[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

[H.A.S.C. No. 112-90]

A DAY WITHOUT SEAPOWER AND
PROJECTION FORCES

__________

JOINT HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES

MEETING JOINTLY WITH THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

__________

HEARING HELD

NOVEMBER 3, 2011

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SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri, Chairman
DUNCAN HUNTER, California MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas RICK LARSEN, Washington
STEVEN PALAZZO, Mississippi JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
TODD YOUNG, Indiana CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland MARK S. CRITZ, Pennsylvania
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia HANK JOHNSON, Georgia
ROB WITTMAN, Virginia BETTY SUTTON, Ohio
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania
Tom MacKenzie, Professional Staff Member
Phil MacNaughton, Professional Staff Member
Mary Kate Cunningham, Staff Assistant
------

SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia, Chairman
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
JOE HECK, Nevada SILVESTRE REYES, Texas
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey DAVE LOEBSACK, Iowa
CHRIS GIBSON, New York GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina
BOBBY SCHILLING, Illinois BILL OWENS, New York
JON RUNYAN, New Jersey TIM RYAN, Ohio
TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii
STEVEN PALAZZO, Mississippi
MARTHA ROBY, Alabama
Jamie Lynch, Professional Staff Member
Vickie Plunkett, Professional Staff Member
Nicholas Rodman, Staff Assistant

C O N T E N T S

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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2011

Page

Hearing:

Thursday, November 3, 2011, A Day Without Seapower and Projection
Forces......................................................... 1

Appendix:

Thursday, November 3, 2011....................................... 31
----------

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 3, 2011
A DAY WITHOUT SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Akin, Hon. W. Todd, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces................. 3
Bordallo, Hon. Madeleine Z., a Delegate from Guam, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Readiness.............................. 5
Forbes, Hon. J. Randy, a Representative from Virginia, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Readiness...................................... 1
McIntyre, Hon. Mike, a Representative from North Carolina,
Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces. 3

WITNESSES

Clingan, VADM Bruce W., USN, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for
Operations, Planning and Strategy (N3/5)....................... 6
Hesterman, Maj Gen John W., III, USAF, Assistant Deputy Chief of
Staff for Operations, Plans, and Requirements (A3/5), U.S. Air
Force.......................................................... 10
Mills, LtGen Richard P., USMC, Deputy Commander for Combat
Development and Integration, Marine Corps Combat Development
Command........................................................ 7

APPENDIX

Prepared Statements:

Akin, Hon. W. Todd........................................... 35
Clingan, VADM Bruce W........................................ 38
Forbes, Hon. J. Randy........................................ 36
Hesterman, Maj Gen John W., III.............................. 61
Mills, LtGen Richard P....................................... 54

Documents Submitted for the Record:

[There were no Documents submitted.]

Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

Ms. Bordallo................................................. 75
Mr. Larsen................................................... 75

Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

Mr. Coffman.................................................. 82
Mr. Forbes................................................... 81
Mr. Palazzo.................................................. 86
Mr. Schilling................................................ 83
Mr. Scott.................................................... 85
A DAY WITHOUT SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES

----------

House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee
on Seapower and Projection Forces, Meeting Jointly with
Subcommittee on Readiness, Washington, DC, Thursday, November 3,
2011.
The subcommittees met, pursuant to call, at 11:42 a.m. in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. J. Randy Forbes
(chairman of the Subcommittee on Readiness) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. J. RANDY FORBES, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS

Mr. Forbes. Good morning. We would like to call this joint
hearing to order.
Mr. Akin, we understand, is on his way, and he will take
over the gavel as soon as he gets here.
But I want to thank Chairman Akin for co-chairing this
hearing and thank all of our members and the distinguished
panel of experts and welcome them to today's hearing focused on
what the future of seapower and projection capabilities may
portend in an era of austere budgets.
I am sure that Chairman Akin will note his appreciation for
all of our witnesses being here, and I want to just say how
much we appreciate your service to our country and your taking
time today to bring your expertise and experience to all the
members of this subcommittee.
I believe it is vital that you are all here today to
continue to inform the members of these subcommittees and the
public in advance of the ``super committee'' [Joint Select
Committee on Deficit Reduction] delivering its ultimate
recommendations to the Congress.
I am going to keep my remarks short in order that we
proceed to the heart of the discussion. The Readiness
Subcommittee has convened numerous times in the past few months
to hear from each of the services, and most recently the vice
chiefs, regarding the current state of the force, the increased
risk and the uncertainty of the future and potential impacts to
military readiness if sequestration were enacted.
While there seems to be a prevailing consensus that
sequestration, under the Budget Control Act, would be
devastating to the military, I remain severely concerned that
we have already gone too far.
Last year, when the DOD [Department of Defense] began
closing Joint Forces Command without any predecisional
analysis, I told members this would soon be coming to a theater
near you.
Well, currently, we are dealing with the $465 billion DOD
cuts that was arbitrarily made without analysis to underpin
that number. Now another shoe has dropped with regard to
civilian personnel. The Air Force announced just yesterday that
they will eliminate 16,500 civilian positions in fiscal year
2012. That is just the Air Force and only one fiscal year.
What happens when the other shoe drops or if it drops under
sequestration?
With all these individual decisions, the cumulative effect
will be devastating. At this point, I would say get ready. The
show is only just beginning.
This leads me to reiterate my concern regarding additional
short-term decisions that could lead to the potential hollowing
of the force under sequestration. That would be a situation
that cannot be quickly reversed.
General Dunford articulated this very point before the
Readiness Subcommittee last week regarding concerns that we
will make these cuts without any adequate appreciation of the
strategic implications.
The implications on our readiness are the implications of
breaking faith; and also, that folks would think that, if we
get it wrong, ``Well, we can just simply fix it in a year or
two.''
That is not possible, particularly in the latter category.
And if we break the trust of our marines, sailors, soldiers and
airmen today, it would be decades before we get it back.
The question I continue to ask is what is the risk to the
national defense of our country if we continue to make some of
the cuts to defense we are hearing being discussed in
Washington?
There are never enough resources to eliminate all of our
risk, but there must be a strategic assessment to underpin the
decisions. Instead, I feel that, currently, the DOD is just
responding to budgetary pressures the result of which could
severely degrade the military's ability to operate.
In Vice Admiral Clingan's written testimony for this
hearing today, he indicates, without question, the fleet is
operating now at an unsustainable level.
To best meet the combatant commander's need for deployed
Navy forces since September 11, 2001, and to respond to
emergent requirements, we have increased the frequency and
average length of unit deployments.
This has resulted in reduced training time, reduced
maintenance availabilities, a narrowing of predeployment
training for certain units to mission-specific tasks, and an
accelerated aging of our ships and aircraft.
Consistent with the testimony that Vice Admiral Burke
provided before the Readiness Subcommittee, the Navy has been
operating in a sustained surge, precluding the opportunity to
do deep maintenance on fleet assets. How will that impact the
future force? Looking forward, will our forces be ready for the
mission they are called upon to do when the time comes?
While there are many contributing factors that brought us
to this point today, we are currently at a crossroads where we
have time yet to prepare for the many tough decisions that lie
ahead.
In doing so, we must not forget our obligation to ensure
our men and women in uniform are given all the tools necessary
for the job we ask them to do.
I look forward to learning from each of our witnesses about
how we cope with these challenging fiscal times while also
maintaining a ready military.
At this time, I would like to recognize my good friend, the
representative from North Carolina, Mr. McIntyre, for any
opening remarks he might have and pass the gavel to Chairman
Akin.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Forbes can be found in the
Appendix on page 36.]

STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE MCINTYRE, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM NORTH
CAROLINA, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND
PROJECTION FORCES

Mr. McIntyre. Thank you very much.
I thank the chairman. Thank you, Mr. Forbes and to Mr.
Akin, and thank them for their leadership.
I also want to thank the witnesses for taking time out of
your schedule to be with us today and to even come and meet
with us yesterday and other days that you have met with us
personally when we have had questions or had concerns and you
have been proactive in raising the awareness of the concerns
that our military has with regard to this budget.
It is becoming clear that, as we draw down from Iraq and
Afghanistan, the demand for maritime presence and force
projection will increase.
We must ensure that our troops are available to quickly
respond to crises around the world. As we know also, there will
be times that we are called upon to offer humanitarian
assistance in disaster situations and to help protect and keep
open economic trade lanes by maintaining peace operations.
I am concerned, very concerned about the impact that large
defense cuts will have on U.S. national security. DOD has given
more than their fair share in budget cuts already. And if
further cuts were implemented beyond those in the Budget
Control Act, our great Nation possibly could be jeopardized in
terms of its status as the global power that is preeminent.
I look forward to hearing the witnesses discuss the current
missions we are executing in our combat AORs [Areas of
Responsibility] and elsewhere around the world. More
importantly, I would like to hear which of these missions would
be compromised if we faced the inevitable situation that we
hope will not face by November 23rd or ultimately December
23rd.
Thank you. Thank you to the witnesses for your service.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

STATEMENT OF HON. W. TODD AKIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI,
CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES

Mr. Akin. [Presiding.] Thank you very much. I appreciate
it.
And thank you, Randy, also for sitting in for me here. I
was caught on the telephone. I think we ought to get rid of
those gadgets.
So, if we could, I would like to back up a little bit,
start the meeting with a prayer, if I could. Father, we thank
you for the people who serve us in uniform, and we just ask
please now for your wisdom as we take a look at the decisions
that we need to be making in this Nation. And I ask your
blessing on everybody here and help us to make good and wise
decisions. I pray in Jesus' name. Amen.
Just to put things simply, and I want to try to get to the
right altitude here, we have already taken $450 billion in cuts
to military just in the last year or so. Now, $450 billion is
more than normal paycheck that I know what to do with, so what
does that amount to? I want to try and put that in perspective.
First of all, we have a Marine general. I think you are
talking about $100 billion maybe for a year to run the United
States Marines. Is that roughly right? So $450 billion cut that
we have already taken would be the equivalent of 4\1/2\ years
for the entire Marine Corps budget, right?
Let us shift over now. Let us talk about aircraft carriers.
We have, I believe, 11 aircraft carriers. We don't lose them
too often, they are considered important. How many would $450
billion buy; about what, maybe 45 aircraft carriers? That is a
long string of aircraft carriers.
That is how big the cuts we have already taken are, and now
there is discussion about cutting more.
And so the point of this hearing is to say, ``When is
enough already in terms of cuts?''
Now, just to put some things onto some graphs, we have a
couple of graphs that I think are very important for people to
be aware of. The first is this one here, and it is on the
chart. Basically it shows, as a percent of GDP [Gross Domestic
Product] how much we have spent on defense through the years,
and also as a percent of GDP what we are spending on various
things that politicians call entitlements.
The red line is the entitlements. The blue line is defense.
What you see is we are spending a whole lot less of the
American dollar on defense than we used to. That is the first
one.
The second chart that I think is somewhat--no, I don't want
to do that chart. I want to do that other one about the number
of planes and men in uniform. Okay.
If you make a comparison to where we were in 1990, the
number of people in uniform, the number of aircraft and the
number of ships, what you see is, is that we are running about
50 percent just in sheer numbers of where we were in 1990.
So we are already at half strength from 1990, and now we
are talking--that is before the $450 billion budget cut. And if
we take more budget cuts, what is that going to mean?
I am very uncomfortable with those numbers, but I am not
the expert. We have the experts right here with us this
morning.
I would hope each of you gentlemen would first of all at
least follow somewhere in your presentation, one, this is the
purpose of what my branch of service is about; and then second
of all, if you take this money away, how is that going to
degrade our ability to do the mission that you have been
assigned to do?
With that, I am going to conclude my opening remarks and go
to the wonderful lady from Guam, Madam Bordallo.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Akin can be found in the
Appendix on page 35.]

STATEMENT OF HON. MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, A DELEGATE FROM GUAM,
RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS

Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and
Chairman Forbes. Thank you for scheduling this hearing. And I
am glad to join my colleague and my good friend Congressman
McIntyre.
I also want to welcome each of our witnesses this
afternoon.
And, General Hesterman, I congratulate you on your new
appointment as the military deputy for readiness in the Office
of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness.
Today we continue our discussion on the implications of the
defense spending reductions resulting from the passage of the
Budget Control Act, as well as the possible implications if
sequestering occurs.
As I have stated in previous hearings, I do not believe
sequestration needs to occur. In fact, I believe former Senator
Simpson, Erskine Bowles, and others got it right when they
indicated that the so-called super committee cannot fail.
Everything must be on the table to achieve a balanced result
that helps put American finances back on track.
So that said, I believe our sea and air-power projection
capabilities are vitally important as we understand the threats
that we will be facing in future years.
This is particularly important for my constituents in Guam.
Our naval and Air Force long-range strike capabilities are what
to a greater extent provide stability in the Western Pacific.
The tyranny of distance in the Pacific makes these capabilities
invaluable.
Recently, Secretary Panetta visited our allies in Asia to
discuss a range of issues, and I commend Secretary Panetta for
his comments while he was in Asia. Time after time he
reiterated the importance of Asia-Pacific to the U.S. military
and our greater national security and economic interests.
He further stated how important it is that no matter what
happens with regards to current or future budget reductions,
that we at least maintain, if not grow, our military presence
in Asia-Pacific.
Secretary Panetta stated, ``Most importantly, we have the
opportunity to strengthen our presence in the Pacific, and we
will.''
I believe that is the right approach for our country to be
best postured to address current and emerging threats. I hope
that each of our witnesses this afternoon will be able to
comment on the importance of power projection or long-range
strikes if we are to maintain a constant and significant
presence in Asia-Pacific.
Specifically, how important is the development of a next-
generation bomber to our presence in the Pacific? What
additional capabilities could this asset provide us in the
Asia-Pacific region? Further, what strategies are being
employed to manage the program in a cost-effective manner?
For our friends in the Navy and the Marine Corps, I hope
you can each comment on the impact that tyranny of distance has
on power projection. What is needed to overcome the tyranny of
distance? There has been some discussion, particularly by our
friends in the Senate, of pulling back most of our military
forces from abroad to bases back home; or whether we even need
a forward-deployed presence.
I hope our witnesses can discuss the strategic value of a
forward-deployed presence, particularly in the Asia-Pacific
region.
Finally, many of those in think tanks are suggesting that
our next conflict will be a maritime and air battle concept. I
remain concerned that budget cuts, because of the Budget
Control Act, will unduly target the operation and maintenance
accounts, and specifically the training accounts.
How are the Navy and the Marine Corps going to approach
this matter? The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were primarily
land based, so what will we need to do to achieve a certain
level of readiness for our Naval and Marine Corps forces? How
important is amphibious landing capability to an expeditionary
Marine Corps?
I hope that each of these matters can be addressed at this
hearing, and I thank each of our witness, and I look forward to
your testimony.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Akin. Thank you very much for your opening statement as
well.
Now we are going to go to our witnesses. And first off is
Vice Admiral Bruce Clingan. He is the Deputy Chief of Naval
Operations for Planning and Strategy.
And so, Bruce, fire away, sir.

STATEMENT OF VADM BRUCE W. CLINGAN, USN, DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS FOR OPERATIONS, PLANNING AND STRATEGY (N3/5)

Admiral Clingan. Thank you, Chairman Akin, Chairman Forbes,
Ranking Member McIntyre and Ranking Member Bordallo and members
of the subcommittee. We thank you for the opportunity to
testify today.
I am proud to represent 625,000 sailors and civilians that
are serving on Active Duty in the Navy today, a testament to
your support today, and which makes the topic of today's
hearing hypothetical, thankfully, as opposed to historical.
I look forward to assisting you to ensure that our Navy
remains fully capable of providing America offshore options to
protect and advance our national interests in an era of
uncertainty and fiscal challenges that must be addressed.
As it has for more than 200 years, our Navy today delivers
credible capability for deterrence, sea control, and power
projection, to prevent crises, contain conflicts, and win our
Nation's wars.
We remain forward at the maritime crossroads, protecting
the interconnected systems of trade, information and security
that underpin our Nation's economic prosperity.
This prosperity requires free access to the global commons,
in particular the maritime air, space, and cyberspace commons
where the Navy operates today, which are increasingly
threatened by both state and non-state actors.
Significant concerns have been voiced regarding the impact
of the Budget Control Act on the Navy's future ability to
fulfill its fundamental responsibilities. There is no doubt
that the evolving security environment, characterized by
systems designed to neutralize our advantages in both space and
cyberspace; proliferation of sophisticated weapons intended to
prevent freedom of action in those global commons; aggressive,
coercive and assertive states, unfettered by international
norms; and persistent attacks by violent extremists. All of
these characteristics of the future security environment pose a
growing challenge to our national interests.
And all of these characteristics demand a ready Navy that
can rapidly and effectively respond to diverse crises with
efficient offshore options ranging from humanitarian assistance
to high-end, high-intensity combat operations against a very
capable adversary.
The risk to successfully accomplishing such missions today
is significant and the impact of the Budget Control Act before
sequestration would push this risk to the manageable limit.
Tough choices will have to be made as we balance this risk and
distribute it across the Navy's portfolio and as we endeavor to
ensure that we are manned, trained, and equipped to fulfill our
obligations to the Nation.
While we anticipate being resourced at a level that will
never result in a day without seapower, I am eager to answer
your questions as we contemplate adjustments that move the Navy
in this direction.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Clingan can be found in
the Appendix on page 38.]
Mr. Akin. Thank you, Admiral.
Our next witness is going to be Lieutenant General Richard
Mills, Deputy Commander for Combat Development and Integration
at the Marine Corps, Combat Development Command.
General Mills.

STATEMENT OF LTGEN RICHARD P. MILLS, USMC, DEPUTY COMMANDER FOR
COMBAT DEVELOPMENT AND INTEGRATION, MARINE CORPS COMBAT
DEVELOPMENT COMMAND

General Mills. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Akin, Chairman Forbes, Ranking Members McIntyre
and Bordallo, members of the subcommittee, thank you very much
for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the
importance of seapower and projection forces.
More importantly, thank you for the tremendous support you
provide to your marines on a daily basis, both here at CONUS
[Continental United States], while embarked aboard ship, and in
combat overseas.
As we plan for the years ahead, we see a world of
increasing instability and conflict. It will be characterized
by poverty, competition for resources, urbanization,
overpopulation, and extremism. Failed states may indeed become
safe havens for terrorists, insurgents, and criminal groups
that directly threaten the United States and our allies.
There is no doubt that these trends will exert a
significant influence on future security environments. History
tells us that we never know when crisis, conflict or security
challenges will occur, but it also tells us we know they will
occur. It also tells us the price we will have to pay if we are
unable to respond to them quickly, effectively, and reasonably.
While the character of the future security environment
continues to evolve and change, our Nation's requirement to
maintain a forward-based force in readiness has not changed and
in fact has never been stronger. Forward-deployed forces are
important for a myriad of reasons.
First, physical presence matters. It demonstrates our
economic and military commitment to a particular region. It
deters our adversaries. It ensures our friends. Crisis response
matters, and crisis response is frequently measured in hours,
if not in minutes. Embassies are threatened. Americans are put
in danger. Disasters occur. Time is critical. Flexible options
are critical.
When the marines rescued a downed American pilot shot down
in Libya earlier this year, the marines did so from amphibious
shipping in the Mediterranean, with the rescue completed within
3 hours of notification. Without our forward presence, that
situation would have turned out dramatically differently.
Imagine how the situation might have changed had Gadhafi in
fact captured a U.S. aircrew.
Earlier in the year, within 20 hours of notification of the
tsunami, forward-deployed marines arrived in Japan to conduct
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions. Crisis
response cannot be adequately accomplished in the United
States. By its very nature, it requires a forward presence that
our naval forces are uniquely positioned to provide. We are the
Nation's away-team ready to respond to any crisis.
The Nation must have forward-deployed marines ready to
respond to crisis. Indeed, I believe that the phrase, ``The
marines have landed and the situation is well in hand,'' means
more than just kinetic success. It means that people struck by
disaster quickly see the United States flag helping them. It
means that a stable, capable force under the United States flag
is on hand to assist in any number of crisis situations.
Ultimately, it means people overseas thankful to the United
States for the help they receive.
The demand for amphibious forces has never been greater.
Flexibility has been the key. This year alone, your Marines
partnered with the Navy have fought an aggressive, full-
spectrum counterinsurgency operation in Afghanistan and we
continue to fight there today. Partnered with allied forces
engaged in missions at every geographic combatant commander's
area of responsibility, we train with our allies.
We have conducted foreign humanitarian assistance and
disaster relief missions in Pakistan, in Haiti, in the
Philippines, and in Japan. We have executed maritime security
operations to ensure freedom of navigation along sea lines of
communication. That includes the recapture of the vessel
Magellan Star and the rescue of its crew from Somali pirates.
The Marines have rapidly reinforced U.S. embassies
overseas, in Haiti, in Guinea, in Kazakhstan, and in Cairo,
Egypt. We have protected diplomatic personnel. And finally, we
have conducted air strikes against loyalist forces in Libya
and, as I mentioned, rescued an American aviator shot down
during Operation Odyssey Dawn.
Demand for amphibious forces has never been greater, as I
said. While we cannot know when the next conflict will occur,
we know in fact that it will occur. When that happens,
America's forward-deployed Navy and Marine Corps team will be
there, ready to plug the gaps during international crisis;
ready to give our decisionmakers back here in Washington time
and space in which to make those decisions; and ultimately, to
provide those decisionmakers with responsible options to
respond when the Nation is ready.
The United States remains the world's largest economy. We
are critically dependent on the sea for exports and imports
that ultimately sustain our livelihood. Disruptions in the sea
have measurable economic impact on every family in the States.
The Nation's naval forces provide the ability to maneuver
through the littorals, to deter, to defend, and to protect
vital areas from any variety of threats without dependence on
land bases.
I would urge the members to remember that the Nation's
economic health is directly tied to our ability to maintain
stability on the seas. Your Navy and Marine Corps team is
forward-deployed and ready to meet the needs of our Nation.
Over the past decade, our men and women in uniform have
made extraordinary sacrifices. We must maintain faith with our
marines. We must send them a clear message that their
contributions are recognized and appreciated. For us the
marines, keeping faith means that the institution, the people,
the marines, the families that are out there in Twentynine
Palms, Camp Pendleton, Camp Lejeune, Beaufort are ready.
We need to maintain their best interests at heart. Even
though they understand there will be changes, we must have
their best interests at heart at all times as you look at the
three main areas of manning, training, and equipping our forces
that go forward. We cannot break faith with them.
Cuts at the level anticipated with sequestration would in
fact break faith with those marines. I would like to add that
as the year continues, the challenge we face operating on a
continuing resolution will only increase. We need a budget
passed so that we have the predictability and flexibility to
carry out our missions.
In the months and years ahead, we will face difficult
resource decisions. I urge Congress to consider how best to
mitigate the risk of a reduced defense capability; and I tell
you, like an affordable insurance policy, the Marine Corps and
Navy's amphibious forces are, in fact, the hedge against the
Nation's most likely risks. It is imperative that our Nation
retain a credible means of mitigating risk as we draw down
other capabilities and capacities.
Thank you for the opportunity to be here. I look forward to
your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Mills can be found in
the Appendix on page 54.]
Mr. Akin. Thank you very much, General.
Our last witness is Major General John Hesterman, United
States Air Force, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for
Operations, Plans and Requirements.
And I also wanted to offer my congratulations, General
Hesterman, at your nomination for Lieutenant General, I guess
was just yesterday, was it?
Thank you very much. Please proceed.

STATEMENT OF MAJ GEN JOHN W. HESTERMAN III, USAF, ASSISTANT
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR OPERATIONS, PLANS, AND REQUIREMENTS
(A3/5), U.S. AIR FORCE

General Hesterman. I thank the chairman. My senior joint
brothers have told me I will immediately become more
intelligent and more eloquent if that confirmation process goes
forward.
Chairman Akin, Chairman Forbes, Ranking Member Bordallo and
all the distinguished members of the committee, thanks for the
opportunity to provide you an update on your power projection
forces and your outstanding airmen around the world.
Today, the Air Force is fully engaged in operations across
the globe supporting our Nation's and our combat commanders'
requirements. Today, our capability and reach are unparalleled
among the world's air forces, and the dedication of your airmen
is truly exceptional, and they are busy.
Each day, 24 hours a day, a mobility aircraft takes off
every 90 seconds. On an average day, your airmen and our
airlift fleet transport 4,500 passengers and over 1,900 tons of
cargo. Our tanker crews deliver 5 million pounds of fuel to
U.S. and coalition aircraft and there has been no let-up in the
pace.
Since September 11th, 2001, our tankers have delivered 15
billion pounds of fuel. Our airlift fleet has delivered over
6.5 million tons of cargo. During a 2-week period last March,
affectionately known inside the Air Force as ``March madness,''
the Air Force conducted humanitarian relief efforts in Japan
simultaneously with combat operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and
Libya.
In Japan, the Air Force opened Sendai Airfield in the heart
of the disaster area within 5 days of the tsunami and started
the flow of much-needed aid. Within 2 weeks, our airlift crews
delivered 2.5 million gallons of water and 167 tons of food to
those most affected.
Last year in Afghanistan, we air-dropped 60 million pounds
of critical supplies in the most heavily contested areas to our
soldiers and marines. Our air-drop for Operation Enduring
Freedom has doubled each year since 2006, from 3.5 million
pounds in 2006 to 60.4 million pounds in 2010. And this year we
have exceeded the 2010 number already.
This important capability minimizes the predictable
overland delivery requirement which puts truck convoys and U.S.
personnel at risk of insurgent attacks and the prolific IED
[Improvised Explosive Device] threats. It saves soldiers' and
marines' lives. At the same time, in the early days of the
Libya conflict, as part of Operation Odyssey Dawn, our B-2
stealth bombers launched from Whiteman Air Force Base in
Missouri flew halfway around the world and destroyed precise
targets in Libya before flying back home to Whiteman. En route,
they were refueled several times by our tanker fleets and their
crews. Yours is the only air force on the planet that can do
that and right now, we can do it anywhere we need to.
Our Nation cannot afford to compromise this long-range
strike capability, particularly as we look at a future with
anti-access/area-denial environments our adversaries are now
creating.
Chairmen, Ranking Members, all the distinguished
subcommittee members, I join our Secretary of Defense and my
Air Force Chief of Staff in stating that any further cuts in
addition to the $450-plus billion already identified in the
Budget Control Act will at least reduce our capability to
conduct these operations concurrently. And if the sequester
provision goes into effect, it may risk our ability to protect
the Nation.
My sincere thanks to all of you for your continued support
of your outstanding airmen and for all our Nation's military,
and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Hesterman can be found
in the Appendix on page 61.]
Mr. Akin. Thank you, all three, for your testimonies.
We are going to now proceed to questions from both
committees here. And as the chairman, I guess I get the first
shot. So I am going to try and start with kind of simple
things.
There are a lot of people that would prefer America to be a
nation that is at peace and where things are peaceful and there
is not war going on all the time.
So if you really want America to be a peaceful nation,
would you think it would be better to have a strong military or
a weak military?
Admiral Clingan. Chairman Akin, I will start the answer.
Of course, you might imagine that you will find unanimity
of opinion at this table that a strong military certainly
contributes to the peace that the American population and,
frankly, our allies and partners desire. And in many cases we
are the guarantor of their peace as well as our own.
Mr. Akin. Good, let us just stop right there. That is kind
of what I was fishing for.
It seems like to me if we are strong, one, it doesn't
encourage adventurism in other nations that are less stable.
And it provides not only peace for our own people but around
the world nations can trade and more or less live at peace just
because of, in a sense, the umbrella that we provide.
Is that a pretty safe assumption? And so if we allow our
defense to degenerate, then we get into a situation where there
is more wars and things, isn't that right? The times that we
have been at war, haven't those times been many times when we
are not as strong as we might have been? Anybody want to
comment on that historically?
General Mills. Sir, I would echo your words. I think any
student of history realizes this country has been most at
threat and gone to war when it has been its weakest. Certainly,
World War II would be certainly an outstanding example of that.
But I concur with the admiral. The best way to ensure a
just peace is to have a strong military that is out there to
deter your enemy and to stand ready to defend your homeland if
called upon.
Mr. Akin. Right.
Now, sometimes people are critical and say, ``Hey, we have
got troops in Germany and we have got troops in Korea, all this
stuff. Why do we need troops all the way over there? Why don't
we just bring them home, and save a lot of money--with having
to resupply all of those different people living in different
corners of the world?''
And, yet, some of the missions that you have talked about
today couldn't happen if we didn't have forward-deployed
troops, isn't that correct?
Admiral Clingan. That is correct, Chairman.
Mr. Akin. So just kind of running through things, first of
all, a navy, your mission in a way is to turn the oceans into
area where we can project force in order to keep the peace but
also be prepared for different contingencies, is that correct?
Admiral Clingan. Chairman Akin, that is absolutely correct.
Mr. Akin. And in order to do that you have to have a
certain number of ships because the globe is a pretty big place
to put ships on, isn't it?
Admiral Clingan. Yes, it is.
Mr. Akin. So you don't have enough ships you are not going
to be present and then people start to become adventurous and
do risky things, is that right?
Admiral Clingan. That is certainly a risk as we look at the
future security environment and the way it is evolving.
Mr. Akin. Okay.
And then from the point of view of the Marine Corps, your
job is to be the first ones in, but in a degree, doesn't that
also buy us time in terms of what our response needs to be when
there is a problem, General?
General Mills. Absolutely, sir. The presence of amphibious
forces near a crisis site, I believe, buy critical time for
decisionmakers to sort out what needs to be done and come to a
reasonable solution over that.
Those forces don't necessarily have to be ashore. Simply
their presence in the area indicates the strength and power of
the United States is there ready to take action if so called
upon; I believe has a huge deterrent effect anyplace in the
world where we have our forward-deployed forces.
Mr. Akin. Because essentially if you need to go into a
particular location in the world in a fairly short period of
time, you could hit with a pretty big hammer and land an awful
lot of marines, is that correct?
General Mills. Sir, we advertise ourself as a middle weight
force but we are in fact strong enough to be able to stabilize
any situation and then allow for the entry of the joint force
as it begins to close on that situation.
But, yes, sir, we are there prepared to win once we get
ashore, and then thoroughly ready to do so under our current
capabilities.
Mr. Akin. Right.
General Mills. Should we suffer drastic cuts, those
capabilities, in fact, could be reduced?
Mr. Akin. And when that is reduced then you have got to
make decisions, right? You got to decide, ``Am I going to cut
training? Am I going to have fewer troops?''--so that makes
everything more risky. ``Am I going to have cheaper, poorer
quality equipment so people don't have the type of protection
they need?''
All those are given you some kind of impossible decisions
to make in a way, aren't they, when you get down to a certain
point?
General Mills. Those are very difficult decisions to make,
sir. I think the battlefield is a dynamic place. It is not
stable. The enemy threat changes every day. I would point to
Afghanistan where we look at an enemy who is adaptive, who is
imaginative and who we have to adjust to. Those require changes
in equipment, they require changes in training and adequate
force structure to conduct the mission once ashore.
Mr. Akin. And then, John, from a Air Force point of view,
in a way, you have a lot of service aspect to what you do
because you are providing all that support essentially to all
the other people, as well as that long-range punch to let
people know that we have some teeth and those teeth can reach
pretty far and bite pretty hard. And that is what you have to
try to maintain that capability too, right?
General Hesterman. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman, that is true.
And let me add, to pile on just a little bit, I spent the
last year of my life in the Middle East as the Deputy Air
Component Commander for Central Command. And there is a reason
the combatant commanders spend most of their time working on
relationships with foreign militaries and foreign leaders: so
that we are able to execute, or we are told to go execute the
things we need to do that we have those relationships in order
to give us the access and the lily pads and the things that we
need to prosecute our campaigns.
Mr. Akin. So there is an ongoing working with other nation
partners and things, which facilitate that ability to provide
that overall umbrella of peace, really----
General Hesterman. I am convinced it is essential, sir.
Mr. Akin. Yes.
Well, if any of you want to jump on; I just want to talk at
the highest level. What starts to degenerate if you don't fund
things enough?
Because we have seen the charts, and we have been cutting
defense, as a percent of GDP heavily. We see that we have
reduced our force almost by half of where we were in 1990.
And now we are talking after $450 billion, which again I am
trying to figure out what 45 aircraft carriers look like in a
row. Imagine, Admiral, you might think it is a pretty sight as
a matter of fact.
But, anyway, that is a lot of money we have already taken
in cuts, and now we are talking about more cuts.
And, really, I think what I am hearing you say is that if
you really want a safe and well-defended America, you just
can't do this. I think that is what I am hearing you say.
Admiral Clingan. Chairman Akin, as we contemplate how to
solve the budget puzzle posed with the current cuts that are on
the table, the Department of Defense appreciates the fact that
those type of major adjustments must be driven by strategy.
And that strategy review is ongoing.
As the Navy looks to its maritime strategy as a supporting
strategy for that defense strategy, we can see the persistence
of some strategic imperatives that you have alluded to; for
example, contain regional conflict, deter adversaries, win our
Nation's wars. And we do that with forward regionally postured
forces.
We also see the imperative to contribute to the homeland
defense in depth to foster and sustain the cooperative
relationships that have been talked about and are of great
value as we work together in an evolving security environment
that is challenging and, of course, to prevent disruptions and
crisis that disrupt the international system. That benefits all
of us, as I mentioned earlier, not just America, but allies,
partners and even adversaries.
To that end, we use globally distributed naval forces. And
the benefit of those forward forces is a commitment, this
declaration of commitment to our allies with which we have
common defense agreements.
To our partners who look to us to protect their interests
and their economic well-being in a world that relies on
container ships moving 90 percent of the commerce, and we look
at the rapid response that the General talked to where we can
provide with the Navy offshore options that are very diverse in
their capability and tailorable to achieve support of our
national interests.
So we look, as these budget adjustments must be
contemplated, at the prospect of finding the forward presence
that we know we need in this evolving security environment to
be at risk.
Mr. Akin. Thank you very much.
I didn't mean to take too much time, but I think the next
person I am going to isn't here; McIntyre.
So I will go ahead----
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
My first question is for General Hesterman.
Last week, while Secretary Panetta was meeting with allies
in the Pacific, he reaffirmed the U.S. intent to remain a
Pacific power. We applaud the Secretary's focus on this key
region, and we will do everything we can to support this
imperative.
However, in order to ensure that such words could be
translated into actual military capability, we need to think
about numbers. Given the tyranny of time and distance in the
Pacific region, and I know I don't have to remind you, but
given that these areas are a part of the United States, and
many thousands of U.S. citizens are living there, at what point
do Air Force fleet numbers drop too low to sustain an extended
air campaign in the region?
We must have enough long-range strike assets in the fleet
to project force over enemy territory in a concentrated
fashion. The Air Force has done nothing but shrink the force
over the past decade. At a certain point, you simply can't do
more with less. So my question is where is the red line
regarding the size of the fleet as we look at the operations in
the Pacific theater?
General Hesterman. Ma'am, I don't have a number for you,
but what I will tell you is this is important to us. It is what
we do. You know, my kid brother is a 46-year-old vice wing
commander at a strategic bomber base in Louisiana. He spends a
lot of time on Guam. Every airplane on the ramp is 4 years
older than him, at least.
So what we have to do is be able to have a budget that
allows the modernization of that fleet, because we expect those
youngsters to fly that thing until 2030. And in order to equip
it and equip the weapons base with the kinds of standoff
weapons they all need to fight in the Pacific theater, we have
to fund those things, because they will go if we ask them,
needless to say.
You know, we have to fund the long-range strike bombers, as
you talked about because at some point, you know, we have to
have a platform that will actually get and be able to operate
inside of that fight.
So it is similarly important to us to have the right number
to be able to prosecute our campaigns in the theater there.
Ms. Bordallo [continuing]. But it must be the right number?
General Hesterman. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you, General.
And I have another question, Mr. Chairman, for Admiral
Clingan and General Mills.
Given China's rapid development of an increasingly capable
blue-water navy and their intent to be in broadened command of
the Western Pacific operating area, how would a resource-
constrained Navy and Marine Corps respond to calls for support
from our allies in the region if contentious natural resource
land or navigation issues arise?
How important is it to have our forces strategically
forward-deployed in the Pacific to overcome the massive
challenge of tyranny of distance?
And I will begin with you, Admiral.
Admiral Clingan. Ranking Member Bordallo, thank you for the
question.
We respond to those types of crises which are unanticipated
and at times come up in a fashion or a manner over a spark that
wasn't anticipated with having forward-deployed naval forces
that are permanently stationed overseas, as well as having
forward presence that we generate through the rotation of
United States-based forces.
It is that combination that allows us to respond
immediately with the presence that are there in theater.
And should the tension or crisis be of such a magnitude
that those forces were insufficient, we would have the
wherewithal to surge additional forces from the continental
United States, should that be required.
But your point is that we need those forward forces to be
sufficient to deter that type of behavior in the first place.
And that is an area that takes the leadership of the United
States, both diplomatic and military, to keep a constant sense
of the trends and the assertiveness of nations; not just China,
but others; so that we understand how that environment is
evolving and we can make adjustments in terms of those standard
levels of presence that would be there.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you, Admiral.
And General Mills.
General Mills. I would just add to the Admiral's comments
on the value of the forward-deployed forces over there, that
they assure our allies and our friends that the U.S. is
interested and that we maintain a presence over there because
of that vital interest and our vital interest in supporting
them as they proceed to their day-to-day activities.
Secondly, it gives us the opportunity, forward-deployed, to
interoperate with our allies, with the Australians, who are
developing an amphibious capability because of some of the
threat that they see on the horizon.
Forward-deployed forces enable us to operate on a day-to-
day basis with them to gain familiarity with them,
interoperability, and develop those relationships that become
very critical during times of crisis and, ultimately, perhaps
in times of war.
So the value of a constant presence out there, I think,
cannot be overstated.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you, General. And I yield back, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Akin. Congressman Forbes.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, gentlemen, thank you so much for your service to our
country and for being here today. Admiral, we talk a lot about
these numbers, and they, kind of, go over everybody's head
sometimes, especially the general public; I know not over the
three of your heads.
But one thing that really just stuck out to me in your
testimony was the fact that you said that, in fiscal year 2011,
throughout 2011, the Navy was only able to meet 59 percent of
the combatant commanders' requirements.
And I am assuming I am reading that correctly.
And that was, as I understand it, before the $465 billion
of cuts that are going to be coming our way that we are already
taking, and, obviously, before any $600 billion in
sequestration. Is that a fair statement, Admiral?
Admiral Clingan. Yes, sir, it is.
Mr. Forbes. General Mills, have you been able to look at a
similar analysis for the ability that you had to meet our
combatant commanders' requirements before all of these $465
billion of cuts, or the $600 billion cuts?
And if you were, can you give us any ballpark of that
percentage, like Admiral----
General Mills. I can, Mr. Chairman.
If you assume that the 20,000 marines deployed to
Afghanistan will also meet a combatant commander's requirement,
then we are at about 60 percent of that requirement.
If you subtract those 20,000 forces out, we drop into the
20s because of that large commitment on the ground that we have
in Afghanistan.
I think some of it reflects, for both of us, the rapid rise
in those requirements over the past few years. Since 2007 we
have seen somewhat of an 86 percent increase in the combatant
commanders' requests for amphibious forces.
So it is a rising demand and there is a large commitment
already made, and we are doing the best the we can.
Mr. Forbes. And you are not seeing anything on the security
front that suggest to you that that is going to reduce
significantly over the next few years, have you?
General Mills. I do not. I do not. I would expect that
demand only to increase.
Mr. Forbes. General Hesterman.
General Hesterman. Sir, I don't have a number to throw out
at you. What I will tell you is the combatant commander
requirement for several of our capabilities are at a 1-1 dwell.
That means people are in combat for at least as much time as
they are home.
You know, so, pararescue men, ISR [Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance] operators, combat
controllers, special operations, weather guys, civil engineers,
our EOD [Explosive Ordnance Disposal] guys that find those
IEDs, there aren't enough of them. And we send all that we can.
And we have already cut well back in some of our training in
order to meet combatant commander requirements. We will
continue to do that.
Our service leadership is committed to giving them
everything that we have.
Mr. Forbes. And, General, just for clarification, that is
before----
General Hesterman. Yes, sir.
Mr. Forbes [continuing]. The $465 billion of cuts that are
coming down the pike we are already taking?
General Hesterman. Yes, sir, that is true.
Mr. Forbes. And obviously long before sequestration.
General Hesterman. Yes, sir.
Mr. Forbes. Admiral, just one last question for you; and
this is no fault of the Navy's. This is because we just haven't
given you the resources. But today, as I understand it, you are
facing--let us forget Afghanistan and Iraq--and let us look at
China and what we face there.
The Chinese, for the first time in our lifetimes, have more
ships in their Navy than we have in our Navy. And we can argue
about capacity and those kind of things, but it is my
understanding that, from just surface-to-surface missiles based
on open-source documents, they can hit us from about 185
kilometers, and we are at about a 120-kilometer range to them.
And at the end of this decade, they are going to have 78
subs to our 32 subs in the South China Sea, if we don't do
something different.
You have a $367 million shortfall in your maintenance
accounts because we haven't given you the money to do them.
My concern is this. If I look at your projections for
shipbuilding, and even, at a minimum, a 313-ship Navy, about 70
percent of those ships that will make up that 313-ship Navy by
2020, we already own today. But we are not able to do the
maintenance; and, again, not through your fault, because we
haven't given you the resources.
What can the Navy do? Are we going to continue to just
allow our resources to wear out so that we take them off
earlier, or are we going to try to invest resources to try to
maintain them and get a greater service life? And if so, how in
the world can you do it if we are already at $367 million
shortfall in the dollars we have given you to maintain the
ships we have, and we are cutting another $450 billion, and we
are talking about sequestration?
How do you possibly get your arms around that?
Admiral Clingan. Well, that is one of the daunting
challenges that we are working with, not just today but as we
look to make the cuts required.
First of all, one of the contributing factors to the
material condition of the ships, which we are working to invest
in through increasing the dollars that we allocate to our
maintenance accounts, to your point, to get those ships to
their expected service life, one of the challenges has been
that, for at least the last 3 years, we have been operating
above a sustainable operational tempo, at a level that we call
surge, as we endeavor to meet that combatant commander's demand
that you alluded to.
That is with our current force structure. It has come at a
cost that represents missed maintenance opportunities or
reduced maintenance opportunities. It has come at longer
deployments that have caused that compression of the
maintenance cycle. It has come at tailored mission training as
opposed to fully robust major combat operations training, so
that we can get those ships forward to do the missions that the
combatant commanders need.
As we have looked at the cost of that surge, we have come
to the conclusion that you mentioned, which says it is an
unsustainable rate and we must build time into our force
generation model that allows the appropriate maintenance to be
conducted and we must fund that maintenance appropriately.
We have taken steps within our budget constraints,
approximately 900 additional million dollars each year toward
that end, but it will come at a cost of reduced forward
presence as we keep those ships which have been operating at
surge at home to get the maintenance required.
Mr. Forbes. So, Admiral, it would be fair to say that that
59 percent that you were able to meet under the previous
budgets, we may not even be able to meet that if we are having
to keep more of the ships back home. Is that a fair statement?
Admiral Clingan. That is a fair statement. It will depend
on their demand signal, which, as the General alluded to, we
expect, in the evolving security environment, will go up.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Admiral.
And, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Thank you.
Thank you, gentlemen.
Mr. Akin. And Congresswoman Davis.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I
appreciate the joint hearing and certainly appreciate the
service of all of you gentlemen. Thank you very much for being
here and for your leadership.
I wanted to just clarify for a minute, as I am looking at
the declining force structure chart, and are these numbers that
you all, if we go over to the final, if the super committee
fails, my understanding is this is really a worst-case scenario
if, totally, across the board, everything is cut.
Are these the Pentagon's numbers?
Admiral Clingan. Congresswoman, I can't attribute the
numbers to anybody beyond what the footnote says. But I can
comment on the impact of sequestration.
Backing up just a minute, as we look at how to work simply
with the current bill that we have with the existing $450
million to $500 million requirement, we are looking to balance
risk as we take those cuts by, number one, making sure that we
are ready to fight and win today; number two, to build the
future force that we can fight and win with tomorrow; and,
three, to take care of our people, as we work through those
priorities to avoid a hollow force.
Mrs. Davis. I----
Admiral Clingan. I can't get any more----
Mrs. Davis. I appreciate that, sir.
I just wanted to understand for myself because I think that
the attribution is for the quote and not for the numbers in the
chart, if I am not mistaken. And I just wanted to, I hope that,
you know, if you all can go back and take a look at those and
see. Is that really what you would come up with, so the
Department of Defense would provide those numbers.
I think the other thing that is really critical and it is
important, I think, for our constituents and certainly for the
country to understand is, you know, as you are talking about
the 59 percent of requirement, and certainly 87 percent, you
know, for Marines, what does that really mean in specifics?
I think you have tried to do that, but it would be helpful
to even have that on paper as we were to draw down. Some of
those requirements, we know, certainly in budgets there are
things that, you know, under the best of circumstances it would
be great to have, but, you know, it is not as critical as some
other things.
I think I am looking at the criticality here. You know,
what is it that really does make a difference? I happen to
believe that humanitarian missions actually can do more for the
country sometimes than other commitments that we have and other
kinetic activity.
So I think that, you know, if we could look at that more,
that would be very helpful because we are trying as hard as we
can to communicate with the individuals that are serving on
this super committee and that kind of specificity would be
very, very important to have. I think that we talk about
hollowing out of the force, but you know, getting down to the
details is also important.
And certainly on the personnel issues, I welcome your
comments about that. You don't have to make them now. But, you
know, where is it? I mean, obviously none of us would like to
touch any of that, but if we have to, and we want to make
certain of the least harmful to our troops, that keep the
faith, et cetera, what is it that you think, you know, in your
many years of service, would actually be reasonable to look at;
would be something worth, you know, worth doing.
And the other thing, just very quickly, I just have a
moment, in terms of the overseas presence. Our constituents ask
those questions all the time. And I don't know whether there
are opportunities where if you drew down a sixth of the force
that is overseas, what difference that would make. We are
talking about more accompanied tours in South Korea, for
example. You know, how critical is that? And is that worthwhile
to put that effort into there? Or, you know, is that not as
important in terms of how are troops are able to carry out
their mission?
I happen to know something about accompanied or
unaccompanied tours, but on the other hand I think, you know,
that is, today with our budget constraints, we may be looking
at some different realities. So I wanted to be sure that I had
a chance to get out that message.
And then I think just finally, we know that our Marines
have certainly not been as much a part of amphibious ready
groups as in the past and there are challenges there, and
within budget constraints where do those lie as well?
So I have given you very little time to respond. I am
sorry. But I wanted to just lay out and understand; help us get
to the specificity when you can.
Would you like to comment?
Admiral Clingan. Just quickly, Representative Davis. As we
work through those priorities I outlined, these ship numbers
are in the ballpark of what could result. So while I can't
credit the numbers exactly, this is the type of impact that you
might expect.
General Mills. I would offer up my, I am not sure where
those figures came from. We did a very, very thorough and
rigorous force structure review over the past year, arrived at
what we felt was a Marine Corps proper size, 186,800 marines
that met our commitments and kept our capabilities where they
were. But more importantly, perhaps, reduced stress on the
force to give marines adequate time at home between training
deployments and between actual deployments, to be able to spend
some time decompressing, if you will, from their activities.
That force is at great peril as we watch the budgets
decline. Where the breaking point is, is probably difficult to
say. We look at what our commitments are; what we are required
to provide the Nation in the way of COM [Command] plans and
things like that, but also what we need to be able to give our
forces adequate time to train and adequate time at home in
order, as I said, to recover.
I would offer up that, as you talked about South Korea, the
presence of forces in the Pacific offer up quite a, present our
possible opponents over there with whom they have to think
about. They can't act as freely knowing that there are American
forces both in Korea, close by Korea, and within the Pacific
region that could respond quickly, and I think raise the stakes
considerably when they decide what their strategy will be
against us in the years to come.
So I appreciate the opportunity to comment on that, but I
think, again, the value of deterrence with forward-deployed
forces cannot be overstated. It is absolutely critical to what
we are trying to do all over the world.
General Hesterman. Ma'am, just very briefly. Our thoughts
on the numbers are the same as my compatriots here. The thing
that we worry the most about is the stress on our airmen,
needless to say. One thing I will tell you, in a lifetime in
the Air Force, the thing that is the biggest morale booster is
having the appropriate training and the appropriate equipment
and the appropriately sized force to win when we send them into
conflict.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you.
Mr. Akin. Yes, I think you had a question on the numbers
that we had in that one set of graphs? Could we throw the chart
up on the screen again? The screen with the different various
cuts. How much we are going to be, what the cuts were going to
be?
I guess we can't put it on the screen. Anyway, my
understanding was, let me get this right, the 1990 numbers are
from where? Those are historical data. Oops, we are getting
closer here. There we go.
So the 1990 number is historical data. The 2000 numbers are
also historical data, right? And the today numbers are
historical. The black and red columns were done by some of the
staff on the Armed Services Committee, and my understanding is
those are simply you take the size budget cut; it is a straight
percentage, and take the percentage, and that is what you get.
Obviously, it is an estimate, but it is kind of a ballpark
if you figure using straight percentages. Okay. Our next
question comes from Congressman Hunter.
Mr. Hunter. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. And I would like to
recognize General Mills, too, first Marine Corps general to
command NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] forces in
combat; just left Afghanistan. So he is not just a Quantico
guy. He just left theater. And I am just happy to have you back
and thanks for the job there.
Think back 50 years ago to World War II, putting a Marine
general in charge of anybody would have created an uproar; but
we were able to do it, so hurrah for that.
When I look at the three of you, what I see is kind of like
the heavy compound list; like let me just phrase it this way:
dead lifts, squats and bench press. I mean, you are what makes
the American superpower the American superpower. You can do
curls and you can do other fancy stuff to get beach muscles,
but when it comes to heavy lifting and how powerful you are,
and the ability to reach out and touch somebody, it is you.
And when you think back to the Falklands in 1982 with the
British as kind of the, Britain's last gasp of trying to reach
out and touch somebody, and succeeding, but also kind of that
was their last gasp, and post-World War II Britain giving up
all of their sea bases to us.
I don't even know where to start with what is happening.
Chairman Akin and Chairman Forbes have laid this out. If we
can't reach out and touch people anymore and we pull back our
sphere of influence, you have things like the LCS [Littoral
Combat Ship], which I would argue is just a fast frigate. It is
not Stealth. The Navy has some carbon-fiber ships that could
evade radar. We are not building them. We are building fast
frigates that can't get next to Taiwan; that can't go through
the strait there.
On one side, we are building ships that are going to be
nice to have. They are nice modular ships, but they are not
going to be able to get our men and women to where they need to
go. And then on the Marine Corps side, I guess the big question
is: Do we need to go anymore?
So I have seen the Air Force's plans for the next-
generation tanker and the bombers, and they are looking good.
They are looking on track and it looks like you have overcome a
lot of the acquisition problems we have had in the past. But
when it comes to the Navy and Marine Corps being able to reach
out and touch and gain access to that anti-access/area-denial
thing that we like to say, it seems like we are well behind
that still.
And there is not a chance in heck of getting there now with
the way that the budget is. But even when we have to
prioritize, we are still not buying the right stuff. We are
buying stuff, but we are not buying the right stuff.
So if you can't get next to Taiwan and you can't get even
close to North Korea, why do you need the ability to knock down
doors and gain a beachhead, if you can't get there in the first
place?
So my question is for General Mills, do we need to get
there in the first place? Does the Marine Corps need that
anymore?
And to Admiral Clingan, how do we do it if we are not going
to build the right ships for it, if we are going to build some
modular fast frigates that are not stealthy and that are not as
fast as some of the ships like the Stiletto in San Diego? It is
a carbon fiber air entrapment whole ship that can go really
fast and is undetectable by radar. If we aren't going to do
that, then how are we going to touch people anyway?
General Mills. Thank you for those comments, Congressman.
And thank you for the comment on my service.
Let me just start off, and I would just say that the Marine
Corps and amphibious warfare go back, as you know, quite a
while. The initial question we had to answer was: Was
amphibious warfare even feasible, back in the 1930s, as we
began to look at an expanding Japanese threat in the Pacific?
There were many people back there who said no, it was not a
feasible military strategy and was foolish for us to pursue and
try to train and equip our forces to do so.
I think the success, obviously, in World War II as it
evolved and as our tactics changed and our equipment changed,
proved, in fact, that was a very feasible strategy.
In the years since World War II, time and time again, the
feasibility of amphibious operations has been questioned,
whether it be in 1949 when it was--General Bradley questioned
the very idea that an amphibious attack would ever take place
again, followed very shortly thereafter, of course, by the
Inchon landing and then what many people would describe as the
decisive stroke of the Korean War, and the other amphibious
operations that have taken place since that time.
Each time, things have changed. The threat has been more.
People have questioned whether or not that was still a feasible
military operation. Each time, I think that the Navy and Marine
Corps team, backed by the entire joint community, has proven in
fact not only is it feasible, but it is extraordinarily
valuable as you pursue operations whether across the entire
spectrum of military operations, everything from humanitarian
relief to full combat ashore with Task Force 58, as we struck
some 450 miles inland to begin the Afghan war back in the early
2000s.
So I would say that those who question the ability of
amphibious forces to conduct operations today just don't
understand the way that we constantly study, that we constantly
adapt, that we constantly change. And we face a threat and we
believe that we can overcome it.
I would argue vehemently that amphibious operations play a
critical role in the United States military spectrum of
capabilities. We fit in very nicely to the joint effort. I
think over the years we have begun to operate more and more
with them. We operate very closely with our SOC [Special
Operations Command] community, which is emerging as a very
powerful force.
We also operate now with our cyber community, which, again,
is adding another facet to amphibious operations.
So I would argue, properly equipped, properly trained,
properly manned, amphibious operations are indeed a valuable
tool for the United States military to have in its toolbox in
the years to come.
Admiral Clingan. Congressman Hunter, thank you for the
question, and you have well articulated one of the challenges
that faces the Navy and the joint force today.
Clearly, to bring the Marine Corps to bear in its
amphibious assault role and in fact to flow the joint force to
a theater of interest and to sustain it requires that we deal
with the anti-access/area-denial environment that is not only
evolving in the Asia-Pacific, but we expect proliferation of
those weapons as well as its uniquely evolving in other parts
of the world.
So it is a global challenge that we must be able to
address, against a very capable adversary that can bring
ballistic missile capability, cruise missiles, submarines and
the entire spectrum of highly technical and sophisticated
weapon systems together to oppose our access. We need to bring
the entire portfolio of the Navy and the Air Force and other
elements of the joint force to bear as well.
So when we look at what is required of the Navy to deal
with this anti-access environment, it runs the gamut from
aircraft carriers to cruisers with ballistic missile and
integrated air missile defense capabilities, as well as our
DDGs and the DDG-51. It takes P-8s to deal with the submarine
threat, and even the Littoral Combat Ship, which is our future
mine countermeasures platform, which is an aspect of area
denial that we have got to deal with.
So it is a challenge, and the budget constraints that we
face are going to require us to balance risk across that entire
portfolio necessary to deal with it.
Mr. Hunter. Thank you, gentlemen.
And I would just end, Mr. Chairman, by saying he who
controls the ocean controls the world, and he who controls
space controls the ocean. And if we lose that ability we are
going to lose our superpower status and be a regional power.
And it is going to be a sad day if we in this committee and in
these committees allow that to happen.
Thank you.
Mr. Akin. Thank you, Congressman Hunter.
And Mr. Larsen; Congressman Larsen.
Mr. Larsen. Either one works, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
recognition. I think what we are hearing is that deficits
matter here on Capitol Hill, and the global recession that
begin in 2007 exacerbated structural deficits, structural
problems in the Federal budget overall that this Congress and
Congresses before us and administration before us and this
administration have all ignored.
And now we are left with a period of having to make some
serious choices, and serious choices sooner rather than later,
because the tail on a lack of making decisions on this is
pretty big. But the impact of making good decisions now is
pretty big as well, in the future.
And so that is kind of what we are left with. And I know on
this committee we talk about a core constitutional function
being common defense, but there is also general welfare,
ensuring the blessings of liberty. So it impacts the entire
budget.
And I just think it is important to make those points as we
are putting this in context. We tend to focus on one set of
issues here on this committee, but there are a lot of
committees and a lot of people around the country who are
looking at a lot of other parts of the budget, too, and trying
to make sure that we are addressing a lot of needs.
And so now we are faced with choices that, frankly, we are
elected to make, but are trying to resist making sometimes.
But, you know, we have to make them. That is a premise.
Admiral, just a couple questions. So I just want to
understand some of the details on some of the points. On the
maintenance and Navy ships that have been at a high operational
tempo over the last 10 years, would this, a couple questions
here, would this maintenance cycle, we have to bring these
home; would these have occurred regardless of sequestration,
first off? In other words, isn't the need for the maintenance
of a lot of these ships going to occur anyway? So what does the
impact of sequestration have on it, have on this maintenance,
first?
Second, the 59 percent of the requests that are being
fulfilled; is that request of any and all requests, or are
these 59 percent of the requests that have been validated by
the Joint Chiefs of Staff that are being fulfilled? Or are 100
percent of the requests that have been validated being
fulfilled? You know, what is that number?
And I guess for the record, if I could have the Air Force
and Marine Corps get back to me.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 75.]
Mr. Larsen. Give me the difference there between the
percentage of requests being fulfilled versus the one that
actually, the requests that have been validated have been
fulfilled. So how do those differ?
And I think those, if I had that kind of information it
would help me understand a little bit better about this
challenge. I know there are challenges, just trying to put some
numbers on them that are from a similar standard so I can deal
with some of these decisions and choices that we are going to
have to make all over the budget, not just here in the defense
budget, but all over the budget.
So, Admiral, if you could, just take a whack at those.
Then, for the other two, for the record, give me the Marine
Corps and the Air Force numbers.
Admiral Clingan. Congressman Larsen, thank you for the
question.
The impact of operating at surge levels over the last
several years has resulted in challenges with regard to the
material condition of our ships. And we have just recently
finished work that has developed class maintenance plans for
each type of ship. And that gives us a good baseline for us to
understand what needs to be done to maintain these ships so
they are ready to be operationally employed and will reach
their expected service life.
So we are endeavoring within budget constraints to put the
right money against those maintenance plans and provide the
time, the access for the ship yards and ship company to the
ships when they are not operating to actually do the required
maintenance.
Sequestration, as you well know, applies a level cut
against all program and activity lines. And so very clearly
that budget line would be cut and we would be forced to rescope
some availabilities and cancel others.
So, if you will, this recovery effort that is required to
get our ships to the expected service lives would be delayed,
if not precluded to some significant extent.
With regard to the 59 percent of the COCOM [Combatant
Command] demand, the COCOMs derive their requirements from
their tasking, and they are pretty good at that. And so they
will work hard at deciding what capabilities across the joint
force they need to accomplish their requirements, their effects
out in the real world, and they get validated. So we are
talking about 59 percent of the validated requirements we are
able to resource.
That said, we are working with them under the circumstances
and have been to explore new and creative ways to meet the
requirements. For example, while we prefer an offshore option
in many cases, perhaps we can send the training team by
aircraft and have them train in situ on the partnership. Not
the way we prefer, but an alternative that may help us not
exacerbate the shortfall in meeting their demands through
innovative and creative ways, as an example.
Mr. Larsen. And, Mr. Chairman, just before I yield back, I
apologize for going over time. For the QFR [Question for the
Record], can you break that down by COCOM as well, and maybe
give me every 2 years, going back to 2000, the percentage every
2 years that is being fulfilled and by COCOM, I guess. So I
might get some perspective on this?
Admiral Clingan. Yes, sir, we can.
Mr. Larsen. Good. Thank you.
General Mills. Representative Larsen, if I could comment--
--
Mr. Larsen. It will be up to the chairman. I am over my
time. Sorry, General Mills. It will be up to the chairman.
Mr. Akin. You can finish the question.
Mr. Larsen. Okay. Thank you, General.
General Mills. I would just add to the admiral's statement,
in addition to the maintenance, of course, which the Marine
Corps also faces on its equipment, which is being used both for
training and for operational purposes, sequestration also
impacts our modernization programs, which are critical to us
resetting the force as it begins to proceed ahead.
Regarding the COCOM requirements, those are validated
requirements. The joint system has a system in which they
submit their requirements to a single point of entry, which are
then prioritized and filled as best.
The Navy, Marine Corps, and the Air Force have looked at
ways of meeting those requirements in really extraordinary
means. I will give you an example. The USS Kearsarge battle
group that was out in the Pacific over the spring and summer of
this year; three ships, at one point, separated literally by
thousands of miles. As each ship conducted and met a COCOM's
requirement, everything from the Pakistani floods to the
operations off Libya to the landing force in support of my
forces that were ashore in Afghanistan at the time when we saw
an opportunity to deal a blow to the enemy.
And so by spreading that force out literally over thousands
of miles, those ships operating semi-independently, we were
able to come to, with one asset, if you will, meet three
requirements.
So the Navy-Marine Corps team, and with the Air Force, and
with the Army, are trying to meet those requirements as best we
can using somewhat extraordinary procedures at times.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Akin. And Congressman Mike.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you all for you dedicated years of service to
this country.
I certainly share the majority's concern within this
committee that the cuts from sequestration, should they occur,
on the Department of Defense would be far too deep and would
hurt this country's capability. I disagree, probably, with the
majority where they feel that no savings, further savings are
available from the Department of Defense.
And first I want to say that we have made progress in
acquisition that have, I think, created efficiencies. We are
going more to fixed-price contracting. And I think that that is
a big help.
I think there is a natural shift that is occurring from a
counterinsurgency doctrine to a counterterrorism doctrine, and
I think that that will bring about substantial savings to this
country.
And I certainly hope we never go down the path of nation-
building again.
And I think it will take a good decade for our military to
reestablish the combined arms capabilities that have been lost
in counterinsurgency warfare that are essential to the
deterring our adversaries.
I have a concern that on the personnel side, the personnel
costs. And Secretary of Defense Gates warned us about this,
that the trajectory of personnel costs are eating into
acquisition costs.
So even if we can deal with a problem external to the
Department of Defense, which is essentially the rise of
entitlement spending, mandatory spending eating into the
discretionary budget, I think we have a problem internal to the
Department of Defense to the military in terms of the
trajectory of personnel costs eating into acquisition costs.
And, again, Secretary of Defense Gates warned us about this.
And I want to express, when I am looking at this chart,
where we talk about 1990 to today and the decline of our
military going from, say, Army maneuver battalions to 180 to
98; Navy ships, 546 in 1990 to 288 today; U.S. Air Force
fighters, 4,355 to 1,990, et cetera.
My guess is, and I will be asking the Department of Defense
this, that we have more flag officers today than we did in 1990
with a much larger force. I believe our military is just much
too top-heavy today and there is an unnecessary cost associated
to that.
I think that we ought to be looking at, when we look at the
force structure, what additional units could be placed in the
Guard and Reserve for savings. I think, probably, we should
look at, on the increasing-cost side, plussing up, I think,
compensation for our deployed military, whether it is sea
service or whether it is hazardous-duty or imminent-danger pay,
to recognize the disparity between our deployed forces and our
non-deployed forces.
But I think that we are going to have to deal with the
trajectory of personnel costs, and that is going to be very
unpopular for this committee, and it is going to take a lot of
courage.
But we have got a two-front war going on against our
capability: again, the external one that is coming upon us on
November 23rd and an internal one on rising personnel costs.
And I wonder if any of you would like to respond to any of the
comments that I made.
Admiral.
Admiral Clingan. Sir, thank you for the question.
The Department of Defense and the Navy appreciate that
challenge of the rising personnel costs. And in almost every
case senior leadership in the Departments have said all things
are on the table.
So many of the things that you have identified we are
exploring with great detail, procurement program, process
improvements, deficiencies, the rising costs of personnel. The
top-heavy, I know we have looked at adjusting, and I believe
have made adjustments, to the number of flag and general
officers we have.
And Active Component-Reserve Component balance, while not
going back to the circumstance we found ourselves a decade ago
where we didn't quite have the combat support and combat
service support allocations across Active and Reserve right.
You know, this budget challenge has caused us to look at
all those things. And I think when the dust settles that you
will find appropriate thought has been applied in those
directions.
Mr. Coffman. Lieutenant General Mills, do you have any
comment?
General Mills. I would agree with the admiral. I think that
we have done, as I said, we did a force structure review last
winter; took a look at the requirements for the Marine Corps
and how they could be met with an appropriately sized force,
looking at the drawdown in Afghanistan.
I think that we designed a force that met our requirements
and that was affordable under those budget conditions. Those
conditions, we know now, are shifting and we are taking another
look at being able to meet our commitments with a, perhaps,
reduced force.
I agree with you, sir, that we need to identify and to
recognize our commitment of our people who are forward deployed
and in harm's way. We do a good job of it. Perhaps we could do
a better of it.
I do believe that Secretary Panetta's guidance has been
relatively consistent over the past couple of months, and it is
critical that we do not break faith with our forces, both with
our men and their families. I think that is important to our
future.
I think that we are going to have some tough choices to
make. We basically got, I think, three ways to look at the
cuts. We look at it through man, through train, or through
equip. And those are the kind of hard selection processes that
we are going to have to make and perhaps ask our question:
``What is good enough?''
General Hesterman. Sir, Air Force leadership is very
similar to what my brother described here.
I will tell you, I was the no-taker this weekend when our
Chief and Secretary sat down with our Guard and Reserve
leadership. They are committed to an optimal mix. They are
committed to doing this together and to making sure that we get
this right.
General Mills. Sir, if I could add just one more thought,
please?
When you spoke about the 10 years you felt that would take
for us to move back to a combined arms environment, I think
that the, if one thing all of our services have shown over the
past few years is our ability to turn, to adjust, and to adapt.
I would argue that perhaps no other force in the world other
than the United States force could have done what was done in
Iraq and Afghanistan, which was move from a high-intensity
conflict, a very traditional armor-against-armor force, to
pivot on a dime, if you will, to moving to a very effective
counterinsurgency campaign.
I think that the flexibility of all of our forces was
paramount to that. And very few people in the world could have
done that.
And I think we will show that same adaptability over the
years to come if we move back to perhaps what you would think
of as more traditional roles.
I believe the combined arms force is still in effect. I
believe an amphibiously capable force is still in effect. And I
think that we are still able to accomplish a wide range of
missions despite the fact that we have been focusing, perhaps,
a bit on the Afghan fight over the past few years.
Mr. Coffman. And, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Akin. Thank you.
And we also have our Congressman Gibson here.
Mr. Gibson. Well, thanks very much, Chairman. And I
appreciate you calling this joint meeting.
I appreciate the panelists today, for your service and
leadership.
The question has to do for the Air Force, General
Hesterman, about joint forcible-entry capabilities,
particularly United States Army airborne, air assault, and then
also United States Marine Corps supported by Navy, obviously.
And looking at it both 12 months out and then also 5 years
out, Air Force support in terms of simulations, but then also
as building capabilities, the training exercises; the
commitment in terms of platforms--C-17s, C-130s, joint arm
airborne command-and-control, electronic warfare, fighters,
bombers--the frequency that the Air Force will be able to
support these exercises used to go on about six times a year at
Fort Bragg, and the level of commitment you are going to be
able to make.
And then is there anything in the long-term planning to
bring this all together, Air Force support to a truly joint
exercise, whether that be simulated or at some point sort of
like what Ocean Venture used to do years ago, bring in the
whole joint team together?
General Hesterman. Sir, first of all, let me say that our
commitment to our joint brothers to be able to provide that
capability you described is, that is why we are here. I mean,
that is what we do.
As far as being able to sustain these exercises or to grow
them in, the reason we are here is to talk about the potential
impact. You can be sure that if we go much beyond the cuts that
we have now or into sequester, that those kinds of things will
be at risk.
Mr. Gibson. Well, then, based on, go with the assumption
for the moment, no sequester. What is the Air Force's
commitment at this point in terms of platforms and really the
diversity of platforms to continue to build that capability
going forward? Do you have any sense or do you want to do that
for the record?
General Hesterman. The sense of it is, is there is a lot of
discussion now about which platforms we'll carry forward. The
commitment, and my Service Chief articulated it yesterday, to
provide this support to our land component is 100 percent.
So what platform we will do that with will be decided in
the next few months, I think.
Mr. Gibson. Yes. You know, my experience with this, I led
the brigade task force that was part of the global response
force, and clearly we had pressing priorities all over the
globe. So, you know, this had to move down in the
prioritization, but of course over time we are incurring more
risk when we do that.
I would assess our risk at very high risk at this point to
be able to conduct a full-blown joint forcible entry. When you
look at the fact that, as you know, it is a very complex
operation, and we often had to pull platforms from all across
the eastern United States and in some cases all throughout the
continental United States to be able to support these
exercises, understandably.
And I know you are juggling a lot of things. And what I am
trying to get a sense of is where we are today in terms of the
Air Force's ability to support. It may very well be that we are
not able to afford doing this six times a year, but what is
that right frequency, are we going to be able to pull this all
together, the entire joint team? Because otherwise I don't know
that the American people and the people's representatives fully
understand the risk that we are incurring over time.
General Hesterman. Sir, what I will tell you is whatever
size we end up, our leadership is committed to it being
exceptionally capable. So, you know, I think we do know how to
do this. And I think the problem will be is in how many places
we can do it, you know, and because obviously we don't get to
decide where it is needed.
But, you know, our capability, I think, will be pure. How
much of that capability exists, I think, is the subject of this
hearing.
Mr. Gibson. Yes. And lastly, I think your pilots will tell
you that, you know, the longer you go without doing these type
of exercises, the more difficult it is to try to restart and to
pull that capability together.
General Hesterman. No argument, sir.
Mr. Gibson. Yes.
Okay. Thanks very much, Chairman.
Mr. Akin. Thank you. Good questions.
One last question to Congresswoman Bordallo.
Ms. Bordallo. Yes. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I just want a clarification before we disperse this
afternoon. And I think you made some comments, and others here,
and I have heard them as well: Why don't we bring our troops
back from these foreign countries? This would save us millions
and millions of dollars.
Well, I would, since we have three very important officers
here before us, I am sure they will be able to answer these
questions. And I will take these two countries: Korea and
Japan.
Now, aside from the need for forward presence to deter
potential adversaries, how much host-nation support are Japan
and Korea providing to station our troops in their countries?
My understanding is that they are paying the bill. And it
is a significant amount of money--billions of dollars--for
MILCON [Military Construction], base operations, facilities
sustainment. In fact, it would cost us a lot more to send all
our troops back to the United States. We would have to build
bases. We would have to build housing.
Am I right in this? And I don't think they charge us any
kind of lease or lots of money for using their properties. Am I
correct in this? Yes, in Japan and Korea, we don't pay leasing
fees and they are providing all the facilities and so forth. Is
this correct?
Admiral Clingan. Congresswoman, I cannot confirm for you
exactly what costs the United States Navy, in our case, is
paying and what costs Japan is carrying. But I do know that
Japan, for example, does pay a significant amount of money to
facilitate hosting us there.
Ms. Bordallo. General.
General Mills. I would agree with the admiral. I will have
to get back to you on the exact split between what the host
nation provides and what we provide.
I would absolutely agree with you that if we brought all
the marines back home, that it would be a MILCON bill back in
the states as our facilities are designed and built and
structured that a certain percentage of our force will be
forward-deployed and therefore they don't need barracks or
office space or training grounds to operate on.
So I absolutely concur with the second half of your
comment.
Ms. Bordallo. And General.
General Hesterman. Ma'am, we will get you the exact
numbers, but I believe your premise is correct.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 75.]
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you. I just wanted to clarify that, Mr.
Chairman, that it would cost us more to bring our troops back
home than when they are stationed over in places like Japan and
Korea, where they are picking up the tab.
Mr. Akin. I very much appreciate all of you sticking with
us today on the committee and for your testimony. I think that
the message is pretty straightforward that we have gone about
as far as she can go on this thing. And I think you have
developed that in terms of a fair amount of detail for us.
So thank you all for coming out, Generals and Admiral, and
I look forward to the next time. God bless you all.
Thanks.
[Whereupon, at 1:15 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
?

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A P P E N D I X

November 3, 2011

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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

November 3, 2011

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Statement of Hon. W. Todd Akin

Chairman, House Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces

Hearing on

A Day Without Seapower and Projection Forces

November 3, 2011

Our witnesses represent those organizations within their
respective services which are responsible for development of
the strategy by which their departments can build a program by
which to execute that strategy. Once the elements of the
program have been defined, the necessary resources can be
determined. Usually there will never be enough resources to
execute the strategy with little or no risks in all of the
elements, and a prioritization process is necessary. The less
resources--the more risk.
The thing about risk in the Armed Services of the United
States usually means the higher the risk, the more casualties
are taken should a conflict occur.
We are about to enter a period of constrained resources,
and I am sure our witnesses are well aware of the impacts in
their respective services of the roughly $465 billion cut to
the budget over the next 10 years from internal Department cuts
and the enactment of the Budget Control Act. To further
complicate things, if the Special Committee for Deficit
Reduction fails to find an additional $1.2 trillion in cuts
over the next 10 years, and a sequestration scenario ensues,
the Defense Department will face the potential for additional
cuts of roughly another $600 billion.
This all happened so fast--and I do not envy our witnesses'
predicament of having to developing strategies that have been
dictated by budgets--it should be the other way around. I am
sure the subcommittees would be interested in hearing the
witnesses' thoughts on this, as well as on what prioritization
processes you are using to comply with the $465 billion cut,
and what would happen were sequestration to occur. I want to
thank the witnesses for appearing today, and look forward to
your testimony.

Statement of Hon. J. Randy Forbes

Chairman, House Subcommittee on Readiness

Hearing on

A Day Without Seapower and Projection Forces

November 3, 2011

I want to thank Chairman Akin for co-chairing this hearing,
and to thank all of our members and the distinguished panel of
experts and welcome them to today's hearing focused on what the
future of seapower and projection capabilities may portend in
an era of austere budgets.
As Chairman Akin already offered, I want to add my thanks
to our witnesses for being with us this morning to continue
this very important dialogue regarding potential cuts to
defense, potential impacts to the future force, and the
readiness of our maritime and projection assets today and in
the future.
I believe it is vital that you are all here with us today
to continue to inform the members of these subcommittees and
the public in advance of the ``super committee'' delivering its
ultimate recommendations to the Congress. I will keep my
remarks short in order that we proceed to the heart of the
discussion.
The Readiness Subcommittee has convened numerous times in
the past few months to hear from each of the Services, and most
recently the Vice Chiefs regarding the current state of the
force, the increased risk, and the uncertainty of the future
and potential impacts to military readiness if sequestration
were enacted.
While there seems to be a prevailing consensus that
sequestration under the Budget Control Act would be devastating
to the military, I remain severely concerned that we have
already gone too far. Last year, when the DOD began closing
Joint Forces Command without analysis, I told members this
would soon be coming to a theater near you. Currently we are
dealing with the $465 billion DOD cut that was arbitrarily made
without analysis to underpin that number. Now, another shoe has
dropped with regard to civilian personnel. The Air Force
announced just yesterday that they will eliminate 16,500
civilian positions in Fiscal Year 2012. That is just the Air
Force and only one fiscal year. What happens if the other shoe
drops under sequestration? With all of these individual
decisions, the cumulative effect will be devastating. At this
point I would say get ready, the show is only just beginning.
This leads me to reiterate my concern regarding additional
short-term decisions that could lead to the potential
``hollowing of the force'' under sequestration. That would be a
situation that cannot be quickly reversed. General Dunford
articulated this very point before the Readiness Subcommittee
last week, regarding concerns that ``we will make these cuts
without an adequate appreciation of the strategic implications,
the implications on our readiness, or the implications of
breaking faith. And also . . . that folks would think that if
we get it wrong, well, we can just simply fix it in a year or
two. That is not possible, particularly in the latter category.
And if we break the trust of our marines, sailors, soldiers and
airmen today, it would be decades before we get it back.''
The question I continue to ask is what is the risk to the
national defense of our country if we continue making some of
the cuts to defense we hear being discussed in Washington?
There are never enough resources to eliminate all of our risks,
but, there must be a strategic assessment to underpin the
decisions. Instead, I feel that currently the DOD is just
responding to budgetary pressures, the result of which could
severely degrade the military's ability to operate.
In Vice Admiral Clingan's written testimony for this
hearing today, he indicates ``Without question, the Fleet is
operating now at an unsustainable level. To best meet the
Combatant Commanders' need for deployed Navy forces since
September 11, 2001 and to respond to emergent requirements, we
have increased the frequency and average length of unit
deployments. This has resulted in reduced training time;
reduced maintenance availabilities; a narrowing of pre-
deployment training for certain units to mission-specific
tasks; and an accelerated aging of our ships and aircraft.''
Consistent with the testimony that Vice Admiral Burke
provided before the Readiness Subcommittee, the Navy has been
operating in a sustained surge, precluding the opportunity to
do deep maintenance on fleet assets. How will that impact the
future force? Looking forward, will our forces be ``ready'' for
the mission they are called upon to do when the time comes?
While there are many contributing factors that brought us
to this point today, we are currently at a crossroads where we
have time yet to prepare for the many tough decisions that lie
ahead. In doing so, we must not forget our obligation to ensure
our men and women in uniform are given all the tools necessary
for the job we ask them to do.
I look forward to learning from each of our witnesses about
how we cope with these challenging fiscal times while also
maintaining a ready military.

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=======================================================================

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING

THE HEARING

November 3, 2011

=======================================================================

RESPONSES TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. LARSEN

Admiral Clingan. From 1991 through 2004, naval forces were
allocated by the Joint Staff through the Global Naval Force Presence
Policy. This policy dictated the COCOM allocation via a long range
schedule. The current Global Force Management (GFM) process, which
started in 2005, allocates forces based on yearly COCOM demand.
Accessible summary records are available going back to 2007, as
follows:

Percent of COCOM unit demand fulfilled:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
EUCOM/
Year Global CENTCOM PACOM AFRICOM SOUTHCOM
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2007 90 98 81 82 75
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2008 76 100 82 73 45
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2009 69 71 74 57 65
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2010 64 73 74 54 76
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2011 59 76 72 53 25
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2012 53 56 65 48 29
------------------------------------------------------------------------

[See page 24.]

General Mills. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.] [See page 24.]

General Hesterman. The Air Force fulfills nearly 100% of the Joint
Staff-validated requirements that are subsequently tasked by the
Secretary of Defense. The Air Force also supports a significant number
of requirements from in garrison--also referred to as ``deployed in
place.'' Many space and cyber capabilities are provided from stateside
locations, and the vast majority of our Remotely Piloted Aircraft are
controlled from non-deployed units in the United States. While not
physically deployed, these forces operate on the Combatant Commander's
battle rhythm in support of theater objectives. The Air Force remains
fully committed to supporting overseas contingency operations and the
high rotational demand from our Combatant Commanders.
Within the Global Force Management process run by the Joint Staff,
the Combatant Commanders submit their force requirements for needed
capabilities to be filled from across the Services. Requests are not
necessarily made for Air Force, Army or Navy forces--they are requests
for capability such as close air support, combat engineering, etc.
Unfortunately the COCOM's needs in some areas far exceed the combined
Services' capacity to fill, so requests are prioritized, coordinated
and then sourced from the available forces (this requires Secretary of
Defense approval). Since the Services all have some measure of air
capability, the Air Force does not fill all airpower requirements. Due
to these factors the Air Force does not report the percentage of
initial requests that enter the Global Force Management process and are
ultimately not filled as a shortfall in AF capability. [See page 24.]
RESPONSES TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO
Admiral Clingan. The Republic of Korea (RoK) provides the U.S. Navy
approximately 64% for logistics cost and 70% for salaries under a
Special Measures Agreement. The RoK provided $19M in 2009 for the
construction of a Fleet and Family Town Center, $5M in 2011 (68% of the
annual Navy budget) for Logistics Cost sharing (acquisition of
logistics equipment, supplies, and/or services), and $4.5M in 2011 (71%
of salaries) for Labor Cost Sharing. The U.S. Navy does not pay for the
land and facilities provided for its use under the Status of Forces
Agreement; this currently totals 95 acres and 344 buildings in Korea.
The Government of Japan (GoJ) provides approximately 75% of the
Navy's total utility bill which covers electricity, water, sewer, and
gas for heating ($62M in 2011). The GoJ voluntarily initiated the Japan
Facilities Improvement Program which provides funding of approximately
$200M per year for services. This program supports infrastructure
capital investment similar to MILCON but it does not provide support to
any base operations or facilities.

The Republic of Korea (ROK)

1.) Salaries: Navy Region Korea has received the following amounts
for Labor. The ROK Government pays 71% of salaries for Korean
Government Service (KGS) employees.
FY 09 $5.2M
FY 10 $4.1M
FY 11 $4.5M

2.) Leases: U.S. Navy does not pay for the land and facilities
provided for its use under Status of Forces Agreement grant. This
currently totals 95 acres and 344 buildings in Korea.

3.) Construction: In recent years Navy Region Korea has received
the following host nation funded construction funds, totaling $32.7M.
CY07 Bachelor Enlisted Quarters $5.7M--Completed 2011
Natural Gas Line $2.7M--Completed 2010
Vehicle Maintenance Facility $2.5M--Under
construction
Fire Station $2.9M--Completed 2011
CY09 Fleet and Family Town Center $18.9M--Under
construction

4.) Sustainment: Navy Region Korea has received the following
amounts for sustainment/equipment from the host nation, totaling $9.6M.
CY09 $2.1M
CY10 $2.6M
CY11 $4.9M

5.) Utilities: Navy Region Korea does not receive utility funding
for consumption, but are given the lowest industrial rates offered.
However, over the past decade, the Korean government has paid for a
completely new electrical system; water storage tank and pipeline
system; and natural gas line installation; shore power mounds at Piers
11 and 22 for use by USN ships; and has funded a number of green energy
projects via host nation construction and sustainment funds, greatly
reducing Navy costs for utilities.

6.) Other funding: Other in-kind support provided includes highway
toll waivers and docking and security patrols at ROK Navy bases for
visiting U.S. Navy ships.

Government of Japan (GOJ)

1.) Salaries: Labor Cost Sharing Program under Special Measures
Agreement Article I. The Government of Japan has for over two decades
funded 85-90 percent of the overall labor costs of DON's largest
foreign national workforce worldwide--13,703 personnel (9,423 with Navy
and 4,280 with Marine Corps) who perform work supporting the United
States Government's (USG) forward deployment strategy in the western
Pacific, including ship repair, supply, communications and
infrastructure maintenance. Most recent financial information in
existence is Japanese Fiscal Year (JFY) 10 (1 Apr 10-31 Mar 11). The
weighted average actual exchange rate obtained by Defense Finance &
Accounting Service for payment of the USG portion was 82.2 yen per U.S.
dollar. Budget Execution Rates and other rates used often vary
throughout the year or by activity.

Navy:
38,936,621,525 was spent on Master Labor
Contracts (MLC)s
5,924,115,963 was covered by USG
33,012,505,562 was covered by GOJ

Marines:
14,645,746,145 was spent on MLCs
859,315,904 was covered by USG
13,786,430,241 was covered by GOJ

2.) Leases: USN does not pay the GOJ for the use of land and
facilities provided under the Status Of Forces Agreement (SOFA) grant.
USN does have exclusive use of approximately 16,000 acres of land and
24,109 facilities with Plant Replacement Value of approximately
$12,873M in Japan. The only type of ``lease or rental'' payment made is
$209,894/year to a private Japanese company for 50 apartment units that
houses the ship repair workforce surge from Puget Sound Naval Shipyard
during CVN maintenance.
3.) Construction: Japanese Facilities Improvement Program (JFIP)
provides infrastructure capital investment similar to MILCON, but
project selection, programming, and award differs greatly from MILCON.
Funding levels have been steadily declining since the mid 1990s from
approximately $1.0B to less than $200M a year since FY08 through FY12
for all the services. Funding varies by year since JFIP vary depending
on projects programmed in each year. Historically, Navy has received
approximately \1/3\ of the annual JFIP.
4.) Sustainment: USN does not receive any funds from the GOJ for
base operation support or facilities sustainment.
5.) Utilities: Utilities Cost Share Program provides GOJ funds to
help offset USN's utility cost of electricity, water, sewer, and gas
for heating. USN receives
6.3 billion annually, approximately $68.0M a year depending yen/
dollar exchange rate, which covers approximately 75% of USN's total
utility bill. For past three years, USN received JFY09 $68.0M, JFY10
$73.0M, and JFY11 $62.0M respectively.
6.) Other funding: N/A [See page 30.]

General Mills. Government of Korea Logistics Cost Share support
received for the past 3 fiscal years follows:

FY09:
Labor--$1,202,767
Vehicles--$43,640
Aircraft In-service Repair--$163,583
Service Depot Level Maintenance (SDLM) for CH-53--
$7,046,340
Supplies--$0
Facilities sustainment--$254,826

FY10:
Labor--$1,011,896
Vehicles--$194,731
Aircraft In-service Repair--$148,152
SDLM for CH-53--$6,258,065
Supplies--$0
Facilities sustainment--$381,848

FY11:
Labor--$1,061,339
Vehicles--$257,605
Aircraft In-service Repair--$104,374
SDLM for CH-53--$6,049,020
Supplies--$2,019,051
Facilities sustainment--$695,951

Government of Japan provided Utility and Labor support: (Please
note that the Japanese Fiscal Year begins on 1 April and ends on 31
March)

FY09:
Labor Cost Sharing--$147,549,249
Utility Cost Sharing--$60,911,050

FY10:
Labor Cost Sharing--$149,067,628
Utility Cost Sharing--$62,051,558

FY11:
Labor Cost Sharing--$158,721,331
Utility Cost Sharing--$64,983,396

Government of Japan provided support under the Japanese Facilities
Improvement Program (JFIP) for various levels of effort including MCAS
Iwakuni, MCB Butler and CATC Camp Fuji:

FY09 MCAS Iwakuni--$86 Million
FY09 MCB Butler--$2 Million
FY09 Camp Fuji--$0

FY10 MCAS Iwakuni--$29 Million
FY10 MCB Butler--$800,000
FY10 Camp Fuji--$300,000

FY11 MCAS Iwakuni--$35 Million
FY11 MCB Butler--$2.1 Million
FY11 Camp Fuji--$200,000

Government of Japan lease payments made to land owners: There are
23,000 land owners on Okinawa who are paid by the Japanese Government.
Land owners are paid two times per year in March and July. The
following figures are payments made to land owners Okinawa wide to
include the Marine Corps, Air Force, and Army.

JFY08--78,375 mil Yen (conversion rate 114.7781) = $682,839,322
JFY09--79,090 mil Yen (conversion rate 114.3007) = $691,946,768
JFY10--79,295 mil Yen (conversion rate 108.9969) = $663,275,744

The U.S. Government does not pay rent for land or facilities in
Japan.

The Government of Japan does not fund any facilities maintenance.

Government of Japan (GOJ) has constructed family housing under the
Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) agreement. GOJ has only
constructed four of eight phases of new family housing. The remaining
four phases are on hold. The GOJ will construct the 56 housing units
that will serve the new hospital. Construction is tentatively scheduled
for FY15. [See page 30.]

General Hesterman. Japan will provide $332 million and Korea will
provide $125 million to support the United States Air Force for FY12.
[See page 30.]
?

=======================================================================

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

November 3, 2011

=======================================================================

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES

Mr. Forbes. Adoption of advanced predictive logistics technologies
to enable major cost avoidance: Section 328 of the FY 2010 NDAA
required DOD to develop a comprehensive plan for improving inventory
management systems, including addressing weaknesses in demand
forecasting procedures. GAO's review of the Comprehensive Inventory
Management Improvement Plan, submitted to Congress in January of this
year, cited difficulties in predicting demand patterns as a key
challenge in implementing improved forecasting. However, we are aware
that several program offices have already effectively addressed this
challenge by adopting advanced modeling and simulation tools, and the
results have been billions of dollars in cost avoidance and savings. If
some program offices have already dealt with this problem, what is
preventing wider application of these tools in the immediate future
across each of the services?
Admiral Clingan. The objective of the Comprehensive Inventory
Management Improvement Plan (CIMIP) is to ensure DOD buys only what we
need and retains only what we use. This OSD-led effort involves
considerable sharing of ideas and lessons learned on techniques to
improve forecasting as well as vetting ideas and adopting proven
techniques across DOD.
As part of our Enterprise Resource Planning implementation, Navy is
currently implementing a SAP1 business solution with an enhanced
forecasting module which will improve our demand forecasting
capabilities and allow for more efficient management of Navy wholesale
inventories. Additionally Navy is utilizing a Multi-Indenture Multi-
Echelon Readiness Based Sparing (RBS) capable model called Supply
Planning and Optimization (SPO) to compute wholesale and retail stock
levels for aviation programs. This model uses advanced RBS techniques
to optimize inventory levels across the enterprise, delivering weapon
systems readiness at least cost.
While customer demands are often difficult to forecast due to
operating tempo changes and low weapon system population density, Navy
is currently working to expand SPO utilization to maritime retail
products and is also researching further integration of wholesale and
retail inventory computation. Navy continues to pursue opportunities to
improve demand forecasting; as successful techniques are identified the
challenge lies in understanding how to apply those techniques to what
are often times widely different customer bases. Demand patterns for
aviation platforms, where there are thousands of airframes, can be
fundamentally different from those for surface ship or submarine
platforms with very small populations.
Furthermore, OSD (Supply Chain Integration) is beginning a study in
which the Navy and Air Force will explore alternative demand
forecasting methodologies for low-demand repairable items.

Mr. Forbes. Adoption of advanced predictive logistics technologies
to enable major cost avoidance: Section 328 of the FY 2010 NDAA
required DOD to develop a comprehensive plan for improving inventory
management systems, including addressing weaknesses in demand
forecasting procedures. GAO's review of the Comprehensive Inventory
Management Improvement Plan, submitted to Congress in January of this
year, cited difficulties in predicting demand patterns as a key
challenge in implementing improved forecasting. However, we are aware
that several program offices have already effectively addressed this
challenge by adopting advanced modeling and simulation tools, and the
results have been billions of dollars in cost avoidance and savings. If
some program offices have already dealt with this problem, what is
preventing wider application of these tools in the immediate future
across each of the services?
General Mills. The Marine Corps cannot answer the question on
behalf of the other services. However the Marine Corps is applying
predictive tools to its inventories as follows:
At this time, the Marine Corps is in the process of implementing
Global Combat Support System-Marine Corps (GCSS-MC) and is currently
using and exploring the full potential of the Advance Planning Suite
(APS) of applications inherent in the system to implement total force
demand planning. APS is comprised of Oracle Demand Planning (ODP),
Inventory Optimization (IO) and Advance Supply Chain Planning (ASCP).
Marine Corps Logistics Command administers the plans while the Marine
Forces (MARFORS) provide input and ultimately execute to their specific
requirements and constraints. The Marine Corps is using 24 months of
shipment history to produce a demand forecast one year in the future.
As this process matures, the Marines will observe, measure, and modify
our forecasts to best support our demand planning while minimizing the
amount of inventory on hand. Additionally an enterprise forecast will
enable better collaboration and communication of Marine Corps
requirements with our suppliers. The GCSS-MC benefits realized are
increased accountability, enhanced visibility, and a right-sized
inventory to reduce inventory carrying costs.

Mr. Forbes. Adoption of advanced predictive logistics technologies
to enable major cost avoidance: Section 328 of the FY 2010 NDAA
required DOD to develop a comprehensive plan for improving inventory
management systems, including addressing weaknesses in demand
forecasting procedures. GAO's review of the Comprehensive Inventory
Management Improvement Plan, submitted to Congress in January of this
year, cited difficulties in predicting demand patterns as a key
challenge in implementing improved forecasting. However, we are aware
that several program offices have already effectively addressed this
challenge by adopting advanced modeling and simulation tools, and the
results have been billions of dollars in cost avoidance and savings. If
some program offices have already dealt with this problem, what is
preventing wider application of these tools in the immediate future
across each of the services?
General Hesterman. The Department of Defense Comprehensive
Inventory Management Improvement Plan includes a Demand Forecasting
sub-plan which lays out a course of action to improve the inventory
level setting process, demand planning accuracy, and forecast accuracy.
The Air Force is collaborating with other components to baseline
current demand forecast methodologies, review best practices, and
establish diagnostic metrics on forecast accuracy and forecast bias. In
our review of best practices, we look across all levels in our supply
chain.
Contributing to improved forecasting, the Air Force has undertaken
a Logistics Modeling and Simulation (M&S) effort which has identified
and catalogued M&S tools in use or available across the Air Force.
However, M&S tools used by our acquisition program offices are not
sustainment inventory forecasting models and have limited application
to Air Force Supply Chain Management.
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. COFFMAN
Mr. Coffman. What is the number of Flag Officers in the Navy in
1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2010? What was the total number of
personnel in your service in 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2010?
Admiral Clingan.

Flag Officers:
1990: 256
1995: 218
2000: 219
2005: 213
2010: 253

Total Personnel:
1990: 582,854
1995: 434,617
2000: 373,193
2005: 362,941
2010: 328,303

The increase in Flag Officers between 2005 and 2010 primarily
reflects the growth in Joint Flag/General Officer billet requirements.
Mr. Coffman. What is the number of General Officers in the Marine
Corps in 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2010? What was the total number of
personnel in your service in 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2010?
General Mills.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Other
Year GOs Officers Enlisted Total
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1990 70 19,868 176,639 196,577
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1995 68 17,714 156,724 174,506
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2000 80 17,849 155,361 173,291
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2005 80 18,803 161,141 180,025
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2010 86 21,221 181,134 202,441
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Mr. Coffman. What is the number of General Officers in the Air
Force in 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2010? What was the total number of
personnel in your service in 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2010?
General Hesterman. In 1990, there were 333 general officers in the
Air Force and the total number of personnel was 530,861.
In 1995, there were 274 general officers in the Air Force and the
total number of personnel was 396,376.
In 2000, there were 271 general officers in the Air Force and the
total number of personnel was 351,375.
In 2005, there were 273 general officers in the Air Force and the
total number of personnel was 349,369.
In 2010, there were 315 general officers in the Air Force. 300 of
these general officers were in authorizations contained in the 2009
National Defense Authorization Act. The additional officers were in
positions that were exempted by title 10 of the U.S. Code and therefore
did not count against Air Force authorizations. The total number of Air
Force personnel was 329,638.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCHILLING
Mr. Schilling. What is the impact of reducing our forward power
globally on our organic base here at home? Will there be reductions in
the amount of work that is required to be done by the military organic
base? Will the military be able to keep our capabilities warm here at
home if we pull back our service members and ships?
Admiral Clingan. The Navy has continued to operate globally even
while providing significant forces to Commander, U.S. Central Command.
Following the end of combat operations in Afghanistan, the Navy expects
to continue to operate forward, employing a combination of Forward
Deployed Naval Forces and rotational forces, at a sustainable level.
While we continuously seek the most efficient and cost effective
approach for ship and aviation depot maintenance, both organic Navy and
private sector capabilities will remain in demand to support Navy
maintenance requirements. As it has historically, this demand will
largely reflect our force structure; the operational tempo of our
forces; and available resources.
Mr. Schilling. How can we maintain force projection in the current
fiscal climate? Are there roadblocks impeding the defense industrial
base that could be fixed to create a more efficient system and help
project better forward strength at a lower cost?
Admiral Clingan. Navy rotational forces have, and will continue to,
reset-in-stride to execute our global responsibilities. While we
continue to seek the most efficient and cost effective approach for
ship and aviation depot maintenance, both organic Navy and private
sector capabilities will remain in demand to support Navy maintenance
requirements. The Fleet Response Plan remains the Navy's force
generation model, and is a proven means to provide ready forces to the
Combatant Commanders globally, in addition to forces ready to surge in
response to crises.
Sustaining the defense industrial base is critical to our war
fighting capability. To this end, potential efficiencies include:
Clearly defining core industrial requirements in the
public and private sectors to sustain present capabilities and
field new capabilities.
Establishing the roles of both public depots and
private industry in meeting these core requirements.
Increased partnering between public and private
sectors. Depot maintenance should not be thought of as a fixed
activity or location, but as a level of maintenance that must
be performed by highly skilled artisans within a core
competency.
Effective integration of product support. This would
include sharing of technical data, public-private partnering in
both technical and trade skills, and maximizing use of
capabilities across our public and private industrial
facilities.
The new DOD Defense Strategy and supporting Fiscal Year 2013 budget
both focus on balancing DOD force structure to address warfighting
needs while sustaining the industrial base. Deliberations on Navy's
force structure are ongoing by the Secretary of the Navy and Office of
the Secretary of Defense; results will be submitted in the President's
Fiscal Year 2013 budget request. Navy is confident our resulting force
structure will be aligned with the new Defense Strategy.

Mr. Schilling. What is the impact of reducing our forward power
globally on our organic base here at home? Will there be reductions in
the amount of work that is required to be done by the military organic
base? Will the military be able to keep our capabilities warm here at
home if we pull back our service members and ships?
General Mills. Reducing forward presence will have a number of
impacts on the forces in the contiguous United States (CONUS).
First, the number of un-planned deployments will increase. Instead
of reacting to crisis with forces that are positioned forward--we will
have to deploy CONUS forces to respond. We currently maintain forces
that are ready to rapidly deploy--these forces will be required to
deploy more frequently. In the past 20 years we would have had to
deploy CONUS reaction forces more than 100 times--for periods of up to
6 months.
Forces used to transport crisis response forces (air and sea lift)
will be at even greater demand. Crises require a rapid response--and
most require a force that is flexible and responsive to a rapidly
changing situation. Marines on the ground have proven to be one of the
best alternatives for these types of situations. If we reduce our
forward presence we will have two options when crisis develop: use
diplomacy and support from partner nations to meet our objectives, or
rapidly deploy a force. If partner nations are willing to provide
airfields and ports, we can respond to many crisis using maritime
prepositioning forces and strategic airlift.
Mr. Schilling. How can we maintain force projection in the current
fiscal climate? Are there roadblocks impeding the defense industrial
base that could be fixed to create a more efficient system and help
project better forward strength at a lower cost?
General Mills. Although the world is continuing to change and
budgets continue to fluctuate, America's requirement to maintain a
forward based force-in-readiness remains. Physical presence matters. It
shows our economic and our military commitment to a particular region.
It deters potential adversaries, assures our friends, and permits
response in a timely manner to crises. Our current combination of
amphibious, air borne and, prepositioned forces provide the minimal
capacity to realistically address this challenge. During these times of
constrained resources, we remain committed to refining operations,
identifying efficiencies, and reinvesting savings to conserve scarce
public funds. For 7.8% of the total DOD budget, our Nation gains the
ability to respond to unexpected crises, from humanitarian disaster
relief efforts, to non-combatant evacuation operations, to conduct
counter-piracy operations, or full scale combat.
The Marine Corps is not aware of roadblocks impeding the industrial
base. That being said, we recognize that our operational capabilities
are enabled by the diverse industrial base. The Marine Corps works
aggressively to identify and mitigate activities or decisions that
could unintentionally destabilize the base upon which we depend.

Mr. Schilling. What is the impact of reducing our forward power
globally on our organic base here at home? Will there be reductions in
the amount of work that is required to be done by the military organic
base? Will the military be able to keep our capabilities warm here at
home if we pull back our service members and ships?
General Hesterman. A forward presence reduction could impact the
ability of CONUS bases to absorb additional force structure, including
limitations of CONUS airspace and ranges to support training
requirements. Also, increased airlift requirements would extend
deployment timelines, affect joint force synchronization, and add risk
to Combatant Commander's Operational Plans. Further, reduced forward
presence would degrade our interoperability and capability to building
partnerships with friends and allies. Lastly, such reductions could
jeopardize our ability to assure access to overseas locations as well
as overcome anti-access or area-denial measures--all are considerations
when determining our global force posture.
Mr. Schilling. How can we maintain force projection in the current
fiscal climate? Are there roadblocks impeding the defense industrial
base that could be fixed to create a more efficient system and help
project better forward strength at a lower cost?
General Hesterman. Ensuring our ability to project force in the
current fiscal environment involves making difficult decisions about
our force posture. Limited budget resources may compel a gradual shift
away from our current posture to one that provides force projection
capability more efficiently and allows us a quick reach to emerging
areas of strategic interest. Equally important is the need to avoid a
``hollowing out'' of the force. A smaller, highly capable and ready
force is preferable to a large, less-ready force. Finally, there is no
escaping the need to modernize our forces. The future operating
environment will challenge us in ways that our current capabilities may
not be able to overcome. Necessary modernization efforts include, but
are not limited to, systems that ensure better interoperability and
integration both within the services as well as with allied nations.
As a general comment, the more technological breadth and production
diversity that exists within the defense industry, the greater our
chances of procuring and employing projection capability at an
acceptable cost. The Defense Industrial Base (DIB) underpinning Force
Projection capabilities, from an AF perspective (e.g., long range
bombers, air lift and tankers), is not separate from the DIB supporting
other AF capabilities and those of other Services. As the DIB has
combined in the upper tier to fewer but more diversified primes, the
DIB in the lower tiers has also realigned, but the effect is not
transparent to the AF. Upcoming cuts in defense spending, up to the $1T
level, will affect the health of the DIB at all levels; however, the
extent is difficult to predict at this point in time. Lower tier
fragility will emerge over time as the impacts of decreased spending
manifest.

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT

Mr. Scott. Can you describe how a Day without the U.S. Coast Guard
would impact the U.S. Navy?
Admiral Clingan. The full strength and value of our Nation's
seapower cannot be fully appreciated without considering realized
without the U.S. Coast Guard. This Service provides unique capabilities
and authorities that enable it to prevent and respond to a broad array
of maritime threats and to seamlessly integrate into naval operations
in all maritime theaters. An invaluable partner and force multiplier,
Coast Guard forces complement the U.S. Navy's ability to employ the
global reach, persistent presence and operational flexibility it needs
to accomplish its strategic imperatives.
As stated in the 2006 National Fleet Policy Statement, the Coast
Guard and Navy mutually support and complement each Service's roles and
missions. To this end, Coast Guard cutters serve alongside U.S. Navy
ships in the Northern Arabian Gulf and other areas of the world. In
theater, Coast Guard forces protect seaports of debarkation, the combat
logistics force, and maritime pre-positioning ships. Coast Guard ships
deployed individually or with Navy task forces support U.S. Navy
``Partnership Stations.'' Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachments serve
aboard Navy ships performing counter-piracy operations off the Horn of
Africa and counterdrug operations in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific.
The 21st century maritime security environment requires these types of
cooperative initiatives to effectively protect and promote our national
maritime interests.
Because a majority of the world's navies and coastguards are not
blue-water, power projection forces, many countries routinely accept,
desire, and explicitly request interaction with the Coast Guard.
Speaking the language of both civil and military organizations, the
Coast Guard's inter-agency expertise provides multiple access points
into foreign nation governments that might otherwise be inaccessible
through purely military channels. Coast Guard training teams and
international port security liaisons also assist developing nations
with building the maritime expertise, infrastructure, domain awareness
and response capabilities needed to protect their maritime interests.
This helps develop layered, integrated maritime regimes that promote
regional security and ultimately contribute to U.S. homeland defense in
depth.
The Coast Guard also provides an exceptional first responder
capability for foreign and domestic disruptions. Events such as
Hurricane Katrina, Haiti Earthquake Response, and Deepwater Horizon
demonstrate the Coast Guard's ability to integrate across conjoined
military (e.g. Navy, National Guard, Air Force, etc.) and non-military
agencies to provide a timely and highly effective unified response.
A day without the U.S. Coast Guard would be a significantly more
difficult day for the U.S. Navy and our Nation.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. PALAZZO

Mr. Palazzo. The Navy is short about 30 ships from the 313 goal set
by Secretary Mabus as the minimum necessary to meet current operational
needs. How does the Navy intend to reach its goal in the budgetary
environment, especially when current shortfalls in maintenance funding
have left one in five of existing vessels unfit for combat?
Admiral Clingan. Although less that the 313 ship floor, the current
Navy battle force of 284 ships provides a fleet capable of meeting
Combatant Commander demands with manageable risk. Going forward, our
current shipbuilding and aviation plans balance the anticipated future
demand for naval forces with expected resources. With anticipated
funding being flat or declining in the future, we will focus our
investments to ensure the battle force has the capability for Navy's
core missions such as ensuring Joint operational access and the
capacity to remain forward in the most critical regions. Our plans also
take into account the importance of maintaining an adequate national
shipbuilding design and industrial base.
Our deployed ships are materially fit for combat. Ships that are in
deep maintenance are not ready for combat operations and are a normal
part of our ongoing Fleet Readiness and Training Process. As for
operating ships, recent readiness reports by the fleet indicate that
the trend of higher failure rates by surface ships on inspections by
the Navy Board of Inspections and Survey is turning--and we will remain
vigilant and proactive. We conducted a review of Surface Force
readiness over the last year, which identified a number of root causes.
These include reduced surface ship and intermediate maintenance center
manning and the disestablishment (by BRAC 1995) of the surface ship
life cycle engineering organization. These changes stopped updates to
ship class maintenance plans, eliminated the technical support to plan
maintenance periods, and reduced the ability of crews to complete
required maintenance.
To address these problems, we put executive-level oversight in
place and initiated a multi-prong plan to improve surface ship
readiness. This plan includes increases to surface ship manning,
restoring organizations to plan and manage ship lifecycle maintenance,
and reestablishing technical support for planning and conducting
maintenance periods. These corrections are all in place or in progress.
We also significantly increased the FY 2011 and FY 2012 baseline Ship
Maintenance budget submissions (compared to FY 2010). Today, Navy's
maintenance account is fully funded.
While our ability to plan and conduct maintenance is much more
comprehensive, an additional factor affecting surface ship readiness is
the high operational tempo of the last ten years. Since 2001, underway
days per ship increased by 15 percent while fleet size decreased by 10
percent. This reduces the time a ship is available in port to conduct
maintenance--even if it is pre-planned and fully funded. The Navy is
investigating options to improve the balance between presence and pre-
deployment training and maintenance requirements, in order to achieve a
sustainable level of operations that is consistent with the size of the
fleet.
Mr. Palazzo. Can we reach the 313 mark, or more as the need arises?
What is the consequence if we do not reach this minimum number?
Admiral Clingan. The Fiscal Year 2012 Long-Range Shipbuilding
Tables submitted to Congress show the fleet reaching 313 ships by
Fiscal Year 2019. The main assumptions behind this plan are that our
ships reach their expected service lives and that we and our
shipbuilders can continue to build and deliver ships on
schedule.
Today, these key assumptions are not being met. Since 2000, the
fleet has about 10% fewer ships, and on average each ship spends about
15% more days underway each year to meet Combatant Commander demands.
The greater amount of underway time comes at the expense of training
and maintenance. Today we are unable to complete all the maintenance
needed on each ship and aircraft, reducing their service lives.
Resources alone cannot alleviate this issue. We will need to establish
a sustainable level of deployed forces through the DOD Global Force
Management process. In conjunction with adjusting the GFM plan, we are
adjusting our Fleet Readiness and Training Plan to establish a
sustainable operational tempo and complete required maintenance and
training between deployments. This will constrain the number of ships
and aircraft we deliver to Combatant Commanders in the future, but will
ensure ships and aircraft reach their expected service lives and help
avoid a further decrease in fleet capacity.
To reach our ship inventory goals, we also need to build and
deliver ships on schedule. We continue to work to reduce costs and
incentivize our industry partners to remain on schedule and maximize
the Navy's return on investment. To reduce costs in general, our
shipbuilding strategy leverages existing designs and proven
technologies as much as possible. The Department has also refined its
internal 2-Pass/6-Gate review process to ensure requirements are set
early and balanced against cost, and that this balance is visible and
managed throughout the acquisition process. The Navy has strengthened
acquisition policy to improve program oversight, control cost growth,
and more effectively monitor contractor performance. The ability to
build and deliver our fleet on time and under cost continues to require
the combined effort of and collaboration between the Navy, the
Congress, and the shipbuilding industry.

Mr. Palazzo. Many people have questioned the relevancy of
amphibious operations in this day and age. Could you please give us
your opinion on the relevancy of amphibious operations in the modern
era?
General Mills. Amphibious flexibility is the greatest strategic
asset that a sea based power possesses. The inherent flexibility and
utility of amphibious forces are not widely understood, as evidenced by
the frequent and mistaken direct correlation between the term
amphibious operations and mental images of World War II marines
assaulting Tarawa or Iwo Jima. In fact, in the last 20 years the Navy-
Marine Corps team has conducted well over 100 amphibious operations of
various types. The majority of these involved humanitarian assistance/
disaster response (HA/DR) or noncombatant evacuations and defense of
U.S. diplomatic posts during periods of host nation unrest occurring in
permissive or uncertain environments. A smaller number involved
operations in openly hostile environments to project or withdraw U.S.
or partner-nation forces. Not included in the last 20 year tally--
because they were only recently codified as a type of amphibious
operation within joint doctrine--are the numerous military engagement
and security cooperation activities routinely conducted by amphibious
forces. Given the National Security Strategy's emphasis on engagement,
these operations are becoming increasingly prominent.
Regardless of the type of amphibious operation conducted, they
generally involve overcoming diplomatic, geographic, and/or military
challenges to access. Regular employment of amphibious forces in
uncertain and austere environments where access is challenged is
chronicled by over 50 amphibious operations conducted since Sept. 11,
2001.
Rapid action is the critical enabler in these operations requiring
immediate response regardless of access afforded. Organic capabilities
such as well decks and flight decks, billeting, communications,
medical, dental, messing, and command and control all combine to
increase the utility of amphibious forces. More importantly, an
amphibious force can loiter off shore indefinitely providing valuable
time for diplomatic efforts to unfold; complementing diplomacy with
demonstrated resolve. Amphibious forces can be task organized to the
mission and threat, and scaled to bring only those capabilities ashore
necessary for mission accomplishment. In a security environment
characterized by uncertainty, operating from the sea provides a degree
of flexibility, force protection, and freedom of action not realized by
traditional ground force lay-down.