[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

[H.A.S.C. No. 112-130]

HEARING

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2013
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

__________

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES HEARING

BUDGET REQUEST FOR

ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES

AND NUCLEAR FORCES PROGRAMS

__________

HEARING HELD
APRIL 17, 2012

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SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio, Chairman
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
MO BROOKS, Alabama RICK LARSEN, Washington
MAC THORNBERRY, Texas MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama JOHN R. GARAMENDI, California
JOHN C. FLEMING, M.D., Louisiana C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland
SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia BETTY SUTTON, Ohio
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia
Tim Morrison, Professional Staff Member
Drew Walter, Professional Staff Member
Leonor Tomero, Professional Staff Member
Eric Smith, Staff Assistant

C O N T E N T S

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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2012

Page

Hearing:

Tuesday, April 17, 2012, Fiscal Year 2013 Budget Request for
Atomic Energy Defense Activities and Nuclear Forces Programs... 1

Appendix:

Tuesday, April 17, 2012.......................................... 51
----------

TUESDAY, APRIL 17, 2012
FISCAL YEAR 2013 BUDGET REQUEST FOR ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES
AND NUCLEAR FORCES PROGRAMS
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Sanchez, Hon. Loretta, a Representative from California, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces....................... 4
Turner, Hon. Michael, a Representative from Ohio, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces............................... 1

WITNESSES

Creedon, Hon. Madelyn R., Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Global Strategic Affairs, U.S. Department of Defense........... 7
D'Agostino, Hon. Thomas P., Administrator, National Nuclear
Security Administration, Under Secretary for Nuclear Security,
U.S. Department of Energy...................................... 28
Huizenga, David G., Senior Advisor for Environmental Management,
U.S. Department of Energy...................................... 30
Kehler, Gen C. Robert, USAF, Commander, U.S. Strategic Command... 9
Winokur, Hon. Peter S., Chairman, Defense Nuclear Facilities
Safety Board................................................... 32

APPENDIX

Prepared Statements:

Creedon, Hon. Madelyn R...................................... 61
D'Agostino, Hon. Thomas P.................................... 101
Huizenga, David G............................................ 139
Kehler, Gen C. Robert........................................ 70
Sanchez, Hon. Loretta........................................ 59
Turner, Hon. Michael......................................... 55
Winokur, Hon. Peter S........................................ 150

Documents Submitted for the Record:

Memorandum of Agreement Between Secretary Robert M. Gates
(U.S. Department of Defense) and Secretary Steven Chu (U.S.
Department of Energy) Concerning Modernization of the U.S.
Nuclear Infrastructure..................................... 232
Statement of ADM Kirkland Donald, USN, Director, Naval
Reactors, National Nuclear Security Administration, U.S.
Department of Energy....................................... 191
Statement of Anne Harrington, Deputy Administrator for
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, National Nuclear Security
Administration, U.S. Department of Energy.................. 195
Statement of Dr. Charles F. McMillan, Laboratory Director,
Los Alamos National Laboratory............................. 211
Statement of Dr. Paul J. Hommert, President and Director,
Sandia National Laboratories............................... 200
Statement of Dr. Penrose C. Albright, Director, Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory.............................. 220
Statement of Maj Gen William A. Chambers, USAF, Assistant
Chief of Staff, Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear
Integration................................................ 181
Statement of RADM Terry Benedict, USN, Director, Strategic
Systems Programs........................................... 171

Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

Mr. Brooks................................................... 241
Mr. Garamendi................................................ 241
Mr. Turner................................................... 239

Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

Mr. Langevin................................................. 248
Ms. Sanchez.................................................. 246
Mr. Turner................................................... 245
FISCAL YEAR 2013 BUDGET REQUEST FOR ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES
AND NUCLEAR FORCES PROGRAMS

----------

House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, April 17, 2012.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:24 p.m. in
room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Michael Turner
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL TURNER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
OHIO, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

Mr. Turner. Good afternoon. We will call to order the
hearing for the Strategic Forces Subcommittee. I apologize for
our tardiness. I know you all are very used to the fact that
the votes throw the schedule off here at the Capitol, and I
appreciate your tolerance for our starting late.
The Strategic Forces Subcommittee hearing on the
President's fiscal year 2013 budget request for DOD [Department
of Defense] and DOE [Department of Energy] nuclear forces, U.S.
nuclear weapons posture, and the fiscal year 2013 budget
request from Environmental Management is an incredibly
important hearing as we move forward on looking at the
priorities and responsibilities of this subcommittee.
I want to thank all witnesses for being here today. For
those who follow the sometimes arcane world of nuclear weapons,
budgeting and policy, the witnesses on our two panels are
familiar faces. They are the Honorable Madelyn Creedon,
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs,
U.S. Department of Defense; and General C. Robert Kehler,
Commander, U.S. Strategic Command.
On Panel 2, we have the Honorable Thomas P. D'Agostino,
Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration; Mr.
David G. Huizenga, Senior Advisor for Environmental Management,
U.S. Department of Energy; and the Honorable Peter S. Winokur,
Chairman, Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board.
On December 1, 2010, prior to the ratification of the New
START [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] Treaty, the then-
directors of Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos, and Sandia
National Laboratories wrote to Senators Kerry and Lugar and
stated: ``We believe that the proposed budgets,'' referring to
the November 2010 update to the Section 1251 plan, ``provide
adequate support to sustain the safety, security, reliability,
and effectiveness of America's nuclear deterrent within the
limit of 1,550 deployed strategic warheads established by the
New START Treaty with adequate confidence and acceptable
risk.''
That plan appears to have been abandoned in the President's
fiscal year 2013 budget request, calling into question whether
there still is adequate support for the Nation's nuclear
deterrent to permit the reductions that are called for by the
New START Treaty.
There have been those inside and outside of Government who
have challenged the linkage of the New START Treaty and the
modernization plan. There are those who make the argument that
because President Obama has requested more funds than his
predecessor, though not the funds that he promised, that he has
done all he is needed to do. Neither of these positions
represent serious thinking that benefits our national security.
The question is what is necessary today and how are we going to
accomplish it.
There can be no doubt that reductions proposed by the New
START Treaty are only in our national interest if we complete
the modernization of our nuclear deterrent warheads delivery
systems and infrastructure.
I want to remind those who have forgotten, this was the
President's modernization plan. It was his Nuclear Posture
Review, issued in April 2010 before there was a New START
Treaty, and his 1251 plan. Here are some of the highlights from
the President's 2010 NPR [Nuclear Posture Review].
It was stated: ``Funding the Chemistry and Metallurgy
Research Replacement Project at Los Alamos National Laboratory
to replace the existing 50-year-old Chemistry and Metallurgy
Research Facility in 2021.''
Also from the President's 2010 NPR: ``Developing a new
Uranium Processing Facility at the Y-12 Plant in Oak Ridge,
Tennessee, to come online for production operations in 2021.''
Also from the President's 2010 NPR: ``The administration
will fully fund the ongoing LEP [Life Extension Program] for
the W76 submarine-based warhead for a fiscal year 2017
completion, and the full scope LEP study and follow-on
activities for the B61 bomb to ensure first production begins
in fiscal year 2017.''
The President's 1251 plan states that CMRR [Chemistry and
Metallurgy Research Replacement] and UPF [Uranium Processing
Facility] will complete construction by 2021, and will achieve
full operational functionality by 2024.
Further, the inextricable linkage of modernization in the
New START reductions was the basis of Condition Nine of the New
START Treaty. The linkage was the legal basis on which the
Senate ratified the treaty. Let me remind everyone that the
Senate said in Condition Nine the following: ``The United
States is committed to proceeding with a robust stockpile
stewardship program, and to maintaining and modernizing the
nuclear weapons production capabilities and capacities that
will ensure the safety, reliability, and performance of the
United States nuclear arsenal at the New START Treaty levels.
The United States is committed to providing the resources
needed to achieve these objectives at a minimum at the level
set forth in the President's 10-year plan provided to Congress
pursuant to Section 1251.''
The President agreed to Condition Nine as I just read it.
First off, I believe the President is abandoning his
commitment that he ratified or acknowledged in Condition Nine,
and I think it is in part because he already has his treaty and
it has already been ratified. I think implementation is
something that he is now putting aside before us. I base that
belief on the budget submitted and that the status report
required by Condition Nine has not been submitted to Congress.
Also the Section 1045 report last year from the NDAA [National
Defense Authorization Act] has not been completed.
Let me remind the subcommittee what Dr. James Miller, the
President's nominee to the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy, told us just last November. He said, quote: ``The first
is that we understand the requirement to report per Condition
Nine if we have less funding than in the 1251, as requested in
the Section 1251 report. Our interpretation of that has been
substantially less,'' meaning that he says that even though we
asked for less funding we don't have to file a report. We have
to ask for substantially less.
In fiscal year 2011 actually slightly less was appropriated
than requested. Back to his words: ``Our judgment was a 1
percent or less change doesn't require us to submit the
report.''
Let us dwell on what he just said again. ``Our judgment was
that a 1 percent change or less doesn't require us to submit
the report.''
The difference we are looking at now in the fiscal year
2012 appropriations bills in both the House and Senate
appropriations bills I think would trigger that. His words, and
we would have to examine that question. If there is
substantially less funding than requested, we will, of course,
provide the report to Congress.
Yet we have no report for either fiscal year 2012 or the
President's own budget request for fiscal year 2013, which
underfunds the 1251 plan.
So what has changed? Is it solely the budget picture? I
don't mean to dismiss the budget situation and the cuts that
DOD has to make, especially it has made those cuts while
transferring large sums of its own budget to fund the
modernization activities at the NNSA.
But again the question here is whether U.S. nuclear force
reductions make sense without modernization. The President's
Nuclear Posture Review makes the case for this linkage when it
stated: ``Implementation of the stockpile stewardship program
and the nuclear infrastructure investments recommended in the
NPR will allow the United States to shift away from retaining
large numbers of nondeployed warheads as a hedge against
technical or geopolitical surprise, allowing major reductions
in the nuclear stockpile.''
In the absence of these investments, will the forthcoming
NPR implementation study continue to hurtle toward what seems
to be a prejudged outcome that the U.S. should further reduce
its nuclear deterrent? I see no other way to understand the
President's recent comments at Hankuk University in Seoul,
stating: ``Last summer I directed my national security team to
conduct a comprehensive study of our nuclear forces. That study
is under way,'' the President said. ``But even as we have more
work to do,'' the President speaking, ``we can already say with
confidence that we have more nuclear weapons than we need.''
Need for what?
So the study isn't done, but we already know the answer
supports the President's goal of a world without nuclear
weapons. Either the President already knows the answers to the
questions, in which case the Congress must be informed, or the
President wrote the question to ensure an answer that he wants.
Again, Congress waits for an answer.
Hopefully, our witnesses today will shed some light on this
important area. Either way, I assure you this year's National
Defense Authorization Act will ensure Congress' oversight of
these issues.
I also want to highlight some of the discussion at this
subcommittee's February hearing on governance and management of
the nuclear security enterprise. At that hearing we heard from
the National Academies of Science about a ``broken'' and
``dysfunctional'' relationship between NNSA and its
laboratories. We also heard about a system of micromanagement
that is costing taxpayers untold millions. The National
Academies study and nearly a dozen others have identified and
documented the problems and suggested possible solutions.
I hope our witnesses on both panels will help us understand
what actions should be taken and when.
Finally, we welcome the opportunity to review the budget
and priorities of DOE's Defense environmental cleanup efforts.
DOE continues to do good work in nuclear cleanup but also
continues to struggle with technical and management issues at
its largest project. I look forward to hearing about how DOE
intends to address these concerns.
With those concerns having been acknowledged, I now turn to
my ranking member, Ms. Sanchez, for her opening remarks.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Turner can be found in the
Appendix on page 55.]

STATEMENT OF HON. LORETTA SANCHEZ, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to join Chairman Turner in welcoming General
Kehler, Ms. Creedon, Mr. D'Agostino, Mr. Huizenga, and Dr.
Winokur.
I am also grateful and thank Ms. Harrington, Dr. Hommert,
Dr. Albright and Dr. McMillan, Admiral Benedict, and Admiral
Donald for the statements in the record that you all have put
in and for being here to participate in our discussion today
during the question and answer part of this hearing.
I'd like to preface my comments by noting that the
congressionally mandated, voted-on, brought-forward Budget
Control Act is reinforcing some difficult decisions, some real
soul-searching in all aspects of our Government spending and
our defenses, and our strategic defenses are no different. We
must reexamine and think about what we really need for the
future and decide what we can afford because it is always about
limited resources. Really, it is always about limited
resources.
So in that context, I would like to touch on a few specific
issues related to sustaining our nuclear deterrent and our
nuclear forces, nuclear nonproliferation, and nuclear cleanup
efforts.
First, our nuclear weapons activities and operations.
President Obama and Vice President Biden have made clear over
and over the importance of maintaining a safe, a secure, and a
reliable nuclear arsenal without nuclear testing while making
prudent progress towards lower numbers. There is no doubt in
that, that's what they would like to see. Quite frankly, that
is what I would like to see.
The Administration is currently conducting an
implementation study of the Nuclear Posture Review that will
inform the requirements. So it is important to note that with
over 5,000 deployed and nondeployed nuclear weapons, the United
States still maintains the ability to destroy the world several
times over. So when I hear my colleague say for what, I mean,
we have a lot in hand.
Even with the progress on nuclear reductions, with nuclear
modernization plan's weapons and associated delivery vehicles
remaining necessary, we must still think about how to do this
in a smart way, how to make effective investments. That is what
we need to do, because every dollar that goes this way is a
dollar that is taken from somewhere else, whether it is the
welfare of our people, the education of our people, the
environment our people live in.
For NNSA [National Nuclear Security Administration], while
construction of the plutonium research facility at Los Alamos
National Laboratory has been delayed, several ongoing or new
big-ticket items do require close oversight, including, for
example, the construction of the Uranium Processing Facility at
Oak Ridge, which is now estimated to cost between $6 to $7
billion, and the B61 Life Extension for forward-deployed
warheads in Europe, so far estimated to cost around $5 billion.
However, as we prepare this fiscal year 2013 defense
authorization bill, our committee has not received from the
NNSA the out-year budget estimate or the stockpile stewardship
and management plan to inform our deliberations.
As we look at requirements for maintaining a powerful
nuclear deterrent, improved oversight and planning will be
crucial to ensure that we can avoid cost overrun and schedule
delays. It is part of what this committee is supposed to do,
and it is an important piece of what we do. And in that I
applaud Chairman Turner for being very diligent about getting
to the numbers and trying to move this committee to do the
oversight that I think that we need to do.
We also have to think about retaining critical skills,
about capability and long-term investments in science and
technology to ensure that we keep our brightest and our best
employed, looking at this, and making and meeting the standards
for nuclear safety.
We will rely on the Department of Defense and STRATCOM
[U.S. Strategic Command] to continue to critically examine Cold
War-derived requirements, assess their continued value and cost
effectiveness, and adaptation to new and likely threats.
This brings me to my second point on nuclear
nonproliferation and nuclear threat reduction. I commend the
Administration for its successes at the nuclear security
summit; particularly the U.S.-Russian cooperation to secure
potentially vulnerable material in Kazakhstan. I would also
like to note the total removal of highly enriched uranium from
Mexico and the Ukraine, as well as the progress towards
converting Russian research reactors to use low-enriched
uranium rather than HEU [highly enriched uranium].
However, in contrast, the budget continues to prioritize
the construction of the MOX [mixed oxide fuel] facility at
almost $1 billion annually, despite the absence of a clear path
forward.
Another example, the nonproliferation budget also includes
$150 million subsidy for low-enriched fuel production, which
should be the weapons activities account, for example, or in
the Department's nuclear energy account.
Urgent efforts such as including the President's goal of
securing all vulnerable weapons usable material in 4 years
must, I believe, be a pressing national security priority.
In this context, I would like to hear about interagency
coordination and how the Department of Defense is supporting
nuclear nonproliferation efforts.
Third, nuclear cleanup remains a critical issue in the
aftermath of the Cold War. Sites like Hanford and Savannah
River site played a unique and important piece in our history
in the Cold War, but we have to be diligent and we have to get
this cleanup done. So I would like to hear about how the
Department is addressing the safety culture concerns at the
waste treatment plant at Hanford and the cost increases for
that program.
Mr. Chairman, there are obviously, and you and I have
discussed this before, a lot of other issues this year as we
try to move forward in the next couple of weeks and get a mark
that is going to work for what we believe are the priorities.
So I am very grateful to have you in front of us today, and
again, welcome.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Sanchez can be found in the
Appendix on page 59.]
Mr. Turner. Thank you.
Prior to the beginning of your comments, I just want to
acknowledge that our committee works very strongly on a
bipartisan basis. We have had an incredible history of strong,
unanimous bipartisan support, one of the few committees or
subcommittees that generally signs letters that include either
all members or both leaderships.
As you begin your comments, I do want to note that this
committee, subcommittee, has historically on a bipartisan basis
unanimously supported the necessity, not just the desirability,
but the necessity of CMRR, the UPF, and the life extension
programs. And with that full support that this subcommittee has
provided, we look forward to your additional insight.
We ask if you will summarize your written testimony which
has been provided to the subcommittee and if you would provide
us your oral statement in a period of 5 minutes, we would
greatly appreciate that.
We will begin first with Assistant Secretary Creedon.

STATEMENT OF HON. MADELYN R. CREEDON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR GLOBAL STRATEGIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE

Secretary Creedon. Thank you, Chairman Turner and Ranking
Member Sanchez and distinguished members of the subcommittee. I
am pleased to be here today with General Kehler, Major General
Chambers, and Rear Admiral Benedict, as well as my colleagues
from the Department of Energy and Dr. Winokur, who are on the
second panel, to testify on the important issues of our nuclear
forces and nuclear policies.
I will make just a few remarks today to highlight some of
the topics addressed in my written statement, which I would
like to submit for the record.
The Department plays a crucial role in the President's
vision to take concrete steps toward a world without nuclear
weapons while maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear
deterrent for the Nation and our allies. We are working towards
this vision while supporting the demands of a complex global
security environment.
We have made and are continuing to make decisions on
policy, strategy and future force structure in a way that
ensures we are meeting key objectives of the Nuclear Posture
Review.
These include: Maintaining strategic deterrence and
stability at reduced nuclear force levels and strengthening
regional deterrence and reassuring U.S. allies and partners. We
are seeking the positive results of these decisions with the
entry into force of the New START Treaty in February of 2011.
The timing and framework for the next round of arms control
negotiations have not been set, but we look forward to
discussions with Russia that are broader in scope and more
ambitious. These discussions should include strategic and
nonstrategic nuclear weapons.
Even after the New START Treaty is fully implemented, the
United States and Russia together will account for more than 90
percent of the world's nuclear weapons. For this reason, our
next round of arms control efforts will remain focused on
Russia, and it is important that Russia join us in a move to
lower numbers.
The Obama administration has made clear that we will uphold
our security guarantees to our allies and partners. In East
Asia we have added new forums to our already robust
relationships with Japan and Republic of Korea. These
collaborations strengthen U.S. extended deterrence.
In the Middle East, we are nurturing long-standing
relationships and expanding new ones to prevent Iran's
development of a nuclear weapon capability and to counter its
destabilizing policies in the region.
And in Europe, NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] is
undertaking a Deterrence and Defense Posture Review to
determine the appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional, and
missile defense forces that the alliance will need to deter and
defend against the range of 21st-century threats.
To promote transparency, the United States took the
unprecedented step of releasing the number of nuclear weapons
in the stockpile to the public. We would welcome similar
declarations from Russia and China. We are also pursuing a
high-level dialogue with China aimed at promoting a stable,
resilient, and transparent strategic relationship.
Here at home, as you know, we are assessing deterrence
requirements to set a goal for future reductions below New
START levels, while strengthening deterrence of potential
regional adversaries, enhancing strategic stability vis-a-vis
Russia and China, and assuring our allies and partners.
I won't go into the further details about the NPR follow-on
analysis at this time. The Secretary of Defense has committed
to sharing relevant aspects of the new planning guidance with
the senior leaders of the defense authorizing committees when
the effort is complete. To be clear, this commitment has not
changed. But it is clear that this analysis will shape our
pathway forward, as will the budget.
The current fiscal situation is putting pressure on the
entire Department, and the Nuclear Enterprise is no exception.
For fiscal year 2013, we have made careful choices to protect
high-priority programs while allowing some efforts to be
delayed with acceptable or manageable risks.
Some programs, including the replacement for the Ohio class
ballistic missile submarine, will be delayed. Others, such as
the new bomber, remain on schedule.
The Department has done much to ensure a viable plan to
sustain and modernize our nuclear forces given the constraints
of the Budget Control Act. In the face of these constraints,
DOD has made tough choices, but ones that continue to meet our
national security requirements. We do this by investing in our
nuclear enterprise, particularly in the stockpile and nuclear
infrastructure, as well as through modernization of the
delivery systems that underpin strategic deterrence. We are
also planning on focusing significant resources on an
underappreciated but critical component of strategic
deterrence, the nuclear command and control system that links
the triad of nuclear forces.
Finally, DOD remains a leader in ensuring that terrorists
and proliferators cannot access nuclear materials and expertise
abroad. In cooperation with our interagency partners, we are
building on our long history of cooperation with allies and
partners to expand our efforts in the nonproliferation arena.
Let me conclude by coming back to the NPR and the
President's commitment to a comprehensive and balanced nuclear
agenda. Our nuclear forces remain the foundation of deterrence.
Our arsenal needs significant and immediate investment, and
nuclear dangers today are real.
I am pleased to be here with my colleagues to discuss the
concrete steps we have taken to sustain the nuclear deterrent
and support the President's vision. I would also like to
underscore the importance of the strong bipartisan support that
the chairman has mentioned on these issues critical to the
Nation's security. We welcome the dialogue and debate on these
issues as a way to sustain and renew a long-term approach to
nuclear security.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Creedon can be found
in the Appendix on page 61.]
Mr. Turner. Great. Thank you for your statement. And the
subcommittee has received statements from each of the
witnesses, and without objection those statements will be made
part of the record. There are also several other written
statements that we have received from various officials on the
subject matter of the hearing that without objection will be
added to the record.
General Kehler.

STATEMENT OF GEN C. ROBERT KEHLER, USAF, COMMANDER, U.S.
STRATEGIC COMMAND

General Kehler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member
Sanchez, distinguished members of the subcommittee. We
certainly appreciate the opportunity to present my views today
on the United States Strategic Command's missions and
priorities, especially our nuclear responsibilities.
I am pleased to be here with Assistant Secretary Creedon, a
great colleague and someone with tremendous insight into U.S.
strategic policy and programs.
I am also glad that you are going to hear from NNSA
Administrator Tom D'Agostino and the other expert panelists in
a little while.
Without question, Mr. Chairman, we continue to face a very
challenging global security environment marked by constant
change, enormous complexity, and profound uncertainty. Indeed,
change and surprise have characterized the time that has passed
since my last appearance before this committee.
Over that time, the men and women of STRATCOM have
participated in many, many activities, to include the support
of operations in Libya and Japan, and others ranging through
the preparation of the New Defense Strategic Guidance. Through
this extraordinary period of challenge and change, STRATCOM's
focus has remained constant, to partner with the other
combatant commands, to deter, detect, and prevent strategic
attacks on the United States, our allies and partners, and to
be prepared to employ force as needed in support of our
national security objectives.
Our priorities are clear: First, to deter attack with a
safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent force; second, to
partner with the other commands to support ongoing operations
today; third, to respond to the new challenges in space;
fourth, to build cyberspace capability and capacity; and
finally, to prepare for uncertainty.
Transcending all these is the threat of nuclear materials
or weapons in the hands of violent extremists. We don't have a
crystal ball at STRATCOM, but we believe events of the last
year can help us glimpse the type of future conflict that we
must prepare for. Conflict will likely be increasingly hybrid
in nature, encompassing air, sea, land, space, and cyberspace.
It will likely cross traditional geographic boundaries, involve
multiple participants, and be waged by actors wielding
combinations of capabilities, strategies, and tactics.
I think it is important to note that the same space and
cyberspace tools that connect us together to enable global
commerce, navigation, and communication also present tremendous
opportunities for disruption and perhaps destruction.
In January, the Department of Defense released new
strategic guidance to address these challenges. This new
guidance describes the way ahead for the entire Department, but
I believe many portions are especially relevant to STRATCOM and
our assigned responsibilities. For example, global presence,
succeeding in current conflicts, deterring and defeating
aggression, countering weapons of mass destruction, effectively
operating in cyberspace, space and across all other domains,
and maintaining a safe, secure and effective nuclear deterrent
are all important areas in the new strategy where STRATCOM's
global reach and strategic focus play a vital role.
No question these are important responsibilities. There are
real risks involved in the scenarios we find ourselves in
today. It is my job to be prepared for those scenarios and to
advocate for the sustainment and modernization efforts we need
to meet the challenges. And in that regard, the fiscal year
2013 budget request is pivotal for our future. We are working
hard to improve our planning and better integrate our efforts
to counter weapons of mass destruction.
We need to proceed with planned modernization of our
nuclear delivery and command and control systems. We need to
proceed with life extension programs for our nuclear weapons,
and modernize the highly specialized industrial complex that
cares for them.
We need to improve the resilience of our space
capabilities, and enhance our situational awareness of the
increasingly congested, competitive, and contested domain.
We need to improve the protection and resilience of our
cyber networks, enhance our situational awareness, increase our
capability and capacity, and work with the entire interagency
to increase the protection of our critical infrastructure.
There are other needs as well, but in short, the new
national security reality calls for a new strategic approach
that promotes agile decentralized action from fully integrated,
I would say fully interdependent and resilient joint forces.
These are tough challenges, but the men and women of
STRATCOM view our challenges as opportunities, the chance to
partner with the other commands to forge better, smarter, and a
faster joint force.
We remain committed to work with this subcommittee, the
Services, other agencies, and our international partners to
provide the flexible, agile, and reliable strategic deterrence
and mission assurance capabilities that our Nation and our
friends need in an increasingly uncertain world.
Mr. Chairman, it is my honor and a privilege to lead
America's finest men and women. They are our greatest
advantage. I am enormously proud of their bravery and
sacrifice, and I pledge to stand with them and for them to
ensure we retain the best force the world has ever seen. I join
with the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, and other senior leaders in thanking you and the
committee for the support you have provided them in the past,
present, and on to the future.
Thank you again, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Sanchez,
and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Kehler can be found in
the Appendix on page 70.]
Mr. Turner. Thank you. We obviously have a tremendous
amount to cover here today, including a number of members who
are here with some very significant questions. So
unfortunately, I am going to ask that we all, including of
course myself, the chairman, have some brevity. But, we do have
a lot that is going to have to be discussed.
Secretary Creedon, I have basically six questions for you
that are divided up into two categories, so I am going to smash
them together a bit.
The first category is on budgetary issues with respect to
CMRR and the MOA [memorandum of agreement] between the DOD and
NNSA, which I will give you, and the second one goes to this
issue of Condition Nine, New START, and the mini NPR. So they
will be divided up into those two categories.
With the first one, Secretary Creedon, as you know, the
Department of Defense has transferred to the National Nuclear
Security Administration some $1.2 billion in budget authority
for specific purposes as agreed to in that memorandum of
agreement that I referenced between Secretary Gates and
Secretary Chu, a copy of which will be added to the record.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 232.]
Mr. Turner. I see a total of $4.5 billion that is pledged
to be transferred over 5 years, with another $1.1 billion for
naval reactors over that period of time to support their work
for the Ohio class submarine replacement. Reviewing the MOA, I
see a total commitment of $1.2 billion for CMRR, which I
understand has been deferred until at least 5-year budget
window.
My three parts to this first question, I would like for you
to first discuss, if you will, why the Department of Defense
considered that it was important enough to provide funding for
CMRR?
The second part of that first question: We also see in the
MOA $785 million that was pledged for the B61 and $224 million
for the W76, both of which programs have now been delayed by
the NNSA. So have you gotten your money's worth from the NNSA
on those two line items?
And then the third is why hasn't the Department of Defense
used the authority that we provided in the Defense
Authorization Act for the Pentagon to transfer $125 million in
appropriated funds directly to NNSA for use in the
modernization program? Is it safe to say that the DOD is
concerned about where this money has gone?
After your answers to these, we will get to the second
component, which is Condition Nine, the mini NPR, and New
START.
Secretary Creedon. I think I have all of that.
Let me start with the CMRR. So the money that was
previously transferred in fiscal year 2011 and 2012, that money
did in fact go to the intended purpose, and that was to
continue to assist with the design of the CMRR.
As we looked at the overall budget for the fiscal year 2013
budget, both for the Department of Defense and for the National
Nuclear Security Administration, the NNSA, in light of the
Budget Control Act, we had to make some difficult choices. And
so within the context of the Nuclear Weapons Council, we looked
at the program of modernization and the two construction
projects and made a very conscious decision within the context
of the Weapons Council to prioritize the uranium facility at
Oak Ridge.
And with that decision came the decision to defer the CMRR
for at least 5 years so that we could focus on the Uranium
Processing Facility, which for DOD was the higher priority.
Now, your second question on that is do we still need CMRR;
and the answer is yes. We need a capability to support the
production of pits. Exactly how many we need in the future; in
other words, what is the future pit requirement, how big CMRR
has to be, how much plutonium it has to hold, those are all
decisions that may in fact change at the completion of the UPF
when we once again resume consideration of the funding and the
design of the CMRR.
Now, with respect to the B61, again the Weapons Council
made a very conscious decision, and I will let General Kehler
address this as well because he was key to this decision, but
the Weapons Council made a decision that deferring this until
2019 was appropriate. The same with the W76. And at some point
Admiral Benedict can also shed some more light on this; but
with the extension of the W76, again that was something that
was in the context of the Weapons Council, was deemed an
appropriate, manageable decision in light of the budget
constraints.
Okay. Now, with respect to the Condition Nine----
Mr. Turner. We will get to that one in a second, but I
guess what was missed--and I appreciate your ability to handle
all of this at once. You have done a great job in answering
them. I don't really have the sense in your answers yet of your
level of concern with respect to the stewardship of the money
that is coming from DOD to NNSA, and there are substantial
funding commitments. There is actually a greater authority than
commitments that are being followed through with DOD. And the
testimony that we have received from just about everyone who
has sat in your chair is that they are highly concerned about
what is happening with DOD's value of funds in the hands once
they are transferred over to NNSA and the lack of
accomplishment of the goals that those funds are intended for.
Do you want to voice an opinion on that?
Secretary Creedon. Sir, one of the issues has been in fact
the cost of these various commitments, the 76, the 61, UPF, and
CMRR. And we have noted over time that the costs, the estimated
costs that had been provided some years earlier, have in fact
all increased. And the decisions with respect to the deferral
were in fact largely driven by the increased costs.
So yes, DOD is very concerned about the management of the
money and about the increased costs associated with the two
projects and the two life extensions.
Mr. Turner. I think that's important, if you could
elaborate just a moment. You mentioned the word ``management.''
It really is a management issue that you are concerned about
within NNSA, right, and not just the issue of the actual cost
of these programs, but the perhaps ineffective management
impacting the cost of those programs and the ability for them
to be completed?
Secretary Creedon. I think it's a little bit of both. I
mean, there is a concern about the cost. Now, I applaud what
Tom D'Agostino, the Administrator of NNSA, is doing to try to
get his arms around the costs, particularly of the UPF and the
CMRR. His decision to go to a 90-percent design basis before he
does his cost basis is not only the absolute right thing to do,
but it really is the first time that the NNSA has really
committed to do that.
So from a DOD perspective, that's hugely important, is to
get to that 90-percent cost design in the UPF, and then
understand the requirements and stick to the requirements. I
mean, that is a big challenge. It is one that DOD hopes the
NNSA can clearly implement. But with some of what Tom is doing,
I think that's the right way to go.
Mr. Turner. Even though you are concerned, but you are
encouraged? You are concerned, though, correct?
Secretary Creedon. I am concerned.
Mr. Turner. You do believe that there are management issues
within NNSA that are resulting in delays in programs and
increased costs?
Secretary Creedon. Yes. And, I also believe Mr. D'Agostino
is aware of it, and he is trying very hard to address it, and
we are going to support him in his efforts.
Mr. Turner. Right. And our goal as a committee, we are
going to have to get way past awareness. This is obviously
something that needs to be addressed, not just awareness.
Secretary Creedon, turning to the issue of Condition Nine,
I quoted before Dr. Miller and his statement that in looking at
the trigger requirement for reporting on Condition Nine, he was
going to interpret the language as requiring reporting only if
there is substantially less funding, before defining that
trigger of substantially less as being 1 percent.
We now have a budget request that appears to be
substantially less, and so turning to you with the question
of--we believe that the report should have been provided to
Congress in February when the budgetary request came in
substantially less, again using his standard because I believe
that the requirement for Condition Nine was just less.
So where is the report and is the President committed to
providing that to Congress? And, are we actually going to have
the Administration arguing that we are not in a substantially
less, even though we are in a significantly, I believe,
substantially less request?
Secretary Creedon. Right now the Department is in the final
processes of reviewing both the Condition Nine report and the
related report that is required in the National Defense
Authorization Act for fiscal year 2012. And as we go through
the final reviews of both of these reports, we hope to have
these finished very soon.
Mr. Turner. So you have concluded that you need to provide
the report? You believe that substantially less has been
requested enough to require the Condition Nine report be
delivered to Congress?
Secretary Creedon. We are providing the reports.
Mr. Turner. Thank you.
On February 21, 2012, we received a letter that is going to
be provided to you explaining that DOD will not have the New
START force structure plan for the committee as required by the
National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2012. We
were told that the New START plan is being held up by the
President's mini NPR study, and we don't understand how the
mini NPR study and the New START Treaty are dependent upon one
another, and perhaps you can explain why one would be holding
up the other because they don't to us appear to be related?
Secretary Creedon. The NPR implementation study is going
forward apace, and we are also at the same time working on the
New START force structural levels. But the New START force
structural levels are still under discussion within the
building.
The initial efforts, which again I think General Kehler and
General Chambers and Admiral Benedict can share some additional
light on, are the priorities of implementation. So right now
the priorities of implementation are those things that have
already been retired. So the 50 Peacekeeper missiles, the 50
Minuteman III missiles that have already been retired out of
inventory, that is what the current focus is right this minute.
Mr. Turner. So is your answer basically then, and I am
sorry, obviously these are very complex issues to compare, is
it a workforce capacity issue? Are they unrelated as we believe
they are unrelated? Or, are you saying that they are related
significantly enough for one to impact the completion of the
other.
Secretary Creedon. The focus right now has been on
dismantling, addressing those systems that were already
retired. So, it is a bit of a prioritization within the Service
budgets that is driving some of this. I am happy to have
General Kehler add something if he wants.
But at this point, it is a prioritization within the
Services' budget. There will be of course a relationship, but
the relationship for the 2012 budget, the 2013 budget has not
been specifically tied to the implementation study--I am sorry,
the analysis of the NPR and the implementation of the NPR.
Mr. Turner. I have a number of questions for General
Kehler, but I am going to pass on so that we can get to other
members asking questions, and I will turn to a second round to
get to my questions for General Kehler.
With that, I go to Ranking Member Sanchez.
Ms. Sanchez. I'll just remind my chairman here that at 4:30
we push into the cyber threat special briefing, which I have to
leave for the Democrats. So I know you want to do questions,
but we do have a second panel also.
Let's just cut to the chase. Are there any of these changes
from the 1251 report plan that were due to budget pressures and
the resulting Budget Control Act, meaning that that translates
to a less reliable deterrent? In other words, how high has the
risk gone because we're under these budget constraints? Or, is
there something that we should have that keeps you up at night
that you are worried that we're cutting away from?
To both of you. General.
General Kehler. Congresswoman Sanchez, I'll start, anyway.
First of all from an operational perspective, the deployed
force today, the deterrent force that is out there deployed
today, in the three words that we use is metrics for safe,
secure, and effective. And I believe that today it is safe,
secure, and effective. We are providing and meeting our
deterrence mission responsibilities. And so, I am comfortable
and have confidence in the deployed forces that sits out there
today.
Second, the question is were there adjustments made that
resulted in changes to the 2013 budget that were budget driven
and the answer is absolutely there were. There were clearly
budget constraints that were placed on us that forced us to
make tough choices in fiscal year 2013.
Having said that, my view is that the 2013 budget still
does, though, maintain the funding for the most critical
capabilities that we have operationally. I think there are some
risks, and I believe that those risks we can address
adequately.
My biggest concern is what happens beyond 2013. And, I know
the committee has received a dual letter from both the
Secretary of Defense and Secretary of Energy that reminds the
committee that right now we do not have a comprehensive plan in
place for post fiscal year 2013.
But the force, I wouldn't want to suggest that the force
that is deployed today is not safe, secure, and effective. It
is. I believe it can achieve its deterrence responsibilities as
we sit there today. In fact, I am extremely confident in that.
There were tough choices that were made in 2013. I think those
choices were made with some amount of prudence. I believe that
we can manage the risk that is associated with those choices,
provided that we continue down the road that has been
established in prior budgets and continues in 2013. And what I
am most worried about is what happens after 2013. And the only
reason I am worried about that is I just don't see the plan
yet.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, General.
Madam Secretary.
Secretary Creedon. I agree with everything General Kehler
said. And, there were some difficult choices. Probably the most
difficult of all was the decision to delay the Ohio class
replacement submarine by 2 years. That was a very difficult
decision, but one that we have high confidence that the Navy
can manage.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you.
Madam Secretary, what is your view of the role of the
contribution of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board? I
know some of them are in here, probably, but please.
Secretary Creedon. The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety
Board does not have a relationship with the Department of
Defense. The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board is an
advisory body that was established by the Congress. It was
established in the late 1980s; it was stood up in the early
1990s, to provide advisory opinions to the Department of Energy
in the operations, the nuclear operations, at the Department of
Energy to ensure that the Department of Energy and now the NNSA
were conducting their nuclear security operations safely and in
conformance with the NNSA and the DOE orders, rules, and
requirements.
Ms. Sanchez. But, I asked you what is your view? Is it
needed? Should the Congress rely more on it? Do we need to beef
it up? Has it done its job, you know, from where you sit?
Secretary Creedon. From where we sit at DOD, so you want
sort of the DOD view. I think from the pure DOD view there is
both recognition that there is a valuable contribution by the
board. But, I think very often there is a lot of
misunderstanding about the role of the board. And, I think
often there is some concern that some of the views and opinions
of the board, and this is again within the Department, might
have caused increased costs with certain projects. So, I mean,
I think the views within DOD vary a little bit. I am not sure
that there is one uniform view of DOD with respect to the
board.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you. Let me ask just one more. I know we
are trying to move it along down the line.
General, when asked in 2010 if there is a military mission
performed by U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in Europe that
cannot be performed by either U.S. strategic or conventional
forces, at the time General James Cartwright, Vice Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, flatly said, ``No.''
Do you agree with that assessment; and is there any
military function for tactical nuclear weapons that cannot be
accomplished by strategic weapons?
General Kehler. I wouldn't--your question was do I agree
with that statement, and the answer is I agree with that
statement partially.
In terms of purely military use in an unlikely scenario
where we would have to use a nuclear weapon, I think that we
have the ability, the U.S. force today has the ability to
provide extended deterrence through a variety of means, not
just forward-deployed aircraft.
The question about forward-deployed aircraft and forward-
deployed weapons is really an alliance question, and I am
firmly of the belief that it needs to be discussed and debated
and decided in the context of the alliance.
Ms. Sanchez. Mr. Chairman, I'll pass it down and when we
get to second round, I will ask the rest of my questions.
Mr. Turner. Mr. Lamborn. We will do 5-minute rounds.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both for
being here.
Secretary Creedon, does the Obama administration have any
plans to reduce the New START limit on deployed U.S. nuclear
weapons, which is 1,550, and what are these plans?
Secretary Creedon. Sir, if I understand the question right,
the Administration is committed to complying with the New START
Treaty within the central limits of the treaty which is by
2018. The plan is to comply with that. That is absolutely true.
Mr. Lamborn. I mean to go below that in the future, below
the 1,550?
Secretary Creedon. The President has said that there is
certainly an interest in making reductions. The Congress has
also had an interest in making reductions, particularly with
the nonstrategic warheads. There is a hope, as I mentioned in
my opening statement, that as we go for future reductions, that
we can include these non-strategics and that we can look--again
with Russia--in total stockpile levels. And, so there is no
plan. There is certainly the hope that we can get there with
Russia.
Mr. Lamborn. You say an interest, on the part of whom to
make these further reductions?
Secretary Creedon. In the debate on the START Treaty, one
of the primary considerations was looking at reducing the
nonstrategic warheads, which have not been part of treaties
heretofore, and that is a very large consideration in terms of
reducing future stockpiles.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Let me ask you a broad, philosophical
question. Do you believe that U.S. nuclear weapons are a threat
to world peace and safety? Just a broad, philosophical
question.
Secretary Creedon. Nuclear weapons?
Mr. Lamborn. U.S. nuclear weapons?
Secretary Creedon. U.S. nuclear weapons right now are very
important to maintaining deterrence in this world.
Mr. Lamborn. But the President is talking about reducing
them further, though they play a role, a beneficial role, it
sounds like?
Secretary Creedon. Yes, they do. And the President has said
that as long as there are nuclear weapons, there will be a
safe, secure, reliable and effective nuclear deterrent, and it
is important and he's committed to sustaining that.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay, thank you.
Let me shift to what the chairman built on, let me build on
something he pointed out. Ratifying the New START Treaty was
based on at least in part an agreement to adequately fund the
modernization of our nuclear stockpile; correct?
Secretary Creedon. It was a large element of the discussion
during the ratification.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Thank you. And, that was done during a
lame duck session.
Given that if this agreement to adequately fund
modernization is unfulfilled, whether it is by the
Administration or Congress or both, should the U.S. consider
withdrawing from the treaty that was based on doing that?
Secretary Creedon. That is the topic of the report that the
Department is currently submitting. Right now the deterrent is
in fact being maintained, safely, securely, and reliable, and
we are in fact planning and focusing on modernizing both the
strategic delivery systems and also the weapons complex. It's
just at a somewhat lower level, and that's largely driven by
the constraints of the Budget Control Act.
Mr. Lamborn. Would you agree that modernization, if it does
not take place, that calls into question our participation in
the New START Treaty?
Secretary Creedon. And, what I am saying is that with the
budget that we have submitted, we are in fact carrying out the
commitment to modernization.
Mr. Lamborn. But, should that commitment not be fulfilled
in the future, should that lead to a discussion of withdrawing
from the treaty?
Secretary Creedon. That is a very hard question to answer
in the abstract and one that would have to look at what exactly
that future situation really was. Right now, here, we are
committed to the modernization of both the complex and the
delivery systems.
Mr. Lamborn. General Kehler, I am seeing a lot of risk in
the Administration's plan for the nuclear stockpile. We've
talked about some of the specifics, the Ohio submarine delay,
delaying CMRR, et cetera, et cetera. Where should we draw the
line on risk acceptance as we don't do some of these steps; and
how do we know when we have reached that line?
General Kehler. Congressman, that's a situational answer.
As much as I hate to say ``it depends,'' it depends.
At this point in time, I can look at the modernization
efforts, the sustainment, first of all, efforts that we have
for the triad, and by the way the budget sustains the triad,
and I think that is the right thing to do. As we look to the
future, I am convinced that the triad continues to serve us
well. So the budget supports the triad. The budget continues to
support sustainment of the existing triad, although there have
been some adjustments made to various pieces of that. The
budget supports modernization of the triad with a question mark
about what we should do with the land-based deterrent, but an
analysis of alternatives that's going to be under way.
So at this point in time, as I look at that, I am
comfortable that we are not at the point where I would stand up
and say operationally we can't meet the objectives that we
have. The investment has to continue in our command and control
system. I think that continues to be important. There is a
little discussed piece of this for intelligence surveillance
and reconnaissance as well. I think that is important as we go
forward. And then there is the issue about the weapons and the
weapons complex where again, as I say, the biggest risk that I
think we are taking in that regard, even though I would have
not preferred to see the Ohio replacement slide to the right, I
think that that increases some risk, but I think it's
manageable.
The same with moving the B61 life extension to the right. I
think that increases some risk, but I believe that that's
manageable as well. I cannot draw firm red lines on a paper for
you today.
I can tell you, though, that we need to watch this very
carefully as we go forward, and in particular, in the weapons
complex. The extended complex past 2013, I am still concerned
about the lack of a firm plan as we go forward. In every other
case I see the plan.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
Mr. Turner. I am going to take the chairman's prerogative
as we go on to the next questions and just insert for a second
some things that we all can agree upon that I don't want to
become confusing as a result of some of the language that is
being used in the answers and the discussion.
The Budget Control Act does not dictate any reductions that
we are dealing with in this subcommittee with respect to NNSA
or nuclear modernization. They are choices being made by the
Administration. The answers that you are providing of the
effect of the Budget Control Act is merely your recognition of
the budget pressures that you have. I want to make that clear
so that no one believes that the Budget Control Act dictates
the choices that the Administration has made that we are now
dealing with in the reductions to NNSA and modernization.
Secondly, as I had said in my opening statement, the issue
of the timing of modernization to the adoption of New START
Treaty was expressly stated by the Senate in Condition Nine and
was expressly concurred with by the President. So it is not
merely conjecture or opinion when people question about the
issue of New START and the nexus between modernization.
Thirdly, with respect to the 1251 and the modernization
plan, both the President and NNSA and DOD have identified it
with respect to the modernization plan as being necessary and
essential, not merely desirable. That is why we have this issue
of the concern of the Administration's choices that it made in
its implementation of the Budget Control Act. That struggle
that we're having as to how these items that had previously
been identified as necessary and essential could fall now to
merely desirable is part of what our essence of our questions
are.
With that, I will turn to Mr. Garamendi.
Mr. Garamendi. I pass.
Mr. Turner. Mr. Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank the
panel for being here. General Kehler, thank you for your great
service to our country. And Secretary Creedon, thank you for
the work you are doing.
General Kehler, just review for me if you would some of
your biggest concerns about the stockpile delivery systems and
the weapons complex itself? And, I guess as part of that, if
you would include your perspective of are these concerns
addressed within the fiscal year 2013 budget and program plan?
General Kehler. Congressman, I would say if I had to
summarize my concern across the board in today's deployed
force, as well as looking at the future, and particularly in
the weapons complex, the word that I would use is ``aging.''
When I look across the force today, the force in every
aspect of the triad, the force is aging. What we know is a
couple of facts. One fact that we know is that the current Ohio
class ballistic missile submarines will reach the end of their
lifetime. They will reach that. There is not a hard line to
draw in the sand, but it is a risk assessment. And, the Navy
has drawn a risk line and said that beyond this point we do not
feel comfortable fielding the current generation of Ohio
submarines. So there is a date out there that there will need
to be a replacement.
For the bomber, we are continuing to fly, of course, B-52s
that are aging, and some would say aged, and the same for the
B-2A which is now a platform that gives us great service, and
so does the B-52H model. But both of them, we need to make some
investments in for sustainment, and we need to, especially in
light of other activities in the world today. We need to invest
in a long-range, strategic strike platform that is going to be
dual capable, either conventional or nuclear capable.
So we need to get on with that, to deal with the problems
that we have in the bomber force.
We don't say much about the tanker, but we need a tanker
that goes with it, by the way.
Regarding the ballistic missile, the land-based ballistic
missile, we believe that we can take the Minuteman to 2030 in
its current form with sustainment investment. Beyond that, I
think we have a serious set of questions to ask ourselves about
what shape and form of the next ballistic missiles should look
like on the land.
In the weapons complex, the same issue is there. Aging. The
complex itself is aging and the weapons are aging. The B61,
which is going to be needed, we believe, to arm the new bomber
platform, is aging in terms of terms of its electronics
components, and it is time for a life extension program there.
The W76 which arms the vast majority of the submarine
force, also is under way for life extension, but we need to
continue and bring it to conclusion as best we can as soon as
we can.
Beyond that, we have other weapons that will come down the
pike that we need to take a hard look at and continue with
plans to modernize them in some way, whether it is a common
explosive package as we go forward or such.
Nuclear command and control is another.
So the question is: are those all supported in the fiscal
year 2013 budget. In their critical aspects, the answer is yes,
they are supported in the fiscal year 2013 budget. They are not
supported the same way that we saw a couple of budgets ago.
We've looked at the risks associated with the various impacts
of the budget on those platforms. And again, my operational
assessment is that we can make the appropriate adjustments. I
will be very concerned if we make more adjustments beyond
these.
I think that further delay to the Ohio replacement, for
example, will jeopardize our collateral work with the U.K., for
example, and I think that would be a mistake. I think that
taking more risk in the current Ohio class is not a prudent
thing to do.
So, I think that we are reaching some points where further
adjustments would cause me to have to reassess whether I
believe that the operational force is being taken care of.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, General.
Secretary Creedon, let me turn to the triad, if I could.
There has been much deliberation recently over the need for a
triad, including the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review which
considered and rejected, of course, the elimination of one or
more legs of the triad. What are your views on the need for a
triad and do you believe we should maintain all three legs of
the triad indefinitely?
Secretary Creedon. Sir, we are very supportive of the
triad. The budget supports the triad. The Nuclear Posture
Review supports the triad. We need to sustain and maintain the
triad. As General Kehler detailed, the fiscal year 2013 budget
does that. But, there are clearly some tradeoffs that we have
made, and we have to watch this every year to make sure that
the budget requests do in fact sustain the triad.
Mr. Langevin. Very good, I would agree.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Turner. Thank you. General Kehler, I have a great deal
of respect for both your intellect, your contributions and
service and your choice of language, but I must ask, being a
gentleman of Ohio, if you would please not refer to an Ohio
replacement. It is the Ohio class sub replacement, and it would
make me feel more comfortable as we go through this.
General Kehler. Congressman, I stand corrected, sir. Thank
you.
[Laughter]
Mr. Turner. Thank you. I turn to Mr. Brooks.
Mr. Brooks. General Kehler, again, thank you for your
service to this country. This question will be for you.
According to the information I have received from
subcommittee staff, President Obama's fiscal year 2013 budget
request proposes to terminate the common vertical lift support
platform. This helicopter was to replace the Air Force UH-1N
that fill critical roles in security in the ICBM
[intercontinental ballistic missile] field. Further, according
to committee staff, the average aircraft age is 41 years for
these helicopters, and the Air Force uses them to provide
support for nuclear weapon convoys, emergency security
responses, activities in the National Capital Region, and other
missions. The Air Force reports that the termination of the
program will save $950 million over the next 5 years and that
current UH-1N helicopters will be unable to fulfill their
mission requirements and will continue to operate under
waivers.
The question is: What is the Air Force's plan to fill the
gap and capability left by cancelation of this program? Is it
simply the waiver process, is there something else?
General Kehler. Sir, I will defer to the Air Force on the
answer to that question. I know we have General Chambers here.
I don't know if he is prepared to answer that.
But let me address it from a standpoint that I can. About a
week ago, in fact, exactly a week ago, I was airborne in one of
those UH-1s in the missile complex at Francis Warren in
Wyoming. I believe that those helicopters are safe to fly in. I
know they are using them every day even though some would say
those are aged platforms as well.
I am concerned for the long term, and the UH-1 will not
meet the security needs as we go to the future. I believe they
are doing extraordinary things with those platforms today, and
I know that the Air Force is looking very hard at whether they
have some near-term alternatives to help with the security
improvement, and then what to do for the long term.
I understand from talking to the Chief of Staff of the Air
Force that this was very much a budget-driven decision as well.
But I will ask Bill Chambers. Bill, is there anything else?
General Chambers. Congressman Brooks, this was one of the
difficult decisions the Air Force made in light of the budget
constraints. We are deferring the requirement. The program that
you heard about last year was terminated, but a new acquisition
strategy for replacement for the vertical lift requirement both
for missile fields and for the National Capital Region and for
personnel recovery are all part of a fresh look at a new
platform.
Meanwhile, one of General Kehler's component commanders,
General Kowalski at Global Strike Command is taking steps to
mitigate the effect of the continued use of the UH-1. First of
all, he has applied more money to sustain the platform. He has
enhanced remote surveillance of the launch facilities. He has
added structural enhancements to enhance onsite security, and
we continue to look at tactics, techniques, and procedures to
enhance the use of the UH-1, to include putting UH-1s on 24-
hour alert to make them more responsive to security needs.
So, this is a risk we didn't like accepting. We are working
it, and have some mitigation measures in place.
Mr. Brooks. If I can just follow up with a question, with
respect to these Hueys, do you have a judgment as to how much
longer we can continue to use them and they meet their mission
requirements? They're 40-41 years average age now.
General Kehler. I do not have a specific answer. I would
like to provide that for the record if we could.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 241.]
General Kehler. I will tell you this, though. My assessment
and because I am a combatant commander, ultimately the
responsibility for security in the missile complexes and for
the rest of our operational force is my responsibility. I
believe that in the ICBM complex specifically, and if you
extend this to other legs of the triad as well, security is far
better today than it has ever been, in the ICBM complex in
particular, through a combination of technology that has been
brought to the missile fields through remote cameras and other
observation methods that have been put in place, plus
additional training, plus additional firepower that has been
put into the missile complexes. I believe that they are far
more secure today than they have ever been.
Mr. Brooks. Great. Thank you, and I had hoped to have a
little bit more time for this last question, but each of you
have talked about the Budget Control Act. For clarity, your
testimony----
Mr. Turner. Mr. Brooks, actually since it is just currently
the three of us, I will certainly provide you as much time as
you would like.
Mr. Brooks. Thank you.
With respect to your testimony concerning the Budget
Control Act and the cuts, has it been strictly the first
tranche of cuts that you have been referencing, or did your
statements also include the impact of sequestration?
Secretary Creedon. No, sir. It's just the first tranche of
cuts.
Mr. Brooks. That being the case, what kind of impact will
sequestration have, which is the law of the land, goes into
effect January 1, 2013, have on our atomic energy defense
activities and nuclear force programs and capabilities?
Secretary Creedon. You know, that is a very good question
and one frankly for which I don't have an answer. The Secretary
has been very clear that it would have a devastating effect,
and we have not looked at exactly how that would be spread
across the various elements. I can only reiterate what the
Secretary has said, and it is just a devastating effect. But I
don't know the answer to that question because we haven't done
that allocation.
General Kehler. Congressman, nor do I. That would be a
question of priorities and it would be a question of depth of
cut, and I would echo Secretary Creedon's comment with the
Secretary of Defense. He's used the word ``devastating.''
Mr. Brooks. The sequestration is 8\1/2\ months away. As I
understand the President's position, he has said he would veto
changes by the Congress to that law. Are you not conducting any
drills or do you not have any plans in place for when these
cuts occur January 1, 2013, 8\1/2\ months away?
Secretary Creedon. Sir, I think the Secretary has addressed
that in some of his hearings. From a policy perspective, I can
tell you I have not been personally involved in anything. I
think the Secretary has made it clear that at the top line it
would just be an extraordinarily devastating outcome. I don't
have an answer for you.
Mr. Brooks. General, have there been any drills or plans to
work through the kinds of cuts associated with sequestration on
your command?
General Kehler. We are not doing anything in my command to
prepare for sequestration.
Mr. Brooks. Is there any plan to plan? We are talking about
something that is pretty dramatic that is only 8\1/2\ months
away, and it's the law of the land. Do you have a judgment as
to when a plan will be in place? Or, are we just going to wait
until December 31 and wake up on January 1 and start planning
at that point?
Secretary Creedon. I don't know the answer to that
question. We have not, as far as I have seen, we have not done
that. Certainly, again, I have not been involved in anything at
my level.
General Kehler. Same for me, Congressman. The Budget
Control Act reduction that was taken, the way it was taken
inside the Department, was applied against the new strategy.
The new strategy was written, and then the Budget Control Act
numbers were put against it. That's where we are.
Mr. Brooks. Well, I am going to make a comment in response
to all this then. You know, I am just a freshman, new kid on
the block. But, we are talking about $40-50 billion in cuts,
maybe 60, national defense depending on your definition under
the statute of national defense. And, we're looking at 8\1/2\
months away, and it is very disconcerting to discern or to hear
that the executive branch may have no plans as to how that is
going to be implemented.
We've heard different theories before HASC as a whole. For
example, over on the Senate side, one person from the Pentagon
talked about it being the equivalent of a Pentagon shutdown. I
believe it was an admiral. My memory may be in error, so I
don't want to use his name, but you could find it out Googling
it real quick.
Then in HASC, we had testimony that there would be a
stoppage of all contracts. Every single contract that the
Federal Government has, that the Department of Defense has,
that the Pentagon has with the private sector, and they would
try to work in somewhere in the neighborhood of 8 to 9 percent
on the low side, 13 to 14 percent on the high side, of prorated
cuts to every contract. Now how you do that with a ship or what
part of an airplane wing do you not put on, this is just very
disconcerting. It would seem to me that we need to have a plan,
and I understand that you all may not be the ones in the
position to make that kind of a decision, but to the extent you
can communicate my views to higher-ups I would very much
appreciate it.
Mr. Turner. Thank you. We'll consider the extended time
that you had, if you do not mind, being your second round,
which will then go into the second round.
My questions are directed to General Kehler, as I
indicated, but I'm going to first turn to Mr. Lamborn in case
he covers some of the issues on his second round and we don't
have repetition.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you. Just two or three questions here.
First of all, I am concerned that the credibility of our
extended deterrent commitments may fall into serious question,
especially if we do unilateral cuts below the New START limit
of 1,550. What steps are we taking or planning to be taking to
reassure our allies of our commitment to providing a credible
deterrent? And at what point will you make unilateral
reductions in our nuclear weapons? Do we increase the
discussion, the risk, the commitment of our allies, roughly 29
or 30, who are under our nuclear umbrella right now, to begin
developing their own nuclear weapons programs?
For both of you.
Secretary Creedon. Sir, the Secretary said last month that,
and this is direct quote, he said: ``We have gone through a
nuclear review and presented options to the President. But let
me be very clear that these options are in no way unilateral.''
Those are the words of the Secretary of Defense. So with
that in mind, the work that we have done, that we did to
engage, to reach out, and to discuss with the allies in support
of the START Treaty was extensive. I was not in the Pentagon at
the time that all happened. But having understood a lot of that
and having also understood what is going on now with respect to
discussions with our allies, we are in very close contact with
our allies. And, the concern that you raised about others
developing nuclear weapons is a very serious concern that we
take very seriously. And, clearly that is not to say the least,
that is not a desirable goal. That is not a desirable outcome.
So, we do take that very seriously, and are working very hard
to make sure that that extended deterrence is in fact credible,
believable, real, effective.
Mr. Lamborn. General.
General Kehler. Congressman, I would just add that I agree
with what Secretary Creedon just said. The credibility of our
extended deterrence begins with our declaratory statements
about our commitment to our allies and our alliances, and it
continues from there through the demonstration that we have of
our commitment in terms of capabilities. And in that regard, we
still have dual capable aircraft in Europe. We have weapons
forward-deployed in Europe. Those are conversations for the
alliance to have regarding the future of that element of our
commitment. But the other part of our commitment is a continued
commitment from our strategic triad, in particular our ability
to have what are essentially dual capable long-range bombers
today that have been used for the last 10 years in conventional
operations but are capable of delivering nuclear weapons.
And so, in both of those regards, we have had a number of
our allies visit with us in Strategic Command. We've gone over
in great detail with them our visible commitment as well as our
capabilities. And, I think they understand very well that it is
a real and credible commitment that we have and backed up by
real and credible capabilities.
Mr. Lamborn. I believe you both are telling us very openly
and honestly everything that you're aware of. It is just that
when I hear some of the rumors floating around about massive
reductions in our nuclear stockpile and I see our President
saying unusual things in an open microphone it just makes me,
you know, really, really wonder if there is something there
that we don't know about. So, thank you for your answers. I
believe you were giving us everything you are aware of.
What are the advantages or disadvantages of deMIRVing our
ICBMs? Are there only advantages, or are there also
disadvantages?
General Kehler. Congressman, I think the advantages are
twofold. First of all, it is one of the ways that we are going
forward to get down to the central limits of the New START
Treaty, the 1,550 warheads.
Secondly though, there is a stability issue related to the
intercontinental ballistic missiles and how many warheads they
carry, and as part of the policy discussion that goes with the
deterrence, there has been a long-standing view that a highly
MIRVed [multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle-
equipped] ICBM in an existing silo can in fact be
destabilizing. And, the theory goes that that is because it is
theoretically vulnerable; and, therefore, the more valuable it
is with the number of warheads that you hang on it, the more
likely it is that an adversary of any kind would want to try to
eliminate it quickly and perhaps stimulate some kind of a
response in a crisis.
And so, the idea is to bring them down to one reentry
vehicle per ICBM to essentially reduce their strategic value.
That's the pathway that we have been on for quite some time. I
support that. I think that that is the right way to go forward
for both of those reasons. I also believe that maintaining the
ability to go back to a MIRV in the future as a hedge is also
the right thing to do.
Mr. Lamborn. Because it has a deterrent value; right? The
more MIRV capable, the more deterrent value, apart from what
you said a minute ago?
General Kehler. Yes, sir. A hedge strategy has deterrent
value. I would agree with that, yes, sir.
Mr. Lamborn. And that kind of leads to my last question.
What is the Air Force's plans, and if you need to bring someone
else up or I should wait for Panel 2, let me know, to a
nuclear-capable air-launched cruise missile and when is such a
capability needed and where do we stand with that?
General Kehler. I'll take that one.
We are committed to retain a standoff weapon for the
current generation of long-range bombers, specifically the B-
52. We're also committed to have a standoff capability as well
as a penetration capability in the new long-range strike
platform. By the way, that will be both conventional and
nuclear. So, we will have conventional standoff weapons as well
as the ability to penetrate and deliver weapons, et cetera.
And, I support both of those.
The current air-launched cruise missile is also aging. We
are keeping it in good shape today with a series of sustainment
investments. And so, right now it looks like the long-range
standoff weapon will be necessary in the mid to late 2020s,
just depending on the progress of the new long-range strike
platform. And, we believe and the Air Force believes, my Air
Force component believes that we can continue to sustain the
ALCM [Air-Launched Cruise Missile] and the W-80 warhead that is
in it until then.
We are going to watch that very carefully, though, to make
sure that is true. And, if there are indications that that is
not true, then we intend to work with the Air Force to try to
accelerate the long-range standoff weapon.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay, thank you.
Mr. Turner. Thank you.
General Kehler, you are the combatant commander for nuclear
weapons, and as such, you are the warfighter for implementing
the President's nuclear weapons employment guidance and the
President's Nuclear Posture View. So, these are your
requirements that you are implementing. So, what I would like
to turn to is the first section of questions that I was asking
the Secretary going to the issue of DOD financial support for
NNSA, concerns that you have concerning both with management
and performance of NNSA on how it goes to the function that you
have. We already went through the long list of things that are
being delayed and are not being completed, and they're not all
budgetary, as were acknowledged in this hearing. Are you
satisfied with NNSA's performance? Do you have concerns about
management and performance?
General Kehler. Sir, first of all, have I mentioned the
need to have a replacement for the Ohio class ballistic missile
submarine, just so I am clear on that?
Second, Congressman, I would say this: We are always
satisfied with the product that we get from NNSA. The concern
that I have is making sure we are on a path to get the product.
That is as clearly I think as I can describe it.
Mr. Turner. There are signs that are troubling to you;
right? You would have that concern even if they were
performing; right? But they are not necessarily performing;
right? So your concern is being met with actual performance
issues that need to be addressed?
General Kehler. Mr. Chairman, the word ``performance''
troubles me a little bit here because, again, in the product
that we get from NNSA, from the laboratories, through the
industrial complex, I don't have any complaints.
Mr. Turner. The product you have?
General Kehler. I am sorry, sir?
Mr. Turner. What you have you mean?
General Kehler. Right.
Mr. Turner. The thing we are focusing on are the products
that you want to get, the future ones. And those you have from
what I understand concerns about the management structure,
performance, and I would like to hear those.
General Kehler. Yes. What I have are concerns about two
things. Number one, I have a concern about what happens beyond
fiscal year 2013, as I have said a number of times. I think the
words that we have been using here is whether or not we have a
comprehensive and definitive plan, and the answer right now is
we do not. We do not have a comprehensive or definitive plan.
That concerns me as I sit here as the customer, if you will, as
the user of the product that is put out by NNSA.
Mr. Turner. In addition to the absence of the plan, you'd
have concern about the substance of that plan; right? I mean,
there are performance timelines and metrics that you need
satisfied?
General Kehler. Exactly.
Mr. Turner. And, so both that plan has to be completed, it
has to be substantively sufficient to meet your needs, and then
there has to be the capability of implementing it?
General Kehler. Yes, sir.
Mr. Turner. And I believe you have concerns on those three,
even beyond just the existence of the plan, what the substance
of the plan would be, and the ability of NNSA to implement it?
General Kehler. To execute it; yes, sir. And, I would throw
all of the stuff you mentioned, when I say I am concerned about
the plan, those are the things that I mean. It is all of those
factors, and then being able to implement it with sufficient
investment that goes behind that. And again, as I said in my
opening remarks, my job is to be the advocate for these things.
And, as long as I am the advocate for these things, I will have
concerns until we get to the point where there is a plan in
place that we know we can execute.
Mr. Turner. General Kehler, your new headquarters is being
built through the military construction authorities available
to the Department of Defense and through the oversight of the
authorization and appropriations committees of Congress. Do you
have confidence in that process and what are the attributes of
that process? I am going to give you a specific.
Would you say that it's a plus for you to know that going
into a project that 20-percent design stage implementation can
occur? When you are at that 20 percent and you've got the
approval, the congressional authorizers and appropriators are
all on board with the project, Congress has committed to
providing the authorizations and appropriations needed for the
project every year. Would you be concerned if you didn't know
each year whether the project was going to be funded because of
a continuing resolution or final appropriations bill that may
not come until December or even April for a fiscal year that
has begun on October 1? Basically as you are looking at your
construction, the processes that Congress goes through affects
your confidence and your ability for completion. You have a
standard of a 20-percent design stage and there certainly are
some benefits to that, there are some benefits to the current
processes that you have. Can you speak to that for a minute and
also then your concerns of how congressional unstable funding
can affect your completion?
General Kehler. Mr. Chairman, I would just say that I
believe that the basic rules of acquisition apply in the case
of a major project, in our case a new command and control
complex, that is supported by military construction. First, you
have to have good requirements. And second, you have to have
stability. You have to have stability in requirements and you
have to have stability in investment. And so, my answer would
be that stability, whether that's annual appropriations from
Congress to make sure that we are stable or other kinds of
stability are critical to make sure that we can deliver on
time.
Mr. Turner. Thank you.
With that, I want to thank this panel for their answers.
And we will be moving on to Panel 2, and so we will take a
short recess as we are changing panels. Thank you.
[Brief recess.]
Mr. Turner. We will reconvene.
On our second panel, which I would like to welcome, we have
the Honorable Thomas P. D'Agostino, Administrator, NNSA and
Under Secretary for Nuclear Security, U.S. Department of
Energy; we have Mr. David G. Huizenga, Senior Advisor for
Environmental Management, U.S. Department of Energy; and the
Honorable Peter S. Winokur, Chairman, Defense Nuclear
Facilities Safety Board.
We will begin with Mr. D'Agostino.

STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS P. D'AGOSTINO, ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL
NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, UNDER SECRETARY FOR NUCLEAR
SECURITY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Secretary D'Agostino. Chairman Turner, members of the
committee, good afternoon and thank you for having me here
today to discuss the President's fiscal year 2013 budget
request. Your ongoing support for the men and women of NNSA and
the work they do, as well as your bipartisan leadership on some
of the most challenging national security issues of our time
has helped keep the American people safe, protect our allies,
and enhance global security.
In February 2013, President Obama released his budget for
fiscal year 2013. Now more than ever before, the fiscal
constraints facing our Nation cause us to ensure that we are
targeting the Nation's investments in nuclear deterrent and
nuclear security with precision and effectiveness.
I want to assure you that the NNSA is being thoughtful,
pragmatic, and efficient in how we achieve the President's
nuclear security objectives and shape the future of nuclear
security.
President Obama shared his vision for a united approach to
our shared nuclear security goals in Prague in April of 2009.
His request for the NNSA in 2013 is $11.5 billion, an increase
of $536 million over the fiscal year 2012 appropriation. This
demonstrates a continued affirmation of the Administration's
commitment to investing in a modern, 21st-century nuclear
security enterprise. We are focused on continuing our critical
work to maintain the Nation's nuclear stockpile and ensuring
that it remain safe, secure and effective.
The budget request provides $7.58 billion for the weapons
activities account to implement the President's nuclear
deterrent strategy with our partners at the Department of
Defense. The President continues to support our life extension
programs, including funding for the B61 warhead activities.
Consistent with the President's 2012 request, we have requested
increased funding for our stockpile systems to support the W-78
and W-88 life extension studies.
Our request for investments in the science, technology, and
engineering that support NNSA's missions will ensure that the
national security laboratories continue to lead the world in
advance scientific capabilities. For over a decade, we have
been building the tools and capabilities needed to take care of
that stockpile, as well as a large and dynamic range of
national security work, before utilizing these tools and
capability towards the mission of maintaining a safe, secure
and effective stockpile while performing the necessary life
extension work. Additionally, these capabilities provide a
critical base for our nonproliferation and counterterrorism
work, allowing us to apply our investments to the full scope of
the nuclear security mission.
This budget includes $2.24 billion to maintain our
infrastructure and execute our construction projects. To
support our stockpile and provide us with world-class
capabilities, we need to modernize our Cold War-era facilities
and maintain the Nation's expertise in uranium processing and
plutonium research. We are adjusting our near-term plutonium
strategy by deferring--not canceling--by deferring construction
of the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Nuclear
Facility Project in order to focus our limited resources on the
highest priority requirements.
We can meet our plutonium needs on an interim basis, using
the capability and expertise found in existing facilities.
Deferring of this project will have an estimated cost avoidance
of approximately $1.8 billion over the next 5 years, which will
help offset the cost of other priorities such as the weapons
lifetime extension programs and construction of the greatly
needed Uranium Processing Facility at the Y-12 national
security complex in Tennessee.
The UPF project is our highest priority capital project
requiring immediate modernization. As you know, our deterrent
is only one part of NNSA's mission. 2013 will see us continue
to advance the President's 4-year goal to secure vulnerable
nuclear material around the world. The budget request provides
$2.46 billion we need to continue critical nonproliferation
efforts.
Our continued focus on innovative and ambitious
nonproliferation and nuclear security is vital. The threat is
not gone, and the consequences of nuclear terrorism and state
proliferation would be devastating. Detonation of a nuclear
device anywhere in the world would lead to overwhelming
economic, political and psychological consequences. We must
remain committed to reducing the risk of nuclear terrorism and
state based proliferation.
Anne Harrington and I recently attended the nuclear summit
in Seoul, South Korea, where the President and over 50 world
leaders renewed their commitment to nuclear security. We know
there is no silver bullet solution which is why we continue to
implement a multilayered strategy to strengthen the security of
nuclear material around the world and maintaining our
commitment to detecting and deterring nuclear smuggling.
$1.1 billion is requested for the Naval reactors program,
which will support the Navy's effort to complete the Ohio class
replacement submarine and modernize key elements of our
infrastructure. Support for the President's request is
essential for our continued ability to support the mission of
the nuclear Navy.
This budget request also gives us the resources we need to
maintain our one of a kind emergency response capabilities,
allowing us to respond to a nuclear or radiological incident
anywhere in the world and anticipate the future of nuclear
counterterrorism and counterproliferation.
We are committed as well to being responsible stewards of
the taxpayer dollars. We have taken steps to ensure that we are
building a capabilities-based infrastructure and enterprise
focused on future enterprise requirements. We view this
constrained environment as an additional incentive to ask
ourselves how can we rethink the way we are operating, how we
can further innovate, and how we can improve our business
processes.
We are not resting on old ideas to solve tomorrow's
problems. We are shaping the future of security in a fiscally
responsible way.
Budget uncertainty adds cost and complexity to how we
achieve our goals. You have been very supportive of our efforts
in the past, and I ask you again for your help in providing the
stability we need to do our jobs efficiently and effectively.
We are improving our business processes by implementing
international consensus standards on quality management, and we
are looking forward to shaping the proper workforce through our
workforce analysis. For example, taking a look at international
standards such as ISO 9001. We are continuously improving, and
I look forward to getting into the details in the question and
answer session.
[The prepared statement of Secretary D'Agostino can be
found in the Appendix on page 101.]
Mr. Turner. Mr. Huizenga.

STATEMENT OF DAVID G. HUIZENGA, SENIOR ADVISOR FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Mr. Huizenga. Good afternoon, Chairman Turner and members
of the subcommittee. I am honored to be here today with my boss
and with Chairman Winokur as well to discuss the important,
positive things we are doing for the Nation through the ongoing
efforts of the environmental management program and to address
your questions regarding our fiscal year 2013 budget request.
Our request of $5.65 billion enables the Office of
Environmental Management to continue the safe cleanup of the
environmental legacy brought about from five decades of nuclear
weapons development and Government-sponsored nuclear energy
research. Our cleanup priorities are based on risk and our
continuing efforts to meet our regulatory compliance
commitments. Completing cleanup promotes the economic vitality
of the communities surrounding our sites and enables other
crucial daily missions to continue. By reducing the cleanup
footprint, we are lowering the cost of security and other
overall activities that would otherwise continue for years to
come.
In August 2011, the Office of Environmental Management was
aligned under the Office of the Under Secretary for Nuclear
Security. This realignment promotes the natural synergies that
exist between the Office of Environmental Management and NNSA.
For example, at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, we are
working with NNSA to accelerate the transfer of certain
components of the uranium-233 inventory. This inventory is
valuable for national security applications and supports NNSA's
missions related to safety, nuclear emergency response, and
special nuclear material measurement and detection. This
innovation and initiative will result in cost savings for our
program and enable us to move forward with cleanup of nuclear
facilities in the heart of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory.
Over the years, the Office of Environmental Management has
made significant progress in accelerating environmental cleanup
across the departmental complex. For example, last December at
the Defense Waste Processing Facility in our Savannah River
site in South Carolina, we solidified a record 37 canisters of
highly radioactive waste, marking the most canisters filled in
1 month in the facility's 15-year history.
Out west at the site in Moab in Utah, we've celebrated the
removal of 5 million tons of uranium tailings from the site to
a safe location away from the Colorado River.
Through 2011, we safely conducted over 10,000 shipments of
transuranic waste to the waste isolation pilot plant in New
Mexico, the world's largest operating deep geologic repository.
As you can see from these accomplishments, the Office of
Environmental Management has made great progress and will
continue to do so with your help.
We cannot have achieved such notable accomplishments
without an outstanding Federal and contractor workforce. The
safety of our workers is a core value that is incorporated into
every aspect of our program. We have maintained a strong safety
record and continuously strive for an accident and incident
free workplace. We seek to continue improvements in the area of
safety by instituting corrective actions and aggressively
promoting lessons learned across the sites.
In collaboration with the Department's Office of Health
Safety and Security and our field sites, we are working to
achieve a stronger safety culture within our program and
thereby improve safe construction and operation of our
facilities.
In this regard, on March 22, I attended a Defense Nuclear
Facilities Safety Board hearing chaired by my fellow panel
member Chairman Winokur regarding the Waste Treatment and
Immobilization Plant at Hanford. At the hearing, we discussed
the status of the board's technical concern regarding vessel
mixing as well as erosion and corrosion issues. We had an in-
depth discussion of safety culture at the WTP project. I
believe we are making steady progress in both addressing the
DNFSB's [Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board] technical
concerns and promoting the safety culture at WTP.
We will continue to identify opportunities to reduce the
lifecycle cost of our program, including the development of new
technologies and other strategic investments. We continue
working with the Government Accountability Office to
institutionalize improvements in contracting and project
management. We have established project-sponsored positions at
headquarters for all capital asset projects, and conduct
regular peer reviews of our most complex projects. We are
including U.S. Army Corps of Engineers personnel who have
demonstrated experience in project and contract management on
these project peer review teams. We are committed to becoming a
best in class performer in this area.
Chairman Turner and other members of the subcommittee, we
will continue to apply innovative cleanup strategies so that we
can complete quality work safely, on schedule, and within cost,
thereby demonstrating value to the American taxpayers.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Huizenga can be found in the
Appendix on page 139.]
Mr. Turner. Mr. Winokur.

STATEMENT OF HON. PETER S. WINOKUR, CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE NUCLEAR
FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

Dr. Winokur. Thank you, Chairman Turner and members of the
subcommittee. I am Peter Winokur, the Chairman of the Defense
Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, known as the DNFSB.
I submitted a written statement for the record that
describes the board's mission and highlights a number of safety
issues that are particularly important to ensuring that the
defense nuclear complex can safely accomplish its missions. I
will provide a brief summary of my written testimony for your
consideration today.
The DNFSB was established by Congress in 1988 to provide
safety oversight for the defense nuclear facilities operated by
DOE and NNSA. We are the only agency that provides independent
safety oversight of DOE's defense nuclear facilities.
As the defense nuclear complex evolves, we cannot ignore
the growing challenges that will define the future of DOE's
nuclear facilities, the need for Federal stewardship of this
enterprise, and the Federal commitment to protect the health
and safety of the workers and the public. Today's challenges of
aged infrastructure, design and construction of new replacement
facilities, and the undertaking of a wide variety of new
activities in defense nuclear facilities requires continued
vigilance and safety oversight to ensure public and worker
protection.
The board's budget is essentially devoted to maintaining
and supporting an expert staff of engineers and scientists,
nearly all of whom have technical masters degrees or doctorates
to accomplish our highly specialized work.
The President's budget request for fiscal year 2013
includes $29.415 million in new budget authority for the board.
It will support 120 personnel, the target we have been growing
toward for the last several years. We believe this level of
staffing is needed to provided sufficient independent safety
oversight of DOE's defense nuclear complex given the pace and
scope of DOE activities.
The board evaluates DOE's activities in the context of
integrated safety management. Integrated safety management is a
process-based approach that builds tailored safety controls
into operating procedures and facility designs as they are
developed. Integrated safety management is efficient and
effective for everything from replacing a valve to designing a
multibillion dollar facility. DOE has embraced this process in
its policies and directives as a fundamental means of achieving
adequate protection of workers and the public.
Shortcomings in safety and efficiency in DOE's defense
nuclear facilities can almost always be related to a failure to
effectively apply integrated safety management. For complex,
high-hazard nuclear operations, a performance-based outcome
approach may appear successful on the surface but underlying
weaknesses and processes can lead to serious accidents and
unwanted results. It is critical that DOE avoid the low-
probability, high-consequence event that can cripple a facility
or program and endanger workers and the public.
DOE and NNSA are designing and building new defense nuclear
facilities with a total project cost on the order of $20
billion. I cannot overstate the importance of integrating
safety into the design for these facilities at an early stage.
Failing to do this will lead to surprises and costly changes
later in the process.
The board is committed to the early resolution of safety
issues with DOE. To that end, we publicly document significant
unresolved technical differences between the board and DOE
concerning design and construction projects in quarterly
reports to Congress.
Even though the concept of safety and design is embodied in
DOE's directives and is constantly emphasized by the board,
safety issues have arisen due to DOE and its contractors
changing safety aspects of a design of major new facilities
without sufficient basis.
One of the most prominent examples involved the Waste
Treatment and Immobilization Plant under construction at
Hanford and the uranium processing facility plant at the Y-12
national security complex. Making such changes without
adequately understanding the associated technical difficulties,
complexities or project risk involved can reduce the safety
margin of the design, create new safety issues, and imperil the
success of the project.
The board is continuing to urge NNSA to replace unsound
facilities and invest in infrastructure for the future. The
9212 Complex at Y-12 and the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research
Building at Los Alamos are both well overdue for replacement.
Since 2004, the board has issued an annual report to
Congress on aging and degrading facilities. We will continue to
update this report periodically to highlight the greatest
infrastructure needs affecting safety of DOE and NNSA defense
nuclear facilities.
In addition to rebuilding its production infrastructure,
DOE is attempting to achieve more efficient operations by
creating and testing new governance models that rely more on
its line organizations for safety oversight, reduce its safety
directives, and reduce contract requirements. The board has
devoted considerable extensive resources toward reviewing DOE's
changes in directives, governance, and oversight. Safety and
efficiency need not be mutually exclusive objectives if
carefully managed.
Finally, the need to constantly assess and maintain a
strong safety cultural throughout the DOE defense nuclear
complex has emerged as an imperative for the Department of
Energy. The hazards posed by a failed safety culture are real
and have led to costly disasters in industry. Lessons learned
from the Fukushima reactor accident in Japan and the Deepwater
Horizon oil well blowout in the Gulf of Mexico give powerful
testament to a strong safety culture.
Mr. Turner. It looks like we will perhaps be having votes
in the middle of the series of this. So I will have to ask your
indulgence as we are going to at some point during the
questioning have to take a break, so I appreciate that, and
perhaps you can incorporate any additional . . .
Dr. Winokur. I am finishing up right now.
Let me add in closing that the bulk of issues that the
board has safety concerns about are addressed at the staff
level without any need for a letter or recommendation. I am
confident that the board is working with DOE's liaison to the
board to establish an increasingly effective working
relationship between the board and DOE. I believe the board's
relationship with Deputy Secretary Poneman has never been
better.
That ends my statement. I will be happy to answer any
questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Winokur can be found in the
Appendix on page 150.]
Mr. Turner. I've just been informed that we have about 35
minutes, so perhaps if we can make it through this and
conclude.
Throughout all of my questions and my opening statement and
I think concerns that you have heard from members of the panel
has been the issue of the abandonment by the Administration in
this budgetary request of the commitment to the modernization
plan that was put forward both in the New START implementation
and the 1251 plan. We have statements from the President, DOD,
this committee, the Senate and House, and the Senate in the
adoption of New START that directly reference the CMRR
facility. It was identified as necessary; not merely desirable,
but necessary.
Now, Administrator D'Agostino, you have the benefit of
having appeared before this subcommittee seven times starting
in 2006 when you were Deputy NNSA Administrator. Looking
through the record of those appearances, almost every time we
see that you stress to this subcommittee how important the
Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement, CMRR, Facility
is and how the capabilities it will provide are critical to
sustaining a stockpile. Again, not desirable, but critical.
And even today, if you look at the statement that you just
read to us, and in the written statement you provided, for us,
the words ``critical,'' ``vital,'' ``necessary,'' appear
repeatedly when you talk about the elements of the issues of
the execution of the NNSA performance and our nuclear
deterrence.
So, for example, in February 2008, you said that the
surveillance and other capabilities that would be provided by
the CMRR would be ``essential to maintaining the existing
stockpile.''
Your 2008 testimony elaborated, saying, quote: ``A
sufficient capacity to produce plutonium pits for nuclear
warheads is an essential part of a responsive national security
enterprise and is required for as long as we retain a nuclear
deterrent. Currently, we have a very small production
capability capacity at Los Alamos National Laboratory, about 10
pits per year, and NNSA has evaluated a variety of future pit
production alternatives. Whether we continue on our existing
path or if we move towards an RRW [Reliable Replacement
Warhead]-based stockpile, we will need a capacity to produce
about 50 to 80 pits per year. To do this''--still your words--
``we would use existing facilities with the addition of a new
CMRR nuclear facility. Our approach would provide sufficient
production capability to support smaller stockpile sizes,
particularly when coupled with potential reuse of pits.''
By these statements, it looks like NNSA evaluated pit reuse
previously, but rejected an over-reliance on reuse because it
would not meet the requirements for responsive infrastructure.
Of course some would say that was 2008 when you worked for a
different President. But here is what you told this
subcommittee just last April when you did work for President
Obama, referring to CMRR and the Uranium Processing Facility,
UPF, you stated: ``These capital projects are key elements for
ensuring safe, secure, reliable uranium and plutonium
capabilities for nuclear security and other important
missions.''
In your comments just last April, you defined responsive
as: ``We have identified that in our plan as having a uranium
processing facility that is up and running, having a CMRR
facility that is available to do the surveillance work on our
stockpile and help support a modest amount of pit manufacturing
capability. But one thing we have clear with the Defense
Department and the National Nuclear Security Administration is
our understanding that it is important to be able to
demonstrate that our infrastructure is responsive.''
Today, you tell us that the CMRR facility is no longer
needed for at least 5 years. I am not certain as this committee
tries to evaluate this how we determine if it is credible. And
in fact, I would want to say it this way. If we take your
testimony and if we put it in front of the committee and
allowed it to vote, your testimony today would be outweighed by
your previous testimony. So it begs a few questions. Who are we
to believe, you from now or you 4 years ago? What are the
actual requirements for pit production capacity? What do we
really need to see in terms of responsiveness? Why was a
reliance on pit reuse insufficient a few years ago but it is
suddenly okay today?
We have heard that you think NNSA has a plan, a revised
plutonium strategy. You have provided the committee two pages
of bullet points, and we do not believe that this is a plan. We
believe it's a fig leaf to cover the Administration while it
scrambles to figure out the repercussions of its hasty
decision, and it was its decision, it was not based on the
Budget Control Act, to terminate the CMRR facility.
Now, we have a memorandum dated February 13, 2012, from
Donald Cook and it is for Kevin Smith, Manager, Los Alamos Site
Office. And this letter shows that you don't actually have a
plan. In fact, it shows that you have given Los Alamos National
Laboratory 60 days to scrape together a plan, meanwhile the
original plutonium plan, the CMRR plan that was put together
over the course of a decade has been thrown out, and I just
want to reference this memo for a moment, the February 13th
memo.
On page 2, it says: ``The assignment is a high-level plan
containing a sequence of actions and resources required each
fiscal year over the fiscal year 2014 to 2018 as a result of
delay in the CMRR.''
The decision had already been made, and now the question is
well, what do we do? There was not a: ``what do we do and then
we can delay the plan.'' There was: ``let's delay the plan, now
what do we do?''
General Kehler, NNSA's customer in many senses, doesn't
seem to think that you have a plan either. In testimony before
the Senate Armed Services Committee just 3 weeks ago, General
Kehler was asked about deferment of CMRR, and said: ``The plan
to upgrade what we call CMRR, or the Chemical and Metallurgy
Building, that allows us to process plutonium is not in place.
This has been slipped fairly far to the right, 5 to 7 years
depending on which of the documents you look at. I am concerned
about that, and I am concerned about our ability to provide for
the deployed stockpile. I will be concerned until someone
presents a plan.''
You heard him. He said it before also. There is no plan
that we can look at and be comfortable with and understand that
it's being supported.
``So I am not saying that there isn't a way forward. I am
hopeful that there is.'' This is General Kehler. Hopeful. We
have a General that has to be hopeful. ``We just don't have it
yet; and until we do, as a customer I am concerned.''
Based on your testimony to other committees, Administrator
D'Agostino, I understand that the CMRR decision was primarily
budget driven; is that right?
Secretary D'Agostino. The budget situation that the country
finds itself in very clearly is an element, but there are other
factors. And, with your indulgence, Mr. Chairman, I would like
to explain.
Mr. Turner. Please.
Secretary D'Agostino. Okay. An important point, number one,
I want to be very clear on, the country needs a chemistry and
metallurgy replacement facility on a nuclear site. It needs the
capabilities that that facility provides. It has to have those
capabilities. And, the capabilities are very simply material
characterization in analytical chemistry work to work on
plutonium, in order to do surveillance, as you have mentioned,
sir. Those capabilities the country must have, those
capabilities the country does have, and those capabilities
exist and can exist in existing facilities that the NNSA and
the country has at its disposal.
The fact is, of course, the budget situation, the financial
situation the country unfortunately finds itself in, the Budget
Control Act, I understood the discussion earlier, but it is a
reality.
The other piece of reality I have to deal with is the
appropriation I received from Congress last December, just one
month before the roll-out of the President's budget for fiscal
year 2013, which reduced our budget by over $400 million,
including $100 million reduction on the CMRR facility. Pulling
all of these pieces together provide kind of that fiscal
incapability background that we had to deal with, but a couple
of things that have changed in the past year that will
illuminate the technical situation on with respect to this
facility and why I believe firmly that we are on solid ground
with the needs that we have on plutonium capability and
materials characterization.
The first is that we have an existing facility, a brand new
facility called a Radiation Laboratory Utility Office Building.
This is a facility at Los Alamos right next to PF-4, our
plutonium facility, and this facility we have looked at the
safety basis documentation, and by using modern dose conversion
factors, we were able to increase by a factor of 4 the amount
of material we can use in that particular building. That opens
the world right up for us in order to be able to do a
significant amount of surveillance work that we need to do in
that facility. This did not exist over a year ago. It exists
right now, and that provides the Nation and it provides us with
a lot of flexibility.
The second particular piece that has changed in the last 12
months is a significant--one of the areas that the CMR----
Mr. Turner. I am sorry, I have to interject here for a
second.
Secretary D'Agostino. Sure.
Mr. Turner. This building fell out of the sky? I mean, it
wasn't a plan, it wasn't something you knew was going to be
there, and your testimony over the past 7 years, and
considering the record of construction I am certain that there
was a significant amount of lead time. Can you please describe
to us how the existence of this building somehow changes your
previous testimony where clearly that building must have been
in the process and its capabilities must have been in the
process, so when you say a year ago, I am----
Secretary D'Agostino. A year ago--the Radiation Laboratory
Utility Office Building is a brand-new facility that we are
placing into operation right now, Mr. Chairman, and the key
here----
Mr. Turner. There was no period of planning, designing, it
just showed up?
Secretary D'Agostino. Absolutely not. Of course, we planned
and designed this facility, and over many years we ended up
putting this facility in place.
Mr. Turner. Were you unaware of the capabilities when you
were----
Secretary D'Agostino. No, we are very well aware of the
capabilities.
Mr. Turner. Then how is it that it didn't affect your
testimony before but it does now when its existence clearly was
something that was anticipated?
Secretary D'Agostino. Mr. Chairman, I may not have been
very clear when I was talking earlier. We have used modern dose
conversion factors. We have looked at the safety basis
documentation and revised that safety basis documentation
within the past year. This was a significant amount of work. We
went through a process, and as a result of that we were able to
increase the amount of plutonium we can use in these facilities
significantly, from four grams of plutonium up to like 34 grams
of plutonium. So it is actually a part and parcel of the
project.
Mr. Turner. Wait a minute. You know, these things are
difficult for us to understand----
Secretary D'Agostino. Sure.
Mr. Turner [continuing]. Because, you know, obviously we
are not the experts like you guys are, and, you know, when we
get your testimony year after year and time after time, and we
go to rely on it and then we suddenly get testimony that is
completely different, I mean, it is not as if we have a
different D'Agostino standing in front of us.
Secretary D'Agostino. Same person, sir.
Mr. Turner. Same guy. It would--I mean, we just have to
apply logic, right? So if you have this--I mean, you are
recommending that the CMRR be delayed 5 years, not that it be
eliminated.
Secretary D'Agostino. That is right, the country does need
a long-term sustainable capability in this area. What we have
right now is an opportunity by using existing facility to do
the work that we, that the CMRR nuclear facility represents,
and the radiation laboratory is actually a part of the CMRR
project. What we have been able to do with additional analysis
is say previously we were limited by between 4 and 8 grams of
certain different isotopes of plutonium to work in that
building. Because we have sharpened our pencil, we have used
modern dose conversion factors, within the past year we have
determined that that amount of plutonium can now be increased
without any increased risk to the public or the workforce to up
in the order of 30 grams. That is a very significant increase
in the amount of work we can do in this radiation laboratory.
We didn't want to take that count on this happening 2 years
ago. We weren't sure that we would be able to do all of the
analysis. But we finished that analysis within the past year.
That provides the country with a lot of flexibility.
I still believe, and I stand by the testimony, that the
capabilities that these facilities provide are absolutely
essential in order for us to do our job.
Mr. Turner. So your answer is that it is not merely
budgetary? Because that was my question.
Secretary D'Agostino. The budgetary piece certainly sets
the tone and the environment on this particular area because
this is essentially, particularly given the concerns and
looking at the seismic issues, working with the defense board,
looking at the seismic issues, we were talking about a
multibillion dollar facility here, as the committee is well
aware, and as a result of that, given the pressures that we
had, we decided instead of going simultaneously with two large
multibillion dollar facilities on top of each other to move
them apart in time, and in essence allow us to focus on the
most important thing that the Nation needs because we know that
this thing that we moved to the right by 5 years or so, the
Nation----
Mr. Turner. Or so. Well, what would the ``or so'' be?
Secretary D'Agostino. Well, we have to finish essentially
our analysis, we have to make sure that we get the uranium
processing facility right and that we still maintain that
capability to use the Superblock facility at Lawrence Livermore
Laboratory and to stage material at device assembly facility as
well as complete the work in the CMR radiation building. So we
want to take full advantage of the investments the Nation has
made over the last 10 years, particularly building the
radiation building as well as take advantage of the new
missions that we have moved to the device assembly facility in
Nevada and the reduction in the amount of material at the
Superblock.
Mr. Turner. You have heard a number of people today, and I
am certain you are aware of prior testimony.
Secretary D'Agostino. Right.
Mr. Turner. That have been pretty condemning of NNSA.
Secretary D'Agostino. Right.
Mr. Turner. ``Broken'' is a word that's been used
frequently. We have had, you know, in private meetings the
representatives from DOD have said that both they and Congress
should be outraged over the lack of performance by NNSA. When
you are trying to manage something, obviously one of the issues
that you look at is what is your metric, right? What are you
going to measure and what is the outcome in that measurement?
In this instance with NNSA, people have a lot of unfinished
projects where there is no ability to measure because there is
no performance. There are areas where people are concerned not
only that there is not a plan to address the fact that there
hasn't been performance, but what that implementation will be
when there is a plan that people haven't seen, and many times
the plans themselves, as you know, are late, and I would like
you to respond to that.
Secretary D'Agostino. Sure. Certainly, I would be glad to.
Mr. Turner. You have to have some concerns yourself, and if
you echo their sentiments, I would like to know that also.
Secretary D'Agostino. Absolutely. I have been looking
forward to taking this question actually after listening to
your comments earlier today. Management involves essentially
people and processes focused on getting the mission done, and
frankly, in that standpoint, leadership is about establishing
that vision. But I take the measurements from the standpoint of
what have we accomplished. Let's think about what has actually
happened over the last number of years. The W76----
Mr. Turner. Just pause for a second. I think we are all
familiar with what happened. What our focus is on, which is why
there is congressional oversight, are the things that aren't
happening, why they aren't happening, and when they are going
to happen. So perhaps you could give us some focus on--because
that I would assume--I mean, your management focus would not be
on a victory lap, it would be on your to-do list, and I am
concerned about your to-do list, so let's focus on those things
that aren't getting done.
Secretary D'Agostino. I think it is important, though,
since you started off the question, sir, with talking about
lack of performance that the NNSA has actually performed very
well over the last couple of years, and I would like to get on
the record the work we have done on the W76, getting that job
done, operationalizing the national ignition facility project,
putting the radiation laboratory building into operation, and
in fact increasing the workload by that facility by a factor of
four, moving nuclear material out of Lawrence Livermore
Laboratory in order----
Mr. Turner. I am sorry, you were doing that so quickly, we
are having a discussion up here, did you just say W76
completed?
Secretary D'Agostino. No.
Mr. Turner. Okay.
Secretary D'Agostino. I said the production work and full
production mode on the W76.
Mr. Turner. Because it's delayed how long?
Secretary D'Agostino. We have got a production rate that--
--
Mr. Turner. How long is the W76 delayed?
Secretary D'Agostino. The finishing of the work that we
jointly agreed to with the Defense Department pushes us back to
2019 in order to meet the Navy's operational memo.
Mr. Turner. A 3-year period is my understanding?
Secretary D'Agostino. Two years. But we are well under way
on production on a very complicated system that the Nation
relies upon. I want to talk about the future, since I think
this is the piece that you were interested on what is happening
out in the future from a governance standpoint.
We are focused, and we work with the laboratories,
laboratory directors, in fact we met with them earlier this
morning on looking at a revised governance approach consistent
with the idea that we have hired solid companies to put things,
bring their best to bear, using international and national
consensus standards, taking advantage of those particular
standards, and looking at what directives we can adjust in
order to simplify and streamline. This is about continuous
improvement. This is not about a magic pill that one can take.
So we've done this before. We have experience in this area.
At the Kansas City plant, we've implemented consensus standards
there, we've seen an increase in performance, we've seen safety
numbers improve fairly significantly, and we expect as a result
of all of this when our new facility is built to save over $100
million a year in doing this. We've worked with our laboratory
directors in, specifically we've identified 28 directives that
they considered burdensome directives, 25 of those directives
have been resolved. We'll be glad to provide the subcommittee
with the details of that if you're interested.
In the security area specifically we've stepped out, we've
taken a look at the DOE orders in the security areas, and for
the NNSA we've streamlined them into two particular policies in
orders and directives, just two from the whole list in order to
streamline those, in order to clarify what some might consider
too much directives, too many potentially conflicting items. As
a result of our stepping out in that particular area, we have
decreased, we have managed to increase our security performance
and decrease the security costs by over 10 percent in that 2-
year period, bringing technology to bear. So, on governance, I
think this is a particularly important point.
Mr. Turner. Before you go into the next, you were just
talking about the rules.
Secretary D'Agostino. Right.
Mr. Turner. We do have a slide show, it is a 9-minute slide
show that we are going to run during the discussion that have,
our understanding is that there are 270 DOD rules, orders, and
directives that apply to NNSA; DOE, I am sorry, 270 DOE rules
and orders and directives that apply to NNSA, and they put
together a slide show of those. Because you have mentioned them
as being a constraint for you, and I would agree.
You can finish.
Secretary D'Agostino. Okay. So, what we have stepped out
over the past years, and we are implementing out into the
future is a review board, an order review board where we
evaluate each one of the directives and orders that we have
that apply to NNSA contractors, we examine them in detail with
our contractors in order to find out what elements of those
orders might be into the ``what'' category versus ``how.'' We
want to try to separate out the responsibilities to give the
flexibilities to our M&O contractors, who are very capable, to
let them figure out the best way to achieve the impact or the
net results, and as a result of that 12, we have changed the
contracts on 12 of these particular orders to simplify and
streamline them, and we have a number of other particular
orders, another slice of orders, if you will, that we've
already looked at. But we have to do a lot more than that,
frankly, in my opinion.
We've made a few changes in our organizational structure.
We've created an acquisition project management organization in
order to address the question of projects being late, to make
sure that the contracts folks and the project people are
working together to put together the best model in place. Bob
Raines is the head of that organization. He has significant
experience in this particular area in order to make that
happen.
The other thing we have done from an organizational
standpoint, and we're not reaping the benefits of all these yet
because this is the things that we have done just within the
past year, but we are moving out on them, is we have hired
Michael Lemke from the Naval reactors organization. He has had
experience in combining site office organizations and driving
efficiencies in Naval reactors. We are going to take that
expertise in that area, and we plugged him in, last week was
his first week on the job, and he was with us this morning with
the laboratory directors, and we're looking at how do we drive
those same types of efficiencies into the weapons side of the
program, particularly addressing the nuclear security and
national security work that we have to do. There is a
tremendous amount of opportunity.
Mr. Turner. Obviously we have been very lenient with your
time period, so we are going to go to our next question.
Secretary D'Agostino. Okay.
Mr. Turner. If you would like to submit for the record the
extention of what you have accomplished, that would be great.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 239.]
Secretary D'Agostino. I would like to. I could talk
probably for hours on this.
Mr. Turner. Going to the additional issues of the to-do
list and the things at NNSA that need corrected, it is our
understanding that the fiscal year 2013 funding request for the
W76 life extension program has contained an error. Is this
true? And if so, is the Administration going to ask Congress to
fix this item and is there an understanding yet what the fix
item would be to correct the error?
Secretary D'Agostino. Within the DO--directed stockpile
work account we have the resources to make sure that we have
the right number in the W76 life extension production rate, and
we will work with the committee on that.
Mr. Turner. Is the number wrong?
Secretary D'Agostino. The number reflects an earlier
assessment on production rate which we don't have anymore. So
we have to increase the number.
Mr. Turner. So it's wrong?
Secretary D'Agostino. Within the directed stockpile work
account we have the right amount of money in order to fix this
problem.
Mr. Turner. But you are fixing something, a number that is
in error? If you don't say yes, that is fine, I will say yes
for you. I mean, it obviously, if that--if you are going to
have to be fixing it, I would assume that it is an error.
Now, on this issue of NNSA and what needs to be fixed--and
by the way, the 9-minute slide is only of the titles of the
rules and regulations that you are under that you were
mentioning. It takes 9 minutes just to go through the titles.
On February 16th we held a hearing with the National
Academies of Science and the former lab directors, and we
received a number of recommendations. Their statements were
very strong that NNSA needed to be reformed. Some of those
included eliminating transactional oversight and instead
judging performance outcomes based on high level metrics,
reducing duplication in health, safety, and security functions
between NNSA and the Department of Energy. A few of them I
assume show up there. Following national regulations you
mentioned international standards or industry best practices
for basic everyday functions instead of unique DOE guidance,
streamlining DOE and NNSA orders, regulations, and directives
to eliminate those that are redundant or do not add value, and
also as an example in response to a question for the record
from a hearing last November, you informed us of these
hearings--these rules and regulations.
What are NNSA and the Department of Energy doing to address
these well documented and chronic problems? And, are there cost
savings to be realized in any of these fixes, and there is a
performance issue, but there is a monetary issue. Perhaps you
could give us your insight there.
Secretary D'Agostino. Sure, and also given the fact I could
probably take 10 minutes to answer this question, I will talk
and you can tell me when to stop, and we will just add the rest
for the record, sir.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 241.]
Mr. Turner. Sure.
Secretary D'Agostino. Okay. We are taking fairly
significant action in this particular area. Some of the actions
I have described in my earlier response, so not to repeat
myself, I won't repeat myself in this particular area. Beside
the organizational changes, bringing others in that have
experience in combining these, we have combined our site office
organization from Pantex and Y-12 site office organization to
drive what we think will be about $100 million a year worth of
savings in this particular area. We are going to be shifting
our oversight from what has been called a transactional level
oversight. The performance evaluation plans are the particular
pieces that have concerns by the laboratory directors, and
what--in order to make that shift to strategic oversight, we
have to have confidence in the management assurance systems
that the laboratories and plants have in place, and we have
that particular set of confidence in the management assurance
systems at Kansas City, at Sandia, and at Y-12, and so we are
going to, specifically for those three sites, and we are going
to be carrying this across all eight sites, we are going to be
working on looking at once those management assurance systems
are fully mature, shifting the performance evaluation plans to
strategic level oversight. Our near-term goal, Mr. Chairman, is
to get the first of these done, frankly, in the June timeframe,
which is shifting to strategic level oversight. That in itself
alone will, I believe, provide a significant shift in the way
we look at governance in the NNSA, but we have to do more than
that, of course, because we believe that getting this
management assurance system, relying on the contractor wholly
to put its items in place is not just enough, we have to
actually take a look at the contract requirements themselves,
one, and, two, take a look at, make sure that our workforce,
who is doing the job we have asked them to do, have shifted
themselves because it is not enough for me to say management
improvements and driving change from my position. It has to
happen both in the laboratory and at the site offices and in
headquarters. So I would call that, you know, day-to-day
supervisors understanding the direction we are going into,
relying on our M&O contractors and their assurance systems and
having confidence in that, and in monitoring them at the
strategic level versus these transactional pieces like put the
clipboard and the check boxes.
So that's our goal, Mr. Chairman, is to get something in
place frankly by the June timeframe at one of our laboratories,
and that was a discussion I had earlier this morning.
Mr. Turner. Mr. Franks is going to be taking the gavel for
the hearing, and I want to recognize Mr. Garamendi.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. D'Agostino, way
back in your testimony you spoke about the December
appropriations. Could you go back and review that, the cuts
that were made in your budget in that appropriation.
Secretary D'Agostino. Mr. Garamendi, I will. I'll
probably--I would like to also take it for the record as well
to make sure we get the full details right down to the last
million dollar level, and we can describe the details. From a
broad brush stroke, the--we received about a $400 million or so
reduction in the weapons activities account. This is the
account that takes care of the stockpile itself, and as a
result of that the--we had to scale back on the finishing up of
the design work on the CMRR nuclear facility itself. Let me see
if I can find it.
Mr. Garamendi. That is okay. I just wanted to get in place
the nature of the problem. We've spent the better part of 2
hours here going over the changes that have occurred in
previous plans. It seems to me that those changes are a direct
result of a significant reduction in the budget for NNSA and
the rest of the nuclear weapons activities. With that in place,
you've made an effort to try to explain to this committee the
difference between ``must have'' and ``nice to have.'' I would
hope that we are listening. It appears as though and I would
like to--perhaps you can do this in additional testimony
written without getting into too much detail here, which you
have already done, how you have modified the plans based
because of the reduction in budget to accomplish the necessity,
the necessary goals, the necessary activities, and we as a
committee need to recognize that this was, this whole scenario
has been put in place by the effort to reduce Government
expenditures in most every category to meet the Budget Control
Act of last summer and now as it plays out, and it doesn't seem
to me to do us any good whatsoever to sit here and start
blaming everybody in the world for what is actually a process
that has been initiated by the budget reductions that this
Congress has put in place.
Now is that correct, that in fact all of these scenarios
that have been laid out here, all of the questions that have
been brought to bear about the CMRR and Y-12 and changes in
plans and delays in helicopters and the rest are a direct
result of reduced funding? Is that correct?
Secretary D'Agostino. Mr. Garamendi, that's absolutely
correct. Because of the reduced funding situation, we--it
forced us, frankly, to responsibly look at what were we trying
to accomplish, what are we trying to get done, what is the most
important thing to do, that what we are not about is building
buildings. We are about providing capability to the country and
making sure we have capability to the country. You've heard my
explanation on the CMR nuclear facility to take this $1.8
billion liability, push it back, and essentially separate out
the camel's humps, if you will, so that we can get things on a
more stable platform. We did the same thing with the plutonium
disposition capability facility and the work at the K reactor
down at the Savannah River site, also took billions of dollars
of liability off the books as a result of using, looking at a
different way to solve a particular problem to provide a
capability, and funding stability, as you said, sir, is very
important.
Mr. Garamendi. Okay. Now I want to move to something else
that you and I have had a conversation about. Part of your
activities deal with the disposition of weapons material,
specifically plutonium. Could you bring me up to date on the
MOX facility in South Carolina?
Secretary D'Agostino. Yes, sir. The MOX facility project is
obviously under way. It is significantly beyond the 60--it is
beyond the 60-percent design point. I have Miss Harrington here
somewhere--there she is--who might come up to the table at some
point if you permit to get into the details.
What we have done with the MOX facility project, though,
sir, is take, and this relates to the plutonium disposition
capability activity that I mentioned, is look at ways to fully
utilize that facility in order to take advantage of
efficiencies that we found in the facility. Space in the
facility that allows us to avoid having to build a plutonium
disposition project either at the K reactor or at a brand new
facility. We've conducted an internal review of the project. We
do this every year, it is part of our new project management
principles where we don't move forward until we have 90-percent
design, but on our projects we do independent reviews on these
projects. We found some challenges, frankly, on this particular
project, and all of our nuclear projects because what we find
is that the country, this country has limited capability to
provide the amount and quantity of nuclear quality assurance
materials and skill sets, people, and equipment necessary to
make these projects successful, and in the South Carolina-
Georgia region there are a number of nuclear projects that are
moving up, and so this MOX project is suffering a bit, frankly,
as a result of having to essentially be the lead horse in
bringing the nuclear capability of the country up to speed.
Mr. Garamendi. Okay, excuse me, but let me interrupt you. I
would like to have a detailed description of the current
status, not only the cost but also the timing.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 242.]
Secretary D'Agostino. Sure.
Mr. Garamendi. And my next question goes to so what are you
going to do with the material that has been processed in this
MOX facility if and when it is ever completed?
Secretary D'Agostino. When the MOX facility is completed in
the 2016 timeframe, and long before that particular point we
are working with the Tennessee Valley Authority in order to
establish an agreement, and we have to go through certain
environmental, appropriate environmental impact types of a
process to get public input to use this material in TVA
[Tennessee Valley Authority] reactors. That has not been
completed yet. I don't want to prejudge the outcome of the work
that has to happen by law in that particular area, but this is
a path forward on this particular project.
Mr. Garamendi. My understanding is you are going to have
considerable trouble achieving that goal and that the material
is not desired by the nuclear industry. I would like to hear
that also.
Secretary D'Agostino. Well, we would be glad to provide the
details of our work with the TVA, and maybe we can come to your
office and give you the details or for the committee itself.
Mr. Garamendi. You know where to find us. Please do so.
Secretary D'Agostino. Yes, sir.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 242.]
Mr. Garamendi. Is the NNSA considering any other
alternatives to the disposal of the pits, the several dozen
tons that we have stored?
Secretary D'Agostino. We are--the Nation has, the NNSA is
proposing and the Administration is proposing to finish
building the MOX facility and to dispose of it in a way that we
have described in our program budget.
Mr. Garamendi. Well, then, back to the question, so what do
you do with the product that is produced at the facility? I
would like to have a detailed answer on that.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 242.]
Mr. Garamendi. And finally, what efforts is the
Administration making with regard to international agreements
or joint projects internationally with particularly Russia on
the disposal of pits?
Secretary D'Agostino. We have worked with Russia, of
course, in the plutonium management and disposition area
itself, met with the Russians, most recently Anne and I met
with the Russians in Seoul, they are proceeding forward on--
what we are talking about is the agreement by which the
verification that we see that they have disposed of the same
amount of material as we have in this particular area, and so
we have to finish the agreements with the State Department on
moving forward in that area.
Mr. Garamendi. My understanding is the Russians do not
believe the MOX process is the way to go.
Secretary D'Agostino. The Russians have chosen a different
path. They are using a fast reactor technology in this
particular area. This is something this country doesn't have.
It would take too long. The Nation has been moving forward in
this with a MOX fashion for a number of years, and I believe it
is the right path.
Mr. Garamendi. Prove it. I want to hear the proof that it
is the right path, okay?
Secretary D'Agostino. Sure.
Mr. Garamendi. And I want to hear why you do not believe
the Russian path is the correct path.
Secretary D'Agostino. Okay. Take that for the record, sir?
Or now?
Mr. Garamendi. Not here, not now. That is a long
discussion.
Secretary D'Agostino. Yes, sir.
Mr. Garamendi. And it won't be completed here, but I would
like to have a detailed analysis from your organization, these
two paths that are possible.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 241.]
Mr. Garamendi. Finally--well, I think I will let it go at
that, Mr. Chairman. I have had more than enough time, more than
my allotted time. Not enough time.
Mr. Franks. [Presiding.] Thank you, Mr. Garamendi, I
appreciate that. We were prepared to extend additional time.
Just we have got some votes coming up here, and I will try to
be brief and we will make sure we get to the floor on time. I
thank all of you, first of all, for being here. You know you
are critically important to the future of two little 3-year-
olds that are my children, my little twins, and I appreciate
you working, hope you do a really good job, and I know, Mr.
D'Agostino, that it is a profound responsibility to make sure
that the nuclear deterrent of this Nation is credible and
capable, and so I hope that you will grant me any diplomatic
immunity necessary in the questions here, recognizing that you
have a tremendous responsibility.
Evidently there seems to be a little bit of an incongruity
between you and former Under Secretary of State Ellen Tauscher
vis-a-vis the link between modernization and reduction of our
current stockpile. Now, it is not a gotcha question, but it
seems to be one of great substance in that it is not just an
academic issue.
At our November hearing your written statement indicated a
linkage between modernizing the current stockpile in order to
achieve the policy objective of decreasing the number of
weapons in the stockpile. However, in the discussion period of
our November hearing then Under Secretary Ellen Tauscher
indicated that the co-joining of modernization and reductions
has been, in her opinion, quote, almost a red herring. Now,
that, maybe it is the Republican in me, I don't know, but that
is a disturbing incongruity in my opinion. Can you help me
understand how to assimilate those two things?
Secretary D'Agostino. I'll talk to my comments because I
think I know who I am and obviously I worked a long time and
very closely with Ellen Tauscher, and I have great respect for
her, so I don't have the full context of when she said that.
You know, I believe that the plan, you know, it is very
important to have a plan, which we do have, on modernization of
our stockpile. I mean, that's a plan that has been in place. It
has been modified, of course, a little bit, as we discussed
earlier, but it has been modified for good reason because,
frankly, my budget has been, was appropriated significantly
less in this particular area than the President requested, and
it would be irresponsible of me, frankly, to try to jump right
back on to that 1251 curve. That would be like a billion dollar
increase in one year. We can't responsibly spend that kind of
money nor would I ask for it, frankly.
So, I believe that when I speak of this that people talk
about linkage. When I talk about it, it's the fact that I know
the path that we have going forward on our life extensions on
the 76 and the 61 and the 78 and the 88 work that we are doing
on a day-to-day basis with the Defense Department, I see the
commitment by all of the people in that particular front, and
we make adjustments when we need to, and therefore the budget
piece is an important link into moving forward on our
modernization itself.
With respect to the START Treaty itself, my sense would be
whether we have the START Treaty or not, whether we have the
START Treaty or not, we needed to do something in this
particular country, in this country. We had to do something.
And what we have is a plan that lined up with the debate on the
New START Treaty itself. So I would have argued, and I had in
previous administrations, on the need to address this problem,
and it wasn't, frankly, until this administration where we
started addressing this problem in the most real way that I
have ever seen in working in this business, close to 20 years.
Mr. Franks. Well, I won't put words in your mouth, but I am
assuming that you don't think that the issue of modernization
and the issue of reduction in our stockpile are unrelated, that
they are not--that the notion of co-joining those is somehow a
red herring, I am assuming that is certainly my own
perspective.
From the two pages of bullets you provided to the committee
on CMRR alternative, we see that the NNSA would rely heavily on
reusing plutonium pits that are currently in storage. We've had
some relatively recent experience certainly that you understand
and are aware of more than I with the plans that we had to
reuse canned subassemblies, and for the B61 life extension
that, as you again know better than I, didn't pan out very
well, and we have also been told that the labs need to conduct
a substantial study on reusing pits to see if this is really a
viable option. So, tell us what happens if plutonium pits reuse
doesn't pan out like the, with the canned subassemblies, and
give us some perspective of the technical challenges that must
be overcome to make these pits, this reuse a fully viable
option, and how much the study would cost related to the study
of reusing the pits.
Secretary D'Agostino. Mr. Franks, the area that is, that we
continue to work on and have to do more work on is studying the
aging phenomena of plutonium metal. Uranium, as you were
describing earlier, is completely different from an aging
standpoint, different, you know; we have issues, concerns with
corrosion on that side. Plutonium metal is very different and
unique. We have done a tremendous amount of aging studies. It
has been checked by the JASON's review, and we have a very
significant body of independent technical peer review that says
this material can last 85 to 100 years or so, and we continue
to evaluate it because we have to, can't assume, can't rest on
those laurels. So that work is going to continue. That will
inform the question that you raised on reusing an existing pit,
which the Nation has a lot of, or pits, taking advantage of the
investments that we have made, frankly, over those many years,
reusing that material. There is a certain amount of
attractiveness to doing that, not because of the dollar value
it saves but because of the amount of handling that you would
have to do on plutonium itself. We are concerned about worker
safety, making sure that the workers are not exposed to this
material longer than necessary. But from my standpoint, we are
working very closely with the Defense Department to examine
multiple options, whether it's a--I don't want obviously to get
classified here, but whether we proceed forward using W76 pits,
W68 pits or any of the other wide number of pits that we have.
And, the good news by all of this, frankly, is there are a
number of options, a number of different paths that we can
proceed. We are not hampered by saying the Nation has to have a
capability right now to make 50 or 80 pits per year in order to
take care of the stockpile. That is great news for the country
because we are not forced into making rash decisions on
significant investments in a very short period of time. So, we
have time to evaluate this area, and just recently General
Kehler has been working on studies that he needs to have, and
he is going to bring to the Nuclear Weapons Council, we are
going to be getting together a Nuclear Weapons Council in the
next few months to agree on a path forward on how to move
forward in the pit area, but we have to start first with the
life extension approach, make sure it informs what kinds of
pits we can use, then go check the pits at Pantex and continue
to do the aging studies on the plutonium itself.
Mr. Franks. Well, Mr. D'Agostino, again, when I started out
here, was recognizing the challenge of your job, so I have
really just one more question. The oft-repeated notion that
national security is the number one job of the Federal
Government is never one that one can overstate or really
perhaps often enough, and you have mentioned a number of times
budget constraints and the impact of the budget and certainly,
you know, I understand that, but I will say to you that some of
us have been quite concerned that some of the philosophical
changes that occur from election to election are not small
issues, and in this case, you know, this potential
sequestration coming, there's some very serious questions
before this Congress and before the country, and our policy and
being able to protect the national security of this country
goes not only to the obvious of protecting our families, but it
also recognizes the need to have a productive environment or a
secure environment for productivity, and I hope that we don't
get these out of order here.
So with that said, first of all, we're hoping that people
like yourselves who have dedicated your life to the cause of
human freedom will make your voice heard regardless of
sometimes the political pressures that you inevitably deal with
because a lot is at stake, and, you know, the budget shouldn't
always--the budget doesn't tell us our national security
challenges, we certainly have to allot it according to those
challenges, but we should first identify the need and be very
clear about the potential threats it faces and the necessary
responses that we might have to have.
So with that, I would like to ask you one last question.
What do you consider the most significant constraint or
challenge that you have in being able to maintain the
credibility and the effective deterrent that is so vital and
has served this country so well for so long?
Secretary D'Agostino. Mr. Franks, I believe--thank you for
your comments earlier. I believe the most significant challenge
we have, we have collectively, is ensuring that the people in
our organization, both Federal and our M&O [management and
operating] laboratory folks, see that the country is committed
and sustainable over a period of time to this particular work.
I believe because people in our organization pay attention to
these hearings, they listen, they read the budgets that get put
out by the Administration as well as they read the
appropriations and authorization bills as they come out. They
say does the country care about this area. I think these
discussions and debates are a very important part of that.
I will say on behalf of the Administration that--this is
not a political statement; this is my view--that the President
in this request, we have a 7.2-percent increase in the defense
programs portion of the weapons activities account from the
appropriation from last December to the request of fiscal year
2013. There are many that will say, well, the President is not
committed to this area. I disagree wholeheartedly. I do have an
opportunity to make my voice heard in both the Pentagon and the
White House in this particular area, and I do, and I am
listened to, and I think the sustained commitment over time to
the people is what is the most important thing in my view.
Without the people, all these great facilities and capabilities
are nothing.
Mr. Franks. Yes, sir. Well, I would just suggest to you
that some of us can't help but have some compunction about some
of the President's comments related to his veto pen being ready
for any adjustments in the sequestration that could have a very
profound effect on what you do, given your comments about the
budget today, and so our concerns aren't altogether just a
fantasy.
With that, though, I want to thank everyone for coming, and
I hope that we can continue to see the beacon of freedom burn.
Thank you.
[Whereupon, the hearing was adjourned at 6:07 p.m.]
?

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A P P E N D I X

April 17, 2012

=======================================================================

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

April 17, 2012

=======================================================================

Statement of Hon. Michael Turner

Chairman, House Subcommittee on Strategic Forces

Hearing on

Fiscal Year 2013 Budget Request for Atomic Energy

Defense Activities and Nuclear Forces Programs

April 17, 2012

Good afternoon. The Strategic Forces subcommittee hearing
on the President's FY13 budget request for DOD and DOE nuclear
forces, U.S. nuclear weapons posture, and the FY13 budget
request for environmental management will come to order.
I want to thank our witnesses for being here today. For
those who follow the sometimes arcane world of nuclear weapons
budgeting and policy, the witnesses on our two panels are
familiar faces. They are:

Panel 1:

LThe Honorable Madelyn R. Creedon, Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs, U.S.
Department of Defense
LGeneral C. Robert Kehler, Commander, U.S.
Strategic Command

Panel 2:

LThe Honorable Thomas P. D'Agostino,
Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration
LMr. David G. Huizenga, Senior Advisor for
Environmental Management, U.S. Department of Energy
LThe Honorable Peter S. Winokur, Chairman,
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

On December 1, 2010, prior to the ratification of the New
START treaty, the then-Directors of Lawrence Livermore, Los
Alamos, and Sandia National Laboratories wrote to Senators
Kerry and Lugar and stated:
``we believe that the proposed budgets [referring to
the November 2010 update to the section 1251 plan]
provide adequate support to sustain the safety,
security, reliability and effectiveness of America's
nuclear deterrent within the limit of 1550 deployed
strategic warheads established by the New START Treaty
with adequate confidence and acceptable risk.''
That plan appears to have been abandoned in the President's
FY13 budget request, calling into question whether there is
still ``adequate support'' for the Nation's nuclear deterrent
to permit the reductions called for by the New START treaty.
There have been those inside and outside of Government who
have challenged the linkage of the New START treaty and the
modernization plan. There are those who make the argument that
because President Obama has requested more funds than his
predecessor, though not the funds that he's promised, he's done
all he needed to do. Neither of these positions represents
serious thinking that befits our national security.
There can be no doubt that reductions proposed by the New
START treaty are only in our national interest if we complete
the modernization of our nuclear deterrent--warheads, delivery
systems, and infrastructure.
I want to remind those who have forgotten--this was the
President's modernization plan. It was his nuclear posture
review, issued in April 2010 before there was a New START
treaty, and his 1251 plan. Here are some highlights:
From the President's 2010 NPR: ``Funding the
Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Project
at Los Alamos National Laboratory to replace the
existing 50-year old Chemistry and Metallurgy Research
facility in 2021.''
Also from the President's 2010 NPR:
``Developing a new Uranium Processing Facility at the
Y-12 Plant in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, to come on line for
production operations in 2021.''
Also from the President's 2010 NPR: ``The
Administration will fully fund the ongoing LEP for the
W-76 submarine-based warhead for a fiscal year 2017
completion, and the full scope LEP study and follow-on
activities for the B-61 bomb to ensure first production
begins in FY 2017.''
The President's 1251 plan states that CMRR
and UPF will complete construction by 2021 and will
achieve full operational functionality by 2024.
Further, the inextricable linkage of modernization and the
New START reductions was the basis of Condition Nine of the New
START treaty. This linkage was the legal basis on which the
Senate ratified the treaty. Let me remind everyone what
Condition Nine stated:
L``the United States is committed to proceeding with a
robust stockpile stewardship program, and to
maintaining and modernizing the nuclear weapons
production capabilities and capacities, that will
ensure the safety, reliability, and performance of the
United States nuclear arsenal at the New START Treaty
levels . . . the United States is committed to
providing the resources needed to achieve these
objectives, at a minimum at the levels set forth in the
President's 10-year plan provided to the Congress
pursuant to section 1251.''
Not only do I believe is it fair to inquire whether the
President's commitment to modernization is lacking now that he
has his treaty, but I base that belief on the budget
submissions and the Condition Nine report that has not been
submitted to the Congress, nor the companion section 1045
report from last year's NDAA.
Let me remind the subcommittee what Dr. James Miller, the
President's nominee to be the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy, told us last November:
``The first is that we understand the requirement to
report [per Condition Nine] if we have less funding
than in the Section 1251 as requested in Section 1251
Report. Our interpretation of that has been
substantially less. In fiscal year 2011 actually
slightly less was appropriated than requested. Our
judgment was that a one percent or less change didn't
require us to submit the report. The difference we are
looking at now [in the FY12 appropriations bills] in
both the House and the Senate appropriations bill, I
think, would trigger that, and we would have to examine
that question . . . If there is substantially less
funding than requested, we will, of course, provide the
report to Congress.''
Yet we have no report for either FY12 or the President's
own budget request for FY13, which underfunds the 1251 plan.
So what's changed? Is it solely the budget picture? I don't
mean to dismiss the budget situation and the cuts the DOD has
had to make, especially as it has made those cuts while
transferring large sums of its own budget to fund the
modernization activities at the NNSA.
Again, the question here is whether U.S. nuclear force
reductions make sense without modernization. The President's
Nuclear Posture Review makes the case for this linkage when it
stated:
``implementation of the Stockpile Stewardship Program
and the nuclear infrastructure investments recommended
in the NPR will allow the United States to shift away
from retaining large numbers of non-deployed warheads
as a hedge against technical or geopolitical surprise,
allowing major reductions in the nuclear stockpile.''
In the absence of these investments, will the forthcoming
NPR Implementation Study continue to hurtle towards what seems
to be a prejudged outcome that the U.S. should further reduce
its nuclear deterrent? I see no other way to understand the
President's recent comment at Hankuk University in Seoul:
``[L]ast summer, I directed my national security team
to conduct a comprehensive study of our nuclear forces.
That study is still under way. But even as we have more
work to do, we can already say with confidence that we
have more nuclear weapons than we need.''
So the study isn't done, but we already know the answer
supports the President's goal of a world without nuclear
weapons? Either the President already knows the answer to the
question, in which case the Congress must be informed, or, the
President wrote the question to ensure an answer he'd want.
Hopefully our witnesses today will shed some light on this
important area. Either way, I assure you, this year's National
Defense Authorization Act will ensure Congress' oversight of
these issues.
I also want to highlight some of the discussion at this
subcommittee's February hearing on governance and management of
the nuclear security enterprise. At that hearing, we heard from
the National Academies of Science about a ``broken'' and
``dysfunctional'' relationship between NNSA and its
laboratories. We also heard about a system of micromanagement
that is costing taxpayers untold millions. The National
Academies study and nearly a dozen others have identified and
documented the problems and suggested possible solutions. I
hope our witnesses, on both panels, will help us understand
what actions should be taken and when.
Finally, we welcome the opportunity to review the budget
and priorities of DOE's Defense Environmental Cleanup efforts.
DOE continues to do good work in nuclear cleanup, but also
continues to struggle with technical and management issues at
its largest project. I look forward to hearing about how DOE
intends to address these concerns.

Statement of Hon. Loretta Sanchez

Ranking Member, House Subcommittee on Strategic Forces

Hearing on

Fiscal Year 2013 Budget Request for Atomic Energy

Defense Activities and Nuclear Forces Programs

April 17, 2012

I would like to join Chairman Turner in welcoming General
Kehler, Ms. Creedon, Mr. D'Agostino, Mr. Huizenga, and Dr.
Winokur.
I am also grateful to Ms. Harrington, Dr. Hommert, Dr.
Albright and Dr. McMillan, Gen. Chambers, Adm. Benedict and
Adm. Donald for your statements for the record and for being
with us to participate in our discussions today during the
question and answer session.
I would like to preface my comments by noting that the
congressionally mandated bipartisan Budget Control Act has
imposed a new fiscal reality that is putting enormous pressure
on all Government programs, including the Pentagon and NNSA.
The Section 1251 report was crafted pre-Budget Control Act.
In this time of fiscal crisis, we must look at what
investments must be made now, what cost-effective alternatives
are available and what can be delayed with acceptable risk.
So it is in this context that I would like to touch on a
few specific issues related to sustaining our nuclear deterrent
and our nuclear forces, to nuclear nonproliferation, and to
nuclear cleanup efforts.
First on nuclear weapons activities and operations.
President Obama and Vice President Biden have made clear
the importance of maintaining a safe, secure and reliable
nuclear arsenal without nuclear testing, while making progress
toward lower numbers. The Administration is currently
conducting an implementation study of the Nuclear Posture
Review that will inform requirements.
It is important to note that with over 5,000 deployed and
nondeployed nuclear weapons, the United States still maintains
the ability to destroy major cities in the world several times
over. A few hundred weapons would be so disruptive to society
and the environment that it would end life as we know it.
Even with progress on nuclear reductions, nuclear
modernization plans for weapons and associated delivery
vehicles remain necessary, though we must make smart and
effective investments.
For NNSA, while construction of the plutonium research
facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory has been delayed,
several big-ticket items require close oversight, including for
example the construction of the Uranium Processing Facility at
Oak Ridge, estimated to cost over $7 billion, and the B61 life-
extension for forward-deployed warheads in Europe so far
estimated to cost over $5 billion.
However, as we prepare the FY13 defense authorization bill,
our committee has not received from the NNSA the out-year
budget estimates or the 2012 Stockpile Stewardship and
Management Plan to inform our deliberations.
As we look at requirements for maintaining a powerful
nuclear deterrent, improved oversight and planning will be
crucial to ensure that we can avoid cost overruns and schedule
delays, retain the critical skills, capability and investments
in science and technology that we need. In doing so, we must
ensure the highest standards for nuclear safety.
We will rely on the Department of Defense and STRATCOM to
continue to critically examine Cold War-derived requirements,
assess their continued value and cost-effectiveness, and adapt
to new likely threats.
This brings me to my second point on nuclear
nonproliferation and nuclear threat reduction.
I commend the Administration for its successes at the
Nuclear Security Summit, particularly the U.S.-Russian
cooperation to secure potentially vulnerable material at the
former Soviet nuclear test site in Kazakhstan. I would also
like to note the total removal of highly-enriched uranium from
Mexico and Ukraine, as well as the progress toward converting
Russian research reactors to use low-enriched uranium rather
than HEU.
However, the funding requests for securing and removing HEU
and second line of defense have decreased compared to FY12
appropriated levels.
In contrast, the budget continues to prioritize the
construction of the MOX facility at almost $1 billion annually
despite the absence of a clear path forward. As another
example, the non-proliferation budget this year also includes a
$150 million subsidy for fuel enrichment.
Urgent efforts, including the President's goal of securing
all vulnerable weapons-usable material in 4 years, must remain
a pressing national security priority. In this context, I'd
like to hear about interagency coordination, and how DOD is
supporting nuclear nonproliferation efforts.
Third, nuclear cleanup remains a critical issue in the
aftermath of the Cold War. Sites like Hanford and Savannah
River Site played a unique and irreplaceable role during the
Cold War and now we continue to make diligent and expeditious
progress toward cleanup. I would like to hear about how the
Department is addressing the safety culture concerns at the
Waste Treatment Plant at Hanford and the cost increases for
this program.

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=======================================================================

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

April 17, 2012

=======================================================================

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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING

THE HEARING

April 17, 2012

=======================================================================

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER

Secretary D'Agostino. Thank you for your continued support of the
Nation's nuclear deterrent and your interest in the National Nuclear
Security Administration (NNSA). We share a common goal of ensuring our
nuclear stockpile remains safe, secure, and reliable and we look
forward to working with you to improve how we achieve that goal.
As you know, the Statement of Administration Policy (SAP) on H.R.
4310 registered strong objections to provisions of the bill as they
relate to the Department of Energy (DOE) and the National Nuclear
Security Administration (NNSA). While we agree on the need to
continuously improve NNSA's performance, the Administration strongly
opposes the sections dealing with governance, management, and oversight
of the nuclear security enterprise because they would unduly restrict
the authority of the Secretary of Energy, weaken safety standards and
protections for workers and the general public; and fundamentally alter
the nature of the relationship between the Department and its
contractors; in particular the NNSA weapons labs.
The NNSA, in partnership with the DOE, has been actively working to
move beyond the Cold War nuclear weapons complex towards a 21st century
Nuclear Security Enterprise by: reshaping the relationship between the
laboratories, sites and headquarters; enacting a series of management
reforms intended to both improve the way it does business and increase
the efficiency of its operations; maintaining a safe, secure, and
responsible security posture at its sites; and engaging in efforts to
examine and reduce the number of budget reporting categories.
The following examples offer a brief summary of the reform efforts
being undertaken by the NNSA to achieve those ends. We believe these
and related actions help address the problems that were identified in
the reports that you refer to in your letter to the President.
Therefore, we submit to you that additional legislative actions in H.R.
4310 are unwarranted at this time and could have deleterious effects in
DOE governance of its contractors and the safety and security of
workers and the general public.

NNSA-National Laboratory Relationship Improvements

The February 2012 National Academy of Sciences and previous reports
have expressed concerns with the relationship between the NNSA and the
Laboratories, including the need to streamline operations. Over the
past few years, the NNSA and DOE have been implementing the following
actions to build trust and drive efficiencies and for this important
relationship:
To increase senior level communication, restore trust and
foster collaboration on significant strategic improvements, the NNSA
Administrator has initiated monthly executive forums that include the
senior contractor leadership from the NNSA labs and plants, NNSA Field
Offices and senior NNSA headquarters staff. This forum is currently
collaboratively working three major initiatives focused on improving
the efficiency and effectiveness of NNSA oversight.

1. National Nuclear Security Administration Equivalency
Matrix: A multisite NNSA effort to examine existing DOE
contractual requirements and other nonstatutory requirements
that can be adequately achieved through industrial standards
and commercial practices.
2. Benchmarking: NNSA has established a cross functional team
between NNSA and Laboratory representatives to review models in
place at other laboratories and Federally Funded Research and
Development Centers (FFRDCs) to document best practices and to
make informed recommendations to increase the efficiency of the
NNSA complex.
3. Strategic Performance Evaluation Plan Pilot Program: NNSA
is undertaking a pilot program to streamline its evaluation of
contractor performance by focusing on strategic outcomes
indicative of acceptable overall performance in lieu of its
historic tactical focus.

Senior NNSA and DOE's Office of Health, Safety, and
Security (HSS) personnel visited each of the seven nuclear sites and
asked senior contractor and Federal personnel whether the Department's
nuclear safety requirements were excessively burdensome. Site Federal
and contractor personnel consistently agreed that while there have been
implementation issues the nuclear safety requirements themselves are
not excessive or inappropriate. The review identified areas for
improvement in the nuclear safety directives, which were provided to
the responsible offices and addressed in recent revisions.
The Secretary's ``National Laboratory Director's
Council,'' which includes the NNSA Labs, was tasked with identifying
burdensome requirements for the DOE and NNSA. Of the 28 burdensome
requirements identified to date by the Lab Directors, 25 have been
resolved, two are on hold at the request of the Directors, and one is
still being worked.
NNSA's Enterprise Operational Requirements Review Board
(EORRB) engages Lab and Plant Directors, Site Managers and Headquarters
leadership to look at requirements and directives in order to ensure
the level of prescription is appropriate and that the requirements are
not excessively burdensome. This initiative has ensured that comments
from NNSA personnel, including contractors, are adequately addressed.
Since using this process, NNSA has been able to obtain a satisfactory
resolution of 100% of its concerns during the revision of DOE
directives, further ensuring that the desired balance in oversight is
achieved.
The NNSA Administrator's Policy (NAP-21)
``Transformational Governance and Oversight,'' signed out last year,
defined principles, responsibilities, processes and requirements to
help in transforming and improving governance and oversight. NNSA also
created a governance board to address governance issues. This document
continues to be revised as additional opportunities for improvements in
efficiency and effectiveness are identified. Using the NAP-21 guiding
principles, the Office of Defense Nuclear Security continues to
implement transformational governance activities, including major
changes in how security policy is developed (using field-led teams),
improving efficiency by allowing our site contractors to approve
security plans and procedures themselves instead of requiring Federal
officials to approve, and establishing a field-led working group to
review performance and assurance actions and identify gaps,
inefficiencies or inconsistencies with NAP-21, as well as potential
inefficiencies.
NNSA has continued its support for laboratory-directed
research and development efforts, an essential scientific component of
a laboratory's ability to recruit and retain top scientists and
engineers, shape the future of nuclear security, and to seed innovation
in critical national security areas.
A four-party governance charter has been signed by the
Departments of Energy, Defense, Homeland Security and the Office of the
Director for National Intelligence to establish a means to examine
strategic alignment of science and technology capabilities across
agencies in order to prevent failure in critical national security
areas. This helps facilitate the critical Work For Others (WFO)
activities of the laboratories for interagency customers.

Organizational & Business Improvements

In March 2012, NNSA created and filled a new position of
Associate Administrator for Infrastructure and Operations. This new
organization is responsible for the integrated management of the NNSA
Site Offices and coordination of all aspects of functional mission
support across the NNSA enterprise. This will facilitate an NNSA
enterprise approach to infrastructure management and operational
support necessary for achievement of the OneNNSA concept.
After more than 2 years of analysis and outside reviews,
NNSA released a Request for Proposal (RFP) for the combined management
of the Y-12 National Security Complex and Pantex Plant, with an option
for phase in of Tritium Operations performed at the Savannah River
Site. Combining contracts and site offices will allow NNSA to improve
performance, reduce the cost of work, and operate as an integrated
enterprise.
In 2011, NNSA created an Acquisition and Project
Management organization to improve business practices. This represents
a fundamental change in NNSA's approach to project and construction
management. This office focuses on improving the quality of work while
keeping projects on time and on budget across the Enterprise. For
example, for the Uranium Processing Facility Phase A scope of work
(rerouting Bear Creek Road and site utilities), the APM analysis of
acquisition alternatives identified an alternate acquisition strategy
that was subsequently approved resulting in a $9M cost savings. Other
similar acquisition analyses are planned for upcoming NNSA projects.
NNSA has realigned functions, responsibilities, and
authorities in the NNSA management structure to support implementation
of governance reform initiatives. This realignment has provided for
clear and direct lines of communication from the federal work-force to
the contractor with a focus on mission execution.
NNSA re-evaluated the assignment of authorities and
responsibilities (and its delegations of authorities) to move decision
making to the lowest appropriate and competent level in the
organization. This has resulted in more timely and better informed
actions and decisions which in turn led to increased productivity.
NNSA is working to develop and implement governance
reform metrics. The metrics will be used as inputs to demonstrate
results and benefits of governance reform and enhance the use of data
for Nuclear Security Enterprise (NSE) decisionmaking.
NNSA awarded a Blanket Purchase Agreement for Enterprise
Construction Management Services. The agreement will standardize NNSA's
approach to project management across the enterprise and provide
subject matter experts to provide independent analysis and advice
related to the design and construction of facilities.
NNSA has developed and implemented an integrated
assessment process to minimize duplication of effort in conducting
requirements driven assessment activities. Project requirement reviews
are coordinated and led by a single office eliminating duplicative
reviews for alternative analysis, cost estimating, acquisition
planning, and safety.
NNSA has affirmed the Contractor Assurance Systems and
Site Office Line Oversight processes at three NNSA Sites. As a result
numerous duplicative requirements, (e.g., reporting, approvals,
systems, and regulations, directives, or policies), have been
eliminated from the contract. The result is reduced transactional
oversight which in turn frees both contractor and federal employees to
focus on mission accomplishment. [See page 41.]
Secretary D'Agostino. [The information was not available at the
time of printing.] [See page 42.]
______

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. BROOKS

General Kehler. The Air Force is committed to safely operating the
aging UH-1Ns and is exploring a cost-effective strategy to sustain and
upgrade these aircraft until they can be replaced. While there is no
established end-of-life, I am confident the Air Force can life-extend
the UH-1N. The Air Force is also exploring a number of strategies to
mitigate the capability gaps in the nuclear security mission. [See page
22.]
______

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI

Secretary D'Agostino. Both the U.S. and Russia have each committed
to dispose of 34 metric tons (MT) of weapons plutonium, enough for
approximately 17,000 nuclear weapons. Under the Plutonium Management
and Disposition Agreement (PMDA), both the U.S. and Russia agreed to
dispose of the weapon-grade plutonium by fabricating it into mixed
oxide (MOX) fuel for use in commercial reactors.
Weapon-grade plutonium, unlike weapon-grade uranium, cannot be
blended with other materials to make it unusable in weapons. However,
it can be fabricated into MOX fuel and irradiated in civil nuclear
power reactors to produce electricity. This irradiation results in
spent fuel, a form that is not usable for weapons or other military
purposes.
This approach was endorsed in a 1995 National Academy of Sciences
Report, ``Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium,''
which identified the use of mixed oxide fuel as a means to dispose of
surplus weapon-grade plutonium that posed ``a clear and present danger
to national and international security.'' Additionally, Russia
supported the MOX option because it would result in a change in the
isotopic composition of the plutonium making it unusable for weapons,
whereas other alternatives for disposition like immobilization would
not.
The Protocol amending the PMDA, signed on the margins of the 2010
Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, D.C., provides that this weapon-
grade plutonium be disposed by irradiating it in light water reactors
in the United States and in fast-neutron reactors operating under
certain nonproliferation conditions in the Russian Federation. Under
the Agreement Russia commits to (1) operate its fast reactors with a
breeding ratio of less than one, resulting in a net decrease in the
amount of weapon-grade plutonium and (2) not generate any new
stockpiles of weapon-grade plutonium.
While both countries will be fabricating surplus weapon-grade
plutonium into MOX fuel, the difference in the reactors that will use
the fuel is simply based on the current nuclear energy strategy in each
country and availability of commercial reactors. In the U.S., light
water reactors are predominant. In Russia, its energy strategy called
for the use of fast-neutron reactors. [See page 46.]
Secretary D'Agostino. Construction of the MOX facility began in
August 2007 and significant progress has been made in the nearly five
years since construction began, with design approximately 90% complete
and the project is more than 60% complete. Eleven of the sixteen
auxiliary buildings needed to support construction and operation of the
MOX facility have been finished, including a new electrical substation
which was completed in September 2010. More than 118,000 cubic yards of
reinforced concrete and 19,000 tons of rebar have been installed by
more than 2,000 workers. More than 400,000 feet of process piping and
nearly six million feet of electrical cable are currently being
installed, while installation of the process tanks is 90 percent
complete.
MOX fuel fabrication technology is well established and mature, and
MOX fuel is used in more than 30 commercial reactors worldwide. The
design of the U.S. MOX facility is based on proven French technology
currently in use at the MELOX and LaHague facilities in France. The
facility at the Savannah River Site is being designed and built to meet
U.S. conventions, codes, standards, and regulatory requirements, and
will be licensed by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The
NRC authorized construction of the facility in 2005 and is currently
reviewing the contractor's application for an operating license.
Construction is currently scheduled to be completed in 2016, and has a
total project cost of $4.8 billion.
However, there continue to be significant cost and schedule
challenges in key areas, including identifying suppliers and
subcontractors with the ability and experience to fabricate and install
equipment to the requirements of Nuclear Quality Assurance (NQA)1
standards for nuclear work, which has resulted in a lack of competition
for work and higher than expected bids. The project is also
encountering significantly greater than expected turnover of
experienced personnel due to the expansion of the U.S. commercial
nuclear industry.
The Department is in the process of formally evaluating the
possible impacts that these cost challenges have on the schedule for
construction and operations of the MOX facility, and is considering
changing the performance baseline if necessary. [See page 44.]
Secretary D'Agostino. The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) is
currently exploring technical and regulatory requirements associated
with irradiation of MOX fuel in five reactors pursuant to an
interagency agreement that was signed in 2010.
The current schedule with TVA is to execute a fuel supply agreement
for MOX fuel in 2013, after NNSA completes a Supplemental Environmental
Impact Statement, in which TVA is a cooperating agency.
In addition, NNSA is consulting with various fuel fabricators
regarding the option of having them market MOX fuel to their utility
customers. NNSA also continues to develop strategies to attract other
utility customers. [See page 45.]
Secretary D'Agostino. The U.S. will sell the fuel that is
fabricated at the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility at the Savannah River
Site to domestic nuclear utilities to be irradiated in NRC-licensed and
regulated commercial power reactors. TVA is one such utility. Money
resulting from the sale of the MOX fuel will be returned to the U.S.
Treasury.
MOX fuel behaves like traditional low enriched uranium fuel in the
reactor's core, and the irradiation results in spent fuel, a form that
is not usable for weapons or other military purposes. [See page 45.]
?

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

April 17, 2012

=======================================================================

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER

Mr. Turner. 1) What is the cost of the alternative plutonium
strategy, including modifications to PF-4 and RLUOB, shipping material
to DAF and Superblock, cleaning out the PF-4 vault, conducting the pit
reuse study, etc.? How much will it cost to implement this alternative
plan? To the extent possible, please break down the cost by individual
actions/projects needed.
Secretary D'Agostino. The preliminary Los Alamos cost estimate for
execution of the interim plutonium strategy is in the range of $590M-
$820M over the next 8 years. This range is the result of a sixty day
study to revise the strategy, and NNSA will work with the laboratory
throughout the FY 2014 Budget formulation process to refine that
strategy and the cost estimate. In the interim, we have provided your
staffs with the detailed analysis from the sixty day study.
The estimated $120M of already-appropriated funds remaining after
the design work on the CMRR-NF is closed out is critical to beginning
to implement the interim plutonium strategy at Los Alamos, which
includes: additional equipment in RLUOB, relocation of equipment from
the original CMR to PF-4, early start up of radiological laboratory
activities in RLUOB, and design work for a secure material
transportation system between RLUOB and PF-4.
In addition, the FY 2013 President's Budget Request includes $35M
to process, package and ship excess material out of PF-4. The PF-4
vault cleanout work is planned for FY 2013-FY 2020, with an estimated
cost of approximately $35-50M per year.
Mr. Turner. 2) Do you still anticipate building CMRR-NF, with work
commencing in 5 years? How much more expensive will CMFF-NF be then vs.
if we built it now?
Secretary D'Agostino. As part of ongoing program analysis and close
coordination with DOD, the option to begin construction of the CMRR-NF
remains available.
The decision to defer construction of the CMRR-NF for at least 5
years enables us to focus on other key modernization priorities while
still ensuring uninterrupted plutonium operations.
Detailed planning is under way to ensure the Nation possesses
continued capability for required analytical chemistry, materials
characterization, and nuclear material storage functions.
While program delays often lead to greater costs in the long run,
they can also yield savings by creating the conditions to consider
options that may meet requirements at less cost.
Mr. Turner. 3) Please provide a final estimate cost figure for the
CMRR-NF facility, based upon where the design is at right now. We
understand that LANL and NNSA have made strides to reduce the cost of
CMRR-NF. How much would CMRR-NF cost if it were to continue today? What
would have been the baseline cost presented to Congress in FY 2013?
Secretary D'Agostino. The current Total Project Cost (TPC) range
estimate for the CMRR-NF, as reported in the 1251 Report, is $3.7B-
$5.8B. The Los Alamos project team identified several opportunities in
FY 2011 to reduce the project estimate by approximately $450M. As part
of design close out efforts in FY 2012, the project team will update
the cost range without the benefit of long-lead equipment vendor design
information. This cost estimate is not expected to be a ``baseline
quality'' estimate, but will reflect best available cost information at
the conclusion of design activities.
Mr. Turner. 4) How much will this alternate plan cost in relation
to what CMRR was expected to cost?
Secretary D'Agostino. The current Total Project Cost (TPC) range
estimate for the CMRR-NF, as reported in the 1251 Report, was $3.7B-
$5.8B. The preliminary Los Alamos cost estimate for execution of the
interim plutonium strategy is in the range of $590M-$820M over the next
8 years. NNSA will work with the laboratory throughout the FY 2014
Budget formulation process to refine that strategy and the
corresponding cost estimate.
Mr. Turner. 5) If we have a continuing resolution for the beginning
of FY 2013, will NNSA recommend to the President that he seek an
``anomaly'' for NNSA--or any individual NNSA programs?
Secretary D'Agostino. It would be premature to state whether I
would recommend to the President an anomaly is what's needed for NNSA
programs in the event of a continuing resolution. Furthermore, any
anomaly request would have to be approved by the Secretary before going
to the White House and would be shaped by the overall funding context
as we head into FY 2013.
How would a continuing resolution, without an anomaly, affect the
B61 life extension program?
The current program of work for the B61 assumes full funding at the
level requested in the President's Budget by October 1, 2012. Funding
at a level less than the request, or an appropriation that comes well
beyond the start of the fiscal year would unequivocally have
implications for the program. That said, it's difficult to say what
those implications would be without knowing the precise amount of the
funding or the precise timing of the appropriation.
Some aspects of the program that we would have to review closely
would be the ramp-up to phase 6.3 activities including hiring
additional technical staff at the national laboratories and production
plants, flight tests, and environmental testing. Ultimately, the
magnitude of the impact will depend on the length of the continuing
resolution period.
Mr. Turner. 6) Will NNSA ask Congress to address the W76 LEP
funding issue? If so, what fix is needed?
Secretary D'Agostino. NNSA is currently considering actions to
realign FY 2013 funding to put the program on track to meet the Navy's
operational requirements by the end of 2018 and complete the overall
W76-1 production in FY 2021. This may include working with the Congress
to realign funding before enactment, or reprogramming funds after the
start of FY 2013.
Mr. Turner. 7) NNSA is conducting a review of all of its Federal
personnel, with an intent of possible streamlining. When will this
review be complete?
Secretary D'Agostino. The review will be completed by December 31,
2012. Our current plans for reshaping the NNSA workforce are being
developed in a manner to ensure, both now and in the foreseeable
future, that we are in a position to: support mission execution, ensure
high quality project management of several critical multi-billion
dollar construction projects, and transform our Cold War nuclear
weapons complex into a 21st Century Nuclear Security Enterprise. The
review under way is a strategic effort to analyze baseline requirements
for NNSA's workforce of the future that includes plans to maintain and
enhance the pipeline of critical talent for the future, concurrent with
changes to the existing workforce.
Mr. Turner. 8) Please provide further details on the effort to
eliminate transactional oversight at certain NNSA sites by June, as
mentioned during the hearing.
Secretary D'Agostino. NNSA is working with its laboratory partners
to assess what is needed for a strategic oversight posture vice a
transactional oversight approach. This assessment includes a review of
actual functions performed by Federal staff and the costs and benefits
of those functions as they relate to the work at the labs. The goal is
to shift oversight for nonnuclear or lower hazard activities to focus
on overall system performance and not individual transactions. This
approach requires fewer resources, is less intrusive, and helps ensure
we can hold plant and laboratory personnel responsible for performance.
Experience with this approach at the Kansas City plant indicates that a
Federal focus on performance outcomes and not individual transactions
improves performance across the board (safety, quality, and
production).
______

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SANCHEZ

Ms. Sanchez. 9) What are the benefits, including cost-savings, and
risks of planning to build CMRR when PF4 is replaced?
Secretary D'Agostino. In five years, PF-4 will be approximately 40
years old and NNSA believes there will be a continuing need to provide
robust nuclear infrastructure to support a variety of national security
missions for the foreseeable future. Over the next several years, NNSA
will continue to evaluate the most effective way to modernize its
infrastructure while maintaining its plutonium capabilities. CMRR-NF
design will be substantially completed by the end of 2012, but
construction is delayed. As part of ongoing program analysis and close
coordination with DOD, the option to begin construction of the CMRR-NF
remains available. It is too early to speculate on potential cost
savings, or risks, associated with a facility that could provide any
combination of CMRR-NF and PF-4 capabilities.
Ms. Sanchez. 10) Can NNSA accomplish its mission safely without
CMRR?
Secretary D'Agostino. Yes. NNSA would not propose to delay CMRR
unless we could safely accomplish our mission in the absence of new
construction. The decision to defer, by at least 5 years, took into
account safety concerns and the final decision was that the risk of
delay was tolerable.
PF-4 has undergone a series of upgrades to improve the facility's
response to seismic events, with other upgrades currently being
implemented through a capital TA-55 Reinvestment Project to further
enhance reliability and safety of the facility.
Ms. Sanchez. 11) Which planned LEPs are expected to require new pit
production?
Secretary D'Agostino. NNSA has existing Life Extension Programs for
the W76 and the B61. The W76-1 and B61-12 do not require new pit
production. The W78 and W88 are undergoing a conceptual study for life
extension options. Options for both reuse of existing pits and
remanufacture of existing pit designs are being evaluated. A decision
for the W78 and W88 will be made during the Phase 6.2/6.2A Feasibility
and Cost Study which will begin this fiscal year.
Ms. Sanchez. 12) With this sea change in plans, what assurances can
you give us regarding the accuracy and reliability of NNSA's
requirement definition process?
Secretary D'Agostino. Determining requirements is the process of
establishing and validating need in collaboration with customers and
stakeholders. For example, the requirement to maintain analytical
chemistry, materials characterization and plutonium storage
capabilities in support of national security mission work at Los Alamos
has been affirmed by an independent DOD assessment. Over the past year,
NNSA made difficult decisions to align with the fiscal reality of the
Budget Control Act. The decision to defer construction of the CMRR-NF
for at least 5 years is fully consistent with DOD's 2011 independent
assessment that recognized the higher operational risk of Building 9212
at Y-12 and the difficulty of executing both CMRR-NF construction and
UPF construction under constrained funding scenarios. The decision to
defer CMRR-NF construction does not increase risk to the safety and
security of ongoing operations, and the operational constraints
resulting from the decision do not prevent the NNSA from meeting
mission requirements.
Ms. Sanchez. 13) The 50-80 pit production capacity requirement was
determined while the NNSA was planning on developing and producing the
Reliable Replacement Warhead. What currently drives this requirement?
Secretary D'Agostino. There are a number of factors the DOD and
NNSA consider when establishing the pit production capacity
requirement. These factors include lifetime of the pits; stockpile size
(number of warheads); potential pit modification; ability to reuse
existing pits; and what is needed to have a responsive production
infrastructure.
Ms. Sanchez. 14) Was a cost assessment done for all the
alternatives to the 3 B option chosen by the Nuclear Weapons Council
for the B61 life extension? Why/why not? If so, how does the cost-range
for the 3B option compare to the funding range for the 3 other options
considered?
Secretary D'Agostino. Several life extension options were
considered and assessed by the NWC prior to the decision to proceed
with Option 3B. Of the 6 other options considered, only 4 fully met the
military requirements including service life. These options all
exceeded the preliminary Option 3B costs by approximately $1.5-$2B.
Other options considered but not selected ranged from $1.5B-$4B for
various component alteration scopes. These less expensive options had
significant shortfalls in the ability to satisfy military requirements.
In addition these options still require NNSA to begin a future life
extension program in the 2020s. The NWC assessment concluded Option 3B
was the most affordable life extension approach that met military
requirements and assured no capability gap in our extended nuclear
deterrent. Furthermore, NNSA and Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD) Cost Analysis and Program Evaluation (CAPE) are jointly
undertaking the B61 LEP Option 3B independent cost estimate, as well as
the broader DOD-NNSA Strategic Weapons and Supporting Infrastructure
analysis. This broader assessment seeks to ``develop decision framework
that balances DOD's weapon needs and NNSA's infrastructure and
stockpile stewardship requirements within fiscal constraints for
incorporation into the FY 2014 President's Budget.'' The final report
for this DOD-NNSA Interagency Team is expected in November 2012.
Ms. Sanchez. 15) Is transactional oversight helpful or necessary to
ensure safety, including nuclear safety? Why or why not? Are there
other areas where transactional oversight should be applied for
performance-based oversight? Why/why not?
Secretary D'Agostino. A transactional approach to Federal oversight
seeks to ensure contractor performance by observing operations and
reviewing or even approving certain critical documents and activities,
and is appropriate where the consequences of a failure are very high or
where a performance failure is intolerable. Ensuring the safety of our
nuclear operations is one area where transactional oversight may be
helpful and necessary. For example, a large radiological release could
significantly jeopardize the health and safety of the public or disrupt
the ability of the Department to conduct its mission. Consequently, the
Department approves the safety basis and startup of operations where
such a release, while unlikely, could occur, and ensures adequate
safety is demonstrated prior to operations.
However, not all safety-related decisions require transactional
oversight and it may even impede operations and add unnecessary costs
for no benefit. For example, when a contractor has demonstrated
adequate safety performance, the authority to review and approve
restart of low hazard activities is often delegated to the operating
contractor. As a general rule, most oversight is a blend of systems-
level and transaction-level oversight. To establish a proper balance of
oversight methods, NNSA is working with its laboratory partners to
assess what is needed for a strategic oversight posture vice a
transactional oversight approach. This assessment includes a review of
actual functions performed by Federal staff and the costs and benefits
of those functions as they relate to the work at the labs.
Ms. Sanchez. 16) Why did NNSA's fiscal year 2013 budget request not
seek funding at the 1251 report level? Given the FY 2012 appropriations
cuts, can NNSA execute work that had been planned under the 1251 report
funding levels?
Secretary D'Agostino. Last year, Congress passed the Budget Control
Act (BCA) which limits discretionary spending for the next decade, and
caps national security spending in Fiscal Year 2012 and 2013. In Fiscal
Year 2012, Congress also reduced NNSA's request for Weapons Activities
by $416 million below the President's request, or 5.4 percent. The BCA
reflects a new fiscal climate in Washington, embraced by both Congress
and the Administration. Like all agencies, NNSA must adjust to this new
reality. The proposed budget allows us to meet DOD's requirements by
making the necessary investments in nuclear capabilities and the
nuclear complex.
The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) worked directly
with the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Nuclear Weapons Council
(NWC) to define a path forward to support the requirements in the
Nuclear Posture Review Report. The realigned program, with adjustments
to the original 1251 program and reflected in a memorandum on March 27,
2012, can be executed within the resources provided by Congress for FY
2012 and those requested for FY 2013.
______

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN

Mr. Langevin. 17) Administrator D'Agostino, earlier this year, this
subcommittee held a hearing that examined the recent National Academies
of Science study pertaining to how NNSA governs, manages and oversees
the nuclear security enterprise. This is in addition to numerous issues
that have been documented through a long series of reports and studies
over the past 10 years. What are the Department of Energy and the NNSA
doing to address these issues and what is the budgetary impact of these
issues?
Secretary D'Agostino. The Department is committed to enhancing the
efficiency of Government oversight while ensuring that critical nuclear
security activities are conducted in a safe and secure environment. The
Department takes very seriously the recommendations of the National
Academy of Sciences regarding safety and security. Led by Secretary
Chu, a former lab director, the Department is working actively to
increase the efficiency of our oversight and to improve our approach to
working with our partners. We believe that our ongoing efforts will be
more effective at addressing those issues than prescriptive
legislation.
The Department, including the NNSA, is committed to maintaining and
improving safety and security standards while improving efficiency.
Below is a description of steps that the Department has recently taken
and plans to take to achieve these goals.

NNSA-National Laboratory Relationship Improvements

To increase senior level communication, restore trust and
foster collaboration on significant strategic improvements, the NNSA
Administrator has initiated monthly executive forums that include the
senior contractor leadership from the NNSA labs and plants, NNSA Field
Offices, and senior NNSA headquarters staff. This forum is currently
collaboratively working three major initiatives focused on improving
the efficiency and effectiveness of NNSA oversight.

Senior NNSA and DOE's Office of Health, Safety, and
Security (HSS) personnel visited each of the seven nuclear sites and
asked senior contractor and Federal personnel whether the Department's
nuclear safety requirements were excessively burdensome. Site Federal
and contractor personnel consistently agreed that while there have been
implementation issues the nuclear safety requirements themselves are
not excessive or inappropriate. The review identified areas for
improvement in the nuclear safety directives, which were provided to
the responsible offices and addressed in recent revisions. Revisions to
governance processes to enhance collaboration will keep this feedback
channel open in the future.
In response to Secretarial direction, a systematic reform
of the Department's safety and security directives has been undertaken
and resulted in a redesigned, streamlined set of requirements that
significantly reduces the level of prescription, offers flexibility for
innovative solutions, and pushes decisionmaking authorities to
appropriate levels within the organization. While maintaining
requirements sufficient for effective safety and security performance,
the Department revised, consolidated and cancelled directives to
achieve a nearly 50% reduction in safety and security directives.
The Secretary's ``National Laboratory Director's
Council,'' which includes the NNSA Laboratories, was tasked with
identifying burdensome requirements for the Department. Of the 20
burdensome requirements identified to date by the Laboratory Directors,
14 have been resolved, four are on hold at the request of the
Directors, and two are still in process.
NNSA's Enterprise Operating Requirements Review Board
(EORRB) engages Laboratory and Plant Directors, Site Managers, and
Headquarters leadership to look at requirements and directives in order
to ensure the level of prescription is appropriate and that the
requirements are not excessively burdensome. This initiative has
ensured that comments from NNSA personnel, including contractors, are
adequately addressed. Since using this process, NNSA has been able to
obtain a satisfactory resolution of 100% of its concerns during the
revision of DOE directives, further ensuring that the desired balance
in oversight is achieved.
The NNSA Administrator's Policy (NAP-21)
``Transformational Governance and Oversight,'' approved last year,
defined principles, responsibilities, processes and requirements to
help in transforming and improving governance and oversight. This
document is being revised to take advantage of lesson learned through
the governance reform process.
A four-party governance charter has been signed by the
Departments of Energy, Defense, Homeland Security, and the Office of
the Director of National Intelligence to establish the Mission
Executive Council as a means to coordinate interagency long term
strategic planning for unique science, technology and engineering
(ST&E) capabilities across agencies in order to ensure that those
capabilities will efficiently and effectively support critical national
security priorities. This now provides the forum for the joint long-
term planning of people, skills and facilities needed to complement
more traditional short-term and tactical Interagency Work activities at
the laboratories.
The Secretary recently approved transitioning DOE's
orders and directives to a more risk-informed foundation (an Enterprise
Risk Model). Future proposals for new requirements to be issued by DOE
for contractor implementation must be evaluated on the basis of their
benefit in terms of risk mitigation as well as their potential cost.
Upon completion of the governance and oversight
transformation effort, NNSA expects to have:

Clearer roles, responsibilities, and accountability,
Stronger Line Oversight and Contractor Assurance
Systems,
Better balanced, performance and outcome oriented
requirements, and
Improved contractual performance accountability.

Organizational & Business Improvements

In March 2012, NNSA created and filled a new position of
Associate Administrator for Infrastructure and Operations. This new
organization is responsible for the integrated management of the NNSA
Site Offices and coordination of all aspects of functional mission
support across the NNSA enterprise. This will facilitate an NNSA
enterprise approach to infrastructure management and operational
support necessary for achievement of the OneNNSA concept.
After more than 2 years of analysis and outside reviews,
NNSA released a Request for Proposal (RFP) for the combined management
and operations of the Y-12 National Security Complex and Pantex Plant,
with an option for phase in of Tritium Operations performed at the
Savannah River Site and recently established the NNSA Production Office
to combine NNSA oversight of both production plants. Combining
contracts and site offices will allow NNSA to improve performance,
reduce the cost of work, and operate as an integrated enterprise.
In 2011, NNSA created an Acquisition and Project
Management organization to improve business practices. This represents
a fundamental change in NNSA's approach to project and construction
management. This office focuses on improving the quality of work while
keeping projects on time and on budget across the Enterprise. For
example, for the Uranium Processing Facility Phase A scope of work
(rerouting Bear Creek Road and site utilities), the APM analysis of
acquisition alternatives identified an alternate acquisition strategy
that was subsequently approved resulting in a cost savings of $9
million. Other similar acquisition analyses are planned for upcoming
NNSA projects.
NNSA has realigned functions, responsibilities, and
authorities in the NNSA management structure to support implementation
of governance reform initiatives. This realignment has provided for
clear and direct lines of communication from the Federal workforce to
the contractor with a focus on mission execution.
NNSA re-evaluated the assignment of authorities and
responsibilities (and its delegations of authorities) to move
decisionmaking to the lowest appropriate and competent level in the
organization. This has resulted in more timely and better informed
actions and decisions which in turn has led to increased productivity.
NNSA is working to develop and implement governance
reform metrics. The metrics will be used as inputs to demonstrate
results and benefits of governance reform and enhance the use of data
for Nuclear Security Enterprise (NSE) decisionmaking.
NNSA awarded a Blanket Purchase Agreement for Enterprise
Construction Management Services. The agreement will standardize NNSA's
approach to project management across the enterprise and provide
subject matter experts to provide independent analysis and advice
related to the design and construction of facilities.

Safety & Security Improvements

The Department is aware of concerns previously raised regarding
overly prescriptive safety and security regulations. The following
improvements to safety, health and security oversight, including non-
nuclear operations, have been implemented to streamline directives and
improve our standards:

In response to Secretarial direction, the Office of
Health, Safety and Security (HSS) fundamentally redesigned its
Independent Oversight program for safety and security. HSS now focuses
its oversight on high-hazard, high-consequence operations, the
Department's most significant national security assets, and instances
of deficient performance. It has eliminated routine oversight of
routine industrial operations and lower value security assets. With
rare exceptions, large inspections teams have been replaced by a more
strategic approach using smaller teams that focus on specific issues
and are better coordinated with DOE (including NNSA) line management to
ensure maximum value and optimal efficiency in data gathering, thus
considerably reducing the impact of independent oversight on mission
activities at DOE sites.
NNSA has adopted a decentralized oversight approach for
nuclear and non-nuclear safety, relying on the site offices to provide
the primary oversight of its contractors rather than a burdensome
regimen of headquarters oversight. This approach is institutionalized
in NAP-21, but will also be captured in the NNSA Functions,
Responsibilities and Authorities (FRA) document, which is nearing
completion. The FRA clearly articulates the regulatory oversight model
that NNSA has implemented for safety and security, and associated
regulatory roles and responsibilities.
To ensure consistent and balanced implementation of
nuclear safety requirements at its site offices, NNSA performs reviews
of each site office every 2 years, evaluating 18 nuclear safety areas.
Areas reviewed include, for example, quality assurance and the
development and approval of safety documentation. These reviews are
staffed largely by Federal subject matter experts from the sites,
allowing good practices to be shared directly between the sites while
developing a common set of expectations amongst the practitioners on
how oversight should be done. Headquarters personnel, augment these
reviews, further helping ensure a consistent set of expectations. These
reviews have helped eliminate site-specific implementation issues,
driving consistent improvements in performance. In the first round of
reviews, began in 2005, expected performance was found in only 67% of
the areas assessed. Two years later, that level rose to 90%, and to 93%
in the most recent series.
To complement its decentralized execution of oversight,
NNSA has implemented a Central Technical Authority who, among other
functions, ensures that DOE policies are developed and promulgated
consistent with the needs of NNSA and its contractors. The
Administrator currently serves this role, and is supported by an
Associate Administrator for Safety and Health with a staff of subject
matter experts. DOE requires CTA concurrence on revisions to
requirements that can affect nuclear safety. NNSA has used this
authority to ensure that the needs of NNSA and its contractors are
properly reflected in revisions to DOE nuclear safety directives.
NNSA completed a security reform initiative to deliver
programmatic reform and provide cost-effective protection of nuclear
weapons, special nuclear materials, classified information, facilities,
and employees that has saved NNSA and taxpayers over $50 million per
year in productivity improvements and cost reductions (several hundreds
of millions of dollars over the 5-year FYNSP), while maintaining a
robust security posture. This security reform initiative restructured
security governance and oversight to redefine the survey and self-
assessment activities. This initiative also had the Site Offices
implement a risk-based model that prioritized and focused resources on
high-risk operational activities.
NNSA has developed NAPs for security with the goal of
achieving management and operational excellence. NNSA's security NAPs
include improvements that would also benefit other DOE organizations,
and that will be incorporated into a revised set of DOE security
directives that provides consistent direction to all DOE sites. The
revisions to DOE directives will focus on establishing security
requirements that are necessary for adequate protection and conform to
national standards, while providing flexibility to site organizations
to use the most appropriate methods to meet the security requirements
and protection objectives. NNSA is working collaboratively with HSS in
the revision process for the DOE security directives and will cancel
current security NAPs upon their incorporation into revised DOE
directives.
NNSA established a Security Commodity Team (SCT) that
delivered a common procurement mechanism with a single provider for
uniforms and a wide range of tactical equipment that produced cost
savings, more efficient processing time, and expedited delivery
schedules.
NNSA initiated a Protective Force (PF) Training Reform
Initiative to develop a corporate PF training program, based upon newly
developed and consistent mission-essential tasks. This initiative will
improve the focus, effectiveness, and efficiency of the annual PF
sustainment training program.

Mr. Langevin. 18) Mr. Huizenga, the DOE received $5.1 billion for
Defense Environmental Cleanup through the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009. Can you provide a status of the projects this
$5.1 billion funded?
Mr. Huizenga. The Environmental Management (EM) American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act Program has demonstrated tremendous success in
accelerating the environmental cleanup of contaminated facilities,
lands, and groundwater across the EM complex. Utilizing the full $5.99
billion received in Recovery Act funds, EM has completed 92 percent of
the projects/cleanup activities on-time and within budget. EM has also
reduced its environmental contamination footprint from over 900 square
miles to 316 square miles as of March 30, 2012. In total, EM has
initiated 126 discrete projects/cleanup activities (85 Defense
Environmental Cleanup funded and 41 Non-Defense funded). To date, 95
projects/cleanup activities have been completed (64 Defense funded and
31 Non-defense funded). Currently, the Defense Environmental Cleanup
Recovery Act account has a balance of approximately $215 million that
will be utilized to complete 21 remaining projects/cleanup activities.

Mr. Langevin. 19) Mr. Winokur, can you please discuss your safety
concerns regarding the Waste Treatment Plant at Hanford, and are there
current efforts between the DNFSB and the DOE to address these
concerns?
Dr. Winokur. For more than a decade, the Board has devoted time and
resources to oversight of the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant
(WTP) with two main safety objectives. First, operation of the plant
must not expose the public or workers to undue risk. Second, the plant
must achieve its design objectives to eliminate the safety and
environmental risks posed by continued storage of millions of gallons
of high-level waste in aging underground tanks. Although this is a one-
of-a-kind project with novel technology that requires significant
research and development, it is being designed concurrent with
construction (also known as a ``fast track'' design/build approach). As
a result, timely identification and resolution of technical issues are
paramount to meeting the objectives of the Hanford cleanup effort.
The Board's safety reviews have focused on ensuring that important
safety systems can meet the safety function and safety performance
requirements specified in the project safety basis documents. The Board
has identified significant weaknesses in the design of safety systems
and is working closely with DOE to correct them. The Board has written
two Recommendations and numerous letters on this project. The principal
issues that have not yet been resolved are summarized below:
Mixing in Process Vessels. On December 17, 2010, the Board issued
Recommendation 2010-2, Pulse Jet Mixing at the Waste Treatment and
Immobilization Plant, to address nuclear safety hazards arising from
inadequate mixing of waste in processing tanks. On November 10, 2011,
DOE provided the Board with an implementation plan that commits to
conduct a test program to determine the capabilities of WTP's mixing
systems, develop waste acceptance criteria for WTP that will address
safety concerns associated with mixing, and determine the requirements
for waste sampling systems in the Tank Farms and WTP. However, on April
30, 2012, DOE informed the Board that a key technical assumption used
in the planned approach to testing and modeling was not technically
defensible, and that a revision to the implementation plan is needed.
DOE plans to issue the revised plan by the fourth quarter of 2012.
Erosion and Corrosion of Piping, Vessels, and Pulse Jet Mixer
Nozzles. The Board found that the WTP contactor had not properly
justified the wear allowances needed to ensure that piping, vessels,
and mixing equipment (particularly items that will be inaccessible once
radioactive operations commence) will not suffer excessive erosion and
corrosion over the 40-year design life of the facility. DOE agrees with
the Board's evaluation. The WTP contractor is developing a plan for
evaluating erosion and corrosion on a vessel-by-vessel basis that
accounts for variations during waste processing operations.
Hydrogen in Piping and Ancillary Vessels. The Board is continuing
to evaluate the safety issues associated with the proposed hydrogen
control strategy for WTP, which allows hydrogen explosions in piping
under certain conditions. The contractor recently completed its
resolution of technical concerns identified by the Board and by an
independent review team chartered by DOE. DOE is presently reviewing
the revised hydrogen control strategy. The contractor has not yet
implemented the revised hydrogen control strategy in WTP's design or
incorporated it in the safety basis. The contractor also needs to
complete a major testing effort to determine the effect of hydrogen
explosions on components such as valves and instrumentation.
Spray Leak Analysis. In 2011, the Board identified technical issues
with the WTP contractor's approach for determining the consequences to
the public of accidents involving sprays of radioactive liquids. DOE
acknowledged that the Board's concerns were valid and committed to
resolve them through a test program. This test program is currently
under way.
Heat Transfer Analyses for Process Vessels. The Board found
technical issues in heat transfer analyses that the WTP contractor was
using to establish post-accident mixing requirements to avoid hydrogen
explosions in process vessels in the WTP Pretreatment Facility. DOE has
agreed that the technical assumptions in the contractor's heat transfer
model needed better justification and is pursuing appropriate analyses.
Instrumentation and Control System Design. The Board found that the
preliminary safety basis did not ensure the required reliability of
safety-significant instrumented systems. DOE had the WTP contractor
complete a comprehensive review of the problem and has committed to
revise the appropriate procedures and guides for engineering and safety
analysis to correct the issue.
Ammonia Hazards. The Board found that the existing design and
safety-related controls will not adequately protect workers or
facilities at WTP from accidents involving the large quantities of
ammonia to be stored at the WTP site. In response, DOE informed the
Board that the project team will perform three new hazard analyses to
address the Board's concerns.
Design and Construction of Electrical Distribution System. On April
13, 2012, the Board issued a letter to DOE identifying safety issues
with the design of the electrical distribution system at WTP. The Board
is waiting for a response from DOE on this issue.
Safety Culture. The Board issued Recommendation 2011-1, Safety
Culture at the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant, on June 9,
2011, after determining that serious flaws in the project's safety
culture were inhibiting the identification and resolution of technical
and safety issues. DOE accepted the Board's recommendation, and has
provided an acceptable implementation plan for corrective actions.
DOE's Office of Health, Safety and Security (HSS) independently
reviewed the WTP safety culture, and confirmed the Board's conclusions
in a report issued in January 2012. Both the DOE Office of River
Protection and the WTP contractor are pursuing corrective action plans
in response to the issues identified in the Board's recommendation and
by the HSS review.