[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

WHEN REGIMES FALL: THE CHALLENGE OF SECURING LETHAL WEAPONS

=======================================================================

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

__________

JULY 19, 2012

__________

Serial No. 112-163

__________

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/
or
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

______

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
75-163 WASHINGTON : 2012
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office,
http://bookstore.gpo.gov. For more information, contact the GPO Customer Contact Center, U.S. Government Printing Office. Phone 202�09512�091800, or 866�09512�091800 (toll-free). E-mail, gpo@custhelp.com.

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
DAN BURTON, Indiana GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
ELTON GALLEGLY, California ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DANA ROHRABACHER, California Samoa
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey--
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California deceased 3/6/12 deg.
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio BRAD SHERMAN, California
RON PAUL, Texas ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
MIKE PENCE, Indiana GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
JOE WILSON, South Carolina RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
CONNIE MACK, Florida ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TED POE, Texas DENNIS CARDOZA, California
GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky
JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
BILL JOHNSON, Ohio ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania
DAVID RIVERA, Florida CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut
MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania FREDERICA WILSON, Florida
TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas KAREN BASS, California
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York
RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina
ROBERT TURNER, New York
Yleem D.S. Poblete, Staff Director
Richard J. Kessler, Democratic Staff Director
------

Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
TED POE, Texas BRAD SHERMAN, California
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
BILL JOHNSON, Ohio GERALD E. CONNOLLY,
TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas Virginia
ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York BRIAN HIGGINS, New YorkRemoved 6/
RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina 19/12 deg.
ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania

C O N T E N T S

----------
Page

WITNESSES

The Honorable Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Jr., chairman, Henry L.
Stimson Center (former Assistant Secretary of State for
Political-Military Affairs).................................... 6
Steven P. Bucci, Ph.D., senior research fellow for defense and
homeland security, The Heritage Foundation..................... 13
Mr. Leonard S. Spector, deputy director, James Martin Center for
Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International
Studies........................................................ 21

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING

The Honorable Edward R. Royce, a Representative in Congress from
the State of California, and chairman, Subcommittee on
Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade: Prepared statement..... 3
The Honorable Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Jr.: Prepared statement..... 8
Steven P. Bucci, Ph.D.: Prepared statement....................... 15
Mr. Leonard S. Spector: Prepared statement....................... 23

APPENDIX

Hearing notice................................................... 44
Hearing minutes.................................................. 45
The Honorable Ted Poe, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Texas: Prepared statement............................. 47
The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress
from the Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement.......... 48

WHEN REGIMES FALL: THE CHALLENGE OF SECURING LETHAL WEAPONS

----------

THURSDAY, JULY 19, 2012

House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Terrorism,
Nonproliferation, and Trade,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 o'clock
p.m., in room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Edward
R. Royce (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Royce. This hearing will come to order. Today we
examine the challenge of securing lethal weapons as regimes
fall, and the cases of Libya and Syria are the primary focus
here because they highlight this challenge. The Syrian regime
could be imploding as we speak.
When we think about the weapons at their disposal, the
chemical and biological weapons, you think back from what we
know in our conversations with the Soviets, the former Soviet
Union in the 1980s, they helped put together a very robust
program from the Syrians. Iran, today, has been helping Syria
with this respect, so they have long had an active chemical
weapons program. We know they have mustard gas. We know they
have sarin, VX, which is certainly the most lethal of nerve
agents. So some of the most dangerous chemicals on the planet
have been weaponized, most of it to put into artillery shells,
and that is why in the proliferation community they call Syria
a chemical weapons ``superpower.'' And the question is, what is
to be done?
For months, we have heard from the administration that
these chemical weapons are secure. But yesterday there was a
report that weapons were being moved to the field. And one U.S.
official has said, to quote him, ``this regime has a plan for
ethnic cleansing.'' Now we don't know exactly what the
intentions are with respect to the way they are moving these
weapons, but one Syrian Ambassador who defected said that he
was ``convinced'' that Assad would use these weapons against
the population.
I think there are several possible scenarios here, but one
is that Assad loses control over his chemical weapons, and the
question is, if that happens, do they come into the hands of
looters, do they come into the hands of opposition groups? Are
there terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda that are searching
for these weapons? Al-Qaeda's interest in obtaining chemical
and biological weapons is pretty well documented. Others
believe that Hezbollah could be on the hunt for chemical
weapons that might fall into their hands. Certainly, they would
have the means of obtaining them. Iran also has an interest.
With the scope of Syria's chemical and biological program,
Defense Secretary Panetta testified that the situation in Syria
is ``100 times worse'' than the challenge of securing weapons
in Libya. Some are concerned that the administration has been
slow to the game here, and as we will hear today there are
critical steps the United States could be taking.
Reaching out to elements of the Syrian Army that have
control over the chemical weapons is one of these steps. Let
them know they will be rewarded if they keep them under wraps.
Let them know that they could be punished if they do not. And
sending the same message, frankly, to the opposition. Working
closely with regional allies on contingency plans, working with
Turkey and Jordan and other countries in the region.
Intelligence sharing, military training, so that they are in
the lead, so they are able to take decisive action should Syria
implode. Building up our intelligence gathering network inside
Syria, making it clear to any future Syrian Government that
recognition and support is going to depend upon these weapons
being controlled and being destroyed, and being prepared to act
decisively. One way to do that is to use surrogates. But if we
know of these weapons falling into hostile hands there has to
be a plan of action given their lethal nature.
Given the magnitude of this challenge, it is discouraging
that one witness with firsthand experience in tackling these
kinds of problems will testify that it isn't just the chaotic
situation in Syria that presents a challenge, but in his view,
our inefficient government bureaucracy. In his view, and I am
going to quote him, ``years of adding more and more offices,
ranking positions and staff results in a slower and more
cumbersome decision process'' and it impacts effectiveness.
This subcommittee has spent a good amount of time focused
on loose shoulder-fired missiles, which terrorists have used
against commercial aircraft in the past. Earlier this year, the
top U.S. official charged with tracking them in Libya was
pretty blunt, and I will quote him: ``How many of these
shoulder-fired missiles are still missing? The frank answer is:
We don't know and probably never will.'' Well, we know from our
experience that they are likely in the thousands, and a point
of this hearing is to learn from the Libya experience. After
the Assad regime falls, let us not be hearing from the
administration that we weren't very effective securing these
weapons under what, admittedly, are difficult circumstances.
And I will now turn to the ranking member, Mr. Sherman of
California, for his opening statement.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Royce follows:]

----------

Mr. Sherman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I think you have
summarized well why this hearing is so important.
As terrible as MANPADs are, as terrible as chemical weapons
are, nuclear weapons are an entirely different order of
magnitude--and so let me mention Iran. It is so critical that
we are able to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons
now, so when that regime falls we are not having a hearing not
about what happens to Syria's chemical weapons, but what
happens to Iran's nuclear weapons.
We all looked at the short Iranian Spring of June 2009, and
we all pray for the day, Insha'Allah, when there are 1 million
people in the streets of Tehran and this regime realizes it has
to yield to democratic forces. But when that happens, will they
have nuclear weapons? Instead of fearing that chemical weapons
will be used against a Syrian population, will we be talking
about the possibility of nuclear weapons being used against
some city in Iran? Instead of chemical weapons perhaps falling
in the wrong hands, will we be talking about how many nuclear
weapons does Iran have and what is going to happen to them?
The solution is to act now over the next year to prevent
Iran from having nuclear weapons, rather than to think that the
low-risk approach is to sit back, do nothing or do only as much
as won't aggravate the business community, won't aggravate our
European and Asian friends. It may be bureaucratically low risk
to advocate only sanctions within the realm of the
conventional, but that may be low risk for an individual
career. It is not low risk for this country.
As for Syria, we are of course alarmed that they are moving
these weapons, and we are alarmed by where they might be used
or who might get their hands on them. The Libyan MANPADs pose a
risk to aviation around the world. Some have estimated that
Qadhafi had 20,000. We have accounted for and recovered 5,000,
and that is certainly a risk.
The State Department's Nonproliferation and Disarmament
Fund is a key tool in our emergency nonproliferation efforts,
however, funds are limited, and the requested amount for the
NDF for fiscal 2013 is only $30 million. It was through the NDF
that the U.S. led much of the effort to secure the MANPADs in
Libya, or at least secure those that we have been able to
secure. I would like our witnesses to comment on the
effectiveness of this and other governmental programs and
particularly whether they are sufficient to deal with the Syria
challenge and other challenges.
Also what should be our contingency plans for preventing
Syria's weapons from falling into the hands of al-Qaeda-
affiliated groups or Iran or Hezbollah? The worst possible
outcome is that Assad uses these against his people, but
perhaps just as dangerous he sells them to Hezbollah or Iran in
return for weapons he is willing to use.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses. I yield back.
Mr. Royce. Thank you. We will go to Mr. Duncan from South
Carolina, okay. And Mr. Connolly from Virginia?
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I am glad we are
having this hearing. And I want to welcome our panel. I
particularly want to welcome Mr. Spector. He and I worked
together as staffers on the Hill some time ago, and for some
reason he has less gray hair than I do. I am not quite sure how
that happened but welcome, Leonard, glad to have you here
today.
According to recent news reports, Syria has begun moving
some of its chemical weapon stockpiles out of its storage
facilities. One article chillingly states the situation, Syria
never signed the 1992 Chemical Weapons Convention and is
believed to have among other things, mustard gas, a sarin nerve
agent and even VX. The article goes on to say that analysis and
officials believe Syria has ballistic missiles that can be
fitted with chemical warheads, and tens of thousands of
shoulder-fired missiles terrorists could use to target civilian
aircraft. The Syrian Government denies that it is moving the
weapons, though that government's affiliation with terrorist
groups question credibility of such a claim. It is unclear what
the movement of these weapons means. Last Thursday's Wall
Street Journal cited the fact that some have said Assad is
using the weapons in a high-stakes game of chicken. He may be
moving them as feint, hoping the threat of a chemical attack
could drive Sunnis thought to be sympathetic to the rebels,
back to their homes or from their homes. That is a grisly
strategy that shines a light on how depraved the regime really
is.
So I look forward to hearing from this panel, Mr. Chairman,
and the suggestions of our panelists in terms of what are the
options available to the United States. And I thank the chair.
Mr. Royce. Thank you, Mr. Connolly.
Let us introduce the distinguished panel of expert
witnesses at this time. We have Ambassador Lincoln Bloomfield,
Jr., chairman of the Henry L. Stimson Center. Ambassador
Bloomfield served as Assistant Secretary of State for
Political-Military Affairs from '01 to '05. From '08 to '09, as
special envoy he worked to reduce the threat from the
proliferation of shoulder-fired missiles. Throughout a
distinguished career dating back to '81, Ambassador Bloomfield
has held positions in the Department of Defense, and State, and
at the White House.
Dr. Steven Bucci is a senior research fellow for Defense
and Homeland Security at the Heritage Foundation. In three
decades of service, Dr. Bucci has served as an Army special
forces officer and top Pentagon official. He has led
deployments in Africa, South Asia, and the Persian Gulf. On
September 11th, he was working directly for the Secretary of
Defense. He is a recognized expert on the interagency process.
And Sandy Spector is the deputy director of the Monterey
Institute of International Studies James Martin Center for
Nonproliferation Studies. He previously served as the Assistant
Deputy Administrator for Arms Control and Nonproliferation at
the National Nuclear Security Administration. He has written
several articles on Syria's chemical weapons program over the
last year.
All of the witness' complete written testimony will be
entered into the record, and I will remind each of you that if
you can keep your oral presentation to 5 minutes that is very
much appreciated. We will start with Ambassador Bloomfield.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE LINCOLN P. BLOOMFIELD, JR.,
CHAIRMAN, HENRY L. STIMSON CENTER (FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF STATE FOR POLITICAL-MILITARY AFFAIRS)

Ambassador Bloomfield. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman,
distinguished members. It is an honor to be invited to testify
before you.
As I looked at the agenda for today, one could have talked
about whether we have the best information on Syria that would
be the work of an analyst or a journalist. We could have talked
about the technical aspects of their program, and my fellow
panelists are probably far more expert than I. The way I looked
at it is someone who has had the privilege of serving in five
administrations doing all sorts of jobs, starting my career as
the desk officer for Lebanon in the Pentagon at a time when
they blew up our Embassy twice, they blew up the Marines,
Hezbollah was formed, and Syria was behind a lot of the
trouble. And so I have to tell you that in 30 years I have
never taken my eye off Syrian politics. It has a certain
quality to it that maintains your interest through thick and
thin.
I have also had the opportunity as the chairman of Stimson
to participate in a study which took seven scholars to
Damascus, and the week before President Obama was inaugurated I
had the opportunity to sit with President Assad and talk to him
for over 2 hours, and probe in my own mind, how does he talk
about Iran, how does he talk about religious issues, how does
he talk about territorial issues with Israel, threat issues?
Just to take his pulse and get a feel for that was quite
interesting.
Mr. Royce. We would like to hear about that.
Ambassador Bloomfield. Well, obviously everything has
changed. He was trying to say he was ready for peace and no
holds barred. And Senator Kerry and Chairman Berman, at the
time, went to Damascus and heard the same message. That has all
changed. It is by the boards. It is over for the Assad regime.
His presidency was an accident of history. His older brother
was groomed to be the leader and he was killed in a car crash,
and the eye doctor from London came back and was groomed for
this position.
So I have always looked at Syria as somewhat of an
oligarchy. You have to look at the money, who controls all the
businesses, who controls the franchise, if you will, who
controls the security. And that has been mapped out, I am sure.
As I looked at this, the question I asked myself was kind of a
Monday morning quarterback question. I am not in the ring
trying to solve this problem, I am on the outside. So I have
great regard for everyone on the inside, let me start with
that.
But the question is, what would you do if it were up to you
to address this problem? And I can't get away from the quote
that you cited, which was mine, and it is not political. It is
Republicans. It is Democrats. It is Congress. It is the
administration. But we used to have a much leaner national
security bureaucracy where individual big thinkers drove the
train. We have gotten away from that and we have taken very
talented people and we have put them into such small silos that
they are very territorial, they have very little budget--you
just mentioned money, Mr. Sherman. And so I posed the question
to myself, what would an all-star effort look like? And I have
tried to lay that out in my prepared testimony.
It involves a lot of excellent offices inside the U.S.
Government, probably none of which have ever been put into one
operation and certainly not under the command of a civilian.
And I have been privileged to talk to our senior leadership at
DoD over the years, and they always talk about whole of
government. Once the troops remove themselves from the field of
battle the civilians need to move in, in a whole of government
effort. We talk about that. I am not persuaded that we have
moved very far toward being able to do ``whole of government.''
And I would commend the Syria example as a great place to try
and make it work. It would take a top-down push. It would take
principal-level authority from the White House, Secretary of
State, Secretary of Defense, the Director of National
Intelligence, and some of the combatant commands to allow
certain pieces of their resource pool to be put under a single,
unified team effort.
And I ask this question: What would happen if there were an
American school in Damascus and 50 young American children were
abducted and spread out all over the country? I don't think
anyone in Washington would stand in the way of an all-points
dragnet where no one would care whose bureau is in the lead or
whether it was State or Defense in charge. Everyone would get
on the same communications net and try to find these children
as fast as possible. My question is, how important are these
chemical weapons? If it is that important, can we not simply
look past all of the lines of authority and resources and pull
them into a special task force to take on this problem?
Another point I would like to make and I will stop, is that
there is no need to wait for the regime to fall. I would like
to see the logistical aspects of this fused into the political
strategy. To take Mr. Sherman's point, Iran may use nuclear
weapons against Israel. That would be a nightmare. But even if
they don't, it will be a way of enforcing what they are doing
right now, today, which is exerting radical influence
throughout the Levant. And that is what we should be mobilizing
against. This is a strategic defeat in the making for Iran as
well as Syria. I think we should have an all-star effort to try
to make sure that it comes out that way. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Bloomfield follows:]

----------

Mr. Royce. Thank you, Ambassador Bloomfield.
Doctor?

STATEMENT OF STEVEN P. BUCCI, PH.D., SENIOR RESEARCH FELLOW FOR
DEFENSE AND HOMELAND SECURITY, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION

Mr. Bucci. Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, I
appreciate you giving me the opportunity to testify this
afternoon. I would like to make three main points very quickly
and then hit some recommendations on possible actions for the
United States. The first point is that we need to keep in mind,
Syria today is not Iraq in 2003, and it is not Libya in the
last incursion. And I can go into details as to why I feel that
way during a Q&A if you would like, but we cannot use those two
events for too much analogous lessons because it will lead us
down false paths.
The second point is probably more important. Today there
are no good military options here. A full-scale effort to
control all 50 sites, whether we do it before the regime falls
or immediately afterwards has been pointed out it would take
about 75,000 troops to do that. By anybody's definition that is
an invasion. And I fear that if we try to do something like
that we would get a negative response from both sides of this
conflict if we came into that country.
The next option that has been bandied about is using air
strikes to destroy all 50 sites. That is another false trail to
go down. The amount of collateral damage of an operation like
that would be astronomical. The strikes themselves would kill
civilians, it would release agent into the air, and frankly,
all it would do would be to basically unlock the gates to allow
people to get into those facilities to loot them.
And the last option, which is the least bad, is to come up
with some use of special operations forces to possibly go in
and do a one-off operation should there be an imminent
potential release of chemical weapons against the population or
some knowledge of an immediate transfer of some of those
weapons to people we don't want to have them. You could
possibly use SOF there, but again that is a very dangerous and
tricky thing. And remember, we are talking about stuff in these
sites that are measured in tons not in, go in and come out with
a couple of briefcases full of agent. SOF going in there is not
going to get it all out and they can't stay there and protect
themselves.
The last point is that to do any of these things we have
got to utilize our friends in the region from the intelligence
and the surveillance standpoint, and building a regime around
Syria to try and monitor anything moving out, we have got to
use all their neighbors. Israel, Jordan, Turkey, Iraq, everyone
has to be involved in helping us with this. And then if we do
take any action, we need to drop Israel out of that equation
and really depend on some of our friendly Muslim countries in
the area, predominantly Turkey and Jordan. Perhaps get some of
the Gulf states who have some pretty good special operations
forces, and perhaps get them involved as well.
If we take any actions at all, they should be the continued
ramping up of all of our intelligence and surveillance, which I
would hope the administration is already maxing out today, but
we need to make sure that is happening. We need to be prepared
and have planned for one of those one-off events if something
does break and we get intelligence of it that we could go in
and try and use SOF to perhaps stop that from happening. We
need to build that security paradigm today with the neighbors,
making sure we are all on the same sheet of music and we have
all come to an agreement as to what we are going to do with any
WMD that falls into anybody's hands, which one would hope would
be to turn it over to us for destruction.
We should warn the Assad regime today, and all of the
members of the resistance that if they use any of this stuff
there is going to be some retribution. Specifically and
publicly we should warn them that anyone who comes into
possession of any WMD and turns it over to al-Qaeda, Hezbollah
or Iran that there would be a kinetic response to stop that
from happening.
And then lastly, we do need to plan for some sort of big
control event, using Muslim forces as I have mentioned, and
perhaps, and this would be the most U.S. involvement directly,
would be the use of U.S. special forces, perhaps Army Chemical
Corps, Marine Corps CBIRF, or even some of the National Guard
WMD Civil Support teams as potential advisors, so when we send
forces in there they actually have some technical capability to
deal with the things that are in those sites.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Bucci follows:]

----------

Mr. Royce. Thank you, Dr. Bucci.
Mr. Spector?

STATEMENT OF MR. LEONARD S. SPECTOR, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, JAMES
MARTIN CENTER FOR NONPROLIFERATION STUDIES, MONTEREY INSTITUTE
OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Mr. Spector. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Ranking Minority
Member Sherman. It is a pleasure to be here and to speak on
these issues.
As I said in my written remarks, I think we need to look at
different classes of weapons and try to have a differentiated
policy, because there is a good deal of variation. We have to
worry about light arms, heavy arms, weapons of particular
interest to terrorists, ballistic missiles, and then chemical
weapons. And I will just say a few words on a number of these.
I think the biological weapons situation seems to be very
opaque. No one seems to know if they exist, so I will put those
aside for the moment, but obviously they would be of great
concern. And nuclear weapons and fissile material are not known
to be present in Syria, but certain sites, however, are
suspected of potentially contributing to this and they are
still to be fully understood.
Our goals, I think, in my testimony, very much are similar
to what we have heard about the importance of maintaining
positive control, avoiding use and avoiding leakage out of the
country. But I think one measure that should be implemented
immediately, and I believe it was noted in the chairman's
remarks as he introduced us, was a need to let the guardians,
the custodians of these weapons, know that if they stand by the
weapons, protect them or hold them close that that will be
taken as good behavior. It will be recognized in some fashion,
and that these forces do not need to worry about the fact that
they were associated with these weapons, being held against
them, provided of course there is no use and there is sort of
holding in place. And in a sense, I think that is one model for
trying to keep our hands around this, which is to use the
experts that they have that may be prepared in this time of
turmoil to sort of sit tight if they know they will be safe.
One concern I have had is that as the lines in the country
shift, a certain of these chemical sites will fall behind the
front lines, so to speak, and will be under the nominal control
at least of the Free Syrian Army. I think in settings like this
we have to worry about how the guardians will behave. Will they
run off because they want to escape the Free Syrian Army? And
again, it is very important to give them an understanding that
they do not have that to fear.
Another point that I tried to make in the testimony was the
importance of using the moment of recognition as a tool for
trying to persuade the new Syrian Government to relinquish
these weapons. This has happened in the past in Argentina,
Brazil, South Africa, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, with
some variation, where this leverage that the outside powers
have has been used to sort of make a precondition. If you want
these external support opportunities, you must renounce some of
these weapons that are in such bad odor, so to speak,
internationally. Qadhafi did this both for chemical and for
nuclear weapons.
So I think we have some good examples of how this tool can
be used. And therefore, I think the Syrian Government that
replaces Assad must be pressed to take very similar conditions.
It is going to be harder for them because these weapons have
been part of some anti-Israel bulwark that Syria has portrayed
itself as representing, but I think we have ways of trying to
get our hands around this, in particular during the period of
turmoil. Finding a way to get international monitors, perhaps,
at some sites where the Free Syrian Army has some control, and
starting a process in which there is sort of an international
coloration placed on the chemical weapons so that the default
is that the weapons are given up and the country signs the
Chemical Weapons Convention.
One matter that hasn't come up here previously is the issue
of the Scuds and the legacy of these missiles. There are a
couple of hundred of them. They are very dangerous from the
standpoint of Israel. They perhaps even represent a threat to
Iran if we have a Sunni, anti-Iranian government in Syria. And
I think we need to be looking for ways to diminish this
capability. Again, we have had precedents in eastern Europe and
with Libya. We were able to persuade countries, at the time
that they were getting recognition and assistance as the
governments were being formed, to renounce these weapons that
are over a threshold in which we say they are capable of
carrying weapons of mass destruction. It is also possible that
these weapons may become targets for the Free Syrian Army as
symbols of the regime or maybe targeted by others.
The nuclear legacy is also one we want to deal with. If
some of these sites that are suspected of having nuclear
activities, but where the IAEA is not permitted in, we may want
to, and we really should, press the Free Syrian Army as they
gain control of them to authorize at least informal inspections
by Western specialists, if not also by the IAEA until a later
time.
Finally, a few words about the resources. It is not only
the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund which is potentially
available, it is also the Cooperative Threat Reduction monies
at the Defense Department which could be of extremely valuable
use here for control purposes and also for training and sort of
bringing the new government into sort of the, accept the norms
that we all accept on the weapons of mass destruction issue. My
understanding is the Defense Department is not able to use its
CTR money in the Middle East at this time, but that they are
seeking the certification to do so, which I believe would be a
very urgent priority.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Spector follows:]

----------

Mr. Royce. Thank you very much, Mr. Spector. Let me ask a
couple of quick questions here, first to Dr. Bucci.
The United States has been reportedly, from what is in the
papers, in discussions with Turkey and with Jordan, on
contingency plans for loose chemical weaponry. Based upon your
knowledge, having worked with both countries, what are their
capabilities in this regard and what advantages do they bring?
Mr. Bucci. Both have very mature militaries. Turkey, their
military is huge, first of all. They definitely have the
capability to provide the manpower to do things, and they are
actually quite disciplined for a conscript-based army because
they are fairly draconian with their methodologies. They could
definitely provide the bulk of the forces to provide security
around any of these sites. The problem there is again their
Turkish vice Arab and that causes some friction. Now they are a
Muslim country so that gives them certain advantages, but not
as much as we sometimes think it would. The Jordanians better
thought of as far as being fellow Arabs, and actually a very,
very capable Army, particularly their special operations
forces. Not near as big and neither of them have the kind of
technological capabilities of dealing with these weapons
systems because neither of them has a chemical capability. So
from a technological standpoint they would have to be augmented
by some technical experts as they do it, but as far as the
military discipline, their positive association with us and
experience working with us, they could handle this kind of
thing very well. But again, if you do it in a nonpermissive
environment it is going to get dicey very, very quickly.
Mr. Royce. I have got a quick question for you though,
because some years ago when the PKK leader, Ocalan, was being
held or being protected by Syria, I remember the Turks were
very, very close to taking military action. And I would
anticipate that because they have mobilized, because it was
only at the last minute that the Syrians gave them up because
they thought they would be attacked. And my presumption was
that the Turkish military would have done some due diligence in
terms of being prepared to deal with chemical weapons given the
fact that they were prepared to go in.
Might that cause you to conclude that perhaps they have
looked at this scenario and might be better prepared?
Mr. Bucci. They clearly have a defensive capability. I mean
they have American protective masks, for instance, so they have
the very basic capability to operate in a chemical environment.
So they are not totally neophytes in the area, but I don't
really feel----
Mr. Royce. Then let me ask you another question. Last week
11 Russian warships that we saw that were dispatched to a
Syrian port, whole battalions of Russian marines aboard.
I remember a trip I took once to Russia where we listened
to the gentleman who was called the ``Father of the Plague''
explain about what they had developed in Russia but that some
of their scientists were missing. And from what we know about
Syria's chemical weapons program it seems that some of the
advances came with Russian assistance, right?
Mr. Bucci. Absolutely.
Mr. Royce. In the event of a security vacuum in Syria,
could the Russians play a role with respect to these 50 sites?
Mr. Bucci. They hopefully could. My guess is those marines
are primarily there to protect that port base which is very,
very important to the Russian navy. But my guess is there is
also some elements in that force that is there to probably
clean up some of the evidence, if you will, of the Russian
collusion with the development of this program in the first
place. One would hope that the Russians would be willing to
cooperate with an international effort to keep these things
from getting out of hand. But given the Russian intransigence
in the U.N. as of this morning, I would not put too much faith
in the Russians being very, very cooperative, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Royce. Let me turn to Ambassador Bloomfield for my last
question, which goes to the phenomenal amount of information
that you see on the front pages of the newspapers these days
which are in the form of leaks about our intelligence
operations. And it is across the board, everything from the
details of those who assisted in the capture of Osama bin Laden
to the details of the attacks on Iran's computers.
You served in government in many different positions over
the years. Are leaks more prevalent and more dangerous these
days, as it seems to me, given the issues that we are talking
about and given the things that we keep discovering on the
front page?
Ambassador Bloomfield. Mr. Chairman, in my opinion they
are. And it is a function of a cultural change, I would say.
Because we had so many journalists embedded with our troops
going into Iraq, there was naturally a far more granular amount
of information that was clearly revealed about how we do our
business. And you have journalists now who have suffered in the
field. They have taken casualties as part of the effort to
report on our interventions, and they enjoy the high trust of
the intelligence community and the military. So I just think it
is a natural evolution.
Does that mean I approve of all the leaks? I certainly
don't. Somebody is making a judgment that they want it out
there for some, perhaps, deterrence purposes or to advertise
their skill and capability. Those judgments should all be made
at very high levels. This isn't the first generation of
government that has leaked, but it is on a higher and more
sensitive scale in my opinion.
Mr. Royce. Thank you. Let me turn to our ranking member,
Mr. Sherman from California.
Mr. Sherman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
There is a tendency in all of these conflicts for us to
think that because the bad guys are bad the opponents must be
really, really good. And there are shades of gray. And because
we assume that those trying to overthrow the bad regime must be
very, very good, we don't bother to use our leverage to get
some promises and enforceable promises up front.
Has any element for the Free Syrian Army or the various
groups trying to overthrow the Assad regime stated publicly
that they are committed to Syria signing the Chemical Weapons
Convention and adhering to it?
Ambassador Bloomfield. Not to my knowledge.
Mr. Sherman. And yet we play the critical role for them
while not asking them to even issue a press release. This is a
repeat of our desire so much that they be successful that we
ask them to do nothing that will help us. Assad has these
chemical weapons, and I think he would use them if he thought
they were helpful. Is there anything he can do with these
weapons that he can't do with conventional shelling,
conventional explosive devices dropped from airplanes?
He is moving them for some reason. One possibility, he
plans to use them in a worst case scenario for him, whole areas
of his country will be under the control of rebel forces, but
is there anything he can do with these chemical weapons that he
can't do with more conventional weapons?
Doctor?
Mr. Bucci. Well, sir, primarily, I mean you are going to
kill people. The chemical weapons would kill them far more
efficiently, would kill them far faster and would cause a great
deal of panic among both the opposition forces and the rest of
the civilian population.
There has been some talk about the regime trying to carve
out a rump Alawite state toward the coast, trying to get the
Sunnis to move out of that area. Even the threat of something
like this could cause people to start to move if that is their
actual stated intentions. So there is a use for them, a very
nefarious use, granted, beyond conventional weapons.
Mr. Sherman. And that is a use that couldn't be achieved
just with strategic bombing capacities that the Syrian air
force has?
Mr. Bucci. You could do it with either one, but the fear
factor that comes in when you begin using chemical weapons is
astronomical and should not be discounted.
Mr. Sherman. Now Assad is moving his chemical weapons. Is
he moving them to areas of the country that he feels he will
always control, or there is a lot of discussion he is moving
them, is he moving them to protect them and make sure they are
not behind the lines of the rebels, or is he moving them
consistent with future use?
Mr. Bucci. At this point, sir, I don't know, and I am not
sure if our intelligence community knows either. That is what
they are trying to determine, what exactly is the purpose for
this alleged movement? And to be honest with you, I am not even
sure if the movement itself has been confirmed, let alone the
intention.
Mr. Sherman. The intention is hard to determine, but we
don't even know to which locations he has moved or even, I
guess, it may be classified, but I haven't seen any reports
indicating he moved them from here that is a predominantly
Sunni area where he may lose control, or he moved them to here
that is an Alawite area where he is confident he will retain
control.
Ambassador, I see you nodding in agreement with our lack of
knowledge.
Ambassador Bloomfield. My only surmise, Mr. Sherman, is
that he is trying to hang onto power and shoot his way out of
trouble; it is a failed strategy and everything is in the
context of survival. It could be a Plan B to take the
offensive, but obviously it is something that should be tracked
closely and we will never know.
Mr. Sherman. Does anyone else have a strategy for comments
on getting the rebel groups, particularly the Free Syrian Army,
to agree now when they need us the most to sign the Chemical
Weapons Convention and otherwise act responsibly toward these
weapons?
Mr. Spector, I don't know if you had a comment on that.
Mr. Spector. I thought the leverage was, possibly, greatest
when they are seeking formal international recognition, but
whenever we do it, it is going to be difficult because there
will be a domestic audience they have to play to as well. So
what I was proposing is that we sort of start the process de
facto during this strange period, the interregnum, by trying to
get some international oversight at least on some of the sites
and that creates a sort of atmosphere or environment in which
the expected outcome is, yes, they will join the treaty and so
forth. So I think if you go about this head on it may be not
quite as effective as a gradual approach, but I am not
disagreeing with you.
Mr. Sherman. I think we sell our support too cheaply when
we don't insist on this, Ambassador. And then I realize my time
is up.
Ambassador Bloomfield. Congressman, I would just point out
that in Iraq in 2003, the policy team of which I was a part,
part of that team decided that anyone who had been affiliated
with the Baath Party in the regime should not be given a second
chance. And indeed, the entire Iraqi army was put outside the
door, at which point all of the competent military talent in
the country turned against our stabilization effort.
In Syria, unless we intend to repeat that mistake, not only
could we be communicating with the opposition, but we should be
communicating with people who in a dictatorship aren't making
decisions anyway; so we are not blaming the mid-level of
military except for those who are particularly aggressive in
shooting up Daraa and Homs and places like that. We should be
trying to peel off the regime as well as the opposition, and so
I would say that across the board to anyone who has military
competency.
But secondly, I would beg the question of how we message
this. Those countries are dense with information operations
coming from adverse sources. Hezbollah, Iran and others
broadcast heavily into that information space. I am not sure
what the U.S. Government is doing, but this is an opportunity
for us to decide what messages should be making the rounds in
Syria so people know that there are war crimes for the worst
offenders, there is salvation for those who mark weapons and
get in touch with the right places. In other words, the
technological equivalent of the leafletting and collecting
effort we did in Iraq before we fired the Iraqi army.
Mr. Spector. Can I just add a point which is that we
haven't obtained ``nothing'' at this stage. My impression is we
have received assurances that the Free Syrian Army won't use
the weapons and will try to keep track of them as soon as they
gain some control. So I don't think it is a zero kind of
commitment on the chemical weapon front, but it certainly
hasn't gone as far as your suggestion.
Mr. Royce. Let us go to Mr. Duncan of South Carolina.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. One of the problems
that the United States has faced in the past is good intel
coming from the region of the Middle East especially in closed
countries. So Dr. Bucci, based on your experience with
intelligence, and honestly, how good is the intel that we are
getting or that we have already? How good is it?
Mr. Bucci. It is at best, or should be, suspect. We have
proven in two different situations both in Iraq and then in
Libya that our intel about weapons of all sorts has been
somewhat less than it needed to be. Now we are looking at the
country of Syria which has been even more closed and done more
things behind the curtain than those other two countries. So
our knowledge of exactly how many of what type of weapon they
have at each site is pretty ethereal. They are doing the best
they can. They are working all the partners in the region who
do have human sources inside those countries, and we are trying
to milk as much intel out of those sources as possible. But
anyone who tells you it is complete and 100 percent accurate is
dreaming. It is at best incomplete. I wish I could give you a
more accurate answer than that and I wish I could give you a
more positive one, but I think that is about the best we are
going to do.
Mr. Duncan. That is not comforting. It is not comforting us
at all.
Mr. Bucci. No sir, it is not.
Mr. Duncan. In 2007, the Israeli attack on the nuclear
facilities in Syria took out the reactor. But we are talking a
lot about chemical weapons here today in this very, very
concerning area, but just as concerning should be the nuclear
capability and components within Syria that could fall in the
hands of, say, Iran who is actively searching for a nuclear
capability. So can you talk, any of you really, but I will
address it to Dr. Bucci first, can you talk about the
centrifuges and any of the ability to enrich uranium and other
things that are used in the nuclear capacity that weren't
destroyed in '07? Do we have a handle on what is there and what
is happening to that technology?
Mr. Bucci. We do not have a perfectly accurate handle on
what was there. To be honest with you, I am guessing what the
Iranians have today is probably better than what the Syrians
had in 2007, so I don't think having a yard sale in Syria is
going to bring up too much from the equipment standpoint.
Of more concern is any possible fuel that was left over,
just radioactive material that would probably be of less
interest to Iran but would be of interest to Hezbollah or al-
Qaeda for use in a radiological dispersal device, a dirty bomb.
That would be a concern and we don't have a good handle on how
much of that was left, what was destroyed, what wasn't
destroyed during that raid. So again, an incomplete picture but
there are some things that we need to keep track of or be
trying to find out before they start walking over any borders.
Mr. Duncan. How difficult would it be for Hezbollah to take
that across the Lebanon border?
Mr. Bucci. Into Lebanon, probably not too difficult, sir.
Mr. Duncan. I just want to shift gears here in my remaining
time and talk about shoulder-fired missiles. Ambassador, you
had talked about that I think, but do we have a handle on how
many, I have read different numbers, tens of thousands of
shoulder-fired MANPADs basically, in Syria. Do we have a handle
on where those are? And do we have an adequate defense for that
in this nation if those fall into the hands of the terrorists?
Ambassador Bloomfield. Well, sir, on the latter question,
we don't. All it takes is one passenger aircraft to trigger a
lot of consequences that would be difficult and adverse, as 9/
11 did with TSA and everything that has happened because of
airline security. So the best strategy is to try to do our best
so that the nightmare never happens.
It has been a long time since I worked in the Pentagon. I
was there for 8 years. DIA would normally have had a very good
lay-down of where the weapons stores and sites should be, which
units would be capable of air defense and what reactions they
had to the previous encounters with Israel in particular, and
so I would expect there is a very strong air defense component
to their regular military. There may be special forces as well
that are Alawite and loyal to the regime.
I personally am not up on the intelligence but that is
where I would look. I would try to piece together the best map
I could, and again try to reach out to those individuals at
this time and tell them how to defect and how to secure them
and how to make sure that those don't become a factor in the
aftermath.
Mr. Duncan. Yes, we are concerned about Hezbollah and
Hamas, but what about the Palestinian that would be very
capable of using a MANPAD due to their proximity to Ben Gurion
Airport?
Ambassador Bloomfield. When you mention the Palestinians, I
immediately think they are Sunni. And so Damascus gave a home
to Khaled Meishal, the radical Hamas leader, who then started
to look around and see that his people were being killed by the
regime. They were being shot up. Those were Sunnis being killed
by the Syrian regime. So I think that there is a potential
split there, and I don't know if that is a tactical or even a
strategic opportunity for the United States, and I am not
flagging a desire to try to embrace radical Palestinians. But
clearly, you want to peel off radicals from each other, and so
I would have a political working group looking very long and
hard about how to exploit that in the information space, to
create mistrust.
Mr. Royce. Mr. Connolly from Virginia.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And actually if I
could pick up, Ambassador Bloomfield, on what you were just
saying. I mean one of the complications obviously in the Syrian
situation is that it is an Alawite-dominated government and
military, and Sunnis are definitely in a second tier and
watched carefully at all levels.
Would it be fair to say that when it comes to chemical
weapons storage that storage is also very much in the control
of the Alawite minority? In the power structure, I mean.
Ambassador Bloomfield. Congressman Connolly, I would expect
so. I go back to Hafez al-Assad, when there was a whole
battalion of T-72 tanks under tarpaulins sitting outside the
apartments in Damascus where the regime figures lived. And this
was during the Muslim Brotherhood episode that led to the Hama
Massacre where 20,000 were killed. The Syrian army would not do
the job, so he turned to an Alawite army, his brother, this is
Bashar's uncle, Rifat, took in the Defense Companies and they
moved in under threat of their own death according to our
attache on the scene at the time, who witnessed it and said
these guys were scared for their lives unless they went in and
killed everyone and put it down. So I would expect there would
be extreme loyalty attached to those assets.
Mr. Connolly. Following up on that logic, would it also be
fair to say that until and unless this fracturing among the
Alawite elite, if ever, or their defeat that control of the
chemical weapons stockpiles is unlikely in the short term to
get in the hands of others that worry us too?
Ambassador Bloomfield. I have never lived through a
revolution. And when your spouse and kids and relatives are all
jumping in cars as happened in Iraq, stuffing cash in the trunk
and racing down for the nearest border, I would not have much
comfort about any particular----
Mr. Connolly. Chaos ensues and--yes.
Ambassador Bloomfield. That is right.
Mr. Connolly. Saddam Hussein, in fact, Sandy Spector, used
chemical weapons against his own population. Has either of the
Assads been known ever to deploy chemical weapons within Syria?
Mr. Spector. Not that I am aware of, but what they have
done just recently in terms of the wholesale slaughter in some
of these cities indicates that they are pretty prepared to take
extremely harsh and coercive measures. And so you wonder how
big a threshold they perceive they would be going over if they
were to take this additional step. I think there has been
enough international focus on this to at least etch the
threshold a little deeper than it might otherwise be, but I
don't think there is any kind of moral compunction. I think it
is more kind of practical tradeoffs.
Mr. Connolly. Dr. Bucci?
Mr. Bucci. Sir, the fact that this regime has been using
not just small arms and not even just heavy machine guns but,
literally, anti-aircraft machine guns that one of those shells,
I mean it is against the Geneva Convention to use those against
personnel and he is gunning down civilians with them. So the
step from that to using a chemical weapon against your civilian
population, if you feel that threatened in your survival as a
regime, is a very small one for somebody like Assad. So I would
not be surprised at all if he made the decision to use those
chemical weapons against his own people unless he gets
sufficient messaging to deter him from doing it, and if he
thinks there is some other way out or some other way of
survival. It is very likely that we could see the use of those
weapons against the civilian population of Syria.
Mr. Connolly. Well, okay. I am hearing both of you say, I
wouldn't count on Assad to have some moral compunction or some
special abstract line beyond which he will not go, because
after all these are chemical weapons. That is a different order
of magnitude. But on the international level and here in the
West, do we, should we have such a line that says, we deplore
and we call for your ouster, regime change, based on what you
have already done, but if you cross that line, what?
Mr. Bucci. Sir, I think that is a very thin line and a very
artificial one. I think the decision needs to be made; you are
either an abhorrent leader doing war crimes against your
population or you are not. What color of war crime it is, is a
little hard to define.
Mr. Connolly. I understand and sympathize with that point
of view up to a point, but the consequence of that point of
view or the logic of that point of view gets us to the point
where we stop distinguishing among weapons. And as a matter of
fact, under international law we do, we do have a special
understanding with respect to chemical weapons. And so
conflating these, in looking at the horrors of the regime could
have an unintended consequence of, frankly, diluting the
international regime we have created around and to control and
regulate chemical weapons.
Sandy?
Mr. Spector. Yes, my sense is that we were all hesitant to
imagine intervention because of the experience in Libya and in
Iraq. But this is a level of intensity which we would not have
seen before, and I think the other side appreciates it also. In
other words that there is a presumption to be overcome that we
are not going to intervene, but chemical weapons would overcome
the presumption. And I think that is what we want to make
clear, and I think we are doing it. It has been repeated at
least twice in the last week by the administration. They
haven't used the word, we are going to intervene, but they have
said that this is a major red line. So I think it is being
treated differently, and I----
Mr. Connolly. And should be?
Ambassador Bloomfield. It should be different.
Mr. Connolly. I am asking, and it should be?
Ambassador Bloomfield. I think in the political
circumstances in which we find ourselves after the history of
Iraq and Libya, we have been sort of hamstrung in terms of
doing what we might have done otherwise in Syria, so I think
treating chemical weapons as the next threshold and an
important one is appropriate.
Mr. Connolly. Mr. Chairman, my time is up but I do see
Ambassador Bloomfield wanting to also weigh in on this, if the
chair would so indulge. I thank the chair.
Ambassador Bloomfield. Obviously, Congressman Connolly, you
are on to an important point. I share it. There is a
difference. The tradecraft that any administration would
exercise is to make sure that they are not setting a special
status on chemical weapons that sends a message that everything
else short of that is somehow okay. And so I think one way to
differentiate it is to message, first of all, we know what you
are doing--even if we don't--and secondly, if there is any use
of these banned weapons or major use of conventional weapons, I
mean Hellfire-type missiles from helicopters, that the people
who are actually commanding those units will be on the list
that ends up in the docket of international law. They will
never have a life outside of jail, to the end of the earth. So
you begin to say, if you sit down and just ride it out and if
you work with us you are not on the list. But if you start to
do these other things, the list grows.
Mr. Royce. Let me conclude by thanking our panel of expert
witnesses for their excellent testimony, and also the members
of the committee. Our staff, I think, would like to follow up
with each of the three of you, if that is all right, to further
explore some of these ideas. And I am particularly interested
in Ambassador Bloomfield's task force recommendations here, and
so we will be in touch with each of you. But again, we thank
you for taking the time and preparing this testimony.
We stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:04 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

----------

Material Submitted for the Hearing RecordNotice deg.

\\ts\

\ statt\

\
statt\