[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

A REVIEW OF NASA'S EXPLORATION PROGRAM
IN TRANSITION:
ISSUES FOR CONGRESS AND INDUSTRY

=======================================================================

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND AERONAUTICS

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

__________

MARCH 30, 2011

__________

Serial No. 112-8

__________

Printed for the use of the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology

Available via the World Wide Web: http://science.house.gov

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COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY

HON. RALPH M. HALL, Texas, Chair
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
Wisconsin JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois
LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California
DANA ROHRABACHER, California ZOE LOFGREN, California
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland DAVID WU, Oregon
FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma BRAD MILLER, North Carolina
JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois
W. TODD AKIN, Missouri GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona
RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas MARCIA L. FUDGE, Ohio
PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia BEN R. LUJAN, New Mexico
SANDY ADAMS, Florida PAUL D. TONKO, New York
BENJAMIN QUAYLE, Arizona JERRY McNERNEY, California
CHARLES J. ``CHUCK'' FLEISCHMANN, JOHN P. SARBANES, Maryland
Tennessee TERRI A. SEWELL, Alabama
E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia FREDERICA S. WILSON, Florida
STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi HANSEN CLARKE, Michigan
MO BROOKS, Alabama
ANDY HARRIS, Maryland
RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois
CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota
LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana
DAN BENISHEK, Michigan
VACANCY
------

Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics

HON. STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi, Chair
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER JR., GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona
Wisconsin MARCIA L. FUDGE, Ohio
LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois
DANA ROHRABACHER, California TERRI A. SEWELL, Alabama
FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma DAVID WU, Oregon
W. TODD AKIN, Missouri DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas FREDERICA S. WILSON, Florida
SANDY ADAMS, Florida
E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia
MO BROOKS, Alabama
RALPH M. HALL, Texas EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas

C O N T E N T S

Date of Hearing

Page
Witness List..................................................... 2

Hearing Charter.................................................. 3

Opening Statements

Statement by Representative Steven M. Palazzo, Chair,
Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science,
Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives........... 13
Written Statement............................................ 14

Statement by Representative Ralph M. Hall, Chairman, Committee on
Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives.. 14
Written Statement............................................ 16

Statement by Representative Jerry F. Costello, Acting Ranking
Minority Member, Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics,
Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of
Representatives................................................ 17
Written Statement............................................ 18

Witnesses:

Mr. Douglas Cooke, Associate Administrator, Exploration Systems
Mission Directorate, National Aeronautics and Space
Administration
Oral Statement............................................... 19
Written Statement............................................ 21

Dr. Scott Pace, Director, Space Policy Institute, George
Washington University
Oral Statement............................................... 34
Written Statement............................................ 36

Mr. James Maser, Chairman, Corporate Membership Committee, The
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
Oral Statement............................................... 43
Written Statement............................................ 45

Discussion
...............................................................

...............................................................

Appendix: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions

Mr. Douglas Cooke, Associate Administrator, Exploration Systems
Mission Directorate, National Aeronautics and Space
Administration................................................. 68

Dr. Scott Pace, Director, Space Policy Institute, George
Washington University.......................................... 81

Mr. James Maser, Chairman, Corporate Membership Committee, The
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics............. 85

A REVIEW OF NASA'S EXPLORATION PROGRAM IN TRANSITION: ISSUES FOR
CONGRESS AND INDUSTRY

----------

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 30, 2011

House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics,
Committee on Science, Space, and Technology,
Washington, DC.

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in
Room 2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Steven
Palazzo [Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.

hearing charter

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND AERONAUTICS

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

A Review of NASA's Exploration Program in Transition: Issues for
Congress and Industry

wednesday, march 30, 2011
10:00 a.m.-12:00 p.m.
2318 rayburn house office building

Purpose

The subcommittee will examine 1) the accomplishments of the
Constellation program, 2) NASA's transition toward development of the
Space Launch System (SLS) and Multi Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV), and
compliance with the FY2011 continuing resolution and the NASA
Authorization Act, 3) the status of the 90-day SLS/MPCV report to
Congress, and 4) examine the key challenges and risks in implementing
the proposed changes including outstanding questions and issues for
Congress from delays or other disruptions to the workforce or aerospace
industrial base.

Witnesses

Mr. Douglas Cooke, Associate Administrator, Exploration
Systems Mission Directorate, National Aeronautics and Space
Administration

Dr. Scott Pace, Director, Space Policy Institute, George
Washington University

Mr. James Maser, Chairman, Corporate Membership
Committee, The American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics.

Issues

Exploration Capabilities in Transition; Issues for Congress and
Industry

At issue is NASA's compliance with Congressional direction on
extending and modifying the Constellation contracts, and the
implications of NASA's actions for the continued, uninterrupted
progress on the Multi Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) and Space Launch
System (SLS). Congressional intent, as reflected in authorization and
appropriation language seek to utilize the existing workforce and
assets in order to limit the damage to the nation's industrial base and
workforce.
As the budget comparison above indicates, the FY2012 budget request
does not adhere to the funding guidance in last year's authorization
bill (PL 111-267). The administration's FY2012 budget request for
Exploration systems is $1.24 billion below the amount specified in the
Act. Exploration systems is $2.5 billion below when comparing both
FY2012 and FY2013. In FY2013, the administration does not identify the
funding specified for the two main components; the MPCV and the SLS.
In spite of the $2.5 billion reduction over two years in proposed
funding for Exploration Capabilities, Administrator Bolden said, ``I am
committed to try to make sure that the funding levels remain about the
same, and one of the things is beginning in 2013 I have asked and I
have been granted that we put human exploration in one budget line so
that we can move the funds around as necessary in each successive year
so that we marry those programs up when we need them, you know, that
being the 2020 timeframe . . . ''
Yet, section 302 of the NASA Authorization Act directs the agency
to develop the heavy lift system in a way that permits early flight
testing of the ``core'' stage elements with a goal of an operational
capability to orbit by December 31, 2016.
The U.S. space industrial base that has supported the Constellation
- now MPCV and SLS effort - has waited while the agency settles on a
plan for human spaceflight, and unless the uncertainty is eliminated in
the near future, there could be serious disruptions to the aerospace
workforce and industrial base as key suppliers begin to exit the
market.

Report due to Congress

The Authorization Act directed NASA to report back in 90 days on
the design of the vehicle envisioned, and to provide the assumptions
and cost analysis to justify the systems selected. On January 10th NASA
provided a preliminary report containing no detailed cost or schedule
assessments, yet concluding nevertheless that, ``to date our studies
have shown that none of those options thus far appear to be affordable
in our present fiscal conditions, based upon existing cost models,
historical data, and traditional acquisition approaches.''
According to NASA it will provide an independent (outside of the
Agency) assessment of cost and schedule for the SLS and MPCV design
options, and make those assessments public this Spring or Summer.
According to the preliminary report, NASA is considering various
acquisition strategies for the MPCV and SLS which could have
significant impacts to the workforce and industrial base. Thus far,
Congress has directed the agency to continue to extend (and modify if
appropriate), the Constellation contracts to the maximum extent
practicable (see background below).
NASA's future acquisition decisions could have wide ranging
repercussions. The preliminary report states, ``While NASA will work as
expeditiously as possible to meet the 2016 goal, NASA does not believe
this goal is achievable based on a combination of the current funding
profile estimate, traditional approaches to acquisition, and currently
considered vehicle architectures.''
When asked by Senator Boozman at the March 15th, 2011 Senate
Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee hearing on The
Challenges Facing NASA whether NASA was basing its analysis on the
funding in the Authorization Act, or the much lower administration
proposal Associate Administrator Doug Cooke replied, ``we are looking
at, in these studies, the president's requested budget.''
A decision to re-compete significant elements of the MPCV or SLS
could result in delays of as much as two years while the Agency issues
Requests for Proposals (RFPs), evaluates the proposals, awards
contracts, adjudicates protests, etc.

Background

The Constellation program consisted of the Ares 1 crew launch
vehicle and Orion crew exploration vehicle, the Ares 5 heavy-lift
launch vehicle, and associated lunar systems. Constellation
architecture had been established since 2004 as a replacement for the
retiring Space Shuttle to deliver Americans and our International
Partners to the International Space Station, and eventually to the Moon
and other destinations beyond Earth orbit. Constellation was authorized
in both the NASA Authorization Act of 2005 [P.L.109-155] and the NASA
Authorization Act of 2008 [P.L.110-422] with a stepping-stone approach
``to ensure that activities in its lunar exploration program shall be
designed and implemented in a manner that gives strong consideration to
how those activities might also help meet the requirements of future
activities beyond the Moon'' and a range of future destinations ``to
expand human and robotic presence into the solar system, including the
exploration and utilization of the Moon, near Earth asteroids,
Lagrangian points, and eventually Mars and its moons.''
The administration has presented various - and often conflicting -
statements and goals for the U.S. Exploration Program. In his April 15,
2010 remarks at Kennedy Space Center, President Obama said: ``Early in
the next decade, a set of crewed flights will test and prove the
systems required for exploration beyond low-Earth orbit. And by 2025,
we expect new spacecraft designed for long journeys to allow us to
begin the first-ever crewed missions beyond the moon into deep space.
We'll start by sending astronauts to an asteroid for the first time in
history.'' But at the March 2, 2011 House Science, Space, and
Technology Committee hearing on NASA FY2012 budget proposal, in
response to a question from Rep. Dana Rohrabacher, Administrator Bolden
said, ``The International Space Station is the anchor for all future
exploration. That is our Moon right now.''
Congress has supported NASA's exploration program and authorized
$10.8 billion over three years (FY2011-FY2013). The Constellation
system that the administration proposed canceling is developing an
array of technologies and heavy lift capabilities applicable to the
goals of exploration beyond low Earth orbit. Sections 203(a)(1) and
301(a) of the 2010 NASA Authorization Act expressed the sense of the
Congress that, ``the ISS, technology developments, the current Space
Shuttle program, and follow-on transportation systems authorized by
this Act form the foundation of initial capabilities for missions
beyond low-Earth orbit to a variety of lunar and Lagrangian orbital
locations,'' and ``The extension of the human presence from low-Earth
orbit to other regions of space beyond low-Earth orbit will enable
missions to the surface of the Moon and missions to deep space
destinations such as near-Earth asteroids and Mars.''
The NASA Authorization Act of 2010 directed the agency to develop a
Space Launch System consisting of a heavy lift launcher (130 ton
rocket, with 70-100 ton ``core'' capability that could be used to
launch the crew capsule to the International Space Station by 2016) and
multi-purpose crew vehicle (the Orion crew capsule). The system was
envisioned to build upon the technologies and extensive capabilities of
the Space Shuttle and Constellation systems, and to provide a backup
capability to access the ISS by 2016 in case the Russian Soyuz, or
commercial crew initiatives are unavailable. In order to limit
termination liability costs and avoid disruptions to the workforce and
industrial base, the 2010 Authorization Act directs NASA to, ``to the
extent practicable, extend or modify existing vehicle development and
associated contracts.''

FY2010 Appropriations Direction: Extend or Modify Constellation
Contracts

In the Statement of Managers accompanying the FY 2010 Consolidated
Appropriations Act, ``The conferees note that the Constellation program
is the program for which funds have been authorized and appropriated
over the last four years, and upon which the pending budget request is
based. Accordingly, it is premature for the conferees to advocate or
initiate significant changes to the current program absent a bona fide
proposal from the Administration and subsequent assessment,
consideration and enactment by Congress.'' The Statement of Managers
also states that ``Funds are not provided herein to initiate any new
program, project or activity, not otherwise contemplated within the
budget request and approved by Congress, consistent with section 505 of
this Act, unless otherwise approved by the Congress in a subsequent
appropriations Act. Funds are also not provided herein to cancel,
terminate or significantly modify contracts related to the spacecraft
architecture of the current program, unless such changes or
modifications have been considered in subsequent appropriations Acts.''
Similar language was included in the Act itself.
The Constellation program has racked up a series of impressive
accomplishments including: 1) the full-scale Pad Abort Test of the crew
escape system; 2) the near completion of the J2X rocket engine
currently slated for testing at the Stennis Space Center in May or
June; 3) the developmental test firings of five segment solid rocket
motors; 4) the Ares 1X test flight in October 2008. (Please see
Appendix 1 for a comprehensive list of Constellation program's
achievements to date.)
The Constellation program's Orion spacecraft was intended to serve
as a back-up for commercial cargo services envisioned by the Commercial
Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) program to service the
International Space Station. NASA's FY2009 budget request stated, ``It
[Orion] will be capable of ferrying up to six astronauts (plus
additional cargo) to and from the International Space Station if
commercial transport services are unavailable.''

Delays in Commercial COTS Cargo Systems Led to Additional Shuttle
Flights

Significant delays in the COTS commercial cargo development fuel
concerns that NASA will be unable to provide the logistics support
necessary to maintain and utilize the International Space Station, or
to fulfill U.S. obligations to our international partners. (Please see
the SpaceX and Orbital Sciences COTS milestone charts in Appendix 2.)
Congress was aware as far back as 2008 that delays in the COTS
cargo program would likely result in the need for additional Space
Shuttle flights to assure that adequate spares would be aboard the ISS.
Thus, section 611 of the NASA Authorization Act of 2008 [P.L.110-422]
added two additional logistics flights, ``In addition to the Space
Shuttle flights listed as part of the baseline flight manifest as of
January 1, 2008, the Utilization flights ULF-4 and ULF-5 shall be
considered part of the Space Shuttle baseline flight manifest and shall
be flown prior to the retirement of the Space Shuttle, currently
scheduled for 2010.''
As Congress debated the NASA Authorization Act of 2010 [P.L.111-
267] in the Fall of last year, no COTS provider had yet accomplished an
initial demonstration flight. (SpaceX launched the first of three COTS
demonstration flights of a Falcon 9/Dragon on December 8, 2010, and the
other two test flights are tentatively scheduled for late 2011 and
early 2012.) As a result of these concerns, the NASA Authorization
funded another Space Shuttle flight (STS-135 will be the last mission
of the program), ``The Administrator shall fly the Launch-On-Need
Shuttle mission currently designated in the Shuttle Flight Manifest
dated February 28, 2010, to the ISS in fiscal year 2011, but no earlier
than June 1, 2011, unless required earlier by an operations
contingency.''
At the March 15th, 2011 Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation
Committee hearing on The Challenges Facing NASA, Associate
Administrator Bill Gerstenmaier explained how critical the STS-135
mission was given the concerns for commercial COTS schedule, ``We see
that mission as extremely critical to us. What that mission provides
for us is it gives us some margin that if the commercial providers are
late and they don't fly in 2011 and 2012 as they plan, then we have got
some time through 2012 that we will have enough supplies pre-positioned
on Space Station that we can continue to do quality research, we
continue to keep our crew size at six onboard station through that
period of 2012 all the way until 2013. If we don't have that shuttle
flight, then it's absolutely mandatory that the commercial cargo
providers come on-line at the end of this year and early in 2012. I
don't think that is a prudent strategy. We need some margin just as in
the shuttle world, we thought we understood where we were going to go
fly, then we had the tank problem that slowed us down a couple months.
I would expect small problems to show up in the commercial providers as
well. We need some margin to do that.''
Importance of MPCV and SLS as a Backup and as Assured Access to ISS
The impending retirement of the Space Shuttle and continuing delays
in commercial COTS systems, reinforced the need for the backup assured
ISS access capability envisioned for the original Exploration Systems
development, as well as to lay the groundwork for exploration beyond
low Earth orbit. Section 2(9) of the NASA Authorization Act of 2010
states, ``While commercial transportation systems have the promise to
contribute valuable services, it is in the United States' national
interest to maintain a government operated space transportation system
for crew and cargo delivery to space.''
Many of NASA's international agreements with the Space Station
partners were put in place before the decision to retire the Space
Shuttle. As a result, even after the Space Shuttle has retired, NASA is
still responsible for cargo delivery and transportation of our
Canadian, European and Japanese partners to and from the International
Space Station.
In Section 201(b) of the NASA Authorization Act of 2010, Congress,
``reaffirms the policy stated in section 501(a) of the NASA
Authorization Act of 2005 (42 U.S.C. 16761(a)), that the United States
shall maintain an uninterrupted capability for human space flight and
operations in low-Earth orbit, and beyond, as an essential instrument
of national security and of the capacity to ensure continued United
States participation and leadership in the exploration and utilization
of space.''

Appendix 1

Key Achievements of NASA's Constellation Program

The Constellation Program achieved notable maturity as a flight
system, as evidenced by the successful completion of a Preliminary
Design Review in March 2010. This review, following the successful
Preliminary Design Reviews of the Ares-I launch vehicle and the Orion
spacecraft, signaled the completion of a coherent Program technical
approach that aligned content, budget and schedule for Phase I
Capability, or LEO missions to the ISS. Key development flight and
ground tests helped the Program to gauge programmatic risk by providing
hard data in areas having the most uncertainty, providing confidence in
the Agency's ability to execute the Constellation Phase I Capability
development within cost & schedule commitments. Associated with this
review, the Constellation Program also successfully completed the Phase
I Safety Review, addressing all hazards that would lead to loss of life
or loss of mission for the integrated system including the launch
vehicle, spacecraft, and ground systems. Technical studies continued on
the Constellation Program Phase II content, which would enable missions
to the Moon & beyond, with technology maturation, trade studies, and
programmatic planning scenarios all under concurrent development for
the Altair Lunar Lander, the Ares V heavy lift launch vehicle, and
Lunar surface habitats. The overall feasibility of the Constellation
Program Phase II architecture was successfully demonstrated at the
Lunar Capability Concept Review conducted in 2008. A listing of key
achievements for the projects comprising the Constellation Phase I
Capability is provided below.

Key Achievements of the Orion Project

The Orion Preliminary Design Review (PDR) was successfully
completed in August, 2009. Both the ISS and Lunar variants of the Orion
spacecraft were examined during the review. The Orion Project also
successfully completed the Phase 1 Safety Review of the spacecraft. The
review addressed all catastrophic loss of crew and/or vehicle, and
critical loss of mission hazards for both the ISS and Lunar Sortie
missions. Orion safety analysis integrated the results of hazard
analysis, probabilistic risk assessment, failure modes analysis, and
engineering design assessments to provide an integrated design and
safety assessment consistent with the latest NASA human rating
requirements. As a result, the Orion design has been more fully
optimized to minimize safety risk while carefully balancing other
project cost, schedule, and technical constraints.
Fabrication of the Orion crew module Ground Test Article, the first
full scale Orion article designed and manufactured to NASA's rigorous
human spaceflight specifications, continues. Construction of this
article has validated many of the advanced production processes,
equipment and tools necessary to manufacture Orion spaceflight
hardware. The crew module pressure vessel and primary structure were
manufactured at the Michoud Assembly Facility in Louisiana using
friction stir welding, an advanced welding process that yields stronger
bonds resulting in optimal structural integrity. The article was
subsequently shipped to a Lockheed Martin facility in Colorado where
final outfitting, including installation of the thermal protection
system, secondary structure and spacecraft subsystem simulators is
underway. Assembly will be complete by July, 2011 at which time
environmental testing, including mechanical vibration and acoustic
testing will be initiated. The article will subsequently be shipped to
NASA's Langley Research Center for high fidelity water landing testing.
Fabrication of similar Orion service module and launch abort system
ground test articles is now also underway.
The first developmental flight test of the Orion Launch Abort
System (LAS) was conducted at the White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico
on May 6, 2010. During this test, the Orion LAS accelerated the crew
module from a standstill to over 500 miles per hour in less than 3
seconds in a real flight environment exactly as would be required
during a real launch contingency in order to save the lives of a human
crew. The Orion LAS includes three newly designed solid rocket motors
(an abort motor, a jettison motor and an attitude control motor)
developed to optimize vehicle performance and improve the range of
survivable abort conditions.
A thermal protection system (TPS) advanced development project was
undertaken to address the low maturity level of TPS materials suitable
for the Orion heat shield. Since the end of the Apollo program, NASA's
focus on reusable TPS materials such as those used in the Space Shuttle
eroded NASA's in-house research and development capability and left the
ablative TPS industry in a state of neglect. The Orion project pursued
a competitive phased development strategy with succeeding rounds of
development, testing, and down selections. These efforts re-invigorated
the ablative TPS industry, re-established a NASA competency to respond
to future material needs, and transferred mature heat shield material
and design options to the unmanned and commercial space industry,
including TPS materials and technology information being used by the
Mars Science Laboratory spacecraft and SpaceX Dragon capsule.
A new sensor technology has been developed that will allow easier
and safer on-orbit rendezvous and docking. The Orion Vision Navigation
System (VNS) is an advanced LiDAR based relative navigation sensor with
performance specifications unmatched in today's relative navigation
sensor market. A flight qualified version of the VNS is installed
onboard the Space Shuttle Endeavour for the STS-134 mission. During the
mission, the VNS will be operated in an experimental mode to
characterize its performance and validate the technology for space
operations. The VNS is a cross-cutting technology that has been
developed in partnership with commercial vendors and is applicable for
future spacecraft requiring rendezvous and dockings as well as other
terrestrial commercial applications.
A new, high speed digital data bus protocol leveraging commercial
developed standards while providing assured delivery of time critical
data packets demanded by spacecraft command and control applications
has been successfully developed for Orion. The protocol, referred to as
Time Triggered Gigabit Ethernet, is an innovative technology employed
that manages flight critical data as well as mission critical data,
such as high definition video, over a single network to minimize weight
and power. The Orion data bus network has been integrated and tested at
the Honeywell labs in Phoenix, AR. The SAE approval of the Orion bus
protocols is nearing completion, allowing for multiple vendors to
supply this critical technology to a variety of commercial and
government applications.
The Orion project successfully completed a Landing Systems advanced
development project to trade, develop, test, and mature candidate
systems to mitigate the loads imparted to the spacecraft and crew upon
landing impact. Extensive analysis on the effectiveness of various
technologies using sophisticated computer models and simulations was
completed. The Project ensured the analysis was well-grounded by
building and testing engineering development versions of the most
promising alternatives, conducting a total of 117 drop tests. These
efforts significantly advanced the state-of the art knowledge in this
field and formed the basis for key Orion design decisions. These
efforts have also provided the basis for the landing systems currently
being considered by commercial human spaceflight efforts.
The Orion project successfully completed a formal Integrated
Baseline Review to assess the adequacy of the integrated project
baseline (cost, schedule, risk, and technical) following the system
PDR.

Key Achievements of the Ares Project

The project completed its Preliminary Design Review in August 2008.
Building on the successful Preliminary Design Reviews of the Upper
Stage, Upper Stage Engine (J-2X), and First Stage, this review focused
on integrated Ares-I launch vehicle design and performance. As a
prerequisite for the Preliminary Design Review, the Ares Project
successfully also completed the Phase 1 Safety Review. The review
addressed all catastrophic (loss of crew/vehicle) and critical (loss of
mission) hazards for the launch vehicle, integrating the results of
hazard analysis, probabilistic risk assessment, failure modes analysis,
and engineering design assessments to provide an integrated design and
safety assessment consistent with the latest NASA human rating
requirements.
In September 2009 and September 2010, NASA and ATK conducted
successful tests of five segment development motors in Promontory,
Utah. These tests were designated DM-1 and DM-2. Beyond validating the
basic performance characteristics of the stage, the tests have enhanced
modeling and understanding of key attributes that have historically
been very difficult to predict analytically such as erosive burning,
thrust oscillations and thrust tail off. Casting for DM-3 has been
completed and the test is scheduled for later this year. This test will
characterize and validate performance materials and processes
applicable to future heavy lift launch systems utilizing solid
propulsion stages.
In October 2009, the Ares I-X test flight took place at Kennedy
Space Center in Florida. Data from more than 700 on-board sensors
showed that the vehicle was effectively controlled and stable in
flight. Thrust oscillation frequencies and magnitude data from the Ares
I-X flight also were consistent with measurements from recent Shuttle
flights that were instrumented, leading us to conclude that the
oscillation vibration on the Ares I would be within the bounds that the
Ares I was being designed to. In the end, this test flight provided
tremendous insight into the aerodynamic, acoustic, structural,
vibration, and thermal forces that Ares I would be expected to
experience. A final report, Final Flight Evaluation Report for Ares I
Use of Ares I-X Data (APO-1041), was completed in January 2011.
The Ares Project successfully completed development and
demonstration on September 30, 2010 of a core end-to-end avionics and
software integration and test capability. This capability included the
integration of upper stage software development unit flight computers,
an initial version of the Upper Stage flight software, a single string
of First Stage engineering avionics hardware, prototype First Stage
rock and tilt thrust vector control (TVC) actuators, and a Kennedy
Space Center-developed Ground System (GS) Launch Control System (LCS)
interface emulator. The team demonstrated prelaunch checkout and
commanding, a complete closed-loop Ares vehicle ascent, and descent of
the recoverable First Stage. State-of-the-art systems modeling &
simulation capabilities that include hardware integration have broad
government and commercial launch systems applicability.
In early 2011, the Upper Stage Element successfully completed
functional testing and delivery of three lithium-ion (li-ion) battery
development test units (DTUs). A total of eight additional battery DTUs
will be delivered to the Marshall Space Flight Center in FY11 for
further evaluation and testing. The flight unit batteries are designed
to power launch vehicle avionics and various other flight hardware
components. Li-ion batteries are rechargeable batteries currently used
in portable electronic applications. They are growing in popularity for
military, electric vehicle, and now aerospace applications. The Ares I
Project is working towards qualification of li-ion technology for human
space flight.
The majority of the J-2X engine E10001 parts has been delivered to
Stennis Space Center and engine assembly has begun with completion
scheduled for May 2011. Static fire testing is currently slated to
begin in the June/July 2011 time frame in Test Stand A2. J-2X
Powerpack-2 Testing will begin in May 2011 in Test Stand A1. The J-2X
offers a viable upper stage engine option in the development of
government and commercial human and cargo launch systems.

Key Achievements of the Extra Vehicular Activity (EVA) Project

The EVA Systems Design Review was successfully completed in May of
2008. Successful completion of this review signaled completion of top-
level EVA requirements and the associated technical feasibility of the
design concept to meet the requirements.
In preparation for EVA Preliminary Design Review, the EVA Systems
Project developed and delivered 5 prototype suits representing various
design configurations and architectures to assess their respective
merits in areas such as mobility, ease of donning and doffing,
durability, reliability and safety.
The EVA Systems Project completed a formal Integrated Baseline
Review in January of 2010.

Key Achievements in Ground Systems, Mission Operations, and
Infrastructure

A two-year renovation of Kennedy Space Center's Operations &
Checkout (O&C) building has been completed, resulting in a pristine new
spacecraft ``factory of the future.'' Built in 1964, the O&C building
will continue its proud heritage of supporting every U.S. human
spaceflight endeavor since the Gemini Program. Lockheed Martin and
Space Florida partnered with NASA to create this state-of-the-art
facility that will allow final assembly and checkout of the Orion
spacecraft to be completed at the launch site.
At Kennedy Space Center in Florida, the deconstruction of Launch
Pad 39B was initiated in October 2010 with the removal of the Rotating
and Fixed service structures. Completion of the deconstruction is
scheduled for April 30, 2011. These structures at the pad are no longer
needed for NASA's Space Shuttle Program, so the pad is being renovated
for future use. The new design will feature a ``clean pad'' for rockets
to come with their own launcher, making it more versatile for a number
of vehicles. The new lightning protection system, consisting of three
lightning towers and a wire catenary system will remain.
In September 2010, four-year Launch Equipment Test Facility (LETF)
renovation effort was completed at the Kennedy Space Center in Florida.
The LETF includes a 600-ton test fixture used for tension and
compression testing, a water flow test loop that tests valves, pumps
and flow meters, two launch simulation towers and two 15,000-gallon
cryogenic towers. The new Vehicle Motion Simulator, or VMS, simulates
all the movements a vehicle will experience from rollout to launch.
At NASA's Kennedy Space Center in Florida, NASA's new mobile
launcher (ML) support structure was completed in August 2010 and was
moved from a construction site, north of the Vehicle Assembly Building
(VAB), to the Mobile Launcher east park site. The base of the launcher
is lighter than space shuttle mobile launcher platforms so the crawler-
transporter can pick up the heavier load of the tower and a taller
rocket. Once there, the ML can be outfitted with ground support
equipment, such as umbilicals and access arms, for future rocket
launches. It took about two years to construct the 355-foot-tall
structure, which will support NASA's future human spaceflight program.
Construction of an advanced Space Environmental Test Facility (SET)
at Glenn Research Center's Plum Brook Station in Ohio was initiated in
2007 and will be complete in the summer of 2011. Development of this
facility will allow all Orion vehicle level qualification testing
including mechanical vibration, acoustics, EMI and thermal vacuum
testing to be accomplished in a single facility.
A hydro impact water basin was constructed at NASA's Langley
Research Center in Virginia. This facility is available to support
water landing impact testing of Orion and commercial spacecraft.
At NASA's Stennis Space Center in Mississippi, construction
continues on a new engine test stand. The 300-foot-tall, steel-framed
stand will be used to test the J-2X rocket engine. When completed in
2013, the A-3 test stand will allow engineers to evaluate the operating
parameters of the J-2X engine by simulating conditions at altitudes as
high as 100,000 feet. Construction on the stand began in August 2007At
NASA's Johnson Space Center in Texas, architectures for the Mission
Control Center-21 (MCC-21) project are being developed. The MCC-21
design features a modern architecture leveraging recent advances in
technology to lower overall sustaining costs while increasing the
flexibility and capability of the system. In concert with the MCC-21,
the Training System (TS)-21 will provide a generalized simulation-based
training capability for crew and flight controllers. This approach will
support integration of a variety of future spacecraft rather than a
single program or vehicle, develop simulation with integrated
instructor tools that will provide common behavior across vehicle
trainers; and create a simulation interface that supports a variety of
vehicle-specific integration models. The Preliminary Design Reviews for
MCC-21 and TS-21 will be held in the summer of 2011.
Several world-class manufacturing capabilities for liquid stage
structures foaming, machining, and welding have been fabricated and
installed at Alabama's Marshall Space Flight Center. These
capabilities, the Vertical Milling Machine (the world's largest
horizontal multi-axis milling machine), the Robotic Weld Tool, the
Vertical Weld Tool, and the Spray-On Foam Insulation Booth, are
adaptable and useful for a myriad of spacecraft applications.

Chairman Palazzo. The Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics
will come to order.
Good morning, everyone. Welcome to today's hearing entitled
``A Review of NASA's Exploration Program in Transition: Issues
for Congress and Industry.'' In front of you are packets
containing the written testimony, biographies and truth in
testimony disclosures for today's witness panel. I recognize
myself for five minutes for an opening statement.
I would like to welcome everyone to today's Subcommittee
hearing to review the transition of NASA's exploration programs
as directed in last year's authorization act. We have a
distinguished panel of witnesses who will give us the status of
the capabilities that have been developed by the Constellation
program, as well as the current status of the transition
activities that have taken place over the past year, and the
effect those changes are having on the aerospace workforce and
industrial base.
I am happy that we are joined today by the Chairman of the
Science, Space, and Technology Committee, Chairman Ralph Hall.
I will keep my remarks brief so I can yield my remaining time
to the Chairman for his opening statement.
During the previous three reauthorization cycles, including
last year's bill, Congress has been clear about its desire to
develop a government-owned launch system capable of taking
astronauts to low Earth orbit and beyond. This Administration,
on the other hand, has advocated an approach where NASA would
rely exclusively on commercial companies to provide
transportation to low Earth orbit. And while a government-owned
capability to extend deeper in space is a ``nice-to-have,'' the
Administration seems to reason there is no rush to develop such
a system, arguing that we aren't prepared nor can we afford to
undertake a deep space mission in this decade. I disagree, and
I think the law is clear: Congress expects NASA to develop a
Space Launch System and Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle in time to
serve as a back-up to the commercial companies, who will likely
encounter delays. And just as importantly, by building a
follow-on system now, NASA will provide continuity for the
skilled engineers and technicians who underpin our Nation's
space capabilities. To not engage them would ensure a quick
withering away of the skill base, and it would take years and
billions of dollars to revive that capability. As Mr. Maser
makes clear in his testimony, the Nation's aerospace workforce
and industrial base is a perishable national asset that can
disappear.
Many of my constituents have been working on the
Constellation program at the Stennis Space Center for a number
of years. The J-2X upper stage rocket engine should be
completed in May, and is scheduled for testing at Stennis in
June or July. The J-2X is one of many advanced capabilities
developed over the past few years that could be applied
directly toward a heavy-lift Space Launch System.
In the very tight fiscal environment we are in, NASA must
make maximum use of every hard-won capability at its disposal.
The decisions that NASA has made, and will make over the next
few months, could have a profound effect on the future of the
aerospace workforce and industrial base. These are important
decisions affecting thousands of people and hundreds of
millions of dollars of investment in national capabilities, and
it is vital that NASA proceed with care but not delay.
I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Palazzo follows:]

Prepared Statement of the Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics
Chairman Steven M. Palazzo

Good morning. I'd like to welcome everyone to today's subcommittee
hearing to review the transition of NASA's Exploration programs as
directed in last year's Authorization Act. We have a distinguished
panel of witnesses who will give us the status of the capabilities that
have been developed by the Constellation program, as well as the
current status of the transition activities that have taken place over
the past year, and the effect those changes are having on the aerospace
workforce and industrial base.
I am happy that we are joined today by the Chairman of the Science,
Space, and Technology Committee, Ralph Hall. I will keep my remarks
brief so I can yield my remaining time to Chairman Hall for his opening
statement.
During the previous three reauthorization cycles - including last
year's bill - Congress has been clear about its desire to develop a
government-owned launch system capable of taking astronauts to low
Earth orbit and beyond. This Administration, on the other hand, has
advocated an approach where NASA would rely exclusively on commercial
companies to provide transportation to low Earth orbit. And while a
government-owned capability to extend deeper in space is a `nice-to-
have', the Administration seems to reason there is no rush to develop
such a system, arguing that we aren't prepared - nor can we afford - to
undertake a deep space mission in this decade. I disagree, and I think
the law is clear; Congress expects NASA to develop a Space Launch
System and Multi Purpose Crew Vehicle in time to serve as a back-up to
the commercial companies, who will likely encounter delays. And just as
importantly, by building a follow-on system now, NASA will provide
continuity for the skilled engineers and technicians who underpin our
nation's space capabilities. To not engage them would ensure a quick
withering-away of this skill base, and it would take years, and
billions of dollars to revive that capability. As Mr. Maser makes clear
in his testimony; the nation's aerospace workforce and industrial base
is a Perishable National Asset that can disappear.
Many of my constituents have been working on the Constellation
program at the Stennis Space Center for a number of years. The J-2X
upper stage rocket engine should be completed in May, and is scheduled
for testing at Stennis in June or July. The J-2X is one of many
advanced capabilities developed over the past few years that could be
applied directly toward a heavy-lift Space Launch System. In the very
tight fiscal environment we are in, NASA must make maximum use of every
hard-won capability at its disposal. The decisions that NASA has made,
and will make over the next few months could have profound effects on
the future of the aerospace workforce and industrial base. These are
important decisions affecting thousands of people and hundreds of
millions of dollars of investment in national capabilities, and it is
vital that NASA proceed with care, but not delay. I look forward to the
testimony of our witnesses.
I now yield my time to the Chairman of the Science, Space, and
Technology Committee - Ralph Hall - for his opening statement.

Chairman Palazzo. I now yield my time to the Chairman of
the Science, Space, and Technology Committee, Ralph Hall, for
his opening statement.
Chairman Hall. I thank you, Chairman Palazzo, for holding
this very important and timely hearing, and thanks to our
witnesses for taking the time that they have taken to prepare,
to travel here and to give us their time and to share their
many years of very valuable experience and insight.
I have seen such great Americans, who are friends of mine
and friends of many of us here like General Tom Stafford, Buzz
Aldrin, Neil Armstrong, Gene Cernan and many, many others who
risked their lives, and some give their lives, to explore space
and demonstrate the strength and resolve of our country. They
are real heroes. When they left to go to some of their
destinations, they weren't positive that they were going to
come back. These men and women are really heroes.
Last year, I listened to their very strong testimony and I
agreed with them that the President's plan took us absolutely
in the wrong direction and took our country in the wrong
direction. His decision on human exploration of space as set
out absolutely undermined five years of broad bipartisan and
bicameral support, Republicans and Democrats working together,
and was made without clear direction or analysis. The
President's action has spawned thousands of lost jobs and cast
fear and doubt throughout the industry.
Last year, after careful consideration, and contrary to the
President's objections, thank goodness, Congress laid out its
plan and passed the NASA Authorization Act of 2010. The debate
is over. This Act is the law. NASA has its direction. The
Administration needs to acknowledge this and Act accordingly.
They don't need to be going to Florida nor to Alabama nor to
Texas threatening those people and telling them that they don't
have to comply with acts of Congress. I just think Congress,
both the majority of Democrats and Republicans in the House and
Senate, are committed to ensuring that NASA follows the law. I
expect them to. I think they will. I respect them.
We have heard favorable comments from those same astronauts
who risked it all for our space program. They told us of the
importance of continuing to develop these exploration systems
for ensuring we can get back to the Space Station, and
preparing for missions beyond low Earth orbit.
But as we have seen from the fiscal year 2012 budget
request, the Administration is trying to ignore the thrust of
this Act. We expect NASA to proceed with the uninterrupted
development of the Space Launch System and Multi-Purpose Crew
Vehicle that builds upon and takes maximum advantage of the
significant work and capabilities that already exist. There is
broad agreement on the importance of minimizing disruptions to
an industrial base that is already reeling from the end of the
space shuttle program.
NASA should make the most expeditious choices possible to
minimize the adverse impact on the aerospace workforce and
industrial base. If further bidding is required, and I am not
suggesting that it is, NASA should ensure it has truly
qualified bidders that should be called upon to demonstrate
their financial strength and technical capabilities to give
some assurance that they can follow through and finish what
they begin.
In total, the NASA authorization provides $10.8 billion
over three years to continue the exploration systems work. This
is a significant commitment. NASA must not delay. Lengthy
studies are no longer needed. Lengthy new starts will not be
tolerated. We are well beyond that point. Congress has given
clear direction and we expect NASA to comply.
Before closing, I want to address a short statement to Mr.
Cooke, and be clear this is not directed at you personally.
This Committee did not receive your testimony until a little
after 4 p.m. yesterday. We have had limited time to review your
statements in any detail, which does a serious disservice to
the hearing process. This isn't the first time that NASA's
statements have arrived at the 11th hour. Even in the prior
Congress under Democratic control, NASA's testimony was prone
to be late. So when you return to headquarters, I hope you will
tell your folks there that is unacceptable practice and that we
don't expect it to be continued. I want to work with you, I am
going to work with you. Please let us work with you. I will not
condone this type of bureaucratic behavior, and I don't think
you would be proud of it.
If I have any time left, I yield it back.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hall follows:]

Prepared Statement of Chairman Ralph Hall

Thank you Chairman Palazzo for holding this important, and timely
hearing. And thanks to our witnesses for taking the time to share their
many years of valuable experience and insight.
I have seen such great Americans, who are friends of mine - like
General Tom Stafford, Buzz Aldrin, Neil Armstrong and Gene Cernan -
risk their lives to explore space and demonstrate the strength and
resolve of America. They are real heroes. They didn't know if they
would return.
Last year, I listened to their strong testimony and I agreed with
them that the president's plan took our country in the wrong direction.
His decision on human exploration of space undermined 5 years of broad
bipartisan and bicameral support, and was made without clear direction
or analysis.
The president's action has spawned thousands of lost jobs and cast
fear and doubt throughout the industry. Last year, after careful
consideration, and contrary to the president's objections, Congress
laid out its plan and passed the NASA Authorization Act of 2010.
The debate is over. This Act is the law. NASA has its direction.
The administration needs to acknowledge this, and Act accordingly.
Congress - both the majority of Democrats and Republicans in the
House and Senate - are committed to ensuring that NASA follows the law.
We have heard favorable comments from those same astronauts who
risked it all for our space program. They told us of the importance of
continuing to develop these exploration systems, for ensuring we can
get back to the Space Station, and preparing for missions beyond low
Earth orbit.
But as we have seen from the FY2012 budget request, the
administration is trying to ignore the thrust of this Act. We expect
NASA to proceed with the uninterrupted development of the Space Launch
System (SLS) and Multi Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) that builds upon -
and takes maximum advantage of - the significant work and capabilities
that already exist. There is broad agreement on the importance of
minimizing disruptions to an industrial base that is already reeling
from the end of the space shuttle program.
NASA should make the most expeditious choices possible to minimize
the adverse impact on the aerospace workforce and industrial base. If
further bidding is required - and I'm not suggesting that it is - NASA
should ensure it has truly qualified bidders that should be called upon
to demonstrate their financial strength and technical capabilities to
give some assurance that they can follow-through and finish what they
begin.
In total, the NASA authorization provides $10.8 billion over three
years to continue the exploration systems work. That is a significant
commitment. NASA must not delay. Lengthy studies are no longer needed.
Lengthy new starts will not be tolerated. We are well beyond that
point. Congress has given clear direction and we expect NASA to comply.
Before closing, I want to address a short statement to Mr. Cook,
and be clear this is not directed at you personally. This Committee did
not receive your testimony until a little after 4:00pm yesterday. We
have had very limited time to review your statement in any detail,
which does a serious disservice to the hearing process. This isn't the
first time that NASA's statements have arrived at the 11th hour. Even
in the prior Congress under Democratic control, NASA's testimony was
prone to late arrival. So when you return to headquarters, I need you
to tell your folks that this is an unacceptable practice and that I do
not expect it to be continued. I will not condone this type of
bureaucratic behavior.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Palazzo. Thank you, Chairman Hall.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Costello for an opening
statement.
Mr. Costello. Mr. Chairman, thank you, and Mr. Chairman, I
thank you for calling this hearing today, and let me associate
myself with the remarks made by Chairman Hall, and Mr. Cooke,
as Chairman Hall stated, it is not directed at you. I think we
all realize that you are dealing with OMB but it is
unacceptable and it is a disservice to this Subcommittee and to
the full Committee and to the Members of this Committee, so I
hope you take that back both to your bosses and to the
Administration.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to start off by saying a few
words about Congresswoman Giffords, a true champion of our
Nation's space program. Ms. Giffords worked tirelessly during
the 111th Congress to ensure NASA's human space exploration
program remained the most innovative in the world. I am honored
to serve as the acting Ranking Member today at this
Subcommittee as we continue her work.
Through the 111th and 112th Congresses, this Committee has
held several hearings to discuss the future of NASA's
exploration program as it faced budget challenges and
considered serious changes to its mission. Despite these
ongoing discussions, we still have not received concrete
answers on how NASA plans to transition away from the
Constellation program and achieve the goals outlined by
Congress in the 2010 Authorization Act. It is my hope that we
receive specific information on four key issues here today from
our witnesses.
First, I would like to know the status of the General
Counsel's review of how existing Constellation contracts can be
modified to carry out work on the crew capsule and heavy-lift
launch vehicles as Congress intended in the Authorization Act.
Secondly, NASA has a preliminary baseline approach to
developing a heavy-lift vehicle after completing several
studies to select the most efficient and cost-effective design.
I would like to hear an exact timeline and date for when NASA
will start work on the new vehicle.
Third, during debate on the 2010 NASA Authorization Act,
Congresswoman Giffords expressed serious concerns about NASA's
ability to achieve the stringent exploration goals at the
authorized funding levels. In view of her concerns, I would
like to hear from each one of our witnesses if the heavy-lift
vehicle and the Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle have a real future
at the current funding levels.
Finally, this Committee needs a clear understanding of
NASA's mission for human exploration and the two vehicles it
will develop under the authorization. Without concrete goals
and benchmarks, we have no way of measuring the program's
success.
I hope today's hearing will provide the opportunity for
Members of the Subcommittee to understand how NASA will achieve
the exploration mission and how Congress and the Administration
can work together to reach these goals.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you again for calling the hearing. I
welcome the panel of witnesses and I look forward to hearing
their testimony and specifically addressing the four issues
that I have raised in my opening statement. Thank you, and I
yield back.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Costello follows:]

Submitted Statement of Acting Ranking Member Jerry Costello

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding today's hearing to review the
current status and the future of the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) exploration program.
I would like to start by saying a few words about Congresswoman
Giffords, my good friend and a true champion of our nation's space
program. Ms. Giffords worked tirelessly during the 111th Congress to
ensure NASA's human space exploration program remained the most
innovative in the world. I am honored to serve as Acting Ranking Member
today as this Subcommittee continues her work.
Through the 111th and 112th Congresses, this Committee has held
several hearings to discuss the future of NASA's exploration program as
it faced budget challenges and considered serious changes to its
mission. Despite these ongoing discussions, we still have not received
concrete answers on how NASA plans to transition away from the
Constellation Program and achieve the goals outlined by Congress in the
2010 Authorization Act.
Following your testimony, it is my hope to receive specific
information about four key issues. First, I would like to know the
status of the General Counsel's review of how existing Constellation
contracts can be modified to carry out work on the crew capsule and
heavy lift launch vehicles as Congress intended in the 2010
Authorization Act.
Second, NASA has determined a baseline approach to developing a
heavy-lift vehicle after completing several studies to select the most
efficient and cost-effective design. I would like to hear an exact
timeline and date for when NASA will start work on the new vehicle.
Third, during debate on the 2010 NASA Authorization Act,
Congresswoman Giffords expressed serious concerns about NASA's ability
to achieve the stringent exploration goals at the authorized funding
levels. Ms. Giffords is a champion of the human space exploration and
she recognizes the importance of moving this program forward in a
responsible way. In view of her concerns, I would like to hear from our
witnesses if the heavy-lift vehicle and the multi-purpose crew vehicle
have a real future at the current funding levels.
Finally, this Committee needs a clear understanding of NASA's
mission for human exploration and the two new vehicles it will develop
under the Authorization. Without concrete goals and benchmarks we have
no means of measuring the program's success.
I hope that today's hearing will provide the opportunity for
Members of the Subcommittee to understand how NASA will achieve its
exploration mission and how Congress and the Administration can work
together to reach those goals.
I welcome our panel of witnesses and look forward to their
testimony. I yield back the balance of my time.

Chairman Palazzo. Thank you, Mr. Costello.
If there are Members who wish to submit additional opening
statements, your statements will be added to the record at this
point.
At this time I would like to introduce our witness panel.
Our witnesses today are Mr. Doug Cooke, NASA's Associate
Administrator for the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate.
Mr. Cooke has experience with the space shuttle, Space Station,
and exploration programs during his distinguished 37-year
career at NASA. Dr. Scott Pace is the Director of the Space
Policy Institute at George Washington University and a former
Assistant Director for Space and Aeronautics in the White House
Office of Science and Technology Policy. Mr. Jim Maser will
testify today as the Chairman of the Corporate Membership
Committee of the American Institute of Aeronautics and
Astronautics. Mr. Maser is also the President of Pratt and
Whitney Rocketdyne and is well prepared to give us an industry
perspective on the state of the aerospace industrial base and
the uncertainty surrounding NASA transition plans.
I want to thank all of you for taking the time and effort
to appear before us today. As our witnesses should know, spoken
testimony is limited to five minutes each after which the
Members of the Committee will have five minutes each to ask
questions.
I now recognize as our first witness, Mr. Doug Cooke,
Associate Administrator of the Exploration Systems Mission
Directorate at NASA. Mr. Cooke.

STATEMENT OF DOUGLAS COOKE, ADMINISTRATOR, EXPLORATION SYSTEMS
DIRECTORATE, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION

Mr. Cooke. Chairman Palazzo and Members of the
Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before
you today to talk about the future of human spaceflight and
exploration and in particular to talk about the next generation
of human spaceflight vehicles known as the Space Launch System,
or SLS, and the Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle, or MPCV. Before
beginning, I would like to express my thoughts on a couple of
matters.
Last year, I appeared before this Subcommittee, which was
chaired by Congresswoman Giffords. My wife, Renee, and I met
with her beforehand and I was very impressed with her as a
person and by her strong support for human spaceflight. I would
just like to acknowledge her as a colleague of yours and a
member of the NASA family and extend my very best wishes for
her recovery.
Second, I want to thank all the NASA and industry team who
support exploration programs and activities. They continue to
work tirelessly to further exploration beyond low Earth orbit
even through challenging and uncertain times that we have
experienced. I am constantly in awe of their dedication and
drive. It is very obvious that exploration is a passion for
them and not just a job. I personally owe them my best efforts
to get us on a stable path through the efforts we have
underway, and I think you share that objective. And now onto
the business at hand.
Let me assure you that NASA is aggressively addressing the
specifics required in the NASA Authorization Act of 2010 and to
providing a path forward in the coming months for the SLS and
MPCV in terms of specific designs that are within budget
constraints. We are also compelled to apply the capabilities,
lessons learned and knowledge gained through the Constellation
program to SLS and MPCV efforts.
At the same time, we are committed to continuing with our
successful human research program and to furthering
demonstrations of maturation of capabilities through commercial
cargo as well as new investments in commercial crew
capabilities for low Earth orbit and to support the Space
Station. We will augment the work on SLS and MPCV by initiating
in-house development of concepts and prototypes of advanced
systems and vehicles also needed for exploring the various
destinations. The Space Station will provide an opportunity to
test many of these capabilities as we prepare for the future.
Therefore, our civil servants across the agency should feel
confident there is exciting, meaningful work for them following
retirement of the shuttle and transition from the Constellation
program as we focus on a more capability-driven exploration
architecture.
Moving forward, one thing is very clear. Developing a
heavy-lift capability and a deep-space crew vehicle are the
first, most important steps needed to send crews to multiple
destinations of interest in human exploration. Therefore, the
SLS and MPCV will and must be capable of transporting
astronauts to multiple destinations beyond low Earth orbit.
Destinations could include Lagrange points lunar surface,
visits to near-Earth asteroids and travel to the premier
destinations of Mars and its moons, Phobos and Deimos. All
these places hold incredible information for us with
discoveries that we probably can't even imagine at this point.
In a constrained budget environment, we know how important
it is to search for ways to make our programs and projects more
efficient through our contracting and management approaches,
and we are embracing this challenge. We have stepped up
activities in-house and in collaboration with our current
industry partners to implement cost-saving measures.
After passing of the Authorization Act, NASA immediately
began studying potential SLS and MPCV configurations based on
the requirements of the Act. We have selected a reference
design vehicle for the MPCV and SLS, both of which are
consistent with the Act and are supported with our past study
results.
For MPCV, NASA has chosen the beyond-low Earth orbit
version of the Orion crew vehicle as that design. The Orion
development effort has already benefited from significant
investments and progress to date and the Orion requirements
closely match MPCV requirements as defined in the Authorization
Act.
For the SLS, we have selected an Ares shuttle-derived
vehicle as our reference vehicle design. This system will
provide 130-metric-ton capability described in the
Authorization Act. We would begin with a scaled-back version of
the same components to provide initial capability of 70 to 100
metric tons to achieve the earliest possible deployment that
fits within budget constraints. We have NASA study teams that
are also looking at liquid oxygen/kerosene vehicle, a modular
vehicle approach, and are looking at affordability of these
various design approaches. We have awarded 13 study contracts
to industry to have them help provide their best ideas and
innovative approaches toward a heavy-lift vehicle. In parallel,
we have procurement teams tracing requirements between MPCV and
SLS to the current shuttle and the Constellation designs to
understand how much the new work is within scope of those
contracts.
Although much work remains to be accomplished over the next
months, we are committed to developing programs and places that
are executable both in terms of schedule and cost. We are
continuing to work on Constellation contracts consistent with
directions in law and are prioritizing work that has a high
likelihood of being applicable to SLS and MPCV. We also are in
the process of setting up program offices at three centers, one
at Marshall for SLS, one at JSC for MPCV, and one at KSC for
commercial crew development office.
In conclusion, I believe that throughout history countries
have led an exploration of the uncharted and unknown, and these
countries have been great world leaders of their time. Today
our country through NASA is at the beginning of a new adventure
in space travel, one that presents challenges that are
appropriate for the talents and resources of our Nation, both
now and for generations to come. Our new adventure will build
on sacrifices and achievements of the past and will contribute
to and reinforce our place in world leadership. With your help,
together we can and will create a bold legacy for future
generations.
I thank you for your interest and I welcome your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cooke follows:]

Prepared Statement of Douglas Cooke, Associate Administrator for the
Exploration Systems Mission Directorate

Chairman Palazzo and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the future of NASA's
human spaceflight program, and in particular the progress NASA is
making on developing the next-generation human spaceflight
transportation systems, currently known as the Space Launch System
(SLS) and the Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV), as well as their
associated mission and ground support elements and other programs of
the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate.
With passage of the NASA Authorization Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-267)
on October 11, 2010, NASA has a clear direction for our human
spaceflight programs, and we are aggressively moving forward with our
next-generation human spaceflight system development efforts. NASA
appreciates the significant effort made in advancing this important
bipartisan legislation, and we look forward to working with you to
shape a promising future for our Nation's human spaceflight programs.
The President's FY 2012 budget request continues to focus Agency
efforts on a vigorous path of innovation and technological development
leading to an array of challenging and inspiring missions to
destinations with an incredible potential for discovery, increasing our
knowledge of our solar system, developing technologies to improve life,
expanding our presence in space, increasing space commerce, and
engaging the public. Within the human spaceflight arena, our foremost
priority is our current human spaceflight endeavor and the safety and
viability of our astronauts. The request also maintains a strong
commitment to human spaceflight beyond low Earth orbit (LEO) via a
capability-driven architecture that will focus on increasingly complex
destinations as we develop the technical expertise for those expanding
missions ever-deeper into our solar system. It focuses on utilization
and operation of the International Space Station (ISS), and on
establishing a U.S. commercial crew and cargo capability to reach this
National Laboratory to maintain our national human space flight
capability rather than rely on foreign-bought services. It establishes
critical priorities and invests in the technologies and excellent
science, aeronautics research, and education programs that will help us
win the future. The request supports an aggressive launch rate over the
next two years with about 40 U.S. and international missions to the
ISS, for science, and to support other agencies.
NASA is excited about moving ahead with this work. We are eager to
find ways to leverage investments made in technology and through
progress made by the Constellation Program. My testimony will outline
how NASA is working to build a bridge between the past program and the
future by transitioning previous and ongoing development work, best
practices and lessons learned from the Constellation Program to the SLS
and MPCV programs and by transitioning and leveraging hardware and
technology investments, wherever possible.
While NASA has not yet finalized its development plans for the SLS
and MPCV, NASA is working expeditiously to ensure we have a credible
and integrated plan with which to move forward. We understand and
appreciate the direction provided by the NASA Authorization Act of
2010, and we are honoring those requirements as we implement the Act.
The President's FY 2012 budget request for Exploration, for example,
reflects all of the major elements of the Authorization Act.
In moving forward on the SLS and MPCV, we will ensure that we have
efficient contracting and management approaches so as to ensure
affordability in the near term and over the long run. We will also
build an evolvable and interoperable human spaceflight transportation
system that will serve us for decades to come as we explore multiple
compelling mission destinations. In a constrained budget environment,
we know how important it is to look for ways to make our programs and
projects more efficient, so finding and incorporating these
efficiencies is a primary goal for us. Therefore, NASA has embraced the
challenge to deliver human spaceflight systems for lower cost, and the
opportunity to become more efficient, innovative and agile in our
Programs. For example, we are revising the management of our
requirements, contracts, and projects and incorporating approaches to
ensure affordability in the near term and over the long run. This
includes the use of focused insight/oversight, specifying, where
appropriate, to industry what we need instead of how to build it,
designing for cost-effective operations, increasing the use of common
components and parts, and smartly consolidating infrastructure.
Therefore, my testimony today will address progress made to date on the
SLS and MPCV programs, as well as outlining the work ahead of us in
order to ensure that we develop systems that reflect the NASA
Authorization Act of 2010 using an affordable, sustainable and
realistic approach.
But before I explore those topics, I would like to personally
recognize the thousands of NASA civil servants and industry team
members who have worked selflessly for countless hours, often under
difficult circumstances and in a turbulent environment, to make the
Exploration programs and projects productive and successful. I am
constantly in awe of their dedication and agility in making progress
through changing circumstances. I am personally indebted to them. Over
37 years at NASA, I have served through many transitions in human
spaceflight programs, so I speak from personal experience when I say
that change is never easy, especially for those who have devoted much
of their professional and personal time and energy to programs they
love. Today, the NASA Exploration team has much to be proud of . and
much to look forward to.
Our civil servants across the Agency should feel confident that
there is exciting and meaningful work for them to do following the
retirement of the Shuttle and the transition from Constellation, and
the shift from assembly of the ISS toward ISS operations. Turning our
focus toward a more capability-driven exploration architecture will
offer far-ranging opportunities for our creative and skilled civil
servant workforce across the Agency. There will be opportunities for
them to apply their cross-cutting talents to new challenges such as
developing and demonstrating prototypes for human capabilities needed
for beyond-LEO exploration. Here are just a few examples of enabling
capabilities that must be developed before we can send crews beyond LEO
- work that will be managed by our new Advanced Exploration Systems
(AES) Program:

Developing a ground-based test bed for demonstrating
life support systems needed to enable long-duration crewed
missions based on lessons learned from operation of the life
support systems currently in use on the ISS;

Developing and testing components for an advanced
spacesuit to improve the ability of astronauts to assemble and
service in-space systems, and to explore the surfaces of the
Moon, Mars and asteroids;

Developing design concepts for future space
exploration vehicles and deep-space habitats; and

Conducting ISS and ground-based analog testing to
validate operational concepts for long-duration missions.

We have already employed this teaming approach quite successfully,
as exemplified by the NASA in-house efforts with Robonaut2 (R2), which
was delivered to the ISS on the last Space Shuttle flight. This robot
was developed in partnership by a joint NASA-General Motors team.
Another example is the Lunar Electric Rover, which is a pressurized
surface rover to provide astronaut mobility for exploring a planetary
body in a shirtsleeve (or non spacesuit) environment. The prototype,
developed at low-cost, has already been demonstrated and matured
through field testing at sites on Earth that resemble the lunar
terrain, for example. The rover, along with some of NASA's astronauts,
also participated in President Obama's Inaugural Parade. In sum, both
of these examples highlight the substantial benefit we will continue
harnessing from our highly creative, competent and mission-focused
workforces across the Agency and at all Centers.
It is clear that NASA has a bright future. The future will bring
new destinations to explore, and a new generation of future astronauts,
scientists and engineers to inspire. Clearly, there is much work ahead
of us, but I am confident that NASA's incredible and talented employees
working with our industry and international partners will continue to
do whatever it takes to make sure that the United States remains the
world's leader in human spaceflight. After all, they do not know how to
commit to less.

The SLS and MPCV: Moving Forward

On January 10, 2011, NASA provided to Congress an interim report on
our SLS and MPCV efforts, with a commitment to provide more extensive
details in the FY 2012 President's budget request and in a follow-on
report to Congress in the spring/summer timeframe of 2011. We recognize
that Congress wanted more information than we were able to provide in
the interim report. The report was due to Congress 90 days after the
NASA Authorization Act of 2010 was signed into law, thereby formally
authorizing NASA to move out on the SLS and MPCV programs. After
passage of the Authorization Act, NASA immediately began studying
potential SLS and MPCV configurations based on the requirements of the
Act and began analyzing current Constellation contracts and their
flexibility. However, the final FY2011 appropriation remains unknown,
and the evaluation process entailed a longer timeframe to come to a
comprehensive design and acquisition approach for these large and
complex projects. Therefore, in an effort to be as responsive to
Congress as possible, NASA developed an interim report which noted the
progress we had made at that time, with a commitment to provide a
follow-on report with more extensive details later this year.
Much work remains to be accomplished over the next few months such
as in-depth planning to synchronize the schedules and budgets for SLS,
MPCV and Ground Operations efforts such that their developments are
coordinated in order for each to deliver its capability in a planned
timeframe. Since an integrated schedule for the SLS and MPCV vehicles
is an essential product of our planning efforts, NASA required
additional time to gain reliable information from on-going system trade
studies, obtain a better understanding of budget requirements and
constraints, and develop acquisition strategies that can put
development on an affordable and sustainable path. Therefore, by
summer, NASA expects to have completed several key analytical steps -
information that will be contained in our follow-on report to Congress:

The basic framework for a capability driven
architecture and concept of operations that provides the
strategic context for exploration of multiple destinations, a
plan that applies the principles of affordability,
sustainability, commonality, and interoperability, and a
framework for expanded partnerships with the international,
interagency, industry, and academic communities;

Analysis of the current Ares and Shuttle contracts
for their applicability to the future development program;

Analysis of the cost and benefits of the Reference
Vehicle Designs for the SLS and MPCV and alternate vehicle
designs; and

Analysis of potential initial acquisition approaches
(in the case when contract changes or new procurements are
indicated, NASA will follow applicable procurement regulations,
including the March 4, 2009, Presidential Memorandum on
Government Contracting).
As required by law, NASA's SLS and MPCV vehicles will be capable of
providing crew and cargo transportation to the ISS as backup to our
current international partners and future commercial crew
transportation providers. However, the primary goal of SLS and MPCV
development is exploration beyond LEO. As such, the SLS and MPCV will
be capable of transporting astronauts to multiple destinations beyond
LEO. Destinations could include cis-lunar space, such as Lagrange
points between the Earth and the Moon, the lunar surface, visits to
near-Earth asteroids, and eventually to Mars and its moons. All of
these places hold incredible information for us - information that we
probably don't even know exists at this point. Compelling missions such
as satellite servicing, new discoveries and exploration advancement are
all enabled by this approach. This journey begins with the SLS and MPCV
as the first important core elements of the broader exploration
evolutionary approach for accomplishing this broad spectrum of
missions.
Consistent with direction in the NASA Authorization Act of 2010,
the Agency has selected a Reference Vehicle Design for both the SLS and
MPCV, giving us a baseline from which to start developing schedule,
budget and requirements, as well as acquisition plans. Recently, NASA
formally authorized the MPCV program office to stand up at Johnson
Space Center (JSC) in Texas, and the SLS program office to be
established at Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) in Alabama. As such,
these teams will be charged with putting more detail on those designs
so as to be able to help us answer the hard questions that will
undoubtedly occur before we finalize our selections. In that spirit, we
are continuing to look at alternative designs to challenge and/or
validate those concepts so as to ensure our final vehicle choices will
be the best value for the taxpayer in terms of cost, schedule and
capability.
The Authorization Act specified that the initial vehicle
performance would range from 70 to 100 metric ton \1\ (mT) to LEO,
evolvable to 130 mT and that it use, to the extent practicable,
existing contracts, investments, workforce, industrial base, and
capabilities from the Space Shuttle and Orion and Ares I projects.
Therefore, for the SLS, NASA has chosen a Reference Vehicle Design that
is derived from Ares and Space Shuttle hardware. The current concept
vehicles would utilize a liquid oxygen/liquid hydrogen core with five
RS-25 Space Shuttle Main Engine-derived engines, five-segment solid
rocket boosters, and a J-2X-based Upper Stage for the SLS as the 130 mT
version of the heavy-lift vehicle - evolvable from the 70 to 100 mT
version. This reference design would allow for use of existing Shuttle
and Ares hardware assets in the near term, with the opportunity for
upgrades and/or competition downstream for eventual upgrades in designs
needed for affordable production.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The Authorization Act specified vehicle performance in terms of
``tons'' but NASA develops capability in terms of ``metric tons.''
Therefore, lift capability references in this testimony refer to metric
tons.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For the MPCV, NASA has chosen the beyond-LEO version of the Orion
Crew Exploration Vehicle design as the Reference Vehicle Design. The
Orion development effort has already benefited from significant
investments and progress to date, and the Orion requirements closely
match MPCV requirements as defined in the Authorization Act, which
include utilizing the MPCV as the primary crew transportation vehicle
for beyond-LEO exploration, as well as being capable to serve as backup
for ISS crew and cargo transportation.
NASA will evaluate the Reference Vehicle Designs and other
alternatives this spring through in-house analyses and maturation of
concepts and will incorporate results of industry studies that the
Agency solicited earlier this fiscal year. In particular, one of the
greatest challenges for NASA will be to reduce the development and
operating costs (both fixed and recurring) for human spaceflight
missions to sustain a long-term U.S. human spaceflight program. We must
plan and implement an exploration enterprise with costs that are
credible and affordable for the long term under constrained budget
environments. As such, our development efforts also will be dependent
on a realistic budget profile and sufficiently stable funding over the
long term, coupled with a successful effort on the part of NASA and our
eventual industry team to reduce costs and to establish stable,
tightly-managed requirements.
NASA is exploring ways to transition the design and development
efforts of the Constellation Program so that NASA will be able to
capitalize on current investments and workforce, as appropriate. In the
meantime, as will be outlined later in this testimony, NASA is taking
steps to concentrate current spending on those aspects of the
Constellation Program that will have the greatest applicability to the
new SLS and MPCV programs.
Currently, NASA has procurement teams who are mapping SLS and MPCV
requirements (those outlined in the NASA Authorization Act of 2010 and
those we are currently developing) against the Ares and Orion contracts
(and other Agency contracts) to determine if the new requirements fit
the scope of the existing contracts. For the SLS, we are reviewing each
element of Ares (First Stage, Upper Stage, Upper Stage J-2X engine and
avionics) to determine whether the new SLS requirements are within
scope of the current contract. For the MPCV, our review of the Orion
contract indicates that the MPCV is within scope of the Orion contract.
The final acquisition plans for both vehicles are expected in the
late Spring/Summer timeframe. The development of the SLS and MPCV and
supporting capabilities must be planned by developing an integrated
budget and schedule to understand how these programs collectively fit
within budget profiles and to determine when preliminary flight dates
are possible. In this timeframe, costs and schedule will be
preliminary, based on pre-formulation information for these new
programs.
NASA recognizes it has a responsibility to be clear with the
Congress and the American taxpayers about our true estimated costs and
schedules for developing the SLS and MPCV. NASA is committed to keep
Congress informed about our planning efforts. To this end, NASA will
acquire independent (outside of the Agency) cost and schedule
assessments for SLS and MPCV design options as part of its decision
process this spring or summer. Furthermore, NASA will make these
assessments public.
Additionally, NASA is currently developing a list of major
development and testing milestones planned for Exploration Systems over
the next several years. However, it is important to note that these
plans are contingent on many factors, including available funding;
decisions about what work from Constellation will transfer to the SLS
and MPCV programs and their associated supporting elements. It is also
contingent on NASA's upcoming decisions regarding SLS and MPCV final
designs and associated requirements and acquisition needs.

The SLS: Where We Are Today

The NASA Authorization Act of 2010 directs NASA to develop an SLS
that is capable of accessing cis-lunar space and the regions of space
beyond LEO. The Act also states that the SLS must be capable of lifting
the MPCV, and that the SLS must be able to initially lift 70-100 mT to
LEO, while ultimately being evolvable to 130 mT or more. For the
initial capability, the Authorization Act set a goal of achieving
operational capability for the core elements no later than 2016.
NASA's SLS development effort is focusing initially on the 70 to
100 mT lift capability, so as to get as close to 2016 as possible in
terms of initial operational readiness. We also are seeking ways to
capitalize on synergies between the lower-range and upper-range lift
capabilities, thereby allowing us to develop some of the upper-range
capabilities at the same time as we are focusing on the 70 to 100 mT
capability. Doing so is actually a fairly natural, evolvable
progression in terms of developing these capabilities. However, before
making any final decisions, we must first understand how our approaches
to heavy-lift will fit within the budget profile, how they will fit
into a future exploration architecture and how they might benefit other
agencies to maximize the investment for the taxpayer. Knowing the
amount appropriated for SLS and MPCV development efforts in FY 2011 and
gaining increased clarity regarding future budget profiles will be an
important factor in helping NASA to finalize plans for the SLS and the
MPCV.
Recently, NASA concluded the first iteration of a Requirements
Analysis Cycle (RAC), which was established to complete a preliminary
analysis of high-level system requirements, to include initial
development planning, design concept maturation, and preliminary
programmatic requirements. By using techniques such as design-to-cost,
the teams considered a balanced set of trades between capabilities and
the price tag to implement them. The RAC teams also brought in ground
processing and launch expertise from KSC so that the long term
operational expenses of various designs could be assessed. The results
will be informed by NASA analysis of the direction in the Authorization
Act, SLS safety and performance, existing national capabilities and
stakeholder priorities for SLS.
The RAC team is now preparing to brief its findings to NASA
Administrator Bolden, and they will also be preparing to incorporate
the findings of several independent, industry-led trade studies into
their analysis. Thirteen of these six-month studies were initiated in
November 2010 in order to provide a ``fresh look'' at innovative launch
vehicle concepts, propulsion technologies, processes and affordability
initiatives that can be infused into the development of the new human
exploration missions - information that will be used to help inform the
overall selection and development of the final SLS vehicle detailed
design.
One of NASA's goals is for the RAC teams and the study contracts
teams to develop ideas to come as close to the goal identified in the
Authorization Act as possible, given budget realities and the need for
the program to be affordable over the long-term. Our commitment will be
to determine a flight date that has a reasonable probability of being
achieved. Additionally, NASA believes that, all else being equal,
utilizing heritage systems will help expedite the development process
and flight dates, even though launch vehicle integration challenges
will still exist as a schedule threat. On the other hand, starting with
a clean sheet may provide a lower lifecycle cost. This is the subject
of the current studies.
NASA is still in the process of developing the full acquisition
strategy for the SLS. Given that the current Reference Vehicle Design
utilizes heritage systems from Shuttle and Ares, NASA is evaluating
existing Ares and Shuttle contracts -- and potential money saving
improvements and modifications to them -- to determine whether those
contracts could be used for development work on the SLS and whether
doing so would be the most affordable and efficient option for
developing the SLS. In the meantime, in order to maintain existing
capabilities during this planning effort, NASA continues work on the
elements of the Ares I Project that are most likely to feed forward
into the SLS, as detailed later in this testimony.
Additionally, the SLS Program will continue to examine ways to
increase efficiency and agility so as to be able to deliver an
affordable and achievable heavy-lift system as soon as possible.
Examples being considered in formulating SLS plans:

Consolidating infrastructure smartly;

Using common parts and common designs across the
Government, so as to encourage bulk buys of heavy-lift
vehicles;

Ensuring requirements are appropriately specific and
also that requirements applied to NASA crew launch vehicles are
similar to those provided to our eventual commercial crew
partners, thereby ensuring that NASA vehicles are not required
to meet more substantial requirements than commercial crew
vehicles and vice versa; and

Conducting insight/oversight activities of our
contract partners in a smarter way, thereby using our resources
more appropriately to focus on the high-risk items, rather than
watching over someone's shoulder, per say, on more mundane
tasks.
NASA continues to review affordability initiatives proposed by our
current industry partners, and where possible, we will incorporate
those potential savings into SLS development processes.

The MPCV: Where We Are Today

The NASA Authorization Act of 2010 directs NASA to develop an MPCV
that continues the advanced development of the human safety features,
designs, and systems in the Orion Project. As such, the MPCV must be
evolvable and capable of serving as the primary crew vehicle for beyond
LEO exploration, and at the same time, it must be capable of providing
an alternative means of crew and cargo transportation to the ISS as a
backup to commercial crew or partner-supplied vehicles. The Act sets a
full operational capability goal of 2016.
NASA's assessments show applicability of the Orion spacecraft
design to the MPCV requirements specified in the NASA Authorization Act
of 2010, which given the Authorization Act requirements, is why the
Orion beyond-LEO version (known internally as ``block 2'') has been
selected as the MPCV Reference Vehicle Design. For example, the MPCV
must include basic capabilities and specifications for nominal,
contingency and abort scenarios - all of which are traceable to MPCV
requirements in the Authorization Act. In addition, the MPCV must also
be capable of launching up to four crew members and carrying them to
beyond-LEO destinations. It will have the capacity for over 21 days of
active mission duration, and it will be capable of beyond-LEO re-entry
velocities and return crews safely to a water landing off of the
California coast. The Orion vehicle meets these requirements.
The MPCV design will be optimized for beyond-LEO exploration, and
while contingency utilization for the ISS is a possibility, doing so
would represent a highly inefficient vehicle usage. Additionally, the
MPCV will be designed so that its capabilities are evolvable for other
mission-specific design variations so as to enable supporting a variety
of missions as described in the Authorization Act such as performing
EVA, rendezvous and docking, and operating in conjunction with payloads
delivered by the SLS or other vehicles in preparation for missions
beyond LEO. This approach is critical to enable the commonality across
the planned systems necessary to improve overall affordability.
NASA has evaluated the degree to which the existing Orion Project,
including designs, facilities, infrastructure, organization, contract,
and processes could be transitioned and continued under the MPCV
Program. While the current designs have been shown to be a good match
with the requirements specified in the NASA Authorization Act of 2010,
affordability and sustainability are being re-examined and validated.
Preliminary assessments indicate that environments and conditions
driven by the Ares I vehicle, which drove the current Orion designs,
tend to be more demanding than design-driving parameters of the SLS and
therefore these new parameters will most likely not result in changes
to Orion. This will, of course, be studied, verified, and tested as the
designs for SLS mature. But at this point, NASA is confident that the
robust design of the current Orion is such that integration with the
SLS will not be a significant challenge. Such factors will have to be
taken into consideration as the final SLS design matures. It is
important to emphasize that no final decision has been made yet with
regard to the current Orion contract.
NASA will endeavor to achieve the earliest possible operational
readiness date for the MPCV within the available budget and in a way
that leads to affordable operations over the long term. NASA will also
strive to ensure that the MPCV design and schedule fits into a
sustainable future exploration architecture Final decisions will be
informed based upon technical analysis, as well as the combined SLS and
MPCV cost and schedule phasing and use of infrastructure and facilities
and will be formalized through NASA's required processes in the coming
months. Knowing the amount appropriated for SLS and MPCV development
efforts in FY 2011 and gaining increased clarity regarding future
budget profiles will be an important factor in helping NASA to finalize
plans for the SLS and the MPCV.
Once the final plan has been decided, NASA personnel will
transition from the Orion Project to the MPCV Program, while also
continuing to refine the requirements for the MPCV system. Orion will
also transition affordability initiatives that are already underway to
include streamlined government insight on high risk areas instead of
day-to-day oversight, phased development, re-use of test facilities,
and new opportunities for partnerships. Available funding will drive
work that can be accomplished in terms of technical content and
schedule milestones. Planned FY 2011 work is focused on continuing the
design of core vehicle systems and performing planned testing of the
Ground Test Article (GTA), which are tasks applicable to the MPCV
Reference Vehicle Design. The GTA recently completed primary
fabrication at the Michoud Assembly Facility in Louisiana, and is
undergoing outfitting and assembly in Colorado. Environmental testing,
such as vibration and acoustic testing, is planned to begin in the
summer, with drop testing at a new water basin facility at Langley
Research Center (LaRC) in Virginia to follow.
An MPCV program schedule, which will be integrated with the SLS's
program schedule that will include all major milestones from inception
to achieving operational capability, will be developed in coming months
and will be provided in the updated report to Congress.
Additionally, the MPCV Program will continue to examine ways to
increase efficiency and agility so as to be able to deliver an
affordable and achievable crew vehicle as soon as possible. Given that
MPCV work is building upon the work performed as part of the Orion
Project, numerous innovative affordability initiatives are already
underway, including:

Streamlining government oversight and insight
activities to ensure we are focusing on the key-risk items;

Implementing an incremental approach to building
vehicle capabilities; and

Planning a more innovative and cost-effective vehicle
qualification plan, utilizing distributed test labs, for
example.
In addition, in partnership with Orion's current contract and its
subcontractors, NASA is also exploring other affordability measures
including consolidating facilities and re-using test assets.

The Constellation Program and its Relevance to SLS and MPCV

NASA greatly values the contributions and efforts of the
Constellation Program team. The Program had many challenges to overcome
despite the hard work of the many talented people in the Program. There
is much to build upon as we transition from the Constellation Program
to the MPCV and SLS Programs.
The current implementation of the Constellation Program was
initiated in 2005 with an assumption of increased funding to NASA and
an aggressive development approach that would have the goal for Initial
Operational Capability \2\ (IOC) as early as 2012 to minimize the gap
between the Shuttle and the Constellation elements. Fiscal realities --
both internal and external to NASA -- contractual realities and
technical maturation and difficulties made this internal goal
unrealistic. This resulted in a stretch out of the Program in 2008,
leading to a 2015 IOC with an attendant increase in cost. (See
attachment 1 and 2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ IOC is defined as the first crewed flight of Orion to the ISS,
enabling fight test astronauts to fly the Orion on its maiden voyage.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
After an extensive review in 2009, the independent U.S. Human
Spaceflight Plans Committee, also known as the Augustine Committee,
concluded that the U.S. human spaceflight program in place at that time
appeared to be on an unsustainable trajectory, and that it was pursuing
goals that did not match allocated resources. One key element of this
analysis was a conclusion that there were insufficient funds (based
upon the budgetary resources likely to be provided for NASA's human
spaceflight activities) to support both the Constellation Program and
the likely extension of the ISS beyond 2016 in a suitable manner.
Therefore, based in part on the Augustine Committee's report, the
President's FY 2011 budget request proposed cancellation of the Program
and instead proposed a budget that focused on developing new
technologies needed for the long term and fundamental investments to
prepare for Exploration in the future.
Throughout 2010, NASA continued work on various Constellations
systems as Congress reviewed the President's FY2011 budget request.
This work was conducted consistent with relevant appropriations law and
was aimed at optimizing those projects considered most applicable to
NASA's future activities. Following the passage of the 2010 NASA
Authorization Act, NASA was in a position to further tailor its effort
on Constellation systems consistent with the direction in the Act.
As of February 2011, NASA had spent $12.7 billion on the
Constellation Program, which includes money spent on labor,
infrastructure, acquisition, and testing of hardware elements and
software systems etc. While some may consider Constellation's
investment to date to be wasted and sunk costs, much of what
Constellation has accomplished is indeed transferable to the SLS and
MPCV programs, not just in terms of hardware, validated requirements
and infrastructure elements, but also in terms of less tangible items
such as knowledge and experience gained by our team with the
Constellation Systems being developed. Therefore, as we work to close
out the Constellation Program, we are also taking care to capture and
build upon Program accomplishments (see attachment 3), especially those
technologies that have a high likelihood of feeding forward into the
SLS and MPCV programs.
From the beginning, the Constellation Program used electronic
records and a centralized database to capture and manage all data,
risks and knowledge learned, including information from test flights,
hardware and software tests and programmatic reviews. Therefore, there
is a wealth of information that the Program will be able to pass on to
future human spaceflight developers, including those at NASA and those
in the U.S. aerospace industry, when allowable by law. Since completing
the technical portion of the Program-level Preliminary Design Review
(PDR) \3\ in March 2010 \4\ and after previously having completed the
Project-level PDRs for Ares and Orion in 2008 and 2009 respectively,
the Program has been working to finalize its technical library, thus
ensuring that historical data from Constellation work is documented,
preserved and made accessible to future human spaceflight designers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ PDR is a crucial milestone during a program's or project's
development cycle in t hat it is the first major review of the detailed
design and is normally held prior to the preparation of formal design
drawings. During PDR, the program verifies that the preliminary design
meets all requirements within acceptable risk limits and within the
cost and schedule constraints. The completion of the PDR and the
closure of any actions generated by the review become the basis for the
start of the detailed drafting and design effort and the purchase of
parts, materials, and equipment needed.
\4\ The Constellation Program did not complete the cost portion of
its Systems-level PDR, NASA never established a formal baseline cost
for each Constellation Project and the Program as a whole
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Constellation Program also can be credited with helping to
reinvigorate NASA's technical base. Following the development of the
Shuttle, NASA's human spaceflight community focused on operations
rather than development in that we were no longer a robust
developmental Agency in terms of developing crew-launch systems, but
rather an operationally-focused human spaceflight Agency. As such, the
Constellation Program enabled us to re-learn how to build a crew launch
system, beginning from the earliest stages of viewgraphs and trade
space and advancing through multiple key project review checkpoints and
ultimately to the point where NASA, along with its industry partners,
had built hardware and integrated systems that were used on two major
test flights, the Ares I-X flight and the Pad Abort 1 (PA-1) flight for
the Orion Launch Abort System (LAS) -- both of which resulted in
substantial data that will be of great use to the MPCV and the SLS
programs.
Additionally, the Constellation Program allowed us to incorporate
new technologies and testing methods that will certainly become the
norm as we move forward with SLS and MPCV. Historically speaking,
during the Apollo era, NASA had comparatively little experience with
in-flight aborts and limited computational capability. Today, however,
flight tests are being combined with advanced simulation tools and
advanced computers, thereby allowing NASA to conduct a more thorough
analysis of hardware and software elements and operating processes. The
Orion integrated abort system's effectiveness can now be calculated
using computer models of the blast environment by employing more
realistic, physics-based, simulations of abort conditions with
remarkable speed and accuracy, given NASA's evolved engineering
expertise and the computation power of modern computers. In comparison,
during the Apollo era, abort effectiveness was estimated by comparison
to escapes from high-performance military aircraft combined with the
results of a few escape system tests.
In fact, our computer modeling scenarios are so accurate, that we
had been able to forgo more expensive ground tests in some cases, and
we expect to see this trend continue with the SLS and MPCV programs,
whenever possible without sacrificing safety. For example, designing
the Ares I allowed NASA to make an important technology leap in the
design process. By transitioning from a 2-D, paper-based vehicle design
and verification process to a 3-D model-based design environment, NASA
was able to gain valuable experience with state-of-the-art design
system that can reduce costs while also increasing system reliability -
benefits that will feed forward into the SLS.

Other examples of work / accomplishments that will feed forward
include:

On May 6th 2010, Orion conducted the PA-1 flight test
at White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico. This test flight
demonstrated a development version of the Orion LAS by
simulating an abort during an emergency occurring before the
launch vehicle has left the pad. The test demonstrated all
three of the LAS' solid rocket motors (Abort Motor, Attitude
Control Motor, and Jettison Motor) working in conjunction. It
also demonstrated an early version of the parachute and forward
bay cover deployment design. Data gathered from PA-1 proved the
overall design concept and LAS architecture are feasible, and
the data gathered will also improve computer design and
analysis models and tools and reduce risks and uncertainty in
the MPCV's production design - or that of commercial crew
partners, should they choose to use this technology.

The Orion GTA: NASA validated advanced-production
processes, equipment and tools such as friction-stir welding)
to manufacture this structural and thermal prototype of the
Orion crew module. The GTA is now in final assembly at the
Lockheed Martin facility in Denver, and will undergo a series
of ground-based environmental tests to validate the Orion
design and computer models. It will undergo structural load
testing later this spring; vibration and acoustic testing
during the summer; and drop testing at LaRC this fall. Given
that the MPCV will be based on the Orion crew module, data
collected from testing the GTA will be incorporated into MPCV
development efforts so as to result in a safe, reliable and
affordable human-rated crew capsule.

On Oct 28, 2009, NASA successfully completed the Ares
I-X test flight at KSC. Data from more than 700 on-board
sensors showed that the vehicle was effectively controlled and
stable in flight and that the vehicle had met all of its test
objectives. Moving forward, this test flight is important in
that it validated the accuracy of NASA's design tools, models
and processes for inline crew launch vehicle configurations,
allowing significant economies in integration and testing to be
assumed for SLS development. For example, the test flight
provided tremendous insight into the aerodynamic, acoustic,
structural, vibration, and thermal forces that Ares I or other
inline launch vehicles would be expected to experience. In
particular, aero-acoustic forces were measured at key locations
along the stack, which has highlighted differences between the
predicted loads and the actual loads for the Ares I. Therefore,
the adjustments to computer models made possible by this Ares
I-X data may significantly reduce uncertainty and risk in
future launch vehicle designs.

In 2009 and 2010, two successful ground tests of the
Ares I First Stage were conducted. In each test, a five-segment
solid rocket motor was tested at a contractor facility in Utah,
thereby demonstrating two temperature cases (normal and cold)
for motor operation. During the full-duration ground test, also
called a ``cold motor'' test, the motor's overall temperature
was lowered to validate the motor's performance in cold weather
and data was gathered to evaluate thrust, roll control,
acoustics, motor vibrations, nozzle modifications and
insulation upgrades. These tests validated performance of
advanced designs and materials in upgrading solid rocket motor
technology and eliminating obsolescence. Beyond validating the
basic performance characteristics of the engine, the test
resulted in enhanced modeling and a better understanding of key
attributes that have historically been very difficult to
predict analytically such as erosive burning, thrust
oscillations and thrust tail off. As such, data from this test
will help advance the safety, technology and knowledge of solid
rocket motors in general - work that will likely be applicable
to the SLS or other human spaceflight systems.

It is also important to note that there are Constellation
technologies that are transferable to the U.S. aerospace industry. For
example, one of our commercial cargo partners, Space Exploration
Technologies (SpaceX), has already incorporated the Orion's Thermal
Protection System and its parachute development technologies into the
company's Dragon capsule, which was successfully launched last year.
Going forward, SLS and MPCV will continue to focus on a risk-
informed design approach, as Constellation has done, thus helping the
Agency achieve its goal of increasing astronaut safety on the next-
generation human spaceflight system, relative to Shuttle missions. As
such, NASA will continue to design systems with an overriding priority
given to crew safety at every stage of the design and operational
process. In doing so, we will design systems to be as inherently safe
as we can make them; we will eliminate known risks and hazards; and
then we will add backup such as an abort system to mitigate residual
risks. In addition to leveraging heritage systems, when feasible, NASA
will continue to utilize improved computer modeling to help identify,
reduce and eliminate or mitigate hazards and risk. Additionally, we
will continue to tightly interweave design and safety team members into
the decision-making process, thereby allowing them to work with design
engineers to provide expertise and feedback via various assessments and
analysis techniques from the very beginning of the design process. At
the same time, a prudent risk system will result in better cost/benefit
assessments to improve overall affordability without sacrificing
safety. Finally, NASA will continue to utilize its active risk-
management process to identify technical challenges early in the
process and aggressively work solutions.
Consistent with the provisions of the FY 2010 Consolidated
Appropriations Act (P.L, 111-117), NASA is continuing to implement the
Constellation Program and associated projects while we also work on the
SLS and MPCV programs in parallel. Therefore, we have not terminated
any Constellation contracts. However, NASA does have the legal
flexibility to prioritize Constellation funding, and as such, we have
deliberately prioritized Constellation funds to maximize their use in
support of transition to SLS and MPCV in the NASA Authorization Act,
thus maximizing the effective use of taxpayer dollars. For example:

Ares has worked closely with SLS planning team to
focus our development efforts on technologies and processes
that could be utilized in the eventual SLS configuration. This
includes vehicle avionics, J-2X Engine testing, First Stage
Engine testing (Development Motor-3), and installation of Upper
Stage tooling applicable to large diameter tanks. At the same
time, we deferred activities that were highly vehicle
configuration dependent including a ground vibration test
article and design of Upper Stage component hardware such as
the reaction control system.

Orion has focused our development efforts on crew
safety, targeting an orbital test flight mid-decade to validate
10 of the top 13 analyzed crew safety risks in the real flight
environment -- risks primarily in the regimes of entry,
descent, and landing. At the same time, we deferred efforts in
areas posing relatively small risk to crew safety such as life
support, communications, crew support systems and the LAS. NASA
has deferred further work on the LAS for the near-term since it
is ahead of other Orion systems in its design and testing.

EVA has coordinated with Orion to focus our
development efforts on suit architecture trades in light of the
new beyond-LEO mission timetable, and including modified
Advanced Crew Escape System (Shuttle launch and entry suit) in
launch and entry suit trade study. At the same time, we have
deferred efforts on beyond-LEO suit design and commonality with
the launch and entry suit.

Ground Operations has coordinated with the SLS team
and focused our Ground Operations work on items that would
mostly likely be needed by heavy-lift launches - works such as
launch pad construction, launch control center construction and
crawler overhauls (the crawler is the vehicle that transports a
launch vehicle stack from an integration building to the launch
site.) At the same time, we deferred Vehicle Assembly Building
modifications at KSC until we know the dimensions of our new
heavy-lift vehicle.

Mission Operations has coordinated with Orion to
focus our efforts on activities required for general human
spaceflight mission support, with efforts concentrated on
Mission Control Center and Training Systems. At the same time,
we have deferred efforts on highly configuration dependent
activities such as a high-fidelity Orion mockup or docking
adapter trainer.

It is important to note that even though NASA currently has the
legal flexibility to prioritize funding, NASA would prefer for Congress
to remove the funding restrictions imposed by the FY 2010
appropriation. Doing so would allow the Agency to terminate unnecessary
Constellation work that is not required for the new SLS and MPCV. As
such, NASA agrees with the NASA Inspector General, who in a Feb. 2,
2011 report to Congress, stated: ``. as NASA moves closer to making
final decisions regarding how best to move forward in designing and
building the next generation space system, it will become increasingly
more difficult for the Agency to continue to juggle the inconsistent
mandates of the Authorization Act and the appropriations legislation so
as to avoid wasting taxpayer funds.'' Therefore, it is important to be
able to move out with new programs in pace and the flexibility to plan
and fund work in the most effective way.

The Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) Projects

Both of NASA's funded COTS partners -- SpaceX and Orbital Sciences
Corporation -- continue to make progress in developing their cargo
transportation systems, based in part on NASA's financial and technical
assistance. NASA sees no reason to doubt either company's ability to
achieve its desired objectives - that of demonstrating commercial cargo
delivery to and from LEO. While each has experienced milestone delays,
this is not unexpected, since both partners have aggressive, success-
oriented schedules, and are facing challenges typical of a space flight
development program. (See attachment 4.) These delays have not required
any additional NASA funding of specific milestones, since the partners
are paid only fixed amounts for achieving milestones. Additional
development costs have been borne by the companies and/or other
investors. NASA has added augmentation funding of $300M for additional
milestones for additional risk reduction such as additional testing, as
authorized by the NASA Authorization Act of 2010.
To date, NASA has invested $529 million in the COTS effort, which
includes funding invested toward the two current funded partners, as
well as funding that was invested toward another partner that was
terminated for failure to perform in 2007. By the conclusion of the
COTS effort, NASA anticipates it will have invested $800 million in the
COTS program, which does not include reimbursable work NASA has
performed and infrastructure support that NASA has provided to the COTS
partners. The $800 million includes the original $500 million
authorized for COTS milestone payments in the NASA Authorization Act of
2005, as well as $300 million in augmented milestone payments
authorized by the NASA Authorization Act of 2010 to help accelerate
technical development, conduct flight tests and develop ground
infrastructure.
In total, NASA anticipates providing SpaceX and Orbital $128M each
in augmented funding via modifications to their respective funded COTS
Space Act Agreements (SAAs) and via the Commercial Resupply Services
contract during FY 2011. To date, NASA has executed two SAA amendments
(known as Quarter 1 and Quarter 2 augmentations) for each company with
respect to the augmentation milestones authorized by the NASA
Authorization Act of 2010. Payments for the Q1 and Q2 augmentations
were made using Exploration funds under the FY 2011 continuing
resolution. The remaining augmentations for Q3 and Q4 are in
negotiation with the companies and are contingent on available funding
at the time the agreements are finalized, which NASA hopes to be in the
near future. As with any SAA milestone, NASA will not pay for a
milestone until the work has been completed successfully.

SpaceX signed its SAA with NASA in August 2006. Since then:

To date, NASA has paid SpaceX $258 million out of the
original SAA amount of $278 million, and $20 million for
meeting its Q1 augmentation milestones. To date, SpaceX has
completed 22 of 29 negotiated milestones.

On December 8, 2010, SpaceX successfully completed
the first COTS demonstration flight, thereby demonstrating
launch of the Falcon 9 booster, separation of the Dragon
spacecraft and completion of two orbits, orbital maneuvering
and control, reentry, parachute decent and spacecraft recovery
after splashdown in the Pacific Ocean.

SpaceX's remaining demonstration flights for NASA are
scheduled for July 2011 and January 2012. NASA is reviewing a
SpaceX proposal to accelerate the third demonstration flight
test objectives, which include berthing to the ISS, during the
second demonstration flight. If accepted, the combined mission
could be flown as early as November 2011.

The augmentation milestones improve the chance of
mission success by adding ground and flight testing,
accelerating development of enhanced cargo capabilities, or
further developing the ground infrastructure needed for
commercial for commercial cargo capabilities. More
specifically, the additional SpaceX milestones include
rendezvous and proximity operations sensor testing, system
level thermal vacuum and electromagnetic interference testing,
and infrastructure improvements at the launch, production and
test sites.

Orbital signed its SAA with NASA in February 2008. Since then:

NASA has paid Orbital $157.5 million out of the
original SAA amount of $170 million, and $40 million for
meeting its Q1 and Q2 augmentation milestones. To date, Orbital
has completed 18 of 22 negotiated milestones.

Recently, Orbital began integration and testing of
its Cygnus Service Module and Taurus II launch vehicle.

Orbital is expected to complete its demonstration
flight for NASA in December 2011.

The Orbital augmentation milestones will lead to an
additional test flight of the Taurus II which significantly
reduces the risks associated with a new launch vehicle
development thereby separating risks associated with the
development of a new spacecraft. The milestones also enable
additional software and control system testing.

Conclusion

Americans and people worldwide have turned to NASA for inspiration
throughout our history - our work gives people an opportunity to
imagine what is barely possible, and we at NASA get to turn those
dreams into real achievements for all humankind.
With the passage of the NASA Authorization Act of 2010, NASA has a
clear direction and is making plans for moving the Agency forward.
Today, we have a roadmap to even more historic achievements that will
spur innovation, employ Americans in fulfilling jobs, and engage people
around the world as we enter an exciting new era in space. NASA
appreciates the significant effort that has gone into advancing this
bipartisan legislation.
In conclusion, let me assure you that NASA is committed to meeting
the goals and requirements of the NASA Authorization Act of 2010. As
such, we are committed to developing an affordable, sustainable, and
realistic next-generation human spaceflight system that will enable
human exploration, scientific discovery, broad commercial benefits, and
inspirational missions that are in the best interests of the Nation. We
look forward to working with you and other Members of Congress as we
finalize our strategy for achieving human spaceflight to many
destinations in our solar system.
Chairman Palazzo and Members of this Subcommittee, I would like to
conclude my remarks by thanking you again for your continued support
for NASA and its human spaceflight programs. I would be pleased to
respond to any questions you or the other Members of the Subcommittee
may have.
Biography of Douglas R. Cooke, Associate Administrator for Exploration
Systems Mission Directorate
Doug Cooke is Associate Administrator for the Office of Exploration
Systems Mission Directorate. The Exploration Systems Mission
Directorate is responsible for managing the development of flight
hardware systems for future human exploration beyond low Earth orbit,
including the moon, near Earth asteroids, Mars and its moons and other
destinations. This includes development of critical technologies, new
capabilities, and human research to support future human spacecraft and
exploration missions. It also includes partnering with industry to
develop commercial capabilities for cargo and crew transportation to
and from low Earth orbit.
Mr. Cooke has over 37 years of unique experience in the Space
Shuttle, Space Station, and Exploration Programs. He has been assigned
significant responsibilities during critical periods of each of these,
including top management positions in all three programs.
Mr. Cooke's first major challenge began in 1975 when he was tasked
with defining and implementing an entry aerodynamic flight test program
for the Space Shuttle. This program was successfully implemented during
the Approach and Landing Tests in 1977, and early orbital flights of
the Space Shuttle beginning in 1981 through 1984.
Mr. Cooke was asked to lead the Analysis Office when the Space
Station Program Office was first organized in 1984. He accepted the
challenge and led the work that defined the Space Station configuration
and many of its design details and technical attributes.
Following the Space Shuttle Challenger accident, Mr. Cooke was
assigned to the Space Shuttle Program Office. He helped lead a Civil
Service and contractor team to provide the system engineering and
integration function that resulted in the return of the Space Shuttle
to flight on September 29, 1988. He reached the position of Deputy
Manager of the NSTS Engineering Integration Office.
Mr. Cooke has played a pivotal role in planning for future space
exploration beginning in 1989. He helped to lead a NASA team that
produced the ``90 Day Study'' on lunar and Mars exploration. Mr. Cooke
was subsequently assigned to the Synthesis Group led by Lt. General Tom
Stafford, Gemini and Apollo Astronaut. The team produced a report for
the White House entitled ``America at the Threshold: America's Space
Exploration Initiative.'' Mr. Cooke was selected to be the Manager of
the Exploration Programs Office under then Exploration Associate
Administrator Michael Griffin, where he initiated and led NASA agency-
wide studies for the human return to the Moon, and exploration of Mars.
In March of 1993, the agency undertook the redesign of Space
Station Freedom. Mr. Cooke was assigned the responsibility of leading
the engineering and technical aspects of the redesign. He was
subsequently chosen to serve in the Space Station Program Office as
Vehicle Manager, leading and managing the hardware development and
systems engineering and integration for the International Space
Station. From April to December of 1996, Mr. Cooke served as Deputy
Manager of the Space Station Program.
Prior to his current appointment to NASA Headquarters, Mr. Cooke
served as manager for the Advanced Development Office at the Johnson
Space Center, Houston. Mr. Cooke provided leadership for the planning
of human missions beyond Earth orbit; including the Moon, Mars,
libration points, and asteroids. This team developed integrated human
and robotic mission objectives, defined investment strategies for
exploration technologies, and managed NASA exploration mission
architecture analyses.
Mr. Cooke was detailed to NASA headquarters during portions of this
period to contribute to headquarters level strategies for human
exploration.
Mr. Cooke served as NASA technical advisor to the Columbia Accident
Investigation Board from the time of the accident to the publishing of
the report.
Prior to his current assignment Mr. Cooke served as Deputy
Associate Administrator for the Exploration Systems Mission
Directorate. He has made significant contributions to the structuring
of its programs, defining the program content, and providing technical
leadership. He initiated and led the development of the Global
Exploration Strategy activity that led to defined themes and objectives
for lunar exploration. International, science, industry, and
entrepreneurial communities were engaged, and they contributed to the
development and shaping of these themes and objectives. He led and
guided the development of the planned lunar exploration mission
approach and architecture. Mr. Cooke has also led the efforts to define
long term NASA field center assignments for hardware development and
operational responsibilities. He has been the Source Selection
Authority for the major exploration contract competitions. In this role
he has successfully selected the companies who are currently on
contract.
Mr. Cooke is a graduate of Texas A&M University with a Bachelor of
Science degree in Aerospace Engineering.
Major Awards: SES Presidential Distinguished Rank Award- 2006, SES
Presidential Meritorious Rank Award- 1998, NASA Exceptional Achievement
Medal- 2003, NASA Exceptional Achievement Medal- 2002, NASA Outstanding
Leadership Medal- 1997, NASA Exceptional Achievement Medal- 1993, NASA
Exceptional Service Medal- 1988, JSC Certificate of Commendation- 1986,
JSC Certificate of Commendation- 1983.

Chairman Palazzo. Thank you, Mr. Cooke.
I now recognize our second witness, Dr. Scott Pace,
Director of the Space Policy Institute at George Washington
University.

STATEMENT OF SCOTT PACE, DIRECTOR, SPACE POLICY INSTITUTE,
GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY

Dr. Pace. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
providing an opportunity to discuss this topic.
The transition away from the space shuttle to a new
generation of vehicles is perhaps the most critical task facing
the U.S. space program today. In this regard, I think it is
appropriate and timely the Committee examine the
accomplishments of the Constellation program and the prospects
for the Space Launch System and Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle.
The Committee posed a series of four questions that I will
try to briefly answer in turn. The first one is the requirement
to use the existing Constellation contracts was, in my opinion,
an effective and prudent measure. Continuation of the contracts
enabled time for industry, Congress and, I believe, NASA to
think more carefully about next steps. This enabled continued
development of the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle to include a
successful pad abort demonstration and completion of a ground
test article. It enabled completion of the five-segment Ares
solid rocket motor including static test firings, continued
structures technology testing with a successful shell-buckling
test that was recently in the news, and continued development
assembly of the J2-X upper stage engine and the A-3 test stand,
the only new cryogenic engine development in the United States
today.
NASA's efforts, however, to transition from the
Constellation program designs to the SLS can be seen as
incomplete and possibly inadequate, and in particular don't
appear to make progress toward one of the CAIB's--Columbia
Accident Investigation Board--central recommendations on
dramatically improving crew safety. The CAIB observed that the
design of the system for next-generation human launch should
give overriding priority to crew safety rather than trade
safety against other performance criteria such as low cost and
reusability or against advance space operations capabilities
other than crew transfer.
To these ends, the Constellation Ares I set a goal of for
probability of loss of crew in excess of one in a thousand,
with design estimates over one in 2,800. In comparison, the
space shuttle's probability of loss of crew has been estimated
at less than one in 150. No other vehicles including the Ares V
design and existing EELV designs are expected to reach the one
in 1,000 standard. This is not to say they cannot do so in the
future but only after accumulating flight heritage comparable
to the shuttle solid rocket motors or the Russian Soyuz.
Now, the Committee also asked about the greatest risks
arising from this transition. Well, the greatest risks, in my
view, are those arising from policy instability and the lack of
a basis for predictable decision-making by NASA and industry.
There was a decline of human-rated launch vehicle and
spacecraft development experience, while shuttle operations
continued and various R&D programs came and went. We atrophied
for some decades. The rebuilding of expertise that was
occurring under the Constellation program, notably with the
Ares I-X flight test, that progress has not been followed up
on. Again, progress has been made in the last year but it has
not been exploited to the degree it should have been.
NASA's plans prior to the Ares I-X testing of the Ares I
and Orion spacecraft could be, I think, fairly characterized as
largely a ground test program that would have avoided
committing the actual flight until a predominant amount of risk
had been retired. The experiences of the Ares I-X and of the
pad abort I think helped teach NASA industry teams how to
finish a product and fly it to really their great benefit. The
experience base could have led to a more prominent role for
incremental flight testing and a means of risk reduction if
funding had continued.
With the kind of programmatic and budgetary redirection
that NASA has received in recent years, it is hard to expect a
positive outcome for workforce productivity and the health of
the space industrial space. The cumulative reductions in future
support for human space exploration have been dramatic over the
last several years.
The Committee asked what are some key indicators that could
help Congress judge the success of transition programs. Well,
the most important consideration is always people, both inside
NASA and in industry. Government and industry cannot have
coherent workforce transition plans if they cannot define what
skill mixes they need today or in the future. Skill mixes
cannot be defined absent a clear understanding of government
roles and responsibilities, what work is to be done in-house
and what will be contracted out, and a stable set of mission
requirements is a part of a large exploration and architecture
strategy. Congress should be looking for updated workforce
transition plans with reports on the identification of key
skills and how they will be retained. Congress should look to
ensure that NASA and industry are creating and strengthening
their internal intellectual capital for developing new human
spaceflight capabilities, and this can be most directly
observed if there is frequent and increasingly ambitious tests
and flights of actual hardware.
Finally, Congress should be asking for progress on the
definition of an internationally recognized and accepted human
space exploration architecture that supports U.S. national
space policy goals and principles because the stability and
predictability we need is not just with industry but also with
our industry and international partners who are trying to make
decisions also in this very difficult environment.
The transition away from the space shuttle and towards new
human spaceflight capabilities while ensuring independent U.S.
access to the International Space Station is, I stress, the
most immediate and critical task for human spaceflight. In this
regard, the upcoming flight of STS-135, I believe is absolutely
crucial but we also need to look beyond that and say what is
going to be coming next.
Major policy questions remain unanswered that I think
complicate the transition efforts and perhaps foremost among
them is whether or not there is a need for independent U.S.
government access to space, and if not, the identification of
those entities upon which we are willing to depend for such
access. In my view, the U.S. government should have its own
means of assuring access to space even as it makes increasing
use of commercial services or international partners. One of my
analogies is, just as a diversified portfolio needs bonds as
well as stocks, a public option is an important, crucial part
of a diversified portfolio for strategic national capability
like human spaceflight. It is the existence of the
Constellation program that enabled a prudent risk-taking in
commercial cargo services and contemplation of eventual
procurement of commercial crew services.
The technical complexities and risks of human spaceflight
make it an activity distinct from buying normal commercial
goods and services. A policy that pretends or assumes that it
is not distinct is unlikely to succeed, just as unrealistic
flight rates planned for the shuttle in 1970s or large
commercial markets planned for EELVs in the 1990s did not
succeed. Merely because something is attractive doesn't mean it
will be true.
The government has several proper roles to play in the next
generation of human space exploration, and those roles can and
should evolve over time. It is time, in my view, to push
carefully for greater reliance on commercial cargo services to
the International Space Station. It will then subsequently be
possible to define a path for commercial crew services that
operate in addition to but not to the exclusion of U.S.
government capabilities. To fully rely on commercial or
government approaches to the exclusion of the other would
place, in my view, all human spaceflight by the United States
at risk, both public and private.
And with that, thank you very much for your kind attention
and I would be happy to answer any questions you might have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Pace follows:]

Prepared Statement of Dr. Scott Pace, Director, Space Policy Institute,
George Washington University

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for providing an opportunity to discuss
this important topic. The transition away from the Space Shuttle to a
new generation of vehicles for human access to space is perhaps the
most critical task facing the U.S. space program today. In this regard,
it is appropriate and timely that the Committee examines the
accomplishments of the Constellation program and prospects for a Space
Launch System and Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle as contained in the most
recent 2010 NASA Authorization Act.
Specifically, the Committee has posed four questions that I will
address in turn:

1. Has the use of existing Constellation contracts to
prioritize the work on the Space Launch System been an
efficient and effective approach?
The FY 2010 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations bill contained a
provision cosponsored by Senator Richard Shelby (R-AL) and Robert
Bennett (R-UT) that said:

``Provided further, that notwithstanding any other
provision of law or regulation, funds made available for
Constellation in Fiscal Year 2010 for 'National Aeronautics and
Space Administration Exploration' and from previous
appropriations for 'National Aeronautics and Space
Administration Exploration' shall be available to fund
continued performance of Constellation contracts, and
performance of such Constellation contracts may not be
terminated for convenience by the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration in Fiscal Year 2010.''

Approval of this provision was, in my view, an understandable
response to the many uncertainties faced by the Congress last year. Two
previous NASA Authorizations, in 2005 and 2008 had approved clear
efforts to transition the Space Shuttle, extend operations of the
International Space Station, and explore beyond Earth orbit. As part of
the Fiscal Years 2007, 2008, and 2009 NASA budgets, the Constellation
program became a consistent and well-understood approach for
implementing exploration objectives. The Obama Administration had
sought to cancel the Constellation program and terminate existing
contracts with the Fiscal Year 2011 NASA budget. However, this dramatic
change of course was not accompanied by a clear explanation of what
would replace Constellation. In particular, there were no concrete
explanations of how the transition away from the Space Shuttle would be
implemented, support for the International Space Station assured, or
human explorations beyond Earth orbit conducted.
In light of this situation, the requirement to use existing
Constellation contracts was an effective and prudent measure. It is
difficult to say that such a requirement was efficient as it would
almost certainly have been preferable if the Administration and
Congress could have found a common approach on human space exploration
before the release of the FY 2011 President's Budget Request. It is the
prerogative of any Administration to review and reorder priorities for
NASA, and it is possible to imagine a dialogue with Congress that would
have resulted in a reordering of the Constellation program (e.g.,
placing greater emphasis on demonstrating new technologies). However,
the disruption that would have resulted from the wholesale cancellation
of the Constellation contracts would have been harmful to the U.S.
space industrial base. The existing contractors would have certainly
been harmed and other potential contractors would not have benefited if
for no other reason than the time it would have taken to define,
compete, and award new contracts. The lack of a clear alternative to
the Constellation program meant that contract cancellation at that time
would largely have resulted in a waste of public funds.
Continuation of the Constellation contracts enabled time for
industry, Congress, and I suspect NASA, to think more carefully about
next steps. This enabled continued development of the Orion Crew
Exploration vehicle to include a successful pad abort demonstration and
completion of the ground test article. It enabled completion of the
five-segment Ares solid rocket booster, including static test firings,
continued structures technology testing with a successful shell-
buckling test, and continued development assembly of the J2-X upper
stage engine and A-3 test stand - the only new cryogenic engine
development for the United States.

2. How do NASA's recent efforts to transition from the
Constellation program to the Space Launch System and Multi
Purpose Crew Vehicle align with the recommendations of the
Columbia Accident Investigation Board?

One of the most important observations from the Columbia Accident
Investigation Board (CAIB) for steps to take after the Space Shuttle
was the following:

``It is the view of the Board that the previous attempts to
develop a replacement vehicle for the aging Shuttle represent a
failure of national leadership. The cause of the failure was
continuing to expect major technological advances in that
vehicle. With the amount of risk inherent in the Space Shuttle,
the first step should be to reach an agreement that the
overriding mission of the replacement system is to move humans
safely and reliably into and out of Earth orbit.''

Furthermore, the CAIB offered the admonition that:

``The design of the system should give overriding priority
to crew safety, rather than trade safety against other
performance criteria, such as low cost and reusability, or
against advanced space operation capabilities other than crew
transfer.''

To these ends, the Constellation Ares 1 set a goal for probability
of loss of crew (PLoC) in excess of 1:1000 with design estimates for
reaching over 1:2800. In comparison the Space Shuttle's PLoC has been
estimated at less than 1:150. No other vehicles, including the Ares V
design and existing Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles (EELVs), are
expected to exceed the 1:1000 standard. This is not to say they cannot
do so in the future, but only after accumulating flight heritage
comparable to the Shuttle solid rocket motors or the Russian Soyuz.
With regard to the CAIB's recommendations, NASA effort to
transition from Constellation program designs to the Space Launch
System can be seen as incomplete and arguably inadequate. They do not
appear to make progress toward the CAIB's central recommendation on
dramatically improving crew safety. The transition of Orion to a Multi-
Purpose Crew Vehicle looks to be in better shape, in particular with
progress on a Launch Abort System, but it is the fully integrated
combination of launch vehicle, crew vehicle, and escape system that
must be considered.
The CAIB also commented on the need for stability of purpose in the
development of new launch vehicles:

``NASA plans to make continuing investments in ``next
generation launch technology,'' with the hope that those
investments will enable a decision by the end of this decade on
what that next generation launch vehicle should be. This is a
worthy goal, and should be pursued. The Board notes that this
approach can only be successful: if it is sustained over the
decade; if by the time a decision to develop a new vehicle is
made there is a clearer idea of how the new space
transportation system fits into the nation's overall plans for
space; and if the U.S. government is willing at the time a
development decision is made to commit the substantial
resources required to implement it.''

As discussed in response to the following questions below, none of
the conditions cited by the CAIB appear to be met by current proposals
before the Congress.

3. What are the greatest risks to the aerospace industrial
base and workforce associated with the transition from
Constellation to the Space Launch System program?

The greatest risks are those arising from policy instability and
the lack of a basis for predictable decision-making by NASA and
industry. Such instability has very real costs as the chart below
indicates:

The history of U.S. human spaceflight over the past two decades is
one of continual turbulence with occasional episodes of progress. There
are many sources of policy instability - some internal to NASA, some
embedded in the relationship between successive Administrations and
Congresses. The net result has been a lack of human-rated launch
vehicle and spacecraft development experience while Shuttle operations
continued and various R&D programs came and went. Unlike the scientific
community at NASA, there was not a steady progression of spacecraft
development programs in which both NASA and industry could gain and
maintain expertise. The rebuilding of expertise was occurring on the
Constellation program, notably with the Ares 1-X flight test, but that
progress has not been followed up on.
NASA's plans prior to Ares I-X for testing of the Ares I rocket and
Orion spacecraft could be characterized as largely ground test programs
that would have avoided committing to actual flight until a predominant
amount of risk had been retired. The experiences from Ares I-X and Pad
Abort I helped teach the NASA-industry teams how to `finish' a product
and fly it - an experience base that would have led to a more prominent
role for incremental flight testing as a means of risk reduction if
funding had continued.
Through its budget proposals, the current Administration has
contributed to policy instability for NASA as a whole, not just in
human space flight. The chart below shows proposed and projected top-
line NASA budgets back to FY 2005 when the Vision for Space Exploration
was proposed and through 2020 when the first human return to the Moon
was planned.

The FY 2005 NASA budget projection was expected to remain flat in
terms of purchasing power and thus it t increased at only 2.4% in the
out years. The FY Y 2009 NASA budget shows that NASA received slightly
less funding that it had planned for in FY 2005 and this resulted in
the schedule slip of Ares 1/Orion first flight to 2 2014 or possibly
later. The first Obama Administration budget for FY 2010 projected a
large reduction, due to placing $3 billion in exploration funding ``on
hold'' while reviews of NASA's human spaceflight p programs occurred.
In addition to those funds directly affected, the projection of out
year spending was reduced to 1.36%. If inflation levels experienced by
NASA were more than that, the agency would experience a d decline in
real purchasing power.
In the FY 2011 proposal for NNASA, the Administration added funds
back such that the NASA top line returned to where it would have been
in continuing the spend ding levels of the Bush Administration.
However, the composition of spending had changed significantly, with
exploration spending dropping and science and technology-related
spending increasing sharply. In FY 2012, the pendulum continues to
swing w with NASA expecting at best a flat budge et in nominal terms
(and thus a reduction in real terms) while OMB seems to envision even
sharper reductions in the near term with possible restoration of some
funds in the out years.
With the kinds of programmatic and budget redirection that NASA has
received in recent years, it is hard to expect a positive outcome for
workforce productivity or the health of the space industrial base.
The chart below show the cumulative reductions experienced in the
overall NNASA budget and the exploration budget respectively for the
years FY 2014-2020. This was the time period that had been targeted d
for conducting the first human missions beyond d low Earth orbit since
Apollo. Even if all of the Administration's space technology fund ding
is counted toward ``exploration,'' the cumulative reductions in future
support for human space exploration remain dramatic.

4. Can you suggest some key indicators that would help
Congress judge the success of NASA's transition efforts?

There are many ways to monitor transition efforts, from workforce
plans, to completion of hardware milestones. However, the most
important consideration has always been people, both inside NASA and in
industry. Government and industry cannot t have coherent workforce
transition n plans if they cannot define what skill mixes they need
today or in the future. Skill m mixes cannot be defined absent a clear
understanding of government roles and responsibilities (e.g., what work
is to be done in-house e and what will be contracted out) and a stable
set of mission requirements that are part of a larger architecture and
exploration strategy.
The lack of a U.S. focus on h human lunar return and an associated
architecture is one of the most serious programmatic gaps that make
transition planning difficult. Efforts to find a feasible and
attractive mission to a Near Earth Object (NEO) have not been
successful and likely await the completion of a more complete survey of
such objects. Sending humans to Mars remains too technically difficult
and expensive at our current level of development. The Moon was and
continues to be the logical focus for efforts to move humans beyond low
Earth Orbit as well as being vital to future commercial developments.
For example, the logistics requirements of a sustained lunar base offer
perhaps the only near term source of significant new demand for cargo
mass to low Earth orbit (LEO). Commercial service to the International
Space Station (ISS) is an important first step, but ISS supply needs
are limited and unlikely to attract major new investment by itself. If
the Administration is truly supportive of stimulating commercial space
transportation beyond LEO then it needs to consider where future demand
might come from. It's not a question of choosing between government and
commercial approaches, but of government first and then commercial in a
well-considered transition.
This does not mean that the Constellation approach to the Moon is
the only one possible - one can envision precursor missions to
Lagrangian points in the Earth-Moon system and tele-presence
experiments prior to a human landing. In a similar vein, one can
imagine missions to NEOs as part of precursor efforts to send human to
orbit Mars. The crucial point is that individual missions should not be
one-time highly dangerous stunts, but should be careful steps in the
continual expansion of human deep-space capabilities that can address
important human exploration questions. The international space
community has developed a lunar architecture as part of a large Global
Exploration Strategy with strong U.S. technical participation. We
should consider making greater use of international partners through
existing international mechanisms to create a more rational approach
for our own plans.
The Congress should be looking for updated workforce transition
plans, with reports on the identification of key skills and how they
will be retained. Next, the Congress should look to ensure that NASA
and industry are creating and strengthening their internal
``intellectual capital'' for developing new human spaceflight
capabilities. This can be most directly observed in through frequent
and increasingly ambitious tests and flights of actual hardware.
Finally, the Congress should be asking for progress on the definition
of an internationally accepted human space exploration architecture
that supports U.S. national space policy goals and principles.

Summary

The design, development, and operation of major space systems
reflect the strategic engineering capacity of the United States. This
capacity is being tested today by the technical and managerial
challenges of developing new human-rated space systems. The transition
away from the Space Shuttle and towards new human space flight
capabilities, while assuring independent U.S. access to the
International Space Station, is the most immediate and critical task
for U.S. human spaceflight.
Planning for and successfully executing this transition has been
made significantly more challenging by the policy, programmatic, and
budget instability of the past two years. As a result, the United
States does not have at present a plausible architecture and strategy
for conducting human missions beyond LEO for the next two decades. In
addition, a plausible architecture and approach for international
cooperation in human space flight beyond the International Space
Station no longer exists. This has been a particular problem for many
countries that had started development of lunar robotic and human space
flight plans based on the Constellation program structure.
Major policy questions remain unanswered that complicate transition
efforts. Perhaps foremost among them is whether or not there is a need
for independent U.S. government human access to space, and if not, the
identification of those entities upon which we are willing to depend
for such access. In my view, the U.S. government should have its own
means for ensuring human access to space even as it makes increasing
use of commercial services or international partners. Just as a
diversified portfolio needs bonds as well as stocks, a ``public
option'' is an important and crucial part of a diversified portfolio
for a strategic national capability like human space flight. Complete
reliance on commercial or international services is an excessively
risky approach that can deter innovation in those areas as they become
``too important to be left alone.'' It was the existence of
Constellation that enabled prudent risk taking in commercial cargo
services and contemplation of eventual procurement of commercial crew
services.
A corollary question is: what is the proper role of NASA for the
human expansion into space, given NASA's disparate functions as
``innovator and technology developer'' vs. ``designer/developer/smart
buyer'' of new systems, and ``system operator'' vs. ``service
customer''? The Administration's proposals for human space flight
appear to have a clear policy theme - that there is no compelling need
for a U.S. government human space flight program and that all necessary
objectives and risks can be meet by private contractors using
government funding with reduced if not minimal oversight. The technical
complexities and risks of human space flight make it an activity
distinct from buying normal commercial goods and services. A policy
approach that pretends or assumes that it is not distinct is unlikely
to succeed - just as the unrealistic flight rates planned for the
Shuttle in the 1970s or the large commercial markets for EELVs in the
1990s did not succeed.
The government has several proper roles to play in the next
generation of human space exploration and those roles can and should
evolve in parallel over time. It is time to push carefully for greater
reliance on commercial cargo services to the International Space
Station. It is subsequently possible to define a path for commercial
crew services that operate in addition to, but not to the exclusion of,
U.S. government capabilities. To fully rely on commercial or government
approaches, to the exclusion of the other, would place all human space
flight by the United States at risk, public and private.
Thank you for your attention. I would be happy to answer any
questions you might have.

Biography of Dr. Scott Pace, Director, Space Policy Institute, George
Washington University
Dr. Scott Pace is the Director of the Space Policy Institute and a
Professor of Practice in International Affairs at George Washington
University's Elliott School of International Affairs. His research
interests include civil, commercial, and national security space
policy, and the management of technical innovation. From 2005-2008, he
served as the Associate Administrator for Program Analysis and
Evaluation at NASA.
Prior to NASA, Dr. Pace was the Assistant Director for Space and
Aeronautics in the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy
(OSTP). From 1993-2000, Dr Pace worked for the RAND Corporation's
Science and Technology Policy Institute (STPI). From 1990 to 1993, Dr.
Pace served as the Deputy Director and Acting Director of the Office of
Space Commerce, in the Office of the Deputy Secretary of the Department
of Commerce. He received a Bachelor of Science degree in Physics from
Harvey Mudd College in 1980; Masters degrees in Aeronautics &
Astronautics and Technology & Policy from the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology in 1982; and a Doctorate in Policy Analysis from the RAND
Graduate School in 1989.
Dr. Pace received the NASA Outstanding Leadership Medal in 2008,
the U.S. Department of State's Group Superior Honor Award, GPS
Interagency Team, in 2005, and the NASA Group Achievement Award,
Columbia Accident Rapid Reaction Team, in 2004. He has been a member of
the U.S. Delegation to the World Radiocommunication Conferences in
1997, 2000, 2003, and 2007. He was also a member of the U.S. Delegation
to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Telecommunications Working
Group, 1997-2000. He is a past member of the Earth Studies Committee,
Space Studies Board, National Research Council and the Commercial
Activities Subcommittee, NASA Advisory Council. Dr. Pace is a currently
a member of the Board of Trustees, Universities Space Research
Association, a Corresponding Member of the International Academy of
Astronautics, and a member of the Board of Governors of the National
Space Society.

Chairman Palazzo. Thank you, Dr. Pace.
I now recognize our final witness, Mr. Jim Maser, Chairman
of the Corporate Membership Committee at the American Institute
of Aeronautics and Astronautics.

STATEMENT OF JAMES MASER, CORPORATE MEMBERSHIP COMMITTEE, THE
AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF AERONAUTICS AND ASTRONAUTICS

Mr. Maser. Thank you, Chairman Palazzo and distinguished
Members of the Committee. I want to thank you for the
opportunity to address a subject of critical importance to the
aerospace industry and to our Nation as a whole, which is a
need for a clear national strategy for space.
It is true that we face many other significant challenges,
and that our country is going through a period of transition.
However, we must not lose sight of the fact that the aerospace
industry overall directly employs more than 800,000 people
across the country and supports more than two million middle-
class jobs and 3,000 suppliers from all 50 States, with total
industry sales in 2010 exceeding $216 billion. As a result, the
health of the aerospace engineering manufacturing base in
America is a crucial element of our continued economic recovery
and employment growth. But in addition to that, the aerospace
industry is unique in its contribution to national security,
and if the highly skilled aerospace workforce in the United
States is allowed to atrophy, it will have widespread
consequences for our future well-being and success as a Nation.
However, the U.S. space community is at a crossroads and
facing an uncertain future that is unlike any we have seen in
decades. This uncertainty significantly impacts our Nation's
ability to continue exploring space without being dependent on
foreign providers. It also has implications for our national
security in the U.S. industrial base.
Thirteen months ago, NASA Administrator Charlie Bolden
called me, as well as several other aerospace manufacturers to
tell us that the Constellation program had been canceled. In
the 13 months since that call, NASA has yet to identify a
strategy to replace the space shuttle. There does not appear to
be a consensus within the Administration regarding the need for
the Space Launch System and Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle, and
clearly there is not consensus between Congress and the
Administration on NASA priorities. This uncertainty has our
industry partners and suppliers very concerned about how we can
position our business to meet NASA's needs while retaining our
critical engineering and manufacturing talent. It is creating a
gap which our industry will not be able to fill.
When the Apollo program ended in 1975, there was a gap of
about six years prior to the first flight of the space shuttle
program. However, the shuttle program had been formally
announced in January 1972, so although there was a gap in U.S.
human spaceflight, there was not a gap in the work on the next-
generation system. Clearly, this transition was difficult for
industry. NASA budgets were reduced but the industry adapted to
this new reality.
During the space shuttle era, we saw NASA budgets
flattening, declining to less than one percent of the federal
budget, and although space industry would have liked to have
seen overall increases, we knew how to plan our business, how
to invest, how to meet our customers' needs and how to compete,
but the situation now is much worse. It poses a much greater
risk to the U.S. space community. To the engineering workforce
and to the U.S. leadership in space. The difference between the
Apollo-shuttle transition and the shuttle-next generation space
exploration system transition is the perilous unknown. We
simply do not know what is next.
Congress passed an authorization bill that directs NASA how
to move to the next-generation program, but NASA has said that
due to the Constellation contractual obligations, they are
limited in moving forward with the authorization bill. This
situation is creating a host of problems and it urgently needs
to change. If NASA is going to be relieved of Constellation
obligations, we need to know how the workforce will be
transitioned, and how the many financial investments will be
utilized for future exploration efforts. Whereas the Apollo-
shuttle transition created a gap in U.S. human access to space,
this next transition is creating a gap in direction, purpose,
and in future capabilities.
In order to adequately plan for the future and
intelligently deploy resources, the space community needs to
have clear goals. Up until two years ago, we had a goal. We had
a national space strategy and a plan to support it.
Unfortunately, at this point, that plan no longer exists. This
lack of a unified strategy coupled with the fact that NASA
transition is being planned without any coordination with
industry leaders, makes it impossible for businesses like mine
to adequately plan for the future.
How can we right-size our business and work towards
achieving greatest efficiency if we can't even define the
future need? This is an impossible task. So faced with this
uncertainty, companies like mine continue fulfilling
Constellation requirements pursuant to Congressional mandate to
capitalize on our investment in this program but we are doing
so at significantly reduced contractual baseline levels.
Forcing reductions in force at both prime contractor and
subcontractor level.
This reality reflects the fact that the space industrial
base is not facing the crisis. We are in a crisis and we are a
losing national perishable asset: our unique workforce. The
entire space industrial base is currently being downsized with
no net gain in jobs. At the same time, we are totally unclear
as to what might be the correct levels needed to support the
government. Designing, developing, testing and manufacturing
the hardware and software to explore space requires highly
skilled people with unique knowledge and technical expertise,
which takes decades to develop. These technical experts cannot
be grown overnight, and once they leave the industry, they
rarely return. If the United States develops a tremendous
vision for space exploration five years from now but the people
with these critical skills have not been preserved and
developed, that vision will disappear. We need that vision,
that commitment, that certainty right now, not five or ten
years from now; if we are going to have a credible change of
bringing it to fruition.
In addition to difficulties in retaining our current
workforce, the uncertainty facing the U.S. space program is
already having a negative impact on our industry's ability to
attract new talent from critical science, technology,
engineering, and mathematics. Young gradates who may have been
inspired to follow STEM education plans because of their
interest in space and space exploration, look at industry now
and see no clear future. This will have implications on the
space industrial base for years to come.
Access to space plays a significant part in the Department
of Defense's ability to secure our Nation. The lack of a
unified national strategy brings uncertainty in volume, meaning
the fixed costs will go up in the short term across all
customers until actual demand levels are understood.
Furthermore, the lack of a space policy will have ripple
effects in the defense budget and elsewhere, raising costs when
it is in everyone's interest to contain costs.
It is of course true that there are uncertainties about the
best way to move forward. This was true in the early days of
space exploration and in the Apollo and shuttle eras.
Unfortunately, we do not have the luxury of waiting until we
have all the answers. We must not let best be the enemy of the
good. In other words, selecting a configuration we are
absolutely certain is the optimum configuration is not as
important as expeditiously selecting one of the many workable
configurations so that we can move forward. This industry has
smart people with excellent judgment, and we will figure the
details out but not if we don't get moving soon. NASA must
initiate SLS and MPCV efforts without gapping the program
efforts already in place intended to support Constellation.
The time for industry and government to work together to
define future space policy is now. We must establish a policy
to recognize the synergy among all government space launch
customers to determine the right sustainable industry size and
plan on funding it accordingly. The need to move on with clear
velocity is imperative if we are to sustain our endangered U.S.
space industrial base, to protect our national security and to
retain our position as a world leader in human spaceflight and
space exploration. I believe that if we work together, we can
achieve these goals. We are ready to help in any way that we
can but the clock is ticking.
Thank you again for the opportunity to address the
Committee today. I look forward to responding to any questions
you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Maser follows:]

Prepared Statement of Mr. James Maser, Chairman, Corporate Membership
Committee, The American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics

Chairman Palazzo and distinguished Members of the Committee:
I want to thank you for the opportunity to address a subject of
critical importance to the aerospace industry and our nation as a
whole, which is the need for a clear national strategy for space.
It is true that we face many other significant challenges and that
our country is going through a period of transition. However, we must
not lose sight of the fact that the aerospace industry directly employs
more than 800,000 people across the country, and supports more than two
million middle class jobs and 30,000 suppliers from all 50 states, with
total industry sales in 2010 exceeding $216 billion.
As a result, the health of the aerospace engineering and
manufacturing base in America is a crucial element of our continued
economic recovery and employment growth. But in addition to that, the
aerospace industry is unique in its contribution to national security.
And if the highly skilled aerospace workforce in the United States is
allowed to atrophy, it will have widespread consequences for our future
wellbeing and success as a nation.
The U.S. space community is at a crossroads and facing an uncertain
future that is unlike any we have seen in decades. This uncertainty
significantly impacts our nation's ability to continue exploring space
without being dependent on foreign providers. It also has implications
for our national security and the U.S. industrial base.
Thirteen months ago, NASA administrator Charlie Bolden called me,
as well as several other aerospace manufacturers, to tell us that the
Constellation program had been can celled. In the 13 months since that
call, NASA has yet to identify a strategy to replace the Space Shuttle.
There does not appear to be consensus within the Administration
regarding the need for the Space Launch System (SLS) and Multi-Purpose
Crew Vehicle (MPCV), and clearly there is not a consensus between
Congress and the Administration on NASA's priorities.
This uncertainly has our industry partners and suppliers very
concerned about how we can position our businesses to meet NASA's
needs, while retaining our critical engineering and manufacturing
talent. It is creating a gap which our industry will not be able to
fill.
When the Apollo program ended in 1975, there was a gap of about six
years prior to the first flight of the Space Shuttle program. However,
the Shuttle program had been formally announced in January 1972. So,
although there was a gap in U.S. human spaceflight, there was not a gap
in work on the next generation system.
Clearly this transition was difficult for industry. NASA budgets
were reduced but the industry adapted to this new reality.
During the Space Shuttle era, we saw NASA budgets flattening,
declining to less than one percent of the federal budget. And although
the space industry would have liked to have seen overall increases, we
knew how to plan our business, how to invest, how to meet our
customers' needs, and how to compete.
But the situation now is much worse. It poses a much greater risk
to the U.S. space community, to the engineering workforce, and to U.S.
leadership in space. The difference between the Apollo-Shuttle
transition and the Shuttle-next generation space exploration system
transition is the perilous unknown.
We simply do not know what is next.
Congress passed an authorization bill that directs NASA how to move
to the next generation program. But NASA has said that due to the
Constellation contractual obligations they are limited in moving
forward with the Authorization bill. This situation is creating a host
of problems, and it urgently needs to change.
If NASA is going to be relieved of Constellation obligations, we
need to know how the workforce will be transitioned and how the many
financial investments will be utilized for future exploration efforts.
Whereas the Apollo-Shuttle transition created a gap in U.S. human
access to space, this next transition is creating a gap in direction,
purpose, and in future capabilities.
In order to adequately plan for the future and intelligently deploy
resources, the space community needs to have clear goals.
Up until two years ago, we had a goal. We had a national space
strategy and the plan to support it. Unfortunately, at this point, that
plan no longer exists.
This lack of a unified strategy coupled with the fact that the NASA
transition is being planned without any coordination with industry
leaders, makes it impossible for businesses like mine to adequately
plan for the future.
How can we right-size our businesses and work towards achieving
greatest efficiency if we can't define the future need? This is an
impossible task.
So, faced with this uncertainty, companies like mine continue
fulfilling Constellation requirements pursuant to the Congressional
mandate to capitalize on our investment in this program, but we are
doing so at significantly reduced contractual baseline levels, forcing
reductions in force at both the prime contractor and subcontractor
levels.
This reality reflects the fact that the space industrial base is
not FACING a crisis; we are IN a crisis.
And we are losing a National Perishable Asset ... our unique
workforce.
The entire space industrial base is currently being downsized with
no net gain of jobs. At the same time we are totally unclear as to what
might be the correct levels needed to support the government.
Designing, developing, testing, and manufacturing the hardware and
software to explore space requires highly skilled people with unique
knowledge and technical expertise which takes decades to develop.
These technical experts cannot be grown overnight, and once they
leave the industry, they rarely return. If the U.S. develops a
tremendous vision for space exploration five years from now, but the
people with these critical skills have not been preserved and
developed, that vision will disappear.
We need that vision, that commitment, that certainty right now, not
five or ten years from now, if we are going to have a credible chance
of bringing it to fruition.
In addition to difficulties in retaining our current workforce, the
uncertainty facing the U.S. space program is already having a negative
impact on our industry's ability to attract new talent from critical
science, technology, engineering and mathematics. Young graduates who
may have been inspired to follow STEM education plans because of their
interest in space and space exploration look at the industry now and
see no clear future. This will have implications on the space
industrial base for years to come.
Access to space plays a significant part in the Department of
Defense's ability to secure our nation. The lack of a unified national
strategy brings uncertainty in volume, meaning that fixed costs will go
up in the short term across all customers until actual demand levels
are understood. Furthermore, the lack of space policy will have ripple
effects in the defense budget and elsewhere, raising costs when it is
in everyone's interests to contain costs.
Now, it is of course true that there are uncertainties about the
best way to move forward. This was true in the early days of space
exploration and in the Apollo and Shuttle eras.
Unfortunately, we do not have the luxury of waiting until we have
all the answers. We must not ``let the best be the enemy of the good.''
In other words, selecting a configuration that we are absolutely
certain is the optimum configuration is not as important as
expeditiously selecting one of the many workable configurations, so
that we can move forward.
This industry has smart people with excellent judgment, and we will
figure the details out, but not if we don't get moving soon. NASA must
initiate SLS and MPCV efforts without gapping the program efforts
already in place intended to support Constellation.
The time for industry and government to work together to define
future space policy is now. We must establish an overarching policy
that recognizes the synergy among all government space launch customers
to determine the right sustainable industry size, and plan on funding
it accordingly.
The need to move with clear velocity is imperative if we are to
sustain our endangered U.S. space industrial base, to protect our
national security, and to retain our position as the world leader in
human spaceflight and space exploration. I believe that if we work
together we can achieve these goals.
We are ready to help in any way that we can. But the clock is
ticking.
Thank you again for the opportunity to address the committee today.
I look forward to responding to any questions you may have.

Biography of Mr. Jim Maser, Chairman, Corporate Membership Committee
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics

Jim Maser is President of Pratt & Whitney Rocketdyne (PWR) Inc. a
division of Pratt & Whitney. Jim became President on December 4, 2006,
and is responsible for the design, manufacturing and performance of
power and propulsion systems. Pratt & Whitney Rocketdyne is the world's
premier liquid rocket propulsion technology company, with a foundation
that extends to the beginning of the U. S. space program. PWR products
power the space shuttle, and have powered missions to nearly every
planet in the solar system.
Prior to his current position, Maser served as President and
General Manager of the Sea Launch Company, an international partnership
that launches commercial communications satellites. Under his
leadership, Sea Launch emerged as one of the premier heavy-lift launch
services in the world, earning the company a reputation of reliability
and affordability in a challenging international market.
Following Sea Launch, Maser took his launch vehicle and
entrepreneurial leadership experience to Space Exploration
Technologies, as President and Chief Operating Officer of the start-up
firm, which was selected by NASA to demonstrate delivery and return of
cargo to the International Space Station.
Maser has a strong background as an aerospace engineer with
extensive experience in program management, design and engineering
leadership. Beginning with the Boeing Delta and Evolved Expendable
Launch Vehicle programs in structural design, he became lead of
advanced studies in systems integration and was one of the key
architects of the evolution of Delta II to Delta IV. In 1998, Maser
transitioned from Chief Engineer of Delta III to Chief Engineer of Sea
Launch. Before joining McDonnell Douglas (now Boeing) in the 1980s, he
was a research fellow at NASA/Lewis (now Glenn) Research Center.
Maser graduated magna cum laude from the University of Akron with a
bachelor's degree in Engineering, followed by a master's in
Engineering. He later received a master's degree in Business
Administration from the University of California at Los Angeles. In
2000, the American Institute for Aeronautics and Astronautics honored
Maser with its George M. Low Space Transportation Award.

Chairman Palazzo. Thank you, Mr. Maser. I thank the panel
for their testimony, reminding Members that Committee rules
limit questioning to five minutes.
The Chair will at this point open the round of questions.
The Chair recognizes the chairman of the full Committee on
Science, Space, and Technology, Mr. Hall, for five minutes.
Chairman Hall. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I hope that
none on this Committee nor within the audience or anywhere
mistake my opening remarks as an indication that I am not very
pro-NASA or that I am not an admirer of the Administrator and
each person working there and I am grateful to you for coming
here today, but had I had your opening statements, I would have
had some questions for Mr. Maser when he says you need
instructions. You do have instructions, and we will have some
questions to send to you and to Doug Cooke. I have a question
for Doug, but I will have some questions for you and for Dr.
Pace and we will hope you send them back to us timely. I think
the Chairman is going to instruct you to send them back within
two weeks. but just so we have them to go down the road.
Mr. Cooke, I thank you for your hard work and your
leadership. You have been operating for years using the
previous Constellation contracts that were awarded through the
competitive bidding process, a process that has been voted upon
by Republicans and Democrats alike here. Have you been able to
successfully extend or modify these contracts to reorient work
to support the Space Launch System and the Multi-Purpose Crew
Vehicle?
Mr. Cooke. Chairman Hall, absolutely. We are modifying the
work on these contracts and making sure that they are focused
on our direction ahead toward the SLS and MPCV.
Chairman Hall. Have you found that to be a reasonable and
efficient way to keep the work moving along?
Mr. Cooke. It is----
Chairman Hall. And if not, tell us about it.
Mr. Cooke. Okay. Within the constraints of the laws, we are
able to vector the work. Obviously the contracts that we have
are for the Orion spacecraft and they are for the Ares I launch
vehicle. The Ares launch vehicle, of course, was designed to
carry the crew capsule. The SLS will be a heavy-lift vehicle so
there are differences in the requirements. But many of the
components of Ares I are functionally the same. We are able to
continue work on the solid rocket booster, which was designed
initially as a five-segment booster that could be used on a
heavy-lift vehicle. The work on the Orion vehicle and the
requirements that they are working to are in line with MPCV
requirements that are called out in the authorization act, and
upper-stage work for Ares I includes the J-2X engine, which was
chosen originally to be common with an upper-stage engine that
could be restarted for a heavy-lift vehicle. Manufacturing
techniques that we have developed on the upper-stage tanks have
been very valuable to us and something that we have learned
quite a bit about. The avionics unit is functionally very
similar to what would be needed on a heavy-lift vehicle. A lot
of the functionality is the same, some of the parameters are
different but there are similarities in function with all these
and potentially lead directly to use in the heavy-lift vehicle,
so we have done everything that we know how to continue work on
long-lead items to specifically put tasks in place that are
consistent with where the act has guided us, and in the case of
the MPCV, the requirements are mapping very closely.
Chairman Hall. I thank you, and my time is almost up. I
just want to tell you that I am very hopeful that we can
preserve our position in space, can keep our word with our
foreign partners, and realize that we do need our space station
and need our leadership. We need our missions beyond Earth
orbit, but I think we need to limit those to a time that the
economy might dictate. I have heard it said at home we don't
want you guys going to the moon or to Mars or to some other
mark out there, wherever, until we can go to the grocery store,
and I guess that is what is going to guide us here, the
economy.
But we thank you for your hard work and appreciate your
input, and I yield back my time.
Chairman Palazzo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I now recognize
the Ranking Member, Mr. Costello.
Mr. Costello. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Mr. Cooke, to follow up on Chairman Hall's question about
existing or modified Constellation contracts, Congress, to my
knowledge, has not seen a final ruling from the General Counsel
on whether NASA can use those contracts. I guess, one, the
first question is, has the General Counsel made a decision, and
number two, if so, what is the decision that was made by the
General Counsel? If not, when will the ruling be made?
Mr. Cooke. Where we stand on working with the current
contracts goes along the lines of we have been mapping the
requirements that are for the MPCV and SLS against our current
contracts. For instance, in the case of the MPCV, we have a
procurement determination from the procurement office in
Houston that MPCV requirements are within scope of the Orion
contract. That has been concurred on by my office and with
General Counsel as well as Procurement Officer for NASA. So
that work has gone on. We are doing the same activity with the
SLS in terms of the contracts that we have there including
first stage, including upper stage, J-2X engine and the
avionics unit, so procurement officials at Marshall Spaceflight
Center are mapping those requirements. We have not gotten to
determinations on those. They are a little more complex because
we are moving from the crew launch vehicle to a heavy-lift
vehicle but that work is ongoing. All of this will be brought
forward in the next couple of months as we finish off our
studies that are leading this, and in order to understand the
best approach to fit within the budget with our acquisition and
the actual design.
Mr. Costello. So the bottom line is, some issues have been
resolved internally, others may not have been, but is there a
final ruling on some but not others, and if so, tell us which
ones and which ones have not had a final ruling.
Mr. Cooke. The determination we have is only currently on
the Orion contract. We are still working on the others, and we
will have to go through an acquisition process to work through
the details of those and make sure we understand what we can do
legally.
Mr. Costello. And what are we looking at as far as the
timeline when Congress can expect a final ruling?
Mr. Cooke. Our plan is to complete this work in the spring
and early summer and get back in that time frame.
Mr. Costello. When can we expect to get an exact timeline
and date when NASA will start work on the new vehicle?
Mr. Cooke. That will be determined at the same time frame.
We are trying to bring all these decisions together through a
plan that we have laid out for the next couple of months that
lay out decision time frames that complete work that we have in
contracts supporting the design decisions and also
incorporating the industry studies that we have out that are
contributing to our heavy-lift studies.
Mr. Costello. So the answer is in a few months?
Mr. Cooke. Yes, sir.
Mr. Costello. Let me ask you a final question and ask the
other witnesses the same question. I mentioned in my opening
statement that Congresswoman Giffords had very serious concerns
about current funding levels, and her concerns were if the
current funding levels in fact could accomplish both the heavy-
lift and the Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle, if they really had a
future at current funding levels, and my question to you is, do
they have a future with current funding levels?
Mr. Cooke. That is the subject of these studies as well, to
understand how these design concepts lay out, what they will
cost, and how the work can be phased within the funding levels
that we are looking at in order to understand when we can
produce hardware and lay out the program plans. We need an
integrated program plan, and that is what we are developing
now.
Mr. Costello. Dr. Pace, based upon what you know now, I
would ask you the same question.
Dr. Pace. Well, I read with interest the report that NASA
provided saying that they would have difficulty meeting the
Congressional time schedule at current funding levels, and as
someone who used to deal with cost estimations and
probabilities associated with cost estimations, I think they
were exactly correct. They cannot meet the schedule with
sufficient confidence with the funding levels that they have. I
think that is fairly straightforward. And this is not, I should
say to be fair, not a new problem. Lack of funding from the
Administration, the previous Administration, in which I served,
also led to cost increases in the program. So inefficient
costing and funding schedules create overall costs to rise, so
I don't think they are there now and I think that if they
continue to be underfunded, the overall cost to the Nation if
we continue on that path will be higher. So they need more
funding now to make schedule, and if they don't get it, you
will see costs go up.
Mr. Costello. Mr. Maser?
Mr. Maser. It is a complex question, and ultimately NASA is
the one who has to execute under the budget provided, and in my
opinion, it depends on whether they extrapolate business as
usual into the future or truly move out on what they are saying
is a more efficient approach. Mr. Cooke in his testimony stated
that NASA is working on stepped-up cost savings and measures
that are supposed to be more efficient both internally and
externally. It is not clear how quickly that can be put into
systems and processes, so I would argue that extrapolation of
the past with the current budget would make it challenging with
the timeline but that it could be achieved with an extended
timeline and the right architecture.
Chairman Palazzo. Thank you, Mr. Costello. I now recognize
myself for five minutes.
Mr. Cooke, NASA's preliminary report seems to indicate that
you intend to design a smaller vehicle, around 70 to 100 tons,
than what was envisioned in the authorization. The
authorization assumes a launch vehicle that is designed from
inception as a 130-ton vehicle with an upper stage, but one
that could make use of the core first stage for early flight
testing of the crew capsule. Could you clarify for us how NASA
envisions the design of the space launch vehicle?
Mr. Cooke. Yes, Chairman Palazzo. I realize there is some
confusion over some of this. Actually, in our teams we are
studying design concepts and we really have to design from the
inception for the full capability of 130 metric tons, and our
approach would be--so there is the design aspects and you have
to understand where you are going, which is 130 metric tons.
There is also a discussion in the act about something evolvable
from 70 to 100 metric tons. So basically starting with 130, you
can assemble the components to get the lower-level
capabilities, and if we do that, we can potentially field a
capability earlier at the lower levels of 70 to 100. But
certainly you have to work on the 70- to 100-metric-ton
implementation considering its ultimate capability at the 130-
metric-ton level.
Mr. Maser. I would like to give an industry perspective on
some of the confusion we have around that whole topic. In a
recent March 25th Space Transportation Association luncheon,
Administrator Bolden was quoted as saying ``NASA does not need
130-metric-ton vehicle probably before the next decade.'' He
also was quoted at the Center for Strategic and International
Studies in March saying, ``We are not going to build 130-
metric-ton vehicle; we can't. We continue to negotiate and
discuss with Congress why that is not necessary.''
So in industry what we hear is a lot of discussion about
what we can't do and what we don't want to do, and okay, so
what can we do, what do you want to do and why aren't we being
explicit now, and why aren't we being transparent now. From an
industry perspective, all I know is the shuttle ends in June.
The Constellation is can celled. Tomorrow will be 14 months
with nothing that I would characterize as other than platitudes
on innovation, inspiration, technology, infrastructure,
education but no plan and no direction with a true ominous gap.
The authorization bill is into law. We need to define the
vehicle. It needs to be something that can go beyond low Earth
orbit right from the get-go and we need to get started now.
Chairman Palazzo. Thank you, Mr. Maser.
Now, this question can be for all of you. We understand the
importance of maintaining our aerospace industrial space. For
purposes of today's discussion, how much of that industrial
base is driven by NASA, and if NASA chooses to reduce its
commitment to the Space Launch System and capsule, what happens
to the people who build these systems? To what degree can the
Defense Department and other civil customers absorb these
people and facilities?
Mr. Maser. Okay. Well, from my perspective, I can't speak
for all of AIAA because it varies in terms of the types of
businesses people are in, etc., so as part of United
Technologies and Pratt and Whitney Rocketdyne, from our
perspective, historically NASA has been a majority of our
industrial base, and in fact, not so far ago, maybe 5 to ten
years ago, 75 to 80 percent of our industrial base, and over
time that has reduced down to, say, 50 or 60 percent of our
entire workload industrial base, and we have been working to
build what I would call a mixed portfolio of business. It not
healthy for a business to have that much tied to one single
customer in any way.
But I will say for a Nation from the national standpoint,
that NASA contribution to the industrial base has benefited the
entire Nation's access to space, and we have a chart that shows
that relative to DOD access to space, and we provide the
majority of propulsion for that, but NASA carrying a large
portion of the fixed costs of that industrial base has
benefited DOD in terms of what I would characterize as
subsidies to their costs and have afforded them relatively
attractive pricing in the past. As we look at what the future
looks like, our ability to adjust our fixed costs and
industrial base quickly is somewhat limit, and what happens in
the short run is that we will have to shift some of those costs
to DOD over time. So there is still a net total cost of U.S.
access to space, and I think there is not an integrated view
being looked at that. But to be clear, NASA has supported a
large portion certainly of the liquid propulsion industrial
base, and that is in jeopardy right now.
Chairman Palazzo. Would anybody briefly like to wrap up? I
am over time.
Dr. Pace. Sure. And I think during the Constellation
program when I was at NASA, there was a certain amount of
advocacy for use of EELVs and we were advocates of it and we
did those sorts of trades with the architecture studies. One of
the things that was important to note about the Constellation
architecture was the large use of RS-68 engines built by Pratt
and Whitney Rocketdyne, and that the combination of large buys
for the Constellation program was beneficial to the DOD side.
One of the largest costs in a launch vehicle is the first-stage
engine. The second largest cost in the vehicle is the second-
stage engine. So even though we weren't buying EELVs that would
benefit, I think, parts of DOD, we were supporting the
industrial base. Again, that kind of integrated thinking, I
think, is absolutely necessary, and it is really hard to do it
if we don't have an architecture or direction as to where we
are going. So it is not just a matter of building vehicles, it
is a matter of saying where are they going to go, and what
schedule are they going to be on so you can then get down to
planning what actually makes sense for the industrial base.
Chairman Palazzo. We have a limited amount of time and a
lot of Members have some questions. Thank you all for that. I
will now recognize Mrs. Fudge.
Ms. Fudge. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank all of you
for being here today.
Mr. Cooke, during the Constellation program, the Glenn
Research Center contributed significantly to the success of
various activities including developing, designing and
constructing the 110-foot upper-stage simulator. That simulator
successfully flew on the Ares I-X. Though I am supportive of
the President's budget and new direction for NASA, I feel that
it is important for Glenn to have a role. So my question, what
Space Launch System and Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle project
management responsibilities are envisioned for Glenn?
Mr. Cooke. In terms of the past, I agree with you, the Ares
I-X effort was very significant, the work was excellent, and
the upper stage was incredible. The Glenn Research Center
continues to have service module responsibilities for the crew
vehicle. In terms of the launch vehicle, those assignments will
be worked by Marshall Space Flight Center. There have been on
Ares I assignments at Glenn and the work that was done on Ares
V in the Constellation program, was there as well. So as we get
to final decisions on these vehicles and understand how the
final designs work out, we will be working those assignments.
Ms. Fudge. As you talk about Marshall, let me just ask,
have any other center-specific assignments for SLS or MPCV been
made?
Mr. Cooke. The assignments that we currently have are for
the MPCV leadership at Johnson Space Center, which is where
Orion has been worked from, and the Space Launch System will be
at Marshall Space Flight Center. Those are the primary
assignments that have been made so far. It will depend on final
designs in the future but we will be working with centers
across NASA.
Ms. Fudge. So if those assignments have been made, then
when do you anticipate that the other assignments will be made?
Mr. Cooke. As we get to our final designs and we begin our
implementation phase of the work for the SLS and MPCV, those
assignments will be negotiated as they have been in the
Constellation program, and that will be following the results
of the work that we are currently doing that should end up this
summer.
Ms. Fudge. Lastly, Mr. Cooke, how is Glenn involved in
current trade analysis leading to the final report on the Space
Launch System and the MPCV?
Mr. Cooke. I will have to take that for the record. I am
not sure exactly their participation in that.
Ms. Fudge. And you would get me that information at what
point?
Mr. Cooke. That is a fairly simple request, I think, so it
should be soon.
Ms. Fudge. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Chairman Palazzo. Thank you. I now recognize Mr.
Rohrabacher.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, at times like these, two stories
come to mind which of course many of us already know these
stories, and that is, the first about the gentleman who takes
his son to the Air and Space Museum and is pointing out the
Spirit of St. Louis. He tells his son that this is where
Charles Lindberg, this is the craft Charles Lindberg first was
able to traverse the Atlantic from New York to Paris. The son
asks, well, was it really difficult for him to do that all by
himself, and the father answers it would have been more
difficult with a committee. We have heard that, as well as the
fact that a camel is nothing more than a horse that was
designed by committee. What we have here is a space policy
designed by committee, not just this Committee but the
committee made up of the Senate and the Executive Branch and
people in the private sector who are all trying to get together
to design a horse, and it is turning out to be a camel and I am
not even sure if it is a camel.
Let us take a look at what we are talking about here in
terms of the billions of dollars that are being spent and have
been authorized. Let me just ask, Mr. Cooke, is the heavy lift
that has been authorized for $4 billion, is that heavy lift
absolutely necessary and the money that is being spent in
developing it for other options other than just the immediate
option that is our immediate task of having a backup for taking
people to the International Space Station?
Mr. Cooke. Yes, sir. The heavy-lift vehicle is a necessary
step, probably the most important step in getting beyond low
Earth orbit to other destinations.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Right. But I mean, in terms of space
exploration, are there other options to space exploration
rather than just the building this heavy-lift vehicle or are we
talking about the option that is driving the heavy-lift vehicle
as a backup to manning the International Space Station?
Mr. Cooke. The role for the heavy-lift vehicle as a backup
to transporting cargo or crew to Space Station, using it for
that is inefficient actually. It is more needed for going
beyond low Earth orbit.
Mr. Rohrabacher. That is correct. But let us take a look
now in terms of actual space exploration. Is it possible that
perhaps developing refueling techniques and other such
approaches to deep space exploration might be, let us say, a
better use or a better method of getting to space exploration
rather than just building a big booster like we did with the
Saturn? After all, we did produce a huge vehicle like this
before. Saturn carried 260 tons into orbit, which is much more
than what we are even talking about now for this heavy lift,
and that was 1950s technology. Is there something--haven't we
progressed to the point that there is other technological
alternatives rather than simply having a huge, dumb and
expensive booster?
Mr. Cooke. There are many technologies that are needed for
going beyond low Earth orbit to other destinations. Getting off
the planet is the hardest part, step one, and we have done
extensive studies over the years to look at various
alternatives. Certainly, in-space fueling can augment what you
would do, but ultimately you have to get fuel off the planet to
go into outer space, and one of the biggest components of, say,
a Mars mission is the fuel it takes to get there. So in-space
transportation efficiencies are important but we have found
that even when you sum up all the gains you can get in
efficiencies that we know how to get to with technology, some
of which we don't currently have in hand, it still may take six
or seven heavy-lift boosters to get all the hardware----
Mr. Rohrabacher. When you talk about fuel, we have had some
great advances in nuclear technology that would not only save
Japan from what it is going through right now but permit us to
utilize very safe nuclear engines in space. These technological
advances have been happening just in the last few years, so I
would suggest that we--quite often these debates are taking
place within the mental framework of what is and what is that
was created by technologies of decades ago, and just a concept
here that yes, NASA is really important to develop a workforce
and it is important to our industrial base but we have to
realize that today we also have a great deal of investment
going on. Bigelow, Boeing, SpaceX, ATK, United Space Alliance,
Orbital and many other companies are now emerging as entities
that are investing in developing space technologies. I would
hope that as we plan through this committee process that we
have got our strategy for the future, that we have to realize
that with the type of deficit spending that we now have taking
place in this government, it behooves us to think with new
thinking to bring as many resources into America's space effort
as we possibly can and also make sure that we are cooperating.
If we have three backups to supplying the Space Station, if we
have three backups and one of them happens to be Russian and
the others happen to be American commercial, I would hope hat
we are not wasting billions of dollars simply to have a third
backup which those billions of dollars could go to developing
the technologies we need for new methods of getting into deep
space.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Palazzo. Thank you. I now recognize Mr. Wu.
Mr. Wu. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Pace, I notice from your CV that you have part of your
portfolio in international issues, and I would like to address
a question in that direction, and it is a question for both you
and Mr. Cooke. Dr. Pace, on page 7 of your written testimony
you state, ``If the Administration is truly supportive of
stimulating commercial space transportation, then it needs to
consider where future demand might come from. It is not a
question of choosing between government and commercial
approaches but of government first and then commercial in a
well-considered transition,'' and I just want to point out that
this transition was rolled out by the Administration with no
transition. Congress was surprised. I believe that NASA may
have been surprised. I won't guess or speak for NASA. And I am
very concerned about that. Further on page 7, Dr. Pace, you
discuss the role of international partners in the future and
you state, ``We should consider making greater use of
international partners.''
I have heard from some of our international partners. I was
surprised when I first got calls from the press in other
countries and from some other folks in foreign countries and
then it became apparent to me that we have these partners, I
believe more than 15. I have heard from some of them. Have you
heard from them, and what have you heard? Are they concerned?
And do we run a risk of fracturing this multinational space
coalition which was so painstakingly put together over a period
of 30 years or so, which I view as very important to the future
of human spaceflight. Dr. Pace, you first, then Mr. Cooke, then
you.
Dr. Pace. Thank you for that. It is an excellent question,
and the answer is yes, we are at a risky period. I mean, the
Space Station continued assembly was done in part because we
needed to preserve our international partner commitments. It
was not clear we could finish the Space Station after the
terrible Columbia accident. We did it in part to keep our
commitments to our international partners and they are with us
now on station. But what is happening is with the kind of drift
in the policy approach with discussions of Mars and near-Earth
objects and the Moon is not quite here and we are not sure what
we are doing next. The partners are having to make their own
decisions with their own governments. They have their own
financial problems, their own budgetary issues, and if there is
not clear leadership and direction for the United States, they
each make their own decisions. This is happening in Japan. This
is happening in Europe. Certainly India is making its own
judgments about what to do next.
So there is a very coherent, I thought, international lunar
architecture that had been created through consultations that
have been done over the last several years, and one of the
things that was great about it was that countries at different
levels of capability could participate, yes, the really high-
end countries with manned space capabilities but South Korea,
Brazil, potentially South Africa, other countries could find
small experiments, could find things to participate in. One of
the problems with some of the ambitious statements that the
Administration has made is that inadvertently, I think
unintentionally, excludes a lot of those countries so I would
urge a return to an international lunar architecture and focus
for beyond low Earth orbit. Not only because I think that is
great for the United States but I think it produces more
opportunities than other alternatives for involving countries
and continue to maintain the partnership and build upon the
amazing partnership that has occurred over the last decade.
Mr. Cooke. I would like to add that in our work with the
internationals, we have developed what is called the
International Space Exploration Coordination Group, which does
include 14 space agencies, That group has developed lunar
architecture that Scott Pace mentioned. We are continuing to
work with them on a weekly basis to develop roadmaps for other
destinations. We also talk about potential for flying
instruments on each others' spaceflight, to continue
collaboration, and I have been in discussions with Bill
Gerstenmaier of Space Ops to understand how we can work
exploration-type activities together on Space Station to help
with that coordination. So we are continuing to work with them.
Mr. Wu. Thank you very much.
Mr. Chairman, if you will permit me the liberty of one more
comment. I believe very strongly in a multilateral approach to
human space exploration. I want to leave no doubt about that.
But I don't think that this can occur without American
leadership. My daughter, after attending the last shuttle
launch, bought the book Apollo 13, and like the comment in that
book, ``In this endeavor, failure is not an option,'' and what
is at stake is just as English is the language of air traffic
control, I want English to be the language of space, and that
is what is at risk with this Administration's drifting human
spaceflight policy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Palazzo. You are welcome. I now recognize Mr.
Smith.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Pace, I would like to address first question to you as
well as to the other panelists, and it is this. While the NASA
Authorization Act of 2010 legislates that a heavy-lift launch
vehicle and a Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle be built, Mr. Maser
contends in his testimony, I think it was page 3, ``There does
not seem to be a consensus within the Administration to build
these systems,'' and it seems to me that the NASA Authorization
Act is being ignored by the Administration. If you agree, what
do you think Congress should do about it, perhaps short of
holding the Administration in contempt of Congress? But what
else can we do to get the Administration's attention and to get
them to follow the laws Congress has passed?
Dr. Pace. Well, thank you very much. I can't really speak
for the Administration or speak for NASA. I know that Doug
Cooke's testimony was very detailed on the subjects of what
they are doing with the Space Launch System and Multi-Purpose
Crew Vehicle. What I know is what the Administration proposed
in the fiscal year 2012 budget, and I look at that budget
proposal and it reflects priorities, and their priorities are
fairly clear in terms of additional technology, money that is
not tied to any particular mission, funding for some important
earth science efforts, funding for commercial crew
capabilities, which one can have a discussion as to how ready
they are, and therefore less priority was placed upon the SLS
and Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle.
So I think what Congress can do is look at that priority,
take it into account and then respond through the authorization
and appropriations act with its own priorities. If in fact
Congress does believe what was passed in 2010 represents a
strong bipartisan basis for moving forward, then that needs to
be reflected in what the appropriations do that the Congress--
the Administration has proposed. It is up to the Congress to
dispose and put its priorities in discussion with the
Administration.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Dr. Pace.
Mr. Cooke, Mr. Maser, do you have any other comments or
observations on that?
Mr. Cooke. I would like to say once again, and it is in my
testimony and my opening statement, we are at NASA taking the
authorization act seriously and we are pursuing the concepts
for Space Launch System and the crew vehicle. We have all the
work in place to get us to a solution on that.
Mr. Smith. Thank you. Mr. Maser, since I quoted you, feel
free to respond.
Mr. Maser. Well, it is interesting because I spent a good
portion of my career in commercial space, and actually this is
my first gig in the government space world and I am still
learning quite a bit. In fact, I talked to Dr. Pace and told
him that four years ago I couldn't even spell space policy and
now I appear in the middle of it. So from my private
experience, it is hard for me to understand the situation,
because I guarantee you, in the private world these kind of
situations resolve themselves relatively quickly one way or
another. In the government world, the only thing I can do is
agree with Dr. Pace and that is based on what I have been able
to learn about this process is appropriations would be
necessary. The authorization is law but does not provide the
direction and the funding to go implement that law, and I think
that would be the most expeditious.
Mr. Smith. That is a good point. Thank you, Mr. Maser.
Dr. Pace, let me squeeze in one more question which is
fairly specific and ask you to respond. In your testimony, you
discuss how ``policy instability or lack of clear direction for
NASA over the last 20 years has resulted in at least $21
billion being wasted in various can celled human spaceflight
programs,'' leaving us in a situation today of course where we
are now having to pay Russia millions of dollars to launch our
astronauts into space. Given the crisis and instability
described in today's testimony, is it too late to consider
continuing flying the shuttle orbiters while a concerted effort
is undertaken to build a follow-on vehicle?
Dr. Pace. I have to say that mindful of the Columbia
Accident Investigation Board recommendations, and I can't
really in all good conscience support continuing to fly
shuttles unless there was absolutely no alternative to
supporting the International Space Station. So in that regard,
I think the STS-135 is something I can reluctantly support as a
necessary and important mission. But I do believe there is time
to get back on track, but as Jim Maser is saying, time is
running out for the industrial base to make those decisions.
Decisions are needed really this year, and I think there is an
alternative that continues building on the work of the
Constellation program and that would not require us to go back
and try to keep shuttles flying. I think the SCS-135 we have
got to do but I really don't think we should continue flying
shuttles unless we utterly, utterly have no other choice.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Dr. Pace. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Palazzo. I now recognize the gentlelady from
Maryland, Ms. Edwards.
Ms. Edwards. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the
witnesses for this hearing.
You know, since I came into this Congress, I have been on
this Subcommittee, served as Vice Chair in the last Congress
with Ms. Giffords, and feel like we are in the Groundhog Day
film, you know, going over the same things over and over again.
I want to say a special thank you to the diverse and skilled
and competent workforce. It is a private sector workforce. It
is a public sector workforce. It is small and large businesses.
And I share their uncertainty and confusion because as a Member
of this Committee, I am uncertain and confused about what NASA
is doing with regard to the Exploration program and confused by
an authorization that we passed that in my view NASA seems not
to be following, so I am confused about what authority NASA is
operating under in terms of the continued implementation.
So I want to ask actually a few questions, Mr. Cooke, and
if you aren't able to answer these now or they are in your
written testimony which, you know, I study this testimony and
unfortunately didn't have a chance to review because we didn't
have it, and so I do hope that doesn't happen in the future.
But you issued a reference design for the Space Launch System
with a caveat that you might make changes pending the results
of industry studies. I just wonder if you have seen anything up
to this point that would lead you to alter the reference design
that you had issued.
Mr. Cooke. Right now we are not altering the reference
design. We are updating our understanding of some of the
approaches in design and some of the work that would make it
more efficient. We are also studying alternative designs to do
our homework to make sure that we challenge our own thoughts
and come up with the best answers. So that work is ongoing but
at this point we have not made changes.
Ms. Edwards. So I want to get some clarity then about the
details. I want to go through a series of questions about the
initial heavy-lift capability that you are looking at. Will the
core stage vehicle use liquid oxygen or liquid hydrogen engines
or liquid oxygen rocket propellant?
Mr. Cooke. The core stage on the reference vehicle is
liquid oxygen hydrogen stage. It uses for the 130-metric-tone
case five shuttle-derived engines, the same engines just
adapted for this use.
Ms. Edwards. So you don't have any plans then to change
that part of the reference design?
Mr. Cooke. Not in the reference design.
Ms. Edwards. And then what is the diameter of the core
stage?
Mr. Cooke. The core stage is 27-1/2 feet in diameter. It is
the same dimension as the current shuttle external----
Ms. Edwards. And can you tell us the thrust of the first-
stage engine?
Mr. Cooke. The thrust of the first-stage engine as it is
flown on the shuttle is, I believe, 470,000 pounds of thrust.
Ms. Edwards. And that remains what you are committed to in
the reference design?
Mr. Cooke. That would be the same engine. We would probably
make some modifications for manufacturer ability. Mr. Maser
could comment better on that than I can.
Ms. Edwards. Well, let me just get through. So you
mentioned earlier that you are still committed to a design to
have an upper stage. Is that correct?
Mr. Cooke. Yes. Part of the reference design is an upper
stage that would and currently employs the J-2X engine that we
are developing in current contracts.
Ms. Edwards. And will it use solid rocket boosters?
Mr. Cooke. The reference design does use five-segment solid
rocket boosters that are consistent with the design on Ares I.
Ms. Edwards. And there is nothing up to this point that you
are looking at that would change that commitment?
Mr. Cooke. On the reference vehicle design, that is where
we are. We are looking at slight modifications to it, but for
the reference vehicle design, we are not making big changes to
what I just described. We do have other studies in parallel,
though, that look at liquid oxygen and kerosene approach to the
launch vehicle and we have one that we call modular approach.
Ms. Edwards. I am going to submit some other questions but
just as I run out here, I just wonder if the vehicle is going
to be available under the President's proposed five-year runout
and then if you could tell me about the studies. You said that
a final report would be issued in the spring. Well, we are
hitting on spring, we hope. It doesn't feel like it outside but
we are getting to spring, so can you give us an exact date or
month that we should expect to receive that?
Mr. Cooke. We are aiming right now for late spring, early
summer for the report.
Ms. Edwards. That is a long time. My birthday is in the
late summer. I like that. But can you tell us, I mean, it is
going to be April, is it May, is it June, July, August?
Mr. Cooke. Right now we are shooting to have the report in
the late June time frame. It is a success-oriented approach but
that is our goal.
Ms. Edwards. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Palazzo. I now recognize the gentleman, Mr. Brooks
from Alabama.
Mr. Brooks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have been going over
the more extensive versions of your testimony, and quite
frankly, I find the testimony conflicts somewhat challenging,
and perhaps you all collectively could assist me in better
understanding the true situation. In looking at Doug Cooke's
testimony, for example, he refers to the President's budget
request as a ``vigorous path.'' He also states, ``It is clear
that NASA has a bright future.''
Yet when I look at the testimony of Scott Pace, he states,
``NASA effort to transition from Constellation program designs
to the Space Launch System can be seen as incomplete and
arguably adequate.'' He also states that ``through its budget
proposals, the current Administration has contributed to policy
instability for NASA as a whole, not just in human
spaceflight.'' Further, ``In the fiscal year 2011 proposal of
NASA, the Administration added funds back such that the NASA
top line returned to where it would have been in continuing the
spending levels of the Bush Administration. However, the
composition of spending had changed significantly with
exploration spending dropping.'' And then finally, we have
``Planning for and successfully executing this transition has
been made significantly more challenging by the policy,
programmatic and budget instability of the past two years. As a
result, the United States does not have at present a plausible
architecture and strategy for conducting human missions beyond
low Earth orbit for the next two decades.''
And without belaboring it too much, looking at Jim Maser's
testimony, he notes, ``The United States space community is at
a crossroads and facing an uncertain future that is unlike any
we have seen in decades.'' And Mr. Maser's testimony contains
additional comments to that substance and effect.
When I look at my own experience in communicating with
people who are involved with NASA either as employees or part
of the administration of NASA or some of the subcontractors and
contractors and the employees in and about the Marshall Space
Flight Center in Huntsville, Alabama, I can't help but note
that many of these in the private sector contractors and
subcontractors are being laid off in large numbers. More
recently, we had a $300 million cut in NASA spending by a vote
on the House Floor in which the cut of $300 million was to
instead go to the COPS program, which is a unique local
function, a state government function, while NASA is a unique
federal government function. Yet during the rather vigorous
debate on whether to transfer those $300 million in NASA funds
to the COPS program, it appears that the White House and the
NASA leadership was AWOL on that vote in as much as based on
the testimony previously in this hearing, neither the White
House nor the NASA administration did anything to persuade any
House Members of the effect that $300 million loss in funding
would do to NASA or the contractor and subcontractor community.
And just as an aside, 83 percent of Democrats voted to cut NASA
$300 million in favor of the COPS program while 30 percent of
Republicans similarly voted to make those cuts.
And then in my private communications with contractors and
subcontractors, I see absolutely nothing that suggests optimism
of any significant nature, and I am quite comfortable with any
of you all addressing this situation. But what can you do to
help persuade me that despite these conflicting testimonies and
rather depressing information within the NASA contractor and
subcontractor community that things truly are going to get
better and get better quickly?
Mr. Cooke. Let me try. Obviously we are in tough economic
times. Budgets are scrutinized. We have to make tough choices,
and we do have an authorization act at this point that was
passed by Congress and signed by the President at his
direction. That is a path forward, and we are addressing that
act. The budgets that are available will be negotiated through
our normal budget processes between the Administration and
Congress, and it is my job to implement what we have, and I can
tell you that with all our ability, we are trying to make the
most of what we are given and we are--and in challenging times
we are working very hard to gain efficiencies in how we do our
work and have extensive efforts within the SLS and MPCV
activities to streamline what we do.
So we want to make progress. We want to get to exploration
of space beyond low Earth orbit and within this environment we,
I guarantee you, are working as hard as we can to make progress
down that path.
Mr. Brooks. Well, if I might just add 15 more seconds, Mr.
Chairman, the Apollo program raced to the moon. The
International Space Station, the space shuttle all existed
because of strong, vigorous leadership from the White House,
and if any of you gentlemen have any ideas as to how we can
light a fire under this White House to provide that kind of
similar strong, vigorous leadership, we certainly would as
supporters of the NASA community appreciate that insight.
Chairman Palazzo. The gentlelady from Florida, Ms. Adams.
Mrs. Adams. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you for being here. I come from Florida's 24th
district, home of Kennedy Space Center, and the hardworking men
and women down there who have spent a lifetime, some of them,
working on the shuttle and on the human spaceflights and all of
the flights that we have had coming out of central Florida.
They have concern that they bring it to me, and as I sit here
and listen, I am just amazed because--a couple of questions I
have, and hopefully you can answer them. My colleague was
asking what is your plan to keep human spaceflight, keep us
moving forward, and you said it is tough budget times and you
are working on it, but, you know, President Obama made a speech
about space exploration last year. He committed additional $6
billion over the next five years to the budget. Then the budget
runout proposes $8.5 billion less for NASA over the same five
years. While cutting NASA's budget, the President proposes
sizable budget increases in other federal R&D agencies and
programs, especially climate change where Science Committee
Chairman Ralph Hall's analysis shows there was $36 billion
spent over the last five years. How does this dramatic increase
in climate change research affect the overall budget picture
for NASA? In other words when you are taking away form space
exploration for the benefit of climate change, there are 16
agencies currently doing that. How does that affect your
ability for human spaceflight?
Mr. Cooke. I actually would have to take that for the
record but it includes more than the work I do. My job is to
lead----
Mrs. Adams. Okay. How about this? Do you believe that
affects your ability for human spaceflight to have those funds
sent to another division within NASA?
Mr. Cooke. The amount of money we get obviously affects how
much work we can do, and with the money that we have in our
budget, we are--as I said, we are working to find efficiencies,
to make the most of the budget we have.
Mrs. Adams. Thank you.
Mr. Maser, if we close down all our human spaceflight in
this country, effectively not send anyone into space on
American rockets for 5 or six years, how long would it take us
to ramp up that kind of industrial base again and at what cost
to the industry and to the government?
Mr. Maser. Well, that is a very hard question that
obviously we are trying to avoid, but I believe----
Mrs. Adams. Your best guess.
Mr. Maser. To ramp back up after being shut down for 5 or 6
years?
Mrs. Adams. For 5 to 6 years.
Mr. Maser. You are talking at least six to ten.
Mrs. Adams. And about what cost do you think to the
American people?
Mr. Maser. Well, what is the cost of loss of space
leadership? I can't quantify it in dollars. I can try to get
AIAA to compile that, but that is a tough question to estimate
from a dollar standpoint. I think it stems back to the larger,
what is the cost of abdicating space leadership for this
country.
Mrs. Adams. Dr. Pace, I would like to speak to you a moment
about America's leadership in space. Recently, Space News
published an article accusing the Administration of being
muddled on its China space policy. On the one hand, the
Administration speaks to the concerns about a growing military
in China, the technological advances, and on the other hand
talks about increased cooperation in space. What do you suppose
would happen to America's leadership in space if there were a
Chinese flag planted on the moon and America could not get past
low Earth orbit, or even get astronauts into low Earth orbit on
American rockets?
Dr. Pace. Well, I think it would contribute to a broader
perception of American decline. I certainly have run into lots
of people who feel that that memo has been sent and anybody who
doesn't understand America has declined from its best days just
doesn't understand the situation. I don't agree with those
people and I have some wonderful arguments with them.
I don't mind the Chinese in space so much as I worry about
us not being there with them. The rules in space, the norms of
space are set by those people who show up, not by those people
who aren't there. So I believe that we should be looking for
ways to cooperate with China in science efforts. I think human
spaceflight is too difficult and too hard for lots of reasons.
We should be willing to reach out to them on smaller projects.
But ultimately our fate is in our own hands, and we should be
the ones in space welcoming the Chinese to work with us in
times and places of our choosing, not responding to offers of
them to work with them in times and places of their choosing.
Mrs. Adams. In the article dated on March 28th, it stated
the Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper,
testifying before Congress stated that China poses
``potentially from a capability standpoint a threat to us as a
mortal threat.'' While Clapper went on to note he was
discussing capabilities and not intentions, is it clear that at
the highest reaches of the U.S. government, China's
capabilities both terrestrial and spatial are engendering great
concern. I submit that our agencies are having some serious
discussions, and maybe this Administration needs to listen to
them.
Chairman Palazzo. Does any other Member have a question?
Mr. Costello. Mr. Chairman, I have a final question and
then maybe a comment to follow up on the gentlelady's question
concerning funding, and let me say, Dr. Pace, that I agree with
your last statement concerning the United States and China.
Talking about funding, and this is a question for all three
of you gentlemen, and that is that if in fact NASA were funded
at the 2008 funding levels, what effect will it have on human
space exploration and on the human spaceflight industry, the
industry as a whole and the workforce? And I would ask you, Mr.
Maser, first.
Mr. Maser. Well, certainly it is below the levels we had
anticipated to develop the next-generation launch system.
However, in 2008 at those funding levels, the shuttle was in
operation with the presumption that shuttle is being retired,
and you could reallocate those resources to the next-generation
system. I think it would be very challenging, and I think we
would have to capitalize on the ability to work more
efficiently with our NASA partners and figure out how to
operate within that budget, and so I think we would end up
probably with lower overall industrial base. would it be
devastating? Not as much as the situation we are in right now
where we are doing nothing. And then we would have to look at
timelines and we would have to look at priorities.
I believe--you know, there is a lot of talk about budgets
but I think the reality of the situation, reality that we
haven't faced, at least as a Nation and an industry, is that we
are going to have to figure out how do with the budgets that
are afforded to us by Congress, and I believe a lot can be done
and I believe there is a lot of ways to improve what we can do
with those budgets. So personally from our perspective, if we
headed on a path, we would figure out a way to achieve the same
or similar scope as efficiently as possible. It might take a
little bit longer, maybe with a little bit less people but it
wouldn't be devastating.
Mr. Costello. Dr. Pace?
Dr. Pace. I think the main point is the policy instability
we have had and budgetary instability over the last several
years has been the thing that has imposed additional costs on
NASA. I think NASA is fortunate to receive the funding it does.
While I personally might like to see more, I think that the
funding levels at 2008, 2009 levels, a lot can get done. The
problem that the agency has had is that the composition and
prioritization within the agency have shifted dramatically. The
top lines have gone down, come back up, shot back down again.
So if you are a budget and planning and programmatic person
such as Doug Cooke and his staff, it is an incredibly difficult
environment to work in. So policy stability and direction at
whatever level of funding the Congress is willing to support
and then maintain time on target for a couple of years to make
progress, that is probably the most important contribution that
can be made and I think there is still hope for that.
Mr. Costello. Mr. Cooke?
Mr. Cooke. Yes. Certainly I would agree with Mr. Maser that
regardless of funding levels, we would work to do our best to
make as much progress as possible. Dr. Pace points out an
important fact that when you start working with the top level,
then it matters how it is allocated within the agency. If I
just look at the funding that we have, if the allocations were
such that we had what we had in 2008, it is $200 million or
$300 million less than we have right now this year, last year
and next probably in that category. So it does matter how it is
allocated. We would obviously do our best. The further it
drops, the less we get done in a period of time.
Mr. Costello. I thank you.
Mr. Chairman, let me just comment. When we are talking
about the authorization and the intent of Congress, I agree
with someone who suggested that the way to make certain that
the authorization is followed by the agency is through the
appropriations process, and I would suggest that that is where
we ought to be talking as far as the intent of the
authorization, making sure that the appropriators understand
that and look at the 2010 authorization.
And finally, Mr. Cooke, let me commend you for your
service. I understand that you have announced your retirement
and that you are moving on, and you have had a distinguished
career with the agency, and I think Chairman Hall said earlier
that his remarks were not directed at you personally, and I
have said the same thing, but you had a distinguished career
and you have done, in my judgment, an excellent job for the
agency and for the taxpayers, and I wish you well in the
future.
Mr. Cooke. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Palazzo. Thank you for that, Mr. Costello, and I
am sure the entire Committee appreciates your service over the
years. Thank you for your commitment and your dedication.
I want to thank all the witnesses for their valuable
testimony here today, and the Members for their questions and
their patience for the time overruns. It was a great exchange
of information, and this membership has no lack of passion in
finding solutions to NASA's problems.
The Members of the Subcommittee may have additional
questions for the witnesses, and we will ask you to respond to
those in writing. The record will remain open for two weeks for
additional comments from Members.
The witnesses are excused and this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:42 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

Appendix:

----------

Answers to Post-Hearing Questions

Responses by Mr. Douglas Cooke, Associate Administrator, Exploration
Systems Mission Directorate, National Aeronautics and Space
Administration

Questions for the Record from Chairman Steven Palazzo

Q1. What concrete steps is NASA taking, or planning to take, to
minimize delays and disruptions in the transition from Constellation
program to the Space Launch System?

A1. The President is committed to ensuring America's continued
preeminence in space and launching a new era of human spaceflight that
takes us beyond where we have ever explored before. Space exploration
inspires the next generation of scientists and engineers and
contributes to important discoveries about Earth and the solar system
as well as innovation that grows our economy and creates jobs. NASA
shares Congress' goal of restoring our Nation's human space launch and
exploration capabilities as soon as possible and is committed to
implementing the Space Launch System (SLS) that Congress authorized in
the NASA Authorization Act of 2010. NASA is also committed to
responsible stewardship of taxpayer dollars. Especially in these fiscal
times, we must be prudent so that our space exploration program remains
sustainable in the long run.
Over the last several months, NASA has evaluated options for
developing an integrated and incremental development approach for the
SLS, Multipurpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) and their associated support
elements that will be capable of achieving progress in an incremental
and sustainable manner.
On May 24, 2011, NASA announced its decision to accept the Orion-
based reference vehicle design, first outlined in NASA's January 2011
report to Congress, as the Agency's MPCV. NASA further determined that
the contractual partnership with Lockheed Martin Corporation maps well
to the scope of the MPCV requirements outlined in the NASA
Authorization Act of 2010 and the current contract will be used for the
development phase of the MPCV.
On September 14, 2011, NASA announced its selection of the design
for a new space exploration system that will take humans far beyond
Earth. This important decision will create high-quality jobs here at
home and provide the cornerstone for America's future human space
exploration efforts. This new heavy-lift rocket will be America's most
powerful since the Saturn V rocket that carried Apollo astronauts to
the moon and will be capable of launching humans to places no one has
gone before, such as asteroids, Mars and other deep space destinations.
In combination with the crew capsule already under development,
increased support for the commercialization of astronaut travel to low
Earth orbit, an extension of activities on the International Space
Station until at least 2020, and a fresh focus on new technologies-
this rocket is key to implementing the plan laid out by President Obama
and Congress in the bipartisan NASA Authorization Act of 2010, which
the President signed last year.
This launch vehicle decision is the culmination of a months-long,
comprehensive review of potential designs to ensure that the nation
gets the best possible rocket for the investment-one that is not only
powerful but is also evolvable so it can be adapted to different
missions as opportunities arise and new technologies are developed.
The rocket will use a liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen fuel
system, where RS-25D/E engines will provide the core propulsion and the
J2X engine is planned for use in the upper stage. There will be a full
and open competition to develop the boosters based on performance
requirements. Its early flights will be capable of lifting 70-100
metric tons before evolving to a lift capacity of 130 metric tons.
The early developmental flights may take advantage of existing
solid boosters and other existing hardware, which will help us control
costs and make early tests smoother.
NASA has continued important work on existing Ares and Shuttle
contracts that will benefit the SLS, including:

Assembly of the Orion Ground Test Article was
recently completed and it is being prepared for a series of
ground-based environmental tests to validate the Orion design
and computer models;

The former Ares Project focused their development
efforts on technologies and processes that could be utilized in
the eventual SLS configuration, including vehicle avionics, J-
2X engine testing, first stage motor testing (Development
Motor-3), and installation of upper stage tooling applicable to
large-diameter tanks; and

Significant progress has been made in the
modifications to Pad B at Launch Complex 39 at Kennedy Space
Center in Florida. There are new fiber optic cables replacing
copper wire, new digital control systems for the pad utilities,
and a state of the art lightning protection system that helped
us clear the Shuttle during STS-135 processing. These
modifications have been done in continued preparation for clean
pad, multi-user capability including SLS.

Q2. Your testimony states that NASA is considering infrastructure
consolidation as part of the SLS program. What infrastructure
consolidations are being considered and what are their anticipated cost
savings?

A2. Moving forward on the SLS, one of NASA's greatest challenges will
be to reduce the development and operating costs (both fixed and
recurring) for human spaceflight missions to sustain a long-term U.S.
human spaceflight program. We must plan and implement an exploration
enterprise with costs that are credible and affordable for the long
term under constrained budget environments.
NASA is currently assessing a number of potential opportunities for
reducing the institutional costs associated with developing, producing,
and operating SLS. For example:

Stennis Space Center: NASA continues to partner with
other federal government and commercial customers to maximize
utilization of the rocket test facilities at Stennis. United
Launch Alliance and the Air Force already utilize test stand
capabilities there, including the B1 test stand for RS-68
testing and the E-complex for component and small-thrust
testing. NASA is currently considering other potential
opportunities for sharing capabilities. In addition, NASA is
continuing to bring the A-3 test stand, which is under
construction and which NASA does not require for near-term
altitude testing, to a level that is safe to put in extended
standby until a future use is identified.

Kennedy Space Center: As part of the 21st Century
Ground Systems Program initiative to recapitalize the launch
capabilities at KSC, NASA continues to seek additional users
and innovative uses for KSC infrastructure and capabilities,
including SLS, in an effort to increase operational efficiency
and reduce the launch costs for all customers. Discussions with
potential government and commercial users were initiated in FY
2010 and continue today.

Michoud Assembly Facility: We are looking for
additional Government and non-Government users for that
facility.

As part of Shuttle transition and retirement, a wide
range of facilities are being considered for retirement.

At the Agency-level, capabilities forums are
conducted to examine needs for facilities with the objective to
consolidate and retire those not needed.

Several of NASA's current industry partners such as ATK and Pratt
Whitney Rocketdyne are also looking at infrastructure reduction,
streamlining and consolidation to help reduce their fixed costs. In
addition to prudent consolidation of infrastructure, the SLS Program
will continue to examine ways to increase efficiency and agility to
deliver an affordable and achievable heavy-lift system as soon as
possible. Examples being considered in formulating SLS plans include
the following:

Using common parts and common designs across the
Government to reduce costs;

Conducting insight/oversight activities of our
contract partners in a smarter way, thereby using our resources
more appropriately to focus on the high-risk items; and

Ensuring that there are no unique configurations or
developments that do not end up directly supporting the final
system.

Q3. What FY 2011 funds have been allocated to date on the SLS and MPCV
projects?

A3. Please see the attached charts.

Q4. The Department of Defense and National Reconnaissance Office
recently committed to buying eight Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle
(EELV) cores per year for each of the next five years. NASA did not
commit to any purchases, and plans to rely on the NASA Launch Services
2 contract for future acquisitions. What is the rationale for this
decision and what is the cost savings, if any, resulting from this
decision?

A4. On March 10, 2011, NASA, the U.S. Air Force (USAF), and the
National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) signed a Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) related to Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles
(EELVs). The MOU included USAF and NRO commitments to procure booster
cores during FY 2013 through FY 2017, subject to Milestone Decision
Authority. At the time of signing this agreement, the NASA requirements
for procurement of EELV booster cores had already been fulfilled
through FY 2015, with one EELV procurement in FY 2011 and two EELV
procurements in FY 2012. The NASA manifest beyond 2015 was not firm
enough to commit to the procurement of further EELV booster cores
during the FY 2013 to FY 2019 timeframe. NASA informed the Department
of Defense (DOD) of its projected EELV procurements so that DOD could
factor them into its planning.
The majority of NASA's missions are not EELV-class payloads, and
the Agency's requirements for launches on EELVs (i.e., Atlas V and
Delta IV launch vehicles) have historically been one or two launches
per year.
Further, while the USAF and NRO launch payloads are specifically
designed to be flown on EELVs, it is not a foregone conclusion that a
NASA payload will be flown on an EELV. NASA procures its missions,
consistent with the Commercial Space Act of 1998 (Public Law 105-303),
through the NASA Launch Services II (NLS II) contract during a
competition amongst the launch service contractors available on this
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Part 12 contract. There are four
contractors available to bid on NASA missions.
Finally, in addition to the USAF and NRO booster core commitment,
the EELV MOU also established the jointly-chaired Government Expendable
Launch Vehicle (ELV) Executive Board as a forum for interagency
communication of acquisition, certification, and programmatic ELV
launch issues. This forum will be used by NASA to formally notify the
ELV Executive Board (including DOD and NRO) of its intent to procure
EELV booster cores so these launch service requirements can be taken
into account along with a DOD ``block buy'' commitment, and thereby
benefit all parties.
Regarding cost savings, the NLS II contract enables NASA to
continue to procure EELVs in a ``commercial'' manner and pay only the
launch infrastructure cost associated with the NASA EELV launch flow
(approximately $15 million per mission). In addition, the NLS II
contract contains a ``most favored customer'' clause. This clause
requires all NLS providers, including ULA, to charge NASA the same
equivalent price for the basic launch service. The clause states:
``The Contractor hereby certifies the CLIN [Contract Line Item
Number] prices for standard launch services (including standard mission
integration) under this contract are no higher than the lowest price
charged to any other commercial or U.S. Government customer for an
equivalent launch service during the twelve (12) months both preceding
and following contract award, or placement of a launch service task
order. The Government shall be entitled to a one-time reduction in
contract price for each standard launch service failing to meet this
certification. The price credit will be equal to the difference between
the standard launch service price under this contract and the lower
price awarded for an equivalent launch service.''
Thus, any NASA-procured EELV booster cores bought on the NLS II
contract during the USAF block buy timeframe will receive the
discounted pricing.
Background on NASA Launch Services
The Commercial Space Act of 1998 requires NASA and other Federal
agencies to plan missions and procure space transportation services
from U.S. commercial providers to the maximum extent practicable;
Section 202 of Public Law 105-303 defines space transportation services
as a ``commercial item.'' The NASA Launch Service Program at Kennedy
Space Center acquires these commercial launch services for NASA-owned
and NASA-sponsored payloads through multiple Indefinite Delivery
Indefinite Quantity Task Order contracts with negotiated not-to-exceed
(NTE) prices. These NASA Launch Service (NLS) contracts provide launch
services on a firm, fixed-price basis and incorporate best commercial
practices to the maximum extent possible.
The NLS contracts have been the primary mechanism to procure
commercial launch services since June 2000. The original NLS contract's
ordering period expired in June 2010. The NLS II follow-on contract was
awarded in September 2010, and is essentially a continuation of the NLS
contract. There are currently four providers on the NLS II contract:
United Launch Alliance (ULA), Orbital Sciences Corporation (OSC), Space
Exploration Technologies (SpaceX) and Lockheed Martin. To obtain an NLS
contract, each provider had to meet the minimum qualification criteria,
including being ISO9001 third-party certified and being a domestic
source that is more than 50 percent owned by United States nationals.
NASA-owned and NASA-sponsored launch services are competitively
procured on the NLS contracts in accordance with FAR Part 12 through
the competitive Launch Service Task Order (LSTO), using specific
mission requirements. Each NLS provider is given fair opportunity to be
considered for each task order provided they have had one successful
flight prior to submittal of an LSTO proposal. The NLS providers are
required to propose on all task orders unless the NLS Contracting
Officer waives the requirements for legitimate reasons (e.g., limited
capacity to perform, excessive performance capability, first successful
flight not achieved). Evaluation and award is based on Best Value to
the Government, considering standard proposal evaluation factors:
technical capability/risk; reasonableness of proposed price; and past
performance. The NASA LSP negotiates launch prices for its missions
through the LSTO process. The NLS contacts have a pre-negotiated set of
NTE prices for the standard launch services, however, the contractors
may propose (and, previously, have proposed) a lower price than the NTE
prices.

Questions for the Record from Rep. Sandy Adams

Q1. Is NASA using the budget direction given by the NASA Authorization
Act or direction given by OMB when doing its budget analysis of the SLS
and MPCV?

A1. NASA remains committed to the faithful execution of the NASA
Authorization Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-267), and the FY 2011 Full-Year
Continuing Appropriations Act (P.L. 112-10). NASA has taken both laws
into account when conducting ongoing schedule and cost analyses for the
SLS and MPCV systems and their associated elements. Given that these
Programs are multi-year endeavors, NASA must also take into account
projections for funding in FY 2012 and out--projections that are
included as part of any annual President's budget request.

Q2a. There are currently 16 agencies doing climate change research.
NASA has seen an increase in funding for climate change research and a
decrease in funding for space exploration. How has the shift in funding
from exploration and toward climate change research impeded your
ability to advance human space flight?

A2a. The President's FY 2012 budget request continues the Agency's
focus on a reinvigorated path of innovation and technological discovery
leading to an array of challenging destinations and missions that
increases our knowledge, develop technologies to improve life, to
expand our presence in space for knowledge and commerce, and that will
engage the public.
NASA's budget reflects a balance of human space flight, science,
aeronautics and technology development. The request prioritizes the
International Space Station--and the safety and efficacy of its
associated functions as well as a strong commitment to human
spaceflight beyond low Earth orbit. It establishes critical priorities
and invests in the technologies and excellent science, aeronautics
research, and education programs that will help us in the future. The
request supports an aggressive launch rate over the next two years with
about 40 U.S. and international missions to the ISS, for science, and
to support other agencies.
The proposed FY 2012 budget funds all major elements of the
Authorization Act, supporting a diverse portfolio of programs, while
making difficult choices to fund key priorities and reduce other areas
in order to invest in the future. NASA's mission remains fundamentally
the same as it always has been and supports our new vision statement --
``To reach for new heights and reveal the unknown so that what we do
and learn will benefit all humankind.''

Q2b. What steps are being taken today to minimize the gap between the
final shuttle flight and the operational capability of the SLS/MPCV?

A2b. The President is committed to ensuring America's continued
preeminence in space and launching a new era of human spaceflight that
takes us beyond where we have ever explored before. Space exploration
inspires the next generation of scientists and engineers and
contributes to important discoveries about Earth and the solar system
as well as innovation that grows our economy and creates jobs. NASA
shares Congress' goal of restoring our Nation's human space launch and
exploration capabilities as soon as possible and is committed to
implementing the Space Launch System (SLS) that Congress authorized in
the 2010 NASA Authorization Act. NASA is also committed to responsible
stewardship of taxpayer dollars. Especially in these fiscal times, we
must be prudent so that our space exploration program remains
sustainable in the long run.
Over the last several months, NASA has evaluated options for
developing an integrated and incremental development approach for the
SLS, Multipurpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) and their associated support
elements that will be capable of achieving progress in an incremental
and sustainable manner.
On May 24, 2011, NASA announced its decision to accept the Orion-
based reference vehicle design, first outlined in NASA's January 2011
report to Congress, as the Agency's MPCV. NASA further determined that
the contractual partnership with Lockheed Martin Corporation maps well
to the scope of the MPCV requirements outlined in the NASA
Authorization Act of 2010 and the current contract will be used for the
development phase of the MPCV.
On September 14, 2011, NASA announced its selection of the design
for a new space exploration system that will take humans far beyond
Earth. This important decision will create high-quality jobs here at
home and provide the cornerstone for America's future human space
exploration efforts. This new heavy-lift rocket will be America's most
powerful since the Saturn V rocket that carried Apollo astronauts to
the moon and will be capable of launching humans to places no one has
gone before, such as asteroids, Mars and other deep space destinations.
In combination with the crew capsule already under development,
increased support for the commercialization of astronaut travel to low
Earth orbit, an extension of activities on the International Space
Station until at least 2020, and a fresh focus on new technologies-
this rocket is key to implementing the plan laid out by President Obama
and Congress in the bipartisan NASA Authorization Act of 2010, which
the President signed last year.
This launch vehicle decision is the culmination of a months-long,
comprehensive review of potential designs to ensure that the nation
gets the best possible rocket for the investment-one that is not only
powerful but is also evolvable so it can be adapted to different
missions as opportunities arise and new technologies are developed.
The rocket will use a liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen fuel
system, where RS-25D/E engines will provide the core propulsion and the
J2X engine is planned for use in the upper stage. There will be a full
and open competition to develop the boosters based on performance
requirements. Its early flights will be capable of lifting 70-100
metric tons before evolving to a lift capacity of 130 metric tons.
The early developmental flights may take advantage of existing
solid boosters and other existing hardware, which will help us control
costs and make early tests smoother.
NASA has continued important work on existing Ares and Shuttle
contracts that will benefit the SLS, including:

Assembly of the Orion Ground Test Article was
recently completed and it is being prepared for a series of
ground-based environmental tests to validate the Orion design
and computer models;

These capabilities will be brought online as soon as feasible.

Q3. In your testimony to the subcommittee, you said in response to a
question about how FY 2008 funding levels would affect NASA:
``regardless of funding levels we would work to do our best to make
as much progress as possible. And Dr. Pace points at an important fact
that when you start working with the top level then it matters how it`s
allocated within the agency. ''
NASA's human spaceflight programs are undergoing a once in a
generation upheaval not seen since the end of the Apollo program. Why
hasn't NASA and the Administration acknowledged this unique situation
and reprioritized funding from other directorates to permit a more
reasonable transition and adhere to the guidance of the Authorization
Act?

A3. The President's FY 2012 budget request continues the Agency's focus
on a reinvigorated path of innovation and technological discovery
leading to an array of challenging destinations and missions that
increases our knowledge, develop technologies to improve life, to
expand our presence in space for knowledge and commerce, and that will
engage the public.
NASA has an incredible balance of human spaceflight, science,
aeronautics and technology development. The request prioritizes the
International Space Station--and the safety and efficacy of its
associated functions as well as a strong commitment to human
spaceflight beyond low Earth orbit. It establishes critical priorities
and invests in the technologies and excellent science, aeronautics
research, and education programs that will help us in the future. The
request supports an aggressive launch rate over the next two years with
about 40 U.S. and international missions to the ISS, for science, and
to support other agencies.
The proposed FY 2012 budget funds all major elements of the
Authorization Act, supporting a diverse portfolio of programs, while
making difficult choices to fund key priorities and reduce other areas
in order to invest in the future. NASA's mission remains fundamentally
the same as it always has been and supports our new vision statement --
``To reach for new heights and reveal the unknown so that what we do
and learn will benefit all humankind.''

Questions for the Record from Acting Ranking Member Jerry F. Costello

Q1. What is the primary mission that is leading to the requirements
for the initial capability of the Space Launch System (SLS) and Multi-
Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV)? What is the target date for that mission
and what has NASA determined as the subsequent missions for the initial
SLS and MPCV capability and when will those missions occur?''

A1. NASA plans to launch an initial uncrewed test flight of an
integrated early version of the SLS and the MPCV as early as 2017. At
present, as designated by the President, a key early destination for
human flight beyond LEO is a crewed flight to an asteroid by 2025.
Other destinations to follow could include cis-lunar space such as the
Earth-Moon Lagrange points, the lunar surface, and eventually Mars and
its moons.

Q2. Please describe in concrete terms what NASA is evaluating as it
reviews Constellation contracts for potential translation to the SLS?
What would be a definitive reason for not being able to transfer or
modify Shuttle and Ares-I contracts for work on SLS?

A2. Analysis has been performed to make an assessment of contract scope
to determine whether or not the SLS requirements are within the
existing scope of the Ares contracts. If they are within the general
scope of the existing contract(s), then it would be permissible to
utilize the Ares contract(s) to accomplish SLS effort. If the analysis
determines that the effort represents a material departure from the
general scope of the original contract, then Federal Acquisition
Regulations require competition or execution of a Justification for
Other than Full and Open Competition prior to using the Ares contract
for SLS effort. This analysis has been accomplished on a contract-by-
contract basis.
NASA procurement teams have mapped SLS requirements. NASA has
reviewed each element of Ares (First Stage, Upper Stage, Upper Stage J-
2X engine, and avionics) and Shuttle Program contracts (Space Shuttle
Main Engines, External Tank, solid rocket booster) to determine whether
the new SLS requirements would be within scope of current contracts. At
the same time, NASA has assessed SLS competition options, including the
potential degree of competition.

Q3. What could be done with the projected level of resources in the FY
2012 budget request in terms of building an operational capability for
the SLS and MPCV and when would that operational capability be
achieved?

A3. The President's FY 2012 Budget requested $1.0 billion for the MPCV
and $1.80 billion for SLS. NASA's direction to expedite development of
the two programs is consistent with the NASA Authorization Act of 2010.
With funds requested in FY 2012, the MPCV Program will do a series
of tests on the crew module ground test article that will determine how
the integrated crew module and launch abort system respond to
environmental and structural tests. In addition, the heat shield
carrier structure will be finalized and integrated into the ground test
article and taken to Langley Research Center for a series of water drop
tests, which will mimic the landing conditions Orion will be subjected
to. The program is also planning to conduct a series of parachute drop
tests, wind tunnel tests, and arch jet tests. All of these will inform
the most important milestone for the program in 2012 which is to begin
building the components and manufacturing of the first space worthy
Orion crew vehicle. This includes the integration of avionics,
software, hardware and outfitting the module.
With funds requested in FY 2012, the Space Launch System Program
will make significant programmatic and technical progress in FY 2012
toward a heavy lift operational capability, to include a System
Requirements Review early in the fiscal year, enabling a System
Definition Review in mid-2012. Current acquisition planning activities
will lead to procurements necessary for the Design, Development, Test
and Evaluation of systems for initial SLS test flights.
Specific activities include refurbishment, fabrication and casting
of Booster Qualification Motor (QM-1) for initial test flight
application. Test and evaluation of the first J-2X development engine
plus manufacturing and test of the second J-2X development engine and
the J-2X powerpack assembly will occur in FY 2012, as well as design
and development of core stage engines for initial test flights and
evolved heavy lift capability. MPCV Adapter SRR and SDR are also
planned for FY 2012, as well as initial design and development of
payload adapter and fairing. And finally, design and development of
baseline SLS Avionics and software, applicable to initial test flights
as well as an evolved capability vehicle, and preparation for SLS
avionics Preliminary Design Review will be achieved in FY 2012.
In order to meet our flight test schedule, all of these milestones
provided for in the FY 2012 budget request will need to be
accomplished. The intent of the President's budget request and of NASA
planning (and the earliest we can prudently estimate given the scale of
SLS development) is to conduct the first uncrewed flight test of an
MPCV atop the SLS by the end of calendar year 2017 and the first crewed
flight test in 2021.

Q4. Mr. Maser said in his prepared statement that if NASA is relieved
of Constellation obligations, industry needs to know how the workforce
will be transitioned and how the many investments will be utilized for
future exploration efforts. Will industry have those answers when you
provide your report to us in the late June timeframe? If not, what
other activities and decisions are needed and when will those be
completed?

A4. NASA has been preparing for Space Shuttle retirement since 2004,
including conducting ongoing activities to facilitate transition of
both key NASA civil service employees and contractor employees to other
programs. The passage of the NASA Authorization Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-
267) has provided valuable direction to the Agency and improved its
ability to make workforce planning decisions. With this guidance, NASA
has continued its efforts to map out the transition of its human
spaceflight workforce from the Space Shuttle and Constellation
programs. This effort is reflected in the Agency's update to its
Workforce Transition Strategy report, provided to Congress in
September, 2011. The first three editions of this report may be viewed
at the website below, under ``Workforce Highlights--View Archives.''
These reports provide details on NASA's initiatives to assist with
workforce transition.

http://www.nasa.gov/transition/

On May 24, 2011, NASA announced its decision to accept the Orion-
based reference vehicle design, first outlined in NASA's January 2011
report to Congress, as the Agency's MPCV. NASA further determined that
the contractual partnership with Lockheed Martin Corporation maps well
to the scope of the MPCV requirements outlined in the NASA
Authorization Act of 2010 and the current contract will be used for the
development phase of the MPCV. As such, the MPCV Program will continue
the roles and responsibilities currently performed by the Orion civil
service workforce amongst the NASA field centers.
On September 14, 2011, NASA announced its selection of the design
for a new space exploration system that will take humans far beyond
Earth. This important decision will create high-quality jobs here at
home and provide the cornerstone for America's future human space
exploration efforts. The rocket will use a liquid hydrogen and liquid
oxygen fuel system, where RS-25D/E engines will provide the core
propulsion and the J2X engine is planned for use in the upper stage.
There will be a full and open competition to develop the boosters based
on performance requirements. Its early flights will be capable of
lifting 70-100 metric tons before evolving to a lift capacity of 130
metric tons.
NASA intends to maximize efficiency and minimize cost by leveraging
investments in legacy space launch systems, as the investments are
determined to be in the best interest to NASA, while using evolutionary
advancements in launch vehicle design. Additionally, NASA will employ
modern manufacturing and processing techniques, improved insight/
oversight practices, and streamlined infrastructure requirements.
Through this approach, NASA will employ key components of the existing
industrial base and will utilize the critical skills and knowledge base
of the NASA civil service and contractor workforce.
NASA procurement teams have mapped SLS requirements. NASA has
reviewed each element of Ares (First Stage, Upper Stage, Upper Stage J-
2X engine, and avionics) and Shuttle Program contracts (Space Shuttle
Main Engines, External Tank, SRB) to determine whether the new SLS
requirements would be within scope of current contracts. At the same
time, NASA has assessed SLS competition options, including the
potential degree of competition. Final acquisition decisions for the
SLS are expected to be made this fall. Until that time, NASA cannot
predict what industry workforce impacts there would be.
With regard to civil servants, NASA's civil servants across the
Agency should feel confident that there is exciting and meaningful work
for them to do following the retirement of the Shuttle and the
transition from Constellation, and the shift from assembly of the ISS
toward ISS operations. Turning the Agency's focus toward a more
capability-driven exploration architecture will offer far-ranging
opportunities for the creative and skilled civil servant workforce
across the Agency. There will be opportunities for them to apply their
cross-cutting talents to new challenges, such as developing and
demonstrating prototypes for human capabilities needed for beyond-LEO
exploration. Here are just a few examples of enabling capabilities that
must be developed before NASA can send crews beyond LEO--work that will
be managed by the new Advanced Exploration Systems (AES) Program:

Developing and testing components for an advanced
spacesuit to improve the ability of astronauts to assemble and
service in-space systems, and to explore the surfaces of the
Moon, Mars and asteroids;

Developing design concepts for future space
exploration vehicles and deep-space habitats; and

Conducting ISS and ground-based analog testing to
validate operational concepts for long-duration missions.

Q4. How will lessons learned from the workforce, design and
development work, and the management of Constellation be transferred to
the SLS and MPCV programs? What are the most important take-away
lessons from Constellation at this point?

A4. In planning the SLS and MPCV programs, NASA is taking to heart one
of the key lessons of the Constellation Program--that a successful
space launch system must be affordable, sustainable and realistic. The
NASA Administrator has made clear that he will not propose a human
spaceflight program that he is not fully confident he can deliver.
Much of what Constellation has accomplished is indeed transferable
to the SLS and MPCV programs. For example, after rigorous analysis, the
Orion design and contract was found to be the correct technical answer
for the MPCV. The J2-X engine development originally initiated as part
of the former Ares Project is absolutely applicable to our needs for
the heavy lift vehicle, as are the avionics for the Upper Stage.
Additionally, the five-segment booster that continues to undergo
development and testing will support our early flights while a
competition for advanced boosters is initiated and awarded. Much of
what is transferable is not just hardware, validated requirements and
infrastructure elements, but also less tangible items such as knowledge
and experience gained by our team with the Constellation Systems being
developed; from better understanding of the role of Government through
refined insight/oversight models to advanced manufacturing techniques
for the Upper Stage. As we work to close out the Constellation Program
we are also taking care to capture and build upon Program
accomplishments, especially those technologies that have a high
likelihood of feeding forward into the SLS and MPCV programs.
From the beginning, the Constellation Program used electronic
records and a centralized database to capture and manage all data,
risks and knowledge learned, including information from test flights,
hardware and software tests and programmatic reviews. Therefore, there
is a wealth of information that the Program will be able to pass on to
future human spaceflight developers, including those at NASA and those
in the U.S. aerospace industry, when allowable by law.
The Constellation Program also can be credited with helping to
reinvigorate NASA's technical base. Following the development of the
Shuttle, NASA's human spaceflight launch community focused on
operations rather than development in that we were no longer a robust
developmental Agency in terms of developing crew-launch systems, but
rather an operationally-focused human spaceflight Agency. As such, the
Constellation Program enabled us to re-learn how to build a crew launch
system, beginning from the earliest stages of formulation and advancing
through multiple key project review checkpoints and ultimately to the
point where NASA, along with its industry partners, had built hardware
and integrated systems that were used on two major test flights, the
Ares I-X flight and the Pad Abort 1 (PA-1) flight for the Orion Launch
Abort System (LAS). Each of these test flights produced substantial
data that will be of great use to the MPCV and the SLS programs.
Additionally, the Constellation Program allowed us to incorporate
new technologies and testing methods that will certainly become the
norm as we move forward with SLS and MPCV. Historically speaking,
during the Apollo era, NASA had comparatively little experience with
in-flight aborts and limited computational capability. Today, however,
flight tests are being combined with advanced simulation tools and
advanced computers, thereby allowing NASA to conduct a more thorough
analysis of hardware and software elements and operating processes. In
fact, the increased accuracy of our computer modeling scenarios has
allowed NASA to forgo more expensive ground tests in some cases, and we
expect to see this trend continue with the SLS and MPCV programs,
whenever possible without sacrificing safety.
Going forward, SLS and MPCV will continue to focus on a risk-
informed design approach, as Constellation has done, thus helping the
Agency achieve its goal of increasing astronaut safety on the next-
generation human spaceflight system, relative to Shuttle missions. As
such, NASA will continue to design systems with an overriding priority
given to crew safety at every stage of the design and operational
process. In doing so, we will design systems to be as inherently safe
as we can make them; we will eliminate known risks and hazards; and
then we will add backup such as an abort system to mitigate residual
risks. In addition to leveraging heritage systems, when feasible, NASA
will continue to utilize improved computer modeling to help identify,
reduce and eliminate or mitigate hazards and risk. Additionally, we
will continue to tightly interweave design and safety team members into
the decision-making process, thereby allowing them to work with design
engineers to provide expertise and feedback via various assessments and
analysis techniques from the very beginning of the design process. At
the same time, a prudent risk system will result in better cost/benefit
assessments to improve overall affordability without sacrificing
safety. Finally, NASA will continue to utilize its active risk-
management process to identify technical challenges early in the
process and aggressively work solutions.
NASA knows how important it is to identify ways to make our
programs and projects more efficient, so finding and incorporating
these efficiencies remains a primary goal. We have embraced the
challenge to deliver human spaceflight systems for lower cost, and the
opportunity to become more efficient, innovative and agile in our
programs. For example, we are revising the management of our
requirements, contracts, and projects and incorporating approaches to
ensure affordability in the near term and over the long run. This
includes the use of focused insight/oversight, specifying to industry--
where appropriate--what we need instead of how to build it, designing
for cost-effective operations, increasing the use of common components
and parts, and wisely consolidating infrastructure.

Questions for the Record from Rep. Donna Edwards

Q1. What, in precise terms, does NASA mean by an incremental,
evolvable SLS and MPCV? Please provide specific examples of how the
systems will be evolved and when.

A1. While our initial development efforts would focus on the 70-100
metric ton lift capability, in parallel, we would plan to capitalize on
synergies between Core Stage and Upper-Stage design and manufacturing,
thereby allowing us the ability to develop some of the upper-range
capabilities for an eventual 130metric ton capability vehicle at the
same time. Doing so is actually a fairly natural, evolvable progression
in terms of developing these capabilities.
This strategy allows for early test flights. These would include
early flights that would begin with a lift capacity in the 70-100
metric ton range, sufficient to get out of Low Earth Orbit with
meaningful mission content, with the first flight targeted for the end
of 2017 and the second flight targeted for 2021. Therefore, the 70-100
metric ton flight configurations will offer early development of the
Core Stage, continuation of the Orion-based design as the MPCV, an
Upper Stage/kick motor capability that will enable a series of
development missions/test flights beyond LEO, and use of existing solid
rocket boosters.

Q2. What is the baseline plan for the SLS and what, if anything, would
cause NASA to deviate from that plan?

A2. The Administration is committed to supporting this development and
working with the Congress to identify and provide the resources
necessary to ensure America's leadership in space exploration
continues. While the fiscal challenges facing the country are great, a
shared commitment to sustaining a space program worthy of a great
nation will be the key to the success of this new human spaceflight
program designed and destined to move the focus of NASA's space
exploration efforts beyond low-Earth orbit. In the end, any successful
space launch system must be affordable, sustainable and realistic, and
NASA will not propose a program we are not fully confident we can
deliver.
On September 14, 2011, NASA announced its selection of the design
for a new space exploration system that will take humans far beyond
Earth. This important decision will create high-quality jobs here at
home and provide the cornerstone for America's future human space
exploration efforts. This new heavy-lift rocket will be America's most
powerful since the Saturn V rocket that carried Apollo astronauts to
the moon and will be capable of launching humans to places no one has
gone before, such as asteroids, Mars and other deep space destinations.
In combination with the crew capsule already under development,
increased support for the commercialization of astronaut travel to low
Earth orbit, an extension of activities on the International Space
Station until at least 2020, and a fresh focus on new technologies-
this rocket is key to implementing the plan laid out by President Obama
and Congress in the bipartisan NASA Authorization Act of 2010, which
the President signed last year.
This launch vehicle decision is the culmination of a months-long,
comprehensive review of potential designs to ensure that the nation
gets the best possible rocket for the investment-one that is not only
powerful but is also evolvable so it can be adapted to different
missions as opportunities arise and new technologies are developed.
The rocket will use a liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen fuel
system, where RS-25D/E engines will provide the core propulsion and the
J2X engine is planned for use in the upper stage. There will be a full
and open competition to develop the boosters based on performance
requirements. Its early flights will be capable of lifting 70-100
metric tons before evolving to a lift capacity of 130 metric tons.
The early developmental flights may take advantage of existing
solid boosters and other existing hardware, which will help us control
costs and make early tests smoother.

Q3. What is the status of NASA's review of the industry studies that
were funded in the Broad Agency Announcement? What criteria will NASA
use to determine whether or not to incorporate concepts discussed in
those studies into the SLS Reference Design and what analysis will be
done to justify modifications to the existing SLS Reference Design?

A3. On July 29, 2010, NASA released Broad Agency Announcement (BAA)
NNM10ZDA001K to solicit proposals for Heavy-Lift and Propulsion
Technology Systems Analysis and Trade Studies (SATS) from industry.
Specifically, the BAA sought technical solutions in support of heavy-
lift system concepts and system architectures, and to identify
propulsion technology gaps to support NASA's goals. NASA's intent was
to gather unique and innovative options, technologies, and concepts to
incorporate any new ideas into Government models and analyses, and to
use the information for future planning and potential acquisition.
These activities helped determine the feasibility of meeting top-
level mission requirements with notional launch vehicle architectures,
while defining affordability strategies, streamlining systems
engineering approaches, and in identifying best practices that will be
applied to the final concept selected to go forward into formal design
and development. In addition, the BAA competition brought out
competitive cost pricing that was below historical averages and costing
model calculations. Innovations resulting from the BAAs were then
incorporated into the SLS, MPCV, and GO Requirements Analysis Cycles
(RACs).
The RAC teams delivered their final results the week of February
14, with BAA presented their final results to NASA on April 28. NASA
used these trade studies to inform the concept sets chosen to go
forward in the Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) process. One key finding
of the AoA was that cost and risk assessments did not identify distinct
discriminators among the alternatives. At $2.5 billion per year, none
of these alternatives achieved beyond-LEO capability with acceptable
risk prior to 2021 based on NASA cost and schedule estimates. Industry
cost estimates through the BAA's were consistent with NASA estimates,
and lower than NASA's historical cost models. However, there was one
interesting finding--management and business approaches drive cost more
than technical solutions do.
Another key finding of the AoA was early full-vehicle competition
adversely affects the retention of Agency critical skills and seriously
impacts the current industrial base due to time-lag in final vehicle
configuration selection (fuel type, mission and ground operations).
Ultimately, the BAA competition strengthened the Government/
Industry relationships and an increased level of contractor-to-
contractor communication was observed.

Q4. How does NASA intend to ensure the safety of both the SLS and MPCV
and the ability to control costs, in light of its proposed 70 percent
reduction in oversight? What oversight activities are you proposing to
eliminate? What alternative means will you use to secure the
information normally captured during those oversight activities?

A4. NASA will retain the oversight necessary to ensure safety.
An example of improved insight and oversight can be found in the
Orion project. A year-to-year reduction of nearly 70 percent of the
dedicated oversight management workforce was realized. (Here it is
important to note that oversight is not exclusively safety activities
and the reduction was not to all oversight but rather to dedicated
oversight by people in primarily a management role.) This included
minimizing oversight, metering insight based on risk, establishing co-
located government contractor teams, and focusing on near-term test
flight missions. This approach deployed the Government workforce to
emphasize the engineering insight that comes from focused, in-line, co-
located contributions to design and testing, and to deemphasize
dedicated oversight management.
The net result of the rebalancing of resources toward hardware
procurement and spacecraft production has been the ability to
accelerate first test article delivery under a dramatically smaller
budget. Government performance of in-line tasks was increased which
refocused Government resources toward tasks directly contributing to
design and testing efforts, further enhanced Government insight, and
fostered a more integrated government and industry team.
Through this process, the Government gains significant insight into
the contractor's vehicle system and has early insight into any issues
or concerns that could impact vehicle safety. The focused insight
allows the government to make recommendations to the industry partner
and the government oversight team to improve the vehicle design or
correct a known issue/defect. As always, final Oversight decisions will
be performed by NASA.
NASA's commitment to safety is paramount.

Q5. Last year, President Obama directed NASA to maintain the Orion
development project for the purpose of serving as a crew rescue vehicle
on the ISS. Is the requirement for modifying Orion as a crew rescue
vehicle for the ISS still being pursued, and if not, how will crew
rescue on the ISS be handled?

A5. NASA has efforts underway to develop an American-made commercial
capability for crew transportation and rescue services to the station
following this year's retirement of the Space Shuttle fleet. The Agency
anticipates these systems will be available by the middle of the
decade. These services will provide the primary transportation to and
from the International Space Station (ISS) for U.S., Canadian, European
and Japanese astronauts. To ensure a smooth transition as this new
capability is developed, Russian Soyuz support will continue as a
backup capability for about a year after commercial services begin. The
use of Russian Soyuz services in support of the ISS is dependent on
NASA's current exemption in the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Non-
proliferation Act (INKSNA). This exemption will expire in July 2016.
NASA is also developing the Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV)--
based on the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle--for missions of
exploration beyond Low Earth Orbit (LEO). Work on the MPCV will focus
only on the deep-space design. While the MPCV could be called upon to
service the ISS--a backup requirement established by the NASA
Authorization Act of 2010--it should be well understood that utilizing
the MPCV for routine ISS transportation would be a very inefficient and
costly use of the MPCV deep-space capability. NASA is confident in the
ability of our commercial and international partners to provide all
currently foreseen support for the ISS. Therefore, there is no
intention to conduct routine LEO missions with the MPCV.
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Dr. Scott Pace, Director, Space Policy Institute, George
Washington University

Questions submitted by Subcommittee Chairman Steven Palazzo

Q1. When discussing aerospace industrial base, and specifically our
ability to compete with launch services, the conundrum appears to be
that most missions flown from US launch facilities are government
payloads. Commercial customers are taking their business to foreign
launch facilities simply because they are less expensive. Are there
steps Congress and government could take to make US launch companies
more competitive? Do you have any suggestions about how to keep US
commercial payloads on our shores?

A1. There are many reasons why commercial operators have gone off-shore
to European and Russian launcher suppliers and cost is only one
consideration, albeit an important one. Demonstrated reliability,
schedule flexibility and schedule assurance are great importance to
firms launching revenue-generating satellites. One of the limitations
at the Kennedy Space Center is a congested launch manifest due to pad
constraints (i.e., only one pad each for the Atlas 5 and Delta 4 EELVs)
as well as staffing limits that constrain total launches to about eight
per year.
Short of direct subsidies, the government can do little to affect
near-term commercial competitions. One thing the government can do
however is support launch range modernization and facility improvements
that would create more schedule flexibility. The most effective long-
term actions would be to support development of a new generation of
efficient liquid propulsion systems, such as the J2-X, and ensure
stable policies are in place so that industry can make efficient
production decisions. As I mentioned in my testimony, the lack of
stable architecture for exploration beyond Earth orbit and uncertain
demand for engines such as the RS-68 have driven up the costs of U.S.
launch vehicles.
Finally, it may be worth considering means by which U.S. launch
suppliers could become more competitive for international payloads by
creating international partnerships. For example, the ``Liberty''
concept of using ATK solid rocket motors and an Ariane liquid
propulsion core upper stage could be used to launch European commercial
payloads as well as U.S. government payloads from the United States. A
robust and capable heavy lift vehicle could relieve some of the
capacity issues at acceptable costs if it could reach a flight rate of
4-6 launches per year instead of just two per year for human space
flight missions.
Q2. Your testimony does a very good job reminding us about the lessons
from the Columbia Accident Investigation Board. Crew safety is an
overriding concern. You suggest that the MPCV and SLS are not adhering
to the safety standards of the previous Constellation system. Would you
elaborate on your observation? As you see it, is there an inherent
safety problem with the systems under consideration, or is the problem
the lack of clear commitment from the administration?

A2. I apologize if I gave the impression that I thought the MPCV and
SLS are not adhering to the safety standards of the Constellation
program. I believe they are - and as was recently announced, the MPCV
is essentially the Constellation program's Orion spacecraft.
The point I was attempting to make is that probabilistic risk
assessments of varying designs, such as Ares 1, human-rated EELVs, and
Shuttle-derived heavy-lift vehicles give different results for the
safety, i.e., the probability of crew loss. These differences are due
to many factors, such as the reliability of the vehicle's design (e.g.
simpler, fewer parts are preferred), flight heritage (e.g., more real-
world experience is preferred), and the effectiveness of the flight
termination and crew escape systems. In comparing these factors, the
Ares 1 was preferred over other alternatives on a crew safety basis by
a significant margin. The variety of configurations being discussed for
the SLS are all more complex than the Ares 1 and while using many
demonstrated Shuttle components, some will be new and lacking in flight
heritage (e.g., the expendable SSME or RS-25F; the J2-X being common to
the SLS and Ares 1 upper stage). This doesn't mean the SLS or other
designs could not attain the same safety levels as promised in the
Areas 1 design, but it would take more design work and flight
experience to do so.
The Congress should closely monitor the connection between NASA
funding levels and safety. Under severe budget pressure, project
managers must make very difficult choices in how much engineering
testing is done to `certify' the design of high-risk components. There
are competing interests that come into play when projects are funded at
low levels, with little to no funding reserves to deal with the
inevitable issues that arise in a complex development program.

Questions for the Record from Acting Ranking Member Jerry F. Costello

Q1. As the former Associate Administrator of NASA's Office of Program
Analysis and Evaluation, what is your perspective on NASA's plan for an
independent cost assessment? Is the plan sufficient for providing a
robust and credible cost estimate to Congress? If not, what more is
needed to ensure that Congress can have confidence in the cost and
schedule estimate that will be provided as part of the final report on
SLS to be transmitted to Congress this summer?

A1. Cost estimates are not just ``point estimates'' but have varying
levels of uncertainty associated with them. For example, a cost
estimate at a 50% confidence level is very different than a cost
estimate for the same project at a 70% confidence level. Cost estimates
are not just about money, but represent an integration of money,
schedule, and risk. NASA has the capability to provide good independent
cost assessments and good policies in place to enable such assessments.
The challenge will be in ensuring the policies and processes are
implemented in a rigorous, objective fashion.
Current NASA policy calls for a joint cost-schedule estimate at the
70% confidence level at KDP C, the transition from Formulation to
Implementation. Congress should recognize and expect that prior to KDP
C, there should be a range of cost estimates and associated confidence
levels that are used to support program planning and design choices.
Cost estimates become more exact as a project matures technically. The
inclusion of schedule risk is a new and more realistic addition but
since it is new, implementation and training challenges can be
expected.
Congress should ensure that there is a process for comparing and
reconciling cost estimates created by the project itself, NASA's
internal independent cost estimators, and any outside cost estimate
that made be required. The reconciliation process is a useful way of
uncovering underlying assumptions about technical and programmatic risk
and clarifying what risk the agency is actually prepared to accept. At
the same time, NASA and the Congress should be particularly attentive
to the cost implication of excessive risk aversion - that is, building
in more reviews and oversight and paperwork to deal with even minor
developmental risks. In this regard, it can sometime be more effective
to budget for a robust series of hardware and flight tests. If the
tests go well, budget can recovered for use on other problems in the
project. If tests uncover unexpected problems, the project team
benefits from learning about them earlier. This was indeed the path the
Constellation Program planning headed toward following successful
completion of the Ares I-X test flight in October 2009.
In summary, Congressional oversight should seek to understand what
factors drive the confidence levels of the cost estimates, the process
used for reconciling independent and project-based cost estimates, and
whether there is a robust test program to identify problems early. To
this end, a strong, expertly staffed independent cost and program
evaluation function is one of the highest leverage management
investments one can make at NASA Headquarters. If utilized properly, it
can help the agency head off problems early and be a valuable resource
for improving program and project outcomes.

Q2. NASA is expected to soon deliver an integrated plan for the SLS
and MPCV vehicles.

In your view, does this constitute a plan for the
exploration program going forward? If not, what more do
Congress, industry, and other stakeholders need to know in
order to have a complete plan for the future of human
exploration?

What should Congress be looking for as it evaluates
this forthcoming plan?

A2. The Augustine Committee made a clear recommendation on a path going
forward, in particular:
Augustine pg 71: In the end, the Committee thought that the most
cost-effective fallback option that would move NASA most rapidly toward
exploration is to continue to develop the Orion, and move as quickly as
possible to the development of a human-ratable heavy lift vehicle. The
first stage of any of the heavy-lift launchers under consideration
would be more than capable of launching an Orion to low-Earth orbit.
An integrated MPCV/SLS plan would be expected to meet this
recommendation and should be welcomed. Unfortunately, there continues
to be great uncertainty over what this capability is to be for. As
covered in my testimony:
``The lack of a U.S. focus on human lunar return and an associated
architecture is one of the most serious programmatic gaps that make
transition planning difficult. Efforts to find a feasible and
attractive mission to a Near Earth Object (NEO) have not been
successful and likely await the completion of a more complete survey of
such objects. Sending humans to Mars remains too technically difficult
and expensive at our current level of development. The Moon was and
continues to be the logical focus for efforts to move humans beyond low
Earth Orbit as well as being vital to future commercial
developments.The international space community has developed a lunar
architecture as part of a large Global Exploration Strategy with strong
U.S. technical participation. We should consider making greater use of
international partners through existing international mechanisms to
create a more rational approach for our own plans.''
I would suggest that the Congress could consider updating the
directions it provided NASA in its FY2008 Authorization Act to
encourage a clearer, international strategy for returning to the Moon.
This would clarify priorities for the MPCV/SLS programs, provide a
firmer foundation for international engagement in exploration beyond
the International Space Station, and encourage longer-range but still
practical thinking about possible roles for the private sector in
supporting exploration.
Q3. You identified updated workforce transition plans as one of the
first measures Congress would use to judge the success of NASA's
transition plans. What should we expect to see? How detailed were prior
workforce plans for transitioning from Shuttle to Constellation? What
were the lessons learned from these prior efforts?

A3. The Congress should expect to see an annual workforce transition
plan at least as detailed as what was provided at the end of the last
Administration, specifically the report on the Space Shuttle and
Constellation Workforce of March 2008. That report responded to the
directions in the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008 (PL 110-161)
that called for a strategy that would include:
1) Specific initiatives that the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration has undertaken, or plans to undertake, to maximize the
utilization of existing civil servant and contractor workforces at each
of the affected Centers; (2) Efforts to equitably distribute tasks and
workload between the Centers to mitigate the brunt of job losses being
borne by only certain Centers; (3) New workload, tasks, initiatives,
and missions being secured for the affected Centers; and (4) Overall
projections of future civil servant and contractor workforce levels at
the affected Centers.
Based on multiple instruments, such as workforce surveys and time
charges, it should be possible to reconcile civil service workforce
assignments across all NASA centers and mission directorates. Skill
gaps and surpluses, both present and projected, should be identifiable
along with plans to rectify those imbalances over time. The ``go to''
workforce and skill levels should be aligned with the directions given
to NASA by the Administration and Congress.
In order to make future projections, NASA would need to have
strategic workforce management model that links workforce levels to
varying assumptions about budgets, center project assignments, work
contracted out, and necessary skills at each Center. In essence, NASA
should be able to project how many people it will need over the coming
decade based on what it is being asked to do, costs estimates for those
projects, and expected budgets and schedules. The NASA Office of
Independent Cost and Program Evaluation (formerly, Program Analysis and
Evaluation) could do this work in cooperation with the Office of the
Chief Financial Officer and the Office of Human Capital Management.
However, to be most useful, such an analysis would benefit from
guidance on what level of expertise (i.e., ``intellectual capital'') is
to be retained by NASA for developing and operating flight hardware. Or
to what extent NASA is expected to only perform R&D with actual
development and operational skills coming from the private sector.
In terms of lessons from prior workforce transition efforts, they
biggest benefit came from having a program to transition the Shuttle
workforce to, i.e., Constellation. Although job losses and retirements
were expected with the end of the Shuttle program and consequent
``gap'' prior to the first flight of Ares 1, core skills were to be
retained. These skills were those considered necessary to developing
and flying the next generation of human-rated spacecraft by NASA. The
lack of a clear transition path today, the certainty of a much longer
gap in government-developed flight system testing in the MPCV/SLS
construct, and the uncertainty as to any future roles in developing and
operating human-rated spacecraft make the current environment a
difficult one for workforce planning. Thus the most important step for
workforce planning is to ensure NASA has a clear set of programs and
mission direction to transition to. The details would then become
clearer.
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Mr. James Maser, Chairman, Corporate Membership Committee,
The American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics

Questions submitted by Subcommittee Chairman Steven Palazzo

Q1. When discussing aerospace industrial base, and specifically our
ability to compete with launch services, the conundrum appears to be
that most missions are taking their business to foreign launch
facilities simply because they are less expensive. Are there steps
Congress and government could take to make US launch companies more
competitive? Do you have any suggestions about how to keep US
commercial payloads on our shores?

A1. This is a complicated subject that crosses supply and demand
economics as well as national agendas for access to space for security
and exploration. As such, the reply attempts to address both of these
topics.
The U.S. industrial base is a national asset that needs to be
considered, addressed and optimized at the national level, rather than
at individual agency levels (NASA and DoD). To make U.S. launch
companies more competitive, the government must define an integrated,
long term roadmap and strategy for access to space for national
security and exploration that is relatively stable and predictable. The
U.S. government must continue to invest in the industrial base in a
stable and predictable manner, such that industry can align their
strategy and investment consistently with more predictable returns and
outcomes. Clearly the current discontinuity in our NASA exploration
plans is creating a lot of inefficiencies that drive costs up. The U.S.
government must continue to invest in and ensure that NASA pursues a
robust space launch program, specifically a heavy lift launch
capability immediately.
Clearly, on the international commercial launch market, the
selection of a commercial launch provider, once proven, is based
primarily on launch cost and secondarily on other factors such as
availability and demonstrated reliability. However, currently other
nations do not solely let market forces define the construct of their
industrial base and take proactive steps to ensure the capabilities
they believe are critical to their national agenda are maintained and
healthy regardless of the commercial market. In order to provide lower
commercial launch prices other nations carry the fixed costs necessary
to achieve their national access to space objectives and allow their
national launchers to sell commercial launches using marginal pricing
based on the additional costs required to build the hardware and launch
that specific satellite. The benefit to the government providing this
type of launch subsidy is to increase the launch tempo of their systems
affording improved reliability. Additionally, foreign national
launchers have a continuous preplanned product improvement activity
funded to eliminate the cost of obsolescence replacement costs from
being passed on to users.
Furthermore, as new countries develop advanced launch capabilities,
such as China and India and perhaps soon, South Korea, they are having
an impact on the commercial market. First, as described above, they
increase the supply of commercial launchers in a relatively fixed
commercial demand environment, placing increased pressure on subsidies
and pricing. Second, prior to having indigenous launch capability, they
purchased launches for national satellites commercially. As they
develop the launch capability, these launches are assigned to their
vehicles and actually serve to pull commercial satellite launches from
the market, thus reducing the demand for commercial launches relative
to the supply. So as more nations develop launch capability, the more
supply is available with subsidized pricing while demand remains
relatively flat at best. Any country that expects their launchers to
compete purely on market forces will find themselves in a less
competitive position simply due to supply, demand, fixed and variable
cost economics.
The Congress could take action to assure a steady government demand
for launchers, fund a robust preplanned product improvement effort, and
allow for marginal pricing of launchers to commercial customers.
Further the Congress could request a study to understand the true total
government demand for launches across civil and Department of Defense
and assess whether adding launch capacity and dividing up the volume
among multiple launch providers is more efficient in the long run than
concentrating launches in one or two launch providers.

Q2. Given the impending end of the shuttle program how does the
uncertainty of developing a follow-on system threaten our industrial
base; can you characterize the capabilities that are at risk? Perhaps
give examples from your own experience.

A2. The uncertainty of a shuttle follow-on system hits the industry at
every level with devastating consequences to our human space flight
program and ultimately our nation's position as the leader in space. In
addition, there are potential ramifications and impacts to our national
security access to space since much of the critical skills and
industrial base supporting this sector have been maintained by NASA
investment. Each company is forced to reduce workforce across the board
to account for the reduced workload. Certain skill sets, such as launch
site operations and mission analysis will experience immediate
reductions in capability. Without immediate commencement of development
work on SLS all other areas of expertise will be reduced until the
industry undergoes a significant drop in capability going into next
year. The important thing to remember is that these are not widget
makers that are being put on the streets. They are rocket scientists,
some of the most intelligent, highly-skilled, technically minded people
in our country. These are professionals who have spent decades and
decades building up their corporate knowledge. Once these people leave
the industry, they generally do not come back. This capability will
need to be rebuilt resulting in a significant increase in cost and
delay in schedule once NASA's going forward plan for human space
exploration is established.
Clearly, the best way to minimize the impact and damage that has
already been done is to move on swiftly with full funding into
development of the Space Launch System capability.

Questions submitted Acting Ranking Member Jerry F. Costello

Q1. Are the actions NASA is taking to ensure that the agency retains
critical human spaceflight skills and capabilities during the
transition from Constellation to SLS and MPCV enough, in your view, to
sustain workforce capabilities? If not, what other actions are
required?

A1. Without question, the actions taken by the NASA are not even close
to sufficient to retain critical human spaceflight skills and
capabilities. It has been more than 17 months since Constellation was
canceled and they still have not announced the architecture for a heavy
lift launch vehicle despite Congress mandating that they do just that.
Had it not been for Congress mandating that Constellation efforts
continue while NASA decides what to do instead, the situation would be
much worse. However, now it appears NASA no longer has that constraint.
Additionally, while SLS has been funded by Congress, it is not
clear how the money has actually been or is being spent on the SLS
program There is speculation in industry that some of this funding is
being diverted to other tasks and all work actually related to these
programs are being either slowed or not started. The impacts of these
continued delays, indecision and lack of a sense of urgency are being
illustrated every day with the thousands of layoff notices being issued
by space industry manufacturers across the country. We would recommend
that Congress hold NASA to their legislated directive to make an
immediate decision on SLS and that the funding provided for SLS and
MPCV actually be provided directly to those programs so that a smooth
skills transition could take place as the Space Shuttle program ends.

Q2. What issues and challenges does the aerospace industry face in
light of movement away from Constellation? How many companies are
affected and what types of businesses are hit the hardest? Are they
mainly primes or sub-tier contractors? Are some of these small
businesses? How dependent are these companies on NASA work? What is the
impact on your workforce?

A2. The existing issues and challenges were not caused specifically by
the movement away from Constellation. While cancellation of
Constellation was certainly a significant development, the issues and
challenges have resulted from NASA's total lack of movement on naming a
replacement for Constellation, despite the fact that the program was
canceled more than 17 months ago. The very precarious situation we
currently find ourselves in as an industry and as a nation was totally
avoidable. And the negative impacts can still be mitigated if NASA will
make a decision, spend the full funding they've been appropriated,
partner with industry to achieve efficiencies and get moving NOW, not
one, three or five months from now.
The cancellation of Constellation has created a series of
challenges for the entire aerospace industry which is compounded by the
lack of a replacement direction and now exacerbated by the end of the
Space Shuttle program. The original plan was to ensure any overlapping
capabilities or suppliers from Shuttle to Constellation would have a
smooth transition. Now there is no transition, and remaining efforts on
elements of Constellation have been slowed significantly such that all
involved companies are forced to spend significant effort in
renegotiating and slowing down planned effort hurting all tiers of the
industry. This slow-down or outright cancellation of effort has forced
all parties to resize their business to accommodate the reduced volume.
Among the hardest hit are the companies who have the highest percentage
of their business volume working products built to the exacting NASA
standards. Small, specialized suppliers are being forced to exit this
type of business and are unlikely to reenter without significant
financial incentive. Examples of this are specialty electronics
providers, super alloy production facilities, and specialty machining
operations companies. As these specialized lower tier producers exit
the market, designs will either have to adapt to lesser component
capability or incur the increased costs of creating in-house capability
at higher tier suppliers. It is safe to say that thousands of companies
are feeling some impact and hundreds are feeling significant impact as
a result of Constellation cancellation and lack of follow-on orders or
direction.

Q3. Congress needs a better understanding of when companies reach the
point-of-no-return when it comes to being at risk of losing their
critical mass of key capabilities and skill sets. Is there a point
where companies have to make a decision to leave the market? What,
exactly, would trigger that decision?

A3. While there is no singular event that constitutes a ``point of no
return'' since capability has been eroding steadily since the
announcement of the cancellation of Constellation more than 17 months
ago, it is fair to state that a major loss of capability is happening
now, and will reach a dramatic crescendo by the end of FY2011 once the
Space Shuttle work force is released with no other work in place to
employ them. There has been a marked increase in skilled personnel
attrition since the announcement however as a major reduction in force
is implemented it is clear that many skilled personnel will leave the
industry forever.
This erosion is not just a loss in current capability, it is a loss
in future capability. Our workforce is aging and, with Constellation,
we were in the process of hiring, training and motivating our next
generation of high technology rocket scientists. Now, not only have we
been reducing this demographic, we have also created a sense of
disillusionment with the space industry. Commercial space will not make
up for this, as ultimately that model is to take mostly existing
technology and transform it into a profitable space trucking and taxi
business. The real inspiration, motivation and innovation that has made
this country a world leader, not just in space, but in many high
technology areas of commerce, has come from the NASA hard challenges
that push the limits of our knowledge and capability. As it stands
right now, aside from some abstract statements, those challenges do not
exist. This capability will need to be rebuilt at significant
additional, and unnecessary, cost and time, once NASA decides what to
do and how to do it. If too much time passes, and we get used to being
mediocre, this nation may lose the willpower or desire to remain a
leader.
Smaller companies who have traditionally relied on space flight
business are also opting to leave the market due to greatly reduced
volumes in the defense segment and made worse by the end of NASA
development. Higher tier suppliers are forced to develop new suppliers
who are reluctant to invest in these capabilities causing all launch
costs to increase significantly. This has implications beyond NASA into
the Department of Defense who will carrier a much heavier financial
burden without NASA's ongoing investment in launch technology.

Q4. Are there international suppliers that would fill the gap if U.S.
companies leave the market? Are there national security issues should
the U.S. have to rely on foreign suppliers?

A4. There are many international suppliers who have been actively
pursuing a position in the U.S. space market. They are all subsidized
by their indigenous governments to service national security launch and
are offering their products at marginal pricing within the U.S. As
domestic suppliers have exited the industry due to lack of investment ,
lack of a stable and consistent strategic roadmap, lack of volume and
opportunities for work, more foreign sourced components are finding
their way onto U.S. launchers since it is cost prohibitive to recreate
and sustain them going forward without any clear market demand.. The
issues created by reliance on foreign suppliers are largely centered on
two areas. First, these components cannot be optimized for U.S. use
very effectively due to export control restrictions which prohibit co-
development hardware with missile applicability. The second issue is
that assured availability is at risk since each supplier's national
policy could prohibit use of their components on defense related
applications. Every other space faring nation has chosen to support its
national infrastructure so that it has assured access to space. Only
the U.S. has opened up its space markets while simultaneously
prohibiting much of its domestic supply base from competing in foreign
markets using marginal pricing.
Clearly, as mentioned earlier, The U.S. space industrial base is a
national asset that needs to be considered, addressed and optimized at
the national level, rather than at individual agency levels. To make
U.S. launch companies more competitive, the government must define an
integrated, long term roadmap and strategy for access to space for
national security and exploration that is relatively stable and
predictable. The U.S. government must continue to invest in the
industrial base in a stable and predictable manner, such that industry
can align their strategy and investment consistently with more
predictable returns and outcomes. Simply allowing foreign supply in for
critical, strategic capabilities that those nations have chosen to
maintain and then market elsewhere because they offer lower prices is,
in many cases a short term budget fix that creates long term issues.
However, since it happens slowly over time, one critical supplier at a
time and in the context of no national industrial base strategy, it
goes unnoticed, until one day we are paying other countries to provide
for our exploration and defense on their terms.