- NOMINATIONS BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, FIRST SESSION, 108TH CONGRESS

[Senate Hearing 108-002]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]

S. Hrg. 108-002

NOMINATIONS BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE,
FIRST SESSION, 108TH CONGRESS

=======================================================================

HEARINGS

before the

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

NOMINATIONS OF

PAUL McHALE; CHRISTOPHER RYAN HENRY; STEPHEN A. CAMBONE; JOHN PAUL
WOODLEY, JR.; LINTON F. BROOKS; LT. GEN. JOHN P. ABIZAID, USA; THOMAS
W. O'CONNELL; PAUL M. LONGSWORTH; GEN. RICHARD B. MYERS, USAF; GEN.
PETER PACE, USMC; GEN. PETER J. SCHOOMAKER (RET.), USA; LTG. BRYAN D.
BROWN, USA; GORDON R. ENGLAND; AND MICHAEL W. WYNNE

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JANUARY 30; FEBRUARY 27; JUNE 25; JULY 10, 24, 29; SEPTEMBER 23;
NOVEMBER 18, 2003

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Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

NOMINATIONS BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, FIRST SESSION,
108TH CONGRESS

S. Hrg. 108-002

NOMINATIONS BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE,
FIRST SESSION, 108TH CONGRESS

=======================================================================

HEARINGS

before the

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

NOMINATIONS OF

__________

JANUARY 30; FEBRUARY 27; JUNE 25; JULY 10, 24, 29; SEPTEMBER 23;
NOVEMBER 18, 2003

__________

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

JOHN WARNER, Virginia, Chairman

JOHN McCAIN, Arizona CARL LEVIN, Michigan
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
PAT ROBERTS, Kansas ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama JACK REED, Rhode Island
SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada BILL NELSON, Florida
JAMES M. TALENT, Missouri E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska
SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia MARK DAYTON, Minnesota
LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina EVAN BAYH, Indiana
ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York
JOHN CORNYN, Texas MARK PRYOR, Arkansas

Judith A. Ansley, Staff Director

Richard D. DeBobes, Democratic Staff Director

(ii)

C O N T E N T S

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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Page

January 30, 2003

Nominations of Hon. Paul McHale to be Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Homeland Defense; and Christopher Ryan Henry to be
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy................... 1

Statements of:

Reid, Hon. Harry, U.S. Senator from the State of Nevada.......... 6
Specter, Hon. Arlen, U.S. Senator from the State of Pennsylvania. 7
Henry, Christopher Ryan, to be Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy..................................................... 8
McHale, Hon. Paul, to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Homeland Defense............................................... 9
Buyer, Hon. Steve, U.S. Representative from the State of Indiana. 10

February 27, 2003

Nominations of Hon. Stephen A. Cambone to be Under Secretary of
Defense for Intelligence; John Paul Woodley, Jr., to be
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works; and Ambassador
Linton F. Brooks to be Under Secretary for Nuclear Security and
Administrator for Nuclear Security, National Nuclear Security
Administration, Department of Energy........................... 77

Statements of:

Allen, Hon. George, U.S. Senator from the State of Virginia...... 80
Brooks, Ambassador Linton F., to be Administrator for Nuclear
Security, National Nuclear Security Administration, and Under
Secretary for Nuclear Security, Department of Energy........... 82
Cambone, Hon. Stephen A., to be Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence................................................... 84
Woodley, John Paul, Jr., to be Assistant Secretary of the Army
for Civil Works................................................ 85

June 25, 2003

Nomination of LTG John P. Abizaid, USA, for Appointment to the
Grade of General and to be Commander, United States Central
Command........................................................ 163

Statement of:

Abizaid, LTG John P., USA, for Appointment to the Grade of
General and to be Commander, United States Central Command..... 164

July 10, 2003

Nominations of Thomas W. O'Connell to be Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict; and
Paul M. Longsworth to be Deputy Administrator for Defense
Nuclear Nonproliferation, National Nuclear Security
Administration................................................. 217

Statements of:

O'Connell, Thomas W., to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/LIC)).... 224

(iii)

Longsworth, Paul M., to be Deputy Administrator for Defense
Nuclear Nonproliferation, National Nuclear Security
Administration................................................. 231

July 24, 2003

Nomination of Gen. Richard B. Myers, USAF, for Reappointment as
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Reappointment to the
Grade of General; and Gen. Peter Pace, USMC, for Reappointment
as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Reappointment
to the Grade of General........................................ 275

Statements of:

Myers, Gen. Richard B., USAF, to be Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
Staff.......................................................... 280
Pace, Gen. Peter, USMC, to be Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
Staff.......................................................... 282

July 29, 2003

Nominations of Gen. Peter J. Schoomaker (Ret.), USA, for
Appointment as Chief of Staff, USA, and Appointment to the
Grade of General; and LTG. Bryan D. Brown, USA, for Appointment
as Commander, United States Special Operations Command and
Appointment to the Grade of General............................ 357

Statements of:

Schoomaker, Gen. Peter J., USA (Ret.), for Appointment as Chief
of Staff, USA, and Appointment to the Grade of General......... 365
Brown, LTG. Bryan D., USA, for Appointment as Commander, United
States Special Operations Command and Appointment to the Grade
of General..................................................... 366

September 23, 2003

Nomination of Hon. Gordon R. England to be Secretary of the Navy. 431

Statement of:

England, Gordon R., to be Secretary of the Navy.................. 438

November 18, 2003

Nomination of Michael W. Wynne to be Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics..................... 473

Statements of:

Wynne, Michael W., to be Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics......................... 476

APPENDIX......................................................... 547

NOMINATIONS OF HON. PAUL McHALE TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE; AND CHRISTOPHER RYAN HENRY TO BE DEPUTY UNDER
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

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THURSDAY, JANUARY 30, 2003

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:45 a.m., in
room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator John Warner
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Warner, Inhofe,
Roberts, Allard, Talent, Dole, Levin, Reed, Akaka, E. Benjamin
Nelson, Clinton, and Pryor.
Also present: Senators Reid and Specter, and Representative
Steve Buyer.
Committee staff members present: Judith A. Ansley, staff
director; Cindy Pearson, assistant chief clerk and security
manager; and Gabriella Eisen, nominations clerk.
Professional staff members present: Charles W. Alsup, Brian
R. Green, William C. Greenwalt, Carolyn M. Hanna, Mary Alice A.
Hayward, Patricia L. Lewis, Thomas L. MacKenzie, and Lynn F.
Rusten, professional staff members; Scott W. Stucky, general
counsel, and Richard F. Walsh, L. David Cherington, and Ann M.
Mittermeyer, counsels.
Minority staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes,
Democratic staff director; Evelyn N. Farkas, Richard W.
Fieldhouse, Creighton Greene, and Maren R. Leed, professional
staff members; Gerald J. Leeling and Peter K. Levine, minority
counsels.
Staff assistants present: Michael N. Berger, Leah C.
Brewer, Sara R. Mareno, and Nicholas W. West.
Committee members' assistants present: Cord Sterling,
assistant to Senator Warner; John A. Bonsell, assistant to
Senator Inhofe; James Beauchamp, assistant to Senator Roberts;
Jayson Roehl, assistant to Senator Allard; Arch Galloway II,
assistant to Senator Sessions; James P. Dohoney, Jr. and Jon T.
Kakasenko, assistants to Senator Collins; Lindsey R. Neas,
assistant to Senator Talent; James W. Irwin, assistant to
Senator Chambliss; Henry J. Steenstra, assistant to Senator
Dole; Tiffany Turner, assistant to Senator Cornyn; Mieke Y.
Eoyang, assistant to Senator Kennedy; Elizabeth King, assistant
to Senator Reed; Davelyn Noelani Kalipi and Richard Kessler,
assistants to Senator Akaka; William K. Sutey, assistant to
Senator Bill Nelson; Eric Pierce, assistant to Senator Ben
Nelson; William Todd Houchins, assistant to Senator Dayton;
Andrew Shapiro, assistant to Senator Clinton; Terri Glaze,
assistant to Senator Pryor.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Warner. The hearing will come to order.
Senator Levin and I had a very long breakfast this morning
with the Secretary of Defense. His parting words were, ``I need
them in a hurry.'' I said, ``Well, then, let us end the meeting
and I can get back here.''
I would like to welcome our new members on the committee
this morning. I will make a brief statement, and then--oh,
Senator Levin is here.
Senator Levin. I welcome the new members, as you do.
Chairman Warner. The committee meets this morning to
consider these two very important nominations, two of the most
outstanding, qualified individuals for public service that I
have been privileged to see in some time. Thank you, and I
thank your families for offering this service.
Mr. Ryan Henry has been nominated by the President to serve
as Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Congressman
Paul McHale has been nominated to fill the newly created
position of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland
Defense. We welcome the nominees and their families.
Mr. Henry, congratulations on your nomination. I understand
that your wife Delonnie, your mother Mildred, and your children
are here today--why don't you introduce all of your family?
Mr. Henry. Yes, sir. I have my youngest daughter, Megan
Rich, and her husband, Michael Rich; my daughter, Maile Reid,
and her husband, Key Reid; and my son, Terrell Henry, at the
end there, sir.
Chairman Warner. I understand there is a little linkage
with our distinguished colleague here.
Mr. Henry. We have the pride of the family--Riley Reid, who
both Senator Reid and I share as the best granddaughter in the
world.
Chairman Warner. Isn't that wonderful? That is nice.
Senator Levin. We better not tell Ella that. [Laughter.]
Chairman Warner. Mr. McHale, I understand you have your
family here. Would you introduce them for us, please?
Mr. McHale. Mr. Chairman, I would like to. I am joined
today by my wife Kathy, my son Matt, my daughter Mary, and my
son Luke.
Chairman Warner. Thank you. Senator Specter is also due to
come by a little later.
Mr. McHale. Yes, sir, that is correct.
Chairman Warner. Then we will stop the proceedings.
Mr. McHale. He indicated to me, Mr. Chairman, that he would
be here about 10:15.
Chairman Warner. Is Congressman Steve Buyer here?
Mr. Buyer. Yes.
Chairman Warner. Good. Nice to see you. We welcome you and
thank you, Steve, the former Chairman of the Personnel
Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee.
I am going to stop where I am now and put my statement into
the record. Senator Levin, why don't you say a few words?
[The prepared statement of Senator Warner follows:]

Prepared Statement by Senator John Warner

The committee meets this morning to consider two very important
nominations. Ryan Henry has been nominated by the President to serve as
the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; Congressman Paul
McHale has been nominated to fill the newly-created position of
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense. We welcome the
nominees and their families.
Mr. Henry, congratulations on your nomination. I understand that
your wife, Delonnie, your mother, Mildred, and your children and
grandchild are here today. Would you introduce them please?
I am pleased that Senator Harry Reid is here today to introduce you
to the committee.
Mr. McHale, I understand that your wife, Kathy, a Lieutenant
Commander in the Naval Reserve, is here today, as well as your
children. Would you please introduce them to the committee?
I also recognize Congressman Steve Buyer, former Chairman of the
Personnel Subcommittee of the HASC. The committee has received a letter
from Mr. Buyer, which, without objection, I will enter into the record.
Family support is critical to the success of individuals in senior
positions in our government, and we appreciate the support and
sacrifices of the families of these distinguished nominees.
I had the opportunity to meet with both of our nominees on Monday.
We are fortunate as a nation that you have both decided to return to
government and, assuming you are confirmed by the Senate, continue your
service to our country.
Mr. Henry, after graduating with distinction from the U.S. Naval
Academy in 1972, you compiled an impressive career of military service
as a naval aviator, serving as a test pilot, as the commanding officer
of a carrier-based Sea Strike Squadron, and as Special Programs Manager
at the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. While on active duty,
you participated in combat operations in Vietnam and over Iraq during
Operation Desert Storm.
Since retirement you have spent time as a Senior Fellow at the
Center for Strategic and International Studies, concentrating on
information assurance and cyberthreats. Currently, you are a Corporate
Vice President for Strategic Assessment and Development with Science
Applications International Corporation (SAIC).
This is an impressive resume by any measure. Our Nation is
fortunate to have someone of your caliber willing to serve in this
challenging position.
Former Congressman Paul McHale has also had a distinguished career,
including service as a decorated Marine Corps officer. In 1990,
following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, Colonel McHale was ordered to
extended active duty and served as Assistant Operations Officer for the
Seventh Marine Regiment (Task Force Ripper). He deployed with the
Seventh Marines to Saudi Arabia in August 1990, shortly after the Iraqi
invasion, and served in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait until his release from
active duty in May 1991. Colonel McHale continues his service to this
day in the Marine Corps Reserve.
Mr. McHale began his political career when he was elected to the
Pennsylvania House of Representatives in 1982 and served five
consecutive terms. After returning from the Persian Gulf region in
1991, Mr. McHale was elected to the United States House of
Representatives to represent the 15th Congressional District of
Pennsylvania. He served three terms in the U.S. House of
Representatives, and, as a member of the House Armed Services Committee
and House Science Committee, distinguished himself with his commitment
to a strong national defense and to the welfare of the men and women of
the Armed Forces. Upon his departure at the end of the 106th Congress,
Mr. McHale was awarded the Distinguished Public Service Medal by then-
Secretary of Defense Cohen.
Since his departure from Congress, Mr. McHale resumed the practice
of law in Allentown, Pennsylvania. Fortunately, he has agreed to answer
this call to duty and to assume what may be his greatest and most
important challenge: enhancing the capabilities of our Nation's
homeland defense.
I am proud to have played a role in including the legislation to
create the position of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland
Defense in last year's Defense Authorization Act. It is central that
the Pentagon have a single focus for the vital homeland defense
mission, working with Secretary Ridge's new Department. I cannot think
of a better person to fill this important position than Congressman
McHale.
Mr. Henry, you will play a central role, from your position in the
``Policy Shop'' in ensuring that Mr. McHale succeeds in his important
mission. You will have many challenges in the months ahead and a broad
range of policy issues. I am confident that you are ``up to the task.''

Senator Levin. I just want to welcome both our witnesses.
They are well-qualified for these important positions; one, a
totally new position and one a relatively new position. We
thank their families. The families serve along with our
nominees, sacrifice along with our nominees, frequently without
being thanked by our Nation as they should be for their service
supporting in this case their husbands and fathers, brothers,
and, I guess, grandfathers. Is that the situation here?
Except for the reference to the most wonderful
granddaughter in the world, I think, other than that, I would
thoroughly support your nomination. [Laughter.]
I say that as I walk around with pictures of my two
granddaughters in my pocket. I would have to not quite buy that
part of your testimony. [Laughter.]
But other than that, we are delighted with your nominations
and look forward to having a chance to ask you questions.
Like our chairman, I welcome again publicly the new members
of our committee. We only have two of our new members with us
today. Senator Pryor and Senator Dole, thank you for your
joining this committee. We look forward to both of your
services.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator Levin.
I certainly join in recognizing the important role of the
families who have unusually long hours of waiting, given the
extraordinary times in the Department of Defense. But those
extraordinary times require extraordinary individuals to serve.
Having studied hundreds of biographies of candidates over
the 30 years that I have been affiliated with the Department of
Defense, we have two of the finest here this morning. I
congratulate you and your families, and say only to the wives
and the children: Get your fathers home! Every decision in the
Pentagon made after 7 o'clock is reversed the next morning.
[Laughter.]
Senator Allard. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman Warner. Yes.
Senator Allard. I want to apologize in advance. I have
another committee meeting at 10 o'clock, and I have some brief
comments I would just like to make part of the record.
Chairman Warner. Of course.
Senator Allard. I want to congratulate each of you, and
wish you well in your new responsibilities.
Thank you, sir.
Chairman Warner. I thank you, Senator.
[The prepared statement of Senator Allard follows:]

Prepared Statement by Senator Wayne Allard

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased that we have two excellent
candidates before us today. The positions they will be occupying are
important to the security of this nation and the functioning of the
Department of Defense. I am particularly pleased that we will be
considering the President's nominee for a newly created position--the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense.
Since September 11, we have been confronted by a new world. No
longer can we afford to be content with the old ways of doing business.
Secretary Rumsfeld has launched a major effort to transform the U.S.
military, though much remains to be done. We need a military that is
mobile, well-equipped, and capable of fighting on multiple fronts
overseas. We also need a military capable of assisting with serious
crises here at home.
I have reviewed Mr. Henry's resume and am impressed by his prior
military experience. His advanced research, development, and policy
analysis expertise will serve him well as he prepares to confront the
many policy challenges facing our country and the Department of
Defense. In particular, I hope to work closely with the nominee as he
assists senior DOD officials develop, coordinate, and resolve national
security space policy issues.
I am also pleased that former Congressman Paul McHale has decided
to return to public service after a 3 year absence. I understand that
he twice served in the active military--first, in 1972 for 2 years as a
Marine Corps second lieutenant; and later, in 1991, as a Marine Corps
infantry officer during the Persian Gulf War. I appreciate his service
to our country, and look forward to working with him on better
protecting our homeland.
Congressman McHale will be in a difficult position from the start.
Since the position for which he seeks confirmation was recently
created, the duties and functions have not been firmly established.
Moreover, many of the agencies with homeland security missions are now
entering a period of transition. I noticed in the nominee's answers to
the committee's advance questions that he will be providing guidance to
U.S. Northern Command through the Secretary of Defense. I would
appreciate it if the nominee would expand on this responsibility
further in either his opening statement or his answers to our
committee's questions.
I thank the Chair for the opportunity to make a few opening
remarks. I welcome our nominees, and I look forward to hearing from
them.

Chairman Warner. The committee has asked our witnesses to
answer a series of advance policy questions. They have
responded to those questions in our standard questionnaire.
Without objection, these responses will be made part of today's
record.
Before we hear from our witnesses, I have several standard
questions I ask of each nominee who comes before this
committee. I ask you to respond.
Have you adhered to the applicable laws and regulations
governing conflicts of interest?
Mr. Henry. Yes, sir.
Mr. McHale. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. Thank you. Have you assumed any duties or
undertaken any actions which would appear to presume the
outcome of this confirmation process?
Mr. Henry. No, sir.
Mr. McHale. No, sir.
Chairman Warner. Will you ensure that your staff complies
with deadlines established for requested communications
including prepared testimony and questions for the record in
hearings?
Mr. Henry. Yes, sir.
Mr. McHale. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses
and briefs in response to congressional inquiries?
Mr. Henry. Yes, sir.
Mr. McHale. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. Will those witnesses be protected from any
reprisal for their testimony and briefings?
Mr. Henry. Yes, sir.
Mr. McHale. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. We will now ask our colleagues to make
their introductions.
Senator Reid, we certainly are privileged to have our
distinguished leader here. I do not know of a harder working
Senator in the entire institution of 100.

STATEMENT OF HON. HARRY REID, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF
NEVADA

Senator Reid. Chairman Warner, Senator Levin, members of
the committee, it is a pleasure for me to introduce Christopher
Ryan Henry as President Bush's nominee to be the Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense For Policy. Ryan Henry is an outstanding
American and an ideal choice for this critical position.
As has already been established--and certainly I want the
record to reflect, that my son Key had the good fortune to
marry Ryan's daughter, Maile, several years ago. When I say it
was my son's good fortune, I really mean that. Ryan and his
wife, Delonnie, are fine parents, and their children are
especially kind, warm, and talented.
I was very pleased and proud when the Reid and Henry
families became connected through the marriage of our children
and the birth of our grandchildren, Riley, Oclell, and Ella
Joy. As has been indicated, Riley is here.
I would also like to welcome Ryan's mother, Mildred Henry,
who came all the way from San Diego to be here with her son. We
are all sorry that Ryan's father, Robert, cannot be here. He
has not been feeling very well in recent weeks.
As a family, we are all very proud of Captain Henry. I know
he will contribute enormously to the mission of the Defense
Department during these difficult and dangerous times.
As the President explained the night before last in the
President's State of the Union Address, our country faces a
wide array of national security threats both here and abroad.
Our policy makers within the defense community are facing some
unprecedented challenges and problems for which there are no
easy answers. But good people, with talent, vision, and
practical experience can help solve these problems. I believe
Ryan Henry is one such person.
He is an honor graduate of the United States Naval Academy
in Annapolis. He served more than 26 years as a Navy officer
and aviator, earning numerous awards and deploying tours in
Vietnam and the Persian Gulf conflict. He has logged over 5,500
hours in air in 54 different aircraft, and has made 750 carrier
landings. His military service record is a clear demonstration
of his bravery and patriotism. Mr. Chairman, I will not go
through the list of commendations, awards, and medals that he
has received, but they are numerous.
His achievements after retiring from the Navy have been
equally impressive. I will not list all of his accomplishments,
but I would like to highlight his service as a senior fellow at
the highly regarded Center for Strategic and International
Studies, and his outstanding record of performance as Corporate
Vice President at Science Applications International
Corporation, one of the world's largest, most prominent defense
and technology companies.
Because of his patriotism and his call to duty by our
Commander in Chief, he is returning to serve in the United
States military in the capacity that his qualifications
certainly enable him to do. Even though he has had to give up a
lucrative career in the private sector, as is very typical for
people who have served in the military, when you have a call to
duty, you answer that call. Captain Henry is no different.
These tough and dangerous times confronting our Nation
require that we call upon the country's best, most capable
citizens to serve. The President and this committee have found
the best in Christopher Ryan Henry.
I would just like to mention in passing as I already have,
how proud I am of his daughter, Maile, who is the mother of two
of my grandchildren.
But also I think it is worth noting that one of Captain
Henry's daughters is now a member of the United States Navy,
having graduated from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
and ROTC program. Within a matter of a couple of weeks, she is
heading for the Gulf to take up her position as a fire control
officer on a destroyer. This is what the family is all about.
Mr. Chairman, I know you will give this nomination every
consideration. I am grateful and proud for having this
opportunity to introduce part of my family.
Chairman Warner. Senator Reid, your introduction has moved
all of us very deeply. Indeed, the Henry family is what America
is all about. You have come back to serve again. As Secretary
Rumsfeld told me to get this hearing over quickly, he needs
you. So we will pass on with that.
Mr. McHale, we have Senator Specter here to introduce you.
Welcome, Senator.

STATEMENT OF HON. ARLEN SPECTER, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF
PENNSYLVANIA

Senator Specter. In the grand manner of the Senate of
yesteryears, we are privileged to have Squire Senator Warner in
our midst. I appreciate your courtesies, Mr. Chairman.
I am chairing another hearing, but I wanted to interrupt to
come by and introduce former Congressman McHale to you,
although you already know him. He is a very distinguished
Pennsylvanian. He served in the Pennsylvania general assembly.
He is a three-term Congressman. He has an outstanding academic
background from Lehigh University. He obtained a bachelor's
degree and a law degree from Georgetown. He is a man of noted
independence. He has spoken out with vigor and clarity. He has
been a marine, consistent with their policy of selecting just
the best.
I know that he will be an outstanding Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Homeland Defense and that is a very major
undertaking. I would talk about him longer, but I want to see
this committee finish its work so we can get him confirmed.
Thank you very much, and good luck, Paul.
Mr. McHale. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Warner. We thank you genuinely for coming because
this is an outstanding individual right here. I was greatly
impressed when I had the opportunity to study his dossier.
Senator Specter. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator.
Mr. McHale. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. At this point, I would also like to insert
into the record the statement of Senator Rick Santorum, who is
unable to be here today.
[The prepared statement of Senator Santorum follows:]

Prepared Statement by Senator Rick Santorum

Chairman Warner and Senator Levin, I want to thank you for
extending me the opportunity to make a statement on behalf of Paul
McHale, President Bush's nominee to be the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Homeland Defense, as he appears before the Committee on
Armed Services. Given Paul's experience as a Member of Congress and a
member of the United States Marine Corps, I believe that President Bush
has chosen a highly qualified individual to carry out the
responsibilities associated with this office.
Prior to the terrorist attacks of September 11, it was unthinkable
to imagine attacks such as those carried out by al Qaeda being
inflicted on us on our own soil. Regretfully, we now realize there are
individuals and organizations that place such little value on human
life that they are willing to execute suicide missions against our
citizens and our homeland. Reorganizing the Federal Government to
better prepare and respond to these new threats drove Congress and the
executive branch to craft the new 170,000-employee Department of
Homeland Security.
This new position for which Paul has been nominated--a position
created by Congress--is one way that the Department of Defense has
reorganized itself to respond to these new 21st century threats. The
new organization will come under the aegis of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy, and is expected to have a close working
relationship with U.S. Northern Command, the new unified command with
responsibility for defense of the homeland. If confirmed, Paul McHale
will provide important policy guidance for the command through the
Office of the Secretary of Defense.
The honor bestowed on Mr. McHale through his nomination by the
President is great. Equally great is the challenge that awaits him in
this position. The task of preparing America against non-traditional
threats to our homeland is a daunting one, filled with many difficult
problems and pitfalls. Nevertheless, it is a task that Paul McHale is
well suited to tackle.

Chairman Warner. Now, Mr. Henry, do you have an opening
statement you would like to make?
Mr. Henry. Just briefly.
Chairman Warner. Yes.

STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER RYAN HENRY TO BE DEPUTY UNDER
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

Mr. Henry. Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, and members of the
committee, as has been mentioned, I come before you as the
President's nominee for the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy. As such, I consider it a great honor, and
appreciate the trust and confidence that the President and the
Secretary have placed in me. I also appreciate the kind words
of Senator Reid.
Most especially, I appreciate the support I have had
throughout my career through periods of long separation from my
wife and family, and their support in this nomination.
Very briefly, I would just like to say to the Senators and
the committee before I start answering questions, that I
understand that being involved in decisions that affect the
young men and women in uniform who are on the front lines of
freedom is the most serious job one can have in government, and
one that I will take with the utmost concern.
During the past week when I have been visiting the
Pentagon, I have been impressed by a sign that is outside the
National Military Command Center which states that, ``The more
you sweat in peace, the less you bleed in war.'' I want you to
know that if confirmed by this committee, I will sweat
unceasingly to make sure that no unnecessary drop of blood is
shed either by our adversaries, our friends and allies, or most
especially, those young men and women who have put their
country, and the defense of their country and its interests
before themselves.
Finally, I would like to thank the committee for the rapid
manner in which you brought before you our nominations and the
opportunity to serve and to participate in this Constitutional
process.
Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Thank you. Mr. McHale, I guess this is the
last time we should address you as ``Congressman.'' Soon it
will be ``Mr. Secretary,'' but I will say, Congressman, do you
have any opening comments that you would like to make?

STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL McHALE TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE

Mr. McHale. Mr. Chairman, I do have a very brief, informal
statement.
As noted earlier, I am joined today by my wife, Kathy, and
my three children, Matt, Mary, and Luke. Before I make any
substantive comments, I want to recognize publicly that my
ability to serve in public office has always been the result of
their willingness to sacrifice for our country. I want them to
know how very much that support means to me.
Joining my family, Mr. Chairman, again, as you noted, and
in a real sense he is a part of my family, is Congressman Steve
Buyer. Steve is a friend and colleague from the House. He is
known for his tact and diplomacy, and he has promised to be on
his best behavior today. I hope that is good enough.
[Laughter.]
We were also joined earlier by Congressman Lane Evans from
Illinois. Lane was perhaps my oldest friend, was my oldest
friend, in Congress. He and I were law school classmates,
fellow marines, and have been friends for more than 30 years.
Lane had to leave, but I did want to note for the record his
attendance.
Mr. Chairman, our Nation is at war. Unlike past conflicts,
technology has now empowered even small groups of terrorists
with the capacity to attack within our own borders American
lives, property, and institutions of government. But they
cannot attack our shared ideals or common resolve. With courage
and tenacity, we will defeat those who wish to harm our Nation
and our people.
If confirmed, I will bring passion and a sense of urgency
to the preparation of our country and domestic military
defense. On that, you have my word, sir.
I am deeply grateful to the President for my nomination,
and if confirmed, will do all that I can to justify the faith
and confidence placed in me by the Secretary of Defense.
I would be honored to answer your questions.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Congressman.
Congressman Buyer, we would be happy to have you say a few
words before the committee if you so desire. We are very
pleased to have one of our own colleagues from the House side
join us today.

STATEMENT OF HON. STEVE BUYER, U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM THE
STATE OF INDIANA

Mr. Buyer. Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin.
Senators, I came here today because I wanted to stand with
a friend. This is a good man. He is balanced, centered,
possesses the virtues and values of character. He is a marine.
He will always be a marine. [Laughter.]
Mr. McHale. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Buyer. He also has the intellect of a scholar. He has
the courage of a warrior. He has the demeanor of a country
gentleman. He is eminently qualified, and we should do it
quickly. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Most eloquent. We thank you, Congressman.
I will place in today's record immediately following your
remarks, the letter that you forwarded to the committee with
regard to the Congressman.
[The information referred to follows:]

Congress of the United States,
House of Representatives,
January 30, 2003.
Hon. John Warner, Chairman,
Senate Armed Services Committee,
228 Russell Senate Office Building,
Washington, DC.
Dear John: I am taking this opportunity to share with you and the
Senate Armed Services Committee members my highest recommendation for
Paul McHale to be confirmed as the first Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Homeland Defense.
For 6 years, I had the pleasure of working with Paul as a colleague
in the U.S. House of Representatives. Paul is eminently qualified to
assume the position as the first Assistant Secretary for Homeland
Defense. His faithful service to our great country began as a United
States Marine in 1972 and has continued to this day in both public
office and as citizen-warrior serving in the United States Marine
Reserve.
Paul and I created the National Guard and Reserve Components Caucus
in the 105th Congress. As co-chairman, Paul never wavered in fighting
for our men and women in uniform and was instrumental in fostering a
well-trained, well-equipped, and relevant Reserve Force for the fully
integrated total force. Recognizing the National Guard's unique role in
securing the homeland, Paul's tireless efforts ensured critical plus-
ups in modernization and readiness accounts above the President's
request. A marine reservist to this day, Paul symbolizes a patriot's
selfless devotion to our Constitution, the principles it enshrines, and
our American way of life.
Paul McHale possesses the necessary qualities to excel in this
important position at this critical time in our Nation's history. His
outstanding leadership and superior integrity, ensure that the
President, and thereby the country, will be well served.
Best Regards,
Steve Buyer,
Member of Congress.
Copy to: Senator Carl Levin,
Ranking Member.

Chairman Warner. I am going to remain through the hearing,
so I thought I would allow my colleague, our new member, to
take part of my time.
You have another commitment with another committee.
Senator Dole. Yes, I do, Mr. Chairman. I have a 10 o'clock
commitment with another committee. I am very sorry to have to
leave.
Chairman Warner. All right.
Senator Dole. I just want to express my strong support for
two outstanding candidates. I certainly look forward to working
with you. I do have a few questions that I would like to have
you answer for the record. I look forward to having an
opportunity to visit with both of you very soon and to work
closely with you.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think we all
have committee hearings at 10 o'clock.
First of all, it is great to be here with my old friend,
Paul. I tell you, Mr. Chairman, that Steve Buyer used to sit
next to me, or I sat next to him, on the fourth tier down of
the House Armed Services Committee. I looked up at all these
lofty people up there. Across the aisle was Paul McHale. We
were only there for 2 years at the same time. He came during my
last years before I came over here.
I have to say this, that there is a lot of partisanship in
both the House and the Senate, and Paul is one who has always
risen above that. I am just very proud that you are here and
doing this.
Mr. McHale. Thank you, sir.
Senator Inhofe. Of course, Mr. Henry, I feel the same way
about you. I have looked at your record. I have not had a
chance to get to know you personally. But there certainly are
going to be lot of problems to--let me just start off with some
things you have said in the past.
I have had a great concern over North Korea. We found out
back in 1998 that even though we suspected it was true, our
intelligence community did not say it was true, that they were
going to have the ability to have a multiple stage rocket. This
happened to be in the latter part of August of 1998. Seven days
after we received a letter saying it would be between 3 and 5
years before they would have such a thing, they fired one.
We know that they have been working on missile technology
as well as weapons of mass destruction, nuclear weapons. We
also know that they are trading with Iraq, Iran, Syria, Libya,
and other countries. You made a statement that I was very proud
of you to make. You said, ``The threat posed by North Korea
will only grow over time if left unchecked.''
Why do you not share with us some of your ideas about North
Korea and what our policy should be?
Mr. Henry. Thank you, Senator. That is a very critical
question, especially at this time in the situation that we are
in with North Korea.
Obviously, North Korea currently does present a real
challenge to our national security policy. Not only have they
demonstrated that they have the capacity to build weapons of
mass destruction and are working on the means to be able to
deliver those, the other problem is that they are probably the
world's prime proliferator. So that is of the highest concern.
It is going to require the entire focus of government.
Should I be confirmed, I would be interested in taking part
in that consultive process, in the interagency process and also
working with this committee.
The President has indicated that he thinks it is of most
value that this matter be taken to the Security Council. It is
not an issue necessarily between just the United States and
North Korea, but one that concerns the entire world.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you.
Mr. McHale, you know how stressed we are right now. We have
talked about that before in terms of end-strength. Prior to
September 11, we had this problem, too. That just exacerbated
that problem. You are going to be having to face some of these
concerns.
Let us look at the Guard and Reserve. They are already at a
point where they are almost at 100 percent capacity. This was
actually before September 11. Now we have been having to use
them in homeland security. It is going to be your
responsibility to make a lot of decisions as to how we are
going to confront this. I would hope that we will look at the
overall problem of end-strength as it affects all of our
services, along with homeland security.
So I would just like to ask you: With the crisis that we
are facing right now in the Guard and Reserve, in that
component, what are your plans regarding both the immediate use
of them, as well as your recommendations for the future so we
can confront future problems?
Mr. McHale. Yes, sir. I do not think there is any question,
Senator, but that the Guard and to a similar extent, perhaps
not as great an extent, the Reserve, will become even more
deeply engaged in homeland defense.
We have a significant strategic reserve in which the Guard
is located. We have eight Guard divisions that are dedicated to
various types of missions. My anticipation would be that among
those missions, in a balanced force, including an overseas
warfighting capability to be retained by the National Guard,
that we would have an even greater emphasis on homeland defense
missions.
Right now, Secretary Tom Hall, Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Reserve Affairs, who was the service chief for the
Navy Reserve when Congressman Buyer and I were over in the
House and we were the co-chairs of the Guard and Reserve
Caucus, is conducting a comprehensive study with regard to the
future roles and missions of the National Guard.
But to give you a very succinct summary, the Guard now
plays an important role in terms of our strategic reserve. It
has an overseas warfighting capability that I think has to be
retained. But an even greater emphasis and of even greater
importance to our Nation, I think, lies ahead in terms of the
Guard's engagement in homeland defense issues, specifically the
Civil Support Teams. The Air National Guard, I think, will
continue to play a vital role with regard to the combat air
patrol (CAP). So, if anything, the Guard will, in some ways, be
coming back to its roots to defend the Nation domestically.
Senator Inhofe. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions.
I just agree with Congressman Buyer, we need to get these
people confirmed and on their way.
Thank you, sir.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
Senator Levin.
Senator Levin. If we could yield to Senator Akaka who also
has another commitment, and then we perhaps could go back to
the regular order. My other colleagues said they are able to
stay.
Chairman Warner. Senator Akaka.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much.
I want to welcome Mr. McHale and Mr. Henry, and also your
families. There is no question you have great support for your
nominations. It is great to know of two people who are so
highly qualified. You have credentials in the military, as well
as in public service. I always feel that it is so important
that you have lovely and good families, and you do. For me, it
makes a huge difference. I welcome you and your families to
this hearing.
I have a few questions here. Mr. McHale, as Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, you will be building
and improving the Department's efforts to support homeland
security requirements and formulating policies that pertain to
all 50 States and all territories.
Mr. McHale. Yes, sir.
Senator Akaka. The homeland security needs of Hawaii,
because of its geographic location, are often ignored or
overlooked in the development of broad, comprehensive national
policies. While we are fortunate to have the United States
Pacific Command headquartered in Hawaii, I am concerned about
the comprehensive homeland security policies being developed
without consideration of the challenges faced by Hawaii because
of its geographic location. For example, we have no bordering
State to engage in a mutual aid agreement. If air travel shuts
down, there are no other expedient means to get medicine,
vaccines, and food into the State.
Given the fact that Hawaii does not fall within the
jurisdiction of United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM),
which is charged primarily with supporting homeland security
functions, what will you do, if confirmed, to ensure that DOD,
in developing homeland security policy, considers the special
factors related to Hawaii? How do you intend to ensure that
there is appropriate coordination between U.S. NORTHCOM and
U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), to ensure that national homeland
security policies include the needs of Hawaii and the Pacific
Island territories?
Mr. McHale. Senator, as you point out in your question,
although most of the homeland defense activities as they relate
to the Continental United States will be under Northern
Command, the homeland defense activities of the Department of
Defense as they relate to Hawaii and other areas of the Pacific
will fall under the jurisdictional authority of the Pacific
Command.
The question you just raised, sir, is nearly identical to
the series of questions that Congressman Bobby Underwood
presented to me yesterday when I bumped into him. He is the
Congressman, the delegate from Guam. He is an old and close
friend of mine.
While I was in the House of Representatives, I visited
Hawaii on numerous occasions and Guam, in an official capacity
related to my duties on the Armed Services Committee. What I
said to Congressman Underwood yesterday was that I am very
sensitive to the homeland defense needs of Hawaii and other
American territories in the Pacific.
I indicated to the Congressman that if I am confirmed, if I
have that privilege, then I will promptly visit both Guam and
Hawaii to confer with PACOM. I will, in fact, discuss this
matter promptly, if confirmed, with General Eberhart who is the
Commander of U.S. Northern Command, in order to guarantee that
there is careful dialogue and integration of homeland defense
policies between Hawaii, Guam, other American territories, and
the Northern Command.
I am acutely aware, sir, that we have 50 States and
additional territories and that, while NORTHCOM covers most, it
does not cover all. I assured the Congressman, and I assure you
today: The needs of Hawaii will receive careful attention.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much for that response, sir.
Mr. Henry, if confirmed, you will be involved in both
reviewing war plans and in advancing joint training. In
response to the question about DOD's potential post conflict
role in Iraq, you stated that you would advocate war plans
that, and I am quoting, ``emphasize expeditious transfer of
responsibilities from U.S. military forces,'' to other
international agencies, and non-governmental organizations.
Given their potential importance to war planning, not only
in Iraq but in almost any future military scenario, how
important is strengthening relationships between DOD and those
agencies and organizations?
Mr. Henry. Thank you, Senator. That is a critical question,
especially at this particular time.
The key in what we do after the conflict is over, I
believe, is coupled into winning the peace. The military is
normally assigned to provide the means and the capability to
win the war. But utmost in all of our minds has to be: How do
we win the peace? This needs to be part, again, of an
interagency consultive process.
DOD will normally be the one that is there to be able to
provide the authority and the civil structure in the immediate
aftermath of a conflict. DOD, as is my understanding currently
and, if confirmed, I would work to continue, should be able to
stay in the area to provide those services to continue the
functioning of a civil society as best as possible after a
conflict for as long as necessary.
But it should not stay any longer than it is required to,
and should look to be able to have--to pick up those services,
those organizations that are best able to do it. Sometimes they
will be agencies of our government, sometimes part of
multinational organizations, specifically the U.N., and then
many times part of non-profits and non-governmental
organizations which play such a critical role in the world
today.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much for your response.
Mr. Chairman, my time has expired.
Chairman Warner. Thank you.
Senator Roberts.
Senator Roberts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am pleased to have before us two distinguished nominees
for positions that are very critical, not only to the overall
stewardship of the Department of Defense, but the successful
management of the military component of America's war against
terror. I cannot think of a more important role or mission
during these current times. I have a tremendous interest in
both positions.
Mr. Chairman, I am chairman of the Select Committee on
Intelligence, and I hope, sir, to return as Chairman of the
Armed Services Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and
Capabilities. It is that subcommittee that I would tell the
nominees and everyone present that has the Department's
response to terrorism at home in its current jurisdiction. This
subcommittee was formed under the leadership of Chairman
Warner.
Chairman Warner established this subcommittee in 1999, 2\1/
2\ years before the attacks of September 11. Clearly, he was
prescient in terms of the need of that subcommittee, and we
have a very forward-thinking chairman in my friend from
Virginia.
Paul McHale, Steve Buyer, I do not know who rode shotgun
and who drove the stage. Either one, but if you are in Dodge
City and the chips are down and you want either Matt or
somebody there to protect you, I cannot think of two better
people to do that. I have served with both in the House of
Representatives. They have my admiration, respect, and
friendship.
Paul's keenness of mind, his integrity of purpose I think
is second to none. We had a good visit yesterday. He is, in
fact, a class act. He also happens to be, Mr. Chairman, a
former marine. I do not know anybody more dedicated to our
national security.
Mr. Henry, I think you are eminently qualified. I support
you in every respect.
Let me ask just a couple of questions, if I might. Paul, in
your answers to advance questions, you state that in regards to
intelligence, your objective would be to ensure that homeland
defense commanders at all levels acquire the best intelligence
available on threats that impact our homeland security.
Now, we have a unifying command--we talked a little bit
about this yesterday--with the responsibility to secure North
America. One would expect the Northern Command to have a
considerable intelligence requirement with respect to potential
threats. I am talking about the ability to prepare to respond
before something happens, i.e. preemption.
I would expect that General Franks, for example, did that
once he knew about any and all threats in the CENTCOM area. I
am sure that is true.
How do we ensure that General Eberhart's situational
awareness as to the threat he faces in his Area of Operational
Responsibility (AOR) is up to speed? How big a player will
Northern Command be in the President's new Terrorist Threat
Integration Center?
That is a new acronym, by the way, Mr. Chairman, which is
called TTIC. I am not sure if that is accurate, but it was a
very forward-thinking move on the part of the President.
My concern is that because of the nature of the other
Federal jurisdictions involved that the Northern Command may
find itself last in line in regards to receiving intelligence
on its threat, and probably the most important AOR, i.e. our
homeland.
Will you respond?
Mr. McHale. Yes, sir. Sir, my belief is that Northern
Command has to be toward the front of the line, not the back
end of it. The AOR for NORTHCOM includes generally Canada, the
United States, Mexico, and portions of the Caribbean. But the
area of interest for General Eberhart, particularly in the
field of intelligence, is worldwide.
The first line of defense that we have, and it goes well
beyond the boundaries of the AOR assigned to NORTHCOM, is a
worldwide awareness where threats may be emerging. Intelligence
is of little value if it is not fused from all sources,
analyzed, and then, most importantly, disseminated to the
operators.
I believe very strongly and will do all in my power, if
confirmed, to make sure that General Eberhart and his J2 out
there at Peterson Air Force Base become intimately engaged in
the operations of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center,
engaged so that their situational awareness brings to them an
awareness of threats long before they reach our shores. I have
said that if one had to choose between a truly superb
intelligence officer on the staff of NORTHCOM and a truly
superb operations officer--and I would hope that we could have
both--that the higher priority would be to have an intel
officer who sees the threat coming, and a competent operations
officer who can respond to it. But if you do not see the threat
before it arrives, it is too late.
Senator Roberts. I did not write that speech, Mr. Chairman,
but it sure sounded like I would have liked to. [Laughter.]
For both of you, there has been some consternation
regarding the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency's
(DARPA) Total Information Awareness Program--that is probably
the understatement of the morning--even an amendment to the
recent omnibus bill placing some restrictions on that effort.
Now I understand that both of your offices--although, Mr.
Henry, you may have more of an impact on this in terms of your
jurisdiction in regards to the direct oversight.
But can you give me your sense of what this effort is
trying to achieve? I have a view that we are simply trying to
better integrate the myriad information sources within the
Federal Government, trying to achieve what Paul referred to as
earlier warnings of potential terrorist attacks.
Maybe ``total information awareness'' is the wrong way to
describe it. I would describe it as improved information
management. That does not seem to have all the bells and
whistles blowing in regards to problems with civil liberties.
The new terrorist threat center, or TTIC as I referred to
it--I say it is an information center--may be the entity to
help in this regard. What is your view about this? I will ask
Mr. Henry first, and then we can go to Paul.
Mr. McHale. Yes, sir.
Senator Roberts. Then my time is expired.
Mr. Henry. Thank you, Senator. My passing understanding of
the Total Information Awareness Program stems from previous
tours as a program manager at the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency where these sorts of ideas had been discussed.
The idea being, first of all, it being part of the
Department of Defense; it would only look outward; the programs
that I was familiar with. The purpose of it is to take all of
the little bits and pieces of information that come from
numerous different sources but tend to be in different layers,
and normally in heterogeneous databases, and to be able to fuse
them into one database, and then to be able to do a sort or a
filtering process where you are able to pull out intelligence
and information, actual information, from the billions and
billions of pieces of noise that are out there. That is the
purpose of it as I understand it.
Obviously, it is part of a fusion process, a fairly narrow
band in looking out for terrorist organizations in foreign
countries, but that is where my understanding comes. If
something like that is available, then obviously that would be
something that we would want to fuse into the total information
picture that the combatant commander has, to be able to put
together his battle plans and respond to threats.
Senator Roberts. Paul, do you have a view on this?
Mr. McHale. Yes, sir. My expectation would be that whatever
its future might be, the TIA program would not be under the
jurisdictional responsibility of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Homeland Defense. The current developmental program
is in DARPA, as you noted earlier.
If, in fact--it is my understanding that if that technology
were to be developed, that the implementation, the operational
use of that technology in a domestic context would be external
to the Department of Defense, that it would migrate from DARPA
out into the civilian law enforcement community.
I can envision, sir, a circumstance where that technology,
particularly if we had a credible threat of a weapon of mass
destruction and we were attempting to locate, for instance, a
WMD device, that the technology, subject to careful constraint
imposed by Congress, could provide an opportunity to locate and
defeat such a weapon of mass destruction.
But that, in a domestic setting, would be subject to the
policy guidance of Congress. It would be a civilian law
enforcement function, and I would not anticipate that the
technology, to whatever stage it might be developed, would ever
come under the jurisdictional control of the Assistant
Secretary for Homeland Defense.
Senator Roberts. I thank both nominees.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
Senator Ben Nelson.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Just 2 days ago in his State of the Union Address, the
President again stated his belief that Saddam Hussein has
failed to present a true accounting of the chemical and
biological weapons he has stockpiled, and that he has missed
his final chance. A second Persian Gulf War now looms.
On the Korean Peninsula, as has been indicated, North Korea
has withdrawn from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and has
recommitted to a nuclear program, and has stated that they are
going to begin testing missiles once again.
Of course, we cannot forget Afghanistan. We cannot forget
the war on terrorism.
Clearly, we need the best minds in our government to
address these simultaneous threats. I am pleased that we have
two of those best minds with us today. I am very proud to have
them and their families who are understandably proud, and are
participating as well as families in this new personal
sacrifice, once again serving your country. So I am glad to
have you here.
I have just a couple of questions because we had quite an
opportunity yesterday to visit, and I appreciate that personal
time that we shared together.
To ``win the peace,'' as you say Mr. Henry, when we win the
war, do you have any anticipation of the number of forces that
might be required? Obviously, a lot of the decision will be
based on and will come from our allies that appear to be lining
up to join with us should that become necessary. But do you
have some idea of what kind of commitment we might have to make
in terms of force structure and/or time frame to win the peace?
Mr. Henry. Well, Senator, the honest answer is: No, I do
not. I have not been briefed into any of those programs. So all
of my insight would be based on that just as a private citizen.
I would expect that it would probably span a spectrum of
what might be needed depending on exactly what the war plans
are, but also how the outcome is and the degree of damage that
takes place in Iraq.
Senator Ben Nelson. In any event, whatever it takes, we
have to make the commitment to accomplish the winning of the
peace because, otherwise, the winning of the war will be
ultimately lost. Is that your impression?
Mr. Henry. I could not agree with you more.
Senator Ben Nelson. Mr. McHale, as recently as just a week
or so ago, 15 other Senators and I, both Democrats and
Republicans, representing 19 States that currently only have
part-time Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams--we
are into acronyms, WMD-CSTs.
Mr. McHale. Yes, sir.
Senator Ben Nelson. We wrote to Secretary Rumsfeld to
encourage him to establish an additional 23 of these units so
that at least one team will be located in each State and
territory.
Nebraska, like the other 18 States, really does not have in
reality a part-time unit because the teams must be certified
and, obviously, it is not certified. But if you think about it,
in terms of the location of Nebraska, Interstate 80 is
certainly one of the busiest traffic-ways in the United States.
Our heavily traveled rail system is the busiest in the Nation,
and perhaps in the world, with the crossroads of so many
railroads going through. We have the busiest location in the
center part of our State.
Obviously, hometown security and homeland security both
depend on our protection in this area. So I was wondering if
you could share your thoughts on these teams, and what your
position would do to help support Secretary Ridge and others
who are faced with these challenges.
Mr. McHale. Yes, sir. Senator, if I were fortunate enough
to be confirmed, I would anticipate being a vigorous advocate
on behalf of the training and resourcing of those teams. When I
served in the House of Representatives, I was the co-chair of
the Guard and Reserve Caucus. It was during that period of time
that the Civil Support Teams were created. Originally, they
were called Raid Teams, and ultimately became the Civil Support
Teams.
At the present time, it is my understanding that we have 27
teams that have been certified. A total of 32 had been
authorized. But in the National Defense Authorization Act of
2003, 55 teams to include at least one in every State were
reflected in the statutory requirement provided by Congress.
I think these teams will play a vital role in terms of our
preparedness to respond to any domestic attack that might
occur. My concern is that they be properly resourced, and that
the training levels be raised and be maintained at a consistent
level among all of the teams. Frankly, I am not sure that that
consistency of training has yet been achieved.
If we were to have a WMD attack in the United States, it is
likely that among the first responders, at least at the Federal
level, would be the Civil Support Teams who would add to the
first responders' capability at the local level, a WMD
capability which we do not normally find in our local
communities. We need to make sure that that follow-on force, in
the form of the CSTs, is prepared to take on the mission.
Senator Ben Nelson. Well, I am encouraged by your
recognition of the importance of homeland security actually
being about hometown security.
Mr. McHale. Yes, sir.
Senator Ben Nelson. Otherwise, it is just a broad
generality with an awful lot of boxes moved and organizational
charts.
Mr. McHale. Yes, sir.
Senator Ben Nelson. When I left as governor, I lost my
public housing, my transportation, the airplane, but I also
lost the military, the Guard. Of all those categories, the
Guard was clearly the most important to the State of Nebraska
and, I think, remains important for hometown security to work
very closely and coordinate closely with the civil authorities
in the first responder categories.
So I look forward to working with you. I know that you will
do what you can to coordinate these activities to make sure
that they are as seamless as possible and they are as
competently trained and as ready as is absolutely humanly
possible.
Mr. McHale. Yes, sir.
Senator Ben Nelson. I appreciate your background on this,
and I look forward to your future work as well. Congratulations
in advance, and my best wishes to both you and your families.
Thank you very much.
Mr. McHale. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Henry. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator. I appreciate
you making reference to those teams because this committee, on
both sides of the aisle here, has been a strong proponent of
those units. We are going to look to you to keep that momentum
going.
Mr. Henry. Yes, sir.
Mr. McHale. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Warner. Senator Talent, we welcome you.
Senator Talent. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just would like
to say thank you for your kind comments and the kindness you
have already shown me. I am really looking forward to serving
on this committee under you and Senator Levin, and it may be
the most enjoyable part of my service in the Senate. It is a
pleasure for me to be here.
It is also a pleasure for the first hearing I am attending
to be on the confirmation of these two nominees.
Mr. Henry, I do not know you, but you certainly have a very
impressive vitae, and I am fully supportive of your nomination
and look forward to working with you.
Congressman McHale, I do know you, and I just want to echo
the comments that Senator Roberts made.
I do not know of a more dedicated or conscientious public
servant. One of the things, Mr. Chairman and Senator Levin,
that we are going to find when we call Mr. McHale before this
committee, and what we are already seeing, is absolutely direct
and to-the-point responses to our comments in which we can
place full confidence.
I am just thrilled at your nomination, Paul.
I was going to ask about the Chemical Biological Incident
Response Force (CBIRF) teams. You have already addressed those.
Let me just ask you about a more general subject that has
troubled first responders in Missouri when I have talked with
them about the possibility of some kind of a terrorist attack
and as they prepare. I am not certain, in your new role, how
much responsibility you may have for this. I think to some
extent, you are, of course, going to be defining your role. I
have full confidence in your ability to do that.
When I talk to county officials, local public health
authorities, fire protection officials, they are eager to know
how much they or someone in their area may be in the loop on
intelligence sharing. In other words, they say, ``We would
really like to know, and not for release to the public, but if
the government is aware of evidence that would suggest there is
a heightened threat at a sports event going on in our county,
or a county fair, or a shipment of some goods going through the
area''--and this whole question of how we share intelligence
both within the government and then to State and local
officials is one that has troubled me.
I am not really satisfied with the system that we now have,
where the government sort of announces that people should be
worried over a particular weekend. I just do not know how
useful that is.
But if we had some protocol for identifying and sharing
with responsible local officials, or maybe with the State
officials, I think that would be useful. I know that there may
be some risk in developing that.
Now, as you exercise your responsibility over the Reserve
components, obviously you are going to be sharing with local
commanders intelligence that they may need to know. Do you have
any opinion on how you could safely, but effectively, share
that with local responders? Because you are obviously going to
be coordinating with them in carrying out your functions.
Mr. McHale. Yes, sir. Senator, I thank you for your kind
words. I think it is appropriate in this context to point out a
core principle in terms of the Department of Defense's role in
domestic activity. We will be a supporting entity, usually
assisting a civilian agency, a lead agency, in the Continental
United States. I would anticipate that that would be true in
the intel arena as well as elsewhere.
I think the Terrorist Threat Integration Center that was
announced by the President in the State of the Union Address is
a monumental step in the direction that you have described; and
that is to fuse all intelligence sources at a national level
for appropriate dissemination. I would anticipate that the
dissemination to State and local authorities would be conducted
primarily through the Department of Homeland Security.
Within the Department of Defense and the National Defense
Authorization Act of 2003, a new position was created for the
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)). I would
anticipate that he and I, if I were to be confirmed, would
coordinate in terms of the domestic implications of that
intelligence sharing so that he would be the primary interface,
I would think, at the Departmental level with regard to DOD's
role in the fusion of that intel at the new integration level.
But because the statute also charges the new Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense with overall
supervision of all homeland defense activities for the United
States, for the Department, that I would be intimately involved
in coordination with the USD(I) in our contacts with Homeland
Security. To the extent that we would share information with
Homeland Security and receive it from Homeland Security, they
in turn, subject to appropriate clearances and so on, would
pass that information expeditiously to State and local
responders.
That is kind of an overview of the process, but my
impression is that that is how it would work.
Senator Talent. I do not expect greater specificity from
you. I just want to make certain that you are fully conscious
of the need to establish a protocol that both governors--and
Senator Nelson, I am certain, would agree with this--and their
offices, and then local EMT teams can have access to, so that
they know who in the county is being informed, what kind of
threats they are going to be informed of, and that we have a
greater certainty than we now have out there.
I think you are right; I doubt that you will be the primary
initiator, but you are going to be involved.
Mr. McHale. Yes, sir.
Senator Talent. As you have these discussions with Homeland
Defense, I hope you will make certain that they will
expeditiously work out these protocols.
Mr. McHale. Senator, we would anticipate that in the office
that I hope to lead, there would be a senior official--and
actually the gentleman that I am going to recommend for that
position if I am given that opportunity--would have, as his
full-time responsibility, the integration of DOD capabilities
in an effective and responsible way into the overall homeland
security strategy, so that he would be primarily responsible
for coordinating between the new Department of Homeland
Security and the Department of Defense. It is such an important
matter that I think somebody has to work on that virtually
full-time.
Senator Talent. I see my time has expired. I do not want to
overstay my welcome on my first visit, Mr. Chairman. Thank you
again very much.
Chairman Warner. We thank you, Senator.
We will now continue with Mr. Pryor. We are going by the
early bird rule unless you want to change. Senator Pryor?
Senator Clinton. I believe in the early bird rule.
Chairman Warner. Good. [Laughter.]
Senator Pryor. Mr. Chairman, I do not have any questions.
Senator Clinton. I especially believe in this guy's early
bird rule. [Laughter.]
Chairman Warner. To follow in the footsteps of a most
distinguished, most beloved father, with whom I had a strong
wonderful friendship, and he often did the same.
Senator Pryor. Thank you.
Senator Levin. If I could just add one word about Senator
Pryor's folks as well. My wife Barbara and I were and are so
close to David and Barbara Pryor and enjoyed serving with them.
I sort of use the word ``them'' advisedly. When David was a
Senator, he made a major contribution to the Senate. He was
just a wonderful, warm human being. He made a major
contribution to the security of this country. He was somebody
who asked some very tough, pointed questions. It is very
useful, very essential that questions be asked of the type that
your dad asked, and we are just delighted that you, Mark Pryor,
are on this committee.
Senator Pryor. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. I associate myself with those remarks.
Now, Senator Clinton, we welcome you to the committee.
Senator Clinton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize for
not being here earlier. I, too, was at another event, but I
appreciate the opportunity to be here at the first public
hearing of this committee that I am honored to serve on now.
I welcome the two nominees and look forward to working with
you in the years to come on these important matters that,
assuming that you are and I believe you will be confirmed, will
be within your area of jurisdiction and oversight.
Mr. McHale, on January 21, National Public Radio aired a
story about how the military buildup for Iraq is moving
firefighters, police officers, and emergency response personnel
from the front lines here at home in the war on terrorism to
the front lines in the Middle East. Last night, CNN ran a
similar piece.
A number of local officials, from Utah to West Virginia to
San Antonio, say that as many as 10 percent of their first
responders may also be in the Reserves. I know that in New York
City 300 of our firefighters are also in the Reserves. This
creates a tremendous dilemma, as I know you are well aware and
as Senator Talent was raising with you earlier because, on the
one hand, I do not believe we are yet giving our local
communities enough resources to take on the additional
responsibilities imposed by their new challenges with respect
to homeland security. At the same time, they are going to be
losing maybe up to 10 percent--and certainly in New York, some
communities have lost an even higher percentage than that--of
the resources they need, and yet they under law will continue
to pay those people, as they should, to keep that job open, as
they must.
So something is going to have to give here because we are
going to be putting many of our local communities at greater
risk, not only for the potential of threats from terrorists,
but just in the ordinary everyday work that they are supposed
to be doing. Do you have any idea at this point how many
police, firefighters, EMTs, public health officials are being
called up?
Mr. McHale. Senator, I do not. As a private person looking
at the prospect of returning to public service, I would
anticipate that that kind of information probably is available.
I do not know if they have it immediately available, but I
think certainly it could be identified through the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, where occupational
backgrounds would routinely be maintained as a matter of
record.
I can tell you that up until about 2 or 3 months ago, I was
the--after I left Congress, I went back to the Drilling Reserve
in the Marine Corps, and I was the Assistant Division Commander
of the 4th Marine Division. That is the Reserve Ground Combat
Division in the Marine Corps Reserve. Just anecdotally, we had
many firefighters, many police officers. I, in fact, read your
speech at John Jay College, and I am aware of your concerns.
I think the Department of Homeland Security, as opposed to
the Department of Defense, will probably have to engage more
immediately on that issue. It is a national problem. As an
American citizen, I obviously have a concern for the issue that
you raise.
As a potential official in the Department of Defense, our
role would be to support, if I were to be confirmed, the
Department of Homeland Security. We would provide unique and
extraordinary capabilities to those first responders. We would
have the statutory obligation to transfer to those first
responders improvements in technology that might be coming out
of the Department of Defense, so that if the Department
developed a technology that was primarily aimed at competency
on the battlefield, but had a corollary benefit to first
responders at home, that they would become aware of that
technology as quickly as possible.
So I--forgive me if I have taken a tangent to your
question. But while it is a vital national issue, the role of
the Department of Defense in a supporting capacity would not
directly interact with the issue that you have raised.
Senator Clinton. Well, what about, though, the utilization
of Guard and Reserve in order to back up and fill in for some
of these positions?
Mr. McHale. Oh, yes, Senator.
Senator Clinton. Because that certainly has been a role and
responsibility as we all know.
Mr. McHale. That is correct.
Senator Clinton. We have all walked through airports and
seen National Guardsmen, or at the Amtrak station and at Penn
Station in New York. So I think that the coordination is
something that we have to watch very carefully. I would hope
that in conjunction with the Department of Homeland Security we
would monitor this very closely because there will be some
places in the country that will be particularly hard-hit.
I do not know how we would fill the gap if 300 firefighters
were called up in New York City, for example. So that will be a
continuing concern of mine, and I hope that it will be an area
in which you will, working with the Department of Homeland
Security and the rest of DOD, perhaps come up with some
suggestions for us.
Mr. McHale. Senator, what I can pledge to you is that, if I
am fortunate enough to be confirmed, I will talk to Tom Hall
who is the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs.
I will attempt to determine if we have identified who are the
first responders serving simultaneously as citizen soldiers. We
have to be acutely sensitive to that.
There are two ways in which the Department of Defense is
likely to become engaged in support of civil authorities: One,
if we have a unique capability, particularly in the area of
WMD; and second, the Secretary has said, if, in fact, civilian
authorities in a given circumstance were to be overwhelmed as
they were in terms of airport security immediately after
September 11th. The recognition of the fact that those civilian
authorities had been overwhelmed would be a further
justification for DOD engagement.
So if that situation were to arise, although the President
and the Secretary would make the judgment call, the Department,
particularly the Guard, would be prepared under those unusual
circumstances to back up the first responders.
Senator Clinton. Thank you very much, Mr. McHale.
I also understand that now that the Coast Guard has been
moved into the Department of Homeland Security that there may
be an increased role for coordination and oversight. I was very
interested--and you may not have this information at your
fingertips, but you or perhaps someone else in DOD or Homeland
Security could provide it--because we have just learned that
the Pentagon is sending four Coast Guard cutters and two port
security units to the Persian Gulf.
Based on our research, this is the first deployment of
Coast Guard patrol boats to DOD since Vietnam. So apparently,
even though they are now in Homeland Security, they have been
assigned or detailed to DOD. This, again, raises resource
issues.
In New York, we count on Coast Guard facilities and
personnel to guard our ports against terrorist threats. We
clearly are not doing enough yet with the influx of container
ships to improve the level of port security. So I would perhaps
look to you to provide some additional information or the
appropriate person within DOD.
If I could, Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit some
additional questions on this Coast Guard issue.
Chairman Warner. Okay.
Senator Clinton. It is a very serious one obviously to many
States, but particularly given the volume of traffic that we
have in the New York port, it is a particularly pressing one.
Chairman Warner. I thank the Senator. That will be done.
That opportunity is open to all Senators to submit questions
for the record as part of the confirmation process.
I will take a question or two and then yield to my
distinguished colleague.
Mr. Henry, NATO has been a subject that has fascinated me
since 25 years ago when my good friend and I came to the Senate
together, and even before that when I served in the Pentagon. I
was concerned, of course, when NATO made a decision the other
day--and they had a vote, and I think there were four that
opposed the more active participation in this Gulf War
situation as it involves Iraq, but that is history.
I have also been a strong advocate since the last NATO
conference, the one preceding the one at which these new
nations were given invitations the other day. This was when
President Clinton was in office. They put into their charter
now the ability to go out of the traditional area of NATO. I
have expressed my--I do not suggest you reply to this. I am
just going to make a comment for the record. It is too
controversial, so you just sit and listen. [Laughter.]
I have suggested that NATO should be invited--and I repeat
the word ``invited''--by the government of Israel and such
government as the Palestinians still have, to look at that
situation and be encouraged possibly to provide some
peacekeeping so that the peace process could get underway
without as great--and I use the term carefully--as great a
threat from outbreaks along the borders there that we have
witnessed, the tragic loss of life on both sides.
So I will continue to pursue that. As a matter of fact, I
will see that my staff provides you with a letter that I wrote
some time ago to the President. I have talked to Lord Robertson
about it on a number of occasions, because I believe the
instability in the Middle East situation is an integral part of
the overall complex situation as it relates to the Persian Gulf
Region.
I am also interested in China. You came up through the
community of Naval aviation, and you must have watched with
great interest when we lost that P-3 aircraft in that tragic
confrontation with China. Fortunately, it was resolved--but I
hope that as a consequence of that resolution, the
relationships can be strengthened in such a way that we obviate
that occurring again.
Many years ago the Department of Defense--and I had a
modest hand in it--adopted a protocol with the then Soviet
Union called the Incidents at Sea Agreement. I have been urging
the Department for some time to take a look at that protocol to
see whether or not we could do something comparable with China
to avoid again any close proximity incidents of confrontation
which could result in a situation like the loss of the P-3. So
that is another area.
I read through your answers to the committee's policy
questions. You discussed the potential benefits of a
comprehensive military-to-military exchange in dialogue
programs with Russia. Do you hold a similar view with respect
to China?
Mr. Henry. Well, Senator, the military-to-military dialogue
program between the Strategic Command and elements of the
Russian military was successful and led to a greater
understanding.
I have not studied in depth our relationships with China. I
do believe it is a very critical situation, as you evidenced by
the incident with the P-3; tensions along the Taiwanese Strait.
China will be a very significant world power, one we are going
to need to understand how to get along with, to understand
their point of view, but be able to effectively project our
point of view.
If confirmed, I can promise you that I will delve into that
and look forward to working with the committee in coming up
with solutions that will benefit our country and our servicemen
there on the front lines.
Chairman Warner. How about the military-to-military
cooperation? That ebbs and flows, but through my years in the
security systems, I have seen tremendous benefits that have
been derived from military-to-military sharing, beginning with
the educational process which we offer in this country to so
many foreign officers. How do you feel about those programs?
Mr. Henry. Well, obviously the International Military
Education and Training (IMET) program is probably the crown
jewel we have of understanding other military cultures. Not
only does it allow them to come and understand how we operate,
the benefit of civilian legislative oversight in the military
process, but also lets us build individual bonds that, many
times, have been critical in diffusing crises in their
incipient phases. So I could not be a stronger proponent of
programs such as IMET and the opportunity to understand how we
are alike rather than how we are different.
Chairman Warner. Good.
One more question, Senator Levin--that I would like to ask
Congressman McHale.
In the State of the Union speech, the President announced
the establishment of a new Terrorist Threat Integration Center
to facilitate the fusion of information. You explicitly
mentioned it in your opening statement. What is the role of the
Department of Defense in this?
Mr. McHale. Senator, my belief is it has not yet been
defined.
Chairman Warner. That is a good answer. I would stick with
that.
Mr. McHale. Yes, sir. [Laughter.]
Chairman Warner. I am concerned that we have what I regard
as a very fine intelligence setup in the Department of Defense.
We are real-time users. I am going to be very careful as you
take your office and work with your colleagues. I want to be
supportive of the President, but I do not want to see any
degradation of the capabilities of our gathering and such
analysis as we do in the Department of Defense and its related
agencies.
Mr. McHale. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. We are agreed on that?
Mr. McHale. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. Good. Thank you.
Senator Levin.
Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, let me ask you, Congressman McHale, about that same
Terrorist Threat Integration Center which has been referred to
by a number of my colleagues, including the chairman most
recently. His is a legitimate concern.
I have another concern. The new law creating the Homeland
Security Department suggests that the responsibility for
analysis will rest with the Homeland Security Department. The
analysis of intelligence currently resides at the Counter-
Terrorist Center at the CIA. In terms of all-source foreign
intelligence, it rests there.
I want to be sure that there is one place that has the
responsibility to analyze all intelligence, all foreign
intelligence. We had that language in our Senate version of the
Homeland Security Bill. It located the principal responsibility
for analyzing foreign intelligence at the Counter-Terrorist
Center.
We saw before September 11 a failure to analyze and share
intelligence. It was very costly. If we had analyzed it
properly and shared what we had in different parts of our
government properly, we might have been able to prevent
September 11 from happening. So in the Senate bill we
established principal responsibility.
I do not want to diffuse that responsibility in any way. I
want to fuse the information, not diffuse the responsibility.
That means we need one place. We will be lucky if we do it well
once. We have millions of pieces of information coming in
yearly, and to get all that information, relative to foreign
intelligence, in one place to analyze and to do it well would
be a real success.
We still have the Counter-Terrorist Center. When I asked
Governor Ridge the other day at his confirmation hearing, is
there any intent to duplicate that Counter-Terrorist Center
with this new agency, he said, ``No. Principal responsibility
will still be at the CIA, at the Counter-Terrorist Center.''
Mr. McHale. Yes, sir.
Senator Levin. The President the other night, as it has
been noted, established a Terrorist Threat Integration Center.
My question to you is: Is it your understanding that it would
duplicate the analytical responsibility which is principally
located at the CIA?
Mr. McHale. Senator, my understanding of that issue is
quite limited at this stage. As a private citizen, I did not
know anything about the President's proposal until I heard it
in the State of the Union message. So I am really not trying to
dodge your question, but I am just not sufficiently well
informed.
What I can tell you is that as somebody who comes out of an
operational background, the fusion of intelligence is what
takes chaos and brings meaning to it, to an operator. So I am
not smart enough to make a judgment call on the specific
question that you have raised. But however it is fused, and
wherever it is fused, it is essential that we get that
information in an expeditious way down to the operators.
Senator Levin. If it is not clear where it is to be fused,
if there are two or maybe now three places which have
responsibility, there is not going to be accountability. The
lack of accountability was severe prior to September 11.
Mr. McHale. Yes, sir.
Senator Levin. So if we want to focus responsibility for
that, there has to be a place which is principally responsible
for that analysis. So even though you are not in a position now
to give us your opinion on that, you soon will be in a position
where you will have some responsibility in that regard, not
just as a customer but, given your background, knowledge,
experience, and intellect and, it seems to me, responsibility,
you need to have an opinion and to share that opinion with
others. So I would urge you to do that.
As you point out, probably the single most important thing
we can do is the intelligence responsibility.
Mr. McHale. Yes, sir. It is the forward edge of the
battlefield.
Senator Levin. If we do not do it well, and if we blur it
and do not make it clear, we are going to pay another price for
the failure. So, please do look into that issue and I hope you
will work hard to avoid any duplication or confusion in that
area.
Mr. McHale. Yes, sir, I will.
Senator Levin. One of the areas that I have had some
concern with, particularly since the attack on the U.S.S. Cole,
is our inability to detect explosives from a distance. If we
can get the technology to do that, we will not only be helping
our defense effort, protecting our forces, but we can also then
share that with local governments, first responders, and the
people who have the responsibility to protect us. Would you
agree that the development of a stand-off explosive detection
technology should be a top priority of the Department of
Defense and the Department of Homeland Security?
Mr. McHale. Without question, sir. I would expand that to
include other weapons of mass destruction beyond explosives.
Senator Levin. I would fully agree with that.
Reference has been made to the Civil Support Teams (CST)
that we have established in some States, and are planned to be
established in every State and territory. What is your
understanding of the Department's current plans for
implementing that provision?
Mr. McHale. Senator, there are 27 teams that have been
certified. There were 32 prior to the National Defense
Authorization Act that had been authorized. The Authorization
Act expanded that number up to 55, which will bring at least
one team to every State and territory of the United States. If
I am confirmed, we will of course comply with the law. That
will require further consultation with this committee to talk
about resourcing and training, but when the law is passed, we
comply.
Senator Levin. Well, it is not just a matter of compliance.
It is full and quick compliance----
Mr. McHale. With urgency.
Senator Levin. Is it your intent to comply with that law
with speed?
Mr. McHale. Yes, sir. Consistent with the resources that
are made available. I believe----
Senator Levin. But to urge that those resources be made
available?
Mr. McHale. Fortunately, I have had many years of contact
and experience and respect for the National Guard. I am aware
of the role that the CSTs potentially play in terms of the
domestic attack, and we have to be ready.
Senator Levin. I just have one other question on this
subject, Mr. Chairman. Perhaps I could just finish on this
subject.
Chairman Warner. Go ahead.
Senator Levin. Relative to the missions of those teams,
should the mission be expanded to include clean-up or
containment capabilities in addition to their current detection
capability and responsibility?
Mr. McHale. Senator, those teams are now assigned the
mission of detection. I frankly have some concerns that we need
to provide better training and resources to make sure that that
element of the mission is operational.
With regard to expanded capabilities, as a nation, we
clearly have to have greater ability than we have now to enter
a hot zone, provide medical care, decontaminate, and remediate
the site. I am not prepared today to say that that mission
should be within the CST teams. We have other components even
within the Department of Defense that have similar
capabilities, CBIRF, the Army's Chemical Biological Radio
Response Team (CBRRT), the technical escort units.
Clearly, we have to move beyond detection to a real and
operational decontamination, medical--an intrusive capability
to enter a hot zone and do much more than we can do now. But I
am not prepared, sir, today to say that that expansion should
necessarily be within the CSTs.
Senator Levin. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. I would like to call you ``Captain
Henry.'' It might be the last time for a while. Maybe you will
revert back to Captain when you finish your distinguished
career in the Department, Mr. Secretary-to-be.
But in the meantime, let us turn to missile defense. I
again went through your responses there. Currently, the United
States is pursuing cooperative defense efforts with Germany,
Italy, Japan, and Israel. Other allies and friends have
indicated an interest in striking up similar relationships. I
personally find that to be a good, strong move because it
dispels the concern in the world that we are trying to gather
in something around us, that we are going to take care of
ourselves, but ignore the rest of the world.
Also, I think that it emphasizes the sharing of the concern
our Nation has for the missile threat, be it short range or
long range. Are these subjects to which you have given some
thought in time and will likewise devote in your new position
if confirmed?
Mr. Henry. Yes, Senator, if confirmed, this will be an area
that will receive my attention. As you are aware, the President
has announced that he wants to go forward with a very limited
deployment of 20 land-based systems, but also 20 sea-based.
That 20 sea-based allows us not only to protect the homeland,
but also to be able to protect our friends and allies.
We are continuing a very robust research and development
effort, close to the tune of $8 billion a year. As those
capabilities mature, we will also be able to share those with
our friends and allies. But missile defense is something that
is--whether it be theater or national, and we now just call it
basically missile defense, it is something that is of interest,
should be of interest to the entire world, not just the United
States. We should be able to share the resources that we
develop.
Chairman Warner. I share that view.
Mr. McHale, the National Guard and the Reserve--I was part
of the Marine Corps Reserve for many years. I was very pleased
when you and I had our excellent visit together. You stressed
how today the integration between the regular and the Reserve
components, has just come together like gears to begin to turn
instantly and you want to foster that.
Mr. McHale. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. That has not always been the case.
Certainly in my earlier days, it definitely was not the case.
But I think to make the Reserve and Guard effective, they have
to be viewed as sharing the tough parts of military careers,
combat arms responsibilities and things like that.
Now, the Guard will have a heavier emphasis on homeland
defense. But at the same time, we cannot, I think, take away
the options that they can have overseas deployments into other
areas of conflict, as they are now serving brilliantly in the
Balkans and have been for some period of time. They are in the
Afghanistan AOR. What are your views on that?
Mr. McHale. Sir, there are some who have argued that the
National Guard should be oriented exclusively toward homeland
defense. I would respectfully dissent from that opinion.
Chairman Warner. I share in that dissent, yes.
Mr. McHale. I have not spoken with the Secretary of Defense
on the issue, but I have read his comments on this question.
The quotes that I have read indicate that he, too, believes
that the National Guard should be a balanced force, part of our
strategic Reserve in terms of overseas deployment, but that
there is sufficient capability and manpower and resources to be
found within the Guard that we can reorient in a balanced
approach a greater emphasis on the homeland defense mission.
So, I think what is ahead, almost inevitably, is that the Guard
will play a very significant role in homeland defense, but not
to the exclusion of the potential of overseas deployment.
Chairman Warner. I find that a reassuring view that you
have, and I hope that you can implement it.
I am going to read this through. This is one of these
tongue twisters, but you will be able to follow it.
Under existing law, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD/SOLIC), who
heads an organization that this committee through many years
has had a long and very strong supportive role, is responsible
for the overall supervision of Special Operations activities,
low intensity conflict activities of the Department of Defense,
and should serve as the principal advisor to the Secretary of
Defense on these matters.
You have indicated that ASD/SOLIC will maintain oversight
with regard to DOD's international counterterrorism activities
and that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland
Defense (ASD/HD)--that is your new title, will coordinate
closely with ASD/SOLIC on matters related to domestic
counterterrorism.
Mr. McHale. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. That all reads very well, but having spent
5 years in the Pentagon where, hopefully, you will move to,
sometimes it does not always work out the way you like to have
it.
Given the global nature of today's terrorist threat, how do
you envision these two assistant secretaries will share the
responsibilities in policy oversight for combating terrorism?
We have struggled here in Congress in the creation of
homeland defense.
Mr. McHale. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. My good friend and I have seen all the
charts, the cross wires, the stove pipes, and we believe in
accountability.
On which desk does the accountability and the buck stop? If
something goes wrong, who is going to stand up and say, ``That
is my responsibility''?
Mr. McHale. Senator, what we have to do is reconcile not
only the statutory language, but the day-to-day operational
responsibilities with regard to the jurisdiction of ASD
Homeland Defense and ASD/SOLIC. Prior to the National Defense
Authorization Act of 2003, all counterterrorism activity,
insofar as the DOD role was concerned, was assigned to SOLIC.
With the passage of the National Defense Authorization Act, the
provision was included that the new ASD for Homeland Defense
would have overall supervision of all homeland defense
activities of the Department. There is a seam created at that
point in the statutory language between the prior
responsibility and the new obligation imposed on the ASD for
Homeland Defense.
The answer to the policy question that I presented, sir,
reflected my personal thoughts on the matter. I do not believe
that ASD Homeland Defense should have any responsibility, any
direct oversight responsibility, with regard to
counterterrorism activity external to the NORTHCOM or other
combatant command AORs as they relate to homeland defense. Or,
in other words, foreign counter intelligence activity,
counterterrorism activity, should remain the responsibility of
SOLIC.
When you come back within the AOR of normally NORTHCOM--but
as Senator Akaka has pointed out, we also have other combatant
commands, PACOM and so on with homeland defense activities--for
ordinary, important but ordinary counterterrorism activity
within the United States, the lead agency is the FBI.
The Department of Defense would support that role. I would
believe, and I would recommend, that under most circumstances
for domestic counterterrorism support of the FBI, the primary
responsibility should be the ASD for Homeland Defense, the
exception to that being at the high end of counterterrorism
activity where we are dealing with the threat of a weapon of
mass destruction--I believe that at the high end, which
continues to require the kinds of operational skills that are
unique to special operating forces, that in a domestic setting,
again probably in a supporting role, but potentially in a lead
role, that should remain within SOLIC.
So for routine counterterrorism activity in support of the
FBI in the United States, I think that will transition to ASD
Homeland Defense. For foreign counterterrorism activity and
high end, weapons of mass destruction, counterterrorism
activity in the United States, that is SOLIC.
I am pleased, Senator, that if I am fortunate to be
confirmed and the office is set up as we envision, we will be
virtually co-located with SOLIC in the Pentagon.
Chairman Warner. I appreciate the breadth of your answer.
But the bottom line is that this committee had a hand in
drafting the legislation to create your position.
None of us are perfect. Even Mr. Buyer would admit that. If
we did not draw that statute up to make it clear, then we
better readdress it here in the forthcoming bill. I would
really task you to come back to this committee if you see that
somehow we did not foresee a potential problem between these
jurisdictions, because what the President did the other day in
creating this organization to fuse all the intelligence is
derivative of problems we have had throughout our government of
one department not sharing with another certain information.
Well, you know that. We have all been through this.
We cannot have that happen. We will just end this with that
you are going to come back here if you feel there is a
statutory correction that is necessary.
Mr. McHale. Sir, I would welcome the opportunity to come
back. My impression is that we do not have a problem.
Chairman Warner. All right. Fine. Optimism prevails at this
point in your career. There is no limitation on the optimism
until the reality sets in, so good luck.
Mr. McHale. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. Senator Levin.
Senator Levin. Mr. Henry, I would like to talk to you about
Iraq. You made reference to the role of international
organizations in keeping the peace after we prevail in a
conflict. I agree with those comments.
But international organizations, particularly the United
Nations, are currently deeply involved in attempting to disarm
Saddam. I want to talk to you about the role of inspections in
that effort. First of all, I would assume that you would agree
that international organizations, including the U.N., do have a
role in preventing war from taking place.
Mr. Henry. I would agree that they have a role along with
other institutions, yes, Senator.
Senator Levin. We obviously have a major role, a bigger
role than that in terms of deterring war through strength. But
so long as the U.N. has a role and presumably we are trying to
help it carry out that role in the disarming of Saddam through
an inspection process, the question is: What are we doing
policy-wise to support the U.N. inspection process?
There was some ambiguity about our position as to whether
we thought inspections were useful. Some of the
administration's comments early on suggested that they were a
waste of time. I thought that was counterproductive and
undermined the importance of that inspection process, but that
is just my own opinion. That is background for the question
that I am going to ask you.
If we are serious that we want the U.N. inspection process
to succeed, then there are some things that we can do to help
it succeed. One of them is to share information with them. I
have said publicly and I will say it again: It is just a small
percentage of information relative to suspect sites that it has
been shared with the U.N. inspectors. They have asked for
information twice, seriously, and yet only a small percentage
of the sites and the information relating to those suspect
sites that we believe we have has been shared with the U.N. so
far. I have urged the President, in a letter which I have made
public, to share that information.
Obviously, we are not going to in any way jeopardize
sources and methods, but that is not the issue. We have raised
that question again today with the Secretary of Defense.
What I want to talk to you about is a comment that you made
in a written answer to the committee's policy questions. You
said that ``The United States will not allow tyrants and
dictators to use sovereignty as a shield behind which to hide
and plot against the sovereignty and security of others.'' I
generally agree with that statement.
But we are now in a situation where U-2 flights could
provide significant information to help with inspections, to
make those inspections more robust, to help them work, to help
them succeed. Yet we have not pressed the U.N. to take a
position with Iraq that the U.N. is going to authorize those U-
2 flights in support of inspections whether Iraq likes it or
not.
The position that the U.N. has taken is, ``Well, Iraq is
not going to authorize it. Therefore, they would shoot at the
U-2s. Therefore, the U.N. will not take that responsibility of
authorizing flights and put a U.N. flag on our U-2 flights.''
I do not think we should allow Saddam to veto U-2 flights
which would aid the inspection process. That goes right to the
heart of the question of whether or not the United States is
going to allow dictators to use sovereignty as a shield. If we
are serious about supporting U.N. inspections, it seems to me
we should be asking the U.N. to adopt a resolution which says,
``U-2 flights operated by United States are authorized, will
become U.N.-supported operations. If Hussein shoots at them,
that will be considered a material breach and an act of war
against the United Nations.''
We are not there yet. Secretary Powell is going to the U.N.
to share information with the U.N. that we have, and that is
fine. I hope they will share that same information that they
present to the U.N. with us if they have not done so yet. But
that is just part of the process. I hope we will consult with
the U.N. if we really want it to be relevant, not just inform
them of what we are going to do whether or not--whatever they
do, regardless of what they do. It is not consultation. That is
notice. That is just informing. It is not consultation which we
are obligated to do under the resolution. So I hope we will
truly consult with the U.N., too, to help it be relevant and to
help it succeed, to listen as well as to share.
But my specific question to you is: Should we not be
pressing the U.N., asking the U.N. to adopt a resolution
relative to U-2 flights being authorized, and informing Saddam
that should he attack those flights he will be acting against
the interests of the United Nations, and in effect, declaring
war on the United Nations? It is a question which I know there
has been some discussion about, including in this morning's
paper, including Secretary Wolfowitz who apparently has spoken
on the subject as well.
But given your position and your answer to our question, do
you agree that we should make that request to the U.N. and
support that the U.N. authorize U-2 missions in support of U.N.
inspections in order to make them relevant and to strengthen
that inspection regime?
Mr. Henry. I would agree with you that intelligence and
helping inspectors is critical. Again, I am only privy to what
I read in the newspapers to date, but I notice that there are
indications from national technical means that up to 2 days in
advance of inspections going out, the Iraqis are making changes
to sites, as reported in the paper.
So having the ability to have U-2 flights would be a good
way to be able to document that those sort of things are going
on and that there might be something with the information flow
into the inspectors.
The exact mechanisms by which we go to the U.N. and present
that, I would think that would be something that would be under
the purview of the State Department. If confirmed, obviously I
would be interested in consulting with them as part of the
interagency process in being able to point out the benefit of
an approach similar to yours.
Senator Levin. I am glad that you will do that. Time is
really of the essence here. I would hope that if you have some
feelings about that particularly in light of your statement
about not letting sovereignty being used by dictators as a
shield, that you would express that opinion, as I have and will
continue to do. We need to if we are really serious about U.N.
inspections succeeding and being relevant, and that that
organization be relevant in order to try to help us prevent
war.
I have some additional questions, Mr. Chairman, on North
Korea, but my time is up.
Chairman Warner. I have other obligations so I am going to
let you go ahead. If you have another question, go ahead.
Senator Levin. This will just be a few more minutes on
North Korea.
Chairman Warner. Okay.
Senator Levin. The administration, in September of 2002,
set forth the National Security Strategy which contained a
policy of preemption which essentially calls for the United
States to take anticipatory action to defend ourselves even in
the absence of an imminent threat. This is a departure somewhat
from the past, when anticipatory defensive actions were tied to
an imminent threat standard. That connection has been loosened,
I would say, by the new doctrine. How would you apply that new
doctrine to North Korea?
Mr. Henry. Well, as I understand in reading the National
Security Strategy, that preemption is one of many tools and the
tool of last resort to be able to use. I think the steps the
administration is taking right now through active diplomacy and
moving toward multinational organizations to be engaged in that
diplomacy is the correct way to go.
Senator Levin. You would say that that is the correct way
to go, the diplomatic approach, even though we are in a
situation where North Korea has announced, in effect, that it
has gone to a surreptitious uranium enrichment program which is
in violation of an agreement and a nonproliferation treaty
which they signed, and an agreement that they signed with the
South? Even though they have now given notice that they are
withdrawing from the nonproliferation treaty, even though they
have removed the inspectors from North Korea, you still believe
that the diplomatic approach is the right approach before any
preemptive attack is used?
Mr. Henry. I think the diplomatic approach is the correct
approach at this time. The President has announced as part of
his deterrence strategy, in order to deter against weapons of
mass destruction that all options are on the table, and he is
not ready to take any off, and that that is what we are trying
to actively use, is deterrence. But to my way of thinking, at
the current stage, active diplomacy is the way to proceed.
Senator Levin. Thank you.
One quick comment and then I am done, Mr. Chairman.
It is on the Total Information Awareness Program which a
number of us are very much concerned with, and the concerns of
probably most Senators are reflected in the language which was
recently adopted in the Omnibus Appropriations bill. Mr. Henry,
you made reference to the fact that this is a test to see
whether it is possible, basically, to fuse information which
comes from various sources.
I would say it is a little bit different from that because
it is not just ``come from'' sources, but it is seeking out
every bit of information from any conceivable source and fusing
it. It is a much more proactive program than just receiving
intelligence information about potential terrorists. It is a
proactive effort to seek as much information, I guess, on
potentially any American from any conceivable source and to
fuse it. So it is that proactivity which is, I think, the issue
which is of some concern for Americans in terms of our
traditional rights and liberties, and sense of freedom and
privacy is most important here.
That is just a comment. I am not asking you, unless you
would like to, to comment. Mr. McHale's reference to the
constraints that are essential in such a program are
reassuring.
I would hope, Mr. Henry, that you would share that sense,
that there needs to be some constraints in any kind of an
effort by government to gather information on its citizens from
any conceivable source, and then to fuse it in one place,
because of the potential for real privacy invasion. There is
always potential for good, but there is also potential privacy
invasion against innocent civilians.
That is something you will be struggling with, but
``constraints'' is the word I picked out of Mr. McHale's
comments which I welcomed. The care and caution which is
reflected in the language in our bill, I hope, would be
recognized by you as you proceed.
Mr. Henry. I would just add, Senator, that from its
inception and my familiarity with the program, it has
specifically been directed at non-U.S. citizen and foreign
sources, and that there are a number of safeguards and
protections that they have put in that, if at any time
something does come up on a U.S. citizen, that it is filtered
out.
Senator Levin. I want to thank you both for your service.
You are both extremely well-qualified. We look forward to a
speedy confirmation under the leadership of our Chairman, who I
know will move these nominations with his usual dispatch.
Chairman Warner. With your help, I thank you, my dear
friend. The hearing, an excellent hearing is concluded.
Mr. Henry. Thank you, sir.
Mr. McHale. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 11:25 a.m., the committee adjourned.]

[Prepared questions submitted to Paul McHale by Chairman
Warner prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:]

Questions and Responses

DEFENSE REFORMS

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. Please describe how you envision your working
relationship, if confirmed, with the following:
Answer. The organization that I will lead, if confirmed, will be a
policy-based organization focused on building and improving DOD's
efforts in supporting the Nation's homeland security requirements. The
organization will unify DOD's homeland defense, military support to
civil authorities, and emergency preparedness activities by providing
focused management, oversight, and supervision of policies, programs,
and resources. Additionally, it will be an advocate in the DOD resource
allocation process for resource requirements to support these
activities.
If confirmed as the ASD (HD), I will maintain close working
relationships with the Principal Staff Assistants throughout DOD who
hold responsibilities for capabilities relevant to homeland defense,
civil support, and emergency preparedness. I envision my relationships
with key officials as follows:
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
Answer.

The ASD (HD) will function under the authority,
direction and control of the USD(P).

Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
and Low Intensity Conflict.
Answer.

ASD (SO/LIC) will maintain oversight with regard to
DOD's international counterterrorism activities.
The ASD (HD) will coordinate closely with the ASD (SO/
LIC) on matters related to domestic counterterrorism executed
in support of lead Federal law enforcement agencies.
The ASD (HD) will maintain careful situational
awareness regarding SO/LIC's counterdrug efforts worldwide.

Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.
Answer. The USD (I) is responsible for assuring that senior DOD
leadership and combatant commanders receive the warning, actionable
intelligence, and counter-intelligence support needed. The ASD (HD)
will maintain a close relationship with the USD (I) to assure support
for homeland defense intelligence needs. The USD (I) will be a conduit
to the intelligence community, providing an opportunity for ASD (HD)
feedback regarding intelligence tasking, processing, exploitation, and
dissemination as it affects homeland defense users at various levels.
Competent intelligence, properly disseminated, is the first line of
homeland defense.
Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control,
Communications, and Intelligence.
Answer. The ASD (HD) will interact with the ASD (C\3\I) regarding
the work of components of C\3\I that perform DOD and interagency policy
formulation, and planning on critical infrastructure protection and
cyber security, in the context of the national strategies addressing
these areas. Routine, effective coordination between ASD (HD) and ASD
(C\3\I) will be essential to a unified defense strategy.
Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Policy.
Answer.

The ASD (HD) will coordinate closely with the ASD
(ISP) especially when technology transfer efforts involving
other Federal, State, and local agencies have implications for
international security and counterproliferation.
The ASD (HD) will also coordinate closely with the ASD
(ISP) on chemical and biological defense policy matters,
including threat assessments, countermeasures and policy
oversight of counterproliferation R&D.

Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs
and the civilian officials of the military departments in charge of
Reserve Affairs.
Answer.

The ASD (HD) will coordinate with the ASD (RA) and
military service Reserve officials on all issues related to
USNORTHCOM's employment of the Total Force.
The ASD (HD) will be an active participant in the
comprehensive review of Reserve component contributions to
national defense.
The ASD (HD) will support the ASD (RA), as
appropriate, in the oversight of Weapons of Mass Destruction
Civil Support Teams.

Question. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau and the Directors
of the Army and Air National Guard.
Answer. The ASD (HD) will work closely with the Chief of the
National Guard Bureau and, through him, the Directors of the Army and
Air National Guard through the Secretary of the Army and the Secretary
of the Air Force, particularly regarding the roles, capabilities, and
readiness of National Guard forces in support of homeland defense and
civil support.
Question. State Governors.
Answer. The ASD (HD) will support DHS in this area as directed by
the Secretary of Defense. I anticipate close tactical coordination
between DOD, State emergency preparedness officials and first
responders.
Question. The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency.
Answer.

The ASD (HD) will work with the Director, DIA
concerning the planning, programming, budgeting, and use of
intelligence resources for the collection and production of
intelligence in support of homeland defense requirements.
The ASD (HD) will review intelligence assessments and
estimates concerning transfers of technology, goods, services,
and munitions with possible implications for homeland defense.

Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs.
Answer.

The ASD (HD) will routinely and regularly coordinate
with the ASD (HA) on all medical aspects of chemical and
biological terrorism, including threat assessment, detection,
countermeasures, and research and development.
The ASD (HD) will maintain situational awareness of
new techniques and technologies developed or adopted under the
purview of the ASD (HA) to assure that they are made available
to other Federal, State, and local agencies, as appropriate.

Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint
Staff.
Answer. The ASD (HD) will coordinate both formally and informally,
on a daily basis, with the Chairman, the Joint Chiefs and the Joint
Staff regarding the roles, capabilities, and readiness of the military
services and combatant commands in support of the homeland defense
mission.
Question. The Director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency.
Answer. In coordination with the Under Secretary for Acquisition,
Technology & Logistics, the ASD (HD) will work closely with DTRA,
particularly regarding efforts in the following areas:

Domestic chemical, biological, radiological, and
nuclear threat reduction and defense
Counterproliferation
Technology security policy
Emergency response support and training

DUTIES

Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense?
Answer. Public Law 107-314, the Fiscal Year 2003 National Defense
Authorization Act, amended Title 10 to establish the position of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, who will have ``as
his principal duty the overall supervision of the homeland defense
activities of the Department of Defense.'' If confirmed, I will perform
those duties prescribed by Secretary Rumsfeld for the position.
I expect that Secretary Rumsfeld will establish duties and
functions of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense
that will include leading, supervising, and focusing the Department's
activities in this area, ensuring internal coordination of DOD policy
direction, providing guidance to U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Pacific
Command, and U.S. Southern Command for their homeland defense mission
and their military activities in support of homeland security, to
include support to civil authorities, and all necessary DOD
coordination with the Department of Homeland Security, the Office of
Homeland Security, and other government agencies.
More specifically, if confirmed, I expect that Secretary Rumsfeld
will make me responsible for developing and supervising the
implementation of the Departmental strategic planning guidance for
DOD's role in homeland security; developing force employment policy,
guidance, and oversight; supervising DOD preparedness activities to
support civil authorities in order to achieve an integrated national
emergency response system; providing DOD support, as appropriate, to
assist in developing capacities and capabilities of civilian agencies
requisite to conducting homeland security missions; and direct DOD
domestic crisis management activities.
Question. What background and experience do you possess that you
believe qualifies you to perform these duties?
Answer. For 30 years I have been directly and personally involved
in a wide range of national security activities. These responsibilities
have involved active and Reserve military service in the U.S. Marine
Corps, beginning as a rifle platoon leader in 1972 and culminating as
an assistant division commander in 2002. That duty included active
military service during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, as
well as a 1-year overseas deployment in the Western Pacific.
As a Member of Congress, I served for 6 years on the House Armed
Services Committee and was a conferee on the National Defense
Authorization Act for 5 years. In addition, I am a former member of the
Board of Visitors at the U.S. Naval Academy, a current adjunct
professor at the U.S. Army War College, and a current member of the
Board of Advisors at the U.S. Naval War College.
Following retirement from Congress, I returned to drilling status
as a U.S. Marine Corps reservist where my assigned duties focused on
rear area security at the joint and component levels. As a civilian,
during this period, I participated in several classified wargames
involving the domestic threat of weapons of mass destruction.

ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

Question. The Department of Defense's combating terrorism
activities are currently divided into four categories: Antiterrorism/
Force Protection, Counterterrorism, Terrorism Consequence Management
and Intelligence. Section 902 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2003, which established the position of Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, also transferred the
responsibility for the overall direction and supervision for policy,
program planning and execution, and allocation of resources for the
Department's combating terrorism activities to the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy.
Please specify what activities within each of the four combating
terrorism categories will be under the jurisdiction of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense.
Answer. If confirmed, I would recommend the following:
Antiterrorism/Force Protection:
Should remain the primary responsibility of the
service components and installation commands, subject to ASD
(HD) oversight.
Counterterrorism:
It is my expectation that the ASD (Special Operations/
Low-Intensity Conflict) will continue to be responsible for DOD
international counterterrorism efforts.
In extraordinary cases where U.S. military
counterterrorism forces are called upon by the President to
undertake a military operation within the United States, I
anticipate that the ASD (HD) will serve as the principal
advisor to the Secretary of Defense.
Terrorism Consequence Management:
Military support to civil authorities, whether to
mitigate the consequences of acts of terrorism, manmade or
natural disasters will be one of my principal oversight
responsibilities, if confirmed. Oversight and supervision of
contingency planning for these missions will be a major ASD
(HD) responsibility.
Intelligence:
My objective would be to ensure that homeland defense commanders at
all levels lawfully acquire the best intelligence available on threats
that impact upon homeland security and related DOD missions.
Question. What DOD official or officials will be responsible for
DOD combating terrorism activities not under your jurisdiction?
Answer. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, as stipulated in
the 2003 National Defense Authorization Act, will exercise principal
responsibility for the overall direction and supervision for policy,
program planning and execution, and allocation of resources for the
Department's combating terrorism activities. If confirmed, I anticipate
that I will be USD (P)'s principal assistant regarding domestic
counterterrorism. I expect a close collaborative relationship with SO/
LIC, who will continue to serve as the principal policy advisor
regarding international counterterrorism.
Additionally, I am advised that the newly authorized Under
Secretary for Intelligence will be the principal intelligence oversight
official within the Department. If confirmed, I will work closely with
him on relevant counterterrorism intelligence matters.
Question. What steps will you take to ensure that the Department's
efforts are focused and well coordinated in this critical area of
homeland defense?
Answer. The Department has already taken the steps to create the
U.S. Northern Command in order to improve command and control of DOD
forces in those homeland defense missions as directed by the President
and the Secretary of Defense. If confirmed, I plan to work closely with
the combatant commanders, in concert with the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, to ensure the full mission readiness of each command.
I expect this to cover policy, program planning, mission readiness and
execution oversight, and allocation of resources.
Coordination will of course be the key to achieving both our
homeland defense and our homeland security objectives. Within the
intergovernmental community at the Federal, State, and locals levels, I
intend to develop close and collaborative relationships to ensure that
DOD's efforts, when appropriate, support and reinforce civilian
contingency plans and resources.
Within the Department of Defense, I intend to initiate a similar
degree of coordination. On matters such as research and development,
health affairs, Reserve affairs, and intelligence, I expect to
integrate our Departmental efforts to ensure we maximize the full range
of homeland defense capabilities.
Question. Section 1511 of the Fiscal Year 2002 National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) required the Department to submit a report on
DOD's role with respect to combating terrorism and homeland security no
later than 180 days after the date of enactment. Section 1404 of the
Fiscal Year 2003 NDAA required the Department to submit a more detailed
report on the Department's role with respect to homeland security, no
later than March 3, 2003.
What is the status of those two reports?
Answer. I am advised that the report required by the Fiscal Year
2002 NDAA has been completed within DOD and is undergoing final review
within the administration. The report was delayed beyond its original
due date because of changes affecting its content, such as the release
of the National Security Strategy and National Strategy for Homeland
Security, and the President's proposal to create the Department of
Homeland Security.
I have been further advised that the report required by the Fiscal
Year 2003 NDAA has been tasked to appropriate organizations throughout
DOD in order to prepare a final draft.

CENTRAL TRANSFER ACCOUNT

Question. The Department has a central transfer account for its
counterdrug activities. The Senate included a provision in its version
of the Fiscal Year 2000 DOD Authorization bill that would have
established a central transfer account for all DOD Combating Terrorism
funds. However, that language was not included in the final version of
the legislation signed by the President.
What advantage, if any, do you see in having a central transfer
account for all DOD Combating Terrorism funds?
Answer. The Department of Defense advises me that it does not see
any significant advantage to the creation of a Central Transfer Account
for DOD Combating Terrorism funds, and believes that it would limit
DOD's freedom to flexibly manage a comprehensive response to the
terrorist threat. Combating terrorism is not a single budget or
specified group of funds. It includes multiple programs for both CONUS
and overseas operations for all DOD components. Various combating
terrorism programs include antiterrorism activities such as force
protection initiatives, intelligence activities, homeland security
programs, consequence management, combat air patrols, continuity of
government programs, and a variety of RDT&E efforts in chem-bio
programs, the Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute, and many
others. To require central budgeting and transfers would greatly
complicate management, create delays, and require complex accounting
efforts. However, if confirmed, I would be happy to examine this issue
in consultation with the committee.

INSTALLATION SECURITY

Question. The security of U.S. military installations--both at home
and abroad--has been a longstanding priority for the Senate Armed
Services Committee. Section 1402 of the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2003 directed the Secretary of Defense to develop a
comprehensive plan to improve the preparedness of military
installations for terrorist incidents.
What is the status of that plan and what steps do you plan to take
to ensure that domestic military installations are secure from a
terrorist attack?
Answer. I am advised that the Department of Defense is currently
preparing a comprehensive plan for improving the preparedness of
military installations, in order to prevent and respond to terrorist
attacks as required by Section 1402 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2003.
If confirmed, I will work with the appropriate offices within OSD and
the military departments to exercise supervision and civilian oversight
in order to ensure that U.S. military installations are properly
prepared to defend against attack.

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION CIVIL SUPPORT TEAMS

Question. Section 1403 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2003 directed the Secretary of Defense to establish 23
additional Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams (WMD-CSTs).
This will provide for at least one WMD-CST in each State and territory.
Section 1403 also contained a reporting requirement that required a
review of whether the mission of the teams should be expanded.
Do you consider the WMD-CSTs an important asset in the event of a
domestic terrorist attack involving a weapon of mass destruction?
Answer. Yes, I consider the National Guard WMD-CSTs to be key
military assets, strategically positioned at the operational level, to
support civil authorities at a domestic Chemical-Biological-
Radiological-Nuclear-Explosive (CBRNE) incident site by identifying
CBRNE agents/substances, assessing current and projected consequences,
advising on response measures, and assisting with appropriate requests
for State support. They are Federally-funded, and under control of
respective State governors. Prior coordination and combined training
with State emergency management officials and first responders in each
team's area of responsibility significantly raises the effectiveness of
the entire Nation's emergency response system.
Question. If confirmed, what role would you play with regard to the
oversight, training, and stationing of the WMD-CSTs?
Answer. I am advised that the policy and fiscal oversight of the
WMD-CST Program rests with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Reserve Affairs. I expect to be working closely with the Assistant
Secretary on matters of mutual concern with respect to the WMD-CSTs,
with particular emphasis upon training activity, contingency planning,
and operational readiness.
Question. Do you believe that the mission of the teams should be
expanded beyond detection to include some cleanup or containment
capability?
Answer. I am advised that the National Guard is currently reviewing
recommendations from a Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Team
Force Management Analysis. The results of the National Guard's review
will form the basis for the Department's analysis of the team's
existing mission and the potential to expand that mission. That
response will be provided to Congress by June 2, 2003, as required, to
meet congressional direction in the 2003 NDAA.
Question. Are there other appropriate and feasible ways to expand
the current team mission?
Answer. As previously mentioned, the results of the National
Guard's review will form the basis for the Department's analysis of the
team's existing mission and the potential to expand that mission. That
response will be provided to Congress by 2 June 2003 to meet
congressional direction in the fiscal year 2003 NDAA. If confirmed, I
would fully cooperate with the committee in reviewing this issue.

CHEMICAL BIOLOGICAL INCIDENT RESPONSE FORCE

Question. The Department currently has a single Chemical Biological
Incident Response Force (CBIRF), a Marine Corps unit that is capable of
mass decontamination in the event of terrorist attack with a weapon of
mass destruction.
Is a single CBIRF adequate?
Answer. I do not consider a single CBIRF to be adequate. The
development of similar capabilities within the Reserve Components,
State or local authorities, or other possible alternatives, in order to
effectively respond to domestic CBRNE events should be considered. In
addition, the Department of Homeland Security should be encouraged to
review the possible development of these technical capabilities within
the civilian emergency response system.
Question. In the event of a conflict in the Persian Gulf, is it
likely that CBIRF would deploy to that theater and therefore be
unavailable to respond to a domestic WMD incident?
Answer. I am advised that CBIRF is tasked to provide sensitive site
exploitation teams for use in support of potential conflicts in the
Persian Gulf. CBIRF will also maintain its CONUS commitment to provide
an initial response force to a CBRNE incident. Deconfliction of the two
missions is an ongoing responsibility of U.S. Joint Forces Command and
the Joint Staff, subject to OSD policy guidance.

NATIONAL GUARD ROLE IN HOMELAND DEFENSE

Question. There is currently considerable debate about the role the
National Guard should play in defending the homeland. The U.S.
Commission on National Security/21st Century (the Hart-Rudman
Commission) recommended that the National Guard be given homeland
security as a primary mission.
Do you believe that defending the homeland should become the
National Guard's primary mission?
Answer. My personal opinion is that the National Guard should
remain a balanced force, trained for both overseas and domestic
missions. The appropriate roles and missions of the Total Force--
Active, Guard, and Reserve--in all areas including homeland security
and the global war on terrorism are currently under review. Defending
the citizens, territory and domestic resources of the United States is
the highest priority of the Total Force, including the National Guard.
The National Guard is clearly capable of conducting selected
homeland defense missions, such as the Air National Guard's preeminent
role in continental air defense. However, the National Guard is also
combat ready to conduct overseas military operations and is relied upon
by combatant commanders as part of a strategic reserve. As the
Department reviews how best to deal with the challenge of the new
security environment, it is mindful of the need to properly balance the
application of the total force to: defend the homeland, contribute to
the global war on terrorism, meet military commitments abroad, and, if
necessary, participate in a major theater war.
Question. What type of role do you envision the National Guard and
Reserve ultimately playing in homeland defense?
Answer. The Department of Defense is currently conducting a study
mandated by Congress in the fiscal year 2003 National Defense
Authorization Act to determine the proper balance of force structures,
proper roles and missions, and command relationships with the National
Guard.

RELATIONSHIP WITH U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND

Question. U.S. Northern Command was established in October 2002
with the mission of conducting operations to deter, prevent, and defeat
threats and aggression aimed at the United States, its territories, and
interests within the command's assigned area of responsibility; and, as
directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, to provide military
assistance to civil authorities, including consequence management
operations.
If confirmed as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland
Defense, how do you anticipate you would coordinate roles and
responsibilities with the Commander, U.S. Northern Command?
Answer. Combatant Commanders report directly to the Secretary of
Defense. ASD(HD) will assist and advise the Secretary of Defense in
refining policy guidance and then manage his prioritization of
resources to accomplish assigned roles and responsibilities. ASD(HD)
should provide DOD-wide supervision, oversight and coordination for all
homeland defense matters on behalf of the Secretary of Defense.
Furthermore, ASD(HD) will integrate the staff efforts of the Joint
Staff, the Combatant Commands, and interagency staffs, particularly the
OHS and DHS.
Question. How do you anticipate that the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Homeland Defense and U.S. Northern Command will coordinate
with civilian law enforcement authorities including the Federal Bureau
of Investigation?
Answer. If confirmed, I anticipate that a senior ASD (HD) official
will coordinate with civilian law enforcement authorities, to include
the FBI, within prescribed legal constraints and subject to the
Secretary of Defense's approval. When appropriate and when authorized
by the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Northern Command will coordinate with
civilian agencies on operational and planning issues.

RELATIONSHIP WITH U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND

Question. The role of U.S. Strategic Command will expand to include
responsibilities such as coordinating intelligence-sharing and
information operations that support the overall Defense Department
mission of defending the homeland.
How will you coordinate your activities with the Strategic Command
and the OSD C\3\I organization?
Answer. I am informed that the coordination of intelligence-sharing
and information operations within the Department of Defense is
currently the purview of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence. If I am confirmed,
I will develop and maintain a close professional relationship with the
leadership of that organization, especially on matters relating to
homeland defense.

RELATIONSHIP WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Question. The establishment of the Department of Homeland Security
is one of the U.S. Government's largest cabinet-level reorganizations.
Despite this reorganization, the Department of Defense will continue to
play a critical role in homeland defense.
What role do you expect to play, if confirmed, in the coordination
of DOD activities with the Department of Homeland Security?
Answer. The Secretary of Defense has made a public commitment to
work closely with the new Department of Homeland Security in order to
coordinate the respective responsibilities. I fully support that
effort. In general, the Department of Defense is responsible for
homeland defense missions--to defend the land, maritime, and aerospace
approaches from external threats--while the Department of Homeland
Security will be responsible for major elements of domestic security
and civil preparedness. DOD will also provide military assistance to
U.S. civil authorities in accordance with U.S. law, as directed by the
President and the Secretary of Defense. For example, such assistance
could include support for consequence management operations led by the
Department of Homeland Security when authorized by the President or the
Secretary of Defense. There will be an ongoing requirement for U.S.
Northern Command to coordinate plans, exercises, and training with the
operating components of DHS.

HOMELAND SECURITY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ISSUES

Question. In recent years, the Department of Defense has devoted
significant science and technology resources to efforts--such as
chemical and biological defense technologies--that have potential
utility for both military and homeland defense purposes.
In what manner, if any, do you believe that the Department should
coordinate these science and technology efforts with the new Department
of Homeland Security?
Answer. I believe that effective coordination between the
Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security regarding
scientific and technological development is essential. Moreover, the
rapid transfer of new capabilities to civilian officials is imperative.
Question. What role do you expect to play, if confirmed, in such
coordination efforts?
Answer. ASD (HD) will be responsible for situational awareness and
coordination of homeland defense and homeland security-related research
and development efforts with the Department of Homeland Security, the
Department of Defense, and other elements of the Department of Defense.
Question. Section 1401 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2003 requires the Secretary of Defense to designate a
senior official to identify, evaluate, deploy, and transfer to Federal,
State, and local first responder's technology items and equipment in
support of homeland security.
In what manner will the designated official coordinate this effort
with appropriate officials at the new Department of Homeland Security?
Answer. I am advised that the Department of Defense is currently in
the process of designating a senior official to carry out the functions
as identified in Section 1401 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2003. One responsibility of the senior official would
be to facilitate the timely transfer of appropriate technology items
and equipment to Federal, State, and local first responders, in
coordination with appropriate Federal Government officials outside the
Department of Defense, including the Department of Homeland Security.
Question. What role do you expect to play, if confirmed, in such
coordination efforts?
Answer. If confirmed, I would be responsible for maintaining
situational awareness and coordination of homeland defense and homeland
security-related research and development efforts, and would be the
focal point for ensuring that effective coordination is accomplished
among DOD, the Department of Homeland Security, and other Federal
departments and agencies for projects of mutual interest.
Question. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) has
developed a ``Total Information Awareness'' program, to develop and
integrate information technologies that would enable the government to
sift through multiple databases and sources to detect, classify and
identify potential terrorist activities.
What legal constraints, if any, would impact the deployment of such
a system within the United States?
Answer. I have been advised that the Total Information Awareness
(TIA) program at DARPA is not an operational system and no decision has
been made to deploy such a system in the future. Neither the
development nor operational deployment of TIA would be under the office
of the ASD (HD). Without more detailed knowledge about the TIA program,
I am unable to provide specific comments concerning the legalities of
any potential deployment of the TIA program.
Question. Do you believe that it is appropriate for the Department
of Defense to play the leading role in developing such a system?
Answer. I believe it is appropriate for the Department of Defense
to research, develop, and demonstrate innovative information
technologies to detect patterns of terrorist planning and potentially
hostile activity directed against American citizens. However, I also
firmly believe the deployment of any such systems must be in strict
accordance with relevant U.S. laws, and should be carried out, if at
all, by civil law enforcement agencies subject to judicial oversight.

USE OF ACTIVE DUTY AND RESERVE PERSONNEL FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE/POSSE
COMITATUS

Question. Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,
National Guard personnel were ordered to active duty to provide airport
security. Subsequently, Guardsmen were activated to augment Federal
agencies to perform border security functions.
What is your understanding of the legal issues and authority
associated with using National Guard and Reserve personnel in security
roles within the United States?
Answer. There are a number of legal issues and authorities that may
be associated with using the National Guard and Reserve in security
roles in the United States. Each particular situation--such as State
status, Title 32, and Title 10--may trigger different legal issues and
authorities. For example, in order to order the National Guard and
Reserve to active duty, or to call the National Guard into Federal
service, the President must exercise one of several possible legal
authorities. Potential legal authorities include his Constitutional
authority and statutory authority under, for example, sections 12301,
12302, 12304, or 12406 of Title 10, United States Code. Once on active
duty or in Federal service, legal issues and authority include ensuring
a clear chain of command, providing appropriate use of force rules, and
complying with the Posse Comitatus Act if the military mission includes
providing support to civilian law enforcement in executing the laws of
the United States. A more detailed discussion of legal issues and
authority depends upon the particular fact pattern of a specific
situation.
Question. In your opinion, does the Posse Comitatus Act (18 U.S.C.
1385) or chapter 18 of Title 10, U.S.C. (which regulates the use of
the Armed Forces in civilian law enforcement and related activities)
require amendment to deal with the present homeland security situation?
Answer. As you are aware, last year Governor Ridge and Secretary
Rumsfeld indicated that they believed that the act appropriately
addressed the use of the military to support civilian law enforcement;
that changes to the act were unnecessary at that time; and that they
remained open to further study of the issues involved as necessary.
Although I am in agreement with the position taken by Secretary
Rumsfeld and Secretary Ridge, should I be confirmed and appointed as
Assistant Secretary, I will fully cooperate with any exercise of
legislative oversight in this manner.
Question. Last fall, in response to requests from the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Defense provided aerial
platforms and camera equipment to a law enforcement task force seeking
to apprehend the sniper suspects in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan
area.
Under what circumstances do you believe that it is appropriate for
the Department of Defense to provide assistance to law enforcement
authorities in response to a terrorist event? What about a non-
terrorist event?
Answer. I believe that Congress has effectively delineated several
areas where military support to civilian law enforcement may be
appropriate, as specified in Chapters 15 and 18 of Title 10, United
States Code. Those authorities apply to military support of the law
enforcement response to both terrorist and non-terrorist events. In
summary, DOD may lawfully provide support to civil law enforcement
authorities to enforce the law under routine circumstances, on a
reimbursable basis, in such areas as training, expert advice, and for
operations and maintenance of equipment. Under emergency
circumstances--for instance, involving a weapon of mass destruction--
posing a serious threat to the United States in which civilian
expertise and capabilities are overwhelmed, and as jointly determined
by the Secretary of Defense and the Attorney General, DOD may provide
special capabilities and expertise necessary to not only counter the
threat posed by the weapons involved, but also to prevent the serious
impairment of civilian law enforcement authorities' ability to enforce
the law and protect citizens. In this regard, the President and the
Secretary of Defense would specifically direct the employment of these
special DOD's capabilities.
Question. What role do you expect to play, if confirmed, in making
such determinations and making such assistance available?
Answer. If confirmed and appointed, I expect to play a significant
role in advising the Secretary of Defense regarding the legality and
operational effectiveness of military support to civilian law
enforcement, oversight in monitoring such support when provided, and in
establishing clear procedures to expedite DOD support when directed by
the Secretary.

CONTRACT LIABILITY RISK

Question. Liability risk has at times been a deterrent to the
private sector freely contracting with the Federal Government to meet
national security needs. To address this risk, Congress has acted in
the past to authorize the indemnification of contracts for products
that are unusually hazardous or nuclear in nature.
Do you see a need to indemnify contracts for homeland security or
anti-terrorist products and services (to include biotechnology and
information technology) that would not meet the ``hazardous or
nuclear'' criteria, as a way to encourage private sector solutions to
homeland defense requirements?
Answer. I have not studied this matter carefully enough to make an
informed recommendation at this time. However, if confirmed, I am
prepared to review the matter with DOD Office of General Counsel and
provide appropriate comment to the committee.

COORDINATION OF EXPERTISE BETWEEN THE DEPARTMENTS OF HOMELAND SECURITY
AND ENERGY

Question. The personnel at the Department of Energy's (DOE)
National Laboratories have expertise that may be useful to the
Department of Homeland Security and to the Department of Defense in the
execution of their homeland defense mission.
What mechanism do you anticipate will be put in place to expedite
communication with the appropriate experts of the National labs to help
respond quickly in the event of a national incident or emergency?
Answer. It is my understanding that the Homeland Security Act of
2002 created an Office for National Laboratories within the Directorate
of Science and Technology of the Department of Homeland Security that
will be responsible for the coordination and utilization of the
Department of Energy's national laboratories and sites in support of
homeland security activities. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that
the Department of Defense coordinates fully with the Department of
Homeland Security and the Department of Energy in order to maintain
continuing awareness of the technical expertise at the national
laboratories, which may be available to support DOD's homeland defense
mission.

HOMELAND SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL ISSUES

Question. If confirmed, do you anticipate that you will have
responsibility for activities outside of the United States, such as
nonproliferation activities, that would have a direct or indirect
relationship to homeland security?
If so, what do you envision these responsibilities would be?
Answer. No. The responsible official within the Department of
Defense for nonproliferation activities is the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy. Under Section 902(b)(4) of the fiscal year 2003
NDAA, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy now has overall
direction and supervision for policy, program planning and execution,
and allocation and use of resources for the activities of the
Department for combating terrorism. While maintaining worldwide
situational awareness, the ASD (HD)'s foreign responsibilities will be
limited to the U.S. Northern Command's area of responsibility.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views,
even if those differ from the administration in power?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Homeland Defense?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and
other communications of information are provided to this committee and
its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes.
______

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

Questions Submitted by Senator Susan Collins

RELATIONSHIP WITH DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

1. Senator Collins. Mr. McHale, one of the most important
responsibilities for the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland
Defense is to manage the relationship between the Department of Defense
and the new Department of Homeland Security. If confirmed, how would
you ensure that the two departments communicate effectively?
Mr. McHale. The Secretary of Defense has made a public commitment
to work closely with the new Department of Homeland Security in order
to coordinate the respective responsibilities. I fully support that
effort. In general, the Department of Defense is responsible for
homeland defense missions--to defend the land, maritime, and aerospace
approaches from external threats--while the Department of Homeland
Security will be responsible for major elements of domestic security
and civil preparedness. DOD will also provide military assistance to
U.S. civil authorities in accordance with U.S. law, as directed by the
President and the Secretary of Defense. For example, such assistance
could include support for consequence management operations led by the
Department of Homeland Security when authorized by the President or the
Secretary of Defense. There will be an ongoing requirement for U.S.
Northern Command to coordinate plans, exercises and training with the
operating components of DHS.
The Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland
Defense has been assigned the responsibility to coordinate the
Department of Defense's relationship with the Department of Homeland
Security. In addition, DOD maintains representatives 24 hours a day in
the Department of Homeland Security's Homeland Security Operations
Center in order to facilitate information exchange and interagency
coordination.

ROLE OF NATIONAL GUARD IN HOMELAND SECURITY

2. Senator Collins. Mr. McHale, the National Guard has played an
important role in homeland security since September 11. Guard units
were temporarily utilized for airport security, and the National Guard
Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams are trained to respond
to domestic contingencies.
Do you believe that the role of the National Guard in homeland
security should be expanded further?
Mr. McHale. Yes. However, the National Guard should remain a
balanced force, trained for both overseas and domestic missions. The
appropriate roles and missions of the Total Force--Active, Guard, and
Reserve--in all areas including homeland security and the global war on
terrorism are currently under review. Defending the citizens,
territory, and domestic resources of the United States is the highest
priority of the Total Force, including the National Guard.
The National Guard is well-prepared to conduct selected homeland
defense missions, such as the Air National Guard's preeminent role in
continental air defense. In addition, the National Guard is combat
ready to conduct overseas military operations and is relied upon by
combatant commanders as part of a strategic reserve. As the Department
reviews how best to deal with the challenge of the new security
environment, it is mindful of the need to properly balance the
application of the Total Force to: defend the homeland, contribute to
the global war on terrorism, meet military commitments abroad, and, if
necessary, participate in a major theater war. The National Guard will
retain important missions in each of these areas.

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

3. Senator Collins. Mr. McHale, the Department of Defense has
devoted significant resources to research and development. Many of the
technologies being developed by the Department might have homeland
security applications. For instance, sensors being developed to detect
biological or chemical weapons for force protection might also be
useful to protect American cities. The new Department of Homeland
Security is establishing its own science and technology capability.
What is the best way to ensure that there is no duplication of
effort between the two departments in technology development?
Mr. McHale. Since many significant elements of the Federal homeland
security/homeland defense efforts will be spread among different
agencies, including the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security,
the need for increased collaboration will be essential. While there is
no ``best way'' to eliminate duplication of effort between various
research and development entities, there are a number of avenues the
Department of Defense can utilize to ensure maximum coordination and
minimize duplicative research and development efforts.
For example, the Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) has a well-
established and successful process for articulating priorities,
soliciting and evaluating proposals, and rapidly prototyping
technologies with the operational community. We anticipate that the
Department of Homeland Security will join this effort between the
Departments of Defense and State in support of the homeland security/
homeland defense mission.
Through the TSWG and other collaborative efforts, we can ensure
that research and development efforts among agencies engaged in
homeland defense/homeland security efforts can be properly coordinated
and duplication of effort can be greatly reduced.
Section 1401 of Public Law 107-314, the Bob Stump National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, requires that the Secretary of
Defense ``designate a senior official of the Department of Defense to
coordinate all Department of Defense efforts to identify, evaluate,
deploy, and transfer to Federal, State, and local first responders
technology items and equipment in support of homeland security.'' I
anticipate that I will be designated as this ``senior official'' by the
Secretary of Defense and, if so, will do my best to carry out the
assigned statutory responsibilities of this role.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Dole

COMBATING TERRORISM AND COUNTERDRUG STRATEGIES

4. Senator Dole. Mr. McHale, as a part of your responsibilities and
role in combating terrorism activities, will you have a role in
counterdrug activities?
Mr. McHale. Yes. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland
Defense is responsible for providing oversight, policy, and guidance to
U.S. Northern Command. U.S. Northern Command, through Joint Task Force-
Six (JTF-6), provides Department of Defense operational, training, and
intelligence support to domestic law enforcement agency counterdrug
efforts in the continental U.S. to reduce the availability of illegal
drugs in the U.S. In addition, U.S. Northern Command is preparing an
operational concept to coordinate the existing Title 32 and Title 10
counterdrug effort. In the future, the preponderance of Defense
Department counterdrug efforts will be executed by States through their
National Guards in both State status and Title 32 status.

homeland defense's relationship with special operations command
5. Senator Dole. Mr. McHale, I am interested in the relationship
that your new office will have with the U.S. Northern Command.
Specifically, how do you envision that the Special Operations Command
and its component special forces units might be used in a homeland
defense role?
Mr. McHale. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense
is charged by law to ``. . . provide overall supervision of all
homeland defense activities of the Department of Defense.'' As such, I
will exercise supervision and oversight with regards to U.S. Northern
Command's homeland defense activities.
The capabilities of Special Operations Command, as well as the
capabilities of any of the combatant commands, may be brought to bear
on homeland defense as the situation dictates.

6. Senator Dole. Mr. McHale, does the new role of the Special
Operations Command as a supported command fit in with any possible role
it may have in homeland defense activities?
Mr. McHale. The Commander of NORTHCOM will in all probability be
the supported commander for military operations in defense of the U.S.,
as authorized by the President or the Secretary of Defense. The
Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command role as a supported
commander is aimed principally at our overseas efforts to prosecute the
global war on terrorism.

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY RESEARCH

7. Senator Dole. Mr. McHale, what role will your office play in
coordinating with the Department of Homeland Security on new science
and technology efforts which DOD has sponsored?
Mr. McHale. Since many significant elements of the Federal homeland
security/homeland defense efforts will be spread among different
agencies, including the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security,
the need for increased collaboration will be essential. While there is
no ``best way'' to eliminate duplication of effort between various
research and development entities, there are a number of avenues the
Department of Defense can utilize to ensure maximum coordination and
minimize duplicative research and development efforts.
For example, the Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) has a well-
established and successful process for articulating priorities,
soliciting and evaluating proposals, and rapidly prototyping
technologies with the operational community. We anticipate that the
Department of Homeland Security will join this effort between the
Departments of Defense and State in support of the homeland security/
homeland defense mission.
Through the TSWG and other collaborative efforts, we can ensure
that research and development efforts among agencies engaged in
homeland defense/homeland security efforts can be properly coordinated
and duplication of effort can be greatly reduced.
Section 1401 of Public Law 107-314, the Bob Stump National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, requires that the Secretary of
Defense ``designate a senior official of the Department of Defense to
coordinate all Department of Defense efforts to identify, evaluate,
deploy, and transfer to Federal, State, and local first responders
technology items and equipment in support of homeland security.'' I
anticipate that I will be designated as this ``senior official'' by the
Secretary of Defense and, if so, will do my best to carry out the
assigned statutory responsibilities of this role.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton

DEPLOYMENT OF COAST GUARD UNITS

8. Senator Clinton. Mr. McHale, recently the Pentagon announced
that it was sending eight Coast Guard cutters and several port security
units to the Persian Gulf, and that the deployment would happen soon.
In New York, we count on the Coast Guard to guard our ports against
terrorist threats.
What missions did these cutters perform and what provisions will be
made to replace their functions?
Mr. McHale. These forces contribute unique Coast Guard capabilities
in coastal and waterfront security, environmental response, force
protection, and protection of high value assets as part of an
integrated maritime force package for the operational commander. Port
Security Units are Reserve Forces specifically organized and trained
for overseas operations. Since September 11, the Coast Guard has met
all requirements for domestic port security, supported combatant
commanders, and continued their traditional roles in maritime safety
and law enforcement. Through continued careful asset management, the
Coast Guard will be able to support both overseas and domestic
missions.

9. Senator Clinton. Mr. McHale, what will the deployment of the
USCGC Bainbridge Island--homeported in Sandy Hook, NJ--mean for
homeland security along the eastern seaboard?
Mr. McHale. The Coast Guard will maintain the same presence on the
eastern seaboard by increasing the operating tempo of forces that are
not deploying. Operating tempo for non-deployed forces will be
increased by approximately 20-25 percent. As part of its normal
contingency planning, the Coast Guard is able to increase operating
tempo by up to 33 percent, and to support that increase for as long as
necessary.
______

[The nomination reference of Paul McHale follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
January 9, 2003.
Ordered, that the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
Paul McHale, of Pennsylvania, to be an Assistant Secretary of
Defense. (New Position)
______

[The biographical sketch of Paul McHale, which was
transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was
referred, follows:]

Biographical Sketch of Paul McHale

Former Congressman Paul McHale was born and raised in Bethlehem,
Pennsylvania.
He graduated from Liberty High School in 1968 and then attended
Lehigh University where he majored in Government, was elected to the
national honor society Phi Beta Kappa, earned a Bachelor of Arts degree
and graduated with highest honors in 1972.
Following his graduation from Lehigh University, McHale volunteered
for duty with the U.S. Marine Corps. Commissioned a second lieutenant
in 1972, he spent 2 years on active duty, including an overseas
deployment as a rifle platoon leader in Okinawa and in the Philippines.
After release from active duty, Mr. McHale entered Georgetown Law
Center in 1974 and received his Juris Doctor degree in 1977. For the
next 5 years, he practiced law in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania.
Congressman McHale began his involvement in public service when he
was first elected to the Pennsylvania House of Representatives in 1982.
During his tenure in the Pennsylvania General Assembly, McHale wrote
and sponsored numerous pieces of important legislation, including the
Child Passenger Protection Act, the Dangerous Juvenile Offender Act,
and the Pennsylvania 911 Emergency Communication Statute. McHale was
also one of the leaders in the successful fight to pass the 1989 Public
Ethics Act and was awarded the Champion of Good Government Medal by
Pennsylvania Common Cause for his efforts.
McHale was elected to five consecutive terms in the State House. He
resigned in 1991 following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, when he
volunteered for active duty as an infantry officer with the Marine
Corps during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.
In January of 1993, Paul McHale began service in the United States
House of Representatives representing the 15th Congressional District
of Pennsylvania. He was elected to a third term in November 1996.
McHale was an active member of the House Armed Services Committee which
has oversight responsibility for all U.S. military operations and
training. In addition, he served on the House Science Committee which
has jurisdictional responsibility for the many Federally-funded
advanced technology programs.
During his three terms in the U.S. House, Congressman McHale
championed the rights of crime victims, the cause of environmental
protection, the funding of Medicare and veterans benefits, the
reclamation and reuse of older industrial sites, as well as the passage
of numerous governmental reforms, including the Congressional
Accountability Act, term limits for committee chairmen, a ban on all
gifts to Members of Congress, a balanced Federal budget, and the line
item veto. President Clinton signed into law the Lobby Disclosure Act,
a major reform measure originally introduced in the House by
Congressman McHale.
In 1996, Congressman McHale co-founded the House of Representatives
National Guard and Reserve Components Caucus representing within
Congress the interests of U.S. reservists and citizen soldiers
worldwide. His efforts through the caucus earned him several important
honors, including the Marine Corps Reserve Officers Association 1997
Frank M. Tejeda Leadership Award, the 1998 Reserve Officers Association
Minuteman of the Year Award, and the Department of Defense
Distinguished Public Service Medal.
McHale has frequently lectured on government, law, and military
policy on the campuses of many colleges and universities, including the
U.S. Army War College, where he is an adjunct professor, and the U.S.
Naval Academy, where he served as a member of the Board of Visitors.
Mr. McHale is currently a member of the Board of Advisors at the Naval
War College, Newport, Rhode Island. In 1995, he was awarded an honorary
Doctor of Laws degree by Muhlenberg College. In 1997, he received the
Jewish Theological Seminary's Herbert H. Lehman Public Service Medal in
recognition of his efforts on behalf of the Jewish community both in
the Lehigh Valley and abroad.
On January 3, 1999, Congressman McHale retired from the U.S. House
of Representatives and became a shareholder in the Allentown law firm
of Tallman, Hudders & Sorrentino, P.C. He withdrew from active law
practice on September 30, 2002 and is currently employed as a
consultant to the Secretary of Defense.
Mr. McHale is married to Katherine Pecka McHale, Vice President of
Millennium Cell Inc., a Lieutenant Commander in the U.S. Navy Reserve,
and a former member of the Pennsylvania General Assembly. They are the
parents of three children with whom they reside in Bethlehem,
Pennsylvania.
______

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Paul McHale in
connection with his nomination follows:]
January 16, 2003.
Hon. John Warner, Chairman,
Committee on Armed Services,
United States Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: This letter provides information on my financial
and other interests for your consideration in connection with my
nomination for the position of Assistant Secretary of Defense. It
supplements Standard Form 278, ``Executive Personnel Financial
Disclosure Report,'' which has already been provided to the committee
and which summarizes my financial interests.
To the best of my knowledge, none of the financial interests listed
on my Standard Form 278 will create any conflict of interest in the
execution of my new governmental responsibilities. Additionally, I have
no other interests or liabilities in any amount with any firm or
organization that is a Department of Defense contractor.
During my term of office, neither I nor any member of my immediate
family will invest in any organization identified as a DOD contractor
or any other entity that would create a conflict of interest with my
governmental duties. My wife is currently employed as a Vice President
of Millennium Cell, Inc., a NASDAQ-traded public company, which has had
very limited commercial contact with the Department of Defense. As
noted in my accompanying SASC disclosure form (Part C, Question 2), my
wife currently holds stock options in Millennium Cell. In addition, we
jointly own approximately 1,800 shares of stock in Millennium Cell. I
do not anticipate that my wife's employer will have any business
activity related to the DOD position for which I am being considered.
I do not have any present employment arrangements with any entity
other than the Department of Defense and have no formal or informal
understandings concerning any further employment with any entity. If
confirmed, I am committed to serve in is position at the pleasure of
the President throughout his term of office.
I have never been arrested or charged with any criminal offenses
other than minor traffic violations. I have been party to only one
civil litigation, arising out of a minor traffic accident and settled
amicably, without adjudication of fault. To the best of my knowledge,
there have never been any lawsuits filed against any agency of the
Federal Government or corporate entity with which I have been
associated reflecting adversely on the work I have done at such agency
or corporation. I am aware of no incidents reflecting adversely upon my
suitability to serve in the position for which I have been nominated.
To the best of my knowledge, I am not presently the subject of any
governmental inquiry or investigation, aside from the background check
ordered as a part of this nomination, and aside from routine
investigation associated with the renewal of the security clearance I
hold as an officer in the U.S. Marine Corps Reserve.
I am a member of certain organizations and professional societies,
which have previously been provided to the committee. None of these
should pose any conflict of interest with regard to my governmental
responsibilities. I trust that the foregoing information will be
satisfactory to the committee.
Sincerely,
Paul McHale.
______

UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
of your answer applies.
Part A--Biographical Information
Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Paul McHale.

2. Position to which nominated:
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense.

3. Date of nomination:
January 9, 2003.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
July 26, 1950; Fountain Hill, Pennsylvania.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Katherine Marie Pecka McHale.

7. Names and ages of children:
Matthew Cornwell McHale, age 18.
Mary Wynne McHale, age 15.
Luke Brendan McHale, age 12.

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions,
dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.
Liberty High School, Bethlehem, Pennsylvania; Attended Sept. 1965
to June 1968; Graduation diploma awarded, June 1968.
Lehigh University, Bethlehem, Pennsylvania; Attended Aug. 1968 to
May 1972; B.A., with highest honors awarded May 1972.
Georgetown University Law Center, Washington, DC; Attended Aug.
1974 to May 1977; J.D. awarded May 1977.

9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the
last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of
job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
Consultant to the Office of the Secretary of Defense; Room 4E808;
The Pentagon; Washington, DC; September 2002-present.
Vice President/Shareholder/Attorney; Tallman Hudders and
Sorrentino; Allentown, Pennsylvania; January 1999-September 2002.
Member of Congress; U.S. House of Representatives; Washington, DC;
January 1993-January 1999.
Attorney at Law; Law Offices of Paul McHale; Bethlehem,
Pennsylvania; April 1991-January 1993.

10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
or local governments, other than those listed above.
Member, Pennsylvania House of Representatives; Harrisburg,
Pennsylvania, 1982-1991.
Member, Board of Directors, Pennsylvania Parks and Forest
Foundation, January 2001-present.
Member, Fountain Hill Planning Commission, 1978.
Board of Visitors, U.S. Naval Academy, 1997-1999.
Board of Advisors, U.S. Naval War College, 2000-present.
Adjunct Professor, U.S. Army War College, 2000-present.
Member, DOD Acquisition Reform Panel (Dawkins), 2000.
Member, Pennsylvania Sentencing Commission, 1983-1987.

11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other
business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
Partner, Paragon Partners, Allentown, Pennsylvania, Real Estate
Investment Partnership.
Member, Board of Directors, Marine Corps Association, Quantico,
Virginia.

12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
American Bar Association Pennsylvania Bar Association Rotary Club
of Bethlehem American Legion.
Veterans of Foreign Wars, Marine Corps Association--Board Member,
Reserve Officers Association, Marine Corps Reserve Officers
Association, Ben Franklin Partnership (non profit) Board Member, Lehigh
Valley Industrial Park (non profit)--Board Member, MPAP (St. Luke's
Hospital, non-profit)--Board Member.

13. Political affiliations and activities:
(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or
any public office for which you have been a candidate.
1980--Candidate for Congress in Democratic primary, 15th District
of Pennsylvania.
1982, 1984, 1986, 1988, 1990--Candidate for Pennsylvania House of
Representatives, 133rd District.
1989--Candidate for Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court in Democratic
primary.
1992, 1994, 1996--Candidate for Congress, 15th District of
Pennsylvania.
(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered
to all political parties or election committees during the last 5
years.
None.
(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign
organization, political party, political action committee, or similar
entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.
March 2000--$500 to John Morganelli for Attorney General campaign
committee--candidate for Pennsylvania Attorney General.

14. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions
for outstanding service or achievements.
Phi Beta Kappa, Lehigh University, 1972.
Honorary Doctorate awarded by Muhlenberg College, Allentown,
Pennsylvania, 1995.
Military Medals: See attached military biography.
Distinguished Public Service Medal, Department of Defense, 1998.

15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of
books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have
written.
I have written a limited number of letters to the editor and op-ed
pieces. In most cases the text can be found through an appropriate
Internet search. The best source for this information is the Internet
archive of the Allentown, PA Morning Call, the principal newspaper
covering the legislative districts I represented. Upon retirement from
Congress, I donated without fee or tax deduction all of my
congressional papers to Muhlenberg College, Allentown, PA. These
documents are available for inspection.

16. Speeches: Provide the committee with two copies of any formal
speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years which you have
copies of and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have
been nominated.
I served for 15 years in the Pennsylvania House of Representatives
and the U.S. Congress. As might be expected, I delivered numerous floor
speeches in those legislative bodies, the text of which can be found in
their respective journals. Nearly all public speeches which I delivered
during this time frame were extemporaneous, delivered from a few
handwritten notes or brief outlines. In many cases the text or quotes
can be found through an Internet search of the archives of the Morning
Call of Allentown, PA. During the 4 years since my retirement from
Congress all of my formal speeches on military matters have been
limited to commemorative events, such as Veterans Day and Memorial Day
ceremonies.

17. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to respond to requests to appear and testify before any
duly constituted committee of the Senate?
Yes.
______

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B-F of the
committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set
forth in the appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to
Parts B-F are contained in the committee's executive files.]
------

Signature and Date

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement
on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information
provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate,
and complete.
Paul McHale.
This 16th day of January, 2003.
______

[The nomination of Paul McHale was reported to the Senate
by Chairman Warner on January 30, 2003, with the recommendation
that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed
by the Senate on February 4, 2003.]
----------

[Prepared questions submitted to Christopher Ryan Henry by
Chairman Warner prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follow:]

Questions and Responses

DEFENSE REFORMS

Question. More than a decade has passed since the enactment of the
Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and
the Special Operations reforms.
Do you support full implementation of these defense reforms?
Answer. Yes, I support the implementation of these reforms. The
focus upon ``jointness'' and civilian oversight driven by the Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986 has significantly enhanced the
responsiveness, readiness, and warfighting capabilities of our U.S.
Armed Forces.
Question. What is your view of the extent to which these defense
reforms have been implemented?
Answer. The Goldwater-Nichols reforms represent a first step in the
transformation process. They have had a pathfinder impact within DOD.
They have strengthened civilian control, improved military advice to
the President and Secretary of Defense, strengthened unity of command
within our combatant commands, and improved readiness to operate as a
joint warfighting team.
Question. What do you consider to be the most important aspects of
these defense reforms?
Answer. The unambiguous responsibility and authority assigned to
combatant commanders for mission accomplishment and the increased
attention to strategy formulation and contingency planning are the most
important aspects in my view.
Question. The goals of Congress in enacting these defense reforms,
as reflected in Section 3 of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of
Defense Reorganization Act, can be summarized as strengthening civilian
control over the military; improving military advice; placing clear
responsibility on the combatant commanders for the accomplishment of
their missions; ensuring the authority of the combatant commanders is
commensurate with their responsibility; increasing attention to the
formulation of strategy and contingency planning; providing for more
efficient use of defense resources; enhancing the effectiveness of
military operations; and improving the management and administration of
the Department of Defense.
Do you agree with these goals?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Recently, there have been articles which indicate an
interest within the Department of Defense in modifying Goldwater-
Nichols.
Do you anticipate that legislative proposals to amend Goldwater-
Nichols may be appropriate? If so, what areas do you believe it might
be appropriate to address in these proposals?
Answer. I cannot recommend any amendments to Goldwater-Nichols at
this time. The Secretary of Defense has an abiding interest in the
transformation of the Department to improve our national defense.
Questions of responsibility, authority, and organization are matters of
specific interest and continuous review. If any of these reviews
recommend refinements to Goldwater-Nichols, I would expect the
Department will consult closely with Congress, and especially this
committee. If confirmed, I would be personally interested in working
with the committee on any efforts to review this legislation.

DUTIES

Question. Section 134a of Title 10, United States Code, provides
that the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy shall assist the
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in the performance of his duties.
Department of Defense Directive 5111.3 emphasizes that the Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy advises and assists the Under Secretary
of Defense for Policy, particularly on strategy formulation,
contingency planning, and the integration of Department of Defense
plans and policy with overall national security objectives.
What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy?
Answer. My understanding of the duties and functions derives from
DOD Directive 5111.3, which states: The Principal Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy (PDUSD(P)), as the principal assistant
to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)), advises and
assists the USD(P) in providing staff advice to the Secretary of
Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense, particularly on strategy
formulation, contingency planning, and the integration of DOD plans and
policy with national security objectives, and by law is empowered to
act in his or her stead.
Question. What background and experience do you possess that you
believe qualifies you to perform these duties?
Answer. I believe I have been privileged to serve in positions and
gain first-hand experience that qualify me to perform the duties of
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
During the first 20 years of my professional career I served as a
naval surface warfare officer and aviator, seeing extensive combat in
two wars--Vietnam and Operation Desert Storm. During this period, I was
a naval strike planner, sea-strike mission commander, strike leader,
and commanding officer, while making six extended deployments to the
Western Pacific and Indian Ocean. These experiences allowed me to work
at the implementation end of policy development, contingency planning,
and the execution of national security strategy.
For the next 6 years, I broadened my experience base in the areas
of national security policy, transformational technology development,
legislative oversight, policy analysis and development, and corporate
operations and leadership. Upon returning from the Gulf War, I was a
top graduate from the National Defense University in 1992 and won the
Commandant's Award for my defense strategy paper, ``Access and
Agility--Strategy and Structure for the 21st Century.'' At the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), I served as the Information
Systems Architect, integrating ``generation-after-next'' systems into
the first network-centric command, control, communications, computers,
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C\4\ISR) architecture
and laying the groundwork for early warfighter integration. During the
first session of the 104th Congress, I served as a Senior Military
Fellow with the Defense Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations
Committee, working on the Defense Appropriations Bill (PL 104-61) and
gaining an appreciation and understanding of the value of Congressional
oversight and consultations. Following retirement, I was a Senior
Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS),
where my work focused on the impact of a Revolution in Military Affairs
(RMA) on the future of U.S. warfighting and the new security challenges
confronting the U.S. and its allies after the end of the Cold War.
For the past 5 years I have worked at Science Applications
International Corporation (SAIC). Initially, I built a successful
business segment that worked with the science and technology community
in steering efforts to develop national security architectures for the
Information Age and the discovery of future tactical, operational, and
organizational paradigms.
For the past year, working directly with the Chairman of the Board
and CEO, I have overseen the corporate-wide development of strategic
business and technology initiatives in the Nation's largest employee-
owned research and engineering company (over $6 billion in annual
revenue and 40,000 employees). I have been developing the strategy and
courses of action to provide information technology, systems
integration, and eSolutions to government and commercial customers in
order to solve complex technical problems in national security,
homeland defense, energy, the environment, telecommunications, health
care, and transportation.
I believe these experiences provide a solid base to advise and
assist the Under Secretary in providing staff advice and assistance to
the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary, particularly on
strategy formulation, contingency planning, and the integration of DOD
plans and policy with overall national security objectives.
Question. Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to
enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense?
Answer. Having just returned this past week from 5 years of full-
time employment in the private for-profit sector, I will need to
acquaint myself fully, across the breadth of the Policy Under
Secretariat, with its personnel and their individual work. I am also
looking forward to receiving in-depth briefings on defense strategy,
deliberate and crisis action plans, the integration of DOD plans and
policy with national security objectives, and on the budgetary
implementation of defense plans.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, are there any other duties
and functions that you expect that Secretary Rumsfeld and Secretary
Feith will prescribe for you?
Answer. None of which I am currently aware.

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. If confirmed, what would be your relationship with:
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
The other Under Secretaries of Defense, including the Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
The Assistant Secretaries of Defense
The General Counsel of the Department of Defense
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Chiefs of
Staff
The Commanders of the Regional Combatant Commands
The Administrator and Deputy Administrators of the National Nuclear
Security Administration
Answer. If confirmed, I will report to the Secretary of Defense and
Deputy Secretary of Defense through the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy. I will work closely with and help coordinate the work of the
Assistant Secretaries in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy. I expect to maintain a close working relationship with
under secretaries and assistant secretaries across the Department, the
General Counsel of the Department of Defense, the Secretaries of the
Military Departments, the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, and with combatant commanders. As appropriate, I also
will, if confirmed, work closely with the Administrator and the Deputy
Administrators of the National Nuclear Security Administration.

MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges and problems
that will confront the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy?
Answer. In my view, the primary challenges are: a) successful
prosecution of the global war on terrorism; b) strengthening joint
warfighting capabilities; c) transforming the force to protect and
advance U.S. national interests; and d) building more adaptive war
plans that are responsive to the changing and uncertain security
environment. The PDUSD(P) plays an important role with respect to these
three challenges.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for
addressing these challenges and problems?
Answer. If confirmed, one of my first priorities would be to assist
the Under Secretary for Policy in advancing DOD's role in the war on
terrorism. In this capacity, I would help the newly created office of
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense to define and
organize the Department's homeland security functions. I would also
provide advice on the effective prosecution of the war on terrorism.
If confirmed, I also would support the Secretary's efforts to
enhance joint warfighting: 1) through integrating air, land, and sea
assets in deliberate and crisis action planning; 2) extending jointness
to all levels in the Department through transformation guidance; 3)
strengthening joint exercises and training; and 4) building a more
agile and responsive system for war planning through new processes and
collaborative planning tools.
Finally, with respect to transformation, if confirmed, I would
continue to focus the Department's transformation efforts on achieving
the critical operational goals laid out in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense
Review (see question 17).

PRIORITIES

Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish
in terms of issues which must be addressed by the Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy?
Answer. I believe the priorities mirror the challenges addressed in
question four above. If confirmed, my priorities would be to: 1)
Successfully prosecute the global war on terrorism; 2) Strengthen
jointness; and 3) Transform the force.
I would also contribute to the following priorities of the
Secretary:

Define and organize the Department's role in homeland
security;
Develop new concepts of global engagement;
Counter the proliferation of WMD;
Build war plans to fit the new defense strategy;
Streamline DOD processes;
Improve interagency process, focus, and integration;
and
Enhance consultation with Congress.

STRATEGY FORMULATION AND CONTINGENCY PLANNING

Question. One of the purposes of Goldwater-Nichols was to increase
attention on the formulation of strategy and contingency planning.
Department of Defense Directive 5111.3 specifically assigns a major
role to the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy for those
important matters.
What is your view of the civilian role, as compared to the military
role, in the formulation of strategy and contingency planning?
Answer. As I understand this activity, the Secretary of Defense
sets the strategic direction for the Department, and the priorities for
deliberate and crisis action planning, in consideration of Presidential
guidance and the National Security Strategy. The Principal Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy (PDUSD(P)), on behalf of the Secretary,
then works in an interactive and iterative manner with combatant
commanders, the Joint Staff, and the military departments to develop
written guidance to the Department for plans, programs, and budgeting
and to the combatant commanders for war plans to achieve the
Secretary's goals. PDUSD(P) conducts formal reviews of the final
products to ensure they meet the Secretary's intent.

SPACE MANAGEMENT AND ORGANIZATION

Question. What role, if any, do you believe the Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy should play in the establishment of
national security space policy?
Answer. As I understand it, the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy has the lead for development of defense strategy, and as such
should play a prominent role in developing national security space
policy and coordinating it through the Space Policy Coordinating
Committee (PCC) within the National Security Council interagency
process. The Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
should identify, coordinate, and resolve national security space policy
issues within the Department and support the Secretary of Defense and
Deputy Secretary of Defense for any Principals or Deputies Committee
meetings on national security space policy issues.

NATIONAL GUARD ROLE IN HOMELAND DEFENSE

Question. There is currently considerable debate about the role the
National Guard should play in defending the homeland. The U.S.
Commission on National Security/21st Century (the Hart-Rudman
Commission) recommended that the National Guard be given homeland
security as a primary mission.
Do you believe that defending the homeland should become the
National Guard's primary mission?
Answer. I view the National Guard as clearly capable of conducting
selected homeland defense missions. However, the National Guard should
also be available to play a critical role in support of combatant
commanders executing military operations abroad.
I understand that the Department of Defense has undertaken a study
mandated by Congress in the fiscal year 2003 National Defense
Authorization Act to determine the ``proper balance'' of force
structures, proper roles and missions, and command relationships with
the National Guard. Therefore, I believe it is premature for me to
offer an opinion on the assignment of particular forces and missions
pending the outcome of that review.
Question. What type of role do you envision the National Guard and
Reserve ultimately playing in homeland defense?
Answer. Independent of the results of the study described above, I
believe the States will continue to use their National Guard in a state
status for a variety of homeland security missions. I understand that
several States, in fact, have already exercised this authority.

HOMELAND DEFENSE

Question. Despite the establishment of a new Department of Homeland
Security, the Department of Defense retains homeland defense
capabilities that will continue to be a key element of any homeland
security strategy.
In your view, what are the principal roles and missions of the
Department of Defense with regard to overall homeland security?
Answer. The Department defines its role in homeland security as
follows: (1) homeland defense, the protection of United States
territory, domestic population, and critical defense infrastructure
against external threats and aggression; and (2) civil support,
providing military support to civil authorities at the Federal, State,
and local levels across a range of conditions.
Question. What do you feel are the principal challenges to the
effective integration of defense, intelligence, law enforcement and
border/port security capabilities to improve our homeland security?
Answer. I believe that one of the main challenges is information
flow between the agencies with responsibility for homeland security and
defense. Heterogeneous and incompatible information and communications
systems inhibit integration and responsiveness. If confirmed, I would
advocate an interagency roadmap to address this long-term problem and
procedural work-arounds in the interim. Similarly, new partnership
protocols and interagency concepts of operation can enhance the
combined effectiveness of Federal, State, and local organizations.
Finally, I believe the Department should reevaluate the processes by
which it shares national foreign intelligence with the homeland
security community.

POSSE COMITATUS

Question. Some have suggested that the Posse Comitatus Act, which
governs the use of U.S. Armed Forces in domestic law enforcement, is in
need of review in the ``post-September 11'' environment. Do you feel
Posse Comitatus unduly inhibits the use of American military
capabilities in support of homeland security efforts?
Answer. As I understand it, the Posse Comitatus Act does not unduly
inhibit the use of American military capabilities in support of
homeland security efforts. The Posse Comitatus Act comes into play only
when military personnel are directly involved in the enforcement of
civilian criminal laws. In that event, it places restrictions on U.S.
military personnel's ability to engage in search, seizure, or arrest
activities.
As you are aware, last year Secretary Rumsfeld and Governor Ridge
indicated that they believed that the act appropriately addressed the
use of the military to support civilian law enforcement. I understand
that this issue is continually under review. If confirmed, I would look
forward to consulting with this committee on this issue.

COMBATING TERRORISM

Question. Clearly, combating terrorism is one of the most important
missions of the Department of Defense.
What is the Department's comprehensive strategy for combating
terrorism, both at home and abroad?
Answer. As I understand it, in accordance with the National
Security Strategy, the Department's strategy for combating terrorism is
directed toward the accomplishment of three comprehensive goals.
First, the Department's strategy seeks to eliminate terrorism as a
threat to America's way of life by disrupting and destroying terrorist
organizations with global reach. The Department is using and will
continue to use intelligence to identify groups that pose a threat to
the United States, and will employ law enforcement and military efforts
to defeat them.
Second, the Department is working with other Federal agencies and
departments to create an international environment inhospitable to
terrorists and those who support them. It will do this by waging a war
of ideas against extremism and anti-Americanism. The Department is
working vigorously to deny state sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to
terrorists. The United States will not allow tyrants and dictators to
use sovereignty as a shield behind which to hide and plot against the
sovereignty and security of others.
Finally, the Department appears to be closely involved in
strengthening America's security at home to deter and protect against
terrorist attacks. As described in the Quadrennial Defense Review, the
military's highest priority is the protection of the United States and
its citizens and interests. The U.S. Northern Command and the newly
established office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland
Defense will work to improve the Department's ability to deter
terrorist attacks and better manage the consequences of such attacks
should they occur.
Question. How can the Department best structure itself to ensure
that all forms of terrorism are effectively confronted?
Answer. In my view, the Department currently appears well-
structured for combating terrorism. Its capabilities should become more
robust with the development of U.S. Northern Command and the offices of
the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense.
Question. Are changes to the defense intelligence community
advisable to ensure optimal support to combating terrorism and other
homeland security efforts? If so, please elaborate.
Answer. There appears to be a significant effort underway to
coordinate among all elements of the defense intelligence establishment
regarding intelligence support. I understand that these efforts are
continuously being evaluated within the interagency working groups. The
new office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence will
coordinate with the Director of Central Intelligence to maximize the
effectiveness of defense intelligence.
Question. Are there steps the Department should take to better
coordinate its efforts to combat terrorism with those of other Federal
agencies?
Answer. I believe the Department of Defense will work with the new
Department of Homeland Security and the intelligence community to
continue to improve coordination of interagency plans and operations to
combat terrorism at home and abroad. The Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Homeland Defense, once confirmed, should play a significant role in
enhancing DOD's integration into the Nation's homeland security
efforts.

SAUDI ARABIA

Question. What is your assessment of the current state of U.S.-
Saudi Arabian defense cooperation?
Answer. I view our decades-long, military-to-military relationship
with Saudi Arabia as healthy and resilient. We have had a U.S. military
training mission in the kingdom since the 1950s. Saudi Arabia has
traditionally been one of the largest purchasers of U.S. weapons and
training. The Persian Gulf War, and shared security concerns since that
time, have significantly increased the breadth and depth of our defense
dialogue. Over the past 10 years, in particular, this dialogue has
provided a solid foundation for the strategic partnership that exists
between our two countries today. This is not to say that all aspects of
the relationship have been without difficulty at all times.
Question. What changes, if any, would you suggest to this
relationship?
Answer. If confirmed, one area I am inclined to examine is the
current level of Saudi participation in the Department's military
exchange programs. Now more than ever, I think it is important that DOD
invite Saudi military professionals into its war colleges,
universities, and other venues, where the Department might promote an
in-depth exchange to address any issues or concerns that might exist
among the next generation of military leaders in both countries.

AFGHANISTAN

Question. In your view what are the major challenges the United
States and the international community face in Afghanistan today, and
how should we approach them?
Answer. In my opinion, major challenges facing the United States
and international community include reforming and rebuilding key
security institutions such as the Afghan National Army, the national
police force, the border police force, and the judicial system. We must
also effect the demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration of
ungoverned parties. Success will require the continued support of this
Congress, along with effective work by U.S. counterparts in the other
countries who have committed themselves to these missions, and by the
United States.
Concurrently, I believe we must ensure implementation of the Bonn
Agreement of December 2001, which has led to the first legitimate
government in 30 years. As I understand it, this agreement provides a
framework for settling constitutional questions in 2003 and conducting
national elections in 2004. Success will no doubt depend upon continued
coordination with the Karzai government, the international community,
and the United Nations to shape and resource a central government that
is viable.
Question. Do you believe that the United States should increase its
troop-strength in Afghanistan?
Answer. I believe that the Department's goal is to keep its
footprint small. The U.S. seeks to be a stabilization force, not an
occupation force. Afghanistan belongs to the Afghans. At the same time,
we must ensure that sectors of the country do not revert to safe havens
for terrorists. I understand that DOD's current commitment (about 8,000
military personnel) is considered sufficient for the mission. In my
view, judicious investments in the Afghan National Army and the central
government will help reduce the commitment of military forces provided
by U.S. and allies over the coming years.

IRAQ--POST-CONFLICT

Question. If we go to war against Iraq, what is your view of the
appropriate role for the Department of Defense in the post-conflict
environment?
Answer. In my view, if Iraq is liberated, the United States and its
coalition partners will become responsible both for the temporary
administration of the country and the welfare of its population. DOD
should commit itself to stay only as long as necessary to ensure
security, protect the territorial integrity of Iraq, rid the country of
WMD, eliminate terrorist infrastructure, assist the Iraqi people in the
process of rebuilding their country, and facilitate the creation of a
broad-based, representative, Iraqi government.
At the same time, I believe DOD also must commit to leave as soon
as the Iraqi people are able to undertake these responsibilities on
their own behalf. Thus, if confirmed, I would advocate post-war plans
that emphasize expeditious transfer of responsibilities from U.S.
military forces to appropriate U.N. agencies, non-governmental
organizations, and ultimately to the Iraqi people themselves.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

Question. The Nunn-Cohen amendment to Goldwater-Nichols established
the Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and the office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict
(ASD/SOLIC).
What is your view on the relationship between SOCOM and ASD/SOLIC?
Answer. As I understand it, pursuant to law, ASD/SOLIC is
responsible for oversight, policy, and resourcing of special operations
within the Department of Defense, and SOCOM has the responsibility for
operational control over the actual special operations forces. The
relationship appears sound and has proven beneficial to the
effectiveness of the Nation's Special Operations Forces. Their superb
performance in Afghanistan serves as a case in point.
Question. What is your view of granting SOCOM greater ability to
function as a supported, as opposed to supporting, command?
Answer. I believe new realities require an expanded role for
special operations. Just as U.S. Northern Command was established to
meet new challenges, so SOCOM must adapt to better apply its scarce
resources in a new security environment more effectively. I believe
SOCOM should not only retain current responsibilities for acquisition,
but also develop its capacity to function globally with its own
operational planning staff. It is my understanding that the Secretary
has designated SOCOM as a supported command in the global war on
terrorism.

WAR ON DRUGS

Question. What is your assessment of the ongoing efforts of the
United States to significantly reduce the amount of drugs illegally
entering our Nation?
Answer. I observe the United States continuing to work with its
friends and allies in Latin America, Mexico, and Southeast Asia to
detect, monitor, and interdict the movement of illegal drugs to the
United States. The President's National Drug Control Strategy
represents a vision that can continue to decrease the supply of drugs,
while significantly increasing the education of Americans about the
dangers of using illegal drugs and the resources needed to treat
Americans who are addicted to illegal drugs.
Question. In your view, what is the appropriate role of the
Department of Defense in U.S. counterdrug efforts?
Answer. I view the appropriate role of the Department of Defense in
counterdrug efforts as one of support to law enforcement. By statute,
the Department serves as the single lead agency for the detection and
monitoring of aerial and maritime foreign shipments of illegal drugs
toward the United States. The Department also supports other Federal
agencies whose core missions include counterdrug activities.
The Department's role is restricted to ensure military personnel do
not participate in actual field operations, including: search, seizure,
arrest, or other similar activities. In my view, the Department should
continue to execute its counterdrug support responsibilities, as long
as they employ military-unique capabilities not available to civil
authorities and do not detract from their core warfighting
responsibilities.

MILITARY TRANSFORMATION

Question. The transformation of U.S. defense capabilities to
successfully confront 21st century threats has been the subject of much
discussion over the past few years.
In your view, what should be the objectives of military
transformation?
Answer. I view transformation as a continuous process, not an end
state. We must remain open to innovative concepts and ideas developed
through service and joint experimentation programs. Broad objectives,
however, are necessary to inform the transformation process and allow
us to make critical near-term investments that are prerequisites for
more transformational capabilities. In this regard, I believe that the
six critical operational goals articulated in the 2001 Quadrennial
Defense Review are the right ones: 1) Protect critical bases of
operations and defeat CBRNE weapons and their means of delivery; 2)
Assure information systems in the face of attack and conduct effective
information operations; 3) Project and sustain U.S. forces in distant
anti-access or area-denial environments and defeat anti-access and area
denial threats; 4) Deny enemies sanctuary by providing persistent
surveillance, tracking, and rapid engagement with high-volume precision
strike; 5) Enhance the capability and survivability of space systems
and supporting infrastructure; and 6) Leverage information technology
and innovative concepts to develop an interoperable, joint C\4\ISR
architecture and capability.
Question. What is the role of experimentation, including joint
experimentation, in this process?
Answer. Ongoing experimentation is an essential part of the
development of future warfighting concepts, which are the engines of
change for driving the development of transformational capabilities.
Experimentation programs assist in the development, testing, and
further refinement of future concepts. However, in the immediate future
it is particularly important to have a robust joint experimentation
program. Enhanced joint capabilities will produce non-linear increases
in combat capabilities, particularly as we attempt to exploit new
technologies that provide improved situational awareness and
intelligence across the entire battlespace.
I have been told that the Department's fiscal year 2004 budget
request, for instance, increases funding for the Joint National
Training Center by about $65 million, a 55 percent increase over its
fiscal year 2003 budget. Likewise, the fiscal year 2004 budget request
for the U.S. Joint Forces Command increases funding by $16 million from
fiscal year 2003.

NATO ISSUES

Question. At the Prague Summit in November 2002, NATO invited seven
countries to begin accession talks to join the Alliance. The gap in
military capabilities between the United States and many of its NATO
partners, however, has been a growing concern over the past few years.
The entry of new members into NATO may exacerbate this problem.
In your view, what are the main reasons, from a military
perspective, for enlarging NATO?
Answer. I think the accession of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia into NATO will have a
positive effect on the military effectiveness of the Alliance. Each of
these invitees has robustly supported U.S. and allied actions in
multiple theaters such as the Balkans, Afghanistan, and the global war
on terrorism. The United States has been intimately involved in the
creation of defense reform plans for each invitee. I understand that
these plans emphasize development of niche capabilities that will allow
for important contributions to the Alliance despite a relatively
limited resource base within each particular state.
Question. Do you believe the Prague Capabilities Commitment and the
NATO Response Force will succeed in encouraging NATO allies to improve
their military capabilities?
Answer. I am hopeful for both initiatives. The Prague Capabilities
Commitment (PCC) represents a firm political commitment to address
specific shortfalls in NATO capabilities. Participants identified a
number of concrete programmatic efforts they should undertake--such as
the acquisition of unmanned aerial vehicles and new precision guided
munitions. The commitment to develop the NATO Response Force (NRF) is
an equally important achievement. The NRF should operate as a
technologically advanced force that is capable of high-end operations.
Allies should commit specific units to take part in the NRF under a
rotational plan. During their period of participation, assigned units
should receive hardware improvements and intensive training. These
initiatives are mutually reinforcing and can serve as levers for the
transformation of NATO.
Question. Why should we expect these efforts to be more successful
than the Defense Capabilities Initiative proved to be?
Answer. As I understand it, the Prague Capabilities Commitment
(PCC) focused on a smaller and more achievable set of capability
shortfalls than the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI). It also
received unprecedented support from the Secretary General. The NRF
complements the PCC as a mechanism to assess and exploit PCC progress.
The Prague Summit committed to specific timelines for NRC
implementation. It also has strong political support. Thus, I am
optimistic with respect to both initiatives.
Question. The relationship between NATO and Russia is an important
element of the new strategic framework with Russia.
How well, in your judgment, is the NATO-Russia Council working in
practice?
Answer. I believe the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) has established an
early record of accomplishments with: 1) the completion of the civil
emergency preparedness exercise in 2002; 2) the completion of the
generic concept paper on peacekeeping operations; and 3) discussions on
topics ranging from terrorism to missile defense. These successes
suggest continued utility as a mechanism for encouraging cooperation
between the Alliance and Russia.

RUSSIA

Question. Are there steps you believe we should take to improve
Russian and U.S. military relationships?
Answer. In my view, our military relationship with Russia has
measurably improved over the last 2 years in a variety of spheres--such
as the global war on terrorism, emergency/consequence management, and
search and rescue. I see a number of areas where we might make further
strides, such as shared missile warning, missile defense, expansion of
exchange programs, and in combined exercises.
Question. Would you support resumption of a comprehensive military-
to-military exchange and dialogue program, along the lines of the
previous exchange program between Strategic Command and its Russian
counterparts?
Answer. In my view, exchange programs with Russia can serve many
important goals, including the promotion of: 1) transparency and
strategic stability; 2) opportunities for cooperation in the global war
on terrorism; and 3) opportunities to promote Russian defense reform.
If confirmed, I am open to consideration of any proposals that serve
these objectives.

BALKANS

Question. U.S. forces have been engaged, together with our NATO
allies, in peacekeeping operations in the Balkans since 1995.
What is your estimate as to when SFOR in Bosnia and KFOR in Kosovo,
and United States participation in those forces, will no longer be
needed to maintain stability?
Answer. In my view, the U.S. contribution to NATO's military
efforts in the Balkans has been essential for its success to date.
However, while NATO's commitment to the peace of the region is
enduring, the commitment of U.S. forces should not be indefinite. I
believe that as the situation on the ground further improves, NATO and
the United States should continue the transition from force deployments
to more normal security cooperation activities and initiatives. These
actions can establish the foundation for Balkan integration into Euro-
Atlantic security structures.

NORTH KOREA

Question. How do you assess the near-term and longer-term threat
North Korea poses to U.S. and allied interests in East Asia?
Answer. In my view, North Korea poses a considerable threat to the
U.S. and allied interests in Asia. Although North Korea's economy
continues to deteriorate, North Korea maintains a robust indigenous
missile program, has over 10,000 artillery pieces along the
demilitarized zone, and is pursuing a nuclear weapons program. These
programs not only pose a threat to North Korea's neighbors in East
Asia, but North Korea's proliferation activities threaten global
stability. The threat posed by North Korea will only grow over time if
left unchecked.
Question. What are the military implications for the United States
of the ongoing tension on the Korean Peninsula?
Answer. In my opinion, the growing tensions on the Korean Peninsula
have significant implications for the United States. North Korea could
embark any day on further provocations in an effort to compel the
United States into bilateral talks. The U.S. and its allies and friends
must be prepared to respond to provocations by North Korea, such as a
ballistic missile launch over Japan or the U.S., the reprocessing of
spent fuel, or a nuclear test. The Combined Forces Command of United
States and the Republic of Korea (ROK) must maintain a robust
deterrence posture and high state of readiness. The U.S. should
continue to closely coordinate with the ROK, Japan and the
international community on the current situation. This is not just a
Korean Peninsula problem. The proliferation of fissile material or
nuclear weapons could impact the foundation of U.S. defense strategy.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Question. The Nuclear Posture Review established a goal of reducing
operationally deployed nuclear weapons to a level between 1,700 to
2,200 by the end of 2012. The same facilities, personnel, and resources
that will be used to sustain and modernize this smaller, operationally
deployed force would also be used to dismantle retired nuclear weapons.
What criteria should guide U.S. policy in prioritizing these
activities?
Answer. In my view, the Department's primary goal is to sustain the
warheads it plans to deploy through a series of Life-Extension-Programs
(LEPs), while reducing the number of operationally deployed weapons
over the next decade. Refurbishment programs should stay ahead of
component aging to modernize components where needed. Over the next
decade or more, the planned LEPs for the B61 gravity bomb, the W80
cruise missile warhead, and the W76 sea-launched ballistic missile
warhead will likely consume most of the capacity available for assembly
and disassembly of warheads. Within the remaining margin of available
resources, I understand there is flexibility to adjust these activities
to accommodate for unplanned repairs or dismantlement of warheads that
DOD will retire.
Question. The Nuclear Posture Review did not recommend additional
reductions to the total number of nuclear weapons in the stockpile.
What nuclear weapons, if any, do you believe should be dismantled
in the future?
Answer. The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) identified the W62 as a
warhead that the United States plans to retire when it is removed from
the Minuteman III Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) force
later in the decade. Retirement is the first step in the dismantlement
process. When it is dismantled will depend on the availability of
capacity within the nuclear weapons complex.
Question. Should the entire stockpile of nuclear weapons be
modernized and sustained at the same level?
Answer. I do not believe the Department currently needs to
modernize all warheads in its stockpile, nor should they anticipate
sustaining the total stockpile at its current size. I confirmed, I
would advocate that the Department reduce the number of operationally
deployed weapons, the Department should assess its warhead requirements
in periodic reviews to meet their goals for the New Triad.
Question. What is the current U.S. policy on underground nuclear
testing?
Answer. To the best of my knowledge, there is no technical
requirement to resume underground nuclear explosive testing, and the
President has decided to maintain the testing moratorium.

ARMS CONTROL

Question. What is your view of the role that formal arms control
agreements should play in U.S. national security in the post Cold-War
era?
Answer. I support U.S. participation in the formal arms control
treaties that serve U.S. national security interests. Future agreements
must be judged on a case-by-case basis, based on the criteria of
advancing U.S. national security interests. In general, I believe Cold
War-style arms control agreements have well-served their purpose and
that agreements such as the Moscow Treaty are more appropriate to
future U.S. security needs.
The Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions (also known as the
Moscow Treaty) is very different from previous strategic arms reduction
treaties in that it does not include extensive counting rules,
verification provisions, or interim reduction goals.
Question. Do you support the Moscow Treaty?
Answer. Yes. I believe that the Moscow Treaty represents a
significant improvement over Cold War-style treaties that reflected and
exacerbated a confrontational and antagonistic strategic relationship
between the United States and Russia. The successful negotiation of a
concise treaty represents a turning point in building a new strategic
relationship with the Russian Federation, based more on the pursuit of
our mutual interests than the threat of mutual annihilation.
Question. Do you believe that any conditions, understandings, or
reservations to the resolution of ratification to the Moscow Treaty are
needed to protect U.S. interests?
Answer. I do not believe that the Moscow Treaty needs any
conditions, understandings, or reservations to protect U.S. interests.
The Moscow Treaty preserves the necessary flexibility to carry out our
national security responsibilities and our ability to respond promptly
to advanced threat developments.
Question. In the context of the terms of the Moscow Treaty, do you
believe that the United States and Russia will have adequate insight
into each other's strategic nuclear plans and programs?
Answer. The Consultative Group on Strategic Stability established
by our respective presidents will serve to strengthen mutual
confidence, expand transparency, and share information and plans. This
group has already established a working group of experts to explore
ways to enhance offensive nuclear transparency. Thus, I believe that we
have a good basis for insight into each other's plans and programs.
Question. Would you support the early implementation of the warhead
reductions required by the Moscow Treaty?
Answer. As noted in the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), DOD will
conduct periodic reviews to evaluate the existing security environment,
assess the continuing role of nuclear forces in achieving the defense
policy goals, and review the progress made in the development of the
New Triad. DOD will support the early implementation of the warhead
reductions required by the Moscow Treaty if such reductions are
justified by these periodic reviews. The current NPR plan is to reduce
the number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to
3,800 warheads by the end of 2007. The first review will begin this
year.
Question. What is your view of the role of the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty in U.S. national security in the post Cold-War
era?
Answer. The United States is strongly committed to its obligations
under the Treaty. The President wants to reduce U.S. reliance on
nuclear weapons by bringing U.S. nuclear forces down from current
levels while developing newer non-nuclear and defensive capabilities
and revitalizing our defense infrastructure. This important policy is
part of the administration's desire to build a new cooperative
relationship with Russia. Moreover, compliance remains critical to the
success of the NPT. In order to avoid weakening the treaty, we must
continue to press for full compliance by certain states and take steps
to strengthen IAEA safeguards.
Question. Do you support other arms control treaties in force to
which the U.S. is a party?
Answer. Yes. I believe that the United States should adhere, as it
has always done, to its treaty commitments. In addition, we should
publicly name those countries that violate their treaty obligations in
order to bring international pressure to bear on them to come into
compliance. Treaties will be an effective international mechanism only
if parties live up to their obligations.
Question. What is your view of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
and its verification measures?
Answer. The President has made it clear that he does not support
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and that he does not plan to resubmit
it to the United States Senate for its advice and consent to
ratification.

NUCLEAR FORCE STRUCTURE

Question. The U.S. removed the bulk of its theater and tactical
nuclear forces from the field in the 1990s, and its remaining nuclear
force structure of ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers was intended to deter our
Cold War adversaries.
In your view, have requirements for U.S. nuclear weapons systems,
platforms, and delivery vehicles kept pace with the rapidly changing
security environment?
Answer. My understanding of the Department's Nuclear Posture Review
(NPR) is that it examined the requirements for U.S. nuclear weapons
systems and found that a new strategic triad, composed of diverse
capabilities, is currently needed to underwrite U.S. national security
in the 21st century. The NPR recognized that the new security
environment demanded that we reexamine the requirements for strategic
nuclear weapons systems, platforms, and delivery vehicles.
In my view, the range of capabilities the New Triad should possess
(including non-nuclear and nuclear strike systems, active and passive
defenses, and a responsive infrastructure, supported by robust
planning, command and control, and intelligence capabilities) should
better keep pace with the rapidly changing security environment.
Question. Are existing systems, platforms, and delivery vehicles
relevant and responsive to the current security environment?
Answer. I believe a broad range of capabilities are needed to be
fully responsive to the uncertainties of the new security environment.
The application of the Nuclear Posture Review's capabilities-based
approach to U.S. nuclear forces generated a decision to transform the
existing triad of U.S. strategic nuclear forces--intercontinental
ballistic missiles (ICBMs) heavy bombers, and submarine-launched
ballistic missiles (SLBMs)--into a New Triad composed of a diverse
portfolio of systems. The New Triad is designed to give the President
and Secretary of Defense a broad array of non-nuclear and nuclear, and
offensive and defensive options to address a wide range of possible
contingencies. ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers will continue to play a vital
role in U.S. and allied security as part of the New Triad. I believe
that this New Triad will be responsive to the current security
environment.
Question. What is your view of the role nuclear weapons should play
in U.S. national security in the future?
Answer. Based on the reductions agreed to in the Moscow Treaty, I
believe that nuclear weapons should continue to play a role in U.S. and
allied security. They should: 1) continue to help deter attacks against
the United States, its allies and friends; 2) dissuade competition from
potential adversaries; and 3) continue to provide assurance to the
public and to U.S. allies that have security agreements with the United
States. That said, I believe the Department should continue seek to
reduce U.S. dependence on nuclear weapons.
Question. In your view, is the Stockpile Stewardship Program
meeting the goals of allowing the Secretaries of Defense and Energy
annually to certify each of the nuclear weapon types within our nuclear
weapon stockpile as safe, secure, and reliable?
Answer. My understanding of the Stockpile Stewardship Program is
that it has not failed us to date. But I believe the challenge to the
Department of Energy, and, in particular, to the Administrator of the
National Nuclear Security Administration, will grow as time passes and
the stockpile ages.
Question. Do you support the Stockpile Stewardship Program?
Answer. I support the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP).
Stockpile Stewardship is an important tool for sustaining our nuclear
weapons in a safe and reliable configuration. I believe we must
continue to furnish it with the resources that it needs, including the
infrastructure within the nuclear weapons complex, in order to meet
future challenges.
Question. Do you believe that there is a current requirement to
resume underground nuclear weapons testing to maintain the safety and
reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile?
Answer. I do not believe there is any current need, or desire, to
resume underground testing. While there are a number of questions that
scientists and engineers might answer through an underground test, I
understand that their current technical judgment is that there is no
need certify the safety, security, or reliability of any weapon type in
the stockpile at this time through underground testing.
The Secretaries of Defense and Energy address the question of the
need to test annually in the Certification Report to the President.
Their recommendation takes into account the judgments of the Nuclear
Weapons Council, the Directors of the Department of Energy's
Laboratories, the military departments, and the Commander of the U.S.
Strategic Command.
Question. In your opinion, will the U.S. have such a requirement in
the future?
Answer. I believe it is conceivable that circumstances could
generate requirements that would compel the United States to conduct a
nuclear test at some point in the future. For instance, the non-nuclear
test and evaluation program could find a serious safety, security, or
reliability problem in a special class of weapon and determine that the
only option available to restore confidence in that class of weapon is
a nuclear test.
Question. What is your view about whether the National Nuclear
Security Administration is equipped and ready to return to underground
nuclear testing should the Nuclear Weapons Council find they cannot
certify all or a portion of the nuclear weapons stockpile and the
President decides an underground test is necessary?
Answer. I understand that the Department of Energy has maintained
its nuclear weapons test site in a 3-year readiness posture. Many view
this as insufficiently responsive should circumstances--such as the
discovery of a problem with a type of nuclear warhead--compel a U.S.
President to resume testing. To that end, I also understand that the
Department of Energy is initiating a program to increase the readiness
of this site such that it can technically support a test within 18
months of deciding to do so. If confirmed, I would support this
initiative.

THREAT OF GROWING BIOTECHNOLOGY CAPABILITIES

Question. Within the next 5 years, expected advances in
biotechnology may lead to other nations having improved capabilities to
manipulate biological agents. While the Department is currently focused
on enhancing means of protection against known biological agents, it
must also address emerging threats posed by these near-term advances in
biotechnology.
What is your view of this threat and the adequacy of the
Department's response thus far?
Answer. I view the ongoing revolution in biotechnology as holding
great promise for helping mankind conquer a host of deadly human
diseases. Unfortunately, these same scientific breakthroughs, such as
genetic manipulation, not only open new frontiers in medical treatment,
but also provide opportunities for potential adversaries to create a
new more horrific class of weapons.
That said, I believe that the Department has taken prudent steps in
recent months to enhance the protection of our troops against
biological threats of greatest concern. As a former combatant in
Operation Desert Storm, I strongly support the ongoing program to
immunize U.S. forces against smallpox and anthrax who are at greatest
risk of exposure and the most critical to military operations.
In addition, if confirmed, I would advocate that the Department
also develop a research and development program to anticipate the
emergence of new biological threats.

DOD'S COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION (CTR) PROGRAM

Question. The CTR program has four key objectives: (1) dismantling
former Soviet Union (FSU) weapons of mass destruction (WMD); (2)
consolidating and securing FSU WMD and related technology and
materials; (3) increasing transparency and encouraging higher standards
of conduct; and (4) supporting defense and military cooperation with
the objective of preventing proliferation.
Do you believe the CTR program should maintain its current scope?
Answer. I understand that the Department is trying to refocus the
CTR program, which is in its second decade. The CTR program now
supports the global war on terrorism and interdiction of WMD. The WMD
Proliferation Prevention Initiative should help non-Russian Former
Soviet Union (FSU) states secure their own borders against WMD
smuggling by terrorists and others. The Department also has refocused
CTR's Biological Weapons Prevention Program. The CTR program is
establishing a disease outbreak surveillance system in the states in
Central Asia in recognition of the expanded U.S. presence there. In
addition, the Department hopes to request authority this year to use
CTR outside the FSU to address emergency nonproliferation situations,
or to take advantage of significant nonproliferation opportunities. If
confirmed, I would support these efforts to enhance the effectiveness
of the CTR program.
Question. Are there other potential opportunities to address threat
reduction using the CTR model, or do you believe the CTR model is
applicable only to the FSU?
Answer. With the war on terrorism and the expanded, global focus on
proliferation of WMD, I believe that other opportunities may arise
outside the FSU. This is why, if confirmed, I would support the
Department's request for authority to take advantage of opportunities
to prevent proliferation of WMD outside the FSU.
Question. Given increases in Russia's gross domestic product during
the past year and subsequent increases in its military spending and
arms exports, what is your view regarding Russia's ability to assume
more of the cost share associated with CTR projects in Russia?
Answer. As I understand it, CTR assistance is provided in support
of U.S. national security objectives. As such, the Department continues
to work with the FSU to live up to their commitments under CTR. The
Department also is looking for new ways for other Western countries to
increase their support for the program, as well as for increased
commitments by the recipient countries. Preventing the proliferation of
WMD, and its means of production and delivery is the key U.S.
objective. Congress and the administration have supported up-front
investment through CTR to achieve this goal. If confirmed, I also would
support this continued investment formula.

EXPORTS OF SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGIES

Question. In the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass
Destruction, the administration states that ``we must ensure that the
implementation of U.S. export controls furthers our nonproliferation
and other national security goals, while recognizing the realities that
American businesses face in the increasingly globalized marketplace. We
will work to update and strengthen export controls using existing
authorities. We also seek new legislation to improve the ability of our
export control system to give full weight to both nonproliferation
objectives and commercial interests. Our overall goal is to focus our
resources on truly sensitive exports to hostile states or those that
engage in onward proliferation, while removing unnecessary barriers in
the global marketplace.''
What policies and procedures do you believe are needed to achieve
this objective?
Answer. It is my understanding that the administration has begun a
comprehensive assessment of the effectiveness of U.S. defense trade
policies to identify necessary changes and ensure that those policies
continue to support U.S. national security, economic, and foreign
policy goals. DOD plays a key role in the ongoing interagency review.
The aims of the review are to maintain America's technological and
warfighting advantages over its potential adversaries, while
facilitating friends' and allies' efforts to increase capability and
interoperability and enhancing controls where necessary to address key
national security priorities. If confirmed, I would support the
Department's effort to improve U.S. defense trade policies.
Question. What role should the Department of Defense play in this
process? Have recent export control reforms designed to streamline the
process, such as the use of the global program license authority for
JSF, adequately addressed this challenge, or do you believe that
additional steps are needed? What is your view regarding the status of
negotiations with our allies to grant them special status in the form
of waivers from certain U.S. export control laws?
Answer. I understand that the Department of State is currently
leading administration efforts to negotiate legally binding agreements
with the UK and Australia that will exempt them (like Canada) from
certain requirements in the International Traffic in Arms Regulations
(ITAR). The ITAR country exemptions are extended to waive certain
license requirements for export from the United States of certain
unclassified defense items, technical data and limited services to
countries with export control systems comparable to those of the United
States. The objectives of ITAR country exemptions, as I understand
them, are: a) raising foreign export control standards toward the U.S.
level; b) enhancing defense trade and cooperation among allies; c)
helping to streamline the licensing process by reducing the number of
applications; d) enhancing U.S. technology security by allowing our
licensing system to focus on higher risk export license applications;
and e) supporting interoperability by facilitating defense industrial
cooperation between the United States and select allies. If confirmed,
I would support the above objectives and waivers for our UK and
Australian allies.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views,
even if those views differ from the administration in power?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as the Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and
other communications of information are provided to this committee and
its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes.
______

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Dole

REPEATED FORCE DEPLOYMENTS

1. Senator Dole. Mr. Henry, we have been through a year of
deployments of units from all of the services, including extensive use
of marines and special forces. Now we are in the midst of deploying
forces again in preparation of a possible war in Iraq.
In carrying out your responsibilities for contingency planning, how
would you factor in the use of forces that have been through repeated
deployments?
Mr. Henry. One of the strengths of our contingency planning system
is that it addresses the possibility of repeated deployments. It does
so through a two-step process. First, we take great pains to apportion
forces among the Department's war plans to minimize the changes of
overtaxing units. Second, when a plan must be executed, we carefully
examine which units required by the plan have returned recently from
deployments and which have been repeatedly stressed over time. When
advisable, and possible, we use forces other than those originally
envisioned for the plan.

2. Senator Dole. Mr. Henry, what emphasis will you place on
concerns about the readiness of forces that have been through repeated
deployments and the morale of those forces and their families?
Mr. Henry. I take this issue very seriously. Maintaining a high
state of readiness and morale is central to the operational performance
of our forces. The Department monitors the readiness and morale of our
forces carefully because of its concern about the long-term impact of
repeated deployments--particularly as they affect high demand units. In
this regard I support the Secretary of Defense in his pursuit of ways
to shape the force more appropriately for today's missions. I also
wholeheartedly support his attempts to identify and field better
management tools for assessing and balancing force requirements and
risk.
Important to achieving good morale and readiness is the sense of
security those who serve our county gain by knowing that their families
are well cared for during deployments. I wholeheartedly support the
Secretary's myriad efforts in this regard, starting with his commitment
to quality of life initiatives like improved housing, health care, and
pay equity. I also strongly endorse service programs that enable
servicemen and women to deploy with greater piece of mind such as well-
run and active family support programs and initiatives that enable
regular communications between deployed service members and their loved
ones during deployments.

3. Senator Dole. Mr. Henry, as you look at other possible conflicts
(for example, military action on the Korean Peninsula) how does your
planning process recognize and acknowledge these morale and readiness
issues as limitations on your contingency planning?
Mr. Henry. Our planning system is designed to mitigate the overuse
of our forces--and the resultant degradation in readiness and morale--
in several ways. First, our forces are structured to fight two
overlapping wars. No unit is apportioned to both wars. Second, our
planning system apportions the best available unit to any particular
mission. At the same time it ensures that like-type forces are
distributed optimally among all the plans. Third, the Department
intensely monitors and manages high-demand units, such as command and
control or intelligence assets, that could be subject to overuse and
high stress. Finally, the services constantly review force requirements
generated by the contingency planning process and adjust unit
deployment schedules as necessary after assessing available units'
capabilities and readiness. The strength of our planning system is its
ability to factor readiness, morale, and other potential stresses into
the assignment of particular units to a mission.
To help the department better manage the risks of overtaxing the
force, we are currently developing new tools for making force
apportionment and deployment decisions. One new tool uses an integrated
database to track the status and location of all units worldwide. It
allows us to see very quickly the systemic impact of potential
deployment decisions. Analysis that used to take us many hours, if not
days, can now be done very quickly, sometimes in minutes. We believe
this tool, along with others, will allow the Department to make better
and more timely deployment decisions--giving us better visibility on
the status of the force as a whole and minimizing the risks of
undermining the readiness and morale of our forces.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

4. Senator Dole. Mr. Henry, how does the newly announced role of
the Special Operations Command as a supported command affect your
strategy formulation and contingency planning activities?
Mr. Henry. In the past, we faced state adversaries who generally
were organized in a hierarchical fashion, and who could be confronted
directly. Today, we face a very different type of enemy--a loose
network of terrorist groups and their supporters. In order to defeat
the international terrorist network, we will need to bring to bear a
range of tools--diplomatic, economic, military, and intelligence--in
new and unusual ways. The terrorist network has proven to be adaptive
and resilient. Consequently, we are attacking it relentlessly and
across all fronts. The U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is
playing a key role in this effort.
As the lead for the Department's global war against terrorism,
USSOCOM will plan and selectively execute combat missions against
terrorists like Al Qaida and their associated organizations around the
world. USSOCOM will conduct operations as a supported command when
appropriate, e.g., if the terrorist network activities cross regional
boundaries or the synchronization of forces for a particular operation
dictates USSOCOM lead. In other cases, USSOCOM will participate in
operations as a supporting command. The decision to select which
command will be supported or supporting will be made by either the
President or by the Secretary of Defense, depending on the
circumstances of threat and operational practicalities.
To win the war on terrorism, seamless cooperation and collaboration
is required by the Department of Defense, the intelligence community,
the Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the
Department of Treasury, and other Federal agencies and departments (to
include the Department of State and our ambassadors overseas). USSOCOM
fully recognizes this imperative and has established a focused planning
capability to draft, coordinate, and synchronize global plans and
operations. Contingency planning will have to be done more quickly than
ever in order to react to emerging intelligence and exploit targets of
opportunity. In some cases, our military forces may not be the option
ultimately chosen to undertake the mission; rather, cooperative host
nation security forces, other allies, or other arms of the U.S.
Government may well be better able to undertake missions successfully.
By organizing an operational planning capability at USSOCOM
headquarters, as well as at smaller Theater Special Operations Commands
in the regional theaters, the U.S. Special Operations Command will have
the tools it needs to better plan and execute missions in support of
the global war on terrorism. These same tools will, in turn, enable
USSOCOM to better meet future challenges and threats to our national
security beyond the war on terrorism.

U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND

5. Senator Dole. Mr. Henry, how does the U.S. Northern Command fit
into your contingency planning?
Mr. Henry. Like all combatant commands, U.S. Northern Command is
assigned specific planning responsibilities for its geographic area of
responsibility and in support of other combatant commanders' plans. As
I stated in my testimony, U.S. Northern Command will work closely with
U.S. Pacific Command to ensure that homeland defense plans cover all of
the United States, its territories, and its possessions.

6. Senator Dole. Mr. Henry, do you envision the use of special
forces as part of your contingency planning in the area of homeland
defense?
Mr. Henry. Special forces' principal role in homeland defense is in
keeping threats away from U.S. shores. By helping to drain the swamps
where terrorists find sanctuary, special forces take the fight from the
shores of our homeland to our enemies abroad. This includes undertaking
military operations beyond U.S. borders and training foreign militaries
in places like Afghanistan. It also includes special forces' assistance
in countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction that
could threaten our Nation. Finally, special forces play a discrete
role in U.S. Northern Command's contingency planning for homeland
defense.

COMBATING TERRORISM AND COUNTERDRUG STRATEGIES

7. Senator Dole. Mr. Henry, in your role in developing strategies
for combating terrorism, how will counterdrug strategies fit into your
planning?
Mr. Henry. We have found that trafficking in weapons, money,
people, and other illegal items is not restricted to narco-traffickers.
Many networks that support the illicit movement of these items for drug
activities also support terrorist groups like Al Qaida, Hizballah, the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan (IMU), and the Al-Ittihad al Islami (AIAI), to mention a
few. To the extent that narcotics trafficking is related to terrorism
and trafficking in other illegal materials, our counternarcotics
programs and activities will also combat terrorism and counter the
trafficking of WMD and arms. We will seek to continually address the
congruence of these threats in order to maximize the efficient use of
our resources and policies to counter them both.

8. Senator Dole. Mr. Henry, what role do you think DOD can and
should play in counterdrug activities?
Mr. Henry. The Department of Defense's counternarcotics efforts are
in direct support of the President's National Drug Control Strategy.
DOD appropriately focuses its counternarcotics programs on fulfilling
statutory responsibilities, providing military-unique resources, and
enhancing readiness. As an example, DOD executes drug demand reduction
programs to maintain the Armed Forces as an effective fighting force.
DOD also carries out drug detection and monitoring at U.S. borders
and beyond. This capability can be leveraged to detect and monitor the
movement of other threats to the United States. Thus, to the extent
that narcotics trafficking is related to terrorism and trafficking in
other illegal materials, our counternarcotics programs and activities
also combat terrorism and counter the trafficking of weapons of mass
destruction and arms.

9. Senator Dole. Mr. Henry, what specific actions should DOD be
taking in dealing with the drug production problem in Afghanistan?
Mr. Henry. At the January 2002 Tokyo conference, the United Kingdom
(UK) agreed to lead counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan. As lead
nation, the UK coordinates activities and programs of other donor
nations and international organizations in eradication, interdiction,
alternative livelihoods, education, and treatment.
The Department of State is the lead United States Government
organization for counternarcotics in Afghanistan. DOD supports the UK
and Department of State as requested and consistent with ongoing
military operations.
The United States Government is currently seeking a lead nation to
train the Afghan Border Police, which will have a primary role in
interdicting drug trafficking. The Department of Defense has offered to
assist in that training.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka

JOINT WARFIGHTING AND TRAINING RESPONSIBILITIES

10. Senator Akaka. Mr. Henry, in your responses to our pre-hearing
questions, you stated that you would contribute to enhancing joint
warfighting efforts by strengthening joint exercises and training.
What specific actions did you have in mind to accomplish that goal?
Mr. Henry. During the past year, the Department of Defense embarked
upon an aggressive new training strategy reflected in the ``Strategic
Plan for Transforming DOD Training'' signed by the Deputy Secretary in
June 2002. The goals of training transformation are bold and
comprehensive and will take years to accomplish. Training
transformation is built around a dynamic, capabilities-based training
system that expands traditional perspectives of jointness. By creating
an integrated training environment that employs live, virtual, and
constructive events, the Department will provide accurate, timely,
relevant, and affordable training and mission rehearsal in support of
specific operational needs. For example, the Department will identify
interfaces between training systems and acquisition, logistics,
personnel, military education, and command and control processes to
ensure training is integrated into all of these processes. Another
important element of training transformation is its expansion of joint
leadership development and Joint Professional Military Education. The
creation of a Joint National Training Capability and continued emphasis
on range management are equally critical to enhancing joint warfighting
efforts.

11. Senator Akaka. Mr. Henry, what should the relationship be
between the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the services with
respect to balancing joint training and the services' Title 10 training
responsibilities?
Mr. Henry. The Office of the Secretary of Defense provides the
broad objectives, framework, and resources that enable the services to
provide trained and ready forces for the combatant commanders. The
services direct and oversee individual and unit training at all
echelons of command. They have the responsibility for honing service-
related operational skills to contribute maximally to joint warfare.
Joint training builds upon this service foundation and integrates
training between the services at the command level where joint forces
are brought together. This joint training does not compete with service
training, but rather complements and enhances it.
The Department has just begun developing joint doctrine underpinned
by new joint operating concepts. These new concepts will undoubtedly
cause us to rethink how we execute the full range of military
operations in a fully joint way. As they mature, I anticipate we will
need to integrate the joint fight at successively lower echelons of
command. Our training will reflect this dynamic.
Anticipating this change, the Department has a number of
initiatives underway at U.S. Joint Forces Command to codify the most
promising initiatives for joint training. It is also exploring and
expanding opportunities for joint training. Particularly exciting is
U.S. Joint Forces Command's initiative to create a ``Joint National
Training Capability'' which will be designed to achieve synergy between
joint and service training at the appropriate level of command.

12. Senator Akaka. Mr. Henry, how would you integrate training for
such cooperation into your broader training goals, balancing priorities
between inter-service, inter-departmental, and inter-organizational
training opportunities?
Mr. Henry. At the same time the Department is expanding its joint
training goals and emphasizing inter-service training opportunities,
its understanding of what constitutes ``jointness'' also continues to
expand. The full participation of other agencies and nations are
increasingly important to the success of U.S. military operations under
the new strategy. With this trend in mind, the Department has set in
motion several important initiatives. One such undertaking, the
``Strategic Plan for Transforming DOD Training,'' tasks the Office of
the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to lead a study that
identifies, analyzes, and develops a common set of interagency,
intergovernmental, and multinational ``Joint'' mission-essential tasks.
I look forward to leading this effort. Because this expanded concept of
jointness will undoubtedly strain our existing training construct, we
will need to be innovative in how we approach this new challenge. It
has the potential to drive a significant transformation of our training
system.

13. Senator Akaka. Mr. Henry, in your pre-hearing answers, you
stated that joint experimentation is an essential part of developing
future warfighting concepts, and noted that DOD's budget request will
include large increases for a Joint National Training Center.
What relationship do you see between experimentation and training,
which by and large tend to operate in separate stovepipes?
Mr. Henry. A robust joint experimentation program is critical to
military transformation. Across the Department, components are
exploring new warfighting concepts, including joint operating concepts,
effects-based operations, rapid decisive operations, and information
operations. U.S. Joint Forces Command assists the Secretary of Defense
in identifying the experimentation necessary to explore these concepts
fully and to test the application of new capabilities.
Military training transformation is tightly linked to this joint
experimentation program. New and exciting joint operational concepts
will require experimentation to develop them more fully. These concepts
will also generate new systems and organizations that must themselves
be tested through experimentation. These various experiments will be
fully integrated with training opportunities. Notably, the Joint
National Training Capability will provide the opportunity to integrate
new concepts, systems, and organizations into a dynamic, capabilities-
based joint training environment.

14. Senator Akaka. Mr. Henry, are there synergies between
experimentation and training that would enhance their benefit, and that
you would attempt to encourage?
Mr. Henry. I am very interested in encouraging the Department to
take advantage of synergies between experimentation and training.
Through service and joint experimentation, the Department can develop
innovative concepts and ideas. Training transformation, in turn,
rigorously tests and validates these concepts through a dynamic,
expanded concept of jointness. The synergy between the two informs
long-term transformation and near-term investments.
Interoperable, net-centric capabilities--such as embedded
simulations, job performance aids, and integrated simulators and
training devices--will further highlight experimentation--training
synergies. The resulting integrated live, virtual, and constructive
training environment will improve operational effectiveness by ensuring
affordable training and mission rehearsal opportunities. Further, by
linking this broadened joint focus to assessments of force readiness,
the Department will be better able to measure, assess, and report on
the concepts explored through experimentation and achieve synergistic
training.

DOD PROCESSES

15. Senator Akaka. Mr. Henry, I reviewed your comments about the
need to streamline DOD processes. Are there specific processes that you
believe should be streamlined, and do you have any ideas about how you
would bring that about?
Mr. Henry. I intend to focus on reforming three major Department
processes: the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS), the
joint requirements process, and the analysis process that supports
requirements and resource allocation decisionmaking.
The PPBS process is now over 40 years old. Having been originally
conceived, in a much different era, and despite some evolutionary
changes along the way, its capability to support the decision making
needs of the Department's top leadership continues to diminish. The
Department recently completed an internal study on how to streamline
this system, and we are carefully considering, its conclusions and
recommendations. Due to the vast size and complexity of PPBS, and its
resulting inertia, major efforts will be required not just to modernize
it, but to transform it. My foremost concern will be to ensure that any
reforms the Department undertakes promote the goal of a strategy- and
planning-driven resource allocation process.
Another process that must be streamlined is the joint requirements
process. Presently, military requirements take too long to be evaluated
and validated. Further, they must be reoriented away from a platform-
centric approach and toward a capabilities-oriented approach. I will be
working with the Joint Staff to help make this happen.
A third process in need of streamlining is the Department's
underlying analytic process. Strategic analyses of key issues of
concern to the Secretary take far too long to accomplish, sometimes on
the order of years. In addition, the overall quality of their results
must be improved, and the processes for developing them, especially
within the Joint Staff and the services, must be better integrated. It
is essential that the analytic process be fully transparent to all DOD
stakeholders, and that the databases needed for conducting analyses be
in ready condition. Improvements in these areas can produce an analytic
system that is much more nimble and responsive than today's to short-
notice requirements from the Department's leadership. The Office of the
Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff have agreed on an analytic
agenda to ensure that these goals are achieved, and I shall be working
assiduously to ensure that we follow through with that agenda.

CONSULTATION WITH CONGRESS

16. Senator Akaka. Mr. Henry, I was interested to see that, if
confirmed, you intend to assist the Secretary in enhancing consultation
with Congress. I welcome your commitment to this goal. Can you describe
how you might improve upon current levels and means of consultation,
and what areas you believe are in greatest need of enhancement?
Mr. Henry. I am committed to working with Congress to further the
Secretary's agenda. In assuming the role of the Principal Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy, I am primarily concerned with
sharpening the Policy Directorate's focus on legislative issues. I hope
to ensure that senior policy officials maintain regular contact with
congressional members and staffs and, equally, that the Under Secretary
of Defense for Policy and his staff are fully informed of legislative
issues that affect their accounts. Some means of improving this two-way
communication are by using legislation as a means of furthering
important reforms, increasing briefings to congressional staff,
discussing the value of congressionally required reports and improving
the timeliness of our response on those reports we are assigned.
Accordingly, I am creating a position for a Special Assistant for
Legislative Affairs. This individual would report directly to me and
would work with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Legislative Affairs, the Department of Defense Comptroller's Office,
and other DOD organizations to facilitate the Policy Directorate's
interactions with Congress.

17. Senator Akaka. Mr. Henry, can you give us some examples of what
increased consultation might involve?
Mr. Henry. By improving the policy organization's awareness of
legislative issues affecting it, I hope to encourage my staff to
exploit such consultative mechanisms as briefings to congressional
staff and responding to congressionally reporting requirements. I will
create a Special Assistant for Legislative Issues to focus policy's
legislative efforts.
______

[The nomination reference of Christopher Ryan Henry
follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
January 9, 2003.
Ordered, that the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
Christopher Ryan Henry, of Virginia, to be Deputy Under Secretary
of Defense for Policy, vice Stephen A. Cambone, resigned.
______

[The biographical sketch of Christopher Ryan Henry, which
was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was
referred, follows:]

Biographical Sketch of Christopher ``Ryan'' Henry

Ryan Henry currently serves as Science Applications International
Corporation's (SAIC) Corporate Vice President for Strategic Assessment
and Development. His professional career spans two wars, 26 years of
military service, advanced research and development, and policy
analysis. He served as a business leader, policy analyst, Congressional
fellow, technology and warfare architect, combat commanding officer and
experimental test pilot.
While at SAIC, Ryan worked with the science and technology
community in developing national security architectures for the
Information Age and spearheaded many leading-edge technology
initiatives. He worked with former principals of the U.S. Joint Chiefs
of Staff to design overarching sensor, communication and information
blueprints that offered dominant battlespace awareness for the High
Commands of the Nordic nations.
While a Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International
Studies (CSIS), Ryan led the information-based warfare initiative and
served as Director of the ``Conflict in the Digital Age'' project. His
book and articles address the impact of technology on public policy,
national security, future conflict, and military operations.
At DARPA, Ryan coordinated a system of information systems designed
to support the American warfighter in the 21st century. He also served
as a Senior Military Fellow with the Senate Appropriations Committee
(Defense Subcommittee, 104th Congress, 1st session) and Program Manager
of Special/Classified Programs at DARPA. While on deployment during
Desert Storm, Ryan commanded the first Sea-Strike squadron to engage in
combat, personally led their first weapons delivery sortie and
accumulated 88 other combat missions. His squadron pioneered numerous
operational capabilities and set an unprecedented number of performance
records. He has over 5,500 flight hours in 54 different aircraft types
and 750 carrier landings.
He graduated with merit from the U.S. Naval Academy and was a top
graduate at the National Defense University. He has advanced degrees in
Aeronautical Systems, Systems Management and Public Administration.
Ryan's military awards include the O'Neill Trophy, Bronze Star with
Combat ``V'', Meritorious Service Medal (2), Individual Air Medal (3),
Strike Flight Air Medal (2), and numerous others. He is the proud
father of Maile (27), Terrence (25), Megan (23) and Terrell (20) and
husband of Delonnie of McLean, Virginia.
______

(1) SAIC Employee Stock Purchase Plan--I agree to divest all
stock held in this plan
(2) SAIC Employee Stock Retirement Plan--I will maintain this
interest by rolling over this plan into Vanguard Fund that is
managed by Vanguard,
(3) SAIC CODA Plan--

(a) Vanguard U.S. Growth Fund--I will maintain this
interest;
(b) SAIC Stock Exchangeable--I will rollover all
exchangeable stock into Vanguard Fund,
(c) SAIC Stock Non-exchangeable--I will forfeit all
non-exchangeable stock held in the SAIC CODA Plan.

(4) SAIC Keystaff Deferral Plan--This is a cash account that
I will be required to liquidate. I will take a lump sum
payment.
(5) SAIC Profit Sharing Retirement Plan--This plan is
invested in Vanguard Life Strategy Cons. Growth Fund. I will
maintain this interest.
(6) SAIC Direct Stock Ownership Fully Vested Shares and
Unvested Shares--I will divest all vested SAIC stock and
forfeit all unvested shares in this plan.
(7) SAIC Options Outstanding Fully Vested Options and SAIC
Option Outstanding Unvested Options--I will exercise and then
divest of all vested options and I will forfeit all unvested
options in this plan.

As defined by Sec. 2635.502(b)(1) of title 5 of the Code of Federal
Regulations, I will have a ``covered relationship'' with SAIC.
Therefore, where circumstances would cause a reasonable person with
knowledge of the relevant facts to question my impartiality in a
particular matter involving this specific party or persons represented
by this party, I will--not, for a period of 1 year from the date of my
resignation, participate in such particular matters, unless in
accordance with section 2635.502(d), it is determined that my
participation in a particular matter outweighs the concern over an
appearance of a loss of impartiality.
During my term of office, neither I nor any member of my immediate
family will invest in any organization identified as a DOD contractor
or any other entity that would create a conflict of interest with my
Government duties.
I do not have any present employment arrangements with any entity
other than the Department of Defense and have no formal or informal
understandings concerning any further employment with any entity. If
confirmed, I am committed to serve in this position at the pleasure of
the President throughout his term of office.
I have never been arrested or charged with any criminal offenses
other than minor traffic violations. I have never been party to any
civil litigation. To the best of my knowledge, there have never been
any lawsuits filed against any agency of the Federal Government or
corporate entity with which I have been associated reflecting adversely
on the work I have done at such agency or corporation. I am aware of no
incidents reflecting adversely upon my suitability to serve in the
position for which I have been nominated.
To the best of my knowledge, I am not presently the subject of any
governmental inquiry or investigation.
I am a member of certain organizations and professional societies,
which are either listed below or have been previously provided to the
committee. None of these should pose any conflict of interest with
regard to my governmental responsibilities. I trust that the foregoing
information will be satisfactory to the committee.
Sincerely,
Christopher Ryan Henry.
______

UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Christopher Ryan Henry.

2. Position to which nominated:
Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Policy).

3. Date of nomination:
9 January 2003.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
11 May 1950; Pasadena, CA.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Delonnie (NMN) Avery Henry.

7. Names and ages of children:
Maile (NMN) Henry Reid; 27; daughter.
Terrence Ryan Henry; 25; son.
Megan (NMN) Henry Rich; 23; daughter.
Terrell Ryan Henry; 20; son.

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions,
dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
School Dates Degree
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Punahou School (Honolulu, HI)........... 1966-1968 HS (1968)
U.S. Naval Academy (Annapolis, MD)...... 1968-1972 BS (1972)
University of West Florida (Pensacola, 1973-1973 MS (1974)
FL)....................................
U.S. Navy Test Pilot School (Patuxent 1979-1980
River, MD).............................
University of Southern California (off- 1975-1982 MS (1982)
campus)................................
National Defense University (Washington, 1991-1992
DC)....................................
University of Southern California (DC 1992-1997 MPA (2003) \1\
campus)................................
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Degree currently in processing process due to clerical error.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Job Description Employer Location Dates
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Corporate Technology Development SAIC... SAIC...................... La Jolla, CA.............. 2002-2003
Group Technology Development............ SAIC...................... Arlington, VA............. 1997-2002
Senior Fellow........................... CSIS...................... Washington, DC............ 1996-1997
Navy Captain/Special Programs Mgr....... DARPA..................... Arlington, VA............. 1992-1996
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day-Saints (Mormon).

14. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions
for outstanding service or achievements.
Military Medals--(personal, not unit) Bronze Star, Air Medal (3),
Combat Action, Meritorious Service, Navy Commendation (3), Navy
Achievement (2).

15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of
books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have
written.
Co-editor of book: The Information Revolution and International
Security (CSIS Press, 1998).
Co-authored articles:

``Military Theory and Information Warfare,'' Parameters,
Autumn 1998, pp. 121-35.
``Assessing `Byte City': An Insightful or Misleading
Vision?'' The Washington Quarterly, Volume 20, Number 2, Spring
1997, pp. 73-78.
Co-authored op-ed column: ``Our Exposure to Digital-age
Terrorism,'' The San Diego Union Tribune, August 23, 1998.

Co-authored several other op-ed columns between 1996 and 1997 in
Washington Times, San Diego Union Tribune, and Seattle Post-
Intelligencer, but I no longer have access to the titles or exact dates
of those columns.

17. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to respond to requests to appear and testify before any
duly constituted committee of the Senate?
Yes.
______

Signature and Date

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement
on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information
provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate,
and complete.
Christopher Ryan Henry.
This 21st day of January, 2003.

______

[The nomination of Christopher Ryan Henry was reported to
the Senate by Chairman Warner on January 30, 2003, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on February 4, 2003.]

NOMINATIONS OF HON. STEPHEN A. CAMBONE TO BE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR INTELLIGENCE; JOHN PAUL WOODLEY, JR., TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
THE ARMY FOR CIVIL WORKS; AND AMBASSADOR LINTON F. BROOKS TO BE UNDER
SECRETARY FOR NUCLEAR SECURITY AND ADMINISTRATOR FOR NUCLEAR SECURITY,
NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

----------

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 27, 2003

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:38 a.m., in
room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator John Warner
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Warner, Inhofe, Allard,
Collins, Levin, E. Benjamin Nelson, and Clinton.
Other Senators present: Senator George Allen.
Committee staff members present: Judith A. Ansley, staff
director; Gabriella Eisen, nominations clerk.
Majority staff members present: Charles W. Alsup,
professional staff member; L. David Cherington, counsel; Brian
R. Green, professional staff member; Carolyn M. Hanna,
professional staff member; Mary Alice A. Hayward, professional
staff member; Patricia L. Lewis, professional staff member; Ann
M. Mittermeyer, counsel; Scott W. Stucky, general counsel; and
Richard F. Walsh, counsel.
Minority staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes,
Democratic staff director; Daniel J. Cox, Jr., professional
staff member; Madelyn R. Creedon, minority counsel; Kenneth M.
Crosswait, professional staff member; and Creighton Greene,
professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Michael N. Berger, Leah C.
Brewer, Jennifer Key, and Sara R. Mareno.
Committee members' assistants present: John A. Bonsell,
assistant to Senator Inhofe; Douglas Flanders, Lance Landry,
and Jayson Roehl, assistants to Senator Allard; James P.
Dohoney, Jr., assistant to Senator Collins; Aleix Jarvis,
assistant to Senator Graham; Henry J. Steenstra, assistant to
Senator Dole; Aaron Scholer, assistant to Senator Lieberman;
William K. Sutey, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Eric
Pierce, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Andrew Shapiro,
assistant to Senator Clinton; and Terri Glaze and Walter Pryor,
assistants to Senator Pryor.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Warner. The committee meets this morning to
consider three very important nominations. Dr. Stephen A.
Cambone has been nominated by the President of the United
States to serve in the newly created position of Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. Mr. John Paul Woodley,
Jr., has been nominated by the President of the United States
to fill the position of Assistant Secretary of the Army for
Civil Works. Ambassador Linton F. Brooks has been nominated by
the President of the United States to serve in the position of
Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration
and Under Secretary for Nuclear Security at the Department of
Energy.
We welcome all of the nominees, and particularly families
and the younger members of the family who decided either on
their own or by persuasion to attend today. Thank you for
coming.
I remember so well coming before this committee so many
years ago that most of you were not on planet Earth----
[Laughter.]
--for my nomination proceeding to be in the Department of
Defense. I still have a yellowed piece of paper that was
printed up by the Senate recording the events of that day, and
hopefully we will have one to record these proceedings and to
reflect on the importance of your service to the country, and
the support that you get from your families to perform that
service.
I am going to omit going into a lot of material here, Mr.
Levin, which we will put in the record, but it recites the
distinct careers that each of these gentlemen have had. I will
defer to you now, Senator Levin, and then we will recognize our
colleague, Senator Allen.
[The prepared statement of Senator Warner follows:]

Prepared Statement by Senator John Warner

The committee meets this morning to consider three very important
nominations. Dr. Stephen A. Cambone has been nominated by the President
to serve in the newly-created position of Under Secretary of Defense
for Intelligence; John Paul Woodley, Jr., has been nominated to fill
the position of Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works; and
Ambassador Linton F. Brooks has been nominated to serve in the position
of Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration and
Under Secretary for Nuclear Security of the Department of Energy. We
welcome the nominees and their families.
Family support is critical to the success of individuals in senior
positions in our government, and we appreciate the support and
sacrifices of the families of these distinguished nominees.
I had the opportunity to meet with all of our nominees earlier this
week. I congratulate each of you on your impressive accomplishments and
your nomination by the President to these important positions.
Dr. Cambone, since your previous appearance before this committee
on June 27, 2001, and your subsequent Senate confirmation for the
position of Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the world has
changed dramatically. You have been a key advisor to the Secretary of
Defense, and instrumental in his determined effort to transform the
Department of Defense and the U.S. military to meet current and future
threats.
Your appointment in July 2002 as Director, Program Analysis and
Evaluation, clearly reflects the trust that Secretary Rumsfeld places
in you and the breadth of your knowledge and ability.
Your resume of achievements and positions held prior to returning
to the Department is impressive by any measure. Our Nation is fortunate
to have someone of your caliber willing to serve in this challenging
new position of Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, a position
that clearly reflects the growing importance of intelligence to our
military operations, and the vital need for total cooperation between
the military and our Nation's Intelligence Community.
Mr. Woodley has had a distinguished career in law and public
service, and presently is serving as Assistant Deputy Under Secretary
of Defense for the Environment. Prior to his appointment to this
position in October 2001, Mr. Woodley served the Commonwealth of
Virginia as Secretary of Natural Resources from January 1998 until
October 2001, and prior to that as Deputy Attorney General of Virginia
for Government Operations. Mr. Woodley is a Lieutenant Colonel in the
Army Reserve and served on active duty with the Army JAG Corps from
1979 until 1985 in Germany and the Pentagon. Mr. Woodley, you are well
known in the Commonwealth of Virginia. I am pleased to have you before
the committee.
Ambassador Brooks previously appeared before the committee on
October 11, 2001, for his nomination hearing for the position of Deputy
Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation of the National
Nuclear Security Administration. On July 9, 2002, the President
appointed him as Acting Administrator for this vitally important
agency.
Ambassador Brooks has had an extensive and distinguished career in
government service. He served as the Assistant Director for Strategic
and Nuclear Affairs at the United States Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, and in the State Department as Head of the United States
Delegation on Nuclear and Space Talks and Chief Strategic Arms
Reductions (START) Negotiator. Prior to that he served as Deputy Head
for the Delegation, holding the rank of Ambassador. Ambassador Brooks'
many accomplishments were built upon a foundation of a distinguished
30-year Navy career. He commanded the nuclear-powered attack submarine
U.S.S. Whale (SSN 638), and served at sea in destroyers, ballistic
missile submarines, and attack submarines, retiring with the rank of
captain.
The committee has asked our witnesses to answer a series of advance
policy questions. They have responded to those questions and our
standard questionnaire. Without objection, those responses will be made
a part of the record.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN

Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me very briefly
join you in welcoming our nominees and their families. They are
well-qualified for the positions to which they have been
nominated. I join you, Mr. Chairman, in thanking their families
for their commitment and service in standing behind these
nominees. There will be many times when they will not get home
in the evenings because of their work, and it is the families
that understand that kind of commitment to country, which your
loved ones are committed to, and we thank you for that. If they
do not get home too many evenings, it probably means that we
have been giving them too big a load, or that the Senate is in
the middle of a filibuster, one or the other.
But I join you, Mr. Chairman, in welcoming our nominees.
Senator Allen, I understand, will be introducing one of our
nominees. It is always great to see you here, Senator Allen.
Chairman Warner. In the course of that, either you, Senator
Allen, or Mr. Woodley, introduce the members of your family--
each of you kindly introduce the members of your family.
But reflecting on the sage observation of my very able and
good friend here, we have been together 25 years, side by side
here on this committee. While I have always admonished the
members of the Department of Defense--and I think the
Department of Energy is pretty much the same, all those
decisions made after about 7 o'clock at night are changed the
next morning, so go on home. [Laughter.]
Families, get them home. It is the way it worked when I was
there.
Senator Levin. Now, if we apply that to the Senate, we
would have been out of here last night at 7 o'clock instead of
2 o'clock in the morning. [Laughter.]
Chairman Warner. Senator Allen, your youthfulness and your
bright face is shining as if nothing occurred last night.
Senator Allen. Well, that is probably a pretty good
description of what happened last night. [Laughter.]
But thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner, Senator Levin,
for at least bringing a smile to a lot of tired faces around
here this morning. Thank you for holding this hearing.
Chairman Warner. Though I think in fairness to our
leadership, we would have to say that it was a matter of
principle felt strongly by both sides and manifested our
Constitutional responsibilities.
Senator Allen. That is right. We will keep fighting.
Senator Levin. Amen.
Chairman Warner. Amen.
Senator Allen. Amen. [Laughter.]
You do not know what you came into here, John Paul.
[Laughter.]

STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE ALLEN, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF
VIRGINIA

Senator Allen. I am here, Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, and
members of the committee, to present an individual who I know
very well. John Paul Woodley is a close friend. He is an
outstanding Virginian, and I think in listening to the opening
remarks, you will recognize he is an outstanding choice of the
President in his nomination to be Assistant Secretary of the
Army for Civil Works.
I have known and worked with John Paul Woodley for decades.
I have known him, and I will get into that, and I recommend him
to this committee with my highest recommendation and without
any reservation whatsoever.
His background as you go through it superbly qualifies him
for this position. You know the responsibilities of it. He
presently is serving as Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense, making him a principal advisor for all environmental,
safety, and occupational health policies and programs in the
Department of Defense.
Prior to his current position, Mr. Woodley served as
Cabinet Secretary for Governor Gilmore in Virginia, as
Secretary of Natural Resources.
I am proud to say that when I was governor, he was serving
in the Attorney General's office, particularly focusing on
government operations. Believe me, while he served in the
Attorney General's office, he served all the people of the
Commonwealth of Virginia in the government operations aspect.
There was much controversy from time to time. You needed
steady, trusted, expert, legal advice on how to do things
properly.
He is also an Army officer with 22 years of active and
Reserve service. He served in active duty in the U.S. Army
Judge Advocate General's Corps from 1979 to 1985. Mr. Woodley
holds the rank of lieutenant colonel in the Army Reserve, and
has been awarded the Army Achievement Medal, the Army
Commendation Medal, and the Meritorious Service Award.
He also practiced law prior to serving in the Attorney
General's office in Richmond. I will say that people regardless
of background, party, partisan affiliation all look at him as
very steady, considerate, and knowledgeable in all of his
examinations of the law and in the different approaches one
would take. I know he will just do an outstanding job for the
people of this country.
He is joined by his family here, his wife Priscilla, his
daughters, Elizabeth and Cornelia----
Chairman Warner. I wonder if they might stand as Senator
Allen introduces them.
Senator Allen. Priscilla and Elizabeth and Cornelia and
John Paul, and his father-in-law, Colonel Ingersoll, is here as
well. It is great to have you all here.
Chairman Warner. The colonel is from the class of 1944 at
West Point, and then he went into the Army Air Corps and
achieved goals which I would have liked to have achieved, but
never did, and probably never could. Thank you, sir.
Senator Allen. Thank you all. Thank you.
So he is backed by a wonderful family, and I can think of
very few public servants that do have such an outstanding
record of service and commitment to the people he is serving.
He is a trusted team player. He will leverage his experience
with environmental issues to make the U.S. Army Civil Works
program highly regarded in the preservation and the restoration
of America's natural resources.
So, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, it is my
pleasure to introduce to you all this exceptional nominee this
morning. I recommend him to you and, as swiftly as possible,
recommend his confirmation.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator Allen.
Senator Allen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. I would like to associate myself with your
remarks and say how proud we are from the Commonwealth of
Virginia for the many years of public service of this
distinguished gentleman and his family. We shall proceed,
hopefully, with that swiftness.
Senator Allen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If I may take
leave, I have to get to the Commerce Committee.
Chairman Warner. The senior Senator grants the junior
Senator leave of absence.
Senator Allen. All right, sir. [Laughter.]
Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
I am going to ask of our nominees now the standard
questions propounded by the chair of this committee over many
years to each of the nominees that come before us.
The committee has asked our witnesses to answer a series of
advance policy questions. They have responded to those
questions in our standard questionnaire. Without objection,
these responses will be made a part of today's record.
But before we hear from our witnesses, I have several
questions to ask of each. First, have you adhered to applicable
laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest?
Ambassador Brooks. Yes, sir.
Dr. Cambone. Yes, sir.
Mr. Woodley. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken
any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the
confirmation process?
Ambassador Brooks. I have not, sir, but I have been acting
in the position at the President's direction, and have taken
the decisions necessary in that status.
Mr. Woodley. No, sir.
Dr. Cambone. No, sir.
Chairman Warner. Will you ensure that in the event of
confirmation your staff complies with deadlines established for
requested communications, including prepared testimony and
questions for the record in the hearings before this committee?
Ambassador Brooks. Yes, sir.
Mr. Woodley. Yes, sir.
Dr. Cambone. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses
and briefers in response to congressional requests?
Ambassador Brooks. Yes, sir.
Dr. Cambone. Yes, sir.
Mr. Woodley. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. Will those witnesses be protected--and I
repeat--be protected from reprisal for their testimony or
briefings?
Ambassador Brooks. Yes, sir.
Dr. Cambone. Yes, sir.
Mr. Woodley. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. All right. Thank you. Now, why don't we
just start left to right? Ambassador Brooks, please make such
opening remarks as you desire. I understand that members of
your family were not able to join you today.
Ambassador Brooks. No, sir. But in everything I do, the
members of my family are with me.

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR LINTON F. BROOKS TO BE ADMINISTRATOR
FOR NUCLEAR SECURITY, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
AND UNDER SECRETARY FOR NUCLEAR SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Ambassador Brooks. Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, members of
the committee, I want to thank you for the opportunity to
appear today, but more for the strong support this committee
has always given our nuclear weapons program.
I am honored by the confidence President Bush has placed in
me in nominating me to lead the National Nuclear Security
Administration. Over the last 16 months, I have had the
opportunity to work closely with this committee as Deputy
Administrator for Nonproliferation, and if confirmed, I look
forward to continuing that association as administrator.
I want to take a few moments to review my background and
how that background will shape my approach to my
responsibilities, if confirmed.
I have over four decades of experience in national
security, much of it associated with nuclear weapons. I have
carried weapons on several ships. I have studied their
technology, and I have examined their effects. From this, I
have learned that their immense power demands immense care.
Thus the first conclusion I have reached as I consider my
potential new responsibilities is the utter importance of
safety, security, and reliability. If I am confirmed,
maintaining a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear stockpile will
be my highest priority.
I have also had the opportunity to serve in nuclear policy
positions in the White House, the State Department, the Navy,
and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. I have been
thinking and writing about nuclear matters for decades and that
has convinced me, as the President has made clear, that nuclear
weapons will remain a crucial component of American power
throughout our lifetime.
Thus, a second conclusion I have reached is that we must
plan for the long-term. This means paying attention to
infrastructure, to attracting and retaining excellent people,
to understanding the fundamental science that underlies nuclear
weapons, and to extending the lifetime of the stockpile. If I
am confirmed, these will also be priorities.
Like everybody with experience in national security, I have
always understood that physical security matters, but the
events of September 2001 drove that home in a horrifying way.
Along with many people in this room, I lost friends and
colleagues at the Pentagon.
But it could have been worse; it could have been nuclear.
Therefore, if confirmed, I will place priority on implementing
the agenda of the President and of Secretary of Energy Abraham
to improve the protection of highly-enriched uranium and
plutonium worldwide. I will place a priority on maintaining
effective security throughout the National Nuclear Security
Administration facilities in the face of what is almost
certainly a permanent transformation of a threat.
If the Senate confirms me, this will be my fourth
opportunity to serve in a confirmed position. My experience
with such positions is it is very easy to be consumed by the
urgency of the in-basket, and it is very difficult to think
about the future.
Thus another conclusion is the importance of consulting
widely, including with Members of Congress, to ensure that I am
doing my utmost to ensure long-term security and the long-term
health of the nuclear weapons complex. Finally, from every job
I have ever had, I have learned that people are what matter. My
final conclusion, therefore, is that if I am confirmed, I
should spend a great deal of time taking care of people.
In the near-term, this means making sure that the
reorganization we announced in December 2002 is implemented in
a way that gains the benefits of increased effectiveness while
ensuring fair and equitable treatment for individuals.
In the longer-term, it means sustaining a challenging and
rewarding working environment in order to retain and recruit
the kind of people that the nuclear weapons complex deserves.
In taking on the duties of Administrator of the National
Nuclear Security Administration, I am conscious that I am
assuming a great responsibility. I believe I am also being
given a great privilege. Not everybody gets a chance to make a
difference. Not everybody gets the chance to work to make the
world safer and the country more secure. Not everybody gets the
chance to use exciting technology for important national ends.
But the men and women of the National Nuclear Security
Administration do that every day.
If the Senate confirms me, I will do my utmost to ensure
that both they and I meet our responsibilities. Thank you for
your attention, and I look forward to your questions.
Chairman Warner. Thank you.
Dr. Cambone.

STATEMENT OF HON. STEPHEN A. CAMBONE TO BE UNDER SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE

Dr. Cambone. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the
committee. I would like to introduce the family that is here
with me. If I may, I would like to start with my sister
Catherine Brown, her husband Steve, and their daughters, Katie
and Megan Brown. I would also like to introduce my wife
Margaret, who is behind me here and my daughter Maria, who sits
immediately behind me.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, it is an honor to
appear before you as the President's nominee for the position
of Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. I am grateful
to the President for his consideration in placing my name
before you as the nominee for this new office within the
Department of Defense.
I would also like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator
Levin, and the members of this committee for your support in
the creation of this new office.
Mr. Chairman, we are a nation at war. It is a war different
in kind than any other in which our great Nation has engaged.
It is likely to persist for some time, but it is one that we
will win.
Now, experience thus far in that war has taught us
important lessons. One lesson which it seems we must learn anew
with each passing generation is that we will be surprised. As
the Secretary of Defense has remarked, ``The only thing that
should surprise us any longer is that anyone is surprised that
we are surprised.''
This truism is reflected in the President's request for the
creation of the Office of the Under Secretary for Intelligence.
If we know surprises await us, it is important that we do all
in our power to avert them, knowing we will not be completely
successful and preparing to mitigate their consequences when
those surprises do occur.
For the Department of Defense, this is a particularly
pressing task. The men and women, civilian and military, of the
Department have volunteered to defend the freedom of the
American people at the risk of their own lives.
The Secretary of Defense believes that the Department owes
it to them to have a senior official report to the Pentagon
each morning with only one task in mind, to ensure that they,
the men and women of the Department, have the intelligence and
intelligence-related support they need to avert those
surprises, to be prepared if they do occur, and to move swiftly
to respond when called upon to do so by the President.
That is the task, Mr. Chairman, of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Intelligence. To that end, if I am confirmed, I
will ensure that the components within the Department are, to
quote Title 10 of the U.S. Code, manned, trained, equipped, and
I might add organized, for this era of surprise.
The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence will also
ensure that the men and women of the Department have timely
access to the intelligence resident within the Intelligence
Community that can help them to: develop and acquire the weapon
systems that will sustain our military advantages over
potential adversaries; develop and implement defense strategies
and policies that will permit the Nation to adjust in a timely
fashion the posture and structure of our forces, the doctrine
of those forces, their deployment and employment; conduct
military operations by pitting our strengths against an
adversary's weaknesses and protecting ourselves against his
strengths--an especially difficult challenge against
adversaries that are not state actors, and then finally to
assist them in protecting on a day-to-day basis our people,
facilities, networks, and information from assault by foreign
and hostile espionage services.
Mr. Chairman, it is worth taking a moment to note that
which is not the task of this Under Secretary. It is not his
task to manage the collection, analysis, and dissemination of
intelligence. The Intelligence Community and its head, the
Director of Central Intelligence, are responsible for that
task.
Mr. Chairman, if confirmed, I am committed to working
closely with the senior leadership of the Department of
Defense, the directors of the intelligence components within
the Department, the Director of Central Intelligence, this
committee, and other interested committees of Congress in
executing the tasks that await the Under Secretary.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, let me thank you
again for your consideration. I am ready to answer any
questions you may have of me.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Dr. Cambone.
Mr. Woodley.

STATEMENT OF JOHN PAUL WOODLEY, JR., TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF THE ARMY FOR CIVIL WORKS

Mr. Woodley. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I want
first to express and acknowledge my deep gratitude to Senator
Allen for his words which are more kind than any public servant
could possibly in truth deserve, but I hope you will take them
at face value.
I also appreciate your kindness in acknowledging my family
members who have come to be with us on this important occasion.
I, too, am mindful of the confidence expressed in me by
President Bush and Secretary Rumsfeld in submitting my name in
nomination for this important post with the Department of the
Army.
The Army Corps of Engineers and its civil works function
encompassing navigation, flood control, water resource
development, and environmental improvement, has for 200 years
contributed greatly to the prosperity and well-being of our
Nation.
Mr. Chairman, in the committee's written questions and in
the course of my visits with many of you during the past few
weeks, the issue of the organization of the Corps of Engineers
and whether some of its missions and functions should be
privatized or shifted to other agencies of government has been
very prominent, so I think it would be appropriate for me to
make clear at the outset of this hearing what my views are on
the matter.
In Section 109 of the Omnibus Appropriations Act for 2003,
Congress has spoken with extraordinary clearness and directness
on this question. That section directs that the transfer of the
Corps of Engineers' missions and functions should not be
implemented or even studied without further direction by
Congress.
I do not have any plans or intentions that are inconsistent
with Section 109. If, in the future, I have ideas to improve
the operation of the Corps of Engineers' civil works function,
the Secretary of Defense has been clear on the need and
importance of consulting with Congress as an important first
step with respect to any such idea. I promise you full and open
communication and consultation.
I deeply appreciate the courtesy of the committee. If
confirmed, I look forward to working with the Chairman and all
members to address the vital navigation, flood control, water
resource, and environmental challenges of the Nation. Thank
you. I would also like to respond to questions.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
I am going to defer my question period, Senator Levin, to
our distinguished colleague from Maine who, as the Chair of the
Committee on Governmental Affairs, has to undergo other duties
shortly.
Senator Collins. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I do
very much appreciate your courtesy this morning. I do have to
chair a nomination hearing in the Committee on Governmental
Affairs, but I did have a couple of issues that I wanted to
raise. So thank you so much.
Mr. Woodley, first of all, congratulations on your
nomination. I think we are very fortunate to have someone with
your background willing to serve in this important capacity.
With an annual budget of approximately $5 billion, the civil
works projects of the Army Corps of Engineers not only have
important implications for the environment, but they are also
vital to the well-being and the safety of many of the
communities across our Nation.
I would like to direct your attention today to one such
community located in my home State of Maine, and I know my
staff has had some discussions with you about this.
Perhaps more than any other community in the Nation, the
safety and well-being of the people of Camp Ellis in Saco,
Maine, depend on successful action by the Army Corps of
Engineers. Unfortunately, it is also precisely because of the
Army Corps that the safety and well-being of the residents in
this area are in jeopardy.
Let me give you a little bit of background about this. Over
a century ago, the Army Corps built a jetty which extends out
into the Saco River adjacent to Camp Ellis Beach. It has long
been known by the residents of this area and was recently
confirmed by the Army Corps' own study, that this jetty has
altered the patterns of currents and sand deposition, and it is
the primary cause of what is truly devastating erosion in this
area that has been shown to have been caused by this jetty
constructed by the Army Corps over 100 years ago.
I want to give you some idea of the extent of the erosion.
We have made a poster which we have given you a smaller copy of
to demonstrate it, but more than 30 houses have been washed
into the sea during the last 100 years. The 1998 shoreline is
400 feet from where the shoreline stood in 1908.
[The information referred to follows:]

The houses that are now in danger were once six rows back
from the shore. I have toured this area and I have walked out
to the end of the jetty and it is an incredible sensation to
look out at these blue waters and realize that once that was
the site of roads, of houses, of city blocks, even of a
railroad track.
Now, recently the problem has taken on an even more dire
aspect. The beach and the dunes have retreated further and the
sea is advancing to such an extent that there is a distinct
possibility if there were a large storm that it would breach
the peninsula and Camp Ellis would turn into an island. That is
how devastating this situation is.
I apologize to my colleagues for taking so much time on
what is a parochial issue, but----
Chairman Warner. I acknowledge the Chair is fascinated.
Senator Collins. Good. [Laughter.]
Chairman Warner. I am saying to myself: Where was Margaret
Chase Smith? Where was Edmund Muskie? Where was William Cohen
on this issue? [Laughter.]
Senator Collins. Exactly. Well, I am coming to the rescue
now----
Chairman Warner. That is quite clear.
Senator Collins.--I hope, with the help of our nominee.
Chairman Warner. Quite clear.
Senator Collins. But the Corps has recognized the extent of
the erosion. The Corps has recognized it is a direct result of
this jetty, and the Corps has undertaken steps to mediate the
problem as a Section 111 project.
Now, the Senate has provided $350,000 in fiscal year 2002
for a study, an additional $1.2 million for fiscal year 2003 to
start construction. But unfortunately, the Corps has discovered
a flaw in its design, and it has now gone back to the drawing
board. It has raised questions about whether it can even
undertake the project.
So today I have two requests of you. The first is I want to
invite you, and you can bring your whole family, we will give
them lobster.
Chairman Warner. Can I come? [Laughter.]
Senator Collins. You can come too, Mr. Chairman, and the
ranking member can come.
I want to invite you to come tour this area, because until
you see it with your own eyes and see the devastation that has
occurred and see where houses once stood, and now the sea has
taken them, it is really difficult to imagine just how serious
this erosion is. So I think if you saw it with your own eyes
that it would be helpful.
Second, I would ask you to work with me and State and local
officials to solve this problem once and for all. The people
locally are very discouraged, because they thought they had an
agreement with the Corps to solve this problem, and now we seem
to be back to square one.
So I am not asking you to commit to a solution today, but I
am asking you to commit to helping us find a solution. I thank
the indulgence of the other committee members.
Mr. Woodley, could you respond?
Mr. Woodley. Yes, Senator, and thank you very much. I will
say that I think it is very important for government officials,
whether State or Federal, who are responsible for natural
resource management issues and policy to travel to these places
and see the land.
I was very proud as Secretary of Natural Resources where I
had oversight for our State parks that I was the first
Secretary of Natural Resources in Virginia to actually visit
each of our State parks, and we have some 35 in our system. It
took me a lot longer than I thought it would to actually get to
all of them. But it is critically important as you say to go
and see the ground and understand--and speak to the local
officials and understand the issue.
If confirmed, that would certainly be a part of my policy,
and a trip to Maine would be a very important part of that
endeavor.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I
do have some questions for the other witnesses, but I will
submit them for the record. I appreciate the indulgence of the
Chair. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. We thank our distinguished colleague very
much. It was quite an illuminating bit of history.
Senator Levin. I think Senator Collins has made quite a
dramatic presentation. I think we would all be interested in
your response to that problem as an indicator of how you are
going to respond to these kinds of important local issues. This
is more than a local issue obviously, since it involves a
national shoreline as well.
Mr. Woodley, let me start with you. There was a National
Academy of Sciences' recommendation that there be an
independent review of large-scale civil works projects proposed
by the Army Corps of Engineers, and the budget of the President
for the last 2 years has expressed support for that approach.
Will you commit, if confirmed, to ensure that independent
reviews are conducted for large-scale civil works projects
proposed by the Army Corps of Engineers?
Mr. Woodley. Yes, sir, I will.
Senator Levin. The Army Inspector General in November 2000
found that three Army Corps of Engineers officials had
manipulated data in a cost-benefit analysis in order to justify
a $1 billion project. Will you personally commit, if confirmed,
that you will work to ensure the integrity of the analyses
conducted by the Corps?
Mr. Woodley. Yes, sir, I will.
Senator Levin. Will you personally commit, if confirmed, to
comply with the letter and spirit of the Whistleblower
Protection Act, ensuring that professionals at all levels
within the Corps of Engineers are encouraged to do their jobs
to the best of their capacity without fear of retaliation or
harassment because their conclusions may not be what the
leadership of the Corps was looking for?
Mr. Woodley. Yes, sir, I will.
Senator Levin. Thank you.
Dr. Cambone, let me talk to you about your new position
here. Congratulations particularly on your appointment--
congratulations to all three of you, but since you are the
first, Dr. Cambone, to occupy this office, you get a special
note here this morning. You are really paving the way, and you
will set the tone for how that office functions in the future.
In October 2002, there was a story in the New York Times
that reported that a four- to five-person intelligence team had
been established by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
to search for information on Iraq, including its ties to
terrorist organizations.
The Deputy Secretary of Defense, Paul Wolfowitz, was quoted
as describing--here, I am quoting him--at least as quoted by
the New York Times, ``a phenomenon in intelligence work that
certain people who are pursuing a certain hypothesis will see
certain facts that others won't and not see certain facts that
others will.'' Then Mr. Wolfowitz said, ``The lens through
which you are looking for facts affects what you look for.''
Do you believe that different intelligence analysts look
through different lenses? Will your analysts, your people, look
through a different lens than the other Intelligence Community
as a whole?
Dr. Cambone. Sir, first the office, itself, is not being
structured to do analysis. That is to be done inside of the
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the CIA. It is the work
that is done by the National Security Agency (NSA) and the
National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA). What the staff of
the OUSD/I will do is inquire if there are questions that are
being raised by the Secretary, or other senior members of the
Department, about finished intelligence or even some of the
unfinished, if you will, intelligence that is received.
If there are differences between and among the Intelligence
Community analysts, if there are questions that senior DOD
officials would like to pursue with more vigor, this office
would facilitate that kind of activity, and press the questions
with the Intelligence Community as a whole, but it is not
intended to do the work itself.
On the question of whether different analysts see different
problems in different ways, I think the answer to that is: Yes,
they do. In part it has to do with their area of expertise. The
photo interpreters at NIMA see things differently than do the
analysts at NSA.
The key to the all-source intelligence product that is
delivered to the Department and other agencies of the
government is that under the direction of the Director of
Central Intelligence (DCI), those are all brought together as a
finished product. But in the end, asking questions about how
analysts arrived at those conclusions and what the sources of
the information were, I think, are the kinds of activities that
the customer ought to engage in because the customer of the
intelligence really does need to know something about that.
Those who are doing the analysis for them need to know what
issues the customers have in the back of their minds, and what
concerns they may have.
Senator Levin. People with different functions in the
intelligence world obviously are looking for information that
relates to their particular function, but the statement that
Mr. Wolfowitz made was that the Intelligence Community is
pursuing one hypothesis which the Defense Department
intelligence team is not pursuing. What hypothesis is that?
Give me an example.
He has not answered my letter I wrote him on November 19.
He has not responded to my letter, and I am determined the he
will respond to this letter. But what is the hypothesis that
that is----
Dr. Cambone. Yes, sir. I cannot speak for the Deputy, but
what I can reflect on is the issue of the hypothesis. That is,
I think, that it is often the case that, depending on the
question you ask, you tend to pursue a problem with a certain
set of assumptions that flow from that question and follow the
material that you have in front of you in light of the
questions that you have asked.
The value of having multiple individuals looking at
information is that many of them will ask a different question.
They will come to the information with a different question,
see different patterns, pursue different angles on a thought.
In the end, that information is brought together again for yet
another look, to ask ``Have we considered all the angles on
this question?''
Senator Levin. I do not think it is a question of different
individuals looking----
Dr. Cambone. Yes, sir.
Senator Levin.--but it is a question of whether the team,
the function of the intelligence team at the DOD has a
different function, a different hypothesis----
Dr. Cambone. Yes.
Senator Levin.--that is going to be pursued than the
Intelligence Community as a whole. Let me try to phrase it a
different way.
Critics have interpreted the establishment of the new
position that you have been appointed to as evidence of
Secretary Rumsfeld's contest with Director Tenet for dominance
over American intelligence operations. Others have stated that
Secretary Rumsfeld is creating another Director of Central
Intelligence for all practical purposes.
Now, I joined with Senator Warner in the creation of this
position, so that is not a view which I particularly hold or
that I hope will prove to be in any way accurate. But what is
your answer to those critics?
Dr. Cambone. Yes, sir. That is not the intent behind the
creation of the office. That is why in the opening remarks I
took a moment to say what this office is not. It is not an
office whose purpose is to do the work of or substitute for the
work of the DCI and the Intelligence Community as a whole.
To the extent that it will be engaged with the Director of
Central Intelligence, it will be through the Secretary of
Defense, who is the one responsible for all intelligence
matters within the Department.
It is designed to enable the DCI, in particular, when he
has needs that can be satisfied by the Department of Defense,
to enable us to respond with alacrity. There have been
occasions in the past--I am sorry to say--when that has not
always been the case. Why? It has been primarily bureaucratic
in character.
In the preparation for this hearing, when I sent around the
answers to the questions that the committee asked me to respond
to, it was 28 individuals to whom I had to send those questions
to even get a first level look at the answers. Had I gone
further, I probably would have been at 50 offices.
So within the Department of Defense we need to be able to
streamline our approaches to intelligence. We need to make sure
that we are able to respond with the timeliness and the
accuracy that the DCI needs, even as we need to do the same for
the combatant commanders.
So the office is meant to be a staff function for the
Secretary of Defense, much like his other offices within OSD,
to ensure that he, the Secretary of Defense, is able to execute
both his Title 10 and, unique to him, his Title 50
responsibilities under the U.S. Code.
Senator Levin. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Cambone, when I see you, I think quite often that
things really do work out for the better, even though we go
through times when we are not too certain of it, and you know
what I am talking about.
Dr. Cambone. Thank you very much.
Senator Inhofe. I can remember--and I have to say that I
believe I was wrong initially when we were going--I know you
are not in the program analysis and evaluation (PA&E) business
anymore, and this has nothing to do with your new position. But
I do think that when we had to redo this thing, it--with the
goal of still giving our kids adequate cover by 2008, by giving
it a capability that they do not have today, and still having
it work out with the future combat system, using the----
Dr. Cambone. Yes.
Senator Inhofe. I think it had a happy ending. I feel good
about that. I would assume you would agree with that.
Dr. Cambone. Yes, sir, I do.
Senator Inhofe. Let me just ask you this question. I have a
quote from you. You said, ``The single most important action
will be to rely on and appoint individuals from throughout the
DOD and Intelligence Community who are highly skilled and
experienced in intelligence, and in intelligence resource
management and acquisition, operations, and policy to positions
of responsibility and authority.''
Do you think we should have had somebody who has that
background more than a background of consuming intelligence?
Dr. Cambone. Consuming--that is a fair question, sir.
Senator Inhofe. Yes.
Dr. Cambone. My answer is no. Let me first say why I said
what I said about those positions. The purpose of the office
is, as I said, to assist the Secretary in the execution of his
responsibilities. The Intelligence Community is a broad and
diverse place. In order, therefore, to get the best advice to
the Secretary and the other senior management in the
Department, I thought it was important that we have people who
are skilled in working within that community, so that is one
half of the problem is managing.
The other half, of course, of the problem is leadership.
Management and leadership are not quite the same.
I think it is important that the head of each of the Under
Secretary components in the Department share the kinds of
objectives for the remaking, the modeling of those activities
over which they have been given responsibility. So that is one
reason.
Second, to go back to this issue of the consumer, the
consumer plays a very important role in--I think, in the work
of the intelligence communities. To the extent that the
consumer is interested, pays attention, follows up on
questions, and gives credit when it is due, and criticism when
it is appropriate, that makes both the consumer and the
producer of the intelligence better. If both are better, then
we will all be better.
Senator Inhofe. I think that is an excellent answer, and I
think you would do an excellent job in this position.
Mr. Woodley, there is an issue that apparently is not a
current issue, but it was discussed. That is the proposal to
divest the Army Corps of Engineers. If that were an issue
today, what would your feelings be?
Mr. Woodley. Senator, my feelings on that would be that
Congress has spoken on that issue in, I believe, it is Section
109 of the Appropriations Act. I have no views, plans, or
intentions in any way that are contrary to that provision of
law.
Senator Inhofe. Of course, we would, in that section, we
know it is not going to happen in this fiscal year, but it
could happen in the future. I was just wondering if you had any
opinions on that, should it come up.
Mr. Woodley. No, sir. The only opinion I have with respect
to that is that that is something that would have to be
presented to Congress, if it----
Senator Inhofe. Yes. It does have to come for congressional
approval.
Mr. Woodley. If a proposal came forward----
Senator Inhofe. That is true. Now, one of the things that
we will be talking about--and it affects not just my State or
Arkansas and the other States, and that is the 9- versus 12-
foot channel issue. We have already talked about that. I would
hope that we will be able to stay together on that so we can
use that capacity and use it very effectively. Do you have any
thoughts about your 12-foot channel?
Mr. Woodley. No, sir. That is not an issue that I have
studied or had any opportunity to develop views on, but I would
certainly want to consult with you on that as we proceed to
manage and develop those water resources and navigation.
Senator Inhofe. Ambassador Brooks, you and I have visited.
I appreciate very much your giving me your time coming by the
office.
I think we have talked about this over the years, our
concern over the reliability of the stockpile without testing.
In a recent NPR interview, you mentioned the age of the United
States plutonium is the oldest that has ever existed and its
characteristics change with age. What is your comfort level in
terms of the reliability, and at what point will testing have
to come into play?
Ambassador Brooks. I am very comfortable about the
reliability of the stockpile today. We have a number of
mechanisms including independent looks by the two national
laboratories, a body that advises the commander of the U.S.
Strategic Command, so I am completely comfortable with the
reliability of the stockpile today.
The farther you go in the future, the less dogmatic I am
willing to be. I do not see any specific time when testing is
likely to be required, but because I cannot be sure, I think it
is important that we maintain the capability to test, if
necessary, to either confirm or correct a problem with a
significant weapon in the stockpile.
Senator Inhofe. I assume that during your term of service
in this position that you will readily come and advise us as
time goes by as to that reliability?
Ambassador Brooks. Absolutely, sir.
Senator Inhofe. Fine. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. If I might ask, Senator, that is a key
exchange of question and reply. But I am not sure, though I
listened very carefully: Were you referring to the testing that
will be provided by the stockpile, what we call that system----
Ambassador Brooks. Stockpile stewardship, sir.
Chairman Warner.--stewardship, or returning to an actual
testing?
Ambassador Brooks. I am referring to the continued
reliability and how sure we can have it without continually
testing.
Chairman Warner. The actual testing?
Ambassador Brooks. Actual testing.
Chairman Warner. It is the word ``actual,'' I think that
should be----
Ambassador Brooks. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner.--put in the record to clarify it exactly.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you for the clarification.
Chairman Warner. That was my understanding of this
important colloquy, but I believed it would be helpful to me
and maybe others to follow it, to put something in on that.
Ambassador Brooks. Certainly, Mr. Chairman. In my reply, I
was using the word ``testing'' to mean underground nuclear
testing with a nuclear explosion.
Chairman Warner. Which currently the United States is not
doing.
Ambassador Brooks. Which currently we do not do. We do a
vast amount of testing of components----
Chairman Warner. Right.
Ambassador Brooks.--and of systems. That continues, and
must continue.
Senator Inhofe. But when this restriction was first placed
on it, you and I remember----
Chairman Warner. Oh, yes.
Senator Inhofe.--questioning, at what point are we taking a
risk? That is what we are getting at. Thank you very much.
Chairman Warner. I think that is important. I intend to
return to this when I start my own questioning. But I want to
accommodate the members who are coming and going.
Senator Ben Nelson.
Senator Ben Nelson. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to
all of you today for being here before us.
For Dr. Cambone, it is a welcome back.
Dr. Cambone. Thank you, sir.
Senator Ben Nelson. I think it is the hope of the committee
that the position that you have been nominated for will greatly
improve the intelligence-gathering capabilities of the
Department and enhance our national security.
Ambassador Brooks and Mr. Woodley, I apologize for having
to cancel the planned office calls due to my attendance at
President Roh's inauguration in South Korea. I appreciate your
willingness to engage with all of the members of the committee
on this, on the occasion of your potential positions.
Ambassador Brooks, 2 years ago when General Gordon
testified before the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, I
inquired about some cuts that the administration's fiscal year
2002 budget would make to the Department of Energy's
nonproliferation programs. I was concerned because they were
cuts of approximately $400 million, and that included the
Material Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A), our
accounting program, which improves the physical security at
Russian nuclear weapons facilities, and that was cut by $31
million; and the nuclear cities initiative, a program to assist
the Russian weapon scientists' transition to commercial
positions, was cut by $20 million.
Now, having said that, I would like to begin by
complimenting you and the Department of Energy for requesting a
30 percent increase now over last year's budget for nuclear
nonproliferation programs. The fiscal year 2004 budget of $1.3
billion is the largest in history for these programs. As far as
I am concerned, it is some of the best money that we can spend
for the protection of the world, but particularly for the
protection of our own people.
My question is with regard to strategic command at Offutt
Air Force Base in Nebraska. Obviously, it relies heavily on
NNSA's ability to ensure the safety and reliability of this
Nation's stockpile. Since 1992, explosive tests have not been
conducted, which NNSA has stated are not needed at this time
but, instead, the lengthy and tedious process of disassembly
and inspection, has been conducted to include refurbishment.
The development of improved surveillance modeling and
simulation tools show signs that earlier reliability
assessments were maybe overly optimistic.
Given that, is our ability to conduct inspections and
perform refurbishment in jeopardy at the current funding rate?
Have we put in enough money to be able to conduct these
inspections and perform refurbishment at this time?
Ambassador Brooks. Senator, I believe we have. The budget
that the President submitted has, in addition to the
substantial increase in nuclear nonproliferation, a substantial
increase in the weapons program work as well.
I think there are several parts to this. One is to continue
to develop the extremely high-tech tools like the National
Ignition Facility, the Dual Access Hydro Radiography Facility,
that will allow us to understand these very complex physical
phenomenon without nuclear explosions. The second part is to
improve our modeling capability through the Advanced Simulation
and Computing Program. Both of those programs are well funded
and proceeding well.
Then, as you correctly note, we have a routine surveillance
program, and that program is not being hampered by funds or by
anything else. So I do not now believe that there are
significant reliability issues with the stockpile. I do not now
see a need to resume underground nuclear testing in the
immediate future.
But as I said in response to a question from one of your
colleagues, I think no one can predict the future with enough
certainty to know that you will never need that. That is why I
believe the test readiness at the Nevada test site needs to
continue to be maintained.
Senator Ben Nelson. But you think at the present time,
regardless of what may happen in the future, we are okay?
Ambassador Brooks. Yes, sir.
Senator Ben Nelson. All right.
Ambassador Brooks. There is probably no single issue which
we devote more intellectual talent to than making sure that the
statement I just made is true.
Senator Ben Nelson. Now, if asked to dismantle and
disassemble warheads to a level of, I think, 1,700 by 2012, do
you think that the budget is sufficient to handle that, at
least at the present time?
Ambassador Brooks. The agreement under the Treaty of Moscow
refers to deployed nuclear warheads. The disposition of all of
those, that is whether they will be retained as part of the so-
called Responsive Force, or dismantled, that decision has not
been made. The approach that we take to dismantlement which
takes place at our Pantex facility in Amarillo, Texas, is a
level funding or a level effort approach. So we use
dismantlement to keep the workforce steady in between life
extensions.
If I had a massive requirement by 2012 to do more
dismantlement, then I think we would need to take a look. It
might not be a money question. It might actually be----
Senator Ben Nelson. Capacity to do it.
Ambassador Brooks.--yes, a capacity question. But our
approach to dismantlement is to treat it, essentially, as an
industrial process and do it in an efficient way while giving
greater priority to the life extension of the active stockpile.
Senator Ben Nelson. I thank you, Ambassador. My time has
expired.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
I see Senator Clinton has joined us. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Clinton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Woodley, I understand your nomination will also be
considered by the Environment and Public Works Committee on
which I serve. I hope you will forgive me if I focus my
attention today on the other two nominees. I will look forward
to having the opportunity to discuss issues with you before the
EPW Committee.
Mr. Woodley. Yes, Senator.
Senator Clinton. Ambassador Brooks, much of the Nation's
work in counter-terrorism will be, as I understand it, managed
and funded by the newly established Department of Homeland
Security (DHS). The Department of Energy and the National
Nuclear Security Administration have led discussions to
establish a joint sponsorship agreement with DHS, and they have
identified five DOE labs that will directly support homeland
security and have special relationships with the DHS.
At this time, the list of labs includes Lawrence Livermore,
Sandia, Los Alamos, Pacific Northwest, and Oak Ridge. After
several discussions with the principals involved, it appears
unlikely that this list will include Brookhaven as one of the
designated key laboratories, even though Brookhaven's
capabilities are important and relevant to the technology
development mission of the DHS. I am concerned about this
refusal to consider Brookhaven as one of the special labs. It
is clearly a critical facility that is performing an
extraordinary amount of high level and essential work that I
believe is directly relevant to the needs of homeland security
and national security.
So my question is: What are you doing to ensure that the
capabilities of all of the DOE labs are brought to bear on
these problems? What about the role of Brookhaven? Is it
possible that Brookhaven could now or in the future be included
as a key DOE laboratory in the area of homeland security?
Ambassador Brooks. Senator, the precise answer to the last
part of your question, I am going to have to refer to my
colleagues at the Department of Homeland Security. But let me
make a couple of comments about how we got here.
First of all, I do not want anything that anybody in our
Department or Homeland Security has done or said to be taken as
some indictment of Brookhaven. Brookhaven has been supporting
our nonproliferation programs, my former responsibility, and
Brookhaven supports our radiological assistance program, which
is part of our emergency management area. When we began
discussions with the Department of Homeland Security, we were
primarily focused on the particular programs that or for which
responsibility is being transferred.
Those programs are all of our chemical and biological
programs, which will be transferred to the new department on
Monday, and our nuclear smuggling program. In those particular
programs, Brookhaven has not played a particularly large role.
So our focus in our initial discussions with the Department of
Homeland Security has been on the seamless transfer of ongoing
programs.
I do not believe that there is any intent to exclude from
future consideration Brookhaven or the other Department of
Energy national laboratories. But we are--our initial focus
was, as I say, on the laboratories which had ongoing programs.
I will be--and the agreement that we are working on with the
Department of Homeland Security would not preclude involvement
of other national laboratories. I will be glad to carry your
concern specifically to my Homeland Security colleagues.
Senator Clinton. I really appreciate that, Ambassador. In
part I do because I think potential for radiological attacks is
as important and maybe even more likely, in some instances,
than chemical and biological given the ease of putting together
a dirty bomb and then, of course, other nuclear terrorist
potential as well.
So I think there are some artificial lines that might be in
the process of being drawn that I am not sure are going to make
that sort of seamless transfer and the integration of the
issues in DHS as smooth as they could be.
But, Ambassador, I also would like to ask: In response to
the committee's policy questions, you state that you favor
securing, accounting for, and disposing of weapons-usable
nuclear material beyond the former Soviet Union, but that the
countries typically identified for such assistance such as
India, Pakistan, and China have thus far shown no interest in
U.S. assistance. Are there other nations that you believe could
benefit from expanded nonproliferation programs? Second, do you
think we are devoting enough resources to securing, accounting
for, and disposing of nuclear material in the former Soviet
Union?
Ambassador Brooks. The second one is easy: Yes. We are not
now in the former Soviet Union limited by money. We are limited
by the ability of a somewhat cumbersome and bureaucratic
Russian system to absorb assistance. So there is no question
that right now the resources that Congress has provided in
2002, 2003, and that I hope will be provided in 2004, are more
than adequate.
With respect to other countries, the principal area that we
need to focus on is research reactors that use highly-enriched
uranium fuel. The notion here is to try and get those converted
so that they do not need highly-enriched uranium, and then get
the highly-enriched uranium fuel which is, by definition,
suitable for weapons use, back. You saw that in the operation
that the State Department and we and others led in Yugoslavia.
We are working those discussions in other countries. I would
like to be a little nonspecific about where we are talking.
Senator Clinton. That is fine.
Ambassador Brooks. I think that is the biggest area. Most
of the highly-enriched uranium--there are a lot of reactors
everywhere, but they use low enriched uranium of much less
concern. Most of the highly-enriched uranium in the world is in
the countries you have mentioned or in countries of Western
Europe where you have--we are always in discussion with our
friends about how to improve security. But the issues are of a
whole different level. They have the knowledge and the
resources. So I do not think that there is a large unmet need,
except in the countries that I referred to in my statement.
Cooperative programs require----
Senator Clinton. Cooperation.
Ambassador Brooks.--cooperation.
Senator Clinton. I might want to follow up in a non-public
hearing on some of the others.
Ambassador Brooks. I would welcome that opportunity, ma'am.
Senator Clinton. If I could, Mr. Chairman, I wanted to ask
Dr. Cambone, based on your answers to the policy questions, you
state that with much of our military based inside the United
States and our role in protecting the Nation, there are likely
to be many areas of common concern and potentially coordinated
action with the Department of Homeland Security.
When George Tenet appeared before this committee 2 weeks
ago, I asked him about the need to ensure that the new
Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) directs proper
intelligence to local and State law enforcement agencies. This
is one of our continuing problems, and it is something that I
am sure will never be resolved satisfactorily to all parties
involved. But nevertheless, it is important that we have as
clear an idea as possible about the type of intelligence, about
the type of threats within our country that you will be sharing
with the TTIC, and how that intelligence will flow to local
officials.
If you could, would you briefly describe the state of play
and the thinking about how that is going to work?
Dr. Cambone. Yes, I would. There are two, at least two
dimensions in which the Department will interact at the State
and local level. One has to do with the relationship of the
base commanders, they in turn working through the command that
we set up in Northern Command, will do what is called
antiterrorism force protection activities; that is, the
physical security of the installations.
That implies an interaction with the local authorities that
assure that communications are properly done, information is
shared. If there are people who are observed outside the fences
of these installations, that information is often shared. Daily
there are reports on the sharing of information between our
people and the law enforcement people in the communities.
The TTIC, as it is called, is designed to enable the flow
of broader information, intelligence, data, back out to those
who need it, to include local and State officials. The key to
this is going to be--and I must say it is in its very early
stages, and I have not been involved in the detail of its
construction to separate the information from the sources of
the information. That is something that we need to learn to do.
It is unfortunate that we oftentimes lend the credibility
of the information to the source. So, therefore, you tend to
send the sourcing along with the information as a way of
validating the information. But once you have done that, of
course, you cannot disseminate the information very far because
you put the source at risk. So one of the interesting cultural
changes we are about to undergo, and have begun is to separate
the collection from the analysis. If we can learn to do that,
and they are struggling to learn to do it, I think then that
flow of information will be a lot easier.
Now, that all has to be coordinated through Governor
Ridge's people at the Department of Homeland Security. They are
the ones who are charged with the lead. But the Secretary has
made it plain that we are to be very active in this effort.
Senator Clinton. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
The Chair is going to remain throughout the hearing,
obviously, so if I can accommodate other Senators. I will ask a
few questions now, and then we will go through another round.
This will be my first opportunity.
First, Dr. Cambone, Senator Levin in his questions
correctly asked about concerns raised by some that the position
for which you are recommended has been viewed by some as a
challenge to the DCI. I think we ought to have in the record
the views of Director Tenet. I think it is important that if
you know them, just to articulate and summarize them.
Dr. Cambone. I do not have with me the detail of his
statement to you. But it came in broadly in two directions in
my conversations with the DCI, so let me talk there: First, it
will enable his community management staff and others within
the Intelligence Community, essentially to have a single point
of reference with the Department for the purposes both of
aiding and assisting the Intelligence Community in its
activities and to better enable the collection of intelligence
and the management of the intelligence agencies within the
Department.
The second is, if you will, a more technical issue of
concern to the DCI, but one that we are attentive to. That is a
better association between the, if you will, lower level
tactical intelligence collection that is done by the Department
of Defense with aircraft, J-STARS, AWACS, the P-3s. There is an
awful lot of information that we collect as an ordinary part of
our everyday activity that does not seem to find its way back
into the collective Intelligence Community.
One of the things we need to do is to assure that that
takes place, because there is a great deal of valuable
information there for the national community that they do not
oftentimes have access to.
So I think the DCI is keen on getting that part of the
relationship better established, in order that when he sits
down to think about the national foreign intelligence program,
he can better calibrate what it is he needs, where he is likely
to get support from Defense and, therefore, how he can better
distribute his resources which are always finite, over the wide
array of concerns and problems that he faces every day.
Lastly, there is a relationship that has been long
established between the Director of Central Intelligence and
the Secretary of Defense, in which they meet in an executive
committee arrangement. The Department of Defense has not had
the proper staffing functions within it to implement the
decisions that are taken there. So the Secretary of Defense is
compelled to make a series of telephone calls after a meeting
to assure that things happen, whereas Mr. Tenet returns home
and turns to his director of community management.
So the Secretary of Defense now will have within the
Department a staff organization that can receive those
decisions and get them implemented and move us in the direction
we need to go.
So I think those are, in my conversations with Mr. Tenet,
the kinds of advantages that he expects to see coming from
this.
Chairman Warner. What will be the exact relationship
between your post and the defense intelligence agencies?
Dr. Cambone. There are within the Department of Defense a
number of intelligence agencies, to include the DIA, the
National Imagery and Mapping Agency, the National Security
Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office. They, being with
the Department of Defense, are subject to the Secretary's
guidance and authority but they are, at the same time, elements
of the national Intelligence Community, and so they are in that
capacity responsive to the Director of Central Intelligence.
When they are operating with the Department of Defense and
particularly as we are now at war, those agencies serve as
combat support agencies. They actually send people to the
combatant commands where they supply them with the daily
information that is needed for those combatant commanders to
execute their missions.
So the expectation of the Secretary is that this Under
Secretary will assure that those agencies, when operating as
combat support agencies, are making full use of the information
that is available, that they get to the combatant commanders
the information that they need, that they get it to them in a
format that is useful, that encourages the attention to what we
in the Department have taken to calling ``predictive
intelligence.''
Most intelligence work--I am sorry Senator Levin is not
here, because this is one of those differences in perspective--
has historically been trying to pick needles out of haystacks.
I mean, you tend to look at the haystack and you turn it around
and you wonder if there is anything in there that is important.
Or you know there is a needle in there, and you try to go and
find it.
What we are trying to get to is the point where we can move
information and intelligence rapidly enough that our combatant
commanders can begin to predict how a battle might unfold, what
an adversary may do in order that our combatant commanders can
be in a position to thwart those actions and to overwhelm the
enemy. So in a combat support role, there are those kinds of
changes in emphasis and approach that need to be done.
In terms of the contribution of these agencies to the
national community, I think he expects that through this
office, we will be able to give to the DCI a coherent
understanding of what we believe in the Department is going to
be necessary in the way of technical capability, manning, the
skill sets of the members of those defense agencies, in order
to be able to support the things that we do, and then--that is
one; and two, then, to rationalize those recommendations by the
Department of Defense for a particular kind of signals
intelligence capability, for example, over against those things
that the DCI knows that he will need in order to be able to
execute the missions that he has.
So there is a rationalization process, a distribution of
resources then that has to be undertaken. So those are the
kinds of functions that will be done by this Under Secretary
relative to those defense intelligence agencies which are
within the Department.
Chairman Warner. Their reporting chain, the directors of
the defense intelligence agencies, will they report through you
to the Secretary, or how will that chain go?
Dr. Cambone. They report to the Secretary of Defense, sir.
Chairman Warner. So there is no chain broken there.
Dr. Cambone. Not in the way that you are suggesting, which
is that the chain of command would alter. As combat support
agencies, the chain of command goes from the President to the
Secretary to the Commander. The role for the Under Secretary is
again to facilitate that activity. It is to make sure that on a
day-to-day basis that communication is kept up, that the
opportunities or interaction between the two are maintained,
and to do the kind of staff functions that are necessary to
ensure the smooth functioning of those organizations and their
relationship with the Secretary.
Chairman Warner. Thank you. I will return with further
questions.
Mr. Woodley, it is essential that the President fully
utilize all resources available for homeland defense and the
war on terrorism. The Corps historically has played an
important role in protecting the Nation's navigable waterways.
What are your views about the Corps and how they might enhance
their approach to the mission of that infrastructure?
I just want to further amplify this question.
I am sure that you are pleased that Ann Loomis is here
today. She has been my chief of legislation for a number of
years and has established an extraordinary, incredible
reputation in the field in which you are about to enter,
hopefully, with confirmation. I am going to read a little
document that I asked her just a few minutes ago to prepare for
me.
The maintenance of our Nation's navigable channels at major
ports is critical to moving American goods and agricultural
projects around the world. These channels with sufficient
depths are also critical for ensuring the movement of our Armed
Forces.
So my point is that the Corps' civil works mission is also
essential to our military preparedness, or responsiveness and,
indeed, America's economy. For example, today in the Hampton
Roads Channel, carrier battle group departures on return to the
Norfolk Naval Base depend on the high tide and coordination
with the scheduled commercial vessels.
What are your views on the Corps' navigation mission and
its relationship between the military requirements as well as
our economic requirements?
Give me a short answer because this is going to require you
to develop a longer response for the record.
Mr. Woodley. I am glad you mentioned the Port of Hampton
Roads because----
Chairman Warner. There was no doubt that that was going to
be mentioned in the course of this day. [Laughter.]
Mr. Woodley. You are aware of the work we have done and the
Commonwealth, and the Governor of the Commonwealth to ensure
the viability of that port as a national security asset and as
a commercial and trade asset. I believe it is and will remain
one of the premiere port and transportation intermodal
facilities on the east coast.
To the extent that the Corps of Engineers has a role, and I
know very well that it has a great role, then the Corps of
Engineers will continue to maintain that function and find ways
to enhance it as it has in the past. I think it is a shining
example of the ways in which the Corps of Engineers has
contributed for 200 years to the security and well-being of our
Nation.
Chairman Warner. Now, for Ambassador Brooks. Where today do
you see the stockpile stewardship program? I have followed this
issue for these many years that I have been privileged to be
here. The amount of funds that have gone into that are
absolutely enormous. Where are we today on that curve between,
of course, the start-up of that project, and where it has
gotten to where it is first beginning to give us some results
and where it is contemplated it will finally reach its plateau
so that, hopefully, it more than fully provides the facts that
were once provided by actual testing?
Ambassador Brooks. Mr. Chairman, we are, I think, on
schedule. The Nuclear Ignition Facility, which is one of the
big tools, will actually start performing experiments that are
directly relevant to the stockpile next year. We continue, of
course, with a robust program of sub-critical experiments.
I had the opportunity to tour the Atlas and Jasper
facilities in Nevada about 3 weeks ago. The progress there is
good. We are moving steadily along in understanding the use of
these very large-scale computers, and beginning to do
calculations that are directly relevant to the stockpile
stewardship program there.
Some of these programs, however, are not going to
ultimately be finished until the end of the decade. The
approach used for the National Ignition Facility, for example,
which ultimately will have 196 beams, is to start doing
experiments when you have enough beams to do them, but we will
not be ready for the full experiments until later in the
decade. I think that we will see over the next several years
more and more data coming out from these programs which will
increase our overall confidence in the stockpile. So I am
confident that the program is on schedule. At the moment, we do
not have any particular problems with the program. I mean,
these are large, complex projects so there are always issues.
Chairman Warner. It is awesome, the amount of computers
involved. Try once again to show me: Where are we on the curve
between start-up of this program many years ago, and the
projected date at which it has reached its full capacity to
provide the facts necessary to give verification to the
reliability of our stockpile?
Ambassador Brooks. I am not absolutely sure that I can give
you a meaningful point using that analogy. I think we are
several years away from having all of the tools that we believe
are necessary completed. I think we are on the schedule that we
expected.
I would be wary of misleading you if I tried to say that we
have 70 percent of the date, sir. I would be happy to give you
a more considered response for the record. But I do not--these
are extraordinarily important things----
Chairman Warner. Please think it through because----
Ambassador Brooks.--and I do not want to shoot from the
hip.
Chairman Warner. Yes. To the layman, there is an assumption
out there that our stockpile is credible. Our President
periodically makes public his determination that it is credible
through the reports that you and others provide. But given that
the program that we have deemed the national nuclear stockpile
stewardship program was yet to be completed, there comes a time
when the aging process of just the raw materials and hand-made
weapons themselves, that it crosses a line that we have to make
that difficult decision: Had we better not quickly go to the
actual testing until the stockpile has fully reached its
optimal point?
Ambassador Brooks. I think the right way, or the way I
think of it at least, is that you use all of the tools that you
have.
Chairman Warner. Right now we do not have the tools.
Ambassador Brooks. We do not have all of the tools yet that
we are going to have. But all of the tools that we do have and
all of the scientific judgment that we have and all of the data
that we have tells us that the stockpile is currently reliable.
Chairman Warner. I am not trying to impugn in any way your
clear statement to that effect in the hearing.
Ambassador Brooks. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. I am looking out in the out-years. You
have said I think in response to a very good question by
Senator Inhofe that: ``There may come a time when I have to
come to the Congress of the United States and advise you of the
progress or lack of progress of the stewardship program,''
because of difficulty of overcoming the most complex of
challenges technically. We better resort temporarily to some
testing to make sure we are going to be all right.
Ambassador Brooks. Yes, sir. What I am trying to portray to
you is a little bit of a race. As the uncertainties broaden
because we are farther and farther from actual testing, so the
capability of the tools increases. Assuming that we keep the
capabilities of the tools and the laws of physics do not just
actually surprise us, then I think we will continue to have
confidence for the foreseeable future that we do not need to
test.
But I do want to make the point that the history of the
nuclear weapons program is replete with physical facts that we
did not know until we knew them.
Chairman Warner. Right.
Ambassador Brooks. So if something comes up, then we could
be in trouble sooner, but I do not see it right now.
Chairman Warner. All right. We are going to ask for Senator
Levin to take another round.
Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Cambone, I want to go back to this intelligence team
that has been established by the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy to find out: What is the relationship between that team
and your new office; as well as asking, I guess, the more
fundamental question as to whether it is appropriate for that
kind of intelligence analysis to be performed by personnel
outside of the intelligence agencies whose job it is to perform
the analysis? Why are we having an intelligence analysis
capability in a policy shop?
Dr. Cambone. I will tell you what I understand of it. That
is that there were a series of reports that had been produced
by one or another of the various groups, intelligence agencies
throughout the government. The Under Secretary for Policy
wanted to take them and array them and ask, ``What do they say?
Let us look at all of them,'' and then compare the information
and the analysis in those reports against the kind of
information that is provided to him, by the way, on a routine
basis. He is a consumer of unfinished intelligence. He is
briefed every morning by the intelligence agencies.
So as a knowledgeable consumer, he then put together a
handful of people to assist him in going through that
information. They were not--in the way that one might use the
term ``technically,'' they were not intelligence analysts. Two
of them, I believe, have had experience in the Intelligence
Community. I do not remember their status. I think one was
retired, and one had moved on from that position. Then there
were one or two others who were assisting them with the
paperwork. It was a way of putting together a better
understanding for the Under Secretary about what all of this
information meant.
Having gone through that drill, they then went out and met
with the analysts at the agency and sat down and talked through
with them sort of on: Where did the information come from? What
is the meaning if we express it this way as opposed to that
way? Does this information square with what you had?
It is my experience more than once that analysts on the
same subject in different parts of an agency do not have the
same information.
That conversation went on for the better part of an hour or
two, and they left, again from my understanding, with an
appreciation on the part of the analysts at the agency for
their interest and their perspective on the data and the
information. Now, did they in the end agree on all of the
particulars? Again, having not been part of it, I do not know.
I can almost assure you, however, that the answer is no, they
did not agree on all of the particulars.
Senator Levin. I am trying to figure out: What is the role
of that group compared to what you are going to be doing now?
Dr. Cambone. I wanted to get that square first.
The second is that they would not be a part of--that group
as it was constituted would not have been--let me back up. If
there had been a desire by the Under Secretary for Policy for a
closer look at some of the information that had been provided,
I would expect, once this office stands up and if I am
confirmed by the Senate, that he would come to me and say,
``Can we take a closer look at this? What is the view across
the broader Intelligence Community activity? Why are they
thinking these things?'' Then we would, as I said earlier,
facilitate that kind of conversation.
Senator Levin. Which means it is really the role of your
office?
Dr. Cambone. I think in the end that will be true. But I do
not want to----
Senator Levin. Are his handful of folks going to stay in
place?
Dr. Cambone. I do not know that, sir. If you mean will they
be--is he going to keep that function going when--I do not know
the answer to that.
Senator Levin. He is going to ask you to perform it,
hopefully?
Dr. Cambone. I would hope so. I think that is the intent,
sir.
Senator Levin. I guess we will have to ask him. But I think
we should ask for the record, to avoid any kind of sloppiness
and duplication, fuzziness, lack of accountability, that we ask
that question of Mr. Feith.
Chairman Warner. I support you in that because it sounds
like he would come and task you with responding to his need.
Dr. Cambone. I would think that would be the way that it
would work.
Chairman Warner. We ought to have that clarified, and the
Senator is correct.
Senator Levin. We could ask Mr. Feith.
Dr. Cambone. But I do want to underscore, Senator Levin,
that all of the consumers--and I think it is as true within the
Department of Defense as it is elsewhere--to engage in a very
active conversation with the analysts and the agencies.
Senator Levin. I would hope so.
Dr. Cambone. As I said earlier, it goes a long way to
improving the understanding on both sides.
Senator Levin. Yes. I would hope they would have active
conversations, but that is different from duplicating a
function.
Dr. Cambone. Yes, sir.
Senator Levin. You made reference to remodeling the defense
intelligence----
Dr. Cambone. Yes, sir.
Senator Levin.--in response to the committee's pre-hearing
policy questions. I am wondering what kind of remodeling you
have in mind.
Dr. Cambone. They are in the two main broad areas, sir,
that I think we have to focus some attention on. One is the
association of what the Department does for its operational and
tactical level intelligence work, the P-3s and the Global Hawks
and the kinds of things that we operate for the express purpose
of supporting our combatant commanders and their subordinate
commands.
Those units, those activities collect an awful lot of
information that is useful to the national Intelligence
Community. There has not been a good process for moving that
information into the national domain and permitting the
Intelligence Community analysts to factor that information into
their datasets, first. Second, it does not really give the DCI
a sense of how he might distribute his own resources in the
National Foreign Intelligence Program, relative to what he
knows he could get if he had a coordinated program at the
operational and tactical level with the Department. So that is
one.
The second is that we really have to step back a bit from
our current efforts to support the war and the current needs of
the Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice, and
the FBI, and ask ourselves in some detail, ``In 2018, in 2020,
what are going to be the tasks of the Intelligence Community,''
not as a broad statement that ``I need to know what leadership
in one country or another is doing.'' But ``what are the tasks?
What are going to be the targets? Where do you have to go to
get that information? What are going to be the obstacles to
getting it?''
We know that our adversaries have found ways to deceive and
deny us, to bury their facilities and activities underground,
that they have learned how to bury their activities within
cyberspace. So what are going to be the obstacles to getting
the information that we want to have? What is the capability we
have today against those expectations? Then how do we remedy
those shortfalls?
It is when you get to the end of that chain and you say,
``How are we going to remedy it,'' that you come to, I think,
the view that an arrangement in which we allow for intelligence
reporting to be done up very distinct chains where the
information only comes together at the top--oftentimes, if I
may say so, in the office of the consumer, that is not going to
be adequate. We need to think through organizational
relationships so that there is more sharing across those
agencies and activities. So that is one.
The second is that the way that we employ our assets,
whether they be technical or human, has to be thought through
again. What we have is a set of parts that are all used
independently of one another frequently. I believe that if we
learn how to use them in concert as a single system, we will
find that we are not only more efficient but that we are
capable of learning things that we before had not been able to
discover.
Lastly, we have to think then about the actual technical
performance of those assets. What kind of signals? What kind of
imagery? What kind of human--how do we have to equip our human
intelligence assets so that they can get the information they
need and transport it?
The world is changing rapidly. The technology is changing
faster. The assets we have in hand today were designed 10 and
15 years ago. Whether they will be adequate to our needs 10 or
15 years from now is, I think, a question we have to pursue
with a great deal of vigor and, based on the conclusions we
come to, remodel the community then in terms of its technical
capability, in terms of the way in which we use those technical
capabilities, and then in the way that we organize and present
the information so that a future President, a future Congress,
a future Secretary of Defense has information that is
appropriate to his circumstances and it is not information that
is presented as a consequence of the way we are organized, and
as a result of the technical performance of our systems.
Senator Levin. A few more questions if I may?
Chairman Warner. Please.
Senator Levin. All right. Ambassador Brooks, let me ask you
a few questions. Is there currently a requirement for a new
nuclear weapon?
Ambassador Brooks. No, sir.
Senator Levin. Is there a requirement now to repeal the
prohibition on research, engineering, and development of a
small, below-5-kiloton nuclear weapon?
Ambassador Brooks. The administration is looking at that
question. My personal view is that anything that inhibits
thinking about the future should be looked at skeptically. But
the administration has not made a decision yet on that
specifically.
Senator Levin. As to whether or not to develop it?
Ambassador Brooks. No, sir. There is no requirement----
Senator Levin. Are you looking skeptically at any
restriction on the development, or just on the research or
what?
Ambassador Brooks. The question of development is a policy
question, and I respond to military requirements from the
Department of Defense as approved by the President.
The question of maintaining the intellectual capability at
the labs is part of my responsibility. I believe that you
maintain intellectual capability by working on real things, and
that placing limits around what you can think about in
general--I am skeptical of the wisdom of things that do that,
sir.
Senator Levin. So you are talking about being skeptical of
prohibitions on research and thinking.
Ambassador Brooks. Yes, sir, I am.
Senator Levin. Okay. Is there, or do you know whether or
not there has been a decision to proceed with the robust
nuclear earth penetrator?
Ambassador Brooks. To proceed with the study, yes. To
proceed with a weapon, no, sir. There is not even an issue to
be decided. The study is to talk about what might be done if we
were to decide sometime in the future to do it.
But as soon as the Department of Defense submits the
congressionally-mandated report, which I expect will come
within the next week or two, my understanding of the law is
that I am then authorized to take the money that was
appropriated in the fiscal year 2003 appropriations act and
start thinking through what might be done. But I want to
distinguish it very carefully with proceeding to understand the
technical implications, and proceeding with a decision to
actually develop or deploy something. We are nowhere near the
latter decision.
Senator Levin. All right. The National Nuclear Security
Administration budget for 2004 requests $6 million for
``advanced concepts.''
Ambassador Brooks. Yes, sir.
Senator Levin. What are ``advanced concepts?'' What kind of
projects are we talking about?
Ambassador Brooks. We are still discussing the specifics
with the Department of Defense, the national labs, and the
military community. We had a formal meeting to start that
discussion in December.
What happens at those meetings is: The military community
looks at concepts that they might--I want to emphasize the word
``might''--find useful. Then the idea of this is for us to go
and get an understanding of: Could that be done at all? Could
it be done without testing? Could it be done with an adaptation
of the existing weapons?
The kinds of concepts that often come up are improved
concepts in safety and security, tailored effects,
electromagnetic pulse, reduced radiation. So we are in the
early stages of deciding exactly which of those possible things
we will look at, but the idea would be to try and understand at
a somewhat deeper level than we do now what might be
technically available if there were formal military
requirements in the past--in the future.
Senator Levin. Have you ever talked with representatives of
other countries that are considering the development of nuclear
weapons, trying to persuade them not to do it, at the same time
that we are looking at advanced concepts for nuclear weapons?
Have you ever been engaged in a conversation with a country
that says, ``You folks are still talking about possible
testing. You are talking about new concepts, new weapons, and
you are trying to talk us into signing a nonproliferation
treaty''? Have you ever had that kind of conversation?
Ambassador Brooks. I have not personally had that kind of
conversation. My experience is that just as, to be candid, I
tend to focus on what I think might be necessary to meet our
own requirements, that other countries do, too.
I do not, however, believe that the things that we are
doing--and I need to make this very clear, both my personal
position and my understanding of the administration's position.
We are not planning or considering a return to nuclear testing.
We are maintaining a capability if we have to do that in the
future. We are not planning, developing new nuclear weapons. We
are maintaining the design expertise at the laboratories and
trying to understand what the law of physics will allow if we
are allowed to do it in the future.
So I think with that caveat, I would be prepared to have
that debate with other countries, but I have not personally
done it.
Senator Levin. One last question, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Yes.
Senator Levin. Do you support efforts to move where
possible, using our dollars, to secure fissile materials that
are, in addition to the former Soviet Union, in other places as
well?
Ambassador Brooks. Yes, sir. Once again, the programs that
I administer are all cooperative programs, and so the first
prerequisite is to find people who have a lot of fissile
material, need our financial help, and are willing to offer it,
because where we use the American taxpayers' dollars is
important. Right now that pretty much means the former Soviet
Union. But in principle, I am in favor of securing fissionable
material anywhere it exists in the world.
Senator Levin. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. As a follow up to that important question,
what is your professional understanding of the sensitivity
between ourselves and the Russian government with regard to our
participation in their nonproliferation programs and access to
some of their sites, allegedly this material that should be
carefully monitored?
Ambassador Brooks. I think at the very highest levels of
the Russian government there is strong support for our
cooperative programs. I think at the working level, when you
get to the actual sites and to people whose responsibilities
are to protect it, they welcome our cooperative program. I
think in the middle, there is a bureaucracy and the FSB, the
Federal Security Service, that still has trouble in believing
we are really there to help rather than to gather intelligence.
So we have a continued challenge to get the appropriate
access. By and large, in the programs that I administer, we
have done well. We have had very good access in the Ministry of
Atomic Energy sites. We have had very good access for the
Russian Navy sites. I cannot speak for the Defense Department's
access, but they also have had good cooperation.
As we finish and get down to the most sensitive facilities,
we are going to see more resistance to U.S. access, and we are
just going to have to continue to work with the Russian
Federation. I am extraordinarily helped in that by the strong
working relationship Secretary Abraham has with his Russian
counterpart. So I think that we are doing well on access, but I
do not want to mislead the committee into suggesting that
everything is rosy. There are still a lot of people in Russia
for whom the Cold War is not over, and we just have to work
through that.
Chairman Warner. Dr. Cambone, we have all heard stories of
the terrorists using internet bulletin boards, cryptic
messages, newspapers, and similar methods to communicate. Most
defense intelligence analysts depend on U.S. and trusted allied
intelligence censors and collectors for their information.
What role can open source information play in the defense
arena? In your view, are we putting enough resources against
that area?
Dr. Cambone. Open source information can be enormously
valuable. I think the short answer is no, we do not put enough
of our resources against that. The Foreign Broadcast
Information Service which was once a--did an awful lot of work
in collecting and finding open source material, is a smaller
organization than it once was.
So, no, we have to put more emphasis on that, if for no
other reason than to begin to give us some contextual
understanding of what is taking place in the countries of
interest to us, first.
Second, the technical journals are interesting sources of
information on technical development. I will give you an
example. When I was working on the Space Commission, we were
concerned about the security of our space assets. We took that
issue to the analytic community and the Intelligence Community,
and they were interested but not as concerned, until we showed
them the website for an organization at the University of
Surrey in the U.K. which had a legitimate business essentially
on the side in which they produced and operated micro
satellites.
You sort of take that--if you just take the screen print
and you say: Now, if the University of Surrey is engaged in
this process--and by the way, one of the countries they list as
a customer has entities in the People's Republic of China and
elsewhere--does that give you some sense that relevant
technology is readily available and that maybe space assets are
prey to this kind of technology?
In the time since, I can assure you there has been
increased interest and a different approach being taken within
that community on that subject.
Senator Levin, if I may, that is another example of a
different perspective on a problem. It is not that I knew
anything more than they did about what was taking place in the
world, other than I came across a piece of information which,
when put into the puzzle, made you see it a little differently.
So as an example to the importance of open source
information, I think that is a very good example.
Chairman Warner. Let us talk a little bit about the private
sector. U.S. commercial businesses have developed extraordinary
capabilities over the past several years especially in the
areas of imagery from space, encryption detection, data mining,
and data visualization. Will you access, as best you can, all
of those talents?
Dr. Cambone. Yes, sir. We certainly will. As you may know,
in my current and previous position, I have been a very strong
proponent of the use of commercial imagery. In my current
position, in the budget that we have submitted for your
consideration, there is a tremendous amount of resources,
dollars, put against exploiting that contemporary technology in
order to create that kind of horizontal integration that we
need across the agencies.
Chairman Warner. Now, my last question gets down to the
real world, floods. Mr. Woodley, as we were returning from our
trip, one of our colleagues was really deeply moved and
concerned about some flooding in his State. I was quite
impressed with the sincerity of his concern on that question.
Experience with natural disasters has shown that in a
typical year the Corps responds to more than 30 Presidential
disaster declarations, plus numerous State and local
emergencies. Additionally, the Corps' flood control efforts
include the maintenance and operation of 383 major dams.
Given the competing mission areas for the Corps of
Engineers, how do you envision that this important
responsibility be carried out in the future?
Mr. Woodley. Mr. Chairman, the maintenance of the civil
works infrastructure, including the flood control
infrastructure, is perhaps the greatest challenge facing the
Corps of Engineers. It would be a very high priority for me, if
confirmed. The work that is being done and the research that is
being done in this area by the Corps of Engineers, I believe it
is fair to say is second to none in the world.
There are a lot of innovative ideas that are coming forward
in this arena that do not necessarily depend on the hard
structures which have been the mainstay in the past, and there
is a great deal of very forward-looking thinking on hydrology,
and that is sponsored by the Corps of Engineers. I can tell you
that, if confirmed, that would be something that we would
continue and I hope that we would be able to enhance.
Chairman Warner. These are very important hearings, and the
responses to our questions I think have been quite satisfactory
and very accurate. But there are more questions to be asked of
each of the nominees. So Senator Levin and I will, on both
sides of the committee, endeavor to collect these questions and
send them to you and ask for your earliest and most prompt
acknowledgment.
Other than that, I thank, first of all, the young people
who have joined us and withstood the test of time, and
hopefully have----
Senator Levin. Which means staying awake, if I could just
say.
Chairman Warner. Oh, yes. [Laughter.]
They have increased their knowledge.
I join with all members of this committee in commending
each of you for the recognition for your appointments by the
President of the United States, to these very key and important
positions. I would hope that the Senate will act expeditiously.
I know my colleague and I will work to see that our committee
does so, and then we will have the responsibility to work with
other Senators on the floor to move these nominations ahead.
Senator Levin. We only foresee that one of you will have
your nomination filibustered. But I am going to keep you
guessing as to which one of the three that is. [Laughter.]
Chairman Warner. Watch out for the floods, my fellow.
[Laughter.]
Senator Levin. In other words, all three of you may be.
Chairman Warner. That is right. [Laughter.]
Good luck, and we thank again the families for joining us.
We are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:29 a.m., the committee adjourned.]

[Prepared questions submitted to Dr. Stephen A. Cambone by
Senator Warner prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follow:]

Questions and Responses

DEFENSE REFORMS

DUTIES

Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of
the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence?
Answer. My understanding is that, if confirmed, my primary
responsibility will be to assist the Secretary of Defense in
discharging his intelligence-related responsibilities under Title 10
and Title 50 U.S.C.:

to serve as the principal adviser to the Secretary of
Defense and, at his direction, to exercise authority,
direction, and control of intelligence organizations within the
Defense Department to ensure that they are manned, trained,
equipped, and organized to support the missions of the
Department;
to serve as the principal adviser to the Secretary of
Defense in the discharge of his responsibility to ensure that
defense intelligence organizations that are elements of the
national Intelligence Community are responsive to the Director
of Central Intelligence (DCI) in the execution of the DCI's
authorities;
to support the Secretary of Defense in his role as the
DCI's counterpart in the Intelligence Community Executive
Committee.

Other responsibilities of the USD/I are to ensure, at the direction
of the Secretary of Defense, that:

the intelligence agencies within the Department are
able to provide effective and timely support in response to
tasking by the Director of Central Intelligence;
the Chairman and other members of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and combatant forces are provided with the intelligence
and related support needed to discharge their responsibilities;
the senior leadership of the Department, civilian and
uniformed, is provided information needed to make decisions
affecting long-term capabilities of U.S. forces, including
development of weapons systems, posture, basing, deployment and
employment;
information--including tactical information--useful to
defense intelligence consumers, and to other users identified
by the DCI, is collected, analyzed, and distributed by defense
intelligence organizations in a timely fashion and in formats
appropriate to users' needs;
the conduct of counterintelligence operations is
overseen to defend the security of defense personnel,
facilities, processes, information, and systems, to include
computer and network-based systems;
recommendations are made to the Secretary of Defense
and the Department's intelligence and intelligence-related
policy, plans, programs, requirements, and resource allocations
are coordinated, to include preparation of Joint Military
Intelligence Program and Tactical Intelligence and Related
Activities budgets as well as DOD activities included by the
DCI in his submission to Congress of the NFIP.

Question. What background and experience do you possess that you
believe qualifies you to perform these duties?
Answer. If confirmed, I believe my past experience qualifies me to
perform the duties of USD/I. I was a consumer of intelligence while
serving on the staff of the Director, Los Alamos National Laboratory in
the early 1980s and as the Director of Strategic Defense Policy in the
Office of the Secretary of Defense in the early 1990s. I served as
Staff Director for two Congressional commissions--The Commission to
Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States (1998) and The
Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management
and Organization (2000). This collective experience has provided me a
broad foundation of knowledge on the collection, analysis, and
production of intelligence, as well as the organization, technical
capabilities, and operations of the Intelligence Community.
The positions I have occupied in the Department since January of
2001--the Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense and to the
Deputy Secretary of Defense; Principal Deputy to the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy; and now as Director, Program Analysis and
Evaluation--have given me day-to-day experience with defense
intelligence as well as the broader Intelligence Community both as a
consumer and in preparation of policy and programmatic guidance. For
example, in my current position, I have been actively engaged in the
development of elements of the fiscal year 2004 budgets for the
National Foreign Intelligence Program, the Joint Military Intelligence
Program and the Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities aggregate.
Question. Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to
enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Intelligence?
Answer. If confirmed, the single most important action will be to
rely on and appoint individuals from throughout the DOD and the
Intelligence Community who are highly skilled and experienced in
intelligence and in intelligence resource management and acquisition,
operations, and policy to positions of responsibility and authority
within the OUSD/I. They will be critical to the tasks of identifying
information resident in the Intelligence Community of interest to
defense users and finding ways to ensure the timely delivery of that
information.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what duties and functions do
you expect that the Secretary of Defense would prescribe for you?
Answer. If I am confirmed, I expect that I will:

Work closely with the DCI and his Community Management
Staff to ensure that there is no misunderstanding between the
Secretary of Defense and the DCI on intelligence matters of
high importance and consequence to the Nation, on the
development of intelligence-related policies, plans, programs,
requirements, and resource allocations and in the day-to-day
management of intelligence;
Recommend to the Secretary of Defense policies, plans,
and intelligence requirements related to the execution of
contingency operations and preparation of deliberate plans by
combatant commanders;
Assist the Secretary of Defense and other senior
defense officials in reducing the likelihood of surprise by
remodeling the defense intelligence culture and capabilities to
continue the efforts within defense intelligence to be more
responsive to its users, quicker to identify emerging threats,
and enabled to employ the most efficient information management
systems;
Ensure that defense activities of the Department that
may support national intelligence efforts are transparent to
the DCI so that he can build the National Foreign Intelligence
Program with the full knowledge of the potential contribution
of these activities to support his requirements;
Oversee execution of defense intelligence resources;
Consult, and coordinate as required, with other DOD
elements to ensure that defense intelligence and NFIP
activities are not unintentionally duplicative of other DOD
activities;
Work closely with Congress in the remodeling of
defense intelligence.
relationships
Question. In carrying out your duties, how will you work with the
following:
The Secretary of Defense
Answer.

If confirmed, I would serve as his principal adviser
on matters related to intelligence in the conduct of his
responsibilities under Title 10 and Title 50 U.S.C. to provide
authority, direction, and control over intelligence
capabilities of the DOD, including those DOD agencies and
elements considered part of the national Intelligence
Community.
Exercise, at the direction of the Secretary of
Defense, authority, direction, and control over DOD
intelligence activities.

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

If confirmed, I would work with the Deputy Secretary
of Defense (as alter ego of the Secretary of Defense) as his
principal adviser on matters related to intelligence in the
conduct of his responsibilities under Title 10 and Title 50
U.S.C. to provide authority, direction, and control over
intelligence capabilities of the DOD, to include those DOD
agencies and elements considered part of the national
Intelligence Community.
I would assist the Deputy Secretary of Defense on the
discharge of any responsibilities related to intelligence
delegated to him by the Secretary of Defense, to include
planning, programming, and budgeting responsibilities.

The Under Secretaries of Defense
USD/AT&L

In recommending policy, plans, programs, requirements,
and resource allocations for DOD intelligence and intelligence-
related activities, I would consult, and coordinate as
required, with USD/AT&L on programs and requirements for
intelligence and intelligence-related systems acquired by DOD.
Coordination would include any offices to which USD/AT&L may
have delegated authority, e.g., the Under Secretary of the Air
Force, who is the DOD Executive Agent for Space.
In addition, I would ensure the timely delivery of
intelligence information to USD/AT&L to permit him to adjust,
as appropriate, DOD S&T, RDT&E and procurement in response to
extant or emerging threats.

USD/Policy

If confirmed, in recommending policy, plans, programs,
requirements, and resource allocations for DOD intelligence and
intelligence-related activities, I would consult, and
coordinate as required, with USD/P to ensure DOD-related
intelligence activity supports the goals, objectives, and
policies of the national security strategy of the United States
and of the defense strategy and policy of the DOD, the
deliberate and contingency plans of the combatant commanders,
and the operational activities of those commanders.
I would ensure timely delivery of intelligence
information to USD/P to permit him to propose changes to the
policy, strategy, plans, structure, posture, deployment, or
employment of U.S. military forces and to anticipate emerging
challenges and threats.
I would support USD/P, as required, in the discharge
of his responsibilities as DOD's representative within the
interagency process and in his interactions with allied,
friendly, and other governments.

USD/Comptroller

If confirmed, in recommending policy, plans, programs,
requirements, and resource allocations for DOD intelligence and
intelligence-related activities, I would consult, and
coordinate as required, with USD/C on preparation of the DOD
program and budget for its intelligence and intelligence-
related activities, including preparation of those DOD items
contained within the NFIP.
I would work with USD/C to ensure, on behalf of the
DCI and DOD intelligence activities, the prompt and proper
distribution of funds by USD/C in support of those activities.

USD/Personnel & Readiness

If confirmed, in recommending policy, plans, programs,
requirements, and resource allocations for DOD intelligence and
intelligence-related activities, I would consult, and
coordinate as required, on directives, instructions, and
policies that would affect DOD personnel engaged in those
activities.
I would ensure timely delivery of intelligence
information to USD/P&R to assist him in the discharge of his
responsibilities for the well-being of members of the defense
establishment, the readiness of U.S. forces, and the capacity
of the department's health care system to meet emerging needs.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control,
Communications, and Intelligence

The USD/I will have responsibility for intelligence
and intelligence-related activities currently resident in
C\3\I.
If confirmed, I would consult with the successor to
the ASD/C3I, and coordinate with him where required, concerning
information and other C\3\ system requirements. ASD/C\3\I will
continue to have oversight responsibility for DOD-wide C\3\ and
computer requirements programs and budgets.
I would provide the successor to the ASD/C\3\I
intelligence information in a timely fashion that will permit
him to adjust defense-wide capabilities to meet emerging
challenges and to support the combatant commanders, especially
in time of hostilities.

The Service Secretaries and the Service Intelligence Directors

If confirmed, I would engage the service secretaries
and their directors of intelligence and intelligence-related
operations in three ways:

On behalf of the Secretary of Defense, I would
provide guidance to them with respect to policy on
manning, equipping, training, and organization within
their military departments that contribute either to
defense-related intelligence or to the Intelligence
Community.
On behalf of the Secretary of Defense, and in
coordination with the DCI, I would provide guidance and
oversight to the military departments related to
intelligence activities conducted by elements of the
military departments for the Intelligence Community
pursuant to existing and future agreements.
On behalf of the Secretary of Defense, I would
synchronize service intelligence agency and defense
programmatic, acquisition, and doctrinal efforts to
meet warfighter needs.

The General Counsel of the Department of Defense

If confirmed, I would seek advice and coordination as
appropriate of the General Counsel in the exercise of
authorities by the USD/I as directed by the Secretary of
Defense.

The Directors of the Defense Intelligence Agencies

The directors of the defense intelligence agencies--
e.g., the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the National
Imagery and Mapping Agency--operate within the DOD and, as
such, under the authority, direction, and control of the
Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of Defense is responsible
for ensuring these agencies and others are capable not only of
performing their defense missions, but also of responding in a
timely fashion to the tasking of the DCI as elements of the
Intelligence Community.
At the direction of the Secretary of Defense, who
works in coordination with the DCI, the USD/I will provide the
authority, direction, and control to the defense intelligence
agencies to ensure they are capable of fulfilling both of the
above-mentioned missions. In addition, and by direction of the
Secretary of Defense, the USD/I will evaluate the performance
of these agencies in their support to defense missions.

The Under Secretary of the Air Force

The Under Secretary of the Air Force (USecAF) has been
designated by the Secretary of Defense as the DOD Executive
Agent for Space. The USecAF is also the Director of the NRO.
If confirmed, I will work with the USecAF to ensure
that those space and other systems for which he is responsible
and which are dedicated to, or may substantially contribute to,
intelligence are developed, integrated, and deployed to meet
the intelligence needs of the DOD and the Intelligence
Community.

The Director of Central Intelligence

The DCI is responsible to the President for the
provision of national intelligence. He has the authority to
task those DOD intelligence agencies that are part of the
Intelligence Community. The Secretary of Defense is charged
with assuring that DOD intelligence agencies support the DCI.
If confirmed, I would exercise authority, direction,
and control of these agencies at the direction of the Secretary
of Defense and would coordinate in his behalf with the DCI
those policies, plans, programs, requirements and resource
decisions relative to these agencies (or other DOD components
and activities) to ensure the ability of the DCI to discharge
his responsibilities.
The USD/I will, at the direction of the Secretary of
Defense, coordinate with the DCI concerning support from the
Intelligence Community required by the DOD and support required
by the DCI from the DOD.
The USD/I will ensure the DCI has insight into and
benefits from DOD tactical activities that can contribute to
intelligence.

The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Community
Management

The staffs of the OUSD/I and DDCI/CM will ensure that
the defense intelligence and national intelligence missions are
coordinated on a routine basis.
If confirmed, I will ensure that matters requiring
coordination between the DCI and Secretary of Defense, e.g.,
policy, plans, programs, requirements, and resources, are
staffed to resolve differences that might arise between their
organizations. Furthermore, in coordination with the DDCI/CM,
the USD/I will staff the Secretary of Defense/DCI Executive
Committee meetings and oversee the implementation of direction
resulting from the Intelligence Community Executive Committee.

Officials in the Department of Homeland Security with intelligence
responsibilities

If confirmed, I will consult, and coordinate as
required, with the Department of Homeland Security regarding
all DOD intelligence activities and any others assigned to
OUSD/I in support of or supported by the Department of Homeland
Security.
I would ensure that the Department of Homeland
Security is provided, via means mutually agreed upon within the
interagency process, with information relevant to its mission
in a timely manner to permit it to successfully discharge its
responsibilities.
major challenges and problems
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will
confront the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence?
Answer. If confirmed, I believe I will have three major challenges:

Continuing to ensure that intelligence information is
provided to the senior civilian and uniformed leadership of the
Department in a timely manner and in useful formats, that is
predictive in character to permit them to take appropriate
action to avoid surprises, mitigate surprise when it occurs,
and otherwise arrange U.S. military forces to meet evolving
challenges;
Ensuring that intelligence information is provided to
combatant forces in a timely manner and in formats useful to
them;
Ensuring that DOD assets are defended from attack by
foreign and hostile intelligence services.

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for
addressing these challenges?
Answer. If confirmed, I believe the key to addressing these
challenges is the organization of the OUSD/I. The Secretary of Defense
has given guidance that he expects it to be ``output'' oriented. That
is, the OUSD/I will not seek to direct the processes by which
intelligence is collected, analyzed, and disseminated by the
Intelligence Community. Instead, it will engage the leadership of the
Intelligence Community to convey the needs of senior defense officials,
civilian and uniformed, and evaluate the timeliness, relevance, and
utility of the resulting product. That evaluation would be used to
recommend, as appropriate, changes in policy, plans, programs,
requirements, and resource allocations to meet the needs of DOD
officials.
Question. What do you anticipate will be the most serious problems
in the performance of the functions of the Under Secretary of Defense
for Intelligence?
Answer. The most pressing challenge facing the DOD is arranging
itself to operate in an environment where surprise is commonplace.
Defense intelligence has an important role to play in helping to avert
surprise and mitigating its effects when it occurs. Defense
intelligence is critical to enabling the Department to adjust its
policies, structure, posture, and capabilities and plans to operate in
this environment. Those activities need to be attentive to the
possibility of surprise and will need to improve its ability to warn of
impending surprises.
One area in which increased attention may be needed is in the field
of counterintelligence. The end of the Cold War did not reduce
appreciably the efforts of hostile espionage services to target DOD
activities. DOD counterintelligence efforts need both to protect DOD
activities and, in collaboration and coordination with the Intelligence
Community and law enforcement, work to deny and disrupt the efforts of
foreign services to target the DOD.
In addition, the advent of the homeland defense and security tasks
requires that DOD intelligence contribute to those tasks. In so doing,
however, great care must be taken to ensure that DOD activities are
fully in accord with the law and conducted under the supervision of
competent authority.
Question. If confirmed, what management actions and time lines
would you establish to address these problems?
Answer. If confirmed, the single most important action I will take
is to find, immediately, highly capable professionals to assess warning
methodologies and lead the OUSD/I CI effort.

PRIORITIES

Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish
in terms of issues that must be addressed by the Under Secretary of
Defense for Intelligence?
Answer. If confirmed, I will establish the following priorities:

Immediately, to ensure that combatant commanders
receive the information they require, in a timely manner and
useful format, to successfully conduct current operations. In
addition, OUSD/I would review and, as appropriate, revise
methodologies for assessing the immediacy and magnitude of
threats to U.S. interests and the manner in which warnings are
prepared and delivered to senior civilian and uniformed defense
officials.
In the mid-term, to address DOD counterintelligence
activities to ensure a balance between the counterintelligence
support managed by military departments and the
counterintelligence support to force protection that is
conducted, per Goldwater-Nichols, under the command of
combatant commanders.
Over the long-term, to work to remodel the DOD
intelligence structure and its human and technical capabilities
as part of the broader DOD effort to transform itself to meet
emerging challenges of coming decades.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS AND
INTELLIGENCE

Question. The establishment of your position would appear to have a
significant impact on the future organization of ASD/C\3\I. Clearly,
there is a close association between the ``C\3\'' functions and
intelligence.
How would you propose that the ``C\3\'' functions, including
information technology management, interoperability, and cybersecurity
policy be integrated into the Department's overall organization?
Answer. Under a plan being developed for the Secretary of Defense,
it is being proposed that the successor to the ASD/C\3\I would remain a
direct report to the Secretary of Defense. The successor to the ASD/
C\3\I would retain responsibility for the C\3\ network, to include its
interfaces, system applications, and information management on the
network. The defense agencies and activities overseen by USD/I will be
users of that network and would rely heavily on the successor to ASD/
C\3\I. As a result, there will be a continuous interchange between
OUSD/I as a service user and the prospective C\3\ as service provider.
Question. How do you anticipate that the responsibilities of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications,
and Intelligence would change once an Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence is appointed?
Answer. Under a plan being developed for the Secretary of Defense,
it is being proposed that the successor to the ASD/C\3\I would focus on
Department-wide information integration, on building the foundation for
network-centric operations utilizing information systems and
management, and on network oversight among other areas. This is an area
of increasing importance to the DOD. Because DOD networks support other
departments and agencies, this is an important area to the overall U.S.
Government as well.

INFORMATION SUPERIORITY

Question. Many have described the major responsibility of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and
Intelligence as ``information superiority.''
Which aspects of information superiority will be under the purview
of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and which will
remain under the ASD/C\3\I?
Answer. Under a plan being developed for the Secretary of Defense,
it is being proposed that the successor to the ASD/C\3\I would retain
responsibility for oversight of information integration and for the
C\3\ networks on which DOD and other U.S. Government agencies depend
(to include ensuring the integrity of the information on the system).
USD/I will have oversight of the employment of those networks for
operational purposes by DOD intelligence activities, the data that
rides those networks, and the deconfliction of those activities with
information operations conducted by DOD entities.

TERRORIST THREAT INTEGRATION CENTER

Question. In his recent State of the Union speech, President Bush
announced the establishment of a new Terrorist Threat Integration
Center to facilitate the fusion of information about terrorist threats
from various intelligence and law enforcement agencies.
What role do you envision for the Department of Defense in this new
organization?
Answer. DOD should play an important role in staffing, supporting,
and deriving significant benefit from the TTIC. The new center is
envisioned as the top of the analytic pyramid, a facility where all
terrorist information is pulled together and then distributed, perhaps
without source attribution, to those working on the front lines of
confronting and defeating terrorism. DOD has offered to assist in any
way appropriate to support the TTIC. DOD has examined facilities,
communications, data handling systems, and training, to name just a
few. As the TTIC system is further developed, DOD will be ready to plug
into it in whatever manner is prescribed, while ensuring that DOD
activities are fully in accord with the law and conducted under the
supervision of competent authority.
Question. In your view, what has changed within defense
intelligence agencies since September 11 to enable them to better share
information among themselves, within the larger Intelligence Community,
and with appropriate law enforcement agencies?
Answer. The expansion of the National Counterterrorism Center,
located at CIA, the FBI's Counterterrorism Division, and the standing
up of the Department of Defense Joint Intelligence Task Force to
Counterterrorism have demonstrably improved the sharing of information
on the terrorism threat. The National Security Agency and National
Imagery and Mapping Agency also have made marked improvements to their
terrorism collection and reporting efforts. To highlight a significant
difference, pre-September 11 information-sharing judgments often
highlighted why something couldn't be shared. Today the emphasis is on
figuring out how we can share the information. Every day, terrorism-
related products of these organizations demonstrate that interagency
cooperation and information sharing have improved significantly. The
creation of the TTIC is a sign that there is room for further
improvement. We should not rest until we are convinced that every stone
is being turned over to root out international terrorism and defeat
this threat to our peace and security.
Question. In your view, what additional changes, if any, are
needed?
Answer. To the degree allowed by law and proper security,
intelligence and law enforcement agencies must be able to access each
other's databases. The Intelligence Community and law enforcement
agencies continue to report not only what they know, but also how they
know it. This ``source-specific'' analysis presentation has a tendency
to drive up the classification levels of analytic products, emphasizes
the distinctions and differences in how information is obtained, and
perpetuates the sense of ownership of certain forms of information. In
some cases the attribution is necessary, but in most cases it could be
eliminated. The Intelligence Community should push for greater emphasis
on reporting what is known about terrorist threats without specifics
about how the community came by the knowledge. Greater effort is needed
to inform appropriately cleared officials about what is not known.

HOMELAND DEFENSE

Question. Over the past year, with the establishment of the
positions of Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, the Department of Defense
has been fundamentally reorganized to better address the critical
homeland defense mission.
In your view, what challenges lie ahead in integrating the
intelligence capabilities of the Department of Defense with those of
the Department of Homeland Security and other associated Federal,
State, and local agencies?
Answer. The challenge facing DOD intelligence, and other
intelligence entities, is primarily cultural. Intelligence entities
have developed ways and means of doing things that satisfied their own
purposes and those of their primary customers. The need to integrate
information for homeland defense and security requires adopting new
policies and, most importantly, new cultures.
Question. Does the Department of Defense's existing requirements
process adequately support the establishment of an intelligence
requirement for the homeland defense mission?
Answer. The establishment of both ASD/Homeland Defense and Northern
Command will bring homeland defense and security requirements into the
programming and resourcing processes within DOD. The defense
intelligence needs of ASD/HLD and NorthCom will be addressed through
the OUSD/I.

TRANSFORMATION

Question. Secretary Rumsfeld has established transformation of the
Armed Forces to meet 21st century threats as one of his highest
priorities.
What is the role of intelligence in the overall transformation
process?
Answer. Transformation is driven in significant ways by
intelligence. The Intelligence Community provides the advance warning
needed to design defense capabilities and effects-based results that
can overcome future threats, to arrange the structure, posture, and
deployment of U.S. forces, and to inform the deliberate and contingency
planning efforts of the combatant commanders for the employment of the
force.
Question. Specifically for the defense Intelligence Community, what
do you believe transformation should mean?
Answer. For defense intelligence, it means developing, in
coordination with the Intelligence Community as a whole, the means
needed to provide ``exquisite'' intelligence--to know our adversaries'
secrets without their knowing we know them. This is essential to
avoiding surprise, especially in this era of widespread proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction.
In addition, it means taking advantage of information management
techniques and modern communications to provide military users with the
information they require, when they require it, and in formats useful
to them. It is particularly important to provide critical, near-real-
time information to forces engaged in operations.
It also means closing the gap--in concept, time, and cultures--
between intelligence and military operations. To do so is to enable a
seamless transition from the collection of information to its
employment to assessments of the effects of that employment. This
seamlessness is key to military success on the modern battlefield.
Question. In your view, what transformation capabilities does our
Intelligence Community require?
Answer. Transformation for the Intelligence Community as a whole is
taking place now, as agencies increasingly employ existing intelligence
capabilities as a single system of multiple parts.
This transformation can and should be accelerated by an infusion of
new technology to permit analysts to be more effective, to substitute
machines for people in performing certain tedious but critical tasks
such as database construction, translations, network analysis, etc.,
and to develop and deploy new collection capabilities to penetrate
adversaries' denial and deception efforts in order to provide
``exquisite'' intelligence and to survive in increasingly hostile
environments.

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES

Question. The defense intelligence structure has evolved over the
years, most recently with the creation of the Defense Human
Intelligence Service in 1996 and the establishment of the National
Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) in 1997.
In your view, is the current organizational structure of defense
intelligence the best structure to support military and national
intelligence needs?
Answer. The existing system is engaged in a war and confronting
simultaneous crises, and the need, it seems to me, is to do the very
best with what we have in hand while taking every opportunity to
maximize the current system's performance. If confirmed, I will not
hesitate to recommend changes that would expedite achievement of those
objectives so long as the changes did no harm to our ability to win the
war on terrorism and to counter proliferation.
Question. If not, what changes would you recommend to the current
structure?
Answer. If confirmed, my examination of current structure will
focus on the future. I am most interested in those intelligence
capabilities of the Department and the Nation that must be created and
managed to deal with threats that will have to be faced over the next
decades. I think it will take considerable study, leadership and a
foundation of consensus amongst the next generation of intelligence
professionals (Congressional and Executive) to achieve the kind of
reform that must be enacted.

HUMAN INTELLIGENCE

Question. The Secretary of Defense has indicated that he would like
to have enhanced human intelligence capabilities within the Department
of Defense.
What are the goals and overall mission of defense human
intelligence?
Answer. The most immediate objective of the Secretary of Defense in
seeking enhanced intelligence provided by human beings is to improve
the knowledge that enables effective decision making--information
useful down to the tactical level in the conduct of a military
operation and that will permit U.S. forces to act with speed and
decisive force. Technical collection is not always sufficient for these
purposes.
Question. In your view, what changes or additional capabilities, if
any, are needed in the Department's human intelligence organization?
Answer. DOD needs to associate those defense elements capable of
providing ``actionable intelligence'' more closely with those assets
under the DCI's control to provide a seamless transition from
collection in support of the U.S. Government and to manage crises, to
intelligence preparation of the battle space to advance force
operations, and then to the support of operations and post-conflict
operations.

NEED FOR INDEPENDENT INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

Question. There is an absolute requirement that intelligence
analysis be independent and free of political pressure to reach a
certain conclusion including a conclusion that fits a particular policy
preference.
If confirmed, are you committed to ensuring that all intelligence
analysts within the DOD, including those who may be seconded to offices
that are not part of the defense intelligence structure, are free from
such pressure?
Answer. Yes.

TOTAL INFORMATION AWARENESS (TIA) PROGRAM

Question. The Defense Advance Research Project Agency (DARPA) has
developed a ``Total Information Awareness'' program, to develop and
integrate information technologies that would enable the government to
sift through multiple databases and sources to detect, classify, and
identify potential terrorist activities.
If confirmed, what would be your intentions for fielding an
operational capability for such a program if the TIA technology project
were to complete a successful development?
Answer. The TIA program is a research program to help develop tools
to track terrorists. It is not a collection program. If this DARPA
research program were to develop tools that could be usefully provided
to other agencies, including some within the DOD, we would be bound by
existing statutory and regulatory restrictions, subject to the
oversight of Congress placed upon the handling of the data those tools
would be designed to sort and better organize.

CONTROL OF INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Question. Some have suggested that the Director of Central
Intelligence should be given sole control over all programming and
budget execution of Federal Government intelligence programs, including
those within the Department of Defense.
What are your views about whether the Secretary of Defense should
retain his current authority for developing and implementing
intelligence programs with the defense agencies?
Answer. The National Security Act of 1947 (as amended) and
Executive Order 12333 created the existing arrangement between the
Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence. The
Director of Central Intelligence is responsible to the President for
national intelligence and, therefore, has specified authorities
relative to the assets capable of providing that intelligence. A number
of those assets reside within the DOD. They do so not out of
convenience but because DOD, down to the tactical level of operations,
is a primary consumer of the information provided by those assets. This
is underscored by the designation of these agencies as combat support
agencies.
The Secretary of Defense is tasked under Title 50 U.S.C. to ensure
that these agencies are capable of supporting and are responsive to the
tasking of the Director of Central Intelligence.
There is a process for apportioning the resources of these agencies
to meet the needs of both the Director of Central Intelligence and the
Secretary of Defense. Absent that process, each would find himself
compelled to recreate, separately, the same or similar capabilities to
meet their responsibilities.
That each will have needs particular to his circumstances is
understandable. Provisions exist for each to meet those needs without
disrupting the larger relationship. The Intelligence Community
Executive Committee is the venue for resolving any issues that may
arise.
In my view, the Secretary of Defense should retain his authority.
The USD/I is being created to assist the Secretary of Defense in
discharging his responsibilities under Title 10 and 50 U.S.C.

ACQUISITION PROGRAMS

Question. Both the National Security Agency and the National
Imagery and Mapping Agency have sizeable development and procurement
programs underway intending to modernize their abilities to support
their customers' intelligence needs.
What role would you play, if confirmed, in overseeing major
acquisition programs within the defense Intelligence Community?
Answer. If confirmed, I will be responsible for guidance on DOD
intelligence policy, plans, programs, requirements, and resources and
for coordination of the same within the DOD and between the DOD and the
Director of Central Intelligence.
Technical support to the USD/I would be provided by, among others,
DOD's USD/AT&L, ASD/C\3\I, and the Under Secretary of the Air Force as
well as by the Deputy Director for Community Management and the Central
Intelligence Agency's Director of Science and Technology.

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Question. Administration officials have indicated that the
Department of Homeland Security, while being a customer of the new
Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC), will also have an analysis
group with an operational role aimed at obtaining a picture of the
threat situation in the United States and addressing vulnerabilities.
Additionally, processing intelligence information collected from
components of the Department of Homeland Security, such as the Coast
Guard, INS, and Border Patrol, will be one of the tasks that must be
accomplished.
What role, if any, do you anticipate that the Department of Defense
will play in the Department of Homeland Security's intelligence
collection and assessment function?
Answer. DOD intelligence organizations already have a variety of
relationships with various components of the new Department of Homeland
Security, including the Coast Guard, Secret Service, Customs, and
others. If confirmed, I would anticipate continued support to these
activities and, in coordination with the ASD/Homeland Defense, an
immediate initiative to work out arrangements for information sharing,
as appropriate, with the intelligence organization established within
the new department. The defense focus is traditionally toward foreign
and overseas threats, but with much of our military based inside the
United States and our role in protecting the Nation, there are likely
to be many areas of common concern and potentially coordinated action.
In any such actions, great care will be taken to ensure that DOD
activities are fully in accord with the law and conducted under the
supervision of competent authority.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as the Under Secretary of Defense
for Intelligence?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and
other communications of information are provided to this committee and
its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes.
______

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

Questions Submitted by Senator Susan Collins

TERRORIST THREAT INTEGRATION CENTER

1. Senator Collins. Dr. Cambone, recently the administration
initiated other reorganizations to improve our Nation's ability to
detect and respond to possible threats. In particular, the
administration announced the establishment of the Terrorist Threat
Integration Center, under the authority of the Director of Central
Intelligence, as the focal point for intelligence analysis. How will
the Pentagon interact with this new center?
Dr. Cambone. The DOD will contribute information developed as a
result of its authorized activities, e.g., force protection,
counterintelligence, preparations to conduct homeland defense missions,
tactical operations abroad, and other activities. In return, the DOD
will benefit by TTIC's intelligence affecting U.S. military operations,
force protection, and homeland defense.

INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS

2. Senator Collins. Dr. Cambone, there are increasing demands on
the Department of Defense's technical intelligence gathering resources.
With the possibility of hostilities against Iraq and continuing concern
about North Korea's development of nuclear weapons, these demands will
continue to grow. As threats develop, do we have adequate resources to
fulfill new intelligence requirements?
Dr. Cambone. The DOD is in the early stages of a long-term
commitment to balance intelligence resources against security threats.
The OUSDI will develop a system by which to capture defense
intelligence requirements across agencies and services, evaluate them,
prioritize them against available resources, and, as appropriate,
rationalize those priorities in light of those of the DCI. It will
conduct a thorough review of existing programs; examine long-term
threats and other criteria by which to evaluate DOD needs over the
longer term; and then seek adjustments to DOD and NFIP programs and
resources as appropriate.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson

TOTAL INFORMATION AWARENESS PROGRAM

3. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Cambone, the Total Information
Awareness (TIA) program has been controversial for its perceived
threats to privacy and lack of independent oversight. What are your
specific responsibilities and authorities relative to the research,
development, deployment, and management of the TIA program?
Dr. Cambone. The TIA program is a research program to help develop
tools to track terrorists. It is not a collections program. It is a
DARPA research program. If TIA were to develop tools that could be
usefully provided to other agencies, including some within the DOD, we
would be bound by existing statutory and regulatory restrictions,
subject to the oversight of Congress placed upon the handling of the
data those tools would be designed to sort and better organize.

INTELLIGENCE SATELLITE PROGRAMS

4. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Cambone, intelligence satellites are a
critical part of DOD's intelligence and communications network. The
future of the DOD satellite program is also tied to the future of the
EELV. What are your specific responsibilities and authorities with
regard to the intelligence satellite programs and will you exercise
budgetary oversight for these programs throughout the budget process?
Dr. Cambone. As USDI, I will have responsibility for recommending
to the Secretary of Defense priorities for intelligence and
intelligence-related satellite programs requirements and resources. As
a member of the Defense Acquisition Board, I will continue to ensure
program development. Through the program review process in the DOD and
in coordinating NFIP proposals with the DCI's staff, I will ensure that
throughout the budget process the Secretary's priorities are addressed.

5. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Cambone, in your view, are the
satellite programs adequately funded in the near- and long-term?
Dr. Cambone. Satellite programs currently underway must be managed
carefully to ensure they are delivered on time, within cost, and
provide desired capabilities. Future challenges will place demands on
all of our intelligence and intelligence-related systems including
satellite programs. We are investing now in R&D for systems that hold
the potential to meet our future needs. As the technology for those
programs matures, we will have better estimates of this cost.

6. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Cambone, how would you prioritize among
the various satellite programs? How would you rank order the
intelligence collection, communications, and navigation support
satellite programs?
Dr. Cambone. All are of high importance. The challenge we face is
arranging priorities within each category to ensure that we sustain
currently needed capability even as we put aside enough resources to
invest in follow-on capabilities. Recommending those priorities to the
Secretary of Defense is one of the USDI's most important roles.

POSITION RESPONSIBILITIES

7. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Cambone, your position as Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence appears to have some overlap with
existing offices. How will your new position's responsibilities differ
from those of the existing Assistant Secretary of Defense for C\3\I?
Dr. Cambone. The USDI will have responsibility for intelligence and
intelligence-related activities currently resident in ASD/C\3\I. I will
consult with the ASD/C\3\, and coordinate with him where required,
concerning information and other C\3\ system requirements. ASD/C\3\
will continue to have oversight of DOD-wide C\3\ and computer
requirements programs and budgets and will focus on Department-wide
information integration, on building the foundation for network-centric
operations, and on network oversight, among other areas. I will provide
the ASD/C\3\ intelligence information in a timely fashion that will
permit him to adjust defense-wide capabilities to meet emerging
challenges and to support the combatant commanders, especially in time
of hostilities. The ASD/C\3\ retains responsibility for the C\3\
network, to include its interfaces, system applications, and
information management on the network. The defense agencies and
activities overseen by USDI will be users of that network and will rely
heavily on the ASD/C\3\. As a result, there will be a continuous
interchange between OUSDI as a service user and the ASD/C\3\ as a
service provider.

OVERSIGHT

8. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Cambone, who will be responsible for
OSD oversight of intelligence-related space programs such as the space-
based radar?
Dr. Cambone. The USDI will be the focal point for oversight of all
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the Department of
Defense.

SPACE-BASED RADAR PROGRAM

9. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Cambone, the space-based radar program
is an important part of any future space architecture. How do you plan
to `rationalize' the new space-based radar program with the Future
Imagery Architecture (FIA) program?
Dr. Cambone. The Transformational Space and Airborne Project, a
joint effort between the DOD and the Intelligence Community, is the
first step toward providing the answer to this question. At the center
of that project is the issue of how best to employ as a single
enterprise existing, planned, and projected space and airborne systems
to satisfy the needs of those who depend on the knowledge they generate
to achieve the Nation's security goals. The project also is examining
how far technology limits can be pushed in meeting those needs, and at
what cost. This project will help us determine which current systems
should migrate to a new future structure and which ought we to develop
to meet future needs. The USDI and the DDCI/CM are responsible for
overseeing this review and reporting its results and proposals to the
Secretary of Defense and the DCI.
______

[The nomination reference of Dr. Stephen A. Cambone
follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
February 4, 2003.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
Stephen A. Cambone, of Virginia, to be Under Secretary of Defense
for Intelligence. (New Position)
______

[The biographical sketch of Dr. Stephen A. Cambone, which
was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was
referred, follows:]

Biographical Sketch of Dr. Stephen A. Cambone

Stephen A. Cambone was appointed by the Secretary of
Defense as Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation, on July
1, 2002. On July 19, 2001, he was confirmed by the U.S. Senate
as the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
He held that position until July 1, 2002. Prior to that, he
served as the Special Assistant to the Secretary and Deputy
Secretary of Defense from January 2001 to July 2001.
Dr. Cambone was the Staff Director for the Commission to
Assess United States National Security Space Management and
Organization from July 2000 to January 2001. He was the
Director of Research at the Institute for National Strategic
Studies, National Defense University (INNS/NDU) from August
1998 to July 2000. Before that he was the Staff Director for
the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the
United States from January 1998 to July 1998; a Senior Fellow
in Political-Military Studies at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS) from 1993 to 1998; the Director
for Strategic Defense Policy in the Office of the Secretary of
Defense from 1990 to 1993; the Deputy Director, Strategic
Analysis, SRS Technologies (Washington Operations) from 1986 to
1990; and a Staff Member in the Office of the Director, Los
Alamos National Laboratory from 1982 to 1986.
Dr. Cambone graduated from Catholic University in 1973 with
a B.A. degree in Political Science, from the Claremont Graduate
School in 1977 with an M.A. degree in Political Science, and
from the Claremont Graduate School in 1982 with a Ph.D. in
Political Science. His numerous awards include the Secretary of
Defense Award for Outstanding Service in 1993 and the Employee
of the Year Award with SRS Technologies (Washington Operations)
in 1988.
------

February 7, 2003.
Hon. John Warner,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
United States Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: This letter provides information on my financial
and other interests for your consideration in connection with my
nomination for the position of Under Secretary of Defense,
Intelligence. It supplements Standard Form 278, ``Executive Personnel
Financial Disclosure Report,'' which has already been provided to the
committee and which summarizes my financial interests.
I do not believe that any of the financial interests listed on my
Standard Form 278 will create any conflict of interest in the execution
of my new governmental responsibilities if I am confirmed. However, any
potential conflict of interest issues will be resolved as indicated in
the ethics agreement attached to my SF 278. There are no additional
potential conflicts of interest to report in Part C of the Committee's
Biographical and Financial Information Questionnaire (or
Questionnaire). Additionally, I have no other interests or liabilities
in any amount with any firm or organization that is listed as a
``Department of Defense Prime Contractor Receiving Awards over
$25,000.''
During my term of office, neither I, nor my spouse, will invest in
any organizations identified as Department of Defense contractors or
any other entity that would create a conflict of interest with my
governmental duties.
If confirmed, I am committed to serve in this position at the
pleasure of the President throughout his term of office.
I have never been arrested or charged with any criminal offenses
other than minor traffic violations. I have never been party to any
civil litigation other than that which was reported in Part D of my
Questionnaire. To the best of my knowledge, there have never been any
lawsuits filed against any agency of the Federal Government or
corporate entity with which I have been associated reflecting adversely
on the work I have done at such agency or corporation. I am aware of no
incidents reflecting adversely upon my suitability to serve in the
position for which I have been nominated. To the best of my knowledge,
I am not presently the subject of any governmental inquiry or
investigation.
I am not, to the best of my knowledge, a member of certain
organizations/professional societies, as has been previously provided
to the committee. None should pose any conflict of interest with regard
to my governmental responsibilities. I trust that the foregoing
information will be satisfactory to the committee.
Sincerely yours,
Stephen A. Cambone.
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

Part A--Biographical Information

Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Stephen Anthony Cambone.

2. Position to which nominated:
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.

3. Date of nomination:
February 4, 2003.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
Bronx, New York; June 22, 1952.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Margaret Taaffe Cambone.

7. Names and ages of children:
Maria Cambone; 12 years.

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions,
dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.
Our Lady of Lourdes High School; 9/1966-6/1970; H.S. Diploma; 6/
1970.
Catholic University; 9/1970-5/1973; B.A., Political Science; 5/
1973.
Claremont Graduate School; 1974-1977; M.A., Political Science;
1977.
Claremont Graduate School; 1977-1981; Ph.D., Political Science;
1982.

9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the
last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of
job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
Director, Strategic Defense Policy; Office of the Secretary of
Defense/ISP, DOD; Room 2D459, Pentagon, Washington, DC; 4/1990-4/1993.
Self-employed; Los Alamos Lab/SAIC/National Institute for Public
Policy; 1809 Barbee Street, McLean, VA; 5/1993-10/1997.
Senior Fellow, Political-Military Studies; Center for Strategic and
International Studies; 1800 K Street, NW, Washington, DC; 6/1993-7/
1998.
Staff Director; IPA, Ballistic Missile Threat Commission; HQ CIA,
Langley, VA; 11/1997-7/1998.
Director of Research; Institute for National Strategic Studies;
National Defense University; Marshall Hall, Fort McNair, Washington,
DC; 8/1998-11/2000.
Staff Director, Commission to Assess United States National
Security Space Management and Organization (detailed from National
Defense University); 2100 K Street, NW, Suite 300, Washington, DC; 7/
2000-1/2001.
Distinguished Research Professor; Institute for National Strategic
Studies; National Defense University; Marshall Hall, Fort McNair,
Washington, DC; 12/2000-7/2001.
Staff Assistant, Presidential Transition Office (detailed from
National Defense University); 1800 G Street, NW, Washington, DC; 1/13/
2001-1/21/2001.
Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (detailed from
National Defense University); 1000 Defense Pentagon, Washington, DC; 1/
22/2001-7/2001.
Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Policy; 2000 Defense
Pentagon, Washington, DC; 7/2001-6/2002.

12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
None.

13. Political affiliations and activities:
(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or
any public office for which you have been a candidate.
None.
(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered
to all political parties or election committees during the last 5
years.
Detailed to the Bush/Cheney Transition Team from National Defense
University.
(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign
organization, political party, political action committee, or similar
entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.
Dole Campaign, 1996, $1,000.
I may have contributed to other local campaigns:
Colleen Sheehan, Congress, PA, c. 1996.
John Eastman, Congress, CA, c. 1998.
William B. Allen, U.S. Senate, CA, c. 1996.

14. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions
for outstanding service or achievements.
Secretary of the Navy, Distinguished Public Service, 2003.
Secretary of Defense Award for Outstanding Service, 1993.
Employee of the Year, SRS Technologies (Washington Operations),
1988.
Ph.D. awarded with High Honors, Claremont Graduate School, 1982.
Best Master's Degree Thesis, Government Department, Claremont
Graduate School, 1977.
Earhart Fellow, 1976-1977.
Blue Key, Honorary Award, 1973.
Pi Sigma Alpha, +9, c. 1974-1980.

15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of
books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have
written.
``Threats and Risks Prompting a Commitment to Ballistic Missile
Defense (BMD),'' National Missile Defence and the Future of Nuclear
Policy, Occasional Paper, Institute for Security Studies--Western
European Union, September, 2000.
With Ivo Daalder, Stephen J. Hadley and Christopher Makins,
``European Views of National Missile Defense,'' Policy Paper, The
Atlantic Council, September, 2000.
``An Inherent Lesson in Arms Control,'' The Washington Quarterly,
Vol. 23, No.2 (Spring 2000).
``After the Assessment: Responding to the Findings of the Rumsfeld
Commission.'' Director's Colloquium, Los Alamos National Laboratory,
February 9, 1999.
A New Structure for National Security Policy Planning, (Washington,
DC: CSIS Press), 1998.
``Demarcation Issues Between Strategic and Theater Systems: A
Response [to an Administration View],'' Robert L. Pfalzgraff, Jr., ed.,
Security Strategy and Missile Defense (Cambridge, MA; Institute for
Foreign Policy Analysis), 1996.
With Colin Grey, ``The Role of Nuclear Forces in U.S. National
Security Strategy: Implications of the B-2 Bomber,'' Comparative
Strategy, Vol. 15, No.1 (Fall 1996).
With Patrick J. Garrity, ``The Future of U.S. Nuclear Policy,''
Survival, Vol. 36, No.4 (Winter 1994-5).
With Don M. Snider and Daniel Goure, ``Defense in the Late 1990s:
Avoiding the Trainwreck'' CSIS Report, 1995.
``Readiness Standards for the Future,'' prepared for the Institute
for National Security Studies, National Defense University, Washington,
DC, 1995.
``An Approach to Defense S&T and Providing Technological
Superiority for U.S. Military Forces,'' CNSS, Los Alamos National
Laboratory, 1995.
``The Coming of Age of Air and Space Power,'' with Dan Goure, CSIS
Report, September 1997.
``NATO Enlargement: The Debate in the U.S. Senate,'' CSIS Report,
September 1997.
``NATO Enlargement: Implications for the Military Dimension of
Ukraine's Security,'' The Harriman Review, Vol. 10, No.3, Winter 1997.
``Will the Senate Endorse NATO's Enlargement,'' RUSI Journal, Vol,
142, No.6, December, 1997.
``NATO's New Members: Ready for Accession,'' unsigned Strategic
Comments for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Vol. 3,
No. 10, December, 1997.
``European Unified Political-Military Planning and Control: The
Creation, Organization and Control of a European Force,'' Gert de Nooy,
ed., The Role of European Ground and Air Forces after the Cold War (The
Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations/Clingendael),
1997.
``ABM Treaty Compliance: U.S. Air Force Single Site NMD Concept,''
for National Security Research Inc., with Linton Brooks, Signey
Graybeal, Keith Payne, William Graham, Patricia McFate, Willis Stanley,
June 1996.
``NATO Expansion: A Strategic Perspective,'' U.S. Defense
Intelligence Agency, 1996.
Preface to ``Medium Extended Air Defense System and the Euro-
Atlantic Defense Relationship,'' CSIS Report, March 1996.
``Organizing for Security in Europe: What Missions, What Forces,
Who Leads, Who Pays?'' Graduate Program in International Studies,
Working Paper 95.5, Old Dominion University, 1996.
``Role of the United States in the Future of Europe,'' Ann-Sofie
Dahl, ed., Security in Our Time: Four Essays on the Future of Europe,
(Stockholm, National Defense Research Establishment), 1995.
Editor, ``NATO's Role in European Stability,'' CSIS Report,
Washington, DC, 1995.
``Time to Define a New US-CIS Relationship,'' Europe Orientale et
Centrale: Les Options de L 'Europe Occidentale (Brussels: Centre
d'Etudes de Defense, Institut Royal Superieur de Defense), 1995.
``The Implications of U.S. Foreign and Defence Policy for the
Nordic and Baltic Region,'' Arne O. Bruntland, Don M. Snider, eds.,
Nordic Baltic Security: An International Perspective, CSIS Report,
Washington, DC, 1995.
``The United States and Theater Missile Defense in North-east
Asia,'' Survival, Vol. 39, No.3, Autumn, 1997.
``Weapons Proliferation: Australia, the U.S. and the Strategic
Equilibrium of the Asia-Pacific'' in Roger Bell, Tim McDonald and Alan
Tidwell, editors, Negotiating the Pacific Century (Sydney: Allen &
Unwin), 1996.
``The Political Setting,'' Dick A. Leurdijk, ed., A UN Rapid
Deployment Brigade: Strengthening the Capacity for Quick Response (The
Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations/Clingendael),
1995.
``NATO and Peacekeeping: Lessons Learned,'' U.S. Defense
Intelligence Agency, 1995.
``Principles of Operational Concepts for Peacemaking,'' Ernest
Gilman, DetlefE. Herold, eds., Peacekeeping Challenges to Euro-Atlantic
Security (Rome: NATO Defense College), 1994.
``Kodak Moments, Inescapable Momentum and the World Wide Web: Has
the Infocomm Revolution Transformed Diplomacy?'' Center for Information
Strategy and Policy, Science Applications International Corporation,
McLean, VA, 1996.
Testimony:
-- ``Iran's Ballistic Missile and WMD Programs,'' Testimony before
the Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation and Federal
Services, Committee on Government Affairs, United States Senate, 106th
Congress, September 21, 2000.
-- ``Elements of a Decision to Deploy National Missile Defense,''
Testimony before the Armed Services Committee, House of
Representatives, 106th Congress, June 28, 2000.
-- ``Elements of a Modern, Nonproliferation Policy,'' Testimony
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, March 21, 2000.
-- ``Issues Surrounding the 50th Anniversary Summit of NATO,''
Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee
on European Affairs, April 21, 1999.
-- ``Qualifications of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic for
NATO Membership,'' Testimony prepared for the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations, 105th Congress, October 22, 1997.
-- ``Prepared Statement on the Costs of NATO Enlargement,''
Appendix 4, The Debate on NATO Enlargement, Hearings before the
Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 105th Congress,
1st Session, Committee Print S. Hrg. 105-285.
-- ``The ABM Treaty and Theater Missile Defense,'' Testimony
before the Military Research and Development Committee of the Committee
on National Security, House of Representatives, 104th Congress, March
21, 1996.
-- ``Space Programs and Issues,'' Testimony before the
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces of the Senate Armed Services
Committee, 104th Congress, May 2, 1995.

16. Speeches: Provide the committee with two copies of any formal
speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years which you have
copies of and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have
been nominated.
I have not delivered formal speeches. I have, however, participated
in numerous panel discussions, colloquies, etc. Those presentations
frequently were developed into articles. Examples include:

-- ``After the Assessment: Responding to the Findings of the
Rumsfeld Commission.'' Director's Colloquium, Los Alamos National
Laboratory, February 9, 1999.
-- ``Demarcation Issues Between Strategic and Theater Systems: A
Response [to an Administration View],'' Robert L. Pfalzgraff, Jr., ed.,
Security Strategy and Missile Defense (Cambridge, MA; Institute for
Foreign Policy Analysis), 1996.
-- ``Organizing for Security in Europe: What Missions, What
Forces, Who Leads, Who Pays?'' Graduate Program in International
Studies, Working Paper 95.5, Old Dominion University, 1996.
-- ``Role of the United States in the Future of Europe,'' Ann-
Sofie Dahl, ed., Security in Our Time: Four Essays on the Future of
Europe, (Stockholm, National Defense Research Establishment), 1995.
-- ``Time to Define a New U.S.-CIS Relationship,'' Europe
Orientale et Centrale: Les Options de L 'Europe Occidentale (Brussels:
Centre d'Etudes de Defense, Institut Royal Superieur de Defense), 1995.
-- ``The Political Setting,'' Dick A. Leurdijk, ed., A U.N. Rapid
Deployment Brigade: Strengthening the Capacity for Quick Response (The
Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations/Clingendael),
1995.
-- ``Principles of Operational Concepts for Peacemaking,'' Ernest
Gilman, Detlef E. Herold, eds., Peacekeeping Challenges to Euro-
Atlantic Security (Rome: NATO Defense College), 1994.

17. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to respond to requests to appear and testify before any
duly constituted committee of the Senate?
Yes.
______

Signature and Date

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement
on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information
provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate,
and complete.
Stephen A. Cambone.
This 7th day of February, 2003.

[The nomination of Dr. Stephen A. Cambone was reported to
the Senate by Chairman Warner on March 6, 2003, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on March 7, 2003.]
----------

[Prepared questions submitted to John Paul Woodley, Jr., by
Senator Warner prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follow:]

Questions and Responses

DEFENSE REFORMS

DUTIES

Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of
the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works?
Answer. The duties and functions of the Assistant Secretary of the
Army for Civil Works are specified in Section 3016 of Title 10 of the
United States Code and Department of the Army General Orders No. 3,
dated July 9, 2002. Section 3016 of Title 10 states that the Assistant
Secretary of the Army (Civil Works) ``shall have as his principal duty
the overall supervision of the functions of the Department of the Army
relating to programs for conservation and development of the national
water resources, including flood control, navigation, shore protection,
and related purposes.'' General Order No. 3 further specifies that this
includes:

developing, defending, and directing the execution of
the Army Civil Works policy, legislative, and financial
programs and budget;
developing policy and guidance for and administering
the Department of the Army regulatory program to protect,
restore, and maintain the waters of the United States in the
interest of the environment, navigation, and national defense;
developing policy guidance and conducting oversight
for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers programs in support of
other Federal and non-Federal entities, except those activities
that are exclusively in support of the United States military
forces;
in coordination with the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3,
developing policy for and directing the foreign activities of
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, except those foreign
activities that are exclusively in support of United States
military forces overseas; and
formulating and overseeing the program and budget of
Arlington National Cemetery and Soldiers' and Airmen's Home
National Cemetery.

Question. What background and experience do you possess that you
believe qualifies you to perform these duties?
Answer. My service as Deputy Attorney General of Virginia for
Government Operations and as Virginia's Secretary of Natural Resources
give me a background in public policy and public administration,
especially policy and administration pertaining to the environment and
natural resources. This experience has been broadened by Federal
service in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, dealing with policy
and oversight for the Defense Department's environmental and natural
resource conservation programs. My more than 20 years' service as an
active and Reserve Army judge advocate provide some insight into the
Army as an institution and the role of the Assistant Secretary for
Civil Works in that institution.
Question. Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to
enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Assistant Secretary
of the Army for Civil Works?
Answer. Yes, I intend to take several actions to enhance my
expertise as Assistant Secretary of the Army (Civil Works). If
confirmed, I will travel to Corps of Engineers divisions to see first-
hand many of the infrastructure development and environmental
restoration projects. My goal is to gain a fuller understanding of the
issues that surround the planning, design, construction, operation and
maintenance of these projects. I intend to reach out to Members of
Congress, the other Federal agencies, State and local interests, study
and project sponsors, and other stakeholders to gain a deeper
appreciation of their perspectives in areas of mutual concern.
I also will work closely with the Chief of Engineers and the
Director of Civil Works to ensure that I am fully informed and prepared
to address the important issues I would oversee if confirmed as
Assistant Secretary of the Army (Civil Works). I look forward to the
challenge and experience this position affords.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what duties and functions do
you expect that the Secretary of the Army would prescribe for you?
Answer. I expect to be asked to carry out the duties and functions
of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Civil Works) as articulated in
General Orders Number 3, dated July 9, 2002.

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. Please describe how you envision your working
relationship, if confirmed, with the following:
The Secretary of the Army
Answer.

I will work closely with the Secretary of the Army in
furthering the goals and priorities of the President.
Consistent with the General Orders, I expect the Secretary to
rely on me to oversee the Civil Works program of the Army Corps
of Engineers and the programs of Arlington National Cemetery
and Soldiers' and Airmen's Home National Cemetery.

Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness

I will work through the Secretary of the Army to form
a close and constructive relationship with the Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense (Logistics, Materiel Readiness) in areas
of mutual interest.

The Under Secretary of the Army
I look forward to working with the Under Secretary of
the Army to learn his perspectives and capitalize on his
experience as Acting Assistant Secretary of the Army (Civil
Works), in order to ensure a seamless transition in oversight
of the Army Civil Works program and the Army national cemetery
program.

Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment

Having worked for the Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense for Installations and Environment, I look forward to
continuing our constructive relationship, working through the
Secretary of the Army, in areas of mutual interest.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense

I will work through the Secretary of the Army to form
a close and constructive relationship with the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense to ensure that the
full array of assets of the Army Corps of Engineers is
available to support the national defense, including the
engineering and technical management and emergency response and
recovery capabilities associated with the Army Civil Works
program.

The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations and
Environment

I will work to form a close and constructive
relationship with the Assistant Secretary of the Army
(Installations and Environment) in areas of mutual interest.

The Chief of Staff of the Army and the Army Staff

If confirmed, I will establish and maintain a close,
professional relationship with the Chief of Staff as he
performs his duties as the senior military leader of the Army.

The Chief of Engineers

I believe the relationship between the Assistant
Secretary of the Army (Civil Works) and the Chief of Engineers
best serves the interests of the Nation when it is based on
mutual respect, trust, and cooperation. Both positions have
enormous responsibilities and demand great attention to very
complex issues. I believe the current Chief of Engineers, LTG
Robert Flowers, and I will have such a relationship. Our
ability to be responsive to the President's priorities and to
the policy directives of Congress depends greatly on the
success of this relationship.

State Governors

The Army and its Corps of Engineers must remain
committed to working cooperatively with Governors and local
authorities for the benefit of local citizens and for
sustainable development and protection of the Nation's natural
resources. These cooperative efforts must be undertaken in the
context of Civil Works authorities and legal responsibilities.
These responsibilities often require a balancing of diverse
interests. The proper reconciliation of these interests demands
open communication among all parties. I am committed to
establishing and maintaining a full and open dialogue with the
Governors on all issues of mutual interest.

MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will
confront the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works?
Answer. Historically the Nation's rich and abundant water and
related land resources provided the foundation for our successful
development and rapid achievement of preeminence within the
international community. Since the beginning of our Nation, the Army
Corps of Engineers has been a great asset, providing engineering
support to the military, developing our Nation's water resources, and
restoring and protecting our environment. The Corps has improved the
quality of our life by making America more prosperous, safe, and
secure. That said, the Corps must be flexible and evolve if it is to
continue to make important contributions to the Nation and respond to
today's problems. There are many pressing needs in this country for
water resources development and environmental restoration. Perhaps the
three greatest Civil Works challenges we face are the need to maintain
the Corps' existing infrastructure, the need to repair our damaged
environment, and the need to ensure the physical security of the Corps'
infrastructure around the country.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for
addressing these challenges?
Answer. We must all work together to define the appropriate role
for the Corps of Engineers in addressing these problems. The challenges
the Corps faces are complex, and there are many difficult decisions to
make. It is of paramount importance that we bring all interests to the
table and that all have a voice in the development of solutions to our
Nation's problems. If confirmed, I will engage in an open and
cooperative dialogue with Congress, other Federal agencies, States,
tribes, and local governments on the many important challenges that the
Army Corps of Engineers faces. With regard to infrastructure security,
if confirmed I will work with the Corps to ensure the protection of its
infrastructure against natural and manmade disasters, including acts of
terrorism.
Question. What do you consider to be the most serious problems in
the performance of the functions of the Assistant Secretary of the Army
for Civil Works?
Answer. I would not identify any specific structural problems with
the performance of the function of the Assistant Secretary of the Army
for Civil Works. The many difficult decisions on complex issues of both
local and national importance are bound to be controversial at times,
and require an open mind and a willingness to entertain input from and,
if possible, to reconcile differing points of view.
Question. If confirmed, what management actions and time lines
would you establish to address these problems?
Answer. I have not yet developed a specific plan. One of my first
priorities will be to meet with the Chief of Engineers and with
officials in the administration and Congress to seek their input and to
develop a plan for how the Army can best fulfill the Civil Works
mission in furtherance of the national interest.

PRIORITIES

Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish
in terms of issues which must be addressed by the Assistant Secretary
of the Army for Civil Works?
Answer. As Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works, I would
work to ensure effective management and administration of the Army
Civil Works program and the Army's national cemetery program. I would
seek ways to more efficiently use the Nation's resources in the
development and execution of these programs to ensure that the
taxpayers' dollars are wisely spent.

CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT OF THE ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS

Question. On March 30, 2000, then Secretary of the Army Caldera
announced a series of reforms intended to strengthen civilian oversight
and control over the Army Corps of Engineers Civil Works program. The
Secretary's memorandum stated:

``The [Assistant Secretary] shall have full authority to
establish the final position of the Department of the Army on
any policy, programmatic, legislative, budgetary, or other
organizational matter involving or affecting the civil works
functions and their implementation, unless directed otherwise
by me.''

What is your view of this memorandum? What steps have been taken to
implement it and what concern, if any, do you have about its full
implementation?
Answer. It is my understanding that the directives in that
memorandum were never implemented. I also understand that the current
Chief of Engineers and a prior Assistant Secretary jointly signed a
memorandum laying out the philosophy that would guide their efforts as
they carried out their respective responsibilities. I have no reason to
believe that philosophy should change. The challenges and complex
issues that arise in the Civil Works program demand a close,
professional relationship between the Assistant Secretary and the Chief
of Engineers, based on mutual respect, trust, cooperation and full
communication. I am committed, if confirmed, to establishing and
maintaining such a relationship with the Chief, in order to respond
effectively to the President's priorities and the policy directives of
Congress.
Question. What is your view of the relative authority of the Chief
of Engineers, the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works, the
Secretary of the Army, the Army Chief of Staff, and the Secretary of
Defense with regard to the civil works function of the Army Corps of
Engineers?
Answer. My view of the relative authority of the Chief of
Engineers, the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works, the
Secretary of the Army, the Army Chief of Staff, and the Secretary of
Defense with regard to the civil works function of the Army Corps of
Engineers follows:
Secretary of Defense. As head of the Department of Defense, the
Secretary of Defense has full authority, direction, and control over
all its elements. He exercises this power over the Corps of Engineers
through the Secretary of the Army, whose responsibility for, and
authority to conduct, all affairs of the Army is subject to the
authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense. If
confirmed, I will cooperate fully with the Secretary of Defense and the
President in fulfilling the administration's national defense
priorities and efficiently administering the Corps of Engineers in
accordance with the policies established by the Office of the Secretary
of Defense.
The Secretary of the Army. As head of the Department of the Army,
the Secretary of the Army is responsible for, and has the authority
necessary to conduct, all affairs of the Department of the Army. He may
assign such of his functions, powers, and duties as he considers
appropriate to the Under Secretary of the Army, as well as the
Assistant Secretaries of the Army, and require officers of the Army to
report to these officials on any matter.
The Chief of Staff of the Army. The Chief of Staff of the Army
performs his duties under the authority, direction, and control of the
Secretary of the Army and is directly responsible to the Secretary. The
Chief of Staff also performs the duties prescribed for him by law as a
member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works. The Assistant
Secretary of the Army for Civil Works is principally responsible for
the overall supervision of the Army's Civil Works program, including
programs for conservation and development of the national water
resources, flood control, navigation, and shore protection. The complex
issues that arise in this area demand a close, professional
relationship between the Assistant Secretary and the Chief of
Engineers, based on mutual respect, trust, cooperation, and full and
open communication. I am committed to establishing and maintaining such
a relationship with the Chief, in order to respond effectively to the
President's priorities and the policy directives of Congress.
The Chief of Engineers. As a member of the Army Staff, the Chief of
Engineers reports to the Chief of Staff, through the Vice Chief of
Staff, with respect to military matters. The Chief of Engineers reports
to the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Civil Works) on civil works
functions of the Army, including those relating to the conservation and
development of water resources and the support for others program. The
Chief of Engineers also reports to the Assistant Secretary of the Army
(Civil Works) with respect to most other matters for which the Chief
may be responsible. In the area of installation activities, the Chief
reports to the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations &
Environment), who has principal responsibility for all Department of
the Army matters related to installations and the environment.
Question. In your view, does the Corps need to make fundamental
changes in the way it operates? If so, what changes would you
recommend?
Answer. While I believe the Corps of Engineers is a fundamentally
sound organization, I nevertheless would look for ways for it to become
more adept at working with its Federal and non-Federal partners in
solving very real problems for our citizens. The Corps has strong
technical abilities and has proven time and time again that it can
solve difficult problems. I would seek ways for the Corps to become
more innovative and creative in serving the President, not only in
domestic Civil Works and emergency response, but also in the Nation's
vital national security interests.

RELATIONS WITH CONGRESS

Question. The position of Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil
Works often involves issues of great significance to States and
localities and their elected officials in Congress.
If confirmed, how would you view your role in addressing such
matters with Congress?
Answer. If confirmed, I would view my role in addressing difficult,
politically charged issues as one of facilitating full and open
communication among all interested parties, be they others within the
executive branch, Members of Congress, or the public. I intend to
appropriately involve all interested parties and make decisions that
take into account all relevant information.
Question. What procedures would you follow regarding consultation
with Congress prior to issuing any secretarial decisions or
announcements regarding reforms that may effect the execution of the
civil works and environmental functions of the Army Corps of Engineers?
Answer. While I have not yet developed a specific plan, I recognize
the importance of consultation with Congress prior to implementing any
reforms that may affect the execution of the civil works and
environmental functions of the Army Corps of Engineers.
Question. What is your view of the role of the civilian and
military leadership of the Army Corps of Engineers in developing goals
for Corps programs and presenting these goals to the legislative
branch?
Answer. If I am confirmed, it is my intent to provide the civilian
leadership needed to enable the Corps to be an even more valuable asset
to the Nation. I would expect the Chief of Engineers and the Director
of Civil Works to bring to me their recommendations in this regard.
Representing the administration, I will work with Congress to set the
proper direction for the Corps.

SCRUTINY OF ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEER PROJECTS

Question. In November 2000, the Army Inspector General found that
three Army Corps of Engineers officials had manipulated data in a cost-
benefit analysis in order to justify a $1 billion project.
What steps have been taken since 2000 to ensure that projects are
appropriately analyzed and justified?
Answer. First, let me say that the expenditure of Federal funds
should not occur unless a proposed project demonstrates a solution to a
public need, is in the Federal interest, has a willing and capable non-
Federal cost-sharing sponsor, will produce benefits that outweigh the
project's costs, and is in compliance with all environmental laws and
policies, economic principles, and engineering criteria. I understand
that these are the principles under which all Civil Works projects are
analyzed. I understand further that, in furtherance of these
principles, a new Project Planning and Review team has been established
in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works
with the mission of providing an Army review of, and oversight and
quality assurance for, Corps of Engineers decision documents that
recommend Federal action.
Question. If confirmed, what initiatives would you take to further
enhance civilian oversight of the execution of projects by the Army
Corps of Engineers?
Answer. If I am confirmed, I will work closely with the senior
leaders of the Corps of Engineers to ensure that the Project Planning
and Review team in my office continues to work as an integral part of a
vertical team including the Corps headquarters, divisions, and
districts to further strengthen the project planning and analysis
process. In this way, we can improve performance and increase
efficiency while still ensuring that we satisfy our oversight
responsibilities under the Army General Orders.
Question. What is your view of the degree of independence that
should be provided to the economists charged with assessing the
economic viability of Corps projects and the role of the senior
civilian and military leadership of the Corps in reviewing the work of
those economists?
Answer. While I am not yet familiar with the details of the
technical and policy review process followed by the Corps of Engineers
in managing feasibility studies, the process needs to ensure that the
many professionals who are involved in those studies are afforded an
appropriate level of independence.
Corps of Engineers professionals at all levels need to follow
established regulations, procedures, and policy in providing unbiased
and professional analyses in determining whether a project is, or is
not, economically justified. Like any other organized system of
analysis, the integrity of this process is critically dependent on all
Corps of Engineers professionals doing their jobs in analyzing,
assessing, and providing the documentation upon which the merits of a
proposed Civil Works project may be weighed.
The role of the senior civilian and military leadership is to
ensure the integrity of the system to provide an independent policy,
legal, and technical assessment of each proposed project, and then to
rely on that documentation as the basis for their recommendations to
policy decisionmakers to accept, reject, or modify a proposed action.

NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES STUDY

Question. In July 2002, the National Academy of Sciences
recommended independent reviews of large-scale civil works projects
proposed by the Army Corps of Engineers.
What is your view of this recommendation?
Answer. Although I am not yet familiar with the details of the
National Academy study, I believe such a review would have value,
provided it does not needlessly increase the cost of projects or delay
decisions. An independent review program should complement existing
technical, policy, and public reviews. Moreover, an independent review
needs to occur when it is most effective, that is, as an integral part
of the planning process, not after studies have been completed.
Question. What action has been taken, if any, in response to the
recommendations of the National Academy of Sciences?
Answer. I understand that the President's budget for the Civil
Works program for fiscal year 2004 provides funding specifically to
establish an independent peer review. The Corps planning process must
address diverse and often contradictory interests on water resources
management, restoration, and development. The independent review
program will facilitate the resolution of such concerns in a timely and
effective manner and, in the long run, will expedite project delivery.

NAVIGATION

Question. The Army Corps of Engineers has built and maintains an
intra coastal and inland network of commercial navigation channels, and
locks and dams for navigation, which comprise an integral parts of the
Nation's critical infrastructure. The Corps also maintain 300
commercial harbors, through which pass 2 billion tons of cargo a year,
and more than 600 smaller harbors. Significant amounts of heavy
equipment and supplies bound for potential overseas military operations
move by ship through ports maintained by the Civil Works program.
What do you view as the greatest challenges facing the Army with
respect to the execution of its navigation mission?
Answer. I expect one of the greatest challenges with the execution
of the navigation mission to be the maintenance and modernization of
aging infrastructure. An equally significant challenge to the
navigation mission is the management of hundreds of millions of cubic
yards of dredged material removed from our Nation's marine
transportation harbors and waterways.
Question. Are there aspects of this mission which you believe
should be transferred from the Department of the Army?
Answer. This is a challenging question and one that I will be
prepared to answer after I have had the benefit of comprehensive
discussions with Members of Congress, Civil Works stakeholders, and
other Army and Corps senior leaders. I believe that analysis of this
concept should take place only in accordance with Sec. 109 of H. J.
Res. 2, as and when that provision takes effect.
Question. In your view, how can the Corps best respond to
environmental concerns in carrying out its navigation mission?
Answer. If I am confirmed, I will work closely with others in
Government, the environmental community, and private industry to seek
the proper balance between supporting the Nation's economic growth
through a competitive port and waterway system and fulfilling our
responsibilities for environmental stewardship. I look upon the
navigation mission as an opportunity to highlight the Army's and the
Corps commitment to the environment, including the use of dredged
material for beneficial uses, such as habitat and marsh restoration.

ENVIRONMENTAL MISSION

Question. The Corps is responsible for environmental restoration
projects at Department of Defense Formerly Used Defense Sites and also
at Department of Energy Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action
Program. Under the DOE program, the Army Corps of Engineers cleans up
former Manhattan Project and Atomic Energy Commission sites, making use
of expertise gained in cleaning up former military sites, and civilian
hazardous waste sites under the Environmental Protection Agency
``Superfund'' program.
What do you view as the greatest challenges facing the Army with
respect to the execution of its environmental restoration mission?
Answer. The Department of Defense Formerly Used Defense Sites
(FUDS) program is carried out by the Army Corps of Engineers as the
Executive Agent for the entire Defense Department. This program would
not be within the purview of my responsibilities if I am confirmed as
the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Civil Works). However, based on
experience in my current position, I would say that the challenge in
the FUDS program is to demonstrate greater progress in the cleanup of
these sites.
The Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP) would
be under my oversight, if I am confirmed as Assistant Secretary of the
Army (Civil Works). As I understand it, Congress directed several years
ago that FUSRAP become part of the Civil Works program of the Army
Corps of Engineers as a means to expedite the accomplishment of the
clean-up of these sites. Like many other programs, I would see the
current challenge as achieving that goal within the limited funding
available, given today's economic and national security environment.
The Corps implements environmental restoration and protection
projects as part of its Civil Works mission, the most well known of
which is restoration of the Everglades. In fact, the Corps has become a
leader in the restoration and protection of our Nation's environment. I
think the greatest challenges facing the Army with respect to its Civil
Works environmental restoration mission are working with Federal,
Tribal, and local governments to plan and implement projects using
watershed or ecosystem perspectives, ensuring that water resources
projects are formulated using sound science, and implementing post-
construction monitoring where appropriate to facilitate adaptive
management, and ensure projects are producing the benefits that were
intended.
Question. Are there aspects of this mission which you believe
should be transferred from the Department of the Army?
Answer. This is a challenging question and one that I will be
prepared to answer after I have had the benefit of comprehensive
discussions with Members of Congress, Civil Works stakeholders, and
other Army and Corps senior leaders. I believe that analysis of this
concept should take place only in accordance with Sec. 109 of H.J. Res.
2, as and when that provision takes effect.
Question. What is your vision for this aspect of the Corps'
mission?
Answer. I understand that the Corps of Engineers environmental
restoration and protection mission has continued to grow, and I
anticipate that these projects will remain popular all across the
country. People want clean water and air, and a healthy environment to
live in, and Corps environmental projects have made significant
contributions to our Nation's environmental health.
Question. If confirmed, how would you propose to address the Corps'
environmental funding requirements?
Answer. If I am confirmed, I will work closely with the Corps of
Engineers, officials within the administration, and Congress in
reviewing funding requirements not only for the critical environmental
activities of the Corps, but also for other, equally-important Civil
Works program areas, such as commercial navigation and flood and storm
damage reduction. We need to find the proper balance among these
purposes. Given the funding constraints associated with current
economic conditions and national defense priorities, it is important
that the Army carefully consider these matters in order to provide the
Nation with an effective, efficient, and well-balanced Civil Works
program.

MISSION OF THE ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS

Question. If confirmed, how would you preserve the integrity of the
Corps's environmental and civil works mission?
Answer. At this time I have no specific proposals. However, I do
understand that, through its Civil Works program, the Army Corps of
Engineers has a unique responsibility to balance environment and
development in the public interest. If I am confirmed, I will preserve
the integrity of civil works missions to protect and restore the
environment and to promote national economic development by making the
environment an integral part of all civil works activities.
Question. What are your views about the potential performance of
regulatory functions presently performed by the Army Corps of Engineers
by other governmental or nonmilitary entities?
Answer. This is a challenging question and one that I will be
prepared to answer after I have had the benefit of comprehensive
discussions with Members of Congress, Civil Works stakeholders, and
other Army and Corps senior leaders. I believe that analysis of this
concept should take place only in accordance with Sec. 109 of H.J. Res.
2, as and when that provision takes effect.

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY AND PROTECTION OF HOMELAND
INFRASTRUCTURE

Question. The establishment of the Department of Homeland Security
is one of the U.S. Government's largest ever cabinet-level
reorganizations. Despite this reorganization, the Department of Defense
will continue to play a critical role in homeland defense.
What coordination do you expect to take place between the office of
the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works and the newly
established Department of Homeland Security?
Answer. The Army Corps of Engineers has long-standing relationships
with several agencies that are being incorporated into the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS). Under the Federal Response Plan, the Corps
fulfills a critical role as the lead Federal agency for Public Works
and Engineering in executing assigned disaster response and recovery
missions in support of FEMA. I fully expect this role and strong
relationship to continue as FEMA becomes part of the DHS structure.
Additionally, the Corps has a clear relationship with the U.S. Coast
Guard that requires close collaboration on port and navigable waterway
operations and security, which I also expect to continue. I can also
envision relationships and coordination with the Transportation and
Border Security elements of DHS for the same reason. Finally, the Corps
needs to maintain close relationships and coordination with DHS in
addressing requirements for the security of the Nation's water
infrastructure, for which the Corps has significant high priority
infrastructure requirements and interests of its own.
Question. Since the attacks on the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon, what processes and new programs have been implemented, or
would you propose if confirmed, to address heightened security and
resource protection issues in civil works projects?
Answer. While I am not intimately familiar with the details of
Corps activities following September 11, I understand that the Corps
completed security reviews and has begun design and implementation of
security improvements for several hundred Civil Works projects in its
inventory of locks, dams, hydropower projects and other facilities to
determine vulnerability to terrorist threat and potential consequences
of such an attack. Critical infrastructure assets operated and
maintained by the Corps are vital national components of the
transportation, water, and power infrastructure sectors. If I am
confirmed, I will work with the Chief of Engineers to continue to
improve security of this essential infrastructure in support of the
global war on terrorism and the Nation's economic vitality.

WETLANDS PERMITS

Question. Section 404 of the Clean Water Act requires landowners or
developers to obtain U.S. Army Corps of Engineers permits to carry out
activities involving disposal of dredged or fill material into
navigable waters of the United States, including wetlands. For more
than a decade, the stated goal of the Federal Government has been ``no
net loss of wetlands.'' A review by the National Academy of Sciences of
June 26, 2001, concluded that the Army Corps of Engineers program for
mitigation of wetlands losses has fallen short of the stated goal of no
net loss of wetlands. Subsequently, the administration prepared its
National Wetlands Mitigation Plan of December 24, 2002.
Do you support the goal of ``no net loss of wetlands''?
Answer. Yes. The goal of ``no overall net loss of wetlands'' was
established by President George Bush in the early 1990s and was
recently reaffirmed by President George W. Bush in December 2002 with
the release of the National Wetlands Mitigation Action Plan.
Question. Do you believe that we are currently meeting that goal?
Answer. This is one question I intend to explore if I am confirmed.
I understand there are differences of opinion on whether or not the
Corps is meeting the goal. I also understand that there are monitoring
and record-keeping issues that should be addressed in this connection.
Question. What is your view of the recommendations of the National
Academy of Sciences report?
Answer. I have looked at that report, and it raises a number of
points that merit consideration. I am sure the report's recommendations
are being reviewed by the Corps of Engineers. If confirmed, I will meet
with the Corps to seek their input and to develop a plan for addressing
the report recommendations.
Question. What specific steps do you believe that the Army Corps of
Engineers should take to move us closer to the goal of ``no net loss of
wetlands''?
Answer. At this time I do not have specific steps in mind. However,
if I am confirmed, I plan to meet with the Corps regarding the
Regulatory Program generally and this important goal in particular, and
explore options for improved performance, including documentation of
performance toward achieving this goal.
Question. What is your view of recently proposed changes and
revised guidance for wetlands program of the Army Corps of Engineers?
Answer. I have not had the opportunity to study the revised
guidance in any detail, but I have been informed that the guidance is
expected to help Corps regulators and the regulated public to
accomplish successful, self-sustaining compensatory mitigation
projects.

STATE WATER QUALITY STANDARDS

Question. In the past, the Army Corps of Engineers has not always
been required to meet State water quality standards in constructing and
operating its water resources projects.
Do you believe that the Army Corps of engineers should be required
to meet State water quality standards in constructing and operating
Corps projects?
Answer. As a general matter, yes, I do.
Speaking in general terms, under Section 401 of the Clean Water
Act, the Army Corps of Engineers is required to obtain water quality
certifications from States for discharges of pollutants, such as
dredged or fill material, that are part of Corps projects.
Subsection 404(r) of the Clean Water Act waives the requirement to
obtain the State water quality certification if the necessary
information on the effects of the proposed discharge of dredged or fill
material is included in an Environmental Impact Statement on the
proposed project submitted to Congress before the discharge takes place
and prior to either authorization of the project or appropriation of
construction funds. Nevertheless, it is the policy of the Corps to seek
State water quality certification rather than utilizing the subsection
404(r) exemption provision in most circumstances. I understand that the
Corps does not invoke Subsection 404(r) to circumvent State section 401
water quality certification requirements, out of respect for and
deference to State water quality policy determinations, and I approve
of this policy.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views,
even if those differ from the administration in power?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as the Assistant Secretary of the
Army?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and
other communications of information are provided to this committee and
its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes.
______

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

Question Submitted by Senator Mark Pryor

WORKING RELATIONSHIPS

1. Senator Pryor. Mr. Woodley, thank you for supporting your
country by agreeing to take on the difficult duties of Assistant
Secretary of the Army for Civil Works. I want you to know that I plan
to support your nomination.
You mention in your written testimony that you plan to travel to
Corps divisions across the country to examine projects first-hand. We
would welcome your visit to Arkansas and I hope that you can put us on
your travel schedule soon. Let me know when you plan to be in Arkansas.
You forthrightly acknowledge the daunting job of balancing the
competing interests at work on many Corps projects. I applaud your
commitment to create working relationships within the Army and with
State Governors.
You mention that you plan to work closely with other stakeholders.
I would like to know what steps you plan on taking in creating useful
dialogues with environmental groups such as, for example, the National
Resources Defense Council, and private industry, such as power
utilities.
Mr. Woodley. If confirmed, I would work to facilitate full and open
communication among all interested parties, be they others within the
executive branch, Members of Congress, or public stakeholders,
including environmental groups, power utilities, and other interested
parties. I intend to appropriately involve all interested parties and
make decisions that take into account all relevant information.
______

[The nomination reference of John Paul Woodley, Jr.,
follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
January 22, 2003.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
John Paul Woodley, Jr., of Virginia, to be an Assistant Secretary
of the Army, vice Michael Parker.
______

[The biographical sketch of John Paul Woodley, Jr., which
was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was
referred, follows:]

Biographical Sketch of John Paul Woodley, Jr.

On October 2, 2001, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
(Installations and Environment) Raymond F. DuBois, Jr., announced the
appointment of John Paul Woodley, Jr. as Assistant Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense (Environment).
Mr. Woodley is the principal assistant and advisor to Deputy Under
Secretary DuBois for all environmental, safety, and occupational health
policies and programs in DOD. Those programs include cleanup at active
and closing bases, compliance with environmental laws, conservation of
natural and cultural resources, pollution prevention, environmental
technology, fire protection, safety and explosive safety, and pest
management and disease control for defense activities worldwide. He
will also advise DuBois on international military agreements and
programs pertaining to environmental security.
Prior to his appointment, Mr. Woodley served as Secretary of
Natural Resources in the Cabinet of Virginia Governor Jim Gilmore from
January 1998 until October 2001. As Secretary of Natural Resources, Mr.
Woodley supervised eight Virginia agencies responsible for
environmental regulation, permitting and enforcement, natural and
historic conservation, and outdoor recreation, including fisheries and
wildlife management.
Prior to his appointment as Secretary of Natural Resources, Mr.
Woodley served as Deputy Attorney General of Virginia for Government
Operations beginning in 1994. The Government Operations Division of the
Attorney General's Office represents all State agencies assigned to the
Secretaries of Administration, Finance, Transportation, Commerce and
Trade, and Natural Resources, in addition to the Virginia Alcoholic
Beverage Control Board, the Workers' Compensation Commission, the
Virginia Lottery and the Virginia Retirement System.
Mr. Woodley attended Washington & Lee University in Lexington,
Virginia, on an Army R.O.T.C. scholarship. He received a bachelor of
arts degree from Washington & Lee in 1974, and was elected to Phi Beta
Kappa. Mr. Woodley also attended the Law School at Washington & Lee,
where he received his juris doctor degree cum laude in 1977.
Immediately after law school, Mr. Woodley was law clerk to the late
U.S. District Judge D. Dortch Warriner of the U.S. District Court in
Richmond from 1977 until 1979.
Mr. Woodley served on active duty with the U.S. Army Judge Advocate
General's Corps from 1979 until 1985, serving in Germany and at the
Pentagon. Mr. Woodley left active military service in 1985 and returned
to Richmond, where he was practiced law until 1994. Mr. Woodley holds
the rank of Lieutenant Colonel in the Army Reserve, and has been
awarded the Army Achievement Medal, the Army Commendation Medal (1st
Oak Leaf Cluster), and the Meritorious Service Medal (2nd Oak Leaf
Cluster).
Mr. Woodley, 48, is a native of Shreveport, Louisiana. Mr. Woodley
and his wife, Priscilla, have three children, Elizabeth (15), Cornelia
(13), and John Paul III (10).
______

January 23, 2003.
Hon. John Warner,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
United States Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: This letter provides information on my financial
and other interests for your consideration in connection with my
nomination for the position of Assistant Secretary of the Army, Civil
Works. It supplements Standard Form 278, ``Executive Personnel
Financial Disclosure Report,'' which has already been provided to the
committee and which summarizes my financial interests.
I do not believe that any of the financial interests listed on my
Standard Form 278 will create any conflict of interest in the execution
of my new governmental responsibilities if I am confirmed. However, any
potential conflict of interest issues will be resolved as indicated in
the ethics agreement attached to my SF 278. There are no additional
potential conflicts of interest to report in Part C of the Committee's
Biographical and Financial Information Questionnaire (or
Questionnaire). Additionally, I have no other interests or liabilities
in any amount with any firm or organization that is listed as a
``Department of Defense Prime Contractor Receiving Awards over
$25,000.''
During my term of office, neither I, nor my spouse, will invest in
any organizations identified as Department of Defense contractors or
any other entity that would create a conflict of interest with my
governmental duties.
If confirmed, I am committed to serve in this position at the
pleasure of the President throughout his term of office.
I have never been arrested or charged with any criminal offenses
other than minor traffic violations. I have never been party to any
civil litigation other than that which was reported in Part D of my
Questionnaire. To the best of my knowledge, there have never been any
lawsuits filed against any agency of the Federal Government or
corporate entity with which I have been associated reflecting adversely
on the work I have done at such agency or corporation. I am aware of no
incidents reflecting adversely upon my suitability to serve in the
position for which I have been nominated. To the best of my knowledge,
I am not presently the subject of any governmental inquiry or
investigation.
I am a member of certain organizations/professional societies,
which have been previously provided to the committee. None should pose
any conflict of interest with regard to my governmental
responsibilities. I trust that the foregoing information will be
satisfactory to the committee.
Sincerely yours,
John Paul Woodley, Jr.

UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
John Paul Woodley, Jr.

2. Position to which nominated:
Assistant Secretary of the Army (Civil Works).

3. Date of nomination:
January 22, 2003.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
September 28, 1953; Shreveport, Louisiana.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Priscilla Woodley.

7. Names and ages of children:
Elizabeth, 16; Cornelia, 14; John Paul, 11.

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions,
dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.
B.A., Washington & Lee, 1974; J.D., Washington & Lee, 1977.

9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the
last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of
job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
1977-79, Law Clerk, USDC, Richmond, VA;
1979-1985, U.S. Army;
1985-1990, Private law practice;
1990-1994, Assistant Commonwealth's Attorney for Henrico County,
Virginia;
1994-1998, Deputy Attorney General of Virginia for Government
Operations;
1998-2001, Secretary of Natural Resources for the Commonwealth of
Virginia;
2001-present, Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Environment;
1985-present, Army Reserves, Judge Advocate General Corps,
Lieutenant Colonel.

10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
or local governments, other than those listed above.
See 9 above.

12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
Virginia State Bar.

13. Political affiliations and activities:
(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or
any public office for which you have been a candidate.
Richmond City Republican Committee, Member.
Henrico County Republican Committee, Member.
Third District Republican Committee, Chairman.
Republican National Lawyer's Association, Board Member.
Virginia Republican Lawyer's Association, Chairman.
Candidate for City Council of Lexington, Virginia.
(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered
to all political parties or election committees during the last 5
years.
See (a) above.
(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign
organization, political party, political action committee, or similar
entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.

30 October 1997.................. Gilmore for Governor.. $100
12 November 1997................. Friends of Jerry $100
Kilgore.
12 December 1997................. Republican Black $100
Caucus.
12 September 1998................ Campaign for Honest $100
Change.
19 October 1998.................. Bliley for Congress... $100
27 May 1999...................... Hord for Delegate..... $100
23 March 2000.................... Henrico Republican $110
Committee.
07 July 2000..................... Republican National $500
Lawyers Assn..
16 March 2001.................... Republican National $100
Lawyers Assn..

15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of
books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have
written.
None.

16. Speeches: Provide the committee with two copies of any formal
speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years which you have
copies of and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have
been nominated.
I have made speeches to numerous groups and conferences. I have
records of only a few of these, which I will provide.

17. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to respond to requests to appear and testify before any
duly constituted committee of the Senate?
Yes.
______

Signature and Date

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement
on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information
provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate,
and complete.
John Paul Woodley, Jr.
This 28th day of January, 2003.

[The nomination of John Paul Woodley, Jr., was reported to
the Senate by Chairman Warner on March 27, 2003, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was referred to the Committee on Environment and Public Works,
which conducted a hearing on the nomination on April 1, 2003,
and reported to the Senate by Chairman Inhofe on April 9, 2003,
with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The
President signed a recess appointment of Mr. Woodley on August
22, 2003.]
----------

[Prepared questions submitted to Ambassador Linton F.
Brooks by Senator Warner prior to the hearing with answers
supplied follow:]

Questions and Responses

QUALIFICATIONS

Question. What background and experience do you have that you
believe qualifies you for this position?
Answer. I have over four decades of experience in national
security, much of it associated with nuclear weapons. I was deployed on
four nuclear-equipped ships, serving as Weapons, Executive, and
Commanding Officer. In Washington I had assignments as Special
Assistant to the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic
Energy, responsible for all Navy nuclear programs and for international
nuclear weapons cooperation, as Director of the Navy's Strategic and
Theater Nuclear Warfare Division, and as Director of Defense Programs
on the staff of the National Security Council. In the latter assignment
I was the White House official responsible, among other things, for all
Department of Energy nuclear programs and for U.S. nuclear testing
policy during the final third of the Reagan administration. Finally, I
have served in the National Nuclear Security Administration for 16
months, the last 7 as Acting Administrator.
Question. Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to
take to enhance your expertise to perform the duties of the Under
Secretary for Nuclear Security, Department of Energy and Administrator,
NNSA?
Answer. I believe there are no specific steps that I need to take
at this time to prepare myself for the duties of Under Secretary for
Nuclear Security/Administrator, NNSA. The experience I have gained
during the 7 months in which I have been acting in this position,
combined with four decades of national security background, has given
me the requisite background and knowledge. Because of the broad scope
of NNSA's responsibilities, I naturally expect to continue to learn and
develop if I am confirmed.

MAJOR CHALLENGES

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting
the next Under Secretary for Nuclear Security, Department of Energy and
Administrator, NNSA?
Answer. I believe the most important challenges I face will
include:

Maintaining a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear
stockpile without underground nuclear testing.
Managing the reorganization announced in December 2002
in a way that gains the promised benefits of increased
effectiveness while ensuring fair and equitable treatment of
people.
Implementing the President and the Secretary's agenda
on improving the protection of highly-enriched uranium and
plutonium worldwide in order to prevent this material from
falling into the wrong hands.
Ensuring that we continue the underlying science to
support the stockpile of the future, adapting the current
stockpile if needed.
Maintaining adequate security for NNSA's facilities,
assets, and personnel, over the long-term in the face of what
may be a permanent transformation of the threat. Maintaining
adequate security over the long-term in the face of what may be
a permanent, and continuous transformation of the threat.
Ultimately we must move beyond guns, gates, and guards to a
greater use of technology and a systems architecture for
security.
Replacing the experienced people who will be coming to
the end of their Federal service over the next few years and
sustaining a challenging and rewarding environment to recruit
and retain the uniquely talented people that are so essential
to our mission success.
Continuing to modernize an aging infrastructure.
Focusing on the future. My experience with Washington
jobs is that it is very easy to be consumed by the urgency of
the in-basket and very difficult to think about the future.

Question. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these
challenges?
Answer. I intend to work closely with my NNSA colleagues and
Congress on each of these issues. I believe successful implementation
of the restructuring of NNSA is key to many of these issues, as is
continued strong budgetary support from Congress.
Question. Please explain the importance you place on continuing to
ensure a unique organizational identity for the NNSA and what steps you
would take to establish such an identity if confirmed?
Answer. I am a strong supporter of maintaining a unique
organizational identity for NNSA as a separately organized entity
within the Department of Energy. Such an organizational identity is not
an end in itself but a means to ensure effective implementation of
NNSA's national security responsibilities to maintain the safety,
security and reliability of the nuclear stockpile.
Thanks to the good work of my predecessor and the strong support of
the Secretary of Energy, I do not believe I will need to take
additional steps to establish such an identity. Instead I believe that,
if confirmed, I should focus my energies on ensuring that NNSA delivers
the benefits to the country for which it was created.

OVERALL MANAGEMENT

Question. In your view, when will the Department of Energy be able
to say that the NNSA has been completely established and implemented as
envisioned by Congress when the NNSA was created in the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000?
Answer. I believe that considerable progress has already been made.
If we are able to implement the restructuring announced in December
2002 in a fashion that eliminates bureaucracy and improves oversight,
if we are able to use new models of oversight to improve contractor
performance, and if we are able to continue the fiscal discipline in
planning, programming, and budgeting established by my predecessor,
then I believe that by the end of 2004 NNSA will be completely
established and implemented as envisioned by Congress when the NNSA was
created.
Question. In addition to NNSA's current reorganization efforts,
what else needs to be done to meet the vision for the NNSA as set forth
in the Fiscal Year 2000 National Defense Authorization Act?
Answer. My predecessor established NNSA as a separately organized
entity, therefore my focus should be on making that entity effective
and efficient in order to meet the intent of Congress. I believe the
NNSA management resulting from the organizational decisions announced
in December will be effective. The elimination of a layer of management
and the creation of a service center should improve both efficiency and
effectiveness. If confirmed, my primary management focus will be to
ensure that this reorganization succeeds. I do not currently have
additional initiatives to propose.
Question. On December 20, 2002, NNSA announced a plan to
restructure its management, including a 20 percent reduction in Federal
personnel in 5 years.
How do you believe the NNSA management should be restructured to be
more effective?
Answer. I believe the most important elements of the restructuring
of December 2002 are the elimination of a management layer and of
overlapping responsibilities and the clarification of lines of
authority. I do not presently see the need for further major changes
beyond those already announced.
Question. How will the announced personnel reductions help meet
this goal?
Answer. I view personnel reductions as the result of the
elimination of duplication and of a shift to a more effective mode of
contractor oversight. Announcing them now forces NNSA managers to
prioritize and streamline work and helps ensure that the benefits of
our restructuring are actually achieved.
Question. NNSA, in large measure, was created in response to
security lapses at the Los Alamos National Laboratory. Unfortunately,
we have seen that security lapses have continued to occur. Section
3212(b)(10) of the Fiscal Year 2000 National Defense Authorization Act
provides that ``the Administrator has authority over, and is
responsible for, all programs and activities of the administration,
including administration of contracts, including the management and
operations of the nuclear weapons production facilities and the
national security laboratories.''
If confirmed, what would be your plan to make sure that security
lapses do not continue at the NNSA facilities?
If confirmed, what policies would you institute to improve the
manner in which managers of NNSA facilities deal with security matters?
Answer. I believe these two questions are so integrally related
that they must be answered together. In my view, there is no single
answer to improving security. Sound polices, constant management
attention, vigorous programs of self-assessment and external review, a
strong security culture, and a habit of sharing lessons learned across
the complex are all required.
If confirmed, I would expect to place particular emphasis on the
role of senior management. In my opinion, previous approaches to NNSA
oversight confused the issue of accountability and responsibility. The
new organization I announced on December 20, 2002, and which, if
confirmed, I am determined to implement, places responsibility for
security management squarely on the shoulders of the Federal line
managers at each site. With clear responsibility and accountability
should come stronger and more effective Federal oversight. At the same
time, I believe that the contractors--especially the top managers--who
operate NNSA facilities must likewise be held accountable. I have
attempted to do so while Acting Administrator and, if confirmed, will
continue to do so.

WEAPONS PROGRAMS

Question. If confirmed, what specific steps would you take to
retain critical nuclear weapons expertise, particularly design
capabilities, in the NNSA workforce?
Answer. Design expertise resides in the three NNSA national
laboratories, Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, and Sandia. I believe
retaining experienced individuals at these laboratories is a function
of providing them with a stable environment and with technically
challenging work. Thus, if confirmed, I will work to resolve the
uncertainties caused by current management problems at Los Alamos and
to ensure that the NNSA budget continues to support a strong science
component.
Question. If confirmed, what specific steps would you take to
ensure that new weapons designers are appropriately trained?
Answer. I believe new weapons designers are best trained by working
on actual complex nuclear design issues. Ongoing efforts to extend the
life of the current stockpile and science based stockpile stewardship
provide some opportunity, but in addition I believe it is important to
have a robust advanced concepts program. Such a program is, of course,
valuable for other reasons as well; it helps provide options for future
adaptation of the stockpile to meet changing conditions and
capabilities to assess foreign nuclear weapons activities. If
confirmed, I will work to ensure a sustained advanced concept program
is an integral part of our overall weapons efforts.
Question. Do you support retaining the capability to re-manufacture
every component expected to be found in the stockpile? Please explain
what you believe are the most pressing re-manufacturing needs.
Answer. Yes, I support retaining such a capability. With only a few
exceptions, each major nuclear weapon component will ultimately need to
be replaced given an extended lifetime for current stockpiled weapons.
To evaluate the most pressing production needs, the NNSA conducted a
Production Readiness Assessment of the manufacturing sites within the
Nuclear Weapons Complex, in 2000, 2001, and 2002. Collectively, these
assessments addressed (1) the ability of the production complex to
implement current schedules, (2) an estimate of the production capacity
of the complex, and (3) an evaluation of our ability to rebuild, within
36 months, any item currently used in the enduring stockpile.
Of the current non-operational production capabilities the most
significant areas of concern are primary and secondary nuclear
component production. NNSA has programs in place to correct for these
shortfalls. I expect LANL will deliver a certifiable W88 pit this year
and a certified W88 pit by fiscal year 2007. At the Y-12 plant in
Tennessee, we have recently resumed wet chemistry operations and expect
to have enriched uranium processes operational next year. If confirmed,
I will support the continuation of these efforts.
Question. What role do you foresee nuclear weapons playing in U.S.
defense and foreign policy strategies in the coming decade and beyond?
Answer. In January 2002, the President submitted the Nuclear
Posture Review to Congress. In that review, he noted that nuclear
weapons will continue to be essential for assuring allies and friends
of U.S. security commitments, dissuading arms competition, and
deterring hostile leaders by holding at risk those installations that
such leaders value and that cannot be held at risk by conventional
means. At the same time, the President noted that fundamental changes
in international security have taken place in recent years that require
us to think of nuclear weapons as part of a ``New Triad'' of nuclear
and non-nuclear strike capabilities, defensive forces, and a responsive
defense R&D and industrial base of which the nuclear weapons enterprise
is a key element. I believe this analysis of the role of nuclear
weapons in defense and foreign policy will remain valid for the
foreseeable future.
Question. What role will the Administrator of the NNSA play in
determining U.S. defense and foreign policy and the role of nuclear
weapons?
Answer. My predecessor played a significant role in the conduct of
the Nuclear Posture Review. If confirmed, I would expect to play a
similar role in any future reviews as well as in ongoing implementation
of the Nuclear Posture Review. I would expect my major contribution
would be in ensuring that the technical capabilities of the nuclear
weapons complex were adequately considered in any policy deliberations.

STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIP PROGRAM

Question. When do you believe the science-based Stockpile
Stewardship Program will be in a position to continuously certify our
enduring nuclear weapons stockpile as safe, secure, and reliable,
without the need for underground nuclear testing?
Answer. In my view, it is not possible to predict when the
Stockpile Stewardship Program will be in a position to continuously
certify the Stockpile with such high confidence that we can guarantee
that nuclear testing will never be required. I do not believe that
Stockpile Stewardship and nuclear testing are alternatives. The goal of
Stockpile Stewardship is to ensure a safe, secure, reliable, and
effective nuclear deterrent. It is our hope to be able to do this
without testing, and I foresee no immediate need for testing. But the
complex conditions of a nuclear explosion and the inherent
uncertainties associated with the aging of nuclear weapons make it
impossible to preclude the possibility that we will someday need to
test. In my view, a test to confirm or correct a problem identified by
the Stockpile Stewardship Program is not a failure of Stockpile
Stewardship, but a confirmation of the wisdom of the program.
Question. What is your view of the Department of Energy (DOE)
Stockpile Stewardship Program and the likelihood that it will allow the
U.S. to maintain its nuclear deterrent in the near- and long-term?
Please identify any vulnerabilities that you see in the Stockpile
Stewardship Program that should be addressed either by DOE or by
Congress, and how they should be addressed.
Answer. I have great confidence in the Stockpile Stewardship
Program and do not see any vulnerabilities requiring action at this
time. Because this program is so important, I will, if confirmed,
continue to monitor it closely and will promptly advise Congress if
problems are identified.
Question. Do you believe that the DOE Stockpile Stewardship Program
is fully integrated with Department of Defense requirements? If not,
please explain those steps you would propose, if confirmed, to ensure
that the plans and programs of the NNSA are fully integrated and linked
with the requirements established by DOD.
Answer. Yes, I believe the program is appropriately integrated with
the Department of Defense.
Question. When do you anticipate there will be a 2003 annual
Stockpile memorandum?
Answer. The NNSA and the Department of Defense have been working to
revise the Stockpile structure to comply with the guidance from the
Nuclear Posture Review. These efforts are nearing conclusion and I
expect the next Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Memorandum to be submitted to
the President in May 2003.

NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW

Question. The Nuclear Posture Review announced the administration's
plan to reduce the number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear
warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200 by the year 2012.
With the large number of refurbishment and other life extension
program activities planned over the next decade, is there enough
facility capacity and personnel in the NNSA workforce to also take on a
large increase in dismantlement during the same decade?
Answer. The current nuclear weapons industrial complex is limited
in the number of weapons that can be processed at the Pantex Plant,
with the work split among units undergoing surveillance, refurbishment,
or dismantlement. Planned renovations of existing facilities at Pantex
will expand capacity sufficient to meet the anticipated Nuclear Posture
workload. During the period fiscal year 2008 through fiscal year 2010--
when three new refurbishments (W80, W76, B61) are underway--there would
be only a small reserve capacity available to fix unanticipated
problems in the stockpile, respond to new warhead production
requirements, or handle a potentially increased dismantlement workload.
That reserve capacity would increase after fiscal year 2014. Under
current planning assumptions, NNSA would not define a firm schedule for
dismantlements; rather it would ``load level'' the Pantex operation by
scheduling dismantlements in a way that does not interfere with ongoing
refurbishments or new production.
Question. Does the Nuclear Posture Review have an effect on
dismantlement rates?
Answer. Some warheads are likely to be retired and dismantled as a
result of the Nuclear Posture Review, but that determination has not
yet been made beyond reaffirming the earlier decision to retire the W62
warhead by 2009.
Question. What should be the policy for setting a priority between
these potentially competing activities?
Answer. Under current planning assumptions, NNSA would not define a
firm schedule for dismantlements; rather it would ``load level'' the
Pantex operation by scheduling dismantlements in a way that does not
interfere with ongoing refurbishments or new production. I believe this
is a sound approach.
Question. What weapons systems, if any, will be dismantled as a
result of the Nuclear Posture Review?
Answer. The President announced in November 2001 that the United
States would reduce its operationally deployed strategic nuclear
warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200 over the next 10 years. Some of the
warheads removed from operational status will become part of the
responsive force while I expect others will be retired and dismantled.
Specific decisions have not yet been made beyond reaffirming the
earlier decision to retire the W62 warhead by 2009.

FACILITIES AND INFRASTRUCTURE

Question. Upon its creation, NNSA inherited a dilapidated
infrastructure throughout the aging nuclear weapons complex. At the
request of the Department of Energy, Congress created the Facilities
and Infrastructure Recapitalization Program (FIRP) in the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002.
Although FIRP appears to be making good progress in revitalizing
our infrastructure through elimination of maintenance backlogs, what
would be your plan, if confirmed, to make sure the current and future
maintenance needs, under the Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities
Program, are met to ensure FIRP goes out of business after 10 years, as
originally planned?
What specific standards should be applied to ensure that the
Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities Program meets current and
future maintenance needs across the nuclear weapons complex so that no
additional scope is added to the FIRP?
Answer. I believe that there are two primary tools to ensure that
NNSA does not revert to the infrastructure problems of the past. The
first is the strengthened Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and
Evaluation program put in place by my predecessor. This program is
producing a meaningful Future Years National Security Program that
gives appropriate visibility to funding across the range of our
programs to assure that we rebuild, revitalize, and sustain our nuclear
weapons program infrastructure.
The second tool is the establishment and implementation of a
disciplined and integrated corporate infrastructure management program.
This includes industry-based maintenance procedures and meaningful
performance metrics for both the Readiness in Technical Base and
Facilities and the Facilities Infrastructure Recapitalization Programs.
A proven approach to knowing if investments in maintenance are having
the desired effect is to measure the deferred maintenance backlog over
time. NNSA has established goals for reducing the deferred maintenance
backlog to within industry standards by fiscal year 2009. Similarly,
industry practices provide for an annual investment in current year
maintenance to assure that the deferred maintenance backlog is not
increased. Collectively, these two efforts work to recover and sustain
the infrastructure.
If confirmed, I will support the continued development and use of
these metrics in the both the Readiness in Technical Base and
Facilities and the Facilities Infrastructure Recapitalization Programs.
Ultimately, prevention of a recurrence of the problems of the past
requires a commitment to maintenance on the part of NNSA leadership,
both Federal and contractor. If confirmed, I would ensure the
implementation of a disciplined and integrated corporate infrastructure
management program for the NNSA. I am committed to ensuring that NNSA
facilities and infrastructure have prudent maintenance and adequate
funding.
Question. What steps will you take to ensure that only the
necessary construction projects are undertaken and how will you ensure
that in 10 years a new FIRP is not needed?
Answer. The NNSA's PPBE process, our formal process for
construction project approval and evaluation and an integrated
corporate infrastructure management program together would be the means
by which we would assure effective management of our infrastructure. If
confirmed, I would continue to assure focus and commitment to these
efforts.
Question. How will you ensure that old unneeded facilities are torn
down, or transferred so that they will not need long-term maintenance?
Answer. Currently NNSA intends to reduce the size of its nuclear
complex through consolidation within existing sites and through the
continued disposition of Cold-War legacy facilities via the
Department's Environmental Management Program. Beyond this, our future
efforts would include planning and execution for decommissioning,
decontamination and disposition of excess facilities to reduce the
nuclear weapons complex footprint and annual costs. If confirmed, I
would continue this focus and I would work to assure that new
construction projects are offset by an equal or greater reduction of
square footage in our program.

TEST READINESS

Question. If the President decides that underground nuclear testing
is necessary, what are the long lead items which result in the
scheduling of such testing 2 to 3 years in the future?
Answer. I believe that the most probable reason for conducting a
nuclear test is to confirm a significant problem with a weapon critical
to the Nation's deterrent posture or to verify that a significant
identified stockpile problem has been rectified. In this case, the
pacing item will be the time to design the appropriate test and
necessary instrumentation. Based on history, such design would probably
take about 18 months (since we are speaking of a hypothetical problem,
it is not possible to be definitive). Thus I support reducing the test
readiness at the Nevada Test site from the current 24-36 months to 18
months.
Question. In your view, what is the criteria by which the President
should determine testing if necessary?
Answer. I believe that the President should authorize a nuclear
test when such a test is the only means to confirm a significant
problem with a weapon critical to the Nation's deterrent posture or to
verify that an identified stockpile problem has been rectified. If
confirmed, I will not hesitate to recommend such testing if required,
although I do not foresee a need for testing at this time.
Question. In your view, what is the optimal test readiness posture
which NNSA should be aiming to meet?
Answer. I believe that readiness to test within 18 months of a
decision to do so is appropriate for the foreseeable future. If
confirmed, I will ensure that NNSA budget requests support such a
readiness posture.
Question. What would your role be, if confirmed, in determining
optimal test readiness?
Answer. If confirmed, I will regard determining optimal test
readiness to be part of my responsibilities, subject to direction from
the President or the Secretary of Energy and to the availability of
necessary appropriations by Congress.

PIT PRODUCTION CAPABILITY AND MODERN PIT FACILITY

Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy stated in
testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on February 14,
2002, ``I believe that of the countries that have nuclear weapons we
are the only one that does not have the capability to manufacture new
nuclear weapons now.''
Please describe the progress being made at the Los Alamos National
Laboratory to manufacture certifiable W88 pits by the end of fiscal
year 2003.
Answer. The progress is good and I expect the milestone to be
achieved on time. Los Alamos National Laboratory has met all critical
path milestones required to manufacture a certifiable pit in fiscal
year 2003. In calendar year 2002, Los Alamos manufactured five
development W88 pits on or ahead of schedule.
Question. Please describe the progress being made on the conceptual
design work and environmental impact statement for a Modern Pit
Facility.
Answer. Progress on a Modern Pit Facility is good. Following
approval of mission need by Secretary Abraham in May 2002 and
notification of Congress in September 2002, NNSA initiated conceptual
design in October 2002. NNSA plans to complete all conceptual design
work required for a critical decision on system requirements and
alternatives in fiscal year 2006. A decision on proceeding with a
Modern Pit Facility and, if we are to proceed, a decision on site
selection should occur by March 2004, following the review required by
the National Environmental Policy Act. If confirmed, I will work to
ensure that these milestones are met.
Question. Has the Department of Defense made a final determination
as to the annual number of pits by weapon type that are required?
Answer. No.

SECURE TRANSPORTATION ASSETS

Question. NNSA is responsible for transporting nuclear weapons and
special nuclear materials, including special nuclear materials being
transported between Environmental Management (EM) sites.
If confirmed, what would be your plan to make sure the growing
demand for secure transportation assets, both within Defense Programs
(DP) and EM sites, is met?
Answer. The Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs and the
Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management are working together
to integrate defense and environmental management requirements. I would
encourage this process to continue. Ultimately, I believe we will need
to increase the number of secure transportation assets, especially
Federal agents. If confirmed, I will support existing plans for such an
increase.
Question. In your view should EM pay for the cost of shipping such
material, including capital investment needed to meet their cleanup
schedules?
Answer. NNSA provides transportation of nuclear materials as a
service to the entire Department, funding such transportation from
within the NNSA budget. At present, I see no need to change this
process, but will continue to review the issue if confirmed.
Question. In your view should NNSA pay for costs of shipping to
other DOE programs?
Answer. NNSA provides transportation of nuclear materials as a
service to the entire Department, funding such transportation from
within the NNSA budget. At present, I see no need to change this
process, but will continue to review the issue if confirmed.

SECURITY VERSUS SCIENCE

Question. Despite recent counterintelligence and security failures
at the Department of Energy's nuclear weapons labs, many have opposed
implementing enhanced security and counterintelligence measures for
fear that doing so would endanger the viability of the science and
research programs carried out at these labs.
Can you describe the relative importance you place on maintaining
the scientific capabilities of the weapons labs and a vigilant security
and counterintelligence posture?
Answer. In my view, both are essential to the effective execution
of our national security mission. Without great science, effective
security would be meaningless. Without effective security and
counterintelligence, the classified science so critical to national
security could not be protected.
Question. Do you believe these goals are at cross-purposes?
Answer. Not at all. The two goals should be complementary; we
cannot achieve success in great science if such success is at the
expensive of national security, and vice versa. However, we must work
hard to better integrate the two.
Question. If confirmed, what would your plans be for implementing a
revised polygraph program?
Answer. The Secretary of Energy is legally required to promulgate a
rule implementing a revised polygraph program, taking into account the
results of the October 8, 2002 National Research Council Report ``The
Polygraph and Lie Detection.'' I am participating in the development of
that revised policy. Pending completion of our work, it is not possible
to comment on specific plans for implementing a revised program.

MANAGEMENT OF THE NNSA

Question. What do you understand the role of the Administrator of
the NNSA to be relative to the Secretary of Energy and the Deputy
Secretary of Energy?
Answer. As the head of a separately organized administration within
the Department of Energy, the Administrator of the NNSA reports
directly to the Secretary. Simply put, I work for the Secretary and
Deputy Secretary.
Question. If confirmed, will you take direction from the Secretary
of Energy and the Deputy Secretary of Energy with regard to:
The organization of the National Nuclear Security Administration;
the management of the National Nuclear Security Administration; policy
development and guidance; budget formulation, guidance, and execution,
and other financial matters; resource requirements determination and
allocation; program management and direction; safeguards and security;
emergency management; integrated safety management; environment,
safety, and health operations; administration of contracts, including
the management and operations of the nuclear weapons production
facilities and the national security laboratories; intelligence;
counterintelligence; personnel; and legal and legislative matters?
Answer. Each of these areas is a formal responsibility of the
Administrator as set forth in Section 2402 of the NNSA Act. I would
therefore neither seek nor expect direction from either the Secretary
or the Deputy Secretary in these areas on a routine basis (direction to
modify the NNSA organization is prohibited by Section 2409 of the NNSA
Act). In the 7 months I have been Acting Administrator, neither the
Secretary nor the Deputy Secretary have sought to involve themselves in
the internal functioning of NNSA. If, in the future, I received
direction in these areas, I would, of course, accept it.
Question. What is your view of the authority of the Secretary of
Energy and the Deputy Secretary of Energy to meet with, receive
briefings and information from, and provide direction to, officers and
employees of the NNSA, including the Directors of the National
Laboratories?
Answer. As I understand the NNSA Act, in providing direction to
officers and employees of NNSA, the Secretary or Deputy Secretary are
to act through the Administrator. The Secretary and Deputy Secretary
can gather information in any way they chose, including by the use of
staff.
Question. Do you believe that the expertise of Department of Energy
personnel serving outside the NNSA can be helpful to you if you are
confirmed as Administrator?
Answer. Yes.
Question. What is your understanding of your authority to draw on
that expertise?
Answer. I understand that I have essentially unlimited authority,
except for dual-hatting.
Question. To what extent would you expect to do so?
Answer. If confirmed, I would expect to draw on wider expertise as
required. My experience suggests that detailing specific individuals to
NNSA has been the most productive way to draw on such expertise. In
addition, my predecessor made a number of formal arrangements that I
would continue. For example, he arranged to use the DOE Office of
Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance to conduct reviews of
NNSA environment, safety, health, security, cyber security, and
emergency management activities, rather than attempt to create a
comparable NNSA review function. As another example, DOE's Office of
Environment, Safety and Health conducts investigations under the Price-
Anderson Act on my behalf.
Question. Would it be helpful to you, if confirmed, to be able to
draw upon the expertise of Department of Energy personnel outside the
NNSA through details, dual-hatting, or other available personnel
authorities?
Answer. Yes, with the exception of dual-hatting, which I believe to
be inconsistent with the concept of a separately organized NNSA.
Question. In your view, should the Department of Energy have a
single counterintelligence czar, who serves as both the head of the
Department-wide Office of Counterintelligence and the Chief of Defense
Nuclear Counterintelligence?
Answer. The National Counter Intelligence Executive was tasked by
Congress to conduct a study of this issue. The National
Counterintelligence Executive report was completed in January 2003 and
recommended the two programs be consolidated with a single manager
reporting to the Secretary of Energy. I am still reviewing these
conclusions and have not yet formed a final opinion.
Question. What is your view of the extent to which the National
Nuclear Security Administration is bound by the existing rules,
regulations, directives, and guidance of the Department of Energy?
Answer. In general, the National Nuclear Security Administration is
bound by the existing rules, regulations, directives, and guidance of
the Department of Energy. The Administrator is authorized to issue
administration-specific policies, which may modify DOE directives,
unless disapproved by the Secretary of Energy. I believe that the
appropriate model is for the Secretary to set Department policy while
the Administrator interprets policy for implementation within the NNSA.
If confirmed, I would expect to develop a separate set of
implementation guides for many Departmental orders.

DEFENSE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAMS

Question. The majority of the programs within the Office of Defense
Nuclear Nonproliferation deal with securing, accounting for, and
disposing of former Soviet Union WMD and their related expertise.
What is your view of expanding these programs beyond the states of
the former Soviet Union to address the emerging threats posed by the
proliferation of WMD arsenals and expertise?
Answer. I am in favor of expanding programs for securing,
accounting for, and disposing of weapons-useable nuclear material
(taking such actions with respect to other weapons of mass destruction
is not, in my view, an appropriate responsibility for the National
Nuclear Security Administration). At the same time, the United States
has concentrated on Russia because that is where the greatest amount of
at-risk material is. Further, the countries typically identified for
potential assistance (India, Pakistan, and China, for example) have
thus far shown no interest in U.S. assistance. Because the material
protection control and accounting efforts of the United States
Government are inherently cooperative, this may make it difficult to
expand to other countries.
Question. In your view, are any improvements needed in the Defense
Nuclear Nonproliferation Programs? If so, what improvements would you
recommend?
Answer. I have not identified any specific improvements required in
the Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Program. These programs appear
generally effective and well-managed. My biggest concern is the
continued slow pace of commitments to specific programs by our
international partners under the G8 Global Partnership.

NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS MONITORING

Question. In your view, are the capabilities of the United States
for monitoring nuclear explosions sufficient to detect any nuclear
explosions?
Answer. No. Remote detection of nuclear explosions under all
possible evasive and low yield scenarios is not technically possible.
Question. What additional steps do you believe could be taken by
the NNSA which could enhance our nuclear explosions monitoring
capabilities?
Answer. The NNSA research and engineering program on nuclear
explosion monitoring is dedicated to maintaining U.S. detection
capability on satellite-based systems and the analysis of data from
ground-based geophysical systems. Historically NNSA supports the
science and technology foundations to sustain existing and future
monitoring of nuclear testing. I do not currently believe that there
are additional steps that NNSA should be taking in this area.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views,
even if those views differ from the administration in power?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as the Under Secretary for
Nuclear Security, Department of Energy and Administrator, NNSA?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and
other communications of information are provided to this committee and
its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to comply with statutory reporting
requirements, including the annual weapons program report?
Answer. Yes.
______

[Question for the record with answers supplied follow:]

Question Submitted by Senator Susan Collins

NNSA COORDINATION WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

1. Senator Collins. Ambassador Brooks, the Administrator of the
National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is charged with
promoting international nuclear safety and nonproliferation. It is
critical that the NNSA work closely with the new Department of Homeland
Security in protecting our Nation from either attacks on American
nuclear facilities, or from a smuggled weapon. Do you have any
suggestions on how to facilitate coordination between the NNSA and the
new Department?
Ambassador Brooks. I believe we are off to a good start. The DOE
and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Memorandum of Agreement
concluded on 28 February 2003 establishes the framework to ensure that
the capabilities of DOE's national laboratories and sites, including
the production plants, are made available to DHS for its missions on an
efficient basis. DOE is committed to supporting DHS counterterrorism
and homeland security initiatives, and related initiatives of our other
partners in the Department of Defense and the intelligence and law
enforcement communities that are responding to this new threat.
In addition to these formal steps, we have taken informal steps as
well. I have met personally with the three Under Secretaries of DHS
with whom we will be interfacing. I have also detailed several
experienced individuals to assist the new Department in coordinating
its efforts with DOE.
______

Question Submitted by Senator John Ensign

NNSA COORDINATION WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

2. Senator Ensign. Ambassador Brooks, as you are aware the
President recently signed into law the Omnibus Appropriations Act for
Fiscal Year 2003. That Act provided $35 million for a National Center
for Combating Terrorism at the Nevada Test Site Facility. By the end of
this year, the Nevada Test Site will have received more than $100
million in funding for emergency response training and instructed
nearly 10,000 emergency responders.
Having endured the horrific attacks of September 11, our Nation now
finds itself committed to a global war on terror. To this end it is
imperative that we utilize every available resource to ensure our first
responders are appropriately trained and prepared to deal with whatever
crisis confronts us. The National Center for Combating Terrorism is the
one facility in the country where all facets of emergency responder
training and research can be brought together. With this knowledge,
will you personally support and willingly work with Secretary Ridge of
the Department of Homeland Security to ensure the National Center for
Combating Terrorism fulfills its goal of being the Nation's premiere
training site of emergency responders?
Ambassador Brooks. The Nevada Test Site has unique capabilities to
provide a wide range of training, research, and field testing of newly
developed sensor technology for use by the Department of Homeland
Security and its customers. I expect it to be well-utilized by the new
Department of Homeland Security. In addition, Congress has funded the
National Center for Combating Terrorism to provide research and
training for emergency responders. I will work with Secretary Ridge to
ensure that the funds are well-used and the center works effectively to
support the national interest.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Saxby Chambliss

GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE--REPORTED CONCERNS

3. Senator Chambliss. Ambassador Brooks, a February 26, 2002
General Accounting Office (GAO) assessment expressed concern regarding
the NNSA's lack of a long-term strategic approach, fragmented budgeting
process, confused line of authority, and workforce quality. Please
address what you have done as Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation to address these concerns and fill longstanding
vacancies within this key directorate with qualified individuals.
Ambassador Brooks. Since assuming the position of Deputy
Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation on October 20, 2001,
I have instituted a number of reforms in NNSA in direct response to the
congressional concerns above, and in support of the President's
Management Reform Agenda. Specifically, I worked with the former
Administrator to develop and implement an integrated Planning,
Programming, Budgeting, and Evaluation (PPBE) process which achieves
the integration we have been seeking between headquarters, our national
laboratories, and our international partners. From an organization and
management standpoint, in December, I formally approved the
comprehensive NNSA organization concept contained in the February 2002,
``Report to Congress on the Organization and Operations of the National
Nuclear Security Administration.'' This reorganization clarifies
headquarters and field roles and responsibilities, and identifies clear
lines of authority, and implements new business practices in NNSA. With
respect to concerns on our workforce quality, it is my opinion that
NNSA, and the Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Program in particular,
has a very high quality and diversified workforce. We have staffed most
of the longstanding vacancies. In addition, I am continuing to
federalize the Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation workforce with a
combination of seasoned contractor employees with experience in the
nonproliferation arena, and younger talent at lower levels using the
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation sponsored Nonproliferation Graduate
Intern Program.
We are also in the process of recruiting several senior level
positions specifically targeting diverse candidates.
In summary, I have taken substantial steps to address the concerns
highlighted in the GAO report. Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation has
instituted an aggressive hiring initiative and that will continue. We
have been successful in hiring many new qualified employees dedicated
to Federal service and to the goals of the nonproliferation program. I
believe we will continue to be successful as we staff new vacancies
provided by Congress in our budget.

NONPROLIFERATION COORDINATION

4. Senator Chambliss. Ambassador Brooks, in a post-September 11,
2001 evaluation, the GAO called for greater coordination among U.S.
nonproliferation programs. Please provide specific examples of
initiatives you have undertaken and programs you have championed during
your tenure as head of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation to improve
nonproliferation coordination and implementation among key agencies
such as the Department of State, Central Intelligence, etc.
Ambassador Brooks. The NNSA primarily coordinates its
nonproliferation activities through the NSC's interagency coordination
committees. Meetings are held frequently to address interagency
nonproliferation issues and activities and include agencies such as the
Departments of Defense and State as well as the Intelligence Community.
Specifically in the area of warhead security, I undertook jointly with
the NSC, Department of State, Department of Defense, as well as certain
other agencies, to establish an interagency working group in order to
ensure effective and close coordination amongst U.S. agencies involved
in USG efforts to improve the security of Russian nuclear warheads that
are in need of improved security. This working group has already met on
numerous occasions and has proven to be highly beneficial.
In addition to the NSC's interagency coordination committees and
warhead working group, I have significantly enhanced our coordination
and interaction with the Intelligence Community to ensure maximum
leverage of our collective understanding and expertise to more
effective address and mitigate the worldwide threat of WMD
proliferation. This interagency ranges from close joint reviews of
proposed IPP projects to gaining a better understanding of potential
nuclear smuggling routes to support our border security mission.
Another important initiative that I have strongly supported
involves detailing on a full-time basis an NNSA nonproliferation expert
to the Department of State's Bureau of Eurasion Affairs to further
enhance our close working relationship with the Department of State in
the threat reduction area. This relationship has specifically
contributed to State Department's and the NNSA's collective ability to
quickly and efficiently address threat reduction issues, including
processes involving the approval of country clearances for NNSA
travelers heading to Russia to perform threat reduction work.
Finally, I would like to highlight one initiative in the area of
R&D nonproliferation, known as the Counterproliferation Program Review
Committee (CPRC). The purpose of the CPRC is to ensure effective
coordination among the Department of Defense, Department of Energy, and
the Intelligence Community on nonproliferation research and development
and counterproliferation activities. This committee has long been an
effective means by which the departments coordinate their activities
and has recently developed joint R&D roadmaps.

TRACKING AND SAFEGUARD OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS

5. Senator Chambliss. Ambassador Brooks, please provide an
assessment of capabilities within the NNSA for international tracking
of so-called dirty bomb and foreign research reactor material and the
prioritization on accurate tracking and safeguarding of these
materials.
Ambassador Brooks. The Material Protection, Control and Accounting
Program (MPC&A) is dedicated to safeguarding nuclear and radiological
materials, both at a storage site and in transit. The MPC&A's
Radiological Dispersal Device Program seeks to develop a coordinated
and proactive strategy to locate, recover, and secure orphan sources
throughout the former Soviet states. Currently, the task of keeping
track of radiological materials is the responsibility of each
individual country. Funding remains an obstacle for some countries, and
other countries do not consider safeguarding materials a high priority.
One of the motivations for holding the International Conference on
Security of Radioactive Sources in Vienna this month was to encourage
many other countries to recognize the urgency of this threat. Through
the NNSA, the U.S. can provide critical support in the form of
technical and financial assistance to enable countries of interest to
properly account for nuclear and radiological material.
In addition to these strategies that focus primarily on the sources
at a storage site, the Second Line of Defense Program provides
integrated, sustainable systems to detect nuclear and radiological
smuggling and thereby significantly minimize the risk of nuclear
proliferation and terrorism.

MONITORING OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS

6. Senator Chambliss. Ambassador Brooks, please provide specific
actions taken by the NNSA since September 11, 2001 to enhance
monitoring and tracking of sensitive nuclear materials.
Ambassador Brooks. We are currently taking a comprehensive look at
our needs for data collection and management on foreign fissile
material holdings. The Deputy Secretary has directed me and the
Director of Intelligence to survey all foreign fissile material
database holdings and we have begun that effort. We are now seeking
information from sources outside the Department. We will be analyzing
those responses to see if there is a need for the additional data
collection at NNSA.
NNSA currently uses the International Nuclear Analysis (INA)
database which is a U.S. Government sponsored project that maintains
the nuclear industry's information and tracks nuclear materials. INA
tracks and monitors nuclear weapons useable inventories of 100,000 tons
of spent fuel and 1,000 tons of plutonium at nearly 200 sites in 33
countries. Current INA services include: nuclear material tracking;
nuclear program modeling; topical reports on nonproliferation issues;
and rapid responses to ad hoc requests from the nonproliferation
community.

INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR ANALYSIS PROGRAM

7. Senator Chambliss. Ambassador Brooks, please provide the status
of funding for the International Nuclear Analysis (INA) program, which
monitors nuclear weapons-usable and radiological-dispersion device-
usable materials internationally.
Ambassador Brooks. The International Nuclear Analysis (INA)
database is a commercial product of the Nuclear Assurance Corporation
(NAC). This product, along with NAC's Fuel Track publication, is a
compilation from open commercial sources of international nuclear
reactor fresh fuel shipments and calculations of spent fuel outputs.
The MPC&A program uses INA to assimilate data on amounts of secured or
vulnerable special nuclear material from a variety of sources, both
sensitive and nonsensitive. NNSA will continue to fund the program in
fiscal years 2003 and 2004. In fiscal year 2005, the Department of
Energy's Office of Security will assume management responsibility for
the INA program, contingent on approval of out-year funding.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Lindsey O. Graham

F-CANYON AND H-CANYON SITES

8. Senator Graham. Ambassador Brooks, F-Canyon at Savannah River
Site (SRS) was originally built in the early 1950s in part to recover
plutonium-239 to support the nuclear weapons stockpile. Section 3137 of
the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2001 prohibited the decommissioning of F-
Canyon until both the Secretary of Energy and the Defense Nuclear
Facilities Safety Board (DFNSB) certified that all materials present at
F-Canyon were safely stabilized and all future fissile materials
disposition can be met by H-Canyon or other facilities. DOE is ready to
certify the fiscal year 2001 requirements, but DFNSB is not prepared to
certify at this time. Do any of the programs within NNSA plan to use F-
Canyon now or in the future?
Ambassador Brooks. So long as the H-Canyon is operational, there
are no NNSA organizations that require the use of the F-Canyon now or
in the future.

9. Senator Graham. Ambassador Brooks, are there any reasons now or
in the future for which NNSA would need to utilize F-Canyon to meet
NNSA's mission?
Ambassador Brooks. NNSA has no reasons now or in the future to
utilize F-Canyon. The complex-wide analysis documented in the Savannah
River Site Canyons Nuclear Material Identification Study, dated
February 2001, concluded that all materials in the complex potentially
requiring canyon processing for disposition can be processed through
the H-Canyon.

10. Senator Graham. Ambassador Brooks, are there any materials held
by NNSA which need to be disposed of and processed through F-Canyon?
Ambassador Brooks. There are no materials held by NNSA which need
to be disposed of and processed through the F-Canyon. However, there
may be some potential materials that require H-Canyon capabilities. The
weapons complex is currently in the process of identifying those
materials.

11. Senator Graham. Ambassador Brooks, does NNSA see any reason why
F-Canyon should not be decommissioned?
Ambassador Brooks. As long as H-Canyon is operational, NNSA sees no
reason why F-Canyon should not be decommissioned.

12. Senator Graham. Ambassador Brooks, what future utilization does
NNSA have for H-Canyon?
Ambassador Brooks. If the Office of Environmental Management keeps
H-Canyon operational, the Office of Fissile Materials Disposition will
use H-Canyon for the disposition of approximately 16 metric tons of
off-specification surplus highly-enriched uranium (REV) that is part of
an interagency agreement between DOE and the Tennessee Valley
Authority. The use of H-Canyon for this purpose would extend until
approximately the end of calendar year 2007 under current schedules. Up
to 3 metric tons of additional off spec HEU was recommended for H-
Canyon processing in a 2001 DOE study that analyzed options for
disposition of unallocated off-spec HEU. Processing that additional
material would require H-Canyon to remain operational through
approximately 2010. If H-Canyon were not available, the Department
would have to consider other alternatives for disposing the materials.

13. Senator Graham. Ambassador Brooks, does NNSA plan to recommend
decommission of the H-Canyon? If so, in what year?
Ambassador Brooks. H-Canyon is owned and operated by the Office of
Environmental Management. As a result, it would be improper for the
NNSA to recommend decommissioning an asset belonging to another part of
the Department of Energy.

PIT FACILITIES

14. Senator Graham. Ambassador Brooks, since we closed the Rocky
Flats site in 1989 the United States has no capability to manufacture
primaries. Los Alamos has a limited capacity to manufacture pits, but
not enough to meet the Nation's future needs. Why is the construction
schedule for the Modem Pit Facility so long? Do we not need pit
production capacity sooner?
Ambassador Brooks. Designing a modern nuclear facility with
appropriate capacity and to comply with all the attendant
environmental, safety, and health laws requires detailed and time
intensive planning and engineering work.
NNSA is working very hard to ensure that this major nuclear
facility will meet our plutonium pit production requirements for the
next 50 years. We plan to begin construction of this facility in 2011
with initial production operations beginning in 2018 and full scale
production by 2020.
Based on currently available data on the aging of pits, the MPF
will be available when needed to support the stockpile. In the unlikely
event that we discover a significant problem with a pit type in the
stockpile, there is a potential to increase the small interim pit
manufacturing capability at Los Alamos.

15. Senator Graham. Ambassador Brooks, what sites are being
considered for the construction of a Modern Pit Facility? Has a
preferred site been identified?
Ambassador Brooks. NNSA is now examining five candidate sites--the
Pantex plant in Amarillo, Texas, Carlsbad, New Mexico, the Nevada Test
Site, Savannah River, and Los Alamos--as possible locations for the
MPF. A draft Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) will be issued later
this spring. Following a series of public meetings, a final EIS and
associated Record of Decision (ROD) will be issued by April 2004. The
final EIS will identify a preferred site.
The NNSA will prepare site specific environmental documentation if
the ROD supports a decision to construct and operate a MPF. The fiscal
year 2004 budget request will allow conceptual design and other
planning activities, NEPA work, and technology development activities
to proceed on a schedule that will support a CD-1 decision in fiscal
year 2006.

16. Senator Graham. Ambassador Brooks, it is my understanding that
as we reduce the variety of nuclear warhead types in the United States
arsenal the greater the need for a Modern Pit Facility. Is that the
case, and if so, could you explain why?
Ambassador Brooks. As the size and diversity of the stockpile
declines, the safety, security, and reliability of the stockpile will
become more vulnerable to problems in a single component such as a
particular pit type. Should a problem arise in the stockpile that
involves the pit, it will be critical for the United States to correct
that problem as quickly as possible. The Modern Pit Facility is being
designed to have a capacity to manufacture at least 125 pits per year
and the capability to manufacture all pit types in the stockpile.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson

DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

17. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Brooks, the Nuclear Posture
Review indicates that this administration may seek to develop new
nuclear weapons. Last year the House tried to remove the legal
prohibition on developing small nuclear weapons, so called mini-nukes.
The Senate prevailed and the current law prohibiting such action
remained unchanged. Has DOD developed a requirement for any new nuclear
weapon?
Ambassador Brooks. There are no current requirements for new
nuclear weapons.

18. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Brooks, is NNSA planning to do
any work on any new nuclear weapons in fiscal year 2004?
Ambassador Brooks. There are no current plans for new nuclear
weapons, nor are we developing or fielding any new nuclear warheads. We
are, however, fulfilling our responsibility to maintain and strengthen
our capabilities to design, develop, produce, and certify new warheads
if we are asked to do so in the future.

19. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Brooks, has DOE been asked to
look at the possibility of developing small nuclear weapons, the mini-
nukes?
Ambassador Brooks. No.

NUCLEAR TESTING TIMELINES

20. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Brooks, the fiscal year 2004
NNSA budget request includes money to move NNSA from the current
approved time to be ready to conduct a nuclear test in 24-36 months to
18 months. Why is this action being taken and how much will it cost to
achieve and maintain this level of readiness?
Ambassador Brooks. It is only prudent to continue to hedge for the
possibility that we may in the future uncover a safety or reliability
problem in a warhead critical to the U.S. deterrent that could not be
fixed without nuclear testing. Were that to be the case, we might
require a test sooner than would be provided by our current 24-36 month
test readiness posture. As a result of the NPR, we have begun a
transition to an l8-month test readiness posture that will enhance the
responsiveness of stockpile stewardship efforts and thereby strengthen
national security. We chose 18 months as a test readiness figure
because that is typically how long it will take to diagnose and correct
an as yet unidentified problem.
In years prior to fiscal year 2003 request approximately $9 million
was identified in the RTBF/Program Readiness as unique for underground
test readiness activities at the Test Site. An additional $6 million is
required to maintain the 24-36 month test readiness posture bringing
the total to $15 million, an additional $10 million is needed to
progress towards an 18 month test readiness posture. We anticipate that
an annual total of $25 million is required to sustain an 18 month test
readiness posture.

21. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Brooks, has there been a formal
approval by the Nuclear Weapons Council of this level of readiness?
Ambassador Brooks. The transition to an 18 month test readiness
posture has been discussed with the Department of Defense, is
consistent with the Nuclear Posture Review, and has the concurrence of
the Nuclear Weapons Council.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS STOCKPILE

22. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Brooks, the nuclear weapons
stockpile is reviewed annually to confirm its safety and reliability.
In the most recent review the conclusion was again reached that the
stockpile is reliable and there is no need to test. Is there any
requirement to conduct a nuclear test at this time?
Ambassador Brooks. At the present time the NNSA Stockpile
Stewardship Program continues to deliver the science and technology
needed by the Directors of the three weapons labs to continue to
certify to the Secretaries of Energy and Defense that the stockpile
remains safe, secure, and reliable and that there is no need to conduct
a nuclear test at this time.

23. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Brooks, under what
circumstances would you recommend to the President that a resumption of
underground nuclear testing was needed?
Ambassador Brooks. I would recommend a resumption of underground
nuclear testing to the President if the laboratory directors advised me
that a high level of confidence in the safety or reliability of a
nuclear weapons type, critical to our nuclear deterrent could no longer
be certified without conducting a nuclear test.

STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIP PROGRAM

24. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Brooks, Stockpile Stewardship
is the program that the NNSA runs to maintain the nuclear weapons
stockpile without underground testing. The bulk of this program would
be needed even with nuclear testing, so in my opinion it is misleading
to assume that the sole purpose of the program is to replace testing,
and if the U.S. returned to testing the program would not be needed. Is
the Stockpile Stewardship Program providing the necessary tools to
provide needed confidence in the stockpile?
Ambassador Brooks. Yes. I agree with your statement that the bulk
of the Stewardship Program would be continued in the unlikely event
that the United States had to return to testing. Even when, prior to
1992, the United States was conducting underground tests the complex
performed a wide variety of physics and engineering experiments to have
confidence in the safety, security, and reliability of the stockpile.

25. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Brooks, are there any
shortcomings of the Stockpile Stewardship Program that you have
identified at this point?
Ambassador Brooks. No. Having served as the Acting Administrator of
the NNSA for the last 9 months, I have been deeply impressed with the
scientific rigor being applied by the weapons complex to ensure that
the nuclear weapons stockpile remains safe, secure, and reliable. I
will continue to closely monitor the work by the complex to ensure that
the best scientific and engineering tools are brought to bear on the
challenges of maintaining and the increasingly older nuclear weapons
stockpile.
______

[The nomination reference of Ambassador Linton F. Brooks
follows:]

Nomination Reference and report

As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
February 4, 2003.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
Linton F. Brooks, of Virginia, to be Under Secretary for Nuclear
Security, Department of Energy, vice Gen. John A. Gordon, USAF,
resigned.
______

[The biographical sketch of Ambassador Linton F. Brooks,
which was transmitted to the committee at the time the
nomination was referred, follows:]

Biographical Sketch of Ambassador Linton F. Brooks

Ambassador Linton F. Brooks was named the Acting Administrator of
the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) by President George
W. Bush on July 9, 2002. The NNSA carries out the national security
responsibilities of the Department of Energy. Prior to this, Ambassador
Brooks directed the NNSA's nonproliferation programs involving nuclear,
chemical, and biological weapons of mass destruction. The
nonproliferation office promotes international nuclear safety and
supports programs that ensure the security of nuclear weapons materials
in Russia and other countries. The nonproliferation office also
supports research and development of detection systems for biological
and chemical agents.
Prior to joining the Department of Energy, Ambassador Brooks served
as Vice President and Assistant to the President for Policy Analysis at
the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA), a federally-funded research and
development center located in Alexandria, Virginia from 1994 to 2001.
As such, he was responsible for broad policy analyses of issues of
national importance. Ambassador Brooks came to CNA following an
extensive career in government service. During the Bush administration,
he served as Assistant Director for Strategic and Nuclear Affairs at
the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and in the State
Department as Head of the United Stales Delegation on Nuclear and Space
Talks and Chief Strategic Arms Reductions (START) Negotiator. In this
latter capacity, he was responsible for final preparation of the START
I Treaty, which was signed by Presidents Bush and Gorbachev in Moscow
on July 31, 1991. In December 1992, he performed a similar function
during the final preparation of the January 3, 1993, START II Treaty.
Thereafter, he served as a consultant on START II ratification to the
Clinton administration.
Before becoming Head of the United States Delegation to the Nuclear
and Space Talks in April 1991, Ambassador Brooks served for 2 years as
Deputy Head of the Delegation, holding the rank of ambassador. He
joined the delegation after spending over 3 years as Director of Arms
Control on the staff of the National Security Council, where he was
responsible, among other things, for all aspects of United States
strategic aims reductions policy and nuclear testing policy during the
final third of the Reagan administration.
Ambassador Brooks' National Security Council service culminated a
30-year military career. Prior to his retirement as a Navy captain,
Ambassador Brooks served at sea in destroyers, ballistic-missile
submarines, and attack submarines, commanded the nuclear-powered attack
submarine U.S.S. Whale (SSN 638), and served in a variety of Washington
assignments relating to nuclear policy, military strategy, and arms
control.
Ambassador Brooks holds a BS in physics from Duke University, where
he was elected to Phi Beta Kappa, and an MA in government and politics
from the University of Maryland. He is a Distinguished Graduate of the
U.S. Navy War College and has published a number of prize-winning
articles on naval and nuclear strategy.
The son of a career Army officer, Ambassador Brooks was born in
Boston, Massachusetts, on August 15, 1938. He now resides in Vienna,
Virginia with his wife, the former Barbara Julius of Lancaster,
Pennsylvania. The couple has two grown daughters, Julie and Kathryn.
______

February 25, 2003.
Hon. John Warner,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
United States Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: This letter provides information on my financial
and other interests for your consideration in connection with my
nomination for the position of Under Secretary of Energy for Nuclear
Security and Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration.
It supplements Standard Form 278, ``Executive Personnel Financial
Disclosure Report,'' which has already been provided to the committee
and which summarizes my financial interests.
To the best of my knowledge, none of the financial interests listed
on my Standard Form 278 will create any conflict of interest in the
execution of my new governmental responsibilities. Additionally, I have
no other interests or liabilities in any amount with any firm or
organization that is a Department of Energy (DOE) contractor.
During my term of office, neither I nor any member of my immediate
family will invest in any organization identified as a DOE or
Department of Defense contractor or any other entity that would create
a conflict of interest with my government duties.
I do not have any present employment arrangements with any entity
other than DOE and have no formal or informal understandings concerning
any further employment with any entity. If confirmed, I am committed to
serve in this position at the pleasure of the President throughout his
term of office.
I have never been arrested or charged with any criminal offenses
other than minor traffic violations. I have never been party to any
civil litigation. To the best of my knowledge, there have never been
any lawsuits filed against any agency of the Federal Government or
corporate entity with which I have been associated reflecting adversely
on the work I have done at such agency or corporation. I am aware of no
incidents reflecting adversely upon my suitability to serve in the
position for which I have been nominated.
To the best of my knowledge, I am not presently the subject of any
governmental inquiry or investigation.
I am a member of certain organizations and professional societies,
which have been separately provided to the committee. None of these
should pose any conflict of interest with regard to my governmental
responsibilities. I trust that the foregoing information will be
satisfactory to the committee.
Sincerely,
Linton F. Brooks,
Acting Administrator.

UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Linton Forrestall Brooks; Nickname: Lint; Middle name misspelled on
birth certificate as ``Forestall''.

2. Position to which nominated:
Under Secretary of Energy for Nuclear Security and Administrator,
National Nuclear Security Administration.

3. Date of nomination:
February 4, 2003.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
August 15, 1938; Boston, Massachusetts.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Barbara Sue Julius on October 24, 1964.

7. Names and ages of children:
Julie K. Brooks (34); Kathryn L. Brooks (30).

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions,
dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.
Columbia High School, Columbia SC; 1954-55; Diploma.
Duke University, Durham, NC; 1955-59; BS; June 1959.
University of Maryland, College Park, MD; 1969-72; MS; August 1972.
U.S. Navy War College, Newport, RI; 1978-79; Certificate.

9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the
last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of
job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, National
Nuclear Security Administration, Department of Energy, Washington DC;
October 2001.
Vice President, Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, VA; April
1993-October 2001.
Consultant, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Washington,
DC; January 1993-September 1995 (part time).

10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
or local governments, other than those listed above.
U.S. Navy officer; June 1959-May 1989.
U.S. State Department; June 1989-August 1992.
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; August 1992-January 1993.

12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
United States Naval Institute (professional).
U.S. Naval Submarine League (professional).
Chase Hill Civic Association (civic).
No offices held.

14. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions
for outstanding service or achievements.
State Department Distinguished Honor Award (2)
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Distinguished Honor Award
Military decorations: Defense Distinguished Service Medal, Defense
Superior Service Medal, Legion of Merit (3), Navy Commendation Medal
Arleigh Burke Prize for professional writing
Richard G. Colbert Prize for professional writing
Phi Beta Kappa

15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of
books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have
written.
Book (co-editor with Arnold Kanter): U.S. Intervention Policy for
the Post-Cold War World: New Challenges and New Responses, (An American
Assembly Book), New York, W. W. Norton & Co., 1994.
Book Chapter: ``Conflict Termination Through Maritime Leverage'' in
Stephen J. Cimbala and Keith Dunn (eds) Conflict Termination and
Military Strategy; Westview Press, 1987; ``Diplomatic Solutions to the
`Problem' of Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons,'' (forthcoming).
Monograph--Peacetime Influence Through Forward Naval Presence, CNA
Occasional Paper, Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, Virginia,
October 1993.
Articles in International Security--``Naval Power and National
Security; The Case for the Maritime Strategy'' (Fall 1986); ``Nuclear
SLCMs Add to Deterrence and Security,'' (Winter 1988/1989).
Articles in Naval War College Review--``Pricing Ourselves Out of
the Market: The Attack Submarine Program'' (September-October 1979);
``An Examination of the Professional Concerns of Naval Officers as
Reflected in Their Professional Journal'' (January-February 1980).
Articles in Submarine Review--``Strategic Planning in the Submarine
Force'' (January 1985); ``Forward Submarine Operations and Strategic
Stability'' (April 1993); ``Comments on Defensive Anti-Air Warfare for
SSNs'' (July 1994); ``Waiting for START III'' (October 1998).
Articles in the Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute--
``Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Forgotten Facet of Naval Warfare'' (January
1980); ``It's Time to Start Speaking Up'' (January 1985); `` `New' As
in Nuclear Land Attack Tomahawk'' (April 1985); ``Escalation and Naval
Strategy'' (August 1985); ``The Nuclear Maritime Strategy'' (April
1987); ``Nuclear weapons at Sea'' (August 1988) (with Franklin C.
Miller); ``Dropping the Baton'' (June 1989); ``Why Doesn't the Navy
Make More Use of the Retired Community'' (January 1994); ``The New
Nuclear Threat'' (May 1994).
Comment and Discussion in the Proceedings of the United States
Naval Institute--October 1983 (Operations in a nuclear environment);
November 1984 (Anti-SSBN operations); December 1984 (Nuclear
escalation); August 1985 (Tomahawk missiles).
Article in Undersea Warfare (official Navy publication); ``Arms
Control and Submarines,'' (Spring 2001).
Articles published in my official capacity and representing U.S.
Government positions; ``The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty: Reducing
the Risk of War,'' NATO Review, Volume 39, Number 5 (October 1991);
``START: An End and a Beginning,'' Disarmament, Volume XV, Number 2
(1992).

17. Commitment to Testify before Senate Committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to respond to requests to appear and testify before any
duly constituted committee of the Senate?
Yes.
______

Signature and Date
I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement
on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information
provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate,
and complete.
Linton F. Brooks.
This 23rd day of February, 2003.

[The nomination of Ambassador Linton F. Brooks was reported
to the Senate by Chairman Warner on March 6, 2003, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on May 1, 2001.]

NOMINATION OF LTG JOHN P. ABIZAID, USA, FOR APPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF
GENERAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND

----------

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 25, 2003

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:38 a.m., room
SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator John Warner
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Warner, Inhofe,
Roberts, Allard, Sessions, Cornyn, Levin, Reed, Bill Nelson,
and E. Benjamin Nelson.
Committee staff members present: Judith A. Ansley, staff
director; and Gabriella Eisen, nominations clerk.
Majority staff members present: Charles W. Alsup,
professional staff member; Ambrose R. Hock, professional staff
member; Thomas L. MacKenzie, professional staff member; Paula
J. Philbin, professional staff member; Lynn F. Rusten,
professional staff member; Scott W. Stucky, general counsel;
and Richard F. Walsh, counsel.
Minority staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes,
Democratic staff director; Daniel J. Cox, Jr., professional
staff member; and Maren R. Leed, professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Andrew W. Florell and Sara R.
Mareno.
Committee members' assistants present: James Beauchamp,
assistant to Senator Roberts; Jayson Roehl, assistant to
Senator Allard; Arch Galloway II, assistant to Senator
Sessions; Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss;
Russell J. Thomasson, assistant to Senator Cornyn; Barry Gene
(B.G.) Wright, assistant to Senator Byrd; Elizabeth King,
assistant to Senator Reed; Eric Pierce, assistant to Senator
Ben Nelson; and Andrew Shapiro, assistant to Senator Clinton.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Warner. Good morning, everyone. The committee
meets today to seek testimony concerning the nomination by the
President of the United States of Lieutenant General John P.
Abizaid, United States Army, for appointment to the grade of
General and to be Commander, United States Central Command
(CENTCOM). We are privileged to have before the committee this
morning a nominee who played such a pivotal role in the vital
mission of Operation Iraqi Freedom by the coalition forces. As
Deputy Commander, Combined Forces Command, forward-located in
Qatar, General Abizaid was General Frank's principal deputy in
the planning and execution of Operation Iraqi Freedom.
I compliment you, General, your staff, and most especially
the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines, together with the
coalition partners, who achieved the remarkable 17-day advance
to Baghdad which eventually led to the overthrow of the
ruthless, tragic Saddam Hussein regime.
However, the continuing loss of life and limb is very much
on the minds of all here in America, especially Congress. The
danger to the United States and the coalition forces, as we all
know so well, continues. The most challenging phases of this
military operation may well be now and in the days and months
and perhaps years to come as we attempt to bring peace,
security, and democracy to the people of Iraq.
All of us, the American people, Congress, and especially
the families of those of the military currently serving in Iraq
and in Afghanistan, are concerned about security situations in
both of these areas of your command.
We also would like to welcome your wife here this morning.
I wonder if you might be gracious enough to introduce her.

STATEMENT OF LTG JOHN P. ABIZAID, USA, FOR APPOINTMENT TO THE
GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, UNITED STATES CENTRAL
COMMAND

General Abizaid. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to
introduce my wife, Kathy Abizaid. We went to high school
together, managed to get married after I graduated from West
Point, and we have been married for 30 years.
She is the sole reason that I have three great kids that
are serving their country, and she has been a marvelous partner
to be with in these 30 years of service to the Nation. She is
the smart one of the family, sir.
Chairman Warner. Your humility shows through, General; a
touch of that, as always, is a very valuable asset.
I have had the privilege of being associated with military
families for a very long time. There is an old saying, a good
military wife makes a good military soldier. Now, today, with
our modern forces, the converse is often true. We have many
women serving with great distinction in military positions.
So we send our thanks to you, Kathleen, and your family for
giving support. I had the opportunity to visit with you this
morning, and your grandfather served in World War I in the
trenches, as did my father. Both of them were doctors. General
Abizaid has a superb record of military service, one of the
most impressive compilations of joint duty that this committee
has had before it in some time. The joint service operations I
think reached an all-time high water mark in the course of the
Iraqi operations.
His prior assignments as Director of the Joint Staff,
Director for Strategic, Plans, and Policies, J-5, of the Joint
Staff, and a participant in joint operations in Kosovo and
Bosnia, and in northern Iraq following Operation Desert Storm,
qualify this nominee, in my judgment, for the challenges of
command.
More importantly, General Abizaid brings a unique
perspective. He is truly an expert on and a student of the
region to which CENTCOM has most of its responsibilities. He is
currently serving his fifth tour of duty in the Middle East. He
is fluent in Arabic, has studied the Middle East, and has a
very proud family heritage closely tied to the cultures of this
region.
General Abizaid also brings a special family perspective to
this position and responsibility. He is the son of a man who
served this Nation as a Navy petty officer in World War II, and
his children are involved in military responsibilities in
various stations around the globe.
General Abizaid will bring the intellect of a Middle East
expert, the wisdom of a compassionate leader, and the passion
and understanding of a parent to this challenging position. The
soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines under your command,
together with those in the coalition forces, are fortunate
indeed that the President has selected you for this position,
and that you are willing to serve, together with your family.
In this hearing today we will review the qualifications of
this superb soldier. The committee will also seek your
perspective on recent events in the region and the challenges
that lie ahead.
Together with Senator Levin and Senator Roberts, we met
with General Abizaid in Qatar in February. I think all of us
were very impressed with his candor and breadth of knowledge.
As I visited with him yesterday, I was reminded of how
remarkably experienced he is for this particular position.
I was also reminded, however, of the many issues that come
before Congress today, and indeed, the American public, who are
desirous to have a clear understanding of such issues as the
following:
What was the level of planning for our military with regard
to securing and stabilizing Iraq following major combat
operations? Was the level of resistance during the major
conflict, and particularly post-conflict, adequately evaluated?
Were preparations in place for those two levels of resistance?
In the course of the campaign you relied on the military
intelligence that you had. How accurate, in your judgment, was
it? What do we look at for the future in terms of intelligence,
the ability to get from the Iraqi people vital information to
try and complete the operations and turn over this Nation to
the people of Iraq?
Troop levels are a constant question. Did we have enough to
accomplish the mission? What does the future hold? How long do
you anticipate the United States will need to keep significant
military forces in Iraq?
I also want to pause for a moment. We were fortunate to
have coalition forces operating with us. Since Senator Roberts
and I met yesterday with a group of British Members of
Parliament, we expressed to them our profound sorrow over the
tragic losses of the British forces recently. Could you please
give us an update on that, and also the operation by which we
interdicted people moving from Iraq into Syria?
During our meeting in February, with the four Senators
visiting you at your headquarters, I asked you the same
question I have asked every single member of this
administration that has appeared before this committee or in
other fora here in the Senate--are we going to find weapons of
mass destruction after the troops move forward and the major
conflict has subsided, and the spotlight of the world press can
come in and take pictures and evaluate the existence or
nonexistence of weapons of mass destruction? At that time, you
gave me a reply, and perhaps in the course of your testimony
today you can address that reply and what you did subsequent to
our meeting to confirm the credibility of your reply.
General Abizaid, we thank you for your service to the
Nation. Thank you for your willingness to lend your
considerable talent to this most difficult of challenges. We
look forward to your testimony.
But I do hope that you have had an opportunity this morning
to look into today's paper, in which I thought there was a very
direct reference to the concern throughout many circles about
the ability of the military to grapple with these challenges
that are being presented today, and the risks that each of them
were experiencing; and indeed, in some instances, loss of life
and limb.
This article recites, ``The teams were established and
trained to provide emergency humanitarian aid to deal with
refugees who perform basic infrastructure repair, not to
rebuild town governments, set up courts, disperse salaries,
sort out agricultural problems, and take on many of the other
chores we have been forced to perform in postwar Iraq.
``We have been given a job that we haven't been prepared
for, we haven't been trained for, we weren't really ready
for,'' said a senior civil affairs officer in central Iraq. ``A
lot of the stuff we are doing, we are making it up as we go
along.''
Now, we all respect the perspective and viewpoints of
others, particularly public servants who are trying to do their
best. But it is clear that in the course of our training, from
boot camp to advanced training, military missions are quite
clear. Soldiers and other military men are trained to seize an
objective and utilize firepower; and under the protection of
that firepower--often under the protection of heavy armor, and
with little doubt as to when and how they are to use their
weapons to protect themselves and gain the objective.
Now they are stranded with 360-degree exposure, often in
ones and twos on the streets of Iraq. They are suffering the
consequences. They are dealing with civilians, and it is quite
a high level of concern here in this committee and in Congress
as to whether or not the planning of this was adequate.
Did we foresee the measure of instability that we are now
encountering? Are we prepared today? If not, what are we going
to do to fill the gap?
You are taking over this command and following a very
distinguished record of achievement by General Franks. He will
be appearing before this committee in open and closed sessions
shortly after the Fourth of July recess period. We will have
the opportunity to talk with him.
I am quite interested in how you are going to take on your
responsibilities. Do you have a change of direction, with no
disrespect to what General Franks did? But you have a mission
that is somewhat different than when you were his principal
deputy and planning for the combat phases.
Senator Levin, do you have a few remarks at this time that
you would like to make? Would you like to address the General
or the committee?
Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me join you in
extending a warm welcome to General Abizaid and his family.
General, you have been nominated to be the commander of the
most challenging of all the areas of responsibility of our
combatant commands. I usually don't distinguish between those
commands, but in this case I think it is obvious that yours is
extraordinarily challenging.
You have in your area of responsibility Afghanistan and
Iraq, where U.S. and coalition forces have recently fought
major conflicts. In the case of Iraq, they are still involved
in conflicts. They are dangerous places for forces conducting
stability operations. Moreover, the Central Command area of
responsibility includes Iran, which continues to pose a
potential threat to regional peace and security, as well as a
number of nations whose territory has proven hospitable to
terrorist organizations.
In sum, after you are confirmed you will have one
dangerous, difficult region under your command. I do not know
of anyone who is better qualified to take over this
responsibility than you are. As a matter of fact, it is hard
even to imagine a better qualified nominee than you. You bring
to this challenging new assignment a wealth of background,
experience, and talents. It makes you particularly well-suited
to a job that requires the mix of warfighter, strategist, and
diplomat.
The questions which Senator Warner has asked, and the rest
of us will ask, are critically important and very difficult. We
are glad that you are going to be there to address the issues
that are raised by these questions.
We congratulate you on this appointment. We thank you for
your extended service to this Nation. We thank your family for
their commitment to your service and to our Nation.
You might have exaggerated just slightly when you said that
your wife was the sole reason for your three children; but
other than that, I have no doubt that your comments about her
are totally accurate.
Marrying a high school sweetheart is always a wonderful
love story. I'm sure the two of you have enjoyed those years
together, and hopefully that enjoyment will continue when you
undertake your new responsibilities. You already have
undertaken this responsibility, so your wife knows what you are
in for and what she is in for. Nonetheless, it is an additional
responsibility that will now rest on your shoulders.
I know this committee and the entire Nation are grateful
for that service and that willingness to continue to serve this
wonderful country of ours.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator Levin.
Senator Levin, I think we should state, for the benefit of
those members of the committee who were not with us yesterday
morning, that 10 members of the committee had breakfast with
Secretary Rumsfeld. We covered a wide range of issues, some of
which we will discuss here today.
I notice in today's press that Secretary Rumsfeld states
that he gave an energetic endorsement of pre-war intelligence
in Iraq, and that virtually everyone agreed that Baghdad had
weapons of mass destruction. The article has further details. I
mention that because that is a subject that this committee will
be considering in the context of the appearance of all the
witnesses, and you and I have extended to Secretary Rumsfeld
repeated invitations to come forward to the committee. I am
hopeful that that can be achieved just after the Fourth of July
recess.
When we go through the standard questions, it is very
important we have a record that reflects your replies. You gave
answers to a series of questions propounded by the committee.
They will be made part of the record. The standard questions we
ask in open session are as follows.
Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations
governing conflicts of interest?
General Abizaid. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken
any actions which appeared to presume the outcome of the
confirmation process?
General Abizaid. No, sir.
Chairman Warner. Will you assure your staff complies with
deadlines regarding communications, including questions for the
record and hearings?
General Abizaid. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses
and briefers in response to congressional inquiries?
General Abizaid. Yes, sir, I will.
Chairman Warner. Will those witnesses be protected from
reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
General Abizaid. Yes, they will.
Chairman Warner. Have you any opening remarks? We will let
you proceed with those momentarily.
I want to make one other comment. I mentioned that four of
us were visiting with you in February. Senator Levin and I and
some colleagues hope to be joining you in the not too distant
future in your AOR.
The subject of congressional delegations is very important.
Congress is a coequal body of our Government. We have very
important oversight responsibilities. Throughout history,
committees of the armed services, the House and Senate
particularly, have initiated many programs on behalf of the men
and women of the United States military.
I say ``initiated.'' They were actually thought through and
designed in Congress. We have a very special trust and
responsibility for the welfare of all those in uniform and
their families. Part of that requires that we periodically
visit them when they are serving in the far-flung outposts of
the world.
Yesterday Secretary Rumsfeld confirmed the importance of
Members of Congress being able to go into the field and perform
their continuing oversight responsibilities.
Our trip has been well-planned, and we expressed
appreciation to General Franks and yourself. We anticipate it
will be very successful. I bring that up only in the context
that I am hopeful other Members of Congress--particularly this
committee and other committees of the Senate with very special
oversight responsibilities on matters of national security--can
avail themselves of the opportunity to visit your AOR at this
particular point in time in history and work with you such that
they can bring back a better and broader understanding of the
challenges facing the men and women in the Armed Forces.
Thank you very much. I would be happy to receive your
opening comments at this time.
General Abizaid. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me start by
saying we certainly do welcome you into the area of operations,
and we agree with you 100 percent that it is important for you
to see the great work our young men and women are doing out
there.
Mr. Chairman and Senator Levin, distinguished members of
the committee, I consider it an honor to be nominated to serve
as Commander of CENTCOM, and I appreciate the confidence of the
Secretary of Defense and the President in making this
nomination. I appreciate your consideration of that nomination,
as well.
Thank you for your support, and for the wonderful support,
I might add, that you have given to the men and women that have
served so well and so faithfully in the CENTCOM area of
operations in war, and now in stability operations in places
like Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Horn of Africa. I would
consider it the greatest privilege to serve as their commander,
and I can think of no honor greater than to serve as the leader
of American service people.
Before I open for questions, sir, I would just like to add
my condolences to yours and the rest of the men and women in
Central Command to the families of the six British servicemen
that were killed yesterday in Iraq; and, I might add, to all of
the servicemen and women that have given their lives there.
They are doing wonderful work. We appreciate their sacrifice.
I am open to your questions, sir.
Chairman Warner. Thank you. We will go to a 6-minute round.
I am glad that you mentioned that. I'm sure that you would have
covered that.
Let us go back to our conversation that took place in
February with regard to weapons of mass destruction, when I did
ask you what you anticipated. Perhaps at this time you can just
review what you stated, and the fact that you went back to
corroborate your own opinions with the experts within your
command.
General Abizaid. Yes, sir. During your visit, you asked me
very directly, in no uncertain terms, whether I believed we
would find weapons of mass destruction, either in the course of
the campaign or afterwards. I believe that I told you that we
would, and I thought we would do it rather early in the
campaign. I believe I also said that I expected that the enemy
would use weapons of mass destruction against our troops.
Fortunately, they did not use weapons of mass destruction
against our troops.
Chairman Warner. We certainly all share in that good
fortune, by the grace of God.
General Abizaid. I believe that--as we get on with the
mission of continuing to look for weapons of mass destruction
and piece together the evidence that is available within the
country, not only by looking through documents but also by
talking to various people that have come forward to give us
information, or people that we have detained that we are asking
for information--that we will piece together the story that
tells us what happened to the weapons of mass destruction
somewhere between 1998 and 2003.
I am confident we will show that there was deception, and I
am also confident that at some point it will lead us to actual
weapons of mass destruction.
Chairman Warner. I share in those views, General. I
continue to believe that the intelligence was accurate, that
the weapons are somewhere concealed, or remnants of the
destruction, and that eventually this will be unfolded. Perhaps
the one thing we can agree on is that we anticipated an earlier
discovery than has occurred thus far. But I know that the
intelligence operations of other governments in the coalition
forces and so forth shared with us the expectations that you
have expressed with regard to these weapons of mass
destruction.
Let us turn to your military intelligence. As a
consequence, recently, there has been, in the views of some--
not this Senator, but the views of some--concern. I think on
behalf of the others--with whom I disagree--it is somewhat
legitimate, as to the validity of that type of intelligence, an
example being the thought that we would soon find weapons of
mass destruction. That is just one example. What do you think
about the quality of the intelligence you had and that the
operations, as they progressed, relied on, and was that
reliance accurate?
The intelligence regarding the future of Iraq, how accurate
do you feel it was?
General Abizaid. Senator, I believe that my overall
assessment of how intelligence served us throughout the
campaign would be that that intelligence was the most accurate
that I have ever seen on the tactical level, probably the best
I have ever seen on the operational level, and perplexingly
incomplete on the strategic level with regard to weapons of
mass destruction.
Let me talk about the tactical level of the quality of
intelligence. Never before have we had such a complete picture
of enemy tactical dispositions and intentions. I think largely
the speed of the campaign was incredibly enabled by the
complete picture we had of the enemy on the battlefield.
From an operational point of view, as we did the planning,
as General Franks postulated what would happen--all of which
was, of course, enabled by intelligence professionals
throughout the community--we came up with a remarkably clear
picture of what the enemy would do operationally. We expected
to fight the main battle between the line of Karbalah, Kut, and
Baghdad. We expected it to be fought against the four
Republican Guard divisions, and we largely expected their exact
positions on the battlefield. We were prepared in our overall
strategic plan to take advantage of that.
Certain things about our strategic intelligence were quite
good. For example, the top 55 leaders, where were they, what
were they doing, what were they thinking, et cetera. Today we
stand at 32 of those top 55, or 52, people in our custody. That
is a real tribute to our strategic intelligence, as well as the
skill of our special operators who have gone forward and
detained many of them. But it is perplexing to me, Senator,
that we have not found weapons of mass destruction when the
evidence was so pervasive that it would exist. After your
visit, I called in my intelligence staff, because you were so
adamant--not only you, but also Senator Levin--about
understanding the questions with regard to the weapons of mass
destruction.
Now, I put my intelligence professionals around the table--
and this was before General Franks had arrived in the theater,
or perhaps he was out traveling around. I asked, is there
anybody around this table who believes we will not find weapons
of mass destruction in Iraq? To a man and to a woman, they all
said we would find them.
So the confidence of the intelligence professionals, and my
confidence in them, was high, and actually, it remains high. It
is interesting, as we conducted the campaign, that as we
overran positions early in the campaign we found an incredible
amount of defensively oriented chemical equipment. I surmise
from that that they were certainly intending somewhere in the
campaign to use weapons of mass destruction. As a matter of
fact, we had a lot of intelligence that said there was a red
line that existed along the line Kut to Al Amarah and Karbalah,
that once we crossed that line and closed in on Baghdad, we
could expect weapons of mass destruction.
In 1991, I had served in northern Iraq. I had seen up in
the Kurdish areas the fact that the Iraqis had used chemicals
against their own people. We certainly knew from studying the
campaigns with the Iranians during the 8-year war that they had
used chemical weapons. A lot of the intelligence traffic
indicated on a tactical level, as well as a strategic level,
that they would use it against us.
Chairman Warner. Let me move on to the question that I
raised in reading the daily press about the training of our
people to take on the very risky business that they are
undertaking today and tomorrow and in the indefinite future.
What can you tell us about that? Were we adequately
prepared to deal with this insurgency among particularly the
Baathist party, which has somehow come together, whether by
communications or just old maxims and instructions, and is now
in all probability at the root cause of the daily loss of life
and limb and the insurgency we are seeing? How best can we
prevent that, and stop it?
Also, to what extent does the mystery of Saddam Hussein
still filter down to give incentives to certain elements,
particularly the Baathists, who promote this insurgency?
General Abizaid. Sir, to the broader question as to whether
or not we are prepared for environments such as that we are now
facing in Iraq, the answer is yes. We have been serving in
places like Kosovo and Bosnia for a long time. The tradition of
the United States Army in particular goes back many years to
constabulary duty all around the world.
We have a tradition and we have a sense of training that
allows us to deal with these difficult types of conditions. The
troops would prefer to be involved in direct combat, as all of
us would, because it is cleaner and it is much more easy to
deal with. But I think all of us understand that in this part
of the world in particular, that it is going to be dangerous
duty, that there are people that don't want us to be there, and
that they will oppose us being there.
I would characterize the opposition that we face in Iraq as
essentially being of three types. The first is the residual
Baathist activity that we see in the Baathist stronghold in a
triangle described by Baghdad, Ar Ramadi, and Tikrit. That is a
very tough area. We believe that there are a number of Baathist
cells that continue to operate there.
Their level of organization doesn't seem to be high to me.
There is nothing that will defeat us militarily that will come
out of that triangle. The way best to deal with the Baathist
resurgence and the Baathist activity there is to take the
battle to them, to be offensive, dismantle the cells, kill
those who would try to kill us, and be very aggressive.
The second level of activity we see in Iraq is that of what
I think is best described as radical anti-American Islamist;
although I use the term ``Islamist'' advisedly, because they
are very un-Islamic in the way they go about doing their
terrorist activities.
We recently had a major strike against a camp of foreign
fighters in the western desert that was quite successful that
indicated that there were foreign fighters from places
throughout the Middle East. I do not believe that these
Jihadists are allied with the Baathists, but it is clear that
they will move towards the ungoverned spaces. Iraq to a certain
extent in certain areas is certainly without government, and
people are moving into those areas to take advantage of
American forces being there, to attack us. Again, the way we
need to deal with them is to be offensive, to find them, and to
attack them, and also to ensure that we pay attention to what
is moving along the Syrian, Jordanian, and Saudi borders, in
particular.
The third level that we find, which is always difficult to
deal with because we are not policemen, has to do with the
criminal element, with the complete collapse of security in
Iraq. With the dissolution of the Saddam Hussein government,
there is no doubt that there is an increase in criminal
activity. Some of the criminals are very well-armed, and when
we come up against them, it appears as if you are dealing with
organized military types, but that is not the case.
So again, dealing with the criminal element becomes a
tougher problem for us. That is one that won't be solved by all
the soldiers in the United States Army, and that will be solved
by building police capacity within Iraq, and time and training
and effort to reform Iraqi police institutions.
Chairman Warner. I anticipate the Senate will confirm you
very promptly. Once you take office, are you going to change
the tactics or the rules of engagement to try and give a
greater degree of protection to our soldiers?
General Abizaid. Sir, the best protection that we can give
our soldiers is an offensive spirit in a tough place. That is
what they need to have. They need to go out and seek the enemy.
They need to bring the fight to the enemy. They need to defeat
the enemy.
We will be able to do that as long as we don't hunker down
in base camps and try to avoid contact. We need to seek
contact. We need to be aggressive. That is what we are doing in
Iraq. We have rules of engagement in doing that.
It is mischaracterized, unfortunately, in the press that we
are sitting around being attacked. In at least half of the
actions that take place there, we are the folks that initiate
the contact. So we will do everything we can to protect our
soldiers and maintain an offensive spirit and take the fight to
the enemy. Over time, we will bring the situation under
control.
Chairman Warner. Senator Levin.
Senator Levin. General, I want to refer to the same article
that Chairman Warner made reference to as to whether or not our
forces there are prepared and trained to carry out the tasks
that they now have. I think, to summarize them, without much
doubt they are really nation-building tasks. Would you, first
of all, agree that they are adequately prepared for these
nation-building tasks?
Second, would you address the issue as to who is really in
charge? What is the relationship between you and Ambassador
Bremer on the civilian side?
General Abizaid. Yes, sir. First of all, there is no
strictly military solution to the problem of bringing stability
to Iraq. It requires a national effort. It requires bringing
together not only all of the resources of the national
community, and of the interagency community, but it also
requires bringing together a lot of the resources of the
international community.
The military tasks of bringing security and stability are
tasks for which we are very adequately prepared. There are
requirements for building police forces that are not exactly
within what I would describe as a job description for the Armed
Forces of the United States. Yet, we do that. The marines have
done a wonderful job in southern Iraq in building police
capacity.
We sometimes forget that we have 8,000 police on duty in
Baghdad, for example. I think overall in the entire country we
probably have somewhere around 30,000 or 40,000 police back on
duty, and they have been brought back on duty through the good
offices of soldiers and marines.
That having been said, are we prepared to rebuild
governmental institutions? No, we are not. We need to turn to
Ambassador Bremer to write a constitution and to cause
political activity to take place that is acceptable to the
Iraqi people, that will allow institutions to move forward in a
manner that will give hope for the future of Iraq. That is not
a military task, and that is not something we are trained for.
We look to Ambassador Bremer on the civilian side to do that.
Ambassador Bremer reports directly to the President through the
Secretary of Defense as the Coalition Provisional Authority. He
brings together the civil side of the house in ensuring that
all the resources that the United States Government and the
coalition can be brought together are brought together to help
Iraq move forward and rebuild institutions, et cetera.
He is served by the commander of Combined Joint Task Force
7 commanded by Lieutenant General Rick Sanchez as his military
arm; I won't say his military commander, because Ambassador
Bremer is not in the military chain of command. But clearly,
Ambassador Bremer sets broad priorities for General Sanchez.
General Sanchez works for General Franks in the direct military
chain of command, and of course, then through the Secretary of
Defense.
So I think that the arrangements with Ambassador Bremer
being there, with the Coalition Provisional Authority being
given a lot of authority--especially fiscal authority--to build
institutions in Iraq, will, over time, make a huge difference.
I would like to remind you that we only crossed the line of
departure 98 days ago. I think that the progress that we have
made is actually amazing. If I were just to relate to you very
quickly my impressions of Baghdad, I have been to Baghdad every
week since the end of the war----
Senator Levin. If I could interrupt you because of a
shortage of time. Please forgive me for doing that.
General Abizaid. Certainly.
Senator Levin. General Sanchez, he reports to General
Franks, correct?
General Abizaid. Yes, sir.
Senator Levin. But what is the relationship between Sanchez
and Bremer?
General Abizaid. The relationship between Sanchez and
Bremer is that General Sanchez coordinates directly with
Ambassador Bremer for his broad priorities within Iraq.
Senator Levin. So Franks reports, then, to the Secretary of
Defense, and Bremer reports to the Secretary of Defense?
General Abizaid. Yes, sir.
Senator Levin. Which means that in terms of the chain of
command, they come together in terms of a unified chain at the
Secretary of Defense?
General Abizaid. That is correct.
Senator Levin. We have about 145,000 troops now in Iraq, is
that correct?
General Abizaid. That is correct, sir.
Senator Levin. Do you expect that number will remain about
the same, or could it change up or down, somewhat?
General Abizaid. Sir, the number can go up and the number
can go down. First and foremost, it depends upon the enemy
situation. I think right now we have sufficient number of
troops to deal with the tasks at hand that we are faced with
militarily.
Senator Levin. Do you expect that number or approximately
that number would be needed for the foreseeable future?
General Abizaid. I think that the number can come down once
we finish with our current offensive operations, which we will
reevaluate on or about the 30th of June.
The other factors that influence it, Senator, are the
number of police that are functioning and reliable within Iraq;
the number of coalition forces that will come into Iraq that
are international forces; and finally, the degree of progress
that we have on the Iraqi national army.
Senator Levin. If it does come down somewhat for whatever
reason, do you estimate that at least for the foreseeable
future, that we still will require a significant number of
troops in Iraq?
General Abizaid. For the foreseeable future, we will
require a large number of troops for Iraq.
Senator Levin. On the weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
question, I think you are right that just about everybody that
I know of expected that we would find WMD. Many still do. It is
still very possible that we will find WMD. That confidence
level was based on the intelligence that we received. Would you
agree with that?
General Abizaid. Yes, sir.
Senator Levin. When you indicated that your forces found
defensive WMD as you overran positions, did they find any
offensive WMD, such as artillery shells or any Scud missiles?
General Abizaid. No.
Senator Levin. That is what you indicate is the perplexing
incompleteness, is that correct?
General Abizaid. I thought as we crossed what we termed
``the red line'' that we would overrun artillery units that had
chemical warheads.
Senator Levin. Finally, in terms of the relationship
between the military forces and Ambassador Bremer, has there
been any change since Ambassador Bremer arrived in that
relationship from what it was when General Garner was there?
General Abizaid. I think the number one change is that we
co-located the headquarters of General Sanchez with that of
Ambassador Bremer. I think it was a very good decision to make,
to bring the two of them together so they could coordinate very
closely on day-to-day operations. That is the biggest change I
would note.
Senator Levin. General Sanchez still reports to you.
General Abizaid. He reports to General Franks, yes.
Senator Levin. Excuse me.
General Abizaid. Yes, sir.
Senator Levin. He will be reporting to you, hopefully, in
the next couple of days.
General Abizaid. Hopefully, yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. Thank you.
Senator Roberts.
Senator Roberts. General, thank you for visiting with me on
Monday. As has already been indicated by the chairman, we truly
appreciate your candor and the information you provided us
concerning the challenges that CENTCOM faces.
When we were in your AOR just prior to kickoff of the
military operations--we just had a very frank visit with you.
In terms of forthrightness, candor, and frankness, I think you
gave us the best briefing that we received.
It may have already been mentioned, Mr. Chairman, but it
certainly bears repeating that this is very much a family
affair for this nominee. His daughter, only 24, is now in Qatar
working on important issues as a DOD civilian. His son-in-law
just came back from Afghanistan. His son, P.F.C. Abizaid, just
came back from Korea. This is a remarkable family with
remarkable dedication to service to our country.
Let me just follow up, if I might. We had a discussion that
the chairman has already gone into, as well as Senator Levin.
You mentioned the foreign intervention and the criminal
element, the ongoing challenges in regard to the cities, the
Shi'as, and the de-Baathizah--I think that was your word; I am
not sure there is a word, but we just coined a new one--and all
the problems and challenges that entails.
I wanted you to touch a little bit on Saddam Hussein. There
were some comments made immediately after the major war effort
was declared over that it didn't make much difference--I know
you didn't say this--whether he was alive or dead, that the
regime has changed.
I think it makes a great deal of difference. Would you
reflect on that for me in regard to the fear factor and the
tribal influence; that after 30 years of degradation and
absolute barbaric rule, that perhaps we underestimated the fear
factor. Also, the factor in the Baathist loyalists and the
Saddam Hussein Fedayeen that if there is hope he is alive, that
there would be some sliver of hope they may be restored to
their position of power.
Would you amplify on those issues a little bit?
General Abizaid. Yes, sir. I agree with you, Senator, that
it is very important to confirm or deny whether Saddam Hussein
is alive or dead. It is important because the fear factor is
high. It is important because he was a brutal dictator who
killed hundreds of thousands of his own people. It is important
for the Iraqi people to come to closure with this nightmare
that he imposed upon them.
I believe that the Baathist party 30-year reign of terror
will not come to an end easily until we can show them that not
only can we get 32 of the 52, but we can get 52 of the 52. So
we need to continue to answer the question of whether he is
alive or dead.
I would say, Senator, that it is an open question as to
whether he is alive or dead. Certainly the capture of the
number four man on the list, Abid Hamid, is a very important
step. I don't know that we could necessarily believe what he is
telling us, but I do know that when you start finding people
like him you are on the right trail.
It is also important to note that it is not just us looking
for Saddam. There are literally hundreds and thousands of
Iraqis that are looking for him, as well, because they have a
score to settle with him. There is not a family in Iraq that
hasn't suffered in some way.
That having been said, he does have a very strong tribal
loyalty up in the Tikrit area, and that tribal loyalty will not
be easily broken.
Senator Roberts. Could you amplify a little bit on Desert
Scorpion, in which you mentioned the need to engage the foreign
interventionists in regards to the young Jihadists that are
coming from all over the Middle East?
I think that, following your line of thinking, instead of
attacking the consulate and embassy or hospital or something of
this nature, if in fact they wanted to take part against the
great Satan, all they had to do is come to Iraq and there are
145,000 Americans there that become targets.
You also indicated to me that through Desert Scorpion not
only did we engage, but we set them back considerably. This was
a very different kind of situation than they had originally
thought. So are we making progress in regard to that kind of a
situation. To set them back, in other words.
General Abizaid. Senator, I believe that in the broader
global war on terrorism, especially in the CENTCOM area of
operations, that we have made a lot of progress. We have set
the terrorists back in Afghanistan, we have set the terrorists
back in Iraq, we have set the terrorists back in other places.
Every terrorist that we find and kill in the Middle East is one
less that will find his way to the United States to kill us
here, so we need to bring the war to them. Desert Scorpion was
a perfect example of how we could do that.
Senator Roberts. It is my understanding that we will be
getting some international help in dividing up sectors of Iraq
along the lines of Kosovo, if that is an allegorical example. I
don't know if it is or not, but with Poland and Britain.
Are there any other of the allies in regard to your
information that may be providing some assistance?
General Abizaid. Sir, we will be receiving about 30,000
coalition troops between now and September. I know the
department is working on bringing more coalition forces in. We
have a British division that will be in the south that will
include Italian, Dutch, and other contingents.
The Polish division will go into the South Central portion.
That will include some Ukrainian and some other contingents. I
know the department is talking with other nations, as we will,
about bringing in coalition forces. I would prefer to take that
one for the record, Senator, and give you a complete list,
rather than try to do it from memory.
[The information referred to follows:]

As of July 15, 2003, 20 countries have military personnel deployed
in Iraq as follows:

[Deleted] Poland.
Australia [Deleted] United Kingdom.

Seventeen additional countries are planning to deploy military
personnel to Iraq as follows:

[Deleted].

Military to military discussions are initiated and ongoing with 10
other countries as follows:

[Deleted].

Senator Roberts. I will use the expression that it is very
true in this particular case that this general is the right man
for the right job at the right time.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator Roberts. I think you
will find strong concurrence in that observation among the
members of the committee.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Welcome,
General Abizaid. I have had the privilege of knowing John
Abizaid for 30 years. We were lieutenants together in the 504th
Parachute Infantry. Back then, it was certain he would be
General, and it is certainly obvious today.
Chairman Warner. How certain was it that you would become a
Senator?
Senator Reed. That was uncertain.
General Abizaid. We were certain of that.
Senator Reed. I will second the comments of all my
colleagues: there is no one better prepared for this important
and critical assignment than John Abizaid. It is a function of
his intellect, his experience, and his character. All those
virtues will be tested mightily in the days ahead.
I also second his recognition of his wife, Kathleen, and
his family. They have been an integral part of everything he
has done. I don't think it was humility, Mr. Chairman. It was
just sheer honesty that he gave credit to Kathy for all the
good things that happened in his life. He is an honest person.
John, General, I am delighted that you are here and that
you will take on this responsibility.
One of the facts I think that we are facing today in Iraq
is an insurgency which is already causing us casualties, and
which is directed against infrastructure. It is unclear yet
whether it is well-organized or if it is simply spontaneous,
but it is an insurgency.
Can you give us your estimate of whether the situation will
get worse before it gets better, or are we, in the days ahead,
in for some very difficult times before it is resolved?
General Abizaid. I think, Senator, we are certainly in for
some difficult days ahead periodically. It would not be safe to
say that the situation is going to continue to get worse. As a
matter of fact, I believe the thing that a lot of people
underestimate is the degree to which Iraqis want military
activity to end, as well.
There is a lot of support for the coalition presence, and
there will be more support for the coalition presence as we
build governmental institutions that are good for the future of
Iraq.
I think over time as we move forward on the economic,
diplomatic, and political fronts, that we will have less
military activity directed against us. But we should not kid
ourselves about the fact that we can be the subject of
terrorist attacks in Iraq, because we know people are coming
our way. We shouldn't kid ourselves about the ability of
Baathist groups to come forward and strike Americans or British
or other soldiers in a way that causes a lot of casualties.
That having been said, I just would like to say that there
are a lot of people in the Middle East that believe that our
weakness is our inability to stay the course. They believe that
two casualties today, two casualties tomorrow, four the next
day, will eventually drive us out. It is a belief they hold
firmly. We need to be just as firm that we can't be driven out.
Senator Reed. I concur with your assessment that there is
probably a thought that if we suffer casualties, we will be
driven out. But one important way to maintain the public
support that is necessary is to be absolutely candid and
forthright about the course that we will bear, in terms of
personnel, in terms of time, and in terms of resources.
About the costs, that is something about which the American
people will react unfavorably to if they feel they have not
been given all the facts. I feel confident you will do that.
Let me raise the issue of troop levels. I know we had a
chance to chat about this in the office. I concur that, in this
situation, intelligence is absolutely critical. Adding more
troops without good intelligence is probably not effective.
But it seems that there are areas in the country that are
essential--because we can't cover them--refuges for
organization or for recovery of these groups. In addition to
that, it appears also that they are targeting pipelines and
other facilities which might require active patrolling.
In the context of the evolving situation, do we need more
forces there?
General Abizaid. Sir, my estimate is that we do not at the
present time. I also want to assure the committee that should
we think we need more, we will ask for more. The protection of
the infrastructure is a problem that we have to look at very
carefully. Right now we have a lot of Iraqis helping us in the
protection of that infrastructure. I think we will find that
over time there will be sufficient Iraqi interest in protecting
their future, and that they will do that.
If, on the other hand, attacks against the infrastructure
continue to score a lot of damage, then we will have to relook
at the way we use our forces. To me, there are sufficient
forces to do what we have to do, but we can't get locked into
this notion of a certain number of soldiers per square
kilometer. The way that you conduct military operations most
effectively is to free up your forces for offensive action and
move to where the problem is. That is what we intend to do.
But we won't hesitate to ask for more if we need them, sir.
Senator Reed. Let me raise an issue, again, with this
intelligence situation. I was very surprised that it appears
there were no weapons of mass destruction deployed with Iraqi
forces. That is a fact, though, isn't it; that is not an
argumentative matter? You found no deployed weapons, is that
correct?
General Abizaid. That is correct, we found no deployed
weapons. Frankly, I thought we would have.
Senator Reed. Frankly, your experience in these matters is
much greater than anyone's on this panel. But I would have
assumed that there would be telltale signs of a chemical
weapon, chemical artillery rounds; that in a situation where
you had penetrated their signals so completely, even random
comments about special weapons--all those things. The
configuration--I recall seeing something yesterday that
Secretary Powell at the U.N. was briefing about a facility
which he declared contained chemical weapons.
Did you have that kind of intel? Were you targeting sites
that you thought, before you crossed the LD, had chemical
weapons?
General Abizaid. Yes, sir. We had about 1,000 sites that we
thought in one way or another were related to chemical weapons
or biological weapons or the nuclear program. But we issued
orders as we crossed the line that I described before, Kut-Al
Amarah-Karbala, to increase our targeting against artillery,
because we had indications from intelligence that they were
getting ready to distribute chemical weapons to forward
Republican Guard artillery units.
That is what we thought, so we really targeted those
artillery units in particular very hard. So the answer to the
question is, I am again perplexed as to what happened. I can't
offer a reasonable explanation with regard to what has
happened, but I believe that when the Iraqi surveillance group
conducts their work, that through the documents we look at,
through the interviews we conduct, and through the people that
are going to come forward, that we will piece the picture
together. But I think it will take some time.
Senator Reed. If I can make one additional comment--it
doesn't require a response by the General--there are many, and
I was included in that category, that felt that there might be
weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, but that was only one part
of assessing the threat which would require a military option.
The other was the intention of the regime to use them and
deploy them.
I think certainly right now we have to reevaluate whether
our intelligence was effectively gauging the intention and
capability or will of that regime to use weapons of mass
destruction, which is the critical question, I suspect, in the
calculation to deploy the military option. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator, an important line of
questions.
I think this very hearing is doing precisely what the
Senator desires, and it is the responsibility of this committee
to probe these areas with the witnesses that come before us.
If my colleagues would indulge the prerogative of the
chair--you say that you are at a loss. That is a very candid
response. I have often, in my consultations with senior
officers, heard that the fact that this campaign was
orchestrated by the Secretary of Defense, together with General
Franks and yourself; was launched without the pattern followed
in 1991, namely, of some 30-day air campaign lay-down, and
Saddam Hussein was probably anticipating some parallelism
between the two campaigns--the fact that from launch time to 17
days you overcame Baghdad, he and his structure of command and
control probably was totally caught off guard. To the extent
that he was contemplating the use of these weapons of mass
destruction, and, as our colleagues said, forward deployment of
the units, that timetable I think was drastically thrown off by
the bold initiatives of the coalition forces.
Could that possibly be an answer?
General Abizaid. It is possible, Senator. But I think--I
said I was at a loss. My wife thinks I am at a loss an awful
lot.
Chairman Warner. That is all right. It is human nature.
General Abizaid. I believe that if we had interrupted the
movement of chemical weapons from the depots to the guns, that
we would have found them in the depots. But we have looked in
the depots and they are not there.
So the question is, at what point did the government of
Iraq make some decision to move its weapons and hide its
weapons somewhere, or destroy them? Before the war we picked up
movement at the depots that we thought meant that they were
certainly moving things forward for use in military operations.
It may very well have been that they had received the order
quite to the contrary, to get rid of them.
But I don't know, and I think we won't know for a while.
Chairman Warner. Thank you.
General Abizaid. But we will know.
Chairman Warner. Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to associate my remarks, General Abizaid, with the
others congratulating you on your fine service. I think there
are few people better qualified for CENTCOM than you. Looking
over your background, it is just extraordinary. You have a
master's from Harvard in Middle Eastern studies. You have been
in combat, and you have led troops in the field; a good
combination of Athens and Sparta, maybe.
It is a challenge, I know, but some of your experience is
extraordinary. I would like to ask you about that, and how it
might apply to what we can expect to see as we seek to have
this country of Iraq reestablish itself as a legitimate nation.
One thing first I would like to ask about. To me, I always
felt that one of the major justifications for confronting
Saddam Hussein was the fact that we really never ended the 1991
Gulf War. We were flying aircraft from Turkey and Saudi Arabia,
the no-fly zones; we were patrolling the Persian Gulf,
enforcing an embargo; we had troops in Kuwait that guaranteed
they did not move in again.
I am not sure that the American people or some of us in
Congress have thought a minute about just how much we were
expending each year in terms of personnel, manpower, and
aircraft to keep Saddam Hussein in his box. Could you give us
any thoughts about what was involved in just maintaining the
status quo before this war commenced?
General Abizaid. Sir, that is a great point. We did expend
a considerable amount of national treasure and effort in
keeping Saddam Hussein in the box.
We had Operation Southern Watch going that flew hundreds of
thousands of hours over southern Iraq.
We had Operation Northern Watch going that flew hundreds
and thousands of hours over northern Iraq.
We spent years bombing antiaircraft positions. We spent a
considerable amount of time in operations such as Desert Fox,
to try to keep Saddam in the box.
So those were good efforts, they were valiant efforts; but,
ultimately, they were not enough. I think that bringing this
brutal regime down with as many of the hundreds of thousands of
people that he killed was a good thing in its own right.
Senator Sessions. I would certainly agree, and would point
out that the effort we were expending was in the name and on
behalf of the United Nations, enforcing the resolutions the
United Nations had passed. We were the primary enforcer of
that.
You spent some time in the Kurdish region of northern Iraq.
You dealt with the people there. Somehow, that group of people
managed to carve out for themselves a semi-functioning
territory and government.
How did that happen? Is there anything we can learn from
that success, as to how we can create a successful new
government in the whole nation of Iraq?
General Abizaid. Sir, I think the success of the Kurdish
enclave in terms of building their own prosperity and building
their own institutions is one we all should look at, because we
freed them of the terror of Saddam Hussein and his intelligence
services and his armed forces. They moved forward in a very
clear way to build a better society for themselves.
The Iraqi people are very talented. They have a great
amount of resources. Over time, they will build a society that
is better than the one that Saddam Hussein gave them. I am very
confident about that. But it is not something that will happen
overnight. It will take some time. They will have to build
their confidence.
If you look in the Shi'a south, for example, Senator, the
Shi'a are experiencing a degree of freedom and ability to live
their lives free from interference and terror in a way that
they have never experienced before. I think we should not lose
sight of that.
The Iraqis have a great opportunity ahead of them to move
forward with us. What we need to do is to be smart enough to
figure out how to make sure that we move forward with them.
Senator Sessions. I think you stated that very well. In the
Kurdish area, we have heard reports that Saddam Hussein used
chemical weapons against the Kurds. You have been there. Is
that true? What kind of weapons did he utilize and what kind of
casualties were there? Can you describe that for us?
General Abizaid. Sir, we certainly know that he used
chemical weapons. It is very well known that he used them in
the village of Halabjah on the northeastern side of the Kurdish
areas, near Sulimaniyah. The number of casualties--I would
hesitate to really give you that number, but at least 5,000
people were killed in that particular attack. It is clear to me
that he used them elsewhere.
It is also clear, and we know beyond any shadow of a doubt,
that he used chemical weapons against the Iranians in the Iran-
Iraq war.
So there is no doubt that he had chemical weapons. He used
what we believe were nerve agents against the Kurds in
Halabjah, and there is certainly no doubt that he had any
scruples about using these weapons of mass destruction.
Senator Sessions. To me, the fact that he never
demonstrated--that he deliberately and openly destroyed those
weapons led anyone to a fair conclusion that they were still in
his possession, Mr. Chairman.
The way I saw it, from the beginning, the United Nations in
1998--when they were forced out, the inspectors were, they left
with a final conclusion that there were large stores of weapons
of mass destruction. We never had any proof, or he never
produced any proof, that he destroyed them or got rid of them.
To me as a lawyer the case was made, and it was never rebutted
up until the time the conflict started. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator. I think at this
juncture in the record the Senator has brought out the use of
WMD by Saddam Hussein. You responded. You should also address
here the killing fields, which were discovered by your
advancing forces. Were the weapons utilized there conventional?
For what reason did he destroy so many of his own population?
You have discovered these mass graves in many instances in
your advance. Could you elaborate on that?
General Abizaid. Yes, sir. As early as 1991 when we
operated in Iraq we found mass graves. Certainly since the
conclusion of combat operations we have found an awful lot of
mass graves, especially in the area of Al Hillah, south of
Baghdad. We will continue to find more mass graves.
The method he used is about as brutal as you can imagine.
Women and children--sometimes you find them with bullet holes
in the back of the skulls. Sometimes you find them with no
marks whatsoever, and you have to wonder whether or not they
just weren't thrown into the pit to be buried alive. That is
certainly what survivors tell us happened.
There is no more brutal regime that ever existed in the
Middle East than this particular regime. We should shed no
tears for the Baathists, and we should be resolute in
prosecuting those that performed these horrible things.
Chairman Warner. Many children were found in these graves?
General Abizaid. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. Some of them clutching their own prize
toys, dolls and otherwise, as they went to death, is that
correct?
General Abizaid. That is correct, Senator. What you can
imagine of the killing fields of Nazi Germany or Cambodia were
every much as much active in Iraq as those other places.
Chairman Warner. Thank you.
Senator Nelson.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome,
General. Welcome to Mrs. Abizaid. Welcome to Florida. I hope
Tampa is greeting you appropriately and taking care of you.
MacDill is a good place. You are in one of the historical
residences there, so we are glad to have you.
General, I would like, for the record, for you to state
what you stated to me in our personal conversation about
looking for Scott Speicher.
General Abizaid. Thanks, Senator. First, let me say my wife
has been in Tampa for about 6 months. I have been assigned to
Tampa for 6 months and I have seen it for 6 days. I liked the 6
days that I have seen it. I hope to spend more time there.
Thank you for your hospitality. It is a great place. Sir, it is
amazing when you think about it that we have had two wars with
Iraq, and there is only one person that we can't account for,
and that is Scott Speicher. We had a very robust effort that
attempted to confirm or deny his location, whether he was alive
or whether he had died as a result of either being in Iraqi
captivity or as a result of the crash of his aircraft.
Chairman Warner. Excuse me, General. I think for the
record, for those following these proceedings, you had better
give a little historical context: when he was lost, the branch
of Service, and the like. Many people are interested in this
case.
General Abizaid. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Scott Speicher,
who is from Jacksonville, was shot down on the first night of
the Gulf War in 1991. We walked away from a downed pilot
through a series of mistakes. When we asked for the exchange of
POWs, we did not ask for him. He had been declared dead,
mistakenly. We asked for his remains. They didn't have his
remains, they had him.
From sightings from corroborated witnesses, there is reason
to think that it is credible that he was sighted as recently as
1998. So you can imagine the trauma that the family is going
through, having him first declared dead, and then about 5 years
later the Department of Defense changes his status from killed
in action to missing in action. Last fall, the Secretary of the
Navy changed his status to ``missing/captured,'' which is POW.
So that is the background, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the
opportunity to clarify that.
Senator, we had an awful lot of places that we wanted to
look into that were associated, as a result of the intelligence
we had, as to places that he could have been moved to or been
incarcerated in, et cetera.
There was one intriguing find at the Hakmiya prison where
we saw the initials ``M.S.S.'' scrawled on one of the walls.
Certainly, Michael Scott Speicher--it is hard to wonder what
else that could have meant.
But in all of our searching, we have yet to find evidence
that he was alive or in the hands of the Iraqis. We have
questioned a lot of people. In the same vein as WMD, we have a
lot of work yet to do. We owe it to him. We owe it to all men
and women that serve in uniform that we will figure out what
happened to him and conclude this case. We will continue to
look.
Senator Bill Nelson. When the chairman had his committee
meet with the Secretary yesterday, Secretary Rumsfeld gave me
his latest classified briefing on Speicher. We discussed the
public information that we made public yesterday that Major
General Keith Dayton has been appointed to oversee not only the
WMD search, but also the search for Captain Speicher.
Chairman Warner. He is in charge of the 1,400-person force
constituted by Secretary Rumsfeld to be specifically tasked
with weapons of mass destruction issues, prisoner issues, and
other matters.
Senator Bill Nelson. And Speicher. That is important. I
handed the Secretary a personal letter from the family
yesterday asking that a high-level person be appointed. They
specifically had asked that he be appointed to report to
Bremer. The Secretary feels like this should go up through
CENTCOM, so they will be reporting to you there, General.
I wanted just to get this on the table, because this is
important. I can't go with the chairman, because of previous
obligations, on his trip that is coming up next week, but I'm
going to come to Iraq as soon thereafter as I can get out
there.
I want to talk to General Dayton. I want to go to that
prison cell, I want to go to any of the graves that you are
examining, and I want to talk to the investigators, the team,
the special team. I want to talk to any prisoners, anything.
This is the least I can do for the family.
Let me ask you----
Chairman Warner. Before we conclude on that, Senator
Roberts will be accompanying me. He has been working with you
in conjunction on this case. He is chairman of the Committee on
Intelligence, and he has a personal interest in this.
Senator Bill Nelson. Senator Roberts and I are joined at
the hip on this. We do everything in coordination with each
other. He has given me a blue slip on my allotted time,
however.
Chairman Warner. Why don't you take an extra bit of time
here, Bill?
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you.
There is a story in today's London Times: ``Resurgent
Taliban forces have reorganized their command structure to
fight against coalition troops in Afghanistan and President
Karzai's government.'' Can you give us your thoughts on that,
and what we ought to do about it differently than what we are
doing now?
General Abizaid. Senator, thanks for bringing up the issue
of Afghanistan. As we focus a lot on Iraq, sometimes we lose
sight of the fact that there are 10,000 U.S. troops up there.
They are fighting in tough circumstances. Nearly every day
there is some sort of engagement with either Taliban remnants,
al Qaeda, or other Afghan groups that seek to overthrow the
Karzai government. My old regiment of paratroopers is up there.
They are doing a wonderful job. I visited them the other day.
We have achieved a lot in Afghanistan. We have denied it as
a safe haven for al Qaeda. We have taken out the Taliban
government. We have given the Karzai government an opportunity
to move forward. I think it is safe to say that there is a lot
of work that still needs to be done in Afghanistan.
Senator Bill Nelson. Is there some degree of Taliban
resurgence?
General Abizaid. I don't know that I would use the word
``resurgence,'' but I would say there is a danger from the
Taliban that we shouldn't underestimate. Does President Karzai
deserve the respect and support of the international community?
I think the answer is absolutely yes. As we are now able to
focus more broadly throughout the theater, I certainly will
reevaluate what we are doing militarily in Afghanistan and have
discussions with the Secretary about what the way ahead is
there.
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Chairman, I have one more
question, but I will wait until my colleagues----
Chairman Warner. Our colleagues would be glad to indulge
you, I think.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, you had said that the movement at the depots, the
intelligence from that, is what led you to believe that when
you crossed the red line that you were going to find that they
had destroyed the chemical weapons.
My question is, as the chairman has launched this
investigation into what went wrong with the intelligence, this
morning the New York Times was reporting an expert analyst
telling legislators that he was pressed to distort some
evidence. This is a senior intelligence expert named Christian
Westerman.
If we have the shading of intelligence to operational
commanders like you, that is a fairly significant--if true--
detriment for a military commander, I would assume. We don't
know the answer because the chairman is going to have his
investigation, but do you have any comments?
General Abizaid. Sir, I firmly believe that there was no
distortion of the intelligence. I looked at it as a military
professional. My subordinates looked at it as military
professionals. I really believe that the intelligence
communities did their best to give us their best judgment about
what they thought, and that is what happened. That we didn't
get it completely right is what I consider to be a fact.
Will we figure out what we didn't know? I think we will.
But again, I would like to emphasize, as I said previously,
there were huge successes of intelligence in other areas,
especially about the Iraqi battlefield, the order of battle, et
cetera.
So I believe that there is no finer intelligence community
in the world than ours. Do we have to do better? Should we look
to see what went wrong and make sure we understand it so we can
fix those problems? Absolutely. It is essential we do so.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator Nelson. I am glad you
emphasized the tactical intelligence. That is confirmed by the
various steps in the military operations.
Senator Cornyn.
Senator Cornyn. Good morning, General. I am interested in
the process of, obviously, first providing security in the
country; but then, what steps are being taken to make sure that
the Iraqis have a reasonable opportunity to create a democracy,
a representative form of government within their country, and
one that recognizes the basic human rights of the Iraqi people
to speak, to worship as they see fit and according to their
consciences, and to exercise their right of consent to the laws
and the policies that govern them?
I would be interested in your--first of all, given the
joint nature of the arrangements between Ambassador Bremer and
General Sanchez, is that something that CENTCOM is intimately
involved in, or is that something that Ambassador Bremer is
doing in connection with the State Department? Could you
describe who has responsibility for that process?
General Abizaid. Yes, sir. Ambassador Bremer has the lead
for remaking the governmental institutions. He has a group of
some extremely talented folks from all over the U.S. Government
that are putting teams together that will eventually help the
Iraqis with a constitutional process. He reaches out to Iraqi
leadership, political leadership, almost daily.
He has an extremely active program to build a
representative government within Iraq. Senator, this is really
probably the toughest of all missions. There is no real
tradition of democracy as we know it in Iraq. We wish them
luck, and they will need a lot of help. But I think that if
anybody can make it happen, it is the people that are working
for Ambassador Bremer and Ambassador Bremer himself.
There is great interest in doing it right. Of course, there
are many conflicting opinions. The important aspect that
Central Command brings to the table is our ability to provide a
secure environment in which meetings can be held and in which
people can express their opinions, et cetera.
So yes, we are partnering in this. But as I mentioned
before, the Iraq problem won't be fixed by any single solution,
not by a single military solution nor a single government
solution. We have to move together economically, militarily,
diplomatically, and on governmental reform together. As we do
that, things will improve.
Senator Cornyn. I know immediately after the main
hostilities ended there were various comments made. I believe
General Garner and others had expressed that maybe it was their
hope, as opposed to a realistic expectation--how long we would
need to stay to provide that help and assistance to the Iraqi
people as they attempt to establish the rule of law and a
representative government.
Do you have an opinion as to what sort of timetable we may
be looking at before the Iraqi people are able to take that
responsibility in hand without perhaps risking the loss of
everything that we have been able to gain through the great
effort of our military forces in such a brief period of time?
General Abizaid. Sir, the Iraqi people are moving ahead and
are very anxious to take charge of the political process of
their own future. That is exactly what we want them to do.
Ambassador Bremer is there to assist, not to dictate.
The process will take time. Governmental and institutional
reform will take a long time, and I would certainly say that
American engagement in that regard will be measured in years.
The military side of the engagement will depend upon
whether or not we are successful in building Iraqi police
institutions, Iraqi military institutions, and the presence of
other international forces.
While I will only say that our military involvement there
will be certainly a long one, I wouldn't want to characterize
how long it is going to be. It can come down as we have success
on the institutional front.
Senator Cornyn. I actually am very glad to hear you say
that, because I think it is far more realistic than perhaps
some of the statements that were made immediately following the
main conflict about our desire to get in and out quickly.
Of course, maybe that was our desire; but the reality is, I
believe, as you have expressed it. We have some history of
reconstruction postwar in places like Japan and Germany which
obviously is on the order of years, not days or weeks.
I was concerned--and I would be interested in your comment
on this--that after the Gulf War we encouraged some Iraqis to
rise up against Saddam, and then we left, and he used that as
an opportunity to repress and indeed to murder thousands of
Iraqis.
Until we actually find Saddam and account for him, whether
dead or alive, do you view that as a pivotal event that will
assist us in moving forward and the Iraqi people in moving
forward? Do you feel like they are hesitating now because of
their uncertainty as to his outcome?
General Abizaid. Sir, in the north they are not hesitating.
The Kurdish population is moving forward. In the south the Shia
are very active politically. As far as they are concerned, they
are not overly worried that Saddam will reappear.
The real problem is in the Sunni heartland. We need to
ensure that we can account for Saddam Hussein so that the
people that were on his team before and are supporting violence
against our forces understand that there is no future for them.
We also need those members of the Sunni community that
would otherwise be afraid to come forward and establish some
sort of political activity in the Sunni community that is
outside the scope of the Baath party. I think some of them are
hesitant to do that until we close out the case of Saddam.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you, General.
General Abizaid. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. I assume if there were any new facts
regarding Saddam Hussein you would share them with the Senate
here this morning. There are no new facts?
General Abizaid. No new facts, Senator.
Chairman Warner. Senator Allard.
Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to join my colleagues in wishing you well in
your new position. I think you are going to be confirmed. I
think you will bring the experience we need. I wish you well.
As a field commander, you obviously look at a number of
scenarios; ``what if'' situations that can happen when you are
on that battlefield. I would assume that you appreciated the
fact that you were warned of the possibility that there could
have been weapons of mass destruction, is that correct?
General Abizaid. That is correct, sir.
Senator Allard. As Commander in Central Command, I presume
you will make every effort you possibly can to warn your field
commanders of any possibility of weapons of mass destruction
that they may incur on the battlefield. Is that correct?
General Abizaid. That is correct, sir.
Senator Allard. I think sometimes you expect things to be
there, but when you show up and find out they are not there,
there is a sigh of relief to a certain degree, because you
didn't have to contend with it. But also I think you appreciate
the fact that you were warned of that possibility and could
have that contingency in mind as you move forward.
Let me talk a little bit--raise a question relating to the
whole command area that you will be serving in or are in
command of, and talk a little bit about the base alignment that
is apparently going on, at least what has been reported in the
media.
The press has reported that the United States has pulled
out most or maybe all of its air assets out of Incirlik Air
Force Base in Turkey, and is in the process of downsizing at
Prince Sultan Air Force Base in Saudi Arabia. They are both
major command centers, as I understand it.
What were the reasons for withdrawing from these bases, and
have we found suitable sites in neighboring countries to
replace these once critical bases?
General Abizaid. Sir, Incirlik is in the European Command
area of responsibility. While there is some drawdown going on
there, there is certainly a desire by the European Command to
maintain a very strong relationship with our Turkish allies.
During the war we got a tremendous amount of support--in
spite of the fact that our land forces didn't come across the
border, we did receive a lot of support from the Turks. But I
would defer any questions about Incirlik to the European
Command.
As for Saudi Arabia, yes, we are drawing down on our forces
at Prince Sultan Air Base, and we have other areas in the
Persian Gulf that have readily accepted U.S. forces that
allowed us to operate from there during the war.
I would like to take the question for the record, because
there are certain local sensitivities in the region about
acknowledgment of the amount of force and the effectiveness of
it, et cetera.
[The information referred to follows:]

[Deleted.] The Office of the Secretary of Defense directed Central
Command [deleted]. Central Command has primarily [deleted.] Plans for
relocation were temporarily suspended due to Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Central Command has since completed the relocation of assets and is
[deleted].

I would like to emphasize that we have a very good and
strong relationship with the Saudi Arabians. They were very
supportive during the war. I think it is clear to the Saudis
that they are facing the same enemies we face in the world of
terrorism, and that together we are going to have to work very
hard to face this threat.
So I anticipate our relationship with the Saudis to
continue to be strong. We won't have the same footprint there,
but we will have a very strong and important relationship in
getting after the terrorists together.
Senator Allard. Thank you for that response.
I would like to talk a little bit about the space-based
assets that you utilized in Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Would you give us an assessment of the performance of these
assets? If you have the insight, can you give us any idea of
additional capabilities that you would like to see in future
combats?
General Abizaid. The space-based assets performed
magnificently. To have a complete picture of the enemy, as
complete a picture of the enemy as we had with regard to their
military formations, has an awful lot to do with our domination
of information technologies and of space-based things.
I don't want to go into the classified parts that you are
well familiar with, Senator, other than to say that there were
other programs that gave us great service, as well, that are
classified. I would be happy to talk with you about it in a
classified session.
In terms of what more we could get out of our space-based
assets, we need to exploit our ability to dominate the
information spectrum from space more and more in the future. It
is just critically important. Our ability to sense, our ability
to see, our ability to hear, our ability to broadcast can all
be enhanced by space-based assets, and I think it is only our
imagination that would keep us from being able to enhance our
ability to fight wars more efficiently using space assets, even
if they are not weaponized.
Senator Allard. That gets back to the basic question of
what happened to the weapons of mass destruction, in many
regards. Talk a little about the Patriot missile system. They
shot down a number of Iraqi ballistic missiles. There were a
couple of friendly fire incidents. Would you talk a little bit
about that system?
General Abizaid. Sir, I have great confidence in the
Patriot system. We have to very thoroughly investigate what
happened on the friendly fire incidents. I have not had an
opportunity to look at the work that the Army is doing to try
to understand what went wrong technically there. I think there
were some similarities in the incidents.
I certainly know that the Patriot systems protected our
forces very well from ballistic missiles that were fired at
them, so I have a lot of confidence in it. But it is important
that we understand what technical problems caused the friendly
fire incidents and correct them right away.
Senator Allard. Thank you for your answers.
Chairman Warner. Do you have another question or two?
Senator Allard. Just one question, Mr. Chairman.
You mentioned in your advanced questions to the committee
that, and I quote, ``Our ability to strike rapidly sometimes
exceeds our ability to sense and assess the effects as quickly
as we would have liked.''
Can you please expand on that? Did you have sufficient
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets? In
a perfect world, what additional ISR capabilities would you
like to have?
General Abizaid. ISR is in chronically short supply for the
department, and I think we need more ISR assets with our wide
responsibilities in order to make sure we are sensing our
environment better. I believe that the Secretary would not be
surprised by that answer.
With regard to the comment in my written questions, it
really had to do with a period that we went through where the
battle damage assessment process was not working as efficiently
as General Franks would have liked it to work.
This was during the stage of the battle when we were up on
the Karbala-Kut line facing the Republican Guards. We did not
think that the turnaround time on the assessments of what
damage we were doing to the enemy came to us quickly enough. I
am not sure whether that is a technical problem or a process
problem. I tend to believe it is more of a process problem.
But certainly we need to always improve our ability to
sense what we have done to the enemy so that we can take
advantage of the weaknesses that we perceive. That requires
some work.
Senator Allard. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
My distinguished ranking member is trying to cover two
hearings at one time, so I will defer my further questions
until he has completed his.
Senator Levin.
Senator Levin. I appreciate that very much, Mr. Chairman.
Just a few additional questions, General.
First as it relates to the recent event next to Syria
relative to that convoy, what was the intelligence about that
convoy? What did we expect it to be? What did it turn out to
be? That is question one.
General Abizaid. Senator, I believe that it would be very
important for me to discuss this with you in a classified
session.
Senator Levin. Including what it turned out to be?
General Abizaid. Yes, sir.
Senator Levin. That is fine, if that is the way it should
be.
Second, we have a new organization here now that is looking
for weapons of mass destruction significantly larger than the
previous one, which I think was the 75th Exploitation Task
Force, if that is correct.
General Abizaid. Yes, sir.
Senator Levin. Can you tell us the way in which the mission
functions and capabilities of the new group, the Iraq Survey
Group, differs from the 75th Exploitation Task Force?
General Abizaid. Yes, sir. The 75th Exploitation Task
Force--I would describe them as the blue-collar WMD searchers.
We, of course, thought we could send them to specific targets,
that they would need to do the muscle work, the technical work
to recover the weapons of mass destruction quickly and then
bring them back to us. They were equipped more for moving,
finding, and quickly exporting.
Chairman Warner. Could I interrupt? I have just been
informed this clock is not functioning. A vote was called, all
the time has expired, and they are waiting for our vote. So we
will go vote.
[Whereupon, the committee recessed from 11:18 to 11:35.]
Chairman Warner. Gentlemen, we will continue the hearing. I
will have to vote again and then come back and we will conclude
it. Senator Levin was not able to return, but he asked that
when I depart for the next vote, could you put into the record
your full response to his question.
General Abizaid. The 75th Exploitation Group did the work
to locate the highly probable areas where we could find weapons
of mass destruction, but they did not have a strong analytical
group that was able to exploit documents, interrogations, and
essentially connect the dots on the missing puzzle pieces that
were apparent with being unable to find weapons of mass
destruction.
So it was decided that we needed to put together a
specialized group that had a very strong analytical capability.
That is when we decided to build--or the department decided to
build the Iraq Survey Group. I would refer to them as the
white-collar searchers for WMD. They have a strong group of
intel professionals and analysts that will look through miles
and miles worth of stacked up documents and reports on
interrogations, et cetera.
They will also look at the history of what the United
Nations had done previously, what intelligence was reported
previously, and then try to solve the central question as to
what happened between 1998 and 2003 with regard to Iraq's
weapons of mass destruction program.
At the same time, as they go through all of this, they
should be able to give us clues as to where we should go next.
The 75th had a list of a thousand sites to go to, but that
really probably is not the most effective way of getting at the
problem, especially now that we haven't found anything. We need
to look at the evidence and have judgments made at a high level
as to where we might achieve the higher payoff. So that is why
there is an ISG.
Chairman Warner. General, the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) to me is one of the greatest institutions
that we have had the privilege as a Nation to participate in. I
have spoken out a number of times in support of NATO, and
hopefully always will. I have heard comments from responsible
persons informing me that serious consideration has been given
to incorporating NATO into your efforts in Iraq.
Could you bring me up to date on that and give your own
personal views?
General Abizaid. Sir, I do not know the degree to which the
Secretary and the folks in the department have moved forward on
the idea to include NATO formally in Iraq stability operations.
Chairman Warner. I would hope that during the course of
your stay here in Washington that that can be briefed to you in
full.
General Abizaid. Senator, NATO has agreed to provide the
next International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) command in
Afghanistan.
Chairman Warner. I was going to go to Afghanistan
momentarily. So at the moment you prefer to respond for the
record on NATO?
General Abizaid. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. Give that further study.
General Abizaid. Yes, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]

Several NATO countries are unilaterally participating in stability
operations in Iraq. NATO, as an organization, has provided support to
Poland as they prepare to lead one of the Multi-National Peacekeeping
Divisions in Southern Iraq. We are continuing to explore additional
methods to leverage the significant capabilities and experience that
NATO possesses. [Deleted.] NATO's imminent assumption of command of the
International Security Assistance Force in Kabul, Afghanistan should
provide some valuable lessons that we can incorporate into our efforts
in Iraq.

Chairman Warner. I just want to conclude by saying that I
strongly endorse at the earliest possible time the
incorporation of NATO in the diversity of challenges that face
you and Ambassador Bremer in the immediate future.
Now, shifting to Afghanistan, my understanding is that they
have now formally concluded those arrangements. I would like to
have you describe what they are, and also the chain of command
that NATO reports through, and the relationship with the United
Nations.
General Abizaid. Sir, the chain of command--Senator, in
Afghanistan right now we have the United States and coalition
forces engaged in combat operations which report directly to
the Commander of Central Command. Then you have the forces of
ISAF, which are not in the direct chain of command with CENTCOM
but do respond to some degree of tactical control.
I will have to respond for the record for precision with
regard to the chain of command with NATO. But I think you will
continue to see ISAF performing the stability role in and
around the Kabul area; American combat operations, coalition
combat operations, being a separate chain of command; and there
are discussions currently under way in the department as to the
future of that chain of command.
It is possible, for example, that there will be some new
command arrangements that move. But suffice it to say that NATO
will participate and will have an important role to play in
ISAF. I agree with you 100 percent that this is a good thing
for us.
[The information referred to follows:]

The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operates under a
United Nations (U.N.) mandate, but not under U.N. control. The current
mandate runs through December 2003. We anticipate that an extension of
the mandate is forthcoming.
NATO has agreed to assume command of the ISAF. NATO involvement
with ISAF is a significant occurrence because this is NATO's first
deployment outside of Europe. An ISAF IV Letter of Arrangement (LOA)
between NATO and the United States will specify command and control
(C2) arrangements between NATO and coalition forces operation in
Afghanistan under Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). [Deleted]. Details
of the relationship between the ISAF and OEF forces, however, have not
yet been finalized.

Chairman Warner. I presume you share that same opinion with
regard to Iraq?
General Abizaid. Sir, I am all for NATO participation, as
long as we do not violate unity of command for combat
operations.
Chairman Warner. It is very important that that be made
ever so clear. NATO I think tactically would have a joint chain
to General Jones and yourself, CENTCOM.
The President of the United States met with President
Musharraf yesterday. I think it was a very beneficial meeting
on a wide range of issues. I have studied the initial reports.
I have had the pleasure of meeting with President Musharraf on
a number of occasions. I presume you have had that same
opportunity.
General Abizaid. No, sir, I have never met with the
President.
Chairman Warner. You will have that opportunity shortly
after you assume your new command.
General Abizaid. Sir, if confirmed, one of the first places
I will go is Pakistan.
Chairman Warner. Pakistan has been enormously cooperative
in missions we have, are, and perhaps will be, conducting in
Afghanistan.
The President made direct reference in the presence of
President Musharraf that we are continuing direct efforts to
get Osama bin Laden. I presume you have been following those
operations. Could you elaborate a little on that?
General Abizaid. Sir, the Pakistani military and some of
their other security services have worked very closely with us
in ensuring that there is no safe haven for al Qaeda within
Pakistan. They have certainly done a wonderful job on their own
in the areas of the urban centers of Karachi, Quetta, et
cetera, where they have done a magnificent job of disrupting,
identifying, and keeping al Qaeda from really establishing
themselves firmly.
They have tougher challenges up along the border with
Afghanistan for a lot of different cultural reasons and for
security reasons, where there is no tradition of strong
Pakistani forces up there.
Chairman Warner. The geography lends a certain challenge.
General Abizaid. The geography is like the Rocky Mountains
times two. It is very difficult, very mountainous; one of the
most daunting areas for military operations that you could find
anywhere on Earth. The same goes for the Afghan side of the
border.
The help that the Pakistanis have given us in operations in
and around Afghanistan has been absolutely essential to the
success of operations there. I certainly will do everything
that I can to build upon General Frank's very excellent
relationship with President Musharraf and with the Pakistani
military.
We both know that it is a matter of utmost importance for
both of our nations to get after the al Qaeda threat and that
Afghanistan's stability is as important to Pakistan as it is to
the United States. So we look forward to close cooperation and
building on closer cooperation with them.
Chairman Warner. I think it is important in this hearing
that I state that in my opinion, there is ongoing risk to
American forces and other forces operating in Afghanistan. The
American public should understand that while they may not be on
page 1 with the frequency that they once were, our troops are
very courageously, bravely, and with a high degree of risk
carrying out these missions. Am I not correct in that?
General Abizaid. Sir, you are absolutely correct. I visited
Afghanistan a week ago. My old regiment is operating out there,
a bunch of young paratroopers, up on the border 10,000 feet
with helicopter support, often with Afghan militias, often with
Afghan regular forces. They are doing wonderful work.
The other place that wonderful work is being done is where
Major General Carl Eichenberry is and the work that he is doing
to build the Afghan National Army. So from a security
standpoint, there is a lot of fighting that continues to go on
there. There is more ahead. Our troops there should be praised
and thanked every day.
Chairman Warner. Senator Levin and I have made two trips to
the region, one just recently. You mentioned your old regiment
and their courageous performance. Any other nations
participating as actively in this?
General Abizaid. Yes, sir. In Afghanistan, I had the
opportunity there to see the Romanians operating. They have a
special operations unit that is doing an excellent job. I also
saw French soldiers that were operating there, likewise doing
the same. In an ISAF we know the Germans were the victims of a
terrorist attack very recently. Those troops serving in ISAF,
Germans, Dutch, and others are doing wonderful work, as well.
The international community, ISAF, plus our own
conventional operations that are going on there, are often out
of the limelight, but they are very important and successful.
Chairman Warner. General McNeill was in command when
Senator Levin and I were there. I was very impressed with him
as a professional. My understanding is through a routine
rotation he is now back here in the United States.
General Abizaid. Yes, sir. He is back in the United States.
He has yet to give up command of the 18th Army Corps. I believe
the Army has that scheduled soon. I'm sure there are great
things in store for that soldier. He is one of the finest we
have.
Chairman Warner. I share in that view. It is the intention
of myself, concurring with the ranking member, to have him
appear before the committee to give us the benefit of his
experiences over there in the very near future. I mention that
because this committee is ever mindful of the situation in
Afghanistan and the risks that our forces are daily
encountering.
Now, I want to read an interesting concluding paragraph in
one of the press stories today, a story which covered in some
detail--the detail that is available--the tragic loss of the
British forces.
``Security concerns will only grow if Tuesday's
violence''--that is referring to that incident--``indicates an
uptick of attacks,'' whatever the word ``uptick'' means; I
would assume an increase of attacks--``is beginning in Shiite-
dominated areas of Iraq, where British troops have a large
security role.''
``The Shiites, who make up some 60 percent of the Iraqi
population, were abused by the Saddam Hussein regime and
constantly had maintained a fairly neutral stance toward the
American and British occupation. Resistance groups also have
been blamed for a series of attacks in recent days on oil and
natural gas pipelines and other infrastructure.''
This is the key paragraph: ``The new attacks,'' again
referring to particularly the one on Tuesday, ``also show that
the British troops' less aggressive stance in the more peaceful
south may not fully succeed in preventing the kind of angry
attacks that until Tuesday had focused on U.S. troops. American
forces have responded with coordinated raids and tough tactics,
while British forces have taken a more kid glove approach to
occupation.''
In my consultations and study of this situation, I was
advised that the British decided that they could perhaps
perform their mission as a central component of nationbuilding
in that region by presenting themselves physically in a less
formidable manner. I think they stopped, for a period of time,
the use of the protective vests and actually utilized equipment
other than helmets, and perhaps in other areas they altered
their practices.
Now, my first question is, was this differentiation in
approach and tactics a matter which was coordinated up through
General Franks and yourself, and was it with your approval; or
was that discretion reposed in the British commanders to
exercise without the necessary approval of the senior command?
I ask that because I suppose a lot of American forces felt
maybe they would like to take off the added weight of the
protective vests and push back the helmet for a softer headgear
or something of that nature; but to the best of my knowledge,
that was not done.
Then this refers to the tough tactics that we employed
versus the less tough tactics exercised by the British forces--
they describe it as kid gloves--in performing their missions.
Did it come through? Did you chop on it and say okay----
General Abizaid. No. Commanders' discretion in the field,
sir. We granted--General Franks in particular, he is a
commander that grants a broad degree of discretion to his field
commanders. It would have gone, probably, as a question unasked
as to whether or not they needed permission to adjust their
operating style.
I would take great issue with the notion that the British
forces are using kid gloves, anyway.
Chairman Warner. That is why I wanted you to have an
opportunity to reply.
General Abizaid. They are undoubtedly among the toughest
and finest professional soldiers on Earth.
Chairman Warner. I share that view.
General Abizaid. It is a great pleasure to have them in the
coalition. I think when the smoke clears we will find out that
what happened yesterday was some sort of a local problem; that
people were surprised by it on both sides, and that it
escalated in a way that is unfortunate and caused the loss of
life.
But there is no lack of aggressiveness in the way that the
British do business. In fact, they often take more risks than
we do because philosophically they have learned different
lessons from their own military history than we have. I think
allowing national contingents to operate within their best
judgment is what makes a coalition strong. You will find the
British as tough as they come.
Chairman Warner. I agree with that. As a matter of fact, I
have said often--and will repeat--without the support of Great
Britain from the Prime Minister on down, this operation would
have been considerably more difficult for the U.S. contingent
of the coalition forces.
General Abizaid. Our greatest concern before the war was
they wouldn't cross the berm with us.
Chairman Warner. They did.
General Abizaid. We are thrilled to have them by our side,
and still are.
Chairman Warner. That brings me to this cultural
difference.
Fragmentary reports on this incident described that the
locals were concerned with tactics used in the course of trying
to remove weapons from the households and other private places.
Also, they have a very--I don't know quite how to phrase it--an
extraordinary respect for the women in their culture, and I
don't mean to differentiate between what we have. I certainly
share extraordinary respect in my culture.
I wonder if you could enlighten us on that cultural
framework, and how, hopefully, as you move in, drawing on your
background, that you can be in a position to advise our troops
and coalition forces about the importance of those cultural
differences and how best to perform our missions, at the same
time paying due respect.
General Abizaid. Senator, if you go to the location where
this incident occurred south of Al Amarah in Maysan province,
in many respects it is one of the most isolated provinces in
the nation of Iraq. Its ties to old tradition are probably
stronger than almost anywhere else.
Chairman Warner. That goes back centuries, am I not
correct?
General Abizaid. Absolutely; thousands of years. As a
matter of fact, near the site of this action is the place
called Al Qurnah, which is rumored to be the original Garden of
Eden, so civilization has been there for a long time.
The cultural norms that they have established are very
private. They are very family-oriented. They are very
protective of the women. We have to be smart enough in our
operations to be culturally sensitive, yet also understand that
Saddam and the Saddam Fedayeen during the war used cultural
sensitivities against us in every way possible. So in order to
protect our forces, sometimes we have to make compromises.
I think our troops are smart enough, as are the British, to
make those compromises at the right time. But we need to be
talking to the local leadership before we conduct major search
and cordon operations.
Chairman Warner. I think more and more this phase of the
operation--we will have to draw on your expertise and
knowledge, and hopefully you will infuse that knowledge right
down to the foot soldier.
I have to go and vote again. I will be right back.
[Whereupon, the committee stood in recess from
approximately 12 noon to 12:21 p.m.]
Chairman Warner. Gentlemen, we want to cover other areas of
your AOR.
Let us start with the border nation of Iran: first, the
implications with regard to our missions in Iraq; and second,
with regard to the Middle East problem; and then with regard to
security to other nations in the region as a consequence of
this what I view as a somewhat unstable and autocratic regime
largely operated by the tier of government referred to as the
Mullahs.
General Abizaid. Yes, Senator. Clearly, Iran, with a
population of somewhere around 65 million people and large
armed forces, is a power to be reckoned with in the Gulf. As a
matter of fact, were we not in the Persian Gulf or the Arabian
gulf, whichever you choose to use, you would find Iran as the
most powerful nation there.
Chairman Warner. Excuse me. That is important, but I think
you describe ``most powerful'' as a consequence, I presume, of
its table of organization and military forces, their equipment,
their readiness, and indeed, the doctrine under which they are
trained?
General Abizaid. Sir, they have the most capable military
force in the region outside of our own. They have a doctrine
that is designed to take advantage of what they perceive as our
weaknesses. They look in particular to target what they view as
naval vulnerabilities, especially in the chokepoints and places
such as the Strait of Hormuz.
Chairman Warner. That poses a threat to our operating units
which periodically and most constantly have been in that Gulf
region, is that correct?
General Abizaid. That is correct, sir. They have a very
robust intelligence service which has played active and not
helpful roles in places like Lebanon, Iraq, and others with
regard to working against the United States. So it is clear
that the Iranians are a challenge.
Yet, on the other hand, I think all of us look with a
certain degree of hope at various reform movements that we see
taking place inside Iran. The government is split between
hardliners and those that wish to move in the direction of
reform; although I think we shouldn't underestimate the degree
to which President Khatami's government could move, even if he
had the desire to do so, in a direction that would be more
accommodating to the United States.
Iran is a very serious contender and player in the
geopolitics of the Persian Gulf and militarily. We need to be
very concerned about them.
Chairman Warner. Does the situation in Iraq have a bearing
on the instability between the Palestinians and the Israelis
and vice versa? Does that have a far-reaching influence into
what is occurring on Iraq?
General Abizaid. Sir, I think that the movement towards
some sort of accommodation between the Israelis and the
Palestinians is a positive and essential step, not only for
Israel and the Palestinians but for the whole region.
There is a connection--there is not a day that goes by
where, as I travel around the region, the various leaders in
countries that are very positively inclined towards the United
States don't ask us to get more involved. I don't think they
are looking for us to impose a solution, but they are looking
for us to play a role in finding a solution.
Although it is way out of my lane, I believe that the
initiatives we are undertaking now are very important, and they
will play themselves out to a certain extent not only in Iraq
but throughout the entire region.
Chairman Warner. In my trip recently through there, like
you, when I visited with the heads of government, the heads of
state, it was brought up at every meeting.
I think we should also include in the record today the
strong support we are receiving from Qatar and Kuwait. I hope
to visit the government of Kuwait with my delegation when we go
there. We have had a long association with them working in the
Senate here over many years with Kuwait. Their contribution in
land alone--we occupied for purposes of training and staging a
very considerable portion of their real estate, temporarily
occupied. I think I would like to have your comments on both.
General Abizaid. Sir, I would describe the Kuwaiti
government's support for the United States of America--and in
particular these recent military operations--as nothing short
of courageous. They have been incredibly supportive. They have
suffered under Saddam Hussein in a way that taught them that he
had to be dealt with, finally, and their support was unwavering
in every respect. We couldn't ask for a better relationship
than that which we have with the Kuwaitis.
It is important Kuwaitis remember that we have helped them
come to grips with a large number of their citizens that we
can't account for. They were last seen being moved by the Iraqi
intelligence services from Kuwait into Iraq in 1991.
Unfortunately, we haven't found any of these people alive. I
think we will find, sadly, that they were executed by the
Iraqis, but at least we can close out the concerns of the
families over time. There is still a lot of work to do there.
To answer your question about Kuwait, we have great support.
The Qatari government has been incredibly supportive as
well in many respects. Not only are they supportive, but they
are one of the most liberalizing influences in the Persian Gulf
region. I think we owe the Qatari government not only a debt of
gratitude for their military support, but also for the example
that they set in their willingness to liberalize in a part of
the world that is not necessarily noted for its liberal
thought.
Chairman Warner. We are contemplating some long-range
relationships there, particularly as it relates to CENTCOM, are
we not?
General Abizaid. Sir, the mutual relationship with the
Qataris is one of the United States providing obvious
protection for their sovereignty, and them providing us with
obvious access to a very strategically located basing
construct, to include the forward headquarters of CENTCOM. It
is a very good place to operate from.
Chairman Warner. Should we not also cover the United Arab
Emirates (UAE) in the context of our discussion here?
General Abizaid. Yes, sir, the United Arab Emirates is also
a staunch friend, and gave us and continues to give us great
support in the Gulf region. Their military in particular has
worked very closely with us in establishing a credible force
there. They have been great supporters of the United States in
many respects.
On the other hand, we shouldn't consider any of these
countries as being our lackeys, because they quickly tell us
what they don't like, and they work with us in very important
ways.
But probably the most important thing that I have not
mentioned is that for Kuwait, for Qatar, for the UAE, for Oman,
for Saudi Arabia, this is a matter of life and death that they
are engaged in with regard to the global war on terrorism. The
terrorists will never defeat the United States, but they could
be a mortal danger to any of those regimes.
Chairman Warner. You did mention Oman, because they have
given us--when I was there some time ago with Secretary Cohen I
saw the foundations of that. I later was there with Senator
Levin.
General Abizaid. This concurrence of interest against the
terrorists should not be underestimated. It is very important
for our continued well-being here at home and also for their
continued well-being in their homes to fight this fight. We are
getting great cooperation from them.
Chairman Warner. Our record today should also reflect that
Jordan and Egypt, through their leadership, have likewise had a
very constructive role in the war on terrorism.
Turning now to the India-Pakistan relationships for the
moment, that seems to have de-escalated to the point where
there may be a ray of optimism.
Have you a view on that?
General Abizaid. Sir, I believe that the India-Pakistani
relationship every now and then shows a ray of optimism, but
the Kashmiri problem is very difficult. It will need a lot of
work. It will need a lot of time. It needs a lot of good will
between both sides.
We have to be optimistic with regard to the India and
Pakistan relationship, because if we are not we could quickly
find ourselves in a position where we have a very important
part of the world moving towards nuclear war, so our engagement
with both sides to find a sensible solution to a very difficult
problem is important. As you have already mentioned, our
military relationship with the Pakistanis is especially
important to CENTCOM.
Chairman Warner. Returning to Iraq, we discussed--and we
certainly have seen a good deal of press, within the past
several weeks particularly--very poignant and accurate stories
about the perception of the foot soldier in Iraq, his view that
he fought the war as best he could, and it is time for him to
be rotated. I know that is difficult.
Could you comment a little bit on your rotation policy for
the Army and Marine Corps units, particularly those units that
bore the brunt of the early action?
General Abizaid. Yes, sir.
Sir, if I may, I know you would concur with me that we also
need to make sure that we mention Bahrain in your previous
question, as well.
Chairman Warner. Yes. I helped start the Navy there many
years ago--or enlarge it, I should say--when I was in the Navy
Secretariat. I am glad you mentioned that.
General Abizaid. We received wonderful support from Admiral
Keating. He is a wonderful, brave and courageous man.
Chairman Warner. Our naval component commander----
General Abizaid. Yes, sir, Admiral Keating is doing a great
job there.
Sir, I understand one of the most important things for any
soldier to know is when they are coming home when they are
employed in a combat zone. When you go into combat operations--
we didn't know whether the Iraq operation would last 17 days or
170 days. We couldn't tell the soldiers when they were coming
home, and General Franks specifically went out of his way to
ensure that commanders understood that there was no guarantee
that when this was over, that--when the combat operations
against major forces were over, that we would bring everyone
home very quickly. He knew clearly that there would be a
requirement for stability forces.
That having been said, we are working currently with the
Services to ensure that units that come in have rotational
dates that are known to the troops. It is important.
I should point out that the First Armored Division was
scheduled to be the rotational replacement for the Third
Infantry Division. That did not happen because the security
situation did not move as quickly in a direction that we
thought it would towards stability, and we needed the
additional forces.
I think you will see in the weeks ahead that we will be
able to make some decisions on rotating the units out that have
been there the longest. We owe those soldiers an answer as to
when that might be.
I would also like to point out, as you mentioned to me in
your office the other day, that we cannot underestimate the
huge contribution played by the Reserve and National Guard.
That is continuing to be played.
I think somewhere between 25 and 30 percent of the force in
the Persian Gulf region, and perhaps within Iraq itself, is
either a National Guard or a Reserve component. That simply
means we couldn't do the job without them under any stretch of
the imagination.
Some of these folks have been deployed ever since September
11, or been activated since September 11. They are making
contributions that are unbelievable. We owe it to them to
review how best to use them in the future, and to make changes
in the way we do business with them that keeps them on the
team.
So I know the Secretary is very concerned about that. I
know the Chairman is. I know General Franks is. All of us are
working hard to figure out what is the right thing to do with
those great people that serve us in this capacity during
wartime.
Chairman Warner. Earlier, I mentioned that we, as a
military force, have reached a high water mark in jointness. I
think one of the most extraordinary positive examples was the
manner in which the United States Marine Corps and the United
States Army in parallel areas of operation worked side by side
in this advance.
Would you like to comment on that?
General Abizaid. Sir, having personally witnessed the low
water mark of jointness during the Grenada operation, I can
tell you, we are better than we have ever been. During Grenada,
I could not get Navy fighters on targets because they had
different maps. I could not get the Marine Cobras to come where
I wanted them to because we couldn't talk properly to one
another on the radio frequencies. I couldn't bring in naval
gunfire on a position that was having good effect against my
soldiers, because we hadn't practiced those sorts of things
properly.
Chairman Warner. We took casualties in that situation.
General Abizaid. We sure did. My company had 5 killed and
10 wounded.
So I think that, as a captain, I witnessed the low point of
our inability to operate. We couldn't even deconflict. Today,
we are actually moving towards joint integration. This joint
force that operated in this battle space, thanks largely to the
plan that General Franks put together, was the best integrated
joint force we have ever put together.
Now, I think there is still more work to be done. We have
to get more joint, we have to get more able to bring in
precision-guided weapons in front of the lowest level unit that
is on the battlefield. We have to make sure that the
inadequacies that currently exist go away; and more joint
training, more joint programs, more understanding of where
these problems are, and working lessons between the Services,
led by joint commanders, are directions that we need to go.
Chairman Warner. I think in that context we ought to talk
about the naval and Air Force component commanders, and the
magnificent manner with which those missions were carried out.
Sometimes well in excess of a thousand missions a day were
flown during the height of the combat operations. As you told
me yesterday when we talked, there are combat air patrol (CAP)
at this very moment on standby in the air and on ships and
ready on land to respond to any contingency experienced by our
forces that would need the application of air power.
General Abizaid. Sir, the use of air power in this campaign
was well coordinated, not only between the various Services
that were flying things in the air, but between the components,
in a way that was unprecedented.
When you went to the combined air operations center, you
saw Navy, Air Force, Marine, and Army folks all working
together to deconflict probably the most crowded airspace that
has ever existed in military history. That we didn't have more
difficulty with fratricide than we did, that we didn't have
more difficulty in the control of airspace than we did, is
nothing short of a miracle.
So the work that has been done to bring all of our air
forces into the battle space in a very precise manner is
something that we need to build on. It doesn't mean it is
perfect, but it is pretty damned good.
Chairman Warner. We should acknowledge that a number of
nations, if maybe not formally part of the coalition--their
ground facilities supported that air operation and were
essential.
General Abizaid. Sir, absolutely. Not only did we have
great cooperation with our British allies, but we had failed
today, or I had failed today, to mention the work that the
Australians did there.
Chairman Warner. Yes.
General Abizaid. We had the Australian special operating
forces with us; we had the air forces in the air with us; we
had the naval forces at sea with us; and all performed in a
manner that was quite phenomenal.
Now, I would say, Mr. Chairman, that we need to find a way,
before the next one of these that comes around, to more agilely
share combat information of a classified nature with our
coalition partners. That was a source of friction that we need
to work our way through. I think it is vitally important.
Chairman Warner. This committee, under the joint leadership
of myself and the ranking member, will conduct some in-depth
after-action studies. We have always done that as the
committee--quite frankly, I am of the opinion, speaking for
myself, that ``after action'' is not a usable title because
action is still going on. I am ever mindful of the risks being
assumed today. So we will eventually get to that.
In that context, we will discuss the biggest tactical
lesson you learned in the conflict; in other words, to point to
the future through lessons learned. Time doesn't permit today
to get into that, but we will undoubtedly see you back here
again, hopefully in your capacity as Commander of CENTCOM, and
we will cover it.
The Horn of Africa, we have had some units down there for
some time. Let's touch on that.
General Abizaid. Yes, sir. We have a joint task force for
the Horn of Africa that is commanded by a Marine one-star at
the present time that is operating from a base location in
Djibouti. These forces are capable of conducting operations
against terrorist targets, should they present themselves. More
importantly, they are working with the local governments in the
region to help them help themselves against the terrorist
organizations that operate in that area.
Over time, it has become clear to us that areas such as
Somalia are ungoverned spaces, and as such, attract the type of
people that want to do us harm.
We need to understand the battlefield as completely as we
can. Our area goes down into Kenya, Somalia, et cetera. You
know the problems we have had in Kenya, and the large number of
operations that the terrorists have conducted there. So it is
really essential to have a presence there.
We are currently examining the command and control
relationships. One of the things I will do, if confirmed, upon
assuming command is review the size, mission, and activity of
our forces down there. My impression is that there is more work
to be done there.
Chairman Warner. The humanitarian suffering in that part of
the world is just extraordinary.
We should touch a bit on the United Nations, their work
with the nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), particularly in
Afghanistan and Iraq.
I presume those nongovernmental organizations--we have
given them such support as we can, and that has been a
reasonably smooth operation in both the Afghan and the Iraqi
AORs.
General Abizaid. Sir, we have worked carefully and closely
with the United Nations and numerous nongovernmental
organizations in both Iraq and Afghanistan. It is very
important that we do what we can to provide a secure
environment for those organizations to operate.
There has been some concern expressed recently in certain
parts of Afghanistan. We will continue to work with them to the
best of our ability to help them operate in a safe atmosphere.
But it is interesting, of all the many things that we
thought could go wrong, in Iraq in particular, one of the
problems has not proven to be a humanitarian nightmare of
displaced people, starving people, et cetera. We have work to
do, and a lot of people need a lot of help, but the
international community seems pretty well disposed to work the
problem in an effective way.
Chairman Warner. The NGOs have done magnificent work, not
only in these two operations, but for a long time. I saw it
firsthand in the Balkans when I made a number of visits in that
area.
On the question of international terrorism, that is your
top priority, as directed by the President? What are some of
the initiatives that you will strike out on once you become
CENTCOM commander?
General Abizaid. Sir, I would build on the work that
General Franks has already started and largely conducted in
places like Afghanistan and elsewhere. He has done an
absolutely magnificent job in establishing a military framework
around which we can get at this problem, or through which we
can get at this problem.
This problem is not going to go away tomorrow. It is not
going to go away in the short run. We have a lot of military
work that we will have to do to keep the terrorists off balance
and bring the war to them on their territory, and not accept
their offensive against our territory.
So I will review in particular the way that we have
organized our Special Operation Forces. I think it is very
important that we not look at Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Horn
of Africa through soda straws and regard them as separate and
distinct theaters of operation that are not connected. The
truth of the matter is that everything in the CENTCOM
operations is connected, especially with regard to the war on
terrorism. There are no borders in the war on terrorism, and we
have to take a theater-wide approach to getting at them
militarily.
The number one way you get at them militarily is not only
through your offensive, aggressive actions against them, but
through closely working with nations that want the capacity to
defeat them, and enabling them to get at the problem
themselves.
Chairman Warner. Is it your professional judgment in the
conduct of the operations, both in Afghanistan and Iraq, that
in any way the drawdown of those forces from CENTCOM resulted
in any loss of momentum in the war on terrorism by CENTCOM?
General Abizaid. Sir, all of us understand very clearly,
from the President through the Secretary to General Franks,
that the war on terrorism is our most important action. There
is no loss of momentum.
Chairman Warner. Thank you for this hearing. We have had a
very full and in-depth hearing on a wide range of issues.
Is there anything left undone that I or other colleagues
did not bring up that you think bears on this important hearing
on your qualifications to assume CENTCOM command?
General Abizaid. No, sir.
I think I failed to say probably the most important thing
of the day, which is the biggest lesson learned from the Iraq
war, that our most important asset is our people.
Chairman Warner. No question about it. It is not something
that we need to be reminded of, but the facts are there.
Also, there is a lesson that this country must be
supporting an overall military establishment which ranges from
the heavy tank to the smallest vehicle. I have actually seen an
unmanned vehicle no bigger than a softball, that can take off
and give the battlefield commanders real-time information. This
is extraordinary, the high tech that is moving into the
military, and how the military have quickly adapted to the
advances in technology to improve their ability to achieve
missions; and, most importantly, to achieve a safer environment
for the personnel to act.
So the foot soldier, the ``boots on the ground,'' is the
phrase that is everlastingly etched in the history of this
country, and this is another chapter of it. Thank you for that
reminder of the troops and their families, who bear the brunt
of the conflict throughout the history of this Nation. I think
this is a ``well done'' to General Franks and a hurrah when you
take over, and one is not going to be louder than the other.
They are both equal. Good luck.
General Abizaid. Thank you, sir. I appreciate your time and
confidence.
Chairman Warner. The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:52 p.m. the committee adjourned.]

[Prepared questions submitted to LTG John P. Abizaid, USA,
by Chairman Warner prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follow:]

Questions and Responses

DEFENSE REFORMS

Question. More than 10 years have passed since the enactment of the
Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and
the Special Operations reforms. You have had an opportunity to observe
the implementation and impact of those reforms, particularly in your
assignments as Director of the Joint Staff and Deputy Commander, U.S.
Central Command.
The goals of Congress in enacting these defense reforms, as
reflected in section 3 of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act, can be summarized as strengthening civilian control
over the military; improving military advice; placing clear
responsibility on the combatant commanders for the accomplishment of
their missions; ensuring the authority of the combatant commanders is
commensurate with their responsibility; increasing attention to the
formulation of strategy and to contingency planning; providing for more
efficient use of defense resources; enhancing the effectiveness of
military operations; and improving the management and administration of
the Department of Defense.
Do you agree with these goals?
Answer. I do. Goldwater-Nichols allows the combatant commander to
focus on warfighting. In my opinion, one need look no further than the
USCENTCOM theater and Operations Desert Storm, Enduring Freedom, and
Iraqi Freedom to demonstrate the soundness of those reforms. The
importance of effective joint and combined operations under a clear
chain of command cannot be overstated.
Question. Do you believe that legislative proposals to amend
Goldwater-Nichols may be appropriate? If so, what areas do you believe
it might be appropriate to address in these proposals?
Answer. I think that Goldwater-Nichols got it right. I do not
believe any significant changes to the act are required.
Question. What do you consider to be the most important aspects of
these defense reforms?
Answer. Goldwater-Nichols required the military to look beyond its
service parochialisms requiring deconfliction across the battlefield,
to move more toward integration of effort and unity of command. While
we still need to continue to move toward full joint/combined
integration we would still be deconflicting battlespace between
Services had Goldwater-Nichols not occurred. In addition, the enhanced
role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff cannot be overstated.
His ability to provide his best military advice gives the Joint Force a
powerful advocate.
Question. Do you believe that the role of the combatant commanders
under the Goldwater-Nichols legislation is appropriate and the policies
and processes in existence allow that role to be fulfilled?
Answer. As I stated earlier, I think Goldwater-Nichols got it
right. I do believe, however, that there is unfinished business in
carrying out the spirit of the act, particularly in the area of
resourcing. In my opinion, we should review the process within DOD that
allots fiscal and manpower resources to the combatant commands. We all
recognize the Services' responsibilities to upgrade and improve
installations, train, and support their personnel and maintain and
acquire new weapons and technology. These responsibilities and programs
are intended to support the work of the combatant commands, but there
are times when the priorities of the combatant commands conflict with
those of the Services. For most missions assigned to a combatant
commander, their service components provide the resources. However,
there are times when the joint warfighting perspective and requirement
needs greater visibility within our resourcing constructs. Such
requirements are exemplified by ISR and strategic lift shortfalls in
the Joint Force.

RELATIONSHIP DEPUTY COMMANDER, COMBINED FORCES COMMAND

Question. Please describe your duties and role as deputy commander
during Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Answer. Combatant commander staffs are generally resourced to
conduct one major theater war at a time. The scope of the Iraq
operation, coupled with continuing operations in Afghanistan,
requirements for coordination elsewhere in the global war on terrorism,
extensive basing demands and unexpected requirements for joint
integration made it clear that additional senior leadership in the
region was needed. As the deputy commander, I helped sustain in-theater
political and military support for Operation Iraqi Freedom by working
on our relationships with militaries in the region, seeking access to
bases and ports, and securing permission for staging and overflight.
During the war, I assisted the commander by focusing on the
integration of joint (and inter-agency) capabilities and the
integration of our joint efforts with those of our allies.
The commander focused my duties in the Iraq theater only. In his
absence I made decisions at the CENTCOM forward headquarters and, at
his direction, conducted detailed coordination between component and
coalition commanders.
The deputy commander's permanent presence in Qatar permitted
constant coordination with coalition commanders. Forward command
presence in the theater facilitated coordination with European Command
(EUCOM) and resolved potentially disruptive issues with nations in the
region.
During the past 7 weeks, I have facilitated CJTF-7 support of the
Office of the Coalition Provisional Authority and helped develop future
plans for joint, combined and Special Operations Forces. In addition,
my presence in the area of operations provides a frequent on-scene
assessment of conditions within the Arabian Gulf theater of operations.
Question. Do you support making this in-theater deputy commander
position permanent, and, if so, where would you recommend the deputy
commander be located?
Answer. I strongly support permanently assigning a three-star
deputy commander to a forward U.S. Central Command Headquarters in the
theater. A three-star deputy commander forward facilitates engagement
and development of personal relationships that are critical to pursuing
bilateral and multilateral initiatives in a volatile region. With the
commander torn between the demands of a huge and difficult region and
frequent interaction with commanders, staffs, and national leaders in
the United States, it makes sense to have a senior leader forward.
Question. How did you share responsibility with the deputy
commander located at MacDill Air Force Base?
Answer. As the deputy commander forward, I focused the majority of
my attention on supporting General Franks in the planning and execution
of Operation Iraqi Freedom. LtGen Delong, positioned in Tampa, remained
aware of the situation in Iraq, but also focused effort on executing
the commander's intent throughout the rest of the area of
responsibility. He also helped maintain a coalition of more than 70
coalition partners who sent Senior National Representatives (SNR) to
Central Command in Tampa. This command and control arrangement allowed
the Commander to maintain a balance of focus between current
operations, long range planning and inter-agency policy development.
As mentioned earlier, the scope of operations in the theater and
the pace of operations allowed Mike DeLong and I to provide 24-hour
senior level oversight and coordination throughout the campaign. Mike's
position in Tampa, in the same time zone as our leaders in Washington,
was extremely valuable.

QUALIFICATIONS

Question. What background and experience do you have that you
believe qualifies you for this position?
Answer. Please see biography.

MAJOR CHALLENGES

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting
the next Commander, U.S. Central Command?
Answer. We face obvious challenges in Afghanistan, Iraq, and in the
global war on terrorism. We must continue to apply offensive action
against terrorist threats within our AOR and at the same time provide
security for major stability operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Long range success in this mission depends on generating and
effectively employing a sustainable mix of U.S. and coalition military
and non-military capabilities.
The threat we face is pervasive, asymmetric, adaptive, and elusive.
We must meet the threats of our region on their home ground.
Question. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these
challenges?
Answer. My immediate focus will be on continuing to improve the
security situation in Iraq and Afghanistan while assisting in setting
the conditions for long term success of the Coalition Provisional
Authority and interim governments. Critical to these efforts are
aggressive prosecution of the threat, strong support from our coalition
partners, creation and sustainment of indigenous police and guard
forces as well as accelerated fielding of national armies. Our success
in these areas will drive how quickly we can redeploy our own forces.
In addition, we will work exceptionally closely with local governments,
our Special Operations Forces and our intelligence agencies to confront
and destroy terrorist entities throughout the region.

MOST SERIOUS PROBLEMS

Question. What do you consider to be the most serious problems in
the performance of the functions of Commander, U.S. Central Command?
Answer. With a region as broad, volatile, and militarily active as
the CENTCOM AOR, the most serious problems are span of control and
unity of command. The issues are further complicated by the necessity
to embed CENTCOM's military activities into the broader context of U.S.
governmental policy and synchronized agency effort.
Question. What management actions and time lines would you
establish to address these problems?
Answer. Within the next year, we should assess ways to streamline
and simplify procedures associated with policy and authority to support
national efforts in both Afghanistan and Iraq. In addition, we will
begin a complete reassessment of our strategies and operational
concepts employed in the theater with regard to the war on terrorism.

OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM

Question. From your perspective as an operational commander, in
theater, and now as the prospective Commander of United States Central
Command, what are the top lessons learned with regard to planning
Operation Iraqi Freedom, including ongoing stability operations?
Answer. Operation Iraqi Freedom was the most well-integrated
combined and joint operation ever. It is a benchmark for future action
by U.S. or coalition forces. Carefully integrated planning and conduct
of mission rehearsals during the 3 to 4 month period prior to the
operation enabled continuous refinement of the plan prior to commencing
operations. These ``rehearsals'' ensured all components understood
timing, synchronization, integration, maneuver, and employment of joint
lethal fires and other non-lethal effects planned for the operation.
Thus we must sustain and improve our robust planning and rehearsal
capabilities for major operations.
The Force Deployment Planning and Execution process requires more
flexibility. The current deployment management systems are ``Cold War
vintage.'' They were not adaptive enough to meet OIF political and
operational planning, basing, access, and over flight requirements.
Automated tools are needed to speed force sourcing, planning and
deployment execution.
Reserve mobilization policies and systems must also adapt to the
more fluid force deployment and employment model we see in the future.
The Reserve Force management policies and systems are inefficient and
rigid. Many Reserve units provide the Active Force with critical combat
support and service support, and there were instances where these
enablers arrived late as a result of our current cumbersome
mobilization and deployment system.
At the strategic and operational levels, battle damage assessment,
interagency integration, and ISR management must be improved.
Shaping interagency involvement, while a key factor in our success,
will also require continued attention and support. Military power alone
does not win wars and it certainly does not win the peace.
Question. How would you assess the adequacy of forces provided to
Central Command, both in terms of quantity and mix, to conduct
Operation Iraqi Freedom up to the fall of Baghdad?
Answer. I assess that our force quantity and mix was adequate to
conduct offensive operations. We employed the most lethal force ever to
take the battlefield in less than half the time in took to posture for
Operation Desert Storm 12 years ago. OIF had the right joint and
combined force mix that allowed the commander to employ their combined
effects and meet objectives.
Question. How would you assess the adequacy of forces provided to
Central Command, both in terms of quantity and mix, to conduct the
ongoing stability operations?
Answer. In general, the mix and quantity are correct for ongoing
operations. Our analysis indicates force sizing is sufficient unless
new missions are added to current requirements. As we moved away from
combat operations to stability operations, the force mix changed
considerably in favor of ground forces. As conditions change, the
composition and size of our forces will continue to change. The factors
that influence the force mix in Iraq are future enemy actions, the
success we have in standing up the Iraq Police Force and the New Iraqi
Army, as well as integrating Coalition Force contributions. That having
been said I will fully reassess our current operational set and force
commitments for both Afghanistan and Iraq immediately upon taking
command.
Question. What role do you foresee for forces from additional
coalition nations in Iraq in the future?
Answer. The role envisioned for coalition forces focuses on
assuming security, stability, and reconstruction operations in various
sectors throughout Iraq. As these coalition forces arrive, we will be
able to redeploy U.S. forces. It has always been important that we
build a diverse and international force mix in Iraq. We currently have
commitments for UK and Polish led Multinational Divisions (under UK
command--UK, Italian and Dutch Brigades; under Polish command--Polish,
Ukrainian and Spanish Brigades). We are continuing discussions with
India to secure a commitment to lead a third division. We also have
been working with Pakistan to provide major forces. Several countries
have agreed to provide forces based on their capabilities to fill out
these multinational headquarters/divisions. At this moment, 18
coalition partners have deployed forces into the USCENTCOM AOR in
support of military operations in Iraq. An additional 42 nations are
conducting military to military discussions with respect to deploying
forces to Iraq in support of post-conflict stability and security
operations.

TRANSFORMATION

Question. Do current transformation initiatives support CENTCOM's
future requirements?
Answer. From recent and current combat operations experiences, I am
confident that DOD initiatives will support CENTCOM's future
requirements. While we have the best fighting forces in the world, we
must not be satisfied with the status quo. Growing asymmetric threats
have dictated that we transform to a lighter, more flexible, more
rapidly deployable force, while maintaining the lethality and overmatch
of our heavy forces. We must remain committed and prepared to swiftly
respond across the full spectrum of military operations, either
unilaterally or in concert with other nations. The CENTCOM staff is
linked to the various transformation efforts in DOD and provides combat
proven lessons into the process of transformation.
Question. How will the Army's transformation impact CENTCOM's
current operations?
Answer. As long as the Army continues to build lighter, more agile
forces and maintain the overmatch of our heavy forces while focusing on
their ability to bring precision guided weapons to bear on the
battlefield in a timely manner, I see nothing in the Army's
transformation efforts to give me concern. Beyond force structure and
operational transformation, there are significant logistics aspects of
Army transformation that will address sustainment issues. Continuing
efforts to establish a common relevant logistics operating picture
through asset visibility and in-transit visibility systems are
particularly important transformational activities in a theater so far
from home.
Question. If confirmed, how do you anticipate you would have to
adjust CENTCOM's operational plans as a result of overall DOD
transformation?
Answer. As DOD transforms, operational plans will be refined
through life cycle reviews to take full advantage of improved
capabilities, while focusing on transformational capabilities rather
than transformational goals. We expect that transformational
capabilities will allow us to reduce force buildup times, leverage
precision engagement for greater effect, reduce anticipated logistics
overhead, incorporate digital infrastructure to support information
dominance, and protect the changing vulnerabilities of the transformed
force. We must, however, guard against building plans which incorporate
unrealized transformational theories and capabilities.
Question. What impact will the Army's transformation have on the
large prepositioned stocks CENTCOM maintains in its area of
responsibility?
Answer. The important aspect of this issue is whether the Army's
transformation will obviate the need for prepositioning; the answer is,
no. As transformation continues, it is important that we maintain
prepositioned equipment and stocks that reflect those changes. The
right mix and correct positioning of equipment, munitions and
sustainment stocks will continue to be an essential component in the
Central Command area of responsibility.

AFGHANISTAN

Question. What is your assessment of the current situation in
Afghanistan?
Answer. Significant progress has been made in the last 18 months.
Thanks to the efforts of coalition forces, Taliban forces no longer
control the government or provinces and al Qaeda has been denied
freedom of operations within the country. The Islamic Transitional
Government of Afghanistan (ITGA) is established in Kabul, provinces
outside Kabul are beginning to rebuild efforts, and elections are
scheduled for the summer of 2004. There remains much to be done. With
continued emphasis on stability operations, reconstruction and with the
support of the international community, I am confident our long-term
goals will be achieved.
Question. What is the status of efforts to develop and field an
effective Afghan Army and national police force?
Answer. The German-led national police force training program is
making strides in developing a high-quality police force. This police
force is the key to long-term security and stability within the
country. However, with only 1,500 in training of the 50,000 required,
the current pace of training will not achieve the results required to
provide security to all provinces in the near-term. Greater USG and
international support is required to achieve our goals.
The U.S.-led Afghan National Army (ANA) program is on track and
will field a full-strength Central Corps by January 2004. Light
infantry battalions are constantly training and providing military
presence in provinces outside Kabul. The first ANA battalion will join
coalition forces in conducting operations within the next 30 days. The
ANA has inspired confidence in the central government.
Question. In your view, what additional military or other
assistance is required to ensure the transition of Afghanistan to a
stable, democratic, and economically viable nation?
Answer. Foremost, improve local security for both the Afghan people
and international aid organizations by increasing the scope and speed
of national police fielding. In addition, empower a civilian-led
authority to oversee all non-military functions and reconstruction
efforts; complete fielding of the eight planned Provisional
Reconstruction Teams with U.S. assets; and press neighboring nations to
end support for regional warlords.

NATO PEACEKEEPERS

Question. What additional opportunities, if any, do you foresee for
NATO forces to conduct out of area operations in the CENTCOM area of
responsibility?
Answer. I look forward to introducing a NATO presence in the
CENTCOM AOR. NATO involvement brings professionalism and experience in
a wide range of capabilities and the ability to integrate seamlessly
with U.S. forces. Their presence and operations will enhance CENTCOM's
ability to fight the global war on terrorism throughout the region. As
NATO forces are introduced, it is imperative that command and control
relationships are established that ensure unity of effort under
CENTCOM's operational control.

INDIA-PAKISTAN

Question. What is your assessment of the current situation with
regard to Pakistani-Indian relations?
Answer. The recent attempt at rapprochement between India and
Pakistan is encouraging, but both countries clearly have a long way to
go to put aside their deeply entrenched mistrusts and suspicions. There
remain contentious and emotionally charged issues to be addressed and
resolved, with Kashmir being the foremost issue. Clearly Indian-
Pakistani conflict can lead to a nuclear war. CENTCOM's continued
relationship with Pakistan provides a venue for dialog and confidence
building that can do much to lessen tensions.

OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM LESSONS LEARNED

Question. From your perspective, what are the top lessons learned
from recent and continuing military operations in Iraq?
Answer. As I mentioned earlier, operations in Iraq demonstrated a
maturing of joint and combined force operations. Some capabilities
reached new levels. From a joint integration perspective, our previous
operations in our AOR (OSW/ONW, OEF) helped to develop a joint culture
in our headquarters staffs and in our components. These operations also
helped to improve joint interoperability and improve our joint C\4\I
networks. Integrated battlefield synergy achieved new levels of
sophistication. Our forces were able to achieve their operational
objectives by integrating multiple and rapid operations incorporating
ground maneuver, special operations, precision lethal fires and
application of other non-lethal effects. We saw a real integration of
forces to achieve effects as opposed to the de-confliction approach
used in earlier conflicts.
Our overall information operations campaign supported both the
operational and tactical objectives of the commander. However, we found
it difficult at times to assess and measure its effects during the
operation. Better resolution of the IO effectiveness is now emerging
during Phase IV operations. Intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance helped decisionmakers plan and execute strikes and
maneuver effectively. However, our ability to strike rapidly sometimes
exceeded our ability to sense and assess the effects as quickly as we
would have liked.
Some capabilities require additional work. Fratricide prevention
suffered from a lack of standardized combat identification systems.
Units in theater arrived with seven different combat ID systems. Manual
procedures and workarounds were rigorously applied by our commanders to
overcome these shortcomings.
As mentioned earlier, deployment planning and execution need some
work to meet emerging needs; deployment management systems must meet
political and operational planning, basing, access, and over-flight
requirements in future contingencies.
Coalition information sharing must also be improved at all levels.
Our coalition partners need our full support during combat operations
and we need to develop agile systems of information sharing that do not
compromise sensitive U.S.-only information.
Finally, a significant command and control challenge was the task
in determining future bandwidth requirements for the AOR infrastructure
and new warfighting systems. The demand for ISR and battlefield
information continues to grow. Additionally, command and control ``on
the move'' was hampered by the finite number of UHF tactical satellite
channels available. The demand for UHF TACSAT exceeded the finite
capacity and forced continuous prioritization of those available
channels as the operations unfolded.

FORMER SOVIET UNION STATES

Question. What is your assessment of current U.S. military
relationships with these nations, including Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and
Kyrgystan?
Answer. Our relationship with the Central Asian States (CAS) is
good and improving. They have actively supported our efforts in
Afghanistan with over flight and basing access for coalition forces. We
continue to expand our security cooperation programs by increasing and
focusing our bilateral military contacts and security assistance
programs to build interoperability and host nation capabilities to
assist in the fight against terrorism.
Question. What security challenges do you see in this portion of
the CENTCOM area of responsibility?
Answer. Terrorism, narcotics trafficking, and the proliferation of
WMD and their components remain the primary regional security concerns
in Central Asia. These challenges are magnified by weak economies and
porous borders that make this area a potential breeding ground for
discontent and radicalism. Through our security cooperation programs,
we are assisting the countries with improvement of their security and
border controls. We remain cognizant of the need to implement strong
force protection measures in a region where the lack of developed
infrastructure could impact the security of our coalition forces.

IRAN

Question. What is the view of U.S. allies in the region with regard
to the threat posed by Iran?
Answer. Iran casts a shadow on security and stability in the Gulf
region. Iran's military is second only to the United States. U.S.
allies in the Gulf region acknowledge Iran's increasingly proactive
efforts to soften its image and to appear less hegemonic; however,
Iran's military poses a potential threat to neighboring countries. U.S.
forward presence will continue as a balance against any possible use of
force by Iran. By continuing our forward presence in the AOR, we serve
to influence Iran against any possible use of military force while
providing assurances of long-term commitment to our friends and allies.
Question. What is your assessment of the prospects for political
reform in Iran?
Answer. This question is probably best addressed by the experts in
the Department of State and the Intelligence Community. In my opinion,
there is chance for political reform to occur in Iran. It will not
happen without some internal instability in Iran which could also
create regional tensions. In such an environment, a credible Central
Command deterrent capability is vital for regional security.

MISSILE AND WMD THREATS

Question. How do you evaluate Iran's current capability to use
ballistic missiles and WMD against U.S. forces, and what is your
projection of Iran's future capabilities?
Answer. Iran has the largest ballistic missile inventory in the
Central Command region to include long-range WMD delivery systems
capable of reaching deployed U.S. forces in theater. Systems include
SCUD short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) and SHAHAB-3 medium-range
ballistic missiles (MRBM).
Iran's indigenous nuclear program continues. Iran has not declared
all of its nuclear facilities and activities in a timely manner as
required by the IAEA. Iran's long-term ability to develop nuclear
weapons remains a source of serious concern.
Iran signed the chemical weapons convention treaty banning chemical
weapons but, Iran is assessed to have the largest chemical weapons (CW)
program in the region. Tehran also has a biological weapons (BW)
program, the size and scope of which remains unclear.
In the future, Iran will continue to develop more advanced/longer
range ballistic missiles and more advanced CBW agents. Iran will
continue to be a proliferation concern in our region.
Question. How do you evaluate Iran's cruise missile capabilities,
and Iran's ability to threaten U.S. naval forces and commercial
shipping in the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Arabian
Sea?
Answer. Over the past 5 years, Iran has substantially improved its
anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM) capabilities through the acquisition of
additional missiles, the indigenous production of mobile launchers and
the purchase of new ASCMs from China and North Korea. However,
realistic training has been very limited; we assess only a limited
capability to effectively employ these weapons.
Nevertheless, the use of ASCMs and other weapons within Iran's
coastal defense forces support a layered force strategy which poses a
viable threat to western naval forces and shipping. Iran's strategy
seeks to simultaneously employ air/land/ship-based ASCMs, submarines (3
x) and naval mines in concert with hundreds of lightly armed small
boats in order to overwhelm the enemy and control the Strait of Hormuz
(SOH). Iran's focus remains in the littoral; its ability to project
power into the Arabian Sea is marginal. Use of externally based
terrorist elements and surrogates is planned to compliment maritime
capabilities.
Question. If confirmed, how would you protect the troops under your
command from these threats?
Answer. I would use all available PATRIOT and AEGIS assets to
counter any ballistic missile and/or cruise missile threat to U.S. and
coalition assets in-theater as appropriate. The Command would work with
Services to continue to develop ballistic missile defense capabilities.
Certainly, military planning will fully consider tactics, timings,
techniques, and procedures to deal with the threat in the event of an
escalating crisis.

FORCE PROTECTION

Question. If confirmed, what would your top priorities be in terms
of force protection?
Answer. USCENTCOM will maintain an offensive orientation and carry
the war on terrorism to the enemy. The Command will continue to develop
and implement dynamic Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection/Critical
Infrastructure programs to assess and mitigate threats to DOD personnel
and assets. These programs include:

Monitoring of terrorist threat intelligence with effective
analysis and dissemination and to remain vigilant to address
new terrorist tactics intended to exploit our weaknesses.
Developing programs that help eliminate sanctuary for
terrorists and enable host nations to detect, deter, and
eliminate terrorist elements.
Pursuing host nation support for force protection measures to
include measures to counter MANPAD threats (off base
patrolling) and to continue the development of force protection
infrastructure at U.S.-occupied bases.
Conducting vulnerability assessments of DOD facilities and
infrastructure regularly to assess and mitigate threats to
personnel and assets.
Integrating appropriate emerging technologies, such as
scanning and imaging systems for vehicles and people; explosive
and metal detectors; military working dogs; and other merging
technologies on the verge of release to field.

I anticipate an ongoing critical need for substantial augmentation
by active duty and Reserve personnel to support Anti-Terrorism/Force
Protection efforts. That having been said, we will never be able to
achieve 100 percent force protection in this volatile region.
Question. What additional steps, if any, need to be taken to ensure
that personnel being assigned to the CENTCOM area of responsibility are
fully prepared for potential threats?
Answer. USCENTCOM must work closely with the Services to
incorporate lessons learned from the field into relevant training,
tactics, techniques and procedures, as well as the development of new
technological capabilities.

HORN OF AFRICA

Question. What is the strategic importance of this region to the
United States?
Answer. The Horn of Africa (HOA) sits astride one of the most
critical sea lines of communications in the world. It is imperative
that we maintain freedom of navigation to ensure strategic maritime
access to the entire CENTCOM AOR and freedom of movement of ocean-borne
commerce, including oil. The ports in Djibouti and Kenya also afford
strategic entry points to the rest of Africa for humanitarian relief
and contingency operations. Ungoverned areas in the HOA are used as
safe havens for terrorist organizations that could potentially threaten
our national interests. We must remain engaged in the HOA to deny the
ability of these organizations to operate freely.
Question. Since EUCOM has geographical responsibility for most of
Africa, what is the advantage of assigning the Horn of Africa to
CENTCOM?
Answer. The majority of the population in the HOA is more aligned
along religious and ethnic lines with nations in CENTCOM than with the
remainder of the African continent. Ungoverned areas within this region
remain safe havens for terrorist and radical Islamic organizations that
threaten our national interests. These organizations are connected to
other elements that mainly operate in the central region. Leaving the
HOA in CENTCOM's AOR provides the strategic and operational advantage
of seamless integration and the creation of optimal conditions for
conducting operations.

PAKISTAN

Question. What is the current status of U.S.-Pakistan military
cooperation?
Answer. The U.S.-Pakistan military relationship is good, and
continues to improve. Pakistan remains a strong ally in Operation
Enduring Freedom (OEF). The Pakistan military continues to improve its
capability and effectiveness to deal with international terrorist
organizations. They have actively pursued and captured terrorists
within their country. We will continue to foster the relationship to
demonstrate our commitment to long-term regional stability and improved
U.S. relations.

SCIENCE ADVISORS FOR COMBATANT COMMANDERS

Question. If confirmed, how would your Command make use of the
technical expertise available in the Services and their laboratories in
order to provide scientific and technical advice to the warfighters?
Answer. I would not only leverage the Service laboratories, but
also the laboratories in other public and private sectors. CENTCOM has
established a Science Advisor position, whose principle responsibility
is liaison with science and technology centers of excellence and
supporting agencies that receive direct input from all public and
private laboratories such as Defense Advanced Research Project Agency
(DARPA), Army's Field Assistance in Science and Technology (FAST),
Counter-Terrorism Technology Task Force (CTTTF) and the Service
laboratories. I see the Science Advisor as the entry point for
technology input into the process of transformation. The critical
linkage between the laboratories and the battlefield is increasing as
we attempt to develop the Future Force.

BANDWIDTH ON THE BATTLEFIELD

Question. What challenges do you anticipate in fully utilizing
these important assets with the limited bandwidth currently available
to the warfighter?
Answer. Bandwidth is a critical warfighting resource and its
availability was, itself, one of our greatest challenges--both inter
and intra theater. Only through significant investments in commercial
terrestrial and space segments leases were we able to secure the
communications pipes necessary to prosecute the war. Our most
significant challenge is determining future bandwidth requirements for
the AOR infrastructure and new warfighting systems--because we know
those requirements will grow. Sustained funding support for these
commercial bandwidth resources is imperative. Operationally, our
challenge will continue to be the smart, balanced employment of
commercial and military communications assets to ensure redundant and
reliable network support to the warfighter. To increase our capability
command and control on the move, it is imperative that we secure
additional UHF (TACSAT) bandwidth or alternate means. All Services have
the obligation to aggressively pursue new technologies and system
designs that take into account this limited critical resource.
Question. What is your assessment of the bandwidth available during
Operation Iraqi Freedom?
Answer. We had sufficient bandwidth for C\4\ISR requirements to
prosecute the war. We achieved this sufficiency through intelligent
investments in commercial communications as well as the smart, balanced
employment of commercial and military communications assets as
discussed in the paragraph above. We had marginally sufficient
bandwidth for command and control on the move, specifically UHF TACSAT.
The enormous demand for UHF channels exceeded the very limited
availability of UHF bandwidth. However we measure sufficiency today, it
is imperative that we do not underestimate the challenges in securing
bandwidth to meet the future requirements as described above.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to
appear before this committee and other appropriate committees of
Congress?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views,
even if those views differ from the administration in power?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as the Commander, U.S. Central
Command?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and
other communications of information are provided to this committee and
its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes.
______

[The nomination reference of LTG John P. Abizaid, USA,
follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
June 18, 2003.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
The following named officer for appointment in the United States
Army to the grade indicated while assigned to a position of importance
and responsibility under title 10, U.S.C., section 601:

To be General

LTG John P. Abizaid, 6229.
______

[The biographical sketch of LTG John P. Abizaid, USA, which
was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was
referred, follows:]
Resume of Service Career of LTG John P. Abizaid, USA
Source of commissioned service: USMA.

Military schools attended:
Infantry Officer Basic and Advanced Courses
Armed Forces Staff College
National Security Affairs Fellowship--Hoover Institute--Stanford
University

Educational degrees:
United States Military Academy--BS--No Major
Harvard University--MA--Area Studies

Foreign language(s): Arabic--Modern, German, Italian

Promotions:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Promotions Dates of Appointment
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2LT........................................... 6 Jun 73
1LT........................................... 6 Jun 75
CPT........................................... 6 Jun 77
MAJ........................................... 1 Sep 84
LTC........................................... 1 Apr 90
COL........................................... 1 Sep 93
BG............................................ 1 Nov 96
MG............................................ 1 Mar 00
LTG........................................... 2 Oct 00
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Major duty assignments:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
From To Assignment
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Jan 74.......................... Aug 74............ Rifle Platoon
Leader, C
Company, 1st
Battalion
(Airborne), 504th
Infantry, 82d
Airborne
Division, Fort
Bragg, North
Carolina
Aug 74.......................... Apr 75............ Scout Platoon
Leader, 1st
Battalion, 504th
Infantry, 82d
Airborne
Division, Fort
Bragg, North
Carolina
May 75.......................... Feb 77............ Platoon Leader, A
Company, later
Executive
Officer, C
Company, 2d
Battalion
(Ranger), 75th
Infantry, Fort
Lewis, Washington
Mar 77.......................... Sep 77............ Commander,
Headquarters and
Headquarters
Company, 2d
Battalion
(Ranger), 75th
Infantry, Fort
Lewis, Washington
Oct 77.......................... Aug 78............ Student, Basic
Arabic Modern
Standard Language
Course, Presidio
of Monterey,
California
Sep 78.......................... Jun 80............ Olmsted Scholar,
University of
Jordan, Amman,
Jordan
Jul 80.......................... May 81............ Student, Harvard
University,
Center for Middle
Eastern Studies,
Cambridge,
Massachusetts
Jun 81.......................... Dec 81............ Student, Infantry
Officer Advanced
Course, United
States Army
Infantry School,
Fort Benning,
Georgia
Jan 82.......................... Nov 83............ S-5 (Civil
Military Affairs
Officer), later
Commander, A
Company, 1st
Battalion
(Ranger), 75th
Infantry, Hunter
Army Airfield,
Georgia and
Operation Urgent
Fury, Grenada
Dec 83.......................... Dec 84............ Staff Officer,
Army Studies
Group, Office of
the Chief of
Staff, Army,
Pentagon,
Washington, DC
Jan 85.......................... Jun 85............ Student, Armed
Forces Staff
College, Norfolk,
Virginia
Jul 85.......................... Jun 86............ Operations
Officer, Observer
Group Lebanon,
United Nations
Truce Supervision
Organization,
Naqoura, Lebanon
Jul 86.......................... Jan 88............ Executive Officer,
3d Battalion,
325th Infantry,
United States
Army Southern
European Task
Force, Vicenza,
Italy
Feb 88.......................... Jun 88............ Deputy Commander,
3d Battalion,
325th Infantry,
United States
Army Southern
European Task
Force, Vicenza,
Italy
Jul 88.......................... May 90............ Aide-de-Camp to
the Commander in
Chief, United
States Army
Europe and
Seventh Army,
Germany
Jun 90.......................... Jun 92............ Commander, 3d
Battalion, 325th
Infantry, United
States Army
Southern European
Task Force,
Vicenza, Italy
and Operation
Desert Shield/
Storm, Northern
Iraq
Jul 92.......................... Jun 93............ National Security
Affairs Fellow,
Hoover Institute,
Stanford
University,
Stanford,
California
Jul 93.......................... Jul 95............ Commander, 1st
Brigade, 82d
Airborne
Division, Fort
Bragg, North
Carolina
Jun 95.......................... Oct 96............ Executive
Assistant to the
Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of
Staff, Office of
the Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of
Staff,
Washington, DC
Oct 96.......................... Aug 97............ Assistant Division
Commander
(Maneuver), 1st
Armored Division,
United States
Army Europe and
Seventh Army,
Germany and
Stabilization
Force, Bosnia
Aug 97.......................... Aug 99............ Commandant of
Cadets, United
States Military
Academy, West
Point, New York
Aug 99.......................... Sep 00............ Commanding
General, 1st
Infantry
Division, United
States Army
Europe and
Seventh Army,
Germany and Task
Force Falcon,
Kosovo
Oct 00.......................... Oct 01............ Director for
Strategic Plans
and Policy, J-5,
The Joint Staff,
Washington, DC
Oct 01.......................... Jan 03............ Director, The
Joint Staff,
Washington, DC
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of joint assignments:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Assignment Dates Grade
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Operations Officer, Observer Jul 85-Jun 86..... Major
Group Lebanon, United Nations
Truce Supervision Organization,
Naqoura, Lebanon.
Executive Assistant to the Jun 95-0ct 96..... Colonel
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, Office of the Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Washington, DC.
Director for Strategic Plans and Oct 00-Oct 01..... Lieutenant General
Policy, J-5, The Joint Staff,
Washington, DC.
Director, The Joint Staff, Oct 01-Jan 03..... Lieutenant General
Washington, DC.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

U.S. decorations and badges:
Distinguished Service Medal
Defense Distinguished Service Medal
Defense Superior Service Medal
Legion of Merit (with 4 Oak Leaf Clusters)
Bronze Star Medal
Defense Meritorious Service Medal
Meritorious Service Medal (with 2 Oak Leaf Clusters)
Army Commendation Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Army Achievement Medal
Combat Infantryman Badge
Expert Infantryman Badge
Master Parachutist Badge
Ranger Tab
Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge
Army Staff Identification Badge
______

United States Central Command,
Office of the Deputy Commander in Chief,
MacDill Air Force Base, FL.
Hon. John Warner, Chairman,
Committee on Armed Services,
United States Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: This letter provides information on my financial
and other interests for your consideration in connection with my
nomination for the position of Commander, CENTCOM. It supplements
Standard Form 278, ``Executive Personnel Financial Disclosure Report,''
which has already been provided to the committee and which summarizes
my financial interests.
To the best of my knowledge, none of the financial interests listed
on my Standard Form 278 will create any conflict of interest in the
execution of my new governmental responsibilities. Additionally, I have
no other interests or liabilities in any amount with any firm or
organization that is a Department of Defense contractor.
During my term of office, neither I, nor any member of my immediate
family will invest in any entity that would create a conflict of
interest with my government duties. I do not have any present
employment arrangements with any entity other than the Department of
Defense and have no formal or informal understandings concerning any
further employment with any entity.
I have never been arrested or charged with any criminal offenses
other than minor traffic violations. I have never been party to any
civil litigation. To the best of my knowledge, there have never been
any lawsuits filed against any agency of the Federal Government or
corporate entity with which I have been associated reflecting adversely
on the work I have done at such agency or corporation. I am aware of no
incidents reflecting adversely upon my suitability to serve in the
position for which I have been nominated.
To the best of my knowledge, I am not presently the subject of any
governmental inquiry or investigation.
I trust that the foregoing information will be satisfactory to the
committee.
Sincerely,
John P. Abizaid,
Lieutenant General, United States Army.

[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior
military officers nominated by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by LTG John P.
Abizaid, USA, in connection with his nomination follows:]

UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

Part A--Biographical Information

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
John P. Abizaid.

2. Position to which nominated:
Commander, CENTCOM.

3. Date of nomination:
June 18, 2003.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
1 April 1951; Redwood City, California.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to the former Kathleen Patricia Denton of Bridgeport, CA.
Married on 22 December 1973.

7. Names and ages of children:
Sharon Marie Abizaid, age 27.
Christine Sandra Abizaid, age 23.
David Edward Abizaid, age 20.

8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
honorary, or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
or local governments, other than those listed above.
None.

10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
Association of the United States Army.
Society of the 1st Infantry Division.
82nd Airborne Division Association.
The Retired Officers Association.
Association of Graduates, United States Military Academy.
Member of Board of Directors, George Olmstead Foundation (Active
Duty Member, no compensation).

11. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding
service or achievements other tahn those listed on the service record
extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
Distinguished Cadet, United States Military Academy, 1973.
Olmstead Scholarship, George Olmstead Foundation, 1980.

12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly
constituted committee of the Senate?
Yes.

13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly
constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if
those views differ from the administration in power?
Yes.
______

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B-E of the
committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set
forth in the appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to
Parts B-E are contained in the committee's executive files.]
------

______

[The nomination of LTG John P. Abizaid, USA, was reported
to the Senate by Chairman Warner on June 26, 2003, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on June 27, 2003.]

NOMINATIONS OF THOMAS W. O'CONNELL TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT; AND PAUL M.
LONGSWORTH TO BE DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR FOR DEFENSE NUCLEAR
NONPROLIFERATION, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

----------

THURSDAY, JULY 10, 2003

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:09 a.m. in
room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator John
Warner (chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Warner, Inhofe,
Roberts, Allard, Collins, Levin, Reed, Akaka, and Pryor.
Committee staff members present: Judith A. Ansley, staff
director; and Gabriella Eisen, nominations clerk.
Majority staff members present: Charles W. Alsup,
professional staff member; L. David Cherington, counsel; Mary
Alice A. Hayward, professional staff member; Scott W. Stucky,
general counsel; and Richard F. Walsh, counsel.
Minority staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes,
Democratic staff director; Madelyn R. Creedon, minority
counsel; Evelyn N. Farkas, professional staff member; and Peter
K. Levine, minority counsel.
Staff assistant present: Andrew W. Florell.
Committee members' assistants present: James Beauchamp,
assistant to Senator Roberts; Douglas Flanders and Lance
Landry, assistants to Senator Allard; James P. Dohoney, Jr.,
assistant to Senator Collins; Elizabeth King, assistant to
Senator Reed; William K. Sutey, assistant to Senator Bill
Nelson; Eric Pierce, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; and Terri
Glaze, assistant to Senator Pryor.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Warner. The committee will come to order. We are
pleased to have before the committee this morning Thomas
O'Connell, nominee for the position of Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, and
I understand our distinguished and valued colleague from Rhode
Island will introduce him momentarily. Additionally, Senator
Roberts will introduce Mr. Longsworth, am I correct on that?
Senator Roberts. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. Fine, thank you. We welcome Paul
Longsworth back. We've never really felt he's left.
Nevertheless, he's one of our very own and we repose tremendous
pride and respect in you, indeed a distinguished number of the
staff of this committee that has gone on to accept
responsibilities in the area of our national defense and
security.
We're fortunate that each of our nominees have included
this morning members of their family and I will at the
appropriate time ask them to recognize those members.
Mr. O'Connell comes highly qualified for this key post but
I'll reserve my observations until Senator Reed and Senator
Roberts have finished their introductions. We'll first
recognize Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Senator
Levin, and colleagues. It's an honor for me to introduce Tom
O'Connell to this committee. He brings to his job as the
Assistant Secretary for Special Operations and Low Intensity
Conflict an expertise and passion. He is a dedicated patriot,
someone who graduated from the University of Rhode Island in
1968, served as an infantry lieutenant in Germany, then went to
Vietnam, where he was decorated with a Bronze Star for Valor
and the Purple Heart. He returned to the United States and
concentrated his military career in intelligence operations,
the very operations which he will supervise.
He has seen it all, from the platoon level, company level,
and battalion level. He's been in Special Operations Command,
he's been in regular units, he's been in the 18th Airborne
Corps. I can't think of anyone more qualified to be Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity
Conflict. He has distinguished himself in many ways. He is now
retired from the military, working for Raytheon, and--I think,
Mr. Chairman, that you pointed out--he has brought with him his
family and he will, I'm sure, at your suggestion introduce
them. They have been a proud part of his life and his career
and a part of his success, I'm sure.
In Rhode Island, we can claim some very distinguished
military officers, and Tom's one of them. His family is still
there working. His brother is a dispatcher in the Jamestown,
Rhode Island Police Department. It is a public-spirited family.
It is a family that has given much to the country. I
unreservedly recommend our committee's approval of this
distinguished American, a great soldier, Tom O'Connell.
Chairman Warner. I thank you very much, Senator Reed. You
speak from a very distinguished record yourself of service in
the United States Army.
Senator Collins, I understand you also have some opening
remarks with regard to this nominee.
Senator Collins. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. As we
can all see by reviewing the background of Mr. O'Connell, he is
eminently qualified to fill the position for which he has been
nominated. What I want to comment on, however, is not so much
Mr. O'Connell's fine record, as his good judgment and
extraordinary fortune in marrying a native of the State of
Maine. [Laughter.]
I think that speaks volumes about his abilities and
judgment. His wife of 35 years, Pat, is a native of Maine. She
is the daughter of the Ladues, who are lifelong residents of
Hollowell, Maine. Her father was the director of property tax
for the State of Maine. Both of the O'Connells' sons attended
the University of Maine, and they have a lake house in
Winthrop, Maine.
So I thought that bit of information was also critical to
the committee's determination. I appreciate the chairman's
yielding to me on that point.
Chairman Warner. I must say as I approached the nominee I
thought it was his daughter that he was introducing.
[Laughter.]
I see this marvelous family--I expect at this point in time
you'd better step in, Mr. O'Connell, and introduce this
wonderful family. We please ask that they stand.
Mr. O'Connell. First, my wife, Pat, who has already been
pointed out by the Senator. My son, Kevin, a captain in the
United States Army, his wife, Lindsay, they're newlyweds,
married a year ago. My son, Andy, who's in the Coast Guard
Reserves, just recalled to active duty from college to the
United States Coast Guard Reserve--he was two courses short of
his college degree, but he's back on active duty with no
complaints. His lovely wife, Catherine, who is an identical
twin. My sister Sally's son, Luke. Sally is sitting in the next
row. I have John Grimes, my boss from Raytheon sitting there,
the distinguished gray-haired gentleman. Well-known in town, my
sister, Sally O'Connell Pezonko. My sister, Lori O'Connell
Fisher. Lori's husband, Carl Fisher. Sally's husband, Larry
Pezonko. A dear, dear friend, Michael Ledeen, and his wife,
Barbara, is AWOL.
Chairman Warner. I wonder if anybody in the room who's not
here in support of your nomination could stand up----
[Laughter.]
These hearings are very important. It is the fulfillment of
the Senate's role under the Constitution of advice and consent
to the President. But in this instance, Mr. O'Connell, speaking
for this Senator and I think the majority of this committee, if
not the entire committee, the President has chosen well in
selecting you. We are delighted that the family has joined you.
I have an old yellowed set of hearing records when I sat in
that chair 30-plus years ago. I treasure that little bit of a
hearing record, as you and your family someday will treasure
the one that this committee will print on your behalf.
So I will put into the record at this point without
enumerating, because I couldn't do it as well as Senator Reed,
the distinguished career that you have had.
Senator Roberts.
Senator Roberts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Like my
colleague, Senator Reed, I want to say that it's an honor and a
privilege for me to introduce no stranger to this committee,
Paul Longsworth. I do it today for two reasons. Well, first
just let me say that the Longsworth posse is not as numerous as
the O'Connell posse but we make up for numbers with quality and
dedication. [Laughter.]
When we ride the trail ride, we ride straight and true from
Wichita to Dodge City to any other place in Kansas. At any
rate, the first reason is that the programs that he will be
responsible for in this new position are under the jurisdiction
of the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, which
I have the good fortune of chairing and which the chairman had
the foresight to form some years ago. But more importantly, I
am pleased to introduce him because he is a fellow Kansan and
certainly we could use a few more Kansans around here in
Washington.
Mr. Longsworth is from Wichita, Kansas. He graduated from
Wichita State University. He's a Shocker and has almost two
decades of experience working with the Department of Energy
(DOE) and its national laboratory system. He has worked in the
private sector and in the Federal Government and in Congress.
As everybody on the committee knows, he most recently served
Congress as a professional staff member on this committee.
Currently he is the senior policy advisor for national security
in the former Soviet Union in Energy Secretary Abraham's
office. In this capacity, he has advised the Secretary on a
wide range of national security matters, including
nonproliferation stockpile stewardship and intelligence.
He works closely with the National Security Council and
other Federal agencies and international organizations such as
the International Atomic Energy Agency, an agency that has
received a lot of mention in today's world in terms of
importance.
I believe all of these experiences and capabilities make
him a highly qualified candidate for the position of Deputy
Administrator. I am proud to support his nomination. I would
also like to join in welcoming Paul's family, and in keeping
with the tradition set by my distinguished friend and
colleague, Senator Reed, I would ask Paul to introduce his
family. His wife, by the way, is from Pennsylvania. We thought
we'd have Senator Specter here and Senator Santorum to give a
ringing endorsement following the example of Senator Collins,
but they are busy. But let me say that they are very proud of
Paul's lifelong selection. Paul, would you like to introduce
your family, please?
Mr. Longsworth. Thank you, Senator. I have my parents here
from Wichita, Thorn and Sue Longsworth. I have my wife,
Rebecca, here, who is from Pennsylvania, and her mother, my
mother-in-law, Sally Keene, from Washington, Pennsylvania.
Senator Roberts. That concludes my comments, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you.
Senator Levin. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if I could just add a
supporting comment here because Senator Collins has established
a precedent which it seems to me is noteworthy. I understand
that your father is a graduate of Michigan State.
Mr. Longsworth. He is. Yes, sir. [Laughter.]
Senator Levin. Number one, where's your green jacket?
Number two, that fact puts your son over the top as far as I'm
concerned. He just made it. It was nip and tuck until then, but
now he's okay. [Laughter.]
Chairman Warner. Senator Allard.
Senator Allard. Mr. Chairman, just briefly, I have written
comments that I'd like to make a part of the record. But I'd
just like to remind the committee that when I first came on
this committee and then became chairman of the Subcommittee on
Strategic Forces, Paul was my staff person and he worked with
me to bring me up to par in what was currently happening in the
area of nuclear issues. I can't think of anybody better
qualified or knowledgeable than Paul to assume this position. I
just wanted to personally wish him well. He did a good job for
me.
[The prepared statement of Senator Allard follows:]

Prepared Statement by Senator Wayne Allard

Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for holding this nomination
hearing today. I believe it is very important that we move these
nominees as quickly as possible. These two positions are too vital to
leave vacant.
First, I want to thank Thomas W. O'Connell for taking the time to
come visit me a few weeks ago. I believe we had a very good but brief
meeting during one of our stacked votes.
Second, I welcome Paul Longsworth back to the committee. When I
first became Chairman of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee, Paul had
the chore of getting me up to speed on all the diverse and complicated
issues surrounding the subcommittee's jurisdiction regarding the
Department of Energy's nuclear programs. Paul is a very qualified
nominee to be the Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation, National Nuclear Security Administration. He will
bring years of experience and expertise to the position. He has been
and will continue to be a valued advisor to Secretary Abraham and
Director Linton Brooks.
Mr. Chairman, I strongly support both these nominees and look
forward to moving out of committee and out of Senate so they can get to
work.

Chairman Warner. I'll put into the record my remarks with
regard to each of these distinguished nominees and again I
commend the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the
Secretary of Energy for their wisdom in selecting these
outstanding individuals who are well-experienced and well-
qualified. We are fortunate in this Nation to have these
nominees together with their families accept public service. It
is quite a challenge, particularly in these days and times
which are quite perilous and uncertain facing this Nation and
indeed the world.
Senator Levin.
[The prepared statement of Senator Warner follows:]

Prepared Statement by Senator John Warner

I am pleased that we have before the committee this morning Thomas
O'Connell, the nominee for the position of Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity conflict. I understand
Mr. O'Connell is a Rhode Islander and will be introduced by Senator
Reed.
It is a personal pleasure for me to welcome back to the committee
Paul Longsworth, a distinguished former member of the committee staff.
Mr. Longsworth has been nominated to serve as the Deputy Administrator
for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation at the National Nuclear Security
Administration of the Department of Energy. I understand that Senator
Roberts will introduce Mr. Longsworth.
We welcome the nominees and their families.
Family support is critical to the success of individuals in senior
positions in our Government. We thank you all for your role in
contributing to the impressive careers of public service of our two
nominees.
Mr. O'Connell comes highly qualified for this key post, having
served over 27 years on active duty as an Army infantry and
intelligence officer, including service in the Special Operations
community. Among Mr. O'Connell's accomplishments, he served with the
Central Intelligence Agency as Deputy for Command Support; as Deputy
Director for U.S. Special Operations Command; as brigade commander for
the Army Special Mission Unit; and as commanding officer of a Military
Intelligence Battalion in the 82nd Airborne Division. His combat
experience includes tours of duty in Vietnam, Grenada, Panama, and
Southwest Asia. His awards include the Defense Superior Service Medal,
the Bronze Star for Valor, the Purple Heart, and the Air Medal. Since
retirement from active duty, Mr. O'Connell continued his public service
as a task force member of the Defense Science Board and the President's
Advisory Committee on National Security Telecommunications.
Paul Longsworth is likewise highly qualified for the position of
Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation at the
National Nuclear Security Administration. The Deputy Administrator is
responsible for programs designed to detect, prevent, and reverse the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and Mr. Longsworth has
extensive experience in this important area. Mr. Longsworth is
currently the senior Policy Advisor for National Security and the
former Soviet Union to the Secretary of Energy, and, as such, Mr.
Longsworth is responsible for advising the Secretary on a wide range of
programs and issues related to stockpile stewardship and
nonproliferation. In addition to his service with the Armed Services
Committee, Mr. Longsworth has worked for the Senate Committee on
Environment and Public Works and for the Office of Science and
Technology of the Department of Energy.
Our nominees have a wealth of experience, and I believe each of
them will excel in the positions to which they have been nominated. We
welcome them and their families and look forward to their comments and
responses today.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN

Senator Levin. Mr. Chairman, I'm going to follow your lead
and put my opening statement in the record. We have two well-
qualified nominees before us. I'm glad that we also have a
nominee who has some experience in the legislative branch, on
this committee no less. Since there has been a great deal of
commentary about the flow of power to the executive branch from
the legislative branch in this administration, which has been
resisted by many of us, this is now a case where we're fighting
back. We are infiltrating the executive branch. We are
delighted with your experience and knowledge, Paul, that you
will be bringing to your new position.
[The prepared statement of Senator Levin follows:]

Prepared Statement by Senator Carl Levin

Thank you, Senator Warner. I want to join Senator Warner in
welcoming our witnesses and their families this morning.
I am pleased that we finally have a nominee--Thomas O'Connell--for
the position of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
and Low Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC) before us today. That position has
been vacant for 2 years, and yet the issues that fall under the purview
of that office--including special operations, peace or stability
operations, counternarcotics policy, and worldwide efforts to combat
terrorism--are among the most critical responsibilities of the
Department of Defense.
Mr. O'Connell comes to us with a long, distinguished background in
special operations and intelligence work, and the endorsement of our
colleague, Senator Reed.
Paul Longsworth, nominated for the position of Deputy Administrator
for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation at the National Nuclear Security
Administration, is a former member of the committee staff. It is always
a pleasure to see former staff members selected for senior positions in
the executive branch.
If confirmed, Mr. O'Connell, you would assume responsibility for
the policy that would guide peace or stability operations. Senator
Warner and I, along with several other members of this committee, have
just returned from Iraq, and we visited Afghanistan earlier this year.
It is evident to me that in Iraq and Afghanistan, we urgently need to
develop a comprehensive, multinational strategy for establishing
security, and fostering political and economic reconstruction.
At the same time, you will be charged with guiding the Special
Operations Command as it assumes its new expanded role in the global
campaign against terrorism. You will also oversee the Special
Operations Command's budget and its prioritization of roles and
missions. This is critical, because while the Special Operations
Command takes the lead in fighting the war on terrorism, special
operators must continue to receive training for, and conduct, the many
other missions, such as foreign internal defense, that give these
operators access to other countries the United States may want to
collaborate with, or where U.S. troops may be deployed in the future.
Finally, among your responsibilities will be formulating and
implementing an effective counterdrug policy, and ensuring that our
military commitments in places like Colombia meet with success and
support U.S. foreign policy.
The position for which Paul has been nominated, the Deputy for
Nuclear Nonproliferation, has grown in significance since its creation.
The Department of Energy, and now the National Nuclear Security
Administration, is at the forefront of the effort to account for,
secure, and protect nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons materials, and
nuclear weapons technology from the former Soviet Union from falling
into the wrong hands.
We now have the opportunity to expand those nonproliferation
programs to address nuclear materials that could be used in
radiological dispersal devices, so-called dirty bombs. Secretary
Abraham recently hosted an international assembly to begin to address
this problem. In addition, we have the opportunity to work
cooperatively with Russia to reduce the size of its nuclear weapons
manufacturing complex. We should take full advantage of these
opportunities.
I look forward to working with both our nominees, upon their
confirmation, to address the challenges of special operations and low
intensity conflict, and nuclear nonproliferation.

Chairman Warner. In keeping with the responsibilities of
this committee, we have asked our witnesses to answer a series
of advance policy questions. They have responded. Without
objection, I will make the responses as well as the questions a
part of today's record.
The committee also propounds to each of its nominees before
the advice and consent procedure standard questions, and I will
proceed now to ask you questions, and if you will please
acknowledge with a sharp, crisp answer.
Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations
governing conflict of interest?
Mr. O'Connell. Yes.
Mr. Longsworth. Yes.
Chairman Warner. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken
any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the
confirmation process?
Mr. Longsworth. No.
Mr. O'Connell. No, sir.
Chairman Warner. Will you ensure your staff complies with
deadlines established for requested communications, including
questions for the record and hearings?
Mr. O'Connell. Yes, sir.
Mr. Longsworth. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses
and briefers in response to congressional requests?
Mr. O'Connell. I will, sir.
Mr. Longsworth. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. Will those witnesses be protected from
reprisal for such testimony or responses that they provide
Congress?
Mr. O'Connell. Yes, sir.
Mr. Longsworth. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. I think we will now proceed with an
opening statement from Mr. O'Connell, but I'd like to make an
observation or two. My good friend and colleague on my left and
I have been on this committee some 25 years. As we look back
over the several things that we have worked on, I think the
establishment of the Special Operations Force category in the
Department of Defense by special congressional legislation--the
two of us worked on it with our former colleague, former
Secretary of Defense, Senator Cohen--it shows that we have
taken a special interest in this position through the years.
It is a very critical position to the changing threats that
face this Nation today because the Special Operation Forces
(SOF) have the versatility and perhaps the degree of mobility
and the speed with which to react that is specially designed
for these forces. They have distinguished themselves in a most
commendable way, in the operations in Afghanistan, in Iraq, and
elsewhere in the world.
I just wanted to make that comment because I'm proud of
what Congress did. We undertook this responsibility in the face
of, I might say, less than full support from the defense
establishment, the fear being that the creation of this force
would result in competition, more competition than perhaps is
desired. I always feel that a little competition between the
branches of the Services is healthy, but more competition would
have not been in the benefit of national defense. Well, that
hasn't proven to be true, and the Special Operations Forces
have proven over and over again not only their courage and
their commitment together with their families, but they have
proven the concept of jointness, that our Armed Forces really
are one.
Proud though they are of their Army, Navy, Air Force,
Marine Corps, and Coast Guard uniforms, the bottom line is they
fight for the cause of freedom, irrespective of the branches
they are in and this has been proven in the SOF. I remember so
well on our first trip to Afghanistan the night when we watched
those teams of somewhere between 20 to 25 individuals board
their helicopters for a very cold and chilly flight in-country
to perform a mission, and then bring themselves out before the
first light. One officer--that was all that was needed because
the enlisted men knew full well their responsibilities. I take
great pride in it, as I'm sure you do, Senator, for what we've
done.
So we'll now receive your statement, Mr. O'Connell.

STATEMENT OF THOMAS W. O'CONNELL TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT (ASD
(SO/LIC))

Mr. O'Connell. Thank you, Senator. Just as an aside, I've
been very fortunate to be present at many of the briefings and
demonstrations that you and several other colleagues on the
committee have attended over the years.
Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, distinguished members of the
committee, I'm honored to come before you as the President's
nominee for the position of Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict. I greatly
appreciate the confidence expressed by the President and
Secretary. I want to assure you that if I am confirmed, I will
strive to justify that trust, particularly to the members of
our Nation's Special Operations Forces, who daily serve
liberty's cause in many dangerous corners of the world.
Anyone fortunate enough to receive an honor like this has
many to thank. I wish my parents, Jerry and Claire O'Connell of
Lake Worth, Florida and Jamestown, Rhode Island, could be here
today. They are my heroes and charter members of the greatest
generation. My wife Pat has provided unwavering support during
a 27-year military career. My sons Andy and Kevin would make
any father proud. My sisters Sally and Lori and my brother Tim
have been very supportive siblings. Our long-time friend who
wanted so much to be here today for this hearing is retired
Navy Captain Chuck Jacques, currently struggling against
leukemia in a Minnesota hospital. I know his heart is here
today. In fact, he is a neighbor of yours, Senator Warner.
We are at an extraordinary time in our Nation's history.
The war on terrorism, coupled with unprecedented security
challenges, now places exceptional demands on our military and
in fact on our entire Government. I believe today's challenges
to our Special Operations Forces parallel those faced at the
darkest days of World War II. As in that era, these challenges
will be met by forces remarkable in their quality, self-
sacrifice, courage, integrity, and dedication.
If confirmed, the primary challenge that I will face as the
assistant secretary is the successful prosecution of the global
war on terrorism. Special Operations Forces are at the
forefront of the war, and this office will be responsible for
making every possible effort to ensure that these missions are
ultimately successful. America's Special Operations Forces
possess unique capabilities to meet the many diverse threats
that mark this conflict and these certainly increase their
importance as a primary force in the Nation's defense.
If I am confirmed, the second challenge would be continued
development and execution of stability operations. In
Afghanistan and Iraq, we have seen that the transition of
operations in the theater from military action to stabilization
and low intensity conflict, and then eventually to local
civilian control, is difficult. I note that both the chairman
and the ranking member just returned from both locations in the
not too distant past. Special Operations Forces, including
civil affairs, and psychological operations elements, can
provide a support essential to the combatant commander.
The third challenge is the transformation of Special
Operations Forces. It will be important to remain fully
compatible with the doctrinal and technical changes that are
taking place within the Defense Department. We must continue to
transform SOF to better position them to confront and defeat
the threats of the 21st century. This will be an especially
important task in light of the designation of the U.S. Special
Operations Command as the lead command for the war on
terrorism.
If confirmed, I will work closely with the Commander, U.S.
Special Operations Command, to ensure that the annual funding
can effectively maintain a ready force to meet the challenges
of the new security environment. I recognize that the creation
of the position of Assistant Secretary for Special Operations
and Low Intensity Conflict is the product of many historical
factors that bear witness to the keen and abiding congressional
interests in these areas of responsibility. The historically
close working relationship between that office and Congress is
a tradition that has served the country well, and as we
continue the war on terrorism and face many other challenges,
it will only become more important. If confirmed, I look
forward to continuing that close relationship.
I wish to thank all the Senators and their staffs who took
considerable time to meet with me and discuss the many critical
issues that face our Special Operations Forces today. I share
your concerns and interests, and if confirmed, look forward to
working with each of you to give these forces every possible
edge against the many adversaries that seek to destroy this
Nation.
I certainly appreciate Senator Reed's willingness to
introduce me and thank him for his kind words. We share the
common bond of having commanded in the 82nd Airborne Division,
and know what an extremely high honor it is to serve with
soldiers ready to risk all for each other.
With that, sir, I'd be pleased to welcome your questions.
Chairman Warner. We'll undertake the questioning of Mr.
O'Connell because he has a very pressing engagement, so if you
will just bear with us, Mr. Longsworth.
Mr. Longsworth. Yes, sir, that's fine.
Chairman Warner. Senator Levin, do you wish to lead off?
I've had the opportunity to speak with this nominee on a number
of occasions. I intend to put most of my questions into the
record.
Senator Levin. Fine, yes, sir.
Mr. O'Connell, this position has been vacant for a number
of years. It is a critically important position, and you are
someone who has the background to fill it and to bring it up to
where we need it to be. On the initiative of Senator Reed, the
Senate version of the defense authorization bill for the next
fiscal year includes a requirement that the Secretary of
Defense report to Congress on the expanded role of the Special
Operations Command (SOCOM) in the global war on terrorism. If
confirmed, have you thought about what decisionmaking
mechanisms you would recommend for authorizing, planning, and
conducting individual missions? Under what circumstances would
you recommend requesting authorization by Congress?
If you haven't given a lot to that issue, that's fine, you
can just indicate that to us and let us know as you proceed in
your new responsibilities how you address that issue. But the
question is, are there any specific decisionmaking mechanisms
that you are prepared to recommend at this time for
authorizing, planning, and conducting the individual missions?
Mr. O'Connell. Senator, I'm not prepared to recommend any
at this time. I would like to state for the record that at
least 7 years ago I had a considerable amount of familiarity
with how those things progressed and I have looked at some of
the mechanisms, or provisos that have been put in place by the
Secretary that these operations will be conducted in
conjunction with the combatant commander. I'd just like to make
that statement for the record, sir.
Senator Levin. That's fine. Do you believe that some of the
special operators should operate undercover?
Mr. O'Connell. Absolutely.
Senator Levin. How are we then going to distinguish between
the roles and missions of the special operators and the
intelligence operators, as a practical matter and as a legal
matter?
Mr. O'Connell. Sir, I believe that the law is quite clear,
and in fact has been quite clear that there are authorities
under both Title 10 and Title 50 to conduct those special
operations missions enumerated in Title 10, some of them
undercover. Again, it's been my experience--but I've been out
of this for 7 years--that there is quite a robust mechanism and
those operations that included both intelligence activities and
classic direct action or military activities were integrated
and overseen quite well.
Senator Levin. Your written answers to policy questions
contain the statement that the Special Operations Command will
look at moving certain ongoing collateral activities not
requiring unique SOF capabilities to general purpose forces in
order to free up special operators for their primary mission,
which is to wage the war against terrorists. What specific
collateral activities, if you have any in mind, should be moved
to the conventional forces?
Mr. O'Connell. Sir, the only one that I am aware of was, I
believe, a training mission in Georgia. To the extent that
there are other missions like that, I believe at least some
current policy decision makers have decided that that is the
type of mission that can be turned over to conventional forces.
That would be one, sir.
Senator Levin. All right, thank you. In your written
answers to pre-hearing policy questions, you refer to a joint
effort between the Office of Special Operations and Low
Intensity Conflict that, ``seeks technology programs to ensure
that the Special Operations Forces' capability remains at the
cutting edge of technology'' and you state that the
``Department's increased investment in science and technology
initiatives will continue that trend'' of accelerating
technologies into deployable systems for special operators and
eventually into conventional units.
However, the budget request for fiscal year 2004 of $6.7
billion for the Special Operations Command includes a decrease
in money for research and development. I'm wondering how do you
intend to increase funding for research and development given
that budget request?
Mr. O'Connell. I noted, sir, that Congress was good enough
to add a plus-up to that. The one thing--and certainly if
confirmed, sir, I would have to go back and look at the
specifics of the difference between what you authorized and
what the SOCOM budget was. But I would like to make one point--
that one of the most difficult things that a military command
does, or anybody in the military does, is to look out across
all the research and development (R&D) areas and make sure that
you are leveraging the ones that can perhaps be used by Special
Operations Forces.
That's an extremely difficult thing to do. It requires a
lot of smart people and a lot of time. If confirmed, sir, I can
assure you that at least I will make good use of that money and
good use of that talent in looking across the entire Department
of Defense.
Senator Levin. Finally, there's a question about retention.
During the Iraq war we saw the single largest deployment of
Special Operations Forces since World War II, something like
10,000 troops were engaged in those operations, securing
airfields, oil wells, dams, ports, clearing mines, searching
for Scuds, weapons of mass destruction searches, arms caches,
and they also rescued Private Jessica Lynch. It was truly
outstanding work. However, we have received reports now from
some special operators that there is an early indication that
there is going to be a negative that arises from these
deployments, including some resignations.
The problem appears to be most acute for civil affairs and
psychological operations forces. Apparently, 80 percent of all
psychological operations forces are still in Iraq. If we are
going to have a retention problem with our Special Operations
Forces, we are going to need some action on your part. I'm
wondering whether you're prepared at this time to make
recommendations relative to retention?
Mr. O'Connell. Not specific recommendations, Senator Levin,
but I'd like to assure you that I have read all of the previous
testimony relative to this issue in front of both the House and
Senate on the manning status, Reserve versus active, in both
the psychological operations and civil affairs units. I know
that adjustments are being made to both build new units and
move more capability into the regular forces. I can assure you,
sir, that if I am confirmed that will be a matter of utmost
concern to me.
Senator Levin. Just to wind up on this issue, since my time
is up--one proposal that we've heard from the civil affairs and
psychological operations officers who have met with staff is
that the retention problem can be effectively addressed by
granting the operators more predictability in assignments and
schedules, including some ability to choose assignments, at
least choose them obviously subject to the approval of a
commander. I just would urge you to take a look at those
particular mechanisms as ways of improving retention and leave
it at that.
Mr. O'Connell. I will, Senator.
Senator Levin. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator Levin.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again I just wanted
to reconfirm the wisdom of the President in selecting Mr.
O'Connell for this important job, he has done us all very proud
in my home State of Rhode Island, he and his family. I
neglected to mention his sister is a Providence school teacher.
I mentioned his brother and his other sister is here with him.
We tend to stick together in Rhode Island, so I'm not surprised
we have half the State here. [Laughter.]
But, just quickly--your responsibilities are worldwide,
literally. An area of the world that has in the past received a
great deal of attention, but because of the conflict in the
Persian Gulf is not currently receiving the same front page
attention, is Colombia. Have you had the opportunity to make a
preliminary assessment about the situation in Colombia and our
involvement?
Mr. O'Connell. Senator Reed, I have not seen any specific
briefing documents on Colombia. I had some experience there a
considerable time ago. I try to follow it as best I can in the
open press. I know it's a very difficult and thorny problem.
The one observation I would make is that I think sometimes we
never see any good news, but I think President Uribe has made
good progress in a very difficult path. But in terms of
specific recommendations on any changes in Colombia, I wouldn't
have them at this time, sir.
Senator Reed. Another point that I would make for comment
if you'd like is that today's Washington Post indicated that
poppy production in Afghanistan is up to 1999 levels, pre-war
levels, and that is not only a counternarcotic problem, it's a
counterinsurgency problem because it fuels the warlords. That's
their cash crop. Any thoughts, specifically or in general,
about your liaison with counterdrug forces and law enforcement
authorities?
Mr. O'Connell. Sir, the current Office of the Assistant
Secretary for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict has
a very robust counterdrug office. The Department recently
redefined counternarcotics and counterdrug to include going
after activities that are related to counterdrug, but not
specifically, i.e. transportation, safe havens, production, and
things like that.
I have no immediate suggestions other than I will be able,
hopefully, to talk to General Vines, the task force commander
there, and certainly talk to the new Central Command (CENTCOM)
commander on his thoughts as well as the many people that DOD
liaises with in the President's Drug Control Office, et cetera.
It is a very serious problem, and I don't pretend that it
isn't. To the extent that we can do anything about it, the only
thing I can say is we can certainly try and I'd be happy to
come back and brief you on what we might try to do.
Senator Reed. Thank you. Just a final point. Among your
range of activities, as I understand, is the responsibility for
detainees, which leads directly to the facility in Guantanamo,
which if you're not aware of this, but you probably are, our
Rhode Island National Guardsmen will deploy there shortly to
take up the security task, so you'll have a special motivation
in this one. But it obviously raises significant issues of
policy and processing. I think we have about 680 detainees, the
White House has recently announced they're commencing legal
process for 6. That leaves over 600 individuals who are in a
status that is unclear, and I'm sure in the course of the next
several years obviously there has to be some decision with
respect to the status of these individuals, but I don't have a
question frankly. I just wanted to--I'm sure you're aware of
it, but to make everyone aware of it.
Mr. O'Connell. I am well aware of the problem, Senator, and
well aware of the challenge I'm going to face there.
Senator Reed. We think you're up to it.
Mr. O'Connell. Thank you, sir.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
Chairman Warner. Thank you again, Senator Reed, for your
participation and interest in this. Mr. O'Connell, as I
mentioned earlier, your office was one created by Congress, and
we take a very special and continuing interest in this office.
I'd hope that if we bring you before this committee in the
future, as we will, that you will share with us your personal
views, even though those views may be at variance with your
superiors.
Mr. O'Connell. I will, Senator.
Chairman Warner. You have some of the finest of all the
services, some who take time and time again personal risks far
more than others do, and therefore, we need the strongest and
toughest of spokesmen in this position. I hope you recognize
that.
I frankly feel that we should be considering in the near
future, and at this time I suggest you not reply to my
statements, but I really think that the size, in terms of
increasing Special Operations Forces should be reviewed. Is
there any capability that is lacking today that should be
added, and indeed perhaps additional roles for SOCOM? Now, we
need look no further than the challenges posed by the African
continent to address the seriousness of peacekeeping and
humanitarian missions, which often Special Operations Forces
are involved in. As I look at some of these situations into
which our people must go, we can't put a badge on them and say,
we're peacekeepers, don't shoot. That doesn't work.
Those who want to place peacekeepers or humanitarian forces
in harm's way will not be deterred simply because of the title
or the written description of the mission. They look at the
uniform, the equipment, the resolute face, and from that point
on they could be in harm's way.
So look carefully at this. I realize you're not in the
operational chain that's traditional in the Department of
Defense. You know full well, the Secretary to the chairman and
down, but your people will look to you to express a strong
voice and to discharge your oversight responsibilities. I hope
that you will not be reserved in advising your superiors of
your views with regard to the missions which the operational
chain may assign your forces.
The primary responsibility of course is the recruiting,
equipping, and training of these forces. But I feel that it's
very broad, and I would push the limits in discharging your
duties. At all times I want you to know that this committee is
available to hear your views if you so desire. Simply inform
myself, the ranking member, or other members of the committee.
Peacekeeping is becoming an ever-increasingly important
role for our Armed Forces worldwide and we're proud of the
manner in which those missions have been carried out to date,
how they are being carried out, and how they will be carried
out in the future because these stability operations and
humanitarian assistance can often solve a problem short of the
use of force.
Now, you have also the counterdrug activities. We've
mentioned that in the context of Colombia. There again, come to
us if you feel that you're not properly financed, equipped, or
otherwise provided for in the discharge of your duties.
The Department of Homeland Security has domestic
counterterrorism, but you have it beyond the shores, and there
again, the President has said that our war on counterterrorists
is our number one priority. I agree with the President, as I'm
sure you do as well.
I'll place the balance of these questions into the record
unless you have any further comments you wish to make to me
with regard to my observations.
Mr. O'Connell. No, Senator, I've written everything down.
Chairman Warner. Good. Recruiting seems to be all right for
the moment. I think it was important that my colleagues raised
the question of retention because understandably I'm very proud
of elements of the SEAL teams and so forth which rotate in and
out of their Navy Department responsibilities with the SOF.
They're all very proud of it. I learned a lot about SOF through
those individuals. So I anticipate I'll be taking a trip down
to visit your various commands with you hopefully in the near
future.
Mr. O'Connell. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Warner. If there are no further questions before
the committee, any Senators desiring to place questions I would
ask that that be done before the close of business tomorrow
such that our nominee hopefully can be voted on by this
committee at the earliest opportunity next week.
Thank you very much, Mr. O'Connell, and we thank your
family. Godspeed and good luck.
Mr. O'Connell. Thank you, Senator Warner. I appreciate your
courtesies.
Chairman Warner. Thank you. You can go ahead and collect
your team and leave Mr. Longsworth on his own. [Laughter.]
Mr. O'Connell. Thank you very much, sir.
Chairman Warner. Thank you. We'll just wait a minute until
you depart.
Chairman Warner. Mr. Longsworth, we would be happy to
receive your opening statement.

STATEMENT OF PAUL M. LONGSWORTH TO BE DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR FOR
DEFENSE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION

Mr. Longsworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Senator
Levin and Senator Reed. I am honored to be here to be
considered as the President's nominee for Deputy Administrator
for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation in the National Nuclear
Security Administration (NNSA) within the Department of Energy.
I, too, am thankful to the President and I'm thankful to
Secretary Abraham and Ambassador Brooks for the confidence that
they've placed in me. I would also like to thank the members of
this committee for your continued support of the programs that
make up the NNSA's nonproliferation effort.
To say that I'm honored to be nominated for this position
is an understatement. I've worked with the Department of Energy
for almost my entire professional career and I've seen many
changes including, most recently, the establishment of the NNSA
by this committee and the House Armed Services Committee.
Chairman Warner. You were very active in the preparation of
the appropriate statutes that made that possible.
Mr. Longsworth. Yes, sir. As my wife will tell you, I've
spent a lot of evenings here working on that. [Laughter.]
Chairman Warner. I remember them well.
Mr. Longsworth. While there have been many changes, the one
thing that has remained the same is the dedication, patriotism,
and competence of the scientists, engineers, technicians, and
program managers that carry out our nonproliferation efforts. I
don't think any group typifies this dedication better than the
people that work in the Office of Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation. These individuals work tirelessly to address
the spread of weapons of mass destruction and they bring to the
task an unmatched level of technical experience and expertise.
Many of these individuals spend weeks out of every year, some
as many as 100 nights a year away from their families and they
work in far-flung locations throughout the world such as the
closed cities of Russia, Siberia, the Ural Mountains, and other
locations, where they lack the most basic western amenities.
They work to secure the materials, the expertise, and the
technologies that might be used by terrorists against the
United States or our allies. In short, they prevent those
threats before they reach our Nation's shores. They're the
front line of our nonproliferation program. They carry out the
work that the committee authorizes, and I commit that, if I am
confirmed, I'll make it my job to make them more successful.
I'll focus my attention on removing any obstacles that hinder
their work or create inefficiencies.
These materials represent an attractive target of
opportunity for the terrorists who are openly and actively
seeking nuclear materials to threaten the United States,
blackmail the international community, or simply inspire
terror. We cannot stand idly by and hope that Russia and other
nations of the former Soviet Union take all the necessary steps
to secure this material because, short of acquiring an intact
nuclear weapon, the quickest route to a nuclear bomb is
accessing poorly secured, highly enriched uranium or plutonium.
Russia alone possesses an estimated 600 metric tons of weapons-
useable nuclear material and thousands of warheads.
My first priority, if confirmed, will be to ensure that we
finish the work that we've started in Russia as quickly as
possible, and I will continue the work that Ambassador Brooks
and Secretary Abraham have started to accelerate our
cooperative programs after September 11 to secure these nuclear
materials and warheads.
Russia isn't the only source of the threat. There are
materials and technologies in other parts of the world that
must also be secured. Our programs will have to adapt and
evolve to locate and address these emerging threats. If
confirmed, I will bolster our efforts to provide export control
assistance to other nations, to assist the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) with a safeguards program, and contribute
to the overall U.S. effort to strengthen the nonproliferation
regime. I commit to this committee that I will work day and
night to ensure that the nonproliferation programs of the NNSA
are effective and responsive to the most urgent threats that
face our Nation.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, sir.
Prior to North Korea repudiating the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty, the NNSA provided a technical
expertise team to monitor the agreed framework in North Korea.
I think you're familiar with that, are you not?
Mr. Longsworth. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. At the time of the team's departure, what
did the team observe regarding the status of the North Korean
nuclear program?
Mr. Longsworth. They were removed from North Korea prior to
North Korea removing the seals that the IAEA had placed on
those canisters, so everything was intact when they left. I
will tell you that the cooling pond was in a fairly shabby
state and we were preparing to replace the pumps and so forth
in that pond where the fuel was actually stored. But it was
fully compliant when our experts left.
Let me just, as a side note, point out that the individuals
who worked in North Korea endured amazing hardships to be at
that location. North Korea has what's called Anti-America Day
and we had our teams in-country at that time. I can tell you
some of the stories, but they were spit upon and yelled at and
threatened quite actively by just normal citizens. So North
Korea was one of the far-flung locations that I referred to
that our experts worked in to prevent the spread of that
plutonium.
Chairman Warner. Putting aside diplomacy within the past 24
hours there has been another development on that, or several
that I've found quite interesting, and putting aside the
subject of military operations, is there anything that your
department could be doing from a technical standpoint or in
relationship to the IAEA to try and lessen these tensions and
bring about a greater degree of compliance with the
nonproliferation objectives of not just this country but the
world?
Mr. Longsworth. We are actively involved in trying to
address the North Korean problem. To answer your first
question, we do provide technologies and we have a very active
research and development program. We developed the sensors and
the computer algorithms and so forth that analyze data to
assess what other countries are doing. We do that both through
national technical means and we support the IAEA on a technical
level.
On a policy front, we are supporting White House and State
Department efforts to reach a solution to that problem, and we
do support that actively on a policy level.
Chairman Warner. Let the record show that in December 2002,
the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation within the NNSA
contributed both funds and technical expertise to the IAEA.
You've just addressed that fact, and the Iraq Nuclear
Verification Office (INVO) and the United Nations Monitoring
Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC). So that was
taxpayers' money going to support those operations, correct?
Mr. Longsworth. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. I think those investments were well taken
by this country. Then I'd have to ask, in the post-conflict
Iraq what additional support and technical expertise do you
think the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation could
provide to the Departments of Defense and State with regard to
Iraq?
Mr. Longsworth. We are advising the Department of Defense
right now. We have supported certain operations in Iraq with
technology and people. Right now, we don't have a lot of
activities going on in Iraq because of the unrest that remains
there, but we stand ready to support the Department of Defense
with both technology and expertise from our material sites when
the request comes. We have not been requested to do that yet.
Chairman Warner. I hope that the relations with the
Department of Defense are very smooth and professional and that
it's a joint effort.
Mr. Longsworth. Yes, sir, they are.
Chairman Warner. I've not detected any strong differences;
views on policy or otherwise.
Mr. Longsworth. No. We work very closely with the
Department of Defense. I think that it's their concern for the
safety of our people going in-country right now, that is the
main barrier.
Chairman Warner. The Secretary of Energy announced on July
2, 2003, that he plans to combine the two offices of
counterintelligence, the one run by the Department of Energy,
and the other run by the NNSA, into one office to be run by the
Department of Energy. As you may recall, it was a
counterintelligence breach that, in the judgment of Congress,
led to the particular legislation creating the NNSA. Do you
have any concerns that taking the counterintelligence program
out of the NNSA may interfere with the type of nuclear
proliferation concerns which led to the creation of the NNSA in
the first place?
Mr. Longsworth. No. We have dramatically enhanced our
counterintelligence capabilities since the NNSA was created. I
don't think that combining those will cause any additional
degradation of our ability to counter threats of espionage or
sabotage or any other threat against our sites or our
technologies. In fact, we hope that this will provide some
synergy and we'll get some efficiencies out of that.
There is also an advantage of having this organization
address the entirety of the Department of Energy and the NNSA
together. You get a seamless counterintelligence program that
way. I will say that because we are not really downsizing the
counterintelligence office within the NNSA. Those activities
themselves will continue; we're simply streamlining how they're
carried out and how the policy is established.
Chairman Warner. Many countries' weapons of mass
destruction programs are developing rapidly despite the
existence of nonproliferation policies and treaties worldwide.
Why do you think this is the case, and what new approaches
should be taken by the United States and the international
community to try and address this universal concern?
Mr. Longsworth. I think the availability of materials and
technology has contributed greatly.
Chairman Warner. Would you say increasing availability, or
about level, or a little less? I don't know what you'd use as a
benchmark.
Mr. Longsworth. I think the appetite for more powerful and
even more destructive weapons is probably increasing on the
part of rogue nations and non-nation state actors.
Chairman Warner. I share that view. Because they look at
the asymmetric system. They can't possibly develop the carriers
that we have and the extraordinary Armed Forces on the ground
there. So they look to this as the means by which to carve out
their place on the world scene that is increasingly worsening.
Mr. Longsworth. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. Do you agree with that?
Mr. Longsworth. Yes, sir, I do, wholeheartedly. With the
fall of the Soviet Union, many of the restrictions that used to
contain technologies and material and to make them unavailable
to these rogue actors, a lot of those protections have gone
away, and we are in a new environment now. The main mission of
the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation is to ensure
that we have layered defenses to protect those technologies
from getting into the hands of bad actors. We protect material
and technology at the source, we protect at border crossings to
detect material transiting countries, and we protect at the
U.S. border with radiation detectors at ports and other places
in the United States. We're working in conjunction with the
Department of Homeland Security now to build layered defenses
because these other, what I'll call Cold War protections, have
fallen away in many cases.
Chairman Warner. Thank you.
Senator Levin.
Senator Levin. Just on that last point, do you think we
should allow vehicles into this country that cannot be tested
for radiation?
Mr. Longsworth. We have a very aggressive program to screen
containers. I'm not sure today that it is technically possible
to screen every container or every vehicle that comes into the
United States. I'm not sure that is practicable.
Senator Levin [presiding]. But if we're unable to screen
vehicles, if there are certain types of vehicles that can't be
practically screened giving the current equipment, should we
allow them in?
Mr. Longsworth. I think you have to look at a whole range
of methods to assess what might be coming into the country. A
detector at a portal or a border crossing is only one. There is
also profiling that you can use, such as, what was the country
of origin, where did it come from, what do we know about it,
and what, from intelligence, do we know about certain
activities by terrorist organizations or other groups? You can
combine all of those into a picture that helps you focus on
which vehicles or containers you should stop and inspect. But
today, to answer your question, I don't think it's practicable
to stop every vehicle.
Senator Levin. That's not my question. I'm not talking
about the quantity of vehicles. I'm talking about the type of
container. If it cannot be inspected because of the nature of
the material in it, shouldn't we be leery about allowing it in?
Mr. Longsworth. I think we should definitely be leery. We
are working on technologies that can assess in all types of
containers what's inside and some of those will require opening
up the container and visually inspecting them.
Senator Levin. Until we can do that, should we not be leery
about allowing them in, until that technology is available or
until we can open them up?
Mr. Longsworth. My personal opinion is I think you would
stop a lot of commerce. Again, I don't think that's practicable
to do.
Senator Levin. Stop a lot of commerce? You mean if as a
practical matter, we don't have the technology and you can't
open them up as a practical matter for inspection, we should
not be cautious or leery about allowing those containers in?
Mr. Longsworth. No, I think that we should use all of the
tools that we have available to assess what's in the containers
and focus our efforts on going after the containers that we
view to be at risk or threatening.
Senator Levin. I want to talk to you about the Nation's
nonproliferation goals and the broader context in which we
should look at the nuclear weapons policies of the Nation. When
you look at the broader context, here's what we are being
requested to do by the administration: repeal the prohibition
against developing new nuclear weapons with explosive yields of
5-kilotons, which is roughly a third of the size of the nuclear
bomb that was used at Hiroshima which immediately killed an
estimated 140,000 people and left many more injured.
The administration is asking us for $15 million to continue
work on a robust nuclear earth penetrator (RNEP) that would
modify an existing high-yield nuclear weapon, a much higher
yield than the one I just described because this one would have
a yield of approximately 30 to 70 times the explosive power of
Hiroshima.
Now, your office is charged with helping to implement the
U.S. policy to dissuade others from pursuing nuclear weapons.
How do you persuade others from pursuing nuclear weapons when
we're looking for new uses of nuclear weapons?
Mr. Longsworth. Actually, I would say that I don't think
that we are intending to look for a new use for a new nuclear
weapon. First let me say also, President Bush, I think, is
fully committed to the nonproliferation regime, including the
Nonproliferation Treaty. I think we have a very good track
record in the nonproliferation arena.
Senator Levin. Rhetorical commitment is one thing. I'm
talking about deeds and actions.
Mr. Longsworth. These are practical deeds. We have
negotiated the dramatic reduction in our nuclear forces,
upwards of 60 percent with the Treaty of Moscow. We've
increased funding for the IAEA for its safeguards and its
verification programs. We have also been working with the G-8
to dramatically increase funding; the proposal now is to
provide $20 billion over the next 10 years to directly affect
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
The one program that you might be referring to is the RNEP
feasibility study, which is just that, a feasibility study. It
is intended to look at the B-83 gravity bombs, to see if they
can be modified to hold at risk known targets.
Senator Levin. To make them useable for a new purpose?
Mr. Longsworth. Well, no, I would say that these are known
targets. These are targets that today, we would like to hold at
risk. I don't think the RNEP study, please note it's just a
study, does anything to change the missions that we have for
our stockpile. It simply makes it more effective.
Senator Levin. What's wrong with the word useable? Why do
you shy away from the word useable? Aren't we looking at the
possibility of using it for that purpose?
Mr. Longsworth. Deterrence is intended to be a threat and
if the threat isn't credible, I think that does undermine our
nonproliferation efforts.
Senator Levin. But the deterrence which you're talking
about is to make a more useful nuclear weapon, in fact two
different warheads.
Mr. Longsworth. We have done this before. We have modified
a nuclear weapon before. The B-61 Mod 7, we modified that to be
the B-611. I think at the time this committee and the previous
administration debated whether that was a new nuclear weapon,
and I think that they--that that was not----
Senator Levin. Is it a new use of an existing nuclear
weapon?
Mr. Longsworth. No. I would say that it is not.
Senator Levin. If it's not a new use for an existing
nuclear weapon, what is it? I mean, why not just be candid
about it and say, ``sure it's a new use for an existing nuclear
weapon.'' I don't see how we can possibly not acknowledge that
this administration is looking into ways to make two nuclear
weapons more useable. You can cite the things that you have,
but it still comes down to the, it seems to me, irrefutable
fact that we are looking at modifying weapons for use as bunker
busters, which otherwise they would not be useable for, and in
the case of the 5-kiloton weapon, it is a new nuclear weapon.
I don't want to press you further than that. You can cite
the Moscow agreement, you can cite the other things we're
doing, but these two things run the opposite direction of our
effort to persuade the rest of the world to rely less on
nuclear weapons and they're held up to us as being, hey, you
guys are doing this while you're telling us to do the opposite.
Mr. Longsworth. I don't think they may make that case.
Other nations may make that case. I think it would not be. I
don't view that as a credible argument on their part, because
we are drawing down our stockpile. I actually will also say, it
has been determined that this is not a new nuclear weapon. I
believe the previous administration came to the same
conclusion, and it is intended to hold at risk targets that we
hold at risk today.
Senator Levin. Okay.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Levin. Again,
welcome, Mr. Longsworth. The Office of Nuclear Nonproliferation
has built up large unspent balances in their nonproliferation
programs, and Congress has provided this money to sort of jump
start the activities in Russia. But it's a double-edged sword.
As the money is unspent, some look to take those monies away
from a very important program, and as we had a chance to
discuss in my office, this is an area of concern. What are your
plans to implement the congressional direction to accelerate
these programs, get the money spent effectively, not just to
spend it but to spend it effectively, and reduce these
proliferation threats?
Mr. Longsworth. First and foremost, I think we have to work
to overcome the obstacles within Russia to utilize the funding
that we provide. Secretary Abraham has indicated that one of
the first things he wants me to work on is to work directly
with my counterparts in Russia to accelerate things like
contract approval processes, to work with them on access
agreements vigorously, to get access to their sites. All of
these things are kinds of barriers to conducting programs in
Russia.
But I do want to say one thing about uncosted balances. It
takes about 18 months to carry out a project in Russia, for a
whole range of reasons. The first of which is we have to have
the money obligated, we have to obligate the money at the time
we begin negotiating contracts. So the money becomes obligated
on that date. Then we have to negotiate a contract, we have to
carry out the work and before we can make payment on whatever
the project is, we have to confirm that the work was done to
the specification that we wanted. All of those things require
our scientists to get access to the facilities and to go there
and visually inspect and access has been a problem in recent
years. We're working to fix that.
So on average it takes about 18 months. You can do simple
math and determine that a fiscal year is 12 months, you'll have
about a third left over in any given fiscal year that is
committed and it is obligated but it is not necessarily costed
yet. I think some people have misinterpreted the high levels of
uncosted balances as us not spending or not utilizing the funds
that Congress authorizes and appropriates, or that we're not
making progress in Russia but that is not true. We are making
progress. But it does take about 18 months to conduct work in
Russia and that will lead to a level of uncosted balances of
roughly a third.
Senator Reed. Thank you. We have some, as you point out,
successful programs in Russia. One is the Initiatives for
Proliferation Program (IPP) and that is to identify Russian
scientists who we want their talents directed at something
good, not something mischievous. That's working pretty well.
We're faced now though with the closure of some major nuclear
facilities in the weapons manufacturing program. How are we
going to deal with those closures on a facilities-wide basis
when you have a large number of scientists who suddenly are
without employment?
Mr. Longsworth. The purpose of the IPP, as you've stated,
is to buffer the downsizing at these weapons complexes so that
the scientists and engineers that work there don't become
unemployed and go work for people that we don't want them to
work for, such as rogue nations and other actors.
There is currently a backlog of proposals in the IPP to do
work from U.S. industry and western industry and to me that is
an indication that the program is immensely successful, the
fact that we have a backlog of people waiting to come into it.
But we will continue to carry out these programs, we'll
continue to do them in a way that focuses the IPP funding on
the sites where we want to have the greatest impact.
I don't think we want to address all individuals at all
times. Our intent is to soften the downsizing, not to
ameliorate it completely.
Senator Reed. Let me ask a final question about the IAEA.
It is an increasingly important organization. At present, it is
inside Iran inspecting, and they're the only, I think, reliable
source of inspections. What can we do to enhance its ability to
operate, what support could we give to it? What are those
things we have to do to make it a more effective and credible
partner in our efforts to end proliferation?
Mr. Longsworth. We do fund the IAEA pretty vigorously and
in fact, in the last 2 years President Bush has dramatically
increased the U.S. support for IAEA, and I expect that will
continue. They really are, as you've noted, able to operate in
countries that one nation alone could not, and frankly, if the
IAEA fails, I think the world is a much less secure place, and
we have a vested interest in making sure that they are
successful. That's why we've increased funding for the IAEA.
We provide them technical experts that actually move and
work in their offices. Senator Warner mentioned UNMOVIC. A lot
of those inspectors were from DOE sites that went into Iraq. So
we support them pretty vigorously and I expect that the support
will increase over time.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner [presiding]. Thank you. I share your views
on the IAEA. I think they've handled themselves with
credibility in the events of recent.
Senator Pryor.
Senator Pryor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you
for being here today. I want you to note that I'm so low in
seniority that they put me down here at the witness table.
[Laughter.]
Senator Reed. If you'd like, Mark, I'll introduce you.
[Laughter.]
Senator Pryor. Yes, please do. My wife's not from Rhode
Island, but----[Laughter.]
Anyway, let me ask a few questions if I may. I want to
focus primarily on North Korea and Iraq, in no particular
order, but let me ask about Iraq first. There have been some
news reports about some official or scientist in Iraq taking
some of our people to his backyard or someone's backyard, and
digging up some pieces or parts of a machine that could be, I
guess, a centrifuge, I'm not quite sure. What exactly was found
there, could you give me the low-down on that if you can?
Mr. Longsworth. This was a scientist who worked in the
Atomic Energy Agency in Iraq. He was a senior scientist. He had
not only components, components which are controlled by export
laws and other things that Iraq was not allowed to have. He had
components of a western uranium enrichment technology. He also
had the schematics for building and designing an enrichment
facility.
Senator Pryor. Let me interrupt right there. Where did he
get this? Where did Iraq get this? Where did they get the
machinery and the schematic?
Mr. Longsworth. They got it illegally. It is a technology
that is a European design and it was proliferated to Iraq.
Senator Pryor. We're in an open session here so we need to
be sensitive to that, but can you tell me the age of the
machine or the parts?
Mr. Longsworth. It's a technology that is perfectly useful.
I would guess that device is about 20 years old, 25 years old.
I'm sorry, not the device itself. The technology itself is
about 25 years old.
Senator Pryor. But is it the kind of thing that if they dug
it out of the ground and cleaned it up and whatever, is it
still useable?
Mr. Longsworth. It absolutely is. But it is just one
component of an entire system, but they did have the drawings
on how to make it.
Senator Pryor. Do you think they have the entire system?
Mr. Longsworth. It's unclear. I don't think we know. I may
not be privy to all of the information.
Senator Pryor. Right. I know that there has been much
discussion about President Bush mentioning the Iraqis trying to
buy uranium from an African nation, and I don't want to drag
you into that unless you have something you'd like to volunteer
on that.
Mr. Longsworth. I don't. It's an intelligence matter.
Senator Pryor. Right. But it did raise a question in my
mind about purchasing uranium and how easy is it for a country
or a company or a terrorist organization or an individual to go
out and purchase the kind of materials needed, the uranium
needed to make a nuclear device.
Mr. Longsworth. Uranium is a commercial commodity. It's
sold throughout the world for nuclear fuel. It's controlled,
but it is a commercial commodity. The way that we attempt to
control and contain those types of materials and technologies
from getting to countries like Iraq is by using export control
laws, and we also work very closely with an organization called
the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which is a group of nations that
supply nuclear fuels and technologies. This group works very
closely with governments to control the spread of nuclear
technology and nuclear material to ensure that the commerce in
natural uranium and other commodities, which by the way is not
useful at all in nuclear weapons, you have to enrich it up to a
very high level to be useful in a nuclear weapon. But that
Nuclear Suppliers Group is very active and we support it very
vigorously.
Senator Pryor. How confident are you in the system that
exists in the world today to control the supply of uranium?
Mr. Longsworth. It's good. It could be better. We're always
looking for ways to improve it. I think the thing that's
happening is that, again, the appetite for nuclear technology
is not decreasing, it's increasing, and that just requires us
to continually try to stay ahead of the threat and continue to
vigorously bolster those countries that have either maybe not
adequate export control laws or maybe even nonexistent or that
they don't enforce them. We need to work closer with those
nations to make sure they know how to do it or they have the
right laws and that they have the right enforcement mechanisms.
Senator Pryor. How many companies or nations, how many
entities are out there in the world today that have the ability
to enrich uranium to the point that it could be useful in a
nuclear device?
Mr. Longsworth. I'm not sure I know the answer to that.
Chairman Warner. I think that's a very important question,
and I would suggest we want accuracy in the answer and that it
be provided for the record. I share with you a desire to have
that knowledge, Senator Pryor. Good question.
Senator Pryor. Thank you.
[The information referred to follows:]

Nine countries currently have commercial uranium enrichment
plants--six supplying the world market and three supplying internal
requirements only. Commercial is used in the context of uranium
enrichment supply for fueling civilian nuclear power reactors.
Countries supplying the world enrichment market:

Country Owner

1. France Eurodif
2. Germany Urenco
3. The Netherlands Urenco
4. Russian Federation MinAtom
5. United Kingdom Urenco
6. United States USEC Inc.

Other countries with enrichment plants serving only internal
commercial requirements:

7. Brazil (startup mode)
8. China
9. Japan

Chairman Warner. You may continue if you want to take a few
more minutes.
Senator Pryor. Thank you. From the standpoint of terrorists
obtaining a nuclear device, it seems to me that they somehow
could get the uranium and enrich it on their own, but I would
think it's more likely that they would be able to actually get
the enriched uranium somewhere on the black market. Is it your
sense that that's the more likely scenario?
Mr. Longsworth. The IAEA has documented a number of
attempts to acquire weapons-useable material, and I believe
there have been other attempts as well.
Senator Pryor. Now the two sources of that that are the
most of concern to me would be one, the former Soviet Union,
and I want to get your thoughts on how confident we are about
the whereabouts of all the former Soviet Union's arsenal, and
two, is North Korea. The reason I focus on North Korea, and I
think it's probably conventional wisdom here on this committee
and in the Senate, is because they are living in such a failed
economy. It seems like one of the few things they have going
for them is their arms programs.
But it seems that those two, the former Soviet Union and
North Korea, seem to be the two primary sources. Now would you
agree with that, or are there other sources that you're
concerned about?
Mr. Longsworth. When you're referring to nuclear material,
weapons-useable nuclear material, I would describe Russia as
the Fort Knox of nuclear material. They have vast quantities at
dispersed locations.
Senator Pryor. Now, when you say the Fort Knox do you feel
like they're as secure as Fort Knox is?
Mr. Longsworth. No, I don't. But let me say this is an
interesting point. A terrorist doesn't necessarily want to
break into Fort Knox to get to a facility that may have large
quantities of material. The most attractive facility is the
country bank or the bank out in the suburbs that maybe doesn't
have as much material in it but is perhaps more vulnerable.
So the weakest link is where we intend to focus our efforts
first. The first priority is to go to those facilities that are
forgotten, maybe don't have a mission, don't have an ability to
generate revenue, to pay their employees, but have quantities,
maybe not the large quantities that are present in Russia's
serial production enterprises, but have enough that would be
useful for a terrorist. Those are the kinds of facilities that
we have focused on first.
Senator Pryor. Now you mentioned----
Chairman Warner. Senator, could I interject?
Senator Pryor. Sure.
Chairman Warner. It's such an important colloquy that I
think that you'd be well advised to, on a technical standpoint,
broaden the category because it's not necessarily the
thermonuclear explosion--we all know that--but we now have the
dirty bomb category which is the dispersal of this material in
such a manner that the effects from the radiation cause severe
damage to human existence. Am I not correct on that?
Mr. Longsworth. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. So I think as you're in this colloquy,
it's the securing of this material for use antithetical to life
and limb that isn't in the category of an actual thermonuclear
explosion, but is in a dispersal pattern such that the dirty
bomb might cause. So I want you to continue, but let's broaden
the category from a technical standpoint.
Senator Pryor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I do agree with
that, and so I would like to broaden that if possible. You
mentioned Russia. Now when you say Russia do you mean all the
former Soviet states, or are you talking about just the Nation
of Russia?
Mr. Longsworth. I was referring just to Russia, but there
are materials that we are working to address in the former
Soviet states.
Senator Pryor. What about the old eastern bloc countries.
Do they have stockpiles?
Mr. Longsworth. They do not have nuclear stockpiles. There
are materials in those countries that would be attractive to
terrorists, yes, and some of it is in the form of reactor fuel,
highly enriched reactor fuel, and some of it is just in spent
fuel and in other forms.
Senator Pryor. Mr. Chairman, that's all I have.
Chairman Warner. That was an excellent line of questioning.
I thank you.
Senator Levin, do you have further questions?
Senator Levin. Actually it's along the same line. The NNSA
has asked for legislation to allow for the expansion of
materials protection beyond the former Soviet Union. What are
the plans for that expansion, do you know?
Mr. Longsworth. We are trying to address the evolving
threats and that means moving outside of the former Soviet
Union itself. We believe we have the authority to do this. I
think what we asked for was clarification that we could do
this.
Senator Levin. What specific plans do you have to do it,
assuming you have the authority, which we hope you have or will
be given?
Mr. Longsworth. We have an action plan, I guess I would
call it a program plan in place and ready to execute in those
countries.
Senator Levin. How many are there, do you know?
Mr. Longsworth. A dozen. I will say that's the first tier.
There are about a dozen countries initially.
Senator Levin. The NNSA's Second Line of Defense Program is
a very effective program working primarily with Russia to
improve border security to prevent nuclear materials from
crossing into or out of Russia. The Department of Defense has
started a program that will be similar to the NNSA program,
which is designed to work with the states of the former Soviet
Union other than Russia.
It's important that the programs, plus a variety of other
U.S. Government programs, be coordinated. How will you work to
ensure that full coordination of those programs?
Mr. Longsworth. We are doing that now. We're actually
working with the Threat Reduction Office of the Department of
Defense to support them. Most of the technology frankly that
they use in their sensors, and frankly the technology that the
State Department used when it initially put up sensors
immediately after the fall of the Soviet Union, most of those
technologies came from DOE facilities. So we continue to be the
technology provider and the provider of expertise, so that
interaction is going on right now.
Senator Levin. We had a discussion before about the earth
penetrator and you said it's not a new weapon, and I agreed,
but it's a new use of an old weapon, so we went through that.
Now let's talk about the 5-kiloton prohibition. That clearly is
a new weapon and if we remove that prohibition on the
development of a 5-kiloton weapon that is the development of a
new nuclear weapon. Doesn't that undermine our argument in the
world of, hey, don't move down that path?
Mr. Longsworth. I don't think it does. One thing that I
think is inherent in our programs is we have not proposed to
design or build anything. We're simply doing studies, and I
would note that the things that we're looking at are only one
element in a spectrum of options that DOD is looking at to hold
those targets at risk. I think it would be very premature to
assume that there is any foregone conclusion that we are going
to move beyond this feasibility study. This is a study to
determine if it can be done.
Senator Levin. The only purpose for this study is because
we may want to do it.
Mr. Longsworth. I think it's to ensure that we are able to
respond quickly as rogue nations and other countries begin to
go deeper and deeper.
Senator Levin. I'm not talking about the earth penetrator.
I'm talking about the 5-kiloton prohibition.
Mr. Longsworth. They are related. The repeal of the Spratt-
Furse provision I think is what you're referring to, the 1993
provision. It is overly restrictive in the sense that many of
our attorneys believed that it would prohibit us from doing
assessments, it would have prohibited our lab scientists from
even thinking about doing additional thinking about what might
be possible.
Senator Levin. So you wouldn't mind the prohibition staying
for the development, providing we don't try to get into
someone's grey matter?
Mr. Longsworth. I think that even that is not needed. We
would have to come to Congress to request funds. It would
prejudge whether we were going to go to a Phase 6.3 in the
Joint Nuclear Weapons Life Cycle Process. I think it's
unnecessary.
Senator Levin. What about the Nonproliferation Treaty?
North Korea pulled out of that treaty--they gave notice that
they were going to pull out of it. Do we have any problems with
countries giving notice under a treaty and pulling out of it?
We did the same thing with the ABM Treaty. We gave notice and
pulled out of it. How do we argue that North Korea shouldn't
use a provision of the treaty to give notice and pull out of
it?
Mr. Longsworth. The Nonproliferation Treaty is, I think,
different than the ABM Treaty.
Senator Levin. Not the withdrawal part of it. I'm just
talking about the withdrawal part. There is a provision in the
Nonproliferation Treaty, is there not, to give notice and
withdraw?
Mr. Longsworth. Yes, sir.
Senator Levin. If that's part of the treaty, why shouldn't
countries exercise that?
Mr. Longsworth. I think the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
(NPT) is a different type of treaty. It underpins all, I think,
civilized nations' attempts to halt the spread of nuclear
weapons. I don't see the comparison between that and the ABM
Treaty, which was really driven by the Cold War and the
structures of the Cold War.
Senator Levin. What about the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty? Would that underpin----
Mr. Longsworth. President Bush has issued a continuation of
the moratorium on testing, and we have no intent to breach
that.
Senator Levin. Or to ratify it.
Mr. Longsworth. As the members of this committee may
remember, we spent a lot of time debating that, and there were
flaws with that treaty. Maybe we can go through those again,
but that treaty itself was flawed, and like the ABM Treaty, one
of the key flaws was that it was a permanent treaty, and it
would prejudge what the world would look like in two, three, or
four decades from now.
Senator Levin. We wish you all the best. We do. You're
well-qualified for the position, and your work on this
committee hopefully gave you some of the tools that you're
going to need.
Mr. Longsworth. Yes, sir. Let me just say I appreciate the
debate and the discussion on these nuclear programs. Obviously
we wouldn't be having a debate if there weren't legitimate
arguments on each side.
Senator Levin. Thank you.
Mr. Longsworth. I think the primary focus of the Office of
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation is to, in a tactile way,
address the threat, and that is material security, that's
keeping scientists from working for rogue nations, and
controlling technology. That is what I've dedicated myself to
do.
Chairman Warner. You had a good hearing this morning, and
you've been very responsive to the questions. I just close by
joining Senator Levin in the pride in the members of this
committee, but perhaps even the greater pride among the
professional staff of this committee.
This committee has been privileged to have one of the
finest professional staffs throughout the many years that I've
been on the committee with my colleague here, under great
chairmen, through these years. It has attracted the finest and
we're so proud when they move on to accept other challenges of
responsibility because life on the committee staff of the Armed
Services Committee is not a bed of roses. They all know that. I
hear some coughs in the background, so I think I better close
the hearing right now. [Laughter.]
Mr. Longsworth. Thank you, Senator.
[Whereupon, at 11:42 a.m., the committee adjourned.]

[Prepared questions submitted to Thomas W. O'Connell by
Chairman Warner prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follow:]

Questions and Responses

DEFENSE REFORMS

Question. More than a decade has passed since the enactment of the
Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and
the Special Operations reforms.
Do you support full implementation of these defense reforms?
Answer. I support full implementation of Goldwater-Nichols and the
subsequent special operations reforms. Those important reforms have had
impressive success in the years since they were enacted. I believe the
increase in readiness levels and the attendant demonstrations of true
joint warfighting capabilities of our Armed Forces validate the wisdom
of the Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.
Question. What is your view of the extent to which these defense
reforms have been implemented?
Answer. These reforms have fundamentally changed the way the
Department of Defense works by strengthening the role of the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders, and
significantly improving the ability of the Department to carry out its
fundamental mission--protecting America's security and furthering its
vital interests. It has made the chain of command clearer, focused
clear lines of responsibility and commensurate authority on the
combatant commanders and provided more effective civilian control of
the military, thus making our Armed Forces more effective. It has
helped us greatly improve the interaction among each of the Services in
conducting military operations--fully joint operations are now the
norm.
Question. What do you consider to be the most important aspects of
these defense reforms?
Answer. In my view, the unambiguous responsibility and authority
assigned to combatant commanders for mission accomplishment and the
increased attention to strategy formulation and contingency planning
are the most important aspects. Further, the act promotes jointness in
our military forces. Our ability to integrate forces into joint
operations provides another exponential increase in military
effectiveness.
``Jointness'' is no longer a buzz word. It is the driving force of
daily military operations. I remember the results of the Holloway and
Long Commissions that contributed heavily to the creation of this
important reform legislation. I believe that the central findings of
both reports are embodied in the Goldwater-Nichols Act and subsequent
implementation.
Question. The goals of Congress in enacting these defense reforms,
as reflected in section 3 of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of
Defense Reorganization Act, can be summarized as strengthening civilian
control over the military; improving military advice; placing clear
responsibility on the combatant commanders for the accomplishment of
their missions; ensuring the authority of the combatant commanders is
commensurate with their responsibility; increasing attention to the
formulation of strategy and to contingency planning; providing for more
efficient use of defense resources; enhancing the effectiveness of
military operations; and improving the management and administration of
the Department of Defense.
Do you agree with these goals?
Answer. Yes, absolutely. If fortunate enough to be confirmed, I
will work to continue implementation.
Question. Do you believe that legislative proposals to amend
Goldwater-Nichols may be appropriate? If so, what areas do you believe
it might be appropriate to address in these proposals?
Answer. I am not aware of any pending legislation relative to
amendments to Goldwater-Nichols. The Secretary of Defense is leading
the transformation of the Department to improve our national defense.
As part of that effort, the U.S. military is pursuing a host of
transformations. Questions of responsibility, authority, and
organization are matters of specific interest and continuous review. If
any of these reviews recommend refinements to Goldwater-Nichols, the
Department will certainly consult closely with Congress, and especially
this committee. As SO/LIC and SOCOM continue to evolve and assess
lessons from our most recent conflicts and the global war on terrorism,
it may be necessary to review relationships. If confirmed, I would
review and assess new proposals, and will consult closely with
Congress.

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. If confirmed, what will be your relationship with:
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security
Affairs
The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security
Policy
The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense
The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commander, United States Special Operations Command
Commander, United States Joint Forces Command
The regional combatant commanders
The commanders of the service Special Operations Commands
Officials in the Department of Homeland Security with intelligence
and counter-terrorism responsibilities?
Answer. If confirmed, I will report to the Secretary of Defense and
Deputy Secretary of Defense through the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy. I expect to maintain a close working relationship with the
other Assistant Secretaries in the Office of the Under Secretary for
Policy, the offices of the Under Secretaries for Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics, Personnel and Readiness, Comptroller, and
Intelligence, the Chairman, Vice Chairman and the Director of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, and with combatant commanders, especially the
Commander of the U.S. Special Operations Command and its component
commands. I will also, if confirmed, work closely with the National
Security Council Staff and with officials in the Departments of State,
Justice, Homeland Security, the Intelligence Community, and other
agencies and departments.

DUTIES

Question. Section 138(b)(4) of Title 10, United States Code,
describes the duties and roles of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict ASD (SO/LIC).
What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the ASD
(SO/LIC)?
Answer. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
and Low Intensity Conflict has oversight of special operations and low
intensity conflict activities. Those activities include direct action,
strategic reconnaissance, unconventional warfare, foreign internal
defense, civil affairs, psychological operations, peace operations,
post-conflict reconstruction, detainee policy, counterterrorism,
humanitarian assistance, theater search and rescue, domestic and
international counterdrug efforts and such other activities specified
by the President and Secretary of Defense. ASD (SO/LIC) is the
principal civilian advisor to the Secretary of Defense on special
operations and low intensity conflict matters. After the Secretary and
Deputy Secretary of Defense, ASD (SO/LIC) is the principal special
operations and low intensity conflict official within senior management
of the Department of Defense.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what changes, if any, in the
duties and functions of ASD (SO/LIC) do you expect that the Secretary
of Defense would prescribe for you?
Answer. At this time, I do not see the duties and functions of ASD
(SO/LIC) changing from those prescribed in law and current directives.
Question. What background and experience do you possess that you
believe qualifies you to perform these duties?
Answer. I completed 27 years of military service as an infantry and
intelligence officer, holding positions of significant responsibility
in the special operations community. I participated in Vietnam,
Grenada, Panama, and the Persian Gulf War. In an assignment as an
exchange officer in the British Army, I observed how our close ally
operates. I have extensive joint and combined service that includes
planning and execution of clandestine special operations activities. I
commanded at the battalion and brigade level, and served at CIA for 3
years. For the past 7 years, I have held management positions in the
civilian defense industry.
Question. In your view, are the duties set forth in section
138(b)(4) of Title 10, United States Code, up to date, or should
changes be considered?
Answer. Section 138(b)(4) of Title 10 United States Code cites the
ASD (SO/LIC)'s principal duty as the overall supervision (including
oversight of policy and resources) of special operations activities (as
defined in section 167(j) of Title 10) and low intensity conflict
activities of the Department of Defense. At this time, I do not see the
need for statutory changes to the functions of ASD (SO/LIC), although I
look forward to making a more formal assessment.
Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend?
Answer. Again, I believe it is too soon for me to recommend changes
to existing law. If confirmed, my daily execution of duties under
section 138(b)(4) of Title 10 would, over time, perhaps provide me with
sufficient expertise to consider changes.
Question. What Department of Defense activities are currently
encompassed by the Department's definition of special operations and
low intensity conflict?
Answer. Special operations and low intensity conflict activities
include direct action, strategic reconnaissance, unconventional
warfare, foreign internal defense, counterinsurgency, contingency
operations, civil affairs, psychological operations, peace operations,
post-conflict reconstruction, detainee policy, counterterrorism in the
United States and abroad, humanitarian assistance, theater search and
rescue, domestic and international counterdrug efforts, and such other
activities specified by the President and Secretary of Defense.
Question. If confirmed, would you exercise overall supervision of
all special operations and low intensity conflict activities of the
Department of Defense?
Answer. Yes.
Question. In cases in which other assistant secretaries within the
Office of the Secretary of Defense exercise supervision over some
special operations and low intensity conflict activities, what is the
relationship between your office and those other offices?
Answer. I am not aware of other assistant secretaries who exercise
supervision over special operations and low intensity conflict
activities. I believe Title 10, Section 138(b)(4) is clear. If an
activity pertains to special operations and low intensity conflict,
then ASD (SO/LIC) supervises and provides policy and oversight, and is
the principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense on these matters.
After the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense and under the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy, ASD (SO/LIC) is the principal official
within senior management of the Department of Defense responsible for
special operations and low intensity conflict. I recognize the need to
work closely with the regional and other functional offices in the
Office of the Secretary of Defense.

SO/LIC ORGANIZATION

Question. The position of Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict has been vacant for over
2 years.
What changes, if any, have taken place during this time in the SO/
LIC organization and in the responsibilities of the ASD (SO/LIC)?
Answer. I understand that there have been three major changes in
the responsibilities of the ASD (SO/LIC): addition of policy oversight
and guidance for the global war on terrorism; addition of policy
oversight and guidance for detainee activities in the aftermath of
operations in Afghanistan and the global war on terrorism; and
divestiture of domestic consequence management, installation
preparedness and homeland defense activities to the office of the ASD
for Homeland Defense.
Question. If confirmed, how would you fulfill your responsibilities
related to counternarcotics?
If confirmed, how would you fulfill your responsibilities related
to combating terrorism?
If confirmed, how would you fulfill your responsibilities related
to peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance?
Answer. If confirmed, I will assume oversight and management of the
varied and complex portfolios in SO/LIC through oversight of the Deputy
Assistant Secretaries for Counternarcotics, Special Operations and
Combating Terrorism, and Stability Operations.
Question. How would you coordinate these responsibilities with the
ASD for Homeland Defense, who has responsibilities for combating
terrorism in the United States?
Answer. A very close relationship between SO/LIC and Homeland
Defense is already developing. If confirmed, I expect to maintain that
relationship with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland
Defense as he enhances the Department's integration into the Nation's
homeland security efforts. He will have a number of responsibilities
for combating terrorism in the United States; SO/LIC retains lead
responsibility for special operations, including all contingencies in
which SOF might be employed. In fact, I had a very useful meeting with
Assistant Secretary Paul McHale to discuss his new responsibilities and
his interaction with SO/LIC. I believe he is off to a great start, and
I noted that SO/LIC provided some exceptional personnel to his staff.

MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will
confront the ASD (SO/LIC)?
Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing
these challenges?
What do you anticipate will be the most serious problems in the
performance of the functions of the ASD (SO/LIC)?
If confirmed, what management action and timelines would you
establish to address these problems?
Answer. If confirmed, the primary challenge that I will face as the
ASD (SO/LIC) is the successful prosecution of the global war on
terrorism. SOF are at the forefront of the war, and SO/LIC will be
crucial to ensuring that they are ultimately successful. I realize the
magnitude of this task, and that it is much easier said than done.
However, I believe my past experience on active duty within the SOF
community has prepared me for this task. A critical component of this
effort will be close and continual coordination with the Under
Secretary for Intelligence, the CIA and other major participants. I
believe it would be prudent to withhold judgment on specific management
action and timelines until, if confirmed, I have the opportunity to
function as the ASD (SO/LIC) for a period of time.

PRIORITIES

Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish
in terms of issues which must be addressed by the ASD (SO/LIC)?
Answer. If confirmed, I believe there are three general areas or
issues that require special attention and commitment on my part. These
areas are not comprehensive or exclusive of each other or other issues
not specifically mentioned, but are a snapshot of the broad priorities
as I see them.
The first is perhaps the most obvious and of immediate importance:
continued execution of the global war on terrorism. As we have
discussed earlier, SOF's unique capability to meet the complex new
challenges of this war has increased their importance as a primary tool
in the Nation's defense--as opposed to merely a tool for leveraging
conventional forces or for smaller, specialized missions. Perhaps the
most important manifestation of this change is in the designation of
USSOCOM to be the supported (or ``lead'') command in the war on
terrorism (whereas before it generally had assumed only a supporting
role for the regional combatant commands).
The second is transformation of SOF. We must continue to transform
SOF to better position them to confront and defeat the threats of the
21st century, especially in the global war on terrorism. The
President's budget request contains a number of significant,
transformational efforts.
The third is continued development and execution of the concept of
stability operations. As in Afghanistan and Iraq, we have seen that the
transition of the theater from one of military action, to one of
stabilization and low-intensity conflict, and then eventually on to
local civilian control, is difficult and benefits from the specific
skills and capabilities of SOF, especially Civil Affairs and
Psychological Operations Forces.

TRANSFORMATION

Question. Secretary Rumsfeld has established transformation of the
Armed Forces to meet 21st century threats as one of his highest
priorities.
What is the role of Special Operations Forces in the overall
transformation vision?
Answer. As I understand it, the Department of Defense has begun a
significant ``retooling'' of USSOCOM to enable the command to lead the
war against terrorism in an even more effective manner. Perhaps the
most profound change is a shift in policy by the Department that
USSOCOM will no longer serve primarily as a supporting command, but
rather will plan and execute key missions as a supported combatant
command. USSOCOM is expanding to plan combat missions directly against
terrorist organizations around the world and execute those missions as
the supported Command, while maintaining the role of force provider and
supporter to the geographic combatant commanders. Additionally, the
assignment of this transformational responsibility to Joint Forces
Command will help SOCOM navigate this increasingly complex environment.
If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with both Admiral
Giambastiani and the Department's Director for Force Transformation,
Vice Admiral (ret) Cebrowski, to further transformation efforts.
Question. Specifically, what do you believe transformation should
mean for the special operations community in terms of missions,
training, equipment, or in any other aspect?
Answer. Transformation is an approach to produce advances in the
individual, the organization, and in technology to build the right
capability at the right time to defeat any threat.
USSOCOM is transforming SOF capabilities to meet the formidable
challenges associated with waging war against terrorist cells scattered
across the globe. The command is transforming by building the
capability to maintain sustained operations in areas where terrorist
networks are operating. It is investing in critical ``low-density/high-
demand'' aviation assets that provide SOF with the mobility necessary
to deploy quickly and to execute their missions quickly. It is
investing in key command, control, and communications to support the
war on terrorism more effectively. The command has added personnel to
better sustain worldwide deployments and 24-hour-a-day operations. In
conjunction with these expanding roles, USSOCOM will also look to move
certain ongoing collateral activities not requiring unique SOF
capabilities to general purpose forces in order to free up special
operators for their primary mission--to wage war against terrorists.
Question. What, if any, special role can SOCOM's development and
acquisition capability play in Service and DOD efforts?
Answer. USSOCOM's unique acquisition authority among combatant
commanders has allowed the command consistently to accelerate emerging
technologies into deployable SOF systems. These technologies routinely
find their way to conventional forces as the military departments and
other Government agencies integrate SOF-developed products into their
equipment arsenals. The Department's increased investment in science
and technology initiatives will continue that trend.

CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT OF THE UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

Question. The 1986 Special Operations legislation assigned
extraordinary authority to the Commander, United States Special
Operations Command, to conduct some of the functions of both a military
service and a unified combat command.
Which civilian officials in the Department of Defense exercise
civilian oversight of the ``service-like'' authorities of the
Commander, United States Special Operations Command?
Answer. ASD (SO/LIC), reporting through the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy, is the principal civilian official, below the
Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, that exercises civilian
oversight of the ``Service-like'' authorities of the command. Federal
law assigns ASD (SO/LIC) the responsibility for providing overall
supervision (including oversight of policy and resources) of special
operations and low-intensity conflict activities of the Department of
Defense. Although the ASD (SO/LIC) is the primary overseer of special
operations and low-intensity conflict activities, we work closely with
regional and other functional offices. Under this arrangement, the ASD
(SO/LIC) coordinates with regional and functional offices, and executes
full oversight of USSOCOM. I fully understand this arrangement and plan
to work closely with the regional and other functional offices as well
as the Commander, USSOCOM, to ensure that oversight of the command is
efficient and effective.
Question. What organizational relationship should exist between the
ASD (SO/LIC) and the Commander, United States Special Operations
Command?
Answer. I believe the organizational relationship between
Commander, USSOCOM, and the ASD (SO/LIC) is a complex one because of
the unique authority and responsibilities granted USSOCOM on
administrative and resource matters. In my view, the organizational
relationship should be a close partnership. Today numerous aspects of
SO/LIC and USSOCOM are closely intertwined, ranging from the Technical
Support Working Group (TSWG) program to collaborative studies on SOF
forward presence and transformation. I intend to continue to foster
this relationship between the two organizations. Through our
cooperative efforts, I believe we can continue to be effective in
wisely allocating the limited resources entrusted to the command.
Question. What should be the role of the ASD (SO/LIC) in
preparation and review of Major Force Program 11 and the Command's
Program Objective Memorandum?
Answer. The ASD (SO/LIC) provides overall supervision of the
preparation and justification of Special Operations Forces programs and
budget. Past Assistant Secretaries for SO/LIC have served, along with
Commander, USSOCOM, as co-chair of the Command's Board of Directors, as
does the current PDASD (SO/LIC), Marshall Billingslea. In this manner,
the ASD (SO/LIC) and the commander participate in every budgetary and
programmatic decision involving Special Operations Forces.
Representatives from SO/LIC regularly spend a significant amount of
time at USSOCOM headquarters in a joint effort to develop the SOF
program. This joint effort produces a program that stresses force
readiness and sustainability, provides sufficient force structure to
meet the demands of the geographic warfighting commanders and
Commander, USSOCOM, in his role as a supported commander. This effort
also seeks technology programs to ensure SOF capability remains at the
cutting edge of technology. If confirmed, I will work closely with the
Commander, USSOCOM, to ensure that the annual funding can effectively
maintain a ready force to meet the challenges of the new security
environment while simultaneously replacing aging and obsolete equipment
with systems that will meet the threat well into the next decade.
Question. What is the appropriate role of the ASD (SO/LIC) in the
research and development and procurement functions of the Special
Operations Command?
Answer. The appropriate role of ASD (SO/LIC) in the acquisition
functions of the Special Operations Command is to advise and assist
Commander, USSOCOM, in resolving acquisition issues. As the lead OSD
official for SOF acquisition matters for the Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, ASD (SO/LIC) represents SOF
interests within DOD and before Congress. The responsibilities and
relationships between ASD (SO/LIC) and Commander, USSOCOM, are clearly
defined and described in a joint Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) that
addresses acquisition oversight, including recommendations, advice, and
assistance provided to program managers and senior decision makers. SO/
LIC representatives participate in working groups, integrated product/
process teams, boards, and committees to address issues, make
recommendations, and approve programs.
In addition, the ASD (SO/LIC) has considerable responsibility to
direct technology development programs that address several mission
areas in support of other departmental, interagency, and international
requirements as well as SOF. For example, the ASD (SO/LIC) exercises
management and technical oversight of the Combating Terrorism
Technology Support program. The Combating Terrorism Technology Support
program conducts rapid prototyping to meet requirements of the
Technical Support Working Group. The Special Operations Command is an
active participant and chairs the Tactical Operations subgroup.
Question. What is the appropriate role of the ASD (SO/LIC) in the
operational planning of missions that involve Special Operations
Forces, whether the supported command is SOCOM or a geographic command?
Answer. According to section 138(b)(4) of Title 10, United States
Code, the ASD (SO/LIC) shall have as his principal duty the overall
supervision (including oversight of policy and resources) of special
operations activities (as defined in section 167(j) of Title 10) and
low intensity conflict activities of the Department of Defense. The
Assistant Secretary is the principal civilian advisor to the Secretary
of Defense on special operations and low intensity conflict matters and
(after the Secretary and Deputy Secretary) is the principal special
operations and low intensity conflict official within the senior
management of the Department of Defense.

EXPANDED ROLES OF UNITED STATES SOCOM

Question. The Secretary of Defense recently announced that USSOCOM
would take on additional, expanded responsibilities in the global war
on terrorism, as a supported combatant commander, in addition to its
more traditional role as a supporting combatant commander.
What role will ASD (SO/LIC) play in the oversight and planning of
such missions?
In your view, what types of missions should SOCOM conduct as a
supported combatant commander?
What role will ASD (SO/LIC) play in preparing SOCOM for its new
role?
Answer. The change from supporting to supported command is a
fundamental change in many aspects of the mission of USSOCOM. The
oversight, planning and policy role for ASD (SO/LIC) is especially
important in that change. The role of SO/LIC and its relationship to
the command in that process will remain largely unchanged. If confirmed
as ASD (SO/LIC), I will continue to provide advocacy and oversight for
the command as it develops the capabilities required to implement these
fundamental changes. What is different, however, is the magnitude of
the changes and immediate implications for our national security.
The changes in the relationships among the relevant commands that
will, in some cases, switch from supported to supporting and vice
versa, is likely to require some specific policy changes and
guidelines. Additionally, changes within USSOCOM will have to be
pursued as well, simply because of the nature of the new
responsibilities. As ASD (SO/LIC), I will continue the process of
working with SOCOM to evolve its capabilities to meet the
responsibilities it has been assigned by the Secretary. Much has been
accomplished in the past 2 years, but there is much more to be done.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS MISSIONS

Question. When announcing additional responsibilities for SOCOM,
Secretary Rumsfeld indicated that SOCOM may divest itself of some
traditional missions, such as foreign military training, that can be
conducted by conventional forces.
What current missions, if any, do you believe can and should be
divested by SOCOM, and why?
Answer. USSOCOM missions and tasks must evolve to meet the future
needs in light of their expanding role in the war on terrorism.
USSOCOM's new role as a supported combatant commander for the war on
terrorism, including both planning and execution, drives a refocusing
of their primary responsibilities and the constraints under which SOF
are employed. The Department and USSOCOM are conducting a review of the
SOF principal missions and collateral activities to identify those
missions and activities that do not require the special skill sets
inherent to SOF and could be transitioned to or shared with general
purpose forces.
Question. Are there any additional missions that you believe SOCOM
should assume, and, if so, why?
Answer. USSOCOM is expanding its role in the war on terrorism.
USSOCOM requirements to plan, synchronize, and execute operations on a
global scale necessitate a more globally capable SOF through the use of
full spectrum integrated SOF. USSOCOM is expanding to directly planning
combat missions against terrorist organizations around the world and
executing those missions as the supported Command, while maintaining
the role of force provider and supporter to the geographic combatant
commanders. To meet this challenge, USSOCOM is establishing command and
control infrastructures that augment the geographic combatant
commanders and investing in programs and systems to improve SOF's
speed, precision, lethality, stealth, survivability, and
sustainability.

FUTURE OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS

Question. Many believe that the principal threats of the 21st
century will be asymmetric, unconventional ones, often emanating from
non-state actors.
Since asymmetric, unconventional threats must now be confronted by
our conventional forces, what is the future role of special operations?
What special threats must SOCOM be focused on for the future?
Answer. As we increasingly face unconventional enemies, we will
have to continue to adapt to meet these threats. This is the very type
of threat that SOF has for decades been geared to confront, and
continues to confront on a daily basis in the war on terrorism.
SOF were called upon to lead Operation Enduring Freedom. In
Afghanistan, that effort was waged by less than 500 SOF personnel. They
mounted an interagency and combined unconventional warfare effort, tied
closely to indigenous forces and linked with the United States Air
Force, in a way that provided for a rapid defeat of the Taliban's
conventional forces. The operation in Afghanistan was prosecuted by
small units that operated with autonomy in a highly fluid environment.
It was won by people who could meld with friendly Afghan forces, able
to:

operate without a safety net;
develop such a rapport that they could trust their
security to their Afghan allies;
live without a huge logistics train to provide
equipment and supplies;
distinguish between combatants and non-combatants in
an environment where civilians and fighters, Taliban and non-
Taliban, and ex-Taliban, were found together; and
engineer combined arms operations between U.S. B-52s
and the Northern Alliance's Soviet era tanks.

The SOF operator is distinguished from other military personnel by
specific skills, extensive overseas experience, ability to work closely
with indigenous forces and to train them, ability to blend into the
fabric of the society in which he operates, independence and maturity,
and an unparalleled degree of training. These Americans truly are one
of a kind--each one. That is why there are so few of them. They are one
of this Nation's most scarce and precious resources, and they should
always be employed with careful consideration.

LESSONS LEARNED

Question. In your view, what have been the most significant lessons
learned by Special Operations Forces in recent military operations, and
what are the future operational, research and development, and
procurement implications of these lessons?
Answer. I understand that a formal military ``lessons learned''
process for both Afghanistan and Iraq is being conducted by the Joint
Staff and will go through Joint Forces Command. That process is not yet
complete. From that process and those findings, SO/LIC will develop
policy advice and guidance to facilitate or enable new operational
constructs for current and future conflicts.
In addition to that formal process, we learned a great deal about
the importance of SOF and the best use of their specialized skills. In
both Iraq and Afghanistan, SOF demonstrated its utility as both a
component of a larger joint and combined force and as a stand-alone
force. In particular, SOF's unique expertise in unconventional warfare
proved invaluable in Afghanistan and in northern Iraq in bringing local
forces to bear against the enemy. As I mentioned earlier, that
capability was able to leverage the nationwide situation to our
decisive advantage with fewer than 500 U.S. personnel. In both
Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, SOF again
demonstrated flexibility, innovation on the fly, improved methods to
enhance the effectiveness of extremely sophisticated, long-range
weapons--all with a very small footprint. These types of experiences
and lessons are what have made SOF into a critical incubator or tester
for methods, techniques and equipment that will make its way into
conventional use and enhance combat effectiveness across the Services.
The most important investment we make in Special Operations Forces is
in the people who comprise SOF--our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines,
and civilians.

SIZE OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

Question. The recent successes of Special Operations Forces in
Afghanistan and Iraq have led many to advocate a significant increase
in the size of Special Operations Forces.
Do you believe that we should increase the number of Special
Operations personnel?
Answer. Yes. The Department of Defense directed the USSOCOM to
assume an expanded role in the war on terrorism, which necessitates an
increase in personnel in specific areas. The President's budget for
fiscal year 2004 supported an increase of 2,563 personnel that
increases the total end strength in fiscal year 2004 to 49,848
personnel. Over the next 5 years, the Department's recognition that
there was a need for more SOF and the Services' cross-walking personnel
will grow the force by almost 4,000. This growth primarily supports the
manning requirements to wage the global war on terrorism. The increases
focus on fixed and rotary-wing aviation, SEAL Teams, Civil Affairs,
Psychological Operations, Theater Special Operations Commands, and
support to USSOCOM as the supported combatant commander in the war on
terrorism.
Question. In your view, can the size of Special Operations Forces
be increased significantly if the rigorous admissions standards for
these organizations are to be maintained?
Answer. People are the most important component of SOF capability.
The SOF operator is one of a kind and cannot be mass-produced. USSOCOM
continues to work with the Services to improve recruiting, retention
and inventory levels of Special Operations Forces. Special Operations
personnel levels remain strong, but new and innovative means must be
found to sustain and grow current projected inventories. World events
significantly increased public awareness of what Special Operations is
all about, consequently raising interest in joining.
Recruiting, training, and retaining SOF will not be without
challenges. Several initiatives were implemented over the past year to
improve the effectiveness of these efforts. Analysis to date indicates
that the command will have the right numbers to sustain the forces the
Nation needs. Training instructors and the number of training slots
available have increased for Army Special Forces, Civil Affairs, and
Psychological Operations. A recruiting initiative was launched in which
new Army recruits can sign up for Special Forces directly, rather than
awaiting selection from a conventional unit. This is an option that has
not been possible since 1988. In addition, special pay and bonuses were
implemented to improve retention in highly specialized areas and units.

SOCOM/USMC

Question. In November 2001, the Commandant of the Marine Corps and
Commander, USSOCOM, signed a memorandum of agreement aimed at
increasing Marine Corps support and cooperation with SOCOM.
What do you believe should be the appropriate relationship between
the Marine Corps and SOCOM?
Answer. I believe that the relationship between the Marine Corps
and SOF continues to evolve in a very healthy direction. As you noted,
for the first time in history, the command and the Marine Corps have
established a construct for joint warfighting. A Marine detachment is
in a 1-year proof of concept phase that began last fall. On October 1
of this year, we expect this detachment will be fully integrated into a
Naval Special Warfare Squadron and serve there on a rotating basis.
Additionally, last year, SOF and the Marine Corps began joint wargaming
exercises called ``Expeditionary Warrior,'' which focus on cooperation
(with naval support) in combating terrorism and counterproliferation
contingencies.
As USSOCOM assumes its role as a supported command in the war on
terrorism, and can draw on all Services' assets in a theater of
operation, the joint capability being established between the Marine
Corps and SOF will undoubtedly grow. We can expect that we will realize
ways in which such cooperation is possible or even essential. Moreover,
I note that events in the field continue to drive the creation of close
working relationships between SOF and the Marine Corps, and other
conventional units.

COUNTERDRUG/COUNTERTERRORISM MISSIONS

Question. Special Operations Forces have been deeply involved in
training forces in Colombia to conduct unified counterdrug-
counterterrorism missions.
In your view, what has been the success of training missions in
Colombia?
Answer. The success of the training effort is best measured in
terms of the unprecedented level of progress being made by President
Uribe and the Colombian military in destroying the FARC and ELN
terrorist organizations, in eradicating drug cultivation, and in
reclaiming Colombia for the people of that great nation. DOD-managed
training missions have and continue to provide an excellent opportunity
to train the Colombian military as it becomes a professional force that
can improve the security of the Colombian people and the respect for
the rule of law and human rights. As a result, the Colombian military
units that the Department has trained are more effective and respectful
of human rights.
Question. Are these appropriate missions for U.S. Special
Operations Forces?
Answer. Absolutely. The Department believes that these missions are
appropriate for Special Operations Forces. We also execute training
missions using non-SOF, such as those of the United States Army and
Marine Corps. The Department reviews training requests to ensure that,
where appropriate, we employ the right mix of SOF and conventional
forces.
Question. What, if any, benefit do unified counterdrug-
counterterrorist training missions in Colombia and counterdrug training
missions worldwide provide to Special Operations Forces?
Answer. I understand that the training missions in Colombia and,
indeed, worldwide, provide excellent opportunities for SOF to work with
police and military forces of our friends and allies. As a result, SOF
hone their language and cultural skills and their ``train the trainer''
skills, and take advantage of opportunities to work in countries where
the United States seeks to enhance relationships.

COUNTERNARCOTICS POLICY

Question. The Department of Defense has been extensively involved
in counternarcotics missions for many years, involving both Active and
Reserve component forces.
In your view, what is the appropriate role of the Department of
Defense in interdicting illegal drugs bound for the U.S., in reducing
drug cultivation, and in reducing demand?
Answer. International, Federal, State, and local law enforcement
agencies are responsible for interdiction activities. DOD supports
those efforts. For example, the Department provides detection and
monitoring support, command, control, communications and intelligence
support and training. I believe that the Department should continue to
use its unique military skills and assets to support agencies that
execute interdiction missions.
Similarly, the Department of Defense does not reduce foreign or
domestic drug cultivation. The Department of State, in partnership with
our friends and allies, manages drug cultivation programs outside the
United States. Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies
manage domestic counter-cultivation programs. DOD, again, provides
detection and monitoring support, command, communications, control, and
intelligence support and training.
As part of the President's National Drug Control Strategy, the
Department executes significant demand reduction programs designed to
prevent the use of and treatment for drugs by Service members, civilian
employees and our families. The Department continues to review these
programs to ensure the efficient use of taxpayer dollars.

STABILITY OPERATIONS

Question. The office of ASD (SO/LIC) is responsible for policy and
activities concerning stability operations such as peacekeeping and
humanitarian assistance.
What has been the involvement of the office of the ASD (SO/LIC) in
the planning and conduct of stability operations in Afghanistan and
Iraq?
Answer. I understand that the Stability Operations office within
SO/LIC has played a leading role in defining policy with respect to
humanitarian assistance, peace operations, reconstruction, and war
crimes issues in both Afghanistan and Iraq. From the early phases of
both conflicts, the Stability Operations office, in close partnership
with Central Command, coordinated the inter-theater delivery of
humanitarian daily rations, bottled water, and relief supplies for
refugees and other civilians.
In the case of Afghanistan, the Stability Operations office
participated in planning for and resourcing the International Security
Assistance Force for Kabul, drove formation of the interagency
Provincial Reconstruction Teams, and has been the DOD lead office for
the fielding of the new Afghan National Army and Afghan Police.
In the case of Iraq, the Stability Operations office has
participated in planning and force generation initiatives for the
multinational force that will eventually assume security
responsibilities throughout the country. The Stability Operations
office has also served as a planner and coordinator for humanitarian
and reconstruction initiatives under the supervision of the Coalition
Provisional Authority in Iraq. In both the Afghanistan and Iraq crises,
Stability Operations has worked closely with regional experts in DOD,
as well as various offices at the Department of State and the NSC.
Question. Who has had principal responsibility within the Pentagon
for the planning and conduct of stability operations in these nations?
Answer. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
closely supervises the planning and conduct of stability operations in
both Afghanistan and Iraq, providing policy-level oversight and
coordination. The Joint Staff, in particular the Directorate for
Strategic Plans and Policies (J-5), also plays a critical role in
developing plans and operational guidance for the relevant combatant
commands. The Stability Operations office has led or assisted other
offices in policy such as the Assistant Secretaries of Defense for
International Security Affairs and International Security Policy and
the Office of the Coalition Provisional Authority, depending upon the
specific plan or issue for action. On every issue, the hallmark of SO/
LIC work is comprehensive coordination, both within and outside of the
Pentagon.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS AND CIVIL AFFAIRS

Question. Psychological operations (PSYOPs) and civil affairs (CA)
have played prominent roles in recent military operations, from the
Balkans to Afghanistan to Iraq. Most U.S. PSYOPs and CA units and
capabilities are in our Reserve components.
In your view, do the Armed Forces have sufficient personnel and
other assets to conduct the range of PSYOPs and CA missions being asked
of them?
Answer. Since the start of the global war on terrorism, PSYOPs and
CA forces have made extraordinary contributions to the security of the
United States, and to the reconstruction of Afghanistan and Iraq.
There is a well-documented and urgent need to enhance PSYOPs
capabilities to penetrate denied areas and to win the ``war of ideas.''
This vital requirement will be accomplished by transformation of PSYOPs
both in personnel and equipment. Planned increases in PSYOPs active
component forces include the addition of two regional and one tactical
PSYOPs companies. The Reserve components will receive an additional
four regional PSYOPs companies.
Modernization and transformation of PSYOPs equipment is at a
critical juncture. Significant investment has already been made to
modernize production, distribution, and dissemination means. More
importantly, additional investments are concentrating on developing
transformational dissemination capabilities that will allow us to get
our messages to previously inaccessible areas. While much has already
been done, I envision additional PSYOPs transformational programs will
be developed, especially in the areas of satellite and UAV
technologies.
Army CA forces have sustained a high operations tempo for several
years now, and personnel strength is a concern. Long before the events
of September 11, a plan was introduced to address the expanded
utilization of Army CA forces.
The most important parts of that plan include the addition of 4
Reserve component battalions, and 84 positions to the lone active duty
CA battalion--the 96th--in the U.S. Army. During the 2\1/2\ years since
the plan was developed, the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion has received
the authorization for its additional staff. From the Reserve component,
one of the four CA battalions has come on line, with the second to
follow shortly. The two remaining new battalions are scheduled to be
activated in calendar years 2004 and 2005, respectively.
If confirmed by the Senate, I would support the continued
implementation of this plan. Given the unprecedented pace of deployment
in support of the global war on terrorism, it may also be necessary to
increase the force size and structure of the active component CA units
to provide a greater capability to respond to emerging, near-term
requirements without requiring mobilizing Reserve CA forces.
Question. In your view, is the planned mix of active and Reserve
components adequate in these areas?
Answer. With regard to PSYOPs, the mix of active and Reserve
components must be reviewed frequently to ensure that the force
structure can respond to national requirements. Additionally, annual
assessments must be completed to match national strategies from a
regional perspective.
Approximately 97 percent of the CA forces are drawn from the
Reserve component. There is no ``correct'' proportion between active
and Reserve components, but the overwhelming majority of the CA
personnel should continue to come from the Reserve component. This fact
will enable the combatant commander to take advantage of the
reservist's civilian expertise in areas such as civil administration,
public safety, and economics and commerce.

TRAINING CAPABILITY

Question. The ability of special forces personnel to train
realistically is of vital importance.
What capabilities do you consider most important for effective
training of SOF personnel?
Answer. Much of what makes SOF personnel special or unique is the
training. Most of it is very intense and very specialized. The skills,
however, are perishable over time and with attrition and must
constantly be pursued. I believe four elements contribute to the
critical training necessary to maintain SOF.
First, SOF needs realistic combat training environs. This includes
ranges that support realistic, live-fire training. It also requires the
integration of modern weapons and techniques on a large scale,
including ground, sea, and air assets. Realistic urban combat training
facilities are of increasing and obvious importance. Less obvious but
essential is training access in real (actual) critical infrastructure
facilities, be it a nuclear plant or a major port. Ranges and simulated
facilities cannot replicate the complexities found in actual
structures.
Second, SOF requires adequate mission planning and rehearsal
systems. Systems that afford the operator the ability to integrate
real-time information into operations planning and rehearsal provide
virtual ``eyes on target'' to enhance mission success. For aviators,
mission rehearsal systems must provide the ability to fly the route,
evade the threat and hit the target before actual mission execution.
Third, SOF must have worldwide access and exposure. This includes
Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET), humanitarian de-mining
programs, and counter-drug cooperation. Language training is an
essential part of this effort. These programs are essential to maintain
the unique SOF skills and knowledge that proved so decisive in
Afghanistan and elsewhere.
Finally, SOF must maintain a robust capability for selection and
training of SOF personnel. Selection criteria, faculty and curricula
must be maintained to the highest standards in order to find and
produce SOF personnel cut from the right cloth. The skills that set SOF
apart and that make them so important to the national defense are
perishable and must be continually reinforced and maintained at the
highest possible levels. Standards must not be reduced.
Training and experience have the greatest long-term effect on SOF
capabilities. In order to maintain strategic flexibility and maximize
the likelihood of operational success, SOF will continue to ``train for
certainty, educate for uncertainty.'' There is no substitute for tough,
realistic training.
Question. What improvements are necessary, in your view, to enhance
training for SOF personnel?
Answer. In my opinion, critical improvements include access and
support for infrastructure facilities (ranges) to conduct realistic
training. Additionally, language training is essential for the SOF
operator. Identifying new and innovative methodologies for maintaining
language proficiency continue to be a challenge.
Question. What, if any, training benefits accrue to SOF from
training foreign military personnel?
Answer. Depending upon the nature of the training mission, there
can be substantial benefit. The JCET program is one of the most
valuable tools the DOD has to train SOF overseas and to maintain SOF
readiness at the highest possible level. JCET ensures critical SOF
readiness regarding regional language, culture, combat operations,
combat support operations, and instructor skills. JCET also sharpens
critical SOF skills to support coalition operations, peacekeeping
training, and non-combatant evacuation. When we deploy joint special
operations task forces they must possess the strategic adaptability to
operate globally and the tactical precision required for sensitive
operations with far-reaching political consequences. This can be
accomplished only by having intelligent, experienced, mature, and
resourceful personnel--armed with cross-cultural communications
skills--to interact successfully with U.S. country teams, other
government agencies, non-government organizations and foreign
indigenous military organizations. JCET activities are a principal
means of developing and sustaining these skills.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views,
even if those views differ from the administration in power?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and
other communications of information are provided to this committee and
its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes.
______

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

Questions Submitted by Senator John Warner

Special Operations Chain of Command

1. Senator Warner. Mr. O'Connell, the United States Special
Operations Command's new role as a supported combatant commander will
require a refocusing of the command's primary responsibilities and the
constraints under which Special Operations Forces are employed. Each
regional combatant command includes a sub-unified command for special
operations providing operational direction and control of special
operations. If confirmed, how would you anticipate exercising your
oversight responsibilities over all special operations activities,
given the increasingly complex network of Special Operations Commands?
Mr. O'Connell. While each geographic combatant command has a sub-
unified command, commonly called the Theater Special Operations Command
(TSOC), they are not independent operators. The majority of their
activities and operations are conducted under the operational command
of the combatant commander. I would exercise my oversight
responsibilities in part through the existing process of coordination
and approval of training, exercise, and operational deployments. My
office reviews and recommends approval on all such activities. This
same construct applies to those occasional activities and operations
that might be under the operational command of the Commander, United
States Special Operations Command.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS AND CIVIL AFFAIRS

2. Senator Warner. Mr. O'Connell, you underscored in your policy
question answers the unique contribution of PSYOPs forces and the high
operations tempo that personnel in this specialty have experienced for
several years. Please explain the plan for active duty and Reserve
Forces aimed at reducing the stress on PSYOPs and CA personnel.
Mr. O'Connell. The Department's current force structure plan
includes increases in both PSYOPs and CA units. Over the next couple of
years we will add two active component regional PSYOPs companies, four
Reserve component regional PSYOPs companies, two active component CA
companies, and two Reserve component general purpose CA battalions.
These planned increases will mitigate some of the high operations tempo
that PSYOPs and CA forces have experienced over the past few years. We
will continue to analyze force structure requirements to ensure that we
can sustain current and anticipated future operational tempo with
available forces.

3. Senator Warner. Mr. O'Connell, are you concerned that too heavy
reliance--currently 97 percent--is being placed on the Reserve
component and not enough on the Active Forces?
Mr. O'Connell. The PSYOPs and CA Reserve component force structure
is being used to meet surge and long term rotational requirements. The
high percentage of the force structure in the Reserve component
provides strategic depth in our manpower resources to meet these
requirements. The Active Force is equally engaged in continuing
operations that require quicker responses than available through
mobilization of the Reserve components. The combination of Reserve and
Active component forces gives us operational flexibility to meet both
immediate and long term requirements. We will continue to analyze
current and anticipated future operational requirements to ensure that
there is the right mix of the two components in the force structure to
meet the Department's needs and provide operation tempo.

COUNTERDRUG ACTIVITIES

4. Senator Warner. Mr. O'Connell, the Department has requested
authority to expand counterdrug activities into certain Andean Ridge
and Asian nations in an effort to encourage nations in these regions to
disrupt cultivation and interdict transit of narcotics in these areas.
What is your view on the need and value of expanding counterdrug
activities in this manner?
Mr. O'Connell. Section 1033 of the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 1998, as amended,\1\ authorized the Department of
Defense, during fiscal years 1999 through 2002, to provide specific
types of support to the Governments of Peru and Colombia, at a level
not to exceed $20.0 million. It has proved to be a responsive and
effective authority for supporting interdiction efforts in Colombia and
Peru and it could be extremely useful to bolster security efforts in
the Andean Ridge and in Afghanistan and the surrounding region.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Public Law No. 105-85, Nov. 18, 1997, amended by Sec. 1021,
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, (Pub. L. No.
106-398)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The proposed legislation recognizes that DOD supports countries
that are key in our national drug strategy and the defense security
cooperation goals. An enhanced interdiction capability for these
nations is critical to our combined efforts to stem the flow of illicit
drugs, attack a source of terrorist funding, and reduce the threat to
struggling democracies. By working with the security forces of these
countries, DOD receives access to host nation information that is
useful for not only tracking illicit drugs, but also terrorists and
weapons of mass destruction.
The proposed legislation expands the nature of support to include
additional types of equipment and supplies that will sustain and
reinforce previously provided training and other support, to enable
these countries to combat drug traffickers.
The inclusion of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan,
and Uzbekistan is a result of the September 11, 2001, attack on the
United States and the recognition that drug trafficking is an important
source of funds for many terrorist groups. Disrupting drug trafficking
in Afghanistan and the surrounding region is also critical for
establishing a stable government in Afghanistan, which will increase
the chance for peace in the region.
The inclusion of Ecuador as a covered country will bolster that
country at a time when drug traffickers will be looking for new venues
in which to avoid the counterdrug pressure in Colombia. This is
appropriate since Ecuador, in spite of its internal difficulties,
assumed its role in the regional struggle against drug traffickers by
providing the United States long-term access to its airbase at Manta.
The expanded authority also provides for upgrading as well as
maintaining and repairing the equipment of these governments that is
used for counterdrug activities. For example, DOD could provide
enhancements to Colombia's and Peru's aerial interdiction fleet to make
them more effective. It specifically provides for sustainment cost,
including ammunition for nations willing to do more interdiction, but
who may not be able to pay for it. The expanded authority doubles
dollar authority to accommodate four times as many countries being
supported, and it deletes references to the term ``riverine'' in
recognition of the fact that host nation counterdrug activities are not
limited to riverine operations.

PEACEKEEPING AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

5. Senator Warner. Mr. O'Connell, peacekeeping and humanitarian
assistance planning and policy had been an important part of the ASD
(SO/LIC) portfolio of responsibilities. Post-conflict planning and
conduct of stability operations and humanitarian assistance have been
handled by other elements of DOD in Operation Iraqi Freedom. What role
do you see for ASD (SO/LIC) in future peacekeeping, stability
operations, and humanitarian assistance operations?
Mr. O'Connell. Due to unique conditions relating to the planning
and conduct of Operation Iraqi Freedom, an ad hoc organization, the
Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), which
later became the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), was indeed
established under DOD authority at the Pentagon, and deployed forward
to Kuwait and then Iraq to coordinate relief and reconstruction
activities. SO/LIC's Office of Stability Operations was linked closely
with ORHA/CPA's planning efforts from the very beginning, and is now
the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy's lead office
for a number of CPA's programs in Iraq. (The Stability Operations
office contributed, in fact, four of its eight assigned military
personnel to deploy forward with the ORHA organization.)
As in planning and determination of policy for all peacekeeping and
humanitarian operations, the Stability Operations office has worked
closely with the appropriate regional office within the Policy Under
Secretariat (in this case ISA Near East/South Asia), with the Joint
Staff, and with the staff of the responsible combatant commander, in
planning for these phases of Operation Iraqi Freedom. I fully expect
that the role of SO/LIC and the Stability Operations office will
continue in this manner for future peacekeeping, stability operations,
and humanitarian assistance missions.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

6. Senator Warner. Mr. O'Connell, Special Operations Forces have
clearly distinguished themselves in Operations Enduring Freedom and
Iraqi Freedom. Many have called for increasing the size and scope of
our Special Operations Forces. What is your view concerning increasing
the size of Special Operations Forces?
Mr. O'Connell. Over the next 5 years, there will be an increase in
the number of personnel assigned to the United States Special
Operations Command (USSOCOM). Some will bolster SOF aviation
capabilities; others will enhance the ability of USSOCOM to perform as
a supported command for the war on terrorism. We also look forward to
certain increases in SOF, such as an additional SEAL team. At the same
time, SOF cannot be created overnight. Special operators often spend
years in conventional forces before they can apply and qualify for SOF.
Creation of SOF therefore requires considerable time and effort on
everyone's part, making long-term retention an equally important issue.
At least as important as overall increases in the manpower assigned to
USSOCOM are the quality, training, and readiness of the personnel they
have today.

7. Senator Warner. Mr. O'Connell, what aspects of SOCOM
capabilities should be expanded?
Mr. O'Connell. The Secretary of Defense has directed USSOCOM to
become a supported command for the war on terrorism. In the past,
USSOCOM has been a force provider, so this requires changes in
organization and staffing to allow it to perform new battle staff
duties. In addition, USSOCOM's ability to undertake what we call
``operational preparation of the battlespace'' needs to be expanded,
both for the war on terrorism and to enhance SOF's ability to support
U.S. and allied conventional forces in campaigns such as Operation
Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. This in turn calls for
increased numbers of people with language capabilities in areas where
we can expect crises to occur and SOF to be employed in the years
ahead.

8. Senator Warner. Mr. O'Connell, what additional roles do you feel
SOCOM should assume?
Mr. O'Connell. There are approximately 46,000 personnel under
USSOCOM today, not a great number considering its global
responsibilities. USSOCOM has a set of core missions which go to the
heart of campaigns like Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi
Freedom, and also of the ongoing war on terrorism. In addition to these
core missions, however, USSOCOM also has a range of collateral missions
which Special Operations Forces are frequently called upon to perform.
Some of those can also be performed by U.S. conventional forces, and at
the present time the Department of Defense is studying which collateral
missions can be assumed by others, to allow USSOCOM to concentrate upon
its core missions. This study's recommendations are being reviewed at
the present time.

9. Senator Warner. Mr. O'Connell, what role do you see for the U.S.
Marine Corps in SOCOM?
Mr. O'Connell. The United States Marine Corps (USMC) did not place
any units under USSOCOM when the command was created in 1986, although
in recent years Marine Corps officers have served at USSOCOM
headquarters and component headquarters staffs. In the past year,
USSOCOM and USMC have worked together on interoperability in various
areas, and also on a first-time USMC force contribution to USSOCOM
based on its force reconnaissance capabilities. The latter, designated
the USMC USSOCOM Detachment, is nearing the end of a ``proof of
concept'' year with Naval Special Warfare Group. USSOCOM also
participates in ``Expeditionary Warrior,'' an ongoing set of USMC war
games exploring how USMC units and Special Operations Forces can
cooperate in a range of contingencies.
______

[The nomination reference of Thomas W. O'Connell follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
May 1, 2003.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
Thomas W. O'Connell of Virginia, to be an Assistant Secretary of
Defense, vice Brian E. Sheridan.
______

[The biographical sketch of Thomas W. O'Connell, which was
transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was
referred, follows:]

Biographical Sketch of Thomas W. O'Connell

A 1968 distinguished military graduate of the University of Rhode
Island with a BA in Economics, Mr. O'Connell began his career as an
infantry officer in Germany. He served in Southeast Asia as a field
advisor to Vietnamese forces including duties with the Phoenix Program.
Mr. O'Connell was assigned as an instructor in Combat Intelligence at
the Army's Intelligence Center and School at Ft. Huachuca, Arizona,
prior to spending 3 years in the 82nd Airborne Division at Ft. Bragg,
North Carolina as an intelligence officer at battalion, brigade, and
division levels. During attendance at the Army's Command and General
Staff College, he earned a Management MA from Central Michigan
University.
Mr. O'Connell then spent 2 years on exchange duty with the British
Army at the Joint Intelligence Centre in England, where he commanded
the Foreign Armed Services Branch. From 1980 to 1983, he was the Senior
Intelligence Officer for a U.S. Army Special Mission Unit. He then
commanded the 313th Military Intelligence Battalion of the 82nd
Airborne Division for 2 years, followed by attendance at the Naval War
College, graduating with highest distinction and completing a Masters
Degree in International Relations.
He returned to Ft. Bragg as the Director of Intelligence (J2),
Joint Special Operations Command, and continued in the Special
Operations Intelligence field with a 2\1/2\ year brigade command of an
Army Special Mission Unit.
After a brief Pentagon assignment in the U.S. Special Operations
Command's Washington Office, he served 3 years at the Central
Intelligence Agency as Deputy for Command Support, retiring in October
1995. Mr. O'Connell's career included participation in four conflict
arenas of Vietnam, Grenada, Panama, and Southwest Asia and various
assignments in 33 countries. He holds a Master Parachutist rating and
received numerous awards including the Defense Superior Service Medal,
the Legion of Merit, the Bronze Star for Valor, the Purple Heart, and
Air Medal.
He is currently a Senior Manager for Raytheon Company. He recently
participated in Defense Science Board Task Forces, and has served as a
frequent Task Force member of the President's National Security
Telecommunications Advisory Committee.
Mr. O'Connell and his wife Patricia, a marketing executive at Mount
Vernon Estate, have two sons, both in the military.
______

UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

Part A--Biographical Information

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Thomas W. O'Connell.

2. Position to which nominated:
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations/Low Intensity
Conflict).

3. Date of nomination:
May 1, 2003.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
July 30, 1946; Great Barrington, MA.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Patricia Ledew O'Connell.

7. Names and ages of children:
Andrew T. O'Connell, 30.
Kevin P. O'Connell, 27.

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions,
dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.
Rogers High School, Newport RI, 1961-1964, HS Degree, College Prep.
(1964).
University of Rhode Island, 1964-1968, BA, Economics (1968).
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS,
1977-1978, Diploma (1978).
Central Michigan University, 1977-1978, MA, Management/Public
Admin. (1978).
U.S. Navy War College, Newport, RI, 1986-1987, MA, National
Security and International Relations.

9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the
last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of
job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
October 1995-Present, Senior Manager, Raytheon Company,
Intelligence and Information Systems, (previously Electrospace Systems,
Chrysler Technology Company, and previously Raytheon E-Systems), 1235
Jefferson Davis Highway, Arlington, VA, 22022.
July 1992-0ctober 1995, Colonel, U.S. Army, Deputy Chief Command
Support, Office of Military Affairs, Central Intelligence Agency,
McLean, VA.
July 1991-July 1992, Colonel, U.S. Army, Deputy Director, United
States Special Operations Command Washington Office, Pentagon,
Washington, DC.
February 1989-July 1991, Colonel, U.S. Army Brigade Commander, U.S.
Army Intelligence and Security Command, Fort Belvoir, VA.
June 1986-February 1989, Lieutenant Colonel/Colonel, U.S. Army,
Director of Intelligence (J2), Joint Special Operations Command, Fort
Bragg, NC.

10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
or local governments, other than those listed above.
Special Terrorism Security Assessment, State of Rhode Island, 1987
(as part of Naval War College Study).
Defense Science Board Task Force on Transnational Threats.
President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory
Committee, Member of Task Forces, Industry Executive Subcommittee
Alternate Member, Raytheon Company (pro bono).

11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other
business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
Senior Manager, Raytheon Company, Intelligence and Information
Systems, 1235 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 800, Arlington, VA 22202.

12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
Member, Army Navy Country Club, Arlington, VA since 1995.
Member, Armed Forces Communications Electronics Association since
1995.
Member, Association of the United States Army since 1968.
Member, Old Crows Association since 1995 (Professional Electronic
Warfare Association).
Member, Republican Senatorial Task Force, 2002.
Republican Presidential Task Force, 2000.
Virginia Republican Party, 2003. Donor and membership.
Phi Gamma Delta Fraternity, University of Rhode Island, 1965-1968
(President, Treasurer).
Alumni Association, University of Rhode Island.
Member, Special Operations Warrior Foundation (Scholarships for
Children of Deceased Special Operations Personnel).
Member, All Ranks Association, Delta Force, and Unit Scholarship
Fund.
Member, Fort Belvoir Parish, Roman Catholic Church.
Member, Board of Directors, Special Operations Division, National
Defense Industrial Association since 2000.
Volunteer, National Leukemia and Lymphoma Society, 2000-2003.
Member, Mount Vernon Civic Association (Neighborhood, since 1996).
Member, Legal and Regulatory Task Force, Presidents National
Security Telecommunications Advisory Commission, 2002-present.
Participation as a member in other NSTAC Task Forces on a pro-bono
basis for Raytheon Company from 1998-2003.
Member, Security Affairs Support Association.

13. Political affiliations and activities:
(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or
any public office for which you have been a candidate.
None.
(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered
to all political parties or election committees during the last 5
years.
Member, Republican Presidential Task Force, 2000.
Member, Republican Senatorial Task Force, 2000, 2002.
Member, Republican Party of Virginia, 2002, 2003.
(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign
organization, political party, political action committee, or similar
entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.
Raytheon Political Action Committee 1998-2002, $400.
Republican Presidential Task Force, $100.
Republican Senatorial Task Force, $100.

14. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions
for outstanding service or achievements.
Military Awards:
Defense Superior Service Medal.
Legion of Merit (2).
Bronze Star Medal (Valor).
Bronze Star Medal (2).
Purple Heart.
Defense Meritorious Service Medal.
Meritorious Service Medal (3).
Air Medal.
Joint Service Commendation Medal.
Army Commendation Medal (Valor) 2.
Army Commendation Medal (2).
Army Achievement Medal.
Vietnam Service Medal.
Vietnam Campaign Medal.
South West Asia Campaign Medal.
Army Service Medal.
National Defense Service Medal (2).
Humanitarian Service Medal.
Overseas Service Medal.
Republic of Vietnam Gallantry Cross.
Expert Infantry Badge.
Master Parachutist Badge.
Joint Meritorious Unit Award.
Army Superior Unit Award.

Other
National Honor Society.
Rhode Island Honor Society.
Naval War College (Distinguished Honor Graduate).
Exceptional Performance Award, Central Intelligence
Agency.
Outstanding Achievement Award, Raytheon Company.

15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of
books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have
written.
Farewell Article, The Rose, Magazine of the Intelligence Corps of
the British Army, 1980.
``Leadership in Retrospect'', Military Intelligence Magazine, U.S.
Army Intelligence Center and School, 1985.
82d Airborne Long Range Reconnaissance in WWII, 1984 Paraglide,
Fort Bragg, NC.
Letter to the Editor, Proceedings Magazine, Naval Institute Press,
2000.
Defense Intelligence Journal, Preparing America's Leaders--
Intelligence Symposium, Joint Military Intelligence College Foundation,
2002.
Numerous official and classified reports written in conjunction
with military duties, 1968-1995.

16. Speeches: Provide the committee with two copies of any formal
speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years which you have
copies of and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have
been nominated.
I have no copies of formal speeches. I have presided over or
participated in numerous professional development panels as a member of
industry including the National Defense Industrial Association Special
Operations Division, the Association of the U.S. Army and have
participated in informal presentations at the American Enterprise
Institute, Washington, DC.

17. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to respond to requests to appear and testify before any
duly constituted committee of the Senate?
Yes.

______

Signature and Date

[The nomination of Thomas W. O'Connell was reported to the
Senate by Chairman Warner on July 16, 2003, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on July 21, 2003.]
----------

[Prepared questions submitted to Paul M. Longsworth, by
Chairman Warner prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follow:]

Questions and Responses

DUTIES

Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of
the Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation?
Answer. The duties of the Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation include preventing the spread of materials,
technology, and expertise relating to weapons of mass destruction;
detecting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction worldwide;
eliminating inventories of surplus fissile materials usable for nuclear
weapons; and providing for international nuclear safety.
Question. What background and experience do you possess that you
believe qualifies you to perform these duties?
Answer. I have over 17 years of experience working with the
Department of Energy and its national laboratory system. As a Federal
employee, I have participated in every phase of the Federal procurement
and budget process, and have managed both programs and people at the
DOE. My work with the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (and its
predecessor agency during the Soviet era, the Ministry of Atomic Power
and Industry) dates back to 1989, when I helped the Department of
Energy craft the first cooperative agreement on environmental
restoration and waste management. While serving as a professional staff
member on the Senate Armed Services Committee, I was responsible for
advising the Chairman on DOE oversight, budget, and policy matters.
During the past 2\1/2\ years, I have served as the Senior Policy
Advisor to the Secretary of Energy for National Security and the former
Soviet Union. In this capacity, I have participated in reviewing and
advising the Secretary on re-shaping the nonproliferation programs of
the National Nuclear Security Administration in order to accelerate and
expand their scope to rapidly address the most urgent threats.
Question. Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to
enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Deputy Administrator
for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation?
Answer. No, not at this time. I feel confident that my past
experiences have prepared me well to carry out the duties of the Deputy
Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what duties and functions do
you expect that the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security
Administration would prescribe for you?
Answer. I anticipate that the Administrator would authorize me to
carry out fully all the programs of the Office of Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation to support and implement the policies of the
President. He has not indicated that he intends to prescribe any
additional duties or functions other than those enumerated in the NNSA
Act.
Question. If confirmed, how would you work with the following:
Other Deputies in the NNSA
Answer. If confirmed, I intend to work closely with the other NNSA
Deputy Administrators and the Associate Deputy Administrators on
crosscutting programmatic issues such as budgets, security,
counterintelligence, personnel, and procurement. The NNSA Administrator
has established a Management Council to coordinate policy, financial,
and other management issues. This Council has been very effective in
establishing cohesion among the NNSA program offices and I intend to
participate actively in its deliberations.
Question. The Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management
Answer. The Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation has no waste
management or storage facilities of its own. As a result, many aspects
of the Office's Fissile Materials Disposition program must be
coordinated with the Office of Environmental Management to ensure that
the Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel program remains on schedule and within cost.
If confirmed, I intend to work through the NNSA Administrator to
establish cooperative and productive working relationship with Office
of Environmental Management.
Question. Other Assistant Secretaries of the Department of Energy
Answer. If confirmed, I intend to work through the NNSA
Administrator to establish cooperative working relationships with other
Assistant Secretaries of the Department of Energy, where necessary, to
ensure that overall departmental missions are met.
Question. Heads of relevant nonproliferation offices at the
Departments of Defense and State
Answer. The Office of Nonproliferation has good working
relationships with the nonproliferation staffs of the National Security
Council and the Departments of State and Defense. In my current
capacity as Senior Policy Advisor to the Secretary of Energy, I work
closely with these parties on a wide range of nonproliferation and
national security issues. If confirmed, I would work to continue the
existing partnerships with those organizations and try to improve them
where possible.

MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will
confront the Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation?
Answer. The principal challenge confronting the Deputy
Administrator will be improving Russia's ability to more effectively
utilize NNSA threat reduction funding. A longer term challenge is
determining how best to reallocate NNSA resources and capabilities to
address evolving proliferation threats outside the former Soviet Union.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for
addressing these challenges?
Answer. Improving Russia's ability to more effectively utilize NNSA
threat reduction funding will require a number of steps, including
working with the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy to improve contract
review procedures, streamline access at MinAtom and other sites, and
breaking down other barriers that hinder NNSA-funded activities. The
Administrator has identified the need to address evolving proliferation
threats outside the former Soviet Union. The effort to characterize and
respond to these threats will be an ongoing effort for the Office of
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation.
Question. What do you consider to be the most serious problems in
the performance of the functions of the Deputy Administrator for
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation?
Answer. The most serious management problems facing the Deputy
Administrator are: (1) establishing a program management system for the
Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation; (2) recruiting and
retaining skilled staff capable of carrying the diverse mission of the
Office; and (3) continuing to improve the rates at which authorized
funds are costed and obligated.
Question. If confirmed, what management actions and time lines
would you establish to address these problems?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Associate Administrator
for Management and Administration to ensure the full implementation of
a program management system which is compatible with the Five Year
Nuclear Security Plan (FYNSP) and the Planning, Budgeting, Programming,
Budgeting and Evaluation (PBP&E) system within NNSA. I will work to
continue the Nonproliferation Graduate Internship Program and other
mentoring programs. I will also work with the contractors and program
managers who execute programs in Russia to find ways to improve the
rates at which funds are costed and obligated.

PRIORITIES

Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish
in terms of issues which must be addressed by the Deputy Administrator
for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation?
Answer. The threat that nuclear materials, technology, or know-how
might fall into the hands of a terrorist organization remains
unacceptably high. Programs carried out by the Office of Defense
Nuclear Nonproliferation continue to work down this threat, but the
threat is an expanding and evolving one. If confirmed as the Deputy
Administrator, my highest priority will be to complete the task of
securing the nuclear weapons complex in Russia and the former Soviet
Union, while preparing to address the new threats that arise in other
regions of the world.

NATIONAL STRATEGY TO COMBAT WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

Question. According to the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of
Mass Destruction of 2002, ``strengthening nonproliferation to combat
weapons of mass destruction proliferation'' is one of the three
principal pillars of U.S. national security strategy. In this regard,
the National Strategy states that ``we will identify and pursue new
methods of prevention, such as national criminalization of
proliferation activities and expanded safety and security measures.''
If confirmed as Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation, what steps would you propose to provide ``new methods
of prevention'' and ``expanded safety and security measures''?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to support the broad U.S.
effort to establish new methods of preventing transfers of WMD
materials, technology, and expertise. Such efforts would include: (1)
working with the IAEA to strengthen its existing safeguards
capabilities; (2) working with members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group
to strengthen and enhance existing safeguards efforts; and (3)
assessing ways to update and strengthen existing export control
measures.

GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE (GAO) REPORT

Question. According to the March 2003 GAO report, Weapons of Mass
Destruction: Additional Russian Cooperation Needed to Facilitate U.S.
Efforts to Improve Security at Russian Sites, the Department of Energy
``plans to help secure Russia's weapons-usable nuclear material by
2008; however the department lacks access to many sites. As a result,
most of [the department's] expenditures in the past 2 years went to
functions other than securing buildings, such as maintaining previously
installed equipment and developing nuclear security regulations.''
If confirmed, what steps would you take to address these continuing
problems in Russia?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to press my Russian
counterparts to expeditiously address the issue of access to Russian
sites. Such efforts would include finding ways to mitigate Russian
security concerns while improving the access necessary for U.S. experts
to confirm that work was completed. I will also continue to work
closely with the NNSA Administrator, the Secretary of Energy, and the
Department of State to ensure our concerns are raised to the highest
levels in the Russian government.

BAKER-CUTLER TASK FORCE

Question. The Baker-Cutler Task Force Report of 2001, A Report Card
on the Department of Energy's Nonproliferation Programs with Russia,
stated that the task force observed ``impediments to DOE program
implementation that should be addressed on an urgent basis. Many of
these seem to revolve around restrictions on international travel
stemming from both DOE international regulations and procedures in
other U.S. Government agencies. These restrictions appear to have
created unnecessary paperwork and bureaucratic impediments. They hinder
DOE's ability to supervise work in the nonproliferation programs,
maintain the pace of projects, and ensure that funds are used
appropriately.''
If confirmed, what management improvements would you propose to
address the impediments to program implementation, including the
``urgent'' problem with the international travel process within the
Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, identified by the Baker-
Cutler Task Force?
Answer. For the most part, the problems identified in the January
2001 Baker-Cutler report have been eliminated and do not pose any
appreciable impediment to the pace of work being carried out in Russia.
However, the Russian government has placed new restrictions on
travelers entering the Russian Federation. These new restrictions will
take effect later this year and could have an adverse impact on the
ability of U.S. experts to travel to Russia.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY REPORT

Question. According to the March 2003 Harvard University report,
Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials: A Report Card and Action
Plan, ``It is crucial that the United States and the other countries
involved provide the financial and personnel resources needed to secure
the world's stockpiles of nuclear weapons and materials, and to
accomplish the other steps needed to block the terrorist pathway to the
bomb, as rapidly as these jobs can be done. As noted earlier, the
available budgets are now large enough, and the non-monetary obstacles
substantial enough, that simply adding money to existing programs,
while making no other changes, would in most cases do little to
strengthen or accelerate these efforts.''
What is your view of this perspective, and what changes, if any,
would you make to strengthen or accelerate these programs?
Answer. My view of the above statement is that it is fundamentally
correct. The greatest challenge facing U.S. threat reduction programs
in Russia is not the level of funding, it is the Russian's ability to
utilize funding from U.S. and other sources for these threat reduction
programs.
The March 2003 Harvard University report on Controlling Nuclear
Warheads and Materials contains several innovative and actionable
recommendations to both strengthen and accelerate NNSA's threat
reduction programs in Russia; however, most of the report's specific
recommendations were being implemented prior to its publication. For
example, the G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons of
Mass Destruction was established in June of last year and will provide
more than $20 billion over 10 years to address proliferation concerns
in Russia.

NEED FOR FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENTS

Question. At present, DOE's Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation
programs are averaging uncosted balances of almost 50 percent of the
programs' total appropriated budget. The DOE-wide average is 15
percent.
If confirmed, what management initiatives would you propose to
lower the level of uncosted balances for all DOE Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation programs?
Answer. Uncosted balances reached a high of 48 percent in fiscal
year 2002 because of several unique circumstances. Among these were the
government-wide nonproliferation review conducted by the National
Security Council in 2001, the post-September 11 travel freeze, and an
influx of supplemental funding provided by Congress late in the fiscal
year. Clearly, NNSA's Nonproliferation program cannot sustain uncosted
balances of 50 percent. If confirmed, I will work aggressively to draw
down uncosted balances in the Office of Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation to the lowest practical level.

PROLIFERATION DETECTION

Question. Early detection of proliferation activities has never
been more critical. The Nonproliferation and Verification Research and
Development program in the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation
plays a key role in conducting applied research to develop near and
long-term nuclear proliferation detection systems that can provide
policymakers with timely information to curtail such activities.
If confirmed, what efforts would you undertake to ensure that
technologies developed in this area would support the nonproliferation
programs within the Office Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, as well as
related programs at the Department of Defense?
Answer. The Verification Research and Development program plays a
pivotal role in the broader interagency community concerned with
detecting, deterring, and attributing proliferation throughout the
world. The work carried out by this office, in many areas, represents
the cutting edge of technology. I strongly support these activities and
will ensure that they are integrated with and supportive of the
activities of the Department of Defense and other relevant Federal
agencies.

NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS MONITORING

Question. Do you believe that the United States' existing nuclear
explosions monitoring capabilities are sufficient to deter and detect
any nuclear explosions?
Answer. No. Current U.S. nuclear explosions monitoring capabilities
are sufficient to detect, and therefore deter, most postulated testing
scenarios. However, the technological capability to remotely detect and
attribute all possible tests, particularly certain evasive or
clandestine test scenarios, is not adequate.
Question. What additional steps, if any, do you believe should be
taken by the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation to enhance U.S.
nuclear explosions monitoring capabilities?
Answer. The Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation has a
vigorous research and development program to address this deficiency.
If confirmed, I will fully support continued R&D in this area to ensure
that U.S. capabilities keep pace with emerging threats.

FISSILE MATERIALS DISPOSITION

Question. In your view, does the MOX program continue to advance
the nonproliferation goal of reducing weapons grade plutonium in the
United States and in Russia?
Answer. Yes. The Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation is
responsible for--among other things--detecting, securing, and
eliminating surplus fissile materials that pose a risk to the U.S. or
its allies. The MOX fuel program is the only cooperative U.S.-Russian
program to permanently eliminate weapons-usable plutonium. This must
remain one of our highest objectives in the effort to stem the threats
posed by weapons of mass destruction.
Question. Do you support accelerating the highly enriched uranium
program?
Answer. Yes. I support U.S. efforts to accelerate the blending down
of weapons-origin highly-enriched uranium (HeU) in Russia. The U.S.-
Russia Highly Enriched Uranium Purchase Agreement converts Russian
weapons-origin HeU into nuclear reactor fuel. Both the U.S. and Russia
have designated commercial parties to carry out that agreement, which
results in the blend-down and import into the U.S. of about 30 metric
tons of Russia uranium each year. Increasing the rate at which Russian
weapons-origin HeU is blended down--and therefore no longer attractive
to terrorists--is very important. However, it must be done in a manner
that does not adversely affect the international uranium market.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as the Deputy Administrator for
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and
other communications of information are provided to this committee and
its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes.
______

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka

ACCESS TO RUSSIAN SITES

1. Senator Akaka. Mr. Longsworth, I am concerned with the United
States' efforts to improve the security of Russia's nuclear weapons
materials. The GAO completed a report that I had requested about these
efforts in March. The report notes that DOE plans to secure Russia's
many tons of weapons-useable nuclear material by 2008. GAO found that
DOE lacks access to many sites which raises questions about whether DOE
can complete the program by 2008. What are your plans for working
cooperatively with your Russian colleagues to obtain the access to
Russian facilities so this important work may be finished in a timely
manner?
Mr. Longsworth. The Secretary has established a high-level working
group consisting of senior DOE/NNSA and senior MinAtom officials
specifically to address access issues that must be resolved before work
can proceed. If confirmed, I intend to be an active participant in this
working group to continue to accelerate the pace of our work in Russia.
I will work to find innovative, practical solutions that address
Russian concerns regarding the protection of their national secrets
while allowing the pace of security upgrades to continue.
I believe that NNSA projects carried out at Russian Navy sites can
serve as a good model for future security upgrades at MinAtom's most
sensitive facilities, such as the serial production enterprises.
While I agree with overall finding of the GAO report that access
issues remain a problem, however, I would point out that the Office of
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation continues to make progress in Russia.
If the program continues to make progress at its current pace, there is
no indication that NNSA will not meet all of its accelerated timetables
and complete its work by 2008.

TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS

2. Senator Akaka. Mr. Longsworth, the numbers and security of
Russian tactical nuclear weapons have been a concern for over a decade.
During the Senate's debate on the Moscow Treaty several Senators
expressed reservations that tactical nuclear weapons were not addressed
by the treaty. In 1991 and 1992, Presidents Bush, Gorbachev, and
Yeltsin made pledges to consolidate and eliminate U.S. and Russian
tactical nuclear weapons. In April 2002, Moscow announced that Russia
could complete destruction of its remaining ground forces battlefield
nuclear weapons--nuclear mines, artillery shells and warheads for land-
based tactical missiles--by 2004, if sufficient financing was
available. Given the concerns about the theft of these easily
transportable ground force weapons, how will you work with your Russian
colleagues to eliminate completely these weapons as soon as possible?
Mr. Longsworth. I share your concern about the importance of
tactical nuclear weapons and the need for their elimination as rapidly
as possible. Currently, the National Nuclear Security Administration is
extensively involved in cooperation with Russia to enhance the security
of Russian nuclear warheads. If confirmed, I would fully support these
ongoing efforts.
At the May 2002 Moscow Summit, Presidents Bush and Putin
established the Consultative Group for Strategic Security (CGSS) in
addition to signing the Moscow Treaty. The CGSS is chaired by the
Foreign and Defense Ministers of the United States and Russia, as the
principal mechanism through which the sides strengthen mutual
confidence, expand transparency, share information and plans and
discuss a broad range of strategic issues of mutual interest. The
initial meeting of the CGSS took place in September 2002, and resulted
in the creation of three working groups: Working Group One on Offensive
Nuclear Transparency, Working Group Two on Missile Defense Cooperation,
and Working Group Three on Nonproliferation.
Working Group One has met twice this year in Geneva. The U.S. focus
has been to build confidence in a spirit of cooperation by presenting a
positive long-term vision and emphasizing near-term transparency. As
Secretaries Powell and Rumsfeld mentioned during their testimony on the
Moscow Treaty and to their Russian counterparts, the United States has
a strong interest in transparency related to tactical nuclear weapons.
The issue of tactical nuclear weapons has been an element of discussion
during the Working Group One meetings this year.

RADIOACTIVE SEALED SOURCES

3. Senator Akaka. Mr. Longsworth, an issue of great importance to
me is the control of radioactive sealed sources and their potential for
use in a dirty bomb. Last month, the GAO delivered a report I requested
concerning U.S. and international efforts to control radioactive sealed
sources. The report shows there is a worldwide crisis in controlling of
sealed sources. Poor accounting, tracking, and security measures for
sealed sources exist in many countries around the globe. The GAO report
recommends that DOE take the lead in the U.S. Government to develop a
comprehensive program for the government to tackle this problem
internationally. Please tell me how this will be accomplished.
Mr. Longsworth. The Radiological Threat Reduction (RTR) program was
initiated in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001.
The RTR program's strategy consists of the three key elements:
securing the most dangerous radioactive materials in the most
vulnerable locations through bilateral and multilateral projects;
leveraging critical partnerships internationally to assist countries to
develop ``cradle-to-grave'' control of radioactive materials; and
detecting smuggled radioactive materials at border crossings and
``Mega-Port'' locations through the placement of detection systems.
Because the RTR program involves many nations and international
organizations, it requires a significant coordination among the U.S.
Government, the Russian government, the host governments, and the IAEA.
We have worked to develop consensus on a number of technical issues
(sources of concern, activity thresholds, worldwide source inventories,
health/economic impacts of a Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD),
etc.). We have also developed internal policies and procedures, such as
our RDD threat reduction Strategic Plan, Implementation Plan, Threshold
Document, and program methodology document. All of these were developed
in the last year through the efforts of numerous government laboratory
and private sector experts.

4. Senator Akaka. Mr. Longsworth, in the case of Russia, NNSA has a
Radiological Threat Reduction program to help Russia control and
protect dangerous sealed sources. GAO found, however, that 93 percent
of the funds spent so far by the DOE on this program have been spent in
the United States by the DOE's national laboratories for labor, travel,
equipment, and overhead. How will DOE look to spend a greater
percentage of the remaining funds DOE has at its disposal for this
program where the problems are overseas?
Mr. Longsworth. I believe there are two principal reasons why the
GAO figure of 93 percent is a misleading figure for characterizing U.S.
spending on international sealed sources.
First, if you take into account the $3.0 million contribution that
DOE/NNSA made to the International Atomic Energy Agency (lAEA) last
year, then you see that only about 60 percent of our budget was spent
inside the U.S. The funds sent to the IAEA are intended to support
security improvements in IAEA member states. The actual total spent by
the RTR program as of January 31, 2003, was $8.9 million. Of this, $5.3
million was spent inside U.S. on labor and travel. Of that money, a
large portion covered the salaries of specialists traveling to
countries of the former Soviet Union to support the mission of securing
dangerous and vulnerable radiological materials.
Second, this is a new program with normal, initial start-up costs.
The first, major activity was a thorough study of the national security
threat posed by radiological dispersion devices. This study was
conducted by U.S. subject matter experts, including specialists from
DOE national laboratories as well as leading experts from private
industry. At least 28 subcontractors, in addition to personnel from the
national labs, were involved and their travel--both domestic and
international--is all reported as funding spent at national labs.
As the program progresses to an operational phase, increased
spending in international venues is planned.

5. Senator Akaka. Mr. Longsworth, the IAEA is developing a Draft
Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sealed
Sources. It will provide non-binding guidelines for nations to follow
if they wish to improve the safety and security of sealed sources
within their borders. This is important, but where possible we should
reduce our reliance on dangerous sealed sources, thus reducing the
``sources'' of concern. Senator Domenici in the Energy Bill has a
provision calling for research on finding substitutes for sealed
sources. How do you plan to work internationally to help countries,
industries, medical facilities, etc., to find substitutes for sealed
sources?
Mr. Longsworth. NNSA is currently exploring these issues with the
International Atomic Energy Agency. NNSA held a meeting in Vienna in
April 2003 with major sealed source manufacturers to discuss ways to
enhance the safe and secure design, manufacture, distribution, and
return of radioactive sources and devices. I anticipate follow-on
meetings and technical discussions to identify recommendations and a
path forward.

6. Senator Akaka. Mr. Longsworth, in May, GAO delivered to me a
report concerning the U.S. program in recovering domestic greater-than-
Class-C radioactive sources. Thousands of these sources still remain to
be recovered. In addition to the concerns over a dirty bomb, GAO showed
that there was enough Pu-239 in unrecovered sources for one to two
nuclear bombs. GAO found that DOE was not giving the program the
attention it needed or deserved. What plans does DOE have to give this
program greater attention?
Mr. Longsworth. Approximately a year and half ago, the Office of
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (NA-20) established a program to
improve the security of sealed sources overseas. The initial focus of
the program has been on the former Soviet Union, but in recent months
has expanded to include other countries of concern. Currently, upgrades
are in progress at a total of 43 sites in 11 countries. By the end of
this fiscal year, it is anticipated that 17 site upgrades in 7
countries will be completed.
The scope of this problem is large and NA-20 has created four
documents to guide its activities including a strategic plan, an action
plan, radioactive threshold values for items of concern, and
programmatic guidelines to ensure that consolidation and security
upgrades are consistent across the program. Efforts in this area have
been closely coordinated with IAEA. Under a tripartite initiative, the
IAEA and the Russian Federation collaborate with NA-20 to locate and
secure vulnerable, high-risk sources in the former Soviet Republics.
Additionally, NA-20 has actively engaged the interagency and has formed
an interagency working group to develop policy recommendations in cases
where take-back U.S. origin sources outside the continental U.S. may be
necessary.

THE IAEA'S NONPROLIFERATION MISSION

7. Senator Akaka. Mr. Longsworth, I am very interested in the
IAEA's efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The
IAEA came to play an important role in uncovering and containing Iraq's
nuclear program. Now we are looking for the IAEA to play a central role
in investigating Iran's nuclear intentions. If our diplomacy with North
Korea bears fruit, the IAEA will undoubtedly be active in monitoring
and inspecting the elimination of North Korea's nuclear weapons
program. What are your plans to assist the IAEA in accomplishing its
crucial nonproliferation mission?
Mr. Longsworth. The Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (NA-
20) is one of the U.S. Government's leading supporters of the IAEA and,
if confirmed, I intend to further our support of the Agency and its
nonproliferation activities. NNSA support to the IAEA includes
financial support, personnel, equipment, training, and technical
consulting services.
NNSA provides experts from its national laboratories to support the
IAEA in a wide range of nonproliferation disciplines. NA-20 made
available over 160 U.S. technical experts who volunteered to support
the IAEA's WMD inspections in Iraq before the recent conflict. NA-20
also provided expert assistance to facilitate the IAEA's verification
of the nuclear material at Tuwaitha last month.
NNSA continues to provide expert advice and technology to assist
the IAEA in its role of conducting inspection and monitoring activities
in the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK). Should our
diplomacy with North Korea bear fruit, the IAEA will be fully prepared
to carry out its important those inspections activities. NNSA has also
developed and trained the IAEA on tools for measuring plutonium in
spent fuel. I anticipate that further high-priority technical support
will be needed by the IAEA, should its inspectors be allowed to return
to the DPRK. If confirmed, I will ensure that NA-20 is responsive to
any such requirements.
Consistent with IAEA concerns, NNSA is also working with U.S.
partners in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to protect against the
diversion of nuclear exports to the DPRK and Iran. NNSA, for example,
developed and circulated watch-lists of nuclear-related items that fall
below the control list threshold, but which could nevertheless support
Iranian or DPRK nuclear weapons development.

NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY

8. Senator Akaka. Mr. Longsworth, I am worried about the future of
the nonproliferation regime. We were concerned about Iraq violating the
NPT. Now we are seeking to get North Korea back into the NPT and to
hold Iran to its NPT commitments. At the NPT's 1995 Review and
Extension Conference, a commitment to sign a Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty by the end of 1996 was one of the key conditions that allowed
the gathered nations to agree to the NPT's indefinite extension. The
administration's decision to explore new nuclear weapons designs and
shorten test site readiness raises questions about U.S. nuclear testing
plans. If the United States were to resume nuclear testing, do you
believe the nonproliferation regime would be undermined?
Mr. Longsworth. The nuclear nonproliferation regime is strong
despite the current compliance challenges it faces in Iraq, Iran and
North Korea. At this time, the United States is not developing,
testing, or producing any nuclear warheads nor does it have any plans
to resume nuclear testing, consistent with its unilateral moratorium on
nuclear testing. The administration continues to maintain its
unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing and urges other states to do
likewise. In light of this moratorium, it would be imprudent for me to
respond to hypothetical questions directed at the impact of resumed
nuclear testing by the United States on the non-proliferation regime.
______

[The nomination reference of Paul M. Longsworth follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
April 28, 2003.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
Paul Morgan Longsworth, of Virginia, to be Deputy Administrator for
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, National Nuclear Security
Administration, vice Linton F. Brooks, resigned.
______

[The biographical sketch of Paul M. Longsworth, which was
transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was
referred, follows:]

Biographical Sketch of Paul M. Longsworth

Paul M. Longsworth was nominated to be Deputy Administrator
for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation at the National Nuclear
Security Administration (NNSA) by President George W. Bush on
April 28, 2003. The NNSA carries out the national security
responsibilities of the Department of Energy (DOE). The NNSA's
nonproliferation programs work to detect, prevent, and reverse
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The
nonproliferation office promotes international nuclear safety
and supports programs that ensure the security of nuclear
weapons materials in Russia and other countries. The
nonproliferation office also supports research and development
of detection systems for biological and chemical agents.
Mr. Longsworth is currently the Senior Policy Advisor for
National Security and the former Soviet Union to the Secretary
of the United States Department of Energy. He is responsible
for advising the Secretary on a wide range of programs and
issues related to stockpile stewardship and nonproliferation.
Mr. Longsworth has over 16 years of experience in national
security, nuclear, and environmental issues. He has served in
the executive and legislative branches of the Federal
Government and in the private sector. Prior to coming to DOE,
Mr. Longsworth served as a professional staff member on the
Senate Armed Services Committee, where he was responsible for
defense nuclear matters, including: nuclear weapons,
radioactive cleanup, fissile materials disposition, and naval
nuclear propulsion programs. Mr. Longsworth has also worked for
the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee, the Center
for Strategic and International Studies, the DOE Office of
Science and Technology, and the Advanced Energy and
Environmental Systems Division of BDM International
Corporation.
Mr. Longsworth hold a Bachelor of Science in Finance-
Economics from Wichita State University. He has received many
awards of distinction.
Mr. Longsworth resides in Arlington, Virginia, with his
wife and two children.
------

UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

Part A--Biographical Information

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Paul Morgan Longsworth.

2. Position to which nominated:
Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, National
Nuclear Security Administration, U.S. Department of Energy.

3. Date of nomination:
April 28, 2003.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
July 1, 1962; Swindon, United Kingdom.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Rebecca Newell Keen Longsworth.

7. Names and ages of children:
Parker Townsend Longsworth, Age 5.
Zachary Keen Longsworth, Age 3.

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions,
dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Attended Degree Graduated
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bellevue East High School, Bellevue, Sep. 1977 to May 1980.. Diploma................ May 1980
NE.
University of Arkansas, Fayetteville, Aug. 1980 to Dec. 1982. None...................
AR.
Wichita State University, Wichita, KS Jan. 1983 to Dec. 1985. B.S., Finance.......... Dec. 20, 1985
American University, Washington, DC.. Sep. 1989 to Dec. 1989. None...................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the
last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of
job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
Senior Policy Advisory for National Security and the former Soviet
Union, Office of the Secretary of Energy, U.S. Department of Energy,
Washington, DC, February 2001 to present.
Professional Staff Member, Committee on Armed Services, U.S.
Senate, Washington, DC, May 1996 to February 2001.
DOE Legislative Fellow, Committee on Environment and Public Works,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC, April 1995 to May 1996.
Technology Transfer Specialist, Office of Environmental Management,
U.S. Department of Energy, Gaithersburg, MD, March 1994 to March 1995.
Program Analyst, Office of Economic Transition, Richland Operations
Office, U.S. Department of Energy, Richland, WA, October 1993 to
February 1994.
Executive Assistant to the Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Technology Development, Office of Environmental Management, U.S.
Department of Energy, Washington, DC, October 1991 to October 1993.

10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
or local governments, other than those listed above.
None.

12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
Member, First Baptist Church, Alexandria, VA.

13. Political affiliations and activities:
(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or
any public office for which you have been a candidate.
Member, Executive Committee, Young Republican National Federation
(1982-1985).
State Chairman, Kansas Young Republicans (1983-1984).
(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered
to all political parties or election committees during the last 5
years.
None.
(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign
organization, political party, political action committee, or similar
entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.
$100 to the Republican National Committee, December 2000.

14. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions
for outstanding service or achievements.
Environmental Fellow, Council on Excellence in Government, 1996.
V. Jerry Blue Scholarship in Entrepreneurship, 1984.
Outstanding Young Men of America.
Eagle Scout.

15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of
books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have
written.
Article: ``Raising the Drinking Age is Not the Answer'' (1983),
Sunflower Newspaper.
Article: ``For the Republican View'' (1984), Kansas Student Voice.
Article: ``Maximizing Research and development Investment in the
Department of Energy's Environmental Cleanup Program,'' (1996), Journal
of Technology Transfer.

16. Speeches: Provide the committee with two copies of any formal
speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years which you have
copies of and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have
been nominated.
I have given several speeches on topics relevant to the position
for which I have been nominated; however, as I do not speak from a
prepared text, there are no transcripts of such speeches.

17. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to respond to requests to appear and testify before any
duly constituted committee of the Senate?
Yes.
______

Signature and Date

[The nomination of Paul M. Longsworth was reported to the
Senate by Chairman Warner on July 16, 2003, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on July 21, 2003.]

NOMINATIONS OF GEN. RICHARD B. MYERS, USAF, FOR REAPPOINTMENT AS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF AND REAPPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF
GENERAL; AND GEN. PETER PACE, USMC, FOR REAPPOINTMENT AS VICE CHAIRMAN
OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF AND REAPPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF GENERAL

----------

THURSDAY, JULY 24, 2003

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:36 a.m. in room
SR-325, Caucus Room, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator
John Warner (chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Warner, McCain, Inhofe,
Allard, Sessions, Levin, Reed, Akaka, E. Benjamin Nelson,
Clinton, and Pryor.
Committee staff members present: Judith A. Ansley, staff
director; Cindy Pearson, assistant chief clerk and security
manager; and Gabriella Eisen, nominations clerk.
Majority staff members present: Charles W. Alsup,
professional staff member; Ambrose R. Hock, professional staff
member; Gregory T. Kiley, professional staff member; Lynn F.
Rusten, professional staff member; Scott W. Stucky, general
counsel; and Richard F. Walsh, counsel.
Minority staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes,
Democratic staff director; Madelyn R. Creedon, minority
counsel; Evelyn N. Farkas, professional staff member; Richard
W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; Gerald J. Leeling,
minority counsel; and Peter K. Levine, minority counsel.
Staff assistants present: Andrew W. Florell and Sara R.
Mareno.
Committee members' assistants present: Christopher J. Paul,
assistant to Senator McCain; John A. Bonsell, assistant to
Senator Inhofe; James Beauchamp, assistant to Senator Roberts;
Arch Galloway II, assistant to Senator Sessions; Frederick M.
Downey, assistant to Senator Lieberman; Eric Pierce, assistant
to Senator Ben Nelson; Andrew Shapiro, assistant to Senator
Clinton; and Terri Glaze, assistant to Senator Pryor.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Warner. Good morning, everyone.
We are here this morning for a very important hearing with
the Armed Services Committee on the advice and consent
procedures by which the Senate, under its constitutional
authority, expresses their collective view on the performance
of these two very fine officers for the 2 years they have been
in office, and the strong likelihood that that advice and
consent will be given for the ensuing 2 years. The nominations
of General Richard B. Myers, U.S. Air Force, current Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and General Peter Pace, U.S.
Marine Corps, the current Vice Chairman, to be reappointed to
the grade of General and to continue to serve for a second 2-
year term in their respective positions are the subject of
today's hearing.
At a time of extraordinary activity for our Armed Forces,
we are privileged to have before the committee this morning
these nominees who have played such critical roles in the
global war on terrorism and in Operation Iraqi Freedom.
General Myers was Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff on September 11, 2001, when the planes hijacked by
terrorists slammed into buildings in New York and here in
Washington, DC, into the Pentagon. In fact, he was in the
building, and was acting Chairman that day when America came
under attack.
We all remember it for different reasons, but Senator Levin
and I went over and joined you, General Myers, and the
Secretary of Defense down in the rooms where the Chiefs make
their decisions. We remember that very well.
Less than 3 weeks later, General Myers was confirmed by the
Senate as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and was
leading the planning efforts for the global war on terrorism.
Replacing him as Vice Chairman during that fateful time for our
Nation was General Pete Pace, who had already served so ably as
Commander of the U.S. Southern Command. Together, they have
provided a great team for America and this administration. I am
pleased that the President and Secretary of Defense have
decided to keep the team together for the coming 2 years,
subject to Senate confirmation.
The committee also welcomes the lovely wives of our two
officers. Forgive me for not speaking to you when we arrived
here, Mary Jo Myers and Lynne Pace.
I ask that in a moment you introduce those lovely ladies
and the family members that may be gathered with them.
Families are an essential part of military life, and they
play a role more and more now. The Armed Forces are about 60
percent, I think, a married force, compared to years ago in our
country when a very small fraction of military men, certainly
in World War II and Korea, were married.
Two years ago, when General Myers and General Pace were
confirmed as Chairman and Vice Chairman, our Nation had just
come under attack. The military was faced with great
challenges. The tempo of military operations over the past 2
years has been unprecedented: operations in Afghanistan, a
global war against terrorism, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and
ongoing commitments around the globe.
While major combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have
concluded, the danger to U.S. and Coalition Forces continues,
and I think that General Abizaid and General Sanchez, and
indeed General Myers and General Pace have tried to clarify
some misunderstanding with regard to the President's historic
remarks made this year in terms of the reality that this war
for the small unit soldiers remains very threatening and is
taking its toll.
The most challenging phase of these military operations lie
ahead, as we attempt to bring peace, security, and democracy to
the people of Iraq and Afghanistan. All of us--the American
people, Congress, and especially the families of those who
continue to serve--are concerned about these challenges, and we
look to you two fine professional officers to give that
leadership.
The global war on terrorism is far from over. Our forces,
Active and Reserve, are the best in the world; but they are
spread, in the judgment of many, including this Senator, in a
very thin way. We have to address how best to take care of the
short-term and the long-term challenges of the standing size of
our forces.
As we speak, a possible deployment to Liberia is under
consideration, and we will cover that subject today in the
course of this hearing, because I have some very grave concerns
about this operation, given the facts as we know them now and
the changing picture, hour upon hour, in that area of the
world. Undoubtedly, there is enormous human suffering,
deprivation, and the like. But to inject U.S. forces into that
scene requires very careful planning.
As always, the threat from North Korea, another rogue
state, looms large on the horizon, and the North Korean
situation is very high on the priority of the members on this
committee as to what our options are there. We will cover that
today.
General Myers and General Pace have superb records of
military service which are summarized in the biographies before
us, and are already well-known to the committee. I will not
elaborate further, other than to say that we are fortunate as a
Nation to have such well-qualified professionals for these
important positions.
General Myers and General Pace, we thank you for your
service, and that of your families--I repeat, that of your
families--and for your willingness to continue to lead this
Nation and our military.
Senator Levin.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN

Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is an historic
event in that we have never before, to my knowledge, held a
hearing in which both the Chairman and the Vice Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff testified at the same hearing. It is
appropriate that it be held, actually, in this historic room.
I want to extend a very warm welcome, both to General Myers
and General Pace, and their spouses and their family members,
if there are additional family members here in attendance.
When the committee held its hearing on the nomination of
General Myers to be Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it
was a scant 2 days after the terrorist attacks on New York City
and the Pentagon. The hearing on General Pace's nomination to
be Vice Chairman followed some 12 days later.
The intervening period since then has witnessed
extraordinary events; some of the most extraordinary events,
indeed, in our Nation's history. United States and Coalition
Forces attacked the Taliban and al Qaeda forces in Afghanistan,
commencing on October 7, 2001. As a result of Operation
Enduring Freedom, the Taliban regime was removed from power, al
Qaeda lost its safe haven, and the transitional government of
President Karzai was selected in a traditional Afghan way to
lead the country until a permanent government could be elected.
Afghanistan, however, is not yet free from conflict, and
some 8,000 U.S. forces remain deployed there, in addition to a
like number of allied forces.
U.S. and Coalition Forces launched Operation Iraqi Freedom
on March 19 of this year. Coalition Forces liberated Iraq and
routed the Iraqi army and security forces with extraordinary
speed. But Iraq is far from free from conflict, and
approximately 148,000 U.S. forces remain deployed there, with
about 12,000 Coalition Forces, mostly British, at this time.
Frequent ambushes, mainly carried out by the Baathist
forces loyal to Saddam, are resulting in almost daily
casualties to U.S. forces. We all hope that Tuesday's firefight
in which Saddam's sons were killed will help to eliminate any
belief or fear that Saddam might return.
Our forces in Iraq--a number of whom have been deployed to
the Persian Gulf for nearly a year, and most of whom have been
there for 6 months--are tired, and with conflicting
announcements as to their departure date, they are riding an
emotional roller coaster. Hopefully, yesterday's announcement
of an Army rotation plan will provide the predictability that
they so sorely need.
U.S. forces also remain overseas in long-term deployments,
such as to South Korea; in mid-term peacekeeping deployments to
the Balkans; and in short-term deployments, such as the Horn of
Africa. Potential deployments to places like Liberia remain
possible, and possibly dangerous. Our forces, both Active and
Reserve, are stretched very thin. This is particularly true of
our ground forces, and is exacerbated in certain specialties
such as military police, special operators, and civil affairs.
In the face of these challenges and demands, American
servicemen and women have demonstrated extraordinary bravery in
combat and unparalleled compassion in combat's aftermath.
Senator Warner and I, along with many of our colleagues on
this committee, have been privileged to visit our troops in
those two nations and elsewhere, and have been enormously proud
of them, their dedication, and their professionalism.
Most of that is because of their own personal qualities;
but some of that is attributable to leadership, and two truly
fine leaders are before us today. The Nation is fortunate that
General Myers and General Pace have agreed to continue to serve
in the demanding positions of Chairman and Vice Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. We will need the experience and the
outstanding professional judgment that these two officers bring
to those assignments. We again are very grateful to them and to
their families for their service and dedication to this Nation.
Chairman Warner. I am about to ask the standard questions,
but I am informed that one of our colleagues, the chairman of a
committee, has to go to chair his own committee hearing, so I
will defer to him at this point.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. I will be very brief. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman. I do have to chair a committee hearing in about 18
minutes from now, so there won't be time to get to questions.
Let me just echo what both of these gentlemen have said. I
honestly cannot think or believe there is anyone I can think of
in the uniformed services that I hold in higher regard than the
two of you. You have done a great job. I don't think we are
giving you all you need, however, so I would like for the
record for you to please analyze where we are in two areas.
There is an article that just came out in Space Technology
that quoted General Handy talking about what you had to do to
handle the transport and tanker problems that we had, and I
felt if something interrupted someplace else in the world at
that time, I think we would have had real serious problems. So
I would like to have you address that.
Also, I have the standard question that I always ask, and
that is regarding both end strength and force structure. Mr.
Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to get to these
questions.
Chairman Warner. Thank you. Will you prepare those
questions and then formally----
Senator Inhofe. I will do that, fine.
Chairman Warner. Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. I have no opening statement, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Senator Nelson.
Senator Ben Nelson. I have no statement, thank you.
Chairman Warner. The committee has asked both General Myers
and General Pace to answer a series of advance policy
questions, and they have responded to those questions.
Without objection, I will make the questions and responses
part of the record.
I also have certain standard questions we ask of every
nominee who appears before the committee. If you will both
respond to each question, then we can move on to the policy
issues.
First, have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations
governing conflicts of interest?
General Myers. I have.
Chairman Warner. General Pace.
General Pace. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. Will you ensure your staff complies with
deadlines established for requested communications, including
questions for the record and for hearings?
General Myers. Yes, sir.
General Pace. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses
and briefers in response to congressional requests?
General Myers. Yes, sir.
General Pace. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. Will those witnesses be protected from
reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
General Myers. Yes, sir.
General Pace. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. If you have any opening remarks, we will
give you the opportunity. But before you do so, I wanted to
share with each of you, because this is a subject which is very
active at the moment, some information that I just received.
I talked to the Deputy Secretary of Defense and to the
deputy to Ambassador Bremer about the release of the pictures
of Saddam Hussein's two sons. I was advised that at this moment
the press, predominantly the Iraqi press, are being given
access to photographs of those remains and those photographs
will be released. Thank you.
General Myers.

STATEMENT OF GEN. RICHARD B. MYERS, USAF, TO BE CHAIRMAN, JOINT
CHIEFS OF STAFF

General Myers. Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, other
distinguished members of the committee, I do have a short
opening statement, and I thank you for the opportunity to
appear before you today.
The first thing I would like to do is to thank you for your
support of all the men and women in uniform who serve today,
and our veterans. I know you are as proud as I am of the work
they have been doing and your statements indicated that and we
thank you for all of that support.
As you indicated in your remarks, the past 2 years have
brought incredible challenges for our Nation. We have united to
prevent a recurrence of the horrible attacks of September 11,
2001, and we have fought the threat of global terrorism. We
have won major battles in the war on terrorism.
In Afghanistan, as you indicated Senator Levin, we toppled
the oppressive Taliban regime. We have disrupted al Qaeda's
safe haven and destroyed terrorist training camps. In Iraq, we
ended Saddam Hussein's brutal regime in a matter of weeks.
However, we certainly aren't dwelling on past successes.
There is clearly much work yet to be done in this war on
terrorism. We continue to work toward stability and security in
Afghanistan, Iraq, and other places around the globe. To ensure
a lasting peace in these countries, we must be aggressive and
determined in our actions, and patient and steady in our
commitment. It will take time for representative governments to
take hold, and it will take time to build the confidence of
newly liberated people.
The situation in Iraq today is complex. Saddam Hussein left
behind a legacy of fear and corruption, a degraded economy, and
a deteriorated infrastructure. This legacy creates a
vulnerability which those who lost their status under the old
regime attempt to exploit.
Former Baathist ex-soldiers, paramilitary groups, security
organizations, criminals, and terrorists from other countries,
operating in small cells or at random, seek to perpetuate
Saddam Hussein's pattern of brutality and destruction by
carrying out attacks on Coalition Forces and on Iraqis who seek
peace and freedom.
In addition to confronting these threats, our men and women
are helping to accomplish some amazing things in Iraq. More
than 30,000 Iraqi police officers are establishing law and
order in Iraq. Our forces are providing training to many of
them, including ethics training, in addition to day-to-day
police work training.
Iraq now has a free press. In fact, more than 100
newspapers are being published. United States forces helped
reopen Mosul's independent television station.
One hundred forty-eight courts are now up and running.
Military lawyers are advising the Iraqis on how to conduct fair
trials. Twenty-seven of 43 banks have begun conducting
transactions, and the Iraqi central bank is paying salaries to
police, hospital staff, teachers, and utility workers.
Coalition Forces are helping to safeguard their vaults.
We have helped deliver over 1 million metric tons of food.
Nearly all of Iraq's 1,450 hospitals and clinics are treating
patients, and our forces are providing security for some of
these. Ninety-five percent of the schools are open, including
Baghdad University, and these schools are now being used for
education instead of storing weapons. Our forces have helped
repair and rebuild some of these schools.
I could go on. The point is that our forces are making a
real difference in Iraq. They are providing not only security
but also prosperity, freedom of expression, justice, education,
and medical care. They are making a very real difference, and
they are providing hope for the future.
Our forces understand the importance of their role in this
mission, and commanders at every level are confident about the
future in Iraq. On the other hand, we know the war on terrorism
isn't over. Brave men and women go in harm's way every hour of
every day, in Iraq and elsewhere. We remember the families and
friends of those who have fallen in our thoughts and prayers.
We are asking a lot of our troops right now, but it is for
good reason. Never before in our Nation's history has our very
existence and all we stand for been threatened in the way it is
being threatened now. Terrorists want to destroy freedom and
democracy here in the United States and around the world and I
am certain that al Qaeda, as we speak, is planning more
terrorist attacks.
One thing you can be sure of: We are committed to fighting
this war on terrorism and to protecting American values, the
American people, and our homeland, and you can also be sure of
one other thing--that we will win.
Again, I think the past few years have brought tremendous
successes, and I intend to continue to pursue the three
priorities that have been my focus for the past 3 years.
Winning the war on terrorism is one of them. Number two is
enhancing joint warfighting, and three is transforming our
Armed Forces so we can deal with this 21st century threat in
the environment we face.
If confirmed, I promise to continue providing you the best
military advice I can offer. Anything less would be a
disservice to the fighting men and women to whom America owes
so much.
When I came before you in confirmation just 2 days after
the terrorist attacks of September 11, I pledged to focus on
sustaining our quality force and taking care of the heart of
our military, our dedicated soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines,
Coast Guardsmen, and DOD civilians. I reiterate that pledge
today, and I look forward to answering your questions. Thank
you.
Chairman Warner. Would you be most kind to introduce your
family, General?
General Myers. Mr. Chairman, I have one family member here
today--at least that I know of--and that is my wife, Mary Jo.
We celebrated our 38th wedding anniversary in June, and I can
guarantee you that I would not be sitting at this table if it
were not for her support, her critique of performances, which
she will be doing later today, and everything that the family
needs in the military today.
You are exactly right. Families are part of the military
and readiness, and our ability to do our job is dependent upon
our families and how they are taken care of.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
General Pace, perhaps you would start by introducing your
family, and then proceed with your statement.

STATEMENT OF GEN. PETER PACE, USMC, TO BE VICE CHAIRMAN, JOINT
CHIEFS OF STAFF

General Pace. Mr. Chairman, thank you, sir. Senator Levin,
members of the committee, it is my great pleasure to introduce
my wife, Lynne. We just celebrated our 32nd anniversary this
past April. Our two children are not able to be here today. Our
daughter Tiffany is an accountant and our son Peter is a
Captain in the United States Marine Corps. We are immensely
proud of both of them, and as General Myers has pointed out,
and as is true for me, and is true for all of our service
members, we cannot do what we do without the unbelievably
strong support of our families.
I know for me personally, my wife and two children have
made me feel every day that what I do is important and like so
many other families, they pretend--and they let me pretend--
that the awards I have received and the promotions I have
received have been based on my own merit. I know that it is,
like with so many other families, because of their support and
because of their sacrifice.
We have families right now whose loved ones are serving
overseas. They don't know when their son or daughter, or their
spouse, is in trouble or in harm's way, so they go through
every day thinking the possible worst. The families do, in many
ways, sacrifice more than those of us who go overseas to fight
our country's battles, and we owe them all a great debt of
gratitude.
Chairman Warner. I appreciate those comments from both of
you, because we have a military force today which I refer to,
really, as a married force. It's at 60 percent; is that about
right, general?
General Myers. That's about right, sir.
Chairman Warner. We have seen recently the courage
expressed by families in times of grief, in times of, frankly,
disagreeing with some of the decisions being made. I think it
has been a healthy thing for spouses to speak out in certain
instances. So speaking for myself, I welcome it and encourage
it.
General Pace. Thank you, sir. I would like to thank you and
the committee for the opportunity to appear before you here
today, and especially, and more importantly, for the strong,
steadfast, bipartisan support of this committee in supporting
all of us in uniform.
It has been my honor since 1 October of 2001 to serve as
Vice Chairman, alongside General Myers. If confirmed, I promise
that I will continue to strive to provide my best military
advice to the leadership of this country.
In providing that best military advice, I will keep in mind
that privates to lance corporals to lieutenants and captains,
and all those who are in harm's way right now, deserve our very
best support and deserve our very best advice to those of you
who make decisions.
Again sir, we owe a great debt of gratitude to all our
families, and I thank you for this opportunity.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
I just want to comment. You mentioned the sergeants and the
corporals and the like. That has really been the backbone and
the strength of our military since the earliest times. We have
had that fine tradition of authority being reposed in those in
the enlisted ranks.
I know all of us here, I think, have visited Afghanistan,
and are about to visit Iraq. We have seen how the sergeants
have had enormous responsibility. General, perhaps you could
share a story that you told me last night about one sergeant
and his role in connection with the location and designation of
Saddam Hussein's two sons? That's quite a story.
General Myers. I would be happy to, Mr. Chairman. It has to
do with the first reports from an Iraqi of where the two sons
might be, and the first report came into part of the 101st
Division. It was one of their military intelligence units. The
first report was to a sergeant.
This sergeant gets tens of these kinds of people walking in
every day with various reports; so he has to be on his toes,
because they can't chase them all down. So they have to sort
them out in a way, just like any kind of work like this.
Chairman Warner. Now, he is the point man to make the first
decisions as to where there is and is not credibility?
General Myers. He makes the first decision. You bet.
His instinct told him, this sounds plausible. So he started
the chain of events that led to the events that you know about.
I would tell you, and I don't know for certain, but I know
the next people in that chain of command were other
noncommissioned officers (NCOs), up to a captain. So probably
for the first hour or so decisions were being made by exactly
the kind of people General Pace was talking about, who serve us
so well.
Chairman Warner. Thank you for that.
I wanted to accommodate, again, Senator Inhofe, who has to
chair another committee hearing.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will not abuse
that generous offer. I will only say that I will be submitting
the questions for the record. A lot of us may be concerned
about the shortage that I have referred to in our tanker and
airlift capability. I will specifically be asking some things
about the advisability of retiring some 68 of our KC-135Es in
light of this shortage; and then wanting to get specifically a
question about Guard and Reserve versus the regular forces, and
the blend change that you folks and others have talked about.
So I'll just do that for the record and Mr. Chairman, you're
very nice to allow me to say this.
Chairman Warner. Then in the minute I have remaining, I
would like to ask for your views on the issue of bringing in
additional nations to participate with the coalition force
structure today in the security mission. What successes you
have had, and what is the likelihood of additional
participation?
My understanding is that there are 19 nations that have
contributed military forces, which are in one way or another
participating in the overall coalition responsibility to bring
about security in the confines of the entire Iraq border.
General Myers. I would be happy to do that, Mr. Chairman.
In the overall way of dealing with the security situation in
Iraq, internationalizing that capability is very important to
us.
We have one international division in there currently being
led by the U.K. They have several nations that support them,
and those are part of the 19 nations that have committed ground
troops to the security situation and to the coalition. There
are 15 other nations that will be committing troops, as well.
We have elements of the Second International Division in
Iraq as we speak trying to learn what their responsibilities
are going to be, and they are being helped by U.S. forces. They
are being helped to put their forces together by the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), because it is a NATO
nation, Poland, that will lead the next international division.
So that is a total of 34 countries that have pledged troops on
the ground, 19 there now, and 15 that will be there.
Ideally we would like more, and we are working with several
other countries to try to get them to come in and lead another
division. We would certainly like three international divisions
here in the near-term if we could get them. We will be working
with these other countries that could possibly provide forces.
So it is exactly the right thing to do, and I think we are
getting the support because people understand how important it
is to win the war on terrorism, to win the war, to finish the
stability operations and win the conflict in Iraq, and create a
prosperous and stable country there.
Chairman Warner. Let's define the role of NATO a bit--they
have not formally been involved, but they are working, as you
say, with the Polish forces. To what extent will you and
others, including the Secretary of Defense, be involved in
trying to solicit further participation by NATO?
The Secretary, when he appeared before this committee a
short time ago outlined that a number of the NATO nations,
notably Spain, have contributed forces. It is anticipated that
others may do so. But the formalized participation by NATO, can
that be more integrated into the overall command and control of
this situation, or is the current headquarters and command
structure sufficient? Doesn't it require either adjunct or
participation by NATO?
General Myers. Mr. Chairman, to answer that, let me remind
people what NATO is involved in today. They are currently
involved in Bosnia and Kosovo, both NATO operations. They are
also taking over the interim security assistance force in
Kabul, a force of over 5,000.
Chairman Warner. In Afghanistan.
General Myers. I'm sorry; Kabul, Afghanistan. They will be
responsible for that mission. It will be a NATO mission. They
are taking over from the Germans and the Dutch who are leading
that mission right now, which of course are both NATO nations.
I think the talk is beginning on what contributions NATO
can make to Iraq, besides the contributions they are making
today from the individual nations that you mentioned that are
making contributions, and the help that they have given the
Polish Division in the force generation and the planning. NATO
has capability there, and they have helped out Poland and other
countries that are joining Poland, in this regard.
I think we just need to keep the door open. Certainly,
nobody has closed the door on NATO participation in Iraq, and
we just have to keep working on that. But I would just remind
people, they are in three major operations right now--well, to
include Iraq, four major operations--and they are the lead in
three of them. But we would welcome, I think, NATO help.
Chairman Warner. My last question would relate to Liberia
and the decision process now underway by which the President is
trying to make an assessment as to the force level and
composition that could be put in by the United States to
stabilize a very tragic situation in terms of human suffering.
But, on the other hand, in my judgment it is a situation
that poses great personal risk to forces such as our forces
that could be injected into that very fast-moving and volatile
situation there in Monrovia and greater Liberia.
General Myers. If you will permit me, Mr. Chairman, let me
just describe the situation that we currently have in Liberia.
It hasn't changed dramatically in the last 24 hours.
We have a situation where you have a leader who has to go.
As we know, he is not a good leader, has not done good things
for Liberia or, for that matter, has not been helpful to the
countries in the region. So President Taylor must leave, and
that part is being worked out.
The other issue is the two major rebel groups, the
Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and
the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL). I think the
intelligence community would tell us that you are probably not
going to get political leadership out of these rebel groups,
that they are not a replacement for Taylor. So it is not clear
who is going to step forward in a political sense when the
situation settles down in Liberia, to take over the political
leadership.
In the meantime, you have a humanitarian situation where
food, clean water, and medical care is a problem. All the
nongovernmental organizations that were in there providing
those kinds of capabilities have left because of the security
situation. So it is a situation that is, as you have described
it, not a pretty situation. It is not going to give way to any
instant fix. Whatever the fix is going to be is going to have
to be long-term.
Currently, we have the West African nations surrounding
that area, to include Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal, and others, that
are looking to put a force in there to help stabilize the
situation in Liberia. They, of course, have asked for U.S.
support, and what the administration is doing right now is
trying to determine what the character of that support is going
to be.
As a military person I am concerned, like you, that
whatever we do, we have a very clear mission, that we
understand the mission we are asked to do, that we have an idea
of when the mission is going to be over, and that we have
sufficient force to deal with the security situation--that we
do not go in on a shoestring when we need an adequate force.
There are other things we can consider, but those are probably
the three main things.
We have looked at all sorts of options. There has been no
decision made on this. I think I will just leave it there.
Chairman Warner. I would also add, for myself, and I draw
that from statements made by our President in earlier days,
that there be a clear and identifiable strategic interest;
security interest, of this country. That to me remains somewhat
to be defined in this situation, should the decision be made to
go forward.
Can I just draw by way of conclusion from your remarks that
you concur, that this is not a risk-free operation, if we were
to undertake it?
General Myers. Mr. Chairman, I don't think any operation
like this is risk-free. We have at least three warring
factions, the LURD, the MODEL, the two rebel groups, and the
government forces themselves. They are all armed. They are not
disciplined troops as we know them. There are a lot of young
people fighting in these groups. It is potentially a dangerous
situation.
So when you go into it, you need to go into it knowing
that. It may be that we can go in in terms of support for these
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) forces.
ECOWAS countries have come forward and volunteered forces. Some
of the forces will need some equipping and some training before
they go in. So it is a longer-term issue, and it is a matter of
months, probably not weeks, for some of those forces. Some of
them probably can get in there fairly quickly, but small
numbers.
Then eventually I believe Kofi Annan up at the U.N. said
this will become a U.N. mission at some point. That all has to
be blended into this.
But I will go back to the larger issue. There is a
political situation there with the president of a country, a
``democracy,'' and how they deal with President Taylor, and
where he goes. This interim government is also important to our
security situation. That is a somewhat cloudy picture today.
Chairman Warner. General Pace, you had experience in your
previous command before becoming vice chairman, with Central
and South America, do you have any views to add to those of the
chairman?
General Pace. Sir, my experience in Somalia is a little
more akin to the potential experience in Liberia. I would echo
what General Myers just said, that it is potentially a very
dangerous situation. If we are asked to do something
militarily, we need to make sure we do it with the proper
numbers of troops and that we be prepared for the eventualities
of having to take military action.
Chairman Warner. Thank you.
Senator Levin.
Senator Levin. Just on that Liberian issue, would you
recommend going in unless Taylor is either gone or on his way
out as we arrive?
General Myers. So far, that has been one of the planning
assumptions that we made. That otherwise, you get into a
situation that General Pace knows only too well, and it would
define your mission, and the mission would be quite different
if Taylor were to remain there than if he were gone. So one of
our planning assumptions is that he will leave, either before
or simultaneously with the troops entering, whether they are
ECOWAS or U.S. troops, or U.S.-supported ECOWAS troops.
Senator Levin. General Myers and General Pace, the United
States has 148,000 troops deployed to Iraq. It appears now our
presence is going to be required for a long time. General
Franks, who was here a few weeks ago, said that he thought the
current troop levels would be required in Iraq for the
foreseeable future.
Do you agree with General Frank's assessment, General
Myers?
General Myers. General Abizaid, after his confirmation
hearing before this committee and after he wound up his work in
Tampa, is back in theater. The first thing he did was go to
Baghdad and meet with all his commanders, his ground division
commanders, and General Sanchez, the Commander of Joint Task
Force 7.
Of course, one of the questions he asked right away was,
``Do you have the resources to do the job that we are asking
you to do?'' His commanders agreed that they had the resources
to do the job.
I would say for the foreseeable future--it is hard to put a
date on it, but I think for the next several months--that I
would not anticipate a major shift in the number of forces over
there. As we continue to work this situation, and as I
indicated, aggressively going after the various elements that
are providing a security threat to Coalition Forces and to the
Iraqi people, we will have to recalibrate that.
So I would say that General Abizaid won't look beyond next
spring. That is about as far as he is looking in terms of force
levels.
Senator Levin. He will make no judgment either way beyond
that at this time?
General Myers. I don't think anybody is prepared to make a
judgment beyond next spring at this point.
Senator Levin. Either way?
General Myers. Either way. But the force rotation schedule
that was briefed by General Keane, the acting Chief of Staff of
the Army, goes a little bit beyond that. It goes through 2004.
Senator Levin. Does that force rotation schedule assume
that there will be a third division coming in from some other
country?
General Myers. It doesn't. No, sir, I don't think it
assumes that. It does not assume that. If that were to happen,
then obviously we would need less U.S. forces.
Senator Levin. You have had a conversation, I think, with
your counterparts in other countries relative to the prospects
for other countries participating in significant numbers; not
of countries, but of countries that have significant numbers of
troops.
General Myers. Yes, sir.
Senator Levin. Because it is not just the number of
countries, but whether they are countries that have large
numbers of troops that might make a commitment and so far, we
have not been able to obtain the commitment of the Indians,
Egyptians, French, Germans, or Pakistanis. There are a number
of other countries.
What, in your judgment--from your conversations with
military leaders in those countries--would it take for us to
obtain commitments from those countries that might be able to
provide significant numbers of troops?
General Myers. Let me first say that between the Office of
the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff, the unified
commanders out there, the Department of State, there is, if you
will, a full court press on some of the countries you just
mentioned for them to contribute troops.
But it comes down to probably at least three categories.
There is one category where what they want is the United
States to come forward and ask them in a way that is acceptable
to them. There is another case where they would like Islamic
nations in the region to ask them; whether it is the Iraqi
governing council that was just stood up or whether it is a
Gulf State or Jordan or somebody, to ask for help to bring in
another predominantly Muslim country. Then there is a third
case where they are looking for the United Nations to ask for
help.
So there are at least those three baskets where I think you
can put a lot of those countries in, and discussions are
ongoing with some of the countries you mentioned. As a matter
of fact, as you said, they have large standing forces and for
the most part, they would like to do it. One of the things that
we continually have to work with is what support do they need
from the United States in terms of getting there, in terms of
sustainment and so forth, and all those issues will have to be
worked. But you can bet that this issue is very high on the
priority list, to internationalize this effort as much as
possible.
General Pace. If I might answer, the other part of the
coalition is the Iraqis themselves, and, sir, about one-half of
these 60,000 police that we estimate we need have been
recruited. The Iraqi Army estimate of about 40,000 is beginning
training. Within the next 10 days, the first battalion begins
its training. The militia force that is going to assist with
static defense of pipelines and the like, is beginning to stand
up.
So the combination--not only of U.S. and other outside
Coalition Forces, but the Iraqi people themselves--will be very
useful and productive in the future.
Senator Levin. Thank you. General Myers, at the press
conference yesterday, Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz said that some
of our assumptions turned out to be wrong in Iraq. He went on
to describe a number of them, including the following: that
none of the Iraqi Army units, at least none of any significant
size, came over to our side so we could use them as Iraqi
forces with us today.
Another one that we assumed incorrectly was that the police
would turn out to be helpful to us, but they turned out in the
opposite direction, to require a massive overhaul. A third
assumption which turned out to be wrong, he pointed out, worst
of all was that the remnants of the Baathists who ran Iraq for
35 years would continue fighting, as they have.
Would you add any additional assumptions to that list which
turned out to be wrong?
General Myers. I think, Senator Levin, that is a fair list.
On the police issue, if I may just put a little more detail, I
was having dinner in Iraq back in May with some Army and
military police who had been working with Iraqi police, and I
said, how do they perform? They said, well, they are really
quite a different force. They aren't police in the sense that
we know police that are out among the populace that are on
presence patrols, as we call it. They stayed in their station
houses and went out to pick up people for interrogation and
bring them back.
I said, well--so it goes back to the opening statement,
where it requires a lot of training. As General Pace said, we
have about 31,000 police now back on the rolls of the total
number needed of 61,000. The 31,000, most of them have been
trained and most of them are out and about, but we are only
halfway there.
Clearly what we assumed about the police force was
incorrect, so we have had to make up for it. In the 100 days
that we have been working this, we have been fairly aggressive
about that part of the action.
I think one of our assumptions was that we would have the
presence of the terrorist organizations like Ansar al-Islam and
other foreign fighters come into Iraq. They don't want the
coalition to be successful; they don't want a democratic Iraq;
they don't want good things for the Iraqi people, so we knew
they were going to come in.
I don't know if we made an assumption on this, but it is
something we need to keep our eye on. About 3\1/2\ weeks ago,
we killed around 80 of these individuals who had come in from
Syria and were in an encampment. They were not Iraqis, they
were foreign fighters from other Arab states. We have to keep
our eye on that.
A big unknown out there--and I don't think it probably
falls in this assumption category, because I think we assumed
there would be issues here--but that is groups that are
supported by Iran that are anti-coalition and that want to have
undue influence on the Iraqi people. We have to watch that very
carefully.
Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, General
Myers.
General Pace. I would just simply add, there were certain
things, also, that we planned for that fortunately did not come
about. We had to plan for the possibility of an environmental
disaster in the northern and southern oil fields, and thanks to
the plan that was executed by General Franks and his forces,
that did not happen. Refugee flow to the tune of hundreds of
thousands, if not millions, did not happen because of the
precision of the attack. Starvation did not happen.
So there were certainly things both good and bad that might
have happened that did or did not happen, sir.
Chairman Warner. Senator McCain?
Senator McCain. I would like to thank both of you for your
service and your willingness to serve the country, and we are
very proud of the leadership and outstanding service you have
rendered to the country.
As you may know, there was a hearing yesterday at the House
Committee on Armed Services concerning the leasing proposal for
Boeing 767 aircraft. I have several questions concerning that.
General Myers, have you ever heard of an acquisition, a
major acquisition, of a weapons system or program that was made
without the conduct of analysis of alternatives? Isn't it
accepted procedure that an analysis of alternatives should be
conducted?
Perhaps, before you answer, I could quote from a letter
that you wrote to me saying, ``If the Department and Congress
decide to proceed with a lease agreement, the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) supports conducting an
analysis of alternatives to address the remaining
recapitalization requirement.''
General Myers. Correct, Senator.
I think, as I understand the situation, that the tanker
lease proposal--there was some direction or guidance from
Congress that they could conduct this differently, perhaps, and
were relieved from some of the restrictions of normal
acquisition programs in pursuing this approach. That is my
understanding.
Senator McCain. In an appropriations bill, certainly not
through this committee?
General Myers. Right.
Senator McCain. But you took the one line in an
appropriations bill as relief of a requirement--or somehow an
excuse--for not having an analysis of alternatives, which is a
fundamental, basic aspect of the determination of a--and this
is at least roughly a $30 billion proposal?
General Myers. I will stick with my letter, sir. I think we
are prepared to do that.
Senator McCain. Do you know if there has ever been a formal
study of the corrosion problems associated with the KC-135s?
General Myers. Sir, I don't know if there has been a formal
study.
Senator McCain. I don't think so. I think some Air Force
generals went down there and looked at planes with corrosion on
them, and said, ``Fire.'' I don't think that is appropriate
behavior, to be honest with you, because I can find you planes
all over the Air Force and the Navy, and the Marine Corps that
have corrosion problems, but before we reach those conclusions,
we do a study of the overall problem.
General Pace, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council
(JROC) plays a critical role in validating major defense
acquisition programs, correct?
General Pace. That is true, sir.
Senator McCain. Validating major defense acquisition
programs generally requires reviewing programs and analysis of
alternatives (AOA). That is the same question I asked General
Myers.
General Pace. Yes, sir.
Senator McCain. In fact, and in October of 2001--and I
understand that you don't remember every document and every
memoranda on which your name appeared. Please don't think that
I do.
But I would remind you that in October of 2001, as Chairman
of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, you directed that
the United States Air Force brief on an air refueling AOA. I
will be glad to supply you with that memorandum.
It says, ``In addition, the Joint Requirements Oversight
Council directs the program in return to brief the results of
the future air refueling aircraft analysis of alternatives upon
its completion.''
Do you know if you were ever provided with that?
General Pace. Sir, to the best of my knowledge the Air
Force came back at least once, if not twice more.
The problem as presented to the JROC, as I recall, was that
we have a 35- to 40-year-old tanker fleet that is key to our
strategic ability to deploy and employ our forces. The JROC
agreed that those tankers need to be replaced, and we did not
determine, nor was it our position to determine, whether they
should be leased or bought. We simply said we needed to get on
with the decision, and we recommended that a decision be made
to replace those aircraft without bias from the JROC as to
whether or not leasing or buying would be more appropriate.
Senator McCain. Well, let me ask you again, did you receive
an analysis of alternatives, as your memorandum requested?
General Pace. We received a briefing, at least one if not
two briefings, on buying versus leasing. The result was that
leasing got us more tankers faster. Buying got----
Senator McCain. How does it get you the tankers faster,
General Pace?
General Pace. If I remember the numbers, it is something
like 68----
Senator McCain. What is it that makes it faster if you
lease versus the normal process?
General Pace. I will have to go back and find the briefing,
sir. But I recall the briefing summary was that we could get
tankers faster by leasing, but it might be more expensive. What
the JROC said was----
Senator McCain. How do you get them faster? The production
line produces a certain number of airplanes per day, week, or
month.
What you are talking about here is that we should--that
because we are making this long-term commitment then we--
Congress doesn't approve the procurement every year. I guess
that is the only thing I can assume. So therefore, we should
lease aircraft carriers? I think the Chairman would be very
amenable to saying let's lease about 10 carriers over the next
20 or 30 years, because we could get online quicker that way.
I want to tell you that--and my time has expired--you
should pay attention to what the General Accounting Office
(GAO) had to say yesterday before the House Armed Services
Committee, and that is that GAO's cost estimate is $173.5
million per plane, which is about $35 million more than $138.4
million.
There is no one on this planet that believes that at the
end of a 6-year lease we are not going to buy the airplanes. No
one believes that. So this facade that we are only going to
have a lease for 6 years, and then we are going to pay them
again for the purchase of it--we are running a $455 billion
deficit here.
I don't think you have a stronger advocate for defense
spending than me, but it is very hard for me to go back--have
you seen the lease yet? Has anyone seen the lease yet?
So what you have done and what the Air Force has done is
come over here and ask for the approval--which two of the
bodies have, the House Appropriations Committee and the Senate
Appropriations Committee--without us ever having seen the
lease. Do you think maybe the taxpayers of America deserve to
see the lease?
General Pace. Sir, as best I can to try to answer the
question, leasing or buying is not within the purview of the
JROC. As I recall, the aircraft were available to be converted
to tankers on the lease program. To buy, you would have to
basically start from scratch and build the airframes.
The presentation we received in the JROC was that not based
on dollars and cents, but simply availability of airframes to
be converted, versus buying and constructing new airplanes,
that you could, in the short-term, get more airplanes more
quickly.
Again, we made no distinction between leasing and buying.
We went forward and said we need to replace the 35 to 40, and
regarding the dollars and cents you went to the civilian side
of the house, where they make the decision about whether to buy
or lease.
Senator McCain. I thank you, General, and perhaps I am
directing my remarks to the wrong person, because it is clear
it was a political decision. An entity set up like Enron, by
the way, is going to be involved in how they acquire this.
But I think that, as advisers to the President of the
United States, that you should be aware, that there has been no
study of the corrosion problems of the KC-135. In a dramatic
reversal of the previous Air Force stated position that the
135s would have to be replaced beginning in the year 2013. That
was a previous Air Force study.
The fact is that we still haven't seen the lease. The GAO,
which is a generally reliable source for information, says this
is going to cost a heck of a lot more than the Air Force
alleges, and I think that this is something that deserves the
utmost scrutiny on your part, because I don't believe,
unfortunately, that defense dollars are going to be as readily
available a few years from now as they are today. It is hard
for me to justify increased defense spending when we have a
sweetheart deal like this in order to bail out Boeing Aircraft.
I thank you.
Chairman Warner. The record should reflect, and you are
aware of this, Senator, that the Department of the Air Force
sent over the standard notification of a new start
reprogramming to this committee, as it did to other defense
committees of Congress. This committee has not acted. This
committee will not act until we have had a hearing, and in
consultation with the members, Senator Levin and I propose to
set that hearing early in September.
Senator McCain. I thank both the chairman and the ranking
member for their cooperation on this issue. I am deeply
grateful.
Chairman Warner. Senator Ben Nelson.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Myers
and General Pace, I, too, appreciate so much your service in
your present capacity for the last 2 years and look forward to
that continuing in the future.
I was looking at the rotation plan that was put together
for the Army with the global war on terrorism, and looking at
Operation Iraqi Freedom and looking at Enduring Freedom in
Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Sinai. I noticed that in the rotation
plan it is a little bit sparse as it relates to Reserve or
Guard units.
I wonder if, briefly, you could tell me--with respect to
all the Services--whether there is a plan to put in place an
additional rotation schedule that would involve the Guard and
Reserve units? Because they are obviously as disrupted as the
regular forces, but in some respects their situation would be
unique, since they have, typically, jobs back home and they are
on extended deployment.
So is there any movement afoot to come up with a plan for
Guard and Reserve units?
General Myers. I think, Senator Nelson, the short answer
is, absolutely. As you noticed in the rotation plan of, if you
will, the combat forces, there are two enhanced separate
brigades that belong to the Army National Guard that are part
of that plan and they will be notified, I believe, in October,
and they will have 120 days to train for their mission. They
will spend about 6 months in theater, more or less, then come
back. We anticipate they will be mobilized for a total of a
year.
The two enhanced separate brigades we are talking about
have not been mobilized in the last 5 years, and that's why
they were picked, because of the kind of capability they have,
and also the fact that they haven't been mobilized.
There are other forces that support these combat forces
that are being worked on right now. Some of those are obviously
going to come from the Reserve because in some cases the combat
support and combat service support are only in the Reserve
component. So there will be more Reserve Forces that will
follow the combat forces.
One of the policy guidance issues that the Secretary gave
us is, don't just look at Army combat support, and combat
service support. If other Services have those kinds of units,
then reach and get them, whether it is active duty or Reserve.
A good case in point would be engineers. All the services
have very good combat and regular engineers, and there is no
reason we need to ask units that have just gotten back, or
Reserve units, if we have active duty units that can fulfill
these missions from the Air Force, the Marine Corps or the
Navy. So we are looking at that as well.
But back to the basic question. Yes, we have to identify
them. I think it's the most important thing we can do, more
important than almost anything else we can do--it is a busy
force. They know why we are busy, but we have to provide them
predictability.
It is important for everybody. It's important for Active-
Duty Forces and their families and so forth, as we have seen
from all the issues surrounding the Third Infantry Division.
But it is perhaps even more important for our Reserve
component, because they not only have their families to worry
about, they have their employers to worry about. It is
important to those employers.
I think employer support has been terrific. We want to keep
it that way. Predictability is one of the ways to do that. So
as we develop this plan and continue to determine the combat
support, and combat service support that is going to support
these units, that is going to be a major part of it and that is
going on right now.
Senator Ben Nelson. Well, I appreciate that.
If there is any discussion about low morale among the
troops, it's not about 120-degree weather, it's not about food,
it's not about the living conditions, it's not about combat
conditions, it's not about safety issues. It's about ``knowing
the date that my deployment might terminate,'' recognizing that
it might be extended.
But an endless deployment, an endless commitment, just
simply is causing a lot of concern. We are now starting to get
letters from family members, asking if we are going to be a
family-friendly unit. I do appreciate both of you and your
comments about your families, about the family support, and I
know you understand that. I may be preaching to the choir. But
we all recognize that if the families back home start to get
concerned about it, it will have a multiplying effect with our
troops.
Anyway, I appreciate that fact. I was going to ask another
question as it relates to adding additional countries to
internationalize the support in Iraq.
I notice you made reference to NATO and Senator Levin
picked up, I think also, on the NATO aspect of what we are
doing. Is there any chance of getting NATO to formally agree to
providing troops and providing support without France or
Germany?
General Myers. Senator Nelson, I don't think I can answer
that accurately, because to my knowledge, we haven't asked that
question, yet.
Senator Ben Nelson. Which brings me to another point. Is
there a chance that we might ask that question?
General Myers. Yes, sir. I indicated that I think there is
ongoing dialogue with NATO. They have, obviously, shouldered
heavy burdens in other parts of Europe and the Balkans, as well
as Afghanistan. There have been some preliminary discussions,
but not at NATO at large.
I don't think in particular that our perception of how
certain countries might react to it would ever stop us from
asking that question and working with NATO, if that is the
right thing to do. We are just not quite to that point yet. But
there is nothing holding us back. There is no prohibition,
there is nothing that is stopping us.
Senator Ben Nelson. I understand that timing is everything
in negotiations and in discussions, but do you think there will
be a terminal point where we might be able to pull the trigger
on the question?
General Myers. I'm sorry?
Senator Ben Nelson. Do you think there will be a terminal
point where we can pull the trigger on the question as to
whether or not they will be supportive of our efforts? Don't
tell me when, but do you think we will be able to ultimately
ask them the question, ``Will you join with us,'' and get an
answer?
General Myers. Probably, would be my answer. I just don't
want to get ahead of the Secretary of Defense and others that
would be considering this, because obviously there would be a
political dimension, not just a military dimension, to doing
that.
But as I said, I have heard nothing about anybody saying
this is not potentially the right thing to do; that is, to go
down this street.
There are, as was mentioned, NATO nations supporting our
efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. There are large deployments.
There are finite capabilities, certainly, in NATO. So we'd have
to be cognizant and aware of that. But I don't know that there
is any other--there is nothing out there that says that we
shouldn't do that. There's nobody saying that we shouldn't do
that.
Senator Ben Nelson. The internationalization of the troops
today amounts to about, what, 10 percent of our troops that are
there?
General Myers. We have 148,000 U.S. forces in there right
now, and Coalition Forces are in the neighborhood of 13,000.
Senator Ben Nelson. I appreciate that.
General Myers. That 13,000 should grow to over 20,000,
somewhere between 20,000 and 30,000 here, in the next couple of
months. It needs to be higher now.
Senator Ben Nelson. That is the point I am making as well.
I appreciate it.
General Myers. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Allard.
Senator Allard. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Like other members
on this committee, I would like to welcome both Chairman Myers
and General Pace. I think you are both doing a fine job.
I am thoroughly impressed with the job that our men and
women in the field have done during our conflicts, and part of
that has been because we have relied on many of our space
assets. That has led to a good deal of our success.
General Myers, prior to September 11, I think it was
generally agreed that the status of the space programs, that
they were a high priority on the list. Since then, we have seen
additional commitments as far as funding everything for our on-
the-ground conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq.
My question to you is, do you see future problems with the
funding and prioritization of our space systems, both white and
black programs?
General Myers. Senator Allard, first of all, let me say we
appreciate your support to the space side of the house. It has
been tremendous, and your interest in that is appreciated.
On the budget you have already looked at in committee for
2004--there were substantial assets that weren't there in
previous budgets that support space assets. Many of the
recommendations of the Rumsfeld Commission on how we organize
for space have been adopted and are in effect right now.
So I think in terms of properly resourcing space, having
the correct organizations to bring space to the warfighter, we
have far advanced the ball since I served my tour at U.S. Space
Command.
The last conflict, the conflict in Iraq, we reached new
heights in the use of space to help enable that warfight. We
have crossed many hurdles in the policy and perhaps legal areas
that we were unable to cross in previous conflicts. I can't go
into more of that because some of it is highly classified. But
we have made great progress in bringing what space can bring to
the fight, so the warfighter is confident that he has this
capability.
I also think in terms of funding that space is seen in many
cases as really being one of the enablers for transformation,
and that the funding is fairly robust. If I were back at U.S.
Space, if there were a U.S. Space Command now, it's in the new
Strategic Command, but I think if you talked to Admiral Ellis,
he would tell you that we are on a pretty good track for
bringing more space to bear on the fight.
General Pace. If I might add to that, Senator. I went to a
meeting, I think it was about a week ago last Thursday. It was
chaired by Mr. Teets, the Under Secretary of the Air Force, in
his National Reconnaissance Office role.
He had in that meeting about 14 to 16 folks from various
agencies in the government pulling together all the programs,
looking at them in ways that they can play off each other so
that the resources that are available to be spent on space
activities are spent in a way that are complementary. I am very
encouraged by what I saw and heard at that meeting, sir.
Senator Allard. I thank you both for your responses.
General Pace, when you came up for initial confirmation,
you expressed support for the Joint Requirements Oversight
Council and its role in developing the requirements process for
the weapons system used by the combatant commanders.
Would you now recommend any changes in the JROC process,
having been in your role for 2 years?
General Pace. Senator, there have been tremendous changes
in the last 2 years, not because I have been chairing it, but
because the process has had the value of the previous year's
experience, growth, and maturing and we have now been able to
improve what I inherited, which was a process that was very
good at grading the Services' homework.
In other words, if a service came up with an idea, they
would bring it to the JROC, prove to us it was a joint
capability, and we would then bless it as a system that was
worthy of being procured, and that it would fit into the joint
fight.
Now, with General Myers' direction and leadership, we have
gotten around in front of that and have begun a top-down driven
process that says, first of all, here are the capabilities that
our country is going to need 15, 20 years from now. Then, these
are the operational concepts that feed those capabilities. Then
we consider the cross-threading of what each of the Services
are doing, for example, in command and control, so that as we
look at major combat operations, as we look at stability
operations, as we look at strategic deterrents, as we look at
homeland security--each of those is a stovepipe-like concept,
and then cross-cutting each of those are things like command
and control.
So we are looking at putting out in front of the Services
the concepts and capabilities that the Nation will need, and
they, then, are coming to us to show us how they will fill the
gaps in capabilities that we are able to define for them,
rather than coming up and just having a series of good ideas.
So it is top-driven as opposed to bottom-up, sir.
Senator Allard. Now, I have a question I would like to have
one of you answer, if you would. It pertains to the personnel
management proposed by Secretary Rumsfeld.
Do you fully support those recommendations, what he is
pushing, and would you share with us the reasons why you think
the changes need to be implemented?
General Myers. I do. I think I can speak for all the Joint
Chiefs of Staff that we have come over and testified on those
changes. I think you are primarily referring to the civilian
personnel management changes that are being requested.
Senator Allard. That is correct.
General Myers. The reason I do, and the reason that the
Joint Chiefs do and that the military does, is because we just
have to increase the flexibility that we have in managing our
workforce. We have tremendous flexibility in managing the
uniformed members, and a lot less flexibility in how we manage
the civilian workforce.
It is important for the security environment that we be
able to do some things that we need to do, and to be able to do
them quickly. I think it plays into the end strength equation.
There are some number of jobs being performed by people in
uniform that could be performed by Department of Defense
civilians that currently can't be because it is just too
cumbersome to try to change. With some of them, it is just too
hard to do, so we usually default to the easiest thing and put
somebody in uniform in the job or hire a contractor on the job,
denying somebody a civil service position.
But the underlying rationale is that in the 21st century,
we need new ways to manage our people that are fair, that are
consistent, that reward people adequately, that are different
from the ways we have done it in the last century. That comes
down to flexibility, primarily, and that's why I support it.
General Pace. I also support it, Senator, for the exact
reasons that General Myers just mentioned, especially from the
standpoint of providing more opportunities to the civilian
workforce. I believe that given the flexibility in those
proposals, that instead of someone in uniform or instead of a
contractor performing the mission, we will be able to hire a
civil servant to do it, because they are capable of doing it.
But the procedures right now just make it too difficult to go
in that direction. We need to get the job done, so we get it
done. We get it done by putting a person in uniform or getting
a contractor to do it, because there is a certain amount of
time within which we must start.
Senator Allard. Thank you both for your responses.
General Myers. Can I tack on one thing Senator Allard, as
we were talking about DOD civilian personnel, that is often
overlooked in our equation because we are in uniform and we
talk about our men and women in uniform? I think it is also
important also to talk about the men and women that serve the
Department of Defense that don't wear a uniform but wear
civilian clothes. They are in Iraq with us. They often face the
same hazards that our men and women in uniform do. They do a
terrific job.
I think both General Pace and I and all the Joint Chiefs
appreciate it probably more than we say; because it is easy to
talk about sailors, soldiers, airmen, marines, Coast Guardsmen,
but we also always ought to add DOD civilians, because very
often, they are right in the fight with us and are doing a
terrific job.
Senator Allard. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator. Senator
Pryor?
Senator Pryor. Mr. Chairman, I thought that Senator Reed
was here first.
Senator Reed. No.
Senator Pryor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to first thank you all for your service today. It
has been outstanding and I congratulate you on your
renominations here and I tend to support those heartily.
General Myers, I would like to ask you a few questions, if
I could, about weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. I think
that--I hope you take these questions in the spirit in which
they are asked, and that is a genuine desire to clear up what
has happened in Iraq since we have been over there.
About 4 months ago, you gave a statement to CNN where you
said, ``We know that the Iraqis have weaponized chemical and
biological weapons. They have surface-to-surface missiles that
can deliver them. They have aircraft that can deliver them.
They have unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) that can deliver them
and they have artillery that can deliver them, as well.''
I was going to ask you specifically about those four
delivery mechanisms, about what we have found in Iraq since we
have been over there; specifically, have we found surface-to-
surface missiles, the aircraft, the UAVs, and the artillery
that could have delivered weapons of mass destruction?
General Myers. We have found surface-to-surface missiles. I
don't know that we have found any that had chemical or
biological warheads mated to them, but we have found the
delivery vehicles.
The documentation for the aircraft--I do not know if we
have found the spray tanks that had been tested, but we have
pictures of that testing, so that is, I don't think, in
dispute. On the UAVs, I think we are going to get into
classified areas here. I will be happy to provide for the
record, what we have discovered.
There are artillery--we know they have that capability.
Just the other day, we found some artillery shells that are for
that purpose. They have a different casing for that purpose.
Whether or not there were chemicals or biological agents in
there, we don't know. We'd have to test that.
But we know--I am very confident that they had the
capability in all those delivery means to employ chemical and
biological weapons if they'd made that decision to do so.
Senator Pryor. I do not want to get into classified
material in this setting so I am sensitive to that concern.
General Myers. If you have a question for the record in
that regard, I would be happy to answer that in terms of UAVs.
Senator Pryor. Okay, thank you.
[The information referred to follows:]

[Deleted].

Also, about 2 months ago on the Today Show you said ``Given
time, given the number of prisoners that we are now
interrogating, I am confident that we are going to find weapons
of mass destruction.''
Do you still have that same degree of confidence today?
General Myers. I do, and the reason I do was the event
yesterday when we came up with Qusay and Uday. The way we found
them was an Iraqi citizen coming forward and saying, I know
where they are. There may have been even a second source that
said, I know where they are.
I think, as has been stated many times, in a large country
like Iraq that has practiced denial and deception on this
program for a long time, it is well-documented that it is a
matter of time before we find the evidence of a program, and
most probably, some of the material itself. It is going to take
time.
We have what we call the Iraqi Survey Group that is
dedicated primarily to this mission. It is over a thousand
people under the leadership of Major General Keith Dayton, who
is one of the deputies over at the Defense Intelligence Agency.
He, along with Dr. David Kay, are leading this effort, and I am
confident that the program and some material will eventually be
found, but I think it is going to take time.
Senator Pryor. You mentioned evidence of the program and
evidence of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). I recall a
number of press reports during our time there in Iraq about the
looting of suspected sites of WMD. What impact, in your
estimation, did looting have on our ability to locate evidence
of the weapons themselves or the evidence of the weapons
program?
General Myers. An excellent question, and I don't think I
can give you a precise answer, as we sit here. Most of the
looters were after things that had some sort of tangible value.
They were not after the weapons of mass destruction. They would
have stayed away, but they were after something they could turn
into cash or some other use to them or their family.
I would have to go back and ask General Dayton now that
they've been working this really hard to see if they think that
valuable evidence was lost. We do know that in the war and in
the immediate aftermath, that some documentation was lost and
some evidence was probably lost.
We also know that there is a lot of evidence yet to go
through, that we have stacks and stacks of evidence. We have a
lot of people that we have to interrogate and go through that
as well. So what percentage was lost and how big an impact, I
can't give you a good balance.
Senator Pryor. One concern I have----
Chairman Warner. Could I interrupt just a minute, Senator
Pryor? That is such an important question that Senator Levin
and I are working on, and we will confirm a day, but we will
have a briefing to this committee next week by Dr. Kay, who is
the civilian head, a former weapons inspector, who is part of
the Rumsfeld team now put in Baghdad under Bremer, and he will
be joined by General Dayton, who is the military commander of
those forces. Significant forces have been assigned to perform
the missions to try and get more information regarding the WMD
program.
Now, you go ahead and take a little more time. I
interrupted you.
Senator Pryor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
One concern I have about the looting and the looters
looking for things of value is that something of value could
have been the weapons themselves, and they could end up on the
black market. They could end up in terrorist hands. Do you
share that concern?
General Myers. I think that is always a concern when you
have weapons of mass destruction, that they fall in the wrong
hands. After all, that was one of the major reasons for going
into Iraq in the first place, to ensure that terrorists didn't
get their hands on biological or chemical weapons that we were
certain the Iraqis had. So, clearly, if they can get them
through other means, that is an issue.
I will tell you, given the forces we have in the country,
given the attention we have on this issue, we are attuned to
that eventuality.
Senator Pryor. The last thing I have is not really a
question but just something I would like to leave you with,
because I think this would be more appropriate in a classified
setting. That is it is probably a little too early today to do
a ``lessons learned'' on your search for weapons of mass
destruction, but certainly I would hope at some point you and I
could visit, possibly with the entire committee, about lessons
learned and maybe knowing what we know today, if we could do it
all over again, what would we change, if anything, and how we
might get to a more sure result in our search for weapons of
mass destruction?
General Myers. I think that is very appropriate. We have
been very aggressive on capturing the lessons learned of the
major combat operations. There is work starting now on the
period after major combat operations ended, on the lessons
learned there, as well.
I think that is one of the things that we will do well. We
will criticize ourselves where it is appropriate, and we won't
waste any time patting ourselves on the back if we did it
right, and we will continue that process.
Senator Pryor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me,
too, congratulate you, General Myers and General Pace, for your
service to the Nation and for something else. I think your
service is motivated by a deep appreciation of the sacrifice
and service of so many young Americans who wear the uniform of
the United States and that's what makes the contribution of the
uniformed officers to our defense something special, and I
thank you for that.
Let me clarify, General Myers, a response that you gave to
Senator Levin. You indicated that--at least I thought that I
heard you say that there was no coalition division involved in
the Army rotation plan. I have information that suggests the
101st Air Assault is scheduled to be replaced next February by
a coalition division yet to be named; is that correct?
General Myers. Yes. I can't remember my response to Senator
Levin, but----
Senator Reed. I just wanted to clarify.
General Pace. I think the difference at the time, if I may,
sir, you are talking about the difference between two divisions
and three divisions and the question is whether or not for the
foreseeable future--which is the next couple of months--whether
or not the three divisions were in there, and I think General
Myers said----
Senator Reed. We both, for the record, recognize that one
yet-to-be-designated, named, and contributed multinational
division is on paper scheduled to replace the 101st next
spring----
General Myers. That's correct.
Senator Reed. This leads to the second question: This a
division-sized unit, so we are not talking about one truck
company from Hungary and a signal battalion from someplace
else. Who are the likely donors for a division-sized unit that
you would, at this point, solicit?
General Myers. We are in discussions with the country of
Turkey. They have a large, very competent army, and we will
continue those discussions. They would certainly be able to
provide, if they wanted to, a division headquarters and
hopefully a couple of brigades.
Pakistan is another country that has a competent army, and
we are in discussions with them, and I think you know the
situation in India. They certainly could provide a division.
They are, again, a competent force and I think that the press
pretty well spelled it out, that they are waiting for an
invitation, perhaps, that would be backed by the United
Nations.
Senator Reed. If we do not successfully recruit a
multinational division, then we are going to have additional
stresses, particularly on the Army. That seems to be obvious,
is that correct?
General Myers. Well, there are some things that are not on
that chart, and one of the things that is not on that chart is
the potential use of a Marine division, and that is in the
thought process and in the planning.
Senator Reed. So now we put the stress on the Marine Corps?
General Myers. Well, another way to put it is that we are
trying to spread the predictability of the stress as much as we
can; not just U.S. forces, but international forces and not,
when you talk about the U.S. forces, not just the United States
Army, but the United States Marine Corps and not just, as I had
mentioned before, in combat support, combat service support.
Not just the Army or Marine Corps support assets, but other
services that can provide those.
Senator Reed. Let me ask you a related question. You may
not have this information, and that is entirely appropriate.
Just get it to the committee.
How much are we contributing to these or proposing to
contribute to these multinational divisions in terms of donated
equipment, logistical support, per diem, or just out-and-out
payments?
General Myers. It depends on the country involved. For some
of the countries that don't have the wherewithal--in the Polish
division, we have said we will provide the lift to get them
there, whether it is our aircraft or whether it's contract
lift, to be determined by the situation; and that we will help
with sustainment while they are in there, because many of those
forces don't have sustainment capabilities.
Again, that does not necessarily mean that we should think
immediately of U.S. forces providing that sustainment. It could
be done by a contractor. So we have committed to the Polish
division, to some of those countries that don't have those
capabilities, we have provided sustainment and we provide lift.
Senator Reed. Could you provide the cost, at least for the
Polish division? I presume we are paying for this and that it
is coming out of American resources, our budget? Your budget, I
should say.
General Myers. Let me provide that for the record. But I
think that we will find that cost comes--there are appropriated
dollars in that cost. We are continually seeking contributions
from international donors, but no money will come from seized
or vested Iraqi assets.
[The information referred to follows:]

The Defense Department currently estimates that it will cost the
United States $29 million to lift, sustain, and equip the Polish-led
Multinational Division that will deploy to Iraq for Phase IV stability
operations. The Defense Department will cover $243 million in costs;
the State Department will cover $47 million. The troop-contributing
nations will all pay their own salaries and other special pays. Future
lift and sustainment costs for other coalition or multinational
divisions will depend upon specific needs and requirements of those
contributing coalition countries.

Senator Reed. Just a final question on this line. I notice
in the rotation plan that the 3rd Infantry Division is being
replaced by elements of the 82nd, both superb divisions, well
led by General Blount and General Swannack. But there is a
difference between a mechanized infantry division in this type
of operation and an airborne light infantry division. The big
difference is vehicles.
How are you going to make up the mobility differences in
that situation and other situations?
General Myers. The forces that are going in are being
tailored for the mission, and in fact what General Abizaid
wants is to go from a heavy force to, if you will, to more
infantry or foot soldiers. Obviously, they need mobility, and
they will make accommodation for that.
By the same token, as you look at the rotation you will see
the 1st Cav Division on there, which is a heavy division. They
will probably not go in heavy with their tanks and so forth.
They will probably go in a mechanized way, not with a lot of M-
1 tanks. So they will be augmented by armored high mobility
multi-wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs), and perhaps some other
vehicles.
In addition, to give them more infantry with the 1st Cav,
the enhanced separate brigades quite likely will be asked to
put battalions with the various brigades of the 1st Cav so they
have more infantry with them as they go in, to include a civil
affairs battalion, as well.
So what General Abizaid is trying to do, and what the Army
is helping him do, is to tailor these forces exactly for the
task that they have today and the task generally does not call
for a very heavy force. But you're quite right, they need the
mobility and they will have that.
Senator Reed. Is there another round, Mr. Chairman?
Chairman Warner. Yes, we will have another round. Would you
like to take an additional question, Senator?
Senator Reed. If I could ask one question.
A few days ago, General Myers, General Pace, a manned
portable air defense rocket was fired at a C130, which would be
a significant, if it continues, escalation in the threat
profile. It begs several questions. One is, is there an
estimate--and you might not be able to give it in open
session--of the number of these systems that are in the
country?
The second question is, is there an estimate of any number
of systems that might have been taken out of the country,
either smuggled out for sale or simply smuggled out for other
purposes?
General Myers. Sir, we are going to have to ask the
intelligence community to provide those estimates. Clearly it
was a weapons system they had. I think there have been two
confirmed firings at C130s since major combat operations ended
and we started operating in Baghdad.
There are several efforts underway to deal with that
threat. One is to offer to buy these weapons to get them off
the market, as we have done in other cases. Another is to
search for them, an active search, around the airports and so
forth, and those operations are ongoing.
As you said, it is potentially a very dangerous threat, and
we have to deal with it. We can get you the number, the
estimates, from the intel community.
Senator Reed. Thank you, General Myers, General Pace.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator. We will now begin a
second round.
General, the subject of the Korean Peninsula is of grave
concern to me, and I think our President is moving with a
policy that is the policy most likely to succeed in bringing
about North Korea recognizing that the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction is not in the interest of that country or
any other country in that region or any other country in the
world, and that to achieve that goal, the multilateral approach
is the best.
We have had a lot of expressions of concern by individuals
recently, most notably, former Secretary of Defense Perry, a
man with whom I was privileged to work very closely in my
service on this committee, an individual that I was privileged
to travel with officially on a number of occasions.
Subsequent to his retirement from the Department, he
continued to pursue efforts to reconcile the differences and to
achieve a status quo with North Korea that would enable the
fulfillment of the goals that the world holds with regard to
nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
That framework that he and President Clinton and others put
in place was put in shambles by actions taken by North Korea.
Now this President again is trying to reconstruct a policy.
But given the proximity of South Korea, which has to be a
partner, and Japan, which would suffer enormous consequences,
economically, if somehow a rapid departure of people from North
Korea and would suddenly descend on Japan. China, I think, has
taken a constructive and active role recently, and we see there
is glimmer of hope that at least a tripartite meeting can take
place with China, North Korea, and the United States, perhaps
as a preliminary to a full multinational meeting.
But putting aside the diplomacy, I have always subscribed
to the belief that our diplomacy can be no stronger than the
military options to enforce diplomatic decisions, if that
becomes necessary. Hopefully, we will not ever see an outbreak
of hostilities on the Korean Peninsula again.
Those hostilities are fresh in this Senator's mind for
personal reasons of many years ago. You and I have discussed
this privately, the consequences of an exchange of conventional
weaponry on the South Korean peninsula has horrific dimensions,
not only to our own forces but to the civilian populations of
South Korea, as well as North Korea, and the military forces
that face each other.
Nevertheless, we have to, as best we can, keep the American
public and others informed as to what the options are that the
Department of Defense is looking at, in consultation with the
Department of State, to back up the goals that we have. That
goal is simply to provide peace and security for both North
Korea and South Korea on that peninsula, and hopefully the
optimism that at some point in the future they might reconcile
their differences so the two nations can become more closely
aligned with each other, whether it is through trade or
immigration, or the like.
So just take your time, and give us your views on this.
General Myers. Well, Chairman Warner, as usual, there is a
lot of meat in almost every sentence that you spoke there, so
let me just start down it as I was trying to take some notes,
here.
You are quite right, if there were to be conflict on the
peninsula, there would be a lot of casualties. It is because of
the North Korean army, over a million-person army, 70 percent
of which is south of Pyongyang, and its artillery which can
range Seoul from just above the demilitarized zone (DMZ) on the
high ground. So there would be great tragedy, because there
would most likely be a lot of casualties. Having said that----
Chairman Warner. Let me just interrupt, because we as a
Nation have seen the casualty rates. We lament every day the
loss of a soldier, two soldiers, and the wounding of five or
six in Iraq. The same is true with Afghanistan. I remember
during that situation, again, we lost many brave individuals.
But my mind is quite fresh with the statistics of World War
II, when in the fall of 1944, to give the last three major
engagements, the United States alone--I'm not talking about
their allies, Britain and France--41,000 casualties killed,
wounded and missing in the Battle of the Bulge, which was the
last major engagement, major in terms of divisional structures
in World War II. That was followed by Iwo Jima, where the
Marine Corps, together with the Army, but primarily the Marine
Corps, lost over 21,000 killed, wounded, and missing. Then we
had Okinawa, with casualties somewhat greater in totality than
Iwo Jima.
Now, that was a half-century ago. But in my judgment, the
magnitude of those casualty figures of World War II could be
replicated in the Korean Peninsula if we saw a full engagement
of conventional forces between the North and the South, and our
allied position with the South Korean forces. Would I be
correct in that?
General Myers. Chairman Warner, it is always difficult to
estimate casualties. But given that North Korea has long-range
artillery well dug into the hills that can range the major city
of South Korea, Seoul, I think you would have to assume that
there would be a lot of carnage. I don't think we can predict
exact numbers. We were never very good at that. But there would
be----
Chairman Warner. Certainly it would be far in excess of
what we have been experiencing here in Iraq and in Afghanistan
and in situations like that.
General Myers. It would be a different circumstance. But--
and that is where I left off, as I was starting my statement.
The next part though is equally important--that there would
never be a doubt about the outcome of this conflict. The reason
is because our U.S. forces on the peninsula and the South
Korean forces are extremely well-trained and led. We know they
often have to deal with a quality of life because of their
facilities and so forth being less than desirable, but as we
speak, their motto is, ``We have to be ready to fight
tonight,'' because of just what you said, about the kind of
forces they are arrayed against.
They are ready, and while we talk about Afghanistan and
Iraq and we talk about other places U.S. forces are, we can't
forget that we have 37,000 U.S. forces on the peninsula that
bring security to the peninsula. Given that, the outcome would
never be in doubt, that if North Korea were to start a conflict
like that, that it would end with the end of that regime, that
would not be a question, militarily anyway. That is probably
the best deterrence we can have against an eventuality like
that.
You mentioned counterproliferation and proliferation of
fissile material that we now know--North Korea has admitted to
reprocessing fuel rods that came out of their nuclear reactors.
They have enough fissile material for 6 to 12 weapons, perhaps.
They have claimed they have already processed all those fuel
rods, publicly.
I think this is a very serious problem. Here is a country,
North Korea, that is the biggest proliferator of missile
technology of any country in the world. They are on the list of
states that support terrorism. Now you add fissile material
with countries out there that we know want fissile material and
have cash--it is a very dangerous combination. So that
convergence is not good.
Clearly, we can't go into this in this open hearing, about
all the military plans and preparations that surround our
ability to defend the peninsula and other plans that we might
have. But I think it must be said that we are working this
issue very hard.
Having said that, diplomacy is the way ahead. Now, I'm
getting a little bit outside my lane, but as you said, it looks
as if we will have another round of multilateral talks. I think
this time they will be multilateral, as opposed to just
trilateral. I think that has yet to be determined. But the
Chinese government is being helpful here, and certainly we
consult with the South Korean government and Japan, as well.
So that is clearly the preferred course here; that somehow
diplomatically we can work our way through this issue, which I,
like you, view as very serious. The notion or the thought that
fissile material could be proliferated to other countries could
change our security environment, again in a not-so-nice way.
You mentioned the number of casualties in the Battle of the
Bulge, and Iwo Jima. I think, as we talk about this war on
terrorism, we haven't had casualties to that number.
But it is interesting to think about how quickly we had
3,000 casualties one September morning. Those 41,000 and those
22,000 were over a little bit longer period of time; but in a
matter of about an hour, we had 3,000 Americans and other
citizens dead. So it is a different kind of threat that we are
dealing with in the war on terrorism.
Chairman Warner. I am glad you brought that up. Very
definitely, we have that September tragedy in mind. It has been
a guidepost for our President, who has courageously addressed
this worldwide war on terrorism. Every time we must reflect on
that loss here in our Nation, right here in the homeland of the
United States.
General Myers. Absolutely. General Pace may have something
to say on Korea or the situation.
General Pace. Well, I think General Myers laid it out very
well. There is great opportunity for the diplomatic equation
here. The United States, South Korea, Japan, China, Russia--to
name five very important countries--have an enormous
opportunity to work together to convince North Korea that there
is a better way to live and to become part of the international
community, but I also echo what General Myers has said. If it
ever were to come down to a military requirement, there is no
doubt in my mind that we are more than ready to execute the
current plans and to prevail on any battlefield.
Chairman Warner. I simply brought up the historical
casualty figures because I think the preparation of the
American public on all aspects, all dimensions of the
contingency is incumbent upon the administration, and indeed
Congress, as we approach these decisions working together.
Senator Levin very graciously said that you may take this
time, Senator Sessions, so we will go right to you.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just wanted to
take this moment, at the time of your reappointment, to express
my tremendous admiration for the work that you have done, for
the leadership you have provided, and for the success with
which you have led our brave men and women in battle, the
efforts that have been undertaken to make this a more secure
country. Yes, we are not perfectly secure, but there is no
doubt in my mind that under your tenure as leaders of the Joint
Chiefs we are much better and much safer today than we were
before. I much prefer that the terrorists be worried that we
are coming after them than us be sitting here waiting on them
to come after us.
You have helped transform our military. I will just submit
some written questions on that subject. But I just want to say
this is a big deal. We have in fact gone from a Defense
Department that was divided to a Defense Department that is
one. The different branches work together in a coordinated way.
While I have no doubt we can do better, we are coordinating
and working together in unprecedented ways, and it is allowing
our men and women to have tremendous success on the
battlefield, and placing great stress on enemy soldiers,
avoiding enemy civilians or civilians in the country there, and
minimizing the threat to themselves. It has just been a
tremendous thing.
Yes, we have critics. You will be proposing more changes.
There will be challenges and questions by this Congress. But I
think you are doing the right thing. All in all, day after day,
we are making tremendous progress. No military in the history
of the world has done as well, in my view. Change is hard for
everybody, but I salute you for it.
I just wanted to take that moment, and you can be certain
that this Senator supports your reconfirmation, and is so
delighted and honored that you have agreed to serve again. I
think it will allow us to complete the Iraqi operation, and
continue to help us transform so that we will be able to meet
the new challenges that face our country.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for letting me be with you here,
and thank you for your leadership. We have some tough times
going on right now in the appropriations authorization process
for the Armed Services Committee, and your leadership is just
remarkable. We appreciate it, we appreciate what you do.
General Myers. Thank you, Senator.
General Pace. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Warner. I want to say that Senator Levin is a
working partner in trying to work through these things. It is
up to you, now.
Senator Levin. Thank you Mr. Chairman.
General Myers, one of the primary goals of Goldwater-
Nichols was to ensure the ability of our uniformed military to
provide independent military advice to the Secretary of
Defense, to the President, and to Congress.
In your response to our prehearing policy questions, you
have pledged if confirmed to give us your personal views, even
if those views differ from the administration in power.
Congress authorized separate staffs for the civilian and
military leadership of the services to ensure that senior
military officers have the staff support and the advice needed
to provide that independent military advice.
We are concerned by recent efforts to combine military and
civilian staffs to make the military support staff subordinate
to the civilian support staff. My question is, do you currently
have the staff support that you need to provide independent
military advice to the Secretary of Defense, to the President,
and to Congress? What role does a separate and independent
staff play in enabling you to provide that advice?
General Myers. Senator Levin, I think we do have that
staff, as it is currently organized. I think it is very
important, as we provide our military advice, that it be pure
military advice; and that the political issues surrounding
military options and so forth be just that, be done by our
political masters.
But I think the advice we give has to be untainted by
political influence. That is the kind of advice that we try to
provide, both General Pace and myself, and the rest of the
Joint Chiefs.
I think our staff is well-organized and appropriately
organized at the current time to provide that kind of advice. I
think that is consistent with the statutes and the way this
country and this Congress intends for us to act.
Senator Levin. Going back to North Korea, now, let me ask
the question this way.
It is clearly in our military and national interest that
North Korea not build an arsenal of nuclear weapons, and that
we should try to persuade North Korea not do so, and I assume
you would agree with that. If not, let me know in your answer
to the question, but that is the starting point, which is
obvious.
If that effort to prevent North Korea from building an
arsenal and from transferring weapons requires that, in return
for a complete and verifiable elimination of their nuclear
weapons program, that we pledge not to attack North Korea,
would that not make good military sense?
General Myers. I think this starts to get outside my lane.
Clearly, as we talked about earlier, conflict on the Korean
peninsula is not a pleasant thought, because of the reasons
discussed earlier.
But once you start talking about how we might deal with
that, what one side might promise to the other--again, that is
a little bit outside, well, quite a bit outside my lane.
But one thing we have learned over the last decade is, a
little bit over the last decade, is that promises made by the
North Korean regime can't be counted on. I think we will need
to leave it to the diplomats and to our political leadership to
decide what we are willing to give for what we get. I don't
think that is necessarily something that, from a military
perspective, we probably ought to have driving the process.
Senator Levin. That is why the verification part of that
question is so important.
General Myers. Absolutely.
Senator Levin. Senator Pryor asked you about the search for
weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and you were asked about a
statement that you made and that others have made that you are
confident that we are going to find weapons of mass destruction
in Iraq.
In answer to that, you talked about programs, which is not
responsive to the question. The question related to weapons.
General Myers. I think I said that we would find evidence
of a program and of weapons. I believe we will.
Senator Levin. Does that mean we're going to--in your
judgment we are still going to find weapons of mass
destruction?
General Myers. In my judgment, I think we will. Now, the
reason I said programs and weapons is, I think, it is so easy
to hide things.
There was a good report done, and I don't know if you have
seen it in the committee. It was a classified report, of which
portions were declassified, and it talked about an inspector
for the Environmental Protection Agency. His job was to find
those companies that were supposedly disposing of hazardous
waste in appropriate ways, but really weren't. They were
bilking the customer, bilking the government by picking up
hazardous waste and then depositing it in other places, and we
talked about so many tons of material that could be put in 55-
gallon drums. You could place these almost anywhere. If you
think about the number of 55-gallon drums within a 5-mile
radius of where we sit, it is probably thousands, and how
difficult it would be to find a few in there that have
hazardous waste or, in the case of Iraq, chemical or biological
weapons.
So there is always the possibility that the Iraqi regime
has, during the war and the aftermath, destroyed a lot of the
evidence. We don't know that.
I am telling you my personal conviction based on the
intelligence that I read before the war, and what the U.N.
inspection teams, both the United Nations Special Commission
(UNSCOM) and the United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and
Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), said. Based on all that
testimony, I think it is likely that we will find material as
well, or traces of material, or evidence of material that
existed, and so forth, and the evidence of a program. That is
my belief, and I think it will----
Senator Levin. Material can include all kinds of things,
including precursors, but the specific question relates to
weapons of mass destruction and the question is, are you still
confident that weapons of mass destruction will be found in
Iraq?
General Myers. Personally, I am confident we will.
Senator Levin. Should I keep going?
Chairman Warner. Sure, take a question or two.
Senator Levin. You were, I think, somewhat reluctant to get
into the question of troops from other countries. I am a little
surprised at that, given our conversations with some of our
commanders in the field about how valuable it would be to have
forces from other countries, including Germany, France, India,
Pakistan, Egypt, and others.
You have indicated what it might take and you put those in
three baskets and I think that is very helpful to obtain the
consent of nations that have large numbers of troops.
But when it came to the question of whether or not it would
be valuable to actually seek the support of NATO which might
make that possible, or to seek the support of the U.N. which
might make that possible, you, I think, were much more
reluctant to be forthcoming in that area. I am somewhat
surprised, and I want to press that issue a bit further.
We have 93 percent of the troops there now, roughly, if my
math is right. If we succeed in the numbers that you indicated
in getting--I believe the figure was 20,000 or so additional
troops--that we would still be at about 80 percent of the
troops on the ground by the end of the year.
Our troops are stretched. We assume that there will be a
third division coming in internationally, as you indicated to
Senator Reed's question. It is in everybody's interest, it is
in the world's interest--at least the decent countries that
care about things like this--that there be stability in the
Middle East and stability in Iraq, and that Iraq move towards
democracy, as well as stability, so there is a common interest
in that.
As you pointed out, NATO knows how to do this. In fact,
they have done it in the Balkans and in Afghanistan. So we
don't have a problem about NATO knowing how to say yes and how
to be supportive, not just of an individual country like Poland
but as an entity. The U.N. knows how to say yes, though it is
always more complex because there are a lot more countries and
there are a lot more political requirements there.
But as you point out, we would expect that the U.N. would
take over the operation in Liberia. Our commanders that we
talked to when we were visiting the region under Senator
Warner's leadership, many of us were there, and they said that
they welcome the troops of countries that have not yet made a
commitment, that they would provide valuable military resources
to us if they joined us.
So there didn't seem to be any reluctance there, talking to
our commanders about the value of troops from, again, Germany,
France, India, and so forth.
Do you agree that it would be of value to have German,
French, Indian, Pakistani, Egyptian, Turkish forces in Iraq;
and that it would be useful to--providing we don't give up the
unity of command or clarity of command, that it would be useful
to seek the support of NATO and the United Nations in order to
make that possible?
General Myers. Senator Levin, let me clear up one thing
right away. I am very bullish on trying to get international
forces in there. I think that is really important, for all the
reasons that you said. It is something that, in fact, the Joint
Staff works on very hard. We have some folks devoting all their
time, some great action officers, trying to make that happen.
Senator Levin. My question very precisely though is seeking
the support of NATO and the U.N. to make that possible.
General Myers. The only reason I hesitate on those two is
because it is going to be a political decision on NATO's part
whether they do or not, and we have just begun to think about
how NATO formally might be part of that. So those discussions,
I think, have started at the highest levels. They haven't
trickled down.
Are we opposed to a NATO organization coming into Iraq? No,
absolutely not. Clearly not. It would be in our best interest
if that were to happen. But all I was trying to indicate is
that those discussions, while ongoing, are not complete yet.
Senator Levin. I want to ask, do you ever see any finite
moment where there might be a request to NATO? There was just a
sort of a real hesitation.
General Myers. Sure. I think there will be.
Senator Levin. Will be what?
General Myers. My answer would be that there would probably
be a request to NATO at some point.
Senator Levin. You would welcome it?
General Myers. Sure, absolutely. There has not been an
insurmountable problem in all our work with our international
partners around the world. Some people hold out command and
control as being a big issue. We have always been able to work
through the command and control arrangements, and there are
ways we can do that that satisfy us, the United States, and
that satisfy other countries and their sovereignty, and ensure
that in the end we have a good unity of effort, a unity of
command. So that will not be a problem, certainly not in our
minds.
Senator Levin. Would the same thing be true, that we could
possibly work that out with the United Nations' support?
General Myers. It is possible that can be done, as well,
certainly.
Senator Levin. Former Senator Abraham, now Secretary of
Energy Abraham, said we are not planning to develop any new
nuclear weapons at all. My final question to you is, are you
aware of any military requirement or any effort to develop a
military requirement for a new nuclear weapon?
General Myers. No, Senator. I am not.
Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both.
Chairman Warner. Before recognizing Senator Clinton, who is
next, I think it is important that the record, in response to
Senator Levin's important question on international
participation, contain a clear answer from the Department of
Defense, in consultation with the Department of State. Because
I think it is a joint responsibility of both departments and
the secretaries of both, so I would put a question in at this
point and ask the administration to answer it clearly as to
what overtures, formal or informal, have been made to, first,
the North Atlantic Council with regard to NATO participation;
and such responses as the administration can share with us; and
what overtures have been made to, specifically, the countries
of France, Germany, Turkey, and perhaps others with regard to
their willingness to participate with the current Coalition
Forces in both Afghanistan and in Iraq, because the questions
are important.
I am not certain that in your position you have full
knowledge of what may have transpired. Perhaps you do. Perhaps
you wish to respond to my question at this time. But I think I
want the Secretaries of State and Defense to respond to these
important questions by my colleague.
General Myers. You are right, Mr. Chairman, it is a shared
responsibility between the Department of Defense and the
Department of State in terms of asking for and getting this
support. I think I am aware of most activities that are going
on, and there are ongoing dialogues with all those countries
that you just mentioned.
General Abizaid recently visited Pakistan. General Jones,
our European commander, recently visited Turkey. General
Abizaid visited Turkey, as well, and those were some of the
topics that were discussed. So on the military level, it is
working. I'm going to take a trip to the region. I'm going to
Iraq, Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan. That will be among the
topics that I cover, as well.
Chairman Warner. Fine. I think it is important that we
continue these, because the internationalization of this force
would have the consequence of lessening the exposure of our
forces, although in no way are we trying to cut and run in any
way, but we must share those burdens, particularly the loss of
our wonderful men and women of the Armed Forces, and injury.
It is a national and an international concern. It is not
just a private matter, it is an international responsibility.
Because if we can achieve the goals in Iraq and allow democracy
to take root in that nation, that democracy could spread to
other nations. To the extent we can democratize those regions,
I think it lessens the chances for terrorism internationally to
find havens in which to train, and then to take their terror
beyond those training camps to elsewhere in the world.
My understanding with regard to France and Germany is that
the heads of State and Government have said conclusively at
this time that they are not going to participate in response to
certain overtures. But I will leave it up to the Secretaries to
respond to those questions definitively.
General Myers. Can I tag on just a minute and respond to
both you and Senator Levin in terms of contributing troops to
the situation?
As General Pace mentioned earlier, it is not just the
number of troops and the composition of troops on the ground;
there are other elements of security that have to be mentioned.
Ambassador Bremer mentioned some to you the other day,
because there is a political dimension, and an economic
dimension that have to come along with the security dimension,
and they all work together to provide the kind of environment
we want in Iraq, and for the Iraqi people.
Then General Pace mentioned the new Iraqi Army. It is going
to take us a year to get the first 7,500 up online. Then it is
going to take us 2 years to get to 40,000. So we will get some,
around a division in 1 year and we'll get several divisions in
2 years. But that work is proceeding.
A new thing, a new concept is a civil defense force, which
is going to be somewhere between a police force and a military
unit, probably made up of young Iraqis who were part of the
regular Iraqi Army, because they have already had some
training. We hope to have 4,500 of them trained and ready to go
with uniforms in August. They can help as far as doing some
things that U.S. forces are doing, and releasing us to do
things that we are very good at.
Then there is the police force, which was mentioned and
we've talked about. It is what the Iraqis are going to do for
themselves. It is the political and economic dimensions, which
are coming along, and Ambassador Bremer covered that, I think,
when he spoke to the Senate the other day; and then, of course,
the troops themselves.
Chairman Warner. Well, that is important, because that new
force, I think it's called a corps, is to guard power lines,
which are being torn down as a part of looting or terrorism,
the broader functions to assist in our convoys as they must go
up and down the main arteries, road systems and so forth. So it
is, I think, a very innovative and wise step that was initiated
by the Secretary of Defense and Ambassador Bremer.
Senator Levin. Mr. Chairman, if my colleagues will yield,
relative to your questions to the two Secretaries--and I think
that is a wise idea--would you be willing to do a number of
things?
One, in addition to asking them what overtures have been
made, to add what overtures are planned? If no request is going
to be made to NATO and the U.N. for support, if they could tell
us why that is not going to happen.
Finally, could you add to NATO the U.N. as the other
organization that we are asking the questions to, and I would
be pleased to send that letter jointly with you, if you would
be willing to have that.
Chairman Warner. We often try to do things in a bipartisan
nature, and I think that is an initiative we can do jointly.
Now, Senator Clinton, you have been very patient. Thank you
very much for joining us at this hearing today.
Senator Clinton. Thank you Mr. Chairman. I apologize I
couldn't get here earlier. We had a hearing on biodefense in
another committee.
But I want to thank General Myers and General Pace for your
service. You came on board at a very difficult time in our
country's history, and I am personally, and I'm sure, on behalf
of my constituents, very grateful.
I also want to commend you on the performance in both
Afghanistan and in Iraq, and particularly the planning of the
mission in Iraq that did limit and minimize the kind of
collateral and civilian damage that might have otherwise
occurred. I think that is a great tribute to you and to the men
and women you are responsible for commanding.
I want to focus for just a minute on Afghanistan.
Obviously, our immediate concern, because of the headlines, is
the continuing dangerous environment in Iraq and the challenges
of rebuilding and reconstructing that devastated nation.
However, as we all know, we do have thousands of U.S.
troops in Afghanistan, including from the 10th Mountain
Division, from Fort Drum, New York. The assessments I receive
are quite mixed.
I am told that the only secure place in the country,
depending upon the time of day, is all or part of Kabul; and
that we have made alliances with a number of warlords out of
necessity, in order to have some effort ongoing to pacify and
bring order to certain parts of the country, but that there has
been a resurgence of Taliban/al Qaeda activity that is
troublesome.
So I would like to ask both of you, what is your assessment
of the security situation in Afghanistan? Do we have enough
troops, either American and international, to provide
significant control? How important are these reports that the
Taliban is regrouping? Finally, if you know at this time, what
role will the 10th Mountain Division troops continue to play in
Afghanistan?
General Myers. I would be happy to answer, Senator Clinton.
Often it's alleged that we don't pay much attention to
Afghanistan, but in fact there has been a lot happening in
terms of Afghanistan in trying to continue to make that country
more secure.
You are right, we have about 10,000 U.S. forces over there,
as part of the Interim Security Assistance Force in Kabul,
which is now a German-Dutch mission, but will turn this August
2003 into a NATO mission. There are over 5,000 international
forces supporting that.
On top of that, we have somewhere between 2,000 and 3,000
Coalition Forces supporting, in this case, now, the 10th
Mountain Division over there. So we have substantial forces.
The security situation in the country--if you map out where
most of the incidents are happening, it is in the area along
the Afghan and Pakistan border, starting about where Kabul is,
the Khyber Pass, and down south all the way to a major incident
we had down to the Spin Boldok area which is the border south
of the ungoverned areas in Pakistan and the more traveled areas
there between Afghanistan and Pakistan in the south-southeast.
That is where the holdouts are. If the Taliban is going to
get traction, that is where it is going to be. We know they go
back and forth across the border fairly freely, and that is a
problem for us. We have gotten complete cooperation from
Pakistan in that regard.
The great folks out of Fort Drum, they are going to focus
on that area. That is where the Italians are focused. We have
an Alpini brigade in there that is a thousand people strong,
that is focused in that area, the Gardez, the Khost area, which
is the area I am trying to describe.
Do we have enough troops? I think we do have enough troops
for the situation right now. What we have tried to do is create
these Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) that are not
large, but do bring sort of all the instruments of national
power, from security, to aid, to construction to the various
communities, and we hope to, in the next couple of months, to
have one of those in each of the provinces in the major cities.
Some are led by the U.S. One is led by the U.K. Other countries
are looking at leading them as well.
These are important ways to continue to show the
improvement of the security situation; and bringing hope and
real things, like wells that provide clean water, like schools,
medical facilities, and so forth. That is the idea of these
reconstruction teams.
On top of that, we have trained, I think, now the number is
up to over 4,000, 4,500--correct me if I'm wrong--about 4,500
Afghan National Army folks, several companies of whom are out
with our forces right now. So we are trying to put an Afghan
face on the security picture that the average Afghan sees. By
the way, these forces are being received by the Afghan people
very well, as a matter of fact.
So there is clearly a lot more to be done. I would have
told you, had it not been for the report I read today, that
since June we have had a decrease in security incidents, and we
actually expected the opposite to happen. Here in the last week
they have started to increase again; but it does ebb and flow.
We had a successful operation killing 25 Taliban down in
the Spin Boldok area. We will continue to work that. There is
also a suspicion that some of the high-value targets that we
are after are in that same area. We will continue to have to go
after them.
So it is uneven throughout the country. I would say three-
quarters of the country is pretty much secure. There is that
part on the Afghan-Pakistan border that is not so secure that
we have to deal with.
Senator Clinton. General, I know my time has expired, but
another element of this that I would----
Chairman Warner. Senator, this is your first round, and I
think Senator Reed and I would indulge you to have a question
or two in addition.
Senator Clinton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, because, Mr.
Chairman, there is another element to this that I am concerned
about, and perhaps we could get a written report or maybe this
is more appropriate for a classified briefing.
But I am also hearing reports about the increasing presence
of Iranian interests in Afghanistan; and that not only with
respect to political, diplomatic, quasi-military presence, but
also doing work in the country reconstructing roads, building
schools--really planting a flag, at least in western
Afghanistan.
I find that concerning, and so it would be very helpful for
me to be given some additional information about what we know
with respect to Iranian actions and intentions concerning
Afghanistan, and then the related issue with respect to
Pakistan.
I agree with you that for many of us, we have gotten much
more cooperation than we ever thought possible. But I am still
concerned about the cross-border movements, and also the level
of instability within Pakistan, and the ongoing efforts to
destabilize the Musharraf regime.
So again, any updates you can give us on that, just to keep
us informed, so we have a better idea of what the real threat-
and-risk ratio is--I would appreciate that.
Finally, with thanks to the Chairman, I am also still,
along with so many of my colleagues, perplexed--which is a word
that General Abizaid used before us--concerning weapons of mass
destruction. I would be remiss if I didn't ask both of you,
given your cumulative experience, your expertise, as to what is
the most reasonable explanation.
I know that the Chairman and I talked on several occasions
about our concerns regarding what would happen to our troops
when they crossed the Tigris or Euphrates, and the likelihood
of the use of chemical weapons, and the necessity of making
sure that they had the proper equipment and were as ready as
possible.
It is just bewildering, I guess. For those of us who have
followed the intelligence reports consistently, now, going back
a number of years, it just doesn't make sense. So I would
appreciate your take on what happened. How do we answer this
question?
There are obvious explanations--it never was as much as we
thought it was and our intelligence was just off by 90 degrees.
It was there, it was destroyed, it is still concealed, or worst
of all options, it has been privatized, in all or part, which
is what I fear most.
But I would appreciate your expert assessment briefly on
that question.
General Myers. Senator Clinton, let me go back to Pakistan
for just a minute. I think it is worthy to note that of the
senior al Qaeda leadership that we have captured--using ``we''
very broadly--most of them have been captured by the Pakistanis
or with Pakistani help, not insignificant. Two, WMD. Clearly,
UNSCOM, the U.N. inspection regime before the last one, the
recent inspection regime and their reports, the U.N. Security
Council resolution--there was no doubt that Iraq not only had a
program, but had material, and they hadn't accounted for it. It
is my belief that we are going to find good evidence of a
program, and it is also my belief that we are probably going to
find material, as well. It is quite possible.
We certainly went into combat on March 19th of this year
thinking that we were going to be subject to chemical and
perhaps biological attack, and that is why our soldiers and our
marines and everybody on the ground there, and the air crews,
were prepared for it. They fought in their protective gear
which is, having exercised in that gear before, it is not
something you do voluntarily, because it is a little bit
cumbersome and it is extremely hot. While the temperatures were
only in the 1980s and 1990s, this was quite a burden on our
forces. But the commands made that decision based on our
knowledge of the threat at the time.
So why haven't we found it? Well, first of all, it has been
about 100 days since the end of major combat operations and I
think, I have always stated--and my belief is--that it is going
to take some time. This is a regime that has practiced denial
and deception. They were at the graduate level in denial and
deception. Witness the reports the other day about one of their
nuclear scientists that was told to go bury some centrifuge
parts under his rose bush. Now, if he had not come forward and
said, ``they told me to bury these parts under this rose
bush,'' it is unlikely we would have uncovered them.
I think the same thing is true. They have compartmented
this so well, and we know they took parts of their program,
their documentation, perhaps the material, and they spread it
out in a land the size of California. So it is going to take
time. It is going to take the same thing that got us the two
sons. It is going to take Iraqis coming forward saying, here it
is, or here is what I know.
We have a very large organization, the Iraqi Survey Group,
led by General Dayton, with guidance from Dr. Kay, and they are
progressing down that road. We are going to have to wait and
see, in the end. But my personal belief is we will still find
the evidence.
I share your concern that the worst of all outcomes and the
reason we went in there is that we did not want weapons of mass
destruction to fall into terrorist hands, and we have to be
very alert to that. I think we have the intelligence apparatus
and forces and people working this so hard that we are going to
try to keep that from happening. That is clearly a danger.
Chairman Warner. The line of questioning by the Senator
from New York with regard to Afghanistan is a very important
part of this record. I think we should also have initiated by
the Senator from New York, the latest report on our continuing
emphasis on trying to apprehend bin Laden and Sheikh Omar, the
two leaders.
In our conversations, that is, you and I, General Pace--I
frequently bring this up in a private context, but I think you
should emphasize today there has been no diminution in our
effort to try and apprehend those two individuals, who in all
probability, are holed up in a piece of geography in this world
unlike anything else in terms of its inaccessibility to us.
General Myers. Mr. Chairman, that's right. We continue
worldwide to go after the leaders of al Qaeda, any members of
al Qaeda we can find, but the leadership is of great interest
to us and those efforts have not stopped, clearly.
Chairman Warner. Thank you.
Do you have something to add?
General Pace. No sir, thank you.
Chairman Warner. Senator Reed. Thank you for your patience.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. As Senator
Clinton has mentioned, the 10th Mountain Division gives me the
opportunity to say they are also great soldiers led by a great
commander, Buster Hagenback.
I would like to return to the situation in North Korea
which the Chairman opened up. To me, it is the most grievous
threat we face. As General Myers pointed out this is a regime
that has shown in the past their willingness to proliferate.
They have declared publicly that they are processing nuclear
rods.
Ironically, we conducted a preemptive attack against a
nation that had very little military capacity relative to North
Korea, and that was stoutly denying that they had weapons of
mass destruction and to date we haven't found any.
The war plans for North Korea are classified, naturally,
but the public sources I've seen--and they are dated, I'll
admit that--suggest that we would need upwards of 200,000 or
more troops to conduct the operation. Because they are dated, I
would assume we probably could get that number down a bit;
given our situational awareness, precision weapons,
communications superiority. But still we are talking at least,
my estimate would be 100,000 or more troops.
Given the deployments today, where are we going to get
those troops without cutting back our effort in Iraq or
Afghanistan?
General Myers. Senator Reed, without going into the
classified parts of the plan, one of our responsibilities to
the Secretary of Defense is to ensure that as we use our forces
around the world on the global war on terrorism, in the Balkans
or wherever it is we are called upon to use them, that we
continually assess our ability to fulfill the defense strategy
and the capabilities that are outlined in the Quadrennial
Defense Review (QDR) and in our national military strategy, our
international strategy, and our national security strategy.
Clearly, one of the major parts of that is our ability to
defend the peninsula, as we talked about earlier. So as we
developed the rotation plan, we looked very carefully at our
ability to respond to a situation on the peninsula, a North
Korean attack, which would be a worst-case sort of situation.
We have designed into the Army's rotation plan the kinds of
units, and the particular timing to make sure that we maintain
the capability to fulfill the war plans as they are being
written right now by General LaPorte over in Korea.
Senator Reed. Mr. Chairman, because of the nature of this
problem, I think it would be very useful if, in a classified
setting, if we had a brief on the plan and a lay down of the
numbers, because I think our responsibility is to ensure that
we can conduct the battle, but we sure as heck have to make
sure you have the forces; and not just the forces but the
critical items, the airlift, high-value items that are always--
--
General Myers. Sure, all the enablers that you need, you
bet. That is something we look at. We assess this periodically;
because we have to remember, we are in a global war, and we
think it is part of the Joint Chiefs of Staff responsibility to
look at our force laydown--can we do what we have said we are
going to do in our National strategy and our defense strategy
and then where is it we have risk, what risk are we willing to
accept, and how we mitigate it.
Senator Reed. I think it comes down, as you point out,
General, to what risk are you running, and that is a judgment
that you have to make, but I think it is something we should be
aware of, and I believe, only in the context of a detailed lay
down of the numbers.
General Myers. We'd certainly have to do that in a
classified setting.
Senator Reed. Indeed.
General Pace. To help just a little bit on that, we have
about 220,000 U.S. forces in the Gulf region right now out of a
force of about 1.4 million. As the chairman has pointed out, we
war game ourselves constantly on forces available versus
potential employment.
Of interest also, you mentioned some of the high-value
things we have, of which we have limited numbers. Because the
war in Iraq, the major battle, is completed, a lot of those
reconnaissance-type assets we use to find major formations have
been able to return to the United States, and are undergoing
reconstitution.
So in some ways, we have a better position today because of
the results of the war in Iraq.
Senator Reed. I think, all of those factors would be useful
to get a more detailed evaluation.
General Pace. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. Senator, I will consult with Senator
Levin, but I think we will ask the Department, particularly the
JCS, to give us the usual briefing with regard to advising
Congress just short of the war plans, which is an area which
the Congress and executive branch has traditionally recognized
that that situation is shared in a limited way.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate that.
A final question--prior to the initiation of hostilities in
Iraq, Secretary Rumsfeld indicated that he had bullet-proof
evidence that there were al Qaeda elements within Iraq. I think
most commentators recognize that there were certain elements in
the Kurdish area that might have had allegiances through Iran
to Iraq, but the implication, obviously, of the Secretary's
comments was that within the control of the Saddam Hussein
regime, there were al Qaeda elements. Have you found any of
those elements?
General Myers. The elements that we know have a direct
connection to al-Qaeda are the Ansar al-Islam elements that I
think you were referring to because they were up there in
northeastern Iraq before the Iraqi conflict began. They were in
the process of developing poisons, for sure. We found evidence
of that.
Senator Reed. But General, that was an area that was
controlled by the Kurds, who are nominally our allies?
General Myers. No, that was not controlled by the Kurds. It
was controlled by the Ansar al-Islam and other people in that
area that favored them. The Kurdish forces had tried to take
that area over several times and were repulsed and lost a lot
of forces.
Senator Reed. I stand corrected. Was it controlled by
Saddam Hussein's forces?
General Myers. That is a question that I haven't seen
answered satisfactorily. We do know, and I am worried about the
classification of this, but maybe it's not as important as
there is no more Iraqi regime, we do know that the Iraqi
intelligence service had people involved back and forth. We do
know that. We also know today that Ansar al-Islam is active
inside Iraq. We know that, and we know that they have perhaps
several hundred people. We rounded up seven of them in Baghdad
the other day. It is one of the things, when you talk about a
security situation, you have to kind of treat them a little
differently than you do the remnants of the Iraqi regime,
because they are likely to fight in a little more sophisticated
way and a little more aggressively.
Senator Reed. To your knowledge, were they in Baghdad prior
to our military operations?
General Myers. I don't know, sir.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
General Myers. What we do know prior to military operations
was that one of the leaders of Ansar al-Islam was in Baghdad
for medical treatment and had gone there from time to time. We
know that.
Senator Reed. Thank you, General.
Chairman Warner. Colleagues, it is the intention of the
chairman to wrap this up, but I am going to remain to do so.
Does the Senator from New York wish to ask an additional
question before I do the wrap-up?
Senator Clinton. Mr. Chairman, if I can just add one more
concern to the questioning about Afghanistan.
Chairman Warner. Yes, of course.
Senator Clinton. A July 9 front page article in The
Washington Post reported that poppy cultivation levels in
Afghanistan appear to be back at 1999 levels, the highest level
ever reached before the Taliban banned the poppy cultivation.
In this article, it pointed to the lack of a rule of law,
and even that the wheat donations by the international
community could, perversely, be fueling this recent upsurge.
Today's Christian Science Monitor reports that the
resurgence of the poppy plants could unravel the relationships
between warlords and the U.S. military.
I know that in your written answers to our prehearing
policy questions you assert that, despite some progress, we
have a ways to go in Afghanistan. So I think we also need some
additional information about how the U.S. military and related
assets could be undertaking a counterdrug and stability mission
to not just address the threat posed by the increased poppy
cultivation, but all the lawlessness that will flow from it.
Once again, we will be back into a situation where we have
warlords, we have smugglers, we have all kinds of challenges in
trying to bring back law and order. We know how difficult it
is. We have not won the drug war in the United States. We have
done a lot to try to help Colombia. We have a long way to go
there. Is there some way that we can, so to speak, nip this in
the bud before it gets full-blown and we face an additional
security challenge, on top of everything else we're
confronting?
General Myers. Senator Clinton, you are quite right, this
is a problem inside Afghanistan. It has been a problem that has
been addressed primarily by Britain. They have been the ones
that have had the lead on this.
It is a complex problem. There is an economic dimension to
it. There is the warlord dimension to it. Certainly, we know
where these products go, and they go up into Europe, and that
is a great concern. So it is one that has to be dealt with by
the international community.
We are addressing it on several fronts. But the U.S.
military at this point has not been one of the primary tools to
use on this particular issue, it has been the Brits.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
Gentlemen, I will conclude with a couple of questions here.
The conference between the House and the Senate on the
defense authorization bill has before it a variety of proposals
concerning modifying the end strengths of the Army, Navy, Air
Force, and Marine Corps. Has anything developed in the course
of events here recently which modifies the positions that each
of you have taken in previous testimony, the testimony of the
Secretary of Defense on those issues, that should be taken into
consideration by the conference at this time before, hopefully,
the conference report can be put together and acted upon by
both Houses in the course of the coming weeks?
General Myers. I will start, and then I will turn it over
to General Pace.
I think the Secretary said that he is not necessarily
against end strengths--I can't put words in his mouth, but not
necessarily against end strength increases, but I think we all
share the concern that----
Chairman Warner. We have always had a long tradition in
this committee, when each of you were confirmed, to ask for
your personal views, and I fully respect your allegiance to the
Secretary as a civilian control of our military, but I think
your personal views would be of great advantage to Congress.
General Myers. I'm going to give you those, and I share the
view that we should not be opposed to the issue of end strength
increase. We have to look at this carefully.
We talked about it earlier. One of the things we have to do
is to make sure if we have somebody in uniform, that they are
doing what somebody in uniform should be doing; and that we
don't have people in uniform doing what others could do,
civilians and so forth.
You can see all sorts of numbers, but there are several
tens of thousands that could be--the jobs they are doing could
be done by civilians, and we are looking at that, as a matter
of fact, in lots of the support areas. That's one thing that
has to happen.
The next thing, when we talk about end strength, is we need
to rebalance our active duty and our Reserve component mix, and
part of the force is in particularly high personnel tempo and
operations tempo, because we don't have that mix right, so that
rebalancing is a piece of it. When we talk about end strength
increases and our commitments, we also need to look at our
commitments, the other part of that equation, and are we in
places where we have a vital national security interest? Given
that we are in a war on terrorism, should we reduce our
commitments in other places?
There has been an effort by the Department to end our
commitment in the Sinai. We have been partially successful
there. On and on it goes. It is very difficult to get out of.
We have been in the Balkans now--somebody walked up today and
said, we have been in the Balkans 8 years. Well, I just hadn't
thought about it that way, but since 1995 we have been in the
Balkans in varying numbers, and generally they have been
decreasing, but we have very significant forces in the Balkans.
The question is, of all those commitments, which ones could
we stop doing, get others to do to help the end strength,
inform the end strength equation?
The other thing I would say is, and we talked about it at
length, is the internationalization of our efforts. We are
doing that in places like Afghanistan and in Iraq. As time goes
on, we are going to bring on more Afghan National Army, Afghan
police, Afghan border patrol. In Iraq, we have talked about the
Iraqis we are trying to bring on board, all of which I think
informs us about where we are.
Then one thing that goes through my mind is that the most
expensive thing we can do is bring on a person on active duty
in end strength. The personnel cost and the medical and all
that is 60 percent of our budget. It is a very expensive thing
to do. It takes time, there is lag time to get them on board,
and then of course, there is the legacy of the budget impact in
the outyears with this large a force.
So I think we need to look at those other things I just
mentioned before we come to the conclusion that an end strength
increase is needed. That is my personal belief.
Chairman Warner. General Pace, do you have views?
General Pace. I would add if I may, Senator, that in
addition to the scrubbing of the 3,000 billets, give or take,
that we think are being performed by military that might be
done by others and in addition to the active Reserve component
mix that General Myers has mentioned, we also need to complete
the process that we are going through right now of our scrub of
our war plans.
We have just shown ourselves convincingly that the war plan
that was on the shelf for Iraq and the war plan that was
executed used about 60 percent of the force that we thought we
needed for the war plan that had been on the shelf. We are
going through the same kinds of analyses right now for Korea
and elsewhere in the world, and as we do that and we absorb the
lessons that we have learned on precision use of weapons and
the speed with which we employ our forces, we are finding out
we can in fact have overwhelming combat power with fewer
numbers of individual soldiers and marines on the ground. So I
believe we have more work to do there before we can come
forward and say we need more troops, sir.
Chairman Warner. A vote has been called and I must depart,
but I'm going to ask several questions for the record and then
one last one here.
The phrase that ``the United States is stretched very thin
in terms of its Armed Forces''--that is causing real concern
for families on the rotation issues, on the ability to recruit
adequately for active, Reserve, and Guard components. I would
like to have you address those issues in a written response at
your earliest convenience.
[The information referred to follows:]

To reduce the stresses on our forces and families, the Services,
Joint Staff, and the Secretary of Defense have developed an Operation
Iraqi Freedom force rotation policy. The intent of the policy is to
provide a measure of certainty and stability for our deploying
soldiers. Eventually, these rotational schedules should permit the
Services to return to their force deployment goals.
We are aggressively working to ensure families have the support
they need during these stressful times. The family support professional
and volunteer staffs are making every effort to reach out to the
spouses, children, and parents of our members. Military families come
together in times like these. This is part of the military's true
strength. Even though our operational tempo over the past several years
has been high, it has not negatively impacted our active duty
recruiting efforts. As military activity continues in association with
Operation Iraqi Freedom and the global war on terrorism, it is still
too early to tell whether these operations will have a measurable long-
term impact on recruiting. However, all of the Services are currently
at or above their fiscal year-to-date recruiting goals. Recruit quality
also continues to hold steady above the Department's benchmarks of 90
percent high school graduates and 60 percent scoring in the top half on
the Armed Forces Qualification Test.
Currently, the Reserve components as a whole are achieving 96
percent of their recruiting objective. Recruit quality is comparable
with past years. Individually, all Reserve components except the Army
National Guard and the Army Reserve are exceeding recruiting
objectives. The Army Reserve has shown significant improvement in
recruitment in the second quarter and is currently achieving 98 percent
of its objectives. While the Army National Guard is experiencing some
challenges in meeting its large recruiting objective, it remains within
acceptable limits of its required end strength. The Department is
closely monitoring the recruiting efforts of the Army National Guard
and is working with them to overcome the challenges they are currently
facing.

Second, this committee has had, I think, a remarkable
record in supporting the use of unmanned vehicles. We have gone
through another very important chapter of utilization of such
vehicles here in both Afghanistan and Iraq.
Again, your views on the momentum with which those programs
should be moving forward and the support that is being offered
by Congress.
Also, the concept of using our forces jointly. It has been
a magnificent chapter in both the Afghan and the Iraqi
campaigns. Where are we in the desired goals for achieving
jointness? Are we there, is more needed to be done, and how can
Congress facilitate that?
Lastly, as we sit here going through the whole world and so
forth, the publicity being given to this, I think,
extraordinarily successful operation of locating and then
securing the sons of Saddam Hussein. The critics or--I don't
mean to do that in a pejorative sense, but some people are
asking, could not this operation have been conducted in such a
manner as to give every opportunity to capture them alive,
hoping that we would receive a good deal of information from
them?
Now, drawing on my own limited experience, and as I look at
the facts that are before us, and General Myers, you and I
discussed this in some detail last night, it seems to me the
on-scene commanders acted with prudence and professionalism.
They made a conscientious effort to take them alive. That
brought harm to our own forces, where we experienced four
wounded. They repeated the attempt, and then came under fire
again.
Then it was after that that the utilization of such
ordnance resulted in the deaths of all but, I think, one
inside; and then that person I think had an opportunity, the
young son to survive, but he, as I understand it, exercised
force by shooting at our forces.
Now, I'm going to ask General Pace to lead off in the
response, because you spent so much of your professional career
with ground force elements. What is your professional judgment,
based on the facts as you know them today, of how this
operation was conducted, and what response should be given to
the people who raise legitimately the question, could it have
been done in another way? Touch on the fact that, I think some
of us were surprised to learn that there was a little bit of a
fortification within this house, of the living spaces.
I mean, clearly, long before this operation was undertaken,
someone made the decision to fortify a part of this house, and
we are now learning that other of the houses in Iraq were
similarly fortified, giving rise to the assumption that Saddam
Hussein anticipated events like this could unfold, and that
those trying to hide themselves from the Coalition Forces could
perhaps survive better in some modification to the house that
enabled a fortified structure.
Also, having watched the search for Noriega, I remember
Senator Nunn, then Chairman, and I was ranking member, we went
to Panama and watched the Army as they pursued Noriega. He had
safe houses and other facilities where he evaded us for some
period of time.
We know that as part of the fortification in Iraq, they did
have an underground tunnel to exit some distance away from this
house and then be able to escape. This will be debated, but
right now it is a hot debate out there, and I think it is
important that this hearing have your views, General Pace and
those of General Myers on that question.
General Pace. Mr. Chairman, not surprisingly, you have
touched on each of the important parts of that operation.
Chairman Warner. I came through some of the training that
you've had, although my career is far more modest in comparison
to yours.
General Pace. Sir, everything I have read and everything I
have been told tells me that the commanders on the ground acted
exactly correctly in this situation. They did in fact, as you
pointed out, offer the opportunity for those inside the
building to surrender. They thought they had the opportunity to
capture or kill Saddam's two sons; but until the operation was
complete, and until confirmation, they did not know with 100
percent certainty what they had.
They did offer the opportunity to surrender, as you pointed
out. They made more than one attempt to enter the building and
to offer the opportunity to surrender. Some of our soldiers
were wounded in those operations.
Clearly, with the amount of fire coming back at them from
inside the building, force was appropriate and should be used,
and was used. As you pointed out, there is no way of knowing
whether or not there might have been tunnels or other routes of
escape.
The question that I would pose to anyone who might ask, why
is it we would kill them, is what question would you be asking
if they somehow managed to escape? I think that given the
battle as it unfolded over 3-plus hours of combat--the
restraint that was shown initially to afford them the
opportunity to surrender, and the power that was used
appropriately, to protect our own sons and daughters who were
going into combat, was exactly what those commanders should
have done.
Chairman Warner. When you briefed me last night, General
Myers, you showed me how that house was co-located with other
private dwellings around it, so we had the concern of other
occupants in their respective houses.
A second part of that question is, we have been handed the
wire stories and other information that these pictures have
now--are in the public domain worldwide. Last night when I was
on a national television show, I was asked the question about
whether or not these pictures should be released. I didn't
presume that I would be able to make that decision last night;
but I did say it would be my hope and expectation when the
decision to release them or not release them was made, it would
be done with the careful analysis of how best such a decision
would protect our forces, the Coalition Forces, against further
death and wounding that we are experiencing every day, and I
hope that was predicated in that decision.
General, can you quickly answer it? They are holding the
vote, so we have to depart.
General Myers. Well, sir, I think as we discussed last
night in your office, the issue of how and when to release
those pictures was carefully considered by Ambassador Bremer,
General Sanchez, General Abizaid, and the folks on the ground
in Iraq, and they used their best judgment and the
recommendations they got from the people that counseled them on
how to do that.
Clearly, I think we have done it in a dignified way where
we don't denigrate the bodies and we don't allow any other
atrocities to happen to those particular bodies, and I think it
was done appropriately.
Chairman Warner. Well, it sends a strong message to those
still in hiding, be it Saddam Hussein or others, that morale is
good among our forces and they are able to conduct the toughest
of operations, and if you wish to have the fate that the others
experienced, the two sons, stand by.
General Myers. Absolutely right, sir.
Chairman Warner. We have concluded this hearing and before
I hit the gavel, I would note that in just a few years this
room will be 100 years old, and many hearings have been held in
it, but this has been among the more important, if I might say,
because we are looking at the future of our Nation and, indeed,
the free world, which is marked by uncertainties of a magnitude
really never experienced before in contemporary history.
We are fortunate to have men and women like yourselves
wearing the uniform of our country, working with your
counterparts in uniform in other countries, taking the risks to
themselves and their families to ensure that freedom, as we
love it here in the United States, can be protected not only
here at home, but to the extent we can, in conjunction with our
allies, be provided beyond our shores.
Thank you, gentlemen.
General Myers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. The committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:29 p.m. the committee adjourned.]
[Prepared questions submitted to Gen. Richard B. Myers,
USAF, by Chairman Warner prior to the hearing with answers
supplied follow:]
Questions and Responses

DEFENSE REFORMS

Question. You previously have answered the committee's policy
questions on the reforms brought about by the Goldwater-Nichols Act in
connection with your nominations to be Commander, U.S. Space Command,
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff.
Has your view of the importance, implementation, and practice of
these reforms changed since you testified before the committee at your
most recent confirmation hearing on September 13, 2001?
Answer. No. My fundamental view has not changed. The Goldwater-
Nichols Act was a watershed event for needed defense reform. Overall,
the reforms have clearly strengthened the warfighting capabilities of
our combatant commands while maintaining appropriate civilian control
over the military. In terms of enhancing the effectiveness of military
operations, the performance of the Armed Forces in Operations Desert
Shield, Desert Storm, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom demonstrates
the results of implementing those reforms.
Question. Do you foresee the need for additional modifications of
Goldwater-Nichols in light of the changing environment? If so, what
areas do you believe it might be appropriate to address in these
modifications?
Answer. Clearly our fight in the global war against terrorism and
our need to work with many agencies outside DOD as well as with our
coalition partners is creating a much different security environment
from the one that drove defense reform in 1986. For these reasons and
others, I have directed my staff to form a working group to identify
suggested changes to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of
selected processes that allow me to carry out my duties as described in
Title 10. I look forward to receiving their recommendations and those
of others working on potential ways Goldwater-Nichols might be adapted
to our new environment.

DUTIES

Question. What recommendations, if any, do you have for changes in
the duties and functions of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
as laid out in Title 10, United States Code, and in regulations of the
Department of Defense pertaining to functions of the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff?
Answer. I serve as the principal military advisor to the President
of the United States, Secretary of Defense, and National Security
Council as established by Title 10. I think the Goldwater-Nichols Act
has provided the appropriate language to facilitate my primary
function. However, in the post-September 11 environment my role has
taken on greater significance in the fight against terrorism in that I
am the senior military officer who maintains a total global perspective
for many issues that cross the boundaries of combatant commander areas
of responsibilities (AORs). This perspective is also critical for
defense of the homeland, and therefore I think it would be appropriate
to formally document my new role as principal military advisor to the
Homeland Security Council.

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. Section 151(b) of Title 10, United States Code, provides
that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal
military adviser to the President, the National Security Council, and
the Secretary of Defense. Other sections of law and traditional
practice, however, establish important relationships between the
Chairman and other officials.
Please identify any changes in the relationships the Chairman and
Joint Chiefs of Staff have experienced with the following officials
since your last confirmation hearing:
The Deputy Secretary of Defense.
Answer. Under existing directives, the Deputy Secretary of Defense
has been delegated full power and authority to act for the Secretary of
Defense on any matters that the Secretary is authorized to act. I have
not noticed any changes in the relationship between the Chairman and
the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the Deputy Secretary of Defense since my
last confirmation hearing.
Question. The Under Secretaries of Defense.
Answer. Title 10, United States Code, and current DOD directives
establish the Under Secretaries of Defense as the principal staff
assistants and advisors to the Secretary regarding matters related to
their functional areas. Since my last confirmation hearing, the only
changes in the relationship between the Chairman and the Joint Chiefs
of Staff and the Under Secretaries of Defense has been associated with
Unified Command Plan changes and the SecDef's recent establishment of
the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. As specified in UCP 2
CHG 2, as with other communications between the POTUS, SecDef and
combatant commanders, communications between under secretaries and
combatant commanders should be transmitted through the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
I have worked closely with OSD, the Joint Staff and USSTRATCOM to
delineate the roles and responsibilities of each entity to carry out
the intent of the POTUS-approved Unified Command Plan.
Question. The Assistant Secretaries of Defense (ASDs).
Answer. The SecDef has created a new Assistant Secretary for
Networks & Information Integration who reports directly to the Deputy
Secretary of Defense. He has also created a new ASD for Homeland
Defense who reports to USD (Policy). I have not noticed any changes in
the relationship between the Chairman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff
with the Assistant Secretaries of Defense since my last confirmation
hearing.
Question. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Answer. I have not noticed any changes in the relationship between
the Chairman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the Vice Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff since my last confirmation hearing.
Question. The Secretaries of the Military Departments.
Answer. I have not noticed any changes in the relationship between
the Chairman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the Secretaries of the
Military Departments since my last confirmation hearing. However, the
Under Secretary of the Air Force now acts as the Executive Agent for
Space Program procurement.
Question. The Chiefs of Staff of the Services.
Answer. I have not noticed any changes in the relationship between
the Chairman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff since my last confirmation
hearing.
Question. The combatant commanders.
Answer. Since my last confirmation hearing, the only changes in the
relationship between the Chairman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
combatant commanders have been associated with Unified Command Plan
changes.
UCP 2 created USNORTHCOM. USNORTHCOM's missions include homeland
defense and providing assistance to U.S. civil authorities.
UCP 2 CHG 1 disestablished USSPACECOM and established the new
USSTRATCOM. UCP 2 CHG 2 assigned USSTRATCOM with the emerging missions
of Global Missile Defense, Global Strike, DOD Information Operations,
and Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C\4\ISR).

MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that you
would confront if confirmed for a second term of office as Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff?
Answer. I see two major challenges for the near term. First, we
must maintain our current commitments while being prepared to respond
to others. Second, we have the challenge of transforming our Armed
Forces to become a force well positioned to face the threats of the
21st century.
Our greatest challenge will be to meet the near-term demands in
winning the war on terrorism while simultaneously transforming the
force to meet future challenges. Demands on the force today will
continue to stress our ability to maintain readiness. We must set clear
priorities for force management and ensuring the institutional health
of the force. We must also continue to balance recapitalization of
existing capabilities in the near-term with the demands of
modernization and transformation that ensure our military superiority
in the mid- to longer-term.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for
addressing these challenges?
Answer. I have set three strategic priorities: winning the global
war on terrorism, enhancing joint warfighting, and transforming the
force.
As we fight the war on terrorism, we continue to improve our
ability to conduct joint and combined operations, integrating all
elements of national power, and employing intelligence in ways that
reduce our response time and allow us to attack time sensitive/time
critical targets.
To enhance joint warfighting, we are integrating lessons learned in
the WOT, improving our adaptive planning processes, and making
organizational refinements. Joint doctrine that encompass not only
military forces, but their complementary interagency partners as well,
ensures unity of effort and increases the synergy required for success.
The joint operational concepts developed during the war on terrorism
and refined through experimentation will lead us to new capabilities
and a transformed joint force.
Our capabilities-based approach requires that we define the
strategic landscape and identify the types of transformed capabilities
the Armed Forces need to project military power globally. The
operational environments our forces will face are such that a wide
variety of robust force mixes may be used to achieve the same strategic
objectives. Our primary responsibility in this arena is to actively
explore all possible mixes and employ the best combinations based on
the situations at hand. To support this approach, we will continue to
invest in our current capabilities while simultaneously investigating
new technologies that will ensure our global primacy.
Across the force, many units have an inordinately high tempo of
operations (OPTEMPO) and personnel tempo (PERSTEMPO). As a result, we
are reviewing the mix of Active and Reserve component forces to ensure
the right mix for future operations.
Additionally, as we develop our rotation plan for the WOT, we hope
to add predictability for our forces, to improve morale as well as
readiness.
We continue to refine the roles and relationships of organizations
like U.S. Northern Command and U.S. Strategic Command. As this process
continues we will also redesign our joint deployment and mobilization
processes to support the application and sustainment of decisive force.
These priorities and their associated tasks will be more fully
defined in our future National Military Strategy, the Joint Vision and
the Joint Operations Concepts documents when they are completed.

PRIORITIES

Question. In your responses to the committee's advance policy
questions in connection with your last confirmation, you identified
your initial priorities as joint warfighting, modernization and
transformation, making the JROC more strategically focused, better
defining the military's role in homeland security, finding ways to
enhance Joint Forces Command's (USJFCOM) role in experimentation and
transformation, sustaining our quality force, and taking care of
people.
How would you describe your progress to date in attaining each of
your priority goals?
Answer. We have continued to make real, sustainable progress in
attaining my priorities. Our progress in the global war on terrorism
continues unabated toward the singular goal of victory. Overseas, our
ongoing successful operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and around the world
continue to pay dividends in weakening terrorist organizations. With
respect to Homeland Defense, we established United States Northern
Command with the mission to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and
aggression aimed at the U.S. We have made progress, but much work
remains ahead.
The U.S. Armed Forces' ability to conduct Joint Warfare is better
today than any time in our history, but challenges remain. Key to
improving our joint warfighting is the development of the Joint
Operations Concept to provide an overarching linkage between strategy
and capabilities. We will continue to improve joint warfighting by
learning from previous operations like Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).
OIF demonstrated the importance of improved C\4\ISR capabilities to
joint operations and warfighting. Improving the warfighter's knowledge
of the battle space and increasing the speed of decisionmaking has
increased success and saved lives. DOD is committed to investing in
transformational command and control programs. I greatly appreciate
this committee's continued support for these critical programs.
We continue our transformation throughout the military. With the
institution of the new Joint Capabilities Integration and Development
System, we have moved the Joint Requirements Oversight Council from a
requirements-based to a capabilities-based process.
USJFCOM continues to play an important role in transformation. We
modified the UCP to provide USJFCOM with the responsibility to support
the development and integration of fully interoperable systems and
capability. We followed that last year by providing the resources
necessary to implement these new responsibilities.
Question. If confirmed, what would be your priorities for your
second term as chairman?
Answer. My priorities for a second term will continue to focus on
winning the war on terrorism, improving joint warfighting, and
transforming our Nation's military to face the dangers of the 21st
century while taking care of the men and women serving in the Armed
Forces.

TRANSFORMATION

Question. If confirmed, you would continue to play an important
role in the process of transforming the Armed Forces to meet new and
emerging threats.
With the benefit of almost 2 years in office, please describe the
progress that the Department, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
the Joint Staff, has made in transforming the Armed Forces?
Answer. Future Joint Force: We are transforming the U.S. Armed
Forces into a truly joint force that is dominant across the range of
military operations. To guide our efforts, we published the Joint
Warfighting and Crisis Resolution in the 21st century perspective on
how the joint force will operate in the future, establishing the
precedent on which joint force development will progress. This includes
a redefined range of military operations that covers warfighting and
peacetime operations alike.
Operations Concept: Against this perspective, we are developing the
Joint Operations Concepts (JOpsC). It provides the operational context
for the transformation of the Armed Forces of the United States by
linking strategic guidance with the integrated application of Joint
Force capabilities.
Joint Experimentation: Under Joint Staff and OSD guidance and
Transformation Planning Guidance (TPG) direction, JFCOM has implemented
a robust joint experimentation campaign plan that runs through 2005.
This plan incorporates lessons learned, post war defense assessment,
and emerging service and joint concepts. From this experimentation
effort, specific recommendations for joint force improvement are being
submitted for JROC approval and implementation.
Joint Training: We have automated the Joint Training System through
the development and fielding of the Joint Training Information
Management System. This permits full implementation of key business
practices linking strategy to joint training and exercise programs.
War Planning: Transforming war planning is a work in progress. For
example, we have streamlined the plans review and approval staffing
process to ensure plans are relevant and current. The OSD and the Joint
Planning and Execution Community are conducting parallel plan review in
order to complete the review process more quickly. The first round of
this streamlined review process in being completed now. Historically
the plan review process took 6 months, and we have transformed it to a
6-week process. We believe our ongoing efforts will enable us to
initiate a new deliberate plan, voice guidance, conduct analysis and
approve it in less than 10 months, where in the past it has taken 2
years.
Joint Professional Military Education: Many changes have been made
to educate our force on what it means to be Joint since Operation
Desert Storm. Joint operations in Afghanistan and in Iraq highlighted
the need to readdress what is being taught in all the military
schoolhouses. One new initiative at National Defense University (NDU)
is designing what we anticipate will be a 1-week course for newly
selected three-star flag and general officers. This course, once fully
fielded, will give our senior leaders needed insights into the demands
of the Joint Force Commander. Additionally, we changed the CAPSTONE
program to address Joint Warfighting at the Operational level for our
one-stars.
Question. What are your goals regarding transformation in the
future?
Answer. Capabilities-based Force: Using the joint operating and
functional concepts, we will complete transformation to a capabilities-
based force that is better prepared to respond to asymmetrical threats
and crises worldwide.
Translating Experimentation to Capabilities: The recommendations
that come out of the joint experimentation efforts will focus on being
``Born Joint,'' so that integration is incorporated from conception of
the relevant ideas, regardless of the service, command, or agency
providing the capability.
Doctrine: We have started to implement a joint doctrine
consolidation effort. Over the next 5 to 7 years we have a proactive
plan to reduce the number of joint doctrine publications. This will
promote jointness and transformation by integrating joint mission
areas, grouping functional doctrine together and eliminating
inconsistencies and redundancies.
Training: We are continuing to provide dynamic, capabilities-based
training for the Department in support of national security
requirements across the full spectrum of service, joint, interagency,
intergovernmental, and multinational operations.
Joint Professional Military Education (JPME): We desire to increase
the number of officers who are able to participate in JPME by
increasing the exposure of all officers to JPME over the course of
their careers. We also intend to tailor the JPME level II program in-
residence, and use distributed learning technology in order to make
JPME II attendance more accessible. To achieve this objective, we
require legislation to eliminate the requirements for JPME II to be
taught only at an NDU school, and for the curriculum at JFSC to be at
least 3 months in duration.
For our Reserve Components, we initiated a course of JPME
encompassing a mix of distributed learning and resident instruction.
Once complete, we expect a throughput of approximately 1,500 reservists
and Guardsman per year. On the Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) side, we
also see an ever-increasing amount of Senior NCOs assigned to Joint
Headquarters. We will continue to aggressively improve JPME for NCOs.
War Planning: We are revising the deliberate planning process to
complete planning from initiation to approval in 10 months. In today's
uncertain security environment we need to be able to develop war plans
that are flexible, and adaptable to specific changes from the initial
planning assumptions, and do it more quickly.
Military Culture: The biggest challenge to transforming the
military is changing the existing culture. That means that our junior
personnel must think differently from day one. Instead of a service-
centric focus, they must have a joint-centric focus. We are reviewing
all levels of military education, including that of our noncommissioned
officers to facilitate this cultural change.
Question. What is the role of Special Operations Forces (SOF) in
the overall transformation vision?
Answer. Operation Iraqi Freedom demonstrated the overall maturation
of U.S. Special Operations Forces, especially SOF integration with
precision airpower. SOF, conventional ground, air, and maritime
operations occurred simultaneously in space and in time frequently with
conventional forces under SOF command and control. The transformation
lesson learned is to continue to expand our Joint Training Exercises
integrating SOF, conventional and coalition SOF.
Question. Specifically, what do you believe transformation should
mean for the special operations community in terms of missions,
training, equipment, or in any other aspect?
Answer. In future missions, we will rely more on Special Operations
Command (SOCOM) to look globally. SOF transformation requires continued
progress in providing the necessary equipment and training to stay
ahead of the threat. As technology spreads, even a local terrorist
group can obtain secure wireless communications, global positioning
systems, and other tools that were unique to military powers only a few
years ago. For SOF to continue pressing the fight against these groups,
their own tools must continue to mature and become more transportable,
survivable, and effective.
Question. What, if any, special role can SOCOM's development and
acquisition capability play in service and DOD efforts?
Answer. SOF will continue its important role in development and
acquisition. Many items now in common use among conventional forces
began as SOF-specific requirements.
expanded roles of u.s. special operations command
Question. The Secretary of Defense recently announced that U.S.
SOCOM would take on additional, expanded responsibilities in the global
war on terrorism, as a supported combatant commander, in addition to
its more traditional role as a supporting combatant commander.
In your view, what types of missions should U.S. SOCOM conduct as a
supported combatant commander?
Answer. U.S. SOCOM should serve as supported combatant commander
for campaigns against those terrorist organizations whose cells,
support networks, or activities are spread across several geographic
combatant commander (GCC) boundaries. This will allow U.S. SOCOM to
synchronize military operations against these groups, while using the
GCC's regional experience and expertise to plan and conduct specific
operations. It is important to resource SOCOM for these new roles as
reflected in 2004 budget proposals.
For some missions, the Secretary may direct Commander, U.S. SOCOM
to exercise command over special operations overseas, as allowed under
USC Title 10. This will generally occur when the GCC is unable to
provide the necessary command and control capability or when the
mission parameters (available time, national risk, political
sensitivity) make this command relationship desirable.

AFGHANISTAN

Question. Given the current level of instability in Afghanistan, do
you believe that the U.S. troop contribution is appropriate in terms of
size and composition?
Answer. Despite many achievements by the coalition and the Afghan
government, Afghanistan is challenged by recent increases in violence
and internal political tensions. DOD, OMB, and DOS are currently
reexamining policies and resources required to address the changing
conditions. As for our troop size and composition, U.S. and coalition,
they are as requested by the Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander and I
believe adequate for the tasks at hand.
Question. What, if any, types of military assistance would you
recommend in addition to current efforts?
Answer. Our current efforts are about right. Although we have a
ways to go in Afghanistan, we are making great strides. We are planning
to increase the number of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) to
eight, which will provide one PRT in each province. I expect release of
this Planning Order within the next few days.
The size of the Afghan National Army (ANA) will increase to 7,200
by January 2004 and to 10,000 by June 2004. By accelerating the
training of the ANA, and increasing the number of PRTs, we will be able
to transfer more of the security responsibilities to the Afghan
government, thereby reducing the demand on U.S./Coalition Forces.
CENTCOM has dedicated forces with the mission of locating high
value targets. They have also developed a Reward Program, offering
rewards for enemy personnel on the Black List. CJTF 180 is conducting
operations in the vicinity of the Pakistani border to interdict
infiltration/exfiltration routes that we believe al Qaeda/Taliban
forces use. Killing, or capturing, remaining al Qaeda/Taliban forces
remains a high priority mission for our forces in Afghanistan.

STATUS OF THE ARMED FORCES

Question. Ongoing operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Balkans, and
the Horn of Africa, coupled with deployments to places such as South
Korea and a potential deployment to Liberia, place enormous pressures
on the active and Reserve components.
In your view, how is the overall morale of forces at present,
particularly with regards to those units and individuals those who have
been deployed for an extended period of time or have been deployed
numerous times in recent years?
Answer. Overall, morale remains good and will improve when we
formalize the rotation policy. Individual service members will continue
to express concerns about the equity of the rotation policy and we will
address those concerns. My assessment is that there is not a
significant morale issue in the Armed Forces.
Current global force requirements will remain steady, or increase
modestly, and as such we are developing a rotational plan in support of
OIF. This rotational plan will facilitate our ongoing operation in
support of OIF, sustain our all-volunteer force, and defend our
homeland, while maintaining the capability to rapidly respond to
unexpected requirements.
Leveraging our Total Force, this rotational plan maximizes the
employment of mostly Active component (Army and USMC) to OIF while the
Reserve components conduct other global requirements. By establishing
theater tour length policy of up to 12 months, we will ultimately meet
respective services' OPTEMPO deployment goals. This rotation allows the
Marine Corps to reconstitute their force and maintain the capability to
respond to emerging requirements. Increased use of coalition support
from one Multi-National Division (United Kingdom) to three Multi-
National Divisions will greatly assist and help lessen out troop
requirements in support of OIF.
Question. What plans do you have to address the stress this high
operational tempo places on our forces and their families?
Answer. We are aggressively working to ensure families have the
support they need during these stressful times. Further, the family
support professional and volunteer staffs are making every effort to
reach out to the spouses, children and parents of our service members.
Military families come together in times like these. This is part of
the military's true strength.

JOINT OFFICER MANAGEMENT

SPACE CAPABILITIES AND TRANSFORMATION

Question. Space assets have played a crucial role in recent
military successes, and future space assets such as space based radar
could transform how the military operates.
Are you satisfied that such space programs have strong support
within the Department of Defense and the Services, and are
appropriately resourced?
Answer. Space systems and programs enjoy strong support from the
Services, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the intelligence
community. I believe that the programs included in the budget are
resourced adequately. The full depth and breadth of space capabilities
required to support the new defense strategy is still under study.
On the intelligence side, the Department and the intelligence
community are engaged in a thorough, joint, end-to-end review of space
and airborne collection systems known as the Transformational Air and
Space Project (TSAP). This effort provides the space and airborne
direction for the future and answers questions of numbers and types of
systems, ISR architecture, and future resource requirements.

INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE SUPPORT (ISR)

Question. Are you satisfied with the level and quality of
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support for U.S. forces?
If not, what further steps would you recommend to improve ISR support?
Answer. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets
provide daily support to U.S. forces in all theaters, providing crucial
and timely information to warfighters and other intelligence agencies.
The current satisfaction with ISR support, however, is tempered by an
aging platform baseline, and high OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO demands on
platforms and personnel. We are developing follow-on ISR programs that
bring more capabilities to defeat emerging threats and offer more
options to warfare commanders, such as persistent surveillance. I
intend to maintain the emphasis to create a more flexible and adaptable
collection capability to continue to support warfighters and decision
makers.

CLOSE AIR SUPPORT

Question. In Operation Enduring Freedom, there was some criticism
of the procedures by which close air support (CAS) was provided; some
cases involved fratricide and others involved allegations that
available aircraft were not being efficiently used.
What steps were taken to improve CAS prior to Operation Iraqi
Freedom, and what was the impact of these steps?
Answer. The Army and Air Force warfighter staff talks held after
OEF established the dialog for addressing OIF specific and some
enduring CAS issues. This led to the acceleration of the Terminal
Attack Control Program (TACP) modernization effort, the establishment
of a very robust Air Ground System, pushing TACP assets down to the
lowest level to include coalition allies, and the establishment of a
robust Air Coordination Element (ACE) at CFLCC and Army V Corps Air
Support Operations Center (ASOC).
We outfitted A-10s with targeting pods capable of day/night, laser,
infrared, and night vision goggle employment. The pod enables standoff
from the target to identify enemy and friendly forces, which gave the
aircraft more time over the target area and increased survivability.
During the sand storm, targeting pod equipped A-10s were able to ``see
through'' the sand to distinguish friendly and enemy forces and
increase the effectiveness of the attack. We also reduced the amount of
command and control nodes to increase responsiveness to forces on the
ground. Finally, all ground attack aircraft were equipped to use GPS-
guided bombs to attack enemy positions very accurately in all weather.
Overall, we significantly improved Joint CAS Operations from OEF to
OIF, to the degree that we seamlessly provided CAS regardless of
service. For example, we had Air Force CAS for marines, and Australian
CAS for Army and Marine Ground Forces.
Question. What areas remain to be addressed in the conduct of CAS?
Answer. We will focus on increasing joint CAS training. Additional
improvements include, but are not limited to, providing SATCOM radios
to forces on the ground to increase communications capabilities and the
outfitting of all A-10s with targeting pods to limit collateral damage,
reduce fratricide, and provide instant positive battle damage
assessment.

STRATEGIC LIFT

Question. The Mobility Requirements Study for Fiscal Year 2005 was
conducted with the assumption of the previous National Military
Strategy of two Major Theater War (2-MTW). For strategic airlift, the
study identified a requirement for 54.5 million ton-miles a day, with
available airlift at the time falling well short. Steps have been taken
to improve our capability since then by continuing the C-17 production
line and initiating two C-5 upgrade programs.
Based on your experience of the last 2 years, how do you assess our
current strategic airlift capability?
Answer. The need to conduct the war on terror on several fronts
simultaneously, changes in how we deploy forces, new defense planning
guidance (DPG) (including homeland defense), Army transformation, and
the proliferation of anti-access weapons signal potentially significant
changes in the combatant commanders' requirement for strategic lift.
Under MRS-05, 54.5 MTM/D was the minimum for a moderate risk solution,
but we are planning to conduct another full scale Mobility Requirements
Study to further clarify strategic lift requirements.

PRECISION-GUIDED MUNITIONS

Question. With an ever-increasing percentage of air-launched
ordnance being precision-guided, do you believe there is a need to re-
visit the inventory objectives for precision-guided ordnance?
Answer. In response to the increased demand for guided weapons, and
to rebuild supplies depleted first in Afghanistan and then Iraq, Joint
Direct Attack Munition kit and laser guided bomb production have
increased significantly. As part of our ongoing operational planning
process, we are currently reevaluating our war plans. We will closely
monitor inventories of precision munitions, adjust them as appropriate,
and with the assistance of Congress fund them at an appropriate rate.

INFORMATION OPERATIONS

Question. Information operations and information warfare will
likely have an increasing role in 21st century warfare. To date, the
role of information operations in contemporary military operations has
not been readily apparent.
What role do you envision for information operations in future U.S.
military operations?
Answer. Information operations are maturing rapidly across DOD as a
whole and within each individual Service. We are committed to fully
integrating information operations (IO) into the Joint Force
Commanders' toolkit on a par with air, land, maritime, space, and
special operations. Information operations are comprised of five core
military capabilities: Computer Network Operations, Electronic Warfare,
Psychological Operations, Military Deception and Operations Security.
The Joint Force Commander employs these core capabilities in an
integrated, coordinated manner across the full range of military
operations to better achieve his objectives. Recent operations have
highlighted the importance of each of these core capabilities and IO in
Operation Iraqi Freedom was more effective than ever before. We are
addressing the limitations and shortfalls that must be fixed.
Question. What concerns do you have regarding the conduct of
extensive information operations?
Answer. My primary concern is that the mission area receives
required support, both in terms of resources and tailored intelligence.
The IO mission area is relatively new, when compared to other
established military operations. As such, it is in danger of not
competing well for scarce resources. In terms of intelligence support,
IO has some non-traditional requirements that we must scrutinize and
prioritize along with our other intelligence requirements.

BLUE FORCE TRACKING

Question. General Tommy Franks, former Commander, U.S. CENTCOM,
recently stated before this committee that multiple, non-interoperable
blue force tracking systems were a problem during Operation Iraqi
Freedom, contributing to some confusion on the battlefield and
complicating efforts to avoid friendly fire incidents. The U.S. Army
has one such system, which they shared with U.S. Marine Corps units.
U.S. SOCOM uses different systems. Our coalition partners had no such
capability.
What steps would you recommend to rapidly ensure effective blue
force tracking of all friendly forces on the battlefield--
unconventional, conventional, and coalition?
Answer. In his testimony, General Franks also described the
``unprecedented situational awareness'' during OIF. This ``SA'' was in
fact enabled by the integration of these various blue force tracking
systems (BFT) within a common picture. The issue wasn't our inability
to integrate the tracks; rather, that this integrated view of blue
tracks was not always available at the lowest echelon--the shooter at
the point of the engagement decision.
In the near-term, our emphasis is on developing interoperable
systems that ensure this integrated BFT picture is distributed to the
shooter. The Joint Blue Force Situational Awareness (JBFSA) Advanced
Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) is already in progress, and
addresses this exact issue. The ACTD will demonstrate, by end of fiscal
year 2004, an integrated architecture of existing BFT capabilities that
includes dissemination and display of a consistent blue force picture
to the U.S. and coalition shooter. In the longer-term, the U.S. Army,
as the Department's JBFSA Lead Service, will assist USJFCOM, the joint
force integrator, in guiding the efficient acquisition of this
transformational capability.

ARMY TRANSFORMATION

REBALANCING FORCES

Question. In a memorandum of July 9, 2003, the Secretary of Defense
directed action by the Services, the Joint Staff and OSD aimed at
achieving better balance in the capabilities of the active and Reserve
components. The Secretary noted that the Department ``needs to promote
judicious and prudent use of the Reserve components with force
rebalancing initiatives that reduce strain through the efficient
application of manpower and technological solution based on a
disciplined force requirements process.''
What do you consider to be the principal problems that the
Secretary of Defense is attempting to address in his memorandum?
Answer. The Secretary emphasized the need for continuous
improvement in assigned roles and responsibilities, functions and
capabilities between the Active and Reserve components that allow us to
swiftly respond to meet the Nation's military requirements. As we
transform the military to deal with future uncertainties and the needs
to defend our territories, we must ensure the RC capabilities are
properly realigned to meet this challenge. I believe the Secretary's
vision is to balance capabilities between the Active and Reserve
component so that our force would be available on-demand, agile, and
more responsive to deal with any future threat, without overextending
any specific segment of our RC forces.
Question. What do you consider to be the biggest obstacles to
achieving the goals that the Secretary of Defense has set forth in his
memorandum?
Answer. I believe the Secretary's tasks are realistic and
achievable. Homeland security, global terrorism, and regional
uncertainties will be the determining factors on how difficult our
tasks will be. The rebalancing of active and Reserve capabilities
require that we look at all available options and the resources
required. We will work with the Services and the Department in the
evaluation of manpower availability, management techniques--including
contractor support, and technical applications to ensure our forces
remain agile, responsive, and ready.
The timeframe for achieving those goals will be challenging.
However, in light of the significant changes we have experienced in
global requirements since the end of the Cold War, it is appropriate to
review our force alignment and make changes where needed as soon as
practical.

U.S. FORCES IN KOREA

Question. Living and working conditions for many military personnel
stationed in Korea fall far below acceptable standards. The current and
previous Commanders, U.S. Forces Korea (USFK), have publicly called for
significantly enhanced pay and compensation for personnel assigned to
Korea to address these factors.
In your judgment, what steps, if any, need to be taken to improve
living and working conditions and the attractiveness of military
assignments for career personnel in Korea?
Answer. The former Chief of Staff of the Army chartered a Tiger
Team that included Joint Staff and OSD representatives to look at
conditions in Korea. The Team took an in-depth look at living and
working conditions, special pay, increasing accompanied tours and
military construction (MILCON).
Many living and working conditions in Korea are substandard. This
adversely impacts morale, retention, and readiness. USFK currently has
41 installations to maintain. As part of the Korea Land Partnership
Plan, USFK plans to reduce that number down to 21 installations. Along
with that base realignment will come improved living and working
conditions. The USFK Commander, as part of the current and future
defense strategy review, is aggressively working the MILCON issues to
ensure we take proper care of our service members.
With regards to special pay we have made significant progress with
the authorization of assignment incentive pay. The Senate Report for
the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2004
includes provisions for an assignment incentive pay ($100 per month)
specifically for Korea. Additionally, we are hopeful that the House and
Senate will enact provisions for the Fiscal Year 2004 NDAA, authorizing
officers an overseas tour extension incentive identical to what we
currently offer enlisted personnel.
With respect to unaccompanied tours, the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2003
requested the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to
report on a plan to increase accompanied tours in Korea from 10 percent
to 25 percent. Increasing the number of accompanied tours in Korea will
require a substantial infrastructure (family housing, medical care
facilities, childcare facilities and other facilities required to
support the increase in command sponsored dependents) investment.

NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY

Question. What aspects of the National Military Strategy, if any,
require modification or clarification as a result of changed world
events since issuance of the Strategy in 2001?
Answer. In 2001, the Secretary of Defense published the Quadrennial
Defense Review, which promulgated a new Defense Strategy. The Defense
Strategy directed the Armed Forces to adopt a capabilities-based
approach for force planning and force development given that the U.S.
faces dangerous adversaries and the certainty that these adversaries
will continuously adapt their capabilities in ways that will challenge
us even more in the future. This document, released in the immediate
aftermath of September 11 provides the foundation for the new National
Military Strategy.
The National Military Strategy will describe our concept for
employing military force to achieve prescribed objectives in this
dangerous and uncertain environment. Moreover, the strategy will
describe the capabilities the Armed Forces must possess to succeed
today and in the future incorporating the lessons learned in the war on
terrorism.
This draft strategy continues to reflect our highest priorities:
winning the war on terrorism, enhancing joint warfighting, and
transforming the joint force. It builds on the new National Security
Strategy and supporting strategies that have been released since
September 11 and positions the Armed Forces to conduct preventive and
preemptive operations in defense of the United States and its global
interests.

COLOMBIA

Question. U.S. military personnel have been involved in the
training and equipping of Colombian military forces involved in
counterdrug operations. U.S. military personnel, however, do not
participate in or accompany Colombian counterdrug or counterinsurgency
forces on field operations in Colombia.
Do you favor continuation of this limited role for U.S. military
personnel in Colombia?
Answer. Yes. U.S. policy for Colombia is clear that we will assist
the Colombian Government to regain control over its territory but that
the Colombian Government is ultimately responsible for resolving its
own conflict. Our forces are doing an outstanding job of training and
assisting the Colombian military and police without deploying on combat
operations with them. I do not believe that allowing U.S. military
personnel to accompany Colombian security forces would have a strategic
impact. Additionally, the Colombian military is not asking for this
type of assistance and is a properly trained and competent force.

EXCESS INFRASTRUCTURE

Question. How high a priority do you place on the closure of excess
Department of Defense installations and why?
Answer. In an environment where resources are scarce, we must
eliminate excess physical capacity to allow for increased defense
capability focused on `jointness.' I strongly support needed
infrastructure reductions facilitated by BRAC 2005.
Question. How do you respond to arguments that initiation of a new
round of base realignment and closure should be postponed until the
requirements of the global war on terrorism come into better focus?
Answer. In the wake of September 11, it is more important than ever
to avoid expending resources on excess capacity. The authority to
realign and close bases we no longer need is an essential element of
ensuring the right mix of bases and forces within our warfighting
strategy as we transform to meet the security challenges of the 21st
century.

READINESS REPORTING SYSTEM

Question. You previously have indicated that expansion and
refinement of the Global Status of Resources and Training System was
necessary and that a comprehensive readiness reporting system is
necessary.
What progress have you made in improving the readiness reporting
within the Department?
Answer. The Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS) will meet the
comprehensive readiness reporting requirements. A development contract
has been awarded on the DRRS. The system is on-track to achieve Initial
Operating Capability (IOC) by the end of fiscal year 2004 and Full
Operating Capability (FOC) by fiscal year 2007.
The Chairman's Readiness System (CRS) will continue to provide
timely and accurate macro-level readiness information until the DRRS
reaches FOC. The Joint Staff also makes discrete changes to the CRS as
required to better capture readiness data, decrease the reporting
burden, and more closely align the CRS with the DRRS vision.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views,
even if those views differ from the administration in power?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and
other communications of information are provided to this committee and
its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes.
______

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe

END STRENGTH

1. Senator Inhofe. General Myers, regarding our troops, Monday the
New York Times ran an article concerning the current strength and size
of our military. The article stated that of the Army's 33 total active
duty brigades, 21 are overseas with 16 of them in Iraq. I believe three
of the brigades are in a training status, which leaves only nine to
cover the rest of world. The article also stated that Secretary
Rumsfeld had sent a memorandum to the service secretaries and to you
requesting you ``rebalance'' the active and Reserve components. Can you
comment on the current balance or blend of active duty, Reserve, and
Guard Forces, the end strength of our military, specifically does the
end strength adequately address our worldwide commitments, and any
proposed changes that will ease the burden on our Armed Forces?
General Myers. To meet the emerging challenges of the future global
security environment, the United States will require a more flexible,
responsive, and capable military force. This force must be able to
rapidly respond to crisis situations anywhere in the world and bring to
bear an arsenal of the world's most advanced and interoperable
warfighting capabilities. We are examining our current and future
military force structure to ascertain whether adjustments are need to
ensure our military capability remains unequaled in the world. Changes
to end strength and/or the active/Reserve component balance are
possible but many other options are also being considered.

TANKER AIRCRAFT

2. Senator Inhofe. General Myers, I recently read an article
concerning the shortage of transport and tanker aircraft. The article
stated that General John Handy, the Chief of the United States
Transportation Command, was forced to devise a new method to deliver
supplies to Iraq because of a shortage of transport and tanker
aircraft. Obviously we were able to get the required supplies to Iraq,
but I am concerned that the shortage of transport and tanker aircraft
will continue to grow and that we are not addressing the issue. Is
there a current shortage of transport and tanker aircraft?
General Myers. Currently, we do not fully meet the 54.5 million ton
miles per day, the minimum requirements for a moderate risk solution as
set forth in Mobility Requirements Study 2005. General Handy's method
of delivery was predicated on the need to conduct the war on terror on
several fronts simultaneously, and reflected recent changes in how we
deploy forces. New defense planning guidance, transformation, and the
proliferation of anti-access weapons signal potentially significant
changes in the combatant commanders' requirements for airlift and air
refueling capability. We are planning to conduct another full scale
Mobility Requirements Study to clarify our transport and tanker
aircraft requirements.

3. Senator Inhofe. General Myers, can you specifically address the
Air Force's desire to retire 68 KC-135Es when there seems to be a
shortage of tanker aircraft?
General Myers. The retirement of the 68 KC-135Es, as directed in
the President's budget for fiscal year 2004, which are less capable
than the other tankers, will allow the Air National Guard to pay for
the sustainment of the aircraft and will result in a slight decrease in
offload capability, the Air Force will be able to mitigate this by re-
distributing aircrew and maintenance personnel throughout the remaining
KC-135Rs. This will allow the Air Force to better utilize all KC-135
aircraft.

4. Senator Inhofe. General Myers, I understand the Air Force is
looking at leasing 100 Boeing 767s, but what are the long-term plans
for replacing the KC-135? Wouldn't the Air Force need more than 100
Boeing 767s?
General Myers. One hundred KC-767s are only the beginning of a
long-term plan to recapitalize the entire tanker fleet. The planned
Mobility Requirements Study and follow-on studies will help us
determine the precise level of tanker capability we will need in the
future. This effort will likely span the next few decades due to fiscal
matters and production rates of suitable replacement aircraft.
______

Question Submitted by Senator Carl Levin

GUANTANAMO BAY DETAINEES

5. Senator Levin. General Myers, the Department of Defense
announced on July 23, 2003, that an Australian detainee, who is being
held at Guantanamo Bay, if charged, would not be subject to the death
penalty and his conversations with his defense counsel would not be
subject to monitoring. Britain's attorney general announced a similar
result with respect to two British detainees on July 22, 2003, after
meetings at the Pentagon. While it may be that these decisions are the
result of a careful review of the particular circumstances in these
three cases, the fact that these decisions apply to the citizens of the
two nations that participated from day one with troops on the ground in
Afghanistan, creates the impression that their citizens are receiving
favorable treatment. Can you tell us if these three detainees are being
given favorable treatment because Australia and Great Britain were part
of the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan, or will similar treatment be
afforded to all detainees without regard to their nationality?
General Myers. The President recently determined that six detainees
at Guantanamo are subject to his military order of 13 Nov 2001. This
determination is not a decision that any of the six detainees will
necessarily be charged or stand trial, only that if tried, the detainee
will be tried before a military commission. Two of those six detainees
are British, and one is Australian. Shortly after the President's
determination, the White House issued a statement that military
commissions against U.K. or Australian nationals would not commence
pending discussions between legal experts of each nation. Since then,
the Office of General Counsel of the Department of Defense has held
numerous discussions with both British and Australian officials, and
more are scheduled. While I am generally aware that many of the issues
raised by the U.K. and Australia have been discussed, the Joint Staff
has not been involved in these discussions, and any decisions on issues
raised during these discussions or relating to commission procedures or
charges will be made at the OSD level.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed

BASIC RESEARCH

6. Senator Reed. General Myers, what role does the Department of
Defense's basic research (6.1) program play in your vision of our
Nation's military?
General Myers. The DOD Basic Research (6.1) program generates new
knowledge and understanding in science and engineering fields that
underpin national defense. It stimulates development of new technology,
which is the foundation for enhancing capabilities of military systems
and for making them easier and less expensive to manufacture, operate,
and maintain. Technological advances are key to fielding a military
that is prepared to fight and win this Nation's battles today and in
the future.

7. Senator Reed. General Myers, what level of investment do you
feel is appropriate for this type of research given other near-term
priorities?
General Myers. The breakthroughs used to maintain our technological
edge and achieve our transformation goals have come through a stable
and robust investment in basic research. The basic research portfolio
allows warfighters today and tomorrow to have superior and affordable
technology options to meet their missions, and to give them
transformational war-winning capabilities. Technologies such as stealth
aircraft, the Global Positioning System, night vision devices,
precision-guided munitions, and vastly more capable information
management systems are the results of the Department's investment in
basic research. The technological advantage our Armed Forces enjoy
today is a legacy of decades of investment in basic resesrch.

8. Senator Reed. General Myers, how will you measure the
effectiveness of investment in these programs in supporting our
Nation's warfighters?
General Myers. Measuring the outputs of basic research is one of
the more difficult metrics in science and technology. We already
measure the numbers of graduate students supported, and the number of
patents and publications. What is more difficult to measure is the
long-term impact of basic research on future systems. For instance,
when the Navy conducted basic research on atomic clocks in the 1960s,
the Department did not realize that one of the outputs would be the
Global Positioning Systems. These discoveries are vital to continued
military dominance and provide the opportunity for continued
transformation.

TECHNOLOGY TRANSITION

9. Senator Reed. General Myers, how effectively does the Department
of Defense transition promising technologies from science and
technology programs into fielded systems?
General Myers. The recent success of our forces on the battlefield
attests to the superiority in technology achieved by the Department of
Defense in transforming science and technology programs into fielded
capabilities. The interaction of organizations responsible for defining
military requirements, identifying technical solutions and fielding
combat-ready systems has produced the best military in the world. As
good as we are, we aim to be better. Working closely with individual
military departments, the Joint Staff established its joint
capabilities based requirements process. The Director, Defense Research
and Engineering restructured his science and technology coordination
group to parallel the joint requirements structure, producing a
streamlined laboratory-to-battlefield connection. The Under Secretary
of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) provides a variety
of programs such as Quick Reaction Special Projects and Advanced
Concept Technology Demonstrations to speed cutting edge technology to
joint warfighters faster than traditional procurement processes. I am
convinced that we transition new technology to the battlefield faster
than ever before.

10. Senator Reed. General Myers, what can be done from the
perspective of operators to improve the speed and efficiency of
technology development and transition?
General Myers. We are building on our technology transition
successes and anticipate even greater efficiency in the future.
Ensuring that our science and technology investments are aligned with
operational requirements yields efficiency of effort. Developing new
acquisition processes to ease access for a diversity of defense
technology providers gives us challenging and refreshing new solutions.
As we aim to be efficient with requirement-driven technology
development, we need also to be receptive to leap-ahead opportunities
that might not be envisioned by warriors. The drive to be responsive to
emergent military requirements and to shorten the timeline between test
bench and battlefield is being vigorously pursued in all arenas related
to transition: designing, testing, demonstrating, procuring, and
sustaining capabilities for frontline fighters. We are without peer in
rapidly transitioning the best technologies to fielded systems.

MILITARY SERVICES SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PROGRAMS

11. Senator Reed. General Myers, the level of investment in science
and technology by each of our military services has not kept pace with
their overall budget increases. Do you think that the military services
should be investing more in science and technology?
General Myers. A strong science and technology program is required
to provide options for responding to a full range of military
challenges both today, and into the uncertain future. I think it is
important to look at science and technology across the Department,
under the current administration the budget request for science and
technology has recently grown over 25 percent, which represents a
significant commitment to science and technology. It is the
Department's goal to grow the science and technology investment to 3
percent of the total defense budget.

12. Senator Reed. General Myers, how should the value of those
investments be compared with investments in procurement and current
operations?
General Myers. Output metrics are important for all categories of
investments and the Department is in fact working hard to develop
output oriented metrics that include science and technology. At the end
of the day, however, decisions require thoughtful, yet subjective input
from experts in science and technology, as well as from military
leaders on what is most important for the Department of Defense.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka

OPERATION NOBLE EAGLE

13. Senator Akaka. General Myers, I would like to get your thoughts
on a mission we don't hear much about any more, Operation Noble Eagle.
As I understand it, one of the primary objectives of the operation is
to deter possible air attacks like those of September 11. Is my
understanding correct that we are attempting to dissuade potential
attackers from September 11th-like attacks with airliners or other
planes used as bombs or missiles?
General Myers. Yes sir. Operation Noble Eagle plays a vital role in
homeland defense. It is a visible and constant reminder of the ability
and resolve of the United States to defend itself against those who
would seek to repeat September 11-like attacks on our homeland.

14. Senator Akaka. General Myers, in your military judgment, is our
current practice of launching combat air patrols and keeping fighter
jets on alert effective in achieving this objective? If so, is this the
most effective way to accomplish this deterrent? Have you considered
any other alternatives or do you have any recommendations?
General Myers. The Department of Defense works closely with the
Federal Aviation Administration and the Department of Homeland Security
to ensure we provide the best deterrent possible within our current
force posture. The use of military air patrols and alert fighters,
Temporary Flight Restriction airspace, and the increased airline and
airport security measures implemented by the Department of Homeland
Security provide a significant, overt deterrent to potential attackers.
Other efforts, such as the interagency-developed and staffed National
Capital Region Coordination Center and the Department of Defense-led
National Capital Region Integrated Air Defense System are clear signs
we are working to integrate both law enforcement and interagency
partners into the air defense community. Finally, we have made
tremendous improvements with the Department of Homeland Security, and
its many agencies such as Immigration and Customs Enforcement and the
United States Secret Service, in the sharing of information and ability
to enhance the effective execution of each other's missions.

15. Senator Akaka. General Myers, how long do you think this
mission will continue, and how long, in your judgment, do you think
that it should?
General Myers. This mission will remain until the threat it
counters is gone. Operation Noble Eagle will be incorporated into
NORAD's Concept Plan 3310-02, U.S./Canadian bilateral air defense plan.
As the threat evolves, the name of the mission might change but the
protection provided by Operation Noble Eagle to the homeland will
continue as long as necessary.

16. Senator Akaka. General Myers, I understand that Operation Noble
Eagle missions are flown by the Air Force, and that a large number of
the sorties are actually flown by the Reserve and National Guard. Are
you exploring options to relieve some of the burden on the Air Force
for this mission?
General Myers. The distribution of missions and the associated unit
Operations TEMPO is a very real concern. However, the historic mission
of the Air Force Reserve and National Guard is the defense of the
United States. By giving the homeland defense mission primarily to the
Air Force Guard and Reserve, we free active duty Air Force, Marine, and
Navy air units for deployment overseas in support of our national
objectives.

RANGE SPACE

17. Senator Akaka. General Myers, there seems to be continuing
pressures to grow on our military ranges, demand is increasing for
range space, and supply is increasingly challenged as urbanization and
other factors limit our range activities. While a partial solution may
be an increased reliance on automation, simulation, and constructive
environments, we will continue to need large plots of land to support
live fire training, testing, and evaluation. Therefore, although these
diverging trends may be manageable in the short-term, a long-term
strategic solution appears to be required. At least part of the
solution may lie in improved management of our existing range space by
increasing joint use, but also by better integrating test and training
ranges. What steps are you taking to develop a viable, long-range plan
to address these challenges, and what changes are necessary to ensure
its success?
General Myers. The pressures and challenges of infringement on our
existing range infrastructure are certainly increasing. In a world of
unconstrained requirements and finite resources, the Department of
Defense recognizes that we must find flexible and creative solutions to
continue to test and train our joint forces effectively. Computers,
models, and simulators are already heavily in use, but can only teach
so much. Combat often involves realities that cannot be simulated. The
availability of usable range spaces is clearly critical to maintaining
military training proficiency. We also realize that we cannot easily
expand or duplicate these capabilities elsewhere to satisfy emerging
needs. To that end, DOD has aggressively sought measures to optimize
the use of our ranges. DOD is studying the problem as part of the
Sustainable Ranges Initiative, which involves identifying range
requirements, documenting capabilities and shortfalls, and examining
utilization as one aspect of a comprehensive solution to long-term
preservation of our Nation's test and training capabilities.
Many of our premier test ranges, like Eglin AFB, are heavily
involved in service and joint training activities. Eglin AFB supports a
wide range of weapons systems and ordnance testing, while
simultaneously sustaining a spectrum of Air Force, sister and joint
training and experimentation needs. This trend towards increasing
collaboration will continue. From a strategic standpoint, joint
training and experimentation capabilities are also of increasing
importance to our Nation's defense. The Joint National Training
Capability, a new DOD initiative to meet today's joint force training
needs will stress the development and implementation of joint training/
exercise capabilities at many premier ranges. This and similar DOD
efforts are leading the way to integrated range use.
Where appropriate, training or testing areas designed for one
service can also accommodate the needs of others. However, joint use
will not fully satisfy service-unique training requirements.
Scheduling, utilization, and availability issues must also be
considered. As an example, much of our land is managed for sustainable
long-term use, which means range managers must consider the land's
``carrying capacity'' for training. This is not just an environmental
concern. Realistic training often calls for well-vegetated and non-
degraded landscapes, and terrain representative of field conditions.
Overuse of the terrain can degrade this realism, as well as compromise
DOD environmental stewardship obligations.

DEPLOYMENT PROCESS

18. Senator Akaka. General Myers, please provide additional details
on the plans DOD has to improve the deployment process, the rationale
to support these changes, and a timeline for their implementation.
General Myers. As the Joint Deployment Process Owner (JDPO), United
States Joint Forces Command is leading the effort to make the joint
deployment planning and mobilization process more efficient. We will
participate fully with USJFCOM on these efforts.
A revision of the requirements review procedure is under way, and
will result in improved processes and automated tools to monitor
availability of forces and validate the combatant commanders' requests
for forces. In the near-term, a ``Quickwins'' Tiger Team formed under
the supervision of the JDPO will propose immediate actions learned from
the Operation Iraqi Freedom deployment. In the mid-/far-term, the JDPO
and the Joint Logistic Transformation Center, in conjunction with the
Joint Staff, will lead the effort to re-engineer the deployment
process. Collectively, new emerging technologies, once integrated into
the deployment process, will offer the force provider an enhanced
capability to more efficiently and effectively manage the total force
deployment, to include the activation of the Reserves.
Regarding mobilization, JDPO is developing a more agile, responsive
process to mobilize Reserve component forces and individuals through
changes in service and joint doctrine, policy, and law. In the near-
term, USJFCOM will use the ``Quickwins'' strategy to garner short-term
improvements in the mobilization process. In the long-term, USJFCOM
will develop new concepts for mobilization more suited to the future
environment and linked to the Joint Deployment Process. This will be
collaborative effort that includes coordination with the Reserve
Component Leadership and the Reserve Forces Policy Board.
______

[The nomination reference of Gen. Richard B. Myers, USAF,
follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
June 18, 2003.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
The following named United States Air Force officer for
reappointment as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
appointment to the grade indicated while assigned to a position of
importance and responsibility under title 10, U.S.C., sections 601 and
152:

To be General

Gen. Richard B. Myers, 7092.
______

[The biographical sketch of Gen. Richard B. Myers, USAF,
which was transmitted to the committee at the time the
nomination was referred, follows:]
Resume of Service Career of Gen. Richard B. Myers, USAF
Date and place of birth: 1 March 1942; Kansas City, MO.

Years of active service: Over 38 years as of 5 June 2003.

Schools attended and degrees: Kansas St Univ, BS, 1965; Auburn Univ AL,
MA, 1977; Air Command and Staff College, 1977; Army War
College, 1981.

Joint specialty officer: Yes.

Aeronautical rating: Command Pilot.

Major permanent duty assignments:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
From To
------------------------------------------------------------------------
USAFR, Not on Active Duty........................... Feb 65 Jun 65
Stu Ofcr, Undergrad Plt Tng, 3576 Stu Sq, ATC, Vance Jun 65 Dec 66
AFB OK.............................................
Plt, Tac Ftr, F-4D, 417 TFSq, USAFE, Ramstein AB GE. Dec 66 Jul 68
Plt, Tac Ftr, F-4D, 417 TFSq, TAC, Mt Home AFB ID... Jul 68 May 69
Stu, USAF Opnl Tng Crs, F-4E, 436 TFSq, TAC, May 69 Dec 69
Homestead AFB FL...................................
Acft Comdr, F-4D, 13 TFSq, PACAF, Udorn RTAFB TH.... Dec 69 Nov 70
Acft Comdr, F-4C, 80 TFSq, PACAF, Yokota AB JA...... Dec 70 Mar 71
Acft Comdr, F-4C, Specl Tactics, 67 TFSq, PACAF, Mar 71 Mar 73
Kadena AB JA.......................................
Flt Comdr, F-4C, Specl Tactics, 67 TFSq, PACAF, Mar 73 Sep 73
Kadena AB JA.......................................
Ftr Wpns Instr, F-4, 414 FWSq, TAC, Nellis AFB NV... Sep 73 Apr 75
Flt Comdr, F-4, 414 FWSq, TAC, Nellis AFB NV........ May 75 Aug 76
Stu, Air Comd & Staff College, AU, Maxwell AFB AL... Aug 76 Jun 77
Air OpS Ofcr, Opnl Test & Eval Div, AF/XOORE, Hq Jul 77 Jul 80
USAF, Pentagon DC..................................
Stu, U.S. Army War College, Hq Comd, Carlisle Jul 80 Jun 81
Barracks, PA.......................................
Ch, wpns & Tactics Div, 4 TFSq, TAC, Seymour-Johnson Jun 81 Oct 81
AFB NC.............................................
Ops Ofcr, D/Ops, 355 TFSq, TAC, Seymour-Johnson AFB Oct 81 Jun 82
NC.................................................
Comdr, 335 TFSq, TAC, Seymour-Johnson AFB NC........ Jun 82 Jan 84
Dep Dir, Pers Plans & Sys, DCS/Pers, Hq TAC, Langley Jan 84 Oct 84
AFB VA.............................................
Inspection Team Ch, Hq TAC/IGD, Langley AFB VA...... Oct 84 Sep 85
Comdt, USAF Ftr Wpns Sch, TAC, Nellis AFB NV........ Sep 85 Aug 86
Comdr, 325 TTWg, TAC, Tyndall AFB FL................ Sep 86 Jun 87
Comdr, 1 TFWg, TAC, Langley AFB VA.................. Jun 87 Feb 89
Asst DCS/Plans, Hq TAC, Langley AFB VA.............. Feb 89 Jun 89
Inspector General, Hq TAC, Langley AFB VA........... Jun 89 Jan 90
DCS/Plans, TAC; Dep Dir, Plans; & DCS/Plans, LANT, Jan 90 Jun 90
Langley AFB VA.....................................
DCS/Requirements, Hq TAC, Langley AFB VA............ Jun 90 Dec 91
Dir, Ftr, Comdr Cntrl & Wpns prgms, SAF/AQ, Pentagon Dec 91 Nov 93
DC.................................................
Comdr, U.S. Forces JA; Comdr, 5 AF, PACAF; Comdr, Nov 93 Jun 96
USAFS JA; & Comdr, WESTPACNORTH Air Def Rgn, Yokota
AB JA..............................................
Asst to CJCS, Joint Staff, Pentagon, Washington, DC. Jul 96 Jul 97
Comdr, Pacific Air Forces; and Air Component Jul 97 Aug 98
Commander, United States Pacific Command, Hickam
AFB, HI............................................
USCINCSPACE; CINCNORAD; AFSPC/CC; and DOD Manager Aug 98 Mar 00
for Manned Space Flight Support Operations,
Peterson AFB, CO...................................
Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Pentagon, Mar 00 Oct 01
Washington, DC.....................................
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Pentagon, Oct 01 Present
Washington, DC.....................................
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Promotions:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Effective
Date
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Second Lieutenant.......................................... 3 Feb 65
First Lieutenant........................................... 5 Dec 66
Captain.................................................... 13 Jun 68
Major...................................................... 1 Sep 76
Lieutenant Colonel......................................... 1 Dec 79
Colonel.................................................... 1 Sep 84
Brigadier General.......................................... 1 Apr 90
Major General.............................................. 1 Sep 92
Lieutenant General......................................... 12 Nov 93
General.................................................... 1 Sep 97
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Decorations:
Defense Distinguished Service Medal with two Bronze Oak Leaf
Clusters
Distinguished Service Medal
Legion of Merit
Distinguished Flying Cross with one Bronze Oak Leaf Cluster
Meritorious Service Medal with three Bronze Oak Leaf Clusters
Air Medal with three Silver Oak Leaf Clusters and three Bronze Oak
Leaf Clusters
Air Force Commendation Medal

Summary of Joint Assignments:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Assignments Dates Grade
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Oct 01-Present.... Gen.
Pentagon, Washington DC.
Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Mar 00-Oct 01..... Gen.
Staff, Pentagon, Washington DC.
USCINCSPACE; CINCNORAD; AFSPC/ Aug 98-Mar 00..... Gen.
CC; and DOD Manager for Manned
Space Flight Support
Operations, Peterson AFB, CO.
Assistant to Chairman, Joint Jul 96-Jul 97..... Lt. Gen.
Chiefs of Staff, Joint Staff,
Pentagon, Washington, DC.
Comdr, U.S. Forces Japan; Comdr, Nov 93-Jun 96..... Lt. Gen.
5th AF, PACAF; Comdr, U.S. Air
Forces Japan; & Comdr,
WESTPACNORTH Air Defense
Region, Yokota AB JA.
Air Ops Officer,\1\ Operational Jul 77-Jul 80..... Lt. Col. Major
Test & Eval Div, Directorate of
Ops & Readiness, Dep Chief of
Staff, Ops, Programs &
Readiness, Pentagon DC.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Joint Equivalent

______

[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior
military officers nominated by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Gen. Richard
B. Myers, USAF in connection with his nomination follows:]

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Washington, DC, 10 June 2003.
Hon. John W. Warner, Chairman,
Committee on Armed Services,
United States Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: This letter provides information on my financial
and other interests for your consideration in connection with my re-
nomination to the position of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Pentagon, Washington, DC. It supplements Standard Form 278, ``Executive
Branch Personnel Public Financial Disclosure Report,'' which has
already been provided to the committee and which summarizes my
financial interests.
To the best of my knowledge, none of the financial interests listed
on my Standard Form 278 will create any conflict of interest in the
execution of my governmental responsibilities. Additionally, I have no
other interests or liabilities in any amount with any firm or
organization that is a Department of Defense contractor.
During my term of office, neither I nor any member of my immediate
family will invest in any entity that would create a conflict of
interest with my government duties. I do not have any present
employment arrangements with any entity other than the Department of
Defense and have no formal or informal understandings concerning any
further employment with any entity.
I have never been arrested or charged with any criminal offenses
other than minor traffic violations. I have never been party to any
civil litigation. To the best of my knowledge, there have never been
any lawsuits filed against any agency of the Federal Government or
corporate entity with which I have been associated reflecting adversely
on the work I have done at such agency or corporation. I am aware of no
incidents reflecting adversely upon my suitability to serve in the
position for which I have been re-nominated.
To the best of my knowledge, I am not presently the subject of any
governmental inquiry or investigation.
I trust that the foregoing information will be satisfactory to the
committee.
Sincerely,
Richard B. Myers,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

Part A--Biographical Information

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Richard Bowman Myers.

2. Position to which nominated:
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

3. Date of nomination:
18 June 2003.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
1 March 1942; Kansas City, Missouri.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Mary Jo Myers (Rupp).

7. Names and ages of children:
Nicole M. Little, 32.
Erin L. Voto, 30.
Richard B. Myers, Jr., 24.

10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
Armed Forces Benefit Association.
The Army and Air Force Mutual Aid Association.
Air Force Association.
Kansas State University Alumni Association.
U.S. Army War College Alumni Association.
Sigma Alpha Epsilon (Fraternal).
The Retired Officers Association.
Vietnam Veterans of America.
Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States.

11. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, and other special recognitions for outstanding
service or achievements other than those listed on the service record
extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
Ira Eaker Fellow, Air Force Association.
1991 Alumni Fellow Award, College of Engineering, Kansas State
University.
Kansas State University, Engineering Hall of Fame.
General Thomas D. White Space Award.
General James V. Hartinger Space Award.
Canadian Meritorious Service Cross.
Medal of the French Legion of Honor and French National Legion of
Honor.
American Academy of Achievement Award.
Distinguished Kansan of the Year.
USAF's Gray Eagle Award.

12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly
constituted committee of the Senate?
Yes.

13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly
constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if
those views differ from the administration in power?
Yes.
______

Signature and Date

[The nomination of Gen. Richard B. Myers, USAF, was
reported to the Senate by Chairman Warner on July 30, 2003,
with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The
nomination was confirmed by the Senate on July 31, 2003.]
----------

[Prepared questions submitted to Gen. Peter Pace, USMC, by
Chairman Warner prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follows:]

Questions and Responses

DEFENSE REFORMS

Question. You previously have answered the committee's policy
questions on the reforms brought about by the Goldwater-Nichols Act in
connection with your nominations to be Commander, U.S. Southern Command
and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Has your view of the importance, implementation, and practice of
these reforms changed since you testified before the committee at your
most recent confirmation hearing on September 25, 2001?
Answer. My fundamental view of the Goldwater-Nichols Act remains
unchanged. Overall, the implementation and practice of the reforms have
clearly strengthened the warfighting capabilities of our combatant
commands while maintaining civilian control over the military. I
believe that when the history books are written on Operation Iraqi
Freedom, they will note that this was the first time that the military
services truly fought jointly, rather than simply deconflict their
actions on the battlefield. That joint fight was key to our success.
Question. Do you foresee the need for additional modifications of
Goldwater-Nichols in light of the changing environment? If so, what
areas do you believe it might be appropriate to address in these
modifications?
Answer. The global war against terrorism has highlighted our need
to work more closely within the interagency process, as well as with
our coalition partners. The Joint Staff is currently identifying
methods that will allow the CJCS and me to carry out our duties as
described in Title 10 more effectively and efficiently. The Center for
Strategic and International Studies is conducting an independent study
of Goldwater-Nichols, and the Department of Defense is conducting an
Organizational Study, led by Mr. ``Pete'' Aldridge. I look forward to
reviewing the suggestions and recommendations these efforts will
produce.

DUTIES

Question. What recommendations, if any, do you have for changes in
the duties and functions of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff as laid out in Title 10, United States Code, and in regulations
of the Department of Defense pertaining to functions of the Vice
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?
Answer. I believe that I serve a critical role for our Nation's
defense as the Chairman of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council
(JROC), and as the Chairman's representative to the National Security
Council Deputies Committee. Further, I am the designated officer to
perform the duties of the Chairman should he be absent or unable to
perform his duties as established by Title 10. In all of these
functions, it is both my legal responsibility and moral obligation to
provide my best military advice to the President, the Secretary of
Defense, and the National Security Council. The Goldwater-Nichols Act
has provided the appropriate language to create my position. I advocate
keeping the position and duties of Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff in tact.

VICE CHAIRMAN'S TERM OF OFFICE

Question. Requirements for appointment as Vice Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and limitations on the length of time an officer
may serve in that capacity, including renewable 2 year terms under
certain conditions, are set forth in Section 154 of Title 10, United
States Code.
What are your personal views about the sufficiency of the
provisions of existing law regarding the office of Vice Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff as set forth in Section 154?
Answer. Recently, the Department of Defense proposed legislation to
provide for 2 year terms for both the CJCS and the VCJCS and that the
President could reappoint the CJCS and the VCJCS as he deems necessary.
The current limitation of two additional terms would be removed under
this proposal. I support this proposal as it provides the President
increased flexibility in managing the most senior levels of his
military advisors, and takes greater advantage of the military
expertise and experience accumulated during previous terms.

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. Please identify any changes you have observed since your
last confirmation in the relationships between the Vice Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and the following officials.
The Deputy Secretary of Defense.
Answer. Under existing directives, the Deputy Secretary of Defense
has been delegated full power and authority to act for the Secretary of
Defense on any matters that the Secretary is authorized to act. Because
of our close association and coordination in numerous briefings,
particularly those involving the global war on terrorism, I am proud to
report that the relationship between the Vice Chairman and the Deputy
Secretary of Defense has grown even stronger over these past 2 years.
Question. The Under Secretaries of Defense.
Answer. Title 10, United States Code, and current DOD directives
establish the Under Secretaries of Defense as the principal staff
assistants and advisors to the Secretary regarding matters related to
their functional areas. Recently, the Secretary established the Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. Aside from this new position, I
have not noticed any changes in the relationship of the Vice Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the Under Secretaries of Defense
since my last confirmation hearing.
Question. The Assistant Secretaries of Defense.
Answer. The Secretary of Defense has created a new Assistant
Secretary for Networks & Information Integration who reports directly
to the Deputy Secretary of Defense. He has also created a new ASD for
Homeland Defense who reports to USD (Policy). Aside from these new
positions, I have not noticed any changes in the relationship of the
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the Assistant
Secretaries of Defense since my last confirmation hearing.
Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Answer. I have great respect and admiration for General Myers and
the job he has done as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I am
proud to serve as his Vice Chairman, and we enjoy a close, and closely
coordinated relationship, not only between our offices, but between us
and the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense. This represents a
continuation of the very effective relationship between the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff since my last confirmation hearing.
Question. The Secretaries of the Military Departments.
Answer. The Under Secretary of the Air Force now acts as the
Executive Agent for Space Program procurement, which is especially
important to the Vice Chairman in the Vice Chairman's role as Chairman
of the JROC. Aside from this, I have not noticed any changes in the
relationship of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the
Secretaries of the Military Departments since my last confirmation
hearing.
Question. The Chiefs of Staff of the Services.
Answer. I have not noticed any changes in the relationship of the
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Chiefs of Staff of
the Services since my last confirmation hearing.
Question. The combatant commanders.
Answer. The President-approved Unified Command Plan created U.S.
Northern Command and redefined the roles and responsibilities of U.S.
Strategic Command. Both of these new command entities have enhanced the
overall ability of the Armed Forces and the Department of Defense.
Aside from these welcomed additions, I have not noticed any changes in
the relationship of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with
the combatant commanders since my last confirmation hearing.

MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that you
would confront if confirmed for a second term of office as Vice
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?
Answer. In my view, there are two major challenges. First, there is
the challenge of maintaining the extent and breadth of our current
commitments while being prepared to respond to others. Simultaneously,
we have the challenge of transforming our Armed Forces to become a
force well positioned to face the demands of the 21st century.
The United States is well positioned to meet these challenges. We
must continue our warfighting efforts; transform the force in a way
that makes joint warfighting second nature; and streamline the
strategic landscape.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for
addressing these challenges?
Answer. The Joint Staff has a long history of anticipating,
planning and executing plans that address these issues. Over the past
year we have undertaken an Operational Availability Study to assess our
force needs and deployment timelines in the context of our military
strategy.
As we look forward, we will continue to execute seminar war games
in support of our global commitments, such as Prominent Hammer and
Elaborate Crossbow. These and other efforts clearly have shaped our
current operational thinking and planning as we work with the combatant
commanders to prepare for the future.
We are also using Operation Iraqi Freedom as an opportunity to
evaluate basing opportunities against the backdrop of the new strategic
situation. The Services are also reviewing their rotation policies to
optimize their readiness and ability to respond globally. All of these
efforts are being done through the lens of our new strategy.
We will continue to capitalize on our lessons learned from recent
operations.
We must also continue on the road to transformation. Over time, we
will use our recently implemented capabilities-based methodology, to
establish a common baseline for analyzing future capabilities and
identifying and filling capability gaps.

TRANSFORMATION

Question. If confirmed, you would continue to play an important
role in the process of transforming the Armed Forces to meet new and
emerging threats.
With the benefit of almost 2 years in office, please discuss the
progress that the Department has made in transforming the Armed Forces?
Answer. One area of transformational progress that I am
particularly proud of as the Chairman of the JROC is the Operational
Availability Study. Simply put, this has been an iterative process of
asking ourselves and our combatant commanders how much of our
warfighting capability is needed, and how quickly is it needed at a
particular place to support the various war plans. By reviewing the
plans in this way, we have been able to tee up decision points for the
Secretary of Defense that have transformed the way we plan,
preposition, and mobilize our current force. It also will have
significant impact on how we equip our forces for future joint
warfighting requirements.
Question. What are your goals regarding transformation in the
future?
Answer. I believe that transformation is as much a mind set as it
is the acquisition of new equipment or the implementation of new
doctrine. My goal is to help grow a generation of warfighters who are
both firmly established in their service culture and strengths, and
equally as comfortable applying that knowledge in the joint arena. The
approach to future transformation should incorporate the latest
technological capabilities, but should also include the ability to
think differently about what we already have.

JOINT OFFICER MANAGEMENT

Question. Provisions of law in Title 10, United States Code,
regarding such matters as management policies for joint specialty
officers, promotion objectives for joint officers, joint professional
military education, and joint duty assignments have been in effect for
over 15 years. Among other factors, changes in the size and composition
of the officer corps, in the career patterns of officers, in
operational requirements, and in the personnel requirements of the
combatant commanders in successfully pursuing joint warfare have
resulted in proposed legislative changes to existing law.
Based on your extensive experience in the joint arena, what
legislative changes, if any, would you recommend in joint officer
management and joint professional military education?
Answer. While the intent of JOM portion of the Goldwater-Nichols
Act remains valid, the requirement for JSOs has changed as the
Department has gained experience in joint operations. The combatant
commanders tell us they need officers well grounded in their functional
skills and service competencies, not simply joint specialists. We
believe the combatant commanders are in the best position to identify
their JSO requirements, and the current numerical JSO quotas limit
their desired flexibility.
In March 2003, the Department forwarded the report of the
congressionally directed Independent Study of Joint Officer Management
and Joint Professional Military Education. The completed report made
several recommendations regarding changes needed to update JOM/JPME. We
are developing a strategic plan to help shape JOM to meet our future
joint requirements.
Question. What legislative changes, if any, regarding the
management of general and flag officers would you recommend?
Answer. The general and flag officer (G/FO) management changes
delineated in the Defense Transformational Act of 2003 will improve the
efficiency and effectiveness of the Department of Defense. The
Department's goal is to design a transformational G/FO management
system that provides flexibility to the President, the Secretary of
Defense, and the military departments in order to respond to rapidly
changing situations. The enhanced ability to manage G/FO job tenure and
career length will improve responsiveness to the evolving requirements
of the 21st century and continue to attract, develop, and retain
talented, experienced general and flag officers.

JOINT REQUIREMENTS

Question. With the establishment of U.S. Joint Forces Command, it
was envisioned that the Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command, would
represent the requirements and interests of combatant commander in the
overall defense requirements and acquisition process.
In your view, has the Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command, been
able to satisfactorily represent the requirements and needs of
combatant commanders to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council and
the military services?
Answer. Yes. For example, in June of this year the Chairman issued
the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS)
Instruction, CJCSI 3170.01C. JCIDS enumerates the procedures of the
Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). The JROC supports the
Department by identifying, assessing and prioritizing joint military
capability needs. JCIDS moves the JROC from a requirements-based to a
capabilities-based process--a change specifically designed to better
develop up-front integrated joint warfighting capability for the
combatant commanders, and specifically enabling the interaction you
envision for Joint Forces Command. In particular, under JCIDs,
Commander, Joint Forces Command, leads the Command and Control
Functional Capabilities Board (FCB), which is the principal organ for
representing the joint and interoperable qualities so essential for
effective command and control in the future.
Question. Are combatant commanders able to identify critical joint
warfighting requirements and quickly acquire needed capabilities?
Answer. Combatant commanders identify joint warfighting
requirements well. The new JCIDS process improves their participation
and strengthens their voices in moving requirements forward and
developing solutions. Every Functional Capabilities Board (FCB)
includes expanded combatant commander representation, giving them
improved insight and new leverage. Advanced Capabilities Technology
Demonstration (ACTD), is one of the Department's means of testing and
quickly fielding promising systems. This new process strengthens and
empowers the combatant commanders in quickly fielding solutions to
their warfighting needs.
Question. What suggestions, if any, do you have for improving the
requirements and acquisition process to ensure that combatant
commanders are able to quickly acquire needed joint warfighting
capabilities?
Answer. In addition to ACTDs, the Department has a number of other
methods for quickly fielding our best ideas, including the Joint Test
and Evaluation Program that is used to assess the military utility of
new capabilities and mature advanced technologies. This program,
initiated at the Congress' behest, employed and evaluated 11
initiatives in Operation Iraqi Freedom. My suggestion for improving the
process would simply be to continue the course with these new methods
of fielding our new ideas and promising systems.

DEFENSE PLANNING

Question. The Office of the Secretary of Defense recently announced
the overhaul of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System and
adopted a 2-year planning cycle. The Planning, Programming, Budgeting
and Execution (PPBE) system will ``. . . get more integrity into the
whole system, much more efficiency, much more clarity, and much more
credibility,'' according to the Comptroller.
What do you see as the Joint Staff's role in this new system?
Answer. The Joint Staff's role is unchanged. The chairman will
continue to meet his statutory obligations by issuing Program Appraisal
and Program Recommendation memoranda and participating actively in
development of the Defense Planning Guidance and in annual OSD program
and budget reviews.
Question. Will the new Planning, Programming, and Budgeting and
Execution (PPBE) system be more responsive to the requirements of the
combatant commanders than the old system?
Answer. Yes. The new Joint Capabilities Integration and Development
System (JCIDS) supports the Defense Department's aim of providing
equipment that is used throughout each of America's armed services and
that best meets the needs of the combatant commanders. The new JCIDS
process directly feeds the PPBE, serving as a tool for combatant
commanders to make timely inputs to the PPBE system for follow-on
programmatic actions. JCIDS not only better incorporates the combatant
commanders capability concerns early in the process, it also helps
combine these needs with the joint concepts and architectures they have
already identified. Additionally, it provides them a seat on the
Functional Capabilities Board that reviews issues in a joint manner
across the Department.
Question. Do you believe the Joint Forces Command should have a
more active role in the PPBE? If so, how should they be included in the
process? If not, why not?
Answer. The Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command, Admiral
Giambastiani, has aggressively set about accomplishing the broadened
mission he was given under change two to the Unified Command Plan. He
has reinvigorated Joint Forces Command's ties to the planning,
programming, budgeting, and execution functionaries in Washington, and
as such is playing a very active role in PPBE.

JOINT REQUIREMENTS OVERSIGHT COUNCIL (JROC)

Question. In your response to the committee's advanced policy
questions from your last confirmation, you indicated an intent to
strengthen the JROC's strategic focus with the goals of enhancing the
JROC's influence of requirements integration through the development of
operational concepts and architectures; integrating U.S. Joint Forces
Command joint experimentation efforts into the JROC process; and
shifting the JROC's focus to future joint warfighting requirements
while still addressing current commander in chief priorities.
How would you assess your success to date in achieving these goals?
Answer. We are on the right path and have recently taken several
steps to ensure the JROC process is better focused on capabilities
needs--a top down, strategy based approach. A lot of work has gone into
this already and more remains to be done. We are developing a Joint
Operations Concept to provide an overarching linkage between strategy
and capabilities. The combatant commanders are providing four
underpinning Joint Operating Concepts. We have aligned our Joint
Warfighting Capability Assessment Teams into five functional areas--
each of which will have its own associated functional concept. Finally,
we have laid out a plan for reviewing and refining these concepts as
the combatant commanders and Functional Concept teams bring them
forward.
Question. Has your vision for the role and priorities of the JROC
changed since 2001?
Answer. The requirements generation process needed to change. The
old requirements generation process too-often produced stove-piped
solutions that were platform-centric and overly threat-based. We found
we needed to provide betters tools, to allow for more objective
analysis. The recently approved Joint Capabilities Integration and
Development System (JCIDS) process addresses these shortcomings. JCIDS
transforms requirements generation from a threat and system-based
requirement process to a capability-based process, and provides a more
focused and complete functional needs analysis to JROC decisionmakers.
Question. Are you satisfied that the requirements process has been
applied appropriately to missile defense programs?
Answer. I am satisfied that the requirements process has been
applied appropriately to missile defense programs. The Unified Command
Plan 02, Change 2 Terms of Reference designates U.S. Strategic Command
as the advocate for all combatant commanders' desired missile defense
and missile warning characteristics and capabilities. Admiral Ellis,
Commander of Strategic Command, is executing that responsibility in
coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). This complies with recent
congressional changes mandating that the JROC review MDA programs.
Question. How do you see the role of the JROC evolving as the
Department moves toward spiral development and a capabilities based
acquisition system?
Answer. We feel we now have the process about right with the
implementation of the new JCIDS. A specific feature of JCIDS is to
avoid making capabilities needs determination a ``100 percent''
solution at the start, and to take advantage of the beneficial
flexibility of spiral development.

RELIANCE ON RESERVE COMPONENT

Question. The men and women of the Reserve component have performed
superbly in meeting the diverse challenge of the global war on
terrorism. There is uncertainty, however, about the potential adverse
effects on recruiting, retention, and morale of continuing mobilization
of Guard and Reserve personnel.
What is your assessment of the impact of continuing Guard and
Reserve deployments on the readiness and attractiveness of service in
the Guard and Reserve?
Answer. The prolonged demand on the Guard and Reserve is a very
serious concern, and we are working hard to deal with this issue. The
Reserve component continues to perform exceptionally well and has
proven to be a major contributor to our force structure. To maintain
current levels of responsiveness, we must continue to ensure our
personnel receive strong support from their civilian employers and
their families. We are evaluating several measures that will reduce the
strain on the Guard and Reserve Forces while continuing to maintain
responsiveness and flexibility.
Question. What missions do you consider appropriate for permanent
assignment to the Reserve component?
Answer. Although there are unique functions performed specifically
by the Reserve compoment, the majority of Guard and Reserve members
participate and provide support across the spectrum as an integral part
of the Total Force. We are conducting studies to look at realigning
active and Reserve component capabilities to better match the defense
strategy. Specifically, we are reviewing a wide range of capabilities
including those that predominantly reside in the Reserve component,
from capabilities currently in high-demand for ongoing operations, to
those that are not frequently mobilized. We are also studying the
capabilities required for homeland security, and those that are
critical to post-hostilities operations.

END STRENGTH OF ACTIVE DUTY FORCES

Question. In light of the manpower demands of Operation Iraqi
Freedom, do you consider the level of active duty authorized end
strength proposed in the fiscal year 2004 budget to be sufficient for
today's missions?
Answer. Yes. We can be justifiably proud of the actions of both
active duty and Reserve component personnel who have successfully
accomplished their assigned missions during Operations Iraqi Freedom,
Enduring Freedom, and Noble Eagle. The President's partial mobilization
of the Reserve components has allowed us to meet a short-term spike in
requirements for security forces, intelligence, and communications
skills. I truly believe in the Total Force concept. These specific
requirements, while not indefinite, will likely continue in the near
term to support homeland defense, antiterrorism, and force protection.
I believe the long-term solution is not increasing the authorized end
strength, but rather looking at the current force mix, and realigning
to meet the anticipated needs of the future.
Question. How do you assess the progress made to date by the
Services in finding ways to reduce the numbers of military personnel
performing support functions that can better be performed by civilian
employees or contractors?
Answer. I believe the Services are making great strides in identify
functions requiring military skills, and those that could be performed
by civilian employees or contractors. This is an ongoing effort, with
an initial review of more than 300,000 military billets being
considered for conversion. To date, close to 50,000 military billets
have been identified for conversion, but we expect this number to
increase as we continue the review.
Question. What manpower savings can be achieved through reductions
in overseas presence, application of technology, and changes in roles
and missions?
Answer. We are taking a comprehensive look at missions, technology,
basing, and required force structure to determine the optimal location
of our military forces to meet any challenge. As these reviews are
currently in their early stages, we do not have any projections on
manpower savings.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views,
even if those views differ from the administration in power?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as the Vice Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and
other communications of information are provided to this committee and
its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes.
______

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed

ROLE OF JROC IN ENSURING INTEROPERABILITY

1. Senator Reed. General Pace, what role does the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) play in ensuring that future
military information and communications systems are completely
interoperable?
General Pace. The JROC has traditionally played a key role in
ensuring future information and communications systems are
interoperable. For the JROC, the Joint Staff Command Control
Communication and Computer System Directorate (J6) certifies
interoperability and supportability requirements of military
information and communication systems to ensure they conform with
policy, doctrine, and applicable interoperability standards for joint
Information Technology (IT) and National Security Systems (NSS). As
part of the review process, J6 requests assessment from the Services,
Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), and other DOD agencies.

2. Senator Reed. General Pace, how does the JROC influence the
research and development community and contractors to ensure that
future systems are joint and interoperable?
General Pace. The JROC validates the Joint Warfighting Capability
Objectives (JWCOs) representing some of the most critical capabilities
for maintaining the warfighting advantages of U.S. forces. These JWCOs
form the basis for the Joint Warfighting Science and Technology Plan
supporting the development of technology options for joint warfighting
capabilities. The Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment teams, now
part of the newly formed Functional Capabilities Boards (FCBs),
interact closely with defense science and technology representatives as
to channel expertise in scientific disciplines to the FCBs. The Science
and Technology Program provides the JROC with an effective basis for
leveraging our Nation's research and development community.
Under the new Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System
(JCIDS) process, the JROC will expand its influence within the research
and development community. The JROC will conduct broader review of
materiel capability proposals independent of Acquisition Category
(ACAT). There will also be better linkage to the acquisition process by
engaging the acquisition agency earlier in the process as capabilities
are being developed. The establishment of five Functional Capabilities
Boards with their expanded membership of combatant commanders, OSD,
defense agencies, and industry and the alignment of the Science and
Technology Program to the FCB portfolios will increase and enhance the
JROC's influence on the research and development community.
______

Question Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka

WAR GAMES

3. Senator Akaka. General Pace, your written testimony discusses
the contributions of war games such as Prominent Hammer and Elaborate
Crossbow. Can you please provide a description of these war games, as
well as the main insights you have gained from them?
General Pace. Joint Staff seminar games, such as Prominent Hammer
(PH) and Elaborate Crossbow (EC), are conducted at the request of the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the Director of the Joint
Staff. These assessment activities address complex issues not easily
resolved through normal staff actions and that involve many disparate
equity-holders. Seminar gaming provides an excellent environment for
senior leaders to explore innovative processes, address difficult
issues, and consider potential second order effects.
Joint Staff seminar games typically take a phased approach to
analyzing a problem or issue. The first phase usually involves an
action officer-level workshop to look at aspects of an area of interest
and identify key issues needing resolution. The second phase is often a
general officer/flag officer seminar in which these key issues are
presented to senior leadership for shaping and decision.
The recently conducted PH and EC series of seminars provided
insight into the interrelationships of various global operations and
their projected impact on our force posture. These wargames also helped
assess force availability for conducting additional contingency
operations. These wargames provided an effective forum for senior
military and DOD civilian leaders to understand complex issues and
provide the best military advice to the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff
and the Secretary of Defense. Specific results of these wargames are
classified at the SECRET level.
______

[The nomination reference of Gen. Peter Pace, USMC,
follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
June 18, 2003.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
The following named Marine Corps officer for reappointment as the
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and appointment to the grade
indicated while assigned to a position of importance and responsibility
under title 10, U.S.C., sections 601 and 154:

To be General

Gen. Peter Pace, 7426.
______

[The biographical sketch of Gen. Peter Pace, USMC, which
was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was
referred, follows:]

Biographical Sketch of Gen. Peter Pace, USMC

General Peter Pace is the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff. In this capacity, he is a member of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff and the Nation's second highest ranking military
officer. General Pace is the sixth officer to hold the position
and the first Marine.
As the Vice Chairman, General Pace serves as the Chairman
of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, Vice Chairman of
the Defense Acquisition Board, and as a member of the National
Security Council Deputies Committee and the Nuclear Weapons
Council. In addition, he acts for the Chairman in all aspects
of the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System to include
participating in meetings of the Defense Resources Board.
General Pace received his commission in June 1967,
following graduation from the United States Naval Academy. He
also holds a Master's Degree in Business Administration from
George Washington University and attended Harvard University
for the Senior Executives in National and International
Security program.
Upon completion of The Basic School, Quantico, VA, in 1968,
he was assigned to the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, 1st Marine
Division in the Republic of Vietnam, serving first as a Rifle
Platoon Leader and subsequently as Assistant Operations
Officer.
Returning from overseas in March 1969, he reported to
Marine Barracks, Washington, DC. During this tour, he served as
Head, Infantry Writer Unit, Marine Corps Institute; Platoon
Leader, Guard Company; Security Detachment Commander, Camp
David; White House Social Aide; and Platoon Leader, Special
Ceremonial Platoon. He was promoted to Captain in April 1971.
In September 1971, General Pace attended the Infantry Officers'
Advanced Course at Fort Benning, GA. Returning overseas in
October 1972, he was assigned to the Security Element, Marine
Aircraft Group 15, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, Nam Phong,
Thailand, where he served as Operations Officer and then
Executive Officer.
On October 1973, he was assigned to Headquarters Marine
Corps, Washington, DC, for duty as the Assistant Majors'
Monitor. During October 1976, he reported to the 1st Marine
Division, Camp Pendleton, CA, where he served as Operations
Officer, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines; Executive Officer, 3d
Battalion, 5th Marines; and Division Staff Secretary. He was
promoted to Major in November 1977. In August 1979, he reported
to the Marine Corps Command and Staff College as a student.
Upon completion of school in June 1980, he was assigned
duty as Commanding Officer, Marine Corps Recruiting Station,
Buffalo, NY. While in this assignment, he was promoted to
Lieutenant Colonel in October 1982. Reassigned to the 1st
Marine Division, Camp Pendleton, General Pace served from June
1983 until June 1985 as Commanding Officer, 2d Battalion, 1st
Marines. In June 1985, he was selected to attend the National
War College in Washington, DC.
After graduation the following June, he was assigned to the
Combined/Joint Staff in Seoul, Korea. He served as Chief,
Ground Forces Branch until April 1987, when he became Executive
Officer to the Assistant Chief of Staff, C/J/G3, United Nations
Command/Combined Forces Command/United States Forces Korea/
Eighth United States Army.
General Pace returned to Marine Barracks in Washington, DC,
in August 1988 for duty as Commanding Officer. He was promoted
to Colonel in October 1988. In August 1991, he was assigned
duty as Chief of Staff, 2d Marine Division, Camp Lejeune.
During February 1992, he was assigned duty as Assistant
Division Commander. He was advanced to Brigadier General on
April 6, 1992, and was assigned duty as the President, Marine
Corps University/Commanding General, Marine Corps Schools,
Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, VA, on July
13, 1992. While serving in this capacity, he also served as
Deputy Commander, Marine Forces, Somalia, from December 1992-
February 1993, and as the Deputy Commander, Joint Task Force--
Somalia from October 1993-March 1994. General Pace was advanced
to Major General on June 21, 1994, and was assigned as the
Deputy Commander/Chief of Staff, U.S. Forces, Japan. He was
promoted to Lieutenant General and assigned as the Director for
Operations (J-3), Joint Staff, Washington, DC, on August 5,
1996.
General Pace served as the Commander, U.S. Marine Corps
Forces, Atlantic/Europe/South from 23 November 1997 to 8
September 2000. He was promoted to General and assumed duties
as the Commander in Chief, United States Southern Command on 8
September 2000 until 30 September 2001.
General Pace's personal decorations include: Defense
Distinguished Service Medal, with two oak leaf clusters;
Defense Superior Service Medal; the Legion of Merit; Bronze
Star Medal with Combat V; the Defense Meritorious Service
Medal; Meritorious Service Medal with gold star; Navy
Commendation Medal with Combat ``V''; Navy Achievement Medal
with gold star; and the Combat Action Ribbon.
------

[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior
military officers nominated by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Gen. Peter
Pace, USMC, in connection with his nomination follows:]

The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Washington, DC, 17 June 2003.
Hon. John W. Warner, Chairman,
Committee on Armed Services,
United States Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: This letter provides information on my financial
and other interests for your consideration in connection with my
nomination for the position of Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. It supplements Standard Form 278 (SF 278), ``Executive Personnel
Financial Disclosure Report,'' which has already been provided to the
Committee and which summarizes my financial interests.
To the best of my knowledge, none of the financial interests listed
on my SF 278 will create any conflict of interest in the execution of
my new governmental responsibilities. Additionally, I have no other
interests or liabilities in any amount with any firm or organization
that is a Department of Defense contractor.
During my term of office, neither I nor any member of my immediate
family will invest in any entity that would create a conflict of
interest with my government duties. I do not have any present
employment arrangements with any entity other than the Department of
Defense and have no formal or informal understandings concerning any
further employment with any entity.
I have never been arrested or charged with any criminal offenses
other than minor traffic violations. I have never been party to any
civil litigation. To the best of my knowledge, there have never been
any lawsuits filed against any agency of the Federal Government or
corporate entity with which I have been associated reflecting adversely
on the work I have done at such agency or corporation. I am aware of no
incidents reflecting adversely upon my suitability to serve in the
position for which I have been nominated.
To the best of my knowledge, I am not presently the subject of any
governmental inquiry or investigation. I trust that the following
information is satisfactory for the committee.
Very Respectfully,
Peter Pace,
General, United States Marine Corps
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

Part A--Biographical Information

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Peter Pace.

2. Position to which nominated:
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

3. Date of nomination:
18 June 2003.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
5 November 1945; Brooklyn, New York.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to former Lynne Ann Holden.

7. Names and ages of children:
Peter Pace, Jr; 26 (26 Oct. 1976).
Tiffany Marie Pace; 24 (21 Aug. 1978).

8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary
or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local
governments, other than those listed in the service record extract
provided to the committee by the executive branch.
None.

10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
Member, Marine Corps Association.
Member, Military Officers Association of America (formerly TROA).
Member, Honorable Order of Kentucky Colonels.
Member, Naval Academy Alumni Association.
Member, National War College Alumni Association.
Member, Board of Directors, Marine Corps--Law Enforcement
Foundation.

11. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding
service or achievements other than those listed on the service record
extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
None.

12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly
constituted committee of the Senate?
I do so agree.

13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly
constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if
those views differ from the administration in power?
I do so agree.
______

Signature and Date
I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement
on Biographical and Financial Information and the information provided
therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and
complete.
Peter Pace.
This 17th day of June, 2003.

[The nomination of Gen. Peter Pace, USMC, was reported to
the Senate by Chairman Warner on July 30, 2003, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on July 31, 2003.]

NOMINATIONS OF GEN PETER J. SCHOOMAKER (RET.), USA, FOR APPOINTMENT AS
CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY AND APPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF
GENERAL; AND LTG BRYAN D. BROWN, USA, FOR APPOINTMENT AS COMMANDER,
UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND AND APPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE
OF GENERAL

----------

TUESDAY, JULY 29, 2003

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:34 a.m, room
SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator John Warner
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Warner, Roberts,
Sessions, Talent, Chambliss, Levin, Reed, Akaka, E. Benjamin
Nelson, Dayton, and Clinton.
Committee staff members present: Judith A. Ansley, staff
director; and Gabriella Eisen, nominations clerk.
Majority staff members present: Charles W. Alsup,
professional staff member; Ambrose R. Hock, professional staff
member; Gregory T. Kiley, professional staff member; Patricia
L. Lewis, professional staff member; Scott W. Stucky, general
counsel; and Richard F. Walsh, counsel.
Minority staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes,
Democratic staff director; Daniel J. Cox, Jr., professional
staff member; Evelyn N. Farkas, professional staff member;
Maren R. Leed, professional staff member; Gerald J. Leeling,
minority counsel; Peter K. Levine, minority counsel; and Mary
Louise Wagner, professional staff member.
Staff assistant present: Andrew W. Florell.
Committee members' assistants present: John A. Bonsell,
assistant to Senator Inhofe; James Beauchamp, assistant to
Senator Roberts; Arch Galloway II, assistant to Senator
Sessions; Lindsey R. Neas, assistant to Senator Talent; Clyde
A. Taylor IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Frederick M.
Downey, assistant to Senator Lieberman; Elizabeth King,
assistant to Senator Reed; Davelyn Noelani Kalipi, assistant to
Senator Akaka; William K. Sutey, assistant to Senator Bill
Nelson; Eric Pierce, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; and
Andrew Shapiro, assistant to Senator Clinton.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Warner. Good morning, everyone. The committee will
come to order. This is an Army day. I note the presence of
General Gordon Sullivan, President of the Association of the
United States Army, and thank you for your consultation.
Last night, I was privileged to join former Secretary of
the Army John Marsh in making presentations together, and he
just wished to say with his usual humility that he takes full
credit for both of these nominations. He was privileged to
serve with you in his capacity as Secretary of the Army for
many years.
All of us here in the committee are extremely pleased that
we have before the committee this morning General Peter
Schoomaker, the nominee to be the 35th Chief of Staff of the
United States Army, and Lieutenant General Bryan D. Brown,
United States Army, the nominee to be Commander, United States
Special Operations Command (SOCOM). I understand General Brown
will be introduced by Senator Roberts.
We welcome the nominees and their families, and I ask at
this moment would each of you introduce your family members.
General Schoomaker.
General Schoomaker. Sir, thank you very much. I have my
wife, Cindy with me here today, whom you've met, and my
godfather here, General Sullivan. [Laughter.]
Chairman Warner. General Brown.
General Brown. Sir, I'd like to introduce my family,
starting with Sergeant Bryan McCoy II of the 504th Infantry
from the 82nd Airborne Division, recently returned from
Afghanistan a couple of weeks ago, and my daughter, his wife,
Shannon. They're also the parents of a little 20-month-old
Green Beret in training. My other son-in-law, Captain Kevin
Leahy, is also an Afghan veteran from the Fifth Special Forces
Group, and my other daughter, Tracey, and then my wife of 33
years, my high school sweetheart and my best friend, who is a
great military wife, consummate volunteer, does all the stuff
that service wives do so well, and that's my wife, Penny.
Chairman Warner. Well, thank you both, and I thank the
families for making arrangements to join us this morning. This
is a very important moment in the history of the United States
of America and in the respective careers of these two
outstanding officers. But in this committee we always recognize
that family support is critical to the success of those
individuals who wear the uniform of the United States, whether
it's in the private's rank or the four-star rank. We thank you
for your role in providing that foundation, which contributes
to the greatness of our military.
General Schoomaker is distinguished in being called back
from retirement to serve in this critically important post. The
ranks of our military retired officers are filled with men and
women of enormous ability and, if confirmed, you will join such
distinguished Army officers as General Maxwell Taylor, General
Lyman Lemnitzer, General Andrew Goodpaster, General George C.
Marshall, and General Douglas MacArthur in reentering the
active-duty ranks to fill key positions.
General Schoomaker's active duty career extended over 31
years, and culminated in his service as Commander, United
States Special Operations Command from 1997 to 2000. Prior to
his service in that capacity, the General commanded the United
States Army Special Operations Command, Joint Special
Operations Command, and the First Special Forces Operational
Detachment. He was actively involved in the Desert One hostage
rescue attempt in Iran in 1980, as well as combat operations in
Grenada, Panama, the first Persian Gulf War, and the Balkans.
General, we congratulate you on your nomination, and thank
you for your willingness to step aside from what was a very
challenging private career to once again accept the call to
service.
General Brown, welcome to you and your family, and
congratulations on your nomination. General Brown is currently
the Deputy Commander, United States Special Operations Command.
He, too, has had a distinguished career in the Special
Operations Forces. Like General Schoomaker, he commanded the
United States Army Special Operations Command and Joint Special
Operations Command. In his career, he also held positions of
leadership in the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault),
Special Operations Command, and First Infantry Division.
General Brown joined the Army as an infantryman, rising to
the rank of Sergeant E-5, and earning a spot on a Special
Forces A Team. Following Officer Candidate School, he trained
as a helicopter pilot and subsequently served in Vietnam. He
participated in Operation Urgent Fury, the invasion of Grenada,
in October 1983, and he commanded a battalion of the 160th
Special Operations Aviation Regiment during Operation Desert
Storm.
Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and Operation
Iraqi Freedom have been revolutionary in the use of Special
Operations Forces. In my view, this is the wave of the future.
Senator Levin and I and a number of other members of this
committee, in our trips to Afghanistan over some years now--we
have made two trips together, as well as to the Iraqi theater--
recognize the enormous, incalculable contributions made by the
Special Operations Forces in these two operations.
General Brown, I congratulate you on your distinguished
career, and on your selection to this important position at a
critical time for the Special Operations Command.
Senator Levin.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN

Senator Levin. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. This
hearing this morning indeed is a very significant one,
involving as it does the nomination of General Schoomaker to be
the Chief of Staff of the United States Army, which also
involves being a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the
nomination of General Brown to be Commander, U.S. Special
Operations Command, which is one of nine combatant commands,
and one which has been given a special role in the war on
terrorism.
I want to join Senator Warner in extending a warm welcome
to both of you and to your families. Special thanks to your
families for their support. You are both very well-qualified
indeed for the positions to which you have been nominated. We
thank you for returning to active duty, General Schoomaker, and
for your continued willingness to serve, General Brown.
General Schoomaker will take charge of the Army at a very
critical juncture. He has noted in his responses to the
committee's prehearing policy questions that it is an Army at
war. After performing brilliantly in the war in Iraq, it is the
Army that is now principally tasked with winning the peace.
Moreover, it is doing all of these tasks associated with
nation-building in Iraq while also fighting against a
continuing insurgency in Iraq.
It takes an incredibly well-trained, disciplined, and
motivated force to wage peace on the one hand by offering the
helping hand of friendship to the majority of Iraqis, while on
the other hand waging war against the minority who would
disrupt that peace.
At the same time, the Army is bearing the brunt of the
continuing effort to stabilize and rebuild Afghanistan, to help
keep the peace in Bosnia, Kosovo, the Sinai, and other areas,
to contain the threat of North Korea, while at the same time
preparing to execute other missions in support of a national
military strategy.
General Schoomaker's challenge, and the challenge for the
administration and Congress, is to ensure that this Army does
not lose its edge or break under the strain. The All-Volunteer
Army has been a huge success. It is primarily the quality of
the men and women of the Army, and secondarily the superb
training, equipment, and leadership that they are provided,
that sets this Army apart from any other in the world. We must
do everything necessary to ensure that they and their families
continue to receive the moral and physical support that they
need and deserve.
General Schoomaker, we will be looking to you for advice on
the critical questions of the day, as we in Congress do our
part in support of our soldiers--questions such as: Is the Army
large enough to meet its commitments in this new strategic
environment?
Your predecessor, General Shinseki, in his retirement
address, warned about a 12-division strategy and a 10-division
force, and about the Army's organizational structure, the
roles, missions, and force mix between the active and Reserve
components. Is the right balance there between current
readiness and future readiness ensured by modernization and
transformation? Given the reality of limited resources, how
should we prioritize among the requirements to recapitalize the
current force, field the interim forces, Stryker Brigade Combat
Teams, and develop the Future Combat Systems of the future
Objective Force?
General Brown, you come to us well-prepared to take this
new responsibility, having served for the last year or so as
the second in command of the Special Operations Command, and
prior to that as the Commander of the Army component of the
Special Operations Command, the U.S. Army Special Operations
Command, and as the Commander of the Joint Special Operations
Command.
General Brown is going to take the helm of the command at a
pivotal time, as the Special Operations Command assumes an
expanded role in the global war on terrorism, and completes
preparations to conduct operations anywhere in the world as a
supported rather than supporting command. These changes were
prompted in no small part by the extraordinary performance of
Special Operations Forces (SOF) in Afghanistan, where small
teams of special operators joined efforts with Afghan allies
and called in U.S. air power to achieve tremendous results.
Similarly, in Iraq, special operators patrol vast amounts
of territory in Western Iraq to prevent the use of long-range
missiles against Iraq's neighbors, including Israel, and joined
forces with the Kurds in Northern Iraq to pin down Iraqi Army
units. At the present time, in both Afghanistan and Iraq,
special operators are carrying out operations to find and
apprehend Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein and other high-
value targets, and civil affairs and psychological operations
personnel are heavily engaged in stability operations.
This means, however, that our Special Operations Forces,
both active and Reserve, are also stretched thin. The
responsibility that has been given to the command by the
Secretary of Defense is great. It is important that the
command's efforts be directed by cogent policy and executed
according to clear guidelines, subject to the authority of the
Department of Defense, the President, and Congress.
Having created the Special Operations Command with the
Nunn-Cohen amendment to the Goldwater-Nichols Defense
Reorganization Act, this committee shares the responsibility
for the success of Special Operations in fighting terrorists
and in executing their other title 10 responsibilities. General
Brown, we're looking to you to tell us how you plan to approach
this new expanded mission for your command and what actions are
underway to ease the pressure on the forces that will be under
your command. Again, I thank you both, congratulate you both,
and look forward to this hearing.
Chairman Warner. Senator Roberts.
Senator Roberts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would observe
that the high road of humility is not often bothered by heavy
traffic in Washington, but it is indeed a humbling experience
for me and a personal pleasure and a privilege to introduce to
the committee the President's nominee to lead the Special
Operations Command, Lieutenant General Doug Brown. I join you,
sir, and also Senator Levin in welcoming what has to be an all-
American family. I'm also, indeed, honored to be here in the
presence of General Sullivan, whom I know personally. His son
and my son were fraternity brothers at Manhattan, Kansas, home
of the ever-optimistic and fighting Wildcats----[Laughter.]
--and there's a base right next door to Manhattan called
Fort Riley that is near and dear to the hearts of these
gentlemen, I'm honored also to be here in support of General
Schoomaker, who has rewritten the MacArthur adage when he
addressed the Joint Session of Congress, that is, old soldiers
never die, they just serve their country again and again and
again, in outstanding fashion. There's no fade away in regards
to General Schoomaker.
General Brown's background is an ideal match for leading
America's quiet professionals. He came into the Army in 1967 as
a private in the infantry. On completion of Airborne School and
the Special Forces qualification course, he served on a Special
Forces A Team. His combat tours include Vietnam and Grenada,
Desert Storm, and others. He was also, perhaps most
importantly, assistant Division Commander of the First Infantry
Division at Fort Riley, Kansas.
He is the Deputy Commander of SOCOM, and previously
commanded the Joint Special Operations Command at Fort Bragg.
He is the right man at the right time, having been intimately
involved in the military component of our war on terrorism and
expanding role of SOCOM, and that role will expand and has in
that effort in the months and years to come. As SOCOM missions
are planned and executed, Doug Brown will not be asking our
special operators to face risks and challenges he himself has
not faced in service to our Nation.
As this committee knows perhaps more so than any other in
Congress, the family of the soldier, the sailor, the airman and
the marine serves and sacrifices right alongside the service
member through distant tours of duty, lengthy deployments, and
the unknown hazards of duty. The Brown family is no exception.
In fact, they are a remarkable example of service to the
country in so many ways.
Penny Brown is with us today, and we thank you for your
service and leadership. Doug's eldest daughter, Tracey Leahy,
teaches school here in Fairfax County, and her husband, Captain
Kevin Leahy, was wounded in Afghanistan while serving with the
Fifth Special Forces Group. He's doing just fine.
Doug and Penny's younger daughter, Shannon McCoy, works at
Pope Air Force Base in North Carolina. Her husband, Sergeant
Bryan McCoy, just returned from a 7-month tour in Afghanistan,
serving with the 82nd Airborne Division.
Mr. Chairman, that's incredible service. America's national
security is clearly a family affair. Mr. Chairman, I not only
endorse General Brown as SOCOM Commander, I also endorse his
family. They have to be an all-American family in what they
stand for.
I asked Penny, when they paid me a courtesy call, ``How do
you put up with these guys, Doug, Kevin, and Bryan.'' She said
simply, ``We just love them.'' I think that says it all. I'm
very humbled and very privileged to endorse all of these
nominations.
Chairman Warner. Senator, we thank you for your very
heartfelt observations. I'm certain that the Brown family
appreciate your remarks, as well as this committee.
Given the importance of this occasion, the chair will be
happy to recognize other members who might wish to say a word
by way of opening statement before we proceed to the matter of
routine questions, and then into the presentation of
statements.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Mr. Chairman, I would just like to say
that I had a good meeting with General Schoomaker, and have
heard reports from quite a number of people who served with him
and know him, and they give him glowing recommendations. I
believe the President has made a great choice. We are also
excited about General Brown's leadership in his important
command, and I have also heard from a number of different
sources great reports on General Brown. I think he's going to
do a great job for us.
Chairman Warner. Good. Senator Reed was with us earlier. He
may return. Senator Akaka, and colleagues on this side?
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to
add my congratulations on your appointments. I want to also
express my appreciation to both of you for being here today and
for what you have already done for our country. You both have
had long, distinguished careers. I'm glad to have this
opportunity to discuss many of the current and future
challenges for the Army. Welcome, and also to your families.
Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Senator Akaka is too modest to mention
that he had a distinguished career himself several years ago in
the United States Army.
Would any other colleagues like to make a statement?
Senator Talent.
Senator Talent. Mr. Chairman, I'll just add to what my
colleagues have said. My admiration for these men--I hope we
will approve them, I'm going to vote to approve them, and they
will undertake these posts at a time as crucial as I suppose
anybody has ever come to these jobs.
This is a Nation at war. They have a record that shows
their unflinching dedication to duty and their willingness to
confront problems honestly, and to do their duty regardless of
circumstances. That's what we expect from them, and I know
that's what they're going to give us, and I'm looking forward
to their comments and the opportunity to ask them about some
issues.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you.
Senator Dayton. Mr. Chairman, if it hasn't been said by
everyone--it has been said--so I will repeat that we're very
fortunate to have these two outstanding servants of our country
and leaders of the men and women in our Armed Forces, and I
look forward to supporting their nominations and having a good
discussion prior to that. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. You were one of the members on our recent
trip to Iraq and part of the congressional delegation, and very
actively engaged in interfacing with the men and women of the
United States Forces on that trip.
Senator Dayton. If you need some new recruits, I'll tell
you, those two gentlemen at the end there are both, for their
age, in remarkable condition. I would say, take them anywhere,
Mr. Chairman, and between their intelligence and their energy,
I think we'd be well served, and I'd be glad to be several
hundred yards behind all three of them. [Laughter.]
Senator Levin. Except for the age reference, we're very
grateful. [Laughter.]
Senator Talent. I don't know that anything we could do
would be unfair to Saddam Hussein, but that would almost be
unfair, to send these three.
Chairman Warner. Senator Clinton.
Senator Clinton. Mr. Chairman, I am delighted to support
these two nominees, and I must say that it is quite encouraging
for many of us of a certain age that General Schoomaker would
come out of retirement to assume this position, and I'm very
grateful and impressed by that. I look forward to working with
them, and in addition to General Schoomaker's considerable
military experience, I was also impressed by his political
savvy when he came for his courtesy call to my office, bringing
with him a young Army Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC)
student from the University of Syracuse. That was very well
done, General. [Laughter.]
General Schoomaker. I wish I could take credit for having
him come.
Senator Clinton. Well, now that you're in charge, take
credit for everything. [Laughter.]
I would echo Senator Roberts' very kind comments, because I
know that in positions like this the family also serves,
particularly the spouses, and even adult children. So I thank
your families for being willing to back you and support you in
undertaking these important missions.
Chairman Warner. Members of the committee, a number of you
have spoken to me already about, if I might digress from the
matter at hand. There was an announcement by the press and two
colleagues in the Senate, that the Pentagon had proposed spying
electronically on Americans to monitor potential terrorists as
a new experiment, with similarities to methods used in online
futures trading market. Our staff are looking into that, and we
will have a report for all members before day's end.
Senator Clinton. Mr. Chairman, I want to personally thank
you for that. I was going to bring that up during the question
period. I was appalled that we would be, in a sense, setting up
a futures market in death and destruction, and it is not in
keeping with our values, and certainly not in keeping with the
highest ideals of the men who sit before us. I thank you for
looking into this matter.
Chairman Warner. Senator, thank you.
Senator Levin. Mr. Chairman, just a point. My staff looked
at that yesterday evening. The first reaction was that it was a
hoax, so it is important that we find out what is the principle
that could possibly be behind it if, in fact, it is being
proposed.
Chairman Warner. I see the nominees suggesting that maybe
if either or both of them might be questioned. I doubt that
will take place, and I would advise you to take the question
for the record, if so asked. [Laughter.]
Senator Levin. Unless you can tell us it's a hoax, in which
case feel free to answer it.
Chairman Warner. We have standard questions which the
committee chair poses to all nominees in your position. The
committee has asked our witnesses to answer a series of advance
policy questions. They responded to those questions. Without
objection, I will make the questions and responses a part of
today's record.
I also have standard questions we ask of every nominee who
appears before the committee. Please respond to each question,
then we can move on to the question period and your statements.
Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations
governing conflicts of interest?
General Schoomaker. Yes, sir.
General Brown. Yes.
Chairman Warner. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken
any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the
confirmation process by the United States Senate?
General Brown. No, sir.
General Schoomaker. No, sir.
Chairman Warner. Will you ensure that your staff comply
with the deadlines established for the requested
communications, including questions for the record before
Congress?
General Schoomaker. Yes, sir, I will.
General Brown. I will.
Chairman Warner. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses
and briefers in response to congressional requests?
General Schoomaker. Yes, sir.
General Brown. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. Will those witnesses be protected from
reprisal for such testimony as they may give, or briefings?
General Schoomaker. Yes, sir.
General Brown. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. Now, we would like very much if each of
you would address the committee for a brief opening statement.
General Schoomaker.

STATEMENT OF GEN PETER J. SCHOOMAKER, USA (RET.), FOR
APPOINTMENT AS CHIEF OF STAFF, USA, AND APPOINTMENT TO THE
GRADE OF GENERAL

General Schoomaker. Sir, Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
I will submit a statement for the record.
Chairman Warner. Without objection.
General Schoomaker. I would like to say very briefly that
it's a great honor to appear before this distinguished
committee today. I am humbled by the opportunity to reenter
active service and lead our great Army, and I stand ready to
answer your questions concerning that.
Chairman Warner. Fine, thank you. Your statement in its
entirety will be put in the record.
[The prepared statement of General Schoomaker follows:]

Prepared Statement by Gen. Peter J. Schoomaker, USA (Ret.)

Good morning. Mr. Chairman, and distinguished members of the
committee, it is a pleasure to appear before you. I respectfully
request that my opening statement be included in the record.
In over three decades of active service in our great Army, I never
imagined this situation, especially after retiring in 2000! Service as
the Army's Chief of Staff is both a tremendous responsibility and a
matter of duty. My active service in the Army covered a wide range of
assignments that included extensive joint duty and participation in
numerous joint contingency operations. I am honored that the President
nominated me for this important post, and believe that I possess the
necessary experience, knowledge, and insight to successfully meet--with
your help--the challenges facing the Army today.
Today, our Nation is at war and we are a critical part of the joint
team--an Army at war. September 11 was not the first shot fired in this
war. In retrospect, we now can see that we have been fighting this war
for over 25 years. This is a war that reaches to the furthest corners
of the world--a war for the very survival of our way of life. It will
be a long fight. As an Army at war, we will experience both change and
continuity. We must adjust our priorities. We may even need to change
our culture. In a world where the strategic environment is transformed,
we should be prepared to even reexamine our fundamental way of
thinking. At the same time, we need to celebrate our victories. Your
Army has much to be proud of.
Today we are deployed and supporting contingency operations at an
unprecedented pace. The Army has met these challenges, and I would like
to publicly acknowledge the role of General Ric Shinseki in that. Every
Chief of Staff stands on the shoulders of his predecessors, and Ric
Shinseki leaves a proud legacy of leadership and vision for our Army.
Inherent to the Army is our critical role as a member of the joint
team. The Army has much to contribute to the fight--and we will fight
jointly. The Army must develop its capabilities with a joint
perspective from the very beginning. Capability development begins with
an appreciation of the future joint operational environment. It then
proceeds to development of joint operational concepts. Finally, that
inherently joint concept drives every dimension of our Army: doctrine,
organization, training, materiel, leader development, people, and
facilities.
We are, have been, and will remain a values-based institution.
Loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity, and
personal courage are the cornerstone of all that we do today. Our
soldiers, who exemplify these values every day, are world class and are
the epitome of our American character. They voluntarily risk everything
that is dear to them in defense of the Nation in faraway places like
Afghanistan, Iraq, the Philippines, Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Korean
peninsula. Our soldiers, civilians, and their families set the standard
every day for selfless service. I am committed to their support to
ensure that we remain the world's finest land force.
The Nation just celebrated its birthday. The Army's challenge--its
very purpose--is to guarantee our future birthdays. For over 228 years,
the Army has never failed the American people, and we never will.
Building and maintaining an Army is a shared responsibility between
Congress, the administration, the American people, our soldiers, and
civilians. Working together, we have kept the Army ready. Threats to
United States interests continue to adapt and pose new dangers to our
society. During this time of uncertainty the Army will continue to
remain a critical part of the joint team--relevant and ready to the
defense of our Nation.
In summary, Mr. Chairman, I am honored to appear before you today
as the President's nominee to a most challenging leadership
responsibility. I thank the President, the Secretary of Defense, and
the Acting Secretary of the Army for the trust they have placed in me
with this nomination. If confirmed by the Senate, I look forward to
working with this distinguished committee and the entire Congress in
the days ahead.

Chairman Warner. General Brown.

STATEMENT OF LTG BRYAN D. BROWN, USA, FOR APPOINTMENT AS
COMMANDER, UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND AND
APPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF GENERAL

General Brown. Senator Roberts, I appreciate your kind
remarks and the courtesy you have extended to me and my
family--sir, I really appreciate it.
Senator Roberts. Yes, sir.
General Brown. Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, distinguished
members of the Senate Armed Services Committee, I'm pleased to
appear before the committee today, and I'm extremely honored to
have been nominated for the position of Commander, United
States Special Operations Command. As an opening statement, I
will simply say that I fully understand and appreciate the
enormous responsibility associated with this position for which
I have been nominated. I can assure you that, if confirmed, I
will never lose sight of those responsibilities, and that is my
role as the Guardian of the Special Operating Forces who serve
this Nation around the world.
I very much look forward to working with the members of
this committee, and I am prepared to answer your questions at
this time. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
General Schoomaker, in the course of a very memorable
private meeting that the two of us had, we shared our personal
experiences and recollections during the period of the Vietnam
War, when you were on the front lines and I was back in the
safe confines of the Department of Defense as Secretary of the
Navy, but nevertheless visited a number of times in theater.
I'm not going to go into details this morning, but you assured
me that the lessons learned in that period--actually, you were,
if I am correct, in Germany during that period of time.
General Schoomaker. That's correct, sir.
Chairman Warner. But you experienced the problems which I
had as Secretary of the Navy with our forces in-country and
elsewhere, as a matter of fact. You shared with me your own
depth of knowledge on that subject, and as we observed today,
tragically, each day it seems like we are losing men and women
of the Armed Forces to death and, indeed, suffering injuries as
they very bravely and courageously undertake the missions in
Iraq. We are both absolutely of the opinion that this war is
being conducted in the best professional manner that we know
how. The people in this country should hopefully continue to
repose a trust and a confidence in the leaders, particularly
those uniformed leaders handling those troops as these
operations are conducted.
We saw recently from time to time soldiers making
comments--understandably, the pressures of the times generate
such comments. Soldiers gripe a bit, but in some respects these
comments went beyond griping, and you assured me that one of
your very first steps, if confirmed, will be to go in-country
and to begin to apply your knowledge as a troop commander these
many years to assist those in command to bring about the
successful conclusion of this operation at the earliest
possible moment.
I assure you that I was greatly reassured by your depth of
knowledge and understanding with respect to the individual
soldiers, and the individual soldier's family, and the stresses
brought upon it, and the difficulty for society to understand
these continuous losses at this time. So we're fortunate, as a
Nation, to have you in this position, after the Senate gives
its advise and consent.
Now, you had the unique opportunity to observe the Army in
your previous role as the Commander of the U.S. Special
Operations Command and from your retired status for the last 3
years. However, I understand you've maintained a steady contact
with the Department of the Army, and perhaps the Department of
Defense, through your participation in numerous panels and
studies. In other words, you've continued your professional
service.
Please outline briefly some of the things that you've done
in the period of time since you stepped down and now have been
recalled to active duty, and describe observations you can make
regarding the Army that you love so much. With no disrespect to
General Shinseki, who handled his job with a great deal of
skill and brilliance, or to the current Vice Chief, who I met
with yesterday, who is going to be stepping down, what changes
would you hope to bring about, and in what period of time?
First, what are some of the things that you've been doing to
keep abreast professionally?
General Schoomaker. Sir, since I retired in December 2000,
I've been both teaching and mentoring within the Army. I'm on
the adjunct faculty of the School for Advanced Military Studies
at Fort Leavenworth, where I work with several colleagues in
leading change in a special elective course out there, as well
as in the normal course. We work both at the War College level
with the fellows, as well as with the advanced students, the
second year students out of the course.
I'm also a senior mentor with the joint warfighting course,
working with General Gary Lupke at Joint Forces Command, where
we conduct the joint warfighting modules for all of the new
flag officers as they come in. It's now been expanded to 5-day
sessions, and I've worked through the Joint Warfighting Center
not only in standing up the new U.S. Northern Command
(NORTHCOM), but also the transition of U.S. Space Command
(SPACECOM) to U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM), as well as
working with General Tommy Franks and General Gary Herold. I
have also worked on an internal look at putting the war plan
together for the most recent combat operations in Iraq. So I've
had my fingers and my head into an awful lot.
I would also like to say that I consider the fact that my
perspective really goes back in the Army to having been born
into the Army, my father having served 32 years, both enlisted
and as an officer in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. I grew
up in that family with four other boys.
I have a brother that's a brigadier general today who
commands Eisenhower Regional Medical Center down in Georgia,
and who is very involved in the well-being of the families and
TRICARE and all of the issues that are involved there. I have a
19-year-old daughter who today is probably doing push-ups in
Georgia down at the jump school. She's in Army ROTC, and she's
learning to be a paratrooper, so hopefully we'll greet her in
another couple of weeks with jump wings on her chest. So I come
about the Army as a lifelong experience, not only my own active
service, but my service as a family member and as a retired
member as well, and I consider all of that important in terms
of how I view this.
Chairman Warner. Very definitely so.
General Schoomaker. I reference the conversation you and I
had about the terrible struggles we had in the late sixties and
early seventies in bringing the Army from the Vietnam
experience into the volunteer Army we have today, and the many
concerns that we would have in seeing the volunteer Army and
the volunteer force across all of the Services threatened
through improper use, management, and leadership. I continue to
stand behind our discussion that we had the other day regarding
that.
Chairman Warner. Well, the theme was that both of us
experienced the draft Army of Vietnam, and the birth of the
All-Volunteer Army, and how well that All-Volunteer Force had
worked. We have an absolute joint view that the All-Volunteer
Army must continue, but it's like other things in life--it can
be fractured if over-stressed due to prolonged deployments, to
family situations which are just put beyond any reasonable
ability to maintain relationships, the question of the Guard
and Reserve call-up, the need to maintain a strong Guard and
Reserve, bearing in mind that persons in those capacities are
different in that they maintain a very important civilian
career and are willing to give that up for periods of time in
order to fulfill their obligations to the Guard and Reserve.
Those obligations must be recognized to be of a duration
that enables them to go back to civilian life and regroup and
return to what they had given up for that period of active
duty. So again, I say to my colleagues, we have here in this
nominee a gentleman who has really experienced all of those
stresses and seen it through these many years, and is able to
take the situation today, which, while by no means to be
critical of the current leaders of the Army, is beginning to
experience some of the stresses that you and I saw during the
Vietnam period.
But what changes would you make? Do you have anything at
this point in time that you want to indicate to the committee,
or would you prefer to get in the saddle and ride?
General Schoomaker. Sir, I think it would be fair to say
that I need to continue to assess the Army, if I'm confirmed,
and have an opportunity to do my own assessment.
My instincts tell me that there are things that I need to
look at, and in preparation for these hearings I've had the
opportunity to be briefed about many things, and I'm starting
to form a short list of things that I want to get into
immediately. I would appreciate your patience in giving me the
opportunity to do that before I have to speak on the subject.
Chairman Warner. Agreed, but you indicated that you would
make at the earliest possibility a trip into theater, both
Afghanistan and Iraq.
General Schoomaker. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. Thank you.
Senator Levin.
Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. A critically
important part of your background, General Schoomaker, is the
fact that you received a master's degree at Central Michigan
University. [Laughter.]
I should have noted that earlier, and I just remembered it.
General Schoomaker. Sir, I had to have something to do at
night. I did that on my own dime.
Senator Levin. General, the United States has almost
150,000 troops deployed to Iraq, and we're going to have a
significant presence at or near that level, apparently, for
some time. A lot of the troops there don't know when they're
coming home. General Franks said he thought that something
similar to current troop levels is going to be required for the
foreseeable future.
I'm just wondering, how long do you believe that we could
maintain a significant troop presence in Iraq, given the
authorized level of 480,000 troops in the active Army? At what
point might we have to raise the force levels to make this
situation sustainable in the long-term?
General Schoomaker. Sir, that's again a difficult question,
and I'd like to have some time to really assess the specifics
of it. As we discussed in the office call, I think that this
isn't just an issue of end strength, it's an issue of
fundamental organization. The fact of the matter is, we will be
in Iraq a long time creating the environment there for it to be
able to transition to peace and the kind of stable nation
that's able to operate within the kind of values we'd like to
see it operate. It's going to require presence there, and that
presence I think, as you've seen, is going to start
transitioning to other friends that will help us do that.
But fundamentally, I think it's an issue of what capability
we have to have there. We could have a lot of people there and
the wrong capability and not be very effective, and that, I
think, is my fundamental challenge--to do an assessment of how
we're organized--do we have the capability packaged properly;
can we establish a rotation base before we make a decision on
whether or not we need more people? Because I think we could
take a lot more people and put them in the wrong places and end
up with the same problem, and I'd hate to go down that road.
Senator Levin. As the chairman indicated, the stress on our
active duty service members and their families has been
immense. The problem with our Reserve and National Guard
personnel, who have really been called up for a longer period
of time than they had reason to expect, are major problems.
You've indicated you want some time to reach some
recommendations on these issues, and that's fair enough, but I
do hope that you would keep in close touch with this committee
on this. Because this is a major issue in our States and for
the Nation as to how much stress we can place on our Active-
Duty Forces, and this whole issue that we've now seen with our
Reserve Forces of being called upon for service for a longer
period as, I won't say anyone contemplated, but that most of
them contemplated. So please give that not only your earliest
attention, which you've indicated you will, but keep in close
touch with us as to what you see after you've reached some even
preliminary conclusions.
General Schoomaker. Yes, sir.
Senator Levin. General, Congress has authorized separate
staffs for civilian and military leadership of the services to
ensure that senior military officers have the staff support and
advice needed to provide independent military advice. Do you
believe it is important that the military staff be there that's
responsible to you so that you can give independent military
advice, to the Joint Chiefs, the Secretary of Defense, the
Secretary of the Army, and Congress?
General Schoomaker. Yes, sir.
Senator Levin. Do you?
General Schoomaker. Yes, sir, I do.
Senator Levin. Okay.
General Brown, given the increased operational and
personnel tempo, especially in Iraq, since the Special
Operations Command drafted plans for an additional 5,100
authorization command-wide, do you foresee a future requirement
for additional Special Operations Forces in addition to that
request of 5,100?
General Brown. Senator, at this time we have not done an
analysis that would say we need more than the 5,100 that we
will grow between now and the 2009 time period. As we work
through what the future brings and we take a look at the
emerging missions, we may have some shortages in specific areas
that we would then try to address, but right now we think the
5,100 looks good.
Senator Levin. Relative to weapons of mass destruction site
exploitation in Iraq, can you tell us how the Special
Operations role now differs, or how does it relate to the Iraqi
Survey Group's (ISG) operations, the group that's led by
General Dayton?
General Brown. Yes, sir. We still have the capability. In
the early days of the war we did many sensitive site
exploitation missions to get out on the ground quickly and
assess what exactly was at those sites, and of course from
those sites we brought back a lot of evidence. We brought back
computer disks and materials that were then turned over to U.S.
Central Command (CENTCOM) for analysis.
Today, because of the standup of the ISG, we're doing a lot
less sensitive site exploitations, but we still have the
capability, and we can move quickly if required to get out to a
sensitive site exploitation that the ISG might not be able to
move quickly enough to get to. Our aircraft are still there,
our people are still there.
Senator Levin. Thank you, General.
Chairman Warner. Before going to Senator Sessions, General
Schoomaker, I copied down your statement about Iraq. You said,
``We're going to be in Iraq a long time.''
In the course of your response to other Senators, I might
ask you to refine that comment, because very definitely it is
the desire of our President and the leaders and heads of State
governments of the coalition forces, that we're there no longer
than necessary to turn that country over to the Iraqi people.
Part of that is the construction of a whole political system of
government that they are in the process of now forming, the
councils, and that's transitioning to a team that will write a
constitution, that would transition to a national election. At
the same time, efforts are being made to stand up their own
military force, which presumably can give them security within
their borders and perhaps such forces as may be needed to
respond to threats coming from beyond their borders. So you
might want to revisit that statement as you go along in your
responses.
General Schoomaker. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I share your
thoughts on Iraq and yes, I have no doubt that we will have a
presence there of some kind. The question is, will we have
148,000 troops or hopefully less as time goes along? We do
believe that we should be there no longer than possible, and
something I've raised and talked about a good bit recently is
the training of local Iraqis to be a military and to be a
police force. Will you give attention to that issue, and would
you be prepared to request additional funds for training of
Iraqis to be an effective Iraqi National Army?
I would just note we could probably pay well 20, 30, 50
Iraqis for the cost of one American soldier. Quite a number, I
would assume. So do you have any thoughts about that question,
and could that help us reduce our presence?
General Schoomaker. Sure. First of all, I take no issue and
I fully support the line of thinking with the chairman and you
in terms of how you described that.
I think that what I am trying to do, and understand that
I'm limited in what knowledge I have right now and access to
the specifics. But I'm being considered here for a position as
the Chief of Staff of the Army, to be a force provider to the
combatant commander. The combatant commander I'm sure would
agree with you that we would like to see ourselves transition
in the shortest period of time with the least possible cost to
the Treasury and lives and all of the things that all of us
agree with.
But as the Chief of Staff of the Army, and somebody that
has to think about how we're going to resource this, I have to
think worst case. I have to think about how we plan and think
through sustaining a long-term commitment there. I think if you
take a look at history, and our experience in the Balkans and
elsewhere, you will find that thinking in the short-term isn't
the way to go, in my opinion, from the position that I am being
considered to assume, and so that's where my statement was
coming from.
I assure you that this is really an important matter to the
Army, because we are going to be the well to which people are
going to be coming for these kinds of things. Because it's
within the core competencies of the Army that we are looking,
and so both of you, in my opinion I take no issue with either
statement, but I think it would be foolish not to think about
the worst case scenario from the position that I'm being
considered for, and that's where I was coming from on that.
Senator Sessions. I appreciate that, General, and I
remember Senator Levin and I being in Kosovo not long after the
hostilities occurred, and there were plans to train a local
police force and security forces. That has not occurred, and
that's the reason we're still there. I really believe that
somebody somewhere deserves some criticism for failing to
create an indigenous government and security force that would
allow our troops to leave. I believe we have 41,000 still left
in Bosnia, or Kosovo, and that's far too many in my view, in
that area of the world.
But I know you're committed to transformation of the Army
and making it as capable and responsive to future challenges as
possible, and to identify what those challenges are. Your
experience in Special Operations I think gives you a special
insight into this new kind of warfare that we're dealing with.
What's your basic thinking about this transformation
agenda? Is it on course? Do we need to speed it up, or slow
down? What are your thoughts on that?
General Schoomaker. Well, first of all I think we have to
think of transformation as a continuing process. I think the
Army has been transforming for its entire history. We've always
embraced change, and at the same time we've looked for the
continuity in our values and the kinds of things that are very
important.
I spent my life--I had a career both in the conventional
force and in the Special Operations Forces, and I can tell you
that the performance of the Special Operations Forces today
that you've seen and all of us are so proud of is a return on
an investment over a quarter of a century of transformation of
those forces. So I don't expect that we're going to be able to
do the kind of transition to the future of the Army over a
weekend. I think that there has been a tremendous start that
goes back to several of my predecessors on the kinds of things
that we're looking at to transform this Army to be relevant to
the future, and I think on my watch I'm going to have to stand
on their shoulders as we go forward and do the kinds of things
that I can bring to the table on it, so it's a long-term thing.
I think that the way I think about transformation is, it
will never be an objective. As I discussed with you, I think in
terms of a current force, and I think in terms of a future
force, and I think we're always in motion. Where we're working
the hardest is at the intersection, the overlap of those two,
where we are bringing technologies, and we're bringing
concepts, and we're bringing organizations and doctrine
together to get the most out of our current force and leverage
the kinds of things we see as we go to the future and organize
ourselves and think appropriately about the kinds of things
we're going to be asked to do. So it's a daunting challenge,
and it's one that's not going to happen over a weekend.
Senator Sessions. It is a great challenge, but we have made
a lot of progress. I think our military is so modern, it brings
in modern management techniques, modern computer abilities, all
kinds of high-tech capabilities. Those are the things that
allowed our soldiers to be so effective on the battlefield at
the NATO assembly for parliamentary members. The French
Rapporteur reported on the war, Mr. Chairman, and he said that
the first and overriding conclusion is, a highly trained
technologically advanced Army can defeat a much larger force
using old methods. So I congratulate you, because you've saved
thousands of American soldiers' lives by being transformed.
You've saved thousands of civilian lives in Iraq, because we
were able to move quickly and decisively, and even reduce the
number of enemy soldiers that ultimately had to be killed. So I
think it's good, and I know that your vision for the future is
strong.
General Brown, let me just ask you this. The Special
Operations Forces performed so well in Afghanistan and in Iraq,
could you share with us some of your thoughts about the role
they play, some of the successes in Afghanistan and Iraq? I
know you were commander there at Special Operations Forces at
Fort Bragg, and during that period your son was there, and your
other sons were in the 82nd, your sons-in-law. Do you have any
thoughts about where we are and where we need to go in the
future with Special Operations Forces?
General Brown. Thank you, Senator. I think the first thing
that comes to mind is that a lesson learned from both
Afghanistan and Iraq is that SOF need to get on the ground
early, and when we did that both in Afghanistan and Iraq they
were much more effective in what they had to do as they built
forces.
This was the largest deployment of SOF in the history of
Special Operations. At one time we had over 14,000 SOF folks
deployed out of a force structure of about 47,000, so SOF is
integral on this battlefield. I thought the plan that was
devised for Iraq that gave large portions of that country to a
SOF and allowed them to use the abilities that Special
Operations Forces bring to the table over large portions of
areas of responsibility was absolutely fantastic. Once we got
on the battlefield, the SOF were fantastic.
I will tell you the number one lesson learned and the most
important thing about Afghanistan and Iraq in my opinion is
that it proved--we have a saying in Special Operations that
humans are more important than hardware, and it proved again
the ability to attract, recruit, train, assess, and retain
Special Operating Forces. People with those skills are critical
to success itself on this battlefield, and any other one.
Senator Sessions. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and
welcome, General Schoomaker and General Brown. With all due
respect, I really came to thank Sergeant McCoy and Captain
Leahy for their service. Sergeant McCoy is a veteran of D
Company, Second Battalion, 504th Infantry, and in 1976 I
commanded that company. He is living proof that the
paratroopers are better, they're taller----[Laughter.]
--smarter, and we're still very proud of them, so thank
you, Sergeant.
General Schoomaker, it's no secret that there was a certain
degree of tension between General Shinseki and the Secretary of
Defense. You're going into a position which requires not only
the confidence of the Secretary of Defense, which I'm sure you
have, but also the confidence of everyone in the Army, which I
assume and expect you will get as well. But there certainly is
a different perception today about the relationship between the
Army and the civilian leaders of the Department of Defense. Can
you comment on that, and your perspectives going forward? How
do you think you're going to dispel any lingering rumors?
General Schoomaker. Well, sir, first of all I can't speak
to the specifics of what's gone on in the past that I wasn't
witness to. But like you, as a private citizen I know what the
perceptions are, and I saw the things that the media reported.
When I was asked to consider returning to active duty and to
take on this job, that was one of the things that was on my
mind. Since the Secretary of Defense is the one that asked me
to do this, that was one of the first things that we discussed.
I'm convinced through our discussions and our subsequent
dealings that we have an open and candid dialogue, and that we
have come to an arrangement where we can agree to disagree, and
at the same time understand what the chain of command is. I'm
very comfortable that he's going to hold to his word, and I
know I'll hold to mine.
Senator Reed. Thank you, sir. I think that's the important
point to begin your service.
One of the innovations that began several years ago was the
Stryker Brigades, and they are poised now to begin their first
operational deployment. Can you comment on that, and also
additional changes that you anticipate--for example, less
reliance upon division headquarters as organizing elements, and
more on separate brigades?
General Schoomaker. Sir, the Stryker Brigade falls in my
view in that area I was talking about the intersection of the
current force and the future force. I think it's going to give
us some tremendous insights into an Army with the capability to
be much more strategically agile, where we can truly maneuver
at operational distances. Ironically the Stryker Brigade that
we're going to deploy, and I've looked at the organization, has
more infantry in it than the heavy brigades that we're
replacing with it, which in an environment like we face in Iraq
right now is particularly useful.
So there are some things there in terms of its strategic
agility, its tactical mobility, its relevance, and in terms
things that we're facing today, I think the Stryker Brigade is
going to be very interesting.
But there are two things that are really important, and
General Brown touched on one of them. The Army is people, and
our ability to retain and train, and to advance these
tremendous people that we have, these soldiers, not only train
them for certainty but educate them for uncertainty, and to
create the human element that are problem solvers, the kinds of
problems that you see them solving every day on the streets of
Baghdad and elsewhere, is fundamentally important.
The second thing that's important is that we leverage the
technologies that allow us to network and operate in a
networkcentric environment. The reason an Operational
Detachment Alpha (ODA), a Special Forces A Team, can kill more
tanks sometimes than what you'll find perhaps in an Apache deep
attack or something, is the fact that they have a radio that is
jointly netted that allows them to call on the entire
Department of Defense.
They don't care where the effects come from in destroying
these targets. All they care about is that they arrive on time
and with the precision that's required to do it. So it goes
back to the question that I was talking about a while back.
This isn't all about how many people you put on the
battlefield. It depends upon what capabilities you put in
there, and their ability to move about and be relevant at the
time and place of your choosing to do the kinds of things that
we need to do--not only in battle, but in winning the peace.
So these are the kinds of things I think conceptually that
we have to get our head around, and make sure that we resource
properly. Because it isn't just an issue of wheels versus
tracks, platforms, what kind of a cannon, what kind of an
armored personnel carrier and a tank that we have. It has a lot
to do with how we bring the whole team into the fight in a very
agile way on a strategic basis.
I'm sorry to go a little long on that, but it's a very
comprehensive issue, and this is the way we're going to
approach this if I'm the Chief.
Senator Reed. Let me ask one additional question, General
Schoomaker, before I ask General Brown a question, and that is,
we have all noticed that particularly in Iraq we're suffering
casualties where high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles
(HMMWVs) are engaged either by RPGs or by grenades. Is that
causing you to relook at the type of mobility equipment we have
in Iraq to give our soldiers more protection?
General Schoomaker. Absolutely, but I will tell you that
the physics of the point are that the tactics and your
procedures have a lot to do with all this. We could put tanks
in position that they could be vulnerable as well. You and I
had the conversation about the up-armored HMMWVs, and this is a
matter of programming and affordability, and the whole issue of
management and how to get those, and soldiers deserve that. We
should give them the very best that we can, but nevertheless,
they have to also be used in a manner that's commensurate with
the environment which they're in.
I played football in college, and that doesn't get you much
more than a cup of coffee sometimes, but I played for a very
successful team. I played for a guy by the name of Fritz
Shurmur, who took the Green Bay Packers. He was a big NFL
defensive guy, and he taught us that there are more ways to win
on defense than there are on offense. You can score more ways
on defense than you can score on offense, and part of this
whole deal is the offensive mindset, even in a defensive
posture, and how your tactics, techniques, and procedures
operate so that you keep the enemy, your opponent, off-guard,
and do things.
So again, I'm going long, but I don't think there are just
pure technological solutions to all of these problems. I think
this is a thinking man's game. It's one that has to change all
of the time. It's a leadership business, and while I'm
committed to making sure that we design and develop and train
the very best forces we can, we also have to be hand in glove
with the joint force commanders to make sure that our doctrine
and the rest of it evolves to maximize the potential of what we
field.
Senator Reed. Thank you, sir. My time has expired. General
Brown, we had a chance to chat yesterday, and I have every
confidence that you're going to do an extraordinary job as well
as General Schoomaker to lead the Army.
General Brown. Thank you, sir.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Talent.
Senator Talent. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Schoomaker, I have first of all what I think is a
very important question I need to ask you if we're going to
have a strong relationship in the future. How do you pronounce
your name, because I've heard Senators pronounce it Schoomaker
and staff Schoomaker, and normally I would assume the staff
knew better than the Senators.
General Schoomaker. First of all, the only one that cares
is my father. It's Schoomaker. It is as though it were S-k-o-o.
Senator Talent. That's easier, because that's how it's
spelled.
There's just one subject I want to go into with you. It's
one of the reasons I wanted to be certain to be here and be
able to ask you the question. I have some history on the whole
issue of end strength, because I went into the House in 1992,
and went on the House Armed Services Committee at that point.
Even as a freshman, knowing as little as I knew then, I could
see that that was an issue, because we had drawn down the force
and the active Army from 780,000-plus troops to 480,000--plus,
and at the same time tempo of operations (OPTEMPO) was going
up. It seemed to me even as a freshman that this was creating a
disequilibrium that would have a danger of breaking the force
and perhaps threatening national security. Obviously OPTEMPO is
even higher than it was then, and I complained about it, I made
a lot of points about it in the last administration and I've
been doing the same in this one.
Now, I'm also a believer in transformation, but I want to
make certain that transformation is a way of accomplishing the
National Military Strategy, not an excuse by which we console
ourselves while we're not accomplishing it, and I want to know
your thoughts on the whole subject of end strength. Senator
Reed mentioned that it's no secret there was tension between
General Shinseki and Secretary Rumsfeld, and I think there's no
secret that part of the tension was a disagreement on that
issue.
What do you think of General Shinseki's evaluation that we
needed 20 to 40,000 more people in the active Army, at least to
round out some of the specialties like military police (MPs)
and civil affairs? Are you at a point where you can make an
assessment? How great a priority is it for you to be able to
make that assessment?
General Schoomaker. First of all, I do need to have time to
formally assess this, but I'm going to take a little risk here
and I'm going to tell you that intuitively I think we need more
people. I mean, it's that simple.
But the problem is that we haven't taken a hard look yet at
how we can rebalance the active component, Reserve component
mix. Much of this has to do with availability. There are many
things that we know that we have to have readily available in a
contingent kind of environment. For instance, port opening
units, which are all in the Reserves, need to be more available
to us, so some of that needs to come across in trade.
My point earlier was that before we just add a very
expensive component on top of our current construct, I think we
need to take a look at rebalancing and make sure we know where
we want to put additional people if we need them. In the Army,
the figures I've looked at planning wise is something like
$60,000 a face for an active enlisted soldier. That's an
important price, and it's one the Army cannot absorb from
within its Total Obligation Authority, and it would have to
come with the moneys attached.
So I think this is an important enough thing that we need
to take a good look at it. It's one of the things that clearly,
if I'm confirmed, we're going to have to look at immediately,
and it has to be done within a context that says, what is a
relevant Army, how should it be organized, how does it fit the
joint doctrine, what do we need immediately available, and how
should it be packaged? We shouldn't be trapped in our old
construct. If the old constructs work for us, fine. If they
don't, we need to modify them, and then make a decision about
whether the Army is big enough.
Senator Talent. I very much appreciate your candor. It's a
tremendous relief to me that you're willing to engage in it
here at the outset. I'm one of those people, and I guess in the
minority, who believe that we can rely consistently and perhaps
indefinitely more on the Reserves than we have. I mean, my
sense of it is that particularly in a time of war they will do
what we are asking them to do, and we can maintain retention,
but I don't want to do that by default. I don't want to do that
because we're unwilling to confront the situation with the
active Army, so therefore we rely on the Reserves because we're
not willing to increase the active Army.
Well, you've answered my second question. I wanted your
assurance that as General Shinseki did, and regardless of
whether we or anybody else agrees or disagrees, that you'll
always give us your best professional opinion on that subject,
regardless of what others in the chain of command may think. We
can't do our job here without getting that from people in your
position, and you've relieved my concern in that respect, I
appreciate that.
General Schoomaker. Thank you, sir.
Senator Talent. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Sessions [presiding]. Senator Dayton.
Senator Dayton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Schoomaker, my State does not have an active base,
so the Reserve and the National Guard are our A Team. All the
active bases are in States like Virginia, Michigan, Alabama,
Hawaii, Nebraska, and Georgia. We are going to change that
hopefully. [Laughter.]
So I am a cosponsor of Senator Graham's, my colleague
across the table there, his proposal to make the health
benefits for the Reserve and the National Guardsmen and women
full-time, since so many of them are now being called into
service almost full-time.
I know there are some bean counters in the Pentagon who
have concerns about the cost of that, and I recognize that. But
I'm persuaded that that would be a very valuable way of
retaining reservists, guardsmen and women, and particularly
their spouses and families who might not be thrilled with the
increasing absence away from their homes and their careers. So
I guess, not to put you on the spot or anything, but I would
ask if you would at least give that your most serious
consideration.
I think that there is a failure, at least in part, to
recognize the real, overall value--cost savings, even--of
maintaining these people, and this would be a very effective
way of doing so. In addition, I think providing a benefit that
would be of enormous value to these patriotic men and women and
their families who are enduring this also on their behalf.
General Schoomaker. Yes, sir.
Senator Dayton. Another matter that has concerned me, in
this order, has been the successor to the Crusader cannon, and
Senator Inhofe has been a prime mover on this. I have been
pleased to work with him. Do you have a sense of what the
future holds for this son of Crusader, as yet unnamed?
General Schoomaker. Are you speaking of the NLOS, the non-
line of sight cannon?
Senator Dayton. Exactly.
General Schoomaker. Which is part of our consideration on
what was known as the Objective Force----
Senator Dayton. Exactly.
General Schoomaker.--part of that system of systems, and to
the best of my knowledge, it continues to be conceptually part
of that system, and is being developed as part of that system.
Senator Dayton. Well, I was privileged to see the first
prototype of that system in Minnesota just the weekend before
last. The target date is 2008, and there was a concern
expressed that that date was not going to be held to, and that
slippage to 2010 or later might be in the unwritten game plan
now.
That would leave quite a void in that period of time, in
terms of the Army's arsenal from what we've been told here. I
want to express the concern that if that slippage in the
timetable is somebody's secret intention, that that be made
explicit to us in the very near future so that we can have that
debate or discussion very soon, and above-board, not after the
fact.
General Schoomaker. I'm not familiar enough with the
details to comment on it now.
Senator Dayton. I would ask that you look at that, please.
General Schoomaker. Yes, sir, I will.
Senator Dayton. Give us your particular views on whether
that timetable is going to be official policy and practice or
not.
General Schoomaker. Yes, sir.
Senator Dayton. General Brown, Brigadier General Harrell,
who was Commander of Special Operations in Iraq, now has
described this article as saying--and I'm quoting here--he's
talking about the precedent-setting scope of Special Operations
in Iraq under his command. He says, ``I've characterized it as
the largest since World War II. In actuality, I suspect it's
probably the largest one we've ever done.''
Is this unique to the circumstances in Iraq, or does this
presage the expanded role of Special Operations in the future?
General Brown. Senator, I think immediately it was to the
fact that we were also doing Afghanistan and Iraq at the same
time, and in fact could be contributed, or attributed to the
battle plan that was drawn up and the use of Special Operating
Forces.
I think you will see a more active role for Special
Operations in the future, but I think in this specific case it
was based on the war plan that was drawn up for Iraq.
Senator Dayton. Thank you.
General Schoomaker, Secretary Rumsfeld just recently issued
a memorandum in which he says in part--it's dated July 9,
2003--that there are three principal objectives he wants to
achieve. The first is listed as the structure of the Active and
Reserve Forces to reduce the need for involuntary mobilization
of the Guard and Reserve, and structure forces in order to
limit involuntary mobilization to not more than 1 year every 6
years.
How far away are we from being able to achieve that
objective?
General Schoomaker. I don't know. I'm very familiar with
the memorandum. I know that's something that the Army staff is
working on. It's fundamental to the rebalance issue, and I'd
like to say, when I was in the position that General Brown is
going for, we had civil affairs there, that I think the balance
is still about the same.
We had 25 battalions of civil affairs at U.S. SOCOM, 24 of
which were in the Reserve structure, and up to the point that I
retired, to the best of my knowledge we had covered all
commitments--you may remember, we deployed almost 80 percent of
that force and never had to involuntarily deploy anybody. It
was totally done by volunteers. I think the robustness and the
willingness of much of our Reserve structure was a lot of it. I
think it was very commendable. I don't think we can count on
that forever in that way, and I think this rebalancing, as
Secretary Rumsfeld has asked for, is a very important
initiative. It goes back to the fundamental issue that we
talked about a minute ago, and that's end strength and the
military occupational specialty (MOS) rebalancing.
Senator Dayton. I certainly agree with you, sir. The
willingness of men and women to serve in times of need, and
their patriotism, and the willingness of their families to
support their doing so is just phenomenal. We don't want to
stretch that beyond what we can reasonably expect, and it also
again goes back to the health benefits. I think it's very
important that we give proper recognition and reward in ways
that make a difference in the lives of those men and women and
their families. I would recommend that again to you.
I just would close then, since my time has expired, and
just commend to your review also this current week's Newsweek
Magazine on August 4. It talks about wives and officers of the
Third Infantry Division (ID) who were on duty in Baghdad
listening impatiently to the speeches at a redeployment meeting
at the base. They all had the same question, when is my husband
coming home, or spouse--women are over there too, but this is
the way the quote read--but the Army had other messages. Here
is some of the advice they received:
``Don't have too much beer in the fridge, he's in no shape
to get drunk, put away the sexy negligee, he probably won't be
in the mood, don't have lists of chores waiting, he will be
physically and emotionally spent, and then one more piece of
advice, don't get your hopes up.''
A few days after the meeting in May the homecoming was
postponed and then later postponed again, and the final thing,
if you're unhappy, keep it to yourself. In the e-mail to family
members the Second Battalion's rear detachment commander
cautioned them against contacting elected officials or the
press, ``in a negative manner regarding the military in this
deployment of their loved ones.''
I hope you'll instruct your subordinates to review the kind
of support that they're giving to the families whose members,
husbands, or wives are deployed, because I think this is an
appalling failure to provide the kind of sensitive and I would
think constructive support that those families are certainly
entitled to.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Sessions. Senator Chambliss.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, as I've told each of you privately, we
appreciate the great job you've done for our country and that
you continue to do for our country, and it's very comforting
and exciting to me to see a man like you, General Schoomaker,
who is willing to come back and serve your country once again.
I appreciate both of you.
Senator Nelson and I have been concentrating within the
Personnel Subcommittee on confronting some issues relative to
quality of life, and in particular, issues dealing with
families of our men and women. Senator Dayton just read that e-
mail comment regarding some members of the Third ID and the
Fourth Infantry, and of course my State is very proud to be the
home of the Third ID at Fort Benning and at Fort Stewart. I've
had the pleasure of not just seeing off some of our men and
women, but having the opportunity to visit with their families
while they're gone.
I'll have to tell you that there are a lot of our families
who are dedicated to the military and great patriots who are
really upset, not just about the scenario that Senator Dayton
referred to of getting promised not two times, but now three
times that their husbands or their wives were coming home, and
that's been put off, but just the OPTEMPO in general. There's
story after story of wives who say that their husbands have
been gone 17 out of 20 months that their children have been
here, and that when their husbands come home, that they're
going to have to look seriously as to whether or not they stay
in.
General Schoomaker, I'd appreciate your comments on the
OPTEMPO, what you think we need to do or can do with respect to
slowing that down so that we can give our military families the
quality of life that they deserve, and at the same time protect
America and protect freedom. Because those folks know that when
they signed up they were committing to do a job, and they're
willing to do it, and certainly will do it. But obviously
OPTEMPO continues to be a problem.
General Schoomaker. Well, Senator, I think that we're going
to continue to face a future where we're going to have these
kinds of demands on our forces. I go back to the fact that this
all has to be done within the context of rebalancing, and that
we shouldn't deploy anything more than we need. We should
always be thinking in terms of how we maintain that balance and
that we don't get ourselves stuck in the kind of cookie cutter
and template solutions to all of these issues.
We've spent most of our life sleeping on cardboard boxes
and meals-ready-to-eat (MRE) cases on cold hard floors in
barracks all over this world, and have spent a lot more days
away from our beds than we've spent in our beds. Our families
have grown up doing this, and I'm talking about the two of us
that are sitting up here. We're just like everybody else.
The thing that has always amazed me is the resilience of
the Army family and of soldiers when they face a tough
challenge. I bring this up because we cannot offer everybody
certainty about what their future is. It's a very ambiguous
future that we look to, and we ought to be very careful about
the expectations we give people.
I think that's the most difficult part of this, is when we
give people expectations that we can't meet. It makes it much
more difficult than it does telling people that we have a tough
job to do and we're going to have to hang in there together to
do it, and I think that's at the root of what we've seen in the
Third Infantry Division, the fact that they've been told one
thing and another. Not maliciously, and not because there's
anybody that wanted to harm anybody, but the fact of the matter
is that there were some expectations developed that couldn't be
met for whatever reason, and as a result you start yanking
people around.
I think that's very difficult. It aggravates what's already
a very difficult commitment that these people have made, but I
am very confident from my own experience and from what I know
about the great people we have in the Army, that our soldiers
and their families continue to be very dedicated servants of
this Nation, and I think that we can work this and sort it, and
I think we will continue to get great service from them.
Senator Chambliss. General Brown, you indicated to me
yesterday that you're not going to increase your number of
Rangers, but your folks are going to be called on more and
more, and you're going to have this same problem. Do you have
any comments on that?
General Brown. Sir, right now, as we mentioned earlier,
we're going to grow about 5,100 people. We're going to fill out
some of the nagging shortfalls that the Rangers had. We're
going to add some enablers, some logistics support, and some
things that will help as we go through these deployments, and
so I think we'll continue to be called on.
Our OPTEMPO over these last 2 years has been pretty
extreme. We have at one time most of our aircraft, some
stationed down at Hunter Army Airfield with the Third Battalion
160th Special Operations and our Rangers. Just about every one
of our MH-47s were deployed overseas. We kept just enough to
keep our school running so we would have some for the future.
We are going to solve those problems. We're adding in some
of those key areas where we have really had OPTEMPO problems,
and that's where, in concert with the United States Army, we're
building a new MH-47E Battalion that will reduce some of the
strain on those.
In our Air Force component, we're going to add some C-130s
with the ability to refuel helicopters. We're adding additional
civil affairs folks and some psychological operations folks,
and all of this based on our analysis of what we need for the
future to ensure that our OPTEMPO that you have to have some
sort of a sustaining base to continue ops like we're operating
right now.
Our OPTEMPO today, based on the downsizing of the forces
that we've had in Iraq and Afghanistan, is manageable except in
some civil affairs areas where we're working very hard to
reduce that OPTEMPO, and additionally, in some of our Special
Forces units, our traditional Green Berets. If nothing else
comes up on the scope in the immediate future, we'll be able to
get all of our aircraft back online, and get them all
reconstituted. Then as we go through the next 4 or 5 years and
continue to build this force structure I talked about, to
include these enablers, I think it will be a great success for
helping us with the OPTEMPO problems we've experienced over the
last 2 years.
Senator Chambliss. With all due respect to my friend from
Minnesota, before we go building any bases up there, we have a
lot of room to expand at our six Army bases in Georgia that
we're very proud of.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Sessions. Senator Akaka.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
General Schoomaker, I am concerned, and so is the
committee, about the many challenges that the Army faces over
the next few years. Specifically, I wonder about the Army's
ability to take on what I consider to be major changes to the
way it currently does business while continuing to support
large numbers of deployed forces around the world.
Some of these challenges include reconstituting and
retraining forces returning from operational deployments. I
just spent a good day at Fort Bragg seeing what they're doing
there. Also, returning in significant numbers are foward
deployed forces to new continental United States home
situations, implementing unit manning initiatives,
incorporating unit set fielding, continuing recapitalization of
major equipment, and continuing to implement changes in
installation management.
In your opinion, what is the largest risk associated with
trying to do all of this at once, and are there aspects that
you think may need to be delayed or restructured?
General Schoomaker. Well, first of all, I share your
concern about this daunting challenge. I've been briefed in
preparation for this, and as I look up this mountain it looks
huge, and quite frankly, I'll tell you honestly that I just
can't at this stage give you any expectation that I can sort
all that out. I'll tell you I'll do the best I can to do it.
I also know that the Army can't stop doing what it's doing
and take a time out to do this. It's going to have to do it on
the run, and it means that we're going to have to take some
risks inside of it. We're going to have to change some things
in this culture and the way we think about doing business, and
we'll probably go down some roads that we will wish we hadn't
gone down in this process, but we can't not do it. The
alternative is not acceptable.
Right now, we have about 33 brigades in the Army. We have
23 of those brigades committed in some form or fashion right
now. We cannot sustain an Army that way indefinitely, with a
rotation base of that nature. If we add more people to each of
these brigades, it doesn't solve the problem. So we have to
look at this in a context that's comprehensive, and we have to
come up with a base that allows us to be more modular.
We have to leverage joint resources. We have to be more
agile, and work in a way that we can establish this sustaining
base for all of our commitments, not just in areas like Iraq
and Afghanistan, but our forces in Korea, and the kinds of
things we're going to do to sustain forward deployed forces in
Europe all have to be in it. So these notions of unit manning,
looking at the personnel system, how we educate and train, all
of these things have to be looked at across the entire force in
terms of what we're going to do.
Again I tell you we don't get to huddle up in this. I mean,
this isn't a soccer game, there's no time out in the deal, or
ice hockey, whatever your preference is, and we're going to
have to do this as we continue to serve the Nation. It is a
daunting task, I won't argue with you. I guess I'm telling you
I share your concerns, and I'll do my very best to deal with
it. I have a lot of good professional help, I'll tell you, in
the Army, and here in this institution.
Senator Akaka. I want you to know that we're looking
forward to working with you on these matters.
Also, because I've been in the Subcommittee on Readiness
and Management Support here, I've been very jealous about
readiness programs to be sure that we can support the programs
that you need. One of the most challenging roles for our
military is providing readiness ranges, places where our forces
can work out their strategies. I'm sure you'll find as you
assume your new responsibilities training areas suitable for
modern forces, and these ranges are in short supply.
I understand the Army has expressed an interest in
acquiring additional land to expand maneuvering space at
Kuwakuloa training area on the big island of Hawaii. The
Kuwakuloa training area offers one of the few training areas
potentially available for expansion in the Pacific region. What
are your views on such action?
General Schoomaker. Well, I'm not familiar with the area
that you're talking about, but as I tour the Pacific region
I'll certainly take a look at it and get more familiar with it.
Fundamentally, to operate the way we're going to have to
operate in a joint context, we're going to have to look at more
expansive areas, not just for things like tank gunnery and
artillery firing and things like that. From the standpoint of
being able to maneuver these forces over the kinds of
operational distances we expect to operate, some of the
insertions into Afghanistan were 900 miles one way, and we have
to have the ability to practice the kinds of things that we
will do on those kinds of things.
The maneuver that you saw in Iraq was over distances that
far exceed our current training areas, and the contiguous
nature of those training areas, yet those are the challenges,
and sustaining over those distances, maneuvering, commanding,
doing battle command over those distances, the logistics of it
all, we're going to have to find it.
Now, what we're dealing with is an area where we have to be
good environmental stewards. We have to deal with the fact that
the areas are in short supply in many places. We're going to
have to be creative in how we put these kinds of things
together, so I guess I'm agreeing with you that this is one of
our fundamental challenges.
I don't think we're going to be able to go out and purchase
or expand just acreage. I think we also have to be creative on
how we use that acreage and how we link it through some of the
technologies that we have so that we can do distributed
training, link it through simulations and network battle
command, and be quite creative on it, but it's going to
continue to be a challenge to us.
I guess that's about all I have on that. It is a concern I
think we all share.
Senator Akaka. Thank you for your response.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Sessions. Senator Nelson.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Schoomaker, it's good to see you again. I
appreciated our visit a couple of weeks ago. General Brown,
welcome, it was a nice brief meeting yesterday. It's good to
have you with us to address the questions regarding special
operations worldwide.
General Schoomaker, you've already referred to what's ahead
of you as a daunting task. In some respects, it might be easier
to face a task that is doing more with less, but you're faced
with doing more in an area of change and transformation and
transition at the same time maintaining current capabilities.
It's an even more difficult version of a daunting task than we
often face.
In the midst of all that, in the discussion about
deployment--I won't go back over the difficult stories that
have been expressed, and I get the correspondence, I get the
contacts as well about families that are worried about lengthy
and numerous deployments, but with questions that are more
centered on when is the end point, when will they return, and
when can I know when they will return.
The military personnel ask it, perhaps in a different way,
but their point is similar, and that is, if I'm going to go on
a deployment, I ought to have some idea of when it may be
designed to end. It could be extended, it could be changed, but
something that's never-ending has no terminal point, and I
think that's the uncertainty that's causing a great deal of
concern.
I did see, and looked closely at the plan of redeployments
and rotation. I think it's an excellent start, but what
concerned me is that it doesn't really expressly deal with
Reserve and Guard units, and there's the possibility, with the
OPTEMPO that continues today, where the rotation is more
related to groups than it is to individuals, or individual
groups. It's very possible for a Reserve or Guard unit to have
its deployment ended, come home, and find it's been assigned to
another unit, and then it's redeployed, even though the goal is
to have rotation; not to do this.
I'm hopeful that you will personally see, as you look at
the rotation plans, and as they're developed in the future,
because it is changing, that we'll try to keep that to a
minimum. Because I think nothing could be more devastating to
morale than to find that people are expecting the rotation to
occur, and everybody's rotated but their group, and then
they're redeployed because they're reassigned. I think that's a
significant area, and I'm going to ask you to respond to that.
But I'm also encouraged by your very astute observation
that not all transformation and transition is improvement, that
we'll be using all kinds of words to describe what's going on.
But the bottom line is that when it's all said and done we have
to be better at doing what we've done in the past. We have to
maintain a currency that is a process, that's a result of
process and there's a continuing goal. There's never a date
when it ends, it's ongoing. I know that you understand that.
Can you give us some assurance that you'll personally look
at the rotation to be sure that we don't end up with that kind
of a situation? I think it would be a tragedy.
General Schoomaker. You can have my assurance that we'll go
very deeply into this, and what you're talking about. We have a
thing, and we used it in Special Operations Command, called the
derivative UIC which allows us to break units up and pull
selected pieces of it out. The problem is that part of the fact
that we're not balanced right now says that we end up with
what's called high demand, low density units, and we've had in
many cases the same high demand, low density units for years.
If you're in business and you have high demand, low density
things, what you're doing is missing a market opportunity. In
this case, what we're doing is whipsawing our people around.
Senator Ben Nelson. Well, we'll overuse our resources, and
we'll lose them for recruitment and retention.
General Schoomaker. Sure, so it goes back to this whole
fundamental issue of how you balance, and make sure that what
we are is relevant, and we've built the capabilities into these
formations that are relevant to the tasks that we've asked. So
I agree with you, but again, it's easier said than done,
because we're going to be doing this on the fly.
Senator Ben Nelson. Well, there's no question it will be on
the fly, and it will always be on the fly, because that's the
way it works. As long as we have a commitment that runs
throughout the force so that we don't get the unfortunate
situation that Senator Dayton referred to from the report. We
don't expect perfection, but that misses the mark by a pretty
wide margin.
General Schoomaker. Yes, sir.
Senator Ben Nelson. So I appreciate it very much. Good luck
to both of you. Thank you.
General Schoomaker. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator. I apologize for my
absence, but together with several other Senators we've been
looking at this situation of the program that was mentioned
today in the press about the lottery type of operation that the
Pentagon envisioned as a means to collect data to look into the
future to hopefully avoid terrorist attacks. It is my judgment,
together with Senator Roberts, who is the chairman of the
subcommittee that handles this particular program, and in
concurrence with Senator Stevens, that this program should be
immediately disestablished. We are going to do that in the
context of the House-Senate conference committee, but at the
same time we're going to recommend to the Secretary of Defense
not to use such funds that he has available, Senator Levin, to
implement the initial stages of this program, which was
anticipated to start this week, on Friday. So I had to digress
for a moment on that.
The committee will receive briefings this afternoon,
Senator, from all members at the earliest possible time. We
will establish that time very shortly.
Senator Levin. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman Warner. Yes?
Senator Levin. On that issue, given the fact that it could
take us a number of weeks before we get a conference report,
I'm wondering if we shouldn't just urge the Pentagon to
disestablish it on their own, without our having to act that
way and I would hope that they would, for obvious reasons.
Chairman Warner. That may well be the end result, but I
think that's a constructive observation. The main thing is to
recommend that they not use the funds that we've isolated now
that they do have available to initiate this program.
Senator Levin. Did we get any notice of this program?
Chairman Warner. Yes, we did. I went back and examined the
budget request that came over, and then there's this famous
Wyden report, which requires reporting, and it was described in
that, so it's been out in public. There's been no effort
whatsoever to make it secret.
The program is modeled after a successful program utilized
by one of the Nation's foremost think tanks, which while not
directed towards terrorism, was directed towards analysis of
other contingencies in the future, and in the community it has
been perceived as a fairly successful program, but we'll go
into that in the briefing. I just got off the phone with the
head of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA),
and we mutually agreed that this thing should be stopped.
I wanted to ask a very general question to both of you
outstanding gentlemen, who have devoted so much of your time to
specialized training in the Army. If you go back in history, at
one point in time you just had the good old-fashioned Army, and
then you had the need for the Delta Force, and that emerged
into the Special Operations Forces, and then Congress enacted
special legislation. Senator Levin and I were very active in
the bill referred to as the Nunn-Cohen piece of legislation,
because we were all here at that time.
But I just wondered, and we'll start with you, General
Schoomaker, about the politics of this within the Army. Once
you begin to set aside, should we say, the more challenging
tasks for just one small group, how has that been managed,
obviously I think successfully, by the Army through these many
years? Then I'd like to have your views on that, General Brown.
General Schoomaker. Well, I'm not sure I understand the
question totally, Senator, but I think you're asking how the
Army has changed over the years. I think if you take a look a
long way back through the Army you'll find particular points
within not only the Army but within our Armed Forces where
there were significant points of change, but the reality is
there have always been changes, both large and small, going on.
If you go back and take a look at the effects of the
various National Defense Organization Acts, you look at the
root reforms back in the early 1900s, there were historical
examples of great revolutionary change that affected things,
just like Goldwater-Nichols did and Cohen-Nunn did within our
business.
But the fact of the matter is, the Army is a large
organization, and it's full of wonderful people that are
bright, that are very competent, and are interested in doing
the right things. But nevertheless they are as subject as
anybody else to the fact that change is difficult, because it
changes the status quo. It changes the things that brought them
success to the point we are. It's the kinds of hard-earned
things on the battlefields of World War II that are hard to let
go of those kinds of experiences. So it takes leadership, and I
feel that's what our job is.
Leadership is dealing with change. You can't manage change.
You have to lead it, and then you manage the complexity that
falls out of the change, and I think that's the Army, and the
Armed Forces have done that well over the years.
Chairman Warner. Let me go back a little bit to my own
modest association with the military through the years. In
World War II we had Merrill's Marauders--did you ever hear of
those? Then they were disestablished, and then for a brief
period the Marine Corps had some paratroop units, and that was
disestablished. But this concept took root in the Army, and has
stayed, and has grown.
What I'm trying to decide, because of the magnificence of
the performance of these units--Senator Levin and I have the
most vivid memories of one night on the border of Afghanistan
in the Thanksgiving period 2 years ago, watching them mount up
on a cold night and getting onto the helos, 20-some-odd men, 1
officer, all the rest enlisted. Each knew exactly what his or
her job was, and they were going to do it. It didn't require a
lot of supervision, didn't require a lot of hands-on, and they
went out and did the mission and came back.
You cannot help but be impressed with that, and I suppose
people would say, well, let's take the whole Army and convert
it into the same thing, but that can't be done. You know that.
We have to have our tanks, we have to have our helicopter
units, we have to have the good old straightforward infantry
there. But here's this group over here that I suppose in some
regard is elitist. Is there more promotion opportunity given to
them, more personal recognition given to them, and does that,
in turn, engender some discontent down in the other elements
that do not see quite the notoriety?
I recognize that there's a degree of risk that these units
take that's quite different in some respects to the others. So
I'm just trying to figure out how you two gentlemen, who have
spent much of your lives in that, have balanced it out, whether
or not, for example, we need to increase Special Operation
Forces. That question's been asked, I think, to you, General
Brown.
General Brown. It has been.
Chairman Warner. But the moment you do that, everybody
thinks it's been such a superb performance, more and more
emphasis should be put on it, and then suddenly we're going to
get top-heavy in one area, and other areas of the Army could be
the loser, so maybe just touch on that, and then we'll go to
General Brown.
General Schoomaker. Well, sir, first of all, when we
downsize the Armed Forces, we didn't downsize our Special
Operations Forces. We couldn't. The demand on it was too high.
We made some adjustments in the Reserve structure, and we
did some active adjustments. But the fact of the matter is,
we're recruiting this brilliant, wonderful Special Operations
capability across the Armed Forces, not just the Army, out of
the conventional force structure. That's where it comes from,
and the conventional force structure is only 60-70 percent of
what it was a decade ago. So it's a very daunting, challenging
task to get the kind of people that you saw to volunteer out of
those ranks and sustain it.
You could go and mass produce a bunch of Green Berets and
put them on people's heads, but that's the most dangerous
strategy you could ever have. My advice is that we continue to
remember that quality is better than quantity, and that we need
to keep our Special Operations Forces special.
Now, part of the transformation of conventional forces,
going into the role that I'm being considered to go into, there
were many things that we can move the conventional force into
that have traditionally fallen under the role of Special
Operating Forces. There are a lot of tactics, techniques,
procedures, technologies, all kinds of things that we can do
that will make the conventional force capable of doing many of
the kinds of things that we traditionally thought here. That's
exactly what my intentions would be, is that we take a look at
some areas where it's appropriate to do that. Because quite
frankly, 90 percent of what we're talking about here has to do
with an attitude. It all has to do with mind set. It has to do
with an attitude and a mind set that says I'm a soldier,
sailor, airman, or marine, and that my job is to serve this
Nation. It's not to have parades. It's not to sit around and
just rub sticks. It has to do with being prepared to do what
this Nation calls on us to do, and I am convinced that these
people in our formations are up to doing that. It's our job as
leaders to make sure that we manage it professionally, that we
manage it appropriately, and that we keep it in proper balance.
That's what we're doing.
Chairman Warner. I think the key phrase is keep it in a
proper balance.
General Brown, your views.
General Brown. Sir, I totally agree with General
Schoomaker. I wrote some random notes here while he was
talking, and I think some of the keys are that, taking the Army
for a specific example, is that down at our Special Warfare
School at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, we've gone to great
lengths to build the bridges to the training and doctrine
organizations in the Army so that they have the ability to
leverage any innovation, any training methodologies, anything
that we're doing down there that will meet their needs.
We always brief that we're not out looking for the best
people, we're out looking for the right people. There are
people that just want to take personal pride in what they do
and being involved in Special Operations, they'd gravitate to
our kind of a force.
The number one retention tool is job satisfaction, and
right now our retention is very good in the Special Operations
Forces, specifically in the Army Special Operations Forces. But
across the board, the fact is that they are able to get out and
do what they were trained to do on the battlefield, and that
has been the number one retention tool.
I think that first of all in the training arena we build on
already excellent training done by the services in every one of
our components. When you do that and you put into their
training additional ideas and opportunities for them to train--
we value very greatly out-of-the-box thinking and innovation,
and a lot of exercises and training that our folks go through
are designed to make them think outside of the box, problem-
solving. In fact some of the reports coming out of Afghanistan,
the official reports actually said, I thought I was back in
training, because the scenarios were so much like what I was
actually doing on the battlefield in Afghanistan. So all that
kind of training and methodology we share with the services,
and we work very closely with them.
So I guess to sum it up quickly, we bring in excellent
people that are already trained to an excellent level by the
services, and then we add to it and give them opportunity to
train. In turn we share the methodologies and the training
systems that we have with the big services.
Chairman Warner. Well, I think history reflects that it was
members of this committee, of which I was a part with Senator
Levin, that really felt that this needed to have special
legislation, and that we, and you, among many others, have
taken that legislation and have made it work in such a way that
it's consistent with a balancing emphasis in the Department of
Army and other Services, but of course, this is joint. We have
Navy, Air Force, Marines, and others now in it.
Senator Levin.
Senator Levin. On this same issue, both of you have
mentioned that because of the huge demand on our Special
Operations Forces that there needs to be additional
consideration to shifting some of their missions to
conventional forces, and some already have been, I think,
shifted at least to a degree to conventional forces.
The statute that created these forces and the Special
Operations Command provides nine missions for SOCOM, and I'm
just wondering--one example is apparently, we've transitioned a
mission such as training foreign militaries in basic infantry
tactics. Apparently it's already been handed off to
conventional forces.
In that process, we lost some valuable language and
cultural training which that particular mission makes
available, or at least lost some of it. That's a pretty
valuable gain for our Special Operations Forces, which is there
to a lesser degree now.
What missions do you think of those nine we can
additionally hand off to our conventional forces? I think
you're obviously familiar with the nine, so I won't go through
them all, but what further handoff do you think we can make of
the missions set forth in the statute to conventional forces
from our Special Operations Forces? Either one of you can
address it, or both.
General Brown, why don't you take a shot at it?
General Brown. All right, sir. My belief is that we do not
want to, or should not transfer any of those nine legislated
missions over to another service. What we should do, and what
we are doing very aggressively, is looking at every one of
those tasks that we are given every opportunity to go around
the world and train for as we deploy on specific types of
missions, and evaluating those as to how well they fit into the
things that we need for cultural awareness, for global war on
terrorism issues, for other things, and then we'll take a look
at those and decide which we can ask another service or another
force to pick up for us.
I think the one you mentioned, Senator, is a great example.
In the Georgia Train and Equip program, where we went in with
our guys that had language skills and the capability and
started to train the Georgian army, and got it to a specific
point where it was up and running, and we had value out of
being there. Then the Marine Corps came in behind us and took
over that Georgia Train and Equip program.
I think there are specific skill sets within those core
missions that the other Services have at some degree where they
may be able to pick up some of the tasks that we've been given
to reduce the load on the Special Operating Forces. But I think
we need to analyze those very carefully, because I think you
make a good point that sometimes is missed, that one of the
keys to Special Operations Forces, and specifically our Green
Berets and our civil affairs folks, is the ability to get out
on the ground with the different cultures and continue to stay
culturally aware, and use the language skills that we're
training them on. So we need to make sure we're maximizing that
opportunity as well as pushing other missions to reduce our
OPTEMPO.
General Schoomaker. Sir, if I could just follow in on that?
Senator Levin. Please.
General Schoomaker. The core missions that you're talking
about are, and I'm just going to recite them a little bit from
memory here, direct action, unconventional warfare, special
reconnaissance, civil affairs, foreign internal defense, those
kinds of things, and I agree with Doug--I think these are
mission areas in the statute that should remain within the
purview of the Special Operating Forces.
The question is, where are the partnerships between the
conventional force and the Special Operating Forces, and I
think if you take a look at our current operations both in
Afghanistan and Iraq, you will find, for instance in direct
action, and the recent operation against the two sons is a good
example, where there was a marriage between Special Operating
Forces and conventional forces in accomplishing that direct
action mission.
Take a look at the kind of reconnaissance being conducted
in these places today--you'll find both conventional and
Special Operations Forces are operating concurrently. Foreign
internal defense, which has to do with things like the Georgia
Train and Equip mission and other kinds of things, there's a
marriage there. It shouldn't be a clean handoff where you lose
the leverage of the team.
So this is the kind of thing that I was trying to talk
about earlier, where I think there is a lot here that can be
leveraged out of the conventional force structure and teaming
with Special Operating Forces, to include, as we look at such
things as how we transform our Army aviation, many of the kinds
of tactics, techniques, procedures, and equipage that goes on
in Special Operations aviation should be transferred. We should
experiment and figure out where we get goodness out of those
kinds of things.
So I'll leave it there. This is a very rich area, and I
think it's all about transformation as we go forward.
Senator Levin. Just one last question for me. You have
mentioned the importance of job satisfaction in terms of
retention, and there's obviously a huge amount of that,
rightfully and understandably so, in Special Ops.
Some of the special operators have reported to our staff
that there could be some retention problems in a couple of
areas in particular, and not because of lack of job
satisfaction, but mainly because of a lack of any
predictability in assignments, and perhaps the huge demand.
Those two areas would be civil affairs and psychological
operations, and I'm wondering whether or not there is a
possibility of greater predictability in those assignments.
We've heard in our conventional forces the raising of
expectations which then creates predictability, which is then
dashed. To the extent that that exists in our Special Ops
Forces, I wonder whether or not we can find a way to provide
greater scheduling predictability.
General Brown. Sir, I can tell you that that's something
that I think is important. We need to work hard to give every
soldier we deploy as much predictability as we can reasonably
do there.
I talked to the Commanding General, Army Special Operations
Command, who is the component commander that owns the civil
affairs forces, just before coming up here for this hearing. I
specifically asked him, are we having a lot of turbulence down
in our civil affairs forces on retention, because we have
really deployed a lot of civil affairs folks when you take into
consideration the Kosovo piece, the Bosnia piece, the Afghani
piece, and the Iraqi piece. He said quite frankly that today
there is not a lot of turbulence down there, but that doesn't
portend what may happen as we start bringing all these folks
back. So we need to work hard at giving the predictability that
we can, and then we need to work towards ensuring that we do
everything we can to keep them in the force.
Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. That brings to mind, as we look to the
future in lessons learned, we've put perhaps a disproportionate
reliance on the Guard and Reserve with regard to civil affairs
officers, and as a consequence they had to by and large be
recalled. So it may well be in the future standing forces that
we have to keep a larger contingent in that area, so that's
something for you to look at.
We've had an excellent hearing here this morning. We thank
you and your families. Based on what we have reviewed here this
morning with you, it will be my thought that we can move very
swiftly to achieve Senate confirmation of your respective
posts. I have placed into the record your advance questions,
but I wish to read this one question which I think is important
for the public to understand, and that is congressional
oversight.
In order to exercise its legislative oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive
testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear
before this committee and other appropriate committees of
Congress? You acknowledged yes.
Further--and this is very important. We have asked this in
the 25 years both of us have been on this committee, this
question--do you agree, when asked, to give your personal
views, even if those views differ from the administration in
power? In other words, your senior civilian--the Secretary of
Defense and others.
Civilian control is maintained historically over the Armed
Forces of the United States, but it's important for Congress
from time to time to receive the views of senior officers such
as yourself, views which could be regarded as at variance with
those of the body in power exercising civilian control, namely,
the Secretary of Defense and, indeed, the President himself. In
Goldwater-Nichols we made a special provision--I remember
working on this, Senator Levin, and if any officer or Chief of
Staff of the Army so desired, they could go to the President
and seek an audience and express their views. I think that's
been done on several occasions. It's been very important that
that be done.
Senator Levin. If I could just support what you're saying,
Mr. Chairman, in addition, as the chairman has pointed out, to
presenting views directly to the President where necessary,
it's essential that you present views to us when asked, your
own personal views, even if they differ from that of whatever
administration might be in power. That is absolutely essential
for us.
We count on it a great deal, and you have demonstrated that
this morning, that you are willing and able to do that, and to
not worry about whether or not your views are exactly in sync
with the views of the civilians, who we do want to ultimately
make decisions. But we need to rely on the unvarnished opinions
of our senior military officers, and we really rely heavily on
that. We're grateful for your direct response to the question
that you will do that.
General Schoomaker. Yes, sir.
General Brown. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much. The hearing is
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:33 a.m., the committee adjourned.]

[Prepared questions submitted to Gen. Peter J. Schoomaker,
USA (Ret.), by Chairman Warner prior to the hearing with
answers supplied follow:]

Questions and Responses

DEFENSE REFORMS

Question. More than a decade has passed since the enactment of the
Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and
the Special Operations reforms.
The goals of Congress in enacting these defense reforms, as
reflected in section 3 of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act, can be summarized as strengthening civilian control
over the military; improving military advice; placing clear
responsibility on the combatant commanders for the accomplishment of
their missions; ensuring the authority of the combatant commanders is
commensurate with their responsibility; increasing attention to the
formulation of strategy and to contingency planning; providing for more
efficient use of defense resources; enhancing the effectiveness of
military operations; and improving the management and administration of
the Department of Defense.
Do you agree with these goals?
Answer. Yes, the Goldwater-Nichols act has significantly improved
our joint operations. The reforms initiated by Goldwater-Nichols have
been irrefutably validated in the crucible of war.
Question. Do you believe that legislative proposals to amend
Goldwater-Nichols may be appropriate? If so, what areas do you believe
it might be appropriate to address in these proposals?
Answer. Although amendment proposals may be appropriate, such
proposals should take into account the lessons learned by all since
Goldwater-Nichols was implemented. If confirmed, I look forward to
working with the Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of Defense to
examine other legislative and regulatory reforms that might improve
capabilities and enhance readiness. Several areas might be appropriate
to address:

- The role of Joint Forces Command has evolved significantly
since Goldwater-Nichols was passed. Goldwater-Nichols
refinements might ensure that clear authorities support the
role we intend for Joint Forces Command.
- It may be possible to revise the planning, programming, and
budgeting system from a budget driven process to a policy/
planning driven process.
- Acquisition reforms should continue to take advantage of new
business cycles and models critical for technology.
- Any changes to the national security structure that better
integrate the economic, political, information, and military
instruments of power might also help solidify interagency
``unity of effort.''

Question. What do you consider to be the most important aspects of
these defense reforms?
Answer. These reforms have significantly clarified operational
chains of command and working relations among the military services to
enhance and synchronize joint operations. Most importantly, they have
clearly communicated the intent of Congress and the President that our
warfighting efforts must be increasingly joint.
Question. Do you believe that the role of the Chiefs of Staff and
the combatant commanders under the Goldwater-Nichols legislation is
appropriate and the policies and processes in existence allow that role
to be fulfilled?
Answer. The general framework established by the Goldwater-Nichols
is appropriate and existing policies and processes allow that role to
be fulfilled. If confirmed, I would like to study in greater depth
whether the act strikes an appropriate allocation of roles between the
combatant commanders and the needs and constraints faced by the service
chiefs. Combatant commanders are often driven by a near-term
operational horizon, while the services must consider longer periods
associated with the research and development, acquisition and
professional development cycles. This leads to natural tensions that
might be rectified through clarification of roles and relationships.

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. Section 162(b) of title 10, United States Code, provides
that the chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of
Defense and from the Secretary of Defense to the commanders of the
combatant commands. Other sections of law and traditional practice,
however, establish important relationships outside the chain of
command. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the
Chief of Staff of the Army to the following offices:
Secretary of Defense
Answer. The Secretary of Defense, as the head of the Department of
Defense and the principal assistant to the President in all matters
relating to the Department of Defense, issues guidance and direction to
the military departments. If confirmed, I will be responsible to the
Secretary of Defense and his Deputy, through the Secretary of the Army,
for the operation of the Army in accordance with such directives. As a
member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I will serve as a military adviser
to the Secretary of Defense as appropriate. I will cooperate fully with
the Secretary of Defense to ensure that the Army properly implements
the policies established by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. In
coordination with the Secretary of the Army, I will communicate with
the Secretary of Defense in articulating the views of the Army.
Question. The Under Secretaries of Defense
Answer. Acting on behalf of the Secretary of Defense, the under
secretaries perform responsibilities that require them, from time to
time, to issue guidance--and in the case of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, direction--to the
military departments. If confirmed, in coordination with the Secretary
of the Army, I will communicate with the Under Secretaries in
articulating the views of the Army. I will work closely with them to
ensure that the Army is administered in accordance with the guidance
and direction issued by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD).
(Note: all the USDs and ASDs may issue instructions to the secretaries
of the military departments if the SECDEF authorizes them to do so.)
Question. The Assistant Secretaries of Defense
Answer. The Assistant Secretaries of Defense have functional
responsibilities that, from time to time, require the issuance of
guidance to the military departments. If confirmed, I will, in
coordination with the Secretary of the Army, communicate with the
Assistant Secretaries of Defense in articulating the views of the Army.
I will cooperate fully with them to ensure that the Army is
administered in accordance with guidance promulgated by the Office of
the Secretary of Defense.
Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Answer. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal
military adviser to the President, the National Security Council, and
the Secretary of Defense. Subject to the authority, direction, and
control of the President and the Secretary of Defense, the chairman
plans the strategic direction and contingency operations of the Armed
Forces; advises the Secretary of Defense on requirements, programs, and
budgets identified by the commanders of the combatant commands;
develops doctrine for the joint employment of the Armed Forces; reports
on assignment of functions (or roles and missions) to the Armed Forces;
provides for representation of the United States on the Military Staff
Committee of the United Nations; and performs such other duties as may
be prescribed by law or by the President or Secretary of Defense.
In conjunction with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(JCS), the Chief of Staff of the Army assists the chairman in providing
military advice to the President, the National Security Council, and
the Secretary of Defense. If confirmed, as a member of the JCS, it
would be my duty to provide frank and timely advice and opinions to the
chairman to assist him in his performance of these responsibilities. If
confirmed, in addition, upon request, I will as a member of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff provide my individual military advice to the President,
the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. As
appropriate, I will provide advice in addition to or in disagreement
with that of the chairman. I will establish and maintain a close and
professional relationship with the chairman and will communicate
directly and openly with him on policy matters involving the Army and
the Armed Forces as a whole.
Question. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Answer. The Vice Chairman of the JCS assists the chairman in
providing military advice to the Secretary of Defense and the
President. If confirmed as a member of the JCS, it would be my duty to
ensure that the vice chairman is provided my frank views and opinions
to assist him in his performance of his responsibilities.
Question. The Secretary of the Army
Answer. If confirmed, my relationship with the Secretary of the
Army would be close, direct, and supportive. Within the Department of
the Army, a large part of my responsibility as Chief of Staff would be
to serve as the Secretary's principal military adviser. My
responsibilities would also involve communicating the Army Staff's
plans to the Secretary of the Army and supervising the implementation
of the Secretary's decisions through the Army Staff and Army commands
and agencies. In this capacity, my actions would be subject to the
authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of the Army. In my
capacity as a member of the JCS, I would also be responsible for
appropriately informing the Secretary of the Army about conclusions
reached by the JCS and about significant military operations, to the
extent such action does not impair independence in the performance of
duties as member of JCS. I anticipate that I would at all times work
closely and in concert with the Secretary of the Army to establish the
best policies for the Army in light of national interests.
Question. The Under Secretary of the Army
Answer. The Under Secretary of the Army is the Secretary's
principal civilian assistant and performs such duties and exercises
such powers as the Secretary of the Army prescribes. His
responsibilities require him, from time to time, to issue guidance and
direction to the Army Staff. If confirmed, I will be responsible to the
Secretary of the Army, and to the Under Secretary through the Secretary
of the Army, for the operation of the Army in accordance with such
directives. I will cooperate fully with the Under Secretary of the Army
to ensure that the policies established by the Office of the Secretary
of the Army are properly implemented. I will communicate openly and
directly with the Under Secretary of the Army in articulating the views
of the Army Staff, Army commands, and Army agencies.
Question. The Assistant Secretaries of the Army
Answer. The Assistant Secretaries of the Army have functional
responsibilities that, from time to time, require the issuance of
guidance to the Army Staff and to the Army as a whole. If confirmed, I
will establish and maintain close, professional relationships with each
of the Assistant Secretaries to foster an environment of cooperative
teamwork between the Army Staff and the Army Secretariat as we deal
together with the day-to-day management and long-range planning
requirements facing the Army.
Question. The General Counsel of the Army
Answer. The General Counsel is the chief legal officer of the
Department of the Army. His duties include coordinating legal and
policy advice to all members of DA regarding matters of interest to the
Secretariat, as well as determining the position of the Army on any
legal questions or procedures other than military justice matters
assigned to The Judge Advocate General. If confirmed, I will establish
and maintain a close, professional relationship with the General
Counsel to assist him in the performance of these important duties.
Question. The Chiefs of Staff of the other Services
Answer. If confirmed, as a member of the JCS, it would be my duty
to engage in frank and timely exchanges of advice and opinions with my
fellow Service Chiefs in their roles as members of the JCS. I look
forward to developing strong working relationships with these
colleagues, many of whom I know from previous service.
Question. The combatant commanders
Answer. Subject to the direction of the President, the combatant
commanders perform their duties under the authority, direction, and
control of the Secretary of Defense, and are directly responsible to
the Secretary of Defense for the preparedness of their commands to
carry out missions assigned to them. As directed by the Secretary of
Defense, the military department secretaries assign all forces under
their jurisdiction, except those forces necessary to perform the
missions of the military departments, to the combatant commands to
perform missions assigned to those commands. In addition, subject to
the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense and
the authority of combatant commanders under title 10, United States
Code, section 164(c), the military department secretaries are
responsible for administering and supporting the forces that they
assign to a combatant command. If confirmed, I will cooperate fully
with the combatant commanders in performing these administrative and
support responsibilities. I will establish close, professional
relationships with the combatant commanders and communicate directly
and openly with them on matters involving the Department of the Army
and Army forces and personnel assigned to or supporting these commands.

QUALIFICATIONS

Question. What background and experience do you have that you
believe qualifies you for this position?
Answer. I have been associated with the U.S. Army since birth and
have experienced literally every aspect of Army life, as a dependent of
a professional army officer through the post WWII, Korean War, and
Vietnam eras, to Army ROTC in college and my own 31\1/2\ years of
active service and 2\1/2\ years of retired status. I believe that my
active military service, including duty in Armor, Armored Cavalry,
Infantry, and Special Forces units, assignments in U.S. Total Army
Personnel Command, on the Army Staff, as an Assistant Division
Commander, and as an Army Major Army Command Commander provide solid
service experience. As one of the initial Joint Service Officers
designated in 1987, I have extensive joint experience including
numerous real world joint contingency operations and command of both
the Joint Special Operations Command and the United States Special
Operations Command. All of this provides me with the experience,
knowledge, and insight necessary to successfully meet the challenges
facing the Army today. My recent experiences working on critical and
timely defense issues as a consultant to the Defense Department have
afforded me with a unique perspective that I believe will be valuable
in discharging the duties of Army Chief of Staff.

MAJOR CHALLENGES

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting
the next Chief of Staff of the Army?
Answer. If confirmed, my fundamental challenge will be to help the
Army--and the Nation--understand what it means to be an Army at war.
This is a war that reaches to the furthest corners of the world--a war
for the very survival of our way of life. As the President has stated,
``this is a different kind of war against a different kind of enemy.''
Being an Army at war means that we must be prepared to question
everything--take nothing for granted. We must rigorously assess our
priorities, our processes, and our programs to ensure we can meet the
needs of the Nation in this war.
Question. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these
challenges?
Answer. My first act would to get out and assess the situation--
talk to the Army's soldiers, their families, and the combatant
commanders they serve. We need to figure out--as an Army at war--what
needs to change and what needs to continue. We may need to adjust our
priorities. We may even need to change the culture--in a world where
the strategic environment is transformed, we should be prepared to even
reexamine our fundamental way of thinking. At the same time, our Army
needs to celebrate its victories. A lot is right with the U.S. Army. We
need to remember that.

MOST SERIOUS PROBLEMS

Question. What do you consider to be the most serious problems in
the performance of the functions of the Chief of Staff of the Army?
Answer. The most serious problem is closely related to our greatest
challenge: the functions of the Chief of Staff of the Army are designed
for a peacetime, more predictable environment than the one we face
today. We need responsive, adaptive processes and organizations to
support an Army at war.
Question. What management actions and time lines would you
establish to address these problems?
Answer. If I am confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary
of the Army and--through him--OSD, to identify solutions. I will
quickly evaluate our current organizational structure and realignment
plans to look for ways to promote unity of effort and enhance
efficiency and effectiveness. I am confident that the Army has the
human talent to solve virtually any problem when provided clear
guidance and a sound organizational framework.

PRINCIPAL ROLE OF THE ARMY

Question. What do you see as the principal role for the U.S. Army
in terms of our overall national security?
Answer. The Army's mission is to provide prompt and sustained land
forces for joint operations.
Question. What roles should the Army play in contingency,
humanitarian, and peace operations?
Answer. The Army provides the Nation, the President, and the
combatant commanders a unique set of core competencies and capabilities
to fulfill whatever missions and tasks the Joint Force is assigned.
Army forces play a vital role in providing the security and stability
necessary to make contingency, humanitarian, and peace operations
feasible.
Question. Is there unnecessary redundancy between Army and Marine
Corps ground combat forces, particularly between Army light divisions
and Marine Corps divisions?
Answer. No. The Army and the Marine Corps each possess unique
competencies with respect to basing, staging, employment, and
sustainability. This range of competencies provides the combatant
commander a broad range of operational options. This combination of
service capabilities maximizes their total complementary and
reinforcing effects, while minimizing their relative vulnerabilities.
Question. Some believe that the Army and the Marines are competing
for the same declining mission area--the contingency forces role--and
that each is pursuing capabilities that the other service already
possesses. What is your view of this observation?
Answer. It is not at all clear to me that the contingency forces
role is declining. The Army and the Marine Corps each possess unique
competencies with respect to basing, staging, employment, and
sustainability. Their combination maximizes their total complementary
and reinforcing effects, while minimizing their relative
vulnerabilities.

ARMY ROLE IN THE JOINT FORCE

Question. The U.S. military fights as a joint force and strives to
achieve realistic training for military operations. The Army provides
trained and equipped forces for joint military operations.
How do you believe the Army can best contribute to improved joint
military capabilities while preserving its service unique capabilities
and culture?
Answer. The Army can best contribute to improved joint capabilities
by developing its force with a joint perspective from the very
beginning, transforming from our past practices of de-confliction to
greater joint interdependence. Force development begins with an
appreciation of the future operational environment--that appreciation
must be co-developed with the joint community. It then proceeds to
development of operational concepts--those concepts must be fully
nested in joint operational concepts. Finally, that inherently joint
Army concept drives every dimension of our force: doctrine,
organization, training, materiel, leader development, people, and
facilities.

VISION FOR THE FUTURE

Question. What is your vision for the Army of the future?
Answer. The current Army vision is generally well accepted. If
confirmed, one of my first tasks will be to assess the current state of
the Army and its environment, identify major issues and challenges, and
capture ideas that confirm or refine our strategic direction. I will
assess the plans in place to achieve our vision and determine if they
warrant modification or prioritization changes.
Question. What foundations would you establish, if confirmed, to
facilitate the attainment of that vision?
Answer. If confirmed, one of my first tasks will be to assess the
current state of the Army and its environment, identify major issues
and challenges, and capture ideas that confirm or refine our strategic
direction. The assessment I make at that time will determine the
foundations needed to facilitate attainment of that vision.

JOINT EXPERIMENTATION

Question. The Army has conducted a wide range of experiments to
identify the path forward toward a digitized force, but has done much
less with regard to transformation to the Objective Force. In the arena
of joint experimentation, while the Army has participated in a few
joint experimentation activities over the last couple years, it is
clear that more joint experimentation is necessary to meet future
operational challenges.
What is your view of the need for joint experimentation and how do
you see the Army participating in future joint experimentation
activities as we move into the 21st century?
Answer. Concept development and experimentation are inextricably
linked. The Army was the first service to co-sponsor a joint wargame
(Unified Quest 03) with Joint Forces Command, and I support future
joint co-sponsorship. The Army must increasingly integrate its
experimentation with the joint experimentation effort and the DOD
Transformation Roadmap.
Question. Do you believe that Army experimentation has been
sufficient in support of transformation to the Objective Force?
Answer. There are many kinds of experiments--game seminars,
modeling, computer simulation, and live experiments on the ground. All
of these supported development of the Stryker Force. Army
experimentation, particularly computer simulation, was critical in
achieving the Milestone B decision of the Future Combat Systems
acquisition strategy.

MISSILE DEFENSE

Question. Do you consider missile defense to be one of the Army's
core missions?
Answer. Yes--missile Defense has been an Army core competency for
47 years and the Army currently operates the Nation's only deployed
ballistic missile defense system, Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-
3). Missile defense is essential to effective land operations.
Question. What is your view of the proper relationship between the
Army and the Missile Defense Agency?
Answer. The Missile Defense Agency should continue to develop and
produce boost and mid-course phase missile defense systems and transfer
proven capabilities to the appropriate services for fielding and
operations and sustainment.
Question. What do you think the Army's responsibilities are or
should be with respect to development, procurement, and operation of
missile defense systems?
Answer. My current assessment is that the Army, in its role to
provide force and asset protection to the combatant commanders, should
retain development, procurement, integration, and operation
responsibilities of all ground-based terminal phase air and missile
defense systems.

TRANSFORMATION

Question. Secretary Rumsfeld has established transformation of the
Armed Forces to meet 21st century threats as one of the Department's
highest priorities and has stated that only weapons systems that are
truly transformational should be acquired. Over the past several years
the Army has terminated or restructured over 77 programs to fund its
transformation initiative.
How would you assess the level of risk to our forces of foregoing
or curtailing current acquisition programs in favor of future
transformation? Can we afford this risk considering the current level
of global threats?
Answer. We must always find the right balance between maintaining
readiness and combat overmatch in the near term and ensuring them--
through transformation--for the future. We are fighting today and have
just demonstrated that we have effective capabilities near term. But we
should anticipate that our adversaries will adapt and--knowing that--
failure to transform would constitute the ultimate, non-affordable
risk.
Question. In the allocation of limited resources, how would you
prioritize among the current force, the interim force (Stryker Brigade
Combat Teams) and the Objective Force?
Answer. If confirmed, I would prioritize resources to maximize our
effective combat capability and capacity over time. Establishing the
Army's priorities will involve the balancing of competing demands with
existing resources. As we seek this balance now and in the future, we
must ensure that we maintain the current readiness of our forces.
Question. What is your vision for the Army and Army transformation?
Answer. The vision and current direction of Army transformation
efforts appear to me to be on track. I will continuously review Army
progress and direction in this effort as one of my highest priorities.
Question. Does your vision of Army transformation include a shift
of force structure from conventional forces, including battalions,
brigades and divisions, to more Army unconventional forces?
Answer. Over the past few years, the Army has realigned over 18,000
spaces to meet the increased requirement for special operations,
chemical/biological, military police, and other similar capabilities.
If confirmed, I will continually assess the Army's force mix, to
include the Reserve component, and make prudent and appropriate
adjustments over time.
Question. Do you believe the Army should be reorganized from its
current division-based structure to a larger number of smaller tactical
units so as to field corps-based joint task forces as some reformers
have advocated?
Answer. At this time, I have not formed any specific conclusions on
this issue. I will entertain all ideas as we look for ways to increase
the capability and capacity of our forces.

LOW DENSITY/HIGH DEMAND FORCES

Question. In your professional judgment, how would you address the
Army's problem with low-density units such as military police, civil
affairs, and others, which are in extremely high demand in this new
strategic environment?
Answer. It takes years to build a new capability, particularly the
soldiers and leaders with the appropriate skills. If we are confident
that the new strategic environment will increase the demand for these
units long-term, then we should move expeditiously to adjust our force
structure to match the demand.
Question. Are there functional changes among the active and Reserve
components that you believe should be made?
Answer. The role of the Army's Reserve components has already
changed significantly. Today, what was once a ``force in Reserve'' has
become a full partner in our daily operations providing critical
specialized capabilities and augmentation. This is an enormous cultural
change for our Army that must ensure that the duration and frequency of
deployments is appropriate for citizen soldiers and properly manage the
effort to ensure predictability.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES--CONVENTIONAL FORCES RELATIONSHIP

Question. Operations conducted in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere
have demonstrated the effectiveness of Special Operation Forces in
addressing threats posed by terrorists and other adversaries.
What, in your professional judgment, is the appropriate
relationship between Special Operations Forces and conventional forces?
Answer. The Army will continue to need to take advantage of the
synergy generated by blending the unique capabilities of SOF with the
traditional warfighting capabilities of conventional forces. The nature
and scope of this relationship will vary according to each mission
situation. SOF is inherently joint and with the Army becoming
increasingly joint in its perspective, I believe that the future will
see much greater synergy achieved in this area.
Question. How can transformation support the relationship between
SOF and conventional Army forces so that SOF can continue to focus on
unique missions, and develop specialized capabilities? What missions or
equipment, if any, should conventional Army forces adopt from SOF?
Answer. Army conventional forces are capable of assuming certain
missions currently performed by Special Operations Forces in the areas
of counter drug activities, humanitarian de-mining activities, and the
training of foreign conventional forces. Furthermore, Special
Operations Forces possess a number of attributes such as agility,
versatility, and deployability that are being designed into the
materiel and leader development capabilities of our future force as a
whole. Together, these initiatives will allow Special Operations Forces
to better focus on maintaining proficiency in their unique core
competencies. Additionally, we must continue to migrate equipment,
tactics, techniques, and procedures from SOF to the Army conventional
forces when appropriate.
Question. What role, if any, can the Special Operations Command's
development and acquisition capability play in Army and DOD efforts to
transform?
Answer. The Special Operations Command is the sole unified command
with internal responsibility for planning, programming, and budgeting
of military forces as well as the authority for the development and
acquisition of special operations-peculiar equipment, materials,
supplies, and services. This has allowed the command's Directorate of
Advanced Technology to concentrate on areas that show potential benefit
to the SOF operator in the near to mid-term. We should look carefully
at the techniques and processes they have used to determine if there
are opportunities to make the Army process more effective and
efficient. As I indicated above, we must continue to migrate equipment,
tactics, techniques, and procedures from SOF to the Army conventional
forces when appropriate.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES--RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ARMY AND SOF COMPONENT

Question. What is your understanding of the relationship between
the Chief of Staff of the Army, the U.S. Special Operations Command,
and the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC)?
Answer. USASOC is the Army component of the U.S. Special Operations
Command and has the responsibility to train, equip, deploy, and sustain
Army Special Operations Forces. The Chief of Staff of the Army is
responsible for the organization, equipping, and training of forces for
the conduct of prompt and sustained combat operations on land. In this
capacity the Army is responsible for resourcing USASOC to the extent
outlined in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.
Question. Do you believe that the Army currently provides the
proper level of support to USASOC in equipment (airframes, etc.),
facilities, personnel billets, and services? If not, what would you
recommend, if confirmed, to increase the level of attention to USASOC
requirements?
Answer. Within current resource constraints and operational needs,
I believe that the Army currently provides sufficient personnel assets,
rotary wing aircraft and equipment to USASOC. I believe conventional
Army forces can further assist Army Special Operations Forces by
assuming or augmenting certain traditional SOF missions on a case-by-
case basis.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES--CIVIL AFFAIRS AND PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

Question. Given the current operational and personnel tempo for
civil affairs and psychological operations, do you believe that we have
sufficient personnel for those mission?
Answer. It is not clear to me that current levels can be sustained
indefinitely. An increase in requirements beyond current levels may
require 2-year involuntary mobilizations. If confirmed, I look forward
to working with all of the combatant commanders to develop long-term,
cohesive, and sustainable force levels.
Question. Do you believe that the mix between active and Reserve
components in those areas is adequate? If not, what remedies would you
propose?
Answer. I do not believe the psychological operations (PSYOP)/civil
affairs force structure is appropriately balanced. For example, the
active component civil affairs skill sets are focused on the tactical
level and lack certain civilian-acquired functional specialties--such
as Rule of Law, Public Health, Governance, Economics, and
Infrastructure--that reside only in the Reserve component. The planned
increase in active component civil affairs structure is encouraging,
and if confirmed, I will devote special attention to ensuring the Army
achieves the proper balance of PSYOP and civil affairs force structure.

COMANCHE

Question. In the fiscal year 2004 budget request, the Army
restructured the Comanche helicopter program and requested an
additional $1.7 billion to cover increased research and development
costs.
Do you support the continued development of the Comanche helicopter
effort as restructured? If so, why?
Answer. The RAH-66 Comanche armed reconnaissance helicopter is a
critical component of the Army's future force. The Army recently
conducted a comprehensive system of systems review of this program both
to restore full confidence in the program and to ensure that it is
properly aligned with the future force. The restructured program is
fully funded and incorporates an evolutionary acquisition strategy
entailing a spiral development of capabilities in three blocks with a
coherent testing program to support key decisions. If confirmed, I will
conduct my own assessment and work hard to ensure that the Comanche
program continues forward on a solid path.

ARMY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

Question. The Army Science and Technology program has successfully
transitioned a number of Future Combat Systems technologies to the
System Development and Demonstration phase.
What do you see as the role that Army Science and Technology
programs will play in continuing to develop Objective Force systems?
Answer. The primary focus of Army Science and Technology (S&T) will
be to develop and demonstrate future force technologies. These
technologies must increase speed of strategic deployments, enhance
tactical agility once deployed, assure networked connectivity for
joint, relevant situational awareness and increase precision for
decisive results. Achieving these capabilities will require sufficient
resourcing, disciplined management, synchronized development of
warfighting concepts, and effective experimentation.

RESERVE DEPLOYMENT AND MOBILIZATION

Question. Leaders of the United States Central Command have
indicated that Reserve modernization policies and systems must be
adapted to the more fluid force deployment and employment model
expected to be used in the future. They have characterized current
Reserve Force management policies and systems as ``inefficient and
rigid,'' and indicated that critical combat support and service support
forces were late in arriving in theater as a result of the current
cumbersome mobilization and deployment system.
What are your views about the optimal role for the Reserve
component (RC) forces in meeting combat missions?
Answer. If confirmed, this is an area that I want to assess. The
Army National Guard and Army Reserve have been integrated into the
planning and execution of all recent military operations and have been
an essential element to success. RC forces have been very successful in
meeting many of their assigned combat missions and they are regularly
employed to meet long-term, predictable requirements such as
peacekeeping missions. The Army is currently doing a thorough analysis
of the appropriate mix of active and Reserve Forces in order to
increase our agility and flexibility. I intend to monitor this analysis
and assess its findings closely.
Question. What is your opinion about the sufficiency of current
Reserve Force management policies?
Answer. We are at war, and the Reserve components are being called
upon in ways and at levels not envisioned in the previous defense
strategies that guided their resourcing and structure. I am also aware
that the Secretary of Defense recently issued guidance to the Services
to reduce the need for involuntarily mobilization, including the
complete elimination of the need for involuntary mobilization during
the first 15 days of a rapid response operation. I support the Army's
examination of ways to streamline the mobilization process and believe
that it warrants consideration of changes to mission profiles and
structure as well as methods to provide Reserve components with greater
peacetime training opportunities and increased levels of modernization.
Question. Do you support assigning any support missions exclusively
to the Reserve?
Answer. There are some capabilities for support missions that
should remain primarily in the Reserve components to prevent the
inefficient use of resources. An example is mortuary affairs units,
which are primarily needed during combat operations and do not need
extensive training time to prepare for their wartime missions. The Army
is currently studying proposals to improve the readiness of Reserve
component units that fulfill support mission requirements to ensure
they can meet combatant commander deployment requirements.

UNIT MANNING SYSTEM

Question. The Army has undertaken a Unit Manning Initiative aimed
at improving combat readiness and cohesion while setting conditions for
improved soldier and family well-being. Previous attempts to achieve
this goal have not succeeded, and the Army has instead relied on an
individual replacement system.
Do you support the implementation of the Unit Manning Initiative?
Answer. I support any innovation that produces higher levels of
readiness and combat effectiveness. The primary goal of the Unit
Manning Initiative is to increase unit readiness and unit cohesion by
synchronizing the unit and soldier lifecycles. My experience confirms
the soundness of this approach.
Question. If so, what factors do you believe will make this attempt
at Unit Manning succeed where others have failed?
Answer. Fundamentally, this effort will succeed because we are now
an Army at war. This is not simply an effort to save money or cover a
rotational presence. To meet our current and projected level of
commitments, we must increase our collective combat readiness. The unit
manning initiative would be a significant step in our effort to do
this.

PREVENTION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

Question. The tragic murder-suicide deaths at Fort Bragg in June
and July 2002 and a subsequent report identified several problems
affecting the ability and willingness of soldiers and their families to
seek assistance in coping with domestic problems. An important issue
identified in the report was that soldiers and their spouses may be
reluctant to seek assistance out of fear that it would adversely affect
how they are regarded within their commands. The report indicated that
mental health services are flawed because they inadvertently discourage
soldiers and their families from seeking help when problems arise.
If confirmed, what steps would you take as Chief of Staff of the
Army to address the problems relating to domestic violence identified
in the report related to the Fort Bragg tragedies?
Answer. I believe that the Army must strive to eliminate domestic
violence by creating a culture within the Army that focuses on
supporting and encouraging prevention efforts. From personal
experience, I know that the Army has long had a number of solid
programs in the soldier and family support arena. I also know that the
Army has recently improved those programs by providing additional
trained professionals, making these services more accessible, and
implementing innovative initiatives like the Deployment Cycle Support
plan.

RECRUITING AND RETENTION

Question. The ability of the Armed Forces to recruit highly
qualified young men and women is influenced by many factors, and is
critical to the success of the All Volunteer Force.
What do you consider to be the most important elements of
successful recruiting for the Army?
Answer. Recruiting success is a function of the successful
integration of the three recruiting drivers that we can influence:
marketing, recruiting incentives, and the size of the recruiting force.
With a stable, predictable, and effective advertising program,
supported by critical recruiting incentives, the Army has been able to
reduce the recruiting mission for active Army recruiters and return
vital manpower to the force for other critical needs.
Question. What are your views about direct recruiting for Special
Forces duty of civilians with no prior active-duty military service?
Answer. Thus far, the effort to recruit Special Forces soldiers
from the general population is encouraging. The success rate for these
new soldiers through basic combat training, infantry advanced
individual training and specialized preparatory training is very high.
Owing perhaps to a higher academic standard for candidates enlisted
directly from civil society, these young soldiers complete the initial
phases of Special Forces Assessment and Selection at a higher rate than
recent in-service candidates. I participated in the Special Forces
Qualification Course (SFQC) graduation ceremony for the first soldiers
recruited in this manner and I was very impressed with them. Only time
will tell how they will do on the operational detachments, but I'm
optimistic. While these preliminary observations are encouraging, and
the program is quite popular among Recruiting Command's target market,
I would like to await further maturity of the preliminary data.
Question. What initiatives, if any, do you support to improve the
retention of highly experienced officers and noncommissioned officers?
Answer. Enhanced pay raises, retention bonuses for selected
specialties, and changes in the retirement system have led to increased
levels of satisfaction and increased retention rates. I support these
initiatives, and I encourage Congress to continue funding these
critical programs.

DUTY IN KOREA

Question. The Commander, United States Forces Korea, has noted that
a DOD survey conducted in 2001 indicated that Korea was selected as the
least desirable military assignment, and expressed concern about what
have been described as some of the worst living and working conditions
in the military.
What are your views about the adequacy of the living and working
conditions in Korea?
Answer. If confirmed, I intend to assess the conditions in Korea
first hand. Among some of the initiatives I would consider would be
military construction programming levels, barracks upgrades, and the
Land Partnership Plan.
Question. Given the conditions experienced by soldiers stationed in
Korea, do you consider the special pays and allowances associated with
duty in Korea to be adequate?
Answer. I have not made any specific conclusions regarding this
issue. If confirmed, I would work to ensure that special pay and
allowances associated with duty in Korea and other overseas locations
are fair and adequate.
Question. What measures do you think need to be taken to improve
quality of life and conditions for troops stationed in Korea?
Answer. I believe the Army should provide our soldiers adequate
living and working conditions and good telecommunications
infrastructure to maintain contact with their families. I understand
that substantial funding has already been programmed to accomplish this
task and if confirmed, I would reinforce this effort.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views,
even if those views differ from the administration in power?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as the Chief of Staff, Army?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and
other communications of information are provided to this committee and
its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes.
______

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

Questions Submitted by Senator John Warner

ARMY'S STRATEGIC READINESS SYSTEM

1. Senator Warner. General Schoomaker, today, more than ever, it is
imperative that we closely monitor and assess the readiness of Army
units to ensure their preparedness for current and future missions. I
understand one of the tools that the Army uses to monitor unit
readiness is the Strategic Readiness System (SRS). This system provides
senior Army leadership with a strategically focused viewpoint from
which to manage resources across the entire Army in an integrated top-
down way through the major commands and Headquarters, Department of the
Army, staff. Please provide your views on the utility of SRS in
assessing Army readiness.
General Schoomaker. The Army has developed and is currently
implementing SRS, which provides an overarching linkage between
strategic objectives, initiatives, and resources that enhances our
ability to make consistent, integrated, and proactive decisions within
a strategic construct. Using performance measures as evaluation
metrics, SRS works to establish links between costs (resources) and
performance (readiness), while leveraging available technologies to
more accurately forecast the readiness outcome of resourcing decisions.
Until the development of the SRS, no single tool was available to
the Army leadership to survey the multitude of Army databases and
assess readiness indicators. SRS provides senior leadership with
performance indicators representative of the entire force, to include
the generating force, operating force, sustainment capability and
infrastructure, that gives an accurate and holistic readiness picture
using the balanced scorecard methodology. The balanced scorecard is the
tool that links resources to readiness and translates strategy into
measurable objectives.
The Army scorecard methodology has been developed focusing on the
four key themes: maintain the capability to support the combatant
commanders' operational requirements (readiness); invest in soldiers
and their families (people); transform the Army into the undefeatable
future force (transformation); and adopt sound business practices. SRS
can analyze classified and unclassified data and assess both leading
and lagging indicators of readiness. SRS will also provide a set of
predictive, interrelated impacts as a basis for informed decisions on
force and funding requirements. SRS will further provide Army senior
leadership with a crosscutting assessment tool with unique predictors
capable of providing decisionmakers with the ability to proactively
manage and resource readiness.

2. Senator Warner. General Schoomaker, please comment on how you
intend to use SRS in the Army's Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and
Execution System.
General Schoomaker. The Army is beginning to tie SRS together with
its Army's Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE)
process. Specifically, SRS provides the capability to assess the
performance measures on which the Army's programs are based and then
use that information in the resourcing processes.
This is not an easy undertaking. It starts with a common framework
that all of the reporting systems and resourcing systems can use. This
includes not only Army systems, but all systems that we need to share
information with, such as interfacing with Joint Capabilities, the
ability to track and assess execution data, and the ability to
communicate our programming and budget data to Congress.
SRS captures the readiness of the Army, but by coupling it with our
execution data and using it to store the performance measures, it will
allow us to assess our programs. We will use these performance measures
to assess the viability of our current programs, ensure we are actively
supporting the global war on terrorism, and provide justification to
Congress in support of requested resources.

3. Senator Warner. General Schoomaker, in your opinion how does SRS
compare with the Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS),
especially given the tasks of refitting, reconstituting, and continuing
to employ significant numbers of Army units in the global war on
terrorism?
General Schoomaker. The current readiness reporting system, the
Unit Status Report (USR), uses lagging indicators as reported in ASORTS
to capture the readiness status of operational units. This system, in
effect since 1963, provides only the ability to retroactively assess
the readiness of the operating forces and does not look at the
generating forces such as the training base, installations, power
projection platforms, and sustainment. It does not directly link
readiness to resourcing decisions. An Army War College Study confirmed
that the current readiness reporting system does not provide the Army
senior leadership with adequate means to manage the strategic readiness
of the total force. The study recommended that the Army re-engineer and
expand the current system so that it is mission-focused, evaluates
strategic readiness, leverages web-based automation, and focuses on the
Army's future capability to perform its missions.
SRS transforms the way the Army manages and measures readiness by
focusing and aligning strategic goals and objectives across the entire
force. SRS is a revolution in the way the Army does business. SRS takes
into account the three quarters of the Army not currently measured by
USR standards. SRS broadens the Army's definition of readiness to
include installations, infrastructure, well-being, the industrial base,
and sustainment. SRS enables senior Army leaders to monitor the ability
of the Army to achieve its stated strategic objectives and core
competencies. The SRS may use some of the data from ASORTS, but does
not immediately replace it. SRS creates no new requirements for units
below the division/separate brigade level. By linking resources to
readiness, SRS will leverage available technologies to more accurately
forecast the effects of resourcing decisions. This will be accomplished
by identifying the strategic objectives of all elements of the Army
above brigade level and evaluating progress toward those objectives
with clearly articulated metrics.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe

END STRENGTH

4. Senator Inhofe. General Schoomaker, the Army has 21 of 33 active
duty brigades deployed around the world. We have thousands of National
Guard and Reserve soldiers on active duty and some are calling for
increases in Special Operations Forces to fight the current war on
terrorism. What is your assessment of the current end strength of the
Army? Is it adequate?
General Schoomaker. The Army is aggressively pursuing adoptions to
make internal changes to mitigate the stress on the force to offset end
strength growth. Increasing active end strength appears to be the
solution; however, it is not cheap, easy or, or quick to do. Therefore,
we must make every effort to maximize the efficient use of our current
forces. Initiatives are underway to seek efficiencies by rebalancing
the mix of active and Reserve capabilities, spreading the workload
across all the services, and converting non-inherently military
positions to civilian authorizations. If, in the end, we've done
everything we can and still are short capabilities in the active
component, then we will go to the Office of the Secretary of Defense
with options, one of which may be increased end strength.

5. Senator Inhofe. General Schoomaker, what kind of restructuring,
if any, do you recommend?
General Schoomaker. The Army shares the Defense Secretary's urgency
in affecting changes to rebalance the force. Active and Reserve
component transformation efforts are already targeting areas that
enhance jointness, responsiveness, and relevance to emerging missions.
These initiatives all serve to re-shape and re-balance the Army to
better meet the National Defense Strategy. During Program Objective
Memorandum 2004 (POM 04), the Army addressed high-demand force
structure shortfalls by adjusting approximately 19,500 active and
Reserve component spaces of force structure.
Restructuring efforts will be done with the intent of reducing
stress, promoting quality of life, enhancing readiness, and enabling
the Army to comply with and support the OSD objectives.

NON-LINE OF SIGHT CANNON

6. Senator Inhofe. General Schoomaker, as you know from our earlier
discussions, I am very interested in the non-line of sight (NLOS)
cannon and its development and fielding. When Crusader was cancelled,
the Army sent to Congress reports that clearly articulated the need for
a ``Crusader like'' capability by 2008. We worked with DOD and the Army
and the NLOS cannon seemed to be the logical solution. As LTG Brown
stated in his advance answers to questions for this committee, ``As the
technology of our adversaries continues to increase, we must ensure
ours is always better.'' Several countries make artillery pieces better
than the Paladins our soldiers use today. Additionally, lessons that
are emerging from Afghanistan and Iraq still point to the need for
artillery 24 hours in all weather. It seems we have learned this
lesson, over and over again. What are your thoughts about the NLOS
cannon and the need for artillery in today's Army?
General Schoomaker. As the Army continues to transform, we fully
recognize that the need to provide timely and accurate fires on the
battlefield will remain a necessity. Both now and for the foreseeable
future, the Army's cannon, rocket, and missile fires will be called
upon to supply overwhelming firepower in support of the global war on
terror.
The NLOS cannon is one of a host of systems currently under
development to meet the Army's future indirect fire needs. The system's
projected improvements in precision, range, mobility, and
responsiveness will provide a significant enhancement to the lethality
of our forces. The current fiscal year 2004 budget includes $353.2
million earmarked specifically for the creation of this new indirect
fire system. In August, we will hold our congressionally mandated
system demonstration--a full month ahead of schedule. The program is on
target to field a capability to the force by 2008. The NLOS cannon is
an integral step in the development of the Army's Future Combat System
(FCS) and will remain a vital component of our overall transformation
process.

7. Senator Inhofe. General Schoomaker, are you as committed as your
predecessor to ensuring that our soldiers have the best equipment?
General Schoomaker. The Army remains committed to providing our
soldiers with the best equipment. The NLOS cannon is the primary
indirect fire support system for our future forces. The Army is
committed to the NLOS cannon as an integral piece of FCS, and we are
pursuing NLOS cannon development as the lead system in the FCS Manned
Ground Vehicle Family of Systems.
One of the congressional mandates for the fiscal year 2003
appropriation included building an NLOS-C demonstration vehicle as part
of the NLOS-C Concept Technology Demonstration program. The NLOS cannon
demonstrator was delivered on schedule in July and is now undergoing
testing in support of the FCS program. The purpose of this demonstrator
is to validate engineering design concepts, which include firing a
large caliber weapon on a lightweight platform, automated ammunition
handling processes, laser ignition, hybrid-electric drive, and band
track mobility.
By the end of fiscal year 2003, the demonstrator will have fired
over 80 rounds to include rate-of-fire and stability testing. In fiscal
year 2004, this same demonstrator will complete its mobility testing.
Lessons learned will be used to develop the final NLOS cannon
prototypes that are planned for testing in fiscal year 2006 as part of
the FCS family of systems. It is this vision of the NLOS cannon
operating within a network of direct, indirect, and joint fires that
will allow the Army to defeat the threats associated with the future
operating environment.

MAINTAINING CURRENT FORCES

8. Senator Inhofe. General Schoomaker, many members have asked
questions of the Army during the past several years about the balance
of maintaining the current forces and investing in the future. The Army
has invested tremendously in Future Combat Systems and some feel they
have neglected some of the so-called legacy systems. What are your
thoughts on this balance?
General Schoomaker. There is a continuing need to balance programs
and investments between the immediate readiness needs of today and the
projected needs of tomorrow. This may periodically require rebalancing
individual components in light of the strategic environment and
operational experiences. Our future force will be the guarantor of
tomorrow's security, and thus, warrants sufficient investment to make
it a reality for the next generation. Prioritization of our precious
national resources to field and support these elements of our Army is
the responsibility of the Army's leadership in coordination with the
Office of the Secretary of Defense and ultimately in deference to the
decisions of Congress. The present balance in prioritization appears
sound. That said, we have the processes in place to ensure that a
serious reevaluation can periodically be made to determine adjustments
required due to changing circumstances.

9. Senator Inhofe. General Schoomaker, what are your plans for
maintaining today's forces and investing in the future?
General Schoomaker. We have a thoughtful and analytically sound
balance between what we invest in for today's force and what we devote
to future capabilities. The current force's readiness will always be a
priority and receive adequate resources. This priority has always been,
and will remain, the maintenance of adequate warfighting capabilities
in the current force. There is always a continual challenge to ensure
proper balance between meeting today's requirements and those of the
future. The Army has maintained this balance in a very responsible way
throughout the transformation process. The balance is never static; it
is constantly evolving and frequently reevaluated to meet the demands
of existing operational environments.

RETURN OF DEPLOYED SOLDIERS

10. Senator Inhofe. General Schoomaker, many family members of
Guard and Reserve Forces have contacted members of this committee with
questions about when they will come home. They have done a tremendous
job and we are all indebted to the service members and their families.
We need to retain them and the support of their employers when they
return. Here is a perfect opportunity to deliver a message to those
service members, their families, and their employers. What can you tell
them about rotations, sacrifice, et cetera?
General Schoomaker. The war on terror has required, and will
require, tremendous sacrifice on the part of all the Army's soldiers
and their families. We are proud of the service and contributions of
our citizen-soldiers in the Guard and Reserve, and we are immensely
grateful for the sacrifices made by their families and their employers.
The Army is working hard to ensure that those sacrifices are rightly
acknowledged. We are closely examining several factors, including our
force balance, mobilization procedures, and rotation policies to ensure
they are structured in a manner that allows soldiers to know when they
are most likely to deploy and for how long. By providing that form of
predictability, and by managing expectations, we can avoid many undue
hardships on the part of our soldiers, their families, and their
employers.

COMBAT SUPPORT AND STRUCTURE

11. Senator Inhofe. General Schoomaker, we always want to ensure
that our forces are structured to maximize our combat, combat support,
and combat service support structure and ensure that it is balanced
properly between the active and Reserve components. As we came out of
Operation Desert Storm in 1991, the Army Science Board determined we
had too little field artillery and recommended a plus up to the non-
divisional field artillery structure, and the Army complied. Now,
nearly 12 years later, I'm beginning to hear the Army may be
considering cutting back on our non-divisional field artillery
structure. I can fully appreciate the joint capabilities from other
services, but I also know that in bad weather much of that joint
capability is diminished just as it was shortly after Operation Iraqi
Freedom was launched. The analysis I've examined does not support the
cutting of our active component non-divisional field artillery
structure in the Army. What analysis have you reviewed that suggests
differently, and what are your thoughts on maintaining a robust non-
divisional field artillery structure in the active component to
directly support our joint force, corps, division, and brigade
commanders?
General Schoomaker. The Army Staff, in conjunction with the Field
Artillery Center, has recently completed an evaluation of field
artillery force structure based upon an assessment of contingency
requirements. The study focused on examining field artillery
capabilities in the context of the systems approach vice a simple
analysis of the number of individual weapons. The effort attempted to
determine the optimal mix of cannon and rocket battalions that would
result in increased lethality and survivability, as well as the best
command and control structure for these systems.
It is true that the emerging recommendations include a reduction of
field artillery force structure. However, our studies indicate that the
risk attributable to the reduction in numbers of weapons and
headquarters is more than adequately offset by the fielding of advanced
field artillery system enablers, such as Multiple Launch Rocket Systems
(MLRS), High Mobility Rocket Systems (HIMARS), and advanced munitions
for both rocket and cannon artillery. We intend to maintain a non-
divisional field artillery force structure fully capable of providing
robust and responsive indirect fire support to the maneuver commander.

12. Senator Inhofe. General Schoomaker, could you provide me with a
briefing about this subject?
General Schoomaker. I welcome the opportunity to brief you at your
convenience.
______

Question Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka

STRYKER BRIGADES

13. Senator Akaka. General Schoomaker, as you continue to assess
the transformation of the Army, do you foresee supporting the
continuation of funding for the last two Stryker Brigades?
General Schoomaker. The Army is resourced for six Stryker Brigade
Combat Teams to contribute to the ``1-4-2-1'' defense construct and
national security requirements. As directed by the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, the Army has provided a plan for potential
enhancements for Stryker Brigades five and six.
Pending Secretary of Defense approval, fielding for the fifth
Stryker Brigade in Hawaii begins in October 2005 and will be complete
in early 2007. Equipment fielding for the sixth Stryker Brigade in the
Pennsylvania Army National Guard begins in January 2006 and will be
complete in 2008.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton

NEW YORK FACILITIES

14. Senator Clinton. General Schoomaker, New York has a number of
important Army facilities that play an important role in our Army's
future. There is, of course, Fort Drum in New York's North Country.
Fort Drum is the home of the 10th Mountain Division, which is the most
frequently deployed division in the Army. Troops from the 10th Mountain
Division fought in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and served
in the recent war in Iraq. The Pentagon recently announced that troops
from the 10th Mountain Division are once again being deployed to
Afghanistan. As I mentioned during your visit to my office, I hope I
have the opportunity to visit Fort Drum with you so you can see
firsthand this impressive facility and the men and women who serve
there.
Another important Army facility in New York is the Watervliet
Arsenal. As you may know, since 1813, Watervliet Arsenal has played a
vital role in arming our military and supporting our Nation and is our
Nation's only manufacturing facility for large caliber cannon in
volume. Benet Labs, on the site of the Arsenal, performs scientific and
engineering activities that range from basic research through design
for production and engineering support for the production of its design
items. No other Arsenal in the United States can boast of this type of
resource. I believe that maintaining Watervliet's manufacturing ability
is critical for our national security. A few months ago, I visited
Watervliet Arsenal and Benet Labs and was greatly impressed by the
leadership and the workforce that I met.
One of New York's crown jewels is the U.S. Military Academy at West
Point. I plan to visit West Point soon and am proud that the Army's
service academy is in my state. Finally, Fort Hamilton in Brooklyn is
an Army installation with an impressive history that played a critical
role after the terrorist attacks after September 11.
Can you describe your views on the role that each of these
installations will play in the Army's future?
General Schoomaker. I too applaud the impressive contributions each
of these installations has made to our Nation. The Army is currently
analyzing all of its installations under the guidance of BRAC 2005
legislation to ensure that we align our bases in support of the defense
strategy and Army transformation. The capabilities afforded by all
installations, to include those located in New York and their
respective surrounding areas, will be fully considered. As we look for
opportunities for greater joint training and operations, and to cut
excess, we will treat every installation fairly. This process will, in
part, determine exactly what roles the installations in New York will
have in the future.

STRAIN ON GUARD AND RESERVISTS

15. Senator Clinton. General Schoomaker, on July 28, 2003, The
Washington Post had a story about the strain that the current
deployment in Iraq has had on a family from Maryland where the father
is a military policeman serving in Iraq. Indeed, many of us are hearing
about the strains being placed on National Guard members and Reservists
by the deployments in both Afghanistan and Iraq. What are your thoughts
about the balance between our Active-Duty Force and our National Guard
and Reserve components?
General Schoomaker. The Army acknowledges an imbalance of
capabilities between our Active and Reserve components and shares the
Secretary of Defense's urgency in effecting the necessary changes in
support of fixing that balance. Our Reserve components are already
undergoing a significant transformational process targeted to enhance
jointness, responsiveness, and relevance to emerging missions. These
initiatives will directly impact readiness, availability, and Reserve
component roles and missions. We plan to accelerate the adjustments in
the mix of forces and to undertake other initiatives to enhance our
utilization of the Reserve components.
The Army is preparing to move capabilities associated with critical
early deployment requirements from the reserve to the Active Force to
reduce involuntary mobilization of the Guard and Reserve for rapid
response operations. The realignment includes an assessment of the
current active-Reserve component mix required for ongoing operations,
homeland defense, and critical post-hostilities operations with a focus
on high-demand combat support and combat service support capabilities.
Additionally, the Army has already implemented policy changes that
leverage Reserve component capabilities to meet predictable, long lead-
time missions such as rotational overseas presence in Bosnia, Kosovo,
the Sinai, and Guantanamo Bay.
Finally, the Army will implement force readiness improvements
through reengineering the mobilization and demobilization process and
instituting greater utilization of reachback capabilities to ensure
combatant commanders receive the skills and support they require in the
most expeditious manner. We will reduce the mobilization burden by
implementing innovative management techniques including policy changes
that foster an increased reliance on volunteerism.
______

[The nomination reference of Gen. Peter J. Schoomaker, USA
(Ret.) follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
June 16, 2003.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
The following named officer for appointment as the Chief of Staff,
United States Army, and appointment to the grade indicated while
assigned to a position of importance and responsibility under title 10,
United States Code, sections 688, 601, and 3033:

To be General

Gen. Peter J. Schoomaker (Retired), 3788.
______

[The biographical sketch of Gen. Peter J. Schoomaker
(Ret.), USA, which was transmitted to the committee at the time
the nomination was referred, follows:]
Resume of Career Service of Gen. Peter J. Schoomaker (Ret.), USA
Source of commissioned service: ROTC.

Military schools attended:
Army Officer Basic Course
United States Marine Corps Amphibious War School
United States Army Command and General Staff College
National War College

Educational degrees:
University of Wyoming - BS Degree - Education Administration
Central Michigan University - MA Degree - Management

Foreign language(s): None recorded.

Promotions:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dates of appointment
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2LT....................................... 1 Jun 69
1LT ...................................... 4 Jun 70
CPT....................................... 4 Jun 71
MAJ....................................... 13 Jul 79
LTC....................................... 1 Ju1 85
COL....................................... 1 Jun 90
BG........................................ 1 Jan 93
MG........................................ 1 Mar 96
LTG....................................... 28 Aug 96
GEN....................................... 31 Oct 97
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Major duty assignments:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
From To Assignment
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Jan 70.......................... Apr 71............ Reconnaissance
Platoon Leader,
Headquarters and
Headquarters
Company, 2d
Battalion, 4th
Infantry, Fort
Campbell,
Kentucky
Apr 71.......................... Jun 72............ Rifle Company
Commander, C
Company, 2d
Battalion, 4th
Infantry, United
States Army
Europe and
Seventh Army,
Germany
Jun 72.......................... Apr 73............ Assistant S-3
(Operations),
later S-4
(Logistics),
Headquarters
Troop, 1st
Squadron, 2d
Armored Cavalry
Regiment, United
States Army
Europe and
Seventh Army,
Germany
Apr 73.......................... Jun 74............ Commander, C
Troop, 1st
Squadron, 2d
Armored Cavalry
Regiment, United
States Army
Europe and
Seventh Army,
Germany
Jun 74.......................... Nov 74............ Assistant
Inspector
General, 2d
Infantry
Division, Eighth
United States
Army, Korea
Nov 74.......................... Jul 75............ S-3 (Operations),
1st Battalion;
73d Armor, 2d
Infantry
Division, Eighth
United States
Army, Korea
Aug 75.......................... Jun 76............ Student, United
States Marine
Amphibious
Warfare Course,
United States
Marine Corps
Amphibious
Warfare School,
Quantico,
Virginia
Ju1 76.......................... Feb 78............ Assignment
Officer, Officer
Personnel
Management
Directorate,
United States
Army Military
Personnel Center,
Alexandria,
Virginia
Feb 78.......................... Aug 81............ Detachment
Commander, 1st
Special Forces
Operational
Detachment-D
(Airborne), Fort
Bragg, North
Carolina
Aug 81.......................... Jun 82............ Student, United
States Army
Command and
General Staff
College, Fort
Leavenworth,
Kansas
Jun 82.......................... Aug 83............ Executive Officer,
2d Squadron, 2d
Armored Cavalry
Regiment, United
States Army
Europe and
Seventh Army;
Germany
Aug 83.......................... Oct 83............ Special Operations
Officer, J-3,
Joint Special
Operations
Command, Fort
Bragg, North
Carolina
Oct 83.......................... Feb 84............ Temporary duty on
the Department of
Defense
Commission on
United States
Marine Corps
Terrorist
Incident in
Beirut, Lebanon,
Beirut, Lebanon
Feb 84.......................... Aug 85............ Special Operations
Officer, J-3,
Joint Special
Operations
Command, Fort
Bragg, North
Carolina
Aug 85.......................... Aug 88............ Various Command
Positions, 1st
Special Forces
Operational
Detachment-D,
Fort Bragg, North
Carolina
Aug 88.......................... Jun 89............ Student, National
War College, Fort
McNair,
Washington, DC
Jun 89.......................... Jul 92............ Commander, 1st
Special Forces
Operational
Detachment-D,
Fort Bragg, North
Carolina
Jul 92.......................... Jul 93............ Assistant Division
Commander, 1st
Cavalry Division,
Fort Hood, Texas
Jul 93.......................... Jul 94............ Deputy Director of
Operations,
Readiness and
Mobilization,
Office of the
Deputy Chief of
Staff for
Operations and
Plans, United
States Army,
Washington, DC
Jul 94.......................... Aug 96............ Commanding
General, Joint
Special
Operations
Command, United
States Special
Operations
Command, Fort
Bragg, North
Carolina
Aug 96.......................... Oct 97............ Commanding
General, United
States Army
Special
Operations
Command, Fort
Bragg, North
Carolina
Nov 97.......................... Nov 00............ Commander in
Chief, United
States Special
Operations
Command, MacDill
Air Force Base,
Florida
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of joint assignment:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Assignment Dates Grade
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Army Special Operations Officer Aug 83-Oct 83..... Major
J-3 (Operations), Joint Special
Operations Command, Fort Bragg,
North Carolina.
Temporary duty on the Department Oct 83-Feb 84..... Major
of Defense Commission on United
States Marine Corps Terrorist
Incident in Beirut, Lebanon,
Beirut, Lebanon (Long
Commission) (No Joint Credit).
Army Special Operations Officer Feb 84-Aug 85..... Major/Lieutenant
J-3 (Operations), Joint Special Colonel
Operations Command, Fort Bragg,
North Carolina.
Commanding General, Joint Jul 94-Aug 96..... Major General
Special Operations Command,
United States Special
Operations Command, Fort Bragg,
North Carolina.
Commander in Chief, United Nov 97-Nov 00..... General
States Special Operations
Command, MacDill Air Force
Base, Florida.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

U.S. decorations and badges:
Defense Distinguished Service Medal
Distinguished Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Defense Superior Service Medal (with 3 Oak Leaf Clusters)
Legion of Merit (with 2 Oak Leaf Clusters)
Bronze Star Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Defense Meritorious Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Meritorious Service Medal (with 2 Oak Leaf Clusters)
Joint Service Commendation Medal
Joint Service Achievement Medal
Master Parachutist Badge
Combat Infantryman Badge
Ranger Tab
Special Forces Tab
Addendum to Resume of Service Career
Current occupation: President, Quiet Pros, Inc., Tampa, Florida, from 2
January 2001 until present time.

Nature, scope, and extent of responsibilities: Self-employed
consultant, mentor, and teacher. Sole owner of Florida
registered S-Corp.
______

[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior
military officers nominated by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Gen. Peter J.
Schoomaker (Ret.), USA, in connection with his nomination
follows:]

July 11, 2003.
Hon. John Warner, Chairman,
Committee on Armed Services,
United States Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: This letter provides information on my financial
and other interests for your consideration in connection with my
nomination for the position of the Chief of Staff, Army. It supplements
Standard Form 278, ``Public Financial Disclosure Report,'' which has
already been provided to the committee and which summarizes my
financial interests.
To the best of my knowledge, none of the financial interests listed
on my Standard Form 278 will create any conflict of interest in the
execution of my new governmental responsibilities. Additionally, I have
no other interests or liabilities in any amount with any firm or
organization that is a Department of Defense contractor.
During my term of office, neither I, my spouse, nor my dependent
children will invest in any entity that would create a conflict of
interest with my government duties. I do not have any present
employment arrangements with any entity other than the Department of
Defense and have no formal or informal understandings concerning any
further employment with any entity.
I have never been arrested or charged with any criminal offenses
other than minor traffic violations. I have never been party to any
civil litigation except as indicated to my answer in part D, paragraph
3, of the Committee On Armed Services form. To the best of my
knowledge, there have never been any lawsuits filed against any agency
of the Federal Government or corporate entity with which I have been
associated reflecting adversely on the work I have done at such agency
or corporation. I am aware of no incidents reflecting adversely upon my
suitability to serve in the position for which I have been nominated.
To the best of my knowledge, I am not presently the subject of any
governmental inquiry or investigation.
I trust that the foregoing information will be satisfactory to the
committee.
Sincerely,
Peter J. Schoomaker,
General (Retired), United States Army.

UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Peter J. Schoomaker.

2. Position to which nominated:
Chief of Staff, Army.

3. Date of nomination:
June 16, 2003.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
December 2, 1946; Detroit, Michigan.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Cynthia Petrosky Schoomaker.

7. Names and ages of children:
Wendy (32); Lara (19); Andrew (17).

8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
honorary, or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
or local governments, other than those listed in the service record
extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
President, Quiet Pros, Inc.
Defense Science Board.
Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) Independent Senior Advisory
Groups (ISAG) on the Untied States Special Operations Command (U.S.
SOCOM) and U.S. Army Future Combat System (FCS).

9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other
business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
Affiliated Computer Services Defense, Inc. (Consulting Agreement,
Quiet Pros. Inc.)
Applied Research Associates (Consulting Agreement, DARPA FCS-ISAG,
Quiet Pros. Inc.)
Arete Associates (Consulting Agreement, Quiet Pros. Inc.)
Avici Systems, Inc. (Consulting Agreement, Quiet Pros. Inc.)
Advanced Vehicle Systems (Consulting Agreement, Quiet Pros. Inc.)
Benchmark International (Consulting Agreement)
Booz-Allen and Hamilton, Inc. (Consulting Agreement, Army Wargames)
Camber Corporation (Advisory Board)
Camber FSC-ISAG (Consulting Agreement, FCS-ISAG)
Center for Strategic Leadership (Army War College Honorarium)
Electronic Warfare Associates Government Systems, Inc. (Board of
Directors Honorarium)
First Command Financial Service (Advisory Board Retainer)
IDA (FCS-ISAG, U.S. SOCOM-ISAG Consultant)
IDA-Joint Commander Information and Knowledge ISAG (Subcontract)
IDA-Leader Chairs (Subcontract Leader Development at the school of
Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth)
Joint Chiefs of Staff Seminar (Secretary of Defense Project-
Government Purchase Order)
LaBelle Ranch, Inc. (Until July 2001)
Massachusetts Institute of Technology-Lincoln Labs (Honorarium)
OAO Corporation (Acquired by Lockheed Martin 7 Dec. 01) (United
States Army Space Command Consulting)
Science Applications International Corporation (European Army
Chiefs' Conference, Heidelberg Consulting Agreement)
Special Operations Warrior Foundation (Pro-bono)
SYNTEK Tech, Inc. (Consulting Agreement never consummated)
Titan Systems Corporation (Consulting Agreement and Advisory Board)
TRW (Consulting Agreement, United States Joint Forces Command,
Joint Warfighting Center, Capstone, United States Northern Command,
United States Air Force Space Wargames)
Special Operations Memorial Foundation (Pro-bono)

10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
Association of United States Army.
Special Forces Association (Life).
Ranger Regiment Association (Life).
Veterans of Foreign Wars (Life).
1st Cavalry Division Association (Life).
Wyoming Alumni Association (Life).
The National War College Alumni Association (Life).
Omicron Delta Kappa Honorary Society.
All Ranks Association (Life).
Military Officers Association (Old TROA).
Chairman, Special Operations Memorial Foundation.
Director/Vice Chairman, Special Operations Warrior Foundation.

11. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding
service or achievements other than those listed on the service record
extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
Football Scholarship in College.
Wyoming Athletic Hall of Fame.
Army Fellow, National War College.
Honorary Doctorate of Laws Degree, Hampden-Sydney College.
Distinguished Alumni Award, University of Wyoming.

12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly
constituted committee of the Senate?
Yes.

13. Personal views. Do you agree, when asked before any duly
constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if
those views differ from the administration in power?
Yes.
______

Signature and Date

[The nomination of Gen. Peter J. Schoomaker (Ret.), USA,
was reported to the Senate by Chairman Warner on July 30, 2003,
with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The
nomination was confirmed by the Senate on July 31, 2003.]
----------

[Prepared questions submitted to LTG Bryan D. Brown, USA,
by Chairman Warner prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follow:]
Questions and Responses

DEFENSE REFORMS

Question. More than 10 years have passed since the enactment of the
Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and
the Special Operations reforms. You have had an opportunity to observe
the implementation and impact of those reforms, particularly in your
assignments as Commanding General, Joint Special Operations Command,
and Deputy Commander, United States Special Operations Command.
The goals of Congress in enacting these defense reforms, as
reflected in section 3 of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act, can be summarized as strengthening civilian control
over the military; improving military advice; placing clear
responsibility on the combatant commanders for the accomplishment of
their missions; ensuring the authority of the combatant commanders is
commensurate with their responsibility; increasing attention to the
formulation of strategy and to contingency planning; providing for more
efficient use of defense resources; enhancing the effectiveness of
military operations; and improving the management and administration of
the Department of Defense.
Do you agree with these goals?
Answer. Absolutely. The defense reforms enacted enhanced the
authority and responsibility of military commanders, even as they
appropriately strengthened civilian control over the military.
Question. What do you consider to be the most important aspects of
these defense reforms?
Answer. The most important aspects of these defense reforms were
clearly delineating the chain of command, firmly establishing the roles
of the unified and specified combatant commands as warfighters, and
requiring the Armed Forces to function as a joint force. Without these,
the Services have made significant strides toward joint operations as
was demonstrated so superbly in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi
Freedom (OEF/OIF) because of the Goldwater-Nichols Act.
Question. Do you believe that legislative proposals to amend
Goldwater-Nichols may be appropriate? If so, what areas do you believe
it might be appropriate to address in these proposals?
Answer. I believe Goldwater-Nichols is working very well, and know
of no need to amend it at this time.
Question. Do you believe that the role of the combatant commanders
under the Goldwater-Nichols legislation is appropriate and the policies
and processes in existence allow that role to be fulfilled?
Answer. Yes.
Question. From the perspective you have gained in your previous
assignments, do you believe that the authority and responsibility of
the combatant commanders, in general, and the Commander, United States
Special Operations Command, in particular, are appropriate?
Answer. Yes.

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. Section 162(b) of title 10, United States Code, provides
that the chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of
Defense and from the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commands.
Other sections of law and traditional practice, however, establish
important relationships outside the chain of command. Please describe
your understanding of the relationship of the Commander, U.S. Special
Operations Command, to the following offices:
The Under Secretaries of Defense.
Answer. The Under Secretaries of Defense were established to assist
the Secretary of Defense in specific functional areas: Policy,
Comptroller, Acquisition and Technology, Intelligence, and Personnel
and Readiness. These under secretaries provide coordination and the
exchange of information with Department of Defense components having
collateral or related functions, which include the combatant
commanders. Combatant commanders are expected to respond and
reciprocate. I would anticipate frequent interaction with the under
secretaries, particularly in the development of military policy and the
acquisition process. The law requires that coordination activity be
communicated through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
and Low Intensity Conflict.
Answer. Title 10 U.S.C., section 138, establishes the duties of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity
Conflict. He is the principal civilian advisor to the Secretary of
Defense on special operations and low intensity conflict matters as
well as the senior management official within the Department for
special operations and low intensity conflict. These responsibilities
include the overall supervision (including oversight of policy and
resources) of special operations and low intensity conflict activities
of the Department. While U.S. SOCOM has the principal responsibility
for the readiness and preparation of Special Operations Forces (SOF) in
support of the geographic combatant commanders, U.S. SOCOM's ability to
execute those missions would be greatly hindered without the sound
policies and oversight, interagency coordination, and advocacy provided
by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-
Intensity Conflict. I believe that this civilian oversight enhances
U.S. SOCOM's ability to carry out its missions. The relationship
provides a key source of advice and information to both the Secretary
of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense.
Answer. With the stand up of U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and
their principal mission of homeland defense, U.S. SOCOM's relationship
with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense will be
linked, to a great degree, with U.S. SOCOM's relationship to the
NORTHCOM commander. I anticipate close coordination and cooperation to
determine the role of SOF in Homeland Defense and to determine military
support necessary to protect the United States and its citizens during
times of national emergency.
Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Answer. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's (CJCS)
responsibilities are clearly delineated in title 10 U.S.C., section
153. He serves as the principal military advisor to the President and
Secretary of Defense. The CJCS serves as an advisor but is not in the
direct chain of command that runs from the President and Secretary of
Defense directly to the combatant commanders. However, there are
provisions for the President to direct communications between him or
the Secretary of Defense and the combatant commanders be transmitted
through the CJCS. This ensures the chairman stays informed in order to
execute his other responsibilities. I see it as a commander's duty to
work with and through--but never around--the chairman in the execution
of Presidential and Secretary of Defense-directed taskings.
Question. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS).
Answer. The functions of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff are prescribed under title 10 U.S.C., section 154. The vice
chairman is a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and when the
chairman is absent, or disabled, the vice chairman acts in his stead.
The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) responsibilities are
delegated to the vice chairman. The VCJCS also regularly represents the
Chairman on the Interagency Deputy's Committee, the Defense Acquisition
Board, and other boards and councils as necessary. Thus, the VCJCS
plays an essential role for the CJCS in fulfilling his principal
military advisor obligations. Communication between a combatant
commander and the VCJCS is as critical as it is with the CJCS.
Question. The Secretaries of the Military Departments.
Answer. The secretaries of the military departments are responsible
for the administration and support of the forces they provide to the
combatant commands. The responsibilities are outlined in title 10
U.S.C., section 165, which notes that the secretaries are subject to
the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense. The
combatant commander's authority over service components including those
forces assigned to him is clear, but requires close coordination with
the secretaries to ensure no infringement on those lawful
responsibilities the Service Secretary alone may discharge.
Question. The Service Chiefs.
Answer. While the Service Chiefs are no longer in the chain of
command, they do have two significant roles. First, they are
responsible for the organization, training, and equipping of their
respective services. Without the full support and cooperation of the
Service Chiefs, no combatant commander can hope to ensure the
preparedness of his assigned forces for presidential directed missions.
Second, as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Service Chiefs
provide military advice to the President and Secretary of Defense.
Individually and collectively, the Joint Chiefs are a source of
experience and judgment that every combatant commander can call upon;
it would be a privilege to work with them. If confirmed as Commander,
U.S. SOCOM, I intend to continue a full dialogue with the Chiefs of all
the Services.
Question. The other combatant commanders.
Answer. Today, more than ever, as U.S. SOCOM takes on the global
war on terrorism, I look forward to close, mutual support and continued
dialogue on key issues with the other combatant commanders, as well as
frequent face-to-face contact. The combatant commanders define
requirements for their respective areas of operational responsibility,
an effort that assists U.S. SOCOM in defining its support requirements.
In my relationship with combatant commanders, I will foster an
atmosphere of teamwork and complete trust, which I believe is critical
to executing U.S. national policy and meeting the commanders' theater
requirements.

QUALIFICATIONS

Question. If confirmed, you will be entering this important
position at a critical time for the United States Special Operations
Command.
What background and experience do you have that you believe
qualifies you for this position?
Answer. I have over 36 years of military service in the United
States Army, having entered as a private in 1967. My military
background includes assignments in Army conventional and special
operations units, and joint Special Operations units. I began my
Special Operations career as a Green Beret Sergeant on a Special Forces
A Team. Subsequently, I commanded at all levels to include three
company commands, two battalion commands, and a brigade command--at the
only Special Operations aviation brigade. Additionally, I served for 30
months as the Directory for Strategy, Policy and Plans at Headquarters,
U.S. Special Operations Command (U.S. SOCOM), and commanded the Joint
Special Operations Command and U.S. Army Special Operations Command,
both located at Ft. Bragg, North Carolina.
My experience in special operations includes command of forces and
management of resources. I have had the honor of command in combat and
have directed requirements reviews, programming, planning and budgeting
for all SOF. Because of my experience in the conventional Army, I also
understand how special operations can support and be supported by
general purpose forces.
As the Deputy Commander, U.S. SOCOM, I am the principal advisor and
assistant to the commander--responsible for preparing SOF to conduct
special operations missions worldwide. On a daily basis, I am involved
in the areas of: global war on terrorism; acquisition of special
operations equipment; intelligence and information operations;
operations, plans, and policy; and force structure, requirements,
resources, and strategic assessments. My military experience to date
uniquely qualifies me to lead the joint services of U.S. SOCOM.

MAJOR CHALLENGES/LESSONS LEARNED

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting
the next Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command?
Answer. U.S. SOCOM faces three significant challenges: planning and
directing the global war on terrorism, preserving the readiness of our
Special Operations Forces (SOF), and transforming to make our SOF more
agile, adaptive, and responsive. The terrorist threats we face are
pervasive, asymmetric, highly adaptive, and elusive. We must meet and
defeat this global threat at a time and place of our choosing.
Regarding readiness, our current OPTEMPO is the highest it has ever
been in our history. This will continue to be a major challenge to
readiness until the threat of terrorism is abated and the level of
global security is improved. Finally, the challenge of transforming is
ever-present and successful transformation will be key in defeating
future threats to our national security. We must face these challenges
head on.
Question. What are the most important lessons you have learned
during your tenure in senior leadership positions in the Special
Operations community?
Answer. People continue to be the key to success. Our ability in
special operations to attract, recruit, assess, train, and retain the
right people is crucial. People with the right mentality for ambiguous
situations and out-of-the box thinking; people that can master hi-tech,
and are still comfortable operating in a world where there is low-tech,
such as the mountains of Afghanistan; people that are dedicated to the
mission, and willing to endure incredible sacrifice. These are the keys
to effective SOF.
Additionally, there is no substitute for readiness--it is non-
negotiable. We must be ready to fight tonight with all the capabilities
we bring to the battlefield. If confirmed, readiness for the global war
on terrorism is my most important issue.
Question. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these
challenges?
Answer. Long-term success in the global war on terrorism depends
largely upon our ability to quickly employ a sustainable mix of
capabilities with little advance warning. To address this challenge,
U.S. SOCOM has recently undergone a major reorganization to stand up a
warfighting center to specifically focus on the war on terrorism and
empowered to coordinate all elements of our national power against it.
If confirmed, I will continue to focus on building teamwork and work
closely with my fellow combatant commanders and other government
agencies which have a significant role to play in the global war on
terrorism. As mentioned previously, the combatant commanders define
requirements for their respective areas of operational responsibility,
an effort that assists U.S. SOCOM in defining its support requirements.
In my relationship with combatant commanders, I will foster an
atmosphere of teamwork and complete trust. Of equal importance, other
government agencies bring the full complement of our national power to
bear. I fully understand that U.S. SOCOM cannot prosecute this unique
war by itself and that it is a fully collaborative effort. We must
continue to apply consistent offensive pressure against terrorist
organizations around the globe, keep the terrorists on the run, off
balance, and well away from America's shores.
Readiness of the SOF is a statutory responsibility that U.S. SOCOM
has historically done well. To address the OPTEMPO challenge to our
readiness, we must continue to closely prioritize what missions SOF
take on, while at the same time emphasize our focus on the human
element. Two of the command's guiding principles are that our people
are more important than their hardware and that quality is more
important than quantity. Selection, assessment, training, and retention
of quality people will be keys to maintaining the readiness of our SOF.
Regarding transformation, we must continue to fund critical
acquisition and modernization programs while at the same time refine
tactics, techniques, and procedures that enhance the capabilities of
our precision forces. Additionally, we must ensure our equipment and
procedures are interoperable with conventional and coalition forces so
we can serve as a force multiplier in larger conflicts. The technology
of our adversaries continues to increase, we must ensure ours is always
better.

MOST SERIOUS PROBLEMS

Question. What do you consider to be the most serious problems in
the performance of the functions of Commander, U.S. Special Operations
Command?
Answer. In my opinion, the most serious problems for the Commander
U.S. SOCOM are not problems, but issues of prioritization. U.S. SOCOM's
traditional responsibilities to man, train, and equip SOF have not
changed and will continue to be performed--to the standards validated
by successes in OEF/OIF. Charged by the Secretary of Defense with the
lead in the war on terrorism, U.S. SOCOM will now face the challenge of
prioritizing a global warfighting function, commensurate with the war
on terrorism, along with these traditional service-like functions.
Question. What management actions and time lines would you
establish to address these problems?
Answer. To address U.S. SOCOM's warfighting function, the
headquarters has stood up the Center for Special Operations (CSO) and
is continuing the refinement of time sensitive planning which
streamlines operational mission planning and senior leadership decision
making and breaks down barriers between Department of Defense and other
government agencies. The time line for this refinement and CSO's
operational capability is ongoing.
U.S. SOCOM will continue to manage OPTEMPO and prioritize special
operations deployments as they relate to the global war on terrorism.
U.S. SOCOM has already transitioned missions to conventional forces
that were not special operations-unique in nature. Missions such as
training foreign militaries in basic infantry tactics have largely been
handed off to conventional forces, including the marines. U.S. SOCOM
will have to continue to be highly selective in Special Operations
employment taskings that could be drawn from the larger conventional
force. For example, deployment orders currently written for SOF now
must directly or indirectly support the global war on terrorism.
U.S. SOCOM must continue to manage its resources, both the
budgetary and human aspect. Management of our MFP-11 budget must be
consistent with and support our new warfighting mission while helping
us transform. The additional $1.7 billion proposed for fiscal year 2004
is an essential step in building a more robust SOF capable of
responding effectively to this mission, now and in the future.
Additionally, the human resource challenges that could result from our
current high OPTEMPO need to be managed closely. While it is difficult
to put a suspense date on OPTEMPO management actions, with gradual and
measurable successes in the global war on terrorism, prioritization of
SOF deployments, and an improvement in the current level of global
stability, OPTEMPO will gradually reduce.

OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM

Question. From your perspective as Deputy Commander, United States
Special Operations Command, what are the main ``lessons learned'' from
Operation Iraqi Freedom, including the ongoing stability operations?
Answer. Some of the key lessons learned involved Special Operations
training and doctrine, early employment of Special Operations, and
joint force integration. Training and doctrine was validated on the
battlefield. Special Operation's high selection standards were evident
and relevant and their regional and cultural orientation greatly
contributed to our successes. Early Special Operations engagement is
imperative. Special Operations engaged in advance of combat operations
proved successful and critical. This concept was a major contributing
factor for successful operations in Northern Iraq. The integration of
Special Operations with conventional forces was a major success. There
are examples throughout Operation Iraqi Freedom of conventional units
under the operational control (OPCON) of SOF commanders and SOF units
OPCON to conventional commanders.
Question. What are the operational, research and development, and
procurement implications of those lessons?
Answer. Special Operations' lessons-learned from both OEF/OIF
validated the need, focus, and importance of U.S. SOCOM's Advanced
Technology Program. The program quickly responded with technology
enhancements for situational awareness, communications, individual
equipment, and medical items for our Special Operations units. Specific
technology successes included use of small unit unmanned aerial
vehicles, improved operator protection with the Special Operations body
armor systems, and dramatically improved communications capabilities.
Additionally, the Advanced Technology Program has been refocused on the
current and emerging SOF requirements for the global war on terrorism.
Key elements of our recent program successes were Defense Emergency
Response Funds that facilitated rapid acquisitions and the ability of
our research, development, and procurement programs to transform those
funds into operational capabilities, in some cases within days.
Question. How would you assess the adequacy of Special Operations
Forces provided to Central Command, both in terms of quantity and mix,
to conduct Operation Iraqi Freedom?
Answer. Based on the outstanding results of Special Operations
missions throughout Iraq, but especially in the West and North, the
quantity and mix of SOF proved to be about right. Without exception,
U.S. SOCOM filled every request for forces (RFF) submitted by Central
Command in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. U.S. SOCOM also provided
all SOF necessary to support two Combined Joint Special Operations Task
Forces established by Special Operations Command--Central Command in
the area of operations. This included 152 Special Operations-skilled
reservists (individual augmentees) and, at its peak, 7,270 Special
Operations personnel deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

TRANSFORMATION

Question. As a result of your role in Operation Iraqi Freedom and
in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, you are familiar with the
requirements affecting U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) both as
a supporting and supported command.
Do current transformation initiatives adequately support SOCOM's
future requirements?
Answer. U.S. SOCOM has identified means in the materiel,
organization, and doctrine categories that will spark and support
transformation within Special Operations that include: the CV-22
Osprey, the Advanced Seal Delivery System (ASDS), the MX aircraft (to
supplement our C-130 variants), Naval Special Warfare's 21st century
realignment and Army Special Operations Aviation 21st century
reorganization initiatives, and improved theatre Special Operations
Command (SOC) capabilities. These initiatives, along with our
headquarters reorganization and focus, and re-positioning of forces,
posture U.S. SOCOM well to pursue its critical objectives and primary
mission in the global war on terrorism. Transformation across the
entire Department of Defense augurs an increasing integration of
current conventional and Special Operational capabilities. Staying
relevant in a dynamic future operating environment also demands we
continue to implement enhancements in collaborative planning,
information technologies and interoperability. The evolution of the
threats facing our Nation and military demands that Special Operations
Forces remain agile, flexible, dynamic, and inculcate innovation into
the future as a core competency.
Question. How will the Army's transformation impact SOCOM's current
operations?
Answer. Because of the relationship between the Army and U.S. SOCOM
in the areas of organizing, training, and equipping the force, Army
transformation efforts enhance U.S. SOCOM's operations, current and
long-term. Army programs--aimed at organizing into a lighter, faster
force--parallel Special Operation's doctrine, and SOF are directly
involved in Army efforts. Special Operations personnel have been
imbedded in the Stryker Brigades, and lessons learned from Operation
Iraqi Freedom will show how conventional and SOF successfully worked
together on the battlefield. Additionally, SOF are assisting in the
development of training programs, such as close quarters combat, where
we are more operationally experienced. U.S. SOCOM will benefit from
these efforts as conventional Army and SOF become more proficient in
supporting each other because of quality training. Finally, Services
are responsible for fielding non-Special Operations unique equipment to
SOF. As a result, any equipment enhancements realized in the Army will
be immediately available to SOF. In some cases, Special Operations-
unique equipment has been provided to the Army for transformation test
and evaluation. There are no negative impacts, and the transfer of
lessons learned and equipment benefit both organizations.

AFGHANISTAN

Question. Almost 2 years after securing a military victory against
the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan, that nation remains a place
with areas of unrest.
What is your assessment of the current situation in Afghanistan?
Answer. I have made numerous trips to that region over the past 18
months, to include being there just 2 weeks ago. Significant progress
has been made in the last 18 months. I have seen significant progress
made in the last 18 months. Thanks to the efforts of the coalition,
which included SOF, the Taliban no longer control the government or
provinces. Moreover, al Qaeda has been denied freedom of operations
within the country. Significant challenges remain. We continue to
pursue Osama bin Laden, his key lieutenants, and other high value
targets. I believe that effort critical. I am encouraged that the
Islamic Transitional Government of Afghanistan is established in Kabul,
provinces outside Kabul are beginning to rebuild efforts, and elections
are scheduled for the summer of 2004. Civil affairs has been a crucial
part of this reconstitution of the infrastructure and government. There
remains much to be done, and SOF will be a critical component in the
coalition's efforts. With continued emphasis on stability operations
and reconstruction, and with the support of the international
community, I am confident our Nation's long-term goals will be
achieved.
Question. In your view, what is the appropriate role of Special
Operations Forces as Afghanistan transitions to a more stable,
democratic, and economically viable nation?
Answer. The role of SOF in pursuing bin Laden and other high value
targets remains appropriate. In addition, Special Operations assist in
rebuilding the Afghani infrastructure through continued civil affairs
projects, which earn and maintain the trust of the Afghani people, and
through information operations that support the message of freedom and
support to these formerly repressed people. SOF continues to support
Central Command's goals and objectives in the region.

COMBATING TERRORISM

Question. If confirmed, you would play an integral role in the
Department's combating terrorism mission.
Which Department of Defense official provides the primary civilian
oversight with regard to SOCOM's combating terrorism mission?
Answer. Combating terrorism has two aspects; counterterrorism
(offensive measures) and antiterrorism (defensive measures). The
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity
Conflict, through the Department of Defense Antiterrorism Coordinating
Committee, provides policy oversight and guidance to Department of
Defense Components in support of respective antiterrorism and
counterterrorism program efforts. With respect to the planning and
execution of counterterrorism missions as a combatant commander, if
confirmed, I would not hesitate to deal directly with the Secretary of
Defense through, and in coordination with, the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs.
Question. What other Department of Defense officials would be
involved in oversight of SOCOM's combating terrorism mission?
Answer. Again, as a combatant commander, coordination directly
through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of
Defense for any deployments of SOF supporting our warfighting mission
would occur. As a functional combatant commander, U.S. SOCOM interacts
directly with the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff to coordinate any
emergent, unforeseen requirements that MFP-11 or the Services could not
fund. Through U.S. SOCOM's representative to the Department of Defense
Antiterrorism Coordinating Committee, U.S. SOCOM would interact with
various Departmental representatives from the Services, the under
secretaries and assistant secretaries on a routine basis along with the
defense support agencies.

FORCE PROTECTION

Question. The bombing of Khobar Towers in 1996, U.S. embassies in
Africa in 1998, U.S.S. Cole in 2000, and the recent suicide bombing at
housing compounds in Saudi Arabia, illustrate the dangers our personnel
deployed in the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR) and their families
live with on a daily basis.
If confirmed, what would your top priorities be in terms of force
protection for SOCOM forces in the CENTCOM AOR?
Answer. Thirty-six years of military service have ingrained in me
the importance of taking care of our service members. I fully
appreciate the awesome responsibility we have to do everything within
our power to safeguard them. If confirmed, my task as Commander, U.S.
SOCOM would be to emphasize the importance of force protection to the
people of this command. Only through my emphasis will they realize the
criticality of resourcing and executing force protection to the fullest
extent possible. I will instill in all 46,000 assigned, not just those
in the Central Command area of operations, that force protection is a
mission essential task. I will work closely with the other combatant
commanders to ensure our personnel are being protected and utilized in
appropriate Special Operations roles. I would set standards for pre-
deployment training focused on SOF and field key force protection
equipment that would enhance the security of SOF in all geographic
combatant commanders' areas of operation. I would not hesitate to get
involved with any combatant commander if I felt there was any reason to
be concerned about the safety of Special Operations personnel. It is a
SOF truth that ``humans are more important than hardware;'' without
those men and women the hardware does matter.
Question. What additional steps, if any, need to be taken to ensure
that personnel being deployed on SOCOM missions are fully prepared for
potential threats?
Answer. Our current level of training and preparedness remains the
same. We pride ourselves on the level of training and readiness that
SOF receive. SOF are prepared to perform their assigned missions in all
environments, throughout all regions.

INFORMATION OPERATIONS

Question. Information operations and information warfare will
likely play an increasing role in 21st century warfare.
What role do you envision for U.S. SOCOM in overall U.S.
information operations?
Answer. Special Operations Forces are very aware of the significant
role Information Operations (IO) plays in today's and in future
conflicts. In fact, U.S. SOCOM made IO one of the command's core tasks
in 1996. U.S. SOCOM units have successfully employed IO core
capabilities in both OEF and OIF, and IO continues to be embedded
throughout SOF operations. However, U.S. SOCOM continues to play a very
significant role in PSYOP. U.S. SOCOM owns the preponderance of the
Department's PSYOP forces and capabilities, including the EC-130
Commando Solo radio and TV broadcast aircraft. Due to the high demand
for PSYOP forces, U.S. SOCOM is in the process of growing its PSYOP
force structure by adding two active duty regional companies and four
Reserve component tactical companies. This year the command also
proposed an Advanced Technologies Concept Demonstration (ACTD) aimed at
improving PSYOP planning tools and long range dissemination into denied
hostile areas. In addition, U.S. SOCOM is creating a 70 person Joint
PSYOP Support Element, to provide dedicated joint PSYOP planning
expertise to the geographic combatant commanders, Strategic Command,
and the Secretary of Defense.
Question. Under what circumstances would the Commander, U.S. SOCOM,
conduct information operations as a supported combatant commander?
Answer. U.S. SOCOM became the lead for the war on terrorism IO
planning after September 11, 2001. In this new capacity, U.S. SOCOM
leads collaborative planning, coordination, and when directed,
execution of IO. U.S. SOCOM envisions IO supporting surgical, limited
duration, counterterrorism missions, as well as, long range planning to
develop coordinated, trans-regional strategies against terrorists and
their supporters. Due to Strategic Command's new Unified Command Plan
responsibilities in regard to global IO, U.S. SOCOM is working very
closely with Strategic Command to insure mutual IO and PSYOP support
and continuity.

SUPPORTED COMBATANT COMMANDER

Question. Recently, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld authorized an
expanded role in the global war on terrorism for U.S. Special
Operations Command, including authority to conduct operations as a
supported combatant commander, in addition to continuing
responsibilities as a supporting combatant commander.
In your view, under what circumstances would U.S. SOCOM conduct
operations as a supported combatant commander?
Answer. The nexus of the Department's global war on terrorism
effort is at U.S. SOCOM. As situations develop, we attempt to locate,
acquire, and identify terrorist targets. Combat operations may follow.
Some examples of Special Operations missions that might be conducted as
a supported combatant command could include small, surgical,
clandestine strike operations involving Special Operations Forces only,
missions tasked when the geographic combatant commander that is totally
involved in other operations, or missions that involve the use of
special skills or where two or more geographic combatant commander
boundaries merge.
Question. What resource, organization, and force structure changes
will be required in order for U.S. SOCOM to be able to conduct both
supporting and supported combatant command responsibilities?
Answer. U.S. SOCOM is rapidly transforming from its traditional
role as a purely resourcing headquarters to its expanded role as both a
resourcing headquarters and a supported command for the global war on
terrorism. The headquarters has reorganized within current resources to
establish a Special Operations Joint Interagency Collaboration Center
(SOJICC) and a Command Special Operations Center to plan, coordinate
and direct counter-terrorist operations on a global scale. The
Department has recognized the increased requirements to meet the new
missions while retaining the role of being a resourcing and supporting
command, by providing an additional 5,100 authorizations command-wide
between fiscal years 2004-2009. The added force structure supports the
global war on terrorism, forward basing in Central Command, rotation
forces to support regional forward basing, PSYOP and civil affairs (CA)
to support regional requirements, rotary-wing and fixed-wing assets to
meet added requirements, and support and training base personnel to
support increased demand. Organizational change, as a result of these
additions include an additional CA Battalion (Reserve), an additional
CA company (active), one MH-47 Army Special Operations Aviation
Regiment battalion (active), one PSYOP company (active), and two
additional Navy SEAL teams. We are also evaluating our mix of Active
and Reserve Forces to ensure they complement and support one another.
As we gain experience in this campaign, I anticipate that additional
shortfalls could emerge and, as always, we will continue to modernize
and upgrade our fielded equipment to ensure our SOF personnel are
capable of defeating known and likely threats.

BLUE FORCE TRACKING

Question. General Tommy Franks, former Commander, U.S. CENTCOM,
recently stated in testimony before this committee that multiple, non-
interoperable blue force tracking systems were a problem during
Operation Iraqi Freedom, contributing to some confusion on the
battlefield and complicating efforts to avoid friendly fire incidents.
The U.S. Army has one such system. U.S. SOCOM uses different systems.
In your view, was blue force tracking of Special Operations Forces
effective during Operation Iraqi Freedom?
Answer. The overall effectiveness of blue force tracking (BFT) in
support of Special Operations was exceptional. While not all SOF were
equipped with BFT devices, BFT systems facilitated coordinated events
during combat operations, enhanced tactical resupply efforts, reduced
recovery time for SOF extractions (both extremis and scheduled) and
saved lives.
BFT proved to be an outstanding control mechanism. Without a doubt,
BFT reduced the potential for fratricide events during Operation Iraqi
Freedom and was the first positive step toward eliminating fratricide
altogether. As with most emerging technology, technical, and
programmatic complications, such as inadequate joint procurement
funding, limited fielding capability and command and control systems
interoperability shortfalls have caused some reliability concerns that
we are already working to resolve. It is important that all combatant
commanders, as well as allied and coalition force commanders, recognize
the value of BFT and are engaged in the further maturation and
proliferation of this capability.
Question. What steps would you recommend to ensure effective blue
force tracking of all friendly forces on the battlefield--
unconventional, conventional, and coalition?
Answer. All Services and the Department have seen the value of BFT
and initiatives are underway to facilitate BFT interoperability, force-
wide BFT requirements should be collected and programmed for rapid,
joint acquisition. BFT capability should be integrated into standard
communication devices, such as manpack and hand-held radios. Combined
BFT development initiatives should be undertaken to ensure allied and
coalition BFT interoperability. Current and future BFT capability
should drive the acceleration of combat identification (CID)
development since the anti-fratricide ability of BFT is, by nature,
limited and time-late. U.S. SOCOM will remain heavily engaged in the
BFT and CID initiatives.

TRANSFORMATION OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

Question. Much attention has been focused on the transformation of
our Armed Forces, but most of that focus is on conventional forces.
Do our Special Operations Forces need to be transformed?
Answer. SOF have been transformational by nature. To be successful
in the unconventional environment or working on the margins of
conventional force capabilities, SOF must continue to transform. U.S.
SOCOM has been given an expanded mission in the global war on terrorism
which is, in itself, transformational. The only aspect of SOF that is
not subject to change is our core values.
Question. If so, what is your vision for such a transformation?
Answer. In the future, SOF should be ready to deal equally with the
demands of both peacetime and warfighting roles. Special Operations
should be deliberate in its transformation to ensure that it continues
to support critical national requirements. Given the range of missions,
it is important to choose an evolutionary path that is supportive of,
but not confined by, the future plans of conventional forces. Special
Operations should possess capabilities that expand the range of options
available to policy makers and military commanders. To that end, future
missions may include operations for psychological effect, low-
visibility strike operations, advanced unconventional warfare, special
forms of reconnaissance, and human and technical collections
operations. SOF should achieve relatively low cost, high value force
application as military and informational elements of national power
integrate with political and economic elements to increase national
security. Because the future is uncertain, SOF will pursue new
combinations of concepts, skills, people, and organizations to create a
force capable of conducting full spectrum engagement in a joint
environment, any time, anywhere, against any adversary.
Question. Are the Special Operations Command and the Department of
Defense investing in the technologies to realize this vision?
Answer. If confirmed, my vision will be to ensure U.S. SOCOM
provides the most capable and relevant SOF in existence while upholding
standards of personal and professional excellence.
Yes, we are investing in those types of technologies. There are two
integral parts to U.S. SOCOM's technology program, leveraging the
services, defense agencies, and government laboratory efforts, while
harvesting those technology efforts that can be rapidly transitioned
into capabilities for the operator. U.S. SOCOM is significantly better
off now than we were even 2 years ago in producing the kinds of
capabilities we believe will be required to meet the challenges of the
global war on terrorism. We will continue to pursue technological
advances that address SOF unique requirements but which can also be
integrated with the conventional forces, and to aggressively develop
advance technologies that provide high-payoff capabilities against
near- and long-term threats to SOF.

RECRUITING AND RETENTION

Question. How successful has SOCOM been in recruiting and retaining
the personnel it needs?
Answer. World events significantly increased public awareness of
SOF, consequently raising interest in joining Special Operations. SOF
historically exceeds annual service reenlistment rates in the non-
commissioned officer corps (NCO). Accessions exceeded losses in each of
the services SOF during fiscal year 2002. While certain specialties are
critically manned, the retention rates in those fields exceed those of
the large services (with few exceptions--Army 18D, Medical and Army
18E, Communications NCO). SOF personnel are historically promoted at a
higher rate than their respective service grades. Service initial
accession bonuses, specific reenlistment incentives, and specific
programs (for example, Critical Skills Retention Bonus, CSRB) that
targeted the senior NCO experience base have positively influenced SOF
recruiting and retention.
Primarily, the unique and important SOF mission is the fundamental
reason that influences assigned personnel to remain in SOF. SOF
warriors are proud to be a part of the special team of ``Quiet
Professionals.''
Question. What are the biggest challenges to retention you see in
the SOCOM community?
Answer. Maintaining the experience base and the personnel we have
in our inventory to meet current operations tempo is paramount to
successful mission execution. The programs mentioned earlier have had a
successful impact on our force and continue to pay huge dividends with
a return on investment for the future. As a supported command, any U.S.
SOCOM growth will impact an already limited pool of applicants. This
concern is being addressed by reengineering our school houses without
lowering standards. The current period is a new era where a policy of
``one size fits all'' does not work for a transforming military. Our
emphasis on personnel strategy and policy must also include a
progressive and consistent strategy that compliments service policy yet
flexible enough to meet the needs of the SOF community simultaneously.
Question. Specifically, what is the status of the efforts to
increase retention among the Navy SEAL officers?
Answer. Naval Special Warfare (NSW) officer advancements,
selections, and retention exceed Navy averages. The Special Warfare
Officer Bonus has had a positive impact on reducing the number of mid-
grade officer resignations. Special Operations Force transformation
dictates that ongoing retention and recruitment initiatives continue to
receive priority attention to sustain present levels and to meet future
missions in the global war on terrorism.
Question. Special Operations Aviation units have some of the most
highly trained and proficient pilots in our military.
What impact is the demand for pilots by the airlines and the
current high operational tempo or our military having on pilot
retention within Special Operations Command?
Answer. Because the airlines have not been hiring, pilot retention
statistics have improved. The Air Force Special Operations Command is
continuing to report pilot shortages equal to the overall shortages in
the Air Force. When compared to the active component, Air Force SOF
guard units are in relatively good shape. High deployment rates in
support of OEF/OIF have slightly impacted training classes. This has
resulted in limited numbers of aircraft and instructors available for
schoolhouse training sorties.
Although the overall warrant officer inventory remains healthy, the
Army continues to experience minor shortages in their senior grade
aviators. This is a concern because the senior grade aviators provide
the aviation experience at the unit level. We also face the challenge
of gaining and maintaining pilots as our force structure increases.
Question. What, if any, recommendations do you have to increase the
retention of these highly skilled pilots?
Answer. The Army has participated in the Aviator Continuation Pay
(ACP) bonus (contract) program for aviators. This bonus is paid between
the 6th and 14th year of service. In fiscal year 2002, U.S. Army
Special Operations Command received special permission to extend this
bonus through 25 years of service for all aviators that agreed to
remain in Special Operations.
The Air Force has two successful programs for pilot/crew retention
that we are monitoring. They are the ACP bonus program, and the
Voluntary Return to Active Duty program which have helped offset
retirements and separations.

SOCOM/USMC

Question. In November 2001, the Commandant of the Marine Corps and
Commander, U.S. SOCOM, signed a memorandum of agreement aimed at
increasing Marine Corps support and cooperation with SOCOM.
What do you believe should be the appropriate relationship between
the Marine Corps and SOCOM?
Answer. U.S. SOCOM is working closely with the Marine Corps to
integrate with and complement each others' capabilities. I believe this
is appropriate because SOF and the Marine Corps offer unique and
distinct mission sets. The Marine Corps' expeditionary capabililty is a
direct result of their embarked sea-based deployment concept. The
potential for SOF leveraging some of the unique options this concept
provides, both in capabilities and sustainment, bodes well in
prosecuting the global war on terrorism. To fully assess the
integration potential of marines and SOF, U.S. SOCOM and the Marines
Corps re-established this formal relationship.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS MISSIONS

Question. When announcing additional responsibilities for SOCOM,
Secretary Rumsfeld indicated that SOCOM may divest itself of some
traditional missions, such as foreign military training, that can be
conducted by conventional forces.
What current missions, if any, do you believe can and should be
divested by SOCOM, and why?
Answer. U.S. SOCOM executes its congressionally mandated title 10
Special Operations activities in accordance with section 167. We
continue to study and refine employment taskings to ensure we retain a
Special Operations focus while helping to reduce the burden on our high
demand/low density (HD/LD) forces. In this regard, there are some
recent examples of transition or divestiture of missions to
conventional forces in order to free up these HD/LD forces.
U.S. SOCOM continues to work the issue of mission divestiture with
the services, the Joint Staff, and the Secretary of Defense. As you are
well aware, SOF are organized, trained, and equipped specifically to
accomplish nine core tasks (counterterrorism, counterproliferation,
foreign internal defense, special reconnaissance, direct action, PSYOP,
CA operations, unconventional warfare, and information operations).
Unlike our core tasks, Special Operations Forces also conduct other
activities (coalition support, counternarcoterrorism, foreign
humanitarian assistance, special activities, combat search and rescue,
humanitarian mine activities, security assistance, and peace
operations).
The capabilities to perform these activities are derived from
Special Operations' ability to execute its core tasks and, in the
context of prioritization of employment taskings in the war on
terrorism; Special Operations may continue to perform some or all of
these types of activities. The key is mission analysis and employment
prioritization.
Question. Are there any additional missions that you believe SOCOM
should assume, and, if so, what are they and why do you advocate adding
them?
Answer. No, there aren't any additional missions I believe U.S.
SOCOM should assume. As previously stated, our war on terrorism mission
has caused us to prioritize employment taskings. U.S. SOCOM will
continue to study and refine our Special Operations responsibilities;
but we must ensure we retain a Special Operations focus.

SIZE OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

Question. The recent successes of Special Operations Forces in
Afghanistan and Iraq have led many to advocate increases in the size of
Special Operations Forces.
Do you believe that we should increase the number of Special
Operations personnel?
Answer. Yes. Additional personnel will enable U.S. SOCOM to more
effectively prosecute the global war on terrorism. This capability is
additive to accomplishing current title 10 missions. Even with
prioritization of SOF deployments to directly or indirectly support the
global war on terrorism, increased end strength will more fully
maximize SOF's global scout capability by ensuring SOF are forward
deployed in theater and in position to respond to contingencies or
react to actionable intelligence.
Question. In your view, can the size of Special Operations Forces
be increased significantly if the rigorous recruiting standards for
these organizations are to be maintained?
Answer. Yes.

CIVIL AFFAIRS UNITS

Question. The increased role of the United States military in
numerous missions throughout the world has stressed the Special
Operations Command, in particular the civil affairs units, most of
which are in the Army Reserve.
If the current high operational tempo continues, would it be
advisable to increase the number of civil affairs units?
Answer. Yes. Our CA force structure must increase. To that end,
U.S. SOCOM has included CA in our force structure growth plan.
Question. If so, should the increase be in the active Army or the
Army Reserve and why?
Answer. Prior to September 11, 2001, analysis of current and
projected PERSTEMPO for Reserve CA forces identified future shortfalls
in Reserve CA force structure to be able to support ongoing
contingencies, i.e., Bosnia and Kosovo. As a result, the Department
created two new Reserve CA battalions to be stood up in fiscal year
2004 and fiscal year 2005 (one each year). After September 11, 2001, in
support of the global war on terrorism, Bosnia, and Kosovo, analysis
further identified shortfalls in the active civil affairs force
structure. As a result, the Department created an additional two Active
CA companies to be stood up in fiscal year 2004 and fiscal year 2005
(one each year). Current analysis of CA force structure is that with
the addition of these Active and Reserve units, CA is properly sized to
meet the challenges of the global war on terrorism and future
contingencies.
Question. What impact has the high operational tempo had on
recruiting and retention in Reserve civil affairs units?
Answer. I understand U.S. Army Special Operations Command has
achieved its U.S. Army Reserves recruiting goals for the last 5 years,
and retention has remained within the goals during that time as well. I
would expect these trends to continue.

SCIENCE ADVISORS FOR COMBATANT COMMANDERS

Question. Scientific advisors to combatant commanders have been
effectively utilized as a means of assisting with technology transition
and providing operators solutions to warfighter challenges.
If confirmed, how would your command make use of the technical
expertise available in the services, including their laboratories, to
provide scientific and technical advice to the warfighters?
Answer. Due to our relatively small technology budget, U.S. SOCOM
relies heavily on the services' science and technology (S&T) knowledge
base and laboratory infrastructure to support SOF. We have Memorandums
of Agreement with the service's scientific communities that facilitate
transfer of research, development, test, and evaluation related
information and technology. We also have in-house Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency and Department of Energy liaison personnel who
match their ongoing technology programs with SOF technology
requirements. These associations allow U.S. SOCOM to leverage service
S&T and other governmental agency programs as an economical and low-
risk source for acquisition program technology insertions to provide
the Special Operations warfighter with innovative evolutionary and
revolutionary capability enhancements. The Special Operations S&T
requirements and desired capabilities are also publicized through the
Department of Defense's centralized technology planning program.

READINESS AND OPTEMPO

Question. To what extent has the pace of operations in recent years
had an impact on U.S. SOCOM's readiness, retention, and resources?
Answer. The OPTEMPO has increased significantly in the last 2
years, but because of our training and education programs and the
special care we pay to all our SOF families, it has been manageable. We
are concerned about the amount of time our forces are deployed in
support of the global war on terrorism and pay close attention to our
recruitment and retention efforts. As of this hearing, our accession,
retention and promotion rates are equal to or higher than the services.
Additionally, our pilot retention statistics have been improving and
our overall pilot inventory continues to improve in the MH-47, MH-6,
and MH-60 communities. We are concerned about the OPTEMPO of our
Reserve Component CA personnel and after September 11, 2001, shortfalls
were identified. As a result, the Department created two new Reserve CA
battalions to be stood up in fiscal year 2004 and fiscal year 2005. Air
Force Reserve air crews are also a concern as many are approaching the
end of their 2 year mobilization period. As we continue to prosecute
the global war on terrorism, I anticipate that manpower and equipment
shortfalls may emerge and, as always, we will continue to maintain,
modernize, and upgrade our fielded equipment to ensure our SOF
personnel are capable of defeating any threat.
Question. What actions can be taken to reduce any negative impacts?
Answer. U.S. SOCOM must continue to grow SOF. We must discover new
sources of quality personnel and efficient training methodology to
accelerate the development of SOF warriors. We must also seek more
effective methods to mitigate the effects of the high operational
tempo.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views,
even if those views differ from the administration in power?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as the Commander, U.S. Special
Operations Command?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and
other communications of information are provided to this committee and
its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes.
______

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

1. Senator Inhofe. Lieutenant General Brown, in your answer to the
advance questions you stated that you feel a need to increase the size
of the Special Operations Forces (SOF). How much larger do we need to
make them?
General Brown. At this point, I cannot provide you ``a number''
with the degree of certainty that would make it meaningful. SOF are not
sized based on desired force end strength, but by what capabilities are
required and can be brought to the battlefield. The global war on
terrorism is a different war that requires not only traditional SOF
skills and capabilities, but unique and specialized skills that we are
still identifying. We know we have shortfalls in some capabilities; we
are studying others to determine the force size required to meet
mission needs.
In the area of command and control, I feel it is critical to have
Theater Special Operation Commands (TSOCs) capable of fulfilling their
role as standing Joint Special Operations Task Forces. During the most
recent increase in SOF end strength, all TSOCs except for that of
Southern Command were sized to enable them to conduct 24 hours-a-day, 7
days a week operations. Based on constraints and priorities, Southern
Command's TSOC was not provided this capability, although it is a
critical requirement.
Mobility is key to SOF's ability to conduct the global war on
terrorism. Recent increases in both fixed-wing and rotary-wing force
size have substantially enhanced our capabilities in this area.
However, additional rotary-wing capabilities are required to provide a
rotational base and forward-based forces. The new CV-22 tiltrotary wing
force being fielded has manning requirements above those of the
platforms it replaces?
The current mix of Active and Reserve Forces may not be optimal. We
may need to rebalance those forces that are largely in the Reserves.
This includes civil affairs and psychological operations in the Army
Reserve and Special Forces in the Army National Guard. We are examining
the requirements for additional Active Forces in those areas. Two
factors drive this analysis: can we bring the requisite force to bear
in a timely manner against contingencies, and can we maintain that
force for a prolonged period, for example with a rotational base.
SOF has increased its operational capabilities in most functional
areas. However, the centers and schools that train our SOF soldiers,
sailors, and airmen must increase their throughput capability in two
ways: first, to train the additional SOF structure gained; and second,
to instruct in new courses focused on capabilities to fight the global
war on terrorism.
Recent increases in SOF have fixed a lot of capability shortfalls;
some shortfalls remain. We anticipate the need for some growth to
address those shortfalls. Any growth of SOF, however, has to be
tempered with the ability to recruit, train, and retain only the
highest quality individuals.

2. Senator Inhofe. Lieutenant General Brown, what kinds of
capabilities do we need to add to enhance the SOF, and how do you plan
to make those increases?
General Brown. In addition to expanding the size of certain
segments of the Special Operations community, the U.S. Special
Operations Command (U.S. SOCOM) will pursue several means to expand and
enhance SOF capabilities to meet the needs of the global war on
terrorism and future operations. These capability increases will result
from modernizing our equipment, upgrading our recruiting and training
processes, and developing several tailored mission sets in response to
Department of Defense directives.
U.S. SOCOM's historic ability to guide and manage the unique
equipping of SOF has paid significant dividends in the recent conflicts
against terrorists and the states that support them. SOF will continue
to modernize its major systems capabilities through procurements like
the CV-22 Osprey tiltrotor aircraft and Advanced SEAL Delivery System,
and modification programs like the MH-47G helicopter and A/MC-130
common avionics architectures. We also plan enhanced small systems for
SOF that contribute critical capability against terrorists. These
enhancements include fielding the SOF Combat Assault Rifle and the
advanced components required to upgrade SOF personal equipment and body
armor. Finally, U.S. SOCOM will leverage new technologies and bring SOF
specific capabilities in areas such as unmanned aerial vehicles,
information operations, and intelligence and communications.
Materiel improvements are not the only aspect to improve SOF
capabilities. We'll continue close cooperation with the Marine Corps on
the V-22, the Navy on SSGN, and with all the services to provide SOF
warriors with service-common items in the fight against terrorism.
While new equipment will boost SOF's capabilities, it's a SOF truth
that humans are more important than hardware. Therefore, upgrades to
SOF recruiting and training are the most effective means to enhance SOF
capability. U.S. SOCOM will focus on recruiting innovations to bring in
the most qualified and capable candidates and train them to the
standards and skills SOF need to fight terrorism. SOF's foreign
language capability will be strengthened and our language program
reoriented towards those languages that best reflect the terrorist
threat. U.S. SOCOM will also be a strong partner in the Defense
Department's directed training transformation joint national training
capability exercise program (not sure where to go here, but 11
adjectives modifying a program may be a record!) that will help SOF
perfect its joint interoperability capabilities. We'll leverage the
latest technologies; strive toward common open architecture databases,
non-proprietary simulator image generators and communication pipelines
capable of moving the necessary data to provide the best live, virtual,
and constructive training environment in the world. Key to this
approach is the ability to recruit and retain the highest caliber of
training personnel. Improved joint interoperability will enable SOF to
better leverage conventional capabilities against terrorism.
New tools and improved training will help, but we need to do more.
To meet the demands of future conflicts with terrorists, SOF must
develop some new capabilities. Among these are the capability to
effectively globally command the global war on terrorism, the
capability to operationally prepare the global war on terrorism
battlespace and the capability to instantly respond to opportunities in
previously un-emphasized regions of the world. To meet these new
demands, U.S. SOCOM will initiate nuanced organizational changes and
equip, train, and place the resulting organizations in positions most
advantageous to our Nation's goals.
These advances in organization, training and equipment will enhance
SOF's readiness, responsiveness, mobility and flexibility to engage
terrorism and terrorists throughout the world.
______

[The nomination reference of LTG Bryan D. Brown, USA,
follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
June 18, 2003.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
The following named officer for appointment in the United States
Army to the grade indicated while assigned to a position of importance
and responsibility under title 10, United States Code, section 601:

To be General

LTG Bryan D. Brown, 2565.
______

[The biographical sketch of LTG Bryan D. Brown, USA, which
was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was
referred, follows:]
Resume of Career Service of LTG Bryan D. Brown
Source of commissioned service: OCS.

Military schools attended:
Field Artillery Officer Basic and Advanced Courses.
United States Army Command and General Staff College.
United States Army War College.

Educational degrees:
Cameron University - BS Degree - Education Administration
Webster University - MA Degree - Business

Foreign language(s): None recorded.

Promotions:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dates of appointment
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2LT....................................... 1 May 70
1LT....................................... 1 May 71
CPT....................................... 1 May 74
MAJ....................................... 3 Apr 81
LTC....................................... 1 Sep 87
COL....................................... 1 Jun 92
BG........................................ 1 Mar 96
MG........................................ 1 Dec 98
LTG....................................... 11 Oct 00
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Major duty assignments:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
From To Assignment
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mar 71.......................... Jul 71............ Platoon Leader, D
Company, 227th
Aviation
Battalion, 1st
Cavalry Division,
Fort Hood, Texas.
Sep 71.......................... Apr 72............ Rotary Wing
Aviator, 129th
Assault
Helicopter
Company, United
States Army,
Vietnam.
Apr 72.......................... Dec 72............ Rotary Wing
Aviator, 182d
Aviation Company
(Assault), 10th
Aviation Group,
Fort Bragg, North
Carolina.
Dec 72.......................... Sep 75............ Section Commander,
later Platoon
Commander, later
Operations
Officer, 129th
Aviation Company
(Assault), 269th
Aviation
Battalion, Fort
Bragg, North
Carolina.
Oct 75.......................... May 77............ Student, Field
ARtillery Officer
Advanced Course,
Fort Sill,
Oklahoma, later
Student, Cameron
University,
Lawton, Oklahoma.
Jun 77.......................... Jun 78............ Commander,
Headquaters and
headquarters
Battery, 2d
Battalion, 17th
Field Artiller,
2d Infantry
Division, Eighth
United States
Army, Korea.
Jun 78.......................... May 79............ Executive Officer,
B Company, 158th
Aviation
Battalion, 101st
Airborne Division
(Air Assault),
Fort Campbell,
Kentucky.
Apr 72.......................... Dec 72............ Rotary Wing
Aviator, 182d
Aviation Company
(Assault), 10th
Aviation Group,
Fort Bragg, North
Carolina.
Dec 72.......................... Sep 75............ Section Commander,
later Platoon
Commander, later
Operations
Officer, 129th
Aviation Company
(Assault), 269th
Aviation
Battalion, Fort
Bragg, North
Carolina.
Oct 75.......................... May 77............ Student, Field
Artillery Officer
Advanced Course,
Fort Sill,
Oklahoma, later
Student, Cameron
University,
Lawton, Oklahoma.
Jun 77.......................... Jun 78............ Commander,
Headquarters and
Headquarters
Battery, 2d
Battalion, 17th
Field Artillery,
2d Infantry
Division, Eighth
United States
Army, Korea.
Jun 78.......................... May 79............ Executive Officer,
B Company, 158th
Aviation
Battalion, 101st
Airborne Division
(Air Assault),
Fort Campbell,
Kentucky.
May 79.......................... Oct 79............ Flight Operations
Officer, 158th
Aviation
Battalion, 101st
Airborne Division
(Air Assault),
Fort Campbell,
Kentucky.
Nov 79.......................... May 81............ Commander, C
Company, 158th
Aviation
Battalion, 101st
Airborne Division
(Air Assault),
Fort Campbell,
Kentucky.
Jun 81.......................... Jul 84............ Air Operations
Officer,
Operations
Directorate (J-
3), Joint Special
Operations
Command, Fort
Bragg, North
Carolina.
Jul 84.......................... Jun 85............ Student, United
States Army
Command and
General Staff
College, Fort
Leavenworth,
Kansas.
Jun 85.......................... May 87............ Commander, C
Company, 101st
Aviation
Battalion, 1st
Special
Operations
Command, Fort
Campbell,
Kentucky (Task
Force 160).
May 87.......................... May 88............ S-3 (Operations),
160th Aviation
Group (Special
Operations), Fort
Campbell,
Kentucky.
Jun 88.......................... May 90............ Commander, 5th
Battalion, 101st
Aviation
Regiment, 101st
Airborne Division
(Air Assault),
Fort Campbell,
Kentucky.
Jun 90.......................... Ju1 91............ Commander, 1st
Battalion, 160th
Special Operation
Aviation
Regiment, Fort
Campbell,
Kentucky and
Operations Desert
Shield/Storm,
Saudi Arabia.
Aug 91.......................... Jul 92............ Student, United
States Army War
College, Carlisle
Barracks,
Pennsylvania.
Oct 92.......................... Nov 94............ Commander, 160th
Special Operation
Aviation
Regiment, Fort
Campbell,
Kentucky.
Nov 94.......................... Mar 96............ Assistant Division
Commander
(Maneuver), 1st
Infantry
Division, Fort
Riley, Kansas.
Mar 96.......................... Aug 98............ Director of Plans,
Policies and
Strategic
Assessments, J-5/
J-7, later
Director,
Requirements and
Strategic
Assessments,
United States
Special
Operations
Command, MacDill
Air Force Base,
Florida.
Aug 98.......................... Sep 00............ Commanding
General, Joint
Special
Operations
Command, Fort
Bragg, North
Carolina.
Sep 00.......................... Sep 02............ Commanding
General, United
States Army
Special
Operations
Command, Fort
Bragg, North
Carolina.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of joint assignment:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Assignment Dates Grade
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Air Operations Officer, Jun 81-Jul 84..... Major
Operations Directorate (J-3),
Joint Special Operations
Command, Fort Bragg, North
Carolina.
Director of Plans, Policies and Mar 96-Aug 98..... Brigadier General
Strategic Assessments, J-5/J-7,
later Director of Requirements
and Strategic Assessments,
United States Special
Operations Command, MacDill Air
Force Base, Florida.
Commanding General, Joint Aug 98-Sep 00..... Major General
Special Operations Command,
Fort Bragg, North Carolina.
Deputy Commander, United States Sep 02-Present.... Lieutenant General
Special Operations, Command,
MacDill Air Force Base, Florida.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

U.S. decorations and badges:
Defense Distinguished Service Medal
Distinguished Service Medal
Defense Superior Service Medal
Legion of Merit (with two Oak Leaf Clusters)
Distinguished Flying Cross
Bronze Star Medal
Defense Meritorious Service Medal
Meritorious Service Medal (with two Oak Leaf Clusters)
Air Medal
Air Medal with ``V'' device
Joint Service Commendation Medal
Army Commendation Medal
Parachutist Badge
Military Free Fall Parachutist Badge
Air Assault Badge
Master Army Aviator Badge
Special Forces Tab
______

[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior
military officers nominated by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by LTG Bryan D.
Brown, USA, in connection with his nomination follows:]

Department of the Army,
Headquarters, United States Army,
Special Operations Command,
Fort Bragg, North Carolina, June 5, 2002.
Hon. Carl Levin, Chairman,
Committee on Armed Services,
United States Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: This letter provides information on my financial
and other interests for your consideration in connection with my
nomination for the position of the Deputy Commander in Chief, United
States Special Operations Command. It supplements Standard Form 278,
``Public Financial Disclosure Report,'' which has already been provided
to the committee and which summarizes my financial interests.
To the best of my knowledge, none of the financial interests listed
on my Standard Form 278 will create any conflict of interest in the
execution of my new governmental responsibilities. Additionally, I have
no other interests or liabilities in any amount with any firm or
organization that is a Department of Defense contractor.
During my term of office, neither I, my spouse, nor my dependent
children will invest in any entity that would create a conflict of
interest with my government duties. I do not have any present
employment arrangements with any entity other than the Department of
Defense and have no formal or informal understandings concerning any
further employment with any entity.
I have never been arrested or charged with any criminal offenses
other than minor traffic violations. I have never been party to any
civil litigation. To the best of my knowledge, there have never been
any lawsuits filed against any agency of the Federal Government or
corporate entity with which I have been associated reflecting adversely
on the work I have done at such agency or corporation. I am aware of no
incidents reflecting adversely upon my suitability to serve in the
position for which I have been nominated.
To the best of my knowledge, I am not presently the subject of any
governmental inquiry or investigation.
I trust that the foregoing information will be satisfactory to the
committee.
Sincerely,
Bryan D. Brown,
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army,
Commanding.

UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Bryan D. Brown.

2. Position to which nominated:
Commander, United States Special Operations Command.

3. Date of nomination:
June 18, 2003.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
20/10/48; Fort Meade, Maryland.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to the former Penny Whightsil.

7. Names and ages of children:
Tracey Leahy (27); Shannon McCoy (23).

10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
Member, Association of the United States Army (AUSA).
Member-at-large, Army Aviation Association of America.
Member, American Legion.
Member, Vietnam Helicopter Pilots Society.

14. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, and any other special recognition for outstanding
service or achievements other than those listed on the service record
extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
2002 Ellis Island Medal of Honor Awardee.

12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly
constituted committee of the Senate?
Yes.

13. Personal views. Do you agree, when asked before any duly
constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if
those views differ from the administration in power?
Yes.
______

Signature and Date

[The nomination of LTG Bryan D. Brown, USA, was reported to
the Senate by Chairman Warner on July 30, 2003, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on July 31, 2003.]

NOMINATION OF HON. GORDON R. ENGLAND TO BE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

----------

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 23, 2003

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:08 a.m. in
room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator John
Warner (chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Warner, Talent,
Chambliss, Dole, Levin, Reed, and Pryor.
Committee staff members present: Judith A. Ansley, staff
director, and Gabriella Eisen, nominations clerk.
Majority staff members present: Carolyn M. Hanna,
professional staff member; Ambrose R. Hock, professional staff
member; Gregory T. Kiley, professional staff member; Thomas L.
MacKenzie, professional staff member; Ann M. Mittermeyer,
counsel; Scott W. Stucky, general counsel; and Richard F.
Walsh, counsel.
Minority staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes,
Democratic staff director; Evelyn N. Farkas, professional staff
member; Creighton Greene, professional staff member; Gerald J.
Leeling, minority counsel; and Peter K. Levine, minority
counsel.
Staff assistant present: Michael N. Berger.
Committee members assistants present: Cord Sterling,
assistant to Senator Warner; John A. Bonsell, assistant to
Senator Inhofe; James P. Dohoney, Jr., assistant to Senator
Collins; James W. Irwin and Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistants to
Senator Chambliss; Christine O. Hill, assistant to Senator
Dole; Russell J. Thomasson, assistant to Senator Cornyn; and
Andrew Shapiro, assistant to Senator Clinton.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Warner. Good morning, everyone.
Before I refer to the purpose of this hearing, namely to
have our distinguished colleague, Secretary England, in his
advise and consent hearing, I want to make reference to the
work done by Congresswoman Fowler and her commission regarding
the Air Force Academy.
Matters relating to this tragic chapter in the current
military history of the Air Force really arose out of this
committee. Our distinguished colleague on the committee,
Senator Allard from Colorado, worked with me and other members
to bring to our attention facts that had been related to him.
The record is very clear about how this committee quickly
became proactive, and eventually sponsored the legislation--our
distinguished colleague, Senator McCain, was very active on
it--which led to the creation by Congress of the Fowler Panel.
They gave their report yesterday. While I and other members
have not yet had the time to go through it in its entirety, my
initial review of this report, together with a private meeting
yesterday with Congresswoman Fowler, leads me to the
conclusion, at this point in time, that that panel deserves
great commendation by Congress and the American public. They
have done, in a mere period of 90 days, a job which is very
important, which is a very important step leading to the long
overdue correction of problems at the Air Force Academy. So I
wish to commend Congresswoman Fowler and all members of the
panel. This committee will hold its hearing tomorrow on that
panel's findings, and go into it with the great detail and care
this report deserves.
This morning, I was asked by the press, ``Does this report
have a relationship to the nomination pending before the
committee by the President and the Secretary of Defense of the
current Secretary of the Air Force to become Secretary of the
Army?'' My response is, yes, it does. After we review the
material with Chairman Fowler--and all members of the panel
will be present tomorrow--I'll have further comment on this.
But, at this time, I'd like to release to the public record
correspondence that I have had with President Bush's counsel,
Judge Alberto Gonzalez, on the respective duties of the
legislative branch and the executive branch with regard to the
constitutional responsibilities of advice and consent. We have
knowledge that certain actions are being investigated by the
Inspector General regarding the Department of the Air Force.
The Fowler Report further puts a recommendation in to the
Inspector General to examine--and the actual words were ``a
full accountability at all levels,'' beginning with the
uppermost levels, civilian and uniform, of the Department of
the Air Force. Consequently, it does have a correlation. I and
other members of the committee will have to determine the
extent to which we can continue to proceed, which I had hoped
to do, on the Roche nomination.
We'll have further to say about that tomorrow, but I'll
release my letter to Judge Gonzalez, and the Inspector
General's letter back to the committee with regard to what they
are doing. That has to be read in context with the Fowler
Report. We'll take up all of this tomorrow.
But, for the moment, we're pleased to have you, Secretary
England, before us again.
Secretary England. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. The President has selected you to go back
to become the Secretary of the Navy, subject to confirmation by
the Senate. Senator Levin is, by necessity, on the floor of the
Senate. Otherwise, he would be here with me this morning. But
he suggested I go forward with this.
Upon learning of the President's selection of you to become
the next Secretary of the Navy, I was pleased to call you up
and reminisce about that famous chapter in history where
Winston Churchill came back to positions of responsibility with
regard to the Royal Navy and the fleet by a signal flag in
those days, signaling that ``Winnie is back.'' So, Secretary
England, subject to advice and consent, you'll be back, and we
welcome you back.
Secretary England. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Warner. I'd like to also make reference to the
Acting Secretary, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Installations and Environment, who I think has discharged the
responsibility of secretary in a very commendable way in the
acting position. It's not easy to be Acting Secretary of the
Navy. As such, I wish to have the record this morning reflect
the commendation, of myself and members of this committee, for
the actions of Mr. Johnson during this interim period.
Secretary England, you are not accompanied by your family
today, but their support is there. You assured me of that in
the anteroom.
Secretary England. Absolutely, Senator.
Chairman Warner. You're no stranger to the committee,
having served as the 72nd Secretary of the Navy. You performed
admirably as secretary during that period, particularly in your
compassionate response to the families of those military and
civilian personnel with the Department of the Navy who died in
the Pentagon tragically on September 11, 2001. That was on your
watch. In your steady, determined leadership in the aftermath
of that attack, working with the very fine Secretary of
Defense, Mr. Rumsfeld, I remember heroism of that Secretary of
Defense as I was privileged to go over that day and join him
for the afternoon of September 11 in the Department of Defense
(DOD).
Once again you came before this Senate for confirmation in
January of this year in connection with your nomination to be
Deputy Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
I spoke on the Senate floor in support of that nomination at
the time, underscoring the superb qualifications that you, Mr.
England, possess by virtue of your impressive experience in the
private sector and the Department of Defense to assist
Secretary Ridge in the difficult task of organizing and
coordinating the efforts of over 22 domestic agencies into one
department to protect our Nation against threats to the
homeland.
Without objection, I'd like to put that in the record,
because that summarizes what I would otherwise be saying now.
No use having duplication.
[The information referred to follows:]

[January 30, 2003]

Mr. Warner. Mr. President, I rise today to commend the President
for the selection of Gordon England for the post to which the Senate
will confirm him soon in the newly created Department of Homeland
Security.
I have had the privilege of working with Mr. England for some time
now. Since he assumed the duties of Secretary of the Navy, we
immediately became friends--because we had known each other while he
was in the private sector, but, of course, I having had the privilege
of serving as Secretary of the Navy some many years before, we were
sort of a band of brothers--those of us who are privileged to serve in
the greatest Navy in the world, and particularly in the post as a
civilian boss. We have worked together these many years.
I want the record to reflect the extraordinary qualifications of
this nominee. The Navy will miss him. But duty calls so often. It did
in this instance because the President and Secretary Ridge wanted to
draw on someone who had a proven record of management capabilities.
Gordon England exhibited that record while he was Secretary of the
Navy. He will exhibit it as the hands-on operator of the management
decisions in assisting the distinguished Secretary, Mr. Ridge.
I am very pleased with this nomination.
I want to mention just a few things about the distinguished career
of this fine person.
He began his career with Honeywell Corporation working as an
engineer on the Gemini space program before joining General Dynamics in
1966 as an avionics design engineer in the Fort Worth aircraft
division. He also worked as a program manager with Litton Industries on
the Navy's E-2C Hawkeye aircraft.
By coincidence, these are programs I worked on somewhat when I was
Secretary, Under Secretary, and then, of course, while I have been here
in the Senate serving now 25 years on the Senate Armed Services
Committee.
He served as executive vice president of General Dynamics
Corporation from 1997 until 2001 and was responsible for two major
sectors of the corporation--first, information systems, and
international.
Previously, he served as executive vice president of the Combat
Systems Group, president of General Dynamics Fort Worth aircraft
company. Before that, he served as president of General Dynamics land
systems company producing land combat vehicles.
He has had this management experience, particularly in high-tech
areas. Much of the Homeland Defense Department function will be going
to the private sector, encouraging that private sector to design state-
of-the-art and beyond--I stress ``beyond''--technology to meet the many
unknowns with which our Nation and other nations are confronted in this
battle against worldwide terrorism.
Mr. England is a native of Baltimore. He graduated from the
University of Maryland in 1961 with a bachelor's degree in electrical
engineering. In 1975, he earned a master's degree in business
administration from the M.J. Neeley School of Business at Texas
Christian University. He served as a member of the Defense Science
Board and was vice chairman of the National Research Council Committee
on the Future of the U.S. Aerospace Industry.
It is an extraordinary record.
If I may say with the greatest respect to our President and to the
new Secretary that his first Deputy, Gordon England, in the Department
of Homeland Security, I think, can help avert what could come about as
a tug of war between the Department of Homeland Security and the
Department of Defense as it regards budget matters. Both have the
highest priorities, properly accorded by our President, and indeed I
think Congress. Homeland defense is just starting. As their cash flow
and appropriations come in, I hope they will be adequate to meet the
needs of this new Department. If they are not, I hope we can find other
means by which to finance those requirements. They should be given top
priority financially and support-wise because they will guard us here
at home--augmenting what is in place already by way of the National
Guard, the North Command and the other commands of the Department of
Defense--many other things that are in place in bringing together the
various and disparate agencies and departments and put them under this
one head.
I am going to be ever watchful--and I think my good friend, Gordon
England, should act likewise--to advise the Secretary of Defense and to
advise the Secretary of Homeland Security. We cannot ever witness a
budget war between these two strong and powerful and vitally needed
Departments. Gordon England is eminently qualified to see that doesn't
happen. Homeland defense starts beyond our shores in the forward-
deployed positions of the men and women of the Armed Forces all over
the world.
For example, on the battlefields of Afghanistan, we have made great
progress.
I had the privilege just this morning of meeting with General
Franks to talk about the progress he has made and the challenges that
remain in Afghanistan. But he has, in large measure, achieved a goal of
stemming the flow of terrorism from that troubled piece of land to
other places in the world and will continue to fight that battle.
That is the clearest example I can give right now of where we have
to stop terrorism before it comes to our borders. Hopefully, it can be
interdicted there and certainly interdicted before it gets into
hometowns in America.
Those two Departments must be adequately funded because they will
work together to protect this great Nation.
I wish my old friend good luck, fair winds, and flowing seas, as we
say in the Navy. He is eminently qualified to take on this position.
I thank the Chair.

Chairman Warner. On Saturday, together with my colleague,
George Allen, and the Governor of Virginia, we accompanied
Governor Ridge on an inspection of the hurricane damage to
areas of Virginia, at which time we engaged in conversations
about your nomination. He feels that it is a decision the
President made, and though he no longer will have the benefit
of your wise counsel, he feels that this job is equally
important to the one you held, and he wishes you well.
He also raised a question, which you and I have discussed
preliminarily, and I hope that you cover in your testimony.
That is, since you have firsthand knowledge of his needs with
regard to space in the current location, Ward Circle, and the
pending decision within the administration, most specifically,
the Department of Defense, of how possibly additional space
could be allocated to Homeland Defense. It is his hope that you
will give this a high priority, and I'll await for your comment
on that.
[The information referred to follows:]

Department of Homeland Security Facilities

The Department of the Navy has offered to relocate 10 Navy commands
(1,147 personnel) from its Nebraska Avenue Complex (NAC) in Northwest
Washington, DC, to provide space for the DHS. The NAC facilities
provide 556,000 square feet of office space. This is a high priority
for us, as we support the effort to consolidate all key aspects of DHS
into a single location to streamline communications and create
operational synergy for homeland security.
Office space for the DHS Secretariat headquarters was made
available on December 19, 2003. As of January 30, 2004, a total of
212,000 square feet of space has been turned over to DHS, and 544 DHS
employees now work at the NAC. The Navy plans to completely relocate
from the NAC, except for one housing unit. As of January 30, 2004, 7
Navy commands (469 personnel) have relocated, with half of all Navy
personnel relocating by September 2004. The remainder will move by
January 2005. Several of the Navy commands will relocate to government-
owned facilities, while others will relocate to leased spaces until we
identify permanent government-owned facilities.
The intent is for the Navy to transfer ownership of the complex to
the General Services Administration (GSA), which will manage the
facilities for DHS. In order to transfer ownership of the NAC to the
GSA, we will require a legislative waiver from section 2909 of the
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act (BRAC), which specifies that
bases may not be closed, except through the BRAC process. GSA is
preparing the necessary legislative proposal that relieves the Navy of
BRAC statutes.

Chairman Warner. Of course, speaking somewhat from a
parochial interest, it has always been my hope that the
Department could have been located in the Commonwealth of
Virginia so that the entire Department could be co-located
together. I was told by Governor Ridge he still has that under
consideration in the out years, but his immediate concerns are
space availability here in the next few months. So perhaps you
should address that question, because it will be before you.
Now, the committee has asked Mr. England to answer a series
of advance policy questions. He's responded to those questions,
and, without objection, I'll make the questions and responses
part of the record.
I also have standard questions we ask of every nominee who
appears before this committee. So, Secretary England, if you
would respond to these questions, then we can move forward with
the hearing.
Secretary England. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. Have you adhered to applicable laws and
regulations governing conflict of interest?
Secretary England. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken
any actions which appear to presume the outcome of the
confirmation process?
Secretary England. No, sir.
Chairman Warner. Will you ensure your staff complies with
deadlines established for requested communications, including
questions for the record, by the Congress of the United States?
Secretary England. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses
and briefings in response to congressional requests?
Secretary England. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. Will you assure that the witnesses that
come before the Congress of the United States will be protected
from any reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
Secretary England. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and
testify, upon request, before any duly constituted committee of
the Congress of the United States?
Secretary England. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. Do you agree, when asked before any duly
constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views,
even though they may be inconsistent with those of the
administration, will you so give that testimony freely?
Secretary England. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. I'd like to defer to my distinguished
colleague, Mr. Chambliss, and also Mrs. Dole, in sequence. I
think, Mr. Chambliss, you were the first to appear?
Senator Chambliss. Senator Dole was, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Senator Dole.
Senator Dole. I have several questions that I would like to
raise. First of all, there are reports that Secretary Rumsfeld
has questioned the role of the Coast Guard in military overseas
operations and is expressing an interest in turning over the
duties of naval force protection and port security to the Navy.
I'm interested in how you view this situation, and also whether
you feel that there is a trend to move more Coast Guard assets
into joint operations, particularly with the Navy.
[The information referred to follows:]

Navy/Coast Guard Roles

The Department of the Navy's number one objective is to continue to
support the global war on terrorism through naval combat forces that
are capable and relevant to the mission assigned by the combatant
commander. As such, the Coast Guard remains a frontline partner with
the Navy in performing national defense and maritime security missions.
The role of the Coast Guard in military operations overseas is
clear. The Coast Guard's ability to perform general defense operations,
maritime interception operations, port security and defense, peacetime
military engagement, military environmental response, and coastal sea
control operations is an integral part of our naval force presence.
Even when not formally assigned to the Navy by the conditions set forth
in title 14 of the U.S. Code, the Coast Guard supports military
operations overseas as one of our Nation's Armed Forces. Their
capabilities have been instrumental to our success in Iraq.
Having said that, we remain aware that we are fighting a war
against terrorists with global reach. The occurrence of a terrorism
incident on our shores of significant magnitude could require all the
current capabilities of the Coast Guard. When viewed in this respect,
the Navy must be able and ready to fulfill those complementary missions
abroad that traditionally might have been performed by the Coast Guard.
The Navy has been reviewing its ability to perform those capabilities
and assessing the risks and mitigating steps for such a situation. As a
result, some Navy defense and maritime security mission capabilities
that may resemble selected Coast Guard mission areas are meant to be
complimentary to those of the Coast Guard against the global threat of
terrorism. Port security and defense, and naval force protection
operations are two such competencies.
The role of naval combat forces in the global war on terrorism is
part of the joint effort to engage potential adversaries and address
threats to our security as far from the United States and our interests
as possible and to ensure defense of the homeland. Joint and combined
operations involving all our military forces, other Federal agencies,
and coalition partners is core to the defeat of terrorism.
Specifically, the partnership we enjoy with the Coast Guard is one we
have long recognized.
Operations involving force protection and port security are not
solely Coast Guard or Navy competencies; in fact, these missions often
involve the marines and sometimes the Army. While the Coast Guard is
part of the new Department of Homeland Security, there are good reasons
that demand we integrate our tradition-bound roles, missions, and
platforms into a more holistic naval and maritime force. The reality is
that we live in a joint world and are finding ways to jointly address
traditional and emerging threats whether operating in a port within our
borders or in some other locale.

Chairman Warner. Senator Dole, I wonder if we could
withhold questions. I thought perhaps you wanted to make some
opening statements regarding the confirmation hearing, and then
after he has given his statement to the committee, we will
proceed with questions. So the question has been asked. I would
ask that the answer be withheld until he's made his opening
statement. Now that we're joined by Senator Levin, I'll defer
to him.
Senator Dole. All right.
Chairman Warner. But I do wish to receive, on behalf of the
committee, the views of my colleagues with regard to this
nomination, then proceed to his opening statement.
Senator Dole. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you.
Senator Levin.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN

Senator Levin. Mr. Chairman, I apologize for being late,
first of all. Let me join you in welcoming Gordon England,
who's an old friend of ours, and well known to this committee.
He has had an outstanding career of leadership and service to
the Nation. We're grateful to you and to your family for the
willingness that you've shown to continue that service to the
United States, once again, as Secretary of the Navy.
If you are confirmed by the full Senate, you are going to
be well-positioned to carry on the critical programs that
confront the Navy today. I'm not sure there is anyone, perhaps
with the exception of our own chairman, who has had the benefit
of as thorough a training course as you will bring to this job.
The Navy has historically dealt with the day-to-day strains of
deployment and high operating tempos. With everyone's concerns
about supporting the readiness of our deployed and non-deployed
forces, your efforts in managing improvements in the force and
its supporting structure are going to be crucial.
So I want to thank the chairman for the speed with which
this hearing has been called. We look forward to supporting
your nomination and working with you during your return
engagement.
Secretary England. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Dole, do you have any comments?
Senator Dole. No.
Chairman Warner. Senator Chambliss?
Senator Chambliss. Mr. Chairman, I would just like to say
that we're certainly glad to have Secretary England back with
us. He did a great job in his tenure as Secretary of the Navy,
where I got to know him well, and I'm very pleased that he has
decided to come back to the Pentagon. He served us well in the
Department of Homeland Security, and, Mr. Secretary, we're just
glad to have you back.
Thank you.
Secretary England. Thank you very much, Senator.
Chairman Warner. Senator Pryor.
Senator Pryor. I don't have an opening statement, Mr.
Chairman, thank you.
Chairman Warner. Senator Reed, do you have any opening
comments?
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me just welcome
Secretary England. He's an extraordinary, talented, and decent
person, who will lead the Navy as he did before, and I'm just
delighted he's returning.
Thank you.
Secretary England. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator Reed. You have some
very important installations such as the Naval War College in
the State of Rhode Island.
Secretary England, please give us your opening comments,
and then we'll proceed to questions.

STATEMENT OF HON. GORDON R. ENGLAND TO BE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

Secretary England. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
I do have some comments which I would like to put into the
record, with your permission, sir, but just a few comments.
First of all, it is a privilege and an honor to be here
once again to seek confirmation as Secretary of the Navy. I
appreciate the confidence and the trust of the President of the
United States and Secretary Rumsfeld, and Secretary Ridge, that
they've placed in me to return to this position of
responsibility and importance to America.
My earlier commitment to you, at my last confirmation, was
to maintain the strongest and most combat-capable Navy and
Marine Corps in the world, and that remains undiminished. I
also, Mr. Chairman, would like to echo your remarks regarding
H.T. Johnson, the Acting Secretary of the Navy, who did an
absolutely admirable, very effective, and competent job as
Acting Secretary. He is a very dear friend of mine. I thank him
for his service during these past 9 months.
Also, my thanks to this committee for your wonderful
support of our military. Without the support of this committee,
frankly, the military could not accomplish what they have
accomplished here for our Nation this past couple of years. So,
Mr. Chairman, members of this committee, I thank you for your
wonderful support of our military.
I also want to comment that it has been a privilege and an
honor to serve with Secretary Tom Ridge as his Deputy in
Homeland Security. I believe the people in that department have
done just a marvelous job in securing America, and it has been
a privilege for me to serve with him. I also thank him for the
opportunity to serve with him and the President, in what is a
very important and historic mission. It's a delight to be here
again. I dearly love our men and women in uniform, and I am
looking forward to returning as Secretary of the Navy, if
confirmed by this committee.
I await your questions, sir.
[The prepared statement of Mr. England follows:]

Prepared Statement by Gordon R. England

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, it is a privilege and an
honor to appear before you to again seek confirmation as Secretary of
the Navy. I am once again humbled by the level of trust and confidence
that President Bush and Secretary Rumsfeld have placed in me, to return
to my previous position of service to our sailors and marines and to
our Nation. My earlier commitment to you to maintain the strongest and
most combat-capable naval force in the world remains undiminished. My
thanks to this committee for your continued strong support of the naval
service and for all of our military. I also want to thank the Honorable
H.T. Johnson for his leadership and personal commitment to naval
excellence during his tenure as Acting Secretary of the Navy.
It has been a unique privilege and an honor to serve Secretary Tom
Ridge as his Deputy in the Department of Homeland Security. Under his
leadership, our Nation daily grows stronger in securing our borders,
protecting our travelers, enhancing our intelligence, protecting our
critical infrastructure and responding to catastrophic events. The
department has come a long way in a short time.
I appreciate the opportunity provided to me by President Bush and
Secretary Ridge to have been part of this important and historic
mission.
In May of 2001, I first appeared before you to address your
questions related to my nomination as the 72nd Secretary of the Navy.
Much has changed since that hearing. Today, we face a threat to the
very foundations of our country--liberty and freedom--justice and law--
unlike any fight we have ever encountered. September 11 was the
confirmation of these dramatic new threats to America. For the first
time in the history of mankind, small numbers of people can wreak
untold havoc in our cities and against our citizens . . . against our
economy . . . and against freedom-loving people around the world. The
past is no longer prologue to the future.
In this new environment with new threats to America, Secretary
Rumsfeld's commitment to transformation is ever more critical . . . and
the naval services stand with him in this mission. This naval
transformation is embedded in the four core initiatives that have
underpinned the leadership focus for the past 2 years; namely, (1)
improving combat capability, (2) achieving a quality workplace and
enhanced quality of life for sailors and marines in order to create an
environment of excellence, (3) improved application of technology and
interoperability, and (4) more effective management techniques to
systemically improve the efficiency of the Department of the Navy.
Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom have
validated the importance of inter-service cooperation and fluidity of
operations. The naval services are committed to continue to transform
as part of a joint warfighting team. The United States has shown,
through the global war on terrorism, that it has the will and the
capability to protect America, even at the far corners of the earth.
The recent operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Liberia highlight the
naval services' ability to quickly respond to an international crisis
while providing a strong stabilizing presence. All such operations have
confirmed the Navy and Marine Corps' essential role to control the sea,
project military power, and influence events well beyond the ocean. The
country's ability to provide persistent naval warfighting capability as
the cornerstone to sustain America's influence around the globe will
continue. New initiatives like DD(X) and littoral combat ship (LCS)
will carry this capability into the future against new threats. Coupled
with other new initiatives, like the Fleet Response Plan, the Navy will
continue to increase flexibility and surge capability.
If confirmed, I will work with the Chief of Naval Operations, the
Commandant of the Marine Corps, the Secretary of Defense and with this
committee to ensure our future combat capability. As part of this
effort, I fully support the Navy's and the Marine Corps' move to
acquire flexible, multi-mission platforms to meet the demands of the
global war on terrorism and to ensure that we remain poised to counter
future threats.
We are blessed as a Nation to have a 227-year legacy where
magnificent men and women volunteer to protect and defend America. All
Americans are proud and thankful for their service. In turn, America
needs to provide them the tools and equipment to accomplish their
mission and to provide for them and their families. Along with this
support, we also need to evaluate continuously our military and
civilian personnel policies. Our terrorist adversary has no large
bureaucracy. Accordingly, we need to assure that our overall military
capability is flexible, responsive and adaptable.
Business practices are a force enabler. How we operate the naval
enterprise, procure our goods and services, maintain our equipment, and
the like, determines the efficiency and effectiveness of the force. By
improving effectiveness, efficiencies are gained, thereby freeing
funding for further effectiveness. This initiative was launched by the
naval leadership team during my prior tenure and will continue, if
confirmed, during my next tour of duty. Admiral Clark and General Hagee
are committed with me to improve the effectiveness of everything we do.
Transformation of business practices across the Navy and DOD are
essential to meet Secretary Rumsfeld's goals, and we are committed with
him in this undertaking.
In recent history, technology has provided the decisive edge for
our military forces. This emphasis is especially important in the
global war on terrorism since a new spectrum of threats now face our
military and citizen populations. Technology is more readily available
to our adversaries. Globalization, the Information Age, lower cost--all
accelerate technology dissemination around the globe, to friend and foe
alike. This global technology transformation necessitates a focused,
responsive technology program within the Department of the Navy to
ensure that the naval services maintain a technological advantage in
all encounters. I am committed to win this battle for continuous
technical superiority.
In closing, the enemies to freedom are organized, cunning and
determined . . . but they are no match for the hardened resolve of
nations and individual citizens who know the value of freedom and who
will pay any cost to protect it . . . and leaders with the will, the
vision, and the determination to win.
Thank you for considering my nomination to be the 73rd Secretary of
the Navy. If confirmed, I will serve our sailors, marines, and Nation
to the best of my abilities.

Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
Drawing on your experience at the Department of Homeland
Security--there is a question about the United States Northern
Command, that it should be given time to develop a coordination
process between the Northern Command and the Department of
Homeland Security. Presumably, you've focused some of your work
at the department on that issue, and I'd like to ask how long
do you think it will take to accomplish this coordination? What
can we do to speed it up?
I am a great supporter of the concept of homeland defense.
The Department of Homeland Security is critical, I think, to
the current and long-term survivability of this Nation. So I'm
hopeful this problem can be resolved expeditiously.
Secretary England. Mr. Chairman, that relationship is
working well. Now, the Northern Command is relatively new, as
is the Department of Homeland Security, but we have several of
our people actually assigned to the Northern Command. One of
our Coast Guard Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
people is assigned at the Northern Command. So we work closely,
we do exercises, joint exercises, with them. So we do have a
close relationship. It is important that we continue to
increase those bonds between us, because we each bring
different types of capability as we protect and defend our
Nation.
But that is going well. There is a recognition on behalf of
both of the organizations to continue to work those
relationships, and I'm sure the department will continue to do
that, Senator.
So there are already ties at the management level, and at
the operational level. I can tell you, as Secretary of the
Navy, I will certainly encourage those ties from the Department
of Defense point of view.
Chairman Warner. Mr. Secretary, the question of the Guard
and Reserve is now coming under close scrutiny. The President
and Secretary of Defense, by necessity, had to call up major
elements of our Guard and Reserve, and continue to do so. That
will have an impact on the ability, in the out years, to
maintain, in the case of the Navy and the Marine Corps, a
strong Reserve. I would hope that you would focus on this issue
as one of your top priorities, assuming your advice and consent
by the Senate, because it's essential that we maintain a strong
Guard and Reserve.
You'll do it in collaboration with the other service
secretaries in the department, but they have performed very
commendably throughout the Afghanistan operation and the Iraq
operation, and continue to do so. In their cases, the impact on
the families is somewhat different than the Active Forces.
There, an active member knows that he or she can be ordered, on
a day's notice, to go abroad and assume responsibilities. In
the case of the Reserve and Guard, it takes them a bit longer
to sort out their obligations at home with the family and in
their workplace before they undertake and accept their orders,
which they have done willingly in this operation.
Could you share with us your views on that, and hopefully
commit to the committee that this will be one of your top
priorities to examine?
Secretary England. Well, Mr. Chairman, I can definitely
commit to that. This is important for our Navy and for our
Marine Corps. The Reserves are very important. We did activate
reservists for both Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi
Freedom.
I will tell you, sir, that we are very sensitive to the
service of our reservists, and we do try to have a fixed period
of time on active duty for them. At this point, I know that a
lot of our reservists are going home to their families. But we
are very sensitive, and we are very appreciative of what our
Reserves do for our Active Force, and their families. I will be
very sensitive to this issue as we go forward, sir. We do
sincerely appreciate their service.
Chairman Warner. Good.
The subject of the Littoral Combat Ship Program, it was
initiated by you and the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) before
your departure from the department. I commend both of you on
it. It is a vital program to the out years of the Navy.
In your absence, the CNO stated that he envisioned that
there will be about 65 of these ships built. The funding for
the first ship in the class is projected in the research,
development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) funds in fiscal year
2005. Because it is the focused mission modules that will
enable these ships to perform their missions, do you believe
that enough emphasis has been placed to date on the development
of these modules?
Secretary England. Mr. Chairman, I don't know everything
that's happened since I left the office earlier in the year.
But I do know that the plan was for the initial ships to use
existing technology for the mission modules, and then to
develop the mission modules in a whole new approach--that is, a
modular design with new business practices--so that the LCS
would indeed not only be a new class of ships, but would be a
new way of buying ships. They would be modular in construction.
We could do this, hopefully, much faster and cheaper than our
other series of ships. This is a whole new approach, and I do
believe, when I left, at least, the Navy had a very excellent
plan to go forward with the mission modules, and I would
expect, sir, that that's still in place.
Chairman Warner. Our committee has heard competing
estimates of cruise missile threats to the Navy. This goes back
to when I was privileged to be in the Navy Secretariat. But
it's becoming an increasing threat, given the proliferation of
technology and the ability to construct these cruise missiles
throughout the world. Some contend the threat is serious.
Others contend the Navy is well prepared. I would ask that you
put this among your top priorities, because our carrier task
forces could be vulnerable to these instruments of war even
being launched from shore and/or small vessels. To the extent
you can talk about this subject here in open session, I'd like
to, again, have your commitment to address this as a high
priority and make such other observations as you feel free to
do so.
Secretary England. Well, I would say that this is certainly
a threat to our Navy. The Navy has invested, I know, a lot of
resources to defeat this threat. But I will, indeed, follow
this issue closely, and we will, indeed, report back to this
committee as our plans continue to unfold in that regard, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Good.
My time has concluded. I say to my colleagues that I am
going to go vote, so that I can return. It would be my hope,
Mr. Talent, that you or others can continue this hearing until
I come back.
Thank you very much.
Senator Levin, do you have questions?
Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
On the end strength issue, there has been a request for the
2004 fiscal year budget that there be a reduction in active
duty end strength for the Navy of 1,900 sailors. A 1,900-sailor
reduction is requested also in the end strength for the
Reserve. I'm concerned about the efforts to cut the size of the
active and Reserve Navy at a time when the operational tempo
has never been higher. Our military personnel are serving
extremely well during times of high stress, and I just don't
see how we can cut end strength and continue with all of our
military missions, and expect our service members to elect to
enlist or reenlist in our already stretched military services.
Can you give us your views on that end strength issue?
Secretary England. Well, Senator, during my last tenure, we
took a lot of steps, frankly, to make the Navy more effective
and more efficient, including lower manning levels on our
ships. Our new ships require less personnel, because they're
more highly automated, with different technologies. So the plan
at that time was, indeed, to reduce the manpower in the Navy
and in our Reserves as a function of less manning on our ships
and better technology. I will look at that when I return, sir,
to make sure that that's still appropriate, and that we're on
the right path, but that was the plan about a year ago,
Senator.
Senator Levin. Secretary England, the administration is
planning on deploying a sea-based missile defense system in
2004, despite the fact that it failed its most recent test.
Will you support deployment of a sea-based missile defense
prior to completion of a successful test program?
Secretary England. Senator, I'm not familiar with the test
program that's being conducted or how extensive or how long
that test program is. Again, I know that we had some successes
when I was Secretary of the Navy before. It was extremely
promising. I think this is likely a question of risk and the
immediacy, in terms of confidence in the design versus the
risk. So I would expect this is a risk-management type of a
decision. I'm not familiar exactly what those risks are at the
moment, because, again, I have not been in that role now for
some time. But, again, I'd be happy to get into that in more
detail. But I do think it's a risk-based assessment that would
be made.
Senator Levin. Would you do a little research on that issue
for the record, and give us a more complete answer for the
record in the next day or so?
Secretary England. Yes, sir, I will.
[The information referred to follows:]

Sea-based Missile Defense

Yes, I support the initial deployment of a sea-based ballistic
missile defense system, in accordance with the commander in chief's
goals stated in National Security Presidential Directive 23. The Navy
and the Missile Defense Agency are executing their sea-based test
program with great success, most recently Flight Mission Six (FM-6) in
December of last year. In that test, a Navy cruiser fired an SM-3 that
successfully intercepted a ballistic missile-like target, meeting all
pre-test objectives.
It is important to note that the initial deployment of our sea-
based capability would provide surveillance and tracking of long-range
ballistic missiles, to support engagements by the Ground Based
Midcourse system. Preparations and testing for a sea-based engagement
capability will continue, with a flight test planned for early calendar
year 2005. I will stay fully engaged with Congress on this issue, and
will ensure you are fully briefed prior to a decision regarding future
developments.

Senator Levin. Would you also--if, in fact, you do support
the deployment of that missile-defense system before completion
of its test program successfully, would you, in your answer,
also let us know if there are any other Navy systems that you'd
recommend deploying prior to successful completion of
operational tests?
Secretary England. Yes, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]

Ballistic Missile Defense

There are currently no other systems I would recommend deploying
prior to completion of operational tests. It would be premature to
recommend deployment of a weapon system prior to the completion of
adequate testing unless there is a dire national security concern, and
then only with the proper risk controls in place.

Senator Levin. Then there are just two other questions,
given the time. One relates to the Harpoon Enhancement Program,
which the Israeli Government has approached the Navy about,
relative to a possibility of joint development and upgrading of
the Harpoon anti-ship missile. Do you support pursuing a joint
development program to improve the Harpoon missile?
Secretary England. Well, I did when I was previously
Secretary of the Navy. Now, again, sir, I don't know what has
transpired since then, but, at the time when it was first
discussed, it did sound like a reasonable approach. I don't
know what the latest situation is in regard to that. That's
another issue. Senator, with your permission, I'll get back
with you.
Senator Levin. That would be great if you would do that.
[The information referred to follows:]

Harpoon Missile

The Navy is overseeing an Israeli Technology Concept Development
Study (CDS) which examines the operational and programmatic impacts of
integrating Israeli proposed upgrades to the Harpoon Block II weapon
system. The U.S. and Israeli Navy--with their industry counterparts--
conducted a second Technical Interchange Meeting on 11-15 January 2004,
further refining the study's trade-space. The CDS should be completed
by September 2004, at which time I will ensure your office is furnished
with the results.

Senator Levin. Finally, in your current position, since
you'll be there for a few more hours, in any event, first, let
me thank you for connecting me with Secretary Ridge so
promptly. This occurred last week. Your offices worked very
well on that, and I appreciate it.
Secretary England. You're welcome.
Senator Levin. Could you remind the Secretary, while you're
still there, that he owes Senator Collins and I an answer--the
Senate and the country, frankly--on the question of
coordination between the Terrorist Threat Integration Center,
the Counter-Terrorist Center, and the new Homeland Security
Department's Information Analysis Infrastructure Protection
Section? Because there could be confusion or uncertainty as to
who has the primary responsibility for analyzing foreign
intelligence unless that, and until that, is pinned down very
clearly. Secretary Ridge knows he owes us that, but please
remind him. It's very important that we not have a repeat of
the situation before September 11 where the failure to clearly
identify responsibility for that analysis, at least in the
judgment of some of us, contributed to our lack of preparedness
and being able to be ready for that kind of an attack and to
know about it in advance. So if you could leave that in your
final notes to your Secretary, we'd appreciate that a great
deal.
Secretary England. I'll do it.
Senator Levin. Congratulations again. We look forward to
your confirmation.
Secretary England. Great, thank you very much. Thank you
for your support, sir.
Senator Talent [presiding]. I'm told that we actually have
two votes. We're going to continue until we hear from the
chairman about whether he's going to try to get back.
Senator Chambliss is recognized.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, I have three outstanding Department of the
Navy installations in my State, of which I am very proud. You
and I have already discussed that we're going to make sure that
you and I have an opportunity to visit those three during your
tenure in office this time.
Secretary England. Yes, sir.
Senator Chambliss. You were kind enough to visit the Albany
facility last time around, and now I look forward to getting
you down on the coast, as well as to the Navy supply school at
Athens.
As we did discuss the other day in my office, I'm very
concerned about what's happening with the Navy and Marine Corps
Reserve aviation assets. I'm concerned that the Navy does not
have a vision for using these Reserve Forces. I'm told that the
active-duty Navy strongly opposed using Reserve F/A-18s from
NAS, Fort Worth, in Operation Iraqi Freedom. However, they were
used, and they performed magnificently on the U.S.S. Roosevelt.
I'm told that between now and fiscal year 2006, the Navy is
planning to decommission approximately 13 Reserve aviation
squadrons, none of which are scheduled to receive new hardware.
This approach, if followed, will result in a Reserve component
with no equipment, only personnel. The Reserve, in this case,
would have no assets to train with and no unit to deploy with.
This has been tried before, and the impact on readiness,
morale, and retention would be devastating.
While I fully appreciate the need to recapitalize and take
advantage of advances in technology, I am extremely concerned
about the Navy's approach and the impact it will have on the
readiness and capabilities of our Navy and our Nation.
Now, I know, with you just coming back to the Pentagon in
this position, you have a lot on your plate at this time. But
if you would, I'd like for you to outline what your vision is
for the Navy and Marine Corps Reserve, and how you plan to keep
them engaged, contributing, and a full member of the Navy team.
Secretary England. Well, Senator, just let me say, in
general, that the Reserves are a very important part of our
Navy and Marine Corps team. My understanding when I left was,
we were starting studies, in terms of how we could most
effectively utilize those Reserves. Sir, I'm not familiar with
the output of those studies or where they are. So, with your
permission, I would like to get back with you on this subject,
Senator.
Senator Chambliss. Sure.
Secretary England. So I will return--if you'll give me just
a short period of time, if confirmed, in reporting to my new
office, I will make an appointment, and we'll discuss this
issue, sir.
Senator Chambliss. Okay. There is one other thing I'd like
to comment on. I had the opportunity to visit with General
Schoomaker this morning, and I mentioned to him that--the same
issue that Senator Levin brought up with respect to force
structure and where we're going. I am receiving numerous
complaints, not necessarily from the members of the Reserve and
the Guard, but more from their families, about the deployment
of these folks on a continued basis. In some instances, and I
don't know that the Navy is included in this, but we have
instances where our Guard and Reserve folks have been called up
over the last 4 years virtually every other year. If we
continue to do that, recruiting and retention is going to
become more and more difficult. So I think it's absolutely
necessary that we start looking at the size of the force
structure. Did we downsize too much? If we didn't, are we
prioritizing where we need to put our folks? I say that as
chairman of the Subcommittee on Personnel here on the Senate
Armed Services Committee.
I look forward to dialoguing with you on this over the next
several months as we head into the 2005 fiscal year. We need to
reevaluate this. I know the Navy has actually asked for a
decrease in personnel, but the tempo of operations (OPTEMPO) is
going up. So I think we need to continue this dialogue, let's
make sure that we're all satisfied that we're on the right
track.
Again, I thank you for your service to our Nation. You're
the kind of person that the United States really needs in
public service. I think by virtue of the fact that--and we
didn't want to hurt your feelings that not many people are
here, but it is a sign of the fact that everybody on this
committee has great respect for you, and we're sure glad to
have you coming back as Secretary of the Navy. As with Senator
Levin, I want to give you my congratulations in advance. So
thank you, Mr. Secretary, and we look forward to continuing to
work with you.
Secretary England. Senator, thank you, and I look forward
to working with you, sir. I look forward to accomplishing a lot
for our Navy, our marines, and for our Nation. Thank you for
your kind comments.
Senator Chambliss. Knowing that one of your hobbies, as is
mine, is fishing, there's great fishing at Kings Bay in places
that ordinary folks can't go that I'm expecting you to get me
into, so----[Laughter.]
--we're going to make that happen. [Laughter.]
Secretary England. Thank you, sir.
Senator Talent. Maybe we should strike that last remark
from the record. [Laughter.]
Senator Warner, I understand, is on his way back. Secretary
England and I have had a chance to visit in private about a
whole lot of issues, and I don't have any questions for him.
There is one vote pending, and they're holding it for Mr.
Chambliss and myself, and then another after that. So what I'm
going to do is just recess the hearing, if the Secretary would
not mind, because the chairman is on his way back, and then he
can decide whether he wants to continue, if he has further
questions, or if he wants to adjourn the hearing.
Secretary England. Great. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Talent. The hearing is recessed until the chairman
returns. [Recess.]
Chairman Warner [presiding]. We will resume the hearing. I
will ask staff to advise the chair if any other members are
likely to come, and if anyone has knowledge of that we will
continue. But I'll proceed with one or two questions here. If
no members indicate that they desire to come to the hearing,
then we'll conclude.
As you're aware, Mr. Secretary, this committee established
a goal for the Department of Defense. By 2010, one-third of
U.S. military operational deep-strike aircraft will be
unmanned, and by 2015 one-third of all U.S. military ground
combat vehicles will be unmanned. What is your assessment of
the Navy and the Marine Corps being able to meet this goal? Do
you agree that it's a laudable goal? What views are you willing
to share with us this morning on that point?
Secretary England. Senator, I'm not sure we're going to
meet those specific goals, but I can tell you that there's a
large interest in the Department of the Navy in unmanned
vehicles of all types--not just in the air, but underwater--and
there is a significant interest on my own part. In fact, as
Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security I participated in the
Unmanned Vehicle Conference here on the east coast of Maryland
just recently, to observe all the various types and the
technology and what might be applicable. I know before I left,
we actually put money in the budget to heighten and increase
our effort in this area with unmanned vehicles. So I can tell
you, this does have my personal attention and my personal
interest. I do know that the Chief of Naval Operations and the
Commandant of the Marine Corps are both personally interested
in unmanned vehicles of all varieties--land, sea, and air.
So this will be an area that we will continue to pursue,
and we will give you a further assessment, Senator. We'll look
at this and respond directly, in terms of, can those goals be
achieved? They do sound aggressive, but those goals have put
us, I believe, on the right path, in terms of unmanned vehicles
for the future.
Chairman Warner. With reference to manned aircraft, I think
it was under your leadership that the CNO and the Commandant
reached this arrangement by which there's just about an
integration of naval and marine air forces, and particularly
incorporating larger numbers of marines in the carrier task
force operating off carriers. That is something that achieved a
dollar savings, training savings, greater utilization of
aircraft and personnel. I hope that you can continue that, and
even improve on it, and find such other means to make the
Marine Corps/Navy team more cohesive.
Secretary England. Senator, absolutely. The key word is the
Navy/Marine Corps ``team.'' I believe that team is the best
it's perhaps ever been. A lot of that is due to the Chief of
Naval Operations, Admiral Vernon Clark, and also the previous
Commandant, General Jim Jones, and our current Commandant,
General Mike Hagee. That's very important. That approach
eventually saved the taxpayer tens and tens of billions of
dollars; and, in our judgment, we ended up with a more
effective force. So this team approach will continue, in terms
of improving our effectiveness and also the efficiency of our
force. You have my commitment, sir. That's very important to
me, personally. I know it's important, again, to the CNO and
the Commandant. We are a very close-knit leadership team, and
we will definitely work this issue.
Chairman Warner. I, together with Senator Levin and other
members of the committee, made two trips this year to the
region of Afghanistan and Iraq, and I actually had an
opportunity to spend several days with the Marine Amphibious
Ready Group (ARG)--that is the task force offshore Liberia.
That task force had been in an operational status for a
considerable period of time, and it was due for rotation when I
was there, I was told--this was 10 days, almost 2 weeks now--
rotation October 1. But in visiting with all levels of troops,
it was clear to me that you're working with the Secretary of
Defense to maintain schedules of your forward-deployed units,
schedules where not only the members in uniform, but their
families, know, as best you can, of the period of those
deployments and the return dates. If they have to be extended,
then, as quickly as possible, inform the families, and there
will be valid reasons for that extension given. But I cannot
emphasize the importance of keeping the uniformed members and
the family members on a timetable, on a schedule, so that they
can fulfill their missions abroad, but, at the same time,
fulfill their commitments to families at home. I hope that that
will be one of your top priorities.
Secretary England. It is. Again, we agree with you,
Senator. The Navy and the marines, we are a deployed force, so
our forces are always deployed. Our men and women look forward
to those deployments. We do try to schedule them so that we
have fixed time dates. Obviously, in time of war they change
somewhat. But I need to tell you, Senator, our retention is at
an all-time high, our recruitment is at an all-time high, and
morale is very high. So I believe the CNO and the Commandant
have just done a superb job, in terms of deploying our forces
and bringing them home at the appropriate time. We're very
sensitive to that, and we will continue to be so, sir.
Chairman Warner. Well, I felt that the force that the
President, I think, very wisely and properly ordered to be
deployed off the coast of Liberia, performed its mission in a
very commendable way that ARG is still there. It's due, I
think, to rotate 1 October or thereabouts. What I would hope
you would consider is due recognition for their services in
that operation, because it was successful.
Secretary England. Absolutely. Again, Senator, this Navy/
Marine Corps team, we deploy for a purpose, and being
everywhere around the world is very important to our Nation,
and that is our mission. We will continue to do that, and we
appreciate these magnificent men and women who do that for our
country, and we'll make sure they are recognized, sir.
Chairman Warner. I share those views.
One of the President's highest priorities is defending the
Nation, its allies, and friends, and deployed forces from
ballistic missile attack. While Navy-based ballistic missile
defense efforts have achieved recent test successes, those
efforts have also undergone significant change since the
cancellation of the Navy Area Defense Program. How important is
ballistic missile defense as a Navy mission? Should the next-
generation Navy surface combat ship be DD(X), and its radar be
built to support the missile defense mission? What role do you
believe the Navy should play in helping defend the U.S.
coastline from shorter-range ballistic missiles that could be
launched from other than naval vessels or barges or other
craft?
Secretary England. Senator, the Navy does have a unique
capability in this regard, since our ships can deploy almost
anywhere in the world. So we can position our ships for this
mission. It is a mission uniquely suited to the United States
Navy. We have had a number of successes in this area. I will
follow up with you in the detail of exactly where we are in
those development programs and deployments. But it is an
important capability for our Navy/Marine Corps team, and it's
also an important capability for the Nation. So hopefully we'll
continue to have test success in that regard and deployment.
Chairman Warner. All right.
[The information referred to follows:]

Ballistic Missile Defense

The President considers protecting the American people from these
threats his highest priority. The Navy is uniquely positioned to
provide some of this capability and we consider it to be among our top
priorities. We do not envision DD(X) as being a ballistic missile
defense asset. The Navy and the Missile Defense Agency will ultimately
equip eighteen cruisers and destroyers for the Ballistic Missile
Defense (BMD) mission, and Navy plans to build a BMD capability into
the CG(X) class of ships. The Department of Defense has authorized the
Navy and Missile Defense Agency to undertake a sea-based terminal
defense experiment that should provide additional information on this
type of coastal threat. The results of this test should be complete by
the middle of calendar year 2005 at which time I will ensure these
results are made available to your office.

Chairman Warner. In 2001, the Commission to Assess the U.S.
National Security Space Management Organization, also known as
the Rumsfeld Commission, made a number of recommendations to
improve DOD oversight of space programs. Do you believe that
the current Department of Defense management structure for
space programs sufficiently addresses Navy space equities? In
your view, how actively should the Navy be engaged in the
management of space programs?
Secretary England. Well, Senator, my understanding is that
we are a full partner in those programs. We do participate with
the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) directly, and we are a
part of their team. But, with your permission, I will get back
with you on that subject, sir, after I become more familiar
with exactly where we are with those programs. During my last
tenure we were a full partner. We were training and equipping
people. But I would be pleased to respond to you, sir, in more
detail on that question.
[The information referred to follows:]

National Security Space Management Structure

The Rumsfeld Commission considered how to strengthen our national
security space program given our growing dependence and vulnerability
in this area. The commission presented a thorough, independent, and
objective assessment of our national space program. Implementation of
the 10 recommendations approved by Secretary Rumsfeld are transforming
the Nation's space programs to a more comprehensive management and
organizational approach--an approach that is necessary to assign clear
responsibilities and accountability for particular space programs.
The Department of the Navy is working as a partner with the Under
Secretary of the Air Force/Director of the National Reconnaissance
Office [the DOD Executive Agent for Space] in the overall space
decisionmaking process. The current structure does sufficiently address
Navy equities. Within the DOD, there is appropriate Navy leadership
representation at National Security Space stakeholder meetings, Defense
Space Acquisition Boards, and other decisionmaking fora. Specifically,
the Navy is designated the executive agent for developing and fielding
the next generation Ultra High Frequency Satellite Communications (UHF
SATCOM) for which it has long been a leader. The Navy leads the Program
Office for development, acquisition, and deployment of the Mobile User
Objective System satellite communications system, which will be used by
all DOD components for their future UHF communications needs.
The Navy should be, and is, actively engaged throughout the
spectrum of space requirements (including those for future space
capabilities), acquisition and operational processes, and space science
and technology/research and development (S&T/R&D). We have organized
internally to ensure appropriate management of space programs, and are
finalizing a revised Naval Space Policy to reflect the changes in the
National Security Space environment. The Navy has also established a
Space Cadre Advisor to assist in the development and assignment of its
space cadre, as directed by Secretary Rumsfeld.

Chairman Warner. The Department of the Navy is working with
both the Marine Corps and the Army to develop a Lightweight
155mm Howitzer. Are there other programs or areas that can
beneficial to both the Marine Corps and the Army, which would
lead to lower development costs and improved interoperability?
Are you familiar with that program?
Secretary England. I am familiar with the lightweight 155.
It is a joint program. It is very successful. As I recall, we
were going into production during the last budget, we were
starting our initial production. So I expect that program is
now in the production phase. But we do work closely with all
the Services. Secretary Rumsfeld's approach is to have a very
joint military, so we do work with all the Services, in terms
of all of our programs, to make sure we have as much
interoperability and commonality as we can, Mr. Chairman, and
we will continue to do that. That is a major thrust of the
Secretary of Defense, and we will certainly continue those
initiatives.
Chairman Warner. On my way to Liberia, I accompanied the
Majority Leader to South Africa. It is my practice, when I
visit nations, to call on the defense establishment. In that
context, some remarkable achievements that South Africa has had
in recent years were brought to my attention in the development
of field artillery delivery systems and, most particularly, the
shells they used. I was advised that the Army is now testing
some of their shells, which, according to certain
representations, outperform our current inventory of artillery
shells by a margin of two to one. They've incorporated some
high-technology innovative systems, and it's working.
Would you have the Marine Corps take a look at those
systems in the context of the question I've just asked?
Secretary England. Absolutely.
Chairman Warner. The Defense Science and Technology Program
is recovering after years of declining budgets. However, the
budget request for S&T still falls short of the Secretary of
Defense's goal of dedicating 3 percent of the total Defense
budget to science and technology. In particular, the Navy
Science and Technology Program has declined significantly over
the past 2 years. Subject to confirmation, how do you plan to
address the shortfalls of the Navy Science and Technology
Program and to try and meet the Secretary of Defense's goal?
Secretary England. Mr. Chairman, it is hugely important to
us, this whole science and technology investment. My only
comment would be that we also do a lot of S&T work particularly
in our very classified programs and at some of our R&D
accounts. So I think if you look at the total S&T that we do
across the Navy, we likely do about 3 percent. I believe the
number is actually larger than it appears. But, also, along
with the 3 percent is the effectiveness of the R&D and the
efficiency of the S&T that we do. So I think there are multiple
dimensions to this. It is important to our future. It is an
issue that I will pay particular attention to. So this is an
issue that does have my attention, Senator, and I will be
pleased to periodically report back to you on how we're doing
in this whole area of S&T.
Chairman Warner. The record will remain open for further
questions to be propounded to the nominee by members of this
committee. We'll keep it open for 48 hours, subject to the
inclusion of such questions as may be put in, and your
responses. This hearing will be concluded this morning, subject
to that exception.
We wish you well, Mr. Secretary. We've had a good hearing.
We have a series of votes on the floor which have detained a
number of our members who otherwise would have been present
this morning.
The hearing is recessed.
Secretary England. Mr. Chairman, I just want to say thank
you for your personal support of my confirmation, and also,
again, thank you for your great support of the United States
military.
Thank you very much, Senator.
Chairman Warner. I thank you, Mr. Secretary.
[Whereupon, at 12:06 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

[Prepared questions submitted to Gordon R. England by
Chairman Warner prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follow:]

Questions and Responses

DEFENSE REFORMS

DUTIES

Question. Based on your experience in the Department of Defense and
the Department of Homeland Security, what recommendations, if any, do
you have for changes in the duties and functions of the Secretary of
the Navy, as set forth in section 5013 of title 10, United States Code,
or in regulations of the Department of Defense pertaining to functions
of the Secretary of the Navy?
Answer. I do not foresee any changes in the duties and functions of
the Secretary of the Navy as set forth in section 5013 of title 10,
U.S. Code. However, I do recommend clarification of authority and
responsibilities between the Service Secretaries and the executive
offices within the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what duties do you expect
that Secretary Rumsfeld will prescribe for you?
Answer. Secretary Rumsfeld will certainly rely on me to provide
effective leadership for the Navy-Marine Corps team. I also expect that
the Secretary will seek my assistance to continue to transform the
business practices within DOD. Additionally, with a background in both
Homeland Security and with DOD, I am uniquely qualified to assist
Secretary Rumsfeld in effectively implementing joint DHS and DOD
activities. Lastly, I serve the President through Secretary Rumsfeld
and will therefore perform whatever duties that fit my qualifications
and experience.
Question. What duties and responsibilities would you plan to assign
to the Under Secretary of the Navy?
Answer. This depends on the qualifications and experience of the
person confirmed for this position. However, I would expect the Under
Secretary to lead special project activities as well as to generally
perform the following functions: oversight of Naval IG, Naval Audit
Service, DON CIO, Naval Space, Financial Management Modernization, and
Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization.
Question. Based on your earlier experience as Secretary of the
Navy, if confirmed, how would you anticipate working with the Assistant
Secretary of the Navy for Manpower and Reserve Affairs; the Assistant
Secretary of the Navy for Installations, and Environment; the Assistant
Secretary of the Navy for Financial Management and Comptroller of the
Navy; the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development,
and Acquisition; and the General Counsel of the Navy?
Answer. During my previous tenure as Secretary of the Navy we
formed a close-knit leadership team between all the Assistant
Secretaries, the Secretary of the Navy, the CNO, the Commandant, and
their staffs. This team approach was highly effective in addressing
issues and solving problems important for the Navy Department and for
DOD. This team process will continue during my second tenure.
major challenges and problems
Question. In your responses to previous advance policy questions
submitted in May 2001, you identified the Department of the Navy's
greatest challenges as improving combat capability, achieving a quality
workplace, and enhanced quality of life for sailors and marines in
order to create an environment of excellence, improved application of
technology and interoperability, and more effective management
techniques to systematically improve the efficiency of the Department
of the Navy.
What do you consider to be your most significant achievements in
meeting these challenges during your previous service as Secretary of
the Navy?
Answer. During the summer 2001, the Department of the Navy was
seeking a supplemental to provide the funding to continue to steam
their ships and fly their airplanes. This shortage of basic capability
was indicative of the general state of the Navy at that time. With the
support of President Bush, this committee, and Congress, significant
funding increases, along with key management decisions within the Navy,
allowed the Navy to transform many aspects of the naval services.
For example, in addition to added funding provided by Congress, the
Navy has self-generated billions of dollars through better business
practices, thereby freeing up additional funds for transformation of
the naval fleet and air wings. Numerous prior programs were cancelled,
like DD-21, and replaced with programs better designed for our future
Navy, like DD(X) and LCS. Navy and Marine Corps Aviation were
integrated, thereby providing a far more effective force at less cost
to the taxpayers. Important programs were strengthened and many new
initiatives started.
Public/private ventures have been implemented across the Navy and
the Marine Corps, providing greatly improved housing for our men and
women in uniform and their families. Morale, measured by retention, is
at an all-time high.
A new vision for the naval team set the foundation for a whole
series of new initiatives, including Sea Shield, Sea Strike, Sea
Basing, Sea Warrior, Sea Enterprise, and Sea Trial. All these
initiatives are underway within the naval services. Perhaps most
importantly is recognition within the naval leadership that
transformation is not a destination but a journey. The naval leadership
has embraced change to continue to meet future threats to our Nation.
Question. Have these challenges changed since your departure in
January 2003, and what are your plans for addressing the challenges you
now envision?
Answer. Assuming confirmation, during my next tenure, the naval
services will continue on the path of transformation to better tailor
naval forces to meet new threats to America and to continue to
emphasize combat capability, personnel, technology, and business
practices.

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY AND DOD

Question. From January 30, 2003, through the present, you have
served as Deputy Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS).
Describe your assessment of the level of cooperation that exists
between DHS and DOD.
Answer. DHS cooperation with DOD precedes the establishment of the
Department, because of the longstanding relationships that many of its
legacy components have had--the U.S. Coast Guard, for example.
Secretary Ridge has set the tone of outreach to DOD for mutual
cooperation. Just a few weeks ago he spoke to hundreds of senior
government leaders at DOD's Worldwide Combating Terrorism Conference,
identifying areas for DHS-DOD cooperation.
DHS participated in DOD's recent Determined Promise 2003 exercise.
DHS and DOD have been sharing research and development information; the
Technical Support Working Group, for example, hosted the recent Broad
Area Announcement that DHS issued to the private sector. DHS
participated in and I personally attended the debriefing of the Defense
Science Board's Summer Study on DOD Roles and Missions in Homeland
Security. DHS Under Secretary Libutti (IAIP) and Under Secretary
McQueary (S&T) will shortly be meeting in Norfolk with DOD Assistant
Secretary McHale (Homeland Defense) and members of U.S. Northern
Command (NORTHCOM) to increase cooperation in a number of areas.
Question. What is your assessment of the effectiveness of NORTHCOM
in interacting with DHS?
Answer. As discussed in the previous answer, DHS is a new
department; barely 6 months have elapsed since the constituent agencies
and personnel reported to it on 1 March 2003. NORTHCOM is the newest
combatant command, and not that much older than DHS. Collaboration
between the two organizations is developing--for example, DHS
participation in Exercise Determined Promise 2003 and future face-to-
face meetings between senior DHS and NORTHCOM personnel cited in the
previous answer. Representatives from the Coast Guard and from our
Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate (FEMA) are already on
the staff at NORTHCOM.
Question. What recommendations would you make to Commander,
NORTHCOM and to the Secretary of Defense for improving the performance
of NORTHCOM in enhancing homeland security.
Answer. I would simply encourage Secretary Rumsfeld and General
Eberhart to continue--perhaps even accelerate--the efforts at sharing
information and participating in joint exercises that have begun. I
would also commend to them the thoughtful analysis and recommendations
that the Defense Science Board has done on the issue of DOD roles and
missions in homeland security.
Question. What changes would you recommend to improve the
coordination and effectiveness of both DOD and DHS in enhancing
national defense and homeland security?
Answer. At this point, because both DHS and NORTHCOM are such new
organizations, I think it would be premature to recommend any changes
to the coordination processes that are currently being developed by DOD
and DHS. The organizations deserve an opportunity to work through that
process and thoroughly test all of the coordination mechanisms before
any assessment is done and changes recommended.
Question. What role would you advocate for the National Guard in
homeland security missions?
Answer. The National Guard is a splendid nationwide organization
that is potentially postured to be of enormous help to the Nation in
performing homeland security tasks--whether under DOD control in time
of national emergency (title 10) or under State Governor control in a
more localized event (title 32). It is important that the National
Guard be structured and trained for homeland security missions, and it
is the understanding of DHS that this transformation is taking place.
Question. Do you advocate any changes to . . . title 18 or title 10
. . . or any other laws or regulations affecting the use of military
forces for civilian law enforcement?
Answer. I have no recommended changes.

PRIVATIZATION

Question. The Department of Defense has been engaged in the
privatization of many of its support functions. Among the most
significant privatization efforts involve military family housing units
and utility systems.
What are your current views about the feasibility of housing and
utility privatization initiatives?
Answer. Housing privatization is an effective mechanism to improve
the quality of life for our sailors, marines, and their families. By
leveraging commercial partners in awarding ten military family housing
privatization projects, the Department of the Navy will be able to
provide quality housing for our sailors, marines, and their families.
But most importantly, the result of these projects will be the
renovation or replacement of over 8,400 inadequate family housing
units, and the addition of over 2,600 new units in critical housing
areas. Housing privatization will allow the Department of the Navy to
eliminate inadequate military family housing by 2007.
Thanks to congressional authorization for three pilot projects, the
Department of the Navy is expanding this approach to improve barracks
for our single sailors and marines. Planned projects are at Norfolk,
VA; San Diego, CA; and Camp Pendleton, CA. From the business
perspective, privatization of housing and utilities allows the
Department of the Navy to focus on its core missions, and obtain
quality support services from businesses who are focusing on their core
missions.
Question. What challenges do the Navy and Marine Corps face in
implementing housing privatization?
Answer. We have a good business model to implement housing
privatization, and have experienced good results. With your support we
will be able to provide quality housing for our families.

INVESTIGATIVE REPORTS

Question. Service secretaries are regularly called on to make
decisions regarding accountability of military and civilian personnel
based on investigative reports of service Inspectors General and field
commanders.
What is your opinion about the quality and reliability of the
investigative reports assessing accountability of individual members,
including flag and general officers, based on the reports of the Navy
and Marine Corps Inspectors General and of line commanders during your
previous tenure as Secretary of the Navy?
Answer. I have high confidence in the quality and reliability of
investigative reports assessing accountability of individuals,
including flag and general officers, conducted by the Navy and Marine
Corps Inspectors General.
From my previous tenure as Secretary of the Navy, I know that each
of investigations of this type are conducted carefully and thoroughly
by the staffs of the Inspectors General and then go through multiple
layers of review within the chain of command. I am confident that the
reports of the Inspectors General can be relied upon to uphold the
standards of the Department of the Navy.
Question. What steps do you believe that a Service Secretary should
take in a case in which the Secretary has doubts about the quality and
reliability of the legal and factual conclusions in an investigative
report?
Answer. In any case in which there is any doubt about the quality
and reliability of the legal and factual conclusions in an
investigative report, there are a number of options. I can return the
report to the Inspector General for further investigation and analysis
of the facts and applicable legal standard, pointing out areas of
concern. In the alternative, I can obtain additional evidence, often by
allowing additional comment from the individuals who may be in a
position to clarify particular facts. In some cases, the solution may
be to request review by the Inspector General of the Department of
Defense, or the assistance of an Inspector General of another service.

DELIVERY OF LEGAL SERVICES

Question. As Secretary of the Navy, you witnessed the working
relationship between the General Counsel, the Judge Advocate General of
the Navy and the Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant of the Marine
Corps in providing legal counsel and services within the Department.
What are your views about the responsibility of the Judge Advocate
General of the Navy and the Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant to
provide independent legal advice to the Chief of Naval Operations and
the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC), particularly in the area of
military justice?
Answer. It is critical that I, the CNO and the CMC receive
independent legal advice from the senior uniformed judge advocates. The
uniformed military attorneys in the Navy and Marine Corps are an
absolutely critical component of the Department's legal service
infrastructure. Both the Judge Advocate General and the Staff Judge
Advocate to the Commandant perform functions in their respective
organizations that are essential to the proper operation of their
service and the Department as a whole. The Judge Advocate General and
Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant work closely with the Navy
General Counsel. Their unique expertise and independent judgment and
advice complement that of the General Counsel and offer the necessary
blend of legal advice to the civilian and military leadership.
Question. What are your views about the responsibility of staff
judge advocates within the Navy and Marine Corps to provide independent
legal advice to military commanders in the fleet and throughout the
naval establishment?
Answer. Uniformed staff judge advocates, assigned worldwide and
throughout the chain of command, are essential to the proper
functioning of the operational and shore-based Navy and Marine Corps.
In addition to the statutory responsibilities of Navy and Marine Corps
judge advocates, which are significant, of equal importance is the
reliance that commanders place on staff judge advocates for a wide
variety of matters. Legal issues arise at all stages and locations of
military operations and staff judge advocates are deployed optimally to
provide timely, relevant and independent advice to commanders
everywhere. Flexibility and mobility are hallmarks of the judge
advocate communities of the Navy and Marine Corps, and assignment
policies and career development are structured to ensure sufficient
numbers of deployable and well-trained military lawyers are ready to
respond to emergent requirements globally. Navy and Marine Corps
commanders depend extensively on their staff judge advocates for their
unique expertise that combines legal acumen with the well-schooled
understanding of military operations and requirements.

TRANSFORMATION

Question. Secretary Rumsfeld has established transformation of the
Armed Forces to meet 21st century threats as one of the Department's
highest priorities and has stated that only weapons systems that are
truly transformational should be acquired.
How would you assess the level of risk to our forces of foregoing
or curtailing current acquisition programs in favor of future
transformation?
Answer. I would assess this level of risk as moderate. The greater
risk is in failing to be transformational, and not developing the
systems, infrastructure, and personnel training programs necessary to
meet future threats.
Question. Can we afford this risk considering the current level of
global threats?
Answer. Yes. We must achieve a balance of meeting our operational
risk today while mitigating our future challenges with a long-term
commitment to transform and recapitalize.
Question. The Navy has expended a great deal of effort in
developing transformation plans.
Please describe your understanding and assessment of the Navy's
transformation plans.
Answer. The Navy is approaching transformation from many fronts.
Navy is developing new acquisition programs such as DD(X), LCS, and the
JSF. We are reconfiguring some platforms to meet future needs,
specifically SSGNs and Cruiser Conversion. Sea Enterprise will improve
the efficiency and responsiveness of our shore support organizations,
while Sea Warrior will improve our personnel readiness. Navy is also
reviewing Reserve programs to ensure their best employment. Previous
strategies addressed regional challenges. Today, we must think more
broadly. The combination of traditional and emerging dangers means
increased risk to our Nation. To counter that risk, our Navy is
expanding its striking power, achieving information dominance, and
developing transformational ways of fulfilling our enduring missions of
sea control, power projection, strategic deterrence, strategic sealift,
and forward presence.
Question. What is your vision for Navy and Marine Corps
transformation?
Answer. The emerging challenges of the 21st century demand a joint,
netted, power projection force that offers modern and ever-evolving
combat capability. Together, under the supporting services' visions of
Seapower 21 and the Marine Corps Strategy 21, now called Naval Power
21, are funded for a full array of transformational initiatives in our
R&D, investment, and operational programs. As an example, the CVN-21
program will provide transformational capabilities for Sea Strike and
Sea Shield while Tactical Air Integration provides new capabilities and
answers the American taxpayer's demand of doing the job smarter and
more efficiently.

LOW DENSITY/HIGH DEMAND FORCES

Question. If confirmed, how would you address the Department of the
Navy's challenge in manning low density/high demand units, ratings, and
occupational specialties?
Answer. The challenge in manning low density/high demand units and
occupational specialties is particularly important for the Navy and
Marine Corps now, and will become even more so in the future as
technology continues to increase in sophistication with the result that
fewer, but more skilled and more multi-functional, sailors and marines
are needed to make up our force.
The issue is fundamentally one of transforming the way we look at
manpower and training. It impacts whom we recruit, the way we train
sailors and marines throughout their careers, the way we assign people,
and the force structure of our Navy and Marine Corps.
The Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine
Corps have embarked on a number of transformational initiatives with
the goal of increasing the flexibility of our forces to be able to
bring the right mix of combat capability and skill to the fight at the
right time as part of the global war on terrorism. The Sea Warrior
component of the Navy's Sea Power 21 vision statement and leadership
guidance is focused on this issue, and includes changes in the Navy's
recruiting, ratings classification, training, manpower distribution,
career development, retention, and mentoring programs. In the same way,
the Navy is exploring different ways of structuring and deploying its
forces.
If confirmed, I will focus my attention on the on-going initiatives
already underway in the Navy and Marine Corps to meet the need for high
demand/low density forces. I will work with the Secretary of Defense
and Congress to ensure we have those forces ready to fight where and
when we need them, and that we do so in a way that does not wear out
our people and equipment in the process.
Question. What units, if any, do you believe that the Navy and
Marine Corps need more of and what time line do you see in fielding
such units?
Answer. High demand/low density assets have been a continuing issue
for several years in the Navy. I know various initiatives have been
under taken by the CNO and CMC. If confirmed, I will review the
situation and report back to Congress.

FLEET RESPONSE PLAN

Question. The Chief of Naval Operations has directed that the Navy
implement the Fleet Response Plan (FRP) in order to provide an enhanced
surge capability for naval assets. The plan is predicated on increased
efficiencies in both maintenance and training, with the aim of
providing higher levels of readiness within existing resource levels.
In your view, what are the most significant benefits and risks to
successful implementation of the FRP?
Answer. Implementation of the FRP is critical to ensuring the Navy
is positioned to respond to the requirements of the Defense Guidance.
In the past, adversaries have counted on our predictability, but FRP
will change how we employ our forces allowing us to be much more
flexible. This added flexibility is an important part of confronting
the new threats posed as we prosecute the global war on terrorism. As
for risk, the greatest one I see is failing to change the force in
response to known changes in our external environment. Of course,
change is often difficult, so from a practical viewpoint, one of the
central challenges to implementing this plan will be in changing a Navy
culture that has been accustomed to fairly fixed operating intervals. I
am confident, however, that our Sailors and the Navy's uniformed
leadership are up to the challenge.
Question. If confirmed, what steps do you envision taking to help
ensure that FRP is successful?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to place great emphasis on
the critical components that will allow us to effectively implement
FRP: personnel, training, and maintenance. We must ensure that our
sailors are employed effectively and fairly, that they are highly
trained, and that the ships on which they serve are in the best
possible material condition.

ACQUISITION WORKFORCE

Question. The Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA)
established specific requirements for managing the Defense Acquisition
Workforce and authorized a series of benefits for the workforce.
Please give your assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the
Department of the Navy's implementation, to date, of DAWIA.
Answer. The department has a strong and vibrant implementation of
the DAWIA. We have in place the training, mentoring, and developmental
programs to ensure that we have a quality workforce at all levels. Our
senior acquisition leadership continues to show the innovation,
business acumen, and strong management skills necessary to function
well in the current and future acquisition environments.
In the past year, the Department has implemented a number of
changes in the structure of our Program Executive Officers and Systems
Commands that has better aligned us to our core acquisition areas and
have helped better focus the workforce on those key areas. Particular
emphasis has been placed in better integrating combat systems, open
systems, and command, control, communications, computers, intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (C\4\ISR) across the Navy-Marine Corps
team and in the joint environment. These changes also provide the
acquisition leadership better tools and leverage when dealing with the
defense industry as it continues to consolidate into a small number of
large, cross functional companies.
Question. In your judgment, does the Department of the Navy's
current acquisition workforce have the quality and training to adapt to
new acquisition reforms, as well as to the increased workload and
responsibility for managing privatization efforts?
Answer. I believe the Department of the Navy's current acquisition
workforce does have the necessary quality and training to operate in
the current and future acquisition environments. A key component of
DAWIA is the strong emphasis on training and experience as personnel
gain greater expertise in acquisition and achieve higher levels of
certification. This well-defined process ensures that changes in
acquisition policy and skills, as well as best practices, can be spread
throughout the workforce. More importantly, the requirement for the
workforce to achieve at least 40 hours of continuous learning each year
ensures they remain knowledgeable on the most current business
practices and policies.

READINESS DEFICIENCIES

Question. In response to advance policy questions in connection
with your previous confirmation hearing you indicated that the Navy was
working to mitigate of combatant commands readiness deficiencies and
that you would continue that effort if confirmed.
How would you assess your accomplishments during your previous
service as Secretary of the Navy in improving the readiness of the
Department of the Navy and eliminating deficiencies?
Answer. I am very pleased with the progress that was made not only
during my tenure as Secretary but also in the aftermath. As you are
aware, with congressional support we made an investment of roughly $6
billion into the readiness accounts in recent years with these
additional resources being used to fund the Flying Hour Program, Ship
Depot Maintenance, Ship Operations, and Sustainment, Recapitalization
and Modernization. These investments had a tangible impact in improving
aviation material readiness, reducing the ship depot maintenance
backlog, and improving our Force Protection. Of equal importance, we
made very good progress in improving retention of our personnel, who
are at the center of the readiness formula.
Question. What do you view as the major readiness challenges that
remain to be addressed and, if confirmed, how will you approach these
issues?
Answer. There are a number of challenges that the Navy must be
prepared to address. We must, of course, not lose sight of the
continuing need to invest in readiness so that we can build on the
early successes I just mentioned. We must also transform our Navy to
provide a more agile, surge-ready force capable of decisively
confronting threats associated with the global war on terrorism.
Finally, we must be careful to ensure that while confronting these
threats we do not overlook the need of tomorrow's Navy. Adequate future
readiness is only sustainable if we capitalize on technologies that
permit us to deliver superior platforms and systems to our operational
commanders and the fleet at large. If confirmed, I will lend my
personal focus to these important areas of concern.

LAW OF THE SEA TREATY

Question. The United States generally follows the provisions of the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea but has never ratified
the treaty.
What are your personal views about whether the United States should
ratify the treaty? Please explain.
Answer. Historically, Navy leadership has supported ratification of
and accession to the Law of the Sea Convention. If confirmed, I will
review this issue in more detail.

OUTSOURCING OF COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES

Question. Over the past several years the Department of Defense has
increased its reliance upon the private sector to perform certain
activities including equipment maintenance and facility operations.
Do you believe that the naval services need to retain a core
capability to perform certain activities, and what approach would you
take to allocate workloads between the public and private sector?
Answer. I am committed to ensuring the DON applies its resources in
an effective and responsible way. Part of finding the right way to do
that involves making sure we have the right functions performed by the
right people. In some cases that should be our military and civilian
employees; in others, the private sector possesses the best capability
to provide support and services. There isn't a one-size-fits-all
answer. We need to focus on those core competencies that we must do to
accomplish our mission and then determine what the best source is to
accomplish those functions that support those core competencies.
Question. Do you believe that outsourcing can yield substantial
savings for the Department of that Navy?
Answer. Studies have shown we consistently produce savings when we
make sourcing decisions in a competitive environment: whether the
outcome is continued use of government employees or outsourcing. The
process itself causes us to look closely at what needs to be done and
find better ways to do it. Competition is healthy and fruitful to our
Nation.

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM

Question. The DOD science and technology program is recovering
after years of declining budgets. However, the budget request for
defense S&T still falls short of the Secretary of Defense's goal of
dedicating 3 percent of the total defense budget to science and
technology.
If confirmed, how do you plan to increase the Navy science and
technology program to meet the Secretary's goal?
Answer. The 3 percent for the S&T account is a worthy goal but may
need to take into consideration other categories of investment in
measuring compliance. For example, in some large naval programs there
are large embedded S&T investments outside the S&T line item.
Additionally, the efficiency and effectiveness of S&T are equally
important measures. My approach will be to invest wisely in
technologies important to the naval services with clearly stated
objectives, measures of progress, and exit criteria.

DEVOLVEMENT

Question. This year the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)
devolved (transferred) several programs to the Services. Many of these
programs reside in OSD because of the inherent jointness of the
program.
If confirmed, how do you plan to maintain the integrity of those
programs devolved to the Department of the Navy?
Answer. The decision by OSD to transfer the execution of programs
to the services is exactly the right decision. The services are
responsible for the execution of OSD policy and programs and have the
work force trained and experienced to do so. I view these programs no
differently than many other ``Joint Programs'' for which the Navy has
execution responsibility. The current philosophy of integrated product
teams that include all key players, works well in many acquisition
programs today and will work well for these ``devolved'' programs. My
philosophy is to put the best qualified people, representing the key
stakeholders in charge of execution, regardless of service or
community. A prime example of this is the V-22 program, where we
selected an Air Force Officer as the program manager.

NAVY AND MARINE CORPS PERSONNEL RETENTION

Question. The retention of quality sailors and marines, officer and
enlisted, active-duty and Reserve, is vital to the Department of the
Navy.
How would you evaluate the status of the Navy and Marine Corps in
successfully recruiting and retaining high caliber personnel?
Answer. The Navy and Marine Corps have been very successful in
recruiting for the past 2 years. The percentage of recruits with High
School Diplomas, some college experience, and high entrance exam scores
is the highest ever. The current retention rate for high caliber
personnel is at a historic high. Over the past 4 years, the Navy has
seen significant success in raising reenlistment rates and lowering
attrition across all zones. The current retention is higher across the
board when compared to that of a year ago, for example first term Zone
A sailors is 64 percent which is 4 percent higher than during the same
period in fiscal year 2002. On the Marine Corps side, we have
consistently improved the quality of enlistees, and current year
enlistments are no different. The Marines Corps has exceeded the DOD
quality goals in both high school graduates and the upper mental group.
Question. What initiatives would you take, if confirmed, to further
improve the attractiveness of active and Reserve component service?
Answer. I think there are a number of areas that deserve further
study. These include performance-based compensation, promotion rates,
pay grade growth, spouse employment portability, improvement of career
development and choices, and closer integration of active and Reserve
components. If confirmed, I will ensure these areas are studied and
appropriate steps are taken to make changes where necessary to improve
the attractiveness of service in the Navy.
Question. What effects on recruiting and retention do you foresee
as a result of the current tempo of operations?
Answer. The full impact of the current operational tempo has yet to
be realized, however, data to date indicates that recruiting and
retention continue to be at an all time high.

NAVAL SURFACE FIRE SUPPORT

Question. In your responses to the committee's advance policy
questions submitted before your last confirmation hearing, you endorsed
the need for the Navy to provide fire support from the sea for the
Marine Corps, the Army, and other expeditionary forces.
Do you continue to support this capability and its underlying
requirement?
Answer. Without question. Fulfilling this requirement is why we
need to keep DD(X), and the development of gun systems similar to that
selected for DD(X), on track.
Question. What progress did you make during your earlier tenure as
Secretary, and what initiatives would you now take, if confirmed, to
improve on the naval gunfire support capability?
Answer. We developed DD(X) to respond to this need and pressed
forward with challenging but important research and development
programs to enable delivery of this important capability. We will
continue to examine and develop promising new options as well. If
confirmed, I will continue to support DD(X) and deliver improved NSFS
capabilities to the fleet as soon as possible--DD(X) and the 5 inch/62
ERGM program are significant steps toward meeting the requirements in
Surface Fire Support.

ORGANIZATION OF THE NAVY STAFF

Question. Section 5038 of title 10, United States Code, establishes
a requirement to maintain a position of Director of Expeditionary
Warfare on the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations. This officer's
duties, as described in that section, are to provide staff support for
issues relating to ``amphibious lift, mine warfare, naval fire support,
and other missions essential to supporting expeditionary warfare.''
Congress took this action after the 1991 Persian Gulf War in an effort
to address critical shortfalls in these areas, particularly in the area
of mine countermeasures capabilities. There have been recent press
reports that the Department of the Navy intends to abolish this office.
What is your understanding of the Department of the Navy's plans,
if any, for changing the current status of the Director of
Expeditionary Warfare and the functions the director is responsible
for?
Answer. Although I've not been briefed on this issue, I am aware
that the CNO is continuing to examine how best to align the
organization to support the concepts articulated in ``Seapower 21.'' I
would expect to be briefed in full regarding any changes that might
impact the role of the Director of Expeditionary Warfare.

MINE COUNTERMEASURES CAPABILITY

Question. Congress has been particularly interested in the Navy's
ability to respond to the asymmetric threat posed by mines. The Navy
has had mixed results in providing for robust mine countermeasures
capabilities.
If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that the Navy
maintains its focus on achieving robust mine countermeasures
capabilities for the fleet?
Answer. I am committed to delivering an Organic Mine
Countermeasures capability in fiscal year 2005, and the Navy is on
track to do that. If confirmed, I will continue to support the
development and fielding of capabilities to meet this important
mission. LCS is also a response to the littoral mine threat, and I
fully support that program and its important mission--we need to begin
construction of the first LCS in fiscal year 2005 so that we can
respond to the changing littoral warfare environment.

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

Question. Do you regard ballistic missile defense a core mission of
the Navy?
Answer. Ballistic missile defense is an important capability for
the Navy, and Navy systems and tests have shown great promise in recent
years. I fully support the recent agreements between the Navy and the
Missile Defense Agency (MDA) that committed an Aegis Cruiser full-time
to MDA, along with the plan to modify other Aegis ships to conduct MDA
missions when required.
Question. Do you support the current division of responsibility in
which the MDA is responsible for ballistic missile defense research and
development and the services are responsible for procurement of
ballistic missile defense systems?
Answer. Regarding development and procurement funding, Navy and the
MDA are working together to develop and field the systems that will
deploy on board ships. I believe that both organizations are doing what
they do best to support the delivery of a range of capabilities from
terminal-phase to national missile defense.
Question. In your view, should the Navy or the MDA be responsible
for the research and development necessary for the spiral development
of deployed ballistic missile defense systems?
Answer. If confirmed, I will look further into this issue.

CRUISE MISSILE DEFENSE

Question. In your view, how serious is the cruise missile threat to
the Navy and are current Navy efforts to address this threat adequate?
Answer. Without question, the cruise missile threat is serious and
will continue to grow in the foreseeable future. We have the best air
defense systems in the world today, but there are always new
challenges. There are several countries committed to proliferation of
this relatively cheap way to threaten naval forces at sea, and they are
working hard to develop better and better ways to defeat our cruise
missile defense capabilities. As a counter, we continue to improve our
systems and countermeasures in every area, from signature control to
soft kill to hard kill systems and weapons; the Navy's efforts support
the implementation of Sea Shield under the global concept of operations
plan, and should sufficiently protect the force.

NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

Question. What is your view of the Navy's long-term role and
mission in nuclear deterrence?
Answer. Although the Cold War has ended, and the threat of global
nuclear war has diminished, proliferation of nuclear weapons remains a
great concern and the threat of nuclear attack still exists. As the
most survivable leg of the Nation's strategic forces, the Navy's Ohio-
class ballistic missile submarines, or SSBNs, provide launch capability
from around the globe using the Trident ballistic missile weapon
system. Although recent changes in the world environment allowed us to
decrease the number of SSBNs from Cold War levels, these platforms and
their weapons will retain their mission and utility for the forseeable
future.

MILITARY SPACE

Question. Do you believe that the current Department of Defense
management structure for space programs sufficiently protects Navy
space equities?
Answer. The Navy is a full partner in the Department of Defense
management structure for space programs.
Question. In your view, how actively should the Navy be engaged in
the management of space programs?
Answer. It is imperative that the Navy/Marine Corps team remain
highly engaged to ensure the continued development of operational space
requirements and capabilities for naval warfighting. We are committed
to developing a cadre of space experts to achieve this objective.
Question. In your view, is the Navy adequately involved in the
requirements process for space programs?
Answer. Yes. One of the guiding principles of the Commission to
Assess United States National Security Space Management and
Organization Report of January 2001, was to formalize an operationally
and technically savvy space cadre, experts who could advocate Navy and
Marine Corps requirements in the joint community and the joint program
offices. We've identified those people, certified their expertise, and
continue to strengthen their identification as a valuable group of
professionals.
Question. What is your view of the Navy's appropriate long-term
role in space systems, other than as a user of space information and
products?
Answer. Space has long been and will remain critical to naval
warfighting. The Navy has been in the forefront of operationalizing
space, from the global positioning system, to early tactical satellite
communications, to the Classic Wizard system, and to bringing real time
targeting to the cockpit and in-flight weapons. The Navy and Marine
Corps need space for increased situational awareness, speed, precision
and lethality and thus want to operationalize space and bring it to
every level of operations. The Navy's contribution to space has been
reflected and continues to be reflected in such major programs as the
Mobile User Objective System (MUOS), various DOD satellite terminal
systems and innovative space-smart people.

DIRECTED ENERGY

Question. In your view, how important are directed energy weapons
to the future of the Navy?
Answer. Directed energy weapons could be a primary weapon in the
arsenal of the future Navy. The Navy has unique platforms to utilize
this technology. Specifically, many Navy ships have large power
generation capability and sufficient space and volume to ease design
constraints. That said, directed energy weapons still require large R&D
efforts to field effective weapons for the Navy.

JOINT OPERATIONS

Question. If confirmed, what recommendations, if any, would you
make to the Secretary of Defense to improve joint force integration?
Answer. One of the primary tenets of joint force integration is
commonality of sensors, weapons, and systems. A second is
interoperability of sensors, weapons, and systems. I would recommend
that commonality and interoperability across services receive high
priority.

NAVY AND MARINE RESERVE FORCE STRUCTURE

Question. Suggestions have been made that the Navy and Marine Corps
Reserves need to make significant changes and transform so as to be of
maximum utility and relevance in future conflicts. Deactivating
underutilized units and shifting their manpower to new military skills,
putting units under the operational command of Active Forces, and
focusing more on homeland defense missions are a few of the changes
that have been proposed.
What are your views regarding the current organization and assigned
missions of the Navy and Marine Corps Reserve components?
Answer. The Navy and Marine Corps Reserves are critical to the
Department of the Navy's total force. We have learned many lessons
about the mobilization and functioning of the Reserves in Operations
Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. If confirmed, I will review those
lessons learned and will support Navy leadership in making changes to
transform the Reserves into a more relevant and useful resource for the
changing world.
Question. What changes in the composition, strength, and mission of
the Navy and Marine Corps Reserves, if any, would you seek to implement
if confirmed?
Answer. It is my understanding that studies addressing these
questions are being undertaken in the Department of the Navy. If
confirmed, I will ensure that this scrutiny continues, that lessons
learned are heeded, and that changes are made accordingly so that the
Reserves are best positioned to maximize their contribution to the
total force.

SHIPBUILDING PLAN

Question. The Navy recently submitted its 30-year shipbuilding
plan.
What level of funding do you think the Navy will need to execute
this plan, and considering competing priorities, do you believe this
level of funding is realistic?
Answer. The Navy's 30-year plan accurately documents the funding
requirements and the Navy's budget submissions support the requirements
with a balanced funding approach that meets the needs of the
shipbuilding budget as well as the other funding challenges ahead. The
Navy's fiscal year 2004 budget requested roughly $12 billion for
shipbuilding, a significant commitment toward achieving our needs. The
shipbuilding funding level must continue to grow, and the Navy's budget
plans accurately reflect that need.
Building a force of about 375 ships will take a major commitment of
resources. The Navy's shipbuilding plan is realistic in stating an
average of $14 billion will be required for an average build rate of
approximately 11 ships per year. In addition to new construction, an
average of $2 billion per year is required for conversion and
overhauls.
If confirmed, I will continue to devote significant effort toward
building the right fleet with the right capabilities.

LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP

Question. The Navy has selected three teams of contractors to
develop concepts for the Littoral Combat Ship. There is much effort
going into the development of the sea-frame for this ship.
Do you believe that there is enough emphasis on the focused mission
modules, both from a funding and technical maturity standpoints?
Answer. Yes. Much of the work in mission modules is not new,
whereas the platform work requires a great deal of initial design
effort. The mission modules for Flight 0 LCS are being selected from
technologies that can be deployed in the near-term. The LCS
requirements team reviewed over a thousand mission module system
candidates, and several sufficiently mature candidates emerged--those
are the systems being developed for Flight 0 LCS.

TACTICAL AVIATION INTEGRATION

Question. The Navy and the Marine Corps have presented a plan that
would result in a greater integration of their respective tactical
aviation components. This plan will result, however, in the
disestablishment of a number of squadrons, including two Reserve
squadrons, one Navy and one Marine Corps, in fiscal year 2004.
What level of risk, if any, do you believe will result from this
force structure reduction?
Answer. The integration of Navy and Marine Air resulted in a force
structure with equal or enhanced capability at lower cost. Therefore,
in my judgment, this force structure will not result in any increased
risk.

SURFACE COMBATANTS

Question. With the early retirement of Spruance-class destroyers,
the Navy surface combatant fleet is declining significantly below the
levels recommended by the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review. While
Arleigh Burke destroyers are still being built, the current Future
Years Defense Program has Arleigh Burke construction stopping well
before any DD(X) destroyers are near completion.
Do you think it is wise to end construction of one class of
destroyers before the next class is further along in design and
construction and what is the level of risk associated with such an
approach?
Answer. The budgets submitted by the Navy are reflective of the
delicate balance between force structure, industrial base, and the
relative maturity of follow-on designs, and I will continue to keep
that balance as a central consideration in my future budgetary
submissions. In this case, the end-year of the DDG production line
corresponds with the start-year of production for both LCS and DD(X).
We have an acceptable level of tactical and strategic risk at this
point, and we need to move forward with the new platforms needed for
the future.
Without question, both Navy and industry are committed to the
success of the DD(X) program. It is the centerpiece of our future Navy,
and we cannot afford to wait to get these ships to sea. We decided to
assume a manageable level of risk to achieve important capability gains
in our future surface combatants. The Engineering Design Models for
DD(X) are moving forward, LCS is moving forward as well, and I believe
at this point that the risk associated with both the DD(X) and LCS
programs are acceptable, and we will achieve our goals on time.

OFFICER PROMOTION SYSTEM

Question. We consider promotions to general and flag officer ranks
as identifying military officers for very senior positions that should
be filled only by officers with the very highest values and
qualifications. The technology and procedures that support this system
must be of the highest caliber to ensure prompt forwarding of
nominations and thorough evaluation of pertinent information, including
adverse information. The Navy has had problems in the past with
antiquated information systems supporting promotion selection boards
and delays in forwarding reports of selection boards.
What is your understanding of the adequacy of the information
systems that support the Navy's promotion selection board processing?
Answer. Through a number of system upgrades since 2000, the Navy
has steadily improved the processing of board records. This has
furthered our goal of assuring a fair, accurate, and unbiased process.
Further upgrades to streamline the reporting process are under
development. Navy is also addressing reporting requirements to ensure
commanding officers make potentially adverse situations known before
promotion. If confirmed, I will demand that constant improvement to the
selection board process is continued in order to ensure only those
officers with unquestionable integrity are selected.
Question. If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that
complete and accurate reports of selection boards are forwarded to the
Senate in a timely manner?
Answer. The Navy is presently reviewing the processing of selection
board reports with the Department of Defense and other reviewing
authorities to ensure timely submission to the Senate. I support this
effort. I am confident that ongoing efforts address standardization and
improved processing timelines. If confirmed, I will remain sensitive to
this issue.

INVESTMENT IN INFRASTRUCTURE

Question. Witnesses appearing before the committee in recent years
have testified that the military services under-invest in their
facilities compared to private industry standards. Decades of under-
investment in our installations have led to increasing backlogs of
facility maintenance needs, created substandard living and working
conditions, and made it harder to take advantage of new technologies
that could increase productivity.
Based on your private sector experience, do you believe the
Department of the Navy is investing enough in its infrastructure?
Answer. The funding situation has improved in recent years. The
Department of the Navy continues to develop programs and budgets to
achieve recapitalization and sustainment rates based on private sector
best business models.

IMPLEMENTATION OF SPECIAL COMPENSATION FOR COMBAT RELATED DISABILITY
PAY

Question. What is your understanding of the Navy's progress in
implementing a system for payment of combat related disability pay?
Answer. My understanding is that the Navy is doing very well in the
implementation of Combat Related Special Compensation (CRSC). In April
of this year, the Naval Council of Personnel Boards was identified as
the organization within the Department of the Navy to review all CRSC
applications. The CRSC division stood up, and began reviewing
applications on 1 June. Since that time, approximately 5,400
applications have been received. It is my understanding that the
division is currently capable of reviewing 1,000 applications per
month.
Question. How many applications has the Navy processed since
implementation earlier this year, and how many will be processed before
the end of 2003?
Answer. The Navy has now received approximately 5,400 applications.
The total number of applications that will be received is unknown.
However, the Navy estimates that they will receive approximately 22,000
applications during the first 2 years of the program.

NAVY MARINE CORPS INTRANET

Question. It has been reported that the attack of the Welchia Worm
on August 18, 2003, infected over 75 percent of the Navy Marine Corps
Intranet (NMCI) workstations.
Can you describe what has been done to secure the NMCI network
since then?
Answer. An automated tool was developed that eliminated the worm
code, and patched the vulnerability it exploited. This fix occurs
automatically when either workstations on the network are re-booted or
when they are re-connected to the network. Additionally, the Navy has
begun an inquiry to determine the sequence of events leading to the
Welchia event, its root cause, and the full scope of operational
impact, including the specific circumstances that made NMCI vulnerable
to this particular problem. The lessons learned will be applied as
appropriate changes to our operating processes and procedures to
minimize similar future incidents.
Question. What is the current status of the implementation of the
NMCI program?
Answer. Currently EDS manages over 273,000 Navy and Marine Corps
workstations. Of these, over 106,000 are NMCI seats and the remainder
are legacy systems awaiting cutover to NMCI.

NAVY TRAVEL CARD PROGRAM

Question. The Navy has been criticized recently by the General
Accounting Office (GAO) for its management of its purchase and travel
card programs.
What actions have been taken by the Department to implement GAO's
recommendations and provide more effectively oversight of these
programs?
Answer. The Department of the Navy has taken aggressive steps to
address both the delinquency and misuse issues associated with card
programs identified by the GAO. Specifically, the Department has
greatly reduced the number of outstanding cards by over 150,000,
implemented mandatory split-disbursement of travel claims for military
personnel, provided expanded training for unit program coordinators to
better enable them to detect card misuse, and worked with the
contractor bank to identify merchants engaging in deceptive practices
intended to mask inappropriate use of the travel card. Additionally,
Echelon II commanders that have delinquency reports in excess of the
departmental goal of 4 percent are now required to report in person on
a quarterly basis to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial
Management & Comptroller) on their actions taken to improve
performance. In short, the Department has focused increased command
attention at all levels to address the problems identified by GAO. This
increased attention is yielding results, but the effort must be
sustained. Should I be confirmed, it is my intention to continue the
practices that have led to the positive developments in these programs
and pursue further improvements.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. Yes
Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views,
even if those views differ from the administration in power?
Answer. Yes
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as the Secretary of the Navy?
Answer. Yes
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and
other communications of information are provided to this committee and
its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes
______

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

Question Submitted by Senator Pat Roberts

THE NAVAL RESEARCH LABORATORY

1. Senator Roberts. The Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) is the
corporate research lab of the Navy Secretariat and the only
installation not controlled by the Navy's uniformed officers. This
dates back to the creation of the laboratory and reflects the intention
of Thomas Edison when he urged the Navy to create the NRL. The Navy is
currently undergoing a consolidation of naval facilities under a newly
established Commander, Navy Installations (CNI). It has come to my
attention that certain functions of the NRL will now be under the
command of the CNI. If confirmed, is it your intention to cede any
functions of the NRL to the CNI? If so, do you feel this conflicts in
any manner with Public Law 588, which establishes the Office of Naval
Research?
Secretary England. It is not my intention to cede any functions
considered essential to NRL's research and development mission.
However, I feel the transfer of certain facility and base operation
support (BOS) functions not essential to NRL's mission is appropriate,
and does not conflict with the Public Law 588.
Public Law 588 (10 U.S. Code, section 5022) allows the Secretary of
the Navy judgment in respect to the research and development functions
of the Office of Naval Research (ONR), together with any or all
personnel, buildings, facilities, and other property used in the
administration thereof. This authority includes the NRL. The Department
of the Navy utilized this authority to transfer most of NRL's facility
and BOS functions to the Naval District Washington and the Naval
Facilities Engineering Command during the 1992 Public Works Center
(PWC) regionalization and the 1997-1998 Installation Claimant
Consolidation.
On 1 October 2003, the Navy consolidated management oversight of
all Navy shore installations into a single Navy Installations Command,
as a further commitment to improving management effectiveness and
enterprise-wide alignment. This consolidation will achieve economies of
scale, increased efficiencies, and a reduction of staff overhead. As
part of this process, the CNI and NRL staffs worked together to
identify additional functions or other economies and efficiencies not
previously captured by earlier consolidations. The two staffs
identified and transferred functions that provide for economies of
effort, but that do not infringe on NRL responsibilities or
authorities. Those functions identified as inseparably imbedded within
NRL's research mission will remain under the laboratory's control.
By consolidating the facility and BOS functions under CNI, we have
provided for a consistent level of facility and BOS support for all
naval installations, while removing NRL's administrative burden
associated with managing functions not essential to their mission. This
will allow the NRL staff and leadership to more effectively focus on
their primary functions of research and development.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Saxby Chambliss

NAVY END STRENGTH

2. Senator Chambliss. I noted with some concern the Navy's
reduction of 1,900 Navy personnel in the fiscal year 2004 budget
request. The President's fiscal year 2004 supplemental budget request,
which Congress received last week, includes additional funds for Navy
and Marine Corps personnel to pay for personnel maintained on active
duty above current end strength levels and to pay personnel affected by
stop-loss programs. The supplemental budget request contained
additional funds for personnel in all of the Services, however only the
Navy is asking for additional money and decreasing end strength at the
same time. With missions growing and length of deployments increasing,
how will the Navy maintain a sustainable OPTEMPO while reducing end
strength?
Secretary England. Navy's strength requirements continue to be
refined through an ongoing process that factors current and future
manning requirements of our ships, squadrons, units, and associated
supporting functional areas, in the context of Global Force Presence
requirements.
Navy exceeded the fiscal year 2003-budgeted end strength of 375,700
by approximately 7,000 as of 30 September 2004. Since Navy had not
anticipated retaining these individuals into fiscal year 2004, funds
necessary to pay the costs associated with them were not included in
the fiscal year 2004 budget request. The Navy requested additional
funding in the fiscal year 2004 supplemental to cover the costs
associated with having those additional personnel on board in fiscal
year 2004.

SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND CLIMATE AT THE NAVAL ACADEMY

3. Senator Chambliss. Yesterday former Congresswoman Tillie Fowler
released her ``Report of the Panel to Review Sexual Misconduct
Allegations at the Air Force Academy.'' Among their findings, the panel
noted that the highest levels of Air Force leadership had known of
serious sexual misconduct problems at the Academy since at least 1993
but failed to take effective action. This is an issue that I and every
member of this committee take extremely seriously. The Air Force is the
only Service that has to deal with this issue publicly. However, I
think all of us would agree that no Service Academy is immune to these
problems and every academy has cultural and discipline issues that need
to be addressed and monitored. As you have watched this story unfold,
what have you learned about what can be done proactively to ensure
these kinds of problems don't develop, and what is the proper role of
leadership at your level in creating the proper climate and
accountability within the Navy so that people below you get the right
messages about the kind of behavior expected of our current and future
military officers?
Secretary England. We are taking action in three areas to prevent
sexual harassment and sexual assault. First, I articulated my
expectation that sexual harassment and sexual assault are not tolerated
within the Department of the Navy. This is true in every Navy and
Marine command as well as at the Naval Academy, and every commander
must foster a command climate that meets this expectation. Early in my
tenure, I met with the Chief of Naval Operations and the
superintendent, and we began a review of Naval Academy policies in
light of the Fowler Panel recommendations. Both the Chief of Naval
Operations and the superintendent are keenly aware of the importance of
this issue, and the superintendent personally emphasizes to the brigade
of midshipmen the high standards of personal conduct that apply to Navy
and Marine officers and midshipmen.
Second, I will ensure that the Department's programs and policies
allow problems to be addressed comprehensively and quickly if a problem
occurs. The Naval Academy Sexual Assault Victim Intervention (SAVI)
program is based on Department-wide policies but contains unique
aspects tailored to the Naval Academy environment. We are reviewing the
Naval Academy's SAVI program with the assistance of The Honorable
Tillie Fowler, and will look closely at the policies, procedures, and
processes involved. To the greatest extent possible we must ensure that
victims feel free to report incidents of sexual assault, that they
receive the necessary assistance, that these incidents are fully
investigated, and that offenders are held accountable. The Fowler Panel
Report notes that perhaps the most important challenge is to strike the
right balance between providing the option of victim confidentiality
and the need to fully investigate sexual assault incidents and hold
offenders accountable.
Third, I will ensure that senior leaders in the Department of the
Navy remain aware of and engaged in issues affecting the Naval Academy.
I concur with the Fowler Panel Report comments in this regard, and have
decided to establish an Executive Steering Group to provide high-level
awareness of issues facing the Academy and a forum for continually
assessing the effectiveness of our policies and procedures.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin

DOD MANAGEMENT

4. Senator Levin. At the beginning of the administration, the
Secretary of Defense indicated that he intended to use the Service
Secretaries to operate in a manner similar to a board of directors to
manage the Pentagon. Does that characterization agree with how things
operated while you served as Secretary of the Navy previously?
Secretary England. Absolutely. While title 10 clearly states that
the Secretary of Defense is ultimately responsible for all matters
related to the Department of Defense (DOD), Secretary Rumsfeld went to
great lengths to ensure departmental decisions were well informed. In
order to do so, Secretary Rumsfeld established several organizations to
ensure his board of directors--my fellow Service Secretaries and the
Under Secretaries of Defense--were involved. Both the Senior Leadership
Review Group (SLRG) and the Senior Executive Council (SEC) were
utilized to provide oversight on those decisions. As part of its
oversight function, the SLRG and SEC reviewed and discussed Department
plans on numerous strategic issues. Our counsel and recommendations
were often the basis on which strategy, plans, and resource allocation
decisions were made.

5. Senator Levin. What understanding do you have about the manner
in which your talents will be utilized in managing the Department of
Defense if you are confirmed as Secretary of the Navy?
Secretary England. The President and Secretary Rumsfeld have asked
me to serve as Secretary of the Navy based on my 30 years as a leader
in the defense and technology industries. I see my role as
incorporating current commercial business practices into the business
of defense in order to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the
DOD and the Department of the Navy.
I will work with the Secretary of Defense and the other Service
Secretaries to support the sustained, iterative, and dynamic process of
change within the Department. Specifically, we will work together to
champion transformation--both from a warfighting and business
perspective. After all, we cannot fully transform our warfighting
capabilities without first improving our business practices.
As Secretary of the Navy, I will play a large role in the Senior
Executive Council (SEC) and the Senior Leadership Review Group (SLRG),
which work much like a board of directors, to systematically implement
improved management techniques such as activity-based costing, and
comprehensive performance measures and metrics to improve processes
that improve products. The initiatives developed from the SEC and SLRG
will enable us to increase our combat capabilities with the expectation
that we become more efficient, agile, flexible, and reliable at a
reduced cost of doing business.
Secretary Rumsfeld expects me, along with my fellow Service
Secretaries, to energize efforts to transform DOD practices in order to
free the resources necessary for improved combat capability. I will not
let him down. I am committed to working with the Department of Defense
leadership to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the
Department in order to increase combat capability, improve support to
our people, accelerate the insertion of advanced technologies, and
implement better business practices.

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY WORKFORCE

6. Senator Levin. The Director of Defense Research and Engineering
recently expressed concerns over the effect that the proposed National
Security Personnel System (NSPS) and Best Practices Initiatives would
have on the Department's laboratory and test center workforce. He
recommended that the NSPS proposal be modified to permit laboratory
directors to retain the authorities they currently have under existing
congressionally authorized personnel demonstrations. He also
recommended that the proposed Best Practices Initiative Federal
Register announcement be delayed until it can be revised to better
support laboratory and test center missions. Similar concerns have been
raised by the Director of the Naval Research Laboratory and directors
of some of the Navy's technical centers, who are currently successfully
managing existing personnel demonstration programs. What actions do you
plan to take to support these directors in their attempts to retain
control over the Navy's scientific and technical workforce?
Secretary England. The statute authorizing the NSPS purposefully
excluded the Office of Naval Research, the Naval Research Laboratory,
the Naval Sea Systems Command Centers, and the other defense research
centers. The law states that NSPS shall not apply to these laboratories
before 1 October 2008, and shall apply on or after October 1, 2008,
only to the extent that the Secretary of Defense determines that the
flexibilities NSPS provides are greater than the flexibilities
currently provided to the labs.
The directors of the naval research and technical centers will
retain current flexibilities available under their separate personnel
demonstrations, as authorized by the Secretary of Defense. The current
flexibilities exist because Congress provided the Secretary of Defense
authority to conduct personnel demonstration projects in section 342 of
the National Defense Authorization Act for 1995, as amended by section
1114 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2001. The authority
allowed the Secretary of Defense to conduct experiments with new and
different personnel management concepts to determine whether such
changes in personnel policy or procedures would result in improved
Federal personnel management.
In March 2002, the DOD established a Human Resources Best Practices
Task Force to review all demonstration projects, to include several
outside of DOD, in order to compile best practices that show promise in
terms of DOD's civilian human resources strategy. The best practices
identified by the Task Force were reviewed, revised, and approved by a
steering group of senior leaders, with the intention of broadly
applying the results. These results were included in a Federal Register
announcement in April 2003. The practices are intended to provide for a
common architecture of personnel management within the Defense
Department science and technology community. These have not yet been
implemented.
It is my intention to support the Secretary of Defense in pursuing
the ultimate objectives of the NSPS and the National Defense
Authorization Acts of 1995 and 2001; that being the identification and
implementation of a civilian personnel management system that best
recruits, manages, and maintains a healthy scientific and technical
workforce.

7. Senator Levin. Do you support a delay in the release of the
final Lab Demo Best Practices Federal Register so that it can be
modified to better meet the concerns of the Navy's labs and technical
centers?
Secretary England. Congress provided the Secretary of Defense
authority to conduct personnel demonstration projects in section 342 of
the National Defense Authorization Act for 1995, as amended by section
1114 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2001. These
demonstrations are experimenting with new and different personnel
management concepts to determine whether such changes in personnel
policy or procedures would result in improved Federal personnel
management. The experiments are occurring in the eight defense science
and technology centers.
The objective of these demonstrations is to examine the results and
lessons to determine the best civilian personnel management policy. In
March 2002, the DOD established a Human Resources Best Practices Task
Force to review all demonstration projects, to include several outside
of DOD, in order to compile best practices that show promise in terms
of DOD's civilian human resources strategy. The best practices
identified by the Task Force were reviewed, revised, and approved by a
steering group of senior leaders, with the intention of broadly
applying the results. These results were included in a Federal Register
announcement in April 2003. The practices are intended to provide for a
common architecture of personnel management within the Defense
Department science and technology community. These have not yet been
implemented.
It is my intention to support the Secretary of Defense in pursuing
the objectives of the National Defense Authorization Acts of 1995 and
2001; that being the identification and implementation of a civilian
personnel management system that best recruits, manages, and maintains
a healthy scientific and technical workforce. The concerns of the naval
research and technical centers are being addressed in this process.

8. Senator Levin. Do you support an aggressive implementation of
existing congressional authorities, possibly to include the
establishment of a separate personnel system for laboratories and
technical centers?
Secretary England. Congress provided the Secretary of Defense
authority to conduct personnel demonstration projects in section 342 of
the National Defense Authorization Act for 1995, as amended by section
1114 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2001. The authority
allows the Secretary to experiment with new and different personnel
management concepts to determine if such changes in personnel policy or
procedures would result in improved Federal personnel management across
the DOD.
In March 2002, DOD established a Human Resources Best Practices
Task Force to review all demonstration projects, to include several
outside of DOD, in order to compile best practices that show promise in
terms of DOD's civilian human resources strategy. The best practices
identified by the Task Force were reviewed, revised, and approved by a
steering group of senior leaders, with the intention of broadly
applying the results. These practices are intended to provide for a
common architecture of personnel management within DOD's science and
technology community. They have not yet been implemented.
Congress recently authorized DOD to implement the NSPS; also aimed
at determining a new civilian personnel management system for DOD. This
statute purposefully excluded the naval science and technology centers
until 1 October 2008, and only applies the NSPS to the extent that the
Secretary of Defense determines the flexibilities NSPS provides are
greater than the flexibilities currently provided to the labs.
The Department will consider both initiatives in establishing an
appropriate personnel management system. It is my intention to support
the Secretary of Defense in pursuing the ultimate objective of the NSPS
and the National Defense Authorization Acts of 1995 and 2001; that
being the identification and implementation of a civilian personnel
management system that best recruits, manages, and maintains a healthy
scientific and technical workforce.
______

[The nomination reference of Gordon R. England follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
September 3, 2003.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
Gordon England, of Texas, to be Secretary of the Navy.
(Reappointment)
______

[The biographical sketch of Gordon R. England, which was
transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was
referred, follows:]
Biographical Sketch of Hon. Gordon R. England
Gordon England was confirmed as the first Deputy Secretary in the
U.S. Department of Homeland Security on January 30, 2003. The
Department of Homeland Security was established on January 24, 2003, to
integrate 22 different agencies with a common mission to protect the
American people.
Previously, Secretary England served as the 72nd Secretary of the
Navy from May 24, 2001, until confirmation as Deputy Secretary. As
Secretary of the Navy, Mr. England was responsible for an annual budget
in excess of $110 billion and over 800,000 personnel.
Mr. England served as executive vice president of General Dynamics
Corporation from 1997 until 2001 and was responsible for two major
sectors of the corporation: Information Systems and International.
Previously, he served as executive vice president of the Combat Systems
Group, president of General Dynamics Forth Worth aircraft company
(later Lockheed), president of General Dynamics Land Systems Company
and as the principal of a mergers and acquisition consulting company.
A native of Baltimore, Mr. England graduated from the University of
Maryland in 1961 with a bachelor's degree in electrical engineering. In
1975 he earned a master's degree in business administration from the
M.J. Neeley School of Business at Texas Christian University and is a
member of various honorary societies: Beta Gamma Sigma (business),
Omicron Delta Kappa (leadership) and Eta Kappa Nu (engineering).
Mr. England has been actively involved in a variety of civic,
charitable, and government organizations, including serving as a city
councilman; Vice Chair, Board of Goodwill, International; the USO's
Board of Governors; the Defense Science Board; the Board of Visitors at
Texas Christian University; and many others.
He has been recognized for numerous professional and service
contributions from multiple organizations such as Distinguished Alumnus
Award from the University of Maryland; the Department of Defense
Distinguished Public Service Award; the Silver Beaver Award from the
Boy Scouts of America; the Silver Knight of Management Award from the
National Management Association; the Henry M. Jackson Award and the
IEEE Centennial Award.
______

September 5, 2003.
Hon. John Warner, Chairman,
Committee on Armed Services,
United States Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: This letter provides information on my financial
and other interests for your consideration in connection with my
nomination for the position of Secretary of the Navy. It supplements
Standard Form 278, ``Executive Personnel Financial Disclosure Report,''
which has already been provided to the committee and which summarizes
my financial interests.
To the best of my knowledge, none of the financial interests listed
on my Standard Form 278 will create any conflict of interest in the
execution of my new governmental responsibilities. Additionally, I have
no other interests or liabilities in any amount with any firm or
organization that is a Department of Defense contractor.
During my term of office, neither I nor any member of my immediate
family will invest in any organization identified as a DOD contractor
or any other entity that would create a conflict of interest with my
government duties.
I do not have any present employment arrangements with any entity
other than the Department of Defense and have no formal or informal
understandings concerning any further employment with any entity. If
confirmed, I am committed to serve in this position at the pleasure of
the President throughout his term of office.
I have never been arrested or charged with any criminal offenses
other than minor traffic violations. I have never been party to any
civil litigation. To the best of my knowledge, there have never been
any lawsuits filed against any agency of the Federal Government or
corporate entity with which I have been associated reflecting adversely
on the work I have done at such agency or corporation. I am aware of no
incidents reflecting adversely upon my suitability to serve in the
position for which I have been nominated.
To the best of my knowledge, I am not presently the subject of any
governmental inquiry or investigation.
I am a member of certain organizations and professional societies,
which are either listed below or have been previously provided to the
committee. None of these should pose any conflict of interest with
regard to my governmental responsibilities. I trust that the foregoing
information will be satisfactory to the committee.
Sincerely,
Gordon R. England.

UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Gordon Richard England.

2. Position to which nominated:
Secretary of the Navy.

3. Date of nomination:
September 3, 2003.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
September 15, 1937; Baltimore, Maryland.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Dorothy Marie Hennlein.

7. Names and ages of children:
Gordon England, Jr.; age 40.
Margaret Kristen Rankin; age 38.
Marisa Claire Walpert; age 31.

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions,
dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.
Graduate, Mount St. Joseph's High School, Baltimore, Maryland, June
1955.
Graduate, Univ. of Maryland, College Park, Maryland, BSEE, June
1961.
Graduate, Texas Christian University, Fort Worth, Texas, MBA, May
1975.

9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the
last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of
job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
President and General Manager, General Dynamics Fort Worth Company,
Fort Worth, Texas, July 1991 to March 1993.
President and General Management, Lockheed Fort Worth Company (GDFW
prior to sale to Lockheed), March 1993 to march 1995.
Self employed President, GRE Consultants, Inc., Fort Worth, Texas,
March 1994 to March 1997.
Executive Vice President, General Dynamics Corporation, Falls
Church, Virginia, March 1997 to May 2001.
Secretary of the Navy, Department of the Navy, Washington, DC, May
2001 to January 2003.
Deputy Secretary, Department of Homeland Security, Washington, DC,
January 2003 to present.

10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
or local governments, other than those listed above.
Benbrook Texas City Council and mayor pro tem, 1982-1986, no party
affiliation.
Member of the Defense Science Board from 1991 to 1996.
Member of the Defense Science Board Acquisition Subpanel from 1997
to 1998.
Member of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Globalization and
Security from 1998 to 1999.
National Research Council, Vice Chairman of Study on the Future of
U.S. Aerospace Infrastructure, 2000-2001.

12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
Member, Omicron Delta Kappa (leadership).
Member, Beta Gamma Sigma (business).
Member, Eta Kappa Nu (engineering).
Lifetime member, Navy League of the United States (Mr. and Mrs.
England).

Personal Contributions
2003 - Kay Granger Re-election - $2,000.
2002 - Good Government Fund (Senator Kay Bailey Hutchinson,
sponsor) - $5,000.
2002 - Congressman Joe Barton Committee - $2,000
2001 - Kay Granger Re-Election Campaign Event, April 11, 2001 -
$1,000
2000 - Johnson for Congress 2000 - $1,000
2000 - Texas Freedom Fund - $1,000
2000 - Friends of Max Cleland - $1,000
2000 - Tiahrt for Congress - $1,000
2000 - Re-Election Campaign of Cong. Chet Edwards - $1,000
2000 - Common Sense, Common Solutions PAC - $500
2000 - Lazio 2000 - $2,000
2000 - RNC Victory 2000 - $2,000
2000 - Texas Freedom Fund PAC, Inc. - $1,000
2000 - Kay Granger Campaign Fund - $1,000
2000 - Kay Granger Campaign Fund - $1,000 (by Dorothy H. England)
1999 - George Bush for President Exploratory Committee - $1,000
1999 - Feinstein 2000 - $1,000
1999 - Texas Freedom PAC - $1,000
1999 - Murtha for Congress - $1,000
1999 - Kay Granger for Congress - $1,000
1999 - Joe Barton for Congress - $1,000
1999 - Kay Granger Campaign Fund - $1,000
1999 - Re-Election Campaign of Cong. Todd Tiahrt - $1,000
1998 - Snowe for U.S. Senate - $1,000
1998 - Leahy for U.S. Senate - $1,000
1998 - Governor Bush Committee - $500
1998 - Murtha for Congress - $500
1998 - 6th District Republican Association - $1,000
1998 - National Republican Congressional Committee Operation
Breakout - $10,000

14. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, military medals, and any other special
recognitions for outstanding service or achievements.
Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service
Department of the Air Force Exceptional Public Service Award
Department of the Army Exceptional Public Service Award
University of Maryland 2002 Distinguished Graduate Award
Henry Jackson Award for Public Service
Silver Knight of Management Award National Management Association
Silver Award National Defense Industrial Association
Selected to Aviation Heritage Hall of Fame
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineering Centennial
awardee

15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of
books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have
written.
Boston Herald - U.S.S. Constitution a reminder of our heroes, July
4, 2002
Washington Times - Chief Executive Transformed - September 10, 2002
Naval Institute Proceedings - One Team - One Fight - November/
December 2002
Sea Power Magazine - Our Mission is Clear - December 2001

17. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to appear and testify before any duly constituted
committee of the Senate?
Yes.
______

[The nomination of Gordon R. England was reported to the
Senate by Chairman Warner on September 25, 2003, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on September 26, 2003.]

NOMINATION OF MICHAEL W. WYNNE TO BE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY, AND LOGISTICS

----------

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 18, 2003

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 4:12 p.m. in room
SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator John Warner
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Warner, McCain, Inhofe,
Allard, Sessions, Chambliss, Levin, Akaka, and Clinton.
Committee staff members present: Judith A. Ansley, staff
director, and Gabriella Eisen, nominations clerk.
Majority staff members present: Brian R. Green,
professional staff member; William C. Greenwalt, professional
staff member; Carolyn M. Hanna, professional staff member;
Ambrose R. Hock, professional staff member; Gregory T. Kiley,
professional staff member; Patricia L. Lewis, professional
staff member; and Thomas L. MacKenzie, professional staff
member.
Minority staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes,
Democratic staff director; Madelyn R. Creedon, minority
counsel; Creighton Greene, professional staff member; Peter K.
Levine, minority counsel; and Arun A. Seraphin, professional
staff member.
Staff assistant present: Michael N. Berger.
Committee members assistants present: Christopher J. Paul,
assistant to Senator McCain; John A. Bonsell, assistant to
Senator Inhofe; Jayson Roehl, assistant to Senator Allard; Arch
Galloway II, assistant to Senator Sessions; Clyde A. Taylor IV,
assistant to Senator Chambliss; Christine O. Hill, assistant to
Senator Dole; Mieke Y. Eoyang, assistant to Senator Kennedy;
Davelyn Noelani Kalipi, assistant to Senator Akaka; William K.
Sutey, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Rashid Hallaway,
assistant to Senator Bayh; and Andrew Shapiro, assistant to
Senator Clinton.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Warner. The committee will now come to order.
We're very pleased to have before the committee this
afternoon Michael W. Wynne, nominee to be the Under Secretary
of Defense for Acquisitions.
Mr. Wynne has been serving as the acting Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics since May of
this year following the departure of Mr. Aldridge, and we
commend him for his service to our country.
How many times have you been up here, Secretary Wynne?
Mr. Wynne. Sir, I've been here about four times.
Chairman Warner. I mean Pete Aldridge, he was----
Mr. Wynne. He was confirmed four times.
Chairman Warner. Four times.
Mr. Wynne. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. Remarkable career.
Mr. Wynne. What a remarkable career.
Chairman Warner. This position, for which the President has
nominated you, is one of the most important in your
department--you know that well. It was established by Congress
to implement a recommendation of the 1986 David Packard
Commission, to place a senior official in charge of defense
acquisition to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of
acquisition management.
I had the privilege of serving in the department as Navy
Secretary under David Packard. He was a remarkable man. Did you
get to know him?
Mr. Wynne. Sir, I met Mr. Packard a couple of times, and he
is very impressive.
Chairman Warner. He was an impressive man.
As the senior acquisition official of the Department of
Defense (DOD), the Under Secretary is responsible for making
critical decisions on major defense acquisition programs, such
as the Joint Strike Fighter, the F-22, the Virginia-class
submarine and the future combat system.
This is not an easy job; it's a very challenging one. Every
sailor, soldier, airman, and marine depends upon your service
and your decisionmaking to ensure that their equipment is the
best that can be obtained by the American taxpayers.
I trust, Mr. Wynne, that if confirmed, you will be a hard
worker to meet this important objective. You certainly have
been one in the years that you've been in the department here
recently.
We welcome you and your family and thank you for the
willingness to serve again. Would you kindly introduce your
family at this time?
Mr. Wynne. Thank you very much, Senator, I certainly will.
This is my wife, Barbara, sitting to my right, and my
brother, Peter, who has traveled here from Texas to see what
goes on here in the Senate----
Chairman Warner. We'll not disappoint him.
The family support, as I said, over the many years I've
been privileged to be here, it's absolutely essential to the
discharge of the functions of this office and the other senior
offices, and indeed, throughout the Department of Defense. So
we thank your family for joining you in this challenging
assignment.
Your previous confirmation hearing took place on June 22,
2001. You were sworn in your current job on July 12 of that
year.
Mr. Wynne is a graduate of the United States Military
Academy at West Point and served for 7 years on active duty in
the Air Force. He has an impressive record of achievement in
industry, retiring as a senior vice president from General
Dynamics, with responsibility for international development and
strategy.
During the course of his career at General Dynamics he was
instrumental in the development of various complex and vital
programs, including the F-16, the Abrams battle tank, and
space-launched vehicles, including the Atlas and the Centaur.
He has a wealth of experience and accomplishment, both in
government and the private sector.
You're eminently qualified for this position, and I commend
the President for elevating you to this important post.
Senator Levin will give his statement as soon as he comes,
but, in the meantime, the committee has asked our witness to
answer a series of advance policy questions; he's responded to
those questions and, without objection, I'll make the questions
and the responses part of today's record.
There are also standard questions that the chair of this
committee, throughout the many years, has asked every nominee
who's appeared before this committee, and I will now do that.
Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations
governing conflicts of interest?
Mr. Wynne. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken
any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the
confirmation process?
Mr. Wynne. No, Senator.
Chairman Warner. Will you ensure that your staff complies
with deadlines established for requested communications,
including questions for the record in all of our hearings?
Mr. Wynne. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses
and briefers in response to congressional requests?
Mr. Wynne. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. Will those witnesses be protected from any
reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
Mr. Wynne. Yes, sir. Absolutely.
Chairman Warner. Do you agree, when asked before any duly
constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views,
even if those views are somewhat different from the
administration under which you serve?
Mr. Wynne. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. Do you have any remarks that you wish to
make?
Mr. Wynne. Yes.
Chairman Warner. Unless my colleague, the Senator from
Hawaii--do you wish to make any comments on behalf of Senator
Levin before we get started?
Senator Akaka. Yes, Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
I would just like to add my welcome to Mr. Wynne and
Barbara and also Peter. It's good to have the family support
here.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
Colleagues, it is my intention to have our witness address
the committee unless anyone desires to have an opening remark
or two.
Fine.
Mr. Secretary?

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL W. WYNNE TO BE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY, AND LOGISTICS

Mr. Wynne. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman and members of this committee, I am honored to
appear before you today as the President's nominee for the
position of Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics.
I'd like to thank President Bush and Secretary of Defense
Rumsfeld for their confidence in me and for this nomination
that you are considering.
If confirmed, I look forward to leading a crucial part of
the Department of Defense team and to working with Congress,
and especially this committee, on the many challenges facing us
all. I look forward to applying the skills that I have learned
in many differing assignments in the military and career
positions within the defense industry and, of course, during my
last 2 years in the Department of Defense.
I believe that serving on behalf of the American people, in
particular our brave military men and women and the civilians
who support them, is a noble calling, particularly when our men
and women in uniform are in harm's way.
I thank you for acknowledging the presence of my wife,
Barbara, who has stood by me throughout all these assignments,
in addition to raising our wonderful children. I also want to
thank my brother, Peter, who has traveled from his job in Texas
to be with us today; and I also thank my colleagues from the
Department of Defense for being here in support.
While we can point to many successes, both in our recent
combat operations around the world and in the transformation of
our defense establishment, we have urgent work remaining. In
that regard, I applaud this committee for the effort involved
in the recent authorization bill and thank you for your
leadership in providing both authority and guidance to continue
our transformation to the future force.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you for the opportunity to appear
here today and to reintroduce myself and provide you insight
into my approach in the challenging post that I have been
nominated for. If I am confirmed, I look forward to working
with Congress, and especially with this committee.
I'll be happy to answer any questions that you might have.
Chairman Warner. There is a matter on the floor. I wanted
to ascertain whether or not we're going to have voice or
recorded votes so the committee can be aware of this.
I don't know whether I'm going to be able to resolve it, so
I'll start in on my inquiry. We'll each take 6 minutes.
The consolidation of the defense industry, Mr. Secretary,
has been a matter of some concern to many of us throughout the
1990s. It raises a question of the adequacy of competition. You
stated in your responses to the committee's advance policy
questions that in several defense markets it has become more
challenging to obtain that level of competition that is
necessary to get the best cost and the best products.
What do you propose to do, in your present position, to try
and maximize the benefits of competition in light of this
lessening number.
Mr. Wynne. Senator, this is an excellent question because
the consolidation of the industrial base is something that we
worry about every day.
Every year, we survey the defense industry to determine
whether or not we have sufficient health in that industry to
conduct our affairs. Unfortunately, our marketplace has been
going down over the years.
I can recall from my days in college when we had many
prototypes and many companies in play across the Nation, to
perform our products. That has been steadily dwindling down to
where we currently have, if you will, a top 5 and perhaps a top
10, of second-tier vendors.
That having been said, each time that we want to conduct a
competition we find that it is, in fact--adequate if you look
across the broader scope of the world--that we have adequate
competition for the vast majority of our products. In a few
cases, they are limited. What I am doing to try to expand that
is to work with the Small Business Administration to get non-
traditional suppliers to come to the game.
We have been relatively successful at doing that. With your
permission, we will get authorization to use commercial-style
practices and Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) Part 12. We
have some very innovative small businesses coming to our
marketplace. That's the way I think we need to address our
future.
Sometimes our future is not really anymore in major
platforms, which are often associated with the industrial base,
but rather an information technology and communications
technology, and then in our power to fuse sensor data.
Chairman Warner. By coincidence, I just had a visit in my
office earlier this afternoon, by a gentleman, Rich Carroll,
whom I've known for many years. He established a very
successful company which, coincidentally, was just sold to
General Dynamics. He's been a strong advocate of the Small
Business Innovative Research program, and I hope that you know
that program.
Mr. Wynne. Yes, I know that program----
Chairman Warner. We talked a little bit about that program
and hopefully how you'll even strengthen it.
Mr. Wynne. Small Business Innovative Research is a
tremendous area where I have personally taken an interest in
making sure that we can fund these small companies that come to
us with an idea. I am a big supporter of the Small Business
Innovative Research Program.
Chairman Warner. Well, I encourage you to do that, because
he's proven, with his company, that it can be quite successful.
Mr. Wynne. Yes, sir, it can.
Chairman Warner. All the ideas don't reside in the big
companies, even though you're proud of your past in the big
ones.
Mr. Wynne. Yes, sir. I have personally been involved in
several small businesses and recognize the talent that lies
there.
Chairman Warner. Let's turn to the subject of Buy America.
The committees of the House and the Senate have just recently
concluded their rather lengthy conference with that key item.
I'm not here to discuss the pros and cons and exactly what
occurred in that conference. The final result is soon to be a
matter of public law as soon as the President signs it.
But, there was quite a debate over Buy America legislation,
and a number of nations abroad paid close attention to it. I
wonder if you might first comment on how you're going to
implement this new legislation. Then, on what you can do to
reassure the world that we're going to follow, strictly, the
President's philosophy of trying to encourage as free a trade
as we possibly can.
Mr. Wynne. Sir, I greatly appreciate the opportunity to
respond to that because my background--I'm a little bit
biased--I've been working in international programs for many
years, and I will tell you that our international trade has
always been to the benefit of the United States.
I think it's almost 3:1, at this point, where we do $75
billion in exports and I believe we only do about $25 billion
in imports, from the international community.
That having been said, many of the people that I just met
at a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) meeting
recently, were very concerned. I applaud the leadership in this
committee for taking the route that you did and standing firm
on the area of free trade. I do think that it is not
necessarily a good time to tell our coalition partners that we
are not interested in doing trade with them.
Chairman Warner. I concur in what you say, and I certainly
want to commend the administration. They gave to Congress some
very helpful guidance on that point.
Quickly, on the Joint Strike Fighter Program, there had
been some delays associated with weight problems. I go back to
the days of the TFX and the A-12. You know about those
programs.
Mr. Wynne. Yes.
Chairman Warner. I don't believe that, in any way, this
program is likely to follow in that path, but I think it's
important that you give your reassurances now, to the committee
and those following this hearing.
Mr. Wynne. The Joint Strike Fighter Program--I was just
down to the program manager's review to all of our partner
nations, which was an extraordinary meeting. The 9 partner
nations were all there, plus the 2 Services, which may, in some
views, be 11 partner nations.
But, the fact is that that program is going very well. I
was down there to witness the first light of the engine.
They do have, at this stage of the design period, some
concerns with weight. It appears that the short take-off and
landing variant is having the hardest time to control because
of the structural requirements inside the skin of the airplane.
I think, though, that they have a pathway forward. It
appears that the products all work and they fly very well, and
it's an extraordinary airplane. The partners are all looking
forward to participating, and they're all looking forward to a
long, stable program.
Chairman Warner. Well, this committee has had a very active
role, really, in the origination of that program, and its
oversight, so I ask you to kindly keep us informed. We'd prefer
to hear from you rather than reading in the paper either good
news or bad news.
All right?
Mr. Wynne. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. Quickly, to the F-22 Raptor program, what
can you give us in the way of a short report on that?
Mr. Wynne. The F-22 program is coming along slowly but
surely, especially in the software area. We put another tiger
team together to go take a very strong look at how they were
developing the software.
Frankly, we found discipline problems in the way they were
doing that. If confirmed, I intend to continue to nurture that
program and make it a success. I do believe in what started in
the 1980s as a three-pronged program of stealth and speed and
precision.
Chairman Warner. Lastly, the V-22, the Marine Corps
program--bring us up to date on that one.
Mr. Wynne. The V-22 program is also a program that is
coming back strong. Frankly, the test discipline has been
reinstalled, the program manager is on top of it, and this
program is coming back. I cannot give you a full assurance,
because I do believe if lightning strikes that airplane, it's
going to be, ``The troubled V-22 crashes.'' On page 50, it's
going to say, ``The cause was allegedly lightning.''
When a troubled program is in trouble, sir--but I think
it's really going----
Chairman Warner. Right now, you have a very positive
feeling about it?
Mr. Wynne. I really do.
Chairman Warner. All right. Thank you.
I'll have further questions later.
Senator Levin, do you wish to make some opening remarks?
Senator Levin. I just have a very brief opening statement.
Should I either go right into questions as well?
Chairman Warner. Whatever your pleasure.
Senator Levin. Thank you.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN

Senator Levin. Mr. Chairman, let me join in welcoming our
nominee and his family to the committee. We're well acquainted
with him, and he's well-qualified for the position to which he
has been nominated.
The Under Secretary remains the Department's point man on a
wide range of very difficult management issues, including: the
effective management of the Department's major weapons
programs; the revitalization of defense, science, and
technology; the continuation of acquisition reform and
logistics modernization; and the even-handed management of the
public-private competition.
I've been disappointed that this administration appears to
have begun a process of dismantling the position in one area by
stripping the Under Secretary of much of his responsibility for
the acquisition of space systems and missile defense systems,
but nonetheless, it obviously remains an extremely important
position, even with those lesser responsibilities.
The questions that I have for you, Mr. Wynne, are in three
or four areas.
First, relative to contracting in Iraq. This has been a
very major issue for a lot of us and concerns have been raised
for some months now about the lack of competition and the
excessive rates that have been charged on some contracts for
Iraqi reconstruction.
There have been a number of concerns raised--and I've been
part of the group that has raised the concerns--about a sole-
source contract for reconstruction of the Iraqi oil industry
that the department awarded to Halliburton--a so-called
temporary bridge contract.
Now, that temporary bridge contract probably had to be
entered into in order to move very quickly. But the problem is
that temporary has become forever. Time and time again, the
department has pushed back its schedule for replacing this
contract, and it has continued to grow in size by about $100
million for every month of delay.
We were assured that it would be replaced by competitive
contracts many months ago, then 1 month ago, and this month.
Recently, we've been told that none of those assurances have
panned out, by the way. Recently, we've been told that the
Department plans to replace the Halliburton contract with two
separate follow-on contracts, one covering Southern Iraq and
one covering Northern Iraq.
Can you tell us how long it will be before we have fully
competitive contracts in place to replace the Halliburton
bridge contract?
Mr. Wynne. Well, sir, there are two aspects to the
Halliburton contract. First it's the repair of the oil fields,
as you've talked about. That has been competed. The award is in
preparation. I have been assured of that because I did inquire
that it should be by the end of the year that that is replaced.
You were correct. It will be replaced by a north oil company
and a south oil company repair business.
The second part of it is the fuel delivery. They are
actually asking the Defense Energy Service Center of the
Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) to take over three out of four.
The fourth should be replaced by early next spring.
Senator Levin. Now why did the Department decide to have
two contractors with exclusive territories rather than
requiring them to compete against each other?
Mr. Wynne. What we had, Senator, was two contractors with
common capabilities so that we could compete them for follow-on
tasks within their scope of record. What we wanted to have is
one that was generally associated with the north oil company
and one that was generally associated with the south oil
company to build the infrastructure and to bring forward teams
of capability such that we could compete in other areas of that
pipeline.
Senator Levin. What steps will you be taking to ensure that
the contracts awarded with money made available under the
recently enacted Iraq Supplemental Appropriation Act are
entered into on a basis of full and open competition?
Mr. Wynne. Sir, we intend to comply with the law as
written. I realize there is a concern on the follow-on. But in
fact, I have detailed my own director of contracts and
services, have augmented her staff to write the proper scopes
to do a proper competition on all of that money that has been
authorized.
Senator Levin. In the missile defense area--following the
President's decision to deploy a national missile defense in
September of next year, the Pentagon revealed that it had
canceled 9 of the 20 national missile defense intercept tests
planned from 2003 to 2007. As a result, there are only two
intercept tests now planned between now and the deployment
date. The targets used in these tests are not going to be
realistic. The radar needed for the system will not be properly
tested at all.
In the fiscal year 2004 Defense Authorization Bill, there
is $100 million to conduct an additional intercept test and for
other risk reduction activities. I understand there is already
a test planned, the so-called IFT 16A, which currently is not
an intercept test, but which could easily be converted into an
intercept test with this extra funding. Will you use that
funding for an additional intercept test to ensure that we have
as much testing as possible prior to deployment?
Mr. Wynne. Sir, I have a two-part answer to that. First, we
are trying to involve the Director of Operational Test and
Evaluation in a maximum sense to assure ourselves that we're
going forward, both on a sub-system basis and on a system basis
prior to our assessment of capabilities and deployment.
I don't know how the $100 million is planned to be
assessed. But I will say that I know that there is great
concern that we make sure that we have the kind of system that
the American taxpayers paid for. I meet with the missile
defense officials biweekly to ensure that.
Senator Levin. So, you will be ensuring that the Department
of Operational Test and Evaluation has a strong and clear role
in the missile defense programs during the development?
Mr. Wynne. They have over 100 people involved today, sir.
We will ensure that they will have a strong presence
throughout.
Senator Levin. Thank you. My time is up. Thank you so much.
Again, congratulations to you.
Chairman Warner. Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. Mr. Wynne, you are aware of the
authorization bill signed by the President last Friday?
Mr. Wynne. Yes, sir.
Senator McCain. Do you intend to implement the
authorization bill's section 135, which concerns Boeing
aircraft under one contract or two?
Mr. Wynne. Sir, I read your letter and the colloquy that
was associated with it. I want to again thank this committee
for coming to a compromise. I read it very carefully. It seems
to me it's going to be very hard to implement under one
contract. But I know the Department is currently reviewing it,
and there are some smarter people than me that may bring some
innovative approach forward.
Senator McCain. When do you expect to reach a decision?
Mr. Wynne. I would say, sir, that the balancing of
resources against the needs--but by the end of the year, I
think we will be close to a decision on that.
Senator McCain. Will you renegotiate the purchase price of
$131 million per tanker?
Mr. Wynne. I cannot assure you that that will be
renegotiated, but what I can say is it's certainly going to be
reevaluated because of the probable change in some of the
scheduling.
Senator McCain. Will you pay on delivery or at the time of
order?
Mr. Wynne. At the incremental funding release that was
allowed, sir, I believe it requires payment on time of order.
Senator McCain. Do you intend to structure the finance and
acquisition or construction of tankers around a special purpose
entity?
Mr. Wynne. I think the first 20 airplanes will probably
continue to be a special purpose entity in the sense that they
will continue to be leased as to the terms of the original
contract.
Senator McCain. You testified before this committee on the
Boeing tanker deal on September 4. At the time, we discussed a
June 23, 2003, e-mail. In this e-mail, a Boeing executive named
Tom Soins described a meeting he had with Air Force Secretary
Roche where Secretary Roche apparently expressed serious
concern about a letter from the Director of Program Analysis
and Evaluation (PA&E) at the Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD), Ken Krieg. I have a copy of that if you'd like for me to
revisit it.
It basically says, ``Our analysis shows--fails to meet the
requirement of Office of Management and Budget (OMB) circular
A-11 because of a lease less than 90 percent of the--our
calculations show that lease payments are more than 93 percent,
exceeding the requirements of the definition and that was
arguing against it.''
Their director, Krieg, as I say, concluded that the
original Boeing proposal failed two OMB accounting rules and,
therefore, violated authorizing legislation. According to the
e-mail, Secretary Roche--and I quote the e-mail, asks, ``Boeing
to put pressure on you to convince PA&E to write a new letter
essentially undoing the first letter.''
The e-mail also indicated that he was not going to answer:
``We'd get in trouble no matter how he answered. Secretary
Roche was going to talk to Wolfowitz tomorrow.'' Did you
interact with Boeing in any way regarding PA&E being a problem?
Mr. Wynne. No, sir. There was no pressure put on me,
especially by Boeing.
Senator McCain. Did you interact with Boeing in any way
regarding PA&E being a problem?
Mr. Wynne. No, sir.
Senator McCain. What concerns about PA&E did Secretary
Roche convey to you at this time?
Mr. Wynne. Secretary Roche only called to tell me that Ken
Krieg had issued the letter, and that he was purportedly
unhappy.
Senator McCain. That who was unhappy?
Mr. Wynne. Secretary Roche.
Senator McCain. He told you that they had issued the letter
and Secretary Roche was unhappy?
Mr. Wynne. Right.
Senator McCain. But he asked you to take no----
Mr. Wynne. He did not ask me to take an action, sir.
Senator McCain. No, but according to his e-mail, he asked
Boeing to put pressure on you. That's according to the e-mail.
That's not according to me.
Mr. Wynne. Very interesting.
Senator McCain. Do you recall anyone ever putting any kind
of pressure on you?
Mr. Wynne. No, sir.
Senator McCain. Well, another e-mail, which we didn't
describe last time, indicates that Secretary Roche suggests to
Boeing that it direct its efforts to OSD in order to undercut
PA&E. A December 17, 2002, e-mail from Boeing executive Andy
Ellis to Rudy DeLeon describe, ``some quick notes from Jim
Albaugh's meetings today.'' It instructs, ``Please don't
redistribute this e-mail.''
Under an entry labeled, ``Meeting with Secretary Roche,''
the e-mail described, ``PA&E now a problem on tankers.
Arguments include price, 767 footprint, and prospects for used
767s. Boeing needs to do more on behalf of tankers in OSD. PA&E
working to convince Aldridge to delay reengine while doing an
analysis of alternatives.''
``We should vector Hill support for tankers at Aldridge.
Said he's very comfortable with the price Air Force has on
tankers and very comfortable with the overall deal. It's the
right time to do this deal. He's waiting until early January to
push on OMB. Wants to deal with the next Congress, not the
current. Boeing needed to work White House and especially
OSD.''
Do you know anything about that?
Mr. Wynne. No, sir. This is all new news to me.
Senator McCain. All right. You are going to conduct an
analysis of alternatives (AOA)?
Mr. Wynne. Sir, I believe an analysis of alternatives----
Senator McCain. That's according to the language of the
authorization.
Mr. Wynne. Yes, it's underway.
Senator McCain. How long will that take?
Mr. Wynne. I understand that it's also scheduled for mid to
late December.
Senator McCain. You are going to do a corrosion study?
Mr. Wynne. That one I will say that----
Senator McCain. That's required by the law, too.
Mr. Wynne. I believe it is required by the law.
Senator McCain. Well, there are a lot of other things that
are so unsavory about this tanker deal. But just a vignette,
Mr. Chairman, that you and the ranking member are aware of. Our
staff went down to Tinker Air Force Base, and Tinker gave a
briefing. The staff asked for the briefing documents. They
couldn't find them. They said Mr. Winslow's on temporary duty.
We are unable to track him down. The colonel who briefed is
also off base on an appointment.
Well, anyway, to make a long story short, after going back
and forth and back and forth, they received these documents,
and they were doctored. They were doctored documents from those
that were briefed. They added information at the top that was
not in the briefing for the staff, and they deleted information
at the bottom, which indicated that there was not a corrosion
problem at Tinker Air Force Base. How do you justify this kind
of behavior, Mr. Wynne?
Mr. Wynne. Well, sir, I cannot justify that kind of
behavior.
Senator McCain. These are facts. I'll be glad to have our
staff testify.
Mr. Wynne. The facts were shared with your staff, sir. I
have no understanding of why they would be doctored en route to
delivery.
Senator McCain. I mean, I could show you--well, I guess I
don't want to take up the committee's time.
I asked you for documents related to the tanker deal e-
mails, et cetera. I received an answer from Mr. Wolfowitz that
those would not be forthcoming. Is that the case?
Mr. Wynne. I very much appreciate the opportunity to
respond to that question. You know the leadership that's been
provided by this committee has been fabulous in concluding the
tanker compromise. I am pleased the debate was robust and fact-
driven. The Department provided access to over 200 documents as
well as provided testimony to fulfill the need for information
regarding the Department's decision to procure tankers. The
compromise forged by this committee stands as a testament to
them.
There is no doubt that you desire information, and I want
to be responsive to your need. That having been said, the
position of the Department, as expressed by Secretary
Wolfowitz, is to preserve in the Department the pre-decisional
debate so vital to informed decisionmaking while still
providing a full and open account of the Department's decision
to take action. I really hope that this committee will allow
that debate, so vital to informed decisionmaking, to continue.
Senator McCain. Well, my time has expired, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Take another minute or 2.
Senator McCain. When we got these e-mails from Boeing, Mr.
Wynne, which reflect the most incestuous, unsavory relationship
that I have ever seen--people called by their first name saying
you have to pressure this guy, you have to do this, we can't do
an AOA. All of that I got from Boeing.
It peaks one's curiosity about what went on in OSD given
the incestuousness of the relationship between Boeing and OSD.
For me to be told that we have been given all information
that's relevant simply strains credulity to a degree that I
can't accept.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. The committee will continue to examine the
basis on which the Department feels it cannot provide these
documents. I judge from your testimony that that
decisionmaking, understandably, is--as we say, above your pay
grade with the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary, but Senator
McCain has raised a very legitimate question. You recall when I
asked you the standard questions, including ``Will you provide
witnesses and briefers in response to congressional requests?''
That incorporates by reference documents. You acknowledged yes.
The same questions were put to Secretary Wolfowitz, and the
committee put the same questions to Secretary Rumsfeld. I
happened to be chairman at the time of his confirmation. So I
find that the proffer of this testimony, while it's the best
this witness understands, it is inconsistent with the way we
conduct the business of this committee. We will continue.
I might add that you said that you examined the colloquy,
in the singular. There were two colloquies by my able colleague
here, one between myself and Senator McCain and another between
the Senator from Illinois is my recollection.
Senator McCain. Mr. Chairman, the Budget Committee.
Senator Levin. I believe it was Senator Nickles.
Chairman Warner. We feel very strongly on this matter. I
commend Senator McCain. You said twice, the ``robust debate.''
This is the Senator that got the ``robust debate'' started.
Some of us may have had a role as it has gone along. But the
outcome, we feel, is clearly embraced in the conference report
which will become statutory law in the very near future.
This committee intends to have very frequent and close
oversight of this contract--this acquisition process by
whatever means. As you indicate, that decision hasn't been made
yet, but it seems to me the statute is clear on that.
Senator McCain. Mr. Chairman, could I interrupt just for a
second?
Chairman Warner. Yes.
Senator McCain. The reason why I bring up this issue of
doctored documents is the only way that this committee can make
informed decisions is through accurate information. We
dispatched the staff. Actually, you and Senator Levin
dispatched the staff to check on the corrosion problems at
Tinker Air Force Base. They were given certain information.
That information was surprising to them, because it showed very
little problems with corrosion.
So after repeated requests, doctored information was sent
back with information on the top which gave a different version
and information deleted at the bottom that indicated that the
corrosion problem was not serious.
Mr. Chairman, if we're going to get doctored information
from the United States Air Force, how in the world can we make
informed decisions? I think there ought to be an investigation
as to why this committee was given doctored documents which
differed radically from the information that they received in a
briefing which was requested. I don't see how we can do
business if we have a branch of our service that doctors
information and then provides it to us.
Chairman Warner. I indicated earlier that this matter is
going to be fully examined by the committee in due course.
I thank the Senator.
Senator Levin. Would the chairman yield on that for just
one point?
Chairman Warner. Yes.
Senator Levin. I am someone who very much favored the
compromise which was reached. I applauded the chairman for his
efforts and supported those efforts. I applauded Senator McCain
for the position that he's taken here, which is a position that
is heartfelt and felt very strongly by Senator McCain.
This question of vacuums, however, is related, but it's an
issue which we have to deal with regardless of what one's
opinion is on the tanker deal. I mean, we cannot be in a
position where the Defense Department is telling us that there
is some internal document which is not available to this
committee.
Unless the Department is asserting a privilege, the Senate
has a right to those documents. I don't know what is in those
documents. I'm talking about the principle here. So I would
suggest, Mr. Chairman--and I know you've expressed some real
sensitivity about this in pursuing it, that you're determined
to continue the inquiry here.
But I will support the chairman in any effort made to get
any document that we are entitled to. We're entitled to those
documents. We're also entitled to an explanation on the changes
in the documents which were submitted to us that Senator McCain
mentioned. But I will support any effort to get any documents
that we're entitled to in the absence of a claim of executive
privilege.
The way you read that explanation there, it didn't sound
like there was a claim of executive privilege. It just sounded
like, well, we want to keep our discussions confidential.
That's all well and good as a desire, but that is not an
acceptable answer to the United States Senate. Maybe it should
be. Maybe we ought to create a new executive privilege for
conversations that occur inside the executive branch.
But there is no such executive privilege. No Senators worth
their salt will ever accept such an executive privilege unless
there is a basis such a privilege. Unless someone wants to
assert it, I think we're entitled to it. I will support any
effort made to obtain those documents, as well as to get an
explanation of the changes that apparently have been made in
those graphs or charts or exhibits that were presented to our
staff.
Chairman Warner. The chair notes the presence in the
hearing room of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Legislative Affairs. We will take it up with him in due course.
Thank you very much, Senator McCain.
Senator Akaka.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I would
like to continue on the issue of corrosion. The National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 included a
provision, as mentioned by Senator McCain, requiring the
Secretary of Defense to designate a senior official or
organization to coordinate and oversee DOD's efforts to prevent
and mitigate corrosion. In your position as Deputy Under
Secretary, you were designated as the senior official
responsible for corrosion.
So, what are your views on efforts to prevent and mitigate
the corrosion of military equipment and facilities?
Mr. Wynne. First of all, I'd like to compliment the
creative nature of your introduction of that into your bill. In
conversation with your staff, especially as the entire issue
that welled up, if you will, concerned corrosion. With your
leadership, I was designated the corrosion official. We have
made tremendous strides in coordinating and centralizing the
information flow and the wherewithal as to how we, not only
stop corrosion, but stop its, if you will, silent tax on the
taxpayers of this country.
Senator Akaka. Apparently there are problems. What do you
see as the most serious obstacles to effective prevention and
mitigation of corrosion across the Department?
Mr. Wynne. One of the biggest problems that we have, I
think, is enforcement of standard, commercial specifications,
if you will, which would inhibit corrosion and highlighting to
the program managers and the contracting officers that they
have to be installed. As a result of your designation and my
ascension to the role of the corrosion official, I have
included it in the Defense Acquisition Board reviews to make
sure that corrosion is not only highlighted, but is on
everybody's mind.
Senator Akaka. The Department's long-term strategy to
address corrosion as required by last year's bill was due to
Congress last week. When do you expect this strategy to be
delivered?
Mr. Wynne. Sir, I have signed it forward recommending the
signing and delivery. It should be out literally within days.
We have a corrosion conference coming up in December. In fact,
this Thursday I'm going to go down and basically lay out for
them what that long-term strategy is. I think there are over
6,000 people signed up, so we have made an impact.
Senator Akaka. The Department of Defense is heavily reliant
on contractors, not only for the reconstruction of Iraq, but
also to provide much of the basic infrastructure and services
needed by American forces in that country. Over the last
several months, a number of contractor employees have been
killed or wounded in Iraq. There have also been reports of
contractor employees who have refused to go to Iraq or who have
decided to leave Iraq without performing assigned tasks because
of the concern for their personal safety and security.
What, in your view, are the implications of the security
problems facing contractor employees for the reconstruction of
Iraq and the future use of contractors on the battlefield?
Mr. Wynne. First let me salute the contractors who do
support our Armed Forces around the world. They are as
patriotic as can be, and many times have stood the test of
bravery and courage. That having been said, contractors on the
battlefield is an issue we face today. Their support has been
tremendous.
Senator Akaka. Mr. Wynne, do you know how much of a premium
we are paying, if any, to attract contractors and their
employees to perform services in Iraq, to provide security to
the employees, and to accommodate the lost productivity due to
increased security needs? If not, would you have the Department
prepare an estimate for the committee?
Mr. Wynne. Yes, sir. I will take that for the record.
[The information referred to follows:]

This estimating of security costs is an inexact science at best
until the construction is complete and the costs are paid. No matter
what number anyone picks it could be wrong. We are working hard to
control all costs, but the environment dictates the level and
corresponding costs for security. It will change over time, and the
costs (percentages) could go up, stay the same, or go down. Predicting
costs, even based on past data from other sources, may be very
misleading. This information is not ``knowable'' in advance like the
cost of cement or pipe.
The Program Management Office (PMO) expects to award a contract in
May 2004 that will provide the security services necessary to protect
life by deterring terrorist attacks against PMO employees. The contract
also will provide for the coordination of security planning and
execution of the 10 prime contractors and their subcontractors for
design/build construction as they deploy, occupy work sites, and
perform reconstruction activities throughout four regions in Iraq. As
part of this effort, the contract will provide for planning,
mobilization, and start-up for a comprehensive security management
development team. This team will provide close personal protection,
movement/escort security, antiterrorism support and analyses, and
security program management. The security management development team
will take the lead in implementing a much-anticipated Security
Operations Center.

Senator Akaka. Over the last several months, Congress has
passed a number of laws addressing the manner in which the
Department of Defense conducts public and private competitions.
If confirmed as Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics, you will be in charge of and charged
with administering these new laws. Section 334 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 prohibits the
Department of Defense from implementing arbitrary deadlines for
conducting public, private competitions.
The Department is required to extend any otherwise
applicable deadline if the official responsible for managing
the competition determines that sufficient personnel, training,
and technical resources are not available to meet the deadline.
Will you ensure that this requirement is implemented throughout
the Department of Defense?
Mr. Wynne. Yes, sir.
Senator Akaka. Section 235 of the same bill prohibits the
Department from implementing any changes to OMB Circular A-76
until 45 days after the Department submits a report describing,
among other things, the Department's plans to ensure
appropriate phasing of the new rules to provide training to
employees in the implementation of new rules and to collect
data on the impact of new rules.
Will you ensure that this requirement is implemented and
that the Department has appropriate plans and procedures in
place to ensure that the new rules can be implemented in a fair
and even-handed manner?
Mr. Wynne. We intend to follow the law, sir.
Senator Akaka. Thank you for your responses.
My time has expired, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for the time that you gave me in
looking into these different issues. I was thinking about it
during the questions that were asked of you. I asked my staff
to check back and see when it was. I remember we had a hearing.
I understand it was in February 2001, where they talked about
the extended service life. It was the extended service life
study of KC-135s.
Mr. Wynne. Right.
Senator Inhofe. At that time, I believe, there were two of
them that had to be--something had to be done by 2030, but the
service life would be extended on to 2040. Now they're talking
about fatigue life. My question is, would this not have
naturally included corrosion at that time?
Mr. Wynne. It certainly should have. I will tell you that
they based it on some of the experiences that Tinker had at the
time. My compliments to the Tinker workforce. The productivity
that has been shown there has been dramatic. There are some
areas of the airplane that were not normally, if you will,
refurbished, because they were so close to basic structure. I
think some of the concern that has been expressed by the Air
Force really concerns that area where it's not normally
penetrated by a refurbishment or a rehab.
Senator Inhofe. There is another thing I have not received
an answer for yet--and we've asked for it several times. So I
would like to have you just answer for the record, because
sometime I want to get to the bottom of it. During the contract
discussion, they talked about the amount of money annually it
would take to maintain the new 767s. It was about twice that
which it takes to maintain the aging KC-135s. So, for the
record I'm going to keep asking the question until I find out
what the answer is. It might be something very complimentary to
Tinker Air Force Base.
Mr. Wynne. I do know, sir, that if implemented, Boeing
intends to continue their partnership with Tinker Air Force
Base, but I have to ask that question myself. There could be
some setups going on there, but non-recurring. I don't know.
[The information referred to follows:]

Sir, the KC-767A would not cost twice as much to maintain as the
KC-135. Comparing the costs based on actual flying hours planned, the
KC-767 is much more cost effective. The Air Force estimates the support
cost-per-flying-hour (CY02$) for the KC-767 to be $10,800 per hour. The
support cost-per-flying-hour for the KC-135E is $27,000 and $17,700 for
the KC-135R. These are the estimated costs for operations in 2012
(expressed in CY02$) when 100 KC-767s could reasonably be projected to
be in the inventory.

Senator Inhofe. Now, in your new position, of course, you
have oversight of the entire military depot structure.
Recently, we've started putting some money back into the
depots, but we went for years--and I'm sure you are familiar
with the condition of many of them right now. I guess I just
would ask you to evaluate their current condition, primarily
the air logistics centers.
Mr. Wynne. Sir, I certainly will. My compliments to this
committee, by the way, for its support of public, private
partnership which, I think, has been a mechanism to infuse both
management technology and production technology into the depots
and has proven to be a real benefit to both public and private
interests.
Senator Inhofe. I know that's the case for Tinker, because
the partnering has been very successful there. We've done some
things--and Secretary Roche initially went out there when he
was first confirmed, and expressed his thoughts and achieved a
lot of those accomplishments. I think they should be a model.
When Secretary Wolfowitz was here, he testified that, as we
change the depot structure, we need to keep core competencies
in the public sector. Yet, to this day I'm still looking for a
definition of core competencies. Do you have a definition you'd
like to share with us?
Mr. Wynne. My own personal definition is close to military
value. In the case of a depot, though, it has to do with all
the skills necessary, if you will, to bring that together,
because together they form a military value, not separately
evaluated.
Senator Inhofe. Together.
Mr. Wynne. So my view of core still looks to military
value, but military value as you might express it in the
combination of personnel to give service.
Senator Inhofe. I appreciate that answer. I look forward to
working with you on these issues as time goes by. Thank you
very much.
Mr. Wynne. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
Senator Clinton.
Senator Clinton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Wynne. I appreciated the opportunity we had
to meet in my office recently. I look forward to working with
you, particularly in the technology area because of my concern
about the DOD technology programs and their particular
importance at the Air Force Research Lab in Rome, New York.
I want to renew my invitation for you to visit that
facility, because I think it's a prime example of the jointness
that has become a hallmark of the efforts by DOD to really
maximize the military competence and the outcomes in all of the
installations. So I hope we'll be able to arrange that at an
early date.
I want to follow-up on Senator McCain's comments, because I
know how closely he has followed this issue. I listened with
great concern to his description of these e-mails and the
apparent changes that were made.
I think we want to underscore what the chairman and the
ranking member said in following up on Senator McCain's
comments that, given everything that's going on now with the
Department of Defense, all of the challenges, all of the
changes, all of the stresses, it's imperative that this
committee have accurate information to conduct its required
legislative oversight.
It is troubling to hear the continuing reports out of, not
only this Senate committee, but other places, about the
difficulty of getting information. I was somewhat concerned
with some of the recent comments coming out of, not only DOD
but, the White House and other places that Members of Congress
will not be given information if it were requested.
So I think it's important that in the position you will be
fulfilling that you help us to get whatever information we need
across the board with respect to these important issues.
To that end, within the answers to your questions, which I
appreciated, I would like some additional specifics that
follow-up on Senator Akaka's questions. On page 24, you
specifically say, ``There's no doubt we face challenges by
relying on commercial resources to provide logistic support in
theater in Afghanistan and Iraq. We need to explore the use of
force projections for commercial contractors, define that core
mission, et cetera.''
I think that this is one of the critical questions which
you raise--to reassess or rely on subcontractors for basic
functions. As you move forward in this area, that will be one
that I have a great deal of personal interest in because I
think we're paying more than we need to pay.
It's not only on no-bid fuel delivery contracts, but it may
be embedded in the current system that we have created, which
is a kind of gerrymander, that I think is not necessarily the
most cost effective or, frankly, the safest way to provide the
services that are required.
With respect to the personnel system and the efforts that
will be undertaken following the passage of the authorization
bill which gives to the Secretary rather far-reaching powers to
rearrange and change the makeup of the personnel in the
Department of Defense, I notice on page 43 a specific question
related to the Director of Defense Research and Engineering
about what would happen to the laboratory and test center
workforce.
I've heard of others in management positions within the
Department of Defense who have expressed similar concerns about
what this is going to mean. I have to say that, as one who
supported the resolution on Iraq, and as one who is just amazed
and appalled at the lack of planning in the follow-up months
that we are still seeing, I am somewhat concerned about both
the management style and the decisions made by the Secretary.
It will be clear that the Secretary is going to be driving this
process.
It would be heartbreaking and, I think, counterproductive
to wake up in a year or 2 and find that we've decimated a
workforce of very accomplished and competent people in the
civilian workforce across the board. Again, I'm going to be
looking for a lot of information about how this proceeds. I
would hope that this committee would be given that information
in a very direct way. I will look to you with respect to your
areas of responsibility to provide that.
Mr. Wynne. Yes, ma'am. Senator, we have been implementing
personnel changes the acquisition depots, which is largely a
piece part of the National Security Personnel System. I will be
free and feel very comfortable coming and seeing you about how
it's being implemented in the laboratories. They have specific
areas of concern. The best practices have just been released in
the Federal regulation, and we intend to use them throughout
their transition into the National Security Personnel System.
So you'll have a real basis of comparison.
Senator Clinton. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Chambliss.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, thank you for your previous service to our
country. We look forward to working with you in this capacity.
This tanker lease issue just seems to get more and more murky
the more we talk about it. I have a question, number one, about
how you're going to pay for it. There is language in the bill
referencing the fact that you can't pay for it out of existing
programs. Is it the intention to find money to pay for it
without dipping into existing programs that are authorized and
appropriated?
Mr. Wynne. Senator, one of the things that I really am
trying to stand for is stability of programs, so that if their
neighbor erupts with a high cost impact, I intend to try to
look within the program to avoid, if you will, the contentious
nature of having one program knock out another.
In this particular instance, it's going to be a careful
balancing of the needs and resources that's going to go on with
this program. But this is a large appropriation.
Senator Chambliss. What about the maintenance of that
aircraft? Is the maintenance of it included in the lease price?
Mr. Wynne. Maintenance is not, per se, included in the
lease price, although there's a warranty for defects. I think
at this point what I can recall is there was an affiliated
maintenance contract, and I'm not sure how the law particularly
reads on that right now. I think we have to take another look
at it.
Senator Chambliss. Well, my understanding originally was
that the maintenance would be competed. This is not parochial
to me because most of the work's been done at Tinker over the
years on our leases. But I am concerned about the precedent we
have set with respect to these leases.
If we're going to build in the cost of maintenance, then
you're pretty soon going to dry up all the new weapon systems
coming into the depot. That seems to be a direction in which
we've been heading over the last several years. I would tell
you that gives me great cause for concern. Do you have a
thought about new weapons systems going into the depot on
either contract or competitive contract or public, private
partnerships?
Mr. Wynne. No, sir. I'm fairly open to all methods. I like
public, private partnerships because I think it keeps a fairly
vital resource healthy. It seems to be a win, win situation for
both public and private concerns.
Senator Chambliss. Well, it does work. We are in the early
stages, of course, on the C-17. We've done a public, private
arrangement between Boeing and Robins Air Force Base. It is
working well. I wish we'd get more aggressive with it. I think
it saves money for the taxpayer. So I hope we do get a little
more aggressive.
There was a study recently--well, I say recently. It's been
several months ago now since it was requested by Secretary
Roche. The study has been completed regarding the long-term
strategy of depots. The report concluded that there is a long-
term three-depot strategy for the United States Air Force.
Could you give me your thoughts as we move into the next round
of base closures relative to how depots are going to be treated
with respect to that study and where we're going in base
realignment and closure (BRAC)?
Mr. Wynne. Well, where we're going in BRAC is easier
perhaps than some of the other responses. Where we're going in
the BRAC process is to have the criteria published by the end
of this year. Then, I believe, it's November 2004 when the
selection criteria is presented to the commission or the
selections are presented to the commission. Then February 2005
is when the commission decides.
That study is one of the scenarios that's being presented
to both the integrated steering group and the joint cross-
service groups that have studied the supply system as well as
the Defense industrial complex. I would say that the depots are
going to get a very fair hearing. I think they bring a value,
and they should be evaluated on that value.
Senator Chambliss. I will be curious and look forward with
Senator Inhofe to following up on this definition of core and
core competency. Because I've been asking for a definition for
9 years. That's been the most moving target I've ever seen.
There's nothing in Iraq that moves faster than the
definition of core.
So I hope that under your leadership we'll give that issue
some real serious consideration. As we move forward through
BRAC, we simply have to have that issue better settled than
what it is right now. It has to be costing the Air Force a lot
of money. If it's costing the Air Force, I know it's costing
every other service, too.
So I hope we'll try to figure out a clear definition of
core, as well as core competency, as we move forward.
Mr. Wynne. Thank you, sir.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you very much.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator.
We're going to another round of questions. Five minutes for
each Senator.
As you heard, several years ago this committee established
a goal that by 2010, one-third of U.S. military operational
deep strike aircraft will be unmanned. I understand your office
has recently established the Joint Unmanned Combat Aerial
Systems Office, and I applaud you for that initiative.
Is it your assessment that the Department will, hopefully,
within reason, reach these goals?
Mr. Wynne. It is my hope that we can do an operational
assessment and evaluation of these unmanned combat air
vehicles. I don't know that we can state for the record how
many of our combat fighters will be replaced with those
vehicles because it's so long in the process of taking over.
I think the plan will be very much in place. That having
been said, I just recently signed an order asking for 185
Ravens, small unmanned air vehicles, to support our troops in
Iraq, that met their requirements. We're also trying to get
more Shadows and more Hunters. My emphasis has been on getting
tactical information down to the warfighter, who needs to know
not what's over the next ocean, but what's over the next hill.
Chairman Warner. Can you shed some light on an issue which
is very troubling to people all across this country, and that
is that during the course of the military campaign in Iraq,
there suddenly was a shortage of the proper protective devices
that the men and women of the Armed Forces were wearing. Do you
know how that occurred?
Mr. Wynne. Sir, the why of it is I think a misstatement of
requirements and a misexpectation of what the violence would
be. But the resolution of it, I can fairly report, has been a
stepped-up response by our supplier base, and by December 4 of
this year it is targeted that all of American forces in Iraq
will, in fact, have plates and a full Kevlar vest.
Chairman Warner. Now, this committee will be examining the
Department of the Army tomorrow, and the question will be more
fully explored.
Contractor ethics--there have been several recent cases of
contractor ethics violations, which have resulted in a number
of large contractors being precluded from receiving further DOD
contracts. These contractors, however, have received waivers to
either compete for new contracts or being awarded additional
work. This has led some observers to question whether there are
separate ethical standards being enforced for the Department of
Defense for small and large contractors.
Can you elaborate on this, and what do you intend to do
with this very important subject?
Mr. Wynne. I cannot but express my outrage at any ethics
violation that occurs at any level and can't tolerate it if
we're to have acquisition integrity, which is one of the
hallmark goals not only of myself, but also of my predecessor.
That having been said, when operations are in violation of
ethics, many times they are about to perform a very sensitive
national act which will help defend the soldiers, sailors, and
airmen. It's a delicate balance as to whether this is a reward
or whether it would be worse for our country to forego the
service that has been contracted.
I realize that in recent times that has been, in fact,
waived and launches have been done. I believe this is
concerning the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV)
contract.
I can't talk very much about that because I was actually an
employee of Lockheed Martin in Denver, not during the actual
time of any wrongdoing being found. But it turns out during the
time that the wrongdoing was being performed. So I will tell
you that I feel very strongly about ethics in contracting----
Chairman Warner. In other words, you're going to
judiciously enforce those standards?
Mr. Wynne. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. All right.
Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. Mr. Wynne, I have the thing that I've been
looking at for hundreds of nominees for 17 years now as a
member of this committee, and it's the standard questions. We
come and we leaf through them. They change from time to time,
but they've been fundamentally the same.
The last question is: Do you agree to ensure that
testimony, briefings, and other--this is your answers to
advanced policy questions--do you agree to ensure that
testimony, briefings and other communications of information
are provided to this committee and its staff and other
appropriate committees? Your answer is yes.
Do you want to amend that answer yes and have it say,
``with the exception of communications of information and
briefings concerning the Boeing lease deal?''
Mr. Wynne. Sir, the question that you've asked is a very
good one. It goes to protection of proprietary information. I
will tell you that we have provided, I think, sufficient access
to allow very----
Senator McCain.--communication of information?
Mr. Wynne. Sir, I must respectfully respond with the fact
that Dr. Wolfowitz in his memo tried to preserve for the
Department the integrity of internal debate, and I don't know
where else to go.
Senator McCain. So we lay it off on Dr. Wolfowitz that you
won't provide communications of information concerning the
Boeing deal.
Mr. Chairman, I can't accept that. I don't think the
committee can accept that kind of caveat when we're talking
about a $20 billion deal which the Congressional Budget Office
alleged, at least in its original form, would cost the
taxpayers an additional $5.7 billion.
Mr. Wynne, I strongly suggest that you amend your answer to
question #4 under the advance policy question on Congressional
Oversight, because no rational interpretation of that question
could say the answer is yes. It would have to be, ``Yes, except
information concerning Boeing aircraft,'' because we asked for
briefings and other communications of information regarding the
Boeing deal.
Mr. Wynne. Sir, I intend to be as cooperative and open as I
possibly can with this committee.
Senator McCain. I won't comment on that response.
Finally, Mr. Wynne, I have in front of me the air refueling
program, or operational requirements document (ORD) level
review, and it has a Navy input. It says, ``Critical the
aircraft must have the capability to refuel two receivers
simultaneously. The rationale is that you should maintain the
current dual refueling capability of the KC-10 and the KC-135
aircraft for probe-equipped aircraft.''
Does the 767 have a provision for two receivers?
Mr. Wynne. Not that I'm aware of. I believe it has a center
boom.
Senator McCain. So the Navy's requirement here was either
deleted or ignored again in this deal for the 767.
I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Mr. Secretary, we've had a very thorough
hearing here, and we will examine your responses. This
committee will meet upon the call of the chair to review your
responses and such other material as is pertinent to this
confirmation process.
I cannot at this time give you any schedule, but you have
my assurance that I'll try and move, as requested by the
Secretary of Defense, as expeditiously as possible.
Mr. Wynne. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
Chairman Warner. I thank you and your family.
I urge the Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs to
work with the staff of this committee to see if we can resolve
some of these questions raised by Senator McCain, myself, and
Senator Levin, because in many respects I think you're
following the instructions of your superior, the Deputy
Secretary of Defense.
The hearing is concluded. Thank you very much.
[Whereupon, at 5:23 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

[Prepared questions submitted to Hon. Michael W. Wynne by
Chairman Warner prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follow:]

Questions and Responses

DEFENSE REFORMS

Question. You previously have answered the committee's advance
policy questions on the reforms brought about by the Goldwater-Nichols
Act in connection with your nomination to be Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition and Technology.
Have your views of the importance, feasibility, and implementation
of these reforms changed since you testified before the committee at
your confirmation hearing on June 22, 2001?
Answer. My views have not changed. The reforms, resulting from the
implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Act over the past 15 years,
have become entrenched in our daily business. From an acquisition
perspective--those changes, particularly the placement of the
acquisition function under the control of civilian leadership within
the military departments, have been an important factor in enabling the
acquisition community to more efficiently and effectively deliver the
capabilities that the joint warfighters need to meet the challenges of
the 21st century.
Question. Do you see the need for modifications of Goldwater-
Nichols provisions based on your experience to date as Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense? If so, what areas do you believe it might be
appropriate to address in these modifications?
Answer. Although I believe that the implementation of Goldwater-
Nichols has been successful and consistent with congressional intent, I
also believe it is important to continue to look at how well our
current processes and structures meet the demands of a dynamic
environment such as the one with which we are faced with today. There
are several initiatives and studies currently addressing these kinds of
issues; however the results are not yet finalized.

DUTIES

Question. Section 133 of title 10, United States Code, describes
the duties of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)).
Assuming you are confirmed, what duties do you expect that
Secretary Rumsfeld will prescribe for you?
Answer. As Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,
and Logistics, I will perform for the Secretary of Defense and the
Department the statutory functions of establishing policies on
acquisition matters for all elements of the Department of Defense, I
will also exercise supervision on behalf of the Secretary and Deputy
Secretary of Defense over the military departments' acquisition systems
and processes. These statutory functions and duties are promulgated in
the Department of Defense Directive 5134.1, the charter of the ``Under
Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics),'' on
April 24, 2000; and Department of Defense Directive 5000.1, ``Defense
Acquisition'' on May 12, 2003.
I would serve the Secretary as the Defense Acquisition Executive
with responsibility for supervising the performance of the Department
of Defense Acquisition System; establish policy for acquisition plans
and strategies, validate program acquisition requirements, and develop
acquisition program guidance; set policy for acquisition matters,
including contracting, research and development, production, logistics,
developmental testing, procurement, and training and career development
of acquisition personnel; serve as the Defense Logistics Executive with
Responsibility for integrating the global supply chain; set policy for
administrative oversight of defense contractors; serve as the
Department of Defense Procurement Executive; serve as the National
Armaments Director and Secretary of Defense representative to the semi-
annual NATO Five Power conference and Conference of National Armaments
Directors; establish policies for, and oversee developmental testing
and evaluation, and coordinate with the Director, Operational Test and
Evaluation (DOT&E) on the Test and Evaluation Master Plan for
Acquisition Category (ACAT) 1 programs, oversee the Joint Test and
Evaluation Program with the DOT&E, and manage the Foreign Comparative
Test Program; develop international memoranda of agreement and
memoranda of understanding relating to acquisition matters; supervise
the Defense Science Board; and chair the Nuclear Weapons Council
assisted by a structure of overarching integrated product teams that
relate to the acquisition process.
Question. Do you recommend any changes to the provisions of section
133 of title 10, United States Code, with respect to the duties of the
USD(AT&L)?
Answer. No.
Question. If confirmed, what duties and responsibilities would you
plan to assign to the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition
and Technology and the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics?
Answer. I would assign the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition and Technology as my principal assistant, and empower him/
her to act in my stead. He/she will also serve as my Principal Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.
He/she would advise and assist me across the full range of my
responsibilities in providing staff advice and assistance to the
Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, particularly with regard to
overseeing policies and procedures governing the DOD Acquisition System
and overseeing the development, implementation, and management of the
Defense Procurement program.
I would assign the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics
and Materiel Readiness (DUSD (L&MR)) as my principal advisor on
logistics and materiel readiness, and as the principal logistics
official within the senior management of the DOD. He/she would advise
and assist me across the full range of my responsibilities in providing
staff advice and assistance to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of
Defense. In this capacity, the DUSD (L&MR) would monitor and review all
logistics, maintenance, materiel readiness, strategic mobility, and
sustainment support programs.

MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will
confront the USD(AT&L)?
Answer. Those most important include, not only reaching my seven
goals mentioned below, but also the following:

Providing the necessary supplies and force protection
equipment to our men and women in Iraq and around the world;
Matching limited resources with DOD's Joint Vision
(increasing acquisition program requirements and decreasing
financial resources);
Implementing a capability-based acquisition process;
Reducing acquisition cycle time;
Maintaining international cooperation;
Preparing for the upcoming BRAC;
Developing and accurately costing software and
integrating it into weapon systems;
Fielding missile defense;
Preserving intellectual capital (strategic workforce
planning coupled with knowledge transfer from our aging
workforce); and
Improving the logistics and business process with
commercial style productivity improvements.

I am sure there will be others, but I am confident that the
Department--working with Congress--will meet any and all future
challenges to our national security.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for
addressing these challenges?
Answer. I have developed a set of seven goals to address my major
challenges and they are as follows:

1. Acquisition Excellence with Integrity
2. Logistics Integration and Efficiency
3. Systems Integration and Engineering for Mission Success
4. Technology Dominance
5. Resources Rationalized
6. Industrial Base Strengthened
7. Motivated, Agile Workforce

ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY, AND LOGISTICS GOALS

Question. Secretary Aldridge established five goals to improve
defense acquisition: (1) achieve credibility and effectiveness in the
acquisition and logistics support process; (2) revitalize the quality
and morale of the DOD AT&L workforce; (3) improve the health of the
defense industrial base; (4) rationalize the weapon systems and
infrastructure with defense strategy; and (5) initiate high leverage
technologies to create the warfighting capabilities, systems, and
strategies of the future.
What progress has been made toward achieving these goals?
Answer. The Department has made significant progress towards
achieving the five goals set by Secretary Aldridge.
Goal 1: To achieve credibility and effectiveness in the acquisition
and logistics support process, we have made several significant
changes. We have revitalized the Defense Acquisition Board, replacing
the assistant secretaries for acquisition from each military department
with the secretaries themselves. This change better reflects the
breadth of issues we face in acquisition matters. It has brought some
welcome stability to many programs, while reducing the decision time.
It brings to bear all the resources of each military department. We
have mandated evolutionary acquisition as DOD's preferred strategy for
acquiring weapons and information systems. This is enabling us to field
capable equipment more rapidly and at lower cost and less risk. We are
also demanding that all of our major weapon system programs be properly
priced and fully funded. These programs are being budgeted to realistic
cost estimates as developed--in most cases--by the DOD Cost Analysis
Improvement Group (CAIG). Consequently, while many of the Goal #1
acquisition metrics (e.g., ``Annual Rate of Acquisition Cost Growth''
and ``Development Acquisition Cycle Time'') have not yet shown
favorable trends, they are expected to in the near future. These
revised program costs and schedules will provide a more realistic
baseline from which future changes will be measured. Realistic funding
and scheduling will reduce the persistent cost and schedule growths of
the past and improve DOD's overall credibility.
We also continue to make progress in the transformation of defense
logistics. Working with the Services, the United States Transportation
Command, the United States Joint Forces Command, and the Defense
Logistics Agency, we have been developing a Logistic Enterprise
Architecture that will provide knowledge-enabled logistics. As a part
of this work, we have completed a comprehensive review of all logistics
enterprise systems and ensured compliance of the logistics domain with
the Business Modernization Enterprise Architecture (BMEA) effort. We
also made changes in the following key areas. In the enterprise
integration area, we have eliminated over 400 legacy systems. In the
weapon system area, we implemented performance-based agreements on 60
weapons programs including the C-17 and the M1A1. In the maintenance
area, we have forged over 100 Government/industry partnerships at our
principal depot maintenance facilities in order to combine Government
strengths in maintenance and tactical operations with industry's
strengths in engineering and supply chain management. In the
distribution business area, we implemented dramatic revisions to the
material management and distribution regulations to exploit best
business practices in our end-to-end services for the warfighter.
Goal 2: To revitalize the quality and morale of the DOD AT&L
workforce, we have taken several initiatives. We have continued the
Civilian Acquisition Personnel Demonstration Project (AcqDemo) and have
consolidated and dramatically improved our acquisition education. Since
it was first implemented in January 1999, the AcqDemo has grown to
approximately 8,000 participants. It remains the only active
demonstration project that crosses component lines and the authority
for the project was extended by last years National Defense
Authorization Act to run through September 2012. Both this and our
efforts in education are vital if we are to exercise the innovative and
progressive management of our own technology and systems development
efforts.
Additionally, we are attempting to broaden the quality and
expertise of the workforce by recruiting from a much larger pool of
people. We are exploring and pursuing various employment avenues to
bring the experience, expertise, and best practices that personnel from
private industry, colleges, laboratories, and other sources may bring
to the defense acquisition workplace. Casting the net both inside and
outside the Federal Government will help bring into the Defense
Acquisition Workplace the new experiences and best practices that
personnel from private industry and elsewhere have to offer. With these
efforts and others, we have measured our progress by looking at five
metrics. We achieved progress on all five measures--morale, as measured
by a survey of the workforce, has remained above 75 percent in two
perspectives, current job satisfaction and anticipation of future job
satisfaction. The quality of our existing workforce continues to exceed
our goal, with 86 percent of our personnel being certified at or above
the level required for their position.
Goal 3: To improve the health of the defense industrial base, we
have taken several important steps. We are monitoring the financial
viability of the aerospace-defense industry, encouraging and monitoring
technology investments, enhancing competition, and encouraging
increased efficiency. We are encouraging major defense firms to invest
at least 2.7 percent of sales in Independent Research and Development
(IR&D) by the end of 2005. IR&D spending as a percentage of sales
dropped during 2002 from 1.89 percent to 1.77 percent--a negative trend
that should reverse as the projected DOD budget increases materialize.
To increase innovation and competition, the Department is encouraging
non-traditional suppliers to enter the defense marketplace. The
Department's goal was to increase the entry of new corporate segments
doing business with DOD by 5 percent in fiscal year 2001 and 10 percent
in fiscal year 2002. In fiscal year 2001, the actual increase was 8.6
percent; in fiscal year 2002 it was 12.0 percent. Also to increase
competition, the Department seeks to enhance the ability of U.S.
defense firms to compete in the international marketplace by improving
DOD's export license review times. Through March 2003, the Department
had improved its average review time to about 19 days. To encourage
increased efficiency, the Department added a new cost efficiency factor
to its profit policy to reward contractors for reducing costs. Initial
data collection to measure the effectiveness of this policy change will
be complete by the end of the year. These efforts, along with increased
defense budgets, and in spite of a stagnant overall U.S. economy,
appear to be paying off. The aerospace-defense sector generally is
either outperforming or keeping pace with the S&P 500 index firms as
measured by several key indicators: stock price, return on invested
capital, debt service capacity, and price-to-earnings ratio.
Goal 4: In rationalizing the weapon systems and infrastructure with
defense strategy, we have made significant progress. We have rewritten
and streamlined the DOD 5000 series, the Directives guiding the Defense
Acquisition System, and coupled it with the Joint Capabilities
Integration and Development System (JCIDS). This process union between
the acquisition community and the Joint Staff is a huge step forward in
the Department's effort to transform. This coupling should make
capabilities-based acquisition much more efficient and consistent with
our Defense Strategy. We have also put the decisionmaking structure for
the next BRAC in place to make the hard infrastructure choices inherent
in that difficult, but important process. The Department's
transformation effort clearly focuses on this rationalization. With it
and with the writing of the next Defense Planning Guidance, we will
continue to converge towards this important goal.
Goal 5: To initiate high leverage technologies to create the
warfighting capabilities, systems and strategies of the future, we have
taken several significant actions. Most noteworthy has been the
Department's increased investment in science and technology (S&T). The
Secretary set the goal of having S&T comprise 3 percent of the DOD
budget. While the Department has not yet reached the 3 percent goal,
the overall DOD S&T investment has increased by approximately 30
percent over the last 2 years.
Over the same time period, the Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency (DARPA) budget request for S&T increased by approximately 50
percent and our request for the Advanced Concept Technology
Demonstration (ACTD) program increased by almost 80 percent. The
majority of high-risk, high-payoff DOD S&T activity is conducted by
DARPA. To support achieving Goal #5, DARPA has been directed to
continue focusing on high risk/high pay-off technologies; that are by
their very nature high leverage transformational technologies.
Approximately 90 percent of DARPA's $2.9 billion fiscal year 2004
President's budget request is oriented toward these high leverage
technologies.
We have also implemented ``Technology Readiness Assessments'' to
ensure that a program has achieved an appropriate level of technical
maturity prior to initiation. We are exploiting the enormous potential
of ACTDs. The ACTD program works with the warfighter to help transition
these technologies through the development of advanced operational
concepts and determining the military utility of the technology options
via expanded prototyping and demonstrations.
Question. What goals would you pursue for improving the defense
acquisition system, if you are confirmed?
Answer. Shortly after becoming the acting Under Secretary of
Defense (ATL), I held an offsite with the staff to update the goals and
align them with the President's Management Agenda and Secretary
Rumsfeld's most recent guidance and initiatives. We thoughtfully
considered the goals, objectives and initiatives of our senior
leadership and as a result, recast the previous five into seven. These
seven goals are specifically targeted to drive performance outcomes
that will directly contribute to our joint warfighting strategy and the
transformation of our DOD business processes. They are:

1. Acquisition Excellence with Integrity
2. Logistics Integrated and Efficiency
3. Systems Integration and Engineering for Mission Success
4. Technology Dominance
5. Resources Rationalized
6. Industrial Base Strengthened
7. Motivated, Agile Workforce

I see these goals continuing the progress we have made so far under
this administration. If confirmed, I intend to continue with these
goals and fully establish the objectives and metrics to measure future
success.
Question. Describe the approach and progress made by this
administration in reducing cycle time for major acquisition programs.
Answer. DOD has made considerable progress in implementing policy
that will reduce cycle time and allow us to field capability rapidly
and efficiently. Our new policies are streamlined and flexible, and
based on an evolutionary or phased acquisition approach. That approach
emphasizes maturing technology before we commit to major investment
decisions, but also allows us to field some capability earlier. As a
result, we are able to reduce program technical risk substantially,
program technical risk can otherwise be a major contributor to lengthy
cycle times. The new policies are in effect and we anticipate seeing
the cycle time benefits in the next few years.
Question. What specific steps has the Department of Defense taken
to adapt incremental and phased acquisition approaches, such as spiral
development?
Answer. On May 12, 2003, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz
issued new policies that identify evolutionary acquisition as the
preferred strategy for satisfying operational needs; spiral development
is the preferred process for executing such strategies. Our objective
is to balance needs and available capability with resources. We must
put capability into the hands of the warfighter as quickly as possible,
while pursuing an acquisition strategy that will permit growth in
capabilities over time.
Question. How will the requirements process, budget process, and
testing regime change to accommodate spiral development?
Answer. The new policies were tailored to facilitate evolutionary
acquisition. An evolutionary approach delivers capability in
increments, recognizing, up front, the need for future capability
improvements. Each increment supports time-phased capability needs that
are matched with available technology and resources to facilitate rapid
development. Each increment will be fully funded before development is
initiated and will have a test and evaluation plan designed to evaluate
the capabilities associated with that increment.
Question. Would DOD's major acquisition programs be more successful
if the Department were to follow the commercial model and mature its
technologies with research and development funds before these
technologies are incorporated into product development?
Answer. The new DOD acquisition policies are very consistent with
successful commercial models because they require technologies to be
demonstrated in a relevant environment before a program is initiated.
The new policies require formal assessments of technology readiness
and, where there are indications that technology is not sufficiently
mature, specify that alternative mature technologies be employed that
achieve the required capability. This approach is consistent with the
most successful commercial business practices, supports an evolutionary
strategy, and facilitates less costly and time consuming systems
development.
Question. What steps would you take, if confirmed, to ensure that
the key components and technologies to be incorporated into major
acquisition programs meet the Department's technological maturity
goals?
Answer. DOD acquisition policy requires demonstration of key
technologies in a relevant, and preferably, in an operational
environment before a program is initiated. If confirmed, I will enforce
and emphasize that policy because I believe it is fundamental to
reducing technological risk and shortening cycle time.
Question. The Department has established a separate set of
regulations for the acquisition of space systems. These regulations do
not appear to place the same emphasis on technological maturity as the
regulations applicable to other programs.
In your view, is the technological maturity of major technologies
and components less important for space systems than for other major
defense acquisition programs?
Answer. No, in fact our recently approved Space Acquisition Policy
requires an independent technology assessment sooner in the weapon
system's life cycle than the model contained in the DOD 5000, which is
used to guide the acquisition of non-space major defense acquisition
programs. As stated in the Space Commission Report (to assess U.S.
National Security Space Management and Organization pursuant to Fiscal
Year 2000 National Defense Authorization Act), advancement of U.S.
technological leadership in space is a fundamental tenet of our
National security. Therefore, as you mention, the Department has taken
several measures, including the formulation of a separate set of
regulations to guide space acquisition programs. This policy
acknowledges the importance of technology by mandating risk reduction
planning and establishing technology readiness assessments at each
milestone.
Question. What steps do you believe that the Department should take
to ensure that the development and production of space systems are not
undermined by efforts to prematurely deploy technologies that are not
yet ready?
Answer. The Department's dependence on technology development, the
pace at which this technology is increasing, and its vital role in our
Nation's defense warrant a robust process to ensure we don't
prematurely deploy technologies. In addition to the establishment of
independent technology assessments, the new space acquisition policy
implements an exhaustive ``peer review'' approach to support milestone
decisions. These peer reviews provide in-depth scrutiny of program
management techniques, including an assessment of the realism of
program costs and program risks. Also, it is important to note that
these are independent reviews, conducted by teams of individuals with
recent acquisition, cost, or operational experience in space programs.
We believe this approach will provide an early understanding of
critical technologies and its associated maturity necessary to meet the
critical communications and intelligence needs our space systems must
deliver on-time with cutting edge technologies.
Question. What role do you expect to play, if confirmed, in the
oversight of the acquisition of space systems?
Answer. In the Department's response to section 911 of the Bob
Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public
Law 107-314) that requested the Secretary of Defense provide a detailed
plan on how the Office of the Secretary of Defense shall provide
oversight of acquisition for defense space programs, the need for a
strong oversight role was highlighted since space represents a
significant military capability given its criticality to maintain and
improve the surveillance, communications, and situation awareness
needed to support U.S. military forces. In my role as USD(AT&L), if
confirmed, I will ensure a robust acquisition program oversight process
remains in place to proactively identify and resolve execution
problems. This will be accomplished by the oversight and analysis of
funding, cost, schedule, performance, and other program status
information to assess the program's progress toward achieving
objectives set forth in their milestone reviews. This results-oriented
management approach establishes effective controls by initially
establishing program objectives at the milestone review and then
monitoring progress toward achieving these objectives through review
and analysis of oversight reporting information. It should also be
noted that the OSD and Joint Staff oversight responsibilities
prescribed by law, and further defined in DOD guidance, have not been
changed by the Department's alignment of space responsibilities
following the Space Commission Report highlighted earlier.
Question. In recent years, Congress has enacted a number of
legislative provisions designed to improve oversight of missile defense
programs.
What are your views of this legislation?
Answer. The legislation passed as part of the fiscal year 2002 and
2003 National Defense Authorization Acts gave the Department much
greater flexibility in how we administer, manage, and fund the
Ballistic Missile Defense System program and its component elements.
The increased funding levels and ability to use fiscal year 2004 RDT&E
funds for items that are not traditionally RDT&E-funded are allowing us
to develop and test elements of the Ballistic Missile Defense System at
a faster pace than under the standard approach. I would note, however,
that the legislation designed to improve congressional oversight of
missile defense programs has also increased substantially the quantity
of reporting to Congress, which requires resources we believe would be
better spent dedicated to fielding our initial ballistic missile
defense capabilities. If confirmed, I plan to work with Congress to
ensure we meet your oversight requirements while maintaining our
increased pace in developing the Ballistic Missile Defense System and
deployment of missile defense capabilities.
Question. What role do you expect to play, if confirmed, in the
oversight of the acquisition of missile defense systems?
Answer. In January 2002, the Secretary of Defense approved a non-
standard approach to acquisition of ballistic missile defenses in order
to speed development, while improving senior level oversight of that
effort. Under that approach, the Missile Defense Agency has sole
responsibility and authority for development; the Services have the
bulk of the responsibility for procurement; and both are subject to
acquisition oversight by the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics). I plan to use the Missile Defense Support
Group to assist in that oversight. In December 2002, the President
decided to begin deployment of missile defense capabilities. Since the
President's decision, the Department of Defense has been preparing for
that step, and we have identified areas where the non-standard approach
to acquisition might be improved. If confirmed, I plan to revisit our
current approach to acquiring ballistic missile defenses to ensure it
effectively meets the Secretary's guidance and the President's
direction.
Question. Problems with computer software have caused significant
delays and cost overruns in a number of major defense programs. Last
year's National Defense Authorization Act required the secretary of
each military service to establish a program to improve software
acquisition processes. It also required the Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to prescribe uniform
guidance for the services to use to establish these programs.
What is the status of this effort and, if confirmed, how would you
ensure that you know the status of the software components of major
weapon systems in order to avoid additional problems in this area in
the future?
Answer. We have begun implementation of the Fiscal Year 2003
National Defense Authorization Act section 804 legislation through
policy, uniform guidance, and an oversight mechanism to track status.
The revised Department of Defense Instruction 5000.1, states
``Acquisitions of software intensive systems shall use process
improvement and performance measures. Selection of sources shall
include consideration of product maturity and past performance.'' In
March 2003, the Department published a policy memorandum specifically
related to section 804 that directs the military departments and
selected defense agencies to establish software acquisition process
improvement programs. This memorandum expanded the scope of section 804
to provide added emphasis on a number of related acquisition processes
and provided specific uniform guidance. It established improvement of
the Department's capability to acquire all types of software-intensive
systems as a Department-wide objective, and required the affected
components to brief the Department's Software-Intensive Systems
Steering Group, which reports to me, on the status of those programs.
Each of the military departments and agencies has established their
programs, and the Software-Intensive Systems Steering Group has
overseen their progress. We have measured progress against the guidance
provided and have created a forum for issue discussion, support, and
resolution. This forms the mechanism by which we will ensure compliance
with the legislation.
Question. Do you believe that the Air Force realignment is
consistent with the intent of Goldwater-Nichols acquisition realignment
legislation?
Answer. I believe the intent of the Air Force realignment that
places three Program Executive Officers (PEOs) for product development
closer to the programs they manage and provides them a greater span of
control over the resources is consistent with Goldwater-Nichols and the
Packard Commission recommendations. I have approved a waiver from the
5000 requirements and asked for a report on the pros and cons. I am
concerned about the span that these commanders (Aeronautical Systems
Center, Electronic Systems Center, and Air Armament Center) will have,
though I was also concerned that the best senior acquisition talent was
not being employed in Acquisition Programs where the Air Force could
use them. It will place Air Force PEOs closer to the programs they
manage and ensure their skills are immediately available to the
programs they supervise. I believe the change adds emphasis to our
intent to have management in the place where it can be most effective
and reinforces our commitment to short, clear command channels.
Question. What steps would you take, if confirmed, to ensure that
the Air Force's realignment of the acquisition structure does not
result in returning to the problems that the Goldwater-Nichols changes
were intended to address?
Answer. The Air Force realignment will not undermine the intent of
Goldwater-Nichols and I expect it will improve our ability to manage
our acquisition programs. However, I intend to assess the results of
the realignment and have directed the Air Force Service Acquisition
Executive to provide a report to me in 2 years that specifically
addresses PEO responsibilities. I believe the Goldwater-Nichols and
Packard Commission recommendations were very helpful, but want to
continue to explore how to best implement their intent.
Question. Section 805 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2003 established performance goals for procuring services
pursuant to multiple award contracts. What steps is the Department now
taking to achieve these goals? In your view, are there any additional
steps that the Department should be taking?
Answer. We have issued guidance to the military departments and
defense agencies concerning the use of performance-based requirements
and competition when placing order under multiple award contracts. The
Federal Acquisition Regulations have also been modified to reflect
these requirements. We are also doing a spend analysis of all service
requirements and have instituted a review process for all services. We
will monitor the effects of these changes to ensure that they result in
the established goals being met.
Question. The Air Force recently announced a revamping of its
contractor award fee system. Can you describe the status of this effort
and whether Department-wide changes are necessary in this area?
Answer. The Air Force's study on revising the contractor award fee
process is not yet complete. Therefore, it would be premature at this
time to make any conclusions about what impact their study may have on
the policies of the Department. However, in this same general area, I
have recently asked various organizations within AT&L to commence a
study on industry profitability and to conduct a review of our profit
policy.
Question. What is the status of the Department's efforts to
implement a management structure in compliance with the requirements of
section 801?
Answer. The Department has issued several policy directives to
implement sections 801 (a) and (d). On May 31, 2002, the Under
Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) issued a
policy memorandum that set up a review structure and process for the
acquisition of services. Each of the three military departments has
developed a ``Management and Oversight of Acquisition of Services
Process'' to provide a review structure for service acquisitions, as
required by the memorandum. The military departments are implementing
this infrastructure, which includes approval levels for services
acquired through another agency's contract.
The Department recently issued an interim rule to the Defense
Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) on October 1, 2003,
establishing approval requirements for contracts and task orders for
services. The interim rule requires certain approval to acquire
services through the use of a DOD contract or task order that is not
performance-based, or through any contract or task order that is
awarded by an agency other than DOD. With respect to service
acquisitions through a contract or task order awarded by an agency
other than DOD on behalf of DOD, the rule requires approval in
accordance with department or agency procedures. The results of these
two policy directives have created stronger oversight and control over
our acquisition of services.
Question. When do you expect the implementation to be completed?
Answer. The policies developed in response to section 801 were
issued in May 2002. The military departments are implementing the
infrastructure to support their approved management and oversight
processes which include approval levels, etc. We will continue to
strive for improvements in the acquisition of services increasing our
efficiency and effectiveness.
Question. What is the Department doing to better manage its
services contracts?
Answer. The Department is improving the management of our
acquisition of services through the implementation of additional
oversight, approval, and control measures as well as the development of
enhanced spend analysis and strategic sourcing efforts. The policy
directive in May 2002 and the interim DFARS rule published in October
2003 established a management structure and process for the review and
approval of these acquisitions. We continue our efforts to assess the
viability of strategic sourcing initiatives for various service sectors
and will implement changes as appropriate.
Question. Does the Department plan to conduct a ``spend'' analysis,
as recommended by GAO?
Answer. The Department initiated a spend analysis covering the
acquisition of services in February 2003. During the first phase we
utilized available data from our acquisition databases to conduct a
review of all DOD acquisition of services. The first phase was
completed in September 2003, and we developed a listing of the top
twenty commodity categories that we believe may offer potential
efficiency increases. We are currently establishing commodity teams to
further analyze in greater detail these commodity areas and develop
strategic acquisition plans where possible. We expect to identify
approximately five commodity areas where we will develop Department-
wide acquisition strategies during fiscal year 2004. We are also
developing methods to enhance our data visibility and accuracy in order
to facilitate this process for future analyses. We have followed
commercial best practices as much as possible and will continue to
monitor commercial trends in the conduct of strategic sourcing efforts.
Additionally, we have regularly briefed GAO on the progress of our
spend analysis.
Question. Can you describe the status of DOD's review of the
Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement?
Answer. DFARS transformation has two important components: (1)
reducing the regulation and making value-added changes; and (2)
improving DOD's rulemaking process using technology to enhance
efficiency and transparency.
Effort on the first component was completed on May 2, 2003. We
reviewed the DFARS to verify currency, accuracy, clarity, and value of
all text, identified opportunities for improvement and reduction to
DFARS requirements, and solicited ideas from Government, industry, and
the general public through memoranda, press articles, and a DFARS
transformation website. We developed 86 significant change proposals
and over 700 other recommended DFARS changes.
The Defense Acquisition Regulations Council opened 77 new DFARS
cases to implement recommendations for improvements and reductions to
DFARS text.
Twenty-seven joint committees are drafting proposed DFARS changes
for public comment. Four rules have been published, and publication of
additional proposed changes is expected to begin in November 2003. The
remaining proposals may result in up to 50 additional FAR and DFARS
cases and several proposed legislative changes for fiscal year 2005.
With respect to the second component, our technology plans involve
issuing a request for proposals (RFP) for the Defense Acquisition
Regulation Integrated System. We are seeking an integrated commercial
off-the-shelf capability to eliminate paper processes, enhance world-
wide communication, deliberation, collaboration, and archiving within
DOD's acquisition rulemaking system. Our plans include issuing the RFP
in early calendar year 2004 and demonstrating an alternative solution
by June 2004.

TEST AND EVALUATION

Question. The Department has, on occasion, been criticized for
failing to adequately test its major weapon systems before these
systems are put into production.
What are your views about the degree of independence needed by the
Director of Operational Test and Evaluation in ensuring the success of
the Department's acquisition programs?
Answer. I believe that there is a very valid need for an
independent assessment of the test and evaluation process as part of
defense acquisition. Both of our offices would prefer that test
problems be identified as early in the process as practicable.
Therefore we are pushing to emphasize Developmental Test and Evaluation
and measuring test readiness at decision points. I fully support the
test communities' effort to shift their focus to providing as much
information as possible (as early as possible) in order to identify
operational deficiencies early in the developmental process. This new
view of testing should enhance the effectiveness of the DOT&E.
Question. What initiatives in this regard would you take, if
confirmed?
Answer. I would continue to work with the DOT&E to achieve
continuous information gathering and decisionmaking processes in which
operational testing and evaluation plays an even more critical role in
forming good acquisition decisions. The T&E process must become as much
a tool for early learning as a test for operational effectiveness and
suitability--particularly as we continue to implement evolutionary and
capability-based acquisition approaches.
Question. The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal
Year 2003 included several provisions to improve the management of DOD
test and evaluation facilities.
Can you outline what has been done to implement these provisions?
Answer. My office is in the process of standing up DOD Test
Resources Management Center (TRMC). A charter has been written and is
in the final stages of coordination, and an interim staff is already in
place. The DOD TRMC is being implemented with a permanent staffing
level of approximately 25 Government personnel.
Section 231 requires the TRMC to produce a biennial strategic plan
that reflects the needs of DOD with respect to T&E facilities and
resources. An initial plan has been prepared by the TRMC with the
active participation of the DOT&E, military departments, defense
agencies with T&E responsibilities, and other cognizant DOD offices.
This first plan is in the final stages of review and will be submitted
to Congress within the month. The plan provides a baseline for future
TRMC strategic planning efforts. It outlines both an approach for
developing future strategic plans and the scope of T&E infrastructure
to be addressed. Overarching goals and objectives for TRMC oversight of
DOD T&E facilities and resources are provided, and an initial set of
modernization requirements is outlined.
Question. Section 232 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2003 establishes
the objective of ensuring that, by fiscal year 2006: (1) the
institutional and overhead costs of the Major Range and Test Facility
Base (MRTFB) are fully funded; and (2) the institutional customers of
the MRTFB are charged only the direct costs of their testing
activities.
What steps has the Department taken to achieve these objectives?
Answer. We have established a group with representatives from the
components and the OSD staff, including the OSD accounting policy and
budget experts, to determine the most appropriate definitions to use in
establishing direction for the components to use in charging no more
than direct costs for users at the MRTFB as directed by Congress. The
group is expected to complete their work in early December and their
definitions will be used by the Services to fully fund their MRTFB
facilities for the fiscal year 2006 program to be submitted to OSD next
summer.
Question. Do you anticipate that the Department will fully meet the
objectives by fiscal year 2006?
Answer. Yes.
Question. What steps do you believe the Department should take to
ensure that milestone decision authorities do not field systems before
system performance has been adequately demonstrated?
Answer. DOD acquisition policy requires a system to be demonstrated
in its intended environment before proceeding to low-rate production.
Our policy is to limit low rate production to those articles necessary
to assess the effectiveness and suitability of the system via
operational test and evaluation. The specified Low-Rate Initial
Production (LRIP) quantities are approved by the milestone decision
authority (MDA) at the beginning of System Development and
Demonstration and reported to Congress in the Selected Acquisition
Report. Changes to the quantities would have to be justified by program
conditions and, via internal DOD reporting procedures, brought to my
attention when the proposed quantities exceed the MDA approved
quantities. Consequently, I believe we have sufficient policy and
procedural controls in place to prevent ``fielding'' of a capability
prior to adequate demonstration.
That having been said, we have been pressed to fulfill combatant
commanders requests for rapid technology insertion, and have responded
to those requests repeatedly in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi
Freedom. In the case of rapid technology insertion, we continue testing
and accept user feedback. We find this process has caused greater
interaction between developers and users that has resulted in shorter
cycle times and more focused response. I see this as a disciplined
application of the 5000 policy, but with the benefit of actual usage,
prior to a larger fielding and service acceptance.
Question. Do you support congressionally-mandated cuts to the
acquisition workforce, and do you think further cuts are necessary?
Answer. Reductions in the Defense Acquisition Workforce that are
not driven by the Department's strategic planning and efficiency
improvements have the potential for exposing the Department to
significant risk. We are using our human capital strategic planning
process to define the workforce we will need in the future and the
actions that we need to take to get there. We have made a number of
process improvements that allowed us to increase our productivity, and
we are continuing to pursue acquisition excellence which will allow us
to make further productivity gains. We will pursue with Congress
additional actions to reduce reporting, promote personnel flexibility,
and close unneeded bases, all of which will allow us to make further
workforce reductions. But I do not in any way support legislated
reductions that are not carefully synchronized with DOD's management
streamlining efforts and are not supported by our human capital
strategic planning.
Question. Please give your assessment of the strengths and
weaknesses of DOD's implementation to date of DAWIA.
Answer. Overall, DAWIA has been good for the Department of Defense,
and today we have one of the most professional workforces in the
Federal Government. We have methods for credentialing our personnel and
molding a professional workforce. In fact, we receive many requests for
program information from other Government agencies wishing to pattern
their programs on our success. However, given the passage of time and
the current statutory structure for the defense acquisition,
technology, and logistics workforce, changes are necessary. Some
portions of the original act have limited the Department's flexibility
in achieving the act's purpose. Also, the extreme detail in the act,
necessary at the time of enactment, no longer is needed. The Department
needs authority to structure the acquisition, technology, and logistics
workforce program by regulation so the Secretary could change
structural details as needed to continue to meet the policy objectives
(e.g., adding career fields, adjusting certification qualifications,
changing the way training is delivered, etc.) without needing future
legislation. I appreciate the support the Senate has given in
supporting DAWIA restructuring in S-1050.
Question. Does DOD's acquisition workforce possess the quality and
training needed to adapt to new acquisition reforms, as well as to the
increased workload and responsibility for managing privatization
efforts?
Answer. This is an area of special concern for me and one that I am
also working very hard. In the dynamic defense acquisition environment,
our people are challenged with managing an increased workload with a
reduced workforce. Consequently, it is very important that the current
acquisition workforce have the necessary training and experience to
implement new acquisition policies, as well as manage the Department's
privatization efforts.
Through the Defense Acquisition University (DAU) and its
Performance Learning Model (PLM), the workforce has convenient and
economical access to learning products 24 hours a day, 7 days a week--
the concept of anytime, anywhere learning. Whether through distributed
learning with web-based courses and continuous learning modules, rapid
deployment training on the latest acquisition initiatives and best
practices, or access to acquisition resources with the new AT&L
Knowledge Sharing System, DAU is providing the DOD AT&L workforce with
a more flexible, responsive, and agile learning environment.
In addition to formal training on privatization that DAU already
provides, I have tasked DAU to develop a web-based privatization
resource center. DAU has also fielded continuous learning modules that
teach the workforce market research and performance work statement
development skills. DAU's communities of practice provide interactive
discussion areas so that field practitioners can share lessons learned.
I believe that these learning assets will allow DOD personnel to better
understand the latest guidance and techniques so they can do a more
effective job of implementing and managing privatization efforts.
If confirmed, I will continue expanding our rapid deployment
training for these acquisition initiatives. I will also continue to
enhance our web-based program for continuous learning and emphasize the
deployment of best available workplace learning practices to accelerate
acquisition and logistics excellence and enable more cross functional
training.
Question. What are your views regarding assertions that the
acquisition workforce is losing its technical and management expertise
and is beginning to rely too much on support contractors, FFRDCs, and,
in some cases, prime contractors for this expertise?
Answer. The DOD AT&L workforce is a critical resource which
requires unique education, training, and experience in order to perform
acquisition functions. Acquisition personnel perform highly technical
and specialized work in areas such as engineering, contracting, and
logistics--skills highly sought after in the private sector. However, a
decade of downsizing has left DOD with a workforce that is not properly
shaped for the future. We have reacted to workforce skill gaps in the
past by contracting for support in order to minimize impact to our
mission, while maintaining in-house expertise. In response to the
pending retirement wave, we have begun to more aggressively manage the
AT&L workforce through human capital strategic planning (to identify
future skill gaps) and a marketing and recruiting campaign targeted at
securing those skills.
Question. What are your views on the current role and
responsibilities of the lead system integrator?
Answer. It is important to remember that a lead system integrator
is no more, and certainly no less, than a prime contractor. The LSI is
still charged with the responsibility of managing all aspects of the
contract--technical, financial, subcontractors, etc. The use of the LSI
term serves to emphasize the increasingly complex integration of prime
and subcontractor efforts required to meet requirements, but should not
be taken as a diminution of the other responsibilities of a prime
contractor. It is important to remember that these responsibilities are
for the execution of contacts awarded for execution of a program.
Overall responsibility and accountability for the entire program
remains with the Government Program Manager.
Question. How would you define the line between those acquisition
responsibilities that are inherently governmental and those that may be
performed by contractors?
Answer. The primary responsibilities required of the prime
contractor have to do, for the most part, with performance of the
contract. This includes such things as design decisions, resource
allocation, and subcontractor selections. Once the prime contractor is
named, the Government's ongoing formal responsibilities focus on
adherence to requirements, and appropriate flow-down to design, funding
oversight performance, and issues that may require contract
modifications--requirement changes, schedule adjustments, etc.
However, the roles of the prime contractor and Government are
really quite intertwined in execution. Through the use of Integrated
Product Teams (IPTs) and sharing of real time contractor information,
performance decisions are open to wide discussion before they are put
in place.
An example of this is subcontractor selection. The prime has the
right to choose the vendors necessary to execute the contract, since
the prime has overall responsibility for meeting the requirement. But,
on occasion the Government gets more involved in the selection process,
and it may reserve the right to grant final approval for the prime's
selections.
Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that
contracting mechanisms which maintain adequate safeguards are in place
to ensure that lead system integrator access to sensitive and
proprietary information is not compromised?
Answer. As mentioned, an LSI is a prime contractor, subject to the
same contracting mechanisms governing access to sensitive and
proprietary information as any other Government contractor.
Question. What specific steps have--or will--the Department take to
monitor the progress of the key technologies for the Future Combat
Systems?
Answer. The Department is engaged with Army leadership in the
identification of key technologies critical to the success of the
Future Combat Systems (FCS). The Army identified thirty-one critical
technologies as part of the FCS Increment One definition; they were
corroborated by an Army-sponsored independent technical review team and
discussed with the Department during the Defense Acquisition Board
reviews prior to the FCS Milestone B decision.
In addition to the Army's review, I chartered an independent review
of the command, control, communications, computers, intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (C\4\ISR) element of FCS, including
the key technologies associated with the network. My staff led the
review. It involved participation by other OSD staff offices, the
military departments, and selected defense agencies. The review looked
at FCS in the context of the FCS Family of Systems, the Army's future
force structure, and the joint force, as well as how the program fits
within the scope of the Global Information Grid. This multi-service/OSD
participation on departmental issues impacting the FCS network provided
a level of insight that would not have been otherwise possible. The
review identified a number of findings associated with the network
which, when resolved and implemented, will significantly improve FCS's
ability to provide a joint capability. The Army and OSD are making
significant progress resolving and implementing the findings. The
results of the review were taken into consideration as part of the
Defense Acquisition Board Milestone B decision.
The Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM) requires the Army to
establish a Critical Technology Risk Mitigation Working-level
Integrated Product Team (WIPT) within 90 days of the Milestone B
decision. The WIPT is online with functional representatives from the
Department fully integrated.
The ADM required the Army to submit updated Critical Technology
Risk Mitigation Plans within 120 days of the Milestone decision. Since
May 2003, the Department has worked aggressively with the Army and
developed Risk Mitigation plans for each critical technology.
The Army is in the process of establishing Technology Transition
Agreements (TTA) between the FCS Program Manager and the DOD S&T
community. The Army has provided ``Draft'' TTAs to the Department for
review and is expected to provide final TTAs for Department approval by
November 15, 2003.
Question. What policies are in place to ensure that the lead
systems integrators do not misuse sensitive and proprietary information
owned by other contractors and do not unnecessarily limit competition
in a manner that would disadvantage the Government?
Answer. The use and protection of subcontractor information is
governed by both the contract itself and the subcontract arrangements
between the prime and the vendor. In this way, the Government can
intervene through the contract terms if necessary, and the vendor can
act on its own behalf, if necessary, to protect its rights.
Question. Based on operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, what
changes, if any, need to be made to the Defense Logistics Agency's use
of prime vendor agreements, virtual prime vendor agreements, and direct
vendor delivery in order to streamline the Department's logistics
systems for commercial items such as medical supplies, clothing and
subsistence, and common hardware items?
Answer. This issue has been studied and independently addressed--
for example, the Combat Support Agency Review Team (CSART) report done
by the Logistics Management Institute showed that the commercial base
of suppliers for medical materiel responded superbly. However, there
are some ``disconnects'' in the process. For example, transportation
and ``in transit visibility'' remain challenges beyond the theater
distribution center ``last tactical mile''--but perhaps the most
important single finding--and this applies across all commodities--is
that advance requirements planning from the customers of the process
has to be much better. DLA can move materiel from employment to
deployment in a matter of days--but if the requirements development and
planning process is flawed, the challenge becomes exponentially
greater. Overall, though, the commercial logistics support has been
exceptional and one of the success stories of the entire theater of
operations.
Based on some of the lessons we've learned:

We are developing prime vendor type contract(s) to
provide maintenance, repair and operations (MRO) supplies to
support facilities maintenance requirements for South West
Asia.
DLA is working an extensive effort to review the
Agency's Direct Vendor Delivery (DVD) contracts for compliance
with Uniform Materiel Movement and Issue Priority System
(UMMIPS)/Time-Definite Delivery (TDD) standards.
DLA has directed actions to ensure DVD outside
continental U.S. shipments meet requirements of the Defense
Transportation System (DTS) when those commercial shipments
have to be diverted through DTS entry points.
DLA is also working to improve requisition visibility
to its customers by implementing Total Asset Visibility (TAV)
across the enterprise. In-transit visibility is part of TAV,
provides information needed to respond more readily and
accurately to customer demands, and is an essential ingredient
to increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of
transportation resources. The Agency's policy is that DVD
arrangements will fully support asset visibility objectives and
initiatives.

DLA is implementing the Distribution Planning
and Management System (DPMS) to simplify vendor
compliance with this requirement.
DLA is requiring vendors to adhere to military
standard documentation and marking in accordance with
MIL-STD-129, to include, but not limited to military
shipping labels and barcoding, and has issued
procedures for providing line-item shipment data via
radio frequency identification tags, electronic
transmission, or telephone calls to support visibility
requirements into the United States Central Command
area of responsibility.

Question. Should the Department continue to rely on commercial
practices that rely increasingly on the private sector to meet the
Department's logistics needs, or are there risks inherent in this
approach that need to be mitigated?
Answer. There are risks in all supply chains, whether 100 percent
organic or increasingly sourced from the private sector. As we continue
to evolve to increased reliance on the private sector, the Department
is addressing issues such as backup supply sources, alternative methods
of transportation, propositioned stocks, and safety levels.
The Department remains committed to adopting best practices in
order to provide flexible, reliable, rapid, and effective logistics
support to the warfighter. These best practices may be found in the
commercial sector, the Government sector, or they may leverage the best
of both.
For example, in support of OIF, we deployed the most sophisticated
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) system in the world. This system
made extensive use of commercial technology applied to a military
environment. Whether or not RFID is a ``commercial practice'' or a
``defense practice,'' it is a best practice. Commercial off-the-shelf
(COTS) software is another area where DOD can continue to modernize by
adopting best practice and proven technology in the supply chain. There
is no need to reinvent the wheel. We can adopt commercial practice and
commercial technology and refine it to meet our needs. All components
are aggressively pursuing initiatives that incorporate COTS technology
in the military logistics space.
Performance Based Logistics has also leveraged commercial
capabilities to deliver superior support to our Warfighters. The F18E/F
Super Hornet delivered better than 92 percent operational availability
during the combat phase of OIF. JSTARS had a 100 percent MC rate during
Operation Enduring Freedom. These are but two examples that show how
weapons systems performance can be improved through the integration of
best practice into our logistics function, and how commercial
capabilities make a difference. We know that commercial ports and
freight carriers are doing a superb job moving material to the theater,
and there are notable successes in the theater, including warehousing
and transportation. At the same time, we must be cognizant of the
challenges and risks associated with the fundamental transformation we
are making within the Department, and we must use this knowledge to
improve . . . to enhance . . . to create the world-class logistics
necessary to meet today's threats in the war against terrorism.
There is no doubt that we face challenges by relying on commercial
resources to provide logistics support in-theater, in Afghanistan, and
in Iraq. We need to explore the issue of force protection for
commercial contractors in the battlespace, and make adjustments as
required. We must define our core missions in logistics, and ensure
that we have a plan to fulfill them. We must assess our reliance on
contractors for basic functions like transport and storage in support
of the battlespace, for these private sector resources may not be
available whenever and wherever we may have to fight. Clearly there are
risks to be managed, but we must not forget the greatest risk of all.
We must not create risk by failing to transform, by failing to learn
how to deliver 21st century warfighting capability. We must apply best
practice, whatever the source. Our greatest risk occurs not when we
apply best practices, but when we fail to properly apply best
practices.

LOGISTICS

Question. In your view, how successful has the Future Logistics
Enterprise (FLE) been in streamlining DOD's logistics policies and
practices, and on what criteria do you make this assessment?
Answer. The success of FLE in streamlining DOD's logistics policies
and practices has been evident in the logistics support provided during
the Operation Iraqi Freedom. Criteria supporting this assessment are
many: the Department moved a ground force farther and faster than
anyone had ever done in history--300 miles in 22 days. DOD moved 15
million square feet of cargo in 60 days, using 100,000 containers that
would stretch 379 miles. The effort involved more than 6,000 railcars,
157 vessels, 108,000 truck shipments, and the third largest airlift in
history. Even today, we have 2,500 trucks on the road every day between
Kuwait and Iraq, carrying--among other things--1.5 million liters of
water and more than 300,000 Meals Ready-to-Eat a day.
Question. What additional steps, if any, remain to be taken to
improve logistics support to the warfighters, and how will the Office
of Force Transformation's work on logistics inform your policy
decisions on logistics matters?
Answer. The second phase or implementation phase of FLE is called
Force-centric Logistics Enterprise. We've accelerated efforts to bring
on additional capability. Additional steps include:

Improved weapon system support through performance-
based logistics and collaboration with industry;
Examination of mission capability improvements, and
working with TRANSCOM, to look at end-to-end distribution
performance; and
Evaluation of how information--knowledge gained from
new integrated systems and tools--provides better situational
awareness.

The FLE has leveraged ``network centric'' and ``knowledge-enabled''
logistics to support the global war on terrorism (GWOT). The GWOT
requires fundamentally different supporting structures built on tightly
knit collaboration and real-time information--i.e. those that are
``network centric''. One aspect that we are looking at closely is
``sense and respond logistics''. In logistics, ``network centric''
means using information technology to ensure efficiency, stability, and
predictability. Knowledge-enabled logistics make it possible to get the
right item, in the right place, at the right time.
Additionally, in September the Secretary of Defense established a
Defense Logistics Executive (DLE). This will be an additional
responsibility of the Under Secretary for AT&L. The DLE will have
overall responsibility for integrating the global supply chain. The
consolidation of authority under one process owner is aimed at
realizing logistics efficiencies by:

Eliminating existing seams between current
distribution processes and standardize the policies, vision and
performance goals in DOD's supply chain.
Driving interoperable information technology solutions
and enhance total asset visibility to distribution customers.
Institutionalizing sustainment planning into our
contingency processes.
Streamlining distribution accountability under a
single combatant commander (provide one single accountable
person for the combatant commander to contact for their
distribution needs).

COMPETITIVE SOURCING

Question. Over the past several years, DOD has increased its
reliance on the private sector to perform certain activities, including
equipment maintenance and facility operations. Some have supported this
effort while others have expressed concern that core activities are
being jeopardized by reducing our reliance on military personnel and
civilian employees of the Federal Government.
Answer. The Department utilizes the process of competitive sourcing
only when it makes military and economic sense to do so. Competition is
a driving force within the American economy, causing organizations to
improve quality, reduce cost, and provide rapid delivery of better
products and services. It is essential that we continue to utilize the
process to obtain work that is clearly identified as a commercial
function, so that we may improve support to the warfighter and increase
readiness efficiently.
Question. Do you believe that public-private competition results in
significant savings to the Department? If so, please explain how.
Answer. Yes, competition has produced significant savings for DOD.
A review of the DOD Commercial Activities Management Information System
indicates that our competitions, from fiscal year 1995 to the present,
will produce an estimated savings of nearly $8 billion through the
period of performance, regardless of whether the Government workforce
or a source in the private sector won the competition. Other
independent evaluators, including RAND, GAO, and the Center for Naval
Analysis, have consistently found that public-private competitions
generate real and substantial savings no matter which source prevails.
Question. What impact will the recent changes to OMB Circular A-76
have on the Department's plan for public-private competitions?
Answer. The recent changes to the OMB Circular A-76 will provide a
fresh start for all participants in the competitive process, including
the Department, employees and Federal labor unions, and the commercial
sector. The new process incorporates provisions of the Federal
Acquisition Regulation (FAR), and provides for robust and fair public-
private competitions. With the transition to the new process, the
Department is taking measured steps to ensure that all planners and
decisionmakers involved are adequately trained to carry out their new
duties involving significant changes from the old process.
Question. Are there other effective alternatives that would achieve
the benefits of public-private competition?
Answer. The Department continues to consider alternatives,
including privatization, divestiture, and public-private partnerships.
Although such alternatives are capable of achieving savings, I believe
that in order for the taxpayers to receive the best value for their
investments, the alternative methods should promote competition.
Question. The GAO Commercial Activities Panel recommended allowing
comparable appeal rights to both parties in public-private competition.
Do you agree that the public and private sectors should receive
comparable treatment in the bid protest process?
Answer. I agree. I believe that the procedures in the revised
circular provide sufficient recourse to Federal agencies for all
parties affected by performance decisions. The GAO's jurisdiction,
under the Competition in Contracting Act, to review bid protests by
Federal employees, is a matter for the GAO to determine.

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (IT)

Question. There appears to be potential overlap between the
responsibilities of the USD(AT&L) and the DOD Chief Information Officer
(CIO) (currently the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and
Information Integration (ASD(NII)) with regard to information
technology acquisition, particularly with embedded information
technologies in weapon systems.
If confirmed, how do you anticipate sharing responsibilities with
the DOD CIO to ensure effective acquisition of information technology?
Answer. The ASD(NII) and the USD(AT&L) work very closely on
information technology acquisition matters, and I would expect that
relationship to continue. For example, the DOD CIO is a member of the
Defense Acquisition Board (DAB), which I will chair if confirmed. In
addition, his Principal Director for Command, Control, Communications,
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C\3\ISR); Space; and
Information Technology Programs leads an Overarching Integrated Product
Team that makes recommendations to the USD(AT&L) before such
information technology acquisition programs are reviewed by the DAB.
Our offices collaborate on a number of other important initiatives,
including the implementation of the Department's Software Acquisition
Process Improvement Program and the Implementation of Management
Initiative Directive 905 on Net-Centric Business Transformation and E-
Government. We have also worked as a team to streamline and rationalize
the Clinger-Cohen certification process, which is reflected in the
recently streamlined 5000 Defense Acquisition System series.
Question. What is your assessment of the Department's ability to
rapidly assimilate commercial information technologies?
Answer. The Department has improved greatly in its ability to
assimilate commercial information technologies. Many of the largest
programs in our business domains are implementing or considering the
use of COTS Enterprise Solutions. To make sure such solutions are
successful, we are working with the Office of the DOD CIO on a
streamlined process for acquiring COTS Enterprise Solutions based on
industry best practices. For example, a COTS IT and National Security
System (NSS) Software Action Plan, signed by the ASD(NII), provides a
set of initiatives designed to increase the use of COTS across the
Department. We are working with the Office of the ASD(NII) on this
effort. The Enterprise Software Initiative (ESI) Program, started in
1998 under the DOD CIO, offers today a suite of commercial software,
hardware, and service products under enterprise licenses, providing
major discounts to its customers for a total cost avoidance of $1.3
billion.
Question. Is DOD's growing dependence on commercial information
technologies a positive or negative development, in your judgment?
Answer. Using commercial hardware and software reduces the costs
and risks of building our own hardware and software for both the
manager and the warfighter. Commercial products enable us to more
rapidly deliver needed capabilities to our users and exploit commercial
best practices. But we recognize and are addressing vigorously the
inherent challenges of embedded malicious or foreign code and
information assurance.
Question. ``Buy America'' issues have been the source of
considerable controversy in recent years. What benefits does the
Department obtain from international participation in the defense
industrial base and under what conditions, if any, would you consider
it necessary to impose domestic source restrictions for a particular
product?
Answer. International sales, purchases, and licensed production are
common forms of international defense cooperation. These transactions
are important in that they contribute to operational interoperability
and promote cost savings, two of the key goals of the armaments
cooperation programs. These transactions are heavily regulated by most
nations and are often politically sensitive because they involve both
national security and public funding.
Although most DOD equipment is from domestic sources, the DOD makes
use of a worldwide supplier base. The DOD is somewhat constrained by
laws and regulations that limit acquisition of certain non-U.S.
products, such as the Buy American Act and annual Appropriations Act
provisions that restrict certain procurements to U.S. sources. The DOD
has agreements with many allies to facilitate defense trade. The aim of
those agreements is rationalization of the defense equipment supplier
base so as to achieve the greatest efficiency in equipping our
collective forces. The agreements establish reciprocity in the
treatment of vendors from the other country.
Congress has encouraged acquisition of defense equipment from U.S.
allies to avoid duplication of research and development effort. For
example, the Foreign Comparative Testing program is funded by Congress
and facilitates testing and acquisition of foreign-developed products
when those non-developmental products can meet DOD requirements. This
program has resulted in substantial cost-savings through avoidance of
development programs.
Foreign-developed products acquired by the DOD are often produced
in the U.S. under license. Examples of such products are the
Rhinemetall 120mm tank gun used on the M1A1 Main Battle Tank, the
Beretta 9mm pistol, the AV-8B Harrier aircraft, the Mark 92 naval fire
control radar, and the Oto Melara 76mm naval gun.
In general, I believe that domestic source restrictions are
counterproductive. However, in certain limited instances involving
national security and the preservation of a key defense technology or
production capability, domestic source restrictions may be necessary. I
would encourage allied and friendly nations to impose national source
restrictions only in similar limited circumstances.
Question. There have been recent indications that the Department of
Defense is backing away from decades of opposition to legislated
domestic source restrictions. What is the rationale behind this
apparent shift in DOD's policy?
Answer. There is no change in DOD policy. Earlier this year we
sought changes to such provisions to clarify and simplify their
application. The House Defense Authorization Bill for Fiscal Year 2004
contained a number of new domestic source restrictions. DOD opposes
these provisions.
Question. Given the outcry from our allies about ``Buy America''
protections, how will the Department manage the potential damage to
defense cooperation with our allies, including such cooperative
programs as the Joint Strike Fighter, as well as DOD's longstanding
policy of encouraging allied interoperability?
Answer. I support greater defense industrial cooperation. More
cooperative endeavors such as teaming, joint ventures, and even mergers
and acquisitions can produce beneficial synergies, efficient use of
limited resources and healthy competition, so long as it occurs in a
positive and constructive manner. One way to encourage more defense
industrial cooperation is to ensure that the programs we pursue receive
full support and are well-managed programs to the marketplace. The
Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) is a prime example of this type of program.
Some of the provisions of the original H.R. 1588 directly endangered
the JSF program, but we do not expect these provisions to become law.
``Buy America'' protections will lessen the desire of our allied and
friendly foreign partners to cooperate in defense projects. This would
adversely affect allied interoperability in the long-term, while
driving up acquisition costs to the DOD and driving out competition.
Question. If DOD were to support more protectionist policies, do
you anticipate ``trade retaliation'' by our allies, including the
possibility of our allies going elsewhere for their defense
acquisitions?
Answer. I do not support protectionist policies. To the extent that
Congress enacts protectionist legislation, our allies' reaction will be
uniformly negative. Many close allies have expressed concern to U.S.
Government officials on the possibility of new legislation in this
area. However, the extent of the impact on U.S. defense trade is
unknown. While retaliation is certainly a possibility, we will do all
that we can to encourage allies to make source selection decisions
based on best value, including interoperability with U.S. Armed Forces.
If protectionist legislation is enacted as it is currently written, the
Department of Defense will sponsor a study to examine the impact of
such legislation on U.S. defense trade.
Question. Could such a development jeopardize our $30-50 billion
annual trade surplus in aerospace products?
Answer. If other countries are denied access to the DOD market, it
is inevitable that they will not continue to grant U.S. companies
unfettered access to their defense markets. This retaliation will occur
across all product lines but is likely to be most pronounced in the
aerospace sector because of our significant trade surplus in that
sector.
Question. If the U.S. were to lose this trade surplus, would DOD
weapon systems costs rise?
Answer. I would expect costs for both current and future U.S.
programs would rise. For example, reduced foreign sales of JSF aircraft
would raise the unit cost of the aircraft bought by the U.S., since we
would lose the benefit of buying in larger numbers. Perhaps more
importantly, our ability to enter into future cooperative defense
relationships will likely be severely undermined.
Question. We understand that the Department is considering an
approach under which significant domestic source restrictions would be
placed in legislation, subject to a case-by-case waiver by the
Secretary of Defense. Has the Department estimated how many waivers
would be necessary if such legislation were enacted? What burdens would
such a case-by-case waiver approach place on the Department of Defense?
Answer. I expect that an important aspect of the language regarding
domestic preference will be a 2-year study to evaluate what items
should be subject to further restriction. Once this study is complete,
we will be better able to evaluate the workload associated with the
waiver provisions.
Question. Do you believe it is premature for Congress to enact
additional domestic source restrictions without first thoroughly
analyzing and studying the impact these restrictions could have on our
trade and defense cooperative relationships and the U.S. defense
industrial base? Specifically, should a Blue Ribbon Commission be
formed to study these issues before Congress enacts any additional
legislation in this area?
Answer. While the Department of Defense would prefer no new
protectionist legislation, a waiver provision would allow mitigation of
the most direct consequences for DOD. However, the impact on trade and
defense cooperative relationships may be indirect or subtle. The extent
of the impact is currently unknown. If protectionist legislation is
enacted as it is currently written, the Department of Defense will
sponsor a study to examine the impact of such legislation on the U.S.
defense trade. Given the uncertainty concerning the legislation impact
on cost of defense industrial requirements, and international
cooperation, a commission like study seems appropriate.

THE DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE

Question. What is your view of the current state of the U.S.
defense industry?
Answer. Generally the U.S. manufacturing sector that supports
defense is healthy, innovative, and responsive. The financial health of
the defense industrial base has improved; the aerospace-defense
industry sector is generally either outperforming or keeping pace with
the S&P 500 index firms as measured by key financial indicators.
Increased defense funding associated with the protracted war against
terrorism will likely negate any residual effects of the recession/
stagnation felt in other sectors of the economy. Additionally, the
Department has been successful in efforts to encourage innovative, non-
traditional suppliers to compete for defense business.
As the defense environment changes, we will continue to monitor
challenges and trends within the defense industrial base and are
prepared to take appropriate action to sustain industrial capabilities
essential to defense, when required.
Question. What impact, in your view, have offset requirements
imposed by other countries had on the U.S. defense industry?
Answer. I believe that offsets are economically inefficient and
market distorting. However, I am aware of no instances in which offsets
have negatively impacted our ability to meet national defense
commitments.
The Department of Commerce has been charged by Congress to evaluate
annually the impact of offsets on defense preparedness, industrial
competitiveness, and trade. In its latest report, dated July 31, 2003,
the Department of Commerce noted almost all non-U.S. purchasers of U.S.
defense systems require offsets as a condition of the sale; and that
offsets have both a positive and negative impact on defense
preparedness. Exports and the revenue generated by export sales are
crucial to producers of U.S. defense systems and, by extension, U.S.
foreign policy and economic interests. On the other hand, U.S.
subcontractors can be displaced by foreign suppliers. On the whole, the
latest Department of Commerce report indicates that jobs generated by
export sales between 1993 and 2000, significantly exceed jobs lost
through offsets (almost 42,000 workyears annually versus less than
9,700 workyears annually). The net is very favorable.
Question. What steps, if any, do you believe the Department should
take to address any such impact?
Answer. I believe that the United States should not act
unilaterally or bilaterally on this issue. Using an interagency
approach, the U.S. Government should encourage multilateral discussions
with our trading partners to reduce or eliminate offsets. We need to be
careful in our approach as the U.S. has been a net beneficiary in
programs with offset requirements. The Department of Defense should
have a prominent role in such discussions.
Question. Over the last decade, numerous mergers and other business
consolidations have substantially reduced the number of major defense
contractors.
Do you believe that consolidation in the defense sector has had an
adverse impact on competition for defense contracts? If so, what steps
should be taken to mitigate those effects?
Answer. The number of active competitors in several defense markets
has declined and, consequently, it has become more challenging to
ensure effective competition in these sectors. Nevertheless, I believe
that our active participation in merger and acquisition reviews with
the anti-trust agencies has ensured that we continue to have sufficient
competition in important defense areas.
When required, we have taken steps to mitigate certain adverse
effects of otherwise acceptable mergers and acquisitions, including
requiring behavioral or structural remedies to preserve competition.
For example, we permitted Northrop Grumman to buy TRW only after
ensuring competitors a level playing field. When acting as a system
prime contractor, Northrop Grumman must not favor in-house payloads
over better value payloads from outside suppliers. Additionally,
Northrop Grumman must offer its own payloads on a competitive basis to
rival system prime contractors. Finally, we have worked with the anti-
trust agencies to block transactions when necessary to preserve
competition.
Question. Do you support further consolidation of the defense
industry?
Answer. I have no blanket policy of encouraging or discouraging
further consolidation or divestiture. Each proposed transaction must be
evaluated on a case-by-case basis in the context of the individual
market, the changing dynamics of that market, and the need to preserve
competition. Considerations include the need to promote innovation for
technological advancement; to preserve price competition within mature
industries; and to secure adequate supply sources.
A consolidation from five suppliers to four in a product market
raises fewer complex issues than a change from three to two.
Accordingly, mergers in some market segments may raise competitive
issues while mergers in other segments may not. Therefore, while our
standards remain constant, prime contractor level mergers in a
concentrated industry are more likely to raise competitive concerns
than would be the case in an industry that is not so concentrated.
Question. What is your position on foreign investment in the U.S.
defense sector?
Answer. In general, I favor foreign investment in the United
States, whether for defense industries or non-defense industries, so
long as the investment does not pose a threat to national security.
Since foreign acquisitions of U.S. defense firms could directly affect
both the reliability of suppliers and the transfer of technology under
development in the Department, we need to oversee and continue to
monitor developments in this area in order to protect our National
security interests. The Department of Defense participates in an
interagency review organization, the Committee on Foreign Investment in
the United States, chaired by the Department of the Treasury, which is
charged to identify and address concerns when foreign acquisition of
U.S. firms poses credible threats to national security. Fortunately,
when foreign acquisitions raise national security issues, we can apply
several risk mitigation measures, such as requiring Outside Directors,
Technology Control Plans, physical and organizational firewalls,
visitation reporting policies, and partial divestitures. Thus we rarely
have to recommend to the President that an acquisition be blocked in
order to protect national security.
Question. Do you believe that there should be greater cooperation,
and perhaps even integration, between defense industries in Europe and
the United States? If so, how can such cooperation be facilitated?
Answer. International armaments cooperation, in its many forms,
enhances interoperability, improves coalition warfighting, stretches
tight U.S. defense budgets, and promotes competition across national
markets. Accordingly, I favor industrial teaming, joint ventures, and
international mergers and acquisitions with partner nation firms that
are pro-competitive and do not compromise national security. I also
support judicious use of Government-to-Government agreements to foster
closer industrial linkages. Accordingly, we are entering into bilateral
Declaration of Principles agreements with allies and friendly nations
such as the U.K., Australia, the Netherlands, Spain, Italy, Norway, and
Sweden. These agreements foster cooperation in key interest areas such
as harmonization of military requirements, research and development,
security of supply, sales and export procedures, security of
information, ownership and corporate governance, technical information,
and promoting defense trade. Finally, we also can encourage
transatlantic cooperation by using Government-to-Government agreements
to bring efficient, well-managed international programs to the
marketplace. The Joint Strike Fighter is a good example of such a
program.
Question. What is your view of the adequacy of the tools and
authorities available to DOD to ensure that its contractors are
responsible and have a satisfactory record of integrity and business
ethics?
Answer. An offeror must be judged to be responsible before it may
receive a Government contract. Having a satisfactory record of
integrity and business ethics is one of the seven criteria that must be
met before a contractor may be determined to be responsible. We have
adequate tools necessary to ensure we deal with responsible entities in
the defense industry.
Throughout the contract period, the government will record how well
the contractor performed and consider this information when awarding
future contracts. We have made prohibited behavior clear to all
involved. For example, the regulations explain how to evaluate
violations of the Procurement Integrity Act, improper gratuities,
kickbacks, and any activity that unfairly restricts competition. A
range of corrective actions are permitted for differing circumstances.
Our contractors understand what is expected of them, and we rely
heavily on competition and corporate self-governance to ensure that all
offerors observe acceptable standards of behavior.
When ethics programs are not effective, violations, regardless of
the size of the entity, may be resolved by criminal and civil penalties
authorized in law, adjustment or cancellation of contracts, or
suspension or debarment proceedings. We are permitted to consider which
course of action best furthers the Government's interests and ensures
that the needs of the Government are met.
Regarding the issue of suspension and debarment, it must be
stressed that these actions are not intended to punish contractors for
wrongdoing. Punishment is the responsibility of the Department of
Justice. DOD must protect its business interests to ensure it is
dealing only with entities that are responsible and conduct themselves
with integrity. We also feel it is in our interests to work with those
entities that appear to be straying from expected practices generally
by entering into administrative agreements in lieu of suspension or
debarment and provide them with an opportunity to effect positive
change. This will allow these contractors to conduct business in a
transparent fashion and provide the goods and services needed to
support the warfighter.

LEASING POLICY

Question. Advocates of leasing capital equipment have argued that
leases enable the Department to obtain new equipment without requiring
significant upfront funding. Opponents of such leases have argued that
this approach, without adequate justification, shifts to future
leaders, today's budget problems.
Question. What criteria would you use, if confirmed, in determining
whether to support a major lease of capital equipment by the Department
of Defense?
Answer. In order to determine whether or not to support a major
lease of capital equipment by the Department of Defense, I would put
each lease proposal through a thorough review process conducted by the
Leasing Review Panel. The Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics) and the Under Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller) serve as co-chairs of the panel, which includes
representatives from Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E), the Office
of General Counsel, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, among others. The
Leasing Review Panel will also consult with the Office of Management
and Budget on each proposed lease. Each proposed lease would have to be
considered on a case-by-case basis and all aspects of the lease
agreement would be scrutinized, including the urgency of the need to
the Department and the warfighter.
Question. For the last two decades, the Department of Defense has
been subject to statutory goals for contracting with small businesses
and minority small businesses.
Do you believe that these goals serve a valid and useful purpose in
the Department of Defense contracting system?
Answer. Yes, the overall small business goals serve a worthwhile
purpose by focusing top DOD leadership attention on small business
matters and serve as a stimulus for continuous improvement to the DOD
Small Business Program. To achieve these goals, DOD fosters an
acquisition environment that provides the maximum opportunity for small
business to participate, both as prime contractors and as
subcontractors. Small business participation in defense acquisition is
vital to the Department of Defense. To maintain our worldwide military
superiority, we must take full advantage of the talent and technology
that resides within American Small Business.
Question. DOD has a number of programs to improve small business
participation in defense contracts. These include among others the so-
called ``rule of two'', which provides that if two or more small
businesses are capable of performing a contract, competition will be
limited to small business, the Section 8(a) program, and the DOD
mentor-protege program.
Question. In your judgment, how could the overall DOD small
business program be improved to ensure that it is providing the right
results for the Department in meeting its acquisition needs, and also
by developing dynamic, entrepreneurial, small businesses that can
compete in the global marketplace?
Answer. One opportunity to improve the overall DOD small business
program is to strengthen the mentor-protege program. DOD recently made
advances toward improving this program by transitioning the execution
of the program to the military services and defense agencies. This
streamlines the process, resulting in an increase in agreements and the
number of small businesses (proteges) receiving technical and business
infrastructure training from DOD prime contractors (mentors). We are
strengthening oversight of the mentor-protege program through the use
of performance metrics that track cost, schedule, and performance.
Another opportunity is to similarly strengthen the Small Business
Innovation Research and Small Business Technology Transfer Programs.
Under these programs, small entrepreneurial companies with the
capability to fill a DOD technology need are awarded contracts. We are
strengthening these programs to emphasize the future commercial
application of their products. We have also upgraded the application
process and we will continue to improve program oversight.
In addition to strengthening these programs, we are refocusing our
analysis capabilities to identify those industry categories where small
businesses could be more successful. More importantly, we are
attempting to identify those categories where small businesses might
add value to the Department's future needs. With this capability we
will be better equipped to assist small businesses with developing
their future capabilities and with targeting their marketing efforts.
Question. What is your view of contract ``bundling''?
Answer. I remain concerned about contract ``bundling'' and
specifically the effects that such a practice may have on the small
businesses that have continuously supported the Department of Defense
in meeting our mission requirements. The small business community has
consistently provided high quality products and services in a timely
manner that supports our military men and women; and they do so at fair
and reasonable prices, which is also good for the taxpayer. These small
businesses are a well-spring of innovation, flexibility, and
competition that the Department can ill-afford to take for granted.
I think it is important to note that the Department of Defense has
issued five Department policy memorandums in regard to ``contract
bundling''. The purpose of the memorandums is to sensitize our
contracting community of the importance that small business brings to
the Department of Defense. The memoranda challenge program executives,
managers, and contracting personnel to continuously understand how
``contract bundling'' impacts small businesses. If any requirements are
``bundled,'' they must meet the statutory requirement that the bundle
offers measurably substantial benefits to the Government and proves to
be necessary and justified. It is our policy that when a ``bundled''
requirement is necessary and justified, the contracting office shall
mitigate the effects on small business to the maximum extent
practicable.
Question. Do you believe that there is a value to having small
businesses contract directly with the Federal Government, rather than
being relegated to the role of subcontractors?
Answer. I believe there is great value that small businesses have
the opportunity to contract directly with the Federal Government. I
also believe it is critical to the Department that we continue to
support small business subcontracting opportunities. Small businesses
bring innovation, flexibility, and necessary competition to our
procurement process. Small businesses produce more patents and
innovations per employee than large business. They are part of the
solution in maintaining and expanding the defense industrial base and
are key to meeting our future needs. The Department continues to build
on the talents, capabilities, and capacities that the small business
community brings to both our prime contracting and subcontracting
tables.
One of the reasons that I believe in maximizing small business
subcontracting opportunities is that most of the small business prime
contractors are introduced to the Department through the subcontracting
program. It is noted that subcontracting remains the small business
standard path to prime contracting opportunities.
Question. What is your view of the appropriate degree of
competition for contracts for the reconstruction of Iraq?
Answer. I believe that we need to push for competition wherever
possible on contracts for the reconstruction of Iraq. There are many
U.S. firms that can perform the work and they need to be given the
opportunity to contribute to the rebuilding of Iraq while affording the
best value for the American public and the Iraqi people.
Question. Do you believe that the Department should take steps to
expedite the award of competitive contracts and minimize the use of
sole-source contracts now in place?
Answer. We are taking steps to expedite the award of competitive
contracts. At the same time, we are working to use the existing sole
source contracts for immediate needs only, and not for larger, longer
term efforts.

CONTRACTOR LOGISTIC SUPPORT

Question. More and more of the Department's maintenance and support
functions are outsourced. These contractor logistics support agreements
have resulted in the increased reliance on civilian contractors in
combat areas.
What are your views regarding contractors on the battlefield?
Answer. The benefits and risks of contractor support are considered
on a case-by-case basis. The challenge for commanders at the
operational level is how to make the most effective use of contractors
and to balance the increased capabilities brought by contractors with
the added challenges. Commanders evaluate each function, define the
acceptable level of risk, and balance the mix of military and
contractor support accordingly. When using contractors, commanders do
not necessarily face more risks, but they do face different risks.
These benefits and risks must be placed in perspective, properly
assessed, and dealt with. For example, use of contractors may actually
reduce operational risk because the contractors represent capabilities,
or increments thereof, that otherwise may not be available to
commanders.
Question. Has the Department, in your judgment, gone too far in
outsourcing maintenance and support functions?
Answer. No. Maintenance and support functions include such things
as facilities and equipment maintenance, and other functions readily
identifiable as commercial and available within the private sector.
These are logical candidates for a ``Competitive Sourcing'' study to
determine who is able to best provide the services in support of our
mission. The Department only does this when it makes military and
economic sense. With respect to depot-level maintenance, the Department
retains core functions and contracts for performance only as permitted
by title 10 of the United States Code.
Question. What changes to current policy would you recommend
regarding the outsourcing of maintenance and support functions?
Answer. With the record of success the Department has enjoyed in
conducting ``Competitive Sourcing'' studies on maintenance and support
functions, I believe the current policy is adequate.
Question. Recent work done by the GAO for this committee
highlighted several challenges related to contractor support of
deployed forces, including ineffective implementation of existing
policy guidance.
Do you believe that the Department's existing regulations are
adequate to address these challenges?
If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure compliance with
existing regulations and policies?
Answer. DOD and the military departments have several policy
documents that describe how to design long-term contractual support
vehicles that consider the operational risks associated with
outsourcing and how to plan for specific contingencies. They do a good
job of addressing the risks associated with using contractors on the
battlefield. Theater planning by combatant commanders also addresses
risk and many of the issues that arise when using civilian contractors
to better prepare the Joint Task Force commander and mitigate the risks
in advance. Although risk assessment approaches vary among DOD
components, all approaches call for effective risk assessment on the
use of contractors on the battlefield and none does anything that
jeopardizes our warfighting capability.
In light of the increasing use of contractors on the battlefield,
the DOD has been working with the RAND Arroyo Center to further examine
our decisionmaking and risk assessment processes affecting use of
contractors and to recommend improvements. Interim findings from the
RAND effort indicate that recent Army doctrine has effectively captured
the conceptual risks relevant to using contractors and choosing between
contract and organic sources and that Army doctrine on risk assessment
provides a reliable framework for improving Army sourcing decisions.
RAND further adds that the challenge now is to transform this doctrine
into practice by training our personnel in the subtleties of risk
analysis relevant to sourcing decisions.
The challenge for commanders at the operational level is to make
the most effective use of contractors and to balance the increased
capabilities brought by contractors with the added challenges.
Commanders evaluate each function, define the acceptable level of risk,
and balance the mix of military and contractor support accordingly.
When using civilian contractors, commanders don't necessarily face more
risks, but they do face different risks. These benefits and risks must
be placed in perspective, properly assessed, and dealt with. For
example, use of contractors may actually reduce operational risk
because the contractors represent capabilities, or increments thereof,
that otherwise may not be available to commanders.
Question. In many cases, the original equipment manufacturer ends
up with a significant role in contractor logistics support (CLS)
contracts.
What procedures are in place to ensure that CLS contracts are not
awarded to the original equipment manufacturer for the life of the CLS
without appropriate competition among qualified vendors?
Answer. Competition is the law of the land. Under the Competition
in Contracting Act, we must conduct competitive procurements unless a
statutory exemption applies, such as when only one source of supply is
available.
Ideally, we define our procurements in terms that are flexible
enough that many suppliers are capable of meeting the Government's
need. Supportability of equipment is something that we consider when we
design a system. We instruct our program managers through the
acquisition regulations to ensure that a flexible, performance-oriented
strategy to sustain systems is developed and executed. This usually
increases the opportunities for more firms to support fielded equipment
than would be the case when we procure specific models of a particular
equipment manufacturer.
In addition, we have a network of Competition Advocates throughout
the Department who are charged with seeking ways to increase
competitive opportunities for particular procurements. For example,
they challenge requirements that are not stated in terms of functions
to be performed, performance required, or essential physical
characteristics. They can be most effective when industry expresses an
interest in competing for an item or service that we believed to be
available from a single source. So I would encourage any firm that
believes it can be an effective provider of logistics support to make
the local Competition Advocate aware of its capabilities and areas of
interest.

ROLE OF THE USD(AT&L) IN THE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM

Question. If confirmed, what role would you play in the oversight
of the Services' and DARPA's science and technology programs?
Answer. If I am confirmed, the oversight role will remain as
currently in place. The Director of Defense Research and Engineering
(DDR&E) reports to the USD(AT&L) and is responsible for the direction
and content of the Department's science and technology program. The
Services and agencies coordinate their programs through the Project
Reliance chaired by DDR&E.
Question. What is the relationship between the USD(AT&L), the
DDR&E, and the Director of DARPA in developing and executing DARPA's
research and technology development programs?
Answer. I will continue with the same reporting structure, with the
Director of DARPA reporting to USD(AT&L) through the DDR&E. The DDR&E
will continue to exercise authority, direction, and control over DARPA.
The DDR&E will be charged to ensure that DARPA's portfolio is balanced,
supports the warfighter, and continues cutting edge research. In short,
DARPA executes; DDR&E sets priorities and objectives and provides
oversight.

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM

Question. The defense science and technology program is recovering
after years of declining budgets. However, the budget request for
defense S&T still falls short of the Secretary of Defense's goal of
dedicating 3 percent of the total defense budget to science and
technology.
If confirmed, how would you plan to increase the Department's
science and technology program to meet the Secretary's goal?
Answer. The Department's goal, established in the Quadrennial
Defense Review (QDR), is to grow the S&T investment to be 3 percent of
the total defense budget. While the fiscal year 2004 President's budget
request (PBR) and future years defense program (FYDP) do not achieve
this goal, they do increase S&T funding from the fiscal year 2003 PBR
and exceed 0 percent real growth in fiscal year 2004 and throughout the
FYDP. We did not make the 3 percent goal because of the topline growth.
The table below shows the fiscal year 2004 PBR and FYDP for S&T
funding, and shows that the buying power of Department's S&T investment
is increasing across the FYDP. If confirmed, I will continually support
increasing the buying power for our S&T investment and believe it is
essential that the Department fund S&T at a level adequate to ensure
the technological superiority of our Armed Forces.

[In millions of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year
DOD S&T Funding (TY) ---------------------------------------------------------------
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year 2004 President's budget request..... 10,000 \ 10,232 10,541 10,790 11,193 11,541 12,134
1\
0 percent Real Growth from fiscal year 2003 PBR. 10,186 10,384 10,592 10,805 11,018 11,231
Delta over 0 percent Real Growth................ +46 +157 +198 +388 +523 +903
Percent of DOD Top Line....................... 2.64 2.69 2.63 2.57 2.54 2.50 2.51
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ $10,000B was the fiscal year 2003 PBR (includes DERF and NPR). $10.773B was appropriated in fiscal year
2003.

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY WORKFORCE

Question. The Director of Defense Research and Engineering recently
wrote to you expressing concerns over the effect that the proposed
National Security Personnel System (NSPS) and Best Practices
Initiatives would have on the Department's laboratory and test center
workforce. He recommended that the NSPS proposal be modified to permit
laboratory directors to retain the authorities they currently have
under existing congressionally authorized personnel demonstrations. He
also recommended that the proposed Best Practices Initiative Federal
Register announcement be delayed until it can be revised to better
support laboratory and test center missions.
Do you support the laboratory directors and the DDR&E in their
attempts to retain control over DOD's scientific and technical
workforce?
Answer. In some ways, the laboratory directors and the DDR&E do in
fact exercise control over DOD's scientific and technical workforce.
Neither the laboratory directors nor the DDR&E have, however, taken the
position that they desired ``control'' over the human resources system
under which our scientists and engineers work. They clearly have had,
and retain, an interest in shaping that system in ways which they felt
would enhance the technical quality of our laboratories. The fact is
that the laboratories and the DDR&E, in collaboration with P&R, have
been extremely successful in achieving this goal. As a result of much
hard work and effective collaboration by all of the interest groups, we
are now in final convergence on a ``Best Practices'' design that we
believe will truly serve the needs of the laboratory directors, the
DDR&E, and the human resources community. That we've obtained this
convergence has been a notable achievement for DOD. So the true story
here is not where we started; rather, it's where we are ending. This is
a success story.
Question. Do you support a delay in the release of the final Lab
Demo Best Practices Federal Register so that it can be modified to
better meet the concerns of the laboratory community and DDR&E?
Answer. I do not support a delay in the ``release'' of the final
Lab Demo Best Practices Federal Register Notice. Further, the Director
of Defense Research and Engineering has never petitioned for such a
delay. For clarification, let me point out that some in the laboratory
community favored a delay in its implementation until the NSPS design
was finalized. Their issue was simply that of avoiding multiple near-
term conversions of personnel practices. This I believe was a totally
rational concern.
I support the immediate release of the Best Practices Federal
Register Notice when the final design tradeoffs are completed. This
does not say that I believe that we've got it perfectly right this
first time. What's important here is that we begin transforming the
entire DOD S&T personnel system, and that we have a way of adjusting
and refining this system as mission needs evolve. I don't see these
adjustments and refinements as having the form of ``exceptions for
individual laboratories.'' Rather, I think what could be necessary is
some fine tuning of the overall umbrella system.

DEVOLVEMENT OF RESEARCH PROGRAMS

Question. This year the Office of the Secretary of Defense devolved
(transferred) several programs to the Services. Many of these devolved
programs resided in OSD because of the inherent jointness of the
program.
If confirmed, how would you plan to maintain the joint nature of
those programs devolved to the Services?
Answer. Senior review groups with members from the Office of the
Secretary of Defense will remain in place to ensure particular military
departments meet the ``core/joint service'' objectives and metrics of
the programs. The senior review groups have already reviewed execution
plans of these programs and have recommended withholding funds from
selected programs until joint issues have been resolved. These same
review groups will review execution plans and metrics again at mid-year
and make recommendations concerning future funding allocations. This
process has been effective in the past and we would expect to continue
it.
For example, the Armed Services Biomedical Research Evaluation and
Management Committee, has oversight of the Department's investment
resources. This committee recommended withholding research funds from
Army and Navy programs that were formerly a part of OSD pending
clarification of program goals and objectives.

JOINT UNMANNED COMBAT AIR SYSTEM (J-UCAS)

Question. As you are aware, this committee established a goal for
the Department of Defense that by 2010 one-third of U.S. military
operational deep strike aircraft would be unmanned and by 2015 one-
third of all U.S. military ground combat vehicles would be unmanned.
What is your assessment of the Department's ability to meet this
goal? In particular, please provide the committee with the role that
USD(AT&L) will play in the oversight of this effort.
Answer. The Department recognizes the inherent advantages of
unmanned systems in military operations. I am encouraged by the
continuing advancement of technology maturation for unmanned systems.
Technology advancements are in computational capabilities, sensor
integration, and onboard intelligence. Critical to the continued
evolution and expansion of unmanned system capabilities is the
continuing development of a robust, industry standard architecture. I
might add that in the Army's design for the Future Combat System's Unit
of Action, well over 33 percent of the Increment 1 combat vehicle force
consists of unmanned ground vehicles.
Additionally, I believe my oversight role in the development and
deployment of unmanned systems is critical. I currently have OSD
oversight for the Army's Future Combat Systems (FCS) program and for
the Joint Unmanned Combat Air System (J-UCAS).
The future of FCS is heavily predicated on the success of unmanned
systems in the next decade. With this in mind, I have tasked additional
members of my staff to focus their oversight role specifically on the
unmanned systems portion of FCS. This oversight will be accomplished by
the same staff that has coordinated the Joint Robotics Program (JRP), a
congressionally-directed program since 1990, that was consolidated at
OSD level and takes much of the credit for our advancement in the
unmanned ground systems area. The Joint Robotics Program was not
devolved to one of the Services in fiscal year 2004, as were other
programs, because of what I believe is the critical nature of its
mission to foster the joint development and fielding of this important
operational and technology area across the Services.
In my oversight role, I have also directed DARPA to lead the J-UCAS
program. DARPA has a rich history of leading and producing state-of-
the-art technology efforts that have resulted in revolutionary
advances. Just two examples are the F-117 Stealth Fighter and the
internet. DARPA has also developed the two most successful UAV programs
in the history of the DOD: Predator and Global Hawk. I firmly believe
that J-UCAS will be no different. To date, three different airframes
have flown over 12 hours in 17 flights. To keep this program on track,
I have chaired one executive committee meeting and have another
scheduled for December 2003. Multiple lower level meetings have
occurred in preparation for these executive committee meetings. The
fiscal year 2005 budget is still being built, but the current
demonstration program is building to meet the stated Air Force and Navy
requirements.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. Yes
Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views,
even if those views differ from the administration in power?
Answer. Yes
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as the Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics?
Answer. Yes
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and
other communications of information are provided to this committee and
its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes
______

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain

LEAD SYSTEMS INTEGRATOR

1. Senator McCain. Mr. Wynne, DOD has shifted significant control
of acquisition programs to defense industry through the utilization of
a Lead Systems Integrator (LSI) for major programs. This construct
provides the LSI unprecedented control in hiring subcontractors in
support of a program. In this setup a parent company receives
proprietary information from all competitors bidding on a subcontract
for a program, and then may well have its own subsidiary bidding for
the contract. I believe this system is ripe for abuse. Currently Boeing
Corporation is the LSI for the Future Combat System (FCS). FCS is
arguably the largest and most complicated acquisition program ever
attempted by DOD, yet this program is being managed by a company that
has been repeatedly cited for an array of misconduct and alleged
misconduct. The Project On Government Oversight says that since 1990,
Boeing has been accused of some 50 instances of misconduct or alleged
misconduct and has been assessed fines, settlements, and penalties
totaling more than $348 million. This does not even include Boeing's
suspension from space launch contracts over the use of a competitors'
proprietary information to garner the majority of launches awarded
through the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle program that resulted in
the programming of over a billion dollars. How can you assure Congress
and the taxpayer that an LSI is not exploiting proprietary information
for its own benefit, and that the requirements are being driven by what
the warfighter needs, rather than what industry is willing to provide?
Mr. Wynne. Much has been made of the increasing use of the term
Lead Systems Integrator, but it is important to remember that an LSI is
a prime contractor. The LSI designation emphasizes the increasingly
complex integration of prime and subcontractor efforts, but the LSI
must also perform all the other responsibilities of a prime
contractor--technical, financial, etc. Of note is the fact that prime
contractors have always had broad authority in the selection and
management of subcontractors. The LSI designation does not change this
situation. Indeed, programs employing LSIs are generally executed with
traditional contractual instruments, either Federal Acquisition
Regulation (FAR) contracts or other transactions.
These contract instruments, as well as the subcontract terms and
civil and criminal law, provide protections against the LSI from
exploiting their position in favor of their own company. Moreover, the
Government, through the use of Integrated Product Teams (IPTs)
maintains a high level of insight into the LSI's selection of
subcontractors. Another alternative is to require Government approval
or consent to certain subcontracts to ensure that a subcontractor
proposed by a prime contractor does represent the best value.
The LSI, or prime contractor, has responsibility for the execution
of the contract, including the determination of technical requirements.
The Government, however, always retains responsibility for the
execution of the program as a whole. This includes control over the
performance requirements of the contract, which are established to meet
the needs of the warfighter. The LSI is charged with finding the best
technical solutions to meet those requirements.

JOINT WEAPONS PROGRAMS

2. Senator McCain. Mr. Wynne, joint programs like AIM-9X and
Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) are obvious success
stories. What are your thoughts on the overall usefulness of joint
versus single service weapons programs?
Mr. Wynne. As we consider the requirements and acquisition strategy
for all of our programs, we carefully review the required capabilities
and evaluate the joint development potential. Where feasible, we pursue
the joint approach because of the likely operational benefits, and the
overall economic advantage for the military departments, the Department
of Defense, and the taxpayer. In fact, recently, we have been
encouraging the military departments to consider either joint program
development or leveraging off of ongoing development.

3. Senator McCain. Mr. Wynne, given the sizeable investment--often
hundreds of millions of dollars--in the development of joint weapons
programs such as Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW) and Joint Air-to-Surface
Standoff Missile (JASSM), how does DOD plan to leap ahead to
transformational programs without losing the investment in current
weapon systems?
Mr. Wynne. We plan to continue to produce current weapons systems
as warfighter needs would dictate while moving forward with
transformational programs. Our performance to date in joint weapons
programs, such as Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) and JSOW, has
been extremely fruitful given their performance in Iraq and
Afghanistan. While these programs are still in production, we must look
ahead to the future recognizing technological advancements and the
changing needs of the warfighter. JASSM represents a technology
advancement that we began several years ago and the Department is just
starting to field JASSM.
With respect to leap ahead capabilities, the Small Diameter Bomb
(SDB) is a truly transformational weapon. SDB's small size and greater
accuracy will allow the warfighter to carry more munitions making
multiple kills per sortie a reality. When coupled with greater
accuracy, it will result in significant reductions in collateral
damage. Finally, the SDB will provide a growth path that will allow for
future variants to take on additional roles, such as precision against
moving targets. These kinds of capabilities would not have been
possible without the groundwork and lessons learned from previous
investments.
It is important to note that transformation in the DOD is not only
about developing new weapons systems but also how we employ current
weapon systems. The development of new tactics, doctrine, training,
organization, and concepts of operations is an integral and ongoing
part of our transformation plan.

4. Senator McCain. Mr. Wynne, the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy
apparently are about to pursue different weapons--Wind Corrected
Munitions Dispenser (WCMD-ER) and JSOW--to fill the same requirement.
Why would DOD consider departing from this joint capability, and isn't
this new tack going to increase the cost to the taxpayer for the same
capability?
Mr. Wynne. The JSOW B is an anti-armor variant, but production has
been deferred by both Servces in the fiscal year 2004 budget because of
weapon cost and the Department's decision to accept risk in anti-armor
capability. The Air Force began WCMD-ER in fiscal year 2003 as a wing-
kit upgrade to their inventory of area attack dispensers (CBU-103, 105)
to provide standoff capability. The weans or modification are only
available in the Air Force inventory. Since this is a modification
program, the projected unit cost is expected to be lower than a full
weapon.

5. Senator McCain. Mr. Wynne, the U.S. Air Force investment in
stealth and low observable standoff weapons is very substantial. What
are DOD's plans to make maximum use of the hundreds of millions
invested to date in JSOW?
Mr. Wynne. Although we deferred JSOW B production in fiscal year
2004, the Department is reviewing JSOW, along with other weapons, while
preparing the fiscal year 2005 budget. We are committed to discuss the
requirement and avoid introducing any critical mission capability gaps
for standoff weapons. JSOW provides a unique combination of cost-
effectiveness, proven combat effectiveness, standoff, lethality, and
survivability, and we will review these very carefully.

6. Senator McCain. Mr. Wynne, I understand the USAF may be
reconsidering its participation in such successful joint programs as
JSOW, AIM-9X, and AMRAAM, and have not joined in the Joint Common
Missile. These have been supported by the United States Congress. In
the case of JSOW, it was recently used successfully in Operation Iraqi
Freedom and was funded in the supplemental. What will you do to protect
the taxpayers' investment in these key programs?
Mr. Wynne. Wherever possible, the Department supports joint weapons
since they provide savings to the payer, ensure interoperability, and
allow for asset sharing among the Services. Capability-based reviews of
programs serving in a particular functional area will be used to
balance the joint warfighting capability across the Department.

TANKER LEASE PROGRAM

7. Senator McCain. Mr. Wynne, the price of the initial 20 tankers
will likely absorb some modest start-up (NRE, R&D) costs. However, any
such costs in the first 20 tankers would be reflected as a savings for
the next 80. What are those savings?
Mr. Wynne. The Air Force is currently working out the contractual
mechanics necessary to comply with the National Defense Authorization
Act for 2004. Although negotiations are not complete, the Department
will share copies of the draft contract for the lease of tanker
aircraft, and will brief the armed services committees of the House and
Senate, before executing the contract. The Department will do the same
with regard to the contract to purchase aircraft.

8. Senator McCain. Mr. Wynne, if the USAF ultimately orders more
than 100 tankers, there should be a further savings reflected in the
overall price for all the planes. What are those savings?
Mr. Wynne. The Air Force could expect savings for orders beyond the
first 100 tankers. It is premature to speculate on what the savings
would be in subsequent orders for these planes. On the one hand, we
would expect a reduction in the unit price because nonrecurring coasts
are fully amortized in the first 100 planes. On the other hand, price
is a function of such things as labor rates, price of raw materials and
components, user requirements, production quantity, production rate,
technical specifications and market demand amongst other factors. Until
a follow-on procurement is more fully articulated and negotiated, it
would be only a guess as to the potential savings.

9. Senator McCain. Mr. Wynne, will financing of the acquisition and
construction of the tankers be structured around a ``special purpose
entity'' (SPE)? If so, please describe.
Mr. Wynne. For the leased tankers, the financing of the acquisition
and construction is expected to be accomplished by way of an SPE. The
SPE will be involved in both the construction financing of the planes
(i.e., to provide money to Boeing to construct the planes) and the
permanent financing of the planes (i.e., to purchase the planes from
Boeing and to lease them to the Air Force). The SPE will function as a
lessor for the KC-767A Tanker Lease and will be established as a
Delaware Business Trust entitled ``KC-767A USAF Tanker Statutory Trust
No. 2003-1.'' The SPE will be managed by the Wilmington Trust Company,
which is a leading trust company in the equipment leasing business. The
SPE will have one independent director (not from Boeing or the Air
Force) to oversee its activities. The SPE will purchase the aircraft
from Boeing and lease them to the Air Force. The SPE will borrow funds
to make periodic payments during construction towards the manufacture
of the aircraft as well as permanent financing for the lease of the
aircraft. The SPE will terminate upon the final sale of all aircraft
and the repayment of all of the debt.

10. Senator McCain. Mr. Wynne, will there be a full and open
competition to raise the financings for the acquisition or construction
of the tankers to ensure that the fundraising is done at the lowest
possible cost to taxpayers? If so, please describe how this competition
will be conducted.
Mr. Wynne. We currently do not envision another competition to
select a company that will assist in raising the financing for the
acquisition of the tankers. As part of their proposal to provide KC-767
Tankers, Boeing competitively selected Citigroup to act as its agent to
arrange bond financing. Citigroup is a world leader in bond financing
and will be responsible for working with the special purpose entity
(SPE), a non-profit statutory trust. The Wilmington Trust Company, a
leading trust company in the equipment leasing business, will manage
this SPE. To purchase the aircraft from Boeing, the SPE raises capital
from institutional market investors to pay Boeing and then in turn
lease the planes to the Air Force. In order to raise this capital, the
SPE will competitively offer tranches of debt to institutional
investors. The structure of the tranches (e.g., debt issues secured at
varying levels of risk) is a proprietary structure developed by Boeing
and Citigroup to ensure that the overall interest rates on the bond
issue will be optimal--given a specific point in time and anticipated
lease payments, lease duration, contractual terms and conditions, and
the aircraft fair market value at the end of the lease. Air Force
commercial financing experts have reviewed the proposed structure of
the financing and agree that it is entirely consistent with practices
for commercial financing and provides the necessary framework for the
Air Force to receive optimal rates.

11. Senator McCain. Mr. Wynne, will the USAF allow the SPE to have
any dealings with Boeing or its affiliates or subcontractors suppliers
other than the contract for the 767 itself?
Mr. Wynne. No, the Special Purchase Entity (SPE) will not have
dealings with Boeing or its vendors outside of the requirements for
this contract. The SPE will only perform the limited functions
specifically authorized in the KC-767A Tanker Contract and it will
terminate upon the final sale of all aircraft and the repayment of all
of the debt.

12. Senator McCain. Mr. Wynne, to what extent are the costs of the
SPE included in the price of the tankers?
Mr. Wynne. As part of the negotiated agreement between Boeing and
the Air Force, all administrative costs with respect to the SPE are
borne by Boeing, as stated in contract clause C-221. These costs are
not separately itemized and, as such, we have no insight into those
costs. Boeing has the economic incentive to minimize these costs. This
is a common way of handling these type of costs in a commercial lease
transaction.

13. Senator McCain. Mr. Wynne, Boeing will be launching a new 7E7
as a commercial upgrade and replacement for the 767. One of the
hallmarks of the 7E7 will be a much more modern and efficient aircraft
than the 767. The 7E7 might be available in the 2008 time frame, just 2
years later than the scheduled first acceptance of the 767 under the
tanker lease program. Why would the U.S. Government and the USAF not
want to buy the most modern aircraft in its size instead of buying the
last of an older and almost obsolete commercial aircraft?
Mr. Wynne. The Air Force did not want to wait for this ``concept
airplane'' to become a reality and then delay recapitalization of the
tanker fleet for the additional period necessary to develop and produce
a tanker variant. Boeing has launched the 767 Global Tanker Transport
Aircraft (GTTA) and has two firm customers: Japan and Italy.

14. Senator McCain. Mr. Wynne, where the 7E7 will be so much
cheaper to manufacture, own, and operate than the 767, why would it not
make sense for the U.S. Government to buy this aircraft and get the
benefits of being a launch customer? Then, the USAF would have a truly
modern tanker fleet instead of buying an aircraft with 1970s
technology. Why must the USAF always be buying the oldest aircraft
model out there? First 707s, then KC-10s, and now 767s which are now
obsolete as commercial aircraft? Why can't the USAF plan to buy modern
planes for the KC/RC/EC/E series aircraft?
Mr. Wynne. The Air Force did not want to wait for this ``concept
airplane'' to become a reality and then delay recapitalization of the
tanker fleet for the additional period necessary to develop and produce
a tanker variant. The Government would assume much more risk from
becoming a launch customer as compared to a customer on a mature
product--including performance, schedule, and cost risks.
______

Question Submitted by Senator Jeff Sessions

JOINT SURVEILLANCE AND TARGET ATTACK RADAR SYSTEM

15. Senator Sessions. Mr. Wynne, Congress has expressed deep
interest in the Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System
(JSTARS) re-engine program and did so as early as the Fiscal Year 2000
DOD Authorization bill. In this year's DOD Authorization Conference
Report the Department is required to report to Congress by early
spring.
I will be very interested in the report, the options provided by
DOD, and the plan offered to keep these planes flying with the most
efficient and best engines available. The JSTARS is a proven combat
multiplier and we cannot afford for it to be grounded due to
shortsighted funding in the Future Years Defense Program.
Mr. Wynne. In accordance with the conference report regarding the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, the Department
will provide a report to the congressional defense committees of an
economic analysis comparing the maintenance of the current engines in
JSTARS aircraft, the purchase of new engines, and the lease of new
engines. The report will identify the Department's preferred option as
reflected in the fiscal year 2005 President's budget, and the
Department's plans to implement that option. The Department will submit
the report early next year.
______

Question Submitted by Senator Susan M. Collins

SHIPBUILDING PROGRAMS

16. Senator Collins. Mr. Wynne, this committee raised in the Fiscal
Year 2004 Authorization Report continued concerns over the adequacy of
the Department's plan for the transition between DDG-51 and DD(X)
shipbuilding programs. We directed the Navy to review the projected
workloads of our two surface combatant shipbuilders, report on their
viability, and describe actions the Navy was taking to ensure
preservation of critical technical and production skills at both
surface combatant shipbuilding yards. My colleagues and I look forward
to receiving that Navy report early next year as we prepare to act on
the administration's fiscal year 2005 defense budget request.
It has been almost 20 years since the Navy and this industrial base
faced the last significant transition between major surface combatant
shipbuilding programs--at that time with the planned completion of the
CG-47 AEGIS Cruiser Class and the initial procurement of the Arleigh
Burke Class AEGIS Destroyer Class. One fundamental contrast between
then and now is that the Navy procured 11CG-47 Cruisers after gaining
funding in fiscal year 1985 for the first DDG-51 Destroyer. The fact
that the Navy overlapped procurement of CGs and DDGs helped ensure that
major surface combatant force levels were sustained, and the surface
combatant shipbuilding industrial base remained healthy and actively
employed despite the inherent unknowns of moving to a new ship class
involving new technologies and production methods.
In contrast, under the fiscal year 2004 budget plan and the future
years defense program, no DDG-51s would be procured after fiscal year
2005, yet DD(X) procurement would start up at a low rate of no more
than one or two ships per year until fiscal year 2009. For these and
other reasons, the Congressional Research Service in a recent report on
surface combatant acquisition programs, raised a concern as to whether
planned surface combatant procurements from fiscal years 2004-2009
would put our two surface combatant shipbuilders--Bath Iron Works and
Ingalls--and their workers, through a roller coaster effect of
decreasing production and employment for several years only to be
followed by the requirement to then sharply increase employment and
production. What steps will you take to ensure that the transition from
the production of DDG destroyers to DD(X) destroyers does not lead to
the decline of our major surface combatant structure, or the loss of
our Nation's specialized defense industrial base sector?
Mr. Wynne. Ship construction schedules, quantities, and procurement
profiles greatly influence a shipyard's projected workload, and
therefore, the impact to shipyard workload is an important
consideration in each decision made by the Department. The Department
continually reviews and monitors the workload for all key shipyards,
both public and private, and considers this information in
deliberations regarding surface combatant procurement. This included
extensive evaluation of the impact of DDG wind-down and DD(X) startup
on both Bath Iron Works and Ingalls, and the conclusion that, in spite
of the reduced quantity of ships being procured, the additional design
and production man-hours associated with startup of the new DD(X) ship
program at both yards will result in relatively minor workload
fluctuations that will not jeopardize their viability, cause
significant employment declines, nor add significant additional
overhead costs to Navy programs. We will closely monitor the progress
of the DD(X) program as it proceeds toward production to determine if
additional action is needed to provide a smooth transition from DDG-51
to DD(X) destroyer production. We will also ensure that industrial base
implications are factored in to the DD(X) acquisition strategy that is
being finalized by the Navy at this time. The concerns you raised will
also be considered at the DD(X) program review planned for early 2004.
As requested in the Fiscal Year 2004 Authorization Report, the
Secretary of the Navy is completing a report on the surface combatant
shipbuilding industrial base and will submit it to the committees. This
report will include a workload projection for the surface combatant
shipyards, an assessment of the financial viability of those shipyards,
and a plan for sustaining the unique technical and production skills
within that industrial base. The workload projections associated with
the fiscal year 2004 President's budget as well as those associated
with the shipbuilding profile under consideration as part of the
ongoing development of the fiscal year 2005 President's budget will be
assessed as part of this report.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Saxby Chambliss

PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS

17. Senator Chambliss. Mr. Wynne, I believe that public-private
partnerships between depots and private industry can, and do, provide
viable alternatives to ensuring two strong industrial bases, using the
best of the private and public sectors while preserving the title 10
capability of our depots, and also providing unique solutions to the
challenging sustainment issues faced by the services today. While there
are documented successes in this area, a recent GAO report indicated
that the use of public-private partnerships were only a small part of
the overall depot program. We currently have pubic-private partnerships
at the Warner-Robins Air Logistics Center at Robins Air Force Base for
the C-130J and C-17 programs. While these partnering relationships have
room to grow, I believe they set the example for how depot operations
should be conducted in the future. Can you give me your opinion
regarding how public-private partnerships should work and how you
intend to foster public-private partnerships in our DOD depots?
Mr. Wynne. Depot maintenance public-private partnering is directed
towards improving the output and performance of organic depots. Our
partnering program includes full exploitation of existing legislative
authority for Centers of Industrial and Technical Excellence,
development of necessary guidance to enhance successful partnering,
evolution of contracts and partnering agreements that encourage
industrial investment, exploitation of commercial industrial
capabilities to enhance product performance and reliability or to
improve processes and support, and development of potential industry/
government training and certification programs. We are fostering depot
maintenance public-private partnerships through aggressive advocacy in
our policies and by making partnerships a key component of our
transformational initiative to improve support for weapon systems
through performance based logistics support.

CIRCULAR A-76

18. Senator Chambliss. Mr. Wynne, during my tenure in the House of
Representatives and the Senate I have watched closely how DOD
implements its competitive sourcing studies through Circular A-76.
While no one believes in or understands the value of competition more
than I do, I continue to be concerned about the competitive sourcing
process and how these studies are conducted. In this year's Defense
Appropriations bill, I supported an amendment which required DOD to
show 10 percent or $10 million savings before outsourcing work, and
allow DOD civilians to always be allowed to establish a Most Efficient
Organization bid to compete against a contractor's bid on their work
effort. I believe, and I believe the administration ultimately agreed,
that these were constructive changes to the new Circular A-76.
Nevertheless, I continue to be concerned that in the revised Circular
DOD workers are required to compete for their jobs every 3-5 years,
even after they have won a competition the first time. While Government
employees should absolutely be held to the same performance standards
as contractors and be subject to repeat competitions if their
performance is not up to standard, I think the requirement to re-
compete every 3-5 years until the work is outsourced is a waste of
taxpayers' money and has an extremely negative impact on our civilian
workforce. Can you share your thoughts on how DOD will implement the
revised Circular A-76, and whether you support eliminating the
requirement that work previously competed and won by the Government bid
be re-competed?
Mr. Wynne. The Department is still shaping its procedures to
implement the revised circular. A smooth transition is essential
because DOD believes the credibility of the new process depends on
successful execution of the initial competitions. As DOD starts
competitions using the new procedures, the Department will ensure
responsible officials are properly trained for new, expanded duties.
For the American people to receive maximum value for their tax dollars,
commercial activities should be subject to the forces of competition.
Our contracted commercial activities are subject to the forces of
the competitive market on a continuous basis (as required by the
Federal Acquisition Regulations). It is essential DOD also ensure a
most efficient organization (MEO) in-place as a result of public-
private competition continues to be efficient and cost effective. In
this manner contractors and Government MEOs are held to the same
standard. Additionally, the Departments' requirements are not static;
re-competition should be a consideration for all commercial activities
whether they are performed by the MEO or private sector.

AERIAL COMMON SENSOR PROGRAM

19. Senator Chambliss. Mr. Wynne, it is encouraging to note a
promising Joint Service Initiative currently ongoing between the Army
and Navy on the Aerial Common Sensor (ACS) and EP-3 replacement
program. Given that the ACS will likely be the C\4\ISR platform for the
Navy and Army for the next 30 years, what role do you visualize you and
your office playing in the acquisition process for this future legacy
system?
Mr. Wynne. My office will retain acquisition oversight and
milestone decision authority for this major defense acquisition
program. With increasing reliance on ``smart'' weapons and weapon
systems, DOD no longer has the luxury to design, develop, and acquire
``ultimate technology'' over a 15-20 year acquisition cycle, in which a
majority of the technology is outdated by the time the system is
fielded. Evolutionary acquisition is the preferred DOD strategy for
rapid acquisition as it delivers capability in increments, recognizing,
up front, the need for future capability improvements.

20. Senator Chambliss. Mr. Wynne, what are your views on threshold
versus objective requirements in planning and executing a new program
like ACS?
Mr. Wynne. I agree with the Joint Staff definition that a threshold
requirement is the minimum acceptable operational value below which the
utility of the system becomes questionable. An objective is the desired
operational goal associated with a performance attribute, beyond which
any gain in utility does not warrant additional expenditure. The
objective value is an operationally significant increment above the
threshold. This distinction between threshold and objective enables DOD
program managers to have the flexibility to work with both industry,
the DOD requirements process and the test community to meet a program's
performance, budget and schedule requirements. The evolutionary
acquisition process enables us to define objective values for key
capabilities from one spiral or increment as threshold values for the
next.

21. Senator Chambliss. Mr. Wynne, what are your views on whether
objective requirements are a goal or a requirement to be met?
Mr. Wynne. In using the term objective without context, it is a
goal that by definition is not a requirement to be met. However, in
many instances, acquisition programs such as ACS that involve
evolutionary acquisition approaches, objective requirements evolve to
threshold requirements for future increments. For example the ACS
reliability requirement for increment 1 is 36 hours Mean Time Between
System Abort (MTBSA). The objective requirement for increment 1 is 76
hours MTBSA. This objective for increment 1 becomes the threshold for
increment 2 and the objective increases to 263 MTBSA. In general we
also look for acquisition programs that require competing industry
teams to show how they will meet ORD stated Key Performance Parameters,
threshold requirements, and also migrate to objective requirements.
During source selection the competing industry teams will be evaluated
on the ability or potential to meet objective requirements or
incrementally modernize to satisfy objective requirements from a total
system perspective including both the platform and the sensor.

22. Senator Chambliss. Mr. Wynne, how important is it to DOD that
ACS truly represent a Joint Service effort? Given my role as a Member
of this committee and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, I
would appreciate your keeping me advised of any significant actions
affecting this program as we move forward.
Mr. Wynne. In any fiscally constrained environment, it is
imperative that the Department look at all programs from a joint
perspective and seek out synergy in our acquisition efforts. The
partnership of the Army and the Navy on the Aerial Common Sensor
program is an excellent example of combining efforts to satisfy service
unique requirements while also satisfying those of the joint
warfighter.
______

Question Submitted by Senator John Cornyn

BUDGETING FOR THE 20-80 TANKER PLAN

23. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Wynne, the Department of Defense proposal
to lease 100 KC-767A tanker aircraft was a major issue in this year's
DOD authorization bill. The plan was revised in conference to authorize
the lease of only 20 aircraft with language allowing DOD to propose
buying an additional 80 tanker aircraft in the out-years. Deputy
Secretary Wolfowitz sent a letter to Chairman Warner on November 5
which has been widely interpreted as committing the administration to
adding sufficient sums to the top-line DOD out-year budget in years
2008-2012 to pay for the unbudgeted costs of these aircraft. There have
been some comments by DOD officials hinting that other fully programmed
Air Force and Navy aircraft programs like the F/A-22, JSF, C-130J, F/A-
18 E/F, and V-22 might be cut back in order to pay for these tankers.
Can you explain how you intend to fund the tanker program, and do you
plan to reduce funding for other vital military aircraft programs?
Mr. Wynne. Without additional funding from Congress, the Department
will have to fund the KC-767 program from currently funded programs or
where savings can be identified within existing activities. The
Department will have to make careful decision to balance costs, risks,
and requirements. It would premature to identify sources until the
lease 20/buy 80 profile is finalized and the delivery schedule
identified, and we have contacts ready for signature.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin

HYBRID ELECTRIC VEHICLES

24. Senator Levin. Mr. Wynne, your office recently (August 2003)
completed a report on hybrid electric vehicles. The report discussed
the potential advantages of fielding hybrid vehicles--including the
capability for silent vehicle operation and the ability to generate
much-needed electrical power on the battlefield. The report also listed
milestones that need to be achieved, including formulating DOD's goals
for hybrid vehicles, designing optimal hybrid electric propulsion
systems for military vehicles, and demonstrating hybrid vehicles that
satisfy DOD's goals. What are your plans for achieving these
milestones?
Mr. Wynne. The Future Tactical Truck System (FTTS) Advanced-Concept
Technology Demonstration (ACTD) is the flagship Department of Defense
(DOD) program to demonstrate the benefits of hybrid electric
technologies for tactical vehicles. This program will conduct a
military utility assessment of hybrid propulsion technologies in fiscal
year 2006. DOD, the Army, and industry are working together to produce
a hybrid system that minimizes vehicle weight and delivers maximum fuel
efficiency at affordable costs. This program will allow DOD to
establish hybrid electric vehicle goals and establish optimal design
specifications for future acquisition programs.

25. Senator Levin. Mr. Wynne, what role will the Tank-automotive
and Armaments Command (TACOM) play in the establishment of goals and
future hybrid vehicle programs?
Mr. Wynne. The Army's Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM)
has a critical role in the hybrid electric vehicle programs of the
Department of Defense. The Army Materiel Command, through TACOM and
Army Research, Development, and Engineering Command (RDECOM) efforts,
is responsible for the effective development, integration, procurement,
and support of DOD hybrid electric vehicles.

26. Senator Levin. Mr. Wynne, how will you leverage advances made
in the commercial sector to get DOD the best hybrid technology most
efficiently?
Mr. Wynne. Leveraging advances made in the commercial sector in the
area of hybrid electric propulsion is critical to DOD's success in
hybrid electric technology for our military vehicles. The Future
Tactical Truck System Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration is the
flagship effort in DOD to promote commercial sector interest in hybrid
electric propulsion and is managed by the National Automotive Center.
The National Automotive Center, located in Warren, Michigan, serves as
a catalyst linking industry, academia, and Government agencies in the
development and exchange of automotive technologies. These efforts
range from supporting Small Business Innovation Research programs to
fully integrated hybrid technology demonstration programs which design,
build, test and evaluate combat and tactical vehicles having hybrid
electric propulsion systems.

27. Senator Levin. Mr. Wynne, will the Commercially Based Tactical
Truck (COMBATT) program provide DOD with hybrid electric vehicles that
can be used in non-military applications? Is there a plan underway for
DOD to procure COMBATT?
Mr. Wynne. The COMBATT program is an effort by the National
Automotive Center to demonstrate hybrid electric capabilities in light
vehicles. The COMBATT demonstration effort will feed Department of
Defense requirements and specification development for future light
tactical vehicles. Commercial hybrid electric vehicles similar to those
developed under this program will be available starting in 2005.
However, there is no military procurement currently planned.

SPACE ACQUISITION PROGRAMS

28. Senator Levin. Mr. Wynne, your predecessor, Under Secretary
Aldridge, delegated substantial responsibility for acquisition of space
systems to the Under Secretary of the Air Force. Do you plan to keep
the delegation in place as written, or do you intend to make any
changes to it? If changes are made what would you change?
Mr. Wynne. The delegation of space acquisition authorities
currently is in place consistent with the recommendations from the
Space Commission. The Under Secretary of the Air Force has substantial
responsibilities as the Executive Agent for Space, while OSD retains
their oversight responsibilities. I believe we should defer from making
any significant changes until we've gained sufficient experience
operating under Air Force's recently approved (October 2003) National
Security Space Acquisition Policy 03-01 to give us an adequate baseline
for making potential changes.

29. Senator Levin. Mr. Wynne, most of the space acquisition
programs have major problems. Many of these problems can be traced to a
lack of oversight on the part of either National Reconnaissance Office
or the Air Force. Will you have a direct oversight role? For instance,
will you play any oversight role in or review any programmatic
milestones or cost estimates?
Mr. Wynne. I retain all of my oversight responsibilities for space
acquisition programs. Section 911 of the Bob Stump National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-314) requested
that the Secretary of Defense provide a detailed plan on how the Office
of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) will provide oversight of acquisition
for defense space programs. As outlined in our response, OSD will
maintain a strong oversight role since space represents a significant
military capability and is critical in both maintaining and improving
surveillance, communications and situation awareness in support of our
military forces. In my role as USD(AT&L), if confirmed, I will ensure a
robust acquisition program oversight process remains in place to pro
actively identify and resolve execution problems. This activity will be
accomplished by proactive oversight and analysis of funding, cost,
schedule, performance, and other program status information to assess
the program's progress toward achieving objectives set forth in their
milestone reviews. This results-oriented management approach
establishes effective controls by initially establishing program
objectives at the milestone review and then monitoring progress toward
achieving these objectives through review and analysis of oversight
reporting information. It should also be noted that OSD and Joint Staff
oversight responsibilities prescribed by law and further defined in DOD
guidance have not been changed by the Department's alignment space
responsibilities following the implementation of the Space Commission
Report recommendations highlighted earlier. Space programs are reviewed
quarterly by the USD(AT&L) and the OSD staff via the Defense
Acquisition Executive Summary (DAES) process. In addition, under the
provisions of the new National Security Space Acquisition Policy 03-01
signed out by the Under Secretary of the Air Force this October, my
staff and I will continue to support and advise the DOD Space Milestone
Decision Authority throughout the acquisition process by participating
in both the Independent Program Assessment for space programs
approaching Key Decision Points and attending the Defense Space
Acquisition Board.

30. Senator Levin. Mr. Wynne, in your view what is the Government's
role and what is the contractor's role in the development of
requirements, concept of operations, and system specifications for a
new space program?
Mr. Wynne. The Government and contractor's roles for new space
programs are the same roles they have for any new DOD program. The
Government is responsible for the development of requirements and for
the concept of operations. The process that is in place for this is the
new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3170.01c. The
Government does work closely with our industry partners during this
process. Contractors interact with the Government in assessing new
technologies and new applications of technology. The Government and
contractor's roles in developing the system specifications varies
widely depending upon the program. While the requirements development
and CONOPs are clearly the purview of the Government, system
specifications may be developed unilaterally by the Government, the
contractor or in a collaborative manner. The Government retains
responsibility for ensuring that the system specification does in fact
meet the requirements.

NSA ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT

31. Senator Levin. Mr. Wynne, section 924 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 mandates a transfer of
management of acquisition programs at the National Security Agency
(NSA), including milestone decision authority, from NSA to the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
(USD(AT&L)). This action reflected long-standing concern that
acquisition processes at NSA were not in conformance with acquisition
reform processes required by the Goldwater-Nichols Act within the rest
of the Department. If you are confirmed, what steps would you take to
ensure that NSA acquisition procedures are reformed and the NSA
modernization takes full advantage of acquisition procedures
implemented throughout the military departments?
Mr. Wynne. NSA has made progress in several areas with regard to
improving acquisition practices. However, both NSA and I recognize that
they still have work ahead to fully implement effective acquisition
practices comparable to those used throughout the Department. We are
developing an oversight framework that emphasizes improvements to NSA
practices and outlines our oversight of their acquisition programs.
Within that framework, I will be the milestone decision authority for
NSA modernization programs until we are able to certify their
acquisition process as effective and return Milestone Decision
Authority (MDA) to them. In keeping with our management philosophy
embodied in DODI 5000.2, we will tailor our program review process to
ensure effective systems are developed to meet intelligence needs. We
intend to implement a collaborative acquisition decision process that
requires NSA to exercise its role in acquisition, while ensuring the
appropriate level of OSD involvement.
I will work closely with the Director of the National Security
Agency (DIRNSA) and his Senior Acquisition Executive to mature NSA
acquisition processes. Additionally, we are working closely with the
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and the Community
Management Staff in this effort.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Edward M. Kennedy

PUBLIC-PRIVATE COMPETITION

32. Senator Kennedy. Mr. Wynne, at a hearing in March, the Office
of Management and Budget (OMB) senior procurement official reported to
the Senate Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Readiness and
Management Support that she had removed obstacles to allowing Federal
employees to compete for work currently done by contractors and new
work. Will the Department of Defense implement such competitions and,
if so, would you please outline the Department plans for subjecting
work performed by contractors and new work (performed by neither
workforce at present) to public-private competition?
Mr. Wynne. Consistent with the previous circular and the more
recent revised circular, the Department's policy has not precluded
competition of contracted commercial activities. Four competitions have
been performed on our contracted commercial activities. However,
subjecting new work to public-private competition on a regular basis
would significantly increase the number of public-private competitions
with little benefit to the taxpayer. Private sector competition under
the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) adequately provides best
value for the taxpayer and contracts awarded under the FAR are re-
competed on a regular basis. Private sector bidders would incur
additional bid and proposal costs for the longer periods of time
necessary to pursue public-private competitions, providing a
disincentive for private sector participation. This, in turn, would
limit DOD access to the innovation and new technology available in the
commercial marketplace.

CIRCULAR A-76

33. Senator Kennedy. Mr. Wynne, at that same hearing, Mr. Aldridge
indicated that the Department would be using the OMB Circular A-76 and
``Alternatives to A-76'' to fulfill competitive sourcing targets. What
are these alternatives? To what extent, if any, would these
``Alternatives to A-76'' involve contracting out work currently
performed by Federal employees without using A-76 or any other form of
public-private competition (that does not include the most efficient
organization plan and minimum cost differential, as required by Section
8014 of the Fiscal Year 2004 Defense Appropriations bill for all
functions performed by in-house staff that involve more than 10
employees)?
Mr. Wynne. The Department continues to conduct A-76 competitions;
however, DOD believes the Department and taxpayers are best served by
employing a wide range of business tools designed to make our
operations more efficient. Rather than pursuing narrowly defined A-76
targets, DOD will not confine its approach to only A-76. The Department
will look for the best instrument available whether through competitive
souring, reengineering, divestiture, privatization, public-private
partnering, etc.--to determine the most efficient and effective way to
do Government business better. Any alternatives that move work from the
private to the public sector must adhere to appropriate legislative
requirements.

34. Senator Kennedy. Mr. Wynne, also at that subcommittee hearing,
Mr. Aldridge reported that, ``OMB identified for DOD a long-term
competition goal for 226,000 positions (50 percent of the fiscal year
2000 FAIR inventory of 452,000).'' Since then, OMB has ostensibly
repudiated its policy of establishing competition quotas for all
agencies. Please identify, numerically, the Department new ``long-term
competition goal'' and explain how, if at all, the Department
competitive sourcing agenda has been changed as a result of OMB's
declaration that agencies would no longer be held to competition
quotas.
Mr. Wynne. The Department's Business Initiative Council decided to
take a two phase approach to address the President's Management Agenda
on competitive sourcing. First, the Senior Executive Council tasked the
military departments and defense agencies to conduct a core competency
review to identify functions falling outside of the Department's core
competencies that should be considered for divestiture or performance
by the private sector. Second, the Department refined its inventory
guidance, which it uses to improve consistency in the identification of
inherently governmental and commercial activities across the
Department. Taking into consideration this phased approach, the
military departments and other DOD components will identify their
competitive sourcing plans in the fiscal year 2005 budget submission.
Those plans will comprise the Department's competitive sourcing plan.
Further, DOD will track the plans and maintain oversight of these
commitments in the budget to ensure that the Department's competitive
sourcing plan is realized.

35. Senator Kennedy. Mr. Wynne, the Inspector General (in D-2003-
056) raised serious doubts about the controversial 12 percent overhead
rate imposed on all in-house bids in the A-76 process. The IG
recommended to the Department of Defense that it either come up with a
more supportable rate or develop a methodology that would allow
overhead to be calculated for each in-house bid. What steps is DOD
taking to respond to the IG's recommendation?
Mr. Wynne. The 12-percent overhead factor represents a compromise
to level the playing field in A-76 cost comparisons precisely because
of the inability of Government accounting systems to measure all
activity based costs. This 12-percent factor is prescribed by OMB
Circular A-76 which allows individual Federal agencies to request
deviations if supported by factual data. No such supporting data
currently exists, but the Department has contracted with the Center for
Naval Analyses (CNA) to study this issue and provide a report in April
2004. This report should provide the factual basis for determining
whether pursuit of deviating from the 12-percent overhead rate is
warranted.

BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE

36. Senator Kennedy. Mr. Wynne, we had an opportunity to talk about
the past Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) criteria for scientific
and technical facilities. DOD has done a poor job in the past of
evaluating the specialized needs of these facilities. Are you
developing new criteria for the upcoming BRAC round to adequately
account for their specialized equipment, personnel, and missions?
Mr. Wynne. Yes, the Department is developing selection criteria for
BRAC round 2005. The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990
(P.L. 101-510), as amended, requires the closure and realignment
recommendations to be based on published selection criteria that make
military value the primary consideration. In accordance with this
statue, the Department will publish these draft selection criteria in
the Federal Register by December 31, 2003, for a 30-day public comment
period. I can assure you that the Department will consider the special
needs of technical facilities in the development and implementation of
the selection criteria.

NATIONAL SECURITY PERSONNEL SYSTEM

37. Senator Kennedy. Mr. Wynne, certain labs, including Natick,
have been excluded from the National Security Personnel System (NSPS).
What are you plans for continuing and expanding the personnel demo
programs at these facilities to help us retain and recruit the finest
possible technical workforce?
Mr. Wynne. All defense laboratories that are not moving to the NSPS
will move to the Best Practices Initiative. Best Practices represents
an improvement over the current demonstration projects in terms of
cost-effectiveness and flexibility since none of the laboratories
enjoys all of the following features:

Pay Banding
Simplified Classification Process
Pay for Performance, including contribution-based pay
Simplified Hiring Process
Modified Reduction-in-Force Procedures
Extended Probationary Periods
Distinguished Scholastic Achievement Appointments
Modified Term Appointments
Voluntary Emeritus Corps
Enhanced Training and Development
Sabbaticals

Over the past 18 months, the Department has been working hard on
its Best Practices Initiative. Best Practices represents a
collaborative human resources solution for the Department to take
advantage of all the good work that has been done in testing civilian
human resources policies in a variety of laboratory environments. As a
respected best of breed in civilian human resources design, this change
will reduce infrastructure costs, allow for intelligent dialogue on the
similarities and differences between labs and their respective civilian
human resources issues, and allow for all labs to benefit from all the
lessons learned at all demos. We applaud the work that has gone into
existing lab demos and look at this next step in moving to Best
Practices as a generational improvement.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Joseph I. Lieberman

SEMICONDUCTOR MANUFACTURING

38. Senator Lieberman. Mr. Wynne, many experts in the defense and
intelligence communities are seriously concerned about the loss to the
U.S. economy of the high-end semiconductor chip-manufacturing sector to
East Asian countries, the likely subsequent loss of the semiconductor
research and design sectors, and the grave national security
implications that this would entail. The composition of the global
semiconductor industry has changed dramatically in recent years.
National trade and industrial policies of East Asian countries which
have capitalized on these changes are driving a migration of
semiconductor manufacturing to that region, in particular to China,
through a large array of direct and indirect subsidies to their
domestic semiconductor industry. This migration is occurring at a time
when these components are becoming a crucial defense technology
advantage to the U.S., due to the present and future needs of advanced
processors in the defense and intelligence communities. Informed
elements of the military and intelligence sectors have made clear that
relying on semiconductor integrated circuits fabricated outside the
U.S. (e.g. in China, Taiwan, and Singapore) is not an acceptable
national security option. When will a report outlining the potential
long-term solutions of this problem be available?
Mr. Wynne. We plan to provide a report to the committee by
September 30, 2004, as requested in Senate Report 108-46, the Fiscal
Year 2004 Authorization Act report. This report will detail the
Department's plans regarding semiconductor chip manufacturing
capabilities as well as research and design capabilities. This report
will naturally follow from the effort we had already initiated under
the Defense Trusted Integrated Circuit Strategy (See details in
question #39).
We have also initiated a Defense Science Board Task Force on High
Performance Microchip Supply that will be publishing their results
around that same time. This Task Force will be looking into some of the
issues you have described and the Department's ability to obtain high
performance microchips given that environment. The Task Force has been
asked to make policy and investment recommendations as well as
addressing some specific technical questions.

39. Senator Lieberman. Mr. Wynne, we understand that a foundry to
ensure DOD access to a short- and mid-term supply of cutting edge
integrated circuits may address immediate national security concerns.
What kinds of long-term strategies are being considered to ensure DOD
first and assured access to critical advanced components from trusted
domestic sources? What programs currently exist that are addressing
this issue?
Mr. Wynne. On October 10, 2003, the Deputy Secretary of Defense
signed the Defense Trusted Integrated Circuit Strategy. This strategy
has five components with the goal to ensure that our defense industrial
base includes leading edge, trusted commercial suppliers for critical
integrated circuits used in sensitive defense weapons, intelligence,
and communication systems. The five components of the strategy are:

(1) Identification of the facilities that could qualify as trusted
sources based on a certification or clearance process.
(2) Identification of the products required by the Department and
which of the above facilities can produce those products.
(3) Identification of acquisition strategies or adjustments to them
to maximize competitive opportunities while preserving domestic
capabilities.
(4) Identification of research initiatives to assure security
concerns are met and support the next generation of integrated circuits
for specialized defense applications.
(5) Support policies that provide a level playing field
internationally for the procurement of commercial products since the
Department's integrated circuit supplier community depends on the
health of the commercial integrated circuit industrial base.

The results of the Defense Science Board Task Force on High
Performance Microchip Supply will inform the implementation of this
strategy.

40. Senator Lieberman. Mr. Wynne, does the Department have plans to
maintain the critical semiconductor equipment industry (i.e.
lithography, photomasks) in the U.S., either through a Government-
industry consortium or through more direct intervention?
Mr. Wynne. In the past, the Department has invested heavily in
research and development directly supporting new technology in the
semiconductor equipment industry. We continue to invest in new
alternative technology for semiconductor manufacturing. We do not and
cannot, however, compete with nor influence the enormous sums of
commercial investment in existing semiconductor equipment technology.
In the past, the Department has directly intervened under the
authority granted the President in section 721 of the Defense
Production Act (also known as the Exon-Florio amendment) to ensure
national security threats are resolved. In particular, the Government
acted to ensure that domestic lithography manufacturing and research
and development capabilities were retained at Silicon Valley Group
facilities when it was acquired by the Dutch firm, ASM Lithography. The
Department would not hesitate to use these tools again if national
security threats could not be resolved through other provisions of law.

41. Senator Lieberman. Mr. Wynne, will Congress have the
opportunity to discuss the proposed solutions as they evolve?
Mr. Wynne. As we implement the Defense Trusted Integrated Circuit
Strategy, we will share our decisions with you.

NATIONAL SECURITY PERSONNEL SYSTEM AND BEST PRACTICES PERSONNEL
INITIATIVE

42. Senator Lieberman. Mr. Wynne, Members of Congress have
previously written to the Department asking that it not take any
administrative action on the implementation of the Best Practices
Personnel Initiative with respect to the Defense Demonstration
Laboratories, which DOD has published for public comment in the Federal
Register. Section 1101 of the recently passed National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, chapter 99, section 9902(c)
requires the exclusion of specific defense laboratories from the NSPS.
Are there currently administrative actions being taken that would place
the defense laboratories within a Best Practices Personnel Initiative,
essentially circumventing the provisions and undercutting the intent of
the statute?
Mr. Wynne. The Secretary of Defense has authority to establish
personnel demonstrations in the science and technology laboratories
under authority previously granted by Congress. We have tested various
personnel flexibilities in these labs for a number of years and are
ready to move to the next step after 18 months of evaluation and
review. Over the past 18 months, the Department has been working hard
on its Best Practices Initiative. Best Practices represents a
collaborative human resources solution for the Department to take
advantage of all the good work that has been done in testing civilian
human resources policies in a variety of laboratory environments. As a
respected best of breed in civilian human resources design, this change
will, reduce infrastructure costs, allow for intelligent dialogue on
the similarities and differences between labs and their respective
civilian human resources issues, and allow for all labs to benefit from
all the lessons learned at all demos.
The Department's intent to improve existing demonstration projects
was clearly announced in the Federal Register of April 2, 2003, which
stated the Department's intent to move the laboratories into Best
Practices. Also, on May 12, 2003, the Dr. David S.C. Chu, Under
Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness testified before the
Senate Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on Oversight of Government
Management, the Federal Workforce and the District of Columbia that
``(w)e can apply this blueprint (Best Practices) to about 150,000 of
Defense civilians who are covered by demonstration project and
alternative personnel system authority.'' We applaud the work that has
gone into existing lab demos and look at this next step in moving to
Best Practices as a generational improvement.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed

TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY ADVISORY COMMITTEE

43. Senator Reed. Mr. Wynne, your predecessor, Mr. Aldridge,
established the Technology and Privacy Advisory Committee (TAPAC), and
charged it with advising the Secretary of Defense concerning the legal
and policy considerations implicated by the application of data mining
technology to counter-terrorism and counter-intelligence missions. Is
the TAPAC looking at programs from all of DOD and the intelligence
community, or just the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA)?
Mr. Wynne. The TAPAC is concentrating on DARPA, but is also
inquiring about other DOD programs, as well as those in other Federal
agencies. The TAPAC has heard presentations about technology and
privacy from the Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, the Terrorist Threat Integration Center, and the Central
Intelligence Agency, in addition to programs in the DOD.

44. Senator Reed. Mr. Wynne, what is the status of the TAPAC's
efforts?
Mr. Wynne. The TAPAC has held five full committee meetings and
numerous subcommittee meetings and teleconferences; heard from over 80
witnesses from Government, private industry, academia, and advocacy
groups; and, consulted hundreds of documents. The committee has had
access to a wide range of information, both classified and
unclassified. The committee welcomed participation by the public and
all interested parties, and sought to inform and motivate that
participation through a Web site (www.sainc.com/tapac) containing
information from its meetings and related background materials. The
committee's report is due in March 2004.

45. Senator Reed. Mr. Wynne, do you plan for this to be a standing
committee that can monitor these technologies as they develop and are
deployed?
Mr. Wynne. Since the TAPAC's final report has not yet been
released, I do not know what the committee will recommend in the
report. However, in the end, it will be up to Secretary Rumsfeld
whether or not a standing committee will continue its work.

DARPA PROGRAM REVIEW

46. Senator Reed. Mr. Wynne, the recently passed Authorization
Conference Report included some language that directed the Secretary of
Defense to establish some means of reviewing DARPA's plans and programs
more closely. I understand that you recently commissioned a review of
DARPA's programs by the Defense Science Board, in order to ``confirm
that DARPA has advanced research projects based on sound, proven
scientific and technological foundations, practices and methods, and
are of high value to DOD's operational missions.'' What were the
results of that review?
Mr. Wynne. At the request of the acting Under Secretary of Defense
(Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) and the Director of DARPA, the
Defense Science Board (DSB) conducted an independent, one-time
evaluation of DARPA's current technology portfolio to confirm that
DARPA had advanced research projects based on sound, proven scientific
and technological foundations, practices and methods, that were of high
value to DOD's operational missions. The DSB Task Force did not look at
DAPRA's strategic plan in its review of their technology programs.
The DSB review results are documented in a November 14, 2003,
Letter Report by the DSB Task Force Chairman. The letter report stated:
``After a summary review of the current DARPA technology portfolio, the
task force found no programs that appeared to have obvious ethical
issues, that had insurmountable technical impediments, or that could
not be of high value to DOD.'' Minor issues identified included:
technical objectives that seemed overly ambitious, program titles that
did not accurately reflect the research performed, or program
documentation that needed to be better cast for a general audience. The
Letter Report suggested two areas that require continued attention from
DARPA management: (1) establish a process to ensure that human and
animal testing protocols are followed by DARPA agents; and (2) remain
sensitive to the potential impact of DARPA research efforts on the
environment.
DARPA has taken action on both recommendations:
(1) DARPA does not own any research facilities and uses the
Services' technical agents to oversee the implementation of DARPA
research projects, to include projects that involve human and animal
testing. These technical agents ensure program performers working in
support of DARPA-funded programs follow established testing protocols.
DARPA also uses a DOD veterinarian to review and monitor DARPA projects
that involve animal testing. To strengthen oversight, the DARPA
director will hire outside experts to conduct scheduled and random
inspection visits of selected Service agents, beginning in January
2004, for the purpose of verifying compliance with testing
responsibilities and procedures. DARPA will immediately end projects if
there is any doubt as to compliance with established protocols.
(2) DARPA is closely examining research projects for environmental
issues, and will end any project where the technology appears to have
an adverse impact on the environment without adequate mitigation. DARPA
will ensure compliance with all environmental law requirements.

47. Senator Reed. Mr. Wynne, will you make the findings of the
Board's review available to Congress?
Mr. Wynne. The completed Letter Report is forwarded for your
review.

48. Senator Reed. Mr. Wynne, do you plan for more of these types of
reviews for DARPA or other organizations in DOD?
Mr. Wynne. At this time, I do not have any planned reviews
scheduled. However, the Director of Defense Research and Engineering
(DDR&E) is conducting a detailed review of DARPA's portfolio for both
technical content and consistency of program. The DDR&E has already
reviewed one office and will be conducting the rest of the reviews
through February 2004.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka

PUBLIC-PRIVATE COMPETITION

49. Senator Akaka. Mr. Wynne, the administration has been
criticized for imposing arbitrary quotas for the number of public
sector jobs that each agency is supposed to subject to public-private
competition. Recently, OMB announced that it will no longer impose
arbitrary goals, but will allow each agency to develop its own
outsourcing plan, based on research and analysis of the work in the
agency that is appropriate for public-private competition. Will you
ensure that the outsourcing plans of the military services and defense
agencies are based on considered research and sound analysis, rather
than arbitrary quotas or goals?
Mr. Wynne. The Department's Business Initiative Council decided to
take a two-phased approach to address the President's Management Agenda
on competitive sourcing. First, the Senior Executive Council tasked the
military departments and defense agencies to conduct a core competency
review to identify functions falling outside of the Department's core
competencies that should be considered for divestiture or performance
by the private sector. Second, the Department refined its inventory
guidance, which it uses to improve consistency in the identification of
inherently governmental and commercial activities across the
Department. Taking into consideration this phased approach, the
military departments and other DOD components will identify their
competitive sourcing plans in the fiscal year 2005 budget submission.
Those plans will comprise the Department's competitive sourcing plan.
Further, DOD will track the plans and maintain oversight of these
commitments in the budget to ensure that the Department's competitive
sourcing plan is realized.

DEFENSE LOGISTICS EXECUTIVE AND AGENCY

50. Senator Akaka. Mr. Wynne, in September, Secretary Rumsfeld
determined that the Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L) would become
DOD's Defense Logistics Executive, with the authority to make any
changes required to integrate the global supply chain. What changes do
you envision as being the most necessary, in both the short and the
longer term?
Mr. Wynne. Thank you for this question. As further background,
Secretary Rumsfeld officially designated the Under Secretary (AT&L) as
the Defense Logistics Executive (DLE) in a memorandum issued in
September. In the same memorandum, the Secretary called for the
establishment of a Defense Logistics Board (DLB), an advisory board to
the DLE. In addition, the Secretary designated the Commander, U.S.
Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) as the DOD Distribution Process Owner
(DPO). I believe the framework we are establishing in response to the
Secretary's memorandum provides the DLE with the tools to fully
exercise the authority granted him. In this regard, I held the first
DLB meeting on December 5. While this meeting was primarily an
informational meeting, we did agree on several issues that directly
address your question. In the near term, we need to develop meaningful
and actionable metrics and targets for our logistics processes. In this
regard, I have tasked the Joint Logistics Board to develop proposed
targets for DLB review within 60 days. I believe these targets will
provide us with the tools to better assess where our processes are
working well and where we need to concentrate our future efforts and
resources. Recognizing that successful integration of the supply chain
will depend upon a DOD team effort, the Board underscored the
requirement for continued and close coordination of effort amongst the
newly designated DPO, the Joint Deployment Process Owner, the military
departments and defense agencies, and the combatant commanders. The
Department is continuing its efforts to institutionalize what I will
call supply chain enablers, such as Radio Frequency Identification
(RFID) and Unique Item Identification (UID). In the long-term, UID
coupled with emerging technologies in RFID will allow the Department to
efficiently track and account for our materiel assets literally from
factory to foxhole. The Department will need to position its logistics
processes and systems to take best advantage of these technologies and
others as they emerge.

51. Senator Akaka. Mr. Wynne, what are your views on the
appropriate relationship between TRANSCOM and the Defense Logistics
Agency (DLA)? Do you think TRANSCOM will be able to effectively execute
its new responsibilities as the distribution process owner without
direct authority over DLA?
Mr. Wynne. I have given TRANSCOM the authority they need as the
Distribution Process Owner to transform and improve the overall
efficiency and interoperability of the distribution process. TRANSCOM
does not need to have command authority over DLA to accomplish this
mission. In fact, simply combining DLA into TRANSCOM does not create a
unified DOD supply chain or materiel distribution system since the
military departments and geographic combatant commands also have
significant responsibilities with respect to the distribution process.
TRANSCOM will coordinate with DLA, the military services, the combatant
commands, the Joint Staff, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense
in order to effect the transformation and integration of the
distribution process that our warfighters require.

EQUIPMENT MAINTENANCE

52. Senator Akaka. Mr. Wynne, one of the most significant
challenges our forces will face as they begin rotating out of Iraq is
returning their equipment to ready status after facing intense use
under difficult conditions. Do you believe that any changes are
necessary either to the law, regulation, or DOD policies, to ensure
that maintenance is performed in a timely, efficient manner?
Mr. Wynne. We have not identified the need for any changes to the
law. We are still assessing how we can reset the systems used in the
Afghan and Iraq wars. There are significant challenges involved in
meeting warfighter timeframe requirements. We will revise our policies
as necessary or ask for changes in the law, if needed, to provide any
necessary flexibility.

ARSENALS AND AMMUNITIONS PLANTS

53. Senator Akaka. Mr. Wynne, earlier this year, RAND issued a
report recommending significant changes in how DOD manages its arsenals
and ammunition plants. Specifically, the report suggests that DOD
divest itself of the responsibility of manufacturing ammunition, and
instead pursue either privatization or the establishment of a Federal
Government corporation. What are your views on what actions DOD should
take to change its management of the arsenals and ammunition plants?
Mr. Wynne. The Department has embarked on a comprehensive review of
our defense and security needs toward transforming the force. Part of
this transformation includes a review of our arsenals and ammunition
plants. The review includes an Infrastructure Steering Group, which
USD(AT&L) chairs, composed of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, the Military Department Assistant Secretaries for installations
and environment, the Service Vice Chiefs, and the Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense (Installations & Environment) to oversee joint
cross-service analyses of common business oriented functions. With
Congress' authorization of a base realignment and closure (BRAC) in
2005, we have an opportunity to explore alternatives that provide an
innovative, responsive, and reliable ammunition production industrial
base.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson

SHIP REPAIR

54. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Wynne, the Navy uses the ``cost plus''
Multi-Ship, Multi-Option (MSMO) approach to repair its ships on the
west coast. The Navy is proposing the same approach for the east coast,
which is currently using ``fixed price'' bids and competing the work on
an individual ship basis to achieve the lowest cost. As a result, the
data suggest that ship repair costs incurred by the Navy on the west
coast on DDG 51 (the first class of ships on the east coast that the
Navy proposes to use the MSMO approach) are two to three times greater
for similar repairs than the costs experienced by the Navy on the east
coast. What oversight of this contracting and workloading approach have
you exercised from OSD--Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics?
Mr. Wynne. I have not been directly involved with the Navy's
acquisition approach for satisfying ship repair requirements on the
east coast because it is below the threshold of acquisition programs
that are normally brought to our attention. Nevertheless, the Navy's
Service Acquisition Executive, has held numerous meetings on the Navy's
internal review process to ensure the proper oversight of the DDG 51
MSMO contract strategy. This oversight helped ensure that the contract
strategy, works hare identification, small business utilization, and
award fee structure are fair from a small business perspective and in
alignment with the Navy's desire to be most efficient and effective in
executing DDG 51 maintenance and modernization strategy. Also, with
regard to the assertion that the west coast MSMO contracting approach
costs two to three times greater than similar east coast ship repair
contracts, the Navy has conducted a thorough analysis of maintenance
expenditure data from both coasts. The Navy's analysis, when
considering a similar scope and underlying assumptions, indicates that
the spend rate on the west coast is similar to what is currently seen
on the east coast.

55. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Wynne, what is your assessment of the
impact of this contracting method on the ship repair industrial base,
especially for the mid-sized to smaller yards or contractors in ship
homeports?
Mr. Wynne. Our assessment, based on prior ship repair contracts on
the west coast, is that this contracting method, which include the
requirement to utilize small business in 40 percent of the production
work and have a minimum of two small businesses participate, will help
ensure that an efficient and effective small business industrial base
is available to the Navy for the foreseeable future. The solicitation
is structured to prevent one repair shipyard from winning the entire
award, allowing the mid-size to smaller shipyards to remain competitive
with large repair shipyards.

56. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Wynne, what are the risks to the
industrial base and how are you helping the Navy to anticipate and
mitigate these risks?
Mr. Wynne. The Navy does not anticipate that this methodology will
have an adverse impact on the industrial base. However, the Navy is
very sensitive to any potential impact on the small business industrial
base that might occur by utilizing the DDG 51 MSMO strategy. In order
to both identify and mitigate any risks, the semi-annual award fee
evaluation board will evaluate the contractors' performance and
evaluate the prime contractor's use of small business in executing the
contract. Each of the ship repair projects in the contract will be
negotiated separately as options and the entire contract will be
awarded as a base year contract with option years which can be
evaluated on an annual basis. This approach will allow the Government
to better evaluate the effect of the DDG 51 MSMO in relation to the
entire east coast small business repair industry and allow adjustments
if deemed necessary.

57. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Wynne, is DOD committed to fully fund
this potentially more expensive ship depot maintenance plan?
Mr. Wynne. As I indicated in my response to question #54, the Navy
does not envision that this contracting strategy will result in a more
expensive ship depot maintenance plan. The Department is fully
supportive of the Navy's effort to both streamline and make more
efficient surface ship maintenance and modernization. The DDG 51 MSMO
is one of several strategies to help ensure the surface fleet can
respond quickly and effectively in support of the Fleet's Readiness
Plan. If executed as envisioned, the DDG 51 MSMO will provide a more
efficient and effective maintenance methodology in supporting a surge
capability for the U.S. Navy.
______

[The nomination reference of Michael W. Wynne follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
September 3, 2003.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
Michael W. Wynne, of Florida, to be Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, vice Edward C. Aldridge,
resigned.
______

[The biographical sketch of Michael W. Wynne, which was
transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was
referred, follows:]

Biographical Sketch of Michael W. Wynne

Michael W. Wynne is the Principal Deputy Under Secretary Of Defense
for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics. The Senate confirmed him to
this position on July 12, 2001.
Prior to joining defense, he was involved in venture capital
nurturing small technology companies through their start-up phase as a
member of the NextGenFund Executive Committee and serving in executive
positions within two companies.
In 1999, Mr. Wynne retired as Senior Vice President from General
Dynamics (GD), where his role was in International Development and
Strategy. He spent 23 years with General Dynamics in various senior
positions with the Aircraft (F-16s), Main Battle Tanks (M1A2), and
Space Launch Vehicles (Atlas and Centaur).
In between working with GD, he spent 3 years with Lockheed Martin
(LMT), having sold the Space Systems division to then Martin Marietta.
He successfully integrated the division into the Astronautics Company
and became the General Manager of the Space Launch Systems segment,
combining the Titan with the Atlas launch vehicles.
Prior to joining industry, Mr. Wynne served in the Air Force for 7
years, ending as a Captain and Assistant Professor of Astronautics at
the U.S. Air Force Academy teaching Control Theory and Fire Control
Techniques. Mr. Wynne graduated from the United States Military Academy
and also holds a Masters in Electrical Engineering from the Air Force
Institute of Technology and a Masters in Business from the University
of Colorado. He has attended short courses at Northwestern University
(Business) and Harvard Business School (PMD-42). He is a Fellow in the
National Contracts Management Association, and has been a past
President of the Association of the United States Army, Detroit Chapter
and the Michigan Chapter of the American Defense Preparedness
Association. He has published numerous professional journal articles
relating to engineering, cost estimating, and contracting.
______

Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense,
3015 Defense Pentagon,
Washington, DC, September 15, 2003.
Hon. John Warner, Chairman,
Committee on Armed Services,
United States Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: This letter provides information on my financial
and other interests for your consideration in connection with my
nomination for the position of Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. It supplements Standard Form
278, ``Executive Personnel Financial Disclosure Report,'' which has
already been provided to the committee and which summarizes my
financial interests.
To the best of my knowledge, none of the financial interests listed
on my Standard Form 278 will create any conflict of interest in the
execution of my new governmental responsibilities. Additionally, I have
no other interests or liabilities in any amount with any firm or
organization that is a Department of Defense contractor.
During my term of office, neither I nor any member of my immediate
family will invest in any organization identified as a DOD contractor
or any other entity that would create a conflict of interest with my
Government duties.
I do not have any present employment arrangements with any entity
other than the Department of Defense and have no formal or informal
understandings concerning any further employment with any entity. If
confirmed, I am committed to serve in this position at the pleasure of
the President throughout his term of office.
I have never been arrested or charged with any criminal offenses
other than minor traffic violations. I have never been party to any
civil litigation. To the best of my knowledge, there have never been
any lawsuits filed against any agency of the Federal Government or
corporate entity with which I have been associated reflecting adversely
on the work I have done at such agency or corporation. I am aware of no
incidents reflecting adversely upon my suitability to serve in the
position for which I have been nominated.
To the best of my knowledge, I am not presently the subject of any
governmental inquiry or investigation.
I am a member of certain organizations and professional societies,
which are either listed below or have been previously provided to the
committee. None of these should pose any conflict of interest with
regard to my governmental responsibilities. I trust that the foregoing
information will be satisfactory to the committee.
Sincerely,
Michael W. Wynne.

UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Michael Walter Wynne.

2. Position to which nominated:
Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics).

3. Date of nomination:
September 3, 2003.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
September 4, 1944; Clearwater, Florida.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Barbara H. Wynne (Maiden Name - Hill).

7. Names and ages of children:
Lisa W. Henkhaus, 36.
Collene W. Finn, 35.
Karen W. Murphy, 32.
Laura W. Killette, 27.

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions,
dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.
7/1962-6/1966, United States Military Academy, West Point, NY,
BSGE.
7/1968-6/1970, Air Force Institute of Technology, WPAFB, OH, MSEE.
9/1973-6/1975, University of Colorado, C. Springs, CO, MBA.

9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the
last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of
job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
6/2001-Present, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L), 3015
Defense Pentagon, Rm 3E1006, Washington, DC.
12/2000-6/2001, Chairman/CEO, IXATA Group, 8989 Rio San Diego
Drive, San Diego, CA.
7/1997-10/1999, Senior Vice President, General Dynamics, 3190
Fairview Park Drive, Falls Church, VA.
5/1994-3/1997, GM, Space Launch System, Lockheed Martin
Astronautics, Deer Creek Canyon Drive, Denver, CO.
3/1991-5/1994, President, Space Systems, 5001 Kearney Villa Road,
San Diego, CA.

12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
None.

13. Political affiliations and activities:
(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or
any public office for which you have been a candidate.
None.
(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered
to all political parties or election committees during the last 5
years.
None.
(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign
organization, political party, political action committee, or similar
entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.
Republican National Committee, approximately $4,000.
Republican Senatorial Inner Circle, less than $1,000.
Democratic National Committee, less than $500.
Senator Feinstein, approximately $750.
Senator Allen, less than $500.
Congressman Hunter, less than $500.
Bush Campaign, less than $500.
Texas Republican Party, less than $200.
Virginia Republican Party, less than $500.
Congressman Cunningham, less than $500.
Senator Snowe, approximately $750.
Lazio Campaign, less than $300.

15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of
books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have
written.
1970, Multiple reentry vehicles, AIAA/IEE proceedings.
1972, Optimal Control; Sightline Autopilot, AIAA proceedings.
1978, Impact of Labor Strike on Learning Curves for Manufacturing
Society for Parametric Estimating.
1985, RD&A Magazine, Benefits of the M1A1 Multi-year for the Army.

18. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to respond to requests to appear and testify before any
duly constituted committee of the Senate?
Yes.

______

[The nomination of Michael W. Wynne was returned to the
President on December 8, 2004.]

APPENDIX

Committee on Armed Services Questionnaire on Biographical and Financial
Information Requested of Civilian Nominees

------

UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
of your answer applies.
Part A--Biographical Information
Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
public inspection prior to the hearing and will also be published in
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)

2. Position to which nominated:

3. Date of nomination:

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)

5. Date and place of birth:

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)

7. Names and ages of children:

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions,
dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.

10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
or local governments, other than those listed above.

12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable and
other organizations.

13. Political affiliations and activities:
(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or
any public office for which you have been a candidate.

(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered
to all political parties or election committees during the last 5
years.

(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign
organization, political party, political action committee, or similar
entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.

14. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions
for outstanding service or achievements.

15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of
books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have
written.

17. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly
constituted committee of the Senate?

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
FINANCIAL AND OTHER INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
Instructions to the Nominee: Information furnished in Parts B
through F will be retained in the committee's executive files and will
not be made available to the public unless specifically directed by the
committee.

Name:

Part B--Future Employment Relationships
1. Will you sever all business connections with your present
employers, business firms, business associations or business
organizations if you are confirmed by the Senate?

2. Do you have any plans, commitments or agreements to pursue
outside employment, with or without compensation, during your service
with the government? If so, explain.

3. Do you have any plans, commitments or agreements after
completing government service to resume employment, affiliation or
practice with your previous employer, business firm, association or
organization?

4. Has anybody made a commitment to employ your services in any
capacity after you leave government service?

5. Is your spouse employed and, if so, where?

6. If confirmed, do you expect to serve out your full term or until
the next Presidential election, whichever is applicable?

Part C--Potential Conflicts of Interest
1. Describe all financial arrangements, deferred compensation
agreements, and other continuing dealings with business associates,
clients or customers.

2. Indicate any investments, obligations, liabilities, or other
relationships which could involve potential conflicts of interest in
the position to which you have been nominated.

3. Describe any business relationship, dealing or financial
transaction which you have had during the last 10 years, whether for
yourself, on behalf of a client, or acting as an agent, that could in
any way constitute or result in a possible conflict of interest in the
position to which you have been nominated.

4. Describe any activity during the past 10 years in which you have
engaged for the purpose of directly or indirectly influencing the
passage, defeat or modification of any legislation or affecting the
administration and execution of law or public policy.

5. Explain how you will resolve any potential conflict of interest,
including any that may be disclosed by your responses to the above
items. (Please provide a copy of any trust or other agreements.)

6. Do you agree to provide to the committee any written opinions
provided by the General Counsel of the agency to which you are
nominated and by the Attorney General's office concerning potential
conflicts of interest or any legal impediments to your serving in this
position?

Part D--Legal Matters
1. Have you ever been disciplined or cited for a breach of ethics
for unprofessional conduct by, or been the subject of a complaint to
any court, administrative agency, professional association,
disciplinary committee, or other professional group? If so, provide
details.

2. Have you ever been investigated, arrested, charged or held by
any Federal, State, or other law enforcement authority for violation of
any Federal, State, county or municipal law, regulation or ordinance,
other than a minor traffic offense? If so, provide details.

3. Have you or any business of which you are or were an officer
ever been involved as a party in interest in any administrative agency
proceeding or civil litigation? If so, provide details.

4. Have you ever been convicted (including a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere) of any criminal violation other than a minor traffic
offense?

5. Please advise the committee of any additional information,
favorable or unfavorable, which you feel should be considered in
connection with your nomination.

Part E--Foreign Affiliations
1. Have you or your spouse ever represented in any capacity (e.g.,
employee, attorney, business, or political adviser or consultant), with
or without compensation, a foreign government or an entity controlled
by a foreign government? If so, please fully describe such
relationship.

2. If you or your spouse has ever been formally associated with a
law, accounting, public relations firm or other service organization,
have any of your or your spouse's associates represented, in any
capacity, with or without compensation, a foreign government or an
entity controlled by a foreign government? If so, please fully describe
such relationship.

3. During the past 10 years have you or your spouse received any
compensation from, or been involved in any financial or business
transactions with, a foreign government or an entity controlled by a
foreign government? If so, please furnish details.

4. Have you or your spouse ever registered under the Foreign Agents
Registration Act? If so, please furnish details.

Part F--Financial Data
All information requested under this heading must be provided for
yourself, your spouse, and your dependents.

1. Describe the terms of any beneficial trust or blind trust of
which you, your spouse, or your dependents may be a beneficiary. In the
case of a blind trust, provide the name of the trustee(s) and a copy of
the trust agreement.

2. Provide a description of any fiduciary responsibility or power
of attorney which you hold for or on behalf of any other person.

3. List sources, amounts and dates of all anticipated receipts from
deferred income arrangements, stock options, executory contracts and
other future benefits which you expect to derive from current or
previous business relationships, professional services and firm
memberships, employers, clients and customers.

4. Have you filed a Federal income tax return for each of the past
10 years? If not, please explain.

5. Have your taxes always been paid on time?

6. Were all your taxes, Federal, State, and local, current (filed
and paid) as of the date of your nomination?

7. Has the Internal Revenue Service ever audited your Federal tax
return? If so, what resulted from the audit?

8. Have any tax liens, either Federal, State, or local, been filed
against you or against any real property or personal property which you
own either individually, jointly, or in partnership?

(The committee may require that copies of your Federal income tax
returns be provided to the committee. These documents will be made
available only to Senators and the staff designated by the Chairman.
They will not be available for public inspection.)

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This ---------- day of --------------------------, 20------.
______

Committee on Armed Services Questionnaire on Biographical and Financial
Information Requested of Certain Senior Military Nominees

------

UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES FOR
CERTAIN SENIOR MILITARY POSITIONS

Instructions to the Nominee:
Complete all requested information. If more space is needed use an
additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number
(i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation of your answer applies.
If you have completed this form in connection with a prior military
nomination, you may use the following procedure in lieu of submitting a
new form. In your letter to the Chairman, add the following paragraph
to the end:

``I hereby incorporate by reference the information and commitments
contained in the Senate Armed Services Committee form
`Biographical and Financial Information Requested of Nominees
for Certain Senior Military Positions,' submitted to the
Committee on [insert date or your prior form]. I agree that all
such commitments apply to the position to which I have been
nominated and that all such information is current except as
follows: . . . .'' [If any information on your prior form needs
to be updated, please cite the part of the form and the
question number and set forth the updated information in your
letter to the Chairman.]

Part A--Biographical Information

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)

2. Position to which nominated:

3. Date of nomination:

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.
Also include your office telephone number.)

5. Date and place of birth:

6. Marital Status: (Include name of husband or wife, including
wife's maiden name.)

7. Names and ages of children:

10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable and
other organizations.

12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly
constituted committee of the Senate?

13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly
constituted committee of the Congress, to give your personal views,
even if those views differ from the Administration in power?

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
FINANCIAL AND OTHER INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

Instructions to the Nominee: Information furnished in Parts B
through E will be retained in the committee's executive files and will
not be made available to the public unless specifically directed by the
committee.

Name:

Part B--Future Employment Relationships

1. Do you have any plans, commitments or agreements to pursue
outside employment, with or without compensation, during your military
service. If so, explain.

2. Has anybody made a commitment to employ your services in any
capacity after you leave military service?

Part C--Potential Conflicts of Interest

1. Describe all financial arrangements, deferred compensation
agreements, and other continuing dealings with business associates,
clients or customers.

2. Indicate any investments, obligations, liabilities, or other
relationships which could involve potential conflicts of interest in
the position to which you have been nominated.

4. Explain how you will resolve any potential conflict of interest,
including any that may be disclosed by your responses to the above
items. (Please provide a copy of any trust or other agreements.)

5. Do you agree to provide to the committee any written opinions
provided by the General Counsel of the agency to which you are
nominated and by the Office of Government Ethics concerning potential
conflicts of interest or any legal impediments to your serving in this
position?

6. Is your spouse employed and, if so, where?

Part D--Legal Matters

1. Have you ever been disciplined or cited for a breach of ethics
for unprofessional conduct by, or been the subject of a complaint to
any court, administrative agency, professional association,
disciplinary committee, or other professional group? If so, provide
details.

2. Have you ever been investigated, arrested, charged or held by
any Federal, State, or other law enforcement authority for violation of
Federal, State, county or municipal law, regulation or ordinance, other
than a minor traffic offense? If so, provide details.

3. Have you or any business of which you are or were an officer
ever been involved as a party in interest in any administrative agency
proceeding or litigation? If so, provide details.

4. Have you ever been convicted (including a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere) of any criminal violation other than a minor traffic
offense?

5. Please advise the committee of any additional information,
favorable or unfavorable, which you feel should be considered in
connection with your nomination.

Part E--Foreign Affiliations

1. Have you or your spouse ever represented in any capacity (e.g.,
employee, attorney, business, or political adviser or consultant), with
or without compensation, a foreign government or an entity controlled
by a foreign government? If so, please fully describe such
relationship.

4. Have you or your spouse ever registered under the Foreign Agents
Registration Act? If so, please furnish details.

Signature and Date

----------------------------------.

This ---------- day of --------------------------, 20------.