[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

ASSESSING AMERICA'S NUCLEAR FUTURE--
A REVIEW OF THE BLUE RIBBON COMMISSION'S
REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY

=======================================================================

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

__________

Wednesday, February 8, 2012

__________

Serial No. 112-60

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Printed for the use of the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology

Available via the World Wide Web: http://science.house.gov

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COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY

HON. RALPH M. HALL, Texas, Chair
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
Wisconsin JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois
LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California
DANA ROHRABACHER, California ZOE LOFGREN, California
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland BRAD MILLER, North Carolina
FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois
JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland
W. TODD AKIN, Missouri MARCIA L. FUDGE, Ohio
RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas BEN R. LUJAN, New Mexico
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas PAUL D. TONKO, New York
PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia JERRY McNERNEY, California
SANDY ADAMS, Florida JOHN P. SARBANES, Maryland
BENJAMIN QUAYLE, Arizona TERRI A. SEWELL, Alabama
CHARLES J. ``CHUCK'' FLEISCHMANN, FREDERICA S. WILSON, Florida
Tennessee HANSEN CLARKE, Michigan
E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia VACANCY
STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi
MO BROOKS, Alabama
ANDY HARRIS, Maryland
RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois
CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota
LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana
DAN BENISHEK, Michigan
VACANCY

C O N T E N T S

Wednesday, February 8, 2012

Page
Witness List..................................................... 2

Hearing Charter.................................................. 3

Opening Statements

Statement by Representative Ralph M. Hall, Chairman, Committee on
Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives.. 15
Written Statement............................................ 16

Statement by Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson, Ranking
Minority Member, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology,
U.S. House of Representatives.................................. 17
Written Statement............................................ 18

Witnesses:

Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft (Ret.), Co-Chairman, Blue
Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future
Oral Statement............................................... 19
Written Statement............................................ 24

The Honorable Richard Meserve, Commissioner, Blue Ribbon
Commission on America's Nuclear Future
Oral Statement............................................... 22
Written Statement............................................ 24

The Honorable Pete Lyons, Assistant Secretary of Nuclear Energy,
Department of Energy
Oral Statement............................................... 44
Written Statement............................................ 46

Appendix I: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions

Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft (Ret.), Co-Chairman, and The
Honorable Richard Meserve, Commissioner, Blue Ribbon Commission
on America's Nuclear Future.................................... 72

The Honorable Pete Lyons, Assistant Secretary of Nuclear Energy,
Department of Energy........................................... 81

ASSESSING AMERICA'S NUCLEAR FUTURE--
A REVIEW OF THE BLUE RIBBON COMMISSION'S
REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY

----------

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 8, 2012

House of Representatives,
Committee on Science, Space, and Technology,
Washington, DC.

The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in Room
2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ralph M. Hall
[Chairman of the Committee] presiding.

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Chairman Hall. The Committee on Science, Space, and
Technology will come to order. And I say good morning and
welcome to today's hearing entitled ``Assessing America's
Nuclear Future--A Review of the Blue Ribbon Commission's Report
to the Secretary of Energy.'' In front of you are packets
containing the written testimony, biographies, and Truth-in-
Testimony disclosures for today's witnesses. I recognize myself
for five minutes for an opening statement.
I want to welcome everyone here today for today's hearing:
``Assessing America's Nuclear Future--A Review of the Blue
Ribbon Commission's Report to the Secretary of Energy.'' This
morning, we will hear from two very distinguished members of
the Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future, former
National Security Advisor and Lieutenant General Brent
Scowcroft; and former Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Richard Meserve. General Scowcroft and Chairman
Meserve will provide an overview of the BRC's key
recommendations to manage the Nation's nuclear waste.
We also will hear from the Department of Energy's Assistant
Secretary for Nuclear Energy, Pete Lyons, and hope that he will
explain how the Administration plans to implement the
Commission's recommendations and utilize its current nuclear
energy research activities to find a permanent solution to the
disposal of spent nuclear fuel.
Thirty years ago, as a Democrat, I supported passage of the
Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982. The law was intended to
provide a solution to what America does with its spent fuel.
And while our understanding of how to handle and dispose of
spent fuel has increased dramatically in the decades since,
nuclear waste is managed exactly as it was in 1982--through
onsite storage at the more than 100 reactors around the
country. I hope I don't have to wait another 30 years to see
the government finally meet its legal obligations.
Just as real progress was being made to construct a
permanent repository at Yucca Mountain, President Obama decided
to change course, just as he did with the space program,
without specifying any proper path. Our space program is in
total disarray and we know that, and apparently, Yucca Mountain
has also received the same type of death penalty. In this case,
he created a Blue Ribbon Commission to reevaluate how our
Nation manages the back-end of the nuclear fuel cycle. In doing
so, President Obama started the whole process over--excuse me--
throwing this country's nuclear waste management policy into
disarray.
When the Commission's draft report came out in July, I
stated that it was time to stop playing politics and move
forward with the Yucca Mountain project. I echo that sentiment
again today. The President dismantled the Yucca Mountain
program on which, to date, the American taxpayers have spent
over $15 billion studying its scientific and technical
viability to serve as a permanent geologic repository.
Electricity consumers contribute approximately $750 million
into the Nuclear Waste Fund annually, and that fund now has a
balance of $27 billion. Recently, the Obama Administration
revised the Federal Government's estimated liability for not
accepting ownership of the radioactive waste to almost $21
billion, an increase of $3.7 billion or 21 percent since
creation of the Blue Ribbon Commission.
Despite this massive investment and decades of study, the
Secretary of Energy explicitly prohibited the Blue Ribbon
Commission from even considering the suitability of Yucca
Mountain to serve as a portion of America's nuclear waste
management policy, effectively tying the Commission's hands and
thumbing his nose again at Congress. Despite this objectionable
action by the Administration, the Commission deserves credit
for highlighting in its report that every expert panel has
concluded that deep geologic disposal is the scientifically
preferred approach. Yucca Mountain is exactly that.
I am disappointed that the Commission was not able to even
consider Yucca Mountain as part of the review, but I recognize
that there are other recommendations by the Commission that
could improve our nuclear waste management policy. I look
forward to hearing about those.
And I thank you again for being here.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hall follows:]

Prepared Statement of Chairman Ralph Hall

I want to welcome everyone here for today's hearing, ``Assessing
America's Nuclear Future- A Review of the Blue Ribbon Commission's
Report to the Secretary of Energy.''
This morning we will hear from two distinguished members of the
Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future: former National
Security Advisor and Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft, and former
Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Richard Meserve. General
Scowcroft and Chairman Meserve will provide an overview of the BRC's
key recommendations to manage this nation's nuclear waste.
We also will hear from the Department of Energy's Assistant
Secretary for Nuclear Energy, Pete Lyons and hope that he will explain
how the Administration plans to implement the Commission's
recommendations and utilize its current nuclear energy research
activities to find a permanent solution to the disposal of spent
nuclear fuel.
Thirty years ago, I supported passage of the Nuclear Waste Policy
Act of 1982. The law was intended to provide a solution to what America
does with its spent nuclear fuel. While our understanding of how to
handle and dispose of spent fuel has increased dramatically in the
decades since, nuclear waste is managed exactly as it was in 1982-
through onsite storage at the more than 100 reactors around the
country. I hope I don't have to wait another thirty years to see the
government finally meet its legal obligations.
Just as real progress was being made to construct a permanent
repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, President Obama decided to change
course just as he did with the space program without specifying any
future path. In this case, he created a Blue Ribbon Commission to re-
evaluate how our Nation manages the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle.
In doing so, President Obama started the whole process over, throwing
this country's nuclear waste management policy into disarray. When the
Commission's draft report came out in July, I stated that it is time to
stop playing politics and move forward with the Yucca Mountain project.
I echo that sentiment today.
The President dismantled the Yucca Mountain program on which, to
date, American taxpayers have spent over $15 billion studying its
scientific and technical viability to serve as a permanent geologic
repository. Electricity consumers contribute approximately $750 million
into the Nuclear Waste Fund annually, and that fund now has a balance
of $27 billion. Recently, the Obama Administration revised the Federal
government's estimated liability for not accepting ownership of
radioactive waste to almost $21 billion, an increase of $3.7 billion or
21 percent since creation of the Blue Ribbon Commission.
Despite this massive investment and decades of study, the Secretary
of Energy explicitly prohibited the Blue Ribbon Commission from even
considering the suitability of Yucca Mountain to serve as a portion of
America's nuclear waste management policy--effectively tying the
Commission's hands and thumbing his nose at Congress. Despite this
objectionable action by the Administration, the Commission deserves
credit for highlighting in its report that every expert panel has
concluded that deep geologic disposal is the scientifically preferred
approach.

Yucca Mountain is exactly that.

I am disappointed that the Commission was not able to even consider
Yucca Mountain as part of its review, but I recognize that there are
other recommendations by the Commission that could improve nuclear
waste management policy. I look forward to hearing about those.

Thank you again for being here. I now recognize Ranking Member Johnson
for five minutes.

Chairman Hall. I now recognize Ranking Member Johnson for
five minutes.
Ms. Johnson. Thank you very much, Chairman Hall, and good
morning to all. I want to thank General Scowcroft, Dr. Meserve,
and their fellow Commissioners for their service to this
country. Given the diversity of backgrounds and expertise on
the Commission, arriving at a consensus on something as
potentially contentious as our nuclear future is not easy and
your efforts should be considered in itself a model for how to
move forward on this issue.
To some degree, this reflects how the national conversation
regarding nuclear energy has evolved over the last three years.
Once a highly polarizing and partisan debate with ardent pro-
and anti-nuclear camps firmly entrenched on either side, we can
now have more nuanced policy discussions on everything from
environmental impacts to financial issues. As a supporter of
nuclear energy, I do find this encouraging. However, one thing
has not changed. After five decades of commercial nuclear power
in the United States, we still have not arrived at a
comprehensive and equitable plan for permanent disposal of
spent nuclear fuel. Yucca Mountain has never fit in that bill.
It was a decision forced upon Nevada by Congress and it was
only a partial solution at best. For this reason, I welcome the
Blue Ribbon Commission's final report. It represents the
strongest effort to date to move the United States beyond what
is arguably one of the most embarrassing policy failures and
one that has spanned both Democrat and Republican
administrations.
Today, we are at an impasse, a stalemate, and we should
have seen this coming. In 1987, the process was short-circuited
and ultimately it broke down. It has cost us 30 years of
progress and billions of dollars. It was always controversial
and unfair, and in the end, we are left frustrated and angry
with an ever-growing waste stockpile and still without a
solution. Regardless of one's personal feelings about Yucca's
suitability as a repository, to spend our time and resources
rehashing the same arguments reminds me of the often-quoted
definition of insanity--doing the same thing over and over
again expecting different results. I hope we will not go down
that road today. It is time to move on and try a new approach,
one that seeks to gain consensus from the start by educating
the public, empowering stakeholder communities.
I applaud the Commission for having this as their number
one recommendation. They have called for a consent-based
approach to identifying a permanent nuclear waste repository
and they acknowledge that the decisions three decades ago
regarding Yucca Mountain were not purely technical or
scientific but political despite vocal and vibrant community
opposition. What we need is consensus from the start. In the
most powerful democracy in the world, it is the only way this
will work. And as the most innovative economy in the world, we
cannot forget the role that future technologies may play in
both reducing our waste stockpile and ensuring the safety of
future generations.
The Blue Ribbon Commission has given us a framework for
this new approach. Some recommendations can be implemented in
the near term and some may take decades to fully realize. All
of them deserve our attention and consideration today.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Johnson follows:]

Prepared Statement of Ranking Member Eddie Bernice Johnson

Thank you, Chairman Hall, for calling this hearing today.

I also want to thank General Scowcroft, Dr. Meserve, and their
fellow Commissioners for their service to the country. Given the
diversity of backgrounds and expertise on the Commission, arriving at a
consensus on something as potentially contentious as our nuclear future
is not easy, and your effort should be considered, in itself, a model
for how to move forward on this issue.
To some degree, this reflects how the national conversation
regarding nuclear energy has evolved over the last few years. Once a
highly polarizing and partisan debate--with ardent ``pro'' and ``anti''
nuclear camps firmly entrenched on either side--we can now have more
nuanced policy discussions on everything from environmental impacts to
financing issues. As a supporter of nuclear energy, I find this
encouraging.
However, one thing has not changed: after five decades of
commercial nuclear power in the U.S., we still have not arrived at a
comprehensive and equitable plan for permanent disposal of spent
nuclear fuel. Yucca Mountain has never fit that bill. It was a decision
forced upon Nevada by Congress, and it was only a partial solution at
that.
For this reason, I welcome the Blue Ribbon Commission's final
report. It represents the strongest effort to date to move the U.S.
beyond what is arguably one of our most embarrassing policy failures,
and one that has spanned both Democratic and Republican
Administrations. Today we are at an impasse, a stalemate, and we should
have seen this coming.
In 1987, the process was short-circuited, and ultimately, it broke
down. It has cost us thirty years of progress and billions of dollars.
It was always controversial and unfair, and in the end we are left
frustrated and angry, with an ever-growing waste stockpile, and still
without a solution.
Regardless of one's personal feelings about Yucca's suitability as
a repository, to spend our time and resources rehashing the same
arguments reminds me of the often-quoted definition of ``insanity'':
doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different
results. I hope we will not go down that road again, today.
It is time to move on and try a new approach, one that seeks to
gain consensus from the start by educating the public and empowering
stakeholder communities. I applaud the Commission for having this as
their number one recommendation. They have called for a ``Consent-Based
Approach'' to identifying a permanent nuclear waste repository and they
acknowledged that the decisions three decades ago regarding Yucca
Mountain were not purely technical or scientific, but political,
despite vocal and vibrant community opposition. What we need is
consensus from the start. In the most powerful democracy in the world,
it is the only way this will work.
And, as the most innovative economy in the world, we cannot forget
the role that future technologies may play in both reducing our waste
stockpile and ensuring the safety of future generations.
The Blue Ribbon Commission has given us a framework for this new
approach. Some recommendations can be implemented in the near term, and
some may take decades to fully realize. All of them deserve our
attention and consideration today.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back.

Chairman Hall. All right. I thank you, Ms. Johnson. The
gentlelady from Texas yields back.
If there are Members who wish to submit additional opening
statements, your statements will be added to the record at this
point.
And I am honored to get to introduce the witnesses at this
time. I want to introduce our panel of witnesses, and our first
witness is retired General Brent Scowcroft, United States Air
Force, and the Co-Chairman of the Blue Ribbon Commission on
America's Nuclear Future. General Scowcroft currently is the
President of the Scowcroft Group, an international business
advisory firm. General Scowcroft served as the National
Security Advisor to Presidents Gerald Ford and George H. W.
Bush. President Bush presented the General with the Medal of
Freedom Award in 1991, the Nation's highest civilian award.
Our second witness is the Honorable Richard Meserve,
Commissioner of the Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear
Energy Future. Dr. Meserve is the President of the Carnegie
Institution for Science. Before joining Carnegie, Dr. Meserve
was Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. He served as
Chairman under both Presidents Clinton and George W. Bush and
led the NRC in responding to the terrorism threat that came to
the forefront after the 9/11 attacks. Before joining the NRC,
Dr. Meserve was a partner in the Washington, D.C. law firm of
Covington & Burling.
Our final witness is the Honorable Pete Lyons, Assistant
Secretary of Nuclear Energy for the Department of Energy. Dr.
Lyons was confirmed by the Senate as Assistant Secretary for
Nuclear Energy on April 14, 2011. Dr. Lyons previously served
as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Office of
Nuclear Energy. Dr. Lyons was a Commissioner of the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission from 2005 to 2009. He also served as the
Science Advisor for Senator Pete Domenici for the Senate Energy
and Natural Resources Committee. Dr. Lyons worked at the Los
Alamos National Laboratory for nearly 30 years.
As our witnesses should know, spoken testimony is limited
to five minutes after which the Members of the Committee will
have five minutes each to ask questions.
I am going to recognize General Scowcroft and Dr. Meserve
together for ten minutes. You can divide that any way you want
to. I am honored to recognize you at this time, sir.

STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT
(RET.), CO-CHAIRMAN, BLUE RIBBON COMMISSION
ON AMERICA'S NUCLEAR FUTURE

General Scowcroft. Chairman Hall, Ranking Member Johnson,
distinguished Members of the Committee, it is a great pleasure
to appear before you today to discuss the final recommendations
of the Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future. We
appreciate the leadership this Committee has shown in
confronting some of our Nation's biggest challenges, which
certainly include the focus of this hearing: managing spent
nuclear fuel and high-level nuclear waste in the United States.
Thank you for allowing us to testify.
Before we begin, I would like to pass along the deepest
regrets of my Co-Chairman, former Congressman Hamilton, for not
being here with us today. It has been an absolute delight
working with him. Both Congressman Hamilton and I are thankful
that Dr. Richard Meserve could stand in his place today. I
would also like to thank the rest of the members of the
Commission who worked so hard in creating our final report.
Congressman Hamilton and I were delighted to work with such a
talented and dedicated work group of fellow Commissioners. We
are thankful for the expertise and insights they brought to our
endeavors. Despite the variety of perspectives and interests in
this issue of the members of the Commission, their
professionalism led to our final report having unanimous
approval, a fact which we believe speaks to the strength of our
recommendations. We are also fortunate to have the services of
an absolutely outstanding staff.
As you are aware, Blue Ribbon Commission was formed by the
Secretary of Energy at the direction of the President. Our
charge was to conduct a comprehensive review of policies for
managing the back-end of the nuclear fuel cycle and to
recommend a new strategy. We came away from our review
frustrated by decades of unmet commitments to the American
people, yet confident that we can turn this record around.
I will present the first half of our recommendations and
Dr. Meserve will continue from there.
Mr. Chairman, as we are all too aware, America's nuclear
waste program is at an impasse. The Administration's decision
to halt work on a repository at Yucca Mountain is but the
latest indicator of a policy that has been trouble for decades
and has now all but completely broken down. The approach laid
out under the 1987 amendments to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act
has simply not worked to produce a timely solution for dealing
with the Nation's most hazardous radioactive materials. The
United States has traveled nearly 25 years down the current
path only to come to a point where continuing to rely on the
same approach seems destined to bring further controversy,
litigation, and delay.
What we have found is that our Nation's failure to come to
grips with the nuclear waste issue has already proved damaging
and costly. It will be even more so the longer it continues,
damaging the prospects for maintaining a potentially important
energy supply option for the future, damaging to state/federal
relations and public confidence in the Federal Government's
competence, and damaging to America's standing in the world as
a source of nuclear expertise and as a leader on global issues
of nuclear safety, nonproliferation, and security.
This failure is also costly to utility ratepayers, who
continue to pay for a nuclear waste management solution that
has yet to be delivered, to communities that have become
unwilling hosts of long-term waste storage facilities, and to
U.S. taxpayers who face billions in liabilities as a result of
the failure to meet federal waste management commitments. The
national interest demands that our nuclear waste program be
fixed. Complacency with a failed nuclear waste management
system is not an option. With a 65,000 metric ton inventory of
spent nuclear fuels spread across the country and growing at a
rate of over 2,000 metric tons a year, the status quo is not
acceptable. The need for a new strategy is urgent.
Mr. Chairman, the strategy we recommend in our final report
has eight key elements. We are certain they are all necessary
to establish a truly integrated national nuclear waste
management system, to create the institutional leadership and
wherewithal to get the job done, and to ensure that the United
States remains at the forefront of technological developments
and international responses to evolving safety--nuclear safety,
nonproliferation, and security concerns. We will now describe
those eight elements in more detail.
The first is a new consent-based approach to siting future
nuclear waste management facilities. Experience in the United
States and in other nations suggest that any attempt to force a
top-down federally mandated solution over the objections of a
state or a community, far from being more efficient, will take
longer, cost more, and have lower odds of ultimate success. By
contrast, the approach we recommend is explicitly adaptive,
staged, and consent-based. Based on activities in the United
States and abroad--including most notably the siting of a
disposal facility for transuranic radioactive waste, the Waste
Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in New Mexico, and recent positive
outcomes in Spain, Finland, and Sweden--we believe this type of
approach can provide the flexibility and sustain the public
trust and confidence needed to see controversial facilities
through to completion.
The second element is a new organization dedicated solely
to implementing the waste management program and empowered with
the authority and resources to succeed. The overall record of
DOE and of the Federal Government as a whole has not inspired
confidence or trust in the Nation's nuclear waste management
program. For this and other reasons, the Commission concludes
that new institutional leadership is needed. Specifically, we
believe a single-purpose congressionally chartered federal
corporation is best suited to provide the stability, focus, and
credibility needed to get the waste program back on track. For
the new organization to succeed, a substantial degree of
implementing authority and assured access to funds must be
paired with a rigorous financial, technical, and regulatory
oversight by Congress and the appropriate government agencies.
The third element is access to the funds nuclear utility
ratepayers are providing for the purpose of nuclear waste
management. Nuclear utilities are assessed a fee on every
kilowatt-hour of nuclear-generated electricity in exchange for
the Federal Government's contractual commitment to begin
accepting commercial-spent fuel beginning by January 31, 1998.
Fee revenues go to the government's Nuclear Waste Fund, which
was established for the sole purpose of covering the cost of
disposing of civilian nuclear waste and ensuring that the waste
program would not have to compete with other funding
priorities. The fund does not work as it can. A series of
Executive Branch and Congressional actions has made the annual
fee revenues--approximately $750 million a year--and the
unspent $27 billion balance in the funds effectively
inaccessible to the waste program. Instead, the waste program
is subject to precisely the budget constraints and
uncertainties that the fund was created to avoid. This
situation must be remedied immediately to allow the program to
succeed.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE RICHARD MESERVE,
COMMISSIONER, BLUE RIBBON COMMISSION
ON AMERICA'S NUCLEAR FUTURE

Mr. Meserve. As General Scowcroft has indicated, we have
eight major recommendations, and he has covered the first three
and I will cover the remainder.
Our fourth recommendation is that there be prompt efforts
to develop one or more geologic disposal facilities. The
conclusion that disposal is needed and that deep geologic
disposal is the scientifically preferred approach has been
reached by every expert panel that has looked at the issue and
by every other country that is pursuing a nuclear waste
management program. Moreover, all spent fuel reprocessing or
recycle options either already available, or under active
development at this time, still generate waste streams that
require a permanent disposal solution. We simply note that
regardless of what happens with Yucca Mountain, the U.S.
inventory of spent nuclear fuel will soon exceed the amount
that can be legally in place at this site until a second
repository is in operation.
So under current law, the United States will need to find a
disposal site even if Yucca Mountain were to move forward. We
believe the approach set out here in our recommendations
provides the best strategy for assuring continued progress
regardless of the fate of Yucca Mountain.
Our fifth recommendation is to assure prompt efforts to
develop one or more consolidated storage facilities. Developing
consolidated storage capacity would allow the Federal
Government to begin the orderly transfer of spent fuel from
reactor sites to safe and secure centralized facilities
independent of the schedule for operating a permanent
repository. The arguments in favor of consolidated storage are
strongest for stranded spent fuel from shutdown plant sites of
which there are 10 across the country. Stranded fuel should be
first in line for transfer to a consolidated storage facility
so that these plant sites can be completely decommissioned and
put to other beneficial uses. The availability of consolidated
storage will also provide valuable flexibility in the nuclear
waste management system that could achieve meaningful cost
savings, provide backup storage in the event that spent fuel
needs to be moved quickly and would provide an excellent
platform for ongoing R&D to better understand how the storage
systems currently in use at both commercial and DOE sites
perform over time.
Our sixth recommendation is that prompt efforts be
undertaken to prepare for the eventual large-scale transport of
spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste to consolidated storage
and disposal facilities when such facilities become available.
The current system of standards and regulations governing the
transport of spent fuel and other nuclear materials has
functioned well and the safety record for past shipments of
these types of materials is excellent. That being said, greater
transport demands for nuclear materials are likely to raise new
public concerns. The Commission believes that state, tribal,
and local officials should be extensively involved in
transportation planning and should be given the resources
necessary to discharge their roles and obligations in this
arena. Historically, some programs have treated transportation
planning as an afterthought. No successful programs have done
so.
Our seventh recommendation is to support advances in
nuclear energy technology and workforce development. Advances
in nuclear energy technology have the potential to deliver an
array of benefits across a wide range of energy policy goals.
The Commission believes these benefits--in light of the
environmental and energy security challenges the United States
and the world will confront--justify sustained public and
private sector support for RD&D on both existing light-water
reactor technology and advanced reactor and fuel-cycle
technologies.
The Commission also recommends expanded federal joint labor
management and university-based support for advanced science,
technology, engineering, and mathematics training. We recommend
this to develop the skilled workforce needed to support an
effective waste management program, as well as a viable
domestic nuclear industry.
Our eighth recommendation is to urge active U.S. leadership
in international efforts to address safety, nonproliferation,
and security concerns. As more nations consider pursuing
nuclear energy or expanding their nuclear programs, U.S.
leadership is urgently needed on issues of safety,
nonproliferation, and security and counterterrorism. From the
U.S. perspective, two points are particularly important. First,
with so many players in the international nuclear technology
and policy arena, the United States will increasingly have to
lead by engagement and by example. Second, the United States
cannot exercise effective leadership on issues related to the
backend of the nuclear fuel cycle so long as our own program is
in disarray. Effective domestic policies are needed to support
America's international agenda.
In conclusion, the problem of nuclear waste may be unique
in the sense that there is wide agreement about the outlines of
the solution. Simply put, we know what we have to do, we know
we have to do it, and we even know how to do it. We believe the
conditions for progress are arguably more promising than they
have been in some time, but we will only know if we start,
which is what we urge the Administration and the Congress to do
without further delay.
Thank you for having us here today. We ask that you include
a full version of our testimony for the record and we look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Scowcroft and Mr.
Meserve follows:]

Prepared Statement of Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft (Ret.),
Co-Chairman, and The Honorable Richard Meserve, Commissioner,
Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future

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Chairman Hall. I thank you, sir, to both of you.
And I now recognize Dr. Pete Lyons for five minutes to--or
whatever it takes to present your testimony, sir.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE PETE LYONS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
NUCLEAR ENERGY, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Mr. Lyons. Thank you. Chairman Hall, Ranking Member
Johnson, and Members of the Committee, thank you for the
opportunity to discuss the Blue Ribbon Commission's Report to
the Secretary of Energy. The Administration commends the
Commission for its work over the past two years. Their report
will inform the Administration's work with Congress to define a
responsible and achievable path forward to manage our Nation's
used nuclear fuel and nuclear waste.
The President, Secretary Chu, many Members of Congress have
spoken out on the importance of nuclear power to our Nation's
clean energy future. New nuclear power options with dramatic
safety improvements are poised for deployment. Late last year,
the passively safe Westinghouse AP1000 reactor received design
certification from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the
BRC, the Commission, endorsed the cost-shared NP 2010 program
that had supported this design certification. The NRC vote on
the first AP1000 construction and operating license is
scheduled for tomorrow, and if approved, it will be our first
license for new reactor construction in over three decades,
creating thousands of new jobs. And with the support of
Congress, we have started the cost-shared program to accelerate
commercialization of small modular reactors, which may offer
immense national benefits.
But the United States must develop a sustainable used fuel
management strategy to ensure that nuclear power continues to
be utilized as a safe, reliable resource for our Nation's long-
term energy supply and security. In this context, Secretary Chu
stated that the Commission's report ``is a critical step toward
finding a sustainable approach to disposing used nuclear fuel
and nuclear waste.'' The Commission's report highlights our
Nation's own success story, the Department's Waste Isolation
Pilot Plant, or WIPP. The WIPP experience has shown that a
consent-based approach and a superb safety record can lead to
the successful development and operation of a geologic
repository for nuclear waste disposal that is very well
supported by the state and local community.
I have been a close observer of both the Yucca Mountain and
WIPP programs. Through growing up in Nevada, working for years
at the Nevada test site, directing programs at Los Alamos
National Lab for both Yucca Mountain and WIPP, living in New
Mexico, and working on Senate staff for eight years, I have
seen the stark difference in success between a largely consent-
based and a non-consent-based program. Many near-term
directions advocated by the Commission align very well with our
ongoing programs. Starting in fiscal year 2011, we established
the Used Nuclear Fuel Disposition Program to conduct R&D on
storage, transportation, and disposal, and I was very pleased
that the Commission positively assessed this program. In fiscal
year 2012, this program will revisit the recommendations of the
2006 National Academy Report on Transportation Issues and will
prepare a report on that work.
We will finalize policy and procedures for providing
technical assistance and funds for training public safety
officials. We will build upon previous DOE and industrial
efforts to initiate the evaluation of designs for consolidated
storage, and we will develop communication packages for use
with potential host communities. We will also continue R&D to
better understand potential degradation mechanisms involved in
long-term storage through a university lab consortium led by
Texas A&M. And we will continue research on geologic media
through partnerships that gain overseas expertise in granite
and clay, expand our own studies on salt, and initiate planning
for deep borehole studies.
The fiscal year 2012 appropriations report requested that
the Department develop a strategy within six months.
Interactions within the Administration and with Congress and
stakeholders will be a part of this process. We thank the
Commission for important contributions towards development of
that strategy.
I look forward to your questions and thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Lyons follows:]

Prepared Statement of The Honorable Pete Lyons, Assistant Secretary of
Nuclear Energy, Department of Energy

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Chairman Hall. And I thank you. I will begin with the
questions at this time.
The Blue Ribbon Commission Report really highlights--and
then first, let me ask you all to thank Lee Hamilton. He is a
man that I have had great regard for, enjoyed a long
friendship, benefited from his advice and we would like very
much to have had him here.
I think we all agree that transparency is better and that
is why I am concerned with the Chairman of the NRC has blocked
the NRC staff from completing the scientific and technical
review of Yucca Mountain's site suitability. General and Dr.
Meserve, regardless of whether Yucca Mountain has a future--and
I know you were prevented from considering that or spending
very much time on that--I have always lived with the idea if I
ignore the impossible and try to cooperate and improve the
inevitable, that is kind of the position I feel like you all
were put in. You have accepted as the leaders that you have
always been and we are trying to receive something from the
benefit of the study of important people like each of you.
But to General and Chairman, whether Yucca Mountain has a
future or not, don't you really believe that the safety review
ought to be made public? Is there any reason why we don't do
that?
General Scowcroft. Well, Mr. Chairman, we didn't really
focus on that part of it.
Chairman Hall. Because you were told not to deal with
Yucca?
General Scowcroft. We are not a siting commission and we
were told not to.
Chairman Hall. Okay.
General Scowcroft. But what I would just say is that our
recommendations accept Yucca Mountain can continue as a part of
a new process. We don't rule one way or another on Yucca
Mountain of what should happen to it. And there is a need for
more than one repository now anyway because the spent fuel
buildup is such that it is close to the capacity of Yucca
Mountain now. So we would need additional repositories in any
case.
Chairman Hall. Well, in any case, though, I don't see any
reason to suppress the safety review and the information from
the safety review.
I will ask Dr. Lyons. President Obama is committed to
making this Administration the most open and transparent in
history. Is there any reason why this information should be
withheld from the public and what might the contingent
suppression of this technical information mean with respect to
the scientific integrity goals, and guidelines that the
President regularly touts that he has?
Mr. Lyons. Well, Chairman Hall, I start with the point that
details of the NRC's future course with regard to NRC are in
litigation now and I think it is appropriate that we wait and
understand what the legal opinions are going to be on that. But
I would add that as a scientist, my goal is in finding a way
forward on a path for used fuel in this country, and I believe
that the Blue Ribbon Commission outlines a coherent overall
path that, if followed, will lead to success.
Chairman Hall. Would the release of the report have any
value at all?
Mr. Lyons. If that is directed at me, sir, since I don't
know what is in the report, I really can't comment in detail.
Chairman Hall. Okay. The Blue Ribbon Commission
recommendations are centered around the assumption that with an
adequate amount of incentives, a ``consent-based siting process
is going to entice localities and states to serve as a host.''
What happens if there is simply no locality that agrees to host
a repository or if the locality agrees and then changes its
mind a couple of years later? And is that the process we have
gone through for the past 30 years? Anybody that wants to
answer it, it is--I would take an answer from----
General Scowcroft. We recommend, as you point out, Mr.
Chairman, a consent-based process. There is nothing magic about
it and so we can't say that it will produce the right results,
but our review of especially the WIPP facility in New Mexico,
which has turned out to be a great success with enthusiasm for
additional responsibilities in that regard and the recent
process in Finland, in Sweden, and in Spain give us the hope
that it would work here. Now, our system is even more
complicated than most of those in that the federal, state, and
local setup is uniquely hard to compromise, but we take great
heart from those examples.
Chairman Hall. I just--my time--I have 28 seconds that I
have used that I am not entitled to. I am going to stay with
the five minutes. But I am just wondering if we are going to be
forced to come back here 30 years from now and start all over
again. That is the thing that bothers me. And please don't be
alarmed by the absence of all these chairs here on both sides
because we are at a crucial time in Congress now and they have
other things to meet and I think it is a shame that they don't
get the benefit of seeing very valuable Americans as you three
when you come here to give your testimony. But we do have your
written testimony. It will be in the record. It will be there
forever and ever and they can avail themselves of that.
I yield back my time and I recognize Mrs. Johnson for her
five minutes or 10 minutes or whatever she wants to take.
Ms. Johnson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
As I have listened to the testimony, it appears that
whatever happened with Yucca Mountain, the capacity is just
about filled. This is my 20th year here and every year that I
have been here, there has been a big controversy over Yucca
Mountain until the last year or so. And so that within itself
has done something to quiet the people near Yucca Mountain. So
I think that because we are such a technological society now,
it is going to take involvement of stakeholders wherever it is
going to be placed. And I think that is what you are
recommending. It is not top-down but bottom-up.
Now, I live--my district has one, two, three--five
interstates crossing it: 30, 35, 45, 20, and 635. The whole
time this kept coming up in Congress, I got all kinds of
questions about what move it was going to take, what it was
going to do to the community. We probably did not do enough
public information. And so whatever happens to Yucca Mountain,
we have got to go forward. It is clear that we need to
establish some repositories. And so I am pleased that your
study does indicate that.
And you have also indicated I think that it is New Mexico
that has--where people really kind of came together and were
pleased that they were chosen. Was the difference that the
people were involved in making the decision or at least kept
informed the whole time the decision was being made?
General Scowcroft. It is my understanding that that was the
case. I hasten to say, though, it still took 20 years for the
WIPP thing to work out. But in a process--an iterative process
back and forth, which is what we recommend again--the local
communities, the state officials, and so on and the Federal
Government came to a conclusion which has worked remarkably
well.
Ms. Johnson. Thank you very much.
Dr. Lyons, what do you see as one of the--what do you think
about these major eight recommendations and has the Department
looked at them or attempted to educate or implement at all?
Mr. Lyons. We are just initiating a process within the
Administration to evaluate those eight recommendations. In
addition, the appropriations for fiscal year 2012, the report
language, requires a report back to Congress on the
Administration's strategy. As that is developed over the next 6
months, there certainly needs to be extensive discussion within
the Administration but also involving Congress and other
stakeholders because many of the recommendations from the
Commission are going to require Congressional action. So it is
going to have to be a coordinated effort over the next 6 months
looking at this excellent set of recommendations to see exactly
how selective ones of them can be translated into policy.
Ms. Johnson. Thank you. Now, on this revenue, this 27
billion in the fund is not accessible. What is the problem
there?
Mr. Lyons. Well, as the Commission outlines, there have
been a number of changes in how that fund is treated in
Congress and that fund is now subject to annual appropriations.
The Commissioners may want to go into more detail but that is
discussed in detail in the report.
Ms. Johnson. Thank you. Did you want--maybe I should just
go back and read the report in detail, but if you would like to
comment, I would appreciate it.
Mr. Meserve. Well, Mr.--Assistant Secretary Lyons has
outlined the situation accurately. There is accumulated total
that is in the waste fund of about $27 billion now, but it is
effectively inaccessible in that in order--the way the
accounting is done this money comes in every year, it is offset
against the deficit, and then money to go out to be spent has
to be appropriated in each year to DOE. And so you have a
problem that the money, that corpus, which has now grown very
large is just not available except through a burdensome
appropriation process. And the appropriations have been less
than the opprobrium has felt has needed over the years I should
add.
We do have some recommendations both short-term and long-
term as to how to address that question and that we proposed,
for example, in the short-term that the money submit to the
Treasury those amounts that would be--then be appropriated for
use against the funds is something that in fact the Congress
does with the NRC budget. And of course in the long term as
this new entity be formed would be created, the funds should be
made immediately available to them for their use.
Ms. Johnson. Thank you very much. My time has expired.
Chairman Hall. All right. We will alternate between the
majority and the minority, and being fair, I will start with
the majority. Ms. Biggert, I recognize you for five minutes.
Mrs. Biggert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
holding this important hearing today.
Fourteen years ago when I came to Congress, my first month
here I received a notice that President Clinton had shut down--
or taken $20 million out of what was then the reprocessing
cycle and that was before I could even pronounce metallurgical
and I had to get that money back, which I did. Now, the
recycling program was shut down, President Carter, and we have
been so far behind other countries now in what we are doing,
and I am really disappointed with the way that the recycling
was treated in the final report. And I would quote, ``We do not
believe that today's recycling technologies or new technology
developments in the next three to four decades will change the
underlying need for an integrated strategy that combines safe
storage of SNF with expeditious progress toward siting and
licensing and disposal facility or facilities.''
My concern is that we have wasted so much time with really
developing the recycling when talking about the sites, for
example, Yucca Mountain, that would be filled with the nuclear
waste that we have now. What a waste that is to allow--we put
the cart before the horse. Why don't we have the development of
the recycling so that we don't have as much waste? We don't--
the sites can be different. And instead, we want to just put it
in--there is so much--and it is fuel still wasted by putting it
into a permanent repository.
And Dr. Lyons, could you tell me if you agree with this
time estimate in the final report, the three, four decades that
we are going to wait? And we have to develop the fast reactor
and we put that aside really to have the recycling at its best.
I was just--I went to Morris, Illinois, where there is a
nuclear plant. Across the street is a reprocessing plant that
was shut down in the '70s and it sits there. It is like a time
warp. You go in--and of course they have removed most of the
equipment there, but here it is, just this building with
these--and it is used completely for storage, which is now
filled. It has been filled since the '80s and it sits there.
Sorry, I am getting off here, but could you talk to the decades
that won't make any difference with the recycling and the
underlying need?
Mr. Lyons. I thank you for the question. We do have an
extensive fuel cycle program that is looking at a wide range of
options. It is looking at everything from the once-through
cycle to the closed cycle that you describe. As we evaluate the
different fuel cycles, we are considering many different
parameters that need to go into such an evaluation. The
facility you mentioned in Morris used technologies that I doubt
would be found acceptable today from an environmental
standpoint, from a nonproliferation standpoint, quite probably
from a cost standpoint. But the national laboratories,
including Argonne very heavily, are directly involved in the
fuel cycle program as we work towards exploring alternatives
and understanding what those may be.
I think a key point which the Commission makes and it is
certainly an important point in my program is that we can use
dry cask storage to buy time to make the decision whether used
fuel should be treated as you suggested as a resource or should
be treated as a waste. Those are all elements of our program.
It is time consuming but it is a logically developed program
leading to solutions that we will eventually be bringing to
Congress for decisions.
Mrs. Biggert. And that timeline could be three, four
decades?
Mr. Lyons. It could be at least two or three decades as we
evaluate different technologies, go through pilot studies. Yes,
it could be that long. This would be an extremely important
decision.
Mrs. Biggert. And General Scowcroft, could you elaborate on
your position on this?
General Scowcroft. Yes, I would be happy to. There are two
aspects to it. First of all, we enthusiastically support
research and development both in reactor design and in
recycling and reprocessing aspects. What we say is that at the
current time, there is no recycling or reprocessing system
which will eliminate the need for waste--to deal with waste.
None of them do away with waste. They change the character of
it in a variety of ways. But that was what--our focus is not we
don't want to do recycling or anything. We agree that we should
look for better ways to utilize fuel. We use maybe one percent
of the energy value of the fuel we put in our reactor. That is
a waste. But what we are saying now, nothing that exists at the
present time will solve the problem of waste. All of them still
create waste.
Mrs. Biggert. Thank you. I yield back.
Chairman Hall. The gentlelady yields back.
I recognize the gentleman from California, Mr. McNerney,
for five minutes.
Mr. McNerney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank the witnesses for your service. This is a
bit of a thankless task and it is important, so I am glad that
you are all out there working on this.
Mr. Lyons, do you have a favorite--and I know this is
simplified; it depends on the nuclear reaction technology. But
do you have a favorite nuclear storage disposal technology that
you prefer?
Mr. Lyons. As I indicated, sir, in my mind the dry cask
storage gives us the opportunity to do additional research to
reach the conclusion that you are asking me for. I think it is
premature at this point to give you that answer.
Mr. McNerney. Okay, thank you. Well I am going to sort of
rehash Mrs. Biggert's question in a different form. Mr. Lyons,
do you believe that nuclear waste has an intrinsic future value
that would justify the cost of making nuclear waste retrievable
or should it just be permanent disposal?
Mr. Lyons. That is going to be a very important question
that is debated as the Administration and Congressional
strategy moves ahead. I don't know what the answer will be to
that and that needs substantial debate. I can argue on both
sides of that.
Mr. McNerney. Thank you.
General Scowcroft, could you recap for us the key issues
that led to past failures and what would lead to responsible
nuclear waste disposal policy today?
General Scowcroft. Well, in sum I think the difference
between what has been followed in the past and what we
recommend is the past was a top-down and it ended up we tried
to direct a solution to the problem on a particular site. What
we are suggesting is a process that goes from the bottom up. We
identify suitable areas and then work with local communities
and states to develop a consent-based process, you know,
providing for say--for example, research facilities which would
go along with a storage site to enable an answer to the
problems that Dr. Lyons suggested. These are the kinds of
things which we believe and which in the past have worked in
this country and overseas to develop people coming forward. And
in Sweden they were bidding for the right to host a site. So
that--so we are optimistic about that.
Mr. McNerney. So to what degree was that sort of approach
taken? Has that approach been taken at Yucca Mountain? Is it--I
mean there is some of that that has taken place but clearly it
is not enough.
General Scowcroft. Well, there was some at Yucca Mountain
but in the end the Congress decided that no other sites would
be considered and Yucca Mountain was it. The local communities,
the county communities surrounding Yucca Mountain are
supportive.
Mr. McNerney. Right.
General Scowcroft. The State as a whole is not and that is
where the deadlock came.
Mr. McNerney. Has that well been poisoned enough that Yucca
Mountain is basically not usable now or is there still enough
political goodwill to move forward with that site?
General Scowcroft. Well, I would just have to speak
personally there, but my sense is that if our recommendations
are implemented, that Yucca site can be a--the Yucca Mountain
facility can be a part of this consent-based agreement.
Mr. McNerney. Good.
General Scowcroft. And if the communities concerned can
agree, yes, it could be.
Mr. McNerney. Thank you.
Mr. Meserve, why should the government continue to invest
in development of new nuclear technologies when it has been in
the commercial arena for 50 years already?
Mr. Meserve. Well, it is in fact the case that we have
currently deployed plants that have been in existence for some
time, but this is a technology that is a complicated technology
in which there are opportunities still for advances that will
enhance safety, will enhance efficiency, will enhance
stability--sustainability of the system and so this is--we are
not at the end of the road on this and these are hugely
expensive technologically sophisticated matters in which
involvement by the Federal Government has traditionally been
very important and I believe that will remain so in the future.
Mr. McNerney. Thank you.
I yield.
Chairman Hall. I thank the gentleman for staying within the
five minutes.
At this time, I recognize Mr. Fleischmann, the gentleman
from Tennessee. And I want to thank you, Congressman, for my
visit to Oak Ridge. That is the site of where the Manhattan
Project was launched long before you were born. And some of us
at that table and I remember that. And they had a computer
simulation of a nuclear reactor at Oak Ridge there. That is a
step in the right direction. I recognize you for five minutes
and thank you for your service.
Mr. Fleischmann. Yes, sir, and thank you, Mr. Chairman, for
your visit. Appreciate that very much. And gentleman, thank you
all for being here today.
I am Chuck Fleischmann. I represent the third district of
Tennessee and that has got all of Oak Ridge, ORNL, Y-12, and
the great history that the Chairman alluded to and a great
future. And I have enjoyed working with DOE.
In regard to this issue, I want to thank you all for your
commitment to the research and development, the SMRs. I think
that is critically important to our future. I do think that
nuclear is an important part of our all-of-the-above energy
policy and I want to see that move forward.
To touch on some of the issues that both my Republican and
Democratic colleagues have touched on, though, I do have some
questions about this reprocessing issue. General, I do
understand that with all--as you have said, with all processes
there is going to be some waste, but it appears to me that
other countries have a vigorous reprocessing program already in
place, and I would like to ask all three of you all if I may,
why are there impediments? Why are we talking possibly a decade
or two decades before we can make a decision? It is my
understanding that over 90 percent of the fuel can be
reprocessed. Where are the impediments, gentlemen?
General Scowcroft. Well, Mr. Fleischmann, there are
countries who reprocess. They do not reprocess to eliminate
waste and certainly don't reprocess to save money. There are
other objectives to reprocessing like to separate elements of
the fuel cycle which can be dangerous in terms of
nonproliferation and so I think we are focused on the waste but
in the background is the whole issue of nonproliferation in
which we feel the United States has to be a leader. We do
believe that reprocessing has a future or we would not be
pushing R&D for it, but what we really say is that at the
present time, there is no kind of reprocessing which eliminates
the need which we are designed to study that is permanent
depository for some of the results.
Mr. Fleischmann. Thank you.
Mr. Meserve?
Mr. Meserve. I might just add that as the General has
indicated that you don't fundamentally change the waste
problem. You still have waste you have to deal with. Regardless
of whether you reprocess or not, you are going to need a
disposal facility. What has fundamentally changed over the
years is I think a lot of the initial interest in reprocessing
and recycling was the belief that we had limited uranium
supplies and that it was going to be necessary to recycle to
extend the resource. That may prove true in the long-term, that
there is value in being very conservative in our use of
resources. But at the present time, most studies that have
examined this have determined that the cost of doing the
reprocessing is excessive as compared to just mining uranium
and doing a once-through fuel cycle. It has turned out that
there is a lot more uranium than people had known at the time
the Morris facility was constructed, for example.
And so that there is not the economic incentive to
proceed, which I think is--there is nothing--there is no
barrier today from a private company to come forward and go to
the NRC and say they want to build a reprocessing facility.
They can do it. There is no interest that I am aware of in
doing that just because the economics don't justify it.
Mr. Fleischmann. Thank you.
Mr. Lyons?
Mr. Lyons. I would agree with the comments made by my
colleagues that certainly one needs to evaluate the
nonproliferation and the environmental aspects as well as the
economic. And as Dr. Meserve just indicated, those economics
hinge quite a bit on the availability of long-term uranium
supplies. One of the research programs in which Oak Ridge is
leading is the extraction of uranium from sea water. Whether
that will prove to possible economically, I don't know, but
that work is going to play a significant role in determining
whether the economics of the overall system are going to
dictate--I think probably be decades from now--a decision that
reprocessing will be driven by the need to better use the
resource or whether there will be sufficient low-cost uranium
to ensure a future as long as we see that it will be needed. So
those are major questions.
Mr. Fleischmann. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman Hall. The gentleman yields back.
At this time I recognize--here we go again--Ms. Edwards
from Maryland.
Ms. Edwards. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am going to take
that as a compliment.
And thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony today.
I want to actually explore this idea of consent-based
approach to siting because it does seem to me that under--in
your discussion, General Scowcroft, you say that the first
requirement in siting is to--obviously to demonstrate adequate
protection for public health, safety, and environment. We can
probably all agree with that. But then you go to the next sort
of threshold which is finding sites where all affected units of
government, including the host state or tribe regional and
local authorities--that is a lot of government--and the
community are willing to accept a facility that has proved. And
that has proved exceptionally difficult. Using that sort of
basic criterion, don't you think that in any case, even in a
next evaluation, that Yucca Mountain would actually fail that
test?
General Scowcroft. Well, I think the way it appears at the
present, yes, because there has been no indication that the
elements necessary--community and state--can come to an
agreement. But in a consent process and in a discussion of what
the benefits might be back and forth, that could change. So I--
and I would not rule it out.
Ms. Edwards. Thank you very much.
And then I want to ask, it seems to me, Dr. Lyons, when you
discussed dry cask storage, that that really is just kind of a
holding pattern, right? It is not by any stretch of the
imagination a long-term solution. And I wonder whether we need
to give a bit of a reality check from the Commission's
recommendation that somehow in 6 months that the Department of
Energy is going to be able to come up with that long-term
solution even given your fine recommendations.
Mr. Lyons. Well, you are certainly correct, Representative,
that dry cask storage is not a long-term solution. It is
certainly not a final solution; it is not a permanent solution.
We have research programs underway that will help to define how
long dry cask storage can be safely used and that will be very
important in determining the time frame that we have for
evaluating other alternatives. But in the meantime, we have the
waste confidence decision of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
that provides for dry cask storage 60 years beyond the end of
the existing license for a location. So that gives us
significant amount of time for research. How much longer than
60 years it may be possible to extend, that will be the basis
of our research.
I also--you questioned whether within six months we would
have a final path forward. I think the best we can do is
following the guidance of the BRC, set ourselves on a path
which they described as certainly consent-based but also
flexible, also adaptive. Going into both the flexibility and
the adaptability are going to be questions like how long can
you use the dry casks? What progress are we making on
reprocessing technologies? And all those I think will play
together in finding an eventual path forward for the Nation's
used nuclear fuel but I think we need to start.
Ms. Edwards. Thank you. And Chairman----
Mr. Meserve. May I just----
Ms. Edwards. Absolutely.
Mr. Meserve. --add a though here is that we are going to be
storing this material anyway. I mean we aren't going to have a
disposal site regardless of what happens to Yucca Mountain that
can take this fuel, so we are going to have--we have 65,000
metric tons of this stuff that is sitting out there and it is
going to be sitting there for many decades. The question that
we raise, the storage is going to happen. The question is where
is it going to happen? At the moment, it is all disposed of at
the sites of the facilities, and we have 10 sites around the
country where the facility is gone, the plant is gone, the
people want to use this land, it is valuable land, and what we
have there are dry casks with a lot of guards standing around
them watching them. We think that there are benefits in moving
this material to free up that land; it is an equity
consideration. It also could save money in that that security
is expensive and you could consolidate it to save money. And it
gives you lots of other advantages in terms of pursuing the
R&D, creates a buffer capacity when you actually have a
disposal site. You can receive fuel independently of whether a
disposal site is ready to accept it, repackage it if you need
to. There is lots of flexibility that it gives you if you were
to have such a capacity.
Ms. Edwards. And I have run out of time. At some point, I
would love to have an answer to the question about the new
organization that you propose in this environment in which
there is not a lot of new organizations being proposed and how
we would make sure that we pay for that. I presume, Mr.
Chairman, that that would come from the annual fees that we
collect that seem to go into the general fund.
And with that, Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Chairman Hall. And I meant it as a compliment to you. I
learn more from your questions than I do from a lot of the
answers. And I will yield you a little more time if you want to
ask that question.
Ms. Edwards. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And if you all could
respond to that because I do think that the question of a new
organization and whether--is that because of a lack of
confidence in the Department of Energy that you need something
new and independent as an organization? And then it would have
to be stood up in addition to the array of responsibilities
that you indicated.
Mr. Meserve. Our recommendation is not intended to be a
slap at the Department of Energy. It has succeeded with the
WIPP site. The challenge we see is that this is going to be a
long-term problem that has to be dealt with over perhaps
centuries that you need a continuity and a focus to that, that
it has to be achieved over time and we think that can be best
done by a separate organization that has that as its business.
The Department of Energy, the reality is is that you have
changes of administrations, changes of officials, you know, in
a period of perhaps four or eight years and so you don't have
that continuity of the management and you have the deflected of
many other issues that they have to deal with. And so I think
having the necessary focus is one that argues for and justifies
setting up this entity that has that as its business and it is
set up to serve that sole function.
It would require and we do recommend making sure that the
funds that have been dedicated to go for this function, they
are available to them independent of an appropriation process.
Chairman Hall. Do you yield back?
Ms. Edwards. I do, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Hall. I thank you for that.
At this time I recognize Mr. Benishek, the gentleman from
Michigan.
Mr. Benishek. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the
gentlemen being here on the panel and I have really been
enjoying all the questions. It is a great--this bipartisan
participation.
As you may know, I represent Michigan's first district. We
have Big Rock Point, which there is--we have a photo of here
which is one of the decommissioned plants that has actually
been decommissioned in 1997 and then for the last 15 years has
been sitting there with these dry casks. And the site
originally took up about 400 acres and now there is 300 acres
that have been returned to their natural state, but
unfortunately, there is these eight casks of 19 feet tall and
160 tons that don't have a home. And it is costing us millions
of dollars a year to protect that site. And I know that we
can't make it disappear but, you know, I am a little frustrated
over the fact that there is a lot of talk and there doesn't
seem to be much action. And how soon are we going to get going
on this plan to site this? I mean are we talking to communities
already? I mean we seem to have an idea of how to do this, you
know, the eight points in the--you know, from below up, getting
everybody involved but I kind of share Mr. Hall's concern that
we sort of have done this a little bit and, you know, the state
changed their mind or, you know, political considerations have
taken place and, you know, my district has got these eight
casks and there is lots of other places around the country that
are the same. So what can we do this year, Mr. Meserve?
Mr. Meserve. Well, I do think that there are some things
that we can do that are productive. We can start the process--
the Department could start the process of trying to engage with
communities to try to identify interest in being able to
proceed. There is a possible barrier that is created by present
law that--the law that governs Yucca Mountain, the same statute
provided that there would not be an opportunity to create a
storage location until there was a license for a disposal site.
I think the thought on the Congress was--is that people might
just grab the storage site and not proceed with the disposal
site which we obviously have to do and that we are afraid it
would disrupt a program that--leading towards creation of a
disposal site. And I can't comment on what the thought of the
Congress was at the time that this provision was put in place
but I believe that was what was underway.
So that there are some needs that are squarely within the
jurisdiction of this body to try to help the very legitimate
concern that your community feels about having this site with a
deal that they made to have a nuclear power plant there but not
to be a long-term site that was holding this fuel with land
that could well be used for much more valuable purposes.
Mr. Benishek. It was on the shore of Lake Michigan for
crying out loud.
Mr. Lyons, you have an idea it sounds like.
Mr. Lyons. Well, the point I would like to make, Mr.
Benishek, to follow on the point that Dr. Meserve made is
really what he was discussing is why in my remarks I emphasized
that as we work towards preparing for Congress an
Administration strategy which is due within 6 months, it can't
be just the Administration. There is going to have to be close
cooperation with Congress as we work together towards a package
that can lead towards a future to address the concerns that you
are describing. But just as Dr. Meserve described, creating the
site that you would like us to create is blocked by the Nuclear
Waste Policy Act and that is just an example of why working
together is essential.
Mr. Benishek. Can't we be doing all these things at the
same time? I mean that is what I am--you know, can't we be
searching for sites, you know, coming up for licenses, working
out a plan instead of like doing one thing and then the other?
I mean I want to know what I can do to make this process go
forward and I would be happy to try to address this legislation
that you are talking about. I mean I just need some ideas.
Mr. Meserve. Well, I think there is a chicken-and-egg
problem here in that I don't think--it may be very difficult to
have a community agree to have a storage site without them
having some confidence whether it is just going to be a storage
site. It is not going to be a site where this material is going
to sit indefinitely. And so I think that we do emphasize in one
of our strong recommendations is that we ought to proceed with
all speed to try to identify a disposal site, and having that
program in place we hope would be reassuring to a community
that would contemplate a storage site and they could have some
confidence that the material having moved there wasn't going to
mean it stayed there forever.
And of course it could be that the storage site is the
disposal site. We don't foreclose that option, but I think
there is a lot of flexibility that has to exist and work that
this entity that we describe would pursue to try to find a
willing community to be able to take these sites.
Mr. Benishek. Thank you. I think my time is up but I am
looking forward in this Committee to be working on legislation
to try to make this process move faster. Thank you.
Chairman Hall. I thank you and I thank you for your
questions.
The General mentioned community support. I might mention
community opposition, too, is pretty strong and maybe, Mr.
Benishek, if you were present in the Senate, we might get that
spent fuel moved a little bit quicker. You may be thinking
about that some.
At this time I recognize the gentlelady from California,
Ms. Lofgren, for five minutes.
Ms. Lofgren. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think this is
a very important and useful hearing. And as I listen--and I
guess it is easy for me to say I don't have a nuclear power
plant in my district, I don't have spent fuel in my district,
so I am looking not from a district point of view but just what
is the Nation going to do? And I am mindful as we discuss these
matters, it is very difficult for us to overtly say we don't
know anything like what we are going to know later. I mean if
you think about who won the Nobel Prize in 1912, it will Nils
Gustaf Dalen, and do you know what he won it for? It was for a
flash controller so that the gas lights could be turned off at
night. That was the hot technology 100 years ago. And so to
think that we have all of the information and technology and
science that we are going to have to deal with this I think is
just not likely. It is not likely. And so I am very interested
in the dry cask storage opportunities. I don't know as much as
I would like to know about that and it sounds like, Dr. Lyons,
that maybe none of us knows all that we would like to know
about that. How resistant is that storage to pilfering? I mean
what is the nonproliferation implication for that storage mode?
How long can it safely be contained and have we looked at not
just the containment but also the geologic conditions of each
site? Because I think those are critical elements in deciding
what to do. I think sometimes deciding proactively not to act
may be the most responsible thing to do. Every time you move
something, you open up risk to accident, to terrorism and the
like, so I think those things need to be balanced, the movement
versus the in place. And I am wondering do we have that kind of
comprehensive analysis going on on the dry cask storage to let
us know how much time do we have or can we buy for the
scientific world to move forward?
Mr. Lyons. Well, if I could offer several points of view on
that very excellent question, I might note for starters that
any dry cask storage site is licensed by the NRC, so questions
that you addressed such as the security, such as the geologic
stability, those would all have to be part of the evaluation by
the NRC before the dry cask storage site was authorized. Of
course to the extent that is at a reactor site or former
reactor site, those same questions were asked with regard to--
--
Ms. Lofgren. If I may, in California we call nuclear
reactors a way to discover previously undiscovered earthquake
faults.
Mr. Lyons. I probably shouldn't comment on that. You raised
a very, very important point that is very prominent in our
thinking about the potential risks of handling and re-handling
used fuel. One of the areas that we are starting in now on a
program which certainly fits in with some of the BRC
suggestions is the need to try to move towards a standardized
cask system. The casks that are in place, for example, your
colleague's Big Rock Point, are not exactly transportable and
they would be--at some of the sites, cask configurations have
been used that will require exactly what you said, of
repackaging in order to transport. We need to start--and my
program is starting--a program to work towards standardized
systems that would look at casks that can be used not only for
storage but also eventually for transportation and disposal.
And that minimizes exactly the point you were making. The fewer
the number of times you handle that fuel, the better off
everyone is. So that is very much a part of our research
program.
Ms. Lofgren. I would just close by--my time is almost out
but--by noting that given how much more our--we will know in
100 years than we know today and that the half-life of some of
the components are in the thousands of years, it seems to me
not irresponsible to try and preserve this situation for that
to occur. If we had had the 1912 technology insisted upon at
that time, we would have a very different society today. I--you
know, I am just anxious that whatever we do, we don't foreclose
the options--you know, the idea that we would bury waste
because it is a problem when in fact it may be an opportunity I
think in 100 years or in 200 years is very much in my mind as
we look at this issue and I hope that we can bring that
perspective to it.
And Mr. Chairman, my time has expired.
Chairman Hall. I thank you for your time. I don't think I
can make another 100 years but we will take a shot at it.
At this time I recognize Congressman Mo Brooks from Alabama
for five minutes.
Mr. Brooks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I appreciate you all being here today with your testimony.
Out of curiosity, do any of you all know how much this report
cost the taxpayers of America?
General Scowcroft. About $10 million to the two-year study.
Mr. Brooks. All right, thank you. About $10 million. In
looking at it, Mr. Scowcroft, I am looking at some of your
testimony. It says--and I am going to quote from it on page 2--
``what we have found is that our Nation's failure to come to
grips with the nuclear waste issue has proved damaging and
costly. It will be even more damaging and more costly the
longer it continues damaging the prospects for maintaining a
potentially important energy supply option for the future. This
failure is also costly to utility ratepayers who continue to
pay for a nuclear waste management solution that is yet to be
delivered, and to U.S. taxpayers, who face billions in
liabilities as a result of the failure to meet federal waste
management commitments.'' And then it adds, ``the need for a
new strategy is urgent.'' How much time have we already spent
on Yucca Mountain? Do any of you all know offhand?
General Scowcroft. Twenty-five years?
Mr. Meserve. The process that started with Yucca Mountain
was about 1982 when the Nuclear Waste Policy Act was initially
passed and--so it was selected by the Congress in 1987.
Mr. Brooks. So we have been at it basically for a quarter
of a century.
General Scowcroft. Um-hum.
Mr. Brooks. And how many tens of billions of dollars have
we already invested in Yucca Mountain?
General Scowcroft. About 15.
Mr. Brooks. About 15 billion. And how much do you
anticipate we would have to invest in some other site? Ten,
fifteen billion starting from scratch? Twenty billion? Thirty?
General Scowcroft. Could be.
Mr. Brooks. Could be higher? Going to what I found really
interesting about your report, it says that the solution to
this site location problem is to get local communities to
consent and I was very much enamored with that conclusion but
on page VIII of the report, it adds, ``finding sites where all
effective units of government, including the host state or
tribe, regional and local authorities, and the host community
are willing to support or at least accept a facility has proved
exceptionally difficult. And if anything, that is probably an
understatement. Out of curiosity, are any of you aware of any
communities that are both environmentally acceptable and secure
wherein the cities, counties, and states that would be impacted
have said yes, we would accept a nuclear depository of the
magnitude that we have discussed in this hearing today?
General Scowcroft. I would point to the WIPP facility in
New Mexico.
Mr. Brooks. Well, is that of the same scope and magnitude
of what we would need?
General Scowcroft. We visited the WIPP site and there was
great enthusiasm for proceeding and expanding the site to
include storage facilities. So that gave us a great deal of
optimism.
Mr. Brooks. So is it your position that the WIPP site in
New Mexico--would all the communities involved, including the
state government, would be more than willing to accept itself
as a depository for all of our nuclear waste that we are
talking about not going to Yucca. Is that what you are saying?
General Scowcroft. No, I am not saying that. What I am
saying is that the WIPP process and the way it is operating now
I would point to as a success story.
Mr. Brooks. That is a success story and that is, as I
understand it, transuranic----
General Scowcroft. Yes, it is.
Mr. Brooks. --material?
General Scowcroft. It is. It is solely defense waste. It is
not spent fuel.
Mr. Brooks. Did you all spend any time considering other
options other than seeking consent which your own report says
would be very difficult to obtain such as changing the laws
that enable communities around the country to go to court and
delay the process almost indefinitely--or in this case years if
not decades?
General Scowcroft. I don't know. I don't know whether we
discussed----
Mr. Brooks. I mean you are talking about a situation that
your own report says is urgent.
General Scowcroft. Yes.
Mr. Brooks. And we have already spent over $10 billion by
your own testimony on Yucca Mountain.
Mr. Meserve. Well, let me--perhaps I should intervene
here----
General Scowcroft. Yeah, go ahead.
Mr. Meserve. --if you would like me to. We have a wide
array of laws that involve public involvement and I would think
they would be outraged if we were to somehow circumvent, for
example, requirements that you have environmental impact
statements that involve public output which give you
opportunities for judicial review, have all NRC and regulatory
requirement process that at its core involves a large amount of
public involvement with opportunity for review in the courts.
And so I would seriously question whether a cram-down solution
would likely to be, first of all, consistent with the way we
have handled difficult issues in our country over the years.
Mr. Brooks. Well, outside this one site in New Mexico, are
you familiar with one place in the country where the consent
option has worked, where they have come forth?
Mr. Meserve. Well, I think WIPP is----
Mr. Brooks. Well, I said with that one exception.
General Scowcroft. I don't know that we have tried it
anywhere else.
Mr. Meserve. Well, let me say that there are--you know, you
have all kinds of waste that people have to deal with that you
have hazardous waste, you have low-level waste sites that have
been difficult to establish sites but there have been some
successes. And so I wouldn't say that it is necessarily in this
country impossible to locate a site that may not be necessarily
at first blush attractive. And what that has to involve is
providing some incentives of various kinds to the communities,
which is what happened with WIPP, what happens with many of
these other sites. And eventually you may get total agreement
but at least acquiescence. And that is enough. This--no one is
denying that it is not going to be--that it will be easy to
have a consent-based process but we have an example, of course,
in Yucca Mountain where we tried something entirely different
and it just hasn't worked.
Mr. Brooks. Well, the Chairman has allowed me a little bit
of extra time so I will conclude with this last question. I
agree with you it is wonderful if we can get communities,
cities, counties, and states to consent for a location that is
environmentally sound and also secure for national security
reasons, but what is your Plan B if we don't get that consent?
General Scowcroft. We don't have a Plan B because we do
believe that in this process--this is a political process and
you are the political experts; we are not. But in looking at
what has worked and what hasn't worked, there is no magic thing
that you can wave a wand and say everything is perfect, let's
go. It is fundamentally a political process. What we said in
our looking at the country and around the world that this
process is the only one which has allowed political entities to
move forward. And so we are optimistic that it can work. But it
is not going to be an immediate solution; it is going to take
time. It is--and we say it has to be adaptive. As we move
forward, we have to try different things, different incentives
for communities to move forward. But this is not alien to you.
You do it on prisons, you do it on different kinds of--there
are all kinds of disagreeable things that can be made agreeable
under certain conditions.
Mr. Brooks. Well, I thank you for your insight and your
candor and my time has well expired.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the additional time.
Chairman Hall. Thank you for the good questions. Another
reason I think that safety review ought to be released.
I now recognize Mr. Lipinski, the gentleman from Illinois.
Mr. Lipinski. Thank you, Chairman Hall. Thank you for
holding this hearing on this important issue. I want to also
thank the BRC for your work and I know, General Scowcroft, you
certainly know a lot about politics, not just us up here. You
certainly do know a lot about it.
And I am a strong supporter of nuclear energy and I think
that we have to embrace nuclear energy, but that doesn't mean
we are ignoring the issues that are involved, so I think that
this--the BRC's report is very important.
One thing that I want to raise, I was pleased that the
BRC's final report recognizes the importance of transportation,
where transportation is going to come in linking the storage of
nuclear waste if we were going to be moving the waste from
where we are storing it onsite right now. One question I would
want to ask is what would you recommend that this Committee or
the Transportation Committee--which I also sit on--do or that
Congress does in order to right now address this issue of
transportation? Because as I said, I think we need to embrace
nuclear energy. My State of Illinois certainly has. But I think
we have to make sure that we are doing all we can to address
the important issues of waste and what we are going to do with
that waste. So where does transportation come in and what do
you think Congress should be doing right now to help address
that?
General Scowcroft. Transportation is a very important part
of all this. When we issued our first draft of our report for
public comment, we did not have transportation as one of the
eight elements. The comment showed a deep concern about
transportation issues and so we gave that more consideration
than we had in our initial study. It is extremely important.
The experience we have is very encouraging. The system which,
again, back to the WIPP facility, it draws its waste from a
variety of areas around the West. The system has worked very
well and there has not been a serious accident at all. But what
we--what they have developed gradually is a process where the
Western Governors Association has supervised it and they have
alerted all of the fire departments and so on along the way so
that if there is an accident, they are prepared to deal with
the particular aspects of that accident and not say oh, my
goodness, what do we do now? So that is a process we think is
one of the first things that needs to be done. And that is to
educate the states and entities about the process of
transportation. We think it is a manageable problem.
Mr. Lipinski. Mr. Meserve, do you have any further comments
or----
Mr. Meserve. Well, I--the only thing I would say to
supplement General Scowcroft's comments is that there are some
things that need to be done by the relevant regulatory agencies
to bring the requirements up to date. That is not--that is
something they have authority to do already. In order to--the
area--one area where it does seem to me in transportation where
there are some opportunities for Congressional action is that
in order to have the kinds of relationships that one would hope
would have between the federal aspirations for transport and
the state and local officials is to make sure that you have
training programs, educational programs, outreach programs that
enable the interaction of those people so that they become
knowledgeable and develop the capacities to deal with
situations that they might confront. That requires funding. And
there is some funding that has been part of the WIPP facility
to allow that kind of training to occur and we would recommend
that similar capacities model basically on what Congress has
done with regard to funding for transportation for WIPP be
something that be embodied for dealing with affected local and
state officials that will have to be a part of a process of a
major transport campaign.
The initial problem is you don't know where the stuff is
going of course until you have a disposal site----
Mr. Lipinski. Um-hum.
Mr. Meserve. --or a storage facility, but you should know
where it is coming from. So you have some communities you know
you have to be dealing with. And so you can start this process
now and it is going to take time.
Mr. Lipinski. Okay, thank you. And as a lot of good
questions asked earlier, I know Mrs. Biggert especially raised
the advanced fuel cycles R&D going on and it was brought up
about the great work going on at Argon and hopefully we can
continue to--when we talk about funding properly--fund that
also.
I yield back.
Chairman Hall. And I thank you.
At this time, I recognize the gentleman from California,
Mr. Rohrabacher.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
General and Dr. Meserve, you mentioned in your joint
testimony that deep geological disposal is the scientific-
preferred approach and this has been reached by every expert
panel that has looked into this issue and every other country
pursuing a nuclear waste management approach. Let me remind
everyone that in 1957, which was before this Science Committee
ever existed, the National Academy of Sciences recommended that
deep burial of nuclear waste, that that would be the way we
solve this problem. In 1982, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act made
that national policy. Now, those dates may seem--General, you
are a little bit older than I am and I am----
General Scowcroft. A lot.
Mr. Rohrabacher. --getting to be older myself. Those don't
seem so long ago to you but in fact that is a long time ago.
And we are still talking about putting waste in a hole. That is
a--we are talking 30, 40 years ago and yet we have this Blue
Ribbon panel to tell us something that was a solution 30 or 40
years ago. Haven't we progressed? Hasn't there been new
technology? Well, there has been. Secretary Chu mentioned and
this Blue Ribbon Commission and of course he said that in
referring to this, we realize that we know a lot more today
than we did 25 or 30 years ago. We will be assembling a Blue
Ribbon panel to look at this issue. We are looking at reactors
that have a high energy neuron spectrum that can actually allow
you to burn down the long-lived waste. These are fast neutron
reactors. We have spent $15 billion, you want to spend billions
of dollars more in order to develop a plan of putting this in a
hole and we don't even know if we can get anybody to agree to
allow the hole to be near their community, yet we now have
companies that are capable of building these fast neutron
design reactors, Toshiba's 4S, GE's PRISM reactor, General
Atomics' EM2 reactor. All of these can take the waste that we
are talking about and burn it as fuel. Up to 97 percent of it
will be burned as part of the process and eliminate the need
for spending all of this money putting things in holes. Now,
how much money have we spent in the last year on nuclear power
research? I guess that should go to you, Mr. Secretary.
Mr. Lyons. Yes, we have a program on reactor technologies
and that is in the last year in the order of 150 million.
Mr. Rohrabacher. All right. How much did we spend on
nuclear energy research?
Mr. Lyons. Nuclear energy research? Our total budget is of
the order of 800 million and about half of that is research.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Now, I have had meetings with people who
told me that the biggest stumbling block--and they could have
been building these reactors which would have eliminated this
problem--that the biggest stumbling block is the first $100
million because they have to have the blueprints and that is a
risk factor in putting together the entire project. And it
costs about $100 million. So we have spent billions of dollars
figuring out how to put something in a hole but our government
hasn't been willing to put out that $100 million that would
permit the private sector to spend the money necessary to solve
this problem.
You know, to say that this is frustrating on this side of
the questions is to put it mildly and there have been people
debating it--I have been advocating this and I know these
companies that I have been talking to for at least five years,
this is not a secret that we can burn 97 percent of the waste
instead of--as the General pointed out--1 percent of the waste
which our current system does. You know, we are talking about
transportation, all these issues about transportation of the
waste, that won't even be a problem if we burn up 97 percent of
it. It will be a miniscule problem. Yet we can't get ourselves
and the Department of Energy to put out the money for that one
roadblock. Now, if they told me that--if these companies have
told me that that $100 million is what is a stumbling block to
developing this revolutionary new approach which would solve
this problem, well, then I am sure they have told you. So why
haven't we financed that?
Mr. Lyons. Again, Mr. Rohrabacher, we do have programs
looking at advanced concepts. You have described a number of
advanced concepts. Some of them require at least several
miracles before they will be able to be fielded. Some of the
suggestions you have made involve advanced materials that
simply don't exist.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Yeah, one of the miracles is getting the
bureaucracy to get off their butt. That is one of the miracles
that we are going to have to have to have these reactors. Now,
we are going to have study after study, Blue Ribbon Commission
after Blue Ribbon Commission and we are going to end up talking
about spending $15 billion putting nuclear waste into a hole
which we could have done 15, 20, 40 years ago. This is
upsetting.
The bureaucracy, Mr. Chairman, is getting in the way of us
moving forward. Those companies have not given me that word,
that they have to have miracles in order to build it. They have
told me they are ready to build now if they could get over this
$100 million hump. I suggest, Mr. Chairman, that we make this a
priority in this country and quit pouring money down a rat hole
that we don't need to have. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Hall. Do you yield back?
Mr. Rohrabacher. Yes, I do.
Chairman Hall. And I thank you.
At this time, I recognize Dr. Harris, who himself as a
Subcommittee Chairman has received publicity recently by simply
insisting on the rules being carried out and I admire you for
that. I was proud to support you.
Dr. Harris. Well, thank you, Mr.----
Chairman Hall. I recognize you for five minutes.
Dr. Harris. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me just
concentrate on one aspect of the report and that is this idea
of the consolidated storage facilities because you make a
recommendation that one or more consolidated storage
facilities--ideally, how many storage facilities--consolidated
storage facilities would it take to handle the continual flow
of nuclear waste in the country? Just because it says one or
more but if it becomes one then kind of morph into a
repository. How many do you envision?
Mr. Meserve. There is no technical limit that would
constrain the volume of waste that was stored at a facility. It
would depend on the particulars of the situation, but we
certainly would have locations in the United States where all
of the material could be stored. I think that the idea of
possibly having multiple storage sites is to reflect some of
the transportation issues. It might be nice to have one in the
East, one in the West, possibly some equity issues. There may
be a community that doesn't want to have all the materials in
its--at its storage site. So that there are--there may be--as
you point out, there may be some reasons why you would want to
just have one but we didn't see the reason necessarily to
foreclose the possibility that there could be several.
Dr. Harris. Now, but the structure you have set up and the
recommendation is that what we ought to do is we ought to go
ahead with this consolidation facility but in a parallel course
go ahead with a repository. But if you are only going to go
ahead with one consolidation facility--and let us bring to mind
the history of the handling of nuclear waste--we have gone into
communities and said take our nuclear--take a nuclear reactor,
don't worry, the waste won't be there forever because we will
handle it. The Federal Government will come in. Don't worry,
the Federal Government will handle it. We never have handled
it. Now, we are going to come into a community and say let's
build a new facility; this one we are going to call a
consolidated waste facility and don't worry, we are going to--
it is not going to be there forever; it is going to go to this
repository. Given the track record, how in the world are we
going to convince the community to build a consolidation
facility? And it begs the question, why don't you just go to a
repository? I mean it seems that what you are building is a
functional de facto--except for the geology--a repository
potentially because that is--let's face it, that is basically
what our old nuclear plants have become. They have become de
facto repositories.
Mr. Meserve. I think you are quite correct. There will be a
challenge in establishing a storage facility in a situation
where the people don't believe that they will inevitably be a
disposal facility. And that is why I think these things have to
go in parallel so that there is--for those communities that are
concerned about the long-term possibility that the material
would be there effectively forever would have some assurance
that the material could move. It will be easier in terms of
licensing to establish a storage facility than a disposal
facility. That could move forward faster but there will
definitely be a challenge in dealing with the opposition. Of
course, the community that was interested in having a disposal
facility might well be very happy to be a storage facility in
the interim.
Dr. Harris. And that is exactly my point, that absent what
my colleague from Alabama suggested, two recommendations on how
to deal with this issue of not-in-my-backyard because I will
tell you, I can't imagine a community saying, you know, sure,
you know, build the disposal facility. We don't want the
repository because, again, the record of the Federal Government
is we have turned even just reactors into repositories long-
term. So why the hesitance to actually make recommendations--I
am looking through here--as to how we can actually make the
process work faster and better with regards to licensed--
because let's face it, the hold up on the licensing has always
been local issues. That is basically it. The other ones are,
you know, are solvable. I don't see anything in here other than
to just say well, make sure the communities approve it.
Anything else that will move this forward? Is there--am I
missing something? Is there something here that says this is a
strategy to get these into communities?
General Scowcroft. Well, I think one of the--WIPP we have
used to great advantage as an example.
Dr. Harris. And WIPP is a repository, is that correct?
General Scowcroft. It is a repository.
Dr. Harris. Okay.
General Scowcroft. It is a repository. And it is working
very well and the local communities around the repository have
actually gone out and leased land which they hope to be used
for a storage facility because they would like to expand their
participation in this program. Now, that is one community but
it doesn't take many communities to deal with this whole thing.
Dr. Harris. And one final question if I might, Mr.
Chairman. You suggest that there should be some governmental
chartered organization to kind of look over all these things
and I assume you mean to look over the contained--I am sorry--
consolidated storage facilities as well. Have--since the
private sector runs most of the power plants themselves, has
the option been considered of letting the private sector
perhaps build and run and just get license to have a storage
facility--consolidated storage facility? Does it necessarily
have to be government-run or could it just be government-
licensed, let the private sector deal with the issue?
General Scowcroft. It doesn't necessarily have to be
government-run. It was our conclusion that a federal
corporation was the best compromise because we think that the
whole issue of nuclear material has a national security aspect
and a proliferation aspect to it that means that the government
has to be more involved than simply turning it over to private
industry.
Dr. Harris. Okay. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Hall. I thank you and recognize Ms. Johnson if she
wants to make any type of a final statement--not final but for
today. I don't like this finality idea. I don't even like to
hear an airport considered a terminal. Go ahead now.
Ms. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I simply want to once again thank all of you for the work
and time that you put into these studies and to simply share
with you an article that came out recently that reported
several of the candidates for President. Former Speaker
Gingrich said ``any deal that is reached must be agreed by the
local, state, and federal officials and founded on sound
science.'' Former Governor Romney, ``no state should be forced
to accept the Nation's nuclear waste against its will.'' And
Congressman Paul says, ``as a Member of Congress, I have always
voted against forcing people in Nevada to use Yucca Mountain as
a nuclear waste storage site. As President, I will work with
the Nevada officials to ensure that whatever is done with Yucca
Mountain reflects the wishes of the people of Nevada.'' Now, I
only quote that because all these people want to be our next
President because it reinforces what your study shows, that it
has got to start bottom up rather than top down.
So thank you very much. Thanks to all of you for being here
this morning.
Ms. Edwards. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman Hall. Who seeks recognition? The gentlelady.
Ms. Edwards. I would just ask on the record there have been
a number of issues raised during this hearing and particularly
by Mr. Rohrabacher that I would be interested in the Committee
exploring related to the newer technologies because I know I
don't know a lot about them but would have some questions. And
I would hope that that would be something that we could
explore.
Chairman Hall. I will provide that, yes.
Ms. Edwards. Thank you.
Chairman Hall. And I thank you for it. That is a very good
suggestion.
Questions are completed and I want to thank the witnesses
very much for your very valuable testimony and for the time it
took for you to get here, the time it took you to get prepared
for here and the time you have given us today. But all of this
is of record. We have had a court reporter taking over
everything. And members and those who assist us will be reading
that. It will be of great support to us in the future.
And for those of you, you three who have come to the
defense of the Nation when we needed you and the national
defense, you helped with the economic recovery, you have given
us your time today, you are truly Blue Ribbon citizens and we
thank you for your time.
At this time, Members of the Committee may have additional
questions for any one of you and they may do that by mail. If
we do, we hope you will answer it timely, maybe within a couple
of weeks if you can. The record will remain open for at least
two weeks for additional comments from Members.
And all of the witnesses are excused and are thanked very
much for your time. And this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:55 a.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
Appendix I

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Answers to Post-Hearing Questions

Responses by Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft (Ret.), Co-Chairman,
and
The Honorable Richard Meserve, Commissioner,
Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future
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Responses by The Honorable Pete Lyons,
Assistant Secretary of Nuclear Energy, Department of Energy

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