- [H.A.S.C. No. 113-7] THE FUTURE OF SEAPOWER

[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

[H.A.S.C. No. 113-7]
THE FUTURE OF SEAPOWER

__________

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

__________

HEARING HELD

FEBRUARY 26, 2013

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SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia, Chairman

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
DUNCAN HUNTER, California JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi RICK LARSEN, Washington
ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr.,
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado Georgia
JON RUNYAN, New Jersey COLLEEN W. HANABUSA, Hawaii
KRISTI L. NOEM, South Dakota DEREK KILMER, Washington
PAUL COOK, California SCOTT H. PETERS, California
Tom MacKenzie, Professional Staff Member
Phil MacNaughton, Professional Staff Member
Nicholas Rodman, Staff Assistant

C O N T E N T S

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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2013

Page

Hearing:

Tuesday, February 26, 2013, The Future of Seapower............... 1

Appendix:

Tuesday, February 26, 2013....................................... 25
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TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 26, 2013
THE FUTURE OF SEAPOWER
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Forbes, Hon. J. Randy, a Representative from Virginia, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces................. 1
McIntyre, Hon. Mike, a Representative from North Carolina,
Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces. 2

WITNESSES

Lehman, Hon. John, Former Secretary of the Navy.................. 3
Roughead, ADM Gary, USN (Ret.), Former Chief of Naval Operations. 5

APPENDIX

Prepared Statements:

Forbes, Hon. J. Randy........................................ 29
Lehman, Hon. John............................................ 31
Roughead, ADM Gary........................................... 40

Documents Submitted for the Record:

[There were no Documents submitted.]

Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]

Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

Mr. Langevin................................................. 51

THE FUTURE OF SEAPOWER

----------

House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, February 26, 2013.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:56 p.m., in
room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. J. Randy Forbes
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. J. RANDY FORBES, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND
PROJECTION FORCES

Mr. Forbes. I want to welcome all of our members and our
distinguished panel of experts to today's hearing that will
focus on the future of seapower in advance of receiving a
budget request for fiscal year 2014.
In January, the Navy presented to Congress a goal of
achieving a fleet of 306 ships, a reduction from the previous
goal of 313 ships. The fiscal year 2013-2017 5-year
shipbuilding plan contains a total of 41 ships, which is 16
ships less than the 57 ships projected for the same period in
the fiscal year 2012 budget request. Of this 16-ship reduction,
9 ships were eliminated and 7 ships were deferred to a later
time. It should be noted that at its current strength of 286
ships, under the 30-year shipbuilding plan submitted to
Congress, the Navy will not achieve its goal of 306 ships until
fiscal year 2039. And given our past record of meeting long-
term goals, I seriously question the viability of the
shipbuilding plans presented in the out-years of the 30-year
plan.
Even worse, the Navy will experience shortfalls at various
points in cruisers, destroyers, attack submarines, ballistic
missile submarines, and amphibious ships. One would think the
number of required ships would have increased instead of
decreased with the Navy now bearing the brunt of missile
defense missions and the announced rebalance to the Asia-
Pacific.
Another area of concern is the cost of the plan. The
Congressional Budget Office estimates that in the first 10
years of the 30-year shipbuilding plan that the cost will be 11
percent higher than the Navy's estimate. It is because of this
issue of affordability that I agree with both Secretary Lehman
and Admiral Roughead on the need for acquisition reform. While
I think it is critical to provide an environment that provides
industry some stability to achieve better pricing, I think it
is equally important to pursue more effective acquisition
strategies. I look forward to understanding what options our
subcommittee could pursue to obtain this needed acquisition
reform.
In addition to new construction of ships, I also have
concerns on the sustainment of ships already in the fleet.
After years of maintenance challenges the Navy has now been
forced to cancel numerous ship maintenance availabilities in
the third and fourth quarters of this fiscal year due to the
budgetary constraints of sequestration and the continuing
resolution. The Navy has been operating in a sustained surge
since at least 2004. We have been burning out our ships more
quickly because the demand has been high. Indeed, in the past 5
years roughly 25 percent of destroyer deployments have exceeded
the standard deployment length.
A key tenet in the shipbuilding plan is an assumed ship
service life for most ships of 35 years. If ships do not get
the planned shipyard repairs, attaining this service life will
be problematic and ships will be retired prematurely.
In fiscal year 2012, the existing force structure only
satisfied 53 percent of the total combatant commander demand.
It has been estimated that to fully support the combatant
commander requirements would necessitate a fleet size in excess
of 500 ships. Without an increase in force structure this trend
would only get worse.
Finally, I think that our Navy needs to place more emphasis
on undersea warfare and long-range power projection as part of
a strategy to prevent potential adversaries from achieving the
benefits offered by anti-access/aerial denial strategies. I am
particularly interested to better understand what options the
subcommittee should consider to achieve these goals and ensure
the combatant commanders have the right tools to achieve our
national strategy.
Today we are honored to have as our witnesses former
Secretary of the Navy John Lehman and former Chief of Naval
Operations Gary Roughead.
Gentlemen, we thank you all for being here. We especially
thank you both for your service. But even more than that, we
thank you for coming to our subcommittee and sharing your
wealth of experience and analysis of these issues. This is
going to be the launch of what we hope will be a revitalization
of United States Navy, and that will be in large part because
of your contributions.
And now I would like to recognize my friend, the ranking
member, Mr. McIntyre, for any remarks he may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Forbes can be found in the
Appendix on page 29.]

STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE MCINTYRE, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM NORTH
CAROLINA, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND
PROJECTION FORCES

Mr. McIntyre. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thanks to both you gentlemen for your service and
commitment and being here today. I am looking forward to
hearing what you have to say with regard to the Navy's role
protecting our national interest and how the Navy is going to
be poised to meet these responsibilities in the coming years.
In January, the Navy submitted a report to Congress stating
that the Navy's new requirement for combatant vessels is 306
ships. Accompanying that report was a new force structure
assessment further breaking down the 306 requirement by ship
class. The Navy has confirmed that the new requirement and
assessment are based on the new strategic guidance released by
the Department last year. But as I look at the new force
structure assessment and compare that to the 30-year
shipbuilding plan that was submitted last year, it appears to
me that the two are not aligned, which is a concern. In the 30-
year plan it shows the Navy will not meet the requirement of
306 ships until 2039.
I would like the witnesses to share with us whether or not
they believe the Navy is being properly resourced to meet what
is being required. Given the recently announced pivot that we
have to the Pacific and the expected drawdown of our ground
forces elsewhere, the question is, should the overall
Department shift more resources to the Navy in order to help
support this new strategy while simultaneously accelerating the
fleet size towards the 306 goal?
As our witnesses know, I am sure, the Navy is currently
operating at an operational tempo that is unsustainable. I
would be interested to hear from our witnesses any suggestions
that you have as to how one might mitigate the long-term
impacts of a sustained surge that in recent years appears to
become the norm.
Thank you again for your service. Thank you for your time
today.
And thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Congressman McIntyre.
And, gentlemen, as we talked about before, we are not going
to give you guys a timeframe because we appreciate you being
here and what you have to offer. You are welcome to just to
submit your written testimony for the record if you would like
and then anything you would like to tell us we are anxious to
hear.
So, Mr. Secretary, I believe you are going to start off for
us and we give you the floor.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN LEHMAN, FORMER SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

Mr. Lehman. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a real
pleasure and an honor to be back in front of this historic
committee. I must have spent 200 or 300 hours in my 6 years as
SecNav [Secretary of the Navy] in this chair when Charlie
Bennett was in your chair. And it was a real partnership, the
600-ship Navy was a genuine partnership between the Congress
and the Administration in developing the strategy and
implementing the programs.
I think that the most important historic accomplishment of
any subcommittee or committee that I know of in Congress
belongs to this committee when it was a full committee of Navy
affairs under the legendary Carl Vinson. When he faced a
situation very similar to the current situation in the early
1930s, after an administration that did not believe there was
any need for a navy, the only administration in history that
never built a single naval combatant--this is the Hoover
administration--it was this committee that took on the
challenge of educating the Congress and the American people
about why there was a need for a strong navy as the United
States grew in its presence and influence and dependence in the
world. And over the entire decade of the 1930s this committee
was where the action was, and they gradually brought the new
Roosevelt administration along to begin to start to program for
the kind of threats that were emerging in Europe and Japan, and
it was this committee that was the forum of the long-term
strategic thinking, assisted very closely by the Navy.
But this was where the action was, this committee. And I
would hope that this committee will again take up that long-
view strategic role, because currently I don't think anyone
else is in the U.S. Government. There are three priorities that
I would suggest that the committee address over the coming
years. This is not something that can be done in this session
of this Congress.
But first you have to reestablish I think the intellectual
framework, the commonsense framework for why we need a Navy and
where we need it and what kind of a Navy to carry out the task.
It was relatively easy for the Reagan administration with a
bipolar world in the Cold War. The Soviet threat clarified the
mind wonderfully and made our task relatively easy. Today you
could argue that the world is a more dangerous place because it
is so multipolar, there are now so many more potential
disturbers of the peace all over the world, and yet we are more
dependent ever in our history on the free flow of energy and of
commerce through the Pacific, Indian Ocean, the Atlantic,
Caribbean, and so forth.
We have to have the capability to maintain stability and
freedom of the seas wherever our vital interests are involved.
We should not be the world's policeman, but we must be able to
give the rest of the world the confidence to know that we are
able to maintain the free flow of a global community of
commerce and freedom of travel, and that we don't have today.
We don't need a 600-ship Navy, as we did when we faced the
entire Soviet fleet, but we certainly need a good deal more
than the 280 ships we have today. And I was part of the
independent panel on the QDR [Quadrennial Defense Review] 2
years ago, and we were unanimous, Republicans and Democrats,
that the minimum necessary was a 346-ship Navy just to maintain
deterrence. This is not arming to deal with a potential threat
from China or anywhere else. It was simply to be able to
maintain stability and deter disturbers of the peace around the
world. The threat has not gotten less since that report was
given to Congress.
But also I think it is very important to understand that we
shouldn't focus on the easily counted numbers of ships and
airplanes and so forth. I would hope that this committee would
concentrate on the larger picture of the global requirements
and what makes up naval power. It is not just numbers.
Certainly the shipbuilding program submitted by this
Administration is way below what is going to be required in the
future.
But even more disturbing is what is going on now in the
overuse of the assets we have. It is very unfortunate that the
institutional memory in the executive branch and in Congress is
so short, because we have been down this road before. Both
Admiral Roughead and I were in the Navy when we had the exact
same situation in the 1970s, and we ran the fleet into the
ground. We made deployments, added 50 percent to deployments
time from 6 months to 9 months, just as the Administration has
decided to do now. And we did not put--we, the U.S.
Government--did not put the money into repairs and overhaul.
And as a result the Navy dropped to the lowest readiness ever,
where the former chief of naval of operations testified to this
committee that we would lose a war if we ended up going into a
conflict, and that was not an assessment lightly taken.
We had the lowest morale, the lowest retention, the lowest
recruiting, because families couldn't live for very long with
that kind of lifestyle. We were just asking them to do too
much. Yes, in a crisis the Navy can do more with less, but for
sustaining peace you cannot do more with less, you can do less
with less. And so I think the current policy of extending
deployments with the fleet we have, small as it is and
certainly too small for the commitments that we are pledged to,
we have got to stop that. And I applaud the Navy's decision to
deal with the cuts of the budget, quite apart from sequester,
by not deploying a Marine amphibious group and a carrier group
as well. That is what they should do in this kind of a crisis,
is just reducing operations and not using what we don't have.
And the last point I would make as an area that I would
hope this committee will concentrate on is procurement. We have
been for some considerable time now disarming unilaterally. In
constant dollars the budget today, outside of the OCO [Overseas
Contingency Operations] expenditures, is by some estimates 40
percent larger than the height of the Reagan administration,
yet the fleet is less than half the size, the Air Force is less
than half the size, the Army is about half the size. And so we
are spending more and getting less in constant dollars, and
that is because we have allowed the uncontrolled growth of
overhead in the Department of Defense.
So while I know you have to deal with the current fiscal
crisis and deal with sequester and so forth, but even if
sequester doesn't happen you are still facing a major crisis
because we are unilaterally disarming. And we have got to fix
the procurement system. It is fixable. And this committee, I
would hope, will take the leadership in taking it on. And I
would be happy to answer your questions, Mr. Chairman, thank
you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Lehman can be found in the
Appendix on page 31.]
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Admiral.

STATEMENT OF ADM GARY ROUGHEAD, USN (RET.), FORMER CHIEF OF
NAVAL OPERATIONS

Admiral Roughead. Mr. Chairman, Mr. McIntyre, it is a
pleasure and an honor to be back----
Mr. Forbes. Admiral, have you got the mike on? Thanks.
Admiral Roughead. I have already lost my touch.
It is a pleasure and an honor to be back before the
committee, and also to be at the witness table with Secretary
Lehman who did so much to build our Navy, rebuild our Navy,
that has set the foundation for the Navy's capabilities today.
Much of what I will say really echoes what Secretary Lehman
said, that I believe our founders had it right when they said
that it was the obligation, the responsibility of the Congress
to provide and maintain a navy. Very different from what was
said about raising and supporting armies, because I believe
they realized the importance then as a maritime nation to have
a navy that was in being, a navy that had the reach and the
power to represent our interests around the globe. And even in
the early days, that field of view was in much closer than it
is today.
And it is that Navy that has been built over the centuries
and recent decades that has enabled the globalization, that has
enabled the free flow of commerce on the world's oceans, and
there is only one navy in the world that can do that, and that
is the United States Navy. It is the only navy that can command
it and control itself globally. It is the only navy that can
logistically support itself globally. It is the only global
navy. And I believe that the path that we are on right now may
make some of those assumptions unfounded.
As we look at the world today, while it is generally
conducive to our interests, it is still a messy place, with
disorder and disruption in more areas than just 10 or 15 years
ago. And as we look out over that world and as the only global
navy, you do have to ask yourself what is the size, what is the
capability that you want resident in the Navy that is to be
provided and maintained by the Congress. And I applaud the
committee for taking this on and looking at it in a strategic
way and taking a long view of what will be necessary in the
future.
I think it is important as we look at building and
maintaining a navy that you can't decouple it from the
industrial base of the Nation. And I think that all too often
is overlooked. I think it is an assumption that these things
just happen. And it is not just the shipbuilders and the
airplane manufacturers, but I am most concerned today about the
second- and third-tier suppliers, the small businesses that are
in each and every one of your districts and all of your
colleagues' districts all over the country. And I am concerned
that the budgetary shocks, the fiscal shocks that we are
experiencing will call into question the survivability of that
base. And it is from so many of those small companies that our
real capability, that new technology is introduced. And so that
I believe has to be very much a part of a strategy as we look
to the future, not only what size and type of Navy do we want,
but what is the industrial base that produces that Navy?
The other aspect is manning the Navy. As the Secretary
mentioned, we are of the vintage that I recall a down time in
the Navy. I recall a time when we didn't have enough money to
maintain ships in the way they needed to be maintained. I
recall a time when we didn't have enough time between
deployments to train the new sailors who had come aboard ships,
and I questioned whether we could fulfill our missions. And I
was particularly concerned about the safety of the young
sailors that were on board those ships as we went out and did
very dangerous and hazardous and stressful things. And I am
fearful that we could return to that time again.
And it is also important as we look at fleet size and the
obligations that we have, just how hard are you going to push
the Navy. Again, going back to my early years, I recall knowing
the date that I was to deploy. I didn't know the date I was
coming home. And there is one thing that sailors don't like and
that is uncertainty. You can tell them how long the job is, how
hard the job is going to be, and they will sign up willingly.
But the uncertainty injects questions and doubt in the minds of
those that we are asking to do the very hard work.
I think as we go forward, in addition to looking at fleet
size--and I agree that as I look at the world the fleet size is
somewhere, as I put in my prepared statement, probably between
325, 345, conservatively--because the messiness of the world is
spreading. We have been able in recent years to essentially be
absent in the Mediterranean. I believe the future is not going
to give us that luxury. I think North Africa and the Arab
awakening, the Levant, Israel, Syria, energy deposits that are
expected to be found in the Eastern Mediterranean are going to
inject some friction and potential conflict and a presence will
be required there.
Even though we talk about a rebalanced Asia, we are not
turning away from the Middle East and the Arabian Gulf and the
importance that that geographic area has on the global economy.
And in a few years the Arctic is going to open, and the Arctic
is an ocean. I refer to it as the opening of the fifth ocean.
And so what sort of a force do you need there, what are the
numbers that you need there? And all of that needs to be taken
into account.
And the question then becomes where do you want your Navy
to be, what do you want it to be able to do, and then how do
you build and sustain that Navy? And so, again, I applaud the
work of the committee and the vision of the committee as you
look to the future to add the strategic underpinning to what I
believe are extraordinarily serious discussions and decisions
that have to be made not just in Congress but in our country,
and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Roughead can be found in
the Appendix on page 40.]
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Admiral and Mr. Secretary. One of
the things that you both encouraged us to do, let me assure you
we are going to do, we are going to revitalize this Navy and we
are going to try to lay a foundation for the Navy for decades
to come. The good news we have in this subcommittee is it is
probably the most bipartisan subcommittee, I would think, in
Congress. Most of the people on this committee, we are personal
friends, we have enormous respect for each other. We each bring
parochial interest and areas of expertise, but we will rise
above those and try to fight against our respective
conferences, against the Administration, whoever we need to do,
to make sure we are doing what is in the best interest of the
United States Navy and the Marine Corps and the future of this
country. And we appreciate you being here to help lay that
footing for us.
And I am going to start with one question and then defer
the rest of mine so that other members can ask theirs. But
there has been a lot of discussion about the overall defense
strategy and the one-third/one-third allocation between the
services of funds that has traditionally accompanied the budget
request. I am going to ask both of you if you can provide your
assessment of the defense strategy, thoughts on allocations
between the services that you might provide.
But there is one other thing. We constantly in this era of
cuts to national defense hear this phrase ``acceptable risk.''
You know, if you wear a suit acceptable risk gets kind of
waffled, but if you are in a uniform it normally means how many
people come back, you know. How do you interplay acceptable
risk? Give us your handle on that when we are looking at these
cuts that we are facing and what we have done and what we may
be doing to national defense. And whichever one of you wants to
have at that one, I would appreciate listening to your
response.
Mr. Lehman. Well, acceptable risk is the judgment of the
most experienced and best people that the country has elected
or appointed to provide that judgment. You can't provide a
metric: If you reach 307 ships you are over the risk factor. It
is a judgment. And when you look at the judgment of virtually
all naval experts today, there is no one, including in the
Chinese Navy and the Iranian Navy, who believes that given the
obligations we have and continue to support, that the size Navy
we have today is adequate to deal with that.
And so acceptable risk of the cuts that are in the
immediate prospect, I think a lot depends on where they are
allocated. I think that there is a huge amount of overhead fat
in the defense budget, but I don't see sequester providing the
flexibility to remove and cut that overhead that is in both the
uniform and the civilian sides of the Pentagon. And by the way,
I think it is much more in the independent agencies and OSD
[Office of the Secretary of Defense] than it is in any of the
Services.
As to the allocation of a third, a third, a third, I just
have never believed that looking at the output of defense
capability as a function of the input of the budget level is an
adequate or valid measure. The more money you put in, if the
system is not functioning, means the less capability you get
out. And the record of the last couple of decades from a macro
standpoint demonstrates that.
So I think you need to start with a strategy, and there is
not a coherent strategy coming from this Administration, and I
must say from the last administration. This committee can
provide the building, the forum to build that consensus of
strategy, as we did have in past eras, and from that should be
derived the requirements to meet that strategy. And it is very
unlikely that it is going to come out a third, a third, a
third. Whether we need the size standing Army we have today
given the threats that we face around the world and the nature
of what our overall role should be in the world, whether or not
we can live with an Air Force with an average airplane age of
something like 28 years, whether we need the size, whether we
need a new bomber, those are all questions that you in the
Congress have to logically decide. I doubt very much if it is
going to come to a third, a third, a third. But first step is
to begin to build the outlines of a strategy so you can make
coherent judgments. Otherwise it will absolutely default to a
third, a third, a third.
Admiral Roughead. I would say that as I look at acceptable
risk it is important to look at where do we believe the Navy
would be called into play, either to assure or deter or compel.
And in looking at that, then you always want to make sure that
you have your options preserved and that your probability of
success is better than a potential adversary's probability of
success.
And so that gets into what is the strategy, where are our
interests globally? To simply say that we are pivoting to Asia
almost implies that you are excluding other areas of the world
that are going to be important in the future. So how you look
at the world, where the Navy would be, and then how you want to
use that Navy with a higher probability of success than an
adversary is the way that I look at it.
And when you do that, and particularly as you look at some
of the trends that are taking place in the world today, the
increased sensitivities with regard to sovereignty, of
reluctance of countries to openly accept large numbers of
ground forces, the space that has been reduced by leaders
around the world because of the way information moves, where
they can privately agree to certain things and then publicly
have a different position, I think we are seeing that that
margin is really compressing down.
So the idea that sovereignty is going to be a much more
sensitive issue to me argues that there are going to be more
offshore options that will be in play, that the likelihood of
selecting a course of action is going to be light footprint
ashore for a minimum amount of time, but having that presence
offshore, having that power offshore. I would say whether we
like it or not we are going to be involved in counterterrorism
operation. Offshore staging areas or ships give you the
opportunity to respond more quickly, more effectively and
potentially more lethally than having to come across great land
masses where you have to get not only the assurance of basing
in the country where you may want to operate, but all of the
overflight rights. Navies allow you to you come from the sea
and not to have to do that.
So the strategy and the way that we are looking at the
future collectively as a nation with rebalancing to Asia, the
reluctance of any administration of any party in the
foreseeable future to avoid large ground campaigns, I believe
argues for the Navy. When you do that, that immediately walks
you away from an equitable share among the Services, and much
the same as when we were involved in the campaigns of recent
years, that biased the budget share differently.
I think one of the challenges that is faced, not only
whether it is sequestration or continuing resolution, is
locking in place the size of personnel, the number of personnel
in the military, as not being able to be touched really
hamstrings the ability to adjust a budget that is tailored to a
strategy, that is tailored to outcomes, that is tailored to
capabilities. So I think that as we look to the future, the
money must be apportioned in the way we believe the military
will be called into action.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you both.
Mr. Courtney is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to the
witnesses for being here today.
I want to echo the chair's comments about the fact that
this is a team on this subcommittee. In fact, I think, Mr.
Secretary, you can just go back a couple years ago, this
subcommittee actually led the way to force advanced procurement
in the Virginia class [attack submarine] program, which again
the prior administration resisted, but thank God we did it. And
the program is I think performing better than even its
proponents expected at the time. The last defense authorization
bill that was passed in December allowed for incremental
funding for both DDG-51s [Arleigh Burke class guided missile
destroyers] and the Virginia class to avoid any dips. We have
obviously got to get an omnibus done to make that a reality,
but again I think you are really talking to people here who are
ready to accomplish the goals and missions that are our
predecessors did so well. And thank you for the little history
perspective, that was quite interesting.
Admiral, you talked about the fact that, you know, we have
got to obviously keep our eye on the industrial base, Mr.
Secretary, you talked about the need for procurement reform.
During your tenure, I mean, I actually give you pretty high
marks about the fact that the system of doing block grant,
block contracts with fixed price, you know, that is firm has
really I think changed behavior within industry and even with
LCS [Littoral Combat Ship] and some of the programs that we
struggled with. And so I guess the question I am trying to
understand is, is that in terms of shipbuilding this model I
think, A, has shown real results in terms of moderating and
eliminating cost overruns, but also protecting the fragile
shipyard, you know, network that we still are barely hanging
onto in this country. So if you had to say what procurement
reform and how that fits in with where we are at and maybe you
could just expand on that a little bit, Mr. Secretary.
Mr. Lehman. Thank you. The reforms I think are simple
reforms. It is returning to the tried and true traditions of
line management and accountability and have a clear chain of
command over programs once they are approved and started. And
this should be centered in the Services with the oversight of
OSD, but with the line accountability and authority in the
Services. That is where Title 10 places the reins of chief
executive authority. And going back to that tradition where a
project manager, for instance, has to stay for 4 years, and if
they don't succeed they are held accountable. A Secretary of
the Navy is given the authority to ensure the proper running of
the programs in the Navy and held accountable if they run off
the rails.
That has been really lost over the recent decades because
the power has been drawn up into OSD and the independent
agencies and into the joint requirements offices, the COCOMs
[Combatant Commands]. There are now currently 40-some
committees, not human beings that you could praise or condemn,
but committees who have authority over procurement programs,
which means nobody is in charge, which has been the curse of
all of the Services' procurement.
The Navy, despite the bad headlines of some periods, has a
tradition of that line accountability. A captain is responsible
for his ship, a program manager is responsible for his program,
and if it goes on the rocks there are consequences. That is not
now the norm in the Department of Defense. Part of the problem
has been the constant growth, and I have to say the House and
the Senate have aided and abetted that process of every time
there is a scandal or a problem, the only answer that Congress
seems to be able to come up with is add more people, we need a
new cost accounting program, we need new contract auditors. You
passed a bill 2 years ago to add 20,000 people to the defense
procurement, civilians to defense procurement. The whole
Pentagon only holds 25,000 and you at the snap of a finger
added 20,000. There are 970,000 civilian employees in the
Pentagon today, almost double what they were when the fleet and
the Army and Air Force were double the size they are today. So
we keep growing the bureaucracy and overhead and shrinking the
force, and shrinking the numbers of products and weapons that
we get for the dollars we spend.
So it is not that complex an issue. We have to return to
lean management line accountability and we have got to bring
competition back in, as has been. The Navy has tried very hard.
I think today we have got some outstanding people in key
positions in Navy procurement, but it is like swimming in
treacle because you have all this oversight of all of these
other nonaccountable bureaucracies that make it so difficult to
do.
You can't have competition if you don't have firm grip over
requirements. And a huge mistake made by Congress in passing
the Goldwater-Nichols Act some 30 years ago was to take the
Chief of Naval Operations and the service chiefs of all the
Services out of procurement responsibility. That is really
crazy. And it was done because they wanted to empower the
bureaucracy, jointness. And the result has been very
predictable. Nobody is in charge of programs, everybody is in
charge.
And everything has reverted back to the normal bureaucratic
norm of sole source, cost-plus for the most part. They call
competitions what are really beauty contests to award 50-year
monopolies. That is not competition. Competition requires dual
sources at least, with real production competition. You have
got to protect the contractors from the constant gold plating
and change order culture that this bureaucratic system we have
produces. How can you have a fixed price if there are 75 change
orders a week, as the LCS had for a long period in the first
ship? You can't.
Mr. Forbes. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Wittman is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Lehman, Admiral Roughead, thank you so much for
joining us today.
Admiral Roughead, I want to begin with you. You spoke a lot
about acquisition. I want to kind of get your perspective.
Admiral Burke recently at the Surface Navy Association spoke
about the costs of the lifecycle of a ship, and he said about
38 percent of that cost is in procurement, the other is in
essentially lifecycle cost operation. Let me get from your
perspective, how do we in looking at using the limited
resources we are going to have in the future, how do we make
sure that we address those long-term costs, those lifecycle
costs up front in the procurement process, especially in light
of where we are with LCS and some of the things that we are
currently experiencing with that? Kind you give me your
perspective on how do we address that, and not only now but in
the long term to make sure we don't keep circling back to those
situations.
Admiral Roughead. Well, thank you for the question. And I
agree that one of the things that has not been done is to look
at what will something cost for the 30, 35 years that you are
going to use it. And you have to take into account your
manpower costs, energy costs, and maintainability. And that to
me should be one of the upfront factors that is taken into
account, because what we are essentially doing, particularly as
we pursue some of the more exotic technology, is that 20, 30
years from now we are delivering a bill that will be
unsustainable by our successors down the road.
And so I would submit that that comparison, that analysis
has to be part of whether you go forward or not. Right now it
is essentially how much do we pay for a unit and then that is
where the decision is made. And as I came into my last position
in the Navy and looked at the cost of operating what we were
buying, it was one of the most sobering afternoons of my
indoctrination. And so I think that has to be something that is
fleshed out, and quite frankly our experience in being able to
do that is not very good.
If I could, I would also just like to reinforce what the
Secretary said in accountability. Accountability is so
important. And I really do believe that it is at the service
chief level where you set a requirement and then that service
chief is responsible for giving the up or the down on changes
that need to take place, because things can take off and these
are well-meaning people with good reasons of doing what they
did. But even in our private purchases we always have to make a
decision about what is it that we are willing to pay for, some
things we are, some things we are not.
I also think that we have to take a look at those who are
in the management of our acquisition system, and particularly
in the programs, and rationalize our personnel system with it.
The Secretary mentioned keeping people in place for 4 years.
But I really believe that we should structure the career
patterns for those in acquisition to really be driven by the
attainment of milestones. In other words, when a program
reaches a particular milestone then that individual can move on
to another assignment, because that only adds to this lack of
accountability. When something doesn't happen on time whose
problem is it, the guy that started it or the guy that is
holding the bag now? And so I think we have to take a look at
that.
And it really gets down to accountability. And since
retirement I have relocated out to Silicon Valley where I spend
most of my time and there is a very, very different view on
accountability on delivering product within a certain amount of
time. We have endless, what seem to be endless time limits in
developing capability, and quite frankly it gets there late to
need and costs us more than we anticipated. So I think we have
to take a look at that.
And failure in test is not failure of a program. You know,
we need to be able to not add more requirements because
something didn't quite work the way we anticipated it. That is
how you develop, that is how you move forward. And we need to
change the culture that recognizes that making progress
sometimes involves having a failure or two along the way.
Mr. Wittman. Want to get you to answer real quickly on
this, I am on limited in time. You spoke very eloquently about
your experience and you have seen times of drawdowns, you have
seen hollowing of the force. Let me ask you this: In going
forward in today's situation, and the chairman spoke very much
about acceptable risk, how do we look at the current situation
and make sure that we are able to maintain a ready, capable,
and trained fleet in light of the current situations, in
knowing, too, that if we don't make the right decisions, as the
chairman said, we are going to be facing that risk scenario and
then having to really face the difficult question of what is
acceptable risk?
Admiral Roughead. I think one of the things that needs to
be done is to look at these very sophisticated machines that we
operate and are we providing the appropriate maintenance to get
them back online again or are we taking shortcuts. Are we not
installing upgrades that give our people the edge against a
potential adversary. And are we investing in the training that
our people need to operate this very complex stuff.
And so I think a lot of it is getting into the, as in so
many things, the devil is in the details. Are the upgrades
being made, is the maintenance being performed on time? Because
if it is not, things are going to start to break. And that only
induces more strain on the force, as you have to pull somebody
who wasn't ready to go, it is now their turn to go. And so I
believe that is the point where we are.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Langevin is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to thank you both, Mr. Secretary and Admiral
Roughead, for joining us today and of course for your
extraordinary service to the Nation. You both can look back on
amazing careers and know that you made have extraordinary
contributions to the Nation, for which we are very grateful. We
certainly appreciate the benefit of your insight as we grapple
with the complex challenges of the future and how best to
posture our naval capabilities to meet them.
Admiral Roughead, if I could start with you since I have
had the pleasure of working with you most directly over the
years. The current Navy shipbuilding plan allows the existing
fleet of dedicated SSGNs [cruise missile submarines], Ohio
class submarines converted to carry cruise missiles, to retire.
In its place the plan relies on the Virginia Payload Module,
which would insert a hull section into the Block V Virginia
class submarines that would have the ability to carry a variety
of assets, including cruise missiles. Admiral, can you speak to
the value of maintaining this type of capability for the
future?
Admiral Roughead. I think that what we were able to achieve
when we converted the SSBNs [ballistic missile submarines] to
SSGNs gave us an incredible capability, not only in the area of
strike but also in support for special operations forces.
Clearly, recapitalization of SSGN, in my view, is
extraordinarily costly and I would submit too costly as we look
to the future. But moreover, putting aside the cost, by being
able to put in the Virginia class, the payload modules, gives
you more of that capability to spread globally. And I talked
earlier about the disorder that was likely going to exist
around the world in many different places, and again it gets
into a question of numbers. And I would tell you that I would
rather have many Virginia class submarines with that
capability, maybe not as many tubes as an SSGN, but it gives me
more options of where to put them and bring that capability to
bear, whether it is strike or whether it is special operations
forces.
So I think the plan to move forward with that in the
Virginia class is important, and I also believe it sets up the
Virginia class to be the ``mother ship,'' if you will, for what
I believe is an extraordinary potential in unmanned systems in
the undersea that will prove to be more dramatic than what we
are seeing in unmanned systems in the air.
Mr. Langevin. I hope to be able to get back to talk about
the UAVs [Unmanned Aerial Vehicles] in just a minute if time
permits. But to the panel--and thank you for that answer,
Admiral--to the panel, to both of you--Mr. Secretary, perhaps
we could start with you--staying on the theme of the
submarines, I am deeply concerned about the possible effects of
the current budgetary uncertainty of the procurement of nuclear
submarines, and as we are at a critical moment now as Virginia
class procurement hits its design rate of two boats per year
and with those boats coming in early and under budget.
Additionally, the Ohio Replacement development program is at an
inflection point in preparation for the procurement of the
first boat in 2018.
To both of you, can you speak to the value of those
platforms in the future and what they mean to America's
deterrent and ability to project power? In particular, can you
speak to the downstream operational costs of any delay in
procurement of the submarines?
Mr. Lehman. Well, first, I think the submarine program has
been one of the best managed of any procurement program in the
Pentagon over the last couple of decades. There are other
approaches that could have been taken, but I think this is a
model for the current era. But to delay it could really lose a
significant proportion of the benefits that have been gained
and the wisdom that has been gained coming down the learning
curve with both ships, or with both contractors on that ship,
on that boat. And it would be a shame because you lose key
welders, particularly with the kind of steels that are involved
in submarine construction, welders and shipfitters and
pipefitters. You can't just get them on the street, you can't
go get a headhunter and hire 20 when the budget comes back on.
When you lose them they are gone, they are gone particularly
with the new sources of energy and the growing gas oil
businesses. So that would be a tragedy, to see the current
procurement program delayed.
As to their utility and necessity for deterrence in the
future, it is not just what they can do as SSNs for projecting
power ashore or defending the fleet, but they make possible all
the commerce, all of the container ships, all of the tankers.
It is those Virginia class that are going to have to bear the
burden of preventing any of the more than 140 active and
effective quiet diesel electric subs around the world, many of
them in the hands of disturbers of the peace, from being able
to close off the Straits of Hormuz or the Malacca Straits or
from actually sinking a tanker and bringing the flow of oil to
a halt for however length of time. So they are essential to any
naval operations around the world, and so I think this
committee should take great care to see that they are
protected.
Mr. Forbes. The gentleman's time has expired.
The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Conaway, is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Conaway. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for being here.
Admiral Roughead, the Navy recently announced that they are
going to delay the refueling or the major overhaul of the
Lincoln [USS Abraham Lincoln supercarrier], which daisy chains
the defueling of the Enterprise [USS Enterprise aircraft
carrier] and then refueling the Washington [USS George
Washington supercarrier]. Can you speak just how is the Navy
going to mitigate this delay in the refueling of these nuclear
carriers and keep us on track?
Admiral Roughead. Well, I am not in a position to speak for
the Navy, but I would say that my sense is that we are going to
have to pay later for what is being done, because this has a
ripple effect throughout the entire carrier force. And by
delaying the refueling, by disrupting the flow within the
industrial base, because particularly when we get into ship
maintenance and especially our very complex nuclear
maintenance, the schedules of maintenance and operations are
very carefully synchronized. And what we are in the process of
doing, for good reason because of the fact that the Navy's
leadership has to be good stewards and accountable for the
funds that they have, we are now in the process of disrupting
that pattern, that synchronization, the workloading of
shipyards in a way that will take some time to recover.
There is a word that I see in strategy and I see it in the
press, it is called ``reversibility.'' And reversibility flows
off everybody's tongue really easy and it is a nice catchy
word. But I believe that we have to be very, very careful of
reversibility within the industrial base, whether it is new
construction or maintenance because, as the Secretary pointed
out, some of those skills that we depend on are going to
migrate out of the shipbuilding business, they have to because
they want to feed their families, they want to keep their
companies alive.
And so I am very pessimistic that once we get into the
shift of work away from our shipyards and the subcontractors
that support our shipbuilding and our aviation maintenance and
building, that it is going to be hard to get it back, that that
depth is no longer existent in the industrial base.
Mr. Conaway. Manning the Navy in Littoral Combat Ship,
there are some reports out there that the Navy may move to a
dedicated significant group of folks who only serve, I guess
their whole career, on LCSs. Can you speak to us about what
your perspective is on that as well as the Blue crew/Gold crew
concept of keeping the boat in place, but just move the crew on
and off, is the Navy seeing good results in that? And then the
overall issue of dedicating a career to just LCSs.
Admiral Roughead. Well, thank you very much. And I would
say that I believe that the crew design that the Navy has for
LCS is a good one, because, particularly when you are in the
Pacific making those long transits, that is just lost time on
station. And having served in small ships before, they can be
quite fatiguing. So I think the crew concept is good, as long
as the resources are provided to train the off crews when they
are ashore, that we don't simply load more work on them because
we have cut in other areas and they are a labor pool that is
not on a ship, so we use them. The whole thing can unravel if
that is allowed to happen.
With regard to serving on LCSs for a career, I think that
for many people that will be just fine. We have sailors today
who serve their whole life on destroyers because they like
destroyers, sailors who routinely go back to aircraft carriers,
and of course our submarine fleet force is pretty unique. I do
think that we will always want to bleed off some of those
sailors to go serve in other areas because of that cross-
pollinization that you get, and the different perspectives and
different ideas I think are very helpful. But I would have no
problem with a young man or woman who likes that duty, stays in
that duty. They will know that ship better than anybody else.
Mr. Conaway. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yield back.
Mr. Forbes. Ms. Hanabusa is recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Thank you, Admiral.
Both of you have come very close to the number that you
believe the ships should be. Admiral, you are between 325 and
345, and Mr. Secretary's adopted the review panel's 346. But
what I don't know is what makes up the 325 to the 345 or what
makes up the 346. In fact, the review panel has 11 aircraft
carriers and 10 carrier air wings, 55 attack submarines and 4
guided submarines and the total of 346, and that kind of
doesn't add up.
So can you both tell me that as we sit here and we make
these decisions, what should we be looking at in your 325 to
345 or in your 346? Is there some sort of criteria as we look
at what we want to see the Navy of the future actually begin to
look like?
Mr. Lehman. That is a very, very good question, because too
often the commentary in the media focuses on those numbers as
if somebody just came up with them and then we will decide how
we will allocate them and where we will use them.
The 600-ship Navy in the Reagan administration and the 346-
ship Navy of the independent panel was derived first from a
strategy. And in the Reagan administration there was a very
clear strategy that the President had very thoroughly vetted
and had approved with the National Security Council. From that
were derived the force packages that were needed to be in place
both for deterrence, and then in the event of conflict in any
area, to be able to reinforce. And when you have a force
package, you have to have submarines, you have to have air
superiority, you have to have resupply ships, you have to have
mine-sweeping capability, and of course you have to have
submarines to keep the area clear of enemy submarines.
And from that, you get force packages made up of those
numbers of ships. And the sum total, in the case of the Reagan
strategy, given the areas we had to be in the world, came to 15
deployable battle groups, with 5 of them forward deployed all
the time on a 1-in-3 cycle, and that came to 600. That is how
it came from. It wasn't the reverse, you pick a number and then
figure out how you are going to use them.
Similarly, the 346 made assumptions, because the strategy
paper in the Administration's QDR was a fairly reasonable and
clear allocation. And the minimum that all of us, Republicans
and Democrats and very experienced people, uniform and
civilian, came up with minimum for force package to meet what
the Administration said it had to do was 346. That included
allocating submarines, reefers [refrigerated cargo ships],
aircraft carriers, et cetera.
So I think that is the way the committee should go about
evaluating the Administration's proposal and other
recommendations from people like us. That is why I emphasize
that the committee needs to start by building a clear, simple,
commonsense strategy, and from that making their decisions and
judgments on individual programs.
Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you.
Admiral.
Admiral Roughead. If I could just add on to that. You know,
I have a band of numbers in mind, and I think that it is not
just a question of where you want to be, but it is what the mix
is, what the Secretary was referring to, and sometimes if you
come down in one area, you might have to have a few more ships
of a different type. But balance is very important. You know,
we could drive to a high number if we just built a bunch of
LCSs, but that is not going to meet the Nation's need. And so I
think you have that.
The other factor that needs to be taken into account, and
this is where strategy comes into play, what are your
assumptions and what are your dependencies on allies and
partners? What capabilities will they bring? Can you be
reasonably sure that that is going to be there when you need
it, because every nation is going to have competing interests
and considerations?
And then there is also the question of where do you base
it, where do you operate from? You know, we gain greatly by
being able to have ships in Hawaii, farther to the west in the
Pacific. We gain greatly by the accommodations that are made to
have forward deployed forces in Japan. We are recently moving
some ships to Spain.
So all of that goes into the mix, and that is why I avoid
shooting at one particular number, because there are factors
that can come into play. But this comes back to this idea of
the committee's view and the committee's strategy, the
committee's assumptions about what kind of a Navy does the
Nation need and how do you see it being used.
Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Forbes. Gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Palazzo, is
recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Palazzo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank the witnesses for their testimony and thank
you for appearing in front of this committee and for your
faithful and dedicated service to our Nation. So I really
appreciate that.
Of course, you know, traveling through my district, we are
starting to hear a little bit more about that awful word,
sequestration. I have been trying to explain it for the past
year to anybody who would listen. I think just the sound of it
just made people bored, but now that they actually realize
that, you know, these are going to be some serious cuts to our
national security, undermining our national security, and it is
going to affect our industrial base and hollow out our
military, people seem to be paying a little more attention.
And so just kind of jumping straight to it, I know with the
continuing resolutions, one after another, the fear of
sequestration and all these things, that the Navy has most
definitely been deferring maintenance on their ships and now
there is talk of deferring procurement on the ships. And you
just got finished talking about what you would like to see the
desired ship numbers be in somewhat of a range.
So my question would be to you, based on your experience,
if they do defer ship procurement, what is going to be
deferred? Is it going to be aircraft carriers, is it going to
be submarines, is it going to be amphibs [amphibious assault
ships], is it going to be destroyers? Just in your opinion, I
would like to know what you think would be the first--LCS's--
what would be the first to go or to be pushed out further to
the right?
Mr. Lehman. Well, I think that you are going to have the
major say in that here in Congress, as you have in the past. I
would say what should be. First of all, maintenance is the
worst of all places to go for deferment, because it has an
immediate impact on morale of the sailors, things don't work,
it is very frustrating, they get unhappy. And then when you
defer it, when you go finally to fix it, it costs more. It is
more difficult. What you might have been able to repair has to
be chucked over the side and replaced with new. And so it is
one of the worst places to go.
If you defer procurement, then you have got to look at the
workforce. Is there enough work, for instance, in Pascagoula to
slip one destroyer without really hitting the workforce as hard
as it would be if you slipped an amphib somewhere else? So it
is a management issue. When you have to allocate pain, it is
just like allocating additional money.
And that gets back, I am sorry, to my hobby horse, which is
the key people that should be making those decisions are not
able to make them independently. The CNO [Chief of Naval
Operations] is out of the procurement chain now by the wisdom
of--the unwisdom of Goldwater-Nichols. Even the people, the
project managers have so many kibitzers that can stop them from
doing things in so many offices and the bureaucracy of 960,000
civilians that the chances, if you don't take control of where
those cuts are going to be made, they are not likely to be made
with all rationality alone.
Admiral Roughead. And I would just add that the complexity
of your question is significant, because there are so many
factors that the Navy will have to take into account. The
Secretary touched on workforce, touched on schedule, touched on
replacement for other ships. But then as you look at some of
the pending procurements that are taking place, they are
predicated on bids that the shipbuilders have gotten from
second- and third-tier suppliers. How long will those bids be
good? And so do you make the decision of we can't defer this
because the whole deal may fall apart, so maybe we have to do
that one first instead of the other.
So it is extraordinarily complex, but I believe those are
the types of questions that the committee needs to address, not
just on the state and the size of the Navy, but also what
impact it has on the industrial base beyond the major
shipbuilding companies, but down into the second and third
tier. Is it going to be survivable with some of these
procurement decisions that are going to be made? And that is
really going to be very, very hard.
Mr. Palazzo. I appreciate you all's comments. I guess my
time is up. Thank you again. And I definitely agree with the
Secretary that our procurement system needs to be looked at
really hard, and I am also extremely concerned about our third-
and fourth-tier subs. I mean, they are already pressed up
against the wall and hurting. Thank you.
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Cook is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Cook. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Admiral.
Thank you, Mr. Secretary. It is been a long time since I
served under you. I think I was a captain or Marine Corps
captain or maybe I was a major. As I said, it was a long time
ago.
But I appreciate some of the things that you were talking
about. And quite frankly, it is very, very scary, and I think
you are right. And one of the battles that we used to have
personally was this phrase, ``the tempo of ops [operations].''
It seems as though it never goes away. And these commitments
with a force that is diminishing, and now you have the extra
problems with your procurement process and the inefficiencies,
and we just don't have that luxury anymore. It is going to be a
come-as-you-are party when war breaks out. We are going to have
to go with what we have. And I am deeply worried about
maintenance, obviously, and training.
One of my colleagues, there were several, we went out to
the Truman [USS Harry S. Truman supercarrier] a few weeks ago
and we saw the carrier ops, including night ops. And I will
tell you, that is such a fine skill that if you lose that
training, bad things are going to happen; even in training
environments, if we lose that time.
So, you know, I am saying to myself, now that I am here and
I am certainly not young, but I am not in the infantry, a
company commander anymore at Camp Lejeune or going down the
ropes of the Francis Marion [USS Francis Marion attack
transport ship], which no one ever heard of, because that was
in a dinosaur Navy.
And what I am looking for is, I agree with you on this
force, that we have this huge bureaucracy, I am actually
looking for hard, concrete suggestions in terms of proposed
legislation, because if we had the courage to change things, we
could actually do it, because, Admiral, I think you are right,
the culture has changed. And if we are not getting those forces
and what have you down to the fleet and down to the troops,
down to the sailors, you know, we are not doing our job.
So, obviously, I should have been retired 100 years ago,
but now I am in a position where maybe I can change that. So
you, gentlemen, I think you kind of beg the question or the
proposal. I am looking for actual suggestions which would be a
major policy initiative to improve the efficiency of the
procurement forces, change it so that readiness is much better,
and save it in a time where budget crisis is going to be after
budget crisis, money is always going to be a problem, where we
can have better efficiency to protect our Navy and make sure
that they are combat ready for anything that comes down the
pike. If you could comment on it.
Mr. Lehman. I would just say one thing. I hate to say
anything particularly in praise of the current Administration's
defense policy, but one of the best things that they have
produced is the Pentagon's report done by the Defense Business
Board on how to get at the bureaucracy and the overhead. They
have put for the first time in my time in Washington the real
hard numbers, finally made them accessible as to how many
people there really are in the bureaucracy and which
bureaucracies. And what surprised everybody, including the
Secretary of Defense, is how many of our uniform people never
deploy, but have become part of the civilian bureaucracy, and
the 250 joint task forces that have grown from seven with no
particular visible requirement, but it provides the billets
necessary under Goldwater-Nichols.
So I would use as one of your primary sources for ideas as
to where to go to get the cuts the Pentagon's own study, which
was completed 2 years ago and is, I believe, being updated. So
there is plenty, plenty of places to go to find reductions that
do not cut into muscle and bone, but really get the fat that is
marbled through the entire process.
Admiral Roughead. If I could, sir, what I would also add is
that we seem--and I will be honest. I can't recall any time
during my time as CNO when I testified either before the House
or the Senate that I was ever pressed on how quickly we were
getting something to the fleet. It was all about price,
capability, things like that.
And I really do believe that focusing on getting the
equipment out quickly is important. And I just keep looking
back on some, particularly in some of the communication systems
and information technology systems, that I saw billions of
dollars invested in and nothing to show for it, and yet I look
commercially, and it is not an apples-and-apples comparison,
but I look at the introduction of the iPod, the iPhone, and the
iPad in a very short period of time, because I believe they
were driven by when do they have to get it to the market.
And for us, with the systems that we field, there is a
market, and that market is to get those systems into the hands
of our young people so that they can beat an adversary. And I
think we have lost sight of that and we allow some of these
programs to just go on and on and on, and there is no pressure
to deliver on time and an examination as to what is holding it
up. So I would offer that.
Mr. Cook. Thank you.
Mr. Forbes. Thank the gentleman for his questions.
And Admiral and Secretary, we just have three more
questions. I deferred mine till the end so I could get them on
the record for you, if you don't mind.
Admiral, after you released the 2007 Cooperative Strategy
for the 21st Century's Sea Power, your staff, as I understand
it, undertook a force study that would size the Navy suggested
by that strategy. What was the size of the Navy that the study
suggested and how was that reflected in the 2010 QDR?
Admiral Roughead. My recollection is obviously we really
stuck a number onto the 313-ship Navy. Some of the subsequent
work that we did took it up into the 324, 325. But I would also
add that that was before the Arab awakening, that was before
some of the science that is now coming out of the changes in
the Arctic, that is before increased tensions that we are
seeing in the East China Sea and the South China Sea. So, you
know, we were at 313, which was a number that I maintained
throughout my time, but the world is changing, and to look at a
number that won't be realized until 2039, I think that the
committee needs to look differently about how we look at fleet
size and how we drive to that number. And I would submit that
getting out to 2039 is interesting, but it is almost
irrelevant.
Mr. Forbes. And for both of you, we look at that 2039
figure and we hear testimony and we hear speeches made. It is
kind of as if we have those ships right now, you know. But we
all know that during that period of time, not only is it a long
time, but there are certain gaps in there where we take rather
substantial risks. We have gaps for our cruisers and
destroyers, our attack submarines, and you know the gaps are
there.
Where would you pinpoint the greatest risk during that
period of time, if you had to look at it, when we are
stretching it out to 2039? What do you think is the greatest
risk we are looking at, what period?
Mr. Lehman. Well, I would not pick a specific risk, because
I think when you have to stretch as thin as we are now already
stretched, when we can't meet deployments that everyone, every
combatant commander believes is minimally necessary, that we
can't protect all of our ships, commercial ships in the Indian
Ocean, for instance, the first time in history that the U.S.
Navy has told ships they have to stay 600 miles away from the
east coast of Africa because we can't protect you.
So the danger is when you are stretched that thin, an
incident happens, and because you have the number of submarines
deploying with a Marine amphibious group, that some North
Korean submarine happens to get a shot off the way they did to
the South Koreans and sinks an entire aircraft carrier of
marines and equipment, that is catastrophic. What that would do
to world markets, to our economy, we would be in the tank
overnight, and who knows once you loose the dogs of that kind
of incident. And nobody sleeps well if they are depending on
the North Koreans or the Iranians not doing anything
irresponsible.
We are there now, so I wouldn't say that you could pick a
time where it gets worse. Obviously the fewer we have and the
thinning out that we have to do more of, which we are
absolutely going to have to do, makes us more vulnerable to
those unforeseen events. And they happen. As any student of
history knows, they will happen.
Admiral Roughead. Mr. Chairman, I would say that, very
similar to what the Secretary said, I think the greatest risk
is having a Navy that is not sized or ready to respond to the
unexpected, because it is going to happen. I mean, we can go
back in history, and no one had perfect vision even 5 years, 10
years ahead. And so I think that that element of risk needs to
be accounted for.
But I would also say that the great risk to achieving a
Navy that meets the needs of the Nation is the erosion of the
budget from within. And we have touched on that with the
inefficient acquisition and the increasing cost of personnel.
And being able to get in and reform that, I think, gives the
Nation much more running room with regard to building and
maintaining the fleet that it needs.
If that is not arrested, if that is not controlled--and I
am not saying take things away from people, I am saying we have
to come up with a different way of attracting, recruiting,
retaining, and compensating those who serve--but if we can't do
that, the risk of providing and maintaining the Navy, I think,
is pretty significant.
Mr. Forbes. And my last question is really two parts, and I
would love to hear both of you respond to this, if you don't
mind. General Pace testified before the full committee several
months ago, and he said at some point in time there is this
tipping point where we are continually making cuts, and some of
our potential adversaries see that tipping point and start
trying to challenge our national security, where they would not
otherwise have it.
I know it is hard to pick an exact figure, but both of you
have talked about the need to have substantially north of 313
ships, whether it is 342, whether it is 346, or whether it is
400 ships, something much higher than we have today. We are
heading in the other direction.
Where would you say, if you had to peg, that tipping point
might be where we start seeing some of our potential
adversaries start saying, my gosh, maybe we can catch them,
one. And then the second thing that we hear over and over
again, Mr. Secretary, you referred to our COCOM requirements
that we have, we are not meeting those now. Give us your take
on our COCOM request. You know, sometime when we are concerned
about that as a committee, we kind of get witnesses that pooh-
pooh those requests, act like the COCOMs are just coming up
with everything under the sun. You guys have seen that. You
have assessed it. Give us your take on those requests and, if
you would, the tipping point and what your opinion is about how
our COCOM make their requests and how valid you believe they
are.
Mr. Lehman. Both very good points. The first one, the
tipping point, I think we clearly are already there. I saw in
this morning's paper a book just out giving Lee Kuan Yew's
assessment of the world balance, and his assessment is already
there. This is very recent. And, you know, I met with Lee Kuan
Yew. He is one of the, I think, wisest global viewers of this
century, or last century as well. And he says the U.S. is
declining and that people in his neighborhood do not believe
they can rely on the U.S. as they have in the past, although he
then says that the nature of the American spirit is such that
he believes the United States will come back. But the
perception in his neighborhood is we are disappearing fast as a
make weight in the balance. And that is what begets the
temptation of disturbers of the peace like North Korea to go
beyond prudent risk.
So we are already there. It is a question of when it can be
reversed, if it can be reversed. And I believe it can. It
certainly can be reversed.
The second question about the COCOMs' requirements, their
responsibility is to assess worst case, and not worst-case
Armageddon and all-out nuclear war, but in the kinds of things
that they see in their theater as possible to happen, what
would they need to win. And they don't just say, sure, what do
you want, what do you want, what do you want, throw it all in
the pot. It is very, very heavily staffed. And so what comes
out is their assessment of their theater in kind of a worst
case of possible things. And so obviously if you tried to fill
them all, we would--and, Admiral, you know this far better than
me--but when I was in the building, if you added up the COCOM
carrier demands, as the minimum, it was 22 carriers. And so,
you know, you have to do a bit of optimizing, obviously, and
you can't meet all the minimum demands of all of the COCOMs.
Admiral Roughead. I would agree with the Secretary. And I
would say that, particularly if sequestration takes place and
is not amended in some way and we go into a year-long
continuing resolution, I think we are on a very, very rapid
downturn that will challenge reversibility. And I already
commented earlier on reversibility. And I think we put too much
weight on that word.
If sequestration takes place, the CR is in place for a
year, you are fundamentally going to have a different Navy than
the Nation has had since the end of World War II, in my
opinion. So I think that we are there.
With regard to COCOM demands, the Secretary has it just
right, but I believe that that is where the broader strategy
that the committee is thinking through allows you to weigh that
risk and why it is so important to have this global view for a
global Navy for our global interests. And I applaud the
committee for taking that on.
Mr. Lehman. Mr. Chairman, just one codicil to that. I agree
totally with Admiral Roughead, but I hope that this committee
will not take the view that if they are able to stop sequester,
which I hope you are able to, that that will solve the problem.
It won't. Sequestration is simply a symptom and it is a step
along a path that even before sequestration puts the Navy on
the decline. Without sequestration, it gives maybe another 6
months' breathing room. So solving sequestration does not solve
the problem that the Admiral and I are talking about.
Mr. Forbes. And we wholeheartedly agree with you. We have
got really the perfect storm. We have these cuts that have
already been taken, which have been extraordinary, I believe,
and I think in many of the situations the budget has been
driving our strategy instead of the strategy driving the
budget. We have the continuing resolution, Admiral, that you
addressed that has been a killer. And then the third thing is
sequestration. But the fourth thing is the lack of kind of a
long-term planning so that we can get on the right course. This
committee is going to try to deal with all of that, you know,
as we look. And along that way, we will probably call you back
in and try to pick your brain through the process.
So thank you both for again your service to our country and
thanks for being here and sharing with us today. And we are
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:25 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
?

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A P P E N D I X

February 26, 2013

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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

February 26, 2013

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Statement of Hon. J. Randy Forbes

Chairman, House Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces

Hearing on

The Future of Seapower

February 26, 2013

I want to welcome all of our members and our distinguished
panel of experts to today's hearing, that will focus on the
future of seapower in advance of receiving a budget request for
fiscal year 2014.
In January, the Navy presented to Congress a goal of
achieving a fleet of 306 ships, a reduction from the previous
goal of 313 ships. The fiscal year 2013-2017 5-year
shipbuilding plan contains a total of 41 ships, which is 16
ships less than the 57 ships projected for the same period in
the fiscal year 2012 budget request. Of this 16-ship reduction,
9 ships were eliminated and 7 ships were deferred to a later
time.
It should be noted that at its current strength of 286
ships, under the 30-year shipbuilding plan submitted to
Congress, the Navy will not achieve its goal of 306 ships until
fiscal year 2039. And given our past record of meeting long-
term goals, I seriously question the viability of the
shipbuilding plans presented in the out-years of the 30-year
plan. Even worse, the Navy will experience shortfalls at
various points in cruisers-destroyers, attack submarines,
ballistic missile submarines, and amphibious ships. One would
think the number of required ships would have increased instead
of decreased with the Navy now bearing the brunt of missile
defense missions and the announced ``rebalance'' to the Asia-
Pacific.
Another area of concern is the cost of the plan. The
Congressional Budget Office estimates that in the first 10
years of the 30-year shipbuilding plan, that the costs will be
11% higher than the Navy's estimate. It is because of this
issue of affordability that I agree with both Secretary Lehman
and Admiral Roughead on the need for acquisition reform. While
I think it is critical to provide an environment that provides
industry some stability to achieve better pricing, I think it
is equally important to pursue more effective acquisition
strategies. I look forward to understanding what options our
Subcommittee could pursue to obtain this needed acquisition
reform.
In addition to new construction of ships, I also have
concerns on the sustainment of ships already in the fleet.
After years of maintenance challenges, the Navy has now been
forced to cancel numerous ship maintenance availabilities in
the third and fourth quarters of this fiscal year due to the
budgetary constraints of sequestration and the continuing
resolution.
The Navy has been operating in a sustained surge since at
least 2004. We have been burning out our ships more quickly
because the demand has been high. Indeed, in the past 5 years
roughly 25% of destroyer deployments have exceeded the standard
deployment length. A key tenet in the shipbuilding plan is an
assumed ship service life for most ships of 35 years. If ships
do not get the planned shipyard repairs, attaining this service
life will be problematic and ships will be retired prematurely.
In fiscal year 2012, the existing force structure only
satisfied 53% of the total combatant commander demand. It has
been estimated that to fully support the combatant commander
requirements would necessitate a fleet size in excess of 500
ships. Without an increase in force structure, this trend will
only get worse.
Finally, I think that our Navy needs to place more emphasis
on undersea warfare and long-range power projection as part of
a strategy to prevent potential adversaries from achieving the
benefits offered by anti-access/aerial denial strategies. I am
particularly interested to better understand what options the
subcommittee should consider to achieve these goals and ensure
the combatant commanders have the right tools to achieve our
national strategy.
Today we are honored to have as our witnesses, former
Secretary of the Navy John Lehman and former Chief of Naval
Operations Gary Roughead. Gentlemen, thank you all for being
here.

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

February 26, 2013

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN

Mr. Langevin. 1) Future threat environments are likely to be
exceedingly complex, as threat actors acquire significant capabilities
in the realms of UAVs, cruise missiles, and swarming attacks. I have
been pleased to note the Navy's increasing investment in the
technologies that I feel will be needed in these environments,
especially in fields like directed energy and railguns that promise the
ability to create diverse effects with minimal magazine requirements,
thereby greatly increasing time-on-station and combat capability for
surface combatants in a future conflict. However, such capabilities are
not without costs in terms of power requirements, cooling capabilities,
and other factors highly relevant to our discussion of future force
mixes. Can you speak to the need for such technologies, and in your
view is the Navy adequately factoring the needs of future high-energy
systems into its future shipbuilding plans?
Mr. Lehman. Along with maneuvering ballistic warheads, and
sophisticated homing torpedoes, these are the principal threats to our
Navy. None are game-changing and all can be countered, but defensive
technologies must stay ahead of these evolving threats. R&D accounts
must be adequate to fund them. It is important however that ships not
be developed concurrently with new parameter changing systems. The
power, dimensional and other requirements of these systems should be
integrated into ships in an evolutionary way. The new destroyer and new
carrier efforts are sad examples of trying to do too much development
of new technologies concurrently with ship designs. The record of LHA/
LHD, DDG-51, and Nimitz class are examples of the proper management of
evolutionary design integration.
Mr. Langevin. 2) I have been following with great interest the
development of semiautonomous and autonomous UUVs and USVs designed for
roles ranging from environmental monitoring to mine-hunting. Can you
please elaborate on the growing roles of such platforms, and assess how
well the Navy is leveraging them as it attempts to do more with less?
Mr. Lehman. These underwater systems, UUVs and USVs can be
relatively more useful in undersea warfare even than their airborne
counterparts are to surface and air forces. Remotely piloted versions
have long been essential to mine-hunting and underwater exploration.
While the Navy recognizes the promise of these technologies, at a time
of shrinking budgets, new technologies without existing bureaucratic
and industry supporters tend to suffer disproportionate cuts and
cancellations compared to programs with political and bureaucratic
constituencies. They must be actively protected by Congress.

Mr. Langevin. 3) Future threat environments are likely to be
exceedingly complex, as threat actors acquire significant capabilities
in the realms of UAVs, cruise missiles, and swarming attacks. I have
been pleased to note the Navy's increasing investment in the
technologies that I feel will be needed in these environments,
especially in fields like directed energy and railguns that promise the
ability to create diverse effects with minimal magazine requirements,
thereby greatly increasing time-on-station and combat capability for
surface combatants in a future conflict. However, such capabilities are
not without costs in terms of power requirements, cooling capabilities,
and other factors highly relevant to our discussion of future force
mixes. Can you speak to the need for such technologies, and in your
view is the Navy adequately factoring the needs of future high-energy
systems into its future shipbuilding plans?
Admiral Roughead. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Langevin. 4) I have been following with great interest the
development of semiautonomous and autonomous UUVs and USVs designed for
roles ranging from environmental monitoring to mine-hunting. Can you
please elaborate on the growing roles of such platforms, and assess how
well the Navy is leveraging them as it attempts to do more with less?
Admiral Roughead. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]