[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

ASSESSING U.S. POLICY ON PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IN AFRICA

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HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH,
AND HUMAN RIGHTS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

__________

SEPTEMBER 13, 2012

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Serial No. 112-186

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Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
DAN BURTON, Indiana GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
ELTON GALLEGLY, California ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DANA ROHRABACHER, California Samoa
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois BRAD SHERMAN, California
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
RON PAUL, Texas RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
MIKE PENCE, Indiana ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
CONNIE MACK, Florida THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
TED POE, Texas ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania
GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut
JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio FREDERICA WILSON, Florida
BILL JOHNSON, Ohio KAREN BASS, California
DAVID RIVERA, Florida WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina
ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York
RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina
ROBERT TURNER, New York
Yleem D.S. Poblete, Staff Director
Richard J. Kessler, Democratic Staff Director
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Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, Chairman
JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska KAREN BASS, California
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York THEODORE E. DEUTCH,
ROBERT TURNER, New York FloridaAs of 6/19/
12 deg.

C O N T E N T S

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Page

WITNESSES

The Honorable Johnnie Carson, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of
African Affairs, U.S. Department of State...................... 5
The Honorable Esther Brimmer, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of
International Organization Affairs, U.S. Department of State... 20

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING

The Honorable Johnnie Carson: Prepared statement................. 8
The Honorable Esther Brimmer: Prepared statement................. 23
The Honorable Christopher H. Smith, a Representative in Congress
from the State of New Jersey, and chairman, Subcommittee on
Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights:
Report to Congress on United Nations Efforts to Prevent
Trafficking in Persons and Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in
UN Peacekeeping Missions..................................... 60
Sexual Exploitation and Abuse.................................. 68

APPENDIX

Hearing notice................................................... 72
Hearing minutes.................................................. 73
Written response from the Honorable Esther Brimmer to question
submitted for the record by the Honorable Christopher H. Smith. 74

ASSESSING U.S. POLICY ON PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IN AFRICA

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THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 13, 2012

House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health,
and Human Rights,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3 o'clock
p.m., in room 2200 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon.
Christopher H. Smith (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Smith. The subcommittee will come to order, and good
afternoon. And let me first apologize for being a bit late. We
did have votes and then all of us had a little trouble getting
back because there is so much going on the floor, so again I
apologize to you.
Good afternoon. Today's hearing will examine U.S. policy on
international peacekeeping operations in Africa, our material
support, and other support for peacekeeping operations in
African countries.
The U.S. Government contributes more than $1 billion
annually for African peacekeeping, most recently dedicating
$1.6 billion for Fiscal Year 2012. Today's hearing offers an
opportunity to look at how we evaluate the effectiveness of
peacekeeping operations that we support in Africa.
There are several current peacekeeping operations in Africa
encouraged and/or supported by the U.S. Government, and others
are being planned even now. The effectiveness of peacekeeping
operations have been called into question in terms of planning
and execution. This is critical at a time when important
peacekeeping operations in Mali are in the planning stage.
Eventually the length of peacekeeping operations often run into
decades, and new models of peacekeeping operations such as
hybrids will be discussed.
Finally, but also of significant importance, we will be
inquiring as to how well the United Nations is implementing its
zero tolerance policy with respect to human trafficking and
other forms of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeeping
personnel. I personally have chaired seven hearings--that is
seven--that highlighted that issue and other peacekeeping
issues in this, the 112th Congress, alone, most recently a June
29, 2012, hearing on Mali. The Trafficking Victims Protection
Act that I sponsored in 2000, and its reauthorizations, also
contain provisions related to peacekeeping operations including
the prevention of human trafficking by peacekeeping personnel
as part of the minimum standards for the elimination of
trafficking in persons.
Peacekeeping refers to activities that create conditions
favoring lasting peace. However, it is often associated with
other related concepts, peacemaking and peacebuilding.
Peacemaking involves dealing with conflicts in progress and
focuses on diplomatic action to bring hostile parties to a
negotiated settlement. Peacebuilding describes outside
interventions designed to prevent the start or resumption of
violent conflict within a nation by creating a sustainable
peace. As the concept of peacekeeping has evolved, it now
includes all three elements.
The first U.N. peacekeeping mission was in 1948, when a
small, armed observer force was sent to monitor a buffer zone
between Arabs and Israelis in the Middle East. Between then and
the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, there were 18 U.N.
peacekeeping missions. Since 1990, however, the U.N.
peacekeeping has risen to more than 50 missions and the number
of peacekeepers worldwide has grown to nearly 100,000. The
record of success of U.N. peacekeeping missions in Africa has
been mixed. A few of them have been credited as qualified
successes, such as the U.N. mission in Sierra Leone. The U.N.
operation in Cote d'Ivoire also was considered successful but
remains incomplete.
Unfortunately other U.N. operations have not been as
successful. For example, the U.N. mission in Somalia which
operated from 1992 to 1993 is clearly seen as such as a
failure. We all remember the infamous Black Hawk Down incident
in which 18 U.S. soldiers were killed following the shooting
down of an American helicopter. The repercussions of that
disaster have affected the subsequent, I believe, unwillingness
of the U.S. Government to commit U.S. troops to peacekeeping
operations in Africa. And I remember so well, personally, when
Les Aspin came before the Hill and was asked in a pointed way,
why weren't the recommendations by the commanders on the ground
for more capabilities given credence? And he said he didn't
think it would fly in the Congress. We weren't asked. And I
think it would have flown and it would have been supported
robustly, but regrettably it was not. And we now have regional
organizations developing and managing peacekeeping operations,
sometimes in concert with U.N. or sometimes on their own. The
African Union, the Economic Community of West African States,
and even NATO have engaged in peacekeeping operations on the
African continent. The changes in peacekeeping operations in
Africa will have a profound impact on U.S. policy and financial
and other support for such operations.
As I mentioned earlier, sex trafficking and other forms of
sexual exploitation and abuse by U.N. peacekeeping personnel
are issues of serious concern. U.N. peacekeeping missions have
been subject to repeated accusations of sexual exploitation and
abuse of local women and young girls by foreign peacekeepers
since at least 2001. The U.N. claims it has effectively
addressed this problem, but we need to ensure that the blue
helmets that are supposed to instill hope that peace is at hand
don't create fear, abuse, and exploitation by the very
protectors sent to help.
And finally I would say paranthetically to that, we have
held in this subcommittee, three hearings on what was going on
in Democratic Republic of the Congo. I went there and met with
peacekeepers as well many of the women who had been exploited,
and young girls in shelters, and was shocked, frankly, how for
$1 or a loaf of bread, young 13- and 14-year-olds were being
abused by U.N. peacekeepers. I am happy to say that at the
time, Jane Holl Lute, who was then working for the U.N. and who
had pushed hard within the U.N. system for the zero tolerance
policy, made a major difference, and she is now as we all know,
number two over at Department of Homeland Security. So U.S.
leadership there was very robust and very, I think, effective,
but there still is a persistent problem. Kofi Annan, to his
credit, announced a zero tolerance policy, just like George
Bush did for our military and deployments overseas, NATO did
the same thing. But at the time we weren't talking about zero
tolerance, but zero compliance, and perhaps you might want to
speak whether or not there have been real gains made in
ensuring that U.N. and AU peacekeepers are not complicit in any
way.
I would like to yield to my good friend and colleague, Ms.
Bass, the ranking member, for any comments she might have.
Ms. Bass. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and once again of
course, thank you for holding this hearing and for your
leadership on this issue.
I wanted to just take a moment, of course, to offer my
deepest sympathies to our friends from the State Department. I
am sure that both of you knew the Ambassador, and all of us
have been shocked by what occurred, but also what is occurring.
And I know it is not the subject of this hearing, but if there
is some update that you could provide about the status of our
Embassies in Yemen and Tunisia and Egypt, that would be
appreciated.
Today's hearing on peacekeeping operations is timely as we
continue to see a serious need for these missions across the
continent, especially in the Sudans, the Great Lakes region and
in West Africa. It is my hope that today's hearing will not
merely bring to the surface how we further strengthen these
peacekeeping commitments and coordination but that we can
acknowledge the tremendous benefit that peacekeepers play in
preventing and addressing conflict in rapidly changing
environments where there is clearly a need to promote and
sustain peace, stability and security.
I want to offer my appreciation to Ambassador Carson and
Assistant Secretary Brimmer for participating in today's
hearing, and for your steadfast efforts on this and many other
areas that are bettered in no small part to your leadership and
your vision.
The United Nations reports that in 2012 and 2013, the U.N.
peacekeeping operations budget, which just began, is estimated
at $7.23 billion. As we will hear from the witnesses today, I
would appreciate greater clarity on the success of U.S. funds
in supporting peacekeeping efforts across Africa, and in what
ways the Global Peace Operations Initiative, peacekeeping
operations and the contributions for international peacekeeping
account budget requests are coordinated. As we make tough
budget decisions while at the same time see protracted
conflicts across the continent, I certainly don't believe that
now is the time to turn our backs on peacekeeping, particularly
as tensions grow in places like Mali. I am interested in making
sure that with limited resources we spend them effectively to
protect populations in harm's way and promote security toward
greater freedom and lasting peace.
Let me add that U.N. peacekeeping has a long history as was
described by my colleague. The benefits of peacekeeping have
definitely been clear. I will just give one example. A GAO
report notes that U.N. peacekeeping is eight times less
expensive than funding U.S. forces with a similar mandate.
These benefits have also long been recognized by both political
parties. Over the last decade the U.N. Security Council, with
support from both the Bush and Obama administrations,
authorized a nearly three-fold increase in the number of
peacekeeping personnel serving in the field. And the reason for
this of course is clear. U.N. peacekeeping operations are
firmly in America's interest. Countries undergoing conflict
threaten the national and economic security of the U.S., risk
becoming safe havens for terrorists and criminals and often
feature serious problems of human rights abuses and human
deprivation. By allowing the U.S. to share the burden for
addressing these issues it is clear that the success of these
missions is in our long-term interest.
I also wanted to raise, as my colleague did, the sexual
exploitation that we of course believe must continue to be
prioritized, and wanted to know if you would comment on the
assessment of training programs of military and police
personnel, the compliance that Congressman Smith was talking
about. Are the peacekeepers that perpetuate and exploit those
that are charged, actually are they charged and held
accountable? With the implementation of the relatively new
global field support strategy, reforms appear to be underway to
more effectively address the management of global inventories
and logistics. Are you satisfied with these reforms? Are they
hitting their benchmarks? Are the various missions getting the
resources they need to credibly fulfill their mandate?
I also wanted to raise Mali. We talked about Mali before,
but also next week we are going to look at developments and
growing tensions between the DRC and Rwanda, and both of these
provide serious concerns for us. The Mali situation calls for a
peacekeeping force. And secondarily, in the DRC, do you believe
a neutral force to monitor the DRC/Rwanda border is needed, and
would the U.N. mission in DRC be the appropriate force to
undertake such a mission?
Thank you, and I look forward to your testimony.
Mr. Smith. Ms. Bass, thank you very much.
Mr. Turner?
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I wanted to offer my
condolences to the members of State for the loss of your
colleague and some American heroes. I am interested in hearing
what you have to say. Thank you.
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Turner.
I would like to now introduce our very distinguished panel,
beginning first with Ambassador Johnnie Carson, who serves as
Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of African Affairs,
a position he has held since May 2009. Ambassador Carson has a
long and distinguished career in public policy. Over 37 years
in the Foreign Service including time as our Ambassador to
Kenya, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. Ambassador Carson has also served
as the staff director of this subcommittee, so it is always
great to have you here, anytime you want go back to the other
side of the dais--and as a Peace Corps volunteer in Tanzania.
Ambassador Carson is a recipient of numerous prestigious awards
for his service from the U.S. Department of State.
Then we will hear from Dr. Esther Brimmer. She currently
serves as the Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of
International Organization Affairs, a position she has held
since April 2009. Dr. Brimmer previously worked in the State
Department in the Office of Policy Planning, and for the
Undersecretary of Political Affairs where her portfolio
included peacekeeping. Dr. Brimmer has also worked for the
Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, the
Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, here in the
House of Representatives, and with McKinsey & Company, a global
management consulting firm.
Ambassador Carson, the floor is yours.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOHNNIE CARSON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. Carson. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Congresswoman
Bass, Congressman Turner, thank you for the opportunity to
appear today to talk about peacekeeping in Africa. As members
of the committee are aware, President Obama's recent
presidential policy directive identified our efforts to advance
peace and security on the continent as one of the four pillars
of the administration's new Africa strategy. This is an area
where we have witnessed both signifant progress and major
challenges over the past decade. Angola, Mozambique, Burundi,
Rwanda, Liberia, and Sierra Leone have progressed from periods
of prolonged civil conflict to new eras of relative peace and
stability. Nonetheless, this progress remains fragile in many
countries, and all too many states are mired still in serious
conflict including Somalia, the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, Sudan, and South Sudan.
Moreover, as illustrated by the ongoing situation in Mali,
the fragile nature of democratic institutions on the continent
means that even relatively stable countries can quickly unravel
and fall back into conflict.
If we are to assist our African partners in achieving a
more democratic, prosperous and stable Africa, we must address
these conflicts. Conflict destabilizes states and borders,
stifles economic growth and investment and robs young Africans
of opportunity for an education and better life. To address
these conflicts we need well resourced U.N., African Union, and
regional peacekeeping operations.
My colleague, Assistant Secretary Brimmer, will be focusing
on the U.N. element of peacekeeping in Africa, and therefore I
would like to focus my testimony on the efforts of the African
Union and the subregional organizations to develop their own
peacekeeping capacities and to conduct operations in support of
peace and security objectives on the continent. I also want to
discuss U.S. Government efforts to strengthen African
peacekeeping capacity at the regional, subregional, and
national levels.
The founding of the African Union, or AU, in 2002, brought
with it the promise of a more robust African regional
architecture that would one day be capable of addressing and
coordinating responses to the myriad challenges facing the
continent. This newfound promise extended to the area of peace
and security, where the AU set forth a vision for an African
Peace and Security Architecture. Partially modeled after the
United Nations and other regional organizations, this
architecture is designed to enable the African Union to act as
an active and dynamic adjunct to the work of the United Nations
in its mission to maintain international peace and security
including in Africa. The centerpiece of this architecture is
the AU's African Standby Force, which is comprised of five
regional standby brigades ready to respond to a range of
contingencies from providing support to political missions, to
robust military interventions to prevent genocide. The five
brigades are the Economic Community of West African States
Standby Force, the Eastern African Standby Force, the Southern
African Development Community Brigade, the Central African
Multinational Force, and the North African Standby Brigade.
All four sub-Saharan African brigades have taken initial
steps toward becoming operational including setting up
headquarters and identifying pledged units from member states.
They have also participated in a number of multinational
exercises. The North African Standby Brigade has made
considerably less progress than the other four sub-Saharan
brigades. However, none of the brigades is currently capable of
conducting the range of operations contained within the African
Standby Forces mandate without significant and ongoing external
support.
Although the African Standby Force remains a work in
progress, the AU and the subregional organizations like ECOWAS
have not stood idly by in the face of persistent conflict. In
fact, in many cases the African Union and the subregional
organizations have proven to be more responsive than the
broader international community in attempting to address
serious conflicts in Africa quickly. The African Union deployed
its first peacekeeping operation to Burundi in 2003, in support
of the international effort to end the long-running civil war
there. In 2004, the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) was
deployed in response to the horrific conflict gripping Darfur.
Despite the immense challenges and obstructions that faced the
troop contributors in the mission area, AMIS helped to set the
conditions and prepare the ground for the deployment for a
larger and more complex U.N./AU hybrid operation called UNAMID,
which remains deployed in Darfur to this day. The AU
authorized, Tanzanian-led intervention, in the Comoros in 2008
was another example of the region stepping up quickly in
response to a regional security challenge.
Somalia best demonstrates the valuable role that the
African Union can play in terms of regional peacekeeping. The
African Union Mission in Somalia, AMISOM, has now been
operating for 5 years in what has been one of the most volatile
conflict environments in Africa. Over those 5 years, AMISOM,
comprised of troops from Uganda, Burundi, and Kenya, has
gradually extended its area of operations from a small enclave
near the international airport in Mogadishu to encompass all of
Mogadishu and the surrounding towns. It has done so with the
support of the United Nations in the form of a logistic support
package provided through the U.N.
Support Office for AMISOM. AMISOM is now in the process of
deploying to additional regions in southwestern Somalia, and
the recent incorporation of Kenyan forces into AMISOM has
further extended the mission's reach.
We think AMISOM has been a relatively strong success story,
and as many of you know, on Monday of this week the
Transitional Federal Government effectively went out of
business in Mogadishu. And over the past year as a result of
the gains that have been made militarily by AMISOM, we have
seen a new Constitution written and approved. We have seen the
election of a new Parliament of approximately 250 members, half
the size of the old Parliament. We have seen the election of a
new speaker of Parliament, and on Monday we saw the election of
a new President. We expect a prime minister and a cabinet to be
named shortly. None of this would have been possible without
the work of AMISOM.
African subregional organizations have also played an
important role in responding to armed conflicts on the
continent. ECOWAS responded to the crisis in Liberia and Sierra
Leone, and set the stage for the subsequent U.N. action.
The examples I have cited reflect the commitment of the
African Union, the subregional organizations and member states
to undertake and participate in peacekeeping missions across
the continent. However, their participation exposes the
enormous challenges that many African states face. These
challenges are a lack of resources. The African Union and
subregional organizations remain dependent on support from the
donor community for specialized training for transport and
equipment, for logistics, for medical facilities, and even in
some cases for salaries. Sometimes, AU member states also lack
the capacity to undertake the complex mission planning and
management that is required to execute complex multinational
and multiunit operations.
While these challenges are significant and in some
instances systemic, I can assure the committee that we in
Washington and the administration are committed to helping our
African partners to overcome them. Our peacekeeping assistance
programs, which are primarily funded through the Global Peace
Operations Initiative, sometimes called GPOI, and the broader
Account, PKO, focus on addressing the capability gaps of our
African partners as well as strengthening the ability of our
African partners to plan, to train and to deploy and sustain
peacekeeping operations on their own. These deployment support
and capacity-building activities are executed through a close
partnership between the Department of State and the Department
of Defense. We continue to build on these programs and to
expand them out. Should we falter in our commitment to
developing African peacekeeping capacity, the consequences will
be heavier burdens on the international community as a whole,
on the United States and our partners whether through
deployment of more U.N. blue helmet operations or even direct
military interventions in the cases where our own national
security is at stake.
It is clearly in our interest to support U.N. peacekeeping
programs across Africa. It is in our interest to support the
AU's capacity building in this area, and it is in our interest
to support the subregional efforts which are designed to
maintain the peace and prevent greater crises from occurring.
I want to thank the committee again for the opportunity to
address you on this important issue. I have a longer written
statement that has been given to you. I welcome the opportunity
to be here and to take your questions after my colleague
speaks.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Carson follows:]

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Mr. Smith. Ambassador Carson, thank you very much.
Dr. Brimmer?

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ESTHER BRIMMER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF STATE

Ms. Brimmer. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Bass, members
of the subcommittee, thank you for convening this hearing on
United Nations peacekeeping operations in Africa. I appreciate
the subcommittee's attention to these important issues, and I
am pleased to discuss the Obama administration's commitment to
promoting peace and security across Africa through multilateral
action and shared responsibility.
Mr. Chairman, U.N. peacekeeping missions are a key tool to
help bring stability to countries emerging from violent
conflict, and to prevent conflict's return. This
administration's support for U.N. peacekeeping is deep, and
builds on a strong, decades long bipartisan effort to improve
these operations' effectiveness. That support is rooted in the
fact that peacekeeping is not a policy in itself. It is a key
tool to deliver on U.S. policy goals. U.N. missions deploy to
promote lasting political settlements that can in turn bring a
durable peace. They provide backing for those who agree to put
down their guns and to support the rule of law.
Assistant Secretary Carson has laid out an approach to some
of these very peace and security issues in Africa. In my brief
comments this afternoon, I will note a few highlights of the
seven U.N. peacekeeping operations in sub-Saharan Africa. And I
appreciate the committee's consideration of my longer submitted
testimony which includes a more expansive discussion of these
missions, their objectives and the priorities that they
reflect. These peacekeeping missions serve critical purposes:
Supporting new country such as South Sudan; helping run
elections in Liberia; promoting stability in Cote d'Ivoire; and
trying to stem renewed violence in Eastern Congo. These
missions are challenging and risky, but they unquestionably
contribute to peace and stability across the continent.
They are also cost effective, and in this era of increasing
fiscal restraint that fact is worth noting. Over 70 percent of
the annual cost of U.N. peacekeeping operations is paid by the
rest of the world. Clearly the cost of any unilateral action
would be far greater, and because U.N. peacekeeping takes
advantage of collective action that leverages the unique
expertise of the U.N., we ensure the efficient use of
taxpayers' dollars while significantly advancing U.S. national
interests.
These missions are often the international community's last
resort, and we know they face acute challenges especially in
Africa. As you know, currently, roughly half of all U.N.
peacekeeping operations are in Africa, comprising over 71,000
peacekeepers, thus approximately three-quarters of the people,
the blue helmets, are now serving.
But these are not your father's or your mother's
peacekeeping missions. Instead of simply observing a ceasefire
or some political settlement under Chapter VI of the U.N.
Charter as was often the case in decades past, and still is the
case in several of the older missions, today's operations
frequently have complex mandates. Today's operations have a
range of tasks and operate, at least in the case of all the
missions in sub-Saharan Africa, under Chapter VII authority.
These articles of the U.N. Charter authorize the use of force
as part of the mission's primary responsibility to restore and
maintain peace and security, including the protection of
civilians. These missions often operate in difficult
environments where state authority is weak and peacekeepers are
themselves the targets of violence. Yet in spite of these
enhanced responsibilities and great challenges, U.N.
peacekeeping missions have played pivotal roles across Africa.
I will briefly touch on the missions and begin with Sudan
and South Sudan. U.N. peacekeepers were instrumental in
supporting South Sudan's independence under the 2005
Comprehensive Peace Agreement and UNMISS is working with the
new government to assist with strengthening its government
institutions and its security sector. Also in Sudan, as with
South Sudan, in Darfur the U.N./African Union hybrid operation,
UNAMID, continues to play a critical role in the safety and
security of Darfuris, taking a leading role in supporting the
implementation of the Doha Document for Peace and helping
ensure that humanitarian conditions don't deteriorate further.
And then Abyei, along the tense Sudan/South Sudan border,
UNISFA has been critical to maintaining the stability despite
aerial bombardments by the Sudanis' armed forces, militia
activities and ground attacks that have plagued the border
area. There are also critical peacekeeping missions in West
Africa, including Liberia where the UNMIL mission has assisted
the government in strengthening its security sector and
promoting the rule of law following years of devastating civil
war. UNMIL has helped disarm over 100,000 ex-combatants
including some 11,000 child soldiers, providing training for
thousands of police officers and delivering critical support to
the 2011 national elections which brought President Johnson
Sirleaf a second term.
UNMIL also boasts the first U.S. flag officer in a U.N.
peacekeeping mission in nearly 20 years. U.S. Army Brigadier
General Hugh Van Roosen is serving as the chief of staff, and
he is one of 28 U.S. personnel currently serving in U.N.
peacekeeping missions worldwide. And today with our support
UNMIL is evolving as needs change. It is beginning to shift in
personnel from a focus on military to more police and civilian
personnel as it works to complete its task and transition
responsibility for security to the Government of Liberia. In
another operation, in Cote d'Ivoire, UNOCI peacekeepers assist
government efforts on security sector reform. They lead on
demobilization, disarmament and rehabilitation of former
combatants, an effort that has been successful enough to allow
the mission to gradually reduce its military component.
Turning to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, MONUSCO,
the second largest U.N. peacekeeping operation in the world,
pursues an ambitious mandate to protect civilians and to
support stability in a highly volatile, conflict-prone region.
Renewed fighting in the eastern province of North Kivu has
undermined the progress of the past few years, and reminds us
that much work remains to be done to eliminate the threat to
civilians posed by armed groups, and to take enduring action to
provide effective governance in that region to address the
legitimate grievances of stakeholders and arrive at a durable
political agreement.
And finally, as my colleague has already noted, in Somalia
the United Nations provides a critical administrative support
to the African Union through UNSOA, the support office to
AMISOM and its field office. And this relationship demonstrates
how multilateral engagement in conjunction with bilateral
partners can assist regional partners in their efforts to
support Somali authorities to effectively eliminate the threat
from al-Shabaab.
Mr. Chairman, no two missions are the same, but across the
missions we see both best practices and critical challenges
that deserve attention, and we need to continue to work to
improve operations and to enhance their effectiveness. We need
to continue work on the protection of civilians. It is a core
task for all peacekeepers, military, police and civilian
throughout the life of a mission. We need to work crucially on
dealing with sexual and gender-based violence. And in the
question and answer I would go into more detail about how we
are addressing this incredibly important issue and how to
further work to enforce the U.N.'s zero tolerance policy on
exploitation. It is extremely important. We also need to work
to support the rule of law and policing to ensure successful
transition back to governments. We need experienced leadership.
It is crucial to these operations to carry out their mandates.
And we think more women need to be included in missions.
And finally, we need to maintain fiscal discipline in
peacekeeping budgets particularly in the current economic
climate. The United States has led this charge, and overall
budgets this year are approximately $500 million less than they
were last year, saving the United States taxpayer nearly $141
million.
I thank the committee for their support over the years in
helping ensure the United Nations peacekeeping operations
remain a useful and cost effective tool that serves U.S.
foreign policy goals throughout Africa and the world, and I
look forward to discussing these issues further and welcome any
questions you may have. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Brimmer follows:]

----------

Mr. Smith. Dr. Brimmer, thank you so very much, and for
your and Ambassador Carson's service to our country and to the
world, especially Africa.
Let me just ask a couple of questions and then yield to my
distinguished colleagues. Again, both of you, especially you,
highlighted the issue of a budget and what is being spent and
what is not. I wonder if you could provide, and this might be
better for the record, but for the current peacekeeping
operations, the unmet needs for each of them, I know we get
fact sheets all the time from the U.N. about troop strength and
how much is being spent, but we don't always get the
information about what the real needs are. That way, we know
where the gaps are and whether or not a more robust effort
could be made with the other donors, but as well as ourselves,
to ensure that adequate funds are there so that those
peacekeeping strengths are not less effective due to
insufficient personnel. That would be a very helpful, where the
unmet need is. And it is a question I always ask of UNHCR and
others so that we really have a guide. The numbers don't mean
as much if you don't know what is not being done because of
lack of resources. So if you could provide that for us or maybe
speak to it now that would be very, very helpful on that unmet
need.
And secondly, Ambassador Carson, thank you for underscoring
in your testimony that the U.N. monitoring group reported in
June of this year that Somali terrorists, al-Shabaab, and you
quoted them, quoted the monitoring group, ``has suffered
dramatic reverses over the past year, experiencing military
defeats, the loss of territory,'' and we have all been
applauding as that has been happening, ``and the erosion of its
revenue base, setbacks that have exacerbated risk within the
group's leadership,'' and as you point out, this is directly
attributable to the success of African-led AMISOM. It is no
exaggeration, you point out, that through the peacekeeping
efforts the AU has given Somalia and its long-suffering people
their best chance for sustained peace. And I mean that is a
success story that this committee and members of this committee
follow closely, but from the press point of view and so many
others it is hard pressed to accept that allAfrica and perhaps
a few other places to find that really highlighted and
underscored.
We limited the defects and the failures. We all remember
UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslavia and the utter disaster that
was, what happened in Rwanda when key triggers and red flags
were ignored, but here you have a great success story, and
perhaps we should all bring much more attention to that and I
hope the press will likewise amplify peacekeeping works. And it
has saved many, many lives for the long-suffering people of
Somalia, so you might want to just elaborate a little bit on
that.
And next if I could on the very critical issue of rules of
engagement, it is always a key question of protection of
civilians, which you both emphasize, which sometimes is less
than stellar, and it is not the troops in the field but it is
the people that write the rules of engagement. If you might
want to speak to how robust those efforts are so that those
civilians can indeed be protected.
And I would ask you, Dr. Brimmer, maybe you wanted to touch
on this, to get further into the trafficking side. Where was
it? There was a U.N. report that made it very clear that last
month U.N. says that it withholds payments for peacekeepers
involved in sexual abuse or trafficking of persons. That was
put out last month. If you can tell us how well that appears to
working, and if you could also just speak to the issue of what
kinds of training packets, what kind of training are
peacekeepers actually given?
Everywhere I go I ask to meet with leaders in various
countries to find out exactly what their country does when a
peacekeeper or any member of their armed forces is complicit in
human trafficking. I wrote the Trafficking Victims Protection
Act and in 2005, the minimum standards update said that we will
assess, for purposes of assigning tier ratings, how well or
poorly a country's military is doing. That is a very important
part of it if they are deployed soldiers. So if you could give
us a real insight into what are they telling peacekeepers they
must do to ensure that they get the right human rights training
in general and human trafficking part in particular.
And then finally, if you could speak, Ambassador Carson
perhaps, to the African Standby Force, the ASF, as you talked
about. You mentioned various stages of readiness or lack of.
What does that really mean; how deployable are they; when will
they be deployable for missions?
I yield to my very distinguished friends for answers.
Mr. Carson. I think the first question, I think, was
clearly for Dr. Brimmer, and that is with respect to broad,
ummet needs, and she can do that one. I will be glad to take
the second issue that you raised with respect to the Somolia
AMISOM peacekeeping operation and really what that signifies
and means. Dr. Brimmer, maybe trafficking and then finally,
trafficking and sexual exploitation. And the last one, African
Standby Force, I will be glad to talk to.
Ms. Brimmer. Certainly.
Mr. Carson. Good division of labor?
Ms. Brimmer. That sounds very good. All right, Chairman,
with your permission I will jump in on the response.
The first off is as you say, it is very important to try to
understand what are the needs of the different operations to
make sure that we are continuing to tailor the operations to
what the actual needs on the ground are, as I said earlier that
peacekeeping is a tool to accomplish other activities. And so
what we do in addition to working with the U.N. itself is we
are also now ourselves trying to look at what is needed in
these operations, to look what is actually happening. And I can
share with you that even from the State Department's point of
view, my own deputies actually travel to look at peacekeeping
operations, to look under the hood to see what is actually
happening. So I had my deputy travel to West Africa to look at
key operations. And actually now as we speak, Ambassador
Torsella, who covers the administrative and budget issues at
our mission in New York, is actually en route and actually
flying now and he will be going out to look at both at UNAMID
and at UNISFA, again to understand what is happening and what
needs may not be covered so that we stay current. Because
indeed, we have to make sure that we are tailoring the
operations to address what is actually going to benefit people
on the ground.
Mr. Smith. As that analysis is done----
Ms. Brimmer. Yes.
Mr. Smith [continuing]. I know having been in office 32
years that very often you find real needs and then get conveyed
at OMB, a redlined number of what is doable or not doable. We
need to know, frankly, to be real partners in this effort, what
really is the unmet need? So as much of that raw information
that you can convey to the committee, it would be very helpful.
Ms. Brimmer. Mr. Chairman, we very much appreciate that
opportunity and we look forward to working with you and your
staff on putting that material together. Thank you.
[The information referred to follows:]
Written Response Received from the Honorable Esther Brimmer to Question
Asked During the Hearing by the Honorable Christopher H. Smith
Every peacekeeping operation is different, but there are common
challenges across missions that could benefit from greater support.
Some cross-cutting issues are systemic in UN peacekeeping missions.
First, there is an urgent need for expanded access to relatively scarce
``niche'' capabilities--in particular in aviation, engineering, and
medical capacity--in many missions. Second, there is an ongoing need
for mission-specific and scenario-based training, particularly in new
missions like the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan
(UNMISS), to help missions implement their goals. This is especially
needed for missions mandated to protect civilians under Chapter VII of
the UN Charter. Third, there is a need for dialogue with both the UN
and troop and police contributing countries on the operational
readiness, performance, and evaluation of troops and police, to help
ensure that the personnel deploying to missions are fully prepared and
fully briefed on human rights and the requirements for appropriate
conduct, particularly with regard to sexual exploitation and abuse.
Fourth, there must be measures in place for the safety and security of
UN personnel and strategies for risk management, especially when
operating environments are non-permissive, such as in Darfur. Fifth,
there must be increased integration between peacekeeping and
peacebuilding, so that the gains that the missions achieve in the field
are made sustainable through the strengthening of institutions that
promote the rule of law, human rights, and good governance, elements
which are key to establishing a stable peace. And finally, there is a
strategic need for effective transitions, so that the UN can retain
best practices and lessons learned. We are working to help missions and
the UN address these issues, and are prepared to brief on any of these
elements.

Mr. Carson. Mr. Chairman, thank you for highlighting the
success that has been achieved in Somalia and in Mogadishu. As
I noted in my initial comments, we believe that a great deal of
progress has been achieved in Somalia over the last 3\1/2\
years. For the first time in 2 decades and 2 years, we now have
in place in Mogadishu, a government which has a firmer
foundation and greater legitimacy than at any time since the
late 1990s.
I myself had an opportunity about 6 weeks ago to travel to
Mogadishu. I was the highest ranking U.S. official from the
State Department to visit Somalia and that part of Somalia in
close to two decades, since the Black Hawk Down scenario event
that you mentioned.
As I said, a great deal of progress has been achieved. We
have a new Constitution, a new Parliament, a new speaker and a
new President. And we have for the first time in two decades a
real opportunity for greater stability, and all of this has
been achieved in part due to the efforts of AMISOM, primarily
the troops from Uganda, Burundi, now Kenya, and troops from
Djibouti. We expect by mid-October they will be joined by
troops from Sierra Leone. Almost all of these troops have
benefited from training and funding and equipping from the
United States through our GPOI program and through our ACOTA
program, which is a part of that. We, in doing this, have been
able to degrade and to effectively disperse and make
significantly less effective a fighting force, al-Shabaab, and
this is clearly in our interest. We have been able to achieve
this with Africans and African governments and African troops
in the lead. We have been a consistent and a strong supporter
of their efforts, but it has been the Africans who have
recognized that the instability in Somalia constitutes a threat
to them as well as the region and the international community.
And they have taken the lead in defeating this threat with us
in the lead. We have contributed a substantial amount
financially to this effort, but we haven't lost a soldier or a
man or a woman in the process. And I think we are all better
off for this operation.
Moreover, I might add that we have been the largest,
single, bilateral contributor to the AMISOM effort. Although
the European Union and the U.N. through its AMISOM support
program have been strong partners in the effort, we have helped
to resource what is a collective achievement led by Africans on
the ground to respond to a crisis in their region and one that
impacts them. It is a real success out there because it helps
to stabilize that country. Helps to defeat al-Shabaab, who has
had some of its top leadership associated and affiliated with
al-Qaeda. It has led to the deaths of the top leadership in al-
Qaeda, East African individuals who were associated with the
bombing of our Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in 1998.
And this is quite a significant achievement. We hope that we
can build on it, but it does show what can be done in a strong
collaborative effort with us working with Africans and African
institutions supporting a hybrid peacekeeping operation.
So we are very pleased by what has happened. It is not the
end of the book, it is just the end of one of the early
chapters in a book that will have many other chapters of
recovery and rehabilitation associated with it. But this is
serious and significant progress that has been achieved.
Mr. Smith. Several questions that I asked, if I could just
get back to them. The ASF, varying degrees of readiness, if you
could just touch on that. And this issue of, what exactly does
the human rights training look like? And I mentioned the U.N.
policy of withholding payments. Is that working? Mali also, if
you could touch on that.
And one last thing you mentioned, Ambassador Carson, the
Dar es Salaam and the Nairobi bombings. For the record, I held
all the hearings, in the House at least, that followed that
terrible, terrible loss of life especially in Kenya and
Tanzania. And I will never forget when Admiral Crowe sat where
you sit and talked about the lack of readiness on the part--
even though we had al-Qaeda doing some horrific things before
that we didn't think transnational terrorism, as Secretary
Carpenter testified at the time, would go after what were
thought of as more secure U.S. missions or outposts. And from
that I actually wrote what is called the Admiral James W. Nance
and Meg Donovan Foreign Relations Act, Fiscal Years 2000 and
2001, which had a heavy emphasis on setbacks and Embassy
security.
And one of the questions I am going to be asking and you
might want to do something for the record on this, I mean we
still have deficiencies no matter how much we try to shore up,
review setbacks, protect our ambassadors, and we are all
heartbroken over the loss of our Ambassador to Libya as well as
the other three individuals who are heroes, all four, but we
really have to get to the bottom of what can we do better to
ensure that no one else is hurt. It is why we have danger pay,
because we know that divisions worth of people called the
Foreign Service who are in absolutely hazardous places all over
the world. But we might be able to do a better job in Congress
to ensure that those threats are further mitigated. But you
might want to get back to us on that. I am thinking of a
hearing itself focused more on what do we do, what are we
missing? But anything you can suggest to us, if there are law
changes, something that needs to be done, and I know the
administration is looking very seriously into what did happen.
But if you could speak on those issues, ASF, the training
packets.
And then I will go to my colleague.
Ms. Brimmer. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I thought I would
take up the question on the rules of engagement.
Mr. Smith. Please.
Ms. Brimmer. And then I will turn to the trafficking issues
and then maybe just touch on the training issues, to many of
those questions, and respond to some of the points that you
both made in your opening statements.
Just in terms of the rules of engagement, one thing to
notice as I say that over the past generation looking at
peacekeeping issues is that we see a more robust use of the use
of force by peacekeepers. They are of course authorized to use
the use of force to protect themselves and their mission, and
now most crucially to try to protect civilians. That is a huge
job. And we recognize that there is so much more to try to do.
They are often working in countries that are very large. But I
thought I might highlight some of the efforts in this area in
particular. That we notice that they are I say engaged in more
difficult places. We even note that even in the case of Somalia
in the hybrid mission that most recently there was an attempt
on the life of the new President, but it was the African Union
troops that actually helped defend him. One was actually killed
in that point. But they were using robust use of force.
But I think we should also note that there have been
efforts in important areas, for example, like, I will just take
MONUSCO in particular in the Congo that has also used, has had
independent military operations to work on dealing with sexual
violence in that country. They have also tried to be much more
robust in their efforts of trying to free children from armed
groups. There is a much greater understanding of the efforts to
try to use the tools of the peacekeeping operations in what is
still an extremely difficult and extreme situation. But again
it is kind of the creative use of understanding appropriate use
of force for peacekeeping operations.
If I may turn to the trafficking and sexual exploitation
and abuse issues and just take a few minutes to maybe to
develop this. This is such an extremely important area. As you
noted that this year for the very first time we have been able
to get into on the funding side of peacekeeping, a link, that
does withhold funds from troop-contributing countries based on
if there is misbehavior by particular troops. That is the first
time we have actually been able to get passed through in the
U.N. system. That is a new mechanism. And that is what
demonstrates we are trying to look at every tool we can use to
try to combat this particular scourge. Will this build on our
efforts in other areas as well? And we start all the way
upstream. How do we work on improving the training for the
peacekeepers that are actually being deployed in the field? And
as my colleague has already outlined that of course there is
important training provided by the United States. Other things
we do are we also talk to other countries that are providing
training for peacekeepers. We visit peacekeeping training
centers. We see the curriculum. Myself and my colleagues have
been briefed on the curriculum, how sexual exploitation is
being dealt with and explained in key troop training centers
around the world.
We also raise this issue bilaterally in our regular
conversations with other countries. So if I just take the
example of Uruguay. Now with Uruguay as you know that there was
an incident with their troops, and I say no country is perfect
here, but I will note that they did bring their troops home and
try them. Because ultimately, the United Nations can't enforce
the behavior of individual militaries. National governments
have to do that. So we make sure we raise that to, as the
United States. So when I was actually in Uruguay talking to
them because they are important troop contributors, I raised
this issue. It is something my colleagues and I do on a regular
basis. We also look at how well the U.N. as well works the
troop contributing countries, and the Department of
Peacekeeping Operations has a package of materials that they
provide to countries when they are going to contribute troops
that also contains these materials. So these are important
steps upstream.
But then we also think it is important to look at what
actually happens when we unfortunately have incidents. And
there again the question is what national governments do is
extremely important, and they have to work both with all of the
peacekeeping personnel. Military personnel, police personnel
and civilians, and there are slightly different rules for
those. Most importantly that the military personnel are usually
governed by the rules that govern their own national military,
so it is important that they in their national systems use
those mechanisms. Civilians, depending on whether or not they
have diplomatic immunity, may be subject to the laws of the
country. So in each of these we are trying to look at what are
all the tools we can deal with in the address of this, it is
still extremely serious. There is still a lot more work to do.
We are still trying to see what else we can do to continue to
work on this issue, but we take it extremely seriously.
Mr. Carson. Mr. Chairman, just a quick sentence on the five
brigades. As I said in my testimony, none of the brigades are
fully operational. The weakest of the five standby brigades is
in North Africa, and because of the developments of the Arab
Spring over the last year, year and a half, they are focused
inward and not on the standby force. The Eastern African
Standby Force is probably the most robust and capable. It has
some of Africa's better armies, Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya. It has
provided the command and staff headquarters for the AMISOM
operations in Mogadishu, and it has been able to carry out both
field and headquarters exercises.
The Economic Community of West Africa also has a number of
large armies. They have shown some capabilities, but they too
would require enormous outside assistance to be able to
effectively mobilize as an operational brigade. The central
African multilateral, multinational force would probably rank
just above the North African force in terms of its limited
capabilities and operational capacities. And the Southern
African Development Community does also have a number of very
capable armies, South Africa and Botswana, that could be drawn
upon to carry out peacekeeping operations. They have engaged in
joint training and some training operations and exercises.
Ms. Bass. Yes, thank you very much for your testimony, and
many of the questions I asked in the beginning you did touch
upon.
I wanted to follow up though on the individuals that are
peacekeepers that might have committed crimes, especially
sexually oriented crimes. So when they are caught, what
happens? Are they sent back home? Are they incarcerated? And I
understand in part it depends on the country that they are in,
but maybe you could give a few examples.
Ms. Brimmer. Thank you, Ranking Member Bass. I will give
some examples and we can also follow up with a sort of fuller,
if I may, fuller treatment or fuller examples as well. That
indeed as I mentioned that you, in a sense, have to look at
peacekeepers in three groups. The military, the police and the
civilians, and that the question is when they are caught that
they go back to their national contingent. Some countries at
that point then will ship them home, some may then have their
own national procedures. But it goes back to the military
command for those particular individuals. The police, in some
cases the police have their own separate command. In some cases
the police are then under with the military, again depending by
country. And then for civilians that depends who the civilian
is and who they are working for. Is this a civilian who is
working directly for the United Nations? Then that is a direct
issue it it is their own staff member. If it is a civilian
working in some other capacity, there again it may be possible
to prosecute them under the individual laws.
What I would like to do is be able to, I can actually just
spell out in greater detail, if you would like me to do a
follow-up, with some of the examples of what has happened in
different cases. And it really has varied by country, I
mentioned Uruguay. In a different case, Pakistan actually flew
out a judge from Pakistan to Haiti. Different region, but there
was an issue in Haiti, and they then sent their own judge out
to then conduct the legal proceedings in Haiti even before they
sent them back with the peacekeepers. So different countries
have followed different models, and those are some countries
where countries actually took on board the issue and tried to
address it. Other countries have not had that same strong
record. We will be happy to follow up on greater detail and
send that to you.
[The information referred to follows:]

Written Response Received from the Honorable Esther Brimmer to Question
Asked During the Hearing by the Honorable Karen Bass, a Representative
in Congress from the State of California

First, we share your deep concern about this problem, and are
working to support needed reforms. Second, as you know, disposition of
serious cases depends on the category of the individual. Military
personnel are subject to discipline by their own chain of command. The
UN Office of Internal Oversight Services investigates allegations of
misconduct against police personnel. Civilian staff may be dismissed
and, depending on circumstances, tried locally or in their country of
residence or nationality. The results can vary due to a number of
factors. Actions illegal in one country may not be illegal in another;
alternatively the host country or country of residence may choose not
to pursue a case, and so on. The UN regularly requests updates from
sending countries on their disposition of cases, but does not have the
authority to enforce reporting.
We are concerned that proper action be taken in such cases, and we
follow up bilaterally whenever we are aware of a serious violation of
the code of conduct. In one example, our Embassy in Rabat communicated
with the Government of Morocco after learning that members of a
Moroccan military contingent serving in Cote d'Ivoire were accused of
patronizing prostitutes. In response to our communications, Morocco
informed the Embassy that it had withdrawn and replaced the whole
contingent, reviewed the case under military procedures, and
disciplined those individuals found to be guilty of misconduct.
There was also a very troubling case involving an American citizen
serving as a UN international civilian employee in Liberia who was
charged with molesting underage girls. The Liberian government, the UN
mission, and the U.S. Embassy cooperated during the investigation. The
UN was prepared to waive his immunity, if any; the U.S. Government made
arrangements to fly him home for prosecution under Federal law; and the
Liberian government placed him under house arrest pending the transfer
to U.S. authorities. Regrettably, the individual committed suicide
while in custody in Monrovia. The UN offered medical and legal
assistance to the girls he had molested, which was accepted in one
case. Although the circumstances of the whole case were distressing, in
fact the system worked--the allegations were made and investigated, the
perpetrator taken into custody and facing trial, and the victims given
appropriate support.

Ms. Bass. Do you have situations of countries where that is
not viewed in the same way we would view it, where they make
light of it or send the person to another country or another
division or cover it up? And if that happens what can be done?
Ms. Brimmer. Well, I think first, I mean no country wants
to have a reputation for particularly problematic units. I
think some countries have had more innovative approaches, who
have actually thought about how to do it. As I mentioned, some
countries have brought them home and had a process, others have
said, no, we will deal with it right in this situation. So it
is varied. And what we try to look at is particularly those who
have taken it seriously, which might be models for others, and
as I say, we also try to follow up in the bilateral context to
stress that the United States takes this very seriously. So
this is something that we raise regularly with our
interlocutors when we are talking about peacekeeping and on
making it better.
Ms. Bass. I appreciate that. Well, on another subject, I
wanted to know if either one of you could talk to me about the
cap that Congress actually has on U.S. contributions to U.N.
peacekeeping that some describe as arbitrary, because I don't
understand very much about it. If you could explain that I
would like to know why it is considered arbitrary. And then
also if it isn't, I understand it isn't a new issue, but that
it also causes us problems, compromises how we are viewed in
other parts of the world.
Ms. Brimmer. If I may I will jump in on this question.
Ranking Member Bass, as you know that the United Nations budget
is divided into the regular budget and the peacekeeping budget.
At the regular budget the United States pays 22 percent of all
costs.
On the peacekeeping side, the five countries that are
permanent members of the Security Council pay an additional
amount, in a sense, an additional premium. They have additional
rights and responsibilities for international peace and
security. Under that there is then a formula that is set every
few years about what the rate will be for all the members that
contribute, but we will actually focus particularly on ours and
what is happening with that. It is based on the calculation of
relative economic strength of the actual U.N. member states. So
that calculation is then raised by, is recommended by the
secretariat, it then goes to the General Assembly that then
approves the whole process with that.
But ultimately it is an allocation that looks at the actual
cost for peacekeeping and actually looks at the actual
strength, economic strength of the different countries. So
under that we pay over 27 percent currently. It is currently
under discussion about what will be the next rate. The
challenge of having a line set for the peacekeeping rate is
that that is below the rate which was actually set for the
United States. It means that operations are not fully or
properly funded, and it doesn't directly relate to what is
actually the relative strength, economic strength of different
countries.
So I note that while the issue is now currently under
discussion for the next 2 years about what will be the rate for
the next 2 years, it is important to note that one of the
conversations is the relative strength. So one of the things
that we would expect is that the rates for Russia and
especially China will increase, because obviously they are in a
different economic situation even than 3 years ago when we last
looked at it, and we think it is important that their rates do
increase, as we expect they will. But the challenge here is
that if we set a rate below what is actually mandated it means
there will be a gap and key operations would not be funded. And
there will be key operations in areas that we think are
important.
Ms. Bass. So you are saying we set that.
Ms. Brimmer. Oh, the United States plays----
Ms. Bass. I know you are talking about the formula, but you
are also saying then that the U.S. comes in and sets a level
that is----
Ms. Brimmer. Well, I am saying that if there were to be
legislation that were to set a level below the level which is
actually where the United Nations has set for the United
States, there would be a gap between what the real cost of the
operation is----
Ms. Bass. Right.
Ms. Brimmer [continuing]. And what we are saying we are
willing to pay. If we don't meet our actual legal commitment to
the right level, key operations won't be funded. And we try to
make sure that of course that rate be as appropriate as
possible, but we recognize it is based on, what are the costs
of these actual operations, and what are the relative economic
health of the different countries that contribute to the United
Nations system?
Ms. Bass. Okay. And then finally, I just can't sit here and
not ask you to comment on the current situation. And I don't
know if that is appropriate for you, Ambassador Carson, but
what can you share about what is going on? And I mean again it
is just really hard to believe that some wacky YouTube video--
--
Mr. Carson. Let me say that, first of all, I am not focused
on a day-to-day basis on the events in the Middle East, and the
Maghreb which is a part of Africa falls under the jurisdiction
of the Middle Eastern bureau at the Department of State. But I
can say that we are, as a department and a nation, deeply
troubled by any attacks that are undertaken against our
Embassies and our personnel abroad, our American citizens as
well as host country nationals who work with us in those
countries. And we don't think that any political or regional or
religious justification exists for attacking American
diplomats.
In the case of what we are seeing across the Middle East,
we believe that there are probably different and complex
reasons for the kinds of reactions that we are seeing in
different countries. We see, first of all, a region that is in
transition, a region that is troubled, a region that is moving
toward greater openness and democracy. We see fragile new
governments that are trying to establish authority, and trying
to put in place institutions and have weak control over their
security services.
The second thing I would say broadly is that in some of the
countries, particularly in what we have seen in Egypt, we are
clearly seeing the population there react to a couple of videos
which have been released here. One by a religious figure in
this country, another quite frankly, by unknown individuals.
These videos have mocked and degraded the life of the Prophet
Muhammad, and it has led to reactions and street demonstrations
and violence against U.S. institutions. It is deeply
unfortunate that people would use this as a reason for
attacking our facilities or our people. And certainly in Egypt
that is the case. But I would say that there are probably
underlying reasons too of transition, weakness of government
authorities and frustration on the street about other elements
of society.
In Libya, the situation is far more complex. And
increasingly it appears that the attack against our facilities
there may have been motivated by political considerations and
that it was not these degradations of the Prophet Muhammad that
led to these. There is a thorough investigation underway, but
these might turn out to be terrorist attacks that were well
planned and well orchestrated and therefore resulted in the
very tragic and unfortunate deaths of our colleagues in the
State Department.
I think from country to country there is a difference, as
to say Egypt and Libya present two different kinds of
situations, just as the situation in Yemen and in other places
in the Maghreb have different causes for concern. But we are
going through a period of turbulence there as we see
authoritarian and autocratic governments being replaced by new
institutions, some stronger in their democratic adherence and
commitment than others. But many are not only weak but new, and
grappling with the ability to control the fast-moving events of
their societies.
Ms. Bass. All I have had a chance to do is catch the news
coverage, and especially today in between hearings. And I guess
a few things that were very disturbing to me were in Egypt,
apparently the President didn't come out and really condemn the
violence. And then there was some question about whether or not
the Muslim Brotherhood was going to take the lead in organizing
a protest. Again, the problem with up-to-the-minute news is
that it might have been a fictitious report, but that is what I
heard last. And then the concern about Libya just makes me
wonder about Mali in terms of what happened with the folks
leaving from Libya going into Mali. Is this going to have
implications for problems that are already happening there? And
I don't know if there has been any report of that.
Ms. Brimmer. If I may just add particularly as well that
just the outpouring support that we have seen, as well as the
Security Council immediately took up this issue yesterday and
immediately condemned the attacks. So I think it is important
to note that all 15 combined consensus' immediately understood
the import of the issue. And as you mentioned already, the
leadership in Libya has spoken out rejecting the violence.
I think it is also important to note that how we honor the
fallen by remembering their mission. So in this also we are
recalling, and I am just looking back at the President's words
yesterday where he talked about the legacy of the Ambassador
``will endure wherever human beings search for liberty and
justice.'' I think as also we have seen in the outpouring at
least from our colleagues at the U.N. that we hear from who are
remembering the work we are still doing in Libya. There is an
important political mission in Libya, a U.N. political mission
there, and recommitting to the goals that they are working on.
So I think as part of the both condolences, we are hearing also
is again support for the very mission that our governments are
working on from many of our colleagues. I know that Ambassador
Carson is seeing the same thing in his post where we are seeing
in all the multilateral posts, condolences coming, but again
committing to the values of the Libyan people and trying to
reject those who are turning to violence. I think that is an
important component of the global reaction to the tragedy.
Ms. Bass. Thank you. Thank you very much.
Mr. Smith. Let me just ask a few final questions, and
beginning first with, maybe it is you, Ambassador Carson, or
either of you, Dr. Brimmer.
Is there a peacekeeping mission not yet constituted that
needs to be established?
Mr. Carson. Speaking from the African perspective, we
believe that the current peacekeeping missions that exist, plus
those that are being led by the Africans themselves are
addressing the key and fundamental issues that Africa faces.
Clearly the one area where there is a possibility of African
countries on a subregional basis coming together to work is in
Mali. ECOWAS has indicated a desire to be supportive and
helpful in putting together a force that would go in and assist
the Malian Government. But at this point, this is only in the
very, very early planning stages, and like other subregional
peacekeeping regions that are in existence and that I have
spoken about would have to be well resourced and well planned
in order for it to be effective.
Mr. Smith. [Inaudible.]
Mr. Carson. Pardon me? No specific region. And I just focus
on what ECOWAS is discussing preliminarily about Mali. They at
this point have not approached the AU nor the U.N. for the kind
of detail of support resources that would be necessary to get
this underway. Still in its very, very initial stages.
Mr. Smith. Let me just say a word or two--or did you, Dr.
Brimmer? I don't want to--please.
Ms. Brimmer. Mr. Chairman, thank you. You had asked both
about Mali, and of course Ambassador Carson has talked
particularly about the early stages that we are looking at. And
I would just say that it perhaps includes insights into some of
the thinking about peacekeeping operations that as I mentioned
earlier we think about how you fit the right tool to the
situation. And as we look at the questions, what is the right
tool? That we look at, of course there is a humanitarian crisis
and there is important engagement by both the United States
that is providing humanitarian assistance, but also even
through the U.N. we are providing much assistance on the
humanitarian side. There are both counterterrorism issues as
well as security issues. So trying to fit the tool to the
situation is so important, and that is why we are looking at,
what are all the different arrangements? A peacekeeping
operation may or may not be the right one. Maybe a political
operation is the right one. Maybe it is another tool. And so we
are trying to think about what are the global tools, the
regional tools, the bilateral, what is the right mix? Because
there is no one model that fits everything and we try to figure
out, see what is appropriate. And that is where it came back.
Mr. Smith. Thank you. As we all know, U.N. peacekeeping is
hazardous. And the blue helmets, a few years back, were rightly
cited for the Nobel Peace Prize, for the bravery which often
goes unheralded, and the deficiencies obviously focused upon to
the detriment of all the good that they accomplish.
And I am wondering, since there are deaths, we know how
hazardous it is, there are wounded peacekeepers, could you
perhaps for the record, or if you have it available now, give
us a sense of how many peacekeepers have been injured, whether
or not there is a PTSD component as we have had with every war
we have been engaged in, and there has to be, I think. There
are peacekeepers, just like any deployed man or a woman service
member, who see things that no one should see.
And just for the record, I chaired the Veterans' Affairs
Committee for a number of years, and wrote a number of laws on
the health care side including the establishment of polytrauma
centers. And the closest one to here in Washington is in
Richmond. And I have been amazed as those polytrauma centers
deal as DoD hands off to the VA, men and women who have deep
brain injuries, loss of limbs, where otherwise they might have
died in the past, are brought back by the coordination of the
treatment of their injuries by a group of doctors, nurses, and
highly skilled personnel to ensure the greatest possibility of
a life with less handicap going forward. And I really don't
know this, what do we do to assist those men and women who are
injured who might be PTSD? Our VA, as you know, has written the
book on how to deal with that issue, and it goes back obviously
to the work to help our Vietnam veterans when it really burst
onto the scene in the early '80s, if not before. But
polytrauma, do we do any sharing through our personnel?
And I would just say paranthetically, I will never forget
in the early 1980s, making trips down to El Salvador during the
years that the FMLN, when mines were being used, foot taker-
offer mines that they called them, that the FMLN was using, and
it was right here in Washington that our military hospitals
provided and helped with prosthetic devices, especially to the
children who were losing limbs.
So do we help these peacekeepers? Saying nothing
detrimental whatsoever to health care that might be provided in
various African countries, but again when it comes to dealing
with battlefield injuries no one does it better, in my humble
opinion, than the VA.
Ms. Brimmer. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for that
question. If I may provide some information at this point and
then follow up for the record with additional information. That
just a data point is that the total number of fatalities from
peacekeeping operations since 1948 is 3,017. But of course we
will respond with a fuller discussion of that.
Mr. Smith. With a break out to Africa and especially the
recent ones that would be very helpful.
Ms. Brimmer. We would be happy to give you more detail
broken out by region.
[The information referred to follows:]

Written Response Received from the Honorable Esther Brimmer to Question
Asked During the Hearing by the Honorable Christopher H. Smith

Thank you for asking this question. Peacekeepers do face challenges
in the field that require greater attention. The UN has kept statistics
since 1948 on deaths in peacekeeping missions, broken out in various
configurations. The total number of fatalities in UN peacekeeping
missions from 1948 through August 31, 2012 (the most recent
compilation), is 3,025. The total number of fatalities for all UN peace
operations in Africa since 1948 is 1,477. Of the current missions in
Africa, the totals since their date of creation are: UNMIS/UNMISS
(Sudan/South Sudan): 61; UNOCI (Cote d'Ivoire): 98; UNMIL (Liberia)
168; MONUC/MONUSCO (Democratic Republic of Congo): 208; UNAMID
(Darfur): 124; UNISFA (Abyei): 7; and MINURSO (Western Sahara) 15.
These figures include deaths by accident, illness, malicious intent and
other causes.
Additionally, we note significant gaps in health care and medical
treatment for troops from various countries and in missions while in
active service. The UN has consistently asked troop contributors to
provide field hospitals for the missions in more challenging
environments, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo.
Assuming that local medical facilities do not meet UN standards,
contingent-deployed medical facilities provide care to all categories
of personnel, including UN civilian staff; arrangements are generally
made with a nearby country to provide more specialized medical care, as
required. The Medical Services Division of the UN's Office of Human
Resource Management plays a coordinating role and performs periodic on-
site assessments of field medical capabilities.
Civilian staff are covered under health insurance plans, whereas
uniformed personnel qualify for payments for death and disability
incurred as a result of UN service (up to $70,000 USD, paid to troop-
contributing countries in the case of military contingent personnel and
to individuals or their beneficiaries in the case of UNPOL and military
observers).

Ms. Brimmer. If I may also note that it does remind us of
some of the capacity gaps, and you raised an important point.
What happens to the peacekeeping veterans? That reminds us that
even when they are serving there are significant gaps. One of
them is in some of the medical care. One of the things we think
which would actually strengthen peacekeeping are more medical
units. These are often something that, for example, countries
with very advanced militaries can supply are the medical units,
to make sure people at the time of critical injury are getting
the best care available. Because often the medical units may
not be at the same standard that we associate obviously with
our U.S. military. Being able to be sure that we are able to
strengthen the police units, even as you know there is a long
issue of getting the right helicopters to allow for the
transport of peacekeepers. We think these are the sort of
capacity gaps we would like to improve. We would even like to
make sure that we are bringing in more women who would be able
to work, particularly since they are working with civilian
groups, thinking about what are the real capacity gaps for
dealing with peacekeeping.
We also think that there are resource gaps. And one of our
concerns with the idea of a cap on peacekeeping, which has been
raised before, is we think we need to--and we have been able to
benefit from Congress lifting the cap at 25 percent each year
recognizing we need to meet our treaty obligations. So as we
think about the capacity gaps that we recognize it affects the
abilities of peacekeepers to do their job on the ground and to
follow up. So we will follow up for the record to those
questions again as we try to work to strengthen peacekeeping.
Thank you, sir.
Mr. Smith. And I would just conclude, unless my friend and
colleague has anything.
That without objection I would like to put into our record
the report to Congress on U.N. efforts to prevent trafficking
in persons.
[The information referred to follows:]

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Mr. Smith. And also a very brief, but very good, sexual
exploitation and abuse prevention and accountability with the
prevention enforcement and remedial action. Without objection
it will be made a part of the record.
[The information referred to follows:]

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Mr. Smith. And I want to thank you again for your
leadership. I look forward to working with you going forward.
And with some of the information, if you can convey it as soon
as possible, that way we can work together to work on these
issues.
And so thank you. The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:41 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

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