[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

PRESERVING PROGRESS IN IRAQ, PART III:
IRAQ'S POLICE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

=======================================================================

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON
THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

__________

NOVEMBER 30, 2011

__________

Serial No. 112-87

__________

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/

______

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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
DAN BURTON, Indiana GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
ELTON GALLEGLY, California ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DANA ROHRABACHER, California Samoa
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California BRAD SHERMAN, California
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
RON PAUL, Texas GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
MIKE PENCE, Indiana RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
JOE WILSON, South Carolina ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
CONNIE MACK, Florida GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas DENNIS CARDOZA, California
TED POE, Texas BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky
GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania
BILL JOHNSON, Ohio CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut
DAVID RIVERA, Florida FREDERICA WILSON, Florida
MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania KAREN BASS, California
TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina
ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York
RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina
ROBERT TURNER, New YorkAs
of October 5, 2011 deg.
Yleem D.S. Poblete, Staff Director
Richard J. Kessler, Democratic Staff Director
------

Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio, Chairman
MIKE PENCE, Indiana GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York DENNIS CARDOZA, California
RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky
DANA ROHRABACHER, California BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania
CONNIE MACK, Florida CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania
ROBERT TURNER, New YorkAs
of October 11, 2011 deg.

C O N T E N T S

----------
Page

WITNESSES

Ms. Brooke Darby, Deputy Assistant Secretary, International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement, U.S. Department of State........ 6
Mr. Stuart W. Bowen, Jr., Inspector General, Office of the
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, accompanied
by Mr. Glenn D. Furbish, Assistant Inspector General for
Audits, Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq
Reconstruction................................................. 24

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING

Ms. Brooke Darby: Prepared statement............................. 8
Mr. Stuart W. Bowen, Jr.: Prepared statement..................... 26

APPENDIX

Hearing notice................................................... 44
Hearing minutes.................................................. 45

PRESERVING PROGRESS IN IRAQ, PART III: IRAQ'S POLICE DEVELOPMENT
PROGRAM

----------

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 30, 2011

House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on the Middle East
and South Asia,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 1 o'clock
p.m., in room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Steve
Chabot (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Chabot. The subcommittee will come to order. Good
afternoon. I want to welcome my colleagues to this hearing of
the Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia.
Before addressing the topic of today's hearing, I would
like to say a few words about President Obama's recent
announcement of a full withdrawal from Iraq by the end of 2011.
For over 8 years, U.S. servicemen and women have labored in
Iraq and sacrificed beyond our comprehension to achieve real,
tangible gains. The mere fact that we today are discussing how
to help Iraq improve the effectiveness of its police force is a
testament to that fact.
Despite this, Iraq remains in a precarious position. It is
painfully clear that although the Iraqi army has progressed
remarkably from where it once was, Iraq is not yet prepared to
defend itself from the threat posed by its nefarious neighbors:
Iran and Syria. It is with this concern in mind that the U.S.
and Iraq endeavored to negotiate an agreement which would
maintain a small U.S. troop presence into 2012.
Public reports indicate that General Lloyd Austin,
Commanding General of U.S. forces in Iraq, requested and
recommended approximately 20,000 U.S. troops remain in Iraq.
Unfortunately, these negotiations failed due to in my opinion
mismanagement by this White House. Amazingly, the White House
is now trying to tout the breakdown and lack of agreement as a
success inasmuch as it has met a promise President Obama made
as a candidate.
This blatant politicization calls into question the White
House's entire effort to secure a troop extension. Fulfilling a
campaign promise at the expense of American national security
interests is, at best, strategic neglect and, at worst,
downright irresponsible. And the White House tacitly admits
this in negotiating an extension in the first place.
I fear, however, that our objective is no longer to ensure
that Iraq is stable but merely to withdraw our forces by the
end of this year in order to meet a political timeline. Saying
that Iraq is ``secure, stable, and self-reliant,'' as Deputy
National Security Advisor Denis McDonough recently did, does
not make it so.
And to borrow a quote from then-Senator Clinton, it
requires ``the willing suspension of disbelief'' to believe
that withdrawing our forces from Iraq at a time when Iranian
agents seek to harm at every turn our country and its allies
advances our strategic interests.
Although I understand that Iraq is a sovereign country, I
believe there is much more we could have done to secure a
reasonable troop presence beyond the end of this year.
Accordingly, I would like to again echo Senator Lieberman's
call to reopen negotiations with the Iraqis. It would be a
failure of colossal proportions to withdraw our forces before
Iraq is ready to stand on its own.
Today's hearing is being called to evaluate the Department
of State's Iraq Police Development Program, the PDP, which has
regrettably been plagued by mismanagement and poor planning
since its inception.
A recent audit by the Office of the Special Inspector
General for Iraq Reconstruction, SIGIR, raises a number of
serious questions about the efficacy of this program. SIGIR's
audit paints a picture of a program which has been formulated
without a clear understanding of or attention to the actual
needs of the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior, MOI.
In a dooming interview conducted by SIGIR officials, Iraq's
Senior Deputy Minister of the Interior Adnan Al-Asadi
rhetorically asked ``What tangible benefit will Iraqis see from
this police training program? With most of its money spent on
lodging, security, and support, all the MOI gets is a little
expertise, and that is if the program materializes. It has yet
to start.''
More to the point, he suggested that the U.S. ``take the
program money and the overhead money and use it for something
that can benefit the people of the United States because there
will be very little benefit to the MOI from the $1 billion.''
Although I appreciate Mr. Asadi's sensitivity to the
current fiscal climate, his statement makes very clear that the
PDP as it exists today will not meet Iraq's needs and has
little, if any, Iraqi buy-in.
And although our witness here today may testify that the
Iraqi MOI does, in fact, appreciate the value of the currently
formulated PDP, the Government of Iraq has yet to sign a
written agreement committing to the program or offer a single
dollar to contribute to it.
I am also deeply concerned by the reports of obstruction
and noncooperation on the part of the Department of State
during SIGIR's audit. This is extremely distressing. And, to
echo the sentiments of several of my colleagues in the other
body which they recently expressed in a letter to Secretary of
State Clinton, the Department of State is legally obliged to
cooperate with SIGIR in the execution of its mission;
jurisdictional games are unacceptable.
Although I have many concerns about the nature of the
current PDP, I do not believe that a permutation of it is
unimportant. The intent of this hearing is not to foreclose the
idea. It is not the idea, but the implementation that worries
me. Helping Iraq build an effective police capability is of
paramount importance. The devil, as they say, is in the
details. And it is my hope that with proper planning, the U.S.
can help Iraq develop a capable and accountable police force
that serves its people's needs.
And I would now yield to the gentleman from New York, the
distinguished ranking member of the committee, Mr. Ackerman,
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Ackerman. I thank the chairman very much. Thank you for
calling this very important oversight hearing.
I would like to welcome Brooke Darby, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State, representing the State Department. And I am
particularly pleased today that we are going to be hearing from
Stuart Bowen, the Special Inspector General for Iraqi, who,
with a team of true professionals, has been doing a tremendous
job protecting the U.S. taxpayers' interests.
Our topic today is the Police Development Program, which
Mr. Bowen and his team have been warning is heading for trouble
for many, many months now. He has testified before other bodies
in Congress. He has released written quarterly reports as well
as specific audits. And the message is the same. The program
for which Department of State officially took responsibility on
October 1st is nearly a textbook case of why government
procurement, in this case foreign assistance, doesn't buy what
we think we are paying for, what we want, and why more money
will make the problem worse.
Failed procurement is not a problem unique to the State
Department. And when it comes to frittering away millions,
Foggy Bottom is a rank amateur compared to the Department of
Defense.
As our colleagues on the Armed Services Committee have
learned, the best projects with the most desirable purposes can
go horribly, horribly off track. And the hardest thing it seems
that any bureaucracy can do is pull the plug on a failed
initiative.
How do we know the Police Development Program is going off
track? Very simple things demonstrate a strong likelihood of
waste and mismanagement. Number one, does the Government of
Iraq, whose personnel we intend to train, support the program?
Interviews with senior Iraqi officials by the Special Inspector
General show utter disdain for the program. When the Iraqis
suggest that we take our money and do things, instead, that are
good for the United States, I think that might be a clue.
Subsequent diplomatic intervention by the State Department
with the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior may have changed their
officially stated views, but I, for one, take the Iraqis'
initial unfeigned contempt to be a more reliable indicator than
their post-coaching enthusiasm.
So if the Iraqis are ambivalent, is the PDP program at
least correctly structured to fill gaps in capabilities that
have been clearly identified and assessed? The answer again is
no. Despite being in development for years, as of today, the
program's objectives remain a mushy bowl of vague platitudes.
There is no comprehensive and detailed plan for execution.
There is no current assessment of Iraqi police force
capability. And, perhaps more tellingly, there are no outcome-
based metrics. This is a flashing red warning light.
Surely the bureau within the State Department that will be
administering this $887 million program is aware of these
deficiencies and is moving swiftly to address them based on
their long history of successful contract administration and
robust management capabilities. Right? Well, not exactly.
The particular bureau at State that has inherited this mess
from the Department of Defense is the Bureau of International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement, known as INL. INL until 9/11 was
informally known as the Drugs and Thugs Bureau, focusing
chiefly on fighting drug trafficking and working to close the
space available to international crime.
Suddenly, with the advent of the war on terror, INL was
asked to administer hundreds of millions of dollars in
contracts in two active theatres of war. Its performance has
been subject to many audits and quarterly reviews by the
Special Inspectors General for Iraq and Afghanistan.
Pre-9/11, INL had no history with massive acquisition,
large contract administration, or long-term program management
on a large scale. It lacked trained personnel, management
capacity, and was, frankly, overwhelmed. INL personnel have
tried hard, but the results have often been poor.
Audit activity by the Special Inspector General on the PDP
shows that the Bureau again is unprepared for the very large
task they have been asked to handle. The warning klaxon is
blaring.
The best indicator for any failed government acquisition,
whether foreign aid or procurement of a new fighter-bomber, is
incessant changes in program and funding requirements. As
mentioned, the Police Development Program is already moving
ahead without a strong buy-in from the Government of Iraq or a
clear and well-defined plan of action, or clear measures of
success. Not surprisingly, the funding levels, personnel
requirements, and spending plans for the PDP have all been in
flux from year to year. We should now be evacuating this
building.
There is, of course, one more major sign of impending
failure. As the last of our troops leave Iraq next month, yes,
next month, as the President promised and as our Nation
deserves, the interest of the United States Congress in Iraq is
going drop like a tree in an empty forest. Not only will it
plummet to Earth, it will do so without anyone even being aware
it happened. A roughly $900 million program without clear
objectives, intended for a partner we will have forgotten, with
requirements that change yearly and no genuine partner country
buy-in, is no place I would be willing to put my money or that
of my constituents.
Let's not wait for Mr. Bowen's next cringe-inducing audit.
Let's pull the plug right now.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much.
At this time if any of the members would like to make a 1-
minute opening statement, we would be happy to call them in the
order that they arrived. Mr. Marino, that would put you next if
you would like to say anything. Okay. Mr. Higgins?
Mr. Higgins. Yes just briefly, Mr. Chairman. I, too, am
very disturbed by what I read here. Given the amount of
American investment in Iraq already. Since 2003, we have
committed $8 billion, $8 billion to training Iraqi police,
almost $1 billion more for 2012.
The fact of the matter is when the surge was undertaken, it
was designed to tamp down violence to give some breathing room
for the Iraqis, Sunni, Shia, the Kurds to do political
reconciliation and deal with all of those other existential
issues, to keep that society from evolving.
Those issues still aren't resolved. And until those issues
are resolved, you can't begin to think about developing a
police force that people are going to recognize as legitimate.
In northern Ireland when we do peace between the Catholics
and the Protestants, political reconciliation preceded the
issue of policing. And so it was political reconciliation and a
commitment to proceed. Then the all-important issue of policing
was dealt with.
This is very disturbing and I don't think a good investment
of U.S. tax dollars.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired.
The gentleman from California, Mr. Rohrabacher, is
recognized for 1 minute.
Mr. Rohrabacher. This whole episode in American history is
a very disturbing thing to look at. And I think when people
look back, they are going to wonder why the hell did we ever go
into Iraq and there will be no question, even in our minds,
they, whether or not the money that was expended and the lives
and the blood that we have expended there was worth it. It was
not.
And whatever we are spending now should be terminated. And
as soon as we can get those troops out, the better. When you
find yourself in a bad situation, you don't try to mess around
and make it a little bit less bad. You just step over and try
to get into a good situation somewhere else where you can
accomplish things.
We have had some heroic efforts on the part of the people
to make it work. And I think that, especially--we have Stuart
Bowen, who has tried as Inspector General to make sure that the
amount of proliferation and abuse of the American tax dollars
was kept to a minimum. And he did his best. Our military forces
did their best.
But it was an undoable job that we were trying to do for an
ungrateful people. And if they don't have the gratitude for
what we have done for them, we shouldn't spend a day more on a
penny more on their behalf.
Thank you. Who cares about whether their police are good or
not? Let them determine whether their police are good or not.
And let them spend the money and make the commitment to do that
themselves.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chabot. The gentleman's time has expired.
The gentleman from New York, Mr. Turner, is recognized if
he would like to make a statement. If not, okay. We will go
ahead and get to the witness, then.
Our witness today is Ms. Brooke Darby. Ms. Darby became a
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, INL, U.S.
State Department in March 2011.
Throughout her career in INL, she has been responsible for
developing and managing peacekeeping and criminal justice
capacity-building programs in the Balkans, Afghanistan, Africa,
and most recently Iraq. Before joining the State Department,
Ms. Darby served on the National Security Council staff.
She graduated with honors from Mount Holyoke College, a
B.A.; and Georgetown University Law Center, a J.D.
And we welcome you here, Ms. Darby. And, as you know, our
witnesses receive 5 minutes, as do the members of the panel
here in questioning the witnesses.
I would note that our clock system apparently is down, at
least at your location there. So you won't have a light system
to look at. So I will tap my gavel here when you have 1 minute
to go and then a little bit louder or we have an electric
shocking system if you would like. We won't utilize that. But I
will do it a little bit louder. And if you could wrap up at
that point, that would be good.
And so you are recognized for 5 minutes. Thank you for
being here this afternoon.
Ms. Darby. Thank you very much.

STATEMENT OF MS. BROOKE DARBY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
STATE

Ms. Darby. Chairman Chabot, Ranking Member Ackerman, and
distinguished members, thank you for the opportunity to appear
today to discuss the Department of State's Police Development
Program in Iraq. With your permission, I will summarize the
prepared remarks which have been submitted for the record.
The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Affairs, which I help to lead, assumed the responsibility for
police development in Iraq as of October 1st, 2011. Our
program, known as the Police Development Program, or PDP,
builds on the U.S. military's efforts with the Government of
Iraq over the last 7 years.
The military's program utilized hundreds of police advisors
to generate a police force from scratch and train it for
counterinsurgency operations. Our much smaller cadre of senior
police advisors work with Interior Ministry officials and
police to help Iraq adopt its law enforcement institutions to
deal effectively with today's complex threats, to develop
structures and systems that operate with respect for the rule
of law, and to establish systems and processes that promote and
protect gender equality and human rights.
The Department of State launched the PDP on October 1st,
2011 and currently has 105 U.S. advisors leading the mentoring
and advising mission in Iraq. Our advisors constitute the most
senior and experienced team ever deployed by the United States
Government with an average of 23 years of police service and
extensive international policing experience. Each assesses
Iraqi police strengths and challenges and works with their
Iraqi counterparts on a peer-to-peer basis to develop
appropriate solutions.
Since October 1st, PDP senior police advisors have held
hundreds of meetings with Iraqi counterparts. At this early
stage, most mentoring and advising needs pertain to management
tasks required to run a police department, such as strategic
planning, recruitment, logistics, and managing criminal
investigations. The Iraqis have also expressed a keen interest
in gender and human rights, for which we have a dedicated
advisory team.
We are developing a rigorous program oversight plan to
continuously assess our progress. In this vein, we appreciate
the audit report released by the SIGIR on October 31st, 2011. I
am pleased to say that we already are implementing the three
recommendations SIGIR recommended for action.
To touch on the SIGIR recommendations briefly, first, we
agree that we need a baseline assessment of Iraqi capabilities
against which to measure progress. Our updated planning called
for our senior police advisors to conduct that assessment.
Since October 1st, they have done just that. And we are
compiling the results now. We will use the results to ensure
that our performance metrics are clear and realistic for each
program element.
Second, we will continue to adjust our police assistance
program as planned based on real-time developments on the
ground. A dedicated INL monitoring and evaluation staff will
measure progress. And every 6 months, we will do a
comprehensive program review to assess progress and to identify
the need for course corrections. We will be able to keep this
subcommittee informed as those developments and review
processes occur.
And, lastly, we fully agree that Iraqi buy-in and ownership
of this program is critical to its success. We at INL have the
unique mission of trying to put ourselves out of business by
offering programs that build sustainable capacities.
This program grew out of the 2008 U.S.-Iraq Strategic
Framework Agreement that this subcommittee knows a great deal
about. Iraqi officials then defined law enforcement needs and
priorities. Our two governments continue to share the costs
involved in police development in Iraq.
Our program will not pay for infrastructure, equipment, or
operational support for Iraqi police. The Government of Iraq
will fund these costs directly along with all personnel costs
for Government of Iraq employees.
Mr. Chairman and distinguished members, we recognize the
complexity and importance of this mission. And we and the Iraqi
Government have committed to bilateral cooperation to help
realize our common security goals.
Just today in Iraq, Vice President Biden and Iraqi Prime
Minister Maliki chaired a session of the U.S.-Iraqi Higher
Coordinating Committee, which recommenced our partnership. The
United States is making good on this commitment by implementing
the Police Development Program hand in hand with the Ministry
of Interior.
Security issues remain a challenge in Iraq. However, the
threat that would result from our failure to follow through on
the investment the U.S. has already made and for which American
servicemen and women, diplomats, and others have sacrificed
their lives is even greater.
Iraq requires continued international support to remain on
its path toward modern, professional, community-oriented police
capable of responding to the difficult security conditions
present in Iraq today. We absolutely expect that our mentoring
and advising support for the Iraqi police service will enable
Iraq's civilian police to secure communities more quickly and
allow democratic principles of government under the rule of law
to take hold.
We appreciate your continued support. And I am pleased to
answer your questions today and in the future. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Darby follows:]

----------

Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much for your testimony. And now
the members will have 5 minutes. And I recognize myself for 5
minutes for that purpose.
The comments by Iraq's senior Deputy Minister of Interior,
which I referenced in my opening remarks are I think you would
agree very distressing. Governing, even more so today given the
current fiscal climate, is about choosing.
And when viewed in the context of the extraordinary cost to
this program, I am concerned that the currently formulated PDP
will not meet Iraqi needs to a degree that justifies the
expenditures.
The current plans, for example, involve an extremely
expensive air wing, for which INL may not even be a priority
user. According to the SIGIR audit of the $200 million DoS
requested for Fiscal Year 2011 fourth quarter, ``Only about 12
percent of the funds are targeted to higher trained and
deployed police advisers and managers. The remaining 88 percent
are for life admission support for the advisers and staff,
security for sites and transportation, and operation and
maintenance of the helicopter air wing.''
Would it not be a better use of taxpayer money to retune
the plans to allow for more trainers in the field at any given
time? And, additionally, how is INL working with the Iraqi MOI
to better tailor the program to meet its needs?
Ms. Darby. Thank you Mr. Chairman.
Let me start by addressing the issue of Deputy Principal
Minister of Interior Al-Asadi's comments with respect to the
PDP. I cannot speak for Minister Al-Asadi.
Based on the comments I have seen attributed to him, I
would say that he is frustrated by the high cost involved in
the security and logistics and support for this program. And,
frankly, I share that frustration. I wish we didn't have to
spend so much of our program dollars in supporting the security
and welfare of our people.
But if we are going to make the commitment to deploy our
people to Iraq, we have a similar commitment to ensure their
safety and their well-being. And at the moment, that is a very
expensive endeavor.
And I think as a result of our continued engagement with
Iraqi police, the Ministry of Interior and improving their
capabilities, we hope to get to a point where they are in a
better position to provide that security or system providing
that security for us and costs will go down. But I can't
project how quickly that will happen.
I can tell you that I was out in Iraq about 2 weeks ago.
And I met with Deputy Minister Al-Asadi. And we discussed his
comments. And he affirmed it to me that he very much supports
the PDP. He welcomes the advice and guidance that it is going
to provide.
He subsequently said the same thing to our police advisers
at their headquarters in Baghdad, reemphasizing that Iraq needs
the support of our advisers to guide and mentor what is a
fairly young Iraqi police force, to professionalize it, to
modernize it.
And his comments, frankly, echo the comments that our
advisers are hearing. Our advisers have already begun to deploy
and engage with their Iraqi counterparts. And the reception
that they have received is very welcoming, very receptive. And
in many cases we have even had Iraqi counterparts visit our
advisers at our facilities.
I think that is a strong indication of the support that
they have and the value that they see in the assistance that we
were providing.
Mr. Chabot. He didn't deny the comments, did he? He didn't
deny the comments? He made the----
Ms. Darby. He didn't directly deny the comments.
Mr. Chabot. All right. SIGIR's PDP audit made three
explicit recommendations, namely the completion of an adequate
current assessment of the Iraqi police forces, and more
comprehensive and detailed program plan, and a written
agreement with the Government of Iraq ensuring its financial
participation in agreement with the program's scope.
Has DoS followed through on these recommendations? And, if
not, can we expect DoS to do so and when?
Ms. Darby. Yes, sir. We are following through on those
recommendations. And I would just like to say at the outset
that we very much appreciate the insights and observations and
recommendations of the audit community: SIGIR, GAO, our own
Office of Inspector General. We take those comments very
seriously. And we already have begun to implement the three
recommendations that SIGIR has identified.
Mr. Chabot. Okay. Thank you.
I think my time has expired or there's some weirdness
happening with the clock here. I am going to go ahead and
recognize the ranking member, then, for his 5 minutes.
Mr. Ackerman. I am just a little bit dismayed with this
whole thing. We are going to screw this up again, aren't we?
Ms. Darby. Sir, I take my responsibility for U.S. taxpayer
dollars very, very seriously. I also take our mission in Iraq
very seriously.
Mr. Ackerman. Have we been getting our money's worth
lately?
Ms. Darby. Sir, this program is only 2 months in execution.
Mr. Ackerman. I mean in the----
Ms. Darby. We have been monitoring it very closely to
ensure that we do get results. And we have put in place a
number of accountability measures to make sure that this
program is carefully monitored and observed.
We have an Assistant Chief of Mission in Iraq, Ambassador
Michele Sison, a two-time ambassador, who oversees the Iraq
police program.
Mr. Ackerman. Well, when will they be ready to stand up
without us?
Ms. Darby. I wish I could answer that question.
Mr. Ackerman. Then why are we spending money if we don't
have the answer? You know, this is turning into what happens
after a bar mitzvah or a Jewish wedding. It is called a Jewish
goodbye. Everybody keeps saying goodbye, but nobody leaves.
I am told there was this song during World War I called
``We're Here Because We're Here,'' and the words were, ``We're
here because we're here because we're here because we're here.
We're here because we're here.'' I think it just went on. There
were no other words.
I mean, there has to be a time when we're no longer going
to be there. And I don't know if $100 billion, if $900 million,
if $800 zillion makes that time come faster, or sooner, or what
you get for more money being there. So if we don't know how
long it is going to take, I am going to stop paying the tuition
when my kid's in his 19th year at college.
Give me some hope. Make up a year.
Ms. Darby. Sir, I have been engaged in international police
development for about 15 years.
Mr. Ackerman. 15 years. That is good. At $900 million a
year?
Ms. Darby. The situation we face in Iraq is that for 25
years, for a generation, police in Iraq were instruments of
repression. Respect for human rights, professionalism in
discipline, gender rights had no place in policing in Iraq.
Iraq needs our help to modernize and become a respected,
effective police force.
Mr. Ackerman. And in your opening statement, you said they
have shown an interest in that.
Ms. Darby. They have, indeed, sir.
Mr. Ackerman. What does that mean, ``They have shown an
interest in that''?
Ms. Darby. They are seeking out our help in developing
plans to implement that in Iraq.
Mr. Ackerman. Can we send them a book?
Ms. Darby. No. We actually have our advisers working right
now at the Ministry of Interior's request on a strategic plan
on human rights and gender issues and how to incorporate those
into the Iraqi Government's administration.
Mr. Ackerman. Is this a human rights and gender issue
project, rather than the national security interest of the
United States, to have them stand up to protect the world
against whatever?
Ms. Darby. That is also an element of the program, sir, but
I think that having an Iraqi citizenry that goes to the police
to resolve their disputes and has confidence that those police
will act in a professional, respectful way that respects their
human rights,----
Mr. Ackerman. What is Iraq----
Ms. Darby [continuing]. Even if they don't turn to militias
groups----
Mr. Ackerman. Okay. If that is what this is supposed to be,
that is pretty admirable if we are flush. In the list of 190
countries in the world, where does Iraq stand in that human
rights and gender issue? Are they in the middle? Are they in
the bottom quarter? Are they in the top 10 percent of the best?
Ms. Darby. I am in no position to offer that ranking. I
don't have----
Mr. Ackerman. Why are we doing human rights and gender
issues in Iraq and not Botswana?
Ms. Darby. Iraq, and stability in Iraq and security in Iraq
is very much in the U.S. national security interest. It is
important to us to have a stable and secure partner in the
region. It is important to us to have a partner on combating
the types of complex threats we face as a----
Mr. Ackerman. How important is it in terms of dollars?
Let's assume the rate is constant and it is $900 million a
year.
Ms. Darby. Sir, we have already made an investment.
Mr. Ackerman. $1 billion bucks a year for how many years?
Ms. Darby. We have already made an investment of billions
of dollars to date.
Mr. Ackerman. ``We're here because we're here because we're
here because we're here.' We have already done it. So we are
doing it again.
Ms. Darby. Our program is very different from the U.S.
military's program. The U.S. military had to focus primarily on
generating a police force from the ground up.
Mr. Ackerman. Is it possible this will take us 8 years?
Ms. Darby. I am not prepared to put a time limit on it.
Mr. Ackerman. 4 years?
Ms. Darby. But, sir, I will say that we will be reporting
on progress.
Mr. Ackerman. We are spending taxpayers' dollars here at a
rate of $900 million a year if it remains constant.
Mr. Chabot. The gentleman's time has expired, but you can
answer the question if you can answer the question.
Ms. Darby. Yes. We will be assessing the progress.
Mr. Ackerman. I know when my time has expired.
Ms. Darby. We will be assessing the progress that we and
the Iraqis are making toward mutually agreed objectives and
goals every 6 months. We will have a dedicated monitoring and
evaluation staff who will be assessing it on a more regular
basis.
We look forward to reporting to the committee, the
subcommittee on what we have found as a result of these reviews
and what it means for the program going forward. And we look
forward to that dialogue with you.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you. I apologize for subjecting you to
my singing.
Mr. Chabot. The gentleman's apology is accepted.
The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Marino, is recognized
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Marino. Thank you, sir.
Good afternoon, and thank you for being here. Ms. Darby,
your credentials are impeccable, and your work experience is
beyond reproach. And I commend you. I don't know if you drew
the short straw for coming in here and someone else just didn't
want to do this, but my hat is off to you.
I am going to get very serious, right to the point. And you
correct me if I am wrong. There are billions and billions of
dollars missing in Iraq that the Iraqi Government cannot
account for. Whether those funds are a mixture of U.S. and
Iraqi or simply U.S. or Iraqi remains to be seen because we are
not getting an answer. Maliki just doesn't want to answer
questions, takes a position that he is offended when we ask
questions like this.
I understand that this government, the Iraqi Government,
implemented legislation that gave absolute immunity to the
government officials for the loss of this money, knowing that
it was stolen by someone or a group of individuals. They
actually granted themselves immunity from criminal prosecution
and civil prosecution for accounting for this money. And I
understand that one particular individual made it quite clear
that he actually walked away with $9 million.
How can we continue to fund a government that works under
that premise where they are granting their own corrupt
government officials immunity from prosecution from stealing,
perhaps from the United States and certainly from the Iraqi
people? Can you give me some insight on that, please?
Ms. Darby. Congressman, I am sorry that that falls outside
the gambit for which my bureau is responsible, which is police
development and justice assistance. I do know we also work on
some of the anti-corruption programs, and I can tell you that
there have been a few positive developments.
I think there is still a way to go, certainly, in
addressing corruption issues in Iraq, and we have been working
with institutions that are designed to assist in that. But
there was a positive step recently in that the Parliament
enacted legislation that now prevents ministers from preventing
the prosecution and investigation of their personnel for
corruption. So I think we look at corruption in Iraq in
incremental steps.
And with respect to missing dollars, I am afraid I can't
answer that question directly, but----
Mr. Marino. Well, I am not asking you to directly answer
the missing dollars, where it is at. I mean, the government
won't respond to it. So, you know, how would we know that?
But I was a prosecutor for 19 years at the state and
Federal levels. I have a basic fundamental problem with
trusting an entity or someone that I know is a crook and a
thief and really has very little interest on appearance about
what happens to the people of that country.
I would hope that the State Department also has that
concern and also keeps that fact that we are not getting
information from them, and there has been literally billions of
dollars stolen and unaccounted for in the back of your mind
when dealing with these people.
I thank you for your response.
Ms. Darby. Could I just respond to that briefly?
Mr. Marino. Please go ahead.
Ms. Darby. Thank you very much for your comments.
I would just like to emphasize that none of the money that
is associated with the Police Development Program goes to the
Government of Iraq.
Mr. Marino. I understand that.
Ms. Darby. Thank you.
Mr. Marino. Okay. Thank you.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you. The gentleman yields back his time.
Let's see--the gentleman from New York, Mr. Higgins, I
believe is next.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Police Development Program under the State Department
is not more than 2 months old. Does this include a current
status as to what shape the Iraqi police apparatus is in today?
I mean, where are we at? And what is the baseline here?
Ms. Darby. Our advisers right now--we began deploying our
advisers this summer. And one of the first tasks we assigned to
them was conducting a baseline assessment of Iraqi
capabilities, which we view as essential to refining the
objectives we have for this program and the performance metrics
that we establish for this program and against which we will
measure and evaluate progress.
This was an issue that was discussed in the SIGIR report as
one of the recommendations of the SIGIR report. I came into
this job in May, and I certainly wish that we had had an
assessment that was completed before we launched the PDP.
Mr. Higgins. Right.
Ms. Darby. There was an effort. We did issue a grant to an
outside entity to conduct such a baseline assessment. And for a
variety of reasons, they were unable to do so. By the time that
became apparent, we already had our----
Mr. Higgins. Claiming back my time, why weren't they able
to do so? I mean, that is pretty important here.
Ms. Darby. I am sorry?
Mr. Higgins. Why weren't they able to do what they were
asked to do?
Ms. Darby. I think it largely had to do with the difficulty
of moving around in Iraq and the length of time it took to get
appointments with the Iraqi.
Mr. Higgins. So lack of cooperation?
Ms. Darby. I think it was also some logistical and security
issues that made it hard for them to get around.
Mr. Higgins. Okay. I mean, what is the sense of things? I
mean, is it a country that has a police force that is, you
know, functioning in certain places, like Baghdad, not in
Ramadi? I mean, you know, what is the anecdotal assessment of
the strength of the Iraqi police force today?
Ms. Darby. I will be able to answer that question a lot
better in about a month's time, when we have completed our full
review of the assessments that our advisers have done. But I
would say in general that there is a sense that in terms of
very basic police skills, the U.S. military has done an
excellent job in working with the Iraqis over the course of the
last 7 years to generate a police force from scratch and attain
a basic level of capability.
Mr. Higgins. What is that basic level of capability?
Ms. Darby. They can basically police. They can provide
presence on the streets. They can take complaints.
Mr. Higgins. Do they have the confidence of the people on
the streets?
Ms. Darby. I think it is a very mixed bag, and I think that
is why we are working as part of this program to build. That is
actually one of the major subject areas of the program, is to
build relationships between the Iraqi police and the community
they serve and also to develop accountability mechanisms within
the Iraqi police. And this is an area where they acknowledge
that they need help.
They need a code of conduct for their police. They need a
discipline system that works. They need to be able to
demonstrate to the Iraqi people that they have taken action
against police officers who have not performed their jobs and
who have, you know, committed crimes or committed human rights
abuses.
Mr. Higgins. Yes, but those things are pretty fundamental,
whether you are policing in Baghdad or Buffalo.
Ms. Darby. Absolutely.
Mr. Higgins. Others have touched on this as well. You know,
since 2003, we have spent $8 billion training the Iraqi police,
approximately $1 billion a year. The Inspector General's review
indicates that about 12 percent of that was spent for actually
training police and 88 percent for overhead costs, including
paying for security contractors.
You know, we have spent $63 billion in reconstructing Iraq.
We are scheduled to leave there at the end of the year. The
past performance doesn't inspire great confidence in the
ability of anybody in changing fundamentally the situation in
Iraq.
Give me some words of encouragement as to what has changed
on the ground. You know, I think that is very important here.
Ms. Darby. I think we are entering a new day. I think what
the U.S. military was able to do with Iraq was some of the
basics. But the basics are not enough to sustain an effective,
respected, professional police force. They need a lot of
advanced and specialized training. They need systems and
structures that will enable them to be a sustainable force,
everything from disciplinary systems to be able to handle their
logistics, to be able to handle their budgeting, making sure
that their forces in the field have----
Mr. Higgins. Yes.
Ms. Darby [continuing]. The equipment that they need to be
basically responsible.
Mr. Higgins. Yes. Let me just claim back because I think I
am out of time. But I just wanted a final comment. All of this
would be comforting and perhaps even confidence-inspiring if
there hadn't been a past. But there is an immediate past that
demonstrates pervasive corruption, a lack of confidence, a lack
of discipline, a lack of a willingness to provide appropriate
oversight to ensure that U.S. taxpayer dollars are being spent
in an appropriate manner.
So, I mean, again, you have been sent over here, and you
are in a tough spot. I understand that. But this is a very
steep hill to climb given the past performance here. And
everything, you know, associated with Iraq, be it its
reconstruction, its political reconciliation, all those
existential issues that are fundamentally important to an
evolving, functioning society are lacking.
And, you know, it doesn't give us a sense that, you know,
there is a lot of opportunity here to see something
dramatically different other than what we have already
experienced. And what we have already experienced isn't good.
It is not bad. It is awful. It is awful.
So I will yield back.
Mr. Chabot. The gentleman's time has expired.
The gentleman from California, who is also the chair of the
Oversight and Investigations Committee of Foreign Affairs
Committee, Mr. Rohrabacher, is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much.
And I have learned a lot today about Jewish weddings that I
didn't know before. And it seems to me that Jewish weddings are
much more fun than the Baptist weddings that I have been to,
where they didn't drink and they didn't dance, and it was just
getting rid of the kids, you know? So thank you for my friend,
Mr. Ackerman.
Mr. Ackerman and I weren't always on good terms. I argued
the case for supporting President Bush in his efforts in Iraq
with Mr. Ackerman numerous times, and I was wrong. Thank you,
Mr. Ackerman. This has been a waste of our lives and our money.
Just the very program we are talking about, this isn't the
first $900 million that we have spent on trying to help them
build their police. In fact, the Department of Defense has been
spending money and trying to help them build their police since
2003. If my figures are correct, we have spent about $7 billion
by the Department of Defense, and they apparently have failed,
perhaps for the same reasons that this program will fail, if
you end up spending 12 percent on the actual training and 88
percent of the money that is being allocated is actually going
to provide for the people who are supposed to do the training,
you know, so that they can get along in that country.
Let me just say that I have in my life gone through several
major upheavals such as this. And I got a very close look
during the Vietnam War, and I was dismayed at that time. I
remember going home from Hawaii--I was not in the military
there. I was doing a part of a political operation in Vietnam,
but I learned enough to know that we were going to lose. I
mean, I just could see it.
I was 19 years old. You see gore and you see incompetence
and you see corruption, all put in the same package, and it
does affect an idealism of a 19-year-old. I will tell you that
much.
And I hate to think what these young men and women that we
have been sending over to Iraq are going to think when they
come home and all the ones who know who they have lost. And for
what? For a country that is run by a man who despises us: Mr.
Maliki. People have no gratitude whatsoever for the bloodshed
and the treasure that we have given them and provided them.
And, again, I am not sure that we could succeed in Vietnam
or Iraq. You had better choose your fights. I think hopefully
we will learn we have got to choose our fights in the future so
that we are not wasting people's lives.
And, like I say, it has not been because we haven't had
dedicated people. I mean, you know, Stuart Bowen has been in my
office so many times trying to make sure that I know what was
going on and the hard work that they have done. And he has had
convictions and saved the taxpayers money.
But, you know, you can't do what is the undoable, and that
is trying to run somebody else's country for them, when they
have such dramatic differences in culture and in desires.
This police training program, that what you say--and, by
the way, again, that figure of 12 percent training, that is not
just for police training. I would like to suggest to my friends
on the other side of the aisle who are much more open to the
idea of benevolent and foreign aid to try to help others almost
all the aid programs come down to that, come down to 12 percent
going to what you really want it to go to. And 88 percent is
going to make sure that the people there have drivers, great
cars, wonderful accommodations. And, even with the NGOs, you
will find them living in very fine houses and out in their SUVs
and being taken care of like royalty in that country.
We need to make sure that we pick where we are going to be
participating and helping. And we obviously have not learned
our lesson yet in Iraq because you are asking us to spend
another $900 million. And I hope that someone is listening
because I wasn't listening when I debated Mr. Ackerman years
ago, and I should have been, on this.
So I won't ask you to comment on that, but I just thought I
would throw that in.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chabot. Will Mr. Ackerman have an opportunity to
comment? [Laughter.]
I thank the gentleman for his remarks. The gentleman's time
has expired.
The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Connolly, is recognized
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I want to congratulate my friend from California. It is
a rare moment here in Capitol Hill that somebody says, ``I
should have been listening. I wish I had. And hat's off to''
somebody else. I think that is to your credit, Mr. Rohrabacher,
that you are willing to do that. And I thank you as a
colleague. I wish more of us had the capacity to do that around
here.
Madam Deputy Assistant Secretary, welcome. Is it your
testimony here today that the State Department is fully
committed to transparency and accountability with respect to
any and all programs it has any oversight or responsibility for
in Iraq?
Ms. Darby. We take our responsibility for accountability
and cooperation with all of the audit entities, with Congress
very, very seriously.
Mr. Connolly. No, ma'am. That was not my question. Is it
your testimony that you are fully committed to transparency and
accountability with respect to those responsibilities?
Ms. Darby. We are absolutely committed to accountability.
Mr. Connolly. Full transparency, full accountability?
Ms. Darby. I am not sure how you define that.
Mr. Connolly. Well, I guess I am not sure why you avoid the
word. That was my question, and you have ducked it three times.
Are we or are we not? Is the State Department fully committed
to transparency, full transparency and accountability, to the
taxpayers of the United States and the people we are trying to
serve in Iraq or not?
Ms. Darby. We absolutely are accountable to the taxpayers,
to our Congress, and to all of the oversight bodies who are
looking into how we are spending our dollars, whether our
programs are achieving success. We are absolutely----
Mr. Connolly. All right. I will sort of kind of take that
as a commitment.
Are you familiar with the August correspondence between the
legal adviser to the Department of State and the IG's office,
SIGIR?
Ms. Darby. I am.
Mr. Connolly. You have reviewed the actual letters?
Ms. Darby. I have.
Mr. Connolly. Now, is it in your view consistent with that
commitment, full commitment? It looks, frankly, to a layman,
like myself, that, frankly, that the State Department is
splitting hairs to avoid producing documents to SIGIR using the
bureaucratic turf argument that this goes beyond your scope
and, therefore, you are on our platform and we are not going to
cooperate when you do that, as opposed to let's see how we can
work out a cooperative arrangement to make sure you have
everything you need to get at the truth?
So given your commitment here today to full accountability
and transparency, I would like you to respond to the
observation that this correspondence doesn't look that way. It
actually looks like the State Department is, you know,
stonewalling.
Ms. Darby. Congressman, thank you for that comment. I will
say that, you know, as I have said already, we very much value
the oversight bodies and the advice and guidance and
recommendations that they provide to us and service to the
American taxpayer and to the Congress.
The issue of coordination of requests from our oversight
bodies; in particular, SIGIR, is not handled by my office. So I
am not in the best position to comment on overall issues of
jurisdiction and coordination. As you noted, our legal
adviser's office is very much involved in that.
I do know, however, that there has been a series of
meetings and dialogues between the Department and with SIGIR,
in particular, to find ways to improve cooperation and
coordination, including the appointment of a single point of
contact. and the Deputy Chief Financial Officer, I believe, is
the individual.
Mr. Connolly. I have to reclaim my time, because, as you
know, we have limits on time. But I appreciate your response.
And I certainly appreciate the fact that, look, there are going
to be turf issues. There are going to be differences of
opinion. And I certainly welcome and I am sure SIGIR does as
well your reiteration of the assurance that you are looking for
ways to actually cooperate because this correspondence looks
like a lawyer who is looking for ways not to cooperate and
justify it legally. And I just mentioned that to you because it
is not a reassuring set of correspondence, as far as I am
concerned.
I want to ask you. The senior Deputy Minister of Interior,
Adnan al-Asadi, referred to the PDP program and said it was a
hopeless waste of money. Why would the Deputy Minister of
Interior of a country we are trying to help say such a thing?
And are those sentiments the State Department has heard from
other senior officials of the Iraqi Government?
Ms. Darby. I can't speak to what may have led Principal
Deputy Interior Minister Al-Asadi to make those remarks. As I
indicated before, I did ask him about those remarks when I was
in Iraq about 2 weeks ago. And he reiterated Iraq's need for
and interest in PDP and, in particular, the advising and
mentoring that we are providing to Iraqi police. And he
reiterated that point. He made a special trip over to our
headquarters of our police program in Baghdad to reiterate that
point to our advisers personally. And he indicated he had
reviewed their CDs.
And I think that the interaction that our advisers have had
with their senior Iraqi counterparts speaks volumes and the
positive response they have received and the real desire and
quest for more help, guidance, and assistance speaks well to
the prospects for success for this program.
Mr. Connolly. If the chairman would allow a very simple,
direct follow-up?
Mr. Chabot. The gentleman is recognized for 1 additional
minute.
Mr. Connolly. I thank the chair so much for his
graciousness.
So is it your testimony that you believe the PDP is, in
fact, an efficacious program, it is working?
Mr. Chabot. Sir, we are 2 months into the program. I am
optimistic about its chances for success. And we have built in
accountability and review measures so that we will be able to
constantly monitor and assess whether we are having an impact,
make corrections if we need to, and have an ongoing dialogue
with the Congress about what success we are achieving and where
we are not achieving it and the direction we see going forward.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you. The gentleman yields back.
The gentleman from New York, Mr. Turner, is recognized for
5 minutes. And following the gentleman from New York's
questions, we will move to the second panel. The gentleman is
recognized.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
How has your day been going so far, Ms. Darby?
Ms. Darby. Just great.
Mr. Turner. Good. I am delighted. Maybe these will be easy
ones.
In January, we will be leaving a lot of civilians there:
Advisers, NGOs, et cetera. Are there any strings or
contingencies built into these plans to protect our citizens
from some of the eventualities that we are sure will be coming
up? They will be attacked. They will be in self-defense. We
will be seeking immunity. There will be kidnappings, et cetera,
et cetera. Is this in the thinking and something we should
perhaps put there if it isn't?
Ms. Darby. Sir, I can only speak to the Police Development
Program, not to all of our citizens in Iraq. And I think
probably diplomatic security is in the best position to answer
the details of your questions, but I will say that we obviously
take the security of the personnel that we deploy to Iraq very,
very seriously.
We are working very closely with a regional security
officer, who is the lead for our Diplomatic Security Bureau, in
the Country of Iraq to constantly monitor and assess the way
that we operate the program to promote the greatest security
for our personnel.
Mr. Turner. Okay. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Chabot. The gentleman yields back his time.
We want to thank you very much, Ms. Darby, for your time
here this afternoon. And we are going to move on to our second
panel now. Thank you.
Ms. Darby. Thank you very much, sir.
Mr. Chabot. As the two members of the second panel
approach, I will go ahead and introduce them. First we have
Stuart W. Bowen, Jr. Mr. Bowen was appointed Inspector General
for the coalition, provisional authority, in January 2004 and
has served as the Special Inspector General for Iraq
Reconstruction since October 2004.
As the taxpayers' watchdog in Iraq, Mr. Bowen oversees more
than $63 billion in U.S. funds, including the Iraq Relief and
Reconstruction Fund, the Iraq Security Forces Fund, the
Economic Support Fund, international narcotics control and law
enforcement funding, and the Commander's Emergency Response
Program. Mr. Bowen's public service career includes service to
President George W. Bush as Deputy Assistant to the President,
Deputy Staff Secretary, Special Assistant to the President, and
Associate Counsel.
He holds a B.A. from the University of the South and a J.D.
from St. Mary's Law School.
And we welcome you here this afternoon, Mr. Bowen. Is Mr.
Bowen here? Oh, okay.
And then our other panel member is Glenn D. Furbish. Mr.
Glenn Furbish is the Senior Audit Manager in the Office of the
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. Mr. Furbish
has served as a senior audit manager with the Office of the
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction since May
2005.
Prior to this, Mr. Furbish spent 28 years with the U.S.
Government Accountability Office as a senior program analyst
for defense issues. And before that, Mr. Furbish spent 6 years
in the U.S. Army as an infantry officer and a helicopter pilot.
He holds a B.S. from George Mason University in accounting.
We want to thank you especially for your service to our
country there, Mr. Furbish.
And, Mr. Bowen, while you were gone, I said a whole lot of
nice things about you. So if you are prepared, Mr. Bowen, we
can go ahead and begin with you first. You are recognized for 5
minutes.

STATEMENT OF MR. STUART W. BOWEN, JR., INSPECTOR GENERAL,
OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ
RECONSTRUCTION, ACCOMPANIED BY MR. GLENN D. FURBISH, ASSISTANT
INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AUDITS, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR
GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

Mr. Bowen. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Ranking
Member Ackerman, members of the committee.
I am honored to be joined by Glenn Furbish, my Assistant
Inspector General for Audit, who has served me faithfully for
years, both here and in Iraq.
And on a personal point, I am also especially blessed that
my mother is here this morning, too, in the audience.
Mr. Chabot. Excellent.
Mr. Bowen. So welcome her.
Today's hearing addresses a crucial issue, as the previous
panel and questions identify. And that is, what is the proper
expenditure of another $1 billion in Iraq? And what will it
accomplish? And that was the core purpose of our audit, which
we began last April, struggled to execute through the spring
and early summer, forcing me eventually to do something very
unusual, send an obstruction letter to Secretary Clinton about
the stonewalling that occurred in the course of the audit.
That had the effect of breaking the logjam and getting us
enough information to produce the audit that we issued on
October 24th. It addresses, really, more than $1 billion in
potential expenditures because the Congress has already
approved and appropriated over 700 million. State has in its
possession now between 200 and 300 million and has a pending
request for 887 million. Do the math. That is more like $1.2
billion.
The program just began about a month ago. And it is
impossible to ascertain the nature of the progress thus far
given its young state.
But I did visit with Ambassador Sison when I was in Iraq on
my 31st trip 2 weeks ago. And she indicated to me that they
embraced our recommendations from our audits. And we are
implementing the assessment, as required.
And I met with Deputy Secretary Burns 2 days ago. And he,
similarly, embraced both what we have had to say and the need
to address the weaknesses.
The latest audit is just the latest in a series of audits
we have been doing on police training since 2007. And they have
echoed similar problems: Weak management controls, weak
oversight. And, indeed, our audit of a year ago on this issue
recommended that an assessment be done of the police forces in
preparation for transition. It wasn't done. That, curiously,
also echoed a recommendation from a joint planning team from 2
years ago that went to Iraq and said, ``Well, we have got to
get a baseline.'' It obviously, as we know, wasn't done.
All the things that we found in our audit were that there
wasn't a sufficiently comprehensive and detailed plan on what
the state intended to accomplish through the PDP; that there
wasn't sufficient transparency in the budgeting; that the
amount of funds that had been requested were probably more than
what is now a scale-back program down from 192 trainers to 115
today; and that, as we have talked about, as the panel has
discussed, Iraqi support was limited or even questionable.
We made three recommendations: Do the assessment again,
develop a comprehensive plan that has metrics and milestones
that demonstrate what is going to be accomplished, what goals
are there;--the committee has already addressed that--and that
we obtain, the State Department obtain, written assurances
pursuant to existing regulations adopted by the Congress from
Iraq on their contributions, certainly at least to that program
money.
Currently, as we have heard, there are about 100 advisers
on the ground over there. And they have got 200 to 300 million
in the bank. They estimate the expense for the program is 500
million. You do the math. Eight hundred eighty-seven million
may not be necessary for next year as you look at it.
But, as was also mentioned by the committee, this is a 5-
year program. It is envisioned to carry on perhaps at, what,
$800 million to $1 billion a year for 5 years. So we are not
talking about one. We are talking about potentially $5 billion.
Iraqi buy-in remains an issue. They haven't provided their
contribution commitment. When I met with Deputy Minister Al-
Asadi 2 weeks ago and asked him, you know, ``Have you withdrawn
from your comments that you made to us a month ago?'' he said,
``Well, they are still on my Web site. They are still posted.''
And he didn't indicate to me that he would step back, although
he said, ``We welcome the support.''
And so, with that, you know, I think it is deserving of
careful scrutiny. I think the committee is demonstrating that
today.
And, with that, I look forward to your questions. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Bowen follows:]

----------

Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much, Mr. Bowen.
And I will now recognize myself for 5 minutes. I had some
very probing questions, was really going to put you on the spot
here this afternoon. But since you brought your mother, I can
get a little more genteel.
Mr. Bowen. Thank you.
Mr. Chabot. All kidding aside, we just want to get the
appropriate responses out there.
First of all, SIGIR documented in its PDP audit what it
believes constitutes continued obstructions to the execution of
SIGIR's statutory authority to conduct oversight on the part of
DoS. To what do you attribute this resistance?
In the correspondence between DoS and SIGIR, DoS expounded
a view that resources and programs which are shared by both the
PDP and Embassy Baghdad do not fall under SIGIR's
jurisdictions. Do you face some more objections in other
audits? Could you address that?
Mr. Bowen. No, we haven't faced similar objections other
than in one prior instance with the State Department regarding
an audit we wanted to carry out of Triple Canopy, a major
defense security contractor in country. And we withdrew our
audit 3\1/2\ years ago because the State Department IG
announced an audit that was virtually identical. So there was a
rational basis for us not pursuing it.
The State Department IG is not auditing the Police
Development Program. And the single biggest largest program in
the United States is funding next year in Iraq. And, thus, it
is crucial for the Congress to know the truth.
Mr. Chabot. Well, SIGIR on numerous occasions cites plans
and documents which were not provided. Do you believe these
documents exist and were not provided because of jurisdictional
disagreements or, alternatively, do you think that the level of
information SIGIR received is reflective of the state of
planning which actually exists or existed in the INL? And have
there been any further developments since the audit was
completed?
Mr. Bowen. Some of those documents did exist. Yet, I think
also some were developed in the face of our requests. Indeed,
as we asked for plans and a comprehensive plan about what did
the PDP constitute, we received a PowerPoint slide presentation
of about 23 slides.
Later, further supplementation was more detailed, but it
appeared it had been developed subsequent to our request. On
the other hand, we never got the Fiscal Year 2011 spend plan,
which certainly existed.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you.
Mr. Bowen, in your testimony, you observed that ``In August
2010, INL received $450 million for start-up costs and $200
million for Fiscal Year 2011 fourth quarter operating costs.''
According to a spend plan, INL expected to use most of
these funds to upgrade hub and aviation facilities and purchase
rotary wing aircraft. However, INL has suspended plans to
operate dedicated aircraft for the PDP.
If not for INL, what do you believe the money was spent
for?
Mr. Bowen. Well, I believe part of the purposes of the air
wing, the State Department's air wing in Iraq was for the
movement of the senior officials and others around the country
on missions and for DV visits as well.
As you pointed out, that particular aspect of the program
was suspended, which raises a question about the 887 million
request since it embraces the airway.
Mr. Chabot. Okay. Thank you.
As you note in your testimony,

``A cardinal rule for successful international
development programs is that the host government must
be fully engaged in and supportive of program planning
and execution. As SIGIR has found from 7 years of
oversight work in Iraq, programs must be geared to
indigenous priorities, capacities, and needs.
``Senior officials from Iraq's Ministry of Interior
told SIGIR this fall that they are ready and willing to
work with INL on the PDP, but they also noted that the
program's merits are impossible to assess as of yet,
that they were not sufficiently consulted on the
program's scope, and that they are withholding judgment
until they see what benefits come from it.
``In an October meeting with my deputy, Senior Deputy
Minister of Interior Adnan al-Asadi, said, `What
tangible benefit is there to my ministry of 650,000
people who are in the midst of massive security
challenges on the streets of Iraq? Very little.' ''

What is your prognosis for Iraqi support, financial or
otherwise, for the PDP?
Mr. Bowen. Well, I think they are not turning their back on
$1 billion. They don't shoot gift horses, do they? They are
willing to accept the $62 billion later. The Iraqis have not
said no to any U.S. dollar sent to Iraq to date. And they are
not saying no to these.
The issue, though, is, as the committee has already
addressed, is this wisely spent? And will it advance a goal
that needs to be met that mainly the internal security of Iraq.
And while Minister Al-Asadi is welcoming at this juncture of
his support, at first blush, when he was first engaged
seriously on the topic, he demurred and perhaps spoke off the
cuff regarding his, at best, curiosity about why we were
spending so much money on an issue.
That President Talibani was addressed 4 days ago in a
public statement. He said, ``Iraq is capable of providing its
own internal security.''
Mr. Chabot. Okay. Thank you very much. My time has expired.
Gentleman from New York, Ranking Member Ackerman, sir, an
extra 5 minutes.
Mr. Ackerman. Do these programs ever work?
Mr. Bowen. They work as best as they can. It depends on
defining goals. And you raise a----
Mr. Ackerman. I can fly as best I can, too.
Mr. Bowen. Yes, Mr. Ackerman, your implicit point is well-
taken. We did train 450,000 Iraqis to be police across the
country. We equipped them. They are better than they were
before. But what we uncovered in our audit of a year ago, as
DoD managed this program, we discovered that there weren't
sufficient metrics or an over-arching strategic plan to judge
whether they worked.
Mr. Ackerman. How much did we spend on that? That didn't
work.
Mr. Bowen. $8 billion.
Mr. Ackerman. $8 billion that didn't work. So what are the
lessons we learned?
Mr. Bowen. Be careful with the taxpayers' money in
stabilization operations.
Mr. Ackerman. Okay. How do we apply that to the new
management so they know how to apply it?
Mr. Bowen. Well, I don't know the answer to that question,
but I would say, as we apply it to this, we should better
assess what the Iraqis' real needs are, which is why a year
ago, we said, ``Do an assessment.'' Then you can target your
aid. The aid is preceding an assessment or, actually, now
coincident with.
Mr. Ackerman. Let me ask a question because I am having
difficulty getting my arms around this. How do you assess in
the near term whether you are teaching human rights to people
who are learning it? How do you evaluate gender rights absent
the 20-year sky view look at it?
Mr. Bowen. Well, Mr. Ackerman, I think you have raised a
larger question about assessing development. Those are----
Mr. Ackerman. It is a dilemma. How do you measure it?
Mr. Bowen. I think it is extremely difficult to do, Mr.
Ackerman.
Mr. Ackerman. So we don't know if we are making progress
toward it either?
Mr. Bowen. I think that is a fair assessment.
Mr. Ackerman. So there is no way to measure it?
Mr. Bowen. On those two issues, given the long-term nature
of such programs, it would be difficult to assess it on a year-
to-year basis.
Mr. Ackerman. So there is no way to evaluate it. We have no
oversight over a program that is costing hundreds of millions
of dollars. And it is not going to be able to be demonstrated,
even if it is working or not working.
Mr. Bowen. With regard to gender and human rights, I think
that is true. With regard to the 48 other things that they are
doing, I think it depends on the particular topic they are
undertaking.
For example, one of the programs is, as I was briefed by
Ambassador Sison, canine training; in other words, providing
them bomb-sniffing dogs, which also has been going on. The
military did do that for years already. So there are some
ground-level aspects of this program as well as higher-level.
Mr. Ackerman. What do we have the best chance of accurately
measuring, evaluating in all of the goals of the program?
Mr. Bowen. I think it is inherently difficult to measure
mentoring, but the best, the most measurable aspects of this
program are those that are subject to more objective analysis,
like how many canine dogs have you provided and training to
trainers who can use them in bomb-sniffing situations?
Mr. Ackerman. Let's say the answer is 106. Is that a good
result?
Mr. Bowen. That is why you have to set goals ahead of time.
And that was one of our criticisms about the program. They
didn't set goals.
Mr. Ackerman. Are they setting goals now?
Mr. Bowen. That is what I have been told.
Mr. Ackerman. How many bomb-sniffing dogs do they need to
be successful?
Mr. Bowen. They haven't told me that.
Mr. Ackerman. How many women in general do they need to be
successful?
Mr. Bowen. We are going to follow up in the spring with
another audit to look at the effects and results of the changes
made by the Department in implementing our recommendations. And
I can better answer those questions then.
Mr. Ackerman. They don't have these metrics in place now?
Mr. Bowen. I have been told that they are putting them in.
This was a core criticism of the audit, the absence of
milestones and metrics. That was our second finding, really.
And they said that they are doing that. We haven't gone back in
to review the success of implementing those changes yet.
Mr. Ackerman. I used to be a school teacher. I knew if a
kid got between 60 and 65, he was going to get a D and knew
what the numbers were to give him an F and where I was going to
give him an A. Do they have such a chart?
Mr. Bowen. Not that I am aware of. They didn't when we did
the audit.
Mr. Ackerman. So they have not said anything?
Mr. Bowen. No metrics, no milestones.
Mr. Ackerman. No metrics, no milestones, no money. That is
my point of view.
Mr. Chabot. The gentleman's time has expired.
The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Marino, is recognized
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Marino. Thank you, Chairman.
Good afternoon, Mr. Bowen, Mr. Furbish. Thank you for being
here.
Mr. Bowen. Thank you.
Mr. Marino. I believe both of you gentlemen were in the
audience when I was questioning the Secretary Darby about
missing funds. This may not be directly on point, but it goes
to the credibility of the prime minister and his government and
it goes to accounting for our tax dollars. So perhaps you can
help me with something.
I am going to read you something that I found early on. In
October in a USA Today article, it was reported that there was
$217 million in cash that was stored in a palace that is still
unaccounted for in Baghdad. There is an additional $1.6 billion
that was intended for distribution among the regions in Iraq
that is unaccounted for. And that was part of a $2.4 billion
deposit to the Baghdad government.
Also, other information that has come to my attention is
that one, if not many more, of the government officials have
just merely walked away with millions of dollars. And the
government has introduced past legislation laws saying that any
government official is immune from prosecution for accounting
for any of this money. No one has been held responsible for it.
And is this information accurate?
Mr. Bowen. With regard to the amnesty law of 2008 that the
Council of Representatives passed, yes. Senior government
officials in Iraq, Iraqi officials told me that that
essentially wiped the slate clean for fraud committed prior to
that date.
Regarding the development fund for Iraq issues, which you
raised, we did issue a new audit on that issue, our third that
identified and raised new questions, identified some answers
but raised new questions about the U.S. use of Iraqi dollars.
And, Glenn, why don't you address what our next audit is
going to hit regarding the $217 million and the $2.8 billion?
Mr. Marino. Can you do that rather succinctly? I am limited
here to about 2\1/2\ minutes.
Mr. Furbish. Very quickly, we are looking right now at how
the U.S. used that money. That money was used by the Corps of
Engineers to carrying out projects in Iraq. And we are looking
at their records to account for that money. We will be
reporting on that within the next 2 months.
Mr. Marino. Perhaps we should ask the prime minister if he
wants to keep these programs in effect over there to account
for the money that has been missing. There is no indication at
this point. And perhaps you can help me with this rhetorical
statement that there have been no plans for Iraq to pass back
anything that we have spent over there. We will never recoup
from the lives that we lost over there.
How can we continue to--I will use this term loosely--do
business with a government that has proven to be corrupt, has
proven to have very little concern for their overall
population? How can I justify to my people in the Tenth
Congressional District of north central Pennsylvania that we
are going to spend billions of dollars more in this Iraqi
Government and my people are losing their jobs?
If I hear of one more time of a foreign despot leaving or
living a life of luxury on billions of dollars of taxpayer
money, I want to be in charge of the team that goes over there
to apprehend them and bring them back.
Mr. Bowen. Mr. Marino, corruption is and has been a
devastating problem in Iraq and has inhibited progress across
the board on the relief and reconstruction front. More
importantly, it inhibits progress for the average Iraqi. They
are going to have a budget next year of over $110 billion. But
the corruption issue, you know, raises real questions about the
proper use of that money.
Mr. Marino. But if I might interrupt you, how are you going
to measure whether we are making any improvements on curtailing
corruption over there?
Mr. Bowen. It is difficult to do because it occurs in the
shadow. However, let me identify one important step that we
have been calling for for years and did occur this year. And
that was the repeal of an article in their criminal code that
allowed any minister to absolve any employee from any liability
for fraud. That is obvious counter to the basic notions of
democracy. They finally did it. And so I commend them on it.
But the reality is, is having laws on the books like that
failing to have a Commission on Integrity that does its job,
failing to have a judiciary that will convict people for
corruption is why Iraq is in the bottom five in the world in
transparency internationals index.
Mr. Marino. Well, at this point I am not convinced to
support any legislation that would send any more money over to
Iraq. And I see my time is up, but I thank you gentlemen for
the work that you have been doing and that you will continue to
do.
Mr. Bowen. Thank you, Mr. Marino.
Mr. Marino. I yield back.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired.
The gentleman from New York, Mr. Higgins, is recognized for
5 minutes.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bowen, you had indicated that you had been in Iraq 33
times?
Mr. Bowen. 31.
Mr. Higgins. 31. Dating back to?
Mr. Bowen. February 2004.
Mr. Higgins. 2004. Your last trip was?
Mr. Bowen. 2 weeks ago.
Mr. Higgins. Okay. The effort starting in 2003 was to
commit $8 billion to train the Iraqi police force some 450,000
Iraqis. Since there are no baseline assessments, again I would
ask you, as I asked the previous witness, anecdotally what is
your sense of the security system, the internal security
system, with respect to Iraq, where the holes are? Are there
any places like in Baghdad, for example, or Ramadi that provide
a good example of a successful result from this financial
effort?
Mr. Bowen. I think there have been examples of success
across the country. Anbar Province is much safer than it was 6
years ago. Kurdistan, the three northern provinces, are largely
very well in order.
Mr. Higgins. But they were pretty calm to begin with.
Mr. Bowen. You're right. There are two Iraqs. There is
Kurdistan and the southern 15. But, really, what you are
addressing is the current state of the Iraqi rule of law system
as a whole. And that embraces corrections, the judiciary, and
the police.
And I think that there continue to be serious problems on
all fronts, not just police training. The judiciary, over 45
judges have been killed in the last 7 years. I met with Judge
Medhat during my trip. And another judge had just been killed.
And he was bemoaning again the lack of weapons cards for his
judge's security members.
And then on the prison front, you know, frankly, we
invested a lot of money building prisons and we wasted a lot of
money.
Mr. Higgins. Sadr City, five million population center of
Baghdad. How does the Iraqi Government deal with Sadr City,
just stay out of there altogether?
Mr. Bowen. I think it is a truce of sorts between the
Sadrists, who control that area, and the rest of Baghdad. And I
think that is why, frankly, Mr. Maliki's senior Deputy
Minister, Al-Asadi, and others are concerned that the primary
location for the Police Development Program in Iraq is right on
the edge of Sadr City. It is directly next to the Baghdad
Police College, another place where we wasted a lot of money,
across the street from the Minister of Interior and adjacent to
Sadr City and, thus, a magnet for indirect fire.
Mr. Higgins. Clearly there is a lack of oversight and
transparency. And that problem is seemingly pervasive and
growing or at least since we have initiated this back in 2003.
Why is it that the State Department would deliberately make
efforts to obstruct efforts to bring greater oversight and
transparency? Why is there that adversarial relationship? It
would seem to me that your efforts would be to benefit the
effective use, efficient use of American resources in that
region because we all have a strategic interest in seeing that
region evolve. Why is it that you suspect that the State
Department is seemingly obstructing those efforts?
Mr. Bowen. Well, it was obstructing. I think we heard today
that they are supportive, almost fully supportive, of our
oversight at this stage. And it took an obstruction letter,
though, Mr. Higgins, as you were pointing to to break that
logjam.
Why? You know, I can't read into the exact motives, but I
think, to a certain extent, it was a legalistic argument about
jurisdiction.
Mr. Higgins. Yes. Okay. Just, you know, a final thought on
this. You know, someone said, I think it was Tom Friedman. He
posed a question. He said, ``Is Iraq the way it is because
Saddam was the way he is or is Saddam the way he is because
Iraq is the way it is?''
I just think when you look at this long, expensive effort--
and I don't just mean financial expense, expense in human
capital--in the surge experience, again, which was to tamp down
the violence, to provide a breathing space, within which all of
the political factions in Iraq could reconcile their
differences and evolve.
It seems as though, you know the surge succeeded
militarily. But politically the situation doesn't seem to
evolve. And obviously the policing issue, as I mentioned
previously, in northern Ireland is fundamental to the success
of any kind of power-sharing agreement.
And without meaningful progress over the past 8 years in
this renewed effort, given this horrible past of wasted money,
of great expectations and lofty goals but very, very little to
show for it, it seems as though, you know, a $1 billion
expenditure over the next 5 years moving forward is not a good
use of American resources in a region that I think we have done
everything that we can do in order to help them achieve their
objectives, whatever they are, be they consistent with our
objectives or not.
So I yield back.
Mr. Chabot. The gentleman's time has expired.
The gentleman from Virginia is recognized for 5 minutes and
will be our final questioner this afternoon.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And welcome both to Mr. Furbish and Mr. Bowen. General
Bowen, I am sure your mother is proud of your performance today
and your service to your country. Thirty-one trips to Iraq,
that deserves a special status. I, in fact, traveled with you
on one of those 31 trips. And I can vouch for the fact that you
get your hands dirty in trying to understand what is going on.
Let me pick up where my colleague Mr. Higgins sort of led
us, which is you said that you issued to the State Department a
letter of obstruction. Is that right?
Mr. Bowen. That is right.
Mr. Connolly. How often do letters of obstruction get
issued from inspector generals?
Mr. Bowen. Well, I explored that question after we issued
it. And my staff tells me that, at least over the last 4 years,
ours was the only one.
Mr. Connolly. So on relatively unprecedented ground.
Mr. Bowen. Yes.
Mr. Connolly. But you heard the first witness in the first
panel reassure us up and down that she was mostly kind of fully
committed to full transparency or transparency and
accountability. I assume a letter of obstruction would, sadly,
contradict such an assertion.
Mr. Bowen. Well, Mr. Connolly, it actually worked in this
case. We received virtually no documents before August 3rd, the
date of the letter. And afterwards we got enough to do the
audit. We didn't get everything we asked for, but vis-a-vis
what we had in June and July, it was a world of difference.
Mr. Connolly. If I understood your answer to Mr. Higgins'
questioning, you attributed this to just turf protection,
bureaucratic turf protection.
Mr. Bowen. Yes, sir. I think that is true.
Mr. Connolly. Well, you know, taxpayer money is on the line
here. Did you not sense any commitment from the Department of
State and its officials to joining you in trying to make sure
that we were protecting this $1 billion investment of U.S.
taxpayer money?
Mr. Bowen. I sensed it today.
Mr. Connolly. Today? I heard you respond to my colleague
Mr. Ackerman in a declarative sentence, ``There are no metrics
and no milestones with respect to the PDP.'' Is that correct?
Mr. Bowen. There weren't when we carried out our audit.
They are remedying that issue now.
Mr. Connolly. But you don't know what they are?
Mr. Bowen. Not yet.
Mr. Connolly. It would strike, I think, the average
American, if not the average Member of Congress to invest $1
billion in anything absent metrics and milestones is a fool's
herring, whatever the intention, however noble the motivation.
If you can't measure it, it is not real as far as I am
concerned. Is that a view shared by you, Mr. Bowen?
Mr. Bowen. That is my judgment. I have said that if you
don't show the Congress good metrics and good milestones and
identify what your goals are, it is tough to ask for more
money.
Mr. Connolly. Yes. I think most of us would maybe feel we
shouldn't, not only more money. We shouldn't spend a dime,
frankly, without some rigorous metrics and milestones that are
efficacious, that are meaningful.
The object here is to train a viable police force that has
some respect for law that isn't corrupt, that can win the
confidence of the people and, frankly, enter into the space we
create when we withdraw. Is that not true?
Mr. Bowen. I think that is exactly right, Mr. Connolly. And
we spent, as I said, $8 billion already. This is a 5-year
program with, you know, several hundred million, actually $400
million, already spent on this part of it. Are we going to
spend $2-, $3-, $4 billion more to do what when President
Talibani said 4 days ago or 5?
Mr. Connolly. To what did you attribute--you cited in your
report, I believe, this quote I read the previous witness from
the senior Deputy Minister of Interior Adnan Al-Asadi, who I
think referred to the PDP as a hopeless waste of money, your
money, American money. Is that true?
Mr. Bowen. That is right. That was his early October
interview with my deputy, Ginger Cruz. And I met with him 2\1/
2\ weeks ago. He moderated his tone a little bit, but when I
pressed him more firmly, he said, ``Well, it is still on''----
Mr. Connolly. ``Still on my Web site''?
Mr. Bowen. That is right.
Mr. Connolly. Now, you heard the previous witness attempt,
I think, to deflect that statement and argue that while our
understanding is now that he is on board and he supports the
program, they are still certainly making the request for the
funding of the program. And she again I think sort of deflected
my question about ``Well, is that a representative view of
senior officials over in Iraq or was that sort of an outlier
point of view or a rare moment of candor?''
You might want to comment. My time is up.
Mr. Bowen. Well, he was the only senior official from the
Ministry of Interior to whom I addressed that issue. And the
core point is he did not step too far away from it in our
discussions.
Mr. Chabot. The gentleman's time has expired. Did you want
to follow up?
Mr. Connolly. No, Mr. Chairman. I just want to say thank
you to you for holding this hearing. I think this hearing has
raised really serious questions about this program. And
whatever our intentions are, Lord knows we do need a well-
trained police force in Iraq.
I don't leave this hearing with any confidence that the
program in front of us with $1 billion being planned in
expenditures over the next several years has the slightest
chance of being effective. And I think that raises real
questions about how we proceed.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you. And I would like to thank the
members of the panel, both up here, for their participation and
probing questions this afternoon, the panel, both panels here
this afternoon. Without objection, all members will have 5
legislative days to revise and extend their remarks.
And, if there is no further business to come before the
committee, we are adjourned. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 2:40 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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