[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

KEEPING AMERICA SECURE:
THE SCIENCE SUPPORTING
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THREAT DETECTION TECHNOLOGIES

=======================================================================

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

__________

THURSDAY, JULY 19, 2012

__________

Serial No. 112-97

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Printed for the use of the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology

Available via the World Wide Web: http://science.house.gov

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COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY

HON. RALPH M. HALL, Texas, Chair
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
Wisconsin JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois
LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California
DANA ROHRABACHER, California ZOE LOFGREN, California
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland BRAD MILLER, North Carolina
FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois
JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland
W. TODD AKIN, Missouri BEN R. LUJAN, New Mexico
RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas PAUL D. TONKO, New York
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas JERRY McNERNEY, California
PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia TERRI A. SEWELL, Alabama
SANDY ADAMS, Florida FREDERICA S. WILSON, Florida
BENJAMIN QUAYLE, Arizona HANSEN CLARKE, Michigan
CHARLES J. ``CHUCK'' FLEISCHMANN, SUZANNE BONAMICI, Oregon
Tennessee VACANCY
E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia VACANCY
STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi VACANCY
MO BROOKS, Alabama
ANDY HARRIS, Maryland
RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois
CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota
LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana
DAN BENISHEK, Michigan
VACANCY

C O N T E N T S

Thursday, July 19, 2012

Page
Witness List..................................................... 2

Hearing Charter.................................................. 3

Opening Statements

Statement by Representative Ralph M. Hall, Chairman, Committee on
Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives.. 9
Written Statement............................................ 10

Statement by Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson, Ranking
Minority Member, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology,
U.S. House of Representatives.................................. 10
Written Statement............................................ 11

Witnesses:

Dr. Richard Cavanagh, Director, Office of Special Programs,
National Institute of Standards and Technology
Oral Statement............................................... 13
Written Statement............................................ 15

Dr. Huban Gowadia, Acting Director, Domestic Nuclear Detection
Office, Department of Homeland Security
Oral Statement............................................... 20
Written Statement............................................ 22

Dr. Anthony Peurrung, Associate Laboratory Director, National
Security Directorate, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
Oral Statement............................................... 30
Written Statement............................................ 32

Dr. Thomas Peterson, Assistant Director, Directorate for
Engineering, National Science Foundation
Oral Statement............................................... 40
Written Statement............................................ 42

Discussion....................................................... 48

Appendix I: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions

Dr. Richard Cavanagh, Director, Office of Special Programs,
National Institute of Standards and Technology................. 68

Dr. Huban Gowadia, Acting Director, Domestic Nuclear Detection
Office, Department of Homeland Security........................ 73

Dr. Anthony Peurrung, Associate Laboratory Director, National
Security Directorate, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory.... 83

Dr. Thomas Peterson, Assistant Director, Directorate for
Engineering, National Science Foundation....................... 90

Appendix II:

Statement submitted by Jerry Costello , Member, Committee on
Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives.. 96

KEEPING AMERICA SECURE:
THE SCIENCE SUPPORTING
THE DEVELOPMENT OF
THREAT DETECTION TECHNOLOGIES

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THURSDAY, JULY 19, 2012

House of Representatives,
Committee on Science, Space, and Technology,
Washington, D.C.

The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:04 a.m., in Room
2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ralph Hall
[Chairman of the Committee] presiding.

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Chairman Hall. The Committee on Science, Space, and
Technology will come to order, and I say to you, good morning
and thank you. Welcome to today's hearing entitled ``Keeping
America Secure: The Science Supporting the Development of
Threat Detection Technologies.''
In front of you are packets containing the written
testimony for all of the Members that are here, biographies and
Truth in Testimony disclosures for today's witnesses. I will
recognize myself for five minutes for an opening statement. I
once again welcome everybody to the hearing.
The September 11th terrorist attacks forced the American
public to confront the daily threat of domestic terrorism, and
advancing threat detection technologies, I think, is one of the
many ways research and development contributes to keeping our
country secure. Recognizing the need to respond quickly when a
potential threat is identified and to counter the growing list
of threats to our country, the U.S. government and the private
sector focused research and development activities on the
detection of explosives, firearms, and dangerous materials
including chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
matter. Scientific research has advanced the development of
technologies to protect the Nation, but the rapidly changing
threats that we face require continued research and development
to ensure that we keep ahead of our enemies. We recognize that
the terrorists only need to get it right once to succeed,
whereas we need to get it right every time to ensure the
protection of our citizens.
I think that with highly visible events such as the Olympic
Games and the Democratic and Republican National Conventions
occurring this summer, and major sporting events that you all
are well aware of more so than probably some of us, and because
of your duties and requirements and your knowledge, and major
sporting events and concerts are drawing crowds of thousands on
a weekly basis, there is continued interest in improving
existing threat detection technologies and advancing new ones.
Today, we have the opportunity to examine some of the
research and development activities that the Federal Government
is undertaking to support the advancement of threat detection
technology. The research and development activities occurring
at these federal agencies that we have talked about have the
potential to both transform and improve threat detection, and
to create products and technologies that could be beneficial
for other purposes.
While I recognize that threat detection is only one piece
of a much larger system required to combat terrorism, better
detection does enable better protection for our citizens. As
the old saying goes, an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of
cure.
I look forward to hearing more about the ongoing research
designed to improve physical threat detection, protect the
public, and support the development of marketable technologies.
And I certainly thank our witnesses for your time, the time
it took you to prepare to come here, the time in your life that
prepared you to be at that table. You are the ones who write
the legislation that we pass, and we thank you for your time
and thank you for your appearance here today and your
willingness to testify before us.
I yield back my time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hall follows:]

Prepared Statement of Chairman Ralph Hall

Good Morning. I would like to welcome everyone to today's hearing.

The September 11th terrorist attacks forced the American public to
confront the daily threat of domestic terrorism. Advancing threat
detection technologies is one of the many ways research and development
contributes to keeping America secure. Recognizing the need to respond
quickly when a potential threat is identified and to counter the
growing list of threats to our country, the U.S. government and the
private sector focused research and development activities on the
detection of explosives, firearms, and dangerous materials including
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear matter. Scientific
research has advanced the development of technologies to protect the
Nation, but the rapidly changing threats that we face require continued
research and development to ensure that we keep ahead of our enemies.
We recognize that the terrorists only need to get it right once to
succeed, whereas we need to get it right every time to ensure the
protection of our citizens.
In March of this year a Gallup poll \1\ showed that terrorism
ranked near the bottom of fifteen issues facing the country today-
behind the economy, gas prices, unemployment, drug use, and the
environment, among others. This may be partly because of the success we
have had in protecting the Nation since 9/11. Economic issues dominate
day-to-day concerns right now, so it is easy to become complacent about
the threat of terrorism. However, with highly visible events such as
the Olympic Games and the Democratic and Republican National
Conventions occurring this summer, and major sporting events and
concerts drawing crowds of thousands on a weekly basis, there is
continued interest in improving existing threat detection technologies
and advancing new ones.
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\1\ http://www.gallup.com/poll/153485/Economic-Issues-Dominate-
Americans-National-Worries.aspx
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Today, we have the opportunity to examine some of the research and
development activities that the Federal government is undertaking to
support the advancement of threat detection technologies. The National
Institute of Standards and Technology, the Domestic Nuclear Detection
Office, the National Science Foundation, and the Pacific Northwest
National Laboratory are all investigating different aspects of threat
detection.
The research and development activities occurring at these federal
agencies have the potential to both transform and improve threat
detection, and to create products and technologies that could be
beneficial for other purposes, such as nuclear applications for use in
medicine.
While I recognize that threat detection is only one piece of a much
larger system required to combat terrorism, better detection does
enable better protection for our citizens. As the old saying goes, an
ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.
I look forward to hearing more about the ongoing research designed
to improve physical threat detection, protect the public, and support
the development of marketable technologies.

Thank you to our witnesses for your willingness to testify before
us today.

I yield back my time.

Chairman Hall. I recognize Mrs. Johnson for an opening
statement.
Ms. Johnson. Thank you very much, Mr. Hall, and thank you
for calling this hearing to examine terrorist threat detection
technologies. Unfortunately, we live in a world where terrorist
threats are growing and we have to be prepared to detect and
respond to these threats.
I also want to thank our witnesses for being here today. We
certainly appreciate all that you are doing to advance threat
detection technology and to keep us safe from those who seek to
do us harm. Without a doubt, there is a lot of good work going
on in these areas and you all should be commended for the part
that you play in that.
There is no denying, of course, that this sort of good work
costs money. We are all so painfully aware that in recent
years, federal budgets have been tight and that funding has
been constrained. I am interested in hearing today about how
reduced or stagnant funding levels have hampered or challenged
your terrorist threat detection activities, if at all.
Sometimes with a little tighter belt, you can produce better
work. We will see. I am also interested in learning what steps
your agencies are taking to leverage the limited resources
available for these activities, and I am curious about how your
threat detection research is prioritized, not only within your
individual agencies, but across the Federal Government. I would
also like to learn more about how you are partnering with non-
federal entities to ensure that the most promising and most
impactful research is still being conducted and does not fall
victim to the budget wars we are waging here in Congress.
I have had the opportunity to review your written testimony
and am impressed by the technologies that have been developed
in recent years. However, for our purposes today, I am most
interested in learning about the challenges that remain, where
we ought to be making future investments, and what this
Committee can do to ensure that the new research is supported.
The truth is that we must stay at least one step ahead of the
terrorists and our threat detection research is our first line
of defense.
I also understand that there are challenges to deterring
terrorist threats that go beyond mere detection. We can have
the best threat protection technologies imaginable, but our
ability to thwart a terrorist attack rests on our capability to
interpret that threat and respond to it. I am interested in
hearing about what is being done throughout the Federal
Government to ensure that we respond appropriately when a
threat is detected and how, if at all, your agencies are
feeding into that process.
And finally, we cannot ignore the very important role that
social and behavioral sciences play in helping to keep us safe
from terrorist attacks. We need to understand more than just
the bomb or how to detect the bomb. We also need to understand
the bomb maker. We need to understand not only what motivates
someone to make or use that bomb, but also what specific groups
and which specific individuals are most likely to make and
attack us with that bomb. There is important social and
behavioral science work going on in this area, including at the
Department of Homeland Security's Science and Technology
Directorate, at the National Science Foundation, and through
the federally supported National Consortium for the Study of
Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, and I hope that we will
have an opportunity to touch on this important research today.
Again, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for holding the hearing
and I yield back the balance of my time.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Johnson follows:]

Prepared Statement of Ranking Member Eddie Bernice Johnson

Thank you, Chairman Hall, for calling this hearing to examine
terrorist threat detection technologies. Unfortunately, we live in a
world where terrorist threats are growing and we have to be prepared to
detect and respond to these threats.
I also want to thank our witnesses for being here today. We
certainly appreciate all that you are doing to advance threat detection
technology and to keep us safe from those who seek to do us harm.
Without a doubt, there is a lot of good work going on in this area and
you all should be commended for your part in that.
There is no denying, of course, that this sort of good work costs
money. We are all painfully aware that, in recent years, Federal
budgets have been tight and that funding has been constrained. I am
interested in hearing today about how reduced or stagnant funding
levels have hampered your terrorist threat detection activities, if at
all.
I am also interested in learning what steps your agencies are
taking to leverage the limited resources available to you for these
activities. I am curious about how your threat detection research is
prioritized--not only within your individual agency, but also across
the Federal Government. I would also like to learn more about how you
are partnering with non-Federal entities to ensure that the most
promising and most impactful research is still being conducted and does
not fall victim to the budget wars we are waging here in Congress.
I have had the opportunity to review your written testimony and am
impressed by the technologies that have been developed in recent years.
However, for our purposes today, I am most interested in learning about
the challenges that remain, where we ought to be making future
investments, and what this Committee can do to ensure that this new
research is supported. The truth is that we must stay at least one step
ahead of the terrorists and our threat detection research is our first
line of defense.
I also understand that there are challenges to deterring terrorist
threats that go beyond mere detection. We can have the best threat
detection technologies imaginable, but our ability to thwart a
terrorist attack rests on our capacity to interpret that threat and
respond to it. I am interested in hearing about what is being done
throughout the Federal Government to ensure that we respond
appropriately when a threat is detected and how, if at all, your
agencies are feeding into that process.
Finally, we cannot ignore the very important role that social and
behavioral sciences play in helping to keep us safe from terrorist
attacks.
We need to understand more than just the bomb or how to detect the
bomb. We also need to understand the bomb maker. We need to understand
not only what motivates someone to make or use that bomb, but also what
specific groups and which specific individuals are most likely to make
and attack us with that bomb. There is important social and behavioral
science work going on in this area, including at the Department of
Homeland Security's Science and Technology Directorate, at the National
Science Foundation, and through the federally-supported National
Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. I
hope that we will have an opportunity to touch on this important
research today.

Chairman Hall. And I thank you, and I thank you for the
warnings. As a matter of fact, in Bulgaria just yesterday, I am
told that Israeli citizens were attacked and seven killed and
about 30 injured, so we have these things to read about, hear
about and be warned about. I think our hearing is very timely,
and I thank you for yielding back.
If there are Members who wish to submit additional opening
statements, your statements can be added to the record at this
time or before we complete our hearing today.
Now I would like to introduce our panel of witnesses. I
have already thanked you, and I will do that again. Our first
witness is Dr. Richard Cavanagh, the Director of the Office of
Special Programs at the National Institute of Standards and
Technology. Dr. Cavanagh is responsible for measurement science
and standards in biology, chemistry and material science.
Our second witness is Dr. Huban Gowadia, the Acting
Director for the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office at the
Office of Homeland Security. In this role, Dr. Gowadia oversees
integration of interagency efforts for technical and nuclear
detection and forensics. In addition, she directs the
Department's radiological and nuclear detection capabilities.
Our next witness is Dr. Anthony Peurrung, the Associate
Laboratory Director for the National Security Directorate at
the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. Dr. Peurrung has
been with the National Security Directorate since 1994 during
which time he has done research on a variety of topics
including special nuclear material detection.
Our final witness for today is Dr. Thomas Peterson, the
Assistant Director for the Directorate for Engineering at the
National Science Foundation. Dr. Peterson helps guide the
Directorate in its mission of supporting fundamental and
transformative research that enhances the competitiveness of
the United States.
As our witnesses know, spoken testimony is limited to five
minutes but we appreciate you so much and thank you so much, we
are not going to hold you to that. Just do your best, and
whatever you do, you will not be gaveled down. Nobody has a
hook that will reach for or anything. Just help us because we
need you and we appreciate you.
I now recognize the witnesses to present their testimony.
Dr. Cavanagh, you are recognized for five minutes to present
your testimony, sir.

STATEMENT OF DR. RICHARD CAVANAGH, DIRECTOR,

OFFICE OF SPECIAL PROGRAMS, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF

STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY

Dr. Cavanagh. Chairman Hall, Ranking Member Johnson and
Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to
appear before you today to discuss the important role that the
Department of Commerce's National Institute of Standards and
Technology, NIST, plays in threat detection technologies. Today
we are driven to detect and respond to threats in ways that are
faster, more definitive and rely on multiple detection
technologies.
As new threats emerge, new detection techniques are often
needed to ensure the safety of the American public. It is in
this mission space that NIST works to support industry and
other federal agencies in meeting these measurement and
standards challenges.
My testimony will today highlight NIST's role and give
examples of NIST's work where the application of our
measurement and standards expertise has helped assure the
quality and reliability and advance the state-of-the-art
detection methods used to protect the Nation.
NIST is responsible for developing and validating
measurement methods and standards that will allow industry to
accurately and reproducibly assess their processes and
products. So when the Department of Homeland Security needed to
facilitate manufacturer-independent transfer of information
from radiation measurement instruments for use in homeland
security applications, as well as for detection of illicit
trafficking of radioactive materials, they called on NIST, and
a test and evaluation program for detection equipment was
established.
NIST is also working with DHS in the development of
standards to address the mandate in the SAFE Port Act to
protect our ports from chemical, biological, nuclear and
explosive threats. To this end, NIST has applied its experience
in the development of calibration standards and measurements to
help DHS and private-sector standards organizations develop a
test and evaluation program to measure and characterize the
sensitivity of portal monitors that are used to scan shipping
containers for radiation and nuclear threats.
NIST works closely with agencies such as DHS, DOD and DOJ,
which are responsible for anticipating emerging threats to
remain attuned to the threats that are on the horizon and
develop appropriate measurement assurance plans in
collaboration with those lead agencies. An example of this kind
of interaction can be seen in the recently released National
Strategy for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and
Explosive Standards that was jointly developed with DHS, EPA
and NIST. In addition, NIST is currently working with DHS to
develop common test methods for chemical, biological,
radiological and nuclear commercial off-the-shelf equipment.
This effort will avoid duplication in testing efforts across
several government agencies.
To protect travelers, NIST has worked on standards for
swipe sampling for trace explosives. An example of this method
is deployed in airports where objects are swiped with a cloth
that is then quickly analyzed. Working with DHS, NIST has
developed standard methods for swipe sampling for biologics
such as suspicious white powders and for trace explosives.
These methods have been dramatically improved through
developments in measurement science.
NIST continues to make advances in this space, and we are
currently working on solving the measurement challenges that
must be overcome to incorporate trace explosive detection
methods into card readers and to assist local, state and
federal agencies in the detection and response to chemical and
biological threats.
In the wake of the anthrax attacks, the first-responder
community needed better guidance and protocols to enable
effective detection of biothreat agents during response and
decontamination operations. Working with DHS and standards
organizations, NIST led the effort to develop the standard for
the collection of suspected biological threat agents and for
the initial response to suspected threats. Work at NIST is also
being done in the development of systems to detect trace
amounts of chemicals or toxins in air and water.
Standards are important in quantifying the level of
confidence that can be placed in any data. NIST's focus is on
the measurements. With deep expertise in dealing with
measurement repeatability and uncertainty in such wide-ranging
areas as chemical, nuclear, biological and explosives, we are
well positioned to support the measurement assurance needs of
academia, industry and other federal agencies. We do this
through development of standards, guidance, calibrations and
reference materials and by providing technical advice when and
where needed.
In conclusion, NIST expertise in measurement science and
standards is playing a recognized role in providing the country
with robust threat detection capabilities.
Thank you again for the opportunity to testify today. I
would be happy to answer any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Cavanagh follows:]

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Chairman Hall. I do thank you, and I thank you a good
opening statement because that indicates to us, I think, the
importance of your testimony here today, important not just to
this Committee or to this Congress but to people everywhere.
You know, we start our weeks off going through detection
equipment. I go through Dallas, and it seems like they have
different rules every doggone Monday. I was so pleased when
they told me last Monday that if I was born before 1982, I
could keep my shoes on, and you know, you have to be careful. I
am sure those things are important, but this is what people are
watching and looking for and complaining about, and I think
this is probably one of the most important hearings that we are
going to have to date as far as the rest of the people, all the
people, a majority of the people are interested in.
So with that, I recognize Dr. Gowadia to present her
testimony, and I hope I have been pronouncing your name right.
Dr. Gowadia. You have, sir. Thank you.
Chairman Hall. You are recognized for five minutes.

STATEMENT OF DR. HUBAN GOWADIA, ACTING DIRECTOR,

DOMESTIC NUCLEAR DETECTION OFFICE,

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Dr. Gowadia. Good morning, Chairman Hall, Ranking Member
Johnson and distinguished Members of the Committee. Thank you
for this opportunity to discuss advances we have made in
science supporting nuclear threat detection at the Department
of Homeland Security's Domestic Nuclear Detection Office. At
DNDO, with its singular focus on nuclear terrorism, we work
with federal, state, local, tribal, international and private-
sector partners to reduce the risk by making nuclear terrorism
a prohibitively difficult undertaking for our adversaries.
Our ability to counter the nuclear threat is fundamentally
based on the critical triad of intelligence, law enforcement
and technology. DNDO contributes to this mission by analyzing
and coordinating the global nuclear detection architecture and
implementing its domestic component. We also conduct research,
development, test and evaluation for threat detection
technology, acquire and deploy it, and support and assess its
operation once it is in the field. To maximize our ability to
detect and interdict nuclear threats, it is imperative that we
apply these technologies and operations that are driven by
intelligence indicators and place them in the hands of well-
trained law enforcement and public safety personnel.
Consequently, we are focusing on an architecture that is
capable of surging in response to credible information that
indicates an imminent threat to our national security. This
means that nuclear detection capabilities must be robust,
flexible, agile and well-coordinated. We have steadily
increased our collaboration with the intelligence community. By
sharing information, personnel and requirements we continue to
improve our ability to successfully bring technologies to bear
on the nuclear detection mission.
The success of our detection architecture is also dependent
on the work and vigilance of law enforcement and public safety
personnel who are appropriately trained and well-equipped for
this mission. Not only is DNDO setting the training standards
and building the curricula necessary to train frontline
operators, we support the technological breakthroughs that give
them the necessary nuclear search and detection tools.
For example, DNDO led the development of a next-generation
radioisotope identification device. We worked closely with our
partners to identify key operational requirements that drove
the new system design. It is based on an enhanced detection
material, lanthanum bromide, and coupled with improved
algorithms. This new hand-held technology is easy to use,
lightweight and more reliable, and because it has built-in
calibration and diagnostics, it has a much lower annual
maintenance cost.
One of our interagency leadership successes has been our
response to the helium-3 shortage. Thanks to our research,
development, test and evaluation efforts, DNDO has proven that
alternative technologies for neutron detectors are both
feasible and now available for integration into radiation
portal monitors. Importantly, due to a collaborative
government-wide effort, our U.S. strategic reserve of helium-3
has increased 40 percent since 2009.
Of course, an adversary can complicate the detection
mission by shielding or masking the nuclear threat. To address
shielded nuclear threats, DNDO has several projects underway.
One, the Shielded Nuclear Alarm Resolution project, seeks to
develop and characterize advanced active interrogation systems
with improved ability to uniquely detect special nuclear
material and to resolve alarms with confidence, even in the
presence of significant countermeasures. As we implement a more
agile architecture, we will need cost-effective detectors that
can be widely deployed and detection systems that can search
wide areas, even in the most challenging environments such as
along our land, air and sea borders.
Such challenges require new materials that can be applied
in novel concepts of operation. DNDO successes here include
exploiting emerging detector crystals such as strontium iodide
and cesium lithium yttrium chloride to improve our detection
localization and identification of radiation sources.
DNDO's technology contributions to the global nuclear
detection architecture start with cutting-edge research,
predominantly executed through our transformational and applied
research portfolio which lays the foundation for our
development mission. This results in a program of progression
that touches almost every one of DNDO's directorates. Paramount
to this technical progression is our rigorous test and
evaluation program that assesses equipment against established
national and international standards.
DNDO is able to strengthen the security triad of
intelligence, law enforcement and technology because of our
integrated and holistic approach to the nuclear threat
detection mission. Our disciplined and singular focus on
nuclear counterterrorism is reinforced by a rigorous systems
development process and anchored by the skills and knowledge of
our interagency staff of scientists, engineers, current and
former law enforcement and military personnel, intelligence
professionals and policy experts.
Thank you again for this opportunity to discuss DNDO's
efforts to protect our Nation from the nuclear threat. I will
be happy to answer any questions from the committee.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Gowadia follows:]

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Chairman Hall. And we thank you, Dr. Gowadia.
I now recognize Dr. Peurrung for five minutes to present
his testimony.

STATEMENT OF DR. ANTHONY PEURRUNG,

ASSOCIATE LABORATORY DIRECTOR,

NATIONAL SECURITY DIRECTORATE,

PACIFIC NORTHWEST NATIONAL LABORATORY

Dr. Peurrung. Chairman Hall, Ranking Member Johnson and
distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for the
opportunity to contribute today. I have devoted much of my
career to ensuring that science has impact on national security
missions and therefore it is an honor and a pleasure to testify
on the critical role of science in the development of threat
detection technology.
DOE's science laboratories strive to accelerate the rate of
innovation, steward unique national capabilities and leverage
our science base for the benefit of missions such as energy and
security. Success also requires that we bring together
university and industrial partners as well as a deep
understanding of operational missions. The threat detection
research programs at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
nicely illustrate how these objectives can come together.
We have scientific strengths and historic capabilities with
roots in the Manhattan Project. In this setting, the lab has
grown such that roughly half of our activity is focused in
support of national security. Threat detection research has
been central in this and remains an area where science plays a
critical role. I am particularly proud of our work to deliver
transformational change in the longer run so that grand
challenges are addressed and our country will be ahead of its
adversaries.
I will illustrate these points now with three examples. The
role of science in the area of ultra-sensitive nuclear
detection has been particularly rich and distinguished. Over
four decades our ability to detect trace nuclear materials has
improved dramatically to the point that we can now measure
radioactive materials 100 million times less concentrated than
those naturally present in this room. This effort is supported
not only by security mission stakeholders but also by DOE's
Office of Science as part of their fundamental physics
programs. Shortly after the tragedy of Fukushima, we were able
to detect the leading edge of a radioactive plume over U.S.
territory, providing timely and critical information to
decision makers.
My second example is detection materials. A helium-3
shortage recently threatened to diminish our national ability
to detect nuclear threats. In conjunction with industry and
several federal agencies, the DOE labs played critical roles in
driving innovation and evaluating technology so that today
needs are met with commercial instrumentation that does not
consume precious helium-3. For the longer run, we are focused
on the science that will explain how and why radiation
detection materials function as they do. This will accelerate
the future discovery of useful new materials.
Airport security provides my final example. Millimeter wave
scanning dates back to the 1960s when researchers pioneered the
development of optical and acoustic holography. While this
technology was transitioned to commercial production, we retain
capability that still drives innovation today. In the future,
we anticipate providing the ability to detect concealed objects
under a much wider range of scenarios. DHS and DOD, for
example, have jointly supported a collaboration that promises
to enable standoff detection of person-borne threats in crowds.
Our combination of chemical science and explosives detection
capability are leading to other breakthroughs such as novel
vapor detection methods and novel X-ray signatures. Our vision
is for a future with airport security technology that performs
better and has less operational impact.
I have attempted to suggest attributes that are common to
successful threat detection research programs. These include
integration of world-class scientific capability and applied
research. There must be effective collaboration with industry
and mission users to ensure long-term impact. There should be a
range of federal sponsors who each leverage and build upon what
has come before.
Largely because of the strength of our national science
base and its effective application to threat detection, we
continue to be global leaders in this area. Ten years ago, a
National Academy of Sciences report stated: ``strengthening the
national effort in long-term research that can create new
solutions should be a cornerstone of the strategy for
countering terrorism.'' I believe this has occurred with
considerable benefit to our national security.
There are challenges as well. Science programs are not
always easily integrated with threat detection research because
of cultural differences between science that is open and global
and programs that are frequently sensitive. The DOE science
labs are ideally suited to take on this challenge, and I assure
the Committee that the leadership team at Pacific Northwest
National Lab will do so.
I would also add that science center threat detection
programs are fragile. They can be harmed not only by the
inevitable fluctuations in funding support but also by rapid
shifts in the leading threat of the day or by excessively
short-term objectives. I recommend that strategic stewardship
of our threat detection research capabilities and the science
that underlies them remain a high federal priority. I am
optimistic that the tremendous benefits of science-driven
innovation will continue to make our Nation safer. We will
continue to develop threat detection technologies that are more
effective and operationally attractive. We will retain an
ability to react rapidly to new changing or elevated threats.
I thank the Committee again for your time and attention.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Peurrung follows:]

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Chairman Hall. And I thank you.
And at this time I recognize our final witness for today,
Dr. Peterson.

STATEMENT OF DR. THOMAS PETERSON,

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, DIRECTORATE FOR ENGINEERING,

NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION

Dr. Peterson. Thank you, Chairman Hall, Ranking Member
Johnson and other distinguished Members of the Committee. It is
an honor to be able to testify before you today on this topic
of threat reduction and detection technologies.
I would like to briefly describe our efforts in this
research area, both in terms of the investments made
exclusively by NSF and in terms of important interagency
partnerships we have, particularly with the Department of
Homeland Security.
The primary mission of the Foundation is to support basic
research in science and engineering as well as advancements in
education in STEM disciplines. The NSF has the ability to reach
deeply into the academic community across a broad range of
areas to truly understand threat detection technologies
requires expertise not only in engineering and physical
sciences but in the life sciences, the social and behavioral
sciences, and education as well, and NSF serves all these
communities and our support in these areas taps into these
particular strengths.
First, let me talk about our investments within the
Foundation. A minimum of four directorates are heavily involved
in advancing our understanding of threat detection and they are
funded through engineering, computer information science and
engineering, math and physical sciences, and social, behavioral
and economic sciences. For example, the resilient and
sustainable infrastructures cluster within engineering focuses
on issues of importance in responding to both natural and
manmade disasters. We support work on sensors and sensor
networks, the fundamentals of sensor devices and technologies,
the use of bioelectronics, optical imaging and optical devices
based on metamaterials, and we support the development of
mathematical and statistical algorithms and methodologies that
are critical for these sophisticated sensor systems.
While much of the work continues to be supported through
the core programs within the NSF, there have been specialized
solicitations focusing exclusively on issues related to threat
detection, and those solicitations have been in partnership
with the Department of Defense and Department of Homeland
Security. In collaboration with the DOD, work supported
primarily by the math and physical sciences and social,
behavioral and economic sciences directorates have examined the
social and behavioral foundations of terrorism and the complex
mathematical and statistical aspects of threat scenario
analysis.
Perhaps our most significant contributions to this effort
have come about through a longstanding and productive
partnership with DHS. It is a program jointly executed by the
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office and NSF and it was
established via a memorandum of understanding in 2007. The
Academic Research Initiative, as it is called, seeks to advance
the fundamental knowledge for nuclear detection and related
sciences. It is about a $60 million effort that has been
groundbreaking collaboration between NSF and DHS on the
detection of domestic nuclear threats. Example awards support
the fundamentals behind methods to detect nuclear materials in
large cargo containers and low-cost, effective, portable
particle detectors that are systems to detect highly enriched
uranium and other specialized nuclear materials.
Not all research focuses on detector technology. Some
supported research utilizes a systems approach to design and
analyze systems for detecting nuclear material at our Nation's
ports. Collaborators at Texas A&M University conduct research
involving the integration of social science and policy factors
into detection systems, and efforts at UT Austin developed a
new class of stochastic interdiction models on transportation
networks. A second solicitation involving a DHS partnership, in
this case, the explosives division of the Science and
Technology Directorate, focused more specifically on explosives
and related threats.
In conclusion, NSF continues to support fundamental
research and education in science and engineering, particularly
for areas and ideas generated by the academic community. Our
ability to bring together a broad range of disciplines within
that academic community is particularly beneficial in
addressing complex issues such as the ones we are discussing
today. By marshaling our expertise and collaboration with the
strong mission-oriented foci of other agencies such as DHS, we
have been able to contribute significantly, I believe, to
advancing fundamental research relating to the detection of
physical threats to our Nation and its people. In challenging
budget times, partnerships such as this can often be
threatened. It is my hope that we can continue to work
collaboratively with our colleagues in DHS, DNDO and DOD and
other agencies and to make valuable contributions to knowledge
in this obviously important area.
I thank the Chairman and the Committee once again for the
opportunity to highlight NSF's contributions and I would be
happy to answer any questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Peterson follows:]

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Chairman Hall. All right, and we thank you, and I thank all
of you for your testimony. I remind Members that Committee
rules limit our questioning to five minutes. I certainly will
stay with the five minutes. At this time I will open the round
of questions, and I recognize myself for five minutes.
Secretary Napolitano has asked for a delay in compliance
with a 2007 requirement that all marine port cargo containers
be scanned prior to U.S. entry. I think you all are familiar
with that. And day to day we have complaints all across this
country as to how they search them, and some question searching
a 2-year-old, but we have knowledge and you all have the
knowledge that people have used their children sometimes
without any care or love of their own children to do harm to
the enemy, and the enemy is us.
And I understand that currently less than one percent of
the cargo is screened, and that is a frightening thing. I am
aware of the commercially developed technology that exists that
have the potential to help the government meet this
requirement, but my question is, is there a way to expedite
this process to find a solution more quickly? And do you
anticipate that this problem is going to be solved by
technologies developed by the government or by the private
sector? I will let any one of you--start off with you, Dr.
Cavanagh, if you would like to answer that. Go ahead and turn
your microphone on.
Dr. Cavanagh. I will get this straightened out, the high
technology.
I don't believe NIST has a contribution to make to this
question. I think my colleagues are better prepared to answer
that.
Chairman Hall. Okay. We gave you a chance.
Dr. Gowadia. Chairman Hall, probably the best part of DHS
to answer to this question is probably our partners our Customs
and Border Protection and our policy directorate. I do know
that we did a pilot, the notion of 100 percent scanning
overseas and there were some significant challenges that were
predominantly diplomatic challenges and some pushback from
international trade and possibly the need for border
reconfigurations should reciprocity be required of us. I do
believe that there are some technologies available for scanning
but scanning of cargo rapidly and efficiently continues to be a
bit of a challenge for us. So I think that is about as far as I
can go, and I think it would be a question best answered by the
Department itself.
Chairman Hall. Okay. And I thank you for that.
Dr. Peurrung. So I have personally been to foreign ports
and observed their operations largely in connection with our
laboratory's work for the NNSA's programs that involve global
security reduction, second line of defense, those kinds of
programs. It is clearly a significant challenge, what you
pointed out. I would only say that the laboratories are working
on advanced technology that should have an impact in the long
run. This is one of these hard problems that calls for
transformational technology. I can't promise anything in the
extremely short-term future but there is promise in the long
term.
Chairman Hall. All right, sir. Do you have anything to add
to it?
Dr. Peterson. No, I don't think NSF would have a specific
contribution in this area.
Chairman Hall. Okay. I still have time to ask another
question.
I hate to keep going back to the airports, but that is the
connection I have with the searches and the complaints are
based on things that happen at different airports, and the
public is probably most aware of threat detection technology at
the airport because people are flying right, left and sideways,
and I guess to what extent is threat detection today going on
behind the scenes and how is threat detection research and
development balanced between detecting materials carried by
individuals and detecting materials in cargo? Is there anyone
here that feels that they can give me an answer to that?
Dr. Gowadia. I will take a small shot at it.
Chairman Hall. I am glad they brought you.
Dr. Gowadia. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Hall. I am going to tell you a story about
searches too in just a moment when we have a little more time.
Go ahead.
Dr. Gowadia. I look forward to that.
At DNDO, we have worked very closely with our partners at
the Transportation Security Administration. Every one of their
VIPR teams, their visible--I should have this acronym down but
I don't. But their VIPER teams are equipped with rad-nuke
detection equipment and they are available to enter not just
into the airport system but also into the other transportation
modes domestically. So from a rad-nuke perspective, yes, we do
work with TSA on that count, and we of course do work with our
Customs and Border Protection colleagues to deploy detectors in
air cargo.
Chairman Hall. And I thank you. I yield back my time.
I recognize Ms. Johnson for her five minutes.
Ms. Johnson. Thank you very much.
You know, apparently we are doing a pretty good job since
we have not faced any real disaster since 2001, but I still am
very concerned about the behavioral science because like Mr.
Hall, much of my experience has been in airports, and there are
times when I see people who look the least interested or able
to be a threat--or just sometimes irritated to death by TSA.
So, I wonder whether or not there is some training that would
give the skills or encourage or at least alert, the employees
of the skills to look for behaviorally.
There are times when--we travel very often, weekly, going
back and forth, and many times we know, we get to know the
people who are there, and yet there is still an overabundance
of checking, and they have tried many times to do alternative
ways for frequent travelers and what have you, and I guess what
I need to understand is, what technologies or skill bases are
being used to detect behavioral changes, or observations that
can go along with the technology that would put a little bit of
common sense in some of it.
Dr. Peurrung. Well, what I would say in response to that
question, Ranking Member Johnson, is that it has long been
known that the skill of the operators of the technology and the
skill of the many professionals that are involved in security
operations in airports and other venues must be a critical part
of any technology system. They must be engaged in a technology
development process. At the end of the day, the technology is
valuable but it is their human skill. I am agreeing with you
that it has to be integrated with that system. That has been
known for a long time. I am not sure other than that that I
have a specific answer to your question.
Ms. Johnson. Thank you.
Dr. Peterson, in your testimony that you submitted, you
mentioned that the National Science Foundation award to the
University of Texas at Dallas on the substantive expertise,
strategic analysis and behavioral foundations of terrorism, and
you gave heard my previous question. I would like to know what
might be the expectations or what directions are you expecting
of that research?
Dr. Peterson. Well, I think I probably couldn't comment
very specifically on exactly that particular program in terms
of the details but I can say, as I mentioned in my testimony,
that it is quite clear that these kinds of challenges involve
not only scientific and engineering challenges but clear issues
related to social, behavioral and economic sciences. One of the
advantages that I think we have at the National Science
Foundation is the ability to reach in and to establish and
encourage and support partnerships across not only the
technical areas, the science and the engineering areas but the
social science and behavioral science areas. The one example
that you have of how engineers and scientists have collaborated
with the social sciences working in this.
So obviously, we don't have, you know, a whole lot of
direct expertise at the back end of these processes, that is,
knowing exactly the specifics of TSA protocols and so forth,
but I think we are conducting a fair amount of research at the
front end to understand more clearly how the social aspects
play a role in the scientific and technical aspects as well.
Ms. Johnson. Thank you very much.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Hall. The gentlelady yields back.
I recognize Ms. Biggert, the gentlelady from Illinois, for
five minutes, and thank you, Madam, for staying within your
five minutes.
Mrs. Biggert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Peurrung, how are the National Labs supporting industry
advancements in threat detection?
Dr. Peurrung. The National Labs are a resource to industry.
We are a partner to industry. There are times when industry--
there are many times when industry is the absolutely, you know,
central role in developing threat detection technology but
there may be operational capabilities that they may lack. There
may be sort of scientific or technological breadth that they
may lack so there are many times when a partnership between a
laboratory and industry is warranted. The laboratories have no
interest in competing with industry, no interest in
manufacturing things as a general rule, and therefore, you
know, as the technologies mature, we often start looking to
industry, American industry, as a way to hand that off and make
that a win. Also, industry can provide the sustaining
capability in the long run, again, as I said in my testimony,
to ensure impact.
Mrs. Biggert. Do the industries--or how often do they come
to you to conduct work for them, or vice versa, how many times
do you go to the industry?
Dr. Peurrung. It is a fairly frequent thing both ways.
Mrs. Biggert. Then Dr. Gowadia, it seems like a lot of the
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office work is coordinated with
other nations. How does the U.S. research and development in
nuclear threat detection compare to other nations?
Dr. Gowadia. I have to say we take the lead on a lot of
things. For instance, in the Global Initiative to Counter
Nuclear Terrorism, which is a partnership between the United
States and Russia, we certainly lead the efforts to provide
national architectures, to provide best practices for nation-
states to provide their own--to develop and implement their own
capabilities and strengths, not just through the detection
mission but also in the nuclear technical forensics mission.
Mrs. Biggert. Thank you.
Then just for anybody, how is the facial recognition
technology being integrated into the threat detection, if at
all? Is that being used?
Dr. Peterson. Maybe I could just give one very quick
example.
Mrs. Biggert. Dr. Peterson, yes.
Dr. Peterson. And this is also related to the question of
interacting with industry. We have a number of programs within
the Foundation that are center programs that involve
collaborations not only with universities but also with
industry. One example of one of our industry-university
cooperative research centers, which is housed at West Virginia
University, looks at biometric systems trying to address and
focus on this particular issue that you are asking about. That
is just one example of universities and industry working
together.
Mrs. Biggert. Thank you.
Then research and development seems to be so important to
everyone, and I think there are a lot of collaborative projects
going on, but is there something that is unique contribution to
the threat detection research and development in your agency?
Maybe Dr. Cavanagh, is it something unique?
Dr. Cavanagh. We have been involved in developing a
strategy for the standards that are needed across the board but
we don't do that in isolation. We do that very closely with
other agencies. I don't think within our agency we have a
standalone program to speak to.
Ms. Biggert. Is there anybody that does?
Dr. Gowadia. I guess the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office
actually is a rather unique construct insofar as we have a
singular focus on the nuclear threat and we integrate efforts
not just in research and development but all the way from the
planning and the strategic, research, development, test and
evaluation, putting detectors in the field, supporting the
detectors once they are in the field. So we do have this unique
larger breadth that makes sure that the research and
development is well balanced and we don't sacrifice future for
present.
Mrs. Biggert. Going back to our work with Russia, and
certainly there is always--there has been right now to reduce
all of the nuclear weapons in both countries and to do that.
Does that have anything to do with the detection?
Dr. Peurrung. Well, that effort is part of the overall
multilayered approach to global security. If you can catch the
material at its origin, that is one of the easiest steps in the
overall process.
Mrs. Biggert. Thank you very much.
I yield back.
Chairman Hall. I thank you.
And the Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from Maryland,
Ms. Edwards, for around five minutes.
Ms. Edwards. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you very
much to our witnesses.
I mean, I do think, as the Chairman and Ranking Member have
indicated, the challenges that we face--and we keep describing
it as a post-9/11 world but this is actually just the world
that we are going to live in--and that we have lived in, and,
you know, they are unique and they are great. But it does seem
to me that even, you know, looking at the news of the tragedy
in Bulgaria yesterday, that the threats are always changing,
there are new methods that are being employed, and a lot of
what we see currently is not sort of the high-tech stuff, it is
the low-tech stuff. It involves behavior and analyzing human
behavior and looking at the dynamics of, you know, sort of
culture and people and those sort of things. And yet in this
environment of budget constraints, it seems that a lot of our
resources, because it is expensive, goes to the nature of the
really big threats that are high-tech, that require a lot more
sophistication in terms of research and analysis. And so I
wonder how you prioritize in this kind of constrained fiscal
environment, where you place emphasis in terms of research. I
think about the Center of Excellence at the University of
Maryland and the START program--which I think is really, you
know, a useful way to begin to analyze some of the, you know,
globally what is happening on that more behavioral human
front--but it is not, you know, it requires obviously high-tech
data and research, but it is looking at a whole bunch of things
that are not the kind of nuclear and chemical and biological
threats that we have spent a lot of time today talking about.
And so I wonder, particularly from NIST and DHS, if you can
give us a sense of what you can do with constrained budgets to
place priorities where we see most of the threat.
Dr. Gowadia. If it is okay, we will go with DHS first on
that answer. When it comes to the behavioral aspects, at DNDO
in particular, we are beginning to look at deterrents theory
and analysis. And this is one of the projects that we would
have liked to work with our partners at NSF this year, but had
to be delayed on account of some of the budget cuts until next
year.
But I would like to draw you back to something I mentioned
in my oral testimony is--we do not look at this problem
singularly from the lens of technology. It is close coupled to
intelligence information and law enforcement skills. So we are
able to bring our detectors to bear, search for nuclear
material and weapons--when we have credible information. We are
able to leverage not just the technology element, but knowing
that the intelligence community will give us some information.
And I cannot stress the invaluable law enforcement skills that
are honed day in and day out in our partners.
Dr. Cavanagh. From a NIST perspective, most of what we
bring is measurement science and physical standards and
calibrations, and when we get guidance from an agency like
DNDO--where there is a need for such metrology support--
touching into the social sciences I think we would be
responsive but we are not in a very good position to take a
lead on that.
Ms. Edwards. Hasn't DNDO faced about 38 percent in cuts
from last fiscal year to the current fiscal year? I mean, I
don't know what you do when your budget is cut 38 percent and
you are supposed to figure out how to do all of this research.
Dr. Gowadia. Well, one of the things we tried to do was to
sort of stretch out and bridge programs as best we could. The
President's 2013 budget request does try to restore our
research and development portfolio back to a healthy level. We
took actually the predominant cut in our long-term research
program, and so again, one of our extremely powerful programs,
our academic research initiative, bore some of the brunt and we
had to diminish our ability to support students, almost 40 of
them this year. That was hard.
Ms. Edwards. Well, I hope we are going to take a look at
the vulnerability that we put ourselves in when we make cuts
like that--that tend to be across the board but actually go to
the thing that will most enable us to analyze threats, detect
them, and prevent them in the future, and with that, I yield.
Chairman Hall. I thank the gentlelady, and I recognize the
gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Hultgren, for five minutes.
Mr. Hultgren. Thank you so much. Thank you all for being
here too. I really appreciate the work that you are doing. This
is a very important topic for us to be discussing, and I think
it is a really important intersection as well for us to be
talking about how science is important to our safety right now,
so thank you so much.
A couple questions I have just to see if any of you have
any thoughts on this. But I wonder how the technologies we are
discussing today work within the wider systems approach to
protecting the public from dangerous materials, and I wonder
also how are the technology end-users and screeners involved in
the development processes?
Dr. Peurrung. So when a question comes up about how the
technologies work in the wider system perspective, that makes
me think of again the point that mission-user input, early in
the process mission-user engagement is absolutely critical. Of
course, they should be setting the requirements, but beyond
that, they should be providing feedback to the technology
developers and the scientists at every stage of the process, if
possible, because all too many good technologies struggle when
it comes to the point of being deployed into the field.
Early in my career when I was a researcher, I learned early
on that a technology in the field could have two, maybe three
lights on it. It could have a red light, fail; it could have a
green light, pass; and maybe a yellow light to say something
else is wrong with the system, and that is a real shock to a
Ph.D. researcher who has come out of school and is used to
hundreds of knobs and dials. So that is an important thing to
get right from the beginning.
Dr. Gowadia. Well, at DNDO, sir, we have what we call our
solution development process, and it is a rather rigorous
process that brings the operators in, as Dr. Peurrung just
mentioned, early on to help define not just the mission need
but the early requirements, et cetera. We use their input all
the way through. They are part of the test program. In fact,
they are beginning to move further and further down into our
science elements now where advanced technology demonstrations,
we are bringing the users in, getting feedback and doing more
research before we advance the technologies so we know that we
are putting technology out that will meet their needs and
building collaboration with them.
Mr. Hultgren. Can you give us something a little bit more
specific? And the Chairman referenced the travel that we all do
and we are back and forth every single week pretty much out
here, and one of the things I have seen both here in DC. and
even earlier in O'Hare where I travel through is the expansion
of the whole-body imaging systems that they are using, and I
just personally feel a little uncomfortable with that. It
struck me, my wife and I traveled recently, and I felt very
uncomfortable of having my wife go through that. I hear from
other people as well, just some privacy concerns, and I feel
like this is an ongoing challenge that we have is, we have got
technology but we also have a commitment to privacy and
respecting privacy. On top of that as well is just safety--
these are X-rays still and if you are going through every
single week, a couple times a week, I know it is very small
impact but if there is susceptibility to some of that
radiation, is there a problem there? So I guess I would just
ask you quickly if you could talk a little bit more about this
technology. Do you feel like the privacy concerns have been
adequately addressed, or could more be done to ease these
concerns so that we are doing everything we can to have safety
but at the same time protect privacy?
Dr. Peurrung. I don't know that I can personally offer
anything on finding the right balance between privacy concerns
and security concerns. As the technology developers,
unsurprisingly, our goal is to deliver the best possible system
from a technical point of view, and we did that, and before 9/
11 there were actually foreign deployments of that system by
other governments who had far less concern for privacy. After
9/11, of course, the equation changed, but I agree with the
premise of your question which is that privacy is a significant
issue. There certainly are ways to address it but finding that
right balance is, I am afraid, not appropriate for a national
laboratory to comment on.
Dr. Gowadia. Again, this is really for TSA and Science and
Technology to respond to, so I apologize, sir. I don't have a
clear answer for you today.
Mr. Hultgren. I think one of our challenges is getting
answers from TSA as well and having them be a part of our
discussions. I am pleased to serve on this Committee. I also
serve on the Transportation Committee and the Aviation
Subcommittee, and it has been one of our great frustrations is
to try and have them be a part of this discussion so we can
make plans. So I know the Chairman has been frustrated with
that and the chairman of the Transportation Committee has been
frustrated as well. So these are important. I understand and
respect your point of view as well, that your charge is to
create the best technology available. It is really our
responsibility to be that balancing agent, and when we don't
have all the information, it is very, very difficult for us to
do our job there of protecting those previously concerns and
security concerns and struggling to find that balance. So I
hope TSA will be more engaged in this process and be more
helpful.
My time is up. Chairman, thank you so much. I yield back.
Chairman Hall. And I thank you.
The Chair recognizes Mr. McNerney from California for five
minutes.
Mr. McNerney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Peurrung, about helium-3, I would just like to get a
basic idea how that works. Does the gamma radiation make that
nucleus unstable, which is easy to detect?
Dr. Peurrung. So a helium-3 neutron detector works because
the neutron, once it has been slowed by a process called
moderation, interacts with that helium-3 nucleus. It has an
exceptionally high propensity to have that interaction. That is
why helium-3 is special. And that releases a large amount of
energy that can be deposited in a very short spatial distance.
That is a unique thing, and that is how a helium-3 tube, we
call it, works. There are alternate technologies as we, both
Dr. Gowadia and I, described in our testimony, that work
through fundamentally the same physics. They just use different
materials that are non-gaseous. Helium-3 is a gas, which is why
it was along with something called a boron trifluoride tube
that some of the earliest technologies in neutron detection.
Mr. McNerney. Thank you.
Dr. Cavanagh, would you discuss the state of standards for
nuclear threat detection? Where are we with the creation of the
standards for the equipment or testing?
Dr. Cavanagh. In terms of testing for nuclear materials, we
have worked with DNDO to set up something like the National
Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program so industry and
detector providers for nuclear detectors can have those
detectors evaluated and their performance ascertained by an
independent party. So some of that is documentary standards.
Some of those are calibration standards. Some of those are
performance standards.
Mr. McNerney. Are standards being developed now for testing
or equipment for nuclear threat detection?
Dr. Cavanagh. Some of the standards that are in place are
public standards. Some of the standards are more sensitive and
they are still being developed to be more specific in terms of
requirements.
Mr. McNerney. Thank you.
Dr. Gowadia, how imminent is the nuclear terrorist threat
in this country?
Dr. Gowadia. That is a hard question to answer directly.
What I will tell you is, we look at the threat from start to
finish. So we look the availability of materials, terrorist-
expressed intent, couple that with expertise from the National
Labs and what they know about how those materials can be
fashioned into a weapon or a more imminent threat, and then we
analyze our architecture all the way from source to target and
see what capabilities we have defensively along the way. That
allows us to prioritize our efforts and drives our mission. So
it is a risk-based approach that we take based on all we hear
from the intelligence community and from the science world.
Mr. McNerney. So how--what kind of cooperation are we
getting from our international partners? I mean, it seems the
best place to stop a nuclear device from entering our port is
to stop it before it leaves the port of origin. Are we having a
good amount of cooperation with other nations in terms of
developing techniques to make that a reality?
Dr. Gowadia. So we do work within not just the IAEA
construct, but also the State Department--the global initiative
construct--to actually work with nation-states to begin to give
them best practices on securing their materials. So we are
further back in the chain, not just starting at the ports. We
look right where the material is. And the DOE certainly--and
Dr. Peurrung could probably speak to this--has a lot of
programs overseas that look at essentially the first line of
defense on how can the material not leave the foreign nations
on its way here.
Mr. McNerney. Are we getting good cooperation from those
nations?
Dr. Gowadia. In the global initiative, yes, we are. We
have--and the IAEA in particular--has been rather a champion of
our best practices.
Mr. McNerney. Dr. Peurrung?
Dr. Peurrung. Yeah, my laboratory worked in over 110
countries in a recent fiscal year and that is largely the
result of NNSA international--we call them international
deployment programs--and I would say yes. Of course there are
degrees to this, but there is a lot of great cooperation from
our international partners.
Mr. McNerney. Thank you.
Dr. Peterson, one last question. Do you believe that the
federal agencies are using research findings as they become
available, or is there a huge lag in deploying technology that
is known from academic research?
Dr. Peterson. Well, I think there are certainly
opportunities to better the so-called lab-to-marketplace
transition, and as you probably know, there are new programs at
the National Science Foundation and in other federal agencies
that are trying to address that particular issue. I do think it
is important in this issue, as well as others, to have strong
research ties to industry and to not only develop what people
would call applied research portfolios based on that, but also
to have their basic research and fundamental research
activities be integrated and tied to potential applications. So
I think we have tried to address those issues in different ways
and I do think it is important, yes.
Mr. McNerney. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman Hall. And I thank you and I recognize Dr. Cravaack
from Minnesota, five minutes.
Mr. Cravaack. I think that is above my pay grade, sir, but
I will take it. Thank you.
Thank you to a very distinguished panel for being here
today. I appreciate all that you are doing, and I have just a
small smidgen of probably what you are talking about, so I
appreciate everything that you are doing for us. But one of the
things I do know a little bit about is education, and Dr.
Gowadia, in referencing your testimony, it is obvious the types
of research that you perform in the division of mathematical
sciences necessitates a strong STEM educational background with
people that you work with. Do you find that you have enough
qualified STEM-educated Americans to produce the types of
mathematical research, algorithms, statistical methodology to
develop the new threat technologies that you are speaking
about?
Dr. Gowadia. Thank you, Congressman. Yes, actually we have
two programs at DNDO specifically addressing ensuring this
expertise pipeline for the United States government at large.
The first is the Academic Research Initiative, which you have
heard Dr. Peterson speak about, and the second is a
congressionally-mandated program where we look at the forensics
expertise pipeline close coupled with the laboratories. There
we are setting up these career paths for these young engineers
and scientists so that we can retain that expertise and have it
brought to bear on our mission.
Mr. Cravaack. How deep do you reach down? What age groups
are you talking about here?
Dr. Gowadia. We go all the way to undergraduates, all the
way to the graduate system, postdocs, even professors. We
support their efforts.
When we select our proposals, sir, we make sure that it is
not just--it has technical merit but also we look at the
coupling of, are they supporting enough students.
Mr. Cravaack. Thank you.
Dr. Peterson, it is my belief that we should reach even
further down than that. I mean, we need to capture these kids
early on and get them hooked on science, so to speak. What is
your opinion on that?
Dr. Peterson. Absolutely, and let me just say a little bit
more about this, the program that we have in partnership with
DNDO. The proposals that are submitted for this partnership are
submitted to the National Science Foundation and are reviewed
by the NSF merit review process, and it looks not only at the
technical merit of the proposals but also at what we call
broader impacts. That does specifically have to do with one's
ability to articulate how important that research is in other
areas, not just to the researchers that are actually conducting
the work. And many faculty members and students in universities
do that through interaction with pre-college opportunities,
whether they be middle schools, elementary schools and so
forth. So while we don't have a very specific program that is
designed just explicitly to do that through this DNDO
partnership, I would say that many of the research projects
that we do support in this partnership have educational
components that reach into the pre-college arena.
Mr. Cravaack. I think it is vital. One of the things that I
think that we need to do, and I agree with one of my colleagues
that just spoke about this, is we have to have a renewed
emphasis on STEM in our country. Dr. Peurrung, did you want to
comment?
Dr. Peurrung. I would just agree strongly with your
comment, and the laboratories in general also have a role to
play here. Battelle, that operates our laboratory, have played
a critical role in standing up a STEM-based high school in
Richland that we hope is a model and also in working to reform
the science and math curriculum with the partnership of the
State of Washington.
Mr. Cravaack. I think it is vital. It is my hope that we
continue to develop STEM-type of initiatives like the National
Flight Academy down in Pensacola, Florida, spending time on a
simulated aircraft carrier to get kids hooked on what it takes
to fly an airplane or, you know, what it takes to navigate a
ship or build a ship and the technologies associated with it.
So I truly believe that capturing these kids early on where
it is cool to be an engineer, it is cool to be a scientist and
how much we value science and technology in this country. So I
think it is one of the major--the kids hold the future, and we
want to make sure they are part of that.
Dr. Cavanagh, it seems like you want to say something.
Dr. Cavanagh. NIST also is very much engaged in STEM. We
have had roughly 175 students over each summer at NIST. We also
have--in terms of reaching down, we also have a small program
for middle-school teachers, science teachers to bring them and
engage them with what is currently going on.
Mr. Cravaack. You hit the nail on the head. Not only is it
important that we educate, you know, our children but we also
have to get those great teachers, those fantastic teachers that
can turn some young kid interested into the mathematics and
sciences of this great country of ours.
So thank you very much for that comment, and it looks like
my time is up. It was a good subject, though. Thank you for
your comments, and I yield back.
Chairman Hall. I thank you.
The Chair recognizes Ms. Bonamici, the gentlelady from
Oregon, for five minutes.
Ms. Bonamici. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank
you all for your testimony and certainly for all the work that
you do to protect our national security.
Dr. Peurrung, you mentioned that the Pacific Northwest
National Laboratory was the first to detect trace amounts of
radioactive material over a U.S. territory after the Fukushima
tragedy. As someone who represents part of the Pacific
Northwest coast, I thank you for your work. I am asked on a
regular basis if there is radioactive materials in the tsunami
debris that is washing up on the shore, so let us work together
on that.
You also said in your testimony that approximately half of
your business is centered on national security missions. Can
you--I know there has been some talk about budget cuts. Can you
talk a little bit about how your laboratory has been impacted,
if at all, by recent cuts to the DHS Science and Technology
Directorate?
Dr. Peurrung. Well, the cuts to the DHS Science and
Technology Directorate are part--you know, that is one of our
many diverse markets--and certainly those cuts were
significant. My goal as a steward of capabilities of the
national lab is to manage through these fluctuations in funding
in a way that preserves the maximum amount of critical
capability. We have been largely able to do that. One of the
main reasons for that is that the capabilities that are funded
by DHS S&T would be things like chem and bio detection, cyber
infrastructure protection, things like that, that are also--as
I made the case in my testimony with any strong research
program--funded by a range of other federal sponsors. So at the
moment, there has really been what I would call moderate
impact. As with many DOE labs, we have had some reduction in
staffing, but really the capability preservation has been
fairly successful to this point.
That said, one more quick point. I think that the concern
going forward is again about strategic stewardship and
whether--in this era of budget cuts--whether there will be
excessive focus on the threat of the day or short-term
objectives.
Ms. Bonamici. Thank you very much.
And I know that many of the technologies that you all
invest resources in will be used by state and local law
enforcement and first responders, and there is of course a lot
of variation. What New York City needs may be very different
from what Cannon Beach, Oregon, needs. We had in Oregon a few
years ago TOPOFF 4, that was a simulated detonation of a
radiological dispersal device. Thousands of people participated
in that exercise, and part of that goal was to figure out the
communication needs with local responders.
So knowing that you are all engaged with Department of
Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate in setting
priorities, would you please talk about the current status of
coordination with state and local stakeholders in determining
that your research is lining up with their needs. Especially
given the budget difficulties, how will you improve engagement
with the state and local stakeholders to make sure that the
research is aimed at meeting their threat detection needs and
requirements? Thank you.
Dr. Gowadia. Well, I can speak to the Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office, not to the S&T Directorate. But for us, our
state and local partners are absolutely critical to what we do.
Again, I go back to that triad. I hate to beat my triad to
death but we can't do what we do without their law enforcement
skills and their willingness to accept our mission. So we work
very closely with them on individual bases. We go out into the
states and work all the way from the governor's office down
into the highway patrol.
I will give you a good example. Very early in DNDO's life,
we had a small program called the Southeast Transportation
Corridor Pilot, and Florida was one of the key partners there.
We started working with them early on, and Florida, of their
own accord, has now statewide rad-nuke detection enterprise. So
we worked with them on training, the detection technologies
they need. They have shaped the development of our new hand-
held system by actively engaging with us. Once they have alarms
in the field, we support them with the alarm resolution. We
have a joint analysis center that takes calls from the field
and works with the National Laboratories to give them advice on
how to respond to the alarm and deal with it.
And one other unique thing we have is our red team. So,
very often the state and local partners will call the red team
in to test themselves in the operational world and keep
building and growing. When DNDO started, I don't think half the
country had rad-nuke detection systems, but today more than
half of it does.
Mr. Bonamici. Thank you very much. Anyone else in
connection with local and state?
Dr. Peurrung. Well, we consider them to be again critical
mission users. We have an office in Seattle that is
particularly engaged with us, Northwest Region First
Responders, and in the interest of time, I will cut it there,
but they are critical mission users that we must collaborate
with.
Mr. Bonamici. Thank you very much.
My time is expired. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Hall. I thank you for yielding.
Congressman Benishek of the State of Michigan for five
minutes, sir.
Mr. Benishek. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks, members
of the panel. I really appreciate your being here. This is an
interesting subject.
I have a border district in northern Michigan, okay, and we
have, you know, a bridge to Canada and we have a river that,
you know, provides a border, and you know, I am concerned about
the threat across--somebody taking a boat across the river. Is
there any new technology, you know, other than just patrolling
the river that is available, you know, on bridges or on rivers
that would protect my district any better than just the patrol
boat? Can you enlighten me about that?
Dr. Gowadia. Well, sir, we have actually been working on
the water detection at DNDO, and we found some promising
capabilities for some standoff detection from a small boat to a
small boat, so we are beginning to invest a little bit further
in some of those technologies. What I will assure you is that
all Coast Guard boarding parties have rad-nuke detection
equipment, so when a Coast Guard vessel is available, they will
bring that capability with them, so you already do have some
coverage by way of your Coast Guard.
Mr. Benishek. Let me ask another question. What is the
most--what are the things that you are most worried about and
what is your highest threat from your point of view? Any one of
you if you have a comment but I am thinking of Dr. Gowadia
since you are with, you know, the radiation agency.
Mr. Gowadia. Right. So sir, we actually look at the global
nuclear detection architecture rather holistically. We try to
balance capability in all pathways so that there is something
in the air domain, something in the land domain, and certainly
something in the maritime domain. That is how we try to make
sure that there is as much capability put in place for
defensive measures against an adversary across the pathways.
Mr. Benishek. But there is not like one single thing that
you think is the most serious threat? I mean, in your own mind.
Dr. Gowadia. Those are some thoughts. Perhaps we can take
it to a closed room, sir.
Mr. Benishek. All right. I understand.
Dr. Peterson, you know, as a scientist myself, you know, I
see that this whole process must be bringing in tons of data
from, you know, all kinds of different sources, and it is of
some concern to me, you know, how do you--what is your process
for, you know, collating this data, making it translate into
policy? I mean, what is the timeline for that and what is the
process?
Dr. Peterson. That is a great question, and it is
applicable not only to this particular problem but to many
other areas of research right now. The whole issue of so-called
``big data'' and how do you deal with it, how do you best
process it, mine it, store it, make it accessible not only to
the researchers that collected it but to others. How do you
make it one set of data as easily accessible as another set so
that one can look at integrated sets. What I can say is that
the NSF is investing a fairly significant amount of money. Big
data is part of what we--you know, we love acronyms. There is a
cross-foundational program called CIF21. And this year, NSF in
partnership with other agencies launched a very specific focus
on how best to handle these large amounts of data and do the
analyses that we described. So I can't give you a specific
example for this particular problem, but it is certainly an
issue that we are trying to engage the academic community in
researching.
Mr. Benishek. Dr. Peurrung, do you have a thought?
Dr. Peurrung. Yeah, I would--I think it is useful to break
the challenge into three parts. I think they are all the
subject of a great deal of ongoing research. The first is, we
need new software tools that can make sense of the data,
combine different types of data, handle data volumes and
streams. The second is, we need computing architectures that
can cope in a reasonable time frame with the mind-boggling
amounts of data that are sometimes available. And the third is,
you need analytical environments and visualization tools so
that the human-computer interface gets to be more effective. So
there is sort of in my mind three fundamental challenges there.
Mr. Benishek. Do you have somebody scanning like private-
sector innovation and other government things? Do you have
somebody doing that on a daily basis, or how does that work?
Dr. Peurrung. This is one of those areas where we are
already in various collaborations with industry around this.
Mr. Benishek. At the end here, I have one more question.
You know, this bridge I am talking about, you know, since 9/11,
the traffic on it is so slow because of the risk and the
commerce that we have in northern Michigan across that bridge
has really changed due to the delays and everything. I
understand the increased risk of the security but the commerce
is definitely suffering for that, and is there ways that that
can be, you know, expedited? Is there any thoughts on that? Is
there any work on that trying to expedite the flow of traffic
on our border crossings to, you know, aid commerce?
Dr. Gowadia. Well, Congressman, I do know that in
everything we deploy from a security perspective, we do keep in
mind the flow of commerce and try very hard not to impact it.
Not knowing exactly what is impacting that bridge, I feel at a
little bit of a loss to help you with that. But we do consider
the flow of commerce in all our studies.
Mr. Benishek. All right. I guess my time is up. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Hall. And I thank you.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Lujan, the gentleman from New
Mexico.
Mr. Lujan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate the
panel very much.
The conversation about access to STEM for our students, I
appreciate that conversation, and I think it is an area we need
to highlight. Dr. Gowadia, I believe you talked about 40
interns that you weren't able to bring on or that you had to
let go because of budget cuts. We need to be cognizant of that.
As we talk about the need for more scientists, physicists and
experts in our fields, we have to understand that there is
impacts with budgetary cuts. And with that, what has been the
effect of the budget cuts? Have we lost research teams or
infrastructure that will be difficult or expensive to
reconstitute?
Dr. Gowadia. Congressman, fortunately this just been the
first year, and I do hope that the President's budget request--
where we tried to bring our scientists back to a healthy line--
is given favorable consideration. Fortunately, since this is
the first year, we have done everything possible to either
extend periods of performance, keep people going as long as
possible, and it hasn't come down to infrastructure loss yet.
But the cuts have impacted some of--for instance, we were not
able to give any new grants out at all this year in the
Academic Research Initiative. Of the 32 grants we had, we have
held 13 at 100 percent funding, or high-priority ones, and the
others are at about 50 to 60 percent funding, which is why we
had to drop 40 undergraduates this year.
Mr. Lujan. I appreciate that, and with emphasis on impact
to infrastructure yet. I think we need to be very aware of that
as well.
I am going to ask a line of questions that maybe we don't
talk about enough, and I am intrigued to find out how it
impacts what we are looking at when it comes to detection of
fissile material coming into the United States of those that
may want to do harm to our homeland. I am sure that you studied
behavior, organizational structure, trafficking patterns, areas
of vulnerability to the United States. You highlighted an
example of how you worked with Florida from the top down all
the way to law enforcement on the ground, and we understand how
these items may move.
I am extremely concerned that we still can't stop narcotics
from moving into the United States. It is clear that when the
Department of Homeland Security was created, and we look back
to 2004, the counter narcotics enforcement program was created
in 2004 by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention
Act. I think we saw then and we know now that there are very
much tied to one another. We constantly detect tunnels that are
being closed. We know now that there are submarines that are
not able to be detected by some of our radar capacity that are
moving in large amounts and volumes of narcotics as well. What
are we doing to take advantage or to employ technologies to
better understand behavior where the United States has serious
risks, serious threats--narcoterrorism cells that have been
tied by the intelligence community as well as the Department of
Homeland Security--to make sure we are stopping that activity
so that way we can better police what is happening with areas
of vulnerability with fissile material potentially entering the
country? And I would open that to anyone.
Dr. Gowadia. Again, sir, we look at the nuclear threat,
again not just from the pure technology element, but
intelligence-informed searches and surges. So in moving our
architecture and our architectural strategy away from the
notion of serendipitous encounter with larger detectors----
Mr. Lujan. Well, if I may, I apologize but time is running
out, I am not talking about serendipitous encounters associated
with narcotic flows. When I look at DNDO, they work to
determine gaps and vulnerabilities in the existing global
nuclear detection architecture and formal recommendations and
plans to develop enhanced architecture. DNDO also conducts, in
accordance with a long-term research and development program to
address, that complements what is happening with the Department
of Energy. I think Pacific Northwest Laboratory highlights the
work they do for DHS in addition to DOE and NNSA, as far as the
intelligence community. From a science perspective, the NSTC
Committee on Homeland and National Security provides guidance
and direction to the NSTC to increase the overall effectiveness
and productivity of federal R&D efforts in the area of science
and technology related to homeland and national security. All I
am suggesting is, if the stuff is going to move in, we know
where the dollars are going to support these terrorist cells.
It is not a big secret.
And, you know, I have other questions pertaining to helium-
3. I am extremely concerned associated with the shortages that
we have and how we can work with the National Labs, and we will
submit those into the record. All I am asking is, as we talk
with the experts and some of the smartest people that we have--
which many of them are right in front of us and those that you
work with--talking about data, computing, the analytical
responsibilities that we have as a country. There is a big
threat to our Nation, and I am suggesting that if we can't stop
this other stuff from entering the homeland, it only opens us
to more danger with what could happen with these other cells
looking to exploit these narco-terrorists, cartels from doing
bad.
And with that, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the indulgence
there and yield back my time. But I thank the panel very much.
Chairman Hall. And I thank the gentleman. He asked good
questions.
I am honored to recognize Mr. Rohrabacher for five minutes,
the gentleman from California.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman,
and I apologize. We have two hearings at exactly the same time.
They are both very important, and so I am coming a little late
to this one.
I can't help but notice that when we talk about budget
cuts, in fact, the Department of Homeland Security has had
budget increases overall. I am not talking about necessarily
your departments but there hasn't been a major budget cut. It
has gone from $55 million to 59, is it billion or million?
Billion. Fifty-five billion to $59 billion. And so when my
colleagues mention the budget cuts even under this
Administration, I don't--someone within the system then has
prioritized. If you are receiving less money for technology
development, they prioritize even in an expanding budget to
decrease your own, or maybe what is happening is, Mr. Chairman,
perhaps people are talking about a reduction in the increase,
which is a game that we have heard quite often over the years.
Mr. Chairman, when we expand our technological capabilities
for defense, it is a double-edged sword, and the double-edged
sword is, anything that can be used to protect us can also be
used against us, and what are we doing to make sure that--and
is there a way that we can actually increase our abilities
technologically for surveillance, et cetera, without having
that also being an alert to us that we have got to be more
careful that our new capabilities aren't being used against
honest people and to control the people rather than protect
them? I am just opening that up to the panel for discussion. I
guess the Department of Homeland Security.
You know, I remember when I was a kid driving to the
airport, jumping out of my car. I was late for the plane. I ran
from the curb to the gate. The door of the plane was closing
up. The stewardess said come on in. I got in. The plane took
off and the stewardess took my ticket on the airplane. We can't
do that anymore. Here we are, we are very protected now. I get
patted down. I have to stand there with my hands in the air. We
are doing all of these things to protect us but I have to tell
you, my freedom as an individual American has been dramatically
impacted to the negative because of what we have done to
protect us against perhaps a worse negative, which would be a
terrorist attack. And I might add, in that very same airport
that I did that, there was a bomb that exploded, and later on
as a reporter, I covered this bomb explosion and I saw where
people's shoes were there and their legs had been blown off and
their feet were still in their shoes.
So this is--every comment and everything we do I guess has
a flip side. What are we doing to make sure--what are your
views on the technology development and how we are going to
make sure it is being used for protection, for benefit rather
than against our freedom?
Dr. Peurrung. Well, a comment I would make to your question
is simply that a researcher who works on threat detection
technology should bear in mind the many technical challenges.
They want faster measurements. They want more sensitivity, more
background rejection abilities, see-through shielding, all of
these things that we all know and understand but operational
impact and operational suitability have to be high on that list
of parameters that matter, and I believe that is recognized by
the research community.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much. That was a very good
answer.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman Hall. I thank you for yielding.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Illinois, Mr.
Lipinski, for five minutes.
Mr. Lipinski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
holding this hearing today.
Chairman Hall. I hope Rohrabacher hasn't scared you to
death.
Mr. Lipinski. I have learned to ignore Mr. Rohrabacher
sometimes.
I think this is critically important. As Mr. Rohrabacher
very clearly illustrated the dangers we are facing, I think it
is easy for some to forget or not understand how important the
R&D is to help keep us safe from the threats that we are facing
and the ever-changing threats that we are facing.
I just wanted to briefly first mention something, talk
about something that has been brought up by a number of Members
here today. I am also concerned about in recent years the cuts
that DHS has had in its R&D budget, especially the 38 percent
drop in funding between fiscal year 2010 and 2012 to the
research, development, acquisitions and operations account. I
know at Argonne National Lab outside Chicago, there are a
number of research projects for the Department of Homeland
Security that are going on, including risk analyses of risks to
our critical infrastructure and the development of sensor
technologies to help detect threats. These are the types of
things I believe we need to be doing, and I hope that we in
Congress make sure that we are providing the funding that is
needed for this part of our defense from the threats that we
are facing. I know a lot of my colleagues have mentioned that.
I just wanted to echo that.
The question I wanted to raise has to do with the social
and behavioral sciences. As someone who was in that field,
after being an engineer, I just--I understand how critically
important social and behavioral sciences can be in terrorist
threat detection. They help us understand what causes a person
to turn to terrorism, who is likely to try to attack us, and by
what means. For example, I mentioned Argonne National Lab
before. I know that they are conducting research in Asian-based
social network modeling to investigate possible terrorist
networks. Now, due to our budget situation, however, and I
think to some extent a misunderstanding by some of what the
social and behavioral sciences can teach us, there has been a
suggestion that we should cut back on funding for social
science research. So I would like to hear from all of our
witnesses, whoever wants to jump in on this, how your agencies
and labs are using social and behavioral science research to
aid in your efforts to improve terrorist threat detection.
Whoever wants to start. Dr. Peterson?
Dr. Peterson. Congressman Lipinski, thanks for giving me a
chance to respond to that. I have already made comments about
this before, but let me just reiterate the primary point, and
that is, I think, that we cannot contribute substantially to
this particular issue, and many other grand challenge issues
that this country and the world faces, without close
partnership among the physical sciences, engineering, the life
sciences and the social, behavioral and economic sciences and
education. And I think we have demonstrated how important the
Foundation feels this is by the emphasis we are placing in many
cross-foundational programs that require partnerships among the
disciplines that I just described. This is a very good example
of this particular issue with respect to threat detection
technologies of how important it is to have the influence and
the expertise of the social, behavioral and economic sciences.
It is sometimes a challenge to engage these strongly
interdisciplinary communities in focusing on these kinds of
research problems. It is a challenge, first of all, to
encourage individuals who may be focusing on more theoretical
aspects to understand the richness of the basic research that
still is involved in some of these more applied issues. It is a
challenge to make sure that the language that the engineers and
scientists use can be understood by the social scientists and
vice versa. I think it is most important, again from the NSF
perspective, it is a challenge, to make sure that the social,
behavioral and economic science community themselves defines
the important research agendas. It is really not up to the
engineers and the scientists to tell them what we need from
them. It is really up to the social, behavioral and economic
science community to define the important research problems
that we need to focus on.
Mr. Lipinski. Anyone else want to--anything additional, Dr.
Peurrung?
Dr. Peurrung. Very quickly, I concur with your point that
the behavioral and social sciences are of increasing
importance. We have made investments in those at PNNL, and I
was really struck with a biosurveillance program, I think
Georgetown University led it, I believe, that used indicators
of social disruption to do biosurveillance quite successfully.
That is an example.
Mr. Lipinski. Thank you.
Anyone else?
Dr. Gowadia. At DNDO, we are looking at universal adversary
models and things like that to begin to understand and
appreciate what an adversary would need, what intent, what
capabilities, et cetera, and how that would drive our systems.
So we do model the adversary. We certainly have very close
coupled with the intelligence community. And with our
partnership with NSF, we are looking to study deterrence theory
and analysis also, again, bringing some of the coupling the
soft sciences with our hard-science modeling.
Mr. Lipinski. Thank you very much. I will yield back.
Chairman Hall. The gentleman yields back. That I suppose
ends our testimony and our questions. You have been great. We
really thank you and for the things you didn't tell us that you
say you could tell us, Dr. Gowadia. I think we would like to
hear that sometime, and thank all four of you. Thank you very
much.
The Members of the Committee will have additional questions
for any of you. We may send you some additional questions and
ask you to respond to them in writing. The record will remain
open for two weeks for additional comments from Members.
And with that, we are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:43 a.m., the Committee was adjourned.]

Appendix I

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Answers to Post-Hearing Questions

Responses by Dr. Richard Cavanagh

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Responses by Dr. Huban Gowadia

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Responses by Dr. Anthony Peurrung

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Responses by Dr. Thomas Peterson

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Appendix II

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Additional Material for the Record

Statement submitted by Representative Jerry Costello

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding today's hearing on federally-
funded research and development (R&D) threat detection technologies.
After the attacks of September 11th, 2001, early threat detection
efforts were increased to counter the growing list of terrorist threats
and to prevent a variety of attacks on the U.S. As a result, federal
investment in threat detection R&D became a necessary central component
of these efforts.
Basic, fundamental science-based research is critical to U.S.
strategy for countering terrorism. Already we have seen significant
advancements in these technologies that have strengthened our national
security and kept America safe. Technologies such as large scale x-ray
and gamma ray machines, and airport security technologies such as the
Millimeter Wave technology that is helping to detect concealed weapons,
explosives, and contraband at our nation's airports.
These are just a few examples of how federal investments in
science-based, innovative R&D have direct public benefits and why it is
important we provide static funding support to ensure that future
technologies reach the maturity necessary to protect against unknown
threats.
I am interested to hear from our witnesses regarding how we can
ensure the federal government's threat detection efforts anticipate and
respond to current and emerging dangers; are pertinent to the Nation's
needs; and how the federal government is working with academia and the
private sector on these efforts. I also want to know how federal
agencies balance and prioritize long-term research activities among
ever-changing terrorist threats.
Thank you and I yield back the balance of my time.