[Pages S12257-S12264]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST-BAN TREATY

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the resolution of
ratification.
The legislative clerk read as follows:

Resolved, (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring
therein),
That the Senate advise and consent to the ratification of
the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, opened for
signature and signed by the United States at New York on
September 24, 1996, including the following annexes and
associated documents, all such documents being integral parts
of and collectively referred to in this resolution as
``Treaty'', (contained in Senate Treaty Document 105-28):
(1) Annex 1 to the Treaty entitled ``List of States
Pursuant to Article II, Paragraph 28'';
(2) Annex 2 to the Treaty entitled ``List of States
Pursuant to Article XIV''.
(3) Protocol to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty.
(4) Annex 1 to the Protocol.
(5) Annex 2 to the Protocol.

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, let me just pose one unanimous-consent
request before we begin. To the extent that it is possible with respect
to people in the Chamber ready to make statements, I ask unanimous
consent that the debate on the proposition be divided in a way that
proponents and opponents speak in opposition to each other, one
following the other.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The Senator from Arizona.
Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
Mr. BIDEN. It has been raised whether or not that is a good idea. As
I understand the unanimous-consent request, it is to the extent
possible we will try to alternate between Democrat and Republican,
opponents and proponents. That is the same as saying, with one
exception, for and against. I do not expect that to mean that we

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would not engage each other in colloquy and debate so we don't just
have statement after statement.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
Mr. KYL. That is precisely why I framed it the way I did.
Mr. DORGAN. Reserving the right to object----
Mr. KYL. It would not be appropriate to say Republican and Democrat,
since I know Senator Specter would like to speak not in opposition.
Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, I hope the
Senator would not put forth any unanimous-consent request. I hope we
would simply have an agreement among the two leaders in the Chamber
that they will alternate back and forth. The difficulty with a
unanimous-consent agreement is you may get a circumstance where you
have no one on one side and three or four speakers on the other side.
I think it is practical to manage it the way the Senator has
suggested.
Mr. KYL. With the understanding that Senator Biden and I just
reached, and the Senator just articulated, I withdraw the request, and
I assume we can proceed in that fashion.
Mr. President, I rise today to explain why I strongly oppose the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty that has been submitted to the Senate for
its advice and consent.
I think the words of six distinguished Americans who formerly bore
the responsibility for safeguarding our nation's security as Secretary
of Defense frame the issue before the Senate quite well. In a letter to
the majority leader this week, James Schlesinger, Dick Cheney, Frank
Carlucci, Caspar Weinberger, Donald Rumsfeld, and Melvin Laird who
served as Secretaries of Defense in the Reagan, Bush, Ford, and Nixon
administrations, stated:

As the Senate weighs whether to approve the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), we believe Senators will be obliged
to focus on one dominant, inescapable result were it to be
ratified: over the decades ahead, confidence in the
reliability of our nuclear weapons stockpile would inevitably
decline, thereby reducing the credibility of America's
nuclear deterrent.

For this reason, these former Secretaries of Defense conclude that
the CTBT is ``incompatible with the Nation's international commitments
and vital security interests . . . Accordingly, we respectfully urge
you and your colleagues to preserve the right of this nation to conduct
nuclear tests necessary to the future viability of our nuclear
deterrent by rejecting approval of the present CTBT.''
I couldn't agree more with the considered judgment of these
distinguished Americans who have had the awesome responsibility of
maintaining the U.S. nuclear deterrent throughout the cold war and
beyond.
Before discussing some of the flaws of the CTBT and how it will
undermine the credibility of our nuclear deterrent, a few words on the
importance of nuclear deterrence, and the limits of arms control I
think are in order.
As my colleagues recall, during the cold war, the Soviet Union
enjoyed a tremendous advantage in conventional military forces in
Europe. The United States was able to offset this advantage in
conventional forces, and to guarantee the security of Western Europe
until the cold war ended peacefully, through the maintenance of a
credible nuclear deterrent. Our nuclear ``umbrella,'' as it is called,
was extended to our allies in other parts of the world as well.
Since the end of the cold war, some have argued that nuclear
deterrence is an outdated concept, and the U.S. no longer needs to
retain a substantial nuclear weapons capability. However, deterrence is
not a product of the cold war and has been around since the beginning
of diplomacy and war. Over 2,500 years ago, the Chinese philosopher Sun
Tzu wrote about the value of deterrence stating, ``To win one hundred
victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue
the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.''
Furthermore, the end of the cold war does not mean national security
threats to the United States have evaporated. James Woolsey, President
Clinton's first Director of Central Intelligence, aptly described the
current security environment when he said, ``We have slain a large
dragon [the Soviet Union]. But we live now in a jungle filled with a
bewildering variety of poisonous snakes.''
Rogue nations like North Korea, Iran, and Iraq have weapons of mass
destruction programs and are hostile to the United States. China is an
emerging power whose relationship with the United States has been rocky
at best. And Russia retains significant military capabilities,
including over 6,000 strategic nuclear warheads.
The gulf war is an excellent case study of the continuing importance
of nuclear deterrence in the post-cold-war world. In that conflict, the
maintenance of a credible nuclear weapons capability, coupled with the
understanding that it was possible that the United States would respond
with nuclear weapons if attacked with other weapons of mass
destruction, saved lives by deterring such an attack.
As my colleagues recall, Iraq possessed a large arsenal of chemical
weapons that it had used against its Kurdish population, and against
Iranian troops during the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s. It is widely
acknowledged that Iraq did not use chemical weapons against the United
States-led coalition during the gulf war because we possessed a
credible nuclear deterrent.
Prior to the start of the gulf war, U.S. leaders practiced the art of
deterrence by issuing clear warnings to Saddam Hussein. Secretary of
Defense Dick Cheney stated:

He [Saddam Hussein] needs to be made aware that the
President will have available the full spectrum of
capabilities. And were Saddam Hussein foolish enough to use
weapons of mass destruction, the U.S. response would be
absolutely overwhelming and it would be devastating. He has
to take that into consideration, it seems to me, before he
embarks upon a course of using those kinds of capabilities.

President Bush also sent a strongly worded message to Saddam Hussein
which said:

Let me state, too, that the United States will not tolerate
the use of chemical or biological weapons. . . . The American
people would demand the strongest possible response. You and
your country will pay a terrible price if you order
unconscionable acts of this sort.

Iraqi officials have confirmed that these statements deterred Baghdad
from using chemical and biological weapons. In 1995, Foreign Minister
Tariq Aziz reported to Rolf Ekeus, chairman of the U.N. commission
charged with inspecting Iraqi weapons of mass destruction facilities,
that Iraq was deterred from using its arsenal of chemical and
biological weapons because the Iraqi leadership had interpreted
Washington's threats of devastating retaliation as meaning nuclear
retaliation.
Aziz's explanation is corroborated by a senior defector, General
Wafic Al Sammarai, former head of Iraqi military intelligence, who
stated:

Some of the Scud missiles were loaded with chemical
warheads, but they were not used. We didn't use them because
the other side had a deterrent force. I do not think Saddam
was capable of taking a decision to use chemical weapons or
biological weapons, or any other type of weapons against the
allied troops, because the warning was quite severe, and
quite effective. The allied troops were certain to use
nuclear arms and the price will be too dear and too high.

Mr. President, as these statements show, a credible nuclear deterrent
remains vitally important to our nation. I would hope that we could
begin this debate on the CTBT by agreeing that a strong U.S. nuclear
deterrent remains essential and that the Senate should reject any
actions that would undermine the credibility of this deterrent.
To the second preliminary point, the fallacy of arms control:
Unfortunately, the CTBT negotiated by the Clinton administration
would do just that. This is not surprising since the Clinton
administration has sought to protect our national security with a
fixation on arms control that columnist Charles Krauthammer aptly calls
``Peace through Paper.''
Of course, arms control is not a new idea. After all, in the year
1139, the Roman Catholic Church tried to ban the crossbow. Like so many
other well-intentioned arms control measures, this one was doomed to
failure from the start.
And who can forget the Kellog-Briand treaty, ratified by the United
States in 1929, that outlawed war as an instrument of national policy.
This agreement and others spawned in its wake left the United States
and Britain unprepared to fight and unable to deter World War II.

[[Page S12259]]

Yet despite these and many other notable failures, the Clinton
administration still looks to arms control as the best way to safeguard
our security. Under Secretary of State John Holum explained this
philosophy during a speech in 1994, stating.

The Clinton Administration's policy aims to protect us
first and foremost through arms control--by working hard to
prevent new threats--and second, by legally pursuing the
development of theater defenses for those cases where arms
control is not yet successful.

The administration continues to cling tenaciously to the ABM
Treaty, which prevents us from defending ourselves against missile
attack, and numerous other arms control measures have been proposed by
senior officials like Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, such as
bans of shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles, laser weapons, anti-
satellite weapons, landmines, and even a proposal to limit the
availability of assault rifles.

As George Will has said of the administration's arms control
philosophy, ``The designation `superstition' fits because the faith of
believers in arms control is more than impervious to evidence, their
faith is strengthened even by evidence that actually refutes it.''
There is enduring wisdom in President Reagan's statement of ``Peace
through strength.''
In 1780, our Nation's first President, George Washington said,
``There is nothing so likely to produce peace as to be well prepared to
meet an enemy.'' Two hundred years later another President, Ronald
Reagan, called this doctrine ``Peace Through Strength.''
I urge Senators to think about the enduring wisdom of these
statements in the coming days as we debate the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty and the negative effects its ratification would have on our
Nation's security.
Let me turn now to a discussion of the CTBT's many flaws.
America's nuclear weapons are the most sophisticated in the world.
This was the point of the letter of the former Secretaries of Defense.
They pointed out that each one typically has thousands of parts, and
over time in nuclear materials and high-explosive triggers in our
weapons deteriorate, and we lack the experience predicting the effect
of these changes.
Some of the materials used in our weapons, like plutonium, enriched
uranium, and tritium, are radioactive materials that decay, and as they
decay they also change the properties of other materials within the
weapon. We lack experience predicting the effects of such aging on the
safety and reliability of our weapons.
We did not design our weapons to last forever. The shelf life of our
weapons was expected to be about 20 years. In the past, we did not
encounter problems with aging weapons, because we were fielding new
designs and older designs were retired. But under the CTBT, we could
not field new designs to replace older weapons, because testing would
be required to develop new designs.
Remanufacturing components of existing weapons that have deteriorated
also poses significant problems. Over time, manufacturing processes
will change, some chemicals previously used in the production of our
weapons have been banned by environmental regulations, and our
documentation of the technical characteristics of older weapons, in
some cases, is incomplete. Furthermore, as James Schlesinger--who
formerly served as Secretary of defense and Secretary of Energy--has
testified to the Senate, the plutonium pits in some of our weapons are
approaching the end of this life-span. According to Dr. Schlesinger,
one of our national laboratories estimates the pits used in some of our
weapons will last 35 years. Since many of the pits used in the current
arsenal are about 30 years old, this means that we will soon need to
replace these pits. But without testing, we will never know if these
replacement parts will work as their predecessors did.
As the former Director of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory,
Dr. John Nuckolls said last month in a letter to me:

Key components of nuclear warheads are ``aging'' by
radioactive decay and chemical decomposition and corrosion.
Periodic remanufacture is necessary, but may copy existing
defects and introduce additional defects. Some of the
remanufactured parts may differ significantly from the
original parts--due to loss of nuclear test validated
personnel who manufactured the original parts, the use of new
material and fabrication processes, and inadequate
specification of original parts. There are significant risks
of reducing stockpile reliability when remanufactured parts
are involved in warhead processes where there are major gaps
in our scientific understanding.

The fact is that, despite our technical expertise, there is much we
still do not understand about our own nuclear weapons. As C. Paul
Robinson, Director of the Sandia National Laboratory has aid, ``some
aspects of nuclear explosive design are still not understood at the
level of physical principles.''
These gaps in our knowledge do not merely present a theoretical
problem. As President Bush noted in a report to Congress in January
1993, ``Of all U.S. nuclear weapons designs fielded since 1958,
approximately one-third have required nuclear testing to resolve
problems arising after deployment.''
Furthermore, in 1987, Lawrence Livermore Lab produced a report titled
``Report to Congress on Stockpile Reliability, Weapon Remanufacture,
and the Role of Nuclear Testing'' in which it extolled the importance
of testing, noting that ``. . . there is no such thing as a `thoroughly
tested' nuclear weapon.'' The report also goes on to state that of the
one-third of weapons designs introduced into the stockpile since 1958
that have required testing to fix, ``In three-fourths of these cases,
the problems were discovered only because of the ongoing nuclear
testing.'' This report went on to say that ``Because we frequently have
difficulty understanding fully the effects of changes particularly
seemingly small changes on the nuclear performance, nuclear testing has
been required to maintain the proper functioning of our nation's
deterrent.''
Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger summed this point up nicely in
1986 when he said:

The irreducible fact is that nuclear testing is essential
to providing for the safety and security of our warheads and
weapons systems. It also is essential if we are to maintain
their reliability. This is not a matter of conjecture, but a
lesson learned through hard experience. For example, in the
case of one nuclear system--the warhead for the Polaris
[SLBM]--testing allowed us to fix defects that were suddenly
discovered. Until corrected, these defects could have
rendered the vast majority of weapons in our sea-based
deterrent completely inoperable.

The importance of testing to the maintenance of any complex weapon or
machine cannot be underestimated. As the six former Secretaries of
Defense noted in this letter opposing the CTBT,

The history of maintaining complex military hardware
without testing demonstrates the pitfalls of such an
approach. Prior to World War II, the Navy's torpedoes had not
been adequately tested because of insufficient funds. It took
nearly two years of war before we fully solved the problems
that caused our torpedoes to routinely pass harmlessly under
the target or to fail to explode on contact. For example, at
the Battle of Midway, the U.S. launched 47 torpedo aircraft,
without damaging a single Japanese ship. If not for our dive
bombers, the U.S. would have lost the crucial naval battle of
the Pacific war.

The Clinton administration has proposed a program that it hopes will
replace actual nuclear tests with computer simulations and a much
greater emphasis on science-based experiments. It is called the
Stockpile Stewardship Program. According to the Fiscal Year 2000
Stockpile Stewardship Plan Executive Overview, released by the
Department of Energy in March this year:

The overall goal of the Stockpile Stewardship program is to
have in place by 2010 . . . the capabilities that are
necessary to provide continuing high confidence in the annual
certification of the stockpile without the necessity for
nuclear testing.

I support the Stockpile Stewardship Program because it will improve
our knowledge about our nuclear weapons. But as former Secretary of
State Henry Kissinger, former National Security Advisor Brent
Scowcroft, and former CIA Director John Deutch said in a letter this
week, ``the fact is that the scientific case simply has not been made
that, over the long term, the United States can ensure the nuclear
stockpile without nuclear testing.''
First, the Stockpile Stewardship Program faces tremendous technical
challenges. As the Director of Sandia National Laboratories, Dr.
Robinson has said, ``the commercially available and

[[Page S12260]]

laboratory technologies of today are inadequate for the stockpile
stewardship tasks we will face in the future. Another hundred-to-
thousand-fold increase in capability from hardware and software
combined will be required.''
Dr. Victor Reis, the architect of the stewardship program, said this
about it during a speech in Albuquerque:

Think about it--we are asked to maintain forever, an
incredibly complex device, no larger than this podium, filed
with exotic, radioactive materials, that must create, albeit
briefly, temperatures and pressures only seen in nature at
the center of stars; do it without an integrating nuclear
test, and without any reduction in extraordinarily high
standards of safety and reliability. And, while you're at it
downsize the industrial complex that supports this enterprise
by a factor of two, and stand up critical new manufacturing
processes.
This within an industrial system that was structured to
turn over new designs every fifteen years, and for which
nuclear explosive testing was the major tool for
demonstrating success.

Senior officials at the Department of Energy and our nuclear labs are
generally careful in how they couch their remarks about the Stockpile
Stewardship Program. They typically state that the stewardship program
is the best approach to maintaining our weapons in the absence of
testing. But they are also careful not to guarantee that, despite the
unquestioned brilliance of the scientists, the Stockpile Stewardship
Program will succeed in replacing testing.
In fact, the Stockpile Stewardship Program has already experienced
setbacks. For example, the National Ignition Facility, which is the
linchpin of the program, has recently fallen behind schedule and is
over budget. It still faces a critical technical uncertainty about a
major goal of its design: will it be able to achieve thermonuclear
ignition?
Another problem with relying on computer simulation to replace
testing is the increased risk of espionage. Former Lawrence Livermore
National Lab Director John Nuckolls made this point in his letter to me
as well: ``Espionage is facilitated when U.S. progress is frozen, and
classified information is being concentrated and organized in
electronic systems.'' In short, in order to achieve the vast increases
in computing power required for the stewardship program, much of the
computer code required for the program will be written by hundreds of
people at participating universities and colleges--in many cases by
people who are not even American citizens.
Mr. President, the bottom line is that a credible nuclear deterrent
is just too important to put all our eggs in the stewardship basket.
In addition to impairing the reliability of our nuclear arsenal, the
CTBT will prevent us from making our nuclear weapons as safe as they
can be. This is extraordinarily important.
Nuclear weapon safety has always been a paramount concern of the
United States. Throughout the history of our nuclear weapons program,
we have made every effort to ensure that even in the most violent of
accidents there would be the minimum chance of a nuclear explosion or
radioactive contamination. The results of such an accident would be
catastrophic.
That's why President Clinton's Secretary of Defense, Bill Cohen,
opposed a test moratorium when he was a Senator. During debate on an
amendment imposing a moratorium on testing, August 3, 1993, then-
Senator Cohen said,

A vote to halt nuclear testing today is a vote to condemn
the American people to live with unsafe nuclear weapons in
their midst for years and years--indeed until nuclear weapons
are eliminated. Not just a few unsafe nuclear weapons, but a
nuclear stockpile in which most of the weapons do not have
critical safety features.

I digress a moment to note when he was asked about this statement
this week, now-Secretary Cohen said, we have replaced those weapons
with weapons in our inventory now that are safe.
I know defense Secretary Cohen would agree, that is not a correct
statement. All of the weapons in our current inventory lack one or more
of the essential safety features that we have been talking about here.
As the Director of Los Alamos National Lab, Dr. Sig Hecker, indicated
in a letter to me in 1997, ``with a CTBT it will not be possible to
make some of the potential safety improvements for greater intrinsic
warhead safety that we considered during the 1990 time frame.'' The
reason is that nuclear tests must be done in many cases to confirm that
once new safety features are incorporated, the weapons are reliable and
still operate as intended. The CTBT makes it pointless to try to invent
new, improved safety features because they could not be adopted without
nuclear testing. Even worse, the CTBT eliminates the possibility of
improving the safety of current weapons through the incorporation of
existing, well understood safety features.
Safety features include items such as insensitive high explosive and
fire resistant pits. Insensitive high explosive in the primary of a
nuclear weapon is intended to prevent the premature detonation of the
high explosive trigger, resulting in a potential nuclear explosion
should the weapon be subjected to unexpected stress, like being dropped
or penetrated by shrapnel or a bullet. Fire resistant pits are intended
to prevent the dispersal of plutonium resulting in radioactive
contamination of an area should the weapon be exposed to a fire, such
as an accidental blaze during loading of a weapon on an aircraft.
Unfortunately, few people know that many of our current weapons do
not contain all the safety features that already have been invented by
our National Laboratories. Only one of the nine weapons in the current
stockpile incorporates all six available safety features. In fact,
three of the weapons in the stockpile--the W78 warhead, which is used
on the Minuteman III ICBM, and the W76 and W88 warheads, which sit atop
missiles carried aboard Trident submarines--incorporate only one of the
six safety features. Another weapon, the W62 warhead, does not have any
of the six safety features incorporated into its design.
The bottom line is that a ban on nuclear testing prevents us from
making our weapons as safe as we know how to make them and creates a
disincentive to making such safety improvements.
Mr. President, another point I think is extraordinarily important as
we debate this CTBT is that the purpose of the treaty cannot be
achieved by its ratification. In addition to undermining our nuclear
deterrent, as I have just spoken to, the treaty will not achieve its
goal of halting nuclear proliferation.
Supporters of the treaty say the United States must lead by example,
and that by halting nuclear tests ourselves, we will persuade others to
follow our example. Yet the history of the last eight years shows this
theory is false. Since the United States halted testing in 1992, India,
Pakistan, Russia, China, and France have all conducted tests.
Furthermore, the CTBT will not establish a new international norm
against nuclear weapons testing or possession. The Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty, the NPT ratified by 185 countries has already
established such a norm. The NPT calls for parties to the treaty, other
than the five declared nuclear powers--the United States, the United
Kingdom, Russia, China, and France--to pledge not to pursue nuclear
weapons programs.
Yet North Korea and Iraq, to name two who are parties to the NPT,
have, of course, violated it. They have pursued nuclear weapons
programs despite their solemn international pledge never to do so. The
CTBT will not add anything useful to the international nonproliferation
regime since these nations, in effect, would be pledging not to test
the nuclear weapons they have already promised never to have under the
NPT. So much for the international norm.
Nor will the CTBT pose a significant impediment to the acquisition of
nuclear weapons by rogue nations since, although nuclear testing is
essential to maintaining the sophisticated nuclear weapons in the U.S.
arsenal today, it is not required to develop relatively simple first-
generation nuclear devices, like those needed or being developed by
Iran and Iraq. For example, the United States bomb dropped on Hiroshima
was never tested, and the Israeli nuclear arsenal has been constructed
without testing.
Incidentally, the Clinton administration does not dispute this point.
In Senate testimony in 1997, CIA Director George Tenet stated:

Nuclear testing is not required for the acquisition of a
basic nuclear weapons capability (i.e. a bulky, first-
generation device

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with high reliability but low efficiency.) Tests using high-
explosive detonations only ([with] no nuclear yield) would
provide reasonable confidence in the performance of a first
generation device. Nuclear testing becomes critical only when
a program moves beyond basic designs to incorporate more
advanced concepts.

I believe Director Tenet is absolutely correct, based on the letter
of the Secretary of Defense that I quoted earlier. We can't afford to
underestimate the weapon described by Director Tenet--a ``bulky, first
generation device with high reliability but low efficiency'' is a lot
like the bomb we dropped on Hiroshima to change world history. It is a
strategic weapon--if North Korea or Iran were able to deploy such a
weapon, they could--to put it mildly--severely reduce our ability to
protect our interests in East Asia or the Persian Gulf. These are
weapons that would be designed to intimidate and kill large numbers of
people in cities, not destroy purely military targets, as the United
States weapons are designed to do.
Another problem with the CTBT is that it is totally unverifiable. It
cannot be verified despite the vast array of expensive sensors and
detection technology being established under the treaty, so it will be
possible for other nations to conduct militarily significant nuclear
testing with little or no risk of detection. Effective verification
requires high confidence that militarily significant cheating will be
detected in a timely manner. The United States cannot now, and will not
in the near future, be able to confidently detect and identify
militarily significant nuclear tests of one kiloton or less by the way,
that is roughly 500 times larger than the blast which destroyed the
Murrah Building in Oklahoma City. We cannot detect a test of that
magnitude.
What is ``militarily significant'' nuclear testing? Definitions of
the term might vary, but I think we'd all agree that any nuclear test
that gives a nation information to maintain its weapons or to develop
newer, more effective weaponry is militarily significant.
In the course of U.S. weapons development, nuclear tests with yields
between 1 kiloton and 10 kilotons have generally been large enough to
provide ``proof'' data on new weapons designs. Other nations might have
weaponry that could be assessed at even lower yields. As we know, crude
but strategically significant weapons, like the bomb we dropped on
Hiroshima, don't need to be tested at all. But for the sake of
argument, let's be conservative and assume that other nations would
also need to conduct tests at a level above 1 kiloton to develop a new
nuclear weapon design.
The verification system of the CTBT is supposed to detect nuclear
blasts above 1 kiloton, so it would seem at first glance that it will
be likely that most cheaters would be caught. But look at the Treaty's
fine print--the CTBT's International Monitoring System will be able to
detect tests of 1 kilotons or more if they are nonevasive. This means
that the cheater will be caught only if he does not try to hide his
nuclear test.
But what if he does want to hide it? What if he conducts his test
evasively?
It is a very simple task for Russia, China, or others to hide their
nuclear tests. One of the best known means of evasion is detonating the
nuclear device in a cavity such as a salt dome or a room mined below
ground. Because it surrounds the explosion with empty space, this
technique--called decoupling--reduces the noise, or the seismic signal,
of the nuclear detonation.
The signal of a decoupled test is so diminished--by as much as a
factor of 70--that it will not be possible to reliably detect it. For
example, a 1,000-ton hidden test would have a signal of a 14-ton open
test. This puts the signal of the illicit test well below the threshold
of detection.
Decoupling is a well-known technique and is technologically simple to
achieve. In fact, it is quite possible that Russia and China have
continued to conduct nuclear testing during the past 7 years, while the
United States has refrained from doing so. They could have done so by
decoupling.
There are also other means of cheating that can circumvent
verification. One is open-ocean testing. A nation could put a device on
a small boat or barge, tow it into the ocean, and detonate it
anonymously. It would be virtually impossible to link the test to the
cheater.
While evasive techniques are expensive and complex, the costs are
relatively low compared to the expense of a nuclear weapons program,
and no more complicated than weapons design. Further, established
nuclear powers are well positioned to conduct clandestine testing to
assure the reliability and undertake at least modest upgrades of their
arsenals. Russia and China do not have good records on compliance with
arms control and nonproliferation commitments. In addition, according
to the Washington Times, United States intelligence agencies believe
China conducted a small underground nuclear test in June and Russia is
believed to have conducted a nuclear test earlier this month. While
neither country has ratified the CTBT, both have signed the treaty and
have promised to adhere to a testing moratorium. Again, so much for the
norm.
The bottom line is that a determined country has several means to
conceal its weapons tests and the CTBT is not effectively verifiable.
Let me stress here that my assessment is not based on opinions. Our
inability to verify a whole range of nuclear testing is well-known and
has been affirmed by the U.S. Intelligence Community. As the Washington
Post reported earlier this week, our intelligence agencies lack the
ability to confidently detect low-yield tests. We would be
irresponsible in the extreme to ratify an unverifiable arms control
treaty--especially when that treaty will inevitably reduce our
confidence in our own nuclear deterrent.
President Clinton's first Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency, James Woolsey, summed up the problems with verification of the
treaty stating in Senate testimony that,

I believe that a zero-yield Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
is extraordinarily difficult, to the point of near
impossibility--and possibly to the point of impossibility--to
verify from afar.

In addition to the negative consequences that would result from
treaty ratification, I would also point out that this accord is very
poorly crafted. The CTBT is weakest at its very foundation--it actually
fails to say what it bans. Nowhere in its 17 articles and 2 annexes are
the terms ``nuclear weapon test explosion'' or ``nuclear explosion''
defined or quantified and these are the terms used in the treaty's
basic obligations.
Acting Under Secretary of State John Holum admitted this point in
responses to questions for the record on June 29 of this year stating:

The U.S. decided at the outset of negotiations not to seek
international agreement on a definition of ``nuclear weapon
test explosion'' in the Treaty text. The course of
negotiations confirmed our judgment that it would have been
extremely difficult, and possibly counterproductive, to
specify in technical terms what is prohibited by the Treaty.

May I read that again:

The course of negotiations confirmed our judgment that it
would have been extremely difficult, and possibly
counterproductive, to specify in technical terms what is
prohibited by the Treaty.

But another nation might choose to apply a less restrictive
definition and conduct very low-yield testing, what we call
hydronuclear testing. While the United States interprets the treaty to
ban all nuclear explosives testing--that is why they call it a zero ban
test--other nations could conduct very low-yield testing, as I said,
which we could not verify but which they would consider in compliance
with the treaty. This so-called hydronuclear testing is very useful to
nuclear weapons programs by helping improve the understanding of
fundamental nuclear weapons physics, develop new weapons concepts,
ascertain existing weapons' reliability, and exercise the skills of
scientists, engineers, and technicians. The nuclear energy released in
a hydronuclear test can be less than the equivalent released by four
pounds of conventional high explosives. This is virtually nothing, and
such a low-yield test would almost certainly escape detection.

This is where the treaty's vagueness is actually harmful to our
interests. Even if we were able to detect it, the nation conducting a
hydronuclear test could simply argue that it was legal under the
treaty. And they would have the historical CTBT negotiating record on
their side. Many drafts of the CTBT

[[Page S12262]]

prior to the Clinton administration allowed for low-yield ``permitted
experiments.''
The verification regime of the CTBT--centered around the
International Monitoring System, or IMS--will not be able to detect
tests with far greater yields than hydronuclear tests. These tests can
be conducted with virtually no risk of detection by either the IMS
system or U.S. technical means.
There is much more to say about this treaty, but I believe I have
outlined the primary reasons why the only prudent course for the Senate
is to reject the CTBT. It will jeopardize rather than enhance our
national security. It will undermine our vital nuclear deterrent by
jeopardizing the reliability of our nuclear stockpile. It will prevent
us from making our weapons as safe as they can be. It will not stop
nuclear proliferation, and it is not verifiable. It is not worthy of
Senate approval.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Gorton). The Senator from Delaware.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I am anxious to respond point by point to
my friend. I suggest, to believe his arguments, as the old saying goes,
requires the suspension of disbelief. I find them to be well intended
but half true. I will be very specific about each one of them,
beginning with this notion of the value of deterrence.
I find it fascinating, my colleagues talk about these other nations
can have a Hiroshima-type bomb and build without testing and that would
radically affect our security; yet we cannot rely in the future on our
certainty of 6,000 sophisticated nuclear weapons in the stockpile. I
urge my friends to read today's New York Times and Washington Post
where our allies are apoplectic about the fact my colleagues are going
to reject this treaty.
The absolute notion that this idea is--don't let them kid you about
this debate, folks, anybody watching this. You do not have to be a
nuclear scientist to understand. You do not have to be a sophisticated
foreign policy specialist to grasp what is at stake.
Think of it this way when they tell you the security of our nuclear
stockpile is going to become so unreliable over time, that, as Dr.
Schlesinger has said and my friend from Arizona has alluded, our
enemies are going to know we do not have confidence in it and that is
going to embolden them, and our allies such as Germany and Japan are
going to go nuclear because they cannot count on us.
That is fascinating. Why did all of our allies sign and ratify this
treaty? Why are they apoplectic about the prospect that we will not
sign this treaty? I ask my colleagues when is the last time they can
remember the Prime Minister of Great Britain or the President of France
saying publicly: My Lord, I hope the Senate doesn't do that.

You cannot have it both ways. This is an argument that I find
absolutely preposterous. Although one can technically make it, it does
require the suspension of disbelief in order to arrive at that
conclusion.
One has to be an incredible pessimist to conclude that the 6,000
nuclear weapons configured in nine different warheads are going to
atrophy after spending $45 billion over the next 10 years, and after
having been able to certify without testing for the last 3 years that
it is in good shape, that some nation is going to say: We got them now,
guys; I know they don't believe their system is adequate; maybe one of
those bombs won't go off, maybe 10 of them, maybe 100 of them, maybe
1,000 of them, maybe 3,000 of them.
We still have 3,000 left. Back when the Senator from Nebraska and I
were kids and Vietnam was kicking up, we used to see bumper stickers:
One atom bomb can ruin your day.
I am going to go into great detail on every point my friend raised
and talk about, for example, the idea we cannot modernize these weapons
when we find a defect; we cannot deal with them without testing.
Dr. Garwin yesterday--one of the most brilliant scientists we have
had, who has been involved in this program since 1950--says, you can
replace the whole physics package without changing.
By the way, I am going to yield to my friend from Pennsylvania.
Names are mentioned here: Dr. Robinson, of Sandia; Victor Reis, the
architect of the program, whom I spent 2\1/2\ hours with the other day.
They do not tell you the end of the sentence. The end of the sentence
is: They both are for this treaty. They both are for this treaty, along
with 32 Nobel laureates in physics. I ask unanimous consent that the
list be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:

A Letter From Physics Nobel Laureates

To Senators of the 106th Congress:
We urge you to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
The United States signed and ratified the Limited Test Ban
Treaty in 1963. In the years since, the nation has played a
leadership role in actions to reduce nuclear risks, including
the Non-Proliferation Treaty extension, the ABM Treaty,
STARTs I and II, and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
negotiations. Fully informed technical studies have concluded
that continued nuclear testing is not required to retain
confidence in the safety, reliability and performance of
nuclear weapons in the United States' stockpile, provided
science and technology programs necessary for stockpile
stewardship are maintained.
The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is central to future
efforts to halt the spread of nuclear weapons. Ratification
of the Treaty will mark an important advance in uniting the
world in an effort to contain and reduce the dangers of
nuclear arms. It is imperative that the CTBT be ratified.

Philip W. Anderson, Princeton University, 1977 Nobel
Prize; Hans A. Bethe, Cornell University, 1967 Nobel
Prize; Nicolaas Bloembergen, Harvard University 1981
Nobel Prize; Owen Chamberlain, UC, Berkeley, 1959 Nobel
Prize; Steven Chu, Stanford University, 1997 Nobel
Prize; Leon N. Cooper, Brown University, 1972 Nobel
Prize; Hans Dehmelt, University of Washington, 1989
Nobel Prize; Bal L. Fitch, Princeton Unversity, 1980
Nobel Prize; Jerome Friedman, MIT, 1990 Nobel Prize;
Donald A. Glaser, UC, Berkeley, 1960 Nobel Prize;
Sheldon Glashow, Harvard University, 1979 Nobel Prize;
Henry W. Kendall, MIT, 1990 Nobel Prize; Leon M.
Lederman, Illinois Institute of Technology, 1988 Nobel
Prize; David M. Lee, Cornell University, 1996 Nobel
Prize; T.D. Lee, Columbia University, 1957 Nobel Prize;
Douglas D. Osheroff, Stanford University 1996 Nobel
Prize;
Arno Penzias, Bell Labs, 1978 Nobel Prize; Martin L.
Perl, Stanford University, 1995 Nobel Prize; William
Phillips, Gaithersburg, 1997 Nobel Prize; Norman F.
Ramsey, Harvard, 1989 Nobel Prize; Robert C.
Richardson, Cornell University, 1996 Nobel Prize;
Burton Richter, Stanford University, 1976 Nobel Prize;
Arthur L. Schawlow, Stanford University, 1981 Nobel
Prize; J. Robert Schrieffer, Florida State University,
1972 Nobel Prize; Mel Schwartz, Columbia University,
1988 Nobel Prize; Clifford G. Shull, MIT, 1994 Nobel
Prize; Joseph H. Taylor, Jr., Princeton University,
1993 Nobel Prize; Daniel C. Tsui, Princeton, 1998 Nobel
Prize; Charles Townes, UC, Berkeley, 1964 Nobel Prize;
Steven Weinberg, Univ. of Texas, Austin, 1979 Nobel
Prize; Robert W. Wilson, Harvard-Smithsonian, 1978
Nobel Prize; Kenneth G. Wilson, Ohio State University,
1982 Nobel Prize.

Mr. BIDEN. Five of the last six Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
are for this treaty, along with people such as Paul Nitze of the Reagan
administration, Stansfield Turner, Charles Curtis, and so on. I ask
unanimous consent that a list of those in support of the treaty be
printed in the Record
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:

Prominent Individuals and National Groups in Support of the CTBT

current chairman and former chairmen of the joint chiefs of staff

General Hugh Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff.
General John Shalikashvili, former Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff.
General Colin Powell, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff.
General David Jones, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff.
Admiral William Crowe, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff.

former members of congress

Senator John C. Danforth.
Senator J. James Exon.
Senator Nancy Kassebaum Baker.
Senator Mark O. Hatfield.
Senator John Glenn.
Representative Bill Green.
Representative Thomas J. Downey.
Representative Michael J. Kopetski.
Representative Anthony C. Beilenson.
Representative Lee H. Hamilton.

directors of the three national laboratories

Dr. John Browne, Director of Los Alamos National
Laboratory.
Dr. Paul Robinson, Director of Sandia National Laboratory.

[[Page S12263]]

Dr. Bruce Tarter, Director of Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory.

other prominent national security officials

Ambassador Paul H. Nitze, arms control negotiator, Reagan
Administration.
Admiral Stansfield Turner, former Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency.
Charles Curtis, former Deputy Secretary of Energy.

other prominent military officers

General Eugene Habiger, former Commander-in-Chief of
Strategic Command.
General John R. Galvin, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.
Admiral Noel Gayler, former Commander, Pacific.
General Charles A. Horner, Commander, Coalition Air Forces,
Desert Storm, former Commander, U.S. Space Command.
General Andrew O'Meara, former Commander U.S. Army Europe.
General Bernard W. Rogers, former Chief of Staff, U.S.
Army; former NATO Supreme Allied Commander.
General William Y. Smith, former Deputy Commander, U.S.
Command, Europe.
Lt. General Julius Becton.
Lt. General John H. Cushman, former Commander, I Corps
(ROK/US) Group (Korea).
Lt. General Robert E. Pursley.
Vice Admiral William L. Read, former Commander, U.S. Navy
Surface Force, Atlantic Command.
Vice Admiral John J. Shanahan, former Director, Center for
Defense Information.
Lt. General George M. Seignious, II, former Director Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency.
Vice Admiral James B. Wilson, former Polaris Submarine
Captain.
Maj. General William F. Burns, JCS Representative, INF
Negotiations, Special Envoy to Russia for Nuclear
Dismantlement.
Rear Admiral Eugene J. Carroll, Jr., Deputy Director,
Center for Defense Information.
Rear Admiral Robert G. James.

other scientific experts

Dr. Hans Bethe, Nobel Laureate, Emeritus Professor of
Physics, Cornell University; Head of the Manhattan Project's
theoretical division.
Dr. Freeman Dyson, Emeritus Professor of Physics, Institute
for Advanced Study, Princeton University.
Dr. Richard Garwin, Senior Fellow for Science and
Technology, Council on Foreign Relations; consultant to
Sandia National Laboratory, former consultant to Los Alamos
National Laboratory.
Dr. Wolfgang K.H. Panofsky, Director Emeritus, Stanford
Linear Accelerator Center, Stanford University.
Dr. Jeremiah D. Sullivan, Professor of Physics, University
of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
Dr. Herbert York, Emeritus Professor of Physics, University
of California, San Diego; founding director of Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory; former Director of Defense
Research and Engineering, Department of Defense.
Dr. Sidney D. Drell, Stanford Linear Accelerator Center,
Stanford University.

Medical and Scientific Organizations

American Association for the Advancement of Science.
American Medical Students Association/Foundation.
American Physical Society.
American Public Health Association.
American Medical Association.

Public Interest Groups

20/20 Vision National Project.
Alliance for Nuclear Accountability.
Alliance for Survival.
Americans for Democratic Action
Arms Control Association.
British American Security Information Council.
Busienss Executives for National Security.
Campaign for America's Future.
Campaign for U.N. Reform.
Center for Defense Information.
Center for War/Peace Studies (New York, NY).
Council for a Livable World.
Council for a Livable World Education Fund.
Council on Economic Priorities.
Defenders of Wildlife.
Demilitarization for Democracy.
Economists Allied for Arms Reduction (ECAAR).
Environmental Defense Fund.
Environmental Working Group.
Federation of American Scientists.
Fourth Freedom Forum.
Friends of the Earth.
Fund for New Priorities in America.
Fund for Peace.
Global Greens, USA.
Global Resource Action Center for the Environment.
Greenpeace, USA.
The Henry L. Stimson Center.
Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies (Saugus, MA).
Institute for Science and International Security.
International Association of Educators for World Peace
(Huntsville, AL).
International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War.
International center.
Izaak Walton League of America.
Lawyers Alliance for World Security.
League of Women Voters of the United States.
Manhattan Project II.
Maryknoll Justice and Peace Office.
National Environmental Coalition of Native Americans
(NECONA).
National Environmental Trust.
National Commission for Economic Conversion and
Disarmament.
Natural Resources Defense Council.
Nuclear Age Peace Foundation.
Nuclear Control Institute.
Nuclear Information & Resource Service.
OMB Watch.
Parliamentarians for Global Action.
Peace Action.
Peace Action Education Fund.
Peace Links.
PeacePAC.
Physicians for Social Responsibility.
Plutonium Challenge.
Popualtion Action Institute.
Population action International.
Psychologists for Social Responsibility.
Public Citizen.
Public Education Center.
Safeworld.
Sierra Club.
Union of Concerned Scientists.
United States Servas, Inc..
Veterans for Peace.
Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation.
Volunteers for Peace, Inc.
War and Peace Foundation.
War Resistors League.
Women Strike for Peace.
Women's Action for New Directions.
Women's Legislators Lobby of WAND.
Women's International League for Peace and Freedom.
World Federalist Association.
Zero Population Growth.

Religious Groups

African Methodist Episcopal Church.
American Baptist Churches, USA.
American Baptist Churches, USA, National Ministries.
American Friends Service Committee.
American Jewish Congress.
American Muslim Council.
Associate General Secretary for Public Policy, National
Council of Churches.
Catholic Conference of Major Superiors of Men's Institutes.
Church Women United.
Coalition for Peace and Justice.
Columbian Fathers' Justice and Peace Office.
Commission for Women, Evangelical Lutheran Church in
America.
Covenant of Unitarian Universalist Pagans.
Christian Church (Disciples of Christ) in the United States
and Canada.
Christian Methodist Episcopal Church.
Church of the Brethren, General Board.
Division of Church in Society, Evangelical Lutheran Church
in America.
Division for Congressional Ministries, Evangelical Lutheran
Church in America.
Eastern Archdiocese, Syrian Orthodox Church of Antioch.
The Episcopal Church.
Episcopal Peace Fellowship, National Executive Council.
Evangelicals for Social Action.
Evangelical Lutheran Church in America.
Fellowship of Reconciliation.
Friends Committee on National Legislation.
Friends United Meeting.
General Board Members, Church of the Brethren.
General Board of Church and Society, United Methodist
Church.
General Conference, Mennonite Church.
General Conference of the Seventh Day Adventist Church.
Jewish Peace Fellowship.
Lutheran Office for Governmental Affairs, Evangelical
Lutheran Church in America.
Mennonite Central Committee.
Mennonite Central Committee, U.S.
Mennonite Church.
Methodists United for Peace with Justice.
Missionaries of Africa.
Mission Investment Fund of the ELCA, Evangelical Lutheran
Church in America.
Moravian Church, Northern Province.
National Council of Churches.
National Council of Churches of Christ in the USA.
National Council of Catholic Women.
National Missionary Baptist Convention of America.
NETWORK: A National Catholic Social Justice Lobby.
New Call to peacemaking.
Office for Church in Society, United Church of Christ.
Orthodox Church in America.
Pax Christi.
Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.).
Presbyterian Peace Fellowship.
Progressive National Baptist Convention, Inc.
Religious Action Center of Reform Judaism.
The Shalom Center.
Sojourners.
Union of American Hebrew Congregations.
United Church of Christ.
United Methodist Church.
United Methodist Council of Bishops.
Unitarian Universalist Association.
Washington Office, Mennonite Central Committee.
Women of the ELCA, Evangelical Lutheran Church in America.

Sources: Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers and Statement
by President Clinton, 7/20/99.

[[Page S12264]]

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, this idea that the stockpile is not going
to be reliable, that you can't--we have thousands of parts, and the
Russians have missiles with bombs with only 100 parts, and that has
some significance. I have said it before.
I will yield now. I used to practice law with a guy named Sidney
Balick--a good trial lawyer. Every time he would start a jury trial, he
would start off by saying: I want you to take a look at my client. I
want you to look at him. They're going to tell you he's not such a good
looking guy. He's not. They're going to tell you you would not want to
invite him home for dinner to meet your daughter. I wouldn't either.
They're going to tell you--and he would go on like that. But he would
say: I want you to keep your eye on the ball. Keep your eye on the
ball. Follow the bouncing ball. Did he kill Cock Robin? That is the
question.
The question is, At the end of the day, if we reject this treaty, are
we better off in terms of our strategic interest and our national
security or are we better off if we accept and ratify the treaty that
all our allies have ratified? Which is better? Keep your eye on the
ball.
I will respond, as I said, in due time to every argument my friend
has made, from ``the safety features argument'' to ``the purpose can't
be achieved'' to ``nations that don't have sophisticated weapons are
going to be able to cheat,'' and so on and so forth. But in the
meantime, out of a matter of comity, which is highly unusual, because I
should do a full-blown opening statement, I will yield to my friend
from Pennsylvania because he has other commitments. Then I will come
back to a point-by-point rebuttal of the statement by my friend from
Arizona.
How much time is the Senator seeking?
Mr. SPECTER. I think I can do it in 20 minutes. It might take a
little longer.
Mr. BIDEN. It can't take any longer. I will yield 20 minutes to the
Senator.