[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN NASA'S
COMMERCIAL CREW ACQUISITION STRATEGY

=======================================================================

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

__________

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 14, 2012

__________

Serial No. 112-104

__________

Printed for the use of the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology

Available via the World Wide Web: http://science.house.gov

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COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY

HON. RALPH M. HALL, Texas, Chair
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
Wisconsin JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois
LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California
DANA ROHRABACHER, California ZOE LOFGREN, California
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland BRAD MILLER, North Carolina
FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois
JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland
W. TODD AKIN, Missouri BEN R. LUJAN, New Mexico
RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas PAUL D. TONKO, New York
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas JERRY McNERNEY, California
PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia TERRI A. SEWELL, Alabama
SANDY ADAMS, Florida FREDERICA S. WILSON, Florida
BENJAMIN QUAYLE, Arizona HANSEN CLARKE, Michigan
CHARLES J. ``CHUCK'' FLEISCHMANN, SUZANNE BONAMICI, Oregon
Tennessee VACANCY
E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia VACANCY
STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi VACANCY
MO BROOKS, Alabama
ANDY HARRIS, Maryland
RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois
CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota
LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana
DAN BENISHEK, Michigan
VACANCY

C O N T E N T S

Friday, September 14, 2012

Page
Witness List..................................................... 2

Hearing Charter.................................................. 3

Opening Statements

Statement by Representative Ralph M. Hall, Chairman, Committee on
Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives.. 10
Written Statement............................................ 11

Statement by Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson, Ranking
Minority Member, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology,
U.S. House of Representatives..................................
Written Statement............................................ 14

Statement by Representative Donna F. Edwards, Member, Committee
on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of
Representatives................................................ 12
Written Statement............................................ 13

Witnesses:

Mr. William H. Gerstenmaier, Associate Administrator, Human
Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate, National
Aeronautics and Space Administration
Oral Statement............................................... 16
Written Statement............................................ 19

Vice Admiral Joseph W. Dyer, USN (Ret.), Chairman, Aerospace
Safety Advisory Panel
Oral Statement............................................... 24
Written Statement............................................ 26

Appendix I: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions

Mr. William H. Gerstenmaier, Associate Administrator, Human
Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate, National
Aeronautics and Space Administration........................... 52

Vice Admiral Joseph W. Dyer, USN (Ret.), Chairman, Aerospace
Safety Advisory Panel.......................................... 57

Appendix II: Additional Material for the Record

Submitted Statement for the Record by Representative Jerry
Costello, Member, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology,
U.S. House of Representatives.................................. 64

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN
NASA'S COMMERCIAL CREW
ACQUISITION STRATEGY

----------

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 14, 2012

House of Representatives,
Committee on Science, Space, and Technology,
Washington, D.C.

The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 9:34 a.m., in Room
2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ralph Hall
[Chairman of the Committee] presiding.

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Chairman Hall. The Committee on Science, Space, and
Technology will come to order. I say good morning and welcome
to today's hearing entitled ``Recent Developments in NASA's
Commercial Crew Acquisition Strategy.'' In front of you are
packets containing the written testimony, biographies and the
Truth in Testimony disclosures for today's witnesses. And we
certainly thank all of you for your preparation time, your
traveling time and for the time you are giving us here today.
We will have opening statements, and I recognize myself for
five minutes for an opening statement.
Before we begin today, I want to take a moment to pay
tribute to a true hero, and I know it is a tribute all of us
would pay, and a very dear friend, Neil Armstrong, who was
memorialized yesterday in a very moving ceremony at the
National Cathedral. He has been before this Committee a lot of
times and he was an inspiration to everyone, a hero throughout
the world, and yet one of the most honorable and gracious men
you have ever known or ever met. I had the pleasure of having
him in my home in late August, and the thing I treasure more
than anything, his letter back several days later that I didn't
really receive, didn't find its way through Washington through
Texas to my office in Rockwell, my home in Rockwell for some
time.
On several occasions he appeared before this Committee. His
first step, I don't say anything here that you don't know, and
you were listening, you heard it yesterday, a lot of it,
established our preeminence in space, and I think it got old to
him to hear people introduce him as the Columbuses and the
Magellans of space, but that is exactly what they were. Neil
was just really an advocate for preserving our leadership, and
I know my colleagues join me in working to carry out his
legacy. We will also be inspired by his very remarkable life
and forever honor him for his place in American history. People
will be reading about him and value very much the pictures they
have with him though they didn't get an autograph with most of
them in his latter years. I think he got a little sick of
people getting his autograph and going and selling it for a
thousand bucks or so.
And I want to thank our witnesses for being with us today.
I know you treasured his recognition yesterday and the memory
that we have of him.
I will get underway with my statement. NASA recently
awarded more than $1.1 billion to three companies to develop
competing concepts for human space transportation launch
systems. Today's hearing is going to review NASA's rationale
for selecting the three companies, to consider the cost and
safety implications of these recent decisions, and given the
unique nature of Space Act Agreements, examine the level of
NASA's insight and thus its ability to evaluate technical and
safety requirements.
Our Nation has made great strides in space exploration but
these strides have not come without cost and without sacrifice.
We have lost astronauts. After the Columbia accident, President
Bush and Congress put our Nation and absolutely put us on a
path to develop new human space transportation systems that
were designed from inception to be safer than the space
shuttle. Safety was very big, of course. NASA responded with
the Constellation system. But this Administration has chosen a
different path. NASA now seeks to use government funds to
stimulate aerospace companies to develop multiple, competing
human spaceflight systems, systems for which NASA may be the
only customer. Are these systems designed from inception to be
safer than the space shuttle, or is NASA responding to
different goals? How and when will we know the safety of these
new systems?
NASA is using Space Act Agreements, not regular contracts,
giving the companies great flexibility to do as they see fit,
in fact, so much flexibility that during this phase no NASA
crew transportation system requirements can be levied. It is
hard for me to understand why NASA is proceeding this way. Will
this result in systems that are safe for our American and
international partner astronauts? How will NASA know if they
don't have the insight? And perhaps more importantly to those
of us in Congress who are asked to fund this, how and when will
NASA know if it is getting what it needs and if these systems
will be safe enough? Redesigns will be costly and time
consuming if important technical or safety requirements were
not addressed up front, which I think they should be.
If our Nation is going to ask crews to explore space, it is
our responsibility to do everything possible to ensure that
those astronauts return to Earth safely. I am not convinced
this approach is the right one but I am willing to listen.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hall follows:]

Prepared Statement of Chairman Ralph Hall

Good morning, and welcome to today's hearing. Before we begin
today, I want to take a moment to pay tribute to a true hero and a dear
friend, Neil Armstrong, who was memorialized yesterday in a moving
ceremony at the National Cathedral.
Neil Armstrong was an inspiration to all Americans, a recognized
hero throughout the world--and yet one of the most humble and gracious
men you ever met. On several occasions Neil appeared before this
Committee to offer his wisdom and insight, deflecting praise and
questions with grace and humility.
Neil's first step on the Moon established America's preeminence in
space and paved the way for scores of spectacular missions involving
hundreds of outstanding Astronauts. Neil was one of the most
impassioned advocates for preserving America's leadership in space and
constantly challenged us to strengthen human space exploration goals
and missions. I urge my colleagues to join me in working to carry out
his legacy. We will forever be inspired by his remarkable life and
forever honor him for his place in American history.
I want to thank our witnesses for being with us today. I know at
lot of time and effort goes into your preparation but your knowledge
and experience is very important to us, so thank you for taking the
time to appear today.
NASA recently awarded more than $1.1 billion to three companies to
develop competing concepts for human space transportation launch
systems. Today's hearing will review NASA's rationale for selecting the
three companies; consider the cost and safety implications of these
recent decisions; and given the unique nature of Space Act Agreements,
examine the level of NASA's insight and thus, its ability to evaluate
technical and safety requirements.
Our nation has made great strides in space exploration. But those
strides have not come without cost and sacrifice. We have lost
astronauts. After the Columbia accident President Bush and Congress put
our nation on a path to develop new human space transportation systems
that were designed from inception to be safer than the Space Shuttle.
NASA responded with the Constellation system. But this Administration
has chosen a different path. NASA now seeks to use government funds to
stimulate aerospace companies to develop multiple, competing human
spaceflight systems--systems for which NASA may be the only customer.
Are these systems designed from inception to be safer than the space
shuttle, or is NASA responding to different goals? How and when will we
know the safety of these new systems?
NASA is using Space Act Agreements--not regular contracts--giving
the companies great flexibility to do as they see fit. In fact so much
flexibility that during this phase no NASA crew transportation system
requirements can be levied. It's hard for me to understand why NASA is
proceeding this way. Will this result in systems that are safe for our
American and international partner astronauts? How will NASA know if
they don't have the insight? And perhaps more importantly to those of
us in Congress who are asked to fund this, how and when will NASA know
if it is getting what it needs and if these systems will be safe
enough. Redesigns will be costly and time consuming if important
technical or safety requirements were not addressed up front.
If our nation is going to ask crews to explore space, it is our
responsibility to do everything possible to ensure that those
astronauts return to Earth safely. I'm not convinced this approach is
the right one but I'm willing to listen.

Chairman Hall. At this time I recognize Ms. Edwards for her
opening statement.
Ms. Edwards. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
your words about Neil Armstrong. It really was quite a moving
tribute in celebration of his life yesterday, and I think for
those of us, whether we were mature back then or were just
little girls in school, it made us come to appreciate the
desire and willingness to explore uncharted territory, and I
think has made me anyway as infectious about NASA and the space
program as I have ever been.
I want to thank our witnesses this morning and look forward
to your testimony. And as my colleagues know, I am a strong
supporter of NASA, both the science programs and the human
spaceflight activities. I also am keenly interested in and
excited by the entrepreneurial energy that is being devoted to
human spaceflight these days. The passion of those working on
commercial approaches to human spaceflight is indeed
infectious, and as I have said before--no great secret--I want
to be there myself. I want to fly.
But that said, in my capacity as a member of this
Committee, I have a responsibility, as we all do, to scrutinize
each of NASA's major projects to make sure that they are well
planned and executable. NASA's Commercial Crew Program has to
be subjected to that same level of oversight and scrutiny if we
are to do our jobs on this Committee.
In that regard, I am concerned that NASA may not be holding
that program, the Commercial Crew Program, to the same standard
as other major acquisitions. Make no mistake: this is a major
acquisition for NASA. When the taxpayer is footing the bill,
paying on average 9 out of every 10 dollars that is being spent
to develop these commercial crew vehicles, we are not talking
about a straightforward purchase of commercial services from
the GSA list. These services don't even exist yet.
I am puzzled and a bit frustrated that NASA appears to be
unable or unwilling to acknowledge the warning signs that this
major program is not on a firm path to success at present, and
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses about that. In
that regard, the written testimony of the Chair of the
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, ASAP, Admiral Dyer, is
illuminating. While his prose is cautious and understated, it
is hard not to read the concern couched in such statements as,
and I quote, ``Lacking an independent cost estimate, we are
uncertain as to affordability,'' and continuing the quote,
``However, we arrive at this point in time with designs that
are maturing before requirements, and where government and
industry have not yet agreed on how winning designs will be
accepted and certified. We worry that the cart is ahead of the
horse,'' and he continued, ``NASA is just now undertaking to
determine how systems will be certified to transport NASA
astronauts. This timing increases programmatic risk and has
serious potential to impact safety.''
And so to that, I would add some of my own concerns, namely
that not only do we not have an independent cost assessment to
guide our Congressional deliberations, we don't have
independent assessment of when these commercial systems will
actually be able to start operational service to the
International Space Station. NASA is saying ``in the 2017
timeframe'' in Mr. Gerstenmaier's testimony, and even 2018 in
one of its notional planning charts, and I would note that both
of those dates are within just a few years of the currently
scheduled end of Space Station operations and years later than
originally promised. Moreover, both of those dates appear to be
based on assumed funding levels for the Commercial Crew Program
that don't seem to bear much resemblance to what Congress has
authorized or appropriated so far, or is likely to approve in
the foreseeable future. If that is true, then I think we need
NASA to give us a cost and schedule estimate that is based on
more realistic budgetary assumptions, so we can see what is
most likely to actually happen, something we require for all
other NASA major programs.
In addition, NASA still has not given Congress a clear
understanding of how much it will cost to fly our astronauts on
these commercial systems. It is reported that NASA has had an
independent assessment that estimates that NASA's commercial
crew seats are likely to be several times as high as Soyuz
costs. If that is true, and I want to know whether it is true,
we need to know.
And finally, as alluded to in Admiral Dyer's testimony,
NASA's latest approach to acquiring those commercial crew
systems is, to put it charitably, ``complex and unique.''
Trying to run Space Act Agreements in parallel to FAR-based
contracts may be a workaround, as the ASAP testimony phrases
it, but that begs the question of why NASA didn't just stick to
its original plan for FAR-based contracting.
So we have much to talk about today. And as I close, I want
you to know how much I appreciate the service that is rendered
to this Committee and to the Nation on a continuing basis by
the gentlemen appearing before us today. Both of you really
have difficult jobs, and we appreciate your efforts, and thank
you very much.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Edwards follows:]

Prepared Statement of Represenative Donna F. Edwards

Good morning, and welcome to our witnesses. I look forward to your
testimony.
As my colleagues know, I am a strong supporter of NASA, both its
science programs and its human spaceflight activities. I also am keenly
interested in and excited by the entrepreneurial energy being devoted
to human spaceflight these days. The passion of those working on
commercial approaches to human spaceflight is infectious--and as I've
said before, I'd love to fly into space myself someday!
That said, in my capacity as a Member of this oversight Committee,
I have a responsibility to scrutinize each of NASA's major projects to
make sure that they are well planned and executable. NASA's commercial
crew program has to be subjected to that same level of oversight if we
are doing our jobs on this Committee.
In that regard, I have to say that I am concerned that NASA is not
holding that program to the same standard as its other major
acquisitions. And make no mistake--this is a major acquisition for
NASA. When the taxpayer is paying on average nine out of every ten
dollars being spent to develop these commercial crew vehicles, we are
not talking about a straightforward purchase of commercial services
from the GSA list--these services don't even exist yet.
That said, I am puzzled and a bit frustrated that NASA appears to
be unable or unwilling to acknowledge the warning signs that this major
program is not on a firm path to success at present. In that regard,
the written testimony of the Chair of the Aerospace Advisory Panel
(ASAP), Admiral Dyer, is illuminating. While his prose is cautious and
understated, it is hard not to read the concern couched in such
statements as:

``Lacking an independent cost estimate, we are uncertain as to
affordability.''

``However, we arrive at this point in time with designs that are
maturing before requirements, and where government and industry have
not yet agreed on how winning designs will be accepted and certified.
We worry that the cart is ahead of the horse,'' and

``NASA is just now undertaking to determine how systems will be
certified to transport NASA astronauts. This timing increases
programmatic risk and has serious potential to impact safety.''

To that I would add some of my own concerns, namely that not only
do we not have an independent cost assessment to guide our
congressional deliberations, we don't have any independent assessment
of when these commercial systems will actually be able to start
operational service to the International Space Station. NASA is saying
``in the 2017 timeframe'' in Mr. Gerstenmaier's testimony and even 2018
in one of its notional planning charts--and I would note that both of
those dates are within just a few years of the currently scheduled end
of Space Station operations--and years later than originally promised.
Moreover, both of those dates appear to be based on assumed funding
levels for the commercial crew program that don't seem to bear much
resemblance to what Congress has authorized or appropriated so far, or
is likely to approve in the foreseeable future. If that's true, then I
think we need NASA to give us a cost and schedule estimate that is
based on more realistic budgetary assumptions, so we can see what is
most likely to actually happen--something we require for all of NASA's
other major programs.
In addition, NASA still has not given Congress a clear
understanding of how much it will cost to fly our astronauts on these
commercial systems. It is reported that NASA has had independent
assessments that estimate that NASA's commercial crew seat costs are
likely to be several times as high as Soyuz costs. Is that true? We
need to know.
And finally, as alluded to in Admiral Dyer's testimony, NASA's
latest approach to acquiring these commercial crew systems is, to put
it charitably, ``complex and unique.'' Trying to run Space Act
Agreements in parallel to FAR-based contracts may be a ``workaround,''
as the ASAP testimony phrases it, but that begs the question of why
NASA didn't just stick to its original plan for FAR-based contracting.
Well, we have much to talk about today. As I close though, I would
like to say that I deeply appreciate the service rendered to this
Committee and to the nation on a continuing basis by the two gentlemen
appearing before us today. You both have very hard jobs, and we
appreciate your efforts.
Thank you, and with that I yield back the balance of my time.

Chairman Hall. The gentlelady yields back.
If there are Members who wish to submit additional opening
statements, your statements will be added to the record at this
point.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Johnson follows:]

Prepared Statement of Ranking Member Eddie Bernice Johnson

Good morning. I would like to join Chairman Hall in welcoming our
witnesses to today's hearing. You both have served the nation well in a
number of capacities over the years, and we appreciate your dedication.
I will try to be brief in my opening comments. It was a little less
than a year ago that this Committee held its most recent hearing on
NASA's commercial crew program. At that time, I raised a number of
concerns and questions that I believe Congress needed to have addressed
if we were to adequately pass judgment on NASA's plans and protect the
interests of the taxpayer. A year later most of those questions and
concerns remain.
I had hoped that in the intervening time, NASA would either
converge on a realistic and executable plan within likely funding
levels that could provide safe, affordable, and timely commercial crew
transportation services to the International Space Station--or
alternatively, determine that it couldn't do so with a high likelihood
of success within the available funding and then look for other ways of
meeting its crew transportation needs.

Unfortunately, NASA has done neither.

Instead of converging on an executable plan, NASA has shifted its
acquisition approach multiple times and now is proposing to carry out
two distinct acquisition approaches in parallel. It has persisted in
basing its program on budgetary assumptions that appear to be
unrealistic based on both the authorizations and appropriations
provided to date and the fiscal outlook facing the agency. And it still
does not appear to have achieved a consensus within the agency on
whether the primary purpose of the program is to provide crew transport
to the ISS as soon as possible or to attempt to create a new commercial
crew industry that doesn't currently exist.
While I hope that I am wrong, those don't appear to be the
characteristics of a program that is headed in a successful direction.
And I see other symptoms of a program in trouble. First, despite
repeated requests by this Committee and concerns voiced by the
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, NASA still has not had an independent
cost and schedule assessment conducted for the commercial crew program,
so we still do not know what the ultimate cost to the American taxpayer
is likely to be, or when these systems are likely to become
operational.
Second, while a number of Members have supported the program
because they do not like the idea of paying the Russians to transport
our astronauts to the ISS, NASA has been unable to provide any evidence
to indicate that the cost per seat to NASA will be any lower than the
costs it incurs with the Russians. Instead, a number of the analyses
done for NASA to date indicate that NASA's cost per seat from
commercial providers could be several times higher than the prices
charged by the Russians.
Third, while one of NASA's stated goals for its commercial crew
program is ``Achieving significant industry financial investment,''
based on Committee staff calculations the recently awarded Space Act
Agreements demonstrate that the companies selected are only willing to
contribute an average of just 11% of the cost of developing the
commercial crew systems-systems that the government will then also have
to pay to use. I'm not sure I can explain to my constituents why they
should consider that a fair arrangement.
Finally, although I think most Members believe the primary
justification for the commercial crew program is to provide crew
transportation to the ISS as soon as possible, NASA's own planning
charts now show operational commercial crew transportation services to
the ISS not starting until 2018-not the 2015 or 2016 dates agency
officials were originally predicting-and only two years from the
currently scheduled end of the Space Station program. Even that 2018
date appears to be based on funding levels from here on out that are
not likely to be achieved.
Well, I'm sorry that I can't give a more positive assessment today.
I really am excited by the work that the companies have done to date,
and I certainly wish them well. However, as I said at last year's
hearing, I can't let my enthusiasm for entrepreneurship override my
responsibility to take a clearheaded look at NASA's plans. I owe that
to my constituents and to all of the American taxpayers.
I will just close by again thanking our witnesses, and I look
forward to your testimony. With that, I yield back the balance of my
time.
Chairman Hall. At this time I am honored to get to
introduce the panel of witnesses. Our first witness is Mr.
William H. Gerstenmaier, a very capable Associate Administrator
of Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate at the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Mr. Gerstenmaier
began his career at NASA in 1977 after graduating from Purdue
University with a bachelor of science degree in aeronautical
engineering. He has been before this Committee on many
occasions. We have sought his advice. He has always been
generous with it. During his tenure at NASA, he has led a
number of activities associated with the shuttle, International
Space Station and the shuttle Mir. Mr. Gerstenmaier has
received a number of awards at NASA including the Presidential
Rank Award for Meritorious Executives, and I welcome you once
again, Mr. Gerstenmaier.
Our second witness is retired U.S. Navy Vice Admiral Joseph
W. Dyer, Chairman of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel.
Admiral Dyer served a long and distinguished career in the
United States Navy. He received his wings in 1971. He
progressed through the ranks, eventually obtaining the position
of Chief Test Pilot and Program Manager for the F-18 program,
and from 2000 to 2003 served as Commander of the Naval Air
Systems Command. Today he is a Senior Executive with the iRobot
Corporation. Welcome, Admiral Dyer. We are very delighted to
have you with us here today.
As our witnesses should know, spoken testimony is limited
to five minutes after which the members of the Committee will
have five minutes each to ask questions. We will be generous
with that with the value of your presentation here and your
gift of your time, getting ready to come here and testify.
I now recognize the witness's to present their testimony.
Mr. Gerstenmaier, you are recognized for five minutes, sir, to
present your testimony.

STATEMENT OF MR. WILLIAM H. GERSTENMAIER,

ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR, HUMAN EXPLORATION AND

OPERATIONS MISSION DIRECTORATE,

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION

Mr. Gerstenmaier. Thank you.
I had the privilege of working with the teams that are
developing and operating the systems that support human
spaceflight. The teams take this responsibility very seriously.
This is a tremendous responsibility and honor. These teams are
doing their best to deliver and operate systems in efficient,
effective, safe and cost-effective manners. The teams also
recognize the sacrifices made by this Nation to provide NASA
the funds necessary to pursue these endeavors. The teams
believe the sacrifices made by the Nation will enable a better
future.
Sometimes folks like to talk about our development
activities, commercial and traditional, as separate, unrelated
activities. There have been two hearings this week, one on
examining NASA's development of the Space Launch System and
Orion crew capsule, and today's hearing, ``Recent Developments
in NASA's Commercial Crew Acquisition Strategy.'' I look at
these as related activities and both in support of human
spaceflight. The Commercial Crew Program is important to the
International Space Station program. We need redundant crew
transportation and rescue capability as soon as possible. We
need to back up crew transportation for this remarkable
facility, the International Space Station. We have similar
redundancy in cargo. We have different providers for cargo, and
we need the same for crew. We need a very different system to
enable exploration beyond low-Earth orbit, that is, for SLS and
Orion. It has different technical capabilities.
The current budget environment is making developing two
systems, crew for ISS and the SLS-Orion for beyond low-Earth
orbit a challenge. Both of these programs are needed for a
human spaceflight program. We need to look at these programs
supporting each other and ultimately the human spaceflight
program for the Nation. The human spaceflight program in
combination with NASA's scientific robotic exploration program
is providing a motivation for innovation, creativity and
provides the Nation a chance to inspire students to pursue
technical careers.
My written testimony covers many of the recent events in
Commercial Crew Program. We recently have made the Commercial
Crew Integrated Capability Space Act Awards. The teams have
completed requirement development for crew transportation. We
have developed an overall strategy that uses Space Act and
contracts. This strategy is outlined in a white paper that is
publicly available. Two days ago, we put out a request for
proposal for the first phase of the contract that will develop
crew transportation for ISS. This is the first award of the
first phase of a two-phase contract that we intend to award in
February of 2013. We are still finalizing the details of our
overall strategy in the outyears.
And then we also put a white paper that describes our
approach to certifying the designs for crew transportation, and
this white paper is not to be confused with the white paper on
acquisition strategy. This white paper talks about how we are
going to actually certify the designs and how we maintain
waivers, et cetera, and ensure the safety of the requirements
that are in place, and we are looking for comments to this
white paper that was recently released.
We have listened to many outside expert advisors and built
a sound strategy to deliver capability for this Nation in a
cost-effective and safe manner. The approach to this program is
different than past programs but shares many similarities. We
have learned from previous activities and are putting that
learning to work. We are also taking lessons from the
commercial crew and applying those back to SLS and Orion. I am
sure we will learn more as we progress. We are innovating as
best that we can. It will not be easy developing a system to
safety carry crew to he ISS. The teams have made tremendous
progress in the last year. We still have many challenges ahead
understanding the fiscal year 2013 budget, completing phase one
awards for the certification acquisition, monitoring progress
of our commercial providers as they head towards a critical
design review level of maturity, and refining the outyear
acquisition strategy. We will listen to the outside advisors
and take their advice into consideration.
I continue to watch the NASA team deliver programs and
products that others thought impossible. With proper support
from all of us, the NASA team will deliver a safe U.S. crew
transportation system for the ISS.
I look forward to your questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gerstenmaier follows:]

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Chairman Hall. Thank you.
I recognize Admiral Dyer to present his testimony.

STATEMENT OF VICE ADMIRAL JOSEPH W. DYER,

U.S. NAVY (RETIRED),

CHAIRMAN OF THE AEROSPACE SAFETY ADVISORY PANEL

Admiral Dyer. Thank you, Chairman Hall, distinguished
members of the panel. Thank you for the opportunity to appear
before you today.
As requested, I will present the ASAP's perspective
regarding NASA's current acquisition approach for the
Commercial Transportation System. As noted in our 2011 annual
report, the Commercial Crew Program remains an important topic
for the ASAP. We have closely followed the program and its
progress and its acquisition strategy.
Sir, my outline for remarks today are how high should the
bar be set with regard to safety, the certification contracts,
a big step forward but how will they be administered, this
relationship between the SAA and FAR contracts that Congressman
Edwards addressed, and lastly, clear communications.
Congressman Hall, when I went through this with my wife
last night, it took me seven minutes. She said that wasn't too
bad for a Southerner. I told her you would understand.
In our 2011 report, we addressed the question, and I quote,
``How safe is safe enough?'' The pursuit of great reward often
comes hand in hand with great risk so it has always been with
explorers. The answer to the question must come from a balance
between risk and reward and should reflect a consensus among
the American people, the White House and the Congress. It is
not our purpose or intent to answer the question, how safe is
safe enough. It is instead to point out areas where we believe
the stated requirement may not produce the requisite safety.
Mr. Gerstenmaier's team produced a retrospective review of
the space shuttle safety program and risk with the benefit of
20/20 hindsight. During those genesis days, there was a belief
that the risk of loss to crew was one in a thousand.
Retrospectively, we believe now that it is one in 12. The
design goal or design baseline for commercial space is one in
270 for a specific mission. So we raised the question, are we
raising the bar high enough. That remains to be seen but I know
it is very much on the mind of NASA.
In our submission, sir, we provide a checklist of what we
believe are the six most important items, and as our practice,
we have color-coded them red, yellow, green to reflect what we
believe to be their status.
A solid green and a giant step forward is that NASA has
clearly communicated to the partners-cum-contractors that
certification is a fundamental requirement of transitioning
NASA and transporting astronauts to and from space.
Three elements that we code as yellow, they are
progressing. They are advanced significantly by the
certification contracts but not yet in hand or establishing
solid requirements, promulgating how the agency will verify
those requirements and a validation and verification plan.
Two elements that are red in our mind deal primarily with
the process that contractors shall follow on the path to
certification. Congresswoman Edwards, as you indicated, it is
not yet clear to us how waivers and deviations will be
approved, who is accountable and how the process shall be
administered.
Lastly, both from the Congress's perspective and NASA's
perspective, budget and budget stability are a significant
challenge.
Mr. Chairman, informally, Committee staff has asked, is the
Space Act Agreement appropriate to support the development of
commercial crew transportation capabilities. To date, many
maintain that the freedom and flexibility of an SAA have
enabled creativity and innovation, and it may be delivering
greater value for money. That may be true. However, we arrive
at this point in time with the designs that are maturing before
requirements, where government and industry have not yet agreed
on how winning designs will be accepted and certified.
The current acquisition approach and funded under the SAA
construct is concurrent with a contracted or FAR-based
certification program. It is unique and it is complex. In our
opinion, this approach is a workaround for the requirements and
the communication and challenges implicit in the SAA. It is not
clear yet to the panel how the safety requirements necessary
for certification will flow from the FAR contract to the SAA
partners.
Let me speak specifically to communication, and I would
submit this is my most important message of the morning. In our
travels to Boeing, SpaceX, Orbital Sciences, Sierra Nevada and
Blue Origin, we have heard pros and cons with regard to the
SAA. Flexibility is universally the prime advantage. However,
as the design matures and begins taking shape, partners seek
reassurance that they are on the right track that will lead to
successful certification. They posed specific questions about
what NASA will eventually require of the designs but NASA
interprets that they cannot provide the answers to these SAA
questions, to these questions under the SAA construct. We asker
the partners so in that case what do you do. One contractor
answered by saying ``We look for nonverbal communication, you
know, body language and winks and nods.'' Mr. Chairman, if you
are the congressionally charted panel tasked to watch over
safety, this is not a comfortable communication approach for
requirements.
The FAR-based certification contract has the potential to
overcome this challenge but it is a workaround for the
downsides of Space Act Agreements. Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Dyer follows:]

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Chairman Hall. Admiral, thank you. It was a very good
presentation. You kind of shook your finger in our face there
once. Did you do that to your wife?
Admiral Dyer. She usually does it to me.
Chairman Hall. Good testimony, and we thank you for it.
Don't judge the interest of this Committee by empty chairs
here because November 7th or 6th is coming pretty soon, and we
have just a few working days. Each of them has somewhere to go.
I am not unlike each of them because I have to leave the chair
to go to the Floor for a while and I am going to ask the
Chairman of Space and Aeronautics, the gentleman from
Mississippi, Mr. Palazzo, to take the chair until I get back,
and not to get used to it or don't enjoy it too much.
Mr. Palazzo. [Presiding] I want to echo Chairman Hall's
comments, and thank you again for your solid testimony. I would
also like to remind Members of the Committee, rules limit
questioning to five minutes. The Chair will at this point open
the round of questions. The Chair recognizes himself for five
minutes.
Admiral Dyer, this is going to be directed to you. Many of
us on this Committee lived through the aftermath of the
Columbia accident investigation and remember some of those
lessons. NASA needs clear requirements and good communication
with its companies. Your testimony points out how NASA's
planned approach, where development is funded by SAA concurrent
STET with certification funded by FAR-based contract is
complex, unique, and a workaround for the communications and
requirements that are necessary to ensure safety and NASA's
final certification. If your panel is not comfortable with this
approach, then Congress should not be comfortable either. What
is the worst-case scenario from this process and what keeps the
ASAP up at night?
Admiral Dyer. Well, sir, there are a number of things that
keep us at night, and let me address two uber ones and then I
will home in a little closer. The first worry is frankly that
another administration takes another approach to space program,
as we have seen over the last several Administrations in our
country. If that happens, it is going to be a long way to Mars.
Closer to home, this issue of clarity and focus is important,
we believe, from the ASAP perspective. There are different
leadership perspectives within NASA, and frankly, there is some
lack of clarity that makes the program harder to manage, that
along with the cost estimate that Congressman Edwards mentions.
The agency knows how to build space systems. The agency
knows how to support economic development. But the concurrency
and some uncertainty as to which is prime is making the program
harder to manage. Likewise, the budget lack of a cost estimate
on behalf of NASA and the uncertainty and instability as
funding finds its way to NASA are probably the largest worries.
To get to the bottom perhaps of the question you are asking,
were NASA to run short of funds and in an attempt to deliver
with lesser funds if they were to continue with the Space Act
Agreement and put aside the FAR-based contracts, we think that
would not lead to a good place.
Mr. Palazzo. Admiral Dyer, proponents of NASA's commercial
crew acquisition approach often tout the monetary contributions
of the companies as an example of efficiency in government
contracting, the implication being that the company should have
some skin in the game. Yet as a business leader, I am sure you
understand that companies only lay out money if they believe
they can get it back plus an adequate return on their
investment. Would you comment on how the life cycle costs of
NASA's current approach could lead to higher seat prices to the
government than if standard contracting had been used in the
beginning?
Admiral Dyer. Well, I am an engineer like my friend, Bill
Gerstenmaier, so let me use the technique of let us look at it
in the limits and then decide where we are somewhere in
between. On one end of the continuum, if a company pays the
total bill in and of themselves, then they should have total
freedom and the marketplace should determine the utility but
the buyer in this relationship has only an indirect influence
on what the company designs and delivers if they are doing it
all themselves. Over on the other end of the continuum in a
more classic government, fully government-funded undertaking,
the government has great influence as the buyer. They can
specify what they want and what the system should deliver. We
are on neither one of those continuums. We are somewhere in the
middle with a significant amount of money being paid by the
government, a smaller amount of money being ``skin in the
game,'' as you call it, but the influence in some people's mind
is the inversion of that. Even though there is a small amount
of contractor money in the game, there is tremendous influence
via an SAA.
So let us just for argument's sake say that we are totally
in the middle and everybody is paying 50/50. Does that
represent a good lifecycle cost equation? Well, it does if it
succeeds but it doesn't if it fails.
Mr. Palazzo. Mr. Gerstenmaier, would you like to respond?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. Yes, I would say that I think the
advantage here to the contractors is, they see a market out
there for these vehicles and this capability beyond NASA's
needs so they look at what they are doing with their rocket
development and it can be used for other applications and it
can fly in other areas separate than NASA, so they have a
market beyond us so they are willing to put some development
funding into this activity so they can support that other
activity when it comes about with their capability they are
developing, and that will essentially lower the cost for us in
development.
So what we are doing is, we are essentially allowing them
to take the work that they are doing, the development they are
working on for the launcher, for example. In the case of
SpaceX, that launcher can be used to launch satellites in
another market separate from NASA. That helps them expend or
receive revenue in those other areas, so that is the reason
that they are contributing. Boeing looks at it. They see
another market out there for commercial crew flights to space
and so does Sierra Nevada as well. So they see another market
out there so they are building this capability not only for
NASA but for their own use, so therefore it is appropriate for
them to contribute some portion of the developmental costs to
this activity.
Mr. Palazzo. Thank you.
I now recognize Ms. Edwards for five minutes.
Ms. Edwards. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
gentlemen. I don't know if others heard it, but I have to tell
you, Admiral Dyer, I hear real warning signs coming out of your
testimony and particularly when you talk about proceeding with
designs before you have requirements. I just don't get that.
Mr. Gerstenmaier, does the schedule that you outlined in
your acquisition strategy assume that you will receive the
President's budget request level of $830 million per year for
the remainder of the development program?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. Based on our BPD submit in 2013, it does
from 2014 on. We expect to receive that level of funding.
Ms. Edwards. Do you think that level of funding really
appears likely in the current fiscal environment, and what
would be the impact on your schedule if you get an annual
funding level of $500 million per year?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. Again, where we are for 2013 is, we are
uncertain about the funding level in 2013 because we are
sitting here with a Continuing Resolution so we are held back
basically at the funding level of 2012. We have accommodated
for that funding scenario in 2013 here where we have been
hoping in 2013 we would get somewhere around the Senate level
that has been discussed in some of the bills. We will see what
we get. Then from 2014 on out, we are looking at getting in the
800 level of funding, and as part of the PB14, we will provide
you the details of the cost estimate, the details of the
budgeting that go behind that in an effort to try to get
support for this program that we think is critically important
and we need on the order of the $800 per year in 2014.
Ms. Edwards. I strongly suggest that, especially in this
environment here, to pen an estimate of completion and activity
based on a hope is a real challenge, I think, for the agency.
Admiral Dyer, does NASA's commercial crew budget seem
sufficient to you and what are your considerations as you
answer that question?
Admiral Dyer. NASA of course supports the President's
budget but I will tell you from close and long-term association
with the folks at NASA, they feel they are underfunded. They
feel they are challenged to deliver what they are asked to
accomplish with the funding available. They are being
innovative, and that is good, but I recommended, Mr. Chairman,
in my first appearance before this Committee some years ago
that if I could give NASA and the Congress a single gift, it
would be a good cost estimate.
Ms. Edwards. Can I just ask you then, given that statement,
how is it that in the absence of an independent cost and
schedule estimate can we in Congress know with any level of
confidence what it will get for whatever budget NASA proposes?
Admiral Dyer. Well, that is a challenge. It is an
understanding of what it is going to cost to deliver, number
one. Number two, it is a confident place to stand with the best
of conscience because somewhere along the line of fewer
dollars, longer time, less money, there must be a place where
good conscience says we can't deliver for this. Now, I will
tell you right up front, I have 30 years of association with
Charlie Bolden and the very highest respect for Bill
Gerstenmaier. These folks will not violate good conscience but
we are making it hard for them.
Ms. Edwards. Thank you.
And just as I close, Mr. Gerstenmaier, can you just tell me
why you failed to seek an independent cost assessment and a
schedule for the Commercial Crew Program and isn't it the norm
for all the other NASA major programs to do such?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. We have the basis for our cost estimate
which we have provided to you. It is not a traditional cost
estimate. If you look at what we are doing here, we are
procuring under a hybrid discussion, as we talked about the
Space Act portion and the contract piece. We ask the
contractors as part of the commercial crew integration
capabilities Space Act to give us the cost to go all the way to
a demonstration flight. We now have that cost data available
from those proposals. We are going to take that cost data now
and run it through an independent group to take a look at that
and develop an independent cost estimate based on that data we
received from them and will provide that to you as part of the
President's budget request for 2014. So we will give you the
data associated with what we have got from the contractors or
from the Space Act activities and we will provide that to you
as an independent assessment as we go forward in 2014. And to
be frank, that was as fast as we could get it to you with this
hybrid approach that we were taking.
Ms. Edwards. Thank you, and I yield.
Mr. Palazzo. I now recognize Mr. Smith from Texas for five
minutes.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Gerstenmaier, you have a wonderful reputation for your
technical knowledge and for being a good manager, so I would
like to direct some questions to you. The first one is that I
appreciate the funding constraints that have been mentioned,
but has the White House sent any signals to you to go slow
either on Orion or SLS?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. No, we have received no signals to go
slow on either Orion or SLS.
Mr. Smith. Okay. Next question is, when it comes to NASA
and the target deadline of 2014 for the first test launch of
Orion, what are the odds that NASA will make that 2014
deadline?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. We have very solid plans to have the
Orion capsule ready to support that 2014 test flight. Our plans
now show delivery of that vehicle. It is actually in Florida
undergoing outfitting in Florida. It should be complete and
ready to be turned over to the launch vehicle at the end of
next year, in December of 2013. What we are waiting on is the
launch vehicle. The current launch vehicle availability is
September of 2014, and so pending the launch vehicle, I believe
we will be ready to fly in 2014. But the capsule work is going
very well. We we are working heat-shield problems. We are
working some avionics problems. We are working some parts
problems. That is all normal stuff we do normally. We have got
schedule margin. We will have the vehicle ready to go fly at
the end of 2013. All we need is a launch vehicle.
Mr. Smith. A hundred percent sure?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. I am never a hundred percent sure but we
will be ready before the launch vehicle is ready. That I can
tell you.
Mr. Smith. Great. Another odds question. What are the odds
that Boeing and SpaceX and Sierra Nevada will meet their
scheduled deadlines?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. If you take a look at some of their
proposals or you discuss with them, they show earlier crew
transportation dates than 2017. They think they can be earlier
than those dates. From a NASA perspective, we backed off. We
said it wasn't appropriate to accept their dates. We wanted
some margin in that. So we have done our planning based on a
2017 delivery date, which gives us some margin.
Mr. Smith. So you have every expectation they will meet
their deadlines?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. I think they will be a little bit late
from what they are advertising in their proposals but they will
be there about the time we estimate in 2017.
Mr. Smith. Okay. Thank you for that.
My last question is this. There has been some discussion
about the definition of ``commercial'' as it is applied to
commercial crew and cargo programs. What percentage of the
funding for those programs comes from the private sector and
what percentage of the funding comes form NASA?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. It varies by each one of the participants
in the Space Act the amount, and it is proprietary to the
companies the exact percentage, but there is a contribution by
them. It is smaller in some cases and larger in other cases.
Mr. Smith. Overall, it has been my understanding that 80 or
90 percent of the funding comes from NASA. Is that a ballpark
legitimate figure?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. I would say the majority of the funding
is coming from NASA for this activity.
Mr. Smith. Does that raise any questions about applying the
term ``commercial'' to some of these enterprises or are you
comfortable with that application?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. We could have a long discussion about
what the term ``commercial'' really means. The way I look at it
is, I would not use that term specifically but what we are
doing is, we are getting a contribution from the contractors to
help in this activity because they believe there is another
market out there. If you want to pin the term ``commercial'' on
that, you can pin the term but the facts are what I described.
Mr. Smith. And regardless, we appreciate what they are
doing and their capability as well. Thank you, Mr.
Gerstenmaier.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Palazzo. I now recognize Ms. Bonamici from Oregon for
five minutes.
Ms. Bonamici. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you both for your
testimony and for all you do.
Admiral Dyer, I want to follow up on the issue of how the
role of Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel is shaped based on the
underlying purpose of the commercial crew initiative, and I
know in the past ASAP has written about the need for clarity
and consistency of purpose, and you talked about that in your
testimony. So in ASAP's opinion, is the purpose of the
Commercial Crew Program to develop the commercial space
industry or is to acquire transportation to the International
Space Station?
Admiral Dyer. Well, that is a great question and one that
we have asked and one that is not entirely clear in its answer,
at least to us. Is it economic development, looking back to the
1930s and the role that government played in what became our
aviation industry via the airmail programs or is it
transportation of astronauts to the International Space Station
and to low-Earth orbit. De facto, I think the answer is both,
that NASA is attempting to do both. But part of what we mean by
a lack of clarity is an answer to which is the priority and
which is first function and first focus. Sometimes I think the
administration and leadership of the program is harder because
those priorities seem at least to ebb and flow.
Ms. Bonamici. Thank you. Thank you very much.
And I wanted to ask Mr. Gerstenmaier, the work that NASA
does is very important to everyone in the country, but in the
district I represent in Oregon, it is home to a lot of high-
tech companies in an area known as the Silicon Forest, and
though they may be not directly NASA related, the technology
companies in the district certainly all benefit from the
development of new, innovative solutions that NASA has been
responsible for over the years. So I want to ask about the
development of a domestic alternative to the Russian Soyuz
spacecraft that is currently being used to transport crew
members to the ISS, and apparently you have indicated earlier
this year, I believe in Senate testimony, that the domestic
alternative is expected to reduce costs, and I understand it
may be too early to determine the exact value of that cost
reduction and those savings but will you please discuss what
factors you will be considering in making the eventual
determination and discuss particularly how or whether NASA will
consider the intangible benefits that a domestic alternative
may have, especially in the area of innovation and economic
development. It is a balance, and I wonder if you could suggest
how we can use this acquisition policy to simultaneously
encourage private-sector creativity and innovation but without
diminishing the safety of our astronauts. Thank you.
Mr. Gerstenmaier. You articulated very clearly all the
things we are trading back and forth. We clearly have to keep
safety as number one in this activity and make sure we have a
transportation system that can keep our crew safe, and Admiral
Dyer described pretty clearly what one of the big questions is
how safe is safe enough, and we are going to have to work
collectively to determine that. None of us can do that
individually but we will definitely adhere to safety.
Innovation is very important. Doing things domestically is
also important, to challenge our folks to do things a new way,
to look at using commercial products to look at other ways of
getting crew to space has tremendous advantages to us
domestically here in the United States. We also would like to
get good value. We budgeted at roughly the Soyuz seat price in
the outyears with inflation going forward. We would like to get
lower than that and we will see where the costs come in as we
go through this activity and we get better understanding of
where things move but I think the things you describe are
things that we need to trade across each other. The one that I
think that becomes a line around is safety. At some point we
don't trade beyond that. We need to make sure we get a
capability that will support what we need. Then the next piece
comes in, the cost side. If the costs go extremely high, which
we don't think they will, we think we have a good chance to get
the costs less than Soyuz but if they go high then we need to
trade, are we getting significant benefit on the innovation
side and the domestic production side to make that warranted,
so we will articulate to you to the best of our ability where
we see that information fall out and with you we can help make
those trades that are right for the Nation.
Ms. Bonamici. Thank you very much. I yield back. Thank you,
Mr. Chair.
Mr. Palazzo. I now recognize Mr. Rohrabacher from
California for five minutes.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I am trying to get a feel for what is really going on here,
and first let me ask, this hybrid system that you are talking
about obviously this is not a pure commercial system that we
are working on. Obviously we are heading in that direction.
Perhaps that is why that term is being used. That system was
put in place and it has been utilized this one time for the
supply of the space station. How much did that save us or did
that cost us to utilize that new system rather than the
traditional ways that NASA has been using to resupply the space
station?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. In the case of cargo, I can't give you a
specific number of what we saved, but if you look at the launch
costs and the cargo delivery, it is substantially less by using
the Space Act approach than actually acquiring the services
under a FAR part 12 contract for the actual delivery of the
services. So that has been a significant savings to us.
The thing that we need to consider with crew is, there is
another dimension and that is the safety aspect, and we need to
watch that as it goes forward, but there was a significant
savings by using this approach with cargo.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Right, and a significant savings, and did
you identify that there was a significant greater risk of using
this hybrid system?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. I think that the risk in the case of
cargo was schedule. We got the systems delivered to us later
than we would have desired but we were able to extend the
shuttle with an extra flight that made that risk tolerable to
have that schedule delay acceptable to us overall.
Mr. Rohrabacher. There is a lot of concern being expressed
today about extending a system that has already worked for
cargo and trying to utilize that for crew, and it has already
proven very significantly successful in terms of financially
without really identifiable risk except of the schedule, and
now people are very concerned that we might apply that same
hybrid principle to crew. Now, obviously we are concerned about
the lives of the crew. Let me also--so that is just one
fundamental that I see going on here in this hearing.
And Admiral, you said something in passing that sort of
started me thinking. It is a long way to Mars basically unless
we have this steady--if we can't count on steady funding. Let
me suggest that I think that nobody wants to face the fact that
we can't afford to go to Mars now. The bottom line is, in order
to have steady funding, we are going to have to defund every
other space project that we have. Nobody wants to face that.
Maybe if we are going to provide safety, maybe if we are going
to provide reliability and do this professionally, maybe we
should set our goals to something that we can actually
accomplish within the budgets that are possible without
destroying every other aspect of the space program. I think
that is what is happening here today. That is what we are
really discussing. And I think there is a lot of things that we
can do in space. I think that this hybrid system that we are
talking about now will give way to really a commercial industry
in which we can have people perhaps putting--we have an example
of that from the gentleman in Nevada right now who is building
space systems that they can put up there and inflate, and they
have already actually put one up into space where you have a
space habitat not done by the government, and it just seems to
me that if we are going to be the number one space power, we
have got to have responsible goals in mind.
I went to Neil Armstrong's funeral ceremony yesterday, and
of course, I am of the generation that he was the ultimate hero
of our generation, and I think he will be the ultimate hero of
a thousand years of human history quite frankly, but that
Apollo program, it appears to me that some people want our
entire space program to be based on the structure of Apollo.
They want--and we did that for the moon. I don't think we can
do that for the entire--and expect to accomplish the great
other things that we have to accomplish. We can't do that for
Mars at the expense of what it would take and expect to have
any other kind of space program. We have some very serious
issues that we need to discuss in terms of safety as we move
forward in terms of the way we approach things.
I appreciate both of you today giving us a lot of insights
as to where we are at and how to proceed, so thank you very
much.
Mr. Palazzo. I now recognize Mr. Clarke from Michigan for
five minutes.
Mr. Clarke. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
This question is for both of you gentlemen, and it deals
with the differences between acquisitions through the FAR and
the Space Act Agreements. Specifically, in your opinion, how
would the outcome of the award and the evaluation of this
contract for transportation services be different under the FAR
as compared to granting the money through Space Act Agreements?
How would the outcome of the award and evaluation process be
different?
Admiral Dyer. I will go first and quick and tell you that
the panel doesn't have access or knowledge with regard to
source selection so I am afraid I am no help with that one,
sir.
Mr. Gerstenmaier. I would say that the differences at the
top level are with the Space Act, NASA loses the ability to
direct the contractor exactly how the requirements are done. As
Congressman Edwards talked about, we can see what is happening
in the design but we cannot directly influence the design so we
get a lot of insight into what is happening. We can see how
they are designing the vehicle. We can see how they are putting
it together--Admiral Dyer talked about that--but we cannot give
them positive feedback, is that design good or is that design
not good. We can just listen to the design and be there. In a
contract, we have the direct ability to interact with the
contractor and tell them exactly what we want, the way we want
it and ensure that it meets our requirements. What we are doing
with this hybrid approach is we are letting them have this
freedom to go ahead and design but then we are holding it
almost in parallel as fast as I can. In February of 2013 we
will have a contract in place where we can then have them tell
us whether they want to use alternate standards, they don't
want to build it the way we want to. We can provide direct
feedback to them under this contract. We are going to ask them
how they do hazard reports, how they control the risks
associated with spaceflight. We can provide direct feedback to
them. So what we are trying to do is, we are trying to take the
advantages of a Space Act that allows them to run fast and
quick but then we are in parallel going to put on top of that a
mechanism that we can get some ability to interact with them in
a more formal manner to actually control the design, that we
get something that comes out the other side that we can
actually use. So those are kind of the advantages and
disadvantages. If you did a pure contract, we would be much
more involved and it would be probably a little bit longer
process and a much more costly process if we did just a pure
contract.
Admiral Dyer. Congressman Clarke, just to shirttail on Mr.
Gerstenmaier's comments, NASA is the keeper of our body of
knowledge on how to get systems into space. So to have better
and clearer communications, to overcome that problem that Bill
just voiced is the thing that we think would be most important
as we go forward in any construct in any type contract.
Mr. Clarke. Thank you, gentlemen. I yield back my time.
Mr. Palazzo. I now recognize Mr. Bartlett from Maryland for
five minutes.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you both very much for your testimony
and your service.
I understand that it is now generally conceded that
transportation via this new vehicle could cost several times as
much as going on the Soyuz. Is that correct?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. We don't believe that that is the case.
We have done some kind of worst-case analysis, I would say, to
go ahead and bound the upper limit of the budget, and that is
what you may be referring to where we have some cost estimates
where the seat price is higher than the Soyuz, but then when we
look at what we have got in CCiCap proposals, we look at what
we have done under this new method and we can see various
approaches that get us below essentially what we believe the
Soyuz seat price is. So I think we have seen both. We will
continue to go work those and see where we are, so we see a
range of prices.
Mr. Bartlett. Obviously from a national-pride perspective,
we would rather be riding our own horse. Was there any
discussion up front as to how much we might be willing to pay
in excess cost to make this happen?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. We have not had that discussion in terms
of excess cost. I believe that is still in front of us as we
bring this design a little bit more to maturity.
I think the other piece is, it is not just having our own
horse but I talked about it in my oral a little bit, to have
another way to get to space station with our crews other than
just the Russians is tremendously important. You know, even
when we had the Columbia tragedy, we could not have kept crews
onboard space station. We could have not continued to assemble
space station without the Russians being able to back us up
with transportation. So no matter how good a transportation
system is, for an asset that is critical as the space station
is to get research done and continue to moving forward, we
believe we need an alternate way to get to space station, and
that is what we are doing with our crews and that is what we
are doing here with this activity, this commercial crew
transportation activity.
Mr. Bartlett. I understand our goal for this new asset in
terms of safety is one in 273. Can you tell me what that is for
the Soyuz?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. We don't have an exact number associated
with Soyuz. We have looked at it from a historical standpoint.
We don't have a detailed understanding of the systems design
and the hardware designs but we looked at it and we would say
the Soyuz is equivalent to that but I can't provide to you a
detailed analysis that shows exactly that equivalency, but if
you look at the flight history of the vehicle, the amount of
time they have flown, I would say that in a more qualitative
discussion, you can say they are roughly equivalent.
Mr. Bartlett. I really hate to ask this next question
because I am a scientist and a huge supporter of NASA and human
spaceflight. If the sequester occurs, it would cut defense
about $50 billion next year. Defense is about one-fifth of our
spending. So let us be fair and cut everything a commensurate
amount. That would mean $250 billion next year. That means we
are cutting Medicaid, Medicare, Social Security. These cuts are
considered draconian and impossible but if they occur, the full
$250 billion, that would be somewhere between only one-fourth
and one-fifth of our deficit. Now, if we cannot possibly cut
one-fourth to one-fifth of our deficit, how do we ever get
there? I have 10 kids and 18 grandkids and two great-grandkids.
Obviously it is not going to be business as usual. Obviously we
can't continue doing the same things that we are doing now, and
there is going to have to be a line that we draw: above that we
fund; below that we can't fund. How do we determine where we
put this program, above or below that line?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. No, I am not sure I can even answer that
question. We can talk about our programs. We can talk about the
value of the programs but then it is ultimately up to this body
and a larger body to decide what the right answer is to that
question.
Mr. Bartlett. Admiral?
Admiral Dyer. I really don't have anything to add to Bill's
last comment, sir.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much. I yield back.
Chairman Hall. The Chair recognizes Mr. McNerney, the
gentleman from California.
Mr. McNerney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am glad to see you
back here this morning again.
Mr. Gerstenmaier, let us talk about the Commercial Crew
Program for a little while. Now, is the plan--I understand what
you said earlier that we are not going to completely eliminate
looking at the Soyuz as a backup program but does this
eliminate the use of the Soyuz as our main reliable carrier for
all of our crews or are we going to still rely on the Soyuz
every so often for our transportation?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. Our intent would be to use this U.S.
space carrier for all the transportation to and from ISS.
Mr. McNerney. Thank you. That is good.
Admiral, do you think that the Commercial Crew Program is
receiving more or less scrutiny than the oversight NASA would
receive if there were no private-sector involvement? Do you
think there is more or less scrutiny now?
Admiral Dyer. The essence of the Space Act construct limits
the flow of information and prohibits direction from NASA into
the partners. They are not contractors. ``Partners'' is the
operative word. So I think an honest answer to your question is
that there must be less because this large body of knowledge
that NASA holds is more difficult in its transfer to those that
are building the future space systems.
Mr. McNerney. That isn't the answer I expected. Does that
put us at more risk then in terms of safety for our astronauts?
Admiral Dyer. You know, sir, you can build confidence in
systems that fly in a couple of ways. The first way I will
mention is difficult, expensive and long in coming, and that is
that you just fly it enough or launch it enough to where
statistically you have built the confidence that it is good to
go. That is not a launch or two or three or even ten, but if
you launch enough, you can build confidence that it is solid
and it is ready to go. And frankly, I think that is part of our
confidence in the Soyuz system.
On the other end of the continuum, you can have detailed
knowledge of the design, detailed insight into the build, and
intimate knowledge in the truthfulness of the people. That
comes with the intimacy that in our opinion is difficult to
establish in the Space Act Agreement.
Mr. McNerney. Thank you. I appreciated your earlier
comment, Admiral, that your biggest gift would be an accurate
budget assessment. What do you think the most difficult part of
the budget is? Is there a specific item or is it just too many
uncertainties all up and down the chain?
Admiral Dyer. Mr. Gerstenmaier, I think, spoke to it when
he said this is a different animal. We know how to do a classic
contract, classic FAR-based government procurement. This isn't
one of those for many and perhaps many good reasons. So it is
more difficult but I don't think it is impossible. I will speak
with a little more freedom than I did in my DOD days when I was
sitting in testimony on the Hill and tell you that one of the
things that I like about a solid cost estimate is it gave me a
confident place to stand if it was cogent. They are never
right, by the way. They always evolve. But if it gives you a
cogent place to stand, then I could be supportive and defensive
of the budget that I thought it would take to execute. And then
if that budget was cut, other folks wore some of the
responsibility for reducing the funding to that program, be it
extended schedule, be it increased risk, be it what have you.
But others had to wear some of the responsibility. If you don't
have a cogent cost estimate, you don't have a place to stand
for that conversation.
Mr. McNerney. Thank you for your frank answer, Admiral.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman Hall. All right. The gentleman yields back. The
Chair now recognizes Mr. Brooks, the gentleman from Alabama,
five minutes.
Mr. Brooks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Gerstenmaier
and Admiral Dyer, thank you for your service.
I would like to get into the finances a little bit more. It
is something you all have touched on. And if you could, share
with me what is each Commercial Crew Integrated Capabilities
participant's total private investment, or, in a different way
of approaching it, the percentage of the government commercial
crew award versus the private investment in these programs.
Mr. Gerstenmaier. Again, I can't provide the specifics
because it is proprietary to the companies but it is on the
order of probably 80 percent, 90 percent as we have discussed
government investment. It could be a little soft around those
numbers but it is on that order overall, and it varies from
partner to partner in the Space Act activity.
Mr. Brooks. Is it fair to say then that the private-sector
contribution to the total cost is in the neighborhood of 10 to
20 percent, the inverse of 80 to 90 percent? What is your
degree of confidence that the private sector is contributing
somewhere between 10 and 20 percent, not more, not less?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. I think we have pretty good insight into
what is going on, and we believe that they are contributing on
that order. There is no reason to doubt that they are actually
contributing those portions that we have discussed.
Mr. Brooks. Do you have any data that establishes the
amount, perhaps that you can't share with us today because it
is proprietary?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. I don't have any direct data. You know,
you would typically ask me, do I have a 533, do I have an
accounting sheet, a record formally transmitted from, and I do
not have that, but we see it from evidence of work they are
doing, activities they are doing and other things, so we
indirectly can attest to the numbers that I just talked about.
Mr. Brooks. Thank you. And continuing, Mr. Gerstenmaier, at
a rate of no more than two NASA missions per year, most
analysts conclude that only one provider will ultimately be
needed. If only one provider is selected to provide this
service, how much government funding will have been provided to
the other firms that will not be providing subsequent services
to the United States government?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. If you want a precise number, I can take
it for the record and we can go calculate what that number is,
but there will be funds that will have gone to these other
providers that are not providing a service. The question is, is
the market going to be just ISS or is the market going to be
bigger than ISS. What we hear from these commercial companies
is they believe that there is a market for their spacecraft
that is beyond the government's need. They believe there is a
commercial-sector market for that. So even though one of these
companies may only provide services to NASA for our ISS
activities, the others may have another market to go do that
can be there. Then I have the advantage from the government
side is now I have another contractor that I could go back and
pick up to go provide services later in some future activity if
we decide to extend, for example, space station beyond 2020 and
we need some additional services. It may be someone else in the
market for us to go by. So we are investing in that other
contractor as you described but we potentially get some benefit
if they can generate a market on their own.
Mr. Brooks. That underlying premise in the question was
that there would only ultimately be one provider needed to do
the two-plus or minus NASA missions a year. Is that an accurate
premise?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. I believe that is where we are looking
for the actual services flight we are looking at potentially we
say likely one provider in that region. I think the other
reason we want to carry multiple providers earlier is, it
provides a competition across those providers which keeps them
meeting NASA requirements, it keeps them wanting to invest
their own funding in this activity so that avenue of
competition up front also gives us some pretty strong benefits
to help us get a good price coming out the end, even though we
may ultimately down-select to just one contractor or one--yeah,
one contractor.
Mr. Brooks. In the Committee notes for this hearing, it
states, ``On August 3, 2012, NASA ordered Space Act Agreements
to three different companies with a combined value of $1.113
billion. Boeing will receive $460 million, SpaceX will receive
$440 million and Sierra Nevada will receive $212 million.'' Is
that consistent with your recollection?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. Yes, sir.
Mr. Brooks. And if I do the math correctly, if only one of
these three companies is ultimately going to be providing
services to the United States government, if, for example, that
happens to be Boeing just because they are the ones that are
receiving the most money, that means roughly $650 million would
have been spent on companies for which NASA is not getting any
direct service but we are spending the money on the hope that
some day that competition will lower the cost. Is that a fair
assessment?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. I would add that the benefit of having
competition, it is very difficult at this stage in the
development to pick a winner. If I knew with certainty which
one of those companies could actually come through this process
and deliver a product out the other side, I could pick now. But
at this point in where we are, I want them to continue their
development. I want them to get into tests. I want to see how
their hardware flies. I want to understand whether they have a
safe system or not. And that, I guess the extra cost you
describe, I believe that gives us significant benefit that it
gives me an opportunity to select another provider if I see one
system is safer than another. It gives me an option to move
forward. So even though there is an extra cost, I believe there
is a significant benefit to us, not monetarily but from a
capability standpoint and from a safety standpoint of carrying
multiple providers at this phase.
Mr. Brooks. Thank you, Mr. Gerstenmaier, for sharing your
insight on why we are doing what we are doing.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the additional minute.
Chairman Hall. Thank you, sir.
I will recognize Mr. Hultgren of Illinois for five minutes.
Mr. Hultgren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Gerstenmaier, NASA's acquisition plan includes a costly
phase, and I think it is about $4.5 billion of optional
milestones. I wondered, would these optional milestones if
selected; using Space Act Agreements or Federal Acquisition
Regulations, so SAA or FAR?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. They are only available for us to
exercise under the Space Act and they are only--and we have the
ability to exercise them one at a time. So we don't need to
pick up the entire phase. We could do those one at a time but
they would be under a Space Act.
Mr. Hultgren. Do you know, do the companies expect the
optional milestones are part of the certification path?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. I think you would have to ask the
companies. I don't anticipate using those in the certification
activity. We believe we are going to move to this certification
products contract phase one followed by a phase two as shown in
the white paper. We may choose to implement one or two of those
milestones but we will be careful about which ones of those we
choose and we will make sure they are justified and understood
and they provide significant value back to the U.S. government.
Mr. Hultgren. So your expectation from NASA's point of view
is that they wouldn't be used, or if they are used, there would
be very minimal usage. Is that right?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. I would say selective. We will use those
if we selectively see some significant advantage to us to pick
up one of those milestones or two of those milestones in that
period.
Mr. Hultgren. Admiral Dyer, from your perspective on the
safety advisor panel, what are the pitfalls do you think of
this process?
Admiral Dyer. I don't know that there are any that I
haven't mentioned in terms of communications, et cetera, et
cetera. It does touch on that what keeps you at night worry,
though, and that is, there is tremendous pressure in any
government agency and any government program to force fit the
job to be done into the money available. So if money does run
short, we worry that there may be an attempt to certify not via
a FAR contract but via the Space Act agreements perhaps with a
very limited demonstration of safety without the insight. That
wouldn't be a good thing.
Mr. Hultgren. Mr. Gerstenmaier, you mentioned kind of what
your thoughts or expectations would be as far as the optional
milestones go. I wonder would they really only become
affordable if the Commercial Crew Program is funded at a higher
level than it receives today?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. As we project forward in our budget
submit for 2013, you know, we are looking for $829 million or
so in fiscal year 2014, we think we need those funding levels.
It is not clear that a funding level would directly tie to
these milestones, in other words, if we had more funding, would
we implement these milestones? I would look at it more from a
technical benefit standpoint, does this provide an ability to
advance or to get more safety insight, does this give us an
additional test that is critical to us. So it is kind of a--I
don't know. We would look at them and evaluate whether it makes
sense, so it is not tied to the overall funding level whether
we would implement those optional milestones or not.
Mr. Hultgren. If I can change direction just a little bit,
while not directly related to today's hearing, I wondered, Mr.
Gerstenmaier, if you could comment briefly on the current state
of the J-2X engine?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. The J-2X is doing extremely well down in
Stennis. We fired that engine for, I believe, up to 19 minutes,
which is one of the longest firings we have had in any liquid-
engine test program. It is meeting all its milestones, all its
performance activities. It is proceeding extremely well down in
Stennis.
Mr. Hultgren. I wonder if there any threat of money being
redirected away from J-2X development toward some of these
other programs?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. Again, we need to look at the overall
needs of the program of what the right approach is as we move
forward for the heavy-lift launch vehicle. The upper stage
clearly needs this J-2X engine if we are going to get into 130-
metric-ton region. We can also get in that same lift capability
by changing the boosters on the side of the SLS. We have an
advanced booster contract to go take a look at that to see
other liquid systems that may go on the side. So we are
actively trading those back and forth. We may slow down the
testing a little bit on J-2X if we think that gets us to a
faster capability for SLS or we may keep it right at the same
path we are on right now, but the intent is, I want to take J-
2X until we have that system fully wrung out and ready to be an
operable system for the future.
Mr. Hultgren. Well, I see my time has just about run out.
Thank you both. Thank you, Chairman. I yield back.
Chairman Hall. I thank you.
The Chair recognizes Ms. Adams, the gentlelady from
Florida, for five minutes.
Mrs. Adams. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Gerstenmaier, can you describe the working relationship
that NASA has with the CCiCap companies and how that
relationship helps NASA guide the development of these new
vehicles, especially since our biggest concern is that NASA
does not have the authority to impose safety requirements at
this stage in the development?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. We have teams located at each one of the
CCiCap providers. Those teams get insight into the daily
activities and the design that is occurring and the work that
is occurring on those designs as they are moving forward.
Mrs. Adams. Are you having open dialog with CCiCap?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. We have full insight into what they are
doing and what activity is going on. We don't have the control
side but we have full insight into what they are doing.
Mrs. Adams. So you don't have a conversation back and
forth?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. I think that is probably a fair way of
saying it.
Mrs. Adams. I want to talk about the cost of Atlas V
rockets. The price of an Atlas has skyrocketed under the
evolved expendable launch vehicle administered under the Air
Force. My understanding is that the Commercial Crew Program
will greatly lower the cost of crew launch for our Nation.
However, NASA has selected two proposals that are using Atlas V
vehicles. Is NASA somehow getting a cheaper price than the Air
Force is getting? NASA paid over $220 million per launch for
the Atlas V rocket for the GOES-R and GOES-S missions. Is the
cost similar to what we paid under the Commercial Crew Program,
or what will be paid under Commercial Crew?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. What we are doing under the Commercial
Crew Program is, we are getting integrated service, which is
transportation of crew to the ISS. It is then up to the
commercial crew providers to negotiate with United Launch
Alliance for the cost of the rockets that you described over
the cost of the Atlas V. That is internal to their contract.
What I am looking for is a total cost on the other side, and it
would be best for you to talk to the individual CCiCap
providers to get their insight into what their relationship is
with United Launch Alliance.
Mrs. Adams. Okay. Do you believe it will be more cost-
effective than what the U.S. Air Force is doing?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. I don't have insight into that. I know
what the seat price is on the other side or the anticipated
seat price, and there needs to be some efficiency there. It
does help in the sense that it is helping throughput through
the system and that helps lower some of the marginal costs
which could potentially benefit both sides. It could
potentially also lower costs for other satellite providers as
well as for us.
Mrs. Adams. If NASA receives level funding on the order of
$500, $525 million over the next several years for Commercial
Crew? Does the acquisition plan hold together; will you get the
services agreement sometime in 2017?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. As part of our budget submit, we will go
look at some alternate funding scenarios and show you what is
available at those various funding levels. I don't have that
information, or I am not prepared to talk about it today.
Mrs. Adams. So you can't talk about whether you think you
will get to a service agreement by some time in 2017?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. Well, I think it would be better for us
to take that for the record and then go ahead and actually put
the numbers together and show you where it is as part of our
PB14 activity.
Mrs. Adams. Okay. In the plan presented today, what would
NASA reduce, eliminate or extend if the program is flat-funded?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. Say the question again. In terms of----
Mrs. Adams. In the plan presented today, in the plan
presented today, what would NASA reduce, eliminate or extend if
the program is flat-funded?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. Again, what we would do is, we would go
look and see what our options are. If we say flat-funded, we
would look into extension, we would look at other alternate
activities. What we need to be cognizant of is what Admiral
Dyer talked about, if I get a certain funding, we need to go
take a hard look at this and say is this something we can
actually deliver.
Mrs. Adams. Are you not having contingency plans?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. We have contingency plans but not of the
level that you just described because I am still struggling
with exactly what my fiscal year 2013 budget is. Is it 406,
which it was back in 2012, or is it the Senate or the House
version that sits out in front of us.
Mrs. Adams. Go back to the awards. If they were made under
the FAR-based selection process, how would the decision process
be different?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. We followed a pretty rigorous process to
do these funded Space Act awards. It didn't fall under the
exact definition of the FAR activity. It has certain
constraints. But the spirit and the intent of what we did in
our reviews, the way we did our deliberations, the way I set up
the teams, the way we did the evaluations, the way we did the
criteria is all consistent with what the FAR was but we didn't
follow the exact letter of the law of the FAR.
Mrs. Adams. But it is very close?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. It is very close.
Mrs. Adams. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I will yield back.
Chairman Hall. The gentlelady yields back.
I think we are about out of soap here. We are going to have
to quit washing pretty soon.
Mr. Gerstenmaier, I didn't get to have a question, but as I
came back in, you were talking about how the Russians had
supported the space station after the Columbia accident, and I
guess my question is, how much can we rely on the Russians to
supply Soyuz after 2016 even if NASA is no longer a customer
there? It is my understanding we are paying them something in
excess of $50 million now and by then it will be around $62
million.
Mr. Gerstenmaier. Again, as we----
Chairman Hall. We are no longer buying seats unless we are.
Mr. Gerstenmaier. We intend once we get our capability we
would no longer purchase seats from the Russians. We have a
problem in July 1 of 2016. We have the Iran-North Korea-Syria
Nonproliferation Act which prohibits us from providing funding
or even bartering for capability from the ISS. We are going to
need some relaxation in that Act to continue to operate the
space station with the Russians. So we could not--we are
prohibited now from buying seats beyond that July 2016 date
with the Russians currently. We anticipate that some
legislation will get approved in the next year that may help us
with that current problem.
Chairman Hall. Okay. I think that answers the question I
had.
Ms. Edwards had a brief question to close on.
Ms. Edwards. Thank you.
Chairman Hall. Your time is up.
Ms. Edwards. I just adore him.
Chairman Hall. Go ahead.
Ms. Edwards. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Just to follow up on that, in terms of--so you will be
seeking a waiver then for INKSNA, and if that is true, do you
actually have a legislative proposal? Because presumably that
would need to happen at the end of 2012 or early next year,
right?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. We need it in the spring of next year,
and we have been working with several folks and working
internal to the Administration to get a proposal to come
forward.
Ms. Edwards. Thank you. Mr. Gerstenmaier, it would just be
really helpful to have that, especially if you look at our
calendar this year and early next year. It would be helpful if
we had something to bounce off of. Thank you.
Chairman Hall. Thank you for your brevity.
Now, the questions are completed, I presume. We have no one
else. I want to thank the witnesses for their very valuable
testimony, and if the Committee--any members of the Committee
who are not here who have other business here have questions
for you, we will submit them to you and would really appreciate
your being able to answer them to us in writing. They will be
submitted in writing, and we will keep the record open for two
weeks for additional comments from other members.
We thank you again over and over for your testimony and for
your time, and you are excused. This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:03 a.m., the Committee was adjourned.]

Appendix I

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Answers to Post-Hearing Questions

Responses by Mr. William H. Gerstenmaier

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Responses by Vice Admiral Joseph W. Dyer, USN (Ret.)

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Appendix II

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Additional Material for the Record

Submitted Statement for the Record by Representative Jerry Costello

Chairman Hall, thank you for holding this important hearing.
I was encouraged by SpaceX's successful cargo demonstration last
May and am looking forward to its upcoming launch of an operational
cargo flight to the International Space Station (ISS) in October. I
hope that Orbital Sciences will likewise be successful.
While these milestones should be commended, it is important to note
that crewed flights are a lot more difficult than cargo flights. As
commercial crew development advances, I am concerned with NASA's
reversal in its commercial crew acquisition strategy--using Space Act
Agreements (SAA), instead of Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR)-
based contracts for design activities and its possible affect on
astronaut safety, which is of paramount importance.
Last year, NASA expressed to this committee that adherence to
NASA's safety requirements could not be assured without using FAR-based
contracts. NASA said that the risk of commercial partners' inability to
meet its human-rating requirements could cause costly and time-
consuming redesigns and pose safety concerns, thus requiring NASA to be
more involved in the development of any commercial transportation
system. As a result, NASA said Space Act Agreements could not be used.
Because NASA has since reversed itself by going back to using SAAs,
I am eager to hear from our panel of experts on what this committee can
expect going forward, whether astronaut safety is being compromised,
and whether we can be assured that taxpayer funds are being spent
wisely.
Mr. Chairman, I want to take a moment to recognize the loss of two
American icons. Neil Armstrong and Sally Ride reminded us of the sheer
ingenuity of the American public and the limitless possibilities
available when Americans come together toward a common goal.
As his last hearing before this Committee, Mr. Armstrong cautioned
that ``NASA, with insufficient resources, struggles to fulfill the
directives of the Administration and the mandates of the Congress. The
result is a fractious process that satisfies neither.'' Acknowledging
that progress is rapid and unstoppable in a technology-driven world he
also said ``Our choices are to lead, try to keep up, or get out of the
way. A lead, however earnestly and expensively won, once lost, is very
difficult and expensive to regain.''
Their achievements, counsel and wisdom on space exploration speak
to the importance of maintaining American preeminence in space flight
and ensuring that NASA is adequately funded to meet future challenges.
Doing so would be a fitting way of honoring their courage,
commitment, dedication, and exceptional accomplishments while
maintaining American leadership in space exploration.