[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 113-3]
THE IMPACTS OF A CONTINUING
RESOLUTION AND SEQUESTRATION
ON DEFENSE
__________
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
FEBRUARY 13, 2013
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
79-491 WASHINGTON : 2013
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One Hundred Thirteenth Congress
HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' McKEON, California, Chairman
MAC THORNBERRY, Texas ADAM SMITH, Washington
WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
JEFF MILLER, Florida ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania
JOE WILSON, South Carolina ROBERT E. ANDREWS, New Jersey
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
ROB BISHOP, Utah JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio RICK LARSEN, Washington
JOHN KLINE, Minnesota JIM COOPER, Tennessee
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa
K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado JOHN GARAMENDI, California
ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr.,
DUNCAN HUNTER, California Georgia
JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana COLLEEN W. HANABUSA, Hawaii
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado JACKIE SPEIER, California
E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia RON BARBER, Arizona
CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York ANDRE CARSON, Indiana
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire
JOSEPH J. HECK, Nevada DANIEL B. MAFFEI, New York
JON RUNYAN, New Jersey DEREK KILMER, Washington
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
MARTHA ROBY, Alabama SCOTT H. PETERS, California
MO BROOKS, Alabama WILLIAM L. ENYART, Illinois
RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida PETE P. GALLEGO, Texas
KRISTI L. NOEM, South Dakota MARC A. VEASEY, Texas
PAUL COOK, California
JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma
BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio
JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana
Robert L. Simmons II, Staff Director
Jack Schuler, Professional Staff Member
Spencer Johnson, Counsel
Aaron Falk, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2013
Page
Hearing:
Wednesday, February 13, 2013, The Impacts of a Continuing
Resolution and Sequestration on Defense........................ 1
Appendix:
Wednesday, February 13, 2013..................................... 67
----------
WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 13, 2013
THE IMPACTS OF A CONTINUING RESOLUTION AND SEQUESTRATION ON DEFENSE
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck,'' a Representative from
California, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services.............. 1
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking
Member, Committee on Armed Services............................ 3
WITNESSES
Amos, Gen James F., USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps, U.S.
Marine Corps................................................... 13
Carter, Hon. Ashton B., Deputy Secretary of Defense.............. 5
Dempsey, GEN Martin E., USA, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff..... 8
Grass, GEN Frank J., USARNG, Chief, National Guard Bureau........ 15
Greenert, ADM Jonathan W., USN, Chief of Naval Operations, U.S.
Navy........................................................... 11
Odierno, GEN Raymond T., USA, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army.......... 9
Welsh, Gen Mark A., III, USAF, Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force.... 12
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Amos, Gen James F............................................ 126
Carter, Hon. Ashton B........................................ 74
Dempsey, GEN Martin E........................................ 89
Grass, GEN Frank J........................................... 134
Greenert, ADM Jonathan W..................................... 104
McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck''.............................. 71
Odierno, GEN Raymond T....................................... 94
Smith, Hon. Adam............................................. 73
Welsh, Gen Mark A., III...................................... 115
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Bishop................................................... 145
Ms. Duckworth................................................ 146
Ms. Hanabusa................................................. 145
Mr. Turner................................................... 145
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Barber................................................... 168
Ms. Bordallo................................................. 160
Mr. Castro................................................... 169
Ms. Duckworth................................................ 169
Mr. Langevin................................................. 156
Mr. Loebsack................................................. 166
Mr. McKeon................................................... 149
Mr. Shuster.................................................. 166
Mrs. Walorski................................................ 170
Dr. Wenstrup................................................. 170
THE IMPACTS OF A CONTINUING RESOLUTION AND SEQUESTRATION ON DEFENSE
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, October 21, 2013.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:03 a.m., in room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck''
McKeon (chairman of the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' MCKEON, A
REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED
SERVICES
The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
Good morning.
We meet this morning at the 11th hour. This is, I think, an
unprecedented hearing in my time. I never remember where we
have had all of you here at one time in a hearing. And I think
that shows the importance that the committee places on our
subject and the importance that you all place on the subject
and the important roles that you play in defending our great
Nation.
This committee has undergone 16 months of exhaustive
examination of the pending damage from sequestration, and now
it appears that this self-inflicted wound is poised to cripple
our military forces in just a few days. As the military members
of our panel noted in a letter I received on January 14th--and
I quote your letter--``We are on the brink of creating a hollow
force.''
None of us came to this committee, or come to this
committee, with clean hands. The debt crisis we face was
decades in the making and a result of choosing the easy path
when we should have explored the bravery of restraint. The
President is not blameless. His negotiators put sequestration
on the table during the long fight over the debt ceiling. We
are not blameless either. Many of us voted for this terrible
mechanism in the naive hope that the President and the Congress
could put our politics aside and fix our debt crisis. That was
a bad bet.
Today we need to hear the ground truth from our witnesses.
They have dedicated their lives to providing their best and
unbiased military advice. We are certainly in need of such
advice today. Unburdened from Administration orders to defer
planning and assessments, you can now make it clear to this
body, the White House, the public, what damage months of
inaction on sequestration and the continuing resolution have
done to our Armed Forces.
General Odierno, you testified yesterday that you began
your military service in a hollow force and that you were
determined not to conclude your career the same way. I hope
that you and the panel can expand on that notion today,
determining at what level of cuts do Congress and the President
turn that fear of a hollow force into reality.
General Dempsey, in April of last year, you testified about
the $487 billion cut from defense. I don't think a lot of
people understand how much has been cut from the military in
just a very short period of time. You told Congress that to cut
further would require an adjustment of strategy. Going through
the $487 billion cuts, you all had a year or so to plan and to
come up with a new strategy, a strategy that changed our
strategy that we have had of protecting the world since World
War II. But I think all of you have stated at least publicly or
to me that we cannot even carry out that strategy with the new
sequestration cuts.
You concluded, General Dempsey, that this new strategy
would--and I quote--``not meet the needs of the Nation in 2020
because the world is not getting any more stable.'' We see that
every day. Anybody that turns on the TV or reads the newspaper
can understand how unsettling this world is. I am interested to
know if you continue to stand by that statement.
Today we anticipate detailed answers to our questions. In
addition to hearing about levels of risk as sequestration's
blind cuts absolve folks from planning, we want to hear if we
have crossed a red line and cut too much. If that red line is
in the near distance, I expect you to point it out.
Again, I don't think many people understand, other than the
fact that we have a debt crisis, a problem, that, so far, the
solution has been to take 50 percent of our debt savings out of
defense when it only accounts for 17 percent of our overall
spending.
Gentlemen, you have no stronger advocate, no stronger ally
in this fight than this committee here, the Armed Services
Committee. And we urge you to work with us in these final days.
In the coming weeks and months, leaders in both parties and
the White House will, I hope, come together to begin discussion
of the drivers of our debt and the path to fiscal health. There
will be no easy choices on that table. I fear that many may
choose to soften the blow of these choices by turning once
again to the Department of Defense. Indeed, the formula to
achieve what the President characterized as a balanced approach
includes tens of billions in additional cuts for this fiscal
year. I cannot support any plan, regardless of how it addresses
entitlement spending or revenue, unless it also offers
meaningful and real relief for the DOD [Department of Defense]
from sequester.
With that, I look forward to your testimony here today.
Dr. Carter has had commitments scheduled long before this
hearing was established. He is going to have to leave at 12:45.
I think the rest of you are committed to 1 o'clock. I would
encourage Members to really pay attention and really get your
questions answered in this hearing.
And I turn now to our ranking member, Mr. Smith.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the
Appendix on page 71.]
STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON,
RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I want to start by thanking you not just for this
hearing but for, going back a year, really focusing attention
on this challenge. We have had a number of hearings on
sequestration, on the impact of it, on the challenges that the
Department of Defense has faced. And I think you did what you
could, basically, to make sure that people were aware of what
was coming. And now that we are days away from it, I think it
is beginning to sink in. But I certainly believe you have done
a good job of shining a bright light on the problem and the
challenge.
I also want to thank the gentlemen in front of us for being
here today but, more importantly, for their service and for
what they have had to go through, really, for 2 years now in
not knowing how much money you were going to have or what you
could spend it on, having to be incredibly creative, figuring
out how to keep programs running.
And certainly sequestration is part of the problem, but the
fact that we haven't passed appropriations bills in a couple of
years is almost as big a problem. Having to operate under
continuing resolution is also very, very difficult for the
Department of Defense. Again, you don't know what programs you
can fully fund and what programs you can't from one year to the
next. It has really put an enormous amount of pressure on our
Government, on our Department of Defense.
I should point out, this is not just the Department of
Defense. This is the entire discretionary budget. Every element
of the Government that is dependent upon discretionary
spending--transportation, homeland security, and a variety of
different other programs--have gone through this same exercise.
And it has had a crippling effect on the ability of our
Government to function and has also had a very, very negative
effect on our overall economy. And I believe strongly that we
need to begin to get back to regular order and fund the
discretionary budget, pass appropriations bills, and set a
clear number.
Now, the idea behind the Budget Control Act and
sequestration started with concern over the debt and deficit.
And I will tell you that I share that concern. There are some
that argue that the debt and deficit aren't really a problem
and get very creative with the numbers to make that argument. I
think they are just flat wrong. It clearly is a problem. We
can't continue to run a trillion-dollar deficit every year and
not have it impact every aspect of our society. We have to get
it under control.
But the problem is, if you are going to get the deficit
under control, there are sort of three pieces to it. Yes, the
discretionary portion of the budget is one piece. It is 38
percent of the budget. But mandatory spending is 58 percent of
the budget. It is a much larger piece. And then, of course, the
other big piece is revenue and taxes, raising more money. We
have systematically over the course of the last 15 years both
dramatically increased spending and dramatically cut taxes. It
is not surprising that we are where we are.
Now, the problem is and the reason sequestration was set
up, it was set up as a forcing mechanism, to basically torture
the discretionary portion of the budget, under the belief that
we would--we in Congress and the President would not want that
torture to continue and would do something about taxes and
mandatory spending. But we have not.
I personally think at this point we need to stop torturing
the discretionary portion of the budget. I absolutely agree
that we need to raise taxes and cut mandatory spending, but
holding hostage the discretionary budget to doing that makes no
sense whatsoever. It doesn't force it; it doesn't make it any
more likely. And it does devastate the discretionary portion of
our budget, make it very difficult for the Government to
function. And it slams the economy, as we saw in the negative
GDP [gross domestic product] growth of the fourth quarter that
was driven by sequestration, by the cuts that were put in the
discretionary budget.
So I would propose that the discretionary budget has given
what it can. It has done what it already can. It has had the
cuts that the chairman described that were part of the Budget
Control Act. We should just end sequestration, get back to the
table talking about mandatory spending and taxes, and get us
back on a path to some sort of both fiscal sanity and governing
sanity.
The Department of Defense and every other department needs
appropriations bills. They don't need a CR [Continuing
Resolution], they don't need the threat of not raising the debt
ceiling, and they don't need sequestration.
So we will keep working on it. It is an intractable
political problem, but it has a very real-world impact on a
number of areas, and certainly the Department of Defense and
our ability to provide national security is one of the most
profound. And I think it will help to have this hearing today
to hear more about the impact of that and, very specifically,
how you are going to deal with it. Because as bad as the
problem is, it is what it is. You all and we have to deal with
it as intelligently as possible. So hearing more details on how
that process is playing out will be helpful.
And, again, I thank the chairman for the hearing. I look
forward to the testimony and the questions of the Members.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the
Appendix on page 73.]
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
I now recognize our prestigious panel of civilian and
military leaders for their opening statements.
Secretary Carter, we will begin with you.
In the interest of time and the number of witnesses that we
have today and the number of questions that we have from the
panel, I would remind you that your complete statements will be
submitted for the record.
And we will proceed with Secretary Carter.
STATEMENT OF HON. ASHTON B. CARTER, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Secretary Carter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Smith. I will be brief because I know you want to get to the
specific impacts of this.
First, let me just begin by thanking you, the two of you
but each and every one of you, for giving us this opportunity
to explain the consequences of sequester and CR.
You know, Mr. Chairman, I would certainly use the red line.
That makes perfect sense to me. And Mr. Smith is right, it is
not just sequester, it is the CR also, which in a different way
is affecting us very adversely. And it is the fact of but also,
as Mr. Smith pointed out, the uncertainty engendered by all
this that we have been living with for quite some time. There
is a real cost to having that uncertainty.
So thank you for giving us the opportunity to be here. You
know, you all know us, and you care about national defense.
That is shown by your membership on this committee. And we are
hoping, I am certainly hoping, that by giving you the picture
of the impacts of CR and sequestration on national defense, you
can, in turn, turn to your colleagues and, by getting them to
see this and understand it more, work our way towards what we
all need, which is a comprehensive solution to this.
Secretary Panetta and I have been using the word
``devastating'' for 16 months, Mr. Chairman. And you and others
on this committee have been speaking about it for 16 months.
Last August, you gave me the opportunity to testify before you,
and I said much of what we will be saying today. That was then,
and now the wolf is at the door.
The first problem, sequestration, which causes us--will
cause us to have to subtract, starting in 2 weeks, $46 billion
from the amount of money that we had planned to spend between
now and the end of the year.
The continuing resolution is a different problem. There is
enough money in the continuing resolution. It is in the wrong
accounts. In particular, there isn't enough in the operations
and maintenance accounts. And as my colleagues will explain,
although we will protect funding for Afghanistan, we will
protect urgent operational needs, we will protect the wounded
warrior programs, the President has exempted military personnel
expenses from sequestration--with all of that, still and all,
by the end of the year, there will be a readiness crisis this
year, in just a few months' time.
And that is the near term. In the far term, if the cuts
continue over the next 10 years, as suggested in the Budget
Control Act, if there isn't a comprehensive solution to the
budget picture in the long run, we aren't going to be able to
carry out the national security strategy that we so carefully
devised with the President just 1 year ago.
So in the near term, a readiness crisis; in the far term,
an inability to execute our strategy. That is very serious.
And I just want to say that, you know, I understand, I have
long understood, that we need to address the Nation's fiscal
situation. And that is why we have already cut $487 billion
from our budget plans over the next 10 years. And that was on
top of the several hundred billion dollars that Secretary Gates
removed from the defense budget, importantly by eliminating
some unneeded and underperforming programs. And on top of all
that, we are making an historic adjustment to the end of the
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. So we are doing a lot, we have
done a lot.
I also understand that the taxpayer deserves a careful use
of the defense dollar. And that is--and every dollar we are
given. And that is why we strive so hard to get better buying
power for every dollar that we get, why we try to do
acquisition reform and so forth. But both a strategic approach
to reducing our budget and good use of the taxpayer money, both
of those are endangered by this chaos and the abruptness and
size of these cuts.
What is particularly tragic to me is that sequestration is
not the result of an economic recession or emergency. It is not
because discretionary spending cuts are the answer to our
fiscal challenge. Do the math. It is not in reaction to a more
peaceful world. It is not due to a breakthrough in military
technology or to a new strategic insight. It is not because
paths of entitlement growth and spending have been explored and
exhausted. It is not because sequestration was ever a plan
intended to be implemented. All this is purely the collateral
damage of political gridlock.
And for our troops, for the force, the consequences are
very real and very personal. As the CNO [Chief of Naval
Operations] can describe in greater detail, we just had to
cancel the deployment of an aircraft carrier. The reason for
that was to make sure that we would be able to field an
aircraft carrier a year from now. But we did that at the very
last minute, and so families that were all ready for that
deployment suddenly had to change their plans--the plans they
had for child care, the plans they had for where they were
going to live, what their families were going to do after they
said goodbye to a loved one so abruptly.
I go around to our bases around the country, and I see
troops, let's say Army troops, that have come back from
Afghanistan. They want to maintain the same level of training
and proficiency that they have become used to. And yet we are
not going to have the funding to keep their training at that
level. But the mission is what motivated--motivates them. That
is what their profession is about; that is what we want to have
motivate them. And as you will see, we will not have the
funding to continue that level of training.
So it has a big effect on the uniformed force. For our
civilians, also a big effect. You know, our civilians are much
maligned. A lot of people think that DOD civilians are people
who wake up somewhere here in the suburbs, get on 395, and come
in here and work in an office building in Washington. Not true.
Most of our civilians repair airplanes, they repair ships.
Eighty-six percent of them don't even live in the Washington
area. And 44 percent of them are veterans.
Yet, still and all, starting very soon, we will, as a
result of sequester, have to furlough the great majority--or at
least the great majority of our civilians will be subject to
furlough for the maximum statutory length of time, namely 22
days, between the beginning of April and the end of the year.
So there is a real human impact here. I have said I am not
a--under the law, I am a Presidentially appointed civilian and
I can't be furloughed, but I am going to give back a fifth of
my salary at the end of the year because we are asking all
those people who are furloughed to give back a fifth of their
salary.
Finally, this has a big effect on the--in addition to the
uniformed civilian employees of the Department, on the industry
upon which we depend. The quality of the weapons produced by
our defense industry is second only to the quality of our
people in uniform in making our military the greatest in the
world. As such, a technologically vibrant and financially
successful defense industry is in the national interest. The
act of sequestration and longer-term budget cuts and even the
prolongation of uncertainty will limit capital market
confidence in our industry, and companies may be less willing
to make internal investments in their defense portfolio.
And the impact will be even greater on our subcontractors.
Remember that between 60 and 70 cents of every dollar we
contract is subcontracted to the tier below the prime
contractors. Many of these smaller companies don't have the
capital structure that will allow them to withstand this
uncertainty and turmoil. And yet many of them are small
businesses; they are a source of innovation and new people for
our industry. So it is very serious.
And, finally, sequester will cause a spike in program
inefficiency because we stretch out programs and we drive up
costs--all the things you don't like. So for the force,
military and civilian, for the industry, consequences are very
direct.
I would just like to close with an appeal to you to appeal
to your colleagues. We need to deal with this situation
broadly, quickly, and comprehensively, and in a balanced way
that you can support, that the President can support. We need
to detrigger sequestration. We need to pass appropriations
bills for all the Federal agencies, for that matter.
The cloud of uncertainty hanging over our Nation's defense
affairs is already having a lasting effect. Ultimately, the
cloud of sequestration needs to be dispelled and not just moved
to the horizon. The magnificent men and women of the Department
of Defense and their families deserve no less. They need to
know with certainty that we will meet our commitments. Our
partners in the defense industry and their employees need to
know that we are going to have the same resources to procure
the world-class capabilities they provide and that we can do so
efficiently.
And perhaps most important, the world is watching. Our
friends and allies are watching, potential foes all over the
world. And they need to know that we have the political will to
implement the defense strategy we need.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Carter can be found in
the Appendix on page 74.]
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
We in this room all know who we are going to hear from now,
but let me--there are, I am sure, going to be people watching
this who are not in this room. Let me just let them know that
next we will hear from General Dempsey, who is Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, who is the top military adviser to the
Commander in Chief, the President of the United States. Then we
will hear from General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General
Welsh, General Amos, General Grass. Each are the top military
leader of their respective branches.
So what they are saying--they have put years into
dedication to this Nation, protecting this Nation, fighting for
this Nation, and peace around the world. Listen carefully to
what they have to say.
General Dempsey.
STATEMENT OF GEN MARTIN E. DEMPSEY, USA, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS
OF STAFF
General Dempsey. Thank you, Chairman, Ranking Member Smith,
distinguished members of the committee. I would like to echo
Dr. Carter's expression of appreciation for you to have this
hearing.
To your point, Chairman, do I stand by my statement of last
year? No. I am now jumping up and down; this is not about
standing next to anything. We are on the verge of a readiness
crisis due to an unprecedented convergence of factors.
And, by the way, if there is anybody in this room or
anybody in this building that thinks we can fix this by
ourselves, they are incorrect. We are facing the prolonged
specter of sequestration while under a continuing resolution
while we are just beginning to absorb $487 billion worth of
cuts from 2011 and while we are still fighting and resourcing a
war. That is unprecedented.
Secondly, these are not the only factors that make this
drawdown more difficult and decidedly different from any other
point in our history. There is no foreseeable peace dividend.
The security environment is more dangerous and more uncertain.
Much of our equipment is older or aging fast. End-strength caps
limit our ability to shape the force, and healthcare costs are
reaching unsustainable levels.
In this context, sequestration will upend our defense
strategy. It will put the Nation at greater risk of coercion,
and it will require us to break commitments to our men and
women in uniform and their families, to our defense industrial
base, and to our partners and allies.
We have and we will continue to be part of the Nation's
economic recovery. We are committed to remaining responsible
stewards of the taxpayers' dollars as we work to build an
affordable and unrivaled force in 2020. But to do this, we need
budget certainty. That is, we need the antithesis of
sequestration. We need a steady, predictable funding stream.
And we also need the time to implement reductions in a
responsible manner over a manageable timeline. Finally, we need
the flexibility to transfer and reprogram money to our highest
priorities. Readiness loses when major portions of the budget
are deemed untouchable. Everything needs to be on the table.
We should resist kicking this further down the road.
Failing to act is a choice of itself, one that will eventually
require a progressive contraction of security commitments
around the world and a less proactive approach to protecting
our interests.
When I testified before this committee last year, I said
that if we fail to step off properly on the budget, we will
reduce our options and therefore increase our risk. Our
military power will be less credible because it will be less
sustainable. Now we are only a few days away from making that
risk a reality.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Dempsey can be found in
the Appendix on page 89.]
The Chairman. Thank you, General.
General Odierno.
STATEMENT OF GEN RAYMOND T. ODIERNO, USA, CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S.
ARMY
General Odierno. Thank you, Chairman McKeon. Thank you,
Ranking Member Smith and other distinguished Members.
Nearly 18 months ago, I was charged with the responsibility
of leading the Army and providing you my best military advice.
Over the course of my 36-year career, I have commanded every
level, including most recently division command, corps command,
and theater command in combat. I know what it takes to prepare
this Nation's sons and daughters for war. I know what it takes
to grow leaders in our Army. I know what is required to send
soldiers into combat, and I have seen firsthand the
consequences when they are sent unprepared.
All of us have experienced the Army post-Vietnam. It was
one that was underresourced, one that was undertrained, one
that lacked appropriate equipment, was not ready, and lacked
discipline. We cannot allow careless budget cuts to bring us
there again.
And as you said, Mr. Chairman, as I said yesterday, I want
to repeat it again: I began my career in a hollow Army; I am
determined not to end my career in a hollow Army. We owe that
to the young men and women who are willing to raise their right
hand and defend this country.
Every day, I am reminded of the uncertainty and danger of
our global environment. It is the most unpredictable and
dynamic security landscape I have faced and experienced in my
career. I remind everyone that today the Army has 58,000
soldiers in Afghanistan, 23,000 soldiers deployed at other
places around the world. They will be impacted by these cuts.
They will be impacted by these cuts.
The other thing I know is we simply don't know when we will
be asked to deploy soldiers to fight again, but history is
clear: We will be asked to deploy our men and women again when
the security of this Nation is at risk. We owe it to them and
to the American people that they be ready when we ask them to
do that. That is our charge, together.
The fiscal outlook which U.S. Army faces in this fiscal
year is dire and, to my knowledge, unprecedented. In addition
to the $170 billion in cuts to the Army levied by the Budget
Control Act of 2011, the combination of the continuing
resolution, a shortfall in overseas contingency operations
funds for Afghanistan, and a sequester in fiscal year 2013 has
resulted in somewhere between a $17 billion and $18 billion
shortfall to the Army's operation and maintenance accounts, as
well as an additional $6 billion cut to other programs. All of
this will come in the last 7 months of this year.
So, therefore, it has grave consequences and immediate
readiness impacts on our forces, especially those not serving
in Afghanistan or forward in Korea. Because we will ensure they
have all the money that they need, but what that means is we
will curtail the funding for the next forces in, for the next
forces after that in.
We will curtail training for 80 percent of our ground
forces. This will impact our units' basic warfighting skills,
induce shortfalls across critical specialties, including
aviation, intelligence, engineering, and even our ability to
recruit new soldiers into the Army.
We have directed an immediate Army-wide hiring freeze, and
we will terminate an estimated 3,100 temporary and term
employees. We will cut 37,000 flying hours from our aviation
training, which will create a shortfall of over 500 pilots by
the end of fiscal year 2013. We will create a backlog at flight
school that will take over 2 years to reduce.
We will reduce our base sustainment funds by 70 percent.
This means even minimum maintenance cannot be sustained, which
will place the Army on a slippery slope where our buildings
will fail faster than we can fix them. There will be over
500,000 work orders that we will not be able to execute.
We will furlough up to 251,000 civilians for up to 22 days.
We will cancel third- and fourth-quarter depot maintenance,
which will result in a termination of an estimated 5,000
employees and a significant delay in equipment readiness for 6
divisions and an estimated $3.36 billion impact to the
communities surrounding our depots.
For fiscal year 2014 and beyond, sequestration will result
in the loss of at least an additional 100,000 personnel:
soldiers from the Active Army, the Army National Guard, and the
U.S. Army Reserve. Combined with previous cuts that have
already been approved, this will result in a total reduction of
at least 189,000 personnel from the force, but it will probably
be higher than that.
These reductions will impact every Army base and
installation that we have. Sequestration will result in delays
to every one of our 10 major modernization programs. It will
create an inability to reset our equipment after 12 years of
war and unacceptable reductions in unit and individual
training. These cuts will be felt across the entire country.
Since 2008, the total Army budget will have been reduced
over 40 percent. If sequestration is enacted, it will be
greater than 50 percent. That is a number greater than any war
that we have been involved since World War II.
In my opinion, sequestration is not in the best interest of
our national security. It will place an unreasonable burden on
the shoulders of our soldiers and civilians. We will not be
able to execute the Department of Defense strategic guidance as
we developed last year.
I understand the seriousness of our country's fiscal
situation. We have and will continue to do our part. But the
significance of these budget reductions will directly impact
our ability to sustain readiness today and into the future. We
simply cannot take the readiness of our force for granted. If
we do not have the resources to train and equip the force, our
soldiers, our young men and women, are the ones who will pay
the price, potentially with their lives.
It is our responsibility, the Department of Defense and
Congress, to ensure that we never send soldiers into harm's way
that are not trained, equipped, well led, and ready for any
contingency, to include war. We must come up with a better
solution.
Thank you so much for allowing me to testify here today. I
look forward to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Odierno can be found in
the Appendix on page 94.]
The Chairman. Thank you, General.
Admiral.
STATEMENT OF ADM JONATHAN W. GREENERT, USN, CHIEF OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS, U.S. NAVY
Admiral Greenert. Good morning, Chair McKeon, Ranking
Member Smith, members of the--distinguished members of the
committee, and thank you for the opportunity to testify today.
And when I last appeared before you, I declared that there
are two important qualities of our naval forces, and they are:
One, that we will operate forward where it matters at the
maritime crossroads of the world, and that they will be ready
when it matters. This remains our mandate. Your Navy and Marine
Corps are uniquely qualified to respond immediately to crises,
to assure allies, to build partnerships, to deter aggression,
and to contain conflict.
But these qualities and their value are at great risk by
the fiscal uncertainty that we now face. Although our primary
concern with sequestration and the lack of an appropriations
bill is the impact they have on the readiness during this
fiscal year, make no mistake: It is going to have an
irreversible and debilitating impact on Navy's readiness
through the rest of the decade. We will not be able to respond
in the way the Nation has expected and depended. And we should
make that kind of decision consciously and deliberately.
Three symbolic but not really all-inclusive examples of the
impact of the delays are the delays of the deployment of the
Harry Truman [aircraft carrier USS Harry S. Truman], the delay
in the overhaul of the Abraham Lincoln [aircraft carrier USS
Abraham Lincoln], and the delay in the initial construction of
the John F. Kennedy [aircraft carrier USS John F. Kennedy].
These were not inconsequential decisions or the only
decisions that we will have to make and that we are going to
make over the coming weeks. They did not come without
significant consequences to our people, to the defense
industry, or to local economies. The impacts of funding that we
realign today will cascade into the future years.
The $8.6 billion shortfall confronting us in operations and
maintenance has compelled us to cancel ship and aircraft
maintenance, reduce operations, curtail training for forces
soon to deploy, and plan for the furlough of thousands of
civilians. These actions enable current missions of forces
forward-deployed but, subject to congressional action, will
have inadequate surge capacity at the appropriate readiness to
be there when it matters, where it matters.
We ask that the Congress act quickly to replace
sequestration with a coherent approach to deficit reduction
that addresses our national security interests. We need an
appropriations bill for this fiscal year that will allow the
Department to allocate resources in a deliberate manner.
Without these actions, the condition and expected service
life of our ships and aircraft will further degrade, our
sailors will not be proficient and they won't be confident to
do the job, and we will be forced to cancel or slow procurement
of relevant platforms and systems needed to preserve our
warfighting superiority, platforms such as the Joint Strike
Fighter [F-35 Lightning II], the P-8 [Poseidon] Maritime Patrol
Aircraft, the Littoral Combat Ship. All those and even more
will be in jeopardy.
Mr. Chairman, I know you are dedicated to the men and women
of our military and to their families. But our folks are
stressed by the uncertainty about their jobs, their operational
schedules, and, more importantly, their future. I appreciate
the opportunity to testify on their behalf, and I thank you in
advance for your efforts in this and that of this body in
trying to avert the very real readiness crisis that we face
today.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Greenert can be found in
the Appendix on page 104.]
The Chairman. Thank you, Admiral.
General Welsh.
STATEMENT OF GEN MARK A. WELSH III, USAF, CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S.
AIR FORCE
General Welsh. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Smith, and members of the committee. It is always an honor to
appear before you, and appearing with this group is especially
a pleasure and a privilege for me.
In line with what you have already heard, sequestration
threatens to carve crucial capability from our Air Force, as
well, with alarming and immediate effects on people, readiness,
infrastructure, and eventually on modernization.
Sequestration represents a potential $12.4 billion top-line
budget reduction for fiscal year 2013 for the Air Force. It
affects every account and every program. If it occurs, it will
significantly undermine your Air Force's readiness and
responsiveness today, it will significantly impact the Air
Force civilian workforce in the coming months, and its impact
on modernization would clearly affect the Air Force in the
future.
You have heard a lot of examples, and the Air Force is
dealing with the same types of things. I will highlight just
three.
The 22-day furlough that the Deputy Secretary of Defense
described will affect up to 180,000 civilian airmen, depriving
our Air Force of over 31.5 million hours of productivity and
specialized expertise just through the remainder of this fiscal
year. It will result in a loss of over 200,000 flying hours.
And what that means to us is that while we will protect flying
operations in Afghanistan and other contingency areas, nuclear
deterrence, and initial flight training, roughly two-thirds of
our Active Duty combat Air Force units will curtail home
station training beginning in March and will drop below
acceptable readiness levels by mid-May, and most, if not all,
will be completely non-mission-capable by July.
It will cut 30 percent of our remaining weapons systems
sustainment funds, which means we will need to postpone about
150 aircraft and 85 engines from depot induction, which creates
a backlog that will keep giving for years.
The Air Force's global vigilance, reach, and power are what
make it one of America's premier asymmetric advantages and a
critical member of this joint warfighting team. But strategic
agility and responsiveness require a high state of readiness.
Sacrificing that readiness jeopardizes the strategic advantages
of airpower. Sequestration will have an almost immediate effect
on our ability to respond to multiple concurrent operations
around the globe, something that we have been asked to do along
with our sister Services many times in the past.
Longer term, sequestration cuts to Air Force modernization
will impact every one of our investment programs. These program
disruptions will, over time, cost more taxpayer dollars to
rectify contract breaches, time-delay inefficiencies, they will
raise unit costs, and they will delay delivery of validated
capabilities to warfighters in the field.
The Air Force is long overdue for reconstitution following
more than 2 decades of war. Our inventory still includes
aircraft that are as old as I am, which is getting to be a
scary thought. And our force is as small as we have ever been
since we became a separate Service. And now we find ourselves
stuck in the unenviable trade space between readiness and
modernization, and we need your help to get out.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Smith, and the committee,
thank you for what you have been doing to address this problem.
Anything we can do to help you pass an appropriations bill and
to eliminate sequestration is our goal.
Thank you for the chance to be here.
[The prepared statement of General Welsh can be found in
the Appendix on page 115.]
The Chairman. Thank you, General.
General Amos.
STATEMENT OF GEN JAMES F. AMOS, USMC, COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE
CORPS, U.S. MARINE CORPS
General Amos. Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith,
members of the committee, forgive me for reading my remarks
here, but it is a strategic message and there is much inside of
it, and I didn't want to miss a single point of it. So if you
would forgive me for doing that.
I am struck as I sit here looking at my colleagues, all six
of us, there are almost 240 years of military experience and
service to our Nation. We have seen a lot. Every one of us are
combat veterans. So what we have to say is from our hearts. It
is honest, Chairman. You will get the truth from all of us
today.
Speaking today principally as a member of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, this body in front of you today, sequestration, by
its magnitude, its timing, and its methodology, will have a
devastating impact on our Nation's readiness, both short-term
and in the long term.
Combined with the effects of the existing continuing
resolution, sequestration creates unacceptable risk in four
main areas: First, risk to our national strategy; then risk to
our forces; then risk to our people; and, lastly, risk to the
United States of America.
Regarding strategy, maintaining a sound international
economic system and a just international order are the very
foundation of our Nation's strategic guidance. The effects of
disruption to this global order could be seen in volatile
energy prices, fluctuating global markets, sovereign behavior,
and economic decline.
Failing to provide leadership in the collective security of
this global order will have significant economic consequences
for the American people. Worse, a fiscally driven lapse in
American leadership and forward engagement will create a void
in which old threats will be left unaddressed and new security
challenges will find room to grow.
There should be no misunderstanding: The combined effects
of continuing resolution and sequestration will have a
deleterious effect on the stability of global order, the
perceptions of our enemies, and the confidence of our allies.
Sequestration, viewed solely as a budget issue, would be a
grave mistake, bordering irresponsibility.
Our collective actions in the next few months would be
scrutinized--will be scrutinized on a global stage, for even
the perception of a disruption of our Nation's willingness to
protect its global interests could and will have strategic
consequences.
Regarding risk to our forces, the linkage between resources
and readiness is immediate and visible. The scale and an abrupt
implementation of sequestration will have devastating impacts
on readiness. Sequestration will leave ships in port, aircraft
grounded for want of necessary maintenance and flying hours,
modernization programs cancelled, and units only partially
trained and reset after 12 long years of combat.
Because of our special role as America's crisis response
force, Marines place a high premium on readiness. I have done
everything within my authorities to date to preserve a ready
Marine Corps. I will continue to do so.
Under continuing resolution, I have kept deploying units
ready, but only by stripping away the foundations of the long-
term readiness of the total force. While these short-term
adaptations are possible, the enduring effects of these
decisions puts the future health and readiness of my force at
risk. By the end of this year, more than 50 percent of my
tactical units will be below minimum acceptable levels for
readiness for deployment to combat theaters.
In a very real sense, we are eating our seed corn to feed
current demands, leaving less to plant for the long-term
capabilities of the force. This pattern inevitably leads to a
hollow force, and its impacts are already being felt under the
continuing resolution.
The most troubling and immediate risks are those that
sequestration imposes on our people. Sequestration does not
hurt things; it hurts our people. The qualitative edge that the
American service member takes to the battlefield is the
fundamental advantage that differentiates our forces from our
enemies. This qualitative combat edge will be severely eroded
by the impacts of sequestration, leaving America's men and
women with inadequate training, degraded equipment, and reduced
survivability.
While military pay and allowances have been exempted in
this round of sequester, the quality of life for the All-
Volunteer Force and their families will suffer as we reduce
family programs and installation maintenance.
Our civilian marines will likewise be impacted. Ninety-five
percent of our civilian workforce is employed outside the
Washington, D.C., national capital area. They are the guards at
our gates, our financial experts who manage our budgets, our
acquisition specialists, the therapists who treat our wounded,
and the teachers who teach our children. The economic impact to
these families and the local communities are put at risk by
short-term furlough or long-term termination.
Protecting our ability to keep faith with our families and
our wounded warriors is a top priority in my Marine Corps. But
even this, the most sacred of responsibilities, will be
increasingly put at risk under sequestration.
In closing, allow me to articulate one more set of risks:
the risk to our Nation. In the final analysis, sequestration
potentially asks the most from those who have borne the
greatest sacrifice. The effects of sequestration over the next
10 years will threaten the foundations of our All-Volunteer
Force, putting the Nation's security on a vector that is
potentially ruinous. It will dramatically shape perceptions of
our Government as both an employer and as a customer, thereby
reducing confidence throughout our Nation's institutions.
These are strategic matters that demand our immediate
attention and action. I urge the committee to consider the full
range of risks created by this legislation and ask for your
assistance in mitigating them to the extent possible.
Thank you, Chairman, Ranking Member Smith. I look forward
to your questions at the right time.
[The prepared statement of General Amos can be found in the
Appendix on page 126.]
The Chairman. Thank you, General.
General Grass.
STATEMENT OF GEN FRANK J. GRASS, USARNG, CHIEF, NATIONAL GUARD
BUREAU
General Grass. Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith,
members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to be
here today.
Over the past 11 years, sustained investment and engagement
in overseas and domestic operations has transformed the
National Guard from a strategic reserve into an operational
force that provides dual-mission capability to our Nation and
our communities. The readiness of this operational force is
clearly at risk, and the total force is on the verge of a
readiness crisis.
The National Guard rapidly expands the capacity of the Army
and the Air Force. The National Guard does the same for
civilian authorities by providing organized, disciplined,
properly equipped military units on short notice. The Guard can
do this because of the institutional procurement, training,
education, and depot-level maintenance programs the Army and
Air Force provide.
The reduction in these critical areas would have an
immediate impact on National Guard readiness. In a matter of
months, our readiness as an operational force for the Nation's
defense and as an immediate homeland response capability will
be eroded. With the inability to transfer funds between
programs, sequestration and the possibility of a year-long
continuing resolution will further degrade our overall
readiness.
I have provided all 54 Adjutants General with a summary of
near-term measures to assist them in mitigating risks and
threats to our readiness. I have asked them to examine
overhead, curtail conferences, not renewing temporary civilian
positions, and implementing hiring freezes. And that is just
the start.
We are planning to defer sustainment and maintenance
requirements for aircraft facilities to conserve operations and
maintenance funds and to use those conserved funds only for
mission-essential, mission-critical functions. Sustainment,
restoration, and modernization cuts will degrade our already
aging armory infrastructure. The continuing resolution
prohibits any new starts in military construction, further
threatening our armory and facility modernization master plans.
The capability of our facilities to support guardsmen
across the States in more than 3,000 communities directly
impacts our ability to reach and support areas of our country
suffering from disasters.
If we face a full sequestration scenario, the National
Guard may have to furlough soldiers and airmen serving as
military technicians, as well as other Government civilians.
This means more than half of the National Guard's full-time
members may be furloughed, resulting in maintenance backlogs in
every State. These actions will reduce National Guard readiness
and the forces available to the Governors to respond to natural
and manmade disasters.
Preparation and training of nearly 13,000 soldiers and
airmen assigned to the units given the mission to mitigate the
effects of chemical, biological, and nuclear terrorist attacks
or industrial accidents in the homeland will suffer as
exercises and training events are delayed or cancelled by
reductions in operations and maintenance funds.
In summary, the potential impact described today will have
a measurable and dramatic negative effect on critical National
Guard capabilities, both for at home and abroad.
I thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today,
and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Grass can be found in
the Appendix on page 134.]
The Chairman. Thank you, General.
You know, when I went to the Steering Committee to apply
for this job as chairman of this committee, I told them I
thought that the responsibility of the chairman was to ensure
that every one of our people that we send into harm's way would
have the training, the leadership, the equipment, the time,
everything they needed to carry out their missions in
protecting this Nation and our allies at peace around the world
and return home safely.
One of the things that I think disturbs me most about all
of this discussion that we have been having now for the last,
actually, couple of years: Doesn't even address the real
problem that we face. Yes, debt is a problem, but where does it
come from?
I have a little chart here that I have been using the last
week that shows what our spending has been over the last 50
years, major percentage-wise over all of the Government area.
The top, the purple, is what we spend each year for
interest on the money that we borrow. The red is mandatory
spending, those items that we don't get to vote on each year.
They have been decided in the past, and they are on autopilot,
and they are just moving forward. Social Security, Medicare--
many of those items that fit into this category. The green is
the nondefense discretionary spending that we spend here out of
Washington: education, roads, transportation, FBI [Federal
Bureau of Investigation], border security, all of those. And
the blue at the bottom is defense.
Now, we can see how defense spending has gone down. We can
see that discretionary nondefense has kind of remained a
constant. We can see that mandatory spending has way more than
doubled in that time period. We know that those numbers on that
progression, the ones that are going down are continuing to go
down; the mandatory is continuing to grow.
That is the real driver of all of this that we are talking
about. If we eliminated all of defense, if we eliminated all of
the discretionary spending, we would still be running a deficit
each year of a half-trillion dollars just for the autopilot
mandatory programs. So those need to be addressed. We need to
put people back to work; we need to grow the economy. That
needs to be addressed.
But, so far, we have focused heavily on cutting
discretionary spending, with at least half of that coming out
of defense, which only accounts for, like, 17 percent of our
overall spending. The President has talked about a balanced
approach. This has been very unbalanced.
None of you in uniform have ever made the decision to go to
war. That is always done by civilians. Yet, once that decision
is made, the responsibility to carry it out falls on you. And
you do a tremendous job.
One of the things that I am most stressed about is what the
impact that this is going to be on our readiness. Now, the way
I interpret that is the soldiers, sailors, flyers, marines,
Guard, all of them that are going to be deployed over the
next--you know, we know the troops are going to come home from
Afghanistan. I wish we could say that will be the last war we
ever have to fight, but look at our history. Look at what we
did after World War II. Look what we did after Korea, after
Vietnam. We have cut, cut, cut so that we won't be prepared for
the next one.
If we could have testimony from all of those who are not
able to testify anymore, who lost their lives because of a lack
of readiness, a lack of training, a lack of proper leadership,
which is the direction we are heading in--I think, General
Odierno, you told me earlier before we came in here that the
American people have always trusted you and even trusted us,
even though our Congress, I think we were given about an 11-
percent approval rating. You probably have the highest approval
rating from the American public of anyone. But they have
expected us and they have taken for granted the fact that we
will always be able to be there to respond when we are
attacked. And we get attacked when we show weakness. And as we
cut our readiness, that around the world shows weakness, and it
opens us up and makes us vulnerable. And then that causes more
lives to be lost.
I am concerned about the troops that are going to be
deployed next year to Afghanistan, and are they getting the
proper total training that they need now. I hear stories that
they are not already, before sequestration fully kicks in.
I would like, if you could, in place of those who are not
able to testify, who have lost their lives--the first ones
going across Africa when they didn't have that training and
leadership and equipment, those who were in Korea when we were
almost pushed into the ocean that lost their lives, that were
not able to have that training--will you please, General
Odierno, Admiral, General Welsh, General Amos, General Grass,
will you tell us some specifics that you already see happening
or you know will happen as they don't get enough ammo to
practice firing their weapons enough, as they don't get enough
flying hours, as we have to bring ships into port, how are we
going to be hit, so that the American people can really
understand?
They think we are cutting waste, fraud, and abuse. That is
a term we throw out. We are way past that. If they understood
what we are really talking about, I think there would be a
rising up of people in this Nation to say, ``Do not try to fix
this problem on the backs of our military.''
General Odierno.
General Odierno. Thank you, Chairman. The impacts are
significant across every area. Over time, you know, first what
we do is we degrade the capabilities of our individual
soldiers. We degrade it because their equipment begins to fail,
it is not maintained at the right level, their training is
reduced, so their proficiency, although still good, is not at
the level we would like it to be, but most importantly it is as
you grow up in terms of the type of unit you train in. For
example, we like to be trained at battalion level proficiency,
so they understand how to coordinate activities at the
battalion level.
Because of these training reductions, right now we believe
we are down to about squad level capability for fiscal year
2013, for example. So that means you only going to train up to
a squad, you won't do the coordination, you won't do the live
fires, you won't do the kind of capability you need to
synchronize and organize yourselves, so when you get somewhere
and have to deploy somewhere, your ability to coordinate and
execute has not trained, and that puts lives at significant
risk.
Secondly, flying, let me talk about flying. You know, for
example in Afghanistan, it is probably one of the most
difficult places we have ever had to fly rotary wing aviation
because of the environment, because of the altitude, because of
the weather conditions, and if we have to reduce the amount of
training we give our pilots, they will go in there with a hell
of a lot less capability. And what does that mean? That means
there will be mistakes made. And what does that mean? That
means we will have accidents or that means we will be more
likely to be shot down by enemy fire, and ultimately that
results not only in the death of our pilots, but those who are
riding with them, and then of course it will then hinder us in
conducting the operations the way we see fit in conducting
operations, so then across a broader range, you now lose your
capability to conduct the type of operations that are necessary
in order for us to be successful.
It is about how well are we able to train our support
forces, our logistics capability that has to go throughout any
area of operation and deliver logistics. And as we have to
prioritize because we don't have enough money, do they get the
right training so they are prepared to run convoys over long
distances, that they are coordinated and prepared to protect
themselves? All of those things now come at risk, and
ultimately those all result in the loss of life and the loss of
capability that we have. And that is what we are concerned
about.
And over the long term it will degrade. It will be worse a
year from now than it is today. It will be worse 2 years from
now than it is a year from now, and it will slowly degrade over
time and then you start to lose the expertise on how to train
and what the right standards are, and it continues to build on
itself as you go forward and it really becomes risky, and then
you find yourself in a hollow force, one that is not capable of
doing the missions that we are going to ask them to do.
Our soldiers, our airmen, our marines, they do the most
complex missions of any military in the world, and we have to
train them so they are able to do those complex missions. That
is why they are so much better than any other military, because
we ask them to do missions that are much more complex and
difficult.
The Chairman. Admiral.
Admiral Greenert. Chairman, let me take you to early 2014,
to calendar year 2014. As a result of what we are not going to
do, training and preparing people here in the near future so
that we can be out there where it matters, like I said before,
right now here is the situation in 2014. We have no ships in
the Southern Command, so the hundreds of tons of drugs that are
being intercepted, there is nobody there to do that, and we are
not nurturing future relationships there and keeping stability
down there.
You have one carrier strike group, an air wing in the
Central Command 2014 instead of the two, which is the demand
signal. So you don't--that central commander does not have the
option to be able to support strikes as appropriate in
Afghanistan while being in the Arabian Gulf to maintain
stability and deterrence there, and again nurture relationships
and keep the peace, if you will, in and around that area.
There are no ships, no amphibious ships or cruisers and
destroyers to support counterterrorism operations, support our
embassies over there for quick reaction, because we don't have
an amphibious ready group over there in and around the African
Command, so that is the support option around Somalia, around
Yemen, the Red Sea, Sudan, all of that, there is no one there.
We would have to kind of surge forward to there. So we are not
there when it matters and we are not ready when it matters in
that regard.
In the ballistic missile defense, we would start stepping
down and we would have no ballistic missile defense deployments
in 2014. Well, we have commitments to meet, so we would have to
figure that out. We have commitments to Israel, we have
commitments in the Central Command to provide ballistic missile
defense.
These are the things that we won't be able to support on
the current situation as you look at 2014.
The Chairman. Thank you. General.
General Welsh. Chairman, to be clear on this from an Air
Force perspective, readiness levels aren't just a problem in
the future, they have been a problem since about 2003, when
operations tempo and things began to build up on the force, and
our readiness levels have been declining ever since. Right now
almost half, just under 50 percent of our Air Force units, the
squadrons, which are our fighting level units, are below what I
would consider an acceptable combat readiness level. The
operational tempo of deployments, equipment degradation over
time, failure to modernize have created this problem now, which
we have been managing with a level of risk that we thought was
acceptable, but we were getting close to what I think Ray
Odierno would describe to you as the razor edge that he feels
the Army is now on.
We set aside full-spectrum training a few years ago to
focus on the fight that we are currently engaged in. We kept a
small piece of our Air Force supremely ready in areas like the
nuclear mission, et cetera, because we knew we had to do that,
but the rest of our combat air forces did not maintain that
readiness level, and so our ability today to go fight a
determined enemy in a contested environment with degraded
communications, degraded navigation, degraded weapons systems
capability is not where it should be, and we are fully aware of
that.
Our Secretary this year for the 2013 budget and then
forward into 2014 declared it a readiness POM [Program
Objectives Memorandum] to try and get back to that kind of
training, improve our simulation capabilities. Our range
airspace is not fully funded to even have this kind of
training, because we haven't been doing it for the last 2
years. So we are trying to recover to that.
The problem as I see it is as we try to get back to that,
Mr. Chairman, when the next major conflict starts, we will send
our joint force to fight regardless of how ready they are, and
they will go and they will fight, and they will die in greater
numbers than they have to, the conflict will last longer than
it should, civilian casualties will be more than we would like
to accept. We owe them better than that.
The Chairman. Thank you. General Amos.
General Amos. Chairman, I think General Welsh's last
comment, the very last point he made about we will go when the
next conflict happens, that is a true statement. There will be
nobody at this table that will hold back, but I am reflected
back to Korea when we came out of World War II and that great
struggle in Europe and the struggle in the Pacific, and that
both those campaigns were over, 1946, America turned its back
on its military across the board, and statements like, we will
never do another amphibious assault, there is no reason to have
that kind of talent, those ships. We had over 1,100 amphibious
ships in World War II. We are down to 30 today.
It was Inchon, 1952, where the marines landed under General
MacArthur and came in the backdoor of the North Koreans that
actually began to relieve the pressure on Seoul. But when that
force was put together, it was cobbled together across the
United States of America. We had marines that went even without
boot camp; never been to boot camp. Medal of Honor recipient,
2nd Battalion 7th Marines, never went to boot camp. Now, you
could say, well, maybe that is okay then, but I will tell you
what, there was a lot of young men that didn't come home from
the Korean conflict as a result of our negligence coming out of
World War II.
For us some mechanical things that you can attribute to, we
have got nine F/A-18 [Hornet fighter jet] squadrons in the
United States Marine Corps. That is it, nine. There are more
than 80 aircraft carriers. There are four deployed to Iwakuni,
Japan. We have some right now in the Persian Gulf postured to
do our Nation's bidding there.
By January of next year, I will have less than half of the
airplanes available to put in squadrons. What that means is
those four deployed squadrons will have their full complement
of 12 airplanes. Those squadrons that are back home preparing
to go will have less than five of a 12-plane squadron.
Our training is already being degraded back home because we
are taking money from training ranges and training
opportunities to make sure that those units that are next to
deploy, the ones that are going to go into Afghanistan, we are
in the middle of changing over right now, in the month of
February and March what we call the 13 Tach I Force is going
into Afghanistan. They have already been trained. They are
fine. They are at what we call a C-1. They are at the highest
level of training. The forces that will relieve them in the
August and September timeframe will be the same. But as I said
in my opening remarks, the seed corn for that was eaten and
paid for for long-term readiness to get those forces ready to
go.
And finally, I would like to throw this out to the
committee here. Several things have happened in the last 3
years, and I think it would be instructive to ask ourselves,
what is it we would not want to do? When we start talking about
Jon Greenert's ships and his faithfulness in trying to get his
ships forward deployed and he is working hard on it, and I am a
partner in that, but here is a couple of things that we did
since 2010, with your Marine Expeditionary Forces forward
deployed. 2010, the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit, deployed
for 7 months, rescued the crew from the Magellan Star, flew 312
combat sorties over Afghanistan. The 53-Echoes [CH-53E Super
Stallions], they are 35-year-old helicopters, flew 400 miles
deep into Pakistan up in the most dangerous part to rescue over
9,000 people in the Pakistani floods.
The 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit in the Western Pacific
went to the Philippines as a result of a mega-typhoon,
delivering 170,000 pounds of relief and rescuing 600,000
victims. I mean, the magnitude of that is staggering. They
turned and they went to northern Japan to Sendai. Nobody told
them to go. They just anticipated the mission, and the very
next morning after that terrible earthquake and tsunami and the
impending nuclear disaster, the marines of the 3rd Marine
Expeditionary Force went up there for 45 days and flew into
radioactive plume, rescuing over 9,000 Japanese and delivering
more than a hundred--several hundred thousand supplies.
2011, 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit rescued the displaced
persons from Tunisia when that country began to unravel.
Operation Odyssey Dawn started, the air campaign over
Libya. For the first 2 days, those were marines that were
flying the deny flight campaign over Libya. They rescued the F-
15 [Eagle fighter jet] pilot late at night in an MV-22 [Osprey
tiltrotor aircraft].
Lastly, a series of other things, but in 2012, the 24th
Marine Expeditionary Unit just this past December on its way
home, had left after being in the Central Command AOR [area of
responsibility] for 8\1/2\ months, they were outside the
Straits of Gibraltar and got turned around and headed east when
the Palestinian and Israeli conflict broke in the Gaza Strip.
And the whole world looked at that. We didn't know what was
going to happen. And yet the 24th knew, found itself off the
coast of Israel.
Those are the kinds of things that our Nation is going to
either have to say we are not going to do in the future, and
that is a significant strategic decision. And that is why I
said in my opening comments, this is not a budgetary issue.
These are strategic consequences that we are dealing with.
Thank you.
The Chairman. General.
General Grass. Mr. Chairman, I think the last time I
checked there is about less than 1 percent of our population
serving in uniform today. And we are all, I think if you ask
any of us, we are all very proud of an All-Volunteer Force,
well led, well trained, well equipped. And the National Guard
is a part of that All-Volunteer Force, and we train with the
Army and the Air Force at their installations, we train at
their combat training centers, we train combat training center
operations and command post exercises with every level from
division down to company.
That training gives us leaders that can go into situations
like not too long ago, Hurricane Sandy, as it came ashore,
12,000 guardsmen from 10 States and a host of other aircraft
that moved equipment and personnel, both military and civilian,
into the area, 12,000 across those States. The reason they were
able to do what they do every day is the individual training
they received at basic training and advanced individual
training and then the additional training, collective training
they received back home, and at some of these combat training
centers where we train today, these regional locations.
They were also able to do it because of the leadership they
had both at the company battalion level, but also at the
brigade and division level. We have going those leaders over
time because we have had the opportunity to do that training.
On the air side, I am very concerned about our pilots,
especially our rotary wing pilots who do search and rescue
every day across this country somewhere. And I am very
concerned about them flying because when they do fly into
situations like last week with the storm that approached and
came up the Northeast, very extreme conditions and as you
continue to degrade the experience level of the flying hours
and the opportunities to go to some of the most difficult
places to train, like the high-altitude training center in
Colorado, if you degrade those opportunities our pilots are
going to be less qualified. And I think, sir, we do have to
keep that. We will put everything we can into moving forces
into these training centers that are going overseas first, but
I do see a degradation of those back home.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Smith.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will try to be quick
here. I know there are a lot of other members who want to get
in, so I will just direct my questions actually to Dr. Carter.
And the focus of the questions is if you were able to get some
certainty, I want to know how much that would help.
Now, obviously, you know, there are concerns about any
further cuts in the discretionary budget. There are many folks
on this panel who think that there shouldn't be any further.
Personally I think there probably is room for some further
cuts, but the big problem is that you have had 2 years now with
the CR, with the debt ceiling threat, threat of Government
shutdown, CR does not enable you to fund the right programs. So
let's say hypothetically, you know, we were to take a 10-year
number and say, you know, we would ask for another $175 billion
cut from defense, but you could do it pretty much wherever you
want, we do it through a normal appropriations process, but
right now today we said that is the number, we are going to
give you an appropriations bill, we are going to kill
sequestration, we are going to raise the debt ceiling, we are
basically going to take that uncertainty off the table and let
you budget going forward for 10 years with $175 billion more
that you need to cut. How much of everything that we have heard
here would that help solve?
And I will throw one other little curve ball in there,
something we haven't mentioned today: There are cuts that DOD
has proposed that Congress has legislatively prohibited you
from doing. I think the most dramatic of these was the cruisers
that we wanted to decommission that you now have to keep, but
you also don't have the money to operate. How much of that also
throws into that problem? If you could just touch on those two
points, that is all I will have.
Secretary Carter. A very good question. I will try to
answer, because I think someone watching this from the outside
would reasonably ask everything that we have been saying: Why
does it go to pot so fast? That is the near-term question, and
it has to do with the continuing resolution and the immediate
effect of sequester.
And what is going on here is that a lot of the impacts that
are so severe are in the operations and maintenance accounts.
Mr. Smith. That is what gives us the hollow force, is you
have got a situation where, you know, you can only cut from
certain places. You can't make the long-term planning of
reducing, you know, longer term procurement or reducing force
size. You have got to cut right now, and if you are cutting
right now, that is day in and day out training. You are not
able to train the force, basically. Sorry. But that, I think--
--
Secretary Carter. That is exactly right, and that is why
this year with sequestration, with the continuing resolution,
we just run out of training money toward the end of the year,
and the consequences of that have been described.
You are asking a longer term question about defense
spending in the long run. It is a very good question. And we
last year began an adjustment that we are still just embarked
on to accommodate $487 billion in budget adjustments. We have
worked very hard to do that in a strategic way in accordance
with the President's strategy. We have not gotten all of the
congressional authority that we need, so there were adjustments
that we wanted to make that were in the best interests of the
strategy that were not accepted, not supported by the Congress,
and that is a big issue for us going forward if we are going to
accomplish that $487 billion adjustment.
Mr. Smith. Because you face the same consequence there. If
you are planning on a $487 billion reduction, I think it is
fair to say, by the way, that that was a reduction in what we
were projected to spend. It is not a dollar-for-dollar cut, it
is what we were projected to spend, but if you are projecting
that out and you say, okay, here is what we are going to do,
and then we can come in and say, nope, you can't do that, then
you are forced back into a similar situation of, okay, well, we
have got to get the money somewhere else, and that forces you
back into those short-term, difficult, hollow-force
adaptations.
Secretary Carter. The turbulence and uncertainty all by
itself is a problem to us. I will just give you one other
illustration of that, which is in our programs with--
acquisition programs. Every time we have a program that we have
on a sound footing, we are trying to get the best value we can,
we have an industry partner who has thought through how they
are going to operate their line, how they are going to operate
their workforce, and so forth, that is what you want, you want
the most economically efficient possible way of providing our
equipment. All that gets thrown into the turmoil every time one
of these changes is made. So turmoil, uncertainty all by itself
is a bad thing.
And this year the combination of continuing resolution and
sequester is just particularly severe, particularly this late
in the fiscal year, and that is why the consequences that are
so dire and so immediate are very real.
Mr. Smith. So, I mean, so basically, I mean, long-term cuts
are a challenge. You have got 10 years to sort of figure it
out. And I don't want to minimize that. It certainly is a
challenge. But it pales in comparison to the short term not
knowing if you can continue any one of the programs that is
right in front of you because you don't have an appropriations
bill that enables you to do it because sequestration is coming.
Those short-term things cause chaos, frankly.
Secretary Carter. Right. Well, they are both concerning to
me. The short-term chaos is concerning and the long-term
endangerment of our strategy and our position in the world and
our ability to have the force structure and the modernization
and the people that we require for defense, both in the short
term and the long term are----
Mr. Smith. Okay. General Dempsey.
General Dempsey. I do feel obligated, I feel like I would
like to respond as well, Congressman. Clearly budget certainty,
time and flexibility help, but there is a magnitude issue here,
too. We built a strategy last year that we said we can execute
and absorb $487 billion. I can't sit here today and guarantee
you that if you take another 175 [billion dollars], that that
strategy remains solvent.
And if you are wondering why this is so hard, let me just
use the Army. You know, people say, well, hell, you did it
after World War II, you did it after Vietnam. After World War
II, we went from a million-man Army to 781,000. After Vietnam
actually, 781. In the 1990s we went from 781 to 495 [495,000].
We grew it for Desert Storm, for OEF and OIF to 570 [570,000].
It is on the way to 490 [490,000] because of the Budget Control
Act.
The question I would ask this committee, what do you want
your military to do? If you want it to be doing what it is
doing today, then we can't give you another dollar. If you want
us to do something less than that, we are all there with you
and we will figure it out.
Mr. Smith. Okay. That makes sense. Thank you. I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Thornberry.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I just have to
observe that I think in the 51 years we have had a defense
authorization bill, I don't think we have ever swallowed any
President's proposal whole without making some adjustments, but
of course what we are talking about today is on a different
scale, as General Dempsey was just describing.
General Odierno, in November 2011 we had a hearing in this
room on sequestration, and you testified that if we go beyond
that, talking about the 487 [$487 billion], it becomes critical
and it becomes a fact that we will no longer modernize, we will
no longer be able to respond to a variety of threats. General
Dempsey just said another dollar beyond the cuts that you all
have already planned for changes the strategy. And it sounds to
me like your testimony said if we go beyond that, we cannot
respond to those threats. Is that still your testimony today?
General Odierno. What I said was in the context of what we
are required to do, so I want to make that clear, so back in
2011, that was in the context of what you are asking the Army
to do, we would not be able to do that. I think it is very much
in line with what General Dempsey said.
I would just throw out one other point, is with the Army it
is about force structure. So, you know, you have got to balance
force structure, readiness, and modernization. You know, for us
to move forward, any significant cuts is a further reduction in
our force structure.
And what I would just tell everybody, we haven't even
started our reductions yet based on the $487 billion cut. That
will start in 2014. Everything we have done so far has been
overseas. That now starts in the continental, in the 50 United
States in 2014. That is going to be dramatic. And I just want
everybody to be braced for that. That has nothing to do with
sequestration. If sequestration goes into effect, that doubles,
and we haven't even started the reductions yet. And that has a
significant impact on readiness and our ability to respond in
itself.
Mr. Thornberry. Okay. General Amos, at the same hearing,
you testified that, so if you go beyond that amount, $1
billion, $2 billion, $5 billion, it is going to come down in
force structure and it will mean capabilities and ability to
respond. And is that still your position today, that beyond
what you have already had to deal with, this 487 [$487
billion], further cuts as, you said, 1 billion, 2 billion, 5
billion, it comes down to force structure and our ability to
respond?
General Amos. It certainly does, sir. I absolutely agree
with that today. The landscape has changed a bit. Just even the
very matter of resetting a force that is currently in
Afghanistan, all the gear that we have had, we still have that
bill and it continues to slide. So not only will we have less
capability because reset is now in competition with
modernization, which is in competition with O&M [Operations and
Maintenance], which is in competition with readiness, and
finally in competition with personnel costs, all of it fits in
the alchemy.
So, yes, what will have to happen is our capacity, you
know, the total volume, the ability to be able to do the things
that our Nation expects its Marine Corps to do will be reduced.
Mr. Thornberry. General Welsh, you weren't here at that
hearing, but your predecessor testified that we are confident
that further spending reductions beyond the Budget Control
Act's first round of cuts cannot be done without substantially
altering our core military capabilities and therefore our
national security.
Do you agree with that?
Mr. Welsh. I do, Congressman. We were already in a position
in the Air Force of trading modernization for readiness. You
saw it in the decision on the C-27 [Spartan military transport
aircraft] last year and our recommendation on the Global Hawk
Block 30 [RQ-4 unmanned aircraft system]. We didn't want to get
rid of those platforms because we wanted to get rid of the
platforms, it is because we couldn't afford to keep doing
everything we were doing. So we are trading new capability in
the Global Hawk Block 30 to improve our readiness numbers for
the remainder of the Air Force. I absolutely agree with General
Schwartz's comments.
Mr. Thornberry. Well, let me just observe that the
President's answer to sequestration has been more cuts in
defense, at least as part of what he calls a balanced approach.
And I hope each of you all are describing these consequences to
him, because further cuts beyond the Budget Control Act are
going to move us in the direction that you have all warned
about here today.
One other observation during my last 20 seconds, the House
has acted twice last year to substitute sequestration cuts
for--or other targeted cuts for sequestration cuts. The
chairman has introduced a bill to prevent sequestration by
Federal attrition. I introduced a bill to stop sequestration
just by delaying further implementation of the Healthcare Act
[Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act]. There are other
ideas that members have, and to quote the President, we can do
this, we just have to want to.
I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Cooper.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is a sad day for
this committee, a sad day for Congress, a sad day for America.
The witnesses have basically told us of a military emergency
that is going to be facing this country, but I don't sense that
we feel like there is a congressional emergency. This is one of
the largest, if not the largest committee in the House of
Representatives, and apparently we don't have the ability to
force a vote between now and March 1, when sequestration kicks
in. Maybe there is one scheduled that I am not aware of, but
basically the House has been doing trivial pieces of
legislation for the last several weeks and we are about to go
on a district work period next week. So as our Nation faces a
crisis, and this is the Armed Services Committee, we are doing
almost nothing, in fact, there is not even very good attendance
at this hearing to hear the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and
all the Chiefs. This is amazing. There is a disconnect here.
As Dr. Carter said, this is all the result of collateral
damage from political gridlock, and a lot of the members'
statements we are hearing more signs of political gridlock.
This is a congressional responsibility and this is the Armed
Services Committee. What are we doing about it? We have the
power to fund this shortfall. Let's use that power. And if we
refuse to do that, we at least have the power to give you all
the flexibility to minimize the damage. We are not even doing
that, because we insist on micromanaging the Department.
So let's take some responsibility here. And as General
Dempsey said, if we won't fund the mission, let's have the
courage to admit a smaller mission. We are refusing to do that.
So why does this committee exist if we don't take
responsibility, if we don't do our job? Because our men and
women in uniform are doing their jobs. We in Congress are not.
And we are about to take a week's vacation right as
sequestration is about to hit. How does that make sense? We do
not even curb our CODELs [congressional delegations], much less
take a salary reduction as a result of shared sacrifice
principles, like Dr. Carter and others are doing, who are
political appointees. We are political appointees. We were
lucky enough to get elected by our folks back home. What are we
doing to help our military?
Mr. Chairman, the best I can tell this committee is doing
little or nothing except talking about it, and yet we are about
the largest committee in Congress. We presumably have enough
votes, enough clout with both parties to get something done, to
shake something loose before it is too late. As you all know,
as a practical matter, it is already way late, because fourth
quarter growth last year was negative partly as a result of
defense drawdowns already anticipating problems, and we are
about to make that worse due to congressional inaction, due to
congressional gridlock?
America deserves better. And Mr. Chairman, I think it is up
to this committee to do better. And we have precious few days
left to do it. So I would urge my colleagues, I would urge
congressional leadership, let's at least have a vote on this
before sequestration happens, let's go on record. Let's not
just duck and dodge, as Congress has been doing for too long.
America deserves better and America deserves a vote.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Cooper. This is the largest
committee in the Congress. We have 62 members. We have now 34
Republicans and 28 Democrats.
I will just point out, this is a bipartisan committee and
we do strive always to work in a bipartisan way. Thirty-one of
the 34 Republicans are here in this hearing today or have been
here. And I agree with you, I don't know why everyone isn't
here. And we have introduced bills. As Mr. Thornberry said, he
introduced one, I have introduced one, and we have tried to
move things in this, but the funding that you are talking about
generates from other committees. So within the jurisdiction of
our committee, we got our bill passed last year, we got our
bill passed the year before, and we have done the things. If
you have other things that we could do within our jurisdiction,
I would be happy to see that we have a vote in this committee.
Mr. Cooper. If the chairman would yield, how about
flexibility for the Department of Defense so that at least they
have the discretion to manage within their means?
The Chairman. That is a good suggestion.
Mr. Jones.
Mr. Jones. Mr. Chairman, thank you. And your comment early
about it is the Congress and the policymakers that send our
troops to war and whether they are necessary or not, and that
is debatable, but I think about the fact we spent over $1.56
trillion in Afghanistan and Iraq combined.
And Secretary Carter, the problem is the American people do
not fully understand the deficit and the debt problems facing
our country. And we have had the policies that have worn out
the budget for our military, and I blame the Congress for that,
and I am part of that, but it leads me to a point, a comment
you made, and I want to build on this very quickly. You said
protect the money for Afghanistan. Well, this Monday, driving
from North Carolina to D.C., I was listening to C-SPAN, and
John Sopko, who is the inspector general for Afghan
reconstruction, made the comment that we are spending $28
million a day in Afghanistan. He took calls from the American
people.
Secretary Carter. That is right.
Mr. Jones. Most of them were very anxious to hear that kind
of money being spent in Afghanistan. He actually said there is
so much fraud and abuse, and gave an example of building a
police barracks, I believe, and the Taliban bombed it a week or
two later, blew it up, so they are rebuilding that. And this is
where it is not fair to the military that--the American people
love the military, the majority do, and yet when they see that
we are spending this kind of money overseas and the country we
are in is known as the graveyard of great empires, I want to
thank the President for reducing the number of troops this
year, and I mean that sincerely, but we signed a 10-year
strategic agreement with Afghanistan, so that means there is
still going to be money going to Afghanistan, there will be
some troops there, and we will have nothing to show the
American people. So therefore, it is tough for us not to issue
sequestration. I agree with the chairman and Mr. Cooper. I
didn't vote for the bill, by the way, so I am not trying to
blame anybody else, but I didn't vote for it because I didn't
understand sequestration, and it was something that if I don't
understand it, I try not to vote for it, but we are not--when
we are telling the American people yesterday in the Marine
[Corps] Times, it says Obama okays $50 million to assist France
in Mali, well, I know that that might not sound like much to
this committee or to those that are testifying, but the people
that read that in eastern North Carolina, that is a lot of
money. Yes, we are supposed to get repaid by the French, but I
think we have got a public relations problem with the American
people. I don't think the military does, but I think we
policymakers and the Administration, I even go back to the Bush
administration and now the Obama administration, we have got a
problem when they see us spending all this money in a foreign
country with very little accountability, and then we come here
and talk about our concerns. And we all are very concerned
about sequestration and continuing resolutions, but Mr.
Secretary, that is the problem we have got. They see us being
the big cock on the block on one hand and the man with the cup
begging for pennies on the next. It just doesn't wash with the
American people.
Secretary Carter. Well, Congressman, you have a number of
important points there. I mean, the first is the strategic
question of why do we have our military in the first place,
what are we doing in Afghanistan, how long are we going to be
in Afghanistan, are we going to succeed in Afghanistan. You
mentioned Mali as well. These are the kinds of commitments that
America has long fulfilled and that we have believed are
important for our security. And I think what you have been
hearing here today is that unless we have long-term budgetary
stability and adequate funding, we indeed can't do these
things, and then we can discuss whether they are necessary or
not for our security, and after all, Afghanistan was the
location from which 9/11 originated.
You made another very important point, two other very
important points. If we are going somewhere, and just for the
moment leave aside whether we should be in Afghanistan, given
that we are there we can't short the troops. And that is what
we have done, is protect the funding for Afghanistan in this
year of where we have the continuing resolution and
sequestration hitting us, and that is one of the reasons why it
is even worse in the other part of the budget, and that is why
for things that are not directly related to Afghanistan, the
hit is even larger.
And finally, you mentioned fraud and bad contracting
practices. They do occur, they are unacceptable anywhere. And I
think that the Department has tried to learn the lessons of
Iraq in Afghanistan, improved contingency contracting,
crackdown on waste, fraud, and abuse, but even a single dollar
lost that way is unacceptable and it doesn't make any sense for
us to be asking for funding from the taxpayer if we are not
also making sure that every dollar is spent the right way. So
that is an excellent point.
The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired, and that is
a good point. I wish he had gone on to tell about the
investigations and the people that are in jail and the
contracts that have been--they have done a lot in trying to
clean that up.
Ms. Bordallo.
Ms. Bordallo. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Gentlemen, I thank
you all for your time today. It is clear through the many
hearings that we have already had on this topic that
sequestration would have lasting effects on the readiness of
our Armed Forces. We all agree on that.
My first question would be to you, Dr. Carter, or perhaps
General Amos. Kim Jung-un once again this week showcased
partially why we are rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific region.
His reckless actions highlight the need for the United States
to maintain a robust presence in this region of the world. So
to that end, I am concerned about the possible impact of
sequestration on our rebalance efforts.
Keeping in mind that the U.S. has an international
agreement with Japan, what impact would sequestration have on
the realignment of Marines from Okinawa to Guam, Hawaii, and
Australia? It would seem to me, gentlemen, that we need to
fulfill our international agreement.
Dr. Carter.
Secretary Carter. I will make one comment and then ask
General Amos and then perhaps General Dempsey more generally
for the Asia-Pacific.
You are right. The cuts that would begin with sequestration
in 2013 and that would extend out over the decade that we are
saying would require a change in our strategy, one of the ways
our strategy would need to change is we couldn't do what we
want to do in the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific theater. And
that is a very important strategic objective for this country,
because for 70 years we have kept the peace in the Asia-Pacific
region. That is what has led to prosperity there, which we have
benefited from, and we are trying to keep that pivotal role of
the U.S. military in the Asia-Pacific theater going, and in
fact to renew it after a decade of focus and concentration on
Iraq and Afghanistan. And all that, which is critical to our
strategy, is put in doubt and put in jeopardy if these further
budget cuts go on.
Ms. Bordallo. General Amos.
General Amos. Congresswoman, I will be happy to talk about
this, because it is very important to me. We have taken aboard
the shift to the Pacific and the reorientation of Marine forces
as directed pretty seriously. We have got over $3 billion in
the FYDP [Future Years Defense Program], and there is a portion
of that that is in serious jeopardy.
As you are aware, we have begun the groundwork for some of
the early realignment of forces on Guam. We have more to do
this year. There is money in the budget to do this. We can't
get the project started. So in essence the realignment from
Okinawa to Guam, if sequestration continues, is going to
jeopardize that shift to the Pacific. But we have already begun
putting more forces in the Pacific. We put another unit
deployment. In fact, we have got two more infantry battalions
on the ground in Okinawa today. You are aware that we have got
the force on Australia that we are working with them. All of
that is going to be in jeopardy. If sequestration hits, the 2nd
Battalion that I just put on the ground on Okinawa, I won't
have enough money to bring them home.
So we are serious, we have the money, we have aligned the
forces for the Marine Corps over the next 18 to 24 months to
move to the Pacific. We are committed. We are committed to go
to Guam, we are committed to reduce the presence on Okinawa,
all the things that our Government and Japan have agreed to.
But if sequestration hits, it is untold yet exactly what the
impact is going to be, but Congresswoman, you can rest assured
it will be a significant impact.
Thank you, Congresswoman.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you. General Dempsey.
General Dempsey. Thank you. Just to let you know, what the
Joint Chiefs do, the reason we exist, is to balance priorities.
So the combatant commanders keep sending demands: We need this,
we need that. This group right here takes it in almost weekly,
actually, and tries to balance the priorities. And the
balancing act, if you will, gets a lot harder as the resources
shrink.
Ms. Bordallo. I just want to remind everyone, this is my
only question, Mr. Chairman, but, you know, we do have an
international agreement to fulfill here. And I think this may
have--if we begin to withdraw or decide not to go ahead with
this, could have lasting effects between our ally Japan and
ourselves. So I want to thank--is there anybody else that wants
to comment on this?
General Amos. Congresswoman, I would like to just make one
more comment on the Pacific, on just the importance of it. We
have got five international treaties. It is more than just
Japan. It starts in Japan, it goes to South Korea, it goes to
the Philippines, it goes to Thailand, and it goes to Australia
and New Zealand.
So we have 60 percent of the world's population is in the
Asia-Pacific area. Seventy thousand people die of natural
disasters every single year in that area. Forty-nine percent of
the world's oil passes through the Straits of Malacca, 100
percent of China's oil does, 100 percent of South Korea's. This
is an important region for us and they are trading partners
with us and they are active, so we have a very vested interest
in the Asia-Pacific area.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much, General, and Dr. Carter
and Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Forbes.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Odierno, you
know, I hope, how much I respect you and each of the gentlemen
to your left who head our Services. I respect your service to
our country and your military judgment, but each of you now
face probably the largest deficit in your O&M accounts that you
have faced in a decade. And, General, I am going to ask you the
question, because you have the largest.
If you look at the chart that I have up here, I was a
little bit surprised when Secretary Carter thanked us for
giving him the opportunity to explain the impact of
sequestration. This committee has not only given that
opportunity, we have begged and pleaded to try to find out that
impact for well over a year.
If you have trouble reading this chart, you can look and
see that the BCA [Budget Control Act] was signed into law in
August, not of 2012 but of 2011. Like many people, I didn't
vote for it, I didn't sign it into law. I lost. Congress passed
it, the President signed it into law. It was the law of the
land in August of 2011. The ``super committee'' [Joint Select
Committee on Deficit Reduction] failed in November of 2011.
There has been 560 days since it was signed into law as the
law of the land, 447 days since the super committee failed. And
if you look to the far right, that is just within the last
couple of weeks when we have received the memos from you guys
about the impacts that this was going to have.
We know that this planning didn't take place, because
Secretary Hale testified before this committee in September of
last year that they were still trying to understand how the law
worked, this is over a year after it was passed, and that they
would do the planning as they got closer. We then heard the
Assistant Secretary for Defense for Public Affairs say that
they were just beginning the planning, that we would get more
specifics in December, just a couple of months ago.
So General Odierno, my first question to you is based on
your best professional military judgment, was it a mistake to
wait that long, all this period of time of silence, was it a
mistake to wait that long to do the planning and communicate to
the American people the impacts that we would have from
sequestration?
General Odierno. I think first there is a couple of things
here, Congressman. First there was a kind of a Bermuda Triangle
happened. So the problem we have for 2013 is part----
Mr. Forbes. And, General, I don't mean to cut you. I only
have 5 minutes.
General Odierno. Okay. But----
Mr. Forbes. If you refuse to answer my--because I am going
to come back to the Triangle.
General Odierno. Okay. Well, the problem we have is, you
know, we thought if necessary the $6 billion reduction would
not have as great an impact as I am now testifying to, because
it is now an $18 billion. Sequestration is about $6 billion.
And, yes, that still has a significant impact, but in
combination with the other two it has grown, and that is why
you are hearing these grave impacts now.
Mr. Forbes. But as to sequestration, was it a mistake to
wait that long to do the planning and communicate its impact to
Congress, yes or no?
General Odierno. I communicated the impact of sequestration
last year. You know, I mean, we were very--I mean, it might
have been general in nature, but we were very clear on the
impact of sequestration. So our testimony on sequestration is
not new.
Mr. Forbes. Well, General, we were asking these questions
and we couldn't get specificity. And again I come back to Mr.
Hale's testimony in September. If you were doing the planning,
Mr. Hale certainly didn't indicate the planning was being done.
General Odierno. No. We made a decision in the Department
of Defense, which we agreed with, that we would wait on
planning. And, frankly, that is because we never thought it
would be executed.
Mr. Forbes. And, General, if you don't do the planning, how
do know the impacts?
General Odierno. We knew in general terms the impacts. We
knew the--you understand the impacts of a $6 billion reduction
in 2013, you understand the impact of a $170 billion reduction
across the armed----
Mr. Forbes. General, the only thing I will just tell you is
this: We heard over and over again when we were asking you guys
what is the impact, we were hearing, we are not doing the
planning, you can't plan for chaos. And the American people
needed to know that.
Let me go to General Welsh. General Welsh, I just heard you
say that the Air Force has been in a decline in readiness since
2003. How then could the Air Force sign off on $487 billion of
additional cuts to national defense in 2011?
General Welsh. As I mentioned, Congressman, our view was
that we could do that with manageable risk. There is no----
Mr. Forbes. But you----
General Welsh. There is no margin remaining.
Mr. Forbes. But that wouldn't have turned around the
readiness decline that you testified was happening since 2003,
would it?
General Welsh. Well, it would if we tried to within the Air
Force change the way we spend our money, which was the purpose
of the PB [President's Budget] 2013 budget that was originally
submitted.
Mr. Forbes. Admiral Greenert, when you gave us the impacts
on this, you didn't give them to this committee--you know,
basically I had to find them from a reporter when they were
given out recently on that.
Let me ask you, I heard you testify early about all the
ships that we don't have in places across the globe, and I
think that was your testimony earlier. Did I mistake that?
Admiral Greenert. That we would not.
Mr. Forbes. We would not have?
Admiral Greenert. Today we do.
Mr. Forbes. With these $487 billion of cuts, in retrospect,
you know, you heard General Odierno say that this is the
perfect storm. Was it a mistake to sign off on those $487
billion of cuts?
Admiral Greenert. That $487 billion in cuts were a law,
so----
Mr. Forbes. So was sequestration, Admiral.
Admiral Greenert. We still have time, Congressman.
Mr. Forbes. Okay.
Admiral Greenert. It is not yet.
Mr. Forbes. I yield back.
Secretary Carter. Mr. Chairman, can I say something about
the planning and the timetable here since it was raised and----
The Chairman. Could you do it very briefly?
Secretary Carter. No. I just want to say----
The Chairman. We have got a lot of people who want to ask
questions.
Secretary Carter. I just want to say it is a very good
question, it is a fair point to raise, but I would make two
important points about it. The first is that we have been
describing the consequences of sequester for a very long time.
We have been anticipating them. They are not hard to see. So
planning isn't the problem, never been the problem. The problem
was doing something.
Now, we didn't do anything until the last few months in the
sense of beginning to act as though sequestration might really
occur, because doing so is harmful. So we have always tried to
balance acting in a way that is harmful to defense in the
anticipation that you might not act to stop sequestration
against the risk associated with carrying out something that
might not actually come to pass. We have tried to make that
balance. We made that balance in the fall by not beginning to
do things like lay people off and release temp and term
employees and so forth.
Beginning in January, I did instruct us to begin taking
action. That is different from planning. That is taking action.
We don't like to do that. These are not things that we will
wish we had done if 2 weeks from now there is no sequester.
These are not good things to be doing.
The Chairman. I think what the gentleman was getting at in
his question is we in previous hearings were told that you had
been ordered not to plan up until last December, which was
about 2 weeks before it was supposed to begin. That is probably
what the gentleman----
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Chairman, since I asked the question, my
concern was this: We have been after the Pentagon for well over
a year, as you know, to give us the specificity of what this
would actually mean, and we were constantly told, we can't get
that information because we haven't done the planning. And my
point is it would have been a lot easier for us to persuade
Congress to act had we had that specificity months ago instead
of waiting until a couple weeks before the deadline would take
place.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Courtney.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You know, in
fairness to the panel that is here, I actually think it was
reasonable for them to expect Congress to do something in the
intervening period. Again, sequestration has a legislative
history that goes back to 1985, which is in our memo today. The
sequestration language that was adopted in the Budget Control
Act verbatim adopted the 1985 sequestration. And if you go back
to read one of the sponsors, Phil Gramm, who authored that back
in 1985, he states very clearly, it was never the objective of
Gramm-Rudman to trigger a sequester. The objective of Gramm-
Rudman was to have the threat of the sequester force compromise
and action.
And we saw a little microscopic example of that on January
1st of this year when the fiscal cliff bill was passed and we
actually delayed sequestration for 2 months. I mean, obviously,
you know, pathetically inadequate, but nonetheless, if you look
at the structure of that compromise, of that act that Congress
approved, it was equally divided between revenue and spending
cuts. That is the Da Vinci Code here in terms of trying to get
the people on both sides of the aisle to actually find a real
solution, and that really should be what we are focused on.
Again, I give this panel great credit for the fact that you
are still, you know, doing your duty to the people of this
country, but frankly you shouldn't be in this position. And,
again, looking at the history of Gramm-Rudman through 2002,
when it was finally laid to rest because we had a balanced
budget, it was Congress that had to sort of bump and grind its
way through budgets that eventually got us to the place where
it became a nullity. And that is our job, that is really how we
fix this, not sort of finger pointing about whether or not
people were doing planning for the indiscriminate cuts which
Secretary Carter described those I think about two or three
times before this committee last year.
Admiral Greenert, I would just like to actually, though,
focus for a second. I mean, your testimony, which again talks
powerfully about sequestration, I mean, the fact is, though,
that the Navy has other issues here in terms of CR's impact on
your O&M account, repair and maintenance.
And I just, you know, if we, again, pull a rabbit out of
our hat in the next 24 hours and get sequestration off the
table, I mean, the fact is is that Congress still has more work
to do in terms of the CR and its impact in terms of keeping a
fleet that is ready to fulfill its mission. Is that correct?
Admiral Greenert. Yes, sir, it is. We have a $4.6 billion
delta, if you will, between what I need to get the job done in
fiscal year 2013 and what would be in the budget, which is the
fiscal year 2012 level.
Mr. Courtney. And, again, just in the last year, I mean,
there have been, you know, the usual unexpected events like a
fire of a submarine up in Maine and collisions at sea that you
have to fix. I mean, this is not stuff that, you know, again,
you can just sort of eat with a flat line from last year's CR.
Is that basically the problem?
Admiral Greenert. Yes, sir, that is correct. The
difference--the 3.2 billion [dollars] literally is the
difference between fiscal year 2012 and fiscal year 2013 in our
President's budget, but as you said, the world kind of gets a
vote. So there was an arsonist started a fire on a submarine,
$350 million. That is not budgeted. There is a collision, $125
million not budgeted. And there is operations in the Gulf to
support UAVs [Unmanned Aerial Vehicles] from ships, to support
an additional carrier strike group, which we spoke to, would
have been the Truman and other operations, the Ponce [USS Ponce
(AFSB(I)-15)], which is our Afloat Forward Staging Base, all
rolled together at $1.4 billion.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you. And obviously it has a ripple
effect on the workforce when you cancel repairs, you know,
planning for having folks in the shipyards obviously takes a
hit when that happens.
Admiral Greenert. Well, there is a double whammy, if you
will. If we furlough, then the workforce is less. And then we
will eventually, we don't--they don't have the work, so
readinesswise, we have less workers, we have less work to be
done.
By the way, this doesn't go away. You don't change the oil
in your car, go in for the 20,000-mile checkup, you won't get
that car for its warranty, and the expected service life is an
issue then for the ships. It is a bill we have to pay.
Mr. Courtney. Secretary Carter, briefly. The President
called for a drawdown to 34,000 troops by the end of this year.
Your budget last year had $88 billion for Afghanistan, going
down to $44 billion. Again, projecting out, I mean, assuming
that we stay on course to 2014, getting down to kind of a rump
force, I mean, there are savings there that we can book at some
point. Am I being too optimistic?
Secretary Carter. No. You are absolutely right. The
Overseas Contingency Operations budget, which is separate from
our base budget, which was about $89 billion last year will go
down as the commitment in Afghanistan goes down.
I should just add parenthetically that in addition to
funding operations in Afghanistan, OCO [Overseas Contingency
Operations] also funds, for example, the reset of equipment of
particularly Army and Marine Corps equipment. So those bills
will need to be paid even as the Afghanistan war winds down,
but you will see OCO go down in the next few years. And we will
be calculating that budget, and Secretary Hale will in coming
months.
Secretary Hale. Just to add briefly, there are other costs
like retrograde, getting the forces out, that are going to add
to our near-term expenses. So I think it remains to be seen how
quickly, but the Secretary is exactly right. It will eventually
come down.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank each of you
for being here today. I want you to know it is my view that you
indeed are providing testimony from the heart. This is the most
candid hearing that I have had the privilege of attending. And
also it reminds me of how in the world did we get here? And
according to Bob Woodward in his book, The Price of Politics,
this originated in the White House, on page 326. And so there
shouldn't be finger-pointing. It needs to be addressed. That is
why I am very grateful that our chairman has twice led the
House to address sequestration to avoid this. Additionally,
there is other legislation. And so I truly hope the White House
that originated this issue, and I think crisis, needs to come
and meet with our chairman and have a positive effect.
Additionally, General Amos, I am very grateful that I--my
late father-in-law was a very proud marine, so I know that it
is the service of our American military that provides us the
freedom to be here today. The Marine Corps is to be reduced by
20,000 marines to 182,000. We know that personnel costs are
significantly higher for marines than the other branches.
Will there be additional personnel reduction below 182,000
to address the issues relative to hollowing out of the
military?
General Amos. Congressman, just to kind of make a
correction here, the actual cost per marine is less than any
other service member. So I have got a little----
Mr. Wilson. Well, that is even--hey, hey, this is good.
General Amos. True statement. Our percentage inside our
total obligating authority is higher than any other Service's.
You raise my total obligating authority, my percentage of
personnel costs go down. So I just want to make that point.
So we are on our way down to 182,000, as planned and agreed
to. I don't know if that is the floor because we don't know
what will happen with all the--you know, we think we do. We are
planning on sequestration; we have already discussed that. But
right now the President has held the manpower account as
stable, so that only leaves two other accounts within my
Service and all ours that you can deal with. You can pull on
the O&M lever, which is training, readiness, or you can pull on
the procurement, which is modernization and reset.
So I don't know where it is going to go. Right now I am
planning on 182 [182,000]. Quite honestly, 182 I consider to be
kind of the standard floor that I can do the missions that are
assigned to the United States Marine Corps around the world, is
a 182 size force. Will I go lower? It is hard for me to tell.
It is just a function of the budget.
Mr. Wilson. And thank you for your explanation.
General Odierno, you earned your way to credibility with me
when I visited with you in Baghdad. And I was so impressed by
your candidness, by the success of the reduction in violence in
that country, which has been so important for the American
people.
As we proceed, the Army is to be reduced by 80,000
personnel to 490,000. You have already very eloquently
documented the dire consequences of sequestration. Do you
anticipate a further reduction below 490,000 personnel?
General Odierno. If sequestration goes into account, we
will have to reduce somewhere around 100,000 more soldiers.
That would be a combination of the Active, National Guard, and
Reserve. So, yes, we will have--we have no choice because 48
percent of our budget is personnel costs. So if our budget goes
down, we have to take personnel out.
And that starts to reduce our capabilities and abilities to
respond. And it will reduce the number of brigade combat teams,
reduce our logistics formations. It will reduce our intel
formations--all that are now supporting combatant commanders
around the world.
Mr. Wilson. And, again, thank you for being so candid and
letting the American people know.
A specific issue is the LUH-72 helicopter [Lakota light
utility helicopter]. And, General Grass and General Odierno, it
is my understanding that they will be placed in nonflyable
storage, possibly on 15 March. What does this do for the
homeland missions of the National Guard? And what effect does
this have on Army readiness?
General Odierno. Let me answer that first, and then I will
turn it over to General Grass.
First, the issue is these aircraft were purchased in order
to support our training that goes on, our installation, and
then support the National Guard in their support of the State
Governors in order to meet the missions that they have. And
because they are not currently aircraft that are deployed in
combat, they are one of the first ones to reduce as we reduce
training.
But I will turn it over to General Grass.
General Grass. Congressman, the first impact is going to be
on the southwest border and the mission there. And we are
looking at that right now to try to find ways to mitigate the
risk on the southwest border mission in support of the States.
Also, we use those aircraft at every disaster, practically,
now. And there is a mission equipment package on there that the
first responders like that actually can give them pictures from
the sky down to the ground.
And one of the major issues that we are going to deal with,
these aircraft are very, very economical to fly compared to a
UH-60 [Black Hawk medium-lift utility helicopter]. So if we
have to go back to flying our 60s, it is going to drive up our
operations costs, our flying hour costs. And, again, with those
counts being devastated here in the long term, we won't be able
to fly.
Mr. Wilson. Again, thank you very much.
The Chairman. Mr. Loebsack.
Mr. Loebsack. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thanks to all of you for being here today and testifying
and for your service, of course.
People often ask me--you know, I am from Iowa--why are you
on the Armed Services Committee? We don't have any bases. I
used to joke, you know, I follow Joe Courtney, we don't have
any submarine facilities, we don't have any bases at all. But
we have a lot of brave men and women in the Active service, on
Active Duty, in all of the different branches of our military.
We have a lot of Guard folks, Air Guard, and Army Guard. We
just redeployed, in the case of about 10 or so folks from the
833rd in Ottumwa, an engineering unit to Afghanistan. And, as I
said, in the case of some of those folks, it is a third
deployment for them.
General Amos knows all too well. My wife Terry and I have a
couple children who are in the Marine Corps. As General Dempsey
knows, they attended the Naval Academy, but we don't talk about
those games anymore.
But, at any rate, there is a lot to be said for Iowa's
connection to the military, not the least of which, of course,
is the region around the Quad Cities which borders Illinois,
and we have the Rock Island Arsenal there. That is why I am
very interested in arsenals and depots. Also, I have the Iowa
Ammunition Plant in my district, in West Burlington, or in
Middletown--a very, very important facility.
But before I get to my question for General Odierno, in
particular, with respect to the organic industrial base, I want
to associate myself with the remarks of Mr. Cooper. A number of
us did not vote for the BCA in the first place precisely
because we feared we would be in this position that we are in
right now. Nobody wants the sequester. It doesn't make any
sense whatsoever.
And my own view is those who thought that somehow we were
going to avoid this because somehow in a fit of rationality
Congress was actually going to get its act together and the
present Congress were going to get their act together to avoid
a sequester, I simply didn't have the confidence that that was
going to happen. And that is a big reason why I voted against
the BCA in the first place. I just was not at all convinced
that somehow this institution and that the leadership in this
institution, along with the Administration, were going to get
their act together and avoid it.
But we are here now, and we are facing these problems, not
only for our military but for many other services that are very
worthy that our Government performs, that it provides our
population. It is very, very critical. I am hopeful but I am
not optimistic that we are going to avoid this. I am very
concerned about it.
When it comes to the readiness of our military and the
organic industrial base in particular, I have a concern about
that. And if I might, General Odierno, can you please detail
for us, if you can, the long-term effects, the steps that are
already being taken in terms of hiring freezes, reduction of
temporary and term employees you mentioned earlier, reduction
in base operations? What kinds of effects will these have on
the Army's organic industrial facilities and really essential
capabilities? And are these effects--even more importantly, are
these effects, are they reversible or not? And, if so, how
would that be the case?
General Odierno. Well, thank you, Congressman.
Over the last several years, we have spent a lot of time
really improving the capability of our depots. They have come a
long way over the last several years. And they have become
efficient; in fact, so efficient, frankly, some of our
industrial partners have trouble competing with them because of
the efficiencies that we have developed in all our depots.
But we have to sustain this capability of both our depot
and industrial base that is right for us as we move forward.
The depots are going to be affected. We are going to have
longer backlogs. We think, as I mentioned earlier, we are going
to reduce about 5,000 employees this year. Frankly, if
sequestration goes into effect, we think that would probably
double the number of people that we would have to take out of
our depots.
So what does that mean? We want to sustain the capability
in our depots; we will do that. But it is going to reduce their
capacity and throughput of equipment, which is going to slow
down our readiness, which is going to take us longer to recover
from the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, which they have done
such a great job of helping us as we have got our equipment
back and get it reset for use for our soldiers. So you are
going to see a significant delay.
The other thing is the partnerships that have been formed
with our depots and our industrial base which have become
critical to our future. And I worry that we will have to
continue to adjust that and lose the great gains we have made.
But when you get down to the individual, personal level
here, what is going to happen is and what I am afraid of is we
are going to lose some of our engineers, we are going to lose
some of our welders, we are going to lose some of our
mechanics, and we won't be able to get them back, those who are
experienced in understanding how to repair our equipment. And
that you can never recover from. And we would have to then
rebuild that expertise.
So those are the concerns I have.
Mr. Loebsack. Yes, I think it is important we continue to
think strategically about this, too. Because whether we like it
or not, there is a likelihood--how high we don't know--we will
engage in conflicts down the road. We have to have that organic
base there. We have to have it ready to be warm as quickly as
possible.
We know that in Rock Island, for example, the uparmoring of
the Humvees was very critical. And the private sector simply
could not take care of that in the same kind of fashion that
the arsenal did.
So thank you very much. I really appreciate this.
The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
I ask unanimous consent to include into the record all
Member statements and extraneous material.
Without objection, so ordered.
Mr. Bishop.
Mr. Bishop. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I appreciate this panel. I came here to listen, and I
have heard quite a bit that is beneficial. I have four specific
questions, perhaps, and then one general one, if I could do it
very quickly.
Mr. Carter, if you could do this quickly, have you done any
calculations as to the termination costs with the supply
chain--our contract termination costs that we have developed
for our suppliers?
Secretary Carter. To begin with, we don't anticipate
terminating a lot of contracts. Sequestration applies to
unobligated funds. So contracts that we have already entered
into in the main we will continue----
Mr. Bishop. So there are no termination costs to calculate?
Secretary Carter. Well, there may be down the road,
particularly if we go beyond this year. There may be contracts
that extend over several years. And they won't necessarily have
termination charges associated with them, but there will be
real costs to stopping them.
Mr. Bishop. You have calculated that?
Secretary Carter. Yes. I mean, we can----
Mr. Bishop. Do you know what that number is?
Secretary Carter. I don't know what the total number is
over the Department. We can get you----
Mr. Bishop. Thank you. I appreciate it if you would.
Secretary Carter [continuing]. Those kind of figures
program by program.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 145.]
Mr. Bishop. Mr. Welsh, or General Welsh--I am sorry--can
you just tell me very quickly what the impact of the 50-50
statute will be with sequestration?
General Welsh. Yes, sir, it is a major problem. As we
furlough civilian employees, for example, in the depots, the
problem we will have is that we will be managing for the last
couple of months of the year day to day, activity to activity
to try and avoid violating the 50-50 rule. Relief from that
rule would be a huge plus on the management side of the depots.
Mr. Bishop. Can you tell me the impact of sequestration on
the F-35 production?
General Welsh. Yes, sir. I think this year we will probably
lose two airplanes, one for sure, probably two Air Force
models, the CTOL [Carrier Take Off and Landing] model.
And then, of course, I think there is some impact on the
RDT&E [Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation] side, and I
think we will lose about $176 million. That will affect
software development, software testing, development of the
Block 4 software, which is our initial operational capability.
Mr. Bishop. Thank you.
Am I making the assumption that the 22-week furlough--you
are making the assumption that that will actually suffice, or
will there be program cuts in addition to that, specifically at
depots?
General Welsh. Sir, I think as the--I think we will lose
about $550 million of work in the depots if we in fact don't
introduce that 150 aircraft and the 85 engines.
I think there will also be an associated half-billion to
three quarters of a billion [dollars] in contract logistics
support break, which will also cause a ripple effect on the
small businesses that are the suppliers and support.
Mr. Bishop. So that will equate to some kind of program
loss at the same time?
General Welsh. Yes, sir, I think so.
Mr. Bishop. Which, once again, goes back to my question
about the termination of contracts, whether you are applying
for it or not. I appreciate those.
Let me ask just one quick general question here that goes
along with this. I look at the panel in front of me, and you
guys are the good guys. If this was the first cut the military
was supposed to be taking, I really wouldn't have any sympathy
for you. But if you go back over the last 6 years, the kinds of
reductions that we have had over the last 6 years in the
military makes this part unacceptable. And that is what the
problem deals with.
Now, I feel comfortable, even some--well, I voted against
sequestration. I also voted for the two solutions that we
presented in the last session. And that would have been very
helpful if you could have taken some of the extra personnel
that you have and gone to the Senate and helped them to
actually pass one of those bills to solve this particular
problem.
But I want you to know at the same time that even though
the opening invitation talked about how the divisiveness of the
Congress has caused this, you guys have helped cause this as
well. You are part of the problem. Mr. Forbes was exactly
right. When I kept asking the one-stars, the two-stars, and
three-stars, what will be the impact you will have on your
facility because of sequestration, there was no answer to it.
You know very well, just as much as anyone, how long it
takes Congress to work. You realize you can't start in January
and get a solution to a problem that is supposed to be coming
up at us. You realize there has to be some kind of lead time.
And the silence that was coming out of the Pentagon, the
silence that was coming out from the Department, from the
military establishment did not help in actually presenting to
the American people what this means. And I am sorry to say
this, but you owe some of that responsibility. You bear some of
that burden, along with us.
And I wish--for heaven's sake, December was too late to
start this question. Had you actually been doing something
earlier about it, we may have been able to get the momentum
that was extremely necessary. And I am sorry, there is a lot of
blame to go around if we actually have to have sequestration.
Don't think you are going to get out of accepting some part of
that blame.
I am out of time. I yield back. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Ms. Hanabusa.
Secretary Carter. Mr. Chairman, I just need to respond to
that.
Let me just start with the Secretary and I. The Secretary
and I have been saying for 16 months that sequestration would
be devastating.
I was up here on August 1st, which would make a very good
diamond right in the middle of the chart that Mr. Forbes
showed, saying just exactly what I said today. There was plenty
of detail. There were--Congressman, I was talking about
furloughs.
And, by the way, in answer to your question, even if we
furlough everybody, all 800,000 civilian employees of the
Department, for the full time that we are allowed to
statutorily, we only get $5 billion of the $46 billion that we
have to get before the end of the year.
So we have been thinking about this a long time and worried
about it for a long time and speaking out about it for a long
time.
And the second thing I want to say is, you know, it doesn't
take a genius to figure out what the consequences of sequester
are. Sequester, it cuts every account one by one. You could see
it all coming. So it is not something that is mysterious. It
is, by design, something that is very mechanical. And so we
knew what was going to happen.
And the last point I would make is that we are now acting
as though sequestration is going to happen. I wish we weren't,
and I still hope it gets averted, but we have had to start
taking some actions now so that it doesn't get worse later.
So the actions that we have started to take over the last
couple of months are, as you hear today, harmful. And they will
have been completely unnecessary if sequester is averted. But
we are starting to take them, we have to take them----
Mr. Bishop. Mr. Chairman?
Secretary Carter [continuing]. So that it doesn't get
worse.
Mr. Bishop. Since this was in answer to my question--I did
have 11 seconds I yielded back. Can I do 11 seconds right now?
The Chairman. Sure.
Mr. Bishop. I am sorry, that answer is not acceptable. The
mere fact of the matter is the planning actually came out in
2012. You were not vigilant on this issue early enough. I am
sorry. That goes back to it. You were not vigilant on this
issue early enough. To stop--to do this only in December of
2012 and then start this type of obvious public campaign does
not help us move forward.
It was too long in which people were saying, We hope it
won't happen, we don't think it will happen; having the
President say, It is not going to happen. A lot of people took
you at your word. That word needed to be different much earlier
than December of 2012.
Now I will yield back, and I apologize for forcing you to
go over. It wasn't my intent.
The Chairman. Ms. Hanabusa.
Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Secretary Carter, on page 4 of your testimony, you make an
interesting statement. Basically you say that if you are given
the authority to transfer funds or reprogram funds, that the
dollars would be sufficient in the base budget, but what you
need to do is take them from the investment accounts to the
operations and maintenance account.
In addition to that, Admiral Greenert says on page 8 of his
testimony that if he has transfer authority as well, he can
probably reduce the impact on his O&M.
And on page 7 of General Amos's testimony, he also talks
about transfer authority. I am not quite sure where he is going
to transfer from, but he has a $406 million shortfall in terms
of operations and maintenance. And we have been having the
discussion of operations and maintenance.
So what exactly do you need in terms of the transfer
authority that you are asking for?
And I do understand, we are talking about two things. You
are talking about a short-term solution for the immediate 2013
to offset the CR as well as the sequestration. And then we are
going to discuss, hopefully, if you answer me quickly enough, a
long-term issue as well.
So can you tell me, whatever authority you want, will that
take care of Admiral Greenert plus General Amos and anyone else
who needs this authority?
Secretary Carter. Well, there are two problems here.
Ms. Hanabusa. Right.
Secretary Carter. One is the continuing resolution. We very
much need and would like to have an appropriations bill, a
normal appropriations bill----
Ms. Hanabusa. I agree.
Secretary Carter [continuing]. That will relieve us from
the CR. And no question about that, that will relieve a lot of
the pressure that we are talking about today.
With respect to sequester, it is--we only have a few months
left, and we have to absorb $46 billion. What that means is you
kind of have to go wherever you can get the money in that
period of time. And so, while additional flexibility is always
helpful, at this point it doesn't help that much.
Ms. Hanabusa. But the implication of your statement is,
what you can assume from your statement is that there is some
fund of money that could, if we were--if you were given this
flexibility, you could transfer.
And I assume, because of the statement that it provides
sufficient total base budgets to DOD but these numbers or these
moneys are in the wrong bucket, for lack of a better
description, that you can do something with this authority,
correct?
Secretary Carter. Yes. If we had a full appropriations
bill, the part of the problem that we have been--part of the
problem that we have been discussing today, namely that related
to the continuing resolution, would be alleviated. Sequester
would still remain.
Let me ask Secretary Hale if he wants to add anything to
that.
Secretary Hale. The only thing I would add, if we do end up
on a continuing resolution, what we would like the
appropriators to do to the CR is to eliminate the limit--there
is a legal limit on the amount of money we can move; it is $4
billion on the general fund accounts--to eliminate that for 1
year or, if not, set it at a very high level so we have the
opportunity to move this money.
Ms. Hanabusa. Okay.
The other question--and, by the way, all the gentlemen to
your left signed it, basically, in that letter of January 14th
to the chair.
The other question is sort of following up on what Ranking
Member Smith was talking about, and that is the $487 billion.
And thank you for clarifying. I always wondered what happened
to Secretary Gates when $100 billion or $200 billion, part of
it being reinvested--and you seem to say that that is also in
the account. So I think we are talking about whether you are
taking it from future spending or not. You are talking about
maybe $687 billion that you believe that the DOD has agreed to.
Now, my question is, where and how is that money accounted
for? I mean, we are saying you are going to do--am I to assume
that the assumption is you are doing $487 billion in this
period of time, taking your 50 percent of the $1.2 trillion,
plus taking the budget cap, which is also part of the Budget
Control Act, and Secretary Gates's $200 billion on top of that?
Or are you fudging--I am not saying it in a negative way--are
you fudging the $487 [billion] and the $200 billion in that
process?
And if you don't have enough time, I will ask the chair to
get it in writing anyway.
Secretary Carter. No. And we will provide it in writing, a
detailed racking of it.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 145.]
Secretary Carter. But, no, it is not double counting.
Under Secretary Gates, we made major adjustments in our
budget plans. And then again with the $487 [billion], those are
distinct and both very--very major.
And I just want to repeat something that I think General
Dempsey and General Odierno said already, which is we are just
on the--we are just beginning to make that big move represented
by the 487 and the Gates cuts before that, the huge strategic
adjustment from the era of Iraq and Afghanistan to the era that
is going to define our security future. So we have laid in
those plans, but we have to actually carry them out. They are
challenging managerially, they are challenging budgetarily.
They are challenging for everybody at this table actually to
carry out, and we are just embarking on them.
And that is why, as we try to make this historic adjustment
with $487-plus billion cut, to have on top of that this turmoil
associated with the CR and the sequestration just makes it
doubly difficult. We are happy to do the first part, to make
the post-Iraq/Afghanistan adjustment, but it is almost
impossible to do it in this environment of uncertainty and
turmoil.
The Chairman. Do you want to change that statement that you
are happy to do the first part?
Secretary Carter. Yes, I do. I am not happy to do it.
The Chairman. You can survive the first part.
Secretary Carter. Yes. And we are committed to making that
work. But it is awfully damn hard when you have seen all
these----
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. LoBiondo.
Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Carter, current law allows OMB [Office of
Management and Budget] to reorder the sequester once it takes
effect, proposing an alternative budget to allocate the cuts.
Congress would have to pass it, but the President is already
authorized to propose a framework that would provide more
flexibility to all of you.
However, at the hearing you attended last August with the
Acting OMB Director, he stated in response to a question for
the record that the Administration would not propose an
alternative budget to grant the military more flexibility in
how it allocates the cuts.
So, given the current circumstances and the concerns that
we all have of all of you, the chiefs, has senior leadership at
DOD reengaged with the White House on this subject to request
the President to take advantage of his current authorities?
Secretary Carter. I am going to let Secretary Hale respond
about what exactly the law provides. But my understanding is
that to amend the provisions of sequester in the Budget Control
Act and the laws that precede it would take a law.
And the larger point I would want to make is that we really
need this cloud of sequestration and uncertainty dispelled. It
hangs over our head. Even if you move it a little bit toward
the horizon, it is still pretty harmful to us. So I just have
to say that we need, once and for all----
Mr. LoBiondo. Well, excuse me, Mr. Secretary. We all know
that it is a cloud, and we all want it to be fixed. But in this
real world that we are working in, it may not be. So the next
best thing may be to give you the flexibility so that you can
manage better what is a horrible situation.
And with all due respect, sir, you did not answer my
question.
Secretary Carter. I am sorry. I see where you are getting
to now, so let me say something and then ask Secretary Hale to
say something.
Yes, more flexibility is good. I have to say, though--and I
made this point earlier--at this point--that particularly
applies to the continuing resolution, where we would love to
have an appropriations bill. At this late date in the year, any
additional flexibility with respect to sequestration is less
helpful than it may seem, simply because we have to go wherever
the money is at this point. So we don't have----
Mr. LoBiondo. Excuse me----
Secretary Carter [continuing]. A lot of flexibility----
Mr. LoBiondo. Excuse me again, sir.
Secretary Carter [continuing]. About where we find----
Mr. LoBiondo. I apologize for interrupting you, I really
do, but maybe I wasn't clear. I am anxious to know if you, the
senior leadership of DOD, will reengage the White House to use
their current authorities in a worst-case scenario to help us
minimize what is going to be a horrible situation. So I will
take it that you are not going to reengage the White House to
do this.
Secretary Carter. Let me ask Secretary Hale. I am not sure
what the law provides----
Secretary Hale. I am not aware of any authorities the
President has to change this law.
Mr. LoBiondo. Well, we will make sure we give you chapter
and verse. I could be----
Secretary Hale. All right, give me chapter and verse,
because you passed the law.
Mr. LoBiondo [continuing]. Wrong, but I understand that
there is an allowance for that. The President can propose; we
must pass it. But it would give you the flexibility. But the
President needs to propose it.
Secretary Hale. Well, you could introduce it, I guess.
Secretary Carter. Yes, if you want to change the law----
Mr. LoBiondo. Well, the President needs to propose it, sir.
Secretary Hale. If you want to change the law, you could.
Mr. LoBiondo. And if DOD senior leadership will engage him,
it will be helpful to get a proposal that we can then look at,
is what we are saying.
Secretary Hale. I would just like to underscore what
Secretary Carter said. At this point in the year, with 5 months
gone, even with flexibility, to get $46 billion out, we will
have to go guns blazing at all unobligated funds.
Mr. LoBiondo. I understand that.
Secretary Hale. Flexibility isn't going to help very much.
Mr. LoBiondo. Okay. I understand that. So I will take that
as that senior DOD leadership will not reengage the White House
on this issue.
Secretary Hale. We will do anything we can to try to help,
but that----
Mr. LoBiondo. Okay. Thank you.
Secretary Hale [continuing]. I don't think would solve the
problem.
Mr. LoBiondo. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Ms. Duckworth.
Ms. Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have two questions. One is for Dr. Carter.
And, Dr. Carter, this might seem a little micro, and if you
can't answer this right away, no problem. If you can't answer
this right away, I would ask the chairman to allow you to
respond in writing.
In the face of sequestration, I am somewhat concerned when
I hear that DOD is still considering expenditures such as the
proposed DISA [Defense Information Systems Agency] building of
a brand-new, multilevel--a multiprotocol label switching
network, MPLS network, that would basically take over the
entire IT [information technology] network, requiring major
capital investment, not available for fully functioning
capability for at least 5 years, significant degradation in
security capabilities from those that are being provided
already by commercial network providers who currently provide
it for financial services industries, for Wall Street and the
like.
So why, when faced with sequestration, would DISA seek to
build an entirely new network with degraded capabilities, less
security, and significantly higher costs?
Secretary Carter. If I may, I would like to get back to you
on that, in specificity on that matter. It is a very good
question. We have to ask why we are doing everything that we
are doing under this circumstance. A very fair question. I will
make sure I get you a good answer.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 146.]
Ms. Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Carter.
My next question is for General Grass.
You spoke of maintaining an operational force. And I am
concerned about the resources that the National Guard is going
to have access to under sequestration for that, to maintain
that operational force. You perform, for example, 95 percent of
all domestic missions. And I don't think people generally are
as aware of the range of missions that you provide--everything
from the civil support teams that provide nuclear, biological,
and chemical sweeps for the inauguration to the regular, you
know, natural disaster recovery.
I, as part of the Illinois National Guard, flew the oldest
flying Black Hawk in the United States Army inventory, and it
is still flying missions in Kuwait today. It was the fourth one
delivered, 1978 model. I understand that 400, over 400, of your
Black Hawks are alpha models, not set even before sequestration
to be replaced until fiscal year 2023 because we will do the
Active Duty forces first before we come to the National Guard.
Could you discuss, General Grass, sort of the range of
missions that you are providing and what sequestration will do
for you if you are not getting the ability to modernize your
equipment and train some of these very specialized mission--
troops that are performing these missions?
General Grass. Thank you for the question, Congresswoman.
Of course, being a first responder in the homeland from a
military perspective, we have to always be ready to support
those Governors and in surrounding States. Just like today in
the Northeast, we have three States that have come to the aid
of Connecticut to help out with the storms.
But I think the problem we are going to get into, as our
equipment degrades and our pilots can't get into schools and
can't continue to maintain their proficiency, it will take
longer and longer to respond into a timely disaster, and we
will have to come from further and further.
And the other thing that I am very concerned about is, we
have been working very closely with FEMA [Federal Emergency
Management Agency] and NORTHCOM [U.S. Northern Command] to look
at responding to complex catastrophes across the Department of
Defense and how we might bring the forces of the Guard, as well
as any other forces that might be available, to respond to that
scenario. And even the planning we are doing now for that, that
response would be at risk, no doubt.
From a National Guard perspective, I think the investment
we make every day--and we work very closely with the Army and
Air Force. And our procurement comes through the Army and Air
Force, for the most part. We do have some under the NGRE
[National Guard and Reserve Equipment] account that we do
specific dual-purpose equipment. But for the most part, all the
training and equipment and the procurement and investment
accounts that we rely on, the Army and Air Force are just
critical to be able to do the homeland mission.
Ms. Duckworth. Thank you, General Grass.
And as a Democrat, I am going to talk a little bit about
the States' rights and my concern that Governors do maintain
the ability to access the troops under State Active Duty in
Title 32, you know, when you have to switch over to Title 32
for those troops.
Can you talk a little bit about your ability under
sequestration and some of these cuts to respond quickly,
especially when you have the State agreements where one State
will come to the aid of another, and how you will be able to
maintain the readiness of those forces?
General Grass. Yes, Congresswoman.
If I look at just in the last 3 days, I mentioned the three
States that responded. During Hurricane Sandy, and which is
more of a regionally based contingency that we responded to, if
you look at all the States coming in, most of that was done in
State-to-State agreement. Even last year, your State of
Illinois provided helicopters to the State of Vermont during
Hurricane Irene.
And what we try to do at the National Guard Bureau is
identify where that equipment is and facilitate the move
quickly. Again, sequestration will definitely degrade our
ability to do that.
The Chairman. The gentlelady's time has expired.
Mr. Turner.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank all of you for being here. I have a very
high regard for each of you and what you do.
General Dempsey, I have a particular high regard for you. I
appreciate your statement that, when looking at budgetary
issues, you have to consider what are we going to ask the
military to do. You said that you could--that the DOD could not
give another dollar if you are going to be doing what you are
doing today. And I appreciate that very strong statement. It is
very helpful.
It is my understanding, General Dempsey, that General
Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General Welsh, General Amos, General
Grass, and yourself, General Dempsey, have not been asked to do
less yet. Is that correct; you have not been asked to do less?
General Dempsey. No.
Mr. Turner. Thank you.
Now, I have a slide. If we could put the slide up?
This is the President's proposal. I want to point out--Mr.
Carter, you had said a long list of what this is not because
of. It is not because of the peace dividend, it is not because
of technology. It is also not because of my support; I voted
``no'' on sequestration.
But we need to talk about what it really is because of. It
is because the President--we know it was his idea, his plan,
and his failure of leadership.
Now, this is the President's proposal on the answer of
sequestration. Before I get to that, I want to point out that
the House passed H.R. 5652, H.R. 6365, H.R. 6684. Mr. Carter, I
have a file for you to take with you so the next time you see
the President--since I had the opportunity to sit in the State
of the Union where he chanted at Congress to take a vote, I
would like you to communicate to him our request that he asked
for a vote on these three bills that have been passed by the
House, have been sitting over at the Senate, that would take
not a dollar from DOD, as General Dempsey said. We passed three
plans that not a dollar would be asked of DOD.
Now, let's go back to the President's proposal, if we could
put that up.
The President actually proposed cuts of $250 billion in his
sequestration solution. Two hundred fifty billion dollars you
can see would be letting half of sequestration go in. Now, he
had campaigned saying that he would not let sequestration
happen. He didn't say he would let half of sequestration
happen.
So, Mr. Carter, I have a really simple question for you.
Since we have General Dempsey and the other generals on the
record that not a dollar more can be taken out of DOD without
them doing less, and we have passed three bills that wouldn't
take a dollar out of DOD, and the President's proposal is $250
billion that would come out of DOD, is $250 billion greater
than a dollar? It is a really simple math question.
Secretary Carter. Yes, of course it is.
Mr. Turner. Thank you. So we would appreciate if the
President would ask the Senate to take a vote on our three
proposals.
Next, General Dempsey, to go to the scope of you not being
asked to do less, one of the things that we are always
concerned about is what is the threat, what is it that we are
trying to respond to, so we can make certain you are not asked
to do less.
Last December, the President threatened to veto, fiscal
year 2013, the National Defense Authorization Act, because that
legislation would have required the President to certify prior
to any U.S. nuclear force reduction that Russia is in
compliance with its arms-control obligations to the United
States.
General Dempsey, can you tell me today if Russia is in
compliance with its nuclear arms-control obligations to the
United States? And those include the Comprehensive Nuclear Test
Ban Treaty, New START [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty], and
the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, and the Moscow
Treaty.
And please don't say that the answer is classified. How we
would know and how they are not in compliance certainly would
be classified, but whether or not they are in compliance is
not.
General Dempsey, are they in compliance?
General Dempsey. Well, I would like to refresh my
understanding, so I will take that for the record.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 145.]
Mr. Turner. Good. Thank you, General.
Well, going back to the President's proposal, the President
has proposed cutting $250 billion out of DOD over the next 10
years. We have three proposals on the table that would cut
nothing. We have General Dempsey saying that you can't give
another dollar without the military doing less.
Mr. Carter, since I am assuming that the President ran this
by you, that you could tell us what exactly the President is
going to ask DOD to do less of under his proposal of cutting
this from the DOD's budget.
Secretary Carter. Congressman, I don't know where the
proposal is that is reflected in your chart, and the President
hasn't indicated to us in the Department any additional----
Mr. Turner. Okay. Mr. Carter, I just want to thank you for
acknowledging that because Mr. Carney, yesterday I think it
was, specifically acknowledged that over the next 9 years the
President's proposal would cut $250 billion from defense. So I
hope that you do get in touch with the White House, since
Carney is saying that the President's proposal would do that,
and ask what less he would have you do.
And I will tell you, it is very important to me because I
have Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in my community, which is
why I voted ``no'' against this. There are tens of thousands of
people who are critical to our national security, as all of you
are, and this needs to be averted. And the President needs to
take action, and that action isn't cutting $250 billion out. It
needs to be asking for a vote on the three bills that have been
passed by the House.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
And that plan that Mr. Turner put up there was given to us
by the President last week after months of saying he would veto
any short-term plan, indicating that he would veto these plans
if, in fact, the Senate had taken them up. But it put us in a
very difficult position.
And basically what he does is he cuts the $500 billion from
defense, the $500 billion-plus from nondiscretionary that are
going to be now over 10 years by law, he cuts that in half. And
he makes up the difference by increasing another $600 billion--
$500 billion, $600 billion in taxes.
Mr. Enyart.
Mr. Enyart. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, I am a newcomer here. I am a freshman. And I
want to say that as a member of the new freshman class, I am
frankly appalled at the questioning that you have endured
today, the political finger-pointing and blame game that you
have had to sit here and listen to.
There have been some substantive questions, and I intend to
ask you substantive questions. But before I do that, as a
member of the 70 or so freshmen who intend to work in a
bipartisan manner to resolve some of these issues that are
facing us, I want to apologize to you for that political blame
game that you have sat through this morning.
Now, General Dempsey, I would like to ask you, please, in
my past life I had occasion to frequently visit with senior
NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] commanders, general
officers, MODs [Ministry of Defence]. And invariably what I
would hear from them is that the United States is the
indispensable partner, largely because of our tanker refueling,
General Welsh, because of our intel capabilities, and all of
those other things that we could bring--not necessarily the
boots on the ground, but all of those, I will call them back-
office things that we could bring to the fight.
And those NATO and--because I dealt mostly with NATO, but I
am sure also our Asia partners rely on us to be that
indispensable partner in securing peace and security through
the world.
What are you hearing today from our NATO partners, from our
Asia partners? What concerns have they expressed to you about
what they are viewing today with this sequester threat?
General Dempsey. Well, they clearly are concerned, although
the most interesting comment was from a British colleague who
said, you know, you are one big budget deal away from regaining
your mojo. And I think that is right, actually.
You know, look, what we are talking about today is
degradation over time. This won't be a cliff. But some of the
effects are already being felt, as you have heard here today.
So our NATO partners are concerned, as our Asian partners are.
You know, frankly, they can't imagine we won't figure this out.
And where they are really concerned is in the capabilities
that we bring uniquely--tankers, ISR [Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance], you know, the things that
they simply can't replicate. But just to let you know, I also
push on them, that they have to do more, as well, because some
of them are underresourcing defense on their side.
Mr. Enyart. Thank you, General.
General Welsh, could you tell me, what impact will the
cancellation of the third- and fourth-quarter aircraft depot
maintenance have on the Air Force's global mobility and long-
range capabilities for Air Force tankers and for airlift
capacity?
General Welsh. Yes, sir. Thanks for the question.
The last time this happened and the depot workforce was
affected this way was in the early 1990s after Operation Desert
Shield and Desert Storm. It took, according to the people who
were managing the depots at that time, 2 to 3 years for the
workforce to recover and become a vibrant, fully productive
workforce in the depots.
The longer problem that we would face is going to be the
backlog of aircraft going through the depot and the work that
we can't surge to make up quickly because we have--capacity is
capacity. And making up is--the longer this continues, the
longer time frame it will take to recapture the bow wave of
work that was not accomplished this year.
Mr. Enyart. Thank you, General.
General Dempsey, as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, I
would like to refer this question to you. Now, I realize that
this is not a direct impact on DOD, but how will cuts to other
Government programs outside of DOD impact the military and
their families that comprise all the Services? And I am
thinking such cuts as the Veterans Administration or other
cuts. How is that going to impact your recruiting, your long-
term stability of the force?
General Dempsey. Well, you know, Congressman, we are part
of the Nation's fabric, so our men and women live across
America. And so--and take advantage of not only the unique
things we provide them but also the things that exist out in
their communities, whether it is schools or child care or
whatever it happens to be. And so, to the extent that America
writ large is affected, we will be affected.
That same thing is true, by the way, in things like
information technology. We talk about cyber on occasion. We are
vulnerable--even though I can protect the dot-mil, we can
protect the dot-mil domain in cyber, to the extent that the
rest of the architecture is vulnerable, we are vulnerable. I
mean, look, we are part of the landscape of America, and if
America is affected, we are affected.
Mr. Enyart. Thank you.
The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Rogers.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I appreciate all of you all taking the time to come here
and describe in such vivid detail the consequences of
sequestration. I think most of the members of this committee
were aware, but the country needs to know, and this is going a
long way to helping that end.
General Dempsey, you all have described pretty clearly what
is going to happen, and you have told us today. Have you had
that conversation with the President?
General Dempsey. I have, Congressman.
Mr. Rogers. And does he seem to appreciate it? Because last
night in his speech he seemed to be in denial that we have a
problem. He didn't make any proposals as to how to deal with
sequestration.
General Dempsey. I can't speak for his plan going forward.
I can simply tell you that we have had that conversation, and
he has expressed concerns in his role as Commander in Chief.
Mr. Rogers. But he has not told you that he expects to be
able to stop this?
General Dempsey. He assured me he is working on it.
Mr. Rogers. Yeah, well, he hasn't told us about it. You
know, the chairman has offered legislation to put this off.
There are initiatives, but we have got to have help from the
other end of Pennsylvania Avenue to remedy this.
Ash Carter--I know he had to leave--had sent out a memo to
you all about proposed ways of dealing with sequestration. It
scared the heck out of folks at the Anniston Army Depot in my
district, for obvious reasons.
General Odierno, based on the notification timelines, when
will the first date of DOD furloughs occur?
General Odierno. We believe that about 45 days required
notification, and so they would begin quickly after that.
Mr. Rogers. And what level the chain of command is that
trigger pulled?
General Odierno. That will be done by the Secretary with
guidance from myself.
Mr. Rogers. And when will that formal notification to
Congress come?
General Odierno. It is going to come very shortly.
Mr. Rogers. Okay.
How does Mr. Carter's recommendations to significantly
curtail unit training and readiness impact the projected
organic industrial bases workload for each military service in
the aggregate and for each center of industrial and technical
excellence in fiscal 2014?
General Odierno. Yeah, what it does, obviously it creates a
backlog of equipment that will be in all of our depots. As I
stated before, the depots have become a critical part of what
we do. And so what we have done by delaying it, it will require
backlogs and it will require us longer and longer to get that
equipment out.
Mr. Rogers. Again, I represent the Anniston Army Depot. As
you know, we call it the pit crew for the American warfighter.
We have a backlog there. Do you know how much of a backlog?
That has already been paid for.
General Odierno. I don't. I don't know the exact number,
but I can get back with you on that.
Mr. Rogers. I would appreciate that.
General Dempsey, you made the comment a few minutes ago in
response to my predecessor's question about degradation over
time, that the sequestration is not going to be a cliff, it is
going to be degradation over time.
But yet, Ash Carter is recommending and I understand you
all have embraced the proposal to cease any additional work
going into the depot systems for the third and fourth quarter
of this year. If it is not a cliff, why is that action being
taken?
General Dempsey. What we are trying to do is stretch
readiness as far as we can stretch it. I mean, the decision not
to deploy the Truman is probably the best case, but we are
trying to stretch the readiness dollars as far as they will go.
And so the actions we are taking, we hope that some of those
will be reversible, but we are in the business of stretching
readiness right now.
Mr. Rogers. Well, see, that is my concern, when you talk
about ceasing. You know, I have talked with the colonel in
charge of the depot, and he has told me he is taking no
additional tanks into the system after the 15th of next month.
I think it is the 15th of next month. That sounds like a cliff
to me.
General Dempsey. Well, I happen to be a tanker, so I think
the answer on the tanks is probably that these gentlemen to my
left are prioritizing--as they stretch, they are prioritizing.
And in the near term we are not using tanks in Afghanistan. It
doesn't mean we will never use them again, but we are probably
prioritizing those things that we think we will use.
Mr. Rogers. Okay.
General Odierno. If I could, Congressman----
Mr. Rogers. Certainly.
General Odierno [continuing]. Give you--I do have some
data.
From February to September, it will be about $294 million
worth of work that is planned in Anniston. There will be about
a $131.8 million carryover into 2014 in Anniston Army Depot.
Mr. Rogers. Okay. That makes me think that we are not going
to need to close it down third and fourth quarter.
General Odierno. No. No. But--no, we are not going to close
it down. We will just reduce.
Mr. Rogers. Man-hours.
General Odierno. Man-hours.
Mr. Rogers. Great.
General Dempsey, last question. As you know, President
Obama did not request any funding for the Israeli Iron Dome
missile defense system in 2012. And with the CR, that means
that there is no funding going to be in the 2013 fiscal year.
Can you commit that you are going to prioritize making sure
that funding is provided to keep Iron Dome----
General Dempsey. Well, what I can commit to is what I can
control, and that is my recommendation that we continue to
support the Israelis and their acquisition of Iron Dome. But,
you know, the decision will be a policy decision made by my
wingman, who is not here right now.
Mr. Rogers. So the reprogramming of any money to cover that
will be done by the Secretary, not you?
General Dempsey. It will be approved by the Secretary, with
our recommendation.
Mr. Rogers. Okay. And your recommendation will be to do
that?
General Dempsey. It will.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, sir.
Thank you all for your service.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Gallego.
Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to yield
15 seconds of my time, please, to the ranking member.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I, by and large, agree with Representative Enyart that we
don't need to get into the blame game and get overly political
here and certainly put you in position of commenting on the
politics of this. But there are a couple things in the record
that I think need to be clarified.
The President has made numerous proposals to stop
sequestration. In the lead-up to January 1st, in particular, he
made countless proposals, including cutting mandatory programs.
He put the chained CPI [Consumer Price Index] out there, saying
that we should cut Social Security and Medicare to help make up
the money.
So there is plenty of room to work on this on both sides.
It is not one side has had an idea and the other side hasn't.
That is first of all.
Second of all, all of the Republican proposals to deal with
this have included substantial cuts to the civilian workforce.
Now, I realize that some of my colleagues seem to think that
the civilian workforce does absolutely nothing, but all of you
sitting up here realize that is not the case. If you cut the
civilian workforce within the Department of Defense, you are
cutting defense.
Now, maybe that is okay, but I will also tell you--I will
answer the question, since Ash Carter isn't here to answer it--
cuts to civilian workforce are more than one dollar. Okay? So
there are cuts on the table, and those are things that we have
to consider.
And, lastly, the box that we are in here, no one really
wants to cut defense by this amount, but no one also wants to
have a trillion-dollar deficit. And unless we are willing to
raise taxes and cut mandatory programs, we wind up stuffed into
that corner.
Now, all of that has plenty of room for bipartisan effort
to work together, but I don't think it is helpful to say it is
just all one person's fault. This is a collective
responsibility. And I will close by thanking the chairman for
his opening remarks, which very clearly acknowledge that.
Thank you. I yield.
Mr. Gallego. Thank you.
General, I, too, join Mr. Enyart. I want to thank you for
your passionate defense and your candid comments on behalf of
our brothers and sisters in uniform. Because my guest at the
State of the Union last night was a wounded warrior from El
Paso, and I wonder what he would think if he was here to listen
to this testimony this morning.
I am somewhat disappointed in the he-said/she-said and even
the Bob-Woodward-said. I have just got here, and so I don't
know. I know that we have to find our way out of this, and I
know that we have to find our way forward. And I know that this
is too important to mess up.
And I am curious, General Welsh, for example, Laughlin Air
Force Base in Del Rio, which has more flying time and more
training, it is one of your best bases, and they have a
significant civilian workforce. Have you all analyzed what the
economic impact would be on the local area of the sequester
cuts? And what happens--I mean, I know what happens on the
military side, but I think it is so important also to talk
about the economic side. Because in many places you are a key
component of the local economy.
General Welsh. Yes, sir. We have not completed an analysis
of every base and the impact on the local economy of
furloughing civilian workforce.
Laughlin Air Force Base is a great example for another
reason, though, because we do have a civilian workforce at
Laughlin that does the aircraft maintenance, scheduling, and
lots of support for the training activity there. So while we
plan to start drawing back all of our advanced flying training
courses on the 1st of April, we will continue our basic flying
courses to produce pilots at Laughlin and other training bases
as long as we can. We hope to make it as long as August, early
September.
The problem is that, as we furlough civilian workforce, we
won't be able to fly the same number of sorties, we won't fix
airplanes as quickly, and those dates will start to slide to
the left, further impacting our ability to train even our basic
pilots. And that has a repercussion that will take us years to
recover from.
Mr. Gallego. And the other question--I have an article from
the El Paso Times, for example, that Fort Bliss is bracing for
a 30-percent cut. I mean, what happens at Fort Bliss if Fort
Bliss takes a 30-percent cut?
General Odierno. I am not sure what the 30 percent means; I
think it is from base operations. And so what that means is
there will be a reduction in services to our soldiers and our
families. It could be anything from gate guards to cutting
morale, welfare, recreation programs to reducing some other key
programs that are there for recreation, as well as counseling
and other things that occur.
We are trying to fence those things that are most important
to our families and to our soldiers, but that 30-percent
reduction is significant to any installation. That is across
all installations, by the way, not just Fort Bliss.
Mr. Gallego. Well, I want to tell you that I do not believe
that you are part of the problem. I look forward to working
with you toward a solution.
And, frankly, I served with a guy who I got along with very
well when he was the Governor of Texas who later became
President of the United States. And one of his mantras was
always personal responsibility. And it is a mantra that I
believe in.
And it is interesting to me to learn today that it is your
job to tell us about the consequences of our own actions.
Because it seems to me that each one of these decisions has
been a law passed by the Congress which has set us on the
course that we are at today. And so the idea that you would
tell us--have to tell us about the consequences of our own
actions doesn't seem in line with this concept of personal
responsibility.
Thank you for your testimony.
General Dempsey. Mr. Chairman, could I just take 15
seconds?
The Chairman. Yes.
General Dempsey. The first chairman, Omar Bradley, in 1948,
in his memoirs said the biggest mistake he ever made was--he
said he knew that the Army was on a path and wouldn't be able
to fight its way out of a paper bag in the early 1950s. In his
memoirs he said that is the greatest mistake he ever made. We
are here today to make sure we don't make that same mistake.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Gallego, before you got here, we were also engaged in
this problem. If you could get staff to brief you on a hearing
that we held a year ago September. We held five hearings before
that on the impact on the military, sequestration. Then we held
one on the impact on the economy of the country, and there was
some very good information there. And that did break down the
loss of jobs and basically said this would take us into another
recession.
And to respond to Mr. Smith's comment, I introduced a bill
last Congress and I introduced it again last week that does cut
the civilian workforce, not because I think that they don't do
a good job and they are necessary. My father-in-law spent his
entire adult life working for the civilian Navy, starting with
trying to get torpedos to explode when they hit a ship rather
than just bounce off. So I have great respect for the civilian
side of the equation also.
But what my bill did was cut the workforce by 10 percent
through attrition. It didn't require furloughs; it didn't
require firing people, laying people off. It was over a 10-year
period. It did just pay for sequestration the first year, both
nondefense and the defense side. And my thought and my hope was
that it would push it after the election, give us some time to
bring some real thought to bear on the issue.
So far, we have ignored that solution and, as a
consequence, probably going to have a lot of people now
furloughed and people lose their jobs. And my legislation would
have eliminated that. Unfortunately, it didn't happen.
Mr. Franks.
Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And let me add my name to the list of all those who have
expressed respect and gratitude to those of you in this panel
today. I remind myself every day that my greatest hope is my
children being able to walk in the sunlight of freedom. If they
do that, it will be in large part because of those of you that
have given your lives to the cause of human freedom. And I
appreciate it very deeply.
I suppose it is in that backdrop that I am bewildered that
the national command structure at the highest echelons, even
your Commander in Chief, have placed all of you in the
untenable position of having to essentially cannibalize the
capability and readiness that you oversee in the interest of,
understandably, maintaining your commitment and support of
those in theater. And it is just an untenable, unfortunate,
tragic situation. And I have to express just a sense of real
sadness that we have all put you in that position.
Having said that, you know, oftentimes in a predictive
environment we don't know what we are going to face. Right now
we look at North Korea's advances and the potential of an
emerging nuclear Iran. Those are all things that we see, but we
don't know exactly all the things we will see. And it is
especially challenging, in my mind, when we don't allow for
additional room for unforeseen possibilities. And the only
thing I know to do in that situation is to make sure that we
have a robust force that is comprehensive in nature.
So with that in mind, I am hoping--I am hoping that the
President of the United States will, before this sequester
takes place, sit down with the Congress still--still--and do
what we can to prevent the worst of this situation from
occurring. And I think the only way I know to motivate that is
to once again do like we have done today, to try to emphasize
the seriousness of it.
So, General Welsh, my first question is to you. You last
week issued Air Force Space Command budget actions that you
will have to take if the sequester kicks in on March 1st. In
the memo, as a point of action you stated that it will,
``reduce some missile warning and space surveillance of 24/7
operations to 8-hour-a-day operations.''
Now, you know, given that a nuclear missile can ruin our
whole day, that seems like an astonishing action. And it seems
important to allow you the opportunity to demonstrate the
pressure and the realities that you face that would press you
to such a decision.
General Welsh. Yes, sir. One of the benefits of our space
operations funding streams is that there is a little
flexibility across the set of sensors that provides both space
warning, missile warning, as well as space surveillance.
And so what our Air Force Space Commander has decided to do
is to try and concentrate the 9-percent, nominal 9-percent
sequestration cut in secondary modes of radars that allow us to
continue the missile warning mission for the United States so
that we are not at risk of not having warning of an incoming
missile from our ground-based radar sites as well as the second
phenomenology, the satellites in space that help contribute to
that, and instead shut down modes of some of the ground-based
radars that allow them to then--that are redundant capabilities
so we don't have as much redundancy now in the system and we
don't have as much capacity to track objects in orbit.
And so that is where he has taken that cut in order to save
money to put against the critical things that those radars do.
Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, sir.
Let me direct my last question to General Dempsey.
General Dempsey, last night, President Obama called for
even more cuts to our nuclear arsenal. Ashton Carter said
something recently, that the Nation's nuclear deterrent is,
``the last thing that you want to do serious damage to.'' And I
find myself in full agreement with that.
But would you agree that the sequester will have pressure
on reducing our strategic weapons? And would that weaken our
strategic nuclear deterrent?
General Dempsey. I am not sure there is a cause-and-effect
relationship there, but I will say that, as we look to the
future--again, in my capacity, what I am responsible for in
terms of military advice--I would say, as I have, that we need
to preserve the triad, we need to ensure that the stockpile is
well maintained, and we need to--if we were to take any further
reductions, it would be in the context of negotiations, notably
with Russia.
Mr. Franks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen.
The Chairman. Thank you.
It looks like we are going to be called in to vote in 15,
20 minutes possibly. We have nine Members left that haven't had
the chance to ask their questions, so we will try to move it
along as quickly as we can.
Mrs. Davis.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you to all of you. I know how difficult all the
choices are that we have before us, and I would certainly hope
that, as we continue to move forward, that we are open to some
of that negotiation. Because we know that, you know, there are
difficult choices, and we don't want to be necessarily
shielding special interest groups who don't need subsidies that
they are already receiving. I mean, there are a lot of choices
out there; that is just among them. And you are faced every day
with these choices, and I know you are trying to make the best
ones you can.
I wonder--I know, Secretary--or Admiral Greenert--I am
sorry--that you have been dealing with a number of
extraordinary cost-cutting measures and trying to do some of
those up front and soon. And Secretary Carter has also talked
about the fact that we need them to be reversible where
possible.
And I am wondering if you could talk a little bit about how
you would hope to stop some of the ripple, some of the effects
throughout the economy, throughout the civilian force as well,
as you make some of those upfront decisions right now that are
scaring everybody, of course, and could create some real
problems down the line.
How are we thinking about reversing any of those decisions?
Admiral Greenert. Well, first of all, if we had an
appropriations bill, we could then reverse these things that we
laid out there because we would have the funding. And I will
speak to operations and maintenance first.
Secondarily, if we don't have an appropriations bill, if we
had the ability to reprogram money, then the kinds of things
which are now near-term could be, if you will, reversed. As we
lay these out, we start, in this case, the third quarter
through the fourth quarter. At any given time during that
period, if we can reprogram money, get a bill or find
unobligated funds, we will then put them where--invest that
where it can best be----
Mrs. Davis. Uh-huh. Are there some areas that this is more
problematic than others? Obviously, I mean, one can anticipate
if you are cutting, you know, contracts, that is very difficult
to do. But are there some that are just, you know, not
reversible, actually?
Admiral Greenert. Once we do not do a ship availability in
a private shipyard, the ship goes back into its rotation, if
you will. Someone else is up next. That is not reversible. Once
that contract is cancelled, number one, the contractor might be
on to something else; number two, again, we have to do the
ship. Same applies to aircraft maintenance, as well.
Mrs. Davis. Uh-huh. Is there an opportunity to spread out
that impact? We had done some of that with Hurricane Katrina,
trying to go to different shipyards. Is that a possibility at
all?
Admiral Greenert. It is a possibility. Step one is, we need
the agility with the money, if you will, other options with
funding.
Mrs. Davis. Uh-huh. Thank you.
If I could turn just quickly to military personnel, as
well, I mean, the President has said that military personnel
will not be immediately affected by sequestration. And yet we
know that, with the exception of current levels of pay,
basically, that there is a way that they would be affected. And
I am wondering how we might be making some of those decisions
of protecting some programs over others.
Admiral Greenert. Well, for me, first, their military pay
itself is protected. Of course----
Mrs. Davis. Right.
Admiral Greenert [continuing]. It is exempted. But I worry
about the furlough of civilian employees who support us: fleet
family service centers in the world I live in; childcare
centers; the, of course, sexual assault advocates of sexual
assault prevention. All of those we worry about.
And I am working very hard and I have directed that we will
not unfund, if you will, for these savings our programs, our
family readiness programs. We will protect those. And so I am
watching that very closely.
Mrs. Davis. Uh-huh.
Did anybody else want to comment on that in terms of other
services?
General Amos. Congresswoman, just like Admiral Greenert,
our military force structure and pay structure, once we get
down to the 182 [182,000] and all the Services adjust to their
new levels, that is hedged off. But I would like to just
reemphasize what Admiral Greenert is talking about, is when we
sat down and looked at our O&M shortfall this year, for CR it
is $406 million, but you add it all up, sequestration, it is
about $1.8 billion, $1.9 billion O&M this year, just for 2013,
for my Service.
As we have prioritized where we are going to try to get
that money to pay those O&M bills, that is readiness, it is
training, and all the things we have talked about here today.
At the very top of the tier--in other words, the last fruit; it
is like the apples on the very top of the tree, they are the
very last ones you take--is wounded warrior care, it is family
readiness programs, it is the 42 brand-new sexual assault
response coordinators that we have hired, the other 42 victim
assault--victim advocates that we have hired, it is our highly
qualified experts to help in the prosecution.
So it is not--I am not throwing, you know, the red flag
down, but I am just saying at the very top of the tree are
these things that are really sacred to all our services, and
they will eventually be impacted. To the degree, I am not sure,
but we are going to be working real hard to try to minimize
that. But I just wanted to be honest with you.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you. I appreciate that, General, because
those are some of the choices that the Congress has to make, as
well, in terms of where we put our great emphasis.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you.
The Chairman. The gentlelady's time has expired.
Mr. Wittman.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you so much for----
The Chairman. Could the gentleman suspend for just a
second?
We are not, obviously, going to have time, and some of
these Members, I know, have been here the whole hearing, as
have you. We are not going to have time for all of their
questions. The vote has already started. I will monitor it and
run it as long as we can.
But those of you who don't get to ask, if you will get your
questions to the staff. I would ask you, gentlemen, if you
would answer them for the record. Thank you.
Mr. Wittman.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, again, thank you so much for your service to our
Nation. I know it is a very challenging time.
I want to go directly to Admiral Greenert and to General
Amos. This picture was in The Washington Times just this week,
and I think it is a snapshot of the readiness crisis that we
are in. And, gentlemen, this could be part of any of our
Services. This could be an air wing on a flight line idle. This
could be an airborne battalion without the equipment or the
planes to fly to train. This is really a snapshot, and this
snapshot just happens to be taken in Norfolk, but it could be
in San Diego, it could be in Pearl Harbor, it could be in
Everett, it could be in Mayport. It could be at any of our
places.
But the thing that concerns me about this is what we see in
this picture are five nuclear aircraft carriers. Now, granted,
one of those is Enterprise, getting ready to be decommissioned.
But what we are seeing now is only 10 aircraft carriers
available through 2015. We know that the Theodore Roosevelt
that is across the river is going through a refueling, so it is
not available. We have two aircraft carriers that are in need
of service, and we have one being decommissioned. Also in this
picture are four of our large-deck amphibs [amphibious assault
ships]. They are the backbone of our MEUs [Marine Expeditionary
Unit].
Now, gentlemen, this picture pretty much sums up, I think,
our readiness crisis. And as they say, a picture is worth a
thousand words. This picture to me denotes a number of things:
number one, great risk. Everyone here on this panel has said
it: readiness crisis. I think that is absolutely at the heart
of this. It is a decreased capability. Lack of resources, loss
of talent, limited response--all those are issues, things that
come to mind.
And, gentlemen, I am not here to place any blame. I don't
think this is a blame game. But what I want to ask Admiral
Greenert and General Amos is, is this picture the future of
what we can expect under sequestration, and is this the future,
what the American taxpayer can expect in the next decade for
our fleet if sequestration goes into place?
Admiral Greenert. Yes, it is, because what you have just
said, Congressman, is we don't have the Navy where it matters,
which is operating forward.
And what you have there is the Abraham Lincoln tied up
getting ready for overhaul; that is okay. But you don't have
the George Herbert Walker Bush under way getting ready for her
workup. The Truman is one of those. And we have discussed
Truman before; I won't belabor your time. Enterprise is
decommissioned. And, as you said, Eisenhower will leave in due
time.
But I am very concerned about the Amphibious Ready Group
future, and I spoke to that, especially in 2014, early 2014. We
won't have an Amphibious Ready Group where it matters so that
she can be ready when it matters. And we know the value of
that.
And I will defer now to the Commandant.
General Amos. Congressman, you are absolutely right, it is.
If you remember those new deployments that I referred to
earlier, about 2 hours ago, some or perhaps all of them would
not have been there. So that is a fact. That could be the
future.
Mr. Wittman. Uh-huh.
General Amos. And the last thing I would say is that you
have those Amphibious Ready Groups as our Nation's insurance
policy. That is what we are; it is an insurance policy. You buy
insurance, health--no, life insurance for the unknown. We don't
know what is out there. We have already heard our chairman talk
about the unstable--the world we live in right now is very
dangerous. It is going to be that way for the next two decades.
I am not trying to scare everybody, but you have to have a
hedge force such that you can do something when something
happens to buy time for our national leaders.
General Odierno. Congressman, if I could just----
Mr. Wittman. Please. Yes.
General Odierno. It is the same type of problem we have.
And I mentioned it yesterday and I will mention it here, is
that right now we are training the next set of units to go to
Afghanistan. We are now not training the ones that go after
them. And that will cause a significant impact there.
But to get to what General Amos just said, what really
concerns me is we will now see a slow degrade in our readiness
that will cause us to have to respond if we have to respond to
contingencies. And as was said earlier, we will respond, but
they will not be as ready as we would like them to be. And that
will ultimately cause--and the cost will be in lives and our
ability to accomplish the mission in a timely fashion, which
ultimately costs us more money in the long run. And that is
what we are trying to prevent here.
Mr. Wittman. Sure. Thank you.
General Welsh.
General Welsh. Congressman, you said it. That is the
future.
And I mentioned in my opening statement that by the end of
July I won't have 75 or 70 percent or so of our combat air
forces combat-ready. They will be flying enough to keep takeoff
and landing currency. That is it. No mission training at all.
Mr. Wittman. Got you. Very good.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
Dr. Fleming.
Dr. Fleming. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, panel. And thank you for your service to our
Nation.
You know, Admiral Mullen, when he was before us, made the
statement that, when asked what is the most pressing problem
that this Nation has certainly in the defense of our Nation,
and basically he said it was our debt and deficit.
Eighty-three percent of Americans agree with that, a Gallup
poll shows. We are simply spending too much. That is the debate
that led us to the Budget Control Act. And, of course, that was
the consideration of holding our defense hostage for a debate
that we all know--both sides of the aisle admit that reforming
entitlements, streamlining entitlements, making entitlements
strong and sustainable is really where we are going to have to
have savings in outyears.
Having said that, you have been asked to cut almost $500
billion even before the BCA. And I felt like that it was
inappropriate for us to hold our national defense hostage, so I
voted, like many on the panel here, against the Budget Control
Act of 2011 and the sequester. But we still have it.
And the President, on the one hand, he talks in platitudes,
he floats trial balloons. The only thing I know of that he has
been specific about that would help put the money back into the
sequester for the military would be to raise taxes. Well, we
have already done that with a trillion dollars through the
Affordable Care Act, another $620 billion barely a month ago
added, and that is crushing our economy today. We are going
into a second recession. And we know this could cause even
worse recession going forward.
So my question for you is this, and this is much more
specific and down in the weeds. I have two important military
bases, Barksdale Air Force Base and Fort Polk. Fort Polk has
JRTC [Joint Readiness Training Center], and we have these
rotating brigades that come in for training.
Would it make sense, could we streamline and lower costs by
permanently locating at least one of these brigades at Fort
Polk? We are adding, as you know, 100,000 acres. It is becoming
a wonderful training site, even much better than it was.
And, General Odierno, go ahead.
General Odierno. Sure. Well, Congressman, as I said
earlier, first, the improvements that have been made at Fort
Polk have been tremendous. I was just down there not too long
ago. And the criticality of the training that we do there is
irreplaceable. So it is a really valuable place for us to
continue to go.
However, that said, as I just told you, we are in the
process now of reducing by 80,000 soldiers, and we are now
reviewing where do they come out of. And so for us to think
about moving and increasing somewhere is a very difficult time
for us to do that. We are trying to figure out where are the
best places for us to reduce our footprint. And that is what we
are going through now.
So I have to figure out where I get 68,000 worth of
structure out of the Army, and it is going to affect every
installation. So after that is done--and part of that process,
looking at where do we want to sustain our bases and how do we
want to sustain our capability across the Army. Fort Polk is
one that we will absolutely continue because of the value of
JRTC. But if we are able to reinvest there yet, I don't know
yet. We are still reviewing that.
Dr. Fleming. Okay. Thank you, General.
General Welsh, my concern, of course, with Barksdale Air
Force Base is the fact that we have a fleet of bombers that are
older than many of the people in this room today, and it will
probably fly another 30 years. But I do support the nuclear
triad. I have heard it mentioned today. I think you do, as
well.
So my concern, of course, is the program going forward of a
modern bomber, a next-generation bomber. We know that, even if
we commit to it, we have another 12 years before the first one
rolls off the assembly line.
Can you help me understand what the impact may be on that,
the next bomber fleet that we are seeing down the road, what
sequester and any other things that we are doing at the
Pentagon may affect that?
General Welsh. Congressman, the Long-Range Strike Bomber
program, because of a change in the contract administration of
mechanics here earlier this year, isn't affected by
sequestration this year. The impact would be as the top line
decreases for--whatever the top line is for the future, that
has the potential to impact everything we are doing.
Dr. Fleming. Right.
General Welsh. And so, as we look at the programs going
forward, once we have an answer on what the funding will look
like in the future, we will take a look at those.
I think you know we are committed to the Long-Range Strike
Bomber. It is something that is foundational to our Air Force
for the future. And, clearly, 60-year-old B-52s [Stratofortress
strategic bombers] aren't going to extend for too much farther
in the future.
Dr. Fleming. Yes.
Thank you, gentlemen.
The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Palazzo.
Mr. Palazzo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Just a quick statement--first of all, thank you for your
service--but because we are running out of time and I want my
colleague from Alabama to have an opportunity to ask some
questions.
I just wish the American people could actually see what we
are discussing today and hear your remarks, hear our questions,
hear your answers. I think we would be over with this in a
week. I think the people would say, this is real. This isn't
mainstream media trying to pick on one party or the other, but
this is real. It is going to affect lives, and people are going
to die over the decisions that we make here. And so I just wish
there was an opportunity for the whole--all the American people
to be able to see exactly what has taken place right here
today.
And I am tired, personally, of people pointing fingers. You
know, I mean, everybody is saying, hey, I didn't vote for
sequestration, I didn't do this. Nobody voted for sequestration
of the military. So let's quit pointing fingers.
I am tired of our President being a little bit AWOL on this
subject. And I am not talking about ``absent without leave''--
``absent without leadership.'' He is our Commander in Chief. He
is the supreme authority when it comes to all things military,
and we need to see his leadership on this.
And I am not pointing fingers at him. I mean, I tell you, I
am kind of aggravated with many of my own colleagues from my
same party who are sitting here, hey, let's just let
sequestration happen, let's see what takes place. Look at this
general over in AFRICOM [U.S. Africa Command], you know, just
spending money as if it is--you know, taxpayer money with
disregard. Look at the overruns that we have on weapons
programs and so forth and so forth.
So, at the end of day, I think it is morally irresponsible.
And it has been said in this room, as I think it has been said
and paraphrased by the chairman. It is morally irresponsible to
try to balance the financial woes and our bank accounts on the
backs of our men and women in uniforms and their families. And
I am praying that we will be able to put this behind us, find a
way to avert sequestration, but also to get our spending under
control in this country.
Thank you for your service.
I yield back.
The Chairman. The gentleman yields back.
Ms. Roby.
Mrs. Roby. Well, I thank you. I am glad I stuck it out. I
didn't know I was going to get any time.
So thank you all for being here today, and thank you for
your patience and your candor. We appreciate all of you and
what you do.
And I am going to submit my question for the record, but I
would like just to get it out there, and any brief comment.
But, General Odierno, we talked about your testimony and
the fact that 500 qualified aviators--pending aviator students
will not be able to receive the necessary training at Fort
Rucker. And we know this is going to have a huge impact.
But I want to know a little bit more specifically about
these rotary-wing--potential rotary-wing pilots and the impact
on readiness and how it is not just going to affect us under
our current obligations, which are still there--and, certainly,
you all know how important these pending aviator students are
to our current mission as well as that down the road, but even
more importantly than that, the impact, the specific impact
that that is going to have 2 to 5 years down the road.
General Odierno. Well, 500 aviators equals 250 aircraft. So
that means we will have 250 aircraft that we will not be able
to man immediately based on this lack of training we will be
able to do this year. So that is significant. I mean, that is a
lot of aircraft, that is a lot of capability.
And then what happens is you form this backlog, so it will
take us longer to get aviators out of the system at Fort
Rucker. So that will cause us to even have more unmanned
platforms because of this backlog. So the implications are very
serious to our future readiness, and it will take us 2 to 3
years to get ourselves out of this problem.
You know, Fort Rucker, we have streamlined our ability
there to train our pilots, but we cannot take shortcuts because
this is very serious business. So we have to make sure that
they are trained to the quality necessary to meet all the gates
necessary for them to be able to be effective as they report to
their units.
Mrs. Roby. Well, I appreciate that.
And, sir, I would like to submit the rest of my questions
for your review on the record.
But thank you again for being here.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Let me thank you for being here. I know this was planned to
go till 1 o'clock, so you have been very patient and stayed
longer with us.
I have one request, that you expedite, if you would, the
questions of these Members that stayed all this time. Because
this is very timely, and we will get those questions to you
promptly.
I have one final question that will be very brief. I think
I know the answer. All I need is a ``yes'' or a ``no'' for the
record.
We have already cut billions under Secretary Gates that
many people have forgotten about, the $487 billion that we have
talked about but are just coming into play that are massive
cuts. If you were asked to support an additional cut of $250
billion, could you do so, given current missions, yes or no?
General.
General Dempsey. Not and execute the current strategy. I
would have to know the change to the strategy and the increased
risk.
The Chairman. Given current missions, the answer is no.
General Odierno. No.
The Chairman. General.
Admiral Greenert. No.
General Welsh. No, sir.
General Amos. No, sir.
General Grass. No, sir.
The Chairman. Nor could I.
Thank you very much. Your service is greatly appreciated.
Your patience here today has been greatly appreciated. Your
answers have been very, very helpful.
This committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:32 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
====================================================================
A P P E N D I X
February 13, 2013
=======================================================================
=======================================================================
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
February 13, 2013
=======================================================================
Statement of Hon. Howard P. ``Buck'' McKeon
Chairman, House Committee on Armed Services
Hearing on
The Impacts of a Continuing Resolution and Sequestration
on Defense
February 13, 2013
Good morning. We meet this morning at the eleventh hour.
This committee has undergone 16 months of exhaustive
examination of the pending damage from sequestration, and now
it appears that this self-inflicted wound is poised to cripple
our military forces in just a few days. As the military members
of our panel noted in a letter I received on January 14th, ``We
are on the brink of creating a hollow force.''
None of us come to this committee with clean hands. The
debt crisis we face was decades in the making and a result of
choosing the easy path when we should have explored the bravery
of restraint. The President is not blameless. His negotiators
put sequestration on the table during the long fight over the
debt ceiling. We are not blameless either. Many of us voted for
this terrible mechanism in the naive hope the President and
Congress could put our politics aside and fix our debt crisis.
That was a bad bet.
Today we need to hear the ground truth from our witnesses.
They have dedicated their lives to providing their best and
unbiased military advice. We are certainly in need of such
advice today. Unburdened from Administration orders to defer
planning and assessments, you can now make it clear to this
body, the White House, and the public, what damage months of
inaction on sequestration and the Continuing Resolution have
done to our Armed Forces. General Odierno, you testified
yesterday that you began your military service in a hollow
force, and that you are determined not to conclude your career
the same way. I hope that you and the panel can expand on that
notion today, determining at what level of cuts do Congress and
the President turn that fear of a hollow force into reality.
General Dempsey, in April of last year you testified about
the $487 billion we have already cut from defense. You told
Congress that to cut further would require an adjustment of
strategy. You concluded that this new strategy would, and I
quote, ``Not meet the needs of the Nation in 2020 because the
world is not getting any more stable.'' I am interested to know
if you continue to stand by that statement. Today, we
anticipate detailed answers to our questions. In addition to
hear about levels of risk as sequestration's blind cuts
absolves folks from planning, we want to hear if we have
crossed a red line and cut you too much. If that red line is in
the near distance, I expect you point it out. Gentlemen, you
have no stronger advocate, no better ally in this fight than
the Armed Services Committee, and we urge you to work with us
in these final days.
In the coming weeks and months leaders in both parties and
the White House will, I hope, come together to begin discussion
of the drivers of our debt and the path to fiscal health. There
will be no easy choices on that table. I fear that many may
choose to soften the blow of those choices by turning once
again to the Department of Defense. Indeed, the formula to
achieve what the President characterized as a balanced approach
includes tens of billions in additional cuts for this fiscal
year. I cannot support any plan, regardless of how it addresses
entitlement spending or revenue, unless it also offers
meaningful and real relief for DOD from sequester.
With that, I look forward to your testimony.
Statement of Hon. Adam Smith
Ranking Member, House Committee on Armed Services
Hearing on
The Impacts of a Continuing Resolution and Sequestration
on Defense
February 13, 2013
I would like to thank our witnesses for attending this
hearing today. Since the so-called Super Committee failed to
reach an agreement, the perils of sequestration have been
apparent, but a deal to avoid its effects has been elusive. It
is clear that, so far, sequestration has failed to motivate
Congress to adopt sound fiscal policy. Now, we have hit a
critical point in the effort to resolve our budgetary problems.
We have repeatedly heard from our military leaders that
sequestration will be damaging to national security. I agree
with Secretary Panetta's description of sequestration as a
``disaster in terms of the Defense Department.'' Damage has
also already been done to our economy.
I think everyone in this room can agree that sequestration
must be prevented. It is clear that large, indiscriminate,
across-the-board cuts to the Federal budget would have serious
implications for national security, our economy, and a wide
range of important Federal programs. The damage from
sequestration compounds the uncertainty created by funding the
Federal Government, particularly the Department of Defense,
through a Continuing Resolution.
Without a doubt, we need to take action to reduce the
Federal debt and deficit, but that cannot and should not be
done through sequestration. Our economy is still fragile, too
fragile to absorb such a blow, and our national security is too
important. Reducing Federal spending by lopping off the top of
the Federal budget without any discretion is bad government and
fundamentally irresponsible. Congress should move toward a
solution that reduces spending and that provides new revenues
for sustaining important Federal programs that ensure national
security and our long-term economic viability.
While hearings like this are useful, to an extent, we have
already established that sequestration would be bad. I share
the view that informing the American people of sequestration's
harmful effects may be useful in pushing Congress to fix the
problem it created, but it is time to stop talking and take
immediate action to stave off the impending disaster that would
occur should sequestration be implemented. There is too much at
stake.
Sequestration is coming. The first of March is only a few
legislative days away, and the prospects for severe damage to
national security and our economy are real. Congress must act
now to remove the threat of sequestration once and for all. Our
economy and national security are at stake.
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?
=======================================================================
WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
February 13, 2013
=======================================================================
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. BISHOP
Secretary Carter. As I mentioned previously, the Department has
consistently stated and still does not anticipate having to terminate
or significantly modify contracts as a result of sequestration. This is
because most existing contracts are fully funded at the time of
contract award; incrementally funded contracts would have to be
reviewed on a case by case basis.
As a rule, the Department does not terminate fully-funded contracts
if termination costs will not result in significant savings. During
sequestration, cost savings will arise from buying less in the future
rather than terminating contracts. We expect the Military Departments
and Defense Agencies to de-scope some of their operations and
maintenance-funded service contracts and subsequently make decisions
not to exercise options or award follow-on contracts. An example is
Navy's decision to delay overhauls. Another is the reduction in our
base maintenance posture.
The Military Departments and the Defense Agencies will re-assess,
program by program, their unobligated funding balances, their mission
priorities, and critical needs, and make appropriate funding decisions.
It will take some time to determine if there are any cost impacts and,
if so, what they are, as decisions are made. [See page 40.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. HANABUSA
Secretary Carter. The budget reductions made under Secretary Gates
as well as the budget cuts levied by the Budget Control Act of 2011
have all been applied to the Department of Defense's budget topline.
In the months leading to the release of the FY 2012 budget,
Secretary Gates directed efforts within the military services, and in
DOD as a whole to generate efficiency savings by reducing overhead
costs, improving business practices, or culling excess or troubled
programs. In total, DOD identified savings of $178 billion in FY 2012-
2016, including $24 billion in FY 2012. The Services were allowed to
reinvest $100 billion of the $178 billion savings to improve readiness
and warfighting capabilities (``tail-to-tooth'') and the Defense
topline was reduced $78 billion in FY 2012-2016, including $13 billion
in FY 2012. The Budget Control Act levied an additional $487 billion of
cuts against the DOD topline, spread across fiscal years (FY) 2012-
2021. The President insisted that the resulting defense cuts be driven
by strategy and U.S. defense needs in the coming decade. The Department
has taken a hard look at the new security environment and developed a
strategy that appropriately allocates reduced defense resources to the
highest priority needs and ensures our national security objectives are
met. The FY 2013 Department of Defense budget was shaped by the
strategic guidance and reflects key mission and capability priorities
emerging from the strategic review. The strategy is executable with the
resource levels currently detailed in the Budget Control Act, but the
potentially severe cuts stemming from sequestration would seriously
threaten the Department's ability to implement the strategic guidance.
[See page 44.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER
General Dempsey. The answer to your question on whether Russia is
in compliance with its nuclear arms-control obligations is more complex
than a simple yes or no. Treaty compliance is assessed and reported
annually to Congress. Each year the Department of State leads an
interagency examination of treaty compliance, the findings of which are
provided to Congress in two reports. Condition (10) of the New START
Treaty Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification calls for the
President to submit a report to the Senate Committees on Foreign
Relations and Armed Services not later than 31 January of each year.
This report was released to Congress earlier this year. Additionally,
the President's report on Adherence to and Compliance with Arms
Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments
is submitted pursuant to section 403 of the Arms Control and
Disarmament Act, as amended (22 U.S.C. Sec. 2593a). This report is in
final coordination and forthcoming but has not yet reached my desk for
review. However, from my perspective, execution of New START is going
well. We continue to work within the Bilateral Consultative Commission
to resolve early interpretation issues, not unlike the pattern of the
original START. I would note that the Treaty of Moscow was superseded
by the New START Treaty and is no longer in force, and the
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, which the United States has not
ratified, has not officially entered into force. [See page 49.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. DUCKWORTH
Secretary Carter. The DOD is not buying a new network, rather we
are implementing technology refresh for an existing network (the
Defense Information Systems Network, or DISN) that has existed for many
years supporting the internal DOD IT capability, providing mission
critical support to the Department and Intelligence Community and
resulting in significant savings. The current effort is an initiative
to improve efficiencies and more closely align with commercial trends
and network evolutions.
The ongoing efforts to upgrade our network infrastructure are
critical since the existing technologies and equipment used in our
infrastructure are becoming obsolete and will soon not be supported
(for example Asynchronous Transfer Mode) by the vendor community. The
primary focus is to converge multiple, disparate physical and protocol
networks into a common, standards-based network. Key to this is the
implementation of Multi Protocol Label Switching (MPLS) technology as
the standard network protocol. The technology refresh will begin this
quarter using the existing technical refresh budget and the first
instantiation is expected by the end of Calendar Year 2014. This will
continue for several years. All security required is being provided via
existing DISN encryption and security methodologies that meet or exceed
all standards and requirements. Additionally, we are currently using an
instantiation of this capability to support the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency in Southwest Asia. [See page 46.]
?
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
February 13, 2013
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MCKEON
Mr. McKeon. In the event of a year-long Continuing Resolution, will
the DOD's Title III Defense Production Act Advanced Drop-In Biofuel
Production Project continue? Additionally, if sequestration were to
occur, would this project proceed? If it does proceed, will there be
any funding or program adjustments? Please provide details of those
changes, if any.
Secretary Carter. A. With respect to the impact of a Continuing
Resolution (CR) for FY 2013:
1. Funding required for Phase 1 of the Defense Production Act Title
III (approximately $24 million) is from the FY 2012 appropriation.
These funds are no-year, no-color funds that are valid until expended.
The CR for FY 2013 funding does not restrict that action.
2. An additional $6M was planned for Phase 1, but is not needed.
These funds will be allocated to Phase 2, for a total of $76M. These
funds will not be impacted by a CR for FY 2013.
3. Beyond the now $76M from FY 2012 available for Phase 2, $70M was
included in the FY 2013 budget request. If the CR does not reduce the
FY 2013 request, there will be a total of $146M for Phase 2, which
would be obligated in middle CY 2014.
4. If a CR were to eliminate the FY 2013 request of $70M, the $76
million of FY 2012 funds will remain available for funding of Phase 2
of the project. This level of funding will enable selection of probably
only one contractor for Phase 2, for the construction, initial
operation, and verification of a biofuel production facility.
B. With respect to sequestration:
1. A total of $170 million in FY 2012 and FY 2013 funding is
budgeted for the Defense Production Act Title III Advanced Drop-In
Biofuel Production Project. The execution plan calls for obligation of
approximately $24 million for Phase 1 of the FY 2012 appropriation
(initial process verification, site selection, cost estimates, etc.) in
March/April 2013, plus $146 million ($76 million FY 2012/$70 million FY
2013) available for Phase 2 (construction, initial operation,
verification of production operation, and costs of production) to be
awarded in summer 2014 to at least one or possibly two contractors.
Early Government and contractor estimates for execution of Phase 2
established an expected need for $70 million of Title III funding for
each phase 2 contractor.
2. Current DOD planning projects a nine percent sequestration
reduction against the $170 million for the Biofuel project, which will
total $15.3 million. The $15.3 million reduction will be applied to the
$146 million allocated for Phase 2. Phase 1 will proceed as planned and
funding of $130.7 million will be available for the contractor(s)
selected for Phase 2. The reduced Government funding may force higher
cost shares on the part of the selected contractors or a reduction in
the scope/scale of the Biofuel Phase 2 effort. It is likely that at
least one contractor could be funded with available funds.
C. Restrictions imposed in the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2013
1. The NDAA (Sec. 315) provided specific direction that embargoes
the $70 million of biofuel funding in FY 2013, saying, ``Sec. 315:
Amounts made available to the Department of Defense pursuant to the
Defense Production Act of 1950 (507 U.S.C. App. 2061 et seq.) for
fiscal year 2013 for biofuels production may not be obligated or
expended for the construction of a biofuel refinery until the
Department of Defense receives matching contributions from the
Department of Energy and equivalent contributions from the Department
of Agriculture for the same purpose.''
2. It is unclear at this time whether or when DOE will provide
their share of the funding.
3. If FY 2013 funding is not available for the project, the nine
percent sequestration reduction would restrict Phase 2 funding to $67
million of the FY 2012 appropriation ($76M from FY 2012 less $9M of
sequestration cut). The reduced Government funding may force slightly
higher cost shares on the part of the selected contractor(s) or a
reduction in the scope/scale of the Phase 2 effort.
Mr. McKeon. To delay sequestration for the rest of FY 2013, the
President's plan would cut $21 billion more from the military, plus the
$2 billion his proposal already cut from FY13 as part of the fiscal
cliff deal. General Odierno, how would an additional $23 billion cut to
the military this year impact the readiness crisis you described in
your testimony and would you support such a cut, assuming sequestration
is not resolved, but merely delayed to October?
General Odierno. Additional reductions to our FY13 budget would
create serious challenges because of the combined impact of
sequestration, the CR, and the OCO shortfall. In a broad sense, our
challenge is driven by a persistent lack of predictable funding
evidenced by the Army operating under a continuing resolution for 14 of
the last 28 months. Each continuing resolution prevents new starts for
needed programs, limits reprogramming actions, and often results in
wasteful funding for accounts that we no longer need. This year we are
also facing a significant known shortfall in Overseas Contingency
Operations (OCO) funding. These two facts are challenging propositions
when taken in isolation, but together the impact is tremendous. Add to
this the potential of sequestration and the impact is devastating. The
proposal to delay sequestration until next fiscal year and replace it
with a smaller reduction this year does little to help us address our
current problems and brings no clarity to the Army's future funding
levels.
It is difficult to state the detailed impacts to the Army of a $23
billion reduction in FY13 because the bill would be apportioned to the
Services by OSD. It would further depend on how the reductions were
stipulated in the law (i.e., directed by appropriation or a topline
reduction). Regardless, Army readiness will still likely suffer in the
near-term as this reduction would be in addition to the current
shortfall of $6 billion caused by the continuing resolution and the $5-
7 billion OCO shortfall. The Army would continue to ensure the
readiness of all soldiers in Afghanistan, those next to deploy, those
stationed forward in Korea, and the Army's Global Response Force at the
expense of non-deploying units and other less critical programs. Our
ability to employ this approach may be extended beyond what we are
anticipating given the full reductions of sequestration, but it would
still erode Army readiness through FY14 when full sequestration would
then be implemented. Delaying sequestration only delays the hollowing
of the force that would ensue as a result of only being able to train
next-deployers and forces for Korea. It means that the forces that
would follow would require a longer period to meet the same standards
as those deploying today, an effect that would only amplify over time,
resulting in greater expenses to rapidly buy back lost readiness over
time.
Mr. McKeon. On November 2, 2011 you testified before the House
Armed Services Committee as follows, ``So, once you get beyond $465
billion, we have taken all of the efficiencies we can take. We have
taken out structure. We have reduced modernization, in my mind, in some
cases lower than we really needed to reduce modernization, already. If
we go beyond that, we now--it becomes critical, and it becomes a fact
that we will no longer modernize. We will no longer be able to respond
to a variety of threats. We will have to get to a size that is small
enough where I believe, as I said earlier, we might lose our
credibility in terms of our ability to deter. And that is the
difference. So it is not ``okay'' at $465 billion. It is something we
have been able to work ourselves through, with risk. But anything
beyond that becomes even higher risk.'' Do you continue to stand by
this statement?
General Odierno. Yes.
Mr. McKeon. When was the Department of the Army authorized to begin
detailed planning for sequestration?
General Odierno. The Army was authorized to ``plan to plan'' for
sequestration on 7 Dec 2012.
Subsequent guidance specifically prohibited detailed planning until
after sequestration is triggered. Army received draft technical
guidance for planning from OSD on 28 Dec 2012 for detailed planning.
Mr. McKeon. Are there any choices that you are being forced to make
now that you might not have made, had you begun to initiate this
planning earlier? For example, could any depot maintenance have been
rescheduled to preserve readiness for the rest of FY13 and beyond?
Would you have changed your spend rate this year?
General Odierno. The Operation and Maintenance, Army appropriation
is currently facing significant funding shortfalls due to the prospect
of a full year continuing resolution at the FY12 Base enacted level,
and fully funding wartime operations while facing a significant
Overseas Contingency Operations funding shortfall. The compounding
effect of these pressures and sequestration would have required
adjustments to any plans and must now be adjusted by operational
requirements. Earlier planning for sequestration may have altered the
magnitude, but not eliminated the myriad of programs and functions
required to be reduced to meet the statutory ceiling.
Mr. McKeon. The January 14th letter sent to the congressional
defense committees calls for legislative solution to the readiness
crisis you are facing. ``We ask for legislative action that adequately
resources readiness while granting the Department the authority and
flexibility to shape the force to new budget realities.'' But the
letter didn't include an actual legislative proposal. General Odierno,
do you have a specific legislative proposal in mind? If so, please
describe such legislation.
General Odierno. OMB provided the enclosed list of anomalies for an
FY13 full-year Continuing Resolution to Congress, which includes
proposed legislative provisions increasing general transfer authority
from $3.75B to $4.5B, authorizes the Department to begin new programs,
projects, and activities or increase rates of production relative to FY
2012 levels, removes the requirement that no more than 20 percent of
current one-year appropriations may be obligated during the last
quarter of the fiscal year, allows the Army to enter into multiyear
contracts for CH-47F Chinook helicopters, and includes a table that
realigns funds to resolve CR O&M, APA, and RDTE shortfalls.
Mr. McKeon. The January 14th letter sent to the congressional
defense committees also mentions potential civilian furloughs. Based on
notification timelines to Congress and to civilian personnel, when
would be the first date an Army civilian could be furloughed? When does
the Army plan to issue the formal notification of civilian furloughs to
Congress?
General Odierno. Secretary Panetta provided Congress the required
furlough notification for the entire Department, including all
Components, on February 20, 2013. Considering the mandatory
Congressional waiting period and the need for at least 30 days notice
to employees, the earliest we anticipate an employee might be
furloughed is late April 2013.
Mr. McKeon. We have seen State by State estimates of civilian
personnel furloughs from the Air Force and the National Guard, and a
regional break down from the Navy. Is the Army planning on issuing a
similar analysis?
General Odierno. Detail PowerPoint slide provided to congress on 15
February, please see attached copy (on page 152) for committee use.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 79491.070
Mr. McKeon. How many Army civilians will have to be furloughed by
the end of FY13? Is there any consideration for retaining critical
skills, if so, in which areas?
General Odierno. The vast majority of the Army's over 251,000
civilian employees will be furloughed with very limited exceptions,
approved by only myself and the Secretary, for those with duties that
are critical at this time. One of the categories of civilians excepted
from furlough, for instance, will be employees who are deployed in
combat zones. Other exceptions may be for those who are protecting the
safety of life or property, but only to the extent that their
continuous presence is required to provide that protection. Lastly, we
will likely exempt civilian employees at Arlington National Cemetery
due to the significant disruption it would cause in maintaining the
current burial schedules. These furloughs are driven by the substantial
combined impacts of a Continuing Resolution, Sequestration, and the
cost to support the war above the current allocated funding.
Mr. McKeon. How much of a cut can the Army take in FY13 before
having to furlough civilians--assuming the cut was not through
sequester, but to the topline?
General Odierno. Civilians are paid from multiple appropriations
across the Army but primarily from Operation and Maintenance, Army.
Since we are operating under a Continuing Resolution through 27 March
and the authorized amounts are based on an FY12 annualized amount, we
are already approximately $6B short of our request for FY13.
Additionally, our OCO request is approximately $5-7B underfunded in
FY13 and we have made a commitment to ensure no degradation occurs in
our support to the warfighters. Thus, we will be required to use our
already short base funds to support the warfight. The cumulative effect
of the FY12 base shortfall, the reduced topline through sequestration
and emerging OCO requirements could require us to use furlough as an
option of last resort to mediate our fiscal deficiency.
Our dedicated civilians do not deserve to be furloughed. It simply
is not right. However, due to the magnitude of our shortfalls, we will
most likely have to use it to achieve the mandated savings.
Mr. McKeon. Has the Army considered a reduction in force as part of
its planning? If so, is that a potential near-term solution to absorb
the cuts from sequestration?
General Odierno. The Army is working to reduce its Civilian on-
board strength in order to meet funding targets established by the
Secretary of Defense in Resource Management Directive 7032A.
Headquarters, Department of the Army Staff and all Army Commands and
Agencies have conducted exhaustive reviews of programs and functions in
order to identify specific functions, activities and workload for
elimination and/or reduction. As a result, the Army may execute
reductions in force during Fiscal Year (FY) 2013 that were initiated
last FY or earlier this FY. However, a reduction in force will not
serve as a near-term solution to address the FY 13 effects of
sequestration because of the costs associated with conducting a
reduction in force and the timeframes for Congressional and employee
notifications.
As part of the FY12 DOD civilian workforce reductions the Army
submitted 54 RIF actions to DOD targeted at achieving end strength
targets and eliminating positions where workload is complete or
discontinued. Those FY12 RIF's will continue executing this year
separating 1,433 employees. In FY13 four RIFs are in progress for a
total of 433 separations. For FY13, based on the on the notification
timelines both in law and policy, there is not enough time left in the
year to plan and accomplish RIFs, nor would it result in any dollar
savings to meet sequestration targets.
Mr. McKeon. In a recent interview, Secretary Panetta indicated
that, ``We have identified $30 billion in new initiatives over the next
five years to eliminate overhead and duplication,'' which would be
included in the FY14 budget request. To assist in realizing this
savings, the Secretary has also indicated the Department's desire to
seek another round of BRAC. Likewise, your January 14th letter to the
congressional defense committees states, ``We must also be given the
latitude to enact the cost-saving reforms we need while eliminating the
weapons and facilities we do not need.'' Presumably, this is a
statement expressing the uniformed military's support for another round
of BRAC. Considering BRAC 2005 will not realize a payback on its $35
billion price tag until 2018, 13 years after the start of the initial
investment, can the Nation afford to exacerbate a potential
sequestration deficit in 10 years by moving forward with another round
of BRAC now?
General Odierno. The BRAC 2005 process was, by design, primarily
about maximizing military value and helping the Army Transform itself
from a Division-based force into modular Brigade Combat Teams, the
modest payback period was a worthwhile investment. While payback
periods can be calculated in different ways, the Army's view is that
BRAC savings are real and substantial. It is better to align
infrastructure with evolving force structure to hasten the realization
of fiscal savings. Delaying the realignment of infrastructure and
civilian staffing with future force structure inevitably increases
future costs and makes future budgetary decisions more difficult.
In Europe, a 45% reduction in force structure resulted in a 51%
reduction in infrastructure, a 58% reduction in civilian staffing, and
a 57% reduction in base operating costs. At overseas installations
(i.e., Asia and Europe), the Army is consolidating facilities already
and Congressional authorization is not required. Army active duty
component end-strength is declining by 80,000 from a peak end-strength
of 570,000 in Fiscal Year 2010 to 490,000 by Fiscal Year 2017. This is
a significant reduction in the Army. Almost every installation will be
affected in some way. Given that total facility square footage at Army
installations has either remained constant or slightly increased since
2005, a reduction of 14 percent in end-strength will create excess
installation infrastructure.
Is another round of BRAC affordable? Perhaps the more revealing
question is whether the Army and the Nation can afford to carry excess
infrastructure and overhead expenses and divert scarce resources away
from critical and future requirements. The Army would use an authorized
round of BRAC, if it were authorized, to conduct a rigorous analysis to
identify excess infrastructure, and prudently align supporting civilian
personnel and infrastructure with reduced force structure and reduced
industrial base demand. If sequestration were fully implemented, an
additional 100,000 soldiers or more would be reduced out of the Active
Duty, National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve. This reduction would
create further pressure to bring infrastructure and civilian staffing
into proper balance with force structure. The Army and Nation cannot
afford to carry excess infrastructure and overhead expenses created by
the downsizing of the force. The Army anticipates that a future round
of BRAC, if authorized by Congress, would more closely resemble prior
rounds of BRAC in which elimination of excess installation capacity was
the main objective. BRAC allows for a systematic review of existing DOD
installations for Joint and multi-service component utilization.
Mr. McKeon. If sequester goes into effect for only 1 or 2 months,
but is then resolved, please describe the impact on training, including
the impact on operations, civilian personnel, facilities sustainment,
depot maintenance, and training.
General Odierno. One of the persistent challenges to the Army has
been a lack of predictable funding, evidenced by operating under a
Continuing Resolution (CR) for 14 of the last 28 months. Each
continuing resolution prevents new starts for needed programs, limits
reprogramming actions, and often results in wasteful funding for
accounts that we no longer need. This year we are also facing a known
shortfall in Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding between five
and seven billion dollars. These two facts are challenging propositions
when taken in isolation, but together the impact is tremendous. Add to
this the potential of sequestration and the impact is devastating--and
those effects are already being felt by the Army. Even if the sequester
is in effect for only one to two months, its resolution will do little
to help us address our current fiscal problems and will likely bring no
greater clarity or predictability to the Army's future funding levels.
The budget uncertainties outlined above have caused the Army to
begin implementing steps to prepare for reduced budget caps. We began
in January to limit the training and overall readiness of units that
are not deploying or scheduled to deploy in order to ensure those that
are have adequate resources to train. Should sequestration only last
one to two months, the Army will still require an extended period of
time and significant resources to restore readiness.
The Army has also implemented cost saving measures that affect the
civilian workforce. We have implemented a civilian hiring freeze with
limited exceptions, and have initiated the release of term and
temporary civilian employees. We also announced the intent to furlough
all civilian personnel, with very limited exclusions, for 22 work days
prior to the end of fiscal year 2013. If a final decision to furlough
is made, the Army anticipates the first furloughs to begin near the end
of April. Should the resolution of sequestration and an OCO shortfall
render a furlough unnecessary prior to that time, furlough plans could
be cancelled and employees would not be affected. If employees are
furloughed prior to resolution being reached, those employees who were
furloughed would not be paid for the furloughed time, unless Congress
takes action to specifically authorize retroactive payment. All of
these actions directly affect the morale of our dedicated civilian
workforce, and the impact has already been felt. Restoring capabilities
and capacities lost due to the hiring freeze and release of civilians,
and restoring the faith of our dedicated civilian workforce could take
a considerable length of time.
The Army has implemented similar measures to reduce costs
associated with facility sustainment and depot maintenance of
equipment. Specifically, we have reduced funding for facility
sustainment to only work that is required for life, health and safety.
The Army has also eliminated most restoration and modernization funding
for facilities due to sequestration and has not implemented any
significant FY13 military construction projects because of the
continuing resolution. Facility conditions will continue to deteriorate
until funding is restored to adequate levels and the backlog of
deferred maintenance can be addressed. The Army is also prepared to
implement cost savings measures across our depots. In the immediate
future, the Army will direct that only equipment required by deploying
forces will be inducted into the depots for the remainder of this
fiscal year. This defers maintenance on a majority of the equipment
returning from Afghanistan as well as other equipment scheduled for
depot level maintenance. Overall unit readiness will be impacted by
reduced equipment readiness conditions and/or the lack of equipment on-
hand.
Regardless of the duration of sequestration, the impacts of an OCO
shortfall and a CR to Army training, to include the impact on
operations, civilian personnel, facilities sustainment, and depot
maintenance, will be significant. The Army has already implemented cost
saving measures across all of these activities because of the current
budget uncertainties and these measures will take time and a
significant commitment of resources to overcome.
Mr. McKeon. Are the effects of a 1- or 2-month sequester
reversible?
General Odierno. The effects of a one or two month sequester can be
reversible--given sufficient time and resources to restore what is lost
(i.e., readiness). However, the situation facing the Army is not solely
driven by sequestration, but rather the cumulative effect of
sequestration, the continuing resolution and the Overseas Contingency
Operations (OCO) shortfall. These budget uncertainties have already had
a significant impact on the Army and sequestration will only add to
that, regardless of duration.
The Army began implementing measures in January 2013 to reduce
spending to prepare for the reduced budget caps and ensure resources
were available to address critical operations and programs, like
Operation Enduring Freedom and Wounded Warriors. Additional cost-saving
measures, to include a 22 work day civilian furlough, will soon be
executed absent any legislative action to address the current budget
uncertainties. These measures have already affected training, equipment
maintenance and sustainment, the civilian workforce, facility
sustainment, and installation services. A short duration sequester will
further impact these programs prolonging the period of time and
increasing the resources it will take to recover what has been lost.
Mr. McKeon. The January 14th letter sent to the congressional
defense committees from the Joint Chiefs of Staff describes the
readiness crisis resulting from a full-year continuing resolution and
sequestration. The letter goes on to state, ``The combination of
capabilities and capacities of the Nation's military force required to
defend our national security interests with an acceptable degree of
risk is a separate issue.'' How do you interpret this statement? Do you
believe the readiness crisis before us, or the issue of full
sequestration, can be separated from the issue of the risk to our
national security?
General Odierno. A full year continuing resolution and
sequestration will have immediate impacts on readiness for our current
requirements, not only to our combat operations, but our military
obligations in the near term. The capabilities and capacities
envisioned to meet military strategies that address anticipated threats
to national security interests over the long term are beyond the
purview of readiness to meet current missions. The Army can meet its
obligations to the current Defense Strategic Guidance with a gradual
reduction of forces to previously planned levels. Drastic changes to
the schedule or scope of that drawdown will warrant revisiting that
strategic guidance to determine how best to balance further reduced
capabilities and capacities and how best to employ them against the
ends derived from our national security interests. We must avoid the
grave risk of an imposed mismatch between the size of our Nation's
military force and the funding required to maintain its readiness.
Failure to do so will inevitably lead to a hollow force.
Mr. McKeon. If sequestration happens and if the White House and
Congress cannot reach agreement on funding, will the military be able
to defend our interests with an acceptable degree of risk, given the
current security environment?
General Odierno. The specific level of risk is dependent on the
legislation passed by the Congress replacing the Continuing Resolution.
In my opinion, sequestration is not in the best interests of our
national security. It will place an unreasonable burden on the
shoulders of our soldiers and civilians. We will not be able to execute
the Department of Defense strategic guidance as we developed last year.
It is our responsibility--the Department of Defense and Congress--to
ensure that we never send soldiers into harm's way that are not
trained, equipped, well-led, and ready for any contingency to include
war. We must come up with a better solution.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN
Mr. Langevin. I am particularly concerned about the effect of
sequestration on cyber operations, which by their nature are more
vulnerable to short-term budgetary pressure.
Can you address the effects of sequestration on cyberspace
activities and how you intend to manage the fiscal pressures given
increasing demands in this regime, particularly in light of the reports
of CYBERCOM's plan to grow the number of cyber operators?
Secretary Carter. The indiscriminate, across the board nature of
the sequestration will have an adverse impact on the Department's
ability to carry out cyber missions, including IT and network
modernization to improve cyber defense capabilities and developing
capabilities supporting integration of cyber into the Combatant
Commands planning. The result will likely be delays in implementing
some of the activities planned in the near-term. The Department does,
however, recognize the importance of supporting critical Cyberspace
Operations, including those associated with defending the Nation
against cyber threats, in these difficult economic times.
The FY13 defense budget includes funds that support CYBERCOM's
cyber personnel request and similarly, the FY14 DOD budget request
includes funding to grow the number of cyber operators.
Mr. Langevin. Secretary Carter, can you speak to the effect of
sequestration on research and development, particularly long-term
research, as well as on defense investments in STEM (science,
technology, engineering, and mathematics) education?
Secretary Carter. Sequestration will have a disruptive and negative
impact on both the Department's long-term research and on investments
in STEM education. A principle of both long-term research and STEM is
funding stability, since both are about the people.
A. The effect on long-term research:
One important impact of sequestration on R&D would be a reduction
to the roughly $2.2B that the Department spends annually in research at
United States universities. This reduction would be about $198M in FY
2013. Since the average university award is approximately $400K, the
reduction would be about 495 fewer DOD-funded university awards this
year. Further, these research efforts support more than 6,800 graduate
students. Therefore, sequestration would reduce by about 612 the number
of science and engineering graduate students who are both performing
defense research and receiving DOD support for research training toward
advanced degrees in fields important to national defense. These impacts
compound over time since the return on investment compounds with time
as researchers build on the knowledge and understanding generated by
the work of earlier researchers. We therefore project a greater
potential long-term impact of the loss of hundreds of university awards
in FY 2013 than one might anticipate solely from the immediate effects
in the current year. We may never know the full impact of these long-
term research cuts to our technological edge over future adversaries,
but it is a risk we cannot take lightly.
B. The effect on defense investment in STEM:
The Department invests in STEM in two ways: directly through
programs like ``Science, Mathematics, and Research for Transformation''
(SMART), and indirectly through research grants, contracts, and other
awards. SMART is an undergraduate and graduate service-for-scholarship
education program with 550 current students. Under sequestration we
could only support previously selected students, and we would not be
able to select any new students for CY 2013. This would result in a net
loss of approximately 150 students. SMART is so attractive to the DOD
because it makes the DOD competitive for the top ten percent talent--in
2012, there were 4,000 applicants for 134 awards. As for indirect
effects, there are a large number of STEM students supported through
research grants, contracts, and other awards to institutions of higher
education. We know a nine percent reduction from sequestration would
remove support for at least 612 students; what we don't know is how
many of these students will continue their advanced STEM degree using
other sources.
Mr. Langevin. I am particularly concerned about the effect of
sequestration on cyber operations, which by their nature are more
vulnerable to short-term budgetary pressure.
Can you address the effects of sequestration on cyberspace
activities and how you intend to manage the fiscal pressures given
increasing demands in this regime, particularly in light of the reports
of CYBERCOM's plan to grow the number of cyber operators?
General Dempsey. I share your concerns about the effects of
sequestration on all military operations, including cyber operations.
The deep, across-the-board spending cuts, combined with a dangerous and
uncertain security environment place the Nation squarely on the verge
of a readiness crisis. I am particularly concerned with the evolving
and increasingly dangerous cyber threat. We must have a professional
cyber workforce across the Active and Reserve Components that is
trained, certified and ready to respond to this evolving threat.
Sequestration will require tough decisions, to include furloughing
civilian employees and curtailing training. In the short-term, we are
putting measures in place to ensure support of critical missions such
as cyber operations. In the medium and long-term, sequestration could
affect our ability to recruit, train, develop, and retain a skilled
cyber work force and will degrade our ability to carry out our assigned
missions.
Mr. Langevin. I am particularly concerned about the effect of
sequestration on cyber operations, which by their nature are more
vulnerable to short-term budgetary pressure.
Can you address the effects of sequestration on cyberspace
activities and how you intend to manage the fiscal pressures given
increasing demands in this regime, particularly in light of the reports
of CYBERCOM's plan to grow the number of cyber operators?
General Odierno. Without proper funding, sequestration will have a
significant impact on Army cyber operations and capability development.
It is important to understand that cyber operations are already under
budgetary pressure by the Continuing Resolution, but when coupled with
sequestration, the effects are compounded significantly. The pending
reduction to cyber-related funding, coupled with a Continuing
Resolution that enforces ``No new starts,'' will result in the Army's
inability to directly support emerging U.S.Cyber Command requirements.
Further, the ability to detect and prevent the 600,000 (+) unauthorized
daily attempts from adversaries to access Army Information Systems will
be diminished since the majority of this work is done by civilians and
contractors. As a reminder, during a significant cyber attack in 2003,
three installations were severely impacted and the cost to rebuild
servers and restore service was approximately $32M per installation.
Funding constraints will also affect the Army's ability to enhance
its cyber capabilities. In response to U.S. Cyber Command requirements,
the current plan of fielding offensive and defensive cyber operations
teams will require an additional 1,008 military and civilian personnel
in Fiscal Years 13-16. Sequestration will affect the Army's ability to
hire and train the civilians necessary to field enhanced cyber
operations teams. Army Cyber Command will be forced to stop or curtail
several initiatives to advance Army cyber capabilities including: the
integration of cyberspace into plans and exercises; cyber leader
development, education and training; and developing the concept for
unified Land Cyber operations.
The full impact of sequestration is unknown. The Army is balancing
Cyber Command requirements against other competing needs.
Mr. Langevin. I am particularly concerned about the effect of
sequestration on cyber operations, which by their nature are more
vulnerable to short-term budgetary pressure.
Can you address the effects of sequestration on cyberspace
activities and how you intend to manage the fiscal pressures given
increasing demands in this regime, particularly in light of the reports
of CYBERCOM's plan to grow the number of cyber operators?
Admiral Greenert. Sequestration will have impacts to Navy's ability
to support National and Fleet cyber-related missions. Like all other
warfare areas, Navy will be required to take added mission risk to
forces as materiel maintenance, technological upgrades, and operator
training designed to provide enhanced effectiveness and efficiency
across all cyberspace operations (network operations and defense) will
be deferred or cancelled. While appropriate risk mitigation measures
are being implemented, in general, sequestration cuts will have the
following impacts to Navy cyber operations:
Increased Vulnerabilities to Navy Networks
Degradation to Information Assurance (IA) standards
Degradation of skill set training and Navy succession
planning for Cyber civilians
Longer lead times for supplies with associated increased
costs
Decreased C2 collaboration environment and global mission
support for both
Navy and Joint forces to include Humanitarian and Homeland Security
missions/crisis. Risk may still increase over time even with effective
prioritization of resources.
Mr. Langevin. I am particularly concerned about the effect of
sequestration on cyber operations, which by their nature are more
vulnerable to short-term budgetary pressure.
Can you address the effects of sequestration on cyberspace
activities and how you intend to manage the fiscal pressures given
increasing demands in this regime, particularly in light of the reports
of CYBERCOM's plan to grow the number of cyber operators?
General Welsh. Over the past few years, we have seen the threat in
cyberspace grow more sophisticated, evolving from individuals or
loosely associated groups of amateur hackers to organized non-state
actors and even nation-states hostile to the United States and our
national interests. Nations like China and Iran have become more bold
and aggressive in their attempts to gain access to our critical
infrastructure as reflected in the Mandiant report released last week.
The Air Force alone blocks one billion probes per week, and we still
have 1,200 to 1,400 cases per year inside the network that are
categorized as suspicious. With the threat level this high, it is not
prudent to reduce resources to network defense. To help mitigate these
threats, my cyberspace superiority core function lead integrator
directed the continued funding of cyber operations during sequestration
at the expense of other mission areas. Therefore, the major direct
impact to cyber during sequestration is the civilian workforce
reduction due to furlough.
Our cyber operations workforce is comprised of approximately 20
percent civilians; therefore, the sequestration furloughs will result
in an immediate impact in our reduced ability to assess, pinpoint, and
respond to vulnerabilities, increasing an adversary's ability to
exploit systems and increasing their time on the network. Our decrease
in civilians will also reduce our ability to restore connectivity of
critical command and control and combat support capabilities to the
network, resulting in outages of three to four days for our mission
planning and maintenance systems, vice our current average restoral
rate of one to two days.
Longer term challenges due to sequestration include a decrease in
our ability to provide mission assurance in support of air and space
operations for combatant commands. Sequestration also causes a
degradation in our ability to plan for, and transition to, new Air
Force capabilities, including AFNet migration, data center
consolidation, internet gateway protection, and Joint Information
Environment and Department of Defense Enterprise email initiatives. We
cannot quantify these effects at this time.
In response to U.S. Cyber Command's (USCYBERCOM) plan to grow the
number of cyber operators, it is developing a cyber force construct
which seeks to remedy our current offensive and defensive capability
gaps. The Air Force, along with the other Services, fully supports
USCYBERCOM's plan to move forward. However, sequestration will hinder
our ability to quickly organize, train, and equip the forces that are
necessary to enable USCYBERCOM's mission. USCYBERCOM's new Cyber
Mission Force will contain approximately 20 percent civilian personnel.
These personnel are not yet hired nor trained, and since 20 percent of
the force is made up of civilians, the Cyber Mission Force will be
decreased and delayed.
The Air Force is committed to delivering a credible cyber force. To
continue operations under sequestration, the Air Force has placed a
priority on cyber operations to minimize the impact.
Mr. Langevin. I am particularly concerned about the effect of
sequestration on cyber operations, which by their nature are more
vulnerable to short-term budgetary pressure.
Can you address the effects of sequestration on cyberspace
activities and how you intend to manage the fiscal pressures given
increasing demands in this regime, particularly in light of the reports
of CYBERCOM's plan to grow the number of cyber operators?
General Amos. Sequestration will likely impose severe consequences
on both short and long-term Marine Corps cyber operations including
network operations, information assurance/cyber security, defensive
cyber operations, computer network exploitation, and offensive cyber
operations. The full extent of the Budget Control Act includes
sequester-related cuts beginning in FY13 and continuing through FY21.
The scale and abrupt manner in which sequestration cuts are designed
will likely disrupt on-going Marine Corps cyber operations, and will
diminish the Marine Corps' ability to develop and grow its cyber
workforce in the manner required to meet emerging threats.
U.S. Marine Corps Forces Cyberspace Command
For U.S. Marine Corps Forces Cyberspace Command (MARFORCYBER), the
linkage between resources and readiness is immediate and apparent.
MARFORCYBER Headquarters has 136 active duty and civilian marines on-
hand. By FY15, MARFORCYBER Headquarters is expected to increase its
workforce by an additional 87--bringing the total active duty and
civilian workforce to 223. Additionally, as approved by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, the Marine Corps will increase its cyber workforce
investment by an additional 579, which will include a combination of
active duty marines, civilian marines, and contractors.
As MARFORCYBER grows its workforce capability and capacity, it is
simultaneously planning a mission support building aboard Fort George
G. Meade, Maryland. Military Construction (MILCON) funding for the new
mission support building is planned to be appropriated in FY14 with
expected building occupancy in FY17. The Marine Corps expects
sequestration will cause delay or cancellation of many MILCON projects,
including the mission support building. The impacts of MILCON delays or
cancellations will be felt across the Marine Corps. Should the MILCON
project be delayed or cancelled the likely result will be degradation
of workforce readiness; decreased capacity and capability of
MARFORCYBER to command, control and conduct cyberspace operations;
continued commercial leased facility expenses; and, unmitigated
operational risk associated with inadequate anti-terrorism/force
protection measures at the current facility.
MARFORCYBER anticipates further readiness and capability
degradation due to equipment shortfalls. MARFORCYBER has planned
software tool purchases to provide needed capabilities for MARFORCYBER
to command, control and conduct cyberspace operations. These purchases
would be delayed or cancelled depending upon the severity of budget
reductions.
Network Operations
Sequestration will negatively impact the Marine Corps' ability to
operate and defend the Marine Corps Enterprise Network (MCEN). The
Marine Corps Network Operations Center (MCNOSC) will continue to
operate and defend the MCEN as well as provide enterprise equipment
(IT) asset management. However, the MCNOSC will do so with reduced
funding and capacity, which will likely increase incident response
times targeting the MCEN. The MCNOSC will likely have significant
capacity reductions in the Marine Corps Computer Emergency Response
Team (MARCERT). Without full MARCERT capacity available, the
identification of new threats and vulnerabilities will be delayed.
Reduced MCNOSC and MARCERT capacity will decrease the overall health,
availability, and security of the Marine Corps segment of the
Department of Defense Information Network. Computer Network Defense
surge capability for major events will likely be reduced.
The MCNOSC will be unable to provide enterprise engineering
services. Without such services, the MCNOSC will be unable to provide
required critical upgrades to the MCEN infrastructure due to emerging
threats, field solutions to new requirements, or address emerging
threats and security imperatives. Under sequestration, the MCNOSC would
be unable to implement USCYBERCOM/MARFORCYBER operational directives
and DOD/DON/USMC policy mandates in a timely manner due to a reduction
in personnel. Sequestration would likely result in a considerable
reduction to preventative maintenance of the MCEN, increasing the
likelihood of service disruptions and diminishing the ability of the
MCEN to support critical operational capabilities required by Operating
Forces.
The Marine Corps has one Global/Service Network Operations Security
Center and four Regional Network Operations Security Centers (RNOSCs),
which are strategically located to support MCEN operations and defense.
The RNOSCs provide regionally focused command and control capabilities
for executing Network Operations supporting our MARFOR Commanders,
which in turn support the Combatant Commanders. The likely furlough of
civilian employees will degrade operations of both the MCNOSC and
RNOSCs. The potential impacts include degraded management and
completion of network operations tasks; decreased situational
awareness; limited capacity to execute priorities and tasks; less
detailed operational impact assessments; and, reduced response to and
control of network defense response actions.
Information Assurance
Sequestration will impact the Marine Corps' ability to provide
information assurance within its networks. The Marine Corps anticipates
a reduction in the number of information assurance inspections and
validation of remediation activities; delay to field automated tools
for network security protection, software assurance (code review), and
system monitoring; and, delay to completion of public key
implementation on the unclassified and secret classified networks as
well as the optical network infrastructure improvements. Lastly, the
Marine Corps cyber security program will likely be further reduced.
This program oversees Marine Corps efforts and capabilities to protect,
monitor, analyze, detect, and respond to unauthorized activity within
the MCEN as required by National Security Presidential Directive-54/
Homeland Security Presidential Directive-23, Titles 40 and 44 of the
U.S.Code, DOD Directive 8500.01E, DOD Instructions 8500.2, 8510.01, and
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 6211.02.
Mr. Langevin. I am particularly concerned about the effect of
sequestration on cyber operations, which by their nature are more
vulnerable to short-term budgetary pressure.
Can you address the effects of sequestration on cyberspace
activities and how you intend to manage the fiscal pressures given
increasing demands in this regime, particularly in light of the reports
of CYBERCOM's plan to grow the number of cyber operators?
General Grass. At this time we are unsure of the exact impact of
sequestration on cyber operations. We believe that sequestration will
impact National Guard cyber operations in the areas of planning and
coordination, policy oversight and resource management capability, and
training and readiness. The loss of productivity from civilian
furloughs and a hiring freeze will lead to degradation in planning a
coordinating capability as well as oversight and resource management.
Planning and coordinating capability and training and readiness will
also be impacted by the loss in productivity from civilian furloughs
and a hiring freeze along with: reduced funding available for cyber
exercise planning and execution; reduced funding available for
mandatory individual training beyond professional military education;
simulator contracts cancelled or delayed; and cancellations of staffing
in support of cyber experiment.
Mr. Langevin. I am particularly concerned about the effect of
sequestration on cyber operations, which by their nature are more
vulnerable to short-term budgetary pressure.
Can you address the effects of sequestration on cyberspace
activities and how you intend to manage the fiscal pressures given
increasing demands in this regime, particularly in light of the reports
of CYBERCOM's plan to grow the number of cyber operators?
Secretary Hale. Cyber operations is a high priority area for the
Department with regard to investment of both resources and management
oversight. Deterring and, if necessary, defeating such attacks will be
a continued key challenge.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO
Ms. Bordallo. I am troubled that 800,000 of our civil service
employees, who contribute greatly to the Department of Defense, may be
furloughed up to 22 days. These employees would take as much as a 20%
cut to their income; and the Department would lose their valuable
contribution to the mission. As we curtail the work of these critical
civil service employees, the Department of Defense in many cases will
continue to pay for contract employees. I am concerned that this
contracting approach will unnecessarily punish our civilian workforce.
What can be done to ensure that the civilian workforce will not be
unduly targeted if sequestration occurs? What criteria are you using to
determine whether a Federal civilian or a contractor stays on the job
or goes?
Secretary Carter. The magnitude of the reductions that must be
absorbed in the Operation and Maintenance accounts leaves the
Department no choice but to reduce the funding required for civilian
personnel. The timing of the sequestration exacerbates the situation,
leaving only 6 months or less to execute these furloughs. This will
result in making almost all Department civilians subject to being
placed in a furlough status for 2 days of every pay period beginning in
April and ending in September. This equates to a 20% reduction in their
salaries for the remainder of the year. Unfortunately, the Department
has little ability to minimize the financial impact on our civilians.
However, the financial impact on civilian personnel can be avoided if
the Congress were to act to avoid sequestration.
Ms. Bordallo. I believe that these challenging times present us
with an opportunity to review how we do businesses and find ways to
improve our processes. The effects of sequestration are obviously
detrimental to the readiness of our Armed Forces; I would like to know
examples of how any of the Services and OSD have made fundamental
changes to your business practices in light of the austere fiscal
times.
Secretary Carter. Over the past few years the Department of Defense
has been diligent in seeking out more efficient business practices in
order to reduce costs. Examples of these efficiencies include: the
Army's 2012 enterprise-wide deployment of Lean Six Sigma which has
already yielded $3.2 billion in benefits from over 2,979 projects with
another 1,300 projects in progress; DOD reduced health care costs in
FY12 by shifting to using Medicare's Outpatient Prospective Payment
Systems (OPPS) for reimbursing private sector institutions for
outpatient care delivered to TRICARE beneficiaries, resulting in an
estimated savings in FY12 of $840M.
However, the combination of the Continuing Resolution and
Sequestration now has us taking steps that undermine readiness and are
not efficiencies. For example, the Services have reduced or delayed
deployments, such as the recent delay of the aircraft carrier USS
TRUMAN, in order to maintain the capability to surge ready-forces to
emergent events. The Services have also reduced and delayed maintenance
and training of military units not directly tied to current operations,
as well as reducing base operations and facilities maintenance. The
Department has frozen the hiring of civilian employees, planned
furloughs of up to 22 days for the overwhelming majority of the 800,000
members of DOD's civilian workforce, and planned for layoffs of up to
46,000 temporary and term employees. The Department has also curtailed
travel that is not mission-critical, including terminating or
postponing participation in conferences.
Ms. Bordallo. I believe that these challenging times present us
with an opportunity to review how we do businesses and find ways to
improve our processes. The effects of sequestration are obviously
detrimental to the readiness of our Armed Forces; I would like to know
examples of how any of the Services and OSD have made fundamental
changes to your business practices in light of the austere fiscal
times.
General Dempsey. First, I defer to the Service Chiefs and OSD to
answer the question for their immediate interests and areas of
responsibility.
In response to the immediate fiscal situation, the Joint Staff will
achieve savings by aggressively looking at internal business practices;
curtailing travel, conference and printing expenses; consolidating and
leveraging IT networks and increasing scrutiny of joint warfighting
requirements through the Joint Requirements Oversight Council.
As examples of changes in our business practices, we have made
significant changes at the National Defense University to improve our
core functions and better align the mission with fiscal realities. By
refocusing NDU on Joint Professional Military Education, we have been
able to disestablish three organizations as well as realign two others
for greater efficiency while maintaining core capability in those
areas. We have also realigned and rescaled our Joint Staff in Suffolk
to significantly improve unity of effort, efficiencies, and operating
speed by organizing along functional lines, flattening command levels,
and better integrating responsibilities.
To more closely scrutinize and reduce our spending on conference
hosting and attendance, the Joint Staff has established conference
approval authorities for Joint Staff-hosted conferences and non-DOD
conferences that Joint Staff personnel attend. The Comptroller's office
reports all conferences the Joint Staff hosts or attends, regardless of
cost to OSD quarterly and all conferences where total expenses are in
excess of $100,000 to OSD annually. In addition, we report monthly to
the Vice Director of the Joint Staff all conferences and contract
actions. Finally, during the sequestration, the Joint Staff is only
participating in mission critical hosted conferences, sending as few
participants as possible and reducing costs as much as possible.
Finally, a Labor Validation Board (LVB) has been established and
meets monthly to review all hiring actions. Though we currently have a
hiring freeze in place due to funding constraints, the board reviews
all actions to determine if any exceptions should be made for critical
fills. If one is determined, it will go forward to the Director of the
Joint Staff for approval prior to any offers moving forward.
Ms. Bordallo. I believe that these challenging times present us
with an opportunity to review how we do businesses and find ways to
improve our processes. The effects of sequestration are obviously
detrimental to the readiness of our Armed Forces; I would like to know
examples of how any of the Services and OSD have made fundamental
changes to your business practices in light of the austere fiscal
times.
General Odierno. While the Army is always looking for ways to
improve the way we do business, fiscal constraints require us to
deliver strategic land power in the most cost-effective way possible.
Within Army business practices, we continue to drive efficiency gains
into everything we do. The following examples highlight recent
improvements.
Last July, the Army successfully deployed the General Fund
Enterprise Business System. This was a major step in moving us away
from supporting, maintaining and training soldiers and Army civilians
to operate over 100 legacy systems that are almost all written in 20 or
30 year old code. This fielding has enabled the Army to retire 31
separate IT systems to date, and we are on schedule to replace a total
of over 100 separate systems by 2017. Having one financial management
system eliminates the need to enter like data in multiple systems,
maintain interfaces or re-enter reporting data among systems and
reconcile data across different systems. This integrates information
into a single source that better serves decision-making at every
echelon. Additionally, the General Fund Enterprise Business System
complies with 97% of the Federal Financial Management Improvement Act
and DOD regulatory requirements. This compliance provides visibility
and traceability that was lacking in the proliferation of legacy
systems, and the Army is looking forward to improved accountability and
stewardship as a result.
The Army is also leveraging its enterprise resource planning
systems to improve business practices in human resources and logistics.
These enterprise resource planning systems are being fielded on
schedule and will also improve audit-readiness. The Integrated
Personnel and Pay System-Army, the Army's human resources enterprise
resource planning system, is reengineering 157 business processes
across 3 Army Components and will retire 53 legacy systems by 2017.
Today, the Logistics Management Program manages $4.5 billion worth of
inventory, processes transactions with 50,000 vendors and integrates
with more than 80 DOD systems. The Global Combat Support System-Army is
80% developed and tested and received a full deployment decision in
December 2012. Given this trajectory of success, the Army is on track
to achieve audit-readiness requirements for an auditable Statement of
Budgetary Resources by Fiscal Year 2014 and full audit-readiness by
Fiscal Year 2017.
In 2012, the enterprise-wide deployment of Lean Six Sigma continued
to drive efficiencies into major processes across the Army with over
2,979 projects which yielded $3.2 billion in benefits. Another 1,300
projects are in progress. These continuous process improvement efforts
increased throughput, reduced delays and improved effectiveness while
reducing costs. Throughout 2012, the Army's Lean Six Sigma program
trained 1,408 leaders. We also trained 304 senior and mid-grade leaders
on how to sponsor Lean Six Sigma initiatives.
In September 2010, the Army followed OSD's guidance to implement 23
actions under the initiative called Better Buying Power. These
initiatives collectively mandated affordability as a requirement,
eliminated redundancy within acquisition portfolios, promoted
competition among vendors, incentivized innovation, and improved
Service acquisition activities. The collective efforts of the Army
Acquisition community have yielded measureable cost savings and cost
avoidance across the FYDP.
To reduce energy costs and help preserve the environment, the Army
initiated 13 energy conservation projects which will save 73 billion
British Thermal Units (BTU) of energy and generate 81 billion BTUs of
renewable energy. Further, the Army's Net Zero Installation Initiative
is improving installations so that they consume only as much energy or
water as they produce.
The Army migrated almost all of its users to a common enterprise
email system provided by the Defense Information Systems Agency. This
effort comprised the Army's foremost technology efficiency initiative
and eliminated redundant requirements for servers, standardized
hardware and software, enabled Army users to operate anywhere in the
world with a single online identity, centralized administration and
reduced vulnerabilities. This effort was also coupled with the Army's
Data Center Consolidation Plan which has already closed 54 data
centers. The Army expects to save $380 million between 2013 and 2017.
These efforts comprise only a small part of the Army's transformation
of its business practices, and more efforts are detailed in the Army's
2013 Annual Report on Business Transformation. Senior leaders across
the Army are performing in-depth assessments of their organizations and
processes with the ultimate aim of improving performance, enhancing
agility and decreasing costs. This effort comprises one of the most
complex projects any organization has ever attempted and requires the
continued support of leaders in Congress.
Ms. Bordallo. I believe that these challenging times present us
with an opportunity to review how we do businesses and find ways to
improve our processes. The effects of sequestration are obviously
detrimental to the readiness of our Armed Forces; I would like to know
examples of how any of the Services and OSD have made fundamental
changes to your business practices in light of the austere fiscal
times.
Admiral Greenert. During the development of each budget, the Navy
strives to be bold in challenging our current organization, constructs,
and structure to maximize the resources available to our warfighters.
During FY 2012 we terminated poor performing or lower priority programs
such as Offshore Vessels and Maritime Aerial Layer Network, contained
Total Ownership Costs through strategic sourcing initiatives, and
achieved contract savings through Multiyear Procurements and revising
the Littoral Combat Ship acquisition strategy. The Navy streamlined
organizations and operations by reducing and consolidating shore
commands such as patrol wings, SECOND Fleet, SYSCOM Warfare Centers, as
well as submarine squadron and carrier strike group staffs.
The FY 2013 President's Budget request, as submitted to Congress,
contains similar efforts such as initiatives to reduce IT costs and
consolidate data centers, eliminate duplicate overhead functions
between the Commander, Navy Installations Command and the Naval
Facilities Engineering Command, as well as revised phasing of CVN
Refueling Complex Overhauls (RCOHs) and DDG procurement, and improved
alignment of Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), FA-18, and DDG modification to
overall requirements.
Ms. Bordallo. I believe that these challenging times present us
with an opportunity to review how we do businesses and find ways to
improve our processes. The effects of sequestration are obviously
detrimental to the readiness of our Armed Forces; I would like to know
examples of how any of the Services and OSD have made fundamental
changes to your business practices in light of the austere fiscal
times.
General Welsh. The Air Force is fully committed to improving
business practices. We are invested in Department-wide commitments made
to reduce the cost of business operations. The following are a few
examples of business practice changes the Air Force has implemented.
The Air Force is a major consumer of Department of Defense (DOD)
aviation fuel. As our largest user of aviation fuel, Air Mobility
Command (AMC) has been focused on large aircraft energy efficiencies
for several years and has established a Fuels Efficiency Office (FEO)
to identify and implement aircraft energy efficiencies and tradeoffs.
AMC leadership and the FEO have tapped into the expertise of commercial
airlines, conducted business case analyses and continual process
improvement initiatives, and implemented policies and methods, which
are driving real savings. The Mobility Air Forces (MAF) now have C-5,
C-17, KC-10, and KC-135 flight crews using commercial methods to plan
and fly more efficiently, taking advantage of atmospheric conditions
for optimal flight altitude, speed, and routes. This is referred to as
mission index flying (MIF). As a result, the Air Force is seeing a
mission and fuels consumption benefit of a 37 percent improvement in
ton-miles moved per gallon by the MAF and 9.3 million gallons saved
across all four platforms combined in fiscal year 2012 (FY12). Another
good example of the Air Force using commercial methods is Mobility Air
Forces Cost Avoidance Tankering (MAFCAT). When cargo loads permit, MAF
crews have been carrying extra fuel from locations with cheaper
aviation fuel into Afghanistan locations where fuel prices are much
higher. The result is a slight increase in total fuel burned due to
flying heavier aircraft, but a decrease in the overall cost of the fuel
consumed. Since less fuel is purchased at a higher price, the Air Force
has avoided an average of $13 million per month since the effort began
in June 2012.
A second significant and fundamental change in Air Force business
processes has been occurring within our logistics and supply chain
operations, and continues to evolve. The Air Force initiated an
enterprise logistics strategy (ELS), a shared ownership of the
logistics enterprise designed to accelerate the pace of change and
drive key initiatives to generate cost-effective readiness. The Air
Force has consolidated supply chain management, merging wholesale and
retail supply responsibility for greater end-to-end management and
control. The Air Force consolidated funding for weapon system
sustainment and the flying hour program within a centralized asset
management account to improve fleet support and enable supply chain
transformation. A last example within evolving, fundamental change in
logistics is the rationalization of repair capabilities and
establishing enterprise repair in place of intermediate base repair.
This is illustrated in the consolidation of AMC's C-130 intermediate
engine repair at Little Rock Air Force Base, and more recently, the
Pacific Air Force commander's approval last year to consolidate F110
engine maintenance in the western Pacific at Misawa Air Base, Japan.
Our body of work in making improvements to the logistics and
installations business is a foundation for continuing work to deliver
savings of over $7 billion across FY12-17.
A third area in which change is occurring is in reshaping how
supporting headquarters activities are conducted in order to reduce the
size of overhead staffs across the Air Force while maintaining
appropriate levels of customer support. In 2012, the Air Force
deactivated three numbered air forces and one air operations center as
part of overhead reductions. Their functions were absorbed into the
supported major command staffs and into a combined air operations
center construct, respectively. The Air Force initiated consolidation
of installation services functions from across the major command
headquarters, Headquarters Air Force (HAF), and field operating
agencies aligned to the HAF. By consolidating activities within central
supporting organizations, the Air Force eliminated 289 civilian
manpower spaces in FY13, growing to a reduction of 354 by FY16.
Headquarters Air Force established common output level standards across
the Air Force for 40 installation support functions. Performance
against these standards is reported by installation commanders (the
customer) back to the central management team, ensuring continued
emphasis on commanders' needs despite the re-organization. Air Force
acquisition practices are another area where we are driving significant
change, with initiatives ranging from a major weapon system perspective
(such as a new aircraft) to base level procurement (such as tools,
computers, and parts). An example of a major weapon system change was
to stabilize the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) procurement
by establishing a fixed annual production rate to control costs.
Anticipated savings of over $1 billion will be confirmed in the coming
months as we complete the next EELV contract award. At the other end of
the procurement spectrum, we established commodity councils to
strategically source installation level services and material for
information technology, knowledge based services, civil engineering,
force protection, medical services, and commodities. The Civil
Engineering Commodity Council awarded two five-year contracts in August
2011 for LED taxiway lighting that is expected to reduce costs by over
30 percent and reduce energy consumption by 60 percent over
incandescent lighting. The Air Force accomplished this through analysis
and aggregation of our buying power across the enterprise.
The last example is the work to establish and codify a standard
method for root cause problem solving and continual process improvement
within the Air Force. We call it Air Force Smart Operations (AFSO) and
our airmen apply tools, such as Lean and Six Sigma, to identify and
eliminate waste. We have established proven commercial practices in an
AFSO eight-step problem solving model. We have trained Air Force
leaders and certified practitioners to help solve problems from the
shop level to enterprise-wide in order to maintain mission
effectiveness. We have applied problem-solving from root cause as part
of our continuing efforts to strengthen the Air Force nuclear
enterprise. We are directing commanders to use appropriate problem-
solving tools, including the eight-step model, for all Inspector
General-identified deficiencies.
These are just a few examples of significant change we have made. I
look forward to reporting in the future more successes in driving
fundamental change to financial management, information technology,
human resources, and other areas of logistics and installation business
practices in which we are engaged.
Ms. Bordallo. I believe that these challenging times present us
with an opportunity to review how we do businesses and find ways to
improve our processes. The effects of sequestration are obviously
detrimental to the readiness of our Armed Forces; I would like to know
examples of how any of the Services and OSD have made fundamental
changes to your business practices in light of the austere fiscal
times.
General Amos. The Marine Corps maintains a long-standing reputation
in the Department of Defense as being a frugal, lean Service that
delivers the best value for the defense dollar. As such, the Marine
Corps has adapted to budgetary reductions by continuing our tradition
of pursuing ways to streamline operations, identify efficiencies, and
reinvest savings in order to get the most out of every dollar. It is
this mentality that has allowed us to continue to provide the best
trained and equipped Marine units to Afghanistan, even in this era of
constrained resources.
The Marine Corps recognizes the fiscal realities that currently
confront the United States, and we are already making hard choices
inside the Service and ensuring that we ask only for what we need as
opposed to what we may want. We understand that the Nation will face
difficult resource decisions in the future, and these difficult times
will undoubtedly have an impact on the manner in which we address the
challenges presented by an uncertain and ever-changing world. The
Marine Corps has aggressively sought and found efficiencies in how we
spend our scarce resources, and these efficiencies have saved precious
resources while ensuring the Marine Corps remains America's ``Force in
Readiness.'' Savings have been found through reductions in basic
allowance for housing costs, more efficient use of energy, greater use
of simulators/reduction in training ammunition, and more efficient
procurement practices. Additionally, we have undergone extensive audits
for the past three years with ever improving results.
However, the lack of an appropriations bill and the implementation
of sequestration have had a negative impact on the Marine Corps'
ability to reap the savings we initially expected. For example, under
the CR, new starts are prohibited without specific approval. This means
that options on existing contracts may have to be renegotiated, which
will likely prevent the Marine Corps from receiving any expected
pricing benefits. This is especially true of savings that were expected
to result from multi-year procurements such as MV-22. Loss of the
ability to enter into a multi-year procurement for the MV-22 will undo
months of tough negotiations that would have resulted in approximately
$1 billion in cost avoidance and reductions in total program cost.
Sequestration threatens our efforts and will impact all of our
investment programs through increased unit costs, schedule delays, and
slowing of necessary research and development. For example if
sequestration occurs, the Ground/Air Task Order Radar (G/ATOR) program
will likely have a Nunn-McCurdy breach. The potential impact of such a
breach will include a restructuring of the program and a delay of
initial operational capability by two years. The G/ATOR's production
transition, including timely semiconductor technology insertion, will
also be significantly impacted leading to a loss of planned cost
savings and misalignment of funding due to a shift in schedule.
In the area of operations and maintenance, the Marine Corps will
have to mortgage the future to pay for readiness today--we will have to
forgo necessary modernization and sustainment to support our forward
deployed forces. We are tasked by the Congress to be the most ready
when the Nation is least ready. In order to accomplish this, we have
been forced to make sacrifices in our modernization and infrastructure
sustainment accounts to pay for the readiness of today's force. This
will mean that we will be forced to delay the purchase of new equipment
and maintain legacy equipment for longer periods of time, incurring
greater maintenance cost. Further, our facilities will not be sustained
at planned rates, meaning that maintenance will be delayed or omitted,
hastening the deterioration of buildings, and driving up long term
costs and the ability to properly train our force.
The Marine Corps prides itself on its ``get by with less''
mentality, and we have always sought more efficient ways of fulfilling
our mission. We clearly recognize that we and the Nation are entering a
period of austerity, and we have identified numerous efficiencies and
reductions--we will continue to deliver the best Marine Corps the
Nation can afford. Unfortunately, the current fiscal uncertainty will
likely undo a number of these initiatives, which will result in further
setbacks and exacerbate the effects of the CR and sequestration-induced
reductions.
Ms. Bordallo. I believe that these challenging times present us
with an opportunity to review how we do businesses and find ways to
improve our processes. The effects of sequestration are obviously
detrimental to the readiness of our Armed Forces; I would like to know
examples of how any of the Services and OSD have made fundamental
changes to your business practices in light of the austere fiscal
times.
General Grass. The National Guard Bureau has instituted strict
management controls to validate our operations and maintenance
requirements and to limit our expenditure of funds to those
requirements that are critical to our mission of ensuring a trained and
ready National Guard. All travel not related to critical aspects of
that mission has been suspended. Service contracts that don't directly
and substantially contribute to that mission are being scrutinized for
reduction or discontinuation. Supply purchases for office requirements
have been significantly curtailed. Civilian term employees are being
dismissed, and we've instituted a hiring freeze for all new civilian
personnel actions. Career civilian employees are subject to being
furloughed by 20% of their normal hours within each pay period.
Ms. Bordallo. I believe that these challenging times present us
with an opportunity to review how we do businesses and find ways to
improve our processes. The effects of sequestration are obviously
detrimental to the readiness of our Armed Forces; I would like to know
examples of how any of the Services and OSD have made fundamental
changes to your business practices in light of the austere fiscal
times.
Secretary Hale. The Department of Defense has always taken its duty
to be an excellent steward of taxpayer dollars very seriously. The
Department takes this duty seriously both because of its responsibility
to the American taxpayer and also because improved business practices
better serve the warfighter. Through the continued implementation of
the Secretary's Efficiencies Initiative and President Obama's Campaign
to Cut Waste, as well as its broader business transformation efforts,
DOD has focused on reducing costs, ensuring that policies and controls
are in place to prevent waste, duplication, or abuse, and improving
business outcomes.
Through these initiatives the Department has identified billions of
dollars to shift from ``tail to tooth,'' made specific, targeted policy
improvements and cost reductions in areas such as travel and
conferences, and pursued many broader business improvement efforts.
These broader business improvement efforts include initiatives such as
Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness, acquisition and contracting
reform, logistics and supply chain management improvements, information
technology and defense business systems investment and acquisition
management improvements, and energy efficiency efforts.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LOEBSACK
Mr. Loebsack. How are decisions being made about the impact of
workforce reductions on the military, civilian, and contractor
workforces? What factors, such as retaining critical skills in the
civilian workforce, are being taken into account in decisions regarding
reductions to each one of these segments of the workforce? How are
these reductions being balanced across the total force?
Secretary Carter. Within whatever funds are available, the
Department's military and civilian workforces, as well as contracted
support, are sized and structured based on the capabilities needed to
implement the national military and security strategies of the United
States. The sourcing of functions and work among military (active/
reserve), civilian, and contracted services must be consistent with
workload requirements, funding availability, readiness and management
needs, as well as applicable laws, even in times of budgetary
uncertainty and reductions. Under sequester, the military personnel
account has been exempted by the President and all other programs must
take equal reductions in funding.
The Department aligns its workforces (both in size and structure)
to mission. As such, the Department formulates the current size or
possible reductions/increases in the workforce based on mission
workload rather than competency or skill gaps to deliver capabilities.
The capabilities-based approach is predicated on a mission, function,
and task construct and informed by current and projected workload, risk
mitigation, and resource availability. The budgetary environment,
including the current hiring freeze and sustained pay freezes, along
with the potential furloughing of civilians employees has an adverse
impact on the Department's ability to recruit and/or retain talented
civilian employees, including those that have critical skills.
As funding is reduced, we will strive to maintain a properly sized
and highly capable civilian workforce that is aligned to mission and
workload. However, under the sequester, the military personnel accounts
have been exempted and many contracts are fully funded, while civilians
will be furloughed to make up for the funding gap. As a result, a
balanced approach is very difficult.
Mr. Loebsack. How will sequestration and a Continuing Resolution
affect the transfer of new missions to Air National Guard units that
are seeing a change of mission under the re-submitted FY13 Air Force
budget plan that was approved as part of the FY13 NDAA?
General Grass. Sequestration and a Continuing Resolution (CR) will
affect Air National Guard unit mission conversions, but to what degree
remains to be determined. Depending on how and when the sequester is
addressed, we could see anything from minor delays in initiating
conversions (delays in environmental assessments and site activation
task force visits), to severe delays which would put conversions at
risk (formal training cancellation and unit flying training cuts).
Sequester could reduce or altogether prevent equipment procurement and
facility funding, and would prevent the 5 ANG MQ-9 Reaper units in
conversion from even reaching an Initial Operating Capability (IOC).
This would also be true for Intelligence missions relying on equipment
and facilities to reach IOC.
The questions surrounding sequestration and CR could also affect
the ability of units converting to new missions to recruit personnel
due to uncertainty and lack of predictability. In fact, when Air
National Guard members see technician furloughs and massive cuts in
operations, training deployments and other areas, this could erode
retention which will further hinder a unit's ability to convert. It is
very difficult to accurately quantify the total impact to Air National
Guard personnel.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SHUSTER
Mr. Shuster. Does the Department of Defense continue to believe
that it is inappropriate for industry to issue WARN Act notices even
though you are about to start notifying DOD civilians?
Secretary Carter. As circumstances evolve, each contractor must
make its own decisions with regard to sequestration's impact on its
business and whether the requirement to issue WARN Act notices has been
triggered. As made clear in the Department of Labor's Training and
Employment Guidance Letter No. 3-12, if and when ``specific closings or
mass layoffs are reasonably foreseeable,'' notice would be required.
Mr. Shuster. Now that DOD will only have seven months to pay for
the sequester in FY13, when will contract modifications, or other
changes that will affect our industry partners, begin?
Secretary Carter. The Military Departments and Defense Agencies
will announce plans to de-scope some of their operations and
maintenance-funded service contracts and subsequently make decisions to
not exercise options or not award follow-on contracts. An example is
Navy's decision to delay overhauls and the Army decision to defer depot
maintenance. Another is the reduction in our base maintenance posture.
The Department has consistently stated and still does not
anticipate having to terminate or significantly modify many contracts
as a result of sequestration. This is because most existing contracts
are fully funded at the time of contract award; incrementally funded
contracts would have to be reviewed on a case by case basis.
As a rule, the Department does not terminate fully-funded contracts
if termination costs will not result in significant savings. During
sequestration, cost savings will arise from buying less in the future
rather than terminating contracts.
Finally, it should also be noted that once a contract is
terminated, it takes months to reprocure under a new contract,
increasing the workload on an already taxed acquisition workforce, and
increasing the costs of the program in the long term.
Mr. Shuster. Will DOD continue to cover the costs of any litigation
associated with industry's failure to issue WARN notices?
Secretary Carter. As circumstances evolve, each contractor must
make its own decisions with regard to sequestration's impact on its
business and whether the requirement to issue WARN Act notices has been
triggered. As made clear in the Department of Labor's Training and
Employment Guidance Letter No. 3-12, if and when ``specific closings or
mass layoffs are reasonably foreseeable,'' notice would be required,
and if a contractor failed to provide appropriate notice in that
circumstance that failure would be taken into account in the
application of the relevant Federal Acquisition Regulations principles
in the determination of the allowability of any costs related to
litigation.
Mr. Shuster. What are the current backlogs at Letterkenny Army
Depot in Chambersburg, PA?
General Odierno. Assuming the cancellation of new 3d and 4th
Quarter orders, LEAD programs with funded work available include: Route
Clearance Vehicle, Force Provider, Aviation Ground Power Unit, Theater
Readiness Monitoring Directorate Equipment, Family of Medium Tactical
Vehicles, Patriot Missile/Radar and numerous additional programs to
include other Service work.
However, the Army is currently reviewing the work scheduled at LEAD
to determine if it supports the Army's most critical priorities. We
will realign work and available funding to meet the Army's most
critical priorities to mitigate some of the projected $18 Billion OMA
shortfall that the Army estimates will occur due to the Continuing
Resolution, Sequestration and Emerging Overseas Contingency Operation
(OCO) requirements.
Mr. Shuster. What is the projected increase to these logs by
cancelling the 3rd and 4th quarter depot maintenance and reset orders?
General Odierno. Ongoing work at Letterkenny Army Depot funded
programs is being assessed. Cancellation of new 3d and 4th Quarter
orders will defer some Route Clearance Vehicle, Force Provider and
generator work.
The Army is evaluating ongoing and scheduled work at Letterkenny
Army Depot to ensure that it supports the most critical requirements.
Less critical work will be deferred and addressed once funding becomes
available.
The Army has an approximate $18B shortfall due to the combined
impact of the Continuing Resolution, Sequestration and Emerging
Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) requirements.
Mr. Shuster. What is the projected timeframe to get caught up on
this log as a result of the sequester? Does this increased backlog
effectively take into account the additional loss of the highly skilled
and technical workers at this depot and the other depots from the
estimated predictions of laying off an additional 5,000 individuals
from the original assessment? Additionally, if funding does return for
these essential programs, has the realistic difficulty to bring these
highly demanded individuals back to the depots been realized in these
analyses?
General Odierno. We anticipate that it will take 2-3 years to get
caught upon on this backlog, depending on availability of funding and
resolution of the Continuing Resolution (CR) and Sequestration. The
expected backlog increase does take into consideration workforce
adjustments--loss and reconstitution of highly skilled and technical
workers--due to funding availability. Letterkenny Army Depot estimates
that it will lose 796 personnel in FY13 and 174 in FY14 due to the CR
and Sequestration.
Additional programs and increases to current planned quantities
will be initiated based on Army prioritization and receipt of funding.
Workforce shaping takes into consideration available funded workload in
FY13, as well as the forecasted workload requirement in FY14 from the
Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, foreign militaries and other
Government agencies. Flexibility in the workforce is always planned to
ensure that changes in workload can be addressed in a timely manner
given some certainty in the budget process. Absent budget certainty, we
cannot provide the workforce with predictable employment.
This uncertainty in funding due to the combined effects of the CR,
Sequestration, and Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) requirements
re-emphasizes the importance of having budget certainty so the
department can adequately plan and make timely decisions to achieve
equipment readiness at best value without jeopardizing capabilities--
highly skilled and technical workers--that will be needed in the
future.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BARBER
Mr. Barber. Last September, in this hearing room, I asked the Vice
Chairs how the threat of Sequestration was affecting the morale of our
service members and their families, and they all said there was
significant anxiety among the force. Marine Corps General Dunford, in
his response, focused on the civilian community. He was concerned, he
said, because the civilian community takes care of our service members
in the field. So if the civilian personnel are suffering here at home,
that will translate to the service members not getting the support they
need to finish the mission overseas. This is certainly true in my
district, and I have heard the same concerns from my constituents. The
civilian community in Southern Arizona makes many of the weapon systems
that the Army, Navy, Marines and Air Force use in Afghanistan and
around the world. They provide Information and Technology support to
the troops in the field. They help make our installations run smoothly.
They answer the phones, and deliver the mail. And I would say we are
treating both our service members and our civilians poorly by not
providing them with any certainty for their future. Secretary Carter,
can you tell me, if Sequestration comes to pass what measures has the
Department of Defense taken to mitigate the potential loss to the
civilians who work on post, or the civilian industrial base outside the
gates?
Secretary Carter. Due to sequestration, regrettably, the Department
is forced to place most of our civilian employees on unpaid furlough
for up to 22 discontinuous workdays. These furloughs translate to
roughly a 20 percent pay cut over the next six months for our civilian
employees. The Department is deeply concerned about the negative
effects of furloughs on the morale and effectiveness of our valued
civilians, and the impact on their pay will also affect the economies
in the communities where they live and work. Sequestration will also
affect Defense contractors, and thus, the industrial base. The
Department is doing everything within our power to minimize adverse
effects of sequestration on military readiness and the effects of
sequestration on our personnel and priorities to the extent feasible.
Mr. Barber. General Grass, I have a question about the effects of
Sequestration on our National Guard units. If Sequestration is
triggered March 1, I understand that there will be very little time in
the remaining 6 months of the 2013 budget to absorb the cuts that the
sequester will bring. National Guard units are supporting counterdrug
efforts that run along the 80 miles of the U.S. border with Mexico in
my district in Southern Arizona. A large amount of the drug smuggling,
human trafficking, and transnational crime from Mexico takes place
along those 80 miles and I'm very concerned about the possibility of a
loss of resources that would adversely impact their ability to support
border security efforts in my district.
The Department of Defense has reported that there will be funds and
resources to support overseas operations, including National Guard
units currently deployed, in the short term. But will we have enough
for the operation and training of our Guard units here at home? What is
the impact of Sequestration on the funding of the National Guard, and
will the Sequester diminish the Guard's ability to perform their
mission, whether along our border with Mexico, or responding to a
natural disaster or national emergency?
General Grass. Sequestration will significantly degrade the
National Guard's ability to maintain a truly operational force, able to
rapidly contribute to contingency operations both domestically and
overseas. Further, if sequestration is executed in accordance with the
current law, it will have a significant effect on training
opportunities, equipment, and personnel readiness, which will have a
negative impact on the National Guard as an operational force.
The National Guard Counterdrug Program could also potentially be
subject to sequestration just as many other valuable DOD programs.
Given the fiscal uncertainty of sequestration and a six-month
Continuing Resolution, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Counternarcotics and Global Threats and the National Guard Bureau
distributed $105.8 million (the President's requested level for FY2013)
for the Counterdrug program in October 2012, along with guidance to
reserve adequate funds to maintain a program for the entire fiscal
year. Although the National Guard Program has received substantial
congressional increases in recent years that could help mitigate a
funding shortfall in the second half of the fiscal year, those
additional funds would not likely be available until later in the
fiscal year. It is my understanding that those funds could also be
subject to cuts necessitated by the sequester.
On a related note, we do not currently anticipate any significant
sequestration-related impacts to our support to the Department of
Homeland Security's Operations Phalanx within Arizona.
______
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. CASTRO
Mr. Castro. In your testimony regarding depot maintenance, you
mentioned your desire for Congress to grant ``relief'' from the 50-50
Rule. This refers to Federal law mandating that no more than 50 percent
of depot maintenance funds may be used for private sector work. Can you
please elaborate on specific measures that may provide ``relief'' from
the rule?
General Welsh. According to 10 U.S.C. Sec. 2466, each Military
Department may not spend more than 50 percent of all funds for
contractor depot maintenance support. The requirement pertains to all
depot maintenance funds regardless of the source of those funds. Each
year the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) submits a report to Congress
showing the allocation of depot maintenance between the public and
private sector. If a Military Department cannot comply with the 50
percent requirement, the SECDEF may waive the 50 percent limitation and
is required to submit a notice of the waiver to Congress along with the
reasons that a waiver is necessary. At this time the Air Force is
uncertain as to whether it will require a SECDEF waiver from 50/50, but
believes that it is prudent to alert Congress that a breach may occur.
If required, a waiver to fiscal year 2013 (FY13) will be requested from
SECDEF in accordance with the law as soon as the impacts to the
continuing resolution (CR) and sequestration reductions have been
finalized. The extent, specifics, and duration of the waiver request
will depend on the actions Congress takes to address the FY13 and
beyond CR and sequestration reductions.
______
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. DUCKWORTH
Ms. Duckworth. In the face of sequestration, it is troubling that
the DOD is still considering expenditures such as DISA's proposed
building of a brand new multi-protocol label switching--MPLS--network
that would basically take over the existing Internet backbone in use by
the individual Services. Such an expenditure would require major
capital investment, estimated between $5-15 billion, and an ongoing
yearly maintenance tail for all the new hardware to be purchased. The
proposed DISA MPLS network will not be available at a fully functioning
capability for at least 5 years and will likely degrade security
capabilities from those that are being provided to DOD already under
existing contracts with commercial network providers. These commercial
network providers are trusted by Wall Street and other financial
services providers with records of efficiency and efficacy for handling
billions of financial transactions annually. So why, when faced with
sequestration, is the Department of Defense building an entirely new
Government network with degraded capabilities, less security, and
significantly higher costs that will directly compete with the existing
more secure, lower cost ones provided by commercial providers? Also, in
keeping with our fiduciary responsibilities to the American people:
What measures are you taking to provide oversight and monitor the
Business Case Analysis supporting DISA's proposal to indicate the true
cost, functionality, and legality of this investment?
Secretary Carter. The DOD is not buying a new network, rather we
are implementing technology refresh for an existing network (the
Defense Information Systems Network, or DISN) that has existed for many
years supporting the internal DOD IT capability, providing mission
critical support to the Department and Intelligence Community and
resulting in significant savings. The current effort is an initiative
to improve efficiencies and more closely align with commercial trends
and network evolutions.
The ongoing efforts to upgrade our network infrastructure are
critical since the existing technologies and equipment used in our
infrastructure are becoming obsolete and will soon not be supported
(for example Asynchronous Transfer Mode) by the vendor community. The
primary focus is to converge multiple, disparate physical and protocol
networks into a common, standards-based network. Key to this is the
implementation of Multi Protocol Label Switching (MPLS) technology as
the standard network protocol. The technology refresh will begin this
quarter using the existing technical refresh budget and the first
instantiation is expected by the end of Calendar Year 2014. This will
continue for several years. All security required is being provided via
existing DISN encryption and security methodologies that meet or exceed
all standards and requirements. Additionally, we are currently using an
instantiation of this capability to support the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency in Southwest Asia.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. WENSTRUP
Dr. Wenstrup. Why does the National Guard have separate
representation on the Joint Chiefs of Staff but the Reserve does not?
If sequestration occurs, to what extent are you willing to expand our
Reserve forces to mitigate the effects of reductions in Active Duty
force strength?
General Dempsey. There are six individual Reserve Components (RCs)
in the Department of Defense and two of them reside in the National
Guard. The Army National Guard and Air National Guard have gained
additional representation on the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) since the
designation of the Chief, National Guard Bureau (CNGB) as a permanent
member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the Fiscal Year 2012 Defense
Authorization Act. The statute specifies the CNGB role of addressing
matters involving non-Federalized National Guard forces in support of
homeland defense and civil support missions. Army, Navy, Air Force and
Marine Reserve and Active Components are fully represented on the JCS
through their respective Service Chiefs.
The Active and Reserve Component mix of forces is a complex balance
of capabilities weighed against our global posture. As Chairman, I have
made it clear to all of the Joint Chiefs that we must ensure the long-
term viability of the Joint Force of 2020 and beyond, which requires
special attention to the strategic capacity provided by properly
manned, trained and equipped Reserve Components. We have also learned
over the past 10 years of war that an intelligently planned rotation of
Reserve Component units into our operational deployments preserves the
capabilities of those units manned by our nation's citizen-soldiers,
sailors, airmen, and marines.
Dr. Wenstrup. Why does the National Guard have separate
representation on the Joint Chiefs of Staff but the Reserve does not?
General Grass. On December 31, 2011, the President signed into law
the National Defense Authorization of Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (P.L.
112-81). Section 512 of this NDAA amended section 511(a) of title 10,
United States Code, adding the Chief of the National Guard Bureau as
the seventh member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As a full member of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau has
the specific responsibility for ``addressing matters involving non-
Federalized National Guard forces in support of homeland defense and
civil support missions.''
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. WALORSKI
Mrs. Walorski. General Dempsey, at the time the President's budget
request for FY13 was submitted, following the first $487 billion in
cuts, did you believe those cuts and that budget request represented
the limits of the acceptable degree of risk? If so, can you please
speak to the additional risks presented by the following scenarios? a.
Sequestration and a Continuing Resolution at FY12 levels. b. A partial
mitigation of sequestration or CR.
General Dempsey. Yes, but determining acceptable levels of risk is
at the President's and Secretary's discretion. At the time the Budget
Control Act was passed, I believed we would be able to achieve our
national security objectives within the law's resource limits and the
Defense Strategic Guidance.
Under sequestration and a full-year continuing resolution we will
no longer be able to execute this strategy. Taken together,
sequestration and the continuing resolution will lead to declining
readiness rates and, with limited ability to shape necessary but
difficult budget decisions, hollow our force. The cuts will also have a
demoralizing effect on our civilian workforce, require us to take sharp
cuts in critical investment programs and reduce our forward presence in
strategically important regions. This means we will need more time to
respond to crises or advance our security objectives; we will have
reduced capacity to maintain global awareness during a crisis; and we
will retain limited ability to respond to multiple crises. Ultimately,
slower response and less capacity will impose greater risks to our
forces.
Sequestration's impact is felt in both its magnitude and mechanism.
Because of the law's inflexibility and magnitude of the funding cuts in
FY13, we must disproportionately reduce our readiness and investment
accounts, which are both key areas to preserve our Joint Force.
Likewise, the continuing resolution inhibits our ability to move
resources between accounts, which drives current readiness and forward
presence decisions. Having additional flexibility in the near-term to
prioritize critical accounts will lead both to longer-term savings and
help preserve the readiness of our forces. It is therefore essential to
have regular appropriations with appropriate transfer authority between
accounts. However, given the magnitude of the additional cuts,
flexibility alone will be insufficient to execute our current strategy.
Mrs. Walorski. Concerning plans briefed by each Service to reduce
costs by cancelling scheduled deployments of units either overseas or
on training center rotations, what will the personnel in those units do
to minimize: a. loss of individual proficiency, b. loss of collective
unit proficiency, c. erosion of morale, and d. disruption of career
progression?
General Dempsey. If sequestration goes into effect, commanders will
take advantage of local resources to maintain individual and unit
readiness as best they can. Commanders will try to preserve individual
proficiency through weapon ranges, virtual training facilities, and
Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) training. Additionally, Service
Members may take advantage of distance learning centers, local colleges
or universities and online resources to further individual development
and limit the disruption of individual career progression. However,
installation commanders will be challenged to prioritize resources due
to the installation's reduced funding and furloughed civilian
workforce.
Mrs. Walorski. At the time the President's budget request for FY13
was submitted, following the first $487 billion in cuts, did you
believe those cuts and that budget request represented the limits of
the acceptable degree of risk? If so, can you please speak to the
additional risks presented by the following scenarios? a. Sequestration
and a Continuing Resolution at FY12 levels. b. A partial mitigation of
sequestration or CR.
General Odierno. In 2010, the DOD developed a ten-year plan to
achieve nearly $300 billion in efficiencies under Secretary Gates. To
comply with the discretionary caps outlined in the Budget Control Act
of 2011, the FY 2013 Budget proposed $487 billion in DOD funding
reductions over ten years, of which the Army's share is estimated to be
$170 billion. Consistent with the drawdown of forces in Afghanistan and
Iraq and in support of the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, the Army is
in the process of reducing the authorized endstrength for active duty
from a wartime high of about 570,000 to 490,000, the Army National
Guard from 358,000 to 350,000, the U.S. Army Reserve from 206,000 to
205,000, and the civilian workforce from 272,000 to 255,000 by the end
of fiscal year 2017 (FY17). This is a net loss of 106,000 soldier and
civilian positions.
By FY17, we will downsize our active component force structure from
45 Brigade Combat Teams to potentially as low as 32. On January 18th,
we released a Programmatic Environmental Assessment describing the
impact of potential force structure reductions across the Army. We
began these force reductions in FY12 focused initially on our overseas
formations. In 2014, however, we will begin significant force
reductions in the United States. In addition to personnel and force
structure reductions, we have had to extend the timelines of our
modernization programs and reduce the frequency of our training
exercises. Our efforts to both comply with the 2011 Budget Control Act
and implement 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance put us on the outer edge
of acceptable risk for creating the future Army force and our ability
to meet our National Security Strategy.
The actions we have taken in response to the 2012 Defense Strategic
Guidance are independent of the continuing resolution and
sequestration. However, the domestic impacts of these actions are only
now beginning to be felt and will be magnified over the next several
years.
In Fiscal Year 2013, the combination of the continuing resolution,
a shortfall in overseas contingency operations funds for Afghanistan,
and the sequester has resulted in at least $18 billion dollar shortfall
to the Army's Operation and Maintenance (OMA) accounts, as well as an
additional $6 billion worth of cuts across all of our other programs.
The impacts of these shortfalls will cause the Army to focus training
resources on next-to-deploy units and to accept significant risk in the
training of non-deploying units. The Army will no longer be able to
train next-to-deploy units to the highest level of readiness prior to
deployment, equipment readiness will continue to decline and the leader
development backlog will expand. Additionally, the Army will not have
trained forces available to respond to emerging contingencies in a
timely manner. Restoring adequate readiness across the force will take
years and significant resources. In addition to the immediate impact of
sequestration for FY13, the lowering of discretionary caps for FY14-
FY21 will have long term impacts that extend far beyond the current
fiscal year. In order to maintain a balance between end strength,
readiness, and modernization, the Army will have to reduce additional
100,000 personnel across the Active Army, Army National Guard and U.S.
Army Reserve. This will generate, at a minimum, a total reduction of
189,000 soldiers in the coming years, but the figure will probably be
closer to 200,000. These reductions of 14% of the Army's endstrength
will equate to an almost 40% reduction in our Brigade Combat Teams and
excess U.S.-based installation infrastructure.
A partial mitigation of sequestration or CR in FY13 will not
resolve the Army's $18 billion OMA shortfall. Immediate removal of
budgetary reductions triggered by sequester and a FY13 appropriations
bill still leaves the Army with a $5-7 billion shortfall in OMA due to
emerging costs associated with Overseas Contingency Operations in
Afghanistan. An appropriations bill would resolve one third of the
Army's OMA shortfall and allow flexibility for us to prioritize funding
cuts through reprogramming actions. In addition, the removal of the
across the board nature of sequester for FY13 would increase
flexibility and prevent cuts to our top priority programs. Even if we
get relief through these mitigations, the budget reductions in FY13 and
beyond that are associated with sequestration will pose a significant
risk to Army readiness and will force us to reconsider the Army's
ability to execute its obligations under the Defense Strategic
Guidance.
Mrs. Walorski. Will Professional Military Education and Permanent
Change of Station (PCS) costs be reduced at the same or greater rate as
readiness-related activities such as ship deployments, flying hours,
and training center rotations?
General Odierno. The essence of readiness is founded upon quality
leadership, supported by the best equipment, training and people.
Professional Military Education is a national strategic resource; it is
the way we cultivate the leadership that is so critical to meeting
current deployment requirements and generating long-term readiness in
our Army. The current fiscal situation is challenging. However, history
definitively shows that we will deploy soldiers again and we must be
careful we do not mortgage our great strategic advantage--our world
class leaders.
There will be some reductions in PME expenses, but not in PCS costs
associated with PME. PCS costs are paid from the MPA authorization,
which is not subject to sequester. However, many PME courses are
attended by personnel in a temporary duty status, which is funded by
OMA. Due to FY13 OMA funding shortfalls, we expect a commensurate
reduction in the historical output of our schools, about 20,000
officers/NCOs a year. While the exact magnitude of the cut is being
finalized, we expect it to increase the wartime backlog of 30,000
Active Component NCOs, 3700 Active Component WOs/Officers and 30-60% of
most Reserve Component cohorts. Furthermore, FY13 shortfalls in OMA
will require us to cancel the NCOES common core distance learning
program. Finally, we may have to cancel the Structured Self Development
(SSD) program. Many mandatory subjects and all Joint training for NCOs
reside in the SSD, so the impact of this change will be significant. We
are currently working to determine the exact amount of all of these
cuts.
Mrs. Walorski. I want to discuss a program of great significance to
our future military readiness, the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV).
As currently constituted, the program will deliver prototype vehicles
for testing later this year, with low rate production scheduled to
begin in 2015. I worry that the progress that has been made in
streamlining the program timeline while reducing costs will be
compromised if the budget cuts we are talking about go into effect. Can
you please give the Committee a sense of your plan to ensure this
program remains on track to deliver a vehicle by 2015? If the program
is delayed, what problematic issues might face maintenance and overhaul
on humvee and other light tactical vehicles in the current inventory
while waiting for JLTV to start production?
General Odierno. The JLTV Joint Program Office has made substantial
progress in streamlining the program timeline, and both the Army and
Marine Corps remain committed to the program. JLTV is currently on
schedule to meet the proposed Milestone C in third quarter fiscal year
2015 (3QFY15) and Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) contract award in
4QFY15. However, that schedule cannot be maintained in the face of
possible sequestration reductions, resulting in an approximate schedule
slip of three months without a reduction to planned testing. Vendor
contracts are firm fixed price and FY13 funds have been fully
obligated. Any sequestration cuts would have to be taken from the
program's remaining FY13 test budget. Even assuming a sequestration cut
is fully ``paid back'' in FY14, the program could not restore the
original schedule. Any efforts to preserve the current program
schedule, despite the reduction imposed by sequestration, would require
reduction in planned test activities. This change would be subject to
the agreement of Service and DOD test agencies and would also increase
the program risk. If the JLTV program is delayed, there is moderate
risk associated with the readiness of the HMMWV fleet. The Army has
planned for enduring HMMWV requirements well into the future, so
maintenance and overhaul capabilities are already established. Even
after 100 percent of JLTVs (49,099) are fielded, HMMWVs (59,000) will
outnumber JLTVs. Additionally, through Recapitalization and Reset
efforts over the past several years, the HMMWV fleet is in very good
health. The current average age is nine years, so a modest delay in the
JLTV program will not have a significant impact on the Light Tactical
Vehicle fleet.
Mrs. Walorski. Will Professional Military Education and Permanent
Change of Station (PCS) costs be reduced at the same or greater rate as
readiness-related activities such as ship deployments, flying hours,
and training center rotations?
Admiral Greenert. Professional Military Education will be impacted
at the same rate as other readiness-related activities to meet the
Navy's overall reduction target. Reductions within the Training and
Education domain will impact capabilities supporting Professional
Military Education, to include contractor support to education, War
Gaming and Maritime Staff Operators Course (MSOC). Limitations on
travel, the civilian hiring freeze and the potential civilian furloughs
will also impact the ability to deliver Professional Military
Education.
The Navy PCS program is funded in the Military Personnel, Navy
(MPN) appropriation. The majority of funding in the MPN appropriation
is directly tied to strength and must be paid for each member on-board.
PCS funding, however, is not strength-related and could be reprogrammed
to offset strength pay requirements if sufficient funds are not
available under the Continuing Resolution. In accordance with Section
255(f) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of
1985, as amended, the President exempted Military Personnel accounts
(Military pay, benefits and PCS) from Sequestration.
Mrs. Walorski. Will Professional Military Education and Permanent
Change of Station (PCS) costs be reduced at the same or greater rate as
readiness-related activities such as ship deployments, flying hours,
and training center rotations?
General Welsh. The President exempted the Military Personnel
Account from sequestration and the Permanent Change of Station (PCS)
budget is part of that account. In this light, we will continue our
long-term Professional Military Education (PME) programs. The Air Force
considers long-term PME as mission critical. The PME schools are
essential to developing the in-depth, critical thinking skills needed
by our strategic leaders. Intermediate-level Air Command and Staff
College (ACSC) and senior-level Air War College (AWC) help the Air
Force develop the intellectual framework necessary to cultivate Air
Force personnel with the skills and knowledge needed to make analytical
and strategic decisions within the national security environment. The
Air Force must continue to build a cadre of leaders who have been
deliberately developed to operate in the complex, uncertain, and
ambiguous environment of 21st century warfare.
Mrs. Walorski. Do you believe the $487 billion in cuts and the FY13
budget request represented the limits of the acceptable degree of risk?
If so, can you please speak to the additional risks presented by the
following scenarios? a. Sequestration and a Continuing Resolution at
FY12 levels. b. A partial mitigation of sequestration or CR.
General Amos. Yes, the $487 billion in cuts and the FY13 budget
request represent the limit of our acceptable degree of risk. As stated
in the February 2012 Posture of the United States Marine Corps report
to this committee, the four priorities for the Marine Corps are: (1)
provide the best trained and equipped Marine units to Afghanistan; (2)
rebalance our Corps, posture it for the future and aggressively
experiment with and implement new capabilities and organizations; (3)
better educate and train our marines to succeed in distributed
operations and increasingly complex environments; and (4) keep the
faith with our marines, our sailors, and our families. Those priorities
can be accomplished at requested FY13 budget levels, albeit with some
degree of risk.
Assuming sequestration and a full year Continuing Resolution, the
risk to our ability to accomplish these priorities increases
exponentially, and cuts of this magnitude, due to their timing and
methodology, will have a devastating impact on our readiness, both
short and long term. The combined effects of an annualized continuing
resolution and sequestration pose a severe risk to our national
strategy, our forces, our people, and to the United States of America.
While the Marine Corps may be able to mitigate the near term effects on
our deployed forces, it will be at the expense of home station units
and our long term readiness--we are mortgaging long term readiness to
form a short term capability to addresses immediate priorities.
Despite the constrained funding resulting from the CR and
sequestration, we expect we will be able to continue meeting Marine
Corps deployed warfighting needs and the training of next-to-deploy
forces for the next six months. Between six and twelve months, however,
we'll continue to decrement readiness accounts resulting in an ever
increasing erosion of home station unit readiness and force
modernization; we also expect that we will begin to see small impacts
to our next-to-deploy forces. Beyond 12 months, we will see a real
impact to all home station units and more substantial impacts to our
next-to-deploy and some deployed forces--in all, a slide to a hollow
force we have fought so hard to avoid. Our Marine Expeditionary Forces
(MEFs) will be forced to postpone or cancel preventive maintenance and
selectively replace replacement equipment with reduced readiness in the
last half of 2013, with a ripple effect on training, negatively
impacting readiness. In aviation, the Marine Corps' F/A-18 squadrons,
as an example, will still be able to source the required aircraft to
meet operational commitments, but the squadrons that are preparing to
deploy will only have five of the twelve aircraft that compose a
squadron available for training by January of 2014. Additionally, each
of the pilots in those squadrons preparing to deploy would complete
approximately seven hours of training per month when the minimum
deployable readiness requires approximately seventeen hours per month.
For the individual aircrew, this equates to greater personal risk due
to less experience--for the Nation, it means we will respond with less
ready forces, and we will pay a price in terms of lives and equipment.
We predict over 55% of USMC forces (ground combat, logistics, and
combat support) will have unsatisfactory readiness ratings, which will
have a dramatic impact to respond to crises outside of Afghanistan when
called upon by the Nation.
A partial mitigation of sequestration or CR, depending on how it
would be implemented, could serve to lessen the risk to our ability to
meet our four priorities and could slow the rate of readiness
deterioration. However, the cumulative effect of multiple years of cuts
will cause the Marine Corps to re-evaluate current plans and make
difficult decisions regarding which missions would continue to be
supported. Depending on the manner in which a partial mitigation would
be implemented, the Marine Corps may still have to mortgage the future
to pay for readiness today, forgoing necessary modernization and
sustainment to support our forward deployed forces. This would mean
that we would be forced to delay the purchase of new equipment and
maintain legacy equipment for longer periods of time, incurring greater
maintenance cost. Further, our facilities would likely not be sustained
at planned rates, meaning that maintenance will be delayed or omitted,
hastening the deterioration of buildings and driving up long term costs
and the ability to properly train our force.
Mrs. Walorski. Will Professional Military Education and Permanent
Change of Station (PCS) costs be reduced at the same or greater rate as
readiness-related activities such as ship deployments, flying hours,
and training center rotations?
General Amos. Permanent Changes of Station and Professional
Military Education for our marines are, in and of themselves, readiness
related activities and are critical to our ability to accomplish our
mission. Without the ability to move marines to the correct unit, units
will not be sourced with the proper personnel prior to deployment;
without the ability to provide Professional Military Education, marines
will not have the necessary training prior to deployment. These two
components are key aspects of overall readiness.
The Marine Corps uses a framework by which it can manage its
readiness as an institution. Called the Five Pillars of Institutional
Readiness, this framework seeks to ensure that Service-wide activities
lead to the proper balance among five categories (i.e. pillars) that
underpin the readiness of the Marine Corps. These pillars capture the
Marine Corps' approach for generating ready forces today and informing
an investment strategy that will ensure the future readiness of the
Marine Corps and enable it to meet the tenets of the Defense Strategic
Guidance. Maintaining balance across these pillars is critical to
achieving and sustaining the Nation's expeditionary force-in-readiness
for today and tomorrow. The five pillars are:
High Quality People (Recruiting, training, educating and
retaining high quality people plays a key role in maintaining our high
state of readiness).
Unit Readiness (Maintaining readiness of the operating
forces, including appropriate operations and maintenance funding to
train to core missions and maintain equipment).
Capacity versus Requirements (Force-sizing and naval
capabilities to meet Geographic Combatant Commander requirements with
the right mix of capacity and capability).
Infrastructure Sustainment (Investing in real property,
maintenance, and infrastructure).
Equipment Modernization (Ensuring ground and aviation
equipment matches the needs of the emerging security environment).
Sequestration, compounded by a full year Continuing Resolution,
will result in across-the-board reductions that will affect all of the
Marine Corps' readiness pillars, will allow for little to no
flexibility in how the cuts are applied, and will mandate reductions in
accordance with the law without regard for requirements and priorities.
In the case of permanent change of station funding, the President
exempted military personnel funding from sequestration cuts in FY13,
and as such, PCS is not subject to a sequestration-induced reduction.
The Operations and Maintenance (O&M) appropriation is subject to
sequestration reduction and will be reduced by the amount prescribed by
the law. Within the O&M appropriation, the Marine Corps will reduce
programs such as professional military education such that we achieve
the best balance possible among our pillars of readiness.
Mrs. Walorski. Will Professional Military Education and Permanent
Change of Station (PCS) costs be reduced at the same or greater rate as
readiness-related activities such as ship deployments, flying hours,
and training center rotations?
General Grass. Permanent Change of Station (PCS) costs are paid for
using National Guard Personnel Appropriations funds, which are not
affected by sequestration. The majority of Professional Military
Education (PME) is also funded through the Personnel Appropriations;
however, some PME courses would be curtailed due to budget constraints.
In addition, Operations and Maintenance funds are used to support
schoolhouses, and those could be subjected to sequestration impacts.