[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
REGIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION: AN
EXAMINATION OF THE CENTRAL AMERICAN
REGIONAL SECURITY INITIATIVE (CARSI)
AND THE CARIBBEAN BASIN SECURITY
INITIATIVE (CBSI)
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JUNE 19, 2013
__________
Serial No. 113-74
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/
or
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DANA ROHRABACHER, California Samoa
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio BRAD SHERMAN, California
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
TED POE, Texas GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MATT SALMON, Arizona THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina KAREN BASS, California
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
MO BROOKS, Alabama DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
TOM COTTON, Arkansas ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
PAUL COOK, California JUAN VARGAS, California
GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III,
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania Massachusetts
STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas AMI BERA, California
RON DeSANTIS, Florida ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
TREY RADEL, Florida GRACE MENG, New York
DOUG COLLINS, Georgia LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
TED S. YOHO, Florida JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
LUKE MESSER, Indiana
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere
MATT SALMON, Arizona, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina Samoa
RON DeSANTIS, Florida THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TREY RADEL, Florida ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
The Honorable William R. Brownfield, Assistant Secretary, Bureau
of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S.
Department of State............................................ 10
Ms. Liliana Ayalde, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Western
Hemisphere Affairs, U.S. Department of State................... 19
Mr. Mark Lopes, Deputy Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Latin
America and the Caribbean, U.S. Agency for International
Development.................................................... 30
Mr. Eric L. Olson, associate director, Latin America Program,
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars............... 47
Mr. Michael Shifter, president, Inter-American Dialogue.......... 56
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable Matt Salmon, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Arizona, and chairman, Subcommittee on the Western
Hemisphere: Prepared statement................................. 4
The Honorable William R. Brownfield: Prepared statement.......... 12
Ms. Liliana Ayalde: Prepared statement........................... 21
Mr. Mark Lopes: Prepared statement............................... 32
Mr. Eric L. Olson: Prepared statement............................ 50
Mr. Michael Shifter: Prepared statement.......................... 58
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 70
Hearing minutes.................................................. 71
The Honorable Albio Sires, a Representative in Congress from the
State of New Jersey: Prepared statement........................ 72
The Honorable Gregory W. Meeks, a Representative in Congress from
the State of New York: Prepared statement...................... 73
Written responses from the Honorable William R. Brownfield, Ms.
Liliana Ayalde, and Mr. Mark Lopes to questions submitted for
the record by the Honorable Matt Salmon........................ 75
REGIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION: AN
EXAMINATION OF THE CENTRAL AMERICAN
REGIONAL SECURITY INITIATIVE (CARSI)
AND THE CARIBBEAN BASIN SECURITY INITIATIVE (CBSI)
----------
WEDNESDAY, JUNE 19, 2013
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:52 p.m., in
room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Matt Salmon
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Salmon. I would like to call this committee meeting to
order. I would like to start by recognizing myself for a brief
opening statement. I know we have kept everybody waiting for a
long, long time. So I apologize. Work here at the House from
time to time is that they call votes on the floor. And that is
audacious, isn't it, that they would expect that we would have
to vote? But anyway, I believe some of the other committee
members were planning on being here and will be here soon.
I would like to welcome everybody here today to the second
of our two-part series of hearings on regional security. As you
may recall, a few weeks ago, we focused on the Merida
Initiative and the direction in which our security cooperation
with the world's highest homicide rates, replacing Ciudad
Juarez last year as the world's most violent city. Poverty,
crime, public corruption and a legacy of violence in the region
have created a perfect storm that critically hampers economic
growth and opportunity, luring youth into a seemingly endless
cycle of crime and drug trafficking.
This week we are going to delve into the security situation
in Central America and the Caribbean Basin and examine programs
we have undertaken in the region to deal with combating drug
trafficking organizations to help the nations of both regions
combat violence and criminality. The security situation in most
countries of Central America and the Caribbean remains
critical. Gangs and organized criminals continue to operate
with impunity. Prisons are substandard, overcrowded. Corruption
remains endemic. And the justice and law enforcement sector
simply lack capacity.
Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala, known as the northern
triangle, suffer from excessive violence. San Pedro Sula in
Honduras has the world's highest homicide rates. And
interdiction alone has proven insufficient in dealing with
serious problems that plague the region. Through CARSI and
CBSI, the United States has led the effort in assisting the
region to address the underlying causes of what seems like a
regional point of no return.
State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement, INL, and USAID have put together a set of programs
designed to help the region's law enforcement agencies contend
with the creeping presence of the Zetas and Sinaloa cartels,
while enabling municipal and Federal police forces to acquire
the appropriate tools necessary to minimize corruption and
human rights violations. In addition, U.S. personnel have
worked diligently with regional partners in an effort to bring
effective and sustainable justice sector reforms to the region,
while USAID has worked with local and regional nongovernmental
organizations to enable communities to partner with the private
sector, to take the citizen security and prevention bull by the
horns, so to speak.
I don't doubt that our efforts are earnest, but I am
looking forward to hearing from both panelists today whether
those efforts have yielded measurable success and if the
political will exists within Central American and Caribbean
governments to press with real results. The horrifying
statistics from the region underscore that our efforts are
needed, but we are only making a dent in the problem at this
point. We need dedicated and strong willed partners if we are
to make progress. And progress cannot be made without a series
of unwavering commitments to transparency, human rights, and
grit from the governments of the region.
As chairman of the subcommittee, I maintain that working
with and assisting our neighbors in Mexico, Central America,
and Caribbean to build the necessary capacity to deal with
these challenges is in our national interest. Our region is
interconnected not only geographically but culturally and
economically. At the risk of sounding like a broken record,
economic growth and prosperity in Central and South America
will lead to more growth in prosperity in the United States.
Regional security matters. Without security, the countries
of Central America and the Caribbean will lack the ability to
grow their economies, give their youth the opportunity and
incentive to move to the next generation of peace and
prosperity.
And as you may know, I did serve in Congress previously
from 1995 to 2001. And I served on the Foreign Relations
Committee then. So I have seen my fair share of summits and
regional meetings where there is plenty of talk, good
intentions, lofty goals, but often too little in terms of
execution and follow-through. The people of the United States
have always been generous and dedicated to helping our friends
and neighbors through tough times. Even in this time of tight
budgets Americans are kind enough and practical enough to
remain engaged and help the region. That said, Americans rarely
enjoy throwing good money after bad, and we have got to make
sure that what we do works.
I see our efforts in Central America and the Caribbean as
important and they need to continue. I want the people of those
nations to have a society that is free of corruption where law
enforcement works for its people to ensure their security,
where the justice system is transparent and fair, and most
importantly, where young people no longer have to turn to a
life of violence gangs and drug trafficking.
I am extremely happy Ambassador Bill Brownfield is back
before the committee again to tell us about INL's efforts in
Central America and the Caribbean. And after our hearing on
Mexico and the Merida Initiative, my subcommittee staff led a
delegation to Mexico City and cities in northern Mexico where
INL is working diligently to help the Mexican Government build
capacity, train law enforcement, and strengthen and reform the
justice sector to effectively deal with all of the problems
associated with transnational criminal and drug trafficking
organizations. What we learned is that there is still a lot of
work ahead for us and our partners in Mexico, that this is a
long-term and vital undertaking.
Ambassador Brownfield, your staff throughout Mexico is
professional, dedicated and up to the task. I was happy to
learn that your office in Mexico has developed a program called
SAME PAGE that provides an efficient and clear way to track
projects and expenditures. The taxpayer appreciates and
deserves that level of accountability. I am pleased that the
law enforcement trainers and other staff you have placed in the
field are dedicated and hardworking Americans. Thank you. And
thank them for their service.
I am grateful to both Deputy Assistant Secretary Ayalde and
Mark Lopes from USAID for being here to testify. Working in
tandem with INL, I am hopeful that your respective agencies can
build on work already done to more efficiently and effectively
tackle the worsening situation in the region. I am also looking
forward to hearing from our private panel: Mr. Eric Olson from
the Woodrow Wilson Center, who just returned this week from
Central America and will hopefully give us a clear picture of
just how dire the security situation is in the region. We also
have Mr. Michael Shifter who is the president of the Inter-
American Dialogue who has written extensively on this topic.
Thank you all for being here today for taking the time to
discuss regional security issues and the growing threat of
violence and criminality in Central America and the Caribbean.
I look forward to a productive and informative hearing. And I
will now recognize the ranking member for his remarks.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Salmon follows:]
----------
Mr. Sires. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good afternoon. And
thank you to our witnesses who have been here today and thank
you for your patience.
Today's discussion on the security situation in Central
America and the Caribbean is both timely and long overdue.
While merited efforts to combat criminal threats and reduce
drug trafficking-related violence in Mexico has diverted our
attention from the public security crisis that has emerged in
Central America, the deteriorated state of security in the
region is a byproduct of gangs, organized crime groups, drug
traffickers that have spilled over from Mexico in attempts to
control the drug trade, coopting local crime organizations into
their network who smuggle drugs, people, illicit goods, and
weapons. And while the Caribbean is not the dominant transit
point of choice for the illicit drugs into the U.S., it would
be naive for us to ignore the possibility that a pressure on
drug traffickers in Mexico and Central America increases. The
Caribbean will become a viable and attractive alternative for
illicit activity.
The most basic functions for any government is to protect
its citizens. With some of the highest homicide rates in the
world amongst the northern triangle countries of El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Honduras, citizen security remains an issue. For
some countries, false conflict institutional reform in the
1990s have left already weak governments with a broken justice
system, corrupt police forces, and poverty stricken unequal
societies. With the persistent unemployment and the lack of
social mobility, many Central American youth have either
emigrated to the United States or been recruited by criminal
groups. As a result, a bigger Central American population now
live in the United States. And for some Central American
countries, remittances represent between 10-20 percent of the
GDP. It is unfortunate when the choice of a young adult is to
either leave one's homeland or face a life of poverty alongside
constant threats to join gangs or other criminal organizations.
I have been concerned with the rise of Central American
gangs into the criminal activities and the constant threat they
pose to susceptible youth and weak governments, particularly El
Salvador and Honduras. Homicides and drug related violence
remain serious obstacles to the peace and security of Central
America. According to the U.N., Mexico, a country with 112
million people, had in 2011 a homicide rate of 23.7 percent per
100,000 people. El Salvador with a population of 6 million had
a rate of 69.2 and Honduras, with a population of almost 8.5
million had a homicide rate of a staggering 91.6. These facts
reinforce our need to ensure that the Central American Security
Initiative and the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative, one,
broad enough to dismantle a transitional crime organization and
curb illicit drug flows with crime prevention and institutional
building efforts to spread to the rule of law and, two, are
implemented in the coordinated manner within the U.S. agencies
and partner countries. While remaining dynamic enough to
address both current and potential threats as seen in the
Caribbean, it will be in our best interests not to overlook
security concerns in the Caribbean.
Today nearly $500 million have been appropriated for CARSI
and about $200 million have been appropriated for CBSI.
However, recent Government Accounting Office reports suggest
that less than 28 percent of CARSI's funds and roughly 90
percent for CBSI funds have been distributed. This committee
needs to understand why such funding has not been carried out
in an efficient manner. I look forward to hearing from our
panelists regarding the assessment of these security
initiatives as well as their determination of the current state
of security in Central America and the Caribbean. Transforming
a generation of corrupt behavior, strengthening the rule of
law, implementing long due institutional reform, and creating a
more inclusive society for youth prone to illicit activities
will take time and determination. However, the United States
must approach these initiatives with a goal of transferring
ownership to Central American leadership. Ultimately, it is the
people of Central America that are responsible to get the
public and the political will to take this difficult task on.
Thank you.
Mr. Salmon. Thank you. I recognize the gentlewoman from
Florida.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. And when
talking about security in this hemisphere, we must not forget
about Cuba, the State sponsor of terrorism 90 miles from my
district. In the last 2 months, the Obama administration has
granted a U.S. visa to Raul Castro's daughter and returned to
Cuba a convicted spy without having him finish his sentence
here in the U.S. This week, we find that the State Department
is engaging the Castro regime in direct mail and migration
talks. The Castro regime will not, has not, never has complied
with any international agreement. In fact, just a few years
ago, the regime signed two international human rights accords.
Yet the tensions on the island have risen. Valiant defenders of
democracy, like Las Damas de Blanco, the Ladies in White, face
weekly beatings. In addition, it is the Castro regime that does
not comply with the mail accords that we signed with him from
years ago. Meanwhile, a U.S. citizen languishes unjustly in a
Cuban prison. Cuban activists, as we speak, are risking their
lives on hunger strikes. And over 70 refugees, 70 fugitives
have gone to Cuba for safe haven. There are fugitives from U.S.
law, including, as you know, Mr. Sires, a cop killer from New
Jersey.
What is next with this administration? Enough is enough.
Basta ya! The Cuban people deserve freedom and democracy just
as all oppressed people do. And these talks will not help them
achieve those goals.
And Mr. Chairman, during the question and answer period, I
look forward to asking our witnesses about the capacity and the
willingness and the capability of the Caribbean nations to
fight drug trafficking and whether the Mexican drug cartels are
penetrating any of these countries. We have heard a lot about
the Dominican Republic having been infiltrated by them.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Salmon. Thank you.
Pursuant to committee rule VII, the members of the
subcommittee will be permitted to submit written statements to
be included in the official hearing record. And without
objection, the hearing record will remain open for 7 days to
allow statements, questions, and extraneous materials for the
record subject to the length limitation in the rules.
I would like to introduce the first panel. Ambassador
Brownfield is the Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. Prior to
his appointment, Mr. Brownfield served as U.N. Ambassador to
Colombia, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, and Republic of
Chile. Pretty easy career there. Ambassador Brownfield is a
graduate of Cornell University and the National War College. He
also attended the University of Texas School of Law.
Mark Lopes is the Deputy Assistant Administrator for the
Bureau of Latin America and the Caribbean. He was formerly the
senior policy adviser/staff director for the chairman of the
International Development and Foreign Assistance Committee of
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Prior to that, he
served on the State Foreign Operations and Related Programs
Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee. Mr. Lopes
holds a BM from Berklee College of Music and an MPP from
Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government.
Ms. Ayalde is a career minister serving as a Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs,
covering Cuba, Central America, and the Caribbean. She
previously served as the USAID Senior Deputy Assistant
Administrator in the Bureau for Latin America and the
Caribbean. In addition Ms. Ayalde served as the United States
Ambassador to Paraguay from 2008 to 2011. She holds a BA from
American University in international studies and a master's
degree in international public health from Tulane University.
And also I understand that you have been nominated to be
Ambassador to Brazil which is fantastic. We were just there.
And they need a great person like you. So best of luck.
And without further ado--I keep calling him Ambassador
Brownfield but we will start with you.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE WILLIAM R. BROWNFIELD, ASSISTANT
SECRETARY, BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW
ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Ambassador Brownfield. You may call me whatever you wish,
Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Sires, members of
the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear
before you today to discuss CARSI and CBSI initiatives.
Our strategic assessment is very simple. We believe the
region suffers from a surge in drug trafficking and violence
and all nations are affected. As efforts succeed in Colombia
and Mexico, traffickers push into Central America and the
Caribbean; therefore, we must pursue a coordinated strategy
throughout the region. As the American people look to Central
America, they see drug flows into the United States. But the
peoples of Central America see violence, crime, and homicide.
Our strategy must address both drugs and violence.
Between 2008 and 2012, Congress provided more than $300
million in funding to my bureau to support law enforcement and
rule of law in Central America. Most Central American
governments have increased their own tax and revenue base to
provide more support for security and rule of law as well. What
are we doing? We support police training and internal affairs
units to identify and root out corruption. But reforming an
institution takes a generation, and the people have a right to
improved performance now. So we support special vetted units
who can work high priority cases today. We link up with USAID's
community development programs to support model police
precincts in the poorest and most violent communities. We
provide specialized training on drugs, criminal investigation,
gangs, and special victims. And we provide training to
prosecutors, judges, border guards, and corrections officials.
Mr. Chairman, over the past year, homicide and violence
rates have gone down throughout Central America, and I will not
claim full credit for CARSI but clearly it is one factor. If
Central America is today's crisis, then the Caribbean is
tomorrow's challenge. I have said it before and I repeat it
today, as our efforts in Central America begin to bite,
trafficking organizations will search for alternative routes
and networks and the Caribbean will look attractive. Drug flows
through the Caribbean are tiny compared to Central America, but
they are growing. In 1 year, they increased from 5-9 percent of
total cocaine flow to the United States.
CBSI is designed to work with Caribbean governments to
reduce drug trafficking, strengthen citizen security, and
improve justice. We are investing today to pay dividends
tomorrow. We are building cooperation. Each country is
different but our programs are regional. We train police in
basic and specialized law enforcement. We train prosecutors,
judges, and corrections officers. We support special units to
combat drug trafficking and gangs. And the Coast Guard leads
maritime exercises.
In Trinidad and Tobago, we work to expand the national
police academy into a regional training hub. Law enforcement
throughout the Caribbean benefits from access to the Automated
Fingerprint Information System, or AFIS, in working their
caseloads.
Mr. Chairman, this subcommittee has been generous in
supporting our efforts in Central America and the Caribbean.
There are some who call this mission impossible, insisting that
we will never solve the problem. I am not one of them. I agree
that it took us years to get into this situation and it will
take years to get out of it. But the hemisphere is focused as
never before. The OAS dedicated its general assembly 2 weeks
ago to the drug issue. We are engaged. We are cooperating. And
we are exploring new approaches and strategies. I believe we
will have a good narrative to tell about Mexico and Central
America. I look forward to telling it.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I look forward to your
questions.
Mr. Salmon. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Brownfield follows:]
----------
Mr. Salmon. Ms. Ayalde, I would like to recognize you.
Thank you.
STATEMENT OF MS. LILIANA AYALDE, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
BUREAU OF WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Ms. Ayalde. Chairman Salmon, Ranking Member Sires, members
of the committee, it is truly a privilege to join you here
today. I appreciate the invitation and the subcommittee's
continuous support for the administration's efforts to partner
with our neighbors in the Western Hemisphere to increase
citizen security particularly through the Central American
regional security initiative, CARSI and the Caribbean Basin
Security Initiative. I wish to focus my comments today on the
administration's efforts to meet pressing challenges in this
region and to galvanize the international community to work
effectively to ensure that our combined efforts are impactful.
The security needs, rule of law capacity deficits, and
requirements for improved quality and quantity of basic
government services for citizens of Central America and the
Caribbean are beyond the capability of any single nation or
donor. Therefore, an international approach to coordinating and
leveraging our efforts is essential. The administration has
highlighted this message at the highest levels at various
international forums in recent months. President Obama visited
Costa Rica in May where he met with the seven heads of state of
the Central American Integration System, SICA, and the
Dominican Republic. He emphasized to them the importance of
shared partnership and our commitment to continue working with
the region on issues related to security. He also emphasized
the critical link between security and economic opportunity and
prosperity. The President stressed that our aim is to reinforce
security and opportunity in every sense, not only combating
crime but ensuring that human rights are respected and
communities are secure in their access to food, energy,
education, health care, social services, and financial and
economic opportunity.
Vice President Biden also championed this message when he
met with the Caribbean leaders in Port of Spain, Trinidad and
Tobago last month. Just last week, Secretary Kerry traveled to
Guatemala where he participated in the annual general assembly
of the Organization of American States, the OAS. Secretary
Kerry countered the misperception that U.S. counternarcotics
policy is primarily focused on law enforcement by highlighting
our comprehensive plan that addresses demand, prevention, and
treatment.
In April, as part of our effort to strengthen multilateral
approaches to supporting Central America, the Department held
the first North America-SICA Security Dialogue in Washington.
Canada, Mexico, the United States and the seven SICA countries
participated. The dialogue provided an opportunity to discuss
enhancing regional coordination on security programming and it
specifically focused on the themes of precursor chemicals and
violence prevention. It provided a forum where we were able to
discuss these issues and begin a process of bringing additional
resources and commitments to specific problems faced in both
Central and North America.
We have reinforced our message with much needed support
through the CARSI and CBSI initiatives that have been
generously funded by Congress, and we are seeing the fruits of
these efforts as partner nations demonstrate increased
political will and the prioritization of their most pressing
citizen security, rule of law, human rights, and prevention
challenges.
The Guatemalan Government, for example, achieved a 20
percent increase in the number of murder cases brought to trial
in Guatemala City over the last 2 years. In Salvador, the
government's commitment to reducing urban violence has exposed
over 6,000 students to the gang resistance education and
training program. In the Caribbean, Dominica recently passed a
comprehensive civil asset forfeiture law with a dedicated
forfeiture fund to ensure that seized illicit proceeds are used
to strengthen law enforcement, prosecution, and drug abuse
treatment and prevention. This is the first such law passed
anywhere in the eastern Caribbean.
The Government of Jamaica has embraced a comprehensive
police anticorruption program that includes an anticorruption
branch of the Jamaican Constabulary Force. We are watchful that
success against the criminal enterprises in Mexico, Colombia,
and Central America could drive them increasingly to the
Caribbean for new opportunities and trafficking routes.
With CBSI assistance, we have an opportunity to address
vulnerabilities in the infrastructure, build government and law
enforcement capacity, and engage at-risk youth before
transnational and other criminal elements can take hold. It is
only through our continued support, the support and expertise
of other donor nations, and the commitments of our partners in
the region that we can prevent an increase in crime in the
Caribbean.
As a partner of Central America and the Caribbean, it is
the goal of the United States to continue to support these
regional and national efforts and to utilize our diplomatic and
political resources as well as foreign assistance to foster
enhanced levels of sustained dialogue and collaboration to turn
today's citizen security challenges into a catalyst for
building a more secure and prosperous future for the
hemisphere.
Thank you again for this opportunity to discuss these
issues with you, and I look forward to the questions.
Mr. Salmon. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Ayalde follows:]
----------
Mr. Salmon. Mr. Lopes.
STATEMENT OF MR. MARK LOPES, DEPUTY ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR,
BUREAU FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, U.S. AGENCY FOR
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
Mr. Lopes. Thank you, Chairman Salmon, Ranking Member Sires
and members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity
to appear before you today.
USAID's work in security is focused on addressing the root
causes of crime and violence not only because of the
implications for U.S. national security but because high levels
of crime and violence threaten to stall economic and democratic
progress as well. The heart of our work in this area is through
prevention programs designed to complement and reinforce
government efforts to improve the rule of law, strengthen the
capacity of municipalities to prevent crime, and create
additional educational and employment opportunities for youth
most susceptible to joining gangs.
To ensure that we have the greatest impact on the most
people, our efforts are largely focused in high crime urban
areas of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. Governments in
the region are largely abandoning the previous decade's failed
mano dura or ``iron fist'' crime fighting tactics in favor of
more prevention-based approaches. We welcome this change.
For example, the Government of Honduras declared 2013 the
year of prevention. The Government of El Salvador recently
launched a new municipal crime prevention policy that we think
is a healthy framework within which to operate. USAID is
employing several novel approaches, a couple of which I will
mention here. First, because no single actor involved has all
the answers, we are aggressively working as a broker to share
lessons from places that have had success. Countries like
Brazil and Colombia have much to offer in this respect. Also,
through an agreement that we signed with the City of Los
Angeles, USAID is adapting L.A.'s proven gang reduction message
in identifying youth susceptible to joining gangs and organized
crime. We are also connecting city officials in the region with
our counterparts in places like Arlington, Texas; Santa Ana,
California; Pinellas County, Florida and tailoring successful
models accordingly.
Second, given the size and scope of these challenges, donor
investments are not enough. Countries must generate and invest
their own resources. For this reason, we are testing models
that allow them to bring in more money, particularly at the
municipal level. And in El Salvador and Honduras we launched a
revenue challenge competition to increase the collection of
unpaid fees. Cities that do this well will get a modest subsidy
to reinvest in crime reduction programs. The idea behind this
is to invigorate local government ownership, increase resources
for prevention and thereby build their capacity to play a
greater role in the solution.
Third, governments and donors are not the only
stakeholders, and therefore USAID is increasingly engaging with
the private sector. Through partnerships with Chevron, Hanes
brands and Starbucks we are working to physically transform
more than 150 schools in the region. We also work with telecom
operators and mobile phone companies who provide free Internet
access in our outreach centers and who develop the mobile crime
system that enables law enforcement in five municipalities to
track, report, and analyze real crime data. The innovations
brought by these companies are as valuable if not more valuable
as their financial contributions.
And lastly, our programs under CARSI would have little
impact if they were not embraced by youth in the region. Most
of them have a mother, a brother, a sister, a cousin who they
can help galvanize around violence prevention. USAID is proud
to support the Central American Youth Movement Against
Violence, which now has chapters in all seven Central American
countries, and in February 40 of these youth presented their
ideas to the Presidents of Central America at a gathering in
Costa Rica. In the Caribbean our programs are similar in spirit
to those in Central America but focus more on crime rate
prevention, including education and government capacity
building, working in close partnership with national and
regional governments.
Mr. Chairman, we also work across a range of other sectors
under the premise that it takes more than prevention and law
enforcement to advance durable security and prosperity. By
keeping children in school, training young people for jobs,
connecting farmers to markets, lifting rural poor out of
poverty, preserving natural resources, and reaching out to
historically marginalized groups, we contribute to a broader
effort to make the region more peaceful and more prosperous.
Thank you again for the opportunity to share our programs
with you, and I look forward to sharing your guidance.
Mr. Salmon. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Lopes follows:]
----------
Mr. Salmon. I would like to yield myself 5 minutes to ask a
question. And then I will go to the ranking member and the
other members on the panel here today. This question is for
both Ambassador Brownfield and Deputy Assistant Secretary
Ayalde.
There have been concerns about the Honduran Government's
efforts to confront corruption and criminality in its police
force and about State Department's Fiscal Year 2012
certification of Honduras. In your estimation, has the Honduran
Government met the conditions for certification? And can you
explain State's rationale in reaching that decision to certify?
Second, what is the impact on your programs and progress from
the Senate holding up the funding?
Ambassador Brownfield.
Ambassador Brownfield. Do you want to start on
certification? I will follow up.
Mr. Salmon. Yes, that is fine.
Ms. Ayalde. We have not issued the report yet. We are
following the situation very carefully. Obviously we are, like
others, concerned with some of the issues of impunity and human
rights. But we believe that our commitment is to the Honduran
people, and we are looking for ways that we could continue to
do so while adhering very closely to the legal restrictions.
Ambassador Brownfield. Mr. Chairman, from a programmatic
perspective, the impact on our ability to conduct our programs
is this: First, we try to have programs that directly attack
the problem, the problem being evidence of corruption and call
it misbehavior or abuse of authority in law enforcement and
security elements. We attempt to address the problem by
training at base level or basic level for those in the police
and security forces and, second, by supporting the
establishment of internal affairs divisions that are able to
identify the corrupt or abusive individuals and eventually
remove them from service.
Second, we are applying the strictest possible vetting
standards to those units and individuals with whom we work, by
which I mean we use the community that assesses these matters,
the human rights community, the legal community, the policy
community both here in Washington and in the field in Honduras
to determine which individuals and which units are reasonably
believed to have committed these abuses in the past or are
continuing to commit them in the future. And those individuals
and units, we will not work with. We will find, in some cases
we apply a lesson by which we have two degrees of separation.
For example, if a particularly senior official is found to have
committed these abuses, we not only will not work with that
official, we will not work with anyone that reports to that
official. We will be at least two steps below that individual
before we would work with anyone in that institution.
What has been the impact of the Senate hold? Mr. Chairman,
there is currently $10.3 million on hold. This funding would be
used to support the ability of the Honduran national police to
conduct interdiction, drug interdiction operations,
particularly in the isolated northern region of the country.
The impact of the hold at this point is our inability to deploy
or support the deployment of Honduran national police in that
area. That in and of itself is not a disaster. The problem of
course is just as you and I realize this, so do the drug
traffickers. And as they realize that this is a zone where the
police cannot reach, it obviously for them becomes a very
inviting area through which to traffic their product.
Mr. Salmon. Thank you. I am going to yield back the balance
of my time and recognize the ranking member.
Mr. Sires. You know, I read before where nearly $500
million had been appropriated for CARSI and about $200 million
had been appropriated for CBSI. Recently, the Government
Accounting Office reports suggest that less than 28 percent of
CARSI and roughly 90 percent of CBSI funds have been
distributed. Can you expand upon that why? It just seems that
we could have done a better job of appropriating more money.
Ms. Ayalde. Yes, sir. It did take a while to get started.
In the Caribbean, we are working with 13 different governments
with different levels of capacity. And we have to ensure that
there were institutions that were going to be good partners in
working that. I think it took a while to get started but we are
at the right pace right now where we are cranking up a number
of activities. So only to say that we recognize the slow start
but we had to be comfortable and assured that there would be
transparency in the use of funds and that the partners would be
able to carry out their commitments. So we are at that place.
In fact, it is unique to see that the governments of the region
have taken the framework of CBSI as theirs. We believe that
this is very positive. Other donors, including the Canadians
who are helping us coordinate among all the donors that are
participating in the Caribbean, are coordinating under the
leadership of Canada, and they are also using the framework of
CBSI.
So it took a while to get started but I think that we are
at the right moment right now. So we recognize that slowness.
Ambassador Brownfield. Congressman, if I could add a little
bit of gloss from my side. And I will run the specific figures
by you. The GAO report was assessing a period of time that
concluded with Fiscal Year 2011. Since then, we have gone
through another whatever number of months we have since then,
another 18 months. Things have happened in that period of time.
Between 2008 and 2012, the INL account, which I am responsible
for for CARSI Central America was $305 million. Of that $305
million, $294 million is now obligated. The remaining $11
million that is unobligated is the $10.3 million that I just
described to Chairman Salmon and another couple of hundred
thousand on another program. Of that sum, more than half has
actually been spent. In other words, the obligation is us
reaching agreement with the governments on how it will be
spent. And the spending, which is a separate process, has
actually moved forward to well over 50 percent as opposed to
the 20 percent number that you had.
In the Caribbean, the figure is between 2010 and 2012 for
our INL funds. Ninety-five million dollars total of which
eighty-three million dollars has been obligated, a figure of
just under 90 percent. I expect that remaining $12 million to
be obligated before the end of this fiscal year. Our
liquidation rate has been a bit slower in the Caribbean than in
Central America for the reasons that Liliana just indicated,
which is to say we are starting up. We are coordinating with
many different governments. This is not the Plan Colombia or
Merida where we are coordinating with just one government. We
are coordinating with 13 in the Caribbean or seven in Central
America. The coordination takes time. And finally to be
absolutely honest with you we were starting at very close to .0
in terms of the personnel and staff that we had in the field.
And I had to beef them up. I had to add additional staff to our
sections in three of our six working Central American
Embassies. And we are adding additional personnel in the
Caribbean. I think the story from this point on will be much
better for you.
Mr. Sires. Okay. Thank you.
Mr. Salmon. Thank you.
I recognize Mr. Duncan.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And the timeliness of
this hearing is ironic. It was almost a year ago today that the
Committee on Homeland Security Oversight Subcommittee that I
now chair had a hearing on a very, very similar topic, on June
21 had a committee hearing titled U.S.-Caribbean Border: An
Open Road for Drug Traffickers and Terrorists. The witnesses
were the Honorable Luis Fortuno of Puerto Rico and Rear Admiral
William Lee, Director of Operations Policy and Capability of
the United States Coast Guard. So during that hearing, we
talked about the Caribbean region being possibly a potential to
become an unlocked back door to the continental United States
not only for drug traffickers but terrorists as well. And given
the confluence of actors in the region, namely drug cartels,
terrorist organizations like Hezbollah, antagonistic Latin
American leaders like the former Hugo Chavez, the Caribbean has
a potential to become a region hostile to the United States.
What is more, given the Caribbean's geographical proximity to
the United States mainland, this threat is even more
unsettling. And during that hearing, we talked about the
Caribbean being astride to major shipping lanes from South
America, North America and even Europe, how appealing that is
to drug traffickers moving cocaine from South America and
Mexico.
So I say all that saying that this hearing is great as a
follow-up so to what we learned there. And then shortly
thereafter, I traveled to Bogota and met with the Colombians
and really learned about what we were doing with the Colombian
Government and helicopter training and a lot of other training
to the tune of about $10 billion I think over a decade. And so
the question I have is, do you see a segue to build on that
Colombian experience? And then how do you see Colombia working
in this? And I will ask Ambassador Brownfield there because I
certainly enjoy his testimony in Congress. He has come several
times. And I think he is very knowledgeable. How do we see
Colombia as possibly being an ally in the region to train maybe
the Hondurans or the Guatemalans, Salvadorians and they may not
go to U.S. for training, but they may go to an ally within
Latin America for training. So are they a willing partner? Do
you see the benefit of that? And how may that help in the
Caribbean nations as well?
Ambassador.
Ambassador Brownfield. Sure. Let me start, Congressman, and
then yield to the good Dr. Ayalde or good Dr. Lopes if they
wish to add on. I think it is an excellent question and even
better, it is an opportunity for me to make a couple of points
about Colombia, a country with whom I have had some
considerable experience, including I would like to think 3
years during which we were trying to lay the groundwork for
exactly what you have just described.
I believe Colombia plays a very useful role in two senses.
One, lessons that we have learned there, frequently, the hard
way between January 2000 when Congress first appropriated funds
to support Plan Colombia and today. Lessons in terms of how you
do these sorts of programs, how you cooperate and collaborate.
How you engage other partners. How you try to bring together
the security side of a program with the developmental side of
the program. How you sequence it. How you figure what your end
game is so that we are not asking Congress to support a program
forever. There are a lot of lessons that we have learned in
Colombia that we can apply in Central America or the country to
the immediate north of Central America or among the 14
countries of the Caribbean.
The second important fact--and I use the word ``fact'' to
talk about in the Colombia sense--is how Colombia itself plays
as a service provider and supporter in these programs because
let me be absolutely frank and blunt. Right now the Colombian
national police is training more police and law enforcement in
Central America than all of U.S. law enforcement put together.
Now, some of it is supported by us. So it in essence it is
CARSI funding, Plan Colombia funding, or some cases, even
Merida funding that does this. And it does it because it is
cheaper for us to have the Colombian national police provide
this training than us doing it ourselves. Sometimes it is the
Colombians themselves providing that training. They are at this
point training in four of the seven countries in Central
America. They are providing training and support in the
Dominican Republic in the Caribbean. They are open to further
engagement. I actually believe we get excellent value either by
Colombians training in third countries or by us bringing law
enforcement personnel from those third countries to train in
many of the Colombian training institutions that we helped
support and set up during Plan Colombia from the year 2000 to
2010. I think we actually should be looking forward and looking
for ways to engage Colombia more and more effectively in this
effort. From my perspective, it is a dividend that we get for
our more than $9 billion of investment in support for Plan
Colombia over the last 13 years.
Mr. Duncan. That is exactly the points I wanted to be
brought out. I appreciate your service there. And my time is
about out. But ma'am, you act like you want to chime in, if the
chairman will allow it.
Ms. Ayalde. Just very quickly to complement what the
Ambassador has mentioned. Colombia is also very eager to be
engaged. We have included Colombia as a member of this North
America-SICA Dialogue because of their interest at not only at
the operational levels such as training and technical
assistance but also in providing some strategic guidance. For
instance, whether there is a reform of the police--and to give
an example, in Honduras, whether there would be some value
added in providing some guidance because of the experience. And
we see that as a big plus. They have also expressed an interest
and are engaged in the forums that we hold to coordinate
strategic directions in the Caribbean. So just as a complement
to what has been said.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you so much. Those are the points I
wanted to make. I appreciate it. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Salmon. Thank you.
I recognize Mr. Radel.
Mr. Radel. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I have a question for Mr.
Lopes. Can you tell me if the programs in Central America have
any kind of a list of individuals that we trained with our
CARSI funds? So what I am getting at here, I am curious with
our taxpayer dollars being spent, do we have a quantitative
measure on who, how many people we are training and maybe more
importantly how many we retain?
Mr. Lopes. Certainly. Thank you. I will touch on our
outreach centers which I am not sure is where your question is
going. But then maybe I can ask a follow-up. I think we have
got a range of programs in Central America focused on at-risk
youth and municipal capacity building. Some of that has a
training element. Some of that has an outreach element. We have
got 100 centers throughout the northern triangle countries as
well as in Panama. Combined, those efforts in 2012 have reached
about 90,000 people. As I mentioned in my opening statement,
there is a lot of secondary benefits to individuals who are
involved in these outreach centers. Sometimes these are youth
at risk. We have also got more structured training programs in
terms of employment opportunities and job generation work that
we use to target in particular areas where people are
vulnerable to engaging in either illicit activities or gang
activities. In terms of impact, we have seen encouraging
results. We have also looked in a scientific way--and I know
that this committee is concerned with impact rather than just
output. And we as well are concerned not just in the region but
around the world that as USAID we have got a treatment and
control group of communities whereby we look scientifically
according to a series of factors with a baseline and a mid
term. That study is not over yet but that mid term evaluation
has shown statistically significant impact in terms of the
treatment communities doing better than those control
communities.
Mr. Radel. So those are kind of qualitative measures. Do we
have lists--correct me if I am wrong here. But we pay people,
right, that have roles that play within this. Do we have
knowledge lists of who these people are and whether we retain
them over a certain amount of time that continue to do the
work?
Mr. Lopes. Certainly. I mean, we would be happy to follow
up in terms of whether it is individuals or profiles and
whatever information that would be helpful.
Mr. Radel. Okay. So it would be clerks, judges, police.
Mr. Lopes. In terms of the justice reform programs and the
work in terms of training for judicial officials, we can
certainly provide you with details on exactly who these
individuals are.
Mr. Radel. And police officers.
Ambassador Brownfield. If it is police, Congressman, the
reason Mark is ducking that question, if it is police, I do it.
And yes, we do do it and we can provide those sorts of numbers
for you.
Mr. Radel. Okay. Great. We will get that then in writing.
[The information referred to follows:]
Written Response Received from the Honorable William R. Brownfield to
Question Asked During the Hearing by the Honorable Trey Radel
The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
(INL) maintains a record of International Law Enforcement Academy
(ILEA) student alumni, including those who received training funded
under the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI) and Central
America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI). Each ILEA management
staff is tasked with maintaining ILEA alumni training information.
Law enforcement professionals from Central America and the
Caribbean receive training funded under CBSI and CARSI at ILEA San
Salvador. Since 2005, approximately 4,400 alumni from Central America
and the Caribbean received training at ILEA San Salvador. This total
includes 203 alumni from Belize, 371 from Costa Rica, 1759 from El
Salvador, 617 from Guatemala, 514 from Honduras, 180 from Nicaragua,
365 from Panama, 23 from Antigua and Barbuda, 70 from the Bahamas, 51
from Barbados, 15 from Dominica, 15 from Grenada, 7 from Guyana, 67
from Jamaica, 12 from St. Kitts and Nevis, 14 from St. Vincent, 21 from
St. Lucia, 45 from Suriname, and 42 from Trinidad and Tobago.
In addition to providing high-quality training for ILEA
participants from Central America and the Caribbean, the ILEA Program
conducts six-month post course evaluations as part of the six-week Law
Enforcement and Leadership Development (LELD), or Core Program. This is
the first year we have conducted six-month evaluations for the LELD
Program, and we will utilize this data to gauge alumni knowledge
retention and make necessary adjustments to improve course delivery.
The LELD six-month evaluation does not track whether or not ILEA-
trained officials remain in their positions.
INL works closely with the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and
Labor to ensure all candidates who attend ILEA courses are vetted in
compliance with Department and Leahy vetting requirements, and this
includes alumni who return for additional coursework. ILEA does not
continue to vet alumni after graduation, but we have no information
indicating that any officials trained at the ILEA have later been
implicated in human rights abuses or have been prosecuted for
corruption.
Mr. Radel. Thank you. I appreciate your time.
Thank you, Mr. Chair. I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Salmon. Thank you. We would like to get to the next
panel. But before I do, I have a question I would like to just
ask and have you submit in writing. I know you have already
been detained way too long. But my question would be,
Ambassador Brownfield, CARSI aid is divided among seven
countries. Actually all three of you, if you could submit any
relevant answers to this. The CARSI aid is divided among seven
countries as well as regional programs. How much funding has
been allocated to each country? And how are those allocation
decisions being made? Are any of the countries not receiving
any or certain types of CARSI aid at this time? And if so, why
not? And finally, to what extent is CARSI aid tied to
demonstrations of political will by partner governments? And do
we have an idea of how much the region spends on their own
security for every dollar the United States contributes? And I
want to thank you very much. And I will have staff provide
those questions to you as well. But if you could respond back,
I would really appreciate it. And thank you so much for your
patience today. And thank you so much for your wonderful
testimony. And it is always a pleasure.
[The information referred to follows:]
Written Response Received from the Honorable William R. Brownfield, Ms.
Liliana Ayalde, and Mr. Mark Lopes to Question Asked During the Hearing
by the Honorable Matt Salmon
The Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) is a
whole-of-government multi-year program that responds to security
threats in Central America and supplements strategies and programs the
nations of Central America are implementing on their own and in
cooperation with other countries. The $496.5 million in U.S. CARSI
assistance committed to date (FY2008-2012) supports: law enforcement
and counternarcotics efforts; rule of law and capacity building,
including police and judicial reform and anti-corruption; and
community-based violence and drug prevention to address the root causes
of crime and violence and build more resilient communities. CARSI funds
are allocated across all seven countries in the region. Guatemala,
Honduras, and El Salvador, the three northernmost countries, receive
the majority of CARSI funding given their particularly high levels of
crime and weak rule of law institutions, and the remaining funds
support regional and national programs in the rest of the region.
We prioritize our citizen security assistance, including the
allocation of resources and programming, in the nations that are most
severely affected by transnational organized crime, including narcotics
trafficking and gangs. We work with our international partners through
the Group of Friends of Central America donor coordination process, our
embassies, interagency partners, host nations, and the Central American
Integration System (SICA) to determine the scope of the threat to
citizen safety in each nation and the needs and deficiencies of host
nation law enforcement, rule of law, and prevention capacity and
institutions. Then, based upon limited U.S. resources, the actions of
other donors, and host nation capacity to absorb U.S. assistance, we
determine the assistance for each nation. In Belize, El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Honduras, we are focusing on replicating programs that
have proved successful in other countries and that can make short-to-
medium-term impact, including municipal crime prevention planning,
critical youth-at-risk services, model precincts and community policing
in crime-ridden municipalities, and border interdiction programs. In
Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and Panama, we are supporting host-nation
efforts to reduce growing levels of insecurity and to rebuild the
capabilities of their rule of law institutions.
Governments in the region have come a long way over the years in
acknowledging the scope of the security threats, taking responsibility
for addressing them, and undertaking serious institutional and policy
reforms to improve citizen security. Governments are passing new laws
to generate taxes and revenue supporting investment in citizen security
programs, extradition, judicially authorized wiretapping, and asset
forfeiture. They are also developing community-based approaches to
reduce violence and taking steps to address difficult issues, including
internal affairs and police reform. This growing political will is
evident at the regional level.
Through SICA, the nations of Central America are showing an
unprecedented level of transnational cooperation on security. This is
essential, because drug traffickers and criminal networks do not
respect national boundaries, and no single country can defeat these
criminals alone. We must work together to address this shared regional
threat. We have much more work ahead of us, and we have encouraged the
region's leaders to devote more resources to these challenges and to
continue to combat corruption and impunity.
Fiscal year 2012 CARSI allocations, through both Economic Support
Funds (ESF) and International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement
Funds (INCLE), were as follows:
Mr. Salmon. We will have one more question. I am sorry.
Mr. Meeks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am sorry about
sneaking in there. In my Financial Services Committee we had
some votes going on. But I did not want to miss the opportunity
to ask a few questions of this distinguished panel that we have
before us on topics that are most important to me.
And I just want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, also though for
your focus on regional security concerns you know as a top
priority for this subcommittee. I think it is exactly the right
place. But let me not dilly-dally. Let me just go straight to a
couple of questions that I don't believe were asked. My staff
was listening and they told me which questions were and which
were not. Mr. Sires may have asked everything but I didn't ask
at all.
So in regards to the--overall, dealing with the Caribbean
drug transshipment, overall the use of the Caribbean as a
transshipment point for illicit drugs from South America to the
United States I am told has diminished over the past 10-15
years as drug traffickers have shifted primarily to using
Mexico and Central America corridor. What is your assessment of
the current status of drug transshipment through the Caribbean
and have you seen any increase recently due to law enforcement
efforts in Mexico and Central America? Let me add on to that,
to what extent is the Caribbean equipped to contend with an
increase in the use of the region for drug transshipments and
to what extent has the CBSI helped increase the interdiction
and law enforcement capacity of the Caribbean nations to
contend with the increase in illicit drug trafficking?
Just a few questions.
Ambassador Brownfield. Mr. Chairman, I am sure I speak for
the entire panel when I say we would be deeply disappointed
were we not to have received any questions from the
distinguished gentleman from Queens. I will be delighted to
offer at least the start of an answer on these and let my
friends Drs. Ayalde and Lopes follow up as they think
appropriate.
What have we seen by way of trends of drug shipments moving
through the Caribbean? Here is my simple answer to that
question, Congressman: We see drug transshipments through the
Caribbean as still a tiny percentage of that which moves
through Central America and Mexico but it is growing. In
between 2011 and 2012, the last year for which we put together
reasonably good statistics so far since traffickers do not
report their business to official government institutions, we
calculate that the amount that has been transshipping through
the region has jumped from 5 percent to 9 percent of the total
that is coming to the United States of America. Nearly
doubling. The overwhelming majority of that flows through the
island of Hispaniola, the Dominican Republic and Haiti and
probably the majority of that that flows through Hispaniola
flows through the Dominican Republic. The trend therefore is
obviously moving in an upward direction.
And I would add a second point. It is perfectly logical
that that happen. The logic is as follows: In the early 2000s,
we squeezed them in Colombia and a lot of them moved their
operations to Mexico. Beginning in 2007-2008 we started to
squeeze them in Mexico and they moved into the Central American
region. Starting around 2009, we began to squeeze them in
Central America. What are they going to do? One option is that
they all go out of business, open beach cabanas, and live
happily ever after as entrepreneurs. The other is they will
look for an alternative and cheaper place to do business. And
when they start that search, the Caribbean and those old
networks that we took down in the 1980s and the 1990s are going
to look very attractive.
And that, Congressman, is what CBSI from my perspective is
all about. We are investing in the future. We are trying to
build both the capabilities and the cooperation among the 13
cooperating governments of the region so that they will be
prepared to address this reality that I see coming down the
road. We are talking about many States that are very small,
vulnerable because they do not have the resources and the
personnel to perform this mission who require this degree of
cooperation and support from us in order to be able to do it.
If we do our job right today, this is not a story in 2 years
time. We will know in 2 years whether we have done our job
right.
Ms. Ayalde. If I may, sir, just to add to that, everything
that is being done is done through the optics of institution
building. To give an example, we have two advisers from ATF
that are posted in the Caribbean to provide technical
assistance on trafficking of small arms. It is a big issue in
the Caribbean, and they are overwhelmed with how to deal with
it. The adviser has been placed in a regional institution. They
are being encouraged to share information which is not very
natural to them. But the idea is that they will get the
procedures, the way things are done to try to track these small
arms. They are being trained and they will have the know-how of
where to go with this information and what to do with it.
So again, it is about institution building, making sure
that what we do is not just for today but for tomorrow.
Mr. Meeks. Let me just ask this if the chairman wouldn't
mind, also, let me just ask about--we did Plan Colombia. We
also had a part of dealing with economic development in the
area so that the locals would not have to resort to selling
drugs, et cetera, when that happens. So are we still doing the
same thing here? Are we doing enough to encourage the economic
and as you talk about institutional development while we work
on security also?
Ms. Ayalde. I have to admit that that is an ongoing
challenge because these are small states. In many cases they
are struggling with their fiscal health. You may be very
familiar, for instance, with Jamaica and how much we worked
with them to try to get them to sign the IMF agreement and some
of the very hard choices they have to make. So we have to look
at it. And this is what President Obama has been saying, the
investment in the economy and that prosperity is essential to
the sustainability of anything we do in security.
It is a challenge in the case of the Caribbean because they
are small states, they depend a lot on tourism. And we have
limited resources. AID is present in a very limited way and so
we don't have as many tools. But what we do have is more
creative ways of working with the business sector. For
instance, I am traveling to Barbados in about a week to launch
the American Chamber of Commerce there to be working in the
eastern Caribbean, and we are encouraged to be able to attract
more business and investment.
Mr. Meeks. Mr. Chairman, I was a little late, but could I
ask unanimous consent to submit my opening statement for the
record?
Mr. Salmon. Absolutely. Without objection.
Thank you very much for your testimony. We really
appreciate it. Thanks again for your patience.
Mr. Radel [presiding]. We would like to go ahead and
welcome our second panel. Thank you so much for being here.
Let's go ahead and run through the bios real quick here.
Eric Olson, a member of our second panel here, is the
associate director of the Latin American program at the Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars. His research and
writing is focused primarily on security issues and the impacts
of crime, organized crime and violence on democracies. He has
also written about reform of police and judicial institutions
as a vehicle for addressing the problem of rapidly expanding
crime in the Americas, which is what we are dealing with here
today. Prior to joining the Wilson Center he was a senior
specialist in the Department for Promotion of Good Governance
at The Organization of American States from 2006 to 2007.
Mr. Olson also holds a BA from Trinity College in history
and secondary education and a Master's Degree in International
Affairs from American University. Again, thank you for being
here.
Over to Mr. Michael Shifter. Mr. Shifter is the President
of the Inter-American Dialogue. Since 1993, Mr. Shifter has
been an adjunct professor at Georgetown University's School of
Foreign Service, where he teaches Latin American politics,
which is a little complicated from time to time. Prior to
joining the Inter-American Dialogue, Mr. Shifter directed the
Latin American and Caribbean Program at the National Endowment
for Democracy.
Mr. Shifter holds a BA from Oberlin College in Sociology
and political science and a Master's Degree in sociology from
Harvard University.
We will go ahead and go along with the testimony and I will
start with Mr. Olson. You are recognized.
STATEMENT OF MR. ERIC L. OLSON, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, LATIN
AMERICA PROGRAM, WOODROW WILSON INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR
SCHOLARS
Mr. Olson. Thank you so much, and I appreciate your staying
on and overseeing this hearing, and thank you also, Mr. Meeks.
I know he spent a lot of time looking at issues of democracy
and security in Latin America, particularly in the Andes
region, so thank you for being here as well.
I have submitted some written testimony to the committee
already so I would like to, with your permission, just make
some summary remarks on that.
I just came back from 10 days in Central America in the
northern triangle of Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador, so
much of what I say reflects that 10-day travel to the region.
But I also lived in Honduras for 2 years in the 1980s and have
repeatedly traveled to the region over the last 20-25 years.
And while I consider myself an optimist at heart, hopeful
by nature, I have to admit that I feet a bit of sense of dj vu
listening to our panel before us, all wonderful people that I
have enormous respect for. But some of what we have been
talking about here today is the same things we were talking
about 20 years ago, building institutions, strengthening
capacity, so on and so forth. So there is a time at which one
has to ask oneself, are we really being successful, are we
really doing the right things? And I don't question the goal.
The problem is not the goal, it is the method to getting there,
and I do have to say that I have some serious questions about
how we are going about it simply because it is not producing
the results we would like to see, and, to be honest, what the
people of Central America want to see and deserve to see. So
that I just offer as a preface.
I would just say in a word that the security situation in
the northern triangle in particular, Honduras, El Salvador,
Guatemala, is dire. I don't want to call it a crisis, but it is
dire. Organized crime and trafficking is rampant. And we are no
longer talking just about drug trafficking, we are talking
about human trafficking, trafficking in minerals, gold
increasingly, other minerals, petroleum products. I mean, you
name it, there is trafficking going on. And what that means is
that the income from those businesses is phenomenal and the
coercive effects of that kind of trafficking is tremendous.
Gains, especially in El Salvador and Honduras, are a daily
reality for people in big urban areas. And although there has
been a truce declared in El Salvador and the homicide rates
have gone down, extortion is still rampant. People are afraid
of taking buses because they get held up consistently and
regularly. So that is an issue.
One of my missions on this trip was to begin an assessment
of the borders in Central America. You can only imagine the
number of problems. To say it is porous and open borders is to
say the obvious. There are eight official crossings between
Guatemala and Mexico and 122 estimated informal crossings. And
I am not talking about foot paths. These are areas where trucks
drive across rivers and where boats traverse rivers without any
kind of control.
Conversely and ironically, at the official ports of entry
there is enormous inefficiency for commerce, legitimate
commerce, where there is high levels of corruption and trucks
and people bringing products in are stuck for days on end.
So the situation again is dire. There are areas of the
countries where there is no effective state presence--I am
sorry, areas of the region where there is no effective state
presence, and even in areas where there are authorities who are
elected, many times, and I don't want to overstate it, but many
times those authorities are on the payroll or themselves
engaged in trafficking. And this is particularly troublesome
along Honduras and the Guatemalan border where there is really
very little state presence.
I wanted to just go ahead and say a couple more things. I
see two problems in Central America that need to be addressed.
First of all, success in Central America depends essentially on
the Central Americans themselves and their capacity and
willingness to make the tough decisions, and, unfortunately, in
many cases that has not been done. Oftentimes there is a
promise of reform, initiatives to reform, there is purging and
vetting, but the fundamental kinds of reforms that create
greater transparency and greater accountability, and I think
you were actually getting at this issue as well, we are
training people, training people, but we don't have a clear
sense of what that outcome is, how is that really turning
things around. I think it is an indicator of how we need to
adjust our strategy in Central America to make it more
effective, have better outcomes, not just better inputs.
I also think that one of the problems is that since we
focus so much on drugs, we tend to reduce every problem in
Central America as primarily a drug problem, and I think
frankly while obviously drugs and drug trafficking are a big
problem, we need to have a broader approach to the region.
Let's not just focus on drugs and getting the drug cartels, but
to also do, as some of you have implied, look at the economic
situation, look at the health care system, look at the
education system, because if you don't start from a broader
perspective and start to reestablish the capacity of the state
at many levels, I think the likelihood and hope for change in
that region goes down quite a bit.
I would focus anything we were to do going forward on
building or defining basic benchmarks for transparency and
accountability. Again, simply training people is not going to
solve their problem. We have been investing in rule of law and
justice reform in Central America for probably 20 years, at
least, and we are still with the situation of a justice system
in Honduras that basically doesn't work.
We have police forces in Central America and particularly
in Honduras where last Monday while I was there the Minister of
Security said that he found over 400 people on the police rolls
who didn't exist, he called them ghosts, people who were
collecting salaries and doing no police work. So without
greater transparency on all of these fronts, I think we can
continue to train people, we can continue to send equipment, we
can continue to provide information, but that is the kind of
fundamental building blocks that we need to start with in the
region.
Obviously in 5 minutes I can't cover it at all. I will
leave it there. I am happy to answer any of your questions and
I think there is a lot more information in my written
testimony. Thank you very much.
Mr. Radel. Mr. Olson, thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Olson follows:]
----------
Mr. Radel. We now go to Mr. Shifter.
STATEMENT OF MR. MICHAEL SHIFTER, PRESIDENT, INTER-AMERICAN
DIALOGUE
Mr. Shifter. Thank you very much, Congressman Radel, and
thank you, Congressman Meeks. It is good to see you.
The security situation in Central America and the Caribbean
is very serious. It varies from country to country, it has
different explanations in each country, but over all the trend
is worsening and very worrying. Criminal violence poses a great
challenge to the rule of law and to fragile democracies. The
situation can and should be addressed by countries in both
regions and by the regional organizations such as SICA and
CARICOM. But the United States has enormous responsibility and
also the capacity to assist.
The economic and demographic ties to both regions are
profound and are growing. The U.S.'s own strategic interests
are at stake. Skepticism about whether the U.S. can help is
understandable but should be put in perspective. I recall
testifying before Congress 13 years ago about Plan Colombia and
everyone asked the question, is there any precedent for the
U.S. providing sustained support to another country in the
world that has helped strengthen the capacity of the state and
led to reduced violence? Back then there were no good answers
to that question. Today it is possible to cite the example of
Plan Colombia itself. U.S. cooperation did not solve Colombia's
problems, but it did contribute to reducing the security
problem in an important and positive way.
Two thousand thirteen is not two thousand and there are so
many differences between Colombia and Central America and the
Caribbean today. But the core problem of governance and
lawlessness applies to both situations. Both CARSI and CBSI are
useful and important steps, but the programs are not enough.
Despite the cooperation, crime and violence in a number of
countries are worsening, not improving. In Honduras, murder
rates increased by some 50 percent between 2008 and 2012,
precisely the time period in which these programs were
implemented. And even where violence has dropped, U.S. support
has been too modest and could be more effectively targeted.
CARSI and CBSI are comprehensive and wide ranging
cooperation programs. They combine traditional counternarcotics
activities with institution building and crime prevention
measures. There has been a welcome shift in resources toward
the latter, but the counternarcotics control and law
enforcement still account for a significant share of the
assistance.
Over the long term the best investment, the wisest
investment, is in institution building. Drug trafficking is a
key element in spreading violence and weakening institutions.
It needs to be addressed. But levels of cocaine seizures, the
main metric used to measure success in U.S. security aid, are
not directly correlated with homicide rates. Even when the
share of cocaine trafficked to the Caribbean has been reduced,
the murder rates have more than doubled over the last decade.
It is critical that resources be delivered in a timely
manner and that they be commensurate with the huge challenges.
According to the GAO, disbursements both in CARSI and CBSI have
been delayed. It is commendable that in this difficult fiscal
environment there will be more resources are for CARSI in next
year's budget. Resources are not everything, but they are
important, and the U.S. should see this region as a high
priority and be prepared to even increase funding should
circumstances warrant.
The U.S. should not limit its policy to Central America and
the Caribbean to security cooperation programs. Diplomatic
instruments and political pressures should also be brought to
bear to engage other governments in the region to be more
helpful. The role of Mexico and Colombia, and Colombia was
referred to in the last panel, are especially critical, but
other governments as well in the region need to be helpful and
supportive.
Central America is also sensitive to U.S. domestic policy
issues. The U.S. should seriously engage in a review of drug
policy, should manage deportations to the countries in the
region with greater sensitivity to how they affect security,
and it should do more to stop illegal arms from entering the
region. The U.S. should recognize that there is a great
opportunity for collaboration in the region. President Obama
and Vice President Biden's recent visits illustrate the
goodwill in both Central America and the Caribbean, and
Colombia shows that sustained U.S. support can make a
difference.
Thank you very much for this opportunity. I look forward to
any questions you might have.
Mr. Radel. Thank you, Mr. Shifter.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Shifter follows:]
----------
Mr. Radel. I now yield myself 5 minutes to ask some
questions.
In committee hearing after committee hearing, Colombia
always is this bright shining example of what we can do when we
work together, fostering an economy, work on security, national
security issues, et cetera, where we go from what was almost a
failed state to what we now have in Colombia, the GDP booming,
growing. But, Mr. Shifter, you pointed out how you cannot have
one-size-fits-all approach when it comes to these types of
issue and you noted some of the differences between Colombia
and present day Central America.
I would ask you, could you expand on that a little more?
What are the differences and how can we better direct resources
based on that?
Mr. Shifter. Well, thank you. I think Colombia has an
internal armed conflict, is a major difference. The political
conflict is now a peace process in Colombia. Colombia clearly
is one country as opposed to small countries, as Ambassador
Brownfield underscored. It is a major coca producer. Plan
Colombia was directed at eradicating the coca production in
southern Colombia. So I think there are enormous differences.
And this is mainly a problem of trafficking. Really this is the
transit routes that go through. So I think there are some real,
real differences.
But the problem in Colombia, Colombia was called on the
brink of a failed state and now some of these countries are
called failed states. So there are similarities in terms of
basic structures of governance, and questions of
accountability, transparency, corruption. These issues were
brought up in the context of Plan Colombia always well.
So I do think that you tackle a very, very similar kind of
problem. What I think is needed is a much more engaged approach
even than we had in Colombia. Colombia is a country with a
strong democratic tradition, stronger than many of the Central
American countries. So they were a partner that you can work
with, and I think in Central America I think really ultimately
the responsibility is with the Central Americans themselves.
But I do think beyond just security assistance programs, there
needs to be a much more engaged and focused and targeted
approach by the United states.
Mr. Radel. And that is where we get back to institutional
support, versus just, gee, how many kilos of cocaine have we
seized today.
Mr. Olson, if you would want to expand on that, that is
kind of what you were getting at as well, right, that
institutional support, whether we are talking the justice
system, education, things like that?
Mr. Olson. I totally agree with what everyone has said,
that institutional support is essential. What I am trying to
get at is in some ways we have been trying to do that for a
long time and not terribly successfully. So what I am
suggesting is maybe we need to take a little bit different
approach to it; that the focus not be so much on training, not
that I am against training, but that not be the main focus of
what we do and we instead try to start with issues of
transparency and accountability.
Let me give you a couple examples. Again, Minister Corrales
in Honduras discovered that there were 400-plus police officers
that didn't exist receiving salaries; 162 missing vehicles;
expensive communication, brand new, never taken out of the
package. That kind of problem you don't solve by training more
people because they are coming into a system of corruption, of
penetration, of capture of the state.
So what I am trying to say is that maybe the first building
block here is to push them to have more transparent procedures.
Nobody in Honduras can tell you how many cases have been
opened, how many have been investigated, how many have been
prosecuted and how many have been sentenced, basic information
so that you could judge whether there is any progress. We keep
training and training and training, but the system stays
basically the same.
And, no, it is not a question of institution strengthening
or not. It is how you are going to do the institution
strengthening that makes a difference. And I think that is the
key to me.
Mr. Radel. Mr. Olson, I thank you for your time. I am the
eternal optimist like you. I hope we can have a brighter future
in this in implementing. Again, I go back to those kind of
qualitative and quantitative measures to address what you have
discussed. I think it is important that this committee too
recognize if there are issues like that, if our funds are being
directed or mismanaged in any way, tied into some of these
issues that you have brought up, I hope that we can address
that.
At this point I will go ahead, and my time has expired, Mr.
Meeks, you are recognized.
Mr. Meeks. Thank you. I was going to call you Mr. Chairman
but I see the chairman is back, so I don't want him to think
there is anything funny going on here.
Mr. Radel. You can still call me Mr. Chair.
Mr. Meeks. Let me again thank you for your dedication and
your focus on issues of concern, especially in Latin America
and Central and South America. I am wondering, going back to
the conversation that we were just having and oftentimes
Colombia is a subject matter which we bring up, now, it seems
to me maybe one of the fundamental differences has been, and
you tell me, is leadership, from the top going down getting the
word out that I want transparency. Because if the leadership
doesn't say I want transparency, then wherever the money goes
it is going to be gone without having transparency.
So talk to me about leadership in some of the key areas
where we are investing money or where we should not invest
money and how do we do that so we can make sure that there is
accountability, eventually transparency and get on a pathway,
as we did in Colombia.
Mr. Olson. I was going to defer to the chairman over here.
I mean, I think that is a very valid point and a good point.
And, again, like Michael said, each country is different. I
think the Millennium Challenge Account has made transparency in
governance a central part of its program and there has been
progress in that in El Salvador, for instance. I think there
has been progress in Guatemala because Guatemala has had the
good fortune of having an attorney general who herself is
courageous and has held people accountable.
But I frankly am pessimistic about what I have heard and
seen in Honduras, and part of it is there has been a revolving
door. They have had three public security ministers in just
over 3 years, and each one of them comes in with a new agenda
and a new reform plan and is really going to shake things up.
And more power to them, but it never takes hold and we never
quite make it beyond that.
So that is why looking at sort of the systemic part of
this, the transparency part is really important. And, you know,
if there were that kind of leadership committed in the long
term, then I would say there is even more hope.
Mr. Meeks. Mr. Shifter?
Mr. Shifter. Thank you. I think you make a great point,
Congressman. In Colombia what happened was they basically said
this country is no longer viable if the situation continues the
way it has been going, so in that context leadership emerged
that kind of tapped into something that was out there. And we
haven't quite seen that yet in Central America.
Part of the problem is that there is a very difficult
challenge in coordinating efforts. Each one is a different
situation. There is some mistrust frankly among the governments
and you really have to have somebody that really plays--no one
has really stepped forward yet to really assume that role of
coordinating the region because everything is on the line. And
that is really what happened in Colombia. It is easier to do it
in one country than it is in many, especially when there are
such different circumstances.
But I think in terms of U.S. policy there are reformers in
each of the countries. I think Honduras, as Eric said, is the
most problematic, the most troubling. If you had to single out
the most difficult one, I think it would be Honduras. But in
Guatemala you have an Attorney General and in other countries
you have people in leadership positions that I think you can be
supporting, you can work with, and I think effort should just
be to focus and to strengthen those individuals in leadership
position, if not the President then at least in the judicial
branch or Congress or in other institutions that are key.
Mr. Meeks. Well, let me ask, I have always been curious,
those individuals that we may have in various institutions in
various countries that seem to be moving in the right
direction, where do they come from? How do we find them? Is it
civil society if it doesn't come from the top? What do we do to
make sure that there more of them, that we are creating more of
them, that we are educating or teaching more of them so we will
have more of them coming from the groundswell up as opposed to
leaving a vacuum?
Mr. Olson. I think that is a great point, and that is why I
say we can't have just such a narrow focus on fighting drugs.
We have to look more broadly, because we have to identify
leaders with possibility that can move this forward. And they
may come from unexpected places.
Again, trying to be optimistic even about Honduras, the one
bright light I see in Honduras is actually the university. A
university that traditionally has been abandoned, underfunded,
corrupt, you name it, now has a rector who is viewed as an
honest person, who is doing new and innovative things at the
university. She has created an observatory on violence that is
actually creating documentation schemes of who is getting
murdered where. The government is not doing that. She is doing
it.
So there is somebody that is not in government and that is
on the outside and maybe the periphery, but I think she is
beginning to create a space in Honduras that is legitimate and
maybe we can build something there.
Mr. Meeks. Thank you. I see my time has expired.
Mr. Radel. Thank you, Mr. Meeks. I now recognize the chair.
Mr. Salmon. Thank you. Either of you can answer this
question. Actually, it is a couple of questions. How has DOD
supplemented the assistance provided through CARSI and what
have been the principal accomplishments for DOD support for
Central America thus far; how will the budget cuts affect the
interdiction and training efforts moving forward; and what are
the major challenges for interagency cooperation; and how would
you respond to concerns that U.S. assistance is being provided
to militaries that still experience widespread impunity for
human rights violations and criminal activity?
Thank you.
Mr. Olson. I am not sure I have an exact answer for you. I
would like to be able to respond in writing. I mean, I take it
by DOD you mean their counternarcotics assistance, because
there is a DOD presence or a State Department presence in
Honduras at the Soto Cano base, but that is not a
counternarcotics function.
SOUTHCOM has numerous programs in the area that are
counternarcotics-focused. I am beginning to look at this issue
of border and border security, and I know SOUTHCOM is doing
quite a bit in Belize, in Guatemala, to try to increase the
capacity of the militaries in those countries to patrol the
borders. I don't have numbers around that and I don't know much
more than that, but I do know they have a presence.
What the sequester impact will be on all these programs, I
just couldn't tell you in honesty.
Mr. Salmon. This is my last question, and either one of
you, I will be happy to have you answer. How would you respond
to than concerns that U.S. assistance is being provided to
militaries that still experience widespread impunity for human
rights violations and criminal activity?
Mr. Shifter. Well, I think this is a concern. I mean,
Central America as you know has a very troubling history and
one of the achievements in Central America is precisely the
reduction of the military over the recent period. And the worst
thing the United States could do would be to strengthening
those military forces for non-military purposes for what should
just be law enforcement purposes. But the problem is the police
are not adequate to the task and there is a lot of public
pressure for order. And if the military is the only institution
that can do that, that is a real dilemma, that is a real
problem. So I think that is a very, very strong concern.
I guess I would respond with a question that if the United
States doesn't provide support to those militaries, those
countries, those militaries are going to do it anyway, and this
at least gives the United States some leverage and ability to
try to constrain those abuses. Because these situations are out
of control, no other institution can provide order, and I don't
think the U.S. wants to sit by and say well, we are not part of
this, but look what they are doing down there.
I think this was the Colombian case. Again if you go back
to Colombia, human rights has been a central part of that
program and there has been a reduction in human rights abuses
in parts thanks to the pressure applied from Washington.
Mr. Salmon. Thank you. Prisons throughout Central America
are overcrowded and in substandard conditions. Moreover, they
have become recruitment centers for criminal gangs, further
complicating the security situation in the region. What are the
governments of these countries doing to address these serious
problems?
Mr. Olson. I know that in the case of Honduras the U.S. had
I believe it was about a $10 million program to help reform and
strengthen the prison system there because not only was it
grossly overcrowded, but the prisons were actually platforms
for organized crime and we had these horrific examples of
prison fires and riots where hundreds of people were being
killed. So there was a real interest in dealing with this
problem here. And the U.S. said before we give you this money,
we have a few conditions: No more cell phones in the prison,
segregate the prisoners, keep minors out of the adult
population, some basic, basic criteria.
And the government was unable to meet those basic criterias
so the U.S. said we are not giving you $10 million. As much as
it is needed, as important as it is, if you can't make some
basic standards, you don't have the will to do some basic
things, we are not giving you the money. So it is a real
dilemma because the problem as you say is extreme.
Now there are better prisons, they have improved prison
conditions in El Salvador, they have improved prison conditions
in other countries. But when a country doesn't have the basic
fundamental commitment to make some minimal changes, one has to
ask oneself is this the right way to invest our money? I think
they did but the situation has not improved.
Mr. Salmon. Thank you very much. I yield back.
Mr. Radel. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thank you both gentlemen. It has been very productive. I
think it gives us a little clarity moving forward on the
realities of this, the cultural realities to this, which is a
theme that just keeps coming up. You can only do so much.
People want to have to want to help themselves. And as stewards
of taxpayer dollars, it is imperative that we look at this very
critically, especially given our own economy and our own budget
here in the United States.
Gentleman, thank you both. There being no further business,
this subcommittee is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:30 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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