[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
DEMONSTRATIONS IN TAHRIR SQUARE: TWO YEARS LATER, WHAT HAS CHANGED?
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 26, 2013
__________
Serial No. 113-9
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/
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http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DANA ROHRABACHER, California Samoa
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio BRAD SHERMAN, California
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
TED POE, Texas GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MATT SALMON, Arizona THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina KAREN BASS, California
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
MO BROOKS, Alabama DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
TOM COTTON, Arkansas ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
PAUL COOK, California JUAN VARGAS, California
GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III,
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania Massachusetts
STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas AMI BERA, California
RON DeSANTIS, Florida ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
TREY RADEL, Florida GRACE MENG, New York
DOUG COLLINS, Georgia LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
TED S. YOHO, Florida JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
LUKE MESSER, Indiana
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
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Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
TOM COTTON, Arkansas DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
RON DeSANTIS, Florida JUAN VARGAS, California
TREY RADEL, Florida BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois
DOUG COLLINS, Georgia JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III,
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina Massachusetts
TED S. YOHO, Florida GRACE MENG, New York
LUKE MESSER, Indiana LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
The Honorable Elliott Abrams, senior fellow for Middle Eastern
Studies, Council on Foreign Relations.......................... 8
Katrina Lantos Swett, Ph.D., chair, U.S. Commission on
International Religious Freedom................................ 14
Tamara Cofman Wittes, Ph.D., director, Saban Center for Middle
East Policy, The Brookings Institute........................... 23
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable Elliott Abrams: Prepared statement................. 10
Katrina Lantos Swett, Ph.D.: Prepared statement.................. 16
Tamara Cofman Wittes, Ph.D.: Prepared statement.................. 25
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 52
Hearing minutes.................................................. 53
The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress
from the Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement.......... 54
Questions submitted for the record by the Honorable Joseph P.
Kennedy III, a Representative in Congress from the Commonwealth
of Massachusetts, to Tamara Cofman Wittes, Ph.D................ 55
DEMONSTRATIONS IN TAHRIR SQUARE: TWO YEARS LATER, WHAT HAS CHANGED?
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TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 26, 2013
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 11 o'clock a.m.,
in room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-
Lehtinen (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. The subcommittee will come to order. I
want to recognize the presence in the audience of a dear friend
of our committee, Annette Lantos, the widow of the late
chairman of this committee, Tom Lantos. It is always a
pleasure, Annette, to see you. Thank you.
After recognizing myself and the ranking member, my good
friend, Mr. Ted Deutch, for 5 minutes each for our opening
statements, I will then recognize other members seeking
recognition for 1 minute each.
We will then hear from our witnesses and without objection,
the witnesses' prepared statements will be made a part of the
record and members may have 5 days to insert statements and
questions for the record, subject to the length limitation and
the rules.
Before I begin my remarks, I would like to convey my
deepest condolences to the families of the nearly 20 tourists
killed and others injured in the horrific hot air balloon
accident in Egypt today. Our thoughts and prayers are with
their families.
The Chair now recognizes herself for 5 minutes. Two years
ago, on January 25, Egyptians were poised to cast off the yoke
of oppression and maybe, just maybe, bring an end to
authoritarian rule in Egypt. The hopes of the Egyptian people
and those of many other nations across the globe, including
here in the United States, would be that Egypt would finally be
able to transition to true democratic rule.
Then in June 2012, Mohammad Morsi and the Islamic Muslim
Brotherhood came to power. Hopes for a free and democratic
society in Egypt quickly eroded into fears that the new Muslim
Brotherhood-led government would turn on its people. Last
November, Morsi took unilateral action to consolidate his power
by issuing a decree that he would be immune from judicial
challenge while also orchestrating a draft constitution that
imposes strict Islamist practices.
The new constitution was hastily put together after
opposition parties and religious and ethnic minority groups
abandoned the discussion over their objections to the Islamist-
dominated proceedings. Instead, the Muslim Brotherhood-led
government was able to integrate Sharia law into the
constitution while leaving out crucial protections for ethnic
and religious minorities.
In addition, there have been reports of unprecedented
crackdown on Egyptians trying to express their freedom of
speech, freedom of the press, and freedom of assembly. Earlier
this month, a live TV broadcast caught Morsi's police agents
brutally beating, stripping, and dragging an Egyptian civilian,
Hamada Saber, during protests against the regime in Cairo.
Dozens of protesters have died or have been injured in clashes
with the Morsi regime, yet this has not deterred Morsi, nor has
it affected the Obama administration's stance on Egypt.
Since the 2-year anniversary of the Egyptian revolution,
Egyptians have rushed to Tahrir Square and to the streets
chanting the same slogans they used to oust Mubarak. In their
eyes, this revolution is not over. Their objectives have not
yet been reached as they thirst for democracy and protections
of their human rights. Nevertheless, the U.S. administration
continues to double down on its failed Egypt policy and has
done nothing to prevent U.S. taxpayer dollars, F-16 fighter
jets, tanks, and other support to be sent to the Morsi regime.
Much attention has justifiably been given to the Benghazi
attacks on September 11th, but many may forget that our Embassy
in Cairo was also attacked on that same date. During this
attack the Egyptian Government failed to provide the necessary
security support needed to prevent the protesters from
breaching the walls of our Embassy.
As our nation is set to face dramatic economic cuts this
week due to sequestration, we should not be providing funds
without conditions to the Muslim Brotherhood-led government
that is not conforming to democratic principles and is not on
the right path to fulfill its obligations to the international
community and to its own citizens.
As the administration seeks to send hundreds of millions of
U.S. taxpayer dollars to the Morsi regime, we need to reexamine
our aid package and use it as leverage to promote true,
democratic reforms in Egypt. To accomplish that, I reintroduced
HR 416, the Egypt Accountability and Democracy Promotion Act.
This bill conditions our security and economic assistance to
Egypt in order to advance US national security interests by
ensuring that Egypt protects freedom, human rights, the rule of
law, civil society organizations and upholds the 1979 Egypt-
Israel Peace Treaty.
During Morsi's tenure, videos surfaced showing Morsi
describing Jews as ``bloodsuckers and descendants of apes and
pigs.'' Morsi has yet to demonstrate his willingness and
ability to properly secure the Sinai. And Morsi has rolled out
the red carpet to Ahmadinejad in an attempt to reestablish ties
with Iran, a state sponsor of terrorism that actively seeks the
destruction of our closest friend and ally, the democratic
Jewish state of Israel. We must recognize that the Morsi
government is unstable and not yet proven worthy of unabated
economic and military support.
And with that, I yield to the ranking member, my friend,
Mr. Deutch for his opening statement.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. Thanks to
the witnesses for appearing today and before I start, I also
would like to just express my condolences to the families of
those who were lost in the tragic hot air balloon accident,
families who literally are in all parts of the globe, and our
thoughts and prayers will be with them.
In the aftermath of Hosni Mubarak's 30-year reign, US
policy toward Egypt has become increasingly difficult to
navigate as Egypt's civil society and government institutions
are now led by inexperienced politicians whose organization,
the Muslim Brotherhood, had been banned for decades. The fact
remains that Egypt is now governed by an Islamist government
and we must determine how US policy should reflect this change.
The United States continues to provide $1.3 billion in
military funds to the Egyptian military in hopes of wielding
American influence and creating a stable security situation for
the United States and for our allies. Despite our large amount
of assistance, we still have major disagreements with Egypt.
There is no doubt we have a drastically different world here
with President Morsi. And the history and belief system of the
Muslim Brotherhood is profoundly alarming for both the United
States and for our ally, Israel.
The tempting position, therefore, is to oppose all aid to
Egypt. Such a decision, I believe, would have serious
ramifications for our interests. First, it is likely that Egypt
would abrogate its peace treaty with Israel. Second, the
Egyptian military would lose tremendous power and the military
still operates virtually independent of the Morsi government
and weakening the military would give the Muslim Brotherhood
nearly complete control. Third, it is safe to say that
Ahmadinejad and the Iranian regime would love nothing more than
to see the U.S.-Egypt relationship crumble as it would bolster
Iran's ambitions to be the region's power. Therefore, despite
my objections to many aspects of the current Egypt Government,
I cautiously continue to support our military and economic
assistance to Egypt, but only, only if we can be certain that
our aid is used in the smartest and most effective way
possible; only, only if it protects the security interests of
the United States and our allies.
The collapse of U.S.-Egyptian relations would pose a grave
security threat to our troops in the region and to Israel, and
the effects would reverberate throughout the Middle East. The
US has been cautious in dealing with the new Egyptian
leadership, and continued political missteps and outrageous
statements by President Morsi seem to repeatedly highlight our
concerns. Morsi's attempts at seizing extra presidential powers
in November, the rushed passage of an incomplete constitution,
and the continued refusal to engage with opposition parties
have reignited tensions across Egypt. These actions beg the
question can Mohammad Morsi and a Muslim Brotherhood-led
government be a reliable US partner? Morsi has shown little
appetite for taking political risks, save for his role as
broker of the cease fire between Hamas and Israel last fall.
Despite the United States' strong condemnation of Morsi's
past anti-Semitic and anti-Israel comments, he has yet to
disavow these and other past statements of great concern. This
is incredibly troubling. Yet, Morsi has repeatedly given
assurances that he will uphold the 1979 Peace Treaty with
Israel.
In addition, the Egyptian military has been destroying
smuggling tunnels in the Sinai into Gaza, the main route used
to transport weapons to Hamas. But the Sinai became a virtually
lawless region following the revolution. Instability in the
Sinai had given way to an increase in kidnappings and activity
by radical groups, all of which culminated in an attack along
the border that killed 16 Egyptian soldiers last August. In the
6 months since the attack, the Egyptian military has ramped up
is efforts to control the Sinai and I am encouraged by the
cooperation between Israeli and Egyptian militaries, but it
remains to be seen whether Morsi has the political will to
withstand any future rise in domestic opposition to the Peace
Treaty with Israel.
I am encouraged by yesterday's news that President Morsi
has moved parliamentary elections to May in order to allow for
all Egyptians to take part. The secular opposition, now
somewhat united, is already threatening to boycott those
elections. President Morsi must engage the opposition in a
meaningful way. Efforts to shut out the opposition will result
in the continued polarization within Egypt and continues to
keep tensions running high on the streets.
It is incumbent upon the United States to send a clear
message that democracy must be upheld. President Morsi simply
must commit to ensuring the rights of all Egyptians. We have
got to ask ourselves and I hope our witnesses will address what
level of trust, if any, exists between the Muslim Brotherhood
and the opposition parties. Is the Muslim Brotherhood
attempting to consolidate power? And finally, what are the next
steps to ensure that American interests and the interests of
our allies are protected while not letting Egypt become a
failed state or worse.
I look forward to exploring these issues and others with
our panel. And again, thanks very much for being here today.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Deutch. I will
recognize members for a 1-minute opening statement should they
desire.
Mr. Chabot of Ohio, the chairman of the Subcommittee on
Asia and the Pacific is recognized.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Madam Chair, for holding this
important hearing to look at developments in Egypt, 2 years
after the so-called ``Arab Spring.'' One of the great concerns
I had at the time of the revolution in Egypt, a concern I know
you shared as well, was that the rise to power of the Muslim
Brotherhood and its Islamist jihadist allies would threaten
the peace and security in the region, particularly with regard
to our closest ally in the Middle East, Israel. I am sorry to
say that those concerns 2 years later have not been alleviated.
I am looking forward to hearing the testimony from our
distinguished panel of witnesses this morning, who I know will
share their thoughts with us on what's happening now in Egypt
and what developments we can expect to see in the months ahead
with regard to our bilateral relationship, the Egyptian-Israeli
relationship, Egypt's role in the Israeli-Palestinian peace
process, and the stability or lack thereof of the Morsi
government. I know their comments will be enlightening and I
know we all look forward to them. Thank you very much.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Chabot. Mr. Vargas
of California is recognized.
Mr. Vargas. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. I want to
thank you for holding this hearing and thank the distinguished
panel for being here today. I, too, have great concerns about
the issues in this region, especially here in Egypt. The Morsi
regime and the Muslim Brotherhood rule means that our national
security interests for the rights--and also the rights of the
Egyptian people, I think, are threatened. I've seen, all of us
have seen, since the assumption of office in June 2012,
President Mohammad Morsi has done a terrible job in bringing
about a peaceful transition of power from marginalizing his
opponents, critics, and protesters to strengthening the
relationships with Iran. Morsi's actions have rightfully caused
great concern here in the United States.
I would also ask the panel if they could address the issue
of what effects these developments in Egypt will have on our
peacekeeping forces. My understanding is that we continue to
have 600 Americans in Egypt as well as 1,000 others in the
force. So anyway, I would like to hear about that, too, because
I think it is very important for us to know how Egypt is
stabilizing the peace with Israel and as well threatening our
own troops. Thank you.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. Mr. Kinzinger of Illinois is
recognized.
Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you all
for coming. You know, one of the concerns especially over the
next few days as we deal with sequester which we're all going
to get sick of hearing, I already am, we're dealing with the
question and the issue of America's role in the world and
especially when it comes to Egypt. What I am concerned about
and what I am interested in hearing from you is what do we do
to stay engaged in Egypt? What leverage do we have besides just
aid? Because I am afraid that we're sending the message both
with sequester and I think frankly with this administration's
actions that America is disengaging from the world.
My concern is when you see America retreat from the world,
you see that retreat followed up by chaos coming where America
once was. And I fear the day when our allies no longer love us
and our enemies no longer fear us. And so my concern and my
question is how do we ensure that we have the maximum leverage
in Egypt? How do we maintain an alliance with them, but also
hold them accountable to the values that we believe and
frankly, the values that America stands for around the globe.
I thank you all for coming.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, sir. Mr. Kennedy of
Massachusetts is recognized.
Mr. Kennedy. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you to the
ranking member and thank you very much, the witnesses, for
being here today and to the chair again for holding a very
important hearing today.
We heard so much about the role of Egyptian youth in
igniting the Arab Spring, the Arab Awakening, and the important
role that it played in Tahrir Square and the demonstrations and
the youth movement throughout North Africa and the Middle East.
And I would love to get and am looking forward to hearing your
comments about what the international community, what the
United States can do and should be doing in order to make sure
that so many of these young adults that are coming of age in a
transition to democracy continue to believe in democracy and
continue to make sure that they have a stake in this process as
it moves forward. Thank you.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, sir. Mr. DeSantis of Florida.
Mr. DeSantis. I am not going to make a statement, Madam
Chairwoman. Thank you.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. I will give your time to Mr. Meadows of
North Carolina.
Mr. Meadows. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and thank you to
the witnesses for being here today, specifically as we look at
this particular issue. I would love for you to address as we
start to look at there has been reports recently of a draft
constitution and comparing that to the 1971 constitution and
the word changes that are out there. So as we start to look at
that, some of the things mentioned in there were very
problematic when we look at a democracy and truly the rule of
law. So I would love for you all to comment on that. Thank you.
I yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, sir. Congresswoman Meng of New
York is recognized. Thank you.
Ms. Meng. Thank you, Madam Chair, and Ranking Member, and
thank you to the witnesses for being here today. There are
obviously very disturbing trends in Egypt that must be closely
monitored. Egypt must recognize that its greatest threat is not
Israel, but rather the scourge of extremism and violence that
is overtaking its country and threatening the stability of its
neighbors. As such, our military aid to Egypt must increasingly
focus on border security, counterterrorism, and
counterinsurgency activities. And we must insist that our aid
serves these purposes.
So as not to repeat the mistakes of the past, we must
pressure Mr. Morsi's government to build the institutions and
civil society necessary to achieve true democracy. Relatedly, I
am deeply concerned about the threats to women in Egypt. The
recent surge and violence against women and the curtailment of
their political rights are not only women and human rights
issues, but they also lead us to question the Egyptian
Government's commitment to a free and democratic society. I
look forward to hearing from the panel. Thank you.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
Dr. Yoho of Florida.
Mr. Yoho. Thank you, Madam Chair, Ranking Member and
panelists. I just want to say, you know, in these tough
economic times, it is absolutely necessary for us to scrutinize
every dollar that the American people spend and for our
Government to follow through with that and that we give it in
good faith that we get a good return on that investment. And I
look forward to hearing your statements today so that we can
draft up some great policies to help both countries and the
rest of the world. Thank you.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, sir.
Congresswoman Frankel of Florida.
Ms. Frankel. Thank you, Madam Chair. I look forward to
hearing this panel. I am interested in really the good and the
bad and the ugly. I would like to know what Egypt is doing well
to bring security to Israel and the Middle East. And what are
the areas that we need to be concerned about. I think all of us
and the American people, especially as we talk about the budget
cuts and so forth, is for you to tell us why continued aid to
Egypt would be important for the security of Israel and
important to the stability of the Middle East.
I would like to echo Ms. Meng and say that I, too, am
concerned about the reports of rape and attacks on women
protesters. And I would want to know what, if anything, can be
done about that. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much. Mr. Weber of Texas is
recognized.
Mr. Weber. Thank you, Madam Chair. I really don't have a
lot to say. I am looking forward to hearing from our panel. I
am interested in the jets sales, the jets that are set to go to
Egypt. I don't know if any of you are set to address that, but
I hope to have some discussion about that and I echo my good
friend and colleague, Dr. Yoho's comments about we need to be
very good stewards of our money and good policy going forward.
Thank you.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, sir. And Mr. Connolly of
Virginia.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and I, too,
welcome our witnesses today. I think it is really important
that this subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee
be very cognizant of the fact that Egypt is a work in progress.
It is not going to be perfect. And where it is not and we can
try to influence it in a positive direction, that is what we
need to do.
We have a lot at stake. This is the largest Arab population
in the world. Camp David must respected. We have a lot at stake
in this relationship. And so I think we need to eschew harsh
rhetoric while still trying to use our good influence to good
effect on the Morsi government. So I look forward to hearing
from our witnesses today, but I would hope we would keep
moderation and nuance in mind in what is an emerging and
evolving Egypt. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. And now the Chair is pleased
to welcome our witnesses. First, we have the Honorable Elliott
Abrams, senior fellow for Middle Eastern Studies at the Council
on Foreign Relations in Washington, DC. Previously, he served
as Deputy Assistant to the Secretary and Deputy National
Security Advisor in the administration of President George W.
Bush. Welcome, Dr. Abrams.
Next, we would like to welcome Dr. Katrina Lantos Swett,
chair of the U.S. Commission on International Religious
Freedom. Also, Dr. Lantos established the Lantos Foundation for
Human Rights and Justice in 2008 and serves as its President
and Chief Executive Officer, carrying on the legacy of our late
chairman and dear colleague, Congressman Tom Lantos. We welcome
you.
And finally, we welcome Dr. Tamara Cofman Wittes. Dr.
Wittes is a senior fellow and the director of the Saban Center
for Middle East Policy at Brookings. Dr. Wittes served as
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs
from November 2009 to January 2012.
I would like to kindly remind our witnesses that your
prepared remarks have been made a part of the record and I
kindly request that you keep your statements to 5 minutes.
Thank you so much and we will begin with the Honorable Elliott
Abrams.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ELLIOTT ABRAMS, SENIOR FELLOW FOR
MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
Mr. Abrams. Thank you, Madam Chairman. It is a pleasure to
be here today. I thank you for the invitation. The questions
the members have posed will only take about 4 hours to answer.
There are a lot of disturbing trends as several of you have
mentioned. More charges have been filed for the crime of
insulting the President in the less than 1 year of Mohammad
Morsi's rule than since 1892.
Freedom of assembly, I'll give another example, is very
much under threat under new laws that have been proposed. The
problem seems to be that the Muslim Brotherhood leaders of
Egypt are not seeking compromise and accommodation. They are
seeking just to rule Egypt and rule it in their direction. The
chairman of the Egyptian Human Rights Organization wrote
recently ``as the situation stands, a grim future lays ahead
for democratic transformation and human rights in Egypt.'' And
he added that Egypt's new draft constitution ``fails to offer
the necessary safeguards for human rights.'' In fact, the term
human rights doesn't appear.
The thing is President Morsi won by 51 to 48. He didn't win
in a giant landslide in that June election last year. Nearly
half of all Egyptians did not want a Muslim Brotherhood
government. And that should have suggested that accommodation
and compromise were the way to go and the healthiest thing, but
don't seem to.
As you know, Egypt's economy is in real trouble, too: The
Egyptian pound falling, foreign currency reserves falling,
tourism falling, foreign direct investment falling. Desperate
need for foreign currency with which to buy bread. Egypt is the
largest importer of grain in the world, but grain traders today
say ``they are living hand to mouth.''
Now the IMF keeps postponing, having to postpone loan
negotiations due to political turmoil in Egypt. There is
another huge problem which is the growing lack of law and
order, the rising crime rate, and especially the number of
assaults on women. There is an epidemic of sexual harassment
and rape in Egypt. And women who take to the streets to protest
are often themselves subject to more abuses.
I want to go back to the economic because the fact is they
are linked. Egypt cannot solve its economic problems until it
addresses its political problems. The economic solutions
require some hard steps and those cannot be taken unless there
is a kind of consensus. But there is no political consensus and
therefore, there is no consensus on what to do on the economy.
The political crisis and the economic crisis are linked.
So I would urge the committee to take a bottom to top look
at our aid program, the timing, the conditionality, and the
composition. I don't think we should return to what was really
our pattern of decades which was if their foreign policy is
okay, we don't much care what happens inside Egypt. I think
that was a mistaken policy.
I don't think we should be supplying things like F-16s that
Egypt does not need to address the security concerns that it
really has: The absence of law and order in the streets, the
problems of anarchy, really, in parts of the Sinai, the
prevention of terrorism in the Sinai. We run a great risk, I
fear, of appearing to many Egyptians to be indifferent to the
human rights struggle that is taking place in Egypt today. If
we are on auto pilot with the aid program, that is the message
that they are going to receive. And despite the huge changes in
Egypt in the last couple of years, there really haven't been
many changes in our aid program. So there is no impact from
President Morsi's horrendous anti-Semitic comments. There is no
impact from the new constitutional provisions which disfavor
anyone but Sunni Muslims. There is no impact from the
continuing trial of 43 NGO workers who were set to work on our
aid program. Those trials have not ended. But there is no
impact on our aid program.
I think all of this needs to be taken into account as you
look forward to the continuation of the aid program in Egypt. I
don't think it can be right that those vast changes there lead
to zero changes in the way we give aid to Egypt. I urge to
undertake that kind of review. And I thank you again, Madam
Chairman, for holding this very important hearing.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Abrams follows:]
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Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Dr. Abrams.
Dr. Lantos Swett, thank you.
STATEMENT OF KATRINA LANTOS SWETT, PH.D., CHAIR, U.S.
COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
Ms. Lantos Swett. Thank you so much, Madam Chairman. This
is an extraordinarily important hearing. We can always rely on
you, Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen, to draw attention to the most
pressing issues of the day and so I am really very grateful
that you have chosen to convene this hearing.
The short and simple answer to the question how have things
changed in the last 2 years is that much has changed in Egypt,
but much more needs to change if the Egyptian people are going
to realize their hopes for a genuine democracy that represents
all Egyptians, fully respects the rule of law, and complies
with international human rights standards including freedom of
religion and belief. These issues matter significantly.
Madam Chair, because of these concerns I led a UCIRF
delegation to Cairo earlier this month to assess religious
freedom condition in the country. And I think that gives me a
bit of an advantage because I literally was there in just the
last few weeks and look forward to answering your questions
about the very fascinating encounters we had with a wide range
of individuals.
The overwhelming sense we got from nongovernment
interlocutors with whom we met was that there was little reason
for optimism about the country's short-term trajectory under
President Morsi. Some we spoke with felt strongly that the
Morsi government has not been inclusive of or taken seriously
the liberal and secular opposition's views. The most common
concerns we heard focused on the poor state of the economy,
increasing radicalization in a society that negatively impacts
women and religious minorities, troubling provisions in the new
constitution limiting religious freedom and other rights, and
frustration about the continuing climate of impunity for
numerous acts of violence, including those targeting Coptic
Christians since the beginning of the revolution 2 years ago.
Regarding the violence and continuing climate of impunity,
it is unclear to what degree how much the current government
could effectively do to improve the situation even if it had
the genuine desire to do so, but we found skepticism among many
we spoke to that that desire was there. As a consequence of the
ups and downs in Egypt over the past 2 years, there have been
some positive societal developments, particularly among
religious and secular groups. Christian communities, including
Coptic, Orthodox, Protestant, Catholic, and others, have
started to organize with opposition groups and representatives
from al Azar to counter religious extremism. Notably, all
Christian groups have come together to form for the very first
time in Egyptian history a council of churches which has held
its first meeting just last week.
Overall, our visit to Egypt confirmed that the situation is
indeed complicated and concerning. Egypt is arguably the most
important country in the region and during this transition is
inadequately protecting the rights of its citizens, including
the right to freedom of religion and belief. The United States
has a unique role to play and our Government must do more to
press Cairo to implement real and meaningful reforms. We cannot
afford to sit idly by.
And before I close my testimony, I would like to share a
very dramatic encounter I had with the Deputy Minister there
that in some ways was the most revealing episode of our whole
visit. I brought up to him the comments that others have
referenced by President Morsi calling on the Egyptian people to
nurture their children and grandchildren in hatred of Jews and
Israel down to the last generation, calling Jews the
descendants of apes and pigs. And I was sitting much, much
closer to him than we are, a little more like the distance
between my good friend and colleague, Elliott Abrams. And I
said to this individual who happened to be a Salafi Muslim, I
said, ``Your President is calling on hatred of me and of my
children to be nurtured and by your children down to the last
generation. Your President is calling me the descendant of apes
and pigs, calling my seven children the descendants of apes and
pigs.''
You could hear a pin drop in the room. I said, ``This is
not the conduct, this is not the language, of a civilized
society. This is not the way people address their fellow
citizens and their fellow human beings in a civilized
society.'' I pivoted and said, ``What if your President,
tomorrow, were to stand up and address the Egyptian people and
the world and say, enough, this is a stain on our character.
This is a stain on our national honor. Never again, no more
will we permit people in positions of responsibility and power
in our country to speak in this way about our cousins, the
Jews.'' I said, ``Well, he would receive plaudits from every
corner of the world, deserved plaudits. And it would open
potentially a new day for the 1.2 billion Muslims in the
world.''
Well, when I shared this experience the next day with a
reformer, their answer to me was very interesting. They said,
``The day after the day after President Morsi said something
like that he would be assassinated by his own people.'' And I
found that to be perhaps the most disheartening and most
illuminating moment of our trip to Egypt. I look forward to
answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Lantos Swett follows:]
----------
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much.
Dr. Cofman Wittes.
STATEMENT OF TAMARA COFMAN WITTES, PH.D., DIRECTOR, SABAN
CENTER FOR MIDDLE EAST POLICY, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTE
Ms. Cofman Wittes. Thank you, Madam Chairman, Ranking
Member Deutch, distinguished members, I am delighted to be with
you. US policy toward Egypt since the revolution has rested on
two pillars: Preserving the Camp David Peace Treaty and the
security of the Israeli-Egyptian Gaza border and trying to
provide economic assistance that could, with wise Egyptian
policy, help to stabilize the Egyptian economy and help a new
government deliver for its people. But like a stool with only
two legs, this strategy is incomplete and it will not produce
stability in Egypt for the reasons my friend, Elliott Abrams,
has noted.
The United States needs to weigh in and press the President
of Egypt and his party, as well as other relevant parties, to
make the necessary accommodations to put Egypt back on the path
to a stable, democratic transition. Now some argue that the
United States can't have any real impact on Egyptian politics
today. I disagree for two reasons. First, because we still have
a lot to offer and it is not all about our assistance dollars.
Second, because Egyptians, both inside and outside government,
still care what we think and what we do about it. If they
didn't care, if they thought we didn't matter, they wouldn't
spend so much of their time trying to embroil us in their
domestic arguments.
And because they still care, I believe the leverage we have
is probably most effectively deployed as incentives, not as arm
twisting. Our recognition, our investment, our visits, our good
opinion, our expressions of partnership all matter, along with
our aid dollars.
Now we can't afford to take a short-sighted approach to
Egypt's transition. We cannot afford to focus on a
transactional relationship with the current winners. We can't
assume we know who will come out on top at the end of this
messy transition. We have to keep our focus on two long-term
goals. First is building lasting stability through democracy.
And that is the choice of the Egyptian people. They have made
clear that whatever economic and social problems they are
facing, they want to solve them through democratic means. So we
need to support that goal consistently.
The second is building a broad coalition in Egypt to
support cooperative relations with the US. We will never return
to the days when Egypt's interests were defined by a single
man. The US should not be seen as having taken sides in Egypt's
fractious politics. We need to engage broadly with Egyptian
politics, with Egyptian society, to make the case for
partnership and we do have common interests with Egypt and with
the Egyptian people.
Egyptians have suffered greatly from Islamist terrorism. In
polls, they reject violence against civilians at a higher rate
than any country in the world where Gallup does this polling.
Egypt's peace treaty with Israel has spared a generation of
Egyptians the destruction of war and brought them stability.
Egypt's majority, its young people, want a better future and
they know that in the 21st century this requires Egypt to be
connected to the world and the norms that we share.
Let me turn briefly to the record of the Muslim Brotherhood
which raises real concerns as my colleagues have stated about
their commitment to core democratic principles, their
obligations as democratic actors. We should communicate our
concerns consistently and at the highest levels, but we also
have to recognize that with all their flaws, the Brotherhood
won the freest and fairest elections in Egypt's modern history.
They may win the next election. They may not win forever, if
human rights can be protected and a strong pluralist system can
be built, but we cannot ignore the Brotherhood or wish them
away.
The real leverage we have is that the Brotherhood-led
government wants our recognition and they seek our partnership.
So we can make clear that their electoral victory does not
absolve them of their basic obligations to democratic rules and
norms, if they want to be recognized as democratically
legitimate on the global stage.
The political opposition, of course, has lessons to learn
as well. And I think all of these actors will either learn the
art of the deal or they will fail in the eyes of Egyptians and
the world.
Let me make one more comment about something disturbing
that I have heard from a number of Egyptians in recent weeks
who are so worried about the instability and chaos in their own
country, that they have begun to talk about the possibility of
a military takeover again. I think a military takeover would be
a disaster for Egypt, for Egyptian stability, for American
interests. Military rule would divert attention and resources
from crucial border security and counterterrorism functions. It
would undermine our ability to continue the cooperation that is
so valuable, both to us and to them. And that is especially
important for the US as we continue to drawdown from
Afghanistan, face terrorism challenges in Gaza and Sinai and
the prospect for confrontation with Iran.
Distinguished members, I look forward to your questions.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Cofman Wittes follows:]
----------
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Excellent testimony. Thank you, the three
of you so very much and I am sure that we will have very good
questions after I am done.
But I wanted to ask two questions. Number one, on
conditioning US aid to Egypt and number two on the prospects of
improved relations or deterioration of relations with Israel.
Would you agree that our leverage to be credible we cannot
simply grant financial aid to Egypt until Morsi's Muslim
Brotherhood-led government meets certain conditions that cannot
and must not be waived, and do you support conditioning our US
aid to Egypt until it recognizes certain conditions, its
citizens' human rights, religious minority rights, protects law
and order, cracks down on illicit activities in the Sinai,
etcetera?
And secondly, on relations with Israel, how do you see
Egypt-Israel relations in this coming year and with the
elections that Egypt is going to be holding in the near future?
Do you think that this will be good for Israel, the kind of
language to be used? Is it a bargaining chip in all of the
political debate, etcetera? We will begin with the Honorable
Elliott Abrams.
Mr. Abrams. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Those are very
difficult questions. On the question of relations with Israel,
Morsi has been careful. For example, within the last few weeks,
Hamas made another request to open an office in Cairo. And the
Government of Egypt said no. And you have seen the reports
about the flooding of those Sinai smuggling tunnels with water
and with sewage. So those are two things we care a good deal
about. Those tunnels are how those arms get into Gaza. The
Government of Egypt seems to be doing a good job, indeed a
better job than the Mubarak regime did.
So I think Morsi realizes that any trouble with Israel
would be devastating at least, at least economically in terms
of foreign investment, tourism, the IMF.
Just on the first part, I want to say I agree with you. I
think conditionality is important. And again, the two go
together. If there ls no political conditionality, the
economic----
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. I don't want to cut you off because I
know you elaborated on that in your statement.
Mr. Abrams. Right.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. If I could have the two other witnesses.
Ms. Lantos Swett. Absolutely. Can you hear me now? Sorry
about that. I was saying that in 2012, UCIRF did in fact,
recommend that the United States Government should certify
progress on protection for religious rights and broader human
rights as a condition of disbersement of military assistance.
So the position that UCIRF has taken in the past, recent past,
has been that there should be some conditionality on aid as a
means of exercising leverage. We're still in the process of our
deliberations for our upcoming report, so I won't address that
specifically, but I will say here under the watchful gaze of my
late father, that I know that when he was serving in Congress,
not only his watchful gaze, but his dog, Gigi. So that that is
a double whammy. I really better behave myself. But he did
support a degree of linkage and conditionality. And he always
felt that that was a means of leverage.
On the issue of relations with Israel, I agree with my
colleague, Elliott Abrams, that Morsi has been careful, but I
think the underlying danger, and this is a great fear that I
have, is that as this government is unable to deliver on a
whole range of promises, you have these huge raised
expectations on the part of the Egyptian people that are now
slamming into all sorts of disappointment on the economic
front, on the political liberty front, on the rights front, and
there is, unfortunately, a long history in that region of the
world of unifying people----
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. I am going to cut you off a second, just
so I can have Tamara speak.
Ms. Lantos Swett. Of course.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Madam Chair. I think we have
to distinguish between the military aid and the economic aid.
The economic aid, as you know, has been shrinking over the last
10 years or so. And so I think on the economic side we can be
most effective either by putting more money on the table if we
think it is a good investment or more likely by working with
others. If you look at the total package of assistance that is
waiting on the signing of an IMF loan, it is about $14.5
billion. That is a much more significant lever than what we can
provide alone. And so we should work to develop conditions that
are shared by the Western governments and the multi-lateral
organizations that are providing this aid.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. We will wait for your Israel answer at
another time.
My ranking member, Ted Deutch is recognized. Thank you.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Madam Chair. Egypt is currently
among the largest recipients of aid from our country. Our aid
to Egypt is a stipulation of the Camp David accords. It has
been the backbone of our relationship with Egypt for decades
now.
If we were to eliminate aid to Egypt, we risk US security,
I think Israel security, stability within the region. We give
bad actors in the region, like the Iranian regime, I think
exactly what they would want, but it is not just a question,
and you have already started speaking to this. It is not just a
question of whether or not we provide it, it is how--I think we
need to ask the question, how do we provide, what do we
provide, and in the context of both of those questions, how
human rights respect for women and religious minorities,
democratic principles, to the extent there is conditionality,
how are those--how do we do it? What are the metrics? How do we
figure that out as to how we provide the aid?
When we provide foreign military funding to countries they
pay, as I understand it, they pay for their purchases up front.
In the case of Egypt, they have the opportunity to finance
their purchases. They pay their contracts out over time. The
only other country that enjoys that system, I think is Israel.
And so the Egyptian military now has multiple contracts
outstanding with American defense firms. A study that the GAO
did back in 2006 found that Egypt had agreements in place in
excess of $2 billion, some of which weren't going to come due
until 5 years later. The point is if something happened that
required a quick cutoff of US aid to Egypt, like a violation of
the Camp David Accords, at that point the United States and
ultimately the American taxpayer would be on the hook to pay
the termination penalties that the defense contractors would be
owed.
So should that continue and should the conditionality be
part of perhaps how we administer that aid?
And then finally, and you have spoken to this some, but I
would like you to elaborate, for the past 30 years, Egypt has
been purchasing military hardware like F-16s and Apache
helicopters. M1A1 tanks, but Elliott Abrams has spoken to this
and we have now heard from many of my colleagues that perhaps
it is in our national security interest and Israel's security
interest and most importantly Egypt's own security interest
that we shift from supplying those sorts of offensive
capabilities to advance counterterrorism capabilities. And I
would like you to address what that would actually look like,
what that shift would entail.
And then the last question is would the Egyptian military
and would the Egyptian Government object to greater
intelligence and counterterrorism cooperation with the United
States? And if the answer to that is no, they wouldn't object,
then shouldn't they acknowledge that US assistance may be
better served by focusing on those other areas?
Dr. Wittes, let us start with you and then we will come
back.
Ms. Cofman Wittes. Thank you, Congressman Deutch. Briefly,
I think on the economic side the most important change we can
make is to reverse the one change we have made since the
revolution. We have halted our democracy assistance and our
support for Egyptian civil society. And in a moment of
transition, that is, I believe, a mistake and something we need
to correct. We need to resume that support now.
On the military side, yes. I think that increasingly the
Egyptian military and the Egyptian Government are aware that
their primary security challenge is not a massive land force
invading their country. It is the 21st century security
challenges we are all facing and that we need to work together
to combat. And I think in many ways the Libyan revolution and
the spiraling effects of that on the neighborhood drove that
point home.
I think this is a time when together Egypt and the United
States can do a real strategic reassessment of military aid and
how we use it.
Mr. Deutch. Thanks. Mr. Abrams, what would that look like?
Mr. Abrams. Too much of the money goes to very big ticket
items like F-16s. If you are trying, for example, to keep order
in Sinai, F-16s are not helpful. Other things may be.
Helicopters may be. APCs may be. Jeeps may be. Training may be.
So I think you would lose some of the big ticket items, but you
would have a different composition of the military aid program.
Mr. Deutch. Thanks. I am out of time, but I hope Dr. Swett
you will have an opportunity to speak to if we move to
conditionality what would those metrics look like? What would
we actually expect to have happened in order to accomplish
that?
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much. Mr. Chabot, the
chairman of the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific is
recognized.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank our witnesses
again for their testimony this morning. I don't know if any of
you had the opportunity to watch 60 Minutes a couple of weeks
ago when President Obama and Secretary Clinton appeared for a
joint interview to reflect on the administration's foreign
policy. The President made an interesting statement. He said
and I quote: ``When it comes to Egypt, had it not been for the
leadership we showed, you might have seen a different outcome
there.'' My first thought was did he really say that? And my
second thought was I can't believe the interviewer let that go
unchallenged.
Today, in Egypt, its Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated
President has carried out a naked power grab of considerable
proportions. He bullied through a new constitution backed by
the Brotherhood that threatens the rights of women and non-
Muslims. Garbage is piling up in the streets. The police force
is said to be just as corrupt as it was during the Mubarak
regime. Civil uprisings are occurring throughout the country.
Opposition figures cite abduction and torture by government
officials. And now we even hear that bakeries throughout Egypt
are contemplating a strike later this week to protest rising
wheat prices.
So I guess I would have to ask just how much worse could
things have been in Egypt without the benefits of this
President's alleged leadership? If I may, I would also like to
get your thoughts on parliamentary elections now scheduled for
April. Egyptian opposition leader Mohamed ElBaradai told the
BBC yesterday that if the elections are held, given the
adoption of the Islamist-drafted constitution, it could set the
country on a ``road to total chaos and instability'' and then
he added ``we need to send a message loud and clear to the
people here and outside of Egypt that this is not a democracy,
that we have not participated in an uprising 2 years ago to end
up with a recycling of the Mubarak regime.''
I wonder if you might want to comment further on the
prospects for the parliamentary election and what further bumps
in the road we can expect as we approach the April dates?
Dr. Abrams, I would like to hear your thoughts on those
points that I just brought up.
Mr. Abrams. Thank you. The problem goes back again to the
lack of any kind of consensus. The government is moving forward
despite opposition and not seeking to get any buy in from
groups outside of the Muslim Brotherhood. So one could envision
parliamentary elections that would kind of bind up the nation's
wounds. I don't think these will because the opposition doesn't
believe that the ground rules are fair and believes as you just
said that the constitution was railroaded through. So they are
just being disregarded.
My fear is that if you combine that with a declining
economic situation, you are going to see more and more disorder
and the temptation, as Dr. Wittes said, is always in a
situation like that to look for a foreign enemy.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you. We only have a limited amount of
time so let me go to another question. I will open this up to
all the panel members. As we all remember when we saw the
protesters on Tahrir Square, the ones who really did favor
reform and change and democracy and all the rest, it was
inspirational to a lot of folks. And of course, the Brotherhood
at that time was saying we are not interested in governing. We
don't want the presidency. That is somebody else's business.
And of course, they were the organized group in the country and
we saw what happened.
Are there any prospects for the non-Muslim Brotherhood
folks to be better organized and do better down the road? Where
are we there? And I will go with Dr. Wittes here and then we
will move down that way, although I only have a minute, so if
you could make it relatively brief.
Ms. Cofman Wittes. Thank you. I will be as brief as I can.
The other political parties right now believe that because of
the crisis facing the President and the Brotherhood, they can
fight this out in the streets. Both sides are playing a zero-
sum game and that is not constructive. Ultimately, if these
opposition parties are going to be successful, they have to get
in and compete and win people's votes. And so yes, the
President needs to reach out to them and change the electoral
law so they will come on board and they need to bargain and
come on board and run.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you. Dr. Swett?
Ms. Lantos Swett. Yes. I think that we saw in the religious
communities a new activism, a new sense on the part of some of
the minority communities that they need to get engaged
politically and to some degree make common cause with the
secularists. They have no confidence in this government. No
confidence in their role in the society in the future. And
there were very, very grave concerns expressed about the
constitution and the way it bakes into the cake some of the
illegitimacy that they see in the government.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you. I ran out of time. Just let me say
it was a real honor to work with your father on this committee
for so many years.
Ms. Lantos Swett. Thank you so much.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. It really was. He was a hero to so many.
Congressman Vargas is recognized.
Mr. Vargas. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. I appreciate
the opportunity. If this was a tabula rasa, a blank slate, we
would never give aid to this country. I mean an oppressive
leader, who oppresses his people; the Muslim Brotherhood that
doesn't respect other religions; the President who has said the
most anti-Semitic things we have heard in the last years. I
mean this is simply a country that we wouldn't want to give
aid, especially military aid.
However, a lot of us do remember Anwar Sadat. We do
remember that Egypt did come together and sign a peace treaty.
We remember him ultimately causing his life. They didn't kill
him the next day, it took a few years, but they ultimately did
assassinate him for that. He spoke at the Knesset.
So I guess my question to you is obviously we all have
great concern about Egypt, its size, its strength, its peace
treaty with Israel. Could you comment about that? I think the
American people think it is crazy to give these guys money and
F-16s, but at the same time there is this other side.
Dr. Elliott Abrams, could you comment on that?
Mr. Abrams. Several members of the committee have said this
is the most populous Arab country and in some ways has long
been the most influential. I don't think any of us are thinking
about breaking off from Egypt, particularly because we don't
like this government which may last for a couple of years or a
couple of decades. So I think the question is as you look at
the aid program, not what will make this government happy, but
given the changes in Egypt and our uncertainty about where they
will be one or 2 or 5 years down the road, what should that aid
program look like?
I don't think a program that looks exactly as it did,
exactly as it did when Hosni Mubarak left office, except that
we have stopped the human rights programs can possibly be the
right way to go. But I wouldn't stop the aid or suspend the
aid. I would change it.
Mr. Vargas. How would you change it? Since you haven't had
much time here, I would like to ask you how would you change
it?
Mr. Abrams. Very briefly, I would say look, we need to sit
down with the new Government of Egypt and say the status quo
won't work for us. It won't work for Congress. It won't work
for the American people. Let us put together a new package and
talk to the Egyptian military about what their needs for this
coming decade are.
I don't think that they are in a position to say to us,
particularly if we are talking with other donors, go away. We
are not interested in re-thinking this. So I think it would
look like a military aid package that is adapted to the real
dangers facing Egypt today. And on the economic side, I think
Dr. Wittes is right. It is not so much would we give, it is
that we have enormous influence as part of a coalition of
donors.
Mr. Vargas. Thank you.
Ms. Lantos Swett. I don't have the competency to address
the specifics of the military aid package, but on the broader
issue of conditionality and linkage, I think that when we, as a
country, set aside our human rights concerns for what we
perceive as our hardcore, tough interest, military interest and
security interest, we are showing a shortsighted lack of vision
and we lose not only the moral power of the cause we seek to
advance, but we also lose the credibility with what is in that
part of the world called the Arab street. We lose that sense on
the part of the people in the country that we are standing for
important values.
And so I think we really do need to look at conditionality
and linkage when it comes to vast sums of aid, whether military
or otherwise and we cannot disconnect that from the situation
of religious freedom or broader human rights in the society.
Mr. Vargas. Thank you.
Ms. Cofman Wittes. Just something very brief to add. We
want a long-term relationship with country. It is a geo-
strategically important country. But at a moment of tremendous
change, we need greater flexibility in the way we engage. And
so we need to look at the aid package in that light. How do we
increase our flexibility? And in that regard, I think the issue
of the cash flow financing that Congressman Deutch raised is a
very important one because when that military aid is tied down,
we don't have the flexibility to make the changes we need.
Mr. Vargas. Thank you. And one quick last question to Dr.
Abrams. Our 600 peace keepers, I believe we still have in
Egypt. If you could comment on that, any danger to them?
Mr. Abrams. Yes. That is a really important point. It is
not a fighting force. It is an observer force, the O in MFO is
Observer.
Mr. Vargas. Right.
Mr. Abrams. There have been a couple of incidents already.
Because there is a real breakdown of order in the Sinai, so it
seems to me that we need to look first of all, are they really
able to defend themselves. And secondly, again, as part of the
aid package, is the Egyptian army ready, willing, and able to
defend them?
Mr. Vargas. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much. Mr. Meadows is
recognized.
Mr. Meadows. Thank you. As each of you have testified, we
keep coming back to this change in the mix as we see it,
perhaps going from more of a military assistance to an economic
assistance or as Dr. Wittes said, democracy assistance.
Can you characterize that a little bit better in terms of
well, we are not just sending dollars there with no
conditionality, as you would put it? How would we look at the
dollars that were spent in terms of taking away from the
military assistance and seeing if we truly have some stability
in terms of peace keeping within the region? Each one of you
can comment on that.
Ms. Cofman Wittes. I think the military assistance, we have
to recognize it plays an economic role as well indirectly in
that it is a large component of the military budget. And----
Mr. Meadows. You mean our military budget?
Ms. Cofman Wittes. No, the Egyptian budget. So it has a
displacement effect. To the extent that our military assistance
is helping them carry out crucial functions, if we were to
transfer that to economic assistance some other way they would
have to pay for that or it wouldn't get done. So we do need to
look at the practical consequences of making such a shift.
I am actually of the view that working with others in the
international community, we could put an economic package on
the table that would be significantly larger and could be a
positive incentive for the right kinds of decisions by an
Egyptian Government. The administration put into its last
budget proposal a Middle East transition fund that would make
money available to governments in the region that were making
good choices.
Mr. Meadows. What are those good choices? Let us get back
to the condition. We all talk--we all want to get together and
sing Kumbaya. But what are those good choices that we are
looking at there?
Ms. Cofman Wittes. Transition to democracy, in other words
enshrining human rights, protecting minorities, building good
institutions with transparency and accountability, good
economic choices meaning free market choices and choices that
will produce stability and deliver for people, not just for
corrupt cronies.
Mr. Meadows. Okay, based on the changes to the
constitution, do you see that those protections for religious
freedom as being really valid?
Ms. Lantos Swett. If I could address that? I think one of
the most critical issues that we would need to look to as a
metric as to whether or not Egypt is going to be capable of
reforming is, in fact, whether they revisit this very
problematic constitution. There are a number of very, very
troubling provisions in it. There are some that sound good, but
they are overridden by competing provisions that in all
likelihood will trump the good ones, the nice rhetoric.
Mr. Meadows. Right.
Ms. Lantos Swett. And there are provisions that aren't
discussed that much on this side, here in this country that
were brought to our attention by women's groups for example,
lowering the age at which girls can be married off, lowering
the age of child labor, a number of really, really problematic
things and perhaps the overarching problem is that the
constitution, the process by which it was adopted, written and
adopted, lacks credibility. And so you have this huge divide in
the society where all the people we would like, all the
reformers, all the secularists, all the minority communities,
the human rights activists, will have nothing to do with it and
reject it.
So unless we see a willingness on the part of the Morsi
government to revisit the constitution, to reopen the process
and change some of these very problematic provisions, I think
that would be a very, very troubling indicator.
Mr. Meadows. So would all of you agree that that becomes
one of those conditions that becomes a line in the sand that if
they are not willing to do that that we need to reexamine our
aid to the region?
Ms. Lantos Swett. You know, I would say I am uncomfortable
with the language line in the sand because of the complexity of
things. We have all talked about the fact that Egypt is in that
region a very indispensable nation. It is the largest nation
and as goes Egypt, so may go much of the region. So we want to
see Egypt succeed.
And the matter of conditionality and the matter of linkage
is one that has to be handled deftly. I know there has been a
lot of talk about sequester and meat cleavers. We don't want in
terms of the way in which we approach issues of conditionality
to be done in a manner that doesn't reflect deftness and
flexibility.
Mr. Meadows. So a soft condition?
Ms. Lantos Swett. I am more comfortable with that language.
Mr. Meadows. Thank you.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much. Mr. Grayson, my
Florida colleague is recognized.
Mr. Grayson. Thank you. I am wondering is there any
evidence that Egyptians themselves regard relations with Israel
as an important part of their political discourse? For
instance, is there polling to show that if they rank the
important issues to them individually that they rank the
relationship between Egypt and Israel as an important issue?
Let's start with you, Ambassador.
Mr. Abrams. I don't know the answer to that question.
Mr. Grayson. You are a very honest man. Anyone else want to
take a shot at that?
Ms. Lantos Swett. I don't know the answer to the question
specifically about polling on the relationship with Israel, but
I believe that the Pew Research group has done polling on
something that is very linked which is the levels of anti-
Semitic attitudes in Egypt and they are off the charts. Don't
hold me to this, but I believe they are among the highest in
the world and among the highest in the region.
I didn't really get to finish an answer earlier, when----
Mr. Grayson. You are going to have to on somebody else's
time. I am sorry.
Ms. Lantos Swett. Okay.
Mr. Grayson. But let me continue talking about what we are
talking about here. Let me ask you this, do the main Egyptian
political parties have stated positions on Egypt-Israel
relations and if so, what are they?
Ms. Cofman Wittes. The Brotherhood's stated position or
rather the Brotherhood's party, the FJP's stated position is to
maintain the Camp David Treaty, although there are individuals
within the party who have called for a national referendum on
whether to keep the treaty. This is part of the ambiguity that
makes this period so uncertain and troubling.
Amongst the other parties, I don't have these facts in
front of me. My recollection is that a number of them have said
yes, we would maintain all of Egypt's international
obligations. But of course, the treaty itself is de minimis in
a way. It is what are they willing to do if they are holding
the reins of power to keep the peace and to deal with security
challenges as they arise.
As Elliott Abrams noted, even the Morsi government has
taken a number of very specific steps that we felt were
important to keep the peace. They know that this is a sine qua
non for us. I think the question we have to ask ourselves is is
that all we want?
Mr. Grayson. Well, given the high level of anti-Semitism
that you just described why is it that no political party in
Egypt has tried to galvanize its own support by trying to
exploit that anti-Semitism or has that happened?
Ms. Lantos Swett. I think that has happened. I think that
is incorrect what you just said. In fact, I think exploiting
anti-Semitism is taking place on a daily basis from pulpits, in
newspapers, and academia and on the part of politicians. The
great fear that I have is that if Egypt is not successful and
we want Egypt to succeed, it is an old playbook, not a silver
lining's playbook, it is an old, dark cloud playbook. In that
region and in other parts of the world that whipping up anti-
Semitism, finding a scapegoat, and making Israel, which I must
say in the minds of most Egyptians, Israel and Jews are
synonymous. There is no differentiation between hatred of Jews
and hatred of what they view as the Jewish Zionist entity. So
sort of the bright lines that we might say, will they or won't
they abide by the Israeli-Egyptian Peace Accord, and the
indication is that for the timing, the intention is to do so,
those lines get very muddied in the discourse there.
I think that we do our foreign policy a disservice when we
don't realize the extent to which these vitriolic, venomous,
and really poisonous attitudes seep into and characterize the
lens through which they view relations with Israel.
Mr. Grayson. Is that anti-Semitism programmatic? In other
words, are there specific elements of anti-Semitic platform,
like for instance, let us say terminating the Camp David
agreements? Or is it simply a manifestation of emotion and
hatred and very little beyond that?
Ms. Lantos Swett. I think manifestations of emotions of
hatred rarely are confined and rarely don't have spillover
effects in terms of the policies of nations. So again, I think
it is accurate to say that programmatically, no party has come
out and said we want to destroy Israel, we are going to wipe it
off the face of the map, we are going to abrogate the peace
treaty. But the discourse is saturated with dialogue that is
problematic and creates a climate in which as the Arab street,
if you will, as the population becomes increasingly frustrated
with the lack of delivery on the dreams they hoped for, it
becomes a dangerous possibility that that old playbook is
brought into action.
Mr. Grayson. And the other parties, what is their position?
Ms. Cofman Wittes. There isn't a lot of specificity on
this, frankly. I think it is opportunism more than anything.
Right now, the priorities of the Egyptian people are jobs,
education, and healthcare. But if governments aren't able to
deliver, parties can't deliver on those core needs, then the
temptation to populism gets much, much stronger.
Mr. Grayson. Thank you, all.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. Thank you very much. Dr. Yoho
of Florida is recognized.
Mr. Yoho. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you guys. I
appreciate the input. This is something that just fascinates
me. You know, back in the 1800s, de Tocqueville came to the
United States to see how our country was succeeding and growing
so well. And when he went back and reported, he said, ``Rarely
could I find anybody that did not understand the
Constitution.'' And then when Anwar Sadat got assassinated, the
question was will the people pick somebody according to the
constitution and the interviewer says the people of Egypt don't
know and don't understand their constitution, so whoever is in
charge of the military and that was Hosni Mubarak.
And now we are going through another change, another
evolution as Dr. Swett, you brought up. They have been evolving
for thousands of years and we are going through another one and
we are at a situation where we put a lot of money into that to
help build stability in the Middle East which I think is
important. I think we will agree to that.
I hear all of you saying how we need to make sure they have
open elections. We need to have free speech, open democratic
elections, extend religious freedoms, and personal freedoms and
women's rights. But what we are doing and correct me if I am
wrong is we are passing on Western ideology to a country, to a
religion, and a political system that doesn't accept it. I feel
personally that is why we are seeing such an upheaval of that
in the Middle East.
My question at this point is with the Morsi government, is
it even stable enough to receive, and I am going to call it the
cookie, that America has? And that cookie is foreign aid. That
cookie is a stable government that they can become a partner
with. Are they stable enough to receive that in lieu of the
fact that we have got these tanks and the airplanes going over
there? And the people in my district aren't real happy about
this and they want it stopped, until we can come back and say
yes, we have a very stable government and these are the things
they are going to follow, the 1970 peace accord, Camp David
Peace Accord. And we want to make sure those things--I just
want to hear your thoughts on that.
Mr. Abrams. I would say Congressman, this is a period of
transition in which they are fighting it out and we hope they
will fight it out at the ballot box rather than in the streets.
But when you say, for example, you know, they don't accept our
standards, they actually are pledged to those standards. They
have signed up to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and so
forth. So they have said they would. And as we said, that was a
close election. Morsi won 51 to 48. There are millions and
millions and millions of Egyptians who are angry, for example,
about the treatment of women in the last few months in the
streets of Egypt, about the lack of law and order. So I think
the critical thing is that we don't walk away from this, that
we let the people who are fighting for the kind of human rights
standards that we believe in know we hope they win.
Mr. Yoho. I hope so.
Mr. Abrams. Politically, morally, and through our aid
program, we should be on their side.
Mr. Yoho. Well, one of my questions, too, is you said that
they signed those agreements, but I also know a man convinced
against his will is of the same opinion still, you know. People
will say and do something to get a reward, but do they follow
through? It is like you are saying we have propped up the
Mubarak regime and there was a lot of human rights abuses going
on in that and you were saying we are giving money, but yet we
knew that was going on, but we kind of turned a deaf ear to it.
Mr. Abrams. We did and I think it was a mistake. And we see
that mistake now. He crushed the center. He crushed the
liberals, the moderates, and he let the Muslim Brotherhood
basically play around so that when he fell, the opposition is
completely divided, except for the Brotherhood which is very
well organized and takes power. So we pay a price for this now,
too.
But I think there are a lot of Egyptians who would like to
see us take a kind of political and moral lead in saying these
are the standards that Egypt and Egypt over decades has pledged
itself to and should meet. And we will hold Egypt responsible
if it fails to meet this.
The problem from the point of many Egyptians is they think
we are walking away from it.
Ms. Lantos Swett. I would just say based on the many, many
meetings we had with a wide variety of interlocutors that the
viewpoint of most of the reformers, again, the people we would
feel that we have most common cause with, right now is very
pessimistic. They are not optimistic about the direction things
are going. And they are highly suspicious and skeptical of the
underlying motives of the Muslim Brotherhood government. They
do not feel comfortable with it and the actual concrete
markers, this flawed constitution and a variety of other
markers, the impunity, the failure to prosecute those who have
launched violent attacks against Coptic Christian communities.
These markers do not give them encouragement.
So the people on the ground with whom we met for the most
part were worried, were concerned, and felt that things were
going in a very troubling direction. The government officials
with whom we met said this is complicated. This is hard. We are
trying. We think we are going to get it right. And where the
full truth lies is hard to know.
Mr. Yoho. I appreciate it. We are out of time. Thank you,
ma'am.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. Congresswoman Frankel is
recognized.
Ms. Frankel. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you to the
panel. I want to talk about unintended consequences. I think
everybody here probably agrees that there is a lot of troubling
aspects of the Morsi regime. My question to you and especially
as it relates to the security of Israel and the stability of
the Middle East, what are the unintended consequences of us
having--withdrawing aid now or having conditions that could not
be met?
Ms. Cofman Wittes. I think one reason why we haven't seen
significant change in the aid relationship is because things
are uncertain. Responding tactically in the initial follow on
to dramatic events makes sense. I think that the way the Gaza
crisis in November was resolved demonstrates that this Egyptian
Government understands the importance not only to the United
States, but to its own interests and its own priorities taking
power, keeping power and governing, of keeping stability with
its neighbors and particularly with Israel.
So at the sort of practical, functional level, I think we
have achieved our objective. The question is how do we ensure
that we are creating an environment where the security of
Israel and the sustenance of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty
will be maintained over the long term. And that gets to some of
these societal issues that we have been discussing. But it also
gets to the fact that the Egyptian people have priorities that
are domestic priorities. And they know that they need trade
with the world. They need tourism from the world. They need
investment from the world. And they are not going to get that
in an environment of chaos or an environment of conflict with
their neighbors.
So the maintenance of peace with Israel is fundamentally in
the interest of the Egyptian Government, the Egyptian military,
and the Egyptian people. And part of the role that we can play,
I think, is to help make that case across Egyptian society and
in all our engagement with Egyptian political actors.
Ms. Lantos Swett. I agree with everything that Dr. Wittes
said. I would just add that interestingly, President Morsi is
now something of a moderate within his government and I think
we need to be mindful of the fact that he is being pulled in
even more extreme directions by some of the Salafist elements
within his own government and his party. So he does not enjoy
full support and stability for this somewhat more moderated, if
you will, and stability-oriented posture that he has taken. So
the evolving nature and the inherent instability and
uncertainty of what we are facing there makes policy decisions
very, very difficult. And you refer to the law of unintended
consequences, it is a great fear of every policy maker. You may
be doing the right thing, but will you get the right result for
doing the right thing.
Mr. Abrams. One of the things I worry about is the
deterioration in the Israeli-Egyptian military relationship. It
has been good, although largely hidden for political reasons in
Egypt. It has been good for a very long time. What we have seen
in the case of Turkey which was a terrific relationship,
Israel-Turkey military, it is pretty much gone. And it is not
the Turkish military that did that. It is the Turkish political
leadership. That is something that we should be worried about.
I think I would say the mil-mil relationship between Israel and
Egypt has deteriorated significantly since Mubarak left. The
question is how to maintain what is still there. Mostly that,
of course, is not our job. It is the job of the Israelis and
the Egyptians. But I think it is something that we should talk
to the government of Egypt about because it is set against this
background. It is harder and harder to do if the overall
discourse is anti-Israel and anti-Semitic in a very great
degree. But I think that is something to watch for.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much. Mr. Weber of Texas
is recognized.
Mr. Weber. Thank you, Madam Chairman. This is for Mr.
Abrams to start with. You said in your opening comments that
you didn't think sending F-16s to Egypt was a good idea, and I
don't remember exactly, it is not in your prepared remarks that
we have, that perhaps they need APCs, which I took as Armored
Personnel Carriers, and a couple of other things that you
listed, like training. And yet, you do say that they have a bad
record in human rights violations.
So what makes you think that they won't take those military
assets that we send them and use them against their own people?
Mr. Abrams. That is a terrific question.
Mr. Weber. I am glad you think so.
Mr. Abrams. It is absolutely right and you know, I can
remember days in Latin America in the Reagan administration
when we were happy to give people in those days F-5s because we
knew that they couldn't use them against their own populations,
so we wouldn't have a human rights problem in that way.
There is absolutely no guarantee.
We do know that the F-16s are not going to be useful to
address the security concerns that ought to be theirs and
certainly are our concerns, for example, the Sinai. The only
thing you can do, I think, is put some kind of conditionality
on it and let the Egyptian political and military leadership
know that this is temporary and it is going to be cut off if
this continues which is what we do in a lot of countries. But
it is a great worry because the relationship between in Sinai,
for example, the Egyptian military and police on the one side
and the Bedouin on the other is bad enough already. So the
likelihood that there would be human rights abuses is very
real.
Mr. Weber. Then you go on to say we have sent four F-16s,
if I remember your comments correctly. How many more do we
lack, and what is the time frame?
Mr. Abrams. There were four on January 28 and the whole
package I believe is 16. I believe it is 16 over the next 1\1/
2\ years.
Mr. Weber. So are you concerned that those will be
eventually used with all of the rhetoric that is going on
against Israel, or are you concerned that those will be used
against Israel in the near future?
Mr. Abrams. No, I am not because I think it is so clearly
against the national interest of Egypt and against this
government's. I think it would be a piece of insanity. One can
worry about what happens 5 years down the road if this
government collapses and is replaced by a Salafi, a worse
government, but for this government, I think they will not do
something that could lead to the collapse of the regime. And a
conflict with Israel which they would lose in potentially
humiliating fashion, could lead to the collapse of the regime.
Mr. Weber. Okay, and then Dr. Swett, I am going to let you
answer that question you didn't get to earlier.
Ms. Lantos Swett. Oh, you are very kind. You know, I did
sort of address it in response to--well, actually, Congressman
Grayson didn't let me say it. You are right. I simply was
intending to make the point that if Egypt is not able to
succeed, if they are not able to fulfill the economic and
domestic needs of their people, it is very hard to imagine this
Muslim Brotherhood government just sort of willingly turning
over power to a more secular, a more moderate, a more Western-
oriented, if you will, government through democratic processes.
And I worry that the virulent anti-Semitism and just unending
avalanche of hatred toward Israel and the Jews could become a
pretext, in fact, for scapegoating and for turning attention
away from the domestic failures by provoking confrontation,
maybe not all out military conflict.
Mr. Weber. Pardon me for interrupting, but if and when that
happens, then what Mr. Abrams said goes out the window, because
they will indeed use those assets in such a fashion----
Ms. Lantos Swett. Or will permit terror from their side of
the border.
Mr. Weber. State-sponsored terrorism. Does that really
exist? Who knew.
Ms. Lantos Swett. Impunity is really the way many
governments operate, that things are permitted to happen and
not stopped. And so that would be, I think, a very real concern
from my perspective.
Mr. Weber. So, back very quickly to Mr. Abrams, if you had
your druthers, you would shut down the rest of those F-16s?
Mr. Abrams. I would.
Mr. Weber. Okay, and how about you, Dr. Swett?
Ms. Lantos Swett. You know, I am here talking about
religious freedom and tolerance and human rights and so I think
I probably better stick to my area of expertise on that one.
Mr. Weber. Thank God you recognize that. Dr. Wittes?
Ms. Cofman Wittes. Very briefly, I will say I would like to
see more of our military-to-military engagement involve
training, involve counterterrorism missions, involve the kind
of engagement that allows us to continue socializing the
Egyptian military toward professionalization, toward norms of
human rights and toward the rule of law as a tool for security
and stability.
Mr. Weber. Thank you. I yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, sir. Mr. Connolly,
my friend from Virginia, is recognized.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and welcome to our
panel. Ambassador Abrams, you mentioned twice that Morsi only
got 51 percent and 48 percent voted against him. What is your
point?
Mr. Abrams. My point is that he should recognize in ruling
Egypt that he is not a dictator, that there is going to need to
be widespread public support including in the Parliament among
the other parties to do the hard things that this new
Government of Egypt has to do. So far, he has acted as if he
had 99 percent of the population----
Mr. Connolly. Mr. Abrams, you will forgive me for
observing, you served in an administration that came into power
with a Supreme Court ruling 5 to 4 when the other guy got more
votes than your guy. So I mean I wish the Bush administration
had followed your advice in terms of that----
Mr. Abrams. I think we did because we had people in
Congress.
Mr. Connolly. I don't think Democrats felt that was the
case. I think it is very dangerous business, frankly, when we
question the legitimacy or implicitly question the legitimacy
of an election. There may have been irregularities. The fact of
the matter is Morsi won an election, whether it was 51 percent
or 80 percent, he won. And we have to deal with it. I think we
are in dangerous grounds when we question the legitimacy of it
and especially when we have had our own problems, frankly, in
our country.
Mr. Abrams. I didn't use the word legitimacy, Mr. Connolly.
Mr. Connolly. I understand.
Mr. Abrams. And I would compare Tunisia where they also won
an election, but have had a coalition government in an effort
to reach out to other parties.
Mr. Connolly. But you made a very good point from my point
of view which was that for 30 something years, we supported the
Mubarak government and in doing so we sort of were complicit in
turning a blind eye to the creation of any alternative
political space. And now we are faced with a Muslim Brotherhood
government which was inevitable if there was no political space
since it was the only group that could network, albeit
sometimes illegally, but it did it.
The real question to me, I was in Egypt in May, and I met
with the Muslim Brotherhood. It was before Morsi's election. To
me, the real question is can the Muslim Brotherhood evolve to
some level of acceptable democratic governance that respects
the rights of minorities, especially--Dr. Swett, you talked a
lot about anti-Semitism, but we haven't talked about Coptic
Christians and the respect for that very substantial minority
in Egypt and what rights are they going to have in this new
constitution that got forced through the legislative body? So
to me, that is the question and I wonder if you agree is that
the question? And what's the proper role of the United States
in trying to help them with that?
It seems to me a sledge hammer is not going to help. They
have got their own domestic politics and if it looks like they
are caving to our pressure that is rather crude. I don't think
politically that is going to work. So in the time that is left,
I wonder if you would care to comment?
Dr. Wittes?
Ms. Cofman Wittes. Thank you. I think we have a lot of
cards to play. As I said, I think they care about our
recognition. They care about the seal of approval, if you will,
from Western governments. It is why President Morsi was so
eager to continue with his trip to Germany, even though he was
facing massive protests in the cities of the Suez. And he
didn't get the full-throated support of the German government
in the way that he wanted because of the human rights problems
in his country.
So I think that we need to continue to think about that
kind of leverage.
Also, ultimately, what will compel the Muslim Brotherhood
to behave in a way that can make them a constructive democratic
actor? Competition. We need to ensure that this is going to be
a pluralist political system. That means rights need to be
protected and it means we need to help the other parties get
their act together and ensure that not only these next
elections, but the ones after and the one after that are free
and fair.
Ms. Lantos Swett. You know, Mark Twain once said that
``history doesn't repeat itself, but it rhymes.'' And in
responding to your question about can the Muslim Brotherhood
evolve and change, I just am having a deja vu moment when I
remember when Putin came to power in Russia. And the discussion
at that time was can a KGB guy be trusted with Russian
democracy? And a lot of people were nervous about it, including
myself. And as that verdict is coming in, it is not actually a
very positive verdict. Count me skeptical on that question.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Connolly.
Mr. Connolly. Can we just allow Mr. Abrams to answer?
Mr. Abrams. Thank you. I wanted to say I agree completely
with Dr. Wittes. The answer I think is competition. If they
think they will lose power in a free election, they will begin
to move. So anything we can do to promote, free debate, free
elections will help.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much. Mr. Cotton is
recognized.
Mr. Cotton. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I agree with my
colleague from Virginia that structural constitutionalism is
very important to freedom and it works very well here in the
United States, so I would like to explore how it works in
Egypt. There has been plenty of talk about freedoms that we
enjoy under our Bill of Rights, religion, speech, assembly,
press, freedoms of women, minorities, due process in criminal
cases, rights of property, rights of contract. As Madison said,
those are only parchment barriers. If you don't have things
like what we have in the articles of our Constitution,
separated powers and independent judiciary and prosecutor,
judicial review, fair, regularly scheduled, impartial
elections, I would like the witnesses to comment on the status
of those kind of structural protections in Egypt. And also
whether our Government is prioritizing those as opposed to
simply prioritizing elections?
Ms. Cofman Wittes. Well, I will start. I think there are
two structural features that I would highlight. The first is
within the Constitution itself, the section that lays out the
rights of individual citizens is structurally subsumed to the
rights and privileges of the state. So that is an architectural
problem. And it is the reverse of what we have with our Bill of
Rights. In fact, it is the reverse of our whole structure.
The other issue I would highlight and one reason why I
think we have seen such troubling indicators over the last 9
months or the last 1\1/2\ years is that essentially, we have
had an executive ruling unconstrained. There hasn't been a
functioning Parliament in Egypt to check that executive's
power. The judiciary is compromised for a variety of reasons, a
lot of holdovers from the previous regime, questions about its
independence.
So without institutional checks on executive power, without
effective opposition parties to check the power of the ruling
party, where does accountability come from? The only place left
is civil society. And I have to say that Egyptian civil society
organizations have been doing an incredible job of trying to
hold this President accountable. Transparency measures, giving
information in public, documenting abuses, challenging proposed
laws, but they can't do it themselves. They need external
support. They need our partnership. And they need those
institutions to be built.
Ms. Lantos Swett. I would say from the religious freedom
perspective there are, as I indicated earlier, a number of
problematic provisions. The one thing that was brought to our
attention repeatedly is that one of the provisions in this new
constitution seems to give a religious body, Al-Azhar, the
authority to interpret the constitution and this was of
enormous concern again to secular and reformist groups. They
were adamant that only a court, a supreme judicial court,
should have that authority. And we heard just repeated worries
on the part of a variety of people and not just secularists,
but certainly the Coptic minority, that Egypt was moving in the
direction of becoming a religious Islamist state. And that
relates to a whole slew of fundamental architectural issues
about how you are going to protect that range of rights that
you referred to earlier. So through the religious freedom lens,
really problematic aspects of the constitution are of grave
concern.
Mr. Abrams. Nothing to add. I think that is really quite
right. Well, one thing to add. We do have a role here to play.
Whether we like it or not, if we are silent about these issues,
we weaken the side that really we are on in those debates in
Egypt.
Mr. Cotton. So if I can synthesize what I have heard, some
of the provisions that we might call the Bill of Rights are
troublesome, some of the architectural designs are more
troublesome yet. Do you think that our State Department, our
Government, is doing enough to emphasize the need for those
kind of structural protections of individual liberties?
Mr. Abrams. I don't think so, Congressman. It appears that
human rights and democracy activists in Egypt don't think so
and that is an important issue. I fear that we are lapsing back
into the way we mostly over 30 years handled the Mubarak regime
which was to go along with the occasional statement. And
frankly, the occasional statement from the State Department
spokesmen or the Embassy spokesmen won't cut it. It really has
got to come from the President or Secretary of State if it is
going to have any impact.
Ms. Lantos Swett. I would agree with that. I think the
default position is always to be quietly critical and publicly
passive. And I just don't think that cuts it. I don't.
Ms. Cofman Wittes. I will just say we said that we would
stand up for a set of principles in the course of supporting
democratic transition and we need to do that.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Connolly. Mr.
Schneider of Illinois is recognized.
Mr. Schneider. Thank you and thank you for joining us
today.
Ambassador Abrams, you talked about the importance of mil-
mil relationship between Egypt and Israel. And I would like to
explore a little bit beyond the personal relationships across
the board, both Egyptian-Israeli, Egyptian-United States. As we
look at Egypt and as it seems to be moving on a path toward
more extremism, similar to what you described in Turkey, how do
we decide when to push forward on relationships to stay engaged
to maybe look for an alternate detour route for those
relationships and when to stay silent?
Mr. Abrams. I think it is very difficult, of course, to
make those decisions. One way to do it, I think, is to be
talking to the people who are fighting for the things that we
believe in, the standards we believe in, in Egypt, the
democracy, the human rights activists, who are feeling let down
right now. They will have an important view of whether more
statements by the United States would help or hurt and what is
a good symbolic act to take. I think we should also be talking
to some of the other Embassies in Egypt. Some are active on
human rights issues. Many are not. But you know, you have in a
sense to rely to some degree on your diplomats, too.
The problem I think has been that diplomats in Cairo over
the years have tended to have far closer relationships with the
Government of Egypt, whatever that government is, and to want
to succor that relationship and not make trouble for that
relationship by having others outside the government with
groups that whatever the government is it views as
troublemakers.
Mr. Schneider. Dr. Wittes.
Ms. Cofman Wittes. Thank you. I will tell you a few of the
things I have heard from activists on the ground because I
think Elliott is right, we need to listen to them. They have
said please don't cut off economic aid. We are in desperate
straits, but hold our Government accountable. They have said
please don't invite President Morsi to Washington until he has
dealt with the political facts he needs to deal with here at
home. And they have said please speak out on the principles
that you articulated as the foundation for your support of
democracy in the region.
And we have said repeatedly, in fact, from the beginning of
the Obama administration that parties that want to participate
in democratic politics need to respect equality of all,
including women and minorities. We have said that they need to
respect the rules of the election after the election as well as
before.
So the precedents are all there, but we need to be
consistent about applying them.
Mr. Schneider. But occasionally desperation can be the
enemy of accountability, especially for diplomats. How do we
make sure as we are holding, trying to hold Egypt to our
standards that we are not pushing them in the wrong direction,
that we hold to the accountability while maintaining the
support that they require?
Ms. Lantos Swett. You know, one thing that I think we need
to bear in mind is we are not holding them to our standards. We
are holding them to international standards to which they have
subscribed. We are holding them to treaty obligations that they
freely undertook which they are not being accountable to. So
you know, it sometimes is important to keep that distinction in
mind. Certainly, in the work that we do at UCIRF, we do not
seek to hold other countries to America's standards on
religious freedom which in some ways are not entirely identical
to international standards. We seek to hold them to
international standards. And I think that that needs to be
emphasized in our dealings because then it is perhaps less
offensive in terms of how we deal with other countries.
Ms. Cofman Wittes. If I may just make one more point? I
think there are politics here, too. A lot of the persuasion
involves helping them recognize that adhering to these
standards is in their own interest.
Mr. Schneider. Right.
Ms. Cofman Wittes. A lot of Coptic Christians voted for
Mohammad Morsi in the hope that he could bring along some more
conservative forces to recognize that Egypt had to be an Egypt
for all its citizens. And when he was inaugurated and spoke
those words they had hope. He promised to appoint Coptic
Christians to his cabinet. And he has reneged on a lot of those
promises. But there is a constituency there. Egyptian politics
doesn't have to be dictated by sect or by religious identity.
It has a strong national identity. And if we can help Egyptian
politicians see how they could benefit, then I think we will be
farther along.
Mr. Schneider. Ambassador Abrams.
Mr. Abrams. Just one quick remark. You do not need to worry
that Secretary of State Kerry is going to be getting memos from
the Near East Bureau that says break off from Egypt. Let us
just cut them off. I think we need to worry that the memos from
the Bureau and the cables from Embassy Cairo are going to be go
slow, go soft, it is difficult here, let us not make trouble,
let us be careful, let us nurture the relationship. I think
they are going to go far over in that direction. It is built
into the system.
Mr. Schneider. Thank you.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. Congressman Deutch and I
agree, excellent panelists. Thank you very much and this
subcommittee is now adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:46 p.m., the subcomittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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[Note: Responses from Tamara Cofman Wittes, Ph.D., to the questions
submitted for the record by Honorable Joseph P. Kennedy III, were not
received prior to printing.]