[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

ASSURING THE FREEDOM OF AMERICANS
ON THE HIGH SEAS: THE UNITED STATES
RESPONSE TO PIRACY

=======================================================================

(112-17)

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON
COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

__________

MARCH 15, 2011

__________

Printed for the use of the
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committee.action?chamber=house&committee=transportation

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COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

JOHN L. MICA, Florida, Chairman

DON YOUNG, Alaska NICK J. RAHALL II, West Virginia
THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon
HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey Columbia
GARY G. MILLER, California JERROLD NADLER, New York
TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois CORRINE BROWN, Florida
SAM GRAVES, Missouri BOB FILNER, California
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa
CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania
DUNCAN HUNTER, California RICK LARSEN, Washington
TOM REED, New York MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts
ANDY HARRIS, Maryland TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York
ERIC A. ``RICK'' CRAWFORD, Arkansas MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine
JAIME HERRERA BEUTLER, Washington RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
FRANK C. GUINTA, New Hampshire GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California
RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois
LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota JASON ALTMIRE, Pennsylvania
BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota
LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana HEATH SHULER, North Carolina
BILLY LONG, Missouri STEVE COHEN, Tennessee
BOB GIBBS, Ohio LAURA RICHARDSON, California
PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
RICHARD L. HANNA, New York DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland
STEPHEN LEE FINCHER, Tennessee
JEFFREY M. LANDRY, Louisiana
STEVE SOUTHERLAND II, Florida
JEFF DENHAM, California
JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma

(ii)

Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation

FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey, Chairman

DON YOUNG, Alaska RICK LARSEN, Washington
HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
ANDY HARRIS, Maryland CORRINE BROWN, Florida
FRANK C. GUINTA, New Hampshire TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York
CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine
JEFFREY M. LANDRY, Louisiana, NICK J. RAHALL II, West Virginia
Vice Chair (Ex Officio)
JOHN L. MICA, Florida (Ex Officio)

(iii)

CONTENTS

Page

Summary of Subject Matter........................................ vi

TESTIMONY

Amend, Kurt, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
Political and Military Affairs, U.S. Department of State....... 5
Caldwell, Stephen L., Director, Maritime Security and Coast Guard
Issues, U.S. Government Accountability Office, accompanied by
Pendleton, John H., Director, Defense Capabilities and
Management, U.S. Government Accountability Office \1\.......... 5
Cook, Admiral Kevin S., Director of Prevention Policy for Marine
Safety, Security, and Stewardship, U.S. Coast Guard............ 5
Wechsler, William F., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Counternarcotics and Global Threats, U.S. Department of Defense 5

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

LoBiondo, Hon. Frank A., of New Jersey........................... 24

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES

Amend, Kurt...................................................... 26
Caldwell, Stephen L., and Pendleton, John H...................... 49
Cook, Admiral Kevin S............................................ 74
Wechsler, William F.............................................. 79

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD

Amend, Kurt, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
Political and Military Affairs, U.S. Department of State,
responses to questions from Hon. Rick Larsen, a Representative
in Congress from the State of Washington....................... 35

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\1\ Mr. Pendleton did not provide verbal testimony during the
hearing.

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ASSURING THE FREEDOM OF
AMERICANS ON THE HIGH SEAS:
THE UNITED STATES RESPONSE TO PIRACY

----------

TUESDAY, MARCH 15, 2011

House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Coast Guard and
Maritime Transportation,
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:00 a.m. in
room 2167, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Frank A.
LoBiondo, (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. LoBiondo. The committee will come to order. The
subcommittee is meeting this morning to review efforts by the
United States and the international community to respond to
piracy on the high seas, and hopefully help prevent future
attacks.
Since the subcommittee's last hearing on this topic, Somali
pirates have vastly expanded the range of their attacks on
merchant vessels to encompass much of the western Indian Ocean.
But even more alarming, the pirates have dramatically increased
the number and viciousness of their attacks. This includes the
recent hijacking of the U.S. sailing vessel, Quest, which ended
in the ruthless murder of four United States citizens.
I believe I speak for all of us who are on this
subcommittee when I express my sincerest and deepest
condolences to the families of the victims, and my outrage at
this brutal violence against American citizens. As I said at
our last hearing, piracy cannot be tolerated by the United
States. I really think we need to re-emphasize that. We just
cannot tolerate it. And the international community.
This hearing provides us with a chance to examine ways to
respond to that ongoing threat. Piracy has become a
multimillion-dollar industry, as a result of ransoms that
continue to be paid out by vessel ownership groups. I do not
think we are tracking ransom payments to the extent that we
should be.
As a result, I am extremely concerned piracy could be
benefitting the terrorist groups operating in Somalia, and that
these groups could use their profits to carry out terrorist
acts here, at home, and abroad. At the same time, I am worried
the Federal Government may hold vessel owners criminally liable
for ransoms they pay to free captive mariners.
Many in the maritime community are looking at ways to
enhance security of merchant vessels, including the placement
of armed security personnel aboard ships. A vessel's crew has
every right under U.S. and international law to defend
themselves and their vessel. However, I do have some concerns
about the guidance going out to these mariners, and hope to
hear more about how we keep them informed of the latest
avoidance and response measures.
The United States has place Navy and Coast Guard assets in
the region, and has partnered with other nations to protect
vessels in the area. I applaud the services for taking action,
but I am concerned about the effectiveness of these efforts. We
know that several of the pirates captured by the naval forces
of other countries are not being prosecuted. Instead, they are
only returned to shore, where they are free to resume their
illegal activity. I am interested in learning more about the
procedures by which suspects are being prosecuted.
Piracy is recognized internationally as a crime against all
nations, and to which all nations must respond. It is incumbent
on us to examine ways to minimize, if not end, this threat and
its impact on both world commerce and our own national economy.
I want to thank the witnesses for appearing here today, I
look forward to their testimony. With that, I would like to
yield to Mr. Larsen for any remarks he would like to make.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
calling today's hearing.
Piracy, particularly off the Somalia coast, is a disruptive
threat to world shipping.
Tragically, just last month, piracy also became deadly for
Jean and Scott Adam of Marina del Rey, California, and their
friends, Phyllis Macay and Bob Riggle of Seattle, Washington.
I, too, extend my sympathies to the families.
These four individuals posed a threat to no one. They were
not mariners involved in international trade. The Adams were
living a lifelong dream. Ms. Macay and Mr. Riggle were friends
joining in the adventure. While the circumstances of their
deaths are still being investigated, we do know that they were
killed by their Somali captors while their release was being
negotiated. But for these pirates, these four U.S. citizens
would be alive and well today.
It is clear that today's pirate is no Jack Sparrow.
Although piracy has been a threat to seafaring nations for
thousands of years, the emergence of aggressive and persistent
attacks off the Horn of Africa is especially concerning.
The killing of these four hostages aboard the Quest
certainly increased the attention of the international
community on piracy, and the international community has
increased its focus on piracy.
The stats are startling. The New York Times reported in
late February that more than 50 vessels were currently captive,
ranging from Thai fishing trawlers to European tankers, super-
tankers, with more than 800 hostages. These hostages represent
mariners and sea-farers that are only doing their jobs. Once
captured, these hostages can be held in deplorable conditions
for months before release.
It is time for the international community to stop this
injustice. The Gulf of Aden and the adjoining Indian Ocean
constitute a critical shipping corridor. GAO's September
report, about which we will hear more a little bit later, their
report on piracy states that over 33,000 ships pass through the
Gulf of Aden annually. This includes tanker ships moving 10 to
15 percent of world petroleum shipments. For vessels headed
west, the alternative route is around the tip of Africa, and
adds 4,900 nautical miles to the transit.
The rise of piracy in the region puts mariners in danger,
and poses an economic burden on ocean carriers and shipping
companies. In fact, according to a Chatham House report,
insurance premiums in the London insurance market for traveling
through the Gulf rose tenfold in 2008.
Several factors have contributed to the frequency of these
attacks: a large number of high-value targets passing through
the Gulf; global proliferation of the small arms trade; and,
most significantly, persistent civil violence, lawlessness, and
economic dislocation in Somalia. Somalia does not have a
functioning government. And with pirates having virtually an
unlimited ability to operate from Somalia, piracy cannot be
eliminated solely from the sea. So I am particularly interested
to hear what the State Department witness will say on this
subject.
Last week, Bloomberg reported that China and Russia will be
leading a new effort at the U.N. to curb the threat of piracy
off the coast of Somalia, and defeat Al Qaeda-linked terrorists
fighting to seize control of that nation. According to this
report, Russia had circulated a draft resolution that would
commit the U.N. Security Council to ``urgently begin talks on
the creation of three courts for piracy cases.'' I would be
interested to hear what the progress of this, and the
likelihood of this resolution is.
The international community has stepped up efforts to
combat piracy. CTF 151, a multinational effort led by the U.S.,
the European Union operation, Atalanta, the NATO operation,
which the U.S. also supports, and independent deployers are
patrolling the area and providing greater protection to ships
traveling through the Gulf. I would be interested to hear what
our Department of Defense witness has to say about giving us an
update on these efforts.
And the International Maritime Bureau's piracy reporting
center and MARAD have helped inform the maritime community
about piracy and how to implement best practices for ships to
evade and defend themselves from pirate attacks, and I look
forward to the Coast Guard's comments on this effort.
GAO's report from last September discusses several
challenges, and I think describes a mixed bag of success.
Prosecution of alleged pirates remains logistically difficult,
although I note that on February 16th the pirate associated
with the attack on the Maersk Alabama was sentenced to 33 years
by a New York district judge.
The pirates have greatly expanded their areas of attack to
an area as large as the lower 48 States. There have been a
steady increase in the number of attacks and the rate of
success has declined. But the number of hostages being held is
increasing, and the ransoms being paid are increasing.
These issues raise important questions for our panel. Are
the efforts of the U.S. and the international community
succeeding, or are they failing? Are the rules of engagement
changing, and do we need to change with it? In light of the
recent killings, is transit in this area becoming more or less
dangerous?
When it come to piracy in the 21st century, there is no X
that marks the spot to point us in the right direction. But
there are several ways that U.S. policymakers can help combat
piracy: encourage the international commercial maritime
industry to adopt best practices; continue advances in the use
of defensive technologies on ships; help coastal States in
pirate-prone areas boost their coastal monitoring and
interdiction capabilities; and provide resources to the Coast
Guard and MARAD, so they can continue to advise the industry on
how to strengthen its own security.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I thank you again for holding this
hearing, and I look forward to our witnesses.
Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you, Mr. Larsen. Mr. Landry, do you
have a statement?
Mr. Landry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be brief. I
thank you for calling this hearing, and our witnesses, for
giving their time to testify.
Article 1, section 8 of our Constitution clearly gives
Congress the ability to define and punish piracy and felonies
committed on the high seas, and offenses against the law of
nations. And while piracy was a great concern to our founding
fathers, many had thought this had been a bypass in history.
However, we have not--seen a resurgence of piracies in ways
not seen since the 19th century. Last year, piracy caused
between $7 billion to $12 billion in damage to our world's
economy. Shipping in the Suez Canal is down 10 percent, due to
piracy concerns, an amount equal to the downturn in the canal's
usage caused by the downturn in the world's economy.
It appears this trend will continue in 2011. Already this
year there have been 87 pirate attacks worldwide, including 61
off the Horn of Africa, and Somalia pirates now hold 33 vessels
and 711 hostages. As someone whose district is directly
dependant upon international shipping, I am very concerned
about this trend. Any reduction in international shipping
commerce will ultimately impact the 28,000 men and women who
work in my maritime district.
As such, I look forward to your testimony, and working with
you all to address these issues. Thank you. I yield back the
balance of my time.
Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you, Mr. Landry. Now we will move on to
our witnesses today. Our witnesses include: Admiral Kevin Cook,
director of prevention policy; Mr. William Wechsler, deputy
assistant secretary of defense for counternarcotics and global
threats; Mr. Kurt Amend, principal deputy assistant secretary
of state for political and military affairs; and Mr. Stephen
Caldwell, director of maritime safety and Coast Guard issues
for GAO. I would like to welcome you all for being here today,
and, Admiral Cook, I look forward to your testimony.

TESTIMONY OF KEVIN S. COOK, DIRECTOR OF PREVENTION POLICY FOR
MARINE SAFETY, SECURITY, AND STEWARDSHIP, U.S. COAST GUARD;
WILLIAM F. WECHSLER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
COUNTERNARCOTICS AND GLOBAL THREATS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE; KURT AMEND, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
STATE FOR POLITICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
STATE; AND STEPHEN L. CALDWELL, DIRECTOR, MARITIME SECURITY AND
COAST GUARD ISSUES, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

Admiral Cook. Well, good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking
Member Larsen, and distinguished members of the subcommittee.
With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would like to have my
written testimony entered into the record.
Mr. LoBiondo. Yes, without objection.
Admiral Cook. Thank you. I appreciate the opportunity to
appear before you and discuss maritime piracy and the Coast
Guard's role in addressing the threat to freedom of the seas,
to the safety of shipping, and, most importantly, to the safety
of mariners.
We were all saddened by the death at the hands of pirates
of four U.S. citizens on board the sailing vessel Quest. This
underscores the importance for all mariners, recreational and
commercial, to understand the risks associated with operating
in areas where piracy is prevalent.
The Coast Guard continues to be a leader in coordination
with U.S. interagency and industry partners, with the
International Maritime Organization, or IMO, and through the
international contact group on piracy off the coast of Somalia,
working to strengthen preventative measures from merchant
ships, and to develop international regimes for prosecution of
apprehended pirates.
Although many nations have provided naval forces to the
region to counter the piracy threat, it remains critical for
individual vessels to take appropriate measures to reduce the
vulnerability to attacks. The responsibility for combating
maritime piracy is a shared one. Responsibility is shared among
vessel owners and operators, governments, and the international
community.
Beyond coordination, the Coast Guard shares responsibility
through our law enforcement detachment boarding teams, which
operate at the request, and in support of, the U.S. central
command's mission to deter, disrupt, and suppress piracy.
Helping to share the responsibility with the industry, the
Coast Guard continues to update its requirements for U.S. flag
commercial ships to modify their security plans, plans which
are required by the Maritime Transportation Security Act of
2002. Vessel owners and operators are required to conduct a
risk assessment for each vessel prior to entering high-risk
waters, including the identification of counterpiracy measures.
Plans must be submitted to the Coast Guard for approval under
the commandant's authority in his maritime security directive,
MARSEC 104.6.
The ships most vulnerable to piracy, those with low
freeboard and/or slow, include provisions for armed private
security teams, among other measures. Beyond U.S. flag
direction, the Coast Guard has a unique role to play
internationally.
The Coast Guard is co-chair, with the Maritime
Administration, of working group three, dedicated to shipping
self-awareness under the contact group on piracy off the coast
of Somalia. The contact group was created on January 14, 2009,
pursuant to the U.N. Security Council resolution 1851. This
international forum brings together countries, organizations,
and industry groups to coordinate political, military, and
other efforts to bring an end to piracy, and to ensure that
pirates are brought to justice. Nearly 600 countries and
multiple international organizations participate in the contact
group.
Through working group three, the Coast Guard has
facilitated the shipping industry's development of preventative
measures to reduce vulnerability to attack, known as industry
best management practices for vessels operating off the Horn of
Africa region.
And just recently, on February 28, 2011, the working group
convened and chartered an effort to develop formal guidelines
for armed security teams for adoption by other flag state
administrations. The international shipping community is
changing their position on armed security teams, and we welcome
that change.
Also internationally, by delegation from the State
Department, the Coast Guard provides head of the United States
delegation for international maritime organization meetings and
activities. The IMO has passed resolutions establishing a
framework for international cooperation, updated counterpiracy
guidance, and promoted judicial mechanisms, so that pirates,
once caught, face meaningful and just punishment under the rule
of law. ``Piracy: Orchestrating the Response,'' will be the
theme for IMO's focus this year.
In closing, Mr. Chairman, I want to assure you that the
Coast Guard is committed to fulfilling its statutory and
regulatory responsibilities for the safety and security of U.S.
merchant vessels and crews. We will remain engaged with the
industry in implementation of counterpiracy measures identified
in our MARSEC directive, as well as within the international
maritime community, through our role at IMO and the contact
group.
The Coast Guard's oversight of the U.S. flag fleet is the
international gold standard, and we will continue to make
improvements wherever possible. We will also continue to use
formal-notice-to-mariner warnings and all other communication
channels to ensure recreational boaters are aware of piracy
risks.
Thank you for the opportunity to be here today, and I look
forward to your questions.
Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you, Admiral Cook.
Mr. Wechsler?
Mr. Wechsler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Representative
Larsen, and other distinguished members of the subcommittee. I
appreciate this opportunity to testify about the growing
problem of piracy on the high seas. I have submitted a written
statement for the record. I will briefly summarize that this
morning.
I would like to begin, as you all did, by expressing my
sincere condolences to the friends and families of the four
victims of the recent pirating of the sailing vessel, Quest:
Jean and Scott Adam, Phyllis Macay, and Robert Riggle.
Congressman Larsen, I understand that Ms. Macay and Mr. Riggle
were from your State of Washington, as you noted. This tragedy
stands as a stark reminder of what is at stake, as we continue
to grapple with this complex challenge.
Mr. Chairman, as you stated, we cannot just tolerate
piracy. We also, as you stated, believe that freedom of
navigation is critical to our national security and
international commerce, and is a core principle of the law of
the sea. Piracy endangers innocent mariners, disrupts commerce,
causes economic damage, and perpetuates instability ashore.
Disrupting piracy will continue to be a challenge for
several reasons. First and foremost, the root causes of Somali
piracy lie in the poverty and instability in that troubled
country. Somalia simply lacks the criminal justice institutions
necessary to deter piracy. Since January 2010, Somali pirates
received as much as $85 million in the form of ransom payments.
In a country where the per capital GDP is about $600, the
prospect of these large ransoms has led to the development of a
complex network of pirate facilitators and financiers. In the
long run, the international community's ability to confront the
Somalia-based piracy problem will be directly linked to
Somalia's ability to provide effective governance.
Secondly, the geographic area affected is vast. Today,
Somali pirates operate in an area covering approximately 2.5
million square nautical miles. Actually, larger than that in
recent days. That is comparable, as a map that we provided, to
the size of the continental United States, a vast area. The
sheer size of this area makes it difficult for naval assets to
reach the scene of a pirate attack quickly enough to make a
difference. To adequately patrol such an area would require
more ships than are currently in the inventory of all of the
world's navies.
Further complicating this challenge is the fact that these
pirate vessels easily blend in with ordinary, legitimate
shipping when they are not engaged in acts of piracy.
Third, even when pirates are captured, as was noted
previously, they are often not prosecuted and held accountable.
Although piracy is a crime of universal jurisdiction, many
States lack the appropriate domestic laws to prosecute pirates.
Other States may have appropriate domestic legal frameworks,
but lack the prosecutorial and judicial capacity to hold
pirates accountable. And worse yet, other States simply lack
the political will to take action.
Finally, as the members of this subcommittee know, the
Department of Defense has many other urgent priorities around
the globe. In the Horn of Africa our existing and planned
counterterrorism activities remain vital to confronting
terrorism in the region. Many of the resources most in demand
for counterpiracy activities, such as intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance assets, are the same assets
that are urgently required elsewhere.
These multidimensional challenges illustrate that there
will be no simple solution to this problem. However, it is
worth noting that, of the more than 33,000 vessels that transit
the Gulf of Aden each year, less than one-half of 1 percent of
these are attacked. And, fortunately, these attacks have
succeeded only about a third of the time.
In support of the National Security Council's action plan,
DoD's primary role is to interrupt and terminate acts of
piracy. We play a supporting role in preventing pirate attacks
by reducing the vulnerability of the maritime domain, and
facilitating the prosecution of suspected pirates.
The United States is most actively engaged in counterpiracy
operations through combined task force 151, a component of
combined maritime forces, and one of 3 international
counterpiracy coalitions made up of navies of more than 30
nations--as was noted, NATO's operations, Ocean Shield, and the
European Union's operation, Atalanta. Combined maritime forces
also regularly host international coordination meetings in
Bahrain to share information and deconflict counterpiracy
efforts in the region.
The Department of Defense is also working with the
international contact group for piracy off the coast of Somalia
on numerous initiatives related to industry, operations, public
diplomacy, and legal issues. We are supporting the Departments
of State and Treasury in efforts to make piracy less lucrative
by going after the funding.
We will continue to work with regional States to develop
their capacity to patrol the seas and hold pirates accountable.
We will also work, when possible, with local authorities in
Somalia to address the on-shore components of piracy. Many of
these efforts complement our development and counterterrorism
goals in the region.
While much remains to be done, we are seeing concrete
results of these efforts. Since August 2008, international
efforts have led to the destruction or confiscation of more
than 100 pirate vessels, and the confiscation of numerous
weapons, including small arms and rocket-propelled grenades.
The international community has also turned over nearly 800
pirates to various countries for prosecution.
Countering piracy in the region must be a shared
responsibility with the shipping industry, as was noted by my
Coast Guard colleague. By following the best management
practices, the majority of pirate attacks can be thwarted
without any need for military intervention. These practices
range from hardening the vessel to maintaining professional
civilian armed services team on board, and can mean the
difference between a successful and a failed pirate attack.
I would also note that, in all cases where armed private
security teams have been used, crews have successfully kept
pirates from boarding their vessel. I am very pleased with the
comment from my Coast Guard colleague, who stated today that
industry's views on this question have been changing recently.
Many have questioned whether there are connections between
piracy and international terrorism. At the moment, the
motivations of Somali pirates appear to be solely financial,
rather than ideological. While I must caution about the extent
of our intelligence and knowledge in Somalia and with the
pirates is limited, at this point, as best as we can tell, we
do not see operational or organizational alignment between al-
Shabaab or other terrorists and the pirates. But we do see
interactions mostly of a coercive nature that benefit
terrorists. We need to ensure that piracy does not evolve into
a powerful funding source for violent extremist organizations.
Finally, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, we
recognize the problem of piracy is not just a problem for
Somalia. In recent years, pirate activity has also occurred in
west Africa, the Straits of Malacca, and elsewhere. Although
the complete elimination of piracy is unlikely, we believe that
we can and must reduce piracy attacks through deterrents,
disruption, interdiction, and punishment. Doing so will require
a coordinated effort amongst the U.S. Government, private
industry, and our international partners. We are confident that
progress can be made in that fashion.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify, and I welcome
your questions and comments.
Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you.
Mr. Amend?
Mr. Amend. Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the
subcommittee, it is an honor to appear before you this morning
to describe the Department of State's contributions to our
government's efforts to combat piracy off the coast of Somalia,
to answer any questions you might have, and to identify ways we
might do better. And if I could ask that the written testimony
I provided be included in the record of today's proceedings.
Let me begin by saying that, since this committee met on
the same subject in February of 2009, and notwithstanding an
increase in international awareness of and efforts to deal with
piracy, it seems as though the problem has only grown worse.
The ruthless killing to which others have referred already this
morning of four Americans on board the Quest on February 22nd
underscores the increasing risks to recreational and commercial
mariners in the region, and the pernicious effects of this kind
of transnational crime.
At Secretary Clinton's direction, we have begun an
intensive internal review of our counterpiracy strategy, a
process that will be finalized shortly. Throughout our strategy
re-think, we will consult closely with Congress, as well as
with a number of executive departments and agencies. Our goal
is to develop a recalibrated strategy that, once implemented,
will enhance the safety and security of Americans on the high
seas.
As we move forward, we will consider a range of actions. We
will continue to collaborate with key international partners by
discouraging the payment of ransoms, by stressing compliance by
the shipping industry with self-protection best management
practices, by encouraging the prosecution of suspected pirates
in national courts, by soliciting contributions of military
forces for counterpiracy operations, and by seeking financial
contributions to the contact group's trust fund to defray the
expenses associated with prosecution and incarceration of
pirates.
At the same time, we will follow a dual track, a diplomatic
approach in Somalia, and examine appropriate counterpiracy
assistance to stem piracy from Somalia's shores. We will work
with port States in the shipping industry to help them develop
and implement creative ways to protect their ships and their
mariners. We will consider how best to support U.N. efforts to
build judicial and incarceration capacity in the region, and to
develop new options for regional incarceration to include a
specialized prosecution mechanism in the region.
Not least, we will consult closely with the Department of
Defense, our colleagues at the Department of Defense, and in
the intelligence community, to explore ways to disrupt and
dismantle pirate operations, both at sea and on shore. And we
will focus more intently on the life blood of piracy, the
formal and informal financial flows that nurture and sustain
this form of criminal behavior. We will coordinate closely with
intelligence, financial, and law enforcement communities to
identify and remove from operation pirate leaders, organizers,
and financiers--the pirate kingpins, if you will.
In doing all of this, we are mindful that the root cause of
piracy has been, and will likely continue to be, State failure
in Somalia. Until good governance, stability, and a modicum of
economic development prevail on land, piracy at sea will remain
a threat.
Our focus will thus be on the kinds of near and medium-term
actions that will increase significantly risks to the pirates,
while reducing by equal measure any potential rewards that they
think they may gain.
This concludes my opening remarks, and I look forward to
your questions.
Mr. LoBiondo. Mr. Caldwell?
Mr. Caldwell. Chairman LoBiondo, Ranking Member Larsen,
other Members of the Committee, Mr. Landry, thank you very much
for having GAO up here to testify on piracy. Allow me to
introduce my colleague behind me, John Pendleton, who is from
our defense team and worked with me jointly on this work.
Before I proceed, I would also like to share my condolences
with the victims of piracy.
GAO's contribution to this discussion is our review of the
NSC action plan, and the U.S. Government's progress against
that. We show that progress in a so-called report card on page
five of our statement. And, in addition to that, in our
September report we also recommended that the action plan be
revised.
We recommended three specific revisions: first, to address
changes in piracy operations and tactics; second, to start
gathering information on the cost and effectiveness of
counterpiracy operations; and then, finally, to clarify agency
roles with the specific lines of actions that were in the
action plan.
Since September, when we issued that report, the piracy
situation has continued to deteriorate, and I have some
graphics that I would like to share with the committee, if
possible. [Graphics shown.]
The first graphic here shows the area of piracy off of
Somalia. The dark rectangle you see is the internationally
recommended transit corridor. The dotted line that you see off
the coast is 1,000 miles out, an area where piracy is now
occurring.
The next chart shows a mileage comparison of the coast of
Somalia to the coast of the eastern U.S., a distance stretching
from Portland, Maine, to Miami, Florida.
Next is a series of maps showing the expansion of piracy.
First we have 2007, where the pirates focus their attacks
relatively close to the coast of Somalia. Next is 2008, where
the pirates focus their attacks on the heavily transited Gulf
of Aden.
Then, in 2009, the pirates continued attacks in the Gulf of
Aden, but moved further off Somalia, as naval vessels began to
patrol the transit corridor.
Then, in 2010, you can see the pirates continue to attack
further out, spreading both eastward and southward, aided
somewhat by the use of hijacked mother ships.
And finally, in 2011 here, so far pirates continue to
attack further out, using mother ships, spreading northward
toward the Straits of Hormuz, which is a key oil tanker route.
Then, finally, we have a slide showing the totality of all
the attacks over the last several years.
Next is a bar chart showing the number of attacks from 2007
to 2010, which shows that total attacks have stabilized or
actually declined in the last 2 years, but the pirates' success
rate is starting to rebound.
And then this final graphic here shows the rapid increase
in the number of seafarers that have been held hostage,
particularly the growth between 2007 and 2008. And then, more
recently, between 2009 and 2010.
In our view, this deteriorating situation for piracy,
again, calls for a more urgent need to revise the plan along
the line of our recommendations. Based on our most recent
communications with the NSC, they do plan to revisit and update
the action plan along the lines that we have discussed. In
addition, as indicated by Mr. Amend here, State Department
plans to revisit some of its plans and efforts. Both of these
are hopeful signs, but we recognize that revising plans by
themselves will not end piracy. The U.S. will need to take
additional steps, both long-term and short-term, and in
conjunction with our allies and with industry, to mitigate
piracy.
In closing, thank you very much. I will be happy to respond
to any questions.
Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you. Mr. Larsen, you want to kick it
off?
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Caldwell, with
regards to your charts and the numbers, in my statement I said
it's sort of a mixed bag of success. It is sort of like
fighting drugs sometimes in the U.S. If you crack down on meth,
the price of meth goes up, because you start cutting off the
supply, or you raise the cost of the transaction, as a result.
And it seems that that argument could be used to explain
the numbers that you are pointing out. We are out there, we are
on the water, we are making it more difficult, so we are seeing
more attacks, more hostages, we are seeing ransoms go up, the
average ransom go up. Is that an accurate assessment?
Mr. Caldwell. Yes. I think there is two things at play. One
is that the Gulf of Aden and the transit corridor there is a
fairly narrow area, much easier to patrol for naval vessels.
And I think the pirate success rate started to decline in 2009,
as those naval vessels moved into that area. That is also the
year that the pirates started--I think maybe late 2009 they
started to shift further out, through the use of mother ships,
and things like that.
In terms of the ransoms, certainly it has proven to be a
profitable business model for the pirates. And as some of the
other witnesses have said, until you start to get at the profit
that is motivating this, I think it will be pretty hard to stop
it.
Mr. Larsen. Mr. Amend, with regards to the profit motive,
and what the State Department is doing in conjunction with
either Department of Justice or Department of Treasury to get
at the financiers of piracy--because these folks in the skiffs
are, you know, they are the frontline folks, but they are not
driving piracy, it seems. It seems the financiers are driving
piracy.
What are we doing about identifying who these people are
with the big money to cut them off?
Mr. Amend. Thank you, that is an excellent question. What
we are doing through the multilateral diplomatic effort, the
contact group, 60-nation-member contact group, we are working
to establish a fifth working group that will focus solely on
financial flows, and to pull together the Departments of
Treasury, the intelligence community, and Justice, and our
international partners to share information, but then to
attempt to identify the informal and financial--informal and
formal financial flows, and to----
Mr. Larsen. Can I ask a question about that? Because you
established the contact group in 2009. You had four working
groups.
Mr. Amend. That is right.
Mr. Larsen. And now you are only getting--now you are
telling me now you are only getting to this fifth group to look
at financial flows. Why was that not established in 2009, with
the other 4 working groups?
Mr. Amend. The initial establishment was four working
groups to focus on naval operations, best management practices,
public diplomacy efforts, and then the kind of legal mechanisms
that we want countries to embrace to allow them to prosecute.
And only recently have we focused on the financial aspect. But
I think this is a good sign. We--State Department hosted, on
March 1st, an ad hoc meeting. A number of nations attended, and
have pledged their interest in taking this a step further.
Mr. Larsen. I think it is a good sign, too. Has there been
a reluctance over the last 2 years from the Department of
Treasury to be involved in this?
Mr. Amend. No, I would not say that. I think only now as
pirates have pivoted and proved to be very adept and shift
their tactics, I think we have recognized that we need to shift
tactics, and to look at other ways to attack the more senior
leaders in the structure, in the networks themselves, that are
behind this.
Mr. Larsen. I may come back to this in a second round. But,
Admiral Cook, with regards to the shift in the international
shipping community's view on private armed security guards, can
you talk about--can you tell us when that might be a ratified
decision, and we can start seeing that implemented?
Admiral Cook. Congressman, I will tell you the way it is
right now. The U.S. stepped out in this regard, and actually,
we were criticized internationally for doing that.
And then, as the piracy issue continues to evolve--and then
I would say that the Quest was a punctuation point for several
of the countries thinking about this--and it just happened to
occur a week or so ahead of the last contact group meeting that
I co-chaired, where this sentiment was finally expressed. We
put it on the agenda to drive it, but in other meetings we
weren't able to get the countries to reciprocate and look at
this.
So, they are at the stage now, I would say, if I could put
a pulse on the international community, where they are
accepting the reality that this is what needs to be done. But
there are complications with countries' national legislation
for flag states, such as Germany. Germany prohibits the use of
arms on their ships. And we have had several ship owners that
have reflagged their ships to other flags.
So, I would say it will not be a seamless incorporation.
The contact group does not have standing--like the IMO does,
under the U.N. It is termed an ad hoc group, although you can
tell by the representation it is quite robust.
And so I would say by September we will have the framework
available, and then the countries will be able to either adopt
it or adapt it. But while this is going on, I can tell you that
there is an increase in the number of private security teams
from different flag state authorizations, and some shipping
companies who maybe reluctantly are doing this without true
flag state concurrence.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. LoBiondo. Mr. Harris, do you have questions?
Dr. Harris. No.
Mr. LoBiondo. Admiral Cook, most of the cost to combat and
deter piracy is being borne by the United States and maybe a
few other countries who have some capacity or will to deal with
this. I think, meanwhile, flag-of-convenience nations, which
register most of the ships that are coming under attack, do not
seem to be providing much, if any, contributions in the anti-
piracy effort.
Has consideration been given to try to talk to them, force
them, develop a means to require flag-of-convenience states to
pay their fair share for the cost of naval and military
operations to pursue the pirate ships?
Admiral Cook. Mr. Chairman, I certainly do not want to
deflect the question. I think that--more appropriately, I think
that would be under the defense moniker where, you know, the
navies are working together under a combined task force, and
also drawing in whatever other support that they can.
The Coast Guard has not approached those flags to
specifically pay for naval protection. What we have done is,
though, continued to press for those flag states to pressure
their ship owners to provide long-range information and
tracking, LRIT, information to the Maritime Safety Center Horn
of Africa, which is the EU body which tracks ships through the
high-risk waters, so that we actually have a better
understanding of the picture, and naval vessels can do a better
distribution of their resources. But as far as directly asking
them to do something momentarily, that has not been done, sir.
Mr. LoBiondo. For the State Department, Mr. Amend, would
you want to take a stab at that last question? I mean is this
something the State Department is looking at, at all?
Mr. Amend. Yes, it is. This is one option among the range
of options that we are considering. And, again, there are a
number of aspects to it, host governments that are less
enthusiastic about it, but will continue to look at, yes.
Mr. LoBiondo. For Mr. Wechsler, as compared with other flag
states there are relatively few number of U.S. flag vessels
that are transiting the waters in the Horn of Africa. Is the
Department of Defense currently tracking the movements of
suspected pirates--are you able to do that at all--that are
based at sea?
Mr. Wechsler. We are able to do that in part, and our
limitations are a result of just the sheer size of the area at
sea that we are dealing with. Where we know of the pirates,
where we do have information of the pirates, we are able to
move rapidly and take appropriate action, as we have most
recently, as have some of our partner nations.
South Koreans, the Indians have recently taken quite
powerful action. And it should be noted that the Pakistanis
currently lead 151. So there are a number of countries that do
take action. And we take action when we are close to a U.S.
flag vessel that is attacked by pirates. And we have also taken
action when it is not a U.S. flag vessel, but we are the
closest, and we are abiding by our responsibilities under the
law of the sea.
Mr. LoBiondo. Are you able to supply, on a timely basis,
intelligence information to U.S. flag vessels when you are
coming on it?
Mr. Wechsler. Yes, there are procedures, and it all depends
on the specific circumstances of the vessel that is in the
process of being attacked, or has been attacked. When we have a
mechanism to communicate directly with the people on the ship,
we most certainly do so.
The ability for us to do so will have a lot to do with
whether or not the ship is abiding by all the best practices
that have been established, whether they have a safe room,
whether that room has communications, whether they were able to
get there, whether they were able to delay the pirates from
taking their ship, from a variety of the evasive actions that
they were--that they should be taking.
Mr. LoBiondo. Mr. Amend, I wanted to come back to part of
your statement, where you said we have not gotten to any of
these folks on shore, on land-based. I mean it seems that with
the vast area that was outlined at sea, that getting to some of
these bad actors on land is the way to go.
I mean is there anything you can--we might be getting into
an area we cannot talk about here, but since you mentioned it
during your statement, I mean, it is an obvious area we need to
get to. How does this----
Mr. Amend. Right. And here I think I need to be mindful of
the views of my colleague and those of the Department of
Defense on the various--the range of options that are out
there.
There are certainly--there are diplomatic concerns with
the--any action that might bring the fight on shore, because of
the potential blowback to--and the way that we would exacerbate
an already difficult situation on land where there has been no
functioning government in Somalia for 20 years now, where we
are concerned about a range of issues, humanitarian, economic
development, and other issues.
But I really cannot--I think probably in this forum, that
is probably as much as I can say.
Mr. LoBiondo. I understand that, and I will maybe switch
gears with one of my other committees at another time, the
intelligence committee, where we can take this up.
But I just say collectively, out of frustration, so what
about if a commercial vessel was boarded and taken? And what if
it had a crew of 30? And what if they were all slaughtered?
And what about if--you know, go through these--I mean what
will it take for us to finally say, ``We are not going to try
to hold hands and serve warm milk and cookies and figure out
how to solve this problem,'' because at a certain point there
has got to be a breaking point for the US of A to say, ``We
have had enough, and if we are not going to get cooperation
from other nations''--I am not talking about putting troops on
the ground there or anything else. We have all kinds of other
means.
Mr. Amend. Mr. Chairman, I would say that we are at that
point. I think the February 22nd tragedy has galvanized
Secretary Clinton and those of us at the State Department to
take a really hard and cold look at the range of options that
are before us. So I think that we are in that process. We are
looking at what is out there, and what could be done.
Mr. LoBiondo. On--switching gears a little bit, still for
you, the Executive Order 13536 names 11 individuals, 2 of whom
are known to be head of pirate gangs. It effectively outlaws
cooperation with these individuals, or support of their
activities. The maritime community is very concerned that the
prohibition on providing material support will make ransom
payments liable for prosecution.
Will the industry be held liable for ransom payments they
made in the past, if they are later found to have ended up in
the hands of one of the 11 individuals listed in the Executive
order?
Mr. Amend. Mr. Chairman, I do not think there is a clear
answer to that. I don't know that that--we would know, until
that has been tested. And I will go back to the Department and
try to develop a fuller written response to that question. But
I do not know.
Mr. LoBiondo. And are you or someone in the Department
actively trying--attempting to track ransom payments?
Mr. Amend. Well, I think that is part of the effort that I
described earlier, in response to Congressman Larsen's
question. Working with Treasury, and the intel community, and
Justice, and others, we are trying to do that, trying to do a
much better job of that now.
Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you. Mr. Caldwell, you mentioned in
your statement that growing ransom proceeds may undermine
regional security and contribute to other threats, including
terrorism. Are there any indications that terrorist
organizations are using piracy as a source of revenue?
Mr. Caldwell. Mr. LoBiondo, we at GAO do not have
independent intelligence capabilities. And the word we are
getting from the DoD and the intelligence community is that
there is no clear nexus now between piracy and terrorism.
But even as Mr. Wechsler said, in the work he has done with
DoD and drug interdiction, these different forces feed on each
other for instability, whether it is greed or political
ideology, and sometimes these groups start cooperating, or
change their motivation.
So, it is certainly a concern. I think we know the long-
term solution to Somalia is governance on land. And when you
have these organizations, whether they are terrorist or whether
they are pirate and criminal, their interest is to prevent and
undermine such governance.
Mr. LoBiondo. Mr. Larsen--Mr. Landry, do you now have a
question?
Mr. Landry. Yes, sir.
Mr. LoBiondo. You exited for a moment there,
Mr. Landry. Yes, sir.
Mr. LoBiondo. OK.
Mr. Landry. I just have a few questions for the admiral.
Does the Coast Guard have the authority to deploy maritime
safety and security teams internationally to deter piracy?
Admiral Cook. Could you repeat the question for me, please,
Congressman?
Mr. Landry. Does the Coast Guard have the authority to
deploy maritime safety and security teams internationally to
deter piracy?
Admiral Cook. Well, we have the authority, but we respond
to the combatant commanders under Department of Defense. So,
unless we were doing a law enforcement action independent from
a Coast Guard cutter, we reserve our resources to be deployed
with the Department of Defense, under their combatant
commander's direction.
Mr. Landry. Could you deploy those members aboard U.S. flag
merchant vessels?
Admiral Cook. That could be done, although it is a
significant resource issue, and I think that has been discussed
in several other forums, that we do not have the capacity to
meet the needs of U.S. flag merchant ships with armed teams
from the Coast Guard.
Mr. Landry. OK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. LoBiondo. Mr. Cravaack, do you have any questions?
Mr. Cravaack. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I do. Good morning. Thank
you all for coming today. Admiral, thank you for the great work
all your Coast Guard people do for us on a daily basis that we
know nothing about. And thank you for all the men and women of
the great Coast Guard.
I do have a couple of questions. I do apologize for getting
in late. I was at another committee meeting. And I do have a
question for Director Caldwell.
I am a little concerned about some of the possibilities--
and I have read conflicting information, so I really do not--I
am looking for your guidance here on some of the money that
might be transferred from piracy to, like, al-Shabaab in the
African region. Could you comment a little bit more about that,
fill me in a little--what you are seeing and what you are
hearing?
Mr. Caldwell. We do not have any intelligence information,
Mr. Cravaack, that is independent from the executive branch.
And the official story is that there is not a clear nexus
between al-Shabaab and the pirates.
But there certainly is a concern that that cooperation
could grow. Both of them are involved in illicit activities,
and if, under certain circumstances it becomes in their
interest to cooperate, to undermine any type of governance, in
Somalia, that it could occur, sir.
Mr. Cravaack. Thank you, sir, for that. Do you have any
idea if there is any foreign terrorist organizations that are
funding these operations? They have to get their money from
somewhere, because I understand they do have some pretty heavy
weapons.
Mr. Caldwell. I am probably not the expert on that, but the
pirates are getting the money from the ransoms. So they do not
need independent funding. The pirates have got a very clear
source of funds, and it is through the shippers, or whoever is
paying the ransom, the insurers, through kidnap and ransom
insurance. And the business model that they have, at this
point, does not require any additional money coming in from
other sources.
Mr. Cravaack. OK. Thank you, sir. Is there anybody else on
the panel who can comment on this regarding terrorist
organizations versus the pirates that are off the coast, as of
right now?
Mr. Wechsler. Sir, what I would say is, first, with an
important caveat about the limits of our intelligence and
information on this question. And then, secondly, what I would
say is that, to the best of our knowledge right now, we do not
see them--those two entities, the terrorists and the pirates--
being operationally or organizationally aligned.
We do, from time to time, see a relationship of coercion,
which ends up with money from pirates potentially going to
terrorist organizations. That is the best that we have at the
moment.
Mr. Cravaack. So there may be a window of opportunity
there. OK. Thank you very much, gentlemen. I appreciate your
testimony today. I yield back, sir.
Mr. LoBiondo. OK. Mr. Harris, do you have anything?
Dr. Harris. Just one brief question, Mr. Chairman. Again,
thanks to the panel for coming to testify.
As I read over, Mr. Amend, your testimony, on the bottom of
page seven it talks basically about how we are going to try to
deal with this through diplomatic terms. And it says, ``We are
examining appropriate counterpiracy assistance, enhancing youth
employment programs.''
Now, I have got to tell you, I mean, it kind of rings--you
know, sounds like midnight basketball or something. I mean tell
me that the United States is not depending on youth employment
programs to stop the slaughter of--that occurred aboard the
Quest. Tell me that. Assure me that we are not depending upon
enhancing youth employment programs in a country where there is
not even a real government.
Mr. Amend. Congressman Harris, we are not depending, I am
here to tell you that.
Dr. Harris. Thank you very much. I hope the next time you
come to us, you make it a little clearer in here that that is--
you know, that is one of the things we are counting on. Thank
you. Yield back the time.
Mr. LoBiondo. Mr. Larsen?
Mr. Larsen. Mr. Amend, in the Coast Guard authorization
bill we provided protection for U.S. citizens in U.S. courts
for actions taken to defend against piracy. However, U.S. ships
call at numerous foreign ports, as you know. And there is a
potential that an action could be brought in a foreign court
for acts on the high seas that were legally justified under
U.S. law.
So, can you answer for me, would the U.S. defend U.S.
citizens against charges in a foreign court?
Mr. Amend. Absolutely. I think we would vigorously attempt
to seek that they would not be held liable for any act that
would be taken in self-defense. Absolutely.
Mr. Larsen. And how would that be accomplished?
Mr. Amend. Well, through diplomatic means. I think we would
put pressure on the host government not to pursue that kind of
an action.
Mr. Larsen. So U.S. citizens defending themselves against
piracy on the high seas can rely upon U.S. Government to defend
them?
Mr. Amend. I think we would step forward and try to defend
them.
Mr. Larsen. Thanks. I have a question about the cost of
addressing piracy, Mr. Caldwell. You noted that there--that we
do not really know what we spend, what we have been spending on
combating piracy, and that was in your September 24, 2010,
report. Do you have any update on that question?
Mr. Caldwell. We do not. The indication we had from the NSC
is that that is one of the things they will consider as they
revise their action plan.
I do want to give the Department of Defense credit, because
they were one of the departments that at least tried to come up
with an estimate for us, based on steaming days of ships, and
things like that.
If I could, I will take this opportunity to add one other
thing, in terms of the armed security teams on ships. That is a
very efficient way to do things, because instead of having
billion-dollar naval ships moving around pursuing pirates, you
have got relatively small teams on merchant ships. And I wanted
to point out something from an industry perspective, because I
do deal with the industry quite a bit.
Some of the industry's initial concerns were that these
armed security teams would lead to escalating violence, and I
think, actually, the opposite has occurred. It is the
escalating violence that has led to the increased use of these
armed security teams. And a lot of the countries that initially
opposed such teams, are now more actively supporting them,
particularly countries--say the Philippines or Korea, where
some of their seafarers have been killed.
Mr. Larsen. About 30 percent of the seafarers are actually
Filipino. Is that about right?
Mr. Caldwell. Yes, they have a very high percentage. But a
lot of those are working on cruise ships, which generally are
not going through the pirate waters.
One other thing about the flag states, and Mr. LoBiondo's
comments about their contribution. Some of the flag states
recognize they do not have navies, so they are not going to be
able to contribute naval forces. But they seem to be the
countries that are more amenable to allowing armed security
teams on board.
Mr. Larsen. Right. With regard to marine insurance, the
general--my statement and from other sources said that,
according to a Chatham House report, insurance rates, at least
through the London insurers, has increased. But your report
specifically says that rates in the United States have not
increased. Can you explain the difference there?
Mr. Caldwell. No, sorry. I am not quite sure.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Caldwell. That is the simple answer. There is other
insurance, such as K&R insurance, which is not mentioned in a
lot of the documents. Kidnapping and Ransom insurance is taken
under a confidential agreement. So there is no public
information on those rates and whether they are increasing.
That is probably one source of these ransoms that are being
paid.
Mr. Larsen. OK. Can you get back to us with any other
information about that?
Mr. Caldwell. We can take that for the record.
Mr. Larsen. Would you do that, please?
Mr. Caldwell. We can come up with an explanation. Yes, sir.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you very much. Admiral Cook, can you talk
about the difference between the vessels' security plans that
were established under the MTSA versus what are commonly known
as the best management practices, and the extent that there are
differences that were required of U.S. flag ships versus what
the BMPs are being implemented on foreign flag ships, and how
wide that difference is? And if it is too wide, how can we
close it?
Admiral Cook. Congressman, fundamentally, they are quite
similar. Ultimately, though, in the BMPs, the best management
practices, it makes a recommendation against the use of armed
security teams. So that is a fundamental difference, right
there. But basically----
Mr. Larsen. So, in other words, in the vessel safety plans
it says what compared to--on that issue--compared to BMPs?
Admiral Cook. It says that because the owner is required to
do the risk assessment based on the type of vessel and the area
that it will be going--for example, the thing that is--really
works against a ship is a low freeboard and a slow speed.
Mr. Larsen. Right.
Admiral Cook. You know, they are obviously a target for
piracy. So, in that case, the owner has a higher threshold to
identify what mitigation procedures they would need, and that
would--they would allow--we would allow them to use armed
teams. Not arm the crew, but armed teams, so that the crew can
remain focused on navigation and running the engine room.
So--but generally, though, in concept, both of them target
ways to prevent unwelcome entry by anyone, you know, pirates,
of course, in particular. They highlight opportunities for non-
lethal--talks about ship operations to evade pirates: increase
your speed, in some cases you might alternate courses, so that
it is more difficult to track the ship.
Communication procedures need to be discussed within the
ship's crew and externally. For example, the ships have ship
security alert systems, which are kind of those buttons like
you picture in a bank, where a silent alarm goes off. In, for
example, U.S. flag ships, the alarm goes off in our Coast Guard
Atlantic area command center in Virginia, which enables us to
then directly contact the ship--we do not contact the ship--the
ship security officer back in the office, and see if their ship
is located where the beacon is saying, and whether they might
be involved in activities where they would be subject to
piracy.
And then, measures to protect the crew. For example, you
have heard the term ``citadel,'' which would be a hardened room
somewhere inside the ship where the crew could then retreat.
And it also requires some type of drills and exercise regime,
so that the crew is well practiced into the communications, or
the entry into the citadel, and those kind of things that would
ultimately protect them in the final measure.
So they are very similar, but they very much depart on the
armed guard part.
Mr. Larsen. OK. I have further questions, but I will----
Mr. LoBiondo. Admiral Cook, with the Coast Guard
authorization bill last year we got some language about
liability relief for owners and operators. And the Coast Guard
is establishing standards for use of force for self-defense of
vessels. Can you give us any idea when those standards will be
published.
Admiral Cook. Yes, Congressman. We went ahead and leveraged
a document called a port security advisory that we already had
in place, because there was a need from our U.S. flag shippers
to know where their limits were, as far as use of force.
And so, that document has been out for over a year. So when
we saw the authorization act, we said this is an opportunity to
test that port security advisory against the language for the
authorization act, and publish it in the Federal Register with
the language from the authorization act surrounding it, and ask
for comments. The comment period closed on March 1st. The
industry is generally very supportive of the language, and it
walks through items such as use of force, use of deadly force,
a variety of things that you would need to have on your mind
like who is in charge--the master is always in charge--those
types of things which are drawn out, which give them the
framework, then, to do self-defense, and know that they will
not be held civilly liable.
So, we are expecting that that can be turned around here as
we work in a couple of comments. Very soon we will be passing
it over to the Department as soon as we can.
Mr. LoBiondo. Mr. Landry, do you have anything else?
Mr. Landry. No, sir, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. LoBiondo. Mr. Larsen?
Mr. Larsen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Amend,
with regards to the potential of sanctions against known piracy
financiers, is that something that is in the State Department
toolbox, and something the State Department is willing to do,
to sanction individuals?
Mr. Amend. Yes, I think. Again, our review is not yet
complete. I do not want to get too far ahead. But I cannot say
at this point. The review process is not yet complete, and so I
would not want to get cross-wise with our senior leadership.
Mr. Larsen. OK. But--and this is the review you mentioned
in your testimony? Sort of--you did--the contact group was set
up in 2009.
Mr. Amend. Right.
Mr. Larsen. You have done 2 years of work on that, there
has been some success, there has been some challenges, and now
you are looking at all this again, and part of what you are
looking at in the future is whether or not you can identify,
and second, when you--if you can identify, whether you should
or you should not apply, or try to sanction----
Mr. Amend. Well, and----
Mr. Larsen [continuing]. Piracy financiers.
Mr. Amend. To think creatively about a number of options,
to include what you just mentioned, and to see how they could
be sequenced in a way that would allow us to achieve a near and
medium-term success.
Mr. Larsen. Yes, OK. So on March 21st, there is a plenary
session of the contact group bringing together the work----
Mr. Amend. Right.
Mr. Larsen [continuing]. Of the working groups, where
presumably, there will be discussion and--on the
recommendations that come out of the working groups.
Is there anything that you all will be discussing that you
might find helpful, getting support from this committee, this
subcommittee, on?
Mr. Amend. No. I appreciate that offer. I think our focus,
in large part, will be to pull together the thinking on
proposals made by the U.N. about new judicial mechanisms in the
region that might be more effective, to focus on the subject of
financial flows, informal and formal financial flows. But let
me take that question back and share that with my colleagues
and respond in writing.
Mr. Larsen. I would--well, you have got a very short period
of time to do that.
Mr. Amend. It is very--it is a narrow window.
Mr. Larsen. Absolutely.
Mr. Amend. But we can move quickly.
Mr. Larsen. I look forward to your quick response.
Mr. Amend. Yes.
Mr. Larsen. And I hope that is interagency, you are talking
to an interagency group about that.
Mr. Amend. Yes, absolutely.
Mr. Larsen. With regards to prosecution, it might have been
Mr. Wechsler who noted that there have been 800--for the sake
of the law, 800 alleged pirates turned over for prosecution.
How many have actually been prosecuted or awaiting prosecution?
Because my understanding is that number is not very high.
Mr. Amend. I defer to information that is provided by the
U.N., office on drugs and crime. It describes countries
regionally and then internationally, currently detained and
those that have been prosecuted.
And I think your observation is accurate, that a few
numbers have been prosecuted, significant numbers have been
detained. Or up to 800, I think, is the round figure that we
see.
Mr. Larsen. So up to 800 are current in detention?
Mr. Amend. Yes, and let me just give you an example. In the
region, Somaliland, 88 all have been convicted; Puntland, 260,
of which 200 have been convicted; Yemen, 120, all convicted;
Oman, 12, all convicted. More broadly, Netherlands, 10, 5 of
which have been convicted, and on down the list.
Mr. Larsen. And what do you find the challenge to
prosecution being?
Mr. Amend. The key challenge is, as I think was mentioned
earlier, piracy is a crime of universal jurisdiction. And we
seek diplomatically to get countries to take on national
prosecutions, to prosecute--to accept--take receipt of and then
prosecute under their national laws, pirates. That is
difficult. And a number of countries have stepped forward.
Kenya, for example, I think has taken up to around 100 now.
But it is an ongoing effort. It is an ongoing challenge to
get countries to do this. Some are reluctant.
Mr. Larsen. You have all noted, as the chairman has noted
and I have as well, that--the tragedy of the Quest, the sailing
vessel Quest. Do you--any of you--have an assessment on whether
this has changed the rules of engagement for the pirates, if
they can be looked at monolithically?
[No response.]
Mr. Larsen. I know it is a rather open-ended--but I would
rather--if someone can volunteer----
Mr. Wechsler. It is--with the caveat that this is an
ongoing investigation, and so we are still learning a lot about
what the individual motivations were of those specific
pirates--but as a general proposition, our initial assessment
is that this was in individual circumstances, and does not
necessarily indicate a wide-ranging change of behavior, talking
about this specific incident.
That said, the wider trends, we do have concerns about the
use of force by pirates more widely.
Mr. Larsen. Yes, yes.
Mr. LoBiondo. Mr. Amend, the U.S., for a while, had a
bilateral prosecution agreement with Kenya. And I guess we
transferred, what was it, 25 or so pirates to Kenya. Kenya
formally withdrew September of 2010. Do we know why they
withdrew from the agreement?
Mr. Amend. My understanding is that they said that they had
reached capacity. But since the suspension of that agreement,
on a case-by-case basis, the Kenyans have accepted suspected
pirates. And so we continue to work closely with the government
there, notwithstanding the fact that we had an agreement that
has been suspended, to, on a case-by-case basis, to seek their
support in accepting new suspected pirates as incidents occur.
Mr. LoBiondo. Has Kenya released pirates without
prosecuting?
Mr. Amend. That I do not know, but I can get an answer back
to you.
Mr. LoBiondo. So would you also be able to comment whether
their withdrawal from the bilateral prosecution agreement has
hindered prosecution efforts?
Mr. Amend. Well, I think, as a general principle, we would
like countries to accept pirates--affected states to accept
pirates and prosecute them. And so we certainly were
disappointed. But we continue to work closely with the Kenyan
Government so that they will make the right decision.
Mr. LoBiondo. And I am assuming we are--State Department is
attempting to prevent other nations from just sort of catch-
and-release programs, so to speak?
Mr. Amend. That is right. That is right.
Mr. LoBiondo. OK. Thank you. Mr. Larsen, do you have more
questions?
Mr. Larsen. Mr. Wechsler, we have heard testimony from you
and the others about the expansion of the area that the pirates
have gotten into, about the size of the lower 48 States. We
have heard from you that if you took all the ships in the
navies around the world, that number would not be enough to
patrol this area adequately.
So, without, obviously, getting into too much operational
detail for obvious reasons, what kind of options do we have,
beyond what we are doing on the water, for degrading their
capacity to operate in such a large area?
Mr. Wechsler. In addition to gaining better intelligence,
which is always a preferred way to attack such problems on the
sea--if you are cued by intelligence, it makes your work much,
much better than if you are going around, hoping to come across
a pirate, which we try not to do.
But in addition to that, I would go back to the first order
of statements that I and a bunch of my colleagues here have
made, which is to make the ships--the vessels themselves much
harder targets for the pirates. There is a significant number
of steps that can be done to make these targets harder. And we
have seen the success to date when targets have been made
harder, that pirates cannot take them, will not take them, try
and fail to take them.
And those steps, as compared to having a lot of naval
vessels, is a much more cost-effective way to address this
problem on the sea.
That all said, as you have said, and as we have said, the
true solution to this problem is going to be on land, not on
sea.
Mr. Larsen. With regards to issues within your area, on the
intelligence side, as the State Department goes to phase two,
or whatever you are calling it, looking at this, rethinking,
will you be advocating, from a defense side, Defense
Department, will you be advocating for more access to the use
of intelligence assets in order to help with this problem?
Mr. Wechsler. Yes, there is a lengthy and comprehensive
process for the global employment of forces and for other
intelligence-related processes to deploy and prioritize those
assets. We make sure that the effort against piracy is included
in that process, so that it can be ranked.
I do have to say, though, sir, as I said in my testimony,
when we are fighting a war in Afghanistan, and when ISR assets
are in great demand in that war, that will understandably be
our highest priority. And we are short of ISR assets, compared
to demand, quite significantly. And that is the unfortunate
situation in the Department of Defense.
Mr. Larsen. And there is no doubt about that, and there is
no doubt we have heard that from Secretary Gates many times, as
well.
I think, Mr. Chairman, that is--those are my questions.
Mr. LoBiondo. OK. I think that will wrap us up. I would
like to thank our panel very much. I do not imagine this will
be the last we will be dealing with this. We look forward to
some updates from you. And I thank you for being here. The
committee is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:14 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]