of these canceled
after spending billions and billions of dollars right down the
toilet.
I would like to ask Mr. Squyres, you have stated and we all
seem to assume that getting to Mars as soon as possible has got
to be our ultimate goal. That just seems to me that everybody
is accepting that. I don't accept that. There are a lot of
other things we need to do in space before we need to get to
Mars. But Mr. Squyres, do you believe that this massive rocket
project that you seem to be skeptical about as well, is that a
prerequisite to going to Mars?
Dr. Squyres. Certainly, some kind of heavy lift capability
is a prerequisite to get to Mars. Mars is far away. But SLS--I
said in my opening statement that I believe that the biggest
challenge, the biggest problem facing the agency is that NASA
is being asked to do too much with too little, and this
mismatch between the amount of money that is necessary to do
SLS right and the amount of money that is actually available is
symptomatic of that. Both Tom and I in our opening remarks
pointed out that we see some tough choices looming in the area
of human spaceflight. We can afford to utilize the Space
Station, which we have invested so much in, for as long as its
operational lifetime. We can afford to develop SLS and to do it
on a safe and reasonable schedule, but I don't see that we can
do both, and so there may be some very tough challenges ahead
for this agency and some choices to be made.
Mr. Rohrabacher. There are other alternatives that are out
there, and we do have a proven rocket system right now. We have
people who have done a good job at producing Deltas and Atlas
rockets that are very effective and very safe, and perhaps
those systems can be used perhaps combined with a refueling
system of some kind rather than spending the tens of billions
of dollars that we are going to spend to have this one large
system that seems to have one purpose.
Let me just note this. It was noted earlier how important
human spaceflight is, and I agree that it is important that we
do that, but NASA isn't the only one in this ballgame. There
are two other programs that I know that are aimed at putting
people into space, and it is not costing us the big bucks from
NASA to keep people in space. I mean, we have got Dennis Tito
out there and I happen to think that his project will inspire a
lot of people. When you are talking about inspiring humankind
and especially young people, I think Dennis' concept of sending
a man and a woman around Mars, that is going to capture
everybody's imagination. Let us hope he is successful, however.
And the other thing is SpaceX, of course, and others are
putting money into developing a system much cheaper than what
we are talking about here of putting people into space in turn
for a number of purposes, one, to go to the Space Station, so
we won't have to hitch a ride with the Russians. So when we
look at this budget, we are going to be looking at these
budgets, Mr. Chairman, and you are going to be looking at this
budget--I don't know how much longer I am going to be around--
but you are going to be around a long time and you are going to
remember when we started this program and in the end, you are
going to have to live through all of the cuts of everything
else that we are going to have to cut to keep this giant rocket
program going. There are other alternatives I think we should
be looking at seriously. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Palazzo. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher. I now
recognize Ms. Wilson--or we will go to Mr. Veasey.
Mr. Veasey. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, and I wanted
to ask Dr. Squyres and Mr. Young a specific question about the
ISS program. I know there has been a lot of comment on the
intrinsic value and strength of the international partnership
that the ISS program has engendered over the decades since the
partnership was established, and what I wanted to know
specifically from you is, how important is it to build on the
ISS partnership in future human exploration endeavors?
Dr. Squyres. I think it is tremendously important. ISS is a
technological marvel but it is also a management marvel. To
have had that many nations work together so effectively to
build such a magnificent piece of hardware, it is unparalleled
I think certainly in the history of space exploration. And the
International Space Station truly is international to a deep,
penetrating degree. The entire system is deeply international
and that is manifested in a whole bunch of different ways. I
believe very strongly that in order for NASA to find a way to
deal with the level of over-commitment that is expected of the
agency, for NASA to be able to do the things out in deep space
that we would like to see happen with anything like the budgets
that we are talking about here, there has to be a really
substantial international component to that. And so I think
building on the partnerships that have been really established
so effectively in the management of the International Space
Station, it has really been a triumph, and I think trying to
take that capability and extend it beyond low-Earth orbit is
probably going to be absolutely necessary.
Mr. Young. I really don't have anything to add. I think
that is exactly right. I mean, you know, the international
relationship aspect of it, it is hard to imagine anything more
successful than the Space Station has been in that regard, and
building on that and doing whatever the next major thing we
encounter or we undertake I think is extraordinarily important.
Dr. Squyres. If I could just add one more thing to my
remarks on that, and that is that if international partnerships
are going to be a key element of our roadmap for exploration of
deep space, it would make sense to involve our potential
international partners in the development of that roadmap so
that they have a sense of ownership of it.
Mr. Veasey. What would be the impact of disrupting the
partnership without a follow-on program?
Mr. Young. It is a good question. It is kind of the nature
of the business, I mean, you know, to have continuity is
certainly a virtue but I would not make it a requirement. In
other words, I think that, you know, we should collectively
figure out the most important things to do and then how is the
most effective way to execute them rather than say we have a
workforce and we have an international partnership and now we
have got to fill that international partnership. I don't know
if that is very helpful, but that would be my general reaction.
Mr. Veasey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back the
balance of my time.
Chairman Palazzo. Thank you, Mr. Veasey. I now recognize
Mr. Posey.
Mr. Posey. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I thank
both the witnesses, and if I heard you correctly, both of you
place a high priority on human space exploration as being the
number one thing that we should be doing. If we started today,
how long do each of you estimate it would be before we could
place a person on Mars?
Dr. Squyres. With the current budget?
Mr. Posey. Yes. Well, we can do it for starters. Give me a
date with the current budget and a date with the Apollo-era
budget.
Mr. Young. With the current budget, bear with me, I would
probably say never.
Dr. Squyres. I agree.
Mr. Young. If you said, if we made this a national
imperative, you know, to go do it, it took Apollo about eight
years, if I recall correctly. I was around doing much of that
activity, and, I mean, it was truly a national endeavor. Mars
is harder. There are a lot of significant issues to resolve
before going to Mars, but I think if we had the same national
commitment to it, I would say 2025 we could land on Mars and
return home safely to Earth.
Mr. Posey. During Apollo, you were around and I was around,
and that was done in ten years. I am told they could not repeat
that performance today. I don't know whether it is true or not.
And if you recall, that is when they carried around slide
rules. The IBM mainframe was a quarter as big as this room and
did about what you can get a little calculator to do for five
bucks at Walmart today. It is amazing. It seems like we have
regressed somewhat in some of our abilities.
Mr. Young. Can I comment on that?
Mr. Posey. Certainly.
Mr. Young. I know I am eating into your time. It really
builds on some of what I think it is important in this
Authorization Act.
I actually think we could repeat that if we managed the
enterprise today the way we managed it then, and I knew the
leaders who were doing that, and we invested the authority and
responsibility in the people executing the program the way we
did it then. So I am not distressed so much that we don't have
the raw material capability; I am distressed that we have a
management process, oversight process, et cetera that
complicates the world.
Mr. Posey. Thank you. And we don't seem to have--I mean, we
have seen polling, and I keep copies of it, 76 percent of the
people thought the Shuttle was a good program, to some people
today, a more recent poll, they rate their dislike of space
funding next only to welfare, and that is not a good position
for us to be in. I mean, it would be great if we could have--
what is it--the Rice University speech the President gave: why
go to the Moon. You know, if more of us could hear that kind of
thing in this day and time and inspire a little bit more.
The President projects 2030, a quarter of a century from
now, is when we could get to Mars, and the question is, do you
think we could maintain the public's interest, if we even have
it now, to take a generation to complete a mission, do you
think without shorter, more precise, more exciting stepping
stones?
Dr. Squyres. Well, I think that a necessary part, probably
not sufficient, but a necessary part of maintaining public
interest is in fact a focus on Mars. When the Curiosity rover
landed on Mars recently, thousands of people showed up in the
middle of the night in Times Square to watch it on television.
People are actually captivated by Mars exploration. So I
believe the focus on Mars is necessary. I am not sure that it
is sufficient, and so as you say, the time scales are
substantial and so I think having some compelling milestones
along the way is an important part of the program as well.
I believe, and Tom and I, I think, are very of like mind on
this, that it should be first and foremost left to engineers
and scientists and managers at NASA to come up with the
technically appropriate set of milestones, the ones that get us
to the goal safely and efficiently, and then to have those
reviewed carefully, both by organizations like the National
Academy but also of course by the Congress and the
Administration to make sure that they make sense in terms of
maintaining the program.
Mr. Posey. And I concur. You know, you just--we say on the
one hand we need to have priorities. Then people say well, you
need to balance your spending, you need to balance your
spending, and I am just afraid we are going to end up making
NASA a jack-of-all-trades and a master of none, and you are
shaking your heads ``yes.'' You have the same fears. Thank you.
Mr. Young. Yeah, I am going to cheat, if I might. I think
the other aspect of the milestones is, don't forget about the
robotic program and the excitement that will go along with
return of samples from Mars robotically, which I think a
necessary prerequisite for the human program, and the idea of
having a rover going out and collecting that sample and storing
it somewhere where a vehicle is going to come along a few years
later and pick it up and return it, I think you can build a lot
of excitement around it.
And as long as I have cheated a little bit, you will
remember Aaron Cohen, and Aaron told me one time--who was
significant in the Apollo program. When we were talking about
the Constellation program, he said we are about to find out how
hard it really was to go to the Moon.
Mr. Posey. Thank you, gentlemen. Thank you very much. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Palazzo. Thank you, Mr. Posey. I now recognize Ms.
Bonamici.
Ms. Bonamici. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you
both for being here today and bringing your expertise.
I just want to start by following up on Mr. Kennedy's
remarks about the importance of STEM education. I just came
from the Education Committee, where we are marking up a bill,
and a lot of discussion about STEM education, and I just share
the concern of making sure that we are engaging the next
generation. I do want to note that NASA recently selected its
trainees to become astronauts, and half of them are women. I
think that is the first time that that has happened. We want to
make sure that we have the next generation of astronauts and
scientists and people who are interested in these fields. So I
am very concerned about whether we are going to be through
restructuring affecting those existing partnerships between
NASA and other education groups and entities. So I want to
share that concern, and I know you have commented on it.
I also want to bring up another thing. You know, many of us
on the Committee do not have NASA facilities in our districts.
We might have involvement with programs like human spaceflight
and missions to Mars just through subcontractors or others in
the supply chain. But NASA has historically been a multi-
mission agency with a balanced portfolio in human exploration,
human spaceflight, science and aeronautics, and I know we are
having conversations about whether those priorities should
change, but because of that multi-mission history, I often
discuss the importance of NASA's other missions including the
Earth Science mission, and I know Representative Edwards
brought this up. I am the Ranking Member on the Environment
Subcommittee. I know the chairman was here. And the Environment
Subcommittee has jurisdiction over NASA Earth Science programs,
so cuts to those programs cause me some serious concern.
There is some significant national activity such as weather
monitoring. Oregon State University, for example, receives
funding through this program and the work that they do helps in
that area. And according to the National Academies, NASA's
aging Earth Observation System threatens a disruption in
information that can help detect long-term climate trends that
contribute to severe weather patterns. That affects not only
space exploration but a lot of other issues as well.
So can you discuss the Authorization Act's reduction in
funding for the Earth Science programs, for NASA's Earth
Science programs? What impact might that have on long-term
weather and climate forecasting, both within NASA and other
agencies, and how important is that work to space exploration?
Dr. Squyres. Well, as I remarked in my opening comments, I
view with considerable concern the deep cuts to Earth Science
that are contained in the proposed Authorization Act. It is
clear that the Administration and the Congress have, at least
as Congress' views are expressed in this draft Act, very
different views of how to allocate money within the Space
Science enterprise at NASA. And on the Administration's side, I
have seen what I view to be alarmingly deep cuts in Planetary
Exploration which has been, I think, one of NASA's real shining
successes in recent years. In this bill, the pendulum swings
too far in the other direction, in my view, and has alarmingly
deep cuts to Earth Science. If it is going to--if we are going
to see a NASA budget, if we are going to see an authorization
level that is consistent with sequestration sorts of budgets,
clearly some tough choices have to be made. But rather than
singling out any one scientific discipline for disproportionate
cuts, which is what I am seeing on both sides right now, having
those cuts sort of sensibly distributed across the Space
Science enterprise I think makes more sense. It is going to
fall on committees like this to come up with some compromises,
and I urge you to try to do that.
To get specifically to your question, if you look at the
suite of missions that were recommended by the Earth Sciences
Decadal Survey from the National Academies, they would focus on
understanding the Earth as a system, not just focusing on
trying to forecast tomorrow's weather but trying to really
understand the Earth's climate system, the Earth geosciences,
to really try to develop a systems approach to understanding
the Earth. And that is inevitably going to pay off in providing
decision makers who are wrestling with things like climate
change with the kinds of information that would be necessary to
make smart decisions.
Ms. Bonamici. Mr. Young, you are nodding your head.
Mr. Young. Yes.
Ms. Bonamici. Thank you very much. I see my time is
expired. I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Palazzo. Thank you, Ms. Bonamici. I now recognize
Mr. Stockman.
Mr. Stockman. I have a quick statement to make about--I am
feeling as NASA is more symbolism over substance, and we have
gotten away from as you talked about in the 1960s where we
actually did things. I think the reason the popularity has
dropped is because a lot of people have no idea really what we
are doing now, and it is kind of muddled, and we keep going off
in these different directions, and I was wondering, what was
the ratio of bureaucrats to engineers in the 1960s versus now?
Mr. Young. I obviously----
Mr. Stockman. I could do Jay Leno, I guess.
Mr. Young. Yeah, I don't have that number. It is a great
question. I will tell you maybe a little bit relevant to that
because I grew up in NASA, and even up through some, you know,
modestly senior positions on Viking program where they landed a
couple spacecraft on Mars and be a director of Goddard, and I
finished that, I went off to my next life in, like, 1982 or
1983. The amount of time that I spent doing other than what I
would call important NASA science and engineering discovery
research would have been single digit. I mean, you know, it was
just not a factor. Now, don't get me wrong. I mean, OMB
existed, you know, other organizations existed, but I--you
know, my time and my dedication was 95-plus percent of doing
science, engineering, research, discovery, whatever you want to
call it. So I personally think that is a significant difference
to what I observe today, and a source of enormous worry.
Dr. Squyres. Well, I don't have anything like Tom's depth
of experience but in the 30 or so years that I have been in
this business, I cannot recall a time when I have seen
organizations like OMB exercising the level of oversight of
minute details of NASA's program. I haven't seen that to this
extent in the years that I have been in this business. And I
think one of the things that characterized the early days that
we are talking about here, the 1960s, was that we had
government organizations like OMB and like the Congress
providing high-level priorities for the organization and then
allowing people like Tom when he worked for NASA to figure out
how to actually implement those policies and carry them out in
detail. There was a level of oversight, you know, give and take
back and forth that goes with that but I think that the level
of detailed oversight that I am seeing at the agency these days
is certainly unprecedented in my experience. And I think in
some respects--and Tom touched on this in his opening
statement--this has been detrimental to the agency doing its
job as effectively as possible.
Mr. Stockman. I think it is kind of ironic hearing a
government agency complain about government. I kind of like
that idea.
I am just amazed. I am a little bit familiar with that, and
I am amazed at the side roads we take, and I think it adds 50
percent or more in the cost of a program, or more. I mean, it
is bizarre some of the things that NASA is requested to do and
that the employees are requested to do, the diversion of time.
It is just amazing to me that we don't have the ability to trim
that back, but if we could do it all across government, I think
we would be much more efficient.
Mr. Young. I think you are right again. You are talking
about, you know, going by--the first large space project I
worked on was Lunar Orbiter, a robot which was fundamentally
aimed towards picking landing sites for Apollo and Surveyor. We
signed a contract for it, and 27 months after that we were in
orbit above the Moon, and people were a little upset because it
was supposed to have been 24 months.
Mr. Stockman. Well, and the last thing I got is a more
parochial question. They are moving the Arc Jet facility, and I
was wondering how that is going to impact future development or
authority of other projects. Oh, you are not familiar with it?
Then I will submit the question and you can research it.
I am extremely frustrated seeing firsthand the amount of
tangential and what I call nonproductive compliance. It is over
the top at NASA, and I just wish that somehow we could reduce
that. Thank you. I yield back the balance of my time.
Chairman Palazzo. Thank you, Mr. Stockman.
You know, there has been a lot of talk about priorities and
missions without the proper funding, and I would just like to--
I think this garners consideration, that as mandatory spending
continues to erode important discretionary investments like
NASA, we are forced to make very difficult decisions. This is
unfortunately the reality we must face until the Federal
Government can get its finances in order. That is why this
discussion draft complies with current law, the Budget Control
Act, which passed the Senate, the House and was signed by the
President, and I do hope that we can get mandatory spending
under control soon so that we can continue funding essential
and discretionary programs like NASA, like national defense,
like homeland security, without having these debates over
making sure that we fund our priorities appropriately.
So I want to thank the witnesses for their valuable
testimony and the Members for their questions. The Members of
the Committee may have additional questions for you, and we
will ask you to respond to those in writing. The record will
remain open for two weeks for additional comments and written
questions from members.
The witnesses are excused and this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:32 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
Appendix I
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Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Dr. Squyres
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Appendix II
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Additional Material for the Record
Submitted statement by Representative Dana Rohrabacher
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Submitted letter by Representative Dana Rohrabacher
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Submitted letter by Representative Steve Stockman
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Submitted report by Robert D. Braun
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