[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
COAST GUARD READINESS: EXAMINING CUTTER, AIRCRAFT, AND COMMUNICATIONS
NEEDS
=======================================================================
(113-26)
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JUNE 26, 2013
__________
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COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania, Chairman
DON YOUNG, Alaska NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia
THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon
HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee, Columbia
Vice Chair JERROLD NADLER, New York
JOHN L. MICA, Florida CORRINE BROWN, Florida
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
GARY G. MILLER, California ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
SAM GRAVES, Missouri RICK LARSEN, Washington
SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts
CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York
DUNCAN HUNTER, California MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine
ERIC A. ``RICK'' CRAWFORD, Arkansas GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California
LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois
BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota
LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana STEVE COHEN, Tennessee
BOB GIBBS, Ohio ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland
RICHARD L. HANNA, New York JOHN GARAMENDI, California
DANIEL WEBSTER, Florida ANDRE CARSON, Indiana
STEVE SOUTHERLAND, II, Florida JANICE HAHN, California
JEFF DENHAM, California RICHARD M. NOLAN, Minnesota
REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin ANN KIRKPATRICK, Arizona
THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky DINA TITUS, Nevada
STEVE DAINES, Montana SEAN PATRICK MALONEY, New York
TOM RICE, South Carolina ELIZABETH H. ESTY, Connecticut
MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Oklahoma LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
ROGER WILLIAMS, Texas CHERI BUSTOS, Illinois
TREY RADEL, Florida
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
RODNEY DAVIS, Illinois
MARK SANFORD, South Carolina
------
Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation
DUNCAN HUNTER, California, Chairman
DON YOUNG, Alaska JOHN GARAMENDI, California
HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey CORRINE BROWN, Florida
PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania RICK LARSEN, Washington
STEVE SOUTHERLAND, II, Florida, TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York
Vice Chair JANICE HAHN, California
TOM RICE, South Carolina LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
TREY RADEL, Florida NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia
MARK SANFORD, South Carolina (Ex Officio)
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania (Ex
Officio)
CONTENTS
Page
Summary of Subject Matter........................................ iv
TESTIMONY
Panel 1
Vice Admiral John P. Currier, Vice Commandant, United States
Coast Guard.................................................... 3
Panel 2
Ronald O'Rourke, Specialist in Naval Affairs, Congressional
Research Service............................................... 22
Steven P. Bucci, Ph.D., Director, Douglas and Sarah Allison
Center for Foreign Policy, The Heritage Foundation............. 22
Lawrence Korb, Ph.D., Senior Fellow, Center for American Progress 22
PREPARED STATEMENT SUBMITTED BY MEMBER OF CONGRESS
Hon. John Garamendi, of California............................... 32
PREPARED STATEMENTS AND ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED
BY WITNESSES
Vice Admiral John P. Currier:
Prepared statement........................................... 33
Answers to questions from Hon. Duncan Hunter, of California.. 37
Ronald O'Rourke, prepared statement.............................. 41
Steven P. Bucci, Ph.D., prepared statement....................... 52
Lawrence Korb, Ph.D., prepared statement......................... 57
SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD
Vice Admiral John P. Currier, Vice Commandant, United States
Coast Guard, responses to two requests for information from
Hon. Rick Larsen, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Washington.................................................. 12
Lawrence Korb, Ph.D., Senior Fellow, Center for American
Progress, request to submit ``Rebalancing Our National
Security: The Benefits of Implementing a Unified Security
Budget''.................................................. \\
ADDITION TO THE RECORD
Lawrence Korb, Ph.D., Senior Fellow, Center for American
Progress, request to submit ``Building a U.S. Coast Guard for
the 21st Century''................................ \\
----------
\\ Task Force on a Unified Security Budget, Center for
American Progress, Rebalancing Our National Security: The
Benefits of Implementing a Unified Security Budget (October
2012) can be found online at: http://www.americanprogress.org/
wp-content/uploads/2012/10/UnifiedSecurityBud- get.pdf.
\\ Lawrence J. Korb et al., Building a U.S. Coast
Guard for the 21st Century (June 2010) can be found online at:
http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2010/
06/pdf/coast_guard.pdf.
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COAST GUARD READINESS: EXAMINING CUTTER, AIRCRAFT, AND COMMUNICATIONS
NEEDS
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WEDNESDAY, JUNE 26, 2013
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime
Transportation,
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in
Room 2167, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Duncan Hunter
(Chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Hunter. The subcommittee will come to order.
The subcommittee is meeting today to review the Coast
Guard's major acquisitions programs. The Coast Guard's effort
to recapitalize its aircraft, vessels, and communications
systems has suffered through some dark days. Fortunately, under
the leadership of Admiral Papp and his predecessor, Admiral
Allen, the program has turned the corner and the Service is
finally taking delivery of new and improved assets in a cost-
effective manner.
Unfortunately, just as the men and women of the Coast Guard
are finally getting the new and improved assets promised to
them nearly 20 years ago, the President is proposing a budget
that will set the program back another 15 to 20 years. The
President guts the Coast Guard's acquisition budget, cutting it
by 42 percent below the current level. The President's request
proposes to terminate or delay the acquisition of critically
needed replacement assets. This will increase acquisition costs
for taxpayers, place further strain on the Service's aging and
failing legacy assets, exacerbate growing capability gaps, and
seriously degrade mission effectiveness.
As this subcommittee has continually highlighted, the Coast
Guard currently operates tens and, in some cases, hundreds of
thousands of hours short of its operational targets. This means
assets are not there for the Service to conduct drug and
migrant interdiction, protect our environment, secure our
ports, or ensure the safety of our waterways.
For instance, the Coast Guard reported that due largely to
its failing legacy assets, it was forced to reduce hours spent
conducting drug interdiction activities by 65 percent in recent
fiscal years. The only way to reverse the decline in the Coast
Guard's mission performance is to make the necessary
investments to acquire new and improved assets.
Unfortunately, based on the last couple of budget requests,
it appears this administration refuses to make those
investments. If that is the case, then it is time for the
President to tell Congress what missions the Coast Guard will
no longer conduct. It is simply irresponsible to continue to
send our service men and women out on failing legacy assets
commissioned over 50 years ago and expect them to succeed in
their missions.
I thank the witness for appearing today and look forward to
your testimony.
With that, I yield to Ranking Member Garamendi.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Chairman Hunter.
And to all the witnesses that are appearing today, thank
you very much for the testimony that you will soon be giving
us.
As we turn our attention this morning to focus once again
on the status of the Coast Guard's long-range program to
recapitalize its aging fleets of surface ships and aircraft and
to improve its communications and intelligence technology for
the 21st century, we are keeping in mind the extraordinary
budget challenges that we are facing--``we'' are facing. It is
not just the administration. It is this Congress as well.
As we discovered during the subcommittee's April 16 hearing
concerning the administration's fiscal year 2014 budget request
for the Coast Guard, we are simply not providing the Coast
Guard with the resources it needs to fulfill its many missions.
Failing that, it is folly for us to believe the Coast Guard
will be able to adequately maintain operations and,
importantly, sustain the progress in its $29 billion
recapitalization strategy, the largest such initiative in the
Coast Guard's storied history.
So the predicament we find ourselves in is not entirely the
Coast Guard's making, nor can it be attributed to any one
factor. And as you, Admiral Currier, will soon be testifying,
at least from your written testimony, the Coast Guard is doing
its utmost to wisely utilize the resources that are
appropriated by this Congress to address the most pressing
problems and priorities that you have.
But the fact remains, if we continue on the same course we
will accomplish little but to hollow out the capabilities of
our guardians of the sea. And the warning signals are there. We
are approaching that tipping point, and it is abundantly clear.
The fiscal year 2014 budget requests for the acquisition
construction improvement account is only $909 million. This is
$600 million less than the funding levels authorized in last
year's Coast Guard Maritime Transportation Act and $1.1 billion
less than the $2 billion funding level recommended for the ACI
account by the Navy League of the United States in the 2013
maritime policy statement.
Additionally, we are seeing certain acquisition programs
prematurely terminated and the timetables for other programs
pushed further into the future. Moreover, the Coast Guard now
faces an imminent gap in operational capability as its aging
legacy assets are pressed far beyond their service life. The
new assets are going to be very late in arrival.
Mr. Chairman, this is a very important hearing. I thank you
for calling it. We have a lot of work to do. I look forward to
the testimony. And I look forward to avoiding the hollowing out
of the Coast Guard. Thank you. Yield back.
Mr. Hunter. I thank the ranking member.
Our first panel is one witness, Vice Admiral John Currier,
Vice Commandant of the United States Coast Guard.
Admiral, you are recognized for your statement.
TESTIMONY OF VICE ADMIRAL JOHN P. CURRIER, VICE COMMANDANT,
UNITED STATES COAST GUARD
Admiral Currier. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Garamendi,
other members of the panel. I ask that my written testimony be
entered into the record.
Chairman Hunter, Ranking Member Garamendi, members of the
subcommittee, good morning, and thank you for the opportunity
to speak today.
In our mission set, our men and women are amongst the most
dedicated, well trained, and highly skilled in the world, and
we owe them our very best efforts to continue to provide the
support and the tools they need to execute maritime governance
and sovereignty for our Nation. Not only do we owe the men and
women of the Coast Guard the tools they need to do their job,
we owe them an environment of trust. And I would like to take 1
minute just to talk about that.
We have respect. We have core values. But most importantly,
we have trust in our workforce. In our business, trust is a
priceless attribute. I can tell you from years past, being a
helicopter pilot, that the trust that the crew holds when you
are out on a hazardous mission is absolutely priceless, and it
is essential to the accomplishment of the mission.
When it comes to sexual assault, an issue that has received
a lot of attention of late, we have been working this issue for
a long time. It is a matter of trust in our workforce. I want
to take the opportunity to assure you that the Commandant and I
are wholeheartedly committed to eliminating the crime of sexual
assault from the Coast Guard. It is our number one priority.
But I know we are here today to talk about acquisition. Let
me start by thanking you for the stalwart support of this
subcommittee for our service and the accomplishments of our
mission. The oversight and advocacy from this subcommittee has
been essential to the remarkable progress we have made in our
recapitalization efforts to date. The Coast Guard remains
committed to sustaining our most critical frontline operations
while funding our most needed acquisition projects.
In the current fiscal environment, this requires difficult
choices. With that in mind, we are balancing funding for our
acquisition projects and operating budgets to address our
highest strategic priorities in the areas we see as greatest
risk.
Our motivated men and women are already seeing the tangible
benefits of our capabilities that have been introduced to the
fleet through our recapitalization programs. A case in point,
recently the crew of the Coast Guard cutter Bertholf employed a
ship-based unmanned aerial vehicle to support the interdiction
of a go-fast smuggling vessel. The Bertholf's crew orchestrated
a seamless aerial surveillance that involved MPA fixed-wing
aircraft, a ScanEagle UAS that was undergoing prototype
testing, handed off to an armed helicopter, who handed off to a
Long Range Interceptor who actually did the stop, the arrest,
and the interdiction. Ended up yielding 600 kilos of virgin
cocaine. This is exactly how the system should work, and we are
very gratified to see this.
The level of interoperability was simply not available with
our legacy assets. It demonstrates how we apply these updated
capabilities to defeat the threats in the offshore environment.
And I would underscore the offshore environment is our area of
greatest risk.
A key element to our layered security regime is persistent
presence in the offshore to deter, detect, to interdict, and to
neutralize threats before they reach our shorelines.
Completing acquisition of the National Security Cutters and
development of an affordable Offshore Patrol Cutter fleet are
critical to the Coast Guard's continued ability to address
threats and protect national interests in the offshore maritime
environment. Our mission set can be particularly challenging in
some of the harsh environmental conditions in which we operate.
Often the question can be asked, if not the Coast Guard, then
who?
We continue to enhance efficiency across the acquisition
portfolio, building on our previous experience and
incorporating lessons learned to minimize risk and maximize the
affordability in our projects. We have achieved stability in
cost and schedule across our largest programs, as evidenced by
the recent fixed-price production contract on the sixth
National Security Cutter, which was awarded at near the same
price as NSCs four and five. This underscores the benefits of
predictable funding and timely contract award. The on-time
delivery of our six Fast Response Cutters, which are already
successfully in service in the 7th District, the Miami/
Caribbean AOR, is further testament to our focus on
implementing best practices across the acquisition portfolio.
In the aviation fleet, we have recently accepted the 15th
Maritime Patrol Aircraft, the HC-144, on budget and on
schedule. We continue to sustain and upgrade the legacy rotary-
wing fleet with critical system enhancements that will equip
aircrews with the capabilities necessary to execute our
missions for the next decade-plus. Should they become
available, we are very excited and poised to accept up to 21 C-
27J aircraft from the Air Force. The business case for
assimilating these aircraft in the Coast Guard inventory is
strong, with a potential of $500 million to $800 million in
cost avoidance depending on how many airframes are made
available.
We recently completed the rollout of the Rescue 21
communications system along our Atlantic, Pacific, and Gulf
Coasts, as well as the Great Lakes, Hawaii and Puerto Rico.
This provides digital selective calling and a digitally based
communication system that includes radio signal location
information for over 41,000 miles of our U.S. coastline. We are
leveraging Rescue 21 capabilities to develop a system
specifically tailored to the unique requirements of Alaska and
our inland Western River System. The Coast Guard recently
reached a milestone of 50,000 search and rescue cases using the
Rescue 21 capability.
We continue to improve and standardize our small boat fleet
through the delivery of the Response Boat-Medium and Response
Boat-Small and delivery of our new standard Over-the-Horizon-
IV, or OTH class IV cutter boat as a common boat deployed on
all our cutters larger than the 110-foot patrol boat. Our
strategy is to limit our ship-borne small boat assets to two, a
7-meter and an 11-meter RB for standardization and universal
use across the cutter classes.
I am very proud of the work of our acquisition
professionals. They perform hard work and thankless work often
on each day to efficiently acquire the assets and capabilities
we need to serve the Nation.
We continue to work hard to make necessary reforms and
realize efficiencies within the acquisition programs. Despite
the significant challenges, we must continue the work we
started on acquisition and mission support reform and keep our
eyes fixed on the horizon.
Our goal, which was set in 2006, was to become a model
midsized Federal agency for acquisition process and results,
and I truly believe we have achieved that goal. I believe that
with predictable funding we can acquire these needed
capabilities efficiently. Your support and predictable funding
of these projects is absolutely critical.
Clearly, we have to make difficult decisions moving forward
in this environment. We will continue to make the best use of
our resources and abilities to provide safe and effective
conduct of our operations in the areas that we see of greatest
risk to the Nation. To the best of our ability, we will
recapitalize our cutters, boats, and aircraft to address
current and emerging threats, particularly in the area of
greatest risk capabilities-wise, as I said, in the offshore
environment.
Thank you again, sir, for the opportunity to testify today.
And thank you for your steadfast support of our Coast Guard. I
look forward to answering your questions.
Mr. Hunter. Thank you, Admiral, for your testimony. I am
now going to recognize Members for questions, starting with
myself.
This subcommittee, I know before I came here, the previous
chairman, Chairman LoBiondo, had hearings about Deepwater and
about the acquisition system for years now, about the
deplorable state of Coast Guard legacy assets, the negative
impact that those old assets and the inability to recapitalize
them has had on performance. The Inspector General, the GAO,
and the Coast Guard have all testified over the last few years
that the continued reliance on aging and failing legacy assets
is robbing the Coast Guard of its ability to conduct its 11
statutory missions.
The Commandant has testified that the Service needs over $2
billion annually to rebuild its assets, to recapitalize. Over
the last decade, Congress has worked closely with each
administration to increase annual funding for the acquisition
program in an effort to reach that goal, even working through
the problems after Deepwater, getting those straightened out,
and saying, OK, now we have a good way ahead.
Unfortunately now this year, as we are finally, I would
say, on a nice flat plain, making progress, the administration
sends us a budget and capital investment plan that cuts our
knees out from under us, that cuts the Coast Guard's knees out
from under it. If the administration is prepared to underfund
and delay the recapitalization of the Coast Guard's assets by
another decade, then it needs to tell us, Congress, and it
needs to tell you, the Coast Guard, which missions you will no
longer be asked to do.
My question is, out of your 11 statutory missions, which
ones will the Service no longer be able to accomplish if
funding remains the way it was this year? Without Congress'
help, where you lose half of your recapitalization budget, and
if your funding stays at $900 million a year going forward, and
we are unable to put that money back in there, which missions
are you not going to do?
I am sure the Coast Guard has looked at this because over
the last few years every report that I have read, the end of it
says, the Coast Guard needs to reexamine which missions it
chooses to do based on the real life--and not the Coast Guard's
strategy but the real life and the reality of the lack of
funding, things like the OPC. Do we need to look at the OPC?
What does it really need to do? Does it need to be in sea state
5? Does it need to be a smaller NSC? Or can we get by with
having it be less capable? So things like that. What has the
Coast Guard determined that its missions can be with the lack
of funding that it is going to receive over the next decade
based on funding this year?
Admiral Currier. Thank you for that question, Mr. Chairman.
I would say this: The Coast Guard is statutorily charged with
11 missions, 11 core missions. They aggregate into maritime
safety, maritime security, protection of the environment. We
site our requirements to perform to a level of capacity across
that 11-mission set. Depending on the resources that we
receive, from an operational perspective in the near term, we
can adjust capacity around the 11 mission capabilities that we
have.
But there are two issues here: One is what we do today and
the other one is what we do tomorrow. Because there is a long-
term investment requirement to maintain the capacity to do
capabilities in those 11 missions. So the two issues are: What
are we doing today and how are we going to invest to ensure
that we can do it tomorrow?
I acknowledge the fact that there have been numerous
reports, many of which have been oriented toward validation of
the program of record that exists, and universally they have
come out to date in support of the program of record as a
reasonable approach. Given the economic times, the fiscal state
of the economy, all the challenges that we are facing as a
Nation, of which we fully recognize, we are not tone-deaf to
that, we think that the current budget demands of us tough
choices, tough choices on where we apply critical funds to the
area we see as the highest level of risk.
The highest level of risk has been identified in our
portfolio as the offshore segment of our layered defense
strategy. So we are driven to, we are required to make tough
choices going into the future on what investments can we afford
to and what will we make to maintain a capacity across our 11
missions into the future?
Quite frankly, were the recapitalization funding level to
remain as it is into the future or be decremented, then that
would require tough choices that put us in a situation where we
will have to go back and say, there are areas that we can't
perform in. And over multiple years, we will end up being a
Coast Guard that looks different from today.
Mr. Hunter. Where are those areas? The ones that you just
mentioned, your last sentence.
Admiral Currier. The administration and the Department this
year--and the Department and Secretary Napolitano has been
particularly supportive of us through this in our cutter
recapitalization in particular--but what we have been asked to
do is to accomplish a portfolio review which basically is to
take what you described as the GAO findings and reassess where
we are with our acquisition portfolio, apply it to our
missions, and find out what we can do and what we can't do.
Because each one of those mission areas are statutorily
mandated, I don't feel that it is incumbent on us to say what
we cannot do specifically capabilities-wise. Capacity-wise we
can say we can only do so much. But this portfolio review is
going to be designed to look at what we do mission-wise and
look at how we are postured to provide that capacity both today
and into the future. And I think the results of that portfolio
review will start to answer the questions that you are asking.
So it won't be the Coast Guard saying, we won't do this or
we can't do this. It will be a combination of the
administration and the Department and the Coast Guard coming to
a rigorous analysis of, given the realities of funding into the
future, what can and what can't we do?
Mr. Hunter. When is that about portfolio review going to be
completed?
Admiral Currier. It has started. We have had meetings with
OMB and the Department. So the effort started. We haven't
totally agreed to when the product will come out. Part of it is
dependent on the rigor that I described. We have models that we
use that were the same models basically that set the force
structure for Deepwater and our acquisition strategies to date.
And we need to run the data through those models to come up
with the effect on mission and the acquisition portfolio.
So it is not just an arbitrary scan and cuts based on less
than a rigorous analysis that is statistically based. It kind
of goes back to what you were saying about, what do we really
need for sea state 5? How many cutters do we need there? Show
me the empirical case for that. And that is what we will be
generating.
Mr. Hunter. Great. Would you come back after you have
completed that rigorous analysis?
Admiral Currier. Absolutely. Yes, sir.
Mr. Hunter. Thank you, Admiral.
Mr. Garamendi is recognized.
Mr. Garamendi. Mr. Chairman, following on your line of
questions, if this budget scenario continues--this is, I think,
the second year or maybe even the third year in which we have
seen these kind of stresses placed on the budget, the
acquisition budget, and now with sequestration on the
operational budgets--we are going, this committee is going to
have to seriously consider modifying the mission of the Coast
Guard. And that is where this is headed.
And you have raised that question, Mr. Chairman. And we
really need to get into this in detail. The last question that
you raised or the last few questions you have raised is
imperative. I would hope it comes soon so that we can spend a
good portion of our time in the remaining session this year to
really get at that.
And we need to understand the implications of it. Just this
week, the Senate is dealing with border security in the
immigration bill. And they have approved or are about to
approve an amendment--I think they did approve an amendment
that would add $46.3 billion to border security on the Mexican
border. We have a lot more border than Mexico. We have all of
the maritime border, which is increasingly being used for
immigrants. I think there are many cases that the Coast Guard
can talk about.
It seems to me that as we go through this immigration
issue, and if, in fact, we are going to spend $46 billion on
border security on the land, we need to think seriously about
the rest of the border. And we also need to think seriously
about threats to, let's just call it nuclear threats. We are
projected to spend some $5 billion on an east coast missile
defense site which assumes that Iran is going to send a missile
our way, which would then assume that Iran disappears from the
map.
However, the more likely event is to use the ports. If we
are going to have a nuclear threat, it is not likely to come
from a missile. It is likely to come from a container. So that
brings us back to the role of the Coast Guard.
Where I am headed here, Mr. Chairman, is that we, as the
deciders--to use a word from the previous administration--as
the people that are going to make these decisions, we need to
think about this in a holistic way. The National Defense
Authorization Act that passed off the floor of the House added
$2.6 billion for unknown airplanes, materials, and supplies for
the Afghan National Army. We would never let the Coast Guard
have $2.6 billion without explaining to us in detail how they
are going to spend it down to the last pencil and bolt. But we
have allocated $2.6 billion to the Afghan National Army in
unspecified use.
The problem is here. The problem is among the 535 of us
that are making, frankly, some very irrational decisions. And
we need to really think seriously about how we are going to
deal with this.
Admiral, I think, to go back to you, beside my
pontification here, you and the Coast Guard are going to have
to explain to us how you are going to carry out the missions,
the statutory missions that you are faced with given the fact
that the Congress of the United States, together with the
administration, is downsizing the Coast Guard. So what can be
done? And we need to understand completely the implications of
that. So when will you have that done?
Admiral Currier. Sir, I think, as I said to the chairman,
the portfolio review is going to reveal those answers. It is
going to establish a position from the administration, the
Department, and the Coast Guard on, given levels of funding,
what we will be able to do and what we will not be able to do.
I think a basic, if you don't mind, just a very brief
understanding of how we operate, especially in the context of
the threat that you described, is probably important. We have
developed post-9/11 a very sophisticated layered strategy for
the defense of our coastline and ports. It doesn't start 5
miles off the beach. It starts in foreign ports. It starts with
IMO-type agreements on security regimes in foreign ports and
our inspection of those ports. It depends on intelligence from
all-source throughout the U.S. Government and international
partners on what are the anomalies on a container? What are the
anomalies on a ship? And then it depends on a layered strategy
for defense that starts offshore, because our goal would be to
hold the threat away from our coast, to near shore, and to in
the port.
And I would tell you, in that layered strategy, which has
proved to be quite effective, the weak link at this point is
our offshore capability, and that translates to the NSC and
OPC. So what we are saying is, we have laid out an acquisition
strategy that has recapitalized successfully, and our in-the-
port, to a large extent, our in-the-port capability, our near-
shore coastal, and our overseas capability in partnership with
other Government agencies and other nations is strong. It is
the offshore capability that our ships present that are having
the greatest decline in capacity and capability.
Mr. Garamendi. So the bottom line of that is that the
entire strategy has a serious flaw. That is, you are missing
one of the key assets.
Admiral Currier. Well, what it will show you, sir, is that
as we are under fiscal duress like everyone else is in the
Federal Government, we are going to make triage-like choices to
go to that area of highest risk and spend the critical capital
that we receive. And right now, that is why we are emphasizing
the procurement of the NSCs and then the OPC follow-on. And we
are fully, fully aware that the OPC program needs to be
affordable.
Mr. Garamendi. If I am not mistaken, for the National
Security Cutters, the next one out is going to get delayed. Is
that correct?
Admiral Currier. We have long-lead funding for seven, and I
have no information that there will be delays in follow-on
cutters.
Mr. Garamendi. So seven. How about eight?
Admiral Currier. Eight? We don't have long-lead funding
identified for eight, which would, if that were to be the case,
result in about a year's delay and some cost increase.
Mr. Garamendi. Given the way in which the budget is going,
and without a significant change on our part and the
administration's, you are headed into a long-term budget that
is headed down. Will you be able to in that budget provide for
the eighth cutter?
Admiral Currier. Yes, sir, I believe we will. But it is
going to be at great cost. And it is, as I said, it is a triage
exercise.
Mr. Garamendi. Well, this goes back to what the chairman
was saying in his statement, is that we need to fully
understand what the future is going to be here, and we need to
have that in detail.
Admiral Currier. Yes, sir.
Mr. Garamendi. Because we are basically operating on
yesterday's plan, which is not consistent with the current
reality. And my point to us, the 535 of us, is that we are
making choices here about where to allocate the resources
available for the United States Government. And, frankly, in my
view, some of those choices are nonsense. And I made two
points, $2.6 billion this coming year for the Afghan National
Army to buy something. Mostly, I think it is probably to open
another account in Qatar for the Karzai government.
Let's move on. I yield back.
Mr. Hunter. Thank the ranking member.
I would like to recognize the former chairman of the
subcommittee, Mr. LoBiondo.
Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have a couple of questions, Admiral, but before I do that
I want to just say, after having the opportunity to chair this
subcommittee for 12 years, the budget that was sent to us is so
separated from reality.
I am a little bit concerned. I am agreeing with Mr.
Garamendi here. I don't know how much we agree on. But this is
so shortsighted. And this is out of your lane. You have got to
take what comes down from the top. But for the record, do we
not remember what happened on September 11? Do we not remember
on September 10 the Coast Guard had no homeland security really
to deal with? And on September 11, everything was ramped up and
we knew that we had to have the Coast Guard prepared? And yet
we are spending money in areas, as Mr. Garamendi said, that
nobody can keep track of. And the few dollars extra that we
could use for the Coast Guard to be prepared, the most
underrecognized and underappreciated Service that there is,
this is absurd. It is totally absurd. Almost a 50-percent cut
in acquisitions, takes us back to the 1990s? What are we doing?
When will we wake up? I had to get that off.
Admiral, in the last session, Mr. Larsen and I teamed up
together and saw reform of the Coast Guard acquisition, and we
worked with the Service to really get things back on track. I
think we have made a great deal of progress. But I remain
concerned that a few of the assets delivered to date are still
not performing anywhere close to expectations. For example, one
of the reasons Deepwater proposed to replace 12 High Endurance
Cutters with the National Security Cutters was that the Service
would be able to get significantly more days away from the port
with the NCS. Central to doing so was a crew rotation concept
which the Service has yet to formalize.
The Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of 2012--
Mr. Garamendi, this may answer one of your questions--prevents
the sixth National Security Cutter from becoming ready for
operations until the Service submits to Congress how the first
three National Security Cutters will achieve the goal of 225
days away from home port. What is the plan for achieving 225
days away from home port? And when will you implement that
plan?
Admiral Currier. Thank you, Mr. LoBiondo, for that
question. And also, thank you for your support over the years
for our acquisition processes. You have been a great champion
of our cause, and we truly appreciate that.
To get to the crew rotation concept, which is what you are
describing, the baseline of the legacy assets, the 378-foot
cutter, was 185 days away from home port. The goal of the new
program, the National Security Cutter, was 225 in some
documents, 230 in other documents for the goal of days away
from home port.
We bring new cutters on, a new class of cutters. We have
had a few growing pains, but not anything that is out of the
norm for the Navy's experience or our previous experience. So
where we are today is we will home port three cutters or we
have home ported the first three cutters in Alameda,
California. Those cutters are scheduled for dry dock
availabilities over the next couple of years to do some
configuration enhancements that were identified later in the
class that need to be retrofitted, to do some maintenance, and
basically we will be in dry dock for a period of time. Those
are the three cutters.
Once those cutters are out of dry dock, we will have them
in Alameda. We will marry up the extra crew. We will have the
shore plant facility to run a full-scale evaluation on CRC. The
goal of CRC is 230 days away from home port. In the interim,
until then, the cutters that exist, the National Security
Cutters will average across the fleet 210 days away from home
port. So we are 20 days short of the eventual goal now.
In the interim, until 2017, late 2017, which is when we
will be able to fully implement the evaluation of CRC, we will
be 210 days until then and then 230 days following. So the end
of 2017 is when we will fully implement the 230-day crew or
cutter requirement.
Mr. LoBiondo. Well, 2017 is a long ways off.
Mr. Chairman, I have another related question from the
Inspector General. But recognizing my time, I will wait for
round two.
Mr. Hunter. Thank the gentleman.
Mr. Larsen is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you.
Admiral, section 220 of the Coast Guard Maritime
Transportation Act of 2012 requires the Commandant to maintain
the approved program of record for the acquisition of 180 RB-Ms
unless the Commandant transmits to the committee documentation
justifying a smaller acquisition. And as you know, the budget
outlines a smaller acquisition, but we haven't received the
justification for that smaller acquisition, the one that we
specifically asked for.
So have we missed that? Has the Coast Guard submitted the
justification as it requires? And if we have not, when will we
receive that written justification?
Admiral Currier. Thank you, Mr. Larsen, for that question,
and also for your support over the years as well.
As you know, the RB-M program is fantastically successful
for us. It had a long developmental----
Mr. Larsen. I would argue right now it is only \17/18\
successful.
Admiral Currier. Say again? I am sorry.
Mr. Larsen. It is only \17/18\ successful. That is, you
have stopped acquisition at 170 when we told you 180.
Admiral Currier. Yes, sir. I will be happy to answer that.
Mr. Larsen. Yeah.
Admiral Currier. We have gone back and we have revalidated,
because of the capabilities of this small boat, against our in-
shore threats and vulnerabilities. And we feel that due to the
capabilities and capacities of this boat, which far exceed what
we expected, that we feel, given the tough choices we are
forced to make in this budget environment, that 170 is the
proper number. That has been agreed to by our Assistant
Commandant for operations, who sets the requirements for the
Service. That will be coming forth in the acquisition program
baseline review for the RB-M, which is in process now.
Mr. Larsen. When do we expect to see that, though?
Admiral Currier. I will have to get back to you for the
record on that, sir.
[The information follows:]
The revised Response Boat-Medium (RB-M) Acquisition
Program Baseline Review is in internal routing/
clearance within the Coast Guard with approval and
forwarding expected during the fourth quarter of 2013.
Mr. Larsen. And I appreciate it. You and your team, it has
been great working with the subcommittee here over the last
several years to get things in order. And I do appreciate that.
It just seems to me that if we don't get that justification
report that we had asked for in the 2012 act until after you
have fully completed the acquisition of 170 and terminated the
program, that starting the program over again to get the
additional 10--or more if the committee so decides--we will
have all the startup costs, again, adding more to the program.
So it can be seen in my eyes that you are terminating a program
before we get the justification report, and then it is too late
to go to 180. Do you see how I can see that?
Admiral Currier. Yes, sir. I see that. And I could do two
things. First of all, get back for the record, and you in
particular, on the projected delivery of the acquisition
program baseline change. And then I will get you preliminary
documentation from our operations directorate that states the
clear justification for 170. So you can review that in advance.
Mr. Larsen. The sooner the better.
Admiral Currier. Yes, sir.
[The information follows:]
The Coast Guard has reanalyzed the Response Boat-Medium
(RB-M) fleet size and determined that 170 boats will be
sufficient to meet the operational need. A revised RB-M
Acquisition Program Baseline (APB) is in routing within
the Coast Guard with approval and forwarding expected
during the fourth quarter 2013.
Mr. Larsen. Great. Thanks.
On the Arctic, with regards to the Arctic policy strategy
that you released last month, indicates a need for increasing
maritime domain awareness in the Arctic. And what sort of
resources does the Coast Guard plan on acquiring to improve
that domain awareness in the Arctic?
Admiral Currier. Domain awareness in the Arctic is going to
be a partnership effort. There is not going to be any
unilateral organization service agency that is going to be able
to come up with the resources to exert domain awareness or a
realtime picture of what is going on in the Arctic. But in
combination with the State of Alaska, with NOAA, with our
partner component agencies, and the Department of Defense, I am
confident--and I can't discuss it higher than the M-class
level--but I am confident that we can demonstrate today a high
level of maritime domain awareness in the Arctic. So I think we
are on a good track with that.
Mr. Larsen. Now that you have the strategy, I know that the
DOD has its strategy. In my office, we are going to put more
time into looking at what it takes to implement that strategy.
And we look forward to working with you on that.
Then finally on Offshore Patrol Cutter, OPC, can you give
me yet and the committee yet an exact date when you will down-
select from eight to three?
Admiral Currier. Yes. We will down-select to three by the
end of this fiscal year. The target is the end of this fiscal
year. And then that will be for a preliminary design contract.
Mr. Larsen. Right.
Admiral Currier. And then there will be another year or so
before we do the actual selection of the single cutter that
will be the OPC.
Mr. Larsen. Right.
Admiral Currier. So the end of the fiscal year will be the
contract down-select for three candidates that will produce
preliminary contract design. And then a year later--and that is
a softer date--will be the actual award of the contract for the
Offshore Patrol Cutter.
Mr. Larsen. So if I may, Mr. Chairman, so the end of the
fiscal year is a hard date?
Admiral Currier. It is a target, sir.
Mr. Larsen. OK.
Admiral Currier. And it is in good faith. I can't tell you
it is a hard and fast date. But indications are at this point
that we will meet that target.
Mr. Larsen. Yeah. OK. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hunter. Thank the gentleman.
I would like to welcome and recognize the newest member of
the subcommittee, from South Carolina, Mr. Sanford.
Mr. Sanford. No questions.
Mr. Hunter. No questions.
Ms. Hahn is recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. Hahn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Garamendi. Really appreciated the remarks that have been coming
out of this committee this morning. I, of course, am one of
those, since I represent the Port of Los Angeles, which is
right next to the Port of Long Beach, the largest port complex
in this country, I have long said the Coast Guard is certainly,
you know, the line of defense when it comes to our Nation's
coasts and waters.
But for me, particularly, the port complex, I still am one,
which I will always go on record saying, I believe our Nation's
ports are still one of our more vulnerable entryways into this
country. I have never been happy with the fact that, even
though Congress passed a law after 9/11 to inspect our
containers 100 percent, we are nowhere close to that. We have
now all sort of just decided to accept the fact that we are
inspecting 2 to 3 percent of our containers. And we are more of
this at-risk, the layered strategy of defense, which makes me
uncomfortable. We have 5,000 men and women that work on our
docks on a daily basis. There are about close to a million
people probably just close to the proximity of Long Beach and
the L.A. ports. If there was something to happen at that port,
loss of lives, but certainly would absolutely disrupt this
Nation's economy and potentially the global economy if
something happened.
So I am all about really completely, I hope we can increase
the funding for our Coast Guard men and women who we really do
depend on to protect us.
You know, last time we had a committee hearing with my
friend Peter Neffenger, vice admiral--he used to be the captain
of the Port at Los Angeles--he testified that the Coast Guard's
cutter fleet was approaching between 40 and 50 years. And
because of its age, it was becoming less reliable and suffering
more casualties, forcing the Coast Guard to cut down on its
patrol hours over the last 5 years. In fact, according to a
report by the Inspector General of the Department of Homeland
Security, patrol and flight hours have decreased somewhere
between 8 and 12 percent.
So can you talk to this committee a little bit about your
aging fleet and how that has reduced the Coast Guard's
operational capacity and how sequestration might, on top of
that, added to that problem, and how does that impact you?
And I will throw in my other question. You know, I am very
concerned about the Panga boats that are a huge threat,
certainly out on the west coast. Unfortunately, we lost a great
Coast Guard member when the Halibut was rammed by a Panga boat,
Chief Petty Officer Terrell Horne. I am really worried about
that. I am worried about that from a security standpoint, its
human trafficking potentials, drug potential. And let me know,
if you can tell this committee what our strategy is in light of
everything to address that issue.
So both those. Your aging fleet, sequestration, and can you
give us some comfort on your strategy for the very dangerous
Panga boat epidemic that is rising.
Admiral Currier. Thank you for those questions, ma'am.
I will start with the aging fleet. We have three classes of
cutter, basically. We have a patrol boat which is being
replaced by the FRC. The OPC Medium Endurance Cutter class, and
then the larger class of cutter, the offshore, the National
Security Cutter. And where our gaps are, as I have explained,
really are tiered. We are in good shape in shore with the
patrol boats. And you see that every day in Los Angeles, L.A./
Long Beach. We are in OK shape for now for our medium class of
cutter, which the OPC is designed to replace.
Where our gap is in our larger ships, the ones that patrol
the Bering Sea, offshore CONUS, the eastern Pacific, the
western Caribbean, drug engagement, migrant engagement. This is
where our most serious gap is at this point.
Our aviation fleet is in reasonable shape. And I will
hopefully talk later a little bit about the C-27 and what that
might mean to us.
As we move into the budget environment that we are in, we
continue to focus on our greatest area of risk from a
capabilities perspective, and that is the National Security
Cutter, funding that ship, which is a fundamental enhancement.
It is 8 ships for 12 ships, the older ones that we are laying
up, but it is a huge enhancement in capability. As I explained
before, the Bertholf's case with the UAV and the helicopter and
the fast interdiction boat the Over-the-Horizon RB, and the C4
capability is just something we have never had before. It
enhances our effectiveness.
But that is where the gap is. The gap is in the offshore.
And the National Security Cutter is the key to that. The
Offshore Patrol Cutter will be the next critical acquisition,
and we have talked a little bit about that.
Sequestration effect on mission. I would never tell you
that sequestration would have an effect of being a drop in
missions, like we are going along fine and then all of a sudden
we are not doing a mission. It is an erosive effect. All right?
I will give you an example. While we will never compromise
our ability to do search and rescue and the most critical law
enforcement missions, there is a reduction in our ability to
put steel on target for certain areas like counternarcotics in
the eastern Pacific. We have less ship days, less aircraft
days, fewer days down there. And they are part of a system,
they are intertwined, because you have to have a surface asset
to do the interdiction.
My concern over the long term in sequestration is that that
erosive effect will start to get to some of those missions that
we have been doing and we will see a reduction in our ability
to interdict drugs and criminal activity and even migrants to a
certain extent.
To get to southern California, our number one operational
priority now is an operation called Baja Tempestad, which is
run between L.A. to San Diego, OK, because that is where we see
the Panga threat. That Panga threat actually you have seen
landings as far north as Monterey, which is amazing considering
it is an open boat. So what we have done is, we have put a
block down there with our assets in leadership of component
agencies like Border Patrol, Customs and Border Protection, the
local, State, and Federal law enforcement agencies down there,
and I think that focus is showing great yield. We are
interdicting. We are stopping.
Some are getting through. But I think Baja Tempestad is a
real success story, and it shows not only our agility but the
agility of the Department of Homeland Security to put a block
in place where there is an emerging crisis.
As they become more effective in shutting down the land
border, you are going to see the end run in the maritime
because there is little resistance to that. And it is incumbent
on us to make sure that we allocate resources accordingly to do
the block there. And it also is the case on the Texas side, to
be perfectly honest, Brownsville.
So I don't think sequestration to this point has affected
Baja Tempestad, but it is affecting our overarching ability to
put steel on target for some of these mission areas.
I hope that answers your question.
Mr. Hunter. The gentlelady's time has expired.
Like to recognize Mr. Young for 5 minutes.
Mr. Young. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will make this short.
And I do apologize for being late.
Admiral, I see in your budget you have got $8 million
acquisition funding to initiate a survey and design activity
for a new polar icebreaker. But that was in 2013. Now in 2014,
I see there is only $2 million. It is my understanding the
Coast Guard's 5-year capital investment plan included an
additional $852 million for fiscal year 2014 for acquiring the
ship. I was told that the Coast Guard anticipated awarding a
construction contract for that ship within the next 5 years and
taking delivery of the ship within a decade. Are we still on
the track for the 5-year program?
Admiral Currier. Yes, sir, we are. And I would say that the
acquisition construction of an icebreaker first of class, only
of class likely is a very complex undertaking.
Mr. Young. Don't take too long to answer these questions. I
want to ask you a question. Admiral Papp and I have discussed
this for years.
Admiral Currier. Yeah, we are on track.
Mr. Young. In 1980, we had the last study about leasing the
vessel. Because I still don't think Congress is going to
appropriate a billion dollars, approximately a billion dollars
to build an icebreaker. I mean, that is something I would like
to have a request, maybe I will request the Coast Guard to look
into the possibility of leasing a vessel that is American
built, because we need those icebreakers in the Arctic. You
know, we had the Operation Arctic Shield. You did what you had.
Less iron on the ground.
But the Arctic is the future. And we are way behind. I
can't get people to understand that. But I can see this
Congress at this time and a later time appropriating a billion
dollars to build an icebreaker. We did this once 38 years ago
with the Polar Star and I think the Polaris and the Healy.
Which reminds me, Admiral, where is the status of the
Polaris and the Polar Star now? Are they totally scrapped? Or
are they going to be fixed? Are they going to be operational?
Admiral Currier. Polar Star is underway as we speak. Just
finished refit. It is fit for sea and is actually going to the
ice to get some experience for the crew in the northern tier
before they deploy to McMurdo next year. The Polar Sea is in
caretaker status. It is cold iron, we would call it called,
tied to a pier in Seattle, and we are trying to determine what
the future is for that ship. The Healy is a full-up midlife
ship. It is a science ship, as you know, and is executing its
scheduled missions.
Mr. Young. Well, again, have you looked, has the Coast
Guard looking at the refitting cost of the--I believe it is the
Polaris--versus waiting now, according to this, 15 years before
we have an icebreaker at sea?
Admiral Currier. Well, we have--the Healy is midlife. We
have got a long-term availability for her. The Polar Sea or the
Polar Star is--got 7 to 10 years of life left in her, and the
Polar Sea--to refit the Polar Sea, I think that was one of your
questions.
Mr. Young. Yes.
Admiral Currier. Would be about 3 years and about $100
million to bring that from coal iron back to a 7- to 10-year
life left.
Mr. Young. What I am trying to get across, according to the
schedule, the 5-year schedule and a decade, that is 15 years,
at least, and that is probably optimistic if you build a new
ship, and I would like to have the Coast Guard look at the
possibility of getting all three of the older icebreakers
operational so they can be dispersed in the Arctic, and
secondly, look at the cost-benefit ratio of a icebreaker that
could be leased at a cheaper rate, I believe, than you can
getting one built and get it in the field sooner. Because I
really think, China is all up there, as you know, and Russia is
up there. Everybody is fooling around in the Arctic but the
United States, and I just think it is time that--and it is our
responsibility to fund you, but I think it is time that the
Coast Guard maybe think out of the box a little bit, take those
three ships, get them operational, and make sure they can do
the job until, if you are going to build one and we appropriate
the money for it, or you lease or it, or whatever it is, so we
can have a full force of Arctic activity up there, because like
I say, China is up there.
I don't know whether you have done this or not. I am about
out of time. Have you looked at the type of vessels now are
trespassing across that Arctic area in the Northwest Passage,
what they are carrying?
Admiral Currier. Yes, sir. We have a pretty good awareness
of what is going on up there. On the Russian side, the North
Sea route they call it, there is all kinds of activity over
there. On our side, it has been generally to mineral
exploitation in Alaska or the offshore drilling. But there is
also cruise ships and some other things that are going on up
there, ecotourism, and we have full visibility of that.
Mr. Young. All right. My time is up, but just, you know, I
would appreciate it if we maybe think out of the box and I know
I have had this argument with every admiral for the last 40
years. I know you like to own steel, but sometimes it is not
very efficient.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hunter. Thank the gentleman from Alaska.
Mr. Garamendi is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Garamendi. I have great confidence in the gentleman
from Alaska taking care of the ice cutter--the icebreakers. If
only we could give you a opportunity for a, maybe--yes, we
would have to change the rules, wouldn't we, so that you could
have your own little program up there.
Mr. Young. Oh, I am willing to secede from the Union right
now for an earmark.
Mr. Garamendi. And then you could be emperor of the North.
I would like to move to the aircraft issue, and
specifically, most of us on this committee also serving on the
Armed Services Committee, so the issue of the C-27 comes up,
and if we could have a discussion about the C-27, the
acquisition for the Maritime Patrol Aircraft program seems to
be moving from acquiring a new plane to acquiring the C-27s.
Where are you with the C-27s? What is the status of these
negotiations with the Air Force? We can probably have something
to do with that if you are basing this whole program on the C-
27s. Let's talk about it.
Admiral Currier. OK, sir. At the risk of giving too long an
answer, I apologize in advance, but----
Mr. Garamendi. Take your time.
Admiral Currier. Our program of record was for the HC-144,
which is a CASA is the name of the aircraft. We have 18 of them
funded. We have 15 delivered, and we are--we have funding for
18 aircraft, 17 mission pallets, so you have got basically a
cargo aircraft that in it has a very sophisticated sensor
package. We were forced--would be forced to take a strategic
pause in that acquisition in fiscal year 2014, and subsequently
we would have to re-examine the affordability of the aircraft,
vis-a-vis, the whole acquisition portfolio.
What became available or likely will become available is
the C-27J, which is a cargo aircraft that the Air Force
operates that is--there are 14 in existence and 7 being
delivered. The NDAA, last year, carved out seven for the Forest
Service for firefighting activity, and we feel that leaves 14
of these aircraft potentially available for the Coast Guard,
and it would be a mil-to-mil transfer. In other words, it is
not like transferring to a civilian agency. It is much easier.
You sign basically a form, and it transfers to our Service.
It comes, they are very low time airframes, actually was a
finalist candidate for the MPA originally, OK. It comes with
SATCOM, radar, some of the things that we need to do our jobs.
There are a couple of minor--some sensors that would have to be
added to the aircraft, but we will be able to use it right
away. So this is 14 aircraft that, depending on how many we
get, could be up to $750 to $800 million cost avoidance if we
are able to execute this deal.
Where it is now, it is in the Air Force's court. We are on
record. The Secretary Napolitano talked to Secretary Hagel. We
are on record for 14 to 21. If we took all of those aircraft
on, we would probably stop our acquisition of the MPA, focus on
operationalizing these aircraft and have that class of aircraft
bought out, so----
Mr. Garamendi. The current acquisition program is for what
kind of plane?
Admiral Currier. The current----
Mr. Garamendi. And who makes it?
Admiral Currier. It is called a CASA the generic term for
it, HC-144, twin-engine transport-type aircraft with an
embedded sensor package. The original program of record was 36.
Mr. Garamendi. Right.
Admiral Currier. We bought or funded for 18.
Mr. Garamendi. Basically halfway there.
Admiral Currier. So we would stop at halfway, we would take
on the C-27 to complete that capabilities requirement.
Mr. Garamendi. Right.
Admiral Currier. What it would give us is two classes of
aircraft in the medium range.
Mr. Garamendi. Where I am going, I understand, you would
have two different airplanes you would have to maintain, so you
have got some issues having to do maintenance and so forth.
There is going to be a kickback from whoever is manufacturing
that plane, the CASA. Who manufactures the CASA?
Admiral Currier. It is made by a company called Alenia, and
they are an overseas company, but----
Mr. Garamendi. It is a foreign company that is
manufacturing the CASA.
Admiral Currier. Oh, no, CASA, the original aircraft is
made by a European company. I thought you were asking about the
C-27J. They are also made----
Mr. Garamendi. No. They are on the ground or flying, one or
the other. I just wondered where the kickback comes. When
somebody loses 18 aircraft, we hear about it, but it is a
foreign company that does that. Thank you.
So you are going to save some $700 to $800 million if we
carry this out.
Admiral Currier. It could be $500 to $750 million or so.
Mr. Garamendi. OK. And what we need--what I need to know
and perhaps the committee also is, is that is this moving
slowly or are there speed bumps or other problems that might
cause this to go off track?
Admiral Currier. I don't foresee any at this point. The
decision has to be made by the Secretary of the Air Force
basically and with the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense.
We have signaled strongly that we are ready to accept them at
any time.
Mr. Garamendi. My personal opinion, it is a really good
idea to acquire those, and whatever modifications are
necessary, put those into the budget so that gets done.
Admiral Currier. Yes, sir.
Mr. Garamendi. Potential savings of three-quarters of a
billion dollars is significant, and I know there is going to be
some kickback coming from whoever doesn't have that contract to
manufacture the remaining 18. I think we can handle that. So,
if you will let us know. I know that, I don't know, four of us
that are up here on the Armed Services Committee, and I think
we are aware of the potential problems here.
I have no further questions.
Mr. Hunter. Mr. LoBiondo is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. LoBiondo. Thanks again, Mr. Chairman. I have a followup
question, Admiral, tagging onto the first one, but before I do,
I am just--I am sorry. I got to continue my rant a little bit
about this budget.
What I don't think most people understand is in addition to
the acquisition problem that we have, that we are decimating
the Coast Guard's leadership for the future. I have the honor
of representing the only Coast Guard recruit training center in
the Nation. For years and years and years, the throughput was
about 5,000 recruits. If I'm not mistaken, I think this year it
is going to be about 2,000. I think it is damaging morale, and
I think the officer corps that we rely on for the experience
and the expertise and the motivation for the younger ones is
just going to be gutted here, so from every aspect we look at
this these are intangibles that you can't measure. These are
intangibles that you can't read on a spreadsheet somewhere
about what it is going to mean, so I don't know what we can do
about this, but I am pretty cranked up over it and I am--so it
won't be the last I have to say.
Admiral, the second part of the question, the first part
was about the days at sea. Both the DHS Inspector General and
the GAO have raised concerns that the National Security Cutters
delivered to date do not meet planned capability.
Now, when we talked about how these would be laid out, we
focused a lot on capability because we knew we would have one
shot at doing this right. They have noted that without Unmanned
Aircraft Systems on the National Security Cutters, the National
Security Cutters are no more capable than the 40-year-old High
Endurance Cutters that they are replacing.
So, as we are squeezed down with acquisitions, it is
important that what we do have out there in acquisitions have
the maximum capability.
What is the status of the Service's plans to acquire UAS or
other capability for the National Security Cutter and fill the
current capability gap and when will the National Security
Cutter be outfitted with UAS?
Admiral Currier. Thank you, sir, for that question.
Specifically to the National Security Cutter, we have UAS on
board the Bertholf now. We are running a test. That is the
ScanEagle. It is a small lightweight but very capable UAS that
is being tested today as we speak. Earlier, I described a case
where they had great success.
The second UAS that might conceivably be used with a
National Security Cutter is the Navy Fire Scout program, which
we are very close to. As you know, sir, originally we had our
own program for UAS for the National Security Cutter, but about
6 years ago we decided to go with the Navy to let them do the
science on this thing. They have proved the concept of this
thing in Afghanistan and in theater in the Persian Gulf, and I
hold great promise that as it is developed we will be able to
adapt it to the National Security Cutter. I don't have a time
for you because we don't control the program. In the interim,
we will use that small, lightweight, highly capable UAS package
on the National Security Cutter and it will fill probably 70
percent of the mission that we would have--we will eventually
use Fire Scout for.
The third thing we are doing UAS-wise is the Guardian
Predator project we have going with CBP. We are supporting
them. General Atomics makes that aircraft. I have met with
them, their chief engineer, to talk about what marinerzation
means and what tailoring that aircraft would require for Coast
Guard use, very productive meeting, and I think that we are
eventually going to have that class of UAS supporting the
cutter offshore as well. So, there is progress being made, sir.
Mr. LoBiondo. Mr. Chairman, if I could, I think that the
capability component of these National Security Cutters is key
and I just hope that the Coast Guard isn't using the Navy, sort
of, to slow walk what we are able to do here. There ought to be
some way we can try to have some inquiries or get this jacked
up, because if you have no idea, then that means we are years
away, and I just don't think that is acceptable.
But I thank you and I yield back.
Mr. Hunter. Thank the gentleman. I have a question for the
record, and I will just, just if you could update us on the
Response Boat-Smalls, that program, we talked about having a 7-
-- you talked about an 11-foot RB and a smaller RB; is that
right?
Admiral Currier. Well, sir, we are talking about a little
bit of two different things, OK. The 7- and 11-meter RBs are
the cutter boats.
Mr. Hunter. Meter RBs.
Admiral Currier. They go on the ships, and we are going to
go to two classes of them for all kinds of reasons, economy,
effectiveness of maintenance and all that. The RB-S is actually
the in-port boat, and we are evaluating the fleet size on them
and we are recapitalizing them as is required. Twenty-five feet
long, very successful, you see them everywhere in the United
States. So there are two distinct classes of boats.
Mr. Hunter. Is that program being cut significantly, the
Response Boat-Small program?
Admiral Currier. The Response Boat-Small program is not
being cut as a result of budgetary pressure. We are
reevaluating our need for the number of those boats based on
our experience post-9/11 on what we really need to do the port
security job, so adjustments to that fleet size will be based
on operation requirements, not budgetary pressure.
Mr. Hunter. OK. Admiral, thank you. Thank you for your
service and thank you for your time. There are no further--oh,
Ms. Hahn you have more questions? I would like to recognize Ms.
Hahn. We do have a second panel we need to get through as well.
Ms. Hahn. OK. Thank you. I will be brief. Just a quick
change of subject because you did touch on it in your
statement, and as you know, the ineffective handling of sexual
assault cases has plagued the military recently and there has
been a huge push to make some major reforms in this area, so
obviously, sitting here looking at all the men showing up for
this hearing, has the Coast Guard made any changes to how it
deals with sexual assault cases? And could you tell us what
specific policies has the Coast Guard implemented?
Admiral Currier. Yes, ma'am. We recognized this problem
about a year ago and it became the object of focus for the
Service. Subsequent to that, there is a film called ``The
Invisible War,'' which I am sure you are familiar with. It has
become a banner headline, but I will tell you that we have a
Service-level strategy, a senior executive working group that
tiers down into working groups. We have overhauled our
training, we have overhauled our messaging, we have overhauled
our system of accountability for not only perpetrators but for
commanders that have environments that are perhaps permissive.
They are held accountable as well. We are in lockstep with the
Department of Defense and the other military services, and we
are cooperating with Congress and the Department and the
administration. Universally, this was held as a problem. This
behavior is a crime, it is a breach of trust, and we are
committed to eradicating this behavior from the Service because
it is a matter of trust, and as I said in my opening statement,
that is a priceless attribute that we have in the military.
Ms. Hahn. Thank you.
Mr. Hunter. Does the gentlelady yield back?
Ms. Hahn. Yes.
Mr. Hunter. OK. Admiral, thank you for your time and your
testimony and your service.
Admiral Currier. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hunter. I would like the second panel to come forward,
please.
Our second panel of witnesses include Mr. Ronald O'Rourke
of the Congressional Research Service; Dr. Steven Bucci. Did I
say that right?
Mr. Bucci. Bucci.
Mr. Hunter. Bucci. Director for Douglas and Sarah Allison
Center for Foreign Policy of the Heritage Foundation; and Dr.
Lawrence Korb, Senior Fellow at the Center for American
Progress.
Mr. O'Rourke, you are now recognized.
TESTIMONY OF RONALD O'ROURKE, SPECIALIST IN NAVAL AFFAIRS,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE; STEVEN P. BUCCI, PH.D.,
DIRECTOR, DOUGLAS AND SARAH ALLISON CENTER FOR FOREIGN POLICY,
THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION; AND LAWRENCE KORB, PH.D., SENIOR
FELLOW, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS
Mr. O'Rourke. Chairman Hunter, Ranking Member Garamendi,
distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify today on Coast Guard acquisition.
Chairman Hunter, with your permission, I would like to submit
my statement for the record and summarize it here in a few
brief remarks.
The Coast Guard's fiscal year 2014 5-year acquisition plan
has about one-third less funding than last year's plan. That is
the largest reduction in a 5-year plan that I have seen in many
years, and it has occurred in the absence of any change in the
Coast Guard's strategic environment that might substantially
reduce Coast Guard mission demands. The plan's average funding
level of $1 billion a year will likely require the Coast Guard
to reduce procurement rates, which would increase unit costs,
lengthen replacement times and possibly compel the Coast Guard
to further extend the lives of aging platforms. The likely
eventual result would be a smaller and/or older Coast Guard
with less mission capacity than called for in the program of
record.
In this sense, the plan raises a fundamental question for
Congress about the Coast Guard's ability to recapitalize its
assets in a timely manner and adequately perform its statutory
missions in coming years. It also raises a potential oversight
question for Congress concerning year-to-year stability in DHS
budget planning and the reliability of DHS budget projections.
In assessing the Coast Guard's future needs, it can be
noted as a starting point that although the program of record
force would have considerably more capacity than the legacy
force, the Coast Guard has estimated that the program of record
force would nevertheless have substantial capacity gaps for
performing six of the Coast Guard's 11 statutory missions in
coming years. If funding limits lead to a Coast Guard that is
smaller and/or older than the program of record force, these
mission gaps would be greater still.
It is not clear that past annual amounts of Coast Guard
acquisition funding are necessarily the most appropriate guide
to what the funding level should be in coming years since the
Coast Guard has entered a period during which it is seeking to
replace multiple classes of assets that in past budget years
were not yet in need of replacement.
A reliance on past funding levels as the sole guide to
future funding levels could short-circuit the policymaking
process, limit options available to policymakers and hamper
their ability to alter the composition of Federal spending over
time to meet changing Federal needs.
In seeking potential alternative guides to future Coast
Guard acquisition funding, comparisons with the Navy are
potentially illuminating. These comparisons suggest that if the
Coast Guard's acquisition account were made proportionate to
Navy procurement funding, the account might total about $3.5
billion a year. That figure might be discounted to account for
the expensive platforms procured by the Navy. Discounting it by
a third or a half, for example, would produce a figure of $1.7
to $2.3 billion a year for the AC&I account. The Coast Guard
for its own part has testified that recapitalizing the
Service's assets on a timely basis would require up to $2.5
billion a year. A level of $1 billion a year, the Coast Guard
has testified, would almost create a death spiral.
The Navy makes substantial use of multiyear procurement and
block buy contracting to reduce ship and aircraft procurement
costs. The Coast Guard, in contrast, is not using these
contracting mechanisms. The difference between the Navy's
substantial use of multiyear procurement and block buy
contracting and the Coast Guard's nonuse of these mechanisms is
striking. The nonuse of these mechanisms by the Coast Guard in
past years may in some cases represent lost opportunities for
reducing Coast Guard acquisition costs.
Moving forward, current Coast Guard programs that might be
considered candidates for multiyear procurement or block buy
contracting include the NSC program, the OPC program and the
FRC program.
These points lead to a number of potential options for
Congress. I will just mention four. One would be to encourage
or direct DHS to program a certain minimum amount of funding
each year into the AC&I account. Another would be to provide
the Coast Guard with greater autonomy from DHS in determining
the funding level for the AC&I account. A third would be to
encourage or direct DHS and the Coast Guard to use multiyear
procurement and block buy contracting where appropriate, and
fourth would be to reduce the Coast Guard's statutory missions
to narrow the future potential gap between Coast Guard mission
requirements and projected Coast Guard capacity for performing
them.
These options underscore the point made earlier, that the
fiscal year 2014 plan raises a fundamental question for
Congress about the Coast Guard's ability to recapitalize its
assets in a timely manner and adequately perform its statutory
missions in coming years.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. Thank you again
for the opportunity to testify, and I look forward to the
subcommittee's questions.
Mr. Hunter. Thank the gentleman.
Dr. Bucci is recognized.
Mr. Bucci. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, Members, I
thank you for having me here. I will let you know the comments
I make are my own and not to be construed as official positions
of the Heritage Foundation.
Prior to joining the Heritage Foundation, I did spend 30
years as a military officer in the Army Special Forces and then
was a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland
Defense where I was DOD's plug into the Department of Homeland
Security and worked extensively with the Coast Guard.
I really want to thank you for the opportunity to be here,
and I am not going to be redundant with my colleagues on some
of the specifics, and I believe the committee is probably just
as expert as I am on many of these details, but I have to tell
you, the Coast Guard is a key natural security asset. It is not
a secondary force. It is one of the key players in defending
our country, and right now, regardless of what we say or do
here, they are being given an expanding mission set in the
midst of contracting assets and resources.
The Coast Guard, to their credit, uses imagination and
innovation to accomplish the mission on a pretty regular basis.
They also have not yet learned how to work the Washington
system, asking for twice as much as you think you need because
you know you are only going to get half of that. They actually
ask for what they think they might be able to get by with and
then it still gets cut in half.
The Coast Guard is never more in character as a military
organization than at budget time. They get their orders, they
are given their assets, they salute and then they go out and
try and do their mission or die trying, and I think it is
incumbent on the Congress, particularly, because unfortunately,
I think the administration doesn't seem to get this. There is a
lot of precious young men and women out there who are putting
their lives on the line in vessels and aircraft that are in
many cases older than they are, and while that may be OK in
some situations, the ones the Coast Guard goes into, that is
not an acceptable situation.
I will touch on one specific thing, not to pile on with Mr.
Young too much, but with the icebreaker fleet. The Coast Guard
study says for them to operate in the Arctic and in Antarctica,
they need three medium and three heavy icebreakers. Right now
they have got the one medium and the two heavies, which
frankly, don't work. I think we should go beyond his idea of
leasing icebreakers and give them an exemption to the Jones Act
and let them lease some standing icebreakers that are not U.S.
made because we really need to have this capability. It is
embarrassing, not too different than riding on the Russian's
rocket ships to get up into space now, that we have to ride
behind Russian icebreakers to resupply the McMurdo Research
Station in Antarctica. I just find that somewhat ironic.
Right now, Congress, if it does not act to correct the
chronic underfunding of the Coast Guard's fleet revitalization
plan, we are going to continue to ask those young men and women
to put their lives at risk while they protect our country. The
maintenance costs of this aging fleet are getting way out of
hand and are going to suck the air out of the very small
revitalization funding we already have, and that has to be
turned around.
The Coast Guard continues to perform its missions
admirably, and they will find it increasingly difficult to keep
up that pace as their assets begin to deteriorate further. So I
would ask the Congress to fulfill its constitutional
responsibility to provide for the common defense by making a
commitment, and I think this committee is making that
commitment, to fund them at a level that meets the needs of the
Service, in some cases in excess of what the Service itself is
asking for.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
Mr. Hunter. Thank you. Dr. Korb is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Korb. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Garamendi. I appreciate the opportunity to come. I also
appreciate the opportunity, sir, to be on a panel with such
other distinguished people.
My association with the Coast Guard goes back to the 1960s
when I worked with them as a naval officer off the coast of
Vietnam. The interesting thing, they still have a lot of same
ships that they had back then. I also spent 4 years teaching at
the Coast Guard Academy. Admiral Papp was there, but he didn't
take a course from me, so I guess that is probably one reason
why he got ahead.
And I worked with them when I was in the Reagan
administration on the War on Drugs and a couple of times when I
went to Iraq and I saw them working there, and I think that is
a key thing. People forget just how much they do. They don't
realize that they have all of these missions.
Now, and it has become clear to me that over the years, one
of their problems is their motto theoretically is ``Always
Prepared,'' but their unofficial motto seems to be, ``We can do
more with less.'' And if you go back and you take a look, for
example, when sequestration came up, Secretary of Defense
Panetta said that, if we have sequestration, the Navy will be
back where it was before World War I. If you ask the Coast
Guard, they will say, well, give us less money, we will just do
the best we can. They don't really, I think, make it clear to
the Congress and the public the jeopardy they are in.
Now, it has become clear in the testimony today that the
Coast Guard has some management problems, but they pale in
comparison to the Department of Defense. I have in my written
testimony, which I would like to put into the record, an
article by Senator McCain on April 26th of this year, and in it
he said the Pentagon turns ``billions of taxpayer dollars into
weapons systems that are consistently delivered late, flawed,
and vastly over budget--if, that is, these systems are
delivered at all.'' He mentions the fact that the Air Force
alone canceled a weapons system, the Expeditionary Combat
Support System, after spending a billion dollars. That is
larger than the whole Coast Guard acquisition budget.
So what are we going to do? We all agree that they need
more money. What we need is a unified national security budget.
The Coast Guard has to be taken into account when the executive
and legislative branches decide where to allocate scarce
resources for national security.
For example, as has been mentioned by Congresswoman Hahn
and Mr. Garamendi, the whole question about port security
versus missile defense. If you take a look, what we spent on
missile defense since I was in Government, is over $200
billion, and a lot of scientists tell us it still does not even
work very well. What are we spending on port security? And, as
Congressman Garamendi mentioned, if I am going to send a
nuclear weapon to the United States, it is much less likely
that I am going to launch a missile with a return address. It
is much more likely that I am going to bring it in through the
port. But yet, we take a look at what the Coast Guard budget is
compared to the Department of Defense, you take a look and you
compare the Coast Guard budget to that of the Navy in terms of
the number of people plus what we spent on procurement.
The Littoral Combat Ship, which Senator McCain also
criticizes in this article, it costs more than your National
Security Cutters and has one-third the range, and yet we don't
get an opportunity to make those tradeoffs between the Coast
Guard and the other armed services. I would like to, with the
committee's consent, to put our unified national security
budget into the record because we go over that over every year
to show you could do those things. \1\
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\1\ ``Rebalancing Our National Security: The Benefits of
Implementing a Unified Security Budget,'' by the Task Force on a
Unified Security Budget of the Center for American Progress, can be
found online at: http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/
2012/10/UnifiedSecurityBudget.pdf.
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Now, let me conclude with two other things that the Coast
Guard needs to do in addition to making these tradeoffs. Number
one, the Commandant needs to be a member of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. When you had the hearing on sexual assault, I noticed he
was at the table. Get him at the table all the time. They have
all of these national security missions. You have just added
the head of the National Guard to the Chiefs, put the
Commandant there, too.
The other thing is, they are going to need the equivalent
of a Service Secretary in the Department of Homeland Security,
someone like the Secretary of the Army, Navy, or Air Force who
can come here and speak up for them.
And then the final thing I would say is, Secretary Panetta
and Secretary Hagel both asked Armed Services Committees to do
something about the escalating cost of personnel benefits.
Well, the committees have not done anything about that this
year, but they also impact the Coast Guard because they have to
go along with whatever the Department of Defense does. Thank
you very much.
Mr. Hunter. Thank you, Doctor. Thank all of you for being
here today. Let me ask you, Mr. O'Rourke. Why do you think they
haven't done multiyear procurements if they are authorized to
do so?
Mr. O'Rourke. It is a good question, Mr. Chairman. I have
asked that myself. It is not clear to me why it is not
happening. One possible contributor might simply be a lack of
awareness of the mechanism. The use of multiyear procurement
and block buy contracting has grown in DOD in recent years and
it could simply be that the Coast Guard has not caught up with
that.
Mr. Hunter. Most shipbuilders do multiyear procurement.
Mr. O'Rourke. That is right. In fact, all three of the
Navy's year-to-year shipbuilding procurement programs are now
under either multiyear procurement contracting or block buy
contracting, all three of them, and so, as I said in my
testimony, the difference between the Navy's substantial use of
these mechanisms and the Coast Guard's nonuse of them is
striking.
Multiyear procurement can save upwards of 10 percent on the
cost of what you are buying, and especially if we are going
into a tighter budget environment there is more reason than
ever to perhaps consider using them.
Now, there are reasons why you might not want to use
multiyear procurement or block buy contracting, and you have to
consider carefully whether you want to do it or not, but if you
decide that it is appropriate, it can offer savings at a time
when apparently the Coast Guard needs those savings more than
ever.
Mr. Hunter. You also noted that the Coast Guard can
successfully, or if it wants to successfully conduct all of its
missions, then it needs to have--it needs to acquire more
boats, more assets. So the question then is, if they don't get
the money to acquire more assets, what does that mean for its
ability to conduct its mission and in what way do you think the
Coast Guard should change its mission set?
Mr. O'Rourke. That is right. In fact, I think it is worth
remembering, as I mention in my opening statement, that the
program of record force itself is not capable of fully
performing all the Coast Guard's statutory missions as the
Coast Guard has estimated. The force that would be needed to do
that could require up to 60 percent more cutters and up to 90
percent more aircraft than what is included in the program of
record force. So the POR force is already somewhere short of
what the Coast Guard has calculated would be needed to perform
the Service's statutory missions in coming years.
If you fall short of the POR force, you are only making
those mission shortfalls even greater. Multiyear procurement
and block buy contracting can, at the margin at least, help the
cost Coast Guard afford a larger force for a given amount of
money. For example, the OPC program is currently estimated at
$12.1 billion. If you are able to save somewhere between 5 and
10 percent of the procurement costs on that program, then you
are looking at saving somewhere between $600 million and $1.2
billion, which can go some way toward buying OPCs or other
platforms that the Coast Guard is interested in getting.
Mr. Hunter. Thank you, Mr. O'Rourke.
Mr. Garamendi is recognized.
Mr. Garamendi. Mr. O'Rourke, in your written testimony, you
spent some time on the C-27. The thing that I am curious about
is that there is a potential savings here of some three-
quarters of a billion dollars. Is that savings--and this is a
question, I think, more for us on our side, but it seems to me
that any savings are not going to be plowed back into the other
acquisition programs for the Coast Guard but rather disappear
into the black hole of the larger budget for the U.S.
Government.
Mr. O'Rourke. As I look at the Coast Guard's 5-year
acquisition plan, it appears to me that the Coast Guard's
budget already banks on receiving those C-27s. They have
already taken the credit for it. You will have an avoided cost
if you don't buy the remaining 18 HC-144s, so that is like a
$40 million or $50 million airplane, so that is several hundred
million dollars in avoided procurement costs, but the Coast
Guard's 5-year acquisition plan already appears to take credit
for that by zeroing out the HC-144 line for the remainder of
the program. The Coast Guard is referring to it as a pause, and
it is a pause in the sense that they are waiting to see whether
they get the 14 to 21 C-27s. If they don't, that requirement
rolls back into the Coast Guard's 5-year plan and you are
looking at another bill for several hundred million dollars
that currently is not reflected in the 5-year plan.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you. I understand that, and even more
completely because of your answer, but where I wanted to go is
that it appears to me that the Coast Guard is getting no
credit, that is, does not have the ability to repurpose, reuse
that $700-plus million to fund its other programs. It looks to
me like they are simply taking a short--the budget is coming up
short even though they are shaving $700 million, potentially
saving $700 million.
Mr. O'Rourke. The removal of the money for the HC-144s
represents about one-third of the total reduction in funding
that we see in this plan versus the 5-year plan from last year.
Mr. Garamendi. Here is----
Mr. O'Rourke. It is about $900 million that they have taken
away.
Mr. Garamendi. For those of us on the policy side of this,
it seems to me that we need to provide a significant incentive,
in this case, for the Coast Guard and perhaps also for other
services that if they are able to, in this as we see here, find
a way to save three-quarters of a billion, then they ought to
be able to take that three-quarters of a billion and apply it
to other acquisition programs that are short of money. It
appears to me that is not the case here and therefore there is
little incentive, even though the Coast Guard seems to be doing
it, to find those kinds of savings.
Just something for us to consider and for you to ponder,
given your role, so that there is this incentive built into the
system that save money and then you can use it elsewhere.
I will let it go at that.
And I think this is again for the members of this committee
that serve on the Armed Services Committee, is to make sure
that those planes are transferred. I mean, we can do that. We
have that power, transfer the planes, shut up, get on with it,
and I would recommend that we do that.
I want to go to Mr. Korb and your question about a unified
budget, which has been the subject of much of what I talked
about here, is that we are not considering the overall defense
or national security. We are looking at it in a segmented and
disjointed way, and it seems to me to be two ways to get at
that. You are suggesting one of them, which is the placement of
a member of the Coast Guard in the Department of Defense's
program; that is, sitting there with the other generals and
admirals. Good idea.
There is also another problem, and that is the organization
of the House of Representatives and perhaps the Senate, which
you didn't talk to. This committee--the Coast Guard is
specifically in the T&I Committee, Transportation and
Infrastructure, and therefore disconnected in policy and
similarly disconnected in the appropriation process.
Now, we can send a Coast Guard admiral to sit over at the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, but unless you take the next step, which
is the organization of the House of Representatives, it ain't
going to count much.
So, I guess more than anything else, I am really talking
about us in almost everything I have said today. It is how we
view the world.
Mr. Korb, would you care to comment? You chose not to do
that, and I appreciate your deference to us, but----
Mr. Korb. I think both the administration and the Congress
need to do it. Before we unified the Department of Defense, you
used to have a committee that dealt with the Navy and another
the War Department and then you created Armed Services. I think
the administration needs to take the lead in this through OMB
by having a unified national security budget that looks at, if
you will, offense, which is the Department of Defense, defense,
which is Homeland Security, and development, which is State
Department; it needs to look at them all together. And we have
done it for the last 8 years. We have taken the amount that the
Bush administration and now the Obama administration says it
wants for all 3, and we show how you can get more bang for the
buck, if you will, by looking at these things together. And I
would suggest that if they take the lead, then the Congress,
like you have a Budget Committee, would have a national
security committee that looks at all of those things together
and suggests some of the trade-offs, some of which we have
discussed today. And you are not going to go over your budget.
In other words, we take whatever amount that you put in your
budget and we say this is a way you can get more security.
For the money, the average age of Navy ships is like one-
third of that of the Coast Guard, so at some point you might
sit down and say, well, maybe we ought to give the Coast Guard
a newer ship and the Navy one less ship, or you take an
aircraft out or whatever, whatever it might be, and I think
that would help, we would get more security for whatever amount
the money that you are willing to spend.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you for that. Mr. Bucci, you are from
an organization known to be fiscally conservative. Could you
comment on this issue?
Mr. Bucci. Well, I----
Mr. Garamendi. Recognizing that you are not speaking for
the organization.
Mr. Bucci. I do. While I agree in the general principle, I
think probably a good interim step might be to look at the
Department of Homeland Security's budget, which has gone up
recently while the Coast Guard, which frankly, no offense to
any of the other wonderful organizations within DHS, the Coast
Guard is by far the most efficient and useful and necessary for
national defense of any of the constituent parts of DHS, their
budget has consistently gone down. So perhaps before we try and
merge the budgets of the Department of Defense with chunks of
DHS, we get DHS to sort of synchronize their own budget
internally and give a little bit more of the assets to one of
their parts that is really pulling a lot more weight than they
might otherwise do.
Mr. Garamendi. Just, Mr. Chairman, you have been very
generous with my time, but just one final comment. If we would
look at the Department of Homeland Defense budget, it is boots
on the ground that seem to be far more important than ships on
the sea. Am I correct?
Mr. Bucci. Right now, given the debate we have been having
for the last couple of weeks, Congressman, I would say you are
absolutely right.
Mr. Garamendi. I yield back the 3 minutes and 6 seconds
beyond the 5 minutes, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hunter. Ms. Hahn is recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. Hahn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Korb, you are speaking obviously, you know, a theme
that I have been talking about since 9/11, which I think our
ports are very underfunded when it comes to our homeland
security and you mention in your testimony that the likelihood
of a nuclear weapon being smuggled through an American port by
an unfriendly nation is much greater than facing a nuclear
launch from one of these countries simply because they don't
want to have a return address for fear of a severe response.
But instead of allocating more resources to our port
security, Congress increased funding for an east coast missile
defense system most experts have described as being wasteful
and has cut critical port security programs. The Port Security
Grant program has been cut by 75 percent since 2009, and the
Coast Guard saw a $300 million cut in the latest Homeland
Security appropriations bill from its 2013 enacted level.
You have touched on this a little bit. Just again for this
committee and all those who are listening, what are the
consequences? Not just to our ports, but to our country and
possibly to the global economy if we fail to adequately address
our Nation's port security? I just want to hear it one more
time.
Mr. Korb. Well, as I put in, the consequence would be
severe if in fact you have someone--it is not just a nation
with nuclear weapons like an Iran or North Korea. A violent
extremist group, you know, that could smuggle one in that they
got because we didn't control nuclear proliferation, the
consequences to the country would be severe and then everybody
would be saying, well, gee, why don't you do anything about
port security. And our point--and we have been doing this, you
know, since 2004, said look, you just tell us how much money
you are willing to spend on national security, OK. It was
higher, and then after sequestration might be lower. Let's--you
can't buy perfect security but let's do some cost-benefit
analysis to make sure that we, you know, get the most bang for
whatever buck we are going to spend.
And I understand people are concerned, they want east coast
missile sites. Well, the head of the Strategic Command is
saying, well, we don't need them. Well, if you are going to put
money into that, why don't you, instead of putting it into
that, put it more into port security. I mean, that is the type
of thing that we are trying to do. And again, because the Coast
Guard itself, and you know, doesn't come up, they don't have a
political spokesman like Secretary Panetta saying, oh, my
goodness, you got sequestration, we will be back to where we
were in 1916, nobody pays attention to that. They need someone
to get out and make the point that you are, somebody like a
Secretary Panetta or something that can say, look, ladies and
gentlemen, let me tell you, of course, you have cut this by
this amount which you just mentioned. This is what you are
risking. Then I think they would get more political support for
it, but in my association with them over the years, they don't
do that. It is always we can do more with less.
Well, I told them what I used to teach there, that is what
you are going to get, and you have got to be more, more
dramatic about it. And so I think that is what I would urge
them to do, and again, it is not just the Congress, the
administration should do that before they send their budget up.
Even if you don't have a national security committee, there
should be OMB or someone looking at those things together much
like we look at the, you know, the four military services
together.
Ms. Hahn. Well, thank you. I know we are always looking at
how to fund things and trying to find extra or dedicated
revenue stream. One of the things that, Mr. Chairman, I have
suggested and something I think we could at least look at is
the customs money, customs fees that comes into the customs
districts. It is based on containers and because it is about
commerce, but I would argue that every container that comes
into our ports certainly represents commerce, but they also
represent risk. They represent risk to security, they represent
risk to our environment, they represent risk to the
infrastructure, whether it is the terminals and the wharves or
the highways and the bridges when they are being carried to
their final destination. We have been using that money,
obviously, for other things, just like we have been using the
harbor maintenance tax for other purposes, but I think we ought
to look at where this money is actually coming in to our ports,
why it is being collected and whether or not we might look at
trying to redirect some of those funds back to the ports where
they are collected for the purpose of securing and certainly
maintaining the infrastructure for our national security.
I yield back my time. Thank you.
Mr. Hunter. I thank the gentlelady, and also, I would throw
in there that it is probably, if you are checking cargo on
American soil it is probably too late. You have got to have
this cargo checked at its ports as they leave port of origin to
come to the United States.
If there are no further questions, does the gentlelady have
any further questions? Then I thank the witnesses for their
testimony and the Members for their participation, and this
subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:50 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]