[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 113-10]
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THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
FEBRUARY 27, 2013
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TONGRESS.#13
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
MAC THORNBERRY, Texas, Chairman
JEFF MILLER, Florida JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
JOHN KLINE, Minnesota SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr.,
RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida Georgia
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona ANDRE CARSON, Indiana
DUNCAN HUNTER, California DANIEL B. MAFFEI, New York
CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York DEREK KILMER, Washington
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
JOSEPH J. HECK, Nevada SCOTT H. PETERS, California
Catherine McElroy, Counsel
Tim McClees, Professional Staff Member
Julie Herbert, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2013
Page
Hearing:
Wednesday, February 27, 2013, The Role of Intelligence in the
Department of Defense.......................................... 1
Appendix:
Wednesday, February 27, 2013..................................... 9
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WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 27, 2013
THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Langevin, Hon. James R., a Representative from Rhode Island,
Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Emerging Threats
and Capabilities............................................... 8
Thornberry, Hon. Mac, a Representative from Texas, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Intelligence, Emerging Threats and Capabilities 1
WITNESSES
Flynn, LTG Michael T., USA, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency 5
Vickers, Dr. Michael G., Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence, U.S. Department of Defense....................... 2
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Vickers, Dr. Michael G., joint with LTG Michael T. Flynn..... 13
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.]
THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
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House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Intelligence, Emerging Threats
and Capabilities,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, February 27, 2013.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 4:05 p.m., in
room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mac Thornberry
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MAC THORNBERRY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, EMERGING THREATS
AND CAPABILITIES
Mr. Thornberry. The subcommittee will come to order. And
let me thank the witnesses and guests for your patience, as we
have had votes that went on longer than expected. The other
administrative note is that Mr. Langevin is on his way and will
be here momentarily. But I want to go ahead and begin the
hearing, and whenever he arrives, before or after, we will give
him the opportunity to make his opening statement.
I want to welcome members, witnesses, and guests to this
hearing on the role of intelligence in the Department of
Defense [DOD]. I suspect our witnesses will agree that the
central role of intelligence is growing rapidly for our
warfighters and for the Nation as a whole in an increasingly
complex, fast-changing world. And as one of our witnesses
testified at our last hearing, today there is no part of the
world that we can ignore. Clause 1(c) of rule X of the House
rules place responsibility on the House Armed Services
Committee for, quote, ``tactical intelligence and intelligence-
related activities of the Department of Defense,'' end quote.
While the overall committee has always followed these
issues closely, Chairman McKeon decided this year that we
should focus more closely on the array of military intelligence
issues. The committee rules now assign this subcommittee with
responsibility for intelligence policy, including coordination
of military intelligence programs, national intelligence
programs, and DOD elements that are part of the Intelligence
Community.
The fact that Mr. Langevin, Chairman Miller, Dr. Heck, and
I also serve on the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence helps ensure that Congress fulfills its
responsibilities to the American people in conducting
independent oversight and in making budgetary decisions on
these crucial programs and agencies.
Having responsibility for military intelligence, science
and technology, special operations, cyber, and counter-weapons
of mass destruction [WMD] helps give this subcommittee a broad
and more integrated picture of many of the most challenging
national security issues facing our Nation. Of course, these
capabilities are some of those that we would undoubtedly rely
upon in meeting some of the threats that arise, but they are
also some of the capabilities that can help identify and
prevent threats before they arise. Having both intelligence
oversight and operational oversight enables us to have a more
complete view of all that faces our warfighters.
Today we want to look at the role intelligence plays in the
Department of Defense. A primary focus for us will always be
whether and how DOD intelligence is meeting the needs of the
warfighters, wherever they are and whatever they may be asked
to do. We also want to examine DOD's current intelligence
requirements, including gaps in our knowledge and capabilities,
integration of intelligence with military planning,
organization and personnel issues, as well as DOD support to
and from the broader Intelligence Community.
We all, on both sides of the river, have our hands full. As
the witnesses note in their written statement, intelligence
budgets are declining even before the across-the-board cuts
known as sequestration begin on Friday. But the world is not
getting any safer. It is not getting any less complex. We have
limited resources, but unlimited problems. That is part of what
makes intelligence so crucial.
More than ever, I think it is essential that the
administration and those in uniform work together with us in
Congress to use our resources as efficiently and as effectively
as possible. And I look forward to working with both of our
distinguished witnesses toward that goal.
At this point, we will turn for the opening statements of
our distinguished witnesses, the Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence [USD(I)], Michael G. Vickers, and the Director of
Defense Intelligence Agency [DIA], Lieutenant General Michael
Flynn. And then, as I say, when Mr. Langevin gets here, we will
have his opening statement.
Dr. Vickers.
STATEMENT OF DR. MICHAEL G. VICKERS, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR INTELLIGENCE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Secretary Vickers. Thank you, Chairman Thornberry and
distinguished members of the committee. General Flynn and I are
pleased to appear before you today to discuss the importance of
intelligence within the Department of Defense.
The unclassified nature of the opening portion of this
hearing precludes us from discussing in detail many aspects of
Defense Intelligence, as well as sharing some of our greatest
successes. We welcome the opportunity to meet in closed session
to fully discuss Defense Intelligence capabilities and
contributions with you.
Before I discuss the importance of Defense Intelligence in
achieving our national security objective, I would like to
review some of our most pressing national security challenges.
First and foremost, we seek nothing less than the strategic
defeat of Al Qaeda--dismantling and defeating core Al Qaeda in
the Pakistan-Afghanistan region, defeating its affiliates on
the Arabian Peninsula, in Iraq and Syria, and in East and North
Africa, and preventing the group from reconstituting.
Second, we must successfully transition our mission in
Afghanistan.
Third, as the Arab world undergoes a historic transition,
we must posture ourselves for the new normal that brings with
it increased instability and violence, and we must accelerate
the transition to a representative government in Syria.
Fourth, we must prevent the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction and associated delivery systems, specifically,
but not exclusively, with regard to Iran and North Korea.
Fifth, we must defend against cyber threats.
Sixth, we must deter and, if necessary, defeat aggression
and ensure our continued access to the global commons and to
critical regions such as East Asia. To be successful in this
effort, we must be able to counter rapidly evolving anti-
access/aerial denial threats.
Seventh, we must ensure that we continue to provide
decisive intelligence and decision advantage to our national
policymakers, and our operators and warfighters, and that we
are postured to prevent strategic surprise.
Finally, we must ensure the continued economic leadership
of the United States. This is the foundation upon which our
long-term national security rests.
At the same time as our intelligence and defense budgets
are declining, the challenges, as you noted, Mr. Chairman, are
increasing and becoming more complex. Intelligence is a major
source of U.S. advantage. It informs wise policy and it enables
precision operations. It is our front line of defense.
The continued war against Al Qaeda and instability in the
Middle East and North Africa requires us to continue to enhance
our counterterrorism capabilities. Our national security
strategy in Asia will require significantly different
investments over the next 15 years in order to obtain the
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities
most appropriate to the unique challenges of ensuring access in
the Pacific.
Likewise, countering cyber threats and nuclear
proliferation requires new resources, as well as new ways of
operating. We are also improving our human intelligence
capability by implementing the Defense Clandestine Service.
Lastly, critical intelligence capability, such as our overhead
and cryptologic architectures, continue to require
modernization and recapitalization. Budgetary instability and
the prospect of further deep cuts put these investments at
risk.
Defense Intelligence is comprised of the DOD organizations,
infrastructures, and measures of intelligence and
counterintelligence components of the Joint Staff, the
combatant commands, the military services, the three combat
support agencies, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National
Security Agency [NSA], and the National Geospatial Intelligence
Agency [NGIA], and the National Reconnaissance Office [NRO]. I
also exercise oversight of the security elements of the
Department of Defense, including the Defense Security Service
[DSS].
Defense Intelligence has just under 60,000 civilians and
123,000 military members supporting our national military
intelligence missions both here at home and alongside our
combat forces worldwide. Defense Intelligence partners at all
levels with our counterparts in the broader Intelligence
Community [IC], including the Director of National Intelligence
[DNI], the Central Intelligence Agency [CIA], Department of
Homeland Security [DHS], Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI],
and numerous other elements.
Under Titles 10 and 50 of the United States Code, the
Secretary of Defense has broad policy and budgetary
responsibility for the intelligence and intelligence-related
activities conducted by DOD components and personnel. In
addition, under Title 50, the Secretary has several specific
statutory responsibilities for elements of the IC that are part
of DOD, including DIA, NGA, NSA, and the NRO.
Consistent with the DNI statutory responsibilities, the
Secretary is responsible for the continued operation of those
elements as effective organizations for the conduct of their
missions in order to satisfy DOD and IC requirements. Congress
established the position of USD(I) in fiscal year 2003,
enabling DOD to strengthen its management of Defense
Intelligence. As the USD(I), I am the principal staff assistant
and advisor to the Secretary regarding intelligence,
counterintelligence, and security matters, and to that end, I
exercise his authority, direction, and control over the defense
agencies and DOD field activities that are defense
intelligence, counterintelligence [CI], or security components.
I am also dual-hatted as the Director of Defense
Intelligence in the office of the DNI. The DNI and Secretary of
Defense jointly established this position in 2007 to ensure the
integration, collaboration, and information sharing between our
two organizations.
My close relationship with Director Clapper, himself a
former USD(I) and someone intimately familiar with Defense
Intelligence, enable us to work together seamlessly to manage
resources in pursuit of our national security objective. We
each manage our respective resource portfolios. The DNI
executes the National Intelligence Program [NIP]. I execute the
Military Intelligence Program [MIP].
To characterize the relative scale of our portfolios in the
fiscal 2013 President's budget request, the NIP totaled $52.6
billion compared to $19.2 billion request to fund the MIP. DOD
MIP funds intelligence, CI, and intelligence-related programs,
projects, and activities that provide capabilities to
effectively meet warfighter operational and tactical
requirements. I also oversee the Department's broader
Battlespace Awareness Portfolio, which includes the NIP,
intelligence-related special access programs, and other
intelligence-related activities.
Let me close, Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the
committee, by thanking you for your support for Defense
Intelligence. I am committed to working with the Congress and
this subcommittee in its new responsibility to find the best
way to continue to deliver intelligence advantage to our
Nation, and I look forward to your questions.
[The joint prepared statement of Secretary Vickers and
General Flynn can be found in the Appendix on page 13.]
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you, Dr. Vickers.
General Flynn.
STATEMENT OF LTG MICHAEL T. FLYNN, USA, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
General Flynn. Good afternoon, Chairman Thornberry, Ranking
Member Langevin and distinguished members of this committee.
Thanks for the opportunity to discuss the Defense Intelligence
Agency and our contributions to the Department of Defense. I
have been the director of DIA now for 7 months and I cannot
overemphasize how proud I am to serve our Nation in this
capacity.
As our defense strategy highlights, our Nation is at a
moment of transition. The global security environment presents
increasingly complex challenges and a growing list of threats
and adversaries. The demands on the U.S. intelligence system
have skyrocketed in recent years and these demands are only
expected to increase.
That said, DIA's mission is to prevent strategic surprise
by providing our warfighters and our national security leaders
the best intelligence available on foreign nation-state
military capabilities and military-like capabilities of non-
nation-state actors, as well as their intentions. With over
16,000 employees in 262 locations around the world, including
142 countries and 31 U.S. States, I believe DIA is well
postured to accomplish that mission.
Our workforce boasts an impressive range of skills
necessary to accomplish our mission. For instance, over 5,000
of our men and women have served on one or more deployments in
combat zones in Iraq and Afghanistan, and more than 550
employees currently are deployed in theater today.
Additionally, over 50 percent of DIA's employees are assigned
outside of Washington, DC. DIA people have proficiency in 54
languages with more than 500 employees who speak a critical
language, and we are planning to further expand our language
capacity in the coming years.
DIA's mission breaks down into two essential tasks,
collection and analysis, and I would like to begin by outlining
our collection capabilities first. As Director of DIA, I serve
as the Defense Collection Manager, so I ensure that the agency
provides robust intelligence collection requirements management
that helps drive our collection in all-source analysis
missions. Much of this activity is in direct support of our
combatant commands and our service intelligence centers.
These responsibilities include planning and assessing the
Defense Department's intelligence collection requirements,
managing the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance of
the Department, and ensuring the professionalization of the
collection management career field. In addition to managing
intelligence requirements, our specific collection operational
capabilities fall into two categories. First is our human
intelligence, counterintelligence, and Defense Attache System.
And second is our measurement and signature intelligence
collection capabilities.
DIA gains vital information from our highly specialized
overt and clandestine human intelligence [HUMINT] activities.
DIA manages the Defense Clandestine Service, which leverages
our unique military access and proficiencies to fulfill defense
and national level intelligence requirements in a fully
integrated operational environment with our interagency
partners.
DIA also manages the Defense Attache System, which trains,
directs, and supports U.S. military attaches assigned to U.S.
embassies or consulates in 139 countries around the world.
These talented attaches work for the U.S. ambassador as members
of the country team and coordinate military activities with the
host nation's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and DOD equivalents.
Further, in close coordination with the Defense Clandestine
Service and the Defense Attache System, DIA's
counterintelligence professionals identify and neutralize
threats posed by hostile foreign intelligence and terrorist
groups. As Director of DIA, I am also the Defense Department
HUMINT and CI manager. In this management capacity, DIA leads,
directs, and centrally manages the worldwide defense HUMINT and
CI enterprise by ensuring that properly trained HUMINT and CI
professionals, fully integrated across the defense and national
HUMINT and CI communities, coordinate and deconflict their
efforts to best support defense and national intelligence
collection requirements.
Second is our measurement and signature collection
capability. DIA is responsible for managing the policy,
requirements, and standards for this vital national
intelligence mission. Measurement and signature intelligence
[MASINT] capabilities primarily identify, measure, and track
the unique signatures or attributes of all foreign military
equipment and chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. Aside
from this core responsibility, DIA's technical collectors also
use other techniques, such as biometrics, forensics, and
document and media exploitation, to satisfy tactical to
strategic intelligence requirements. While collection is a
vital component of what we do, the foundation of DIA's mission
is to provide all-source defense intelligence analysis in
support of our warfighters, our military services, our Joint
Staff, and our Nation's policymakers.
Regardless of its source, whether it comes from open source
or a Twitter feed, from an agent inside a terrorist group or a
scientist abroad, from biometric data or a chemical signature
left behind after a weapons test, or from overhead imagery or a
cyber attack, DIA collects, analyzes, processes, and
disseminates to our customers all-source analysis assessments
and key judgments, painting as clear a picture as possible,
enabling leaders at all levels to make better, more informed
decisions.
We are continuously seeking ways to apply the right mix of
classified and open-source information that identifies future
national security challenges and threats, and the people,
trends, movements, ideologies, and social phenomena fueling
them. From feedback received across our customer base that I
stated above, to include our law enforcement partners and
allied and coalition partners, what our analysts produce
provides these customers, especially our troops in harm's way,
a more decisive advantage in today's increasingly complex
national security environment. That is our litmus test for
judging our performance.
As we transition from a decade of war and hard-won lessons
learned, DIA is building on the best practices we have learned
since September 11, 2001. Principally, we are focusing on the
integration and fusion of intelligence and operations and the
success of applying the full range of intelligence
capabilities, such as HUMINT, signals intelligence [SIGINT],
geospatial and cyber, against some of the hardest targets we
face, whether those are state or non-state actors. This all
must be done in close collaboration with our Intelligence
Community and interagency partners, as well as our foreign
partners.
These two essential tasks, collection and analysis,
represent critical components in our Nation's arsenal of
intelligence weapons and are increasingly in demand during
these very uncertain times. Because of the pace of events and
this growing uncertainty, we find ourselves in an era where
strategic warning cycles and timelines are much faster than
they were even 5 years ago. So in all that we do, we must
operate at our customers' speed and inside their decisionmaking
cycles, no matter the time zone.
To this end, my goal for DIA is simple: We will remain the
best defense intelligence agency in the world and continue to
provide world-class intelligence support to those men and women
willing to sacrifice for this country. To do so, we must
continue to carefully recruit, retain, and manage the talent
that represents our Nation's national security future. This is
vital.
Before I conclude, I would like to take this opportunity to
mention the impact that sequestration will potentially have on
DIA. First, I am in complete agreement with Under Secretary
Vickers and his complete statement, and I hope I have made
clear that DIA is about putting our people first. We cannot
accomplish our mission without the men and women who serve this
Nation so well. The impact sequestration will have on an
organization which depends on human resources for its
capability is astoundingly complex and far-reaching. There is a
geometric impact which includes not only the cost of lost
opportunity, but also the cost of rebuilding the capability
that we stand to lose.
What we cannot predict is the real impact on national
security of that lost capability. If we think that our
adversaries will use this time to take a strategic pause or
that we will somehow manage to stay ahead of the most
potentially catastrophic intelligence issues while opting to
take cuts against the low-threat areas, then we are deluding
ourselves. The real cost of this action is in public insecurity
and potential strategic surprise.
Since it is very difficult to prove a negative, there is no
way to know what we will have missed, nor to appreciate the
cost of that missing intelligence. At best, we may never know
what key intelligence we have missed as a result of
sequestration. At worst, I fear we may find ourselves rehashing
another major intelligence failure.
Above all else, what defines DIA is the value our people
bring to our operating forces, our Nation's military, and
national security leaders, as well as our coalition and foreign
partners who depend on our capabilities. Speaking truth to
power is critical during these uncertain times and no other
standard is more important. Thank you all for your service to
our Nation, and I look forward to the questions in closed
session.
[The joint prepared statement of General Flynn and
Secretary Vickers can be found in the Appendix on page 13.]
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you.
I would yield to the distinguished ranking member for any
comments he would like to make.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. LANGEVIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
RHODE ISLAND, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE,
EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I apologize for
running behind schedule. I had to speak on the floor just
before this hearing started. So first of all I want to welcome
our witnesses, Secretary Vickers and General Flynn.
Thank you for your testimony. I certainly look forward to
hearing more and getting into the questions and answers.
Most especially, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for
holding this hearing. As you are well aware, the Intelligence
Community is an issue that is of great interest to me, as it is
to you, and of great importance to this committee and to the
Congress. And I am certainly pleased that this subcommittee now
has jurisdiction over intelligence policy within the Department
of Defense because, like the gentleman from Texas, I also have
the benefit of examining intelligence matters from my position
on the Select Committee on Intelligence. So it provides great
crossover.
I certainly look forward to working with the gentleman to
ensure that our intelligence efforts and resourcing are
harmonized between the two committees, particularly with regard
to the provision of timely and accurate intelligence to
decisionmakers, the defeat of Al Qaeda and its affiliates, and
the new geopolitical challenges that we face across the globe,
and the burgeoning field also of cybersecurity.
It is my goal to make sure that our Intelligence Community
is properly resourced between the MIP and the NIP and that,
wherever possible, it is well coordinated, but also, when
necessary, deconflicted.
So with that, in the interest of brevity and maximizing the
utility of our time today, I would yield back so that we can
proceed with the classified component of this hearing, but I
would be remiss if I didn't first again welcome the panel,
Under Secretary Vickers and Lieutenant General Flynn, who I
might mention is a fellow Rhode Islander.
And great to have you both here, and I certainly look
forward to our continued work together as we work to move
forward.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Thornberry. I thank the gentleman.
And with that, the open portion of this hearing is
adjourned, and we will reconvene immediately next door in
closed classified session.
[Whereupon, at 4:28 p.m., the subcommittee proceeded in
closed session.]
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A P P E N D I X
February 27, 2013
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
February 27, 2013
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