[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 113-32]
HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2014
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES HEARING
ON
FISCAL YEAR 2014 NAVY,
MARINE CORPS AND AIR FORCE
COMBAT AVIATION PROGRAMS
__________
HEARING HELD
APRIL 17, 2013
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio, Chairman
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York JIM COOPER, Tennessee
JON RUNYAN, New Jersey JOHN GARAMENDI, California
MARTHA ROBY, Alabama RON BARBER, Arizona
PAUL COOK, California DANIEL B. MAFFEI, New York
JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana WILLIAM L. ENYART, Illinois
MAC THORNBERRY, Texas PETE P. GALLEGO, Texas
WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina MARC A. VEASEY, Texas
ROB BISHOP, Utah
John Sullivan, Professional Staff Member
Doug Bush, Professional Staff Member
Julie Herbert, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2013
Page
Hearing:
Wednesday, April 17, 2013, Fiscal Year 2014 Navy, Marine Corps
and Air Force Combat Aviation Programs......................... 1
Appendix:
Wednesday, April 17, 2013........................................ 33
----------
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 17, 2013
FISCAL YEAR 2014 NAVY, MARINE CORPS AND AIR FORCE COMBAT AVIATION
PROGRAMS
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Sanchez, Hon. Loretta, a Representative from California, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces........... 3
Turner, Hon. Michael R., a Representative from Ohio, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces................... 1
WITNESSES
Davis, Lt Gen Charles R., USAF, Military Deputy, Office of the
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition; and Lt
Gen Burt Field, USAF, Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, Plans
and Requirements............................................... 7
Skinner, VADM W. Mark, USN, Principal Military Deputy to the
Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development, and
Acquisition); LtGen Robert E. Schmidle, USMC, Deputy Commandant
of the Marine Corps for Aviation; and RADM Bill Moran, USN,
Director of the Air Warfare Division........................... 5
Sullivan, Michael J., Director of Acquisition and Sourcing, U.S.
Government Accountability Office............................... 3
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Davis, Lt Gen Charles R., joint with Lt Gen Burt Field....... 102
Sanchez, Hon. Loretta........................................ 37
Skinner, VADM W. Mark, joint with LtGen Robert E. Schmidle
and RADM Bill Moran........................................ 57
Sullivan, Michael J.......................................... 39
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Garamendi................................................ 129
Mr. McIntyre................................................. 129
Mr. Veasey................................................... 131
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Barber................................................... 146
Mr. LoBiondo................................................. 137
Mr. Thornberry............................................... 135
Mr. Turner................................................... 140
Mr. Veasey................................................... 147
FISCAL YEAR 2014 NAVY, MARINE CORPS AND AIR FORCE COMBAT AVIATION
PROGRAMS
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, April 17, 2013.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:24 p.m., in
room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Michael R.
Turner (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL R. TURNER, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM OHIO, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND
FORCES
Mr. Turner. The hearing will come to order. The
subcommittee meets today to receive testimony on the Navy,
Marine Corps and Air Force budget requests for the combat
aircraft programs for fiscal year 2014.
We welcome our distinguished panel of witnesses. We have
Mr. Michael Sullivan, Director of Acquisitions and Sourcing in
Government Accountability Office.
We have Vice Admiral W.M. Skinner, Principal Military
Deputy of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Research,
Development and Acquisition.
We have Lieutenant General Robert Ron Schmidle, Deputy
Commandant of the Marine Corps for Aviation. And we have Rear
Admiral Bill Moran, Director of the Air War Division of the
U.S. Navy.
We have Lieutenant General Burton Field, Air Force Deputy
Chief of Staff, Operations, Plans and Requirements. And
Lieutenant General Charles Davis, Military Deputy, Office of
the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition.
All of our witnesses today have very short titles. I thank
you for your service and look forward to your testimony today.
We have a number of issues to cover today, but my opening
remarks will focus on the F-35 [Lightning II Joint Strike
Fighter] and Strike Fighter inventories. The F-35, a fifth-
generation fighter, is required to achieve the effects
necessary to win an integrated anti-access and area-denial
environment. So I was encouraged to note that the F-35 program
was fully funded in both the research and development and the
procurement accounts for fiscal year 2014, as well as the
future years defense program. The F-35 did well in testing last
year, but with about one-third of flight testing completed,
much testing remains to demonstrate and verify its
performance.
Going forward, F-35 software development is of particular
concern. While software management practices have improved,
significant challenges lie ahead as software integration and
testing continue to lag behind plans. This is an area that the
subcommittee continues to watch to ensure that the final
software block of the development phase is completely on
schedule.
While the capability of the F-35 is needed for the future,
the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps cannot ignore the
modernization and life-extension upgrades for their legacy
fleets of AV-8Bs [Harrier II vertical/short takeoff and landing
(V/STOL) ground-attack aircraft], F/A-18s [Hornet fighter jet],
A-10s [Thunderbolt II close air support aircraft], F-15s [Eagle
fighter jet], and F-16s [Fighting Falcon fighter jet]. These
critical upgrades are required to maintain the capability and
capacity necessary to execute the national military strategy.
I was encouraged to note that the Navy's Strike Fighter
shortfall was reduced from 56 last year to 18 this year as a
result of increased F/A-18E/F [Super Hornet fighter jet]
procurement and expected lower utilization rates of legacy
fighters.
Based on the vague defense strategic planning guidance
announced last year, the Air Force, for a second year in a row,
is not reporting a projected Strike Fighter shortfall through
2030. These projections are based on our legacy fleets
receiving the modifications made during depot availabilities.
Just last week, the Air Force announced that it planned to
ground 17 combat squadrons for the rest of the fiscal year
because the funds required to operate and maintain these
squadrons are no longer available due to sequestration. We
don't yet know what the long-term effects sequestration will
have on Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force Strike Fighter
modernization to include inventories. If these arbitrary cuts
also affect Air Force and Navy's ability to make the necessary
capability and life extension modifications, decreased Strike
Fighter inventories could result in risks that I am not willing
to accept.
Before we begin, I would like to welcome all of our panel
members. And I would like to say that as we do have our
discussions today, I would appreciate your information and
insight as to the effects of sequestration. Now, as I am fond
in saying in these hearings, I voted against this mess, and I
voted against this mess because I believed it would happen, but
one of the ways that we have been, I think, shackled in this is
that the Department of Defense had been previously restrained
of telling the American public and even this committee and the
subcommittees what the effects of sequestration would be.
And so since we had this long term of sequestration without
detailed substance to its effects, we have been inhibited in
our ability, as the DOD [Department of Defense] has, to
advocate for sequestration to be set aside. Just yesterday we
had a hearing where the commandant of the Marine Corps
indicated that from our traditional military policy objectives
of being able to win in two major combat areas, that even the
new strategy that the President's articulated of merely one
major contingency operation, that the Marine Corps would find
it difficult to prevail, and even won.
We need to have that information so we can effectively make
the argument that it should be offset. And I think today's
hearing, regardless of the question that you are asked, if you
could give us some information, insight as to what you foresee
sequestration affecting, I would appreciate it.
When we talked to the Navy's and Marine Corps' budget
yesterday, they acknowledged that the budget they delivered did
not take into consideration sequestration. So the follow-on
questions had to address that. I would appreciate today if you
would just, on your own, digress into the effects of
sequestration as it would affect your answer if it is
continued, because we need that information to offset it.
We are going to then begin with our panel members unless my
ranking member would like to make a comment, and we could
always return back to her statement if she would like. With
that, we will begin, then, with--would you like to make a
comment or would you like to return to a comment later?
STATEMENT OF HON. LORETTA SANCHEZ, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND
LAND FORCES
Ms. Sanchez. I would like to just keep this short and say
that we are very interested in the budget process. And I will
submit my opening statement for the record so that we can hear
our panel.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Sanchez can be found in the
Appendix on page 37.]
Mr. Turner. Excellent. I appreciate the dedication of my
ranking member and her bipartisan spirit also.
All right. Turning to Michael Sullivan, if you would begin.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL J. SULLIVAN, DIRECTOR OF ACQUISITION AND
SOURCING, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Mr. Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ms. Sanchez, members
of the committee. I am pleased to be here today to discuss the
status of the F-35 Lightning II Fighter this afternoon. My
remarks and the statement that I have put forward is limited to
the F-35 and doesn't go into more of the other general tactical
air issues.
I have submitted a written statement for the record, and I
would like to take a few minutes now to hit the high points of
our work on this program regarding where it has been, where it
is now, and what may lie ahead.
The F-35 acquisition program began in 2001 with an
estimated cost of about $231 billion. And today, 12 years
later, the program is estimated to cost about $390 billion. The
average cost to buy a single F-35 aircraft since the beginning
in 2001 has about doubled from an estimated $69 million in 2001
to $137 million today.
Needless to say, the program had significant risk when it
started, and that risk has translated into this cost growth.
There are many reasons for that risk, but chief among them are
poorly understood requirements at the beginning, and
overlapping schedules for testing and buying F-35s.
In the past 2 years, the program appears to have stabilized
to some degree. Since 2010, when the program had a Nunn-McCurdy
breach, the Department of Defense and all the Services came in
to the program and restructured it and did some very good
things, in our opinion, about adding reasonable costs and
limiting requirements and adding schedule and some manpower to
the program.
So since then, since that restructuring took place, the
program has now delivered all 14 developmental aircraft. They
have all been delivered to the test program. More test flights
are taking place on a daily basis on the program. Procurement
aircraft deliveries, while still not meeting original delivery
schedules from the original program, have picked up and have
closed the schedule gap significantly, so there is a lot more
aircraft being delivered today. And there is additional
progress being made in one of the very high risk areas, which
is software management.
At this point in time, the Government has invested about
$28 billion to buy 121 aircraft, and development flight testing
is now about a third complete. This overlap between testing and
production represents additional cost, in that design changes
to the aircraft that come from flight testing must be reworked
into the aircraft already produced. So there are retrofit
costs. To date, the cost of that rework on the first 58
aircraft that have come off the production line is about $900
million. That adds about $15.5 million to the cost of each of
these 58 aircraft. About $830 million more of future rework is
planned as a result of concurrent testing and production.
The program still has tremendous challenges ahead, even
though it seems to have stabilized in the last couple of years.
For example, there are still significant risks with the helmet-
mounted display system, the software development to deliver
Block 3 capability, which is the full-up integrated warfighting
capability for the aircraft, still has a long way to go, and
there is continuing overlap between flight test and production.
Most importantly, probably, the future annual funding needs
of the program represent the most significant risks moving
forward. This program will require about $12 billion on average
over the next 15 to 20 years, and that is quite a bit of money
for the Congress to have to appropriate.
The imperative now is to demonstrate that the F-35 program
can effectively perform against costs and schedule targets in
the new baseline and deliver on the promises made. Until then,
it will continue to be difficult for the United States and all
of our international partners, there are eight international
partners, to plan, prioritize and budget for the future, retire
aging aircraft, as we will hear more about today, and establish
basing plans with a support infrastructure.
Achieving affordability and annual funding requirements and
in addition to that, to life-cycle operating and support costs
will, in large part, determine how many aircrafts a warfighter
can ultimately acquire, sustain, and have available for combat.
That is the end of my statement. Thank you very much. I
will take questions when the time comes.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Sullivan can be found in the
Appendix on page 39.]
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Sullivan. Turning to Admiral
Skinner.
STATEMENTS OF VADM W. MARK SKINNER, USN, PRINCIPAL MILITARY
DEPUTY TO THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY (RESEARCH,
DEVELOPMENT, AND ACQUISITION); LTGEN ROBERT E. SCHMIDLE, USMC,
DEPUTY COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS FOR AVIATION; AND RADM
BILL MORAN, USN, DIRECTOR OF THE AIR WARFARE DIVISION
Admiral Skinner. Chairman Turner, Ranking Member Sanchez,
distinguished members of the subcommittee, thanks for the
opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the
Department of the Navy's aviation programs.
Joining me today are Lieutenant General Robert Schmidle,
Deputy Commandant for Marine Aviation, and Rear Admiral Bill
Moran, Director of Air Warfare for the United States Navy.
On behalf of us all, I thank you and all members for your
steadfast support to our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines,
and coastguardsmen who are meeting the Nation's commitments
around the world.
With the permission of the subcommittee, I propose to
provide a brief statement and submit a separate formal
statement for the record.
The Navy Marine Corps team is forward-deployed and forward-
engaged, performing missions around the globe. Today naval
aviation components are in the skies of Afghanistan protecting
troops and Afghan civilians on the ground, providing
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance off the coast of
Korea, over the Sea of Japan, the Persian Gulf, and the Horn of
Africa, and they are providing maritime security along the
world's vital sea lanes from which the United States and our
trading partner economies can prosper, conducting antipiracy
and drug interdiction patrols, and supporting global
partnerships to strengthen ties to our allies and friends, all
the while standing as a force of deterrence to those who would
do harm to our Nation or our Nation's interests. And while our
sailors and marines are doing all of this and more, they are
also training for their next deployment or the next operation.
In support of the defense strategic guidance, we are
developing and recapitalizing to support the President and the
Secretary of Defense's strategic priorities to rebalance to the
Pacific to ensure we provide the capability and the capacity to
maintain an important presence in this region today and for the
foreseeable future.
We continue to assess and reshape our naval aviation plan
to reflect the priorities of this defense strategy with the
reality of fact-of-life, topline reductions consistent with the
Budget Control Act of 2011. As such, this year's aviation and
strike weapons plan strikes a balance between capacity,
capability, affordability, and the maintainability of the
industrial base.
To fulfill our Nation's commitments and strategic
priorities, the Department of the Navy's 2014 aviation budget
request includes funding for research and development and
procurement of 165 aircraft, and 3,505 strike weapons.
Selected specific items include continued investment in
fifth-generation F-35 Joint Strike Fighter aircraft to provide
multimission capability across the full spectrum of conflict;
new carrier-based unmanned air system capabilities; the CH-53K
[Super Stallion cargo helicopter] heavy-lift aircraft; and all-
weather moving target capability strike weapons, including
procurement of EA-18G [Growler] electronic attack aircraft, P8
[Poseidon] multimission maritime aircraft, the MV-22 [Osprey]
assault aircraft, tactical Tomahawk cruise missiles, and
capability improvements to the
F/A-18 Super Hornets, and air-to-air missiles, and
modernization of our attack and utility rotary wing aircraft.
We have important work to do to close out your capability
gaps and risks. In doing so, however, we are working to deliver
the full capability and capacity that our warfighter needs in
an affordable manner.
The Secretary of the Navy remains strongly committed to
investing in the required aviation and strike weapons programs
to support our national priorities, and we have placed that
commitment to work over the last year with the delivery of more
than 200 tactical rotary wing and unmanned aircraft, but we
recognize that it is not possible to simply buy our way to
recapitalizing our force.
To achieve our recapitalization goals, we are continually
focusing on improving affordability in all naval aviation
programs. For example, we are increasing implementation of new
cost-reduction initiatives, like competition and early standup
of depot maintenance. We are striving to use multiyear
procurement strategies, strengthening an acquisition workforce
culture to ensure that we provide the best return on investment
and be the best possible stewards of the taxpayers' money.
Mr. Chairman, the strength of our naval aviation force is
also closely coupled with our naval aviation industrial base.
Over and over again, naval aviation has shown to be a critical
element of the Nation's global reach, global presence, and when
called upon, the tip of the Nation's interdiction force. We
recognize that we have been successful in executing our duties,
not only because of our sailors and marines, but because of our
civilian workforce and the aviation industrial base.
However, one of the key challenges to our future aviation
programs, and therefore to elements of that same industrial
base, is the increasing cost of development and procurement. To
this end, the Department of the Navy is investing in design for
affordability, requiring the use of open architecture systems
where applicable, employing fixed price contracts to control
cost at production, and limiting disruptive changes to
contracts.
Ultimately we recognize that as we balance requirements,
manage the increasing pressure to our topline, and factor in
industrial base considerations, it is ever more important that
our naval aviation programs closely align with not only with
the priorities outlined in the new defense strategy, but the
Government and industry continues to work together to increase
efficiencies and improve affordability to support current force
and help us build the future force of naval aviation.
Mr. Chairman, thank you once again for the opportunity to
appear before your subcommittee today, and me and my colleagues
look forward to answering your questions.
[The joint prepared statement of Admiral Skinner, General
Schmidle, and Admiral Moran can be found in the Appendix on
page 57.]
Mr. Turner. Great. Thank you. We will turn next to General
Davis for his statement. And for those of you who are not
speaking about the written statements, you, of course, will be
responding to questions. I will close the hearing, also asking
if there are any closing remarks, so if as the hearing is
proceeding, if there are things that you think of that you
would like to add, at the end, you will have an opportunity to
provide those for the record.
General Davis.
STATEMENT OF LT GEN CHARLES R. DAVIS, USAF, MILITARY DEPUTY,
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE FOR
ACQUISITION; AND LT GEN BURT FIELD, USAF, DEPUTY CHIEF OF
STAFF, OPERATIONS, PLANS AND REQUIREMENTS
General Davis. Chairman Turner, Ranking Member Sanchez, and
members for the subcommittee, thank you for very much for this
opportunity. And I stand before you today reminding everybody
that our Air Force proudly provides you the ability--your Air
Force provides you the ability to surveil and if required,
strike any spot on this planet if required at any time, while
defending our borders and protecting our allies, and we are
very much committed to that mission.
Although as we look in this environment of fiscal
uncertainty, our focus remains on our five core missions: air
and space superiority; intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance; rapid global mobility; global strike; command
and control. And that is the means by which we deliver global
reach, global power, and global vigilance.
In 2012, your Air Force flew global precision tac-aircraft
that accomplished over 28,000 sorties and 41,000 hours in
support of overseas contingency operations. In support of these
operations, our intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
airmen provided intelligence that shaped combat plans for 33
named operations, enabling the removal of 700 enemy combatants
from the fight, and built awareness for our coalition forces
and over 250 troops in contact engagements.
Our special operations personnel executed over 1,600 strike
missions and 7,700 specialized mobility missions.
On the home front, Air Force fighters, air refuelers and
early warning aircraft have flown almost 64,000 total sorties
supporting Operation Noble Eagle since September 11, 2001.
As a testament to the capability of our total force, the
National Guard and Air Reserve have flown more than 65 percent
of these Operation Noble Eagle sorties, with the Air National
Guard currently operating 17 of our 18 airspace control alert
sites across the United States.
Our fiscal year 2014 budget attempts to--our request
attempts to retain the critical force structure and maintains
the Air Force ability to rapidly respond to global demands. It
is involved quite intricately from a concerted effort to
balance risk, modernization, and force structure reductions
with a commitment to readiness and taking care of our people.
There is still a considerable uncertainty in the fiscal
year 2014 Air Force topline funding level. The fiscal year 2014
budget will not reverse the damage done by the fiscal year 2013
sequestration that Chairman Turner alluded to. Recovering and
warfighting capability, improving readiness requires at least a
reduction in OPSTEMPO [Operations Tempo] or additional
resources or a combination of the both.
Now, recently in their posture hearing, our Chief and
Secretary did a good job basically going over the very specific
impacts of sequestration. I will cover them at the top level,
but it is a reminder that reduced flying hours have and will
cause harm to units that have had to cease flying operations
and may result in severe rapid and long-term unit combat
readiness degradations.
Cuts to Air Force modernization programs will, over time,
cost more taxpayer dollars to rectify the contract restructures
and program inefficiencies, the increase in unit cost and the
delay in delivery of capabilities to the warfighter.
In spite of these ongoing budget concerns, however, many of
our fighters and weapons do see some enhancements as a result
of the fiscal year 2014 budget. These include the A-10, F-15,
F-16, F-22 [Raptor fighter jet], and AMRAAM [Advanced Medium-
Range Air-to-Air Missile]. For example, we will modernize a
portion of our
F-16 and F-15 floats with advanced radars, countermeasures and
situational awareness. But I have to caution you on how we use
the term ``modernization'' and ``investment accounts'' in this
context. The systems that we are putting on these weapons and
weapons systems are, in many ways, just bringing in the
capabilities and technologies that have been developed as much
as 10 years ago, and in some cases, they have been fielded that
long. So we are really just bringing a lot of these airplanes
as they currently exist up to the current state of the art of
capability to match current threats with very little growth in
the ability to handle future demands.
More troubling to me is that roughly half of our
modernization budget today has to go to maintain just the
current performance levels of our fighter fleet and really adds
no new combat capability.
Going forward, I have to worry about what the budgets and
the outyear budget numbers will do to our ability to continue
to ramp up our production on F-35 and replace some of these
aging airplanes. But as we navigate the uncertain way ahead to
mitigate risk in critical areas like readiness, force structure
modernization, we will continue to work with Congress to
develop executable
options.
Personally, I worry that unresolved budget issues will
threaten our ability to recapitalize our aging fighter and
bomber fleets. I think we all need to be mindful of one fact,
and that is that one nation that plays very prominently in our
defense strategy recently flew two new stealth aircraft within
a 22-month period. In robust defense budget times, this took us
over 9 years.
Nonetheless, our objectives are to remain as steady as
possible today and set a course toward full-spectrum readiness,
preserve a highly responsive and scalable force, and overcome
force structure modernization challenges in order that we
continue to have your Air Force provide the Nation the world's
most capable air power now and in the future. And I do look
forward to your questions.
[The joint prepared statement of General Davis and General
Field can be found in the Appendix on page 102.]
Mr. Turner. Thank you, General. I appreciate that very,
very frank statement of--as we look to this issue in this
hearing, we are not merely doing oversight of the status of the
expenditure programs. We really are looking what had always
been identified as a critical path to both maintain current
capabilities and obtain future capabilities to respond to
emerging threats and capabilities of adversaries, and the
funding, both in sequestration and in reduced budgets, is
disruptive of that. And I think your clarity that you are
providing us is very important.
And I am going to turn, General Schmidle, to you first. In
your written testimony, page 8, there is a discussion of--the
words are, the Marine Corps may experience elevated operational
risk in 2020 as the predicted shortfalls come to fruition. And
you identify that the Marine Corps may experience elevated
operational risk in the 2020s if the predicted Strike Fighter
shortfall comes to fruition.
Please describe why you believe the Marine Corps faces this
elevated operational risk and what the Department of the Navy
is doing to mitigate those risks? And also, you know, as I was
just saying, this doesn't just fall on the Navy. You are here
in front of us as to what we need to be doing and what the
Administration needs to be doing. In part, this hearing is to
establish that record to show that we are at an operational
risk and what needs to be done to ensure that we don't have a
shortfall as you described. General.
General Schmidle. So chairman, if I could, the shortfall in
the outyears, in the Strike Fighter shortfall is an inventory
shortfall. What is happening to us today, though, that is much
closer is the shortfall that we have in terms of the numbers of
airplanes that we actually have available for training on the
flightline today.
So as an example, in the F/A-18 community, we have 257
airplanes in the Marine Corps. One hundred and two of those
airplanes are what is called out-of-reporting status, in other
words, they don't exist on the flightline. And with the advent
of sequestration now, we are not going to be able to induct the
numbers of airplanes in the third and fourth quarter through
the depot so that we can do the high flight hour inspections so
that we can keep the airplanes flying.
And what that is going to translate to is beginning in
January of 2014, our nondeployed squadrons will now have as few
as six airplanes available for training on the flightline. And
what that means, of course, is obvious: The squadrons that are
forward and that are going forward are going to have a full
complement of airplanes, but the squadrons that are home and
training will have fewer jets. And so you are either going to
train pilots to a lower standard or you are going to overfly
those airplanes, put more hours on them to train people, and
then that is going to drive them into the high flight hour
inspections again.
Now, this year we have sufficient money to do the high
flight hour inspections at 8,000 hours in order to get our F/A-
18s, our legacy fleet out to 10,000 hours, but any disruption
in that, for instance, if the full effects of sequestration,
what that will do is it slows down the throughput through the
depot to do those inspections, and that will cause us to have
less airplanes on the ramp when we get ready to--as we go
forward in terms of trying to train.
So the inventory shortfall that we mentioned in the
statement in the outyears is clearly a challenge, but in the
near term, we actually have a more near-term challenge, because
we are trying to get our legacy F/A-18s through to the JSF, to
the Joint Strike Fighter, transition as we go forward.
We have similar problems with the AV-8 Harrier. It is not
quite as significant. We are now going to fly that airplane to
2030. We originally had planned on the end of its service life
being in 2012. So we are having to--that airframe itself is in
pretty good shape, but we are going to have to do modifications
to the airplane, avionics modifications in order for the
airplane to remain survivable and relevant as we go forward.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, General.
General Davis, you mentioned in your written testimony that
depot delays will require the grounding of some of the affected
aircraft and that sequestration cuts to Air Force modernization
will impact every one of the Air Force's investment programs,
creating inefficiencies, raising unit costs, and delaying
delivery of value capabilities to warfighters in the field. You
also note that the fiscal year 2014 budget request does not
enable full recovery of warfighting capability, capacity and
readiness, and that additional resources will be required.
What effects will sequestration have in the current fiscal
year in the Air Force inventory, and what additional resources
will be needed in fiscal year 2014 to make the fighter fleet
whole again?
General Davis. Mr. Chairman, I will tell you that we are
just beginning to try to figure out the effects of what is
going to be imposed on our depots. We already know that we are
about 60 aircraft and 30 engine inductions behind in that
process. It is a mix across all the airframes, not just the
fighters.
Trying to buy that back is going to take more than a year.
So those airframes that will be affected will not come back in
2014. I mean, the workforce, the throughput, the capability
just doesn't exist, so it will have to come back over time.
When we get through this, I would like to just let my partner,
General Field, here talk a little bit about how they will
attempt to do something with the readiness in the fighter
squadrons, but specifically, as we talk about in the
sequestration impacts, while we were able to put significant
funds against buying radars for F-15 Cs and Es, we had to
decrease the quantities that we bought those particular radars
at. That is increasing the unit cost. So that means those
programs stretch out over at least a couple of years of
increase to finish the programs on those two airplanes.
As we look at what happens, we will probably delay the
start of the F-16 Combat Avionics Performance Enhancement
System, the CAPES program, as we look and see how much money we
have to start that and how quickly we can ramp up the
replacement of the radars on the F-16s.
One thing that is very troubling is that we know that some
portion of our fiscal year 2013 buy of F-35s will be cut. It is
3 to 5 airplanes. We don't know. It will depend on negotiation
status, it will depend on a lot of things as it plays out. So
that right there starts, you know, at about a third of a
squadron's worth of modernization that will be pushed off at
least another year, and we don't know exactly what 2014 will go
from there.
So there is a spreading cut across all of our programs in
terms of the modernization. And I will let General Field talk
about what it takes just to buy back a little bit of that
combat capability on the operational squadrons.
General Field. Thank you. Based on the fiscal constraints
that we are facing in fiscal year 2013, we have just decided to
stop flying up to 13 combat Air Force squadrons. These are
squadrons that are coded to go out and fight for the Nation's
wars or be a presence across the globe as required.
The reason that we ended up in that position is that we
prioritized our commitments. We started with the commitments to
Afghanistan; we looked at commander requirements, again
starting with CENTCOM [U.S. Central Command] and PACOM [U.S.
Pacific Command]. We tried to keep fully funded the forces in
Korea, and as much as possible in Japan. And then we looked at
all the commitments on a short notice to both of those
theaters. We also maintained our commitment to support the
French as they help the government of Mali in Africa. And then
we are looking to maintain our training pipeline for our new
and senior air crews. All of those are a big balancing act, and
we are trying to prevent an unrecoverable situation in the
outyears.
The upshot of that is that we ended up essentially running
out of money, and so that is why we had to stop flying those 13
air squadrons. Some of those squadrons are currently deployed,
either in Afghanistan or somewhere else around the globe. And
they will come back. Four of them come back and they will stop
flying as soon as they return home.
The requirement to regain that readiness after a 6-months
grounding is a little bit unknown, because we are definitely in
uncharted waters. We have never before, in the middle of a
fiscal year, stopped flying a third of our combat air forces
because of some kind of money issue. So we will have a lot of
work to do and catching up to do.
It will take essentially a very dedicated and focused
effort to come up with the right training plan to recover that
readiness, it will take time and it will take resources. I
promise you that we will put the focused effort into the
recapitalization of that readiness, but we are going to need
some assistance both within the Department of Defense and
without on the time and the resources.
Mr. Turner. Gentlemen, before I go into my last very quick
question and hand it over to my ranking member, I just wanted
to tell you that all of us on Capitol Hill are very aware of
the personal effects that sequestration has. As we are
listening to the effects on what are real and necessary
capabilities that they are diminished, and we heard that in all
the hearings. I have heard from General Wolfenbarger of
Materiel Command at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base that
frequently that the men and women who are in uniform and the
civilian employees are not aware enough of the fact that their
Members of Congress understand that they have kids in college,
they have house payments to make, they have vacations that are
being cancelled as a result of the effects of sequestration. So
even as we talk about the programs today, I want you to know.
And please tell those under your command and who you work with,
that Congress is very aware of the personal effects.
And I have one real quick question and I will hand it over
to my ranking member, and that is, you know, you just told us
the real and necessary capabilities of each of the areas of
your operations will be affected by sequestration. There, I
think, is a misnomer in Congress, and that is there is a belief
that sequestration will actually result in savings, but the
message I was hearing from each of you today and as evident in
your written statements is that especially in the area of
acquisitions, as we have decreased funding, we are actually
probably going to, on the other side, have increased costs to
achieve what are real and necessary modernizations or
sustainment of capability.
From your review of sequestration, I am going to ask, you
know, all five of our Generals and Admirals today, could you
please report, do you believe in what you are currently seeing
in the implementation of sequestration if you assess that these
reduced funding effects from sequestration will result in
higher costs in the future. General.
General Davis. Sir, they absolutely will. I mean, you just
go back to the depot and the expense of trying to buy back
those airplanes that we have to put back on the ramp, the price
of that will go up, we will have to lay on additional
workforce, additional something to get there. Every one of
these items that I mentioned that we are not going to buy for
the airplanes this year, whether it is an
F-35 or radar for the F-15, when we decrease just one or two
out of a lot buy, every unit in that lot goes up; a very
inefficient price tag.
So I am sure we could take for the record and get you an
answer back if we cut three or four or five or whatever the
units are for F-35s coming out, what that will increase the
unit lots, each airplane in that unit as we go from there.
And I look at our programs, and we ask our programs to go
through multiple restructuring drills as we tried to guess what
the 2013 number was going to be and start preparing what the
outyear numbers will be, the inefficiencies of the program is
not being effectively managed and executed while they are out
doing drills. I worry about that, and that is an unaccounted
cost we haven't seen yet.
Mr. Turner. General Field.
General Field. Sir, I agree with General Davis. I think it
will be increased cost. In addition, in terms of readiness, it
will be either increased cost or increased time if we don't
increase the cost to get back to the readiness levels that we
would like. You have heard from both sides of me, from General
Davis, General Schmidle, that the depot is a--in their working
depots are going to be a big factor of that.
We think that it is going to take more sorties to regain
that readiness because of the 6 months of standing down from
flying, and that is all dependent upon aircraft availability.
And aircraft availability is dependent on how well the depots
produce spare parts and the inspections required for our
aircraft. And if that is reduced, then that backlog will just
continue to grow.
Mr. Turner. Thank you. Admiral Moran. And as you are moving
to answer, please take General Davis's offer of providing
additional record information for the record when you actually
get that data as a standing question from our subcommittee that
I would like each of you to undertake. Admiral.
Admiral Moran. Yes, sir. Right. I completely agree with my
colleagues from the Air Force. And I would only add that since
sequestration spreads itself across multiple lines, in a test
and--in the test programs, we are likely to see the effect of
that to stretch out tests, which means delivery of capability
later, which means you have got to carry your legacy platforms
longer. So there is a multiple effect that occurs over time.
That is all I have, sir.
Mr. Turner. Thank you. General Schmidle.
General Schmidle. For the record, just two quick things to
pile on real quick. So with regard to the depot, one of the
other concerns there, too, is the civilian workforce. Of
course, most of the work that is being done, for instance on
our airplanes is being done on the second and third shift, and
those are the kinds of folks that there is discussion about--
you know, about the effect of sequestration on them.
And the other point on the readiness piece, so you don't
fall off the cliff in readiness overnight. It is sort of
insidious. As the money starts to dry up and you become less
and less ready and as we start to climb back out of that again,
as General Field said, it is going to take us a while. And we
are not quite sure how long, because, again, we have never been
in a position where we have effectively gone down to those
lower levels of readiness and then had to ramp back up again.
Mr. Turner. Thank you. Admiral Skinner.
Admiral Skinner. Mr. Chairman, I think it will certainly
add inefficiency into the way we procure our aircraft. You
know, the CNO [Chief of Naval Operations] testified yesterday
that it is going to cost us $6.1 billion in Navy investment
accounts, and certainly that is going to cost us some tails
that we will probably have to move towards the end of the
production line. My folks got their controls last week. They
are going through it now and looking at how they are going to
manage their programs, but certainly, this is the third time we
have replanned 2013. Just the inefficiency of doing that is
going to impact the cost, but I would agree with my colleagues,
and that it will certainly increase our costs across the board.
Mr. Turner. Well, Mr. Sullivan, my fellow Ohioan here, you
might be prepared that you are probably going to get a request
from our subcommittee to look at JAO [Joint Air Operations]
capturing these increased costs from sequestration.
To my ranking member, Ms. Sanchez.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen,
for your service to our country and for being before us today.
I have a lot of questions on the F-35, because Mr. Turner and I
have been taking a look pretty heavily at the F-35, but I think
I want to start with Global Hawk [RQ-4 high-altitude unmanned
surveillance aircraft]. I was pleased to see that the Air
Force, General Davis, followed the fiscal year 2014 NDAA
[National Defense Authorization Act] that requires continued
funding for Global Hawk Block 30 operations, but it is unclear
to me how the Air Force intends to follow the requirements of
the fiscal year 2014 defense appropriations bill which directs
the Air Force to use some old fiscal year 2012 funding, that is
about $300 million or so, to procure three more Global Hawk
Block 30 aircraft.
How is the Air Force planning to address this issue? If
buying three new aircraft doesn't make sense, is there a way to
use it for upgrades or some other piece of Global Hawk
operation aircraft? For example, we are told that the Global
Hawk doesn't work well in poor weather. Is there some fix or
upgrade or something that somebody's working on with respect to
that?
General Davis. Yes, ma'am. I think our Secretary said in
his hearing that this has been a difficult discussion with
Congress and he realizes that a lot of the Congress does not
agree with the Air Force position that we have no firm
requirements for the Global Hawk Block 30 airplanes past the
end of the calendar year 2014, and that he fully intends to
pursue avenues available to him to try to request to allow the
United States Air Force to use that money for much higher
priorities than Global Hawk Block 30. And we still have to work
through that process and that will probably be a difficult
conversation we have yet to go.
So the premise that some of those dollars could be used to
improve the capability of the airplane may be true, but I think
our Air Force would come back and tell you that we have a few
other higher priorities that we need to fix if we have the
opportunity of putting that money against such things as
bringing combat squadrons back up to combat readiness status or
buying back some of the F-35 capability we lost. And we
understand that that is going to be at the congressional
discretion, but that is kind of our position right now.
Ms. Sanchez. Okay. Thank you for that. With respect to the
F-35, when we were over with the contractor recently--well, let
me begin by just relooking at some of these numbers.
Mr. Sullivan, you said that in the beginning, we thought
that the program would cost us $231 billion, but 12 years later
it has cost us, or the estimate is $390 billion?
Mr. Sullivan. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Sanchez. Okay. So we went from thinking that one
airplane more or less would cost us about $69 million and now
it is at $137 million on average, because----
Mr. Sullivan. That is the average across----
Ms. Sanchez. Depending on the lot and how it comes out, et
cetera. Okay. So I gather that that is about a $129 billion
difference just in 12 years. Am I correct on my math there?
Mr. Sullivan. Yes.
Ms. Sanchez. Okay. Thank you. So we were over and talking
to the contractor and it seems to me--I mean, I understand
about fixed costs and variable costs. And their comment to us
was that as we cut back on the number of planes that we are
asking them to produce in a year or this year or next fiscal
year, whatever was projected, that obviously the cost becomes
higher per unit on that. So we are really not saving as much as
we thought we would or as some in the Congress thought the
sequestration thing would do.
And they also felt that as we pulled back because of
sequestration and other issues and lowered the amount of
aircraft that we created or have produced, that our allies, who
are also on the order block to grab some of that, are also
pulling back.
Is that correct from your understanding and how you see the
things going on with the F-35?
Who is procuring? Who wants to answer that?
General Davis. Well, to answer the first of part of your
question, ma'am, we obviously know that there will be a cost
increase and it will affect the rest of our budget. We know our
European partners, at least the ones that are buying the CTOL
[conventional take-off and landing] airplanes, the United
States Air Force are very closely watching the moves we make
and will be very interested to see what the impacts to their
unit cost will be when we negotiate the reduced buys as a
result of 2013. And then, if we can recover those buys in 2014
back up to at least to the 19 that the President requests, then
we will see how that plays out, but there will be an ongoing
effect from 2013 to 2014.
So I do know that that is playing very heavily in their
decisions, and they are very much and in a lot of the same
situations we are in terms of having challenges with their
budgets. So from that aspect, that is my input.
Admiral Skinner. Congresswoman, I would also say that there
is a cost to concurrency. As we dialed back our production
requests, it is because there was a certain amount of
concurrency that we would have to take the jets that we were
buying, and in some future time, we would have to go back and
modify those jets and bring them up. So when we start talking
about as we dial back our production numbers and the cost per
unit goes up, if we buy them later in the buy, then our
concurrency costs go down. So we have to look at the entire
business case there with regards to balancing the cost of
concurrency against the cost of dialing down our production
lots and having an increased unit cost. To the----
Ms. Sanchez. So are you trying to say that may--I
understand the fact that we were going to buy some and we would
go back and put in the fixes that we needed, or if we weren't
all the way up to developing, but as we went on, we developed
actually what we needed, we would come back and fix. So are you
saying let's just wait and wait this out till we have the right
fixes to everything and then purchase?
Admiral Skinner. I think what we have seen in the
production numbers that are currently in the budget, that is
exactly what we are doing. We have dialed back some of our
production numbers so that we can take a look and fix some of
these issues. We have also, I believe, after--in future
contracts with the contractor, we will share the cost of
concurrency, so there is an incentive to the contractor to
reduce these issues in the jets as soon as possible, but, yes,
exactly.
Ms. Sanchez. And my understanding is also that these
foreign partners that we have, well, they are sort of seeing
that same cost line, and they are saying, why don't we wait
until the end, because the unit is going to be so much less
expensive for us than for now. So it is like, who is going to
go first? Is that what you are seeing also from our--we don't
have--do we have someone that is working with the international
groups? Mr. Sullivan.
Mr. Sullivan. Yeah. I just wanted to say that there is--the
program, when the original baseline of the program would have
had 1,500 F-35s under contract by now.
Ms. Sanchez. And how many do we have?
Mr. Sullivan. And what we have now is somewhere around a
little bit more than 350; 365, I believe. And the reason that
that happened was because of the problems that they had in
designing the aircraft. They had weight issues early, they had
a lot of problems----
Ms. Sanchez. Right.
Mr. Sullivan. Very slow production.
Ms. Sanchez [continuing]. And other things, yes.
Mr. Sullivan. So I think my point is that they have--you
know, the program has been very slow to deliver on its own. I
mean, it was a very tough climb for this program to meet the
requirements. Concurrency was part of that as well. So now you
have the test program, which is about a third complete, so they
still have 66 percent of the test program to go, and those
changes will continue to flow into aircraft that we buy. As I
said in my statement, there are 58 aircraft that are built now,
that have been produced, production aircraft that are being
retrofit as we speak. They have projected that there will be
another--I think the total cost from retrofit from the test
program is going to be somewhere around $1.7 billion, and that
is going to play out over the next 3 or 4 years. So right now
the program itself is just now beginning to hit----
Ms. Sanchez. Its stride.
Mr. Sullivan [continuing]. Its stride, and it still
actually is below its original schedule for deliveries. I don't
think that is, you know, a huge issue for the program now. They
are beginning to hit their stride.
On the other side of this, I think, is--and something that
the generals and admirals really need to be concerned about is
all of the--as the F-35 has been delayed and as the aircraft
are slow in getting out, that is more and more cost for
extending the life of their legacy aircraft. I think to date,
because of delays to the F-35 program, they have had to invest
as much as $8 billion in just keeping the existing legacy
aircraft----
Ms. Sanchez. Right. They have got to have planes to fly.
Mr. Sullivan. Yes.
Ms. Sanchez. Let me ask you, Mr. Sullivan, since we are on
this issue, these cost overruns or these--I don't know how we
call them. There is just so much more cost----
Mr. Sullivan. Yes.
Ms. Sanchez [continuing]. To it. Who--is it because we were
just--we just want too much and we were pie in the sky when we
made this contract, or were there physics limits to this and we
should have known better? I mean, where do we--at whose feet do
we lay $129 billion? And I am asking that only because I have a
set of generals over here telling, oh, my God, the--you know,
basically the sky is falling, because, you know, you are
hollowing out what is going to be for the future, and where do
we get that that money, we need to get that money, and yet we
are $129 billion more than an original $231 billion.
Mr. Sullivan. Yes. Well, I think on this program, and
others can speak on this as well, but I think the requirements
for the F-35, three variants, one that is going to take off
from an aircraft carrier, one that has a short takeoff and
vertical landing capability, an incredible set of requirements
for one program to achieve.
So I would lay most of the cost growth that you see--you
know, the development costs under a cost plus contract and
development have doubled, and the procurement costs as they
learn more about how to really build to these requirements----
Ms. Sanchez. Come down.
Mr. Sullivan [continuing]. The unit cost for the aircraft
is not what they thought it was going to be. The commonality
that they were hoping for in these variants was--one of the
things that this program was supposed to be able to bring was,
you know, maybe 50 percent or more of these three aircrafts
would be common, and as they got more and more into the
requirements and the technologies that would be needed to
achieve these three variants, they found out that that wasn't
happening, either. So it was misunderstood requirements would
be the genesis of the problems that this program has
encountered, I think.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Sullivan. I don't mean to keep
going on, on this subject. If the gentlemen there have any last
comments to make on this issue of the F-35 and the fact that we
have eaten so much money in trying to get there, I would love
to have your comments. Otherwise, you know, we are going to
continue this. It is not going to be a topic that goes away.
General Davis. Ma'am, just to add to----
Ms. Sanchez. Yes, General Davis.
General Davis. Yes, ma'am, if I could. As was mentioned
here, to extend our F-16 fleet with new radars and similar
amounts of capability that was not an original program we had
in our books, the Combat Avionics Performance Enhancement
System for 300-plus F-16s, which is about $480 million just in
development.
Ms. Sanchez. And that is because you don't have the
production planes off the F-35 that you thought you were going
to have then?
General Davis. It is because we--yes, ma'am. We had to
extend the F-16 fleet to fill in that gap based on these issues
that were brought up. So there is a complex set of fall-out
costs that go well beyond the unit costs to the airplane as we
deal with this.
Ms. Sanchez. Right. Thank you. I think--thank you very
much. And I think we will probably have some follow-up
questions on that very issue of how much is this really costing
us?
Mr. Turner. And also they can put those answers in their
closing statements.
Mr. Cook.
Mr. Cook. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
A couple of questions. And I am trying to understand the
CH-53K ``Kilos'' [K model] are not in the budget. Is that
correct? Or the buy for it? Foreseeable future, is it?
Admiral Skinner. No, sir. I think the CH-53s are in the
budget.
Mr. Cook. They are?
Admiral Skinner. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cook. Okay. Because they know the ``Echo'' [E] model is
probably very--is 30 years old. Is that correct?
Admiral Skinner. Yes, sir. We are in a current development
program for the CH-53K that will replace the CH-53 Echo. I will
let my colleague----
General Schmidle. So the 53 Kilo is currently being built
right now. The first model is down in Palm Beach, Florida, but
it is going to replace the 53 Kilo. And it is funded and
Sikorsky has been developing the test demonstrator for us, and
it is going to be able to carry 27,000 pounds 110 miles, and it
is going to do for us everything--it is going to carry three
times as much as the current 53 Echo that we have in the
inventory.
Mr. Cook. Okay. I want to back up a little bit to a comment
that you briefed us yesterday on the issue of the Growlers
versus the EA-6s [electronic warfare aircraft], the old
Prowlers. And I was concerned about, you know, whether there
might be a gap there between that. And, of course, I was led to
believe that the F-35 would fill the void on that. We wouldn't
need at least in the Marine Corps, the EA-6s or the Growlers,
the EA-18. And maybe I am getting it wrong.
And so I was a little bit concerned about that, because the
EA-6, that is a very, very old platform, it is almost as old as
me, but not by much. And it just seems like I want to make sure
there is that crossover. Electronic warfare is something that
is extremely important to me. And if you can just address that
again a little bit.
General Schmidle. So I could. So the plan is still to
sundown, or to take out of service, the legacy EA-6Bs by 2019.
What the plan is inside the Marine Corps is to leverage the
capabilities that we have in F-35 in addition to other
capabilities from ground and airborne platforms in a system-of-
systems approach to electronic
warfare.
And I would offer to you that I would be happy to come and
brief you or the committee in a classified setting, and I think
I could do a much better job of explaining how we would intend
do that.
Mr. Cook. No. I am not worried about that. I am just
worried about any delays in the F-35 and whether that gap
there, if here we go again, the same thing we were addressing
in the avionics and the F-16s because of production in the F-35
might be delayed and delayed and delayed and it is going to
affect other programs. Am I wrong in interpreting it as such?
General Schmidle. No. You are absolutely right. And I think
that is why you have heard from everybody here at the table
that we are concerned about keeping the program on schedule and
about, you know, the Harriers. We were going to retire those
last year, and now we are going to take them out another 17
years. So it is clearly an issue.
Mr. Cook. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Turner. Mr. McIntyre.
Mr. McIntyre. Thank you very much. Thank you, gentlemen,
for your service. In the short time I have, I wanted to ask
Admiral Moran or Admiral Skinner, it is our understanding the
Navy has a requirement for 40 squadrons to fill 10 carrier air
wings with 4 squadrons each. Of the squadrons, the Navy has 35
and the Marine Corps provides 3 squadrons with an agreement to
supply 5.
The question is: Does the Department of the Navy have
enough Strike Fighter squadrons to fill 10 carrier air wings
and still meet the marine commitments, including the overseas
rotations and the marine expeditionary unit deployments, or are
you several squadrons short of this requirement?
Admiral Moran. Sir, thank you for the question. I think the
agreement that we have with the Marine Corps called TACAIR
[Tactical Aviation] Integration, which you correctly termed as
five additional squadrons, on any given day, the Marine Corps
has a number of squadrons that they can rotate through to
support our carrier air wings to fill that void.
We currently have our full allotment of Navy Strike Fighter
squadrons to fill out the 10 carrier wings you referred to, and
with the help of the Marine Corps to fill out the gaps that we
had between 35 and 40, we are able to do that and support our
deployed operations. And we are programmed to, inside both the
F/A-18E/F program and the F-35C program over time, to complete
that 40 squadrons of Strike Fighters per 10 air wings.
Mr. McIntyre. All right. The fiscal year 2014 budget
request also shows the Navy eliminated 13 Super Hornets that it
was supposed to buy this year, however, the tactical aviation
shortfall was reduced. Can you clarify for us how you account
for the reduction in aircraft and a corresponding reduction in
the shortfall? What is the tactical aviation shortfall this
year for 2014?
Admiral Moran. Yes, sir. General Schmidle referred to it
earlier. Our Strike Fighter inventory management is largely
based on our ability to control how we utilize the aircraft, so
it is a primary factor that determines----
Mr. McIntyre. Right.
Admiral Moran [continuing]. Over time. The second part of
that is our ability to inspect the airplanes out to a certain
life. For legacy platforms, currently we can inspect them out
to 9,000 hours. Last time when we reported the number, we were
allowed to inspect only out to 8,600 hours. So that additional
400 hours per aircraft across the fleet is a significant bonus
for us in terms of driving the number down or managing the
number down.
And, finally, Congress was kind enough to add 13 E/Fs in
the budget in 2013, which drove the number further down. So
while we did lose 13 in DON [Department of Navy] in 2013,
Congress was kind enough to add 11 back in, so the net effect
was very small.
So when you add all those three things together and you put
it through the machine, the Strike Fighter shortfall projected
out in 2023 long-term is approaching around 18 airplanes.
Mr. McIntyre. All right. Thank you for additional
clarification on that.
At the Navy League last week, there were presentations on
both the funded flight plan of the Super Hornet and additional
advancements being considered. Please tell us about the
importance of the modernization program for the Super Hornets
in order to take that aircraft out for another 25 years or
more. You can talk some about combat avionics.
Admiral Moran. Yes, sir. Much like what the Air Force
described in getting their fleet up to being able to deal with
threats today, our flight plan that you referred to does invest
significant amount of money in bringing all of our Hornets,
Block 2 Hornets, up to AESA [Active Electronically Scanned
Array]-capable Hornets.
And then there are several other programs that I would be
happy to come back, and in a classified setting to talk to you,
to walk you through those investments. They are all in the
classified world, but they are very significant, they are fully
funded in 2014, and there will keep our Super Hornet fleet very
relevant well into the late 2020s and early 2030s.
Mr. McIntyre. All right. Thank you. And, General, you
mentioned about the Harrier and being extended to 2030,
originally to be retired by 2013. What was the year it was
first put into full service, the Harriers?
General Schmidle. I am not sure of the first variant. The
variant that we are flying right now, the B model, I would have
to take that to get the exact year for you.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 129.]
General Schmidle. I would be guessing. I would say it is in
the late 1980s.
Mr. McIntyre. Yeah. I was thinking it was back in the
1980s. Okay.
General Schmidle. Yeah.
Mr. McIntyre. Thank you. Thank you, gentlemen. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Turner. Thank you. Due to our gavel rules, Mr.
Garamendi would be next.
Mr. Garamendi. Sorry, Mr. Chairman. My questions go to the
ISR [Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance] systems
for both the Navy and the Air Force. It is not at all clear
what the overall vision and strategy is for ISR as it relates
to everything from satellites to various manned and unmanned
systems, and we really need to understand that. So whatever you
gentlemen might want to do for the record, or in classified to
develop that information would be, I think, very helpful as we
try to sort out what to do with some difference of opinion
between Congress and at least the Air Force with regard to the
Global Hawk and other platforms.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on pages 129-130.]
Mr. Garamendi. My question specifically goes to Admiral
Skinner and the MC4 [MQ-4C Triton surveillance unmanned aerial
vehicle], the Triton system and what you called Point Mugu and
I call Camp Malibu. What is the cost of building the program at
Camp Malibu?
Admiral Skinner. Well, sir, we went out--I think in the
recent budget we went with an allocation, if I recall, of about
$59 million from Military Construction to put in the
appropriate modifications to the existing infrastructure at
Point Mugu, sir, to host the MQ-4 Tritons at that particular
air base.
Mr. Garamendi. That was for a hangar?
Admiral Skinner. Yes, sir.
Mr. Garamendi. What about the other infrastructure,
communications, housing, et cetera?
Admiral Skinner. Well, housing is already there, sir. I
know that I can probably take the question for the record and
get you the exact cost breakdown, but if we intend to base our
Tritons at that particular base, then certainly we would
enhance all of that infrastructure in order to accept those
airframes.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 130.]
Mr. Garamendi. There is no communication infrastructure, is
there, for this particular point?
Admiral Skinner. Well, there is a robust communications
infrastructure at Point Mugu. They have a large sea range. They
have a lot of communications. Whether or not they could be
modified quickly to accept the Triton, I would have to take
that for the record.
Mr. Garamendi. Has the Navy developed a full cost for
basing this system at that location?
Admiral Skinner. To my knowledge, we have, sir, but like I
said, I can take it for the record and get it back to you.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 130.]
Mr. Garamendi. When will it be back?
Admiral Skinner. Probably within 30 days.
Mr. Garamendi. We are going to be doing a national defense
authorization within 30 days. That process is already under
way.
Admiral Skinner. We can get it as soon as possible.
Mr. Garamendi. It would seem to me you would not proceed
without a full cost for the program, would you? Without knowing
the full cost, in which case you ought to be able to deliver it
tomorrow morning.
Admiral Skinner. We will go back and get it to you as soon
as possible, sir.
Mr. Garamendi. I will be waiting. A year ago, you were
going to base this at Beale. Why did you decide to change?
Admiral Moran. I can help with that. Beale was an effort to
join with the Air Force in where we train crews and maintainers
to operate Global Hawks across the Services. When we got the
indication that the Air Force might not be going down that
path, the Global Hawk path, we decided to base our BAMS [Broad
Area Maritime Surveillance] out of one west coast site and one
east coast site. The east coast site is still to be determined.
It is either Jacksonville or Mayport, and the west coast site
would be Point Mugu, as you say.
Mr. Garamendi. And you did that decision with full
understanding of the cost of developing Point Mugu as opposed
to basing at--and I am unaware that the Air Force is abandoning
Beale for the Global Hawk.
Admiral Moran. I didn't mean to imply they were going to
abandoned Beale. It is just the BAMS program along with the Air
Force future Global Hawk was where we were going to join
together, and it wasn't clear to us when we had to make
decisions on where to base and put the infrastructure in that
it was in time for delivery of the BAMS platform.
To your earlier question on communications, the concept
behind controlling BAMS is that we are going to put the
controlling capability to talk to the airframe when it is
forward in orbit at a collocated site at Whidbey Island as part
of the P-8 BAMS integration. Where you have the manpower
expertise that operate P-8s and
P-3s [Orion maritime surveillance aircraft] today, that same
expertise will operate the BAMS vehicles when they are forward.
The only thing that we are going to be required out of Point
Mugu is the launch and recovery element for the aircraft
itself. So it is not as robust as I think you might believe.
And we can get a much clearer answer to you on the total cost
for both sites to enable the BAMS program to get under way on
the west coast.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 130.]
Mr. Garamendi. Please do so.
Mr. Chairman, I am out of time. I have some more questions,
but I will take it in the next round.
Mr. Turner. Thank you.
Mrs. Roby.
Mrs. Roby. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to each
of our witnesses that are here today. We certainly appreciate
your service to our country, but that of your families as well.
So I just want to thank you for that.
General Davis, you mentioned in your written testimony that
all three mission areas in the air-to-surface munitions
inventory are short of inventory objectives and those missions
are standoff, direct attack, and penetrator munitions. Could
you provide this subcommittee with a list of those munitions
and amounts that could be increased to the budget request, and
if authorized and appropriated, could be executed in the fiscal
year 2014?
General Davis. Yes, ma'am, we certainly can. Let me just
kind of give you the broad brush on those. As we face these
very challenging times of budget reductions it seems munitions
quite often are the flexible accounts we have to go to, to
balance the budget accounts.
Our current, just to give you some ideas, we can buy more
of our Joint Air to Surface Standoff Missiles. The production
lines allow it, at least at a baseline variance. And it would
probably be better if we gave you the exact objective
quantities in a classified format, just so you know, but we are
probably somewhere around 50 percent of that requirement right
now. We are using a lot of Hellfire missiles, as you can
imagine, in conjunction with the Army. We could certainly
increase the quantities on those.
JDAM weapons, the Joint Direct Attack Munitions, were
significantly increased in '14 to fill in shortfalls of the
numbers we used. But they do have a very large production line
to handle all the world's demands, if you will, because a lot
of customers buy that.
The one thing that we can increase that is probably of
critical nature right now is our AMRAAM missiles. Our
subcontractors to Raytheon are in the process of trying to
recover the ability to build solid rocket motors for rockets,
and we are partnering with a company in Norway as well as
bringing up to speed another company in the United States to be
able to build those rocket motors at the rates we need to match
the guidance sections at Raytheon. So we are probably at the
max on our AIM-120 AMRAAM missiles. So we can give you a little
bit more detail on that. But there is some capacity in some of
the weapons, but not all of them.
Mrs. Roby. Thank you very much.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Turner. Thank you. I am going to go out of order for a
minute and jump down to Mr. Garamendi to finish his
questioning.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
This series of questions goes to the Air Force, similar to
the questions that I placed to the Navy. What is your vision
and strategy for ISR?
General Davis. Sir, let me just mention back to one I know
of interest to everybody, obviously it is Global Hawk. I will
say this and we can bring the operational context into it. We
did not do that without carefully looking at how we cover that
mission with the
U-2 [``Dragon Lady'' reconnaissance aircraft] and other
classified platforms, and that would be one we probably need to
go into some detail with in another forum, because there are
systems out there that can do this in a variety of different
ways.
Mr. Garamendi. Overall, this whole ISR thing is confused.
There have been changes. We have made changes, you have made
changes, the Navy has made changes, and it is confused, and it
frankly doesn't make much sense. So we need to understand what
your vision--Navy, Air Force, and others--what the vision is
for the Department of Defense so that we can help make rational
decisions about what needs to be done and what money needs to
be spent. And until that happens, I remain very, very
concerned.
General Davis. I do, sir. Let me put a little more context
in that. We have pretty much heavily funded ISR for a very
permissive environment for a couple of decades, so we are in
the process now of trying to look at all the assets with our
operational requirements, with our intel [intelligence]
requirements, to try to rationalize a program that has operated
almost totally uncontested and prepare it for a scenario where
it is not going to have that freedom. So you have got to
understand that we have a program that has got to do some very
significant transitions over next few years in a challenging
budget. We owe you those details----
Mr. Garamendi. Yes, you do.
General Davis. But it is not without the context of how we
got into a situation that probably in many ways does not make
sense.
Mr. Garamendi. I appreciate all of that, and we really do
need to have that and it probably has to be in a classified
briefing where we can spend time on it.
You did say something, General Davis, that I found curious,
and that is you have higher priorities, and then you mentioned
the F-35 and one other piece of equipment. When we have that
lengthy discussion, I would like to know what the higher
priorities are. And we ought to also have a discussion about
where these systems are likely to be used--in an environment
without contention, or one with contention. For example,
Africa. Not much contention there right now. So anyway, we need
to have a much deeper discussion.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 130.]
Mr. Garamendi. With regard to the Navy on this thing, I
don't understand why you are developing a new base when, in
fact, you have adequate facilities at an existing base where
you were going to go. Frankly, your discussion that well, the
Air Force decided to change doesn't make any sense when, in
fact, if the Air Force decides to change, there would be excess
capacity at Beale.
So we need to get into this in great detail, and I would
suggest that you not go forward until we have such great detail
available to you.
For example, if the Air Force is not going to use the Block
30s at Beale, then there is an excess capacity there in a
hangar that is already in place with all of the infrastructure,
including all of the communications in place ready to go. I
will take a comment.
Admiral Skinner. Well, we owe you the details, sir. I
reviewed my written statement. We put $79 million in MILCON
[Military Construction] in the budget for Point Mugu and
Andersen Air Force Base out in Guam for putting the Triton out
in the Pacific. But we owe you the detail. We have an ISR
roadmap that our N26 requirements organization has put
together, and we will bring that detail to you very rapidly and
have that discussion.
Mr. Garamendi. I would appreciate it.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for your assistance on this matter.
I know it is of concern to you as well as to me. Thank you, and
I yield back.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Garamendi.
We will turn to Mr. Veasey.
Mr. Veasey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I wanted to ask a
couple questions about the F-35 in particular, basically the
capabilities. I know that with various planes and what have you
that you can upgrade them by putting different radars on there,
but I wanted to know particularly with everything going on in
North Korea right now, and we saw the show of force in South
Korea by some of the current fighters that we have, and we know
everything that has happened in other parts of the world, can
you discuss the importance of advanced stealth capability that
the F-35 will give us in the future to meet the increase in
threats around the world?
And I was curious, is there anything, because I know that
some people have said, no, you can upgrade certain jets that we
already have in our fleet and make it just as good as the F-35.
I just want to hear from you directly, is that the case?
Anybody. Any of the
officers.
General Schmidle. If I could, to begin with we really do
need to take this discussion offline in a classified setting.
What I can tell you is that what the F-35 is going to bring is
much more than just the one capability you mentioned. It is
going to bring a capability to fuse information that is beyond
anything that we have today. So that, I think, that would be
best served though if we could sit down with you in another
forum and walk you through all of those capabilities.
Mr. Veasey. Okay. I wanted to also talk about the ramping
up of the F-35. It appears that the Department has finally
stabilized the production rate for the F-35 program and is
committed to increasing the ramp rate beginning in 2015. I
understand that the unit costs have been coming down year over
year. Can you tell the committee what you expect the costs of
the F-35A CTOL variant to be when the program reaches full
production rate in 2018? General Davis.
General Davis. We always have an interesting discussion
every time you talk about the unit cost of an airplane, there
are so many factors that go it, between fly-away and
everything. If you look at what the last production lot was
negotiated for, it was roughly at a flying cost of around $100-
105 million for the airframe, and roughly around $15-16 million
for a conventional engine. I will tell you once we get to the
rate in 2015, that curve continues down, but it depends on the
numbers we are able to buy with our budgets that we have
between now and then.
So while we hope it will decrease and continue to, I
couldn't begin to tell you exactly what the 18 number would be.
I am sure we can get that for the record and give you the
projections that the program office has for you.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 131.]
Mr. Veasey. One last question I wanted to ask Admiral Moran
about the additional capabilities that the F-35 could bring to
the fleet and its program and the importance to the Navy's
tactical aviation recapitalization effort.
Admiral Moran. Yes. As our Chief testified to yesterday,
the F-35 is a key component of the future air wing mix that we
are planning on. And much like what you just heard from the
other gentlemen here, to really fully appreciate what that
capability is and how it blends in with our other assets in the
carrier wing, we would have to come back and talk to you in a
classified setting. We would be happy to do that.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 131.]
Mr. Veasey. And one more question, if the chairman wouldn't
mind. I know that one of the things that the military is
looking to do is to be able to respond more quickly to
situations like what happened in Benghazi. What sort of role
would this particular plane be able to play in that sort of a
situation and being able to respond to things like that in the
future?
General Schmidle. Sir, I think one of the things that we
talk about when we talk about crisis response just with my
colleagues to the left of right of me here with the Navy and
Marine Corps team is having that capability afloat, if you
will, and the variants of the F-35 that we are buying,
including the B variant that the Marine Corps is buying, will
be on amphibious shipping and it will be in floating in
addition to the AF-35s that will be on carriers. So I think
what it is going to bring to the Nation is a lot more
flexibility in terms of our ability as a Nation to respond to
those kinds of crises.
Admiral Skinner. Sir, if you recall, we had an F-15 pilot
shot down in Libya and we had assets, because of this very team
we are talking about, we had assets on top of him very, very
quickly and had him extracted from country very, very quickly,
because we had those types of assets in amphibious shipping
close into the country. And that would be the same thing with
additional capability that the B could bring to the fight.
Mr. Veasey. Thank you.
Mr. Turner. Thank you.
General Field, I know General Schmidle has done a great job
of balancing that line between what we can talk about and what
we can't talk about, but yet, we are in this situation where we
have to paint the picture of how dire things are and that the
military that we have now and that we have been able to conduct
operations with will not be the military that we have at the
end of sequestration and the significant budget cuts if we
allow them to all go into place.
So capturing and articulating that unacceptable level of
risk is difficult, because the word ``risk,'' you know, we are
Americans. We rise above risk. So when you say something is at
risk, we say well, we always succeed. What is risk?
But the reality is, is that there are significant threats
out there. There are people who are developing significant
capabilities that will make the whole dynamics of what General
Davis was saying about we can go anywhere, deliver a force
anywhere and have a full capability, that this is not just at
risk, but may be a new paradigm where we are not capable of
having the force that we had
before.
So in your statement, you described a decreased fighter
force structure of 1,900 total fighter aircraft as an increased
risk to carry out the national military strategy. That is a
reduction from a 2,000 fighter aircraft inventory of just 2
years ago. Could you please give us an understanding of what
does that risk mean? I know with General Schmidle saying there
are capabilities we have to talk about offline, but this risk
has to be articulated in a manner where it can be dealt with by
Congress and the Air Force.
What does that mean, increased risk, and what does Congress
need to do about it? General.
General Field. Yes, sir. This is another bit of a
classified situation, so we can come back and talk to you about
that, but here is how I would lay it out in this forum.
Our current inventory of just fighter aircraft, if that is
what we are going to talk about, is barely able to meet the
requirements in a couple of the scenarios that we were planning
against where requirement and demand equal one another. And
when you have a situation where today, our readiness forces
are, as we measure them today, about 50 percent, what we would
call totally ready, that presents in a situation, in my
opinion, of great risk.
When you talk about sequestration and now you take nine of
those fighter squadrons and you sit them on the ground, like
General Schmidle said, this is not something that happens
overnight. That readiness level and the proficiency of those
air crew will decay over time. But within about a month and a
half to 2 months, they will be out of currency in several
specific events, and within about 3 to 4 to 5 months, we are
going to have to do something very significant in terms of
getting them back up to speed, especially in terms of this
high-end threat that you alluded to.
And that threat is not just confined to some of the bigger
nation-states on the globe. Those guys produce very effective
systems, and they sell them to other countries. So in the
Middle East, for example, there are several countries that
provide a significant threat to airborne assets. We can address
that threat in several ways. You can address it through systems
and technology and you can address it through tactics,
techniques, and procedures. And you, we, all of us at this
table, will address it across that whole spectrum.
And whatever we have in our kit bag is what we will fight
that scenario with, and we will try to do it where we minimize
the cost to our forces and maximize the destruction to the
enemies, and that is what we have trained to do for, on this
table, our entire professional career.
Now, at the end of the day, readiness is about a couple
things. It is about ready to do what, and, again, like you
said, at what risk? So if we were at a risk level that was
pretty high before, and now we ground or stop flying nine
fighter squadrons and four bomber squadrons, that is obviously
going to increase the risk depending on when those forces were
called upon to do something.
So readiness is a balancing act that we all have to pay
attention to and it is readiness now to do something and then
we have to pay attention to what kind of readiness to do what
will we need to be at in 2020.
We have talked a little bit about how many F-35s should
have been on the ramp right now, and how many new tankers
should have been on the ramp right now, and I know that we owe
Congresswoman Sanchez a little look at that ancillary cost of
keeping legacy aircraft afloat that we hadn't planned on. And
if we continue down that road and focus on readiness only for
today, then we will be, 10 years from now, we will be with the
same equipment, 10 years older, in a lesser readiness level
than we are now. So we are going to have to take some risk,
between now and 10 years from now, in terms of how much ready
for today's fight versus how much ready for tomorrow's fight.
Mr. Turner. Thank you. I know that this is a difficult
thing to discuss in an open format, but when you have the
Commandant of the Marine Corps yesterday saying that with the
President's direction to take our military strategy from two
major contingency operations down to one, and that with
sequestration he gave us what was going to be required to
undertake one and be successful and that sequestration took us
below that level, I think people don't necessarily understand
that when you go from two major contingency operations to one,
that means if we are occupied, others, not just the United
States being at risk, but others could have mischief
threatening our other allies. And certainly as we look to your
diminished capacity, we look to the issue of who else besides
us are at risk, and what does that mean for the world that
those who might do harm to others are not as deterred knowing
that our force structure is not what it has been.
And that we have to articulate clearly, and I looked for
each of you to help us find a way to say this that is not
classified so we can convince those who don't hear what you
tell us in classified formats the message so that we can set
this aside and get our budgets reformed.
Ranking Member Loretta Sanchez.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And these are
difficult decisions that we are trying to make here and we
appreciate getting the information from you so we can make
better decisions, because that is really the role of Congress,
is to try to figure out what we can.
My fear is that we invest our moneys in these F-35s--look,
we need the F-35. We all know that. It is not going away. Mr.
Veasey, don't worry about that. He represents Dallas and Fort
Worth over there, you can probably tell. And we went to your
place to take a look at them. And it is not because of that
reason that we are asking the questions. We are asking the
questions because we are trying to figure out how do we get
this all done?
My fear is we buy a bunch of planes and what we have seen
in some countries and we always, amongst ourselves, always are
talking about these countries who buy planes but they don't
have the pilots trained or they don't have the maintenance
capabilities or operational capabilities to even know how to
fly them. So we don't want to end up with a bunch of planes and
also have our people untrained to be able, as you said, to not
be able to fly these things. So how do we do this? It is a very
difficult thing to take a look at.
I also want to talk about the F-22 right now, because I am
looking at the budget and what I see is, F-22, okay, we have,
what, about 180 or so of these that we made, not we, but great
people on the line, obviously, and it costs about $370 million
apiece. The Air Force is requesting $919.5 million for upgrades
to the 187 F-22 aircraft we already have in service. That is
about $5 million an aircraft. And the funding in this range
more or less continues in the budget through fiscal year 2018.
So can you tell me, $5 million, on average, $5 million
worth of upgrades on a plane that we spent $320 million on and
continuing forward for the next 4 or 5 years, what are we
doing? What are we buying? Given the pressures that we have,
what is that doing? And is it really $900 million every year
for the next 4 or 5 years in order to--what are you doing with
that, $5 million a plane for the next 4 or 5 years.
General Field. Ma'am, I can talk to some of the
capabilities of the F-22. In 2007, I went to Marietta, Georgia,
and I picked one up from the factory, signed my name on the
piece of paper, and the flyaway cost of that airplane was $91
million. So, again, this whole how things cost out and how much
it costs per flying hour is, in my opinion, a very arcane and
constrained science.
Ms. Sanchez. If you were in a business, General, if we were
in a business and I had my fixed costs, and that includes R&D
[research and development], and my variable costs, and at the
end of the whole thing I got to one large number and I divided
it by the number of widgets I made, you know, yours might have
cost me $70 million or what have you, but if my first one costs
me $300 million or $800 million, if I am a business person, we
are always talking about how we are Americans and business is
the business of America, if I am a business person, I am not in
business if I sell each of those planes at $90 million apiece.
Do you see what I am saying? So it might have cost you,
that particular one, less. But now we are going to go back and
we are putting $5 million, on average, maybe it is just a few,
maybe it is the whole thing, maybe every year there is
something new to put on it, what is in this $900 million number
every year?
General Field. So what it does is it enables us to operate
in those contested environments within those threat systems
that are being built around the world and proliferated around
the world, whether those are new mobile surface-to-air missile
systems, whether those are new radars that link together to
make an entire system more capable.
What the F-22 does, because in terms of its speed and
stealth and its fusion capability, it allows us to change the
nature of that battle space and pick out areas that are
vulnerable that would not be vulnerable to aircraft that don't
have that kind of capability on there.
So what the upgrades over the next 5 years do is it
improves the radar ground mapping of the aircraft so that it
can find targets better on the ground; it improves the data
link capability on it; and it puts some of our advanced weapons
like the AIM-120D [advanced medium-range air-to-air missile]
and the AIM-9X [Sidewinder short-range air-to-air missile] into
the aircraft.
All of those are necessary to operate in that very tough,
very high-threat environment. And right now those F-22s,
combined with our legacy aircraft, whether they are Air Force,
Navy, or Marine, help provide a synergistic effect to how
effective all of those aircraft are, and we have proven that
time and again in exercises both within the United States and
outside the United States.
So that is the value that we have. And it is expensive, but
I think that we are going to, if something bad were to happen
around the world, that is the kind of capability we are going
to need to initially operate in that environment, to change
that battle space so that the rest of our legacy aircraft have
a better chance of survival and being effective in that combat
arena.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you for that. Again, I would go back to
this whole hollowing out of, are we really going to have the
skill set? And when I look at that, Mr. Chairman, I not only
see it from, will our airmen be able to fly these souped-up
things we soup up every year, but will we even be graduating
people who can enter the Air Force Academy, for example, if we
are not investing in our schools. Because there is always a
tradeoff, domestic spending versus having the weapons in
storage for when we need them. It is a very difficult thing for
us to do.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you having called
this hearing.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Ms. Sanchez. I appreciate your
partnership in working on all those important issues.
Gentleman, as I am promised you, we will conclude with you
providing any closing thoughts that you have. You don't need to
feel compelled. But I always want to have the opportunity in
case there is something that has preceded your testimony that
you thought you would like to add to the record.
Mr. Sullivan, I will begin with you.
Mr. Sullivan. I have nothing to add, Chairman.
Mr. Turner. Admiral Skinner.
Admiral Skinner. Nothing to add, sir.
Mr. Turner. General Schmidle.
General Schmidle. I do have something to add.
Mr. Turner. Very good.
General Schmidle. Just a couple of things. The first thing,
Mr. Chairman, your discussion before about how we can talk
about this in an unclassified environment, back to what the
Commandant said yesterday at the hearing, I think the issue he
was getting at, and you articulated, is ``capacity.'' That is a
simple word, but that really just defines what we are talking
about. We have capabilities, but it is the capacity that we
have that is affected by some of the things we have been
talking about.
And if I could, the last thing, we the Marine Corps
actually have two F-35 squadrons stood up right now. One of
them is in Florida. It has 11 airplanes and 17 pilots. It
actually has 13 airplanes. We borrowed two from the Brits which
we are flying. We have two British pilots in this squadron. And
we have an operational squadron, that is our training squadron,
we have an operational squadron in Yuma, Arizona, that has 4
airplanes and 7 pilots and 166 maintainers. And we actually
have marines out there turning wrenches on this airplane right
now today without any contract maintenance and they are flying
airplanes out there. By the end of this year, they will have 16
airplanes in Arizona by September of this year. We are going to
declare the initial operating capability of that squadron in
2015, and then we are going to deploy it to Japan in 2017. So
that is kind of our plan right now.
Mr. Turner. Thank you. That was a very excellent point.
Admiral Moran.
Admiral Moran. Nothing to add.
Mr. Turner. General Field.
General Field. Yes, sir. Chairman Turner, Ranking Member
Sanchez, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you
for allowing us to appear before you and discuss these very
important topics today. General Davis and I know that we owe
some of you some homework and we will get that back to you as
soon as possible, either in terms of a document or probably in
a couple of cases a briefing, that we need to come back and
have a more enriched discussion in a classified environment.
I would like to emphasize the troubling effects of
sequester that we have on our current and future readiness. For
the first time in my memory, Air Force combat forces are not
flying due to the lack of funding in the middle of a fiscal
year. While we are protecting the current fight, those
scheduled next to deploy and baseline training, at a large
number of bases, combat training operations have come to a
complete halt. If you have the opportunity to visit airmen at
these bases, you are going to find the silence a bit unnerving.
As we speak, their combat capability and effectiveness are
eroding.
For example, by canceling our weapons instructor courses,
we have created a gap in the production of graduate-level
instructors that will have long-term impacts on a generation of
warfighters. Those instructors are the heart, the soul, and the
brains of our warfighting capabilities. Over the years,
phenomenal training programs have been developed and they
sustain a United States Air Force that is second to none. But
we have just terminated a large portion of those full-spectrum
training operations.
The effects of sequestration on weapons systems sustainment
and the Flying Hour Program will not disappear on the first of
October with the new fiscal year. We are developing a Return to
Fly Program for those affected units, but it will take time,
additional resources, and a reduced OPSTEMPO to fully recover.
The sooner we begin to fly a full training program, the
sooner we will recover, but make no mistake, it will be an
uphill battle. The greatest challenge will be to find the
balance between minimizing the impact on readiness and
preserving investment dollars for modernization,
recapitalization of our fighter and bomber fleets, and the
preferred munitions inventories, all the while meeting the
requirements our defense strategies demand overseas. As we
discussed, this is a delicate and very tough balance.
So we appreciate the support of the subcommittee and the
HASC [House Armed Services Committee], and I ask for your
continued support to mitigate the effects of sequestration into
fiscal year 2014 and beyond. The sooner we can stabilize
training, modernization, and munitions funding, the sooner we
can ensure that we are on the track to fulfill our Nation's
requirements now and in the
future.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Turner. Thank you. Well said.
General Davis.
General Davis. Nothing, sir.
Mr. Turner. With that, I thank each of you for
participating and thank you for your dedication.
[Whereupon, at 4:00 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
?
=======================================================================
A P P E N D I X
April 17, 2013
=======================================================================
?
=======================================================================
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
April 17, 2013
=======================================================================
Statement of Hon. Loretta Sanchez
Ranking Member, House Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces
Hearing on
Fiscal Year 2014 Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force Combat Aviation
Programs
April 17, 2013
Today's hearing will focus on the Fiscal Year 2014 Navy,
Marine Corps, and Air Force requests for aircraft development,
modifications, and procurement. This area of investment
represents the largest single portion of the DOD's entire
procurement funding request. While the combat capability the
Navy, Marines, and Air Force bring to our Armed Forces is the
best in the world, it comes at a very high cost.
The total Navy request for aircraft procurement and
modifications, including the Marine Corps, is $18 billion. To
put that figure in context, the Navy request for shipbuilding
in FY14 is only $14 billion.
For the Marine Corps, which is primarily a force designed
for ground combat, the FY14 request for aircraft procurement
and modifications is about $3.5 billion. To put that figure in
context, the Marine Corps entire budget for buying new ground
equipment is only $1.3 billion.
And finally, the Air Force request for aircraft procurement
and modifications is about $11.4 billion. While less than the
Navy and Marine Corps, $11 billion is still more than the
entire defense budgets of the Netherlands, Colombia, Poland,
Singapore, Greece, and many other countries.
So, in FY14 it is clear that DOD continues to invest
significant resources in maintaining the United States' status
as the world's premier combat aircraft force. The question
before the subcommittee today is whether or not these
investments are sustainable given the many other pressures on
military service budgets and the DOD budget as a whole.
It is important to remember that while the Navy, Marines,
and Air Force are proposing to spend more than $30 billion on
new aircraft and modifications to current aircraft, we have:
L17 squadrons of Air Force fighter aircraft
that have no money to fly;
Lan entire Aircraft Carrier battle group that
did not deploy as planned; and
Lmost of the U.S. Army has been forced to stop
conducting training above the squad level.
At some point, it may be time to question whether or not
the U.S. military can afford to have what amounts to three
separate ``Air Forces''--one for the Navy, one for the Marines,
and one for the Air Force itself. For example, could the Nation
perhaps get by with only two Air Forces instead of three? With
sequester cuts now an unfortunate reality, it may well be time
to relook assumptions that haven't been challenged for a decade
or more.
I thank the witnesses for their service and look forward to
their testimony.
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?
=======================================================================
WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
April 17, 2013
=======================================================================
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. MCINTYRE
General Schmidle. In April 1971, the Marine Corps' first
operational AV-8A squadron was established in Beaufort, South Carolina.
In January 1985, the Marine Corps' first operational AV-8B squadron was
commissioned at Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point, North Carolina.
AV-8B Initial Operational Capability, or IOC, was achieved in August
1985. [See page 20.]
______
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI
Mr. Sullivan. As of now, the Department has an Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) roadmap, but no coherent ISR
investment strategy. Congress and GAO have pushed for the development
of an ISR roadmap and investment strategy for nearly a decade. The
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 specifically
required DOD to develop a roadmap to guide the development and
integration of DOD ISR capabilities over a 15-year period and report to
Congress on the contents of the roadmap. In addition to other matters,
the 2004 legislation required DOD's roadmap to include: (1) fundamental
goals, (2) an overview of ISR integration activities, and (3) an
investment strategy. In response, DOD issued an ISR Integration Roadmap
in May 2005, which it updated in 2007 and again in 2010. GAO's recent
review of the 2007 and 2010 roadmaps found that while DOD has made
progress, neither roadmap included all the elements specified by
Congress or addressed the important issue of how to invest future
resources among competing priorities. \1\ GAO noted that without a
detailed investment strategy, DOD and the military services may not
have a common understanding of how activities should be prioritized.
Until DOD addresses challenges related to managing funding, integrating
ISR capabilities, and minimizing inefficiencies in its ISR enterprise,
the department risks investing in lower-priority and even duplicative
capabilities while leaving critical capability gaps unfilled. As a
result, GAO suggested that the Congress consider establishing
additional accountability in legislation, such as conditioning a
portion of ISR funding on completion of all congressionally directed
management elements, including the development of an integrated ISR
investment strategy, to ensure that future versions of the ISR
Integration Roadmap meet all of the elements of an integrated ISR
roadmap identified in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2004 as well as the 2008 House of Representatives Committee on
Armed Services report. [See page 20.]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ GAO, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: Actions
Are Needed to Increase Integration and Efficiencies of DOD's ISR
Enterprise, GAO-11-465 (Washington, D.C.: Jun 3, 2011).
Admiral Skinner and Admiral Moran. The Navy's ISR Strategy involves
advanced sensor development across all domains: Navy's increased
capability and capacity should be aimed at having complete visibility
into regions of interest and overcoming an adversary's efforts to deny
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
access to critical areas. Advanced technologies are needed to:
Increase autonomy of sensors, platforms, and data
processing to reduce data latency and manpower costs.
Optimize the mix of autonomous manned and unmanned
platforms and sensors to increase capability and capacity to
commanders and weapons.
Develop sensors that:
Enhance multi-INT, multi-domain collection
capabilities, and improve visibility into contested
battlespace;
Increase the number of multi-purpose, low-cost,
networked, deployable, and expendable assets;
Process data locally and disseminate required
data smartly.
Replace larger single-capability satellites by
hosting sensor payloads on other types of platforms and
identify options for spacebased collections:
Investigate micro-, mini-, and nano-satellites
to provide fine-scale temporal and spatial resolution
data via common C2 paths as well as to provide
persistence, increase collection fidelity and mitigate
capacity issues;
Improve low-power sensors and battery and fuel
cell technology to enhance persistence and endurance;
Develop and collect strategic signals of
interest by improving NTM and tactical collection
capabilities in support of emerging threats;
Pursue satellites technologies with greater on-
board processing and direct downlink capabilities to
deployed forces and weapon systems to reduce the SATCOM
requirement;
Determine the capability and availability of
other agencies' and countries' ISR assets in near real-
time to support Navy/maritime collection requirements,
and make greater use of international partnerships;
achieve net-enabled cognitive interactions between
disparate forces to enhance collaborative operations,
including allies.
Develop sensors and networks that use ``Spectrum
Agility'' to work seamlessly across broad areas of the
spectrum, increasing survivability and effectiveness; detect
and precisely measure and map the EM environment in real-time.
Meet the growing data demand coming from new SIGINT
and oceanbased sensors, as well as higher resolution persistent
sensors coming from space-based systems and multi-spectral
sensors.
[See page 20.]
General Schmidle. The DOD ISR Roadmap defines the DOD vision/
strategy for ISR and was last published on 18 Mar 2010. It is a
classified document that outlines how the DOD will satisfy the key
strategic ISR goals and objectives embedded within the National
Intelligence Strategy (NIS), Defense Intelligence Strategy (DIS), and
Guidance for the Development of the Force (GDF). The DOD ISR Roadmap
describes all important programs that must be integrated across the DOD
in order to achieve efficient investment in new ISR capabilities,
enhance the DOD's role in fulfilling Homeland Security
responsibilities, and support optimal resource planning and budgeting
across the enterprise. The next version of the DOD ISR roadmap is
expected within the next 90 days. [See page 20.]
General Davis and General Field. The Air Force answered this IFR
through classified briefings to Congressman Garamendi's office on 8 and
22 May. [See page 20.]
Admiral Skinner and Admiral Moran. Point Mugu, CA (Naval Base
Ventura County or NBVC) was the original MQ-4C Triton West Coast basing
location. It was changed to Beale Air Force Base in President's Budget
2012 to support a Memorandum of Agreement signed between the Chief of
Staff of the Air Force and the Chief of Naval Operations who agreed, in
principle, to several actions anticipated to bring greater synergy and
efficiencies to Q-4 Unmanned Aircraft System operations. Following the
United States Air Force decision to divest of RQ-4B Global Hawk Block
30s in President's Budget 2013, and in consideration of Federal
Aviation Administration limitations on Unmanned Aircraft System flight
operations at Beale Air Force Base, the Navy elected to realize the
projected savings and operational advantages of basing the MQ-4C Triton
at NBVC.
The cost to build four new facilities for MQ-4C Triton maintenance,
training, and operations at Beale AFB would be $121M. The cost to
refurbish two facilities and build one new facility at NBVC would be
$61.8M. The required housing, communication, and other Navy Unmanned
Aircraft System support already exists at NBVC. By basing the MQ-4C
Triton UAS at NBVC vice Beale AFB the Navy estimates a cost savings of
$100.7M across the FYDP. [See pages 20-22.]
General Davis and General Field. A reduced high-altitude ISR
requirement (in which the U-2 was sufficient) and a reduced budget (the
Department could no longer afford further investment in RQ-4 Global
Hawk Block 30) drove the retirement decision.
In August of 2011, DOD's Joint Requirements Oversight Council
reviewed recent adjustments in military strategy and determined the
Department could reduce high-altitude ISR force structure requirement.
The Air Force further determined the U-2, which remains viable until at
least 2040, was sufficient to meet these reduced requirements.
Continued investment in the RQ-4 Block 30 was required to field a
comparable capability to the U-2, but was not warranted given a
significant reduction in the Department's budget and an alternative
system, the U-2, that was still operationally viable at a considerably
lower cost over the Future Years Defense Plan.
To meet the Budget Control Act (BCA) requirement for budget
savings, the funds obtained from the RQ-4 Block 30 divestiture were not
moved into other accounts. These funds were used to meet part of the
required BCA budget reduction. [See page 23.]
______
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. VEASEY
General Davis and General Field. The Air Force is scheduled to
answer this IFR in a SAP classified briefing on 23 Jul. Congressman
Veasey is planning to attend this briefing along with all members of
the HASC Tactical Air and Land Forces Subcommittee which was scheduled
by PSM John Sullivan. [See pages 24-25.]
Admiral Moran. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.] [See page 25.]
?
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
April 17, 2013
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. THORNBERRY
Mr. Thornberry. It is clear that the world is getting more
dangerous, not less. The situation with North Korea makes that very
clear. Iran is moving toward a potential nuclear weapon. We know that
Russia and China are developing advanced stealth fighters and
proliferating advanced surface-to-air missile systems. Can you discuss
the importance of the advanced stealth capability that the F-35 will
give us and our allies in the future to meet the increasing threats
around the world?
Admiral Skinner and Admiral Moran. The F-35C provides a 5th
generation fighter aircraft to the Navy carrier air wing and brings
with it the ability to effectively engage and survive a wide range of
threats, both air and surface, in contested airspace. It provides a
``day-one'' strike capability enabling tactical agility and strategic
flexibility required to counter a broad spectrum of threats and win in
operational scenarios that cannot be addressed by current legacy
aircraft, including operations in an anti-access/area denied
environment.
F-35C's 5th generation survivability and lethality is enhanced by
very low observable stealth characteristics, fusion of onboard and off-
board passive and active sensors, and real-time integration with other
F-35Cs and Navy assets, which provide a ``first detect/first shot''
capability throughout the battlespace. The F-35C will provide a
significant additive value when brought to bear with the networked
fighting concepts of the U.S. Navy Carrier Strike Group and in a joint/
combined warfighting arena.
Mr. Thornberry. Can you provide the Subcommittee with an update on
the F-35B STOVL variant's progress in the test program and discuss why
you and the Commandant believe this aircraft is so critical to the
Marine Corps' future?
General Schmidle. In 2011 and 2012, the F-35B test program made
significant progress and has demonstrated key capabilities that confirm
the aircraft will meet our requirements. As of 17 May 2013, the F-35B
has conducted 1,129 test flights for a total of 1,588.1 test flight
hours, and has successfully completed initial ship trials, air start
testing, and released both precision and air-to-air weapons. The
testing of STOVL performance capabilities continues to expand the
envelope resulting in our first operational vertical landing in March
2013 at MCAS Yuma, Arizona.
The Marine Corps' transition to the F-35B STOVL is well under way
with the establishment of VMFAT-501, the Fleet Replacement Squadron,
and VMFA-121, the first tactical squadron. VMFAT-501 currently executes
a full training schedule for F-35B transition pilots and maintainers.
VMFA-121, which stood up in November 2012, now has 4 F-35Bs and will be
fully outfitted with 16 F-35Bs by this fall.
The F-35B supports the rapidly changing nature of expeditionary
operations by providing flexible basing options that allow tactical
aircraft to improve responsivenes and increase sortie generation rates.
The value of STOVL has been demonstrated repeatedly, most recently in
combat operations ashore, through the use of forward operating bases
(FOBs) in Iraq and Afganistan, as well as during embarked operations
throughout Central Command's Area of Responsibility.
Based on the testing completed to date we are confident the Marine
Corps' requirement for one tactical aircraft type, capable of multiple
missions, providing the MAGTF with flexible expeditionary basing and
the superior technology needed to dominate the fight is the F-35B.
There are no alternatives to the F-35B that support the full range of
crisis response obligations of the United States Marine Corps.
Mr. Thornberry. It is clear that the world is getting more
dangerous, not less. The situation with North Korea makes that very
clear. Iran is moving toward a potential nuclear weapon. We know that
Russia and China are developing advanced stealth fighters and
proliferating advanced surface-to-air missile systems. Can you discuss
the importance of the advanced stealth capability that the F-35 will
give us and our allies in the future to meet the increasing threats
around the world?
General Schmidle. The F-35's low observable survivability, powerful
integrated sensor suite, fused information displays, interoperable
joint connectivity, precision weapons suite, and self-protect anti-air
weapons, is a total package of capabilities that will revolutionize our
Naval Air combat power in all threat and operational environments. The
advanced fifth-generation stealth capability allows our aviation
elements to operate in threat environments not compatible with fourth-
generation aircraft without extensive and intensive electronic warfare
augmentation. By using the F-35 in these high threat environments we
reduce exposure, increase survivability, and improve overall mission
effectiveness with tailored and precision application.
Mr. Thornberry. Can you speak to the additional capability the F-35
will bring to the Fleet and the program's importance to the Navy's
Tactical Aviation recapitalization efforts?
Admiral Moran. The F-35C provides a 5th generation fighter aircraft
to the Navy carrier air wing and brings with it the ability to
effectively engage and survive a wide range of threats, both air and
surface, in contested airspace. It provides a ``day-one'' strike
capability enabling tactical agility and strategic flexibility required
to counter a broad spectrum of threats and win in operational scenarios
that cannot be addressed by current legacy aircraft, including
operations in an anti-access/area denied environment. Key additive
capabilities that F-35C will bring include very low observable stealth
characteristics and fused active and passive sensors that will enhance
the inherent stealth design. These fully integrated capabilities will
allow F-35C to retain a `first detect/first shot' capability throughout
the battlespace. F-35C's survivability and lethality will fully
integrate with the other Navy Carrier Strike Group assets and provide
increased real-time situational awareness to all other networked
assets. As such, F-35C offers complementary, additive capability to F/
A-18E/F in numerous mission areas. A force equipped with F-35C aircraft
enables combatant commanders to attack targets day or night, in all
weather, in highly defended areas of joint operations. Target set
includes: fixed and mobile land targets; enemy surface units; and air
threats (including advanced cruise missiles). F-35C will supplant some
of the aging Navy TACAIR inventory by replacing legacy F/A-18C aircraft
and early blocks of the F/A-18E/F. F-35C procurement remains a vital
element of the Navy's strike-fighter force mix.
Mr. Thornberry. Affordable F-35 recapitalization is dependent on
capturing economies of scale as quickly as possible by increasing
production as quickly as possible. It finally appears that the
Department has stabilized the production rate for the F-35 program and
is committed to increasing the ramp rate beginning in FY-15. Contrary
to the public perception, unit costs have been coming down year-to-
year. What do you expect the cost of the F-35A CTOL variant to be when
the program reaches full-rate production in FY 18?
General Davis. Based on the current production profile, the
estimated unit recurring flyaway cost (URF) for the F-35A will be
approximately $87 million (TY$) in FY18. The URF cost includes the
airframe, electronics, engine and engineering change orders. The
estimated flyaway cost is approximately $96 million (TY$) in FY18. The
flyaway cost adds in non-recurring and ancillary equipment costs. The
F-35A unit cost is subject to change if the U.S. Services or partner
nations adjust their procurement profiles.
Mr. Thornberry. It is clear that the world is getting more
dangerous, not less. The situation with North Korea makes that very
clear. Iran is moving toward a potential nuclear weapon. We know that
Russia and China are developing advanced stealth fighters and
proliferating advanced surface-to-air missile systems. Can you discuss
the importance of the advanced stealth capability that the F-35 will
give us and our allies in the future to meet the increasing threats
around the world?
General Davis and General Field. Since World War II, the U.S. has
relied on its ability to control the skies over the battlefield,
protecting our forces and holding any adversary's targets at risk. Our
potential adversaries are keenly aware of the importance of air
superiority to our nation's way of war. This is why the development and
proliferation of weapon systems that contest our asymmetric advantage
in the air are increasingly prevalent. For the past 30 years, our
fighter fleet remained ahead of this evolving threat, superbly
performing all its missions and supporting the joint warfighter in
operations such as EL DORADO CANYON, DESERT STORM, ALLIED FORCE,
ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM. However, even during these
conflicts we sometimes faced threat systems that posed a significant
threat to our legacy fighter fleet. For example, during the first days
of DESERT STORM only our fleet of F-117 stealth fighters was able to
safely operate and survive in the highly contested skies over Baghdad.
We believe that air superiority remains an imperative when fighting
any adversary and maintaining the ability of our aircraft to penetrate
and persist in contested environments is vital to the joint warfighter.
As you mention, the threats we may face continue to evolve in
technology and complexity. Potential adversaries are acquiring advanced
fighters on par with or better than our legacy fleet, developing
sophisticated and networked early warning radar surveillance systems,
and fielding surface to air missile systems with increasing range and
lethality. These capabilities all work together to create advanced, and
extremely dangerous, integrated air defense systems (IADS). These anti-
access/area denial environments seriously challenge our ability to gain
air superiority and hold targets at risk. We already face this
challenge in some parts of the world and as you said, and these threat
environments will continue to expand as these systems proliferate.
Our legacy fleet is approaching the limits of capability
modernization that permits them to survive and operate in these
environments--they simply do not have the advanced stealth capability
required to defeat the emerging threats. Only our fifth generation
fighter fleet's combination of advanced stealth, precision weapons,
unmatched electronic warfare systems, fused multi-spectral battlespace
awareness, combat identification systems, maneuverability, and speed
has the ability to operate and survive in these advanced threat
environments. All these capabilities inherent in the F-35, particularly
its advanced stealth properties, ensure the U.S. and our allies have an
air superiority advantage, and will enable our combatant commanders to
bring the full spectrum of capabilities of the joint force to the
fight.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LOBIONDO
Mr. LoBiondo. This committee has been concerned with the strength
of the Department of the Navy's tactical aviation fleet. Specifically,
we have questioned the inventory size and how the Navy planned to
manage a strike fighter force structure in the near and long term. The
Navy has a requirement for 40 VFA squadrons to fill 10 Carrier Air
Wings (CVWs) with 4 squadrons each. Of these squadrons, the Navy has 35
VFA squadrons, and the Marine Corps provides 3 squadrons with an
agreement to supply five squadrons. Does the DON have enough Strike
Fighter squadrons to fill 10 Carrier Air Wings and still meet all the
USMC commitments, including overseas rotations and MEU deployments? Or,
are you several squadrons short of the requirement? Does the strike
fighter inventory model take into account these missing squadrons? The
Fiscal Year 2014 budget request also shows that the Navy eliminated 13
Super Hornets it was supposed to buy this year. However, somehow the
tactical aviation shortfall was reduced. How can you account for this
reduction in aircraft and a corresponding reduction in the shortfall?
What is the tactical aviation shortfall this year?
Admiral Skinner and Admiral Moran. The Navy and Marine Corps have
sufficient strike fighter capacity. We continue to carefully monitor
strike fighter inventory requirements and projected availability and
will continue to take management actions to meet all carrier-based and
expeditionary TACAIR requirements.
DON utilizes the Inventory Forecasting Tool (IFT) to project the
combined effects of transition plans, attrition, and pipeline
requirements on total strike fighter aircraft inventory. The IFT is
updated in conjunction with annual budget submissions to provide a
forecast of strike fighter inventory compared to requirements. This
model does take into account the current force structure gap in TACAIR
integration.
The shortfall number decreased significantly from last year's
estimate due to 3 primary factors: (1) lower utilization rates on Super
Hornets, specifically F/A-18Fs, (2) aircraft that successfully
completed High Flight Hour (HFH) inspections that were allowed to fly
an additional 1000 flight hours instead of the originally planned
additional 600 flight hours. These 400 additional flight hours per
aircraft extended service life by up to two years, (3) PB-13 includes a
Congressional add of 11 F/A-18E/F in FY-13, which settles the POR at
563. The Strike Fighter Shortfall is projected to peak at 18 in 2023.
Mr. LoBiondo. This committee has questioned the inventory size and
how the Navy planned to effectively manage a strike fighter inventory
in the near and long term. Last year, the Marine Corp emphasized a
service life extension program (SLEP) for 150 F/A-18A-D aircraft, which
would help bridge to the F-35B when squadrons become combat
operational. This year, briefings indicate a new high flight hour
inspection regime for aging legacy aircraft in order to maintain
adequate force structure. However, the committee is getting reports
that the Government depot-level inspections for tactical aviation are
taking far longer than anticipated, and at a greater cost. For
instance, there are reports from the Navy that 42% of legacy Hornet--F/
A-18A-D models--are ``out of reporting.'' Moreover, inspections that
were scheduled to take only 180 days are estimated to be taking at
least twice as long. And, the Navy released a Request for Information
(RFI) to the industry on capabilities available to support these depot
inspections, in part because there is a rapidly building backlog of
aircraft awaiting inspection. The costs and schedule analysis have not
been provided to the committee on this new policy, so it remains
uncertain that it will sufficiently address our concerns about
inventory shortfalls. General, can you discuss the new high flight hour
inspection and SLEP plan for legacy aircraft? And has there been an
analysis on the costs and schedule of this new process? Can you tell
the committee what percentage of your fleet is trending ``out of
reporting''? Can you tell the committee what the actual throughput is
for F/A-18A-D aircraft? Under the current plans, will the Marine Corps
have enough squadrons to transition to the F-35B? What impact will this
have on the aviators and maintainers to make this possible? What is the
cost of this new inspection and SLEP plan across the FYDP?
General Schmidle. Q. General, can you discuss the new high flight
hour inspection and SLEP plan for legacy aircraft?
A. In order to meet our operational commitments through 2030, the
DON plans to extend the life on 150 F/A-18A-D aircraft to 10,000 flight
hours by way of the Service Life Extension Program (SLEP). All other F/
A-18A-D aircraft will complete a high flight hour (HFH) inspection at
the depot prior to reaching the current service life limit of 8000
hours. Once complete, the aircraft will be granted an extension
authorization to 9,000 hours with recurring operational level
inspections at 200 hour intervals. If done with no other added work
such as other regularly scheduled Planned Maintenance Interval (PMI) 1
or 2, Center Barrel Replacement (CBR), or other avionics modifications,
it is called a ``Stand Alone.'' To date, the DON has completed 101 HFH
inspections and the issues identified were consistent with
anticipations. In addition to the HFH inspection, each of these
aircraft required engineering analysis and follow-on repairs or parts
replacements in order to return them to an operational status.
Q. Has there been an analysis on the costs and schedule of this new
process?
A. There has been analysis on the costs and schedule of HFH
Inspections. The data is provided below. Ninety-eight HFH inspections
have been completed at the Fleet Readiness Centers since 2008 and every
year the NAVAIR 4.2 Cost Team evaluates the cost and schedule based on
updated information. The results are then compared to the existing FYDP
and adjusted requirements are forwarded up through the budgeting
process.
The ``HFH Stand Alone'' turn-around time is averaging approximately
one year. The average cost of this inspection is currently $447,186.
These are not simple inspections. Aircraft inducted into the depot have
required extensive repair and there has not been a case where an
aircraft only required the inspection making it difficult in attaining
the 180 day turn-around goal. The main contributors are material and
engineering dispositions, both of which are being closely monitored and
standardized to improve throughput. As more SLEP modifications become
available, they will be incorporated into aircraft inducted,
alleviating long lead material and reducing turn-around times.
Q. Can you tell the committee what percentage of your fleet is
trending ``out of reporting''?
A. As of the latest NAVAIR Flight Hour and Inventory Report (May
2013), 115 of 258 USMC F/A-18A-D aircraft are ``out of reporting'' for
various depot level maintenance events. This constitutes 45% (44.57%)
of the USMC F/A-18 fleet. There is an increasing trend in ``out of
reporting'' over the past year: May 2012 (88 of 245, 36%), Sep 2012
(102 of 249, 41%).
Q. Can you tell the committee what the actual throughput is for F/
A-18A-D aircraft?
A. The throughput for F/A-18A-D HFH aircraft is shown below.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ......
``Projected'' High ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ......
Flight Hour (HFH) 54 60 50 55 35 25
Inductions
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Actual 17 22 21 43 62 25 ...... ...... ...... ...... ......
Induction Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Actual 3 13 17 22 32 11 ...... ...... ...... ...... ......
Completion Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Average throughput over 6 years (2008-2013) = 51% of A/C inducted
(98 completed of 190 aircraft inducted).
Q. Under the current plans, will the Marine Corps have enough
squadrons to transition to the F-35B?
A. Assuming the current JSF delivery plan is not reduced or
delayed, the USMC will have enough squadrons to complete the TACAIR
transition to the F-35. Successful implementation of the USMC TACAIR
transition plan will be extremely difficult if the growing out of
reporting problem in the USMC F/A-18A-D community is not addressed.
More importantly, if the depot maintenance throughput is not
significantly improved, the backlog of aircraft at the depot will
increase to a point at which it will affect our ability to properly
equip forward deploying units during the transition.
Q. What impact will this have on the aviators and maintainers to
make this possible?
A. The F/A-18 out of reporting problem is driving USMC squadrons to
train and operate at less than the planned mission aircraft
authorization (PMAA) of 12 aircraft. Currently the USMC F/A-18 fleet
averages 9 aircraft per squadron, not including the FRS. This aircraft
deficit poses a unique dilemma to aviators: 1. Fly a smaller number of
aircraft at a much higher utilization rate to maintain combat
readiness, or 2. Sacrifice combat readiness to maintain planned
utilization rates on the available aircraft. The first option will
drive aircraft to reach the 8000 hour limit at a greater rate further
aggravating the depot backlog and throughput problems. The second
sacrifices the combat readiness at a time when USMC TACAIR is
experiencing high operational demand.
Bottom line for aviators--projected lack of aircraft on the
flightline will cause a downward trend in Marine Corps tactical
aviation readiness. More importantly, if depot maintenance throughput
is not significantly improved, the backlog of aircraft at the depot
will increase to a point at which it will affect forward deployed
units.
For the maintainers at the squadron level--the fleet is currently
annotating and analyzing the impact of the increase in man-hours
incurred by the HFH recurring interval inspections.
Q. What is the cost of this new inspection and SLEP plan across the
FYDP?
A. FY13 HFH inspections and SLEP plan are fully funded. The FYDP
costs are shown below.
HFH OMN Budget (in $M)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current Budget FY (PB-14) 13 14 15 16 17 18
------------------------------------------------------------------------
HFH Inspection Budget $26.5 $19.8 $17.0 $9.5 $14.8 $9.9
(OMN)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SLEP APN-5 Budget ($636.56M FYDP)*
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current Budget FY (PB-
14) $M 13 14 15 16 17 18
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SLEP Budget $54.63 $59.52 $111.64 $206.88 $106.7 $151.8
(APN5 within OSIP 11- 2 0
99)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
*In PB-14, OSIP 11-99 (funding for SLEP/SLMP) was reduced by
$697.28M across the FYDP (Issue #20025 -$99.26M & Issue #62294 -
$598.00M). This equates to a 52% reduction in funding for combined HFH
and SLEP in PB-14.
The average cost of the HFH Stand Alone inspection is currently
$447,186 with turnaround times averaging 328 to 403 days depending on
the depot site.
Mr. LoBiondo. As you know, the F/A-18E/F Block II Super Hornet will
be part of the Navy's aviation backbone for the next 25 years and
beyond. Both the Super Hornet and the F-35C will be providing force
projection for our carriers. Because of its importance to the long-term
health of tactical aviation, the Committee understands that there are
efforts under way to support advancements to the current Block II
platform. At Navy League last week there were presentations on both the
funded ``Flight Plan'' of the Super Hornet and additional advancements
being considered. Can you talk about the importance of a modernization
program for the Super Hornets in order to take that aircraft out the
next 25 years or more?
Admiral Moran. F/A-18E/Fs will remain critical multimission assets
in the air wing of the future and will complement the first-day/first-
strike capability of the F-35C. As the bulk of the strike/fighter
force, the Super Hornet will continue to execute many of the same
mission sets as the F-35C and will be expected to serve as a primary
delivery platform for long-range air-to-air and air-to-surface weapons.
Continued upgrades to the F/A-18E/F platform are critical. Efforts to
modernize the 2025 Carrier Air Wing (CVW) include integration of
weapons and capabilities through coordinated management and
synchronized requirements development with the flexibility and agility
to meet any threat. The CVW leverages networked weapon system
integration and interoperability to find, fix, track, target, engage
and assess any threat by utilizing off board cueing, operating across
the RF spectrum and with stealth technology to achieve full spectrum
dominance to interrupt red effects chains. Future F/A-18E/F
improvements such as Multifunctional Information Distribution System
(MIDS) upgrades, Multi-System Integration (MSI) refinement,
configuration modifications and improved Counter Electronic Attack
(CEA) for the Advanced Electronic Scanned Array (AESA) radar,
introduction of the long-wave Infra-Red Search and Track (IRST) pod,
Advanced Targeting Forward Looking Infra-Red (ATFLIR) pod enhancements
and improved weapons integration will allow the Super Hornet to meet
the capability requirement of the 2025 CVW.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER
Mr. Turner. Mr. Sullivan, your most recent report identifies a
number of technical risks the program faces that could substantially
degrade the F-35's capabilities and mission effectiveness. Can you
please identify the major technical risks the program faces going
forward. What is the status of these risks? Specifically, with regard
to the Helmet Mounted Display, what risks remain and what actions are
being taken in order to reduce these risks?
Mr. Sullivan. The key areas of risk we highlighted in our March
2013 report were the Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS), the
arresting hook system for the carrier variant aircraft, structural
durability, the Helmet Mounted Display (HMD), and software integration
and testing. \2\ While the program still faces a number of challenges
going forward, it has taken positive steps to address risk in these
areas. For example, limited capability ALIS systems are now being used
at training and test locations and the program has made progress in
developing the smaller, transportable version needed to support unit
level deployments with the expectation that a fully capable system will
be fielded in 2015. The program has completed the redesign of its
carrier variant arresting hook system, conducted risk reduction testing
on the new hook point, and expects to begin flight testing the entire
redesigned system in late 2013. The program is also testing redesigned
structures and planning for other modifications that are needed to
address problems identified during the aircraft's structural and
durability testing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ GAO, F-35 Joint Strike Fighter: Current Outlook Is Improved,
but Long-Term Affordability Is a Major Concern, GAO- 13-300
(Washington, D.C.: Mar 11, 2013).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With regard to the HMD, the original design encountered significant
technical deficiencies and did not meet warfighter requirements. Those
deficiencies included degraded night vision capability, display jitter,
and latency (or delay) in transmitting sensor data. Program officials
stated that software updates are being made to improve night vision
capability, filters are being added to displays to decrease jitter, and
data latency is not as severe as originally assumed. Early
developmental testing of these updates has shown improvement, according
to program officials, but risks remain as additional testing still
needs to be done. In addition, the program is pursuing a dual path by
developing a second, less capable helmet while working to fix the first
helmet design. Both helmets are being evaluated, and while DOD may make
a decision as to which helmet to procure later this year, the selected
helmet is not expected to be integrated into the baseline aircraft
until 2015.
Software integration and testing continue to pose significant risks
to the program, although the aircraft contractor and program office
have recently taken steps that are likely to improve software
management and output. The number of lines of code necessary to achieve
full mission capability is now estimated to be to over 24 million.
While most of the code has been developed, a substantial amount of
integration and test work remain before the program can demonstrate
full warfighting capability. The specific software needed to
demonstrate that capability including electronic warfare, communication
navigation identification, and radar is behind schedule, and the most
challenging work still lies ahead.
Mr. Turner. Mr. Sullivan, for years GAO has been a critic of the
JSF program with regard to cost growth and schedule delays, yet your
most recent report seems to indicate things are getting better. What
changes has the program made in order to set it on a new path? Going
forward, what critical challenges remain for the program from a cost
and schedule standpoint?
Mr. Sullivan. After 12 years and more than $20 billion dollars in
development cost growth, the department has fundamentally restructured
the F-35 program. In doing so, it has steadily lowered the production
ramp-up rate over the past 3 years and cut near term procurement
quantities. This means that fewer aircraft are being procured while
testing is still ongoing, which lowers the risk and cost of having to
retrofit and modify aircraft. The new development flight test schedule
is also more realistic and better resourced, using more conservative
assumptions about fly rates and test point achievements and providing
for more flights and more test assets. In addition, the acting Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics has
established unit cost affordability targets for each variant of the
aircraft that the program is expected to meet by the start of full-rate
production in 2019. In the area of software management, the program
began the process of establishing a second system integration
laboratory, adding substantial testing and development capacity, and
prioritizing its resources on incremental software development as
opposed to the much riskier concurrent development approach.
Going forward, affordability and concurrency between testing and
production will continue to pose significant cost and schedule
challenges for the F-35 program. The new acquisition program baseline
projects the need for a total of $316 billion in development and
procurement funding from 2013 through 2037--which represents an average
of more than $12 billion annually. Maintaining this level of sustained
funding will be difficult in a period of declining or flat defense
budgets and competition with other ``big ticket items'' such as the KC-
46 tanker and a new bomber program. In addition, the program's highly
concurrent test and production schedule poses significant risk going
forward. With nearly two-thirds of the developmental test program
remaining, additional time and money will likely be needed for
retrofits and rework of procured aircraft. At the time of our report,
the program office projected retrofit and rework costs of $1.7 billion
on aircraft procured under the first 10 annual contracts.
Mr. Turner. Mr. Sullivan, as you know, the JSF acquisition program
is expected to require over $300 billion still to complete the
acquisition and $1 trillion to operate and sustain the aircraft. How do
you view affordability as a challenge for the program?
Mr. Sullivan. Affordability poses a challenge because sustaining an
annual acquisition funding level of over $12 billion on average from
2013 through 2037, as currently projected, will be difficult in a
period of declining or flat defense budgets and given the competition
for funding from other ``big ticket items'' such as the KC-46 tanker
and a new bomber program. It should also be noted that the program's
current funding projections assume financial benefits from
international partners purchasing at least 697 aircraft. If fewer
aircraft are procured in total or in smaller annual quantities--by the
international partners or the United States--unit costs will likely
rise according to analysis done by the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation office.
In addition, current F-35 life-cycle cost estimates are
considerably higher than the legacy aircraft it will replace; this has
major implications for future demands on military operating support
budgets and plans for recapitalizing fighter forces. The most recent
estimate by the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation
projects total U.S. operating and support costs of over $1 trillion for
all three variants based on a 30-year service life and predicted usage
and attrition rates. Defense leadership stated in 2011 that sustainment
cost estimates of this magnitude were unaffordable and simply
unacceptable in this fiscal environment. U.S. military services and
international partners have all expressed concerns about long-term
affordability. The program has undertaken efforts to address this life-
cycle affordability concern, but until DOD can demonstrate that the
program can perform against its cost projections, it will continue to
be difficult for the U.S. and international partners to accurately set
priorities, establish affordable procurement rates, retire aged
aircraft, and establish supporting infrastructure.
Mr. Turner. You mentioned in your written testimony that F-35
sustainment costs remain a concern. What actions are the F-35 Joint
Program Office and the Department of the Navy taking to reduce F-35
life-cycle costs?
Admiral Skinner. The Department of the Navy (DON) continues to
support the F-35 program in its disciplined approach to analyzing and
reducing sustainment costs. The F-35 program is conducting a
sustainment business case analysis to identify cost reduction
initiatives. The program recently held an industry day to foster
competition for sustainment contracting, specifically targeting supply
chain, support equipment, training operations support, and Autonomic
Logistics Information System administration. A focused reliability and
maintainability program is identifying cost drivers based on actual
fleet data. These cost drivers can be targeted for improvements, either
by redesign or qualification of a second source. The program also uses
contracting standards for suppliers to reduce repair times. As the
services fund depot standup, this will also increase the sources for
repair, improving quality and repair times.
Importantly, the services and JPO now have a common definition of
cost per flight hour. This seemingly simple step will allow the
services to investigate the underlying assumptions for cost drivers
such as training, mission personnel, engineering support, and assumed
annual flight hours.
The DON, working with the F-35 program, will analyze options
outside the Program Executive Office's span of control such as
reviewing basing option and sequencing, unit level manpower and
squadron size, discrete sustainment requirements, and appropriate use
of simulation for training. Work is under way for a level of repair
analysis to maximize cost effectiveness and fully exploit existing
service maintenance infrastructure. Such efforts yielded savings for
legacy platforms, such as MV-22 and EA-18G.
Through these combined efforts, the Department of the Navy believes
the PEO can converge on an affordable F-35 sustainment strategy that
meets the required level of service performance and lowers the total
life cycle cost of the program.
Mr. Turner. The Navy's Broad Area Maritime Surveillance Program had
assumed cost savings in production and operations and maintenance
because of Global Hawk program shared overhead, training, basing costs,
and other operations and sustainment costs. In addition, there is the
possibility of a break in the production line, with Global Hawk Block
30 termination, given the current BAMS production schedule. Do you know
what these costs will be?
Admiral Skinner. The United States Air Force decision to terminate
the Global Hawk Block 30 Lot 11 production contract in President's
Budget 2013 has resulted in a gap on the production line that will cost
the Navy MQ-4C Triton program an estimated $27M (Research, Development,
Test & Evaluation, Navy). Final cost estimates will not be known until
the Navy negotiates the Low Rate Initial Production contract with the
Prime Contractor.
Mr. Turner. Your written testimony notes that the Marine Corps may
experience elevated operational risk in the 2020s if the predicted
strike fighter shortfall comes to fruition. Please describe why you
believe the Marine Corps faces this elevated operational risk and what
the Department of the Navy is doing to mitigate those risks.
General Schmidle. As legacy F/A-18 squadrons are reduced, the
service shortfall number must be considered in proportion to the
primary mission aircraft inventory requirement. Due to a lower number
of F/A-18 squadrons in the 2023 to 2026 timeframe, the shortfall number
associated with the Marine Corps will have a more significant impact on
our remaining F/A-18 operational squadrons. For example, in 2023 the
USMC F/A-18 fleet will have three active and one reserve squadron
remaining. A shortfall of (11) F/A-18 aircraft would comprise
approximately one quarter of the total squadrons or one third of the
active component.
The Department of the Navy (DON) continues to manage aircraft
service life of each aircraft at the operational level in order to
achieve the maximum allowable service life limits prior to its sundown.
The continued engineering and Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) kit
development over the FYDP will ensure there is sufficient inventory to
meet DON requirements through the transition to the F-35.
Mr. Turner. The total Department of the Navy strike fighter
shortfall is 18 aircraft in approximately 2023. Of that amount, what is
the Marine Corps strike fighter shortfall?
General Schmidle. The Marine Corps' portion of the Department of
the Navy strike fighter shortfall in 2023 is 11 aircraft according to
the latest excursion of the Inventory Forecasting Tool (IFT v21
excursion C012).
Mr. Turner. Your written testimony notes that Marine aviation is on
a path toward a distributed Airborne Electronic Attack system of
systems including both unmanned and manned assets. Please describe the
number and types of unmanned and manned assets that will be part of
this system.
General Schmidle. The Marine Corps anticipates a future operating
environment comprised of advanced Electromagnetic Spectrum (EMS)
Warfare and digital threats. The Marine Corps will address these
threats with the Marine Air Ground Task Force Electronic Warfare (MAGTF
EW) concept. This approach will leverage all available transmitters and
sensors across the MAGTF on both manned and unmanned platforms. A
coordination cell comprised of EMS, Cyber, Operations, Intelligence,
and Communications subject matter experts (SME) will collectively
integrate collections and effects-delivery efforts in real-time. The
Marine Corps will no longer depend on a large single-purpose platform,
since the low-density, platform-centric approach has proven
insufficient for meeting capacity requirements. MAGTF EW systems will
be capable of networking with Marine and Joint assets spanning the air,
ground, space, and cyber domains.
Any current or future airframe employed in support of MAGTF
operations will maintain the ability to host advanced EMS payloads in
support of integrated Spectrum and Cyber Operations. The Intrepid Tiger
II Electronic Warfare pod, currently deployed to Central Command
(CENTCOM) and aboard Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs), is one such
payload example. The types and numbers of these platforms and systems
will be based on Service capacity and future mission requirements.
These platforms specifically include future Group 4/5 UASs, RQ-21, F-
35, KC-130J, AV-8B, F/A-18, AH-1, though any aircraft in the inventory
will be capable of serving as a host platform in the distributed
capability network. As the future linchpin of Marine Corps Tactical
Aviation, the F-35 JSF will contribute by reducing counter-integrated
air defense systems (C-IADS) requirements due to its inherent Spectrum
survivability, and adding decisive networked attack and exploitation
capabilities in EMS regions of significance.
While the Marine Corps is currently achieving combat success with
EMS payloads on manned platforms in theater and adding such capability
to deployed Marine Expeditionary Units, the application of airborne
Spectrum Warfare will increasingly gravitate towards UAS platforms.
Marine Corps Aviation is actively exploring options to expand its UAS
fleet with larger platforms to provide requisite size, weight, and
power to perform a combination of standoff and penetrating Spectrum
Attack operations. This approach will enable a deliberate Spectrum
Warfare portfolio growth from communications-based targets by
incorporating RADAR-based targets, directed-energy (DE) and LASER
targets, as well as targets susceptible to low-yield electromagnetic
pulse (EMP). Additionally, the Marine Corps is exploring the viability
and readiness of advanced (medium-high Technology Readiness Level)
Spectrum Attack technologies to augment baseline Intrepid Tiger 2
capability for future incorporation.
Mr. Turner. Like the Air Force, Naval air forces require
inventories of precision air-to-air and air-to-ground munitions. Please
describe which inventories and short of requirements and provide the
committee a list of those munitions and amounts above the budget
request that could be executed in fiscal year 2014.
General Schmidle. The following list of precision air-to-air and
air-to-ground Naval munitions have been identified as falling short of
their requirement, as defined by the POM-14 Naval Munitions
Requirements Process (NMRP) output, and can execute the amounts shown
above the budget request that could be executed in fiscal year 2014.
AIM-9X: $135M for an additional 350 missiles.
AARGM: $16.5M for an additional 22 missiles.
JSOW C-1: $28M for an additional 92 weapons.
GP Bombs: $237.8M for the additional components below:
--JDAM tail kits ($72M, QTY 3,000)
--Laser JDAM ($50.4M, QTY 3,500)
--GBU-12 ($12M, QTY 3,000)
--GBU-10 ($3.5M, QTY 700)
--Computer Control Groups ($24M, QTY 2,000)
--BLU-109 Bomb Body ($64M, QTY 2,000)
--FMU-143 fuze ($11.9M, QTY 3,500)
Rockets: $118M for the additional components below:
--M151/MK152 HE Warhead ($18M, QTY 12,917)
--MK 66 MOD 4 Rocket Motor ($24.3M, QTY 41,258)
--WTU-1/B Inert Warhead ($1.1M, QTY 12,881)
-- WGU-59/B APKWS II Guidance and Control Section
($74.3M, QTY 2,564)
--LAU-61 G/A Digital Rocket Launcher ($0.28M, QTY 5)
Mr. Turner. In your statement you note that initial operational
capability (IOC) dates have not been determined by leadership but you
describe capabilities for IOC such as 10 F-35B aircraft with software
block 2B for the Marine Corps, and 10 F-35C aircraft with software
block 3F for the Navy. You also mention that you will report those
dates by June 1st of this year. Based on the current F-35 development
and procurement schedule, can you estimate what year the F-35B and F-
35C will be declared IOC?
General Schmidle. IOC dates are capability based, and the services
will declare IOC dates in a report to Congress due by 1 June 2013. The
current F-35B IOC plan is based on appropriate software, weapon
clearances, performance envelope, training, deployability, and
sustainment capabilities. The Marine Corps estimates it will declare
IOC for the F-35B between July 2015 (objective) and December 2015
(threshold).
Mr. Turner. Like the Air Force, Naval air forces require
inventories of precision air-to-air and air-to-ground munitions. Please
describe which inventories and short of requirements and provide the
committee a list of those munitions and amounts above the budget
request that could be executed in fiscal year 2014.
Admiral Moran. The following precision air-to-air and air-to-ground
Naval munitions have been identified as being short of their inventory
requirement. The funding above the PB14 budget request that could be
executed in fiscal year 2014 is also provided below.
AIM-9X: $58.1 for an additional 150 missiles.
AARGM: $16.5M for an additional 22 missiles.
JSOW C-1: $28M for an additional 92 weapons.
GP Bombs: $237.8M for the additional components below:
--JDAM tail kits ($72M, QTY 3,000)
--Laser JDAM ($50.4M, QTY 3,500)
--GBU-12 ($12M, QTY 3,000)
--GBU-10 ($3.5M, QTY 700)
--Computer Control Groups ($24M, QTY 2,000)
--BLU-109 Bomb Body ($64M, QTY 2,000)
--FMU-143 fuze ($11.9M, QTY 3,500)
Rockets: $118M for the additional components below:
--M151/MK152 HE Warhead ($18M, QTY 12,917)
--MK 66 MOD 4 Rocket Motor ($24.3M, QTY 41,258)
--WTU-1/B Inert Warhead ($1.1M, QTY 12,881)
-- WGU-59/B APKWS II Guidance and Control Section
($74.3M, QTY 2,564)
--LAU-61 G/A Digital Rocket Launcher ($0.28M, QTY 5)
Mr. Turner. In your statement you note that initial operational
capability (IOC) dates have not been determined by leadership but you
describe capabilities for IOC such as 10 F-35B aircraft with software
block 2B for the Marine Corps, and 10 F-35C aircraft with software
block 3F for the Navy. You also mention that you will report those
dates by June 1st of this year. Based on the current F-35 development
and procurement schedule, can you estimate what year the F-35B and F-
35C will be declared IOC?
Admiral Moran. In accordance with the FY13 NDAA Conference Report
(112-705) on H.R. 4310, the Secretary of the Navy will submit, along
with the Secretary of the Air Force, a report to Congress declaring IOC
dates for all three variants of the Joint Strike Fighter by June 1,
2013.
Mr. Turner. You mentioned in your written testimony that depot
delays will require the grounding of some of the affected aircraft, and
that sequestration cuts to Air Force modernization will impact every
one of the Air Force's investment programs, creating inefficiencies,
raising unit costs, and delaying delivery of valued capabilities to
warfighters in the field. You also note that the Fiscal Year 2014
budget request does not enable full recovery of warfighting capability,
capacity and readiness and that additional resources will be required.
a. What effects will sequestration have in the current fiscal year on
the Air Force fighter inventory? b. What additional resources will be
required in fiscal year 2014 to make the fighter fleets whole again?
General Davis. a. The Air Force fighter force structure requirement
is currently 1,900 TAI (Total Active Inventory), and 1,100 PMAI
(Primary Mission Aircraft Inventory, or ``combat-coded'' fighter
aircraft). Because these force structure numbers are minimums set to
meet our National Military Strategy at increased aggregate risk, the
Air Force is actively managing force structure to offset the effects of
sequestration. Although sequestration itself will not affect the
tactical fighter inventory in the current fiscal year in terms of PMAI,
some fighter units are currently stood down and will likely remain so
throughout FY13. Overall, sequestration has created significant
readiness shortfalls and reduced our ability to meet future steady-
state and surge requirements. Examples of sequestration impacts include
postponement of field level maintenance and depot inductions,
reductions in depot production and interruption of aircraft
modification and modernization efforts. Based on the force structure
minimum of 1,900 TAI/1,100 PMAI, the Air Force's ability to meet the
National Military Strategy is already at increased risk, and
sequestration exacerbates the Air Force's near term readiness impacts
and its ability to meet future requirements.
b. It will take 3-6 months and additional funding to bring stood
down fighter squadrons back to their pre-sequestration readiness
levels, which were sub-optimal. Achieving full mission readiness goals
will be a multiyear effort beyond what is achievable in FY14. For FY14,
we estimate an additional 10% flying hours above PB14 levels for the
stood down units, or approximately $115M. In addition, to recover the
deferred FY13 depot actions for the fighter fleet overall will cost
approximately $34M.
Mr. Turner. You mentioned in your written testimony that all three
mission areas in the air-to-surface munitions inventory are short of
inventory objectives. Those missions are stand-off, direct attack, and
penetrator munitions.
a. Please provide the subcommittee a list of those muntions and
amounts that could be increased to the budget request and, if
authorized and appropriated, could be executed in fiscal year 2014.
General Davis. Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) is a
conventional, low observable, cruise missile, with standoff ranges of
200nm (JASSM Baseline) or 500nm (JASSM-ER). The current inventory for
JASSM Baseline is approximately 1,060 units and objective inventory is
approximately 2,000 units. The Air Force FY14 President's Budget (PB)
request is $291.2 million for 103 JASSM Baseline units and 80 JASSM-ER
units. The Air Force supports the FY14 PB. In order to reach the FY14
production capacity of 175 JASSM Baseline units, an additional $81.4
million is required. The currently inventory for JASSM-ER is 0 units
and objective inventory is approximately 3,000 units. The FY14 PB
request for 80 JASSM-ER units is the production capacity.
Hellfire is a direct attack munition used to prosecute time-
sensitive targets. It is the only weapon employed on the MQ-1 Predator
and the only forward firing weapon on the MQ-9 Reaper. The current
inventory is approximately 2,000 units and objective inventory is
approximately 5,000 units. The Air Force FY14 PB request is $48.5
million for 413 units. The Air Force supports the FY14 PB. In order to
reach the FY14 production capacity of 7,200 across the Army, Navy, Air
Force, and FMS procurement, an additional $492.4 million is required.
Small Diameter Bomb Increment II (SDB II) is a standoff miniature
munition designed to kill mobile targets in adverse weather conditions.
The current inventory is 0 units and objective inventory is
approximately 12,000 units. The Air Force FY14 PB request is $42.3
million for 144 units. The Air Force supports the FY14 PB. In order to
reach the FY14 production capacity of 173, an additional $4.4 million
is
required.
Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) is a field-installed guidance
kit with global positioning system aided inertial navigation system
(GPS/INS) that integrates on 500, 1,000, and 2,000 pound general
purpose bombs. JDAM provides an accurate, adverse weather capability,
and is integrated with the B-52H, B-2A, B-1B, F-16C/D, F/A-18A+C/D/E/F,
F-15E, AV-8B, A-10C, and F-22A aircraft. The current inventory is
approximately 96,200 units and objective inventory is approximately
150,000 units. The Air Force FY14 PB request is $188.5 million for
6,965 units (however, note that the FY14 Tail kit quantities in the
FY14 budget documents are incorrect and should reflect 4,451 units, not
6,965 units). The Air Force supports the FY14 PB. However, the Air
Force also requested $85.5M for an additional 2,879 units in the FY14
Overseas Contingency Operations. If only the FY14 PB is met, an
additional $141.5 million is required in order to procure an additional
5,428 units. However, if both the FY14 PB and the FY14 OCO requests are
accepted,
an additional $66.5 million is required to procure an additional 2,549
units. The
FY14 production capacity is 15,000 units across the Navy, Air Force,
and FMS
procurement.
Mr. Turner. We understand the inventory objective for the CV-22
fleet is 50 aircraft, but when the last CV-22 is delivered in 2016, the
inventory will total 49 aircraft due to a class A mishap of one CV-22
in June of last year. Are there any plans to replace that aircraft to
meet the CV-22 inventory objective of 50 aircraft?
General Davis. The Air Force is currently exploring all funding
options available to replace the CV-22 lost during training in June
2012, before the CV portion of the production line starts closing down
in FY14. However, with budget reductions and sequestration, near-term
funding will be difficult to find.
Mr. Turner. We noted that the Combat Rescue Helicopter program is
currently in source selection. When is the contract award announcement
planned?
General Davis. The Air Force continues to press forward with the
Combat Rescue Helicopter contract award and we are currently in the
4QFY13/1QFY14 timeframe.
Mr. Turner. You noted in your written testimony that the majority
of the $1.32 billion across the Future Years Defense Program for F-16
modernization will focus on the service life extension program (SLEP)
and the combat avionics programmed extension suites (CAPES) for 300 F-
16s. You also note that you will have to SLEP and modernize more. Does
that mean you're planning to accomplish the SLEP and CAPES
modifications on more than 300 Block 40 and 50 F-16s? If so, how many
additional F-16s will require the SLEP and CAPES modifications?
General Field. The current requirement as defined in the FY14
President's Budget is to SLEP and CAPES 300 F-16 aircraft. While there
is no currently approved requirement to accomplish SLEP or CAPES
modifications to more than 300, both the SLEP and CAPES programs are
scalable up to 635 Block 40-52 F-16 aircraft. Potential certainly
exists for the number of aircraft programmed for modification to shift
from 300 (up or down) in order to address USAF requirements, but
specifics pertaining to any potential shifts are not defined at this
time.
Mr. Turner. In your statement you describe a decreased fighter
force structure of 1,900 total fighter aircraft as ``an increased
risk'' to carry out the National Military Strategy, which is a
reduction from a 2,000 fighter aircraft inventory 2 years ago. Please
describe the increased risks in terms of meeting military objectives.
What actions is the Air Force taking to reduce this risk? What actions
can the Congress take to reduce this risk?
General Field. The decision to reduce force structure was a very
difficult one. From the mission risk perspective, a smaller force means
that objectives may take longer to achieve; integrated air defense
systems (enemy surface-to-air missiles and fighters, etc.) will take
longer to defeat, thereby increasing the threat to our aircrews; there
will be greater likelihood that the Air Force will not be able to gain
and maintain air superiority, but may have to settle for temporary,
local air superiority; and greater likelihood that joint/coalition
ground (and possibly naval) forces will be at risk of enemy air attack
for the first time since the Korean War. Insufficient capacity to
support defense strategic guidance will result in more force
substitutions at greater risk (particularly for air superiority
missions), more difficulty conducting nearly simultaneous surge
operations resulting in higher attrition and the potential for failure.
Reduced capacity also drives a higher OPTEMPO leading to readiness
degradation and reduced availability for enduring overseas operations.
Within significant budgetary restrictions, the Air Force is mitigating
these risks by modernizing and sustaining legacy fighters, by upgrading
and procuring fifth generation aircraft, and by procuring preferred
munitions. Congress can help reduce these risks by continuing to
support the Air Force's fighter force structure with stable funding;
supporting the minimum inventory requirement of 1900 fighter aircraft;
allowing continued modernization and sustainment of legacy fighters,
procurement of fifth generation aircraft, procurement of preferred
munitions, and allowing the Air Force to close excess installations as
part of a new Base Realignment and Closure process.
Mr. Turner. What is the status of the Air Force's air-to-air
weapons inventory? Are there shortages in the AIM-120 or AIM-9
inventories? If so, please provide
additional amounts that could be executed in fiscal year 2014 to
address those
shortages.
General Field. AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile
(AMRAAM) is a beyond-visual-range missile used to counter existing and
emerging air vehicle threats, operating at high or low altitude and
having electronic attack (EA) capabilities). The current inventory is
approximately 2,500 units and the objective inventory is approximately
5,000 units. The Air Force FY14 President's Budget (PB) request is $340
million for 181 units, which is the FY14 production capacity.
AIM-9M Sidewinder Air-to-Air Missile is a short to medium-range
infrared-guided missile. The current inventory is approximately 3,100
units and the objective inventory is approximately 700 units. This
missile is no longer in production, so there was no procurement FY14 PB
request in the FY14 PB.
AIM-9X Sidewinder Air-to-Air Missile is a short to medium-range
infrared-guided missile, with enhanced detection and tracking
capabilities, and increased maneuverability. The current inventory is
approximately 1,100 units and the objective inventory is approximately
1,800 units. The Air Force FY14 PB request is $120 million for 225
units. The Air Force supports the FY14 PB. In order to reach the FY14
production capacity of 800 units across the Navy, Air Force, and FMS
procurement, an additional $135 million is required for an additional
350 units.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BARBER
Mr. Barber. General Davis, thank you for your service to our Nation
and your testimony before this committee today. In your testimony
today, you mentioned improvements to the A-10 airframe to ensure its
combat viability through 2035. I understand the A-10 is a critical
close air support platform that the Services have come to rely upon for
its effectiveness and precision. Truth be told, it is quite an iconic
aircraft, and I'm proud to have A-10s in my district at Davis-Monthan
Air Force Base. As the Air Force transitions a number of the A-10 fleet
to the Reserve Component, how is the Air Force ensuring its Reserve
fleet of A-10s are kept at the same level of readiness as their Active
Duty counterparts?
General Davis. Aircraft with existing wings that are considered
beyond repair will get new wings, regardless of whether they are Active
Component (AC) or Reserve Component (RC). The determination of which
aircraft get new wings is based on an inspection of the wings when the
aircraft is at the depot. RC aircraft will receive the standard block
software upgrades (OFP). All AC and RC A-10s will receive the same OFP
upgrades.
Mr. Barber. General Field, thank you for your service to our Nation
and your testimony before this committee today. I would like to begin
first by saying I remain committed to solving the fiscal challenges and
uncertainties facing our Nation today. I have said time and again that
cuts applied in an across-the-board manner by sequestration are
nonsensical and harmful to our national defense. While the CR provided
the Department some flexibility, I am not satisfied. That being said, I
understand the Department must adhere to the law and move forward with
securing our national defense regardless. As the Department has begun
to identify ways to be more efficient, top military leaders have stated
that Building Partner Capacity will remain a critical tool for ensuring
global stability. Air Force units in my State, Arizona, contribute
significantly to this effort by training foreign pilots, and I am proud
of their service and commitment to our global security. Over time,
these airmen have developed an indispensable skill critical to the
effort of Building Partner Capacity. I'm sure you can agree, as good
stewards of U.S. resources, we cannot allow skills and expertise to
erode as a result of sequestration. As such, it makes sense to ensure
we recycle and maintain the expertise of our airmen as we integrate new
technology. General, in this case, I'm talking specifically about the
F-35 and Air Force basing decisions for the F-35. General Field, my
question to you is this: When making F-35 basing decisions, how much
weight will the Air Force place on bases' current missions and the
expertise they possess from conducting those missions when determining
where to base the F-35? What will drive the Air Force's basing
decisions for future missions, specifically the F-35?
General Field. The Air Force strategic basing process begins with
criteria development, which outlines basing requirements. Mission is
one of (normally) four categories of criteria. The mission category is
comprised of elements specific to the weapon system being considered
for basing. Each element is weighted based on their relative importance
to the mission. The mission elements address requirements unique to
that weapon system, not necessarily current missions at a particular
location, or resident expertise. Regarding the F-35A, criteria for
future training basing decisions will be reviewed and updated as
necessary, but is not expected to change markedly.
The strategic basing process is requirements-driven. In the case of
the F-35A, future basing decisions will be based upon the aircraft
delivery schedule and the potential for foreign military sales (FMS) of
F-35A aircraft. The Air Force anticipates a future need to identify a
long-term FMS location for F-35A training, but that is dependent upon
future foreign sales.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. VEASEY
Mr. Veasey. This question is for all of the flag officers. It is
clear that the world is getting more dangerous, not less. The situation
with North Korea makes that very clear. Iran is moving toward a
potential nuclear weapon. We know that Russia and China are developing
advanced stealth fighters and proliferating advanced surface-to-air
missile systems. Can you discuss the importance of the advanced stealth
capability that the F-35 will give us and our allies in the future to
meet the increasing threats around the world.
Mr. Sullivan. We have not conducted the work necessary to answer
this
question.
Mr. Veasey. This question is for all of the flag officers. It is
clear that the world is getting more dangerous, not less. The situation
with North Korea makes that very clear. Iran is moving toward a
potential nuclear weapon. We know that Russia and China are developing
advanced stealth fighters and proliferating advanced surface-to-air
missile systems. Can you discuss the importance of the advanced stealth
capability that the F-35 will give us and our allies in the future to
meet the increasing threats around the world.
Admiral Skinner and Admiral Moran.
F-35C offers the first 5th generation fighter aircraft to
the Navy carrier air wing and brings with it the ability to effectively
engage and survive a wide range and threats, both air and surface, in
contested airspace. It provides a ``day-one'' strike capability
enabling tactical agility and strategic flexibility required to counter
a broad spectrum of threats and win in operational scenarios that
cannot be addressed by current legacy aircraft, including operations in
an anti-access/area denied environment.
Key additive capabilities that F-35C will bring include
very low observable stealth characteristics and fused active and
passive sensors that will enhance the inherent stealth design. These
fully integrated capabilities will allow F-35C to retain a `first
detect/first shot' capability throughout the battlespace. F-35C's
survivability and lethality will fully integrate with the other Navy
Carrier Strike Group assets and provide increased real-time situational
awareness to all other networked assets. As such, F-35C offers
complementary, additive capability to F/A-18E/F in numerous mission
areas.
A force equipped with F-35C aircraft enables combatant
commanders to attack targets day or night, in all weather, in highly
defended areas of joint operations. Target set includes: fixed and
mobile land targets; enemy surface units; and air threats (including
advanced cruise missiles).
F-35C will supplant some of the aging Navy TACAIR
inventory by replacing early blocks of the F/A-18E/F and legacy F/A-18C
aircraft. F-35C procurement remains a key element of the Navy's strike-
fighter force mix.
Mr. Veasey. Lieutenant General Schmidle, can you provide the
Subcommittee an update on the F-35B STOVL variant's progress in the
test program and discuss why you and the Commandant believe this
aircraft is so critical to the Marine Corps'
future?
General Schmidle. In 2011 and 2012, The F-35B test program made
significant progress and has demonstrated key capabilities that confirm
the aircraft will meet our requirements. As of 17 May 2013, the F-35B
has conducted 1,129 test flights for a total of 1,588.1 test flight
hours, and has successfully completed initial ship trials, air start
testing, and released both precision and air-to-air weapons. The
testing of STOVL performance capabilities continues to expand the
envelope resulting in our first operational vertical landing in March
2013 at MCAS Yuma, Arizona.
The Marine Corps' transition to the F-35B STOVL is well under way
with the establishment of VMFAT-501, the Fleet Replacement Squadron,
and VMFA-121, the first tactical squadron. VMFAT-501 currently executes
a full training schedule for F-35B transition pilots and maintainers.
VMFA-121, which stood up in November 2012, now has 4 F-35Bs and will be
fully outfitted with 16 F-35Bs by this fall.
The F-35B supports the rapidly changing nature of expeditionary
operations by providing flexible basing options that allow tactical
aircraft to improve responsivenes and increase sortie generation rates.
The value of STOVL has been demonstrated repeatedly, most recently in
combat operations ashore, through the use of forward operating bases
(FOBs) in Iraq and Afganistan, as well as during embarked operations
throughout Central Command's Area of Responsibility.
Based on the testing completed to date we are confident the Marine
Corps' requirement for one tactical aircraft type, capable of multiple
missions, providing the MAGTF with flexible expeditionary basing and
the superior technology needed to dominate the fight is the F-35B.
There are no alternatives to the F-35B that support the full range of
crisis response obligations of the United States Marine Corps.
Mr. Veasey. This question is for all of the flag officers. It is
clear that the world is getting more dangerous, not less. The situation
with North Korea makes that very clear. Iran is moving toward a
potential nuclear weapon. We know that Russia and China are developing
advanced stealth fighters and proliferating advanced surface to air
missile systems. Can you discuss the importance of the advanced stealth
capability that the F-35 will give us and our allies in the future to
meet the increasing threats around the world.
General Schmidle. The F-35's low observable survivability, powerful
integrated sensor suite, fused information displays, interoperable
joint connectivity, precision weapons suite, and self-protect anti-air
weapons, is a total package of capabilities that will revolutionize our
Naval Air combat power in all threat and operational environments. The
advanced fifth-generation stealth capability allows our aviation
elements to operate in threat environments not compatible with fourth-
generation aircraft without extensive and intensive electronic warfare
augmentation. By using the F-35 in these high threat environments we
reduce exposure, increase survivability, and improve overall mission
effectiveness with tailored and precision application.
Mr. Veasey. Rear Admiral Moran, can you speak to the additional
capability the F-35 will bring to the fleet and to the program's
importance to the Navy's Tactical Aviation recapitalization efforts?
Admiral Moran. The F-35C provides a 5th generation fighter aircraft
to the Navy carrier air wing and brings with it the ability to
effectively engage and survive a wide range of threats, both air and
surface, in contested airspace. It provides a ``day-one'' strike
capability enabling tactical agility and strategic flexibility required
to counter a broad spectrum of threats and win in operational scenarios
that cannot be addressed by current legacy aircraft, including
operations in an anti-access/area denied environment.
F-35C's 5th generation survivability and lethality is enhanced by
very low observable stealth characteristics, fusion of onboard and off-
board passive and active sensors, and real-time integration with other
F-35Cs and Navy assets, which provide a ``first detect/first shot''
capability throughout the battlespace. The F-35C will provide a
significant additive value when brought to bear with the networked
fighting concepts of the U.S. Navy Carrier Strike Group and in a joint/
combined warfighting arena.
Mr. Veasey. Lieutenant General Davis, affordable F-35
recapitalization is dependent on capturing economies scale as quickly
as possible by increasing production as quickly as possible. It finally
appears that the Department has stabilized the production rate for the
F-35 program and is committed to increasing the ramp rate beginning in
Fiscal Year 2015. Contrary to the public perception, I understand that
unit costs have been coming down year-over-year. In fact, unit costs
have come down more than 50% from LRIP 1 through LRIP 5. Furthermore,
it has been brought to my attention that the projected unit cost per
aircraft for the F-35A CTOL variant in Fiscal Year 2018 is projected to
be approximately $75 million in Fiscal Year 2012 dollars ($85 million
in then-year dollars) if the current production profile is maintained.
Can you confirm this for the Subcommittee?
General Davis. Based on the current production profile, the
estimated unit recurring flyaway cost (URF) for the F-35A will be
approximately $87 million (TY$) in FY18. The URF cost includes the
airframe, electronics, engine and engineering change orders. The
estimated flyaway cost is approximately $96 million (TY$) in FY18. The
flyaway cost adds in non-recurring and ancillary equipment costs. The
F-35A unit cost is subject to change if the U.S. Services or partner
nations adjust their procurement profiles.
Mr. Veasey. This question is for all of the flag officers. It is
clear that the world is getting more dangerous, not less. The situation
with North Korea makes that very clear. Iran is moving toward a
potential nuclear weapon. We know that Russia and China are developing
advanced stealth fighters and proliferating advanced surface to air
missile systems. Can you discuss the importance of the advanced stealth
capability that the F-35 will give us and our allies in the future to
meet the increasing threats around the world.
General Davis and General Field. Since World War II, the U.S. has
relied on its ability to control the skies over the battlefield,
protecting our forces and holding any adversary's targets at risk. Our
potential adversaries are keenly aware of the importance of air
superiority to our nation's way of war. This is why the development and
proliferation of weapon systems that contest our asymmetric advantage
in the air are increasingly prevalent. For the past 30 years, our
fighter fleet remained ahead of this evolving threat, superbly
performing all its missions and supporting the joint warfighter in
operations such as EL DORADO CANYON, DESERT STORM, ALLIED FORCE,
ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM. However, even during these
conflicts we sometimes faced threat systems that posed a significant
threat to our legacy fighter fleet. For example, during the first days
of DESERT STORM only our fleet of F-117 stealth fighters was able to
safely operate and survive in the highly contested skies over Baghdad.
We believe that air superiority remains an imperative when fighting
any adversary and maintaining the ability of our aircraft to penetrate
and persist in contested environments is vital to the joint warfighter.
As you mention, the threats we may face continue to evolve in
technology and complexity. Potential adversaries are acquiring advanced
fighters on par with or better than our legacy fleet, developing
sophisticated and networked early warning radar surveillance systems,
and fielding surface to air missile systems with increasing range and
lethality. These capabilities all work together to create advanced, and
extremely dangerous, integrated air defense systems (IADS). These anti-
access/area denial environments seriously challenge our ability to gain
air superiority and hold targets at risk. We already face this
challenge in some parts of the world and as you said, and these threat
environments will continue to expand as these systems proliferate.
Our legacy fleet is approaching the limits of capability
modernization that permits them to survive and operate in these
environments--they simply do not have the advanced stealth capability
required to defeat the emerging threats. Only our fifth generation
fighter fleet's combination of advanced stealth, precision weapons,
unmatched electronic warfare systems, fused multi-spectral battlespace
awareness, combat identification systems, maneuverability, and speed
has the ability to operate and survive in these advanced threat
environments. All these capabilities inherent in the F-35, particularly
its advanced stealth properties, ensure the U.S. and our allies have an
air superiority advantage, and will enable our combatant commanders to
bring the full spectrum of capabilities of the joint force to the
fight.