[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 113-41]
THE READINESS POSTURE OF THE
U.S. NAVY AND THE U.S. MARINE CORPS
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
APRIL 26, 2013
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TONGRESS.#13
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
80-770 WASHINGTON : 2013
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office,
http://bookstore.gpo.gov. For more information, contact the GPO Customer Contact Center, U.S. Government Printing Office. Phone 202�09512�091800, or 866�09512�091800 (toll-free). E-mail, [email protected].
SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia, Chairman
ROB BISHOP, Utah MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa
KRISTI L. NOEM, South Dakota COLLEEN W. HANABUSA, Hawaii
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia JACKIE SPEIER, California
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey RON BARBER, Arizona
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado WILLIAM L. ENYART, Illinois
E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia PETE P. GALLEGO, Texas
STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi
Jamie Lynch, Professional Staff Member
Vickie Plunkett, Professional Staff Member
Nicholas Rodman, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2013
Page
Hearing:
Friday, April 26, 2013, The Readiness Posture of the U.S. Navy
and the U.S. Marine Corps...................................... 1
Appendix:
Friday, April 26, 2013........................................... 37
----------
FRIDAY, APRIL 26, 2013
THE READINESS POSTURE OF THE U.S. NAVY AND THE U.S. MARINE CORPS
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Bordallo, Hon. Madeleine Z., a Delegate from Guam, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Readiness.............................. 3
Wittman, Hon. Robert J., a Representative from Virginia,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Readiness............................ 1
WITNESSES
Burke, VADM William R., USN, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations
Warfare Systems (N9), U.S. Navy................................ 5
Cullom, VADM Philip Hart, USN, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations
for Fleet Readiness and Logistics (N4), U.S. Navy.............. 6
Faulkner, LtGen William M., USMC, Deputy Commandant,
Installations and Logistics, U.S. Marine Corps................. 10
Tryon, LtGen Richard T., USMC, Deputy Commandant, Plans, Policies
and Operations, U.S. Marine Corps.............................. 8
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Burke, VADM William R., joint with VADM Philip Hart Cullom... 44
Tryon, LtGen Richard T., joint with LtGen William M. Faulkner 55
Wittman, Hon. Robert J....................................... 41
Documents Submitted for the Record:
President's Budget for Fiscal Year 2014 U.S. Navy Projected
Battle Force Inventory: Acronyms and Ship Hull
Classification Symbols..................................... 73
U.S. Navy Projected Battle Force Inventory: FY 14-FY 23...... 74
U.S. Navy Projected Battle Force Inventory: FY 24-FY 33...... 75
U.S. Navy Projected Battle Force Inventory: FY 34-FY 43...... 76
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Courtney................................................. 80
Mr. Wittman.................................................. 79
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Wittman.................................................. 83
THE READINESS POSTURE OF THE U.S. NAVY AND THE U.S. MARINE CORPS
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Readiness,
Washington, DC, Friday, April 26, 2013.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 8:00 a.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Robert J.
Wittman (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT J. WITTMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
Mr. Wittman. Welcome to the Readiness Subcommittee.
Today's hearing, ``The Readiness Posture of the U.S. Navy
and U.S. Marine Corps,'' is the subject before us.
I want to welcome you to this morning's hearing. I would
like to thank our witnesses for being here to address the
readiness posture of the Navy and the Marine Corps in light of
the fiscal year 2014 budget submission and deeply concerning
current fiscal year shortfalls.
Joining us today are Vice Admiral Bill Burke, the Deputy
Chief of Naval Operations Warfare Systems, N9; Vice Admiral
Phil Cullom, the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Fleet
Readiness and Logistics, N4; Lieutenant General Richard Tryon,
the Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies and Operations; and
Lieutenant General William Faulkner, the Deputy Commandant for
Installations and Logistics.
Gentlemen, thank you all very much for being here.
Admiral Burke, thank you for your 40 years of service to
the Navy and to our Nation. We are delighted to have the
opportunity to garner your insights at your final hearing
before this subcommittee. Again, thank you so much. I
understand your son is here today, so the Burke family Navy
legacy will continue. We wish, obviously, you the best as you
move onto your next endeavor. Thanks again for your service.
As we review this budget request, we cannot lose sight of
the impacts on readiness and implication for operational
missions. We are quickly compromising the readiness of our
force, and it is our duty and commitment to ensure that we
provide the resources necessary to support our warfighters and
to protect our Nation, particularly in light of the fact that
our forces have been operating at a very high operational tempo
over the past 10 years.
We are experiencing the very real effects of the budget on
a daily basis. Despite the fiscal year 2013 appropriation, the
Navy still faces a $4.5 billion shortfall in its fiscal year
2013 O&M [Operations and Maintenance] accounts. This further
exacerbates unanticipated bills resulting from rising fuel
costs. So you see all those cost challenges coming to bear at
one time, which makes things, as I said, even more complicated.
In February of this year, the Navy deferred the deployment
of the USS Truman to the Gulf and reduced its carrier presence
to 1.0. Additionally, in March, an additional five deployments
were canceled and the ``next to deploy'' forces are being
affected. For example, we see a reduction in two carrier air
wings to the tactical hard deck, which is the minimum level of
training required to maintain basic air proficiency and the
ability to safely operate the aircraft. By making the near-term
decisions in light of fiscal constraints, the Navy will soon
begin to see the impacts on units beyond those that are next to
deploy.
As maintenance availabilities get reduced or outright
canceled the Navy will be challenged to reconstitute the
requirement in the very near future due to the lack of capacity
at shipyards. Ultimately, this results in significantly shorter
life for the assets, particularly when coupled with the impacts
of the sustained surge in recent years, which has taxed both
the equipment and personnel at rates significantly higher than
anticipated. Add to this mix the tenuous progress the Navy has
made to reverse degraded surface fleet readiness trends, and I
am deeply concerned about losing the momentum we have achieved
to preserve the readiness of our naval force.
In particular, I have strong concerns about the readiness
of the fleet as it relates to the total number of ships
projected in the inventory. Any proposal to retire assets
earlier than the end of their expected service lives will
increase the strain and degrade the readiness of the remaining
force. It is apparent, by the updated Navy 30-year shipbuilding
plan, that there are deficits in the very near future. The
dichotomy is that you will lose capacity, but it is not
apparent how the Navy intends to replace it.
Despite slow improvements in Marine Corps readiness levels,
the force structure continues to downsize to a total of 182,000
marines, facing a nearly $1 billion cut as a result of
sequestration. In light of the fiscal situation, the Marine
Corps will undoubtedly be challenged to meet global
commitments, to reconstitute the force and to sustain high
operational tempo. The strains will likely be further
compounded by the need to support new important missions, like
the forward deployment of a special MAGTF [Marine Air-Ground
Task Force] in Spain to support AFRICOM [U.S. Africa Command]
and the expansion of critical legacy missions, like the Marine
Security Guard Program slated to grow to protect an increasing
number of embassies in high-risk areas around the globe.
During my recent visit to Afghanistan, it became readily
apparent that we have very near-term retrograde and reset
issues associated with battle worn equipment. I witnessed
thousands of containers, hundreds of vehicles and millions of
individual items awaiting shipment home to units that
desperately need them, all items at risk as transportation
costs continue to rise and budgets continue to shrink.
In addition to the service specific issues, one of my
foremost concerns is consideration for the civilian workforce
and the impacts on the depots and the skills that could be lost
in the industrial base.
Make no mistake, the impact of the readiness of the force
is real, and it is occurring today. During this hearing, I
would ask that you share your perspective on this and help us
to answer some basic questions. How do you define
``readiness,'' and ready for what, and will the forces be ready
in both fiscal year 2013 and fiscal year 2014. In the absence
of the OCO [Overseas Contingency Operation] budget for
consideration before the Congress at this time, can you please
describe the impact of OCO funding on your ability to provide
ready and trained forces, and how will you sustain that in the
long run as OCO funds begin to diminish? Please address also
the actions that you are taking for the rebalance to the
Pacific and what it means for both the Navy and Marine Corps
and your ability to meet global force management allocation
plans.
I have every expectation that you will continue to seek
options to mitigate the long-term consequences and ensure we
don't create a hollow force. That said, I strongly believe that
our long-term naval and Marine Corps strategies cannot be
articulated until the budgetary pressures get resolved. I am
deeply concerned that we are on the brink of the Department
making near-term decisions that could potentially mortgage
future force readiness, and it is imperative for us to work
together to avert that outcome.
With that, I would like to wish a warm welcome to my
partner on the Readiness Subcommittee, our ranking member, Ms.
Madeleine Bordallo, and I am truly honored to have such a
distinguished ranking member working with me as we review these
weighty issues.
Ms. Bordallo.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wittman can be found in the
Appendix on page 41.]
STATEMENT OF HON. MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, A DELEGATE FROM GUAM,
RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for those
kind words.
And I would like to also welcome our witnesses this
morning, Admiral Burke and, of course, your son, Lieutenant
Burke, who may be in your chair in the future sometime; Admiral
Cullom; Generals Faulkner and Tryon. Thank you for your service
to our great country and testimony this morning.
I have appreciated getting the chance to meet and talk with
you over the past years, so, Admiral Burke, I understand that
this may be the last time you testify before this subcommittee,
and I know you will be retiring soon, and we greatly appreciate
your service to our Nation and testimony before this committee.
Some of us here even remember when you were a mere lieutenant
commander in the House Liaison Office downstairs.
This is our final in a series of hearings that will dive
into some level of detail about the readiness issues facing
each of the Services. Today we will explore the readiness
challenges of the Navy and the Marine Corps.
The Navy and Marine Corps are critical to meeting the DOD's
strategic guidance released in 2011. In particular, the Navy
and Marine Corps play a central role in the rebalance to the
Asia-Pacific region. We on Guam understand the importance of
this shift better than anyone, especially with the realignment
of marines from Okinawa to Guam, as well as the deployment of
additional Navy assets to the island. Additionally, the air-sea
battle concept makes the capabilities that the Navy and the
Marine Corps bring to the table even that more important.
However, we are asking this in light of shrinking budgets
and sequestration. I hope that our witnesses will broadly
address how the Navy and the Marine Corps are balancing the
need to support the strategic guidance in light of the impacts
of sequestration. If sequestration is allowed to continue,
something I very much oppose and believe we can avoid, what is
the impact to meeting our strategic objectives from the Navy
and Marine Corps' perspective?
The Navy has revised its objective of retaining a fleet of
313 ships down to a fleet of 298 ships. Given this information,
it will be even more important for the Navy to sufficiently
maintain and repair its current fleet of ships. Yet the fiscal
year 2014 budget shows nearly $1.3 billion in deferred
maintenance, and the proposed budget for repairs is decreased
by about 20 percent below fiscal year 2013 levels. Now, how is
the Navy going to properly maintain its fleet with its current
operational tempo and in light of a previous history of poor
maintenance reports?
I also hope that our witnesses can discuss the impact of
how deferring maintenance now saves money in the short term but
ends up costing more in the long term and the financial
implications of retaining our current fleet size. Further, I am
also concerned that with current budget constraints, there is
an increasing emphasis on repairing and overhauling ships in
foreign shipyards. I need our witnesses to clearly indicate how
the Navy will continue to adhere to the intent of Section 7310
and continue to repair and overhaul U.S. Navy ships to the
maximum extent practical in U.S. shipyards.
I also hope that our witnesses from both the Navy and the
Marine Corps can comment on the impact of sequestration on the
training and flying hours that are available for their aviation
components. We have seen a drastic reduction in flying hours in
the Air Force for nondeployed units. Are there similar cutbacks
in the Navy or Marine Corps, and what is the impact on
readiness? What risks are associated with any reduction in
flying hours?
I am also pleased to see plans to resume the Unit
Deployment Program in the Pacific region. The UDP [Unit
Deployment Program] plays a critical role in ensuring that we
have a robust, resilient and distributed posture for marines in
the region. I hope our witnesses can comment on what, if any,
impact sequestration would have on the UDP program.
Finally, as our chairman, Mr. Wittman, mentioned, he and I
just got back from Afghanistan and appreciated the chance to
meet with service members while in theater. We spent some
significant time on retrograde and reset issues, and I hope our
witnesses will discuss how much equipment is currently in
theater and challenges that will occur with reset as a result
of sequestration.
Again, I very much look forward to the witnesses'
testimony.
Thank you again, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Ranking Member Bordallo.
Gentleman, we will go now to your testimony. I would ask
that you stick to the 5-minute limit on your opening remarks.
Your written comments will be entered into the record, so we
will make sure any details that you may miss in your opening
statement do get captured for the record. Make sure, too, that
you push the little buttons on your microphones there in front
of you, so we can all make sure that we hear you clearly and
that your remarks get
recorded.
So, with that, Vice Admiral Burke, we begin with you.
STATEMENT OF VADM WILLIAM R. BURKE, USN, DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS WARFARE SYSTEMS (N9), U.S. NAVY
Admiral Burke. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Congresswoman
Bordallo, and distinguished members of the House Armed Services
Committee on Readiness. It is my honor to appear before you to
testify on the readiness of our Navy, our readiness plan for
fiscal year 2014 and the outlook for the readiness of the
force.
Just over a year ago, I was appointed the first Deputy
Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Systems, N9. In this role
I am responsible to the CNO [Chief of Naval Operations] to look
after the wholeness of our platforms through their requirements
and budgetary processing within the Navy staff.
Our Navy resources continue to be pressurized with the
increasing costs to sustain our force, man our fleet with high-
quality sailors, and improve our capability to pace the growing
and complex global threat. As a result of the sequestration of
fiscal year 2013 funds and the Appropriations Act of 2013, Navy
has a shortfall in operations and maintenance accounts, as you
mentioned, of over $4 billion, which is approximately 10
percent of the planned amount for the fiscal year. This has
forced some hard choices, and some of our fleet accounts have
been impacted.
The Navy's decisions reflected a commitment to the
readiness of our deployed forces, our obligations to the
combatant commanders, and our future readiness. Navy
recommended changes to the fiscal year 2013 Global Force
Management Allocation Plan, or GFMAP, including canceling
deployments in the Pacific, to Europe and to South America and
reducing our flying hours and steaming dates for nondeploying
units.
Materially, we reduced intermediate ship level maintenance
and deferred eight surface ship maintenance availabilities and
reduced the scope of one availability. We plan to eliminate
these deferrals with the fiscal year 2014 request and our
fiscal year 2013 reprogramming authorities.
Our PB 14 [President's Budget for Fiscal Year 2014] budget
ensures sufficient forces and readiness to provide forward
presence to satisfy our fiscal year 2014 GFMAP [Global Force
Management Allocation Plan] requirements. However, the impact
of fiscal year 2013's reduced fleet operations and maintenance
will be less surge capacity. All our forces deploying in 2013
and 2014, including two carrier strike groups and two
amphibious ready groups, will be fully mission capable and
certified for major combat operations. We will also retain one
additional carrier strike group and amphibious ready group in
the United States that are fully mission capable, certified for
major combat operations, and available to surge within 1 to 2
weeks. But due to reduced training and maintenance, almost all
of our other nondeployed ships and aviation squadrons will be
less than fully mission capable and not certified for major
combat operations. That is about two-thirds of the fleet.
Despite the fiscal challenges we incurred in fiscal year
2013, our Navy advanced our readiness in critical areas. One
such area was mine countermeasures capability. Through focused
investment over the past 18 months, the mission readiness of
our MCM-1 class [Avenger class Mine Countermeasures] ships has
doubled; the clearance code time of our MH-53 [Sea Dragon
Airborne Mine Countermeasures] helicopters has tripled, with an
accompanying 28-percent increase in operational availability.
We improved legacy-minded identification and clearance traits
through rapid fielding of Seafox and MK 18 unmanned underwater
vehicles.
We have also begun to focus a period of investment in our
surface fleet. As our Nation's conflicts wind down, the Navy is
using this time to begin an 8-year reset, that will allow our
surface fleet to undergo deep maintenance and modernization
foregone as a result of the decade-long conflict. These reset
efforts will help the fleet sustain these ships through their
estimated service life, a fundamental assumption of our long-
term force structure.
We estimate this initiative will increase our depot
maintenance requirements by close to $2 billion over that time
period. However, by making this investment, we will buy back 5
to 10 years on each of our hulls, increasing our fleet's life
by a cumulative 450 ship years.
We appreciate the support Congress has shown the Navy,
including continued approval of our Overseas Contingency
Operations request. As we look forward to the future, we must
be aware that $3 billion of our fiscal year 2014 OCO request is
funding enduring requirements for an operational tempo and
rotational force structure that will remain after our forces
have withdrawn from Afghanistan. As we work together in the
future, we will need to address this baseline shortfall to
prevent the Navy from sacrificing investment in our future
force structure to fund the readiness needs of our current
fleet.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
[The joint prepared statement of Admiral Burke and Admiral
Cullom can be found in the Appendix on page 44.]
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Vice Admiral Burke.
Vice Admiral Cullom.
STATEMENT OF VADM PHILIP HART CULLOM, USN, DEPUTY CHIEF OF
NAVAL OPERATIONS FOR FLEET READINESS AND LOGISTICS (N4), U.S.
NAVY
Admiral Cullom. Chairman Wittman, Ranking Member Bordallo,
and distinguished members of the House Armed Services
Subcommittee on Readiness, it is my honor to join Admiral Burke
and my Marine Corps counterparts, Generals Tryon and Faulkner,
today to testify on Navy readiness.
In my position, I am accountable to the CNO to work across
the entire Navy enterprise to provide an objective, holistic
view of fleet readiness and logistics that assesses our ability
to support planned capability, presence and operational
requirements. Particularly over the long term, this must
reflect the strong interrelationship between personnel,
equipment, supply, training, ordnance, and facilities and their
collective contribution to support the mission.
Our budget request strikes the most effective balance
across these combat enablers and directly aligns with CNO's
three tenets of ``Warfighting First, Operate Forward, and Be
Ready.''
Today I would like to highlight a few areas that are
especially relevant, given our current operating environment
and fiscal climate. These include our operational tempo, what
it takes to meet that pace, and the additional focus we must
have on our sailors and families, fleet training, and energy
security, to be successful.
Over the course of the past decade, we have been operating
at a wartime pace with roughly half of our force at sea at any
given point in time. In 2013, our carrier strike groups and
amphibious readiness groups will deploy for 7 to 8 months, with
several deploying in excess of 9 months due to emergent
maintenance requirements or additional combatant commander
requests for forces. Over the same decade, we have increased
force presence 20 percent by surging our surge capacity and
stationing roughly 6 percent more of the fleet forward, all
with a force that has decreased in size by 10 percent.
The underlying requirements are driven by a level of
activity unlikely to abate with the ongoing defense rebalance
to the Pacific, especially given the maritime nature of this
theater and our ongoing presence requirements in Southwest
Asia.
The good news is that we continue to meet the demand, but
it comes at the expense of stress to the force, both in terms
of the impact upon sailors and their families and maintenance
of the fleet.
Taking care of our people is at the heart of maintaining a
strong Navy. This budget request provides steady funding for
warfighter and family readiness programs, like child
development centers, fleet and family support centers, sexual
assault prevention, and services for wounded warriors and
exceptional family members. In addition, the budget is on track
to meet established goals to improve the quality of bachelor
and family housing. Our sailors can then go into harm's way
knowing all is well on the home front and that they will be
cared for upon their return.
Another tool in our arsenal to mitigate stress on the force
is our investment on shore infrastructure to give our sailors
what they need to do their jobs. We continue to prioritize our
sustainment, restoration, and modernization funding to target
facilities that directly support operations, such as airfields,
hangars, piers, and barracks. The budget includes the
investment of $425 million in our public shipyards, fleet
readiness centers, and Marine Corps depots. This level ensures
the adherence for the 6-percent investment in these key
resources required by the 2012 National Defense Authorization
Act.
To support a ready Navy, it is imperative we provide our
warfighters with robust quality training before they serve at
the tip of the spear. The budget includes sustained investments
in key training capabilities, including fleet synthetic
training. To further improve undersea warfare readiness, it
also increases funding for the diesel electric submarine
initiative and continues development of the shallow water
training range. Continued procurement of high-speed
maneuverable surface targets provides realistic live fire
training at sea for operator proficiency.
We must ensure our training investments are not compromised
to the detriment of our warfighters. Encroachment to key
training sites, both physical and electromagnetic, can occur
both ashore and at sea. If not controlled, it threatens our
ability to train and operate and can adversely impact our
national security. Over the course of the past year, we have
learned that encroachment can include adjacent development,
ocean observing systems, or economic expansion. Increased
awareness and continued interagency cooperation are central to
maintaining our national security.
Energy fuel and how we power our ships have always been
vital issues for the United States Navy. As we have seen during
previous maritime conflicts and our current ground war,
potential adversaries see energy as a vulnerability and have
demonstrated a resolve and ability to exploit it. Our Navy
energy program is focused on foreclosing these efforts by
reducing the magnitude of our energy reliance and usage. Our
goal is to be more Spartan and judicious in what we use and
thereby gain greater agility, endurance, and flexibility in
conducting our missions at sea, in the air, and on land.
This is facilitated by new technology, but it is equally
reliant upon a change in mindset and culture. This combination
will permit us to stay on station longer, decrease the
frequency of replenishments, and reduce our vulnerability to an
adversary's asymmetric attempt to use energy as a weapon. Our
smarter use of energy will make us better warfighters.
Together with the United States Marine Corps, the Navy
continues to be our Nation's away team, and we must remain
steady and capable to protect our Nation's security. Our
sailors represent the highest quality, most diverse force in
our history, and continue to make us the finest navy in the
world.
On behalf of all the men and women of the Navy--Active,
Reserve, and civilian--thank you again for your help in
delivering an approved 2013 defense appropriation and for your
continued support. I look forward to your questions.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Vice Admiral Cullom.
We will now go to Lieutenant General Tryon.
STATEMENT OF LTGEN RICHARD T. TRYON, USMC, DEPUTY COMMANDANT,
PLANS, POLICIES AND OPERATIONS, U.S. MARINE CORPS
General Tryon. Good morning, Chairman Wittman, Ranking
Member Bordallo, and distinguished members of the Readiness
Committee. It is a pleasure for me to appear before you today
to discuss the readiness of the United States Marine Corps. I
am also pleased to be seated here with my fellow deputy
commandant and my counterparts in the Navy and my shipmates,
Vice Admiral Cullom and Vice Admiral Burke.
Today, after a decade of combat operations, the United
States Marine Corps remains the Nation's premier expeditionary
amphibious force in readiness. The ability of the Marine Corps
to serve as the Nation's crisis response force can be directly
attributed to the steadfast support of this committee and
Members of Congress, and for that, the Marine Corps remains
grateful.
Partnering with the United States Navy, we are forward-
deployed and forward-engaged across the globe. At this moment,
there are roughly 23,000 marines deployed around the world;
9,000-plus are serving in support of Operation Enduring Freedom
in Afghanistan.
Marine Expeditionary Units aboard amphibious ready group
ships are on station in the waters of the Gulf of Aden, the
Persian Gulf and in the Western Pacific. Forward-deployed
amphibious forces remain a uniquely critical and capable
component in support of our national strategic requirement for
forward presence, crisis response, power projection, and
theater security cooperation.
During 2012, marines participated in more than 120 security
cooperation engagements external to Afghanistan, developing
partner nation capabilities, reassuring our allies, deterring
our enemies, and providing the geographic combatant commanders
with a credible and relevant force in readiness. Marine Corps
forces were ready and able to respond to a range of crises,
ranging from natural disasters to civil uprisings and to
terrorist attacks. Marines were sent to Libya, returning once
again to the shores of Tripoli, to provide security in the wake
of the violence and uncertainty there.
Fleet Anti-Terrorism Security Teams--FAST marines--also
deployed to reinforce the security of our embassies in Egypt
and Yemen during the period following the attempted breach of
the embassy walls by violent protestors. Today, marines stand
guard at 152 embassies and consulates in 137 countries around
the world. Marines also supported Hurricane Sandy relief
efforts in the Northeast and super typhoon Pablo relief efforts
in the Philippines. In short, your marines have met our
congressional mandate to be the most ready when the Nation is
the least ready.
Over the course of the last year, as we have drawn down our
combat forces in Afghanistan, we have in stride reconstituted
in support of the Defense Strategic Guidance rebalancing to the
Asia-Pacific region, where we have had a presence for well over
70 years. As Congresswoman Bordallo has pointed out, our Unit
Deployment Program is well under way with the Second Infantry
Battalion deploying this past week to Okinawa and to Darwin.
The Third Battalion is scheduled to deploy in the fall of this
year.
As we look to the future, the Marine Corps is well aware of
the fiscal realities confronting our Nation. This year's
baseline budget submission was framed by the following service
priorities. First, we will continue to provide the best-trained
and equipped marines and units to Afghanistan. Second, we will
protect the readiness of our forward-deployed forces. Third, we
will reset and reconstitute the operational forces of our
marines and equipment, returning after nearly 12 years of
continuous combat operations. And, finally, to the extent
possible, we will modernize our force by first investing in the
individual marine and then by replacing worn and aging combat
equipment. And throughout these efforts, we will strive to keep
faith with our marines, our sailors, and our families.
The Corps' challenge in an era of sequestration is to
preserve the readiness of our forward-deployed forces, while
working to improve the readiness of our nondeployed forces so
that we can respond to crises and contingencies. Today, over
half of our nondeployed units report unacceptable levels of
readiness. The impacts of sequestration will severely challenge
our ability to equip and train our units.
Our crisis response mission is incompatible with tiered
readiness. Marines don't start to get ready when a crisis
occurs. We must be ready, we must be forward-deployed, and we
must be prepared to respond immediately.
After years of continuous combat operations, in order to
meet the high state of readiness of our forward-deployed
forces, we have globally sourced equipment and personnel,
thereby adversely affecting our home station training and
ultimately home station readiness. With significant degradation
of home station readiness, responding to a major contingency
operation will require additional time and create additional
risk.
Despite the efforts of sequestration and the associated
budget caps, the Marine Corps will do everything in its power
to protect the enduring U.S. global interests that underpin our
Nation's security. We will meet our responsibilities for rapid
response to crises wherever they may occur. Naval forces and
the Marine Corps in particular are our Nation's insurance
policy in a dangerous and unpredictable world. That is why we
exist.
In closing, the readiness of your Marine Corps is directly
linked to the unwavering support of Congress and the American
people, and we are committed to being responsible stewards of
the scarce public funds. We are dedicated to serve the Nation
with honor, courage, and commitment.
Once again, I would like to thank all of the members of the
committee for the opportunity to appear before you today, and I
look forward to the discussion and to your questions.
[The joint prepared statement of General Tryon and General
Faulkner can be found in the Appendix on page 55.]
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Lieutenant General Tryon.
Lieutenant General Faulkner.
STATEMENT OF LTGEN WILLIAM M. FAULKNER, USMC, DEPUTY
COMMANDANT, INSTALLATIONS AND LOGISTICS, U.S. MARINE CORPS
General Faulkner. Chairman Wittman, Ranking Member
Bordallo, members of the subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today to comment on the
readiness posture of the United States Marine Corps.
As General Tryon just mentioned, our marines continue to be
fully engaged around the globe as the Nation's crisis response
force. This past year, we have been serving as a key member of
the joint force in every geographical combatant command,
meeting operational commitments as a highly capable Marine-air-
ground logistics task force. Even with the many potentially
competing operational requirements, our number one priority and
principal focus remains crystal clear, doing everything to
ensure the readiness of our marines on the ground today in
Afghanistan, as well as those men and women who are preparing
to go.
Concurrent with supporting operations in Afghanistan, we
are busy ensuring that we are most ready for any contingency
across the full range of military operations. In support of
this effort, the retrograde and the reset of ground equipment
after approximately 12 years of sustained ground combat
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan is well under way. We have a
coherent strategy in place, and it is working. We are confident
that we know exactly what is on the ground, when it is
scheduled to return, and where it is going to go once it is
completely reset.
Over the course of the last 18 months, with the help of our
partners and the United States Transportation Command, the
Defense Logistics Agency and others, we have reduced the amount
of Marine Corps equipment on the ground in Afghanistan by over
60 percent. The majority of these over 38,000 individual items
of equipment, such as trucks, radios, trailers, and generators,
are currently at one of our two depot maintenance facilities in
Albany, Georgia, or Barstow, California, being repaired to be
quickly redistributed out to select sites around the globe. We
definitely have a sense of urgency to accomplish our reset as
quickly as possible, maximizing each and every overseas
contingency money provided by the
Congress.
Concurrent with resetting our equipment from operations in
Afghanistan, we are also supporting the defense strategy with a
rebalance to our historic backyard in the Pacific. Support to
Pacific operations comes with challenges to logisticians to
combat the tyranny of distance associated with this part of the
world. Our logisticians will be asked to do more, and we
understand the importance of fostering development of well-
trained and educated marines able to succeed in distributed
complex environments.
A key enabler to our success will be the synergy and the
cooperation between our Navy shipmates as well as leveraging
logistics information technologies. We will continue to enhance
the MAGTF's organic logistics capabilities through the
continued development of naval logistics integration as well as
the maximization of the interdependence of the Joint Force
Supply Throughput and Distribution Organization.
We also know that in order to remain ready, we need to
continue to invest in our critically important bases and
stations. Our commandant is very much aware that a hollow
supporting establishment, or said another way, bases and
stations unable to support the training and readiness of our
marines, is a direct contributor to a hollow or a non-combat-
ready force.
Our installations do much more than just house and feed our
marines and shelter our equipment. The development and the
preservation of our installations from recruit depots to air
stations to training centers to other maintenance depots and
the atrophy of our facilities will have a direct and a long-
lasting impact on our top priority, continued support to our
marines. We must keep our depots churning in order to ensure
the highest level of unit readiness.
These challenges are further complicated by less resources.
We pride ourselves on our frugal nature, and we are proud to
say that the Nation gets the most for its money out of the
Marine Corps. This will always be the case, but the continued
support of Congress will help ensure we remain the Nation's
crisis response force and the force that is most ready when the
Nation is least ready.
I would like to thank the committee for holding this
hearing and ask that my statement be entered into the record,
and, ladies and gentlemen, I certainly look forward to
answering your questions.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Lieutenant General Faulkner. We
appreciate your opening testimony and again thank you for being
with us today.
I want to begin the line of questioning, focusing on the
question about our cruisers and our amphibs [Amphibious Assault
Ships]. We have a slide I would like to go ahead and put up
that is the projected PB 14 battle inventory.
If we can go ahead and put that slide up.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on pages 73-76.]
Mr. Wittman. It is a little bit difficult to see, but that
being said, maybe we can take it past the microscopic level. I
wanted to refer to this chart specifically and tell you of my
concern about the unsatisfactory track the Navy is proposing on
the current inventory projection.
In this plan, you know that Navy's projection in fiscal
year 2015 is to retire nine assets comprised of seven cruisers
and two amphibs which the Congress restored in fiscal year
2013. Congress provided sufficient funds to retain and
modernize these assets over two fiscal years. However,
yesterday, in testimony before the Seapower Subcommittee, Navy
witnesses reaffirmed that the Navy intends to eliminate these
ships from the inventory with approximately 10 to 12 years
still remaining on their hulls.
Therefore, I would like to ask this question: How do you
intend to employ these ships over the next two fiscal years,
and how do you intend to use the funds that Congress has
allocated if not for the purpose of modernizing these assets as
Congress intended? I was wondering, how do you propose to
backfill the capability gap with these assets not being
available after fiscal year 2015, particularly in light of the
increased demands that the Navy faces in the Pacific and the
insufficient capacity that is there in their shipyards?
If you compare the PB 14 battle force inventory to the
previous inventory, what you see is that in fiscal year 2015,
the previous projection was 276 ships. You see that we are now
down to 270 ships. And my concern is, where we are going; where
are we going to end up with capability, especially in light of
reset and needing to make sure we have that capability in an
area, as we know, that is going to be a challenge and where
naval assets are going to be extraordinarily important?
Vice Admiral Burke, I will begin with you.
Admiral Burke. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the question.
Just to start on that, we certainly share your desire to
have the biggest and best Navy we possibly can. However, our
challenge is we have to balance our books. So, as I testified
last year in front of this committee on this very topic, this
was an extremely difficult choice for us to make, but the
fiscal situation has not changed for the better. It has
actually changed for the worst, so we are even more challenged
today to maintain the inventory of ships that we have than we
were as we talked last year.
So the reason we chose the cruisers is, yes, they do have
about 10 years of life on them. However, they have an awful lot
of maintenance that needs to be done and modernization that
needs to be done. And a couple of those ships are specifically
challenged with some superstructure cracking in their aluminum,
that once something like that happens, you don't know if you
can ever fully repair it. So given that, we chose those ships
to be decommissioned.
Now, we certainly appreciate the money and the sense of
Congress to go fix those ships. Given that the money actually
showed up a month ago, and not knowing whether the money would
show up, we have not taken any action as far as maintenance or
modernization of those ships.
Mr. Wittman. Have you made any determination then about how
you are going to use those moneys? Because the concern is,
going forward, if you are not going to use those to modernize,
to extend the service life of those ships, and there doesn't
appear to be anything at least in the short term to replace
that capability, the concern is that the readiness element,
especially with the reposture to the Asia-Pacific, creates a
pretty significant gap.
I certainly understand resource issues, but from our
standpoint, too, we need to be making the argument about where
the resources need to be. I understand the limited resource
pool, but we need to understand, is the money either going to
be spent to modernize these ships to take them to the end of
service life? I understand the limitation of the industrial
base to do that, but there is also a significant limitation to
be able to build new ships to replace those.
So I just want to get a sense from you about what you see
as the direction where we are going to maintain that
capability.
Admiral Burke. Sir, I would expect that we will operate
those ships as normal for the next couple of years, and then we
would decommission those ships. I believe that the money is
better spent, as I mentioned in my opening statement, on buying
back the life of younger ships. Because of the last 10 years,
we have not inducted our surface fleet into maintenance at a
level we would like to. Therefore, we have a maintenance
backlog on many of the younger ships that we have that are more
capable going forward than those cruisers. So we would be
better off using that money to buy back life on ships that have
25 or 30 years left in them than on those ships that have 10
years left in them.
Mr. Wittman. Admiral Cullom, do you have a perspective on
that?
Admiral Cullom. To answer a portion of your question about
how would they be used, they will definitely be used as a
portion of the battle force and to be assigned missions as we
can in the Global Force Management Allocation Plan.
On the second question about whether or not the
modernization, I think we are still in the process of trying to
look at how would you fit those modernizations for those ships,
because they have to fit within when can you accomplish those
in their cycle of operations they would be expected to, and you
can't easily do all seven of those cruisers, for instance. You
couldn't do those all in 2 years or even 3 years. It would take
a number of years to even be able to do that.
As we have seen with some of the aging of or the work that
we put much of the rest of the force and how we are going to
recover that over the next few years, it is going to take a
number of years. I think Admiral Burke spoke to that in his
first statement about several years, that it is going to take 8
years or so before we are able to recover it. And doing the
modernizations have to fit within those dry docking
availabilities, and I think we are still evaluating the plan
for that.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, gentleman.
I am going to go now to our ranking member, but I do want
to make one comment before I turn over the questioning. I am
concerned that in the long run if we continue to go down the
path of saying we are going to retire ships early, much earlier
than what we intended, and the Navy comes back to Congress to
ask for the next class of ship with a proposal that a ship were
to last 25, 35, 40 years, whatever it may be, that the
credibility begins to be eroded, and it makes it more difficult
for Congress in considering those new classes of ships and what
is projected as their service life out in the future to make
those kind of commitments.
As we know, lifecycle cost is an extraordinarily important
part of what we need to consider here. So it is not just the
ship class itself, but it is the lifecycle cost. And this type
of effort really exacerbates our ability to project out in the
future what the Navy's needs are and to be able to meet those
needs.
I understand the forces to be with high OPSTEMPO
[operational tempo] and those sorts of things, but we have got
to get things back to the point where we look at lifecycle
costs to make sure we get these ships to their expected service
lives. If not, we will never get our arms around this.
Let me go ahead and go to Ms. Bordallo.
And, Admiral Burke, I will give you an opportunity to
comment on that later.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
My first question would be to Admiral Cullom and General
Tryon. How will you know that your nondeployed forces are not
ready to respond to an emerging mission or threat, and what
will be the triggers or metrics that will tell you your forces
are not ready? Also, in your opinion, how far away are we
before we reach a significantly degraded readiness status?
Admiral Cullom. Ma'am, with regard to what we are seeing as
the continuing resolution that we were in as well as the
sequestration playing out, we had already taken a number of
cuts to the operations of the nondeploying ships. Those
nondeploying ships, their readiness would normally be higher
than it currently is and will be for--the restoration will
help, but there is still going to be an impact on those
nondeployed ships. So, in essence, the average readiness of
those ships, and actually the chairman mentioned that in his
opening remarks about the roughly two-thirds of the fleet that
ends up in that position of not being able to be MCO ready--
Major Combat Operations ready--if it continues for longer, that
can be even worse. If we go through fiscal year 2014, and we
are still this in those challenging situations, then we will
see that percentage grow pretty considerably. It could easily
get up to 80 percent of the fleet that is nondeployed, is not
ready to go in a timely manner. We can still get it ready. It
will take longer to do that.
The things that we look at, and this is to address the
second part of your question about what do we look for to know
those canaries in the coal mine, the things that tell us that
we have got a real problem, are the things that happen
insidiously, in terms of things like cannibalization or cross-
decking.
Cannibalizations right now are rather steady, meaning that
we are going to actually move it from one ship to another ship,
actually take it off an active ship to the other. The cross-
decking, cross-decking has actually increased quite
considerably. We are cross-decking people. We are cross-decking
parts. So you can see that that is part of that ``bathtubbing''
of the readiness.
We are keeping a close eye on those things, but right now,
we are able to meet the 13 global force allocation program, and
we project that we should be able to meet it unless we still
are in the sequestration problems. Then it will get much more
serious.
Ms. Bordallo. More serious. General.
General Tryon. Yes, ma'am. In response to your question
about how will we know, we use the Defense Readiness Reporting
System, called DRRS, as a framework to aggregate information on
personnel, on equipment, on training and on supply readiness,
and we balance that against--we measure that against the tables
of organization and tables of equipment, our unit and force
structure. Our commanders use DRRS [Defense Readiness Reporting
System] as a tool to help the commandant understand the state
of readiness of his Marine Corps. As an example, today, as I
have mentioned in my opening remarks, our nondeployed home
station units report a high level, an unacceptable level of
readiness currently.
We are going to know when we are unable to meet the global
combatant commander requirements. We are going to know when it
impacts our Unit Deployment Program and being able to put the
battalions on Okinawa and ultimately on Guam. We are going to
know when we have to descale or descope our training exercises,
when our O&M, our operations and maintenance accounts, preclude
us from conducting the mission essential training that allows
us to be ready. We are going to know when there is an increase
in safety mishaps, and we are going to know when there is a
degradation of quality of life at our installations and bases.
And I would forecast, I would predict at this point based on
the information that is available in the DRRS, that with
sequestration, we will be at an unacceptable level, far
unacceptable, severely unacceptable, in fiscal year 2014.
Ms. Bordallo. 2014.
General Tryon. 2014, yes, ma'am.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you, General.
General Faulkner, I note that funding for a Marine Corps
hangar on Guam is requested in the fiscal year 2014 budget, and
I greatly appreciate the Marine Corps' continued commitment to
the realignment of marines from Okinawa. We have significant
U.S. investment in this realignment, but we also have
significant Japanese investment in this realignment as well.
Unfortunately, while this committee remains supportive of the
realignment, the Senate has continued to insist on language
that greatly restricts the use of Government of Japan funds.
Now, given the significant budget constraints that our
budget faces, how critical would it be to remove these
restrictions on Japanese funding?
General Faulkner. Ma'am, as you stated, certainly Guam
continues to be critically important to our larger
repositioning through the Pacific. The aircraft hangar that you
mentioned, just right short of $87 million is the price of that
in 2014, and that is very important to us in support of
exercises and others.
Getting more specifically to your question about the
Japanese piece of that funding, we are obviously very
interested in those restrictions as well because that is part
of the larger military construction package associated with not
only Guam, which was the focus of your question, but really
throughout the Pacific.
We continue to follow that. We are very interested in it.
From a DOD, Department of Defense, perspective and Department
of Navy perspective, we are interested in doing everything we
can at our level, recognizing the high level of political
issues that this is being discussed at now to influence that.
So we are very much part of the discussion and look forward to
being in the future.
Ms. Bordallo. Have you shared these concerns with the
Senate?
General Faulkner. Ma'am, to my knowledge, following what
our Commandant has talked about in his testimony, both in front
of the House and the Senate, I know he has talked about the
rebalancing to the Pacific, but as I recall, he hasn't
specifically addressed the importance of Japanese funding as
part of the larger pivot.
Ms. Bordallo. I think it would be very important to pass
this on to the Senate.
General Faulkner. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Bordallo. Mr. Chairman, in the interest of time, I have
a couple more questions, but----
Mr. Wittman. We will come back for a second round. We will
do that.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Ms. Bordallo.
Now we will go to Mr. Scott.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and gentlemen thank for
being here today and thank you for your service to this
country. I represent Georgia, so I have several military
installations, a little one named Kings Bay on our coast that
obviously is extremely important to our national security. I
represent Robins in the heart of my district, which has a
Marine detachment there, and I am on the edge of Albany, which
obviously is the Marine Corps Logistics Base in Albany. I also
have family that works at that base, so Easter, I got a good
what-for from some of my cousins, and we had good friendly
conversation about the things going on there as well.
So I think I would just kind of mention as we go forward,
these budget challenges are not going to go away in fiscal year
2015 or 2016. We have got some significant challenges that we
have all got to work through. And as somebody who has traveled
to several of the bases lately, I think what I would ask and
what I believe we need from our standpoint and I think you want
to give us is, what is the core mission of the base, any
individual base, going to be 24 and 36 months from now, and how
do we balance the MILCON [Military Construction] projects that
are being requested now with making sure that we are not
building something that is going to take us 24 months to build
that is not consistent with the base's core mission at the time
of the completion of that project?
But going back to the Marine Corps base in Albany, the work
that is performed at that depot obviously is extremely
important to our men and women as they train and especially
those who are deployed. The current budget environment, when we
talk about readiness, it is the same at any of the bases we
talk about, my depot at Robins, the logistics base in Albany.
I would like, if you would, to speak potentially to the
furloughs at the Albany depot, if you could, and what we expect
at this stage so the men and women can at least plan for their
pay as we go forward. And then my question would be about the
amount of the equipment--another question would be the
equipment to be reset and how much workload we expect at that
base going forward, which deals with capacity and other things.
And then, as you know, General, the Marine Corps Logistics
Base in Albany has gone over and above with green energy and
the impact that that movement is having on operation of our
bases.
General Faulkner, most of those may fall under your
category. If they fall under somebody else's, I respect their
opinion as well.
General Faulkner. Yes, sir. Thank you.
Thank you very much for your question, and I will take it
in pieces here. First--and you were spot-on with the importance
of Albany, not only to our reset, which I will talk about, but
just in day-to-day operations in terms of depot maintenance of
our equipment.
Getting to the first piece of your question in terms of
equipment that is at Albany now or scheduled to be there once
we continue our retrograde out of Afghanistan, on the ground
now and in Albany is somewhere around 20,000 principal end
items, and most of these items of equipment have been
retrograded from Afghanistan. So our large surge buildup that
we did in Afghanistan, all that equipment is now back. A lot of
it is sitting--it is either waiting to go through the depot or
it is being worked on today. Some of it has been pushed to
Barstow, California, which is our other depot.
Our prediction right now is, in support of reset with
Afghanistan equipment, somewhere between 2 and 3 years after
the last marine is out of Afghanistan, let's say December 14,
is when we will have completed the reset of that equipment. So
that takes us well into 17, Congressman, so that is consistent
workload. Now, that is only for the reset out of Afghanistan.
Of course, Albany operations will continue for the rest of the
Marine Corps equipment. So there is a lot to do and that is why
it is critically important that we have a stable and a
predictable workforce, which gets to the second piece of your
question.
If, in fact, we are told to furlough, which we are not in
favor of furlough, but if in fact we were to do that, then the
civilians at Albany will be furloughed as part of a larger
approach to all bases and stations across the Marine Corps. It
will have an impact. For every day furloughed that we are not
able to use the depot, it just pushes that to the right one day
forward, so that is a concern of ours.
What we are doing now at----
Mr. Scott. General, my time has expired. I apologize, but
when we get to the second round of questions, we will come
back.
Mr. Wittman. We can do that, or too, if you want to do some
additional questions, we can also have that one taken for the
record, so however you would like to pursue, Mr. Scott, we will
be glad to----
Mr. Scott. You can respond for the record if that is more
convenient, and when you go to Albany, please let me know, love
to see you over there. If it is hunting season, we will buy you
a quail hunt.
General Faulkner. Sir, I will, and I look forward to
answering the energy question because that is a good news story
for Albany.
Mr. Scott. Yes, sir.
General Faulkner. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Scott. Absolutely.
Mr. Wittman. We can certainly get that in the second round.
Now we go to Ms. Hanabusa.
Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Admirals.
Thank you, Generals, for being here.
Throughout the time that I have been on HASC [House Armed
Services Committee], one of the, I guess, the perplexing
questions I have always had is what do you anticipate the force
or your different expeditionary force, what it is going to do,
and the Navy, what do you expect it to look like in the future?
And quite honestly, no one has really been able to give a
response to that, so as we talk about readiness, it seems
obvious that you are measuring it against something. So to say
that we are ready or we won't be ready by the year 2014 is
against some kind of measurement that you must have in your
mind.
Yesterday, the Army sat in exactly where you were, and
they, of course, said that they must be flexible into the
future to fight in potentially two theaters, Asia-Pacific, the
rebalance, but also the Middle East, to ensure our commitments
to the Middle East. It seems that those are two different times
of theaters. So, I assume that the Navy and the Marine Corps
also feel the same way, that you are going to have to be ready
in two potentially different theaters, so can you tell me what
your measurement of ready would be other than being able to
train? In other words, I want to know what that force structure
is going to look like. And in one of the other conversations we
had in Seapower was we had Former Secretary of the Navy John
Lehman speak to us as well as Admiral Roughead, and you know,
they both had different numbers as to the amount of ships that
we would need.
The Secretary of the Navy Lehman was from the infamous 600-
ship Navy, and he said, well, 346. Admiral Roughead said
somewhere between 325 and 345, but they both came down to the
conclusion that it depended on where he would be and what we
need.
So, with that as the background for my question, whoever
wants it to take it, I appreciate it. Thank you.
Admiral Burke. Thank you, ma'am.
The way we determine what our force structure should look
like is we develop our strategy, and today that is a--we get
help from that from OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense]
and--but by that case, we all have a strategy that looks to be
ready to fight in various conflicts around the world, but there
are some conflicts that are potentially more likely and some
that are potentially more challenging. And then, given that
work, we then do what we call a force structure assessment that
would say, okay, if that is what you--if that is the future you
are going to see, then what kind of forces do you need? And we
have done that work, and that says we need 306 ships with the
associated aircraft, and people training, readiness,
maintenance, et cetera.
Now, then, what we do is we build a shipbuilding plan, and
the chairman put up a portion of that shipbuilding plan
earlier, one of the tables from it, and what that shipbuilding
plan does, it says when we would need to buy those forces--and
there is a similar aviation plan, when we need to buy those
forces to achieve that number and type of platform to get to
the 306. And as, you know, the chairman alluded, there is a
pretty big challenge out there in the future for getting to
that number. So we have a difference today between what we
think we need and what OSD agrees that we would need and what
we can afford. And so we will clearly need help from the
Congress in order to get there.
Ms. Hanabusa. General.
General Tryon. Thank you, ma'am.
I would echo much of what Admiral Burke said. We are a
general purpose force in the Marine Corps, and as a general
purpose force, we have a design mission. We look at the most
likely enemy course of action, we look at the most dangerous
enemy courses of action that we would anticipate meeting. These
threats manifest in a variety of different manners.
Conventional threats, threats, such as the hybrid threat where
you have a non-nation-state actor who may have access to
sophisticated technology that will pose a threat to our vital
national interests. Terrorism is a concern, threats to our
diplomatic missions abroad.
There is a wide array of threats that we need to consider,
and as we do that, ma'am, we measure what capabilities are
required in order to be able to provide an adequate response
and then what capacities we want to be able to deliver those
capabilities.
As an example in terms of our amphibious force, we have
worked with our shipmates in the Navy, and we feel that it is
important to be able to provide this Nation with a two-assault
echelon Marine Expeditionary Brigade Force. And in
conversations and agreements with our shipmates, that is 33
amphibious ships.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Ms. Hanabusa.
We now go to Mr. Palazzo.
Mr. Palazzo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, it is good to see you this morning. I appreciate
your testimony. I definitely appreciate your service to your
country.
I have a lot of the same concerns about reset, and for me,
largely centered around replacing old ships with new ones. The
shipbuilding industry is extremely important. I don't think
just to me, but to our Nation, but it is also, because of the
fiscal restraints and the environment that we are in, when we
do provide a product, we have to provide it at the best
possible price, since the taxpayer is paying for it.
So, with that, I have seen some--I have noticed some
comments from the Commandant over the past couple of weeks, and
I would like to ask General Tryon and General Faulkner about
them, and I think it serves almost two purposes, not only
replacing old ships with new ones but doing it in the most
efficient and effective, especially cost-effective manner.
So, to recap, a few weeks ago, the Commandant mentioned
that he wanted to see the replacement for the LSD dock landing
ship make use of the LPD amphibious transport dock production
line that is about to draw to a close. Can you give us any
thoughts on the utilization of the LPD hull as a bridge for the
LSD hull?
I will start with you, General Tryon.
General Tryon. I will take a quick stab at that, and then I
will defer to the subject matter experts on hulls. We are, of
course, inextricably linked to the Navy, and the Navy's
investment in amphibious ships, maritime prepositioning ships,
ship-to-shore connectors, mine countermeasures and the Navy
expeditionary combat commander are where we are invested and
are our most critical dependencies with the Navy.
We have agreed to a fleet of 30 operational available
amphibious warships to meet the combatant commander
requirements. Within the construct of those 30 ships, 11
amphibious assault ships, LHA or LHD; 11 amphibious transport
docks, LPDs; and 11 dock-landing ships, LSDs, are the inventory
that we believe are necessary to operate and to be able to
provide employment of the assault echelons of two expeditionary
Marine brigades. I will defer to my Navy counterpart to discuss
that specific----
Mr. Palazzo. Before we do that, can I ask you, so you agree
with the commandant that we should probably utilize this hot
production line to bridge the gap, or do you disagree with the
Commandant?
General Tryon. Let me think about that. I agree with the
commandant, sir.
Mr. Palazzo. Okay. Thank you. I appreciate it.
Admiral Burke.
Admiral Burke. Congressman Palazzo, thanks for the
question.
The, I think, preamble on this by General Tryon was right
on. We have an analysis of alternatives ongoing with regard to
what the LSD replacement will be, and so that analysis of
alternatives will consider anything at the high end. It will
consider the LP-17-like ship and then it will consider other
options in addition to that.
Right now there are about 10 options being considered, and
that is being done under the cognizance of N95 [Director of
Expeditionary Warfare] and the Navy Sea Systems Command. N95
works for me, and so we expect to get to a conclusion on that
this late summer or fall.
Mr. Palazzo. Yes, please.
Admiral Cullom. I would also add that there are other
combat enablers that also make this expeditionary thing work,
and a lot of those are--they don't have the--they don't go but
USS, they go by USNS, our Military Sealift Command ships. We
have some really good news stories in some of those. The new
mobile landing platforms, the MLPs, are coming off the assembly
lines, and they are on time and on schedule. Montford Point was
just christened just recently.
In addition, the T-AKEs--dry cargo and ammunition ships--
are also out there, and those also add to the ability to be
able to get the things that we need as that 911 force together
to be able to enable the USS ships, the LSDs, the LPDs, and big
deck amphibious ships to do their job.
Mr. Palazzo. I appreciate your responses.
I yield back.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Palazzo.
We now go to Mr. Courtney.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank the witness for their testimony, very frank
testimony this morning, particularly about the impact of
sequester.
You know, this morning's New York Times has a story about
the FAA [Federal Aviation Administration] deal that passed in
the Senate and which hopefully we are going to take up later
today, and there is a Member, one of our colleagues, who is
quoted, again, still lauding the benefits of sequester, saying
I think it is the first time we have saved money in Washington,
D.C.; I think we need to move on from the subject.
Your testimony clearly shows that we don't--we can't move
on. I mean, we are far from out of the woods here, and again, I
always cite Phil Gramm, who invented sequester, who was quoted
recently saying the purpose of sequester was not to be a policy
but to in fact be an incentive for people to sit down and
compromise and act. And that is really what your testimony kind
of reinforces today very powerfully.
And the Navy, before March 1st, did put out the warning to
Congress, despite the claims in some quarters to the contrary.
Admiral Greenert testified, again, before March 1st, that
failure to fix sequester as well as failure to pass the CR
[Continuing Resolution] would have canceled about 22 ship
availabilities. Obviously, the CR mitigated some of that.
I guess the question is, there are a few others, you know,
they are sort of hanging out there, and I was wondering, one
particular, the USS Providence, you know, whether or not, can
you report anything this morning, whether the Navy is any
closer to resolving, you know, that work moving forward before
the end of the fiscal year?
Admiral Burke. Congressman Courtney, I don't know, but I
will get back to you.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 80.]
Mr. Courtney. All right.
Admiral Burke. I will take that one for the record and get
back to you pretty quickly. I think we are getting close on
that, but I don't think we have gotten there quite yet.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you.
And yeah, we would appreciate that.
Mr. Rigell and I visited the Truman not too long ago, which
also has been impacted by the sequester situation, and again,
there is some sort of claims around here that, you know, the
Navy was kind of doing what the board of education does, you
know, cutting football when the budget is under pressure. And
again, this is not a decision that I know you came to lightly.
Rob and I were just over in Bahrain a few days ago, and you
know, the hole that that creates was pretty obvious. Again, I
was wondering if you could talk about that a little bit, Vice
Admiral Burke.
Admiral Burke. Yes, sir. It frustrates me greatly to hear
the discussion about how that was a political decision. You
know, what we were challenged with there was, we had Truman
ready to go, could have sent Truman, and we could have had two
carrier strike groups in the Gulf right now. However, because
of sequestration, we would not be able to get the next one
ready in time to go when they finish their time, so we were--
the option was either two now and none later, or one now and
one later. And we felt like the obvious right answer to that
was one now and one later.
Mr. Courtney. And I mean, and that is really--we are still
sort of stuck there for now. I mean, it really requires us to
fix sequester in a much more comprehensive way in terms of
funding that shortfall. Is that again correct?
Admiral Burke. Yes, sir, that is correct. So, essentially
where we are with sequestration in the operations and
maintenance accounts is we have taken a pretty good hit out of
our shore support. We have cut some administrative areas.
Operationally, everything we are sending forward is fully
ready, fully loaded out, et cetera, but we are not able to get
everybody, keep everybody at the same level they have been. So
the next guys to get ready to go, we are working them, but the
ones that are not next are not doing very much. And so what we
usually call that is ``surge''--the ability to send ships and
planes forward--and we have reduced our surge capability as a
result of sequestration in a significant way, such that two-
thirds of our force is not ready right now.
Mr. Courtney. And again, just so we are clear, the 2014
budget has been submitted. Let's just say, you know, this
place, you know, had an epiphany and we moved forward and
enacted it in record time, I mean, that still kind of begs the
question of what you are talking about here. It doesn't sort of
reach back and fix the problem that--of the Truman, does it?
Admiral Burke. No, sir. If the 2014 budget were approved as
is, we would still have sequestration.
Mr. Courtney. Right.
Admiral Burke. And so we would be, you know, take that,
whatever number it is, and take $50 billion, $55 billion or
whatever the number is off of that, and some 12--well, probably
15 comes to the Department of the Navy, and so we--we would be
in the same position, if not worse. And so any of those
maintenance availabilities on the aviation side or the ship
side that are deferred or descoped, that would start to
cascade. And then that part of the readiness piece certainly
affects you a year or two later, and so we would have even more
challenges getting ships in place for it.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you.
Admiral Cullom. We have to remember that the Truman was
part of the surge capability and was being surged to be able to
handle or the desire to have two out there at one time, so that
is what we have come to, is what Admiral Burke is saying, is
this point where we don't have that surge capability, that
surge volume to be able to put forward if a request for force
comes in.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Courtney.
We now go to Mr. Rigell.
Mr. Rigell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And gentlemen, I join my colleagues in expressing my
sincere appreciation for your service. Thank you. Thank you
very much. This is going to be somewhat as a followup to Mr.
Courtney's line of questioning there, so I think it is headed
to the Navy side of the table.
In February, latter part of February, a number of Members,
myself included, received a response back from Secretary Mabus
and Admiral Greenert, and it said in part this, that the fleet
commanders have been directed to notify contractors of the
potential for cancellation, deferral or descoping of private
sector fiscal
year 2013 third and fourth quarter surface ship maintenance
availabilities.
That letter was sent to us. This bipartisan letter that we
have sent to the Secretary, and just so you know, expressing
our concern about this matter, we closed the letter this way;
our letter said, This is not an acceptable solution for us or
the taxpayers.
Now, subsequent to those letter exchanges, we finally
passed HR 933; 933 [Consolidated and Further Continuing
Appropriations Act, 2013], and so, albeit late, far later than
anyone of us would have wanted, we have provided clarity on
funding from our side, and I ask you this morning if you could
provide clarity where we stand on third and fourth quarter
availabilities.
Admiral Burke. So, where we stand is we have got eight
avails [availabilities] that are deferred at this point. They
are highest on our buyback list. We think we will be able to
execute those availabilities as planned, but we are not 100
percent sure of that. I talked to our comptroller last night
anticipating you might ask this question, and that is where we
stand. So they are number one on our buyback list. And he
thinks that we will make that, we will make them happen.
But I will tell you that one of the things you ought to
know is, here is what happens when this sort of thing occurs:
When the money is not appropriated at the right time, two
things potentially happen. One is, planning stops or is
reduced. Secondly, shipyards, knowing that avails are unlikely
to happen, lay off people or don't hire. And when that happens,
then if money is later appropriated, now planning gets turned
back on, shipyards hire, but what happens is, and we will spend
the money, but we will not necessarily get the maintenance done
that we want to get done, so--because we haven't----
Mr. Rigell. Admiral Burke, I hesitate to interrupt, but our
time is always short. I just want you to know, Admiral, that
this is realtime, of course, in Virginia, too, the Norfolk
waterfront, and I have great empathy and understanding, and I
am doing everything I can with my colleagues, especially in the
House, to help my other colleagues understand that
sequestration, the uncertainty that this institution has
created for our men and women in uniform is harmful to our
national defense. You know, the failure to pass a budget is in
and of itself harmful to national defense to some degree. So,
we are going to continue to fight for you, and I wish we had
done better on our side.
I do want to transition very quickly in the short amount of
time I have left here about material inspections. The Navy, by
law, conducts material inspections of all Navy ships to
determine a ship's fitness, and let me just get to the point
here.
Three possible inspection results: satisfactory, degraded
and unsatisfactory. If we look at the trend line of 2007, 2008,
2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, the trend is unsatisfactory, as I see
it here, 8 percent, 13 percent, 19 percent, 22, 20, and 21.
That is the percentage of inspections that fall below
satisfactory. And in the short amount of time you have here, if
you could just give a quick comment on that. We may have to do
this offline. I am just trying to understand the causal factors
of why that is and if we can do something on our end to help
you with it.
Admiral Burke. I don't think we need help, other than, you
know, we need to fund readiness in the way that it needs to be
funded. If----
Mr. Rigell. If I may, is it your testimony--not your
testimony. Just in our conversation here, is it--is it the
sequestration, is that--and I am just trying to understand, you
know. It went from 8 percent to 21 percent. It looks like it is
kind of holding at that level. Is it things that we have done
on our end on the uncertainty side or----
Admiral Burke. It is not sequestration.
Mr. Rigell. Okay.
Admiral Burke. The numbers you reference go back to, I
think, 2007, 2008.
Mr. Rigell. Right.
Admiral Burke. But the last couple of years, we have
actually been steady. So I think what we would say is that we
have taken a round turn on this; we have stopped the bleeding;
and we are working our way toward getting better.
Mr. Rigell. I thank you.
Admiral Cullom. I would add that it is a part of 10 years
war and running those ships----
Mr. Rigell. Yeah.
Admiral Cullom [continuing]. So hard, not getting them in
for the maintenance that they needed, and now having a plan to
be able to move forward and looking at every ship individually
and planning those things out, and we know the challenge we
have over the next roughly 8 years.
Mr. Rigell. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Rigell.
I want to go back to my original line of questioning and
now drill down a little bit on amphibious capability. We know
that our combatant commanders request that capability quite
often for things like security cooperation and crisis response
and regional deterrence. And these are the underpinnings of the
Marine Corps' mission, and we know that it spans the spectrum
of the conflict issues that we face today.
One of the Marine Corps' principal contributions to U.S.
global responsiveness is really focused on the rotational
forces aboard amphibious ships, and as we have seen that
historically, we have seen over 1,000 missions accomplished
there over the past 21 years, so it is very, very significant.
I want to ask this and get both the Navy and the Marine
Corps' perspective here. In looking at the current requirements
for amphibious lift, do we meet those requirements? And if not,
why are we considering further fleet reductions? And I will ask
that, and I want to ask a question as a follow up to that
specifically for our Navy witnesses.
If the requested amphibious ship retirements go forward,
that is, those two amphibs will be retired, what is the Navy's
assessment of the increased risk assumed by the Marine Corps?
And I will ask that conversely from the Marine Corps, too, how
would you characterize the increased risk, and especially in
light of where the Marine Corps is faced with the reposture of
the Pacific and also the constraints that may push the Marine
Corps to disaggregate or distribute their MEU [Marine
Expeditionary Unit] operations throughout the theaters? So I
will go ahead and get your basis on the current lift
requirements, where we are, what increased risk we might assume
from a Navy perspective and a Marine Corps
perspective.
Admiral Burke. The requirement is 38 amphibious ships. The
Navy and the Marine Corps for several years have agreed that
the 33 is a fiscally constrained requirement in order to make
30 ships operationally available at any one time. We do not
meet that requirement today.
Mr. Wittman. Very good. Where do you see us going in the
future, especially with an additional reduction of two? Where
would we be in the near term, I say within the FYDP [Future
Years Defense Program], where do you see us being?
Admiral Burke. We are struggling to get to 33. We will--I
don't have the figures in front of me, sir. You may, but we are
in the low 30 range during that--during the timeframe. You
know, to our discussion earlier, if--with regard to cruisers,
you know, we kind of lumped the cruisers and the LSDs together,
if we were to buy back any of those ships, the higher priority
ships would be the LSDs.
Mr. Wittman. How do you see us in the risk scenario with
increased risk based on the level of amphibious ships we have?
Admiral Burke. Well, we certainly have increased risk based
on--we have risk based on not meeting our numbers, but we have
a process called the Global Force--GFMAP, Global Force
Management Allocation Plan, by which we address risk. So we
take what we have, take the COCOM [Combatant Command]
requirements, address the highest priority COCOM requirements
with what we have, and therefore, we minimize the risk we take
because we either don't service the lower priority requirements
or we look for different ways to service some of those
requirements.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you.
Lieutenant General Tryon.
General Tryon. Thank you, sir. I would not need to remind
anyone here that the United States is a maritime nation. We are
a Atlantic Ocean nation, and we are a Pacific Ocean nation: 28
of the world's--21 of the world's 28 megacities lie within 60
kilometers of the coast; 95 percent of the world's
communication travels by underwater cable; 95 percent of the
world's commerce travels by sea; 60 percent of the population
lives within 100 kilometers of the coast; and 23,000 ships are
under way every single day carrying vital commerce to which we
are inextricably linked.
The value of the amphibious force, I think, is manifest in
the request that we routinely see, routinely see, from the
combatant commanders. We don't make or meet the requirements
that they generate as part of the Global Force Management
Allocation Plan. We consistently fall short, yet the demand
signal remains. So the combatant commanders recognize the value
of the amphibious and expeditionary force that we bring.
It provides them with a low signature in terms of a shore
basing. It provides them with the opportunity to operate from
over the horizon. It is operational maneuver from the sea,
ship-to-shore objective, without impinging on the sovereignty
of a given nation, and it provides our Nation's leaders with
the time and decision space necessary to make follow-on
determinations.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you. Let me ask you just with a yes-or-
no answer, will the current and future projections on
amphibious force structure, will it affect the operational
capacity or the structure of how the Marine Corps expeditionary
units function today?
General Tryon. Sir----
Mr. Wittman. In other words, will it fragment your views?
General Tryon. To give you a yes-or-no answer to that
question----
Mr. Wittman. Will it fragment your views? Will you go away
from the current concept of how the----
General Tryon. We have the flexibility, the agility, the
adaptability with the Marine Air Ground Task Force afloat, to
adjust to split ARG [Amphibious Ready Group] operations,
desegregate ARG operations, and at the same time bringing those
forces together for a purpose.
The inventory right now, we have 31 this year. It will fall
to 28 in the near term, but over the long term, it will rise to
32 ships in the 30-year construction plan.
Mr. Wittman. Okay, sir. Very good.
Thanks, Lieutenant General Tryon.
Ms. Bordallo.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Cullom and General Faulkner, what specific
flexibilities or exceptions did you request in terms of
furloughing the civilian personnel who provide the backbone of
support for our operational Navy and Marine Corps? And also,
what is the impact of using borrowed military manpower to
backfill civilian positions or functions previously performed
by contractors?
General.
General Faulkner. I will go ahead and go first, ma'am, and
then go over to my shipmate. Thank you for the question. The
process, as you alluded to, does allow us----
Mr. Wittman. Leutenant General Faulkner, if you could turn
your mike on.
General Faulkner. Sorry, sir. Got it. The process, as you
alluded to, does allow us to identify exceptions, which is
exactly what we have done. And so, in the Marine Corps, what we
have focused in on are those individuals--those civilians that
are most closely linked to safety of our marines and our marine
families. So, for example, fire and rescue, medical response
capability, water and electricity plant operators that are
linked, and in fact, we were very careful when we looked at
each individual in terms of who met that bill.
To answer the second piece of your question in terms of
using military--using our marines to replace the civilians, we
have no intention to do that. The bottom line is that we know
right now that there will be an impact when in fact our
civilians are furloughed. Our ratio of marine--our civilian to
marine is 1 to 10, I believe the lowest of all the Services.
And in fact, 69 percent of those civilians are retired
military, so in fact, right now, that is just risk that we are
going to have to bear through the furlough process.
Ms. Bordallo. So, General, what you are telling the
committee then is that in spite of the fact that furloughing
includes the contractors and civilians, there has been no
Active military to take these positions? Is this what I--or you
are not using Active
military?
General Faulkner. No, ma'am, we are not, and so we have no
intention to take our marines from their primary occupational
specialty and plug them into this furlough. It is risk we are
going to have to bear.
Ms. Bordallo. Admiral.
Admiral Cullom. Yes, ma'am. On the Navy side, I think it is
an important point to make that there is a direct operational
impact to our personnel. We oftentimes think that our civilians
are people that do administrative work and move paper around in
the Pentagon, but the reality is, there is over 23,000 artisans
that are either in shipyard waterfront jobs or in aviation
depots, on the shop floor day to day that are fixing planes,
fixing ships, and putting them back out to sea, so they have a
very, very important role.
What we don't often think about with the furlough is that
we say, well, if it is a 20-percent reduction, then we lose 20
percent of the work. But the reality is that it is much greater
than that because we rely upon overtime in both aviation depots
as well as within our shipyards to accomplish our work, and
that is so that we don't have too many people on board during
the periods where there is lesser work, so we rely upon that
overtime to get us through that.
So, the impact is the 20 percent direct that you lose as
well as maybe 15, 17 percent additional that is the overtime
because you are not allowed to pay overtime if you furlough. So
the impact can be as high as almost 40 percent, 35, 40 percent
in terms of the impact that it has to us.
It is not our intention either to use military personnel.
They don't oftentimes have the skill sets to do what those
artisans do.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you, Admiral.
And I have one final question, Mr. Chairman.
And it is a question for each of you, but if I could have a
concise answer, since time is the essence.
Okay. How are you using sequestration as an opportunity to
essentially change and transform the way you do business? For
example, what thought have you given to administrative or base
operation functions that the Navy or Marine Corps may not need
to do at all? I guess we will start with Admiral Burke.
Admiral Burke. Thank you for the question.
I think there are a couple of things that we are looking at
doing. One is--we started this some time ago, but it is
certainly even more appropriate during the fiscal situation--is
to put more ships forward, so to get more bang for the buck out
of the ships. So those ships in your theater that are
homeported forward in Guam or Japan, give us more bang for the
buck. We get far more operational availability out of those.
So we are sending LCS [Littoral Combat Ship] to Singapore.
We will send another SSN [nuclear-powered attack submarine] to
Guam, while at the same time, maintaining what we have in other
areas. We will also send some JHSVs [joint high speed vessel]
for it, but I think there is other things as well.
We certainly are looking hard at our administrative
overhead to see what we can skim out there, and then--and then
BRAC. I mean, we have a need for BRAC [Base Realignment and
Closure]. The last BRAC was based on 340 cruiser equivalents.
We have--we don't have anywhere near 340 cruiser equivalents.
We don't have anywhere near 340 ships, and it is unlikely we
will have that many, so we are carrying excess overhead that we
need to get at.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you.
Admiral.
Admiral Cullom. Ma'am, I would also add that we are also
looking at our business transformation, the businesses that we
do, and service contracts as well as the audit ability that we
have for our records, and I would like to get back to you,
maybe for the record, with a response more complete to how to
align the things that we are doing in that regard because those
are important, and they save millions, and those millions go
back to putting ships back to sea.
Ms. Bordallo. General Tryon.
General Tryon. Yes, ma'am. We are, I think, probably
already pretty lean in terms of our bases, stations, and
installations. We pride ourselves on being good stewards of the
scarce public funds. I think we consume the smallest percentage
of the Department of Defense budget. We do consistently and
continuously look at force structure, force structure review,
force structure analysis. We look hard at where operational
concepts can blend with technological innovation and provide us
with the capability that is more efficient and more effective
for our Nation. I would point to the deployment of the Special
Purpose MAGTF Crisis Response that is under way today
responding to request for forces for AFRICOM as an example of
that kind of a measure.
And I will pass to General Faulkner.
Ms. Bordallo. General Faulkner.
General Faulkner. Ma'am, real quickly. I would just add
that we don't need sequestration as a forcing mechanism, if you
will, to review our internal processes. That is continuous. We
like to say, like camouflage, it is continuous. The only thing
I would say, just for the record, is that getting to my fellow
marine's point is we don't believe we have any excess
infrastructure. In fact, we believe that we are right-sized
today in terms of bases and stations for our 182,100 force.
Certainly, if we are told to participate in BRAC, we will do
the analysis again, but again, that is where we sit in terms of
our infrastructure.
Ms. Bordallo. So what I am taking from this is you are all
going to be better businessmen, right? Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Ms. Bordallo.
Mr. Scott.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And gentlemen, I apologize, after my question, I am going
to be leaving for another meeting.
But I want to come back to you, General Faulkner, but I
want to make a kind of a statement if I could to the gentlemen,
the
admirals.
Our national geography for America gives us a distinct
advantage over many countries. I mean, our enemies are not
going to come through Canada. They are not going to come
through Mexico. I mean, we would clearly be able to stop that
at those borders if they tried that.
I guess my frustration with the naval shipbuilding, if you
will, is that I believe our threat comes from the sea. The
Atlantic, the Pacific, that is where, that is where I think if
a major country wanted to come to us and do us harm, they would
come through there. Obviously, the Gulf is there, but I think
that is limited as well.
So, I would like for us to find a way to do a better job of
the shipbuilding, and I would just offer this as an example,
may or may not work: In Georgia, when I was on the
appropriations committee, if we were buying a fleet of school
buses and the life expectancy of the school buses was 5 years,
we would issue a 5-year bond to purchase those buses. And I
just wonder if there is a better way for us to handle the
purchasing of the fleet that maybe could be considered as we go
forward, that may actually help us get the ships that we need
to defend this country.
I know we are going to be forward-deployed, but as an
American citizen, as a father, I also want to make sure that we
have got enough naval vessels here to protect us in the
Atlantic and the
Pacific.
General, you mentioned BRAC, and you said that you have got
excess capacity. For me, as a Member of Congress, we hear that
from most of the branches. If you know you have excess
capacity, I would like for you--to ask you to trust us and to
show us where that excess capacity is. If you know there is 20-
percent excess capacity, can you tell us where it is?
Admiral Burke. Sir, I can--you know, I can tell you what I
just said. We have--we did the last BRAC based on 340 cruiser
equivalents. We don't have that today. We have fewer ships than
aircraft by 10 percent than what we had during the last BRAC of
2005. We have not done the specific analysis that would need to
be done in order to give you the answer, you know, on which one
is specifically in excess. But given those--given those numbers
based on the last one, it is clear to me that there is excess.
Mr. Scott. Thank you.
General Faulkner, if I may, I would love for you to have
the opportunity to finish the answer, especially with regard to
the Marine Corps logistics base in Albany with the green energy
initiatives.
General Faulkner. Sir, thank you for the question.
The energy situation in the Marines, we feel like, is a
good news story, and there are two components. Certainly there
is the installation piece and the operational piece. Just real
quickly on operational piece, if I could.
Right now we are pursuing several initiatives in terms of
energy-efficient sheltering, solar batteries, generators,
reverse osmosis water purification, et cetera. But getting to
the installations piece, which is your question, Albany is
certainly a good news story, and they have been recognized by
Secretary of the Navy for their initiatives in terms of energy,
use of an on-base landfill that was created to generate power
right there in support of not only the base proper, but the
logistics base as well. Also, they are pursuing third-party
financing off base with some of the local partners in terms of
an energy coop, if you will, to better support their efforts.
Quite frankly, they are at the forefront among all our 24,
25 bases and stations in terms of what they are doing in
support of energy, together with doing their normal day-to-day
operation in terms of our depot maintenance efforts, so a good
news story in terms of energy.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, gentlemen.
And again, if you come down there, I would love to have the
opportunity to buy you lunch or a cup of coffee, and we will
see you there.
General Faulkner. Sir, I will take you up on that.
Thank you.
Mr. Scott. Mr. Chairman, I yield for the remainder of my
time and apologize for having to step out.
Mr. Wittman. No problem. Thank you, Mr. Scott.
Ms. Hanabusa.
Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
One of the other hearings that we had, it was evident that
the Navy and Marines basically have the flexibility in what you
have in your operation maintenance, that you really didn't have
to furlough, but the problem was, I believe, the Army that
didn't, and as a result, the furlough issue that affects our
civilians was going to be one that treated everyone ``the
same.'' So, as a result of that, we went from the 20 to
potentially the 14 to potentially 7. As far as I know, we still
have not gotten the final word as to what that number is going
to be, but is it still remaining true that if the--if the
branches were to be able to treat their respective civilians
separately, that the Army and the Marine Corps really do not
have to institute the furlough; is that correct?
Admiral Burke. Do you mean the Navy and the Marine Corps,
ma'am?
Ms. Hanabusa. Yes.
Admiral Burke. Yes. I think what you said is accurate. A
decision has not been made yet. That decision is being looked
at today by the Secretary of Defense, and I don't--I personally
have no insight into what he might decide.
Ms. Hanabusa. But you do have sufficient funds that you
would not need to furlough if given the opportunity to make
that decision independent--as an independent branch. That is
also correct, isn't it?
Admiral Burke. Excuse me. I don't know--we would certainly
like not to furlough and--but I don't know how the, necessarily
how the money is going to shake out, so I don't know whether
that will end up being true in our case or not.
Ms. Hanabusa. Well, I know the Army has made it very clear
that they would have to furlough, and I think the Navy has, in
the past, given testimony that they think that you can avoid
it, so we appreciate that.
General, you made a statement in my last series of
questions about the most likely enemy, and I would like for you
to define--you don't have to identify the most likely enemy,
but if you can--if you can define what you think that most
likely enemy is going to require, I would appreciate it, and I
am raising this in the context of--because as I said earlier, I
have asked this question many times, and I still remember what
General Chiarelli said, and he said, We have been 100-percent
accurate in being 100-percent wrong, on determining what that
enemy is going to look like in the future. So given that, I
would like to know what you are planning when you said the most
likely enemy.
General Tryon. Thank you, ma'am. Tough question. If it is
true that we have been 100-percent wrong all the time, my
thoughts are, then we better be 100-percent ready for whatever
is coming our way. I don't know that I would put my finger on
any particular nation as a threat, but you only have to read
the front page of your newspaper to identify a wide variety of
threats.
We look at North Korea today and the threat they pose to
our homeland in terms of Guam. In Hawaii, we look at our--the
hybrid threats, the hybrid threats that I mentioned that are
out there that manifest themselves on an all-too-regular basis.
We look at terrorism, which has touched us in the recent past,
and I would simply say that as a general purpose force, we have
to rely on the indications and warnings, we have to rely on
what we know to be the world as it is in order to prepare to
defend our vital national interests and the security of the
country.
That is probably not the essay answer you were looking for,
but it is a difficult question, I think, to provide a precise
response to you, ma'am.
Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you. And you can understand why in
trying to understand what we should be appropriating for, that
it is a very difficult question because unless we understand
what you are expecting to fight, then it then determines, I
think, what we would, of course, fund appropriately.
General Tryon. If I may, ma'am, that is a great point. What
I would tell you is I know where we don't want to fight them,
and that is here, in the CONUS--the Continental United States.
It is not in Hawaii, and it is not in Guam. So we need to be
forward-deployed and ready to meet and engage at a distance,
and your Navy/Marine Corps team is optimally organized to do
just that.
Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Ms. Hanabusa.
I wanted to finish my line of questioning with focusing
again on the readiness element and looking at the current ship
capabilities, and that includes the number of ships going
forward. There is still, I think, a significant amount of
concern about where we are, and I wanted to then follow up on
that and ask this question, Admiral Burke. What can Congress do
to keep the retirement of those nine ships from happening in
fiscal year 2014? Would extending the funds that we put out for
the next 2 years past 2014, would that allow the ships to stay
in service longer? Give us your perspective on how we, as
Congress, can help to maintain the most capable Navy going
forward?
Obviously, we have got some tough decisions to make about
resources, but we have to be able to know what we can do in
order to battle for those resources because that is essentially
what it is, is battling, within the defense budget, to make
sure that Navy receives a portion of those resources, and then
within the Department of Defense framework, within the entire
budget, to battle for those. So give me your perspective on how
we can--what can we do to put off or get those ships to their
expected service life?
Admiral Burke. Yes, sir. First of all, I certainly
appreciate and agree with your concern about service life and
lifecycle costs. Admiral Cullom and I are broken records inside
Navy talking about this.
But I think, given the shortage of funding, that we have
several options available on where we could spend our limited
resources. I am a fan of keeping everything until service life,
but we won't be able to do that, so I would prefer to put the
money into destroyers as opposed to cruisers, because those are
younger; the modifications we need to make to them are simpler;
and we are actually looking for ways to, as I mentioned the
other day in your office, looking at ways to combine
availabilities and do better on those availabilities as far as
time and cost.
In the case of the cruisers, we have enough of them without
those ships. So, I think they would be--we would potentially be
throwing good money after bad. If we are to buy back something,
I would buy back the LSDs. To get to the specific point on the
cruisers, however, the challenge we have is I got it that it
was pretty clear that the committees--all four committees--were
interested in retaining those ships but the money shows up at
the 6-month point and it is 2-year money, and it is hard to go
buy things with 2-year money to maintain them.
So, a potential option is to extend the life of that SMOSF
[Ship Maintenance, Operations, and Sustainment Fund] money, and
if you were to extend the life of that money, we would have the
opportunity, perhaps, to work out a way to retain some of those
or all of them or--but I think that would give us the
flexibility to at least have a conversation about it and
probably get there.
Mr. Wittman. And I certainly understand the whole
restrictions on certainly one of those ships there and the
decisionmaking there. I understand, too, some of the issues
with the aluminum superstructure, so--but what we would want to
be able to do is to again look in that short term, where we
have that precipitous dip in the number of ships that are
available, which I think is a concern to all of us, and I
appreciate you talking not only about the cruisers but also
about the LSDs, which we think are important.
Let me ask you something. I want to go back to another
macro question, too, and it goes right back to PB 14 structure
numbers. What do you all believe--and I want to ask across the
board here. I want to ask of the Navy, and I want to get the
Marine Corps' perspective. What do you believe the fleet size
needs to be? And I know what you project can be build or will
be built, but what do you think the fleet size needs to be to
normalize maintenance, training, and operations across the
fleet, based on today's surge operations tempo? And we look at
that, and reset is going to be an important part of that going
forward, so we always try to project, and what was pointed out
earlier is, you know, we don't always get that right.
But that being said, we live in today's world that is
pretty dangerous, and our ability to respond, just as was
pointed out by the Marine Corps, is absolutely critical, and
our ship capability, I believe, is the cornerstone of this
Nation's defense structure in order to really respond to the
things that happen around the world.
I mean, we watch today, anything that has happened from a
security standpoint, who is there at the tip of the sphere? It
is the Navy that goes there immediately along with the Marine
Corps. So I want to get your perspective. Where do we need to
be as far as fleet size to really do the things that we need to
do? And I would like to get every one of your perspectives on
that.
Admiral Burke. Sir, just a quick question before I answer
it. Are you talking about where we should be without fiscal
constraints, or are you asking, given fiscal constraints, what
are we able--what would be the right size?
Mr. Wittman. I would say--I would say, sans the fiscal
constraints, looking purely at strategy and looking at what you
project, where do you think that we need to be?
Admiral Burke. Yes, sir. As I mentioned earlier to
Congresswoman Hanabusa's question, we actually--taking the
strategy and then doing a detailed force structure assessment
by our assessment division, we determined that the right number
is 306. And it is a mix of various types of ships.
So, that is where we think it ought to be. Now, that would
require, in addition to just buying the ships, we would need--
we would need to fill in the OCO hole. We have $3 billion or so
in OCO that ought to be in base. There are some other issues
that we would need to--need to address, but those are
relatively minor when you compare it to the money to buy the
ships in the first place and the OCO; everything else is
relatively minor. So we think that 306 is the right number.
Now, that will change over time. It changed here recently
from 313 to 306, and that is just addressing certain things
that have changed in the world and certain things that will--
parts of our force structure that we will retire or a different
way of doing things with our force structure, for instance,
with our SSNs or SSGNs [cruise missile submarines], they will
go away over time. We think we can essentially do that mission
by putting Virginia payload modules in this. So, you know,
there is a little bit of give and take over the years, but
generally, it is in the low 300s.
Mr. Wittman. Very good.
Vice Admiral Cullom.
Admiral Cullom. Yes, sir, I would concur with Admiral
Burke. The Force Structure Assessment is pretty clear on how it
gets to the number and the methodology by which it gets to it.
So, in the unconstrained environment, 306 is the right number.
I think the reason, when you have asked that question of
numerous people and you keep getting different answers, if you
will, across the board, is that combatant commander desires and
requests out there, we do not fulfill all those, not by a long
shot; roughly only half of those. So, above and beyond the
things that the Force Structure Assessment towards the
operational plans are built, there is this need that, because
of what General Tryon was talking about, that need for us to be
out there because it is such a maritime world and everyone
lives close to a coast is why there is a desire to have more
than that.
In the constrained world, that then, I would have to say,
tell me what the constraint is and I can tell you what that
could give us in a whole manner. And we have had to do a lot of
thinking about that just in case we can't get further on
sequestration.
Mr. Wittman. Very good.
Admiral Burke. Before you throw it to General Tryon, can I
just add one thing, sir?
In order to meet COCOM demand, we would need a Navy
approaching 600 ships. Certainly, we would be happy to have
anywhere between 300 and 600, but I think that is probably
unreasonable, and that is where the GFMAP comes in adjudicating
where we go and where we don't.
Mr. Wittman. Lieutenant General Tryon.
General Tryon. My Navy counterparts are nervous right now,
sir, as I prepare to answer this question. This is a force
generation and a capacity question. I think due diligence on
the part of the Department of Navy has been realistic, given
our funding
available.
The fleet response plan for amphibs is 27 months, and
understanding operational availability is typically running at
70 percent, I would tell you that we would say that the 38-ship
requirement that has been advertised heretofore is a realistic
number. It would not meet, again, all of the combatant
commander requirements, but we believe it would provide us with
the forward-deployed presence, the ability to surge and at the
same time to maintain and take care of the ships in the event
that we had a major contingency
operation.
Mr. Wittman. Very good.
Lieutenant General Faulkner.
General Faulkner. Sir, I would just add, I won't throw out
a number, but I would just add, and it was mentioned earlier in
terms of our strategy and our rebalancing to the Pacific, even
more so in the future than ever before, it is going to be
important for those very reasons that we are forward to be
relevant and that we are flexible and we are as agile as
possible, and that is going to call for us to be able to be
even better in terms of training.
We didn't talk much about sea basing when in fact that is a
key part of our future ability logistically to support across
those wide areas in the Pacific, and it demands an even greater
reliance on that amphibious shipping.
Thank you.
Mr. Wittman. Very good. Thank you, gentlemen.
I appreciate your perspective. As you can see from our
standpoint, it is a little frustrating, because the numbers, as
you know, go all over the chart as far as where we need to be
strategically. I have always been a proponent to say that
strategy needs to drive budget, not budget driving strategy.
And then it is up to Congress to make the tough decisions about
where does the money goes. And many times it is going to fall
under what the strategy may dictate, but at least we have the
knowledge and we can make an objective decision about how
priorities need to be made. And we can ask you then the
questions and say, well, if we need 306, 316, 330, whatever the
number may be, and this is what we can do, how do we address
that in the short term and the long term? So I want to make
sure that we continue to have an understanding there.
One question I do want to pose to you, but I want to take
it for the record, and that is one of the areas we will look at
in the future that is a significant cost for both the Navy and
the Marine Corps is energy and whether it is operational energy
or at the base level. I want to get your perspective on what
both branches or what the Navy is doing, with the Marine Corps
being an element of that, what you all are doing on reducing
that energy cost. I think there are a lot of things that are
going on that are pretty significant, but I want to get you all
on the record as to what you are doing with that. And that is a
significant cost savings. As you know, when we get that energy
footprint down, it is money we can plow back into the force
structure and the systems that we need for the Navy in the
future.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 79.]
Mr. Wittman. So, Ms. Bordallo, do you have any other
questions?
Ms. Hanabusa?
Very good. Well, with that, we will adjourn the
Subcommittee on Readiness.
Gentlemen, thank you so much for joining us today. Thanks
for your perspective.
[Whereupon, at 10:00 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
?
=======================================================================
A P P E N D I X
April 26, 2013
=======================================================================
?
=======================================================================
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
April 26, 2013
=======================================================================
Statement of Hon. Robert J. Wittman
Chairman, House Subcommittee on Readiness
Hearing on
The Readiness Posture of the U.S. Navy
and the U.S. Marine Corps
April 26, 2013
Welcome to this morning's hearing. I would like to thank
our witnesses for being here to address the readiness posture
of the Navy and Marine Corps in light of the Fiscal Year 2014
budget submission and deeply concerning current fiscal year
shortfalls. Joining us are:
LVice Admiral Bill Burke, the Deputy Chief of
Naval Operations Warfare Systems (N9);
LVice Admiral Phil Cullom, the Deputy Chief of
Naval Operations for Fleet Readiness and Logistics
(N4);
LLieutenant General Richard Tryon, the Deputy
Commandant for Plans, Policies and Operations; and
LLieutenant General William Faulkner, the
Deputy Commandant for Installations and Logistics.
Gentlemen, thank you all very much for being here. Admiral
Burke, thank you for your almost 40 years of service to the
Navy and to our Nation. We are delighted to have the
opportunity to garner your insights at your final hearing
before this subcommittee. And, we wish you all the best as you
move on to your next
endeavor.
As we review this budget request, we cannot lose sight of
the impacts on readiness and implications for operational
missions. We are quickly compromising the readiness of our
force, and it is our duty and commitment to ensure that we
provide the resources necessary to support our warfighters and
to protect our Nation, particularly in light of the fact that
our forces have been operating at a very high operational tempo
over the past 10 years.
We are experiencing the very real effects of the budget on
a daily basis. Despite the FY13 appropriation, the Navy still
faces a $4.5 billion shortfall in its FY13 O&M accounts, which
is further exacerbated by unanticipated bills resulting from
rising fuel prices. In February of this year, the Navy deferred
the deployment of the USS Truman to the Gulf and reduced its
carrier presence to 1.0. Additionally, in March, an additional
five deployments were cancelled, and the next-to-deploy forces
are also being affected, for example, by reducing two carrier
air wings to ``tactical hard deck,'' which is the minimum level
of training required to maintain basic air proficiency and the
ability to safely operate the aircraft.
By making the near-term decisions in light of fiscal
constraints, the Navy will soon begin to see the impacts on
units beyond those that are ``next-to-deploy.'' As maintenance
availabilities get reduced or outright cancelled, the Navy will
be challenged to reconstitute the requirement in the very near
future due to lack of capacity at the shipyards. Ultimately,
this results in significantly shorter service life for the
assets, particularly when coupled with the impacts of the
sustained surge in recent years which has taxed both the
equipment and personnel at rates significantly higher than
anticipated. Add to this mix the tenuous progress the Navy has
made to reverse degraded surface fleet readiness trends, and
I'm deeply concerned about losing the momentum we have achieved
to preserve the readiness of the naval force.
In particular, I have strong concerns about the readiness
of the fleet as it relates to the total number of ships
projected in the inventory. Any proposal to retire assets
earlier than the end of their expected service life will
increase the strain and degrade the readiness of the remaining
force. It is apparent by the updated Navy 30-year shipbuilding
plan that there are deficits in the very near future. The
dichotomy is that you will lose capacity, but, it is not
apparent how the Navy intends to replace it.
Despite slight improvements in Marine Corps readiness
levels, the force structure continues to downsize to a total of
182,000 marines facing a nearly $1 billion cut as a result of
sequestration. In light of the fiscal situation, the Marine
Corps will undoubtedly be challenged to meet global
commitments, to reconstitute the force, and to sustain high
operations tempo. The strains will likely be further compounded
by the need to support new, important missions like the forward
deployment of a special MAGTF in Spain to support AFRICOM and
the expansion of critical legacy missions like the Marine
Security Guard program slated to grow to protect an increasing
number of embassies in high-risk areas around the globe.
During my recent trip to Afghanistan it became readily
apparent that we have very near-term retrograde and reset
issues associated with battle-worn equipment. I witnessed
thousands of containers, hundreds of vehicles, and millions of
individual items awaiting shipment home to units that
desperately need them--all items at risk as transportation
costs continue to rise and budgets continue to shrink.
In addition to the service-specific issues, one of my
foremost concerns is consideration for the civilian workforce
and the impacts on the depots and the skills that could be lost
in the industrial base. Make no mistake--the impact to the
readiness of the force is real, and is occurring today. During
this hearing, I would ask that you share your perspective on
this and help us answer some basic
questions:
How do you define ``readiness''? And, ready
for what? And, will the forces be ``ready'' in both
FY13 and FY14?
In the absence of the OCO budget for
consideration before the Congress at this time, can you
please describe the impact of OCO funding on your
ability to provide ``ready'' and trained forces? And,
how will you sustain that in the long run as OCO funds
begin to diminish?
Please address the actions you are taking for
the rebalance to the Pacific, what it means for both
the Navy and Marine Corps, and your ability to meet
Global Force Management Allocation Plans.
I have every expectation that you will continue to seek
options to mitigate the long-term consequences and ensure we
don't create a hollow force. That said, I strongly believe that
our long-term Naval and Marine Corp strategies cannot be
articulated until the budgetary pressures get resolved. I am
deeply concerned that we are on the brink of the Department
making near-term decisions that could potentially mortgage
future force readiness, and it is imperative for us to work
together to avert that outcome.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0770.001
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0770.002
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0770.003
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0770.004
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0770.005
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0770.006
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0770.007
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0770.008
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0770.009
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0770.010
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0770.011
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0770.012
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0770.013
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0770.014
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0770.015
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0770.016
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0770.017
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0770.018
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0770.019
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0770.020
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0770.021
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0770.022
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0770.023
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0770.024
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0770.025
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0770.026
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0770.027
?
=======================================================================
DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
April 26, 2013
=======================================================================
President's Budget for Fiscal Year 2014
U.S. Navy Projected Battle Force Inventory (FY 14-FY 43)
Acronyms and Ship Hull Classification Symbols
AFSB (I): Afloat Forward Staging Base, Interim
AS: Submarine Tender
CG (47): Ticonderoga Class Aegis Guided Missile Cruiser
CLF: Combat Logistics Force
CVN: Aircraft Carrier
DDG-1000: Zumwalt Class Guided Missile Destroyer
DDG-51: Arleigh Burke Class Aegis Guided Missile Destroyer
FFG: Frigate
JHSV: Joint High-Speed Vessel
LCS: Littoral Combat Ship
LHA/LHD: Amphibious Assault Ship
LPD: Amphibious Transport Dock Ship
LSC: Large Surface Combatant
LX (R): Dock Landing Ship Replacement
MCM: Mine Countermeasures Ship
MHC: Coastal Mine Hunter
MLP: Mobile Landing Platform
MPS: Maritime Prepositioning Ship
SSBN: Nuclear Ballistic Missile Submarine
SSC: Small Surface Combatant
SSGN: Nuclear Guided Missile Submarine
SSN: Nuclear Attack Submarine
T-AE: Ammunition Ship
T-AGOS: Ocean Surveillance Ship
T-AKE: Dry Cargo/Ammunition Ship
T-AO: Fleet Replenishment Oiler
T-AOE: Fast Combat Support Ship
T-ARS: Rescue and Salvage Ship
T-ATF: Fleet Ocean Tug
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0770.029
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0770.030
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0770.031
?
=======================================================================
WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
April 26, 2013
=======================================================================
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WITTMAN
Admiral Burke and Admiral Cullom. Energy is necessary for every
Navy platform, installation, and asset and its judicious use is central
in ensuring the success of our operational mission. We are working
diligently to reduce consumption and improve security for our energy
resources, become more resilient and effective warfighters, and thereby
enhance our combat capability. Each of our energy initiatives reduce
our total ownership cost, improve our energy security, and critically
enhance our combat capability.
Examples of Operational Energy Initiatives:
Ship Energy Dashboard: Ship-wide monitoring system
that will, in real-time, compute the power usage and operating
conditions of numerous energy-consuming systems on the ship and
display this information for decision-makers, both in port and
underway.
Stern Flaps (Amphibious ships): Develop and install
stern flaps on LHD 1 and LSD 41/49 class ships for improved
hydrodynamics, improved fuel economy, and greater endurance.
Aviation Simulator Upgrades: Simulator fidelity
improvements and capacity expansion, in combination with Fleet
optimization of simulator contribution, reduces flight hours
while maintaining sufficient levels of training and
readiness.
DDG-51 Hybrid Electric Drive R&D: An electric motor
attached to main reduction gear allows for electric propulsion
mode at slower speeds resulting in improved fuel economy and
endurance.
Aviation Energy Conservation R&D: Identifies,
evaluates, validates energy savings initiatives for legacy and
emerging Naval aircraft such as F-35 Block 5+ engine fuel
economy, improved mission planning software to incorporate
energy considerations, and T-56 engine maintenance refinement
to increase energy performance, reduce tanking requirements,
and improve range/
endurance.
Variable Cycle Advanced Engine Technology: Identify
and mature critical technologies for next generation carrier-
based aircraft that combine the high performance of a military
engine and the fuel efficiency of a commercial core into a
single versatile propulsion system.
Examples of Facility Energy Initiatives:
Energy Efficiency: To reduce energy demand and
consumption, Navy is conducting energy audits, installing high-
efficiency building components (HVACs/energy control systems/
lighting/window film) and optimizing utility systems.
Renewable Energy: Evaluate and pursue renewable
energy projects where economically viable. The Secretary of the
Navy has established the 1GW task force to identify, develop
and execute utility scale renewable energy projects on/around
Naval installations.
Energy Security Ashore: Conducting audits and
developing mitigation strategies to ensure critical assets have
a resilient energy supply.
Navy is not only relying on technological solutions to energy
consumption reduction, but also pursuing culture change initiatives
through education and working to reform the acquisition process to
ensure energy considerations are considered early in the process. Navy
has already established programs to affect culture change, such as the
Master's program and Executive Education Course at Naval Postgraduate
School, which focus on energy efficiency as a combat enabler and
incorporate energy conservation practices in a component of the coveted
Battle `E'.
I will defer to the Marine Corps to address their operational and
facilities energy reduction efforts. [See page 35.]
General Tryon. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.] [See page 35.]
General Faulkner. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.] [See page 35.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. COURTNEY
Admiral Burke. USS PROVIDENCE (SSN 719) will be conducting
submarine operations for the remainder of Fiscal Year 2013 (FY13). USS
PROVIDENCE (SSN 719) FY13 docking availability is scheduled to be
executed with a period of performance from 15 December 2013 to 17 April
2014. [See page 21.]
?
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
April 26, 2013
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WITTMAN
Mr. Wittman. In light of the existing shortfalls in the FY13 O&M
accounts, what are your greatest concerns about the Navy's readiness?
And, what is the impact it will have on the future?
Admiral Burke and Admiral Cullom. Our greatest concerns regarding
Navy readiness, in light of the shortfalls in the FY13 O&M accounts,
are the potential loss of eight planned surface ship maintenance depot
availabilities and the backlog of work in our maintenance depots (ship
and aviation) due to mitigation actions required by the FY13
sequestration. After Congress completes its consideration of the
Department's proposed reprogramming for FY13, we are hopeful that
funding will be available to complete the eight unfunded
availabilities. However, as a result of overtime restrictions, a hiring
freeze, and furloughs, there will be delays in completion of required
maintenance in our ship and aviation depots.
If maintenance work scheduled for FY13 is pushed into FY14,
additional resources will be required above those currently budgeted to
execute that work. If additional mitigations are required due to
sequestration in FY14, the effects will be compounded and will quickly
drive readiness shortfalls with a longer recovery
period.
Mr. Wittman. How do you define ``readiness''? And, ready for what?
And, will the forces be ``ready'' in both FY13 and FY14?
Admiral Burke and Admiral Cullom. The processes and certifications
for Navy readiness and force generation are defined in Fleet
instructions. In general, Navy measures readiness against resources
(personnel, equipment, supply, training and ordnance) and mission areas
(and their associated Navy Mission Essential Tasks), and operationally
certifies units/groups using outside observers in both live and virtual
training environments. Our goal is to certify all deploying forces for
the full range of major combat operations for which our Navy's multi-
mission platforms are designed.
In FY13, Navy has prioritized resources to ensure Forward-Deployed
Naval Forces and rotationally deploying forces are ready. Navy will
take the same approach in FY14, but in case of a continuing resolution
and/or sequestration in FY14, this will again come at the cost of
readiness of our non-deployed forces. This will impact our surge
capacity and ability to support additional requests for forces by the
Combatant Commanders.
Mr. Wittman. In the absence of the OCO budget for consideration
before the Congress at this time, can you please describe the impact of
OCO funding on your ability to provide ``ready'' and trained forces?
And, how will you sustain that in the long run as OCO funds begin to
diminish?
Admiral Burke and Admiral Cullom. OCO funding has been essential to
Navy's ability to provide `ready' and trained forces during the
conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan over the past 12 years. The
operations and sustainment of our Navy expeditionary combat support
forces most directly involved in the operations have been highly
leveraged with OCO funding. Sustaining this long warfight has also worn
upon the material condition of our ships and OCO funding has become a
critical component of our ship maintenance program. Supplemental
funding above the baseline will likely be required for some time to
restore the readiness of our ships. The Ship Operations, Aviation Depot
Maintenance and Flying Hour Programs also receive OCO and cannot
sustain their present level of operations without it. Navy remains
concerned that, although ground combat operations will end in
Afghanistan, Navy operations are likely to continue at their current
pace or even increase in the coming years.
Current Navy force structure and our current level of operations
are not sustainable with the baseline budget.
Mr. Wittman. In light of the fact that the Navy has spent the last
6 years operating a significant part of the force above a long-term
sustainable tempo level, as the DOD draws down in Afghanistan and
rebalances to the Pacific, a predominantly maritime environment, will
the Navy be able to sustain its operations and meet enduring GFMAP
requirements with base funding? And, by doing so, what risk will you
assume?
Admiral Burke and Admiral Cullom. Current base funding does not
fully sustain our current force structure and ongoing level of
operations. The Ship Maintenance account is highly leveraged with OCO,
and the Ship Operations, Aviation Depot Maintenance and Flying Hour
Programs cannot support a level of operations equivalent to that today
without supplemental funding. Attempting to sustain operations within
baseline funding will quickly degrade the material condition and
readiness of the force, create conditions that will make it challenging
to retain our best personnel, and move the Navy towards a hollow force.
Mr. Wittman. How do you ensure you do not create a ``hollow force''
and that you continue to preserve the short- and long-term ability to
provide ready forces to the combatant commanders--particularly in light
of the impacts to operations, training and maintenance due to
sequestration?
Admiral Burke and Admiral Cullom. Navy requires a long-term
budgetary and strategic framework in order to properly align resourcing
decisions that will sustain Fleet readiness and provide ready forces,
with the right capabilities, to the Combatant Commanders. In the
present environment of year-to-year sequestration, we are attempting to
preserve the reversibility of budget decisions until it is clear what
that framework may be. Our priority remains to provide ready forces to
the Combatant Commanders. This will become increasingly difficult as
training is compressed and maintenance/modernization is deferred.
Repeated budget sequesters, as opposed to a long-term plan that
balances fiscal constraints with a strategic vision for the force,
results in the compounding of negative readiness impacts from year to
year and will ultimately result in a hollow force.
Mr. Wittman. What are the operational impacts of civilian furloughs
on maintenance activities particularly in light of civilian hiring
freezes and reduction to overtime work?
Admiral Burke and Admiral Cullom. Furloughs, combined with the
ongoing hiring freeze and overtime restrictions, will have an extended
impact on Fleet maintenance capacity.
For example, the combination of the civilian hiring freeze,
overtime restrictions, and 11 furlough days at the aviation depots is
expected to delay the delivery of approximately 66 aircraft and 370
engines and modules from FY13 into FY14. This equates to 80% of a
carrier air wing, and will result in fewer aircraft ready for tasking
and a commensurate reduction in flight hours for non-deployed units.
Recovery of the delayed work will drive additional unbudgeted costs.
The Naval Shipyards have been exempted from the furlough and were
recently granted a hiring freeze waiver. This waiver, approved on 18
June 2013, allows the Naval Shipyards to hire to replace 100% of
attrition and up to 25% of programmed growth for FY14. While the
furlough exemption and hiring freeze waiver mitigate much of the impact
to the shipyards, the cumulative effects of overtime restrictions and
the hiring freeze to date have impacted FY13 capacity resulting in a
corresponding delay in the completion of maintenance availabilities.
The final number of availabilities impacted and magnitude of delays
will depend on several factors, including the length of time the
remaining overtime and hiring restrictions are in effect, the amount of
workforce attrition and corresponding loss of experience, and the
ability of the shipyards to hire to the maximum extent allowed by the
waiver.
Mr. Wittman. The Navy was about to turn a corner on reversing its
trend of degraded surface fleet maintenance. What will be the short-
and long-term impacts to the fleet of the FY13 funding impacts and
sequestration? And, if given additional money, is there any ability to
recover the availabilities in the same timeframe?
Admiral Burke and Admiral Cullom. As reflected in our initial FY13
budget, Navy remains committed to performing the necessary ship depot
maintenance to sustain the readiness of the Fleet. While sequestration
has had a significant impact on surface ship maintenance funding, we
have been able to execute all but eight of the FY13 availabilities to
minimize the short-term impact to the Fleet. Those eight private-sector
availabilities remain a top priority for Navy and we are pursuing
options to fund them this year. In the public-sector, some
availabilities will be extended in the short-term due to capacity
reductions as a result of FY13 sequestration actions such as the hiring
freeze and overtime restrictions.
If Navy is able to fund the remaining FY13 availabilities and
sequestration is limited to FY13, we do not expect long-term impacts to
surface fleet readiness. If sequestration continues into FY14, funding
for private-sector availabilities will be at risk that would reduce the
capacity utilization of public sector yards. The result would be an
increase in the backlog of surface ship maintenance, erasing the hard-
earned gains made in recent years toward improving surface ship
material
readiness.
The Navy's FY14 Budget is based on the assumption that all FY13
work is completed as planned. Any work deferred from FY13 will either
displace planned FY14 work or require additional funding. Even with
additional funding in FY13, the Navy will not be able to recover all
eight availabilities in the same timeframe as originally planned. While
these delays will impact near term readiness, Navy should be able to
reschedule the availabilities to ensure long-term surface fleet
readiness.
Mr. Wittman. What is the current requirement for amphibious lift?
What level are we currently providing? What is the plan to close the
shortfall?
Admiral Burke and Admiral Cullom. The Navy remains
committed to the 38 amphibious ship requirements, fiscally constrained
to 33, to meet naval amphibious lift demand. This number was validated
through a Force Structure Assessment (FSA) based on defense strategy
guidance. The assessment addressed the operational demands and
requirements and took into account the importance of maintaining an
adequate national shipbuilding design and industrial base.
33 ships ensure 30 are operationally available to meet
operational timelines and will optimally be comprised of 11 LHA/D, 11
LPD 17 and 11 LSD/LX(R).
--11 LHA/D will be achieved in FY22 with delivery of LHA 8.
--11 LPD 17 will be achieved in FY17 with the delivery of LPD
27.
--11 LSDs can be achieved in FY25 once the first LX (R) is
delivered.
In the short term, we are accepting risk to aviation and
vehicle lift. We may be able to reduce the risk by relying more heavily
on carrier tactical aviation for close air support and by delivering
additional support vehicles via Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) and/or
Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV) to support ground maneuver.
Our proposed delivery/decommissioning profile will meet
historical sourcing for Amphibious Ready Groups. However, with an
emphasis to PACOM, we must accept some risk to geographic Combatant
Commander's demand for independent deployers to source activities such
as Partnership Stations and rely more on other platforms such as MLPs
and/or JHSVs to support these independent
operations.
Mr. Wittman. If requested amphibious ship retirements go forward,
what is the Navy's assessment of the increased risk assumed by the
Marine Corps?
Admiral Burke and Admiral Cullom. In the short term, we
are accepting risk to aviation and vehicle lift. We may be able to
reduce the risk by relying more heavily on carrier tactical aviation
for close air support and by delivering additional support vehicles via
Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) and/or Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV) to
support ground maneuver.
The Navy remains committed to the 38 amphibious ship
requirements, fiscally constrained to 33, to meet naval amphibious lift
demand.
33 ships ensure 30 are operationally available to meet
operational timelines and will optimally be comprised of 11 LHA/D, 11
LPD 17 and 11 LSD/LX(R).
Our proposed delivery/decommissioning profile will meet
historical sourcing for Amphibious Ready Groups. However, with an
emphasis to PACOM, we must accept some risk to geographic Combatant
Commander's demand for independent deployers to source activities such
as Partnership Stations and rely more on other platforms such as MLPs
and/or JHSVs to support these independent
operations.
Mr. Wittman. How do you define ``readiness''? And, ready for what?
And, will the forces be ``ready'' in both FY13 and FY14?
General Tryon and General Faulkner. The Marine Corps uses a
framework to manage its readiness as an institution. Known as the Five
Pillars of Institutional Readiness, this framework seeks to ensure that
Service-wide activities lead to a proper balance among five categories
pillars that underpin the readiness of the Marine Corps. These pillars
capture the Marine Corps' approach for generating ready forces today
and informing an investment strategy that will ensure the future
readiness of the Marine Corps and enable it to meet the tenets of the
Defense Strategic Guidance. Maintaining balance across these pillars is
critical to achieving and sustaining the Nation's expeditionary force-
in-readiness for today and tomorrow. The five pillars are:
High Quality People (Recruiting, training, educating,
and retaining high quality people plays a key role in
maintaining our high state of readiness).
Unit Readiness (Maintaining readiness of the
operating forces and reserves, including appropriate operation
and maintenance funding to train to core missions and maintain
equipment).
Capacity versus Requirements (Force-sizing and naval
capabilities to meet Geographic Combatant Commander
requirements with the right mix of capacity and capability).
Infrastructure Sustainment (Investing in real
property, maintenance, and infrastructure).
Equipment Modernization (Ensuring ground and aviation
equipment matches the needs of the emerging security
environment).
During the development of the FY13 budget, the Marine Corps worked
to build a comprehensive program that achieved balance between these
pillars. The passing of HR 933 enables the Marine Corps to meet near-
term readiness commitments for deployed and next-to-deploy forces;
continue to rebalance to the Pacific; and support the Marine Rotational
Force Darwin and the Unit Deployment Program in FY13. While the Marine
Corps is capable of meeting near-term readiness commitments in FY13, we
are taking risk in our long-term infrastructure sustainment and the
unit readiness of our home station units due to sequestration. We
cannot continue to sustain these levels of reductions in FY14, without
impacts to our non-deployed crisis response forces at home.
Mr. Wittman. In the absence of the OCO budget for consideration
before the Congress at this time, can you please describe the impact of
OCO funding on your ability to provide ``ready'' and trained forces?
And, how will you sustain that in the long run as OCO funds begin to
diminish?
General Tryon and General Faulkner. The Marine Corps' readiness
remains heavily dependent on the Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO)
budget as it provides funding to sustain the manpower, operations, and
equipment repair and replacement in support of Operation Enduring
Freedom (OEF). The Department's strategic guidance emphasizes a smaller
and leaner force that will no longer be sized to support long-term
stability operations that have dominated the past decade. The enduring
active duty end strength required for the Marine Corps to support the
new strategy is 182,100 Marines. With the move to the new strategy and
the Marine Corps' commensurate reduction to 182,100 Marines, end
strength above 182,100 is now considered to be temporary end strength
and as such, has been requested in the OCO budget. This overstrength
must be maintained through the end of FY16 to allow the Marine Corps to
simultaneously support its forward presence mission, combat operations
in support of OEF, Combatant Commander requirements, and ensure that it
keeps faith with its Marines.
The reset of our equipment after more than a decade of combat
requires an unprecedented level of effort, and our depots stand ready
to meet the challenge. Reset is composed of strategic and operational
reset; our fiscal year 2013 near term, operational reset cost is $0.9
billion and is included in the Overseas Contingency Operations request.
Strategic reset costs will not be finalized until OEF operations have
ceased and reset will occur over a two to three year period following
the return of our equipment from Afghanistan. Last year, our reset
liability was approximately $3.2 billion. We estimate it will be
something less, however; we are unsure exactly what that number is
until we can get a better picture on both the totality of the costs
associated with returning our equipment from Afghanistan and the
detailed costs associated with resetting our gear after 10 years of
combat.
Mr. Wittman. How do you ensure you do not create a ``hollow force''
and that you continue to preserve the short- and long-term ability to
provide ready forces to the combatant commanders--particularly in light
of the impacts to operations, training and maintenance due to
sequestration?
General Tryon and General Faulkner. The Marine Corps balances the
long-term health and readiness of its force by balancing resources
across five broad pillars: high quality people, unit readiness,
capability and capacity to meet requirements, infrastructure
sustainment, and equipment modernization. Maintaining balance across
all five of pillars is critical to achieving and sustaining Marine
Corps readiness. Given the impacts of sequestration, the Corps is being
forced to take actions to ensure its short-term readiness, such as
transferring facilities sustainment funding to support operations and
equipment maintenance. These actions create an imbalance across these
pillars that result in both near- and far-term readiness shortfalls and
concomitant impacts with respect to long-term readiness. The Marine
Corps has a strategic trajectory to reconstitute to a ready force by FY
17. Its reconstitution efforts will restore and upgrade combat
capability, ensure units are ready for operations across the range of
military operations, and sustain home station readiness so that units
are ready to deploy on short notice. Unit training is rebalancing to
encompass capabilities across the range of military operations, with a
renewed emphasis on core expeditionary and amphibious capabilities.
Marine Expeditionary Force and Marine Expeditionary Brigade readiness
will continue to improve with larger-scale exercises that emphasize
shifts to conducting maneuver and amphibious operations.
America's ``Force in Readiness'' must maintain a high state of
readiness at all times to respond to contingencies and commitments
throughout the globe. Despite the constrained funding resulting from
sequestration, the passing of HR 933 will mitigate most of this year's
near-term operational impacts from sequestration. The Marine Corps will
meet near-term commitments for deployed and next-to-deploy forces. It
will continue to rebalance to the Pacific and support the Marine
Rotational Force Darwin and the Unit Deployment Program. The funding
levels for ground depot maintenance allow for the continuation of
planned reset activities. HR 933 supports recruiting, advertising, and
restores funding for tuition assistance
programs.
In FY 14 and beyond, sequestration would negatively impact future
readiness. Facilities sustainment reductions would be unsustainable and
would degrade training range sustainment and quality of life for
Marines and their families. The curtailment of training and maintenance
would degrade the readiness of non-deployed crisis response forces.
Nearly half of Marine Corps ground units and one-third of Marine Corps
aviation combat units would remain below acceptable readiness levels.
Sequestration would also adversely impact operations and exercises in
FY 14 and beyond. Sequestration will decrease training opportunities as
the Corps reduces its scale, scope, and participation in operations and
exercises for each geographic combatant commander. The Corps will need
to invest in ranges and facilities to maintain readiness, particularly
as it rebalances to the Pacific. Sufficient O&M funding is needed for
steady state operations and to maintain equipment. Sufficient O&M is
also essential in the Pacific to support the Unit Deployment Program,
provide rotational forces in Guam and Australia, and train and engage
within the region.
Equipment shortages are the biggest readiness detractors for the
Corps' operating forces and sequestration will exacerbate that problem.
The full impact of sequestration on depots has yet to be determined.
Sequestration related delays in modifications, critical survivability
and mobility upgrades, and modernization programs for equipment will
adversely impact materiel condition and the Corps' ability to provide
Marines with ready, relevant, and capable combat systems.
Sequestration's impacts on the availability of amphibious and
maritime prepositioning ships are a concern for reconstituting the
force. The combat readiness of these ships is a foundational
requirement for training to and executing expeditionary force presence
and amphibious force projection. As such, the Navy acknowledged that
low amphibious ship availability and readiness could present a
significant challenge to the training readiness of Naval Expeditionary
Forces and it is actively addressing maintenance readiness shortfalls.
Continued Congressional support for the Navy's shipbuilding and surface
ship-to-shore connector programs is vital to retain and maintain an
adequate fleet of modern combat-ready amphibious ships, which provide
continuous naval expeditionary presence and projects power across the
globe.
The linkage between resources and readiness is immediate and
visible, and fiscal restraints have caused the Corps to pay keen
attention to its priorities. To guide the Marine Corps as it optimizes
investments and readiness in the force, its priorities are:
Provide the best trained and equipped Marine units to
Afghanistan
Protect the readiness of forward-deployed rotational
forces within the means available
Reset and reconstitute the operating forces as
Marines and equipment return from more than a decade of combat
Modernize the force through investments in human
capital and by replacing aging combat systems
Keep faith with Marines, Sailors and families
Mr. Wittman. What are the operational impacts of civilian furloughs
on maintenance activities particularly in light of civilian hiring
freezes and reduction to overtime work?
General Tryon and General Faulkner. Despite the fact that the
Marine Corps has not instituted a civilian hiring freeze at this time,
Marine Corps operational readiness will be impacted by depot
maintenance workforce furloughs. Marine Depot Maintenance Command
(MDMC) is the primary source for repairing and resetting the Marine
Corps' ground weapons systems. The 11-day furlough will have negative
impacts on maintaining depot productivity necessary to complete the
FY13 scheduled workload. Approximately 240,000 direct labor hours will
be lost and, as a result, a commensurate level of FY13 workload will be
carried over into FY14. Historically, MDMC has maintained an overtime
rate of approximately 25%. MDMC plans to maintain that overtime rate
during the furlough period without violating overtime guidance from
DON.
Mr. Wittman. How will the Marine Corps absorb additional missions
like the MAGTF in Spain without impacting training or other missions?
How would the Marine Corps' ability to absorb future mission growth be
hampered by a full implementation of sequestration?
General Tryon and General Faulkner. U.S. Marine Corps leadership
recognized two significant events were on the horizon; warfighting
efforts in the USCENTCOM region were approaching conclusion, and U.S.
economic recovery would be a prolonged event; and embarked upon a route
which reviewed the structure of the Marine Corps (Force Structure
Review Group--FSRG) and how that structure could be best utilized
(Force Optimization Review Group--FORG) to remain as the Nation's
premiere Force In Readiness. These efforts re-shaped the U.S. Marine
Corps and reduced overall end-strength from 202k to 181.1K, and
eliminated redundancies and duplicative efforts across the U.S. Marine
Corps. These fiscal offsets permitted the U.S. Marine Corps to maintain
regionally aligned forward postured Special Purpose Marine Air Ground
Task Force (SPMAGTF), rotational Amphibious Ready Group(ARG)/Marine
Expeditionary Units(MEU) and reconstitution of III MEF forces in the
Pacific; as well as introduction of SPMAGTF-Crisis Response (CR) in
response to the New Norm.
Previous fiscal off-sets notwithstanding, the U.S. Marine Corps
continues to review all Geographical Combatant Command (GCC) rotational
force demands to determine if efficiencies can be gained to reduce
overall operating, employment and sustainment cost. The U.S. Marine
Corps currently has three SPMAGTF's forward postured in the European
Area Of Responsibility (AOR). Each are deployed to provide specific
capabilities to the supported GCC's (CDR USAFRICOM/CDR USEUCOM); yet
the U.S. Marine Corps recognized resourcing challenges (i.e. fiscal,
manpower, material, equipment, etc.) associated with forming,
organizing, training, equipping, sustaining and reconstituting these
SPMAGTF's; and employed an ``economy of force'' methodology where each
SPMAGTF performs a wider array of missions/task beyond their core
purpose. These additional missions/task are inclusive of Crisis
Response (CR), Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) and Security Force
Assistance (SFA); thereby negating a requirement to generate upwards of
90 additional stand-alone Mobile Training Teams (MTT), Subject Matter
Expertise Exchange (SMME) Teams, and PTDO SECFOR elements; resulting in
employment/operating cost efficiencies which provide sufficient fiscal
offsets to maintain the current force posture. The U.S. Marine Corps
continues to address efficiencies by closely reviewing SPMAGTF-AFRICOM,
SPMAGTF-CR and SPMAGTF-Black Sea Rotational Force (BSRF) After Action
Reports (AAR) and official Lesson Learned in order to revise force
generation, force employment and force reconstitution actions.
A broader review of U.S. Marine Corps structure, roles/
responsibilities, core competencies and operational imperatives may be
required to determine feasibility to maintain our current forward-
deployed operational posture. However, in the interim, the U.S. Marine
Corps has employed a broad review of Global Force Management (GFM)
requirements with the intent to closely analyze existing GCC force
demands, mission/task and depth of U.S. Marine Corps resources in an
effort to determine level of effort required to maintain current
SPMAGTF posture. This analysis reflected no immediate off-ramps or
curtailments were required, providing economy of force efforts (as
previously noted in question 10) were permitted to continue, with
options to economize in other functional areas (i.e. logistics,
maintenance, sustainment, etc), permitting greater flexibility to both
the Service and supported GCC. However, as previously noted, FULL
sequestration will require a more detailed analysis of all allocated
SPMAGTF's, their specified and implied missions/task, and U.S. Marine
Corps fiscal posture across all functional and operational areas. It is
anticipated that such analysis will require consideration of further
economy of force actions under a FULL sequester, whereas potential
curtailment (less than 1.0 presence), or de-scoping actions (SPMAGTF
mergers: SPMAGTF-AFRICA and SPMAGTF-CR) may be required in order to
reduce C2, logistics and aviation redundancies. The U.S. Marine Corps
continues to plan to meet HIGH priority and emergent CCDR requirements,
with potential lesser priority GFM offsets as
required.
Mr. Wittman. What are the impacts associated with delaying or de-
scoping the reset and reconstitution of the Marine Corps? How does your
reset plan support the new strategic guidance's directed role for the
Marine Corps? How will reset be impacted by sequestration? How long
will it take to recover?
General Tryon and General Faulkner. There is a significant risk to
the long term health of the force associated with delaying or de-
scoping reset and reconstitution. As previously documented in CMC
Congressional testimony, the Marine Corps delayed the reset of a
significant amount of the Iraq equipment set to support the 2009 surge
into Afghanistan. As a result, reversing the accelerated degradation of
our ground equipment, including most of the medium and heavy
transportation assets and almost all the Marine Corps fleet of MRAPs,
is critical to increasing home station unit readiness and
reconstituting the force. On average, fifteen percent of our mission
essential equipment remains in Afghanistan and up to thirty percent for
some items such as critical low density radar and satellite
communications suites, heavy engineering equipment and our medium and
heavy tactical vehicle fleet. Significant reset workload exists at our
Depots and maintenance facilities today. We returned over 40,000 items
to date to those facilities with over 11,700 (28%) reset and returned
to the operating forces thanks to the funding support from the
Congress. To complete reset and realize force reconstitution by FY2017,
the Marine Corps will continue to require OCO funding support from
Congress for approximately two to three years after the last Marine
leaves theater.
Our Reset funding Strategy fully supports Marine Corps' strategic
guidance to maintain a global crisis response capability that ensures
readiness of ground equipment in support of amphibious operations
shipping and maritime positioning ships worldwide. Although the purpose
of the Reset Strategy is to create unity of effort across the
enterprise with respect to reset planning and execution from
Afghanistan, it similarly supports our Commandant's direction to
quickly re-establish presence in the Pacific, and to ensure reset and
reconstitution actions are balanced to protect the long-term health and
readiness of our most precious asset, the warfighter. The long-term
impact of sequestration is deferred maintenance. The Marine Corps will
have to closely scrutinize and determine equipment maintenance
priorities, assume risk in mission-essential weapon system readiness,
delay normal depot sustainment, and potentially delay reset operations.
Our efforts to maintain the readiness of the deployed force and correct
the readiness imbalance of the non-deployed forces could be further
exacerbated by sequestration if our Operations and Maintenance (O&M)
accounts are diminished. While we anticipate being able to remain on
schedule with our reset plan for the remainder of FY2013, sequestration
in FY2014 and beyond would hinder the Marine Corps' ability to ``reset
and reconstitute in-stride'' by FY2017 and ultimately impact equipment
readiness.
Mr. Wittman. What is the current requirement for amphibious lift?
What level are we currently providing? What is the plan to close the
shortfall?
General Tryon and General Faulkner. Per a shipbuilding agreement
document dated 7 Jan 09 (sent to Congress), CNO, CMC, and SECNAV agreed
that the validated requirement for amphibious warships is 38. This
requirement is based on the ability to deploy a 2.0 MEB Assault Echelon
in support of major contingency operations. Due to fiscal constraints,
the CNO, CMC, and SECNAV agreed that the Navy will sustain an inventory
of 33 amphibious ships. The Navy and Marine Corps assumed risk in this
shortfall, but have deemed it as acceptable. The inventory of 33
amphibious ships, when applied to a planned operational availability
rate of 90%, provides 30 operationally available ships.
There are currently 30 amphibious warships in the Navy inventory.
The Annual Report to Congress on Long-Range Plan for Construction of
Naval Vessels for FY2014 (dated May 2013) reflects the Navy's plan to
achieve the agreed-upon requirement of amphibious ships that provide
the lift capacity for a 2.0 MEB Assault Echelon. This plan will achieve
an amphibious warship inventory of 34 ships in FY25, and maintain an
inventory of 33 ships through FY29. This plan includes the early
decommissioning of two Whidbey Island-class ships, at approximately
half of their estimated service life, in FY15.
Mr. Wittman. How would you characterize this increased risk? How
would these reductions change Marine operations? If this or other
constraints push the Corps to more distributed MEU operations, are
there increased operational support costs? If so, does the FY 2014
budget support those increased costs?
General Tryon and General Faulkner. The security environment across
the global commons is tenuous and mandates ready, responsive and
forward postured forces to protect vital U.S. strategic interest,
facilities and personnel. The loss of SPMAGTF's crisis response
capabilities increases strategic and operational security risk to
potentially unacceptable levels. Full sequestration will impact many
different functional and operational areas across the U.S. Marine
Corps; inclusive of end-strength structure, operating budgets and
programmatics/modernization; resulting in creating an intricate balance
between maintaining critical forward postured crisis response
capabilities, affecting full recovery/reconstitution from a decade of
wartime efforts, and modernizing the force to meet more agile,
technologically advanced and complex threats. At higher risk is DOD's
ability to protect U.S. strategic interest, facilities and personnel
without benefit of forward postured immediate response SPMAGTF
capabilities. Regardless of Service sourcing, FULL sequestration will
degrade DOD's ability to provide adequate protection and immediate
response to counter a continuously eroding security environment.
Full sequestration will have a debilitating impact across the U.S.
Marine Corps to maintain crisis response capabilities across the global
commons. Actual operations will likely not change because of the nature
of today's specified and implied threats. However, Marine Corps force
structure and programmatic/modernization offsets may afford only minor
fiscal maneuver space, permitting sustainment of CR capabilities in
HIGH risk areas. The mid to long term impacts are anticipated to be the
gradual degradation of U.S. Marine Corps available inventory, inability
to surge forces when the security environment erodes further, and
reduction of Marine Corps and Navy maritime agility to operate
seamlessly across air, land and sea
domains.
Distributed and Split-ARG operations are common operational
imperatives today, and are not envisioned to change in the mid to long
term environment. The ARG/MEU offers a unique capability that is not
bound by political agendas, host nation agreements, basing permissions
or ground maneuver space. As such, the Navy/Marine Corps team embarked
upon development of doctrinal changes in which the ARG/MEU forms,
organizes, trains and embarks Naval forces in a manner which permits
both distributed and split-ARG operations. Although when distributed,
the ARG/MEU represents a lesser capability than when fully aggregated,
even this degraded capability presents SECDEF and GCC's an option for
employment which is seamless in transition from one GCC AOR to another,
and provides a response option to most any type security/threat
environment. Associated operating cost increased accordingly as
sustainment and logistics hubs are expanded to cover multiple GCC AORs.
The Navy/Marine Corps teams continually looks toward economy of force
opportunities, leveraging logistics/sustainment and throughput hubs
provided by ground based SPMAGTF's, CVN Task Forces and other Services
in order to minimize unprogrammed cost impacts.
Although the ARG/MEU presents the most versatile capability in the
DOD inventory, the amphibious shipping inventory has gradually
decreased over the past decade (60 amphibious ships pre-9/11 to 30
ships 2013), rendering this unique capability limited in capacity to a
point where no more than 2 X ARG/MEU's can be forward-deployed at any
time. The Naval 30 year shipbuilding plan does not offer reprieve to
today's current shortfalls as the projected end-state is 33 ships, with
28 anticipated to be operationally ready/available for tasking.
Efficiencies gained through execution of economy of force efforts,
in conjunctions with U.S. Marine Corps FSRG/FORG structural reductions
and risk to delay programmatic/modernization actions; provide limited
fiscal maneuver space. Each global threat or event requiring a
heightened security posture, resulting in unprogrammed deployment of
forces, potentially consumes any fiscal agility that may have been
previously gained. Additionally, decreases in Overseas Contingency
Operations (OCO) funding significantly increases pressure on Service
level baseline budgets. Since the POM and GFM cycles are not fully
synchronized, these process compete against each other versus being
complimentary. Until such time that the POM and GFM cycles are aligned,
the Services will be unable to create a ``contingency'' funding posture
which would permit surging forces when required, without degrading the
operating budget of those already allocated for specified mission/task.