[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 113-29]
THE READINESS POSTURE
OF THE U.S. ARMY
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
APRIL 16, 2013
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_____
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia, Chairman
ROB BISHOP, Utah MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa
KRISTI L. NOEM, South Dakota COLLEEN W. HANABUSA, Hawaii
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia JACKIE SPEIER, California
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey RON BARBER, Arizona
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado WILLIAM L. ENYART, Illinois
E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia PETE P. GALLEGO, Texas
STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi
Ryan Crumpler, Professional Staff Member
Vickie Plunkett, Professional Staff Member
Nicholas Rodman, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2013
Page
Hearing:
Tuesday, April 16, 2013, The Readiness Posture of the U.S. Army.. 1
Appendix:
Tuesday, April 16, 2013.......................................... 33
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TUESDAY, APRIL 16, 2013
THE READINESS POSTURE OF THE U.S. ARMY
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Bordallo, Hon. Madeleine Z., a Delegate from Guam, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Readiness.............................. 2
Wittman, Hon. Robert J., a Representative from Virginia,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Readiness............................ 1
WITNESSES
Fountain, BG Walter E., USARNG, Acting Deputy Director, U.S. Army
National Guard................................................. 9
Huggins, LTG James L., Jr., USA, Deputy Chief of Staff for
Operations, U.S. Army.......................................... 4
Mason, LTG Raymond V., USA, Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics,
U.S. Army...................................................... 6
Visot, MG Luis R., USAR, Deputy Commanding General for
Operations, U.S. Army Reserve.................................. 8
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Fountain, BG Walter E........................................ 54
Huggins, LTG James L., Jr., joint with LTG Raymond V. Mason
and MG Luis R. Visot....................................... 39
Wittman, Hon. Robert J....................................... 37
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Enyart................................................... 77
Mr. Rogers................................................... 77
Mr. Scott.................................................... 77
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Barber................................................... 84
Mr. LoBiondo................................................. 84
Mr. Wittman.................................................. 81
THE READINESS POSTURE OF THE U.S. ARMY
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House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Readiness,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, April 16, 2013.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:26 p.m., in
room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Robert J.
Wittman (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT J. WITTMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
Mr. Wittman. I call to order the Subcommittee on Readiness
of the House Armed Services Committee.
I want to welcome this afternoon this panel to our hearing
and I would like to thank all of you for taking the time to
address us today concerning the readiness posture for the
United States Army.
And as you know over the past 12 years, the Army--Active,
the Guard, and Reserve--has deployed more than 1.1 million
soldiers to combat with more than 4,500 giving the last full
measure of devotion to this country.
More than 32,000 soldiers have been wounded, 9,000
requiring long-term care. In that time, soldiers have earned
more than 14,000 awards for valor to include 7 Medals of Honor
and 22 Distinguished Service Crosses.
The Army's contribution to our Nation's security have been
numerous and continue around the world today. This hearing
comes at a time of strategic inflection for the Army.
After more than a decade, the protracted counterinsurgency
operations and cyclic combat operations in the Middle East, the
Army must find a way to return to full spectrum operations,
reset and reconstitute the force, responsibly draw out an
operation in Afghanistan, and fully develop its role under the
new defense strategic guidance.
The Army must also find a way to do all of this under a
tightening budget and the compounding talent challenges of
sequestration, continuing fiscal challenges in Afghanistan, and
to do so with a smaller force.
To discuss how the Army plans to meet the challenges of
tomorrow in this austere budgetary environment, we have with us
this afternoon Lieutenant General James L. Huggins, Jr., the
Army's Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations; Lieutenant General
Raymond V. Mason, the Army's Deputy Chief of Staff for
Logistics; Major General Luis Visot, the Deputy Commanding
General for Operations of the U.S. Army Reserve; and Brigadier
General Walter E. Fountain, the Acting Deputy Director of the
U.S. Army National Guard.
Gentlemen, thank you all very much for being here with us
today and I appreciate your thoughtful statements as we head
forward in your insights on today's Army and the challenges
that we have ahead. So with that, I am going to go to my
Ranking Member, Ms. Bordallo, for her opening statement.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wittman can be found in the
Appendix on page 37.]
STATEMENT OF HON. MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, A DELEGATE FROM GUAM,
RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
Ms. Bordallo. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
General Huggins, Mason, Visot, and Fountain, I thank you
all for your testimony and your service to our Nation, and I
look forward to our dialogue this afternoon.
This is the first in the series of hearings that will dive
into some level of detail about the readiness issues for each
of the Services. Moreover, this is also our first hearing
subsequent to the President's budget release as well as passage
of the fiscal year 2013 Consolidated Appropriations Act, so we
can hopefully have a more thorough and data-driven discussion.
The 2011 strategic guidance, the effects of sequestration
and the planned withdrawal of the U.S. forces from Afghanistan
place a significant pressure on all our military components,
but particularly the Army.
The Army has planned on reducing its end strength to
490,000 soldiers over the next several years. Yet, still must
equip and train each soldier according to its force generation
model.
The Army has been at the forefront of the wars over the
last decade, but now has an opportunity to reset the force in a
time of great financial strain. It is under this context that
we must evaluate the readiness of our army for current missions
in Afghanistan and potential contingencies in the coming years.
So, I hope that our witnesses will be able to touch on the
strategic risk and the lack of strategic depth because of the
inability to train nondeploying forces as a result of
sequestration and general budget constraints.
I am particularly concerned about this risk and its impact
on the National Guard and their ability to meet Title 32 or
Homeland Defense requirements. We must all understand that all
deploying forces to Afghanistan or elsewhere will be fully
trained and equipped but subcommittee members have to
understand the level of risk that we are embarking on with
nondeployed forces.
So in this vein, I hope our witnesses can also comment on
the potential impact of shifting the current force generation
model for Active Duty soldiers from a 36-month cycle to a 24-
month cycle. What will be the impact on their quality of life
and ability to train soldiers?
And I am also curious to understand what further changes
there might be to the force generation model as a result of the
refocus on the Asia-Pacific region. The current force
generation model focuses primarily on meeting the requirements
of the COIN [Counterinsurgency] strategy.
So given the unique environments and wide-ranging
environments that exist in the Asia-Pacific region, what is the
Army doing to incorporate that into any force generation model
as well as their trading scenarios?
I am also concerned about the current budget situation's
potential impact on maintenance of Army equipment. As we
retrograde from Afghanistan, we will need significant funds to
get our equipment back to CONUS [Continental United States] and
then reset. Given the immediate nature of the cuts imposed by
sequestration, what is the short and medium term impact of
sequestration to maintaining our current equipment?
So I hope that our witnesses can touch on the cost growth
over the next several years to maintaining and resetting our
equipment as a result of this significant cut in the budget
caused by sequestration. What gaps in maintenance will we have
as a result of some of the immediate deferrals and does this
have an impact on the training of soldiers?
And finally, gentlemen, I hope our witnesses will comment
on the current BCT [Brigade Combat Team], restationing and
composition changes that are ongoing. I am particularly focused
on how this assessment may impact the missions and requirements
of the Army National Guard.
The Army National Guard has a mixture of infantry and
combat support elements. Do our witnesses see this changing
substantial as a result of this BCT composition review or as a
result of the 2011 strategic guidance?
So again, I look forward to the witnesses' testimony, and
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Ms. Bordallo. Thank you so much for
your opening comments and for your leadership as our Ranking
Member. I would like to--again gentlemen, thank you very much
for being here and I look forward to your thoughtful statements
and your insights into our Nation's army.
General Huggins, General Fountain, and General Visot, I
understand that for each of you, this is your first time
testifying before the subcommittee, and I want to welcome you,
and General Mason I understand that this is a time again, back
before us, so welcome back.
As you know, last year, this subcommittee spent a great
deal of time exploring our current state of readiness in
discussing how we remain prepared to meet the challenges we are
likely to face in the future.
Time and time again, we heard of a force being described as
being on the ragged edge. Today we again explore readiness,
this time in the context of how the Army is reshaping itself to
be ready for the future challenges and conflicts of the 21st
century.
The administration continues to argue that we can afford a
smaller force with a smaller army--an army with less capacity
so long as we have a more capable one. To enable a skilled
superior army, one that can meet the Nation's needs and respond
to a wide range of threats, will require timely, thoughtful and
targeted investments.
The Army must spend every dollar wisely as it seeks to
remain ready, anything less will result in a far-reaching and
long-lasting implication for the Army and for this Nation.
Congress has a responsibility and a constitutional duty to
train and equip our soldiers to ensure they are ready for the
job we have asked them to do.
I look forward to learning about what investments and
readiness you are making and how the Army plans to meet its
mission in these challenging times. And gentlemen, with that,
we will go to your opening testimony.
I want you to know that your full prepared remarks will be
entered in for the record, so I know we have those. I would
urge you to keep your opening comments to 3 minutes and that
gives us the advantage of time here for members to ask
questions.
So if you will do that, I will assure you that the full
text of your comments will be entered into the record and if
you can abide by that then that helps us get right to questions
which is where I think the members would like to focus their
time.
So, with that, General Huggins, we will begin with you.
STATEMENT OF LTG JAMES L. HUGGINS, JR., USA, DEPUTY CHIEF OF
STAFF FOR OPERATIONS, U.S. ARMY
General Huggins. Chairman Wittman, Ranking Member Bordallo
and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today along with my colleagues
to discuss the readiness of the United States Army and the way
ahead.
On behalf of Secretary of the Army, the Honorable John
McHugh, and Chief of Staff of the Army, General Odierno, thank
you for your service and your support and your commitment to
our soldiers, civilians and their families.
Today we are here and honored to represent the nearly 1.2
million talented, experienced, well-led, and professional
soldiers, and testify on the critical issues of readiness for
our total army force, Army Active, National Guard, and the
United States Army Reserve.
Upfront, the Army is facing severe fiscal challenges. It
has serious implications on our ability to provide trained and
ready forces for the Nation. Sequestration and shortfalls in
overseas contingency operating funds pose substantial impacts
to the readiness throughout the remainder of fiscal year 2014,
but also even more grave is the outlook for fiscal year 2014
readiness given the cost we have deferred and pushed into
fiscal year 2014 to make it through fiscal year 2013.
This in effect compounds the risk in 2014. And after more
than a decade of conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Nation
and our army are in a period of transition--a turning point
characterized by a fiscally constrained environment and a
global and security environment that is more complex and
uncertain than any time since the end of World War II, and as
the tragic events yesterday in Boston unfolded, it might also
indicate that the future is even more unstable.
And I would like to take just a moment and recognize the
great work of our Army National Guard brothers there in that
moment of great tragedy for our American brothers in Boston.
This discussion on readiness is perfectly timed and the
magnitude of the challenges ahead have serious implications on
our ability to provide trained and ready forces for the Nation.
If sequestration is implemented without significant changes
from fiscal year 2014 to fiscal year 2021, the readiness of our
total force will be gravely impacted.
The Army simply will not be able to meet--will not have the
resources to meet the defense strategic guidance and we risk
becoming a hollow force. Now, we have talked about ragged edge
before, but the hollow force really is indicative of three
critical areas there that must be balanced--end strength,
readiness, and modernization. By staying balanced in those
three areas is the only way we can make sure we have a force
capable of completing a wide array of missions.
As each of you know, the Army's primary purpose is to fight
and win our Nation's wars and we are fully committed to that
nonnegotiable obligation. As a total force, again Army Active,
National Guard, and Army Reserve, we have led this effort
performing missions again in Iraq and Afghanistan with great
proficiency and professionalism.
Our Army's readiness is also a key deterrent as well as a
hedge against strategic risk during unpredictable times. Your
support has been critical to the successes we have had in the
past but will be more so in the future.
Continued investment in our readiness is a strategic
necessity. However, to meet our sequestered targets, the Army
will curtail approximately 80 percent of our ground forces for
the rest--training for the rest of the fiscal year. This will
create secondary shortfalls in critical specialty areas such as
aviation, intelligence, and engineering. The latter will impact
approximately 2,300 soldiers in their initial entry training.
And then operating under numerous continuing resolutions
has only compounded the effects of sequestration and is
affecting the training for fiscal year 2014 as we look ahead
and beyond.
And finally, we will also be forced to look at cancelling
all but two of the remaining decisive action brigade level
training events at our combat maneuver centers unless
additional funds can be made available.
The Army understands the seriousness of our Nation's fiscal
situations, however we need legislative solution that averts
sequestration and gives our leaders the flexibility to work
with the resources you provide to shape the soldiers for the
future.
The magnitude of today's fiscal constraints and uncertainty
is not lost on the Army--senior military and civilian leaders
understand Army must be good stewards of our resources and tax
dollars that are provided to us.
However, sequestration, fiscal constraints, shortfalls and
overseas contingency operating funds have caused us to do what
matters with less as opposed to doing more with less. However,
doing what matters with less cannot come at the price of the
overall readiness of our total army.
Our current readiness, the Army is committed to balancing
the current global demands for security with a realistic
strategy that maintains American land power, America's
dominance in land power remains unchallenged, and it is
imperative that the Army's total force remain ready and
relevant in this persistent engagement era.
Our priorities as we work through the challenges today are
our Homeland Defense, Operation Enduring Freedom, and that is
to the approximately 60,000 soldiers that are there as well as
the next to deploy soldiers, and those others that are deployed
in other contingency response missions around the world.
We are also focusing on maintaining them in training as
well as properly equipping them and having them prepare to
execute other on-call missions. We must also provide for the
readiness--high levels of readiness for our forces that are in
Korea as well as our global response force which is our hedge
to respond to no notice contingencies or crises.
As the G-3/5/7 [Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations,
Plans, and Training], you have my commitment that I will ensure
the leaders and soldiers are properly trained and ready for a
full range of these missions. However, it will take a
reprioritization of resources.
At the end of the day, the Army must remain well-trained,
equipped and ready. The Nation's strategic land power maintains
its credible advantage over the adversaries because of our
capacity, our capabilities and modernization efforts, and our
readiness.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I want to conclude
my statement by telling you all that it is an honor to serve
this great Nation as I have for the past 32 years, and it is a
privilege to be here today with my colleagues, and thank you
again for the opportunity to appear before the committee, and I
look forward to your questions.
[The joint prepared statement of General Huggins, General
Mason, and General Visot can be found in the Appendix on page
39.]
Mr. Wittman. Very good. General Huggins, thank you.
General Mason.
STATEMENT OF LTG RAYMOND V. MASON, USA, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF
FOR LOGISTICS, U.S. ARMY
General Mason. Well, good afternoon, Chairman Wittman,
Ranking Member Bordello and distinguished members of the
subcommittee.
Thank you for holding this hearing. I want to just touch on
a few areas of readiness that are on the top of my list and I
imagine are on the top of your list as well and that would be
equipment retrograde from Afghanistan, reset of that equipment,
and the Army's organic industrial base.
Like my fellow witnesses, my top priority is to ensure our
soldiers in harm's way have what they need to succeed and those
next to deploy are trained, equipped, and ready because they
continue to have a challenging and dangerous mission ahead of
them.
In the next 20 months, our focus will be on closing bases
and bringing out $20 billion worth of army equipment from
Afghanistan. The logisticians did a terrific job in
retrograding the equipment from Iraq.
But bringing home the equipment from Afghanistan is orders
of magnitude harder. Moving equipment out through the northern
distribution network and the Pakistan ground lines of
communication, while improving, is still a slow and fragile
process. So our primary method continues to be the more costly,
multimodal air alternative.
After a dozen years of war, it is important that we
complete our mission right. Over the years, our citizens and
the Congress have entrusted us with billions of dollars worth
of modern equipment.
We need to ensure, especially during these times of fiscal
constraints, that the equipment we need for whatever the Nation
asks for us next is reset and ready and back in the hands of
our soldiers. To make sure that that equipment is ready, we
need a fully funded reset program that continues for 3 years
after the last piece of equipment comes back from Afghanistan.
The reset program you have funded to date has enabled this
army to maintain operational readiness rates in theater for our
ground fleet at 90 percent or better, and for our aviation
fleet at 75 percent or better. However, that equipment has
experienced significant wear and tear from operating from over
a decade in the extreme temperatures and rugged mountains of
Afghanistan.
In fiscal year 2013, we expect to reset approximately
100,000 items at our industrial facilities and 60,000 pieces of
equipment on site where our units are stationed or what we call
``field maintenance.'' That includes over 400 aircraft.
However, sequestration will cause us to defer some of these
requirements to future fiscal years which I call compounding
risk and it is going to have a negative impact on our combat
readiness both in the near-, mid-, and long term.
As I believe the members of the subcommittee are aware,
this year we published our Organic Industrial Base Strategic
Plan to help us transition our depots to rationalize those and
our arsenals from war to peace time operations.
This plan gives us a framework to make informed, optimized
decisions so that our army and the Nation will continue to have
a modern, reliable, cost-effective, and highly responsive
industrial base enterprise for years to come.
Sequestration cuts, and I would add annual continuing
resolutions, fall heavily on the Army's operations and
maintenance accounts. Deferring maintenance will cost
production gaps in the industrial base and create breaks in the
supply chain recovering--causing--requiring years to recover.
These gaps greatly impact equipment readiness, industrial
partnerships and sub-vendors supporting the supply chain, those
second-, third-, and fourth-tier suppliers, and many of those
are small businesses. It also takes a heavy toll on our highly
skilled civilian workforce.
So in closing, I very much appreciate working with you and
your staffs as we continue to sustain a high-quality, all-
volunteer army that remains the most decisive land force in the
world, and I am also very honored to be here after 34 years in
the service to be in front of this committee. So thank you very
much. I look forward to your questions.
Mr. Wittman. Very good.
Thank you, General Mason.
General Visot.
STATEMENT OF MG LUIS R. VISOT, USAR, DEPUTY COMMANDING GENERAL
FOR OPERATIONS, U.S. ARMY RESERVE
General Visot. Chairman Wittman, Ranking Member Bordallo,
distinguished members of the subcommittee, good afternoon and
thank you for the opportunity to testify today.
On behalf of the more than 200,000 Army Reserve soldiers
and 12,000 civilians and military technicians and their
families, I want to thank the subcommittee for its continued
outstanding support of the Army Reserve.
I am proud to report that America's Army Reserve is a
ready, trained, and accessible operational force. The days of
Strategic Army Reserve are simply gone.
We provide a great return on investment for the American
taxpayer as we comprise almost 20 percent of the total army for
just 6 percent of the budget. As part of that total army, we
provide lifesaving and life-sustaining capabilities to all
Services and all components for both combat and contingency
missions.
The Operational Army Reserve currently has more than 12,000
soldiers mobilized and deployed, serving in more than 28
countries with almost 5,000 soldiers today in Afghanistan, and
we are deeply committed to the health and welfare of our
dedicated men and women.
We continue to promote Army Reserve soldier and family
resiliency by ensuring all members of the Army Reserve family
have awareness of and access to the training and resources
available to support their personal and professional well-being
and wellness.
Never in our Nation's history has the Army Reserve been
more enduring and indispensible to America. The steady demand
for the Army Reserve capabilities has introduced a new paradigm
of reliance on the Army Reserve as a positive investment for
America and an essential part of our national security
architecture.
While we are poised to continue to provide soldiers for
planned and contingency missions, we are concerned with the
additive impact of sequestration this year and in the future on
training and readiness that may certainly have a negative
effect on our capacity and ability to support missions abroad
and respond to domestic disaster.
In closing, we have the best Army Reserve in the U.S.
history. Now is the time to build an investment that our Nation
and this country has made in our Army Reserve. We understand
the fiscal uncertainty we currently face as a nation, but that
is exactly why it is critical to continue--invest in our
Operational Reserve force. Keeping us ready, trained, and
accessible is more critical in light of the budget impacts that
will hit our army in the coming decades.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today and I look
forward to your questions. Twice the Citizen, Army Strong.
Thank you.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, General Visot. We appreciate that.
General Fountain.
STATEMENT OF BG WALTER E. FOUNTAIN, USARNG, ACTING DEPUTY
DIRECTOR, U.S. ARMY NATIONAL GUARD
General Fountain. Chairman Wittman, Ranking Member
Bordallo, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you
for this opportunity to speak with you today.
It is my honor to represent the more than 356,000 citizen
soldiers in the Army National Guard.
The Army National Guard is the best-manned, best-led, best-
trained, and best-equipped and most experienced in its 376-year
history. This is do in no small part to the support of this
committee, the daily support of our Guard families and
employers, and the magnificent performance of our soldiers.
This historic and essential level of readiness as an
operational force is at risk due to budgetary uncertainty. If
continued, it will erode current levels of readiness and
potentially return the Army Guard to the Strategic Reserve.
As we speak, there are more than 24,000 Guard soldiers
mobilized across the world. Since September 11th, 2001, there
have been more than 517,000 soldiers mobilized for Federal
missions. The past year alone, Guard soldiers have provided
over 447,000 duty days in service to State and Nation, saving
lives and property in the face of disasters and emergencies.
Over the last 12 years of conflict, the Army National Guard
has shown that it is accessible to the Nation and States,
capable of performing any mission assigned to it and ready for
service.
The Army Guard has answered the call time and again without
fail. As an operational force, continued employment in
contingencies, exercise and training opportunities at home and
aboard is vital to maintaining the Army Guard's hard-won
readiness and experience.
Additional mobilization authorities enacted in the 2012
NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] provides the
Department of Defense with an important option to employ
Reserve forces overseas outside of current contingencies.
Through preplanned and prebudgeted requirements, Reserve forces
can bring their expertise and experience to support the
combatant commander.
The Army Guard has demonstrated that its units are capable
of performing every mission they have been given.
Simultaneously, it responded with no notice to some of the
worst natural disasters in our Nation's history.
This readiness for missions both at home and abroad is a
function of resourcing. However, field and depot level
maintenance in equipment is now being deferred, rotations to
the Army's premiers Combat Training Centers have been
cancelled, and technicians who do most of the maintenance are
in danger of being furloughed.
All these measures began to undermine the Guard's ability
to respond rapidly to contingencies overseas and our no notice
emergencies here at home.
The Army Guard has recruited and retained a magnificent
core of veteran soldiers who have demonstrated their eagerness
to serve. All of them have either joined since September 2011
or have made a conscious decision to continue service since.
They expect to be employed in conducting the Army and
Nation's business. Reductions in OPTEMPO [Operational Tempo]
funding less money for military schools and fewer opportunities
to perform training overseas deployments have occurred.
If there is one mission I could--message I could leave you
with today, it is now is not a time to put the Army National
Guard back on the shelf and allow us to return to the Strategic
Reserve. The current budget situation, if continued over time,
presents challenges to the ability to maintain our operational
Army National Guard.
Today's Army National Guard is a low-cost, high-impact
option for our Nation's defense. With continued modest
investment, the Army Guard, as part of the total army solution,
the Nation can continue to benefit from a cost-effective force
of over 350,000 well-trained, ready soldiers who are eager to
take on any mission at home or abroad.
I appreciate the opportunity to speak today and look
forward to your questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Fountain can be found in
the Appendix on page 54.]
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, General Fountain.
We appreciate your opening comments and that gives us a
good baseline by which to go forward and I will begin the
questioning.
I want to start off with the issue of sequester and you all
had alluded to that as how it affects the different elements of
what is going on with the Army. It is a $5.3 billion reduction
in operation and maintenance funding through fiscal year 2013,
$1 billion of that is in the Reserve Component for both
operation maintenance accounts.
And to absorb this, the Army has had to do some things that
I think in the--both in the short term and long term prove to
be pretty challenging. With a reduction in training for over 78
percent of our nondeployed BCTs, deferment of post combat
maintenance on equipment, that is concerning, and also furlough
of 251,000 Army civilian personnel, all of those I think
collectively get us on the track that creates some problems.
But I want to--I want to look at the training component,
and General Huggins, I want to go to you and ask, to what level
of readiness are the units training right now, both the
deploying and non-deploying units? And are they able to
accomplish collective training? In other words, at what level
are they able to train--at the brigade level, at the battalion
level, at the company level? How are we trying to overcome as
best you can the training deficiencies, not just for the
deploying units?
I understand the deploying units are going to be kept up at
their readiness training levels, but the nondeploying units to
me, we will see quickly a decay of readiness as that training
component decays.
So if you could give me a little bit of overview about how
training is going forward there and then at what level, at what
magnitude, can training be pursued? And are there opportunities
to try to overcome that by strategically looking at the
training component?
General Huggins. Chairman Wittman, thank you very much.
First and foremost, as you stated, the forces that we have
deploying will maintain a high level of collective, and by that
I mean I--I mean brigade level since that is typically what we
deploy training. Likewise, if it is a smaller element, a
battalion or company or troop, we would work it at its highest
level.
That said, there is still a little bit of a difference than
we would have done perhaps in the past. What we have done is we
have tailored those units for their specific missions. As many
of you have visited Afghanistan and Iraq, you know the strategy
there has changed somewhat to security force assistance.
So, what we have done with those, let's say ``standard
brigade combat teams,'' is that they are deploying for their
security force assistance mission, we have tailored their
readiness standards to meet that. We have focused our
collective training to meet that.
But that is not the measure of readiness that we use in the
standards updates we provide quarterly to the members. I mean,
that is the--that readiness standard is as the unit was
designed.
So if it was a brigade combat team infantry, it is designed
to conduct basically decisive action, either combined arms
maneuver or wide area security now, and to the most lethal end
of the spectrum of combat.
So, even those units we are sending in harm's way but are
not trained to that full level but they are trained to meet all
of their combat requirements. I can absolutely guarantee you
that portion. That is the easy part of the answer and that is
our obligation as each of you has pointed out.
For our non-deploying forces, they are tiered in the
measure I spoke to. We are maintaining a high level of
readiness for those in Korea, but even that is still somewhat
less than our full measure of readiness. In our terms, C-1
[Readiness level] would be the highest; this one would drop
back down again to an assigned level.
But for the vast majority, almost 80 percent--78 percent,
as you stated, Mr. Chairman, is we have curtailed their
training. If you are not deploying or going to either Kuwait
for some of those stability operations we are conducting in
operation Spartan Shield there, you will train only at the
squad level.
What forces command has--our component has relayed is that
it is what we define as A-4. That is the bare minimum. But we
are struggling to reach anything above that and as I said, we
have cancelled Combat Training Center rotations and the real
impact on this is the ramp to regain readiness is long and not
very steep because it takes time.
And you can lose readiness very, very quickly.
It is--and what we are trying to do to mitigate that is
also focus on our professional and leader development portions.
But even that, that is just a mitigation measure. So, that is
why I said I believe that is the case for 2013 and our outlook
is it will extend into 2014.
The real risk comes into global environment and that is
those formations that could be allocated to respond to certain
contingency plans around the world for the combatant
commanders.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, General Huggins.
I will not go to our Ranking Member, Representative
Madeleine Bordallo.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I guess this question would be to any one of the
witnesses here and it is a takeoff, I guess, further on what
the Chairman has been discussing.
How will you know that your forces are not ready? And if
you could limit your answer since we are timed up here and I
would like to get in as many questions as I could. Whoever
would like to, the question is how will you know that your
forces are not ready? What will be the triggers that will tell
you your forces are not ready and how far away, in your
opinion, are we in terms of degraded readiness?
General Huggins. Madam Chair--Madam Congressperson, I will
tell you--I will go quickly because I think it is important to
each of us here on the panel to give you a quick answer on this
one.
We have established standards, obviously, for avoiding--I
can tell you that we are all committed to maintain our
readiness at those squad levels we talked about. Our brothers
in the Army Reserve and National Guard are funded to a little
bit more than that but I will let them explain that.
But the real measure is because we have given guidance to
limit that readiness because we can't afford to buy more
readiness other than at the squad level in about 80 percent of
our formation, and that is so we can ensure we send the other
forces in harm's way, fully trained and properly equipped,
ma'am.
Ms. Bordallo. Next.
General Mason. Madam Congresswoman, you know, I focus on my
job on equipment readiness, and so each month we do the unit
status reporting, the strategic readiness updates. So I am
watching those very carefully, and we are beginning to see a
downtick in the home station, nondeployed forces.
My concern is that we have got to watch that very closely
because it is one--readiness is one of those things that all of
a sudden drops off the--off the cliff. It happened to us in the
1990s, so we are watching that very closely. That is unit
readiness and that is happening down at our camps, posts and
stations.
And then there is a deeper strategic depot readiness that
we are also watching very closely. And you won't feel that
today or even next month or perhaps 6 months from now. You will
feel that in a year or 2 years.
And so there is this balance between looking at near-term
readiness of units through our USR [Unit Status Report]
reporting and we are watching that very closely. I look at it
almost every day and brief it to the Chief several times a
week. So we are focused on that and watching that.
But the deeper one is the one that concerns me perhaps a
little bit more because that is the one you can't get back. It
will take you a long time to do that. So it is this balance
between that. And so, that is where the sequestration, I think,
will have the deeper, longer effect.
Ms. Bordallo. Yes. Next.
General Visot. Ranking Member Bordallo, as far as the Army
Reserve, we are continuing to be a provider of sustainment and
support capabilities that we have within the Army Reserve. We
provide at a readiness level for training--at a training too,
and utilized the Army Force Generation model, and we don't
anticipate at this point, as we speak today a significant
reduction for us because we are in that 60-month period of time
for us to provide that readiness.
At the T-2 level, that is as we go into the available year,
our focus is primarily that we provide company level
proficiency, and at the same time, battalion level or staff,
you know, battle proficiency.
So we don't anticipate at this point in time any
significant impact upon our readiness in being able to provide
the forces that our army requires and our army nation requires.
Ms. Bordallo. Well, thank you, General.
General Fountain.
General Fountain. [Off mike.] --Ranking Member Bordallo,
from an Army National Guard--Army Force Generation model--
readiness model which has allowed us and at the individual
level and we continue to increase the level of readiness as we
progress to the 60-month model to a collective level or unit
level. For our combat formations, our objective is to reach
platoon level for our combat's support--support in combat
service, support company level as our brothers from the USAR
[U.S. Army Reserve] do.
To answer your question on how will we know when we reach
degraded readiness levels, as I stated in my opening comments,
we have already reached that point in the collective level with
the cancellation of brigade combat team, CT--Combat Training
Center rotations.
The equipment levels will impact our readiness as well in
regard to the availability of that equipment that is moving
through depot and reset level maintenance.
Finally, it should be known that for us to execute our
domestic or home mission, that is based on our level of
readiness to conduct our wartime mission as well so that we
will have--be impacted--we will always respond domestically,
the response could be slowed.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you. Thank you very much.
Mr. Chairman, I know there are other members and I hope
they have an opportunity to ask some questions, but I think I
would like to come back for----
Mr. Wittman. We will.
Ms. Bordallo [continuing]. More.
Mr. Wittman. We will----
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you.
Mr. Wittman [continuing]. Have a second round of questions.
Ms. Bordallo. And I yield back.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Ms. Bordallo.
We will go now to Mr. Rogers.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I thank all of you for being here and your service to our
country.
General Mason, I want to direct my question to you. As you
may or may not know, I have the Anniston Army Depot in my
congressional district and they have been a great asset as we
prosecuted these two wars and many of them have gone over in
the theater and just done everything that has been asked of
them and more.
But I have been bothered lately by the fact that this
furlough talk has many of them concerned that they may be hit
with furloughs and my understanding is that the defense working
capital fund is fully funded that pays for the projects that
are at the depot through this fiscal year and well into next
year--toward the end of next year.
Do you believe that the depot workers at Anniston would be
subject to a furlough if in fact it were issued by the DOD
[Department of Defense] given that working capital fund is
fully funded?
General Mason. Yes, Mr. Congressman. I agree with you 100
percent. What our organic industrial base has done in Anniston,
specifically with combat vehicles, has been amazing.
The investment in that has taken the health of our combat
fleet and our wheel fleet significant high and we have reduced
the age of our fleet. So our fleets are in really pretty good
shape right now thanks to the great workers in Anniston and the
other Red River and the other depots that are there.
The answer to your question is, right now, a furlough
decision has not been made. It is still being worked through
with the leadership of the Department of Defense and--but if it
does, if we do have a furlough right now, the workers at
Anniston would be part of that furlough. And we will have to
work our way through, what the numbers will be there. But yes,
sir, that is the plan right--even though it is an army working
capital fund----
Mr. Rogers. And why is that since it is already fully
funded?
General Mason. It--the structure for the furloughs and
working capital fund are a separate piece and while the working
capital fund, as you know, is that revolving fund in there, the
workers still fall in like all the other workers do and it is
not separated by either structure or by policy or law.
So, it is something to look at in the future discussions
and I personally would like to have some discussions with--
inside the Army and then with OSD [Office of the Secretary of
Defense] as to whether there is a possibility in the future,
could we separate the working capital fund or reimbursable type
work from the other type of work that is there. That would be a
policy issue that we would have to go back to OSD on but I
think it is something worth looking at.
Mr. Rogers. At present, it is not separated.
So the working capital--you are saying at present it is not
separated----
General Mason. The dollars are but not the workers.
Mr. Rogers. Right. And the dollars are subject to the cash
flow problems that they are having?
General Mason. They are. That is correct.
And as workload comes down, you order less parts, the
working capital fund then becomes at risk but there is cash in
the working capital fund right now, that is correct.
Mr. Rogers. I have heard in recent press reports over the
last few days that there is a discussion within your Department
about the furlough potential exposure being closer to 7 days
than 14 days. I know it came down from 21 to 14. Is--are those
press reports accurate?
General Mason. I think all of those options are being
looked at. You know, it was 21 days, potentially 14 and 7 is--
what I understand in the meetings I am in is that that is an
option. Seven days is a potential option. I don't know where it
will end up at.
Mr. Rogers. Okay. Let me ask you, ultimately, how you feel
this--if there are furloughs, would affect the readiness
equipment that is already scheduled for maintenance.
General Mason. It will end up pushing those works into
2014, and so we will compound the risk that we have got in 2013
and we will go into 2014 because we won't have the work there--
the workers to do all the work we need to do, and sequestration
compounds that with the dollars that are going to be available
to execute the work in the depots.
So, as you know, we looked at cancelling. We have already
began to cancel some third- and fourth-quarter work.
Mr. Rogers. You know, my understanding is those
cancelations are not applicable to Anniston as an Army depot,
is that accurate?
General Mason. Sir, I will take that for record.
Mr. Rogers. Fine.
General Mason. I think that there are--is work that will be
cancelled, but I will take that for the record and come back to
you.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 77.]
Mr. Rogers. I would appreciate that.
And I would just say as a side note, burdening the
structure even more, I just came back from Afghanistan a week
before last, and as they are positioning that equipment to come
back, that is also going to be piling up at these depots
whether it is small arms, wheeled track vehicles, whatever.
We got a very important industrial base that we got to
maintain and I appreciate the work that you do in that effort
and we need to be doing a better job on our side of the table
to make sure you have what you need. So, thank you for your
service. And I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
General Mason. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Rogers.
Ms. Hanabusa.
Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think my question
is either going to be answered by General Huggins or General
Mason.
One of the things that we know from sequestration is its
impact on the civilian workforce, and civilian workforce, just
so we are not confused, we have of course those that--what I
would call the ``outsourced workforce.'' And in--for example, I
am from Hawaii, so Schofield Barracks depot is actually BAE so
it is more of an outsourced kind of situation than people who
are civilian--military civilian employees.
Now having said that, it is also my understanding that the
civilian, the military workforce, is under the operations and
maintenance budget and that is why we are hearing all of these
issues regarding furloughs.
I also understand that all the Services are not ``created
equal'' in terms of how those funds work. So, it is said that,
for example, Navy and Marine Corps, probably have enough in
their operations and maintenance budget or the amounts that
they have to have zero furloughs.
And I am wondering where you are because it is also said
that you are not in the same position as Navy and there is a
movement to treat everyone equally which then may result with
the 7 days or the 14 days from the 22 days, whichever it is. So
would one of you like to take a stab at that first?
General Huggins. We tag team pretty well, ma'am. So, we
will----
Ms. Hanabusa. It is okay.
General Huggins [continuing]. We will probably go back at
it. I will try and frame the higher problem first. I understand
the comments in terms of our Navy and our Marine brothers. Our
challenge, it is an OMA [Operations and Maintenance, Army],
operations maintenance fund issue, but it really stems for us
from an overseas contingency operating fund shortfall to which
we started out the year in and to which we continue to see
increasing demands for everyday.
So then that now has bled into out OMA account which then
creates the shortfall in terms of our civilian pay. And
obviously, that is a large percentage of it. So, that is the
higher portion of the impact.
Ms. Hanabusa. Before you tag off, let me ask you this, when
we looked at the impacts of sequestration, and when the
continued resolution and everything was identified, the
sequestration component for OCO [Overseas Contingency
Operations] was I believe about 6 billion. But what you are--
are you speaking to something other than that immediate
sequestration impact that was assessed to the OCO budget?
General Huggins. No, what I am saying is that initially we
had a $10 billion shortfall in what we had requested in
overseas----
Ms. Hanabusa. I see.
General Huggins [continuing]. Contingency funding.
Ms. Hanabusa. Okay. I understand.
General Huggins. That is right.
Ms. Hanabusa. Okay.
General Mason. Yes. Yes, ma'am. I think to add to that, we
have got those--as I have mentioned earlier, we have got the
near-term readiness of OPTEMPO which deals with repair parts
and also fuel. And it deals also with the contractors who are
supporting that equipment, and you don't want to take a lot of
risk there right now because we are focused on deployers and
next deployers. Where we are taking some risk frankly in the
deeper readiness which is in the depot maintenance, both in the
base account, which we are taking ready--we are taking risk in
there, and now some risk in the OCO reset account because we
want to make sure that the down--the soldiers and equipment
that is down range in Afghanistan is fully ready to conduct
combat operations.
So that is that balance we have got right now. And so that
is as--we don't then have the ability to move around that OMA
dollars back here in the base and so that is impacting the
furlough issue.
Ms. Hanabusa. I know that has always been an issue of the
flexibility that you may or may not need, but if you don't have
dollars in there, you can't really be flexible.
Now, one of the things that we will hear is that as we
anticipate the--call them the ``drawdown'' from Afghanistan and
everyone is sort of saying, ``Well, by then--by the year 2014
or 2015 fiscal year, we should be down to zero on OCO.''
But what I am hearing you are saying you really can't do
that unless an additional account is boosted up because you
can't do the retrograde and the reset at that time. Am I--am I
hearing you correctly?
General Mason. Yes, ma'am, you are correct. Just because
the last combat soldiers or that part of the mission might end
in 2014, of course we are looking at an enduring force and that
is----
Ms. Hanabusa. Right.
General Mason [continuing]. Going to be determined what
that number will be and of course that is going to require
reset. But even as that equipment comes out in 2014, you got to
transport it back, get it into the depot, a helicopter--a reset
of a helicopter takes over a year.
So even if that helicopter was to come back at the end of
2014, you at least need dollars to 2015 and you have got other
helicopters that are sitting there. So, this equipment takes
some time to get it back, get it through the depot, work the
repair parts against it.
So, we have said is we need to reset OCO funding for 3
years after the last equipment comes back that allows us to
work through all the depots, get it out the other end and then
impact the readiness.
And just to let you know what that will end up doing is,
that $20 billion worth of equipment that is sitting in
Afghanistan right now, we have estimated it will cost us about
$8 billion to reset it and that will improve our readiness
equipment on-hand and our units from about 88 percent up to
about 92 percent for all three composts. A significant,
positive impact to readiness.
Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Ms. Hanabusa.
Mr. Scott.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Mason, I appreciate you talking about the need in
future years and the impact on future budgets. I think one of
the things that we are struggling with right now is to meet the
12-month number with quite honestly a lifetime's worth of
responsibilities to form basic duty of protecting the United
States citizens and their property.
I have a 13-year-old son, so I want to talk with you
briefly as a father who thinks that our world is more dangerous
today than it was yesterday and thinks that it will probably be
more dangerous in the year 2020 than it is today. And that is
an important year to me because that will be my son's freshman
year of college. And I don't know if any of you have children
in that age range but certainly that is--if you do, I think you
will understand where I am coming from with this.
And I want to ask you, when you get a chance, to look at
page 189 of the President's budget. And I want to just give you
a couple of numbers from that and I am going to read directly
from them.
``With regard to total federal spending between this year
and 2020, we will increase total federal spending by $1.2
trillion,'' according to the President's budget in this
country. Non-defense discretionary spending will go up. Social
Security will go up. Medicaid will go up. Every other mandatory
program will go up. Net interest on the national debt--net
interest on the national debt, assuming that we are able to
manipulate interest rates the same way they are currently being
manipulated, will exceed, according to the President's budget,
what we spend on national security in 2020--the year that my
child is a freshman in college.
Total defense spending in that budget in 2020 is scheduled
for $601 billion--$601 billion, well below where it is today.
And so, when I hear the talk about the lack of training, well
when our men and women aren't training, then we are putting
them at risk, more so than they already are when we send them
into action.
When I hear that a minimum of the cuts that we are going to
have, it is a delayed response. We can't wait. The minute when
they put on the uniform, they go--when the bell sounds and we
are going to continue to do that as Americans, and I guess, you
know, when I look at all of this, and I look at the vision of
the President for the country and there are a lot of us up here
who really want to help you put some of these things right, and
get our military back to the place it needs to be, and I am
pretty frustrated with the DOD, and I feel like that some of
the leadership at the DOD comes over here and they say, you
know, ``Yes, sir. Thank you, sir. May we have another cut.''
And so the question I have or that my request from you
before I get into specific question is, when you are not on the
cameras, please, please, look at that sheet, because if we
can't help you, if the DOD is going to come over here and say,
``Yes, we are going to take these cuts,'' if the--if the
executives are there to--so, with that said, one of the
questions that is on everybody's mind is BRAC [Base Realignment
and Closure].
And General Mason, I will offer this to you because I am
down to a minute and a half and I know I don't have time for
everybody to speak to this. But it cost $2.4 billion, is the
request for the BRAC in this year's budget. Given the
uncertainty, given the lack of training, given the need to
reset, couldn't that money be used to offset some of the
reductions in those areas that we all agree are so necessary
for us to do our fundamental duty to protect the American
citizens?
General Mason. The--I know that the Secretary of Defense
talked about BRAC during his testimony and discussed whether
that would be something to put on the table or not. So, I will
obviously defer to the Secretary of Defense.
It is a base realignment and closure type environment. Do
we need to do some realignment potentially in the outyears? Is
there closure out there that may need to be done? I think it
is--I think as the military officer, we look at options, so I
think it is one thing that it needs to be discussed and let the
facts take us to where it make sense.
Do we have the dollars to spend on that or should we spend
those dollars somewhere else? I think the analysis needs to be
done and we need to let the facts drive us to what the right
decision is.
Mr. Scott. General, in their force reductions in Europe
that we have had, how much are the--we are reducing them by
about 45 percent. Are we see a corresponding amount of
infrastructure reduction and are these reductions in your--
likely to save that much money?
General Mason. I am not sure. I will take it for record on
how much money it is because I am not familiar with that
specific dollar figures.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 77.]
General Mason. I would say that, you know, I have served in
Europe, sir. We have come down significantly as you know and
there is a study ongoing right now for a European
restructuring. Do we have it right from an Army standpoint and
all the other Services so that I have members on that team that
are looking at right now, we have a responsibility to go back
to the Secretary.
Mr. Scott. General, my time for this round is expired.
Thank you very much and I--again, page 189----
General Mason. Yes, sir.
Mr. Scott [continuing]. I hope that you will take a serious
look at that and where this country is headed.
General Mason. Sir, I will.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Scott. Excuse me. Mr. Enyart.
Mr. Enyart. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Visot, congratulations on becoming the Deputy
Commanding General of Operations of USAR.
General Visot. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Enyart. You are welcome. Good to see you again, Luis.
General Mason, the fiscal year 2014 budget shows a request
for $2.4 billion for MILCON [Military Construction], and could
you estimate for me what percentage of that is going to go to
active installations and what percentage is going to go to Army
National Guard installations?
And what particularly concerns me is the fact that more
than 46 percent of Army Guard Readiness Centers are over 50
years old and at the current level of funding, it looks like it
will take 154 years. So let's see, that is roughly from the
Civil War to today to modernize those facilities. So, I
appreciate if you could tell me what that looks like.
General Mason. Yes, Mr. Congressman.
First off, military construction is not in my area of
responsibility or do I have a lot of depth in it. I mean,
obviously, as an Army officer of 34 years, I have touched
military construction. But currently, that is managed by our
Installation Management Command Commander Mike Ferriter and
also the Corps of Engineers. So I will certainly take part of
your question for the record.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 77.]
General Mason. I will tell you that my experience over the
last 10 years of what the Congress has given us to improve our
installations I think is pretty dramatic, and I think if you
travel--and I am sure you have--to our installations across the
compost, I think the investment that the Nation has put in our
facilities is really amazing and we appreciate it.
So, I can't speak to the specifics but I will take that for
the record and make sure that the appropriate folks answer that
and come back to you sir. I don't know if you have any
questions, comments about the Reserve Component infrastructure,
but I will have to take that for the record.
Mr. Enyart. Thank you, General, I was just picking on you
because you are four; four gets everything.
General Mason. [Off mike.]
Mr. Enyart. If it is log-related, I am going to pick on
you.
General Huggins, with the pivot to the Pacific, can you
tell me, without going into any kind of classified level, what
the Army's plans are to support AFRICOM [United States Africa
Command]?
General Huggins. The biggest concept is our regionally
aligned forces concept which will be supported by the Army
Force Generation model. Currently, we are working our first
proof of principle for AFRICOM with the designation of a
brigade combat team which will provide forces for the combatant
commander. Some of those will go into Djibouti, others will
become crisis reaction forces that we have been called to
establish since the Benghazi incident.
Mr. Enyart. So, you are talking about one BCT?
General Huggins. Sir, due theater security cooperation,
that is correct. We will also go further and regionally align
divisions and corps, but those forces will obviously not be
forward-positioned.
But we will work the home station training with--as the
term we used which even confuses us--some of us in uniform, is
now distributed, so we used to have allocated and apportioned
and our forces command has--whose proponent of running the
regionally aligned forces model that is talked about a
distribution of forces to where we assign corps and divisions
and then brigade combat teams to align for the combatant
commanders. Sir.
Mr. Enyart. Thank you, General.
General Huggins, I will pose this to you but if you want to
pass part of this off, I will certainly understand. You know,
the--of course, the Army War College teaches us its ends, ways,
and means.
And with what we see happening with sequestration, with the
budget problems that we have and with the cutbacks, and the
size of the military and proposed further cutbacks, do you
believe or do you foresee a mismatch--a significant mismatch
between the ends that we proposed to accomplish with our
military force and the means with which we will be attempted to
accomplish those ends?
General Huggins. Sir, I personally see the potential for a
mismatch. As Chairman Wittman stated at the beginning, I mean,
the strategy must drive where we need to go, what the Army must
accomplish and then the force structure designed to accomplish
that task.
And we are in significant discussions with the Office of
the Secretary of Defense through our strategic choices
management review process which has all the Services a part of
that to look at the defense strategic guidance and other
governing documents to determine the way ahead.
But we also know that it is an exceptionally, fiscally
constrained environment, and what we hope not to go to is an
environment that tells us what to build in force structure
based upon resources as opposed to strategy.
Mr. Enyart. Thank you, General.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Enyart.
Mr. Palazzo.
Mr. Palazzo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I would like to thank our witnesses for their service
to our country and also for being here today for your
testimony. There is absolutely no secret that our Nation faces
some very serious financial challenges.
You know, I think many of us in Congress, we advocate for
cutting spending but there is a responsible way of cutting
spending and there is a--I guess a dumb way of cutting
spending, and sequestration I think falls on--in the latter,
mindless cuts to defense. Yes, I think 50 percent of all the
cuts to date are coming from defense when we only make that
almost less than 20 percent of the budget.
So having said that, my kind of--my heart lies with the
Reserve and the Guard. I love our Active Duty men and women in
uniform, but being a reservist and a guardsman--my citizen
soldier life.
I want to--real quick--because I do have three questions. I
want to ask you, do you foresee us going from an operational--
the Guard and Reserve--going from an operational force back to
a Strategic Reserve because--and there are other discussions
going on of that nature, Major General, then we could go to
Brigadier General Fountain, so?
General Visot. Congressman Palazzo, first, thank you very
much for your service to our Nation as a guardsman in the State
of Mississippi. I appreciate that very much.
Mr. Palazzo. Pales in comparison to you all's.
General Visot. No. So, from my perspective, you know, in
terms of--we cannot afford, you know, to lose what we have
gained as a result of 11 years of experience in the battlefield
with--you know, from an Army Reserve perspective, with the
National Guardsman an Active Component.
I don't think the Nation can afford, you know, to give away
on that investment because that is what it is. You know, the
Army Reserve is a positive investment for the United States and
for our Nation. And to give away what we have earned, we feel
very strongly, it is not a thing that we can afford to do in
our Nation. And we hope that, you know, throughout the years
with the support from the Congress that we will continue to do
that and not go back to a Strategic Reserve.
General Fountain. Congressman, the Army has no intent, in
my professional opinion is, in to returning us to a Strategic
Reserve.
The reality and what I hope to have captured during my
opening statement is that the readiness has already been
discussed that was developed over the last 12 years is
perishable, that it was a significant investment for us to make
the transition from a Strategic Reserve to a full partner in an
operational force that is a function of resourcing, and the
resourcing is where we will depend on your assistance to see
that we do not return to that point.
The--I think the three components together are stronger
together than we are at different levels of readiness. That is
what has brought us to this point. So, there is no intent for
us to return to that point. It is just a reality of resourcing.
If we cannot continue to do those things to train as we
have in the last 12 years, if we do not maintain our equipment,
all those second-, third-order effects to resourcing or a lack
thereof.
Mr. Palazzo. Well, General, I agree with you both. I have
served in both the Strategic Reserve Component and also the
operational force structure. And I would much rather--I don't--
I would hate to see us waste that investment and some hard-
earned lessons.
Real quick, I know last year, the 11th annual QRMC
[Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation] actually proposed
the possibility of cutting Guard and Reserve pay by 50 percent.
Now, personally, I think that would be devastating to readiness
recruitment and retention especially as the Active forces are
downsizing. We would like our Active Duty men and women to look
to the Guard and Reserves because we would like to see that
become a repository of their hard-earned skill and knowledge
and training.
Real quick and I know I am kind of running short, are you
all hearing this and are you all squashing it as that
possibility may come up and in you all's conversations?
General Visot. Congressman, we have heard about that. As
you all know, the critical part of this is not just the pay,
you know, to attend a battle assembly. It is all the cost that
is also associated with that, so just travel cost, hotel cost,
you know, lodging cost, that are just not, you know, within
that enough, especially when you look at a, you know, a
sergeant, you know, in an Army that has to travel distances.
So all those things come into play, so I think the way that
we currently are, you know, paid for our service to our Nation
is a very small investment for the return that we get.
Mr. Palazzo. Okay. General Fountain.
General Fountain. Yes, Congressman, the Army National
Guard's position is very similar in that we feel the current
compensation system meets the requirement, is fair, and clearly
added value to the resource you get from the Army National
Guard.
While there could be merits in reviewing any compensation
plan, we think that a full review would have to be done as to
whether or not you actually get cost savings if you start
considering different benefits that would come with a day's
order or something of that scenario.
So, a full review and all potential second-, third-order
effects for readiness I think would be due before you can make
a decision such as that.
Mr. Palazzo. All right. Thank you, gentlemen.
General Fountain. Sir.
Mr. Palazzo. I yield back.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Palazzo.
Mrs. Hartzler.
Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your
service and I am going to echo some of my colleagues' comments
but I certainly did not support these cuts to our national
defense and I was glad to be part of the Budget Committee to
help restore the defense spending in the 2014 budget that was
passed out of the House. We are going to continue to try to do
that.
But in the meanwhile, I want to follow up on some of the
President's proposal regarding the BRAC. I know my colleague
asked some questions here earlier. But has there been an
assessment done within the Department of Army on excess
infrastructure on army installations?
General Huggins. Ma'am, one was done for the last BRAC. We
are currently not doing a continuing assessment other than what
General Mason mentioned for Europe which is a specific look for
those forward-deployed.
But to the--really the--to set the context, I mean, we
currently--we are looking at--as the Active force goes to
490,000, we are looking in going through our programmatic
environmental assessment process.
And we are currently in our listening, we have gone out to
communities and are conducting our listening sessions to hear
firsthand what the impacts are from them.
And then we will make a decision after that is done in
terms of what kind of a recommendation as to where we think
future stationing will be. And then, that may potentially drive
us to look at places for--where excess capacity or excess
equipment exists. But, we are a little bit away from that at
this point in time.
Mrs. Hartzler. I just don't quite understand the move to
try to push a BRAC when--it is my understanding you had 490,000
before 9/11, isn't that correct? It is about the same force
structure we had pre-9/11. And we had a BRAC in 2005 which took
some excess infrastructure out.
So basically, you are having the same number of soldiers on
our bases with less infrastructure right now. So, why is there
a move to push for more infrastructure to be taken out?
General Huggins. Well, we are at a high of 569,000----
Mrs. Hartzler. Yes.
General Huggins [continuing]. Now from--so we have grown
and we have put structure in places as we look for the best
places to build divisions, build enablers that would support
those divisions on installations. Going down to 490,000, we
have got to take a holistic review of everything to make sure
we have it. And efficiencies will play in that obviously, but--
--
Mrs. Hartzler. Yes.
General Huggins [continuing]. I think it is prudent that we
do that. But right now, we are--again, as we are still trying
to gain the rest of the information from the community.
Mrs. Hartzler. Okay. And I understand that you are moving
to move down to force structure but I still think with the
excess cost that we see haven't even broke even yet from the
2005 BRAC. It cost $37 billion, now you are supposed to break
even to 2018 and then we have all these other cuts and less
resources and then $2.4 billion cost to do any more. I am
reticent to support that.
But I wanted to shift and follow up on my friend from
Mississippi's comments to the Guard and Reserve. I certainly
appreciate the role that you play. My dad was in the U.S. Army
Reserves, and so I grew up appreciating that very, very, much.
And I know in the defense strategy that came out last
October, there was a move and a shift to continue to place more
and more of the responsibilities of our National Defense on an
Active operational force of the Guard and Reserve.
And I guess my question is, with sequestration and the
current budgetary environment, do you feel like, that you are
going to have what you need to be able to continue at that
level of proficiency?
General Visot. Congresswoman, thank you very much for the
question. As far as the Army Reserve, as I stated earlier, we
just cannot afford, you know, to lose that tremendous
investment on our capability to remain an Operational Army
Reserve.
The impact of sequestration we will have is one for
example, of civilian pay and furlough. It will have an impact
upon depot maintenance, you know, as my--as General Mason
mentioned specifically in reset. It will have also an impact
upon OPTEMPO in terms of the training, you know, that we have
going on. The, and lastly, the impact will be in sustainment
restoration and modernization.
All those four items combined, you know, will have a
significant impact in us in order for us to be able to sustain
our ability to remain an Operational Army Reserve which I don't
think at this point in time in our history we can afford to do
that as a nation.
Mrs. Hartzler. Exactly. General Fountain.
General Fountain. Yes, Congresswoman. The same impacts of
sequestration that the Army suffers and the USAR suffers, so
will the Army National Guard. The sequestration from strictly
Army National Guard perspective impacts that investment of
time, just as my colleague mentioned from the USAR.
It simply is a situation where--and I believe the Chairman
of Joint Chiefs General Dempsey made a statement during his
discussion in reference the fiscal year 2014 budget when he
stated that, ``It is less expensive to stay ready than to get
ready,'' and that I am probably messing that quote up but that
is the bottom line.
From our perspective, we have through investment from what
this great country have transitioned from an Operational
Reserve--Strategic Reserve to an operational force at a great
cost, and to lose that investment to us would be buying high
and selling low.
Mrs. Hartzler. There we go. Thank you very much.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mrs. Hartzler. We are going to
begin a second round of questions and I want to focus on the
DOD's new strategic guidance that was released in January of
2012 and then the accompanying document from the Secretary on
Defense budget priorities and choices.
And as you know, there is a significant element in there
that relates to readiness in the U.S. Pacific Command and I
wanted to get each of your perspective on how does that affect
Army readiness?
What are the challenges that that new strategic directive
provides to the Army to get your perspective on where things
are going?
And again, it goes back to the earlier comments about
strategy and making sure that strategy is driving how we
determine how resources are allocated, not the other way around
looking at resources and then say that that drives a strategy
and we have some clear strategy directives now.
So I wanted to get each of your individual perspectives on
this new strategy initiative and then the Secretary of
Defense's comments and directives on our defense budget
priorities and choices. And we begin with you General Huggins.
General Huggins. Chairman, thank you. Obviously, the
strategy drove us to the Pacific in terms of--as we looked at
our national vital interest. The Army has taken in and now is
upgunning the three-star headquarters we have in U.S. Army
Pacific at Fort Shafter to four-stars, so that is measure one.
And we don't do that to create another four-star position
but because the oversight on the responsibility for increased
capability there requires such. And that increased capability
is, first and foremost, in the form of the 25th Infantry
Division which is now forced into the PACOM [United States
Pacific Command] area. We have also gone to Fort Lewis--or
Joint Base Lewis-McChord and allocated it also.
So, the first corps as the JTF [Joint Task Force] and we
are working training exercises with PACOM and USARPAC [U.S.
Army Pacific] to certify those headquarters as a combined joint
task force level--take resources, but once there are probably
good investments for a strategic hedge given especially our
current world situation in that area.
There are--the brigades have also been taken off of our--
what we have notionally called the ``patch chart'' that shows
the deploying units for our combat operations. So, we have
taken the 25th Infantry Division brigades--the brigades in
Alaska and two of the Stryker Brigades at Joint Base Lewis-
McChord, and basically protected them to work their readiness
for response to the Pacific area and those threats.
That said, Sir, we are only training those forces to the
squad level.
Now, the exception to that are the forces that are
committed to--on the peninsula of Korea already, which again we
will maintain a higher level of readiness for. It is an impact,
but we have--in this case, we have clear priority so we move
to--to those priorities. We just wish we could gain higher
level of readiness for each of those divisions, the corps and
the BCTs and our soldiers within them.
Mr. Wittman. Very good.
General Mason.
Thank you, General.
General Mason. Mr. Chairman, I have got four tours in the
Pacific, a little over 10 years. Most recently, 3 years ago, I
commanded the two-star headquarters there, so I spent a fair
amount of time.
To me, it is a region of opportunities and challenges.
There are great opportunities there, well, for our Nation
economically. And there are opportunities there for us as a
military to train with other forces to become interoperable
to--and most of those militaries in that part of the world are
actually predominantly Army, and so there is--although it is a
big ocean out there, there is a land force out there, and so
connecting with that land force and staying with them.
And there is great exercise programs both at the joint and
the Army level, so it can improve our readiness.
And as General Huggins mentioned, rotating forces in and
out of there and getting them used to that part of the world,
we can leverage capabilities of these other nations. They bring
incredible capabilities--our particular allies, the
Australians, others that are there.
We also preposition stocks out in the Pacific. APS [Army
Prepositioned Stocks] sets, both brigade sets, that is--as well
as what we call operational project stocks. They--so we have
got land out there, we can put on the ground, so our allies in
Japan, in Korea and other places. You know, we are discussing
it with the Australians potentially. But it has challenges.
Probably the primary challenge is the tyranny of distance.
Traveling in the Pacific is expensive. You got to have ships,
then you get to a location. You got to have planes to get
deeper in locations, and it is very helicopter-intensive, so it
has got some challenges for training that does increase your
cost. But I think the opportunities in the Pacific both at the
strategic operational tactical level are worth those kinds of
costs. And I think we are going to be a better Army by staying
engaged in the Pacific. I think we are going to be a better
nation by staying engaged in that part of the world.
And there is cost-sharing that occurs. We have cost-sharing
with the Koreans. They bear some of the cost of our
capabilities there. And potentially, there is other cost-
sharing relationships.
Some of our strongest alliances and treaties are in the
Pacific. So it is a dichotomy of challenges and opportunities,
Sir.
Mr. Wittman. Very good.
General Visot, if you could do that quickly and General
Fountain, then in the interest of time for--so I get to Ms.
Bordallo.
General Visot. Mr. Chairman, we are definitely committed to
continuing to support because we presently have about 4,000
soldiers that are located in the Pacific Command area of
support, and we continue to provide the sustainment and
support, you know, capabilities within that area and align
ourselves with the strategy of aligning regional alignment
forces through our Army Reserve engagements cells and Army
Reserve engagement teams, we will be able to fulfill the
Nation's requests.
Mr. Wittman. Okay. General Fountain.
General Fountain. Yes, Mr. Chairman. The Army National
Guard also feels that we can make the transition and support
the chief staff of the Army's regional alignment forces
strategy as well.
Whether it would be security cooperation or building
partnership capacity, we feel that that would be a natural
evolution of our 65 partnerships across the globe today. And
the Army Force Generation Model is adaptable enough to focus
mission training and deployment and keep us engaged as an
operational force to the strategy.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you. And that is a great lead-in to
Ranking Member Bordallo, who has a great National Guard
component there in Guam.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you. Thank you very much. I was going
to mention that, Mr. Chairman.
I wanted--just whoever you think, if the answer is the same
between the two Services, then I guess, we will just go to
those that may have a different idea on this. What
flexibilities or exceptions did you request in terms of
furloughing civilian personnel? And also, what is the impact of
using borrowed military manpower to backfill the civilian
positions?
General Huggins. Ranking Member Bordallo, we ask for no
exceptions based on the guidance that were given to us. We have
looked at the impact in terms of the furlough. And as was
stated before, we are, even today, working drilldowns as we go
from 14 to 7 and possibly to zero on furloughs because we do
think that is going to impact on the way ahead.
I would tell you it will impact, you know, our readiness in
the long-term because of exactly what has been stated in terms
of what we are going to have to defer.
The minimum amount that--and General Mason can speak more
of this--that we are trying to do to keep our depots operating
so we don't have to go into a cold status and then have to
start them up over again. But I will see if General Mason has
anything else to add.
Ms. Bordallo. General.
General Mason. To the second part of the question about our
military manpower, we have taken very--very seriously, Ma'am,
and we are looking at them. The G3 holds weekly meetings and we
are looking at where can we use soldiers appropriately that
aren't too far outside of their military occupational
specialty. But based on the constraints we have got now with
dollars, we likely are going to have to have some borrowed
military manpower.
Now we have done it in the past and it is one of those
things that commanders take a hard look at because you want to
balance training with all the other requirements on there, and
we are working our way through that.
As far as the furlough impact on the depots, it will be
significant. And, you know, as a depot operates, you don't want
to shut a depot down, you want to keep it on, yes, while you
are on two or three shifts as you well know. So our concern is
this herky-jerky kind of situation with a furlough. And that
will be challenging, and we will see where the numbers come
out, but obviously the less furlough the better for us in the
depots.
Ms. Bordallo. Would the others like to comment, General?
General Visot. Yes, ma'am. From the Army Reserve, our
position is we would like not to have to furlough, you know,
our civilian military technicians because of the fact those are
GS-5s and GS-7 employees. As you know, when you cut 20 percent
of their salary for, you know, 14 days or so, that has
significant financial impact not only on the soldiers
themselves, but also on their families.
Ms. Bordallo. And General Fountain.
General Fountain. Ranking Member Bordallo, as the impact
goes with the Army National Guard is that our--we have very few
civilians. Our full-time manning provides a baseline of
readiness for support of the other 83 percent of our force
which is part-time or traditional guardsmen. Military dual-
status technicians are actually members of those Army National
Guard formations and deployable assets whether at home or
abroad.
The areas where we did request some exception was at the
area of physical security, emergency response services and
others. But the primary impact will be for us is readiness that
the administration, training, and maintenance that is done by
these individuals. And the part utilized and borrowed military
manpower really doesn't apply to Reserve Component in that we
are a part-time force.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you. Thank you, General.
How are any of you using sequestration as an opportunity to
do business differently at the headquarters or administrative
levels? Are any of you--if you could give me a quick answer
because my time is running out.
General Huggins. We all can refine and look for that
opportunity. Madam Chairperson, it is a matter of really
looking at our processes.
For instance, in our modernization processes, we are going
through with our acquisition community and finding
efficiencies. Some were forced that way because of just
absolute need where, in the past, perhaps it was easier to try
and do it another way. But there have been multiple
opportunities. And it is not a good thing, but we try to find
the best we can out of it.
Ms. Bordallo. So you are going to become businessmen?
General Huggins. I would scare most of you if we try that,
but I would sure take that for the record, Ma'am.
Ms. Bordallo. All right. Thank you.
Was there anything else you wanted to add just very
quickly?
General Mason. No, ma'am. I think we don't want to become
businessmen, but we will use business practices where they are
appropriate for sure just as you described.
Ms. Bordallo. Very good. All right.
In closing, Mr. Chairman, I wish to say that I am extremely
proud of the service that has been rendered by the Reserves,
the Air Guard, the National Guard.
And currently, as Mr. Chairman said, I just returned from
the State of Mississippi where I witnessed the briefing of 600
of the Guam National Guard. That is quite a number for a small
United States territory, and we are very proud of them.
And I also want to thank you for your leadership with all
the different organizations that you represent here. And I join
my colleagues, and I do not agree with the deep cuts to our
Armed Services.
And with that, I yield back.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Ms. Bordallo.
We will now go to Mr. Scott.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, I want to talk with you briefly about AFRICOM
and--and just about Africa, in general, and the challenges that
are there. As somebody who just looking at the raw numbers, you
are talking about approximately a billion people.
You are talking about 20 percent of the land mass of the
world. You are talking about 54 countries plus Somalia and--I
am sorry, Somaliland and Morocco, so we got 56 different
governments that you would potentially have to deal with. We
are talking about downsizing our military both in the terms of
manpower and in the terms of our weapon systems and
capabilities.
Why is the military convinced or the leadership of the
country convinced that we can engage in Africa with the type of
challenges that are there while, at the same time, engaging in
all of these massive cuts to our military and the equipment and
the training that they need would be my first question.
And the second question I have would be, is China
downsizing their military? Is Russia downsizing their military,
are any of those countries that could potentially be our foes
in the future downsizing their military?
General Huggins. Congressman Scott, thank you very much for
the question. First to set the stage for the AFRICOM piece, you
certainly bring up a great topic because there is an awful lot
of human suffering going on in that area.
I have great confidence in General Rodriguez who just took
the helm there in terms of defining the requirements to us as
the Army service to support his engagements. Currently that
demand signal does not exist that much, but I would have to be
honest and say that probably is more a function of everything
we have committed for years to Afghanistan and Iraq.
Hopefully as we see that situation begin to downsize even
further if the situation require. We can support it. We could
see a strategy that might allow other forces to go to other
places. But I believe first and foremost the Africa piece is
probably a whole-of-government approach to work engaging. And
then our piece is working with the various militaries to try
and build capacity at that level, which we are doing.
Our National Guard brothers engage right now in Partnership
for Peace activities, the State Partnership Exchanges. But what
we have found in our previous engagements there, our
capabilities so outmatch many of the Armies that are in that
country. And I am really talking more about Central Africa,
West Africa, and the south, not all the way to South Africa,
that they want basic levels of instructions. And we are able to
help them with that.
The real issue is, is how we are going to address the whole
continent writ large as in--and that becomes a multiple COCOM
[Combatant Command] requirement or challenge when we look at
the partnering space with Central Command, Sir.
General Mason. I would add, Sir, that we need to stay
engaged in that part of the world, but the engagement doesn't
necessarily to be in large formations, even brigades.
Many times just well drilling, building a bridge, and
engagement with USDA or Department of Agriculture, those kinds,
that whole-of-government piece, I think, many times pays back
greater dividends. You put a small footprint in there.
Now we have a command----
Mr. Scott. General, if I may----
General Mason. Yes.
Mr. Scott [continuing]. I certainly mean to be as
respectful as I can. I am down to about 1 minute. With all due
respect, Sir, you are talking about nation-building, and that
is not the reason we have the Armed Services of this country.
But that is nation-building when we are doing wells and other
things along those lines.
And again, I think that we want to do what we can to help
people. But my fear is that we are leaving our country
vulnerable.
And if you look at where we are today, we don't talk about
Iran that much because Syria heated up. We don't talk about
Syria that much because North Korea heated up. I mean, we are
still in Afghanistan. We spent a fortune in Iraq and
Afghanistan. We have been up against a capable enemy, but not
an enemy that is capable technologically of taking down
insignificant numbers.
Our aircraft, not that any loss is insignificant, but we
have not been up against China or Russia, or anybody who has
got the aircraft to take us one on one.
And I guess, my concern again is, you know, with due
respect, you are talking about nation-building. And as we take
these cuts, I really think we got to focus on making sure that
we protect America first because if we don't protect America
first, we can't do anything to help the men and women in the
other countries out there.
General Mason. Sir, I very much appreciate that. My point
would be is if you can build stability in a country, the
opportunities for terrorists to come in and for other agents to
create an environment such as in Afghanistan with the Taliban
may be less. So I think it is directly related to national
security, but I understand your point.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Scott.
Ms. Hanabusa.
Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Mason, you used the words ``organic industrial
base.'' Just so that we are on the same page, can you tell me
what you mean when you say ``organic industrial base''?
General Mason. Yes, Ma'am. When I talk about the organic
industrial base, I am talking about the industrial base that
United States Army and, of course, the other Services have
similar. But we have what we call hard-iron depots--Anniston,
Red River, depots of that nature.
We also include our arsenals, which have manufacturing
capabilities such as Rock Island Arsenal and Watervliet.
Watervliet does cannons. Rock Island does a real fine type of
metalwork. So those are our arsenals and our hard-iron depots
where we do rebuild and reset of trucks, tanks, helicopters.
Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you.
You also mentioned the fact that, you know, we are teaming
up with others. And this is because of your experience in the
Pacific. I don't think my colleagues are aware of the fact that
as far as the U.S. Army Pacific that you really have now an
Australian general in a dominant, quite obvious position for us
in Hawaii.
So can you explain to us what the position of the
Australian general is and what he is anticipated to do and
participate? Does he have full range of participation?
General Mason. And all of the three perhaps can answer
this, but he is the deputy commander there so he has all the
full responsibilities of a--just as a U.S. general was. And, in
fact, I did a 2-year exchange in the Australian Army, so I
understand it very well. In fact, I commanded Australian forces
during my tour, so I had full rights and responsibilities as
a--in that military. So that is his role, and I think it is a
great partnership.
As you know, we have Canadian down with Fort Hood, so this
relationship with some of our greatest allies is very powerful.
And I think it is a really good thing here in USARPAC.
Ms. Hanabusa. Do we have any concerns about any kind of
confidential information or anything like that, General
Huggins?
General Huggins. No, ma'am. There are certainly limits. And
we typically have an acronym we use for the five eyes for the
nations that we have the highest level of clearance rate. But
we still protect some information.
But the Australians are great partners. And more
importantly, it sends a message to all of our Pacific partners
the team that is trying to be built there because it will be,
you know, a multicultural, a multinational solution here.
Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you.
General Fountain, one of the things that I have always been
curious about is Title 32 and Title 10 interface. And I do
understand the amount of investment that we have made as a
country both in the Guard as well as in the Reserve, and it
would be a travesty to lose that.
Having said that, however, as far as the Guard is
concerned, you know, you are the State militia primarily, which
means to a certain extent, well, maybe not even to a certain
extent, technically the Governor of the State--of respective
States are really your co-commander.
So as you come before us and you say that we want to ensure
the continuation of the Guard, there still is this other player
out there called the Governor, Title 32.
So have you given any consideration or Generals, yourselves
as well as to how as you want to maintain, and there is nothing
that I am necessarily opposed to, but how are you going to do
that if a Governor, for example, does not cooperate and says,
``We don't want--whatever minimum amount it may cause the
State, we don't want that expense.'' How do you intend to
basically get that in line with what you want to do?
General Fountain. Yes, Congresswoman. I cannot speak for
each Governor or the Governors Association, but I would simply
say that it is a challenge and just as running our democracy is
a challenge.
However, I do believe each Governor is very aware that that
capability and capacity that resides within their Title 32 Army
National Guard and Air National Guard, for that matter, is
developed through our relationship with our Title 10 services.
And those Title 10 services man, train, and equip to fight and
win America's wars. But that capability and capacity is
leveraged by the Governors and their adjutant generals to
support that State, regional, and in some instances, national
mission set here in the homeland.
Ms. Hanabusa. So we would be--we will be on--I mean, I
would be correct. If I were to say that if, for example, the
Army decided that it didn't want the level of participation
that you have now that they probably would be very little for
them to--for a Governor to leverage under your scenario.
General Fountain. Yes, Congresswoman.
The Army Total Force Policy is something that all three
components are committed to. And we believe that the Army Total
Force Policy is essential to us remaining in the operational
force. So provided resources are available to continue to
maintain those hard-fought gains, I believe that we will
continue to be that equitable partner, and the Army will
continue to leverage us for those areas where we are very
skilled in our contribution to the total Army.
Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Ms. Hanabusa.
And with that, if there are no other questions to come
before our witnesses we will adjourn the Subcommittee on
Readiness for the House Armed Services Committee.
[Whereupon, at 4:01 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
April 16, 2013
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
April 16, 2013
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Statement of Hon. Robert J. Wittman
Chairman, House Subcommittee on Readiness
Hearing on
The Readiness Posture of the U.S. Army
April 16, 2013
Welcome to this afternoon's hearing. I would like to thank
our panel of experts for being here today to address the
readiness posture of the United States Army.
Over the past 12 years, the Army--Active, Guard, and
Reserve--has deployed more than 1.1 million soldiers to combat
with more than 4,500 giving the last full measure of devotion
for this country. More than 32,000 soldiers have been wounded--
9,000 requiring long-term care. In that time, soldiers have
earned more than 14,000 awards for valor to include 7 Medals of
Honor and 22 Distinguished Service Crosses.
The Army's contributions to our national security have been
numerous and continue around the world today. This hearing
comes at a time of strategic inflection for the Army.
After more than a decade of protracted counterinsurgency
operations and cyclic combat operations in Middle East, the
Army must find a way to return to full-spectrum operations,
reset and reconstitute the force, responsibly draw down
operations in Afghanistan, and fully develop its role under the
new Defense Strategic Guidance.
The Army must find a way to do all this under a tightening
budget and the compounding challenges of sequestration,
continuing fiscal challenges in Afghanistan, and do so with a
smaller force.
To discuss how the Army plans to meet the challenges of
tomorrow in this austere budgetary environment, we have with us
this afternoon:
LLieutenant General James L. Huggins, Jr., the
Army's Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations;
LLieutenant General Raymond V. Mason, the
Army's Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics;
LMajor General Luis R. Visot, the Deputy
Commanding General for Operations for the U.S. Army
Reserve; and
LBrigadier General Walter E. Fountain, the
Acting Deputy Director of the U.S. Army National Guard.
Gentlemen, thank you all very much for being here today. I
appreciated your thoughtful statements and your insights into
our Nation's Army.
General Huggins, General Fountain, and General Visot, I
understand that for each of you this is your first time
testifying before the Armed Services Committee, welcome.
General Mason, welcome back.
Last year this subcommittee spent a great deal of time
exploring our current state of readiness and discussing how we
remain prepared to meet the challenges we are likely to face in
the future.
Time and time again, we heard of a force that was described
as being ``on the ragged edge.'' Today we again explore
readiness, this time, in the context of how the Army is
reshaping itself to be ready for the future conflicts of the
21st century.
The Administration continues to argue that we can afford a
smaller force with a smaller Army--an Army with less capacity,
so long as we have a more capable one.
To enable a skilled, superior Army, one that can meet the
Nation's needs and respond to a wide range of threats, will
require timely, thoughtful, and targeted investments.
The Army must spend every dollar wisely as it seeks to
remain ready. Anything less would result in far-reaching and
long-lasting implications for the Army and for this Nation.
Congress has a responsibility and constitutional duty to
train and equip our soldiers--to ensure they are ready for the
job we have asked them to do. I look forward to learning about
what investments in readiness you are making and how the Army
plans to meet its mission in these challenging times.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
April 16, 2013
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RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS
General Mason. No. The current budget uncertainty caused us to
shift our efforts from lower priority to higher priority programs, and
like all depots and arsenals, Anniston had some program cancellations
or deferrals to FY14.
Workload is not evenly distributed across the depot's shops and
some workload will be delayed while awaiting parts and materials.
Production gaps for some equipment lines began in the April/May
timeframe. Many of the remaining lines will operate at substantially
reduced quantities, but will remain open and continue to repair assets.
As of 10 April, Anniston has released 449 personnel. Anniston has
utilized the Voluntary Early Retirement Authority/Voluntary Separation
Incentive Pay (VERANSIP) to minimize non-voluntary permanent employee
separations. [See page 15.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT
General Mason. The Army over the past several years has
aggressively moved to reduce costs and shrink its facility footprint in
Europe. For example, in 2006 there were 54,000 Soldiers stationed in
Europe. The Army projects this number to be 30,000 by 2016. This wi1l
represent a 45% reduction in end strength since 2006. Our total
facility square footage in Europe is declining from 143 million gross
square feet (GSF) to 68 million GSF by 2017. This decline amounts to an
infrastructure reduction of 54% which corresponds closely with the
reduced end strength and force structure. The Army projects these
reductions in end strength and infrastructure to be accompanied by an
approximately 57% reduction in the annual operating budget, which will
drop from $2.37 billion in 2006 to $1 billion by 2017. [See page 19.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. ENYART
General Mason. The Army's FY14 Military Construction base budget
request is $1.615 billion, of which $1.12 billion is for Active Army,
$321 million is for Army National Guard, and $174 million is for Army
Reserve. [See page 19.]
?
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
April 16, 2013
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WITTMAN
Mr. Wittman. How will utilization of regionally aligned forces
(RAFs) support the new strategic guidance? How will they be funded? Is
the RAF construct viable under sequestration? What is the Guard and
Reserve's role?
General Huggins. The 2010 U.S. National Security Strategy calls for
strong security partnerships with allies and partners. In response, the
2012 Department of Defense Strategic Guidance directed the U.S.
military services to strengthen allied and partner relationships, and
to pursue new partnerships. Knowing that these partnerships are
fundamental to regional and global security, and to ensure better and
faster Army responsiveness to Combatant Command security cooperation
and operational requirements, the Chief of Staff of the Army directed
the Army to improve its ability to be globally responsive and
regionally engaged. The goal of regional alignment is to provide
Combatant Commands (CCMDs) with reliable and responsive capability to
meet requirements across the full range of military operations, to
include operational missions in response to crisis or contingency,
operations support, theater security cooperation activities, and
bilateral and multilateral military
exercises.
--``Resource requirements for the successful implementation of RAF
will be managed within existing Army resource levels'' (HQDA EXORD
dated 21 December 2012). In other words, the cost to implement the RAF
concept will be a zero sum gain with offsets required to cover major
structural changes (APS, OCO to Base, Army Language and Culture
Enterprise etc).
--In contrast, the demand costs associated with implementing the
National Strategy are the responsibility of the CCMDs. Regional
Alignment of Forces does not create new, unfunded requirements but,
rather, offers an efficient, focused, Army resource to fulfill
existing, funded requirements. Rather than creating demand, RAF better
focuses Army capabilities against existing demand. It is a better
sourcing solution for forces, not the funding.
--While RAF implementation is viable under sequestration, the
ability for the concept to reach full potential in supporting CCMD
requirements will be significantly delayed across additional budget
years. This is mainly due to decreased funding for CCMD programs,
exercises, DoS Title 22 programs, as well as the well-documented
problems with decisive action training for units in FY13.
--RAF are drawn from the Army Total Force (Active Army, Army
National Guard and Army Reserves). Many elements of the Reserve
Component are already regionally aligned (civil affairs) and the Army
National Guard State Partnership Program is seen as both complementary
and supporting the Regional Alignment of Forces concept.
Mr. Wittman. To the extent that you can in this setting, can you
explain the impact of current anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD)
capabilities on the Army's ability to execute its mission? How is the
Army mitigating/compensating for A2/AD in the
region?
General Huggins. The proliferation of current A2/AD capabilities
around the globe results in greater importance and need for Army
engagement and shaping activities with partners and allies to build new
and strengthen current relationships to assure access necessary to
conduct potential operations.
The Army has developed the Regionally Aligned Force concept, which
focuses capabilities across the Active Component, Army National Guard,
and Army Reserve to support combatant commanders. Regionally aligned
forces will improve partnering capabilities: Daily steady-state
activities with partner armies are potentially the Army's most
significant and durable contribution to mitigating A2/AD challenges.
They maintain the foundations for basing and operational access
necessary to prevail should a conflict occur. The National Guard State
Partnership Program continues to be one of the Army's most valuable
investments in ensuring operational access throughout the world.
The Army will habitually align corps and division headquarters,
where practical, to geographic combatant commands for planning and
mission preparation in accordance with the combatant commander's
priorities. These units will also complement existing capabilities at
the theater army level for providing Joint Force Capable Headquarters
to those combatant commands.
The Army provides invaluable contributions to overcoming A2/AD
capabilities, from the Patriot and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense
systems, providing much of the Joint Force's administrative and
logistics backbone, as well as combat and support contributions for the
Global Response Force.
The Army is continuing to refocus its training institutions back
towards developing the skills necessary for successful combined arms
maneuver in an A2/AD environment, while retaining the base of knowledge
gained in stability operations. In support of U.S. Pacific Command the
Army maintains a forward presence with eight Active Component Brigade
Combat Teams, twelve batteries of Patriots, and theater enabling units.
The combination of regionally aligned forces and those trained in
combined arms maneuver deter regional threats while reassuring allies,
before a conflict even starts. The foundations laid in regional
engagement are essential in enabling the Joint Force to prevail against
A2/AD challenges should the need arise.
Mr. Wittman. To what level are you able to repair your equipment
now? Can you achieve the maintenance standards required in technical
manual 10-20, or are you having to settle for less? If less, what is
the impact of not achieving 10-20?
General Huggins, General Mason, and General Visot. The Army
currently maintains ground equipment for units preparing to deploy or
forward deployed at Technical Manual (TM) 10/20 standards. The Army
maintains aviation equipment at Fully Mission Capable (FMC). Due to the
effects of budget uncertainty and sequestration, for all other ground
equipment (including missile systems, communications and electronic
systems and watercraft) the TM 10/20 maintenance standard is waived and
the equipment is maintained at a Fully Mission Capable Plus Safety
standard.
As a result of maintaining ground equipment at FMC Plus Safety, the
Army will defer approximately $392M in Operations & Maintenance, Army
funds from FY13 to FY 14. Deferred maintenance will impact future Army
readiness if not addressed in subsequent years. Capacity constraint
limits Army's ability to address deferred maintenance in a single year
and could require 2-3 years to restore selective ground equipment to TM
10/20 standards.
Mr. Wittman. Does sequestration call into question our ability to
maintain an Operational Reserve? What would be the impacts of reverting
to a Strategic Reserve?
General Visot. Yes, sequestration, by reducing programmed funding
in the President's Budget, adversely affects personnel, training and
maintenance of our equipment and thereby impedes readiness of our
Soldiers and units. As a consequence, sequestration does indeed hinder
our ability to maintain an Operational Reserve. Reversion to a
Strategic Reserve would clearly increase the risk of our not being able
to promptly deploy ready Army Reserve Soldiers in support of various
contingencies that we might otherwise be more than able to do.
The sequester has had the biggest impact on the Army Reserve due to
the 2d and 3rd order effects of cancelled training for Active Component
(AC) units into which Reserve Component units were integrated. Key
cancelled AC training includes:
--6 x Combat Training Center Rotations affecting 1537 Soldiers.
--2 x Major Functional Exercises affecting 2058 Soldiers.
--Reduced 2013 ODT requirements affecting 429 Soldiers.
It is crucial that the Army Reserve continue to be resourced as an
Operational Reserve in order to continue to provide critical life-
saving and life-sustaining capability to all Services and all
components.
Mr. Wittman. Does sequestration call into question our ability to
maintain an Operational Reserve? What would be the impacts of reverting
to a Strategic Reserve?
General Fountain. Yes. Sequestration is an important factor in
determining whether the Army National Guard (ARNG) remains an
operational force. Ongoing loss of readiness due to sequestration may
have far-reaching implications for overseas missions as well as no-
notice emergencies here at home.
In its first few weeks, sequestration has led the Army to off-ramp
the mobilization of ARNG units in the remainder of FY 13 in order to
use base program funds to resource Unfunded Requirements and avoid the
expense of mobilizing these troops. Subsequently, the Army has
announced its intentions to off-ramp ARNG units scheduled for
mobilization in FY14. An unintended consequence of off-ramping is the
hardships it creates for Citizen Soldiers and their families who have
already made major life decisions in preparation for the deployment.
Regular, predictable employment is critical to leader development
and maintaining the operational force. Loss of deployment and training
opportunities deprives ARNG units and Soldiers of valuable operational
experience, which directly impacts future ability to conduct both
overseas and domestic missions. It is the readiness to conduct wartime
missions that enables the ARNG to execute domestic operations with
skill and efficiency. Of course, the ARNG will always respond
domestically, but the response may be slowed due to lower levels of
readiness in equipment, personnel and training.
As a result of sequestration, the Army has cancelled rotations at
its Combat Training Centers for all but deploying units, leading to the
cancellation of rotations for several ARNG Brigade Combat Teams and
enabling units. CTC rotations occur less frequently for the Guard than
for Active Component forces; if missed, Guard leaders may not have
another opportunity to gain this training for several years, if ever.
In terms of equipping, another key measure of readiness, the Army
National Guard's Equipment On Hand (EOH) and modernization rates are
expected to decline as sequestration causes the Army to procure less
new equipment in coming years. Sequestration has also led to the
postponement of Field and Depot level reset of equipment, both,
limiting the availability of thousands of items of equipment in the
present, and creating a maintenance backlog which will take time and
money to address in the future.
The Army's funding of Contract Logistical Support (CLS) has been
affected by the sequestration with flying hours for UH-72 helicopters
reduced by 30%. The FY 13 programmed funding plan will also curtail new
UH-72 fielding and may administratively ground the aircraft due to
total loss of contract logistical support this summer. The UH-72 is
critical in providing support to Southwest Border and counterdrug
operations, flight training courses, medical evacuation and other civil
support requirements.
Sequestration is expected to have an impact on the roughly 45% of
the ARNG full-time force who are dual-status Military Technicians.
While technically civilian employees, the 27,100 dual-status military
technicians in the Army Guard are required to be members of the units
in which they serve and wear their military uniform to work every day.
They perform the vast majority of maintenance on Guard ground and
aviation equipment, and perform myriad other tasks that make the 83% of
the Guard which serves part-time a capable and ready force. The
expected 11-day furlough of Technicians will be another drag on
readiness, particularly the readiness of Guard vehicles for short-
notice or no-notice domestic response missions.
OPTEMPO funding is another area that will be impacted
significantly. As a result, units will have fewer tank miles and flying
hours, less money for repair parts, and less time to train to the
required level of proficiency. This will lead to an increase in the
amount of post-mobilization training required in order to prepare units
for operational employment.
The Congress' decade-long investment in the Army National Guard has
been substantive and sustained. It can be measured in billions of
dollars that have raised equipment on hand levels to historic highs,
recruited quality Soldiers, and provided them with superb training. The
payoff can be seen in more than 518,000 separate Soldier deployments of
Citizen Soldiers, the overwhelming majority in support of Operation
Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom. When deployed, numerous
experts attest that Guard Soldiers perform on a par with their Active
Component counterparts. When not deployed, the Nation retains this
superb capability at about a third of the cost of a full-time Soldier.
In fact, when factoring in the relative costs of retirement and the
lower usage of housing and medical benefits, Guard Soldiers cost less
than the Active Component even when deployed. Given this relative
value, it would be a terrible waste of resources to allow the Army
National Guard, a superb operational force, to revert to its previous
status as a Strategic Reserve. It takes only a continued modest
investment to maintain an operational force when compared to the
Strategic Reserve the Nation had prior to 9/11.
Mr. Wittman. To what level are you able to repair your equipment
now? Can you achieve the maintenance standards required in technical
manual 10-20, or are you having to settle for less? If less, what is
the impact of not achieving 10-20?
General Fountain. The Army National Guard (ARNG) objective is to
maintain all equipment at a 10/20 level of readiness. The ARNG is
currently maintaining overall fleet readiness rates at levels which are
comparable to the last five years.
Due to budget constraints, the Army has authorized commands and
organizations to begin maintaining ground systems, including missile
systems (less Patriot missile systems), communications and electronic
systems and watercraft at ``Fully Mission Capable Plus Safety'' level.
The ARNG has not adopted this mitigation measure at this time, but
may consider such mitigations as the impact of constrained budgets
becomes clearer.
It is also important to consider the implications of not achieving
10/20 maintenance standards:
Delayed or deferred maintenance does not go away. It remains
required maintenance and builds a backlog which is expensive to
correct.
If 10/20 standards are not maintained, the Army National Guard can
expect lower equipment readiness and mission capabilities. This could
have a particularly serious impact on the Guard's domestic emergency
response missions, which--unlike overseas deployments--occur with
little or no notice time with which to bring equipment up to standards.
Funding required for delayed maintenance will relationally increase
with the length of delay.
______
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. BARBER
Mr. Barber. General Huggins, thank you for your service and your
testimony today. I understand the Army is in the midst of a precarious
balancing act due to budget cuts and general uncertainty. The Army must
determine how best to restructure the force as a result of mandatory
spending caps while simultaneously maintaining its readiness.
Meanwhile, General Odierno has mentioned that the Army might need to
reduce the total Army force by an additional 100,000 service members as
a result of sequestration. There can be no doubt these cuts will impact
the Army's ability to carry out its assigned missions. General as you
know, Ft. Huachuca is in my home district, and the fort carries out the
important mission of building partner capacity by training foreign
military officers. General, my question to you is this, how will
another drawdown affect the Army's ability to continue the important
mission of building partner capacity, such as the training offered at
Ft. Huachuca?
General Huggins. The Army is committed to providing the best
possible training for foreign military officers, through any end
strength reductions, and to continue building international
partnerships through this training. Army force structure reductions may
influence the size of the institutional training force; however, those
decisions have yet to be made.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LOBIONDO
Mr. LoBiondo. What do you see as the impact of budget cuts to
readiness and how industry and the Army can move forward in partnership
to sustain the industrial base and provide best value to the Army?
Performance Based Logistics programs have demonstrated value and DOD is
seeking to increase the effective use of PBLs. How do you see the Army
optimizing readiness with PBLs?
General Huggins, General Mason, and General Visot. The budget cuts
present a significant challenge to the Army's ability to maintain
readiness and will require tough choices for how to best apply limited
resources to optimize readiness as the Army navigates through the
difficulties of transitioning from an Army at War to an Army preparing/
training for the next contingency.
The challenges of this fiscally uncertain environment will require
the Army to explore new partnerships and expand existing ones with
industry to achieve the best value. The Army has consistently
recognized the need to build strong relationships, either with Sister
Services, Allies, or the Host Nation populace, and is committed to
achieving best value in acquisition programs, through performance based
agreements to include sustainment throughout equipment lifecycles.
This commitment to best value is demonstrated through existing
Public-Private Partnerships and Performance-Based Logistics product
support strategies, as well as support of the Department of the
Defense's (DOD) Better Buying Power initiative. Additionally, the Army
recognizes the benefits of PBLs such as the AH-64 Apache Helicopter and
the Patriot Missile Defense System, which have optimized readiness and
life cycle costs. The Army is a key member of a DOD led Integrated
Project Team responsible for evolving current PBL product support
strategies to the ``Next Generation'' PBL that will broaden usage of
PBLs as the product support strategy of choice across the DOD.
Mr. LoBiondo. What do you see as the impact of budget cuts to
readiness and how industry and the Army can move forward in partnership
to sustain the industrial base and provide best value to the Army?
Performance Based Logistics programs have demonstrated value and DOD is
seeking to increase the effective use of PBLs. How do you see the Army
optimizing readiness with PBLs?
General Fountain. Budget cuts present a significant challenge to
the Army's ability to maintain readiness and will require tough choices
for how to best apply limited resources as the Army navigates from a
wartime to a peacetime--but still actively engaged--standing.
The challenges of this fiscally uncertain environment will require
the Army to explore new partnerships and expand existing ones with
industry to achieve the most value. The Army has consistently
recognized the need to build strong relationships, either with sister
Services, allies, or the host nation populace. The commitment to
achieving best value in acquisition programs includes sustainment
throughout the lifecycles of systems, services, or products. This
commitment to best value is also demonstrated through existing Public-
Private Partnerships and Performance-Based Logistics (PLB) product
support strategies, as well as support of the Department of the
Defense's (DOD) Better Buying Power initiative.
Additionally, the Army recognizes the benefits of PBLs through
existing PBLs such as the AH-64 Apache Helicopter and the Patriot
Missile Defense System, and continues to look for new PBL
opportunities. Finally, the Army is a key member of a DOD-led
Integrated Project Team responsible for evolving current PBL product
support strategies to the ``Next Generation'' PBL that will broaden
usage of PBLs across the DOD.