[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 113-6]
THE QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW: PROCESS, POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
FEBRUARY 26, 2013
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS
MARTHA ROBY, Alabama, Chairman
K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts
MO BROOKS, Alabama ROBERT E. ANDREWS, New Jersey
WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina JACKIE SPEIER, California
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma
Christopher Bright, Professional Staff Member
Paul Lewis, Counsel
Arthur Milikh, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2013
Page
Hearing:
Tuesday, February 26, 2013, The Quadrennial Defense Review:
Process, Policy, and Perspectives.............................. 1
Appendix:
Tuesday, February 26, 2013....................................... 23
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TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 26, 2013
THE QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW: PROCESS, POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Roby, Hon. Martha, a Representative from Alabama, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations................... 1
Tsongas, Hon. Niki, a Representative from Massachusetts, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations........... 2
WITNESSES
Brimley, Shawn, Vice President and Director of Studies, Center
for a New American Security.................................... 4
Dueck, Dr. Colin, Professor, George Mason University............. 6
Thomas, Jim, Vice President and Director of Studies, Center for
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments............................ 8
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Brimley, Shawn............................................... 31
Dueck, Dr. Colin............................................. 43
Roby, Hon. Martha............................................ 27
Thomas, Jim.................................................. 51
Tsongas, Hon. Niki........................................... 29
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Ms. Speier................................................... 67
THE QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW: PROCESS, POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, February 26, 2013.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:00 p.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Martha Roby
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARTHA ROBY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS
Mrs. Roby. Welcome. And I am delighted to gavel to order
the first hearing for the 113th Congress of the Oversight and
Investigations Subcommittee of the House Armed Services
Committee. And I am pleased to have as ranking member my
colleague, Ms. Tsongas from Massachusetts. She and I have
worked together in the past on other important matters, and I
am really looking forward to her guidance and collaboration in
her new leadership role in this subcommittee. So it is a
pleasure to be working with you.
And as members know, this subcommittee plays an important
role, a very special role with the Armed Services Committee.
And Ms. Tsongas and I have received comments from many of our
members, and we have met to discuss the subcommittee's
prospective activities. Ms. Tsongas and I also have both met
with the bipartisan subcommittee staff to review all of our
shared goals. And as you know, pursuant to established
procedures, the chairman of the full committee works with the
full committee ranking member to determine issues and subject
matter appropriate for consideration and investigation by the
subcommittee. The chairman, in coordination with the ranking
member, also provides approval authority for investigations.
So soon we will receive our guidance for the coming months.
And I intend to work with Ms. Tsongas and other members and
staff to establish a plan to fulfill not only Chairman McKeon's
directive but also address other pressing matters requiring
this subcommittee's attention. And I look forward to working
with all members and staff to exercise our responsibility in a
close and collaborative fashion.
Let me now turn to the important topic of today's hearing.
The Quadrennial Defense Review [QDR], which the Pentagon
undertakes every 4 years, is an extraordinary effort. It is a
very important mechanism for our defense leaders to consider
our Nation's long-term military strategy. It is a way to
attempt to match our defenses to the likely threats of the
future.
Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a clear
articulation of the U.S. defense strategy has become more
challenging, which I know all of you, our witnesses, certainly
understand. And the threats to the United States have become
more varied and unpredictable. And clearly describing our
national defense posture in an unstable world is a difficult
task of the QDR.
The QDR process is just now beginning. And over the next
year, the Department of Defense [DOD] will carefully consider
how to approach the world and determine what resources and
force structure are consequently needed. The Department has
committed to come before us in the coming months to learn more
about how that effort is proceeding. Today, we will hear from
three distinguished witnesses who are knowledgeable about the
past QDRs and defense strategy in general. And they will
testify about how the QDR process might be shaped and about
broader strategic issues they believe the coming QDR should
consider.
I hope this panel can help clarify the principles on which
a National Defense Strategy should be based and how those
involved in the current effort might approach their task.
In 2 months, we will mark the 33rd anniversary of the
historic testimony before this subcommittee; in May of 1980,
the chief of staff of the Army, General Edward ``Shy'' Meyer
coined the phrase ``hollow Army'' in describing the conditions
of Army units deployed across the globe to members of this
subcommittee. The world has changed tremendously in the
intervening years, but it remains dangerous. This 2014 QDR is
meant to guide our planning as we anticipate the threats to our
Nation and the forces that we must maintain in response to
those threats. We cannot return to the days of a hollow Army.
I thank the witnesses for their attendance today, and I
look forward to hearing your testimony.
I now turn to my distinguished ranking member for any
remarks that Ms. Tsongas may wish to make.
[The prepared statement of Mrs. Roby can be found in the
Appendix on page 27.]
STATEMENT OF HON. NIKI TSONGAS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
MASSACHUSETTS, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND
INVESTIGATIONS
Ms. Tsongas. Well, thank you, Chairman Roby. And I, like
you, look forward to working with you on this most important of
committees.
And good afternoon to all of you, Mr. Brimley, Mr. Thomas,
and Mr. Dueck. Great.
I want to thank you for appearing before our subcommittee
today, and I look forward to your testimony.
As Martha, Chairwoman Roby, said, this is the first hearing
of the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee for the 113th
Congress. And I want to congratulate Representative Roby on her
selection as chairman. I am glad that we have already been able
to meet personally. And I know the staff has been meeting
regularly as well. And I look forward to working with you and
all of your colleagues on the subcommittee.
I would also like to take this opportunity to welcome my
Democratic colleagues, Representative Rob Andrews,
Representative Tammy Duckworth, and Representative Speier, who
will also be serving with us.
I know we are going to meet soon to discuss the issues and
agenda for this subcommittee. This subcommittee has the ability
to dive deeply into some of the long-term issues facing the
Department of Defense, its service men, service women, and
their families. And I look forward to doing so in the
bipartisan spirit of the Armed Services Committee. We have much
to do.
Turning to the QDR, I think it is always important to have
a regular, thoughtful, and reflective review of both the long-
term and short-term issues confronting the Department of
Defense. Having this regular review of the review, so to speak,
is also critical. As with all that we do, we can always do it
better. If we did it right the first time, we would be out of a
job. This is even more so with the unsettled environment we are
dealing with fiscally, and with the new and evolving threats to
our national security.
We are well past the Cold War and a decade past 9/11. We
all have very difficult decisions to make regarding the best
way to protect our Nation in the future. And I look forward to
hearing our panelists' views. As of now, we have the QDR, an
independent review of the QDR, a GAO review of the sufficiency
of the QDR, a military strategy assessment by the Joint Chiefs,
as well as a recent National Security Strategy by the White
House and the joint DOD-Joint Staff Defense Strategic Review.
We need to make sure all of these reviews are consistent and
don't contradict each other.
I want to make sure we get this right. And I am pleased we
have such an experienced panel here today.
With sequestration set to take effect just 3 days from now,
I believe that this hearing is also quite timely. Our defense
strategy, after all, does not exist in an intellectual void. It
must reflect the resources that we extend to our armed
services. I am curious to hear all of your thoughts on how we
can evolve our strategy to meet 21st century threats in a
period of fiscal austerity. I look forward to our discussion
today with our distinguished panel. I hope you can help us with
these difficult decisions we have ahead. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Tsongas can be found in the
Appendix on page 29.]
Mrs. Roby. Thank you, Ms. Tsongas.
I will introduce our witnesses and review how we will
proceed. All of the witnesses have provided written statements
to the subcommittee. These were circulated to members in
advance of today's hearing, along with full witness
biographies.
The statements will be entered into the hearing record as
received. Therefore, I invite each of you to summarize your
written statements within 5 minutes.
Then we will have rounds of questions, with each member
allotted 5 minutes.
Our witnesses today are Mr. Shawn Brimley, who is Vice
President and Director of Studies at the Center for New
American Security. From February 2009 to October 2010, Mr.
Brimley served in the Obama administration, including as
Special Advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy,
where he focused on the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review.
Mr. Colin Dueck is an Associate Professor in the department
of health--excuse me, the Department of Public and
International Affairs at George Mason University. He has
published two books on American foreign and national security
policies. He studied politics at Princeton University and
international relations at Oxford under a Rhodes Scholarship.
Mr. Jim Thomas is Vice President and Director of Studies at
the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. Among
previous positions, Mr. Thomas served for 13 years in a variety
of policy, planning, and resource analysis posts in the
Department of Defense, including spearheading the 2005-2006
Quadrennial Defense Review.
So, Mr. Brimley, I will start with you.
STATEMENT OF SHAWN BRIMLEY, VICE PRESIDENT AND DIRECTOR OF
STUDIES, CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY
Mr. Brimley. Thank you, Chairman Roby, Ranking Member
Tsongas, and members of the subcommittee.
I am honored to testify on the 2014 Quadrennial Defense
Review. I had the privilege of serving as the lead drafter for
the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, but I wanted to be clear
up front that I was not a senior decisionmaker, just one of
many, many action officers working in that year-long process.
I would like to quickly highlight a few items from my
written statement. The principal challenge with QDRs as I see
them is that they generally have attempted to satisfy multiple
audiences for multiple purposes. QDRs are often judged by their
ability to do five things: One, be a reasonable response to
specific congressional legislation; two, an enterprise-wide
strategy document for the Department; three, an important near-
term lever for the current budget cycle; four, a vehicle for
the Secretary of Defense to advance particularly important
initiatives; and five, a critical public relations and
strategic communications document.
I believe the 2014 QDR should deprioritize the perceived
need to be a big public relations document and strategic
communications approach and focus on providing Congress the 20-
year vision for the Department of Defense and then, coupled
with that, a detailed examination of how that vision can best
be applied given constrained resources. The essence of good
strategy, after all, is aligning ends, ways and means.
I have some thoughts on some recommended areas of focus for
the 2014 QDR. And a core challenge for any defense review is
avoiding the powerful gravitational pull toward the perceived
need to cover everything. The QDR cannot afford at this time to
be a mile wide and an inch deep, and it not need not be. This
will be a second term QDR that has a highly detailed
predecessor and, more importantly, a recently concluded
strategic review closely overseen by the Commander in Chief.
The 2014 QDR should therefore use the 2012 Defense
Strategic Guidance as the baseline strategy, and focus on how
best to implement that strategy over 20 years at various
plausible levels of resources and risk. I believe the 2014 QDR
could best achieve this by focusing in part on a few strategic
issues. First, we need to preserve investment in game-changing
technologies. One of the biggest challenges in this environment
will be to ensure that investments in generation-after-next
technologies continue. And Congress should really focus on this
area. A good example of this is the ongoing attempt to develop
a carrier-based long-range unmanned combat aerial vehicle, or
UCAV, that can provide real capability in an anti-access
environment.
And we should think about how to preserve and protect these
investments over--even in the face of continued budget
pressure. And we should remember we have done this before in
very constrained budget environments. In the so-called interwar
years of the 1920s and 1930s, America and other nations
developed and fielded tanks, long-range bombers, radar,
submarines and aircraft carriers. And if these kinds of
investments could be preserved in that kind of economic
environment--remember it was the Great Depression--surely we
can find a way to prioritize game-changing technology
investments today.
Second, I think the QDR should focus on reversing the
declining value of the defense dollar. I think the 2014 QDR
must deal forthrightly with the ballooning cost of military
personnel accounts. The 2014 QDR cannot be confined to defense
strategy and force structure alone. To be truly meaningful, it
must tackle head-on the challenge of identifying specific ways
to put personnel, health care, benefits, and retirement
spending on a more sustainable trajectory for the Department.
And this will require elements of DOD that are not historically
involved in the year-long minutiae of the QDR to be
structurally integrated into that process from the very
beginning.
On the important role of Congress and you all play in the
QDR, I have a couple recommendations. First, really try to
leverage the QDR independent panel. I think you should
carefully consider all appointments to the panel, biasing
toward former policymakers with Pentagon experience, and also
those with a bipartisan pedigree. Also important will be a key
supporting staff of people who have had previous QDR
experience, also hopefully with a bipartisan ethos. I think the
Department should provide the QDR independent panel with all
the materials necessary--all the materials they need to
succeed; for instance, the QDR terms of reference, all the
scenarios that involve force size and shaping that the
Department will use to assess force structure over 20 years.
And I think they should also consider providing the QDR
independent panel with a dedicated space in the Pentagon and
some reasonable level of administrative support to make sure
they get the briefings that they need.
Second, I think you should consider requiring the QDR to
have some classified components of the review. One of the big
problems with these documents is they do a lot of work in the
classified domain, and they then translate that into an
unclassified report. And I think oftentimes a lot of the
important details get lost. Sometimes they use classified
annexes, but I think it would be interesting to consider
mandating the Department to classify certain sections of the
QDR into the actual report itself and not just a series of
annexes.
And finally, I think the QDR should really try to be
resource informed. Now, I know the legislation specifies
specifically that it is a 20-year time frame unconstrained. But
I think the problem potentially is that the QDR will go and
skew toward fantasy rather than reality. But it can't simply be
a near-term budget drill. A reasonable approach would be for
Congress to make sure the 2014 QDR outlines the size and shape
of the force structure required over 20 years and then also a
series of alternative force structures, given the plausible and
increasingly constrained budget environment.
I think, with that, my time is up. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Brimley can be found in the
Appendix on page 31.]
Mrs. Roby. Thank you.
Dr. Dueck.
STATEMENT OF DR. COLIN DUECK, PROFESSOR, GEORGE MASON
UNIVERSITY
Dr. Dueck. Thank you. I would like to thank the members of
the subcommittee for inviting me to speak with you. The
overpowering consideration with defense strategy in some ways
has been--can you hear me? The overpowering consideration for
some time now has been budget cuts to defense. And
unfortunately, this trend looks likely to continue. The
temptation has been to let budget cuts drive strategic thinking
rather than the other way around.
The QDR is supposed to help outline national defense
strategy. A strategy begins by identifying certain vital
national interests. It then identifies threats to those
interests arising from specific real-world adversaries.
Finally, it recommends the development of specific policy
instruments, including military capabilities, to meet those
threats. It is sometimes said that we live in an age of
austerity, so inevitably budgetary constraints drive the
strategy. But resources are always limited, and strategy is
always about developing a coherent approach toward specific
threats under conditions of limited resources.
So if we simply let declining budgets dictate how we
identify threats to our national interests, then we are not
really engaging in strategy at all. Strategy is about facing
trade-offs. It is about matching up commitments and
capabilities so the two are in some kind of reasonable balance.
And the truth is that right now there is a wide and growing
gap, or imbalance between America's declared international
security objectives on the one hand and its military
capabilities on the other.
Just a couple of examples: The United States has adopted a
policy of pivoting or rebalancing toward the Asia-Pacific. At
the same time, however, we have continued to cut back the
number of ships in the Navy. The two opposing directions don't
really add up. If one of the purposes of the pivot is to
reassure our Asian allies and remind China that the United
States is in East Asia to stay, then how can we bolster that
impression while at the same time cutting back on our maritime
capabilities?
The overall trend, which is growing worse, is that we have
broad international commitments that are under-resourced
militarily. Under such circumstances, basically only a few
options exist. Either the country can boost its military
capabilities to match existing commitments or it can scale back
dramatically on existing commitments to match reduced
capabilities. There is, of course, a third option, which is to
claim that we will do more with less while denying that any
real trade-offs exist. I would call this strategic denial. But
this is not a true option. We can do more with more. We can do
less with less. But when it comes to national defense, we can't
actually do more with less.
Assuming we now add on additional defense cuts of some $500
billion over the next decade, then it has to be emphasized that
even the downscaled national defense strategy implied in the
2012 Strategic Guidance will no longer be coherent or
sustainable. Perhaps the only good thing about this dire
prospect is that it might force a genuine debate and assessment
of some of the basic assumptions surrounding U.S. defense
strategy. The relative emphasis today on long-range strike
capacity, Special Operations, drone strikes, cyber war, area
denial, and light-footed approaches rather than on heavy ground
forces, stability operations, counterinsurgency or major
regional war contingencies, is a move in the direction of what
some call offshore balancing. And such a strategy has a certain
appeal. But it carries risks or downsides as well.
For many years, America's overarching forward presence
abroad, including its related bases, its alliance system, and
clear U.S. military superiority, have played a crucial role in
deterring authoritarian powers, reassuring democratic allies,
and upholding a particular international order that, for all
its discontents, is remarkably prosperous and free by
historical standards. If this strategic presence becomes
detached or uncertain, there is no reason to expect that the
benefits of that order for the United States will continue. And
if we give up on that presence, we can't assume it will be easy
or cheap to buy back. It never has been before.
So if you ask me to make policy recommendations related to
the coming QDR without regard to the immediate political
climate, the first thing I would say is we do have to stop
cutting national defense. Because if we don't, we will soon be
left with no honest strategic options other than some form of
offshore balancing. And as I have indicated, there are multiple
reasons to believe that such a choice could have negative
international consequences on a scale we can barely foresee
today.
But the second thing I would say is let's at least not
engage in strategic denial. Let's not pretend we can maintain
existing commitments while continually cutting military
capabilities. Let's have the debate. And this is where I
believe you can play a vital role in relation to the coming
QDR. You can help ensure that it reflects the original and
stated intention of Congress to produce a long-term reflection
on international security trends and a serious strategy from
start to finish, rather than denying or glossing over the
growing gap between our capabilities and our commitments.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Dueck can be found in the
Appendix on page 43.]
Mrs. Roby. Thank you very much.
Mr. Thomas.
STATEMENT OF JIM THOMAS, VICE PRESIDENT AND DIRECTOR OF
STUDIES, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS
Mr. Thomas. Chairman Roby, Ranking Member Tsongas, and
members of the subcommittee, thank you for your invitation to
testify today on the QDR. As you know, one of the QDR's major
tasks is to develop a defense strategy which is supposed to be
the foundation for determining the Department's priorities,
where it should invest and what activities it should undertake.
It is difficult, however, to imagine a process less suited
to developing good strategy than a QDR, a highly bureaucratic
process involving thousands of people that results in an
unclassified report that is read by our foes and our friends
alike. In trying to capture everything the Department does and
address every challenge it faces, previous QDRs have often
delivered simplistic, lowest-common-denominator results.
Challenges as diverse as transnational terrorism, long-term
strategic competitions with other great powers and weapons of
mass destruction each demands their own strategy, rather than a
single unclassified strategy intended to address them all.
Such challenges do, however, share one common trait. They
will require U.S. forces in the future to operate in far less
permissive environments than in the recent past. Increasingly,
terrorists will be pursued outside of designated war zones in
places like Africa, with more restrictive rules of engagement,
more surveillance requirements, but less logistical support.
Frequently, they will require working indirectly, through
foreign forces, to pursue common objectives.
Unlike Afghanistan, we should also expect that future
adversaries will contest the air domain more vigorously with
sophisticated air defenses and communications jamming. Future
adversaries, moreover, could hold regional ports and airfields,
the key choke points through which many of our forces arrive in
theaters and from which they operate, at risk with precision-
guided missiles and weapons of mass destruction. They could
threaten large surface naval combatants that operate close to
their shores with missiles and mines specifically designed to
target them. And they are more likely to threaten our global
space, logistics, and information systems, as well as critical
infrastructure at home, with anti-satellite weapons and cyber
attacks.
Given such nonpermissive environments, the next QDR should
emphasize highly distributed, autonomous, and low-signature
forces capable of operating independently far forward in denied
areas. This isn't a recipe for offshore balancing, but this is
a recipe for how we maintain viable power projection and how we
stay forward as a nation. These forces and capabilities include
Special Operations Forces for both surgical strike and working
by, with, and through foreign partners; submarines with greater
strike capacity, and unmanned underwater vehicles with greater
endurance; land- and sea-based long-range, air-refuelable,
unmanned stealth aircraft for surveillance, strike, and
electronic attack; deeper inventories of stand-off munitions
that can overcome modern air defenses and electronic
countermeasures, as well as more powerful air-delivered
conventional weapons for holding deep underground facilities at
risk; more survivable and/or resilient space-based systems; and
finally, nonkinetic cyber, electronic warfare, and directed
energy capabilities to achieve both lethal and nonlethal
effects.
Combinations of such access and sensitive forces are likely
to be the spearhead of future campaigns against terrorists, WMD
[weapons of mass destruction] powers, and adversaries
possessing robust anti-access networks. Moreover, these
conventional and Special Operations crown jewel capabilities,
coupled with a robust nuclear deterrent, should become more
central in U.S. military planning, especially in an era of
declining resources. Beyond external challenges, strategy
development also has to take explicitly into account available
resources. None of us want a strategy that is simply budget
driven, but neither can we responsibly craft a strategy that is
unconstrained by our resources.
One of the tricky risk balances that the next QDR needs to
get right is the balance between America's sustained economic
health and maintaining a strong national defense. Failing to
take measures now to reduce our national debt as a percentage
of GDP will only compound our fiscal problems that our children
will face and will leave only fewer resources for our future
defense. While DOD leaders should rightly fight for every penny
they can get to maintain a strong defense, there also needs to
be a recognition that putting the United States on a path back
to strong economic growth and fiscal rectitude is essential to
sustaining the country's long-term military predominance.
Thank you, Madam Chairman. That concludes my opening
statement.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Thomas can be found in the
Appendix on page 51.]
Mrs. Roby. Again, I appreciate you all being here today.
And we will now start our questions. Each member will have
5 minutes, and we will see how far we get.
My questions are for any of you, so please feel free to
jump in. But I want to start with the issues that we have in
this current budgetary environment. And I want to know how can
the Department better address the mismatch between defense
strategy and resources. And I want to kind of dig down on this
a little bit.
But Mr. Thomas outlined some suggestions, and I think what
I will do is try to shift it to the other two panelists and ask
you if have you a better way in mind to set defense priorities
than the existing QDR process, beyond what Mr. Thomas has
already outlined.
Mr. Brimley. If I could, Madam Chairwoman, I think--and I
think Jim and I had very similar comments. You know, one of the
challenges is to satisfy the congressional legislation for a
true 20-year strategic vision for the Department of Defense
that is unconstrained in terms of the immediate budget picture.
But at the same time, that is really only half of the question.
I think the QDR can really, you know, with the support of
this subcommittee and Congress, really take that other view of
translating that unconstrained picture and translating that
back into the near- to mid-term environment where the budget
environment is pretty fraught. And I think part of the way you
can do that is take the Defense Strategic Guidance that the
President spent a lot of time with in 2011 and early 2012 and
use that as the baseline approach. And, you know, through your
oversight, require the Department of Defense to submit to you a
series of alternative force structures that outline plausible
levels of budget funding over the near- to mid-term and require
them to assess those alternative force structures in terms of
the overall risk that poses to the defense strategy.
No strategy is without risks. There is no such thing as an
unconstrained strategy. It is all about aligning ends, ways,
and means. So if we think the budget environment is going to
continue to be fraught, I think one way you get around that is
you require the Department to assess along different plausible
lines of activity and lines of funding what kinds of risk could
we as a nation take against the defense strategy over time? And
there will be a point where the risk is too much, that it
requires a fundamental relook about defense strategy. I
personally am not there. I think that the Defense Strategic
Guidance as outlined in early 2012 is--I would guess is fairly
sufficient in terms of articulating the overall strategic
thrust for defense policy, i.e. the focus on Asia and the
Middle East, for instance. But I think if you require the
Department to take an educated view as to what levels of risk
they could incur in different alternative force structures,
that would go a long way I think to address for Congress and
the Nation the kinds of defense strategy choices we might not
have to face.
Mrs. Roby. Dr. Dueck.
Dr. Dueck. Thank you. Do I have this right now? Can you
hear me?
Mrs. Roby. I think so.
Dr. Dueck. Okay. Yeah, the 2012 Strategic Guidance in some
ways was a significant change from the 2010 QDR. It moved away
from the traditional two-war standard. So that was, in a way,
an accommodation of the fact that the budget has been cut
already.
Now, I actually think if you are going to ask me in the
abstract is that a good idea, I would say no, because you are
raising the risk that one rogue state or another is going to
engage in more aggressive behavior because it judges the U.S.
can only handle one crisis at a time; so, for example, North
Korea versus Iran.
However, having said that, if what you are looking for is
just a more internally coherent strategic document, given where
defense cuts are headed, I mean, it has to be said, we can't
really sustain the two-war standard right now. So as you
probably could tell from my opening statement, I would prefer
to maintain the two-war standard and then fund it. But if we
are not going to, it has to be said the 2012 Strategic Guidance
is more internally coherent. I think it raises risks very high.
But if the question is internal coherence, it does that.
Now, just one good point that Mr. Brimley made in his
statement was personnel costs. If you wanted a practical
suggestion, it is not always the case of, as all of you well
know, simply whether expenditures are higher or lower. I think
that he is exactly right to say that the ballooning level of
personnel costs would be an area to tackle. In other areas,
though, really, the U.S. should spend more. I mentioned
shipbuilding. So if you could redirect in that way, have an
effect in that sense, it would help close the gap between
capabilities and commitments.
Mrs. Roby. Thank you.
And we will circle back on those. But I think probably in
light of what you have said, the dangers associated with that
are inherent in what our future security threats look like. And
we don't necessarily know that, although we can have that
conversation.
My time has expired. And in the interests of setting a good
example, Ms. Tsongas.
Ms. Tsongas. Thank you all for your testimony.
We do live in a very dynamic time, as I said, both on our
fiscal situation and sort of the resources that allows us to
work with but also in a very changing world.
And it was interesting, Dr. Dueck, when you talk about a
change from being able to conduct two wars simultaneously. In
essence, even currently, we had to divert our efforts in
Afghanistan, kind of sort of put them on the back burner, as we
went to Iraq because we really didn't even--didn't even have
the resources then to fully engage in two wars at the same
time. So to change to kind of deal with the change that that is
dictated by more apparent fiscal constraints I think kind of
reinforces or kind of highlights the fact that we actually
haven't done that in recent times, haven't been able to do
that. So I think the issue of what we have, the resources we
have, the fiscal resources we have is very real.
I am curious, since you all have been involved in the QDR
process and obviously studied it very carefully, it is why you
are here today, but if each of you could give one thing, what
is the most important thing for the QDR to do, what that would
be. And how would that help both the Defense Department and
Congress as it wrestles with some very difficult decisions? And
you can----
Mr. Thomas. Thank you, Congresswoman Tsongas. All I would
say is that there are really two things that really have to
occur in tandem. One is getting the strategic diagnosis of the
problem right. What are the core challenges? And how, and this
is really I would underscore the word how, how are you going to
address them? And then the second part of that, which really
goes in tandem, is aligning the program and the efforts of the
Department with that strategic direction.
Dr. Dueck. Well, I would echo that. I think that is exactly
right. The task is one of--although Mr. Thomas has pointed out
that it is--in some ways, it is a strange process because it is
public, I think it would be helpful to try as far as possible
to truly align interests, threats, resources within that
document. And as difficult as it is with a public document,
let's not shy away from mentioning and describing intentions
and capabilities of real world adversaries. I understand there
are arguments against it because it is a strategic
communication document. But, at least for our own conceptual
clarity, it might be worthwhile to have that discussion and
clarify it.
Mr. Brimley. I think there are two things I would say. One,
and I mentioned in my opening statement, you know, when budgets
start to collapse or decline, and they will, military services
historically have tended to sort of get into a bunker
mentality. And so a lot of what I would call game-changing
technologies--Jim talked long-range unmanned submersible
vehicles and likely aerial vehicles--a lot of these
capabilities that have been fully funded in times of plenty,
when the budget starts to decline, they may be perceived as
threats to other things, like manned fighter aircraft, for
instance.
I would encourage Congress to really pay attention to, you
know, we have to invest in these game-changing technologies
now. Take the Asia-Pacific, for instance. There is a lot of
talk about how the anti-access area-denial environment in East
Asia is rather fraught. Well, you think it is bad now, wait 12,
15, 20 years in the future. And so we need to make sure that as
we go through this pretty austere environment, that we focus on
preserving our pretty substantial investments in these game-
changing technologies so we can lock in some comparative
advantages when that environment is really going to get rather
challenging in 10 or 12 years.
And finally, I do think elements of the QDR should employ
the classified realm more aggressively. I think a lot tends to
get lost in translation. And then the QDR gets published, and
then we turn around in the Pentagon, and we reargue first
principles because now we are rearguing an unclassified
document. I think it would be helpful for Congress, frankly, to
use the classified realm to get more out of the Pentagon in
terms of its actual strategies and scenarios and plans. But it
also would really help the Pentagon to make sure that it has a
document, parts of which are classified, that it can then go
right into implementation documents that the Department does as
part of its annual budget cycle.
Ms. Tsongas. Thank you.
I am almost out of time, so I will yield back.
Mrs. Roby. Mr. Conaway.
Mr. Conaway. Well, Madam Chairman, out of respect for my
colleagues who have been here the whole time, I will defer to
the end, since I just got here. Chairing the Ethics Committee,
so I was on official business. But it is fairer for the other
folks who have been here the whole time to go first.
Mrs. Roby. Mr. Andrews.
Mr. Andrews. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Thank the witnesses for their preparation. I was looking at
a document today that identified the security environment for
the United States. And the document highlighted cross-border
aggression, particularly in the Middle East and in the Korean
Peninsula; civil wars within failed states, such as the former
Yugoslavia and Somalia; and then what the report identified as
transnational dangers, which they identified three in this
order: Drug trafficking; flows of immigrants that could cause
threats to United States citizens; and one sentence,
increasingly violent and capable terrorists will continue to
directly threaten the lives of United States citizens and try
to undermine U.S. interests and alliances. This was the 1997
QDR; one sentence devoted to the asymmetric threat of terrorism
4 years prior to 9/11.
What are we missing this time? Are we geared up to begin
thinking outside the box and thinking about threats and issues
that threaten our citizens and our country that we so--we
didn't miss it in 1997, but I mean, one sentence out of about
four pages on the international security environment. It is
human nature to always be fighting the most recent war. But
what mechanism do we have within our defense structure to think
about what we might be missing today that would cause the
country great peril down the road?
Mr. Thomas. Thank you, Mr. Andrews.
You know, every QDR is going to get it wrong as we look
out, just given the mandate in looking out over a 20-year
period. It is going to miss things. So I think a critical part
has to be what sort of agility or adaptability or resilience
are we building into our posture so that we are in a better
position to respond to those surprises if and when they emerge?
That said, I think there are three enduring challenges. And we
talk about preparing for the near term versus preparing for the
long term. I think if you think about the dangers and the
threat posed by Al Qaeda and associated movements, if you think
about the rise of great powers in the Middle East and Eurasia
and elsewhere, and also the growing specter of, not only the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, but their use,
whether it is against our homeland or it is overseas, those
challenges are with us today. And I don't see them falling off
the table anytime in the next 20 years. And I would say those
are three of probably the most pressing that I can imagine.
Mr. Andrews. But I would say that to look for new problems
doesn't mean you ignore the existing ones. Let me use this
example that he is not with us now on the committee, but Mr.
Bartlett in these kind of hearings occasionally would ask
questions that would kind of furrow people's brows, and he
would talk about electric pulse shock and things of that
nature. And I admire him for that because he was thinking in a
way that someone who might want to do harm to our country would
be thinking, which is what bag of tricks do they have? What
weapons do they have? What incentives do they have?
And again, I am so troubled when I read the--I was here for
the 1997 QDR, so I have my own share of blame and
responsibility. But if you would have said to this committee in
1997 that we would be at war in Afghanistan for a decade in the
next decade, I think people would have probably ordered a
saliva test for you. So what are we missing? What aren't we
thinking about?
Mr. Brimley. If I could, Congressman, I think you are onto
one of the perennial challenges with these documents. You know,
Fareed Zakaria, in 2003, wrote a book called ``The Future of
Freedom,'' where he talked about the democratization of
violence, essentially. We obviously saw that on 9/11, and we
saw that, as you allude to, years before that.
But when we think about things like 3D manufacturing, the
ability to literally print out weapons perhaps, nanotechnology,
proliferation of very advanced cyber tools, you know, the
democratization of violence, the lowering entry barriers, where
previously these technologies would be available only to
states, now they are being increasingly pushed down farther and
farther down. You know, Hezbollah is now using very rudimentary
drones, for instance. It is this area that I think we should
focus on. Partly that is why I am talking about preserving
investments in these game-changing technologies, both to take
advantage of them on behalf of our defense strategy but also to
make sure that we understand what these game-changing
technologies are, investing in them, and also investing in
potential defenses. But that is an area where I think certainly
the 2014 QDR should spend some time looking.
Mr. Andrews. I thank you, and I thank the chair.
Mrs. Roby. Thank you.
Ms. Duckworth.
Ms. Duckworth. Thank you, Madam Chair.
So, you know, I think this hearing is timely because of the
impending threat of sequestration and continuing resolution
will be devastating to our country's current National Security
Strategy and readiness. You know, in the face of a Middle East
that is roiled by the Arab Spring, in the face of North Korea
and Iran continuing to pursue a nuclear program, I am concerned
that we are balancing budgetary requirements and the mounting
costs of our current forces with what we need to do to project
into the future with these new threats that are emerging.
So, you know, Mr. Thomas, I sort of looked at your
testimony, and in your written testimony, you said that none of
us wants a strategy that is simply budget driven, but neither
can we responsibly craft a strategy that is unconstrained by
resources. So, in looking at the QDR process, do you have any
best practices? Do you have any recommendations in terms of the
cost monitoring portion of it? For example, would you recommend
having an individual, such as an IG [inspector general] or a
comptroller, with a very specific expertise who would be in
charge of looking at budgetary impacts on proposed initiatives?
Or how do we pay for some of the new emerging technologies if
we are going to balance the threats versus what we are capable
of doing so that we are not wasting money on programs that are
no longer effective or programs that are no longer relevant to
the emerging threat, so that we can indeed pay for those
unmanned submersibles and aircraft? And while we are
maintaining and, you know, making sure that our forces get the
equipment that they need? And also modernizing the existing
force. I am a member of the National Guard. And over half of
the Blackhawks in the National Guard are still alpha model
Blackhawks. When are we going to upgrade those? So can you talk
about that comptroller-IG part? Would that be something that
would be a best practice or something that you would recommend
as part of the QDR process?
Mr. Thomas. I think that is an interesting idea. I mean,
ultimately, as I was thinking about it, it is really Congress
that has the power of the purse. And so, you know, one
possibility might actually be closer consultation between the
executive and legislative branches at the start of a QDR to
think about what the fiscal outlook is. And I don't think we
are trying to get it down to the penny, but just to have some
idea of rough order of magnitude what should we anticipate? Is
the slope going to be straight-lined? Is it up? Is it down? But
what should we plan on? And I am really reminded, historically,
in the 1930s, it was a time of severe austerity, especially for
the U.S. Army. And you had folks who they weren't sure if they
were going to get their next paycheck. They were really living
on a shoestring. The senior leadership of the Army never
questioned the resources that were provided to them by the
Nation. They just said we will do the best we can with what we
are given. And that is still the attitude of our U.S. military
today.
But I think the other element of this is that before we get
into a lot of the meat, how we project power abroad, there is a
lot of overhead and backroom office functions, there are a lot
of reforms that we can make, whether it is reducing
headquarters' staffs, it is thinking about how we better manage
personnel costs and tailor personnel benefits that are most
suitable for the people we have got in our service today, those
sorts of steps we can take. And I think we can preserve a lot
of our ability to project power overseas.
Ms. Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Thomas.
Mr. Brimley, do you have similar types of best practices
you can perhaps talk to? You know, I think about, for example,
the increasing privatization of--well, moving a lot of military
services to contractors. When I was in Iraq, our food was
provided under contract at $38 per meal, three meals a day, per
soldier. And that was in 2004.
So, Mr. Brimley, can you talk a little bit about best
practices and how you feel about a person that could provide
that oversight of the budgetary aspect of the QDR?
Mr. Brimley. I think it would be interesting to go back and
look at--for instance, in my written statement, I say that the
2014 QDR could be the most important since the 1993 Bottom-Up
Review. The Bottom-Up Review was interesting because it
basically presented three alternative force structures, with
all the underlying implications that would be associated with
that. It would be interesting to think about whether the 2014
QDR could do something similar, to come up with three or more
alternative force structures that potentially bias in certain
strategic ways. What does an Asia-Pacific focused strategy
really look like? And what would a force structure look there?
Should we invest much more in the Navy? What would a force
structure look like where we can maintain the abilities to do
long-term stability operations in the Middle East? That would
be an interesting exercise. And I think it would be tough. But
if you mandated something like that and the associated cost
implications thereof, that could be something that I think
could be pretty useful.
Ms. Duckworth. I am out of time.
Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Mrs. Roby. Mrs. Speier.
Ms. Speier. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Mr. Brimley, you just said, ``interesting exercise.'' And I
am sitting here beginning to wonder if this whole QDR process
is just an interesting exercise. All three of you have been
critical on one level or another, calling it a, you know, these
conflicting goals, being a PR [public relations] exercise.
Supposedly, it is supposed to help us guide us in terms of the
budget. If you were to grade how the QDRs have helped us, or
how it has been reflected in strategy, what grade would you
give the military and Congress?
Mr. Andrews. Well, the military.
Mr. Brimley. I will go first and give my panelists a chance
to think. I mean, my first inclination would be to say, you
know, F. But I think when you look at each individual QDR as a
snapshot in time, and you look at all the QDRs all the way from
the base force that Chairman Colin Powell did in 1991 and the
Bottom-Up Review, and the four QDRs, and the next one, and the
Defense Strategic Guidance, if you look at all of those that
provide sort of an arc or a narrative arc of U.S. defense
strategy, or really even U.S. grand strategy over the entire
post-Cold War period, I think we have done a pretty good job as
a nation, as a Department, as a congressional branch, grappling
with the question of what is the role of the United States in
the post-Cold War world? What is the role of the United States
in the post-9/11 world? So I wouldn't say I am bullish on QDRs,
but I think they are useful exercises because it is a really
good forcing mechanism for the Secretary of Defense, but also
for Congress to really engage on these issues.
Ms. Speier. All right. Dr. Dueck.
Dr. Dueck. I think I am known as a relatively easy grader,
maybe a gentleman's C or something like that for the grade.
Ms. Speier. All right.
Dr. Dueck. I mean, I think the United States, in terms of
its overall ability to adjust, in spite of initial hiccups and
failures, has been much more impressive than the QDR process
itself. Put it that way.
Ms. Speier. Mr. Thomas.
Mr. Thomas. I would just say that, just picking up on
Shawn's comment earlier, I mean, there has been an awful lot of
consistency across the last four Quadrennial Defense Reviews in
terms of the challenges that they have highlighted and the
steps that need to be taken. I think where they all have fallen
down is the lack of alignment, their inability to align the
program. It is not going to happen overnight, but we are still
running on the force structure and the program that was
essentially laid out in the 1993 Bottom-Up Review. We really
haven't moved beyond that. We talk a good game about changing
the force planning construct, getting beyond the two major
theater war construct, but we still aren't there. And I think
we have a long way to go.
The last point I would just say, ma'am, is I think there is
a danger that the QDRs have just gotten too big. It has gone
from being an innovative practice to being institutionalized,
where you have a bureaucracy that is working this. Tons of
contractors, lots of folks, each service has its own QDR office
that is already established. It just gets to a point where I
think it has gone too far. And I think simplifying that process
and getting it down to where it is not all things to all people
would be a step in the right direction.
Ms. Speier. All right. Maybe we need a separate hearing in
which you can come back and suggest to us how it should be
reconstructed. I have a question on energy costs that are
eating the Defense Department up. But I think you, Mr. Brimley,
actually referred to it in your testimony. For every 25-cent
increase in the price of a gallon of oil it costs the
Department of Defense a billion dollars. That is staggering.
And the idea that somehow we are not going to engage in
alternative energy would be deeply troubling to me. Do you have
any comments that you would make on that in terms of strategy?
Mr. Brimley. I would say one thing, Congresswoman. It is
regarding overseas posture. One of the things I did when I was
at the Pentagon was I was a member of the team that convinced
Secretary Gates to make investments in forward architecture in
Southeast Asia in places like Darwin, Australia, or pushing
forward the deployment of littoral combat ships to Singapore. I
think there is a key strategic need for us to remain engaged
overseas. But part of it is a cost issue. I think if you look
at in the very near term, yes, it costs money. But if you look
at our forward presence over the long term, say 15 to 20 years,
you know, the ability to forward station in particular naval
assets in Asia I think is a very real cost saver over the long
term, because you are not paying for the fuel to go back and
forth, back and forth across the Pacific for 20 years. I think
there is real cost savings associated with overseas basing and
forward posture. And I know that is not a popular issue on the
Hill, but I think it is one we should look at.
Mrs. Roby. Mr. Conaway.
Mr. Conaway. Well, thank you, Madam Chairman. It is some
interesting comments. Kind of playing off of some of the things
that have already been said, the role of the national strategy,
which was developed by the White House and, in 2011, just kind
of rolled out there, I have been in the process during that
time frame, and I didn't see a lot of transparency, a lot of
discussion as to why we made that change or what was the
analysis done. What would be the role of the QDR at creating
the National Security Strategy? It is a chicken or egg kind of
thing, I guess. But should as a part of this QDR process say
that that National Security Strategy is valid and we ought to
plan against that? Or where is the interplay between the two?
And you got one group working for the White House who kicked it
out. And I understand the tension there. But where in the
system does the White House get graded on changes to the
National Security Strategy?
Mr. Thomas. Well, just, sir, I think normally Quadrennial
Defense Reviews don't take on the issue of evaluating the
National Security Strategy. And perhaps they should. And I
think you are raising an interesting point. The other thing is
that a lot of Quadrennial Defense Reviews have ended up rolling
out a year or so before the National Security Strategy comes
out. So there is kind of a disconnect in terms of the
sequencing of events; that normally it is the top-level
strategy that drives the defense strategy and so forth.
The other thing I would say that is really missing is we
have a Quadrennial Defense Review, the State Department now has
its own Quadrennial Diplomatic and Development Review that it
does, and other departments are doing this as well. But it
seems to me there is a crying need for some sort of a national
security review that occurs across departments. And I think one
of the goals should be to take on this issue of informing or
crafting what a National Security Strategy should be at the
grand strategy level.
Mr. Conaway. Kind of playing off what Ms. Speier talked
about, we brag on the 1993 QDR. Can you give us an example of
how 2011 and 10 or 11 years in Afghanistan and a big fight in
Iraq, what happened out of the 1993 QDR that made us better
prepared and more nimble?
Mr. Dueck, you made the comment that made the most sense,
and that is we are incredibly adaptive. And we will take, if
you watch our military, we will take folks who are trained to
do a lot of things and ask them to do totally out-of-their-lane
things, and they get it done. So what happened out of the 1993
QDR that helped us in this decade that we ought to brag on?
Dr. Dueck. Well, I think Mr. Brimley was right initially
when he said that that in some ways was probably the most
impressive, over the years, of the QDRs. It necessarily adapted
to a post-Cold War world. So there was a pressure of necessity.
And but, you know, over the years, the trend has been this
gap between capabilities and commitments. One point I would
just make, going back to an earlier comment, was that it is
true, as Mr. Andrews said, that we never can predict exactly
what the future will hold, which in a way is an argument for
simply being very strong. I mean, you can make the case to say
there is a risk that if we try to get too far ahead, that we
could give up on existing capabilities. For example, if we now
plan on the premise that we won't face anything like Iraq or
Afghanistan, and it is safe to say we won't, I mean, the
historical pattern has been since the 1940s we never get it
right in terms of predicting what the next conflict is going to
be. So, in a sense, it is not simply a matter of predicting
some very futuristic wave; it is actually a sense of being
strong across the board.
Mr. Conaway. I guess the point would be that the reason
that our team is so good at doing whatever it is we ask them to
do, and many times it is nothing they have been trained to do,
is it is about personnel. So as we try to deal with that
tension between the costs of personnel, which are huge, and a
big deal, versus the capacity to do other kinds of things, you
know, we have never been really good at making those--you know,
I hate to use the word hollow out the force, but it has been
used an awful lot. We have not seemed to be able to learn our
lessons and protecting that American mind-set that wears our
uniforms that gets things done no matter what the odds, no
matter what the resources available. Whether it is in the 1930s
when they just took what they got or the folks who have been in
this fight for 12 years now. You know, undervaluing that I
think is probably the biggest danger to the system, and not
being able to have folks in place who can adapt, who can take a
tool that is used for one thing and use it for something else.
Madam Chairman, I yield back.
Mrs. Roby. Thank you.
And I have a few more questions, and Ms. Speier has a few
more questions. So we are just going to--and then, Mr. Conaway,
if you have any follow-up. We are just going to plow through
this. I know we are expecting votes soon. But then we will be
able to wrap it up.
And I want to also echo the sentiments, as I said in my
previous questions, that what our enemies look like in the
future and what Mr. Andrews makes an excellent point in being
prepared for that.
And I hear, Dr. Dueck, what you are saying as well.
But I really think in light of this balance between, you
know, unconstrained by resources, but the budgetary
constraints, we have got to be realistic in making sure that we
are prepared. And I think this is an opportunity to do that.
And so I hope that we will take into consideration our evolving
relationships with places like India and China and Iran, but
also those that may be unanticipated in other parts of the
world as well.
We talked about the grade for QDR, not Congress. If it is
an F, and we have an opportunity right now to improve upon it,
I want to spend a little bit of time and hear your comments,
because it hasn't come up yet, about the role that the
independent panel is going to play in this QDR as opposed to
the previous. By having them involved, a smaller panel involved
ongoing throughout the process, as opposed to them reviewing it
at the end and telling us this document is worthless and
doesn't mean anything. So maybe they didn't say it like that,
but essentially that is what they told us. So how is this, the
independent panel's involvement throughout going to improve?
Because a lot of the suggestions that have been made, and these
are very valid questions about the process, may be too late for
the 2014. This is an opportunity to improve upon the final
document. So if you could just explain to us about that.
Mr. Brimley. If I could, I spent some time in my written
testimony looking at this. I mean, I was in the Pentagon when
the first independent panel started up, and I thought it was
very useful, but it was handicapped in a sense because it
started when--we were probably 75 percent of the way done, and
then it was really this dynamic of them grading the homework,
which I think was a useful thing to do, but I think, as you
allude to, Madam Chairwoman, you know, standing up the
independent panel now and giving them the documents they need
to succeed, to include, I think, a lot of classified material,
maybe secure space at the Pentagon with some administrative
support, with a support staff that maybe is part-time, maybe
some full-time that have, you know, full clearances that have--
you know, that have a background in this stuff could be
extremely useful.
I remember when we were doing the 2010 QDR, we had internal
red teams, and we brought in external folks from the think tank
community, so there was a lot--there was a willingness, I
think, on the part of the Pentagon, the folks crafting the QDR
to really use these sorts of mechanisms. And I think you are
right, if you stand up the independent panel now, staff it the
right way, select panelists who have a background and interest
in this stuff, I think it could be a very, very powerful
mechanism to track all the way through.
The final thing I would say is to structure in, you know,
on and off ramps throughout the process where the panelists
come back and brief this committee and others but also brief
the Secretary of Defense. I think this could be a useful
process, not just for Congress but also for the Secretary of
Defense and the executive branch.
Mrs. Roby. Absolutely.
Does anybody want to add anything?
Okay. I will forego the rest of my time.
Ms. Tsongas, you had a couple of follow-up questions, and
then we will go to Ms. Speier.
Ms. Tsongas. Not so much a question but just this hearing
really is our opportunity to sort of revisit and visit the QDR
process as we are poised for this next round, and as I said in
my opening comments, if we got it right at the first--if we got
it out of the gate, we would do ourselves out of a job. And I
do know that we've revisited this QDR process over time and
that now having the independent panel do its work in concert
with the QDR rather than being a follow-on to sort of revisit
and assess, I think, is an important reform, and we will see
how it works. Thank you.
Mrs. Roby. Mrs. Speier.
Ms. Speier. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Mr. Brimley, you referred to wasting assets, and you know,
some would argue that aircraft carriers and stealth technology
are examples of assets that have limited comparative advantage.
Are you--could you point to any other wasting assets that we
should be looking at?
Mr. Brimley. I think that term is generally--I should cite
that, Jim's boss, Andy Krepinevich, wrote a great article in
Foreign Affairs that talked about wasting assets, so, in some
ways, this is really a question for Jim. But I think, yes, you
named a couple of capabilities that I think stealth, even
aircraft carriers, if you want aircraft carriers to be
survivable in the future, you really need to make investments
now in increasing the range of the carrier air wing. I think
that is a huge issue, so that is one aspect.
I think investing in aviation capabilities that can help
America project and sustain power over much longer ranges than
we have in the past is really--is really what I was trying to
get at when I used that term. You know, the massive amount of
money we are spending procuring thousands of relatively short-
range type of flyer aircraft does not really align, in my view,
to the future of security environment we are going to see in
places like the Middle East or the Asia-Pacific.
Ms. Speier. Comments by Mr. Thomas.
Mr. Thomas. To echo Shawn a little bit, I mean, especially
when it comes to the aircraft carrier, the Nation has made an
incredible investment in carrier aviation over many decades,
but we see today that the challenges we face in areas like the
Western Pacific and even the Persian Gulf where countries with
anti-ship ballistic missile technologies and anti-ship cruise
missiles as well as mine and torpedo threats using their
submarine forces, they are going to end up pushing our forces--
our naval forces out, and they are going to have to operate
from greater ranges.
So, figuring out how we extend the life of the aircraft--
extend the range of the aircraft that fly off the decks of the
carriers is absolutely critical to getting every penny of value
out of the aircraft carriers that are in the fleet today and
that we are going to have in the future.
Ms. Speier. Thank you all.
Mrs. Roby. Well, I just want to thank you, Mr. Brimley and
Dr. Dueck, and Mr. Thomas. We really value what--the
information that you brought us today and all of the
information contained in your testimony, and I just want to
say, as we really enter into this process and think about the
things that we talked about today and, you know, God willing,
improve upon this process so we have an end product that is
going to be useful in these outyears and really not focusing so
much on the now, which we got caught up in a little too much in
the last, but really, really taking this opportunity to prepare
for 20 years from now.
So thank you again for your time and your testimony, and to
the members of the committee.
And with that, we are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:05 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
February 26, 2013
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February 26, 2013
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
February 26, 2013
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SPEIER
Ms. Speier. Mr. Thomas mentioned the Red Team as playing an
important role in the 2006 QDR, and participated in the 2010 external
Red Team. Do you think an external Red Team should be part of the
process for the 2014 QDR, and do you have any sense as to whether one
will be in place?
Mr. Brimley. Given the scale of the challenges facing the
Department and Congress in working through the current fiscal
environment to make smart, prudent, and pragmatic defense choices, it
is right and proper to leverage a Red Team process to help those
working the QDR produce the best possible product. It will be important
for any red team effort to not attempt to develop an alternative QDR or
to get in the way of the QDR Independent Panel. I would suggest that
Congress request that the Secretary of Defense establish a QDR Red Team
that shall be exposed to the initial QDR conclusions in the July/August
2014 timeframe, with the goal of reporting to the Secretary of Defense
no later than October 31 2013, in order to ensure that the conclusions
of the team are received in time to be influential to the end-game of
the formal QDR process. This timing also ensures that the red team will
not get in the way of the assessment of the QDR Independent Panel,
which will report after the QDR is released in February 2014. I do not
believe a formal QDR Red Team has yet been established by the Secretary
of Defense.
Ms. Speier. Mr. Brimley, I'm very concerned with personnel and
healthcare costs at the Department of Defense, and was struck by your
comment that the QDR must also look at these costs. Most of the
concerns we've heard about the QDR is that it's not sufficiently
engaged in strategic thinking, why do you argue that the QDR is the
right forum to develop a strategy for addressing these costs?
Mr. Brimley. It may well be the case that the QDR is not the right
forum to develop a strategy for addressing the spiraling cost of
personnel and healthcare costs, but I am concerned that it is possible
that no other forum currently exists that is structurally important
enough to signal real change. I believe that the essence of strategic
planning is understanding where you are, where you are likely to go
given current trends, and making informed choices about how to navigate
into the future. If the QDR process does not include any references to,
or assumptions about, the projected costs of military personnel and
healthcare than any discussion about levels of investment with respect
to military capabilities would be fundamentally ignorant and nearly
useless for the Secretary of Defense and for Congress. So whether it is
the QDR, the current Strategic Choices and Management Review, or some
other high-level forum, it is critical that the underlying cost drivers
for the Department of Defense be fully exposed to scrutiny in order to
have a meaningful conversation about the sustainability of U.S. defense
strategy.
Ms. Speier. Mr. Thomas mentioned the Red Team as playing an
important role in the 2006 QDR, and participated in the 2010 external
Red Team. Do you think an external Red Team should be part of the
process for the 2014 QDR, and do you have any sense as to whether one
will be in place?
Dr. Dueck. I do think a ``red team'' should be part of the process
for the 2014 QDR. Such an independent assessment from the outside helps
to test the assumptions behind the QDR and in the end makes them
stronger. In 2010, for example, there was an Independent Panel for the
QDR that year, a genuinely bipartisan panel, that made good
recommendations across a range of areas and actually anticipated
certain policies such as the administration's strategic pivot to Asia.
Congress has mandated that a similar independent panel, the National
Defense Panel, provide independent assessment of the upcoming QDR 2014,
and a number of excellent appointments have already been made to that
panel by members from both parties. I believe the National Defense
Panel will play an indispensable role in the 2014 QDR process.
Ms. Speier. Mr. Thomas mentioned the Red Team as playing an
important role in the 2006 QDR, and participated in the 2010 external
Red Team. Do you think an external Red Team should be part of the
process for the 2014 QDR, and do you have any sense as to whether one
will be in place?
Mr. Thomas. Yes, I believe that a Red Team should [be] part of the
2014 QDR. It should be composed of a group of distinguished civilians
and retired senior military officers with reputations for challenging
the status quo. They should be unencumbered from normal bureaucratic
concerns. However, the aim should NOT be to create a bi-partisan group
like the National Defense Panel that offers its own independent
assessment of the security environment and the strategy. Rather, the
Red Team should be to bring together a group of apolitical strategy and
force planning experts (thus avoiding the typical bipartisan commission
result of ``splitting the difference,'' that removes any sharp edges
from their recommendations and is more likely to maintain the status
quo) to advise and assist the Secretary of Defense.
The Red Team's mandate should be to consider how best to align the
defense program with the Secretary of Defense's strategic guidance. The
Red Team should make its recommendations directly to the Secretary of
Defense, free from requirements to coordinate or staff their findings.
To maximize its effectiveness, the chairman and executive director of
the Red Team should be granted accesses to all Department Special
Access Programs. The Red Team's findings should be classified.
I am not aware that the Secretary of Defense has made any decision
to establish a Red Team for the upcoming QDR.