[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION: POLICY AND GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES
=======================================================================
JOINT HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND POWER
AND THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND THE ECONOMY
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 28, 2013
__________
Serial No. 113-11
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Printed for the use of the Committee on Energy and Commerce
energycommerce.house.gov
_____
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COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
FRED UPTON, Michigan
Chairman
RALPH M. HALL, Texas HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
JOE BARTON, Texas Ranking Member
Chairman Emeritus JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan
ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky Chairman Emeritus
JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey
GREG WALDEN, Oregon BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois
LEE TERRY, Nebraska ANNA G. ESHOO, California
MIKE ROGERS, Michigan ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania GENE GREEN, Texas
MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee LOIS CAPPS, California
Vice Chairman MICHAEL F. DOYLE, Pennsylvania
PHIL GINGREY, Georgia JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
STEVE SCALISE, Louisiana ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York
ROBERT E. LATTA, Ohio JIM MATHESON, Utah
CATHY McMORRIS RODGERS, Washington G.K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina
GREGG HARPER, Mississippi JOHN BARROW, Georgia
LEONARD LANCE, New Jersey DORIS O. MATSUI, California
BILL CASSIDY, Louisiana DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, Virgin
BRETT GUTHRIE, Kentucky Islands
PETE OLSON, Texas KATHY CASTOR, Florida
DAVID B. McKINLEY, West Virginia JOHN P. SARBANES, Maryland
CORY GARDNER, Colorado JERRY McNERNEY, California
MIKE POMPEO, Kansas BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois PETER WELCH, Vermont
H. MORGAN GRIFFITH, Virginia BEN RAY LUJAN, New Mexico
GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida PAUL TONKO, New York
BILL JOHNSON, Missouri
BILLY LONG, Missouri
RENEE L. ELLMERS, North Carolina
Subcommittee on Energy and Power
ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky
Chairman
STEVE SCALISE, Louisiana BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois
Vice Chairman Ranking Member
JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois JERRY McNERNEY, California
JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania PAUL TONKO, New York
LEE TERRY, Nebraska EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ROBERT E. LATTA, Ohio GENE GREEN, Texas
CATHY McMORRIS RODGERS, Washington LOIS CAPPS, California
BILL CASSIDY, Louisiana MICHAEL F. DOYLE, Pennsylvania
PETE OLSON, Texas JOHN BARROW, Georgia
DAVID B. McKINLEY, West Virginia DORIS O. MATSUI, California
CORY GARDNER, Colorado DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, Virgin
MIKE POMPEO, Kansas Islands
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois KATHY CASTOR, Florida
H. MORGAN GRIFFITH, Virginia JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan
JOE BARTON, Texas HENRY A. WAXMAN, California (ex
FRED UPTON, Michigan (ex officio) officio)
------
Subcommittee on Environment and Economy
JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois
Chairman
PHIL GINGREY, Georgia PAUL TONKO, New York
Vice Chairman Ranking Member
RALPH M. HALL, Texas FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey
ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky GENE GREEN, Texas
JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado
TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania LOIS CAPPS, California
ROBERT E. LATTA, Ohio JERRY McNERNEY, California
GREGG HARPER, Mississippi JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan
BILL CASSIDY, Louisiana JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
DAVID B. McKINLEY, West Virginia JOHN BARROW, Georgia
GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida DORIS O. MATSUI, California
BILL JOHNSON, Missouri HENRY A. WAXMAN, California, ex
JOE BARTON, Texas officio
FRED UPTON, Michigan, ex officio
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hon. John Shimkus, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Illinois, opening statement.................................... 1
Prepared statement........................................... 3
Hon. Paul Tonko, a Representative in Congress from the State of
New York, opening statement.................................... 4
Hon. Bobby L. Rush, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Illinois, opening statement................................. 4
Hon. Fred Upton, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Michigan, opening statement.................................... 5
Prepared statement........................................... 6
Hon. Ed Whitfield, a Representative in Congress from the
Commonwealth of Kentucky, opening statement.................... 6
Prepared statement........................................... 7
Hon. Henry A. Waxman, a Representative in Congress from the State
of California, opening statement............................... 21
Prepared statement........................................... 22
Witnesses
Allison Macfarlane, Chairman, Nuclear Regulatory Commission...... 8
Prepared statement........................................... 11
Answers to submitted questions............................... 74
Kristine L. Svinicki, Commissioner, Nuclear Regulatory Commission 23
Answers to submitted questions............................... 108
George Apostolakis, Commissioner, Nuclear Regulatory Commission.. 23
Answers to submitted questions............................... 120
William D. Magwood, IV, Commissioner, Nuclear Regulatory
Commission..................................................... 24
Answers to submitted questions............................... 126
William C. Ostendorff, Commissioner, Nuclear Regulatory
Commission..................................................... 25
Answers to submitted questions............................... 137
Submitted Material
List of Nuclear Reglatory Commission (NRC) licensing actions,
submitted by Mr. Gingrey....................................... 61
Letter of January 7, 2013, from the National Mining Association
to the NRC, submitted by Mr. Burgess........................... 64
Letter of February 7, 2013, from House Members to the NRC,
submitted by Mr. Barrow........................................ 68
Picture of Emergency Filtered Containment Vent................... 72
Chart entitled, ``Nuclear Regulatory Timeline (Typical--4 Unit
Fleet)''....................................................... 73
THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION: POLICY AND GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES
----------
THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 28, 2013
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Environment and Economy,
Committee on Energy and Commerce
Washington, DC.
The subcommittees met, pursuant to call, at 9:02 a.m., in
Room 2123 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John
Shimkus [Chairman of the Subcommittee on Energy and Power]
presiding.
Members present: Representatives Shimkus, Whitfield,
Scalise, Gingrey, Hall, Pitts, Terry, Murphy, Burgess, Latta,
Harper, Cassidy, McKinley, Kinzinger, Griffith, Bilirakis,
Johnson, Barton, Upton (ex officio), Rush, Tonko, Dingell,
Markey, Engel, Green, Capps, Barrow, Christensen, Castor,
McNerney, and Waxman (ex officio).
Staff present: Nick Abraham, Legislative Clerk; Gary
Andres, Staff Director; Charlotte Baker, Press Secretary; Mike
Bloomquist, General Counsel; Sean Bonyun, Communications
Director; Allison Busbee, Policy Coordinator, Energy and Power;
Annie Caputo, Professional Staff Member; Vincent Esposito,
Fellow, Nuclear Programs; Tim Hassenboehler, Chief Counsel,
Energy and Power; Alexa Marrero, Deputy Staff Director; David
McCarthy, Chief Counsel, Environment and the Economy; Mary
Neumayr, Senior Energy Counsel; Chris Sarley, Policy
Coordinator, Environment and the Economy; Peter Spencer,
Professional Staff Member, Oversight; Lyn Walker, Coordinator,
Admin/Human Resources; Jeff Baran, Democratic Senior Counsel;
Phil Barnett, Democratic Staff Director; Alison Cassady,
Democratic Senior Professional Staff Member; Greg Dotson,
Democratic Staff Director, Energy and Environment; and Caitlin
Haberman, Democratic Policy Analyst.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN SHIMKUS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
Mr. Shimkus. I would like to call the hearing to order, and
welcome our guests and my colleagues. I recognize myself for 5
minutes for an opening statement.
Before I do that, there are early votes, as a lot of
members know. We are going to try to go rapidly through the
opening statements as quick as possible and then get into our
round of questioning. We will then break for votes. We will see
what the will of the committees are. We may have to come back
to finish up at least the first round. With that, I would like
to now recognize myself for 5 minutes for my opening statement.
First, let me welcome you all here. It is nearly 2 years
since the Fukushima accident and nearly 1 year since the NRC
issued a suite of requirements responding to the accident.
Since you last testified before this committee, the NRC
instituted a moratorium on licensing actions until the agency
addresses a court remand of its Waste Confidence rule. We have
also heard announcements two nuclear plants will close
prematurely and there is speculation in the press that several
others may also.
So, it is in this context I would like to discuss the
defense-in-depth philosophy, which has been fundamental to
nuclear safety in our country since the industry's inception. I
am sure we all agree it plays a vital safety role. That was a
painful lesson for the Japanese to learn and one that was
highlighted by the Diet report, which stated: ``The defense-in-
depth concept used in other countries has still not been fully
considered.''
With the Atomic Energy Act, Congress endeavored to balance
the benefits that nuclear energy brings to the general welfare
with protection of public health and safety. I am concerned the
Commission risks undermining this balance by shifting to an
unlimited application of the defense-in-depth philosophy in
reaction to the Fukushima accident.
Defense-in-depth has, or should have, a sensible
constraint. For example, I understand there is a three-unit
nuclear plant here in the United States, which currently has
eight emergency diesel generators. These reactors need six
generators to ensure safety in case the plant loses access to
offsite supplies of electricity. That means this site has two
redundant spares. In the wake of Fukushima, this site will add
two more in a separate bunker away from the plant for a total
of ten diesel generators.
An unmanaged application of the defense-in-depth philosophy
would question why stop at 10? Why not have 20? Or a hundred? I
don't know what the right number is. However, common sense and
critical thinking should show that at some point there are
diminishing safety benefits from additional generators. It
seems to me cost-benefit analysis provides a necessary and
sensible constraint in this situation: that safety gains should
be significant enough to outweigh additional costs.
Unfortunately, with the NRC staff's filtered-vents
proposal, we have exactly the opposite. The staff's
recommendation to mandate filtered vent structures failed the
cost-benefit test so the staff chose to justify the mandate
based upon the defense-in-depth philosophy. The staff
recommended this mandate against the advice of the NRC's body
of experts, the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards. That
committee advised a more holistic approach, recognizing that
all plants are different and a one-size-fits-all mandate may
create unintended consequences.
As the Near-term Task Force wrote in their 2011 report
following the Fukushima accident: ``Adequate protection has
typically only led to requirements addressing beyond-design-
basis concerns when they were found to be associated with a
substantial enhancement in safety and justified in terms of
cost.''
Recommendation one in their report was that the Commission
should reassess the role that the defense-in-depth philosophy
should play. While the Commission has not resolved this policy
question, agency staff nonetheless appears to be embedding its
preferred approach in the filtered-vent recommendation. I don't
think the staff should attempt to set policy on a matter on
which the Commission has not yet reached a conclusion.
Furthermore, this matter was raised in our January 15th
letter, which 20 of my colleagues and I signed, and the
Commission's response was unsatisfactory beginning with the
failure to answer our very first question: When will the NRC
conduct a gap analysis of the regulation differences between
the United States and Japan? I expect some of my colleagues
will likely share some additional concerns with your response.
I am disappointed that you didn't take your communication with
members of this committee more seriously and I expect that you
will do that in the future.
I again want to thank you all for being here today. I look
forward to your testimony.
[The statement of Mr. Shimkus follows:]
Prepared statement of Hon. John Shimkus
First, let me welcome you all here. It is nearly two years
since the Fukushima accident and nearly one year since the NRC
issued a suite of requirements responding to the accident.
Since you last testified before this Committee, the NRC
instituted a moratorium on licensing actions until the agency
addresses a court remand of its Waste Confidence rule. We have
also heard announcements two nuclear plants will close
prematurely and there is speculation in the press that several
others may also.
So, it is in this context I'd like to discuss the defense-
in-depth philosophy which has been fundamental to nuclear
safety in our country since the industry's inception. I'm sure
we all agree it plays a vital safety role. This was a painful
lesson for the Japanese to learn and one that was highlighted
by the Diet (Dee-ett) report which stated: ``The defense-in-
depth concept used in other countries has still not been fully
considered.''
With the Atomic Energy Act, Congress endeavored to balance
the benefits that nuclear energy brings to the general welfare
with protection of public health and safety. I am concerned the
Commission risks undermining this balance by shifting to an
unlimited application of the defense-in-depth philosophy in
reaction to the Fukushima accident.
Defense-in-depth has, or should have, a sensible
constraint. For example, I understand there is a three-unit
nuclear plant here in the U.S. which currently has eight
emergency diesel generators. These reactors need six generators
to ensure safety in case the plant loses access to off-site
supplies of electricity. That means this site has two redundant
spares. In the wake of Fukushima, this site will add two more
in a separate bunker away from the plant for a total of ten
diesel generators.
An unmanaged application of defense-in-depth philosophy
would question why stop at 10? Why not have 20? Or a hundred? I
don't know what the right number is. However, common sense and
critical thinking should show that, at some point, there are
diminishing safety benefits from additional generators. It
seems to me cost-benefit analysis provides a necessary and
sensible constraint in this situation: that safety gains should
be significant enough to outweigh additional costs.
Unfortunately, with the NRC staff's filtered vents
proposal, we have exactly the opposite. The staff's
recommendation to mandate filtered vent structures failed the
cost-benefit test so the staff chose to justify the mandate
based on the defense-in-depth philosophy. The staff recommended
this mandate against the advice of the NRC's body of experts,
the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards. That Committee
advised a more holistic approach recognizing that all plants
are different and a one-size-fits-all mandate may create
unintended consequences.
As the Near-term Task Force wrote in their 2011 report
following the Fukushima accident:
``...adequate protection has typically only led to
requirements addressing beyond-design-basis concerns when they
were found to be associated with a substantial enhancement in
safety and JUSTIFIED IN TERMS OF COST.''
Recommendation 1 in their report was that the Commission
should reassess the role that the defense-in-depth philosophy
should play. While the Commission has not yet resolved this
policy question, agency staff nonetheless appears to be
embedding ITS preferred approach in the filtered vents
recommendation. I don't think the staff should attempt to set
policy on a matter on which the Commission has not yet reached
a conclusion.
Furthermore, this matter was raised in our January 15th
letter, which twenty of my colleagues and I signed, and the
Commission's response was unsatisfactory beginning with the
failure to answer our first question: When will the NRC conduct
a ``gap analysis'' of the regulation differences between the
U.S. and Japan. I expect some of my colleagues will likely
share some additional concerns with your response. I'm
disappointed that you didn't take your communication with
Members of this Committee more seriously and I expect that you
will in the future.
I again want to thank you all for being here today and look
forward to your testimony. I'd now like to yield to our Ranking
Member Mr. Tonko for the purposes of an opening statement.
Mr. Shimkus. And now I would like to yield to our ranking
member, Mr. Tonko, for the purposes of an opening statement.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL TONKO, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Mr. Tonko. Thank you, and good morning. Thank you, Chair
Shimkus and Chair Whitfield, for holding this hearing. I thank
Chairman Macfarlane and Commissioners Svinicki, Apostolakis,
Magwood and Ostendorff for appearing before the subcommittees
today.
The work of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is extremely
important to the public. Congress recognized way back in 1974
that the licensing and regulation of nuclear power and
radioactive materials should be separate from research and
development and promotion of the civilian nuclear industry.
Public confidence in this technology is directly related to
their confidence that the NRC will act to ensure the safe
operation of nuclear power plants and the safe handling of
nuclear materials.
Nuclear power provides nearly 20 percent of our electricity
nationally. If we are to continue to rely on nuclear power, we
must maintain safe operations and we must deal with nuclear
waste in a manner that inspires public confidence and serves
the needs of the 104 power plants that we have across our
Nation. It is a tall order, and one that obviously comes with
many challenges. The tragic events in Japan that occurred at
the Fukushima Daiichi plant were a stark reminder of how
important safety is to this industry. To the public, there is
no such thing as a small nuclear accident. A large one is
devastating. I encourage the NRC to take the steps necessary to
implement the recommendations from the review of that tragedy
to further improve the safety of our Nation's nuclear power
plants.
Again, I thank you for being here this morning. I look
forward to your testimony.
I would like now to yield my remaining time to the ranking
member of the Energy and Power Subcommittee, Representative
Rush.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOBBY L. RUSH, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
Mr. Rush. I want to thank you, Mr. Tonko, for yielding. I
want to thank the chair, and I want to thank you, Chairwoman
Macfarlane, and all the NRC Commissioners for being here today.
As a representative of the great State of Illinois, which
houses more nuclear reactors than any other State in the
country, I am eager to hear about the progress that the NRC is
making in regards to recommendations that the Near-Term Task
Force released back in July 2011 following the nuclear disaster
at Fukushima. My constituents want to be assured that the NRC
adopts commonsense protocols for both mitigating risk of a
nuclear disaster as well as procedures to safeguard the public
in the event that a disaster occurs. Safety is my primary
concern, and I would support the implementation of a
performance-based approach that will allow licensees to employ
a combination of systems to address performance standards and
avoid widespread disaster in the case of emergencies.
Another issue of great importance to me is the NRC's work
with Historically Black Colleges and Universities, HBCUs. In
May 2012, the NRC was honored as one of the government agencies
that was most supportive of the engineering departments of
HBCUs, and I look forward to hearing more about the types of
programs and forms of support the NRC provides to these HBCU
colleges and universities. It is in the national interest to
make sure that we are educating all of our students to enter
the STEM fields of science, technology, engineering and math,
and so it is very encouraging to hear that the Nation's
foremost nuclear authority is providing its support to help
move our Nation forward in this effort.
I look forward to engaging the Commissioners on these very
important issues, and I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Shimkus. The gentleman yields back the balance of his
time. The Chair now recognizes the chairman of the full
committee, Mr. Upton, for 5 minutes.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FRED UPTON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN
Mr. Upton. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Certainly, oversight of federal agencies is a very
important responsibility for this committee, especially for the
NRC, given the broad scope of changes within the nuclear
industry, and there are two particular issues on my mind today:
the NRC's reactor oversight process and the impact of budget
sequestration on the NRC.
In 2000, the NRC's reactor oversight process was
implemented under Chairman Richard Meserve's leadership, a
chairman well respected on both sides of the aisle. The
development of the process was very rigorous with the goal of
creating an objective, measurable process that would provide an
accurate representation of a plant's performance while
minimizing subjectivity.
Last year, the Palisades plant in my district spent time in
column 3, a designation for troubled plants, which requires
significantly increased inspections. This raised considerable
concerns among folks in my corner of the State, concerns
certainly that I shared. Entergy needed to do better, and they
outlined their comprehensive and methodical plans for returning
Palisades to the high level of safety that all plants should
have.
This past November, the NRC returned Palisades back to
column 1, the best column, which normally would signify the
NRC's conclusion that the plant is operating safely and should
give the local communities confidence that the plant is back on
the straight and narrow. However, when the NRC made the
determination to move Palisades back into column 1, the agency
did so begrudgingly, I believe, and qualified the rating,
indicating that it would continue to apply increased oversight
beyond the normal inspections for column 1. That does send a
mixed message to the community: does Palisades belong in column
1 or not, and I would like some clarification on that.
In closing, I would like to echo the disappointment
expressed by Chairman Shimkus regarding the NRC's response to
our January letter. We did ask very detailed questions, yet the
response was somewhat dismissive, even contradicting the
Japanese Diet report' conclusion that they had not fully
considered the defense-in-depth philosophy as Chairman Shimkus
mentioned. You wrote that you would give us careful
consideration but the answers were not quite where we would
like them to be.
So with that, I would yield back the balance of my time to
Chairman Whitfield.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Upton follows:]
Prepared statement of Hon. Fred Upton
Oversight of federal agencies is an important
responsibility for this committee, especially for the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission given the broad scope of changes within
the nuclear industry. There are two particular issues on my
mind today: The NRC's Reactor Oversight Process and the impact
of budget sequestration on the NRC.
In 2000, the NRC's Reactor Oversight Process was
implemented under Chairman Richard Meserve's leadership, a
chairman well respected on both sides of the aisle. The
development of the process was very rigorous with the goal of
creating an objective, measurable process that would provide an
accurate representation of a plant's performance while
minimizing subjectivity.
Last year, the Palisades plant in my district spent time in
``Column 3,'' a designation for troubled plants which requires
significantly increased inspections. This raised considerable
concerns among folks in Southwest Michigan--concerns that I
shared. Entergy needed to do better, and they outlined their
comprehensive and methodical plans for returning Palisades to
the high level of safety that it should have.
This past November, the NRC returned Palisades to Column 1,
the best column, which normally would signify the NRC's
conclusion that the plant is operating safely and should give
the local communities confidence that the plant is back on the
straight and narrow. However, when the NRC made the
determination to move Palisades back into Column 1, the agency
did so begrudgingly and qualified the rating, indicating that
it would continue to apply increased oversight beyond the
normal inspections for Column 1. This sends a mixed message to
the community--does Palisades belong in Column 1 or not. I
would like some clarification on that.
In closing, I'd like to echo the disappointment expressed
by Chairman Shimkus regarding the NRC's response to our January
15th letter. We asked very detailed questions, yet the response
came off as dismissive, even contradicting the Japanese Diet
(pronounced DIE-it) report's own conclusion that they had not
fully considered the defense-in-depth philosophy as Chairman
Shimkus mentioned. You wrote that you would give our views
``careful consideration'' but the answers provided to our
questions fall short. These are serious questions that deserve
thoughtful and thorough deliberation.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ED WHITFIELD, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF KENTUCKY
Mr. Whitfield. Thank you very much, and I want to certainly
welcome all the Commissioners here today. We appreciate the
important work that you do and recognize the importance of
nuclear energy for providing energy in our country.
The NRC Near-Term Task Force report, which was issued last
summer, highlighted some lessons learned from the Three Mile
Island accident. Some of the actions taken by the NRC after
Three Mile Island were not subject to a structured review and
were subsequently found not to be of substantial safety benefit
and were removed.
I am concerned that the NRC's consideration of post-
Fukushima issues is not as structured and integrated as it
should be. I would like to call your attention to four items
which appear to be interrelated but which the Commission is
considering individually, independent of each other. Number
one: the Near-term Task Force Recommendation number one
concerning the defense-in-depth philosophy, which Chairman
Shimkus mentioned; number two, the Severe Accident Management
Order the Commission issued a year ago; number three, the
filtered-vents proposal about which we wrote to you; then
number four, the economic consequences proposal regarding the
potential for land contamination.
From looking at records of the Commission, it is quite
clear that many statements have been issued about how these
issues are related to each other and yet it seems that the
Commission is determined to treat each one separately in what
some people say is an unstructured process.
The Commission's 2011 decision to prioritize its work into
three tiers was a good start but time has passed and there is a
great deal more information that has surfaced since then. It
seems like a more integrated approach to post-Fukushima issues
is long overdue. So I hope we have an opportunity to discuss
that some this morning, and I would yield back the balance of
my time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Whitfield follows:]
Prepared statement of Hon. Ed Whitfield
I also want to thank you for coming here today. In our last
hearing with the Commission, I expressed my optimism and hope
that Chairman Macfarlane would restore collegiality to the
Commission. She appears to be doing a better job than her
predecessor and I think we are all very grateful for that.
When you folks were here last summer, I urged all of you to
remember that the costs of regulatory changes are ultimately
born by consumers who are struggling to fill their gas tanks
and pay their bills. This concern is now joined by a concern
for those who will lose their jobs at plants that may close
prematurely.
I stated my firm belief that we need to ensure that any
additional regulatory costs are justified by real safety
benefits. Those concerns are just as valid today, especially
given that the Commission is considering a recommendation from
the staff that is NOT cost-justified, as Chairman Shimkus just
mentioned.
Last summer, I also referenced a cautionary comment from
the NRC Near-term Task Force report regarding lessons learned
from the Three Mile Island accident: ``...some of the actions
taken by the NRC after Three Mile Island were not subjected to
a STRUCTURED review and were subsequently not found to be of
substantial safety benefit and were removed.''
I am concerned that the NRC's consideration of post-
Fukushima issues is not as structured and integrated as it
should be. I'd like to call your attention to four items which
appear to be inter-related but which the Commission is
considering individually, independent of the others:
The Near-term Task Force Recommendation #1
concerning the defense-in-depth philosophy which Chairman
Shimkus mentioned;
The severe accident management order the
Commission issued a year ago;
The filtered vents proposal about which we wrote
to you; and
The Economic Consequences proposal regarding the
potential for land contamination.
Clearly the recommendation to mandate filtered vents is
propelled by concerns about land contamination that might
result from a severe accident. In fact, in the Commission's
January meeting on filtered vents, there were 43 statements
about how the filtered vents issue is linked to the other items
I just mentioned. The transcript for the Commission's meeting
on Economic Consequences last September tells a similar story:
49 statements on how it is linked to these other issues.
Altogether, we reviewed transcripts from 4 Commission meetings
since August on these topics and found 145 references
indicating how these issues are linked.
I simply don't understand why, with these issues so
intertwined, that the Commission would consider each one
separately, in such an unstructured process. The Commission's
2011 decision to prioritize its work into three tiers was a
good start. But time has passed and there is a great deal more
information that has surfaced since then. It seems like a more
integrated approach to post-Fukushima issues is long overdue.
So I hope we get some clear explanations this morning.
Mr. Shimkus. The gentleman yields back the balance of his
time. Without objection, I would like to be able to allow Mr.
Waxman when he arrives 5 minutes to do his opening statement,
and we will move right into questions until he arrives. So I
would like to recognize myself for the first 5 minutes--oh, we
will go to the Commission. We are so anxious to talk to you
all, so Chairman, you are recognized 5 minutes for your opening
statement.
STATEMENTS OF ALLISON MACFARLANE, CHAIRMAN, NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION; HON. KRISTINE L. SVINICKI, COMMISSIONER; HON.
GEORGE APOSTOLAKIS, COMMISSIONER; HON. WILLIAM D. MAGWOOD, IV.,
COMMISSIONER; AND HON. WILLIAM C. OSTENDORFF, COMMISSIONER
STATEMENT OF ALLISON MACFARLANE
Ms. Macfarlane. Thank you, Chairman Shimkus. Good morning.
Chairman Whitfield, Ranking Member Rush, Chairman Shimkus,
Ranking Member Tonko and distinguished members of the
subcommittees, on behalf of the Commission, I appreciate the
opportunity to appear before you to discuss policy and
governance at the NRC.
When the Commission appeared before you last on July 24,
2012, I pledged to work closely with my fellow Commissioners
and to approach my job as Chairman in a collaborative and
collegial manner. Over the past 7 months, we have developed a
very productive, respectful and collegial working relationship.
In my tenure, I have also gained an even greater appreciation
of the expertise of the NRC staff who carry out the mission of
ensuring the safe and secure use of radioactive materials and
protecting public health and safety and the environment. I
believe the NRC is operating very well and is fulfilling its
mandate. I am pleased with the NRC's commitment to use
operating experience and insights to continuously improve and
remain a strong and effective regulator.
As we approach the second anniversary of the great Tohoku
earthquake and the subsequent tsunami in Japan, I would like to
share my personal impressions from a recent visit to the
Fukushima Daiichi site. I was struck by the deserted villages,
abandoned roads and rail lines that we passed on the drive to
the plant. More than 160,000 people today are displaced from
their homes there, and the site itself is scattered with
twisted metal and debris from the force of hydrogen explosions
in the reactor buildings as well as the tsunami itself. While
the Japanese are diligently working to clean up and
decommission the site, it will take them many decades to
complete.
The NRC continues its work to apply lessons from Fukushima
to the regulation of NRC-licensed nuclear facilities. You may
recall that the NRC identified a series of recommendations that
were subsequently prioritized in three categories or tiers. The
NRC has already taken many actions on the near-term priorities
and is now turning its attention to long-term actions. We are
actively exchanging lessons learned with the international
community and maintaining a high level of open collaboration
with the industry and public.
Throughout this process, the agency remains determined to
ensure that the regulatory actions stemming from this review do
not become a distraction from day-to-day safe plant operations.
The NRC has approved license renewals for 73 reactors and
continues to review additional applications. However, two
reactors that had planned to operate an additional 20 years
have recently announced their intention to permanently close
due to economic factors. In the months and years ahead, the NRC
will adjust our oversight from ensuring these reactors operate
safely to ensuring they will be decommissioned safely.
Overall, the U.S. reactor fleet is performing well. There
are a few reactors that have had significant performance
problems, which the NRC is addressing in accordance with its
regulatory procedures. Browns Ferry Unit 1 continues to address
equipment problems. Fort Calhoun remains shut down as it
addresses problems stemming from an inadequate flood strategy
and a fire. And the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station has
been shut down for more than a year due to unexpected
degradation of the plant's replacement steam generators. The
NRC will not allow any of our licensed facilities to operate
unless we are satisfied that they can do so safely.
Since the NRC issued the first combined operating licenses
last year for new reactors at the Vogtle and Summer sites in
Georgia and South Carolina, construction has begun. Although
there has been significant progress at both sites, there have
also been some delays due to design implementation and
fabrication issues. We anticipate that all necessary license
amendments will be issued by the end of this week, which will
permit both sides to begin pouring first nuclear concrete.
Among other activities in the licensing and regulation of
radioactive materials, the NRC is preparing to implement
construction and operating inspection programs for two newly
licensed facilities: a uranium laser enrichment facility and
the depleted uranium deconversion facility. We have also
revised our regulations for the physical protection of spent
fuel transportation and are preparing to publish a new role to
expand security measures for the physical protection of
category 1 and 2 byproduct material. The NRC staff continues to
make progress in addressing the issues cited in the Court of
Appeals decision on waste confidence. Our work is already well
underway and on schedule for completion by September 2014. The
Commission has directed that all affected license application
review activities will continue but the agency will not issue
final licenses dependent upon the waste confidence decision
until the court's remand is addressed. The agency is actively
engaging the public in the process.
The NRC continues to make international cooperation a
priority with active involvement in a variety of bilateral and
multilateral initiatives. I recently assumed the chairmanship
of the Multinational Design Evaluation Program, an organization
that strives to leverage the knowledge and resources of
regulators to improve the design reviews of new commercial
power reactors. In the next several months, the NRC will
continue its focus on these and other important issues.
I am proud of our accomplishments and confident that we
will address the challenges ahead with the same high-quality
work. I thank you for the opportunity to appear before you and
would be happy to answer your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Macfarlane follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Shimkus. Thank you, Chairman.
Now I would like to turn to the ranking member of the full
committee, Mr. Waxman, for his 5-minute opening statement. Then
we will turn back to the Commissioners for your hopefully 2-
minute opening statements.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HENRY A. WAXMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Mr. Waxman. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to
begin by welcoming Dr. Allison Macfarlane, the Chairman of the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and her colleagues on the
Commission. Thank you all for being here today.
By all accounts, Chairman Macfarlane has ushered in a new
era of collegiality at the Commission. I commend her for her
leadership.
The Commission is grappling with a number of important
matters that deserve our attention.
In California, the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station
has been shut down for more than a year due to serious problems
with the plant's brand-new steam generators. The generators
cost California ratepayers $670 million. This expense was
large, but the new equipment was supposed to last for decades.
Two of the steam generators did not even last a year.
Southern California Edison has requested permission to
restart one of the plant's two reactors. The Commission has an
obligation to ensure that the reactor could operate safely
before it is allowed to restart, and California residents are
counting on the Commission to do its job carefully and with
safety as the first priority.
But the Commission should also look at its own actions to
understand why it did not detect the design and manufacturing
flaws in these steam generators before they were turned on. If
the NRC had detected these problems before the generators were
installed, California ratepayers could have saved hundreds of
millions of dollars.
The Commission also continues to address the safety gaps
revealed by the Fukushima nuclear accident in Japan, which
happened almost 2 years ago. Last year, the Commission issued
three orders to U.S. commercial nuclear reactors to enhance
safety in the wake of the Fukushima disaster. Today is the
deadline for operators to submit their plans for implementing
these orders. Nuclear plant operators have until the end of
2016 to fully implement their plans to increase safety. It is
important that this safety deadline does not slip as others
have in the past.
A major problem at Fukushima was that hydrogen gas built up
in the reactor and eventually exploded when the pressure could
not be released. One of the Commission's post-Fukushima orders
requires reactors similar to the type used at Fukushima to
install pressure-venting systems that operate reliably in
severe accident conditions. That is a commonsense improvement,
and I commend the Commission for requiring that step.
The Commission's technical experts recently recommended
that the Commission go a step further to require these reactors
to install filters on the vents in order to reduce the amount
of radioactive material released with any vented gases. The NRC
staff conducted a full cost-benefit analysis and concluded that
this safety precaution would be amply justified. Safety should
be the Commission's top priority, and I urge the Commission to
approve the NRC staff's recommendation to require filtered
vents as soon as possible.
I was pleased to hear Chairman Macfarlane's testimony. I am
looking forward to the comments of her colleagues and for the
opportunity to ask questions about these issues and the other
significant safety issues pending before the Commission.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back the time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Waxman follows:]
Prepared statement of Hon. Henry A. Waxman
I want to begin by welcoming Dr. Allison Macfarlane, the
chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and her
colleagues on the Commission. Thank you for being here today.
By all accounts, Chairman Macfarlane has ushered in a new
era of collegiality at the Commission. I commend her for her
leadership.
The Commission is grappling with a number of important
matters that deserve our attention.
In California, the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station
has been shut down for more than a year due to serious problems
with the plant's brand new steam generators. The generators
cost California ratepayers $670 million. This expense was
large, but the new equipment was supposed to last for decades.
Two of the steam generators did not even last a year.
Southern California Edison has requested permission to
restart one of the plant's two reactors. The Commission has an
obligation to ensure that the reactor could operate safely
before it is allowed to restart, and California residents are
counting on the Commission to do its job carefully and with
safety as the first priority.
But the Commission should also look at its own actions to
understand why it did not detect the design and manufacturing
flaws in these steam generators before they were turned on. If
the NRC had detected these problems before the generators were
installed, California ratepayers could have saved hundreds of
millions of dollars.
The Commission also continues to address the safety gaps
revealed by the Fukushima nuclear accident in Japan, which
happened almost two years ago.
Last year, the Commission issued three orders to U.S.
commercial nuclear reactors to enhance safety in the wake of
the Fukushima disaster. Today is the deadline for operators to
submit their plans for implementing these orders. Nuclear plant
operators have until the end of 2016 to fully implement their
plans to increase safety. It is important that this safety
deadline does not slip as others have in the past.
A major problem at Fukushima was that hydrogen gas built up
in the reactor and eventually exploded when the pressure could
not be released. One of the Commission's post-Fukushima orders
requires reactors similar to the type used at Fukushima to
install pressure venting systems that operate reliably in
severe accident conditions. That's a commonsense improvement
and I commend the Commission for requiring that step.
The Commission's technical experts recently recommended
that the Commission go a step further to require these reactors
to install filters on the vents in order to reduce the amount
of radioactive material released with any vented gases. The NRC
staff conducted a full cost-benefit analysis and concluded that
this safety precaution would be amply justified. Safety should
be the Commission's top priority, and I urge the Commission to
approve the NRC staff's recommendation to require filtered
vents as soon as possible.
I look forward to hearing the views of Chairman Macfarlane
and her fellow commissioners about these issues and the other
significant safety issues pending before the Commission.
Mr. Shimkus. The gentleman yields back his time.
The Chair now recognizes Commissioner Svinicki for 2
minutes.
STATEMENT OF KRISTINE SVINICKI
Ms. Svinicki. Thank you, Chairman Whitfield, Ranking Member
Rush, Chairman Shimkus, Ranking Member Tonko, Chairman Upton
and distinguished members of the subcommittees for the
opportunity to appear before you today at this oversight
hearing to examine NRC policy and governance.
Since the Commission appeared before you last summer, NRC
has continued its important and diverse activities related to
oversight and licensing of nuclear power plants, research, test
and training reactors, nuclear fuel cycle facilities, medical,
industrial and academic uses of radioactive materials, and the
transport, storage and disposal of radioactive materials and
waste. Of these many diverse responsibilities, I will highlight
two of current focus.
The NRC continues to oversee industry compliance with the
cybersecurity regulations that NRC put in place in 2009 to
protect critical digital assets at nuclear facilities. Working
cooperatively with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,
the North American Electric Reliability Corporation, the
Department of Homeland Security and other organizations, we
continue to monitor and help combat the cyber threats to our
Nation.
In the area of small modular reactors, the NRC continues
its work to identify and resolve policy and licensing issues
related to adapting our regulatory framework, which was
developed for large light water reactors, to the diverse
designs and approaches put forth by the small modular reactor
community of developers. NRC policy encourages early discussion
prior to submission of a license application between NRC agency
staff and potential applicants in public meetings. These
discussions enable the NRC staff to identify and resolve
potential issues early in the process. These efforts will
continue and will take more specific form as the U.S.
Department of Energy advances its SMR program activities this
year and next.
All of these activities are achieved through the committed
efforts of the women and men of the NRC who work to advance the
NRC's mission of ensuring adequate protection of public health
and safety and promoting the common defense and security day in
and day out. I am grateful to them for the work they do.
I appreciate the opportunity to appear and look forward to
your questions. Thank you.
Mr. Shimkus. Thank you, and now the Chair recognizes
Commissioner Apostolakis for 2 minutes.
STATEMENT OF GEORGE APOSTOLAKIS
Mr. Apostolakis. Chairman Whitfield, Ranking Member Rush
and members of the subcommittees, good morning.
At the 2-year anniversary of the accident at Fukushima, the
NRC and the nuclear industry have made significant progress in
addressing lessons learned. Decisions on nuclear safety matters
should not be made without careful deliberation. Such
deliberation includes the technical evaluations by NRC senior
management, the views of the statutory advisory committee in
regard to safeguards, and public interactions with external
stakeholders.
As a result of this open and transparent process, the
technical basis for implementing the Near-Term Task Force
recommendations was strengthened. Additional technical issues
for consideration were identified in such areas as filtration
of containment vents, loss of the ultimate heat sink, and the
expedited transfer of spent fuel to dry casks to cask storage.
The process for reaching post-Fukushima decisions has been
and continues to be methodical and transparent. This decision-
making process has highlighted the potential tension between
implementing new safety enhancements and maintaining regulatory
stability. Our own Principles of Good Regulation state that NRC
regulation should be perceived to be reliable and not
unjustifiably in a state of transition. The agency will
continue to face the challenge of striking the right balance
between safety enhancements and regulatory stability.
In closing, I note that there are many other safety
improvements being made at nuclear power plants that are not
related to Fukushima. These also require significant resources
to implement. It is a challenge to ensure that additional new
requirements do not adversely affect the implementation of more
safety significant activities or our licensees' ability to
maintain their focus on day-to-day safe operation. Thank you.
Mr. Shimkus. Thank you, Commissioner.
Now, Commissioner Magwood, you are recognized for 2
minutes.
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM D. MAGWOOD, IV
Mr. Magwood. Thank you, and good morning. Chairman Shimkus,
Ranking Member Tonko, Chairman Whitfield and Ranking Member
Rush, Chairman Upton and distinguished members of the
subcommittees, it is a pleasure to appear before you today to
discuss the activities of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Two years after the massive earthquake struck northeastern
Japan that precipitated the disaster at the Fukushima plant,
responding to these important lessons of that event remains a
very high priority for our agency. While we continue to work
with our Japanese friends and the international community to
study the sequence of events at Fukushima to mine this tragedy
for information that will help prevent future disasters, we
have already learned the highest priority lessons.
We understand that we must change the way we think about
extreme events, what we in our business call beyond-design-
basis events. These events are rare but can result in very high
consequences. Fukushima has led to new thinking regarding how
U.S. facilities should prepare for these occurrences.
From Fukushima, we understand it is possible for a nuclear
plant to experience the loss of both offsite power and onsite
emergency diesel generators as a result of a single event. We
have also seen the unanticipated challenges associated with the
failure of multiple reactors at a single site.
This Commission has led our agency to aggressively respond
to these new learnings. We have issued orders to address these
issues and many more. I believe that the great majority of risk
revealed in the aftermath of Fukushima has been addressed by
the actions we have taken thus far. Nevertheless, more work
remains both in implementing successfully the decisions we have
already made, and to address remaining important issues such as
the improvements that can be considered regarding containment
of venting systems for Mark I and Mark II boiling-water
reactors.
My colleagues and I have had many spirited, open
discussions and debates over these matters, and we have all
spent countless hours with the excellent NRC staff as we work
to find the best solutions to these difficult issues and assure
the health and safety of the American people. Meanwhile, the
regular work of our agency continues. As our work continues, we
appreciate the strong interest that you have demonstrated in
our activities and the ongoing efforts that we have in becoming
a stronger, more effective and more open nuclear safety
regulator.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
Mr. Shimkus. Thank you.
The Chair now recognizes Commissioner Ostendorff for 2
minutes.
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM C. OSTENDORFF
Mr. Ostendorff. Chairman Shimkus, Chairman Whitfield,
Ranking Member Rush, thank you for the chance to be here today.
As we approach the 2-year anniversary of the Fukushima
Daiichi event, I think that we are making very good progress at
our agency in implementing previous actions in response and in
looking at what needs to be done and what does not need to be
done.
Along with all my colleagues here at this table, I know
that we take seriously our responsibilities in making sure that
we do not impose additional requirements without there being a
strong justification. I firmly believe as a Commissioner that
we are doing just that.
With respect to other work, safety performance of our
licensees remains very good. When deficiencies are identified,
we enhance our level of oversight and we ensure appropriate
corrective actions are taken.
We are also effectively providing construction oversight of
new reactors in Georgia and in South Carolina and are promptly
addressing the waste confidence remand from the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals.
I appreciate this committee's oversight role and I look
forward to your questions.
Mr. Shimkus. Thank you. You get the prize, Commissioner
Ostendorff. I would like to now begin our opening round of
questions. I will recognize myself for the first 5 minutes.
As you all know, we are still waiting for a decision from
the D.C. Circuit Court on whether the NRC is legally bound to
resume consideration of the Yucca Mountain license application.
Chairman Macfarlane, last July when you last testified before
this committee, I asked you if you would honor the court's
decision, and you said, and I quote, ``Absolutely.'' Do you
still stand by that statement?
Ms. Macfarlane. Absolutely.
Mr. Shimkus. To the rest of the Commissioners, will you
also commit to honor the court's decision?
Ms. Svinicki. Yes, I do.
Mr. Apostolakis. Yes.
Mr. Magwood. Yes.
Mr. Ostendorff. Yes.
Mr. Shimkus. Our investigation last year uncovered an
estimate by NRC staff indicating that the Yucca Mountain Safety
Evaluation Report could be completed in 6 to 8 months. The
Safety Evaluation Report would document the NRC's review and
conclusions regarding the license application. In answers to
questions following our last hearing, the NRC stated the cost
would be approximately $6.5 million. The NRC's Performance and
Accountability Report issued 2 weeks ago states that the NRC
currently has $10.4 million in unobligated balances from the
Nuclear Waste Fund for the purpose of reviewing the license
application, and this is to all five Commissioners: Having
committed to honor the court's decision, if the court orders
the NRC to resume its review of the license application, will
you commit to ensuring that staff will complete the review and
publicly release the Safety Evaluation Report in accordance
with these time and resource estimates? Chairman?
Ms. Macfarlane. Well, I will first wait to see what the
court's decision is and then I will wait to see the analysis of
the available funds.
Mr. Shimkus. So you don't believe that you have $10.5
million in unobligated accounts in the NRC?
Ms. Macfarlane. We do. Whether it is released or not is
another issue.
Mr. Shimkus. And you don't agree that you responded in your
last appearance here that there was $6.5 million in--well, it
was the projected cost.
Ms. Macfarlane. I agreed to that.
Mr. Shimkus. And you have agreed that if the court decides
to move forward that you as the Chairman of the Commission
would do so?
Ms. Macfarlane. Yes.
Mr. Shimkus. OK. Thank you. Same question to you,
Commissioner Svinicki?
Ms. Svinicki. Mr. Chairman, the figures that you mentioned,
I believe are correct. I do not know if the NRC staff would
need to update the cost estimate for completing and issuing the
SERs. The longer the duration of the suspension of their
activities, it may be that reconstituting their work would have
a higher price tag than that, but of course, any direction to
the staff will be deliberated amongst the Commissioners. As an
individual member of the Commission, I do believe there would
be value in completing that work.
Mr. Shimkus. Thank you. Commissioner Apostolakis?
Mr. Apostolakis. I agree with Commissioner Svinicki.
Mr. Shimkus. Great. Commissioner Magwood?
Mr. Magwood. Yes, I would echo that as well, and also add
that I think we also would require some additional guidance
from Congress on that to assure we apply the money correctly,
but with all those constraints, absolutely.
Mr. Shimkus. And Commissioner Ostendorff?
Mr. Ostendorff. I agree there is value in moving forward to
complete the SERs and publicly issue those documents
irrespective of what the long-term siting of the repository may
be.
Mr. Shimkus. And final question. If the court issues such
an order, will you commit to provide this committee with
monthly reports on the staff's progress and expenditures of
resources?
Ms. Macfarlane. Yes.
Mr. Shimkus. Commissioner Svinicki?
Ms. Svinicki. Yes.
Mr. Apostolakis. Yes.
Mr. Magwood. Yes.
Mr. Ostendorff. Yes.
Mr. Shimkus. Thank you very much. Now the Chair recognizes
the gentleman from New York, Mr. Tonko, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Tonko. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Last March, the Commission issued three orders to United
States commercial nuclear reactors to enhance safety in the
wake of the Fukushima disaster. One of the orders is focusing
on boiling-water reactors, similar to the type used in
Fukushima. The Indian Point nuclear facility south of my
Congressional district uses this type of reactor. NRC is
requiring these reactors to install hydrogen venting systems
that would be reliable and operable under emergency conditions.
That seems like common sense, and in fact, today is the
deadline for operators to submit their plans for implementing
these orders to the NRC.
Chairman Macfarlane, these reactors have until the end of
2016, I believe, at the latest, to execute these plans. Is that
correct?
Ms. Macfarlane. To execute the--I believe that is correct.
Mr. Tonko. That is more than 5 years after the Fukushima
accident for only three orders. The post-Fukushima task force
made many additional recommendations for how to improve reactor
safety. Chairman Macfarlane, how long will it take, in your
opinion, to implement all of the Fukushima task force's
recommendations?
Ms. Macfarlane. This is an issue that we are looking at,
and we are trying to--we are evaluating a number of these
recommendations going forward. As you know, we have prioritized
them into three tiers. The first tier were the activities that
could be conducted immediately without further study, and now
we are evaluating the tier two and tier three activities to see
if there is reason to go forward with them, but we are doing it
with all due deliberation.
Mr. Tonko. I appreciate that, but I believe it is important
to maintain a sense of urgency in the implementation of the
lessons learned from Fukushima. As time passes, we tend to lose
focus, but the hazards don't become any less real over the
course of time.
I want to also ask you about another issue that seems like
common sense, and that is whether NRC should require the
installation of filters on these hydrogen vents in order to
reduce the amount of radiation released into the outside air in
the event of a severe accident. NRC's technical experts
recommended that the Commission require filtered vents. Some
members of this committee have raised concerns that this
requirement would be too costly. Chairman Macfarlane, my
understanding is that the NRC staff did a full cost-benefit
analysis examining both quantitative and qualitative factors.
Is that correct?
Ms. Macfarlane. That is correct.
Mr. Tonko. And there is nothing unusual about looking at
qualitative factors. Is that correct?
Ms. Macfarlane. That is correct.
Mr. Tonko. As is consistent with NRC's guidance on cost-
benefit analyses?
Ms. Macfarlane. Yes.
Mr. Tonko. OK. Well, based on its analysis, NRC staff
determined that requiring filtered vents would be cost-
justified and would indeed increase safety. Is that correct?
Ms. Macfarlane. That is the staff's analysis.
Mr. Tonko. I know you are currently voting on this issue.
Ms. Macfarlane. We are.
Mr. Tonko. And I respect that process. I believe that you
need to work together to come to a conclusion on this issue,
but I would encourage you to resist outside pressure to
disregard the expert recommendations of your staff. I think it
is imperative. I think it is important that we move forward
having learned from the lessons of Fukushima, and it is
important for us to maintain a sense of safety with all of our
nuclear activity across the country.
So with that, I thank you, and Mr. Chair, I yield back.
Mr. Shimkus. The gentleman yields back his time. The Chair
now recognizes the chairman of the full committee, Mr. Upton,
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Upton. Well, again, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I do
appreciate, as I said in my opening statement, your particular
concern as we all share with my particular plant in my
district, the Palisades plant, and it is in the interest of all
that that Palisades plant be returned to column 1, which it
was. I appreciated you keeping us updated. And as I indicated
in my opening statement, and you indicated as well, that you
are going to apply increased oversight beyond the normal
inspections for that particular facility. Can you elaborate at
all in terms of how long that might last, what progress we have
seen since you indicated such a number of weeks ago?
Ms. Macfarlane. Sure. The increased oversight is a result
of degradation in safety culture that we observed at the
Palisades plant, and they had a few other issues but this was
the issue that prompted the increased oversight, and we are
going to continue with the increased oversight to ensure that
the positive changes that we have seen at the Palisades site in
safety culture hold, and we will continue that for a while as
long as we are convinced that changes have permanently taken
place at the plant, and this is completely normal and this is
what we do with other plants. We are not singling out Palisades
in any particular manner, and it is all moving in a very
positive direction.
Mr. Upton. I appreciate that, and I appreciate your
leadership, and I just want to extend an invitation. In my
district, I have two facilities that are literally 10 miles
north of where I live and 10 miles south, and it would be an
easy trip for you perhaps to come visit both on literally the
same day, so I appreciate your leadership and I yield back.
Mr. Shimkus. The gentleman yields back his time. The Chair
now recognizes the ranking member of the Energy and Air Quality
Subcommittee, Mr. Rush, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Rush. I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairwoman Macfarlane, I am going to switch the focus again
from some of the nuclear-centered anxieties that are prevalent
on this committee, and I want to focus on what I consider one
of your strengths.
In my opening statement, I remarked that I was pleased to
see the NRC being honored as one of the governmental agencies
that was most supportive of the engineering departments at
HBCUs in 2012, and I think that is an issue that really we need
some airing on and hearings of this type, and that is the issue
of getting more students to go into the STEM fields so that
they can be the engineers and scientists of the future, and I
want to commend your agency again for its outstanding
achievement.
The API recently released a report that half of this
industry will turn over in the next 7 to 10 years and it is in
our national security interests that we make sure that we train
young people to become scientists and engineers and that they
have the skills and the expertise that is necessary to replace
this aging workforce. Can you provide this committee with more
information on programs, what forms of support the NRC provides
to these HBCUs and do you think that these types of programs
can be replicated at other agencies?
Ms. Macfarlane. We can certainly provide a list in writing
on these programs, and I think these programs are very
important. Coming from an academic background myself, I find it
very important and I have been getting briefed from the staff
on all the range of programs that we have. We have some very
important programs to not only encourage students to go into
these fields but also to make sure there are faculty there to
teach the students, and I think that is an important piece of
this as well. So these are very important programs. I don't
know if my colleagues would like to comment.
Mr. Rush. Anybody?
Mr. Magwood. Sure, Congressman, just a quick comment. I
agree with Chairman Macfarlane. I think these activities are
very important, and it is not simply programs aimed at HBCUs
obviously. It is really the broader academic community. And NRC
has a unique role to play because it is not just simply the
dollars that we put into this, it is also a lot of our staff
who are very interested in these programs and serve as
champions for various universities across the country where
they travel and I travel quite frequently to visit students and
talk to students about careers in science and technology, and
of course, particularly nuclear science and technology.
In the area of our Minority-Serving Institutions program, I
think the biggest portion of the program is what we would call
capacity building, building the ability of these universities
to compete on a more equal basis with larger universities for
research dollars and other types of grants. So it is something
that we are very proud of.
Mr. Rush. Ms. Macfarlane, the NRC Principles of Good
Regulation state, and I quote, ``Regulatory activity should be
consistent with the degree of risk reduction they achieve.
Where several effective alternatives are available, the option
which minimizes the use of resources should be adopted,'' and
``Once established, regulations should be perceived to be
reliable and not unjustifiably in a state of transition.'' What
specific measures do you employ to ensure that the NRC's
regulatory process provides sufficient flexibility to satisfy
these principles while ensuring a predictable and stable
regulatory regime?
Ms. Macfarlane. We operate a number of different processes
to ensure that there is a stable regulatory regime, and we work
closely with industry and other stakeholders to ensure that we
are going forward and we are sensitive to issues that come up.
Mr. Rush. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Shimkus. The gentleman yields back his time. The Chair
recognizes the chairman of the Energy and Air Quality
Subcommittee, Mr. Whitfield, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Whitfield. Thank you, Chairman Shimkus, and thank you
all for your statements.
In my opening statement, I talked about the Near-Term Task
Force recommendation number one concerning the defense-in-depth
philosophy, the Severe Accident Management Order, the filtered-
vents proposal, and the economic consequences proposal, and I
noticed that after last July's hearing, Commissioner
Ostendorff, you submitted answers to some questions we had
submitted in which you supported an integrated, prioritized
assessment of the Near-Term Task Force recommendations, and as
I said in my opening statement, all of these issues seem to be
so intertwined and yet there seems to be an effort at the
Commission to do them independent and separate of each other.
Would you give me your views on this issue?
Mr. Ostendorff. Thank you very much, Chairman Whitfield,
for the question. It is a very important question.
My personal views on this are as follows, that there may be
some externally who would criticize the NRC staff for the
sequencing of these four issues that you just raised. I take a
different view, and I will tell you that amongst the five of us
when we meet in periodic meetings several times a month one-on-
one, we discuss this exact issue. I would fear that for us to
go back and tell our Executive Director for Operations go back
and sequence this in the way that you think is appropriate,
that we would be inappropriately delegating our own policy
decision-making authority to our staff. I think it is incumbent
upon us as decisionmakers to take that integration and
prioritization function on these key policy issues and deal
with them as a Commission-level decision, not a staff decision.
So for instance, if I could just add, in our economic
consequences vote, and nothing is wrapped up but we have all
had lots of discussions on this, and the filtered-vents vote, I
think you will see when those votes are released under our
processes, there has been significant consideration for the
interconnection of these issues.
Mr. Whitfield. Would any of the other Commissioners like to
make a comment?
Ms. Svinicki. Yes, Chairman Whitfield. I agree with
Commissioner Ostendorff. I would add that I think since our
responses last summer, individually and as a Commission, we are
trying to strike a balance between, as Congressman Rush just
read, our commitment to a principle that the entire regulatory
framework not be unjustifiably in a state of transition and the
need to disposition some of these measures which have been
under evaluation. So we are attempting to integrate as well as
we can but at the same time, if issues are held open even
longer, we contribute to this state of transition for the
regulatory framework. So as we discuss with each other and we
feel we are able, if we can disposition an individual issue, we
think that getting that stabilized is beneficial.
Ms. Macfarlane. Let me add that I agree with both of my
colleagues on this issue, and we have been discussing it on a
very regular basis, but I think what we are also benefiting
from, as the staff does more analysis, is more information to
help us really understand all the issues that are at play and
exactly how we can deal with the overlap or the lack of
overlap, depending on the particular issue. So we are giving
this due consideration, please be assured.
Mr. Whitfield. Yes, sir?
Mr. Apostolakis. Well, in addition to what my colleagues
said, there is one other element that plays a role in our
decision-making process, and that is how long it would take to
implement one of those recommendations. Ideally and logically,
recommendation one should be the first one to deal with, but
recommendation one requires time, it requires rethinking of the
regulatory system, so I don't think any one of us would want us
to still be working on recommendation one without doing
anything else. So there are other actions that we can take, and
it is not an ideal situation. But again, there is this time
pressure too, that we do want to do something, and
recommendation one will have to wait for a while.
Mr. Whitfield. Mr. Magwood?
Mr. Magwood. Not to be the only one to stay silent on the
issue, I guess I will have to make some comment. I think that
the outcomes that we have been able to generate I think have
been good, and that is not to say that we could not have had a
more, I guess I should say a more coordinated approach to how
these issues were sequenced and how we approach them, but to be
honest, a lot of these issues have evolved a bit while we have
been working on them. For example, we have merged some of the
issues together so that they aren't independent decisions
anymore. So our understanding of how to approach this has
changed as we have gone forward. So it is easy to look
backwards and say well, I wish we could have done it this way,
but I think the progress we have made so far has been so
positive that I am hesitant to be overly critical of the fact
that I would have liked to have seen one decision come before
another.
Mr. Whitfield. Well, thank you all so much for talking
about it. Thank you.
Mr. Shimkus. The chairman's time has expired. The Chair now
recognizes the ranking member of the full committee, Mr.
Waxman, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Waxman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chair Macfarlane, I would like to start by asking you about
the problems with San Onofre. I mentioned it in my opening
statement. The nuclear generating station is located near San
Diego. In 2010 and 2011, new steam generators were placed in
service at that plant. The project cost California ratepayers
$670 million but the new equipment was supposed to last for
decades. However, since January 31 of last year, both reactors
have been shut down after a tube in one of the units' steam
generators started leaking radioactive steam into the
atmosphere. When you last testified before the committee, all
five Commissioners agreed that this is a serious safety issue
that must be corrected before the plant restarts. The operator
of the plant, Southern California Edison, is now proposing to
run one of the units at 70 percent of power for 5 months. I
know that NRC staff is evaluating that proposal.
Chairman Macfarlane, would running a plant at less than
full power for an extended period of time normally require an
amendment to the plant's operating license?
Ms. Macfarlane. You know, we are in the process of
evaluating the proposal by Southern California Edison for their
restart, and we are also evaluating whether they understand the
root cause of the problem with the steam generators, and let me
assure you first of all, that we will not let the plant operate
until we are assured that it can operate 100 percent safely.
Mr. Waxman. But my question is--and I thank you for that
comment--is that if they are going to run this plant at less
than full power, don't they require an amendment to the plant's
operating license?
Ms. Macfarlane. I think this is in adjudicatory space right
now and so I can't comment on that particular issue.
Mr. Waxman. NRC didn't detect the flaws in the generators
before they were turned on. That raises important questions.
How did this happen? How do we make sure it doesn't happen
again? What progress has NRC made in answering these
outstanding questions?
Ms. Macfarlane. The process for changing out steam
generators at plants--and this has been done at 65 plants
across the country, 65 reactors. We have done this over and
over. It has been a fairly straightforward process. So the
situation at San Onofre is somewhat unique. But nonetheless, we
are going back and evaluating whether we have the right
procedures in place when these big pieces of equipment are
changed. So this is an active area.
Mr. Waxman. And how long do you figure this is going to
take?
Ms. Macfarlane. That what is going to take?
Mr. Waxman. This evaluation to know what NRC didn't do and
should have done and will do in the future.
Ms. Macfarlane. I am not sure, but we are in the process of
determining lessons learned, and we will really move on with
lessons learned once this situation with San Onofre is
completed.
Mr. Waxman. I want to turn to the issue of climate change
and its impact on nuclear power plants. For years, scientists
have warned that climate change will bring more extreme weather
and flooding, more heat waves and droughts. We are now
experiencing impacts consistent with these predictions.
Chairman Macfarlane, what is NRC doing to ensure that our
Nation's nuclear plants can operate safely not only in the
current climate but in a warmer climate with more extreme
weather? There are indications that climate change is already
having a harmful impact on the nuclear sector. Last August,
Dominion Power was forced to shut down a nuclear reactor at its
Millstone Power Station in Connecticut because the water it
needs to cool its reactor became too warm.
Ms. Macfarlane. Yes, I appreciate that question. I think it
is important for us to evaluate all external hazards including
those that may be posed by climate change, but I think the
Fukushima accident showed us that we need to be aware of recent
information in terms of earthquake activity, tsunami, etc. So
we need to be prepared for all of that, and in fact, we are
moving in that direction right now. In the tier one activities
from the Fukushima follow-on, we have asked plants to
reevaluate both the seismic and flooding hazard, and the
flooding hazard is a broad hazard. It can be from riverine
flooding from too much rain, from coastal storm surge, as we
saw during Hurricane Sandy, even from tsunamis. And then as we
move through our other----
Mr. Waxman. Are you aware of other instances of nuclear
plants shutting down or curtailing their output as a result of
cooling water they depend on becoming either too warm or too
scarce?
Ms. Macfarlane. Yes. If it becomes their licensing basis,
they do have to shut down.
Mr. Waxman. The Tennessee Valley Authority has to curtail
its output of its Browns Ferry nuclear reactors in Alabama
during the summers of 2010 and 2011 because the temperature of
the river used for cooling waters became too hot. Exelon
Corporation had to receive special permission from regulators
last summer to continue to operate its Braidwood reactors in
Illinois when their cooling water pond's temperature reached
102 degrees.
The impact of climate change on our Nation's nuclear power
plants are real and happening now, and I think it is even going
to get worse in the future. Thank you very much.
Mr. Shimkus. Thank you. The gentleman yields back his time.
The Chair now recognizes the chairman emeritus from the full
committee, Mr. Barton, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Barton. Thank you, both chairmen and ranking members of
the subcommittees for holding this hearing. It is very decent
of the full Commission to come before the two subcommittees.
Madam Chairwoman, several months or maybe a month ago,
myself and 20 other members sent you a letter asking some kind
of general policy questions. One of the questions we asked was,
when we could expect your Commission to conduct a full
regulatory review between the Japanese system and the United
States system, and in spite of some of the things that you said
to member of this committee informally and in private
conversation, you didn't answer that question, and I was a
little bit surprised. I didn't think that was a trick question.
Do you want to enlighten the committee why you were so
nonresponsive to such a basic baseline question?
Ms. Macfarlane. Well, let me thank you for your question. I
appreciate it, and I am sorry you found our answer wanting. And
I will start off, and I will invite my colleagues to jump in,
because it was a response from all of us collectively.
Let me note first of all that operational experience is a
foundational element in our work at the NRC, and the
experiences at Fukushima represent experience that we need to
learn from. We are of course aware of the situation with Japan
and we are aware of the analyses that the Japanese have done
themselves of the accident and their conclusions. Nonetheless,
I think the accident pointed out a number of issues that are
important for us to learn from. For instance, prior to the
accident, we had not imagined that more than one reactor could
melt down at a single facility. So it is imperative for us to
now consider that in our regulatory analysis.
Mr. Barton. Well, can we----
Ms. Macfarlane. But let me invite my colleagues to comment.
Mr. Barton. Let me just do a quick follow-up. Are you
willing to commit to the committee right now that you will
conduct such a full regulatory review comparison and, if so,
when might we expect that to be given to the committee and the
public?
Ms. Macfarlane. I think that we are working with all due
deliberation, very carefully considering the lessons learned
from the Fukushima accident and I think we are----
Mr. Barton. That is not an answer to my question. You know,
are you going to conduct a full regulatory review or not?
Ms. Macfarlane. I am satisfied with the analysis and the
progress that we are making at the agency.
Mr. Barton. So you think you have already done it even
though you have not----
Ms. Macfarlane. I think we have done an adequate job, and
we are----
Mr. Barton. Does the rest of the Commission agree with
that? That is a stunning statement if you all agree with that.
Ms. Svinicki. Congressman Barton, if I may, predating
Chairman Macfarlane's service on the Commission, as an
individual member, I did propose in a vote to my colleagues
that the Commission direct the staff to conduct a regulatory
comparison. This was in the months immediately succeeding the
event in Japan. In the process of working as a deliberative
body, my proposal was scoped down to a comparison of station
blackout requirements. I respect the majority, so I appreciate
that my colleagues on the Commission supported a partial
comparison at that time.
I continue to believe that a more complete comparison would
be a good check for us even 2 years from the accident. It would
allow us to be aware if we have any gaps that we have not yet
addressed. Our direction to the staff arises from a majority
vote.
Mr. Barton. I am not trying to be argumentative but I don't
see how you can decide what to do going forward if you really
don't do a thorough review of the two regulatory systems that
are currently in existence, or were in existence at that time.
Mr. Shimkus. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. Barton. Sure.
Mr. Shimkus. And our point is this. Collegiality is great,
but just signing a letter because that is the majority way
instead of you have opposition and you have a better way to do
it, stand your ground. We want you to be collegial. We want you
to talk. But this letter and this response is unacceptable to
this committee, and we would ask that we get it right and that
you give us a thorough analysis of the two systems.
Mr. Barton. I can assure you that most members of the
committee on both sides of the aisle are not trying to sandbag
the Commission. In fact, I would say to the contrary, we are
your biggest allies. So to be nonresponsive, I won't say it is
shocking because it is not the first time we have received such
a nonresponse from a regulatory agency but it was
disappointing.
With that, I yield back.
Mr. Shimkus. The gentleman's time is expired. The Chair now
recognizes the other chairman emeritus of the full committee,
Mr. Dingell, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Dingell. Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your courtesy
and commend you for this hearing.
A yes or no question here. This is to the chairman. As you
know, the Yucca Mountain facility remains unused yet we are
still generating nuclear waste at facilities across the country
at a tremendous rate. Has the Commission considered whether the
D.C. Circuit Court's 2012 decision and the lack of a permanent
storage facility will affect the continuation of existing
licenses or possibly invalidate them? Yes or no.
Ms. Macfarlane. It won't invalidate existing licenses.
Mr. Dingell. Now, if not, does the Commission plan to do
so?
Ms. Macfarlane. Sorry. Can you repeat the question?
Mr. Dingell. If not, does the Commission plan to do so?
Ms. Macfarlane. To invalidate existing licenses?
Mr. Dingell. Well, what are you going to do? You have
already said--you have given me an answer to the first part of
the question. Does the Commission plan then to take any further
action here such as terminating the use of the facility and
reviewing or bringing to a halt the development of the nuclear
power in the country?
Ms. Macfarlane. Let me ask for clarification. Are we
talking about----
Mr. Dingell. Please submit the answer in written form, and
Mr. Chairman, I will submit questions to the Commission.
Mr. Shimkus. Without objection, all members will be able to
submit questions to the Commission for a response.
Mr. Dingell. Now, Madam Chairman, would you submit then
additional information on this subject for the record to the
committee? I will be submitting to you an appropriate letter on
this matter.
Now, this is again yes or no. The nuclear industry has been
ahead of many industries in cybersecurity efforts, and the
Commission had robust cyber regulations already in place. Do
you believe the Commission has the necessary authority and
resources to do all you can to defend against cybersecurity
threats and breaches and prepare for future threats? Could you
answer this yes or no?
Ms. Macfarlane. Yes.
Mr. Dingell. Again, Mr. Chairman, I will be submitting some
questions on this point for the record.
Madam Chairman, in addition to the nuclear facilities and
the computer infrastructures that support them, nuclear
facilities could potentially be disrupted through offsite
attacks such as attacks on the mines or transportation or on
other activities at the companies that manufacture parts. If
reactor fuels, parts, equipment or other products are qualified
to come on site, should the Commission have jurisdiction or
input over cyber or physical protection before it comes on
site? Yes or no.
Ms. Macfarlane. We are beginning to look into this issue.
Mr. Dingell. All right. And again, I will submit some
questions on this.
Madam Chairman, the Fukushima disaster obviously gave us a
lot to think about when it comes to nuclear energy, and the
Commission has put considerable thought into this matter.
However, in a recent letter to the Commission, I joined my
committee colleague, Mr. Barrow, for whom I have great respect,
and others to express concern about a pending decision that may
require a significant number of nuclear facilities to install
containment filtered vents. The concern is, it may not be
appropriate for the facilities your decision may affect due to
the differences in affected reactors. Would a case-by-case
evaluation provide greater certainty the best technologies are
being used rather than a broad approach such as a filtered-vent
proposal? Yes or no.
Ms. Macfarlane. I am sorry. I didn't get the question.
Mr. Dingell. Well, I am running out of time.
Ms. Macfarlane. The filtered-vents issue is still an active
area of voting so I am not going to talk about it right now,
with all respect to my colleagues.
Mr. Dingell. Thank you. I will submit again questions on
this. In regards to other Fukushima recommendations already put
in place, please submit for the record why these were issued as
orders and not through the rulemaking process. Why did you
issue these as orders and not through the rulemaking process?
Ms. Macfarlane. Because we felt that these particular
activities were activities that needed to be accomplished very
quickly. Rulemaking is a very time-consuming process, and in
response to what we now know about what can happen at reactors
based on the Fukushima accident----
Mr. Dingell. Now, they will be submitted rather
imperfectly, and this is going to require further refinement by
the Commission, is it not?
Ms. Macfarlane. Yes. We are in rulemaking mode as well.
Mr. Dingell. Madam Chairman, I submitted a question to you
last year with regard to the status of an application by
Aerotest Operations for an indirect license transfer to Nuclear
Labyrinth. In your written response, you indicated that the
Commission would request additional information from Aerotest.
It is my understanding that such additional information has
been submitted. Does the Commission anticipate requesting
further information to Aerotest?
Ms. Macfarlane. The information was submitted, I believe,
this past January and it will take between 6 to 8 months for us
to review this.
Mr. Dingell. Would you please submit for the record your
timeline on this?
And Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your courtesy.
Mr. Shimkus. The gentleman's time is expired. The Chair now
recognizes the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Gingrey, for 5
minutes.
Mr. Gingrey. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the recognition.
Since we are somewhat rushed for time--I think we have Floor
votes coming up soon--let me get right to the questions, and I
am going to go starting with Chairwoman Macfarlane, and I want
each of the Commissioners to respond to this if you will.
To me, it seems abundantly clear that this Administration
unilaterally decided to ignore the Nuclear Waste Policy Act and
indeed canceled Yucca Mountain, our Nation's only nuclear waste
repository program. Subsequently, the Commission's waste
confidence rule was vacated by the D.C. Circuit Court, which
rebuked the Commission when it wrote, ``The Commission
apparently has no long-term plan other than hoping for a
geologic repository.'' As a result, you have a 2-year
moratorium now on issuing new plant licenses or renewals for
existing plants. For each of the Commissioners, again,
Chairwoman Macfarlane, I will start with you. Wouldn't simply
following the law and reconstituting the Yucca Mountain program
reestablish a basis for confidence that there will be a
disposal path for spent nuclear fuel?
Ms. Macfarlane. This issue, the Yucca Mountain issue, is in
the courts right now and we will await the decision of the
courts and we will follow the law.
Mr. Gingrey. Please.
Ms. Svinicki. Yes, I believe that having clarity in both
the language of the law and its implementation would allow the
NRC to continue its licensing activities. I suppose I am just
observing that if the national policy for disposal of these
materials is uncertain, then these types of legal complications
such as waste confidence arise in our licensing activities.
Mr. Apostolakis. I agree with Chairman Macfarlane.
Mr. Magwood. I think it is quite evident that the
uncertainty in national policy created the situation we have
with Waste Confidence, so I think the answer to your question
obviously is yes, but I would also stress that I believe that
our original Waste Confidence decision in 2010 was, in my view,
and remains, in my view, appropriate. So I still think that was
a good aste confidence determination at the time despite the
fact the court didn't agree with me on that.
Mr. Ostendorff. Congressman, I agree with Commissioner
Magwood. I voted on that waste confidence decision when I first
got to the Commission along with other colleagues here. I
believe that we recognized it is the Department of Energy's
responsibility under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act to establish
a repository. We had good faith that they would follow that
law. The law should be followed or amended.
Mr. Gingrey. Mr. Chairman, I have a list of the licensing
actions subject to the moratorium issued by the Commission.
This is the list, Mr. Chairman, and I would like unanimous
consent that this document be included in our record.
Mr. Shimkus. Is there objection? Hearing none, so ordered.
[The information appears at the conclusion of the hearing.]
Mr. Gingrey. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
On the third page of this document, listed are two
independent spent fuel storage installations. That is a fancy
word for interim storage, of which we have 68, as I understand
it, across the country, 68 different interim storage
facilities. So there are two that can't get their existing
license renewed because of this waste confidence moratorium.
There are some individuals that probably hope that interim
storage will fix the waste confidence problem, but that looks
like a catch-22 to me. Can each of you comment, again, starting
with the chairwoman, can each of you comment on how interim
storage can solve waste confidence if you cannot license it
because of the moratorium?
Ms. Macfarlane. First of all, let me point out that the
resolving of the waste problems is the purview of the Congress
and the Administration and not the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission. Our job is to ensure that any interim storage
facilities, any repositories, if so deemed by law, if that is
our role, then we----
Mr. Shimkus. If the gentleman would yield, it is the law of
the land, so just for the record, I think no one in the basic
reading of the law would say that Yucca Mountain is not the law
of the land.
Ms. Macfarlane. Yes, I am not trying to say that Yucca
Mountain is not the law of the land. I am just clarifying our
role as regulators.
Mr. Gingrey. Why don't we move along pretty quickly? I am
running out of time and I would like to hear from each one of
the Commissioners on this as well.
Ms. Svinicki. Congressman, I would only observe that the
Commission, I believe, has crafted a response to the adverse
court decision, which is not dependent on legislative action.
We have directed our staff to remedy and rehabilitate both the
rulemaking and the environmental impact statement that the
court found lacking. Once that activity is complete, our
ability to issue licenses and the legal underpinning for that
will be restored.
Mr. Apostolakis. I agree.
Mr. Magwood. Yes, I agree with Commissioner Svinicki.
Mr. Ostendorff. I also agree.
Mr. Gingrey. Mr. Chairman, my time is expired. I yield
back. Thank you.
Mr. Shimkus. The gentleman's time is expired. The Chair
recognizes the gentlelady from California, Ms. Capps, for 5
minutes.
Mrs. Capps. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all for your testimony, and Chairwoman
Macfarlane, as we discussed before, Diablo Canyon Power Plant
is located in my Congressional district. Diablo Canyon is the
largest private employer in the area. PG&E, which operates the
plant, does a lot of great work. I visited there several times
over the years and I want to thank you for taking the time to
visit the plant earlier this year.
Now, we have known for a long time that this nuclear plants
sits on the Hosgri earthquake fault. But in 2008, the U.S.
Geological Survey discovered a new fault called the Shoreline
fault. The Energy Commission recommended and our State PUC
directed that the utility conduct independent peer-reviewed
advanced seismic studies prior to applying for relicensing. As
you know, PG&E asked to have the relicensing request paused
pending completion of these studies. The NRC granted their
request, and I supported that action.
PG&E came up with a plan for the studies but California's
Coastal Commission rejected it last year due to environmental
concerns. I was similarly concerned about these impacts on
marine life, which is why I supported making it limited pilot
program. But the health and safety of my constituents is my top
priority, and I strongly believe that additional study of the
fault is needed before the relicensing process can move
forward. While I understand this effort has been driven by the
State, I would hope the NRC would also want to have the best,
most up-to-date information about this fault.
Chairwoman Macfarlane, do you also agree that having
additional independent data on the Shoreline fault would be
helpful? And I would appreciate it if you just say yes or no.
Ms. Macfarlane. Well, additional information can always be
helpful but we can operate with the information that we have.
Mrs. Capps. But you do agree that more information is a
good thing?
Ms. Macfarlane. I agree in general that more information is
a good thing.
Mrs. Capps. Last October, the NRC published a research
information letter claiming that Diablo Canyon is seismically
safe, yet there are other scientific studies that seem to
conflict with the NRC's report, and I am holding up one. USGS
seismologist Dr. Jeanne Hardebeck, who discovered the Shoreline
fault, just published an article in the peer-reviewed Bulletin
of Seismology Society of America which says, and this is a
quote: ``Much is unknown about the Shoreline fault.'' This
raises concerns for me and my constituents that there are still
unanswered questions about the seismic situation. So Chairwoman
Macfarlane, how can we ensure that these questions and concerns
are properly addressed?
Ms. Macfarlane. Well, fortunately, right now there is an
ongoing process. There is a committee called the Senior Seismic
Hazard Assessment Committee that is actively evaluating the
seismic situation at Diablo Canyon and they are in the middle
of their process. We are observing this process and we are
looking to see what the outcome is.
Mrs. Capps. And the fact remains that another federal
scientist in a peer-reviewed study says more information is
needed. So we clearly need to figure this out. I think we can
agree that every angle must be thoroughly examined. NRC
analysis needs to incorporate independent, concrete data that
can be tested against those of seismic experts like Dr.
Hardebeck. I think it makes sense to have the best eyes and
minds in the country working together looking at these seismic
issues because, actually, first and foremost, this is about
safety. The NRC has the responsibility to make sure that Diablo
Canyon is as safe as it can be today but also in the future.
And I want the record to note that Diablo Canyon and the NRC
have more than a decade to make these decisions because these
licenses don't expire until over a decade from now, so there is
no rush. We must work together to find a responsible way to
gather and consider the additional data before relicensing
moves forward.
Chairwoman Macfarlane, I hope you share this commitment,
and I look forward to working with the NRC to ensure that this
process is done right. I do have some additional questions for
the Chairwoman and for other members of the panel but I am
going to submit those for the record, and I look forward to
their response. I do have 45 seconds left and I want to know if
there is another response that you would like to give now, or
any of the other members of the Commission about this very
urgent need at the nuclear facility in my Congressional
district.
Ms. Macfarlane. I think it is important that we make sure
that these plants can operate safety, I agree with you, but I
will offer my colleagues an option to comment.
Mrs. Capps. All right. I yield back.
Mr. Shimkus. The gentlelady yields back her time. The Chair
recognizes the gentleman from Nebraska, Mr. Terry, for 5
minutes.
Mr. Terry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairwoman Macfarlane, I represent Fort Calhoun, and you
did mention Fort Calhoun in your written statement, so I want
to follow up and ask a specific question regarding the NRC's
relationship with the folks at Fort Calhoun and Omaha Public
Power. I meet with them fairly regularly on the status of Fort
Calhoun. I don't meet with you regularly on it. My question as
a layman, reading the newspaper articles and hearing about
their continuous meetings, what I am concerned about is, it
seems about every 6, 7 months, the NRC issues a new list of to-
do things for that plant before it could reopen. So it appears
to me as a layperson that the NRC may not have all of its
organization skills applied here in the sense that it just
seems like they get really close to being able to reopen and
then all of a sudden they get this new list. Why and how does
that happen?
Ms. Macfarlane. I think we are working deliberately again,
carefully with Fort Calhoun, and as you know, there were a
number of issues that arose at the site, I think it was in 2011
, in the summer of 2011, first the flooding issue and then a
fire.
Mr. Terry. And the fire.
Ms. Macfarlane. Right, and then there were a number of
significant safety-culture issues. As you know, Omaha Power
Public District has now contracted with Exelon to operate the
site, so it is a matter of getting those Exelon folks in,
reestablishing stability at the site and addressing the issues
that exist.
Mr. Terry. Are you familiar with Fort Calhoun and that
process?
Ms. Macfarlane. Yes. I have not visited the site yet.
Mr. Terry. You are speaking at a general level here. I
already know about Exelon, and there was an additional punch
list once the approval of Exelon had come in and helped with
the management culture there, and as I understand the new punch
list, it didn't really have much to do with the management
aspect but physical things in that plant.
Ms. Macfarlane. Right.
Mr. Terry. And it just seems odd that those physical things
were there a year and a half ago but they weren't on your list,
and that gives me concern that, well, there is another agenda
out there, at least questions like that. I just want to put
that out there.
Ms. Macfarlane. I understand your concern, and a couple of
these issues have come up as a result of the licensee
discovering of these issues. Some of them have to do with
electrical penetrations into the containment building. There
are a number of technical issues like this that the licensee
noticed and therefore we are under obligation to ensure that
these particular issues are addressed. I invite my colleagues
to----
Mr. Terry. Well, I am going to go on to my next question.
Because of your situation and incidences that occurred
internally, we wrote a bill for reform of the NRC a couple
years ago, 3657. Are you familiar with that bill?
Ms. Macfarlane. I am familiar.
Mr. Terry. It has not been reintroduced, comma, yet. So I
am going to go down the list. Is everyone familiar with that
bill? Ms. Svinicki?
Ms. Svinicki. Yes.
Mr. Terry. So one of the major parts of that is about the
declaration of emergencies that seem to be one of the abuses
that was identified. So do you believe that the Chairman should
officially declare an emergency to the Commission and to
Congress before assuming emergency powers? And I am going to go
from you, Chairwoman, on down.
Ms. Macfarlane. I think the Chairman should certainly
consult with his or her colleagues when declaring an emergency.
Mr. Terry. And to Congress?
Ms. Macfarlane. And to Congress.
Ms. Svinicki. I think certainly members of the Commission
need to be notified and there needs to be an official
declaration.
Mr. Apostolakis. Yes, I agree.
Mr. Magwood. Yes, there should be an official declaration.
Mr. Ostendorff. Yes.
Mr. Terry. I have three more questions that I cannot ask in
17 seconds.
Mr. Magwood, I just want to thank you for your strength
during a difficult process before Chairman Macfarlane got
there. So good job. Yield back.
Mr. Shimkus. The gentleman yields back his time. The Chair
recognizes the lady from Florida, Ms. Castor, for 5 minutes.
Ms. Castor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning and
thanks to the Commissioners for your testimony this morning.
Over the past 5 years or so, certain ratepayers in Florida
have struggled with the cost and uncertainty of the Crystal
River nuclear power plant north of Tampa Bay. In 2009, the
previous owner of the plant embarked on somewhat typical
repairs to the plant but during those repairs the containment
wall was seriously cracked, and the new owner announced earlier
this month its intent to close the plant. That is the first
closure of a nuclear power plant in Florida, the first major
closure of a plant in the Southeastern United States. So I
understand the utility and the NRC face two choices on how to
decommission the plant. You can either decontaminate it quickly
over time called decon under the NRC lingo or over 60 years, a
process known as safe storage where the radioactivity decays
over time. The utility announced that they are choosing the
latter option. What is the role of the NRC? Do you agree with
that? What analysis goes into those options? What is your role?
Do you agree with that decision?
Ms. Macfarlane. Those options are both options that are
available under our regulatory framework. So a plant can decide
to decommission immediately such as what was done at Maine
Yankee or it can decide to put the plant in SAFSTOR for up to
60 years before finally decommissioning the site. So those are
all available within our purview and our role is to ensure that
whichever path is chosen is carried out safety and securely.
Ms. Castor. What are the pros and cons of----
Ms. Macfarlane. I think that is in part up to the licensee
to decide what the pros and cons are.
Ms. Castor. So the NRC's role is not to provide direction?
The rules provide that they can choose either option and then
you provide oversight and input once that option is selected?
Ms. Macfarlane. Correct.
Ms. Castor. Because it is interesting that the estimates I
have seen that decommissioning the plant quickly would cost
under a billion dollars while safe storage over 60 years could
cost over $6 billion. Does that sound correct in the ballpark?
Ms. Macfarlane. I am not sure for the particular facility
at Crystal River. I don't know, maybe my colleagues could
comment.
Ms. Castor. There is just a lot of sensitivity because in
Florida, there was an advanced recovery fee and ratepayers have
been on the hook for future construction. They may be left on
the hook for very significant sums of money for a plant that
was never repaired and one that may not be built, alternative
fuel, so that kind of cost-benefit analysis does not enter into
your oversight responsibility?
Ms. Macfarlane. No, that is a cost-benefit analysis that
would be done by the licensee.
Ms. Castor. OK. So at this point once they have selected
the safe store option, what kind of oversight do you provide on
that process? What kind of input? How involved, what kind of
staff requirements? Can you go into a little more detail on
that, please?
Ms. Macfarlane. We provide oversight to make sure that what
remains of the facility remains in a safe and secure manner and
so we will continually inspect it to make sure that that
occurs.
Ms. Castor. So continually how often are you in contact
with the utility and how often are you on site? Maybe it will
be necessary for you all to meet with me after the hearing to
provide those details.
Ms. Macfarlane. Sure. I am happy to go through the details
of all of this so that you understand the whole process.
Ms. Castor. Does the impending sequester, across-the-board
cuts through all government agencies, affect your ability on
what you would plan to do on oversight of the decommissioning
process at Crystal River?
Ms. Macfarlane. No, it won't. We will ensure that our main
mission, which is to ensure the operating facilities and
decommissioned facilities, shutdown facilities, will remain
safe and secure.
Ms. Castor. Does it affect it at all?
Ms. Macfarlane. No.
Ms. Castor. Thank you very much. I yield back.
Mr. Shimkus. The gentlelady yields back her time. The Chair
now recognizes the vice chairman of the Energy and Air Quality
Subcommittee, Mr. Scalise, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Scalise. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate all of
our panelists coming and engaging in this hearing.
In a March 2011 information paper to the Commission, the
NRC staff had cautioned that the cumulative effects of
regulation ``can potentially distract licensee or entity staff
from executing other primary duties that ensure safety or
security,'' and, you know, I have looked at this cumulative
effect risk and it seems valid.
[Slide shown.]
Mr. Scalise. If you can turn your attention to the slide on
the screen, this is a timeline of the regulatory actions an
average owner of four reactors would need to comply with.
Clearly, this represents a lot of new requirements in addition
to what we already expect of them every day to safely and
reliably operate their plants.
We raised this matter in our hearing last July, and the
NRC's response was ``Process enhancements focus more on
scheduling and less on reducing or scaling back requirements.''
We raised this issue again in our January 15th letter, and the
NRC's response was, ``The staff is currently working with
industry to understand the impact of implementation dates,''
and mentioned the timely development of guidance.
So more regulation is not always safer. Sometimes it is
just more things that they have to do that take away from their
primary safety responsibility. I don't know how anyone can look
at this slide and dismiss the cumulative impact of regulations
as merely a matter of scheduling, and I am told that in
addition to this, there are approximately 40 more post-
Fukushima items yet to be considered. Is that correct?
Ms. Macfarlane. We are in the process of considering a
number of post-Fukushima activities.
Mr. Scalise. Do you know how many? I am told it is around
40. Is that an accurate assessment or do you know an exact
number?
Ms. Macfarlane. I think it is----
Mr. Scalise. Higher or lower?
Ms. Macfarlane. It is lower.
Mr. Scalise. How much lower?
Ms. Macfarlane. It depends on exactly how specific you want
to get.
Mr. Scalise. Well, if you know it is less than 40, than you
know it is some number below that, so 30 maybe?
Ms. Macfarlane. We will get back to you with the specific
exact number for the record.
Mr. Scalise. So you will get that back to the committee?
Ms. Macfarlane. But that does not mean we will decide to
enforce all of those activities. Those are things that are
under consideration.
Mr. Scalise. Well, you know, and that is on top of what
everybody is already expected to do, you know, and I guess that
gets to a question of priorities. At some point if you are not
going to enforce all of them, then you have got to establish
some set of priorities, I would expect because----
Ms. Macfarlane. We have.
Mr. Scalise. You have that?
Ms. Macfarlane. Yes, we have a set of priorities.
Mr. Scalise. Do the people who operate all the reactors
know what those priorities are that you are going to enforce?
Ms. Macfarlane. Yes, they do.
Mr. Scalise. And if you can get that to us as well. Can you
do that?
Ms. Macfarlane. Sure.
Mr. Scalise. Because we all want the same thing. We want
safety. We want the nuclear plants to be safe. But you have
repeatedly indicated that our plants are safe and that
regulatory changes are often referred to as safety
enhancements. So what I would like to know from the panel is
how to seriously tackle the cumulative impacts of these
regulations. Who would like to go first?
Ms. Macfarlane. Well, we have been talking with industry on
these issues. I know this is an area of concern for them, and
we are concerned that we do not want to distract licensees from
their main mission of ensuring safety at the facilities, of
course. At the same time, I think it is our job to impose
whatever requirements are needed to provide adequate protection
of public health and safety.
Mr. Scalise. But are you going to impose things that you
yourself know you are not even going to enforce? I mean, is
that really the responsible thing to do?
Ms. Macfarlane. Everything we impose, we will enforce, of
course. Let me ask my colleagues to comment because I think
they would like to.
Mr. Apostolakis. About 3 weeks ago, the Commission directed
the staff to do two broad things. The first one is to propose
ways of achieving these things, prioritization of new
requirements or potential requirements with existing
requirements. For example, when we received the Fukushima
report from the Near-Term Task Force, we just prioritized the
Fukushima recommendations regardless of what else was going on.
So now we are asking the staff to actually consider what else
is going on in the future and give prioritization of
everything. And second, we are asking the staff, directing the
staff to come up with options for giving the licensees the
option of arguing back why certain requirements they should
delay because they are doing something else that is of more
safety significance, and to do that.
Mr. Scalise. And real quick--I apologize, I have got 3
seconds left--I just want to ask when you are sending that list
with 30 or whatever the number is going to be of those new
items, does that include new regulatory guides, issuing new
generic communications, using revised interim staff guidance,
developing inspection findings, disposition of license,
amendment requests? Are those what would be included in that
list or would that be outside of that?
Ms. Macfarlane. These are issues that are under
consideration. These aren't decisions that we have made yet.
Mr. Scalise. OK. So as you get those, if you could share
those with us. Thank you very much. I yield back.
Mr. Shimkus. The gentleman's time is expired. The Chair now
recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. McNerney, for 5
minutes.
Mr. McNerney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. So many questions,
so little time.
Commissioner Svinicki, how does the security of nuclear
plants compare to conventional power plants with regard to
cyber attacks?
Ms. Svinicki. I would say that the NRC has some of the, I
think, most specific and strongest regulations in the cyber
area. As I mentioned, in 2009, NRC was able and had the
authority to put in place cybersecurity regulations that have
the licensees identify all of what we term critical digital
assets at the site and then propose a security plan to the NRC.
We have received those from all of our power plant licensees.
We have reviewed them, and I believe that we have begun our
process of inspecting those cybersecurity plans that are in
place.
Mr. McNerney. So they may be more secure than our
conventional plants?
Ms. Svinicki. I have visited one fossil plant but I did not
discuss cybersecurity there so I am not certain.
Mr. McNerney. Is there any legislation needed to enable the
nuclear plants to secure themselves from cyber attack?
Ms. Svinicki. In my time on the Commission since 2008, the
Commission has looked very actively at our legal authorities,
and we have not identified any gaps that we have, so we do not
seek any additional authorities in this area. We feel that we
have a very robust authority.
Mr. McNerney. Thank you. One or two other questions for
you. Small modular reactors--how long might it take for a
competent power producer to get a license for a small modular
reactor? Are there any licenses out there now?
Ms. Svinicki. There are not, and we have no pending designs
that are undergoing review right now. We do anticipate with the
Department of Energy's program now, they made selection of a
technology for their program late last year. We expect that we
may receive that application in, I think either late 2013 or
2014, I believe. Chairman Macfarlane says it will be 2014.
Mr. McNerney. Are there any foundries in the United States
capable of producing the containment vessels for these
reactors?
Ms. Svinicki. I think I would like to take that question
for the record to be certain of being accurate in my response,
but I believe that the intention is that the small modular
reactors would have components, a substantial portion of which
would be able to be manufactured here in the United States.
Mr. McNerney. But the large containment vessel, you are not
sure of?
Ms. Svinicki. I am not certain for the various designs that
are proposed for small modular reactors. I am not sure of the
largest of the sizes of those. I don't know if any my
colleagues are.
Mr. McNerney. How about for the other kind of nuclear
reactors? Are those foundries capable of producing those?
Ms. Svinicki. For the large light water reactors, there are
not U.S. facilities.
Mr. McNerney. Chairman Macfarlane, you are a true expert in
nuclear waste. Is that correct?
Ms. Macfarlane. That is correct.
Mr. McNerney. You mentioned in your testimony the laser
uranium enrichment facilities. Are those also used in
processing nuclear waste?
Ms. Macfarlane. No, they are not.
Mr. McNerney. Do you see other facilities for nuclear waste
than Yucca Mountain on the horizon that could be acceptable
within a 20-year time frame?
Ms. Macfarlane. I think what is acceptable and what
policies develop is in part dependent on what occurs in
Congress and the Administration. In the original Nuclear Waste
Policy Act, there was always a question of a second repository,
and currently, the Yucca Mountain repository was to be
statutorily bound by certain volume of material. That volume is
already exceeded at reactors, so there is an open question
about a second repository.
Mr. McNerney. In a futuristic sense, do you see nuclear
waste becoming valuable in its own right within the next 20 or
50 years?
Ms. Macfarlane. It is not my area of expertise.
Mr. McNerney. OK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Shimkus. The gentleman yields back his time. The Chair
now recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Burgess, for 5
minutes.
Mr. Burgess. I thank the chairman for the recognition.
Commissioner Svinicki, let me ask you a question. In your
opening remarks, you made mention of the fact of the ability to
reenergize or revisit Yucca Mountain would depend not only on
the funding but the degree to which the data collected during
the license application, the degree to which that data has
degraded over time.
Now, I was fortunate enough to go with Chairman Shimkus to
Yucca Mountain 2 years ago. At that point they were 6 months
into their appropriations lapse, and the gentleman who showed
us around that day did make mention of the fact that there will
over time be an attrition of that data or degradation of that
data. It appeared to me that there was a lot of material
collected during that license application. Do you have a sense
as to--you know, we always talk about the half life of nuclear
material but do you have a sense about the half life of this
data that has been collected during the licensing application
and how long the inactivity of the Congress or the Commission,
how that will harm the ability to reclaim that data?
Ms. Svinicki. Congressman, my testimony in response to the
prior question discussed the fact that the longer that
activities have been in suspension, the more challenging and
expensive the reconstitution is or reconstitution may even be
imperiled. Although you are mentioning data and analysis, what
I had in my mind when I made that statement was actually people
and experts and scientists. I know that the NRC, since the
suspension of its Yucca Mountain activities, has had
retirements of scientists who had been on this project for over
20 years and also we have reassigned individuals. Conceptually,
they may be available then to be brought back to this work but
there is additionally, as you mentioned, at Yucca Mountain,
there were physical samples and core borings. The quality and
chain of custody of those, in the licensing process is a very,
very important matter. I don't know the state of DOE's
preservation of any of that or the chain of custody of those
materials for the purposes of us relying upon them in a
scientific investigation. So I think there are many dimensions
to the challenges of reconstitution but time is the enemy.
Mr. Burgess. Yes, there is big machinery that was in use
that seemed to be just out in the weather and had daisies
growing out of the treads and that sort of thing, which just
you really had to wonder, this funding lapse or this
appropriations lapse is very damaging, and the real loser here
is the poor consumer who has funded this for years with
surcharges on their bill with the expectation that in the
future their reliability and their supply of electricity would
be assured because the federal government was in fact taking
care of this problem of long-term storage. Is that a fair
statement?
Ms. Svinicki. Yes, it is.
Mr. Burgess. And I do want to acknowledge the fact that you
have been very responsive to my office and my staff, and I
appreciate that. I was also concerned when the Fukushima
reactor went down, the danger from the rods and the spent fuel
pools. You provided some reassurance to us that that was not as
big a problem as it appeared in the press, so I was grateful
for your input that day.
Chairman Macfarlane, can I ask you a question? I have a
letter here from the National Mining Association to you dated
from January 7th of this year, and they have several points
that they were making, but the lead point and one that is of
concern to uranium producers in my area of North Texas is the
relicensing applications that apparently are pretty expensive.
Their fees are pretty expensive and yet they are told by the
Commission that the staff man-hours are not there to be able to
process those relicensing applications because of lack of
funding, but it does seem like they are funding that activity
with their application fees. What am I missing here?
Ms. Macfarlane. No, I think we have--my understanding is,
we have adequate staff to deal with the new applications and
the relicensing applications. The issue sometimes is that we
don't get complete applications and so there is a period of
back and forth with the licensees.
Mr. Burgess. Well, and again, the opinion of this letter
submitted by the National Mining Association was these
applications were submitted in their entirety and that they
were complete. I would appreciate some follow-up on this
because clearly there is a concern, and Mr. Chairman, I would
ask unanimous consent to put the National Mining Association
letter into the record.
Mr. Shimkus. Is there objection? Hearing none, so ordered.
[The information appears at the conclusion of the hearing.]
Mr. Burgess. Since you were so compliant, I will yield back
my 8 seconds.
Mr. Shimkus. It is a historical event, your yielding back
time. The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from the Virgin
Islands, Mrs. Christensen, for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Christensen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning,
everyone.
In addition to the three orders to commercial nuclear
reactors in the United States in order to address the safety
concerns raised by the Fukushima accident in Japan that you
issued last year, the NRC also required all commercial nuclear
reactors to perform inspections or walk-downs to verify that
they are prepared to respond to flooding and earthquakes as
required in their licenses and that all necessary equipment to
respond to such events is available, functional and properly
maintained.
Chairman Macfarlane, I understand that all operators have
completed walk-downs of their facilities?
Ms. Macfarlane. They have.
Mrs. Christensen. And what did the walk-downs find? Did
they raise any red flags about the preparedness of the U.S.
nuclear fleet to respond to a serious flood or seismic event?
Ms. Macfarlane. I appreciate the question. Most plants were
just finding only minor discrepancies. A few plants identified
more significant issues in the flooding walk-downs. In the
seismic walk-downs, no significant issues to date.
Mrs. Christensen. And the NRC, as I understand it, they
asked the U.S. commercial reactors to go a step further and
reevaluate their flood and seismic hazards and compare any
newly identified hazards with the extreme-events plans are
designed to withstand. What was the goal of the reevaluations,
or was that just for the few plants that----
Ms. Macfarlane. Well, the reevaluation actually was begun
even before Fukushima, the Fukushima accident, and then it was
folded into the Fukushima recommendations, but the goal is to
bring the plants and their seismic hazard analysis and flooding
hazard analysis into up-to-date current information that is
available in the earth sciences. So it is updating the hazard
analysis at all these facilities.
Mrs. Christensen. I understand that the reevaluations will
be completed by the end of 2015. Is that correct?
Ms. Macfarlane. Yes.
Mrs. Christensen. And then once they are complete, what
would the next step be for NRC?
Ms. Macfarlane. Depending on what is found, we will have to
go individually plant by plant and see if some changes are
required or not. It depends on what we find at each plant.
Mrs. Christensen. Thank you. These reevaluations, they are
to be a critical step in ensuring that the U.S. nuclear fleet
is prepared to respond to a range of hazards and protect the
public health in an emergency. I appreciate your answers.
I don't have any further questions, Mr. Chairman. I yield
back.
Mr. Shimkus. The gentlelady yields back her time and now
the Chair recognizes the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Latta, for 5
minutes.
Mr. Latta. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and
thank you very much to you all for being here today. We really
appreciate it.
If I could just kind of back up a little bit. There were a
few comments made today about cybersecurity, and as we all
know, in the last month, month and a half, it has been in the
news quite a bit, and in fact, just last week in my district,
we had a large cybersecurity event that we had the FBI in to
talk to about 170-plus people in my district as to what is
happening and what they have to do protect themselves and their
businesses. But if I could, going back, the NRC had an order
after September 11th that had ordered nuclear power plants to
enhance their security including requirements for certain
cybersecurity threats, and this effort later culminated in a
specific cybersecurity rule in 2009 and the associated
regulatory guidance was based on the cybersecurity standards
published by the National Institute of Standards and Technology
and the Department of Homeland Security, and if I could,
Commissioner Ostendorff, could I ask if you could give a brief
overview of how that rule is being implemented and the level of
coordination between the NRC and other agencies.
Mr. Ostendorff. Thank you, Congressman, for the question.
This is a complicated area. Two years ago, this Commission
worked with FERC and NERC to outline the lines of demarcation
using what is called a bright-line survey to ensure that we had
a unitary regulatory approach that only the NRC would regulate
on-site, basically the transmission line boundary of the
plants, recognizing that NERC on behalf of FERC is regulating
externall y. So that I would say is a great example of positive
cooperation inside the U.S. interagency to ensure we did not
have conflicting regulatory inspections, rules, et cetera.
The cyber rule that our licensees are required to be in
compliance with as of the end of December of last year,
currently our staff is out and doing inspections to ascertain
compliance with that rule. I think our staff is well equipped
to do that. I think we will find some things we hadn't thought
about. This is a tough area. But I think we have the proper
resources and the proper approach going forward. This
Commission is staying very actively involved with our federal
agency counterparts. Just last Thursday, we spent 2\1/2\ hours
in a classified briefing with DHS on cyber issues for the
United States and so I think it is an issue that is very much
before us as a Commission and an agency.
Mr. Latta. Well, thank you very much, and Mr. Magwood, if I
could just ask you briefly, I know that in 2011 when you all
were testifying before us here in committee, I had asked
questions, just kind of paraphrasing how if you had all the
information that you needed to make informed decisions and
pretty much you had said most of the time that that was
happening. Can you tell me how are things going right now with
the flow of information back and forth for you all to make
these very important decisions that come before the NRC today?
Mr. Magwood. Actually, Congressman, the question has never
come to my mind in the last 6 or 7 months so I think the
situation at the NRC is working very well.
Mr. Latta. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Shimkus. The gentleman yields back his time. The Chair
recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Green, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Macfarlane, in your testimony you mentioned the
importance of international cooperation with the NRC. In 2011,
our committee members led by Representative Murphy, we did a
trip to France and Sweden to see how the French and Swedish
reprocess and store their nuclear waste. I was impressed with
the progress not only in France, because I was there in 1998 to
look at how they are reprocessing their waste but particularly
with Sweden seeing what they have done with even a prototype of
a deep storage. I am interested in learning what cooperation is
presently taking place between the Commission and, for example,
Sweden and France and what lessons can be taken from their
models.
Ms. Macfarlane. In terms of nuclear waste disposal?
Mr. Green. Nuclear waste disposal, or recycling.
Ms. Macfarlane. Right. We don't do a lot on the back end of
the fuel cycle with these countries. We certainly exchange
information with their regulators and what their regulators
regulate because it is not our job to make policy for the back
end of the fuel cycle in the United States. We just oversee the
existing facilities. So we are aware of what is going on there
and we are aware of what their regulators are doing at these
facilities.
Mr. Green. Well, it sounds like you are saying that for the
United States to be involved in reprocessing, and even for the
long-term nuclear storage, whether it be Yucca Mountain or
something similar to what Sweden has done, you need more
guidance from Congress?
Ms. Macfarlane. Yes, please.
Mr. Green. Myself along with 25 other Democratic members
sent a letter to you 3 weeks ago calling for your agency to
adopt a flexible performance-based approach as recommended by
the independent ACRS with regard to mandating filters on
boiling-water reactors. First I wanted to ask, what is the
status of the Commission's response to our letter?
Ms. Macfarlane. We responded to your letter.
Mr. Green. You did?
Ms. Macfarlane. We sent you a response.
Mr. Shimkus. Unacceptably, but they did respond.
Mr. Green. OK. Second, I would like to learn what outreach
the Commission has made toward industry and other stakeholders
in order to achieve the regulatory goal in the safest and most
effective and least costly manner.
Ms. Macfarlane. We meet regularly with industry and other
stakeholders who are interested in these issues and understand
their concerns and work together.
Mr. Green. Another question. In your testimony, you state
the NRC, due to the lack of final waste confidence rule, will
not issue any final licenses until at least September of 2014.
As you are aware, most legislation that is passed by this
chamber and signed into law typically calls for agencies to
issue rules within 6 to 12 months, and I would like to hear why
the Commission, for an issue that goes to the heart of your
agency's duties, needs in excess of 2 years to issue a final
rule.
Ms. Macfarlane. In developing an environmental impact
statement and other processes we are governed by NEPA law and
other laws, and there is a public comment period that must be
incorporated into all these things, and this is in part what
takes time.
Mr. Green. Additionally, I would like to learn what
guidance the Commission has provided these facilities whose
licenses are being delayed.
Ms. Macfarlane. We are actively working on the licenses. We
just won't issue the final licenses or license renewals in this
period.
Mr. Green. With the likelihood of sequestration hitting all
federal agencies by midnight tonight, I would like to ask first
what steps is the NRC taking in order to best comply with
sequestration. Are furloughs or layoffs anticipated?
Ms. Macfarlane. We do not anticipate any furloughs or
layoffs.
Mr. Green. And second, will sequestration in any way
degrade the NRC's ability to keep our Nation's nuclear
facilities safe?
Ms. Macfarlane. Absolutely not.
Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shimkus. And if the gentleman would yield, just to
correct the record, I think you were referring to a Barrow
letter that you signed that I am unsure of whether the
Commissioner responded to. Would someone want to address that?
Ms. Macfarlane. I believe we have not responded to that
letter. Sorry.
Mr. Green. You haven't responded to the Barrow letter?
Ms. Macfarlane. Right.
Mr. Green. Because obviously from Georgia, they have a
bigger interest. We are having our problems in Texas because
one of our investors for the South Texas expansion also owned
Tokyo Power, so we are still looking for $125 million to expand
nuclear power in South Texas. Thank you.
Mr. Shimkus. The gentleman yields back his time. The Chair
now recognizes the other gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Johnson, for
5 minutes.
Mr. Johnson. I thank the chairman for the recognition, and
I am new to the Energy and Commerce Committee so I look forward
to the discussions we will have with you Commissioners, and I
thank the chairman for holding this hearing on a very, very
important topic.
Ms. Macfarlane, according to the Japanese government's
report, and I quote, ``TEPCO's manual for emergency response to
a severe accident was completely ineffective.'' What is your
view and the view of your colleagues about the ability of U.S.
emergency response capability to a severe accident?
Ms. Macfarlane. I think we are prepared but I think we must
be mindful that there are situations that we may not be
expecting and we need to learn from operating experience, but I
invite my colleagues to comment.
Mr. Apostolakis. One of the problems that they had in Japan
is that there was no single authority making decisions. In this
country, we have made sure that there is one authority. We are
not going to go to higher political figures to approve what
needs to be done. So I believe that we are in much better shape
than the Japanese were at that time.
Mr. Ostendorff. Congressman, I would just add to my
colleagues' comments two specific issues we are also
addressing. One, as mentioned earlier, in response to a prior
question, we have not typically dealt with multiple-unit
accidents. We have dealt with a one-reactor accident at one
site even if that site had two or three reactors. So we are
looking at multi-unit response. Secondly, we are looking at how
to integrate our casualty and operating procedures in a more
effective way.
Mr. Johnson. Sure. Well, I appreciate those answers, and
Mr. Apostolakis, you actually hit on something that I want to
go to next. The Japanese Diet report stated, ``We believe that
the root causes were the organizational and regulatory systems
that supported faulty rationales for decisions and actions.'' A
report by the American Nuclear Society Special Committee on
Fukushima stated, ``The committee believes that in responding
to the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi plant, human error and
flows in governance and regulatory oversight contributed to the
severity of the accident.''
Mr. Apostolakis, you just mentioned that we are way ahead
of where the Japanese were. Don't you think it is important to
compare our regulatory systems with Japan's to see if we share
some of the gaps that contributed to the accident?
Mr. Apostolakis. There is no formal comparison that the
Commission has done. However, that doesn't mean that we are not
aware of the differences, and if one wanted a more formal
approach to the evaluation, that would be an interesting thing,
but I don't think we can say that we completely ignored the
differences between us and the Japanese when we issue actions,
orders or other regulations.
Mr. Johnson. Well, I appreciate that. It seems to me that
such a comparison would reveal and further validate what you
just testified to, that America is much further ahead of where
the Japanese were in terms of information flow, decision
making, and it would seem to me that that would be an important
step prior to issuing additional regulations that are going to
additionally hamstring our nuclear industry from operating, and
in some cases, according to nuclear industry experts, drive our
team our of existence.
So I am not sure we are doing our homework. We know that we
are ahead of the Japanese and yet we want to proliferate
regulations to address what? I mean, if we don't know what the
gaps are, what are we addressing?
Mr. Ostendorff. I wanted just to comment. I think we have
heard loud and clear today, I don't think we have been
effective at communicating back to this committee a
satisfactory answer to your question. I think the Japanese
Lessons Learned Directorate, about 20 people on our staff, have
been working these issues, looking at differences. I think we
failed to communicate that in a clear manner to this committee
and I think I need to talk to my colleagues about how can we
better respond because I think a lot of the work that we have
done, we have not appropriately told you how we are doing it.
Mr. Johnson. Well, I would appreciate responses to that
because I think that is a necessary first step before we start
issuing regulations that address some gap that we are not even
aware of.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Shimkus. And I appreciate the gentleman from Ohio.
Maybe we will get a chance to officially ask you for a better
response. And now the Chair recognizes the gentleman from New
York, Mr. Engel, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Engel. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I welcome
everyone. Thank you for joining us here today.
My district is very close to the Indian Point nuclear plant
in Buchanan, New York. The safety of Indian Point continues to
be one of the most serious issues facing the Hudson Valley
region, and I have been calling for it to be shut down for
years. I was the first Member of Congress to call for its
shutdown, probably 10 years ago, and Governor Cuomo has also
called for it to shut down. The bottom line is the siting of
the plant, it is near the major metropolitan area in the
country, the New York metropolitan area, and if it were being
built today, it would never be built in Buchanan, New York.
Frankly, I think that the scrutiny of the renewal for the
licenses of these plants should be as great as a new plant
being built. I don't understand why there seems to be less of a
threshold for relicensing of the plants than there is for a
brand-new plant. Safety is safety, and it should be the same
for both of them.
Since the disaster at Fukushima, the need to shut down
Indian Point, as far as I am concerned, has only grown. I am
not opposed to nuclear power. I never mentioned closing Indian
Point until I started learning about it. It is built on a major
fault. On September 11th, one of the planes hitting the World
Trade Center flew directly over Indian Point. It is just
unbelievable. I am happy that the NRC has implemented three
immediate orders but I hope there will be strong follow-up,
especially in regards to plants like Indian Point that have a
history of problems. The fire last month at one of their
transformers is just the latest in a long line of a systematic
failures at the Point. Let me say, every Member of Congress who
has a district very near to Indian Point has called for its
closing.
Beyond the safety issues at Indian Point, there are
numerous environmental concerns--the effect on the Hudson
River--and I have asked the NRC to see if we can move to a
closed-cycle cooling system, which would have less of an impact
on the water and the fish. Another major concern is the
radioactive waste stored in the pools, almost three times the
amount that is currently being stored there than was stored at
Fukushima, and the plant sits near a reservoir that serves
almost 9 million people. I hope we will find a long-term plan
for storing this waste. I will soon be reintroducing
legislation that would call for material to be moved into dry
casks within a year, and I hope that we will consider it.
Let me say that the safety violations at Indian Point and
other nuclear power plants have raised serious questions about
nuclear power safety. I anticipate that the NRC will continue
to monitor the plants closely and to see that the three
immediate orders are implemented quickly and effectively.
Can someone please tell me why there seems to be a lesser
standard for the relicensing of plants than there is to build a
plant? If a plant is unsafe or if there are questions about its
safety, why should it matter if it is newly built or if it is
an old plant where the license is being renewed? Safety is
safety and that is the bottom line. I am wondering if anybody
can tell me the rationale for that.
Ms. Macfarlane. I will take a stab at that and offer it to
my colleagues, but very briefly, in relicensing, we look at the
overall systems and structures in the plant. We continually
evaluate the equipment, inspect and oversee the equipment, the
operations of the facility, the safety culture of the facility.
We have resident inspectors on site. Currently right now at
Indian Point there are four for two reactors who every day are
there overseeing the safe operation of the facility, but let me
ask my colleagues to jump in.
Mr. Apostolakis. Yes, I don't think it is accurate to say
that we have a lesser standard for license renewal. The license
renewal focuses on aging effects, and I think that is
appropriate because the plant has operated for 40 years or will
have been operated for 40 years. If anything else happens that
threatens safety, as the chairman said, then it is handled
according to the normal processes we have for operating plants,
so the only new thing is this aging effect, so it is not a
lesser standard, it is a more limited review. The scope is more
limited.
Mr. Engel. Well, it still would seem to me--I understand
what you are saying, but it still would seem to me that the
scope should be broadened. There have been questions about it
and they are legitimate questions. It is not just two or three
people who are opposed to nuclear power. There are serious
questions by those of us that support nuclear power, and I do.
I think the United States has to have a balanced energy policy,
but I think that it is clear to me that Indian Point should be
shut down. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shimkus. The gentleman yields back his time. The Chair
recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Hall, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Hall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I noted, Commissioner Magwood, you were talking of issues
and the things that you are faced with, and I am just trying to
make the point that you all do work and studies for us with
dangerous, threatening and relentless enemies out there.
I think I want to ask Commissioner Apostolakis--I do better
calling you George. Did I pronounce it right?
Mr. Apostolakis. Yes.
Mr. Hall. A year ago, you testified before the Senate EPW
committee and made the following remarks: ``I don't think that
what happened in Fukushima can happen here, and I repeated, it
was not unthinkable.'' Were you talking about it was not
unthinkable that that could happen there? Is that what you
meant? It is not important, but that is the way I took it.
Mr. Apostolakis. People were saying that what happened in
Fukushima was an unthinkable event. I said no, it was not. I
mean, there were so many flaws in the system and the design
that really it was not unthinkable.
Mr. Hall. Well, let me go, and in fairness to you, say what
you did say. You said, ``I don't think what happened in
Fukushima can happen here, and I repeat, it was not
unthinkable. They made terrible mistakes. There are, I think, a
couple of things that stand out if you look at happened in
Japan. The regulatory authority there, NISA, was very, very
weak technically and they didn't have the amount of
independence that we have, for example. The second is more
technical. It has to do with tsunami calculations where they
were very poorly done, let us put it that way. They ignored
data from the past.'' Is that still--do you still feel that
way?
Mr. Apostolakis. This is still my view, yes.
Mr. Hall. You don't think an accident like Fukushima can
happen here?
Mr. Apostolakis. No, I don't think so.
Mr. Hall. Well----
Mr. Apostolakis. Well, I mean----
Mr. Hall. I hope so. I hope you are right. But, you know,
some 15 or 20 years ago, we did a study in the committee I
chaired at that time studying asteroids, and we found out
during the hearing--and I got people from Russia, China,
England and, I believe, France that were supposed to have
witnesses here but none of them showed because they were told
that we were going to get a world operation to look for
asteroids because they affect the world and not just Texas or
not just your State or this Nation, and none of them showed.
But during the committee hearing, it came up that an asteroid
had just missed this country by 15 minutes some time the year
before. No one knew it. I didn't know it. No one knew it, and
we really ought to be studying that.
I think isn't it more reasonable to think and to thoroughly
consider the imposition of additional requirements and ensure
that any requirements are cost-effective, that an accident like
Fukushima can happen here? The asteroid just happened in
Russia, and we got pictures of it. We know what happened there.
We don't know why it was there or when it was coming or when
the next one will come. You protect us from very serious and
relentless enemies. Why is it that you think that that just
couldn't happen? Please don't let up, because it could happen.
Mr. Apostolakis. Well, I don't think the question really
should be whether something can happen. It is really a question
of probability, and for example, you mentioned the asteroid
issue. I don't think that there could be a rationale on our
part to start protecting nuclear plants from them. It happened
in Russia, but this is not something that we should do.
Mr. Shimkus. I apologize. I have no idea what is going on
with the microphone. We will work through it. Would the
gentleman continue?
Mr. Hall. Don't you kind of think the public might benefit
from a better understanding of the differences between nuclear
safety in Japan and nuclear safety here?
Mr. Apostolakis. No, we certainly would benefit from that,
yes.
Mr. Hall. But if you think it couldn't happen here, I don't
understand how you can answer that last question as you did. I
know things can happen. I don't know how much more time I have.
Mr. Shimkus. Your time is expired.
Mr. Hall. In that case, I want to yield a question--oh, the
gentleman is gone.
Mr. Shimkus. No, the gentleman's time is expired.
Mr. Hall. I yield back my time.
Mr. Shimkus. The gentleman yields back his time. Just in
time for Mr. Markey. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman
from Massachusetts, Mr. Markey, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.
The Fukushima meltdowns taught us that not only do we need
to develop safeguards to present nuclear accidents but we must
also plan strategies to respond to such an accident and to
minimize the damage. Twenty-three reactors in this country have
the same design as the ones that melted down in Japan including
Pilgrim in Massachusetts and Vermont Yankee. The NRC staff
recommended that these reactors have vents that could release
hydrogen gas to prevent the sort of explosions that occurred in
Japan and also that the vents include filters to remove the
radioactive materials that would be released into the air if
the vents were used. These filtered vents are already used in
Canada and in many European countries. I strongly urge the
Commission to follow the recommendations of the technical
staff. If you fail to do so, I believe you will be making a
mistake. I think you have a responsibility to ensure public
health and safety in the face of a nuclear catastrophe that we
know could happen here.
You have all testified in the past that you support the
Commission's internal commission procedures. Do you all believe
that we should follow those internal Commission procedures that
are currently in force? Do you all believe that that is the
case?
Mr. Apostolakis. Yes.
Ms. Macfarlane. I think we should strive to comply with our
internal Commission procedures but they don't foresee every
situation that might occur.
Mr. Markey. So I have here a copy of your procedures for
transmitting sensitive documents to Congress, which says that
your general practice is to release them to members of your
oversight committee, and that includes every member of this
committee. Over the years, members of this committee have
requested and received hundreds of sensitive documents as part
of their oversight efforts including security-sensitive
materials, proprietary materials and other nonpublic documents.
I believe that every member of this committee will be as
disturbed as I was to learn that in its failure to fully
respond to several of my most recent oversight letters, the
Commission is currently violating its internal Commission
procedures. The Commission is even considering a change to
these procedures to enable it to refuse future requests for
documents made by members of this committee. So I ask all of
you, do you support your current procedures to provide
sensitive documents to members of your oversight committee?
Ms. Macfarlane. Right now, the Commission is evaluating the
request that you made, and we are in deliberations on it, and I
don't want to say any more about that until we have actually
been able to go through them.
Mr. Markey. Well, I think that in fact the Justice
Department has made a ruling that there is not a conflict with
the Freedom of Information Act, that in fact their current
guidance says that giving materials to a Member of Congress
should not result in an agency having to make them public. So
if you make this change, you will be obstructing legitimate
Congressional oversight of your activities and you will be
creating a more secretive agency, and I am going to resist this
in every single way I can.
The San Onofre nuclear reactors have been shut down for
more than a year because of unexpectedly high levels of wear
found in both steam generators. Three weeks ago, Senator Boxer
and I sent you a document I obtained that said that Southern
California Edison and Mitsubishi engineers had identified some
technical problems that could have caused this wear long before
the steam generators were installed, but the document also says
that they chose not to implement recommended design fixes
because they wanted to avoid a more rigorous safety review and
licensing process at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. You
then told us that you had initiated an expansive investigation
regarding the completeness and accuracy of information that had
been provided to you, and I understand that the Inspector
General has also initiated an investigation of its own. So
Chairperson Macfarlane, Southern California Edison wants to
restart one of the reactors as soon as this summer. Can you
commit to postponing any decision on this request until after
the pending investigations are completed and reviewed by the
Commission?
Ms. Macfarlane. What our usual process is in this kind of
situation, when all the technical aspects of the particular
issues have been adequately addressed, our staff, our executive
director of operations will check with our office of Inspector
General, our office of investigations to ask if there are any
issues or information that might prevent the restart, and that
is how we usually go about this.
Mr. Markey. Well, I strongly recommend that you complete
the investigation before you give permission to restart. I
think that the prudent way to proceed on this issue, and I
thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shimkus. The gentleman's time is expired. Just for
informing the public, there are votes now on the floor. We are
going to try to make sure those in attendance get a chance to
speak. I would encourage people to do it quickly.
I would also, just in response to my colleague, I think
there is an understanding of personal and executive sessions
and issues in the record that may not be appropriate to air,
and so we can address that later.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Virginia, Mr.
Griffith, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Griffith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I do appreciate
all of you all being here. I will tell you that in my first
term of Congress, that first meeting that I had with you--not
you, Chairman, but before you were on board--was probably the
scariest hearing that I participated in just because I knew the
important issues you all were dealing with and the problems
that you all were having were of great concern. I feel much
better today. While we may or may not agree on some issues, I
feel very confident that you all are working hard and trying to
move in the right direction, and it makes me feel much better
than I did this time a little short of 2 years ago. So I do
appreciate that.
I would ask you all to look at, and particularly, I am
going to address this question to you, Commissioner Ostendorff.
You all have had some time working on this and the
subcommittees have. In the Commonwealth of Virginia, we had a
nuclear power plant, North Anna, which after experiencing a
nearby earthquake in Mineral, Virginia, was shut down for a
period of time. We understand this shutdown was a result of the
earthquake and subsequent NRC processes were a positive example
of bringing a unit back online after an atypical event. The San
Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, which was just mentioned, is
currently offline, and I know there may be other issues
involved, but it had an atypical event that initially at least
didn't rank as high as the earthquake, and I am just wondering
if you can explain if the process that was used in North Anna
is also the same process that is currently being used in that
situation, San Onofre.
Mr. Ostendorff. Congressman, I would comment that overall,
the process is the same as far as how a determination is made
whether it is safe to technically restart a nuclear power
plant. There are some significant differences, however, between
the San Onofre case and the North Anna earthquake from August
of 2011. Those differences involve other pending
investigations, which we can't discuss in this forum. They also
involve adjudicatory matters before the Atomic Safety and
Licensing Board, so I will acknowledge there are some
significant differences there.
Mr. Griffith. All right. I appreciate that.
I had another question, and I want to just make a
statement. It appears that when looking at regulations, and I
have been given some data that it appears that the estimates
for new regulations, the cost of those estimates have been off
by being as much as 350 percent more. I hope that you all will
look at your processes behind the scenes, because when you are
deciding what to do on regulation, there is a cost analysis
involved, and if you are off by 350 percent, it indicates that
something is not being analyzed correctly and I would hope that
you all would do a better job on that as you go forward with
any new regulations.
And with that, Mr. Chairman, I am going to yield back.
Mr. Shimkus. Thank you. The Chair recognizes the gentleman
from Georgia, Mr. Barrow, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Barrow. I thank the chairman. I thank the Commissioners
for appearing today. I just want to share my concerns about
proposed regulations to require the installation of external
containment filters on boiling-water reactors. I want to begin
by saying, I understand the Commission requires a cost-benefit
analysis in order to make sure there is adequate protection for
the public. I also understand that there is a movement to go
forward with such regulations even in the absence of a finding
that it is necessary in order to provide adequate protection
for the public concern.
I have generated a letter, which has been subscribed to by
a number of my colleagues, members of the House as diverse as
Mike McIntyre, Jim Matheson, myself, Mr. Dingell on the one
hand and other members like Steny Hoyer, Jim Clyburn, Mike
Doyle, Joe Crowley, Rob Andrews and Chaka Fattah on the other,
basically making the case that we want to have you all make
sure that there is an adequate cost-benefit analysis performed
before imposing any such mandate on the industry. The letter
concludes as follows: ``Absent a finding that mandatory filter
installation is necessary to ensure adequate protection of the
public, we believe the Commission should work with the industry
to achieve the regulatory goal in the safest, most effective
and least costly manner.'' That letter speaks for itself, and
with the chairman's permission, I would like to submit this
letter for inclusion in the record.
Mr. Shimkus. Without objection, so ordered. We have already
discussed the letter.
Mr. Barrow. I want to make it a part of the record on my
time. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you all.
[The information appears at the conclusion of the hearing.]
Mr. Shimkus. The gentleman yields back his time. The Chair
now recognizes our final member, Mr. Kinzinger from Illinois,
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you all
for your time today. Chairman Macfarlane, I am happy to see
that the focus of this hearing is on the important work of the
Commission. I believe your work over the next several years
will determine the viability of the industry, and your
decisions will have an impact on U.S. energy policy for
decades.
The members of this committee need to be aware that the
bounty of natural gas that we have unlocked through technology
and innovation is a blessing but it is going to bring new
challenges. I have 35 power-generating facilities in my
district, and every single one is being impacted by the lower
price of natural gas including the four nuclear power plants.
Good for the consumer but it may not be good for a diverse
energy supply. We have some of the best minds in the world
creating and collaborating on new nuclear technology. It would
be a shame if low-cost natural gas discouraged U.S. companies
from investing in nuclear R&D, facilities and education.
A lot of what you heard today is about the regulatory
process, and I believe that the members who support nuclear
power want to ensure that the Commission is operating under the
best processes for the safety of the plant. I hope you will
help us in this effort by answering a few more questions. We
will just make them quick yes or no questions.
I understand that the Atomic Energy Act grants the
Commission broad authority to issue safety requirements and
that the Commission's regulatory tools include orders,
rulemaking and policy statements. So just yes or no, please.
With regard to orders, is it true that the Commission has the
authority to issue orders with merely a majority vote? We will
start with you.
Ms. Macfarlane. Yes.
Ms. Svinicki. Yes.
Mr. Apostolakis. Yes.
Mr. Magwood. Yes.
Mr. Ostendorff. Yes.
Mr. Shimkus. Is it that the Commission has the authority to
issue orders without conducting technical and cost-benefit
analysis?
Ms. Macfarlane. If we deem it adequate protection, yes.
Mr. Kinzinger. So yes?
Ms. Svinicki. Yes.
Mr. Apostolakis. Yes.
Mr. Magwood. Yes.
Mr. Ostendorff. A regulatory basis is required for orders.
Mr. Kinzinger. OK. Is it true that the Commission has the
authority to issue orders without any public participation? Do
you have the authority?
Ms. Macfarlane. Yes, we do.
Ms. Svinicki. Yes.
Mr. Kinzinger. And as I understand it, safety requirements
that the Commission determines are necessary for the adequate
protection of safety are not subjected to cost-benefit
analysis. The less significant safety enhancements are subject
to cost-benefit analysis, and if found inadequate, can be
challenged under the agency's Backfit Rule. Is it true that
orders are not subject to challenge under the Backfit Rule?
Mr. Apostolakis. True.
Ms. Macfarlane. Yes.
Mr. Kinzinger. Yet here we have the agency staff
recommending that you issue an order to mandate filter systems,
an approach that your expert advisory body, the Advisory
Committee on Reactor Safeguards, disagrees with, that failed a
cost-benefit analysis and about which there are serious
questions that agency staff may have underestimated the cost. I
believe that orders are a necessary and a valid tool where
there is an urgent safety need in the immediate aftermath of
events like September 11th or Fukushima. However, it is nearly
2 years since the Fukushima accident and the Commission acted
on the most urgent, safety-significant changes a year ago. It
is time to return to what we members would call regular order:
restoring the agency's historic reliance on rigorous technical
and cost-benefit analysis and public involvement inherent in
the process of rulemaking.
I understand my friend and colleague, Lee Terry, is working
on legislation in this area, and I plan to work with him to
address my concern that the Commission's use of orders should
be limited to urgent, significant safety needs, and with that,
Mr. Chairman, I will yield back.
Mr. Shimkus. The gentleman yields back his time. We want to
thank you for coming. It will not be your last appearance. I
know you are looking forward to that.
If there are no other members wishing to ask questions,
members are reminded that the record will remain open for 10
business days to submit additional questions for the record.
There being no other business to come before the
subcommittee, the subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:30 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
[Material submitted for inclusion in the record follows:]
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