[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
SEQUESTRATION OVERSIGHT: PRIORITIZING SECURITY OVER ADMINISTRATIVE
COSTS AT TSA
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
of the
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT
AND GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
APRIL 18, 2013
__________
Serial No. 113-22
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov
http://www.house.gov/reform
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COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM
DARRELL E. ISSA, California, Chairman
JOHN L. MICA, Florida ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland,
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio Ranking Minority Member
JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
PATRICK T. McHENRY, North Carolina ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
JIM JORDAN, Ohio Columbia
JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
TIM WALBERG, Michigan WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
JUSTIN AMASH, Michigan JIM COOPER, Tennessee
PAUL A. GOSAR, Arizona GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania JACKIE SPEIER, California
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee MATTHEW A. CARTWRIGHT,
TREY GOWDY, South Carolina Pennsylvania
BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas MARK POCAN, Wisconsin
DOC HASTINGS, Washington TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
CYNTHIA M. LUMMIS, Wyoming ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
ROB WOODALL, Georgia DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky TONY CARDENAS, California
DOUG COLLINS, Georgia STEVEN A. HORSFORD, Nevada
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina MICHELLE LUJAN GRISHAM, New Mexico
KERRY L. BENTIVOLIO, Michigan
RON DeSANTIS, Florida
Lawrence J. Brady, Staff Director
John D. Cuaderes, Deputy Staff Director
Robert Borden, General Counsel
Linda A. Good, Chief Clerk
David Rapallo, Minority Staff Director
Subcommittee on National Security
JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah, Chairman
JOHN L. MICA, Florida JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee Ranking Minority Member
JUSTIN AMASH, Michigan CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
PAUL A. GOSAR, Arizona STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
TREY GOWDY, South Carolina JACKIE SPEIER, California
CYNTHIA M. LUMMIS, Wyoming PETER WELCH, Vermont
ROB WOODALL, Georgia MICHELLE LUJAN GRISHAM, New Mexico
KERRY L. BENTIVOLIO, Michigan
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on April 18, 2013................................... 1
WITNESS
Mr. John W. Halinski, Deputy Administrator, Transportation
Security Administration, U.S. Department Homeland Security
Oral Statement............................................... 9
Written Statement............................................ 11
SEQUESTRATION OVERSIGHT: PRIORITIZING SECURITY OVER ADMINISTRATIVE
COSTS AT TSA
----------
Thursday, April 18, 2013,
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on National Security,
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
Washington, D.C.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:00 a.m. in
room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, the Hon. Jason
Chaffetz [chairman of the subcommittee], presiding.
Present: Representatives Chaffetz, Mica, Issa, Gowdy,
Speier and Cummings.
Staff Present: Alexia Ardolina, Majority Assistant Clerk;
Molly Boyl, Majority Parliamentarian; Daniel Bucheli, Majority
Assistant Clerk; Caitlin Carroll, Majority Deputy Press
Secretary; John Cuaderes, Majority Deputy Staff Director; Adam
P. Fromm, Majority Director of Member Services and Committee
Operations; Linda Good, Majority Chief Clerk; Michael R. Kiko,
Majority Staff Assistant; Mitchell S. Kominsky, Majority
Counsel; Mark D. Marin, Majority Director of Oversight; Scott
Schmidt, Majority Deputy Director of Digital Strategy; Rebecca
Watkins, Majority Deputy Director of Communications; Jaron
Bourke, Minority Director of Administration; Devon Hill,
Minority Research Assistant; Chris Knauer, Minority Senior
Investigator; Rory Sheehan, Minority New Media Press Secretary;
Cecelia Thomas, Minority Counsel.
Mr. Chaffetz. Good morning. The committee will come to
order.
I would like to begin this hearing by stating the Oversight
Committee mission statement. We exist to secure two fundamental
principles. First, Americans have a right to know the money
Washington takes from them is well spent; and second, Americans
deserve an efficient, effective government that works for them.
Our duty on the Oversight and Government Reform Committee is to
protect these rights.
Our solemn responsibility is to hold government accountable
to taxpayers, because taxpayers have a right to know what they
get from their government. We will work tirelessly in
partnership with citizen watchdogs to deliver the facts to the
American people and bring genuine reform to the Federal
bureaucracy. This is the mission of the Oversight and
Government Reform Committee.
First, I would like to take a moment to express our deepest
condolences to the victims and families of the Boston Marathon
attacks and certainly what is happening at this time in West,
Texas. It affects all of us. You can't be human and not feel
for the people that are having to deal with these things.
You also can't be grateful enough to the men and women who
are there and responding. They woke up one day and everything
was good and they were going to go to work or enjoy a marathon,
or just be at home, and then all of a sudden, a disaster
strikes, and terrorism strikes. And there are good men and
women who wake up and answer that call and respond. They didn't
necessarily choose or think they were going to be in that
situation. But suddenly they were. Our hearts and prayers go to
them.
And certainly, with my colleague and ranking member, Mr.
Tierney, who is obviously in the Massachusetts area today, we
will miss him, but totally understand it is the right place for
him to be.
Senseless acts of violence and terrorism, such as what
happened in the community of Boston, should never be tolerated.
The bombings are a sober reminder that the threat of terrorism
has not disappeared.
I want to specifically commend the TSA, including officers
at the Boston Logan Airport for their dedication and working
closely with the Boston police to heighten security and help
ensure the safety of the traveling public. Their quick and
immediate response in making sure that some of those facilities
were secure for some of the departures of somebody who might be
trying to escape are certainly commendable, not only in Boston
but some of the smaller, other regional airports as well.
TSA proactively helped by asking passengers if they had
seen anything, had photos or videos of the explosion. Also, it
is my understanding that TSA wisely increased security at other
significant airports during a period when it is unknown whether
the bombings in Boston were part of a greater plot. For that,
we are very grateful to the men and women who participated.
That is what they are there for, and we need their help and
their expertise and we appreciate it.
The tragedy which occurred in Boston is very much relevant
to today's proceedings, as this hearing is designed to evaluate
the impact of the sequestration on TSA's security operations.
On March 1st of this year, the President issued a sequestration
order, as required by law, mandating $3.2 billion in budget
cuts for the Department of Homeland Security.
Prior to and in the wake of sequester, Secretary Napolitano
alarmed the public with sharp rhetoric on multiple occasions
that TSA's operations would in fact be significantly impacted
via the sequestration. For example, on March 4th of this year,
Secretary Napolitano stated that airport lines were already
``150 to 200 percent as long as they would normally expect,''
and that TSA would start sending furlough notices immediately.
However, in TSA Deputy Administrator Halinski's written
testimony for today's hearing, Mr. Halinski states that ``the
initial projected impacts on wait times are largely
mitigated.'' This assessment seems in stark contrast to
Secretary Napolitano's initial rhetoric.
Now, we are almost two months beyond the start of
sequestration, and today I would like to learn whether TSA has
furloughed any employees, and if so, how many. I would also
like to hear today if Secretary Napolitano's concerns about
wait times doubling for the traveling public has proven true.
Deputy Administrator Halinski's written testimony also
notes that ``After applying sequestration to its final enacted
fiscal year 2013 appropriation, TSA's fiscal year 2013 funding
level is $670 million less than fiscal year 2012.''
Placed in context, however, President Obama's fiscal year
2013 budget includes $7.65 billion for TSA, which includes more
than $2.5 billion in fee collections. In other words, while the
reduction to TSA's budget does require prudent planning, I
strongly believe that TSA could be cutting unnecessary
administrative costs and spending more effectively on security
programs and other types of technology.
For example, despite the looming budget cuts required by
sequestration, TSA agreed to an eyebrow-raising $50 million
contract for TSA uniforms. I will note, though, that I do
appreciate the responsiveness from the TSA. In my short time
here, I have seen a dramatic change in the responsiveness.
Initially as we sent letters and other things back to the
agency, we didn't get any responses. But in the case
specifically of the uniforms, we got a very thorough and a very
timely response. That is new. We like that. We encourage that.
We applaud it and we note it here today.
Moreover, during the 112th Congress, this subcommittee held
a series of TSA oversight hearings. During these hearings, we
learned that there are numerous examples of ongoing waste at
the TSA. These hearings examine the range of issues including
the effectiveness, privacy issues, health risks associated with
whole body imaging machines. We looked into the use of canines,
airport perimeter security, SPOT program, TWIC, TSA
procurement, deployment and storage of airport security-related
equipment.
I would also note the work of the then-chairman of the
Transportation Committee, Mr. Mica, who is here on this panel
with us today, and thank him for his good work on the oversight
of this as well.
GAO believes the SPOT program, for instance, which has
already cost taxpayers more than $800 million, is ineffective
and recommended that Congress should consider limiting funding
for the program. Likewise, committee investigators found that
TSA had wasted approximately $184 million by inefficiently
deploying screening equipment and technology to commercial
airports.
These are just a few examples of a number of potential ways
for TSA to spend taxpayer funding more efficiently to account
for the budget reduction without impacting security operations
or increasing wait times.
Today's hearing should explore potential solutions to
account for the budget cuts without affecting operations. For
example, instead of using whole body imaging, TSA should be
doing an analysis of whether canines would be more effective in
conjunction with metal detectors and behavioral profiling and
other types of efforts like that.
I also invited the Customs and Border Protection today,
CBP, but unfortunately they are unable to testify.
Mr. Halinski, I would like to hear your thoughts on how to
lessen wait times for international travelers entering the
United States. I look forward to hearing from the Deputy
Administrator about the continued planning for sequestration
and the challenge faced by the TSA and the solutions we can
reach together.
I would now like to recognize the gentlewoman from
California, Ms. Speier, for her opening statement.
Ms. Speier. Mr. Chairman, thank you, and thank you, Mr.
Halinski, for being here. I too want to associate myself with
the comments made by the Chair in applauding the first
responders in Boston, our FBI who was on the scene immediately,
and send our condolences to the families who have lost loved
ones and those who have endured excruciating pain and maiming
as a result of this horrific incident. It draws into clarity
why we do need to have a homeland security operation and TSA as
well.
I first want to make clear that I believe that deficit
reduction should be a priority. But I am also of the opinion
that spending cuts should be targeted and implemented in a
strategic way.
Unfortunately, Congress did not allow Federal agencies that
discretion. Instead, Congress required all Federal agencies to
make a hatchery of cuts to every program activity and program.
This was supposed to be such a bad idea that it would not
happen. But as a result of this dysfunction and the institution
it has, and we and the public are now seeing some of the
consequences.
We heard on Tuesday about planned cuts to services in our
national parks, our beloved Smithsonian. But at least those do
not affect our national security.
At TSA, sequestration was causing reductions in the number
of TSA officers at the Nation's airports. TSA was powerless to
prevent that outcome because Congress had required the agency
to impose these across the board cuts. So Congress took action,
as only Congress can. It passed a new law that provided TSA
with additional funds to partially reverse the effects of
sequestration. Still, Congress has not even tried to reverse
the effects of sequestration at most other Federal agencies.
Today we will hear from TSA regarding the impacts of
sequestration on their operations, and on national security. I
look forward to hearing how they have been affected by these
budget cuts and its plans to try and balance administrative
personnel and equipment costs going forward.
One of the biggest cuts has been to TSA's information
technology budget. This includes checkpoint technologies,
security screening equipment and infrastructure accounts. These
budget cuts have caused contracts for new IT equipment and
maintenance to be deferred or reduced, leaving security
equipment prone to error and threatening our citizens safety.
At the same time, I have in the past been concerned by some
of TSA's technology programs and procurement efforts including
the much-discussed airport puffer machines several years ago,
that were purchased without any determination of whether they
would work in an airport environment.
I would like to hear from TSA how TSA has improved its
technology procurement practices and how, in this challenging
budget environment, TSA will ensure accountability and an
adequate acquisition workforce to ensure proper use of TSA
funds in technology development.
Finally, the Federal air marshals the last line of defense
against those who seek to disrupt domestic flights, through
criminal or terrorist actions, will be cut by $49 million and
are expected to remain on a hiring freeze. I look forward to
hearing how this will affect the security of the traveling
public and its long-term implications for the air marshal
services.
These are not speculations or scare tactics, but rather,
these cuts are affecting real people and we need to have our
eyes wide open to assess to what extent these cuts potentially
jeopardize the safety and security of the United States. It is
the responsibility of Congress to make these budget cuts more
targeted and less likely to put innocent citizens in harm's
way.
I would like to join with the chairman and my colleagues on
both sides of the aisle to start a meaningful, bipartisan
negotiation to replace aspects of the sequester and to prevent
these cuts from becoming something we will regret. I have
recently launched the bipartisan Congressional Watchdog Caucus
with Congressman Coffman of Colorado to create a culture of
accountability for taxpayer dollars. I firmly believe that if
we work together we can be smarter in weeding out waste, be
fiscally sound and still ensure the safety of the traveling
public.
In light of the despicable terrorist bombings that occurred
in Boston on Monday, I cannot imagine that any American citizen
is remotely interested in hearing about how the dysfunction of
this Congressional body allowed unnecessary and preventable
budget cuts to compromise their safety.
I yield back.
Mr. Chaffetz. I now recognize the chairman of the full
committee, the gentleman from California, Mr. Issa.
Mr. Issa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Speier,
Mr. Cummings, my ranking member, and Mr. Mica.
We have all sat through multiple hearings about the
dysfunctional organization known as the TSA. Now, Ms. Speier
says sequestration is to blame. If I were a southerner and had
been around animals long enough, I could say ``bull'' in a
better way. But it is bull.
You are here today because, in fact, you have more assets
than you should possibly need. You have grown assets, you have
grown bureaucracy, your organization is constantly known as
TSA, Thousands Standing Around. And the reason is, you
endlessly include more and more people doing less and less.
And I am not blaming the men and women of the TSA. There
has been a pattern of acquisitions, of products that don't
work, warehouses filled with equipment that was bought and not
used, contracts that promised to do one thing, and $1 billion
later, they don't do what they claim to do.
I think the most important thing is, until people going
through checkpoints see the efficiency of people with blue
uniforms, and by the way, I would like those blue uniforms to
be a little more cost effective the next time you buy them,
they are not going to believe a word you say today. You can
tell us everything you want to tell us, but the men and women
on the dais here, we go through the checkpoints. We see it. We
see long lines, we have seen long lines for more than a decade,
as your numbers have increased.
We see more people right now working in the headquarters of
the TSA than work in the GAO, our accounting and investigation
section. You have practically as much overhead as all of
Congress. And yes, you have made cuts in areas that could
potentially endanger America, because you haven't been willing
to have attrition and right-sizing. You haven't encouraged
alternatives to Federal employees when you could.
Now, the truth is, and I think the chairman would say he
has seen it going back to Utah, like I have seen it going back
to California, I listen to people who are TSA employees being
used to say, no water bottles, put this in there, do this, do
that. The bottom line is, that does not have to be an essential
function. There were essential failures on 9/11, and they were
mostly what we didn't know. And each time we have had another
incident, we learn something else, your men and women, your
hard-working men and women, have tried to react.
But between too much overhead, organizational failures,
incredible staffing questions, I am going to close with this,
Mr. Chairman. And this is not a normal opening statement for a
chairman. But when I see these little daises being put up so
that supervisors can look over the legions of people that it
takes to put somebody through a line, I could do a simple
count, and every member here can. The number of people to move
a person through the line is not going down, it is going up.
Now, you are going to testify about, woe is me, we are
going to be unsafe because we got a little less dollars. Go
back to your budget after 9/11, 2003, 2004, 2005. Move it up in
constant dollars and I am terribly sorry, but by 2004, tell me
that shouldn't have been your highest cost at the time. It is
not that there were more travelers, there were less.
So as you give us your testimony, bear in mind that the
only people who will really believe that you are doing all you
can for efficiency and safety are people who have not flown.
I yield back.
Mr. Chaffetz. I thank the chairman. I now recognize the
ranking member, the gentleman from Maryland, Mr. Cummings, for
an opening statement.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much.
I had not intended to even attend this hearing. I really
didn't intend to say anything. But I want us to not be
distracted. I want us to not be distracted.
We have to make sure that the people that we represent are
getting the best service possible. Their health, their safety,
their welfare is number one.
It is easy to sit back and try to quarterback the other
team. Decisions have to be made at TSA, and I am going to
believe that TSA wants to do the right thing. That does not
necessarily mean that I or my colleagues will agree with those
decisions.
But first of all, I want to make sure that those decisions
are based in a culture of integrity. That is number one. Number
two, I want to know that they are informed decisions; that is,
that you have gathered information and your decisions are based
upon information that is accurate. Number three, I want to know
that the decisions were based upon and consistent with the
goals of TSA.
Now, we all know that sequestration has had its impacts. It
has had a tremendous impact. If it can have an impact on Johns
Hopkins University, which is smack dab right in the middle of
my district, which is now having to end research on some life-
saving types of research, it certainly can have an impact on
TSA. What I am interested to know is, number one, how these
decisions were made; number two, is there some room to do
things differently; number three, were they consistent with
making sure that the public is safe.
And certainly we all want to know that there is a balance.
Safety is number one. And convenience is down the line. I don't
want to sacrifice safety for convenience. So I am hoping that
the testimony will shed some light on what I just said.
Finally, let me leave you with this. In the end, the
Republic is looking at us, as members of the Congress, and I am
sure asking why can't you all get this right. I am not going to
sit here and blame TSA, I am going to blame us. We are the ones
who are responsible for sequestration, because of our failure.
Now, that does not let TSA off the hook. But we have our
own homework to do. But in the midst, and I tell my kids that
usually in bad situations, people do not so bright things.
Under pressure, people do not so bright things. So I am hoping
that while we are going through this sequestration that we are
making the very best decisions, consistent with the goals that
I just mentioned. So I am looking forward to hearing the
testimony. And I want to know what the future looks like, no
matter what, assuming that this Congress is doing what it is
supposed to do. I am praying to God that we do, but assuming
that we don't, assuming that there are additional cuts, I want
to know what the future looks like. Because that is what we
have to deal with. We cannot deal with illusions. This is
reality, because we are dealing with the safety of our
constituents.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for your
courtesy, and I yield back.
Mr. Chaffetz. I thank the ranking member and now recognize
the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Mica, for five minutes.
Mr. Mica. First of all, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and
ranking member. Let me say that Mr. Chaffetz and I and the
chairman have sat down to look at how we are going to approach
improving and reforming TSA. And with this hearing, we are
beginning under the jurisdiction of this subcommittee, National
Security, that process.
We will continue that in my subcommittee, Government
Operations. We will begin a series of hearings in May and we
will target some operations that transcend just the national
security area. And you can see from the passion of the
chairman, probably at the full committee, we will be taking up
this matter as far as the need to reform and dramatically
overhaul an agency that has spun out of control.
I can tell you that it has spun out of control because I
helped create it. Originally we had 16,500 screeners, private
screeners under the airlines' supervision. On 9/11/2001, it
wasn't that group that failed, it was the Federal Government
who did not set guidelines or parameters or restrictions in
place. Never, I can tell you, in our wildest imagination, did
we expect to balloon from 16,500 to 65,000 TSA employees. In
fact, we have now grown to bigger than seven Cabinet agencies.
We are spending close to $8 billion, an incredible sum of
money.
We have 51,000 screeners, according to their website. That
means you have another 14,000 administrative staff. I see they
are now cooking the latest books and trying to mislead Congress
on what they spend for administration, which is approximately
$1.8 billion for screening and about $1.2 billion. They have 28
percent of the headquarters employees who are supervisors. We
are here to talk about sequestration, and as the chairman
pointed out in his opening statement, the Secretary tried to
mislead the public and the Congress by saying that line would
be 150 percent or people would be inconvenienced by what
Congress did.
Now, with 51,000 screeners, they can't get the job done. I
can tell you it can be done with less than half that number. We
need to get them out of the screening business. They are not
law enforcement officers. TSA was set up to connect the dots
and also to set the standards and also to coordinate some of
the effort. But what we have now is an agency that again has
spun out of control. We have again a situation where they are
spending money, and we will look at it today, on things like
uniforms. I am told that our Marines are given a $400 lifetime
allowance. And a few weeks before sequestration they sign a
multi-million, I think it is tens of millions of dollars for
thousand dollar, which I guess they had agreed to with the
screeners' allowance, to put that into perspective.
We only have 457 airports where we have TSA's presence, and
we are spending in fact huge amounts of money with huge amounts
of personnel. If you take 3,000 to 4,000 people in Washington,
administrative personnel, another 10,000 in the field, do the
math of the army that is out there in administrative staff
alone, not to mention the failures in training, employment, in
a whole host of areas that are all outlined. I would ask that
this report that the Transportation Committee put together on
the tenure record of TSA, which is a record of failure, it was
outlined by the chairman, the purchase and implementation of
deployment of top technology, of hiring and training, retaining
personnel. It goes on and on.
The different systems that have been put in place, not by
my judgment, but by other evaluative agencies like GAO, the
failure in behavior detection programs, never detecting a
single terrorist, in fact, letting some of the known suspects
get through. It is a record of failure and it needs to stop.
I look forward to working with Chairman Chaffetz, the full
committee chairman, ranking member and others to do better. We
can and we must. I yield back.
Mr. Chaffetz. Without objection, we will enter that into
the record. So ordered.
Does the gentleman from South Carolina have an opening
statement?
Mr. Gowdy. No, sir, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chaffetz. Members will have seven days to submit
opening statements for the record.
We will now recognize our first panel, the only witness
that we have here today, Mr. John Halinski, who is the Deputy
Administrator for the Transportation Security Administration.
Mr. Halinski, we appreciate your being here today.
Pursuant to committee rules, all witnesses are sworn in
before they testify. So if you would please stand and raise
your right hand.
Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you are
about to give will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing
but the truth?
[Witness responds in the affirmative.]
Mr. Chaffetz. Thank you. You may be seated, and let the
record reflect that the witness answered in the affirmative.
Mr. Halinski, we now recognize you for your opening
statement.
STATEMENT OF JOHN W. HALINSKI, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR,
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Halinski. Good morning Chairman, distinguished members
of the Subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify
today about the impact of sequestration on the Transportation
Security Administration's operations.
As you know, the President's March 1 sequestration order,
as mandated by law, requires across-the-board budget cuts at
most Federal agencies, including $3.2 billion in cuts for the
Department of Homeland Security through the end of this fiscal
year.
TSA is the Federal Government's lead agency for protecting
our transportation systems from terrorist attacks while
ensuring the freedom of movement for people and commerce. The
agency manages effective and efficient screening and security
of all air passengers, baggage, and cargo on passenger planes.
It also deploys Federal Air Marshals internationally and
domestically to detect, deter, and defeat hostile acts
targeting air carriers, airports, passengers, crews, and other
transportation infrastructure.
Each year, transportation systems protected by TSA
accommodate approximately 640 million aviation passengers; 751
million passengers traveling on buses; more than 9 billion
passenger trips on mass transit; nearly 800,000 daily shipments
of hazardous materials; more than 140,000 miles of railroad
track; more than 4 million miles of public roads; and nearly
2.6 million miles of pipeline.
TSA functions as a critical component of those efforts with
a highly dedicated workforce working around the clock and
across the globe to execute our transportation security
responsibilities. Every day we interact closely with public and
private sector stakeholders in the aviation, freight rail, mass
transit, passenger rail, highway, and pipeline sectors to
employ an intelligence-driven, risk-based security approach
across all modes of transportation. We are dedicated to
preventing terrorist attacks, reducing the vulnerability of our
transportation systems to terrorism, and improving the
experience of the nearly 1.8 million domestic air passengers
who fly each day.
Throughout the planning efforts, TSA and its DHS components
were careful to strike a balance to take prudent, responsible
steps to implementing the across-the-board budget reductions.
Our guiding principles have been as follows. One, preserve
TSA's frontline operations and other mission-critical
activities to the maximum extent possible. Two, take care of
our workforce by managing hiring practices, managing overtime
and through other means.
While the reductions required by sequestration will
continue to impact our operations, the recent passage by
Congress of the fiscal year 2013 Consolidated and Further
Continuing Appropriation Act provides TSA with some additional
funding for transportation security officers, which to some
degree lessens the impact on our workforce and operations.
TSA will use these additional funds to maintain its
security screening workforce through prudent management of
hiring and controlled overtime.
Although initial projected impacts on wait times are likely
to be mitigated through the additional funding provided by
Congress, travelers may see lines and wait times increase
during the busiest travel periods or required surge operations.
The Federal Air Marshal Service has had a hiring pause in place
for more than a year to manage a planned program adjustment
from $965.8 million in fiscal year 2012 to $929.6 million in
fiscal year 2013. Congress further reduced that funding in the
full fiscal year 2013 appropriation to $906.9 million, or $858
million under sequestration, an 11.1 percent cut below fiscal
year 2012 levels.
The FAMS mission funding is dominated by personnel, travel,
and related costs. TSA continues to assess the personnel
actions and mission adjustments that will be necessary at this
decreased budget level.
Sequestration has also had impacts on TSA's information
technology, checkpoint technology, security screening equipment
and infrastructure accounts, totaling a $288 million reduction
from fiscal year 2012. In light of these cuts, IT service
contracts, equipment refreshment and maintenance schedules will
be deferred or reduced through the end of the fiscal year.
Furthermore, security equipment technology replacement and
investment plans are being adjusted to reflect the reduced
budget level.
Finally, TSA is taking action to establish additional
controls across the agency. We have canceled previously
approved training activities, conferences and meetings that
require travel. This includes management control training,
field and oversight and compliance audits, operational and
support program coordination planning and preparedness
training.
Our Nation continues to face an evolving threat to our
transportation system. In the face of sequestration, TSA will
continue implementing an intelligence-driven, risk-based
approach to security across all transportation modes, and to do
so as efficiently as possible.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I
look forward to answering your questions.
[Prepared statement of Mr. Halinski follows:]
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Mr. Chaffetz. Thank you, Mr. Halinski. Again, we appreciate
your being here.
I will now recognize myself for five minutes.
How many furloughs do you anticipate, or how many have
happened so far and how many do you anticipate?
Mr. Halinski. Sir, at this point we do not anticipate any
furloughs. We believe that through managed hiring practices,
and control of overtime, we will not have to furlough any of
our personnel.
Mr. Chaffetz. So no furloughs. Number two here on my list
of questions, where specifically are we experiencing longer
lines than pre-sequestration? You have the same personnel,
right? So there are no furloughs. Where are we having longer
lines?
Mr. Halinski. Sir, I would tell you that I don't know that
we are having longer lines across the board anywhere at the
checkpoint. If we do, it can be dependent on a number of
factors, weather, flight delays, things like that.
Mr. Chaffetz. So there are natural things that would happen
that have nothing to do with sequestration. Would it be fair
for me to say that due to sequestration, there are no longer
lines?
Mr. Halinski. I would say that we have not experienced any
longer lines at this point, sir.
Mr. Chaffetz. When did you start planning for
sequestration?
Mr. Halinski. Sir, we started planning for sequestration in
2012.
Mr. Chaffetz. Do you know when in 2012?
Mr. Halinski. I don't have that right off the top of my
head, sir. I know it was in late 2012 we started looking at
sequestration, the effects. And we planned almost on a daily
basis. We looked at a number of factors. What I would say, sir,
is that things moved quickly. It was bit of a moving target.
Sequestration, no sequestration, CR, no CR, budget, no budget.
And we continued to plan based on numbers that we got both from
the House and the Senate.
Mr. Chaffetz. What I am trying to do is commend you for the
fact that, the contrast that I see here, I want to commend you
for planning in such a way that you were able to absorb a cut
in the budget. Despite what Secretary Napolitano said, there
are no longer lines, there are no furloughs out there. TSA is
one place that we can point where the services were basically
uninterrupted, and the effect to the public was minimized. I
compliment you for that. I think we can all, every once in a
while, we have growing and expanding budgets and you have cut
back just a little bit, you have tightened your belt a little
bit, you have become more efficient. Sometimes that pushes you.
My compliments and hats off to you.
The inbound international passengers are experiencing some
lines. But that has nothing to do with the TSA, is that
correct? Is that Customs and Border Patrol that is slowing
those lines down?
Mr. Halinski. Sir, I believe that the Secretary clarified a
couple of weeks ago when she was talking about longer wait
times that it was not the TSA, that it was Customs and Border
Protection, where they were experiencing longer wait times,
sir.
Mr. Chaffetz. So you did something that they didn't do.
Obviously you have been able to make the adjustments, no
furloughs, no longer lines. I think there are an awful lot of
scare tactics out there, they still continue, you still have
people saying, oh, my goodness, the world is falling down and
people are going to die and we can't invest. But at least I
think part of the story here with the TSA is you have been able
to absorb it. The public has been well served.
There are still a lot of issues that we have with the TSA.
But what I am trying to get at is specific to sequestration. I
think that is interesting.
I know Mr. Mica has done a lot of work on this,
particularly as the chair of the Transportation Committee, he
may hit on this as well. I want to ask you about the TWIC
program, this is the Transportation Worker Identification
Cards. There was a GAO report back in May of 2011 that said
that it ``could cost the Federal Government and the private
sector combined total of between $694.3 million and $3.2
billion over a 10-year period.'' And yet still to this day, we
don't even have the scanners needed to read these cards.
This and the FAA card, which I am not going to hold you
responsible for, that is another whole issue, but the TWIC
card, where are we with that? What kinds of problems and
challenges is that causing at security, particularly at
airports?
Mr. Halinski. Sir, first let me say that the TWIC program
is a fee-based program, number one. Two, that the TSA portion
of the TWIC program, and we work very closely with the Coast
Guard and the Department on this particular program, TSA's
portion of this basically can be defined in two areas. The
first I would say is customer support at the enrollment
centers. I would tell you that we have done an assessment of
those particular enrollment centers based on complaints that we
received. We have adjusted that, we have changed contractors
and we are having a more direct approach on that customer
service approach and oversight.
The second piece is more of a technical piece for TSA, sir,
and that is the identification of readers, quite frankly. We
would provide a best qualified or a recommended qualified list
of readers. One of the issues that we have encountered, sir, is
the fact that trying to look at contractors that have readers
and push them forward to try to develop readers that we think
will meet the requirements. We believe we are working on that,
we just had an industry day last week with a variety of vendors
to provide those readers. We would like to get that out in a
very short period of time, a recommended list for the TWIC card
moving forward.
As I said, we worked very closely with the Coast Guard on
this, sir, and the Department, on the TWIC program.
Mr. Chaffetz. Thank you. I look forward to continued
updates. This is a very costly endeavor and should have really
been implemented much sooner. But I appreciate the update and
look forward to more.
I will now recognize the ranking member here today, Ms.
Speier, for five minutes.
Ms. Speier. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Halinski, you actually had money restored to your
budget after sequestration in the CR. How much was restored to
your budget?
Mr. Halinski. Ma'am, I don't have that right here. The
other piece that I think is important about TSA is that we also
have two-year money. Unlike many other components in DHS, and
many other agencies, we had two-year money with carryover. So
that helped us quite a bit, where it may not have helped other
components or the Department.
Ms. Speier. So the chairman's comments that well, you
didn't furlough anyone, you were able to live within
sequestration, does not take into effect that one, you have a
two-year budget, and two, in the CR you had money restored to
your budget that other departments did not have, is that
correct?
Mr. Halinski. I would tell you, ma'am, I would like to go
back to what I said about planning. We have planned
meticulously for sequestration. We want to focus on two things.
One is making sure that we accomplish our mission based on the
threat. Two is that we take care of our workforce. We have
tried to avoid furloughs, we have used two-year money. We have
used money that was resubmitted to us. And that is the process
we have used. We continue to plan to make sure that we can
accomplish those first two objectives.
Ms. Speier. All right. We tend to focus on the airports as
being your sole responsibility. The truth is, TSA also has the
responsibility to oversee rail security and pipeline security,
is that correct?
Mr. Halinski. Yes, ma'am, it is.
Ms. Speier. I just wanted to make a point of that.
I have had an interesting experience with TSA and their
uniforms. A number of years ago, a contract was issued to a
company here in the United States to make the uniforms for TSA.
It was competitively bid. And once it had the contract, it
realized there wasn't a requirement that the actual uniforms be
made in the United States. So they closed the plant here in the
United States and they made the uniforms in Mexico.
Is this the same company that you have just issued a new
contract to?
Mr. Halinski. I am not sure if it is the same company,
ma'am. The company that we use is a company called VF Image. A
portion of the uniforms are made in Mexico. We have to comply
by NAFTA as well as the U.S.-Chilean trade agreement. We are in
compliance with the law in that area.
About a third of the uniforms that our officers have are
made in the United States. The material itself is made in the
United States. The company assembles the uniforms and it is
shipped back and we are trying to comply with the NAFTA and the
U.S.-Chilean trade agreement, ma'am.
Ms. Speier. Mr. Halinski, we somehow get around the NAFTA
rule when it comes to military uniforms being made in the
United States for security purposes. I can't imagine why NAFTA
applies to TSA. And, if in fact, NAFTA does apply to TSA, then
I think this committee should take some steps to make sure that
we are making these uniforms in the United States, and not in a
foreign country whether NAFTA is involved or not. We actually
closed a plant here in the United States. Jobs were lost in the
United States because this company, upon getting the contract,
recognized it could make them in Mexico.
Now, let's move on to talk about this. This is a $50
million contract. Is this a ceiling, or is this the actual
amount of money that will be spent on these uniforms?
Mr. Halinski. Ma'am, it is a ceiling. It is a bridge
contract. We are moving to align with the Department so that
the acquisition process for the uniforms in the future. It is a
two-year bridge contract. It is the ceiling. Typically over the
last couple of years, the allowance that we have spent on
uniforms is between $16 million and about $19 million.
I would say, ma'am, it is essential, we are a uniformed
service, we require uniforms to conduct our activities.
Ms. Speier. I understand that. Is there a provision within
this contract for you to cancel the contract?
Mr. Halinski. Ma'am, I don't know that. I could get back
with you on that.
Ms. Speier. All right, would you please inform the
committee about that?
I still continue to be very disturbed that these uniforms
are being made, the majority of these uniforms, based on your
testimony, two-thirds of them are being made outside the United
States. It is a slap in the American people's face, I think.
And for all the people that are unemployed in this Country,
even today, the fact that we are making them in Mexico is very
disturbing to me.
I yield back.
Mr. Chaffetz. I now recognize the gentleman from Florida,
Mr. Mica, for five minutes.
Mr. Mica. Thank you.
Let me continue on the uniforms. What did you just say,
that we are a uniformed agency? What was your term?
Mr. Halinski. Yes, sir, we are a uniformed service.
Mr. Mica. Who told you you were? Where is it written?
Mr. Halinski. Sir, I will have to go back.
Mr. Mica. Where is it written? You just said that before
the committee.
Mr. Halinski. Sir, I believe it is in ATSA that we are a
uniformed agency.
Mr. Mica. Are your personnel, your screeners, are they
sworn personnel? Are they sworn law enforcement personnel? The
answer is no. You are the deputy, you don't know. First of all,
you came up with the term that they are uniformed. Secondly,
you do not know whether they are sworn. Are they sworn
personnel? Are they law enforcement personnel? They are not.
Come on, admit it to the committee. Yes or no? Is there some
acoustical problem we have here? Maybe staff should check it.
Can he hear me? Can the witness hear me?
Mr. Halinski. Yes, sir, I can hear you.
Mr. Mica. Are they sworn personnel? They are not. Is that
correct? They are not sworn personnel. Why do we even have law
enforcement personnel to supplement TSA personnel at almost
every exit? Because TSA are not law enforcement officers. They
are screeners. And now you are telling me they are uniformed
personnel. You just heard the ranking member, what an insult.
You hijack an agency like TSA, you turn it into one of the
biggest bureaucracies we have ever created. I want to know the
cost of changing out, you had white uniforms, didn't you, when
we started for many years? Didn't we have white uniforms,
without a badge? They had a TSA patch without a badge? How much
did the badges cost?
They are not sworn, or they are not law enforcement. You
went out and bought millions of dollars worth of badges, didn't
you? The insult too is we're wearing Mexican uniforms, you
changed them out to blue to look like law enforcement folks
another mirage. Have you ever looked at England and U.K., for
example, two areas that have experienced probably the highest
levels of terrorism and bombing and terrorist incidents? Most
of their employees don't even wear uniforms, did you know that?
Have you been there, to both of those?
Mr. Halinski. Yes, sir, I have.
Mr. Mica. Did you notice that? I was just in Israel earlier
this year. I was in the U.K. just a while ago, inspected the
people who are there. They don't even wear them. Here, you
spent $50 million, now I am told you have committed this every
year, this is a $1,000 a year, 51,000 employees, is that true?
Just before sequestration, you signed the contract, right?
Were you aware that our uniformed personnel, like our
Marines, get a one-time $400 lifetime allowance when you cooked
that deal with the unions? Were you aware of that? Did you look
at that?
Mr. Halinski. Could I have an opportunity to respond, sir?
Mr. Mica. Did you look at who else, like men and women who
put their lives at risk in our military, what they get as an
allowance? Is that going to continue? Is that going to continue
every year?
Mr. Halinski. Sir, I spent 25 years in the Marine Corps. I
know the Marine Corps very well.
Mr. Mica. Okay, then you should know the allowance. I am
more offended by someone who has been in the Marines or aware
of the Marines and to give that kind of a deal. Is this every
year?
Mr. Halinski. Sir, may I have a chance to respond?
Mr. Mica. Is it a thousand dollars a year? Simple question.
Mr. Halinski. Sir, what we spend on our uniforms is not a
thousand dollars a year. We have an initial allowance of about
$371, which allows our screeners to buy three sets of uniforms.
Mr. Mica. To wear the Mexican uniforms.
Mr. Halinski. Sir, those are uniforms that are in
compliance with the regulation. They are the uniforms that were
procured through a procurement process which was the most
effective process, sir.
Mr. Mica. Let me say, Mr. Deputy Secretary, I have no
problem with collective bargaining. I think you are screwing
the screeners, when you spend $1.2 million in administration
and they are getting about $1.8 or $1.9 billion, when you have
28 percent of the personnel in Washington as supervisors, the
average salary in Washington, D.C. for personnel is $104,000 a
year. And those guys are dogging it at $38,357, on average. I
have no problem with that.
I see the other great things you negotiated with, some
conduct of security in business or anything, improving that. It
was the size of the tie tack, wasn't that part of the
agreement, whether they could wear a TSA emblem on their ball
caps, is that correct? Whether they could wear a vest with the
TSA emblem, those are some of the other terms of the agreement?
Mr. Halinski. Sir, I can answer your questions on the
uniform if I have an opportunity to speak.
Mr. Mica. Mr. Chairman, I have a whole host of questions, I
don't know if we will get to another round. But they ignored us
in the Transportation Committee for a total of six years. We
have questions that they have not answered. I will submit to
the committee all of the remaining questions. And I know you
signed off and Mr. Issa signed off, they still have not
responded.
And I am telling you, if I have to come down there and sit
in Mr. Pistole's office, we are going to get answers to those
questions that are pending. They will be submitted through the
committee and the chairman. And if we have another round, I
have additional questions.
Ms. Speier. Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Chaffetz. Yes.
Ms. Speier. I would request that Mr. Halinski be given the
opportunity to answer those questions.
Mr. Chaffetz. We will certainly submit the questions. And
Mr. Halinski, if you would like to take time to respond, we
will be happy to have you do that. Then we will recognize the
ranking member of the full committee, Mr. Cummings.
Mr. Halinski. Yes, sir. On the subject of the uniforms,
sir, every personnel that comes into TSA takes an oath to
defend the Constitution of the United States. We serve the
public, sir. Our job is to protect the traveling public. We
take that very serious. If we fail at our job, people die.
We wear uniforms. We are a uniformed service. It doesn't
mean we are a law enforcement service. We are a uniformed
service. We looked at this contract because it was expiring. We
went through many different planning processes. We were not
going to have a contract to buy new uniforms or replace worn
and torn uniforms if we didn't sign that contract.
Bad timing, sir, 17 February, 2013. It wasn't
Machiavellian, we weren't doing that against anybody. We want
and we have to have uniforms, bottom line. We follow an
acquisition and procurement process which means that we go for
the lowest cost uniforms, sir. And quite frankly, it is a
bridge contract, it is a two-year contract. We have no
intentions of, hopefully not, getting anywhere near that
ceiling. But it is a requirement that we have those uniforms,
sir.
Mr. Chaffetz. Thank you.
We will now recognize the gentleman from Maryland, the
ranking member, Mr. Cummings, for five minutes.
Mr. Cummings. Mr. Halinski, I am sure you can understand
the frustration. We are trying to make sure that Americans have
jobs. And certainly your challenges, because like NAFTA and the
things you have to do in the bidding process, got that. But I
want to make sure that you know that we up here are trying to
make sure, just like those TSA folks have their jobs, we want
to make sure that other Americans have jobs, too.
But I do understand the dilemma. All I am saying is that
wherever American jobs can be provided, we need to do that. You
got that? Are you listening, sir?
Mr. Halinski. I understand, sir. Absolutely.
Mr. Cummings. All right.
I can imagine your frustration, I sit on the Transportation
Committee also. Whenever there is a problem with regard to
something getting through an airport, with somebody getting
through an airport, you are damned. And at the same time, I
guess TSA is trying to keep a balance, personnel trying to
figure out how many people you need at certain airports, so
that you can protect the public. Got that.
The question is, you are in a situation right now where,
and I am going to something Ms. Speier asked you about, she was
asking you that you had some funds restored under the CR, you
said you did, did you not?
Mr. Halinski. We did, yes, sir.
Mr. Cummings. And she asked you at least three times how
much was restored. You don't know that answer?
Mr. Halinski. I don't have that right in front of me, sir.
I can get back with that answer, sir. We were given enough
funds which has helped us maintain our screening work.
Mr. Cummings. I understand that. I would suggest to you
that whenever you are testifying before Congress and they are
going to ask you about the things that we are talking about, a
logical bit of information to have is that, you have to
anticipate some questions, and that is one you should have
anticipated, how much money you have and what impact has that
had on what you have been able to do, that is, maintaining
services as they are.
And so you don't know that. And I would think that the two
people sitting behind you, are they with you?
Mr. Halinski. Yes, sir
Mr. Cummings. They should have been able to get a cell
phone call in the meantime to let us know that. Hopefully we
can find that out very shortly.
But you are freezing employment, right? In other words, if
somebody retires, you are not hiring anybody? Or somebody
quits, you are not hiring anybody? Or are you?
Mr. Halinski. We are hiring, sir.
Mr. Cummings. You are?
Mr. Halinski. Yes, sir. The way we have been able to manage
this sequestration is to do it through managed hiring, managing
our overtime. And what do I mean by managed hiring, sir, what I
am talking about, we understand, we have a normal attrition
rate per year. We look at the attrition rate, it is also very
dependent on specific airports and regions in the Country. What
we are doing is we are hiring to a level that we believe, and
it is a very high level, and in some cases it is 100 percent,
so that we can continue to conduct the mission. It is planning,
sir, and we are planning to that level and we are hiring to
that level.
We are also managing overtime. We are trying to restrict
overtime to only mission-critical, absolutely mission-critical
periods of time. That is the way we are dealing with
sequestration, sir, through proper planning and through looking
at it every single day.
Mr. Cummings. Let's go to managed hiring. I just have two
more questions. Under managed hiring, there is a bottom line,
is there not? In other words, there is a goal. Say for example,
you spent a billion dollars last year, maybe you want to come
down to three-fourths of a billion this year. Do you have a
goal? Do you follow what I am saying?
Mr. Halinski. Sir, we are looking at it from a fiscal
process, but more importantly, we are looking at it from a
threat perspective and also a manpower issue. So when we are
looking at this, we are factoring all those areas in there.
Specifically to accomplish our mission, which is to secure
those airports. We are looking at threats in those specific
airports, down to specific airports.
Mr. Cummings. I got that.
Mr. Halinski. How many people we need to accomplish that
mission. And that is how we are hiring. And what the attrition
rate is in those areas. Some airports have higher attrition
rates. That is why in some airports we will hire absolutely to
100 percent.
Mr. Cummings. What I am asking you, though, the thing that
you also have to calculate in there, I am assuming, is cost,
right? In other words, you are trying to get out of it. You are
not answering my question. Are you trying to get to a certain
goal, cost-wise?
Mr. Halinski. Sir, what we are looking at it the modeling
that we need to accomplish that mission. Yes, we are factoring
in costs.
Mr. Cummings. So you want to reduce costs?
Mr. Halinski. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cummings. That is all I am asking you.
Mr. Halinski. Yes, sir, we are looking at costs. We are
trying to save wherever we can, sir. And that is why we are
looking at some reduced manpower models in specific airports,
based on what we need to accomplish that mission. So yes, we
are looking at costs. I have a financial team of analysts that
look at those costs. I don't have those costs right in front of
me, sir. Next time I will be better prepared.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you. Just the last thing, and I think
we all should be interested in this, and you should be
interested in this question, too. The question becomes, if you
are managing overtime, does that mean that you are overspending
for overtime at some point? Do you follow what I am saying?
I am assuming that you are keeping safety at the same
level. I am assuming you are spending less money. But I mean,
for credibility's sake, for your credibility's sake, I am just
curious, were we overspending on overtime? Do you follow me?
Mr. Halinski. Yes, sir. No, I do not believe we were. When
we are talking about looking at overtime, let me give you an
example, sir. In an airport, to preclude periods of extended
lines, things like that, we may bring on more people for a
period of time. So what we are trying to do is look at where we
think the threat is, where we see the highest volume of
traffic, and managing that based on the expectation that we
move people through the checkpoint quickly. The idea is to use
a risk-based philosophy, move them through quickly, and focus
on where we consider the highest threat, sir.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You have been most courteous,
thank you.
Mr. Chaffetz. I thank you.
We will now recognize the gentleman from South Carolina,
Mr. Gowdy, for five minutes.
Mr. Gowdy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, I had initially intended to yield my time to
you. Because of all the folks that I have worked with in
Congress, at least in the two years I have been here, you have
been as interested in the workings of TSA as any of my
colleagues. So that was my original intent, and I think I will
still do that at some point.
But Mr. Halinski, some earlier questioning led me to want
to ask you a couple of questions. Let me start by saying thank
you for your service to our Country. I think you told Mr. Mica
that you served in the Marine Corps, and I want to thank you
for your service.
You also, in response to Chairman Chaffetz, he asked you
some questions about some prior comments made by Secretary
Napolitano. My concern is that once credibility is impeached,
it is awfully hard to get back. Credibility can be impeached
either because of a prior inconsistent statement, or
credibility can be impeached because of the use of hyperbole.
So when you say there are going to be furloughs and there is no
furlough, that to me impacts someone's credibility.
So do you know the genesis or the origin of her mistaken
belief that there were going to be furloughs because of
sequestration?
Mr. Halinski. Sir, first, I can't speak for the Secretary.
But I would tell you that the entire Department was working
together, looking at what was needed, what money would be
available, what the impact of sequestration would be. As I said
earlier, it was a moving target, sir.
Mr. Gowdy. I understand that, and I understand you can't
speak for her. I am not asking you to speak for her. What I am
asking is, did she speak to you?
Mr. Halinski. Sir, we worked very closely with the
Department.
Mr. Gowdy. Did she talk to you before she made the public
statement that there would be furloughs? Who gave her the false
information which she then relied upon and made public
proclamations?
Mr. Halinski. Sir, there was a number of planning factors
that continued to move throughout the year before
sequestration, right after sequestration.
Mr. Gowdy. Why would the better course of discretion not be
to not make any comments until you actually knew what the heck
was going to happen? Why would that not be the better course?
Or am I just naive?
Mr. Halinski. Sir, I would tell you that we continue to
plan for a number of different factors.
Mr. Gowdy. Did she talk to you before she made those public
comments? That is actually not a complex question.
Mr. Halinski. Sir, the Secretary did not talk to me, but we
are working with her staff.
Mr. Gowdy. So the answer would be no, she did not. Do you
know who she talked to before she publicly created this Mayan
apocalypse scenario with long lines and furloughs?
Mr. Halinski. Sir, I believe the Secretary clarified that
the long lines and furloughs she was talking about were
immigration checkpoints
Mr. Gowdy. But you know what? The beautiful thing about
clarification is if you get it right the first time, you
actually don't need to clarify anything. I guess that is what I
am asking, is why not use a little bit of discretion, gather
the facts before you go make hyperbolic, apocalyptic comments?
Why is that not the better course? You agree it is, right? That
way you don't have to clarify.
Mr. Halinski. Sir, I am going to go back to what I said
that there was an enormous amount of planning being done. The
terrain was shifting continually.
Mr. Gowdy. And I want to go back to my original question,
which is, isn't it a better course of discretion to not make
false comments to begin with? Accordingly, you would never have
to make a clarification, if you actually gathered your facts
before you made public pronouncements which were demonstrably
false.
Mr. Halinski. Sir, I am going to once again go back to, the
terrain continued to shift. There was planning every day, there
was worst case to best case scenario and everything in between,
how are we going to deal with this.
Mr. Gowdy. Well, let me ask you a broader question. Do you
agree, if the public is cynical or skeptical about
pronouncements made by government, and I include myself in it,
I am a member of Congress, there is a skepticism and a
cynicism. Would you not agree that we should make every effort
to be credible and accurate in what we say, what the effects of
something are going to be? On both sides of the aisle,
everyone, regardless of political affiliation, we really ought
to make an effort to be accurate with what we say. That is not
a controversial comment, is it?
Mr. Halinski. No, sir, and I think every day there was a
different definition of what was going on. And people tried to
be as accurate as they could.
Mr. Gowdy. Which is why you don't send out press releases
every day. Right? If things are changing every day, you wait
until something actually has settled and you don't send out
press releases every day. That would obviate the need for
clarification, in my judgment.
With that, I would yield the remainder of my time to
Chairman Chaffetz.
Mr. Chaffetz. Mr. Halinski, the difficult part, and I know
you are not the Secretary, you didn't make this comment, but
she was quoted, and I will read the quote from her, ``We will
begin today sending out furlough notices.'' Now, I don't know
what time of day she said that, but by the time we got to the
end of the day, there were no furlough notices sent out. In
fact, we are here April 19th and there were no furlough notices
sent out.
So we are trying to figure out what changed in those few
hours and who provided her that information.
Mr. Halinski. Sir, I believe she was not talking about TSA.
I believe she was talking about other components within the
Department and not TSA.
Mr. Chaffetz. Well, the beginning of the quote is, now that
we are having to reduce and eliminate basic overtime for both
TSA and Customs, and then she goes on. And then the story says,
lines at some Transportation Security Administration
checkpoints, Napolitano added that the events sponsored by
Politico, are already, ``already,'' she said, ``150 to 200
percent as long as we would normally expect.'' But you
testified that that never happened.
So the question is, is somebody feeding her bad
information? How is there such a discrepancy, to say that lines
are going to be up to 200 percent more and you can't name a
single one that is even a little bit more?
Mr. Halinski. Sir, the Secretary did clarify that those
were Immigration lines that she was talking about at certain
airports.
Mr. Chaffetz. Thank you. The gentleman yields back. I will
now recognize the gentlewoman from California, Ms. Speier.
Ms. Speier. I have no further questions.
Mr. Chaffetz. I believe Mr. Mica from Florida has some
additional questions. This will be the last set of questions,
and then we will adjourn due to pending votes.
Mr. Mica. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The latest figures I had for TSA online, are 64,578
employees. Is that about right, Mr. Halinski?
Mr. Halinski. Sir, I believe our approximate number right
now is about 61,000 personnel, sir.
Mr. Mica. You testified today that we would not need any
furloughs, is that correct?
Mr. Halinski. Sir, we are working to avoid furloughs, yes,
sir.
Mr. Mica. How many screeners do you have, I think you had
up to 51,000 approximately?
Mr. Halinski. Approximately, yes, sir.
Mr. Mica. Is that still the case?
Mr. Halinski. I believe it is, sir.
Mr. Mica. How many vacancies do we have?
Mr. Halinski. Our screening workforce, sir, we are hiring
to a certain percentage, roughly we are talking about 47,000 as
of today, sir.
Mr. Mica. So you are actually down about 4,000?
Mr. Halinski. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mica. At one time we had, Congress had set a maximum of
40,000. Actually that was when there was a higher number of
passengers, I believe. So what would be the number of screeners
that you could operate with without any delays, do you know?
There are 47,000 could you absorb another 5,000 cut, 10
percent, 4,000?
Mr. Halinski. Yes, sir. First let me say that we have a
layered security program. That layer involves many different
aspects of security. We believe in the layered program. All our
screeners are involved in a number of different security
activities, because we believe a layered effect is the way for
successful security.
Mr. Mica. One of the layers that you have that I disagree
with is the huge bureaucracy, about 9,000 to 10,000 people out
in the field, and then another, well, it used to be 4,000 in
Washington. I see you have done some new accounting and taken
some folks off of that. So it is approximately 3,000.
Administrator Pistole promised me a downsizing in the
administrative overhead. Can you tell us, we are down in
screeners, you just testified, from 51,000 to 47,000.
Now, again, not doing the phony baloney math, what are we
at in administrative personnel in Washington and then in the
field?
Mr. Halinski. Sir, our headquarters has approximately 2,500
personnel. That is about 4 percent.
Mr. Mica. Again, you took out some of the air marshal and
other activities that were previously counted, is that correct,
in your new accounting?
Mr. Halinski. Sir, we have our operations center, we have
our vetting center in Annapolis. Part of the headquarters
personnel that you are talking about also was our international
staff. All of those numbers fell under an accounting line as
being part of headquarters. Actually they are not located at
headquarters.
Mr. Mica. Again, there is a new math, new accounting. But
what I am trying to get at is the net number of positions that
have been reduced, both in Washington, D.C., if you could get
that to the committee and then out in the field. God bless the
screeners, they are working, there are fewer of them.
Now, another thing that I haven't been able to get
information on is you have a national security deployment
force.
Mr. Halinski. Yes, sir, we do.
Mr. Mica. Is that still operating?
Mr. Halinski. Yes, sir, it is.
Mr. Mica. They are strange names, and I never get straight
answers on how much it costs. Because they go out, they are
sent out at places where you can't hire people or you have
vacancies for some personnel management reason, is that
correct?
Mr. Halinski. Sir, our national deployment force is made up
of screeners who normally work in the airports. When there is a
threat, then they are deployed.
Mr. Mica. I am talking about the people that are sent out
there, they are put on per diem and they are screening because
of a lack of ability to either recruit, train or have personnel
to cover those vacancies. That force is still in place. Will
you get me and the committee the last five years of costs? You
changed names a couple of times. When I started inquiring,
because I had information that they were being put up at
substantial expense, I don't know for certain, and sent out to
different places, because again of the failure to be able to
recruit and train. Are you still recruiting people in the
Washington area from the tops of pizza boxes?
Mr. Halinski. I don't believe we are, sir.
Mr. Mica. How about discount bump advertisements to get a
job at Reagan? Do you know?
Mr. Halinski. Sir, we hire personnel through a variety of
methods. And we vett those personnel.
Mr. Mica. We have disclosed some of those in the past. The
other thing, too, since you have been under some siege by
Congress, this wasn't just a Mica attack or a partisan attack
from this side of the aisle. I came actually not as well
prepared as the ranking member, who got you pretty good on the
uniforms.
But in fact, I know that you have ramped up your PR team. I
want to know every penny you have been spending on
communications, advertisement, et cetera. Can you get that
information? We will give you a specific, by the end of the
month.
Mr. Halinski. Yes, sir. If that is a requirement, we will
send you that information.
Mr. Mica. Okay, thank you. I would like to see that.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and yield back.
Mr. Chaffetz. Thank you.
Mr. Halinski, thank you for your service. We appreciate
your willingness to come testify today. The committee now
stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:14 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]