[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
ELECTIONS IN IRAN:
THE REGIME CEMENTING ITS CONTROL
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JUNE 18, 2013
__________
Serial No. 113-46
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DANA ROHRABACHER, California Samoa
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio BRAD SHERMAN, California
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
TED POE, Texas GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MATT SALMON, Arizona THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina KAREN BASS, California
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
MO BROOKS, Alabama DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
TOM COTTON, Arkansas ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
PAUL COOK, California JUAN VARGAS, California
GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III,
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania Massachusetts
STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas AMI BERA, California
RON DeSANTIS, Florida ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
TREY RADEL, Florida GRACE MENG, New York
DOUG COLLINS, Georgia LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
TED S. YOHO, Florida JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
LUKE MESSER, Indiana
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
TOM COTTON, Arkansas DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
RON DeSANTIS, Florida JUAN VARGAS, California
TREY RADEL, Florida BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois
DOUG COLLINS, Georgia JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III,
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina Massachusetts
TED S. YOHO, Florida GRACE MENG, New York
LUKE MESSER, Indiana LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
Mr. Alireza Nader, senior international policy analyst, RAND
Corporation.................................................... 8
Suzanne Maloney, Ph.D., senior fellow, The Saban Center for
Middle East Policy, Brookings Institution...................... 19
Mr. Karim Sadjadpour, senior associate, Middle East Program,
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace..................... 29
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
Mr. Alireza Nader: Prepared statement............................ 10
Suzanne Maloney, Ph.D.: Prepared statement....................... 21
Mr. Karim Sadjadpour: Prepared statement......................... 31
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 52
Hearing minutes.................................................. 53
ELECTIONS IN IRAN: THE REGIME CEMENTING ITS CONTROL
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TUESDAY, JUNE 18, 2013
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:30 a.m., in
room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-
Lehtinen (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. The subcommittee will come to order.
After recognizing myself and the ranking member, Mr.
Deutch, for 5 minutes each for our opening statements, I will
then recognize other members seeking recognition for 1 minute
each. We will then hear from our witnesses. Thank you to all of
you for being here. And without objection, the witnesses'
prepared statements will be made a part of the record, and
members may have 5 days to insert statements and questions for
the record subject to the length limitation of the rules.
The chair now recognizes herself for 5 minutes.
In our fervor to repudiate all things Ahmadinejad and force
ourselves into believing things in Iran are set to change, the
West has rushed to anoint Hassan Rouhani as the moderate hope
who will ease tensions between Iran and the West. And in
wanting this change so badly, we've quietly lulled ourselves
into submission accepting that a Rouhani victory was the choice
of the Iranian people who wanted change, unwilling to see that
this was still just a victory for the Supreme Leader and the
regime.
The people never really had a choice. They were forced to
choose from one of Khamenei's candidates, and this is what
Khamenei wanted. The whole thing was rigged from the start.
Khamenei is once again playing games with the West. In
Rouhani he now has the perfect opportunity to coax the United
States and the international community to ease up on sanctions
while using Rouhani as the fall guy should public opinion turn.
The regime in Tehran will use his election as an
opportunity to undermine support for sanctions and buy time to
fight back the effects the sanctions have had on Iran, while
marching forward with its nuclear program. And we must see this
for what it is, and not get caught up in the enthusiasm that
has accompanied nearly every Presidential election in Iran
since the 1990s, because if history has shown us anything, it
is that these elections tend to bring with them a false hope
that the regime is cracking when, in fact, it is just cementing
its control.
These elections were anything but free and fair. It is not
fair when half of the population is disqualified from running
because they are of the wrong gender, or they are a religious
minority, and they aren't free when the candidates are
handpicked by the regime, assuring that no matter who wins the
regime has their man in office.
And that is what unfolded in Iran last Friday. The people
didn't have a free choice, and they got stuck with Rouhani, the
consummate regime insider.
I would urge caution to those so desperate to label Hassan
Rouhani as a reformist or moderate. He is a man who has been in
the core of the inner circle of the regime since the beginning
having been close with the Founding Clerics of the 1979 Islamic
Revolution, including the Grand Ayatollah Khameini. And how
quickly those who need Rouhani to be something that he will
never be, whitewash his past so that his election fits this
reformist narrative.
They seem to have forgotten that in 1999, Rouhani serving
the regime led a relentless and violent crackdown on a student
uprising. During a pro-regime rally in response o the students,
Rouhani reportedly declared,
``From today our people shall witness how in the arena
our law enforcement force shall deal with these
opportunists and rightist elements if they simply dare
to show their faces.''
This speech was reportedly followed by an IRGC force
storming through university campuses, arresting, torturing, and
murdering those who sought reform. And now this is what we have
pinned our hopes to as a reformer in Iran.
I urge all of us to remember that, ultimately, the power in
Iran rests with Khamenei, the IRGC, and the regime. I fear that
we will be too eager to lift the pressure on the regime under
the false narrative of reform and moderation.
The U.S. position must be clear: No concessions, no
rewards, no easing of sanctions. The U.S. must not give up any
ground unless the regime takes verifiable steps to halt its
enrichment and dismantle its nuclear program.
Let us not forget that he was part of the regime that
concealed its nuclear program from the world for 20 years
before becoming the face of that program as Iran's top nuclear
negotiator. And while many point to the halting of enrichment
in 2004 under his watch as positive signs, I'd advise you to
use caution with this rationale. This was a delay tactic that
the regime, and even Rouhani himself had admitted to using in
order to push the nuclear program forward.
During the campaign, Rouhani reportedly bragged that under
his watch Iran didn't suspend the program. No, indeed, they had
completed it.
And with that, I'm pleased to yield to the ranking member,
my friend, Ted Deutch.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Madam Chairman, for holding this
important hearing today.
Last Friday, the Iranian people participated in what was
expected to be an uninteresting election with a predetermined
result to replace the pugnacious and repugnant Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad. Instead, the Iranian people rallied around the
token moderate, Hassan Rouhani, proving their desire to chart a
different course for their future and improve Iran's relations
with the international community. And while I commend the
Iranian people for their inspiring civic participation, this
election should not be viewed as the birth of Jeffersonian
democracy in Iran.
Before even one ballot was cast, the Supreme Leader went to
great lengths to insure that one of his own proxies would be
elected by disqualifying hundreds of qualified candidates. Even
regime stalwart Rafsanjani was disqualified, thus signifying
that political space in Iran had contracted to the point where
it appeared that Iranian elections were little more than
Ayatollah Khameini's personal selection.
Furthermore, this election occurred in a staggeringly
repressive environment. In the weeks leading up to the
election, the regime harassed pro-reform activists, throttled
the internet, blocked foreign Persian language television
stations, shut down university campuses, denied permissions to
poll workers and conducted cyber attacks against numerous
Iranian opposition sites.
Yet, in spite of brutal repression, we saw the Iranian
people again find a small opportunity to have their voices
heard and advocate for change in Iran.
Of course, you can't think of Iran's victory without
remember those who demanded their voices be heard in 2009, when
we witnessed massive rallies against the status quo that were
brutally suppressed by the government.
However, as we learned this weekend, the Green Movement and
the people's desire for change endures. Presented with a small
opening, the people delivered a powerful message that the
Iranian people want to shape their own future.
Now, Rouhani campaigned on a platform of reforming the
economy and improving relations with the international
community, and freeing political prisoners, all of which
challenges the status quo.
At a rally of nearly 9,000 supporters days before the
election he told the crowd,
``If you want Iranian officials to stop presenting
inaccurate economic data, if you want the rial to
regain its value, if you want the Iranian passport to
be respected again, come to the ballot boxes.''
This seemingly go for broke strategy created a last minute
surge in massive public support that persuaded a security-
conscious regime to concede a Rouhani win. And as impressive as
this civic activism is, Iran will be judged on its actions.
We know that Rouhani is only a moderate candidate on the
Iranian continuum, and that he has made hostile comments about
the United States, and about Israel. We know that despite the
attempts to paint him as a reformer, he still is a regime
insider, intensely loyal to the Supreme Leader. He has not
disavowed Iran's nuclear ambitions, far from it. And we know
that the reformist agenda have been stymied by the regime in
the past.
We know that a different President won't change the fact
that the Supreme Leader will continue to have veto power over
the issues of foremost concern to the United States, and to our
allies.
The U.S. has worked hard to create an unprecedented
international community united against Iran's illicit nuclear
weapons program. And it remains to be seen how a new President
will affect that dynamic. But one thing is clear, being
deferential to the Supreme Leader or being silent about human
rights abuses will not compel Iran to moderate its nuclear
policies.
I hope the Iranian regime will heed the will of the Iranian
people and make choices that create a better future for all
Iranians. It's time for this regime to engage with the U.S.
Government and our allies in a substantial way on the nuclear
issue. It's time for Iran to end its support of terrorism, end
its support of Assad's murderous regime, and respect the basic
rights of its people.
Coming into this election, we all expected the Supreme
Leader would promote a yes man like nuclear negotiator Jalili,
but as we witnessed, the status quo is no longer sustainable.
Many analysts have said that Iran's number one priority is to
ensure regime survival.
Well, if this brutal regime wants to survive while ruling
over a young population frustrated with everyday life, then it
must fundamentally alter its behavior. Otherwise, the election
of this seemingly moderate candidate won't yield the last
results that the Iranian people so powerfully advocated for at
the polls.
Thank you, and I look forward to discussing this further
with our distinguished panel.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Deutch.
I will now recognize members for any 1-minute statements
they like to make. We will start with Mr. Health, Mr. Kinzinger
from Illinois.
Mr. Kinzinger. Well, thank you, Madam Chair. And thank you
for holding this hearing, and thank you to the witnesses for
coming. It's going to be a very interesting thing.
I think if we were 10 years ago right now and this had
happened, I think we'd be in a much different position. We
could say hey, let's see how this kind of plays out. Let's see
if this guy really is a moderate. Let's see if Iran ends up
engaging with the West.
I think our big concern, as you've heard from everybody
that's spoken so far is Iran is on the edge of attaining a
nuclear weapon, and being a major game changer in the region.
So, while I really want to celebrate a potentially positive
move here, I remain very, very concerned that this is either a
stall tactic, or that the train has already left the station
and we're going to see Iran attain a nuclear weapon.
So, I only have a minute to speak, but I just want to add
myself to the voice of what I think you'll hear on a lot of
folks on the panel, which is we cannot allow Iran to get a
nuclear weapon. We cannot allow this to be an impetus for
saying well, we're going to soften our stance, we're going to
back off a little bit, we're going to re-engage diplomatically
because they really want to make a difference. And with that, I
yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much.
Mr. Cicilline, America's mayor.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, ranking
member Deutch for holding today's hearing on this important
issue.
The continuing threat that Iran poses to international
peace and stability remains a paramount concern of the United
States and the entire world, and addressing that threat must be
a top U.S. foreign policy priority.
Over the weekend, the people of Iran elected former chief
nuclear negotiator, Hassan Rouhani as the nation's next
President. Although he's considered much more moderate and
reform-minded than his predecessor, with Rouhani's support Iran
continues its pursuit of nuclear weapons in defiance of
international sanctions. And while he has been hailed by some
as a champion of reform, Rouhani was, nevertheless, selected
with the final approval of the Supreme Leader who remains in
full control of Iran's nuclear program and military.
As my colleagues have described this morning, to describe
the Presidential election as full and fair elections would be a
gross overstatement; but, nonetheless, understanding the impact
of Iran's elections on the Iranian people as well as the rest
of the world is critical, and I look forward to hearing the
testimony of our witnesses this morning.
Thank you, and I yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much.
Mr. Cotton of Arizona is--Arkansas, sorry, is recognized.
Mr. Cotton. I'm sure Arizona is a wonderful state but not
quite as great as Arkansas.
The Iranian elections were not free and fair. They were a
sham election and Iran is a sham democracy. Iran remains a
totalitarian theocracy. All candidates were screened by the
mullahs who also censored and suppressed the media during the
so-called campaign.
Mr. Rouhani is not a moderate. He was part of the 1979
ruling clique, and a devoted follower of Ayatollah Khameini. He
led the crackdown of the 1999 student uprising, and is a
nuclear negotiator for Iran's regime. He often deceived and
dissembled with the West.
If Iran wants to rejoin the civilized world, it's very
clear what they should do, not have sham elections. They should
denuclearize in an objective, verifiable way subject to
international inspections. They should withdraw all support for
Bashar Assad, including the 4,000 troops they've sent to Syria
to support him. They should stop funding and arming Hezbollah.
They should quit exporting terrorism around the world,
including against our troops in Afghanistan. They should
recognize Israel's right to exist. They should respect the
civil, political, and religious liberties of their own people,
and they should hold a genuine election, not a sham election.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Schneider of Illinois.
Mr. Schneider. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you to the
witnesses.
The election of Hassan Rouhani begins a new chapter for the
Iranian people. Receiving over 50 percent of the votes in a
six-man race establishes a mandate to govern for Rouhani. As we
look forward to the possibility of a more open and free society
with Iran, we must also recognize the reality that Presidential
power within Iran is only a small portion of the true power
structure which continues to be led by the Supreme Leader,
Ayatollah Khameini.
Rouhani has been described as a reformer who ran on a
platform of restoring pride for the Iranian people, and their
government, and economy. Previous to his election, however,
Rouhani served as the lead negotiator for Iran from 2003 to
2005. He was seen as diplomatic, but his concessions to the
West in proposing a suspension of Iran's nuclear program
ultimately got him removed by then President Ahmadinejad.
This lesson was well ingrained in President Rouhani, and
with a weakened ability to bring substantive change to Iran's
ongoing nuclear activities in his election, while preferable
for the Iranian people will not likely yield a productive shift
from past Iranian policy.
I look forward to hearing from the panel with their
thoughts and insights for what, if any, potentially
transformative policies might be voted for in President
Rouhani's election.
Thank you, and I yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Meadows of North Carolina.
Mr. Meadows. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I'm happy to have
the opportunity to hear more about recent elections. Thank you
for being here, what it means to the people of Iran, and to the
Middle East as a whole.
I wish I could say that I was optimistic, that we're going
to see real change, but from what I've seen so far this is not
going to be the case. You know, the Supreme Leader is still in
place. He's still hostile to the U.S. interests, and
specifically to the continued existence of Israel. And as long
as the ruling regime remains with no checks on their power it's
going to be hard to be optimistic about Iran.
This has been true for years, but it's even more relevant
as they're currently fighting a proxy war to uphold the Assad
regime in Syria, so we need to really re-evaluate this. I look
forward to your testimony, and I'm looking forward to a future
with a stable and a truly democratic Iran.
Thank you and I yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Vargas of California.
Mr. Vargas. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman and ranking
member, and distinguished witnesses for holding this hearing on
such a timely topic. As we know, the election in Iran last
Friday resulted in a Presidential victory for Hassan Rouhani
who has been deemed by a moderate voice among the
fundamentalist cleric who served the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah
Khameini.
As we temper our expectations with the realities of the
rigged electoral process in Iran, there remains many questions
moving forward. We must steadfastly maintain our strategic goal
of preventing Iran from developing a nuclear weapon. Will this
former head nuclear negotiator provide a space for an
international deal, or will he continue to be a party to the
delay and deceit tactics you have seen throughout the years?
As the Obama administration moves to arms the rebels in
Syria, will Iran continue to bolster the Assad regime and use
its proxy for international terrorism. Finally, our greatest
friend and ally in the region, Israel, has expressed skepticism
about any potential change of course, and has rightly stated
that Iran will be judged by the actions, and we will judge them
by their actions. Thank you very much.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, sir.
Congresswoman Meng from New York.
Ms. Meng. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, Ranking Member, and
our witnesses for being here today.
We were all surprised by the nature and result of the
recent election in Iran. The President-elect Hassan Rouhani is
the most moderate of the candidates selected by the Guardian
Council, but is in every way, and in every respect a regime
insider. The Iranian threat is as grave as it was last week,
and the centrifuges are still spinning.
But the question here is not so much who Mr. Rouhani is, or
where he has been, but rather it is where he is going. As we
saw with the strike 30 years ago, a tinge of freedom, a tinge
of moderation can yield far more when coupled with popular
will. I look forward to exploring this possibility today and I
yield back my time.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Congresswoman.
Congressman Connolly of Virginia.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Madam Chair, and welcome to the
panel. I think all of us, obviously, are interested this
morning in who is the new cleric President of Iran, Rouhani.
Given his pedigree, he's been referred to as a moderate,
but he certainly has impeccable credentials from the
revolutionary point of view, and from the theocratic state
point of view. So, just how much change can we really expect?
And how much of a risk is it for us to fall into the trap of
buying more time for the nuclear development because a moderate
has been elected to the Presidency once again? So, I think all
of us are interested in hearing your views about that and
engaging with you as the United States tries to think through
its policy in this post-election period.
Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Connolly.
Thank you for excellent opening statements from all of our
members. And now I'm so pleased to introduce our witnesses.
First, we welcome Mr. Ali Nader, a senior international
policy analyst at the RAND Corporation and the author of
``Iran's 2013 President Election, It's Meaning and
Implications.'' Pretty timely. He has published numerous titles
on Iran's internal politics, and prior to joining RAND, Mr.
Nader served as a research analyst at the Center for Naval
Analysis. Thank you, sir.
Next we welcome Dr. Suzanne Maloney, a senior fellow at the
Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings
Institution, where her research focuses on Iran and Persian
Gulf energy. Prior to joining Brookings Institution, Dr.
Maloney served on the Secretary of State's policy planning
staff and directed the 2004 Council on Foreign Relations Task
Force on U.S. Policy toward Iran.
Next we welcome Mr. Karim Sadjadpour, and because your name
is a little difficult for me, my staff made sure that your name
is mentioned in every sentence of your introduction. He's a
senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment. Prior to this, Mr.
Sadjadpour was the chief Iran analyst at the International
Crisis Group. In 2007, Mr. Sadjadpour was named a Young Global
Leader by Royal Economic Forum in Davos. Mr. Sadjadpour is
board member of the Banu Foundation, an organization dedicated
to empowering women worldwide.
Thank you to our panelists. Without objection, as I said,
your full prepared statements will be made a part of the
record, and we will ask you to please summarize it in 5
minutes. Mr. Nader, we will start with you.
STATEMENT OF MR. ALIREZA NADER, SENIOR INTERNATIONAL POLICY
ANALYST, RAND CORPORATION
Mr. Nader. Thank you, Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, ranking member
Deutch, and members of the subcommittee. Thank for allowing me
to appear before you today to speak about the Iranian
Presidential election, and policy options for the United States
going forward.
I would like to make three points before offering U.S.
policy recommendations. First, Hassan Rouhani's election as
President demonstrates the Iranian people's frustrations and
deep opposition to their leader's decisions. This election is a
refusal of the policy of so-called resistance on the nuclear
program pursued by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khameini and
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, which has led to Iran's growing
isolation and its economic devastation.
Second, the election also showed that U.S. pressure against
Iran is beginning to pay off. Iran's economic crisis played a
significant role in Rouhani's election. Iran's continued
progress with the nuclear program has been very hostile.
According to Iran's Oil Minister, energy exports have declined
by 40 percent. The Iranian Government has reported an inflation
rate of 30 percent, although some economists claim it is much
higher. Iran's currency, the rial, lost 80 percent of its value
in 2012 alone. The livelihood of many Iranians, including the
middle class, is in grave jeopardy. Khamenei and Ahmadinejad's
policies, especially in the nuclear program, threaten to
unravel the Islamic Republic. Khamenei could be seeking a way
out of the crisis and he could be working through Rouhani.
Third, Rouhani's presidency may provide a better
opportunity to solve the nuclear crisis through diplomacy. His
past experience as a capable nuclear negotiator and a moderate
on foreign policy is encouraging, but not all of Iran's
policies may change. For example, Iran is unlikely to abandon
the support for the Syrian regime. Rouhani will, nevertheless,
have an opportunity to reshape Iran's position on the nuclear
program, as he will appoint Iran's nuclear negotiator and other
key figures.
There's still enough time and space for the U.S. policy of
sanctions and diplomacy to succeed, but negotiations between
the P5+1, which is composed of the permanent members of the
U.N. Security Council in Germany and Iran, could fail if the
Iranian regime perceives sanctions as being geared toward
regime implosion and overthrow, rather than a way to achieve a
diplomatic solution.
U.S. policy has to be balanced to include not only
pressures but a dignified way for the regime to compromise.
This means a cap on Iranian enrichment, intrusive inspections,
limits on the Army nuclear facilities, and a limited stockpile
of enriched uranium. In return, the P5+1 would accept Iran's
declared right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes and
would lift the most onerous sanctions.
Any future sanctions should be specifically designed to
impact the regime's nuclear calculus. In addition, they should
be reversible in the event of a nuclear deal between Iran and
the P5+1. This means that this should not be defined by issues
related to human rights or Iran's regional behavior. Moreover,
the United States should have the freedom to issue waivers when
necessary for third-party countries regarding their compliance
with sanctions. This allows Washington to maintain the
impressive International Coalition which has isolated the
Iranian regime.
It is important that future sanctions target the regime as
much as possible. Sanctions have so far hurt the regime but
they have also caused suffering among the Iranian people. The
United States should seek more creative ways in targeting the
regime. Recent U.S. Treasury sanctions against Khamenei's
business empire are to be commended in this regard.
Furthermore, the United States must ensure that sanctions do
not lead to a shortage of food and medicine in Iran. This would
be used as a propaganda tool by the regime and could erode
Iran's goodwill toward the United States.
While sanctions should not be tied to human rights, the
United States and its allies must be more vigorous in
highlighting Iran's human rights abuses while opening better
channels of communication with the Iranian people.
This election has demonstrated that the Islamic Republic,
although authoritarian, is responsive to pressure. Washington
should engage Rouhani before it pursues additional sanctions.
If the regime does not respond, then it will be met with a
great deal of pressure.
The future of Iran is impossible to predict but time is on
the side of the United States and the Iranian people. The
United States still has the opportunity to resolve the nuclear
impasse diplomatically while it helps the Iranian people
realize a better future for their country.
Again, Chairwoman Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member Deutch, and
members of the subcommittee, thank you for allowing me to speak
to you about this important issue. I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Nader follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, sir.
Dr. Maloney.
STATEMENT OF SUZANNE MALONEY, PH.D., SENIOR FELLOW, THE SABAN
CENTER FOR MIDDLE EAST POLICY, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION
Ms. Maloney. Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member Deutch,
and members of the subcommittee, I'm very grateful for the
opportunity to appear today to discuss the recently concluded
Iranian Presidential election with you.
Obviously, Iran is at the forefront of all of our security
interests. This election does not change any of those interests
or any of our concerns about Iranian behavior, but it does
offer the possibility of new momentum in addressing them.
In my testimony, I will highlight the importance of
election to the office of the presidency, speak for a few
moments about why it is we think Rouhani won, and why it is he
was allowed to win. And then conclude with a few remarks about
U.S. policy moving forward.
Many even in this room have dismissed the irrelevance of
Iranian electoral processes and institutions. I fully
understand why, and yet I respectfully disagree. In fact, it's
a misreading of Iran's complicated domestic dynamics to dismiss
its elections or its representative institutions as mere window
dressing.
Elections, even ones that are highly orchestrated as the
ones in the Islamic Republic are, represent critical junctures
in the life cycle of political systems. In Iran, they have
repeatedly sent the revolutionary system careening in new
directions.
The election that just concluded in Iran reinforced the
subversive utility of semi-democratic institutions even in
authoritarian systems. Iran's elections matter because they
provide openings for candidates to challenge the official
narrative, as we heard time and time again in this campaign on
the nuclear issue.
They matter because they enable journalists and crowds of
people to come and speak about issues that have been off limits
for public debate for many years, including the arrest and
detention of the two candidates from the 2009 election.
Elections release genies from bottles, as one of the
foremost Iranian dissents has said. We also know that the
presidency matters. If nothing else, we have learned from the
past 8 years about Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is that Iran's
presidency is important to the way its policy is conducted. The
President controls budgets and institutions. More importantly,
he controls the context for Iran's internal domestic politics,
but also for its relationships with the word. We would not have
the sanctions regime that we have today were it not for Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad.
Let me just say a few words about why it is I think Rouhani
won. First, he ran a very smart campaign. He appealed to
Iranian young people. He pushed the bounds on the nuclear issue
in a way that no one really anticipated, and he created the
opportunity for, in fact, conservatives to pile on to this
particular issue in an amazing televised public debate that was
on state television for 4\1/2\ hours in which all of the
candidates effectively said what we're doing now is not
working. We need a deal. We have never, in fact, heard anything
like this from the Islamic Republic before.
Rouhani, in fact, managed to do what the reformists have
been trying to do in Iran for more than a decade, which is to
create a coalition that can actually advance their interest.
They did this by banding together with centrists, with
pragmatists, with conservatives. Really, Rouhani is not a
reformist by any stretch of the imagination. He's very much a
pragmatic conservative, and his election represents a new
alliance, a new political force in Iran.
He also benefitted from conservative disarray. None of this
really explains, however, why it is that Khamenei let him win.
I think many people, and certainly the prevailing narrative in
the press is that this was just an explosion, and Iranians once
again told their leaders something they didn't want to hear.
I think that's quite possible, and certainly the role of
the Iranian people and their unhappiness about their horrendous
economic conditions is very important, but I think there's also
an argument to be made, and I can sketch it out in greater
depth during the discussion period that, in fact, the regime is
looking for a way out of the box that it's in. And, in fact,
what they've done is what they did toward the end of the Iran-
Iraq War which is to try to empower a fixer, someone who can
get them out of a very dire situation.
For the U.S., this is an opportunity, but also one that
offers no easy path forward. We see confirmation, as Ali has
just said, that the U.S. strategy is working to a point. The
point of a dual track policy that we've had in place for many
years now has been to create the political will for a deal on
the nuclear issue, and we know that that exists. That's huge,
and it's a tremendous opportunity.
Of course, Rouhani's election will inevitably lead to
sanctions erosion and other challenges for U.S. policy. We have
to be prepared that the United States will negotiate seriously,
that we can offer tangible rewards in exchange for confirmed
overtures from the Iranians, and specific concessions on the
nuclear program.
Congress' role in this moment of opportunity is extremely
important. For Washington to greet the empowerment of the first
serious moderate, someone who has an apparent mandate to make a
deal on the nuclear issue with a new raft of sanctions would be
a disaster.
U.S. policy makers should appreciate that Rouhani will
experience real constraints. He doesn't have an easy path
forward, but this is someone who's been dubbed the sheik of
diplomacy. He may just be the right man to do the deal we've
been waiting for.
I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today,
and I look forward to the discussion. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Maloney follows:]
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Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Dr. Maloney.
Mr. Sadjadpour.
STATEMENT OF MR. KARIM SADJADPOUR, SENIOR ASSOCIATE, MIDDLE
EAST PROGRAM, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE
Mr. Sadjadpour. Thank you, Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, and
members of the subcommittee.
I think the election of Hassan Rouhani was another
important and humble reminder that there are no experts on
Iranian politics, only students of Iranian politics. And it was
another reminder that Presidential elections in Iran tend to be
unfree, unfair, and unpredictable, as Representative Deutch can
attest by my briefing before the election.
I think what was most surprising about Hassan Rouhani's
victory wasn't that he received the most votes. He was the lone
``moderate''candidate on a ballot which was amongst five
hardline representatives of the government. But what was most
surprising, as Suzanne mentioned, was that he was allowed to
win. And I think, as many of you have said here today,
Rouhani's victory I think can be better interpreted as a
reflection of the tremendous popular discontent in Iran rather
than a deep-seated affection for the candidate of Hassan
Rouhani himself.
We did see after the election that Iranians reacted
jubilantly, and I would describe this as the equivalent of a
population experiencing a light rain after 8 years of drought.
When you do live in Iran, it makes a difference who your
President is. During the era of Mohammad Khatami, it was a
country which was more politically and socially tolerant. There
was a much better economy than under Ahmadinejad, so from the
vantage point of Iranian citizens it does make a difference who
their President is. But as everyone has said here today, Hassan
Rouhani is no Nelson Mandela. He's not even Mohammad Khatami.
He's someone who's not committed to reforming the system. He is
a consonant regime insider who is committed to the preservation
of the Islamic Republic, but I think there is an important
caveat here, which is that Rouhani comes from the tradition in
Iran of the pragmatic conservatives who, again, are deeply
committed to the revolution, to the maintenance of the Islamic
Republic, but they believe that in order to preserve the
regime, Iran needs to privilege economic expediency over
revolutionary ideology. And I think this will probably put him
in contrast to the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khameini, who has
long believed that compromising on revolutionary principles
would actually--could possibly unravel the system rather than
strengthen it.
Let me move to a couple of thoughts on U.S. policy. I think
the discussion on U.S. policy toward Iran is nicely framed by
two quotes from Henry Kissinger, who said, ``There are few
nations in the world with whom the United States has more
common interests and less reason to quarrel than Iran, but Iran
has to decide whether it's a nation or a cause.'' And I think
under a Rouhani presidency, as much as there is a popular
desire for change in Iran, when it comes to the strategic
principles of the Islamic Republic, namely, resistance toward
the United States and toward Israel, Rouhani's will or ability
to change those principles is very unclear.
But I will say one thing about Iran, and that is that Iran
is one of the very few, if only, countries in the Middle East
in which America's strategic interest and its democratic values
align rather than clash. If you look at a lot of the other
countries in the Middle East, particularly in the Arab world,
more representative systems in those countries actually produce
less tolerant governments, and governments which are less
sympathetic to the United States. And I think that is the
exception in Iran, and for that reason I think it's imperative
for us to think more creatively about ways to facilitate
political change in Iran beyond just sanctions.
And I would argue that the single most important thing the
United States can do to facilitate genuine political change in
Iran is to inhibit the Iranian regime's ability to control
information and communication. And in this context, I think one
thing which is absolutely critical, which we haven't fully
taken advantage of is our Voice of America Persian News
Network. This is something which has the potential to reach 25-
30 million Iranians, but it's woefully underperforming. It
doesn't have nearly the popularity or the professionalism as
the BBC Persian Television Service which played an integral
role in these elections. So, I think that if there's one thing
Congress can do, it's to spearhead the reform and the
privatization of Voice of America's Persian News Network. Thank
you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Sadjadpour follows:]
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----------
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, excellent testimony
by all of you.
It is my pleasure before I begin my questioning to
recognize the Delegation of Women Parliamentarians that we have
to our right. They're from Kyrgyzstan, Georgia, Kenya, and
Mongolia. They are here to learn of our democracy and they're
touring Capitol Hill today to observe several hearings. I had
the pleasure of speaking to them yesterday afternoon, and they
asked very interesting questions about our democratic process,
such as it is. So, thank you so much. Let's give them all a
welcome. Thank you, ladies.
I want to touch on the role of the President and the
office's relationship with the Supreme Leader. The power of the
Supreme Leader greatly outweighs that of the Office of the
President. The Supreme Leader controls the military, the media,
and the judicial branch. Over time, the Supreme Leader has
exerted even more influence and control over the most powerful
institutions in Iran by directly appointing their leaders to
institutions like the Guardian Council, the Revolutionary
Guards, and it is the Supreme Leader who has the final say in
virtually every decision that impacts Iran's nuclear program,
Iran's involvement in Syria, any other important foreign policy
decision. So, when we look at the election of Rouhani, I see a
man who was selected by an entity controlled by Khamenei, and I
see a man who has been part of the Islamic regime in Iran since
its beginning.
So, I ask knowing what we know about the power structure in
Iran, and Rouhani's background as a regime loyalist who was
handpicked to run by the regime, what should we expect from him
to be able to implement democratic reforms, let's say, or bring
an end to human rights abuses, discrimination against women,
against ethnic and religious minorities, and does he view the
U.S.-Israel relationship with the same contempt as Khamenei,
and will he continue to spread terror across the region through
Hezbollah?
And to revisit the hope and optimism theme, for decades now
every time there's an election in Iran we heard that Iran is on
the cusp of change, that reforms are on their way, but hope
fades and we see a resurgent regime further cemented into
power. Can we expect that this time it will be different?
And then, lastly, where's Ahmadinejad? What role will he
play? Is he an outcast? Will he have a role to play even if, or
is it an empty office? Mr. Nader.
Mr. Nader. I think that's the key question, how much power
will Rouhani have, how much leeway will Khamenei give him. It's
true that Rouhani is not a reformer. We can't expect major
changes in Iran under his presidency. We can expect an
improvement in human rights, necessarily, or an improvement
really in social freedoms, maybe slightly. However, his goal is
not to really change Iran domestically as much as it is to
alleviate Iran's external pressure.
Ayatollah Khameini, of course, is the Supreme Leader, the
Supreme Authority in Iran. The Revolutionary Guards are very
powerful. Both institutions are largely unelected, and largely
unaccountable, but I think it's interesting that Rouhani was
allowed to win. He is a regime insider. He is a Supreme
Leader's representative on the National Security Council, but
Rouhani provides an opportunity for Khamenei to exit the crisis
that Iran is facing currently.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Let me just interrupt you to give the
others a chance. Dr. Maloney, and Mr. Sadjadpour.
Ms. Maloney. Very quickly, I think Rouhani has been elected
to run the National Unity Government. His priority will be very
much on the economy, which effectively means getting a nuclear
deal. It's ironic because this is the one issue on which he's
been vilified by hardliners for a decade, and yet I think this
is his mandate. It means he will be very cautious about
touching other issues, like Syria, certainly, like anything to
do with Iran's support for terrorism.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. So, he will concentrate on the nuclear
program because that's been looked upon as his weak part.
Ms. Maloney. He will concentrate on it because it's the
only way he can solve the economic problems of the country. He
will also have, I think, an onus on him to do something in
terms of his promises to release political prisoners, and
specific to that Mousavi and Karroubi, the two candidates from
2009.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Yes. Thank you.
Mr. Sadjadpour. One interesting tidbit about Rouhani is
when you look at his nuclear team when he was Chief Nuclear
Negotiator, there was three men, Javad Zarif, Hossein
Mousavian, and a guy called Cyrus Nasseri. All of them were US-
educated. They all came from merchant backgrounds, not
ideological backgrounds, so these folks when you speak to them
privately, they're not death to America rigid ideologues. I
think they're interested in Iran, which again pursues economic
interests and ideological interests always, but they're
certainly not interested in genuine democracy and opening up
the system because I think they understand that that would be a
threat to their interest.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. And Ahmadinejad, where will he
be relegated to?
Mr. Nader. Hopefully, he will have no role in Iran in the
future. Ahmadinejad made a lot of enemies, so he has to be very
careful what he does from now on.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Good. Dr. Maloney?
Ms. Maloney. He's already been called before the court, and
will have probably a difficult time either staying out of
prison, or finding some new post in the Islamic Republic. He's
persona non grata.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Wonderful. Thank you very much.
Mr. Deutch.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
I also want to thank the witnesses for really enlightening
testimony. And I extend my welcome to the visiting delegation,
as well. It's wonderful to have you here.
Less than a week ago it seemed that most Iran analysts
believed the Supreme Leader would cement his control over the
system by rigging the election to ensure that a compliant
conservative like Jalili would become the President. Yet, days
before the election he gave a speech encouraging even those who
do not support the Islamic system to vote in the election. And
it now appears that the Supreme Leader made the calculated
decision to acquiesce to the will of the Iranian people.
Dr. Maloney, you talked about empowering a fixer. That may
be the case and, if so, I'd ask why he did this? But just to go
on, I'm not sure if it's a reaction to not wanting to further
upset a young and volatile electorate like he did in 2009, or--
and I'd like all of you to chime in on this, is the Supreme
Leader--is there a possibility that the Supreme Leader is not
empowering a President who can come in and do a deal, but the
Supreme Leader, instead, seeks to undermine the United
International Coalition against Iran's nuclear program that
currently exists.
For instance, Mr. Nader spoke about putting a--what a deal
would look like with a cap on enrichment, and a limited
stockpile of enriched uranium, and intrusive inspections, but
now that we have a moderate President no longer spewing
bellicose statements like Ahmadinejad did, will countries like
Russia and China, for example, be willing to accept a deal
under Rouhani that we wouldn't accept under Ahmadinejad?
So, what if they offer less, but it comes without the venom
that came with Ahmadinejad? What if they offer to minimize
their stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium, but they don't
have the rigorous inspections, and the safeguards that would
stop their long-term nuclear weapons development? Would a deal
like that potentially split the P5+1 unity due to negotiations
fatigue and this sense of relief that we have that no one has
to deal with Ahmadinejad any longer?
Let's start with that. Dr. Maloney, I'll start with you.
Ms. Maloney. I think we should have no illusions about
Rouhani's level of flexibility, or his degree of authority on
this issue. But I think it's notable that he published a memoir
which created a sensation within Iran and a number of people in
this town and others have read it, in which he revealed an
enormous amount of information and self-criticism about Iran's
approach to the nuclear issue.
So, for that reason, I don't think he's there as a patsy or
a dupe, but I also think he will not drive any easy bargain.
I've spoken to the Europeans who dealt with him when he was in
charge of this brief, and they found him quite frustrating.
They didn't enjoy the experience of negotiating across the
table from him.
But I think Iran today is in a very different set of
circumstances than it was in 2003 when the leadership was
watching U.S. moves in Iraq. The economy, as Ali and Karim have
both indicated has suffered grievously as a result of the
sanctions. And I think it's quite clear that they are looking
for some mechanism that won't just erode the compliance with
sanctions, because that's insufficient. What they really need
is the relaxation and specific removal of sanctions.
Mr. Deutch. All right. But, Mr. Sadjadpour, is there a
possibility that they could get that by giving up less given
who the spokesperson is now with a negotiating partner?
Mr. Sadjadpour. That's certainly plausible in that at the
moment, I've noticed just in the last few days there have
already been statements from Russian, Chinese, and European
officials, former--current European Foreign Ministers saying we
now need to engage Iran. So, the role Ahmadinejad played in
uniting the international community against Iran, Rouhani is
now creating potential fissures.
That said, I think that it's going to be difficult for the
P5+1 to offer meaningful concessions, and for the U.S. and
Europeans to offer meaningful concessions if Iran isn't going
to make meaningful nuclear compromises.
Mr. Deutch. Mr. Nader, you laid out what you think a deal
might look like. Do you think that the Russians and Chinese,
for example, might take less given the new President?
Mr. Nader. I don't think they'll necessarily take less. We
have to remember when Hassan Rouhani was National Security
Advisor, Iran stopped uranium enrichment. And when Ahmadinejad
became President in 2005, that was reversed. Now, Rouhani in
his press conference yesterday said that those days are gone.
We're not going to stop uranium enrichment, but I think there's
potential to cap the Iranian enrichment program so they don't
go up to 20 percent, they don't amass their stockpile. And I
think this is something that is acceptable to the P5+1. And
sanctions are going to continue no matter what, even if the
Chinese and the Russians think Rouhani is more moderate.
Mr. Deutch. Thanks. Madam Chairman.
I would--I'd just close by referring back to what Mr. Nader
said at the beginning, that U.S. pressure is really just
beginning to pay off, and we shouldn't be willing to let up on
the pressure because there is someone who is less belligerent,
saying being less bellicose. I think it's an important thing
for all of us to remember. I thank the witnesses, and thank
you.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Deutch.
Mr. Kinzinger.
Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you, Madam Chair. And I want to also
thank Mr. Deutch for those comments. I think they were good.
And I kind of want to pick up on that, but first I want to say
to the visiting delegation, I also add a thanks. I've been to
Georgia many times, and I was stationed in Kyrgyzstan with the
military at Manas Air Base, so thank you for being hear and for
your hospitality. And to the other two nations represented,
hopefully we can come and visit you also some day, so thank
you. And continue to press forward on your march toward
freedom, we encourage you.
In terms of the actual specific issue of Iran, Mr. Nader,
I'm not sure I'm saying it right, I want to make sure I fully
understood what you were saying. So, you're advocating for, and
I'm not arguing with you. I'm curious because you're advocating
for basically allowing Iran to go nuclear, but capping the
level of enrichment to allow them to have a peaceful nuclear
process.
Now, let's say, and I'm not a technical nuclear guy, but
let's say we cap them at 20 percent, or whatever, how quickly
could that be reversed? So, if they agree to inspections, they
agree to the cap, how quickly at the point our relationship
falls apart again, or whatever, can they either secretly or
openly get to highly enriched uranium where they can marry it
with a bomb? Let me just ask you that question.
Mr. Nader. I don't advocate they go nuclear. We should make
all efforts to stop Iran's development of a nuclear weapons
capability. But the Supreme Leader has supposedly issued a
religious ruling or fatwa stating that Iran does not want
nuclear weapons, so let's let Iran operationalize that. Let's
just have them limit uranium enrichment to 5 percent, because
they have to go to 20 percent and then higher to develop a
nuclear weapon.
Mr. Kinzinger. But then how long does that--and you may not
be a technical nuclear guy. How long does the 5-20 percent
take?
Mr. Nader. Well, Iran is under IAEA inspection, so anything
they do is going to be monitored. And the goal is to make
inspections even more intrusive, to have Iran open up some of
the suspected nuclear sites to inspection.
And Hassan Rouhani has said that he wants to be more
transparent on the nuclear program. Let's give him a chance. If
Iran does not want to be more transparent, then we impose
additional sanctions and increase pressures on Iran.
Mr. Kinzinger. I know where you're coming from. My only
concern is, again, and as I mentioned in my opening statement,
if this was 10 years ago, I think we'd have the pleasure of
time to be able to say well, we can give it a couple of years
and see if he's legitimate. But I really, personally, from all
I've heard, we actually are up against Iran becoming a nuclear
state. So, unfortunately, and I wish we did; unfortunately, I
don't know if we have the luxury of being able to see how this
develops, and how this kind of rounds out.
A concern I have, too, and again I want to encourage, I
don't want the feeling to be from this committee, and I don't
think this committee has given it yet, but I don't want the
feeling to be hey, to the people of Iran we don't trust you, we
don't believe that you really did what you went out to do,
which is elect a moderate. But, obviously, you can understand
our concern because of the wall that we're up against, and what
I saw in 2009.
Now, I don't want to make this an attack on the
administration today, but I will say I do believe that America
lost a really big opportunity in 2009 for a serious uprising,
and I'm afraid I don't want to do that here, as well.
But let me ask another question. If we do find ourselves in
this position of we are now facing a nuclear Iran, you know,
let's say it comes to be, whatever the fall is, or something
like that, and this guy is in power. And I want to ask all
three of you, what is preferable, to let this guy--to trust him
enough to let him take Iran to a position where he wants to
negotiate with the West, or to press forward on i.e., military
strikes to ensure that Iran does not become nuclear? So, you're
kind of faced with we've got this guy in power, but on the
other hand we believe that they're going to go nuclear. We'll
start with Mr. Sadjadpour. I hope I said that right.
Mr. Sadjadpour. I will just say that what I would argue
Iran is doing with the nuclear program is just taking a very
incremental approach. They're simultaneously putting their foot
on the gas and on the brakes, meaning they're expanding the
number of centrifuges, they're expanding the sophistication of
the centrifuges, but they're at the same time taking that
stockpile of low enriched uranium and converting it to fuel
rods which has been allaying some of the concerns of the
Israelis.
And I would simply argue that trying to dialogue and engage
with this new Rouhani government, in my opinion is a win-win.
If we're able to make forward progress, we reach some type of
detente, that's a win. If we don't, we expose them as the
problem.
Mr. Kinzinger. Dr. Maloney.
Ms. Maloney. I don't think Rouhani changes the position of
any of us, or anyone in this town that we do not want Iran to
have access to a nuclear weapon. What he does do is potentially
provide the opportunity for a deal that is mutually tolerable.
We believe it will exist for that within the Iranian
political establishment today. I know that it exists within the
administration, and within this building.
Mr. Kinzinger. Well, thank you. And my time is expired, but
I just want to say look, I hope this works out to be something,
trust me. It would be nice to have this situation off the
world's table.
A military strike, as an example, against Iran would be
terrible, but a nuclear Iran would be even worse. So, these
are--hopefully, this is maybe a miracle in the Middle East, but
we'll see. I yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
Mr. Cicilline.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Thank you to the
witnesses for your testimony.
If, in fact, it's the case that Rouhani was allowed to win
in part because the Iranian people would not have reacted well
to a more conservative candidate, that the outpouring would
have been so strong, it seems to me we have two possible
narratives. One is, the Supreme Leader is actually trying to
get Iran out of this box. And one has to ask well, if that were
the case, couldn't the Supreme Leader have done that directly,
which would have been consistent with what Iranian people want,
which would seem to be a really good path?
So, instead, is it more likely that what the Supreme Leader
is attempting to do by allowing Rouhani to win is provide this
safety valve so the people sort of are calmed down, and then to
my friend, Congressman Deutch's point, to create an opportunity
to really destabilize the international coalition that has
really very strongly held together in the face of Iran's
nuclear program. And doesn't that, in fact, put us in a very
difficult position in terms of balancing both this opportunity,
but at the same time safeguarding against this sort of
opportunity that the Supreme Leader now has to dissipate some
of the strength of the international coalition, and to continue
full speed ahead with the nuclear program?
If that analysis is reasonable, what is the best way for us
to respond? What are the best ways to sort of understand what
the true motivation is? I invite all of you.
Mr. Nader. I think Khamenei wants to save face, and he
couldn't compromise as long as Ahmadinejad was President,
because in 2009 he strongly supported Ahmadinejad, and he's
been saying for the last 8 years, Ahmadinejad's policies are
correct. Ahmadinejad turned out to be disastrous for him, and
this was embarrassing for him.
So, this provides an opportunity to make some of these key
decisions with Rouhani as President. If the Rouhani experiment
fails, Khamenei can say well, it wasn't me, it was Rouhani.
In terms of the P5+1, I just don't think a Rouhani
presidency will weaken the coalition, because the sanctions
right now are not going to be reversed until Iran makes a move
to build confidence among the international community. Even the
Russians and Chinese, I think, are aware of this.
Ms. Maloney. I think that your analysis is absolutely
reasonable, but I do think that Khamenei took a big risk, if
that's what he did, because the safety valve of Rouhani risked
putting people out in the streets in a way that they were in
2009, which is something that clearly Khamenei and the
hardliners deeply, deeply fear. These young people shouting
with joy, dancing around a particular color even was something
that played into his own paranoia about a soft revolution
sponsored from the outside.
But I think you're absolutely right to sort of believe that
any possibilities are accurate right now in terms of the
interpretation. And in terms of how it is we avoid getting
sucked into an Iranian ploy, I think as actually both fellow
panelists have suggested, the best way to do that is to ensure
that we continue to approach the negotiations with full
seriousness, that we are prepared to meet the Iranians, any
concessions from the Iranians with meaningful incentives for
continuing and confirming those concessions.
And as Karim says if, in fact, this is not serious, then
we'll surely know that, and we will strengthen the coalition.
If it is, then we may find a way to at least turn down some of
the urgency with respect to the nuclear concerns.
Mr. Sadjadpour. Well, the word ``cementing'' is in the
title of the panel today, and I think cemented is a good
adjective for the sanctions. It's going to be very tough to
remove U.S. Congressional sanctions, even the European oil
embargo, so I think we shouldn't be too worried that the entire
sanctions regime is going to suddenly fall apart just with
Hassan Rouhani.
With regards to the Supreme Leader's calculations, I
sometimes think we confer on them too much strategic planning
and Machiavellian brilliance than oftentimes is the case. I
would say in this case it was simply a lot of ad-hocery, and he
probably didn't know that morning who was going to be
President.
But I would argue this, is that I actually think that
Khamenei's image, his tattered image has been rehabilitated in
a way that many of us didn't anticipate; meaning, I think he's
far more popular now with the Iranian people than he was on
June 13th, 2013.
Mr. Cicilline. I think it just makes the point that the
sanctions that we've imposed are--or the international
community has imposed with us are working, and we should just
remain very cognizant of that as we move forward.
Again, thank you for the testimony. I yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Cicilline.
Mr. Meadows is recognized.
Mr. Meadows. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Mr. Nader, I notice that you kind of gave the back and
forth when you said his tattered reputation was perhaps
reinvigorated, so I'd like you to go ahead and make your
comments in a verbal manner, so I can follow-up on that.
Mr. Nader. With all due respect to Karim, who I think is a
great analyst and is a friend, I think the Islamic Republic
does not have a good reputation in Iran. I think the days of
the Islamic Republic are numbered. I think that as long as
Khamenei is alive we won't see major change in Iran, but when
he passes away there'll be an opportunity to have a better
Iran, a more democratic Iran. And we have to keep in mind that
Rouhani was not elected because Iranians love him, as Karim
said, but because they're desperate, because the regime----
Mr. Meadows. And they're desperate because of the economic
conditions. Right?
Mr. Nader. Because of the economy, because of inflation,
because of unemployment, because of lack of social freedom,
prostitution, drug use. I mean, this regime is destroying Iran
and its people realize it, and they seek a way out. And that
was the only option available to them, to vote for Rouhani.
Mr. Meadows. Dr. Maloney?
Ms. Maloney. I can't gauge the current popularity of
Ayatollah Khameini. I never found him to be all that well liked
when I had the opportunity to visit Iran.
I do think that this is a boost for the regime and,
obviously, that makes our strategy now more complicated. But,
clearly, Iranians want a way out that does not involve
disruptive change. They're not prepared to risk their lives on
the street today for good reason. They know that they will be
shot, thrown in jail, forced to leave the country and leave all
their possessions and family behind. They want to find a
moderate way, a sort of way to get out of this terrible set of
circumstances that they're in through gradual change.
Mr. Meadows. So, a peaceful coup. Is that what you're
suggesting?
Ms. Maloney. I think that would be the best possible
outcome to what we've seen. I don't think it is the inevitable
outcome to what we've seen.
Mr. Meadows. Okay. But in your opening testimony, you were
very positive, or at least more optimistic than most of the
opening statements up here, so what would you say are the two
bright spots that you see in this election that we can
celebrate with the Iranian people?
Ms. Maloney. The most important part of this election
actually wasn't the election itself, it was the debate that
took place a week before the ballot in which conservatives from
across the board pounced on the nuclear negotiator and attacked
the current strategy, and the failure to have gotten a deal
from the international community in the series of negotiations
that have taken place.
That, to me, was the most important. The other most
important element is the fact that Iranians had the opportunity
to carry through the messages they've been trying to get out
since 2009, and have been too repressed to do, which is to go
to the street, demand the freedom of political prisoners,
demand opportunities to engage with the world, and actually
celebrate the possibility of some optimism going forward.
Mr. Meadows. So, what--and this final question is to each
one of you. So, what benchmarks do we put in place where we say
okay, well, these benchmarks have been met, so sanctions can be
lessened or weakened, acknowledge progress here, and this is--
what would be those benchmarks?
Mr. Nader. If I can go first, that Iran has an entirely
peaceful nuclear program, uranium enrichment is capped, that
Iran is----
Mr. Meadows. That's verifiable?
Mr. Nader [continuing]. Subject to vigorous inspections and
it's verifiable, and Iran cannot move toward a nuclear weapons
capability.
Mr. Meadows. Okay. Dr. Maloney?
Ms. Maloney. I would characterize it very similarly. I
think there's a deal to be had that involves all of those
elements, that provides greater transparency and reliability,
that our ability to foresee Iran's efforts to jump toward a
nuclear weapon, but I think that we also have to be gauging
what's happening within the country, as well. I don't think we
can simply disregard the political and social circumstances
within the country.
Mr. Sadjadpour. I just want to make clear that I'm not
trying to paint Ayatollah Khameini as a positive, as a popular
guy.
Mr. Meadows. I understand.
Mr. Sadjadpour. And I think the fact that the candidates
aligned with him showed so poorly in the election is a
reflection of that. But I'm simply arguing he's more popular
now than he was before.
With regards to prospects for political change in Iran, I
simply say that in 1979, Iranians experienced a revolution
without democracy, and I think today they aspire for democracy
without a revolution. There's not the same stomach to do what
the Syrians are doing.
Mr. Meadows. So, do any of you see realistically their
withdrawal of supporting Hezbollah in Syria?
Mr. Sadjadpour. I would say no, as long as Ayatollah
Khameini remains Supreme Leader, the rejection of Israel's
existence, support for groups like Hezbollah and Islamic Jihad
and resistance against the United States, I would argue aren't
going to change.
Mr. Nader. If I can just add, I agree. I think the Islamic
Republic will always oppose Israel, but I think Rouhani is
going to be less ideological than Ahmadinejad. In his press
conference he referred to Israel as ``Israel'' instead of the
``Zionist entity.'' It's a very small gesture but it's
something. Does it show he's a true moderate? No, you know, a
true moderate would acknowledge Israel, but when you compare
him to the rest, he's a tad better, and I think that's just a
little room for cautious optimism.
Mr. Meadows. I appreciate the patience of the chair. I
yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Excellent question. Thanks, Mr. Meadows.
Mr. Schneider of Illinois.
Mr. Schneider. Thank you, Madam Chair. And let me just take
this initial moment to welcome the Women Parliamentarians. It
is an honor to have you here. We are glad you're here.
Witnesses, thank you for your testimony. We are clearly at
a moment of uncertainty as we watch the dust settle.
Dr. Maloney, you mentioned the relevance of elections, and
the importance of even a semi-democratic process in an
authoritarian context. I wonder if you could touch on a little
bit any of whatever meaning there was in the turnout for the
election, and the fact that Mr. Rouhani was able to win on the
first ballot?
Ms. Maloney. I think this was huge. If I were an Iranian
and I had been through what they had been through in 2009 when
the vote was blatantly rigged, and when the protestors who came
out and demanded to know where their vote was were brutally
repressed, I don't think I would have had the stomach to go to
the polls; particularly after much of the hype surrounding the
rejection of the candidacy of Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani, who
was seen as the primary moderate. So, I think it is a
tremendous testament to the faith of the Iranian people, their
willingness to invest in highly imperfect institutions, and
their willingness to continue to hope even in a situation that
doesn't provide a lot of hope.
The fact that Rouhani won on the first ballot was also a
big surprise. It's always hard to tell where the political
winds are going within Iran. And, of course, the social media
buzz in the run up to the ballot was very much favorable toward
Rouhani. But, of course, that was the case back in 2009, and we
didn't see the same outcome. So, part of this goes to the
disarray among the conservatives, their inability to unite
behind a single candidate. And there I think we should remember
that nearly--at least 49 percent of the Iranian people voted
for someone who was moderately to expressly hardline. And that
should be a reminder of some of the constraints that we face.
Mr. Schneider. Thank you. And that's a good lead into my
next question. Is there any reason to think that the change in
President should affect our calculus, as we said earlier,
change in benchmarks of our decisions, when to strengthen
sanctions or conversely looking for changes where we might
lessen or pull back on sanctions?
Ms. Maloney. I'll say just briefly, I think that, you know,
the next step should be at the negotiating table. It should not
be in this building, because I think if there's intensification
of sanctions, Iranians themselves will read it as directed
against their own action, and they, I will tell you, do not
appreciate the sanctions.
But, in fact, our benchmarks shouldn't change, but we can
expect and hope, I think, to see a more serious set of
negotiators, as Karim described, the people who were with
Rouhani when he was handling the file 10 years ago. And I think
we should be prepared to do more than offer the sort of spare
parts for aircrafts that has been kicking around now for a
couple of decades. We should be prepared to give meaningful
sanctions relief in exchange for meaningful concessions on the
nuclear issue.
Mr. Schneider. Mr. Sadjadpour?
Mr. Sadjadpour. I would agree with that, and I would simply
say that for the Supreme Leader, I would argue rapprochement or
better relationship with the United States is inimical to his
interests, so when we actually make efforts to try to engage
Iran and he rebuffs us, I think it makes him look very bad in
the eyes of his people who desperately do want to emerge from
isolation, and the rest of the international community.
Mr. Schneider. And yet, Mr. Nader, you mentioned his press
conference yesterday. In his press conference in referring to
the nuclear enrichment program, and I'll quote him, he said,
``All should know that the next government will not be budged
from our inalienable rights.'' Does that lead us to have any
hope that there is room for negotiation?
Mr. Nader. Yes, because I think there is a middle ground
where we could recognize their right to enrich uranium as long
as it's peaceful, especially if it's capped. And, you know, the
Iranian elite always talk about the U.S. pursuing a logical
position on the nuclear program, and that's often interpreted
in Iran as meaning having a program but also saving face. I
mean, this is very important for them to show that sanctions
and pressure have not worked on their decision making;
although, I argue they have.
So, let's give them an off-ramp on this crisis. Let's give
them an exit and allow them to exit the nuclear crisis, because
we've built a lot of leverage against Iran and it's time to use
the leverage.
Mr. Schneider. Thank you. I think that's an important
point. With my last few seconds, Mr. Sadjadpour?
Mr. Sadjadpour. I would just say that I would argue that
the Obama administration's unprecedented but unreciprocated
overtures to Iran actually made this sanctions regime happen.
We should take that into account.
Mr. Schneider. I think that's a good point, as well. The
last few seconds, Iran is increasingly engaged in Latin
America, South and Central America. Do you see Mr. Rouhani's
election as having an impact on their involvement, good or bad,
within the Western Hemisphere?
Mr. Sadjadpour. Having lived in Latin America, Mexico, I'm
confident that Iranian Shiite soft power isn't going to go a
long ways in that part of the world. And they do have certain
assets in line with Hezbollah, but after the death of Hugo
Chavez, I think they've lost their chief ally in Latin America.
Mr. Schneider. All right, thank you. I yield.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much.
Dr. Yoho.
Mr. Yoho. Thank you, Madam Chair, for holding this
incredible hearing in a timely manner with the elections in
Iran. And I appreciate hearing from you guys, the experts,
about this election and the dynamic in Iran.
Additionally, I'm interested in knowing how this election
will affect Iran's stance with both Syria and Israel. I think
this is something I hear from you guys that we should tread
cautiously about Mr. Rouhani as a so-called moderate in lieu of
what I've read here that back in a newspaper in 1999, there was
a student demonstration, and he took a real tough stance at
clearing that. Those arrested for sabotage and destroying state
property would face the death penalty if found guilty. That's a
pretty tough stance.
Then a former student was talking about how the guards
broke into their dorm rooms and murdered students in front of
them. And as recently as January, Rouhani stated that Syria has
constantly been on the front line of fighting Zionism, and this
resistance must not be weakened.
You were saying how we should continue forward to engage
him. How would you recommend we engage him with that kind of a
stance? I've heard some overtones here, and I'd like to hear
more specifically. We'll start with you, Mr. Nader.
Mr. Nader. On the question of Syria, I see Iran's
Revolutionary Guards and the Supreme Leader as determining
Iran's position, and I don't feel like they're likely to budge
on that issue. But it's also important to note that Rouhani has
stated he wants to fix Iran's relations with key allies, such
as Saudi Arabia. During his press conference he said the Saudis
are our brothers. I signed the first security agreement between
Iran and Saudi Arabia. So, if Iran's relations with the Saudis
and some of the other Arab countries improve we could see a
change.
In terms of how we should engage, I believe in bilateral
negotiations with Iran. U.S. diplomats should be able to talk
to the Iranians. Talking to the Iranians does not mean that we
accept their regime. It's just a foreign policy tool at our
disposal.
Mr. Yoho. Okay. Dr. Maloney?
Ms. Maloney. I would echo everything that Ali has just
said. I think that Rouhani will be able to dig up quite a bit
of very vociferous rhetoric for Rouhani on Syria, as well as a
number of other issues. But he did speak during the campaign
about the need for engaging in diplomacy, about the need for
talks between the Assad government, the Assad regime and the
opposition, as he described them. That's more moderate rhetoric
within the Iranian political discourse than the rest of the
candidates certainly articulated.
I think to the extent that he will have any influence on
Syria, it will only be if he can make the argument that it is
harming Iran's ability to repair its relationships with the
world, and that comes back to the economy and his need to fix
it.
His ability to create confidence within the Gulf is going
to be critical. He certainly, I think, assuages a lot of fears
there about what direction Iran is going, and whether or not
he's able to open up a channel of communication with Riyadh on
this particular issue I think would be enormously important.
Mr. Yoho. Mr. Sadjadpour?
Mr. Sadjadpour. I see very little likelihood that Iran will
change its position toward Israel. I think rejection of
Israel's existence is one of the three remaining symbolic
pillars left of the revolution and the Islamic Republic.
With regards to Syria, as someone once wrote, Syria is not
America's Vietnam, it's Iran's Vietnam. Iran is bleeding very
heavily in Syria. They've spent billions of dollars to keep
Assad afloat, and Rouhani being, as I said, someone who sees
economic expediency oftentimes trumping revolutionary ideology,
if he has a role, I would argue that he would probably argue
for a different approach. But it is going to be the
Revolutionary Guards who continue to carry out Iranian policy
in Syria, not the presidency.
Mr. Yoho. Okay. We keep hearing about the continual creep
toward developing a nuclear weapon, and their nuclear program
continuing. Do you see the day that they'll develop a weapon?
If so, when? And if they do, what do we do?
Mr. Nader. Well, the U.S. intelligence community has
assessed that Iranian leadership has not made the decision to
weaponize the program, that Ayatollah Khameini has not made
that decision. And this is a regime that bases its decisions on
cost-benefit calculations. The costs for Iran's pursuit of
nuclear weapons capability are going up, and they could be
reacting to the pressure. So, as long as those costs exist,
there's a good chance that they will not weaponize, especially
if we maintain the pressure, and make sure Iran is more
transparent on its nuclear program, as Mr. Rouhani has claimed
he would like to do, to have more transparency.
Mr. Yoho. Okay. Dr. Maloney?
Ms. Maloney. I think the only confidence that we'll ever
have about an Iranian nuclear capability is when there's a
different government in place within Iran.
Mr. Yoho. I agree.
Ms. Maloney. It's not within our capability to achieve that
today or tomorrow, but I think that, ultimately, what we have
to be focusing on constantly is putting as much distance
between this regime and nuclear weapons capability as possible.
Mr. Sadjadpour. I would just echo Suzanne's comments.
Mr. Yoho. Okay. I appreciate your time, and I yield back,
Madam Chairman.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Dr. Yoho.
Mr. Vargas of California.
Mr. Vargas. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman. I'd also
like to welcome the Women Parliamentarians and note that we
have a woman chairwoman here, of course. And we're very proud
of her on both sides of the aisle. We are.
You know, I think we all look at this through different
lenses. I look at it a little bit differently maybe than most
that have spoken so far. I see two differences between
Ahmadinejad and now Rouhani, and that is that this guy is a
cleric, the other guy wasn't. The other guy was somewhat of a
ruffian. This guy is a sophisticate. This guy speaks five
different Western languages. He speaks English, he was educated
in Scotland, he speaks French, he speaks German, he speaks
Russian.
I think that it's going to be very interesting the dynamic
between the Supreme Leader and him, because they have a
relationship on a different level that you don't have I think
when you're not a cleric. I could see very easily that the
Supreme Leader would say hey, you know, I trust you. You're a
cleric. Go out there and get me some time. You know, you're a
sophisticated guy. Go out there and talk to the West in a way
that this other guy couldn't. Gain us some time, because you
can see that these sanctions are really hurting us. They'll
trust you, as they don't trust him. Now, go out there and be
soft, look soft.
You know, I have to say, I'm very skeptical because I could
see that happening, and then United States saying hey, wait a
minute, you know, we've got a little thing going here with this
guy. Let's back up, let's ratchet back, let's throttle back,
when we should be doing the opposite maybe in tightening the
sanctions down, because the sanctions do seem to be working.
What do you think about that? I mean, again, we all look at
it through different eyes. I'm a former Jesuit so I look at it
through the eyes of the cleric. I mean, here's a guy, these two
people can trust each other at a level that normally you don't
have. Anybody?
Mr. Nader. I can just go first, briefly. The issue with
Ahmadinejad was that in Persian culture you're supposed to
respect your elders even if you don't like them, and
Ahmadinejad did not do that. It is more likely than not that
Rouhani will maintain respect for the Supreme Leader, and work
within the parameters set for him by the Supreme Leader. Yes,
he is charming, he's a mellow, calm guy. He's pragmatic, but I
don't think he's going to be able to smile his way out of
Iran's crisis.
Again, we have to ensure that Iran is held accountable no
matter how popular and how much opposite he is of Ahmadinejad.
I think the fact that the international community is more
positive toward him shouldn't mislead us into thinking that all
of a sudden pressures on Iran are going to stop, because
everybody realizes what the Islamic Republic is about, even if
Rouhani is the President.
Mr. Vargas. Doctor?
Ms. Maloney. Very quickly, Rouhani and Khamenei have a
relationship that dates back decades. And, obviously, that's
going to help. It also helps explain how it is that he's gotten
to where it is, but it's also important to realize that
Khamenei has spent the past decade disparaging Rouhani's role,
specifically in public with Rouhani sitting in the audience.
It's really remarkable, you don't often see that in the Islamic
Republic. So, you know, he made--he was forced to back down, he
was forced to take someone whose position on the nuclear issue,
which is obviously of critical importance to the regime, was
not one that he has been articulating himself, that he has been
defending and advancing himself for the past 10 years. So, I
think that it's important that we see that there is this
opportunity without in any way changing any of our own
positions on the nuclear issue.
Mr. Sadjadpour. I think after 8 years of seeing the Iranian
cup 80 percent empty, maybe it's time to look at it 20 percent
full just for once to say okay, this is a guy who is actually,
as you mentioned, he studied abroad. His advisors were all US-
educated. I think in his heart of hearts he would probably
prefer a better relationship with the United States. And I'm
not concerned that he's going to be able to smooth-talk his way
out of sanctions without them making any meaningful
concessions. I don't think that's a concern we should have.
Mr. Vargas. Well, he seems like he's already smooth-talked
us a little bit. I mean, just saying he's moderate and all
these other things. I have great skepticism. I think Reagan
said, ``Trust but verify.'' Here I think it's verify and
verify. Again, thank you very much, and I yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Very good, thank you.
Congresswoman Meng.
Ms. Meng. I, too, want to extend a welcome to our women
dignitaries here today. As our chairwoman and I are members of
a body less than 19 percent female, it's very encouraging to
see you all here today.
On one hand, we want to speak directly to the Iranian
people, its women, and its youth. On the other hand, we want to
build up trust with the regime if we're going to negotiate
successfully. What's the best way to manage these dual
objectives?
Mr. Nader. Ultimately, I think regime change is up to the
Iranian people. It is not up to the United States to change the
regime in Iran. There are ways we can help, opening up
communication, reforming Voice of America, like Karim said.
But, ultimately, the Iranian people will determine their own
destiny.
I think for now we have to make sure that Iran stops its
nuclear pursuits, and that we can verify it. And over time,
especially once the Supreme Leader passes away, Iran will have
an opportunity to seek a new future, possibly without the
Islamic Republic.
Ms. Maloney. I think we've already got some good programs
in place that have been in many ways put on hold because of the
atmosphere that Ahmadinejad and this recent political context
within Iran helped to create where it was dangerous for
Iranians to participate in some of the international visitor
programs, and the other opportunities to come here. That's of
some importance to many Iranians. But the highest priority for
Iranians is economic opportunity. Economic opportunity can only
come through restructuring of their economy, dealing with some
of the longstanding mismanagement, but also in the removal of
sanctions.
What we can do best to serve the Iranian people is to
respond to serious offers of concessions from its government on
the nuclear issue with meaningful sanctions reform.
Mr. Sadjadpour. Not to belabor the point, but I think that
we oftentimes underestimate the role that satellite television
played in the uprisings in the Arab world, the role of Al
Jazeera, and Al-Arabiya, and this model doesn't really exist.
Upwards of 90 percent of Iranians rely on television as the
primary news source, and it's basically either state television
for their news, or BBC Persian.
We have a huge opportunity here with Voice of America which
we're totally squandering. It's an unprofessional service. The
quality of programming is terrible, and with this one thing
which costs less than an F-15 fighter jet, we can reach over 30
million Iranians.
Ms. Meng. Thank you. I yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. Thank you, Ms. Meng.
Don't have anyone from our side, and don't have anybody
here. Okay.
Well, thank you very much for excellent testimony. It'll be
interesting to see what the future holds with this new leader.
And I hope that with his soft demeanor he doesn't lull us into
thinking that he's wearing the white hat, because reforms are
difficult to come by, as long as the Supreme Leader is calling
the shots.
And with that, the subcommittee is now adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:55 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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