[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

[H.A.S.C. No. 112-10]

EQUIPPING THE WARFIGHTER IN AFGHANISTAN

__________

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

__________

HEARING HELD

MARCH 1, 2011

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SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland, Chairman
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey SILVESTRE REYES, Texas
JOHN C. FLEMING, M.D., Louisiana MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
TOM ROONEY, Florida JIM COOPER, Tennessee
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts
JON RUNYAN, New Jersey LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina
MARTHA ROBY, Alabama MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina BILL OWENS, New York
W. TODD AKIN, Missouri JOHN R. GARAMENDI, California
JOE WILSON, South Carolina MARK S. CRITZ, Pennsylvania
MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio KATHY CASTOR, Florida
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
Jesse Tolleson, Professional Staff Member
Doug Bush, Professional Staff Member
Scott Bousum, Staff Assistant

C O N T E N T S

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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2011

Page

Hearing:

Tuesday, March 1, 2011, Equipping the Warfighter in Afghanistan.. 1

Appendix:

Tuesday, March 1, 2011........................................... 23
----------

TUESDAY, MARCH 1, 2011
EQUIPPING THE WARFIGHTER IN AFGHANISTAN
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Bartlett, Hon. Roscoe G., a Representative from Maryland,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces......... 1
Reyes, Hon. Silvestre, a Representative from Texas, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces........... 3

WITNESSES

Dee, Thomas P., Director, Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell, Office of
the Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics...................................................... 4
Solis, William M., Director, Defense Capabilities and Management,
Government Accountability Office............................... 9

APPENDIX

Prepared Statements:

Bartlett, Hon. Roscoe G...................................... 27
Dee, Thomas P................................................ 31
Reyes, Hon. Silvestre........................................ 29
Solis, William M............................................. 39

Documents Submitted for the Record:

[There were no Documents submitted.]

Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]

Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

Mr. Bartlett................................................. 57
Mr. Turner................................................... 61
EQUIPPING THE WARFIGHTER IN AFGHANISTAN

----------

House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, March 1, 2011.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:35 p.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Roscoe G.
Bartlett (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM MARYLAND, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND
FORCES

Mr. Bartlett. The Tactical Air and Land Forces Subcommittee
meets today to receive testimony on the Department of Defense
processes and procedures currently used to rapidly respond to
and fulfill urgent warfighter capability requirements.
These urgently required capabilities are defined by the
Department of Defense as capabilities that if left unfulfilled,
usually within days or weeks, could result in the loss of life
and/or prevent the successful completion of a near-term
military mission.
We just received a classified briefing on equipping U.S.
Forces in Afghanistan and learned of the current capabilities
being used by the warfighter, as well as what the warfighter
currently requires. We want to make sure that the processes are
in place or get put in place to get our warfighters the
equipment they need as quickly as they can get that equipment.
The Department's record in quickly getting needed
capabilities to the warfighter has not been what it should have
been. This was most evident in the Department's slow response
to the improvised explosive device threat. On the other end of
the spectrum of responsiveness is the Mine Resistant Ambush
Protected vehicle program, which shows what can be done when
the Department of Defense partners with industry.
We believe we have now fielded the best warfighter
equipment available, but as long as we have injuries in the
field, we must continue to do everything possible to better
protect our people. With 147,000 service men and women
operating in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is our mission to ensure
that they are provided with the most effective equipment
available, in a timely manner, and not repeat previous
mistakes.
There have been numerous studies and reports by independent
and government agencies that have all cited inefficiencies in
the Department's ability to rapidly respond to warfighter
capability requirements.
The GAO [Government Accountability Office] notes that,
currently, multiple entities in the Department of Defense
reported a role in responding to similar categories of urgently
needed capabilities: Five entities have a role in responding to
counter-IED [counter-Improvised Explosive Device] capabilities;
eight entities have a role in responding to ISR [Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance] capabilities; and six
entities have a role in responding to command, control,
communications, and computer capabilities.
The committee is aware of an urgent request that was made
last July by U.S. Forces in Afghanistan for advanced analytic
capability to analyze the tremendous amounts of intelligence
information being collected. The request stated, ``This
shortfall translates into operational opportunities missed and
lives lost.''
Further, this specific capability was described by an
intelligence officer in Afghanistan as ``enabling U.S. Forces'
ability to find insurgent targets to skyrocket.'' The specific
capability being requested by U.S. Forces in Afghanistan was
off-the-shelf. It already was being used by 30 separate units
and agencies in Afghanistan and here in the United States.
When our committee chairman and ranking member wrote the
Department in October, 3 months after the request had been
made, asking why this capability was being delayed, it was
determined the request had not even yet made it to Washington.
This analytic capability is only now being fielded in limited
numbers while the fielding of the promised program of record
capability has slipped from November of last year to the end of
this month.
The committee is also aware that due to the large number of
services', agencies', and organizations' failures to use common
databases for these urgent requests, duplication occurs in
responding to urgent requests. In one instance, an agency spent
millions-of-dollars doing a proof of concept on an off-the-
shelf rotorcraft unmanned aerial vehicle that was already being
used by another service.
According to the GAO, the Department does not
comprehensively manage and oversee its urgent needs efforts;
overlap and duplication exists in the Department's urgent needs
efforts; and several challenges, such as funding, training,
technology, and maturity of proposed solutions, could hinder
the Department's responsiveness to urgent needs in the future.
We recognize the Department has taken steps to create
urgent needs processes that are more responsive to urgent
warfighter requests than traditional acquisition procedures,
yet the Department has been at this for 10 years, and very
clearly, much needs to be done in establishing an
institutionalized capability and process.
Congress has given the Department of Defense rapid
acquisition authority. This authority allows for the rapid
acquisition and deployment of equipment that is urgently needed
to eliminate a combat capability gap that has resulted in
combat fatalities. The subcommittee believes the Department
could improve employment of this rapid acquisition authority
and better inform decisionmakers within the Department that
this authority exists. Over the past 5 years, the Department
has only used this authority four times.
The Government Accountability Office released a report
today that is critical of the Department's processes and makes
several recommendations for improvements. I would hope the
Department will expeditiously implement these recommendations.
We are prepared to help, if necessary, legislatively.
Finally, I again want to assure the men and women in
uniform and their families that while the acquisition process
has oftentimes been inefficient and duplicative, it has
provided the best equipment available to our warfighters.
Before we begin, I would like to turn to my good friend and
colleague from Texas, Silvestre Reyes.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Bartlett can be found in the
Appendix on page 27.]

STATEMENT OF HON. SILVESTRE REYES, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS,
RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES

Mr. Reyes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And today's hearing covers the critical topic of how the
Department of Defense fields urgent warfighter needs from the
field.
This subcommittee has always operated in a bipartisan
manner that focuses on the needs of the troops in the field.
So I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for having this
hearing on this vital issue, and this being our first hearing,
I hope it underscores the importance of this topic.
For the purposes of providing oversight to DOD [the
Department of Defense] and the military services on this issue,
I think this subcommittee must focus on two key areas: One
issue is the efficiency, as you mentioned, of responding to the
operational needs of warfighters in a way that avoids wasting
money. While efficiency is important and is always something
that we should focus on, I think it comes in a distant second
to the other critical issue, which is speed, the speed of DOD's
responses to urgent operational needs in the field, in other
words, the warfighters and their needs.
To me, this is the overriding issue that we face because
getting a capability into the hands of a soldier, even if it
isn't the perfect solution or the most affordable, can and
often does save lives.
We saw this with the process DOD went through to get MRAPs
[Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles] in the field. In the
end, it took Congress and Secretary Gates constantly pushing to
get these life-saving vehicles deployed. That, regrettably,
should not have been the case, but it is something hopefully we
can all learn from.
But after reading, as you mentioned, GAO's testimony on
this issue for today's hearing, I am not entirely sure that the
Defense Department and the military services have fully
appreciated and learned the lessons they should have from the
MRAP program.
While I have no doubt that servicemembers and civilians
alike at the Pentagon are doing the very best that they can to
act quickly and that they are working hard every single day, it
appears that the system, as we all talk about the system, for
responding to urgent needs has become overly onerous, complex,
bureaucratic, and slow.
The GAO identified at least 30 different organizations in
the Department of Defense involved in responding to these
urgent operational needs. They also point out that no single
high-ranking individual is in charge. This is a critical lesson
learned from the MRAP program.
Given the massive amounts of funding involved, at least $76
billion since 2005, and then the urgency of the needs, it is
not acceptable, simply not acceptable, to have the level of
fragmentation and overlap that GAO has reported and found in
their study.
In addition to understanding what needs to happen with DOD,
today's hearing will hopefully also help our subcommittee
identify where Congress can act to improve the system, whether
through changes in how we provide funding or the authorities
given to the military services. This needs to be a team effort
between Congress and DOD.
So, again, Mr. Chairman, thank you for calling this hearing
on this vital and critical issue, and I look forward to working
with you on the topic as we build a National Defense
Authorization Act for the year 2012.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Reyes can be found in the
Appendix on page 29.]
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much.
Two bells followed by five bells means a series of votes is
on. We have perhaps 10 minutes or so before we need to leave at
about 2 minutes before the vote is scheduled to close so that
we can get our vote. So we can begin your testimony. Depending
on how long your testimony is, we can have testimony from one
of you or both of you. I want to thank you very much for coming
today.
Mr. Tom Dee, Director, Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell. Mr.
Dee is also representing the Deputy Secretary of Defense
William Lynn and the Department's Chief Management Officer.
And Mr. Bill Solis, Director of Defense Capabilities and
Management, Government Accountability Office.
We will proceed with the panel's testimony, as much as we
can before we need to go to vote, and without objection, all
the witnesses' prepared statements will be included in the
hearing record.
Thank you, sir. You may begin.

STATEMENT OF THOMAS P. DEE, DIRECTOR, JOINT RAPID ACQUISITION
CELL, OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, ACQUISITION,
TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS

Mr. Dee. Chairman Bartlett, Ranking Member Reyes, members
of the Tactical Air and Land Subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the
Department of Defense's urgent operational needs processes.
The experience of war has taught us that new enemy weapons
and tactics will emerge in times of conflict and that we will
not always have existing capability or capacity to adequately
counter those new threats. Addressing those unanticipated
threats is the underlying purpose of the Department's urgent
needs processes.
As is the case for our deliberate requirements and resource
allocation processes: JCIDS, the Joint Capabilities Integration
and Development System; PPBES, the Planning, Programming,
Budgeting and Execution System; and the acquisition processes,
the urgent needs process is comprised of three main elements:
deciding what you need, the requirements; providing adequate
resources to buy it, the programming and budgeting; and
assessing alternatives and executing a solution, the
acquisition process, to include the operation and maintenance.
A fourth critical step, fielding, is also vitally important to
address since this can be the limiting factor in a contingency
situation and will shape the suitability of any proposed
solution.
The challenge for the JUONs [Joint Urgent Operational
Needs] process is how to execute each element on a much more
compressed timeline, often in the absence of well-defined
requirements, supporting CONOPS [Concept of Operations] and
doctrine, and/or supporting operations and maintenance
concepts. Working under such compressed timelines, the
Department necessarily accepts some higher level of
programmatic risk in traditional areas of cost, schedule and
performance. In a time of war, schedule often becomes the risk
that is least acceptable because the speed at which something
can be fielded, even if it is only a mitigating capability, is
often the most relevant factor in reducing the commander's
operational risk. Not surprisingly, therefore, the commander's
assessment of his operational risk is where the urgent needs
process begins.
As you pointed out and as identified in a recent GAO study,
there are multiple mechanisms through which a commander can
submit an urgent operational needs request. Appropriately,
under Title X responsibilities, the service components have all
established processes to facilitate a timely response to
identified warfighter needs.
In cases where a commander identifies the need as joint,
the combatant commander certifies the requirement and forwards
it to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for validation
as a joint urgent operational need. The Joint Staff Director
for Force Structure, Resources and Assessments, the J8, uses
its established functional capability boards to assess both the
validity and the urgency of the requirement. Should the Joint
Staff J8 Deputy Director for Requirements, the DDR, determine
that the need is valid and that it is urgent, he passes it to
me as the Director of the OSD's [the Office of the Secretary of
Defense's] Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell.
I, in turn, coordinate with the service components, JIEDDO
[the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization],
the ISR Task Force, other elements of OSD, including the
Offices of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and
Engineering, the Assistant Secretary for Logistics and Material
Readiness, and various Defense agencies to identify potential
solutions to the validated requirements and any challenges or
risks associated with executing that solution.
We then formally task the appropriate component with the
responsibility to satisfy the need. Now this is not a strictly
linear process. As soon as the need is identified, the
combatant commander, CENTCOM [Central Command] in most cases,
Joint Staff, the JRAC [Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell] and the
services begin collaborating to determine the most suitable way
forward.
There are many challenges associated with compressing the
requirements, budgeting, and acquisition cycle, but despite
these challenges, through our urgent needs processes, the
Department has provided our forces with the best force
protection, command and control, counter-IED, and ISR
capabilities available.
Now, that is not to say that the Department is fully
satisfied with our processes, with the speed at which we could
field new capabilities, and our ability to anticipate the next
threat or with the efficiency with which the whole process
works. In our 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, the Department
recognized the continuing need to build agile, adaptive, and
innovative structures capable of quickly identifying emerging
gaps and rapidly adjusting programming and budget priorities to
mitigate those gaps. Our urgent processes must provide a means
of quickly prioritizing and quantifying requirements and of
ensuring that the resources are available to enable rapid
fielding of capabilities inside of the Department's PPBES
cycle.
The Department has also acknowledged and largely concurred
with the findings and recommendations of the April 2010 GAO
report on DOD's urgent needs processes. Contained in that
report are recommendations that the Department implement the
comprehensive management framework with better defined
accountability to improve our responsiveness to urgent
operational needs.
Section 804 of the fiscal year 2011 National Defense
Authorization Act further directs the Department to conduct a
complete review of the process for fielding capabilities in
response to urgent operational needs and to include
consideration of earlier GAO reports and a July 2009
congressionally directed study by the Defense Science Board on
the fulfillment of urgent operational needs. The legislation
recommends a streamlined and tightly integrated approach to the
Department's urgent needs processes, clear definition of the
roles and responsibilities within the Department for the
fulfillment of urgent needs, and the development of an
expedited review process to determine which needs are
appropriate for a rapid fielding process.
Concurrent with the development of many of these reports,
the Department has adapted its urgent processes. Beginning in
2009, the President's revised strategy in Afghanistan has
served as a catalyst to initiate, if not fully implement, many
of the actions recommended in the GAO reports. Among the common
findings of these many reports is the perceived lack of a
common management framework and clear senior leadership of our
urgent needs processes.
Recognizing the need for improved synergies among the
multiple organizations that contribute to the counter-IED
campaign, the Secretary of Defense established a Counter-IED
Senior Integration Group in November 2009 to leverage the
efforts of JIEDDO, the military services, the Defense agencies,
the MRAP task force, and the ISR task force. Under the
leadership of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics, Dr. Ashton Carter, and the Joint
Staff Director of Operations, the J3, then Lieutenant General
Jay Paxton, now Lieutenant General Bob Miller, the C-SIG
[Counter-IED Senior Integration Group] provided clear
priorities and common focus in the counter-IED fight.
It quickly became clear, however, that counter-IED is not a
strictly confined problem set. Multiple capabilities, ranging
from ISR to force protection, contribute to a successful
counter-IED campaign. So under the Under Secretary of Defense's
AT&L [acquisition, technology and logistics] Dr. Carter's
leadership and with the Secretary's consent, the C-SIG has
evolved to include oversight of many of the most critical and
urgent needs of our operational commanders. While the evolved
role of the Senior Integration Group does not yet enjoy the
clarity of a written policy directive, the senior governance
board provides Department-wide focus on expediently meeting the
urgent needs of our commanders.
A recent organizational change indicative of this improved
senior leader focus was the realignment of my office, the Joint
Rapid Acquisition Cell, from the Rapid Fielding Directorate
within the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Research and Engineering to a direct report to Dr. Carter as
the Under Secretary of Defense for AT&L. This organizational
change has streamlined the decision process for those urgent
needs submitted by the operational commanders and validated by
the Joint Staff.
For example, multiple urgent needs that had been identified
since the beginning of this fiscal year had been languishing
for lack of funding. With his direct involvement in the
process, Dr. Carter was quickly able to bring the issue to the
attention of Secretary Gates, who convened a meeting of the
Department's leadership and made a decision to immediately fund
and execute these urgent needs. Within the authorities
available to the Department, $350 million was quickly realigned
to support those critical needs that could be executed quickly.
An additional $1 billion of requirements was also quickly
sourced, but since the Department did not have the authority to
reapportion these funds, a prior notification reprogramming
request was submitted to Congress for approval.
Please accept my thanks on behalf of the Department for
your committee's quick response to this request and approval of
part three for urgent needs. But unfortunately, due to the
Department acting without a fiscal year 2011 appropriation, the
Department lacks a fiscal year 2011 source to support the
requested urgent operations and maintenance requirements.
Nevertheless, this action, this reprogramming action,
demonstrates the Department's commitment at the very highest
level to quickly make the decisions necessary to respond to
warfighter requirements.
Another example of improved focus on urgent needs is the
increased use of rapid acquisition authority, which you
addressed in your statement, Mr. Chairman. It was originally
provided in section 811 of the NDAA [National Defense
Authorization Act] for fiscal year 2005 and was further amended
this year. Use of this authority is identified, further
identified, as an interest item on your committee's oversight
agenda for the 112th Congress, and I would take to this
opportunity to also thank the committee for its action in the
fiscal year 2011 National Defense Authorization Act that
expanded this authority to include supplies as well as
equipment and, more importantly, for expanding the authority
from $100 million----
Mr. Bartlett. I am sorry. We have a few minutes left in our
vote. So we need to recess now to go vote, and we will finish
you testimony when we return and then get to the testimony from
GAO. Thank you very much.
[Recess.]
Mr. Bartlett. We will reconvene our subcommittee. There was
a little confusion on the floor. The last vote was voiced, and
that wasn't very clear, so some people are still waiting I
think for a vote that is not going to occur.
Mr. Dee, we will let you complete your testimony and then
proceed with the GAO testimony.
Mr. Dee. Sure. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me pick up by again thanking you for the action the
committee has taken in modifying the rapid acquisition
authority within fiscal year 2011 expanding NDAA, expanding the
authority from $100 million to $200 million per fiscal year.
The Department has already made use of this expanded authority
and used $116 million as part of the aforementioned decision by
the Secretary to immediately fund those most urgent and
executable needs.
As our management framework continues to evolve, our
processes and policies must ensure that all components place
appropriate priority and use all available authorities to
deliver timely and effective capabilities to meet the urgent
needs of our operational commanders. To that end, in March
2010, Dr. Carter, Under Secretary for AT&L, issued a memorandum
to the service components highlighting the flexible authorities
provided through the existing acquisition regulations and
policy and directing them should those existing authorities be
insufficient to enable a rapid response to request the use of
rapid acquisition authority.
While the Department has enjoyed many successes in rapidly
delivering capabilities to the field, there are still
challenges to overcome. The most difficult challenge in rapid
acquisition is not strictly acquisition, but rather
prioritizing needs and quickly identifying the resources needed
to execute a solution.
While Congress cannot help us with prioritizing our
warfighting needs, it can help to facilitate their rapid
funding. The increase of rapid acquisition authority has
helped, but identifying new funding in the year of execution
remains a challenge. On average, the Department must expect a
reprogramming request to take 3 months from the decision to
fund an urgent need until the funds are authorized. In
preparing our troops in contact for an upcoming campaign, a 3-
month delay in funding can be an unacceptably long period. The
Department needs immediate access to the funds needed to
initiate actions as the soon as the need is validated.
Our fiscal year 2011 budget submission included a $300
million overseas contingency operation request and the fiscal
year 2012 President's budget request includes $100 million in
the base budget and an additional $100 million in the overseas
contingency operations to provide immediate source of funding
for urgent needs. While this money would not fully fund all of
the Department's urgent needs, it would allow sufficient funds
to initiate actions immediately while additional funds are
requested through Congress. Your support of these requests is a
critical part of our improved responsiveness.
As we have evolved our structures and processes and
continually improved our responsiveness, we have recognized the
value of many of the findings contained within the reports that
your committee has sponsored over the past several years. While
we have embraced the need for focused senior leadership, as
evidenced through the evolution of the Senior Integration
Group, we are cautious not to allow the imperative to establish
formal policy and process distract from the continual effort to
rapidly field those capabilities identified by the operational
commanders as urgent.
The changes made in section 803 of the fiscal year 2011
NDAA expanding the authority given to the Secretary are
appreciated. I also believe that the review required by section
804 of the National Defense Authorization Act will also help as
we strive to strike the appropriate balance between acceptable
levels of programmatic and operational risks. Pending the
outcome of that study, the Senior Integration Group will
continue to function as the Department's senior level
governance council as we develop and staff the permanent policy
that will implement the guidance contained within the recent
Quadrennial Defense Review to institutionalize rapid
acquisition.
Thank you, again, for your opportunity to speak with you
today. While we still have work to do, I believe that the
Department is on a path towards developing a more agile and
efficient management framework for responding rapidly to urgent
needs. And I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Dee can be found in the
Appendix on page 31.]
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much.
Mr. Solis.

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM M. SOLIS, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE CAPABILITIES
AND MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

Mr. Solis. Chairman Bartlett, Ranking Member Reyes, members
of the subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity to be here
today.
I had a detailed oral statement, but since a lot of the
findings in the report that we are issuing today have been
covered by both you and the ranking member, I am going to
quickly summarize and maybe highlight a couple of things as we
go forward.
You mentioned a number of the entities, numerous entities
that are involved in this urgent needs process--I think there
were 31--and also that a number were also involved in
capability development, like counter-IED, the lack of senior
involvement, the fact that there is no tracking process. But
there were a couple of things that I just wanted to highlight
going forward, and that is, in part of this tracking process, I
think it is not only good to track through from the time the
process begins validation, the validation process once it comes
out of theater to the initial fielding, but also, how effective
is that solution we have fielded to the warfighter? Is it being
used as it was envisioned? I think also going forward, is this
something that we might be able to use into the future, another
combatant command might be able to use the technology or
materiel solution that has been developed? So I think having
that tracking system and evaluating the effectiveness of that
weapons system would also be very, very good.
And finally, the only other point I want to make in terms
of our report, as we pointed out, there are a lot of different
entities involved. There is not a baseline policy in existence,
and there is a need for senior involvement. But also, we think
there are some options for potentially consolidating some of
these entities, and we laid out some of those options and both
put the advantages and disadvantages in our report. And again,
we made that recommendation that the Department explore those
options, particularly the CMO [Chief Management Officer]. The
Department has concurred with that. But I think going forward,
that would be one thing that I would probably ask that the
committee continue to observe, in terms of trying to come up
with better processes, possibly through consolidation, that can
help our warfighter get what he needs or she needs in the
quickest possible manner.
That concludes what I have to say at this point. I will be
glad to answer any questions that you or the members of the
committee might have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Solis can be found in the
Appendix on page 39.]
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much.
As chairman, I almost always ask my questions last, hoping
that someone else will ask them, so I don't have to.
Mr. Reyes has graciously yielded to Mr. Turner because Mr.
Turner is on a tight time schedule.
Mr. Turner.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Reyes.
I greatly appreciate that.
With the votes and the schedule we have had, I appreciate
the panel's patience as we popped in and out.
And thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity.
Gentlemen, as you know, we are operating currently under a
continuing resolution. That means Congress never finished its
work; we never got our job done. So we have not even agreed on
a document that will pay the bills of the military for this
year. Just now we are debating and pushing forward a short-term
continuing resolution, one that would just kick the ball
forward for only two weeks with the hopes that ultimately we
will come to resolution on how we will pay our bills for fiscal
year 2011.
During the same time, in the environment we have coming out
of Department of Defense continuing questions of looking to
efficiencies and reductions and cost savings. And we are
looking even now to the Congress discussing budget cuts, the
Department of Defense for 2011, for fiscal year 2011, fiscal
year 2012. And we have, then, this discussion on the urgent
needs of the warfighter, emphasis on the word ``urgent.'' And I
know that every time we discuss budget reductions or the
continuing resolution, we have to have the effect--understand
the effect of what it does to DOD to have the uncertainty of
not having one full year of spending approved. We have the
uncertainty of cuts and efficiencies, and in all of these
discussions, people say, but it won't affect the warfighter.
But I think it does affect the warfighter. I think you probably
think it affects the warfighter. And certainly I know it gives
our men and women in uniform insecurity to know that we are
looking at reductions in spending and even issues of not having
an agreement on how to pay our bills.
I wondered if you could speak for a moment on your thoughts
on the effects of a continuing resolution and its blanket of
uncertainty that it provides as opposed to our finishing our
work and giving you one full year of funding for Department of
Defense as a picture and also, if you have any concerns as we
go forward in discussing reductions in 2012 and how that might
ultimately translate to effects to the warfighter. Someone?
And thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Reyes, again.
Mr. Dee. Yes, sir. In my comments, I mention that the
Department will always face unanticipated needs, and we will
always have the need for adequate funding in an execution year
in order to be able to resolve these unanticipated needs.
In some cases, the needs may have been anticipated. We may
have put money in requested funds in the last year's--in the
budget request for this year in order to be able to execute
something that we knew was going to happen this year. There was
an example given in the classified briefing that took place
just before this about--and people are aware of Aerostats, the
need for additional Aerostats. We had actually anticipated that
need, and we had put funds--the Army had placed funds in their
budget request within the fiscal year 2012 budget request for
procurement of additional Aerostats that we just don't have
access to.
So, in lieu of that, we have gone through a rather lengthy
and a very large reprogramming request in order to attempt to
get the funds for that. That reprogramming request is further
complicated by the fact that there is not a fiscal year 2011
source. So included in that reprogramming request, where it is
$180 million worth of operations and maintenance requirements
in order to continue to support some things that we have
fielded and are in the process of fielding right now, without
an fiscal year 2011 appropriation, there is no fiscal year 2011
source. As you know, O&M [operations and maintenance] is 1-year
money, so we can't reach backwards into unobligated 2010 or
2009 funds. So we just don't have a source to move any
additional money into fiscal year 2011 O&M accounts right now.
So, at some stage in the not-too-distant future, some of these
capabilities that we are pushing forward to the field are not
going to be able to be funded any longer.
Now, will there be prioritization where we decide that,
yes, we want to keep this particular system operating overseas
and continue the analytical support for a particular system in
lieu of doing something back here? That is very possibly the
case. But it does have a fairly significant impact, both in
terms of when we do manage to anticipate growing needs,
anticipated needs that we have, in fact, put in the budget that
we can't now get access to, which leads us to the reprogramming
action and then also just on the O&M side, just the complete
inability to be able to move any money into an O&M account.
Mr. Solis. We haven't looked at that directly, but I would
say anytime you have uncertainty, whether it is in the budget
or any program, in terms of trying to figure out where this
money is going to come from is going to cause issues, if not
for the warfighter but for potentially other programs from
where you may draw that money out of, because you don't know
where that money is going to come from to replace it. And it
could ultimately have more of an impact on programs that you
have back here, as opposed to the warfighter, because they will
try to find--the war fight is always a priority for the
Department.
But in terms of what happens particularly when you don't
know how much money you are going to have for a particular
program, yes, it can have an effect on those particular
programs.
Mr. Turner. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you.
Now my good friend and ranking member, Mr. Reyes.
Mr. Reyes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, gentlemen, thank you for your testimony.
I have here one of the charts that was furnished to the
committee. And I want to ask a question regarding the time
frame that it represents. On this chart, it is titled the JUON
process flow. It has got some time frames in there that I find
rather lengthy in my opinion. It takes 14 days as the time
required to triage one of these warfighter requests and then to
forward to the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell. Then the second
part of it takes 30 days as the time that it takes to get this
same request to the next step, which is getting it to a
military service or JIEDDO. And that is only the beginning of
the process before something actually gets out in the field.
So the question I have is, why does it take 45 days to
accomplish these two tasks? Is the problem a lack of people, a
lack of funding, or is it a coordination issue? What can we do
to speed up this process? And then is part of the issue that
maybe it is slow because other entities in DOD don't cooperate
with your group? So if you can comment on that, I would
appreciate it, because to me it seems like it is too long a
process.
Mr. Dee. Yes, sir. Those time lines that you cited, 14 days
within the Joint Staff to validate the requirement and then 30
days in my shop in order to be able to do the assessments and
task it out. Those are not measures of how long it takes. Those
are objective goals that we try to stay within whenever
possible.
Let me talk a little bit before I get to the specific time
lines about what happens in those two processes. So what the
Joint Staff does when they get a requirement from the
operational commander, from the combatant commander, they work
within their Functional Capability Boards to do two things:
One, determine if it is a valid requirement, if there is any
redundant activities going on or programs of record that could
be accelerated in order to meet this requirement and then also
to determine the level of urgency that something may have. So
they are looking at it from a requirements perspective, working
with the services through their Functional Capability Board to
see what other activities may be going on in the Department
that may be relevant with this, making sure going backwards
with the combatant commander that they really understand what
the requirement is.
When we get these joint urgent operational needs, it is not
as if you are getting a capabilities development document or a
capabilities production document with very strictly defined
performance parameters and objectives and thresholds and such.
They tend to come in as a much vaguer statement of requirement.
So trying to figure out, and this is one of the most difficult
points in this whole urgent needs process is, what is good
enough. So what is it that we are really going to be able to
pursue?
Again, it is not we are going to build something to meet
these performance parameters. We are going to try to identify
something that can provide 80 percent of that requirement or 70
percent or whatever the commander determines is good enough. So
there is a dialogue that goes back and forth, and that
requirement should be viewed as somewhat fungible. And that is
really what takes time on the Joint Staff process is to
determine, so what is it really that you are looking for? How
do we get down to the good-enough stage? And then they pass it
to me.
Now, my part of it, similarly determining what is good
enough, let us identify the potential solution set. They are
looking at it from a requirements side; I am looking at it from
a solution set side. Let us look at the potential solution set
that we have got; what is actually executable in the near term?
What is the technology maturity level of this particular thing
they are asking for? What is the producability of this? What it
is it going to cost? Where is the money going to come from? So
all of those things are what we are kind of working with in
those two processes before they go out.
One of the things that we are doing at the moment that I
mentioned, the Senior Integration Group that falls under Dr.
Carter and General Neller, is we are trying to consolidate all
of that. And we do have and have had now for quite a while
regular video teleconferences with both CENTCOM and with the
ISAF [International Security Assistance Force] Command and the
USFOR-A [U.S. Forces-Army] Command to talk through these
requirements and resolve as many of those things in one spot as
we can to reduce the time that it takes to be able to push
things out.
We have things that fly through the process in a number of
days, single-digit number of days, and we have other things,
depending on the complexity, largely when we can't find a quick
solution, and we have a few examples of those, that the search
for a solution before you task it to somebody becomes a drawn-
out process and has gone in fact beyond 30 days on some
occasions.
Mr. Reyes. So I think what I am hearing you say is that
these are optimum goals, for 14 days and 30 days, to get
through these processes?
Mr. Dee. That is right. I wouldn't use the word
``optimum.'' I would say that our optimum goals would be
single-digit days, you know, 1 or 2 days in each spot. But the
reality is it sometimes takes longer depending on the vagueness
of the requirement and the complexity of a potential solution
set. So we use those just to have a measurement, to have a
target that at least we can measure ourselves against and be
able to apply some metrics and see how well we are doing.
Mr. Reyes. Do you track, statistically, do you track the
average or of, say, 10 requests or 100 requests? Do you keep
track of that kind of performance or not?
Mr. Dee. Sir, I am sure Mr. Solis will be willing to add to
this.
Mr. Reyes. I am going to ask him next.
Mr. Dee. Our metrics on this process are not as good as we
like. I will say that upfront. So we do track the individual
requirement from the time it comes in until it gets satisfied,
until it is delivered and satisfied. So we do track that. We do
track the number of days it takes. We don't have a single
consolidated database, authoritative database for doing that.
But between the services, between Central Command, where most
of these things come from, and the Joint Staff, all have
databases that collectively provide that information. We don't
have a nice, neat OSD level dashboard that will present the
metrics that we would like to see. We would like that, but we
are not quite there yet.
So we do track them individually, the individual items. As
Mr. Solis I am sure will mention, it becomes when you are
trying to roll up that data from so many different sources, it
becomes very difficult to measure how well collectively you are
doing within your process. We could identify with any
particular requirement how well we have done. When you are
trying to look at it collectively, it becomes somewhat
difficult to get that more strategic level metric that says,
yes, our process works great or it doesn't.
Mr. Reyes. Okay. Mr. Solis.
Mr. Solis. I just add, you know, as a mention, they can
look at maybe from the time elapsed until initial fielding, but
I think you have got to look at everything in between. And one
of the things that we talked about was funding and not just
what gets reprogrammed. But I think one of the hang-ups is,
where does the source of funding come from, even before you get
to the reprogramming process?
And I think if you begin to start building it or breaking
it down into the elements of where, what is happening, whether
it is funding, whether it is in the acquisition process, then
you can start to begin to look at where I should invest my time
on these choke points. And I think that is the kind of thing
that you really need to look at as you look through the
process.
So, ultimately, you can say, okay, here is where we need to
spend our time. Here is where we need to figure out a way to
work through this so we can ultimately field that requirement,
as soon as possible.
Mr. Reyes. So somebody like an efficiency expert looking at
this would find ways to greatly reduce the time?
Mr. Solis. I think, first, you have got to have the
information data to say, where are your choke points? And I
think even the Department I think a couple of years back had
what they call a Lean Six Sigma team going in and do a look-see
at that. And I think they began to identify where some of these
choke points were. And I think that is the kind of thing that
you then begin to figure out where your solutions, how you are
going to deal with all of these issues, whether it is funding,
whether it is the acquisition process or if you have got to go
out and get an acquisition to satisfy that requirement.
Even the fielding process, sometimes, you know, if you are
going to, like we were talking about before, up-armoring all
vehicles as we did, you just can't pull all of the vehicles out
in one day and just not--you know. That all takes time. So I
think you need to have where all these--how long is it taking
in general for whether it is a counter-IED solution, ISR,
whatever, so that you have the information so that you can
begin to make good management decisions.
Mr. Reyes. I am not sure I like the answer.
But thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you both.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you. Now in order of the member's
appearance on the committee, Ms. Hartzler.
Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen. I read that the Congress has provided
the Department with rapid acquisition authority to get things
done quickly, but it has only been used four times since 2005.
So can you explain a little bit about why that hasn't been used
more? And what were the four times? What did they request?
Mr. Dee. Yes, ma'am. The report is a little dated now.
Since that report was--the data was collected for that report,
we did a few more rapid acquisition authorities. We just did
one, which I mentioned in my statement, that the comptroller
kind of honchoed or directed for $116 million to cover multiple
projects to be able to move money very quickly. In the past,
those four that were referred to, two of them were CREW
systems, counter, radio-controlled IED counter-measure systems,
and the other two were ISR systems.
Mrs. Hartzler. I am very interested, as I know many people
are, in the IED problem that we have. And I see that we have
invested $19.7 billion so far to counter that, and there is
3,100 people working on that. I guess I would like a little bit
more explanation of, what do they do? What do 3,100 people do,
and what have we gotten for our money with the $19.7 billion?
Mr. Dee. I will talk to some of that. I think you are
referring to some numbers associated with prior reports in the
Joint IED Defeat Organization. So let me talk a little bit
about what we have gotten for the money and not talk so much
about their organization, which I prefer to defer to their
director. As was addressed in a classified briefing, IEDs are
still the number one casualty over in Iraq. When the Joint IED
Defeat Organization was stood up back in 2006, you didn't have
a central focal point for counter-IED within the Department
and, as importantly, you didn't have a fund that you could
rapidly reach into in an execution year again in order to
deliver capabilities.
So if you look at the capabilities that have been provided,
it includes everything from CREW, which I just mentioned,
counter-RCIED, electronic warfare, which pretty much very well
mitigated the radio-controlled IED threat. It includes things
like mine rollers. It includes various force protection
capabilities, standoff explosive detection capabilities. So
there is a whole range of things that would not have been
fielded had it not been for an organization like JIEDDO and for
the flexible appropriation they had been given since their
startup. In terms of their internal organization, again, I will
take the question and defer that to the director.
Mrs. Hartzler. I know there have been some successes at it.
I represent Fort Leonard Wood, and they have the engineering
school there. And I was there about a month ago, and they were
showing me some of the equipment that they are training their
troops to use in order to try to help with this problem. But
they also showed me some examples of some IEDs that are come
back from Afghanistan, and the ingenuity of our enemy is just
really hard to deal when they take a log and hollow it out and
just have plastic tubing in it and somehow--I don't remember if
it was water or air to detonate it or something. But it makes
it very, very, very difficult. So this is certainly something
we have to continue to address.
I just hope that we have had a lot of success with the
amount of money that we have invested in this. And do you feel
confident that things are going well in this area, that we are
making the headway in this prevention?
Mr. Solis. I will just take a shot at it. Just going back
to your original question; what are these 3,100 people doing?
Just, in general, there are three lines or three mission areas,
as they call them. One is the attack network. One is defeat
device, and the other one is training mission. One is dealing
with materiel solutions, much of what we have talked about
today. Another one is assisting the warfighter in providing
information about the network of folks who are building or
creating IEDs. And it is not necessarily an intel center, but
it has maybe some of those--it looks like an intel center. And
then there is a training mission about, as our troops are
getting ready to deploy out to Iraq or Afghanistan, about how
to deal with IEDs as they encounter them. I mean, that is sort
of the broad three areas that they deal with.
I think one of the things we have talked about with JIEDDO
and while there is no doubt there have been successes in terms
of some of the fielding, we still don't have a real good
sense--and this goes back to the thing that we are talking
about today, about the effectiveness of all of the solutions--
we can tell maybe on a one-on-one, but globally I don't think
we still have that information out there. So while I think that
the money has gone to a lot of good things, I think there are
still questions about how effective are all of the solutions
that have been provided? Are they meeting all of requirements
of the warfighter, and are they effective, is this something we
want to transfer into some other combatant command? I think all
of those kinds of things are still up in the air.
Mrs. Hartzler. Is there any consolidation of bringing
together all of the processes and entities to centralize so
these decisions are made in one place regarding all of these
programs?
Mr. Dee. So there is not a decision to consolidate all of
the organizations or bring everything under a single hat. That
was a recommendation that was contained within the
congressionally directed Defense Science Board Report in 2009
to create a rapid acquisition and fielding agency, give them a
one-half percent of the Department's budget, set them aside and
let them get on with it.
The difficulty with doing that is that almost relieves the
rest of the Department from worrying about what the most
immediate threats are. So what we are working to do and which I
think we are being relatively successful at is getting the
larger institution, the 90 percent of the building in the
Department that is involved in the normal requirements,
resources, programming and acquisition process, involved in the
game. To do that, what we have done, instead of saying that now
JIEDDO no longer exists, ISR task force no longer exists, MRAP
task force, all these other guys, you are now one organization,
we pulled their reporting chain under a single spot. And that
is Dr. Carter's Senior Integration Group, which I addressed
earlier, co-chaired by the J-3, General Neller. And what that
provides for us--and going back to an earlier question, what is
the hard part of this is and what takes longer? The hardest
part is getting everybody to accept that the requirement is a
priority. If you have all of this coming to a central senior,
very, very senior level decision point, that can say, yes, in
fact, these are priorities, this particular requirement is a
priority, and everybody from the requirements folks through the
budgeting, the programming folks, the acquisition folks, all of
the acquisition folk, the PM [Program Manager], the contracting
officer, the head of the contracting activity, et cetera, et
cetera, and to then go back out to the transportation community
to be able to get something out into the field itself; once all
of those entities are on the same sheet of music in terms of
priorities and we can get the money there, then things tend to
happen pretty well.
So the hardest part has been getting a common understanding
of priorities. And I think what Dr. Carter is doing with the
Secretary's permission through the SIG is going to provide
that.
Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you.
Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you for your efforts. I am actually encouraged. I
had two of my oldest sons serve in Iraq, and in their service,
I was really assured by the military leadership, but I always
hoped, too, that UAVs [Unmanned Aerial Vehicles] would be
overhead or some level of advanced technology.
And I share the concern of Congresswoman Hartzler, too,
that we are dealing with a well-financed enemy, sadly a very
determined, educated enemy. And so what you are doing is just
so important to respond to technological challenges to our
troops that are identified. And with that in mind, and I know
that you are working with the warfighter to receive input from
them, and are there mechanisms in place where--I have just
gotten back from visiting with the troops in Iraq and
Afghanistan. And if I had suggestions from them, I would like
to present them to you, but also, is there a mechanism where
they can communicate directly with your offices?
Mr. Dee. Yes, sir. We have many mechanisms for reaching
back both into the services and to OSD and the Joint Staff, to
identify new requirements to exchange ideas and such. Let me
just talk real briefly some battle rhythm items. So depending
on what level you are at, we have a biweekly civics secure VTC
[Voice Teleconference] with the theater in order to discuss new
technologies that may be emerging to allow them to take a look
at these things. They all have--or certainly down at the
brigade level, they have science and technology advisors that
allow them to look at this. So from the upfront stuff, we have
got new opportunities, technical opportunities that may be of
value to you. We have that exchange through various VTCs and
such. The Army's research and development and engineering
command hosts a weekly VTC with many of the same players but
further expanded that goes to all of the different RCs and the
leadership of all of the RCs [Regional Commands]--not the
leadership, but kind of the action officer, 0-6 level within
all of the RCs to sort of do the same thing, to review
requirements, to review technical opportunities, to mitigate
requirements, as well as just to review the delivery of
capabilities that may be going out there. At the senior-most
level, Dr. Carter has every 2 to 3 weeks another forum where he
has leadership of USFOR-A, ISAF and the different codes, the
different RCs, the Intelligence folks, everybody, CENTCOM,
ourselves, the Joint Staff and everybody in the building that
is participating in this thing. So we have lots of venues for
exchanging information, somewhat informally, but at least to
make sure everybody understands the state of play both in terms
of what may be available with technical opportunities as well
as requirements.
On the requirements side, there are multiple venues for
identifying your requirements as well. Of course, the informal
thing kind of kicks it off, but more formally, depending on the
service, depending on the type of need that you have, we have
this JUONs process that we are talking about it if it is a
joint need, also in a lot of cases if it is a very technically
difficult problem to solve. But the Army has what they call an
operational needs statement process. The Marine Corps has a
process. The Navy and the Air Force all have processes that
through their component commands they can submit requirements
that then get vetted through their services, again with OSD
providing oversight of that and some visibility over the kinds
of things that they are doing.
Mr. Wilson. Another resource, we have very creative people
in our country, such as the chairman of the subcommittee, who
himself has numerous patents and has been a person who has been
a visionary on different issues.
And we have constituents come to us with very enterprising,
entrepreneurial, helpful suggestions. Should we direct them to
you, or who should we direct innovators to?
Mr. Dee. Sir, you can always direct them to us or to me,
and we can put them in touch with the right folks. There are
lots of opportunities for industry and folks who have got ideas
to participate in our process. And each service and
organization has a slightly different ways of soliciting
inputs, but we do go through broad agency announcements. We do
requests for information, requests for proposals. JIEDDO has a
rolling process that anybody can get on the site and look and
see what kind of capabilities they are looking for and submit
proposals.
If there is something more specific that they have got
which there may not be a solicitation out there for at all, we
are more than happy to take a look at it. Of course OSD doesn't
execute anything, so we would refer to one of the services that
has got responsibility for that particular capability area.
Mr. Wilson. Again, I want to thank you.
And 10 years ago, I was at the National Training Center in
Desert Warfare training with the Army National Guard, and I
like to point out that the equipment I have is now 5
generations removed, and I say that complimentary. So thank you
very much for your efforts.
Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you.
We will have several questions for the record. I just have
three brief questions before we recess the committee.
Mr. Dee, we understand that DOD is developing new guidance
for its urgent needs process to be issued in a directive-type
memorandum. When do you expect this new guidance to be issued?
Mr. Dee. Sir, I told the GAO in response to the report in
March of 2010 that that directive was forthcoming, and I think
we are now a year later, and I don't have it. But what has
happened in that interim period, again, was the evolution of
the Senior Integration Group. We are now codifying decisions
that the Secretary has made in regards to using the Senior
Integration Group as the single senior leadership point
decisionmaker for the Department. We are codifying that in a
directive-type memorandum.
I would like to give you a specific date when it will be
done, but given the coordination process within the Department,
it could be anywhere between a month and 4 months from now.
Mr. Bartlett. Okay. The next question. Does DOD have a
visibility over how well urgent needs solutions are performing?
If so, has the Department performed analysis of this data, and
what are the results of any such analysis?
Mr. Dee. Sir, again, the execution happens at many
different levels of these various processes. Each entity, each
component that executes these urgent needs processes has an
assessment process in place. We have multiple, both the Army's
Test and Evaluation Command and the Marine Corps' Operational
Test and Evaluation Command have folks overseas in theater that
do operational assessments or capability limitations
assessments of systems that have been fielded. They distribute
surveys of the users of these things to try to get an idea of
how well they are using.
JIEDDO does something similar, also leveraging the ATEC
[Army Test and Evaluation Command] efforts but also using some
of their own folks to do assessments both before things are
deployed but, as importantly or even more importantly, while
they are deployed to figure out what the operational
effectiveness of this stuff is.
So, within each of those entities, there is an organization
that manages these assessments that provide to the operational
users in order to determine if what we did think was good
enough is in fact good enough to mitigate the particular
capability gap. All of those reports--and I think in ATEC's
case, it is about 166 reports they have done in the past 18
months or so on urgently fielded requirements. Those are all
available on the various component Web sites within the
Department. They are not necessarily rolled up into a single
spot.
But the folks who are stakeholders in those particular
capabilities, whether from the acquisition side, the
requirements side or from the operational user overseas, they
do have access to that. And those reports, as well as the
service that they do, then inform any changes to the
requirements that they may have, which may be a modification to
a JUON. It may be the recision of a JUON, or it may be the
submission of a whole new JUON, because what we thought was
going to work just plain didn't work and we are starting over
again.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you.
Mr. Solis, you said that in addition to lacking
comprehensive guidance, DOD does not have a senior-level focal
point for urgent needs. Why is it so important that DOD have
such a focal point?
Mr. Solis. It sounds like they are going to have a senior
focal point, based on what I heard today. But I think it is
important because you need somebody who can go between all of
the different offices, and we mentioned all of the different
entities that are involved in the urgent needs process. Without
that senior leadership--and we have seen that in other areas of
counterterrorism, business transformation, contracting and
contingencies, that when you have senior leadership--and I mean
senior leadership at the AT&L level, which we are talking about
in this case, I think that is going to help make things move
different things through the process. Whether it be funding,
whether it gets hung up for some other reason, I think that
senior leadership can step in and make things happen.
I think the most extreme example of that is the MRAP. When
Secretary Gates said, we want to make this happen, it happened.
I am not saying that the Secretary can do that at every time.
But when you do have that senior leadership involvement, it can
help facilitate and move things in ways that haven't been even
thought of.
Mr. Bartlett. Mr. Reyes, do you have any additional
questions?
Mr. Reyes. I was just going to mention, although we are
focused on challenges, are there some good news stories out
there of things that we were able to deploy very quickly,
capabilities that were asked for that we were able to get them
out--kind of give you a shot at a good news story that you can
comment on?
Mr. Dee. Yes, sir. Thank you for that opportunity.
But, yes, I think we do have lots of good news stories.
Some of them were briefed at the classified briefing that
happened beforehand. But we can mention the Aerostats, and you
saw the effect that those are having, and that was a very quick
turnaround on a very large, complex program that not the least
part of the complexity being the fielding of those capabilities
and actually getting them to all of these remote sites and
getting them set up, which was a very difficult challenge.
But if you look at--MRAP was mentioned already; MATV [MRAP-
All Terrain Vehicle] mentioned already, all of those things. A
lot of the counter-IED equipment, the CREW equipment, which has
largely mitigated what was a very serious threat not many years
ago. A lot of these things are tremendously good news stories.
We have--although not a rapid acquisition fielding agency, not
everything coming through a single office, between the
components, the various task forces that we have and that have
stood up over the years, we have pushed a lot of good stuff
over into the field. And I said in my statement that we believe
that our Forces have got the best force protection, counter-
IED, ISR, C2 [Command and Control] capabilities in the world. A
lot of that has been developed through these urgent processes.
And we believe that sincerely that they do have that.
We think there is still a ways to go. We are always looking
for better technologies and better capabilities to provide to
them. But we do think that given in your opening statement,
putting the imperative on the speed to get things over there,
rather than on the risks associated with the traditional cost
schedule and performances, we think we have had some successes
since the early days of this war.
Mr. Reyes. Good.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you.
I have but one brief question before we adjourn the
committee. I hope you will humor me in a little poll that I am
conducting. This has to be one of the most asymmetric wars in
the history of the world. If you will take a piece of paper,
without consulting with your colleague, and write down a number
when I ask you for it and then read that number back to me. For
every dollar that they spend on IEDs, how many dollars do we
spend in response, like MRAPs and mine rollers and ISR and
JIEDDO and just an educated guess? Write that number down.
Mr. Solis. Sir, again, the question is how much do you
think----
Mr. Bartlett. For every dollar they spend for putting an
IED out there on the road or out in the field, how many dollars
have we spent in response to that, including things like MRAPs
and JIEDDO and the whole gamut of things, the little dirigibles
that are up there that are surveilling them, the pilotless
aircraft.
Okay. Mr. Dee, your number?
Mr. Dee. Sir, this may be low-balling it, but I think it is
probably at least 1,000 to 1.
Mr. Bartlett. I was wondering whether it was closer to a
1,000 to 1 or a million to 1.
Mr. Solis?
Mr. Solis. I had put 1,000 to 1.
Mr. Bartlett. You put 1,000 to 1.
Okay. Thank you very much for my little poll. Thank you
very much for your testimony. And we will submit some questions
for the record. We would appreciate you responding to that. We
now stand in adjournment.
[Whereupon, at 5:13 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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A P P E N D I X

March 1, 2011

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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

March 1, 2011

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

March 1, 2011

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BARTLETT

Mr. Bartlett. Mr. Dee, we understand from GAO's report and
testimony today that DOD does not have in place a comprehensive
approach for managing all of its various urgent needs processes. More
specifically, GAO said DOD needs to develop DOD-wide guidance that,
among other things, defines roles, responsibilities and authorities,
and designates a senior-level focal point for urgent needs. GAO also
recommended that DOD evaluate potential options for consolidation. We
understand DOD concurred with all of GAO's recommendations. Can you
tell us what specific actions DOD plans to take to address them? Given
that DOD concurred with GAO's recommendation to evaluate potential
options for consolidation, can you give us examples of where you might
consolidate urgent needs entities and/or processes, and any cost
savings you may achieve through such consolidation? We understand that
DOD is developing new guidance for its urgent needs processes, to be
issued as a directive type memorandum. When do you expect this new
guidance to be issued?
Mr. Dee. As part of the review directed by Section 804 of the Ike
Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 (Public
Law 111-383), we will consider the various improvements to the
acquisition process for rapid fielding of capabilities in response to
urgent operational needs. The assessment will address the specific
items required by Section 804 as well as those that have been
recommended by the GAO, the FY09 Defense Science Board Report and
others. Specifically we intend to develop DOD-wide guidance and
evaluate potential options for consolidation. This review and report to
Congress will be completed by January 7, 2012.
As stated in our response to GAO report 11-273, published March 1,
2011, we will assess options for consolidation as part of the Section
804 study.
We are currently coordinating a draft DOD policy memorandum to
establish a ``Senior Integration Group for the Resolution of Joint
Urgent Operational Needs.'' Completion is contingent on the successful
resolution of any critical comments we receive but we anticipate
finalizing the memorandum in April 2011.
Mr. Bartlett. Section 804 of the Ike Skelton National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 calls for the Department to
conduct a broad review of its urgent needs processes and report back to
the Congress in January 2012. Who in the Department will be responsible
for conducting this study? Based on the results of that study will an
implementation plan be developed for any actions to be taken, to
include milestones and metric to measure progress? Who would be
responsible for developing and implementing such a plan? Do you
anticipate the Department will take any actions prior to reporting back
to Congress in January 2012?
Mr. Dee. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology
and Logistics will have overall responsibility for conducting the
review in coordination with other components of the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, The Joint Staff and the Services. We are unable
to appropriately respond to your other questions until completion of
the review.
Mr. Bartlett. Numerous solutions have been developed and fielded in
response to urgent needs over the past several years. These include
large equipment items such as MRAPs, sophisticated counter-IED
technologies and teams of experts to provide support with law
enforcement and cultural awareness issues. Does your office track the
amount of equipment and other solutions that have been fielded, and if
so how much has been fielded in terms of costs? If you do not track
these solutions, who does? Does DOD have visibility over how well
urgent needs solutions are performing? If so, has the Department
performed analyses of this data and what are the results of any such
analyses?
Mr. Dee. Urgent needs are primarily satisfied through Service
acquisition processes and deployed in support of U.S. Forces who
maintain accountability for the equipment and other urgent needs
solutions. We do not have nor can we readily obtain a cost for the
amount of equipment and other solutions that have been fielded. The
Defense Science Board estimated, in September 2009, that $50B was spent
by DOD for urgent warfighter needs from 2005 to 2009. Subsequently, the
GAO estimated that department-wide urgent needs efforts cost at least
$76.9B from Fiscal Year 2005-2010.
The various DOD Components fulfilling urgent needs track equipment
and costs in accordance with Component and Department policy. Joint IED
Defeat Organization, the Army's Rapid Equipping Force, Army Test and
Evaluation Command, the Marine Corps Systems Command and many other
Departmental organizations provide a robust presence in theater to
evaluate the performance of their equipment and report on their
capabilities and limitations.
The Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell hosts a monthly Central Command
Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUONs) Review to monitor progress in
the fulfillment of JUONs and to provide CENTCOM with a venue to discuss
any problems identified in their deployment or effectiveness of JUON
solutions. Services maintain oversight of their responses to Component
specific urgent needs.
There have been no Department level analyses on the performance of
urgent needs solutions. Service testing organizations often review the
performance of individual initiatives to assess their capabilities and
limitations and report these results to the Services.
Mr. Bartlett. In November of 2009, the Secretary of Defense
established the Counter-IED Senior Integration Group (or CSIG) to
integrate, prioritize and accelerate activities across the Department
of Defense to counter the IED threat in Afghanistan. We understand that
this group was initially planned to be temporary and to be discontinued
in June 2010. What role has JRAC had with respect to the CSIG? How have
the roles of this group fit into the urgent needs processes? Can you
tell us what the status is of this group and is the department
considering similar senior-level involvement for other urgent needs
areas beyond counter-IED? Was the CSIG created to overcome any
authority issues with regard to JRAC or the Joint IED Defeat
Organization? If so, what were these limitations and how has CSIG been
able to overcome them?
Mr. Dee. The Director, Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell (JRAC),
participates as a member of the C-SIG. The C-SIG's role has evolved to
become the Department's senior level governance council with oversight
of many of the most critical urgent needs of our operational
Commanders, not just Counter IED requirements. The C-SIG is expected to
be re-chartered as the Senior Integration Group, in the near future, to
reflect its broader role as the senior level governance council for the
Department's urgent operational needs.
No, the C-SIG was not created to overcome any authority issues with
regard to JRAC or the Joint IED Defeat Organization.
Mr. Bartlett. JRAC has moved organizationally a couple of times in
the past few years, with the latest move elevating it to directly
report to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology
and Logistics. Why was this latest change made? Did JRAC previously
experience any issues with having the necessary authority to do its
mission? Do you believe this latest move places JRAC in the most
appropriate position, and does JRAC have the authority it needs to
effectively carry out its roles and responsibilities?
Mr. Dee. This organizational change was made to streamline the
decision process for those urgent needs submitted by the operational
Commanders and validated by the Joint Staff.
The JRAC did not previously experience any issues with having the
necessary authority to do its mission.
Yes, the personal involvement of senior leadership in the
resolution of Joint Urgent Operational needs ensures that the JRAC is
well positioned for success and provided ample authority to carry out
its roles and responsibilities.
Mr. Bartlett. As Mr. Solis from GAO stated in his testimony, in
April 2010, GAO cited challenges in obtaining funding as a major factor
that increased the time needed to field urgent needs solutions to the
warfighter. Accordingly, to improve the availability of funding, GAO
recommended that DOD (1) designate an entity to recommend the use of
rapid acquisition authority to the Secretary of Defense where
appropriate for urgent needs and (2) create an executive council to
make timely funding decisions as urgent needs are validated. What
action has DOD taken with regard to GAO's recommendations? What other
actions, if any, have DOD taken to improve the timely availability of
funding for urgent needs? Does DOD have a means to continually evaluate
the timeliness of its urgent needs funding processes and, if so, what
does this evaluation show?
Mr. Dee. The JRAC currently serves as the entity recommending use
of rapid acquisition authority to the Secretary of Defense. The Counter
Improvised Explosive Device Senior Integration Group (C-SIG), soon to
be the Senior Integration Group (SIG), is a senior governance council
co-chaired by the USD(AT&L) and The Joint Staff J-3 that provides
oversight of the funding, contracting and fulfillment of critical
urgent needs.
The Department uses Overseas Contingency Operation (OCO) funding,
below-threshold reprogramming, above threshold reprogramming, and rapid
acquisition authority to provide funding for urgent needs during the
year of execution.
To mitigate the inherent delays in the reprogramming process, the
Department has requested funds for urgent operational needs. The Fiscal
Year (FY) 2011 budget submission included a $300M OCO request which has
not been appropriated and was not supported by the Defense committees.
The FY12 President's Budget Request includes $100M in the base budget
and an additional $100M in the OCO request to provide an immediate
source of funding for urgent needs.
The JRAC monitors funding of Joint Urgent Operational Needs and the
Military Departments provide oversight of their respective
requirements. The JRAC has supported the C-SIG, in its evolving role,
in monitoring the funding status of urgent operational needs under the
oversight of the C-SIG. These evaluations have again demonstrated, as
the GAO and others have found, that there are improvements that can be
made to the funding processes. The results of the evaluations will be
folded into the process improvements considered as part of the
assessment and process improvements required by section 804 of the Ike
Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for FY11 (Public Law 111-
383). Funding process improvements will be addressed in the report to
Congress required by section 804.
Mr. Bartlett. How do you see the future integration of DOD's urgent
needs processes with its traditional acquisition system? Will these two
processes remain separate or will there eventually be one integrated
approach?
Mr. Dee. The urgent needs processes are currently under review in
response to section 804 of the Ike Skelton National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 (Public Law 111-383). The
relationship of urgent needs processes and the ``traditional
acquisition system'' will be assessed as a part of this review.
Mr. Bartlett. In your testimony, you said that GAO identified at
least 31 entities that have a role in managing urgent needs, and that
overlap and potential duplication exists among these entities. Can you
give us an example of where such overlap and potential duplication may
exist?
Mr. Solis. As cited in our most recent reports \1\ and testimony
\2\, we found that overlap exists among urgent needs entities in the
roles they play as well as the capabilities for which they are
responsible. For example:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ GAO, Warfighter Support: DOD's Urgent Needs Processes Need a
More Comprehensive Approach and Evaluation for Potential Consolidation,
GAO-11-273 (Washington, D.C.: March 1, 2011) and GAO, Opportunities to
Reduce Potential Duplication in Government Programs, Save Tax Dollars,
and Enhance Revenue, GAO-11-318SP (Washington, D.C.: March 1, 2011).
\2\ GAO, Warfighter Support: DOD Should Have a More Comprehensive
Approach for Addressing Urgent Warfighter Needs, GAO-11-417T
(Washington, D.C.: March 1, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There are numerous places for the warfighter to submit a
request for an urgently needed capability. Warfighters may submit
urgent needs, depending on their military service and the type of need,
to one of the following different entities: Joint Staff J/8, Army
Deputy Chief of Staff G/3/5/7, Army Rapid Equipping Force, Navy Fleet
Forces Command or Commander Pacific Fleet, Marine Corps Deputy
Commandant for Combat Development and Integration, Air Force Major
Commands, Special Operations Requirements and Resources, or the Joint
improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization. These entities then
validate the submitted urgent need request and thus allow it to proceed
through their specific process.
Multiple entities reported a role in responding to similar
types of urgently needed capabilities. GAO identified eight entities
focused on responding to intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
(ISR) capabilities, five entities focused on responding to counter-
improvised explosive device (IED) capabilities, and six entities
focused on responding to communications, command and control, and
computer technology.
Additionally, we found potential duplication of efforts as several
entities have focused on developing solutions for the same subject
areas, such as counter-IED and ISR capabilities. For example, both the
Army and the Marine Corps had their own separate efforts to develop
counter-IED mine rollers.
Mr. Bartlett. In your testimony you say that GAO identified ``at
least'' 31 entities and that you identified funding for urgent needs to
be ``at least'' $76.9 billion. Why can't you be more specific as to the
total number of urgent needs entities and costs?
Mr. Solis. As cited in our recent work \3\, DOD cannot readily
identify the totality of its urgent needs efforts, including the cost
of such efforts, because it has limited visibility over all urgent
needs submitted by warfighters--both from joint and service-specific
sources. DOD and service officials cited two impediments to full
visibility: the lack of a comprehensive tracking system to manage and
oversee all urgent needs identified by the warfighter and a lack of
clearly defined roles. Thus, we describe our estimate to be ``at
least'' because the amounts we reported may underestimate the actual
total amounts expended on urgent needs from fiscal years 2005 through
2010 because the list of entities is not exhaustive. In conducting our
work, we cast a wide net in an attempt to capture the universe of
urgent needs entities and costs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ GAO-11-273 and GAO-11-417T.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Bartlett. You said that in addition to lacking comprehensive
guidance, DOD does not have a senior-level focal point for urgent
needs. Why is it so important that DOD have such a focal point?
Mr. Solis. As cited in our recent work \4\, it is important that
DOD have a senior-level focal point to manage, oversee, and have full
visibility to track and monitor all emerging capability gaps being
identified by warfighters in-theater. Specifically, a focal point is
necessary to 1) lead the department's efforts to fulfill validated
urgent needs requirements; (2) act as an advocate within the department
for issues related to DOD's ability to rapidly respond to urgent needs;
(3) develop and implement DOD-wide policy on the processing of urgent
needs or rapid acquisition, or (4) maintain full visibility over its
urgent needs efforts and the costs of those efforts. Moreover, without
establishment of a senior-level focal point, DOD officials may be
unable to identify areas for improvement, including consolidation, to
prioritize validated but unfunded requirements, to identify funding
challenges and a means to address such challenges, or ensure
collaboration to modify capabilities in development to meet several
similar urgent needs requirements--and may be unable to reduce any
overlap or duplication that may exist as solutions are developed or
modified. We have previously testified \5\ and reported \6\ on the
benefits of establishing a single point of focus at a sufficiently
senior level to coordinate and integrate various DOD efforts to address
concerns, such as with counterterrorism and the transformation of
military capabilities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ GAO-11-273 and GAO-11-417T.
\5\ GAO, Combating Terrorism: Comments on Counterterrorism
Leadership and National Strategy, GAO-01-556T (Washington, D.C.: Mar.
27, 2001).
\6\ GAO, Military Transformation: Clear Leadership Accountability,
and Management Tools Are Needed to Enhance DOD's Efforts to Transform
Military Capabilities, GAO-05-70 (Washington, DC.: Dec. 17, 2004).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Bartlett. You point out that DOD does not have a universal set
of metrics for its urgent needs processes. Are you saying that DOD
cannot determine whether its processes are working or not?
Mr. Solis. As cited in our recent work \7\, we found that disparate
tracking systems limit DOD's visibility over its urgent needs process
and can hamper improvement efforts. Although the Joint Staff and the
military services maintain databases to track urgent needs solutions as
they move through their processes, more than a third of the entities we
reviewed did not collect or provide the necessary information to those
systems to track the solutions. Having disparate systems and a lack of
adequate data makes it very difficult for DOD to comprehensively
evaluate the progress of urgent needs solutions, perform analyses to
determine effectiveness of the overall processes, and identify needed
improvements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ GAO-11-273 and GAO-11-417T.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Further, our work found that DOD has not established a universal
set of metrics for evaluating the effectiveness and tracking the status
of solutions provided to the warfighter. The majority of DOD urgent
needs entities we surveyed reported that they do not collect all the
data needed to determine how well these solutions are performing. Thus,
DOD and military service officials have limited awareness of all urgent
needs--including how well those needs are being met--which can hamper
their ability to effectively manage and identify areas where overlap
and duplication exist. Without the establishment of a metric or
mechanism to track the status of a validated requirement, including its
transition, and full visibility, the department may not be able to
identify key improvements. Moreover, without a formal feedback
mechanism or channel for the military services to provide feedback, the
department is likely to be unaware of how well fielded solutions are
performing.
Mr. Bartlett. In your report, you recommend that DOD's Chief
Management Officer should evaluate potential options for consolidation
and you provide several examples of such consolidations. Are you saying
DOD should pick one of these, or is your recommendation much broader?
Mr. Solis. We did not intend that the department be limited to
those ideas we presented. We analyzed several operations aimed at
potential consolidations and increased efficiencies in an effort to
provide ideas for the department to consider in streamlining its urgent
needs entities and processes. The options GAO identified are not meant
to be exhaustive or mutually exclusive. The examples we provided may
not be the only possible ways to consolidate urgent needs entities or
processes. We recognize there are benefits and trade-offs for each
potential option and that DOD would need to perform its own analysis,
carefully weighing the advantages and disadvantages of options it
identifies to determine the optimal course of action. Given the
increasing number of urgent needs and the escalating fiscal challenges,
it is critical for DOD to reevaluate the current status of how it
fulfills its urgent needs and whether there is potential to reduce
duplication, fragmentation, and overlap to achieve increased
efficiencies or cost savings, or both.

______

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER

Mr. Turner. Current conversation on the Budget has shifted focus
from the warfighter. In his State of the Union address President Obama
devoted only six sentences to the war in Afghanistan. The 25-second
standing ovation that followed lasted almost as long as the President's
war remarks. I am concerned that our government's diverted attention
from the war in Afghanistan will result in an underfunding of important
programs that will cost the lives of the men and women in uniform
fighting on the front lines.
Will the Secretary of Defense's efficiency plan and defense cuts in
any way prevent our men and women in uniform from receiving the modern
equipment and support that they need?
Mr. Dee. The Department continues to fund the urgent operational
needs of the warfighter and uses Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO)
funding, below-threshold reprogramming, above-threshold reprogramming,
and rapid acquisition authority to provide funding for urgent needs
during the year of execution.
The President has supported and continues to support funding
requests to fulfill urgent operational needs. The President's Fiscal
Year (FY) 2011 budget submission included a $300M OCO request to be
used to fund urgent operational needs. This has not been appropriated
and was not supported by the Defense Committees. This has required the
Department to fund such urgent needs using other authorities that, in
some instances, added delay in providing capability to the warfighter.
The FY12 President's Budget Request includes $100M in the base
budget and an additional $100M in the OCO request to provide an
immediate source of funding for urgent needs. While this money would
not fully fund all of the Department's urgent needs, it would allow
sufficient funds to initiate actions immediately while additional funds
are requested through Congress.
Mr. Turner. Much has been said about the effects of the continuing
resolution on military operations.
a. To date, how has the continuing resolution impacted the
warfighter?
b. Explain how the continuing resolution could continue to endanger
our troops?
c. What would be the impact of a yearlong continuing resolution on
equipping the warfighter?
Mr. Dee. Secretary Gates has stated that a yearlong continuing
resolution or significant funding cut for Fiscal Year 2011 will cause a
crisis for the Department of Defense. This includes significant impacts
on the Department's responsiveness to urgent needs. It affects
anticipated urgent needs because we can't access budgeted funding and
must reprogram funds to cover these requirements. It also adversely
impacts operations and maintenance (O&M) requirements because we are
unable to reprogram any funding into the O&M account.
Mr. Turner. Current conversation on the Budget has shifted focus
from the warfighter. In his State of the Union address President Obama
devoted only six sentences to the war in Afghanistan. The 25-second
standing ovation that followed lasted almost as long as the President's
war remarks. I am concerned that our government's diverted attention
from the war in Afghanistan will result in an underfunding of important
programs that will cost the lives of the men and women in uniform
fighting on the front lines.
Will the Secretary of Defense's efficiency plan and defense cuts in
any way prevent our men and women in uniform from receiving the modern
equipment and support that they need?
Mr. Solis. Our work has not evaluated the impact of the Secretary
of Defense's efficiency plan or defense cuts on meeting urgent needs
identified by the warfighter. However, we have examined funding issues
related to urgent needs in the past. For example, in April 2010 \8\, we
reported that the amount of time needed to field urgent needs solutions
has been increased by the challenge of obtaining funding, in one case
adding as much as 293 days to the time needed to field a solution to
the warfighter. We found that funding challenges exist in part because
the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) has not given any one
organization primary responsibility for determining when to implement
the department's statutory rapid acquisition authority or to execute
timely funding decisions. In addition, we reported that DOD can
reprogram funds appropriated for other purposes to meet urgent needs
requests, but authority for determining when and how to reprogram funds
has been delegated to the services and combatant commands. However, we
found that the services are reluctant to reprogram funds from their
respective budgets to fund solutions to joint urgent needs and that DOD
faced challenges in consistently securing timely cooperation from them.
Our prior work \9\ has demonstrated that strong leadership from OSD
over resource control is critical to overcoming the deeply entrenched
nature of the department's financial management challenges.
Accordingly, we recommended in April 2010 that the Secretary of Defense
designate an entity with primary responsibility for recommending use of
rapid acquisition authority and that DOD establish an executive council
to make timely funding decisions on urgent need requests. The
department partially concurred with these recommendations and
identified actions it planned to take to address them.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ GAO, Warfighter Support: Improvements to DOD's Urgent Needs
Processes Would Enhance Oversight and Expedite Efforts to Meet Critical
Warfighter Needs, GAO-10-460 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 30, 2010)
\9\ GAO, Defense Infrastructure: High-Level Leadership Needed to
Help Communities Address Challenges Caused by DOD-Related Growth, GAO-
08-665 (Washington, D.C..: June 17, 2008).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Turner. Much has been said about the effects of the continuing
resolution on military operations.
a. To date, how has the continuing resolution impacted the
warfighter?
b. Explain how the continuing resolution could continue to endanger
our troops?
c. What would be the impact of a yearlong continuing resolution on
equipping the warfighter?
Mr. Solis. The continuing resolution was not within the scope of
our work. Thus, we did not evaluate the impact of continuing
resolutions on equipping the warfighter. However, as stated previously,
we have identified cases in prior work where funding challenges have
lengthened the time needed to field urgent needs solutions to the
warfighter. In these cases, the funding issues we identified occurred
in part because DOD may not have been effectively managing the
resources it had. For example, as noted above, in April 2010, we
reported that funding has not always been provided in a timely manner
for joint urgent needs in part because OSD has played a reactive rather
than proactive role in making decisions about when to invoke the
department's rapid acquisition authority. In addition, we reported that
DOD delegated the authority for determining when and how to reprogram
funds for addressing urgent needs to the services and combatant
commands, but faced challenges in consistently securing timely
cooperation from them.