[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
WHAT DOES A SECURE BORDER LOOK LIKE?
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER
AND MARITIME SECURITY
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 26, 2013
__________
Serial No. 113-3
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
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__________
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Candice S. Miller, Michigan, Vice Brian Higgins, New York
Chair Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Ron Barber, Arizona
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania Dondald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Jason Chaffetz, Utah Beto O'Rourke, Texas
Steven M. Palazzo, Mississippi Tulsi Gabbard, Hawaii
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Filemon Vela, Texas
Chris Stewart, Utah Steven A. Horsford, Nevada
Keith J. Rothfus, Pennsylvania Eric Swalwell, California
Richard Hudson, North Carolina
Steve Daines, Montana
Susan W. Brooks, Indiana
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania
Greg Hill, Chief of Staff
Michael Geffroy, Deputy Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER AND MARITIME SECURITY
Candice S. Miller, Michigan, Chairwoman
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania Loretta Sanchez, California
Steven M. Palazzo, Mississippi Beto O'Rourke, Texas
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Tulsi Gabbard, Hawaii
Chris Stewart, Utah Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Michael T. McCaul, Texas (Ex (Ex Officio)
Officio)
Paul L. Anstine, Subcommittee Staff Director
Deborah Jordan, Subcommittee Clerk
Alison Northrop, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Statements
The Honorable Candice S. Miller, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Michigan, and Chairwoman, Subcommittee on
Border and Maritime Security................................... 1
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Border and Maritime Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 4
Prepared Statement............................................. 60
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security.............................................. 6
Witnesses
Mr. Michael J. Fisher, Chief, Border Patrol, Department of
Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 13
Joint Prepared Statement....................................... 15
Mr. Kevin McAleenan, Acting Assistant Commissioner, Office of
Field Operations, U.S. Customs and Border Protection,
Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 20
Joint Prepared Statement....................................... 15
Rear Admiral William D. Lee, Deputy for Operations Policy and
Capabilities, U.S. Coast Guard, Department of Homeland
Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 22
Prepared Statement............................................. 23
Ms. Rebecca Gambler, Acting Director, Homeland Security and
Justice, Government Accountability Office:
Oral Statement................................................. 27
Prepared Statement............................................. 29
Mr. Marc R. Rosenblum, PhD, Specialist in Immigration Policy,
Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress:
Oral Statement................................................. 39
Prepared Statement............................................. 41
For the Record
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement of Thad W. Allen, 13 February 2013.......... 6
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Border and Maritime Security:
Statement of the American Civil Liberties Union................ 61
Report by the American Immigration Lawyers Association......... 65
The Honorable Beto O'Rourke, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Texas:
Statement of Colleen M. Kelley, National President, National
Treasury Employees Union..................................... 79
Statement of Jesse J. Hereford, Chairman, and Nelson H. Balido,
President, the Border Trade Alliance......................... 82
Appendix
Questions From Honorable Steven M. Palazzo for William D. Lee.... 95
Questions From Honorable Steven M. Palazzo for Michael J. Fisher. 95
Questions From Honorable Beto O'Rourke for Kevin McAleenan....... 96
WHAT DOES A SECURE BORDER LOOK LIKE?
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Tuesday, February 26, 2013
U.S. House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:02 a.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Candice S. Miller
[Chairwoman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Miller, Duncan, Palazzo, Barletta,
Stewart, Jackson Lee, Thompson, O'Rourke, and Gabbard.
Also present: Representative Cuellar.
Mrs. Miller. Good morning, everyone. The Committee on
Homeland Security, our Subcommittee on Border and Maritime
Security will come to order.
The subcommittee is meeting today to examine our Nation's
border security. We have an all-star panel of witnesses here
this morning: Michael Fisher, who is the chief of the United
States Border Patrol; Kevin McAleenan, who is the acting
assistant commissioner in the Office of Field Operations at
Customs and Border Protection; Admiral William Lee, who is the
deputy for operations policy and capabilities at the United
States Coast Guard; Rebecca Gambler, the director of the
homeland security and justice section for the Government
Accountability Office; and Marc Rosenblum, who is a specialist
in immigration policy at the Congressional Research Service. I
will be introducing them in a moment.
But first, let me just recognize myself for an opening
statement, and I would first like to congratulate the
gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee, for her appointment as
the Ranking Member of this subcommittee. We have had the
opportunity to already work together previously and we have had
some meetings before we started scheduling some of the
hearings, so we are certainly looking forward to working
together to strengthen our Nation's border.
I would also like to just recognize the Republican Members
of the committee who are with us. First of all, Jeff Duncan,
from South Carolina. It is his second term--he is a veteran of
this subcommittee, and a second term in Congress as well, and
we are looking forward to his service on the subcommittee and
in the Congress, and I certainly want to congratulate him, as
well, as being selected as the Chairman on Oversight and
Management Efficiency Subcommittee here in Homeland Security.
So excited to welcome him back.
Steve Palazzo, from Mississippi, is with us. He is a CPA.
He is a United States Marine, a veteran of the Persian Gulf
War, and still is in the Army National Guard in Mississippi. So
we appreciate his service to the country and in the Congress
and looking forward--and I know he has a lot of interest in
maritime issues, in particular.
Congressman Barletta--Lou Barletta--who is here from
Pennsylvania. He is a former business owner, entrepreneur, a
former mayor of Hazleton, and really is--has been an extremely
strong voice on immigration issues and brings a, sort of a
unique perspective to the entire thing. So we welcome him.
Then certainly Congressman Stewart, Chris Stewart, from
Utah, as well, who is a world-record-setting Air Force pilot,
New York Times best-seller author, and he really has a very
impressive resume and I think will bring, again, a unique
perspective to this committee and to the committee in general.
Appreciate your service, as well, to the service--to our
Nation.
Securing the Nation and our border--all of our borders and
our Nation is certainly one of the principal responsibilities
of the United States Congress and one that we have under the
Constitution, actually. Since September 11 we have spent
literally billions of dollars in our Nation to shore up the
gaps in the Nation's border security.
Unfortunately, some of the spending that was done we think
may have been done in an ad hoc way. We spent an incredible
amount of resources throwing them at problems without really, I
think in some instances, trying to connect it to what we hoped
to achieve with all of this spending.
So it is no surprise that Congress thinks of solutions to
border security chiefly in terms of resources--how many Customs
and Border Protection officers; how many Border Patrol agents
that we have; the hundreds of miles of fence that we have
constructed, which is about 700 currently; the number of Coast
Guard cutters or unmanned aerial vehicles, the UAVs; other
kinds of technologies that we have sent to the border in recent
years. All of those are incredibly, incredibly important, of
course.
But we also need to continue our conversation about--the
conversation that we need to be having about border security
and really what does a secure border look like, how do we use
the resources that we have at our disposal to get there, and
then finally, what is the best way for us to actually measure
the progress that we have had in securing our border?
Because it is a dynamic place; it is not static. Once we
have secured one section, you know, it is not secured forever,
so how we address that border should reflect that reality.
Today I sort of want to pivot to a discussion away from the
resources and into one that touches on outcomes. So again,
instead of discussing entirely how we have just grown the
Border Patrol, the CBP, the Coast Guard, or the different types
of technologies that we have put on the border, I want to
examine really what the American people have gotten for the
investment that we have made in that and how effective are we
at stopping the flow of illegal aliens who are crossing the
border, stopping the drugs that chiefly are coming into our
country through the official ports of entries? In the maritime
domain, can we interdict the growing threat of
semisubmersibles, these panga boats, that have all of these
drugs that are now coming up the coastline of California?
Using apprehensions as the only metrics for success, as the
GAO and others have already noted, is an incomplete way to look
at border security. Operational control--sort of the buzz term
here on the Hill--maybe that is not best the way--the best way
to measure border security and isolation. But the Congress and
the American people have sort of been in the dark since
Secretary Napolitano has abandoned that term.
When the Department of Homeland Security stopped using the
term ``operational control,'' at that time only 873 miles of
the Southwest Border was considered controlled and only a few,
really, on the Northern Border. They have said that we had
about--I think it was 44 percent of the Southern Border under
operational control; certainly in the low single digits on the
Northern Border.
Where we are today I think is an open question. You have
Department of Homeland Security officials who have been telling
us that a new, holistic measure called the border condition
index is on its way. That was something that was told to our
subcommittee and to the full committee about 3 years ago and we
are still waiting to understand what that term means and how it
would work.
So I think when we hear individuals saying that the border
is more secure than ever, that is not a substitute for very
hard, verifiable facts, which is, again, why I want to examine
today at this hearing the effectiveness and to push for a risk-
based, outcome-oriented approach to border security.
GAO's most recent border security report is really the
first time that we have seen an examination of the Border
Patrol's efforts couched in terms of effectiveness, which in my
view is a very positive development, certainly a good place
to--for us to be talking about today. I believe that the CBP
and the United States Coast Guard as well should also have
outcome-based metrics that explain the state of security at the
ports of entry and along our maritime borders.
I have been advocating the need for a comprehensive
strategy to secure the borders for the last several years
because I am absolutely convinced that the Department of
Homeland Security needs to just stop the ad hoc application of
resources without really thinking about the big picture. I know
that they are in many cases, but again, this hearing will
really try to get to the nuts and bolts of how we can use a
metrics to measure our success.
We have to be held accountable for outcomes. We can't just
say that the border is more secure than ever because we now
have lots of agents, we have lots of technology, we have
infrastructure on the border without, again, being able to
verify from an accountability standpoint how effective they
have actually been--we have been.
Because the bottom line for the American people will be
these simple questions: What does a secure border look like?
How do we get there? Then, how do we measure it?
So I look very much forward to hearing from the
distinguished panel of witnesses today. I think this is going
to be a very interesting hearing and one that can be a critical
component for the entire Congress as we are totally engaged, as
the Nation is, in this debate now about immigration reform and
what a--again, what a critical component border security is to
that debate.
At this time the Chairwoman now recognizes the Ranking
Minority Member from the subcommittee, Ms. Jackson Lee.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the Chairwoman very much, and I am
also looking forward to working with you and appreciate very
much some of the earlier meetings that we had but also the
opportunity that we have had to work together. I certainly
adhere to the issue of outcomes.
I, too, am very pleased to acknowledge new Members of our
committee and welcome them, as well. But let me acknowledge all
of our Members of our committee: Representative Loretta Sanchez
hails from a State with both border and maritime interests and
she has even served as subcommittee Chairwoman; I want to
welcome Representative Beto O'Rourke, who represents a district
along the U.S.-Mexico border and knows first-hand the
importance of border security but also knows first-hand the
enhanced safety and security that they are facing and
experiencing through hard work in El Paso.
I welcome you.
Like to also welcome Representative Tulsi Gabbard--thank
you so very much--who comes from a district with unique
homeland security interests--I would say very unique. You add a
very special commitment to this committee because we need to
understand the--both the successes and challenges of Hawaii
that is facing a different order of intrusion, being in its
location.
I am also delighted to welcome our Ranking Member, Mr.
Thompson, who has had an on-going commitment to securing the
border, and we have worked over the years together, and has
generated under his leadership a number of successes.
I would, before I go into my full remarks, also welcome Mr.
Cuellar, who was a Ranking Member on this committee and worked
on the GAO request that many of us are reviewing and that I
have joined.
So, Madam Chairwoman, I ask unanimous consent that the
gentleman from Texas, Mr. Cuellar, be allowed to sit and
question the witnesses at today's hearing.
Mrs. Miller. Without objection, and we certainly welcome
him being back with us.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you so very much.
I want to, as well, comment on outcomes and comment on the
idea of data sharing and being more cooperative with our local
officials. I think, Madam Chairwoman, we can find common
ground. I have understood in briefings--and I indicated I would
use this terminology--that securing the border is not
simplistic. I think it is a moving process.
We, in fact, see different topography; we see moments when
one area is secure and others are not as secure. We note that
there are cities, such as San Diego and El Paso along the
border, that count themselves having great improvement and one
might use the terminology ``operational control,'' primarily
because there are border stations there.
We know that there are 1,993 miles of border, 651 miles of
fencing. One might make the argument that the un-fenced area is
less secure. I would argue against that.
One of the things that we need to ensure that we allow the
Border Patrol to do is to advise us of how they believe using
the right resources they can effectuate a secure border. But it
is always moving.
One of the issues that I think should be prominent in this
is what we have done, such as in 2004, as a Member of this
committee working with Senator Kerry, we provided the answer to
the original request by Border Patrol, and that is equipment.
That was the year that we presented all the helicopters, all of
the Jeeps, all of the laptops, all of the night goggles, all
the enhanced equipment. But we know that those kinds of
resources are not the only answer to border security.
What I would like to see is to match your outcomes with the
use of new technology, but at the same time, as we move forward
on technology and having the Border Patrol respond in a very
short order of strategies that would give them what they feel
is on-going operational control should be the moving forward on
comprehensive immigration reform. I say that because when you
speak to professionals about border security they speak less of
the intrusion of masses of people as much as they talk about
gun trafficking, drug trafficking. Those are the criminal
elements--the cartels--that make the border unstable.
So I would almost suggest that if you have regular order
with immigration reform--comprehensive immigration reform--you
then give a process of people being able to enter the country
so that it gives more of a latitude for the resources that the
border security--Border Patrol individuals would have to be
able to work on something we could rename--may not call it
``operational control,'' but enhanced border security and on-
going border security.
I would also suggest, as I was able to glean from some very
good conversations, that I would like to see enhanced
intelligence. I would like to give the Border Patrol the
resources to identify the threats and then I think that they
would be able to come forward and provide us with the necessary
strategy going forward.
Again, I would offer this morning that as we proceed with
this hearing I would like to also bring into play coordination
between local and State authorities. My State legislature just
voted yesterday, Madam Chairwoman, to ask the Federal
Government for reimbursement. Some of those who voted for it
recognize the challenges but they have been investing a lot in
border security.
So my point would be, as I conclude, is, one, I would like
to see a coordination between DEA--and I say that enhanced
coordination, want to thank them for the work already done--
ATF, FBI, Border Patrol, certainly local and State, and around
that, the Border Patrol takes the lead on, one, defining what
an on-going operational control--if we don't want to use that
terminology, a high level of border security throughout our
expanded area, including the north--Northern Border, including
the Southern Border, and again, to recognize that comprehensive
immigration reform--and let me also note the very fine work of
the Coast Guard in a very unique border effort that goes deep
out beyond our borders in the waterways really being the first
line of defense for security.
But finally, allowing the comprehensive immigration reform
to parallel this effort of this committee, and the reason being
is that will give a metric, a marker on how you are to be able
to allow people in and to document those who are already within
our borders.
So I look forward to the testimony of all of our witnesses
and again, I thank them for their service.
Madam Chairwoman, I thank you for your courtesies. I yield
back.
Mrs. Miller. Thank the gentlelady.
The Chairwoman now recognizes the Ranking Member of the
full committee, the gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Thompson.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman, and I,
like my colleague, Ms. Jackson Lee, look forward to this
hearing.
Welcome, to our witnesses. Some I have seen for a quite a
while now. Good seeing you.
Today's subcommittee is examining the Department of
Homeland Security's efforts to achieve border security. With
the support of Congress, DHS has made unprecedented efforts to
better secure our borders in recent years, as already outlined
by Ranking Member Jackson Lee's opening statement.
Reasonable people may disagree about the best way to
proceed from here about what having a secure border means. Some
may believe we need expensive new technology along the borders;
others, including me, see the need for additional effective,
targeted resources accompanied by a comprehensive border
security strategy that ensures we are using taxpayers' border
security dollars wisely and avoiding past acquisition failures.
Some may believe we need to return to using operational control
as our metric for measuring border security; others, including
me, believe we need a workable metric and a set of metrics that
offer an accurate assessment of security of all our Nation's
borders, both at and between the ports of entry.
Earlier this month, former Coast Guard Commandant Thad
Allen testified at the request of Chairman McCaul and urged the
committee to decide what is an acceptable level of risk at our
borders while accepting that risk will never be zero. I agree
with former Commandant Allen and would like to insert his
statement from the full committee hearing on February 13.
Mrs. Miller. Without objection.
[The information follows:]
Prepared Statement of Thad W. Allen
13 February 2013
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Thompson, and Members of the
committee, I am pleased to have been invited to testify on this
important topic and I thank you for the opportunity.
A Retrospective
Mr. Chairman, the 1st of March will mark the Tenth Anniversary of
stand-up of the Department of Homeland Security. The Department was
officially created on the 24th of January 2003, but the operating
components from other departments were not moved to DHS until 1 March
2003 when the Department became operational. From the signing of the
Homeland Security Act on 25 November 2012 to the actual operation of
the Department on 1 March barely 3 months passed. I am not here to
dwell on the past but it is important to understand the circumstances
under which the Department was created.
While this could be considered Government at light speed, little
time was available for deliberate planning and thoughtful consideration
of available alternatives. The situation was complicated by the fact
that the law was passed between legislative sessions and in the middle
of a fiscal year. Other than Secretary Ridge, early leadership
positions were filled by senior officials serving in Government.
Confirmation was not required to be ``acting.'' Funding was provided
through the reprogramming of current funds from across Government for
Departmental elements that did not have existing appropriations from
their legacy departments.
Operating funds for components that were transferred were
identified quickly and shifted to new accounts in the Department to
meet the deadline. Because of the wide range of transparency and
accuracy of the appropriation structure and funds management systems of
the legacy departments some of the new operational components faced a
number of immediate challenges. Estimating the cost of salaries for
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) or Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) required the combination of different work forces,
with different grade structures, different career ladders, and
different work rules.
Basic mission support functions of the Department such as financial
accounting, human resource management, real property management,
information resource management, procurement, and logistics were
retained largely at the component level in legacy systems that varied
widely. Funding for those functions was retained at the component level
as well. In those cases where new entities were created (i.e.
Departmental-level management and operations, the Under Secretary for
Science and Technology, the Under Secretary for Intelligence and
Analysis, the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office) support systems had to
be created rapidly to meet immediate demands of mission execution.
Finally, components and Departmental offices that did not preexist the
legislation were located in available space around the Washington, DC
area and the Secretary and number of new functions were located at the
Nebraska Avenue Complex in Northwest Washington.
At the time of this transition I was serving as the Coast Guard
Chief of Staff and was assigned as the Coast Guard executive to
overseas the Service's relocation from the Department of Transportation
to the new Department. We began planning for eventual relocation as
soon as the administration submitted legislation to the Congress. I
also assigned personnel to the Transition Planning Office (TPO) that
was created in the Office of Management and Budget by Executive Order
to prepare for the transition. A considerable challenge during this
period was the fact that the TPO was part of the Executive Office of
the President and there were legal limitations on how much of their
work could be shared externally. As a result much of that effort was
redone or duplicated when the Department was created.
As I noted earlier, my intent is not to dwell on the past but to
frame the degree of difficulty facing the leaders attempting to stand
up the Department from the outset. Many of these issues persist today,
10 years later. Despite several attempts to centralize and consolidate
functions such as financial accounting and human resource management,
most support functions remain located in Departmental components and
the funding to support those functions remains in their appropriations.
Because of dissimilarities between appropriations structures of
components transferred from legacy departments there is a lack of
uniformity, comparability, and transparency in budget presentations
across the Department. As a result it is difficult to clearly
differentiate, for example, between personnel costs, operations and
maintenance costs, information technology costs, and capital
investment. Finally, the 5-year Future Years Homeland Security Plan
(FYHSP) required by the Homeland Security Act has never been
effectively implemented as a long-rang planning, programming, and
budgeting framework inhibiting effective planning and execution of
multi-year acquisitions and investments.
In the Washington Area the Department remains a disjointed
collection of facilities and the future of the relocation to the St.
Elizabeth's campus remains in serious doubt. As the Chief of Staff of
the Coast Guard and Commandant I committed the Coast Guard to the move
to St. Elizabeth and only asked that we be collocated with our
Secretary and not be there alone. The Coast Guard will move to St.
Elizabeth's this year . . . alone. One of the great opportunity costs
that will occur if colocation does not happen will be the failure to
create a fully functioning National Operations Center for the
Department that could serve at the integrating node for Departmental-
wide operations and establish the competency and credibility of the
Department to coordinate homeland security-related events and responses
across Government as envisioned by the Homeland Security Act. As with
the mission support functions discussed earlier, the Department has
struggled to evolve an operational planning and mission execution
coordination capability. As a result, the most robust command-and-
control functions and capabilities in the Department reside at the
component level with the current NOC serving as a collator of
information and reporting conduit for the Secretary.
The combination of these factors, in my view, has severely
constrained the ability of the Department to mature as an enterprise.
And while there is significant potential for increased efficiencies and
effectiveness, the real cause for action remains the creation of unity
of effort that enables better mission performance. In this regard there
is no higher priority than removing barriers to information sharing
within the Department and improved operational planning and execution.
Effective internal management and effective mission execution require
the same commitment to shared services, information systems
consolidation, the reduction in proprietary technologies and software,
and the employment of emerging cloud technologies.
Mr. Chairman, this summary represents my personal views of the more
important factors that influenced the creation and the first 10 years
of the Department's operations. It is not all-inclusive but is intended
to be thematic and provide a basis for discussion regarding the future.
Looking to the future the discussion should begin with the Department's
mission and the need to create unity of effort internally and across
the homeland security enterprise. I made similar comments before the
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs last year.
The Future
The Quadrennial Homeland Security Review was envisioned as a
vehicle to consider the Department's future. The first review completed
in 2010 described the following DHS missions:
Preventing Terrorism and Enhancing Security;
Securing and Managing Our Borders;
Enforcing and Administering our Immigration Laws;
Safeguarding and Securing Cyberspace;
Insuring Resiliency to Disasters.
An additional area of specific focus was the maturation of the
homeland security ``enterprise'' which extends beyond the Department
itself to all elements of society that participate in and contribute to
the security of the homeland.
The QHSR outcomes were consistent with the fiscal year 2010 budget
that was submitted in early 2009 following the change of
administrations. That request laid out the following mission priorities
for the Department:
Guarding Against Terrorism;
Securing Our Borders;
Smart and Tough Enforcement of Immigration Laws and
Improving Immigration Services;
Preparing For, Responding To, and Recovering From Natural
Disasters;
Unifying and Maturing DHS.
The fiscal year 2010 budget priorities and the follow-on QHSR
mission priorities have served as the basis for annual appropriations
requests for 4 consecutive fiscal years.
I participated in the first review prior to my retirement and we
are approaching the second review mandated by the Homeland Security
Act. This review presents an opportunity to assess the past 10 years
and rethink assumptions related to how the broad spectrum of DHS
authorities, jurisdictions, capabilities, and competencies should be
applied most effectively and efficiently against the risks we are
likely to encounter . . . and how to adapt to those that cannot be
predicted. This will require a rethinking of what have become
traditional concepts associated with homeland security over the last 10
years.
Confronting Complexity and Leading Unity of Effort
Last year in an issue of Public Administration Review (PAR), the
journal of the American Society for Public Administration (ASPA), I
wrote an editorial piece entitled ``Confronting Complexity and Leading
Unity of Effort.'' I proposed that the major emerging challenge of
public administration and governing is the increased level of
complexity we confront in mission operations, execution of Government
programs, and managing non-routine and crisis events. Driving this
complexity are rapid changes in technology, the emergence of a global
community, and the ever-expanding human-built environment that
intersects with the natural environment in new, more extreme ways.
The results are more vexing issues or wicked problems we must
contend with and a greater frequency of high-consequence events. On the
other hand advances in computation make it possible to know more and
understand more. At the same time structural changes in our economy
associated with the transition from a rural agrarian society to a post-
industrial service/information economy has changed how public programs
and services are delivered. No single Department, agency, or bureau has
the authorizing legislation, appropriation, capability, competency, or
capacity to address this complexity alone. The result is that most
Government programs or services are ``co-produced'' by multiple
agencies. Many involve the private/non-governmental sector, and, in
some cases, international partners. Collaboration, cooperation, the
ability to build networks, and partner are emerging as critical
organizational and leadership skills. Homeland security is a complex
``system of systems'' that interrelates and interacts with virtually
every department of Government at all levels and the private sector as
well. It is integral to the larger National security system. We need
the capabilities, capacities, and competency to create unity of effort
within the Department and across the homeland security enterprise.
MISSION EXECUTION AND MISSION SUPPORT
As we look forward to the next decade I would propose we consider
two basic simple concepts: Mission execution and mission support.
Mission execution is deciding what to do and how to do it. Mission
support enables mission execution.
Mission Execution . . . Doing the Right Things Right
As a precursor to the next QHSR there should be a baseline
assessment of the current legal authorities, regulatory
responsibilities, treaty obligations, and current policy direction
(i.e. HSPD/NSPD). I do not believe there has been sufficient visibility
provided on the broad spectrum of authorities and responsibilities that
moved to the Department with the components in 2003, many of which are
non-discretionary. Given the rush to enact the legislation in 2002 it
makes sense to conduct a comprehensive review to validate the current
mission sets as established in law.
The next step, in my view, would be to examine the aggregated
mission set in the context of the threat environment without regard to
current stove-piped component activities . . . to see the Department's
mission space as a system of systems. In the case of border security/
management, for example, a system-of-systems approach would allow a
more expansive description of the activities required to meet our
sovereign responsibilities.
Instead of narrowly focusing on specific activities such as
``operational control of the border'' we need to shift our thinking to
the broader concept of the management of border functions in a global
commons. The border has a physical and geographical dimension related
to the air, land, and sea domains. It also has a virtual, information-
based dimension related to the processing of advance notice of
arrivals, analysis data related to cargoes, passengers, and
conveyances, and the facilitation of trade. These latter functions do
not occur at a physical border but are a requirement of managing the
border in the current global economic system.
The air and maritime domains are different as well. We prescreen
passengers at foreign airports and the maritime domain is a collection
of jurisdictional bands that extend from the territorial sea to the
limits of the exclusive economic zone and beyond.
The key concept here is to envision the border as an aggregation of
functions across physical and virtual domains instead of the isolated
and separate authorities, jurisdictions, capabilities, and competencies
of individual components. Further, there are other Governmental
stakeholders whose interests are represented at the border by DHS
components (i.e. Department of Agriculture, DOT/Federal Motor Carriers
regarding trucking regulations, NOAA/National Marine Fisheries Service
regarding the regulation of commercial fishing).
A natural outcome of this process is a cause for action to remove
organizational barriers to unity of effort, the consolidation of
information systems to improve situational awareness and queuing of
resources, and integrated/unified operational planning and coordination
among components. The additional benefits accrued in increased
efficiency and effectiveness become essential in the constrained budget
environment. The overarching goal should always be to act with
strategic intent through unity of effort.
A similar approach could be taken in considering the other missions
described in the QHSR. Instead of focusing on ``insuring resiliency to
disasters'' we should focus on the creation and sustainment of National
resiliency that is informed by the collective threat/risks presented by
both the natural and human-built environments. The latter is a more
expansive concept than ``infrastructure'' and the overall concept
subsumes the term ``disaster'' into larger problem set that we will
face. This strategic approach would allow integration of activities and
synergies between activities that are currently stovepiped within FEMA,
NPPD, and other components. It also allows cybersecurity to be seen as
an activity that touches virtually every player in the homeland
security enterprise.
In regard to terrorism and law enforcement operations we should
understand that terrorism is, in effect, political criminality and as a
continuing criminal enterprise it requires financial resources
generated largely through illicit means. All terrorists have to
communicate, travel, and spend money, as do all individuals and groups
engaged in criminal activities. To be effective in a rapidly-changing
threat environment where our adversaries can quickly adapt, we must
look at cross-cutting capabilities that allow enterprise-wide success
against transnational organized criminal organizations, illicit
trafficking, and the movement of funds gained through these activities.
As with the ``border'' we must challenge our existing paradigm
regarding ``case-based'' investigative activities. In my view, the
concept of a law enforcement case has been overtaken by the need to
understand criminal and terrorist networks as the target. It takes a
network to defeat a network. That in turn demands even greater
information sharing and exploitation of advances in computation and
cloud-based analytics. The traditional concerns of the law enforcement
community regarding confidentiality of sources, attribution, and
prosecution can and must be addressed, but these are not technology
issues . . . they are cultural, leadership, and policy issues.
Mr. Chairman, this is not an exhaustive list of proposed missions
or changes to missions for the Department. It is an illustrative way to
rethink the missions of the Department given the experience gained in
the last 10 years. It presumes the first principals of: (1) A clear,
collective strategic intent communicated through the QHSR, budget,
policy decisions, and daily activities, and (2) an unyielding
commitment to unity of effort that is supported by an integrated
planning and execution process based on transparency and exploitation
of information to execute the mission.
Mission Support . . . Enabling Mission Execution
Mr. Chairman, in my first 2 years as Commandant I conducted an
exhaustive series of visits to my field commands to explain my cause
for action to transform our Service. In those field visits I explained
that when you go to work in the Coast Guard every day you do one of two
things: You either execute the mission or you support the mission. I
then said if you cannot explain which one of these jobs you are doing,
then we have done one of two things wrong . . . we haven't explained
your job properly or we don't need your job. This obviously got a lot
of attention.
In the rush to establish the Department and in the inelegant way
the legacy funding and support structures were thrown together in 2003,
it was difficult to link mission execution and mission support across
the Department. To this day, most resources and program management of
support functions rest in the components. As a result normal mission
support functions such as shared services, working capital funds, core
financial accounting, human resources, property management, and
integrated life cycle-based capital investment have been vexing
challenges.
There has been hesitancy by components to relinquish control and
resources to a Department that appears to be still a work in progress.
The structure of Department and component appropriations does not
provide any easy mechanism for Departmental integration of support
functions. As a result information sharing is not optimized and
potential efficiencies and effectiveness in service delivery are not
being realized. As I noted earlier, a huge barrier to breaking this
deadlock is the lack of uniformity in appropriations structures and
budget presentation. This problem has been compounded by the failure to
implement a 5-year Future Years Homeland Security Plan and associated
Capital Investment Plan to allow predictability and consistency across
fiscal years.
Mr. Chairman, having laid out this problem, I see three possible
ways forward. The desirable course of action would be to build the
trust and transparency necessary for the Department and components to
collective agree to rationalize the mission support structure and come
to agreements on shared services. The existing barriers are
considerable but the first principals of mission execution apply here
as well . . . unambiguous, clearly communicated strategic intent and
unity of effort supported by transparency and knowledge-based
decisions. A less palatable course of action is top-down directed
action that is enforced through the budget process. The least desirable
course of action is externally-mandated change. Unfortunately, the
current fiscal impasse and the need to potentially meet sequester
targets while facing the very real prospect of operating under a
continuing resolution for the entire fiscal year 2013 represents the
confluence of all of these factors and a fiscal perfect storm. There is
a case to act now. We should understand that a required first step that
lies within the capability of the Department would be to require
standardized budget presentations that can serve as the basis for
proposed appropriations restructuring to clearly identify the sources
and uses of funds and to separate at a minimum personnel costs,
operating and maintenance costs, information technology costs, capital
investment, and facility costs.
Creating and Acting with Strategic Intent
Mr. Chairman, I have attempted to keep this testimony at a
strategic level and focus on thinking about the challenges in terms
that transcend individual components, programs, or even the Department
itself. I have spoken in the last year to the Department of Homeland
Security Fellows and the first DHS Capstone course for new executives.
I have shared many of the thoughts provided today over the last 10
years to many similar groups. Recently, I have changed my message.
After going over the conditions under which the Department was formed
and the many challenges that still remain after 10 years, I was very
frank with both groups. Regardless of the conditions under which the
Department was created and notwithstanding the barriers that have
existed for 10 years, at some point the public has a right to expect
that the Department will act on its own to address these issues.
Something has to give. In my view, it is the responsibility of the
career employees and leaders in the Department to collectively
recognize and act to meet the promise of the Homeland Security Act.
That is done through a shared vision translated into strategic intent
that is implemented in daily activities from the NAC to the border
through the trust and shared values that undergird unity of effort. It
is that simple; it is that complex.
I understand the committee is considering whether the Department
should develop a comprehensive border strategy that would encompass all
components and entities with border equities, including State and local
law enforcement. I also understand there is concern about performance
metrics associated with carrying out such a strategy. There are also
potential opportunities related to the equipment being returned from
military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Finally, we are witnessing
a transition of leadership in Mexico as we continue to jointly address
the threat of drug and other illicit trafficking as a major hemispheric
threat.
In considering the strategic course of action going forward
regarding the management of the border in a global commons or any of
the diverse missions of the Department of Homeland Security, we should
remember then General Eisenhower's admonition that ``Plans are nothing;
planning is everything.'' I have been involved in strategic planning
for decades I can attest to their value. Done correctly that value is
derived from a planning process that forces critical thinking,
challenges existing assumptions, creates shared knowledge and
understanding, and promotes a shared vision. Accordingly, I would be
more concerned about the process of developing a strategy than the
strategy itself. It is far more important to agree on the basic terms
of reference that describe the current and likely future operating
environment and to understand the collective capabilities,
competencies, authorities, and jurisdictions that reside in the
Department as they relate to that environment and the threats
presented.
I believe the Homeland Security Act envisioned that process to be
the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review. Accordingly, the committee
may want to consider how that process that is already mandated in law
might become the vehicle to create strategic intent. Intent that
unifies Departmental action, drives resource allocation, integrates
mission support activities, removes barriers to information sharing and
creates knowledge.
Strategic Intent and the Border
I am often asked, in the wake of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill,
``Is it safe to drill offshore?'' My answer to that question is
relevant to any consideration of how we carry out the sovereign
responsibilities of a Nation in managing our border. My answer is that
there is no risk-free way to extract hydrocarbons from the earth. The
real question is: ``What is the acceptable level of risk associated
with those activities in light of the fact that it will take a
generation to develop alternate fuels?'' Likewise, there is no risk-
free way to manage a border short of shutting it down. Discussions
about operational control of the border and border security too often
focus on specific geographical and physical challenges related to
managing the land border. While those challenges exist, they cannot
become the sole focus of a strategy that does not account of all
domains (air, land, sea, space, and cyber) and the risks and
opportunities that the border represents. As I mentioned earlier we
need to think of the border as a set of functions. We need to think
about what is the acceptable level of risk associated with those
functions. We cannot neglect trade and become fixated on driving risk
to zero; it cannot be done.
Whether it is TSA considering options for passenger and cargo
screening, the Coast Guard considering the trade-offs between fisheries
and drug enforcement, ICE considering resource allocation to protect
intellectual property or remove dangerous aliens, NPPD considering how
to deal with cyber threats to infrastructure, or USCIS deciding how
immigration reform would drive demand for their services, the real
issue is the identification and management of risk. Those decision are
made daily now from the Port of Entry at Nogales to the Bering Sea,
from TSA and CBP pre-clearance operations in Dublin to Secret Service
protection of the President, and from a disaster declaration following
a tornado in Mississippi to the detection of malware in our networks.
The question is: How are they linked? Are those actions based on a
shared vision that make it clear to every individual in the Department
what their role is in executing or supporting the mission?
A strategy for the border or any DHS mission ideally would merely
be the codification of strategic intent for record purposes to support
enterprise decisions. The creation of self-directed employees that
understand their role in Departmental outcomes on a daily basis in a
way that drives their behavior should be the goal. If a border strategy
is desired, I believe it must be preceded by a far deeper introspective
process that addresses how the Department understands itself and its
missions as a unified, single enterprise.
Mr. Thompson. Regardless of these differences, Madam
Chairwoman, I would hope that we can all agree that pulling the
equivalent of 5,000 Border Patrol agents and 2,750 CBP Officers
from our borders, as called for by the sequester, is no way to
achieve anyone's definition of a secure border. Forcing the
Coast Guard to curtail air and surface operation by more than
25 percent, reducing essential missions including migrant and
drug interdiction and port security operations is no way to
achieve border security. Additionally, reducing the number of
available immigration detention beds from 34,000 that we have
today is no way to secure our borders.
I hope we can have a frank discussion today about the
challenges DHS will face in securing our borders if and when
sequestration takes effect.
I am also pleased that we are joined today by a witness
from the Government Accountability Office. GAO has done some
very important work on border security matters on behalf of
this committee.
This work includes a report being released today that
examines crime rates on the U.S. side of the Southwest Border.
The report shows that in general crime rates have fallen in
border communities in recent years and, in fact, are mostly
lower than crime rates in non-border communities within the
same States. This data would appear to suggest that while
border-related crime is a concern, border communities are
largely safe places to live, work, and do business.
I hope to hear from Ms. Gambler in more detail about the
report and what GAO's body of work indicates about the state of
security along the borders.
Finally, as groundwork is being done to develop
comprehensive immigration reform legislation, I want to remind
all our Members that border security is linked to immigration
matters and will be an integral part of any reform proposal. As
a leading committee on border security in the House, the
Committee on Homeland Security has a long and successful
history of conducting oversight of the Department of Homeland
Security's efforts to secure our Nation's borders. It is
imperative that this committee's expertise on border security
inform any legislative proposal produced by Congress to reform
our immigration system.
With that, Madam Chairwoman, I look forward to today's
hearing and I look forward to the witnesses' testimony. I yield
back the balance of my time.
Mrs. Miller. Thank the gentleman.
Other Members of the committee are reminded that opening
statements may be submitted for the record.
Again, we are just so pleased to have the distinguished
panel that we have before us this morning, and I think what I
will do is just go through and introduce you, or read your bio
and intro you all en masse and then we will start with Chief
Fisher.
Michael Fisher was named chief of the U.S. Border Patrol in
May 2010. The chief started his duty along the Southwest Border
in 1987 in Douglas, Arizona. He also served as a deputy chief
patrol agent in the Detroit sector and as an assistant chief
patrol agent in Tucson, Arizona.
Mr. Kevin McAleenan is the acting assistant commissioner at
the U.S. Customs and Border Protection where he is responsible
for overseeing CBP's antiterrorism, immigration, anti-
smuggling, trade compliance, and agriculture protection
operations at the Nation's 331 ports of entry.
Rear Admiral William D. Lee is the deputy for operations
policy and capabilities for the United States Coast Guard, and
in this role Rear Admiral Lee oversees integration of all
operations, capabilities, strategy, and resource policy. He
spent 13 years in six different command assignments and spent a
career, as well, specializing in boat operations and search and
rescue.
Rebecca Gambler is an acting director of the U.S.
Government Accountability Office of homeland security and
justice team where she leads GAO's work on border security and
immigration issues.
Marc Rosenblum is a specialist in immigration policy at the
Congressional Research Service and is an associate professor of
political science at the University of New Orleans.
The witnesses' full written statements will appear in the
record, and the Chairwoman now recognizes Chief Fisher for his
testimony.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL J. FISHER, CHIEF, BORDER PATROL,
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Fisher. Thank you.
Chairwoman Miller, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, Ranking
Member Thompson, and other distinguished Members of the
subcommittee, it is indeed a privilege and an honor to appear
before you today to discuss the work U.S. Border Patrol agents
and mission support employees do every day to secure America's
borders.
Today my intent is to offer my thoughts regarding the
question and purpose of this hearing: What does a secure border
look like? In short, a secure border is characterized by low
risk, one in which we reduce the likelihood of attack to the
Nation and one that provides safety and security to the
citizens against dangerous people seeking entry into the United
States to do us harm.
As we enter our first year of implementation I would like
to highlight how the operational implementation plan is
developing. First and foremost, we have a definitive
requirement for information and intelligence to provide greater
situational awareness in each of our operational corridors.
Advanced information will provide us the ability to deploy and
redeploy resources to areas of greatest threat. We have
prioritized and submitted our intelligence requirements and we
expect collection against these requirements soon.
Second, we have assessed areas of high risk in certain
corridors and determined appropriate staffing levels to reduce
risk. We are currently increasing staffing levels in some
corridors from others to ensure we are placing increased
capability against the greatest threat.
Third, we continue to refine the South Texas campaign,
which was the first implementation of that strategy. The
lessons learned from the past year confirm the importance of
joint planning and execution with strategic objectives against
common threats.
Central to this campaign is the importance of including all
communities of interest in the process and the establishment of
joint targeting teams. We have found that focused, targeted
enforcement, operational discipline, and unified commands do,
in fact, have value.
Fourth, we have commenced our first area reduction flights.
The purpose of these flights is to identify remote areas along
the border--areas where we have limited presence and
technology--and determine whether or not vulnerability exists.
This will allow us to periodically check sections along the
border using technology and analytics, providing broader
situational awareness to inform field commanders of any change
in the terrain and the probability of entries, and to adjust
resources in advance of increased activity. Moreover, this
methodology will also allow us to verify the absence of threats
in particular areas, in essence shrinking the border.
In the end, the metrics and performance measures will
provide us and this committee the answer to the questions: Are
we winning, and how do we know? No longer will apprehensions
alone be the anchor metric. Instead, we will concentrate on the
likelihood of apprehension once an entry is detected in areas
of significant illegal activity, and where this makes sense, 90
percent effectiveness is our goal.
We continue to learn the value of analyzing recidivism
rates and what this means relative to reducing risk.
Since my last testimony in front of this committee I have
strengthened my conviction that assessing security along the
border 1 linear mile at a time is the wrong approach. First,
the environment in which we operate, characterized by dynamic
threats operating within a corridor, does not lend itself
neatly to steady, incremental metrics.
Second, to ask the question, ``Is the border secure?'' in a
vacuum presupposes a definitive end-state that is static, which
it is not. The tremendous complexity of the border demonstrates
why no single metric can be used to assess border security.
Instead, a valid determination of border security can only
be made by analyzing all available data and placing it in the
context of current intelligence and operational assessments.
Accomplishing this requires a structured process and
methodology to shift the discussion from the possibility of
threats to one involving a probability of threats and
subsequent risk mitigation strategies.
Although border security resources such as agent staffing,
and detection, tracking, and monitoring technology are critical
in providing enhanced capability against threats, simply
measuring the amount of enforcement resources in a particular
area does not by itself provide an accurate security
assessment. Likewise, vulnerability does not simply exist in
the absence of resources. Vulnerability exists when resources
and corresponding capability are insufficient to meet defined
and existing threats.
So what do I propose? I would envision a process by which
we would periodically brief this committee on current threats
as assessed by the intelligence community. We would then show
you how we are responding to those threats and brief the
relevant metrics to assess our progress toward mitigating risk.
In the end, we would be able to assess the state of the
border from our perspective, work with other stakeholders who
have equity and corresponding responsibility toward those
objectives, and ultimately offer our professional judgment on
the extent to which our border is secure.
I want to applaud your efforts, Chairwoman Miller and the
Members of the committee, for asking the critical question,
``What does a secure border look like?'' Thank you, and I look
forward to your questions.
[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Fisher and Mr.
McAleenan follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement of Michael J. Fisher and Kevin McAleenan
February 26, 2013
Chairwoman Miller, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and distinguished
Members of the subcommittee, it is an honor to appear before you today
to discuss the role of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) in
securing America's borders, a role that we share with our Federal,
State, local, Tribal, and international partners.
We are here today to discuss what a secure border looks like. Some
have suggested that it can be described in terms of linear miles of
``operational control,'' a tactical term once used by the Border Patrol
to allocate resources among sectors and stations along the border. We
do not use this term as a measure of border security because the
reality is that the condition of the border cannot be described by a
single objective measure. It is not a measure of crime, because even
the safest communities in America have some crime. It is not merely a
measure of resources, because even the heaviest concentration of
fencing, all weather roads, 24-hour lighting, surveillance systems, and
Border Patrol Agents cannot seal the border completely.
For border communities, a secure border means living free from fear
in their towns and cities. It means an environment where businesses can
conduct cross-border trade and flourish. For other American
communities, it means enjoying the benefits of a well-managed border
that facilitates the flow of legitimate trade and travel. Our efforts,
combined with those of our international, Federal, State, local, and
Tribal partners, have transformed the border and assist in continuing
to keep our citizens safe, our country defendable from an attack, and
promote economic prosperity.
For CBP, securing our borders means first having the visibility to
see what is happening on our borders, and second, having the capacity
to respond to what we see. We get visibility through the use of border
surveillance technology, personnel, and air and marine assets. Our
ability to respond is also supported by a mix of resources including
personnel, tactical infrastructure, and air and marine assets.
UNPRECEDENTED RESOURCES AT OUR BORDERS
Thanks to your support, the border is more secure than ever before.
Since its inception, DHS has dedicated historic levels of personnel,
technology, and infrastructure in support of our border security
efforts. Today CBP is the largest law enforcement agency in the United
States.
Law Enforcement Personnel
Currently, the Border Patrol is staffed at a higher level than at
any time in its 88-year history. The number of Border Patrol agents has
doubled, from approximately 10,000 in 2004 to over 21,000 agents today.
Along the Southwest Border, DHS has increased the number of law
enforcement on the ground from approximately 9,100 Border Patrol agents
in 2001 to nearly 18,500 today. At our Northern Border, the force of
500 agents that we sustained 10 years ago has grown to over 2,200. Law
enforcement capabilities at the ports of entry have also been
reinforced. To support our evolving, more complex mission since
September 11, 2001, the number of CBP officers ensuring the secure flow
of people and goods into the Nation has increased from 17,279 customs
and immigration inspectors in 2003, to over 21,000 CBP officers and
2,400 agriculture specialists today. These front-line employees
facilitated $2.3 trillion in trade in fiscal year 2012, and welcomed a
record 98 million travelers--a 12 percent increase over fiscal year
2009, further illustrating the critical role we play not only with
border security, but with economic security and continued growth.
Infrastructure and Technology
In addition to increasing our workforce, DHS has also made
unprecedented investments in border security infrastructure and
technology. Technology is the primary driver of all land, maritime, and
air domain awareness--and this will become only more apparent as CBP
faces future threats. Technology assets such as integrated fixed
towers, mobile surveillance units, and thermal imaging systems act as
force multipliers increasing agent awareness, efficiency, and
capability to respond to potential threats. As we continue to deploy
border surveillance technology, particularly along the Southwest
Border, these investments allow CBP the flexibility to shift more
Border Patrol agents from detection duties to interdiction and
resolution of illegal activities on our borders.
At our ports of entry, CBP has aggressively deployed Non-Intrusive
Inspection (NII) and Radiation Portal Monitor (RPM) technology to
identify contraband and weapons of mass effect. Prior to September 11,
2001, only 64 large-scale NII systems, and not a single RPM, were
deployed to our country's borders. Today CBP has 310 NII systems and
1,460 RPMs deployed. Upon arrival into the United States, CBP scans 99
percent of all containerized cargo at seaports and 100 percent of
passenger and cargo vehicles at land borders for radiological and
nuclear materials.
The implementation of the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative
(WHTI) involved a substantial technology investment in the land border
environment; this investment continues to provide both facilitation and
security benefits. For example, today, more than 19 million individuals
have obtained Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology-enabled
secure travel documents. These documents are more secure as they can be
verified electronically in real-time back to the issuing authority, to
establish identity and citizenship; they also reduce the average
vehicle processing time by 20 percent.
The implementation of WHTI in the land border environment, and the
increased use of RFID-enabled secure travel documents, has allowed CBP
to increase the National law enforcement query rate, including the
terrorist watch list, to over 98 percent. By comparison, in 2005, CBP
performed law enforcement queries in the land border environment for
only 5 percent of travelers. In terms of facilitation, CBP has also
capitalized upon these notable improvements to establish active lane
management at land border ports; this process is analogous to the
management of toll booths on a highway. Through active lane management,
CBP can adjust lane designations as traffic conditions warrant to
better accommodate trusted travelers and travelers with RFID-enabled
documents.
CBP continues to optimize the initial investment in the land border
by leveraging new technologies and process improvements across all
environments. Since 2009, a variety of mobile, fixed, and tactical
hybrid license plate readers (LPR) solutions have been deployed to 40
major Southern Border out-bound crossings and 19 Border Patrol
checkpoints. These capabilities have greatly enhanced CBP's corporate
ability to gather intelligence and target suspected violators by
linking drivers, passengers, and vehicles across the core mission areas
of in-bound, check-point, and out-bound. In the pedestrian environment,
automated gates coupled with self-directed traveler kiosks now provide
document information, query results, and biometric verification in
advance of a pedestrian's arrival to CBP officers.
CBP not only supports security efforts along the nearly 7,000 miles
of land borders, but also supplements efforts to secure the Nation's
95,000 miles of coastal shoreline. CBP has over 268 aircraft, including
10 Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), and 293 patrol and interdiction
vessels that provide critical aerial and maritime surveillance and
operational assistance to personnel on the ground. Our UAS capabilities
now cover the Southwest Border all the way from California to Texas--
providing critical aerial surveillance assistance to personnel on the
ground. Our UAS flew more than 5,700 hours in 2012, the most in the
program's history. Over the last 8 years, CBP transformed a border air
wing composed largely of light observational aircraft into a modern air
and maritime fleet capable of a broad range of detection, surveillance,
and interdiction capabilities. This fleet is extending CBP's detection
and interdiction capabilities; broadening the ``border'' and offering
greater opportunity to stop threats prior to reaching the Nation's
shores. Further synthesizing the technology, CBP's Air and Marine
Operations Center (AMOC) integrates the surveillance capabilities of
its Federal and international partners to provide domain awareness for
the approaches to the U.S. borders, at the borders, and within the
interior of the United States.
CBP is also looking to the future by working closely with the DHS
Science & Technology Directorate to identify and develop technology to
improve our surveillance and detection capabilities in our ports and
along our maritime and land borders. This includes investments in
tunnel detection and tunnel activity monitoring technology, low-flying
aircraft detection and tracking systems, maritime data integration/data
fusion capabilities at AMOC, cargo supply chain security, and border
surveillance tools tailored to Southern and Northern Borders (e.g.,
unattended ground sensors/tripwires, upgrade for mobile Surveillance
System, camera poles, and wide-area surveillance).
Indicators of Success
This deployment of resources has, by every traditional measure, led
to unprecedented success. In fiscal year 2012, Border Patrol
apprehension activity remained at historic lows with apprehensions in
California, Arizona, and New Mexico continuing a downward trend. In
fiscal year 2012, the Border Patrol recorded 364,768 apprehensions
Nation-wide. In fiscal year 2012 apprehensions were 78 percent below
their peak in 2000, and down 50 percent from fiscal year 2008. An
increase in apprehensions was noted in south Texas, specifically of
individuals from Central American countries, including El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Honduras. However, significant border-wide investments
in additional enforcement resources and enhanced operational tactics
and strategy have enabled CBP to address the increased activity. Today,
there are more than 6,000 agents in south Texas, an increase of more
than 80 percent since 2004.
At ports of entry in fiscal year 2012, CBP officers arrested nearly
7,900 people wanted for serious crimes, including murder, rape,
assault, and robbery. Officers also stopped nearly 145,000 inadmissible
aliens from entering the United States through ports of entry. As a
result of the efforts of the CBP National Targeting Center and
Immigration Advisory Program, 4,199 high-risk travelers, who would have
been found inadmissible, were prevented from boarding flights destined
for the United States, an increase of 32 percent compared to fiscal
year 2011.
We see increasing success in our seizures as well. From fiscal year
2009 to 2012, CBP seized 71 percent more currency, 39 percent more
drugs, and 189 percent more weapons along the Southwest Border as
compared to fiscal year 2006 to 2008. Nation-wide, CBP officers and
agents seized more than 4.2 million pounds of narcotics and more than
$100 million in unreported currency through targeted enforcement
operations. On the agricultural front, from fiscal year 2003 to fiscal
year 2012, CBP interceptions of reportable actionable plant pests in
the cargo environment increased over 48 percent to 48,559 in fiscal
year 2012. In addition to protecting our Nation's ecosystems and
associated native plants and animals, these efforts are important to
protecting our Nation's economy as scientists estimate that the
economic impacts from invasive species exceed $1 billion annually in
the United States.
Reduced crime rates along the Southwest Border also indicate
success of our combined law enforcement efforts. According to 2010 FBI
crime reports, violent crimes in Southwest Border States have dropped
by an average of 40 percent in the last 2 decades. More specifically,
all crime in the seven counties that comprise the South Texas area is
down 10 percent from 2009 to 2011. Between 2000 and 2011, four cities
along the Southwest Border--San Diego, McAllen, El Paso, and Tucson--
experienced population growth, while also seeing significant decreases
in violent crime.
These border communities have also seen a dramatic boost to their
economies in recent years. In fiscal year 2012, over $176 billion in
goods entered through the Laredo and El Paso, Texas ports of entry as
compared to $160 billion in fiscal year 2011. Additionally, the import
value of goods entering the United States through Texas land ports has
increased by 55 percent between fiscal year 2009 and fiscal year 2012.
In Laredo alone, imported goods increased in value by 68 percent.
Arizona is also a significant source for the flow of trade. In both
fiscal year 2011 and fiscal year 2012, $20 billion entered through
Arizona ports of entry.
Communities along the Southwest Border are among the most desirable
places to live in the Nation. Forbes ranked Tucson the No. 1 city in
its April 2012 ``Best Cities to Buy a Home Right Now'' and in February,
2012, the Tucson Association of Realtors reported that the total number
of home sales was up 16% from the same month the previous year. Tucson
also joins Las Cruces, New Mexico on Forbes' list of ``25 Best Places
to Retire.'' These Southwest Border communities are also safe. In fact,
Business Insider published a list of the top 25 most dangerous cities
in America, and again, none of them is located along the Southwest
Border. In fact, El Paso was named the second safest city in America in
2009 and the safest in 2010 and 2011. This is in dramatic contrast to
Ciudad Juarez, just across the border, which is often considered one of
the most dangerous cities in the Western Hemisphere.
The successes of a secure border are also reflected in key National
economic indicators. In 2011, secure international travel resulted in
overseas travelers spending $153 billion in the United States--an
average of $4,300 each--resulting in a $43 billion travel and tourism
trade surplus. In addition, a more secure global supply chain resulted
in import values growing by 5 percent and reaching $2.3 trillion in
fiscal year 2012 and is expected to exceed previous records in the air,
land, and sea environments this year. CBP collects tens of billions of
dollars in duties, providing a significant source of revenue for our
Nation's treasury. These efforts compliment the strategies implemented
by the President's National Export Initiative (NEI) which resulted in
the resurgence of American manufacturers, who have added nearly 500,000
jobs since January 2010, the strongest period of job growth since 1989.
Additionally, other efforts to boost trade and exports are producing
results. In 2011, U.S. exports have reached record levels, totaling
over $2.1 trillion, 33.5 percent above the level of exports in 2009.
U.S. exports supported nearly 9.7 million U.S. jobs in 2011, a 1.2
million increase in the jobs supported by exports since 2009. Further,
over the first 2 years of the NEI, the Department of Commerce had
recruited over 25,000 foreign buyers to U.S. trade shows, resulting in
about 1.7 billion in export sales. The administration's National Travel
and Tourism Strategy calls for 100 million international visitors a
year by the end of 2021, bringing over $250 billion in estimated
spending.
PROTECTING AMERICA FROM AFAR: SECURE BORDERS EXPANDED
While enforcement statistics and economic indicators point to
increased security and an improved quality of life, CBP uses an
intelligence-based framework to direct its considerable resources
toward a dynamic and evolving threat. CBP gathers and analyzes this
intelligence and data to inform operational planning and effective
execution.
CBP's programs and initiatives reflect DHS's ever-increasing effort
to extend its security efforts outward. This ensures that our ports of
entry are not the last line of defense, but one of many.
Securing Travel
On a typical day, CBP welcomes nearly a million travelers at our
air, land, and sea ports of entry. The volume of international air
travelers increased by 12 percent from 2009 to 2012 and is projected to
increase 4 to 5 percent each year for the next 5 years. CBP continues
to address the security elements of its mission while meeting the
challenge of increasing volumes of travel in air, land, and sea
environments, by assessing the risk of passengers from the earliest,
and furthest, possible point, and at each point in the travel
continuum.
As a result of advance travel information, CBP has the opportunity
to assess passenger risk long before a traveler arrives at a port of
entry. Before an individual travels to the United States, CBP has the
opportunity to assess their risk via the Electronic System for Travel
Authorization for those traveling under the Visa Waiver Program, or as
part of the inter-agency collaborative effort to adjudicate and
continuously vet visas, which are issued by the Department of State.
CBP has additional opportunities to assess a traveler's risk when they
purchase their ticket and/or make a reservation, and when they check-
in.
Before an international flight departs for the United States from
the foreign point of origin, commercial airlines transmit passenger and
crew manifest information to CBP. CBP's National Targeting Center then
reviews traveler information to identify travelers who would be
determined inadmissible upon arrival. As part of its Pre-Departure and
Immigration Advisory/Joint Security Programs, CBP coordinates with the
carriers to prevent such travelers from boarding flights bound for the
United States. From fiscal year 2010 through fiscal year 2012 CBP
prevented 8,984 high-risk travelers from boarding as a result of these
programs.
CBP also continues to expand Trusted Traveler Programs such as
Global Entry. More than 1.7 million people, including over 223,000 new
members this fiscal year, have access to Trusted Traveler Programs,
which allow expedited clearance for pre-approved, low-risk air
travelers upon arrival in the United States. CBP processed 500,000 more
Global Entry passengers, with over 689,000 more kiosk uses in 2012,
compared to the same time in 2011.
These efforts not only allow CBP to mitigate risk before a
potential threat arrives at a port of entry, but they also make the
travel process more efficient and economical by creating savings for
the U.S. Government and the private sector by preventing inadmissible
travelers from traveling to the United States.
Securing Trade and the Supply Chain
In fiscal year 2012, CBP processed 25.3 million cargo containers
through the Nation's ports of entry, an increase of 4 percent from
2011, with a trade value of $2.3 trillion. The United States is the
world's largest importer and exporter of goods and services. To address
increasing travel volumes, CBP assesses the risk of cargo bound for the
United States, whether by air, land, or sea, at the earliest point of
transit.
Receiving advanced shipment information allows CBP to assess the
risk of cargo before it reaches a port of entry. Since 2009, the
Importer Security Filing (ISF) and the Additional Carrier Requirements
regulation have required importers to supply CBP with an
electronically-filed ISF consisting of advance data elements 24 hours
prior to lading for cargo shipments that will be arriving into the
United States by vessel. These regulations increase CBP's ability to
assess the scope and accuracy of information gathered on goods,
conveyances, and entities involved in the shipment of cargo to the
United States via vessel.
Since 2010, CBP has implemented the Air Cargo Advance Screening
(ACAS) pilot, which enables CBP and the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) to receive advance security filing cargo data and
help identify cargo shipments in-bound to the United States via the air
environment that may be high-risk and require additional physical
screening. Identifying high-risk shipments as early as possible in the
air cargo supply chain provides CBP and TSA an opportunity to conduct a
comprehensive review of cargo data while facilitating the movement of
legitimate trade into the United States. Benefits to ACAS pilot
participants include: Efficiencies by automating the identification of
high-risk cargo for enhanced screening before it is consolidated and
loaded on aircraft and reduction in paper processes related to cargo
screening requirements which may increase carrier efficiency.
CBP also has a presence at foreign ports to add another layer of
security to cargo bound for the United States. The Container Security
Initiative (CSI) launched in 2002 by the former U.S. Customs, places
CBP officers on the ground at foreign ports to perform pre-screening of
containers before they placed on a U.S.-bound vessel. The CSI program
has matured since its inception in 2002, through increased partnership
with host country counterparts and advances in targeting and
technology, allowing CBP to decrease the number of CBP officers on the
ground at CSI ports, while still screening more than 80 percent of
cargo destined for the United States prior to lading on a U.S.-bound
vessel.
Securing the Source and Transit Zones
The effort to push out America's borders is also reflected by CBP's
efforts to interdict narcotics and other contraband long before it
reaches the United States. Since 1988, CBP OAM and the former U.S.
Customs Service, has provided Detection and Monitoring capabilities for
the Source and Transit Zone mission. The CBP OAM
P-3 Orion Long Range Tracker (LRT) and the Airborne Early Warning (AEW)
aircraft have provided air and maritime surveillance, detecting suspect
smugglers that use a variety of conveyances. Transnational Criminal
Organizations (TCOs) smuggle various contraband towards the U.S.
Borders and Arrival Zones. The CBP P-3 aircraft have been instrumental
in reducing the flow of contraband from reaching the Arrival Zones, by
detecting the suspect aircraft and vessels while still thousands of
miles away from the U.S. border. In fiscal year 2012, P-3 crews were
involved in the seizure of 117,103 pounds of cocaine and 12,824 pounds
of marijuana. In the first quarter of 2013, P-3 crews have been
involved in the seizure of 33,690 pounds of cocaine and 88 pounds of
marijuana. Providing direction to interdiction assets and personnel to
intercept suspects long before reaching the United States, the CBP
P-3 aircraft and crew provide an added layer of security, by stopping
criminal activity before reaching our shores.
CONCLUSION
CBP has made significant progress in securing the border with the
support of the U.S. Congress through a multi-layered approach using a
variety of tools at our disposal. CBP will continue to work with DHS
and our Federal, State, local, Tribal, and international partners, to
strengthen border security and infrastructure. We must remain vigilant
and focus on building our approach to position CBP's greatest
capabilities in place to combat the greatest risks that exist today, to
be prepared for emerging threats, and to continue to build a
sophisticated approach tailored to meet the challenges of securing a
21st Century border. At the same time, the Secretary has made it clear
that Congress can help by passing a common-sense immigration reform
bill that will allow CBP to focus its resources on the most serious
criminal actors threatening our borders.
Chairwoman Miller, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and distinguished
Members of the subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to testify
about the work of CBP and our efforts in securing our borders. We look
forward to answering your questions.
Mrs. Miller. Thanks very much, Chief.
The Chairwoman now recognizes Mr. McAleenan for his
testimony.
STATEMENT OF KEVIN MC ALEENAN, ACTING ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER,
OFFICE OF FIELD OPERATIONS, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION,
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. McAleenan. Good morning, Chairwoman Miller, Ranking
Member Jackson Lee, Ranking Member Thompson, and distinguished
Members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to
appear before you today. I appreciate the committee's
leadership and commitment to ensuring the security of the
American people and to having a productive discussion this
morning on this important topic.
CBP's Office of Field Operations carries out its border
security activities in all 50 States, at 330 ports of entry,
and globally at 70 locations in over 40 countries. Our priority
mission is preventing terrorists and terrorist weapons from
entering the United States while also interdicting inadmissible
persons, illicit drugs, agricultural pests and diseases, and
unsafe imports or goods that violate trade laws.
But at ports of entry we define a secure border not only by
our ability to prevent dangerous people and goods from entering
the country, but also in terms of our ability to support the
expeditious movement of travelers and cargo. In other words, a
secure border at our Nation's ports of entry is a well-managed
border, where mission risks are effectively identified and
addressed and legitimate trade and travel are expedited.
With this committee's support, CBP and the Department of
Homeland Security are more capable than ever before in our
efforts to secure our borders, but we remain committed to
continuous improvement in our efforts and we strive to develop
programs, tools, and operations to make those efforts
increasingly effective. The process of measuring our progress
is a constant focus and can be almost as complex as the mission
itself.
The Office of Field Operations uses a number of different
types of metrics--several hundred of them--to assess our
performance in managing our security risks and facilitation
responsibilities. These metrics are both qualitative and
quantitative; they include both effectiveness and efficiency
measures; and they are assessed at the National, programmatic,
regional, and port levels. We use these key indicators to
assess our performance and evaluate trends and developments
over time.
It is important to emphasize that there is no single number
or target level that can capture the full scope of our security
or facilitation efforts. Instead, there are a series of
important indicators that we use to assess and refine our
operations.
We begin our assessment by prioritizing the risk we face
across the volume of people and goods we process and analyzing
our capacity to mitigate vulnerabilities. Qualitatively, we
look at measures we have in place to address specific risks--
whether they are comprehensive and whether they can be
improved. Quantitatively, we use random, baseline examinations
of both people and goods to help us assess how effective our
efforts to identify and interdict threats are and we use
efficiency measures to determine whether our security
operations are properly targeted.
Last, we use facilitation measures, such as traveler and
vehicle wait times, to assess whether we are pursuing our
security requirements and deploying our resources in a manner
that expeditiously moves legitimate cross-border traffic.
While I won't be able to cover many of our results in the
time allotted, please allow me to walk through some of the
measures we are capturing in key mission areas. Our
foundational measures are the volume of people and goods we
process. Last year CBP welcomed more than 350 million travelers
at our air, land, and sea ports of entry and processed 25.3
million cargo containers and over 100 million air cargo
shipments with a trade value of $2.3 trillion. Securing these
growing traffic levels without impeding them is our core
challenge and we are tackling it head-on.
In our primary antiterrorism mission we measure our success
by how effectively we identify potential risks and how early we
can take action to address them. In the last fiscal year,
through our National Targeting Center, our overseas programs,
and our coordination with interagency, international, and
private-sector partners, CBP prevented 4,200 inadmissible and
high-risk travelers from boarding flights to the United States,
almost a 10-fold increase in this pre-departure activity from
2009, and identified and mitigated risks in over 100,000 ocean
cargo containers and over 2,000 air cargo shipments before they
could be ladened on a vessel or loaded in an aircraft destined
for the United States.
Our ability to identify and deny admission to inadmissible
persons seeking entry to the United States is a core mission
where we have seen marked improvement with the implementation
of technology like US-VISIT and the Western Hemisphere Travel
Initiatives. These technologies have served as a significant
deterrent to attempted illegal entries and the use of
fraudulent documents, and overall, our arrests at ports of
entry have increased while attempts by inadmissibles to enter
through our ports have diminished.
We have enhanced our efforts in both agriculture and trade
protection to focus on those threats that present the highest
risk to the U.S. economy and public. We are using three key
types of metrics in this area: Our total examinations, the
interceptions and seizures they produce, and our effectiveness
rate in undertaking those exams. All of these show positive
trends.
These are just a few examples, and I look forward to
further discussing areas of interest to the subcommittee. As
you are well aware, we live in a world of ever-changing threats
and challenges and we must continue to adapt to effectively
identify and address them, anticipate vulnerabilities, and
increase our facilitation.
Chairwoman Miller, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and Members
of the subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to testify.
I look forward to taking your questions.
Mrs. Miller. Thank you very much.
The Chairwoman now recognizes Admiral Lee for 5 minutes of
testimony.
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM D. LEE, DEPUTY FOR OPERATIONS POLICY AND
CAPABILITIES, U.S. COAST GUARD, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Admiral Lee. Good morning, Madam Chairwoman, Ranking Member
Jackson Lee, Ranking Member Thompson, and other distinguished
Members of the subcommittee. I am honored to be here today to
discuss the Coast Guard's role as a lead agency in combating
our border security threats within our country's maritime
domain.
The Coast Guard uses a layered strategy to counter the
threats we face in the maritime approaches to our Nation's
borders. This strategy starts overseas with our partner
nations. Our international port security program assesses
foreign ports on their security and antiterrorism measures and
continues into our own ports where, along with our
intergovernmental and industry partners, we escort vessels,
monitor critical infrastructure, and inspect facilities.
Offshore, our major cutter fleet, along with Coast Guard
law enforcement detachments on-board United States Navy and
allied warships, are always on patrol, ready to respond to
threats on the high seas. Coast Guard aviation assets support
the fleet, providing surveillance and response, which helps
optimize our overall effectiveness. Last year we removed over
163 metric tons of illegal drugs before they reached our
streets.
Last summer I testified before you on the role that the
interagency and international partners play in protecting our
maritime borders closer to home. These partnerships enhance our
capability and effectiveness along our coast and our waterways.
An outstanding example of these partnerships is the regional
coordinating mechanism, or RECOM. In fiscal years 2012 and to
date in 2013 the San Diego and Los Angeles-Long Beach RECOMs
interdicted 803 illegal migrants and more than 164,000 pounds
of illegal drugs along the south--Southern California
coastline.
We enjoy very strong partnerships with Canada and Mexico.
Through integrated border enforcement team operations, Coast
Guard and Royal Canadian Mounted Police officers jointly
conduct interdiction operations along our Northern Border.
This success spurred the formation of integrated cross-
border maritime law enforcement operations, commonly referred
to as Shiprider, which allows the U.S. and Canadian officers to
conduct integrated maritime law enforcement activities. We have
trained and exercised together and we are ready to begin joint
operations this spring.
Through our North American Maritime Security Initiative
partnerships, which coordinate training and operations with
Canada and Mexico, we have conducted 27 joint cases and removed
more than 85,000 pounds of illegal narcotics. For example,
earlier this month a Coast Guard Airborne Use of Force
helicopter disabled a fleeing panga 26 miles west of Mexico. A
Coast Guard boarding team detained two suspected Mexican
smugglers and seized 1,800 pounds of marijuana. Using standard
operational procedures developed through the North American
Maritime Security Initiative we were able to quickly coordinate
jurisdiction with the Mexican Navy, allowing for prosecution in
the United States.
These operations are not without risk, however. Our
operating environment is challenging and traffickers can and do
pose a serious threat of violence. As you may know, we recently
lost a fellow Coast Guardsman when a suspect panga rammed a
Coast Guard small boat, fatally injuring Senior Chief Terrell
Horne. We are making every effort to prevent another tragic
event such as this from happening.
To maximize our effort, we are a member of the National
intelligence community. We screen ships, crews, and passengers
bound for the United States by requiring vessels to submit an
advance notice of arrival some 96 hours prior to entering any
U.S. port.
Using our two maritime intelligence fusion centers and our
intelligence coordination center's CoastWatch program, we work
with CBP's National Targeting Center to analyze arriving
vessels and ascertain potential risk. Last year we collectively
screened more than 118,000 vessels and 29 million people.
Our goal is to detect, deter, and interdict threats well
before they pose a threat to our Nation.
Again, I thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
today and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Lee follows:]
Prepared Statement of William D. Lee
February 26, 2013
INTRODUCTION
Good morning Madam Chairwoman Miller, Ranking Member Jackson Lee,
and distinguished Members of the subcommittee. I am honored to be here
today to discuss the Coast Guard's role in maritime border security.
Threats to security along our Nation's maritime border may arrive
by sea, air, and land. The potential threats include terrorist activity
against our ports, smuggling, and other forms of criminal activity, and
disruption of maritime commerce. The Coast Guard is one of the Federal
agencies at the forefront of combating these threats, and I would like
to share with you some of the ways we are doing that.
A LAYERED APPROACH TO COUNTER MARITIME RISK
With more than 350 ports and 95,000 miles of coastline, the U.S.
maritime domain is vast and challenging in its scope and diversity.
Under Federal statute, the U.S. Coast Guard has the statutory authority
and responsibility to enforce all applicable Federal laws on, under,
and over the high seas and waters subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States.
The Coast Guard leverages its unique authorities, capabilities,
capacities, and domestic and international partnerships to maintain
maritime border security through a layered and integrated approach--one
that actually begins in foreign ports. Through the International Port
Security Program, we conduct foreign port assessments to determine the
port security effectiveness and antiterrorism measures of foreign
trading partners.
Offshore, our major cutter and patrol boat fleet supported by
maritime patrol aircraft guards against and responds to threats, while
maintaining a vigilant presence over the seas. Closer to shore, Coast
Guard helicopters, smaller cutters, and boats monitor, track,
interdict, and deliver boarding teams to vessels of interest. In our
ports, the Coast Guard, along with Federal, State, local, Tribal, and
port partners, works to monitor critical infrastructure, conduct vessel
escorts and patrols, and inspect vessels and facilities. The Coast
Guard's mix of cutters, aircraft, boats, command and control, vessel
monitoring, and intelligence-gathering programs and systems--all
operated by highly proficient personnel--allows us to exercise layered
and effective security through the entire maritime domain.
When the Coast Guard is alerted to a threat to the United States
that requires a coordinated U.S. Government response, the Maritime
Operational Threat Response (MOTR) Plan is activated. The MOTR Plan
uses established protocols and an integrated network of National-level
maritime command and operations centers to facilitate real-time Federal
interagency communication, coordination, and decision making to ensure
timely and decisive responses to maritime threats.
This layered approach, facilitated by our participation within the
National intelligence community, allows the Coast Guard to position its
limited resources more effectively against the Nation's most emergent
threats.
INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS
To combat threats as early as possible, the Coast Guard fosters
strategic relationships with partner nations. The International Ship
and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code provides an international regime
to ensure ship and port facilities take appropriate preventative
measures in alignment with our domestic regime under the Maritime
Transportation Security Act. Through the International Port Security
Program, Coast Guard personnel visit more than 150 countries and 900
ports on a biennial cycle to assess the effectiveness of foreign port
antiterrorism measures and verify compliance with the ISPS Code and our
maritime security regulations, as appropriate. Vessels arriving from
non-ISPS compliant countries are required to take additional security
precautions, may be boarded by the Coast Guard before being granted
permission to enter our ports, and in specific cases, may be refused
entry.
Additionally, the Coast Guard maintains 45 maritime bilateral law
enforcement agreements with partner nations, which facilitate
coordination of operations, and the forward deployment of boats,
cutters, aircraft, and personnel to deter and counter threats as close
to their origin as possible. These agreements also enable us to assist
partner nations in asserting control within their waters, and
maintaining regional maritime domain awareness.
To further address maritime threats and leverage opportunities to
improve border security closer to the United States, the Coast Guard,
U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), the Mexican Navy (SEMAR), and the
Mexican Secretariat for Communications and Transportation (SCT) have
strengthened relations through the Security and Prosperity Partnership
(SPP). Through the SPP, SEMAR and SCT are increasing their engagement
with the Coast Guard through training, exercises, coordinated
operations, and intelligence and information sharing.
Furthermore, the North American Maritime Security Initiative
(NAMSI) provides an operational relationship between SEMAR, NORTHCOM,
Canadian Forces, and the Coast Guard built upon standard procedures for
communications, training, and operations. Since the inception of NAMSI
in December 2008, there have been 27 joint narcotics interdiction cases
resulting in the seizure of 85,500 pounds of illegal narcotics.
As outlined by President Obama and Canadian Prime Minister Harper
in the Beyond the Border declaration, border security includes the
safety, security, and resiliency of our Nation; the protection of our
environmental resources; and the facilitation of the safe and secure
movement of commerce in the global supply chain.
Along our Northern Border with Canada, the Coast Guard is an
integral part of the Integrated Border Enforcement Team (IBET)
operations where U.S. and Canadian agencies share information and
expertise to support interdiction operations along our common border.
From this partnership, an operational relationship known as Integrated
Cross-border Maritime Law Enforcement Operations, commonly referred to
as Shiprider, has emerged. Operations coordinated under the Shiprider
Framework Agreement, ratified by the Canadian Parliament during the
summer of 2012 and formally authorized in the Coast Guard and Maritime
Transportation Act of 2012, are expected to commence this spring. This
agreement provides unprecedented law enforcement flexibility in the
shared waters of the U.S. and Canadian maritime border.
Under the Shiprider Framework Agreement, specially trained U.S and
Canadian officers from Federal, State, local, and Tribal agencies are
granted cross-designated law enforcement authorities. U.S. law
enforcement officers are designated Peace Officers in Canada, and
Canadian officers are designated Customs Officers in the United States
for the purposes of executing law enforcement operations approved under
the agreement. This arrangement facilitates improved integrated
operations and provides U.S. and Canadian law enforcement officers the
authority to carry weapons and conduct law enforcement operations on
both sides of the border. The Coast Guard and the Royal Canadian
Mounted Police (RCMP) are the lead agencies for Shiprider for the
United States and Canada respectively. Together, the Coast Guard and
RCMP have developed a curriculum taught at the Coast Guard's Maritime
Law Enforcement Academy in Charleston, South Carolina. To date, law
enforcement officers from the Coast Guard, RCMP, U.S. Customs and
Border Protection (CBP), the Ontario Provincial Police, and the St.
Regis Mohawk (United States) and Akwesasne (Canada) tribes have been
trained and cross-designated as Shipriders.
DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIPS
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) continues to apply a
broad-based approach to border security on the Southwest Border with a
focus on keeping our communities safe from threats of border-related
violence and crime, and to weaken the transnational criminal
organizations that threaten the safety of communities in the United
States and Mexico.
The Coast Guard coordinates and conducts joint operations with
other DHS components and interagency partners as part of a whole-of-
Government response to border threats. Our efforts are guided by the
DHS Small Vessel Security Strategy and its Implementation Plan, and
Maritime Operations Coordination Plan (MOCP). The MOCP is the
Department's cross-component plan for maritime operational
coordination, planning, information sharing, intelligence integration,
and response activities.
In our ports, Coast Guard Captains of the Port (COTP) are
designated as Federal Maritime Security Coordinators (FMSC). In this
role, they lead the Area Maritime Security Committees (AMSC) and
oversee development and regular review of AMSC Plans. The purpose of
the AMSC is to assist and advise the FMSC in the development, review,
and update of a framework to communicate and identify risks, and
coordinate resources to mitigate threats and vulnerabilities for the
COTP zones. AMSC's have developed strong working relationships with
other Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies in an
environment that fosters maritime stakeholder participation.
On a National scale, the establishment of Interagency Operations
Centers (IOCs) for port security is well underway. In ports such as
Charleston, Puget Sound, San Diego, Boston, and Jacksonville, the Coast
Guard, CBP, and other agencies are sharing workspace and coordinating
operational efforts for improved efficiency and effectiveness of
maritime security operations.
The Regional Coordinating Mechanism (ReCoM) is another example of
the evolution of joint operations among interagency partners. Located
at San Diego, Los Angeles, and San Francisco the ReCoMs are manned with
Coast Guard, CBP, and State and local law enforcement agencies. The San
Diego and Los Angeles/Long Beach ReCoMs coordinated operations
contributing directly to the interdiction of 803 illegal migrants and
164,000 pounds of illegal drugs in fiscal year 2012 and fiscal year
2013 (through February 7).
In December, to counter the drug and migrant smuggling threat in
waters off Southern California, the Coast Guard, in partnership with
other Federal, State, and local agencies increased our levels of effort
for the standing Coast Guard Operation Baja Tempestad, which is also
supported by CBP's Operation Blue Tempest. This combined surge brings
additional resources to the fight against transnational criminal
organizations along our maritime border, including flight deck-equipped
cutters with airborne and surface use-of-force capability; increased
Coast Guard and Customs and Border Protection maritime patrol aircraft
flights; additional non-compliant vessel use-of-force end-game
capabilities from our shore-based boats; and enhanced intelligence
collection, analysis, and dissemination. Thus far in fiscal year 2013,
this interagency effort has led to the removal of more than 44,000
pounds of marijuana and the apprehension of 164 illegal migrants.
On the high seas and throughout the 6 million-square-mile drug
transit zone, joint interdiction operations with Federal partners are
coordinated through the Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-S)
and Joint Interagency Task Force West (JIATF-W). Additionally, Coast
Guard Law Enforcement Detachments are deployed aboard U.S. Navy and
Allied (British, Dutch, and Canadian) assets to support detection,
monitoring, interdiction, and apprehension operations.
In support of another DHS initiative, the Coast Guard and CBP are
participating in the Aviation and Marine Commonalities Pilot Project
(AMCPP) in Puerto Rico; a 6-month operational pilot intended to test,
measure, and evaluate the operational efficiency and effectiveness of
existing DHS aviation and marine assets under actual operating
conditions. Analysis of this information can improve coordination,
decision making, force utilization, and highlight other operational
dividends. Project efforts will also provide insight on the value of a
Unified Command organization, potential efficiencies of coordinating
action plans among components, the significance of continuing
quantitative measures of data, the need for a common operational
lexicon, and the potential for application elsewhere.
In Puerto Rico, the Coast Guard is part of a broad Federal effort
to strengthen current joint operations. To this end, we are conducting
targeted surge operations and collaborating with international
stakeholders. As a result of these joint efforts, 7,165 kilograms of
cocaine and 200 pounds of marijuana were removed in fiscal year 2012.
So far in fiscal year 2013, approximately 7,194 kilograms of cocaine
and 1,750 pounds of marijuana have been removed.
To leverage existing programs, the Coast Guard established formal
partnerships to collaborate with CBP on their maritime Predator
Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) program (land-based), and with the Navy
UAS programs. Incorporating the UAS capability with manned patrolling
will improve detection and surveillance activities significantly at a
reduced cost when compared to manned aviation.
MARITIME INTELLIGENCE AND TARGETING
Coast Guard vessel screening is the process of applying criteria to
transiting vessels to develop a manageable set of targets for potential
Coast Guard boarding and/or inspection. The Coast Guard screens ships,
crews, and passengers for all vessels required to submit a 96-hour
Advance Notice of Arrival (ANOA) prior to entering a U.S. port.
Complementary screening efforts occur at the National and tactical
levels. At the National level, the Intelligence Coordination Center's
Coastwatch Branch--which is co-located with CBP partners at the
National Targeting Center--screens crew and passenger information.
Through our partnership with CBP, we have expanded access to
counterterrorism, law enforcement, and immigration databases and this
integration has led to increased information sharing and more effective
security operations. In 2012, Coastwatch screened approximately 118,000
ANOAs and 29.5 million crew/passenger records.
At the tactical level, each of the Coast Guard's Area Commanders
receives support from a Maritime Intelligence Fusion Center (MIFC),
which screens the commercial vessels operating within their areas of
responsibility (over 350,000 in 2012) for unique indicators, as well as
providing additional screening for vessels that submit an ANOA. The
MIFCs focus on screening characteristics associated with the vessels
itself, such as ownership, ownership associations, cargo, and previous
activity. Coast Guard vessel screening results are disseminated to the
appropriate DHS Maritime Interagency Operations Center, Sector Command
Center, local intelligence staffs, and CBP and other interagency
partners to evaluate and take action on any potential risks. If the
Coast Guard determines a vessel poses a special security risk, the
Maritime Operational Threat Response Plan is activated.
The Coast Guard also supports the CBP Container Security
Initiative, to ensure that all United States-bound maritime shipping
containers posing a potential risk are identified and inspected prior
to being placed on vessels. This initiative encourages interagency
cooperation through collecting and sharing information and trade data
gathered from ports, strengthening cooperation, and facilitating risk-
informed decision making.
CONCLUSION
The Coast Guard has forged effective international and domestic
partnerships to optimize maritime border security while minimizing
delays to the flow of commerce. We foster training, share information,
and coordinate operations to deter and interdict current and emerging
threats to our border.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today, and thank you for
your continued support of the U.S. Coast Guard. I would be pleased to
answer your questions.
Mrs. Miller. Thank you, Admiral.
The Chairwoman now recognizes Ms. Gambler for her
testimony.
STATEMENT OF REBECCA GAMBLER, ACTING DIRECTOR, HOMELAND
SECURITY AND JUSTICE, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Ms. Gambler. Good morning, Chairwoman Miller, Ranking
Member Jackson Lee, Ranking Member Thompson, and Members of the
subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity to testify at
today's hearing to discuss GAO's work on border security
efforts and performance measurement issues.
In fiscal year 2011 Customs and Border Protection reported
spending over $4 billion to secure the U.S. Southwest Border.
In that year, Border Patrol within CBP reported apprehending
over 327,000 illegal entrants and making over 17,000 seizures
of drugs.
In May 2012 the Border Patrol issued a new strategic plan
focused on mitigating risk rather than increasing resources to
secure the border, and the Border Patrol is in the process of
implementing that strategic plan.
Today I would like to focus my remarks on two key areas.
First, I will highlight GAO's work reviewing what data show
about Border Patrol efforts and deployments of resources along
the Southwest Border. Second, I will highlight GAO's work
reviewing performance measures and indicators for border
security.
With regard to my first point, Border Patrol data show that
from fiscal year 2006 to 2011 apprehensions within each
Southwest Border sector declined. Over that same time period,
estimated known illegal entries also declined.
To provide an example of this, our analysis of Border
Patrol data for the Tucson sector in Arizona showed that from
fiscal year 2006 to 2011 apprehensions declined by 68 percent
and estimated known illegal entries declined by 69 percent.
Border Patrol attributed these decreases to various factors,
such as changes in the U.S. economy and increases in resources.
Fiscal year 2012 data reported by the Border Patrol
indicate that apprehensions across the Southwest Border have
increased from 2011 but it is too early to assess whether this
indicates a change in trend.
In addition to data on apprehension, other data collected
by the Border Patrol are used by sector management to inform
assessments of border security efforts. These data include,
among things, the percentage of estimated known illegal
entrants who are apprehended more than once, which is referred
to as the recidivism rate, and seizures of drugs and other
contraband.
With regard to the recidivism rate, our analysis of Border
Patrol data showed that the rate decreased across Southwest
Border sectors from fiscal year 2008 to 2011. With regard to
drug and other contraband seizures, our analysis of Border
Patrol data showed that they increased by 83 percent from
fiscal year 2006 to 2011.
In addition to these data, Border Patrol sectors and
stations track changes in their overall effectiveness as a tool
to determine if the appropriate mix and placement of personnel
and assets are being deployed and used efficiently and
effectively. Border Patrol data showed that the effectiveness
rate for eight of the nine sectors on the Southwest Border
increased from fiscal years 2006 to 2011.
Now, turning to the issue of performance measurement:
Although Border Patrol has issued a new strategic plan to guide
its border security efforts, the agency has not yet developed
performance goals and measures for assessing the progress of
its efforts and for informing the identification and allocation
of resources needed to secure the border.
Since fiscal year 2011, DHS has used the number of
apprehensions on the Southwest Border between ports of entry as
an interim performance goal and measure for border security.
This measure provides some useful information but does not
position the Department to be able to report on how effective
its efforts are at securing the border.
The Border Patrol is in the process of developing goals and
measures. However, it has not yet set target time frames and
milestones for completing its efforts.
We recommended that the Border Patrol establish such time
frames and milestones to help ensure that the development of
goals and measures are completed in a timely manner. The
Department agreed with our recommendations and stated that it
plans to develop such time frames and milestones by November of
this year.
In closing, DHS's data indicate progress made toward its
fiscal year 2011 goal to secure the border between ports of
entry with a decrease in apprehensions along the Southwest
Border. However, as an interim goal and measure, the number of
apprehensions does not inform program results and therefore
limits DHS and Congressional oversight and accountability.
Going forward, it will be important for the Border Patrol
and the Department to continue development of goals and
measures that are linked to missions and goals, include
targets, and produce reliable results.
This concludes my oral statement. I would be pleased to
answer any questions Members may have.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Gambler follows:]
Prepared Statement of Rebecca Gambler
February 26, 2013
BORDER PATROL.--GOALS AND MEASURES NOT YET IN PLACE TO INFORM BORDER
SECURITY STATUS AND RESOURCE NEEDS
GAO-13-330T
Chairwoman Miller, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and Members of the
subcommittee: I am pleased to be here today to discuss our past work
regarding the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) efforts to deploy
and manage resources along the Southwest Border and to assess the
results of those efforts. In fiscal year 2011, DHS's U.S. Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) reported spending over $4 billion to secure the
U.S. border with Mexico.\1\ The Office of Field Operations, within CBP,
is responsible for securing the National borders at designated U.S.
land border ports of entry.\2\ Border Patrol, also within CBP, is the
Federal agency with primary responsibility for securing the borders
between the ports of entry. CBP has divided geographic responsibility
for Southwest Border miles between ports of entry among nine Border
Patrol sectors. In fiscal year 2011, Border Patrol reported
apprehending over 327,000 illegal entrants and making over 17,150
seizures of drugs along the Southwest Border. Across the Southwest
Border, the Tucson sector reported making the most apprehensions--over
38 percent--and the most drug seizures--more than 28 percent--in fiscal
year 2011.
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\1\ This figure represents the estimated percentage of net costs
applied to the Southwest Border for CBP's Border Security and Control
Between the Ports of Entry and Border Security Fencing, Infrastructure,
and Technology programs.
\2\ Ports of entry are officially designated facilities that
provide for the arrival at, or departure from, the United States.
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Border Patrol is moving to implement a new strategy for securing
the border between ports of entry. Border Patrol's 2004 National Border
Patrol Strategy (2004 Strategy), developed following the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001, was designed to facilitate the build-up
and deployment of border resources to ensure the agency had the right
mix of personnel, technology, and infrastructure and to deploy those
resources in a layered approach at the immediate border and in other
areas distant from the border. For example, from fiscal years 2004
through 2011, the number of Border Patrol agents on the Southwest
Border nearly doubled, from about 9,500 to about 18,500; and DHS
reported that since fiscal year 2006, about $4.4 billion has been
invested in Southwest Border technology and infrastructure. Through
fiscal year 2010, these resources were used to support DHS's goal to
achieve ``operational control'' of the Nation's borders by reducing
cross-border illegal activity. The extent of operational control--also
referred to as effective control--was defined as the number of border
miles where Border Patrol had the capability to detect, respond to, and
interdict cross-border illegal activity. In May 2012, Border Patrol
issued the 2012-2016 Border Patrol Strategic Plan (2012-2016 Strategic
Plan), stating that the build-up of its resource base and the
operations conducted over the past 2 decades would enable the Border
Patrol to focus on mitigating risk rather than increasing resources to
secure the border. This new strategic plan emphasizes using
intelligence information to inform risk relative to threats of cross-
border terrorism, drug smuggling, and illegal migration across
locations; integrating border security operations with those of other
law enforcement partners; and developing rapid response capabilities to
deploy the resources appropriate to changes in threat.
My testimony today summarizes the findings of our December 2012
report on CBP's management of resources at the Southwest Border, and
our past work highlighting DHS's processes for measuring security at
the Southwest Border.\3\ As requested, my statement discusses: (1) What
apprehension and other data show about Border Patrol efforts and
deployments across the Southwest Border and to what extent the data
show these deployments to have been effective in securing the border,
and (2) the extent to which Border Patrol has developed goals and
measures to identify resource needs under its new strategic plan and
assess results.
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\3\ See GAO, Border Patrol: Key Elements of New Strategic Plan Not
Yet in Place to Inform Border Security Status and Resource Needs, GAO-
13-25 (Washington, DC: Dec. 10, 2012); Border Patrol Strategy: Progress
and Challenges in Implementation and Assessment Efforts, GAO-12-688T
(Washington, DC: May 8, 2012); and Border Security: Preliminary
Observations on Border Control Measures for the Southwest Border, GAO-
11-374T (Washington, DC: Feb. 15, 2011).
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My statement is based on prior products that examined CBP's
management of resources and DHS's processes for measuring security at
the Southwest Border, with selected updates related to Border Patrol
fiscal year 2012 operations data conducted in February 2013. For the
past products, among other methodologies, we analyzed Border Patrol
planning and operational assessment documents, interviewed relevant DHS
officials, and analyzed data related to Border Patrol performance and
cross-border threats for fiscal years 2006 through 2011; we determined
that these data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our
report.\4\ We also analyzed data supporting the border security
measures reported by DHS in its annual performance reports for fiscal
years 2005 through 2012.\5\ More detailed information on our scope and
methodology can be found in our report and testimonies. For the
selected updates, we interviewed Border Patrol officials and analyzed
Border Patrol fiscal year 2012 apprehension and seizure data; we
determined that these data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes
of this testimony. We conducted this work in accordance with generally
accepted Government auditing standards. These standards require that we
plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence
to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on
our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions, based on our audit
objectives.
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\4\ GAO-13-25.
\5\ GAO-12-688T and GAO-11-374T.
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APPREHENSIONS DECREASED ACROSS THE SOUTHWEST BORDER FROM FISCAL YEARS
2006 TO 2011, BUT DATA LIMITATIONS PRECLUDE COMPARING OVERALL
EFFECTIVENESS OF RESOURCES DEPLOYED ACROSS SOUTHWEST BORDER SECTORS
Apprehensions Decreased at About the Same Rate as Estimated Known
Illegal Entries Across the Southwest Border From Fiscal Years
2006 to 2011; Other Data Provide a Broader Perspective on
Changes in Border Security
Since fiscal year 2011, DHS has used changes in the number of
apprehensions on the Southwest Border between ports of entry as an
interim measure for border security as reported in its annual
performance reports. In fiscal year 2011, DHS reported data meeting its
goal to secure the land border with a decrease in apprehensions. In
addition to collecting data on apprehensions, Border Patrol collects
and analyzes various data on the number and types of entrants who
illegally cross the Southwest Border between the ports of entry,
including collecting estimates on the total number of identified--or
``known''--illegal entries. Border Patrol's estimate of known illegal
entries includes illegal, deportable entrants who were apprehended, in
addition to the number of entrants who illegally crossed the border but
were not apprehended because they crossed back into Mexico (referred to
as turn-backs) or continued traveling into the U.S. interior (referred
to as got-aways).\6\ Border Patrol collects these data as an indicator
of the potential border threat across locations. Border Patrol data
show that apprehensions within each Southwest Border Patrol sector
decreased from fiscal years 2006 to 2011, generally mirroring the
decrease in estimated known illegal entries within each sector.\7\ In
the Tucson sector, for example, our analysis of Border Patrol data
showed that apprehensions decreased by 68 percent from fiscal years
2006 to 2011, compared with a 69 percent decrease in estimated known
illegal entries, as shown in figure 1.
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\6\ We defined these illegal entries as estimated ``known'' illegal
entries to clarify that the estimates do not include illegal entrants
for which Border Patrol does not have reasonable indications of cross-
border illegal activity. These data are collectively referred to as
known illegal entries because Border Patrol officials have what they
deem to be a reasonable indication that the cross-border activity
occurred. Indications of illegal crossings are obtained through various
sources such as direct agent observation, referrals from credible
sources (such as residents), camera monitoring, and detection of
physical evidence left on the environment from animal or human
crossings.
\7\ Border Patrol arrests both deportable aliens and nondeportable
individuals, but for the purposes of this testimony we define
``apprehensions'' to include only deportable aliens, in keeping with
Border Patrol's definition. According to the Immigration and
Nationality Act, deportable aliens include those who are inadmissible
to the United States or present in violation of U.S. law, who have
failed to maintain their status or violated the terms of their
admission, or who have committed certain criminal offenses or engaged
in terrorist activities, among others. (See 8 U.S.C. 1227 for a
complete list of the classes of deportable aliens.) Aliens with lawful
immigration status and U.S. citizens would be considered nondeportable.
Border Patrol officials attributed the decrease in apprehensions
and estimated known illegal entries from fiscal years 2006 through 2011
within Southwest Border sectors to multiple factors, including changes
in the U.S. economy and successful achievement of its strategic
objectives.\8\ Border Patrol's ability to address objectives laid out
in the 2004 Strategy was strengthened by increases in personnel and
technology, and infrastructure enhancements, according to Border Patrol
officials. For example, Tucson sector Border Patrol officials said that
the sector increased manpower over the past 5 years through an increase
in Border Patrol agents that was augmented by National Guard personnel,
and that CBP's Secure Border Initiative (SBI) provided border fencing
and other infrastructure, as well as technology enhancements.\9\ Border
Patrol officials also attributed decreases in estimated known illegal
entries and apprehensions to the deterrence effect of CBP consequence
programs--programs intended to deter repeated illegal border crossings
by ensuring the most efficient consequence or penalty for individuals
who illegally enter the United States. Data reported by Border Patrol
following the issuance of our December 2012 report show that total
apprehensions across the Southwest Border increased from over 327,000
in fiscal year 2011 to about 357,000 in fiscal year 2012.\10\ It is too
early to assess whether this increase indicates a change in the trend
for Border Patrol apprehensions across the Southwest Border.
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\8\ Specifically, these objectives were to: (1) Deter illegal
entries through improved enforcement--defined as increasing the
certainty of apprehensions through the proper mix of assets and
implementing prosecution strategies that establish a deterrent effect
in targeted locations--and (2) leverage ``smart border'' technology to
multiply the effect of enforcement personnel. Border Patrol defines
``smart border'' technology to include camera systems for day/night/
infrared operations, sensors, aerial platforms, and other systems.
\9\ The number of Border Patrol agents in the Tucson sector
increased from nearly 2,600 in fiscal year 2006 to about 4,200 in
fiscal year 2011, augmented by 9,000 National Guard personnel deployed
periodically from June 2006 through July 2008 under Operation Jump
Start. Under SBI, CBP expended approximately $850 million on technology
in Arizona such as wide-area and mobile surveillance systems, to
augment Tucson sector operations. Other infrastructure as of March 2012
included installation of 352 miles of pedestrian fencing and 299 miles
of vehicle fencing along the Southwest Border, for a combined total of
651 miles of fencing.
\10\ See GAO-13-25. Our analysis of Border Patrol data--queried as
of March 2012--also shows over 327,000 apprehensions across the
Southwest Border in fiscal year 2011. According to Border Patrol
officials, any differences in our apprehension and seizure numbers and
those of Border Patrol are due to variances in when the data were
``queried,'' or reported--that is, Border Patrol reports apprehension
and other data on an ``end-of-year'' basis, and therefore agency data
do not reflect adjustments or corrections made after that reporting
date.
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Border Patrol collects other types of data that are used by sector
management to help inform assessment of its efforts to secure the
border against the threats of illegal migration, smuggling of drugs and
other contraband, and terrorism. These data show changes, for example,
in the: (1) Percentage of estimated known illegal entrants who are
apprehended, (2) percentage of estimated known illegal entrants who are
apprehended more than once (repeat offenders), and (3) number of
seizures of drugs and other contraband. Border Patrol officials at
sectors we visited, and our review of fiscal years 2010 and 2012 sector
operational assessments, indicated that sectors have historically used
these types of data to inform tactical deployment of personnel and
technology to address cross-border threats; however, the agency has not
analyzed these data at the National level to inform strategic decision
making, according to Border Patrol headquarters officials. These
officials stated that greater use of these data in assessing border
security at the National level may occur as the agency transitions to
the new strategic plan.
Apprehensions compared with estimated known illegal entries.--Our
analysis of Border Patrol data showed that the percentage of estimated
known illegal entrants who were apprehended by the Border Patrol over
the past 5 fiscal years varied across Southwest Border sectors. The
Tucson sector, for example, showed little change in the percentage of
estimated known illegal entrants who were apprehended by Border Patrol
over the past 5 fiscal years. Specifically, our analysis showed that of
the total number of estimated known aliens who illegally crossed the
Tucson sector border from Mexico each year, Border Patrol apprehended
62 percent in fiscal year 2006 compared with 64 percent in fiscal year
2011, an increase of about 2 percentage points. Border Patrol
headquarters officials said that the percentage of estimated known
illegal entrants who are apprehended is primarily used to determine the
effectiveness of border security operations at the tactical--or zone--
level but can also affect strategic decision making. The data are also
used to inform overall situational awareness at the border, which
directly supports field planning and redeployment of resources.
Repeat offenders.--Changes in the percentage of persons apprehended
who have repeatedly crossed the border illegally (referred to as the
recidivism rate) is a factor that Border Patrol considers in assessing
its ability to deter individuals from attempting to illegally cross the
border. Our analysis of Border Patrol apprehension data showed that the
recidivism rate has declined across the Southwest Border by about 6
percentage points from fiscal years 2008 to 2011 in regard to the
number of apprehended aliens who had repeatedly crossed the border in
the prior 3 years.\11\ Specifically, our analysis showed that the
recidivism rate across the overall Southwest Border was about 42
percent in fiscal year 2008 compared with about 36 percent in fiscal
year 2011. The Tucson sector had the third-highest recidivism rate
across the Southwest Border in fiscal year 2011, while the highest rate
of recidivism occurred in El Centro sector, as shown in figure 2.
According to Border Patrol headquarters officials, the agency has
implemented various initiatives designed to address recidivism through
increased prosecution of individuals apprehended for crossing the
border illegally.\12\
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\11\ We used a rolling 3-fiscal-year time period to determine the
percentage of apprehensions of deportable aliens in a given year who
had previously been apprehended for illegally crossing the border in
any of the previous 3 years, at any Southwest Border location. We used
four rolling 3-fiscal-year time periods because our analysis covered a
5-year period and required comparable time periods to assess recidivism
in each fiscal year. Using a single time period would result in a bias,
given that some apprehensions in earlier years would be incorrectly
classified as nonrecidivist.
\12\ Border Patrol's 2012-2016 Strategic Plan emphasizes the
importance of the application of appropriate consequences to illegal
entrants. Border Patrol has developed a new Consequence Delivery System
that guides management and agents in evaluating each individual
apprehended and identifying the ideal consequence to break the
smuggling cycle. Consequences delivered under the system include
administrative, criminal prosecution, and programmatic elements that
are designed to stem the flow of illegal activity.
Seizures of drugs and other contraband.--Border Patrol headquarters
officials said that data regarding seizures of drugs and other
contraband are good indicators of the effectiveness of targeted
enforcement operations, and are used to identify trends in the
smuggling threat and as indicators of overall cross-border illegal
activity, in addition to potential gaps in border coverage, risk, and
enforcement operations. However, these officials stated that these data
are not used as a performance measure for overall border security
because while the agency has a mission to secure the border against the
smuggling threat, most smuggling is related to illegal drugs, and that
drug smuggling is the primary responsibility of other Federal agencies,
such as the Drug Enforcement Administration and U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, Homeland Security Investigations.
Our analysis of Border Patrol data indicated that across Southwest
Border sectors, seizures of drugs and other contraband increased 83
percent from fiscal years 2006 to 2011, with drug seizures accounting
for the vast majority of all contraband seizures. Specifically, the
number of drug and contraband seizures increased from 10,321 in fiscal
year 2006 to 18,898 in fiscal year 2011. Most seizures of drugs and
other contraband occurred in the Tucson sector, with about 28 percent,
or 5,299, of the 18,898 Southwest Border seizures occurring in the
sector in fiscal year 2011 as shown in figure 3.\13\ Data reported by
Border Patrol following the issuance of our December 2012 report show
that seizures of drugs and other contraband across the Southwest Border
decreased from 18,898 in fiscal year 2011 to 17,891 in fiscal year
2012.\14\ It is too early to assess whether this decrease indicates a
change in the trend for Border Patrol seizures across the Southwest
Border.
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\13\ Drugs accounted for the vast majority of all contraband
seizures; contraband seizures other than drugs include firearms,
ammunition, and money. Although drug seizures increased 81 percent from
fiscal years 2006 through 2011, the percentage of all contraband
seizures that were drug seizures compared with the percentage of all
contraband seizures remained nearly constant, averaging about 93
percent over this time period.
\14\ GAO-13-25.
Sectors Schedule Agents to Patrol the Border More Than Other
Enforcement Activities; Data Limitations Preclude Comparison of
Overall Effectiveness across Sectors
Southwest Border sectors scheduled most agent workdays for
enforcement activities during fiscal years 2006 to 2011, and the
activity related to patrolling the border accounted for a greater
proportion of enforcement activity workdays than any of the other
activities. Sectors schedule agent workdays across various activities
categorized as enforcement or nonenforcement.\15\ Across enforcement
activities, our analysis of Border Patrol data showed that all sectors
scheduled more agent workdays for ``patrolling the border''--activities
defined to occur within 25 miles of the border--than any other
enforcement activity, as shown in figure 4. Border Patrol duties under
this activity include patrolling by vehicle, horse, and bike;
patrolling with canines; performing sign-cutting; and performing
special activities such as mobile search and rescue.\16\ Other
enforcement activities to which Border Patrol scheduled agent workdays
included conducting checkpoint duties, developing intelligence, and
performing aircraft operations.
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\15\ The percentage of total agent workdays scheduled for
deployment across enforcement activities compared with nonenforcement
activities in fiscal year 2011 ranged from a low of 66 percent in the
Yuma sector to a high of 81 percent in the Big Bend sector. The Tucson
sector scheduled 73 percent of agent workdays across enforcement
activities in fiscal year 2011. Examples of nonenforcement activities
include administrative duties, training, and intelligence support.
\16\ ``Sign'' is the collective term for evidence that Border
Patrol agents look for and find after they have dragged dirt roads
using tires lying on their sides flat on the ground and pulled by
chains behind a sport utility vehicle. ``Sign'' can be footprints,
animal prints, and tire or bicycle tracks--any indication in the smooth
surface created by the drag. The term ``cutting'' refers to the
practice of concentrating on the marks within discrete, manageable
slices or segments of terrain. Border Patrol agents track illegal
cross-border activity by cutting for sign to find persons who may have
crossed the border illegally.
Border Patrol sectors and stations track changes in their overall
effectiveness as a tool to determine if the appropriate mix and
placement of personnel and assets are being deployed and used
effectively and efficiently, according to officials from Border Patrol
headquarters. Border Patrol calculates an overall effectiveness rate
using a formula in which it adds the number of apprehensions and turn-
backs in a specific sector and divides this total by the total
estimated known illegal entries--determined by adding the number of
apprehensions, turn-backs, and got-aways for the sector.\17\ Border
Patrol sectors and stations report this overall effectiveness rate to
headquarters. Border Patrol views its border security efforts as
increasing in effectiveness if the number of turn-backs as a percentage
of estimated known illegal entries has increased and the number of got-
aways as a percentage of estimated known illegal entries has decreased.
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\17\ Border Patrol officials stated that only entrants who can be
traced back to a cross-border entry point in a border zone are to be
reported as got-aways. These officials also noted that while the agency
strives to minimize variance in the collection of these data by using
standard terminology and consistent collection and reporting methods,
in many cases the determination of a turn-back or got-away depends on
agent judgment. Patrol agents-in-charge are responsible for ensuring
that Border Patrol agents are aware of the integrity of data collection
at their respective stations and field commanders must ensure the
accurate counting of got-away data for reconciling possible
inconsistencies in data between operational boundaries.
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Border Patrol data showed that the effectiveness rate for eight of
the nine sectors on the Southwest Border increased from fiscal years
2006 through 2011.\18\ For example, our analysis of Tucson sector
apprehension, turn-back, and got-away data from fiscal years 2006
through 2011 showed that while Tucson sector apprehensions remained
fairly constant at about 60 percent of estimated known illegal entries,
the percentage of reported turn-backs increased from about 5 percent to
about 23 percent, while the percentage of reported got-aways decreased
from about 33 percent to about 13 percent, as shown in figure 5. As a
result of these changes in the mix of turn-backs and got-aways, Border
Patrol data showed that enforcement effort, or the overall
effectiveness rate for Tucson sector, improved 20 percentage points
from fiscal year 2006 to fiscal year 2011, from 67 percent to 87
percent.
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\18\ The exception was the Big Bend sector, which showed a decrease
in the overall effectiveness rate from 86 percent in fiscal year 2006
to 68 percent in fiscal year 2011.
Border Patrol headquarters officials said that differences in how
sectors define, collect, and report turn-back and got-away data used to
calculate the overall effectiveness rate preclude comparing performance
results across sectors. Border Patrol headquarters officials stated
that until recently, each Border Patrol sector decided how it would
collect and report turn-back and got-away data, and as a result,
practices for collecting and reporting the data varied across sectors
and stations based on differences in agent experience and judgment,
resources, and terrain. In terms of defining and reporting turn-back
data, for example, Border Patrol headquarters officials said that a
turn-back was to be recorded only if it is perceived to be an
``intended entry''--that is, the reporting agent believed the entrant
intended to stay in the United States, but Border Patrol activities
caused the individual to return to Mexico.\19\ According to Border
Patrol officials, it can be difficult to tell if an illegal crossing
should be recorded as a turn-back, and sectors have different
procedures for reporting and classifying incidents. In terms of
collecting data, Border Patrol officials reported that sectors rely on
a different mix of cameras, sign cutting, credible sources, and visual
observation to identify and report the number of turn-backs and got-
aways.\20\
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\19\ Officials said that sometimes illegal entrants can be ``drop-
offs'' or ``decoys'' to lure agents away from a specific area so others
can cross, such as smugglers returning to Mexico to pick up another
load, or an individual crossing the border to steal an item and take it
back to Mexico.
\20\ ``Camera'' indicates that one of the remote cameras caught
sight of an individual; ``sign cut'' indicates that an agent
encountered footprints that led him/her to believe that an unauthorized
crossing took place; ``credible source'' indicates a report by a non-
Border Patrol witness, who could be a local law enforcement agent, a
citizen, or a ground sensor; ``visual'' indicates an agent actually
witnessed an unauthorized crossing.
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According to Border Patrol officials, the ability to obtain
accurate or consistent data using these identification sources depends
on various factors, such as terrain and weather. For example, data on
turn-backs and got-aways may be understated in areas with rugged
mountains and steep canyons that can hinder detection of illegal
entries. In other cases, data may be overstated--for example, in cases
where the same turn-back identified by a camera is also identified by
sign-cutting. Double-counting may also occur when agents in one zone
record as a got away an individual who is apprehended and then reported
as an apprehension in another zone. As a result of these data
limitations, Border Patrol headquarters officials said that while they
consider turn-back and got-away data sufficiently reliable to assess
each sector's progress toward border security and to inform sector
decisions regarding resource deployment, they do not consider the data
sufficiently reliable to compare--or externally report--results across
sectors.
Border Patrol headquarters officials issued guidance in September
2012 to provide a more consistent, standardized approach for the
collection and reporting of turn-back and got-away data by Border
Patrol sectors. Each sector is to be individually responsible for
monitoring adherence to the guidance. According to Border Patrol
officials, it is expected that once the guidance is implemented, data
reliability will improve. This new guidance may allow for comparison of
sector performance and inform decisions regarding resource deployment
for securing the Southwest Border.
BORDER PATROL HAS NOT YET DEVELOPED GOALS AND MEASURES FOR ASSESSING
EFFORTS AND IDENTIFYING RESOURCE NEEDS UNDER THE NEW STRATEGIC PLAN
Border Patrol officials stated that the agency is in the process of
developing performance goals and measures for assessing the progress of
its efforts to secure the border between ports of entry and for
informing the identification and allocation of resources needed to
secure the border, but has not identified milestones and time frames
for developing and implementing them. Since fiscal year 2011, DHS has
used the number of apprehensions on the Southwest Border between ports
of entry as an interim performance goal and measure for border security
as reported in its annual performance report. Prior to this, DHS used
operational control as its goal and outcome measure for border security
and to assess resource needs to accomplish this goal.\21\ As we
previously testified, at the end of fiscal year 2010, Border Patrol
reported achieving varying levels of operational control of 873 (44
percent) of the nearly 2,000 Southwest Border miles.\22\ For example,
Yuma sector reported achieving operational control for all of its
border miles. In contrast, the other Southwest Border sectors reported
achieving operational control ranging from 11 to 86 percent of their
border miles, as shown in figure 6. Border Patrol officials attributed
the uneven progress across sectors to multiple factors, including
terrain, transportation infrastructure on both sides of the border, and
a need to prioritize resource deployment to sectors deemed to have
greater risk of illegal activity.
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\21\ Border Patrol sector officials assessed the miles under
operational control using factors such as operational statistics,
third-party indicators, intelligence and operational reports, resource
deployments, and discussions with senior Border Patrol agents.
\22\ GAO-11-374T.
DHS transitioned from using operational control as its goal and
outcome measure for border security in its Fiscal Year 2010-2012 Annual
Performance Report. Citing a need to establish a new border security
goal and measure that reflect a more quantitative methodology as well
as the Department's evolving vision for border control, DHS established
the interim performance goal and measure of the number of apprehensions
between the land border ports of entry until a new border control goal
and measure could be developed. We previously testified that the
interim goal and measure of number of apprehensions on the Southwest
Border between ports of entry provides information on activity levels,
but it does not inform program results or resource identification and
allocation decisions, and therefore until new goals and measures are
developed, DHS and Congress could experience reduced oversight and DHS
accountability.\23\ Further, studies commissioned by CBP have
documented that the number of apprehensions bears little relationship
to effectiveness because agency officials do not compare these numbers
with the amount of cross-border illegal activity.\24\
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\23\ GAO-12-688T.
\24\ For example, see Homeland Security Institute, Measuring the
Effect of the Arizona Border Control Initiative (Arlington, Va.: Oct.
18, 2005).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Border Patrol officials stated that the agency is in the process of
developing performance goals and measures for assessing the progress of
its efforts to secure the border between ports of entry and for
informing the identification and allocation of resources needed to
secure the border, but has not identified milestones and time frames
for developing and implementing them. According to Border Patrol
officials, establishing milestones and time frames for the development
of performance goals and measures is contingent on the development of
key elements of the 2012-2016 Strategic Plan, such as a risk assessment
tool, and the agency's time frames for implementing these key
elements--targeted for fiscal years 2013 and 2014--are subject to
change. Specifically, under the 2012-2016 Strategic Plan, the Border
Patrol plans to continuously evaluate border security--and resource
needs--by comparing changes in risk levels against available resources
across border locations. Border Patrol officials stated the agency is
in the process of identifying performance goals and measures that can
be linked to these new risk assessment tools that will show progress
and status in securing the border between ports of entry, and determine
needed resources, but has not established milestones and time frames
for developing and implementing goals and measures because the agency's
time frames for implementing key elements of the plan are subject to
change.\25\
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\25\ Border Patrol officials stated that DHS and Border Patrol have
established a performance goal--linked to relevant measures--addressing
border security that, as of October 2012, was being used as an internal
management indicator. However, a DHS official said it has not been
decided whether this goal and the associated measures will be publicly
reported or used as an overall performance goal and as measures for
border security.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard practices in program management call for documenting the
scope of a project as well as milestones and time frames for timely
completion and implementation to ensure results are achieved.\26\ These
standard practices also call for project planning--such as identifying
time frames--to be performed in the early phases of a program and
recognize that plans may need to be adjusted along the way in response
to unexpected circumstances. Time frames for implementing key elements
of the 2012-2016 Strategic Plan can change; however, milestones and
time frames for the development of performance goals and measures could
help ensure that goals and measures are completed in a timely manner.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ The Project Management Institute, The Standard for Program
Management (Newtown Square, Penn., 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To support the implementation of Border Patrol's 2012-2016
Strategic Plan and identify the resources needed to achieve the
Nation's strategic goal for securing the border, we recommended in our
December 2012 report that Border Patrol establish milestones and time
frames for developing a: (1) Performance goal, or goals, for border
security between the ports of entry that defines how border security is
to be measured and (2) performance measure, or measures--linked to a
performance goal or goals--for assessing progress made in securing the
border between ports of entry and informing resource identification and
allocation efforts.\27\ DHS agreed with these recommendations and
stated that it plans to establish milestones and time frames for
developing goals and measures by November 30, 2013. Milestones and time
frames could better position CBP to monitor progress in developing and
implementing goals and measures, which would provide DHS and Congress
with information on the results of CBP efforts to secure the border
between ports of entry and the extent to which existing resources and
capabilities are appropriate and sufficient.
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\27\ GAO-13-25.
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Chairwoman Miller, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and Members of the
subcommittee, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to
answer any questions you may have at this time.
Mrs. Miller. Thank you very much.
The Chairwoman now recognizes Mr. Rosenblum for his
testimony.
STATEMENT OF MARC R. ROSENBLUM, PH.D., SPECIALIST IN
IMMIGRATION POLICY, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, LIBRARY OF
CONGRESS
Mr. Rosenblum. Thank you.
Chairwoman Miller, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, Ranking
Member Thompson, thank you for the opportunity to testify today
on behalf of the Congressional Research Service.
Chairwoman Miller's opening statement and several of the
witnesses have talked about the diversity of threats that we
face at U.S. borders and how we assess those risks. My
testimony really focuses exclusively on illegal migration but I
want to mention that CRS released a new report last week that
is all about understanding the diversity of threats and risk
assessment, and I have a--I have that report here with me today
as well.
But focusing on illegal migration, there is broad consensus
among all sides on the immigration debate that we should secure
the Southwest Border but no consensus about exactly what that
means or how to recognize a secure border when we see it. The
challenge is that we know a lot about the resources we devote
to border security, and CBP and the rest of DHS know a lot
about the law enforcement outcomes that result from those
efforts--things like apprehensions of unauthorized migrants--
but these data don't measure the questions that we are really
interested in, which is, how many unauthorized migrants enter
the United States, and of those attempting entry, how many does
CBP apprehend?
These questions sound simple, but they are difficult to
answer for the obvious reason that unauthorized aliens seek to
avoid detection. The illicit nature of unauthorized migration,
along with the complexity of DHS's border security mission and
the size and diversity of U.S. borders, means that no single
quantitative indicator accurately and reliably provides a
metric or score on border enforcement.
Instead, we assess border security by estimating
unauthorized flows and apprehension rates. There will likely
always be some disagreement about these estimates.
Many people expect DHS to come up with a number, but DHS is
primarily interested in law enforcement. For that reason, most
of the data that DHS collects and the databases it uses to
manage that data are designed for law enforcement purposes and
not for the kind of analysis that we need to assess illegal
flows.
My written testimony describes the different types of data
that go into estimating illegal flows and the different
analytic tools we can use to assess border security. The best
methodologies rely on multiple data sources.
My testimony also identifies steps DHS could take to
develop better border metrics. First, DHS could include a
statistical sampling framework, like the COMPEX system that OFO
uses, within other enforcement programs. That would allow the
agency to draw clearer and more statistically valid and
accurate conclusions about underlying flows.
Second, DHS could structure its databases to facilitate
data analysis. CBP already appears to have taken some steps in
this direction.
Third, DHS could share certain administrative enforcement
data with outside researchers, a move that would expand the
pool of people working on and evaluating border security
metrics.
My written testimony also reviews recent investments in
border security and immigration enforcement. I examined a range
of indicators, including Congressional appropriations, DHS
databases, CBP personnel, border infrastructure, surveillance
technology, detention facilities, and enforcement programs at
the border and within the United States. Across all of these
areas a consistent story emerges that we have made substantial
investments in immigration enforcement over the last couple of
decades, and particularly in the last 5 to 10 years.
Placed in historical perspective, CBP's shift from low- to
high-consequence enforcement practices at the border and the
development of the Secure Communities program to conduct
immigration screening of persons arrested throughout the United
States seem like particularly significant developments.
I also identify areas where investments arguably have been
less robust, including investments at ports of entry, the
development of a complete biographic or biometric entry-exit
system, increased worksite enforcement to deter employers from
hiring unauthorized workers, and the development and wide-
spread use of a reliable system to verify workers' employment
eligibility.
To return to the big picture, how has the growing
enforcement enterprise affected unauthorized migration? There
is little doubt that inflows have fallen sharply in recent
years and that the unauthorized population residing in the
United States has diminished.
But explaining what caused this drop-off is difficult
because many new enforcement measures have coincided with the
U.S. economic downturn and with especially--with relatively
robust growth in favorable demographic conditions in Mexico and
other countries of origin. The effects of Secure Communities
and of new consequence delivery programs may not have even
registered yet in some of our date. Nonetheless, research that
disentangles these factors suggests that enforcement efforts
have likely helped--likely help explain reduced inflows.
More effective border security metrics could contribute to
the immigration debate by offering clearer insight into the
state of border security and the effectiveness of different
enforcement strategies. These are critical issues, given the
trade-offs Congress and DHS face between investing additional
resources at the border versus within the interior of the
United States, and investing at ports of entry versus between
the ports, among other choices.
Clear border metrics may also offer insight into returns on
future enforcement investments, and importantly, about what
level of border security realistically can be obtained in the
absence of additional immigration reforms.
Thank you again for the opportunity and I look forward to
your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Rosenblum follows:]
Prepared Statement of Marc R. Rosenblum
February 26, 2013
This hearing raises an important question for Members of Congress
concerned about border security: What would a secure border look like?
The United States spends billions of dollars and expends extraordinary
effort to secure the border; and the Department of Homeland Security
collects tables full of enforcement data. Yet after years of grappling
with this question, no consensus exists about how to measure border
security or how to evaluate existing enforcement efforts. Thus, while
the White House asserts that our borders today ``are more secure that
at any time in the past several decades,''\1\ Chairwoman Miller and
others have warned against ``accepting empty promises on border
security,'' and asked ``how the American people can be assured that the
border is truly secure?''\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The White House, ``Fixing the Immigration System for America's
21st Century Economy,'' accessed Feb. 24, 2013, http://
www.whitehouse.gov/issues/fixing-immigration-system-america-s-21st-
century-economy.
\2\ Candice Miller, ``Real Immigration Reform Begins with Strong
Border Security,'' Press Release, Feb. 12, 2013.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
My testimony begins by describing how to measure border security
and identifies several concrete steps that could be taken to develop
better border metrics. The second part of my testimony reviews recent
border security and immigration enforcement efforts and identifies
possible gaps in these efforts. I conclude by offering a tentative
assessment of the current state of border security.
BORDER SECURITY METRICS
The relationship between border security and unauthorized migration
is a key issue for many people interested in immigration reform.\3\ Two
questions loom large in this discussion: How many unauthorized migrants
enter the United States?\4\ Of those attempting entry, how many does
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) apprehend?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Immigration control is just one aspect of DHS's border security
mission, which also encompasses combatting crime and illegal drugs,
detecting and interdicting terrorists, and facilitating legal travel
and trade, among other goals. See CRS Report R42969, Border Security:
Understanding Threats at U.S. Borders, by Marc R. Rosenblum, Jerome P.
Bjelopera, and Kristin M. Finklea.
\4\ An unknown proportion of unauthorized migrants enter
surreptitiously through ports of entry, and an estimated one-third to
one-half of unauthorized migrants enter legally and overstay a visa.
See CRS Report RS22446, Nonimmigrant Overstays: Brief Syntheses of the
Issue, by Ruth Ellen Wasem.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
These questions sound simple, but they are difficult to answer for
the obvious reason that unauthorized aliens seek to avoid detection.
This missing information means analysts do not know the precise scope
of the illegal migration problem, nor can they calculate CBP's
enforcement success rate.
These challenges are well known. Several Members of this committee
have called on the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to develop
clear, measurable, outcomes-based metrics to evaluate progress with
respect to immigration control. Unfortunately, the illicit nature of
unauthorized migration along with the complexity of DHS's border
security mission and the size and diversity of U.S. borders mean that
no single, quantitative, off-the-shelf indicator accurately and
reliably provides a metric or ``score'' for border enforcement.
Instead, we assess border security by estimating unauthorized flows and
apprehension rates, and there likely will always be some disagreement
about these estimates.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Moreover, while the number of illegal entries may be
objectively (though not precisely) estimated, how people evaluate the
diverse economic, social, cultural, and other effects of unauthorized
migration is inherently subjective. See CRS Report R42969, Border
Security: Understanding Threats at U.S. Borders, by Marc R. Rosenblum,
Jerome P. Bjelopera, and Kristin M. Finklea.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nonetheless, researchers have done substantial work on how to make
such estimates. Three different types of data may be involved:
Administrative enforcement data, survey data, and proxy data (see Types
of Data, below). By drawing on multiple data sources, analysts may
develop models of border flows that are likely to provide more accurate
assessments of border security than any single type of data in
isolation (see Analysis of Raw Data, below). Model-based estimates can
improve on single-measure estimates, and they could be further
strengthened by modifying how DHS collects and manages data, and by
making certain DHS data more widely available to analysts and
researchers (see Developing Better Border Security Metrics, below).
Types of Data
(1) Administrative Enforcement Data
Administrative enforcement data are records of DHS's enforcement
actions and other interactions with unauthorized migrants. The best
example of this type of data is alien apprehensions. For almost 100
years, the U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) has apprehended removable and
deportable aliens and made a record of these enforcement actions. An
advantage of using enforcement data to estimate border security is that
these data usually can be measured with a good deal of certainty:
Border Patrol knows how many people its agents apprehended last year
and records such numbers at the sector and station level, along with
information about where and how people were apprehended.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ For a full list of administrative data collected by the Border
Patrol, see Panel on Survey Options for Estimating the Flow of
Unauthorized Crossings at the U.S.-Mexico Border, Options for
Estimating Illegal Entries at the U.S.-Mexico Border, Washington, DC:
National Research Council, 2012 (hereafter: NRC, Options for Estimating
Illegal Entries).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Yet apprehensions are not a perfect indicator of illegal flows
because they exclude two of the groups of greatest interest: Aliens who
successfully enter and remain in the United States (i.e., enforcement
failures) and aliens who are deterred from entering the United States--
including perhaps because they never even initiate a trip (i.e.,
certain enforcement successes). A further limitation to apprehensions
data is that they count events, not unique individuals, so the same
person may appear multiple times in the dataset after multiple entry
attempts.
Fundamentally, apprehensions data do not measure illegal flows.
They describe certain enforcement outcomes. Thus, we do not know if a
decline in apprehensions is a good thing, because fewer people are
attempting to enter, or a bad thing, because more of them are
succeeding.\7\ To varying degrees, the same problem is true of other
types of administrative enforcement data.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ See Edward Alden and Bryan Roberts, ``Are U.S. Borders Secure?
Why We Don't Know and How to Find Out,'' Foreign Affairs 90, 4 (2011):
pp. 19-26.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to apprehensions data, CBP (including USBP) and U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) collect several additional
types of enforcement data. Although they display some of the same
limitations as apprehensions, each may contribute to an estimate of
illegal border flows:
USBP estimates of ``got-aways'' and ``turn-backs''.--Border
Patrol stations and sectors estimate the number of illegal
entrants who successfully travel to the U.S. interior and who
USBP ceased pursuing. Stations and sectors also estimate the
number of people who illegally cross the border but then cross
back to Mexico. USBP uses these additional data, along with
apprehensions, to estimate the total number of known illegal
entries. Yet got-away and turn-back data, like apprehensions
data, are a function of enforcement resources, and (unlike
apprehensions) these data may be highly dependent on the
subjective judgments of agents doing the counting. CBP recently
made its estimates of got-aways and turn-backs for fiscal year
2006-fiscal year 2011 available to the public for the first
time.\8\
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\8\ For a fuller discussion, see U.S. Government Accountability
Office (GAO), Border Patrol: Key Elements of Strategic Plan Not Yet in
Place to Inform Border Security Status and Resource Needs, GAO-13-25,
December 2012.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
USBP estimates of unique apprehensions and recidivists.--
Since late 1999, the Border Patrol has used biometric
technology to record the identity and track individual case
histories of most people apprehended by USBP.\9\ Border Patrol
uses these data to track the total number of unique individuals
apprehended per year and to estimate the number of recidivists,
defined by USBP as unique aliens who are apprehended more than
one time in a single fiscal year. Data on unique apprehensions
avoid the ``overcount'' problem in the counting of apprehension
events. The ratio of unique apprehensions to total
apprehensions and the number of recidivists apprehended both
may offer insight into whether aliens who have been previously
apprehended are deterred from making additional illegal
entries--a key question for border metrics. CBP released
recidivist and unique apprehensions data to CRS in 2011 (the
first time such data were made publicly available), but has not
released updated data for fiscal year 2012.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ These records are stored in the DHS Automated Biometric
Identification System (IDENT) database, discussed in greater detail
below (see Growth and Integration of DHS Databases). With over 150
million unique records as of January 2013, IDENT is the largest
biometric database in the world, according to US-VISIT Office of
Congressional Affairs, January 24, 2013.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total apprehensions.--Data on total apprehensions (i.e.,
including apprehensions away from the border) offer additional
insight into the number of aliens arriving in the United
States, though they are subject to the same limitations as data
on border apprehensions. About 90% of alien apprehensions
between fiscal year 1990 and fiscal year 2006 occurred at the
Southwest Border; but with the recent expansion of ICE's
interior enforcement programs (see below, Interior Enforcement
Programs) and decline in inflows, interior apprehensions
accounted for over a third of all apprehensions in 2009 and
2010, and for half of all apprehensions in 2011.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ CRS calculations based on data from Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) Office of Immigration Statistics (OIS), Yearbook of
Immigration Statistics fiscal year 2011, Washington, DC, 2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2) Survey data
Several large-scale surveys offer insight into illegal migration
flows and the effects of enforcement by interviewing migrants and
potential migrants about their histories and intentions. An advantage
to surveys is that they may collect much more information about their
subjects than is found in administrative enforcement data. In addition,
because surveys are conducted within the U.S. interior as well as in
migrant countries of origin, surveys may be better able than CBP data
to capture information about successful illegal inflows and about the
deterrent effects of enforcement. Partly for these reasons, DHS
recently commissioned a comprehensive study by the National Research
Council (NRC) on the use of surveys and related methodologies to
estimate the number of illegal U.S.-Mexico border crossings.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ NRC, Options for Estimating Illegal Entries.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As the NRC study describes, data collected within the United
States, including the U.S. Census's American Community Survey (ACS) and
its Current Population Survey (CPS) are used to estimate the size of
the unauthorized population in the United States by comparing the
number of foreign-born identified in these surveys to known legal
migration flows.\12\ Three different Mexican national surveys also may
be used to estimate the number of emigrants from that country, which
may be compared to known legal outflows to generate an analogous
estimate.\13\ And a pair of binational (U.S.-Mexican) and one Mexican
survey focus specifically on migrants and potential migrants, drawing
samples from the border region and from migrant-sending and -receiving
communities.\14\ These targeted surveys ask a number of questions about
U.S. immigration enforcement and how it affects respondents' migration
histories and future plans.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Ibid. Also see CRS Report RL33874, Unauthorized Aliens
Residing in the United States: Estimates Since 1986, by Ruth Ellen
Wasem.
\13\ The NRC focused on Mexican surveys because Mexican nationals
are estimated to account for about 90% of attempted unauthorized border
crossings on the U.S.-Mexico border, though that proportion appears to
have fallen in recent years. The Mexican surveys are the ``long
questionnaire'' of the Mexican Census of Housing and Population, the
National Survey of Occupation and Employment (ENOE), the National
Survey of Population Dynamics of Population Dynamics (ENADID), and the
longitudinal Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS). Also see Andrew R.
Morral, Henry H. Willis, and Peter Brownell, Measuring Illegal Border
Crossing Between Ports of Entry, RAND Homeland Security and Defense
Center, Santa Monica, CA, 2011.
\14\ The binational surveys are the Mexican Migration Field
Research Program (MMFRP) based at the University of California--San
Diego and the Mexican Migration Project (MMP) based at Princeton
University; the Mexican survey is the Survey of Migration and the
Northern Border (EMIF-N).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While analysts must account for the likelihood that unauthorized
migrants may be less than forthcoming with interviewers and also may be
under-represented in certain survey samples, a large body of social
science research has made use of these data and developed widely
accepted methodologies to account for these and other challenges. One
limitation of survey data is that typically it is not collected and
analyzed quickly enough to generate timely estimates. And some surveys
do not have large enough samples to generate reliable estimates of
certain variables. Nonetheless, the NRC concluded that DHS should use
survey data and modeling approaches in combination with enforcement
data to develop better estimates of unauthorized border flows.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ NRC, Options for Estimating Illegal Entries, p. S-5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(3) Proxy data
The great majority of persons who illegally cross the border to
enter the United States make use of human smugglers.\16\ The prices
charged by smugglers therefore may be used as a proxy (i.e., indirect)
indicator of the effectiveness of border enforcement efforts (along
with the demand for illegal flows) because more effective enforcement
should increase the costs and risks to smugglers, with smugglers
passing such costs along to their clients in the form of higher
fees.\17\ Border Patrol apprehension records and several surveys
identified above contain information about smuggling fees.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ See Princeton University Mexican Migration Project, ``Access
to Border-Crossing Guides and Family/Friends on First Undocumented
Trip,'' http://mmp.opr.princeton.edu/results/002coyote-en.aspx.
\17\ See Bryan Roberts, Gordon Hanson, and Derekh Cornwell, et al.,
An Analysis of Migrant Smuggling Costs Along the Southwest Border, DHS
Office of Immigration Statistics, Washington, DC, November 2010, http:/
/www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ois-smuggling-
wp.pdf. Also see Morral et al., Measuring Illegal Border Crossing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Analysis of Raw Data to Estimate Illegal Flows
None of the raw data sources described above, by themselves,
reliably describe illegal border crossers or enforcement rates. But
these data sources may be analyzed to produce such estimates. This
section describes three methods for conducting this type of analysis.
(1) Ratio of apprehensions and turn-backs to estimated
known illegal flows
The Border Patrol's estimates of turn-backs, got-aways, and
apprehensions--while problematic for the reasons discussed above--offer
a rough tool for estimating its enforcement success rate: i.e.,
apprehensions (or apprehensions plus turn-backs) divided by total
estimated known illegal flows. Between 2005 and 2010, the Border Patrol
used essentially this methodology to describe the portions of the
border under ``operational control.'' In particular, the agency rated
its ``ability to detect, respond, and interdict illegal activity at the
border or after entry into the United States'' on a five-point
scale.\18\ Portions of the border that were rated in one of the top two
categories on this scale were described as being under ``effective'' or
``operational'' control: About 1,107 miles (57% of the Southwest
Border) in fiscal year 2010.\19\ Beginning in fiscal year 2011, the
Border Patrol determined that this metric was ineffective, and the
agency no longer reports on miles of the border under operational
control.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ U.S. Government Accountability Office, Border Security:
Preliminary Observations on Border Control Measures for the Southwest
Border, GAO-11-374T, February 15, 2011, p. 7.
\19\ U.S. Congress, House Committee on Homeland Security, Feb. 15,
2010.
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(2) Capture-recapture models
Capture-recapture models initially were developed by ecologists to
estimate the size of wildlife populations. Social scientists working in
the 1990s showed that a similar methodology can be used to estimate the
total flow of unauthorized migrants based on the ratio of persons re-
apprehended after an initial enforcement action to the total number of
persons apprehended.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ Thomas J. Espenshade, ``Using INS Border Apprehension Data to
Measure the Flow of Undocumented Migrants Crossing the U.S.-Mexico
Frontier,'' International Migration Review, vol. 29, no. 2 (Summer
1995), pp. 545-565.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
An advantage to the simple capture-recapture method is that it
relies on observable administrative enforcement data--apprehensions and
repeat apprehensions--to calculate border metrics of interest: Illegal
flows and apprehension rates. Yet the models are highly sensitive to a
pair of assumptions about migrant behavior: That virtually all
intending unauthorized migrants eventually succeed, and that the odds
of being apprehended are the same across multiple attempts to cross the
border.\21\ Both of these assumptions, while supported by certain
research, may not hold in some cases; and underestimating the number of
migrants deterred causes the model to over-estimate illegal flows.
Thus, in order to produce accurate estimates of illegal flows based on
the capture-re-capture method, analysts must supplement administrative
data on apprehensions and repeat apprehensions with solid data on the
odds of being apprehended and the number of migrants deterred,
adjusting the model accordingly.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ Ibid.
\22\ See NRC, Options for Estimating Illegal Entries. According to
data provided by CBP Office of Legislative Affairs December 20, 2011,
CBP reportedly plans to use a modified capture-recapture model along
these lines as one element of the ``border conditions index'' (BCI),
which is currently being developed. The BCI is designed to provide a
more comprehensive picture of border security, encompassing a capture-
recapture estimate of illegal migration inflows between ports of entry,
a measure of wait times and volatility at ports of entry as well as
illegal flows through ports of entry, and a measure of quality of life
in border communities, based in part on border area crime rates.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(3) Regression models
Social scientists also used survey data about aliens' migration
histories and intentions to analyze factors that are associated with a
person's propensity to migrate illegally. For example, how are
demographic and economic characteristics such as gender, age, and
employment opportunities correlated with an individual's reported
illegal migration history or a person's intentions to migrate illegally
in the future? How are migration plans associated with people's
perceptions of border enforcement, or with the actual allocation of
enforcement resources?\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ See for example, Wayne A. Cornelius and Idean Salehyan, ``Does
border enforcement deter unauthorized immigration? The case of Mexican
migration to the United States of America,'' Regulation & Governance
1.2 (2007): pp. 139-153; Manuela Angelucci, ``U.S. Border Enforcement
and the Net Flow of Mexican Illegal Migration,'' Economic Development
and Cultural Change, 60, 2 (2012):311-357. Also see Morral, et al.,
Measuring Illegal Border Crossing Between Ports of Entry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
An advantage to regression analysis is that well-designed studies
may offer insight into questions with great policy relevance, as these
examples illustrate. Yet many regression techniques require large
samples to be effective, and they may be sensitive to specific time
periods or migrant cohorts. And while research based on survey data
offers important insight into migration dynamics, researchers generally
have not had access to real-time and large-scale data sets--including
administrative enforcement data in particular--that might provide
additional information to policymakers seeking to evaluate border
security.
Developing Better Border Security Metrics
Each of these analytic approaches offers insight beyond basic
enforcement, survey, or proxy data, but none appears to have met
Congress's request for a clear and credible metric of border security.
What can be done to develop such a measure? Capture-recapture models
would be improved by better data on deterrence at the border, and our
overall understanding of border security would benefit from better
information about illegal flows through ports of entry. Three concrete
steps that would improve border metrics would be for DHS to structure
certain enforcement programs to support better data collection, for DHS
to structure its enforcement databases to support better data analysis,
and for DHS to make these and existing data available to the broader
research community.
(1) Structure Certain Enforcement Programs to Support Data
Collection
Without compromising its law enforcement and security practices,
DHS could design certain enforcement actions to allow the agency (and
others) to draw inferences about the underlying population of migrants.
In other words, certain enforcement and surveillance actions could be
allocated based on a statistical sampling framework. Just as pollsters
draw inferences about public opinion based on a sample of interviews,
DHS could draw inferences about the immigration status of a population
or the security of the border based on a sample of enforcement and
surveillance actions. CBP Office of Field Operation's (OFO's)
Compliance Examination (COMPEX) program illustrates how enforcement may
be designed with data collection in mind. At certain ports of entry, in
addition to targeting high-risk vehicles and passengers, OFO selects a
random sample that has been cleared for admission and subjects
travelers to a post-entry inspection. Because the sample is selected at
random, OFO can infer that the proportion of otherwise-cleared entrants
found to be carrying illegal goods or hidden passengers is equivalent
to the proportion in the overall population of cleared vehicles (though
some independent analysts have argued that COMPEX's sample is too small
to accurately measure such violations).\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ For a fuller discussion, see GAO, Border Security: Despite
Progress, Weaknesses in Traveler Inspections Exist at Our Nation's
Ports of Entry, GAO-08-219, November 2007. COMPEX reportedly samples
about 250,000 travelers per year out of over 200 million travelers at
land ports of entry, or less than 0.1%.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Many other DHS programs include a combination of risk-based and
random targeting because randomness makes enforcement unpredictable.
For this reason, as a recent RAND study observed, other border
enforcement programs could be designed to include statistical sampling
frames without compromising security.\25\ For example, in addition to
allocating agents based on a geographic needs assessment, Border Patrol
could assign additional agents to certain segments at random. To the
extent that the initial allocation was well-designed, increased
apprehensions in the enhanced segments would be an indicator of illegal
flows in the unenhanced segments. Similar resource surges could be
tested in CBP's Outbound Inspections Program and its deployment of
surveillance equipment and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), among other
programs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ See Morral, et al., Measuring Illegal Border Crossing Between
Ports of Entry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A second way enforcement data can be used to draw conclusions about
the underlying population is through universal deployment. For example,
Secure Communities and the Criminal Alien Program \26\ together are now
deployed in virtually every law enforcement jurisdiction in the
country, and screen persons arrested and booked into jails in the
United States. For this reason, apart from ICE's use of these programs
for enforcement purposes, they offer unique insight into the
unauthorized population by providing a real-time census of the
immigration status of almost everyone arrested in the United
States.\27\ A third possible tool for collecting additional data about
illegal border flows is to field ``red team'' penetration testers:
Agents posing as unauthorized migrants who attempt to enter without the
knowledge of CBP personnel in the region. Over repeated trials, the
ability of such teams to enter successfully could be an indicator of
aliens' success rate.\28\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ For a description of these programs, see in Interior
Enforcement Programs (in this testimony, below) and CRS Report R42057,
Interior Immigration Enforcement: Programs Targeting Criminal Aliens,
by Marc R. Rosenblum and William Kandel.
\27\ Note, however, that Secure Communities does not accurately
identify the subset of unauthorized aliens who enter without inspection
and have never had any contact with DHS. In addition, Secure
Communities only provides an accurate estimate of the unauthorized
population to the extent that unauthorized migrants are equally likely
as lawful aliens and U.S. citizens to be arrested and to have their
status checked.
\28\ See Morral, et al., Measuring Illegal Border Crossing Between
Ports of Entry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2) Structure DHS Databases to Support Data Analysis
In general, ICE and CBP databases are structured for law
enforcement purposes, and not for analytic purposes. As a previous NRC
analysis of how DHS enforcement actions affect Department of Justice
budgeting explained, a core problem is that DHS databases are organized
to track events (as in apprehensions), rather than case histories, and
therefore cannot examine person-specific flows through the system.\29\
As a result, according to CRS conversations with ICE officials, the
agency cannot readily answer critical analytic questions, such as how
enforcement outcomes (time in detention, final case disposition,
probability of re-apprehension) differ across jurisdictions and/or
enforcement programs.\30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\ Committee on Estimating Costs of Immigration Enforcement in
the Department of Justice 2011, Budgeting for Immigration Enforcement:
A Path to Better Performance, Washington, DC: National Research
Council, pp. 112-113.
\30\ The House Appropriations Committee report on the Fiscal Year
2013 DHS Appropriations Bill requested that DHS report on enforcement
outcomes by program and in this manner. See U.S. Congress, House
Committee on Appropriations, Department of Homeland Security
Appropriations, 2013, report to accompany H.R. 5855, 112th Cong., 2nd
sess., May 23, 2012, H. Rept. 112-492 (Washington: GPO, 2012), p. 56.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CBP appears to have begun addressing this problem in its analysis
of its ``consequence delivery system.''\31\ According to CBP officials,
CBP tracks recidivism rates broken down by sector and by initial
enforcement disposition. Thus, for example, CBP should be able to
calculate whether an alien subject to voluntary departure was more
likely to be re-apprehended than an alien subject to formal removal or
an alien facing immigration-related criminal charges. This analysis may
inform Congress's understanding of border security and of the cost
effectiveness of different enforcement strategies, but CRS has not been
able to review or analyze these data, so CRS cannot comment on their
usefulness.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ For more information about the CBP's consequence delivery
system see ``Enforcement with Consequences'' in this testimony, below;
also see CRS Report R42138, Border Security: Immigration Enforcement
Between Ports of Entry, by Marc R. Rosenblum.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Following the creation of DHS, data management problems have been
exacerbated by certain limits on integration.\32\ One noteworthy
illustration of this problem is that DHS's Office of Immigration
Statistics (OIS) and ICE report two different numbers each year for
``total removals,'' with ICE defining this number to include ICE
voluntary departures, but not CBP-expedited removals; and OIS reporting
the sum of ICE and CBP removals, but not ICE voluntary departures.
DHS's Office of Immigration Statistics may seem like a logical agency
to manage such Department-wide data management and analysis; but
different DHS agencies manage their own data, and OIS does not reliably
play this role.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\ For a fuller discussion see NRC, Options for Estimating
Illegal Entries, pp. 5-12-5-14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(3) Make DHS Administrative Data Available to Outside
Researchers
Most DHS administrative data are not available to outside
researchers at a level of aggregation that can be used for research and
program evaluation purposes. In many cases, even data at the National
or sector level are not released in a timely or predictable manner.
This lack of data may impede researchers' and Congress's ability to
evaluate border security and may contribute to doubts and confusion
about the border. Increased public access to reliable information about
immigration enforcement, as well as DHS' strategic planning, also would
provide additional structure to the immigration policy debate.\33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\33\ See John Whitley, Bryan Roberts, and Robert Shea,
``Immigration and Border Control: How Data-Driven Management Could
Enhance Success,'' Accessed February 24, 2013, http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2018580.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At least in part, data are not released because they are considered
law enforcement sensitive and/or to protect the privacy of enforcement
subjects. Yet as the NRC has recently observed, numerous mechanisms
exist to release ``clean'' versions of these data, including by purging
the small number of serious criminals from the dataset or masking
certain fields, among other options.\34\ Congress could support data
sharing by authorizing funds for this type of data cleaning. While DHS
analysts reportedly are engaged in their own model-building exercises
which may meet Congress's need for better metrics, releasing more
administrative data to independent researchers would substantially
expand the number of scholars able to work on this question, and would
ensure that research and analysis on border metrics are subject to
rigorous external peer review.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\34\ NRC, Options for Estimating Illegal Entries.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
recent investments in border security and immigration enforcement \35\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\35\ For a fuller discussion of recent investments in border
security and immigration enforcement, see CRS Congressional
Distribution Memorandum, ``Immigration Enforcement Since 2006,'' by
Marc R. Rosenblum, available to Congressional staff from the author
upon request.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Congress and DHS have made substantial investments in border
security and immigration enforcement over the last 25 years, and
particularly since the last time Congress debated comprehensive
immigration reform in 2005-2007.
Enforcement Appropriations
Investments in Congressional appropriations to DHS immigration
enforcement programs are one indicator of this trend, and are
summarized in Appendix Table 1. As Table 1 indicates, DHS's four
immigration enforcement accounts (i.e., CBP, ICE, the U.S. Visitor and
Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) program, and the E-
Verify account within U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services) were
appropriated a total of about $114 billion for fiscal year 2006-fiscal
year 2012. This total encompasses appropriations to CBP for fiscal year
2006-fiscal year 2012 of $75 billion, including about $17 billion for
enforcement at ports of entry (including travel and trade facilitation
as well as customs and immigration enforcement); $21 billion for
enforcement salaries and expenses between ports of entry (i.e., Border
Patrol); $5 billion for border security fencing, infrastructure, and
technology; and $5 billion for CBP air and marine acquisitions and
operations. Appropriations to ICE totaled $37 billion for this period,
including $16 billion for alien enforcement and removal operations
(ERO).\36\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\36\ Also see Doris Meissner, Donald M. Kerwin, Muzaffar Chisthi,
and Clare Bergeron, Immigration Enforcement in the United States: The
Rise of a Formidable Machinery, Washington, DC: Migration Policy
Institute, 2013.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Growth and Integration of DHS Databases
Among the many databases managed by DHS, two are noteworthy with
respect to immigration enforcement because they are used extensively
during the immigration process and are shared across several law
enforcement agencies. The Automated Biometric Identification system
(IDENT) is the central DHS-wide system for the storage and processing
of biometric (i.e., fingerprints and digital photographs) and
associated biographic (i.e., name, birthdate, nationality, and other
descriptive information) data for National security, law enforcement,
immigration enforcement, intelligence, and related uses. Whereas IDENT
included only about 7 million records in 2004, increased deployment of
biometric technology allowed the database to grow to 64 million entries
at the end of 2006 and to over 150 million unique records as of January
2013, including over 6.4 million people on the US-VISIT watch list.\37\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\37\ US-VISIT Office of Congressional Affairs, January 24, 2013.
Individuals on the US-VISIT watch list are the subjects of derogatory
information in a DHS database. Such information includes arrest
warrants, known or suspected terrorists, certain visa refusals,
Department of Defense biometric watchlist records, smuggling
information, overstay records, visa fraud, and other DHS enforcement
data. CBP officers check certain travelers' biometric records against
the US-VISIT watch list during primary processing at ports of entry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Arrival and Departure Information System (ADIS) is the DHS-wide
biographic database that includes records of encounters with DHS for
aliens who have applied for entry, entered, or departed from the United
States. Both databases are managed by the US-VISIT office, which also
manages the US-VISIT entry-exit system. The ADIS database included
about 169 million identities at the end of 2006, and included over 270
million unique identities as of January 2013.\38\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\38\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
DHS databases are increasingly integrated for enforcement purposes.
All US-VISIT workstations are now fully interoperable with the Federal
Bureau of Investigation's (FBI's) Integrated Automated Fingerprint
Identification System (IAFIS) database, used for criminal background
checks. (IDENT data previously could be compared against the IAFIS
database via a manual search.) Since 2009, ICE routinely has used the
IDENT database to initiate immigration status checks when persons are
booked into Federal, State, and local jails through the Secure
Communities program (see Interior Enforcement Programs, below). Since
2011, US-VISIT also conducts automatic searches against biometric
records in the Department of Defense Automated Biometric Identification
System (ABIS), a biometric database with National security and
intelligence records.
Border Security Personnel
A total of fewer than 19,000 CBP personnel (Border Patrol agents
and port of entry officers) were posted to U.S. borders in 2004, the
first year for which complete CBP data are available (see Appendix
Table 2). As of fiscal year 2013, CBP personnel had grown to about
31,000 officers and agents, including a doubling to more than 21,000
Border Patrol agents (18,000 at the Southwest Border). The personnel
data in Table 2 do not represent an exhaustive account of DHS and other
law enforcement personnel at the border. In addition to Border Patrol
agents and CBP officers, about 5,000 ICE agents are deployed to U.S.
borders, along with numerous other Federal law enforcement agents
(including U.S. Marshals, Drug Enforcement Administration officials,
among others) and various State and local law enforcement agents.
Fencing, Infrastructure, and Technology
CBP deploys fencing and tactical infrastructure at the Southwest
Border to impede illegal cross-border activity, disrupt smuggling
operations, and establish a substantial probability of apprehending
illegal entrants. The Border Patrol also utilizes surveillance
technology to augment its ability to patrol the border. As noted in
Table 1, Congress has expanded spending on border fencing,
infrastructure, and technology programs from $115 million in fiscal
year 2006, to a high point of $1.2 billion in fiscal year 2008, and
$400 million in fiscal year 2012. Appropriations to CBP's Office of Air
and Marine increased more slowly, from $653 million in fiscal year 2006
to a high of $862 million in fiscal year 2010, to $792 million in
fiscal year 2012.
As Appendix Figure 1 illustrates, a portion of this spending has
gone to fund construction of new fencing at the Southwest Border, with
total miles of fencing increasing from 76 miles in fiscal year 2001 to
139.4 in fiscal year 2006 to 652 miles in fiscal year 2012. As of
December 2012, Border Patrol maintains 35 permanent interior
checkpoints and 173 tactical checkpoints. The Border Patrol also
maintains 12 forward operating bases in remote areas to house personnel
in close proximity to illegal crossing routes.\39\ As of November 2012,
Border Patrol reported 337 Remote Video Surveillance Systems (up from
269 in 2006), 198 short- and medium-range Mobile Vehicle Surveillance
Systems and 41 long-range mobile surveillance systems (up from zero in
2005), 15 agent portable medium range surveillance systems (up from
zero in 2005), 15 Integrated Fixed Towers that were developed as part
of the SBInet system (up from zero in 2005), and 13,406 unattended
ground sensors (up from about 11,200 in 2005).\40\ In addition, as of
November 2012, CBP operated a total of 10 unmanned aerial vehicle
systems (UAVs), up from zero in 2006.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\39\ U.S. Border Patrol Office of Congressional Affairs, December
20, 2012.
\40\ 2012 data from U.S. Border Patrol Office of Legislative
Affairs, November 8, 2012; fiscal year 2006 data from DHS Congressional
Budget Justification 2006; 2005 data from GAO, ``Border Security: Key
Unresolved Issues Justify Reevaluation of Border Surveillance
Technology Program,'' GAO-06-295, February 2006.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Alien Detention \41\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\41\ For a fuller discussion, see CRS Report RL32369, Immigration-
Related Detention: Current Legislative Issues, by Alison Siskin.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
DHS's detention system has been strengthened in two main ways since
2006. First, funded detention bed space has grown by 63%, from 20,800
beds in fiscal year 2006 to 34,000 beds in fiscal year 2012.\42\ The
average daily detention population has also grown by a similar
proportion during these years, from 19,409 to 32,953. Second, under a
policy announced in 2005 and implemented in August 2006, DHS now
detains 100% of removable non-Mexicans apprehended at the border until
their final removal orders.\43\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\42\ Ibid.
\43\ CBP, ``DHS Secretary Announces End to `Catch and Release' on
Southern Border,'' http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/admin/c1_archive/
messages/end_catch_release.xml.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Enforcement with Consequences \44\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\44\ For a fuller discussion, see CRS Report R42138, Border
Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry, by Marc R.
Rosenblum.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Historically, most Mexican aliens apprehended at the Southwest
Border were permitted to voluntarily return to Mexico. Since 2005,
under a set of policies known as ``enforcement with consequences,'' CBP
systematically has limited the number of aliens released on bond or
allowed to voluntarily return to Mexico. Instead, to the extent that
resources permit, the agency subjects an increasing proportion of
aliens apprehended at the border to one or more of the following
``high-consequence'' forms of enforcement: Formal removal (including
but not limited to standard removal proceedings, expedited removal, and
reinstatement of removal),\45\ criminal charges (including under
expedited judicial processing through the Operation Streamline
program),\46\ and remote and lateral repatriation through the Alien
Transfer Exit Program (ATEP) and the Mexican Interior Repatriation
Program (MIRP). As Appendix Figure 2 illustrates, the proportion of
aliens apprehended on the Southwest Border granted voluntary return
fell from 82% (956,470 out of 1,171,428) in 2005 to 41% (134,108 out of
327,577) in fiscal year 2011.\47\ As the figure illustrates, one reason
that the proportion of apprehensions subject to high-consequence
enforcement has risen is that the total number of Southwest Border
apprehensions has fallen sharply. Nonetheless, as the figure also
illustrates, CBP's effort to expand high-consequence enforcement has
resulted in an absolute rise in removals, prosecutions, and lateral/
interior repatriations since 2007, even during a period of falling
border apprehensions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\45\ Aliens formally removed from the United States are ineligible
for a visa for at least 5 years (or 20 years for a second or subsequent
removal), and may be subject to criminal charges and expedited
enforcement practices upon reentry.
\46\ Unauthorized aliens apprehended at the border may face Federal
immigration charges, but historically, most have not been charged with
a crime. A total of 75,118 faced immigration-related charges in
Southwest Border districts in fiscal year 2011 (out of 340,000
apprehensions), up from 35,266 in fiscal year 2005 (out of 1.2 million
apprehensions). See Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts,
``Judicial Business of the U.S. Courts,'' http://www.uscourts.gov/
Statistics/JudicialBusiness.aspx; Southwest Border apprehensions from
U.S. Border Patrol, ``Fiscal Year Apprehensions Statistics.'' For a
fuller discussion of immigration-related criminal charges, see CRS
Report RL32480, Immigration Consequences of Criminal Activity, by
Michael John Garcia.
\47\ These figures should be interpreted as ratios, not as strict
percentages, because aliens may face removal and/or criminal charges in
a year other than the year in which they are apprehended. In addition,
some aliens may face both formal removal and criminal charges, and some
aliens may appear in the data set more than once.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Interior Enforcement Programs \48\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\48\ For a fuller discussion of interior immigration enforcement
programs, see CRS Report R42057, Interior Immigration Enforcement:
Programs Targeting Criminal Aliens, by Marc R. Rosenblum and William
Kandel.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ICE operates four main programs to identify and remove aliens from
within the United States:
Criminal Alien Program (CAP).--CAP officers interview aliens
within prisons and screen them against DHS databases; initiate
removal proceedings against certain aliens prior to the
termination of their criminal sentences, and ensure that aliens
are transferred to ICE and removed from the United States upon
the completion of their sentence.
National Fugitive Operations Program (NFOP).--NFOP pursues
at-large criminal aliens and fugitive aliens,\49\ aliens who
pose a threat to National security and community safety,
members of transnational gangs, child sex offenders, and aliens
with prior convictions for violent crimes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\49\ Fugitive aliens are aliens who have failed to leave the United
States following a final order or removal, or who have failed to report
to ICE after receiving a notice to do so.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
287(g) Program.--Under this program, ICE delegates certain
immigration enforcement functions to State and local law
enforcement agencies pursuant to memorandums of agreement
between such agencies and ICE. ICE trains and supervises the
local officers, who may perform specific functions relating to
the investigation, apprehension, or detention of aliens, during
a pre-determined time frame.
Secure Communities.--Secure Communities is an information-
sharing program between the Departments of Justice and Homeland
Security that uses biometric data to check people's immigration
records following an arrest. When initial checks indicate that
an arrestee may be a removable alien, the ICE field office in
the arresting jurisdiction is notified about the match and may
contact the jurisdiction to initiate removal proceedings.
As Appendix Figure 3 illustrates, ICE's interior enforcement
programs have expanded exponentially in recent years. Whereas CAP and
NFOP identified and administratively arrested (i.e., for removal) a
total of fewer than 11,000 aliens in fiscal year 2004 (with the 287(g)
program making no arrests and Secure Communities not yet created),
Secure Communities alone was responsible for identifying 436,377 aliens
who were potentially subject to removal in fiscal year 2012; and the
other three programs were responsible for 269,765 administrative
arrests.\50\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\50\ CRS Report R42057, Interior Immigration Enforcement: Programs
Targeting Criminal Aliens, by Marc R. Rosenblum and William Kandel.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Worksite Enforcement \51\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\51\ This section is based on CRS Report R40446, Electronic
Employment Eligibility Verification, by Andorra Bruno, and CRS Report
R40002, Immigration-Related Worksite Enforcement: Performance Measures,
by Andorra Bruno.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Section 274A of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)
establishes civil penalties for failing to comply with the INA's
document verification requirements and for knowingly employing an
unauthorized alien; and it provides criminal penalties for employers
engaging in a pattern or practice of knowingly employing unauthorized
aliens. As Appendix Figure 4 illustrates, 385 employers were subject to
civil penalties in 2011, mainly for verification violations, up from
zero in 2006. A total of $10.5 million in administrative fines was
imposed in fiscal year 2011--a figure which exceeds the level of fines
imposed in fiscal year 2000-fiscal year 2009 combined.
As Appendix Figure 5 illustrates, administrative and criminal
arrests in worksite enforcement operations increased between 2006 and
2008, but have declined since then. Worksite administrative arrests,
which are mainly of unauthorized aliens for purposes of immigration
enforcement, declined from 3,667 people arrested in fiscal year 2006 to
1,471 people arrested in fiscal year 2011. Worksite criminal arrests,
which may be of unauthorized aliens charged with criminal violations or
of citizens or lawful aliens charged with a pattern or practice of
illegal hiring or with related criminal activities, were essentially
flat, falling from 716 people in fiscal year 2006 to 713 people in
fiscal year 2011. Within these numbers, there is some evidence that ICE
in recent years has placed greater emphasis on arresting owners,
managers, and corporate officials, rather than non-managerial
employees.\52\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\52\ For a fuller discussion, see CRS Report R40002, Immigration-
Related Worksite Enforcement: Performance Measures, by Andorra Bruno.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Other changes since 2006 related to worksite enforcement concern
the E-Verify electronic verification system. Improvements to E-Verify,
along with Federal and State-level requirements that certain employers
use the program,\53\ have led to higher participation rates in the E-
Verify program (see Appendix Figure 6). As figure 6 illustrates,
participation in E-Verify grew from 5,272 employers representing 22,710
hiring sites on January 31, 2006 to 402,295 employers representing more
than 1.2 million hiring sites on September 30, 2012. Between fiscal
year 2007 and fiscal year 2012, the number of E-Verify queries
increased more than six-fold, from 3.3 million to 21 million. For
comparison purposes, there were about 50 million non-farm hires in the
United States in 2011, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics.\54\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\53\ On State-level E-Verify requirements, see CRS Report R41991,
State and Local Restrictions on Employing Unauthorized Aliens, by Kate
M. Manuel.
\54\ U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, ``Job
Openings and Labor Turnover--January 2012,'' news release, March 13,
2012, http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/jolts_03132012.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
gaps in border security and immigration enforcement
Based on this review, where are the remaining gaps in border
security and immigration enforcement? While a comprehensive answer to
this question is beyond the scope of this testimony, comparing across
the different border zones and looking at resources deployed at borders
vs. elsewhere throughout the enforcement system leads to the following
observations:
Since 2002, far more resources have been devoted to
enforcement between ports of entry than to enforcement and
trade and travel facilitation at ports of entry or worksite
enforcement. This comparison appears to hold across several
different categories of comparison: Personnel, appropriations,
technology acquisitions, etc. Little is known about illegal
flows through ports of entry, or how such flows are affected by
tougher enforcement between the ports.
While significant progress has been made to implement parts
of the US-VISIT biometric entry-exit system by deploying
biometric technology to virtually all ports of entry, most
Canadian and Mexican nationals and most U.S. lawful permanent
residents are not required to participate in US-VISIT at land
ports of entry. In addition, CBP does not routinely collect
biometric exit data from any departing travelers, and does not
collect any data from travelers departing at land port of
entry. While biographic data arguably allows DHS to track visa
overstayers traveling by air and sea, no such system exists for
land travelers.
With an estimated 8 million unauthorized aliens in the
workforce in 2010 \55\ and just a few hundred employers
arrested or fined annually for immigration violations, the
threat of worksite enforcement so far has not appeared to be an
effective deterrent to illegal hiring.\56\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\55\ See CRS Report R41207, Unauthorized Aliens in the United
States, by Andorra Bruno.
\56\ The legacy Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
reported on the number of agent work-years devoted to worksite
enforcement, but ICE does not report this information.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Although a growing proportion of newly-hired workers are
screened through the E-Verify system, the great majority of
employers still do not use the system. Moreover, according to
the most recent research on E-Verify accuracy rates, E-Verify
appears to erroneously confirm about half of the unauthorized
workers who are processed through the system, mainly because
the system is vulnerable to identity fraud.\57\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\57\ For a fuller discussion, see CRS Report R40446, Electronic
Employment Eligibility Verification, by Andorra Bruno.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ASSESSMENT OF THE STATE OF BORDER SECURITY AND CONCLUDING COMMENTS
How have these investments at the border and elsewhere affected
illegal immigration inflows? Placed in a historical perspective, CBP's
shift from low- to high-consequence enforcement mechanisms represents a
dramatic departure from previous border practices. Arguably, the most
significant change in the U.S. immigration enforcement system in recent
years is the implementation of Secure Communities, which has
exponentially increased DHS' ability to identify removable aliens
within the United States.
DHS enforcement data indicate that total apprehensions of
unauthorized aliens in fiscal year 2011 (641,633) was about one-third
the level of apprehensions in 2000 (1,814,729) and about half the level
it was in 2006 (1,206,457). Apprehensions at the Southwest Border
(364,768 in fiscal year 2012) were up slightly from 2011, but also
remained at historically low levels. DHS estimates that the
unauthorized population residing in the United States has fallen from
about 12.4 million in 2007 to about 11.5 million in 2011.\58\ And the
Pew Hispanic Center estimates that net unauthorized migration from
Mexico has fallen to about zero, or that outflows may now exceed
inflows.\59\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\58\ CRS Report RL33874, Unauthorized Aliens Residing in the United
States: Estimates Since 1986, by Ruth Ellen Wasem.
\59\ Jeffrey Passel, D'Vera Cohn and Ana Gonzalez-Barrera, ``Net
Migration from Mexico Falls to Zero--and Perhaps Less,'' Washington,
DC: Pew Hispanic Center, May 3, 2012.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To what extent is the apparent drop in illegal inflows a function
of the enhanced enforcement efforts and spending described above?
Answering this question is difficult because many new enforcement
measures have coincided with the U.S. economic downturn and with
relatively robust growth and favorable demographic conditions in Mexico
and other countries of origin. And the effects of Secure Communities
and certain consequence delivery programs may be too recent to have
been registered in some enforcement data. Nonetheless, some recent
research suggests that enforcement efforts likely help explain this
downturn, particularly in recent years.\60\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\60\ Ibid. For a fuller discussion, see U.S. Congress, House
Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Border and Maritime
Security, Measuring Border Security: U.S. Border Patrol's New Strategic
Plan and the Path Forward, testimony of Marc R. Rosenblum, 112th
Congress, 2nd session, May 8, 2012. Also see Manuela Angelucci, ``U.S.
Border Enforcement and the Net Flow of Mexican Illegal Migration,''
Economic Development and Cultural Change, 60, 2 (2012):311-357.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
One recent study sought to disentangle these factors by combining
administrative enforcement data with community-level economic
indicators in migrant-sending and -receiving communities. The authors
of the study reported preliminary findings that 40% of the reduction in
illegal inflows between fiscal year 2004 and fiscal year 2010 was due
to a stronger Mexican economy, 30% was due to the weaker U.S. economy,
and 30% was due to increased U.S. border enforcement.\61\ Detailed
results are not available, however, because DHS has not cleared for
publication the administrative data used in the paper.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\61\ See Scott Borger, Gordon Hanson, and Bryan Roberts ``The
Decision to Emigrate From Mexico,'' presentation at the Society of
Government Economists annual conference, November 6, 2012.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Better border metrics may contribute in important ways to the
immigration debate by providing additional information about the state
of border security and about the effectiveness of different enforcement
strategies. These are critical questions given the trade-offs Congress
and DHS face between investing additional resources at the border
versus within the interior of the United States, and at ports of entry
versus between the ports, among other choices. Clear border metrics may
also offer insight into returns on future enforcement investments, and
what level of security realistically can be obtained at the border in
the absence of broader immigration reforms.
APPENDIX: TABLES AND FIGURES TABLE 1.--DHS IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT APPROPRIATIONS, FISCAL YEAR 2006-FISCAL YEAR 2012
[Dollars in millions]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CBP ICE
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- E-Verify
Fiscal Year Gross Between Air and Gross US-VISIT (USCIS)
Total At POE POE BSFIT Marine Total ERO
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2006................................................. $7,891 $1,605 $1,778 $115 $653 $4,224 $1,358 $337 N/A
2007................................................. 9,302 1,860 2,278 1,188 778 3,483 1,984 362 $114
2008................................................. 10,808 2,279 3,075 1,225 797 5,581 2,381 475 60
2009................................................. 11,948 2,561 3,501 875 800 5,948 2,481 300 100
2010................................................. 11,765 2,750 3,587 714 862 5,822 2,546 374 137
2011................................................. 11,174 2,913 3,583 574 801 5,835 2,618 335 103
2012................................................. 11,651 2,904 3,620 400 792 5,862 2,751 307 102
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total.......................................... 74,539 16,872 21,422 5,091 5,483 36,755 16,119 2,490 616
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sources.--CRS Reports R42644, R41982, R41189, R40642, RL34482, RL34004, and RL33428.
Notes.--Fiscal year 2006-fiscal year 2012 data include supplemental appropriations and rescissions. Gross totals for CBP and ICE include fees, trust
funds, and mandatory appropriations. POE means ports of entry. BSFIT refers to the Border Security Fencing, Infrastructure, and Technology account.
The BSFIT account was established in fiscal year 2007; fiscal year 2006 data are for appropriations to the SBInet program for tactical infrastructure
and border technology. ERO refers to ICE's Enforcement and Removal Operations Program, which was known as the Detention and Removal Program prior to
2011. US-VISIT refers to the U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology program. E-Verify (formerly known as Basic Pilot and as the
Employment Eligibility Verification program) was funded for the first time in fiscal year 2007. Data for enforcement at POEs, enforcement between
POEs, and ERO are for relevant salaries and expenses (S&E) accounts within CBP and ICE. Data for BSFIT, US-VISIT, and E-Verify are for total
appropriations to those programs within CBP, the National Protection Programs Directorate , and USCIS, respectively. Data for Air and Marine include
the Air and Marine acquisitions account as well as Air and Marine S&E appropriations.
TABLE 2.--CBP PERSONNEL BY LOCATION
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Border Patrol Agents CBP Officers
------------------------------------------------------------------ Total CBP
Fiscal Year Northern Northern Border
Total Border SW Border Total Border SW Border Personnel
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2004............................... 10,819 979 9,506 18,110 3,423 4,771 18,679
2005............................... 11,264 988 9,891 18,134 3,351 4,733 19,003
2006............................... 12,349 919 11,032 18,031 3,293 4,760 20,004
2007............................... 14,925 1,098 13,297 18,452 3,258 4,979 22,632
2008............................... 17,499 1,363 15,442 19,776 3,619 5,144 22,568
2009............................... 20,119 1,887 17,408 21,339 4,028 5,660 28,983
2010............................... 20,558 2,263 17,535 20,687 3,796 5,477 29,071
2011............................... 21,444 2,237 18,506 20,582 3,710 5,551 30,004
2012............................... 21,394 2,206 18,516 21,790 3,668 6,453 30,843
2013 (request)..................... 21,370 2,212 18,462 21,775 3,662 6,444 30,780
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source.--CBP Office of Congressional Affairs, January 9, 2013.
Notes.--Border Patrol agent and DBP officer total personnel numbers are based on all employees, including those
posted at locations other than the Northern and Southwest Borders. Total CBP border personnel is defined as
the sum of Border Patrol agents and CBP officers posted to Southwest and Northern Borders. Fiscal year 2013
data are based on statutory floors and end-of-year requirements, and reflect minimum expected staffing levels
for fiscal year 2013.
Mrs. Miller. Thank you very much.
And I thank all of you--all the witnesses for their
testimony. I was sort of struck as I was listening to you all
that on this side of the table we have the front-liners that
are out there each and every day doing everything that you
possibly can with the resources that we give you to accomplish
your mission and the task that you have been given, and how
professionally and extraordinarily well you all do that.
Then sort of here on this side, including all of us, I
guess, is sort of the--I don't want to say we are all
bureaucrats, but we are all looking for measurement systems,
and matrices, and statistics, and various kinds of things, and
we are not on the front line every day and we don't see
everything that you see. Sometimes we forget about--the admiral
was just mentioning about the loss of life with the panga boat
situation, et cetera. I shouldn't say we forget; we don't think
about it all the time as we are trying to measure border
security or various other kinds of things.
But suffice it to say that we are all on the same team, of
course, and I look at a hearing like this and as a--personally,
as a Member of Congress, just trying to understand how we can
do what the American people want us to do, what our
Constitutional obligations are to secure a border, and part of
that, as a Member of Congress, is making sure we resource you
to the capabilities that we have, understanding that the
constraints--terrible fiscal constraints that we currently
have. But what we can do better.
So with that, I guess I would start with a question to Ms.
Gambler. I was listening to your testimony about the
apprehension rate as a component of measurement and statistics,
et cetera, and you mentioned that the--you were talking about
all of the various numbers which indicated that the flow has
significantly declined. Yet, your other report I was trying to
look at last night there said that the apprehension rate was
basically static, that it had gone from just 62 to 64 percent.
Keeping in mind the incredible amounts of resources that we
have put down there--and again, I understand that the
apprehension rate, as the chief said, is just--it is just one
part of it--just one part of how you measure what a secure
border is, what it looks like, et cetera. I think we had
367,000 apprehensions last year. We thought about 100,000 got
through, if those were the correct numbers--something like
that.
So I would just say, how do you explain that even though we
have put all of these resources, if you try to look at it from
a percentage of how we are doing, only having a 2 percent
differential? But, could you help me with that?
Ms. Gambler. Sure. The data that you are mentioning
Chairwoman Miller, are for the Tucson sector in particular. So
in looking at fiscal year 2006 to 2011, the apprehension rate
for that sector remained relatively the same, 62 percent to 64
percent. The apprehension rate in the other Southwest Border
sectors varied over time. We provided the Tucson sector rate as
an example in the report because it is a high-traffic sector.
In terms of what that means, the apprehension rate is
really looking at the percentage of known illegal entries--
entrants who are apprehended, who are arrested by the Border
Patrol. Their ability to make those arrests can be impacted by
various factors, including where the agents are deployed, what
the terrain is like in the varying sectors. So some of those
factors sort of explain what the rates are and explain
differences in the rates across the sectors.
Mrs. Miller. Okay. I appreciate that.
Chief, talking about the apprehension rate, I guess I would
pick up on that, and you mentioned maybe it is not the best way
but it is certainly one way that we measure border security.
Perhaps we should use something other than apprehensions as a
better way of measuring border security.
I would also like you, if you could, to expand on your
goal--I was making some notes here--you talked about 90
percent. What does a secure border look like?--and you
mentioned about a 90 percent effectiveness rate would be
optimal for us, which I think is a very admirable goal. I mean,
hardly anyone ever gets to 100 percent of anything. If we could
get to 90 percent we would feel pretty darn good, I think,
here.
But, you know, you mentioned, for instance, some of the
various significant areas of illegal activity try to get to 90
percent. Would you look at a 90 percent goal across all of our
borders or are you thinking about particular sectors?--Tucson,
or the Rio Grande, or--maybe you could flesh that out a bit for
me as well, if you could, Chief.
Mr. Fisher. Yes, ma'am. I would be happy to.
First of all, 90 percent really wouldn't make sense
everywhere. Let me give you a particular area of the border and
you can pick a particular spot where--let's say, for instance,
we know--because we have technology that is out there; we can
see it--that on average, on every day, for instance, there
would only be four people coming across. If over a period of
time we were catching three out of four, if we just said, well
90 percent is the standard, it wouldn't really necessarily make
sense to start putting more and more resources over there just
to arbitrarily get to a 90 percent.
The reason why I qualified it into areas of significant
illegal activity as a goal is because when we start
differentiating sections of the border and start
differentiating areas where we have less activity versus more
activity, we want to make sure that we are applying those
resources into those areas of high activity, which, in part of
the calculation, gives us a higher-risk area.
So theoretically, what we want to be able to do is move
those resources over there, optimize the capability in terms of
people--the Border Patrol agents that are out there to close
the last 50 feet--make sure the detection capability is out
there in the right locations, and be able, as a goal, to
achieve 90 percent.
You are absolutely right, Madam Chairwoman. When you look
at the smuggling organizations as a business, when--they are in
the smuggling business to make money. When we start applying
our resources and we are starting to impact their ability to do
that, their profit margin--so we may start off by perhaps
apprehending 40 percent of their commodity, whether it is
people or whether that is narcotics, and as we start applying
resources over time we start incrementally increasing the
effectiveness.
In other words, we are apprehending a higher proportion of
those things that they are smuggling. As we move to 50 and 60
and 70 percent there is a business decision that generally is
made at that point. The smuggling organization is no longer
able to make money and they will then displace to other areas
along the border or change some of their tactics, techniques,
and procedures.
We put 90 percent as a goal because there are sections
along the border where we have not only achieved, we have been
able to sustain 90 percent effectiveness. So it is a realistic
goal but I wouldn't necessarily and just arbitrarily say 90
percent is across-the-board because there are other locations
where there is a lot less activity and there won't be a lot of
activity simply because of terrain features, for instance.
So where it makes sense we want to go ahead and start
parsing that out within those corridors and within those
specific sectors.
Mrs. Miller. Thanks very much, Chief.
I am going to recognize my Ranking Member, since we want to
try to all keep to our 5 minutes here, because we have a pretty
hard stop time at noon this afternoon. So with that, I would
recognize our Ranking Member.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the Chairwoman. I also, Madam
Chairwoman, would like to ask unanimous consent that my entire
opening statement be put in the record.
Mrs. Miller. Without objection.
[The statement of Ranking Member Jackson Lee follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Sheila Jackson Lee
February 26, 2013
Today, I am pleased the subcommittee is meeting to examine the way
forward on border security.
While I welcome the discussion, I want to caution against the
notion that our Nation's borders can ever be fully and finally secured.
The border is always changing and evolving.
New threats emerge and we, in turn, have to find new ways to
respond.
In other words, our efforts to secure our borders will always be a
work in progress.
For that reason, we must not tie comprehensive immigration reform
to achieving some arbitrary standard of border security.
Instead, we must move forward on parallel tracks, reforming our
broken immigration system while continuing to work together to achieve
more secure borders.
Over the last several years, Congress has made unprecedented
investments in border security personnel, technology, and resources, to
help DHS do just that.
These investments include:
A roughly 50% increase in total appropriations for DHS's
immigration enforcement and border security-related activities, from
$7.89 billion in fiscal year 2006 to $11.65 billion in fiscal year
2012.
Nearly doubling the total number of U.S. Border Patrol agents--from
10,819 agents in fiscal year 2004 to 21,394 in fiscal year 2012.
A 20% increase in the total number of CBP officers--from 18,110 in
fiscal year 2004 to 21,790 in fiscal year 2012.
More than quadrupling the number of miles of fencing on the
Southern Border, from 139 miles in fiscal year 2006 to 651 miles as of
this year.
Deploying hundreds of new fixed and mobile video surveillance
systems at our Nation's borders.
An increase in the number of ground sensors to detect cross-border
movements to 13,406 in 2012, up from about 11,200 in 2005.
The establishment of an unmanned aerial system (UAS) border
surveillance program. Today, there are 10 UASs patrolling our land and
maritime borders. In 2006, there were none.
Unfortunately, I have serious concerns that, unless Congress acts,
cuts mandated by the sequester would undermine the progress we have
made with these investments.
Under sequestration, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) would have
to absorb more than half a billion dollars in cuts, rendering the
agency unable to maintain current staffing levels of Border Patrol
agents and CBP Officers as mandated by Congress.
Specifically, CBP would have to reduce its work hours by the
equivalent of over 5,000 Border Patrol agents and over 2,750 CBP
Officers.
Staffing reductions would affect the Border Patrol's ability to
secure our borders between the land ports of entry and increase wait
times for passengers and cargo at land, air, and sea ports across the
country.
Similarly, the U.S. Coast Guard would have to curtail air and
surface operations by more than 25 percent, reducing essential missions
including migrant and drug interdiction and port security operations.
This is absolutely unacceptable.
I hope to hear from our CBP and Coast Guard witnesses today about
the effects of the sequester on their ability to carry out their
missions their plans for dealing with these draconian cuts.
Finally, as we discuss ``what a secure border looks like'' today, I
urge my colleagues to be mindful that border security means more than
just securing the Southern Border between the ports of entry.
It also means knowing who or what may be attempting to come across
the vast open places along our comparatively less-monitored Northern
Border.
It means stopping a terrorist intending to cross through a port of
entry on our Northern Border to blow up LAX.
It means interdicting Omar Farouk Abdulmutallab before he boards a
plane headed to Detroit.
It means preventing migrants or narcotics from turning up in
vessels along the coast of California.
And it means knowing who and what is entering our ports and
waterways, whether the coast of South Florida, the Great Lakes, the Rio
Grande, or the Port of Houston.
But I am encouraged by the progress we have made and believe we can
do still more.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I would like to ask unanimous consent that
the document that I have here--statement written by the ACLU
on, ``What does border--secure border look like?'' be submitted
into the record.
Mrs. Miller. Without objection.
[The information follows:]
Statement of the American Civil Liberties Union
February 26, 2013
I. INTRODUCTION
The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) is a Nation-wide, non-
partisan organization of more than a half-million members, countless
additional activists and supporters, and 53 affiliates Nation-wide
dedicated to preserving and defending the fundamental rights of
individuals under the Constitution and laws of the United States. The
ACLU's Washington Legislative Office (WLO) conducts legislative and
administrative advocacy to advance the organization's goal to protect
immigrants' rights, including supporting a roadmap to citizenship for
aspiring Americans. The Immigrants' Rights Project (IRP) of the ACLU
engages in a Nation-wide program of litigation, advocacy, and public
education to enforce and protect the Constitutional and civil rights of
immigrants. The ACLU of New Mexico's Regional Center for Border Rights
(RCBR) addresses civil and human rights violations arising from border-
related immigration policies. RCBR works in conjunction with ACLU
affiliates in California, Arizona, and Texas, as well as immigrants'
rights advocates throughout the border region.
The ACLU submits this statement to the Subcommittee on Border and
Maritime Security of the U.S. House of Representatives' Committee on
Homeland Security on the occasion of its hearing addressing ``What Does
a Secure Border Look Like?'' Our statement aims to provide the
subcommittee with an appraisal of the civil liberties implications of
border security. The ACLU is particularly concerned with attempts to
define border security that fail to take into account the fact that
border security benchmarks in previous immigration reform proposals
have been satisfactorily met. Any proposal for immigration reform
should not be made contingent upon border security escalation, because:
Deployment of additional border security along the U.S.-
Mexico border would be wasteful and unnecessary, with
apprehensions by Customs and Border Protection (CBP) personnel
at their lowest level in 40 years and net migration from Mexico
at zero; and
Spending on the Southwest Border has increased dramatically
over the last decade with virtually no accountability measures,
resulting in civilian deaths at the hands of CBP personnel and
many other civil liberties abuses, including rampant racial
profiling.
At a time of sequestration, when the Federal Government is poised
to cut spending by 8.2 percent, our country can no longer afford to
throw money down the border drain. Congress must not adopt the
conventional wisdom of inadequate border security, nor heed siren calls
for more border enforcement resources. Instead, border security
resources should be guided by principles of fiscal responsibility,
accountability and oversight, and attention to the true needs of border
communities suffering from a wasteful, militarized enforcement regime.
Experts, including from the Department of Homeland Security, agree that
the border is more secure than ever.\1\ Congress should proceed
unimpeded by border security obstacles to the vital task of providing a
roadmap to citizenship for aspiring Americans in a way that advances
our Constitution's principles and American values of family unity and
due process.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Testimony of DHS Secretary Napolitano to the Senate Judiciary
Committee (Feb. 13, 2013), available at http://
www.judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/2-13-13NapolitanoTestimony.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
II. THE PATHWAY TO CITIZENSHIP MUST NOT BE CONTINGENT ON THE FALSE
Metric of a ``completely secure border.'' instead, immigration reform
should end the abusive militarization of border communities.
a. The ``Mini-Industrial Complex'' of Border Spending
Congress should not seek to define a ``secure border'' as an
airtight 2,000-mile border, because this would ignore the fact that
border security benchmarks of prior proposed or enacted legislation (in
2006, 2007, and 2010) have already been met or exceeded.\2\ In the last
decade, the United States has relied heavily on enforcement-only
approaches to address migration, using deterrence-based border security
strategies:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Chen, Greg and Kim, Su. ``Border Security: Moving Beyond Past
Benchmarks,'' American Immigration Lawyers Association, (Jan. 30,
2013). Available at: http://www.aila.org/content/default.aspx?bc=25667/
43061.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. Government has expanded the powers of Federal
authorities by creating ``Constitution-Light'' or
``Constitution-Free'' zones within 100 miles of land and sea
borders, areas in which CBP personnel claim they have authority
that would be unconstitutional in other parts of the country,
despite the fact that two-thirds of the American population
resides within 100 miles of these borders.
Because of ``zero-tolerance'' initiatives like Operation
Streamline,\3\ the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) now
refers more cases for Federal prosecution than the Department
of Justice's (DOJ) law enforcement agencies. Federal prisons
are already 39 percent over capacity, due in large part to
indiscriminate prosecution of individuals for crossing the
border without authorization, often to rejoin their families.
The majority of those sentenced to Federal prison last year
were Hispanics and Latinos, who constitute only 16 percent of
the population, but are now held in large numbers in private
prisons.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ See generally ACLU, ``Operation Streamline Issue Brief.'' (Feb.
25, 2013), available at http://www.aclu.org/immigrants-rights/
operation-streamline-issue-brief.
\4\ U.S. Sentencing Commission, 2011 ANNUAL REPORT, Chapter 5,
available at http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics/
Annual_Reports_and_Sourcebooks/2011/2011_Annual_Report_Chap5.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Since 2003, the U.S. Border Patrol has doubled in size and
now employs more than 21,400 agents, with about 85 percent of
its force deployed at the U.S.-Mexico border.\5\ So many Border
Patrol agents now patrol the Southern Border that if they lined
up equally from Brownsville to San Diego, they would stand in
plain sight of one another (about 10 per mile). This number
does not include the thousands of other DHS officials,
including CBP Office of Field Operations officers and one-
fourth of all Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
personnel deployed at the same border. It also does not include
651 miles of fencing, 333 video surveillance systems, and 9
drones for air surveillance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Meissner, Doris, Kerwin, Donald M., Chishti, Muzaffar, and
Bergeron, Claire. Immigration Enforcement in the United States: The
Rise of a Formidable Machinery, Migration Policy Institute, January
2013. Available at: http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/
enforcementpillars.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
From a fiscal perspective, from fiscal year 2004 to fiscal year
2012, the budget for CBP increased by 94 percent to $11.65 billion, a
leap of $5.65 billion; this following a 20 percent post-9/11 increase
of $1 billion.\6\ By way of comparison, this jump in funding is more
than quadruple the growth rate of NASA's budget and is almost ten times
that of the National Institutes of Health. U.S. taxpayers now spend
more on immigration enforcement agencies ($18 billion) than on the FBI,
DEA, ATF, U.S. Marshals, and Secret Service--combined.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Michele Mittelstadt et al., ``Through the Prism of National
Security: Major Immigration Policy and Program Changes in the Decade
since 9/11.'' (Migration Policy Institute, Aug. 2011), 3, available at
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/FS23_Post-9-11-policy.pdf.
\7\ Migration Policy Institute, Immigration Enforcement, supra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CBP's spending runs directly counter to data on recent and current
migration trends and severely detracts from the true needs of border
security. Over the last decade, apprehensions by the Border Patrol have
declined more than 72 percent (2000-10). At a time when migrant
apprehensions are lower than at any time since the 1970s, wasteful
spending by CBP must be reined in.\8\ In fiscal year 2012, Border
Patrol apprehended on average 18 people per agent.\9\ A weakening U.S.
economy, strengthened enforcement, and a growing Mexican economy have
led to a dramatic decrease in unauthorized migration from Mexico. In
fact, net migration from Mexico is now zero or slightly negative (i.e.,
more people leaving than coming).\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Testimony of DHS Secretary Napolitano to the House Judiciary
Committee (July 19, 2012); DHS Fact Sheet, ``Apprehensions by the U.S.
Border Patrol: 2005--2010.'' (July 2011), available at http://
www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ois-apprehensions-
fs-2005-2010.pdf; see also Jeffrey Passel and D'Vera Cohn, ``U.S.
Unauthorized Immigration Flows Are Down Sharply Since Mid-Decade.''
(Pew Hispanic Center, Sept. 1, 2010), available at http://
pewhispanic.org/reports/report.php?ReportID=126.
\9\ Chen and Kim, ``Border Security,'' supra.
\10\ Philip E. Wolgin and Ann Garcia, ``What Changes in Mexico Mean
for U.S. Immigration Policy.'' (Center for American Progress, Aug. 8,
2011), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/08/
mexico_immigration.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The costs per apprehension vary per sector, but are at an all-time
high. The Yuma, Arizona sector, for example, has seen a 95 percent
decline in apprehensions since 2005 while the number of agents has
tripled.\11\ Each agent was responsible for interdicting just 8
immigrants in 2010, contributing to ballooning per capita costs: Each
migrant apprehension at the border now costs five times more, rising
from $1,400 in 2005 to over $7,500 in 2011.\12\ Indeed, despite Border
Patrol's doubling in size since 2004, overtime costs have amounted to
$1.6 billion over the last 6 years.\13\ Congress should heed House
Appropriations Committee Chairman Hal Rogers' warning about the
irrationality of border spending: ``It is a sort of a mini industrial
complex syndrome that has set in there. And we're going to have to
guard against it every step of the way.''\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ Richard Marosi, ``Plunge in border crossings leaves agents
fighting boredom.'' Los Angeles Times (Apr. 21, 2011).
\12\ Immigration Policy Center, Second Annual DHS Progress Report.
(Apr. 2011), 26, available at http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/sites/
default/files/docs/2011_DHS_Report_041211.pdf.
\13\ ``Border Patrol overtime, staffing up; arrests down.''
Associated Press (Feb. 5, 2012).
\14\ Ted Robbins, ``U.S. Grows an Industrial Complex Along the
Border.'' NPR (Sept. 12, 2012), available at http://www.npr.org/2012/
09/12/160758471/u-s-grows-an-industrial-complex-along-the-border.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
b. Lack of CBP Oversight: Racial Profiling and Excessive Use of Force
Unprecedented investment in border enforcement without
corresponding oversight mechanisms \15\ has led to an increase in human
and civil rights violations, traumatic family separations in border
communities, and racial profiling and harassment of Native Americans,
Latinos, and other people of color--many of them U.S. citizens and some
who have lived in the region for generations. The bipartisan framework
that was proposed by the ``Gang of Eight'' Senators in late January
rightly recognizes a need for strengthened prohibitions against racial
profiling and inappropriate use of force. In addition, more must be
done to transform border enforcement by prioritizing investment in
robust and independent external oversight that includes input from
border communities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ Tim Steller, ``Border Patrol faces little accountability,''
Arizona Daily Star (Dec. 9, 2012), available at: http://azstarnet.com/
news/local/border/border-patrol-faces-little-accountability/
article_7899cf6d-3f17-53bd-80a8-ad214b384221.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Stressed border communities are a vital component of the half-
trillion dollars in trade between the United States and Mexico, and the
devastating effects of militarization on them must be addressed in
immigration reform. The U.S.-Canada border has experienced an increase
in border enforcement resources as well, with Northern Border residents
often complaining about Border Patrol agents conducting roving patrols
near schools and churches and asking passengers for their documents on
trains and buses that are traveling far from border crossings. The ACLU
of Washington State has brought a class action lawsuit to end the
Border Patrol's practice of stopping vehicles and interrogating
occupants without legal justification. One of the plaintiffs in the
case is an African-American corrections officer and part-time police
officer who was pulled over for no expressed reason and interrogated
about his immigration status while wearing his corrections uniform.\16\
A local business owner said he's ``never seen anything like this. Why
don't they do it to the white people, to see if they're from Canada or
something?''\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ Complaint available at http://www.aclu-wa.org/sites/default/
files/attachments/2012-04-26--Complaint_0.pdf.
\17\ William Yardley, ``In Far Northwest, a New Border Focus on
Latinos.'' New York Times (May 29, 2012) (emphasis added), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/29/us/hard-by-canada-border-fears-of-
crackdown-on-latino-immigration.html?pagewanted=all.
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CBP also aids and abets State and local police racial profiling
practices, ensnaring U.S. citizens. In February 2011, Tiburcio Briceno,
a naturalized U.S. citizen, was stopped by a Michigan State Police
officer for a traffic violation while driving in a registered company
van. Rather than issue him a ticket, the officer interrogated Briceno
about his immigration status, apparently based on Briceno's Mexican
national origin and limited English. Dissatisfied with Briceno's valid
Michigan chauffeur's license, the officer summoned CBP, impounded
Briceno's car, and told him he would be deported. Briceno says he
reiterated again and again that he was a U.S. citizen, and offered to
show his social security card but the officer refused to look.
Briceno was released after CBP officers arrived and confirmed that
he was telling the truth. ``Becoming a U.S. citizen was a proud moment
for me,'' Briceno has since reflected. ``When I took the oath to this
country, I felt that I was part of something bigger than myself; I felt
that I was a part of a community and that I was finally equal to every
other American. Although I still believe in the promise of equality, I
know that I have to speak out to make sure it's a reality for me, my
family and my community. No American should be made to feel like a
criminal simply because of the color of their skin or language
abilities.''\18\
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\18\ ACLU of Michigan, ``ACLU Urges State Police to Investigate
Racial Profiling Incident.'' (Mar. 21, 2012) (emphasis added),
available at http://www.aclumich.org/issues/racial-justice/2012-03/
1685.
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In addition to racial profiling at and beyond the border, incidents
of excessive use of force are on the rise, with at least 19 people
killed by CBP officials since January 2010,\19\ including five U.S.
citizens and six individuals who were standing in Mexico when fatally
shot. On April 20, 2012, PBS's Need to Know \20\ program explored the
trend of CBP's excessive use of force, with a focus on Anastasio
Hernandez Rojas. New footage depicting a dozen CBP personnel
surrounding and repeatedly applying a Taser and other force to Mr.
Hernandez--who was shown to be handcuffed and prostrate on the ground
contrary to the agency's incident reporting--shocked viewers. The San
Diego coroner classified Mr. Hernandez's death as a homicide, noting in
addition to a heart attack: ``several loose teeth; bruising to his
chest, stomach, hips, knees, back, lips, head and eyelids; five broken
ribs; and a damaged spine.'' CBP's version of events described a
``combative'' person: Force was needed to ``subdue the individual and
maintain officer safety.'' Spotlighting another CBP fatality, 3 weeks
ago the Arizona Republic reported that ``An autopsy report raises new
questions about the death of a Mexican youth shot by at least one U.S.
Border Patrol officer four months ago in Nogales. The Border Patrol has
maintained that Jose Antonio Elena Rodriguez, 16, was throwing rocks
over the border fence at agents on the U.S. side when an agent fired
across the international border the night of Oct. 10. But entry and
exit wounds suggest that all but one of as many as 11 bullets that
struck the boy entered from behind, according to the report by two
medical examiners working for the Sonora Attorney General's
Office.''\21\
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\19\ Jorge A. Solis, 28, shot and killed, Douglas, AZ (Jan. 4,
2010); Victor Santillan de la Cruz, 36, shot and killed, Laredo, TX
(March 31, 2010); Anastasio Hernandez Rojas, 32, tortured to death, San
Diego, CA (May 28, 2010); Sergio Adrian H. Huereca, 15, shot and
killed, El Paso, TX (June 7, 2010); Juan Mendez, 18, shot and killed,
Eagle Pass, TX; Ramses Barron Torres, 17, shot and killed, Nogales,
Mexico (Jan. 5, 2011); Roberto Perez Perez, beaten while in detention
and died due to lack of proper medical care, San Diego, CA (Jan. 13,
2011); Alex Martinez, 30, shot and killed, Whatcom County, WA (Feb. 27,
2011); Carlos Lamadrid, 19, shot and killed, Douglas, AZ (March 21,
2011); Jose Alfredo Yanez Reyes, 40, shot and killed, Tijuana, Mexico
(June 21, 2011); Gerardo Rico Lozana, 20, shot and killed near Corpus
Christi, TX (Nov. 3, 2011); Byron Sosa Orellana, 28, shot and killed
near Sells, AZ (Dec. 6, 2011); Alexander Martin, 24, died in car
explosion that may have been caused by Border Patrol tasers (March 15,
2012); Charles Robinson, 75, shot and killed, Jackman, ME (June 23,
2012); Juan Pablo Perez Santillan, 30, shot and killed on the banks of
the Rio Grande, near Matamoros, Mexico (July 7, 2012); Guillermo
Arevalo Pedroza, 36, shot and killed, Nuevo Laredo, Mexico (Sept. 3,
2012); Valerie Tachiquin-Alvarado, 32, shot and killed, Chula Vista, CA
(Sept. 28, 2012); Jose Antonio Elena Rodriguez, 16, shot and killed,
Nogales, Sonora (Oct. 11, 2012); and Margarito Lopez Morelos, 19, shot
and killed, Baboquivari Mountains, AZ (Dec. 2, 2012). This count does
not include Border Patrol agent Nicholas J. Ivie, 30, who was fatally
shot by friendly fire near Bisbee, AZ (Oct. 2, 2012).
\20\ PBS Need to Know special, aired April 20, 2012 and entitled
``Crossing the line at the border,'' available at http://www.pbs.org/
wnet/need-to-know/security/video-first-look-crossing-the-line/13597/.
\21\ Bob Ortega, ``New theory on Border Patrol killing of boy.''
Arizona Republic (Feb. 7, 2013), available at http://www.azcentral.com/
news/articles/20130206border-patrol-killing-boy-new-theory.html.
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After a Congressional letter signed by 16 Members was sent to DHS
Secretary Janet Napolitano, DHS Acting Inspector General Charles
Edwards, and Attorney General Eric Holder,\22\ on July 12, 2012, the
Associated Press reported that a Federal grand jury was investigating
the death of Anastasio Hernandez.\23\ Border Patrol's use-of-force
incidents have attracted international scrutiny with the government of
Mexico,\24\ the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,\25\ and the
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights \26\
weighing in.
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\22\ Congressional sign-on letter sent May 10, 2012 to Secretary
Janet Napolitano available at: http://serrano.house.gov/sites/
serrano.house.gov/files/DHSletter.pdf; letter sent to DHS Inspector
General Charles Edwards available at: http://serrano.house.gov/sites/
serrano.house.gov/files/DHSIGletter.pdf; letter sent to DOJ Attorney
General Eric Holder available at: http://serrano.house.gov/sites/
serrano.house.gov/files/DoJLetter.pdf.
\23\ Grand Jury Probes Anastasio Hernandez Border Death, available
http://www.kpbs.org/news/2012/jul/12/grand-jury-probes-border-death/.
\24\ See, e.g., Bret Stephens, ``The Paradoxes of Felipe
Calderon.'' Wall Street Journal (Sept. 28, 2012), available at http://
online.wsj.com/article/SB1000087239639044391610457802244-
0624610104.html?mod=hp_opinion.
\25\ See ``IACHR condemns the recent death of Mexican national by
U.S. Border Patrol Agents.'' (July 24, 2012), available at http://
www.oas.org/en/iachr/media_center/PReleases/2012/093.asp.
\26\ See U.N. Radio, ``United States urged to probe deaths of
Mexican migrants at border.'' (May 29, 2012), available at http://
www.unmultimedia.org/radio/english/2012/05/united-states-urged-to-
probe-deaths-of-mexican-migrants-at-border/ .
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While the Federal Government has the authority to control our
Nation's borders and to regulate immigration, CBP officials must do so
in compliance with National and international legal norms and
standards. As employees of the Nation's largest law enforcement agency,
CBP personnel should be trained and held to the highest professional
law enforcement standards. Systemic, robust, and permanent oversight
and accountability mechanisms for CBP should be integral to border
security measures. Congress must seize this moment for immigration
reform to transform border enforcement in a manner that is fiscally
responsible, enlists border communities in defining their true needs
and upholds Constitutional rights and American values.
III. CONCLUSION
The ACLU urges Congress to prioritize the reduction of abuses in
the currently-oppressive immigration and border enforcement system
which has cost $219 billion in today's dollars since 1986.\27\ By
jettisoning proposals for escalated border security that clash with
civil liberties and thereby creating space for genuine immigration
reform, Congress can ensure that the roadmap to citizenship for
aspiring Americans is a generous one, free of unjust obstacles. Members
would thereby maximize the historic expansion of Constitutional
freedoms for spouses, friends, parishioners, and neighbors in our
communities, who contribute every day to their successes and deserve
full and prompt citizenship.
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\27\ Robbins, ``U.S. Grows,'' supra.
Ms. Jackson Lee. And a statement of the American
Immigration Lawyers Association, ``Border Security: Moving
Beyond Past Benchmarks,'' be put into the record?
Mrs. Miller. Without objection.
[The information follows:]
Report by the American Immigration Lawyers Association
Border Security: Moving Beyond Past Benchmarks
SUMMARY
For years, but especially after 9/11, the calls for border security
have been increasing with many lawmakers demanding that the border must
be secured. The idea has gained traction, and recent comprehensive
immigration bills have been loaded with border security measures that
include more border agents, fencing, and high-tech surveillance, and
the expanded use of detention. Proposals, such as the 2007 Senate
reform bill (S. 1639), went further by requiring that specific
benchmarks, ``triggers,'' be met before legalization could take
place.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Text of S. 1639--Kennedy (D-MA) & Specter (R-PA) http://
www.aila.org/content/default.aspx?docid=22682;.
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Though none of these proposals became law, a resource-heavy
approach has been implemented and has resulted in a dramatic build-up
of border security and a massive expenditure of resources focused on
the following: (1) Achieving ``operational control'' of the border; (2)
Increasing border personnel; (3) Increasing border infrastructure and
surveillance; and (4) Increasing penalties for border crossers,
including prosecution and incarceration. In fiscal year 2012, Customs
and Border Protection (CBP) alone was funded at $11.7 billion, an
increase of 64% since fiscal year 2006.\2\ In 2010, Congress passed a
special border security bill providing an additional $600 million on
top of the amount already appropriated.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ DHS, Budget-in-Brief, FY 2007 http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/
assets/Budget_BIB-FY2007.pdf; DHS, Budget-in-Brief, FY 2012.
\3\ Text of Public Law 111-230. http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-
111publ230/pdf/PLAW-111publ230.pdf ($305.9 of the $600 million went to
CBP to fund the hiring of new personnel, including 1,000 new Border
Patrol agents and 250 CBP officers, greater use of UAVs, and new
communications equipment. http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-250_162-
6768934.html).
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This report examines past immigration reform proposals,
specifically the 2006, 2007, and 2010 Senate bills (S. 2611, S. 1639,
and S. 3932), and evaluates the proposals in these four areas:
Operational control, border personnel, border infrastructure and
technology, and detention.
Missing from these proposals is a proven way to measure when the
border is reasonably secure. For example, lawmakers call for dramatic
increases in spending on border agents without stating how many more
personnel are actually needed to ensure border security. The 2007 bill
proposed raising the total number of border agents to 20,000, but never
explained why that number of agents is necessary. In fact, the number
of agents on the border has increased steadily for the past several
years. In 2011, there were 21,444 border agents, nearly double the
number in 2006. Despite these increases, which exceed the number
proposed in the 2007 bill, calls for more border agents persist.
Often-cited indicators of progress by CBP are the number of
apprehensions of unauthorized entrants, the level of violence at border
towns, and the seizures of contraband. In recent testimonies before
Congress, CBP reported significant achievements in each of these areas.
Apprehensions at the border are down more than 80 percent from peak
numbers in 2000. FBI crime reports from 2010 show that violent crimes
in Southwest Border States have dropped an average of 40 percent in the
last 20 years.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Josiah McC. Heyman, ``Guns, Drugs, and Money,'' Immigration
Policy Center. (September 2011) http://immigrationpolicy.org/
perspectives/guns-drugs-and-money-tackling-real-threats-border-
security.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Yet, the calls for increased border security continue, even at a
time when border apprehensions are at the lowest rate in more than 40
years. Border agents are completing only a few apprehensions per agent
per week. Also, some border agents have been aiding other law
enforcement agencies with tasks unrelated to their mission.\5\
Immigration reform proposals need to identify clearer goals for border
security and ways to measure success rather than simply increasing
resources.
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\5\ Lisa Graybill, ``Border Patrol Agents as Interpreters Along the
Northern Border: Unwise Policy, Illegal Practice,'' Immigration Policy
Center. (September 2012) http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/sites/
default/files/docs/borderpatrolagentsasinterpreters.pdf; (The report
documents CBP participation in providing translation and responding to
911 emergency assistance calls); November 21, 2012--CBP released
guidance on providing language-assistance, which directs CBP to
redirect requests for assistance based solely on a need for language
translation. http://foiarr.cbp.gov/streamingWord.asp?i=1233; Richard
Marosi, ``Plunge in Border Crossings Leaves Agents Fighting Boredom,''
Los Angeles Times, Apr. 21, 2011;.
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operational control--an ``outdated measure'' \6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Testimony of Michael Fisher, House Homeland Security Committee,
Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security, ``Securing our Borders--
Operational Control and the Path Forward.'' (February 15, 2011) http://
www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/con_res/ref_rec/congressional_test/
fisher_testifies/chief_fisher.xml (``Since 2004, CBP has used
`operational control' to describe the security of our borders. However,
this measure did not accurately represent the Border Patrol's
significant investments in personnel, technology, and resources or the
efforts of other DHS Components who are engaged in border security such
as ICE and the U.S. Coast Guard. Operational Control as applied by the
U.S. Border Patrol is the ability to detect, identify, classify, and
then respond to and resolve illegal entries along our U.S. Borders . .
. The Border Patrol is currently taking steps to replace this outdated
measure with performance metrics that more accurately depict the state
of border security.'')
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The 2007 Senate bill (S. 1639) required DHS to demonstrate
operational control of the border between the United States and Mexico.
Recent bills and Congressional reports have continued to call for
operational control.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Congress, in the fiscal year 2012 House Homeland Security
Appropriations Conference Report: (``[committee] has consistently
directed that CBP employ a comprehensive strategy for achieving
operational control of the border, including identifying and utilizing
the right mix of people, infrastructure and technology.''); H.R. 1091
Unlawful Border Entry Prevention Act--Hunger (R-CA) (112th) http://
www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/hr1091/text--(calls for a plan to
achieve operational control of border experiencing at least 40 percent
increase in apprehensions and directs DOD to deploy additional National
Guard until DHS certifies operational control of the border).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
``Operational control,'' as defined by the Secure Fence Act of
2006, sets an unrealistic expectation that the border can be 100
percent sealed.\8\ The GAO, in its testimony before Congress, noted
that ``[r]esources that would be needed to absolutely prevent every
single incursion would be something probably out of reasonable
consideration.'' As of February 2011, the GAO reported that the
Southwest Border is at 44 percent operational control, with nearly two-
thirds of the remaining 56 percent at the ``monitored'' level, and the
rest at ``low-level monitored.''\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Secure Fence Act of 2006: (`` `operational control' means the
prevention of all unlawful entries into the United States, including
entries by terrorists, other unlawful aliens, instruments of terrorism,
narcotics, and other contraband.'') http://www.govtrack.us/congress/
bills/109/hr6061/text.
\9\ GAO Report, ``Border Security: Preliminary Observations on
Border Control Measures for the Southwest Border'' (February 2011)
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11374t.pdf. See also Edward Alden,
``Immigration and Border Control,'' Cato Journal Vol. 32, No. 1 (Winter
2012) http://www.cato.org/pubs/journal/cj32n1/cj32n1-8.pdf (``Evading
border enforcement has become more difficult, more expensive, and more
uncertain than before. But border control will always remain imperfect;
it is not possible for the United States to create a perfectly secure
border, and that should not be the goal.'')
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Achieving absolute border control, whereby no single individual
crosses into a State without that State's authorization, is impossible.
Commentators have noted, ``the only nations that have come close to
such control were totalitarian, with leaders who had no qualms about
imposing border control with shoot-to-kill orders.''\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Rey Koslowski, ``The Evolution of Border Controls as a
mechanism to Prevent Illegal Immigration'' Migration Policy Institute.
(February 2011) http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/bordercontrols-
koslowski.pdf.
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DHS itself has moved away from using ``operational control'' as an
outcome measure for border security, and cites the need to establish a
border security measure that reflects ``a more quantitative methodology
as well as the department's evolving vision for border control.''\11\
In 2011, Border Patrol Chief Michael Fisher, in his testimony before
Congress, called operational control an ``outdated measure.'' The 2012-
16 Border Patrol Strategic Plan does not mention ``operational
control,'' and instead, focuses on goals that would ``[mitigate] risk
rather than [increase] resources to secure the border.''\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ GAO Testimony, ``Border Patrol Strategy: Progress and
Challenges in Implementation and Assessment Efforts,'' House Homeland
Security Committee, Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security (May
8, 2012) http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/590686.pdf.
\12\ 2012-2016 Border Patrol Strategic Plan http://www.aila.org/
content/default.aspx?docid=41854; GAO, ``Border Patrol: Key Elements of
New Strategic Plan Not Yet in Place to Inform Border Security Status
and Resource Needs,'' (December 2012), http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-
13-25; Congressional Research Service, ``Border Security: Immigration
Enforcement Between Ports of Entry,'' (January 2012) http://
fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/180681.pdf (``[A]ccording to CBP
officials, effective control will be replaced by a `border condition
index,' '' which will combine multiple dimensions of border security,
public safety, and quality of life into a holistic `score' that can be
calculated for different regions of the border.'')
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BORDER PERSONNEL
The 2006 (S. 2611), 2007 (S. 1639), and 2010 (S. 3932) bills
prescribe large increases in Border Patrol agents, through incremental
annual increases or set numbers.\13\ Comparatively small increases for
CBP officers at ports of entry (POE) are also included. For example,
the 2006 bill proposed an annual increase of 2,400 Border Patrol agents
for the next 5 years, compared to an annual increase of 500 for POE
inspectors. As cited previously, since 2006, Congress has funded a
near-doubling of Border Patrol agents, from 12,185 to 21,444, and
current numbers exceed the numbers set forth in the 2006, 2007, and
2010 bills.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ Text of S. 2611 Specter (R-PA) http://www.aila.org/content/
default.aspx?docid=19568; Text of S. 3932--Leahy (D-VT) & Menendez (D-
NJ) http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/111/s3932/text.
The fallacy that more agents equals greater overall security has
resulted in continued proposals for more personnel without a clear
evaluation of security goals. Despite historical increases, recent
immigration proposals continue to call for more personnel.\14\ These
calls for more border personnel are unjustifiable when apprehensions by
Border Patrol Nation-wide are at the lowest level since 1972.\15\
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\14\ Key Provisions of McCain-Kyl Border Security Enforcement Act
of 2011 (proposing an increase of 6,000 National Guard troops to be
deployed to the border and additional 5,000 Border Patrol agents,
because ``the border is still not secure.''; Other bills introduced in
the 112th Congress calling for more personnel: H.R. 152 (Poe)--
directing deployment of at least 10,000 National Guard troops, H.R.
1196 (Miller)--proposing increase of 8,000 Border Patrol agents by
2015.
\15\ USBP Apprehensions FY 1925-2011 http://www.cbp.gov/
linkhandler/cgov/border_security/border_patrol/usbp_statistics/
25_10_app_stats.ctt/25_11_app_stats.- pdf; National Immigration Forum,
``Immigration Enforcement Fiscal Overview: Where are We, and Where are
We Going?'' Feb. 2011; Richard Marosi, ``Plunge in Border Crossings
Leaves Agents Fighting Boredom,'' Los Angeles Times, Apr. 21, 2011.
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This focus on personnel between ports of entry has coincided with
an increase in traffic through ports of entry. At the same time that
apprehensions between the ports of entry decreased Nation-wide, illegal
entries through ports of entry have increased. Ports of entry have also
seen an increase in seizures of drugs, weapons, and currency.\16\
Moving forward, there needs to be an evaluation and establishment of
clear and reasoned goals and strategies for resource allocation at the
border to address needs on the ground.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ Testimony of Michael Fisher, House Committee on Homeland
Security, Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security, ``Measuring
Border Security: U.S. Border Patrol's New Strategic Plan and the Path
Forward.'' (May 8, 2012) http://www.dhs.gov/news/2012/05/08/written-
testimony-us-customs-and-border-protection-house-homeland-security (CBP
seized 159 percent more weapons along the Southwest Border in fiscal
year 2009-2011 compared to the preceding 3 years. For those same
periods, CBP also seized 74 percent more currency and 41 percent more
drugs.); Susan Ginsburg, ``Countering Terrorist Mobility: Shaping an
Operational Strategy'' Migration Policy Institute. (2006) http://
www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/MPI_TaskForce_Ginsburg.pdf (There is a
question of priority when current policies and rhetoric emphasize
``non-port security along the U.S.-Mexico border, despite the terrorist
threats being either via airport entry points or internal to the Unites
States, and guns, drugs, and money mainly flowing through land
ports.'')
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BORDER INFRASTRUCTURE/SURVEILLANCE
In conjunction with personnel, the border has seen increases in
infrastructure and surveillance technologies. The 2007 and 2010 bills
call for the construction of fencing and increase of Unmanned Aerial
Vehicles (UAVs). Congress has answered by pouring billions into border
infrastructure to build double-layer fencing and remote surveillance
systems and deploying increasing numbers of UAVs. Current numbers
exceed the markers set in the 2007 and 2010 bills. In particular, the
2007 bill required the construction of 370 miles of fencing and 300
miles of vehicle barriers, 105 ground surveillance towers, and four
UAVs. As of 2012, CBP had 651 miles of fencing, 300 video surveillance
systems installed, and nine UAVs in operation.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ CBP factsheet http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/border_security/ti/
ti_news/sbi_fence/; Testimony of Michael Fisher, House Homeland
Security Committee, Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security,
``Securing our Borders--Operational Control and the Path Forward.''
(February 15, 2011) http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/con_res/
ref_rec/congressional_test/fisher_testifies/chief_fisher.xml (``Out of
652 miles where Border Patrol field commanders determined was
operationally required''); CBP, ``Environmental Assessment for Remote
Video Surveillance Systems,'' (September 2012) http://www.cbp.gov/
linkhandler/cgov/border_security/otia/sbi_news/sbi_enviro_docs/nepa/
otia_arizona/rvss_sept2012.ctt/rvss_sept2012.pdf; CBP Factsheet,
``Unmanned Aircraft System MQ-9 Predator B,'' 08/12 http://www.cbp.gov/
linkhandler/cgov/border_security/am/operations/oam_vessels/aircraft/
uas/predator_b.xml/predator_b.pdf.
Since 2006, DHS has poured approximately $4.4 billion into border
technology and infrastructure. In 2010, DHS terminated SBInet, the
``virtual fence,'' after incurring costs of nearly a billion dollars
and only 2.5 percent of the project completed. In 2011, the GAO
reported concern for CBP's implementation of a new technology plan when
``cost and operational effectiveness and suitability are not yet
clear.''\18\
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\18\ GAO, ``Border Security: DHS Progress and Challenges in
Securing the Southwest and Northern Borders'' (March 30, 2011), http://
www.gao.gov/new.items/d11508t.pdf; DHS, ``Report on the Assessment of
the Secure Border Initiative Network (SBInet) Program,'' (2010) http://
www.globalexchange.org/sites/default/files/DHS_Report.pdf.
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DETENTION
Border security has also resulted in dramatic increases in
resources for detention and prosecution of immigration-related
offenses. The 2006 and 2007 bills called for an increase in the number
of detention beds, 20,000 and 31,500 respectively, benchmarks that have
been met and exceeded. The current Congressional appropriation for
detention beds sets a level of 34,000 beds.
Legislatively mandating the number of detention beds raises similar
issues as with ``operational control,'' by setting inflexible goals and
taking away the ability of agencies to adapt to shifting risks and
enforcement needs. In 2012, DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano testified
before the House Homeland Security Appropriations Subcommittee and
requested fewer funds for detention beds for fiscal year 2013 compared
to the previous fiscal year. She stated that ``[DHS had] enough beds to
handle the detained population.''\19\ Nonetheless, Congress raised the
appropriation for fiscal year 2013.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ Secretary Janet Napolitano. Hearing before House
Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland Security on Fiscal Year 2013
DHS Appropriations. (February 15, 2012) http://www.micevhill.com/
attachments/immigration_documents/hosted_documents/112th_con- gress/
TranscriptOfHouseAppropriationsSubcommitteeOnHomelandSecurityHearingOnFY
-13- BudgetForDHSNapolitano.pdf.
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RELATED RESOURCES
Center for American Progress, ``The `Border Security First' Argument: A
Red Herring Undermining Real Security'' (March 29, 2011).
National Immigration Forum, ``Immigration Enforcement Today Measured
Against Benchmarks Set in 2007,'' (December 2011).
Appendix.--Current Status of Benchmarks
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
Ms. Gambler, the GAO was given a very important assignment
by members of this panel, and if you had to grade the level of
security that we have right now based upon the review that GAO
made what grade would you give it?
Ms. Gambler. Ranking Member Jackson Lee, I think it is very
difficult to assign a grade because DHS and the Border Patrol
in particular have not established goals and measures for
defining border security between ports of entry and how they
would assess progress made toward that goal.
Ms. Jackson Lee. What grade would you give them?
Ms. Gambler. Again, I think it is really important for the
Department to set a goal for how secure the border is.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I would rather you guess at what grade you
would give them.
Ms. Gambler. I think it--again, it is really contingent on
the Department to sort of set their goal and measure for how
secure the border is and how they would measure progress----
Ms. Jackson Lee. In the review of GAO, what grade would you
give them?
Ms. Gambler. I think it is hard to sort of quantify a
specific grade, but I think it is important to--for them to
sort of look at what----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Would you give them an A, a B, a C?
Ms. Gambler. I think you would need to----
Ms. Jackson Lee. I am going to keep asking the same
question until you give a grade.
Ms. Gambler. I think they are making progress toward
securing the border----
Ms. Jackson Lee. So is that a B?
Ms. Gambler [continuing]. And their effectiveness rate has,
as they look at it on a sector-by-sector basis, you know,
improved----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Is that a B?
Ms. Gambler [continuing]. Over time for sectors. So they
are making progress.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So will that be a B, or B-plus?
Ms. Gambler. Again, I think it is hard--I think it would
be, you know, sort of how you would think about grading them.
They certainly have made progress towards securing the border.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I think GAO can do a better job with
providing a more certain answer. I appreciate that you are not
giving me an answer. I will come back to you, give you enough
time to think and see what kind of grade you will give to them.
Chief Fisher, you mentioned a, I think, very important
point about intelligence gathering, because that helps with the
threats and determining the threats. Can you expand on that a
little bit in terms of the focus on intelligence gathering, and
do you need more resources for that, more collaboration, or
more tools?
Mr. Fisher. Thank you. Absolutely, both in terms of
intelligence and, just broadly, information, which is the
reason why it is the first pillar in our strategy.
Unlike the ports of entry, for instance, when Border Patrol
agents are out working out in the canyons we don't have a lot
of advanced information on how many people are coming and what
type of individuals they are, if they are carrying narcotics or
if they have weapons or not, so our ability to understand the
environment in which we operate--intelligence provides us that.
Information from the community provides us that, as well, and
the more information that we know about the environment in
which we operate, the more information we know about the intent
and capability of those organizations--who are they, what do
they intend to do--gives us a better tactical advantage to be
able to ensure that we are protecting this country against a
future attack, and certainly to provide the level of safety and
security that the citizens within those communities deserve.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I am going to ask both you and Admiral, we
are looking down the road to a possible sequester on this
coming Friday, and wondering what would be the impact if this
occurred this coming Friday with respect to services by the
Border Patrol in terms of numbers, and then services by the
Customs and Border Protection, so that is Mr. McAleenan and
then Admiral.
Chief, would you care to note what might happen?
Mr. Fisher. Certainly. Without question, if, in fact, on
March 1 sequestration does happen the Border Patrol will have
reduced capability. However, we will prioritize and accomplish
the mission as we normally would do. There are prioritizations
that we would take a look at in terms of deployments of
resources to include Border Patrol agents, but it will have an
impact in terms of reduced capability.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. McAleenan, if you--and Admiral?
Mr. McAleenan.
Mr. McAleenan. Yes. As the Secretary has testified, it
would be about a 2,750-officer cut. That is about 12.5 percent
of our staff. We would take mitigation actions, as Chief Fisher
alluded to, as well, but at the ports of entry it would have
significant impact on wait times and our ability to move people
and things through the border.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Admiral.
Admiral Lee. Yes, ma'am. The Coast Guard also will have a
reduction in operations but we are going to preserve our
capability to respond to search and rescue and urgent ports and
waterways security missions.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Mrs. Miller. Thanks.
We will have the ability for a second round of questions,
perhaps. We will see how we do with time.
At this time I would recognize the Ranking Minority Member
of the full committee, Mr. Thompson.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman.
A number of us for quite a while have been trying to get a
comprehensive border strategy, and we have tried to encourage
the Department to come up with it.
Chief, can you tell us where we are along this development
of a strategy for the border, to secure it?
Mr. Fisher. Yes, sir. First and foremost when a couple of
years ago we started looking at our strategy we started first
and foremost with the Department's Quadrennial Homeland
Security Review. That basically set the template.
Then last year Homeland Security--Department of Homeland
Security submitted their strategy for 2012 and 2016 and we did
ours in conjunction with that, as well. So if you look at the
chain, if you will, from the Department down through, at least
from CBP's standpoint, a lot of our objectives, the things that
we are attempting to do within our strategy is in line with the
Secretary's priorities and mission sets, as identified in the
QHSR.
Mr. Thompson. So, very succinctly, have we put that
strategy in writing so that Members of Congress and others
might know what it is?
Mr. Fisher. Yes, sir. Our strategy was published last
spring and it is in writing and certainly available for your
review, sir.
Mr. Thompson. All right.
Tied to the strategy is the border control index. Where are
we with that?
Mr. Fisher. It is my understanding, sir, that that is still
under development. It has been getting some peer review and it
is not ready for full deployment at this time.
Mr. Thompson. Is it your opinion that that border control
index would be something positive for the security of the
border?
Mr. Fisher. I think any additional layer, when we look at
answering this question, you know, the extent to which this
border is secure, additional layer--different analytics, the
way that we pool information together--acts as a check-and-
balance system. So anything the Department would put forward
would just be another layer to check some of the things that,
at least from the Border Patrol's perspective, we think are
important to evaluate.
Mr. Thompson. Ms. Gambler, did you all look at any of this
in your review?
Ms. Gambler. During the course of our review we did not
specifically look at the border condition index. We do
understand that that is under development within the
Department.
We did look at some of the other metrics that Chief Fisher
mentioned in his opening statement and has been discussing, in
terms of the effectiveness rate and also the recidivism rate,
as well, which he mentioned looking at the percentage of
estimated known illegal entrants who are apprehended more than
once. So we have looked at some of the data that has been
mentioned but not specifically the border condition index.
Mr. Thompson. Well, again, let me thank all of you who are
on the law enforcement front lines side. You do a wonderful
job.
The statistics bear out the fact that if you have the
resources you can do a better job. No question about that.
One of the things I think you all are faced with now is
with the expectation of a reduction, that puts each one of you
in a position of having to prioritize where you are going to
attack.
Admiral, you talked a little bit about search and rescue as
being a priority versus some of the other things.
But if you are trying to define this secure border, if you
are having to prioritize in the light of budget cuts, some
things will not get the attention that it would get if you had
resources. Am I correct?
Admiral Lee. Yes, sir, if you are addressing that to the
Coast Guard. Bottom line is, when we have to take our
corresponding cut in operations we are taking people and assets
off-line, and so it gives you gaps in that line in defense.
Mr. Thompson. I would like to also get on the record to say
that a lot of what we do focuses on the Southwest Border, but
we do have maritime borders, we have a Northern Border, and so
all of this is the framework of border security, and I would
hope that as we continue to review this policy that we make
sure it is inclusive of all the borders that we operate to try
to secure and not just focus on the Southwest Border.
I yield back, Madam Chairwoman.
Mrs. Miller. I thank the gentleman and I appreciate his
comment about all of the borders. As a Member from a Northern
Border State, and Admiral talked about Shiprider and some of
the other things that have been a great success between us and
the Canadians, and so we have all of these borders.
At this time the Chairwoman recognizes the gentleman from
South Carolina, Mr. Duncan.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Let me just start off by saying I think Americans are
receiving mixed signals when it comes to border security and
immigration, and I would just point to an A.P. story on
February 4 that reports Secretary Napolitano saying, ``I
believe the border is secure. I believe the border is a safe
border. That is not to say everything is 100 percent.''
Then I go back to the whole idea that in 2010 Secretary
Napolitano stopped reporting the number of miles that the
border was under operational control--in fact, not even using
that term anymore, calling the term archaic and not
representative of security progress along the border. DHS is
developing a new measure, called border condition index, which
I would like to hear a little bit more about, but this has not
been released, and as a result, I think that Congress and the
public are sort of in the dark when it comes to the true
numbers and true effectiveness, and that necessitates the
hearing that we have got today, so I appreciate that.
I went down to the border back in the fall and I had a
conversation with Congressman Barber from Arizona earlier this
month, and we were talking about border security and he said
that, you know, until ranchers in Arizona who live along the
border--their ranch is straddling the border there--until they
feel safe enough--that the border is safe enough for them to
leave their home and leave their children at whatever ages
there at the ranch to go into town to buy a gallon of milk, or
whatever they need, and come back, the border isn't secure. I
thought that was an interesting analogy that he made that the
ranchers don't feel safe enough to run to 7-Eleven and grab a
gallon of milk for their kids without gathering everybody up
and taking them with them because their home, and their farm,
and their property is not secure from illegals coming across
for whatever reason. So I think that is just an interesting
thing to talk about.
Chief Fisher, just real quickly, I was in Texas recently
and the gentleman I was talking with was telling me that he
helps CBP, and he was talking about other than Mexicans that
they catch in groups that are coming across. Do we have any
sort of percentages of what other groups, such as--he was
saying Chinese and even South Americans--South Africans,
rather, even Middle Eastern folks coming across in groups. Do
you have any sort of percentage of other-than-Mexicans that
come across?
Mr. Fisher. I do. So in 2012, for instance, and we had
mentioned a little over 350,000 apprehensions along the
Southern Border--that represented individuals that were
arrested from 142 different countries. What we do know in terms
of the Southwest Border in terms of other-than-Mexico, the
three sending countries in this order--Guatemala, Honduras, and
El Salvador--are still the top three percentages.
In terms of those that are from the country of Guatemala,
about 3 years ago one out of every three individuals
apprehended in South Texas came from Guatemala. Today it is
almost 60 percent.
So we are seeing the shift in terms of those individuals
seeking entry into the United States between the ports of
entries in places like South Texas, where the majority of those
individuals now are not from Mexico, they are from countries
other than Mexico.
Mr. Duncan. Okay, so, Guatemala shares a border with Mexico
so I can understand the ease of the Guatemalans coming.
But I want to shift gears a little bit because there is a
concern about drone use over the homeland, and I know that the
Coast Guard and CBP are both using drones. So, Chief Fisher,
and then I will come to the admiral, how effective has the
drone use been surveying the border?
Mr. Fisher. The unmanned aerial systems for the Border
Patrol in particular has been invaluable in providing that
level of information along the border on--to provide a longer
and steady, persistent surveillance, if you will, from the sky
to be able to cue Border Patrol agents on people that are
seeking entry into the United States. So it has been very
valuable as an enforcement tool.
Mr. Duncan. Yes.
Admiral, how do you see the drone use helping you and your
job with the panga?
Admiral Lee. Well, I echo Chief Fisher's comments. It is an
invaluable and indispensible tool for maritime domain awareness
so that we can know where to put our resources and target them
for the end-game interdiction.
Mr. Duncan. You have got a lot of square miles to cover, I
would assume.
Admiral Lee. Millions.
Mr. Duncan. Yes.
Chief Fisher, as far as the responsiveness, let's say you
need to re-task that drone and focus on a certain sector where
you see some increased activity during the night. How easy--
because I know those drones aren't necessarily flown locally--
how easy is it to coordinate that movement?
Mr. Fisher. CBP is getting better with that coordination.
That is a great question, sir. I can tell you that the
certificates of authorization we have across the border, so we
have the authorization now to be able to get that airspace to
move those from one area to the other.
CBP is getting better and better at the federated flights--
in other words, doing the launch and recovery from one location
and then doing a hand-off for the flights during the sortie to
another location. We are improving each and every week.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you, gentleman, and everyone, for your
service to our country.
I will yield back.
Mrs. Miller. Thank the gentleman.
The Chairwoman now recognizes Mr. O'Rourke, from Texas.
Mr. O'Rourke. Thank you. Madam Chairwoman, I would ask
that--I would ask for unanimous consent to submit the statement
from the National Treasury Employees Union and a statement by
the Border Trade Alliance into the record.
Mrs. Miller. Without objection.
[The information follows:]
Statement of Colleen M. Kelley, National President, National Treasury
Employees Union
February 26, 2013
Chairwoman Miller, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, distinguished
Members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to provide this
testimony. As president of the National Treasury Employees Union
(NTEU), I have the honor of leading a union that represents over 24,000
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Officers and trade enforcement
specialists who are stationed at 329 land, sea, and air ports of entry
(POEs) across the United States. CBP employees' mission is to protect
the Nation's borders at the ports of entry from all threats while
facilitating legitimate travel and trade. CBP trade compliance
personnel enforce over 400 U.S. trade and tariff laws and regulations
in order to ensure a fair and competitive trade environment pursuant to
existing international agreements and treaties, as well as stemming the
flow of illegal contraband such as child pornography, illegal arms,
weapons of mass destruction, and laundered money.
In fiscal year 2012, CBP seized more than 4.2 million pounds of
narcotics across the country. In addition, the agency seized more than
$100 million in unreported currency through targeted enforcement
operations. At ports of entry in fiscal year 2012, CBP officers
arrested nearly 7,700 people wanted for serious crimes, including
murder, rape, assault, and robbery. Officers also stopped nearly
145,000 inadmissible aliens from entering the United States through
ports of entry. Inadmissibility grounds included immigration
violations, health, criminal, and National security-related grounds.
Additionally, CBP agriculture specialists conducted more than 1.6
million interceptions of prohibited plant materials, meat, and animal
byproducts at ports of entry while also stopping nearly 174,000
potentially dangerous pests.
CBP uniformed and non-uniformed personnel at the air, sea, and land
ports of entry not only ensure a secure border, but also collect
significant revenue through trade compliance and enforcement. CBP is a
revenue collection agency, processing more than $2.3 trillion in trade
annually. In fiscal year 2012, CBP processed nearly 25 million cargo
containers through the Nation's ports of entry, up about 4 percent from
the previous year. In addition, CBP conducted nearly 23,000 seizures of
goods that violate intellectual property rights, with a total retail
value of $1.2 billion, representing a 14 percent increase in value over
fiscal year 2011.
CBP personnel at the ports of entry are key to achieving and
maintaining a ``secure border'' and the greatest current threat to a
``secure border'' is sequestration under the Budget Control Act that is
mandated to be ordered on March 1 unless Congress acts.
If Congress allows sequestration to go into effect on March 1,
CBP's discretionary budget will be reduced by 6.4%--a cut of $652.56
million in appropriated funds out of a $9.5 billion budget--$558.26 of
which must come from the CBP Salaries and Expenses (S&E) account.
Also, under the sequester, CBP's mandatory spending, including user
fee accounts, will be cut by $100 million. User fees will continue to
be collected from industry to provide travel and trade security,
immigration and agriculture inspection services, but CBP will be
prohibited from using $100 million dollars of these user fees between
March 1 and the end of the fiscal year. It is not clear whether these
user fees collected will go to the general treasury, but user fees are
not a tax, by law they pay for specific services provided by the
Government. Sequestration nullifies the use of $100 million of these
collected fees to pay for CBP inspectional services.
The current CBP sequester plan, in order to cut the S&E account by
$558.26 million and the mandatory spending account by $100 million,
requires all CBP employees to be furloughed up to 14 days during the
remainder of fiscal year 2013 or 1 day per pay period beginning early
to mid-April through September 30, resulting in a 10% pay cut for all
CBP employees. These furloughs will exacerbate an already unsustainable
shortage of CBP inspection and enforcement personnel at international
air, sea, and land ports of entry.
As Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Janet Napolitano
stated last week before the Senate Appropriations Committee,
``sequestration would have significant impacts in our economy,
including travel, tourism, and trade. Reductions mandated under
sequestration would require furloughs and reduced staffing at our
Nation's POEs and airport security checkpoints, increasing wait times
for travelers and slowing commerce across the country. Reduced CBP
staffing would make 4- to 5-hour wait times commonplace and cause the
busiest ports to face gridlock situations at peak periods.''
There is no greater roadblock to legitimate trade and travel
efficiency than the lack of sufficient staff at the ports of entry.
Understaffed ports lead to long delays in our commercial lanes as cargo
waits to enter U.S. commerce.
Those delays result in real losses to the U.S. economy. According
to a draft report prepared by the Department of Commerce, border delays
in 2008 cost the U.S. economy nearly 26,000 jobs and $6 billion in
output, $1.4 billion in wages, and $600 million in tax revenues
annually. According to the same report, by 2017, average wait times
could increase to nearly 100 minutes, costing the United States more
than 54,000 jobs and $12 billion in output, $3 billion in wages and
$1.2 billion in tax revenues. The cumulative loss in output due to
border delays over the next 10 years is estimated to be $86 billion.
More than 50 million Americans work for companies that engage in
international trade, according to the U.S. Department of the Treasury.
If Congress is serious about job creation, then Congress should support
enhancing U.S. trade and travel by mitigating wait times at the ports
and enhancing trade enforcement by increasing CBP security and
commercial operations staffing at the air, sea, and land ports of
entry.
In addition, under sequestration, CBP will reduce by $37.5 million
inspectional overtime. Overtime is essential when staffing levels are
insufficient to ensure that inspectional duties can be fulfilled, that
CBP Officers have sufficient back-up and that wait times are mitigated.
In CBP's own words, ``Overtime allows CBP Office of Field Operations to
schedule its personnel to cover key shifts with a smaller total
personnel number.'' The Congressionally-mandated sequester will
significantly cut overtime hours and result in longer wait times at the
ports of entry.
SEQUESTER EFFECTS EXAMPLES IN FLORIDA, TEXAS, AND CALIFORNIA
Just last Wednesday, February 20, DHS Secretary Napolitano, at the
request of Florida's Governor Rick Scott, toured the Miami
International Airport (MIA) with a delegation from Congress and airline
and cruise representatives and other industry stakeholders. Governor
Scott noted that insufficient staffing at the new state-of-the-art CBP
facility at MIA caused a ``bottleneck'' for passengers trying to exit
customs. ``As a result, customers--often numbering well over 1,000 a
day--and their baggage are misconnected and must be rebooked on later
flights, many leaving the next day.''
In a letter to the Secretary, Governor Scott stated, ``If this
staffing problem is not corrected immediately, it has the potential to
damage Florida's international competiveness. More than 1 million jobs
in Florida depend on international trade and investment. The
engineering models and recommendations reflected that for optimal
operations a minimum of 62 of the 72 lanes must be staffed at peak
arrival periods.''
Congressman Mario Diaz-Balart said after the tour, ``Tourism is the
backbone of Florida's economy, and DHS must do more to adequately staff
our ports. Our CBP agents are working diligently to protect us from any
security threats, illegal substances, and invasive pests and diseases
entering the United States, but the lack of staffing is creating long
and disorganized lines for travelers, and discouraging travelers from
visiting and using South Florida's ports.''
Another State with on-going significant CBP personnel staffing
shortages is Texas where more than 420,000 jobs depend on trade with
Mexico. Texas leads the Nation with 29 international ports of entry.
The Houston field office manages 19 of these, including the Port of
Houston, George Bush Intercontinental Airport (IAH) and airports at
Dallas-Fort Worth, Austin, San Antonio, Midland, Lubbock, Amarillo, and
also Oklahoma City and Tulsa. Currently IAH wait times are considerably
longer than Houston's airport competitors--Dallas and Atlanta. And the
City of Houston is considering a proposal to allow international
commercial flights at Hobby Airport.
In El Paso, city officials have used the word ``crisis'' to
describe the sometimes hours-long wait times at the local ports of
entry and are considering legal action over the environmental effect of
international bridge wait times and ``CBP's failure to keep those
booths open.''
Wait times of up to 3 hours at Los Angeles International Airport
(LAX), the Nation's third-busiest airport moved 10 Members of Congress
to demand that CBP transfer CBP Officers from other ports of entry to
LAX. Despite continuing staffing shortages at LAX, the Bradley terminal
is undergoing a $1.5 billion overhaul that calls for expanding the
number of CBP inspection booths to 81.
Also in California, Congress has funded the first phase of a $583
million upgrade of the Port of San Ysidro. When the first phase is
completed in September 2014, there will be 46 inspection booths--up
from the current 33. An additional 17 booths would be built in the
third phase bringing the total number of booths needing CBP Officer
staffing from 33 to 63.
As noted in these examples, Congress, local jurisdictions, and
industry stakeholders continue to act as if CBP can staff whatever is
built.
CBP cannot adequately staff existing port facilities under current
funding levels provided by Congress. Proposed port expansions, allowing
international flights at airports that are currently not served by
international flights, and other new construction to address the growth
in international trade and travel, is not possible under the
Congressionally-mandated sequester. And, if the sequester, which is
intended to be permanent, continues into fiscal year 2014, the current
levels of CBP staffing, as set by Congress in statute, will be
unsustainable.
CBP'S ON-GOING STAFFING SHORTAGES AT THE POES
The Congressionally-mandated sequester only exacerbates CBP's on-
going staffing shortage problem. In 2008, the Government Accountability
Office (GAO) reported, ``At seven of the eight major ports we visited,
officers and managers told us that not having sufficient staff
contributes to morale problems, fatigue, lack of backup support, and
safety issues when officers inspect travelers--increasing the potential
that terrorists, inadmissible travelers and illicit goods could enter
the country.'' (See GAO-08-219, page 7.)
``Due to staffing shortages, ports of entry rely on overtime to
accomplish their inspection responsibilities. Double shifts can result
in officer fatigue . . . officer fatigue caused by excessive overtime
negatively affected inspections at ports of entry. On occasion,
officers said they are called upon to work 16-hour shifts, spending
long stints in primary passenger processing lanes in order to keep
lanes open, in part to minimize traveler wait times. Further evidence
of fatigue came from officers who said that CBP officers call in sick
due to exhaustion, in part to avoid mandatory overtime, which in turn
exacerbates the staffing challenges faced by the ports.'' (See GAO-08-
219, page 33.)
Without adequate personnel at secondary, wait times back up and
searches are not done to specifications. This is a significant cargo
security issue. A full search of one vehicle for counterfeit currency
will take two officers on average a minimum of 45 minutes. Frequently,
only one CBP Officer is available for this type of search and the
search will then take well over an hour.
Finally, NTEU has been told that when wait times in primary
inspection become excessive in the opinion of the agency, CBP Officers
are instructed to query only one occupant of a vehicle and to suspend
COMPEX (Compliance Enforcement Exams) and other automated referral to
secondary programs during these periods. This is a significant security
issue. Also, when primary processing lanes become backed up, passenger
vehicles are diverted to commercial lanes for processing, backing up
truck lanes and increasing wait times for cargo inspection.
In October 2009, the Southwest Border Task Force, created by DHS
Secretary Janet Napolitano, presented the results of its staffing and
resources review in a draft report. This draft report recommends the
``Federal Government should hire more Customs [and Border Protection]
officers.''
The report echoes the finding of the Border-Facilitation Working
Group. (The U.S.-Mexico Border Facilitation Working Group was created
during the bilateral meeting between President George W. Bush and
President Felipe Calderon held in Merida in March 2007.) ``In order to
more optimally operate the various ports of entry, CBP needs to
increase the number of CBP Officers.'' According to its own estimate,
the lack of staffing for the San Ysdiro POE alone is in the
``hundreds'' and the CBP Officer need at all ports of entry located
along the border with Mexico is in the ``thousands.'' (``CBP:
Challenges and Opportunities'' a memo prepared by Armand Peschard-
Sverdrup for Mexico's Ministry of the Economy: U.S.-Mexico Border
Facilitation Working Group, January 2008, pages 1 and 2.
Also, when CBP was created, it was given a dual mission of
safeguarding our Nation's borders and ports as well as regulating and
facilitating international trade. It also collects import duties and
enforces U.S. trade laws. In 2005, CBP processed 29 million trade
entries and collected $31.4 billion in revenue. In 2009, CBP collected
$29 billion--a drop of over $2 billion in revenue collected. Since CBP
was established in March 2003, there has been no increase in CBP trade
enforcement and compliance personnel and again, the fiscal year 2013
budget proposed no increase in FTEs for CBP trade operations personnel.
In effect, there has been a CBP trade operations staffing freeze at
March 2003 levels and, as a result, CBP's revenue function has suffered
and duty and fee revenue collected has remained flat.
CONCLUSION
As noted by Members of Congress, industry stakeholders, the
traveling public, and DHS's own Advisory Council, for too long, CBP at
the POEs has been underfunded and understaffed.
By allowing the sequester to go into effect on March 1, Congress
will continue and exacerbate staffing shortages at the U.S. ports of
entry, the U.S. economy dependent on international trade and travel,
will suffer and U.S. private sector jobs will be lost.
The title of this hearing is ``What does a secure border look
like?'' NTEU's answer is ``not one ravaged by the effects of a
sequester.''
The more than 24,000 CBP employees represented by the NTEU are
capable and committed to the varied missions of DHS from border control
to the facilitation of legitimate trade and travel. They are proud of
their part in keeping our country free from terrorism, our
neighborhoods safe from drugs and our economy safe from illegal trade.
These men and women are deserving of more resources and technology to
perform their jobs better and more efficiently.
Thank you for the opportunity to submit this testimony to the
committee on their behalf.
______
Statement of Jesse J. Hereford, Chairman, and Nelson H. Balido,
President, the Border Trade Alliance
February 26, 2013
The Border Trade Alliance appreciates this opportunity to submit
for the record this testimony on sequestration's potential effects on
cross-border trade and travel. Our organization believes that, with
these dramatic Government-wide budget reductions just days away from
implementation, exploring this topic is both timely and necessary.
ABOUT THE BORDER TRADE ALLIANCE
Founded in 1986, the Border Trade Alliance is a non-profit
organization that serves as a forum for participants to address key
issues affecting trade and economic development in North America.
Working with entities in Canada, Mexico, and the United States, the BTA
advocates in favor of policies and initiatives designed to improve
border affairs and trade relations among the three nations.
BTA's membership consists of border municipalities, chambers of
commerce and industry, academic institutions, economic development
corporations, industrial parks, transport companies, custom brokers,
defense companies, manufacturers and State and local government
agencies.
SEQUESTRATION LOOMS: WHAT'S AT STAKE?
The subcommittee should be commended for examining how
sequestration will affect our cross-border trade relationship with our
neighbors and NAFTA partners Canada and Mexico.
Looking at recently released 2012 trade data\1\ by the Census
Bureau, Canada is the United States' No. 1 trading partner in total
trade, accounting for $616 billion or 16 percent of total U.S. trade.
Canada is our No. 1 export market and our No. 2 import market.
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\1\ http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/highlights/top/
top1212yr.html.
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Mexico is our No. 3 trading partner by total trade, accounting for
$494 billion or 13 percent of total U.S. trade and is our No. 2 export
market and our No. 3 import market.
These aren't just economic data compiled by Government
statisticians. These numbers mean jobs. One in four U.S. jobs depends
on international trade. Consider the border States like California
where 617,000 jobs depend on international trade, or Texas, where it's
539,000 or Michigan where it's 210,000.
CBP: AT THE CENTER OF TRADE
The agency with the most influence over the conduct of this cross-
border trade is Customs and Border Protection. To say that
sequestration would be disruptive to CBP's dual mission of trade
facilitation and border enforcement would be a vast understatement.
As Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano made plain in a
recent Senate Appropriations Committee hearing, in fiscal year 2012
alone, CBP processed more than 350 million travelers at our ports of
entry, as well as $2.3 trillion worth of trade.\2\
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\2\ http://www.dhs.gov/news/2013/02/14/written-testimony-secretary-
napolitano-senate-committee-appropriations-hearing.
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In her testimony, Secretary Napolitano touched a nerve with our
organization and the rest of the trade community when she said.
``Sequestration would roll back border security [and] increase wait
times at our Nation's land ports of entry and airports.''
Perhaps no other issue occupies our work more than the issue of
border delays, which increase the cost of doing business and create a
drag on the American economy.
For the past several months, the BTA has been working with the
Government Accountability Office as it carries out a request by former
Texas Sen. Kay Bailey Hutchison to assess how CBP measures wait times
at ports along the U.S.-Mexico border and determine what the agency is
doing to mitigate those delays.
In roundtable discussions with GAO analysts and members of the
trade community in the border communities of Laredo, Texas; El Paso,
Texas; Nogales, Arizona; and San Diego, California, one theme has
emerged again and again: CBP does not have the human resources in place
to keep up with today's trade demands.
Sequestration only exacerbates these staffing challenges, forcing
CBP to immediately begin furloughs of its employees, reduce overtime
for front-line operations, and decrease its hiring to backfill
positions. Specifically, beginning April 1, CBP would have to reduce
its work hours by the equivalent of between 2,750 and 3,400 CBP
Officers.
Quite simply, we cannot reconcile CBP's tremendously important dual
mission with deep cuts in its operating budget.
As concerned as we are over these nearing reductions, we are
heartened that CBP is putting in place procedures to mitigate as best
as possible sequestration's effects. Specifically, CBP has informed the
trade community that directors of field operations (DFOs) will be
tasked with providing 30-day notices of pending operational changes at
ports of entry to employees and trade stakeholders so that industry can
plan changes to manufacturing and shipping schedules.
TRAVEL
The BTA also has deep concerns over sequestration's effect on
cross-border travel, which is so important to border community
businesses that depend on the ability of customers located on the other
side of the international border to reach stores, restaurants, and
other attractions in the United States.
Using only Texas as an example, Mexican shoppers' impact on that
State's border communities is profound, representing over 40 percent of
retail sales in Laredo, 40 percent in McAllen, 30 percent in
Brownsville and over 10 percent in El Paso according to research
conducted in 2011.\3\
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\3\ ``Cross-border retail activity along the Texas-Mexico border,''
Coronado, Phillips and Saucedo; Nov. 2011.
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According to data compiled by the International Trade
Administration's Office of Travel & Tourism Industries, U.S.-bound
travel from Mexico spiked over 30 percent from March 2011 to April
2011.\4\ The most likely reason was Semana Santa, or Holy Week, when
ports of entry along the U.S.-Mexico border are clogged with travelers
headed north and south for family visits culminating in Easter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ http://tinet.ita.doc.gov/view/m-2011-I-001/table1.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We cite this particular time on the calendar because it is fast
approaching and our ports of entry must be ready. Sequestration leaves
our organization very concerned over the negative effects that could be
borne by our border communities and land border ports in just a few
short weeks.
A WAY FORWARD IN A TIME OF AUSTERITY
While the picture for our border agencies under sequestration
initially seems bleak, there are policy options available to Congress
and the administration.
Sen. John Cornyn has introduced legislation, S. 178, the Cross-
Border Trade Enhancement Act of 2013, which would create a needed and
innovative mechanism for private-sector or existing local public-sector
funds to be leveraged for border port infrastructure projects and/or to
supplement Congressionally-appropriated staffing dollars.
A new way of bringing border infrastructure and increased staffing
levels on-line is needed, and sequestration makes that all the more
apparent. The Federal Government simply does not have the resources
necessary to keep up with all of the growing demands placed on our
borders resulting from rising trade flows and on-going security
concerns. But local communities and the private sector are ready to act
where the Federal Government is unable. We are hopeful that companion
legislation to Sen. Cornyn's bill will soon be introduced in the House.
CONCLUSION
Nothing in our testimony should be construed as somehow endorsing a
Federal budget that needs serious reform. We know that cuts are needed
in many areas. We simply urge Congress and the administration to make
those reductions thoughtfully and in a manner that will inflict as
little harm as possible on the overall economy.
We thank the subcommittee for the opportunity to submit these
comments. Please do not hesitate to contact us should our
organization's nearly 30 years of cross-border experience prove
valuable to your work going forward.
Mr. O'Rourke. I would also like to thank you, Madam
Chairwoman and Ranking Member Jackson Lee, for assembling this
panel and holding this hearing on what a secure border looks
like, and it is perhaps one of the most important questions for
us in Congress and for our country to answer.
The fate of 12 million people in the United States right
now and the future of comprehensive immigration reform depend
on the answer to this question. The fate of the community that
I represent, El Paso, Texas, the safest city in the United
States, but one which is heavily dependent on cross-border
trade and the legitimate, secure flow of people and goods
across our ports of entry, my city--the people who work in it,
the people I represent--depends on our answer to this question.
I would argue, the fate of our country. We have more than 6
million people whose jobs are directly dependent on the secure
flow of trade that crosses our ports of entry. We trade more
than $450 billion a year with the country of Mexico, and if we
want to see economic growth in this country, the fate of our
country depends on how we answer this question. Not to mention
the billions of dollars that we spend right now to secure the
border, as our Chairwoman has pointed out, with not a lot of
measurements attached to it to define whether or not we are
doing a good job.
So since we are unable to succinctly define what a secure
border looks like today--although we are working on it and I
hope we have additional hearings--I was hoping that Chief
Fisher and Commissioner McAleenan could answer this question:
Considering El Paso is the safest city in the United States,
San Diego, also on the U.S.-Mexico border, is the second
safest, if you look at the border on whole from Brownsville,
including Laredo, all the way to San Diego and you compare it
to the rest of the United States, we are safer than the country
on whole, and I would argue that the rancher going to get his
milk in Arizona is far safer than the single mom leaving her
apartment in Washington, DC, or Detroit, or New Orleans, or
many of the cities in the country's interior today.
So with that, the record deportations, the record low
apprehensions, the record money spent, the doubling of the
Border Patrol force, are we as safe and secure as we have ever
been?
Mr. Fisher. Sir, I believe in many sections along the
border I can compare to when I came in the Border Patrol in
1987, certainly because of this committee's support and others
we have received unprecedented resources, both in terms of
Border Patrol agents and technology, and there are more
sections along this border that are secure because of that.
Mr. McAleenan. I would agree with--our technology
deployments, our operational improvements, how we are using our
targeting systems, the ability with the Western Hemisphere
Travel Initiative to query almost every person crossing the
land border, we are significantly more secure with
inadmissibles, with our counternarcotics mission, agricultural
pests and diseases, and of course, our efforts against
terrorism.
Mr. O'Rourke. Commissioner, could I ask you to reach the
conclusion that I think you started, which is we are more
secure in all those areas than we have ever been?
Mr. McAleenan. That is correct.
Mr. O'Rourke. Okay. I think that is important for us to
know because I share this committee's frustration with the fact
that we don't have a defined goal and measurements on which to
chart our progress against that goal. We are no longer using
operational control. We haven't released the new comprehensive
index from DHS.
So in the absence of that, with so much riding on our
ability to speak intelligently about border security, I think
it is really important for this panel and the country to know
the border is as secure as it has ever been.
Commissioner, an additional question for you: While El Paso
is the safest city in the country--and I would argue, if you
want to know what a secure border looks like look at El Paso,
Texas, the world's largest bi-national community, safest city
in the United States next to what until recently was the
deadliest city in the world, Ciudad Juarez, with 10,000 murders
over the last 6 years, one of the things that is a threat to El
Paso and our economy and, by extension, the National economy is
the slow pace of cross-border traffic.
We hear of shippers--and I am sure Congressman Cuellar can
attest to this--who wait up to 9 hours to cross north into the
United States. We hear from constituents who wait 3, 4, and
even 5 hours in pedestrian or auto lines to cross these
bridges. There are just some basic issues of being humane to
the people who are crossing, and then we also are dependent on
them for our economy.
When I crossed this week when I was back in El Paso, CBP
agents knew I was coming back over, there was no wait time.
When I talked to other members in my staff who regularly cross,
they wait 3, 4, and 5 hours. If we can get me across in 10
minutes why can't we get everyone across in 10 minutes?
Mr. McAleenan. As I mentioned in my oral statement, our
wait times and our service levels to the traveling public and
commercial trade are a huge focus for us. We made significant
efforts in El Paso over the last year, increasing our booth
time by 14 percent with staffing remaining flat. That has
resulted in reduced wait times, actually, in fiscal year 2012
over 2011.
The traffic is up in every category--pedestrian, personal
vehicles, commercial vehicles--12 percent over the last 3
years. We are using our new technology, our active lane
management procedures to try to get people into the trusted
lanes, try to get people into the RFID-enabled lanes to move
them quicker.
You have seen the technology in the pedestrian area at PDN.
That has increased our capacity 25 percent. The wait times are
down significantly. We are staffing the booths the peak times
more efficiently, and that is making a difference but it is a
continued focus for us. We are going to need to move that
increasing trade and travel even more efficiently this year.
Mrs. Miller. Chairwoman now recognizes the gentleman from
Pennsylvania, Mr. Barletta.
Mr. Barletta. Thank you. I would like to thank the
Chairwoman, also, for this very, very important hearing today.
I come from a much different perspective, being a mayor--a
former mayor--of a city that is 2,000 miles away from the
nearest Southern Border. We had an illegal immigration
problem--some of you may have known I was the first mayor in
the country to pass a law dealing with illegal immigration.
Over 10 percent, it was estimated at the time, in my city
was in the country illegally, and they didn't cross--the
majority did not cross a Southern Border. Our population grew
by 50 percent but our tax revenues stayed the same so I see
this from a different prism as many others because there is an
economic side to this problem of illegal immigration as well as
a National security side.
I disagree--I am listening here today and I guess my first
disagreement is how we even define our borders. I believe there
is an important piece to this issue that is missing here.
Any State that has an international airport is a border
State. Any State with an international airport is a border
State. Forty percent of the people that are in the country
illegally didn't cross a border; they came here on a visa, the
visa expired, and they disappeared into the system and we can't
find them.
We have our immigration laws for two reasons. No. 1 is to
protect American jobs, and No. 2, to protect the American
people.
My question, Chief Fisher, is: Do you believe adding more
people on the border would have stopped the attack on 9/11?
Mr. Fisher. No, sir.
Mr. Barletta. Mr. McAleenan, if I were a could-be terrorist
and I flew into Harrisburg International Airport or Des Moines,
Iowa Airport and didn't leave after my visa expired how would
you find me?
Mr. McAleenan. Sir, we are assuming this individual is not
known to the intelligence community or law enforcement as a
potential terrorist?
Mr. Barletta. That is correct.
Mr. McAleenan. Okay, that is a multi-agency effort. First
of all, we would use the biographic information transmitted to
CBP called the Advanced Passenger Information System, which
would tell us who they are, when they have arrived, a record of
their crossing date. We would work with US-VISIT and
Immigration and Customs Enforcement to determine whether they
left on time. That is the biographic exit effort----
Mr. Barletta. If I could just interrupt you 1 second,
please.
Mr. McAleenan. Please.
Mr. Barletta. Then how would we have 40 percent of the
people in the country illegally who have--whose visas have
expired, why haven't we been able to do that?
Mr. McAleenan. I think this is an acknowledged area,
Representative, where we need to improve and we have been
improving over the last several years.
Mr. Barletta. That is exactly my point, because you see,
some of the--and you know this--some of the 9/11 terrorists
overstayed their visas. In fact, one of the 1993 World Trade
Center bombers was granted amnesty in 1986; he said he was an
agricultural worker and was granted amnesty and later was one
of the masterminds to that.
Now there is a new proposal here to grant the pathway to
citizenship to millions who have crossed the border illegally
or who have overstayed a visa. I believe that this will only
encourage millions more, now, to come here through our open
borders. You know, basically what this proposal is telling
anyone that is here on a visa right now is that you can throw
your visa away because this proposal will now allow you to
stay.
We need to make sure that we are doing first things first--
that we are securing our borders. That is not only airports--
seaports, Northern Border, Southern Border, East Coast, West
Coast. We can't exclude those that come here through a legal
pathway and then stay here and become here illegally. That is
what is missing here today, and we certainly shouldn't use our
immigration laws to make new friends or to use it to battle for
new voters.
You know, today is an important day. Today is the 20th
anniversary of the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center where
six people died and over 1,000 people were injured. Our
immigration laws are here to protect American jobs and protect
the American people. We are a long way from secure borders and
that should be a reminder to everyone here in Congress that we
don't replace the carpet in our homes while we still have a
hole in our roof.
Thank you.
Mrs. Miller. Chairwoman now recognizes the gentlelady from
Hawaii, Ms. Gabbard. Am I pronouncing your name correctly?
Ms. Gabbard. Gabbard.
Mrs. Miller. Gabbard.
Ms. Gabbard. Thank you very much.
As the Ranking Member, Ms. Jackson Lee, mentioned, I am
going to take the conversation a different direction because,
as all of you know, we face very unique challenges in Hawaii
that are very different than many of the issues that have been
brought up here this morning, but they are not issues that only
affect Hawaii. As you well know, with what is happening in Asia
and across the Pacific, Hawaii's strategic location there
really is a gateway to what is happening in our country.
My first question is for Admiral Lee. You talk in your
testimony about the domestic partnerships that the Coast Guard
has formed and that you share in areas of the U.S. waters but
don't really get into much of the details about what is
happening in the Pacific and the kinds of partnerships that you
have there, especially considering within the 14th District,
folks who I visited with, Admiral Ray and his teams out on the
ground really do cover not only the islands of Hawaii, but
Guam, America Samoa, Saipan, even Singapore and Japan, and
would like you to talk a little bit more about the partnerships
you have there, especially as we are looking at the cuts that
the Department has spoken about affecting nearly 25 percent of
air and surface operations and how we can make sure we are
maintaining coverage in that vast region.
Admiral Lee. Well yes, ma'am. Thank you for the question.
We have an outstanding working relationship with our
partners at Pacific Command. We have cross talks at the Admiral
Ray level routinely.
We are watching, as is the Nation, with what is developing
and unfolding in the Pacific arena. We are watching what is
going on between the Japanese and the Chinese off the Senkakus.
We are watching what is going on with fisheries.
Frankly, our force is standing ready to respond as the
Nation needs it to. That is a large body of water that, as you
are well aware, requires resources to patrol and maintain. We
have an aging and decrepit fleet that is being reduced in size,
so therefore our capacity to patrol those areas and meet surge
demands is being diminished.
Ms. Gabbard. Can you talk a little bit more about what
kinds of impacts you foresee should the sequester occur on
March 1 within the Pacific region?
Admiral Lee. We haven't singled out the Pacific for any
more or any less cuts than anywhere else. The operational
commanders have been given guidance whereby the guiding
principle was, preserve our capability to respond to search and
rescue and the preservation of life and property and to meet
security demands, and it was--there was no more specificity
than that.
Secretary Napolitano stated the other day that she would
anticipate that the operational lay-down could be curtailed as
much as 25 percent. We are leaving it to the operational
commanders to decide where that 25 percent cut will occur,
again, preserving our ability to respond and to surge if the
situation dictates.
Ms. Gabbard. Thank you very much. It is obviously an issue
of concern for us as we look forward to kind of keeping a close
eye on this as it develops. I also just want to commend your
folks on the ground who, as I have seen within the communities
and at all different levels--county, State, as well as the
Federal partners are creating these great partnerships that
allow for sharing of resources in ways that may not normally
occur. So great job with the folks on the ground.
For Mr. McAleenan, again, as Hawaii is a through point for
so much traffic, especially from Asia, and with your office
being responsible for customs and agricultural inspections
specifically, I have met with some of the folks on the ground
there who, as all of us are concerned about continued shortages
in manpower and labor and what that does to affect us as an
island State and our economy in particular with the
agricultural and other pests that we are often threatened by.
Invasive species have and could continue to destroy not just
our environment, but really from a basic economic level, we had
the coffee berry borer completely destroyed crops, costing
millions and millions of dollars to our local farmers and
really caused issues for our economy.
I am wondering how you foresee, as you are prioritizing
your risks, big picture, affecting economies like Hawaii's that
are these major through-points with the agricultural
inspections.
Mr. McAleenan. Thank you. Yes, being originally from
Hawaii, I am keenly aware of the importance of tourism and the
fragile agricultural ecosystem on the islands. With the
sequestration cuts we are still going to be doing all mandatory
agricultural exams. These are required under statute and
regulation that are run by the U.S. Department of Agriculture,
and it is the highest priority on the agricultural mission side
to continue those during sequestration.
On the tourism side, we are going to have fewer people to
staff the primary booths, so we will see increased wait times
at the airport. That could be up to 50 percent, with peak times
increasing significantly. So that is a concern. Lot of people
want to stay in Hawaii when they get there so it has some of
the--fewer challenges with missed connections than other
airports, but it is an issue that we are going to be facing if
we do go into the sequester.
Ms. Gabbard. Thank you. I didn't know you were a local boy.
What kinds of technology are you or your team looking at
really to----
Mrs. Miller. This will be the last question for the lady.
Your time is over.
Ms. Gabbard. Oh, I am sorry. I will stop there then. I can
follow up. Thank you.
Mrs. Miller. At this time the Chairwoman would recognize
Mr. Cuellar for 5 minutes. We welcome you back to the
committee.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you so much. Thanks for allowing me to
be here. To you, Madam Chairwoman, and the Ranking Member, and
Mr. Thompson, also, thank you very much.
We as a country, we still need--one of the most important
things we need to do is secure the border. For us here in
Texas, for the ones that don't just come visit and get an
impression but for the ones that live in Texas, we understand
that in areas like Texas securing the border has always been
challenging. It has been a concern.
In fact, I have a letter here from--somebody in charge of
the border sent this letter to the highest-ranking official in
Texas and he is talking about nine families--nine individuals
that came in with their families. They came in, they
disregarded the law, the stayed in Texas in disregard of what
the law was.
Most people would agree that that is an issue. The only
thing is that this was written under God and liberty by Coronet
Jose de las Piedrasto Stephen F. Austin on November 12, 1830.
He was talking about Americans coming into Texas. That was part
of Mexico at that time. Of course, you know, a little bit after
that they declare independence, then the United States got into
the real estate business and took over 55 percent of the
Mexican territory at that time that included Texas, California,
Utah--parts of Utah--and a whole bunch of other States.
So the border has been a concern for us in Texas for many
years. The issue is: How do we secure the border? Because I
think the gentleman, Mr. Barletta, was right: For anybody that
comes in with the simplistic view that if you put a fence that
will secure the border, you know, we have got to look beyond
that. By the way, we are just talking about his--the fence that
we built that we spent billions of dollars on the fence. There
were two young ladies that climbed the fence in 18 seconds, and
this is the fence that we spend billions of dollars, so we have
got to be smart on how we secure the border.
One mile of fence will cost--at least the numbers we were
given in this committee years ago--$7.5 billion per mile. One
mile of technology will cost about $1 million per mile, so we
have got to be smart on how we secure the border.
The other thing is, you are absolutely right, 40 percent of
those individuals didn't cross the river but came in through
legal permits and visas, so you can put the biggest fence and
still not secure the issue. So we have got to be smart on how
we do it.
When we spend billions of dollars we have got to understand
we are getting the best bang for the dollars. You know, for
years we have been struggling on how we measure the results for
those billions of dollars, how do we measure what we are doing?
A lot of times it has been, if I can say, us versus you--
and I appreciate all of the work that you all are doing, the
men and women--but as Mr. Thompson said, is a lot of times we
as the oversight individuals, we are not given the information
until later. For example, the border condition index--I haven't
seen it. I have no idea who is putting that together, and when
David Aguilar was in Laredo this last weekend we talked about
it and he gave me the same answer, that you all are working on
it.
We don't know what--who is putting the information to this
border condition, and I think folks like Beto or myself that
live on the border, folks that live there, we have got our
families there, we had our businesses there, we had everything
there, we want to know what performance measures are being used
to measure the border. I will tell you, I had Michael McCaul at
my house, stay with me, stay there with my wife, my two kids,
and think he was secure as a happy lark, and you know, he was
happy there, and you know, we didn't walk around with secure
guards or anything like that.
So, I mean, there is--everybody has a perception of what
border security is, but what we need is we need your help so we
can all agree finally what a secure border is. I am one of
those, I also feel that the border is secured.
Do we need to do more? Yes, I think we need to do more, and
this is why we asked GAO to do this comprehensive because in
the past, if you recall in this committee, we had two
individuals that were paid a little bit of money to come up
with this report that called the border a war zone. As Beto
said, you know, Laredo is more secure than Washington, DC. The
murder rate here is higher than other areas. But we have got to
come to an agreement as to what measures, otherwise Democrats
are going to say it is secure, Republicans say it is not going
to be and we are never going to get--hopefully we can get your
help in giving us that information so we can all come down to
the same measurements.
Before my time is over I have got to ask you: Who is
involved with preparing this border condition index? What
consultants are involved in this?
Fisher. Mr. Fisher.
Mr. Fisher. I am not aware of which consultants. I do know
that within U.S. Customs and Border Protection Mr. Mark
Morkowski, I think, had the lead for the office to help staff
that, but I am not aware of any consultants.
Mr. Cuellar. All right.
Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Mrs. Miller. Thanks.
In the interest of time--again, we have a hard deadline of
noon or before, but I know that it sounds like some of the
Members may like to have a follow-up, so if there are Members--
excuse me--we will go to 2 minutes for questions.
Start with the Ranking Member.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Madam Chairwoman, thank you very much, and
thank the Members very much.
Let me just say that I will quickly make these points. I
think the violence focuses more on drug cartels and gun
trafficking and various guns than two or three people walking
over the border, though it is of great concern.
I am going to ask some rapid-fire questions.
Chief Fisher, I would like to know your explanation as to
why ``operational control'' may not be the best terminology.
I would like to ask my good friend, Dr. Rosenblum, to try
to match the value of comprehensive immigration reform with
border security, how the two may be parallel.
I would like my friend from the GAO to assess how she
believes the CBP is responding to the recommendations that you
have made.
Finally, let me say that I empathize with my friend from
Pennsylvania, having been here during 9/11. But I will say that
overstays can be handled through a comprehensive immigration
reform.
Coming from Texas, I want to help ranchers and farmers, and
I hope that the chief will listen, and that is why I asked the
question about operational control. Move Border Patrol agents
to these areas, and can you do so when there is a need to
protect our ranchers and farmers?
I thank the Chairwoman--in my raspy voice.
Mr. Fisher. First question, in terms of operational
control, I want to be clear, because I know 3 years ago I
vehemently came out and said, ``No. No operational control.''
It is not because I am against that term, by the way; it is
because of the way that it was being used synonymously with
security at the time.
As we look at its origination and being a tactical term for
us to be able to deploy, redeploy resources and measure that in
a linear fashion as we deployed it, I didn't think it was
synonymous with security, given the context in which it was
being used outside of the organization. So I just wanted to be
clear on that and I think the direction that this committee is
having, in particular with the leadership of the Chairwoman, I
think it gets us back on track in terms of, regardless of what
we call it, what is it that we are looking to measure--that
being outcomes, not necessarily outputs.
Unknown. [Off mike.]
Mr. Fisher. Certainly. One of the challenges that we have
in moving--and the third pillar of our strategy, obviously, is
rapid response. How do we, when we have the intelligence, when
in an integrated fashion have to move Border Patrol agents,
some of the challenges include three things in particular: No.
1, when it comes to the negotiated agreement with the union
there are some things within the collective bargaining
agreement that prevents us from doing some of the flexibility,
the mobility that we need to. We would just normally work with
the union to be able to minimize and negotiate any impact and
implementations.
No. 2, the Office of Personnel Management, with the rules
and regulations, somehow--sometimes in the manner in which we
want to move Border Patrol agents within those rules and
regulations doesn't allow me the flexibility to do that at
times. No. 3, as we had discussed, is the uncertainty in terms
of budget.
Mr. Rosenblum. Ms. Jackson Lee, thank you for the question.
I think that one of the points that has come up today from
several of the questioners and several of the comments on the
panel is how important it is to think about border security in
a systemic context, you know, that we are concerned about flows
across the border, we are concerned about illegal flows through
the ports, we are concerned about overstays, and the tools that
we put in place right on the border are, you know, one of
several tools that also occur in a context of what we are doing
at worksites, what we are doing within the country, what our
admissions policies look like. So to focus just on the border
by itself and to aim for a number versus thinking about that
whole systemic approach, I think that it has come up over and
over again that that systemic approach has to be sort of how we
come up with that assessment.
Mrs. Miller. Thank you.
The Chairwoman now recognizes the gentleman from South
Carolina.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Just in the times of budget constraints and whatnot, I
would like Chief Fisher to talk with me a little bit about how
you work with local law enforcement, local ranchers on ranch
security as a force multiplier on securing the border.
Mr. Fisher. Thank you, sir. That is a really important
point, by the way. Matter of fact, in the strategy we call that
community engagement.
We recognize even with finite resources and Border Patrol
agents on the border, the border is very broad. The space in
which we operate is vast, as you well know.
Our ability to work with not just the State, local, and
Tribal law enforcement organizations that have the duty and
responsibility to enforce those laws and to assist us in the
same common goals in protecting this country, but it is the
community, right? It is the business owners that operate in and
around the border as well. They have a whole different
perspective in terms of things that they are seeing. They know
what is odd in a particular area and they know what belongs in
a particular area.
Our responsibility is to bring them in as communities of
interest and explain to them not just what we are doing and
hope they like us more, but understand specifically what the
threats are as defined by the intelligence community, defined
by our perspective and the area in which we operate, and make
them aware of that, and so that over time they are--and this
has worked over this past year in South Texas in particular,
you know, with some of the increase in business in terms of the
oil industry down there. We have had great cooperation with the
industry because we are explaining that some of the tactics,
techniques, and procedures that the criminal organizations are
using in that area and they have oftentimes given us
information that we wouldn't have otherwise gotten about
illegal activity there because we have explained to them what
our strategy is, the objectives in which we are trying to
achieve, and they have a better sense on how they can cooperate
in that regard.
Mr. Duncan. Were you shifting resources when you received
that information about where there might be a threat?
Mr. Fisher. Yes, sir.
Mr. Duncan. Okay. That is good.
Just one real quick question for Ms. Gambler: TSA--and you
have got a Global Entry program and you also have a TSA
PreCheck program. Is there any talk about combining those for--
just for efficiency measures?
Ms. Gambler. I am not aware of anything specifically like
that, but let me say that we do have some on-going work that we
are initiating to look at CBP's Trusted Traveler programs,
including the Global Entry program, and so we will be looking
at that going forward, in part for this subcommittee.
Mr. Duncan. I guess TSA PreCheck is more internal U.S.
domestic flights and so we need to make it easier for domestic
frequent travelers to fly within the United States.
Thank you.
Mrs. Miller. Thank you.
I certainly want to, again, thank all of the witnesses. I
think your testimony has been very, very helpful to the
subcommittee, and as we sort of take a step back here and ask
that question again, what does a secure border actually look
like and how do we get there, how do we measure it, et cetera?
So I appreciate all of your testimony.
I know the Ranking Member had two questions, and we would
ask for GAO in particular to----
Ms. Jackson Lee. And the chief, as well----
Mrs. Miller [continuing]. And the chief to respond in
writing to the Ranking Member's questions.
I would also remind every Member of the committee, as well,
that the hearing record will be open for 10 days, so if they
have any further questions or comments we can pursue that
avenue as well.
Without objection, this committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:46 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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Questions From Honorable Steven M. Palazzo for William D. Lee
Question 1a. The maritime domain is a vast far-reaching area with
over 12,300 miles of general U.S. coastline. It is unreasonable to
expect the Coast Guard will prevent all conceivable smuggling
activities. Our ability to maintain situational awareness is even more
critical because the maritime domain is so large. How does the Coast
Guard establish situational awareness in the maritime environment as to
have a best understanding of the trafficking of contraband?
In your view, what is the greatest threat to the homeland in the
maritime domain?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 1b. Are there any pressing gaps that the Coast Guard needs
to address?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2a. Maritime smuggling is constantly evolving with recent
trends including the use of panga boats and semisubmersible submarines.
Drug cartels are bypassing land borders and Ports of Entry by employing
panga boats on smuggling routes further west and north along the
California coast. Is there any pattern emerging that these panga boats
are using routes along the Gulf Coast?
What level of risk would you give the Gulf Coast to panga boats and
other similar smuggling methods?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2b. If so, has Border Patrol taken any steps to counteract
this trend?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2c. Does Border Patrol/Coast Guard have the necessary
resources to combat maritime smuggling both along the Gulf Coast and
the West Coast effectively?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Honorable Steven M. Palazzo for Michael J. Fisher
Question 1a. Maritime smuggling is constantly evolving with recent
trends including the use of panga boats and semisubmersible submarines.
Drug cartels are bypassing land borders and Ports of Entry by employing
panga boats on smuggling routes further west and north along the
California coast.
Is there any pattern emerging that these panga boats are using
routes along the Gulf Coast?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 1b. What level of risk would you give the Gulf Coast to
panga boats and other similar smuggling methods?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 1c. If so, has Border Patrol taken any steps to counteract
this trend?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 1d. Does Border Patrol/Coast Guard have the necessary
resources to combat maritime smuggling both along the Gulf Coast and
the West Coast effectively?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2a. In your testimony, you indicated that travelers should
expect delays because of the effects of sequestration.
What alternatives is CBP considering for avoiding delays for
travelers at its land border crossings, while maintaining effective
levels of security?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2b. How often does Border Patrol utilize the National
Guard in securing the border?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2c. How effective have these missions been?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2d. Could Border Patrol benefit from an increase of the
National Guard's presence along the border, particularly as we draw
down from the war in Afghanistan?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Honorable Beto O'Rourke for Kevin McAleenan
Question 1a. In your testimony, you noted that wait times and
service levels at our land ports of entry are a major focus for the
U.S. Customs and Border Protection. Specifically, you highlighted
efforts such as reduced vehicular wait times at our ports of entry in
fiscal year 2012 despite a 12% increase in traffic volume over the past
3 years and a 25% increased capacity to facilitate pedestrian traffic
flows at certain locations, such as the Paso del Norte Port of Entry in
my Congressional district.
Please provide data to the committee on the average vehicular and
pedestrian wait times at land ports of entry across the nine sectors of
the Southwest Border over the past 5 years.
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 1b. Based on current data, has CBP been able to project
future vehicular and pedestrian volume and wait times at the land ports
of entry across the nine sectors of the Southwest Border? If so, please
provide this data.
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 1c. Specifically as it relates to the each land port of
entry in El Paso (i.e. Paso del Norte Bridge, Ysleta International
Bridge, Stanton Street Bridge, and Bridge of Americas) please provide
the following data for the past 5 years:
The average vehicular and pedestrian wait times broken down
by time of day;
The average number of vehicular lanes open and closed;
The average number of hours all lanes have been opened.
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 1d. What current technological capabilities has CBP
implemented at its land ports of entry to provide real-time information
to travelers wishing to enter the United States? How accurate does CBP
believe this information to be? How does CBP plan to continue improving
upon its current technology?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 1e. How does CBP expect sequestration to impact wait times
at our land ports of entry? Additionally, does CBP have specific
projections as to how long vehicular and pedestrian wait times may
increase?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.