[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 113-14]
HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2014
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
FULL COMMITTEE HEARING
ON
THE POSTURE OF THE U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND AND U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND
__________
HEARING HELD
MARCH 5, 2013
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
79-955 PDF WASHINGTON : 2013
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Thirteenth Congress
HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' McKEON, California, Chairman
MAC THORNBERRY, Texas ADAM SMITH, Washington
WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
JEFF MILLER, Florida ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania
JOE WILSON, South Carolina ROBERT E. ANDREWS, New Jersey
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
ROB BISHOP, Utah JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio RICK LARSEN, Washington
JOHN KLINE, Minnesota JIM COOPER, Tennessee
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa
K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado JOHN GARAMENDI, California
ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr.,
DUNCAN HUNTER, California Georgia
JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana COLLEEN W. HANABUSA, Hawaii
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado JACKIE SPEIER, California
E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia RON BARBER, Arizona
CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York ANDRE CARSON, Indiana
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire
JOSEPH J. HECK, Nevada DANIEL B. MAFFEI, New York
JON RUNYAN, New Jersey DEREK KILMER, Washington
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
MARTHA ROBY, Alabama SCOTT H. PETERS, California
MO BROOKS, Alabama WILLIAM L. ENYART, Illinois
RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida PETE P. GALLEGO, Texas
KRISTI L. NOEM, South Dakota MARC A. VEASEY, Texas
PAUL COOK, California
JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma
BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio
JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana
Robert L. Simmons II, Staff Director
Kimberly Shaw, Professional Staff Member
Tim Morrison, Counsel
Spencer Johnson, Counsel
Leonor Tomero, Counsel
Aaron Falk, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2013
Page
Hearing:
Tuesday, March 5, 2013, The Posture of the U.S. Strategic Command
and U.S. Pacific Command....................................... 1
Appendix:
Tuesday, March 5, 2013........................................... 43
----------
TUESDAY, MARCH 5, 2013
THE POSTURE OF THE U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND AND U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck,'' a Representative from
California, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services.............. 1
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking
Member, Committee on Armed Services............................ 2
WITNESSES
Kehler, Gen C. Robert, USAF, Commander, U.S. Strategic Command... 3
Locklear, ADM Samuel J., USN, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command.... 5
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Kehler, Gen C. Robert........................................ 51
Locklear, ADM Samuel J....................................... 74
McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck''.............................. 47
Smith, Hon. Adam............................................. 49
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Bishop................................................... 115
Mr. Langevin................................................. 115
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Barber................................................... 128
Mr. Bridenstine.............................................. 129
Mr. Johnson.................................................. 126
Mr. Langevin................................................. 122
Mr. Larsen................................................... 122
Mr. McKeon................................................... 119
Mr. Rogers................................................... 123
Ms. Shea-Porter.............................................. 127
Mr. Wittman.................................................. 126
THE POSTURE OF THE U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND AND U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, March 5, 2013.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:07 a.m., in room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck''
McKeon (chairman of the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' MCKEON, A
REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED
SERVICES
The Chairman. The committee will come to order. I would
like to welcome everyone to today's hearing on the posture of
the U.S. Strategic Command and the U.S. Pacific Command.
Unfortunately we still don't have a budget from the President
and sequestration has now taken effect. But this committee
intends to move ahead with our annual posture hearings to
ensure there are no gaps in the committee's oversight. With
that in mind, I would like to thank our two witnesses for
agreeing to be the first to testify in our posture hearing
lineup.
With us today we have General C. Robert Kehler, the
Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, and Admiral Samuel L.
Locklear, the Commander of U.S. Pacific Command. General
Kehler, I know you have many different hats that you wear, from
missile defense, to cyber, to nuclear deterrence. I am deeply
troubled about what sequestration means to these areas of
responsibility, which pose existential challenges to this
Nation. I also am very concerned by the direction the President
wants to go in driving further U.S. nuclear reductions at the
present time.
I understand the President has been considering a new
nuclear guidance document that will seek to reduce our nuclear
forces even further. If that is in fact the case, nothing has
been shared with this committee. Furthermore, it is not clear
to me why this is necessary. It certainly does nothing to deal
with threats like North Korea or Iran. As for Russia, why would
we believe we can trust Vladimir Putin to honor new arms
control agreements, when he has shown a consistent willingness
to violate current arms control agreements, when he denies
visas to members of this body to travel to Russia, and when he
uses adoptive children as props in his neonationalism?
I am especially concerned and suspicious when the President
appears to be attempting to avoid the Senate and the Congress
in getting such an agreement. Without a formal ratified treaty,
any agreement will inherently be nonbinding. We know the
Russians will violate such an agreement, as they did when we
tried this in the early 1990s. General Kehler, understanding
that you must support your chain of command, today I hope to
explore further why additional reductions are in our best
interest, especially since we no longer have a production
capacity.
Admiral Locklear, it has been over a year since the
President released the Defense Strategic Guidance and outlined
the rebalancing to Asia. I am concerned about recent
developments in Asia and how PACOM [Pacific Command] is
postured to respond to a crisis. North Korea's threats and
their nuclear and missile programs continue unabated. China's
dangerous actions in the South and East China Seas pose a
threat to our regional allies, and partners, to U.S. national
security interests, and to the sea lines of communication that
are vital to global economic stability.
This committee will continue to ask for more details on
what the rebalancing means, and how we can hope to deliver on
the new strategy in light of other operational demands and lack
of resources. I want to thank you both again for being with us
here today. Mr. Smith.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the
Appendix on page 47.]
STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON,
RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mr. Smith. Thank you Mr. Chairman. I too want to thank our
witnesses, General Kehler, Admiral Locklear, appreciate you
being here today, and appreciate your service to our country. I
think the greatest challenge is the one that the chairman
outlined: how do you continue to carry out your missions and
your plans, in light of sequestration? We have built a strategy
based on a certain budget, and now that budget is dramatically
different. And it is not just sequestration, it is the lack of
an appropriations bill for the first 5 months of this fiscal
year and perhaps longer depending on what happens in the next
weeks ahead.
It is very difficult for you gentleman to do your job when
you don't know exactly how much money you are going to have,
and then when that changes from month to month. We in Congress
need to pass appropriations bills for all discretionary
spending, not just defense, to make it easier to govern, and
make those decisions. In light of that I think the most
interesting thing that we have to talk about this morning is,
how that impacts the plans. Particularly in Asia, where we have
made, you know, much talk about the pivot to Asia, the focus on
its importance, which I think is perfectly appropriate.
It is a region of enormous importance that we should be
focusing intently on, building as many positive relationships
in that region as we can. I understand that Pacific Command is
a very important piece of that, and I think in 2011, or 2012, I
forget which, there were over 700 port calls that were done by
our Navy throughout the Asian theater. That is a way to build
relationships, and part of that effort to build the
partnerships we need there. I want to know how that process is
going, and how sequestration challenges it.
And then of course specifically the threat of North Korea,
and the impact that that has on the region.
In Strategic Command, there are also obviously a number of
challenges, starting with our nuclear arsenal. You know, what
is the purpose and mission of that arsenal? What do the numbers
need to be, to meet the requirements that we have? I personally
think that it is very appropriate, some, gosh over 20 years
after the Cold War, to continue to reexamine, you know, what
size of a nuclear arsenal we need? When we are making difficult
budget decisions, what are our most important national security
objectives? Are there ways to find savings within the nuclear
arsenal? I believe that there are and I am anxious to hear more
about how we implement that.
And then of course, the incredible importance of missile
defense. We have seen its impact in the Middle East. We know
the threat that is rising from Iran and North Korea, how do we
posture our forces and invest in missile defense technology to
best meet those threats, again, within the tight budget
constraints that we have.
So I look forward to testimony and questions from the
members. I thank you both for being here, for your service to
our country and I thank the chairman for holding this meeting.
With that, I yield back.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the
Appendix on page 49.]
The Chairman. Thank you.
General Kehler.
STATEMENT OF GEN C. ROBERT KEHLER, USAF, COMMANDER, U.S.
STRATEGIC COMMAND
General Kehler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If it is
permissible with you, I would like to make my full statement a
part of the record.
The Chairman. Without objection, both of your full
statements will be in the record.
General Kehler. Thank you, sir.
The Chairman. So ordered.
General Kehler. And good morning to you, Ranking Member
Smith, distinguished members of the committee, I am certainly
honored to join with all of you today.
It is a privilege to begin my third year leading the
outstanding men and women of the United States Strategic
Command.
I am also pleased to be here with Admiral Sam Locklear, a
great colleague whose responsibilities as Commander of Pacific
Command cover some of the most critical areas and issues on the
globe.
Pacific Command and Strategic Command are the closest of
partners. Admiral Locklear and I collaborate frequently and I
greatly value his leadership, vision and counsel.
Uncertainty and complexity continue to dominate the
national security landscape, even as the United States
transitions from a decade of active conflict in Southwest Asia.
Uncertainty and complexity make this transition unlike any
we have experienced in the past. Many regions of the world
remain volatile and increasing economic and information
connections mean regional issues can quickly have global
consequences. Events over the past year validate this
perspective.
Since my last appearance before the committee, we have seen
violent extremists continue to act against or threaten U.S.
interests, citizens, allies, partners and our homeland.
Cyber activity has increased in both quantity and intensity
with the potential for greater exploitation of U.S.
intellectual property, institutions and critical
infrastructure.
Iran's nuclear ambitions remain concerning. North Korea
conducted a missile launch in violation of its obligations
under multiple U.N. [United Nations] Security Council
Resolutions and announced last month, it conducted another
nuclear test.
Civil war continues in Syria, and Russia and China continue
to improve and demonstrate their strategic capabilities.
Fiscal uncertainty is adding additional unique challenges.
Not only are the additional sequestration reductions steep, but
the law allows little flexibility in how to apply them and we
are also working from a continuing resolution while
transitioning contingency needs to the base budget, this during
a time when continued readiness is essential, modernization is
overdue, violent extremists remain active, threats in space and
cyberspace are increasing and the possibility of nuclear and
ballistic missile proliferation persists.
As we confront these challenges, our enemies and potential
enemies are watching. In this uncertain and complex world,
STRATCOM [Strategic Command] remains focused on conducting the
missions that are most critical to protect our core national
security interests. My priorities support this focus.
Our fundamental purpose remains constant. With the other
combatant commands, we must deter, detect and prevent attacks
against the United States, assure our friends and allies of our
security commitments to them and if directed, employ
appropriate force to achieve national objectives should
deterrence fail.
To do this, our men and women wield a range of
complementary capabilities to create the tailored effects the
Nation needs. Our primary objective is to prevent conflict by
influencing in advance the perceptions, assessments and
decisions of those who would consider threatening our vital
national interests.
Ultimately, this requires the continuing credibility of
America's military capabilities brought to bear in concert with
other elements of national power.
While our heritage is nuclear and our nuclear vigilance
will never waiver as long as those weapons exist, STRATCOM's
activities today are far more diverse and versatile.
Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to report that STRATCOM is
capable of executing its assigned mission responsibilities
today. However, given the potential impact fiscal uncertainty
and declining resources could have on STRATCOM, I am concerned
that I may not be able to say the same in 6 months or a year.
I am most concerned with the impact financial uncertainty
is having on our people. Uniformed and non-uniformed members
alike have managed the effects of sustained high stress combat
deployment and operational tempos. They willingly take personal
risks for their country but they are fearful of taking
financial risk for their families.
Hiring restrictions, salary freezes and the likelihood of
unpaid furloughs, are especially troubling to our civilians.
Civilians comprise about 60 percent of the STRATCOM
headquarters staff. They hold key leadership positions. They
represent critical expertise and they represent much of the
essential workforce which provides crucial functions like
intelligence, maintenance and sustainment.
Because they are such dedicated patriots, I believe our
military and civilian members will cope with the effects of
financial uncertainty in the near term. But I worry that over
time, our most experienced professionals will retire early and
our best young people will leave to pursue more stable
opportunities elsewhere. We are detecting hints of that now.
Beyond the human dimension, sequestration will eventually
impact the command's readiness and curtail growth in new areas
like cyber defense. Even though the services are trying to give
STRATCOM's missions as much priority treatment as possible
within the law, we could not remain immune.
So while the immediate impact will vary by command, overall
in STRATCOM, the effect is like an avalanche. Seemingly small
initial impacts are going to grow. As time passes, we will see
greater impacts to the nuclear deterrent, global strike missile
warning and missile defense, situational awareness in both
space and cyberspace, and to our support for warfighters around
the globe.
In the longer term, continuing on this financial path will
affect STRATCOM's modernization and long-term sustainment
needs, potentially eliminating or jeopardizing a number of
important recapitalization efforts. Ultimately, reduced
readiness and curtailed modernization will damage the perceived
credibility of our capabilities increasing the risk to
achieving our primary deterrence and assurance objectives. Mr.
Chairman, STRATCOM's responsibilities have not changed. But the
strategic and fiscal environment in which we must carry them
out is much different than a year ago. I remain enormously
proud of the superb men and women I am privileged to lead and
convinced we can meet our mission responsibilities today. But
the pathway we are on creates growing risks to our defense
strategy and our ability to execute it.
I look forward to working with this committee and Congress
on these difficult and complex challenges and I look forward to
your questions.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Kehler can be found in
the Appendix on page 51.]
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Admiral Locklear.
STATEMENT OF ADM SAMUEL J. LOCKLEAR, USN, COMMANDER, U.S.
PACIFIC COMMAND
Admiral Locklear. Good morning Chairman, Ranking Member
Smith, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for
this opportunity to testify today and provide you with my
perspectives from the U.S. Pacific Command.
For the past 12 months, I have had the great honor to lead
over 328,000 service members and 38,000 civilian employees
along with their families.
Our area of responsibility is diverse and extremely
complex. Stretching from California to India, the Indo-Asia-
Pacific encompasses over half the Earth's surface and well over
half its population.
The region is culturally, socially, economically, and
geopolitically diverse. The nations of the Indo-Asia-Pacific
include 5 of our Nation's 7 treaty allies; 3 of the largest and
7 of the 10 smallest economies; the most populated nations in
the world, including the largest Muslim majority nation, the
largest democracy, and the world's smallest republic.
The Indo-Asia-Pacific is the engine that drives the global
economy. The open accessible sea lanes throughout the Asia-
Pacific annually enjoy over $8 trillion in bilateral trade with
one-third of the world's bulk cargo and two-thirds of the oil
shipments sailing to and from 9 of the world's 10 largest
economic ports which are in this part of the world.
By any meaningful measure, the Indo-Asia-Pacific is also
the world's most militarized region with 7 of the 10 largest
standing armies, the world's largest and most sophisticated
navies, and 5 of the world's declared nuclear armed nations.
Now when taken all together, these aspects represent a
region with a unique strategic complexity and a wide diverse
group of challenges that can significantly stress the overall
security environment.
Effectively engaging in the Indo-Asia-Pacific requires a
committed and sustained effort and USPACOM, as a military
component of this commitment, is focused in our efforts to
deter aggression, assure our allies and our partners and to
prevent should our national interests be threatened.
While the Indo-Asia-Pacific today is relatively at peace, I
am concerned by a number of security challenges that have the
possibility to impact the security environment.
Examples include, climate change, where increasingly severe
weather patterns and rising sea levels, along with inevitable
earthquakes and tsunamis and super-typhoons, and massive
flooding threaten today and will continue to threaten
populations in the future in this region.
Transnational non-straight threats will persist which
include pandemics, pirates, terrorists, criminal organizations
as well as drugs, human trafficking and of course, weapons of
mass destruction.
Historic and emerging border and territorial disputes will
no doubt continue. Access and freedom of action in the shared
domains of sea, air, space and cyberspace are being challenged.
Competition for water, food and energy will grow.
Instability on the Korean Peninsula will persist.
The rise of China and India as global economic powers and
their emergence as regional military powers will continue.
And finally, recognition of the fact that no single
organizational mechanism exists in the Indo-Asia-Pacific to
manage relationships and when needed, to provide a framework
for conflict resolution.
Simply put, there is no Pacific NATO [North Atlantic Treaty
Organization]. The U.S. joint force has been heavily tasked in
other AORs [areas of responsibility] over the past decade and
as a consequence, the USPACOM AOR in many key areas has been
resource-challenged and has assumed additional risk.
Our rebalance to the Pacific strategy has given us a new
opportunity to begin to solve these challenges and reemphasize
to our allies and our partners that we are a committed Pacific
nation. It also reflects a recognition that the future
prosperity of the U.S. will be defined largely by events and
developments in the Indo-Asia-Pacific.
Over the past year, the rebalance has helped focus our
planning and our resource decisions as we work closer with our
allies and our partners to ensure a security environment
favorable to U.S. interests.
However, the impacts of sequestration and the realities of
continuing resolutions have created significant budget
uncertainties, limited our flexibility to manage, and have the
potential to undermine our strategic rebalance momentum, as our
ability to operate and maintain our force is at increased risk.
Nonetheless, USPACOM will continue to work with services to
preserve, to the extent possible, our essential homeland
defense and crisis response capabilities, capabilities which
are resident in many of our forward deployed forces.
The Pacific Ocean does not separate us from Asia; it
connects us. We are connected by our economies, by our
cultures, by our shared interest and by our security
challenges. We have been resource-challenged in accepting risk
in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region for some time. But our
rebalance strategy is in place and we are making good progress.
Let me assure you that USPACOM will continue to demonstrate
to our allies, our partners and others the U.S. resolve and
commitment to peace and security in this important part of the
world.
On behalf of our superb military and civilian members and
their families who sacrifice everyday to ensure that our
country is well defended, I would like to thank each member of
the committee for your support.
I look forward to your questions. Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Locklear can be found in
the Appendix on page 74.]
The Chairman. Thank you very much. You know, we are cutting
from our defense budget this year. Last year our number was
$550 billion. This year, after sequestration, it is $501
billion. The OCO [Overseas Contingency Operations] number last
year was $122 billion; this year, after sequestration, $88.5
billion.
So we are cutting, this year, out of our national security,
our defense budget, over $80 billion. Very significant. I have
an article before me that says that China, this year, plans to
raise its defense budget by 10.7 percent, or $115.7 billion.
They are raising theirs $115, we are cutting ours over $80.
I think that is something that all of us on this committee need
to pay attention to, need to understand the significance of.
We will have the opportunity this week in the House to vote
for a continuing resolution which will fund the government
through the end of this fiscal year, 9/30. Wrapped in that
budget, or in that CR [continuing resolution], will be a
defense appropriations bill.
Now this committee last year completed our National Defense
Authorization Act. We went through the process. We held the
hearings such as we are holding here today. We passed a bill
through these subcommittees, through this full committee and in
the House on the floor with a very good vote.
The Senate, while it took them a little longer, did get
their work done and did pass their bill in December of last
year. We conferenced. We had a very short time to do it, but we
came out with a bill. We passed it. It was signed by the
President of the United States.
That bill has no effect unless the appropriations bill is
passed. They, the appropriators, have also done their work.
They held their hearings. They passed it on the floor, passed
in the Senate. They have worked jointly to do this. They
followed regular order. And because of that, it is part of this
CR. They are the only committee that has done that.
I think that we could probably find reasons to vote against
that bill, but I think every member of this committee should
understand the importance of getting that passed and the
benefit it will have to at least take away some of the sting of
sequestration on our military by giving them the authority to
spend money on more important areas than they are having to do
if they become just part of a CR without the appropriation
bill.
So I urge all members of this committee to really look at
that and understand the responsibility we have in protecting
the national defense of this Nation.
Now General Kehler, Admiral Locklear, the sequestration
deadline passed on Friday. You are still operating, at this
point, under a continuing resolution. How are the current
fiscal restraints that you are operating under, how do they
impact your plan to execute your missions today? Six months
from now? A year from now?
I would like you to please be specific. Has your ability to
respond to a crisis been impacted? And what are not you able to
do today or any longer because of these conditions you are
operating under?
General.
General Kehler. Mr. Chairman, I would make a couple of set-
up points here. First, because of the nature of the combatant
commands, I think that the immediate impacts of----
The Chairman. General, could you move that mic just a
little closer?
General Kehler. Yes, sir. Is that better?
The Chairman. Thank you.
General Kehler. Sir, because the nature of the impact will
be different from command to command, let me just describe
that. And I think it is important that the committee knows
this, I think it is important that any potential adversaries
know this.
Strategic Command is capable of performing its full range
of missions today. We are 4 days, I guess, past the time that
sequestration began. And as I sit here and look for the coming
months, I do not see a dramatic impact on our ability to
accomplish our mission.
But as I said in my opening remarks, what will happen is
that as the service chiefs have struggled with how to apply
these various financial rules that they have been given, they
have had to go to some places to take cuts that eventually are
going to impact us. Flying hours, for example.
In the near term, what the Air Force is going to try to do
is take their flying hours in the bomber force, for example, in
such a way as to make sure that our crews that are nuclear-
certified will remain so for as long as possible. But
eventually, those--if unaddressed, those issues will persist.
And then those impacts will begin to be felt in Strategic
Command.
There are other impacts that are--we have seen out of
potential moves that the services have had to make. We could
see eventually impact of the reduction of maintenance, or the
deferral of maintenance, for example. Eventually that will
impact the forces that are assigned to Strategic Command.
Again, I think the services are trying as best they can
within the rules that they have, to give us, in some of these
critical places, some priority treatment. If, in fact, we have
to continue with some curtailment of operations of sensors, for
example, eventually that will impact space situational
awareness.
Those are the kind of things that I can't sit here today,
Mr. Chairman, and say, ``Today we have--we have had a dramatic
impact on either our readiness or our ability to perform our
missions.'' I would be mischaracterizing where we stand today.
But I don't want to understate the impact of what is coming
to us. And I believe that other commands would probably have a
different assessment of where they stand today. I am concerned
that as time passes that this, as I say, the best way that I
can describe this is it is an avalanche. It begins very small,
in Strategic Command, and then it begins to cascade as the
momentum builds.
Those are the issues that we are most concerned about,
because we can't see clearly yet the way forward. We know that
some of these impacts are coming. I can't tell you exactly what
those are going to be or when. The other issue that I think is
a big one for me, personally, is the issue of the impact that
all of the uncertainty is having on our members, and in
particular the civilians, as I said. I think that they are
being asked to sacrifice much here and I think we need to be
mindful of that.
We have an intern program that one of my predecessors
started where we go to universities and we try to bring interns
in with the hopes that they will come to government service. We
have been--we have had some success with this, especially in
those technical areas that STRATCOM is reliant on, we have had
a number of those new government employees, college graduates,
come to their supervisors in the last several months and
question whether this is a future for them.
So I don't want to overstate that either, but I don't want
to understate. I think there is a human dimension to this that
we need to be mindful of and I can't characterize that as an
impact on readiness, but we have--our people are concerned
about all of this.
The final thing that I would say is I can't characterize
either the potential impact on investment because those
decisions haven't been made. Again, the services are struggling
with those kinds of impacts. What I can say, I believe, from
STRATCOM's portfolio of capabilities is I am certain that
everything that is in STRATCOM's portfolio will be on the table
when we make those decisions.
So I would like to be able to be more crisp today with
specifics of the impact. I can't give you that. I just know
that the readiness impacts are coming, if unaddressed. And I
know that there is an impact in the way our people are--the
discomfort level with our people. I can't tell you yet what is
happening with investment because I just don't know what the
Department is going to decide yet in terms of reprioritizing
and all the things that go with that. If that helps you, sir.
The Chairman. We understand that the chiefs had a year to
work on the $487 billion and to really plan where they would
cut and the sequestration they were basically ordered not to
plan. So we understand the--how those decisions haven't been
made yet and it is going to take some time to do that.
And we understand how each combatant commander has
different--it will impact them differently. So when we get
through this whole process of listening to all of you, then we
will have a little bit better picture ourselves as we move
forward into the subcommittee hearings and put our bill
together.
Admiral, I don't want you to telegraph any weaknesses that
we may have. So if you can understand that you know how to
answer the question so that we get a general understanding,
without knowing specifics, that we can discuss in open session
like this.
Admiral Locklear. Yes, sir. Well, thank you.
First, I think the Pacific Ocean is the largest object in
the world. It is the largest thing on the Earth. You could take
every landmass in the world and you could put them all together
and fit them in the Pacific Ocean and still have room for an
African continent and a North American continent.
And I think sometimes at least people here in my hometown,
they don't recognize that. They don't recognize the vast
distances. They don't see the impacts of American interest
here. It doesn't--it is not--it doesn't show up. They don't
understand that all the goods and services, many of them come
across this vast ocean through other economies that make our
economy vibrant.
So one of the things that has enabled that over the last 70
years has been the presence of U.S. military forces in this
part of the world that have provided really quite a remarkable
presence and security that allowed the rise of these large
nations, large democracies, in a peaceful way that has fueled
our own economy and helped our quality of life, and will
continue to do so for the next--for the future.
So with that--in that context, there is three things that I
do as a combatant commander that have to look the impacts of
resources. Because I am the end user from the services as they
push things out to me in this vast region.
The first thing I would have to do is what is the impact on
our ability to deter? And there are significant deterrence
issues here. Today we are deterring a North Korea that you see
through all the rhetoric and all the provocations that have
occurred that this is not getting better. We are deterring to
ensure that a security environment is consistent through the
coming decades and not one that leads us to any kind of
conflict in this very militarized part of the world.
The second thing I do is I assure. Now we only have seven
allies in the world--seven treaty allies. Five of them are in
my AOR. The other two are NATO and I think the Rio--Rio [1947
Inter-american Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance] is the other
one. So they are--really the five nations that are our allies
are here. And we have--our relationship with Thailand goes back
180 years. It is the first ally we had.
And these alliances have underpinned our security and our
security strategy and our economic strategy I think in this
part of the world for many decades. And so assuring those
alliances that the U.S. is committed to our commitment to the
alliance and that they are committed to us as well takes
presence. It takes time. It takes effort. It takes exercising.
It takes relationship capacity building, those types of things.
And then the third thing that I worry most about is
preventing. So let's say that all the good things we do to try
to ensure the security environment remain stable, yet somehow
that fails. I am accountable to you and to the American people
and to the President to be able to say that I can defend U.S.
citizens and U.S. interests in my half of the world.
It is 52 percent of the world in the PACOM AOR, so we rely
very heavily on forward deployed forces, forward station
forces, the ability to rotate forces effectively that are well-
trained into the theater in a way that allows me to accomplish
those three things.
So what are the near-term impacts? Well first, we will
start to see the readiness accounts because that is the only
place the service chiefs can go, really the only place they
have the flexibility to find near-term savings, so they will
take that out of things like flying hour programs.
So the airplanes that I need to put on the carriers that
need to come forward or that go into my fighter rotations in
theater will not be trained and may not come. We will not
deploy ships. We were just sitting on my front porch in Hawaii
2 days ago and there was a ship sitting there that was supposed
to deploy early--the first day of this month and it hasn't
gone.
And it hasn't gone because the operating dollars to send it
forward to do the three things that I just said for you to do
will not be available. Similarly, you could apply that across
all aspects of whether my exercise programs have been
truncated.
Just in my headquarters alone, one of the things, because I
am in Hawaii I have about a, you know, a staff that is required
to be out and active in 35 nations to do the things that we
have been asked to do. My travel budget, I immediately cut it
by 50 percent. So we are 50 percent effective today just
because we had to cut that. And that is a small thing, but it
gives you an indication of kind of the near-term impacts.
The long term, well just as General Kehler said, it is
going to be like an avalanche. It is going to compound. You
know, the bad decision we make today just ends up in three or
four more down the road because of the way our force is
structured, because of the way we deploy our force from our
homeland. And pulling those dollars out will ultimately result
in less capacity for my AOR.
It also will ultimately, if allowed to, undermine the
rebalance. Now the rebalance strategy, I don't think--I have
never found anybody who disagreed with it. It was clear that
the American people looked at it, I looked at it, I think all
of you all did, and said, you know, for the next century for
our children and our grandchildren, we have to get it right in
the Asia-Pacific.
And that after several decades of war in the Middle East
that we--where we have maybe prioritized our efforts there, and
we have to look more closely at the Asia-Pacific. And a big
piece of that is how we insure and put our military in a
footing in the Indo-Asia-Pacific that does the three things
that I talked about.
So we have a plan for rebalance. Since the last year when I
saw you all a year ago, we have worked diligently to try to put
things into place, but they are not all going to happen
overnight. The road we are on will undermine that.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Smith.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If I can follow up on
that a little bit on that, Admiral, talking about our pivot to
Asia and some of the efforts ongoing there, our relationship
with China. The first thing, I do want to clarify.
The chairman said that the Chinese budget had gone up 10
percent, which is true, but I think it also sort of implied
that it had gone up by $115 billion. It didn't go up by that
much. The best estimates are that the Chinese defense budget is
somewhere between $120 billion and $180 billion, not over a
trillion.
Granted, that is difficult to calculate, but let's round up
and say it is $200 billion. That is still a little over $350
billion less than we are spending this year. So from a money
standpoint, you know, we ought to be able to compete. It is a
matter of how we make the decisions going forward.
Can you talk a little bit about the--as part of the Asia
pivot, there have been troop movements in the effort--the
ongoing effort to try to figure out our Marines on Okinawa
working with the Japanese government, how many we are going to
move to Guam, how many we are going to move elsewhere. What is
the latest on that?
It has sort of been stalled by the fact that the Japanese,
you know, want us to move from Futenma, but they have yet to
actually put in place the other spot on Okinawa where we are
supposed to move to, and that has sort of been making it
difficult to make those decisions. So an update on that, and
then also how are things going in Australia with our rotational
placement there and how the Australian government and the
Australian people are reacting to that.
And then just a little bit more about the importance of
partnership building as part of our strategy, that it is not
just a matter of us having, you know, this huge enormous
presence, but it is a matter of building allies in the Asian
theater that we can work with. How is that going? So I guess
there are three pieces to that. One, our troop movements. Two,
Australia in particular. And then three, other allies and how
that is developing.
Admiral Locklear. Let me start by talking about troop
movements before I talk about Okinawa and Futenma specifically.
As an obvious signal of the rebalance already, I think I
would like to comment that the I Corps, which is a large Army
unit up in the northwest which has been aligned to the Middle
East for the better part of a decade, have now been realigned
under PACOM and are under me and are now--we are planning for
their activities in the Pacific theater here. So I think that
is significant.
III MEF, which has largely been out of the Pacific area for
the last--Marine Expeditionary Force--for the last decade or so
has now returned to the Pacific, and they are out and about and
doing their traditional role in deterring, assuring and
preventing in their amphibious operations. So that is a good
sign that we are making some headway in the rebalance.
On the issue of Okinawa, the underlying reasons that we did
this are still sound. The agreement that we have with the
government of Japan remains I think in a forward progress mode
at this point in time.
We plan--as far as the troop movements, I think you have
been briefed on the most recent ones, but that movement would
entail about I think just a little under 5,000 returning to
Guam, probably about 2027--at some point in time around the
time 2025, 2026, coming to Hawaii.
The issue of the Futenma had been, we disconnected that
from the troop movements so that it--because it was just
slowing us down too much. But there is progress in that regard,
too. I believe that the government of Japan will some time in
the very near future pass the EIS [Environmental Impact
Statement] statements to the Okinawans and then ask for them to
move forward on the permits to be able to begin their
reconstruction of the Futenma facility.
So I think we are on track on that, and I believe that it
is a rational--the entire thing is a very rational strategy for
the way I see the Pacific--PACOM AOR and the proper positioning
of our forces for the future, not necessarily for the past. I
think it is a good step.
Australia figures in that equation well. We have finished
our very successful first rotation of about 250 Marines. I
visited them about a month and a half ago in Darwin. There are
some magnificent training ranges there. We have very fine
partners with, and allies with, the Australians.
The response from the, both the political and the local
population has been very positive. They have been good
citizens. We will do another 250 rotation this year with the
hopes that we would expand that to about a thousand next year.
Now keep in mind these are rotational forces that are only
there for about 5 or 6 months out of the year. We are not
building a base. We are not building any more U.S. bases in the
Asia-Pacific. We are using our partnership and capacity issues
to allow the Australians to assist us and help us here. It
doesn't mean it is free, but it does mean that we are using
that to a great degree.
And I think that these Marines will now, during the 5 or 6
months that they are not out there in Australia training, they
will be out and about. They will provide me better flexibility
in contingency forces that are ready to respond to anything
from a humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, to a
contingency somewhere else.
Now, the importance of partnership, and partnership
building is partnership capacity, is an important part of my
theater campaign plan. I look out about 5 years. I look at all
the countries, first of all the five allies, and how we
strengthen our allies' capacity to work with us, to be able to
be seamless with us in our operations, and it varies among the
allies about their maturity of that. And so we have to take
that into consideration. But certainly my hope is that they are
able to continue to do more, and that they are able to continue
to contribute more across all spectrums of potential crisis,
whether it is from a humanitarian disaster relief, or whether
it is all the way up to a higher end contingency.
We are looking for--we continue to look for partnerships
beyond our alliances. As you know, we are looking for a long-
term strategic partnership with India. So I have been to India
and we begin this dialogue. India has a tremendous capability
to be a security guarantor in their part of the world, in the
Indian Ocean, and we welcome that. And we look for
opportunities to--so that we maintain our interoperability. And
a lot of these things require the types of things in our budget
that sometime might look like, well you can do without that.
But, you know an exercise with a potential partner that allows
us to improve and help them improve their capacity, becomes
important. And things like CRs and sequestrations kill those
first.
Mr. Smith. I think those pieces are going to be critical
going forward. We are going to need as many partners--and it is
really a more effective way to operate. I know different
theater, but in Africa we had a lot of success with partnership
capacity, which has helped us deal with Somalia and Yemen in a
much less costly, and I think more effective manner.
Thank you, Admiral, I appreciate the time.
I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Thornberry.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you both
for being here today. I just want to follow up on this question
about a CR versus appropriation bill, because we are going to
have an opportunity later this week to vote on a Defense MILCON
[Military Construction] appropriation bill, and within just
very limited time that I have, I would appreciate each of you
describing generally how big a difference it makes, whether you
have the same amount of money to operate under a CR for the
rest of the fiscal year, or the same amount of money to operate
under a regular appropriation bill?
Is it a big deal to you? Is it medium? Is it not that much
difference at all? General Kehler.
General Kehler. Congressman it is a big deal to us. In
particular I think number one, it helps put certainty back into
the process. It converts uncertainty to certainty. The second
thing is that of course it establishes, or at least we would
hope that it establishes a different baseline instead of
continuing to baseline fiscal 2012 numbers, it would baseline a
different number in fiscal year 2013. And of course, I think
that that would be very helpful for us in my small O&M
[operations and maintenance] piece of the pie, it would also--I
am--I would believe anyway it would help the service chiefs
quite a bit.
Mr. Thornberry. Okay. Admiral.
Admiral Locklear. Yes, sir, it is a big deal. I was the
programmer for the Navy in a previous job, so I had a chance to
see how budgets were built, and POM [Program Objective
Memorandum] processes work, and how all that happened. And on
the surface it sounds like, well what are you complaining
about, you have all the same money you had last year, so why
don't you just get on with it? But money is not spent that way,
it is not executed that way. It is executed through, as you
know through what y'all pass to us as a budget that has certain
assumptions in it, and changes.
So when you look at a 2012 budget compared to a 2013
budget, there are some fundamental assumptions that the service
chiefs had to make changes about, as they move forward to
rebalance, to change the nature of their force structure. And
those things can't be accomplished. It is--they end up, I think
in the case of the Navy this year, they end up carrying excess
bills on things that they thought they were going to be able to
do in 2013, that you haven't allowed them to do because there
hasn't been enough appropriation to allow it.
And so there are unintended large bills they have to
contend with that, if they had perfect fungibility on their
budget, perfect discretion, then they--we--they would be able
to solve it, or maybe solve part of it, but they don't have
that and I wouldn't advocate that they did, but I think it is
what makes a difference.
Mr. Thornberry. Well, I--like the chairman, I hope that we
can do that. Because I am afraid we have got a limited window
to get a Defense appropriation bill done, or else we are going
to all be living under a CR for the rest of the year, and which
would not be good.
General Kehler, let me change the subject right quick and
just ask you this question, which has always perplexed me. All
of this talk about nuclear weapons, and we have got charts our
staff has provided with the treaty limits and so forth, but
nothing ever takes into account the tactical weapons.
As you do military planning, as you try to assess the
effects of a blast from one nuclear weapon versus another, is
there really a difference between a tactical nuclear weapon and
a strategic nuclear weapon as far as the importance that you
have to place on it in terms of military consequences? Or is it
more a political difference?
General Kehler. Congressman, it is more a political
difference in what you call it, really. It is like calling a
platform strategic, or tactical. It is really about effect. It
is not about the platform, and it is not about the weapon. In
most cases, and certainly if you are on the receiving end, I
don't think you notice much difference from a nuclear weapon
that somebody says is a tactical weapon, or one that somebody
says is a strategic weapon. I think that we have used that as
an accounting method over the years for arms control purposes,
and I understand why we have done that.
We used to make a bigger distinction between strategic and
tactical nuclear things, different decision processes, et
cetera. But I think as a practical matter as we go forward,
there is probably less utility in describing the weapons that
way. In fact the nuclear posture review laid out some of that,
and with the suggestion that it is probably time as we go back
and chat again with the Russians, for us to address what we
have called historically nonstrategic, or tactical nuclear
weapons. I think that is a prudent thing for us to do, and I
think it is probably time for us to do it.
Mr. Thornberry. Great, that is helpful to me. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mrs. Davis.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, all of you for being here. I think you have
tried to clarify the shift or the rebalancing to the Pacific as
best you can, but I recently was at a conference, and there was
really quite a bit of skepticism about that, and the fact that
this was really about containing China. Could you comment on
that?
Admiral Locklear. Yes, Congressman. I get the same question
throughout my AOR, in fact over half the world, different
countries I get almost the same question.
First the rebalance is a strategy of collaboration, not one
of containment. If we wanted to contain any country, we would
kind of know how to do that, and we wouldn't be doing what we
are doing now. Now, to that degree I can't tell you whether
another country feels contained by our activities; that is in
the eyes of the beholder. But in the case of China, as I have
communicated to them when they have asked me this as well, I
said first of all you have to recognize that the U.S. is a
Pacific nation.
We have lots of national interests in this part of the
world. We are going to stay here. We are here with our allies.
We are concerned about a security environment that protects our
interests. We recognize that China is on the rise, both
economically and as a regional power. And we think that we can
accommodate China into those--into the economic world, as well
as the security world, and that they have the opportunity to
come in as a net provider of security and that we are happy to
allow that to happen, and we will actually facilitate them
coming in if necessary.
But they, as all others do, have choices that have to be
made, and we are just hopeful that those choices will be ones
that bring them in, in a productive way.
Mrs. Davis. Have any of our allies in the region expressed
some concern that they might have to choose between being their
friends in the region? If in fact they perceive it that way?
Admiral Locklear. Right, well I think there are two
concerns. One is, they all express that the last thing they
want to see happen is for the U.S. and China to have an
adversarial relationship. It is not in our best interest, not
in China's best interest, and it is certainly not in theirs.
And so they are pretty emphatic about that. The second thing is
as you just said, they don't want to have to choose. I don't
see a reason for them to have to choose at this point in time,
assuming that we all make the choice for peace and prosperity
in a security environment that can ensure that.
Mrs. Davis. If I could just go back to a second to the
discussion that we have had about building capacity. One of the
things that we have tried to do, and I know you all have been
actively involved in more of a whole of government approach,
and yet as we see with budget cuts, and constraints that we
have, that that is certainly going to affect other agencies,
other government agencies that are part of this, as well as
other entities, private and certainly our allies in the region.
What role then do you play? Will we be playing to enable
that relationship to continue, given the budget constraints
that probably will be falling on them tougher than yours?
Admiral Locklear. Well, I think for some time, the benefit
of the Pacific Command is that they have had a view, not just
at the military side, but many of the other aspects of whole of
government, just because of the size of the region and how hard
it is to get around. I mean if you take a look at the--just the
number of your members that actually make it in the Pacific, it
is because it is so long, and so hard to get there it makes it
more difficult. So what I have done in my headquarters is I
have expanded in there, the outreach I have to other agencies,
and I have them actually in--physically inside of my
headquarters. So it allows me a conduit into the other agencies
that I use routinely to ensure that whatever assets and things
that I do are well synergized with other activities. So I have
a very close relationship with our partnerships at State, with
AID [Agency for International Development], with Energy, with
the Drug--DEA [Drug Enforcement Agency], the FBI [Federal
Bureau of Investigation], the CIA [Central Intelligence
Agency], all these are present inside of my headquarters, and
it is a team effort, not just a military one.
Mrs. Davis. Do you see those being compromised at all in
the coming year or so?
Admiral Locklear. Well, as I speak to them, I think they
are less uncertain about the impacts on them, than I am.
Mrs. Davis. Would you recommend that they have the same
flexibility perhaps that you all are going to be having?
Admiral Locklear. It would be a, flexibility is always
good, I think, particularly if you are trying to rebalance.
Mrs. Davis. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Forbes.
Mr. Forbes. General and Admiral, we want to first thank you
for your service to our country. Thank you for the weight you
both carry on your shoulders and thank you for the
professionalism you both display in a very unstable policy
world.
Chairman, I want to thank you for trying to bring some
stability to national security and all you have done to do
that.
And I want to first of all set our context. We are talking
about sequestration, cuts that will be about $42.5 billion this
year. But we need to realize that the administration has
already come in here and voluntarily taken 19 times that amount
of cuts already. Because we have cut about $800 billion out of
the last 4 years.
So if I could put those into a sequencing and, for
measurement purposes, put them as 20 cuts, one of those cuts
would come from sequestration, but 19 of them would have
already been coming from the administration.
We fought against them because we said they do not leave us
any bumps in the road. They don't leave us a situation, in case
we have a downturn in the economy, or national crisis. Indeed,
we spent more than this on relief for Hurricane Sandy.
But we are where we are and Admiral, the question I would
have for you is this. Our Navy is currently at 286 ships. When
we add the cuts already made to national security with the cuts
under sequestration, this figure could fall to the 230 range.
Yet the demand for Navy assets only continues to increase.
Admiral, in your best military judgment, is our Navy large
enough today to meet the demand of both your COCOM [combatant
command] and our international responsibilities in the coming
decades? And what are the risks we are assuming if it is not?
Admiral Locklear. Well, I would like to make my comments
from that of a Joint Commander's perspective, not necessarily
from a person who is in the Navy because I think there is
always a perception, well, you are a Navy guy, you are going to
say the right thing.
The Navy and the Joint Force have consistently said that
the U.S. Navy should be in the range of 306 to 313, somewhere
in that number, and that number--I think you can argue about
the each's of that number. Today we are at about 285 ships.
But I think when you back it up into the larger context, it
is really what is it you want your Navy to do. So there are
always the comments, well, your Navy is larger than the 10
largest navies in the world, so what are you worried about?
I say, if you ever put that in the context of having to
defend your home shores with your Navy, whether it is off of
Long Beach or whether it is off of Norfolk, that argument is
pretty good.
But if you look at the world as a global common and you as
a world leader in both economics, in social and military, and
that you want to be able to influence what happens in that
global common to the benefit of the American people and to
secure our national interests there, then you start talking
about size matters and the numbers matter. Because, you know,
only one ship can be at one place at one time.
And they are much more powerful ships, they are, they are
really great ships we have today. But when you are talking
about 285 and what we have seen happen just in the last decade
with the pressure that is from the Middle East, the Persian
Gulf, to what is happening off the Horn of Africa for anti-
piracy, to my requirement to have to deter, assure, and
prevent, in a very--when an area is becoming more complex, the
numbers that we have in the Navy today are too small because my
requirements are not being satisfied by the Navy today.
So in that context, it is probably--285 is not meeting the
global demand for the world we find ourselves in today.
Mr. Forbes. Admiral, can you give us a picture of--let's
just take our most important capabilities in Asia-Pacific is
probably going to be our attack submarines.
Can you give us a picture kind of where we are going to
line up number-wise in the next decade between the number of
submarines the Chinese will have versus ours in the Pacific
area? If we stay on the course we are on today.
Admiral Locklear. Yes. Well, I won't give you exact
numbers, I will just give you relative. I think there are well
over 300 very quiet or extremely quiet diesel submarines
globally today. Some are by our--owned by our friends and
allies, others by not.
And then there is another subset--another set of those that
are nuclear capable ships that have much longer ranges, and
that type of thing. The growth of the Chinese submarine force
is a little bit puzzling to me in both its size and its
sophistication. I believe the predictions are it is going to
grow to about 70, high 70s or 80--in the numbers of 80.
That is the Chinese decision on how big they want their
submarine community to grow and I don't--and I think as they
get more global, that they are going to have to build a
military that can be more global and protect their interests as
well.
But that number of submarines in a very basically
constricted space, it causes a little bit of questions.
Now to compare their submarines to ours is a little bit of
an apples and oranges comparison, but the numbers in the
Pacific will be, of submarines that we have, day-to-day to
operate, will be less than that.
Mr. Forbes. How many?
Admiral Locklear. I would just rather answer that off-line
to give you the exact number.
Mr. Forbes. That is great. Thank you.
General Kehler. Congressman, may I just pitch into this?
Mr. Forbes. Please do.
General Kehler. As a Joint Commander, we ask our Navy to do
something else that is critically important. Fourteen of those
ships are Trident ballistic missile submarines that form the
most survivable part of our strategic deterrent.
And when we talk about deterrence and assurance, a great
deal of what we must be mindful of is the extended deterrence
that provides the assurance for our allies and our partners
around the world.
I think, as we go forward, we need to be very mindful that
those Trident submarines are going to reach the end of their
service life at some point in time and part of the
recapitalization that we are going to need to proceed with,
even in tough financial times, will be the recapitalization of
that ballistic missile submarine force.
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Chairman, thank you for your patience.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Larsen.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to discuss
briefly some of the flexibility issue. This issue came up last
week when we had a hearing with the Federal Aviation
Administration [FAA]. And the majority of the House and the
majority of the Senate voted for the situation we are in today,
sequestration. We are trying to find a way out of it now.
But to underline the inflexibility of sequestration, the
question came up at the FAA hearing based on the concept that a
lot of people just think there is a line item for waste, fraud
and abuse in every agency, including in STRATCOM and including
in PACOM, including every agency in the Federal Government.
And FAA has to cut about $627 million out. But under
sequestration, even if there is a line item of waste, fraud and
abuse and it was $627 million, they could still only cut 8 to
10 percent of that because of the strict rules of
sequestration.
And that just underscores the inflexibility of the
inflexibility of sequestration and underscores the importance,
at least for step one, of providing some flexibility.
But I would also argue that that flexibility should apply
to all agencies and not just to the Department of Defense. I
have got folks who are making choices about housing vouchers in
nonprofit housing authorities in my district. I have got folks
who are making decisions about not delivering meals to seniors
who are shut-ins in their homes through the Meals on Wheels
program.
At least having some flexibility in other agencies, I mean,
if it is good enough for the goose, it is good enough for the
gander, in my view.
But I want to move, though, to another set of issues with
regards to that. And General Kehler, you mentioned it more so
in your oral testimony, and Admiral Locklear, you mentioned
more of it in your written testimony. And that is the impact of
the pay freeze that impacts your civilian employees, as well as
the furloughs.
Can both of you, very briefly, a minute each, with General
Kehler first and Admiral Locklear second, can you discuss in a
little more detail the impact of the potential furlough and
current pay freeze, as well as for the proposed-pay freeze, is
having on your civilian employees and their ability to do their
job?
General Kehler. Sir, I would add to that a hiring freeze,
as well, which we have had for quite some time. And also, a
reduction. While we went through a contractor to civilian
conversion, then we went through some civilian reductions over
the last several years.
And so it is a combination of all of those things that have
been impacting our civilians.
In terms of the furlough, though, the pay freeze and the
furlough, I think as I said in my opening remarks, both of
those are causing our civilians to question their future. And I
think there is an intangible impact there. It will have a
practical effect on some of our people. It will have an
intangible effect on all of them. And how to characterize that,
we have been struggling with that a little bit, certainly in my
headquarters. We believe that in my headquarters we can stagger
the way the civilian furlough is applied to try to minimize
mission impact.
But I can tell you there are some places out beyond
STRATCOM headquarters where people sustain critical parts of
our nuclear deterrent, for example, where it may not be
possible to stagger the workforce furlough.
And for example, I know that the Navy was looking at how
they will manage civilian furloughs in the strategic warfare
centers on the Atlantic and the Pacific that support the
Trident ballistic missile submarines. They tell me that when
you get right down to it, there is a critical pathway for
sustaining those----
Mr. Larsen. You have 10 more seconds.
General Kehler [continuing]. There is a critical pathway
and they may not be able to stagger furloughs. You may have to
take block furloughs. Those are the kind of issues we are going
to work our way through.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you.
Admiral Locklear.
Admiral Locklear. Well, first, I think what we are
potentially going to do with our civilians in this is somewhat
tragic.
I think, over time, in an All-Volunteer Force, the line
between our civil servants who serve in our Defense Department
and our military have blurred to some degree, and we rely very,
very heavily on these civil servants to do the type of things
that you might historically have considered as kind of core
military.
But let me just give you a couple of examples. In the State
of Hawaii alone, there is--where my home is--there is about
20,000 civilian employees. So on 21 April, I understand, when
this takes effect, they will effectively take a 20 percent
reduction in pay for the rest of this year.
Now I don't know about everybody in this room, but I don't
think I could take a 20 percent cut in pay in a high-cost area
where I have children in school and I have mortgages in a high-
cost living area. And I don't know how I would survive it. And
yet we are going to ask them to do it. And chances are, many of
them will, many of them may not.
In the area of things it will have trickle-down effects.
For instance in our DODEA [Department of Defense Education
Activity] schools which educate all of my children--our
children that are overseas. Most of them are civilians--
government civilians so--so that means that one-fifth of the
teachers won't be teaching on any given day in those schools
which are already probably pressurized to be as efficient as
possible.
Our hospital systems overseas are mostly government
employees. So we are going to have a decrease in the hospital
care immediately. So those are--I could go--I could just keep
going on but that is the tip of the iceberg.
Thank you.
The Chairman. The time has expired.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you very much, and I would just note that
that same principle applies to a lot of other agencies outside
the Department of Defense and services provided to people
around this country.
Thank you.
The Chairman. There is no question that this is going to
spread pain across the whole Federal Government of employees,
and I wish I had the ability to bring an appropriation bill for
everything, but I don't think we should let the perfect be the
enemy of the good, the better. And we do have the opportunity
to vote on an appropriation bill which has gone through the
process, unfortunate that the--we never got a budget out of the
Senate and we have had to operate under these kind of
conditions. But we should really, again, be very mindful of
this vote this week.
Mr. Bishop.
Mr. Bishop. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Am I the good, the better or the perfect or just the enemy?
The Chairman. You are the perfect, you now have 4 minutes
and 50 seconds left.
Mr. Bishop. There is always a penalty attached.
General Kehler, if I could ask you what I think are about
six pretty basic questions if I could please.
In your opinion, do you--would you say that or believe that
further nuclear reduction should be bilateral and verifiable
rather than unilateral? Is there a significant advantage in
that?
General Kehler. Sir, if we are going to go beyond the New
START [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] levels of 1,550 then I
think that should be bilateral.
Mr. Bishop. Are you aware of any precedent that this Nation
has ever undertaken to negotiate a bilateral and verifiable
agreement that did not take the form of a treaty?
And if you need time to look that up or need to be more
comfortable, I can do that.
General Kehler. Well, I would like to take that for the
record. And why I am hesitating, I am not sure the agreement
that was made between the United States and Russia with
President Bush to go to 1,800 to 2,200 weapons. I just don't
recall--I will have to take that for the record, sir.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 115.]
Mr. Bishop. Okay.
It--I mean why do we need to have things that are
verifiable? Is, I mean, is verifiable there simply because we
need to know if there is cheating involved?
General Kehler. It, certainly, there is an element of
verification that gets to whether parties are cheating. I think
that is a piece of it.
Another piece, I think, is, there is a transparency piece
of verification. There are certainly an information exchange
piece of verification, there are insights that are all gained
from verification. But I think at its core, verification is
about ensuring that we can place our trust in a country that we
have entered an agreement with.
Mr. Bishop. Is there kind of, is there some kind of
threshold, or is cheating more military significant at a lower
force level?
General Kehler. I think that--I get the question, sir,
sometimes about cheating. I think there are two answers from my
perspective about cheating.
Number one, I think any country that intentionally cheats,
I think there is a significant concern about that. But then the
second question is, does the cheating have a military effect. I
think that is a different question and the answer is it
depends.
Mr. Bishop. So, if a country were to break a key obligation
under an arms control commitment, you know, like say one of the
central limits of the New START Treaty, is that militarily
significant?
General Kehler. It can be, yes sir.
Mr. Bishop. Is there a threshold level about that? I mean
would ten missiles be significant, 50? How many would be
required to make it significant?
General Kehler. Well, I think we would have to take a hard
look at the circumstances. I, so what I would say is, I mean
you could take this to an extreme. You could say if 1,550
accountable warheads is what the treaty says and someone has
1,551, is that militarily significant? And I--we could assess
that.
Mr. Bishop. What if the concept was either developing or
deploying a prohibited type of weapon?
General Kehler. I think----
Mr. Bishop. Is that significant?
General Kehler. That can have military significance. It is
hard to talk about this in the abstract, though.
Mr. Bishop. I understand that. Thank you.
If you reduce your nuclear force by a third, is there any
way that that is not militarily significant?
General Kehler. Sir, we begin the conversations about how
many weapons we need based on strategy and national objectives.
And so, and then we take a hard look at the threat and the
potential threat. Ultimately, as we work our way through this,
this turns into military tasks in the face of a threat and how
many weapons we need is based on that.
And so if, without some changing circumstances that go with
this, without some changing conversation about the threat, it
is hard, again, to look at does one-third make a difference?
Does 10 weapons make a difference, et cetera.
Mr. Bishop. So the key element then in that decision is the
threat itself?
General Kehler. I----
Mr. Bishop. If there is no reduction in our outside threat,
that would still be a significant impact.
General Kehler. I think there are two, two primary drivers
of this. One is the potential threat or the nature of the
potential threat. The other is the national guidance and the
strategy that we are trying, and the objectives we are trying
to achieve. Those are both together.
I think in the long run though, my view is that if we are
going to engage in another conversation about reductions below
New START, that should be done in a bilateral sense. That
should be done with the Russians.
Mr. Bishop. Thank you, I appreciate that.
Mr. Chairman, I will yield back an additional two seconds,
including the ones I took earlier.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Courtney.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, thank you to the
witnesses for being here today.
Admiral, on page nine of your testimony, you clearly I
think wanted to convey a point of highlighting the advances in
undersea warfare in the Asia-Pacific area, which again, Mr.
Forbes's question sort of alluded to.
You know, one question I hear all the time from other
members is, you know, why do we need submarines and you know,
aren't they Cold War relics?
Again, your testimony again suggests that actually there is
something changing out there and I just was wondering if you
could sort of, you know, maybe elaborate a little bit more than
your prior answers in terms of just how submarines fit into a
modern security strategy.
Admiral Locklear. Well, I would disagree with anyone who
said that they are Cold War relics. The modern submarine force
of today, first is globally deployable. It is a highly
proficient force and it does things well beyond what people
would think from a Cold War perspective.
They are significant in intelligence and reconnaissance
collection. They have long-range strike capability when
necessary. They have the ability to carry Special Forces or
special operating forces into denied areas.
They have the ability to use the asymmetric advantage of
stealth under the ocean and able to be a force multiplier for
our force and our Nation that has global interests,
particularly as you talk about maritime domain and insuring
that we have proper access.
You know, it is always widely reported that 95 percent of
everything that moves on the global economy moves on the ocean.
That is true. What is not reported is that in the last decade
or so, that number has quadrupled. And so whether it is energy
or whether it is the things that need to be supplied to local
stores in our country, it is--the global economy runs on the
oceans. And so to cede that to anyone at any time is not in our
best interest. Submarines have a significant play in making
sure that we have freedom of access to our national interest.
Mr. Courtney. Great, thank you. That was a very good
statement that I think is helpful as we again have to always
deal with competing priorities here.
You know, on page 28 of your testimony, you talked about
again the need for bilateral and multilateral communication
collaboration as you said is really what the pivot to Asia-
Pacific is really about.
At the end of January, there was an incident in East
China's sea where it was reported that Chinese frigate locked
actually weapons on Japanese vessels and there is obviously now
this sort of competing dispute about whether it really happened
or whether it did happen. And I mean, you know, to me, that is
sort of where, you know, the success of whether or not
collaboration is going to work in terms of whether or not we
have got systems here for making sure everybody is
communicating well and understands what is going on out there.
And you know, the last thing in the world is that we want
an incident like this to escalate into something where we are
going to be sort of involved. And I just wonder if you could
sort of comment, not necessarily about what actually happened
there, but, you know, how do we get ahead of these kinds of--
because there is a lot of congestion out there is what we are
hearing this morning--to make sure that we don't sort of run
into these incidents that spin out of control.
Admiral Locklear. Well because I wasn't actually at the
scene when it occurred, but it was reported by the Japanese
forces, and I think subsequently denied by the Chinese.
First that type of activity is highly escalatory; by mature
navies, that is recognized as something that you don't do
unless you are directed to do it and it is because of, say, a
move towards greater hostilities.
I believe that if it had occurred, that the Japanese would
have been able to detect it, their navy and their military is
sophisticated enough to be able to understand what was being
done.
And I have been complimentary of the Japanese command and
control and their ability to maintain a level of calm and as
they work through this very difficult challenging security
issue they are dealing with. And I think that is indicative of
the close alliance relationship we have had in building our
navies and our militaries together in that alliance to
understand each other. And so I think that kind of worked.
And we have very close--I have very close communication
with the Japanese leadership on the military side of these
issues and I am quite comfortable with that.
Now, on the Chinese side, we are trying to create these
avenues. We have been successful in the last couple of years, I
think historically successful in being able to keep our mil-to-
mil relationships going even through the periods of time when
we disagree as a nation.
I mean, there will be--you don't have two--a superpower and
a rising power that won't have competition and won't have
friction.
The question is how do you manage that friction so that it
is productive rather than negative. So we are opening venues.
We have a tremendous number of high-level engagements. I have
been to Beijing twice just in the last year to talk to my
counterparts. I have had them come to Hawaii.
So we are improving in our dialogue. We need--there is more
to do--much more to do, and much more to do I think at the
tactical level, being able to have that near-term voice-to-
voice communication, mil-to-mil with the Chinese that we quite
frankly don't have yet but that we are working towards.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Admiral.
The Chairman. Mr. Turner.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Kehler, in
your discussions with Representative Bishop, you were talking
about threats and strategy, and basically that the process you
were describing, it was in part determining what our
requirements are for our nuclear deterrent.
You are the requirement setter for our nuclear deterrent,
and you look at yourself as a customer of our National Nuclear
Security Administration. As you know, I am very concerned about
our plutonium capability and have been an advocate for the
completion of the CMRR [Chemistry and Metallurgy Research
Replacement] that was part of the administration's promises in
the New START process.
We have heard of the proposal, as CMRR has been delayed, of
an interim strategy, perhaps a modular approach. And we are
very concerned about, you know, lack of details with what those
interim strategies might be for satisfying our need for
plutonium capability and what the modular approach might be.
So I am assuming that you have the details of those
proposals, and I have a series of questions about them. You
know, one, do you have the details? And two, if you had to pick
between what you are hearing about the modular approach and the
interim strategy versus CMRR, which would you pick if you were
only going to get one?
General Kehler. Well, let me start with we have spent the
last year--I think as you know, when we came in front of your
committee last year, I expressed some grave concerns about the
plan that we had for the nuclear enterprise, the weapons
complex and the weapons life extensions and other activities
themselves. Because as I said at the time, the plan didn't
close, as you well know.
We took the last year and we sat down as the Nuclear
Weapons Council and we worked our way with the National Nuclear
Security Administration through a strategic approach, through
an implementation plan. We associated budget with that, and all
of that is pending with the fiscal year 2014 budget release,
which I can't describe today.
What I don't know is what is going to happen to it now.
Because I am far more comfortable with the approach that I
believe that we have hammered out over the last year. I believe
that the plan does close. It is not without risk, but I don't
know what is going to happen to it given the fiscal uncertainty
and fiscal year 2014 in particular.
An element of that plan deals with the plutonium needs that
we are going to have. And again, if you are asking me if I pick
between one thing or the other, I think the practical matter is
that one way or another, we are going to need to have an
interim strategy for plutonium. Whatever we decide to do in the
long term, we are going to need to do something on an interim
basis.
Mr. Turner. So you--are you saying you have sufficient
enough details on the interim strategy, which perhaps includes
a modular approach, to endorse that strategy with the Nuclear
Weapons Council?
General Kehler. Well, I think--again, I need to be a little
careful here because the entire plan hasn't been released. But
I have been comfortable with the proposal that we have
discussed regarding an interim plutonium strategy. Now that is
different than what do you do in the longer term----
Mr. Turner. Well, and that is my next question actually. So
let me frame that, which will be part of what your answer is.
That is, there is the issue of, you know, which would you want,
CMRR or the interim strategy, the pick. And that is the long-
term strategy.
But the second aspect of that--so there is two components.
One, you know, do you think we could maintain in interim
strategy in perpetuity versus the investment required for CMRR?
But the second aspect is would you ever consider undertaking
reductions in our hedge based upon just the interim strategy
versus the long-term strategy of the CMRR?
General Kehler. Well, let me go back to the interim
strategy. I--again, I don't think we have a choice. I think
that we have to do some kind of an interim strategy. The
question then becomes, okay, what do we do next? And I think
that that isn't quite solid in my mind yet, and I think that is
going to be one of the open questions as we come forward.
Again, assuming--I don't know what to assume about the 2014
budget at this point in time to tell you the absolute truth.
But having said that, I believe you have to do some kind of
an interim strategy. I believe that that gets us through the
time period that we are talking about. Certainly in the long
run we would prefer to see a more permanent solution to the
plutonium needs. And I think that will also--I think there are
a number of steps that impact a hedge strategy. That is one of
them.
Mr. Turner. Great. Because you would agree that our ability
to have a long-term ability for production, in a production
infrastructure should be a basis for us considering whether or
not we reduce any of our hedge in case there isn't an issue
with the weapons that we have.
General Kehler. Sir, I think that is one consideration. I
don't think that is the only consideration. And I think that
there are some scenarios that you can unfold where an interim
strategy will serve us even under some technical issues. So I--
but I think for the United States of America in the long term
that we want a permanent solution to the nuclear enterprise
that includes a permanent solution to the plutonium.
Mr. Turner. I appreciate that. I am surprised, General, by
your last answer.
The Chairman. Thank you. Ms. Hanabusa.
Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you, General. And
of course aloha, Admiral. Admiral, in reviewing your testimony,
and this is a hearing on the posture of both of your commands,
I did not see a real specific reference to PMRF [Pacific
Missile Range Facility]. And I wanted to give both of you the
opportunity to testify about the importance of PMRF in both of
your postures. Admiral.
Admiral Locklear. Aloha.
Ms. Hanabusa. Aloha.
Admiral Locklear. Well, I mean, I think that, for those of
you who visit Hawaii and go to Kauai to see PMRF, I think it
becomes readily apparent the importance of it, particularly as
we pursue our technologies and our research and development and
are able to demonstrate in an airspace our ability to do
ballistic missile defense, to develop those technologies which
are critical to our own homeland defense.
One of the problems we have is finding a range in places
where you can actually have the airspace and the outer space,
if you call it, to be able to fly targets and to be able to do
them. And PMRF is a relatively modest organization, but they
carry a lot of weight in this. And I think you would see that
any future strategy we have towards our ballistic missile
defense will have a--PMRF will play a central role in being
able to test and evaluate those systems.
Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you. General, would you like to add to
that?
General Kehler. Congresswoman, I would just say that I
completely agree, and I would add one other point, although it
isn't completely related to Hawaii. The importance of the
facilities on Kwajalein farther to the south and west are
equally important for those same reasons.
That is where we--the entire Pacific Range Complex, that
includes PMRF, it includes Kwajalein, it includes Vandenberg at
the eastern end of it, it includes other assets, is critically
important for us for missile defense purposes, for our ability
to continue to demonstrate the effectiveness of the nuclear
deterrent and for lots of other reasons, development of radar
and other things. So all of those are important places.
Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you. And for those that may not
understand PMRF, it is the Pacific Missile Range Facility.
Admiral, I think the chair of the subcommittee on seapower sort
of got into it, and that is how many ships do you need?
We had a hearing earlier last week I believe where former
SECNAV [Secretary of the Navy] Lehman testified, as well as
Admiral Roughead also testified, and we had a range of numbers.
Of course, we all know that Admiral--I mean the Secretary
Lehman is known for his 600 fleet under President Reagan, but
he says 346 is his number. And Admiral Roughead said 325 to
345.
So when I asked him, well, what does that mean, they both
kind of said it depends on our needs and that we are to
understand that when we are talking about a fleet that there
are support vessels and everything else associated with it.
If you were to pick a number that you believe would be
necessary, what would that number be, and also what would the
number be for you to accomplish what you feel is necessary for
what I call your DAP [Defense Acquisition Policy] in the
Pacific?
Admiral Locklear. Well, you can see you get competing
numbers from almost any source you talk to. I would start by
saying that the number we have today is insufficient. So from
that--start from that perspective.
But if you look at I think at Navy's and its, and other
aspects of our force, it really starts by how do you define
your--what it is you want to do. What is your national
aspirations around the globe? And from a maritime perspective,
the globe is actually getting not physically bigger but it is
actually getting more challenges. When I was a young junior
officer, I never contemplated operating in the Horn of Africa.
I probably didn't know where it was because we just didn't go
there.
I would not contemplate--wouldn't have contemplated that
there was a potential for Arctic operations in my lifetime, but
you know, that is going to probably happen in the next
generation of naval officers that have to go and deal with
this. I wouldn't have anticipated the rise of some of the
militaries that we are seeing and the lack of transparency in
some of them and what that would mean.
So, you know, the debate about how big the Navy is has been
one that is historic in our Nation, is really about how do we
define ourselves. And if we think we are going to be a global
maritime power and a maritime domain that is increasingly
important, then we have to build a Navy that can stay out there
and we can sustain it.
The one we have today I think is challenged to do that. And
the exact numbers, like I said, it depends on what you want to
do and where you want to do it at and what type of ships you
want to do it with. But as you can see, just in my lifetime we
have grown from a--basically a sea-controlled environment to
now a ballistic missile defense environment.
So many of the requirements that are driven in the PACOM
AOR about my service ships are equally as much about anti-
submarine warfare and maritime security and patrol of the seas
is equally about ballistic missile defense of our homeland and
defense of our allies and the treaty allies we have.
So I think we really do need to have that debate about,
what is the right size for that? And I think the CNO [Chief of
Naval Operations] is heading in that direction.
Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Rogers.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Kehler, good to see you again. I want to ask you if
you agree with a statement made by Secretary Panetta last year
before this committee in testimony, quote--``Reductions that
have been made, at least in this administration have only been
made as a part of the START Process, and not outside of that
process, and I would expect that that would be the same in the
future''--closed quote. Is that the right way to do our
reductions?
General Kehler. Congressman, yes I think so.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you. Next, Assistant Secretary of State
Stephen Rademaker stated in 2006 that, quote--``President
Yeltsin committed to similar reductions in Russian tactical
nuclear weapons, but considerable concern exists that the
Russian commitments have not been entirely fulfilled''--closed
quote. Mr. Rademaker was discussing the President's Nuclear
Initiatives, PNIs, which President George H.W. Bush and
President Yeltsin entered into. But without the treaty process,
and thus it had no legal effect.
In 2009, the Perry-Schlesinger Commission stated in its
final report to Congress that Russia, quote--``Is no longer in
compliance with PNI commitments.'' Do you have reason to
believe that the Perry-Schlesinger Commission was wrong?
General Kehler. I don't although I can tell you from our
perspective today in terms of New START, we believe that they
are complying. They are above the ultimate numbers, so are we.
We are working our way down, and we believe they are complying.
Mr. Rogers. What about Secretary Rademaker's position that
I just outlined?
General Kehler. You know sir, I am going to have to take
that for the record. I really would like to know more about
what he was really talking about.
Mr. Rogers. Would you respond in writing when you have the
chance to do that?
General Kehler. Yes, sir.
[The information referred to was not available at the time
of printing.]
Mr. Rogers. And lastly, what would you say are our most
significant concerns with respect to modernization of our aging
strategic deterrent enterprise?
General Kehler. I think that I have two primary concerns.
Actually, I have got three primary concerns. One is in the
command and control area, to make sure that we have kept our
nuclear command and control, which is more and more and more
becoming national command and control capability, that we keep
that such that that is the bedrock of our deterrent. I think
that in the forces themselves, as I said earlier, I am
committed to wanting to support the replacement for the Ohio
ballistic missile submarines. I fully support a long-range
bomber that will eventually come along to supplement the B-2
and potentially take the place of the B-52 as time passes.
I support, even though it is not within my joint command, I
get the use of the Air Force's aerial refueling tankers, and so
I am deeply committed, because I see the value of those tankers
every single day, and I know every combatant command would say
the same thing, that they see the value of those tankers every
day. And I certainly support the analysis of alternatives to
look about what we might do with the Minuteman intercontinental
ballistic missile beyond 2030, which is where the Air Force
believes they can take it today. So, that is part number two.
Part number three is the weapons themselves, and the
nuclear enterprise that supports and sustains those weapons. We
are in a different era today. The era that we are in, is an era
of a moratorium on testing nuclear devices. And so we have got
to maintain the science that underpins those weapons. We have
got to make sure we are sustaining those weapons, and
surveiling those weapons as they age, and then we have got life
extension programs that we need to put in place.
And all of this comes at a time of significant physical
challenge as you all well know, and we are going to have to
make some tough choices, I am sure.
Mr. Rogers. In your opinion is that a limitation--a
prohibition on testing inhibiting your ability to modernize?
General Kehler. No, sir not today, it is not.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, sir. That is all I have, Mr.
Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Kilmer.
Mr. Kilmer. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Admiral, at the end of
your written remarks targets your concerns regarding the
impacts of inadequate maintenance, and a potential bow-wave of
maintenance down the road. I know this is consistent with a
letter that was sent out by the Secretary of the Navy, which
detailed cutbacks resulting from sequestration. I was out on
Friday at the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, which is in my
district in Washington State, and obviously the DOD [Department
of Defense] civilians who were there were concerned about
furloughs, and the impacts to them personally, financially.
But the broader concern that was raised and I was very
impressed with, the number of people who are concerned about
the implications to national security to the real physical work
done there at the shipyard at the west coast hub of maintenance
activity. Can you say a bit more about the immediate impacts of
sequestration with regard to maintenance and the mission in the
Pacific? And the downstream impacts as well? And also if you
could discuss for me the impacts of delayed maintenance on
carriers and the national security implications as we shift our
strategic focus to the Pacific?
Admiral Locklear. Well certainly from my years of
experience on ships, you know, you have to applaud our Navy
today for how ready it is, and how it has been able to sustain
itself, even the size it is globally in a pretty intense
environment. But to do that, it is so far away from home, it
requires a consistent approach to how you maintain and keep
these ships going. As you know, they are complex platforms with
tremendous amounts of capability that require sophisticated
maintenance and upkeep.
And that we do in the most cost-effective way we can, using
the great resources we have, like in the shipyard that is in
your district. And over time, we try to build a business model
that allows us to keep our forces forward with the ones we have
in the most efficient way we can. So when you put a burble in
that, it is you know, you cannot change the oil in your car
once, you cannot change it twice, but then when it is at
100,000 miles you have an engine replacement.
We need to have these ships around for 30 to 35 years. The
same for our airframes across the Air Force, same for our
submarines. So, built into them and the life expectancy that
they have of many, many years, is a requirement to do
maintenance, this is particularly important as well in our
carrier force. Our carrier force, I think continues to be one
of the most important aspects of a peaceful maritime
environment around the globe. And keeping the size of the
carrier force that we have today globally deployed as a very
sophisticated platform requires continuous maintenance.
Of course it is amplified by the fact that they are nuclear
vessels, so there is an aspect of us ensuring that the
maintenance is done safely and properly, and I believe that
the--if you look across the nuclear power program that the Navy
has, it is an unbelievable model of success and safety. And we
do that running the entire program with basically 19- to 25-
year-olds. And to do that, it requires investment and ensuring
that the systems are maintained properly, at the right time
periodicity.
So as we interject this unpredictability into our
maintenance schedules and we start doing things near term, it
just--you don't--it is pay me now, or pay me later, and that is
the era I think we are entering into more under sequestration.
General Kehler. Congressman, could I add a piece to that?
From another joint perspective, I think it is important to note
that as we defer maintenance, we are beginning at a different
starting point. We are coming out of 10 years worth of high
operations tempo events. And so the stress on the platforms to
begin with is higher than it has been at other places when we
have tried to reset in the past. Or at the end of other
conflicts. This is a force that, whether it is flying hours on
aircraft, or steaming hours on ships, or vehicles that the Army
has, we are starting at a far different place. And so the
magnitude of deferred maintenance I think is going to be
higher.
We also have some older platforms today, the car oil change
analogy is--you know if your car already has 200,000 miles on
it, you have got a different place to start.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Franks.
Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentleman, thank you. I always try to take a moment just to
express my gratitude for people like yourselves that give your
whole lives to the cause of human freedom. On behalf of my
little 4-year-old twins, I am grateful because I think they
have a better chance at life because of what people like you
do. With that, my first question is directed to you General
Kehler. I just want to thank you for your written testimony, in
which you state, and I will quote you if I can, quote--
``Ballistic missile threats are likely to grow at least as
rapidly as our defensive assets, giving us little margin for
error in acquisition and force management decisions.''
``Sustained missile defense investments support deterrence
and assurance goals by significantly improving the protection
of our homeland, our forward base forces, and our allies and
partners.'' And I am in violent agreement with you. I think
that that is well stated. And I have--I wanted to ask you about
your concern with the potential threat posed to our critical
infrastructure by a major EMP [electromagnetic pulse] event,
you know GMD [Ground-based Midcourse Defense], or something
deliberate, or even in isolated cases, EMI [electromagnetic
interference] technology that seems to be at least on the North
Korean radar, and as stated in STRATCOM's mission, you know,
your responsibility to prepare for uncertainty and partner with
other COCOMs, how is STRATCOM preparing? How does it perceive
the uncertainty of a threat like EMP?
General Kehler. Congressman, I think the entire
electromagnetic spectrum needs to get more attention, and we
have stood up, we were given over the past several years a
number of organizations that work various parts, either
assessing potential threats whether it is EMP, or in some cases
cyber threats to our systems and our capabilities. We have now
some organizations that do that. We have some other
organizations that are looking hard at how to detect such
electromagnetic spectrum issues, whether it is EMI or EMP when
it occurs.
We have some others that are doing some planning against
how to deal with those threats as they emerge, and we have put
all of those together now in one single organization. It is in
many different places, in one single organization to try to
address these on behalf of STRATCOM and the other combatant
commanders. I think we haven't paid nearly enough attention to
this. I am concerned about the threat of electromagnetic pulse.
There are some pretty good books that have been written here
recently about this, a couple of novels that were written that
you turn the page looking for the happy ending and it never
comes in the book.
And so I would tell you that we are still mindful of
electromagnetic pulse. It is not a Cold War relic. It is
something that we need to prepare some of our systems to deal
with in the operational environment.
I think as we look particularly at anti-access/area-denial
environments in the future, one of the ways that adversaries
will try to take away our U.S. advantages will be through the
electromagnetic spectrum. Whether that is jamming, whether that
is some kind of electromagnetic interference or whether it is
through cyberspace or whether it is via an electromagnetic
pulse, we need to be prepared for that.
And I think that we need to--we have a lot of work to do. I
am not yet comfortable that we have gone anywhere near where
the magnitude of this problem should take us.
Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, sir. I am glad you are where
you are.
Admiral Locklear, can you describe the capability, for this
committee--some of us are perhaps more familiar with it than
others--of the sea-based X-band radar and why it is important
as a capability? And is it a capability that we continue to
need to defend United States and deployed forces?
And what is its special significance on issues like,
perhaps, protecting us from, you know, road-mobile missile
threats from a North Korea sometime in the future?
Admiral Locklear. Well, the sea-based radar has been an
important part of our ballistic missile defense architecture as
we built it over the last decade or so. It has played a
tremendous role in research and development. It is a great
radar. It is on a mobile platform, so it has those attributes
to it. But it is not an end all to beat all, I mean, it is just
a part of an architecture. So as we go forward in the future--
and it is an expensive part of the architecture, to maintain it
at sea. So as we go forward in the future, we will have to look
at how it might--and we do, we are looking at that now--how it
might more effectively fit into that architecture over the long
run, or whether it is eventually, at some point in time,
replaced by something else.
Because the nature of the platform it is on just becomes
more and more expensive every year to keep it, because it is
kind of an unusual, unusual thing. But it has tremendous
capability and we have and will continue to use it as necessary
to ensure that we are properly defending our national
interests.
Mr. Franks. Thank you, gentlemen. Thank you.
Mr. Johnson.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am just reading some reports about North Korea and the
fact that the U.N. is considering a new raft of sanctions
against North Korea as the result of its testing of a nuclear
device back in February. The blast from that device being about
double the force of the last device that was tested back in
2009. And this device being miniaturized, as was described by
the North Koreans.
So the thinking is that perhaps this miniaturized nuclear
device that was successfully tested, coming behind the recent
successful launch into space of a North Korean satellite, it
raises the specter that there is now a nuclear device that can
fit onto a missile, which can then be used to launch a nuclear
strike.
And now, with this talk of new sanctions and there being an
agreement, by the way, with the Chinese, the only ally of North
Korea, being a party to this agreement for sanctions, we are
looking at an unsafe area of the world, no doubt. A young
leader who has never been told no, who has always gotten his
way and who is just uneducated about military affairs, world
affairs, how his country fits into the overall scheme of
things.
And it is sobering to think that these kinds of things are
happening throughout the world. But just using this as an
example. And here we are going through senseless cuts to our
ability to defend the Nation and its interest, this
sequestration. Something has to happen.
But tell me, what do you think--how do things look as far
as North Korea, which threatens to withdraw from its armistice
agreement that has resulted in no hostilities over there, well,
I won't say no hostilities, but has kept hostilities low? What
do you see happening over in North Korea?
And I will ask that first of General Kehler, and then if
you would respond, Admiral.
General Kehler. Congressman, from my perspective in
Strategic Command, all of the items that you described are
deeply concerning. We have seen North Korea parade a long-range
ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile]. There are, I think,
valid questions about how far along that program is. We have
seen other steps that you mentioned. And so all of that
together is deeply, deeply troubling.
We have been involved with a review of our plans and our
posture related to North Korea, particularly we have been
working very hard with Pacific Command and Northern Command
regarding our ballistic missile defense posture and our
ballistic missile defense approach.
So as I said earlier, I am confident that STRATCOM can
perform its deterrence and assurance mission today. And that we
are capable of extending our deterrent umbrella over our key
allies in Admiral Locklear's area of responsibility.
I am equally confident that we can meet a limited missile
threat from North Korea with ballistic missile defenses that we
have in place.
Mr. Johnson. All right. Well, given that, could I now,
since I only have 20 seconds----
General Kehler. Yes, sir.
Mr. Johnson [continuing]. Could I go to Admiral?
Admiral Locklear. Well, to your comments, I think you
articulated what Kim Jong Un wants the world to believe. And
so, the fact that he talks about it and demonstrates things and
shows things, I think it causes us to have to take them--at
least be concerned about them.
But I think the important thing for the new leader to
recognize is that, in the end, this will be unsuccessful. In
the end, this is not in the best interest of the people of
North Korea, where the average citizen gets about 800 calories
a day. They spent more money on the missile launch in 1 day
than they could have fed their entire nation for 1 day--or for
1 month, on what they spent in 1 day to launch a missile.
And so, we are--us and our Korean allies, we are postured
to ensure we are monitoring carefully what is going on on the
Korea peninsula. Obviously, our defensive forces are postured
in case something really crazy were to happen.
But in the end, we have to, I think, number one, applaud
the efforts of the U.N. Security Council as they continue to
put pressure on this regime from all sides. And in the end,
just assure Kim Jong Un that his strategy will not be
successful.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you. I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Dr. Fleming.
Dr. Fleming. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Kehler, I represent the 4th District of Louisiana,
which is the home of Barksdale Air Force Base and Global Strike
Command. And I want to thank you both for appearing before us
today.
I am very much sold on the idea of nuclear deterrence and
also on nuclear security. And I want to point out that in a
fiscal year 2013 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress
added language addressed to the issue of nuclear weapons
storage areas, WSAs, and quotes the 2008 SECDEF [Secretary of
Defense] Task Force on DOD Nuclear Weapons Management, which
concluded, and I quote--``the closure of WSA at one of the
bomber bases was a significant mistake with a negative
operational impact.''
As it stands now, with the closure of the Barksdale WSA in
2007, we have a single point of failure in the ALCM [Air
Launched Cruise Missile] mission.
And just to kind of expand a little bit, as you know, if we
have all of our ALCMs in one location, and for whatever reason
we have to gear up for battle at some point, or maybe a higher
level of alert, then obviously other nations can monitor our
bombers going and picking up the ALCMs from another location.
It takes a little bit of the surprise effect away and
certainly it is important that we keep, again, nuclear
assurance.
So I just wanted to get your response. I know that a lot of
this is driven by budget issues. We are talking about anywhere
from $80 to $200 million going forward, if you include not just
the standards that have to be brought to bear on the WSA site,
but also the employment and other, I guess, device expenses.
So what is your response? Is this something that we are
going to be able to stand up at some point, maybe when we get
past sequestration?
General Kehler. Sir, I think that it is something for us to
go look at as time passes. I think particularly as we go
forward and we begin to see a long-range strike platform come
into being, I think where and how we base that, how we would
support the dual-capable nature of that platform.
Just like we do with the B-52s today, we made some
decisions about how to support the dual-capable nature of those
B-52s, I think there are many questions for us to ask and that
we will have to answer as we go forward.
Today as you say, that would be a very expensive
proposition to try to go back and revisit. However, I can say
that commander of Global Strike Command and I have just met to
discuss nuclear security and I know he has in his mind a review
of that and the other storage areas because as we go forward, I
think we recognize there are some investments going to have to
be made to keep up to date with security standards and other
things.
I can tell you we are, I think security-wise, we are in far
better condition today than we were just a few years ago. But I
think as we go forward to make additional security
enhancements, it will be an opportunity for us to come back and
take a hard look.
Dr. Fleming. Right.
And maybe to follow up and expand that a little bit more,
does the Air Force and the Department of Defense remain
committed to a nuclear triad as effective deterrents, you know,
the you just mentioned the long-range strike fighter platform
that will eventually replace the B-52. There may be some that
are critical of that and certainly we follow that closely. B-
52s at some point in time will be too old to fly.
Now they may be a century old before that happens and as
you know, General, they are doing an outstanding job as they
are. But some day, they are just simply going to wear out.
Are we still committed to that nuclear triad and to the
newer platform?
General Kehler. I am certainly committed to the nuclear
triads. Strategic Command's position is that we are committed.
I have seen, certainly I heard Secretary Panetta say more than
once that the Department was committed. I have seen some
written commitment to that effect from Secretary Hagel. It was
the recommendation of the nuclear posture review to sustain a
triad, and that would certainly be my position going forward.
I think much like every other item that will be on the
table as a result of fiscal issues, I suspect that that will
get looked at again. But I can tell you my view is we ought to
continue with that.
Regarding the replacement, one of the enduring advantages
of the United States is that we have the ability to project
power and----
The Chairman. Thank you, the gentleman's time has expired.
General Kehler [continuing]. Lots of reasons for that, the
long-range air piece is a big part of that.
Dr. Fleming. Thank you, Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, General Kehler and Admiral Locklear, for
appearing before the committee today and I certainly appreciate
your service and I also appreciate having the benefit of your
insight and experience as we attempt to navigate a policy and
budgetary challenges.
General Kehler, if I could start with you, turning to one
of my favorite subjects, cyber. General, with the complex
demands of operating cyberspace, it is certainly no surprise
that U.S. Cyber Command has expressed a need to increase the
number of its cyber professionals as recently announced.
However, I am also given to understand that the situation is
not as simple as adding more people, that instead they will be
reallocated within the service components.
What progress has been made in acquiring these
professionals? What training will they require? And how they
would be allocated across the services and what is STRATCOM's
role, specifically in shaping this force and in advocating for
the resources needed?
General Kehler. Sir, let me start with the last piece
first. The responsibilities to protect the Department of
Defense's networks and to be prepared for activity in
cyberspace, remain assigned to Strategic Command to include
advocacy, to include our responsibility to make sure that the
service are providing us with adequately trained and resourced
sufficient capacity and capability, if you will.
I delegate most of those responsibilities on a day-to-day
basis to the commander of the U.S. Cyber Command, General
Alexander, who executes--he is the execution arm if you will of
this and of course, as you know, his command has been growing.
This is a growth area I believe for the Department as we
look to the future. I will get you the specifics for the record
in terms of the number of people that we have added here in the
near term.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 115.]
General Kehler. What we have finally done is we have come
to grips with how to describe--how we would grow the cyber
capacity and capability if this was F-16 squadrons, we would
know how to do that. We would have a model for how to do that.
We finally put something in place for cyberspace as well.
So we can now come back into the resource allocation process
and advocate for the amount of resources that we need. I think
that part of it is going well. The question will be with budget
reductions, is how successful we will be and I think that is an
open question that we will have to see how that goes as time
passes.
But in my view, anyway, cyberspace is such an important
part of our national security and our economic well-being and
our ability to conduct business. As you know, the bulk of
cyberspace exists in the civil domain. I think that having said
that, though, its use for national security purposes is
critical and it is important that we do everything we can to
grow the capacity and capability we need to make sure that we
can operate there effectively.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you.
Admiral, let me turn to you, can you discuss the role that
cyber operations play in your activities, particularly in
information operations programs and how they factor into your
partnership activities in the Pacific. Do you feel that your
command is adequately resourced in cyber in order to remain
resilient in full spectrum conflict?
And then the second question I have for you, if you could
probably start with this one first. I continue to be concerned
about the capabilities of our bases to withstand a cyber attack
directed against outside supporting infrastructure, such as the
electric grid, which is owned and operated by the private
sector, but you don't have any responsibility or capability to
defend that private network. Your, but our bases are dependent
on them.
Your predecessor, Admiral Willard testified on this topic
last March. Can you update us on the progress that has been
made in evaluating the ability of our bases in the PACOM AOR to
operate and recover in the event of such an attack as well as
any mitigation members that are underway?
Admiral Locklear. Well, you know, cyber domain is the only
manmade domain that we have, air time, space and others are
given to us; this one we created. And sometimes we tend to
think of cyber as only what shows up at the end of our computer
device in our hand. But the reality is there is a large
supporting infrastructure that supports cyber globally, not the
least of which is under-seabed cables which are prolific
throughout the world, it would have to be understood where they
are and how those are protected.
So to the question of what we have done in the last year to
look at our ability to operate our cyber networks. Assuming
that the infrastructure in those cable networks, those things
are secure which is one of the things that I have to worry
about.
And from the defense perspective, from my ability to
operate as a--and to operate the forces I have, I feel
relatively secure that we can defend the networks that we
actually would do warfighting or contingency operations on. But
we are working hard at it and Cyber Command's agreement to grow
and to provide experts and allow us to know how to do computer
network defense, how to recognize computer network attack,
these are all important and they are critically important to me
and to PACOM AOR.
Mr. Langevin. I know my time expired----
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Langevin [continuing]. Admiral, if you could though
write and respond what we have done to protect our ability to
be resilient in our bases.
Okay, thank you
The Chairman. Excuse me, I didn't hear you but your time
had expired. What were you requesting?
Mr. Langevin. They--the Admiral didn't quite answer my
question in terms of what has been done in terms of
resiliance----
The Chairman. Okay, would you please respond for the
record?
Admiral Locklear. Can I provide it in--I will provide you a
written answer to it. Will that be adequate?
Mr. Langevin. That would be adequate.
Admiral Locklear. Thank you.
[The information referred to is classified and retained in
the committee files.]
The Chairman. Thank you.
Dr. Heck.
Dr. Heck. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Locklear, what transnational terrorist threats are
the greatest concerns to you in the PACOM AOR and how are you
engaging with our international partners to address the
terrorism threat in Southeast Asia and how will the current
fiscal constraints impact that engagement?
Admiral Locklear. Right, well, if you look globally at
terrorist threats and violent extremist organizations, they are
increasingly kind of popping out in the Asia-Pacific region.
And whether they are in the south of the Philippines or in
other areas, the vastness of the region and the way that it is
structured, I think allows the opportunity for, if not
monitored properly, to be a proliferation area for terrorists.
Now, but that is not the only threats. We know that
Southeast Asia is the number one supplier of precursors for
methamphetamines that are created in drug labs inside the
United States. So we have a JIATF [Joint Interagency Task
Force] West that works for me and we do a large network of
looking and interdicting and understanding networks that
provide these, what would appear to be innocuous chemicals that
show up on ships that show up in our ports and harbors that
eventually show up in garages and people's houses that are
making illegal methamphetamines that are being--now I think
the--they are probably one of the number one scourges of parts
of our society.
So, the next thing that I would say is fairly prolific in
this region is the human slave trade that has to be contended
with. I am told that last year alone, the human slave trade was
worth about $30 billion globally--$30 billion, that is as much
as I think Nike, Google and Starbucks put together.
And so, looking not only at how do you stop that, but what
are the networks that are benefiting by this type of
unbelievable behavior that adds to the sense of lack of
security in areas where we have a lot of national interest is a
priority for us at PACOM.
So those are the ways we look at it.
Now you can't--the area is too big to interdict all this
stuff. If you were taking interdiction mentality, you would run
out of resources in a very short period of time.
So what we have to do is we have to--through our
partnership building, through our interagency processes where
we go in with the FBI or we go in with AID or we go in with the
CIA or other interagencies. And we work with these nations to
let them, first of all, understand what is happening to them.
Let them be able to sense what is happening and then to help
them, hopefully build partnership organizations or
organizational structures inside their own militaries and their
own governments that allow them to deal with this in an
effective way. And I think we are having some great progress
throughout the Asia-Pacific.
Dr. Heck. Well, can you address the last piece, the current
fiscal constraints, what is it going to do to your ability to
have an impact on those three areas?
Admiral Locklear. Well, I mean, just recently my JIATF West
organization took about a 20 percent reduction in their
operating costs, just in this year.
So that is the organization that drives all of these
discussions. It is predominantly a civilian-led, government
civilian-led organization. So the ones that are left, they will
be working 4 days out of the week.
So it compounds the problems in ways that I think that
aren't always apparent to the people talking about
sequestration.
Dr. Heck. General Kehler, I have got about a minute and a
half left.
We are seeing some increased threats to our space-based
capabilities. What is STRATCOM doing to monitor our space
capabilities against disruption of service and other threats?
And how are we postured to respond to these threats?
General Kehler. Congressman, over the last year we have
done a lot to improve our plans and to address our resilience
so that we can continue to deter such attacks. But you are
right. We see the potential for those kinds of activities in
space, or directed against space objects, growing as time
passes.
Space is no longer an operational sanctuary, for the United
States, certainly. And we are dealing with that through
improved plans, our improved ability to monitor what is
happening. And ultimately we need to transition from monitoring
and building a catalogue of items that are there to getting to
real-time situational awareness, like we would have in the air,
for example.
So we still have a lot to do. There could be investment
impacts there, as time passes. But how we process sensor
information about what is happening in space and how we
maintain global awareness and situational awareness in space is
going to be critical as we go to the future.
How we plan, then, to improve our resilience, I think, will
be equally important.
The Chairman. Thank you. Ms. Bordallo.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member
Smith. And thank you, General and Admiral, for your time this
morning.
I especially appreciate Admiral Locklear. I appreciate your
opening comments and thank you for reminding the committee
about the vastness of the Pacific Ocean and the strategic
importance of the U.S. territory of Guam.
Admiral, I am particularly interested to hear your views on
the rebalance of forces in the Pacific. Can you address some of
your challenges regarding the distributed lay-down of Marines
in the Pacific? How the current budget outlook may affect the
timing of this plan?
And I do hope that PACOM continues to prioritize our
investments and realignments in the Pacific.
Admiral Locklear. Well, thank you. As I said earlier, I
think we have a good plan. I think it one that certainly makes
sense in the context of where we want the Marines laid down for
the 21st century in the AOR.
Guam is a centerpiece of that. I mean, if Hawaii is kind of
the front door to the Asia-Pacific, Guam is well into the heart
of the living room. All it takes is just a quick look at the
vastness of the region and a map and you can see why we would
want to make sure that we optimize our capabilities, both in
peace and in crisis, from Guam.
And that bringing this part of the Marines back there is a
critical piece of that.
So the challenges to it are ensuring--it is a little bit of
a house of cards. You have to move one thing before you do the
next. So ensuring that we can move ahead with the changes that
we need to be funded in Okinawa, to be able to allow the
movement of those Marines in a timeframe that allows us to have
the infrastructure that is needed to be constructed on Guam.
And we have--quite frankly, I think we have had some
struggle in trying to get those funds released. And I am
hopeful that in the coming weeks and months, that that will be
in our favor.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much, Admiral.
I would also like to ask about bilateral and multilateral
military training exercises in your AOR. I understand that the
current budget will place constraints on training and joint
exercises. But in a more ideal fiscal situation, what would you
like to see with regard to multilateral training in the
Pacific?
I fear that we have a lot of bilateral training exercises
that could be better leveraged through our multilateral
training.
And also if you could please address how you intend to
provide effective training in a more cost-efficient manner,
given DOD's budget constraints?
Admiral Locklear. Well, you know, after the World War II,
we basically had a bilateral relationship structure, kind of a
hub-and-spoke structure for U.S.--with U.S. allies and U.S.
partners. It served us quite well for many decades.
But the strategic landscape has shifted to some degree now
and the importance of multilaterals, I think, is growing day by
day. The importance of multilaterals is if you get a larger
group of like-minded people working on problems that all matter
to them, you build improved inter-operability between
multilaterals instead of bilaterals.
You get in a very vast and uncertain region, you get a much
better intelligence and picture of what is going on if you have
multiple countries participating in that. Because they all have
a little bit different view than we may have from Hawaii or we
may have from Washington.
So we are pursuing multilaterals. We are very supportive of
ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian Nations], the East Asia
Summit, and those multilateral forums. Even with our own
allies, we are pursuing more trilateral operations where we can
between Japan, the U.S. and Korea. Japan, the U.S. and
Australia. Just pick one. But we are moving in the direction of
multilateralism.
And you can--you really--in fact, if you take the Rim of
the Pacific Exercise, which is the largest maritime exercise in
the world, it is a multinational exercise. I think last year 22
nations participated. Russia came with ships for the first
time. It was a great success. We invited the Chinese, the PLA
[People's Liberation Army], to send ships in 2014 and we are
hopeful that they will come and participate.
But in those, we get to know each other better. We get to
operate together. We get a common understanding. And when you
have militaries that can operate and understand each other, it
lowers your threshold of crisis, no matter how you cut it. It
is a good thing for all of our security and our own national
security.
Now how can we be more effective in our training? One is to
ensure that the bilateral training we do is effective for the
strengthening of the alliance. But that where we can leverage
that bilateral training into multilateral, that we take those
opportunities. And we are doing that.
We also have to make sure that our range systems, where we
have actually conduct our operations, our training operations,
are unencumbered, remain unencumbered. Encroachment is one of
the biggest problems we have everywhere in the world today,
where sometimes it gets too hard to do operations because they
are just too big of a population growth area or environmental
concerns.
So our ranges in the Pacific Northwest are critical. Our
ranges around Hawaii that we have already talked about are
critical. The opportunity to find additional range space in
your part of the world, I think will be important.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much, Admiral, for your
continued interest in our area. And thank you, General.
I yield back.
The Chairman. That is it. Thank you very much for your
service. Please convey our thanks to those under your command,
the men and women that are serving.
Thank you very much. This committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:19 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
March 5, 2013
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
March 5, 2013
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[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
March 5, 2013
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RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. BISHOP
General Kehler. I am not aware of any negotiated, bilateral and
verifiable agreements regarding nuclear weapons that did not take the
form of a treaty or a Congressional-Executive agreement (SALT I). [See
page 22.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN
General Kehler. USSTRATCOM and U.S. Cyber Command are working with
the Joint Staff and Service Chiefs to identify, train and position the
highly qualified and standardized cyber force that this nation needs.
The first one-third of this force is being generated this year by
realigning existing personnel within U.S. Cyber Command service
components to form the Cyber Mission Force. Plans are in place to
provide individuals with requisite training utilizing existing DOD
training courses. The remaining two-thirds of the planned force is
being identified, trained and positioned in FY14-FY16. The service
burden conforms to a standard 30-30-30-10 (personnel percentage from
each service) model for Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps
respectively. I am fully engaged with Commander U.S. Cyber Command to
shape and advocate for the cyber professionals the nation needs to
defend and operate in cyberspace. [See page 36.]
?
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
March 5, 2013
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MCKEON
Mr. McKeon. I understand that the Air Force is in the process of
conducting an analysis of alternatives for the next generation Defense
Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP). Additionally, a recent GAO
report on government risk highlights various capability gaps in
environmental satellite data that could lead to inaccurate future
weather forecasting. What is the Air Force doing to mitigate risk, and
has the Air Force considered purchasing commercial data from American
companies as a potential solution?
General Kehler. Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) will complete an
Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) in the summer of 2013. The AOA will
determine if and when a replacement for DMSP is required and identify
alternatives to support continued mission success. To mitigate risk, we
recently provided direction to reduce the DMSP constellation to a
single orbit allowing the DOD to launch a replacement ``on need'' and
potentially extend coverage through the 2025 timeframe. There are
currently no commercial providers for satellite weather data; however
the AOA is considering a proposal by a commercial company that could be
the provider of weather data. The AOA includes many alternatives which
will be assessed for cost, risk and operational utility.
Mr. McKeon. How do you assess national intelligence support to
STRATCOM? Please specifically discuss support from the Defense
Intelligence Agency, the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, the
National Security Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, as well
as the rest of the Intelligence Community. Do you have any
recommendations to improve support provided by these agencies?
General Kehler. In general, the Intelligence Community (IC)
provides excellent support to USSTRATCOM:
The Office of the Director of National Intelligence
(ODNI) provides a senior representative to USSTRATCOM who coordinates
and aligns IC support with my highest priorities.
DIA provides high-quality, finished all-source
intelligence reporting and strategic assessments; collection management
support and advocacy; and the foundational intelligence and data
necessary to meet our strategic warning and targeting needs. However, I
am concerned that my rapidly expanding requirement to understand
adversary decision calculus combined with planned DIA reductions could
impact DIA's ability to meet USSTRATCOM's needs.
NGA provides excellent imagery intelligence analysis and
imagery systems support. An NGA Support Team (NST) provides critical
analysis in support of my missions and is fully integrated within my
Joint Intelligence Operations Center (JIOC). This arrangement has
become the model for imbedded national agency support.
NSA provides direct and reach-back support by embedding
signals intelligence experts within the JIOC, and NSA's integration
with USCYBERCOM remains essential for execution of the cyber mission.
NSA's reporting and analysis has been somewhat degraded by resource
reductions, but remains satisfactory overall.
NRO maintains a liaison office at USSTRATCOM and provides
critical support to my space mission.
Because budget reductions are being addressed independently by each
Agency, I am concerned that unless the cuts are coordinated within the
IC, the aggregate effect could introduce additional risk to IC support
of Combatant Command missions.
Mr. McKeon. How does the Joint Forces Component Command for ISR
prioritize and determine ISR allocation to Combatant Commands? What are
the challenges associated with such allocation determinations?
General Kehler. JFCC ISR, through the Global Force Management (GFM)
process, uses the Guidance for the Employment of the Force (GEF), and
more specifically the Force Allocation Decision Model (FADM), to inform
prioritization and allocation recommendations. The FADM lays out
prioritized categories for specific missions and target areas across
the geographic Combatant Commands (CCMDs). However, when developing
allocation plans and recommendations for Secretary of Defense approval,
JFCC ISR does not only recommend ISR capabilities according to the
FADM. Instead, to the degree possible, JFCC ISR accounts for the
marginal intelligence gain or loss in each GEF Category and distributes
ISR capabilities across the categories to better support current
operations and hedge against mid-term and long-term threats.
The challenge associated with ISR force allocation is that the
process is not all science. There is an art to quantifying and/or
qualifying intangible (yet invaluable) concepts such as intelligence
gain and operational risk.
Mr. McKeon. The committee understands that U.S. Pacific Command is
currently undergoing a manpower study to review its size and structure
as part of DOD's shift to the Asia-Pacific region.
a. Do you anticipate making any changes to its size and structure
of PACOM headquarters?
b. Can you provide details of any potential areas of concern for
the command in terms of staffing? For example, do you anticipate any
growth or shifts of personnel within the J-code structure in PACOM?
c. We understand that PACOM has more than one-fifth of its
authorized headquarters staff in the commander's staff, the J0. What
functions do these staff perform versus the other staff in the plans,
logistics, and other directorates? How do you avoid overlap or
duplication of effort?
Admiral Locklear. a. Yes. HQ USPACOM recently underwent a manpower
study to validate our rebalance manpower requirements. The study was
led by the U.S. Army Force Management Support Agency and contained
representatives from all Services. The team conducted a comprehensive
review of all the HQ missions, billets, as well as organizational
structures, and validated 152 new or realigned manpower requirements
(90 mil/62 civs). These are needed to ``rebuild readiness areas that
were deemphasized over the past decade'' and ``expand our networks of
cooperation with emerging partners'' as directed in the President's
``Rebalance'' strategy, documented in Sustaining Global Leadership:
Priorities for 21st Century Defense, January 2012. The manpower study
will serve as the documentation to support the USPACOM rebalance
manpower request that will be submitted to the Joint Staff's Joint
Manpower Validation Process (JMVP).
b. Potential areas of concern highlighted by our recent manpower
analysis include insufficient staffing levels in the areas of
Targeting, Space Operations, Ballistic Missile Defense, Air Defense,
Global Force Management, Cyber Operations, Planners (Operations,
Strategic, Engineering, Logistics), and more. USPACOM is executing
internal shifts to address our priority requirements. However, we
anticipate growth within the J-code structure to meet expanding mission
requirements and to reduce capability gaps. We will request the
manpower growth required to reduce these gaps and mitigate risk through
the JMVP.
c. The J00 (Commander) personal staff consists of 18 manpower
billets that provide direct support to the commander. In addition,
within the J0 Staff are the Deputy Commander, Chief of Staff, Surgeon,
Headquarters Commandant and their supporting staffs. Other headquarters
staff elements, such as protocol, legal, and public affairs provide
administrative and advisory support to the entire headquarters staff.
These functions are common amongst all Combatant Command (COCOM) and
Service component headquarters staffs. The recently-conducted manpower
review of headquarters staff analyzed overlap and duplication of effort
and resulted in subsequent staff realignments. One result of this
analysis was the reallocation of 14 billets into J3, J5, and J6 in
March 2013.
Mr. McKeon. The committee understands that PACOM also has over
1,200 personnel authorized to support subordinate unified commands in
South Korea, Alaska, and Japan as well as more than 1,400 in direct
reporting units such as a drug task force and missing person's office.
a. How does the command manage and oversee personnel within the
subordinate unified commands and direct reporting units to ensure that
resources are being efficiently allocated and that there is no
unnecessary overlap in functions?
b. Are some or all of these subordinate unified commands and direct
reporting units part of the ongoing manpower reviews?
c. What changes, if any, do you anticipate in their size and
structure?
Admiral Locklear. In fiscal year 2013, USPACOM is authorized 3,518
active duty military and civilian positions. A total of 686 positions
support subordinate unified commands; US Forces Korea (468), US Alaskan
Command (66), US Forces Japan (152). Direct reporting units account for
2,075 positions including: Joint Interagency Task Force-West (108),
Joint Prisoners of War Accounting Command (JPAC) (631), Defense
Intelligence Agency (837), Special Operation Command Pacific/Korea
(336), Security Cooperation Organization (151), Center of Excellence
(10), and USPACOM Rep Guam (2). The remaining 757 billets support
Headquarters PACOM.
a. Over the past five years, USPACOM conducted multiple studies of
the headquarters, subordinate unified commands and direct reporting
units to ensure that resources are efficiently allocated and contained
minimal overlap in functions. In 2007, USPACOM conducted a COCOM
headquarters baseline review, led by Deputy Secretary of Defense. In
2010, PACOM conducted a zero-based manpower review of the headquarters,
subordinate unified commands, and direct reporting units in response to
the Secretary of Defense's 2010 efficiency initiative. We also
conducted in-depth analysis looking at the feasibility of
disestablishing the U.S. Alaskan Command and assessing the alignment of
the Joint Interagency Task Force-West with Special Operations Command
Pacific. In addition to multiple manpower reviews, U.S. Pacific Command
Instruction S3020.2L, Command Relationships in the U.S. Pacific
Command, defines the command relationships between Commander USPACOM
and subordinate commanders and between the commanders and established
coordinating authorities. Given the governing guidance and recent
studies conducted over the last five years, USPACOM believes existing
resources are appropriately allocated and there is minimal overlap in
functions. The most recent headquarters manpower study actually
highlighted a significant shortfall in manpower resourcing needed to
address high risk levels and capability gaps in the following areas:
Targeting; Cyber (Security, Analysts, Plans); Space Operations;
Ballistic Missile Defense; Air Defense; Global Force Management; Joint
Operations Center; Financial Controls; Foreign Disclosure Officers;
Assessments; Medical Plans and Operations; Munitions Safety; POL
Management; Senior Leader engagement; Inter-Agency coordination; and
others. PACOM's participation in the Joint Manpower Validation Process
(JMVP) provides the Joint Staff and OSD with an excellent opportunity
to help this HQ mitigate the risk associated with these capability
gaps.
b. While the commands were not included in the most recent
headquarters study, each has either completed or is currently
conducting individual command manpower reviews.
c. We anticipate programmatic manpower increases in the theater
special operations command and JPAC (to support the requirements of the
2010 National Defense Authorization Act). We also anticipate structural
changes in U.S. Forces Japan and U.S. Forces Korea.
Mr. McKeon. The committee understands that the service component
commands supporting PACOM had about 2,500 authorized personnel in 2012,
and the theater special operations command had 250 authorized
personnel. How do you anticipate the rebalance towards the Pacific
region will impact the size and structure of the service component
commands and theater special operations command? Do you anticipate that
they will need to get larger or need to make other structural changes?
Admiral Locklear. In FY13, the service component commands
supporting USPACOM were authorized 2,871 military and civilian
positions in their headquarters staffs. This includes Pacific Fleet
(638), U.S. Army Pacific (977), Pacific Air Forces (725), and Marine
Forces Pacific (531). Special Operations Command Pacific/Korea, which
is currently a USPACOM sub-unified command, is authorized 336 military
and civilian positions. We anticipate that a balance of both growth and
organizational structure changes will be required for the service
component commands and the theater special operations command to
effectively meet the January 2012 strategic guidance for the Department
of Defense to rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region.
Mr. McKeon. What other changes are needed to improve ``intelligence
mission management'' for PACOM?
Admiral Locklear. PACOM needs:
(1) A doctrinal foundation for the Intelligence Mission Management
concept
(2) Professionalization of the Intelligence, Surveillance,
Reconnaissance (ISR) and Collection Management career fields at the
service and Department of Defense agency levels
(3) Better ISR visualization and planning tools
(4) Advanced Information Technology (IT) development to refine
command and control of ISR
Mr. McKeon. What role do area weapons, and particularly the Sensor-
Fused Weapon (SFW), have in operational plans for the Pacific Command?
Admiral Locklear. In a Korea contingency, the North Korean military
possesses a large and capable military that includes significant ground
conventional armor, mechanized and light capability. Given this
capability, current operational plans evaluate and address the threat
posed to U.S. and allied forces. Sensor-Fused Weapons are one of the
key munitions considered in countering or reducing the threat, while
lowering the risk of collateral damage.
Mr. McKeon. Are area weapons seen as essential in defending the ROK
should deterrence fail?
Admiral Locklear. Area weapons remain a significant and essential
aspect to defending the ROK. The proximity of a large and capable North
Korean military with significant ground conventional armor, mechanized
and light capability highlight the need for area weapons. Without area
weapon options, the level of operational risk and the threat to ROK and
U.S. forces and the civilian population dramatically increases.
Mr. McKeon. What type of consequences would you foresee if U.S.
forces could rely only on unitary systems to defend against a North
Korean armored attack? What costs in terms of protecting friendly
forces, materiel and dollars would be incurred?
Admiral Locklear. Based upon a formidable North Korean threat with
the capability to conduct short to no notice conventional and
asymmetric attacks, U.S. reliance strictly on unitary systems will
increase operational risk to the U.S. and the Alliance. This
restriction would delay the U.S. and Alliance ability to swiftly defeat
North Korean aggression, likely increase the number of military and
civilian casualties, and increase the overall materiel and dollar cost
to prosecute a Korean contingency.
Mr. McKeon. What efforts have been undertaken and are anticipated
to remove by 2018 munitions available to the Pacific Command that are
prohibited by the 2008 Policy on Cluster Munitions and Unintended Harm
to Civilians?
Admiral Locklear. USPACOM components have removed approximately
260,000 rounds of cluster munitions from Korea since 2009 using planned
surface ship retrograde missions and opportune lift, as available.
Retrograde of cluster munitions is managed by the services with USPACOM
service components reporting annually on their progress to-date towards
meeting the reduction milestones mandated by the 2008 policy on cluster
munitions. The component projections are tied to the assumption that
funding for transportation and demilitarization are not significantly
reduced.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN
Mr. Langevin. General, please discuss the risks and cost savings
associated with any further slippage in the schedule for the Ohio-class
submarine replacement. Will the Navy be able to fulfill STRATCOM's
continuous at sea deterrence requirements in future years at the
current schedule, and what is the effect if these replacement
submarines are further delayed?
General Kehler. The Ohio-class submarines will be the oldest class
of submarine the U.S. has ever operated assuming they begin to retire
in 2027, and it is my understanding that the Navy's current assessment
is that they cannot be life-extended further. The Ohio Replacement SSBN
is being delivered ``just in time'' to prevent a critical strategic
deterrent capability gap and additional schedule slips would lead to a
situation where current U.S. strategic deterrence requirements will not
be met. It is also my understanding that delays could have negative
impacts on the United Kingdom's efforts to recapitalize their ballistic
missile submarine fleet.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LARSEN
Mr. Larsen. As the military's strategic pivot to the Pacific
continues, I would like you to comment on the importance of airborne
electronic attack (AEA). As our adversaries evolve their own
capabilities--and even use rudimentary technology--to try to overcome
our nation's superior weapons platforms, it seems absolutely critical
that we control the electro-magnetic spectrum. From your perspective as
the Strategic Commander, could you talk about the importance of
expeditionary AEA in the context of your ability to conduct operations?
General Kehler. Airborne Electronic Attack (AEA) is a key enabler
at the initiation of hostilities, and critical to Joint Force freedom
of action in any Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) environment. As the
Joint Force advocate for Electronic Warfare, I am focused on retaining
adequate AEA capacity and capability to ensure our success in conflict
now and in the future. We must continue to press for the latest
capabilities to ensure U.S. AEA capabilities remain ahead of our
adversaries while retaining current capabilities within the confines of
a resource limited environment. Additional investment in AEA capability
and capacity will help provide the operational flexibility,
responsiveness, and persistence required by the Joint Force to ensure
future mission success.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS
Mr. Rogers. There are various efforts in the Department, namely Air
Force, Army, and DARPA, to provide rapid low cost launch solutions. How
do you foresee this type of capability being used by the warfighter? In
light of increasing foreign threats to our space systems, how important
is it that we prioritize these efforts?
General Kehler. Rapid launch and low-cost launch are two very
different considerations, and should be addressed separately. The
priority for efforts to develop low-cost launch is very high, while the
priority of effort for rapid launch development is significantly lower.
Reducing launch costs benefits the entire space enterprise and
would positively impact all users--military, civil and commercial. For
DOD in particular, low-cost launch would help the business case for
initiatives ranging from science and technology demonstrations to
emerging operational concepts like cube/nanosats or disaggregated space
architectures. In an era of fiscal austerity, reducing launch costs
while maintaining high assurance is a top priority.
Rapid space launch on the other hand requires a launch-ready
payload--essentially developing, building and then storing satellites
for future use. Historically, the costs on the payload side of the
equation are too prohibitive regardless of launch costs or
responsiveness. Therefore, to operate in this increasingly contested
domain we are pursuing other approaches to protect/preserve our
capabilities while on orbit.
Mr. Rogers. There have been major advances in Overhead Persistent
Infrared with the launch of the Space-Based Infrared System. Are we
leveraging this capability to the fullest extent for missile defense?
What challenges and opportunities are ahead?
General Kehler. We are in continuous dialogue with the Missile
Defense Agency (MDA) to exploit every operational advantage from our
on-orbit systems. MDA has a plan to improve utilization of Overhead
Persistent Infrared capabilities as they become available and the
system matures. One challenge is the constrained fiscal environment we
are in and the uncertainty surrounding the budget.
Mr. Rogers. In your statement for the record, you outlined the
competing forces on limited electromagnetic spectrum, which
``potentially pits economics against national security needs.'' What
are the warfighter's operational demands on electromagnetic spectrum?
Based on past experiences with spectrum relocations, what would be the
operational demands on the force if another round of relocations was
called for? Further, based on the recommendations from the report by
the President's Council of Advisers on Science and Technology titled
``Realizing the Full Potential of Government-Held Spectrum to Spur
Economic Growth,'' has STRATCOM assessed spectrum sharing as a feasible
option in some instances?
General Kehler. The electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) is a critical
enabler of our nation's defense capabilities--not a single military
mission is executed without direct or indirect reliance on the EMS. Our
military relies on access and control of the EMS to successfully
perform operational tasks ranging from precision guidance of advanced
weapons to global Command, Control, and Communications (C3). At home,
our forces must have the spectrum access required to test and train for
employment of the capabilities integral to these operations. As the
Joint Force advocate for spectrum matters, USSTRATCOM takes into
consideration the potential adverse impacts of domestic spectrum
reallocations on current and future military operations. The USSTRATCOM
Joint Electronic Magnetic Spectrum Operations (JEMSO) Office works with
the Joint Staff, DOD Chief Information Officer, and support agencies to
review the feasibility of, and advocate for military spectrum
requirements in potential reallocation or sharing scenarios.
Mr. Rogers. During your testimony, you responded to Mr. Bishop that
``if we're going to go beyond the New START levels of 1,550 then I
think that should be bilateral.'' Can you please elaborate as to
whether you think such reductions should be both ``bilateral'' and
verifiable?
General Kehler. Yes, I believe such reductions should be bilateral
and verifiable. Bilateral reductions ensure stability and, when
combined with verification provisions, guarantee both nations are
adhering to the agreement.
Mr. Rogers. In responding to Mr. Bishop, you stated some
uncertainty about the Moscow Treaty, which was ratified by the Senate.
Specifically, is it your understanding, as stated in the treaty's
article-by-article summary, that the Moscow Treaty relied on the
verification mechanisms in place under the START I agreement, at least
until that agreement expired in 2009?
General Kehler. The Moscow Treaty depended on the START Treaty's
comprehensive verification regime to provide the foundation for
confidence, transparency, and predictability. Without the START Treaty
in force, the Moscow Treaty alone did not contain any measures to
provide such confidence, transparency, and predictability.
Mr. Rogers. Do you know of any rigorous analysis that would support
the recommendations of several reports such as the Global Zero U.S.
Nuclear Policy Commission Report, which advocate dramatic reductions in
our strategic force numbers? To your knowledge, did the authors of that
specific report interview you or any members of our strategic deterrent
force leadership in the process of drafting their report? Do you
believe in an underlying premise of that report that ``Security is
mainly a state of mind, not a physical condition''?
General Kehler. I am not aware of any rigorous analysis conducted
within USSTRATCOM or the Department of Defense as a whole regarding the
Global Zero or other non-DOD report. The Global Zero report authors did
not interview me nor, to my knowledge, interview members of my staff. I
do support critical review and examination of these key issues. I do
not believe ``security is mainly a state of mind.'' Rather, I believe
national security is better characterized as both a physical condition
and the perceptions that exist about those conditions.
Mr. Rogers. Are you concerned that our present nuclear arms control
agreements do not encompass tactical nuclear weapons and isn't that
asymmetry in our respective stockpiles a matter of concern? Am I
correct that the Russian Federation could arm an Akula sub, or other
sub, like the new Yasen class, with a cruise missile and it could be a
threat to the U.S.? Am I correct that these types of weapons are not
presently limited by any arms control regime? What level of these
forces is destabilizing and a threat to the U.S.? Are you concerned
that further reductions could undermine the credibility of our extended
deterrence commitments to our allies and have the perverse effect of
promoting proliferation amongst our allies?
General Kehler. I agree with the findings of the Nuclear Posture
Review that strict numerical parity with the Russian Federation is no
longer as compelling as it was in the Cold War but large disparities
may not be conducive to maintaining stability. Further, I agree that
future reductions should include all nuclear weapons. Yes, sea launched
cruise missiles could threaten the United States, and sea launched
cruise missiles are not currently limited by any treaty. Given the
existing U.S. and Russian Federation force levels and postures, I'm not
concerned about stability issues. As discussed in the NPR, I believe
any further reductions must continue to strengthen deterrence of
potential regional adversaries, strategic stability vis-a-vis Russia
and China, and assurance of our allies and partners.
Mr. Rogers. Would you advocate any significant changes in our
present doctrine of flexible response?
General Kehler. I would not classify our present doctrine as
``flexible response'' as this term is often historically used with
President Kennedy's and President Johnson's administrations. More
generally, I believe there are adjustments that can be made in our
strategy to more properly align it with the current geopolitical
environment.
Mr. Rogers. What is Plan B if we can't do pit reuse now that we
have postponed CMRR-NF? If you need a certain number of pits per year
with reuse, how many do you need without it? Do you agree with the Navy
and the Nuclear Weapons Council that we need an ``off ramp'' for the
Navy and the W88 warhead if an Interoperable Warhead doesn't prove
technically feasible or affordable?
General Kehler. The Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) recently approved
a long term stockpile modernization strategy that includes a number of
decision points and ``off ramps'' to address warhead life extension
technical and affordability risks. NNSA has developed an interim
plutonium production capability plan to support near term warhead life
extension programs and they are continuing to develop an enduring
plutonium pit production strategy. Elements of this plan will be
included in the pit production requirements report required by the
Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense Authorization Act.
Mr. Rogers. Two weeks ago, at the House Energy and Water
Appropriations subcommittee hearing on the FY14 budget, Chairman
Frelinghuysen asked Don Cook, the Deputy Administrator for Defense
Programs, if further reductions in the U.S. stockpile would save money
in the annual budget. Dr. Cook's response was, ``I'd answer the
question directly by saying not much . . . So not much savings will be
achieved.'' Do you agree with Dr. Cook? With any further reductions,
should we expect cost savings directly proportional to the size of the
cuts in the force structure or stockpile?
General Kehler. I agree with Dr. Cook's assessment. While over the
long term, a smaller force structure and stockpile would require fewer
resources, cost savings are not directly proportional to reductions.
Regardless of the force structure or stockpile size, there is a certain
level of fixed costs associated with maintaining a safe, secure, and
effective nuclear deterrent capability.
Mr. Rogers. We hear that we could save $120B over ten years by
implementing the Global Zero report, which calls for postponing the
next generation bomber and Ohio-replacement and immediately eliminating
the ICBM land-based leg of our deterrent, not building CMRR-NF or UPF,
and reducing the U.S. stockpile to a total of 900 warheads, with only
450 deployed. Do you support that plan? Please explain why or why not?
General Kehler. No, I do not support the illustrative changes to
our force structure, posture and supporting infrastructure in the
Global Zero report. These illustrative changes are not consistent with
the current security environment.
Mr. Rogers. What are your concerns about the Global Zero
recommendation that the U.S. take steps to ensure a 48 hour to 72 hour
delay in responding to nuclear attack on the United States? Do you
believe the President of the United States should have his hands tied
in that way?
General Kehler. In today's security environment, I do not support
the introduction of a delay in response timelines. Introducing
mandatory delays in response time can be destabilizing for two primary
reasons: such a delay is largely unverifiable, and early moves to
reposture in a crisis could be interpreted as threatening or
immediately escalatory.
Mr. Rogers. It is now March 2013, we have to implement the New
START by February 2018. How soon do we need to start implementing that
treaty? Some suggest we should go to New START levels now and not wait
until 2017/18. Is it as easy as that? Can we just implement New START
tomorrow?
General Kehler. We began implementing the New START as soon as it
entered into force in February 2011. Early treaty implementation
activities included exchanging strategic databases with the Russians,
conducting bomber and submarine exhibitions, and viewing a Russian
exhibition of a new, mobile ICBM. The process of adjusting U.S. nuclear
force levels in an efficient manner involves an intricate series of
activities that will take a number of years. We completed the
conversion of B-1B bombers to non-nuclear capability and continue to
eliminate mothballed B-52G bombers. In the coming years, we will
eliminate unused Peacekeeper and Minuteman ICBM silos, reduce the
number of warheads carried aboard ballistic missile submarines, de-MIRV
ICBMs, and convert additional B-52H bombers to a non-nuclear role.
USSTRATCOM is overseeing the New START implementation plan and we are
confident that we will meet our obligations within the prescribed
timeframe.
Mr. Rogers. At present, there is no LRSO warhead LEP in the
production schedule at NNSA. When will we see an LRSO warhead in the
production queue at NNSA? Will it follow the W76, B61 and W78? Will it
be slipped in somewhere? To what extent is NNSA's ability to execute
all of these life extension programs a concern to you?
General Kehler. The NWC-approved stockpile modernization strategy
aligns NNSA's workload with DOD platform development and acquisition
schedules, including LRSO warhead production which currently follows
the B61 LEP. A primary consideration in this plan is the ability of
NNSA to execute multiple warhead life extension and sustainment
programs in an efficient and affordable manner. With adequate,
sustained funding, the risk to accomplish these life extension programs
is manageable.
Mr. Rogers. In the past several years, DOD has transferred billions
of dollars in budgetary authority to NNSA to pay for DOD's top
priorities in NNSA's programs. Did you support these funds transfers to
DOE to help provide the resources for nuclear deterrent modernization
programs? Can you say what DOE did with that Department of Defense
money? Are you satisfied with DOD's ability to understand where and how
DOE/NNSA is spending that money?
General Kehler. Following the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, DOD
agreed that NNSA required additional funding to support nuclear weapon
stockpile and Naval Reactors activities. I support that decision and
the subsequent transfer of DOD funds for weapon surveillance,
maintenance, and life extension activities. Over the past year, the
Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) worked closely with NNSA to develop and
approve an executable, long term stockpile management strategy which
increased our awareness of how DOD funds are being applied to sustain
our Nation's strategic deterrent capabilities. Increased NWC visibility
into NNSA's financial process to include DOD certification of NNSA's
budget, have been positive changes. We will continue working with NNSA
to ensure our nuclear deterrent remains safe, secure and effective.
Mr. Rogers. In your response to Mr. Turner, you said that while you
believe the NNSA's most recent plan for plutonium capabilities now
``does close, it's not without risk''. Would you please elaborate on
those risks? Are you confident that NNSA can execute this plan, if
provided the resources to do so? Do you believe the interim plutonium
strategy has sufficient detail for you to be comfortable with it and
NNSA's ability to carry it out? Do you believe the long-term plutonium
strategy NNSA prefers--the modular approach to replacing plutonium
capabilities--has sufficient detail for you to be comfortable with it
and NNSA's ability to carry it out?
General Kehler. While every program can experience technical and
production risks, an uncertain fiscal environment remains my primary
concern in sustaining a safe, secure and effective nuclear deterrent.
NNSA has identified the necessary resources for an interim plutonium
production plan using existing facilities that will meet our near-term
weapon life extension requirements. A modular approach to develop an
enduring plutonium production capability seems reasonable, but I do not
have sufficient details to render an opinion. I will continue to work
with NNSA on the long-term plutonium strategy until I have sufficient
detail to certify the concept and associated budget.
Mr. Rogers. You mentioned in your response to Mr. Turner that a
responsive production infrastructure is ``one consideration'' for
whether or not we can reduce our hedge stockpile--but that you ``don't
think that's the only consideration.'' Would you please elaborate on
these considerations, as well as how the need for a responsive
infrastructure is linked to potential reductions in our hedge
stockpile?
General Kehler. Historically, the U.S. retained a non-deployed
stockpile of weapons to manage risk against technical problems and
geopolitical uncertainty. Recapitalizing or replacing our aging
plutonium and uranium production facilities could enable us to reduce
the non-deployed stockpile as we demonstrate the capability to address
these risks in a timely fashion. Other considerations that determine
the size of the non-deployed stockpile and production infrastructure
capabilities include: National policy and strategy objectives;
geopolitical conditions; arms control agreements; force composition and
condition of our delivery systems; warhead and component aging; and the
need for improved safety and security.
Mr. Rogers. At what force size does the ICBM force become
unsustainable from a personnel standpoint? Would reductions in the size
of the ICBM force below a certain level hinder the Air Force's ability
to attract and retain skilled officers and enlisted personnel to the
missile force? What impacts might de-alerting the ICBM force have on
personnel, morale, and the ability to attract and retain skilled
officers and enlisted personnel to the missile force?
General Kehler. The 2010 NPR concluded that the current alert
posture of U.S. strategic forces, including nearly all ICBMs on alert,
should be maintained. It is premature to speculate on further
reductions to the ICBM force or the broader impact of potential force
changes on the ICBM enterprise. As we reduce the size of the nuclear
force to meet our New START obligations, we will work with the Services
to ensure we attract and retain the skilled Airmen and Sailors we need
for this important mission.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. JOHNSON
Mr. Johnson. I am concerned about news reports indicating
discussion of a U.S. nuclear presence in South Korea. What are the
risks involved with the redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons to the
peninsula?
Admiral Locklear. The U.S.-ROK Alliance is prepared to deter, and
if necessary, defeat aggression from the North without the need for
nuclear weapons stationed or positioned in South Korea.
It is my judgement, and the judgement of the Commander of U.S.
Forces Korea, that the addition of nuclear weapons to Korea is
unnecessary. If required to do so, the U.S. has the ability to deliver
nuclear weapons without basing them in Korea. Further, we have robust
conventional capabilities that can be immediately employed in
deterrence.
The deployment of nuclear weapons, in addition to being militarily
unnecessary, could appear to conflict with broader U.S. non-
proliferation and denuclearization efforts, providing propaganda
opportunities for North Korea and other critics.
We have been assured by ROK military and political leaders that
there is no serious consideration by the new ROK government of
demanding the re-introduction of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons or
pursuing an indigenous program.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WITTMAN
Mr. Wittman. What is the Joint Warfare Analysis Center's (JWAC's)
Budget Requirement?
Does USSTRATCOM have a $30M deficiency and is a minimum of $4M of
this associated with JWAC?
Will the $4M shortfall at JWAC impact manpower and civilian pay?
What steps is STRATCOM taking to work with the USAF to ensure an
ATR is in place to address the deficiency at JWAC?
General Kehler.
-- FY13 PB includes $77M for JWAC Operations and Maintenance (O&M).
-- H.R.933 reduces the USSTRATCOM O&M PB request by $88M. The H.R.
933 reduction combined with Sequestration; place USSTRATCOM at high
risk of a significant FY13 O&M deficiency. The exact level of
deficiency is unknown pending release of Command FY13 funding.
-- Included within the $88M reduction is a negative $12M mark
citing ``Civilian pay inconsistency for Joint Forces command
restructure''. Per conversation with HAC and SAC Professional Staff
Members, this mark is directly related to the transfer of JWAC civilian
pay from USJFCOM to USSTRATCOM. While JWAC civilian pay was reduced by
30% from the FY12 level to account for a reduction in force, the
request included in the PB is the appropriate amount required to
maintain the revised/authorized FY13 workforce level. To that end, the
Appropriation Bill underfunds JWAC civilian pay account by $12M. The
deficiency in JWAC civilian pay coupled with general reductions to
USSTRATCOM O&M accounts and Sequestration directly impacts funding
available for JWAC.
-- After considering mitigation measures available internally
within USSTRATCOM, we currently estimate there is a minimum $4M
shortfall in JWAC O&M account for FY13.
-- USSTRATCOM is engaged with USAF to address the O&M shortfalls
and is confident civilian pay will be satisfactorily addressed either
through below threshold reprogramming (BTR) or above threshold
reprogramming (ATR) action. USSTRATCOM is also working with USAF and
OSD to address remaining high priority O&M shortfalls, to include JWAC,
through ATR.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SHEA-PORTER
Ms. Shea-Porter. I agree with President Obama that, ``Now is the
time to reach a level of research and development not seen since the
height of the space race.'' I'm concerned that Federal funding for R&D
has been shrinking as a percentage of our GDP, and with sequestration
and current trends continuing, that we may not only lose our leadership
position but be unable to meet global challenges. What do you see as
the most significant challenges where our research and development
investments could help in PACOM's AOR?
General Kehler and Admiral Locklear. With respect to the challenges
we face in the Indo-Asia-Pacific, USPACOM develops the Integrated
Priority List to define what we believe are our most significant
challenges in the theater. These are binned into five broad categories
and provided to the joint staff and the Secretary of Defense to help us
address these problems. Broadly, our biggest concerns are: 1) Command
and control, Cyber Defense, Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance, 2) mitigation of Anti-Access, Area Denial capabilities,
3) potential shortages in critical munitions, 4) detection,
identification, tracking and engaging both submarines and unmanned
underwater systems and 5) improvements in our logistics support
capabilities.
Ms. Shea-Porter. You say in your testimony that ``China's rapid
development of advanced military capabilities, combined with its
unclear intentions, certainly raises strategic and security concerns.''
What are the implications of China's military modernization for PACOM's
posture?
Admiral Locklear. China is continuing to pursue its long-standing
policy of military modernization. This is the natural impulse of any
nation enjoying a period of growth and prosperity. We do not view PRC's
military modernization by itself as a concern, but we do have concern
about the lack of transparency of Chinese intentions and a lack of
clarity of PRC willingness to use military force to resolve disputes in
the region. For example, China's comprehensive network of excessive
maritime claims coupled with its military modernization program has
created anxiety among its neighbors and other maritime nations. Through
expanded engagement with the People's Liberation Army, USPACOM seeks to
increase the level of transparency of PRC intentions underlying this
military modernization policy and message them directly on our concerns
as well as those of the region. Additionally, through military
readiness, we will remain ready to undertake operations across the full
spectrum of military activities in support of regional security and
stability. A consistent U.S. presence in the region serves to reassure
partners and allies of continued U.S. commitment to the region.
Ms. Shea-Porter. The Department's strategic guidance calls for
cooperative partnerships to bolster common interests in the region.
What are some examples of the kinds of innovative partnerships that
PACOM can assist in developing?
Admiral Locklear. Strengthening partnerships with allies, partners,
and other organizations and agencies is a central pillar of the USPACOM
five-year Theater Campaign Plan for peacetime activities. In ballistic
missile defense (BMD), we are working with Japan and Republic of Korea
to integrate sense, warn, and interdiction capabilities. We are also
coordinating efforts with these allies in shared maritime, space, and
cyberspace domains to strengthen the situational awareness and
capabilities of partners like the Philippines and Vietnam. These
activities address shared threats and advance common interests across
the region. USPACOM is also reaching out to China, welcoming their
participation in the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) multilateral exercise
in 2014.
In addition to expanding relationships with allies and partners,
USPACOM works with regional organizations such as the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) through the ASEAN Regional Forum and
ASEAN Defense Minister's Meeting-Plus. Through these organizations, we
build collaborative approaches to challenges ranging from maritime
domain awareness to counter-terrorism and non-proliferation. For
example, with our co-chair Indonesia, we are preparing to conduct the
inaugural Counterterrorism Exercise (CTX) of the ASEAN Defense
Ministers' Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) Experts Working Group (EWG) on
Counterterrorism in 2013.
Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HA/DR) activities
provide a particularly important way to establish foundational
relationships that can lead to greater opportunities for partnership in
the future. An innovative example of this type of humanitarian
assistance is PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP, an annual deployment of personnel
from the U.S. military, host nations, partner nations, and non-
governmental organizations that provide humanitarian, medical, dental,
and environmental assistance to countries in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. In
2012, PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP included twelve participating nations, four
host nations, and 23 NGOs. Participants treated over 49,000 patients,
7,000 animals and performed 104 community service projects in Cambodia,
Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. This type of cooperation
strengthens host nation resiliency while building USPACOM's and other
countries and organizations' capability to respond effectively to
natural disasters and humanitarian crises.
Ms. Shea-Porter. In your testimony, you say that China ``questions
the sustainability of the rebalance, pointing to sequestration and
other looming fiscal issues.'' Are other Pacific nations also beginning
to question our commitment to the Pacific region? Has the seemingly
endless dispute over sequestration and the budget made us seem weaker
and increased our strategic risk in the Pacific?
Admiral Locklear. It is fair to say that the regional audience is
closely watching the political process in Washington, D.C. and they
have voiced concerns to me personally over potential impacts to the
theater.
Ms. Shea-Porter. You say, as a result of sequestration cuts, that
``Degraded facilities put missions at risk and delayed MILCON projects
endanger the implementation of international agreements.'' This sounds
like a real problem. Can you be more specific?
Admiral Locklear. Sequestration cuts have driven the Services to
cut sustainment funding by approximately 60%, causing facility
sustainment activities not directly related to life, health, and safety
to cease. Thus, projects like replacement or improvements to lighting
and environmental systems and facility repairs are no longer being
performed. Additionally, restoration or modernization projects such as
those required to facilitate mission stationing or beddown decisions,
and facility reduction programs to increase energy efficiency are
unfunded and deferred.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BARBER
Mr. Barber. General Kehler, I understand that the United States has
lost some of its institutional knowledge regarding the manufacture of
rocket motors and that we have been forced to look overseas for help in
the manufacture of the rocket motors we require for certain missiles.
Personally, I see this loss of our ability to produce state of the art
technology and products as a threat to our national security. The
expertise of our industrial base, once lost, is not easily reversed,
and I fear that in a time of fiscal constraint and sequestration for
the Department of Defense, we could lose more experienced
manufacturers. General, what is Strategic Command doing to preserve our
critical industrial base skills and helping to keep them here at home
in America? Do you agree that keeping this institutional knowledge here
in the United States is a matter of national security?
General Kehler. Successful and efficient execution of any future
strategic modernization or development program requires an industrial
base workforce with critical engineering, technical, and program
management skills. Unfortunately, strategic rocket motor demand has
been on a steady decline for the last two decades, placing a heavy
burden on Navy and Air Force resources to keep it viable. Planned
investments across our entire strategic deterrent enterprise offer the
Department and our industrial partners the opportunity to right-size
rocket motor production capacity for the short term while retaining
critical skills for the future. With adequate resources, the ongoing
and planned delivery platform, weapon, and facility upgrade programs
will exercise the unique skills across the industrial base maintaining
this critical capability.
Mr. Barber. Admiral Locklear, in your testmony, you mentioned that
on average over 100 IEDs occur per month in the PACOM area of
operations. This fixture of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars is now being
used in the Southeastern Pacific--in the Philippines, Indonesia, and
Thailand. You also mentioned that PACOM has made progress in building
partner capacity in the region. In 2004, the Department of Defense
began researching methods to defeat the IED threat. This effort led to
the eventual creation of the Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO).
Since its inception, JIEDDO has been on the cutting edge of technology
to find and defeat IEDs. A good deal of JIEDDO's research and testing
has occurred in my home district at the Electronic Proving Grounds at
Fort Huachuca, Arizona. Admiral, my question to you is this, how much
of the hard work and testing that JIEDDO has conducted at places like
the Electronic Proving Ground have we used, and will we use to continue
building our partner capacity with allied nations to find and defeat
IEDs in the Pacific region?
Admiral Locklear. Through a JIEDDO-assigned USPACOM Integrator on
the USPACOM staff and multiple Counter improvised explosive device
Operations Integration Center (COIC) personnel embedded with
subordinate commands, my headquarters and service components leverage
the diverse capabilities of JIEDDO and its proving grounds to attack
the network, defeat the device, train the force and build partnership
capacity in theater. We continue to train our joint force not only to
successfully operate in IED environments in Afghanistan, but in such
places as the Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand. The Asia Pacific
CIED Fusion Center (APCFC), as part of United States Army Pacific
(USARPAC), collaborate with partners in Australia and New Zealand to
improve intelligence sharing and training within the theater, and plans
to conduct training and engagements with over a dozen allied and
partner nations this year. JIEDDO's hard work and testing enable all
these efforts.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BRIDENSTINE
Mr. Bridenstine. Your testimony says that STRATCOM is pursuing
``new processes and relationships'' with other COCOMs to better
synchronize planning and operations. What are examples of these ``new
processes and relationships''? Does this effort include reassessments
of joint operational plans?
General Kehler. The extensive re-write of our operational plans has
the personal attention of our most senior government officials and will
remain my highest priority over the course of this year. We have made
significant progress through our objective-based, systems-based
approach to planning that will ultimately align and synchronize our
plans with those of other Combatant Commands. This unprecedented level
of integration makes certain that when executed, these plans and
operations will function as a single, coherent American campaign.
Although I am very encouraged by the teamwork thus far, meeting our
aggressive timeline for completion will require the continued support
of the entire Command and our external partners.
Mr. Bridenstine. I am always concerned about international bodies
or other nations being able to check our freedom of action in space. Do
you support international ``rules of the road'' governing behavior in
space? If so, wouldn't these rules impact our military freedom of
action?
General Kehler. Many nations share the space domain and it is in
our best interest to create an environment where the sharing of SSA
data facilitates transparency and enhances safety and security. I agree
the time is right for the development of a standard set of norms that
promotes the safe and responsible use of space for all space-faring
nations. I support DOD's proposed norms of behavior approved by the
DepSecDef last July because I believe they are in our National Security
interest and preserve sufficient military freedom of action.
Mr. Bridenstine. Your testimony notes the challenges of spectrum
management. In an increasingly spectrum-hungry world it seems like
these we face tradeoffs between protecting military access to spectrum
and providing spectrum for economic competitiveness. How does STRATCOM
de-conflict spectrum requirements? How does the newly established Joint
Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations Office (JEMSO) contribute to
rational allocation of spectrum to its best uses?
General Kehler. USSTRATCOM's spectrum use and de-confliction
responsibilities are in accordance with national and associated DOD
regulations and policies. The USSTRATCOM JEMSO Office serves as the
lead for electromagnetic spectrum control and management issues. The
JEMSO Office works with partners in the Department of Defense and other
Combatant Commands to assess tradeoffs between civilian and military
demands on the spectrum based on the survivability, availability, and
criticality of military systems. Additionally, USSTRATCOM is the
operational sponsor of the Global Electromagnetic Spectrum Information
System (GEMSIS) which provides increased spectrum situational awareness
to reconcile competing spectrum use.
Mr. Bridenstine. In your testimony, you note the importance of
intelligence support to operations, specifically making `` `all sensed
data' available to our analysts.'' You also stated that you need
``effective command and control over ISR in real-time.'' Do current
authorities not give you effective C2 now? What changes can Congress
make to increase your ability to direct ISR assets?
Admiral Locklear. Current authorities give USPACOM effective
Command and Control (C2) of its assigned forces. C2 of ISR,
specifically, broadens the definition to include working with ISR
capabilities, which are not necessarily ``assigned'' to USPACOM, but
are depended on in order to execute operations. USPACOM relies upon
real time visibility, transparency, and the ability to dialog with
those non-PACOM entities that do control other assets. Congress can
help by continuing to support the development of information technology
solutions that provide transparency with national capabilities and
those of our trusted allies and partners we need.
Mr. Bridenstine. You note that Japan has pledged $3.1 billion to
help relocate our Marines to Hawaii and Guam as part of the Defense
Policy Review Initiative. Please provide a cost breakdown for planned
actions associated with the Realignment Roadmap. As the Roadmap has
changed from its inception, has the U.S. assumed a greater cost sharing
burden? If so, by what justification?
Admiral Locklear. The U.S. cost-sharing burden is decreased under
the new Distributed Laydown Plan (DLP). Preliminary DLP analysis
indicates this plan is less in cost than the original 2006 Defense
Policy Review Initiative (DPRI) to relocate 8,000 Marines to Guam.
The preliminary estimate to execute DLP is $13.7B (FY12 dollars).
The 26 Apr 2012 U.S./Japan ``2+2'' Statement expressed bilateral
commitment to the DLP, which reduces over 9,000 Marines from Okinawa
and relocates 4,700 to Guam, 2,700 to Hawaii and up to 2,500 to
Australia as an expeditionary rotational presence. Japan's commitment
to contribute $3.1B was reconfirmed in the 26 Apr 2012 ``2+2''
Bilateral Statement. The U.S. contribution to complete the plan is
currently $10.6B for a total cost estimate of $13.7B.
A refined budget-level quality cost estimate will occur after the
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) selection of Preferred
Alternatives for Marine cantonment and training range locations on Guam
and Hawaii. The Guam EIS is currently under development and selection
of preferred alternatives is scheduled to occur in June 2013. Master
planning and detailed cost estimates for budget planning will begin
once the preferred alternatives are identified. Hawaii's EIS is not
scheduled to begin until early next decade following the Marine's
establishment of initial operational capability on Guam. Hawaii land
use studies are currently in progress to examine Hawaii Department of
Defense-controlled lands to develop beddown alternatives using existing
infrastructure that will be analyzed in detail in the future Hawaii
EIS. Hawaii land use studies are scheduled to be completed in December
2013.