[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

U.S.-INDIA COUNTERTERRORISM COOPERATION: DEEPENING THE PARTNERSHIP

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HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

__________

SEPTEMBER 14, 2011

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Serial No. 112-62

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Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/

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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
DAN BURTON, Indiana GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
ELTON GALLEGLY, California ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DANA ROHRABACHER, California Samoa
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California BRAD SHERMAN, California
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
RON PAUL, Texas GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
MIKE PENCE, Indiana RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
JOE WILSON, South Carolina ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
CONNIE MACK, Florida GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas DENNIS CARDOZA, California
TED POE, Texas BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky
GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania
BILL JOHNSON, Ohio CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut
DAVID RIVERA, Florida FREDERICA WILSON, Florida
MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania KAREN BASS, California
TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina
ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York
RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina
VACANT
Yleem D.S. Poblete, Staff Director
Richard J. Kessler, Democratic Staff Director
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Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
TED POE, Texas BRAD SHERMAN, California
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
BILL JOHNSON, Ohio GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania
RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina

C O N T E N T S

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Page

WITNESSES

Ms. Lisa Curtis, senior research fellow, Asian Studies Center,
The Heritage Foundation........................................ 4
Mr. Frank Cilluffo, associate vice president, director, Homeland
Security Policy Institute, The George Washington University.... 16
S. Amer Latif, Ph.D., visiting fellow, Wadhwani Chair in U.S.-
India Policy Studies, Center for Strategic and International
Studies........................................................ 31

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING

Ms. Lisa Curtis: Prepared statement.............................. 6
Mr. Frank Cilluffo: Prepared statement........................... 19
S. Amer Latif, Ph.D.: Prepared statement......................... 33

APPENDIX

Hearing notice................................................... 46
Hearing minutes.................................................. 47

U.S.-INDIA COUNTERTERRORISM COOPERATION: DEEPENING THE PARTNERSHIP

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WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 14, 2011

House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Terrorism,
Nonproliferation, and Trade,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 o'clock p.m.,
in room 2200 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Edward R.
Royce (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Royce. Today, we will examine U.S.-India
counterterrorism cooperation. Of course, this hearing comes
after our memorial for 9/11. And it comes right after India has
again suffered a terrorist attack. Last week, a powerful bomb
decimated part of one of New Delhi's high profile courthouses.
It killed dozens of people. Scores of people were also injured.
A few months ago, a coordinated triple bombing struck Mumbai,
and that attack came during rush hour. Indian authorities are
still searching for answers.
July's coordinated Mumbai attack brought back the horrors
of 26/11 to India. Three years ago, a coordinated rampage
rocked this great city. It killed 166. And in that total were
six Americans who were killed. But unlike in 2008, this time
India authorities responded more rapidly, though there is still
frustration in India. Defending an open country of India's size
is no easy task. Mumbai is particularly challenging. It's got a
population of 20 million people. Fortunately, there are good
opportunities for the United States to increase its
counterterrorism cooperation with India. I visited Mumbai after
the 26/11 attacks and had an opportunity at that time to not
only talk with the Prime Minister about this subject, but to
talk to the head of the counterterrorism operations in India
about the necessity of closer cooperation between the United
States and India.
I think the two countries have worked together on this for
over a decade in terms of discussions that I'm cognizant of.
But by all accounts, this cooperation substantially improved
after the 2008 Mumbai attacks, when investigators from both
countries stood shoulder-to-shoulder in response. The
Counterterrorism Cooperation Initiative, Homeland Security
Dialogue and other working groups plug along. This April, the
FBI, working with the Indian Home Ministry, hosted 39 senior
police executives from across India in Los Angeles, where they
participated in an exchange on counterterrorism, crisis
response and megacity policing. They visited the FBI's Regional
Computer Forensics Laboratory in Orange, California, a city I
represent, to be trained in all aspects of digital evidence
recovery.
This is good, but I'd like to get to a point where our
counterterrorism exchanges are just as high profile, just as
numerous, just as unprecedented as our combined military
exercises with India are. I think Secretary Clinton had it
right this July when she stressed in India ``how important it
is that we get results'' from all of our counterterrorism
agreements.
Let's be clear: This is more than just helping a democratic
ally. There are real, hard U.S. interests at stake. Simply put,
the militants targeting India are also the militants targeting
us. Indeed, at a subcommittee hearing on the ``Future of al-
Qaeda'' after bin Laden's death, many experts placed just as
much importance on Pakistan-based LeT as any al-Qaeda
affiliate. LeT is India's mortal enemy, and it has gone global,
with Western targets in its sights.
This week Vice President Biden said of Pakistan, ``They
have to get better. We are demanding it.'' But are we? Last
month, the Wall Street Journal reported that the U.S. has begun
to condition security assistance to Pakistan on a ``secret
scorecard of U.S. objectives to combat al-Qaeda and its
militant allies.'' Although details are classified, from the
Journal's reporting, it does not seem that the U.S. has put
emphasis on Pakistan making further progress on the Mumbai
attackers or LeT in this ``scorecard.''
This would be shortsighted if it's the case. And I think
this has to do with tearing down barriers that might be in the
way of greater cooperation with India. As one witness will
testify, ``The U.S. cannot allow its national security to be
held hostage by nearly two decades of unfulfilled expectations
in Pakistan.''
In the past decade, U.S. relations with India have grown
considerably. But we've hit a lull. Counterterrorism
cooperation is a way to reinvigorate this relationship, and
it's a way to better protect America.
I'll now turn to the ranking member for his opening
statement, Mr. Sherman.
Mr. Sherman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for these important
hearings today and for that opening statement that I want to
associate myself with. I look forward to hearing from our
witnesses on how to further increase our counterterrorism
cooperation with an important and democratic friend, India. I
also note that we are the Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and
Trade Subcommittee and look forward to our subcommittee
focusing on how to expand American exports to India as well.
As has been noted, the U.S.-India relationship is one of
the most important bilateral relationships in the world for the
21st century. Despite significant improvements since the end of
the Cold War, there has been significant distrust and
bureaucratic impediments to better relations. Commercial
relations, as I've mentioned, are often portrayed as a bright
spot, but American firms have not benefitted as much as we had
hoped from India's efforts to modernize its military equipment
and develop civilian nuclear power, and that's just two
examples.
While it was inconceivable just a few years ago for U.S.
firms to even seriously be considered for such projects as
India's jet fighter needs, now our jet fighters are considered,
but ultimately the U.S. firms were not selected earlier this
year.
We see a similar picture in counterterrorism cooperation in
other areas. Relationships have improved. They have reached new
heights. The level of cooperation and mutual assistance after
the 2008 Mumbai attacks were remarkable, but old, lingering
distrust and suspicions continue to hamper needed deeper
cooperation.
Last week a powerful bomb placed in a briefcase exploded in
a reception area of the Delhi High Court killing 12, wounding
70. Harakat-ul-Jihad-i-Islami, an al-Qaeda-linked group with
bases in Pakistan and Bangladesh, appears to be behind that
latest attack. The groups that target India may not be the same
exact groups that target the U.S., but they have major contacts
and indeed overlap with al-Qaeda and they share a similar pan-
Islamic ideology, although often the groups that target India
have a more local anti-India focus, rather than a world-wide
focus.
Deeper intelligence sharing has benefitted both countries.
Further improvements are needed. Due to its sensitivity and
strong bureaucratic prerogative this is also one of the most
challenging areas for greater cooperation.
I bring up the subject of Pakistan. We should not have our
need to cooperate with Pakistan hinder our cooperation with
India and I've consistently called the State Department and
others in our Government to call out Pakistan for its often
duplicitous role in the struggle against terror. Pakistan's
intelligence service, ISI, has for too long aided violent
extremists, several Pakistani groups, including as the chairman
mentioned, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba--and I apologize to those who are
familiar with South Asian languages for my pronunciation--
Jaish-e-Mohammed, have links to al-Qaeda. These groups have
launched numerous attacks against the Indian population and
government, including the deadly assault against the Indian
Parliament in New Dehli in 2001. The hands of Pakistan's
Government are also seen in the 26/11 2008 attacks in Mumbai,
using the Indian way of identifying month and date, that is to
say the 26th of November 2008.
Failure to point out the Pakistani connection to this
terrorism will only serve to perpetuate it. We have to work
with those we can in Pakistan but we must be more effective in
calling out, and in the words of Secretary Clinton, ``lean hard
on Islamabad.''
At the same time, the present administration is rightly
building on efforts of its predecessors to deepen
counterterrorism ties with India. In July 2010, the U.S. and
India signed a Bilateral Counterterrorism Cooperative
Initiative Memorandum of Understanding. This MOU was followed
by the creation of a Homeland Security Dialogue during
President Obama's visit to India. We only have such a dialogue
with a handful of our closest allies. Secretary Napolitano led
a delegation to India earlier this year, holding the first
dialogue meeting in New Dehli. This high-level focus will
hopefully play a significant role in efforts to break the
patterns of bureaucratic lack of communication that we've seen
in the past.
Again, Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for holding these
hearings. As it happens, as you know, the Financial Services
subcommittee is having a hearing of importance to Southern
California as well, so any part of this hearing that I miss I
know will be on tape and on disk for me to watch over the next
couple of days. Thank you.
Mr. Royce. Thank you very much, Mr. Sherman. We're going to
go to our distinguished panel at this time and we'll start with
Ms. Lisa Curtis. She is a senior research fellow for South Asia
at The Heritage Foundation and before joining Heritage, Lisa
served on the staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
She also served with the State Department and with the Central
Intelligence Agency and has appeared before the House numerous
times. And we welcome her back.
Mr. Frank Cilluffo is associate vice president and director
of the Homeland Security Policy Institute at George Washington
University. He served in the White House as Special Assistant
to the President for homeland security and he's one of the
leading experts on terrorism and homeland security.
We have Dr. Amer Latif with us as well, a visiting fellow
for U.S.-Indian Policy Studies at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies. He was director for South Asian Affairs
in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy,
responsible for defense relations with India and surrounding
countries.
All of the witnesses have submitted their testimony. It's
already part of the written record, so we will ask you all to
abbreviate, make a 5-minute presentation and then we'll go to
questioning. We'll start with Ms. Curtis.

STATEMENT OF MS. LISA CURTIS, SENIOR RESEARCH FELLOW, ASIAN
STUDIES CENTER, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION

Ms. Curtis. Thank you very much for inviting me here today
to testify on U.S.-India counterterrorism cooperation. The U.S.
and India are under threat from terrorists that seek to disrupt
our country's democratic way of life, our economic progress,
and indeed, to strike terror among our people. And this point
was driven home, as you both mentioned, last week with the
attacks in New Dehli, as well as the threat information that
came to light that terrorists might be preparing to attack New
York City and Washington, DC, on the 10-year anniversary of the
9/11 attacks.
Now India's failure to identify a specific organization
responsible for the bombing in New Dehli partly defines the
evolving nature of the threat that India faces. Analysts there
are increasingly focusing on networks of individuals and the
possibility that small groups of Indians may be working with
Pakistan-based terrorist groups like the Lashkar-e-Tayyiba or
the Harakat-ul-Jihadi Islami. And the reality that India faces
a threat from homegrown Islamic terrorists was acknowledged by
India's home minister.
Now India has taken some important steps to improve its
counterterrorism capabilities since the 2008 Mumbai attacks
such as establishing the National Investigative Agency much
like our FBI and strengthening it's antiterrorism laws. But it
must do far more to cope with persistent threat it faces. And
the amount of resources that India has invested in bolstering
its counterterrorism capabilities has simply failed to meet the
challenge at hand.
Now immediately following the Mumbai attacks, as you
mentioned, Chairman Royce, Washington and New Dehli broke down
many bureaucratic barriers to their counterterrorism
cooperation. But unfortunately, the handling of the David
Coleman Headley case revived to some extent Indian mistrust of
the U.S. and its handling of terrorism cases implicating
Pakistan. Striking revelations of the LeT's international reach
and connections to Pakistani intelligence emerged from the
trials of David C. Headley and his accomplish Tahawwur Rana.
But it took almost 9 months before Indian authorities were
given direct access to Headley. Moreover, the U.S. failure to
pressure Pakistan to arrest intelligence officers named by
Headley as involved in the Mumbai attacks reinforced Indian
beliefs that the U.S. will gloss over Pakistani involvement in
attacks on India so long as Pakistan continues to cooperate
with the U.S. against groups that threaten the U.S. homeland.
To some extent, India is right. In the past, the U.S. has
viewed the LeT, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, only through an Indo-
Pakistani prism, rather than as part of the international
terrorist syndicate. Thankfully, opinions within the U.S.
administration are beginning to change on this issue. And as
you know, the dangers of the LeT and its link to global
terrorism are well known and I won't spend time going over
those.
I think a hesitant U.S. approach to sharing information on
Pakistan-based terrorist groups with India does not serve U.S.
interests. Indeed, it cripples the U.S. ability to fully get a
handle on the terrorism threat in South Asia because by
choosing to view the activities of al-Qaeda and other Pakistan-
based terrorist groups through a separate lens, U.S. officials
have failed to hold Pakistan fully accountable for dealing with
the terrorists located on its territory. And indeed, Pakistan's
tolerance of groups like the Lashkar-e-Tayyiba have facilitated
al-Qaeda's ability to operate from Pakistan and Osama bin
Laden's ability to hide in the country as long as he did.
So hopefully, the U.S.-India Homeland Security Dialogue
that was launched in May will help overcome some of this
mistrust between our two countries and provide fresh
opportunities to enhance our counterterrorism cooperation and
beyond enhancing intelligence sharing, I think the U.S. should
also position itself as a resource for India as India seeks to
improve it's own homeland security. For instance, improving the
security of cities, large cities like Mumbai will require
investment from international companies that can provide state-
of-the-art technology and products that help protect critical
infrastructure and here, U.S. companies certainly have a role
to play.
The two countries can also look at the issue of
deradicalization in their counterterrorism dialogue. I think
this is an area that merits further exploration. Home Minister
Chidambaram's acknowledge that Indian citizens have been
involved in recent acts of terrorism should drive the
government to deal with the issue of Muslim alienation. I think
because of the history of Hindu-Muslim communal violence in
India, Indian officials up until now have been somewhat
reluctant to admit the homegrown Islamic threat.
Lastly, I think the U.S. can help India with training and
equipping its police forces. Ultimately, it is India that must
raise its budgets for its own homeland security needs. However,
the U.S. can enhance police exchanges and provide training, to
share best practices and ideas for enhancing community policing
and intelligence gathering.
That concludes my remarks. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Curtis follows:]

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Ms. Curtis. Thank you very much.
Mr. Royce. We'll go now to our next witness.

STATEMENT OF MR. FRANK CILLUFFO, ASSOCIATE VICE PRESIDENT,
DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY POLICY INSTITUTE, THE GEORGE
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY

Mr. Cilluffo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Ranking
Member Sherman. Thanks for the opportunity to appear before you
today. I will be exceptionally brief, not my strong suit since
I've never had an unspoken thought, but I will try to get this
within the 5 minutes.
Obviously, U.S.-India counterterrorism cooperation in the
face of the shared threat both of you have already eloquently
laid out has not been all that it could be. I would argue this
is to the detriment of both of our countries. The leadership in
this area is to be commended and it should help, I think,
bolster the security posture of America and India alike.
As everyone has already mentioned, we share a number of
common threats, concerns and tragedies, most notably 9/11 and
26/11. And just like we saw in the United States, India, too,
is going through major efforts and calls for reform, some of
which are making some significant progress. It is vital, I
think, that the U.S. work with the Indian Government to
strengthen our security efforts and develop common, best
practices and intelligence-sharing protocols among U.S. and
Indian law enforcement and the intelligence community, as well
as the security services--those responsible for internal
security.
I don't make these recommendations lightly and I recognize
the challenges they pose at both the operational and strategic
level, especially in regard to Pakistan. Yet, I am equally
cognizant of the fact that India is a key democratic ally in an
unstable region dominated by extremism from jihadists and
Islamic separatists operating in Jammu and Kashmir, to Maoists
in the Naxalite belt, to the reemergence of Sikh extremism.
Simply put, they live in a tough neighborhood.
Furthermore, these threats affect not only Indian public
safety, but also directly threaten U.S. national security
interests and I would argue jihadi extremism posing the
greatest threat of all. Yes, enhanced cooperation with India
will complicate U.S. cooperation with Pakistan. The truth is,
however, that this cooperation has been erratic at best and
varies based on the political climate and bureaucratic
interests in Islamabad. While there is some recent good news
such as the arrest of Younis al-Mauritani, the U.S. cannot
allow, as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, our national security to
be held hostage by unfulfilled expectations in Pakistan.
Just a few words on the current threat environment as I
think it should predicate U.S. and Indian counterterrorism
efforts. We have seen that the threat is morphing. It's
metastasized. It comes in various shapes, sizes, flavors, and
forms, ranging from al-Qaeda senior leadership--no,
unfortunately, ding dong, the witch is not dead after Osama bin
Laden was killed. We still have a threat that is very
significant from al-Qaeda senior leadership and its affiliates,
most notably al-Qaeda in the Arabian peninsula, operating out
of Yemen, but also al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb operating
out of North Africa and the Sahel. And I might note, Mr.
Chairman, you had an excellent blog post on AQIM's linkages to
Boko Haram, as well as, obviously, al-Shabaab in Somalia. So
the threat itself is morphing and it's changing and we've got
to be ready for it.
More regionally, as it pertains to this particular hearing,
we've seen the conflation of Jihadi organizations in Pakistan.
This witch's brew of organizations from the Haqqani Network or
HQN to Lashkar-e-Tayyiba from Tehrik-e-Taliban to HuJI, from
JEM to the Islamic Jihad Union to the Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan, all these groups to some extent or another are
coming together, sometimes tactically, sometimes strategically,
but they're all linked by an affinity for a Jihadi narrative
and ideology.
I think of unique significance is that many of these groups
historically had discrete and narrow objectives. Now they're
ascribing and subscribing more and more to al-Qaeda's goals,
visions, and objectives. That is a unique set of issues for the
United States. And all have found refuge and safe haven in
Pakistan.
I want to highlight just three--the Haqqani Network,
Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, and HuJI--as organizations that pose serious
security implications for the United States, for India, and
yes, even for Pakistan. Time prohibits me to get into any
specificity here, but one thing I wanted to reinforce is it's
critical that we work with Pakistan and hold them accountable
to take additional action. To me, the big litmus test here is
whether or not they are willing to sever their ties to LeT and
HQN and no longer view them as proxies to influence events in
Afghanistan and India, respectively. With respect to HQN, this
has huge implications for the future--to the future U.S. role
in Afghanistan. So we need to hold them accountable on that
front.
Bottom line, why Yemen, why Somalia, why the Sahel, why
Waziristan, why FATA? These are un- and under-governed spaces.
It provides the terrorists the time and the space to move. We
need to be able to address these issues because the host
nations either lack the political will or the capacity or a
combination of both to address these issues. So in short, I
think that what we need is a combination of intelligence,
paramilitary force, conventional force, and policing. Now is
not the time to ease off the gas pedal. Now is the time to push
hard. Right now, they are on their heels, they're on their back
feet. But the bottom line is to think of it as suppressive
fire. The reason they're on their back feet is because I'd
rather them looking over their shoulder not knowing when
they're going to get hit than having the time to plot, train,
and execute attacks. So I just caution drones, SOF, way to go,
happy to go into that in much greater length.
And I'll just wrap up very briefly because I agree very
much with what Lisa has laid out in terms of U.S.-India going
forward, but two impediments to intelligence sharing. One, the
Indians do have to take very seriously the endemic corruption
within their police forces. Two, there are concerns about the
Russian and former KGB connection to the intelligence security
services of India, most notably R&AW. So we need further
assurances to be able to make sure that that information can be
protected.
My bottom line here is law enforcement to law enforcement
is the way to go, not only federally, and we need to get down
to not only these strategic conversations, but down to the mid-
level to ensure that these become reality.
I'll stop at that. I tried to do it within 5 minutes. Mea
culpa for going over. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cilluffo follows:]

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Mr. Royce. Thank you, Mr. Cilluffo.
Dr. Latif, go ahead.

STATEMENT OF S. AMER LATIF, PH.D., VISITING FELLOW, WADHWANI
CHAIR IN U.S.-INDIA POLICY STUDIES, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Mr. Latif. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, Ranking
Member Sherman, members of the subcommittee, thank you for
inviting me to testify here today on the issue of the U.S.-
India counterterrorism cooperation.
I'd like to mention at the outset that the views that I
express here during the testimony are my own and do not
necessarily represent those of CSIS or the Department of
Defense.
Mr. Chairman, it is timely for this committee to be holding
this hearing on U.S.-India counterterrorism cooperation, given
the terrorists attacks which you've mentioned in your opening
statement. It is useful at this juncture to be able to evaluate
the status of our counterterrorism efforts, assess the progress
to date, understand existing challenges, and propose ways to
advance the partnership.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to take this opportunity to
quickly summarize some of the highlights of my written
testimony which I have already submitted for the record. To
begin, it's important to note that the U.S. and India have made
notable progress on counterterrorism cooperation since 2000
when the Counterterrorism Joint Working Group was established.
In July of last year, the U.S. and India signed the
Counterterrorism Cooperation Initiative or the CCI, which
outlined a range of areas for cooperation. And this May, of
course, we had the Homeland Security Dialogue held in New
Dehli. Intelligence sharing appears to have deepened after the
26/11 attacks as well. However, the progress that's been made
over the past decade could plateau in the future due to
challenges facing bilateral counterterrorism cooperation.
Let me briefly outline three challenges for your
consideration. Number one, the lack of bureaucratic alignment
and optimal communication between the U.S. and India and within
their respective bureaucracies. The Indian and American
bureaucracies are not communicating or coordinating as
effectively as they might, due to markedly different structures
and bureaucratic cultures. Within the U.S., you have a number
of CT-related dialogues that have CT-related issues and also
unclear leads and responsibilities for particular U.S.
agencies. On the Indian side, you have limited bureaucratic
capacity and also a centralized decision making system which
makes decisions very, very slow.
The second challenge I would outline is that each side has
a different view of terrorism priorities. While both sides
agree on the need to fight the scourge of terrorism, there are
concerns in New Dehli about Washington's relationship with
Pakistan and that the U.S. is not doing enough to pressure
Pakistan in dismantling Lashkar-e-Tayyiba.
Third, I would say that India harbors doubts about whether
or not Washington is going to be fully transparent and
forthcoming with intelligence in the wake of the David Headley
case.
So Mr. Chairman, let me now briefly outline some ideas of
where the U.S. and India might advance counterterrorism
cooperation. Number one, streamline the working groups and
bureaucratic procedures between both sides. The U.S. and India
should agree to have the Department of Homeland Security and
the Home Ministry as the conduits for all CT cooperation. There
should also be a bilateral comprehensive review of all
dialogues with CT equities to determine which groups could be
consolidated into others, left to their own, or eliminated
outright.
Second, Washington should continue to apply pressure to
Pakistan on completely dismantling all Lashkar-e-Tayyiba
infrastructure.
Third, there ought to be an intensification of the
bilateral intelligence dialogue between the U.S. and India on
Afghanistan. As the U.S. begins to withdrawn from Afghanistan,
Indians will have a lot of concerns about the nature of
stability. Having an intelligence dialogue on Afghanistan would
be an excellent way to be able to build confidence and
counterterrorism cooperation between the U.S. and India.
And finally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to offer the idea
of the U.S. and Indian sides working together to harden the
Indian periphery. What I mean here is that the U.S. and India
should work together to build the border security and
counterterrorism capacities of India's bordering countries to
include Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives.
Lashkar-e-Tayyiba is a very dynamic organization and has
also proven its ability to be able to exploit ungoverned or
poorly governed spaces in these areas. Having the United States
and India work together toward building the CT capacities in
these countries would be able to make India much, much safer.
Mr. Chairman, while there are challenges to greater CT
cooperation, the strategic stakes are too high for both sides
to allow their efforts to lag. Once again, I would like to
thank you for allowing me to appear before the committee and I
look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Latif follows:]

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Mr. Royce. Thank you, Mr. Latif.
Let me ask Ms. Curtis a question and it goes to a statement
that Secretary Clinton made in July. She called for Pakistan to
prosecute the perpetrators of the 2008 Mumbai attacks,
transparently, fully, and urgently. On the other hand, the
State Department's recently released Annual Terrorism Report
found that Pakistan's antiterrorism courts that have been set
up in Pakistan that are supposed to work under the rule of law,
but the acquittal rate is something like 75 percent. There's a
real question that they're really plagued by a situation where
they're almost incapable of prosecuting suspected suspects or
terrorists to date.
Given that, do we have any hope that the Mumbai attackers
will face justice?
Ms. Curtis. Thank you. I want to go to a comment that you
made in your opening statement that I completely agree with
that the LeT should be part of that secret report card that we
have developed with Pakistan in terms of benchmarks that they
need to meet because as I said in my testimony, both written
and oral, the LeT does have links to al-Qaeda. They are an
international danger. We should in no way give Pakistan the
impression that we will give them a pass on the LeT, so long as
they take steps on terrorists like al-Zawahiri and other al-
Qaeda leaders. I think we need to put a full court press on
both issues because they are related and they both affect our
security as well as India's.
In terms of the question will they actually move forward
with prosecution. They have detained LeT leaders, but they have
failed--it's been almost 3 years now and they have not moved
forward with prosecuting these individuals. I think it's
completely unacceptable. And where you talk about the
challenges in the court system and their inability to prosecute
individuals, I believe that it's really a lack of political
will at the top. And that is a message is sent from the top
levels of the Pakistani leadership and here I'm talking about
the Pakistan military and intelligence agencies, to move
forward I think Pakistan could. So I think we need to keep the
pressure on, make it clear that if Pakistan doesn't move
forward with these prosecutions, it's going to increasingly
lead to Pakistan's international isolation and ultimately
weaken its position in the region. I think this is the message
that we need to keep driving home to the Pakistanis and it does
need to be at the top of our priority list and so that comes
back to the point that you're absolutely right, it has to be
part of that report card.
Mr. Royce. Maybe Mr. Sherman and myself, given our
concurrence on the view on this should write the administration
on this subject. I look forward to work with you on that, Brad.
Let me ask you also about the Karachi Project. One of the
things I wanted to get to was the link between LeT and the
Indian Mujahideen and the Students Islamic Movement of India.
The Karachi Project, you indicate Pakistani intelligence
and LeT worked to motivate and equip Indians to attack their
own country, right? Can you go into a little detail on that?
Can you expand on it a little bit?
Ms. Curtis. Yes, first let me give a little bit of history.
The Students Islamic Movement of India, SIMI, that you
mentioned, have been around for a long time since the early
'90s. And they were sort of functioning within the country, but
it wasn't until around the attacks of 9/11 that they were
perceived as a real danger to India. And they were outlawed at
that time and they had made statements supporting al-Qaeda. And
there is a belief that the Indian Mujahideen, some of its
leaders may have been some of the same individuals that were
involved with SIMI. So the Indian Mujahideen may be an
evolution of that SIMI group which, of course, then it would be
an indigenous group, made up mostly of Indians.
And the interesting thing is there were many attacks in
2007, 2008, for which the Indian Mujahideen claimed
responsibility in India and the 2008 Mumbai attacks were
different in that it was obviously the Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, the
Pakistan-based group that was involved. But I think the Karachi
Project or the information that's been forthcoming on the so-
called Karachi Project begins to explain what maybe we have
been seeing over India in the last 5, 6 years.
And if the information on the Karachi Project is correct,
what it discusses is a very deliberate effort by the Pakistani
intelligence working in tandem with groups like Lashkar-e-
Tayyiba, Harakat-ul-Jihadi Islami to infiltrate into India,
recruit Indians to carry out attacks. Equip them with the
capabilities to do so. So I think this is something that we
need to continue to look at and explore, but it also shows that
India has a two-pronged issue that it needs to address. And
that is one, how does it deal with getting at the Pakistan-
based organizations. I think the U.S. and India have to work in
tandem on that issue. And second, what can it do to prevent the
recruitment of Indians?
And that's why I brought up the idea of working together on
countering violent extremism, working with communities to
educate about the radicalization process. I think it's a good
sign that the Home Minister has actually come forward and said
hey, this is a problem we have to deal with. Many politicians
have been reluctant to do so in the past.
Mr. Royce. We're running out of time, so I'm going to ask
one more question here. Some have suggested that the U.S. and
Indian high-tech companies could collaborate to spur the next
generation of homeland security technology. How could they
better join forces?
And then Mr. Latif, I'll ask you to what extent do U.S.
restrictions on technology-sharing hamper U.S.-India
counterterrorism cooperation, and what are the dangers of using
such restrictions. If you could just briefly answer that, we'll
then go to Mr. Sherman.
Mr. Cilluffo. I mean, put very briefly and simply,
obviously, India is home to a number of the more advanced
technological companies, certainly from an IT perspective. And
when you look at India's biggest deficits, to me it's the
information sharing challenges they have between and among
their various police entities and how they connect with other
police entities and how they, in turn, connect with the Home
Ministry. So I think there's a lot that they can do right there
and there's a lot, I think, that the United States can do
because we have to have similar integration challenges.
If you really look back to 9/11, the greatest progress has
been made in the sharing of information vertically and
horizontally. So I think from an architectural standpoint, we
have a lot that we can share. I know the Indians have visited
the fusion centers. I know they have examined CJIS and N-DEX,
some of our other systems. So I think there are opportunities
there.
Mr. Royce. Thank you, Mr. Latif. That last question?
Mr. Latif. Yes, sir. On technology transfer with India and
the United States, there has been a tremendous amount of
technology that has been transferred to India since the civil
nuclear deal was actually completed in 2008. So there's been a
paradigm shift, I think, within the U.S. Government on
transferring technology to India and we've seen that most
recently with a very high percentage of licenses that have been
granted.
Mr. Royce. True enough. We're discussing the down side of
risk on some of that.
Mr. Latif. Right. Some of the risks would entail perhaps a
potential that India might reengineer--reverse engineer some of
the technologies. And also given their long relationship with
Russia, there is a concern within the government that perhaps
maybe some sensitive technologies could leak to Russia and be
compromised.
Mr. Royce. Thank you, Dr. Latif.
Mr. Sherman?
Mr. Sherman. Mr. Cilluffo, you point to police corruption
in India, used to police departments looking the other way when
there's vice. Are there elements in the police in India that
would cooperate with Islamic terrorism or Maoist terrorism?
Mr. Cilluffo. The corruption issue is a significant one and
that must be addressed as well. As to whether or not you have
police officers who are sympathetic to Islamic extremists or
Maoists, I would have to say the likelihood is yes, that is
indeed a concern.
Mr. Sherman. So more, not so much corruption in the sense
of doing it for money, but doing it out of genuine belief in
the terrorist organization's objectives?
Mr. Cilluffo. I don't see those as either or propositions.
I think both are issues.
Mr. Sherman. What can we do to make it easier for India to
buy the technology it needs for its security and have the
recent export control reforms benefit U.S.-India relations?
Ms. Curtis?
Ms. Curtis. As I mentioned, as we are building this
strategic partnership and homeland security cooperation being a
major part of that, U.S. companies will become involved and
looking to the opportunities to help India solve some of its
homeland security challenges. And protecting ourselves means
partnering with others.
Mr. Sherman. I understand how important it is. Are any of
our witnesses aware of anything India was kind of interested in
buying that they would face some problems in buying due to U.S.
law?
Mr. Latif. Mr. Sherman, I'm not aware of anything. As far
as I'm aware anything that India has wanted to purchase in
terms of technology for its counterterrorism or homeland
security purposes, they have been granted. Unless it has
application to missile development or nuclear programs, the
Indians are allowed to purchase it.
Mr. Sherman. So face recognition technology, drones.
Mr. Latif. Well, on drones, it depends. I mean if we're
looking at Predators, that might be a little bit of a problem.
Mr. Sherman. Not so much as armed drones as surveillance
drones.
Mr. Latif. Right, right.
Mr. Sherman. Moving to another issue, the Indian Prime
Minister has identified the Maoist or Naxalite insurgency as
the biggest internal security challenge. How does that
insurgency affect India and its ability to focus on the Islamic
extremist terrorist threat?
Mr. Latif?
Mr. Latif. Well, sir, it is a very big problem for the
Indians. You've got a Naxalite insurgency that is spread over
10 states. You don't have a central plan to attack the
insurgency. And so as a result within India, because of the way
that law enforcement relationships are set up, the state has
primacy over the Center. What this means in terms of the amount
of capacity that they have to be able to address the multitude
of terrorist threats that they've got, they're a bit stretched.
You've got a Naxalite insurgency. You've got Islamist
terrorists coming up in Kashmir and then, of course, in the
Northeast.
Mr. Sherman. Well, thank you. My time in this room hasn't
expired, but my time to get to that room is virtually expired.
Mr. Royce. Well, thank you, Mr. Sherman. I want to thank
each of our witnesses. I very much appreciate your testimony
here today. We're going to have to adjourn for final passage on
this legislation. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 2:49 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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