[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
KOSOVO AND SERBIA: A PATHWAY TO PEACE
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, AND EMERGING THREATS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
APRIL 24, 2013
__________
Serial No. 113-23
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DANA ROHRABACHER, California Samoa
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio BRAD SHERMAN, California
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
TED POE, Texas GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MATT SALMON, Arizona THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina KAREN BASS, California
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
MO BROOKS, Alabama DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
TOM COTTON, Arkansas ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
PAUL COOK, California JUAN VARGAS, California
GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III,
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania Massachusetts
STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas AMI BERA, California
RON DeSANTIS, Florida ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
TREY RADEL, Florida GRACE MENG, New York
DOUG COLLINS, Georgia LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
TED S. YOHO, Florida JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
LUKE MESSER, Indiana
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats
DANA ROHRABACHER, California, Chairman
TED POE, Texas WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
PAUL COOK, California BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
Mr. Jonathan Moore, Director, Office of South Central European
Affairs, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, U.S.
Department of State............................................ 9
Daniel Serwer, Ph.D., professor, School of Advanced International
Studies, Johns Hopkins University.............................. 30
Ms. Shirley Cloyes DioGuardi, Balkan Affairs adviser, Albanian
American Civic League.......................................... 36
Mr. Obrad Kesic, senior partner, TSM Global Consultants, LLC..... 53
Mr. Roland Gjoni, JD, LLM (former senior legal and policy advisor
to Effective Municipalities Initiative in Kosovo).............. 61
Mr. Robert A. Churcher (former director, International Crisis
Group in Prishtina)............................................ 70
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable Dana Rohrabacher, a Representative in Congress from
the State of California, and chairman, Subcommittee on Europe,
Eurasia, and Emerging Threats: Prepared statement.............. 3
Mr. Jonathan Moore: Prepared statement........................... 11
Daniel Serwer, Ph.D.: Prepared statement......................... 32
Ms. Shirley Cloyes DioGuardi: Prepared statement................. 39
Mr. Obrad Kesic: Prepared statement.............................. 55
Mr. Roland Gjoni: Prepared statement............................. 63
Mr. Robert A. Churcher: Prepared statement....................... 72
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 100
Hearing minutes.................................................. 101
Ms. Shirley Cloyes DioGuardi: Material submitted for the record.. 102
The Honorable Dana Rohrabacher: Material submitted for the record 104
KOSOVO AND SERBIA: A PATHWAY TO PEACE
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WEDNESDAY, APRIL 24, 2013
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3 o'clock
p.m., in room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dana
Rohrabacher (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Rohrabacher. I call to order this hearing of the
Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging
Threats.
Today's topic is Kosovo, or Kosovo--I keep changing the way
I pronounce it just so I won't offend anybody, or offend
everybody--and Serbia: A Pathway to Peace.
After the ranking member and I each take 5 minutes to make
opening remarks, each member present will have 1 minute to make
an opening statement, and alternating between majority and
minority members. And without objection, all members may have 5
days to submit statements, questions, or extraneous materials
for the record. And hearing no objection, so ordered.
This hearing was postponed from an earlier date, but the
delay has proven most fortunate. Because it was just last
Friday that after 6 months, the Prime Ministers of Kosovo and
Serbia initialed an agreement mediated by Lady Ashton of the
European Union. However, the document that emerged last week
was entitled, ``First Agreement of Principles Governing the
Normalization of Relations.'' So it is not the end of the
process, and as it implies there is much more to come.
So today's hearing, we will look at what has been
accomplished and what still needs to be done. Just this week,
Kosovo's Prime Minister summed up the sentiment on both sides,
and that is, and I quote, ``Don't expect us to start loving
each other.'' So the divisions are still there and they run
very deep. A huge issue has been the status of the four
overwhelmingly Serbian majority municipalities in northern
Kosovo, which borders on Serbia.
The Kosovars fought a war, a brave war and a courageous war
for independence, because they did not want to be ruled by the
Serbs. In the same token, the Serbs do not want to be ruled by
the Kosovars. The principle of self-determination, I believe,
should apply to everyone. And this wasn't a case over the years
where American policy, or at least my involvement in it as a
person who is deeply involved in these issues, was never based
on because I like Kosovars more than I like Serbs or vice
versa, but always that the principle of self-determination is
something that is written down in the American Declaration of
Independence and should be part of the heart and soul of what
Americans are all about.
The United States and NATO supported Kosovo's independence
with the use of military force, and it has also sided with
Kosovo over who should control the northern Serb communities.
Of course, they have decided Kosovo. The Serbs have wanted
autonomy for municipalities, and Serbia has been supporting
``parallel institutions'' to provide local services. While this
first agreement favored Kosovo on the principle of
``authority'' over the northern disputed territory, the Serb
communities will control their own areas of economic
development, education, health, urban and rural planning. Thus,
Kosovar authority, here, you could read that ``sovereignty,''
in those areas is a facade. It is an illusion which will come
back to hurt both parties if an illusion just is allowed to sit
in order to take one step more in a certain direction.
The core of sovereignty is the control of security forces.
The agreement places all police and security personnel under
central Kosovo command. However, the northern regional police
commander will be a local Serb appointed by the Kosovo
Government from a list provided by Serb mayors. The composition
of the police force will reflect the ethnic composition of the
population of the four municipalities. So it will be a Serb
force, under a Serb leader, supposedly enforcing Kosovo law.
There will be a division of the National Appellate Court
established in the north with a majority of Serbian judges to
hear cases from the Serbian municipalities.
Serbia has not recognized Kosovo's independence, and still
stands in the way of Kosovo joining the United Nations or other
international bodies as a sovereign state. Both did agree not
to block each other's path into joining the EU. I don't know
what that says about people who want to join the EU at this
point, sort of wishing each other good luck. The New York Times
called this a ``power-sharing agreement.'' What it doesn't do
is satisfy the people most affected, and that is the people of
northern Kosovo. As long as there is a clash of identities and
a deep distrust borne of centuries of conflict, there is a
likelihood of more trouble. Negotiations between governments
can lead to compromise, but they can also heighten tensions
when core values are at stake.
Perhaps it is time to consult the people living in the
disputed areas and see what they want to do. The people living
in predominantly Serb areas of northern Kosovo should be
allowed to vote in a referendum for which country they would
like to be integrated into. The parallel referendum should be
held in predominantly Albanian areas in southern Serbia and
surrounding areas giving them the same choice. And that is an
American concept that the people of certain areas have rights
to self-determination through the ballot box. But I don't think
anyone would be surprised by the outcome of there was such a
vote.
The borders of both Serbia and Kosovo could be adjusted in
accordance with the desires of the people who are living within
those borders. Territory of about equal size could be exchanged
to establish a new equilibrium in the region. The result would
be two much more unified countries without the constraint and
irritation of trying to rule over unhappy minorities who are
looking across the border for help and sparking disputes.
So I would be interested to hear from our panelists why
such a democratic process would not be welcome, and what is
truly the way to normalize relations between Serbia and Kosovo.
With that said, I turn to the ranking member, Mr. Keating.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Rohrabacher follows:]
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Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
holding this timely hearing. We are also pleased to be joined
by Ranking Member Engel who has extensive firsthand knowledge
and experience in the region.
In the last week, we witnessed both Kosovo and Serbia take
immense strides toward greater stability and prosperity for
their people. Through agreeing to the EU-brokered April 19th
agreement, both nations did something rather unprecedented in
the region. They set aside their deep-rooted past to focus on
the future. If they continue on this path, this week may
signify a turning point for the Balkans as a whole. Of course,
there have been many notable successes in the region, but some
of that progress has been stalled by obstructive policies that
have prevented budding nations from joining Western
multilateral institutions like NATO or the EU.
If implemented correctly and thoughtfully this agreement
can place both Kosovo and Serbia on a path toward EU accession,
which is certainly a positive move for both nations and a
vision that our own troops helped to protect. Yet, peace is
fragile, and in the Balkans this fragile nature can at times
take a life of its own. For this reason, I encourage this
committee to look forward just as these nations have decided to
do, especially since there is much left to be done. Aside from
the practical matter of implementing this agreement, the two
sides need to address respective corruption and rule of law
issues. Further, the region has much to gain from attracting
increased investment which has the potential to encourage
cooperation over division.
Finally, and perhaps most important, both countries must to
their best to support tolerance and leadership amongst the
youth in Serbia and throughout Kosovo. There are already a
number of NGOs in this region, like the National Democratic
Institute and the institute Crisis Group and others that foster
this type of collaboration, and their work should be
encouraged. There is absolutely no need for your younger
generations to get wrapped up in battles of their grandparents
and, ultimately, I don't believe that anyone within Kosovo and
Serbia truly wants their children to repeat the regional cycle
of violence that either has experienced.
Director Moore, it is good to see you again, and I look
forward to your testimony as well as the testimony of our
second panel of witnesses. With that, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rohrabacher. We will now have 1-minute statements by
the rest of our panel. Judge Poe?
Mr. Poe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The world is seeing the
results when out-of-towners, as I call them, go into an area of
the world and start drawing a new map and forcing people to
live in their specific areas. Outsiders have forced people to
live together who really don't want to live together. We have
drawn the boundaries and they do not really reflect the
historical situation on the ground. I believe Serbia, though,
has been hard at work to make this work. When it comes to
identifying the missing from wars, Serbia has done an excellent
job. It has shared locations of graves, identified bodies
exhumed, and more countries, I think, in the area need to
follow Serbia's lead in identifying the missing.
We also need to recognize that human rights violations
occur on all sides. Too little attention has been paid to
ethnic violence against non-Albanians, including Serbs, in
Kosovo. We have seen the destruction of 100 Serbian gravesites
and 150 churches destroyed. In February, nine Serbians were
arrested in Kosovo by Kosovo police outside of a Serb
monastery, allegedly tortured, released without being charged.
The accusations of torture were so serious that the EULEX and
the EU Mission in Kosovo launched an official investigation and
the 11 accused Kosovo police officers have been suspended.
I use this as an example to show that human rights
violations still occur in the region. The good news is in spite
of all the problems, now Serbia and Kosovo are trying to work
together, I believe, both in good faith to resolve certain
issues. As explained by the chairman, last Friday's agreement
is a good first start. It is important that the rest of the
world keep these two areas of the world in constant
conversation and communication and discussion about resolving
issues that they both are concerned about. When people are not
talking, bad things occur. So this is a good first step.
I urge the EU national leaders to formally agree to start
talks with Serbia at their summit in June. My personal opinion
is, it is in the best interest of Serbia and the United States
that Serbia look to the West and not look to the former Soviet
Union for political dialogue. Just because some deal has been
worked out since last Friday doesn't mean problems have been
resolved. There are numerous unresolved human rights cases
throughout the area. There is a problem with ethnic tension and
violence, and we must take a stand for all victims of violence
regardless of who they are and where they are from. Ethnic
violence is always wrong no matter who does it.
And I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, Your Honor. Next, we
have a statement from the ranking Democrat on the Foreign
Affairs Committee, Eliot Engel, who has been deeply involved in
this issue for at least 20 years. And we were both very young
and handsome at that time. But Eliot is someone who has kept
very active in this issue. He understands the area, and we are
very happy that you have joined us today, and you may use
whatever time that you choose to consume.
Mr. Engel. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Mr.
Ranking Member. Thank you for the opportunity to join your
subcommittee today. As the ranking member of the Foreign
Affairs Committee, let me say, Mr. Chairman, that we both share
a long-standing interest in the Balkans, and while I may
disagree with some of your proposals regarding moving borders,
you have been a serious and important player in all of these
issues for so many years.
We obviously are classmates together. We came to Congress
together in 1988, and there has been no one who has been more
serious than you as far as I am concerned in terms of knowing
these issues, working hard on these issues, and trying to
resolve these issues. So I look forward to continuing our
discussions on efforts to bring peace and prosperity to the
region.
This hearing is obviously, as the ranking member pointed
out, very timely as it comes on the heels of an agreement
reached between the Prime Ministers of Kosovo and Serbia. I
congratulate Kosovo and Serbia for reaching this landmark
agreement, and in particular I would like to recognize Prime
Minister Thaci for his courage and his willingness to make hard
decisions, and Prime Minister Dacic for his pragmatism and
forward-leaning vision. The personal involvement and leadership
of EU foreign policy chief Lady Ashton has been critical to
this historic agreement. It sends a clear signal of hope to a
region which longs for an end to conflict and to peoples who
want to live their lives in peace and prosperity in the
European Union.
I was very happy to have a chance to speak with Lady Ashton
about this region when she was last in Washington a few months
ago. And yet again, which is another very positive point, this
is yet another affirmation of the fact that the Republic of
Kosovo is independent, sovereign, free and permanent. I was a
leading supporter of independence for Kosovo and am proud of
how far they have come. It has been 9 years since the EU
declared a Thessaloniki Summit at ``The future of the Balkans
is within the European Union.''
Croatia's July entry into the EU validates the strategic
vision of last week's agreement. The EU is moving to buttress
the confidence of the other Balkan States including Kosovo that
their day is near, and we learn once again that it is the
shared aspiration of EU membership that binds the Balkan States
together. The Kosovo-Serbia agreement underscored the
understanding that the region will only prosper when all of the
states of the Balkans have joined the European family, and I
welcome all of them into the EU. The EU as it now offers Serbia
a date for EU accession negotiations, must also offer Pristina
what other Balkan countries have already been granted, a clear
and transparent pathway to future membership.
I would like to take a minute or so to discuss Kosovo's
Euro-Atlantic aspirations. Brussels is working with Pristina on
moving Kosovo toward a Stabilization and Association Agreement
and toward visa liberalization where Kosovars would be able to
travel freely to Europe as citizens of their fellow Balkan
countries can already do. Unfortunately, the progress is
halting and slow, and unlike its neighbors, every little step
in Kosovo's progress with Brussels could face a veto by one of
the five EU non-recognizers of Kosovo independence. While this
makes the climb even steeper, it makes Kosovo's accomplishments
even more significant. In the end we must ensure that Kosovo be
included in Europe along with its neighbors, because otherwise
we would create a new black hole in the Balkans where our worst
fears of crime, corruption, and worse could come true.
Kosovo's pathway toward NATO is equally very important.
Along with other countries in the region, Kosovo's membership
in NATO will cement its Western outlook while adding another
strongly pro-American country to the alliance. In fact, Kosovo
is the most pro-American country in Europe according to a
recent Gallup survey. Of course, membership in NATO requires
Kosovo to develop a military, and I am glad that we may see the
early steps in that direction through the planning of a
professional defensive army later this year. As a sovereign and
independent republic, Kosovo has every right to build its armed
forces, and it speaks highly of the new country that it plans
to work closely with the United States and our European allies
on the timing and organization of its defense forces. We must
not buy into the irrational fears of some who express unfounded
misgivings about a potential Kosovo military considering the
assurances that it will be small and defense-oriented.
Regardless, I look forward to the day when Kosovo's troops will
stand side by side with American soldiers in the fight against
international terrorism and other global ills.
And finally, I think it is long past time for the five EU
holdouts to recognize Kosovo. Twenty-two EU nations do, five do
not. Not only has the International Court of Justice accepted
Kosovo's Declaration of Independence as valid and legal, but
with the Kosovo-Serbia normalization agreement there is no
reason left for the continued intransigence. I hope the State
Department along with European foreign ministries will now
renew their efforts to bring about more recognitions.
There is certainly additional challenges which the new
country must still address. Unemployment is high. Corruption
continues to place a drag on the economy. And interethnic
relations must continually be strengthened. At the same time,
however, agreements between Serbia and Kosovo must be fully
implemented, and as laid out in the latest accord, parallel
structures in the north must either be eliminated completely or
made a transparent part of the unified Kosovar state so that
minorities can be treated fairly wherever they are. Again, I
would like to congratulate Kosovo and Serbia for signing the
agreement on normalization, and offer my help to both countries
in their efforts to join a Europe whole and free.
And I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to offer
my thoughts on the matter, and the time, and again look forward
to working with you and the ranking member.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Mr. Holding?
Mr. Holding. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this
hearing as the subcommittee examines the recent agreement
between Kosovo and Serbia and what this means in terms of
providing a starting point for achieving regional stability as
both countries look to the international community.
While I served as the United States Attorney for eastern
North Carolina, I was privileged to travel to Kosovo and work
with their government and Department of Justice to train law
enforcement authorities, which focused on establishing their
rule of law by ensuring the proper enforcement of criminal
laws. And indeed, while U.S. Attorney, I sent about a dozen
different missions to Kosovo from my office comprised of
Federal prosecutors and various members of law enforcement to
engage, and then in return we welcomed several missions from
Kosovo to North Carolina to cross-train.
So I am encouraged by recent developments made within the
last week that recognize that challenges still exist, and look
forward to hearing from our witnesses as how we can best
support their efforts. So Mr. Chairman, thank you, and I yield
back.
Mr. Rohrabacher. And Mr. Stockman?
Mr. Stockman. I want to thank the chairman for taking on
issues which aren't always popular but are nonetheless very
important. I was fortunate to visit Belgrade a few years ago,
and I think it is important that we listen to all sides and to
work out a solution that we can all benefit from. And I
appreciate these hearings being open and honest and balanced,
and I look forward to working out a solution that we can all
join on. Thank you. I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much. Our first panel,
which is composed of our representative of the administration,
and then we follow by a second panel of experts. So our first
panel is Jonathan Moore, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for
European and Eurasian Affairs at the U.S. Department of State
and has led policies responsible, these for Albania, Bosnia,
Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia.
That is quite a portfolio.
He is a career member of the Senior Foreign Service and
with extensive experience in this region. He was assigned to
the U.S. Embassy in Belgrade in 1991, and was Desk Officer for
the former Yugoslavia in the State Department from 1993 to
1995. He was Deputy Director of the State Department's Office
of Russian Affairs from 2000 until 2002, and prior to his
current assignment was Deputy Chief of Mission in Bosnia and
Herzegovina from 2009 to 2012.
And Mr. Moore, if you would perhaps could keep your
statement down to about 5 minutes and the rest will put into
the record, you may proceed.
STATEMENT OF MR. JONATHAN MOORE, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SOUTH
CENTRAL EUROPEAN AFFAIRS, BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN
AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Moore. Chairman Rohrabacher, members of the
subcommittee, good afternoon. I am honored to appear before you
to discuss Kosovo and Serbia. On behalf of the State
Department, please allow me to thank you and the subcommittee
for your timely and deep interest in these countries, as well
as in the broader Balkan region, where the United States
continues to make investments of personnel and resources to
ensure that the conflicts of the 1990s are not repeated.
The Governments of Kosovo and Serbia concluded a
significant agreement last Friday through the European Union
facilitated Dialogue. This development has come after years of
sustained engagement by the United States and our European
partners. In order to speak of a Europe that is whole, free,
democratic, and at peace, the Balkans must be in the European
and Euro-Atlantic family. This has been a goal of
administrations, both Democratic and Republican, for over 20
years. As we have seen elsewhere in Europe, integration has
been and remains the best means of fostering long-term
stability, investment, and prosperity. The unprecedented joint
visit of Secretary of State Clinton and European Union High
Representative Ashton to Pristina, Belgrade, and Sarajevo last
year is proof that we and the EU stand united in this goal.
The parties' April 19th agreement on the normalization of
relations includes a durable solution for northern Kosovo
within Kosovo's legal and institutional framework with
substantial local self-governance under Kosovo law. The
agreement covers the creation of an ``Association'' or
``Community'' of Serb majority municipalities in Kosovo that
may exercise municipal competencies collectively, and will also
have a role in representing the Serb community to the central
authorities.
On April 22nd, High Representative Ashton and EU
Enlargement Commissioner Fuele recommended to EU member states
that negotiations be opened with Serbia on EU accession, and
with Kosovo on an EU Stabilization and Association Agreement,
as well as allowing Kosovo to participate in EU programs. We
welcome these recommendations which the European Council will
consider at its June session. While the Dialogue is an EU-led
process, it has had our full and active support. Our Deputy
Assistant Secretary, Ambassador Philip Reeker, has actively
engaged the parties and the EU. We have been in constant
contact with both countries' leaders, including meetings of
Vice President Biden with President Nikolic and Prime Minister
Thaci in Rome in March. We are encouraging Kosovo and Serbia to
implement expeditiously and fully all Dialogue agreements.
We know, Mr. Chairman, this will not be easy. Hardliners
and criminal elements in northern Kosovo will resist. They have
long benefitted from the conditions that disadvantage and
intimidate the population in northern Kosovo, keeping the
situation there on edge and perpetuating weak rule of law.
Dismantling the parallel political and security structures in
northern Kosovo will be a major challenge. Municipal elections
in the north this year with OSCE facilitation should usher in a
new era of accountable, decentralized, and effective
governance. Serbia must demonstrate the willingness and ability
to use its influence to isolate those who block implementation.
For its part, Kosovo must demonstrate the commitment and
ability to protect and preserve the lives and livelihoods of
the Kosovo-Serb population in the north and throughout the
country, and to guarantee the rights afforded to them by Kosovo
and international law, including the far-reaching self-
governance to which they are entitled under Kosovo's
Constitution. Of course, the full cooperation of both Kosovo
and Serbia with the international community and its missions,
NATO's Kosovo Force (KFOR) and the EU Rule of Law Mission
(EULEX) remains essential for success. The United States will
support both parties and its partners on the ground in their
implementation efforts.
Despite the difficulties, this agreement is the best way
forward. Reconciliation is the goal of Serbia and Kosovo, not
partition or land swaps. This administration, like the Bush
administration that recognized Kosovo's independence in 2008,
has made clear its commitment to a democratic, sovereign and
multi-ethnic Kosovo within its existing borders. Assistant
Secretary of State Gordon stated our policy before this
subcommittee in November 2011, ``There is no way for borders in
this region to be redrawn along ethnically clean lines. . . .
Questioning the ability of people of different ethnicities to
live together is harmful to regional reconciliation and
contrary to the international community's decade-long effort to
move the region beyond the brutal conflicts of the 1990s.'' The
April 19th agreement should be the focus. It is a key signal
that both governments are capable of making compromise and are
committed to putting the past behind them, moving forward with
their European aspirations, and building a peaceful and
prosperous future.
Mr. Chairman, we remain committed to helping them realize
these goals, and hope for your support and that of the
subcommittee. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Moore follows:]
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Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, thank you very much. Now Mr.
Secretary, I will ask you a few questions. We will pass this on
to other members as well. First is, the agreement sets out in
detail the establishment of a Serb-led police force in the
northern areas, in that northern area of Kosovo. The
commentators claim also that there was some sort of sidebar
agreement not to deploy Kosovo's Security Forces or special
police units into that northern Serbian area except in an
emergency. Is that true?
Mr. Moore. Thank you for your question, Mr. Chairman. The
Kosovo Security Forces work very closely with NATO and KFOR.
The authorities in Kosovo fully respect the role of KFOR to
provide safe and secure conditions in northern Kosovo. As you
have seen from the informal text of the agreement that has
circulated, there is no role for KSF in implementing the
agreement, so we are quite confident that KFOR has the lead,
not the KSF, in the north and in the context of implementation.
Mr. Rohrabacher. So the answer is yes.
Mr. Moore. The answer is yes.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you. Both Serbia and Kosovo want to
join the EU, and Kosovo has expressed interest in joining NATO.
Do we have a position on whether or not they should be part of
NATO, both of these countries?
Mr. Moore. Mr. Chairman, as you know NATO operates by
consensus. Serbia has not sought membership in NATO. Kosovo is
not yet in a position to have applied for membership in NATO.
The Kosovo Security Force needs to evolve. It will do so with
the help of NATO. This is something being discussed in Brussels
now with our NATO partners and allies. We certainly see the
potential for their future in Euro-Atlantic institutions, that
means NATO and the EU. If Serbia chooses to apply that would be
taken very seriously. We have excellent bilateral military-to-
military relations with Serbia as well as with Kosovo. That
will depend upon the desires of those countries, and of course
the decisions of all NATO member states including ours.
Mr. Rohrabacher. All right. So the bottom line is that we
have no position on it right now, but maybe in the future.
Mr. Moore. We support them having that aspiration and we
will have to see.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Right. Okay, though this agreement gives
central government in Kosovo authority, on paper at least, over
the entire claimed territory or what you said, within existing
borders, I think, was the phraseology you used, does the local
power that has been granted to the Serbians in the northern
part of the country, doesn't that mean, and especially what you
have just acknowledged was that there wouldn't be Kosovar
forces going up there, doesn't that mean autonomy? And wouldn't
an autonomy up there in the northern part of Kosovo harden the
feelings on both sides? And if Kosovo can't control the north,
which is composed of 90 percent of the people there don't want
to be part of Kosovo, why do you think it wants to hang on to
it, and why are we encouraging them to keep authority but not
actually having authority, but the facade of authority, over an
area in which has autonomy from their rule?
Mr. Moore. Well, Mr. Chairman, we do not use the term
``autonomy'' in the context of the agreement and what is being
granted to those municipalities. By the way, it is important to
note that the opportunities, the rights of those
municipalities, which they can exercise collectively, extend to
other municipalities in the south of Kosovo that have a
majority Serb population.
In terms of the eventual development of the Kosovo Security
Force and its role in the north, that is a subject for a later
point. In terms of immediate implementation of the Dialogue,
all of these matters need to be worked out.
But Mr. Chairman, I think part of the fundamental
perspective we have--and granted, as diplomats we are looking
for the middle path, the compromises, to succeed--is that we
honestly don't believe that ethnic rights and freedoms are
protected by anything other than the rule of law. You make the
point, Mr. Chairman, the population may be 90 percent Serb but
it is not 100 percent Serb. We don't believe that ethnic rights
and freedoms, human rights, are protected by making countries
ethnically pure. We think the key thing is the rule of law, so
that is what we hope to see in the north----
Mr. Rohrabacher. I am sure that our great thinkers at the
State Department have charted out philosophically how people
must be taught to respect the rule of law and that is the
nirvana. That is the solution that is going to happen. Them
people have been fighting each other for centuries, and we are
just going to have a rule of law concept that is going to let
some of them then say, well, we will just submit to these
people who we have been fighting for centuries, rather than
trying to find a way in which people in Kosovo are happy to be
in Kosovo, and people in Serbia are happy to be Serbians, thus
they don't have to believe in anything except what they really
desire, which is a national identity, of being ruled with a
national identity.
Let me ask you this. Why is it that when we, we always
focus on the Serb communities in Kosovo when we are talking
about autonomy and things such as that but we never mention the
Kosovar communities in Serbia. There are several areas right
near the border in this valley there that are just as heavy a
concentration of Kosovars as you have a concentration of Serbs
north of the river. So how come we never talk about Kosovars
and their community across the river and their desire for
autonomy?
Mr. Moore. Mr. Chairman, thank you for that point as well.
Talking about the ethnic Albanian population in that part of
southern Serbia, Presheva Bujanovac, we have every confidence
that the Government of Serbia will look after the human rights
of its citizens there regardless of their ethnicity, and we
have the same confidence in the ability of the Government of
Kosovo to look after all of its citizens in the north or the
south regardless of their ethnicity. So that is why we are
focused on the rule of law aspect with that.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much. And Mr. Keating, and
then we will let Mr. Engel again. Well, maybe we will go with
the judge and let Mr. Engel have what time he would like to
consume.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The April 19th
agreement includes the establishment of an implementation
committee by the two sides with the facilitation of the EU in
place as well. How strong do you feel the EU's role has to be
in order to actually ensure that implementation, and are there
clear penalties laid out by the EU or the U.S. if Serbia or
Kosovo do not implement the accord? For instance, could the EU
freeze Serbia's accession talks or Kosovo's Stabilization and
Association Agreement? What are your feelings on that, Mr.
Moore?
Mr. Moore. Congressman Keating, thank you for the question.
Yes, of course, as an EU-facilitated process the continued role
of the EU is critical to the success of the process. The next
implementation meetings are taking place in Brussels even
today, tomorrow, the rest of the week, to see about the best
way to move things forward. Both sides fully recognize that it
was not just by initialing this agreement last Friday that they
move forward on their EU paths. They have to show commitment
and they have to work to implement the agreement. So while it
is up to the EU to decide what penalties or steps they might
take, it is certainly necessary for both Serbia and for Kosovo
to act to implement this agreement in order to benefit from
positive decisions by the European Union.
Mr. Keating. Right. I just wanted to quickly say, do you
think any kind of penalties are in order as part of that
enforcement process? Can you envision that?
Mr. Moore. I can tell you, Congressman Keating, from what I
know and what we have heard, the EU is definitely going to hold
both sides' feet to the fire. Exactly what the menu of options
is for them, it may be among those that you suggested, that
will have to be determined by the willingness of one side or
both sides to implement. The important thing is that both
Kosovo and Serbia have passed toward the European Union and
that neither can hold up the other.
Mr. Keating. And you think that one of those possibiities
could be not allowing accession?
Mr. Moore. Certainly that again becomes a matter for the
member states. Accession to the EU is years away even for
Serbia. We just saw for Croatia the process took well over 10
years. So there are many steps along the process where the EU
can stall or suspend or make other demands if they have
concerns, and we expect that they would do that if
implementation is not complete.
Mr. Keating. All right, thank you. As you mentioned, Kosovo
lags behind the other countries in the Balkans in its efforts
to join the EU, but while Serbia is moving ahead with accession
talks, Kosovo is still working to achieve visa liberalization
and a Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU.
Mr. Moore. Yes.
Mr. Keating. And every small step in Kosovo's progress with
Brussels could, indeed, as mentioned before by the ranking
member, could face a veto by one of the five EU non-recognizers
making their path even harder. Can you discuss Kosovo's pathway
toward the EU? Are they making steady progress at this point
even if it is a ways off, or are there more roadblocks,
literally and figuratively, ahead? Is there a way that the U.S.
assistance to Kosovo can be used to help Pristina with some of
the technical requirements involving moving forward in the EU?
What could be the U.S.'s role in that regard?
Mr. Moore. Thank you for the question, Congressman Keating.
In terms of the support and assistance of the United States on
specific issues, for example, visa liberalization, that comes
down to many aspects of the rule of law and the functioning of
Kosovo's institutions and many technical requirements. The
assistance we have in the rule of law sector along the lines of
where Congressman Holding did his work years ago was very
important to that effort.
On a grander scale, of course, this agreement opens many
doors to the EU for Kosovo as well as for Serbia. On the
specific issue of non-recognizers it is of course true,
Congressman, that recognizers at one point or another can raise
objections or concerns to the process moving forward. That is
the nature of how the EU works. We would certainly like to see
a situation where those five non-recognizers are able to
recognize Kosovo. We have an ongoing diplomatic effort to
encourage greater recognition of Kosovo not just in Europe but
all around the world. Those countries like other EU members
will have to choose their own level, what decisions they want
to make and how supportive they are of Kosovo's progress toward
the EU.
Mr. Keating. Yes, you mentioned briefly that the U.S. could
be helpful in giving technical advice toward moving toward the
rule of law. What other things could the U.S. be doing besides
that?
Mr. Moore. Well, there are many aspects of course of EU
legislation. I forget how many tens of thousands of pages of
laws, rules, have to be harmonized, have to be implemented as a
country moves toward the EU. Rule of law is an obvious sector
because legislation has to be harmonized and implemented
throughout Kosovo. There are other areas in which we work to
provide assistance for the growth of the economy, for example
in the energy sector which are not as directly tied to their EU
prospects, but are necessary for their long-term prosperity and
economic success.
Mr. Keating. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you. Judge Poe?
Mr. Poe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As I mentioned in my
opening statement, Mr. Moore, human rights violations are a big
concern. And part of the reason is when the people involved,
the countries involved, believe that there are human rights
violations in another country that causes tension in trying to
work out some long-term relationship of trust.
I want to ask you about the status of the special task
force investigating an organ trafficking ring operation out of
the so-called Yellow House in Kosovo. This operation supposedly
took place from 1999 to 2000, maybe after that. When I went to
Serbia and Kosovo this was talked about and brought up quite a
bit. It is not talked about, I don't think, over here in the
United States much, and I don't know about the United Nations.
But it is talked about as a situation that is not resolved.
And do the findings made by the Council of Europe Special
Rapporteur Dick Marty, in his findings, deserve some kind of
closer look? And has anybody been brought to, so to speak,
justice for these accusations? Has it been resolved one way or
another? I mean it has been awhile. Where are we on this, Mr.
Moore?
And let me just finish this. You said that we expect that
the Kosovos will make sure that there are no human rights
violations in their country and we expect the Serbs to do the
same. This may be an example of where that isn't working out so
well when we have these accusations of human rights violations.
So help me out with this. Where are we on the Yellow House
situation?
Mr. Moore. Thank you, Your Honor. First, let me say that
unfortunately as is documented in our annual human rights
reports to Congress, there are human rights violations in
countries all around the world, including very well established
and----
Mr. Poe. I am not talking about around the world. Let us
talk about the area that we are talking about today, Mr. Moore.
Mr. Moore. I am very pleased to do that, Your Honor. In
specific reference to those accusations, we take them and all
accusations of war crimes very seriously. Clint Williamson, the
former Ambassador-at-Large of the United States for war crimes,
is leading the Special Investigative Task Force. He is doing
that under the auspices of the European Union EULEX Mission.
That work continues. The hope is that----
Mr. Poe. What does that mean that the work continues? What
does that mean? What is being looked at? Are people being
questioned? I mean how long is this investigation going to
take? Is it going to be another investigation like the Warren
Commission that just takes forever, or what? Is there going to
be some resolution to it? So kind of cut to the chase, Mr.
Moore. Where are we on this investigation?
Mr. Moore. Well, thank you, Your Honor. You would be more
familiar with the amount of time needed for prosecution than I
am. The hope is that a prosecution will be possible in the next
year. Ambassador Williamson and his team are still collecting
evidence. They are doing that through EULEX. The latest
information I have, Your Honor, is that they are not ready to
go directly to prosecution. There is also a question about
where the prosecution is going to take place. I will take that
question, if you will allow me, Your Honor, and get you any
more specific up-to-date information on that. Ambassador
Williamson is working very actively and certainly the intention
is to have a prosecution if there is sufficient evidence to
warrant that within the next year.
Mr. Poe. Okay. Thank you, I would appreciate some follow-up
in writing. NATO, what is the current position of the Serbian
Government and its desire or lack of desire to be in NATO? When
I am over there I hear different things. What is it today
regarding Serbia being a part of NATO?
Mr. Moore. The latest information we have with regard to
the current opinion of the standing government in Serbia, is
that they have not in any way applied for NATO membership. The
previous governments have not done that. We do have a very
active military-to-military relationship at the highest ranks,
but at this point I am unaware of any desire by this or
previous Governments of Serbia to apply for NATO membership.
Mr. Poe. Thank you. I will yield back.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, Your Honor. And now I
yield to Mr. Engel for what time you may choose to consume.
Mr. Engel. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
just want to say that there have been trials by some people,
Ramush Haradinaj and others, in The Hague, and Mr. Haradinaj
was found innocent of all charges twice. So we in the United
States are not used to a situation where if you are found
innocent at a trial you can be recharged on the same issues. He
was recharged and found innocent twice. I think it is important
to state that.
Let me ask you that Kosovo hopes not only to join the EU in
the future but to join NATO as well. To do that it has to first
establish a military and join the Partnership for Peace. Could
you let the subcommittee know the U.S. position on when the
independent, sovereign Republic of Kosovo will be able to
create a military and join the Partnership for Peace? Will the
United States support Kosovo's efforts to establish a military
and join the Partnership for Peace?
Mr. Moore. Thank you, Congressman Engel, for your question.
Now let me say that as I mentioned before we are working very
closely with our NATO allies on exactly these issues now. The
Kosovo Security Force, of course, has essentially a civil
emergency mission now. The evolution of that into a different
sort of military is something which involves KFOR and NATO very
closely. It is also a matter of consensus within NATO exactly
the sort of relationship that NATO is able to support, the sort
of forces that NATO is able to support. This is an ongoing
topic. At the same time we are working with the Kosovo Security
Force directly. We are working with the Ministry of the Kosovo
Security Force on these sorts of questions. It is a likely step
for that to evolve at some point in the near future, but this
is a matter of discussion both with Pristina and within NATO.
Mr. Engel. Well, I just think that the U.S. needs to let
our European allies know, particularly the five EU countries
out of the 27 that still do not currently recognize Kosovo,
that they ought to do it. I know that has been our position and
I know we have been somewhat vocal about it. But I think that
in light of the April 19th accord, I think that should change
the equation. Do you think that the April 19th accord will
cause those five EU countries that do not currently recognize
Kosovo to do so?
Mr. Moore. We would certainly like to think that the April
19th accord would provide greater impetus and justification for
recognition by those five and countries outside Europe. That is
part of our diplomatic efforts as you say, Congressman Engel.
We will have to see what successes we have with that effort.
But certainly they should have more reasons to engage, if not
recognize, Kosovo.
Mr. Engel. How about us? Will we make a renewed effort to
do this?
Mr. Moore. The pursuance of recognition of Kosovo is an
active effort. We have a full-time action officer in my office
at the State Department focused on this. Whether it is for
Europe, Asia, Africa, or the rest of the world, we have a
comprehensive effort to seek recognitions. I even traveled to
Africa in an effort to secure more recognitions from African
countries as part of a delegation with Kosovo. This is a very
comprehensive effort and I can assure you that we continue to
engage on that.
Mr. Engel. I am for Kosovo joining the EU and I am for
Serbia joining the EU. Should Serbia and Kosovo join the EU at
the same time in order to prevent the potential of Serbia
blocking Kosovo's membership? What are we doing to make sure
that if Kosovo is moving at a slower pace with the EU accession
that Serbia cannot or would not block it, and what can we do
expecting Kosovo's aspirations to join the United Nations that
is currently blocked by both Serbia and Russia?
Mr. Moore. On the first question in terms of their path
toward the EU, they are on different tracks. They of course had
different starting points. Serbia is already a candidate member
and Kosovo is just looking at securing a Stabilization and
Association Agreement. Exactly what tempo, of course, they
pursue toward EU membership will depend very much upon their
performance in the process of introducing and implementing
legislation, meeting other steps, meeting other criteria set by
the EU. They are on separate tracks. As was pointed out in the
agreement, of course, neither can hold back the other. That is
a principle to which they should continue to be held. So
regardless of which country reaches membership first, they
would not be able to disadvantage the other. That has been an
issue of evolving policy in the European Union, and we will
have to see at what stage the European Union is when that
question arises, if it is a question of one trying to block the
other. We certainly would hope that is not the case.
Mr. Engel. Well, is it ironclad that it cannot happen? It
seems to me to be a bit unfair if there is even the remote
possibility that it could happen. It would seem to me that we
should make it clear, or that you should make it clear that
that could not happen. That one country could not block the
other.
Mr. Moore. Congressman, that is an excellent question. I
can only tell you that in the recent case of Croatia and
Slovenia, Slovenia raised objections quite late in the process
to Croatia moving forward. They were able to address that issue
bilaterally. The EU has changed the circumstances under which a
single member state can block the progress of a new member. I
think that process will need to evolve, but I apologize, I am
not in the position to speculate about exactly how thing will
be. Even for Serbia we are talking about a process that will
last, to judge by other averages, at least a decade.
Mr. Engel. Okay. Let me ask you a final question. I have
been deeply concerned that to date no individuals have been
convicted for the brutal killing of three United States
citizens, the Bytyqi brothers, Agron, Ylli and Mehmet. As you
know, they were helping to save the lives of a Roma family from
Kosovo where they were unlawfully detained by Serbian
authorities and suffered an execution-style murder. It was a
long time ago. We want to move on. But 11 years after the
discovery of their bodies no one has been held accountable for
their killing, and the chief suspects in the chain of command,
including the camp commander, have never been charged.
So what is the status of their case, and can you describe
the State Department's efforts to press Serbia to bring the
killers to justice? Is there anything more that Congress can do
to help press Serbia to achieve justice for the Bytyqi family?
I just met with the fourth Bytyqi brother who is in New York.
Just a few weeks ago I sat down with him.
Mr. Moore. Thank you, Congressman. This is a case which
disturbs us greatly, the arrest and then murder of three
American citizens. We also have met with Fatose Bytyqi, the
surviving brother, who lives in the United States. We have
engaged at this level and at the most senior bilateral levels
including by Secretary Clinton when she was in Belgrade last
fall. Our Deputy Secretary of State raised it directly with
Prime Minister Dacic, and he is also Interior Minister of
Serbia.
We continue to call upon these authorities in Belgrade to
investigate this case and to prosecute it. We are not aware of
direct progress. There have been no convictions in this case.
Serbia is certainly very well aware that it is extremely high
on our bilateral agenda. We want to see justice in this case as
in all cases of war crimes. This happens to involve, as you
say, three American citizens so it figures prominently in our
bilateral agenda from that perspective as well. But
unfortunately, to this point we have not received any
information from the government or authorities in Serbia that
that case is moving forward other than some investigations.
Mr. Engel. Well, let me conclude by saying that I think
that this should be continued to be pressed and is a real
priority, and I know the chairman would agree with me because
we have discussed these issues a lot. These are three American
citizens and we really demand answers for American citizens.
Mr. Moore. Yes.
Mr. Engel. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rohrabacher. I guess when you have a case like that
pending that it undermines this belief that everyone can just
trust the rule of law, even though you set up a situation where
you have people who hate each other are within the same
governmental structure.
Mr. Holding?
Mr. Holding. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Speaking of the rule
of law, I would like to take my time and allow you to give us,
or give me, somewhat of an update on the state of the rule of
law in Kosovo. I believe I was there in 2010. It is plagued by
high unemployment and high crime and public corruption. So I
would be interested in having your thoughts as to where they
stand now. Have they had some improvement over the course of
the last 3 or 4 years?
Mr. Moore. Congressman Holding, thank you for the question.
We do believe there has been improvement. Part of that has come
about because of our assistance programs and our cooperation.
As you mentioned, we offered training exchanges. We brought
people from law enforcement organizations and authorities here.
We worked through different programs of the U.S. Department of
Justice with judges, with prosecutors. We worked directly
through ICITAP with the police in Kosovo as well.
It is a comprehensive effort. It takes a lot of time.
Corruption is rampant throughout the region, throughout the
former Yugoslavia. These are all countries, even the most
established like Serbia, that suffer under a history of years
of Communist and undemocratic leadership and institutions. So
it is a tough road. I think there has been progress. We believe
there has been improvement. But indeed the Kosovo police is
better able, for example, to protect Serbian historical and
cultural sites than they did in the past. Of nine key sites,
they are able to provide security at seven. There are excesses.
The situation is not perfect.
Taking Judge Poe's advice and comments into mind, I don't
wish to comment on comparisons to other countries, but suffice
it to say we are not done with the work. We are working closely
with Ministers of Interior and other such leaders to fix
things, but we do see some improvement over the past few years.
I apologize. I don't have a direct means to quantify that now.
If this is of interest to you I would be happy to follow up
with more specific information on that.
Mr. Holding. That would be great if you could get back on
that. The level of cooperation that we have now, has it been
increasing over the number of years as far as Department of
Justice cooperation, U.S. lawyer cooperation? Is that still on
the rise or has that started to diminish?
Mr. Moore. Congressman, you are correct, it has started to
diminish. Based on needs and priorities around the world for
U.S. assistance dollars, the number has gone down a bit. Both
Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina are still focal points for
U.S. assistance in the region. Those numbers have gone down for
all countries in the region, but we still have a robust effort
coordinating with our colleagues at the U.S. Department of
Justice on rule of law cooperation in Kosovo.
Mr. Holding. Well, Kosovo always has struck me as a great
opportunity for the United States to partner with because it is
a nation that likes the United States and it has a
predominantly Muslim population of some 90 percent, and it is a
Muslim nation that likes the United States. And I think there
is great opportunity there being the youngest nation on our
planet. And hopefully it will be welcomed into the fold by all
nations as it comes to fruition in the course of years. So
thank you, and I yield back.
Mr. Moore. Thank you, Congressman.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much. I have one last
clarification for you.
Mr. Moore. Please.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Was it your testimony earlier that part of
this understanding, if not part of the agreement, was that
Kosovo would not deploy security forces in those northern
provinces that are Serbian-dominated, and that how ever that
was going to be compensated for, in some way balanced out
because the fact that KFOR and U.S. forces would then be
deployable. Is that correct?
Mr. Moore. In the context of what you correctly pointed
out, Chairman Rohrabacher, as the first agreement, there is no
role for KSF, and freedom of movement in a safe and secure
environment will be handled by EULEX and KFOR without needing
to turn to KSF. So in this immediate situation--as this is
again just the first step--there is no role for KSF or a
successor military. However, in the future that could change.
And if I have stated in a way that there is no role at any
point in the future that would not be correct. In the context
of this agreement and the effort to implement this agreement,
there is no role for KSF.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay. So the agreement then actually
depends upon KFOR and the United States to continue
indefinitely, because there is no mention as to any length of
time that this status quo will exist either. That is quite
disturbing.
Mr. Moore. May I clarify further, Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Rohrabacher. Yes, you may.
Mr. Moore. It is certainly not our intention that KFOR
should remain there indefinitely. There are still 5,000 troops
in KFOR of which nearly 800 belong to the United States.
Recognizing needs and priorities around the world, we want to
see that change. The hope is that with this effort to implement
this agreement, over time the security situation in Kosovo will
evolve, and we hope, by the way, on a shorter timeline rather
than a longer timeline so that KFOR's role does not need to be
what it is today and that both the United States and other
troop contributors can appropriately reduce their presence on
the ground in Kosovo.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much. I would suggest that
again that things will evolve a lot quicker if people would
draw maps that are consistent with the will of the local
population rather than expecting the local population to ignore
the attitudes and the values that they have developed and
reactions to each other that have been developing for
centuries. Thank you very much, and we appreciate your
testimony.
Mr. Moore. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rohrabacher. And next we have another panel and they
may proceed to sit down. And we will have five panelists, and
each one will be expected to testify around 5 minutes, but have
a more in-depth testimony will be made part of the record as
part of their testimony.
I want to thank this panel of witnesses for joining us
today. We will start with Daniel Serwer who is a senior
research professor of Conflict Management as well as a senior
fellow at the Center for Transatlantic Relations at Johns
Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. He is also a
scholar at the Middle East Institute, and while working for the
U.S. Institute of Peace he led missions to the Balkans. He was
a minister-counselor at the Department of State, serving from
1994 to '96 as a special U.S. envoy and coordinator for the
Bosnian Federation, mediating between the Croats and the
Muslims, and negotiating the first agreement that they reached
at the Dayton peace talks.
We then have with us Shirley DioGuardi, and she is a Balkan
affairs adviser to the Albanian American Civic League, a
position she has held since 1995, together with her husband who
is a former Member of Congress, I might add, a very well
respected Member of Congress. She has worked to bring lasting
peace and stability to the Balkans. Shirley is a former
publisher of the Lawrence Hill Books specializing in domestic
and international politics. And then in 1995, she published
``Yugoslavia's Ethnic Nightmare,'' the first book on the causes
and consequences of the Balkan conflict. She has worked closely
with the Albanian communities and holds a Bachelors degree in
Sociology from Oberlin College and a Masters in Divinity from
the Union Theological Seminary in New York.
And after that we have Mr. Kesic, a senior partner with TSM
Global Consultants. Over the last two decades, Mr. Kesic has
served as consultant on Balkan affairs for various U.S.
agencies, international corporations and organizations. Mr.
Kesic is a member of the board of directors of the Institute on
Religion and Public Policy. He is a co-founder and represents
the Serbian American community in the National Democratic
Ethnic Coordinating Committee, and is a consultant and advisor
to the Serbian American Institute.
We then have Mr. Gjoni who, since 2005, has been an advisor
and a component leader for USAID projects in Kosovo. Before
that he worked for the United Nations in Kosovo. He was also an
expert working on drafting the Kosovo Constitution in 2008. He
is currently a Ph.D. candidate at the School of Politics and
International Relations of the University College Dublin, and a
Fulbright Scholar. He holds a Masters of Law degree from
Columbia Law School, and a law degree from Faculty of Law at
the University of Tirana in Albania.
And then we have Bob Churcher, a freelance consultant
specializing in political analysis and post conflict issues
with considerable experience in the Balkans. Following a
successful career in the British Army, he went to work for the
British Foreign Office and the European community as an
observer in the Bosnian war, and stayed in the Balkans, most
often in Albania and Kosovo, with various international
organizations. This included serving as director for the
International Crisis Group on Kosovo.
Now with that we may start with Mr. Serwer, and as I say,
if you could try to keep it to 5 minutes then we will have time
for a dialogue or questions and answers. But anything you would
like to put into the record will be made part of the record, at
the time, along with your testimony. So thank you very much.
You may proceed.
STATEMENT OF DANIEL SERWER, PH.D., PROFESSOR, SCHOOL OF
ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY
Mr. Serwer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for this
opportunity to testify on the pathway to peace for Kosovo and
Serbia, which has been a long and difficult one. With your
permission, I will summarize and submit my full testimony for
the record.
I would like to make five points. First, this is a good
agreement. If fully implemented, it will go a long way to
establishing democratically validated institutions as well as
clear legal and police authority on the whole territory of
Kosovo while allowing ample self-governance for Serbs in
northern Kosovo on many other issues, in fact, ample self-
governance for Serbs throughout Kosovo.
Second, implementation will be a challenge, one that
requires Pristina to make integration attractive, and Belgrade
to end the financing that makes resistance in northern Kosovo
possible. Belgrade and Pristina will need to cooperate to end
the smuggling of tax-free goods that has enriched organized
crime and spoilers, both Serb and Albanian.
Third, the agreement should end any discussion of exchange
of territory between Kosovo and Serbia which, in my view, is a
bad idea that risks destabilizing Bosnia, Macedonia, and even
Serbia proper. We should work to make northern Kosovo a model
of win-win reintegration for the rest of the Balkans.
Fourth, Belgrade and Pristina have taken an important step
toward normalizing relations, but they will need to do more,
including eventual recognition and exchange of Ambassadors. If
that does not happen neither will be able to get into the EU
and both may try to arm themselves for a possible new
confrontation. In accordance with this agreement, I would note,
each will apply for EU membership as a separate, independent
and sovereign state.
Fifth, we owe props to the EU, and in particular Catherine
Ashton not only for the mediation work she did but also for the
vital incentives the EU provided. The U.S. Government shares
supporting actor credit with leading Lady Ashton, which is as
it should be.
Mr. Chairman, I am relieved that an agreement has been
reached, but still concerned about the future. The Belgrade-
Pristina Dialogue is a classic case of elite pact-making
without a broader peacebuilding process. The underlying drivers
of conflict have not been addressed. Many Serbs and Kosovo
Albanians still think badly of each other and rank themselves
as victims. I agree with you about that.
There has been little mutual acknowledgement of harm. Few
Albanians and Serbs have renewed personal ties and it is
becoming increasingly difficult to do so as many younger people
lack a common language other than English. It is almost 14
years since the end of the NATO-Yugoslavia war. To be self-
sustaining this peace process is going to need to go deeper and
involve many more citizens on both sides.
The road is long, Mr. Chairman, but we are near its end and
we need to keep going in the right direction. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Serwer follows:]
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----------
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, thank you very much for your very
optimistic testimony.
Shirley, are you as optimistic as that gentleman?
STATEMENT OF MS. SHIRLEY CLOYES DIOGUARDI, BALKAN AFFAIRS
ADVISER, ALBANIAN AMERICAN CIVIC LEAGUE
Ms. Cloyes DioGuardi. I regret to say I am not. Mr.
Chairman, first of all, thank you for giving me the opportunity
to testify. I will be submitting my testimony for the record
and summarizing it here. I would also like to take this
opportunity to append to my testimony a recent article in the
Eurasia Review by Faton Bislimi, entitled, ``The Politics of
Compromise is Compromising Kosovo's Future.''
Mr. Rohrabacher. With no objections that will be attached
to your testimony.
Ms. Cloyes DioGuardi. Thank you. I want to note that it is
primarily in this hearing room among all the governmental
bodies in the West that the hard questions about the Balkan
conflict have been asked over the past two decades. Under
former chairmen Gilman, Hyde, Lantos, the serious effort was
made to reveal and explore the realities on the ground in South
Central Europe during Serbian dictator Slobadan Milosevic's
brutal 10-year occupation of Kosova and genocidal march across
the Balkans that ultimately claimed 200,000 lives and left 4
million displaced. It was here that the vote was cast to
support NATO airstrikes against Serbia which finally brought
the Kosova war to an end in 1999, and ended the Balkan wars of
the 1990s.
Mr. Chairman, in my opinion, it cannot be more timely to
have this particular hearing now in your subcommittee raising
questions about the resolution of the Balkan conflict just days
after Catherine Ashton, the European Union's High
Representative, has proclaimed a successful outcome to 10
rounds of talks between Belgrade and Pristina. If the outcome
were genuinely successful this hearing would not be necessary.
But unfortunately, in my opinion, the agreement between
Serbian Prime Minister Dacic and Prime Minister Thaci is a
quick fix. It does not amount to a comprehensive and effective
agreement that will bring lasting peace and stability to the
region. In my opinion, this will only happen when Serbia
recognizes Kosova's sovereignty and its admission to
international institutions, grants equal civil and human rights
to the Albanian majority in the Presheva Valley-on a par, I
might add, with the rights that are currently enjoyed by Serbs
in Kosova-relinquishes its parallel structures in northern
Kosova, and focuses on the economic and political development
of Serbia. Once that happens, Kosova's Government will need to
focus on the establishment of a genuine democracy and rule of
law, something it has failed to do because of its lack of
sovereignty and the corruption of many of its government
officials.
The 15-point agreement on April 19 does not, in my opinion,
as Catherine Ashton has declared, amount to ``a step closer to
Europe for both Serbia and Kosovo.'' On the contrary, it will
allow Serbia to interfere in the internal affairs of Kosova.
With this agreement, Serbia will be allowed to enter into the
membership negotiations with the EU through a false
demonstration of neighborly relations with Kosova and
ultimately to achieve what has always been its primary goal,
the denial of Kosova's sovereignty and the acquisition of
northern Kosova.
Now how have we arrived at this point? It is the result, in
my opinion, of three interconnected patterns in the postwar
period that still continue 13 years after the war. One,
delaying the resolution of Kosova's final status, its
declaration of independence notwithstanding, due to a misguided
Western foreign policy approach that has appeasing Serbia as
its centerpiece. Two, successive U.S. administrations taking a
backseat to Europe when it comes to policy in the Balkans. And
three, Belgrade's efforts to destabilize Kosova with the goal
of making the de facto partition of northern Kosova a legal, de
jure reality.
We had a different chance at war's end. The Clinton
administration and the EU could have recognized Kosova's
inevitable independence, informed Belgrade that it had
forfeited its legitimacy to govern Kosova, and set Serbia on a
path to democratization. But as we know this isn't what
happened. Kosova became a protectorate of the U.N., and even
today because of a large number of member states in the U.N.
General Assembly have not recognized Kosova's sovereignty, and
especially because five member states in the EU--Spain, Cyprus,
Greece, Romania, and Slovakia--still refuse to do so, Kosova's
political, economic and social progress, like Bosnia, has been
stymied.
For the past 13 years, almost 14, we have witnessed a
foreign policy in the U.S. State Department that instead of
being prevention-oriented and making human rights the
centerpiece, that it instead has constructed policy frameworks
to delay the resolution of Kosova's final status and admission
to the EU, NATO, U.N. and other international institutions. I
don't believe that it serves the United States to continue to
distance itself from the resolution of the Balkan conflict by
deeming it Europe's problem. Contrary to what our State
Department has said today, whenever the United States has taken
a backseat to Europe, and I still believe it has, the situation
in the region has deteriorated because the EU's diverse, 27
member states have not been able to coalesce around a common
foreign policy apart from America's political and military
leadership. That has been true for over a decade.
The Obama administration has been publicly holding the line
that the de facto partition of northern Kosova should not
become legal, but they actually haven't taken any action to
back up the position. For more than two decades, Belgrade has
been able to move into that vacuum created by the lack of unity
and lack of resolve among the EU member nations, between the EU
and the U.S., and all the more so because the guiding principle
of the EU and our Government has been appeasement. Belgrade's
goal has always been to achieve its expansionist aims in Kosova
diplomatically by legalizing the partition of northern Kosova,
just as it achieved its expansionist aims in Bosnia by force
when at the end of the Bosnian war in 1995 it was awarded with
the artificially created Republika Srpska.
Ever since the war ended in June '99, there has been an
effort to destabilize the north. Now, and I will conclude, in a
final push to resolve the conflict between Belgrade and
Pristina in order to achieve the principle of exiting the
region, the EU, with the support of the U.S. Government, has
proclaimed an agreement that unfortunately papers over the
roots of the conflict and the realities on the ground. The
Balkans are again at risk because the current agreement does
not grapple with the roots of the Balkan conflict and doesn't
carve out a real solution.
I think the time has come to ask all parties, the U.S.
Government, the EU, Serbia, what do they really want? Will
Belgrade struggle to retain Kosova at all costs, and will
Serbia become part of Europe? The current accord enables
Belgrade to enter into membership talks with the EU but without
dismantling the structures of northern Kosova, without
recognizing Kosova's sovereignty, without acknowledging
Kosova's right to enter bodies. Will the U.S. and the EU decide
what they really want--a whole, undivided, peaceful,
democratic, and prosperous EU, or a periphery of failed, aid-
dependent societies that saddle it with economic and law
enforcement responsibilities?
To prevent a costly and potentially deadly conflict going
forward, the West will have to rethink its diplomatic strategy.
We need a new paradigm for how we handle foreign policy in the
Balkans and elsewhere, again one that emphasizes conflict
prevention and human rights not stability at all costs. Thank
you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Cloyes DioGuardi follows:]
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----------
Mr. Rohrabacher. Let me add one phrase and then we will go
onto the questions afterwards from your presentation. And does
Kosovo, how long will they insist on hanging on to an area
where the vast majority, 90 percent of the people, don't want
to be part of Kosovo in the same way they didn't want to be
part of Serbia?
Mr. Kesic, you may proceed with your testimony.
STATEMENT OF MR. OBRAD KESIC, SENIOR PARTNER, TSM GLOBAL
CONSULTANTS, LLC
Mr. Kesic. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I ask that my complete
statement be entered into the record.
Mr. Rohrabacher. It certainly will be, thank you.
Mr. Kesic. Thank you. One quick question for you. Can I
depart from my prepared statement for 1 minute?
Mr. Rohrabacher. You may depart from your prepared
statement for the whole testimony, and your testimony will be
put into the record, but you have got 5 minutes.
Mr. Kesic. Okay. That is fine. That is all I will need. I
want to respond to something that you actually initiated in the
discussion with Jonathan Moore. And that is the question about
the issue of partition or allowing self-determination. And I
will come back to this from my full statement. But the one
question that has really perplexed not only Serbs but also some
experts in this town is why the U.S. Government insists on
taking every option off the table and claiming that partition
is destructive when they partitioned Serbia? There seemed to be
no qualms about changing the borders of Serbia, but yet they
all of sudden have found the religion, true religion, when it
comes to changing any other borders.
And I think your position is legitimate. That is not to say
that I agree with it, but I believe it is a question that needs
to be asked, and this is a timely hearing to pose questions
like that as well as the questions that Congressman Poe posed
about the discrepancy between justice and how justice and the
rule of law are interpreted when it comes to trying to push
forward the independence of Kosovo.
Now having said that let me go back and try to explain to
you why Serbs are very skeptical about this agreement as a
whole. Even those who have signed this agreement have expressed
skepticism and have claimed that they signed on the basis that
if they didn't they would be forced to accept the worst
reality. So it wasn't out of free will as they would portray
it, it was coerced signature. And of course that leaves
questions of implementation, and there we agree in terms of the
skepticism that we share about the pitfalls of continuing
dialogue and trying to implement something that from the start
is difficult to implement.
Now many Serbs view that the U.S. and the EU have shown a
consistent pattern of lying about their commitment to protect
Serbs in Kosovo. During the '99 NATO intervention, Serbs were
told that NATO, following the withdrawal of Serbian police and
army, would protect them. Since the entry of NATO into Kosovo
in June 1999, over 250,000 non-Albanians were driven from their
homes through violence, intimidation and harassment. According
to the OSCE Kosovo Mission in a report of October 2012, 235,000
non-Albanians remain displaced.
Also the U.S. constantly, and the EU constantly move the
goalpost. The Serbs were promised that status would be dealt
with after standards were implemented, then once that proved to
be impossible they told the Serbs that it would be standards
and status simultaneously. Then when Kosovo proclaimed
independence they were told that standards would come after
status. We are still waiting to this day to deal with the
standards. Serbs do not have confidence in the word of the U.S.
and the EU.
Secondly, many Serbs also question the selective
application of international law by the U.S. and the EU. When
the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was disintegrating
in violence and conflict, the Badinter Committee ruled that
territorial sovereignty and integrity of the republics
prevailed over the rights of national groups to self-
determination, thus holding that Slovenia, Croatia and the four
republics have the right to partition Yugoslavia, while at the
same time being entitled to their own territorial integrity
regardless of the demands of the Krajina Serbs and the Bosnian
Serbs to self-determination. It should be noted that the
Commission held that this was also was the case with Serbia
itself. Most Serbs wonder why it seems that everybody but Serbs
have a right to self-determination.
The third point is that Serbs are also upset with what
seems to be constant moving of goalposts by the EU and the U.S.
when it comes to conditionality regarding Serbia's entry into
the EU. I just want to move to my recommendations and I will
end there.
The first recommendation is the U.S. and the EU should
firmly oppose any use of violence especially directed or
threatened against the Serbs in the rth of Kosovo no matter
from whom that threat comes from. Secondly, the EU should
engage the Serbian leaders in the north of Kosovo and begin a
series of discussions that would lead to their active
involvement in all negotiations that concern their future.
Third, the EU and the U.S. should reconsider all potential
options for the northern Serb communities including enhanced
autonomy, parallel shared sovereignty, the federalization-
regionalization of Kosovo and even allowing them the right to
self-determination.
Fourth, the EU should be encouraged to formally and
publicly announce all of the remaining conditions being put
before Serbia and Kosovo. That the U.S. should insist that this
list be considered final and that no additional conditions be
added without the consensus of all EU members.
Fifth, the EU and the U.S. must demand that the Albanian
dominated Kosovo Government increase its efforts to protect the
rights of Serbs and other non-Albanians throughout the
remaining territory under its control. Sixth, the U.S. Congress
should organize additional hearings focusing attention and
building support for action in improving human, minority and
civil rights of Serbs and other non-Albanians in Kosovo.
And finally, the EU-sponsored talks between Belgrade and
Pristina should be continued but refocused on technical issues
such as property rights, et cetera, so that there could be a
gradual building of goodwill, so that then we can address this
other issue of status. And once the issue of status is
addressed then the U.N. should be present since it will take a
Security Council resolution to resolve the issue of status and
formalize it.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kesic follows:]
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Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much for your very poignant
presentation.
And Mr. Gjoni?
STATEMENT OF MR. ROLAND GJONI, JD, LLM (FORMER SENIOR LEGAL AND
POLICY ADVISOR TO EFFECTIVE MUNICIPALITIES INITIATIVE IN
KOSOVO)
Mr. Gjoni. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and dear members of
committee. I would like to say that I have made a full written
statement which I wish, with your permission, to be included as
a part of the record, and I hereby summarize the main elements
of it.
Mr. Rohrabacher. And no objection, so ordered.
Mr. Gjoni. So my presentation today is mainly based from a
policymaking perspective. I come here after working with
Pristina institutions and many extensive experience in Serb
communities in Kosovo with the establishment of post
independence municipalities. So I will explain the positions of
the parties when this EU-brokered agreement started, where did
it end, and what does it mean for the future or the sustainable
peace in the Balkans.
First, I must say that in October 2012, EU High
Representative Ashton managed to bring together for the first
time after independence the two prime ministers, and the
central issue revolved around the status of the northern
predominately Serb municipalities. Pristina started from the
prospective that the Ahtisaari Plan was sufficient to address
all potential concerns of Serb community in Kosovo in terms of
cultural preservation, leaving Serbs within Kosovo. And Serbia
started with a new political platform for discussions with
Pristina institutions which provided extensive powers for a
Serb community in the north Kosovo extending as well in the
south enclaves.
After several rounds, with several workouts from both
representative delegations, we have now seen one rejection on
4th of April by the Prime Minister of Serbia arguing that what
has been offered by EU does not address the concerns of the
Serb community in the north. And on 19th of April we have a 15-
point agreement. This is now important to see what the position
of the parties came to be after the renewed talks.
Now Kosovo has gone beyond the Ahtisaari Plan in accepting,
partially, the Serbian requests. For one, elevating the status
of the Serb community to almost an autonomous monoethnic entity
allowing the four municipalities to coalesce and have the
police commander for the region and four police stations, a
separate panel of judges, and I hope it is not true but it has
been reported that under guarantees from NATO it has been
agreed that no Kosovo Security intelligence or police forces
will ever access or operate or in the area. Now this as you may
better know from MCulloch v. Maryland in the United States, it
is very consequentials for the territorial integrity of Kosovo,
because even in Federal states, the Federal Government can and
should in the limited areas where it is sovereign, intervene
for different reasons. In this particular case, it appears that
no Kosovo institution can ever reach there even if it is about
scenarios of rebellious attitudes from a local population.
So the second thing that I would like to point out is that
it has been during the Ahtisaari talks the policy of
international EU and U.S. negotiators that a human rights based
approach and not a territorial based approach is the solution
to Kosovo's future. And we have looked carefully to Ohrid
Agreement and Bosnia, and without any doubt people thought back
then that the best institutional mix for ensuring all
communities in Kosovo was a human rights minority based
approach modeled around Ohrid. What we see now, we see a
further territorialization of politics, which is a departure
from the concept of a multi-ethnic society, which is the
lynchpin of Ahtisaari incorporated in Kosovo institution.
The second problem that I see in this agreement is that it
is uneven. While we can see the move of Kosovo into approaching
or accommodating the Serb community, it has not been the
persistence of EU to ensure that at least Kosovo is not blocked
in the membership in the U.N. system. Of course there is some
thrown-away provision about not blocking each other on U.N.
integration, but what does that mean when five nations don't
recognize Kosovo anyway, so what can Serbia help there, I don't
understand.
And the third is, where do we go from now? I think if there
is any good thing that this has shown, is that EU regardless of
economic downturn and crisis has a significant appeal in the
western Balkans and it may be the only thing that Albanians and
Serbs agree on is the EU integration. Therefore, I think,
first, there is no room for complacency here. Second, there
should be a point where EU and U.S. redirect the parties toward
a comprehensive deal which deals with missing persons, which
deals with war reparations, which deals with border
demarcations and reciprocity in terms of how we treat
minorities no matter where they are straddled.
And this is why I think the U.S. has a significant role to
back this agreement and ensure this is only a first step, very
pragmatic though. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gjoni follows:]
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----------
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much for your testimony,
and we will be anxious to read your written testimony as well.
So you are still waiting for this comprehensive agreement to be
brought on by the Europeans and the Americans. After 12 years
of waiting, hope springs eternal.
Mr. Churcher, you are next.
STATEMENT OF MR. ROBERT A. CHURCHER (FORMER DIRECTOR,
INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP IN PRISHTINA)
Mr. Churcher. Mr. Chairman, firstly, I want to thank you
and the members for the honor of being able to testify here. I
would then say that I would like to submit my testimony for the
record.
I should start with an interjection to say that you have,
really, very much taken the words out of my mouth. My views
very much reflect yours. Despite the difficulties, I think that
a better settlement would be self-determination in some way. I
do appreciate the difficulties with it. Now let me summarize my
views about this new EU-brokered agreement.
In contrast to many, certainly outside of this room, I do
not believe that it is a good or workable agreement.
International commentators have already made the agreement out
to be wonderful, but as people say, the devil is in the detail.
In reality, without any recognition of Kosovo by Serbia, it
leaves Pristina in limbo. There will be a roadblocked Kosovo,
and the agreement will enable the creation of a new Republika
Srpska in the north of Kosovo.
Without recognition there is no way forward for Kosovo.
Kosovo will remain dysfunctional in the absence of any real
legal sovereign status, and Serbs will continue to want to
claim it or claim it back. Unfortunately, to be frank, this
agreement has been much more about making the new EU Foreign
Service, and in particular its leader Catherine Ashton, look
good rather than producing any long-term sustainable solution
to the Balkans. In my view, this was any agreement at any cost,
whatever it took to agree it.
Without including the recognition of Kosovo by Serbia, the
agreement simply ratifies what already exists--a Serb-run
statelet in the north of Kosovo. All that will be changed is
that it will now be a legal Serb-run statelet within the north
of Kosovo. Serbia's failure to recognize the loss of Kosovo is
a failure to recognize the defeat of the Serbian project to
drive the Kosovos out of Kosovo in the 1990s. I regard it as
admirable that the United States intervened decisively in the
Bosnian-Kosovo wars, but find it puzzling and disappointing
that the resulting peace agreements have been designed to
appease Serbia rather than to create stability and lasting
solutions in the Balkans.
A much better solution than the present agreement might
have been an agreement for territorial exchange, swapping the
new, now Serb-populated north with the still Albanian speaking
Presheva and Bujanovac Valleys. In contrast to the State
Department speaker's view, I can assure you that the local
people in Presheva do not share the feeling that Serbia is
looking after their human rights. Unfortunately, this idea is
probably not yet practical in international terms, but there
has to be a way forward. The situation ratified by the new
agreement will be disastrous in enabling the establishment of a
second Republika Srpska.
The only answer, in my view, is that the United States
should use its international influence to press for Serbia to
recognize Kosovo, and thus finally end the conflict and enable
the Kosovo Government to move forward from what will be
otherwise an endless uncertainty. Without recognition I believe
we are doomed to perpetuating instability in the Balkans which
is not in the United States' interest or that of anyone else.
And then let me conclude by pointing out, there is
absolutely no use to rely on Europe, unfortunately, to sort
this out. Europe remains completely disunited and dysfunctional
in its dealings with Kosovo, as it was and is in Bosnia. As in
1999, only the United States has sufficient weight and
influence to bring the Serbs to recognize reality that Kosovo
is lost and that in order for both countries to move forward
they need to recognize it. Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Churcher follows:]
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Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, I want to thank all of our
witnesses, and I certainly appreciate your last comments there,
of course. Let me just note and then we will have a dialogue, a
little back and forth.
This religious conviction that you cannot change borders or
it will create all sorts of problems is, I think, the major
obstacle to having a significant peace agreement between these
two entities, between the Kosovars and the Serbs. And it is our
own Government that is pushing this nonsense. It is nonsense. I
mean the Czechs and the Slovaks knew that they couldn't get
along so they divided, and they have changed the border. The
border what now became Czechs and Slovaks in two separate
countries. You had the north and south Sudan. They believe that
we should forcibly keep the north and south Sudan together?
What would that bring? It would bring a lot of bloodshed, that
is what it would bring.
What about Ireland? Wouldn't it be how horrible to think
that we are going to change the borders of Great Britain itself
by letting these--so what if the Irish want to have
independence, the vast majority? They are still part of the
British Empire, and here it is. We can't change the border of
the British Empire to just include the areas in the northern
part of Ireland that happen to be a majority of Protestant.
That was a good decision. That was a good decision. Let us end
the conflict and agree that those people in the northern part
of Ireland have the right to make their decision with a ballot
box. But we are being told here, no, no, oh, can't do that.
Then of course we do have to, as Mr. Kesic said, if we
accept the fact that the United States and the allies had any
moral foundation to coming in to help Kosovo--I want you to
know of course that I was a huge supporter of Kosovo--and
coming in to help them win their freedom and independence,
because I believe in their right to make that determination,
national self-determination. Well, if the people in the north
don't have, how come Kosovo had that right to break away from
Serbia? That changed borders.
And I believe Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, I seem to
remember the Soviet Union as it was breaking up say, no, no,
this is a part of Russia. It doesn't make any difference what
those people want. They are part of Russia. And there are, of
course do we think that it was really, we should have
encouraged the people of Bangladesh to knuckle under and stay
part of Pakistan? Because that is going to change the borders
of Pakistan.
And by the way Pakistan, what borders do they have? Who
created Pakistan? Pakistan and most of the things we are
talking about were created by the colonial imperialists of 150
years ago and 200 years ago. And we are saying we have to stick
with the decision of some drunken royalty in one of these
countries who decided this is where the borders are going to be
now? It is ridiculous. And what we have done by this fantasy
that that is off the table, we have left us in a situation
where our friends the Kosovars have now, it looks like from
this agreement, they have now been put into a position of
getting nothing, because this word that you can call autonomy
authority all you want, but what we have here is an official
recognition of the autonomy of those four northern provinces.
And our friends in Kosovo, who I happen to be on their
side, have got nothing to show for it. At least if we could
have an honest agreement on the right of self-determination,
which is what the people of Kosovo believe in, that is why they
declared their independence, at least we could have some sort
of a readjustment of a border that includes people who want to
be in the country that now has emerged because of the changes
that have taken place historically.
So I am very disturbed by this settlement. This settlement
will not lead to peace. This settlement will encourage those
Serbs in the northern part, these four provinces, to work with
Belgrade and Belgrade to work with them in order to keep this
sort of combative relationship going, and it will not create
less, it will create more tensions. And that is just my
personal observations. And it seems to be that the Presheva
Valley and the fact that you have so many Kosovars living
there, it is almost the same sizes as the four northern
provinces, almost same territory, almost same population, that
it is a natural way for Kosovo and Serbia to do something real.
Not just play with words about autonomy versus authority, but
something real that could then serve as the basis for them
starting to get along and try to open up their borders, try to
have free trade between them, try to have respect for each
other's citizens. Because we now aren't forcing people into a
recognition of something that they don't want and they don't
culturally feel right and historically feel right about it.
So all of these countries what I just mentioned, especially
the Irish, can you imagine if Britain would have said that and
wanted to keep the Irish in? That would have been a disaster
for Great Britain as well as, I might add, for Pakistan and
Bangladesh and the rest of the ones. If any of you have a
comment on what I just said, please feel free. Yes, sir?
Mr. Serwer. Mr. Chairman, with due respect----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Absolutely. Feel free to disagree with
everything that I have said.
Mr. Serwer. I do disagree.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay. Yes, sir.
Mr. Serwer. I disagree because I think you are failing to
make some important distinctions between moving the border to
accommodate ethnic differences and changing the status of an
existing boundary or border, which is what we have done in the
Balkans.
Mr. Rohrabacher. So moving the border and changing the
border are two different things?
Mr. Serwer. Moving the border and changing its status are
two completely different things. Moving the border to
accommodate ethnic differences leads to an infinity of movement
of borders. It can never be----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, isn't that what we did with Kosovo?
Isn't that what----
Mr. Serwer. No, we did not do that with Kosovo. We kept the
boundary between the province of Kosovo, the one time Serbian
province of Kosovo, and Serbia proper. We kept that exactly
where it is. That is why we have the problem that we have.
Mr. Rohrabacher. By the way, who drew those borders?
Mr. Serwer. Those borders were drawn under Tito, they were
changed various times.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Tito, was he a democratically elected----
Mr. Serwer. No, but look----
Mr. Rohrabacher. How about Stalin changing the borders of
Ossetia and Abkhazia for Georgia?
Mr. Serwer. If you set off an infinite series of border
changes you also precipitate ethnic cleansing, and that would
be a disaster for the Balkans. I can guarantee you that if the
north of Kosovo is lost to Kosovo, you will have radical
Albanians who will seek to expel Serbs from south of the Ibar
and who will seek union with Albania and with Macedonia. You
would say, let them. I say that is a scenario for an extreme
outburst of violence.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Actually, I would never say, let them. I
believe that keeping large hunks of people who are contiguous
to another border can't be in the middle of a country
obviously, but keeping them artificially in that other country
is what creates violence, which creates people wanting to
commit some sort of attack on those people, and their
retalitation against those. It has happened over and over
again.
And what doesn't create, I mean this idea that we are going
to instill in the rule of law and that that is what is going to
make the Irish give up their notion that they want to be
independent or the Bangladeshis or the people, the Serbs north
of that river going to give up their consciousness as being
Serbs, it doesn't work that way.
Mr. Serwer. Nobody is asking them to give up the
consciousness of being Serbs. In fact, there are all sorts of
provisions in the Ahtisaari Plan for maintaining the links to
Serbia. They get dual citizenship. But to open Pandora's box
and allow an infinite series of border changes to accommodate
ethnic differences would be a mistake. There are Bosniaks in
Serbia who would want to be part of Bosnia.
Mr. Rohrabacher. And so you believe that the boundaries set
up by brutal tyrants and kings and royalty have to be
maintained because it is going to open Pandora's box, even
though there are significant groups of people who have a
cultural and historical identification with each other who want
to become a nation, but if violates what King Charles or some
monarch someplace did back 2 or 3 years ago----
Mr. Serwer. I believe that everybody's rights should be
protected within the borders in which they happen to find
themselves, yes, because anything else----
Mr. Rohrabacher. So you oppose the Kosovars' independence?
Mr. Serwer [continuing]. Leads to death and destruction.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay, but you then oppose Kosovars', when
they rose up and said no, we want to be independent, you were
opposed to that, right, because that would change the borders
of Serbia?
Mr. Serwer. I was not the first one to endorse independence
for Kosovo, I will say that. But the behavior of Serbia in
response to that uprising unquestionably made independence the
only solution. It was achieved not by moving the border to
accommodate ethnic difference, but by changing the status of a
preexisting border. And I believe that that decision saved
lives, yes.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Let me suggest to you that, and then I
will go to the panel, suggest to you that had, when Yugoslavia
just broke up, had the West been very clear that different
people have a right to vote on their self-determination and
included the Kosovars in that, that would have been a whole,
the bloodshed that happened wouldn't have happened. Instead we
had Jim Baker down there misstating our case to, was it
Milosevic, and let him think that well, whatever force he needs
to use to keep things together that is, we are looking for you
to be the force down here of stability. And of course that just
was a go-get-them type of thing.
Shirley, and then Mr. Kesic, and then Mr. Engel will have a
chance or whoever else wants to jump in. Yes?
Ms. Cloyes DioGuardi. To my colleague I want to ask a
question because I want to ask many. Why are we always talking
about potential Albanian violence in Macedonia, in the north?
Why is that happening? I think one of our problems is the
constant discussion of a kind of false parity and
characterization of a war that was supposedly based on ethnic
and religious differences. This was not the case.
This was a land grab. And we sat back as you know, our
State Department, the EU, while Milosevic made his genocidal
march across Europe over 10 years. What I would like to see
right now is for this agreement to be ground to a halt, because
I understand very much what you are trying to say about the
issue of Presheva and the north. But the problem is we are in
trouble now. Presheva, the Albanian majority of Presheva, were
never brought to the discussion to begin with.
And Mr. Churcher, was I correct in saying the State
Department was wrong when it said that Mr. Moore said that the
Albanians in the Presheva Valley had civil rights and human
rights protections? That is absolutely not the case. They have
second, if not third-class citizenship. So how do we do
something now to turn this around so that everyone is forced to
look at the true conditions of what is happening in the
Albanian scene?
Mr. Rohrabacher. What we could do is we can make believe
that the word authority and autonomy just have different
meanings and we could make pretend what those words mean.
Ms. Cloyes DioGuardi. Well, we already have because the
Association of Serbian Municipalities is, in effect, an
autonomous region already. To a great extent we have lost the
north.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Especially when you suggest that the
forces of the country can't go into the area, and that is not
an autonomy. Mr. Kesic, do you have a comment?
Mr. Kesic. Yes, Mr. Chairman. It is, for me, the most
frustrating thing is this relative moralism that comes out in
the official position of the U.S. Government, but also in terms
of some analysts here in Washington, DC, and also in Europe.
You have this argument, for example, that you can change the
borders of Yugoslavia. And by the way, the U.S. Government was
against that at that time as you know, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rohrabacher. That is right.
Mr. Kesic. We opposed it, but it happened. Imperial powers
have come to the Balkans throughout history believing that they
were setting borders that were going to last for all ages.
Every single time the borders changed. We are just the latest
of the great powers who have come into the region, and our
hubris tells us that what we are going to do is going to last
for all time. History will prove us wrong, unfortunately, I
just hope it is not through more bloodshed.
Now to go back and to say as was said here, for example,
that Serbia somehow lost its right to Kosovo because of the use
of violence, then I would lay before the question, what is that
magic point where a country loses the right to part of its
country because of ethnic persecution and violation? Is it
60,000 Kurds in Turkey that are killed? Is it 230,000 Serbs and
non-Albanians driven out of Kosovo? What is that magic point
where a people become entitled to self-determination? It would
be very useful as a guideline for all of these oppressed
peoples throughout the world to understand, what is the
position of the U.S. Government on this?
Mr. Rohrabacher. I appreciate that comment, and if you do
believe in self-determination by a vote of the people you don't
have to worry about that, do you, because you have got that one
standard. And yes, why don't we go right on down and then we
will let Mr. Engel have his chance to question. Yes, sir?
Mr. Gjoni. Mr. Chairman, with your permission I will come
back to a point that you, in passing, mentioned about relying
more on internationals even after 13 years. And I would
respectfully disagree with you. What I am saying in my
presentation, and it is clear in the full, written statement,
is that I don't believe in hypocrisy. If in 2008, Russia, EU
and U.S. did a lot of arm twisting to say to Kosovo that the
way forward is a melting pot. Now you either stick to it or you
say let us go to border changes, open all the cards, let us
talk about Albania and nationalism effects in Bosnia and
Croatia, but openly so, just put the cards on the table.
So my perspective is that I think that the idea of EU is to
Europeanize the Balkans, not to further Balkanize the north,
and wait for the moment when Serbia or Kosovo can out-trick,
out-smart, or out-maneuver each other through the help of great
powers. Mine is for a no-borders Balkans where minorities just
leave the Serbs or Albanians where they are, and there are 127
laws adopted for that matter in Kosovo. Thanks.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Again, I don't know why that you have a
vast majority of people in a certain area that that is not to
be taken into consideration. That their views are, again, we
have got Serbians who are north of that river who do not want
to be part of this country, and there is a natural border, and
it is the same number of Kosovars just in a valley not too far
from there in about the same area, but nobody wants to talk
about adjusting a border because of this--and I will have to
say it from my point of view, and I know you are very educated
people who can disagree honestly on it--but this absolutely
hysterical idea that borders can't change.
It is people, we as the United States started with what,
we, the people of the United States, I mean we are here because
we are declaring our independence. We declared our independence
from Great Britain. That is what the Declaration of
Independence was, that the people have a right by a majority to
determine their future.
And last question, and then Mr. Engel. Yes, sir? Or a
comment, go right ahead.
Mr. Churcher. To reenforce your remarks about borders----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, then you can have twice as much
time.
Mr. Churcher [continuing]. And to comment on Mr. Serwer's
point. He referred all the time to opening the possibility of
an infinity of changes, and he skated over slightly the fact
that there have, in fact, been an infinity of changes in this
particular area, in 1912, in the 1920s and '30s, again in the
'50s. At times in Yugoslavia, different ministries used
different borders in this area. There was nothing fixed or
immutable about these borders. And as you said before, my view
remains that if people wish to change them voluntarily, that is
entirely different from imposed border changes. The key is, if
people want to vote to be somewhere else then they should be
able to.
And just then very quickly to answer two points which came
up earlier. The Yellow House was remarked to be by rumor in
Kosovo. It is not. It was rumored to be in Burrel, which is in
Albania, just as a point. My end view is that those stories are
fantasy, but you wouldn't want to catch a cold in Burrel, let
alone have a transplant.
And finally, to answer your question about the KSF in the
north, my understanding is that there is a further sort of
sidebar within this agreement that, in fact, the present
Serbian Civil Defense Force in the north will in some way
attempt to be incorporated within the Kosovo Security Forces as
a Serb part in the north, again a separate thing under the same
sort of arrangements that have been made for the police and
justice sectors. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, thank you very much. It would seem
to be that--and then Mr. Engel can, or Mr. Keating, would you
mind if Mr. Engel----
Mr. Keating. I was just going to say, Mr. Chairman----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay.
Mr. Keating [continuing]. Why don't we yield, with your
permission, to Mr. Engel?
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay, and let me just, one point and that
is, it seems to me if we have had armed forces there, and I
have visited our troops there many times, if we have armed
forces there and not just from our country but from all these
countries, it would be better to have them there to strongly
and emphatically enforce a pre-election, run the election for
people to determine how they want to run, what sovereignty they
are willing to give, rather than have a force there for 13
years just to deter any type of ethnic violence that might
happen, and hope that in another 20 years from now they will
forget the historic differences between them.
Mr. Engel?
Mr. Engel. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and you and I
have had many, many, many discussions on this through the
years. And while we may disagree on this point, you have
certainly, as I said in my opening statement, been a champion
for freedom in the region. And since I was among the first, if
not the first person, Member of Congress, to endorse the
independence of Kosovo, and we looked for people who would take
principled position on this issue, you were right there all the
time as well. So I want to say that publicly because I have
lived with this issue for many years and you were always right
there fighting for peace and justice.
I essentially disagree with moving the borders. If you
could somehow just do it with Kosovo and Serbia and kind of
move the borders and it would have no ramifications on any
other place in the Balkans I would say, well, okay, if both
sides agree let us just do it and do it quickly, and that would
be it. But I do agree with Mr. Serwer that this would just, in
the Balkans anyway what would you do with western Macedonia
which is a vast majority Albanian? What would you do in Bosnia
when Republika Srpska wants to join Serbia? And you would just
keep going, keep going. There would almost be no end. But I do
know how sincere you are and how thoughtful you have been with
all these issues.
I really wanted to talk about the agreement, because I was
told that most of you, if not all of you, didn't like this
agreement between the Kosovars and the Serbs. I like the
agreement. I like it not because I think every part of it is
just, I like it because I think it offers the potential of hope
and peace to the Balkans. I would hope that ultimately both
Kosovo and Serbia would be members of the EU, and I think when
the people are all in the EU, borders are not going to be that
important because people will have access to all places.
I mean I was, I think, the first Member of Congress to
advocate for an independent and free Kosovo, but I also set up
a time that Serbs had a lot of interest there that needed to be
respected, for instance, monasteries and things like that. I
think it is possible to do that.
I have met with Slobodan Petrovic. He is the deputy Prime
Minister in Kosovo. I have met with him in Kosovo. I have met
with him in Washington. I have met with him in New York. He
plays a very important role. I know perhaps many Serbs don't
like it, but I have watched him and I have seen him be very
constructive. He is a Serb and he is part of the majority in
the Kosovo Parliament and a deputy Prime Minister. I met him in
the municipality of Gracanica. That is a Serb municipality in
Kosovo. I sat and met with him and bunch of other Serbs who are
participating in the system, in the election. We had lunch. We
sat for hours and hours, and had very, very frank talks.
I would remind everybody here that most of the Serbs, the
majority of the Serbs living in Kosovo are in southern Kosovo
not in northern Kosovo. When Serbs south of the Ibar first
voted in Kosovo they said they would only vote in local
elections, but then they voted in Kosovo's national elections.
So these things can work if people really put their minds to
it. In negotiations you don't get everything you want. I mean
that is the point of negotiations. You get what you need to get
and the other side gets what they need to get, and if you have
an agreement you move on from there.
I think that Prime Minister Thaci had pressure on him, and
I think he passed the test and was very courageous in moving
forward with this agreement. And I think the same for Prime
Minister Dacic, also had pressure. Sometimes, I think you have
got to look beyond the rhetoric. You have got to look beyond
the passion. In the Balkans, especially, there are all kinds of
grievances. Grievances, slights that have been going on for
centuries. I would hope that this agreement would be a small
step in moving the Balkans into the 21st century. And again, I
hope that Kosovo and Serbia become part of the EU and that
borders would not be that important any more.
So I just wanted to say that. I think it is easy to take a
position in opposition to agreements where not everybody gets
everything that they want, but I think it is a courageous step
forward and I think it will be good for the region. And I have
in my 24, now 25 years in Congress, I have not worked harder on
any issue than I have worked on this issue. I know it backwards
and forwards. I respect everybody's opinion up here. You are
all good witnesses and intelligent people and have your vantage
points. But I think that when you boil it all down, this
agreement has some promise for the future, and I hope it will
be implemented and I hope we will take little steps that will
be moving forward.
And I think the role of the United States in this is very,
very important because we are trusted in the region. I
certainly know the Albanian community in the Balkans better
than I know any community in the Balkans, and I know that the
Albanians like and trust the United States and are very pro-
West. The day that Kosovo issued its independence, there were
more American flags in the streets of Pristina than there were
Albanian or any other kind of flags. So there is a very strong
tie in the Albanian communities of Kosovo, and Albania,
frankly, of trusting the United States, of a belief in the
United States, and wanting to work with the United States.
So I hope the administration will be there every step of
the way. And it doesn't mean it is going to be easy, and it
doesn't mean that there still aren't perceived slights and
threats and everything on both sides. But I hope it means we
are moving forward, and I hope the United States is there every
step of the way. Because I don't believe that there can be as
much progress without the United States right there as there is
with the United States right there. And I thank you, Mr.
Chairman, for letting me express these sentiments.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Might I suggest to my colleague that if
they have some comments, you might want to have a little
dialogue with our panel?
Mr. Engel. Sure.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Whoever, go.
But you are in charge of pointing out who you want here.
Mr. Engel. Okay. Shirley, yes.
Ms. Cloyes DioGuardi. Congressman Engel, thank you. I very
much agree with your long-term perspective. I think there is no
one at this panel who would not want, obviously, just and
lasting peace and stability in the region, and certainly,
ultimately, the integration of the EU. But I think we have to
look at the specifics of this issue. For example, you have said
something, I think, that is very important. The majority of
Kosova Serbs live in the central and southern part, two-thirds
do. Sixty-six percent of the Kosova Serbs voted in the last
election. Those Serbs are well integrated into Kosova. Why is
it that the north is a different story?
And I am concerned that we tend to forget about how the
north became to be. I mean after the war ended, the French took
over the area. It became the part of Kosova that Albanians were
thrust out of. Yes, there are a majority of Serbs in the north,
but what has transpired since the war is Belgrade extremists,
Serb extremists in the north backed by Belgrade, and we have
had lawlessness, corruption, smuggling, a complete breakdown.
So when we go now, and by the way we should add one other
thing. When independence was declared, what happened? Our own
NATO troops even stood on the sidelines while Serb extremists
blew up customs, courthouses, destroyed many things in
reaction. So now when we look at the current agreement that has
come forward, I think we have to be realistic. Does it solve
the root causes of the crisis? Does it change the conditions in
the north? And the devil is always in the details?
And when you look at the ability of what will be, and
Chairman Rohrabacher talked about it, a police force and an
executive that very much has a lot of autonomy, we will now
see, I think, a different relationship--and this is sad--
between the northern municipalities where four mayors will
basically decide who the Kosova chief of police will be. There
will be a different relationship, potentially, between the
north and the Serb communities in the central and south areas
of Kosova because there isn't any kind of real willingness on
the part of the Belgrade Government for Kosova to succeed in
the future in what you are talking about, long-term development
and integration into Europe.
So this is why I said, before you came back into the room,
to Chairman Rohrabacher, I would like to see this whole
agreement ground to a halt. I know that may be the ultimate
illusion, but if we had more U.S. interaction and less of a
backseat on the part of the administration and an ability to
reconnect at least in a very full engagement during this
process where we are supposedly now going up until April 26th,
look how soon that is, to talk about the implementation, and
that is when we bring Presheva back on the table.
Mr. Engel. Well, I would say this. The incentive for the
Serbs to try to make this happen is that they know that they
cannot become an EU member unless they normalize, to an extent,
their relations with Kosovo. That is the incentive. And
likewise, the Kosovar Albanians understand that if they want to
be integrated into Europe they have got to have some kind of
agreement with the Serbs. So I think that that is the glue that
binds them, and we have to again, America, United States, be
there every step of the way.
Many things similar to what you just said, Shirley--and I
respect the work you have done through the years--was said
about the Serbs in the south. That they would never
participate. That they would never accept it, until people
started participating. And then they saw benefits in their
lives of being part of the Kosovar state. I believe a similar
thing can happen in the north. I think we have to try, and I
think that again while there's no magic wand and obviously
people are born and raised in their families talking about
previous wars 100 and 200 years ago, 500 years ago, and
whatever, that is ingrained in people.
But I think we need to understand that once Belgrade feels
that they may not like everything in the agreement but if it
gets them into the EU that is the price they have to pay. And
conversely, the same thing with the Kosovar Albanians. So I
think that that is the glue that holds them together, the
incentive to get into the European Union. And that is why I
think this is a good agreement. I don't think it is a great
agreement for either side, but I think it is a good agreement
for either side. And I think, again, Thaci and Dacic deserve a
lot of credit for their courage.
Mr. Kesic. Thank you, Mr. Engel. Just a few quick comments
and ideas for you to think about. First, I agree with you. It
would be wonderful when the time comes when borders are
unimportant. But the Serbs in the north have a hard time
understanding, if borders are to become unimportant why are the
borders of Kosovo so important to be established? If the goal
is to make borders irrelevant, why force the Serbs in the north
to accept borders and have to impose it on them, which leads me
to my second statement, which is that the only way this
agreement can be forced on the Serbs in the north is through
the use of force. And I don't think any one of us in this room
would like to see the use of force against anybody in the
region. There has been already too much use of force.
So if we say that this is not an enforceable agreement,
doesn't mean that we don't support the process of negotiations
and the general idea that agreements need to be reached between
conflicting parties, it is just the skepticism that this
particular agreement, for all the reasons that were laid out
from different perspectives, are going to create more problems
on the ground and lead us to this decision of whether or not to
use force. And I hope that this committee as well as the U.S.
Congress comes firmly down against the use of any force against
anybody in the region in any future scenario.
And finally, the EU process I wish could be sped up, but we
have to be realistic. What the remaining countries of the
western Balkans are looking are, first, the very uncertain end
of the line. Nobody knows, first and foremost, what is going to
happen with the EU. Secondly, nobody knows how long the process
will take. We heard the representative of the administration
say it took Croatia 10 years, so that we can then start the
clock rolling perhaps for Serbia for the next 10 years, but we
are not sure. My own opinion is that realistically, in the best
case scenario it will take 15 to 20 years, and in the meantime
we have a security vacuum that needs to be filled.
And I think we need to have everything on the table to
consider including the ideas of the chairman in order to better
approach dealing with these issues in a durable way, in a long-
term way. Thank you.
Mr. Engel. Well, let me say this. I have long felt that
Belgrade was lacking in leadership of people with vision who
would take their people into the future. It is very easy to be
as radical as you want to be. We do it here in this country. It
is human nature. You throw red meat at the crowd. Republicans
do it. Democrats do it. And you can all do that. But I think if
you are really trying to foster a change that it takes
concessions and at least an attempt to understand what the
other side is thinking and needs.
So we can all pick apart this agreement all we want. There
are things anyone could pick apart. I could pick it apart. But
I instead would like to accentuate the positive. I think there
are a lot of positives in this agreement that we can hopefully
see the people of the Balkans building on for the future so
that they could live side by side and have a better future for
their people.
I remember the northern Ireland situation. I thought that
was a situation that would never be solved. And look at it. It
was solved because people decided that it was time to put aside
these fights forever and look toward a better future for their
children. I hope that is done here in the Balkans. I hope it is
done in the Middle East regarding the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict. I think it was done in Ireland. I think that there
are always things that we think should be changed a little bit,
but in negotiations, you don't get everything that you want.
And the incentive, I think, for the people of Kosovo is
that they deserved their independence and that they can be a
country and are a country that will be recognized as an
independent country. It is one thing--when I used to go around
and talk about independence for Kosovo, and again I was the
first Congressman to say that I supported independence and have
worked very hard for it, I used to say, and this is where Mr.
Rohrabacher, because he and I have discussed this many times,
feel strongly about self-determination and the right to exist.
I used to say, it is one thing to say that the former
Yugoslavia should not have broken up and that everybody should
stay together, but once it did break up and once you had
Croatia and all these different countries deciding that they,
Macedonia, et cetera, would be independent, I felt very
strongly that the people of Kosovo had that same right to self-
determination. I hope again that with the EU borders will not
be that important.
And you are right, Mr. Kesic, it might take 10 or 15 years.
I hope not. I hope not. Can I guarantee that it won't? I can't.
But I think if people want to put the past, the bad elements of
the past behind them, I think that extreme nationalism is just
a path to destruction. And maybe trying to forge an agreement
with a gentle push of the United States, maybe that is a better
path to a better future for all the peoples in the Balkans.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Engel, for
all you have done. And his whole career has been trying to be a
positive force in that part of the world. I guess I have been
out trying to stir things up and he has been trying to make
things better. But we both are trying to make things better.
Mr. Engel. You have been trying to make things better too,
and I applaud you for it.
Mr. Rohrabacher. All right. And we have time for just a few
more questions from Mr. Keating, and then we are going to have
to close up.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And there is one
thing I think the people here can get a sense of, we have the
ranking member of the full committee and we have the chairman
here, and their interesting concerns of the Balkans is intense
and it is real and that is a good thing that there is that much
feeling for our country and the representatives to get
involved.
I am newer to the scene. I have a different approach. I
really was going to use the same analogy that Mr. Engel used
with northern Ireland and Ireland in terms of the emotions and
the feelings, and the feeling by most that they would never
succeed. It is interesting, even though it is centuries
difference, some of those same arguments that I have heard you
can say about our country, when we were starting our own
country that there is not a strong enough authority, there is
not a strong enough administration to pull things together. We
are not in a position yet to do those things. And we had some
tough times and we had a civil war along the way, but we have
succeeded in that process here in the United States as well.
So my view that I just want to address the one question on
is just the belief that this cannot be done just with two
countries. That it is really a regional issue, has regional
impact. And I believe, personally, that progress and stability
and prosperity will come through economic means. I think we
have seen it so many times. We have seen it in Europe. We have
seen it throughout the globe. So with the region as a whole as
the context, what we do, I guess if I had to ask one question
given the time, Mr. Serwer, I would just like to say, what do
you think the April 19th agreement would have on the region on
other areas if this is to progress and we make progress, what
would it do with the Presheva Valley area and Serbia,
Macedonia, Bosnia, what could it be? Because I think as hard as
the road is ahead with this agreement there could be great
regional progress. It can be a great example to go forward for
other areas too. Could you address that please?
Mr. Serwer. I agree entirely, Mr. Keating, and it is
suggested in my testimony that northern Kosovo could be a model
of reintegration. I must say, in the initial stages though, I
think there may be some protests in southern Serbia among
Albanians asking for some of the same things that people in the
north are getting in this agreement.
But ultimately I think the point is this. If partition were
to take place you would have real trouble in Macedonia and real
trouble in Bosnia and southern Serbia. With this agreement, as
imperfect as it may be from the point of view of some of my
colleagues, I think you have the potential, if fully
implemented, for a decent sort of reintegration that could
really help with the rest of the Balkans. And it is very much
my hope that the authorities in Pristina and Belgrade will take
the implementation seriously.
And I see no reason why it is unworkable, frankly. It
leaves a large amount of room for self-governance, but it
incorporates the north into the legal constitutional structures
of Kosovo, and if they are sincere about initialing this
agreement, and I think the EU will ensure that they remain
sincere by not giving out any goodies until they continue with
implementation, I think it is workable. I think it could be a
real step forward for the region.
Mr. Keating. Well, I yield back my time, Mr. Chairman. The
hour is late.
Mr. Rohrabacher. I would like to thank our panelists, and
thank you, each and every one. You added, each, a lot of spice
to our meal of ideas, and I want to thank Eliot and our ranking
member for adding to this hearing. I think we have had a very
good discussion and aired a lot of ideas and concepts, and I
appreciate each and every one of you.
The one little thing I left out on my list, I left out of
the list that Montenegro was permitted to have a vote by the
Serbs, Montenegro. And the Serbs could have just said, no, no,
no. Montenegro, that is part of our country. And that is like a
state. It is not really like a separate country. And by doing
that they let those people have their freedom. And I am just
sorry that that didn't happen with Kosovo a long time ago. But
I think the Serbs demonstrated with Montenegro that this type
of thing can work, and I would hope eventually all of these
people understand that these borders are artificial and they
should have free trade and work together. And once you get
something like that going where there are all those countries,
people will be crossing the borders and making money and
building things, and positive things such as that. And that is
a vision we all have is a Balkans at peace and not a Balkans
where people are at war with one another.
So thank you all very much, and this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:48 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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